KNOWING, DOING AND THE MORAL MIND:

Development of a Non-Realist and Non-Rationalist Interpretation of the Meaning of Moral Knowing and Its Implications for Moral Education

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Abstract

Modern theories of moral education question the truth of Socrates's belief which involves an idea of positive relationship between 'moral knowing' and 'doing'. As a result, such theories divide moral education between development of moral judgment and character training. However, the division of moral education invites a more puzzling philosophical perplexity such as the denial of a relationship between 'knowing' and 'doing'.

The study proposes a theory of moral education which dissolves the philosophical perplexity, through a linguistic analysis of the words which constitute moral statements and relying on an educational examination of the meaning of 'moral knowing' which is seriously distorted by Socrates's inadequate definitions of the terms 'virtue' and 'knowledge' in his proposition, 'Virtue is knowledge'.

The meaning of the word 'X' in the form of moral statement such as 'X is good', which is primarily fact-denoting, extends for its accompanying meaning beyond that as delimited by Socrates and the realists. Accompanying meanings are moral notions but non-descriptive, though they may be in some cases symbolised roughly by such 'notional words' as 'benevolence' and 'justice'. Contrasting with the statement such as 'Benevolence is good', which constitutes itself with a notional word, the form of 'X is good' will be meaningless unless it is understood with moral notions.

'Knowing' in moral education is not theoretical, having regard to the nature of moral notions. 'Moral notions' embrace both 'knowing' and 'doing'. Therefore, education for the development of 'moral mind' must not be confined to clarification of meanings of words and ratiocination of judgments; it should help pupils to perceive moral qualities in situations where such qualities are deeply embedded and to imagine the world as it should be from the world as it is.
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Chapter 1

Introduction:
Moral Inconsistency
and the Philosophical Perplexities
in Theories of Moral Education

Socrates's proposition 'Virtue is knowledge' lightened the darkness at the beginning of education in ancient Greece but bestowed upon the education many complex views: the negative and the positive. Scepticism about the effects of moral education in fact abounds in analyses of contemporary theories moral education and practices. Amongst the most current commonplaces of the sceptics might be the query raised about the relationship between moral knowing (understanding moral principles) and moral doing. Most obviously, this query seriously challenges many educators' views on the positive relationship between moral knowing and doing; this is so especially for the educators whose beliefs base on 'the intellectualist legend' inherited from the Socrates's proposition. These educators believe that intelligent human performance involves the observance of rules or the rational application of criteria and maintain that the pupil must first go through the internal process of avowing to himself certain moral principles about what is to be done and only then can he execute his performance in accordance with the principles.¹

¹ For the intellectualist legend, see Gilbert Ryle (1949) The Concept of Mind, ch. ii (New York: Barnes & Noble).
Many debates on the relationship between moral knowing and doing have appeared widely and repeatedly, both in the philosophy of education and in ethics where radically different philosophical views on the meaning of 'moral knowing' clash and yield disagreements on the nature of the relationship. Thus some philosophers negate even the possibility of moral knowledge, while others affirm it. Ludwig Wittgenstein and A.J. Ayer, in particular, belong to the former category. Most proponents of this claim are usually classed as 'moral emotivists'. For the moral emotivist, the use of the phrase 'moral propositions' or 'moral knowing' is quite improper in his logic. This account of the language of morals basically sides with the philosophical line which holds the verificationist principle of knowing.

'There can be no ethical propositions'; thus writes Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. Furthermore, in *A Lecture on Ethics* which was probably read to the students' society known as 'The Heretics' in Cambridge in 1929, he concludes:

> Ethics, so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, ... can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any science.

The same contention reappears, in a more intensified form, in Waismann's *Notes on Talk with Wittgenstein*: 'I regard it as very important to put an end to all the chatter about ethics - whether there is knowledge in ethics, whether there are values, whether the Good can be defined, etc'. A similar position, but different in its philosophical grounds and developments, for which the use of the phrase 'moral propositions' is improper, can be seen in moral emotivism. Though A.J. Ayer partly admits in his later work *Freedom and Morality and Other Essays* that certain theories of ethics can be defended, he still excludes such a view as refuted by epistemological and logical analysis, as in the influential chapter 'Critique of Ethics and Theology' in his *Language, Truth and Logic*. He thus asserts that moral judgments are not propositions at all, but ejaculations of feeling.
or commands which attempt to provoke the hearer to act in a certain
way. According to him, no such thing as ethical science exists, if by
ethical science one means the elaboration of a 'true' system of morals.
Ayer argues further that, as moral judgments are mere expressions of
feeling, there can be no way of determining the validity of such
judgments, and, indeed, no sense in asking whether or not such
judgments are true. For the moral emotivist nothing can justify the
view that moral judgments are a 'form of knowledge'.

In complete contrast the moral realist claims the existence of a
distinctive range of moral facts, ie. moral realities which are presented
to us as something independent of our 'feelings' about them. Hence
there is a possibility of awareness of the realist's moral facts. In the
realists' view, moral beliefs, like other beliefs, 'are determined true or
false by the way things are in the world'. Thus the moral realist thinks
of moral beliefs as being cognitive. Moral intellectualism, amongst
other theories, is closely related to this position.

A claim similar to that of the realist view can be found in the
sphere of education. The 'forms of knowledge' theory which Paul H.
Hirst has established includes moral judgments as a unique form of
knowledge. And Hirst dares to use here the phrase 'moral knowledge',
though he makes a modest modification of the phrase in his later
writing, and adopts instead the phrase 'moral awareness'. The theory
accepts moral judgments as having equal status with other forms of
knowledge, for instance, logic, physical science, and social sciences,
and therefore suggests, in its whole context, that moral judgments
satisfy the 'three distinguishing features' which can be apprehended as
the 'conditions of knowledge' in an epistemological analysis.² The
same point emerges in his The Logic of Education (written in
collaboration with Richard S. Peters) thus:

The claim of objectivity in the case of moral judgments is a matter of long-standing

² Paul H. Hirst (1965) Liberal education and the nature of knowledge, in
R.D. Archambault (ed.) Philosophical Analysis and Education, pp.128-31 (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul).
dispute, but the sustained attempts there have been to show the objectivity of morals and its irreducibility to other forms of knowledge, make this domain one which must be recognised as having serious claims to independent status.3

Insofar as he maintains the possibility of moral knowledge Hirst's theory accepts the moral realist's view, though no philosophical demonstration of the possibility of moral knowledge can be found in his account.

However, moral realism can be divided into two different positions when we investigate it in terms of moral motivation. One of the moral realist positions, designated by the term ‘internalism’ or ‘internalist (moral) realism’, holds that having moral beliefs (cognitive morality) itself can be the sufficient condition for providing the moral agents with reasons to act morally.4 This internalist moral realist's type of argument is implicative, because the two elements - moral knowing and moral doing - in the internalist's conditional statement - ‘if one has a moral belief (moral knowing), then one will behave in accordance with the belief (moral doing)’ - have a positive relationship; hence a type of argument $p$: if the antecedent occurs, then the consequent would follow; thus moral knowing implies moral doing; they are harnessed together in this type of argument.5 Therefore, if the teacher follows internalist moral realism, the teacher will necessarily take a cognitive approach in moral education and expect the pupil to behave in accordance with the principle which is taught. This internalist argument exactly corresponds to what the intellectualist presumes.

The other realist position, designated by the term ‘externalism’ or

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5 The official doctrine of the relationship between human mind and body, which hails chiefly from Descartes, shows most clearly this argument. The doctrine assumes that minds influence bodies and vice versa. See Gilbert Ryle (1949) *Descartes' myth*, in idem, *op. cit.* (London: Hutchinson & Co.).
‘externalist (moral) realism’, is quite opposed to the internalist position. The externalist realist holds that having moral beliefs does not correspond with behaving morally; he views having moral beliefs as involving awareness of moral facts, but this view does not necessarily provide moral agents with reason to act. This externalist realist's type of argument is non-implicative, because the two elements - moral knowing and moral doing - are here independent. Thus if we follow the externalist realist claim, then we have a type of argument $q$ - even if the antecedent occurs, the consequent does not necessarily follow. Moral knowing and moral doing in this type of argument are not harnessed together; though they sometimes happen together in contingency. In this position moral knowing does not necessarily imply moral doing.

These two different realist positions stand on the same ground, at least in the point that both claim a positive view of the possibility of moral knowing, as we generally understand moral realism. But the two positions are quite contrary to each other in their different views about the effect of moral knowing upon doing, as aforementioned. From this fact it follows that in the two types of argument $p$ and $q$, the meaning of moral knowing must be construed in a rather different way; in their theoretical contexts these two contrary positions open two alternative ways. Thus a moral realist educator may follow the internalist line that affirms the positive relationship between moral knowing and doing, and conceive the meaning of moral knowing as in association with moral doing, while the other kind of realist educator may follow the externalist line that denies the relationship, and conceive the meaning of moral knowing in a state of dissociation from moral doing.

However, the internalist educator frequently sees his pupils' actions that are inconsistent with their own principles and therefore confronts the scepticism provoked by this inconsistency. In fact such scepticism is much heightened through Gilbert Ryle's investigation of the logic of mental-conduct concepts and especially the seemingly
absurd assumption - if one has a moral belief, then one would behave accordingly - on which both internalism and intellectualism are based. Intellectualism has hailed chiefly from the rationalist view, like Descartes's, that a performance of any sort depends on some anterior intellectual operation of planning what to do. To avoid the sceptic's criticism of internalism, many educators who are in line with externalism compartmentalise morality into two parts - the cognitive and the behavioural - and accordingly suggest two different sorts of moral education. This is clearly illustrated, for example, in Hirst's theory of liberal education and his most recent view on moral education, in R.F. Dearden's theory of primary education, in the philosophy of moral education of W.K. Frankena and in many other claims. The externalist sees the internalist view as a philosophical myth and instead he proposes a dictum which is contrary to the internalist view; ie. moral knowing is one thing and moral doing quite another. Hence the bifurcation of morality: the cognitive and the behavioural. And the bifurcation has not only dichotomised the aim of moral education but also split up the practice of moral education into two parts; education for knowledge about morality and that for moral behaviour.

However, the modern educational theory of cognitive morality has left inescapably perplexing philosophical problems. John Wilson and

*6* The absurdity originates from the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine. "It maintains that there exist both bodies and minds; that there occur physical processes and mental processes; that there mechanical causes of corporeal movements and mental causes of corporeal movements. But the phrase", Gilbert Ryle says further. "'there occur mental processes' does not mean the same sort of thing as 'there occur physical processes'. and, therefore, that it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two." According to Ryle, the dogma is the Cartesian category-mistake. Gilbert Ryle, op. cit., pp. 18-23.

his collaborators endeavour to identify certain cognitive components that constitute moral knowledge, as well as certain other components which should be introduced in moral education for the elevation of moral behaviour, though he puts much emphasis on the cognitive facet of morality, as is illustrated in his work *Introduction to Moral Education* and his new version of the work *A New Introduction to Moral Education.* In this regard, Tasos Kazepides categorises John Wilson as an example of rationalist philosopher of moral education. Thus, they have built a theory of moral education which muddles together the things - the cognitive and the behavioural - that seem to belong to different categories.

However, the most typical version on the dualist position of moral education appears in Hirst's theory. For example, Hirst's theory of

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8 John Wilson and others list the cognitive components of morality, along with the convenient labels for them; concern and respect for persons (including oneself) as being all of equal moral worth (phil), awareness of or insight into other people's feelings (emp), mastery of relevant factual knowledge (gig 1), knowledge of social conventions, knowledge of what helps or harms people, mastery of relevant practical knowledge (gig 2), knowledge of social skills, adoption of a set of moral principles that incorporate 1 to 4 above (dik), ability and power to translate one's moral principles into moral judgments and resolutions (krat 1), ability and power to translate one's moral judgments and resolutions into moral action (krat 2). See J. Wilson, N. William and B. Sugarman (1967) *Introduction to Moral Education,* pp. 192-7 (Penguin); John Wilson (1990) *A New Introduction to Moral Education* (London: Cassell).


10 The moral elements in Hirst's theory, are as follows: procedural knowledge or 'know-how' of the logic of rational moral judgments, procedural knowledge of social skills and roles; propositional knowledge or 'know-that' of the fundamental moral principles; propositional knowledge of the physical world; propositional knowledge of persons, both self and others; propositional knowledge of social institutions and roles; dispositions, conscious and unconscious, to think and judge morally; dispositions, conscious and unconscious, to act in accordance with moral judgments; emotional experiences in keeping with rational moral judgments which facilitate moral action. See Paul H. Hirst (1974) *Moral Education in a Secular Society,* p. 91 (University of London Press).
liberal education manifests two distinctive moralities, similar to the Humean doctrine of a distinction between the faculty of understanding and the active or conative faculty. The aim of moral education in Hirst's theory of liberal education is strictly confined to the education of moral judgments; thus character education, or 'character training', to adopt his own phrase, is entirely excluded from his definition of liberal education and put into the category of 'general education' which is significantly distinct in this theory from liberal education.\textsuperscript{11} Frankena's two-fold moral education - MEX and MEY - also exemplifies a dualistic point of view on moral education; there is handing on a 'knowledge of good and evil' or 'knowing how' to act and there is ensuring that the pupil's conduct will conform to this knowledge.\textsuperscript{12}

Dichotomising the aim of moral education, Hirst and other educational theorists of cognitive morality leave the educators to resolve the problem of moral inconsistency; these theorists consequently make the educational and philosophical perplexities awkward, the perplexities of splitting moral education into two differing jobs and two collateral approaches. The philosophical perplexities seem to have their origins in the ambiguity and vagueness of the meaning of phrases such as 'moral knowing', and the different views of internalism and externalism on the nature of moral knowing and on the effect of moral knowing upon moral doing as well. If this is so, the dissolution of these perplexities might follow from the work

\textsuperscript{11} Paul H. Hirst (1965) \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 114 & 134 where he states: "...though moral understanding has to be pursued in contexts where it is not the only dominant interest, the aim of its pursuit is precisely the same as for all other elements in a liberal education, ...What is wanted (just as in the study of the disciplines \textit{per se}) is, basically, the use of the appropriate concepts, logic and criteria, and the appreciation of the range of understanding in this form." Hirst also clearly distinguishes, on p. 136, liberal education from general education to which 'character training' and 'physical education' are allocated, but other theorists do not clearly distinguish them.

\textsuperscript{12} William K. Frankena (1958) \textit{op. cit.} Frankena divides moral education into two parts; MEX (moral education of judgment) and MEY (moral education of behaviour or character training).
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of clarification of the meaning of moral knowing, particularly in relation to the meaning of moral doing. This is because the ultimate aim of moral education is not restricted to the development of moral judgments. For this purpose much serious attention in this research will first be paid to the critical examination of moral realism, particularly in relation to its positive claim for the possibility of moral knowledge, on which the internalist and the externalist both stand. At the same time, the research will re-establish our conception of the nature of moral knowing in terms of moral education. However, some examination, criticism and adoption of strengths and weakness of moral emotivism and quasi-realism will be paralleled with the re-establishment of our conception of the nature of moral knowing.\(^{13}\)

Even though both the internalist and the externalist share the positive claim of the possibility of moral knowledge, their views on the nature of moral knowing are extremely different since they characterise differently the effect of moral knowing upon moral doing. The internalist realist's claim is very hazy in its justification, as with classical theory such as intellectualism; the internalist, it seems, relies entirely on metaphysical speculations on the relationship between moral knowing and moral doing, whereas the externalist merely relies on empirical observation of the relationship. The presumption implied by moral internalism remains as a purely metaphysical doctrine which thickly veils itself through the use of an unclarified meaning of moral knowing. Relying not on metaphysical doctrine but on logical and linguistic analysis, the research will put much emphasis on the rectification of the assumption implied by the internalist's metaphysical doctrine. However, with the purpose of rectifying the muddled cognitive theory of moral education this research will take a great interest in a critical examination of the externalist's dichotomisation of the aim of moral education. Re-establishment of our conception of the nature of moral knowing,

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aforementioned, seems to open up new vistas for the resolution of the unpromising dichotomisation of the aim of moral education and the bifurcation of the practice of moral education, because the dichotomisation and the bifurcation are thought to have resulted from our misconception of the meaning of moral knowing. Based on a new interpretation of the nature of moral knowing, the research will endeavor to reconcile the dichotomised aim of moral education and the bifurcated practice of moral education.

Different views on the meanings of 'moral knowing' and 'moral doing' yield different claims on the theory and practice of moral education. In *Meno* Socrates argues that it is wrong to try to discuss whether virtue can be taught before discovering first what virtue itself is. Before considering the philosophical and educational perplexities mooted by our different ideas of the relationship between moral knowing and moral doing we must first clarify their meanings. The clarification is necessary to unravel the perplexities caused both by the absurdity of the modern educational theory of cognitive morality based on moral externalism and by the myth that moral internalism implies, since the absurdity and the myth originate chiefly from misconceptions of the meanings of 'moral knowing' and 'moral doing'.
Part I

Ethics, Semantics and the Moral Notions
Words describe things. However, words in moral statements do not always describe things clearly and extensively. Moral attributes related to things elude factual descriptions of words, because of their distinct features — the elusiveness of value components in description and the specific way of their existence which seems to be not in the real facts but in the way of seeing things. Descriptivism and its paragon 'scientism' accordingly fall short of grasping the moral attributes of things in a fuller sense. Based on descriptivism, ethical realism fails to reach the point. The forgotten part in ethics, semantics and [moral] education in particular are all left untouched in realism and therefore it makes a moot point. Words in moral statements do not simply describe things; they are accompanied by added meanings as they are used in a proper way and these added meanings tell us something that is going beyond the factual attributes of things. Accompanying meanings, entitled 'moral notions', have to be conceived as something culturally and traditionally formulated and as something with which we see things. However, some parts of them are ineffable and vague and others even indefinable; thus they constitute 'rough grounds' of the meanings of moral words or of the moral mind which are to be refined or developed through education. Misconceiving this point, the realist ethical theories erroneously postulate the possibility of the descriptivist objectivity; hence such theories, including contemporary ethics and modern theories of moral education, restrict the scope of moral knowing to the descriptivist limitations of moral awareness. Accepting the preposterous point that the mind simply mirrors the appearance of the world, those theories consequently bring forth the disconnection between the mind and the world out there. Things appear to be in our moral consciousness, when and only when they are seen and appreciated through moral notions. Without acquiring moral notions through education and through the cultural experiences in one's examined life, it seems, the pupil would see nothing but the factually describable, and therefore lose from his moral sight the moralities things are accompanied by and the meanings moral discussions carry in depth.
Chapter 2

Moral Realism, Moral Words and the Accompanying Meanings

Realities are found, not generated by mental acts of awareness; moral realities exist independent of our mind in the way other things are in the world, therefore they are to be observed and described. This point of view is, speaking technically, a form of realism. The term 'reality' in realism is used to refer, for instance, to wood, brown, pleasure as such, to each particular 'piece' of wood, 'patch' of brown, 'pulse' of pleasure. Moral realism is a kind of metaphysical thesis about the nature and status of morality and moral opinions. The realist view of morality asserts the existence of moral facts and true moral propositions. Though clear introductory statements of contemporary moral realism are not easy to find and not popular, except for a few excellent defences of realism, the moral realist teacher fundamentally adopts the doctrine that there are mind-independent moral realities which are as much a part of the real world as any other realities and in


moral experience we are genuinely aware of such moral realities.³

If moral realities are assumed to be mind-independent, as is stated above, then it might be supposed that moral realities are something which can be discovered; this means that we can observe and describe the goodness of things or actions in the same way as we see Russell Square and describe it. This realist descriptivism seems prima facie to be acceptable for us provided that there are such moral realities which are independent of us as other things are. However, much uncertainty appears when we pay serious attention to realist descriptivism which implies that moral words can depict moral realities in the same way as other words describe things which are factual, because moral realities are, it seems to me, different in their quality from factual things. Of course, the moral realist might object right away to this query of uncertainty by insisting that a moral word has a compound meaning which means a union of the descriptive and the evaluative, and that an evaluative meaning has its own referent and, therefore, it must be real enough to be describable.⁴ If we accept ex hypothesi this realist's response to the question of uncertainty, together with the descriptivism, we must first admit the realist presumption; However, the realist presumption bears some serious difficulties in the


⁴ For this view, revisit the moral realists' works as follows: John McDowell (1978) ibid; John McDowell (1985) Values and secondary qualities, in Ted Honderich (ed.) Morality and Objectivity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul); S. Lovibond (1983) ibid.
perspectives of epistemology and educational practice. For the presumption some criticisms shall be given in this chapter and follows by the argument that no clear justification could be found for realism. Perhaps for many theorists the presumption may be taken as valid, but there are still more difficult problems which remain to be clarified in the light of linguistic and conceptual analysis and educational contexts in particular. Instead of accepting the claim that moral words have descriptive meaning, the chapter will pay much attention to the manifestation of the difficulties involved in this presumption and introduce one of my key concepts used throughout the thesis, i.e. the 'accompanying meaning' with which the meanings of words in moral statements can be characterised in the ensuing chapter. The final section clarifies more distinctively the meaning of the key concept 'accompanying meaning', developed in the second section, and also introduce an idea of the 'moral notions' which is related, in its generic form, to the concept of accompanying meaning.

2.1 Moral words and the inaptitude of realist descriptivism

According to the realist's descriptivism, words are used to describe things; things are realities; words describe realities, though realities are various in their qualities and kinds. There are, of course, many words, amongst moral words, which are unexceptional from this descriptivist view of the function of words, and so it is especially for the moral realist. For the moral realist the word 'rescuing', for instance, in the statement 'Rescuing (a child's life from drowning) is good' is taken as describing a course of moral action.\(^5\) This is so for

\(^5\) To interpret the nature of the innate sympathetic moral mind which human beings possess, Mencius initially uses the phrase 'rescuing a child's life from drowning' in his theory of human nature, but his own theory does not necessarily belong to moral realism.
other words or phrases which are morally relevant - positively or negatively, ie. the words 'caring' in the statement 'Caring (for aged people) is good', 'promise-keeping' in 'Promise-keeping is good', 'stealing' in 'Stealing money is wrong', etc. Though we usually use these words for evaluation of human conduct as such, these morally relevant words are primarily descriptive in their functions, because they are words which, before all else, denote certain factual events or the actual processes of human behaviours that come into view at certain times and places. This category of word shall be called 'X-word(s)', henceforth.

However, in this case, the things which X-words describe exist in the world, as other real things exist; the things remain as factual things even in the absence of the user of those words. Therefore, ostensive descriptions of facts are possible, as the realist claims, for X-words in the above sense, insofar as we admit both that X-words belong to the category of language which describes factual things and that moral realities truly exist in the way other things do, as the realist's first presumption implies. However, if the realist claims, as an alternative, that referents of evaluative meanings exist there in the same way that the referents of descriptive meanings exist, then the matter becomes worse than ever. This is because he would commit a fallacy of reduction; that is, the error of reduction of values to facts. It must be true to say that the objects of description are not entirely different from the objects of evaluation and, ipso facto, that the evaluative function of X-words necessitates their descriptive function.

Descriptions of the utility or disutility of things also do not necessarily reveal moral qualities in relation to the things. This is one of the weak points of utilitarianism. G.E. Moore also ignores this point, as he argued that the wrongness of 'murder' is explained basically in terms of the fact of disutility or that murder's becoming a common practice would promote a general feeling of insecurity." G.E. Moore (1959) Principia Ethica, p. 156 (Cambridge University Press), where he states: '...one action is generally better than another as a means, provided
This explanation does not clearly reveal what kind of value entity exists exactly in the fact of ‘murder’, except showing clearly how the fact influences the society badly. Evaluation requires something more than the objects of description; such as, for example, criteria of evaluation which are deemed, in a logical sense, not to be inside the category of purely descriptive meanings. And even if the evaluative function of X-words requires their descriptive function, there may yet be some possibility of making some exact distinctions between these two sorts of function; the evaluative meaning of an X-word is not descriptive, in its logic. R.M. Hare, too, makes a distinction between the descriptive and evaluative meaning, which a single term may have in a certain context, though he mentions that ‘the descriptive and evaluative meaning of a term in a given context may be tied to it with varying degrees of tightness’.  

Some descriptivists may object to this argument by insisting that descriptive and evaluative meanings are shared by X-words in their intrinsic sense, therefore not separately existent. However, the word ‘rescuing’, in the literal sense of the word, primarily refers to a particular factual event which happened perhaps in one afternoon, as is shown by the fact that the word is used in a report of a particular incident and though it would still be true to say that a certain particular emotive response occurs when we see that incident. The word picks out a particular activity or process. Therefore, even if we admit that a certain particular emotive response occurs when we see a certain incident, asking what kind or amount of emotive response occurs when we see the incident or use an X-word which denotes that certain other circumstances are given. We do, as a matter of fact, only observe its good effects under certain circumstances; and it may be easily seen that a sufficient change in these would render doubtful what seem the most universally certain of general rules. Thus, the general disutility of murder can only be proved, provided the majority of the human race will certainly persist in existing’. (Italics mine). See, also, R.E. Ewin (1981) Co-operation and Human Values: A Study of Moral Reasoning, p. 100 (Sussex: The Harvester Press).

incident is in a logical sense one thing and asking whether or not the referents of evaluation of the fact exist in a factual sense is quite another. Description logically requires factual things and in this case there might be nothing else in a strict sense than just describing or reporting a certain event that happened this afternoon. If this is the case, it would be valid to ask which is the referent of descriptive meaning of the word ‘rescuing’, because the word has its own stark factual denotation; but it would be quite absurd to ask the same question of the referent of evaluative meaning of the same word, because evaluation is not of description in its essential sense.

The moral emotivist and the quasi-realist both deny the realist's claim of the independence of moral realities. This is precisely because they both understand moral expressions as ejaculations of feelings or prescriptions of moral standards or projections of our moral attitudes onto the world. At the base of these claims exists a basic idea of emotivism: our values are not in the real world; an untendentious description of the world would not mention any values; our values are not the objects we see with our physical eyes, but are to be ejaculated or projected onto the world; they are something with which we feel something happening there in the factual world. According to the philosophers who propose such an idea, moral attitudes are not presented to us as something independent of our moral beliefs; they are not outside our mind, therefore they are not the thing of discovering, as they were.

For the emotivist and the quasi-realist these attitudes and feelings are something we create in experiencing the world, not the properties of the world per se which are naturally appearing without bearings on our peculiar way of seeing. The realist descriptivism cannot stand


on this sense of emotivism. Hence the difficulty of the independency claim of moral realities. This emotivist idea, as a result of linguistic analysis, is quite different from the realist's metaphysical speculation.

To reiterate, the realist's descriptivism might be appropriate just for the factual world whose referents are clear enough and tangible. Nonetheless, if someone, perhaps the realist teacher, claims the describability of moral realities in education, this would hardly be acceptable for two reasons. First, it is not entirely possible to suppose that moral realities or values exist independent of the pupil. Secondly, even if we grant pro tempore the independence of moral realities, they would essentially elude the circumscription of moral words, as the moral emotivist properly understands.

Description presupposes certain kinds of observation, and the moral realist claims that moral realities are observable. According to moral realism, our experience of the world involves experience of moral values and we see, for instance, 'the goodness of the rescue of a child's life from drowning' in the same way as we see the beauty of Oxford spires. For the moral realist, then, Hume's confident assertions about the unobservability of beauty may be taken as breathtakingly counter-intuitive. Observing necessitates objects, but objects of seeing are various in kind. Certain objects of seeing are factual things, as are those relevant to scientific observations and measurements, and certain others non-factual. The objects of the former class belong to 'the world as it is independent of our mind', ie. the impersonal cosmos, but those of the latter 'the world as it seems to us'. Therefore, seeing in the former class requires both our physical and conceptual eyes, even if the physical seeing, the seeing visual impressions of objects which are physically reflected on our retinae, is not always necessary for seeing such objects. On the contrary, the seeing in the latter class requires only conceptual 'eyes'; thus much incommensurability exists

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between these two classes of objects of seeing.

The realist's definition of moral observation is very vague and uncertain, especially as he asserts that one observes moral realities as one sees other things in the world. Certainly, X-words are observational vocabulary, so we can describe properly our observations with these words, as is assumed by the realist. They pick out some specific type of activity; they have meaning on model of names, amongst others, which are associated with some typical referents. But it is quite uncertain that X-words delineates moral realities which are seemingly beyond their descriptive or typical referents; once we attempt to describe what we observe, then the moral realities, if any, will easily be elided from the description, just because they are different from the descriptive referents in their qualities as aforementioned. The realist ignores and depreciates more often than not the difference between the descriptive meanings and the supposed evaluative meanings of X-words. However, the thing which is so much the worse, related to this matter, is that many people confuse the difference between the two. For instance, the confusion arises in Yang-ming's theory. Yang-ming (the 16th century Chinese neo-Confucian) confuses the meaning of seeing moral realities with that of seeing other things in the world, especially as he explains the positive relationship between knowing and doing: one delights in (doing) simultaneously as one sees (knowing) a red flower; likewise if one knows a certain moral principle, one behaves morally in accordance with the principle. There is certainly no difference, in this case, between the meaning of seeing a red flower and that of seeing moral goodness. But, according to Toegeh (the 16th century Korean neo-Confucian), seeing moral goodness is fundamentally different from seeing a red flower.¹¹

The meanings of seeing and delighting in the moral domain must be interpreted in a significantly different way from that of the world.

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of flowers and colours. There must be some people who cannot see moral goodness even when they see certain human behaviours in which moral goodness is explicitly or implicitly expressed. Certainly, every man who has normal sight would see such human behaviours and the red flowers in the flower bed. Colours and human behaviours are sensible by our physical eyes; they are simple and concrete objects of seeing. The seeing in this case takes place according to physical laws. However, moral goodness is invisible within the physical laws; value is not crudely ‘there’, according to the physical laws, because value is not a physical property; it must be seen in a fundamentally different way from the seeing of physical things. ‘Though there is a certain givenness about the natural world, it is not simply there to see; for what we see depends not only on our interests but also on the concepts and theories which structure our perceptions.’ Moral seeing is the seeing certain principles which guide human behaviours in certain direction, but these principles are not simple and concrete objects of seeing. The seeing happens with certain other specific epistemological devices.

The moral realist may still insist that ‘there is no difference in kind between the moral case and others’, i.e. between the moral properties and the non-moral properties. For the moral realist, in this sense, there might not be any difference between seeing non-moral properties and seeing moral properties. This is the very point that makes the realist eye opaque. It seems that the realist fails to see what is meant by ‘moral seeing’ and, as a result, the point that moral seeing and factual seeing are not one and the same thing. Moral seeing is not of a factual observation, though the former requires the latter for a perfect seeing: it is a kind of seeing which is, as it were, about the intuition of values or principles involved in or expressed by human behaviour morally relevant. But the point to make is that such values are not the same things which are describable in a factual sense. The

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realist descriptivism bypasses this point. For this reason, many difficulties over this realist matter lead us back again to the long-standing debate on the value-fact problem.

Non obstante, the moral realist denies the possibility of that sharp and significant distinction between fact and value which is the hallmark of his opponent's position, i.e. the hallmark of the Humean declaration on the matter of fact and value. Hume famously held that 'morality ... consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discovered by the understanding'. If the moral realist rejects the fact-value distinction and thereby claims a union of fact and value as he now suggests, then the realist's observation of the world would necessarily include both fact and value, as the cardinal presumption of moral realism suggests: there are moral realities to which one can be genuinely sensitive in the same way as to other things. And, from this realist's unjustified belief comes the realist's second presumption: evaluative meanings are conceptually shared by moral words.

Some possibility of a union of fact and value is alleged by many philosophers, but the conceptual distinction between the thing which is moral and the thing which is non-moral is still both significant and meaningful. A fortiori, the distinction between value and fact is logically possible, whereas the union of value and fact remains as having a much more difficult logical problem. Insofar as there is a logical difference between value and fact, the meaning of the observation of moral properties and that of observation of non-moral properties must be distinguished. Moral realities seem to be human constructions, not things which are to be discovered by human beings.  

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15 A very similar point to this assertion can be found in J.L. Mackie (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin).
way other things are - is tenable, then the describability of the moral realities might also be probable. But the first presumption meets with some logically crucial problems, as mentioned thus far, and, therefore, cannot be perfectly sustainable.

The realist's descriptivism causes much confusion because of its referential opacity. Language describes the world, but once the world is described by language it loses much of its concreteness. For example, many other concrete attributes of a flower are not captured by the word 'flower'. By X-words we may describe more or less correctly someone else's morally relevant behaviour, but the description in the case is logically limited to the factual attributes of the behaviour and thus loses many other extended meanings of the words, the extended meanings, amongst others, which are to be used for moral expressions and to be attentive by the teacher, but unable to be described in such a way as the realist descriptivism puts forward.

2.2 Moral words, accompanying meanings and the non-realist point of view

Someone may be inclined to say that words are created to describe things as they are and in this sense the value of words may depend on their capacity to describe things. For some people this claim may appear to be a truism, especially for the teacher who is strongly influenced by the realist descriptivist's reference theory. However, it is not always the case; there are many states-of-affairs around the teacher which are unable to be described clearly by words, and so is this for moral realities, if we assume ex hypothesi that moral realities are in the same way that states-of-affairs are. But moral realities are likely to be elusive, in their essential nature, whenever the teacher tries to describe them with words.

Many words carry factual or propositional information. A piece of information is factual if it purports to describe a certain state-of-
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affairs; this is so for a word employed in that piece of information. However, this is but one of the characteristics of language. X-words are not always employed for the function of factual information; they also serve for the expression of their extended meanings, i.e. human attitudes and feelings onto humanist moral prosperity. In fact, many words carry these non-factual qualities of human desires, if they are used properly in a particular way. For instance, the X-word ‘rescue’ is used to describe a human act of delivering someone else from a situation of danger, restraint, or violence, as is expressed in a reportage as the phrase ‘three rescues from drowning in one afternoon’. The term ‘rescue’ in this description is used almost purely in a factual sense, and the meaning of which consists of factual properties. However, its meaning extends further, if we use the word in other ways; it goes beyond the pure description of the fact. The extensionality of the meaning of the word might be much more clearly apprehensible in the following four exemplary phrases: i) rescuing a man’s name from oblivion, ii) rescuing a man from captivity, iii) rescuing a drunkard, iv) rescuing a child from drowning. One extreme use of the word ‘rescuing’ is morally neutral, as the example i) properly shows, but the other extreme like iv) is quite different; it not only describes a certain human affair, but also carries with it above all a certain particular meaning which is morally relevant, only if one sees the affair appropriately with moral perspectives.

The same claim can immediately apply to other X-words. For instance, the word ‘kicks’ in the statement ‘S kicks a ball’ (briefly ‘S-statement’, henceforth) depicts a fact of S’s behaviour. ‘Kicking’ is a factual behaviour; it is a purely behavioural term. However, once the same word is used in the statement, for example, ‘T kicks a boy’ (briefly ‘T-statement’) it simultaneously carries with it a distinctive evaluative or extended meaning and induces our emotional or moral responses to T’s behaviour. T’s kicking has much to do with moral deliberations, whereas S’s kicking has nothing to do with them, because the meaning of S’s kicking is nothing more than descriptive.
Therefore, ‘kicking’ is not always value-neutral; it, more often than not, carries a meaning which is morally relevant, especially when it is used in a whole context of the statement, to borrow Fodor's term, in a ‘meaning holism’.

However, the point to note here is that this conception of the extensionality of the meaning of the word is not what the realist means; it is beyond the realist description of morality, because the extended meanings are not altogether of descriptions of thing morally relevant. Thus the extended meaning does not advocate the realist's presumption. Referents of descriptive meanings of X-words might be clearly there in the way other things are in the real world, as the realist tenet pronounces solemnly. Thus the behaviour of, for instance, ‘kicking’ can be seen palpably by both the pupil's physical and cognitive eyes. However, the same talk does not cogently and properly proceed without any epistemological hazard in the case of ‘extended meaning’. This is precisely because it is absurd to suppose both that there are referents of extended meanings and that referents of extended meanings, if any, exist exactly in the same way as those of descriptive meanings.

The nature of extended meanings is in principle not that of denotation; it would be safer to say that, following the emotivist account, the extended meaning of a word is to express the pupil's attitudes towards something encountered; it is not to describe things. Thus the nature of extended meaning is logically impossible to be explained in terms of referential properties. In this sense, at least, the emotivist account of the nature of evaluative meaning shares with this view of extended meanings of words in part; in part it is because the emotivist tends to explain the nature of evaluative meaning in terms of attitudinal projection.

Extended meaning, at least as we use this phrase in a moral or an ethical context as is the case of T-statement, it seems, cannot be

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explained validly in terms of referential properties; it would be much more properly be explained in the sense of having something additional or, more clearly, carrying some moral criteria with which the pupil sees certain human behaviours as morally relevant. Of course, the extended meaning defined thus presupposes descriptive elements involved in things, for which the pupil appraises as ‘morally good or bad’; without such presupposed facts extended meanings human moral aspirations bestow are nothing else but fanciful drawings. But the most important point is that such criteria, carried with the pupil's seeing of certain human behaviours as morally relevant, are not at all the things per se which are descriptive. They are the pupil's moral beliefs with which the pupil sees things; ie. with which the pupil evaluates things (activities) in moral terms.

Contrary to the realist's presumption, extended meanings are not conceptually shared by X-words. In fact, the most important thing to be noticed here is that the word ‘kicking’ is primarily a descriptive word whatever way it may be used, as is seen clearly in both S and T-statements. In this logical analysis of X-words, one can detect the echo of David Hume's famous rhetoric:

But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In whichever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in this case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action ... Vice and virtue ... are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind.17

Certainly ‘kicks’ in S-statement and also that in T-statement are used in different ways; the former can be used for a pure description of S's behaviour, but the latter cannot be used just for the same purpose; it of

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course carries with it some extended meaning, and expresses the speaker's attitudes to T's behaviour. 'Kicking' is a word with many distinctive meanings, and this is so for other words. Regarding this point, it seems not too difficult to make a logical distinction between the two meanings of X-words, i.e. the 'primary or descriptive meaning' and the 'extended meaning'.

A very similar distinction between the meanings implied by morally relevant words can be seen if one pays a little attention to R.M. Hare's argument that the meanings of the words such as 'rude', 'courageous', 'honest', 'industrious', 'humble',...are all primarily descriptive and secondarily evaluative. However, Hare's point in this description admits that evaluative meanings are inherent to such words; they are explained in his theory not as something carried whenever the words are used in moral terms, and consequently not as something which are varying according to its contextual use. This all means that in Hare's conception both the evaluative and descriptive meanings are conceptually shared by the morally relevant words; therefore, his conception of the nature of 'evaluative meanings', at least only in this concern, is not far away from the implication represented by the realist's presumption. And for this reason the idea of extended meanings disagrees with Hare's 'evaluative meanings'.

Certainly, the X-word 'rude', for instance, carries some evaluative meanings in the emotivist sense and it induces the hearer to have certain attitudes of disapproval upon the denotatum of the word when it is spoken in a specific context; and, other things being equal, we would be inclined to avoid the behaviour the X-word 'rude' denotes. This view suggests that the word 'rude' carries some evaluative meaning which is distinct in its logic from the descriptive meaning of the word. But the important point is that the evaluative meaning is not

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necessarily connected logically with the descriptive meaning of the word.

The effect of the evaluative meaning is varied certainly by the context in which the word 'rude' is used. In a specific context the effect of evaluative meaning does not altogether happen, especially when the word is used in the 'inverted comma sense'. Indeed, the word 'rude' is useful for a variety of contexts; the 'rudely' in the statement 'it is a rudely fashioned craft' is used in an aesthetical way; the word 'rude' in the statement 'it is rude to point at people' in a moral sense, and the same word in the sentence 'keep the yard in its rude state' in a natural or geographical sense. The word 'rude' shows different meanings according to its different contextual uses. Therefore, it must be said that the evaluative meaning the word 'rude' carries is not inherent to the very word.

Nonetheless, some philosophers assert that 'the evaluative meaning' of 'rude' is inherent in the very word. R.M. Hare explains the nature of evaluative meanings as something inherent in the function of morally relevant words, though he is not a realist in categorisation. Bernard Williams made a claim which is very similar to that of Hare, but in a very limited concern. For him the fact-value distinction, or the 'descriptive-evaluative distinction', is illegitimate; the word 'rude' is a 'thick term', as he calls it, and it means that evaluative meaning is conjoined to the descriptive meaning of the word. No clear distinction of meaning is possible between the descriptive and the evaluative in the use of the word, according to Williams.  

Philippa Foot's claim is also very close to the Harean argument, especially when she maintains that the meanings of 'rude' are essentially blended and that 'there is something else to be said about the word 'rude'' besides the fact that it expresses, fairly mild, condemnation; it can only be used where

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certain *descriptions* apply.\(^{20}\)

Of course, we now no longer call into question of the immorality of slavery, for it has already moved away from a topic of debate to get the universal agreement. It stands as universal, regardless of what any particular person or specific people may happen to say in a slightly different way. This means that in the use of the word 'slavery' the descriptive and the evaluative are blended. The same is also the case for the X-word 'murder'; if there is someone who is still discussing the morality of murder, he must be a man who was not born into any culture on this planet. Evaluative meaning is 'inherent', to adopt a Harean term, to the X-word 'murder'.

However, even if we accept this supposition *pro tempore*, this insight does not necessarily lead us to negate the possibility of the logical distinction between the descriptive meanings and evaluative meanings of the words. What is more, there are many X-words in making and existing to which evaluative meanings are not always inherent, as we see it in the case of 'kicking'; these words carry such meanings, it seems to me, if they are used in a specific contexts. Nevertheless, if one maintains that the word 'kicking' always carries evaluative meanings, his assertion would then be lead to a shallow argument in that his claim did not actually consider seriously the varying or contextual meanings of words. 'Inherent' implies some state of fact in which certain factors always exist and invariable. But evaluative meanings of words are not always apparent in the use of words and thereupon variable.

One meaning is, I think, logically distinguishable from the other, as Foot puts it: 'Either thinking something rude is not to be described

\(^{20}\) Philippa Foot (1978) *Virtues and Vices*, p.102 (Oxford: Clarendon Press), where she states: If 'attitudes' were solely a matter of reactions such as wrinkling the nose. and tendencies to such things as making ... scolding, then thinking something rude would not be describable solely in terms of attitudes. (Italics mine) The same argument can be found in the same author's (1967) Moral beliefs, in: Philippa Foot (ed.) *Theories of Ethics* (Oxford University Press). However, in this paper she takes the concept 'courage' for an exemplary word.
in terms of attitudes, or attitudes are not to be described in terms of such things.²¹ It seems to me that the moral realist confuses this point; to evaluate something, the pupil needs to know first about the descriptive elements that construct the very nature of the thing. But the descriptive elements themselves say nothing about evaluation and vice versa. The word 'rude' is used, in general, for an evaluative function - variously identified as expressing feelings, inducing attitudes and even commending certain behaviours. However, the point is that the word with evaluative meaning must not be taken as a purely evaluative term and that the evaluative meaning is not inherent in the word.

It can still be maintained that an evaluative meaning is not logically connected to the factual or descriptive meaning. 'Rude' can be used in a purely descriptive or 'inverted comma sense'; 'rude' is not always used for one and only purpose of evaluation of something. Wittgenstein's 'picture theory of meaning' well illustrates this point by revealing the dissimilarities between the descriptive meaning and the evaluative meaning of such words as 'rude'. Ostensive teaching of a word can be said 'to establish an association between the word and the thing'.²² In this case one very likely thinks first of all that a picture of the thing comes into the pupil's mind when the pupil hears the word. But the picture appearing in the pupil's mind might well be represented only in a factual or descriptive sense; it is therefore very difficult to suppose that the picture represents, immediately or at the same time, even value elements which are supposed by the moral realist to be involved in the meaning of the word. There may be some cases in which such evaluative meanings clearly appear, but this only happens when the word, for instance, 'rude' is used in a specific way and by the pupil who sees things with some specific mind.

Bruce Brower clearly distinguishes evaluative meaning from

²¹ Ibid. p. 103 (1978).

descriptive meaning when he says:

Lying is usually of negative value; but the value is not included in the concept of lying. Similarly, kicking others is usually of negative value; but the concept of kicking others is not evaluative". 23

There are some significant differences between the meaning of ‘lying’ when the word is used emotively and its meaning when used descriptively. In the same way the meanings of ‘rude’ and that of ‘kicking’ in one sense are not identical with those of ‘rude’ and ‘kicking’ in the other sense. In one sense they are primarily and purely descriptive, in the other sense they are evaluative, but not primary. Evaluative meanings are not logically inherent in the concepts of words morally relevant; they would be rather something which is accompanying when the pupil uses the words in moral terms or sees things with a moral eye. In this sense they might be said to be ‘additional’ to the concepts of words. For this reason, I shall prefer henceforth the phrase ‘accompanying meaning(s)’ to ‘evaluative meaning(s)’ for the denomination of that meaning more distinctively. And this idea is clearly opposed to the realist's presumption.

In T-statement, as it were, the word ‘kicks’ is accompanied by some logically distinctive meaning which is added to the descriptive; this is so particularly as we see the meaning of the word in a given specific context of the statement. Certainly many other words or phrases belonging to the category of X-word can be characterised in the same way as the word ‘kicks’. The pupil sees racial discrimination with a negative attitude; thus the pupil believes that racist sentiments will be unequivocally condemned, that racist actions should be outlawed, and that racism must never become respectable. However, these attitudes should not be confused with descriptive meanings of the phrase ‘racial discrimination’; they might be some moral standards with which the pupil sees things and evaluates them in moral terms.

The pupil can, of course, give a clear descriptive meaning to the phrase without any reference to such beliefs. But this does not necessarily mean again that these beliefs are nothing to do with the inverted comma sense of the phrase 'racial discrimination'. On the contrary, wherever the pupil uses the phrase in moral terms such beliefs or evaluations are always involved. If it were not for such a function of expression of the phrase, the meaning of the phrase would be too barren.

The idea of the accompanying meanings of X-words which is introduced thus far shows a specific logic of moral language and opens a new vista for the conceptualisation of *moral knowing* in a way which is quite different from the realist's and accordingly from both the internalist and the externalist moral theorists. Thus the idea is fundamentally different from the realist's presumption in that it is not in agreement with the realist descriptivism of moral realities and in that moral values are by no means shared logically, with the purely descriptive meanings, by X-words. Moral values do not exist in the world outside our minds, independently of our experience of them; they are not to be described factually and discovered in that way; they are things, to recapitulate, which *accompany* the words when we use them properly in terms of morals.

### 2.3 Accompanying meanings and the moral notions

Moral words carry in themselves some emotive meanings, according to one line of moral emotivism, which are to be thought of as sheer ejaculations of our feelings, as in A.J. Ayer's first account.\(^{24}\) According to another line of emotivism, the emotive meanings refer to the moral realities which are assumed to be cognizant, as is claimed in

part by Hare and Charles Stevenson. Both of these lines are the roots of quasi-realism. Quasi-realism, the most recently developed theory of value, seems to be partly opposed in its arguments to the realist view of the mind-independent existence of moral realities. In this respect, the idea of accompanying meanings can be taken as something which is akin to quasi-realism.

Quasi-realism is an attempt to escape the weakness of classical emotivism which fundamentally denies the objectivity of moral realities, as we find the claim in emotivism as a point d'appui. Thus for quasi-realism moral realities are something which exist at a time when we project our moral attitudes onto the human affairs concerned and are interwoven into the fabric of our experience of the world. Thus moral realities in quasi-realism are to be thought of as something we create, not discover, in perceiving the world; they are something appearing in the process of our awareness of the world, but are not intrinsic properties of the world per se. For the quasi-realist, moral realities are not genuine properties of the world; they are certain specific aspects of our experiences: thus not mind-independent. In this

25 For the interpretation of cognitive elements in moral emotivism, see Charles L. Stevenson (1944) *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press). There he says: 'The growth of emotive and descriptive dispositions in language does not represent two isolated processes. There is a continual interplay'. (ibid., p. 71) It may happen that ...a word acquires a laudatory emotive meaning partly because it refers, via its descriptive meaning, to something which people favour. And in other place he also says: 'a sign's descriptive meaning is its disposition to produce cognitive mental processes, where 'cognitive' is to be taken as a general term designating such specific kinds of mental activity as believing, thinking, supposing, presuming and so on'. (ibid., p. 62) This means that emotive meaning is not altogether the will-o’-the-wisp, as someone may think, as far as it is not separated from descriptive meaning. His claim goes further: 'But this answer is far from a full solution; it is merely a step toward envisaging the broader problem with which meaning-theory must inevitably deal the nature of cognition'. (ibid.)

26 Quasi-realism is a newly developed form of moral emotivism. Actually there have been many transmutations of moral emotivism, from A.J. Ayer to Simon Blackburn, the most recent emotivist in categorisation of the schools of ethics. See, Simon Blackburn (1993) *op. cit.*

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respect, Simon Blackburn denies, as his primordial form of quasi-realism interprets, the realist claim of the existence of mind-independent moral realities.\(^{28}\)

What is more, quasi-realism significantly distinguishes the attitudes assumed to be projected, as words are in use, onto human affairs from the realist's referential meanings of words which involve, as the realist claims, moral realities; it sees attitudes, as it were, as being not logically involved in those referential meanings. Contrary to the realist, Blackburn does not attempt to apply the mind-independence model of ontology of value in the interpretation of the features of moral realities.\(^{29}\) In this point of view, quasi-realism is very close to the idea of accompanying meaning of X-words: both theories do not see moral experience as a matter of discovering something which exists independently of us; they picture moral realities as something the pupil places on things.\(^{30}\) So there are some similarities between quasi-realism and the idea of accompanying meanings.

However, some dissimilarities also appear between quasi-realism and the idea of accompanying meanings especially when quasi-realism is applied into the account of the nature of morality. Blackburn's projectivism, the sub-theory of his quasi-realism, interprets the function of moral words as expressing attitudes or feelings; the speaker projects, with the words, his own attitudes onto the things concerned. This projectivist interpretation goes with Austin's idea of

\(^{28}\) The realist claim that there is a mind-independent moral reality might be epitomised as follows: 'The real world is thought of as what is there anyway, irrespective of what we may happen to believe about it. It sets the independent standard to which our beliefs must conform if they are to be true. What is real is independent of our minds'. And the moral realist accepts, without any modification, this realist tenet, thus: Moral value 'exists out there in the world, independently of our experience of it', or, to say, mind-independently, 'waiting to be encountered'. This epitome of realism is adopted mainly from N. McNaughton (1988) *op. cit.*, p. 94.


the perlocutionary function of language.\textsuperscript{31} Certainly we often express our feelings or attitudes with words or sentences and there is in fact a certain sort of word or sentence which performs this kind of function. We use words or sentences very often with exclamation marks to express specific feelings, to project our attitudes, and to induce other persons' behaviour. If Blackburn's projectivism includes even this kind of language use in its theoretical components, it would confuse moral meanings with some psychological meanings language may convey in its use and, for this very reason, make a mistake in interpretation of the moral meaning of words by replacing it instead with psychological interpretation of language.

The concept 'attitude' was first introduced by the protagonist of emotivism, Charles Stevenson, to interpret the nature of moral judgments. According to him, moral judgments are expressions of the speaker's attitudes.\textsuperscript{32} Attitudes are of course involved in the expressions both of personal preference and of moral evaluation, especially in using the evaluative word 'good'. Emotivism and quasi-realism do not take account for X-words in their theoretical systems. However, the emotivist, including Blackburn, does not make any clear distinction between these two kinds of expression. Emotivism has not yet identified and characterised clearly the nature of attitudes and their origin. About this responsibility, proponents of the emotive theory are silent and accordingly fail to avoid an empty circularity in resolving the matter, as Alasdair MacIntyre indicates.\textsuperscript{33}

Insofar as attitudes are concerned, the emotivist may see something

\textsuperscript{31} For the perlocutionary act, see J.L. Austin (1962) \textit{How to Do Things with Words}, Lecture VIII (Harvard University Press).

\textsuperscript{32} Charles L. Stevenson (1944) \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 21-2.

\textsuperscript{33} Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) \textit{After Virtue}, p. 12 (London: Duckworth). There he says: 'Moral judgments express feelings or attitudes', it is said. 'What kind of feelings or attitudes?' we ask. 'Feelings or attitudes of approval', is the reply. 'What kind of approval?' we ask, perhaps remarking that approval is of many kinds ...identifying the relevant kind of approval as moral approval ...becomes vacuously circular.
which the pupil ought to do and at the same time he may be inclined to
do something else; hence the two opposing cases are compatible in
emotivism; one is for moral obligation and the other for psychological
fact. This compatibility comes directly, it seems to me, from the
emotivist's insufficient distinction between the meanings of moral
attitudes or feelings and those of the psychological features of them. In
whatever way the projectivist uses the words 'attitudes' and 'feelings'
and interprets their features, if he does not make any sufficient
clarification of the meanings of these words in moral terms, inter alia,
he will then easily fail to avoid the perversion of the words and
consequently unable to see other meanings of the words. This is so,
insofar as the problem of fact-value distinction in ethics still remains.
Insofar as quasi-realism and its sub-theory projectivism root, in their
origin, in emotivism, they could not identify the authentic place of
morality in human mind. For this very reason, Blackburn's
projectivism carries in itself a decisive weak point in its theoretical
base.

Projection of one's attitudes or feelings onto other persons is a
psychological mechanism; thus projectivism pictures what is only the
mechanism as something that one can contemplate as an object in itself,
as John McDowell rightly understands it.\(^{34}\) However, the way of
interpretation of the function of language as a psychological
mechanism is one thing, and that of interpretation of it within an
epistemological sense is quite another. However, the accompanying
meanings are neither purely emotive ones, nor mere expressions of
our feelings, nor inherent to X-words; they are thought to be carried
as we see things through the moral eye. At this juncture, the two
theories diverge significantly.

The idea of accompanying meaning is a theory which has a distance
from the projectivist psychological interpretation of our use of words
or sentences; it is rather a way of seeing human affairs with moral

\(^{34}\) John McDowell (1985) Values and secondary qualities, in Ted Honderich
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eyes, ie. with a moral point of view; in this sense, the idea of accompanying meaning is a way of interpretation of the use of moral language and of our awareness of morality in terms of logic and epistemology in an educational context.

Plato's 'sun' is an effluence of the power of seeing, whatever it may be. The light of the sun enables the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear. Without this light of the sun, seeing is impossible altogether in an epistemological sense. The light of the sun, to paraphrase, is the prerequisite for a perfect seeing. That is to say, we see things with the light of the sun. In epistemology when the pupil sees a certain specific thing the pupil usually sees it as one of a kind and (or) 'from a point of view', as was initially suggested by David Hume and claimed again by J. Urmson and William Frankena, though there are some differences between their theories. Therefore, saying that the pupil sees certain things, for example, in terms of biology, is logically equivalent to saying that the pupil sees them with the 'point of view' the discipline implies. To reiterate, the pupil sees thing biologically relevant with the eye empowered by the form of biology; seeings necessitate certain points of view in order to see things properly.


36 The 'point of view' metaphor initially comes from David Hume, especially when he seeks of 'the point of view of humanity' from which the moral sentiment is felt and from which one speaks the moral language, see David Hume (1957) An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.93 (New York: The Liberal Arts Press). And also see K. Baier (1958) The Moral Point of View (New York: Cornell University Press); William Frankena's two articles 'The Concept of Morality' and 'Moral Point of View Theories' given at the Humanities Institute, North Carolina, in fall 1979. Urmson distinguishes the object of seeing as a kind from the object of seeing 'from a point of view', see J.O. Urmson (1968) The Emotive Theory of Ethics, ch. 9 (London: Hutchinson University Library). David Hume's and William Frankena's version of the 'moral point of view' can also be found in A. Baier (1985) Postures of the Mind, ch. 9 (London: Methuen).
In the same way, the pupil sees education with some points of view which are inherited in the history of educational thoughts, that is to say, with an 'educational eye' (mind). And the same again would be the case in seeing morally relevant things. If the pupil is equipped enough with moral mind, he will see the thing with that mind. ‘Seeing things with moral mind’ means that one sees things, as Urmson emphasises, with ‘moral points of view’. This is a notional seeing which always takes place with moral notions, as I prefer to use the phrase here in a specific way. However, the moral notions applied here are not logically different from the idea of accompanying meanings of X-words so far clarified and identified, precisely because to say that X-words have some distinctive accompanying meanings is logically equivalent to saying that the pupil sees the referents of X-words with moral notions.

Acquisition of moral notions is thus a prerequisite for ‘moral seeing’, because this seeing is logically impossible unless one acquires moral notions. ‘Human dignity’, ‘fraternity’, ‘justice’, ... belong to moral notions. However, moral notions might more properly be exemplified by the locus classicus in Mencius; there are four minds, according to him: the mind of commiseration, the mind of shame and dislike, the mind of complaisance, and the mind of right and wrong. These minds are essential to man; therefore all persons have these minds just as they have their four limbs, if they are educated persons.

37 For Urmson's suggestion of this subject, see Urmson (1968) op. cit., p.108 (London: Hutchinson University Library) where he suggests that the 'from a point of view' use of 'good' is very important and common in moral contexts.

38 I found that the same phrase ‘moral notions’ was used by J. Kovesi. See, J. Kovesi (1967) Moral Notions, ch. 1 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul). His idea of ‘notions’ concurs in parts with mine when he says: "...all that we perceive are qualities given to our senses, ... : there is no quality of being-a-table as such that we could perceive; we construct ... our notion of a table out of empirically-given qualities". See, ibid., p. 2. But his exemplifications of moral notions (eg lying, revenge, inadvertence, cheating) seem to me irrelevant, just because they are not purely notional in their qualities. See, again, ibid., p. 13.
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According to Mencius. And Mencius adds that the mind of commiseration is the clue to the principle of benevolence, the mind of shame and dislike to that of righteousness, the mind of complaisance to that of propriety, and the mind of right or wrong to that of wisdom. Morally qualified men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others; therefore, if a person suddenly sees a child about to fall into a well, he will without exception have the mind of commiseration and rescue the child from drowning; this rescuing is nothing to do with gaining the favour of the child's parents, nor with the praise of their neighbours and friends. These four minds, Mencius has specified, are essentials of morality; they are the moral elements of our nature. However, moral notions are not restricted in their range to the examples borrowed from Mencius. They might be ad infinitum in scope. Such being the case, if the pupil bears these notions in mind, then he would certainly see things as morally relevant with these notions. Therefore, it would necessarily be impossible in an epistemological sense to understand what could be meant by these notions unless the pupil has such notions in his mind.

However, moral notions are non-factual or non-physical; they are our mental states, properly speaking; they cannot, therefore, be thought as being involved in the descriptive meanings of X-words. Just in this sense, the language of moral notions is different altogether in its nature even from X-words. For this reason, I will use this language in the name of 'notional words'.

Notional words - 'benevolence', '(human) dignity', 'propriety', 'justice', etc. - do not simply describe things which come into view to our physical eyes, because they do not have any particular factual denotations, unlike the case of X-words; nor do they have any factual connotation, because they are in relation to our notions of human


40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.
aspirations like morality and humanity.\textsuperscript{42} \textit{De facto}, it is the false assumption that all words or phrases have meanings on the model of names which are associated with some typical referents. Notional words, contrary to X-words, pick out no particular things or activities, as is the case of the word, for instance, ‘education’. Referents of descriptive meanings of X-words are sensible and destructible in a physical sense, because they are the things in the world; they are mind-independent realities, so to speak. However, the referents of notional words are out of our physical eyesight; hence, invisible, untouchable and indestructible.\textsuperscript{43} The figures of notional words distinctively appear when we compare it carefully with that of X-words: the denotation of the word ‘kicking’ in T-statement exists there and then; the event as referent of ‘murdering’ in the statement ‘The murder in the Cathedral was wrong’ was there and then, in Canterbury 1170; but the mind of commiseration, as a moral notion, for instance, does not denote any particular thing which exist outwardly, simply because the meaning of the ‘mind of commiseration’ or the ‘mind of complaisance’ is not factual. For this reason, notional words do not refer to mind-independent realities, the realist's moral realities; their qualities are not \textit{percipi} but \textit{concipi}.

Against the above claim someone will argue, thus; there could be certain human behaviours which correspond to the meaning of ‘mind of commiseration’, for instance. Certainly, enormous behaviours are around us, which are related in one way or another to the meaning of ‘mind of commiseration”; ie. behaviours such as caring for poor

\textsuperscript{42} A very similar idea to this claim will be found in Wittgenstein (1958) \textit{op. cit.}, sec. 613, where he writes, thus: ‘Willing is not the name of an action’.

\textsuperscript{43} ‘This is exactly reverence for life’ or ‘That is precisely what I mean by human dignity’, a teacher may say in this somewhat odd way. However, what is the referent of the phrase ‘reverence for life’?; and again what is the very fact that is exactly corresponding to the phrase ‘human dignity’? What are the referents of the indicative pronouns ‘this’ and ‘that’ in the teacher's statements; is there any sensible, clear, objective and definite object as a denotation of the indicative pronoun ‘this’ or ‘that’? No affirmative answers are possible for these questions. ‘This is exactly reverence for life’ might be corrected, thus; ‘This shows reverence for life’.
people and collecting gifts for lonely people at Christmas. Someone may therefore insist that all these behaviours can be called by the phrase 'mind of commiseration'. But this insistence faces a logical difficulty, because the phrase is not a name of a particular thing.

Ludwig Wittgenstein once wrote that 'to have understood the definition means to have in one's mind an idea of the thing defined, and that is a sample or picture'. If the pupil has understood the meaning of an X-word such as 'stealing', he may very likely draw in his mind a picture corresponding to the meaning of the word. The picture he might draw may be very clear and simple in its perspicuity. But the case is quite impossible for all notional words, because the pupil who could draw panoptically a picture of 'stealing' would fail in the case of drawing the picture of 'mind of commiseration' or 'mind of complaisance'. The picture of 'mind of commiseration' cannot be drawn on a drawing paper in the same way as the case of 'stealing', because the referent of 'mind of commiseration', if any, does not appear actually as a perspicuous picture in our mind as in the case of 'stealing'; rather it must be understood as something notional, because it does not carry with it any perceptual connotation. Commiseration is not an event or an action, it is one of our notional mind.

Our notions are in some part tacit intellectual powers; thus they have in principle the problem of articulation, though certain other part of them are appearing in words. They are rather sentient, implicit operations of intelligence; hence, tacit components of our ideas. Moral notions are very often not clearly expressed in language in their essential sense; they are non-descriptive, as it were. Let us suppose that the teacher teaches the pupil the concept 'bachelor'. For successful teaching the teacher might show the pupil a clear descriptive

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44 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) *ibid.*, sec. 73


circumscription of the attributes of the concept of bachelor, as we see this point in Socrates's dialectics. This teaching is actually possible, because the concept 'bachelor' circumscribes its attributes very clearly, i.e. 'unmarried' in marital condition, 'maturity' in physical development and 'male' in sex. However, the teaching of the language-game of notional words is quite different from the teaching even of the language-game of X-words, because clear circumscriptions of the components of the meanings of notional words are impossible at all. We can see this impossibility when we attempt to define the meanings of, for instance, 'mind of commiseration', 'mind of complaisance' and 'human dignity'. If a word does not possess clear connotations, it also does not possess any clear denotation.

However, we must note here one important fact: without X-words moral notions have nothing to do with this practical world of life and, conversely, without moral notions X-words might be empty vessels having nothing to carry. The case of seeing things denoted by X-words like 'rescuing' and 'kicking', for instance, is different in essence from the case of seeing a flower, because we see rescuing and kicking through moral notions as is not the case when seeing a flower. Whenever we see things the X-words denote we see them both with descriptive meanings of the words and with moral notions. This means that the seeing in moral terms accompanies moral notions in a specific way. Through human history man has always seen morally relevant things with moral notions, ever since he created and acquired such notions. In this regard, if there are accompanying meanings with the descriptive meanings of X-words, as examined thus far, it might be said that moral notions are added, in the process of history, to the descriptive meanings of X-words. However, this interpretation of moral notions must not be confused with the realist's claim that moral realities are inherently involved in the descriptive meanings of X-words.

Learning X-words is not altogether neutral from value situations, as is claimed by R.W. Beardsmore: '... the people by whom we are
taught themselves possess certain values. They do not merely describe certain actions as murder, suicide, or lying, but also react to them in characteristic ways'. He speaks about certain descriptive terms which accompany certain kinds of value both in the process of learning them and in their use. St. Augustine also once confessed that he learned the use of language not through the formal teaching of language but through the life with his brothers, the life in which he encountered the expression of face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of body, and the tone of voice all of which express our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. This way of language learning might be the natural and typical one in any society and at any historical period; this way of learning might better be explicable by the phrase ‘forms of life’ to which Wittgenstein and Williams gave much attention.

The adaptation of many different uses of words necessarily brings an accompaniment of many other significant and specific meanings as well as their initial, descriptive meanings. X-words are accompanied by such meanings, as is shown in the preceding section, and the meanings work together with their initial meanings if they are used in a fuller sense, ie. in moral terms. In this way X-words are seen as having a very specific kind of relation to notional words. Without having accompanying meanings rendered by moral notions X-words cannot enter into the centre of moral discourse; this means that moral notions qualify X-words. If an X-word is thought to be truly at the heart of some serious moral conversation, this means that again the X-word carries its accompanying meaning. However, clear interpretation of the relationship between X-words and notional words is hardly to be expected. Is there any logical connection between the words ‘helping’ and ‘mind of complaisance’ or between ‘rescuing’ and

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49 See Bernard Williams (1985) op. cit., chs. 7 & 8.
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`mind of commiseration'? These two pairs of word - pairings of an X-word and a notional word - seem to have a very close relationship in their specific use in moral terms. However, X-words are not logically related to moral notions; this means that no descriptive meanings of the words 'helping' and 'rescuing' can be found at all in the words for moral notions 'mind of complaisance' and 'mind of commiseration'. And no clear causal relationships are found between the meaning of 'helping' and 'mind of complaisance' and between the meaning of 'rescuing' and 'mind of commiseration', simply because the concepts 'complaisance' and 'commiseration' are not factual ones; they belong to different categories in their nature. For this very reason, no logical or factual relationship between X-words and moral notions is found.

However, one last point needs to be emphasised, although it has been already mentioned in this chapter, is that one sees things in certain perspectives. This is so, if the pupil has not merely inert knowledge of the world. In moral situations two different seeings - the descriptive and the notional - work together, not separately but concomitantly. But the descriptive seeing alone is meaningless in a moral sense, because it does not necessarily or naturally consort with notional seeing in an epistemological sense. Seeing things in moral terms necessitates notional seeing; moral seeing logically presupposes moral notions. The two seeings are thoroughly different in their meanings; they are, in other words, different 'ways of looking at things'. This is the point that the moral realist misconceives and that the teacher must pay much attention. This is because as follows. The pupils who are all having different colour-experiences will agree about the colour of a flower when they are looking at the same red flower. The colour of a flower can be seen in one and the same way by every pupil, if he is not colour-blind. And in this case one single seeing - descriptive seeing alone - would be sufficient to see correctly the colour of a flower. But if this assertion is applied to the case of seeing the situations denoted by X-words, it would make no sense at
all. Seeing a situation of rescuing in a moral sense is not like seeing a red flower: it presupposes some moral notions with which the pupil is able to see such a situation.
Non-Realism and the Logic of Moral Statements

The moral realist, whether he is an internalist or an externalist, asserts that moral realities are something to be found in the world; they are independent of us, observable and discovered. For these reasons the moral realist says that 'I see the goodness in children's behaviours and see sometimes their cruelty to something, as I see the beauty of landscapes; there is a mind-independent, distinctive range of moral reality'.

Based on this realist conception of moral reality, both moral intellectualism and the modern educational theories of cognitive morality interpret the meaning of a moral statement ‘X is good’ (‘X’ in this open sentence is to be replaced by X-words, the nature of which is characterised in the preceding chapter) as a statement which describes what we see as a moral reality which exists there in the world, mind-independently, in the same way other things exist. For X we can substitute a host of names of kinds of things which are morally relevant. As for the case of the modern educational theorist of cognitive morality, if one relies on moral realism, he would be convinced that the aim of teaching ‘X is good’ statements (this paradigmatic type of moral statement shall be called at a proper place ‘X-statement’, henceforth) in schools is to enable the pupil to sense a certain mind-independent moral reality which can be objectively

described by the word ‘X’.  

Certainly, X-words are observational terms; therefore observation of denotations of X-words might be possible, if it is required in understanding the meanings of moral statements. However, if the teacher takes this realist view without any serious reflection upon it, and engages in teaching his pupil to see moral realities in terms of the realist principle, then both the teacher and the pupil may be led to difficulty in understanding and identification of the moral realities which are assumed, by the realist, to be there in the world and described by moral statements. The difficulty will be seen as much more serious, if we examine the structure of moral statements, especially the relationship between the subjects and the predicates of the statements. In this chapter, applying and criticising some traditional ethical theories, this realist difficulty will be clarified, and from this an account of the logic of moral statements will be derived, with which the meaning of moral understanding can be interpreted without relying on the moral realist's tenets.

3.1 Traditional ethics, realism and the difficulties in understanding ‘X is good’ statements

Words in statements are joined together by certain sorts of logical devices, and the devices differ according to different structures of statement. The device in mathematical statements is logical equilibration of numbers, and that binding biological words might be causal relationships, for instance, the adaptational mechanism between the biological elements of organisms and their environments. It is, however, very difficult to see what kind of logical device actually

\[ \text{Frankena's theory of MEX and Hirst's theory of moral education within his concept of liberal education, both of which are about the development of moral judgment might be a typical example of this moral realism. For Frankena's phrase MEX (moral education for judgments), see the introductory chapter of the thesis.} \]
conjoins the words ‘X’ and ‘good’ in an X-statement.

Ethical naturalism is akin, in many respects, to the realist viewpoint on moral realities. This is clearly so, especially when we examine utilitarianism, a representative of ethical naturalism. The ethical naturalist reduces the meaning of the moral word ‘good’ to that which is describable in a factual sense, i.e. to ‘desire satisfaction’ or ‘acquisition of pleasure’. The reduced form of a moral statement, then, might be that ‘X gives satisfaction’ or ‘X gives pleasure’ and the logical link between the subject ‘X’ and the predicate ‘satisfaction’ or ‘pleasure’ of this reduced form may seem to be interpreted by the logic of factual relationship; in this case any enquiry about the relationship must be over the question of whether or not X factually gives us satisfaction or pleasure, though it is debatable whether this could be regarded as an ethical question.

The naturalist transformation of a moral statement might be that ‘the quality of a thing (X) which gives us pleasure is good’. The first part of the transformed statement ‘the quality of a thing (X) which gives us pleasure’ is factual; of course, as far as this factual argument concerns us it can and must be claimed in a factual sense. What is more, this statement is not at all problematic in its grammatical form. But the second half part of the statement ‘[what is] pleasant is good’ raises a much more serious philosophical problem just when it is taken in ethical terms. This is simply because if the pupil translates the meaning of the moral word ‘good’ into words which describe natural properties like ‘acquisition of pleasure’ or ‘desire satisfaction’, one will necessarily fall into the naturalistic fallacy, as is suggested by G.E. Moore. Further, ‘Good’ in moral statements is not ‘good of a kind’ but ‘good from a point of view’, following Urmson's classification of such statements, thus the ‘good’ is not so closely tied to the noun that relates to it. Nonetheless, the naturalist confidently


believes that since some combination of natural or factual properties involves the quality of goodness, this quality of goodness is inseparable from these natural properties. Because of this belief, he consequently ignores the dissimilarities between the two different parts of the statement; Certain qualities of thing give us pleasure and the pleasure is good. The first half part is a factual judgment whereas the other part is a value judgment; therefore, saying that the quality of a thing gives us pleasure is not, in any sense, logically identical to saying that pleasure is morally good. An enquiry about whether or not a certain thing actually gives us pleasure is one thing and a question about whether or not the pleasure which a certain quality of a thing gives us is morally good is quite another.

The naturalist's major premiss 'X gives pleasure', which is conceived as describing a factual relationship between the quality of X and pleasure, does by no means raise any problem in its own structure; it is rather a necessary part of a sound moral judgment, because prior to any moral judgment there must be a valid factual judgment which is relevant to that judgment. However, the most important point to make here is that the factual judgment alone is insufficient for a perfect moral judgment: this is simply because moral judgments do not consist solely in the fact-finding parts in their whole process; factual judgments, or the natural property of X and pleasure in the factual judgment, do not, in a logical sense, involve value or moral properties. Enquiry about whether the fact X gives us pleasure or not is essentially of a factual question, but moral questions are far beyond such factual enquiries in their characters. The problem related to the naturalist transformation of moral statement arises, therefore, in the judgment 'pleasure is good'. In this premiss, the pupil will inevitably confront a crucial problem, if he gives serious consideration to the matter of the logical disconnection between the subject 'pleasure' and the predicate 'good': the logical difficulty in binding the subject and the predicate of the premiss.

A.J. Ayer mentions that it is sometimes morally wrong to perform
an action which causes more pleasure than pain or more satisfaction than discontent; it is not at all self-contradictory to say that doing a pleasant thing is not morally good or that a certain bad thing may be desired.\(^5\) This point was first suggested by Aristotle; ‘good’ is determinate, according to him, but ‘pleasure’ is not; pleasure admits of degrees of extremity; not all pleasures are necessarily good, some of them are even bad. Some painful activities might be sometimes judged morally good; and some pleasant activities also might be sometimes judged morally wrong. Aristotle states thus:

... since activities differ in respect of goodness and badness, and some are worthy to be chosen, others to be avoided, and others neutral, so, too, are the pleasure; for to each activity there is a proper pleasure. The pleasure proper to a worthy activity is good and that proper to an unworthy activity bad; just as the appetites for noble objects are laudable, those for base objects culpable ... As activities are different, then, so are the corresponding pleasures.\(^6\)

In this passage Aristotle illuminates the point that the qualities of thing which give us pleasure are not always good. This means that ‘pleasure’ is not always equivalent, in its logical sense, to the goodness of an activity; it is not an ultimate determinant in evaluating an activity, though an activity gives us pleasure in one way or another. The ethical determinants of an activity must be something other than pleasure, as is suggested by the adjectives ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ which qualify an activity as such in the above quotation. We should therefore admit that certain pleasures can be taken as morally justifiable but others cannot: some pleasures can be ‘desirability characterisations’ and therefore taken in moral terms.\(^7\) ‘Pleasure’ is not the final ground on which justification of moral ‘good’ is based.


\(^6\) Aristotle (1915) *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1175b (Oxford University Press). (Italics mine)

Even when we take the meaning of pleasure as an epiphenomenal term, the problem remains just the same for the naturalist's transformation. Aristotle, it seems, makes this point when he defines the nature of pleasure:

... there are many things we should be keen about even if they brought no pleasure, e.g. seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing the virtues. If pleasures necessarily do accompany these, that makes no odds; we should choose these even if no pleasure resulted. It seems to be clear, then, that neither is pleasure the good nor is all pleasure desirable. ...

This passage suggests not only a logical difficulty in the naturalist's reduction of moral good to the natural properties of human nature, but also an epistemological obscurity of our vision in seeking a logical device which actually binds, in a specific way, 'pleasure' and 'good' in the naturalist's form of moral judgment.

The moral realist, of course, claims that goodness exists in rerum natura. If this is the case, then the goodness which is assumed, by the realist, to be in rerum natura, i.e. in 'pleasure', must be perceived through the senses. However, it is debatable whether it should be so regarded, in an epistemological sense. What is more, nowhere does the realist show us clearly what are the ingredients of goodness which he assumed to be there in 'pleasure' or in rerum natura. As to the question whether moral realities are part of the fabric of the world, one can hardly give an affirmative answer. This difficulty, it seems to me, comes basically from the realist's metaphysical assumption of moral realities as being in rerum natura, particularly from his problematic tenets; the observability, describability, independence of moral realities. These metaphysical tenets give us much more difficulty if we try to make sure of the nature of moral realities in accordance with the realist's ontology. This is especially so, when we encounter some realists' agreement on the claim that 'moral properties are not physical properties and moral facts are not physical facts, but

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8 Aristotle (1915) op. cit. p. 12 (Italics mine).
all the same they are real properties and facts', as is acutely pointed out by Hare. Moral realism thus offers many problems in understanding the nature of moral realities, and the difficulties of the naturalistic approach to moral understanding might be the corollaries of this weakness of moral realism.

On the other hand, the ethical intuitionist holds that moral statements can be known to be true by intuition; they are something to be known self-evidently, without involving any process of inference. The intuitionist has attempted to explicate this way of understanding of moral statements, but reached the result unsatisfactorily by restricting the explication just to the meaning of the predicate 'good' and its converse 'bad'. As Moore maintains, the predicate 'good' is simple in its characteristics; therefore, indefinable and unanalysable. For this very reason, the meaning of 'good' should be understood in an intuitive way, according to him. Thus the intuitionist interpretation of the way of understanding moral goodness makes opaque, in the intuitionists' logic, our vision of any satisfactory answer for the question; what is the logical device which binds, in a moral statement, the subject (X) that essentially denotes a factual object and the predicate (good) that is indefinable and unanalysable?

Certainly, some moral statements might be accepted by the pupil immediately. However, it would be very difficult for us to discern whether or not this immediacy in accepting moral statements is exactly the same, in its meaning, to the intuitive understanding per se. This is because many ambiguities and difficulties exist in the meaning of the intuitionist's phrase 'immediate apprehension of moral realities'. Many ambiguities appear as we ask a philosophical question about the meaning of the intuitionist's phrase. In fact the case of the pupil's 'immediate apprehension' of the meaning of moral statements, if any such case exists, is very uncertain, because it is always problematic to decide whether it should be so regarded in a logical sense or

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psychological sense or some other specific cultural, anthropological senses.

W.D. Ross sees an affinity between the intuitive seeing of moral realities and the intuitive understanding of geometrical axioms like ‘A whole is greater than any of its parts’. For the intuitionist, moral knowledge, if there is any, resembles geometrical knowledge in the way that relationships between geometrical terms are grasped by intuition. Geometrical axioms might be apprehended without any complex logical catena of inference, and the same might be the case for the basic principles of algebra, the principle of identity, for instance. The same claim reappears in H.A. Prichard's ethical theories. He interprets the meaning of moral understanding, thus: moral understanding is immediate, in precisely the sense in which a mathematical understanding is immediate, eg the understanding that this three-sided figure, in virtue of its being three-sided, must have three angles. Understanding in both areas is immediate in the sense that our insights into statements directly and necessarily lead us to recognise that the meanings of predicates are involved by subjects.

However, if a moral statement is claimed to be understood as true immediately in the same way as we understand a geometrical statement like ‘A square contains right angles’, then a logical difficulty arises right away. In a logical or analytical statement some properties of the subject are possessed by the predicate, as is shown by the case that the meaning of the predicate ‘right angles’ in the geometrical statement ‘A square contains right angles’ is possessed by the subject ‘square’. But the subject and the predicate in a moral statement are not, in their characteristics, words which can be interpreted in the same way as the geometrical words; for this reason, the subject in a moral statement is not connected to its predicate in the same way as that of a geometrical

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12 Ibid., p. 8.
statement. Moral statements are fundamentally different, in their logical structures, from geometrical statements. Because of this fact the intuitionist's application of geometrical intuition to the interpretation of moral awareness is hardly tenable.

The meaning of the intuitionist phrase 'immediate apprehension of moral realities' can so easily be confused with some psychological tendencies which accept favourably, without giving any simple reasoning, the truth of certain moral utterances. Cultural anthropology, too, tells us that members of a certain society accept, without any question, certain specific value claims which are culturally pervasive in one way or another in that society. The immediate understanding of the meaning of a geometrical statement like 'A whole is greater than any of its parts' may generally be called 'intuition'. However, even in this simple understanding, there must be at least a basic ratiocination in a strict sense. And this understanding is possible only when we already have such concepts as 'whole' and 'part'; without having these concepts no immediate understanding of the geometrical statement is possible at all. In fact, even the psychological and cultural tendencies of immediate acceptance of certain utterances or value claims cannot be interpreted, in a fuller sense, without presupposing some attitudes or notions which are, in advance, possessed by us. For these reasons, the intuitionist phrase 'immediate apprehension of moral realities' is very ambiguous and unlikely to be accepted in an interpretation of the meaning of moral understanding.

A moral statement, for example, 'Stealing is wrong' may be immediately accepted as a valid judgment even by the pupil whose moral acumen is not much developed. However, it is debatable whether such an acceptance can be taken as an intuitive awareness of wrongness. The difficulty of evaluating immediate apprehension of moral realities might be suggested, if one carefully observes what is happening between the teacher and the pupil in the classroom in which a moral conversation is taking place, as Rousseau shows us with his example in *Émile*. There are some cases of serious asking about the
whys and wherefores of the moral judgments and some viciously infinite regress of justification in defining the meaning of wrongness.13

‘Intuition’ is etymologically a Latin derivation; the Latin ‘intueor’ means ‘to look at’ or ‘I gaze on’. Both phrases ‘to look at’ or ‘gazing on’ presuppose a certain kind of object. The property of the predicate ‘good’ in a moral statement may be an object which is a non-natural simple notion, and therefore unanalysable and indefinable, as is maintained by the intuitionist.14 If this is taken as such, the property of ‘good’ might be seen in such a way as the intuitionist holds. However, the property of the subject in a moral statement is an object of seeing which is fundamentally different from that of the predicate; the property of the subject is natural, and therefore describable and definable, whereas that of the predicate is non-natural and unanalysable. Therefore the subject of a moral statement and its predicate are objects which assume different ways of ‘gazing on’. Considering this point we are confronting again a logical problem of how the intuitionist connects the subject which is an object of a different seeing from the seeing which is required for the predicate.

In fact the moral word ‘good’ is used in conjunction with words which are concrete and factual, as can be seen in the exemplary cases of moral statements like ‘X₁ is good’, ‘X₂ is good’, ‘X₃ is good’, ... ‘Xₙ is good’. Let us suppose here that ‘X₁’, ‘X₂’, ‘X₃’ stand for, for example, ‘caring’ (for ageing persons), ‘truth-telling’, ‘rescuing’ (a drowning child) respectively. Even though we generally take it for


Non-realism and the logic of moral statements

granted *ex hypothesi* that ‘X₁’, ‘X₂’, ‘X₃’ are all assessed as good in moral terms, it would be still very difficult for the intuitionist to explain how the analysable and definable terms can effectively be connected to the unanalysable and indefinable terms. Perhaps the intuitionist may explain the structure of moral statements from the way that the property of the predicate ‘good’, which is assumed by the intuitionist to have a *simple* quality on which we gaze, is embedded in the meanings of ‘X₁’, ‘X₂’, ‘X₃’. However, it would be logically difficult for the intuitionist to claim that these subjects commonly share both simple and indefinable qualities and descriptive properties together. This matter is a serious problem which the intuitionist confronts and must be examined in a very sophisticated way.

These difficulties of ethical realism which we encounter in considering the structure of moral statements, engender very crucial problems which must be seriously examined before we teach such statements at school while mainly relying on realist claims on the nature of morality. As far as we engage in moral education while relying on moral realism, it would be a logical demand to do this job within the *bounds* of statements. This is simply because moral realism is one of the various kinds of moral cognitivism which maintain that moral realities can be precisely described by words and statements in the same way other things could be. And if we take our moral expressions in this way, it would be a logical demand, again, to claim that the teacher must understand the structure of such expressions in the same way that natural or social scientists understand their statements. However, unfortunately, the difficulties laid out in the above examination of ethical realism show that this logical demand is hardly satisfiable.
3.2 Projectivism, quasi-realism and the categorial problem

Neither any relevant analysis of the meaning of 'good', nor any positive contribution to the interpretation of the logic of moral statements could be found in classical ethical emotivism. The classical emotivist proclaims, applying the verificationist principle, that moral statements are nothing but pseudo-propositions. This is because the predicates of moral statements are apprehended by the classical emotivist as having only the function of ejaculation of the speaker's feelings which arise from the speaker's attitudes towards the facts that constitute the subjects of moral statements. If this is so regarded, it will anomalously transform an moral statement into 'X!!' (the subject with exclamation marks), as is held by the verificationist, Rudolf Carnap, amongst the classical emotivists. As a result, this anomalous form, which consists of the subject and the exclamation marks, leads to a broken-grammar view and, of course, any idea of a conceptual relationship between the subject and the predicate is hardly tenable from this view. Insofar as the 'broken-grammar view' is held, it is theoretically impossible to find in the classical emotivist conception of moral statements any logical catenae which are presumed to bind the subjects and the predicates together in moral statements. A varying viewpoint of morality, which will be called 'modern ethical emotivism', has emerged from the 'attitude' theory of classical emotivism. Charles L. Stevenson assumes that there exist cognitive

15 The phrase 'classical ethical emotivism' is used here to distinguish it from modern ethical emotivism which is modified and thus allows more cognitive elements in moral arguments; we see in main this trend in R.M. Hare's claims. 'Classical ethical emotivism' belongs to the extremist negative view on the justifiability of moral statements, the view which is largely based on logical positivism, and thus denies the cognitive elements in moral arguments.

elements in moral attitudes, especially as he asserts that 'all disagreement in attitude is rooted in disagreement in belief' about the world. And, according to him, moral agreements or disagreements are reconcilable by reason.\textsuperscript{17} However, modern emotivism (in brief) does not yet reach satisfactorily the point that suffices for a positive and distinctive interpretation of the relationship between the subjects and the predicates in moral statements. Modern emotivism claims that the statement 'X is good' can be transformed into the statement 'I approve of X'. However, this modern emotivist's transformation tells us nothing at all about the matter of the relationship between the subject 'X' and the predicate 'good' in the statement, except for its interest in the emotional or attitudinal aspect of the use of the word 'good'. As a result, if one applies Stevenson's idea to the interpretation of the nature of moral statements, one would soon face the problem of irrelevance in using this interpretation exclusively for moral terms. Stevenson actually uses the word 'attitude' in relation to the meanings of many words; aspirations, wants, preferences, desires and so on. However, these words can be used in many other different domains than in ethics, eg in anthropology, psychology and sociology.

R.M. Hare, a prescriptivist, seems to be much nearer, in claiming the attitudinal view of morality, to those who seek a possibility of a positive relationship between 'X' and 'good' in an X-statement. Reflecting upon some features of moral statements, Hare argues that the term 'good' is evaluative and therefore in making moral judgments it necessarily makes sense to ask for the reason why it is judged so.\textsuperscript{18} To be an evaluative statement means to have in one way or another certain justificatory grounds, simply because evaluation logically necessitates a certain sort of criterion for the fulfillment of its own specific purpose; this is so whether or not the grounds can be clearly

\textsuperscript{17} Charles L. Stevenson (1944) \textit{Ethics and Language}, p. 136 (New Haven: Yale University Press).

\textsuperscript{18} R.M. Hare (1972) \textit{The Language of Morals}, p. 176 (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
expressed in words.

In the Harean view, goodness in an evaluative statement, for example, ‘This book is good’ appears in its transposition ‘the character in this book is very funny’.¹⁹ Hare claims that there seems to be some close logical connection between the judgment ‘This strawberry is good’ and the statements on which it supervenes ‘This strawberry is sweet’ or ‘This strawberry is juicy’.²⁰ However, his supervenient form leaves much more obscurity than clarity, when he maintains that there is ‘some close logical connection’ between the meaning of the evaluative word ‘good’ and the meaning of the factual word ‘sweet’ or ‘juicy’. In logic, no such connection is allowed. The crucial problem in this case is about the way he connects the factual word ‘sweet’ or ‘juicy’ to the value word ‘good’. A certain kind of connection between those words may be possible in certain evaluative statements about physical or psychological things, as has just been shown by the Harean supervenient forms. But in the moral sphere such a possibility is hardly acceptable in that it does not safely escape from the logical deadlock of the ‘is-ought’ problem in ethics. In this sense the Harean supervenient form faces the same difficulty that is found in the naturalist transformation of moral statements aforementioned.

Moral projectivism, based on quasi-realism, might be a much improved form of moral emotivism. Quasi-realism is trying to work out a realistic point of view of moral realities, while recognizing rightly the subjective sources of our judgments, inside our own attitudes, needs, desires, and natures.²¹ Thus it maintains that there are real moral values and that many of them are independent of us, like some improved sets of attitudes that are coherent and consistent.

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²⁰ R.M. Hare (1972) *op. cit.*, p. 111.

Applying the analogy with secondary qualities and without abandoning a non-realist account of value, quasi-realism claims that value, like colour, is interwoven into the fabric of our experience of the world and therefore can be observed. But, according to the projectivist, the fabric of our experience does not accurately represent anything in the world, because 'value and colour are to be thought of as something we create in perceiving the world'.

Value and colour, from the very nature of secondary qualities, are 'modes of our awareness of the world and not properties of the world'. Protected by quasi-realism as such, projectivism explains moral utterances as a form of expression adequate to our needs. Projectivism in this sense sides in part with the non-realist position about moral properties; thus, according to it, moral properties are taken to be qualities which are not there in the world, but qualities which we project onto the world; they are our valuational response onto the world, as it were. If this is so, the structure of X-statements must be explained by showing that they are our moral expressions or projections of our moral attitudes onto the things denoted by the

22 The emotivist account of moral realities is far removed from its origin, since some emotivists have turned to a common conception of what are traditionally called 'secondary qualities', like colours, sound, smell and taste.


25 Ibid., p. 195.
subjects of X-statements, the things which are observed by us and impinge on us. This may be a plausible explanatory theory of the nature of moral expressions.

However, the projectivist explanation does not actually show us any clarity in its own position on the relationship between the subjects and the predicates of moral statements. On this point, the projectivist, it seems, adds nothing more than the modern emotivist view to the interpretation of the relationship between the subjects and the predicates of moral statements. Projectivism is an explanatory theory, as is initially understood and shown by the Humean picture of moral realities, which maintains that moral values are projections of our subjective sentiments. However, the projectivist does not take such sentiments as simple psychological phenomena which fluctuate in differing times and places. In this sense, to protect his conception of moral realities Simon Blackburn applies quasi-realism and writes: 'Protected by quasi-realism, my projectivist says the things that sound so realist to begin with - that there are real obligations and values, and that many of them are independent of us, for example'.

If projectivism is adequately protected by quasi-realism, as is held by Blackburn, for instance, the projectivist of course will not take our sentiments as something which are simply given. On this point Blackburn writes further:

We have sentiments and other reactions, caused by natural features of things, and we 'gild' or 'stain' the world by describing it as if it contained features answering to these sentiments, in the way that the niceness of an ice-cream answers to the pleasure it gives us.

We respond to, and describe, some independent aspects of reality when

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27 Simon Blackburn (1985) op. cit., p. 5.
we moralize, according to Simon Blackburn.28 Thus, Blackburn's projectivism, differing from a revisionist projectivism which is represented by Mackie's error theory, seeks to defend a propositional form which we give to moral utterances.29 In this sense, though there are many problems of inadequacy in the results of this quest, projectivism accommodates, in its theoretical point of view, the propositional grammar of ethics, 'the realist-seeming grammar of moral discourse'.30 For Blackburn, the sentiments which we project onto the world exist objectively. Just on this point, Blackburn's picture of moral realities is very close to that which the realist advocates. But Blackburn's projectivism would confront, in its theoretical base, the difficulties in interpretation both of the nature of sentiments we project onto the world and of the way in which the sentiments and the world are joined together, to create some specific qualities, without ignoring the everlasting philosophical problem of the value-fact distinction.

Blackburn's metaphor of projection dilutes to a large degree the value-fact distinction and obfuscates our minds about the different categories of value and fact. This is so especially when we carefully examine the implications of his interpretation of projectivism: 'we gild or stain the world with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment' and this activity 'gives our creation its own life, and its own dependence on facts'.31 But in this projectivist interpretation there exists much obscurity about the reality or the world which is gilded or stained with the colours borrowed from our internal sentiment and

28 Ibid.


30 For Mackie's point of view on this subject, see J. Mackie (1977) op. cit.

31 Simon Blackburn (1984) op. cit. (Italics mine)
about the way this 'gives our creation its own life', ie. about the way the factual world can be gilded or stained with the *colours* of value properties and how it comes to have value properties. Thus far no crucial discrepancy is found between Blackburn's account and Hume's insistence that we do not experience objects as having value. Blackburn's account was initially Hume's idea; we see this point in Hume's language:

...the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood; the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects, as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: the other has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation.\(^3\)

However to this distinction of reason and taste, Blackburn adds his own account for moral realities and makes a considerable discrepancy between his own and Hume's idea of ontology of value. Blackburn writes:

All the information about the world which we take in would be describable in *natural* terms. But just as we can use that information to construct theories involving higher-order concepts, such as those of *physics*, so we can use it to construct the moral concepts. But when we have done so, we have a further *description* of the world, and are regarding it as *containing* further, *moral*, states of affairs.\(^3\)

From this consideration, moral value, Blackburn claims, virtually exists there in the world. If we apply this claim to the interpretation of the nature of moral statements, all subjects in moral statements would be taken to involve moral qualities which are there by gilding or staining, and we respond to such gilded or stained qualities of what subjects denote or to what our sensibilities find in the world, according to Blackburn's claim. If this is so, then this way of

\(^3\) David Hume (1957) *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, p.112 (New York: The Liberal Arts Press).

interpretation might be understood as nothing but a combination of those of realism and classical emotivism.

However, moral realism and emotivism are, until now, conceived by many philosophers as two opposing theories. Therefore, on these theoretical bases, there must be some logical difficulty in tying them together, the two theories which have ever been theoretically dangling loose. In fact Blackburn's projectivism does not satisfy at the same time both realism and emotivism. On the one hand it is contrary to moral emotivism in claiming that value-properties really exist mind-independently, impinge on us, and are genuinely observable. On the other hand projectivism is a little far from a popularised moral realism in that it is quite inconceivable that the qualities of objects which are gilded or stained are truly observable, describable, and mind-independent. Moral realism is, in its general feature, committed to the observability and describability of moral reality. Projections of sentiment might be conceivable more adequately in a subjective way, as the emotivist claims. In projectivism, the difference between 'being and seeming' is very uncertain.

To establish projectivism the projectivist takes the case of colour-property as an example. But the example is not proper for the establishment of the theory. Colour-properties, here taken as a secondary quality, may be mind-independent and observable in a sense. But colours are typically colours of bodies and, unlike value properties, they are sensory appearances which can be conceived as objects of observation. In this regard, 'colours are primary properties of objects, not of something objects make or give off'; they should be seen as more akin to primary qualities. P.M.S. Hacker writes thus:

Colours are not looks. Roses are red and fragrant, they have a fragrant smell, but they do not have a red look any more than the way to Tipperary has a long look. To

be red is to have a *colour*, not a look.\(^{35}\)

Value-properties cannot easily be explained in the same way as colour-properties can be explained, precisely because the former are non-physical properties, whereas the latter are physical. Awareness of values, unlike awareness of colour properties, is not constitutive of what it is to have perceptual experience of the external world, as is suggested by C. McGinn.\(^{36}\) 'To be red is to have a colour, not a look'; it is to have physical properties of colour, amongst others. But to be good is not a matter of having something like physical properties, not a matter of appearances. These two statements clearly illustrate the difference between the nature of colour-properties and that of value-properties. Perception of colour and that of value are not at all categorised in their nature by one and the same criterion. A secondary quality experience of colour presents itself 'as perceptual awareness of properties genuinely possessed by the objects that confront one'.\(^{37}\) One sees properties of colours through one's physical eye. Thus 'an experience of something as red can count as a case of being presented with a property that is there anyway - there independently of the experience itself'.\(^ {38}\)

Different people may have different colour-experiences, different experiences of presented phenomenal qualities. This is because colour-properties we experience are revealed in *sensory* experience and the sensation of experiences is different in accordance with different

\(^{35}\) P.M.S. Hacker (1987) *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 121-3 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). The word 'look' here applies not only to mean the act of looking, but also to mean the visible features of the objects of vision.


phenomenal environments. For this very reason colour words must not be words for particular L-properties; they must be essentially phenomenal-quality words.\(^{39}\) Kant has readily noticed this point, as he writes:

Colours ... cannot rightly be regarded as properties of things, but only as changes in the subject, changes which may, indeed, be different for different men.\(^{40}\)

But what remains true, even in terms of the phenomenal quality of colours, is that our colour-experience is mainly of sensual perception in which physical reflections arise and we see first such reflections through our physical eyes.

Hume's distinction between 'impressions' and 'ideas' may help us in understanding the nature of colour-experience. Impressions, in Hume's theory, include all our sensations, passions and emotions, especially all our more lively perceptions: hearing, seeing, feeling, hating, desiring, willing, etc, whereas ideas are the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only, those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure and uneasiness it may occasion.\(^{41}\)

When we feel a passion or emotion of any kind, or have the images of external objects conveyed by our senses; the perception of the mind is what Hume calls 'impression'. And when we reflect on a passion or an object which is not present, this perception is an idea. Colour-experience, thus, mainly belongs to the category of impression, rather than idea.

\(^{39}\) G. Strawson (1989) Red and 'red', *Synthese* 78, p. 223. Here the term 'L-properties' means the case that a certain thing we experience has certain constant light-reflection, light absorption, light emission properties under lighting conditions are constant and there we do not see the (colour-) properties differently. See also *ibid.*, p. 197.


However, our value-perception does not belong to this category; it belongs to reflection of impressions, of 'the images of external objects conveyed by our senses'.

Regarding this point it would be not so difficult to assent to the claim that the idea of 'secondary qualities' of things, like colour-properties, cannot properly be counted as a theory which can interpret the feature of moral properties. This is mainly because moral values, even if they are thought ex hypothesi to exist independently just as other things exist in the world, are not objects of sensual perceptions. Moral values are not attributes which can be perceptible by our mere sight and touch. As Hume writes, we may 'feel a passion of any kind or have the images of external objects conveyed by our sense'. And, for our whole of experience of perceptions, it would be quite impossible to draw a sharp line below which such perceptions are sensual and above which they are non-sensual or notional. There also seems to be seamless continuity between the sensuous pleasure of 'red' roses and the aesthetic enjoyment of the colour as a whole. But sensual perceptions - passions and emotions, for instance - are impressions, not value-perceptions. Moral values are not objects of purely sensual perception; they must be taken in a different way.

Therefore, it is very difficult, in the moral domain, to say, applying quasi-realism, that there exist moral values as secondary qualities (of things) just in the same way as colour-properties of flowers exist. A flower has both shape and colour, a primary quality and a secondary quality, so called; thus we can say: the rose in the garden has a certain particular shape and it is red. And the predicates, in this case, are involved in the subject, as is shown by the statement. This statement is factual; the flower has a red colour, not a look; it has a certain shape, not a look. However, in an moral statement the relationship between the subject and the predicate cannot be interpreted in the same way as in the case of the statement 'The flower in the garden is red' in which the predicate 'red' is factually involved in the subject. We can successfully draw a picture of a flower with
shape and colour; however, it is factually impossible for us to draw a picture of the subject of a moral statement, with the value or non-physical quality which is meant by the predicate 'good'. The two statements are something disparate.

In fact Blackburn does not clearly answer the question of what are the independent aspects of moral-properties which are supposed to be there in the world as secondary qualities or what are the moral sentiments, in moral terms, which are assumed, by Blackburn, to be 'spread on the world'. To establish projectivism one needs to explore further these problems in terms of ethics, especially the problems of the nature of moral properties and the sentiments. Much difficulty exists indeed in projectivism and this difficulty again leads to an educational problem which we shall encounter without doubt if we apply the projectivist idea of morality and endeavour to show the pupil the grammar of moral statements according to the view of the projectivist theory.

3.3 Between the subjects and the predicates in moral statements and the moral notions

Information about the real world which we take in must be describable in factual terms. The subjects in moral statements are factual terms, and they first give us some factual information, amongst others, about the world. However, it is hardly acceptable that the subject itself in a moral statement describes moral realities as clearly as it gives us information about the world. What is more, it is argued in the preceding sections that moral realities defy description, even though we assume *ex hypothesi* there are such realities, as is claimed by the realist. For this reason, the grammar of moral statements, more precisely the relationship between the subjects and the predicates in moral statements, cannot be shown properly in the realist interpretation of the character of X-words.
Quasi-realism, which relies mainly on projectivism, confronts, in parsing ‘X’ and ‘good’ in an X-statement, the same ontological problem of moral realities as moral realism faces. ‘Projecting’ in its etymological origin means what Hume referred to as ‘gilding and staining all natural objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiments’, or ‘the mind spreading itself on the world’. However, when Blackburn revised projectivism and developed quasi-realism, his thinking varied greatly from the projectivism which initially emerged from the Humean view of moral utterance. Blackburn's projectivism has deviated considerably from its original meaning, in his claiming the describability of moral statements and the possibility of mind-independent moral realities. Thus quasi-realism has already turned completely towards moral realism, as I have already shown. Things, which are mind-independent, do not in their descriptive concepts possess something of moral realities, unlike what the realist or the quasi-realist assume to be there in the real world. An ‘impulse from a vernal wood’ may strongly stimulate some people to feel reverence for life as a moral reality in some particular way, but it is important to notice that the vernal wood does not intrinsically or conceptually possess such a moral reality. Nature itself never taught us that there really exists such a moral reality. For this reason I have rejected these theories as improper for the interpretation of the logic of moral statements.

All statements, including moral statements, are expressions of our thoughts or sometimes feelings about things we encounter, whether or not the statements are expressed properly in some propositional forms. But things might be otherwise than they are, because things could be seen from different points of view and words also could be used in different ways. A prism decomposes light is a factual statement in which the nature of decomposition is naturally given to a prism and thereby the subject ‘prism’, in its intrinsic nature, possesses the attribute of decomposing light. Therefore, if there is a prism of which

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we can fairly say 'It is really a prism', then it always possesses its constant reality of decomposing light, other things being equal. For this exemplary statement no different points of view could be given, except the physical disposition of the decomposition of light. However, X-words, unlike the case of the word 'prism', cannot be interpreted in this consistent way. They may be used for pure description of a certain value-neutral fact in a certain specific situation, as is the case, to take a very simple instance for clarity's sake, of the word 'abortion' and the statement the word constitutes. The word 'abortion', in a medical sense, may sometimes be used in a quite different way from a moral point of view. However, the word is accompanied by certain moral notions or certain particular moral points of view, if and only if the word comes into a serious moral discourse.

'Truth-telling' can be used in a moral sense and it also can be used in a factual sense as it is used in a court of judicature; a certain moral notion accompanies the use of the word in one case but not in the other case. 'Kicking' might be another example, it can be used in different ways in different contexts, the different contexts, for instance, which the two statements 'kicking a ball' and 'kicking a boy' imply. Even love is not always divine or moral: it is in some cases debasing and erotic, for instance. These cases of love are very natural in their characters. But 'love' in morals and that in divinity are non-natural as are the cases of love for the sub-human, friendship and charity. The love that is natural may be necessary in a natural law but the one that is for friendship or charity is non-natural; thus without the former none of us would have been begotten and reared, but we may breed and survive without the latter. The former are too obviously connected with our nervous system, too obviously shared with the brutes, but the latter seem to raise us to the level of non-natural quality, ie. the level of having moral qualities, amongst others.

Insofar as X-words have both conceptual and descriptive meanings,

\footnote{For the distinctions between several kinds of love and clarifications of them, see C.S. Lewis (1960) The Four Loves (Glasgow: Collins).}
X-words do not always reveal clearly or necessarily carry moral notions in moral statements; this point can be seen in the use of the words ‘truth-telling’, ‘kicking’, ‘love’ as are exemplified above and equally for the words ‘lying’ and ‘promise’.\(^{44}\) ‘Lying is wrong’ may be taken as a valid statement in an ordinary sense, but it is not always to be taken so; lying can be acceptable in a certain particular circumstance, as we see in the case in which a doctor tells his patient a lie, for some medical purposes, about the result of diagnosis of the patient’s disease. But lying in this case is used for non-moral ends, perhaps for the purpose of medical treatment of the patient; it also can be used even in some moral ends, if a doctor tells a lie about the result of the diagnosis of the patient’s hopeless disease after he seriously reflects about whether his truth-telling about the result may give the patient mental sufferings. This case shows that ‘lying’ is not always used in a moral sense; it does not always have a particular fixed meaning; it can be used in many different ways in accordance with different points of view.

X-words, if they are properly used in moral discourse, would be used with a much fuller sense of their meaning than when they are used in non-moral discourse; they are used not just in a descriptive or conceptual sense (a narrower sense), but also in some other important sense, ie. in a fuller sense with which they carry imaginations, emotions and moral notions. ‘Polygamy’ or ‘monogamy’ may be used only in a narrower sense if they describe certain institutions value-neutrally, but they might be otherwise if they are used in a much fuller sense; they would then convey certain imaginations, emotions, and, amongst others, moral notions. Beyond the descriptive or conceptual faculty, the use of an X-word largely depends on how the word is taken by a particular speaker in his moral conversation.\(^{45}\)

\(^{44}\) Philippa Foot (1967) *Theories of Ethics*, pp. 124-5 (Oxford University Press).

\(^{45}\) Cf. R.M. Hare (1952) *Language of Morals*, pp. 112-3 (Oxford University Press).
this sense, moral statements are no longer appreciated as a way of asserting only that some state of affairs obtains, but as a way, in their specific character, of expressing our moral notions in relation to the world. This is a particular character of moral statements; the meaning of a moral statement varies entirely in accordance with whether or not we see the object an X-word denotes with some moral notions.

However, the point is that words do not always clearly and successfully reveal their multifarious meanings on the surface structure of statements which they compose, as is the case of drawings. Drawings convey to us some clear idea of the beauty of scenery, but some other ideas do not clearly and always appear on the horizon of our simple perception, as with the sense of beauty that drawings reveal. In the same way some words, in certain particular statements, reveal their meanings only in part, not in a fuller sense, due to their idiosyncratic grammar of expression. Statements like ‘Doing α is good’ in sports, or ‘Doing β is good’ in a musical play, show clearly this specific grammar of expression. No lucidity about the reason why one should do α or β rather than χ or δ has appeared on the surface of these statements. But this does not necessarily mean that no reason exists for doing α or β. We can enquire about the whys and the wherefores from the speakers of the statements and may hear the proper kind of answer; that is to say, by doing α the centre assists the right wing in Rugby and doing such a thing eventually leads to the winning of the game, or by doing β the clarinettist makes the music much more harmonious and thus plays the music more beautifully. For the speakers in these cases the ‘good’ means winning the game or playing more beautiful music. However, the reasons why these actions are called ‘good’ do not yet clearly appear on the surface of the statements.

We express our thoughts, emotions and feelings through movements of the body, sounds, drawing and sentences, etc. In the same way we express our moral notions through our actions or sentences. ‘The human body is the best picture of the human soul,’
writes Wittgenstein. The same thought might well be applied, without any alteration, to sentences and actions as an extended form of sentences. But such notions do not clearly appear on the surface of moral statements, though they accompany X-words when the words are used adequately in moral discourse; this is because notions do not carry descriptive or perceptual connotations. Therefore, these notions are assumed to be somewhere in moral statements, i.e. beneath the moral statements. This means that moral statements are not such descriptive statements as the moral realist claims, depicting moral realities as he assumes, but are a certain specific way of expression as a form of our seeing something from a moral point of view or with moral notions. Being understood in this way, it must be assumed that moral statements are a certain specific form of statement which does not plainly reveal these notions in its surface meanings, but a form of statement which is sustained by moral notions that must be assumed to lie beneath the surface in a grammatical sense or in our mind in an ontological sense. The notions are hidden from the statements; they are invisible from a grammatical point of view. This way of characterisation of moral statements might seem to be steering clear of the weakness of moral realism which makes a grammatical difficulty in construing the structure of moral statements.

Projectivism, in a positive view, might be taken in part as a distinctive theory that highlights the character of human expressions. However, relying too heavily on moral emotivism, the projectivist partially sees and erroneously examines the nature of moral utterances, and thus overlooks an important feature of moral statements, with which moral statements can be construed more adequately than when interpreted improperly by relying mainly on moral emotivism. Blackburn's projectivism or quasi-realism is a


47 From this account might be derived the statement 'Actions are the best picture of moral notions'.
continual harking back to emotivism and loses a positive transformation its initial meaning. When words such as 'rescuing', 'helping', 'stealing', 'murdering', ... are uttered by someone else, we sometimes feel certain kinds of strong emotion and project them towards the utterance or what the words denote, as the projectivist claims; we often feel a particular timbre and ambient abomination when we hear the word, for instance, 'murder'. This is so especially when these words come into moral discourse. The word 'kicks' in T-statement 'T kicks a boy' causes offence to someone, but this is not the case for the same word in S-statement 'S kicks a ball'; there is a remarkable contrast between the two different uses of the same word 'kicks'. A person speaks the word 'stealing' with a very unpleasant speech sound, but does not for the word 'helping'. The same is also true for the case of the word 'water-pollution'; the word in most cases is used in a factual or scientific term, but when it once enters into moral discourse it carries a very strong abhorrent feeling. The meaning of the word that is used in an environmental scientist's report is fundamentally different from the feeling the word produces when it is used in moral colloquy. From this observation comes a very simple clarity about the fact that certain particular emotional attitudes accompany some words when we use them in moral discourse.

Certainly, these emotional attitudes are, in their nature, too vague to be cognitive or meaningful elements in construing relevant statements, as Wittgenstein and A.J. Ayer suggest; they may be counted as pure psychological reactions towards the impressions the exemplary words produce and also as factors breaking the grammar of moral statements, as is claimed by the verificationist. But the emotivist, in seeing the other facet that his theory implies in itself, does not have any interest in examination of the nature of emotional attitude in relation to the idea of moral notions, ie. the idea of underlying or accompanying meanings of words. This is because, it

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seems to me, the emotivist misses the point that we express our attitudes towards the utterance of some words from some religious or political points of view and in the same way from moral points of view. Attitudes, in this point-of-view theme, might be thought to be rooted, in whatever way it may be, in certain kinds of basic notions through which we assess the world, though there exists much difficulty in the articulation of these basic notions.

Hume's phrase 'the point of view of humanity' might be one proper example of the basic notions. Many philosophers and psychologists introduce a view which takes emotions to be combinations of affects, cognitions and desires. Sartre seems to characterise certain emotions, such as horror, in terms of affective ways of seeing the world; and other philosophers, influenced by Sartre, have claimed that emotions are interpretive patterns of awareness of the world and the people in it. S. Schachter and J.E. Singer also define emotion as 'a joint function of a state of physiological arousal and an appropriate cognition', and many other exponents of this view, including A. MacIntyre, C.D. Broad, S. Hampshire and J. Marks, speak of emotions as feelings along with beliefs or imaginations; they understand emotions as 'affectively charged cognitions'. R.C. Solomon, amongst others, has given a


purely cognitive account of emotions, analysing them in terms of such phenomena as thoughts, awareness, and apprehensions. These accounts might seem more promising than other suggestions. Solomon writes thus:

I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or offended me. Accordingly, we might say that anger involves a *moral* judgment ..., an appeal to moral standards and not merely personal evaluations. My anger *is* that set of judgments. Similarly, my embarrassment is my judgment to the effect that I am in an exceedingly awkward situation. My shame *is* my judgment to the effect that I am responsible for an untoward situation or incident. My sadness, my sorrow, and my grief *are* judgments of various severity to the effect that I have suffered a loss. An emotion is an evaluative (or a 'normative') judgment, a judgment about my situation and about myself and/or about all other people.52

The cognitivist claims that emotions are actually sets of judgments, thoughts, or awareness, and so, given the appropriate set of cognitions, one will indeed have an emotion. J. Oakley partially dissents from these cognitivist claims, but the epitome of his main objection to the claim might be that cognition alone is insufficient for emotion; yet he agrees with the involvement of cognitions in the concept of emotion, as is given by his own conceptualisation of emotion: 'an emotion is a complex which involves dynamically related elements of cognition, desire, and affectivity'.53

A thoroughgoing investigation of the use of X-words reveals much more clearly the existence of accompanying emotions when we use the words, though they often seem to be contingent, as we have examined

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them so far. Such emotions may not have seemed, for some philosophers, to be clear in their meaning, and consequently the idea of the association between the emotions and the words might have counted for them as something meaningless. However, the idea of association must not be counted for nothing and put aside as is done by some philosophers, like Ayer and Wittgenstein. The point is that the word ‘kicks’ in T-statement carries some emotional meanings in its use, but the same word in S-statement does not carry with it any emotion; and no other reason for the point can be seen, except that the former case invites moral assessment whereas the latter does not. Both T and S-statement share one and the same grammar, but they are clearly different in their meanings as we see from the different uses of the word ‘kicks’ in the statements and the entirely different functions - positive or negative - in the accompanying emotions in the use of the word. The words entering into moral discourse always carry certain particular emotions like sympathy or antipathy, but the words outside moral discourse may or may not do so. It follows from this fact that the emotions arising in moral discourse are not to be taken as something totally meaningless; they make themselves a specific meaning in moral discourse; therefore, they must be taken rather as a *sine qua non* which makes our colloquy *moral* in one way or another; they are distinctive, insofar as they accompany some serious moral discourse.

Certain things are objects for which we have emotions morally relevant at the very moment we *see* them, but other things are not; certain words carry our emotions at a time when we utter them, but other words do not. Therefore, these emotions are something which must not be taken, in a logical sense, as something worthless which is a pure psychological reaction to certain things as long as they are accounted for morally relevant ones. This means that something logically precedes the accompaniment of emotions: *ex nihilo nihil fit*, i.e. the accompaniment of emotions is something to do with the way of moral seeing or the moral notions. The point is that the emotions are
closely related in one way or another to the points of view with which we see things and utter the words. Seeing a thing carries some particular emotions especially when we see it from a certain point of view, but it may not carry the same emotions if we see the same thing from other points of view. Likewise, for an environmental researcher the factual phenomenon in which rivers are polluted with filthy waste from factories does not carry emotions about the pollution in the same way and degree that such a phenomenon carries a moralist's emotions against it. This suggests that having emotions is logically related to seeing things in some specific ways or with some points of view. The moral emotivist fails to touch this basic ground of moral emotions and its causal relations with the way of moral seeing. It seems that if the emotivist were to accept the idea of accompanying meanings of moral statements, not his idea that characterises moral attitudes as simple or meaningless feelings, the emotivist or the verificationist broken-grammar view of moral statements would not result. C.L. Stevenson's conception of 'attitude' adjoins this point I have just suggested, but this classical emotivist view of attitude falls too short.  

Different experiences of the world entail different ways of seeing and vice versa. We see certain things from certain specific points of view; in this case emotions accompany seeings; but in other cases they do not. Of course, there are some exceptional cases, like anxiety and phobia, in which certain emotions arise without such seeing. In a logical sense, therefore, the relationships between the ways of seeing and the accompaniment of emotions are contingent. However, a particular connection, in many other cases, must be presumed to exist between the emotions and the ways of seeing things around us from certain points of view. This means that the emotions have surely something to do with the ways of seeing things. This critical point might be sustained by the cognitive-affective theories of emotion  

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54 Charles L. Stevenson (1944) *Ethics and Language* (Yale University Press).
which suggest that emotions accompany cognitions or beliefs.\textsuperscript{55} However, this is what the classical moral emotivist erroneously disregards. In other words, the classical emotivist fails to see a particular connection between the ways of seeing and the accompaniment of emotions in the ways of seeing.

The seeing of things from moral points of view is distinctive, in its logic, from the seeing of things with other points of view; we may see a certain thing from a moral point of view; we may see the same thing from a political point of view; and the two seeings are different in their meaning. However, the meaning of the phrase ‘seeing things from moral points of view’ is not different in its logic from the meaning of the phrase ‘seeing things [with] moral notions’. Moral seeing, if it is truly a moral seeing, always presupposes moral notions; without them no moral seeing takes place.

‘The notion of persons’, R.S. Peters rightly says (applying Kant's supreme ethical principle), ‘picked out not simply the fact; it also bore witness to the ethical importance of the fact’.\textsuperscript{56} The ethical importance of the fact is not naturally shared by the fact \textit{per se}; the fact shares something of ethical importance only when a seeing with moral notions takes place. Therefore, it must be granted that moral notions are something which do not exist in the fact itself; they must be somewhere outside the factual properties; they might be something like mental properties. The colour-impression in ‘It looks red’ cannot be detached from the object, but moral notions do not belong to this case; they are genetically exogenous.\textsuperscript{57} If it is true to say that we have moral notions and see things with these notions, it would necessarily follow that moral statements are concerned with our representations of

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  \item \textsuperscript{56} R.S. Peters (1966) \textit{Ethics & Education}, p. 209 (London: George Allen & Unwin). (Italics mine)
  \item \textsuperscript{57} See Hume's argument again, which is quoted in the last part of the preceding section.
\end{itemize}
our moral notions.\textsuperscript{58} It is however not an easy job to discover whether we first understood the reference of the subject of a moral statement and thought of it afterwards in moral terms, or approached it the other way around. Nonetheless, it is very clear that we do indeed see, with our moral notions, a particular thing as morally relevant.

Moral seeing presupposes moral notions; it is a kind of \textit{notional} seeing which is significantly different from classical emotivism and its transformation. Moral statements might well be examples of our representations of our moral notions. However, the moral notions do not clearly appear in moral statements; therefore we cannot see them in the grammatical structure of moral statements. They are not conceptually involved by the subjects of moral statements; what is more, they are not such primary or secondary qualities as those which can be grasped through our physical perceptions, since they do not carry the perceptual connotation. Nevertheless, if we once appreciate both claims, that moral seeing presupposes moral notions, and that these notions do not appear on the surface structure of moral statements, then we should alternatively admit that they exist somewhere between the subjects and the predicates of moral statements; this is not because they are thought to be so in terms of a metaphysical assumption that value systems precede all value judgments, but because, as a logical necessity, if the subjects do not conceptually involve value properties which belong or relate to the meanings of the predicates, then alternatively the value properties must be taken to \textit{mediate} between the subjects and the predicates. In being beneath the surface structure of moral statements, it must be understood, moral notions \textit{connect} the subjects and the predicates in moral statements.

The naturalist's form of transformation of an moral statement, 'X gives us pleasure and pleasure is good', might be an example of

\textsuperscript{58} This representational theory (of perception) rejects the naive realist view of perception; it holds that our experiences have intentional content. See, F. Jackson (1977) \textit{Perception} (Cambridge University Press).
mediate inference, although this naturalist form of inference has been considered to have some weakness when we examine the naturalist mediate variable ‘pleasure’ (eg ‘pleasure’ that is descriptive in a factual sense), which must be assessed again by the sense of moral goodness. But if we apply the idea of moral notions, instead of applying the idea of the naturalist mediate variables, we can reveal more clearly how moral notions function meaningfully between the subjects and the predicates of moral statements and how they exist beneath the surface structure of X-statements, thus: X is accompanied by (and therefore represents) a moral notion and the moral notion is good, therefore we can safely get an X-statement, ie. ‘X is good’. A moral notion, for instance, the mind of commiseration or the mind of complaisance, to borrow Mencius's terms in this form of inference, differs considerably in its characteristics from the naturalist's mediate variable ‘pleasure’; the former is characterised by a notional word which intrinsically expresses the positing by a human mind of a value, whereas the latter is characterised by a factual word.

Human behaviour, if it is not to be taken as unconscious, is accompanied by (and therefore represents) some notional entities. If we admit this argument, we should also accept that moral behaviour (X) is accompanied by some moral notions. One behaves in a specific way and one's notions ride the behaviour; if this is true, it would follow that when one behaves in terms of morals, some moral notions accompany the behaviour; if not, the behaviour could not be properly called 'moral behaviour' at all. In the same way if one looks at X, the looking is notional. ‘X is accompanied by (and therefore represents) moral notion’. in the above paragraph, is a factual statement, because it is basically a factual thing to enquire whether or not the behaviour is accompanied by the moral notion, though such an enquiry is extremely difficult to carry out (and thus must be left for another study). However, to say that ‘moral notion is good’ is a kind of categorial

59 See section 2.1 for the naturalist's transformation of an X-statement and the criticism I made.
statement which means that the moral notion belongs to the category of moral goodness.

If we follow this approach to the examination of the structure of moral statements and the place of moral notions mediating them, it would be not so difficult for us to understand the fact that moral notions do not appear in the grammatical structure of the sentences; they are something invisible and cannot appear on the surface of the statements; they are hidden, in their features, by the appearance, because they are lying beneath the descriptive meanings of X-words, ie. beneath the appearances X-words denote. Though they lie behind our descriptive use of words, they nevertheless connect the subjects and the predicates of moral statements in a particular way suggested above and consequently signify that the statements express our mind meaningfully. Such being understood, it seems, contrary to the realist claim, that the mediate variables ‘moral notions’ are not something independent from us; this is because they are not of the realist or the projectivist conception of the qualities of things which seem to be independently as other things are in the world; they might be something constituting the postures of the mind.

Rejecting the realist idea of moral realism and criticising some existing ethical theories, especially with ethical emotivism and projectivism or quasi-realism, the logical device conjoining the subjects and the predicates of moral statements has been established. The realist idea is first rejected, ie. the realist tenets of moral realities which are explained in terms of mind-independency and objective observation, on the account both that the predicates in moral statements are not at all mind-independent, observational terms and that the subjects or X-words are primarily factual whereas moral realities are not to be considered to be in rerum natura, ie. with the factual meanings of X-words.

Blackburn's quasi-realism, as a much developed branch of ethical emotivism, seemed to be much closer to my idea, because it recognises subjective sources of our moral judgments. However, applying the
concept of secondary quality, quasi-realism admits that values exist in the way of something like colour or something which is interwoven into the fabric of our experience of external world. Thus, Blackburn's picture of moral realities is akin to moral realism which is criticised through this chapter.

Rejecting and criticising the existing theories in terms of the nature of moral statements, I have sketched a profound theory which explains the way with which we see the structure of moral statements, without committing the realist error of confusing factual realities of things and our valuational propensity to things around us. This theory admits ethical emotivism, but partly, because rejecting its undifferentiated idea of our emotive responses onto the world, it does not fall into the emotivist's naive interpretation of the nature of emotions. Thus the theory does not see moral statements as something of 'expressing attitudes' or 'expressive semantics'.\textsuperscript{60} The theory instead sees moral statements as evaluative semantics which are, in a logical sense, unable to be thought in another way from the way of seeing things through our moral notions. However, on the surface of such statements do not appear the moral notions with which we see things; they are grammatically hidden beneath the surface structure of the statements.

\textsuperscript{60} These terms have been borrowed from M. Devitt (1984) \textit{Realism and Truth}, p. 55 (Oxford: Blackwell).
Beyond the Realist Mode of Rationality: the dimension of moral notions

Modern educational theorists, including Paul H. Hirst, accept the realist assumption, without much alteration, in their theories of moral education, wherein they aim to foster ultimately the rational moral mind of the pupil. This assumption is allied to a strong conviction of the increasing rationality of human conduct, and also to the view that progressive growth in scientific knowledge seems to be able to uncover the natural order of things, as is indicated in B. Smart's comment on the modernity of rationality and truth. However, it seems that the assumption gives rise to much difficulty when applied to moral education, if a serious examination is given to the realist's claims for the rationality of moral beliefs and to his ontology of moral


realities. It would be indeed very baffling, if one takes the view of moral notions developed in the preceding chapters, to accept the position that we can justify moral beliefs, in education, on the grounds of the rationality of morality and the realist ontology of moral realities.

Relying on the idea of ‘moral notions’, this chapter will offer a brief critical examination of the realist claim of rationality in relation to moral judgments, and proceed to establish a non-realist position on moral understanding, based on the conception of ‘moral notions’. For this purpose, more detailed features of moral notions will be identified through an in-depth analysis of their logical characteristics, and also the place of moral notions in moral understanding will be specified.

4.1 Differences between seeing what is really there and seeing what seems to be there

Truth is logically presupposed as a guiding principle in the pursuit of knowledge of what is the case. From the argument in Plato’s Theaetetus to the viewpoint of recent epistemologists such as A.J. Ayer and R.M. Chisholm, it has been convincingly maintained that knowing presupposes truth. In this regard, if the pupil knows that p, then it is necessarily the case that p must be true.1 Realism, amongst other theories, takes this condition of knowing as a cardinal principle for all academic enquiries, even if it is not made explicit. The same position is taken by the moral realist, and many similar ideas have been upheld by educational theorists who side with modern rationalism, as is seen, for instance, in Hirst’s early theory of liberal education, and his theory of moral education in particular, although Hirst’s position is now a bit different. Hirst writes:

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The form, by virtue of its particular terms and logic, has expressions and statements (possibly answering distinctive types of question) that in some way or other, however indirect it may be, are testable against experience. This is the case in scientific knowledge, moral knowledge, and in the arts, though in the arts no questions are explicit and the criteria for the tests are only partially expressible in words.⁴

It is however very debatable whether all human intellectual pursuits should be so regarded, including the sphere of moral education, in the same way as the realist claims and as Hirst writes above. Diverse types of argument, which deny the rationality of moral judgments, abound in the field of metaethics. Amongst these is the case for moral emotivism, for instance. The non-realist, who partly, if not entirely, accepts ethical emotivism, denies the possibility of objective moral realities and rational claims based on them. The non-realist instead believes that moral statements are expressions of our moral feelings about the world and, for this very reason, they are deemed, by the realist, not to be assessed by the realist standard of verification.

According to a moral realist, like John McDowell, moral realities exist in the way things are in the world, independently of our experience of them. For him, therefore, moral realities must be something that can be seen or discovered by the pupil in a certain specific way.⁵ If this is the case, then the seeing would be objective, and thus moral statements, which are regarded by the realist as the descriptions of moral realities which we actually see, could be verified as true or false. However, it can hardly be sustained that the structure of moral statements meets the suppositions of moral realism, if we take the non-realist view which claims that moral realities are not what are ‘really there’ but what only seem to be there when we see things with moral notions.

⁴ Paul H. Hirst (1965) op. cit., p. 129. (Italics mine)

'Seeing what is really there' presupposes something which exists there in the world independently from the pupil who sees it. And in this case, the denotation of a X-word must be an object, whatever realism means by 'seeing', and, only if this is so, could the realist safely say that he sees a certain moral reality which a X-word denotes. It is, nonetheless, very difficult to agree that moral realities exist in the way that the realist maintains, and can be 'seen' objectively by the pupil in the class room. However, it would be assumed that many a pupil would 'see' nothing else except for the factual elements which X-words denote, when they are given a moral statement; this is particularly likely for the judgment of the moral-novitiate who is at the initial stage of moral understanding. This is because X-words like 'helping' and 'rescuing'(a life) connote in their primary meanings factual or empirical properties, and the same is true for other X-words.

The referents of X-words are obviously observable by the pupil's physical seeing, because they are factual things and thereby necessitate observations for the final attestation of their objective existence. However, if the moral realist insists that moral reality exists mind-independently in the real world and can be discovered by perception, then he would become a naive realist who views moral reality as an immediate object of perception. And an epistemological difficulty at once arises immediately from this naive or common-sense realist position, the difficulty in discerning the moral realities, whatever they may be, from the whole image reflected on the pupil's retina. The realist observation of moral reality is based on the assumption that

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6 Man first sees the physical world; the seeing in this case is possible by virtue of physical laws; thus this seeing can be called 'physical seeing'. However, without utilising epistemological principles and apparatuses (ie concepts), man is helpless with physical seeing alone, because he is unable to make any distinction among the spinning whirl of lights and colours or the conglomeration of images of things around conveyed by his optical sense. Seeing with epistemological principles and apparatuses might be called 'conceptual seeing'. The phrase 'physical seeing' is very similar in its use to the physiological criterion of seeing that appears in Wittgenstein (1958) *ibid*, part ii, xi, 212e. For the initial idea of 'seeing', see J.F. Soltis (1966) *Seeing, Knowing and Believing*, ch. 5 (London: George Allen & Unwin).
value and fact are not to be precisely differentiated. However, it is logically improbable that the factual image reflected on the pupil's retina necessarily reflects to us at the same time the moral realities which the realist assumes to be there in the factual events.

Realism bases its classification on empiricism, as Hilary Putnam writes correctly. It is a theory about the external world as perceived by observers. Realism has been developed from naturalism and physicalism; thus it sees truth as correspondence between statements and worlds, i.e., between statements and some sets of things the statements describe. Therefore, the realist conception of the truth of any statement basically depends on how well statements correspond with the things they refer to. However, the issue of truth in moral statements hardly fits this realist condition for truth. The difficulty arises mainly from the differing nature of ways of seeing; seeing things that are really there as physical objects or qualities is one thing and seeing moral realities quite another. Moral reality, if it exists, does not appear in the world as clearly and objectively as things 'that are really there'; and seeing moral realities, accordingly, does not requires the same conditions as seeing things 'that are really there'. It would, therefore, not be difficult to find that the pupil who is asked to 'see' moral realities in an actual situation will be very much confused, if he endeavours to do so in accordance with the realist principle of epistemology. The pupil, it would not be very difficult to suppose, will instantly face a great difficulty in discerning any moral reality before he picks it out, if a realist teacher teaches his pupil a moral statement of the form 'X is good' and expects him to pick out the actual moral element from the things 'X' denotes. Things themselves tell or show us nothing of value; they reflect nothing of moral reality by themselves

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for the pupil's eyes, even though we admit *ex hypothesi* that there are such realities as is assumed by the realist teacher.

No correspondence theory of truth is possible in a strict sense, according to Blackburn. Blackburn maintains that any acceptance of correspondence theory results in implausible ideas. He writes thus:

This invitation [however] may lead to bad development: to the idea of the mind's awareness of fact as something which, favorably, is uncontaminated by judgment, and purely passive; or to the idea of thoughts as pictures in the mind copying the world, or to the idea that each individual judgment has its own identity regardless of its associations with any others in a body of beliefs, and is in turn made true by one isolated, self-subsistent state of affairs. 9

In the sky there is no distinction of east and west; people create the distinctions out of their own minds and then believe them to be true. Just as a picture is drawn by an artist, all our civilisations and cultural surroundings are created by the activities of the mind. The moral mind is not purely passive in its nature: it creates something ideal in its own core; it is not a copy of the world; it rather constructs the moral world it enshrines. And yet the moral mind is not isolated from other beliefs; it is a complex product of the pursuit of the good life. If these statements are accepted, then, unlike the case of the correspondence between the statement 'Snow is white' and the colour of the snow in the yard, the claim that the moral statement 'X is good' points to a certain definite reality of goodness to which the statement corresponds, in the way that realism implies, would be absurd.

Saussure, as a linguist, also does not accept the realist's correspondence theory of truth; he rather favours truth as a grammatically correct assertion in a linguistic expression. 10 There is a deep gap between realities and linguistic expressions. Thus the structural linguist rejects both the realist's conception of objective

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10 Cf. The Wittgensteinian conception of language-game and certainty.
reality and his theory of truth. On the contrary, he conceives language as something which *gives* a special 'spectrum of reality'; for him language creates a distinct form of the world. Not always does language describe simply the world as it is; rather it creates more often than not something which is not really there; it creates something which is possible.\(^{11}\) The objects of our intellectual enquiry do not always and simply exist outside our conceptual schemes, nor are they discovered; instead, they are created, as in the cases of geometry, arts and ethics, in particular.\(^{12}\) From this argument, it follows that meanings of words do not always have language-independent referents to which meanings correspond.\(^{13}\) It is indeed hardly tenable that the function of language is description and nothing else. Language does much more than describing things. Therefore, if someone says that all utterances, including the aesthetic and the moral, are descriptive, he would commit a 'descriptive fallacy', to borrow a phrase from J. Austin.\(^{14}\)

Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, as Hume states.\(^{15}\) Values might be understood as something interwoven into the fabric of our experience of the world and, therefore, they might be observed, that is to say, as secondary qualities. But the observation of values is not the same thing as seeing what is really there, because values are not qualities in physical objects; they are something in the mind. Values are to be thought of as standards with which we evaluate things when we perceive something

\(^{11}\) D. Lewis (1973) *Counterfactuals*, p. 84 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).


\(^{14}\) J. Austin (1962) *How to Do Things with Words*, p. 3 (Harvard University Press).

agreeable or disagreeable. They are, it seems, **modes** of our assessment of the world and, for this reason, if we describe them as actual properties of the world, it would be misleading; they are not *in rerum natura.*

Bernard Williams partly accepts the above point, as he makes a distinction between the world which exists independently of our experience and the world which *seems* to exist. In other words, there are two different worlds; one is the world which is *really* there, and the other is the one which only *seems to be* there; they are perhaps the two worlds denoted by Kant's terms as 'noumena' and 'phenomena'. If there are two different worlds, then there can certainly be two different 'seeings': seeing what is really there and seeing what seems to be there. Once we accept the distinction between the two seeings, there would be no further difficulty in accepting the non-realist claim that moral realities are not what are really there in the world. 'Seeing what is really there' and 'seeing what seems to be there' are fundamentally different in an epistemological sense. The moral realist, it seems, confuses this point, and this confusion leads consequently to the absurd support of a correspondence theory of truth which is invalid in the sphere of morality.

Different conceptions of the way of seeing things, as clarified above, yield different envisions of truth: one fits for seeing what is really there and the other for seeing what seems to be there; the former, contrary to the latter, bases itself exclusively on the empiricist view of truth and consequently relates only to enquiries about anything *outside* the world of mental and subjective explorations. Hence things in the case of the former can be properly and truly known through some fixed standard of scientific method erected on an assumed Archimedian point which is far out of a contact with a subjective way of seeing things.

Allied exclusively to rationalism or objectivism, the realist conception of truth suppresses thoroughly the conventionality of our

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16 Bernard Williams (1985) *op. cit.*
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way of seeing, which is developed and transmitted through a long history of practical transitions in how things are understood. In this way, the realist tries to touch only something real, objective and scientific, as he considers. As Gadamer points out, the imperialism of scientific method and its restrictions upon what counts as truth engender much more difficulty than any other theory of truth in the history of epistemology. Therefore, it could hardly be maintained that the natural sciences are the sole mode of acquiring true knowledge and the universally applicable model of intellectual exploration. Scientific imperialism is seriously defective through overlooking other types of human enquiry which accommodate human intellectual uncertainty, in their methodology and therefore surpass exclusively confined rationality. The realist conception of truth seriously confines itself only to the correspondence between descriptions and objects to which the descriptions refer and to the way of seeing what is 'really' there, at the cost of ignoring other conceptions of truth in relation to seeing what seems to be there.

4.2 Ineffability and vagueness of moral notions

Tools in a carpenter's tool-box differ in their shape and colour, in their weight and size, and in their use in particular. Every tool in a tool box has perhaps been made for a particular purpose of use. But an instrument held in a masterly carpenter's hand is not used for only one fixed specific purpose of manipulation. Likewise, there are many relative meanings in the use of a word, just as many different uses exist for a tool in a carpenter's hand; the realist misses this crucial point about language. The multiplicity of the use of words appears in their practice in many language-games, as we usually experience in the


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use of ordinary language and also even in specific theoretical discourses. 'Seeing' and 'objects of seeing' are not used solely in an invariable sense. They have a wide range of applications, especially when they are used for different contexts and specific purposes. Differentiation of the meanings of 'seeing' entirely depends on the nature of the different objects of seeing. Certain objects are factual, as in the case of observations in the enquiries of some natural sciences, and certain other objects are purely conceptual or 'notional', such as those considered in this text. The seeing of factual objects is exactly equivalent to the seeing 'what is really there'; the objects of seeing in this case are mind-independent or external to the mind, like a teapot and a toboggan. In this respect, if a pupil really knows what a toboggan is, he would then have an idea or a picture of a toboggan in his mind. In this case, the picture might be very clear and simple in its perspicuity and, a fortiori, he could draw a picture of toboggan clearly on a piece of paper and it would be equivalent to the image which is reflected in his mind.

However, conceptual seeing, in its logical sense, can take place without such factual objects as are mentioned above. Having made a thorough investigation of his life and epistemic ideal, Plato, it seems, devoted himself to helping his students to see those objects of seeing, which exist independently of physical eyes. In a geometrical enquiry, lines, points and circles do not necessarily require to be drawn on a piece of paper, though they are useful, as often as not, for the students who are at a lower level of geometry. A triangle on a paper is not exactly how it is defined in terms of geometry. In a logical sense, a defined triangle does not exist there in the real world, unlike the way a toboggan exists: infinity, a number which is conceptualised as unlimited, boundless and endless in quantity, does not have any

See Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) *Philosophical Investigation*, section 23 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), where Wittgenstein writes about the multiplicity of language-games; '... giving orders, and obeying them - describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements - constructing an object from a description (a drawing) - reporting an event - speculating about an event ...'
extension, so it is properly expressed by the symbol \( \infty \) in a limited extension on a piece of paper; it exists in our mind; it is conceptual in its essential sense. Geometricians see for instance a concept which is defined as a ‘plane polygon having three straight sides’.

Seeing things through moral notions is not quite different, at least in its basic mode, from conceptual seeing, just because both do not have any fixed factual objects of seeing; notional seeing is, in this sense, on a par with conceptual seeing. However, one critical point to be made here is that, unlike such objects of conceptual seeing as ‘triangle’ or ‘infinity’ (of number), those of notional seeing do not always have any succinctly definable elements. ‘Benevolence’, for example, does not have any clearly defined conceptual element; the same is true for the case of ‘reverence for life’. Thus, use of the pronouns ‘this’ and ‘that’ in both statements, ‘This is reverence for life’ and ‘That is what benevolence denotes’ would be very improbable. In contrast to the case of ‘triangle’, the denotations of

20 Mathematical knowledge originates, as we understand it, from the practical activities of Egyptians, Babylonians and Chinese. However, much developed mathematics in a later period was no longer tied to practical activities; it was only occasionally that mathematicians were concerned with the physical properties of real things, though in applied mathematics this is nowadays not the case. As a matter of fact, a very limited study of our mathematical understanding is possible through observations and manipulations of ordinary things, as we see in the results of Piaget's experimental research on the development of children's mathematical concepts. But rods and beads in childhood mathematics are simply the classroom children's mathematical toys, and these must be abandoned later as their mathematical thinking is more developed. Several millennia ago, mathematical knowledge was rudimentary and from this humble beginning it has evolved and changed in its form into the present impressive corpus of highly abstract knowledge. Thus, referents of mathematical words at an advanced level no longer remain as perceptual items like the rods and beads what may be useful in the mathematical learning at its lowest level, for instance, at the level of concrete operations in Piaget's theory of cognitive development. Cf. G. Frege (1971) On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic (ed. and trans. E.H.W. Kluge) (Yale University Press) and P. Kitcher (1984) The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (Oxford University Press). Both works will be a great help to understanding historically the origin and transitions of mathematical knowledge. However, the two authors take quite different lines on the exploration of the nature of mathematical knowledge; Frege defends the apriorist thesis of mathematical knowledge, but on the contrary Kitcher rejects apriorism and thereby holds mathematical empiricism.
these demonstrative pronouns are too hazy to see in terms of conceptual sense. A fortiori, notional seeing can take place even when there exists something which is very little or not at all to do with the concept of a notional term. For example, it would be indeed very striking to apprehend that one sees 'sufferings of others' through the moral notion 'benevolence'; 'sufferings of others' are not the conceptual referents of benevolence, nor are they meanings of the term at all. Nonetheless, one sees such things through moral notions. Notional seeing goes far beyond the scope of conceptual seeing; it has some objects other than the conceptual elements, compared to the case of conceptual seeing which has no other objects than conceptual elements themselves. Thus, if one recognises this fundamental characteristic of notional seeing, one would therefore notice that it is very absurd in an epistemological sense to ask such questions as 'What is the referent of benevolence?' and furthermore 'What is there in the real world, to which the statement - This is benevolence or That is reverence for life - corresponds?'; 'What are the things the demonstrative pronouns - this and that - denote?' Notional seeing does not have any 'evidence-independent' referent, nor does it have more often than not any defined concepts. Seeing things through moral notions is beyond the factual and very often the conceptual scopes of observation.

Such being the case, it would be logically impossible to draw a picture of 'benevolence' or of 'reverence for life', for instance. Nevertheless, one could try to draw a picture of benevolence in an imaginary way, like a cartoon which shows how 'a man collects money for the lonely people' or 'a boy helps one's handicapped friend walking on the rough ground'. This imaginary expression may be related in one way or another to some meaning of benevolence, but it could not be said that what the cartoon of benevolence expresses is isomorphic to 'benevolence' in all its contexts. There is certainly an aspectual difference between them, i.e. between the picture of benevolence drawn by the pupil and the meaning of 'benevolence' per
The imaginary expression of 'benevolence' is distinctive from the conceptual manifestation of 'triangle'. It is essentially a matter of linking some sort of impression to certain actual and possible perceptions of things, like the sufferings of others or seeing a child drowning in a river.\textsuperscript{21} The image of benevolence is not conceptual, since the definiens of the term 'benevolence', if there is any, cannot be stated completely with words so as to be unequivocal and clear-cut in its meaning, though Mencius roughly defines it as 'the feeling of commiseration'.\textsuperscript{22} It is therefore far from the requirement of sharpness which we have for a realist picture, and also far from the mathematician's clarity of definition; the man who has a moral mind 'sees' 'sufferings of others' through the notion of benevolence.

'There is a quality of life', as writes A.N. Whitehead, 'which lies always beyond the fact of life'.\textsuperscript{23} This quality is embedded in the way of living; it is often as not hidden deeply beneath the descriptive level of living; hence invisible. Yet, the quality of life is meaningful; it is 'spun' by us in a specific way. Goodness in life is a 'non-natural quality', as G.E. Moore writes, and thus it neither exists in a particular time period nor in a terrestrial part of the world, nor presents itself to be perceived by our sensory experience. Goodness is a notional quality and therefore 'mystical' to the extent that the word functions without any definite factual reference. This notional world might be comparable to Lao-Tzu's metaphysical interpretation of Tao (way or main principle) in his Tao Te Ching, where he writes; it is something '... you look at, but cannot see, ... you listen to, but cannot hear, ... you try to grasp, but cannot get hold of, ...'\textsuperscript{24} In this phrase, the main principle which seems to lie beneath every phenomenon, either natural


\textsuperscript{22} J. Legge (1960) \textit{The Chinese Classics}, book. ii, ch. 6, p. 202 (Hong Kong University Press).


\textsuperscript{24} Lao-Tzu, \textit{Tao Te Ching}, ch. 14.
or non-natural, is vastly remote from our power of physical perception. In Lao-Tzu's metaphysics, the main principle is something that cannot be either denominated or illustrated by words; it is nevertheless something, according to his metaphysical illustration, which must be there in the world in which we live and 'which cannot be said', thus mystical to some extent; there are, it seems, order and complexity which express it, but what transcends the limit of our lingual expressions.

The world of moral notions might be compared, in an analogical sense, to the 'bland dark stuff' of the universe; it is ineffable and inarticulate. The meaning of the phrase 'respect for persons' as an expression of a part of the notional world is 'complex, controversial and in crucial ways confused', as Michael Katz has shown in his paper 'Respect for Person and Students: charting some ethical territory'. The notional world does not, accordingly, appear explicitly on the 'surface' of the mind or, in a more extreme way, in the factual or sensual world. It is rather mingled into practice, which is extremely complex, featureless and imprecise. Thus, if we try to give any name for the notions we have in mind, most parts of them become lost in language; such notions are beyond 'what can be said', hence practical rather than theoretical. The nature of moral notions in this sense almost agrees with J. White's conception of 'basic values' which are interpreted as 'deeply embedded features of our common life without which that life would be inconceivable'.

The imprecision and vagueness of the words for moral notions are


26 John White (1990) Education and the Good Life, pp. 118-9 (London: Kogan Page), where he continues; 'Attachment to one's friends is one such value. If you asked me why friendship is a good thing, I would not know how to reply. I could not point you to any more fundamental value on which it rests; and neither would I want to say that the value of friendship has an existence of its own in some Platonic world of values - they provide the framework for our common life. We have indeed created them and refashioned them - on a long time-scale, of course - so as to make this life less vulnerable and uncomfortable, and to enable us the better to flourish.'
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determined in principle not by the nature of the words themselves, but rather by the characters of notional qualities *per se*. What is more, moral notions reside in human function, and so they seem to be for man, as Aristotle postulates.\(^{27}\) They are therefore very difficult to describe; moral language fails more often than not to reveal this dimension. Though there are some words in moral dialogue, like 'reverence' (for life), 'benevolence', (human) 'dignity' and most likely 'goodness', these are not words whose meanings are clearly disclosed or efficiently revealed; they do not 'speak for themselves', as it were. Many moral notions can hardly be articulated, either in words or images, very similar to the values which are ineffable and far from having clear-cut meanings, even though there are some value-words which are articulated to some extent; however, they are, in a strict sense, 'what cannot be said'. Human self-knowledge also necessarily belongs to this particular case.\(^{28}\)

Not altogether differing from the way that teachers are unable to give a well articulated lingual and propositional account of their work in education, the practical dimension of moral life eludes the network of language as publicly used. This is mainly because moral notions are elusive in their nature and laid down in depths beneath our compound moral practices. For this reason, moral notions are often excluded from the category of knowledge, as some philosophers refuse to accept them in the field of knowledge. However, it would be premature to conceive that moral notions are purely emotional, as is claimed by the logical positivist or the ethical emotivist, and therefore meaningless altogether, and that they are disordered and outside the cognitive world. Though a large part of the notional mind seems to be too dark and delicate to distinguish and mould, it must be granted that the notional mind still effectively guides our thinking and imagination.

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when they deal with morality at its deepest level. Man inclines to express one's notional mind in various ways - facial or emotional expressions, positive or negative behavioural responses, and multiplex ways of life shown in certain specific mores - even if they are usually unsatisfactory. In fact, the notional mind in its very nature drives to tell us something and to reveal something which is quite beyond what can be said. In its context, it would be better to accept this notional expression as a special kind of language.

Notional language tells us 'what cannot be said' in a particular way, contrary to the language of fact which is the oppositional pair of notional language and tells us 'what can be said'. The majority of moral notions would be rather characterised by something that is 'tacit' or 'prearticulate' or 'ineffable', to borrow Michael Polanyi's terms again.29 Knowing and expressing something, as Polanyi writes, 'operate widely without causing us to utter any explicit statements', and even when they do issue in an utterance this is used merely as an instrument for enlarging the range of tacit powers that organise it.30

'Benevolence' may be used for expressing a certain position of our moral notions, but even in that case the word cannot depict precisely something one intends to express which is embedded in the depth of one's mind. In principle one cannot say 'what cannot be said'; a fortiori, one cannot say exactly even 'what can be said'; language disfigures and very often misrepresents life. Differing from language of fact, notional language mainly concerns the amorphous quality of the mind and therefore it has no definite or bounded meaning. The quality of life eludes the descriptive power of language; hence the vagueness or looseness of language, as found especially in notional language, is a distinctive aspect for a particular form of expression; M. Black is clearly aware of this remarkable point.31 Articulation in


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any sense pictures essential constituents of life, but only in some reduced scale; therefore, it lends itself more easily to the work of the imaginative manifestation of life. This is important particularly for the manifestations of moral life which are in essence delicately constituted by tacit components.

The articulation of substantial commitments of ‘benevolence’ must be very vague, broad and far reaching. According to Mencius, ‘all men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of other persons (in some cases, all other living beings, including plants) ... From this case we may perceive that the feeling of sympathy is essential to man ...’\(^\text{32}\) In his work, Mencius articulates this mind, which is essential to man, as ‘benevolence’, as introduced earlier. However, the remaining task is to make clear what the term ‘benevolence’ means; ‘benevolence’ may literally mean the ‘wish to do good or activity in doing good’. But this makeshift definition touches only the surface of such a notional quality of human mind, not its bottom; thus it lays on us a still further heavy and improbable onus of definition of the meaning of ‘doing good’; such a requirement leads naturally to the problem of vicious infinite regress. The mind which is denoted with the term ‘benevolence’ is too meager to be articulated more exactly. Mental qualities are far from reaching the requirement of legitimate articulation, because they are indefinite and boundless in their nature; they are shifting, elusive and polymorphous; hence they defy analysis.

4.3 Beneath the phenomena: the dimension of moral notions

Moral notions are amorphous. This conception of the nature of moral notions necessarily rejects the modernist view of moral education, in which a rigorous rationality in all moral conversations is

\(^{32}\) J. Legge (1960) \textit{op. cit.} (Italics mine)
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inappropriately sought. For this reason, the conception agrees partly with ethical emotivism. However, the authentic idea of ‘moral notions’, developed thus far, is not tantamount to that of the ethical emotivist, because the idea does not altogether deny the possibility of public agreement on moral judgments based on moral notions and consequently does not entirely exclude the possibility of cognitive morality. This point will be made here more distinctly, establishing a non-realistic point of view which stands clear from modern rationalism and the realistic way of understanding things, but still resists getting lost in the cosmic spectrum of skepticism.

Different modes of discourse yield different ways of justification. To demand the same criteria of justification for all logically different intellectual discourses is therefore to commit a justificatory mistake by ignoring the different modes of discourse. Some set their justificatory standards of truth to the rationalist or the realist tenets. Not every discourse can be justified in a rationalist or realistic way. Defined so narrowly, the rationalist stance of justification does not reach the point. Paul Feyerabend's conception of incommensurability tells the weakness of rationalism and realism.\(^{33}\) Marking the vital points involved in competing scientific theories reveals that they share no general standards of choice which scientists could appeal to when they adopt or work on one theory rather than another. Therefore, we are led necessarily to face the subjective aspect of enquiry. Choice among competing scientific theories cannot be determined by logically compelling arguments. Different scientists may make different choices in responding to the same situation.

The rejection of objectivity in natural sciences extends into the spheres of social sciences and also of ethics. No overarching cultural standards and social norms can be guaranteed as bases for comparisons; nor does any objective, fixed methodological principle

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exist on which we can rely as we make a judgment of superiority. Peter Winch and Roger Trigg both advocate this incommensurability between those things conceived by the different languages used in different societies. Winch's case for conventionalism and incommensurability in social sciences, mainly based on different linguistic analyses, suggests that there is no touchstone with which objective comparison can be made across different cultural and linguistic forms of life. Denying Lakatos's claim for the superiority of science, which defines in a positive way the relationship between science and other forms of knowledge, Feyerabend also constructs his own idea of the incommensurability between forms of knowledge, at least with an implication that there cannot be a decisive claim in favour of science over other forms of knowledge. 34 Things can be seen in different ways in accordance with different cultural contexts, ie. with different uses of language in different societies.

Moral notions are too vague to be scientific ideas and too esoteric to be objective, like the 'imagos' which are somewhat inchoate 'pictures' or not fully formed understandings of idealisations. 35 Commensurability in the time of Aristotle was taken as a hallmark of truly scientific arguments. Nonetheless, Aristotle's view of φρονησις, it seems, at first opened a new vista for practical deliberations, each of which has a unique form of discourse. He writes thus;

... there will be many philosophic wisdoms; there will not be one concerned with the good of all animals (any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing things),


but a different philosophic wisdom about the good of each species.\textsuperscript{36}

Practical deliberation about morals is not like scientific understanding, because it is in many cases anthropocentric. Deliberations about practical matters and also the words for them, at least in terms of Aristotle's ethics, are indeterminate, imprecise and indefinite, not because they are not adequate, but because of their necessary features.\textsuperscript{37} Every statement concerning matters of practice ought to be made in outline and not with precision; so Aristotle writes.\textsuperscript{38} Human understanding of practical matters is very different from that of theoretical matters which has to satisfy the scientific way of enquiry. This is not because ethics has not yet reached the level of an authorised discipline, but because it is not in its nature a study which must satisfy scientific rigour. For this very reason, contrary to Plato's approach, Aristotle emphasises repeatedly the point that the goal of ethical discourse is not purely to reach theoretical conclusions, but to attain some practical effects.

Aristotle attacks Plato's conception of goodness, which has recently been explained by Martha Nussbaum as something which lacks any 'fragility'\textsuperscript{39}. Contrary to the singleness of the Platonic conception of the form of the Good, Aristotle's 'good' is used in the categories of substance, quality and relation, and, among these categories, substance is prior in nature to the rest; therefore, there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods.\textsuperscript{40} 'Goodness', in Aristotle's terminology,

\textsuperscript{36} Aristotle (1915a) \textit{op. cit.}, 1141a31-2.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, 1137b17-19.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}, 1103b34-1104a10.

\textsuperscript{39} Martha Nussbaum compares Plato and Aristotle's conceptions of 'goodness'; thus, she interprets the 'goodness' in Plato's theory as having no 'fragility' and that in Aristotelian ethics as having 'fragility'. For this, see Martha Nussbaum (1986) \textit{The Fragility of Goodness}, parts ii & iii (Cambridge University Press).

\textsuperscript{40} Aristotle (1915a), \textit{op. cit.}, 1095a16-22.
cannot be something universally present in all cases of substantial goods. Rejecting thus Plato's unified scheme of ethics, 'Aristotle argues that the values that are constitutive of a good human life are plural and incommensurable', according to Martha Nussbaum.\textsuperscript{41} Aristotle gives us as an example the plurality of pleasure. Pleasures are distinct one from another, without having any commensurability; they are different kinds of excellent activity;\textsuperscript{42} they differ in kind, as the associated activities differ.\textsuperscript{43} Some of them are worthy of choice and some others are not; some are better and some others worse; some of them are pleasant only to corrupt people, while some others are pleasant to good people.\textsuperscript{44} 'Pleasure' can be used for many different purposes.

However, from the claim of the ineffability, vagueness and incommensurability of moral notions, a pessimistic view of inevitable disagreement in moral discourses does not necessarily follow; nor the view that seeing things through moral notions is altogether meaningless and helplessly esoteric. Even though the nature of moral notions enriches and evokes the vagueness of meanings in our moral discourses, it seems that there is a corresponding variation in a tacit coefficient of meaning and consequently a possible strength in expressing the complexities of moral notions and experiences. In order to express the 'rough ground' of our moral notions, language must be less precise in its conceptual circumscription. With a language which was all made up of precisely encompassing descriptions, expressions of our moral notions would not be possible. As it turns out, language, of any kind, fails to picture the moral notions which are deeply hidden in a culture; culture does not easily allow linguistic or conceptual delineation. Life is too fresh and complicated to manifest itself within

\textsuperscript{41} Martha Nussbaum, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 294.
\textsuperscript{42} Aristotle (1915a), \textit{op. cit.}, 1153b9-12.
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid.}, 1173b28ff.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.}, 1173b20ff.
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The horizon of lingual expression. Notional quality of 'life' might be the most significant one, but it is something which has not yet been touched; there is indeed the 'inexpressible', to borrow Wittgenstein's term.  

As the above proves, moral notions are too vague to be articulated clearly, to have self-contained meanings and to be contents for substantial communication. Such an account of the nature of moral notions avoids most distinctively the optimistic but very limited view of human enquiry which is favoured by the modern scientist and the rationalist, both of whom are over confident in the extreme view that language is meaningful when and only when it is used for 'what can be said', as is asserted in Wittgenstein's early thought. However, language does not necessarily mirror the world, simply because there is a 'mirrorless world', such as is seen through the eyes of the anti-realist, for instance, Richard Rorty. Not all parts of the mind reflect themselves on the 'mirror' of reality.

Moral notions very often represent themselves through habitual ways of acting and doing things; they are the motives of such actions. To adopt Iris Murdoch's phrases, moral notions are understood by some 'modes of vision' or 'qualities of consciousness'. For this reason, moral notions must be in their own right and therefore accounted as in their logic, unable to be reduced to the simple reflections of naive emotions or of something like simple aspirations. Beyond mere desires or aspirations, these modes and qualities of the notional mind seem to be determined in the experience of culture and these, in a reverse way, constitute the traditions of society. And these notional qualities pervade all the environment of forms of life.


However, in many cases, emotions accompany expressions of moral notions and are accompanied by morally relevant behaviours; when one has the mind of ‘benevolence’, it causes simultaneously certain modes of moral behaviour. Emotions and other affective states in some cases contain and reveal value and valuations, and then are related in one way or another to moral notions, though in other cases they are not.\(^{49}\) Desiring company might mean something like seeking emotional comfort and, for this reason, it cannot be clearly distinguished from the mind of ‘fraternity’ which involves some kind of moral sentiment. ‘Fraternity’ goes with ‘love’; they essentially involve emotions such as care, concern, interest, and sympathy; these emotions are morally significant in that they are embodied in our caring about promoting each other's good life; some range of human emotions share moral notions.\(^{50}\) The majority of the sentiments of desire for good company share some morally significant notions of humanity, though these sentiments do not necessarily appear as an articulated form of communication.\(^{51}\) Deeply seated in human nature and in our social traditions alike, such sentiments are rooted far beyond the intellectual and rational touch of our routine social life. They cut much deeper than scientific delineations of things.

The grandeur of human sentiments offers richness of moral imagination, ie. notional resources of morality. In this fact, such sentiments are to be thought of as having much to do with moral notions. These sentiments seem to transmit to actual social life through the vehicles of shared experiences and various ways of communal life,

\(^{49}\) In recent times the majority of philosophers in the fields of philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology have held that emotions are important for ethical knowledge and values are constituted by emotions. Emotions and values are closely intertwined, according to these philosophers. See, M. Stocker (1996) How emotions reveal value, in M. Stocker and E. Hegeman *Valuing Emotions* (Cambridge University Press).


Beyond the realist mode of rationality and truth particularly through sharing vocabularies which are accompanied by morally significant additional meanings.\textsuperscript{52} Including even assenting or dissenting facial expressions and ejaculations of ‘boo-hurrah’ feelings, multifarious ways of conversation, taking place in our traditions, are all constituents of the realms of meaningful life. The authentic form of conversation, it seems, takes place significantly with such moral sentiments which might be accounted properly as the extension of moral notions. Insofar as this specifically extended form of conversation proceeds well in our traditions without confronting any impairing breach, there must be a certain degree of public agreement. What is more, such a claim of agreement should legitimately be accepted in the way that traditions have shifted through the normal process of cultural transition and are based on deep and ‘rough ground’ commonly shared by the people in any society.

The conception of ‘deep and rough ground of traditions’ fit better the nature of notional language, to return to the coined word, rather than that of the language of fact whose meanings float without root in many ways in accordance with the indefinitely large disjunctive sets of attitudinal perspectives on the things referred to by the language and where therefore no common agreement could be found. For instance, ‘murdering’ as a X-word carries in itself ambivalence, because it helplessly allows many different perspectives for people who have differing attitudes to the event the word denotes. However, if one pays serious attention, not to the purposes of the act, but to the misery of the killing of a human being, then one would feel a very strong sentiment of sympathy for the victim, a sentiment which is possessed by all people whether they see the event in view of religion or of politics. The surface or lexical meaning of ‘murder’ falls too short of touching the underlying ground of the meaning - the feeling of

\textsuperscript{52} In this perspective, the claim is distinct from Oakeshott's stance which excludes, in the domain of 'rational conduct', experiences that are embedded in a traditional mode of conduct. Such experiences are not 'rational', according to Oakeshott. See Michael Oakeshott (1962) \textit{Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays}, pp. 84-5 (London: Methuen).
‘commiserations’, to borrow again Mencius's term. In the same way, two medical doctors' different ways of speaking about one and the same thing - one tells the truth about the diagnosis of a patient’s fatal illness and the other does not tell the truth about the result of diagnosis - are different in their meanings and have no parallel at all between them on the surface level. However, the case becomes different, if one tries to see what they say from the underlying motive in both human minds, for instance, 'commiseration'; the two doctor's words are not contrary in their deep meaning. Having a limited grammar, a X-word fails to refer to all our minds, as art disfigures life. The grammar of language of fact, in this account of it, is inappropriate for the underlying meanings of the practical expressions of human life. Per contra, notional language tells us something which is authentic and it far surpasses the grammatical limitations and various forms of representations of things, though sometimes this happens in a form of paradox. However, this does not necessarily mean that notional language destroys grammar.

The fragility of referents is the character of words. Complexity and diversity of meaning necessarily arise in the use of language of fact; nonetheless, beneath the diversity of the language, as is indicated above, are appropriate grounds of ethical goodness that are internal to the traditions and practices of our social life: this is so, even though the plurality of moral norms has been sustained by some philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, and Philippa Foot; these philosophers place much reliance on specific modes of virtues or moral norms that are local both in origin and in application, as Nussbaum mentions with concern. Such moral philosophers seem to read only the meaning that language of fact carries; therefore they

53 Cf. J. Legge (1960) op. cit.

appear to be missing something underlying; hence come ‘different voices and different worlds’.

However, moral conversations, if we read the grammar of notional language, do not drift inertly on the waves of the projections of individual or local interests and of shifting traditional tides. By contrast, moral discussion always seeks in depth the common grounds shared by seemingly different moral outlooks. Such enquiry for ‘moral depth’ appears in Aristotle, though he does not use the same language as is adopted here.

‘There is no one thing’, in Aristotle's discussion of the nature of pleasure, that is always pleasant, because our nature is not simple but there is another element in us as well. There may be many kinds of pleasure and no commensurability between them. The *joie de vivre* of a man is not always to do with goodness; it is very often ungood; it is a natural endowment, a gift of nature. Aristotle, however, seeks continuously the *goodness* of pleasure, and at the end of the discussion he concludes that God always enjoys a *single* and *simple* pleasure, not its multiplicity or mutability. ‘This account’, according to Nussbaum, ‘is supposed to be objective in the sense that it is justifiable by reference to reasons that do not derive merely from local traditions and practices, but rather from features of humanness that lie beneath all local traditions and are there to be seen whether or not they are in fact recognised in local traditions’. One of the Aristotle’s most obvious concerns, it is worth noticing, is his criticism of local moral traditions. Through this criticism he reached point of showing that something actually exists, which is most agreeable to our sense of goodness. There seems to be a large degree of agreement between local traditions, as is said by Aristotle in his *Politics*; ‘as a general rule

55 Aristotle (1915a), *op. cit.*, 1154b20.
57 Martha Nussbaum, *op. cit.* (Italics mine)
it is not what is ancient but what is **good** that the world wants'. 58

Even though there are many differing, competing and incompatible virtues which are 'what can be said', they have, it seems, in Aristotle's theory of ethics, some commonality as a result of which different people may have common notions of morality. 'One may also observe', writes Aristotle, 'in one's travels to distant countries the feelings of recognition and affiliation that link every human being to every other human being'. 59 Such feelings that fasten human concerns together might constitute significant moral notions which are essential to all human beings, though they are amorphous in their features. Thus, as one encounters a human being's misery, one would share some sense of this archetypal notion, across different cultural traditions, like the feeling of commiseration or the sense of humanness. Insofar as these notions are essential to all human beings, they could not be accounted for as something which has nothing to do absolutely with the objectivity of the mind, though this objectivity of the mind could not receive the realist attestation of finality.

58 Aristotle (1883) *The Politics of Aristotle* (trans. J. Welldon), book ii, ch. viii (London: MacMillan) (Italics mine); E. Barker's version of the statement is: 'all men, as a rule, seek to follow, not the line of tradition, but some idea of the good'.

59 Aristotle (1915a), *op. cit.*, 1155a21-2.
Part II

Knowing, Doing and Moral Education
Clarifications of 'moral knowing' have to be prior to the discussions of moral education in general. For the development of moral mind, it is logically required that the nature of moral knowing should be identified in advance. However, different views on the constituents of the moral mind abound in the theories of moral education and therefore different characterisations of the nature of moral knowing. Moral knowing seems to place itself specifically between the theoretical and the practical in types of knowledge and is defined in this respect, amongst others, by moral notions which are, in their character, quite beyond both the limit of descriptivism and the rigidity of rational reasoning. In this consideration dualism in moral education — the spurious assumption of two moralities and two aims in one education which is prevalent in modern theories of moral education — would no longer stand on the newly established concept of moral knowing. Moral knowing reformulated thus leads the way to the moral internalism as an interpretation of behavioural motivation, apart from being helplessly reliant on behaviour externalism which attracts the dualism. The concept of moral notions comprises broadly all components of both moral knowing and doing and integrates them in a logical sense; hence not two moralities, nor two aims of moral education can be postulated in moral education. However, it is not likely that morality prepares its own place on the rationalist conception of curriculum inherited from Socratic dialectics proper. It seems instead more probable that moralities keep their seats beneath all arts and sciences subjects, and under the whole milieu of school life. At the roots of all arts and sciences subjects, it seems, lies the vagueness of moral values and traditions centred on the notion of humanity culturally transmitted and evolved in the process of human history. On these 'rough grounds' root possibly the competed and agreed notions of morals. The development of moral notions in education depends largely upon the way of perceiving such grounds through cultural experiences the school curriculum prepares.
Chapter 5

Moral Knowing in Education:
a distinctive character of the mind

Since the publication of MacIntyre's *After Virtue* and Williams's *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, amongst other works, philosophers of morals have paid great attention to the nature of moral knowing and offered a variety of renewed discussions of the theme.¹ In fact, this same theme has almost always been taken as the most central concern of ethics, particularly since Socrates's dialectic enquiry about moral problems emerged and a specific conception of 'knowing' with regard to leading a 'good life' began to form and develop. The meaning of moral knowing implied in Socrates's dialectic seems indeed hardly to be on the same plane as that of his contemporaries, including the Sophists; this is so even with Aristotle's arguments about the matter. Traces of many more stages in the conceptual evolution of 'moral knowing' are readily seen in the history of Greek ethics which includes particularly

¹ For most people the use of the phrase 'moral knowledge' or 'moral knowing' may seem to be invalid. They use 'knowledge' or 'knowing' in a narrow sense, referring only to what is known, a range of information, a body of known facts or skills. Nonetheless, in this work, I shall use the phrase, not because it is ideal, but because it should also be used in a rather broader sense in all educational perspectives to embrace more fully the impalpable notions of morality on which our practical moral lives are based. In fact, the term 'knowledge' is used ordinarily to refer to various types of complex situations in which a person is acquainted with, has personal experience of, is aware of, understands, perceives, or is versed in or skilled in things, states or processes.
the Sophists' and the Aristotelian ethics. In the classical Greek period and since then, the conception of ‘moral knowing’ has evolved in accordance with the growing tendency which sees ethics as a discipline based on knowledge; and this disciplinary conception of moral knowing has spread widely into the domains of moral philosophy and moral education.

However, the problem which ensued in education is that the discipline-based view of ethics fragments the conception of a moral mind and as a result loses a crucially important primary meaning of ‘moral knowing’. The moral mind which is to be fostered in education should be characterised by not exclusively relying on the disciplinary conception of moral knowing, but essentially by a conception of moral knowing which accommodates the whole spectrum of the pupil's growing moral awareness in the whole context of his life. The discipline-based view of the nature of moral knowing is not suitable at all for the education of the pupil's moral development. The use of ‘moral knowing’ in ethics is not always on a par with its use in education. Criticising the discipline-based moral curriculum and re-establishing especially an educational view of moral knowing, this chapter will therefore illustrate the specific character of the moral mind which is to be developed in moral education.

5.1 The evolution of ethical enquiry and the shift of the meaning of moral knowing

Disciplines are constantly evolving, and from this process of evolution comes the very extensive shifts of the conception of ‘knowing’ in each discipline. It is, however, observable that two influential trends are characteristic in the history of disciplinary developments. The first is the attempt to seek an objectivity-oriented methodology. Articulation of our notions of the world might be one of the crucial requisites of the method. Highly developed symbolic language and supremely
refined meanings of words are prerequisites of objectivity of enquiry. The second is the attempt to eliminate the 'symbiotic' parts of disciplines. Value-neutralisation in scientific studies might well be part of this trend. The rejection of value attributes is considered to be a necessary condition of scientific study. However, the two trends have left behind some of the most precious meanings of knowing which are primary, comparable to the ethical elements of political thinking that have been lost in the process of its development.

In fact, the revolution in modern politics, initiated first by Machiavelli and Thomas More, resolutely rejected ethical components in favouring scientific accuracy in political thinking. The discontinuity between ethics and politics might be seen as a monumental mark in the scientific development of politics. For the same reason, Hobbes was no longer doing Aristotelian politics which was understood by Aristotle as continuous with the study of ethics. Aristotle understood ethics as a part of politics; for him politics is the study concerned with finding the common good for individuals and communities. He actually treated *Ethica Nicomachea* and *Politics* as a single enquiry. However, through the process of differentiation from ethics, politics has been established a specific form of *science*, but of course with the rejection of the ethical components that were involved in Aristotelian politics.

In its evolution and differentiation, ethics has been taken the same way as other disciplines. Pre-Socratic ethics relied mainly on the art of rhetoric. This is because the social demands for an 'art of conduct' naturally called for the rhetoricians who seemed to have skill in inculcating the accepted moral principles in the people's minds. For the ancient Greek scholars, such as the Sophists, the 'art of words' was related to the 'art of conduct'. Rhetoric was thought of as something to do with the pursuit of the good life. However, it was by Socrates that the problem of the bewitchment of language was raised seriously in

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ethics. Socrates's primary concern was keeping the clarity of the meaning of words in ethical arguments, and the logical consistency of arguments. Using his own philosophical device 'dialectic', Socrates used to awaken his interlocutors from using the unclear meanings of words in one case and logical absurdity in the other. Socrates seriously felt the scientific need for clear meanings of moral words which perhaps would be achieved through the careful elaboration and refinement of meanings in the light of the scientific criteria of truth. In Plato's *Euthyphro*, dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro sets about the problem of defining 'holiness'. Euthyphro gives several examples of 'holiness' in answering Socrates's question about the meaning of 'holiness', but without answering the question. Socrates does not ask for such a list of examples of holiness; he asked only for the essential meaning of the term. The same form of dialogue can also be found in *Gorgias, Symposium* and *Meno* where the meanings of 'justice', 'love' and 'virtue' respectively are discussed seriously and steadily. Such an attempt at defining the meanings of words was common to all disciplines at their birth.

For Socrates there is true knowledge, though 'true knowledge' in the Socratic conception was very nebulous and vague; this was so for the meaning of moral knowing at least until his successor Plato shaped it in more perfect form and Aristotle characterised it in a more detail and as clearly and sharply as possible. Aristotle seems to have understood Socratic conception of moral knowing correctly, when he maintained that all virtues in Socratic ethics are reducible to knowledge which is theoretical in character. Aristotle's *Ethica Eudemia*

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4 Aristotle (1915a) *op. cit.*, 1144b28, where he writes: 'Socrates, then, thought the virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of scientific knowledge), while we think they involve a rational principle'.
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reads as follows:

Socrates, then, the elder, thought the knowledge of virtue to be the end, and used to enquire what justice is, what bravery and each of the parts of virtue; and his conduct was reasonable, for he thought all the virtues to be kinds of knowledge ... Therefore he (Socrates) inquired what virtue (justice) is, not how to or from what it arises. This is correct with regard to theoretical knowledge, for there is no other part of astronomy or physics or geometry except knowing and contemplating the nature of the things which are the subjects of those sciences, ...

Socrates thought ‘all the virtues to be kinds of knowledge’, though precisely why he was prepared to equate virtue and knowledge so boldly is not entirely clear except that he attributed great power to the rational examination of human thoughts about the common good. ‘The force of Socrates's argument depends upon an inseparable union of the conceptions of virtue and interest in the single notion of Good’, according to Sidgwick. Certainly Socrates's ‘knowledge’ was not yet fully differentiated, compared to Plato's forms of knowledge and Aristotle's types of knowledge. Socrates speaks of virtue in one case as ἐπιστήμη, in another as ἐπιστήμη, and in still another as τέχνη. Thus, ‘knowledge’ in Socrates's dialogue comprises a broad range of human knowing, as MacIntyre accurately comments:

The knowledge that constitutes virtue involves not only beliefs that such and such is the case but also a capacity for recognising relevant distinctions and an ability to act. These are all bound together by the Socratic uses of ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη, and any attempt to separate them out inevitably leads at once to a simplification and to a falsification of the Socratic view.

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5 Aristotle (1915c) Ethica Eudemia, 1216b 3-8 (Oxford University Press). (Brackets and Italics mine)


7 Plato, Laches, 193b5, 195a1, 195e11.

‘Knowing’ in the Socratic conception seems to be comprehensive. Thus, for Socrates, if we have learned geometry or architecture, we are architects and geometers; to know justice is to be just. Explaining this claim, Henry Sidgwick maintains that it would be a misconception if we think of knowledge of virtue as distinct from interest.9

However, the most critical point is that Socrates's conception of moral knowledge is rather nearer in its meaning to the nature of crafts (τεχνη), which refers to the knowledge of the means for something to be achieved. Socrates takes the view that scientific knowledge conduces to production and the knowledge of how to use the product; he regards virtue as instrumental to happiness.10 Because of this undifferentiated conception of knowledge, Socrates fails to recognise other qualities of moral virtue. What is more, identifying moral virtue with theoretical knowledge, he makes it distinct from the pre-theoretical qualities of the mind, amongst others, and accordingly from feelings and states of character.11 For him, the non-rational or the pre-theoretical is regarded as an aberration in knowing. As a consequence, the non-rational character of awareness disappears from Socrates's conception of moral knowing, as is corroborated by both Laches and Charmides.

Denying partly the Socratic assumption, Plato argues that virtues are not purely cognitive; they are constituted partly by non-rational quality, as we see from his division of the soul.12 Plato believes that purely theoretical knowledge is not the sole component of moral virtue; he recognises the non-rational quality of the moral mind, but he prefers most distinctively the rational quality to the non-rational. For this reason, ‘the ethics of Plato’, writes Henry Sidgwick, ‘cannot properly be treated as a finished result, but rather as a continual

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9 Ibid.

10 Plato, Euthydemus, 289b4-6.

11 Aristotle (1915b), op. cit., 1182a15-23.

movement from the position of Socrates towards the more complete and articulate system of Aristotle.\textsuperscript{13} Contrary to Socrates, Plato's account of ethics proposes a dualist conception of the moral mind which dichotomises it into rational and non-rational parts.

In a more detailed analysis, Aristotle divides virtues into two kinds: the moral and the intellectual. Moral virtues are distinct in Aristotle from intellectual virtues, as shown by the distinction between 'health' and 'medical science'. However, a distinction of the intellectual virtue is further developed, that is, the theoretical understanding of what is demonstrable, necessary and eternal; the practical virtue that is how to secure proper means for the right ends or the good life; and the productive virtue that is how to make things in accordance with rules.\textsuperscript{14} However, for Aristotle, ethical enquiry belongs to the category of practical wisdom. Contrary to Socrates's ethics, it is not purely theoretical; nor is it simply productive. 'Practical wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge (theoretical wisdom), nor art' in Aristotle's system of intellectual virtue.\textsuperscript{15} In this way, Aristotle characterises the scope of ethical enquiry more narrowly in its scope than his two predecessors, and makes a radical change in the meaning of moral knowing, though it still remains in the domain of intellectual pursuits.

Aristotle's 'practical wisdom' (φρονησις) is equivalent to 'prudence' which differs in its meaning from simple understanding and hence cannot be identified with scientific knowledge in the strict sense; it should be rather understood as 'the means to the end'. Aristotle explains in this way:

The work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as

\textsuperscript{13} Henry Sidgwick (1993), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 36.


\textsuperscript{15} Aristotle (1915a) \textit{op. cit.}, 1140b1-5, 1140b20-25.
moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means. ... for the one determines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the end.\textsuperscript{16}

The form of practical wisdom is identical with the practical syllogism.\textsuperscript{17} Alasdair MacIntyre reformulates \textit{mutatis mutandis} the process of Aristotle's practical syllogism, as follows: i) a certain end \(\psi\) is proposed, but \textit{not} expressed in a form of reasoning, ii) an alternative assertion follows, for instance, in the way that 'x promotes \(\psi\)', iii) a decision comes; \(\phi\) is an instance of x, iv) therefore, comes the action \(\phi\).\textsuperscript{18} The practical syllogism involves in its process a rational proceeding, viz. seizing relevant facts, weighing them up, considering alternatives, and making a right decision. However, the fact is that between moral virtue and practical wisdom as a branch of intellectual virtue remains a logical gulf, though Aristotle mentions that they are closely and reciprocally related; the first concerns the \textit{end}, the second concerns the \textit{means}. Thus, practical wisdom in the Aristotelian edifice of knowledge falls into a different category from moral virtue in its logical sense.

No differences can be found between the development of ethics and the evolutions of other disciplines. Ethics in fact has developed through defining terms \textit{descriptively}, systemising the form of reasoning with logical rigour, and pruning meanings and thoughts which are unable or less able to be described or articulated with clarity. Therefore, it was not accidental to take, though unduly, the most highly developed rational mode of practical syllogism for the form of moral judgment.

Kant assumes that man's moral life consists of the reason which is

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 1144a6-9; 1145a5-6.

\textsuperscript{17} W.F.R. Hardie (1968) \textit{Aristotle's Ethical Theory}, pp. 240-3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

not theoretical but, as he calls it, 'practical'. However, 'practical reasoning' is not completely excluded from the Kantian account of the theoretical or the transcendental; for Kant, the reason is an organic whole which is capable of functioning both practically and theoretically. In Kantian ethics all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely a priori in the reason; they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical evidence. It is essential for the purity of moral knowing that practical principles deserve to be fundamental in moral judgments. Kant writes as follows:

It is not only of the greatest necessity, from a purely speculative point of view, but is also of the greatest practical importance, to derive these notions and laws from pure reason, to keep them pure and unmixed, and even to determine the compass of this practical or pure rational knowledge, that is, to determine the whole faculty of pure practical reason.

Practical reasoning in Kantian ethics thus cannot be considered apart from theoretical or rational knowledge. Theoretical reasoning is always presupposed in Kantian practical reasoning. In this way, moral principles are found to be altogether a priori, free from everything empirical, and their nature is defined in terms of metaphysical aspects. Kant explains the nature of moral principles thus:

Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied, pure logic from applied, so if we choose we may also distinguish pure philosophy of morals (metaphysics) from applied (viz, applied to human nature). By this designation we are also at once reminded that moral principles are not based on properties of human nature, but must subsist a priori of themselves, while from such principles practical rules must be capable of being deduced for every rational nature, and accordingly for that of man.

'Practical reasoning' here implies 'a purely speculative point of view'.

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20 Ibid., p. 29.

21 Ibid., p. 28. (Italics mine)
which is derived from pure reason and which is treated independently as pure philosophy; it is about the world of the *a priori* which lies far beyond the world which is 'based on properties of human nature', properties which are non-rational in a great measure.

A contemporary version of the rationality-based conception of morality would be Paul H. Hirst's and Richard S. Peters's idea of morality. However, G.H. Bantock finds that 'Peters has been much influenced by the thought of the procedures relevant in scientific learning and discovery'. In fact, Peters sees a methodological link between morality and science in the value of the rational process assumed to be involved in both cases; he writes:

Both science and morality involve being reasonable or the use of reason ... (This) means the determination to follow reasons and to disregard irrelevant considerations, or acting in accordance with certain procedures which are essential to discovering the truth...

'Knowing', in this conception of morality, would be nothing other than reasoning relevantly. And this conception has been very influential on the way of understanding morality.

After Socrates, virtues are distinguished and classified in a distinct form of knowledge in accordance with the differentiation principles of disciplines. When a discipline develops, the meanings of words must be clarified and the form of dialogue systemised. Ethics is not exceptional to this paradigm of evolution. However, the result is that the meaning of 'moral knowing' has been defined more and more narrowly, losing and leaving behind the non-rational part of the moral mind, which seems in part inarticulate and contingent but still seems to have an important *raison d'etre* in perceiving things in a particular way. The disciplinary evolution of ethics restricts the meaning of

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‘moral knowing’ to an intellectual or practical virtue of the mind. Hence comes the strictly limited use of ‘moral knowing’ which concentrates on pure ratiocination of moral judgments and excludes other complex components of virtue, which encompass multivalent perceptions of the fabrics of moral life.

5.2 Irrelevancy of discipline-based curriculum and the fragmented moral mind

All disciplines have developed so far through taking the same course of evolution; clarity of meanings of words and rigidity of arguments were the *sine qua non* of a developed discipline. However, there have always been important connections between the evolutionary history of the developed forms of disciplines and the evolutionary pathway of school subjects and their content. Hence comes the myth: ‘for every school subject there must be a corresponding discipline’.

As the history of curriculum shows, the myth has always been a dominant power in the planning of school curriculum. Thus, the curriculum theorist selects school subjects and subject matter ‘only from disciplines’.

Many educators' well-known views of the curriculum manifest the myth. For instance, Bruner's discipline-centred curriculum and Hirst's forms of knowledge theory in his conception of liberal education exemplify it. These curriculum theories represent the ‘discipline-based curriculum’ which takes the view that school subjects mirror disciplines. The curriculum theorists hold the view, for instance, that literary criticism should be first taught, then studied in literature; they favour teaching *about* literature rather than reading literature; they

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view the school curriculum as sets of theories. Such theorists forget the facts that literary criticism is not literature *per se* and that disciplines are remote from the pupil's ordinary concerns. Thus, the problem is that the discipline-based curriculum mistakenly rules out the very subject matter which ought *not* to be ruled out, that which is considerably remote from any approved discipline but important and useful when considering educational values. Amongst educational concerns, there are emotions to be fostered, attitudes to be developed, convictions to be edified, and ways of acting to be promoted, for instance.

Through the process of evolution disciplines metamorphosed considerably and thereby lost their original way of knowing the world. In fact, through rejection and simplification of the primary meanings of knowing, the evolution of disciplines has seriously limited the scope of each discipline. Modern politics, for example, shows this rejection and simplification of primary meanings. Machiavelli reduced the scope of political understanding to technical skill, and Hobbes too contributed to this development through establishing politics as a science. However, the remarkable point is that the loss in modern political thinking is far too primal to be made good; this is particularly evident if we examine the Aristotelian politics. With the loss of the ethical basis of political dialogue, modern politics lost, for instance, the pedagogical attitude towards the character formation of a people and the prudent understanding of political situations. ‘Knowing’ in politics came to be defined more narrowly than at the birth of the discipline.

The loss of primary meanings of knowing in disciplines leads in turn to a very serious problem, if it is related to the aims of education and the meaning of knowing which was implied in the pre-discipline-based school curriculum. However, the most distinctive seriousness of the loss may be found in ‘morals’ as a school subject. In the first place, it is not at all difficult to see that the discipline-based subjects advocate keeping the descriptivist view of definition for the purpose of the
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clarity of meanings which such subjects employ. For this reason the descriptivist view of moral words and the discipline-based subjects reject moral notions which are not easily definable. However, moral notions are altogether richer, more inspiring and more astonishing than the understanding with carefully defined moral words. Moral notions constitute a broader sense of moral knowing which teachers should reveal in education, not for the acquisition of ethical theories and meta-ethical attitudes to moral languages but for the full development of moral sensitivity with which the pupil can survey the 'rough ground' which underlies complicated ordinary moral situations and the traditions of morality. Discipline-based moral education loses a larger part of the primary meaning of moral knowing.

In the second place, the primal virtue of morality has been rejected until now in the course of the disciplinary evolution of ethics. In accordance with the Aristotelian classification of virtue, Paul H. Hirst, John Wilson and most contemporary philosophers of education bifurcate morality, and this view is reflected in the school curriculum. As a result, there is appearing, on the school curriculum, the dissociation of moral education into separate areas; one for the intellectual virtues and the other for 'character training', as Hirst's argument suggests. Prima facie, Hirst's position may be taken as leading to safe curriculum planning, if one considers it desirable that the curriculum includes both sides of virtues proportionally. However, the principal point is that such a curriculum is based on dualism, which always divides a thing into two parts and devalues one of them, as the history of dualism displays. Thus, the growing tendency is that the meaning of 'moral knowing' in the school curriculum strictly confines itself to the intellectual virtue established by the study of morality as a discipline. In this way such a tendency excludes other qualities of the mind that are more significant in terms of the whole

context of the 'moral virtue' which should be developed in education.\textsuperscript{26} For instance, direct or existential experience and pre-theoretical knowledge are segregated and excluded from the leading concerns of moral education.

Though Hirst recognises the pre-theoretical qualities of the mind, he actually establishes their place in a domain of moral education which is separated from the domain of 'moral judgment and awareness' in his favourite forms of knowledge. He gives the separated domain a different name, that is, 'character education'. Hence comes the fragmented conception of the moral mind as it is considered in educational analysis. Indeed, as is revealed in his 'forms of knowledge' theory, Hirst's appreciation of the rational part of the mind strengthens the intellectual quality of the mind and relatively downgrades the other quality, though a very considerable modification of his position has been made in his recent paper.\textsuperscript{27} Relying heavily on epistemology, Hirst in his forms of knowledge theory rejects any attempt to develop the mind in terms of moral virtue, and John White justly criticises his knowledge-based view of education.\textsuperscript{28} The two dissociated types of moral education — education of moral judgment and character education — thus dichotomise the concept of moral knowing and consequently lead to the division of the moral mind; this is a widely recognised epiphenomenon, appearing in education, which is mainly caused by the disciplinary evolution of ethics as a subject of study; this is also one of the reductionist fallacies which are resulted in relying exclusively on epistemology and in believing the myth of the discipline-based curriculum without paying enough attention to the quality of mind in general and in terms of how it is affected by

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 114. (Italics mine)


education.

Nonetheless, the discipline-based curriculum theorist maintains that the intellectual virtue which underlies all the disciplines is the main subject to be taught at school, because he identifies disciplines with the subjects on the school curriculum. Moral education, as he conceives it, is to teach about moral principles which are structured in the strict form of conceptual scheme. The understanding of the nature of moral principles through a concentration on the justification of moral beliefs and judgments, definition of moral concepts, and the clarification of arguments as in Socrates's 'what-is' questions; these are all the subject matters of 'morals'. For many educators moral education in this sense has been conceived inadequately as something which teaches about moral principles or moral judgments, and remote from the education of moral virtues. The subject matters of moral education, in this case, are supposed to be something 'out there' which is available in an established body of moral beliefs presented by the great philosophers or schools of thought and constitute a set of moral codes.  

Splitting the virtues into the moral and the intellectual, and disregarding one part of them, the modern theory of moral education fragments and disintegrates notoriously the pupil's moral mind. The fragmentation of the moral mind begs a substantial question as to the authentic meaning of moral knowing, not in the view of ethics as a discipline but in its educational implications. Disciplines have eliminated the non-rational components in their enquiries for the purposes of being rational and scientific. Thus, critical changes in the nature of knowing have resulted from discarding the primary type of understanding things: the changes from the personal to the impersonal, from the non- or less-rational to the rational and finally from the ordinary to the disciplinary. Therefore, the changed conception of knowing hives itself off from the fabric of our ordinary life. It is impossible to suppose that there should be equivalence between the

goal of disciplines and that of education. School subjects cannot be the exact parallels to the disciplines. ‘Knowing’ in education need not necessarily be the ‘knowing’ of disciplines. Otherwise, if we erroneously follow the disciplinary view of the school curriculum and Hirst’s narrowly defined concept of liberal education, then the nature of moral knowing in education would necessarily be confined very narrowly to the scope of intellectual virtue.

Relying too heavily on the disciplinary view of curriculum, the curriculum theorist has misunderstood the meaning of ‘moral knowing’, ever since the myth of the discipline-based curriculum has bewitched the curriculum theorists and led them to have a commitment to school subjects; thus, a vital truth has been lost. However, if we examine the matter seriously, not in the context of ‘disciplines’ but of ‘education’, the distorted meaning of moral knowing must be corrected, insofar as we appreciate education as a human endeavour engaging in the development of the moral mind in its whole context.

5.3 Towards the redefinition of moral knowing in educational perspectives

Drawing on epistemology, rather than educational values and philosophy of mind, philosophers of education segregate the pre-disciplinary meaning of moral knowing which bases the primary type of moral knowing, and in this way reduce the meaning of moral knowing. As a result, moral virtue has been abandoned as the main concern of moral education, and usually lost in the darkness of oblivion in school curriculum policy.

For the development of moral mind in a fuller sense, there should be an attempt to restore to the school curriculum the lost part of the meaning of moral knowing and a ground should be prepared on which a much broader sense of moral knowing than its narrow disciplinary meaning can be thoroughly built. The restoration of the lost part and
the enlargement of the scope of the meaning of moral knowing are not in any sense logically independent. Rather, the truth is that the enlargement of the meaning is the revelation of the significance of the pre-disciplinary meaning of moral knowing in education.

R.K. Elliot confidently suggests the possibility and the authenticity of pre-theoretical knowledge that must be taken as an important resource in education for ‘the development of mind’ in its most fundamental sense. Others, in addition, claim that basis of knowledge in certain school subjects like ‘art’ and ‘morals’ can be acquired more perfectly through direct and existential experiences. Moral awareness, amongst other kinds of awareness, is possible through pre-theoretical experiences. It is like the imaginative awareness of art, because it is synoptic and perhaps synnoetic rather than analytic and scientific. Education in morality, if it does not have merely the analytic study of morality as its main purpose, needs to help the pupil to have some synoptic or synnoetic experience of the situations which are morally relevant.

Socrates deserves to hold the title of the pioneer in the clarification of the meaning of moral terms and accordingly in the establishment of ethics as a discipline, though Socrates's ‘what-is’ questions about definitions of moral terms usually conclude without giving any definite meanings to the general moral notions carried by the words his interlocutors use. However, through the symbolisation and

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31 The reason why Socrates did not give any clear definitions of words concerned in his dialogues is uncertain. However, two presumptions for this matter seem to be possible: One of them might be interpreted in an educational perspective in that Socrates ends each dialogue, if he judges that his interlocutor recognises sufficiently what is unclear in the argument; the other, though it may seem remote from Socrates's explicit idea, might be connected to the main idea of the thesis, in assuming that it is possible to give clear meanings to moral words but only to perceive the general notions implied by the words. On the one hand, Socrates's 'what-is' questions contributed to the disciplinary evolution of ethics. However, on the other hand, with the questions, he lost the most important meaning of knowing in
logical formulation of reasoning, his contribution ironically resulted in the loss of broad embryonic part of knowing from which, as is conceived, general notions of things bring about; ie. the lost part which bases the rough ground of moral notions represented by vagueness of meanings, sensitivity to values, ineffability of feelings, ordinariness of common understanding, in particular.\textsuperscript{32}

Moral knowing is not scientific, nor is it something which can be neatly abstracted from the stark world of facts. 'Socrates was wrong', in this point, 'in supposing the virtues to be sciences', as Aristotle states.\textsuperscript{33} The rough meanings of words in morals are fundamental in that they carry and reflect the notions which lie, not on the surface of the meaning which may be arbitrarily trimmed for the disciplinary purposes of clarity and neatness of concepts, but at the base of our moral life. At the root of all moral language lies the vagueness of the meanings of moral words which are founded deep in the 'rough ground' of our moral notions and which are embedded in our way of moral life and also steeped in our social traditions. The vagueness of the meanings of moral words constitutes the primary meaning of moral knowing and remains unbroken as a huge grey area beneath the refined meanings of moral words.

Language cannot determine in a fuller sense what things are, without referring the notions which accompany them and the public standards the notions reflect. Language is not a 'replica' of the world. It is, therefore, spurious to argue that rigorous definitions, and disciplines which stand on such definitions, can delineate most perfectly what is real being. Many important attributes of things elude the meanings of words defined succinctly according to the usage of the disciplines; they are very far from the meanings which the disciplinary approach of definition try to define, but very important resources in education.

\textsuperscript{32} For 'common understanding', see R.K. Elliott (1975) \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 62-6.

\textsuperscript{33} Aristotle (1915b) \textit{op. cit.}, 1183b8-18.
Pre-theoretical or pre-disciplinary knowing extends beyond the rationalist or the scientist conception of the definite meanings of words. However, education, if not bewitched by the myth of the discipline-based vue de curriculum, needs the conception of words which have some undifferentiated and ‘blurred edges’ in their meanings, especially for the purpose of perceiving and understanding the ‘rough ground’ which is the underlying base of the texture of our practical life.\textsuperscript{34} For this reason, ‘knowing’ in education requires a much broader sense of the use of words, necessarily related to the pre-disciplinary meaning of knowing, just as that R.K. Elliott’s ‘common understanding’ enlarges the meaning of knowing to include pre-disciplinary knowing. Elliott writes thus:

Unlike understanding within the disciplines, common understanding does not limit itself to any special area of being, but concerns itself with anything which will yield to it. It is not necessarily disciplined, for discipline, as the following of rules counter to immediate inclination, may be exercised whenever a person’s tempted to resort to arbitrariness in thinking. Common understanding is largely embodied in practical capabilities and mastery of language, both of which are acquired largely pre-reflectively, but there is also a considerable truistic common lore concerning human being and the world.\textsuperscript{35}

The most striking feature of pre-disciplinary knowing is that it does not limit the scope of knowing; its scope is broader than that of disciplinary knowing; it ranges over a wider domain than discipline-based subjects, and touches more intimately the underlying rationale on which human life rests. Blurred edges of concepts, accompanying meanings of words and tacitness of understanding are all beyond the

\textsuperscript{34} As regards the ‘texture of life’ in an educational aspect, Israel Scheffler writes as follows. ‘Human lives thus do not ride on fixed rails; they do not follow trajectories already laid down by physics supplemented with biology. Their courses are modified by belief and interpretation, fear and hope, recollection and anticipation, symbolism and value. The newborn child, considered simply as a biological unit, is indeterminate as a human being - the texture of its life is still to be filled out largely by human effort, that is to say, by culture, history, education and decision’. Israel Scheffler (1985) \textit{Of Human Potential}, p. 41 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

\textsuperscript{35} R.K. Elliott (1975) \textit{op. cit.} p. 62.
limited meaning of knowing as defined in the discipline-based curriculum, allying it to descriptivism, realism and scientism. Therefore, pre-disciplinary knowing deserves to be covered in a broader field of study and valued as multiplex level of knowing in education.

The meaning of moral knowing, not in moral philosophy but in education, need not be restricted to the limits of the descriptivist definition. Adopting not the descriptivist way of definition but the conception of wide moral awareness, education helps in a great measure the pupil's assimilation of many moral experiences and as a result enhances his power of moral perception. Therefore, the educational value of the pre-disciplinary meaning of moral knowing can be justified, because pre-disciplinary knowledge extends the depth and breadth of moral knowledge in spite of the indeterminacy of the ordinary use of moral words and the looseness of pre-disciplinary discourse.

‘Moral knowing’ in this prospect must be redefined to comply with the educational conception of knowing, instead of the philosopher's limited use of knowing which is based exclusively on epistemological requirements and on the rationalist's view. The educational conception of moral knowing goes far beyond the significance which the disciplinary view upholds, because it admits in its character the inexplicable modes of moral experience and understanding which are intangible otherwise; it proposes a rather different order of knowledge.

The disciplinary view of knowing is akin to the realist manoeuvre in the point that the realist admits the scope of knowing only to the extent that language describes world. But the disciplinary view forgets that the world includes much more than what language reflects, and that attempts to define indefinable words very often loses many essential facets of knowing, whether these points are examined in educational perspectives or in disciplinary aspects.

The relationship between language and mind is clarified by
considering the meaning of understanding in Frege's theory of sense. Understanding requires much more wide sense of the meaning of word than that of the disciplinary view. Pieces of language might have the meanings which are rigorously defined in accordance with the disciplinary principles of definition, but they must go beyond what are provided by the meanings clearly defined especially when they use in art and morality. Sentences are determined in the best way by the senses of their components; these senses can be grasped more perfectly by the mind which has a broad conception of their definition; and grasping a sense is understanding the word which expresses it. For this reason, an expression might have a sense but lack a meaning.

The pre-disciplinary conception of moral knowing is what the refinement of terms which has proceeded during the disciplinary evolution of ethics has left out, and thus the pre-disciplinary conception became helplessly to be the detached from the concept of knowing in the disciplinary view. However, the pre-disciplinary meaning of moral knowing is the base of moral understanding, as is demanded by the nature of moral education which aims not at the establishment of ethical theory, but at the development of moral virtue which fabricates the texture of a moral mind.

The shifting meaning of moral knowing, after Socrates, engendered the idea of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom embodied itself in the form of moral judgments. The contemporary discipline-based curriculum in the same way identifies 'moral knowing' with making moral judgments. However, in Aristotelian ethics, practical wisdom is conjoined with philosophical wisdom and both are categorised by intellectual virtue which is separated from moral virtue.

38 Aristotle classifies the excellence of the intellect into philosophical wisdom and practical wisdom. Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1140b6-1142a7.
characterises practical wisdom as the knowledge of how to secure the ends, the knowledge which is ‘a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human good’. In this conception, a pupil with practical wisdom could be understood as a person who is able to deliberate rightly about what sort of thing conduces to the good. Thus, for those contemporary educators who are predisposed to accept the discipline-based curriculum, ‘moral knowing’ is equivalent to the virtue of practical wisdom or moral judgment.

Aristotle retained from Plato the idea of practical wisdom as an indispensable element of morality. As Aristotle maintains, it cannot be denied that a factual relationship exists between practical wisdom and moral virtue, in that moral virtue ensures that the end is right and practical wisdom certifies the means that conduces to the end. It is, in fact, more helpful for being good, if education equips the pupil with the virtue of practical wisdom; moral virtues and practical wisdom are yoked together in many cases in the practice of morality. Regarding this point, practical wisdom might be nearer than other qualities to the essence of morality. However, the crucial point is that a logical distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom is still possible and significant, especially in an educational analysis of virtue. A practical syllogism, in the view of W.K.C. Guthrie, is the embodiment of practical wisdom, though the practical syllogism Aristotle alludes appears in a variety of examples. Nonetheless, the various examples share the rational power of knowing how to live well. They seek to define the means for the ends ‘according to right reason’. Right reason in the form of practical syllogism is ‘a thought-process

39 Ibid., 1140b30.
40 Ibid., 1144a6-9.
43 Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1138b25.
undertaken with a view to discovering the best means to a predetermined end', as Guthrie writes.\textsuperscript{44} It is concerned mainly with the selection of means; it does not deal with deliberation about ends.

Practical wisdom, like τεχνη, is about the dimension of means rather than that of ends, i.e. the intellectual aspect of virtue, not the moral aspect. In this condition, a practical syllogism which proceeds 'according to right reason' can, to adopt MacIntyre's phrase, 'degenerate[s] into or remain[s] from the outset merely a certain cunning capacity for linking means to any end rather than to those ends which are genuine goods for man'.\textsuperscript{45} A practical syllogism is valuable only when the right end is aimed at. The power to define the means is not the power to obtain the ends. In Aristotle's interpretation of 'deliberation' can be found the same point.

We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained;\textsuperscript{46}

For Aristotle, 'the end cannot be a subject of deliberation'; it is assumed.\textsuperscript{47} Therefore, the prudential mind which chooses the ends is unable to be assured, in Aristotle's conception, by deliberation about means. In Aristotelian ethics moral virtue determines the end and practical wisdom makes us do what leads to the end.\textsuperscript{48} But without the former, the latter is feckless; practical syllogistic reasoning is instrumental for the attainment of the right ends; it is merely the 'technical knowledge', spurned by Protagoras, which is not knowing

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
    \item W.K.C. Guthrie (1981) op. cit., p. 351.
    \item Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) op. cit., p. 145.
    \item Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1112b12-16.
    \item \textit{Ibid.}, 1112b36-37.
    \item \textit{Ibid.}, 1145a5-6.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Nonetheless, the dualist curriculum theorist, who has a disciplinary view of the school curriculum, depreciates and forgets the value of the prudential mind which understands 'what is the right end', and consequently appreciates only the cleverness of the practical syllogism. However, moral virtue is more essential and primal than intellectual virtue; this is so particularly in terms of moral education which aims at the improvement not of the knowledge of ethical theories but of the virtues of practical moral life. As Aristotle recognises, this is the very question which must necessarily 'be raised as to the utility of these qualities of mind'.\footnote{Ibid., 1143b17.} Though there is a factual relationship between the two virtues, one of them is sufficient for a good man and the other is necessary. Aristotle writes as follows:

\[\text{... if we are to say that a man should have practical wisdom not for the sake of knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, practical wisdom will be of no use to those who are good; but again it is of no use to those who have not virtue; for it will make no difference whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obey others who have it, and it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of health; though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not learn the art of medicine.}\] \footnote{Ibid., 1143b27-33.}

These statements both explicate that there exists a logical gulf between practical wisdom and moral virtue, and illustrate again that one of them is more primary for goodness than the other. In this regard, the disciplinary view of moral education, which appreciates most highly the intellectual virtue, can hardly be satisfactory; it is in fact preposterous.

A practical syllogism may be useful just when a choice of means is necessary, as in the doctor's case of whether he should tell the truth or should give comfort first to the patient, even if this means not telling the truth. However, even in this case, the practical syllogism is of no use if one is not equipped first with moral virtue, because practical
judgment always necessitates the right end. A practical syllogism can be used even for the choice of the means with which a wrong purpose can be attained; this means that there is not logical relationship between moral virtue and practical wisdom. Practical wisdom alone does not necessarily and properly constitute the legitimate meaning of moral knowing. ‘Moral knowing’, not pursued solely in a disciplinary purpose, should be extended to the full depth and breadth of its meaning, especially for the educational development of the power of moral virtue.
In Plato's dialogue, the *Meno*, Socrates identifies 'virtue' with 'knowledge'. The Socratic unity of virtue and knowledge entails that knowing and doing are inseparable. For Socrates, moral ακρατεία (incontinence) is thought to be nothing other than the result of the absence of moral knowing.¹ Just in this respect, the Socratic conception of 'knowing' is not at all different from the conception of 'p-knowledge' as it was named and defined in the introductory chapter.² However, it is not very clear *in what way* Socrates assumed that moral knowing implies doing moral deeds, if we examine carefully his meaning of 'knowledge', which continuously developed and shifted in the process of his dialogues with Sophists. What is more, in a factual sense, how *p*-knowledge assures the pupil's moral action is still more obscure. In fact, many controversial claims on the relationship between moral knowing and doing have been diffused by moral philosophers, and especially in theories of moral education, since Socrates first launched his thoughts on the subject.

¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, 357d-e, 358c.

² See, *Chapter 1: Introduction*, p. 4 where the meanings of the coined terms 'p-knowledge' and 'q-knowledge' are comparatively illustrated; in *p*-knowledge 'knowing' implies 'doing', and in *q*-knowledge 'knowing' does not necessarily imply 'doing'.
The moral internalist assumes that there must be consistency between moral knowing and doing moral deeds; for him ‘doing’ entirely depends on the agent's state of ‘knowing’. In contrast, the moral externalist does not accept the Socratic internalist assumption of moral consistency. The externalist believes instead that there is no logical device which fastens the morality of doing and that of knowing together; for the externalist moral behaviours are caused largely by mind-independent determinants. For this reason, the moral externalist bisects morality into two different parts and accordingly divides moral education into two different types, as is shown by the modern theorists of moral education. These types are education for cognitive morality, and moral education for character. Moral externalists see moral motivation as being outside the meaning of moral knowing, as they take a different position from Socrates; thus, they see moral knowing as purely theoretical and remote from the practical characteristics of moral doing.3

Many intertwined theoretical perplexities and fallacies are implicated in both theories. Attending to the problem of the Socratic unity between knowing and doing, and rejecting both epistemological internalism and psychological externalism as inadequate for the conception of moral education, this chapter re-interprets the possibility of the reunion of knowing and doing by broadening the meaning of moral knowing, and establishes a newly contrived theory which will underpin moral education that is exempt from the errors made in the Socratic dialogues and in the psychological reduction of morality.

6.1 Epistemological internalism and its fallacy

Rationalist internalism has influenced teachers insofar as they believe that there is a positive relationship between knowing moral principles and doing. However, it seems that moral internalism has lost the ground in which it was first rooted. Socrates assumed that virtue is knowledge of what is good for the agent. And ‘good for the agent’, Socrates explained, implies ‘promoting the agent's happiness’ in a practical sense. In this regard, the Socratic position might indeed be the first example of moral internalism, but his precise meaning is obscure because he did not demonstrate his position in detail, in spite of the fact that he developed a path to more precisely rational thinking. Neither the Kantian motivation of the will, nor the Harean alignment between evaluation and the moral emotions appears in Socrates's internalism and his conception of knowing. No Aristotelian definition of moral behaviour, and nothing like the modern account of psychological dispositions are found in Socrates's dialogues on moral internalism.

Socratic conception of virtue is simply of a kind of knowledge which cannot be clearly distinguishable from the craft knowledge of

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5 Plato, *Euthydemus*, 172a, 278e & 280b.

6 Immanuel Kant (1949) *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* (trans. Thomas K. Abbot), p. 25, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, where Kant wrote: ‘...common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they always have it really before their eyes and use it as the standard of their decision. Here it would be easy to show how, with this compass in hand, men are well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good, what bad, conformably to duty or inconsistent with it. If, without in the least teaching them anything new; we only, like Socrates, direct their attention to the principle they themselves employ; ...’; R.M. Hare (1952) *The Language of Morals*, chs. 7 & 11 (Oxford University Press).

the shoemaker. Socrates speaks often of virtue and knowledge in terms of craft knowledge and praises their rational character. The rationality of a craft is the central element of knowing that leads, for instance, the shoemaker's work to be good. However, by identifying moral knowing with craft knowledge, Socrates is obliged to put the unique quality of moral knowing aside. It would seem that the Socratic conception of rationality cannot be interpreted other than showing the implication involved in the following conditional statement: if a shoemaker knows that doing $x$ is better for his work than doing $z$, then he would prefer $x$ to $z$. Perhaps, in this process of judgment, such rational thinking and action may be sufficient for the job in which the shoemaker is engaging. Virtue in this sense is nothing more than the knowledge which is helpful for the shoemaker.

Knowing and doing in the Socratic conception of $\tau\varepsilon\chi\nu\eta$ are logically conjunctive in their relationship. Therefore, a hypothetical statement might be drawn from this conception; if the shoemaker knows that doing $x$ is better than doing $z$ for his objective $y$, then he would prefer to do $x$ rather than other alternatives in a given situation: knowing determines the way of doing in this restricted sense: they are internal in terms of $\tau\varepsilon\chi\nu\eta$. Selecting doing $x$ in this case depends on the agent's rational power which follows evidential routes to the choice. However, in the subject of morality, it is very unlikely that such a way of rational choice satisfies the conditions of moral doing; rationality alone does not always lead to moral behaviours, because 'rational thinking' is not necessarily read as 'making a moral practice'.

However, the rationalist internalist after Socrates holds the view that moral knowing and moral doing are indeed logically separated, but that the cognitive force in moral knowing motivates moral

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8 Plato, Gorgias, 447cd.
9 Plato, Charmides, 165c-166b; Plato, Apology, 22cd.
10 Plato, Laches, 194cd; Plato, Charmides, 165c.
Educational theory of moral knowing and doing

This view therefore still assumes a dualism and sees the former as leading the latter, as appeared in 'tandem theory' of the mind and the body that was first espoused by Descartes in early modern times. In this way, the rationalist idea has dominated for long the teacher's conception of the relationship between knowing and doing in moral education. As a result, the teacher erroneously assumes that there is a logical device called 'rationality' which fastens knowing and doing together, and thus knowing and doing are consistent for the pupil who has a fully developed rational mind. The image of a 'ghost-machine connection' is the typical model behind this assumption.\(^\text{11}\)

However, the mere knowledge of the rational choice of action alone does not always move the agent to act in a strict sense, as is shown by the witness of Socrates's disciple Alcibiades in the *Republic* and the *Symposium*, though it may provide in some cases the agent with a justificatory reason for choosing a moral action than animal one. Knowing the reason why one should choose \(x\) rather than \(z\) does not necessarily make one do the action \(x\). In the presence of Socrates, Alcibiades clearly knows that Socrates's argument about how best to live is right, but, corrupted in nature, whenever he is away from Socrates, he loses sight of what he had once known and its particular consequences, acting then from appetite and ambition.\(^\text{13}\)

The most critical hazard that moral internalism confronts seems to be caused by its erroneous characterisation of the nature of moral knowing. If moral knowing is characterised exclusively by its rationality, then the internalist claim would not possibly be justified. This is because, first, there is no such characteristically rational moral knowledge to be accepted, as is asserted by the classical moral


emotivists like A.J. Ayer. The more important second reason might be that the rationalist assumption is falsified by the result of the teacher's observation of his pupil's moral understanding of moral principles and practice. To supplement this moral deficiency which resulted from rationalist internalism, the modern theorist divides moral education into two categorically differing types; education for moral judgments and that for character. Gilbert Ryle distinguishes, for the same reason, 'knowing how' from 'knowing that' and suggests that 'knowing how' to behave morally as a point of principle cannot be reducible to 'knowing that'. More important still, it should be noticed that, in the earlier period of the history of moral education, Aristotle recognised that theoretical knowledge of morality is distinguishable from the moral virtue by which man actually comes to be good:

... the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others, for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use, ...

Guthrie agrees with this Aristotelian view when he states the point as follows:

Even if one were to agree with Socrates that knowledge of the nature of courage or justice is a necessary precondition of becoming brave or just, it would be difficult to concede that it is a sufficient one.

Socrates failed to grasp the critical point that 'moral knowing' as understood in his rationalist view is only a *sine qua non* of virtue. If this is the case, then it would be a Socratic mistake to identify moral

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15 Gilbert Ryle (1949) *op. cit.*, ch. 2.


virtue in its full sense with the knowledge defined as characteristically rational. And from this mistake the corollary must result that Socrates's 'moral knowing' must be a quasi-$p$-knowledge in which moral knowing and doing are not necessarily harnessed together, though he appeared to assume that it is $p$-knowledge. In fact, rationality in knowing cannot by itself furnish all the sufficient elements of moral doing; it is not sufficient for moral motivation.

For Plato, an action is irrational if it is not caused by rational thinking. This view is not startling at all, because Plato appraised human knowledge according to its rationality; thus, in the Republic, he chose algebra, geometry, harmonics and dialectics as the most worthwhile knowledge, claiming that they would lead to the 'nobleman's' integrated rational life. In the Platonic tradition, moral education has been undertaken the way giving emphasis on the 'justificatory' knowledge than the 'motivational' one, in other words, ex parte of the theoretical or rational quality of morality. It was not until quite recent times that scepticism concerning rationality in education began to re-examine the Platonic epistemology, though Roman education had a while been critical of the Platonic tradition.

Epistemology as a branch of philosophy must be evaluated as having contributed notably to the advancement of human knowledge in its qualities of accuracy, clarity, coherency and simplicity. The study of epistemology has sought the commensurable ground on which the value of human thoughts can be testified. However, in this idea of knowledge which is generally assumed by epistemologists is hidden a dogmatic belief that the ground of commensurability of knowing can be established solidly, and this ground finally provides human thinking with objectivity. The ground needs, amongst other things, the 'sameness of meaning' of words for the attainment of objectivity of

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Thus, the forms of any statement require the use of objectively explanatory concepts. To be rational and to achieve a common ground of thinking, it is thought, is to find and to use proper terms and to organise them systematically. However, the crucial point is that this human aspiration necessarily requires the delimitation of the meanings of words by excluding the added or accompanying meanings, following example of the Socratic dialogues.

Western philosophy, fortified by its commitment to keeping and extending the accuracy of human thought as far as possible, has seen orthodoxy as shaping the form of intellectual enquiries on the ground of objectivity and rationality, and as reducing the reckless acceptance of convention from human life. Since the period of Descartes, this philosophical aspiration has been accentuated repetitively in academic enquiries, and has influenced much education in that direction. Rational enquiries presuppose narrowly and clearly defined meanings of words. With their way of requiring definitions, rationalists have paid much attention to the work of seeking objectivity and rationality in human thinking; but they did so, deliberately or not, at the expense of the inevitable subjective or secondary meanings of language. For the rationalist, there is no truth and objectivity, if there is no clear expression of thoughts in language. However, the rationalist obliterates the very clear point that sentences are expressions of human experiences and that languages are human creations for the expression of human desires; perhaps he may be successful in seeing the objective world which is out there mind-independently, but he would certainly fail to allow for the fact that descriptions of human experiences are not of something mind-independent. Therefore, subjective expressions of deep human aspirations and desires are sometimes more appreciated than objective expressions.


Insofar as the moral terms and morally significant behaviours are estimated as humanly created and as accompanying human desires, elements of subjectivity must be inevitable characteristics of the terms which constitute moral statements. Subjectivity is a striking feature of moral words and accordingly of moral knowing.\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, the rationalist view of the meaning of ‘knowing’ in general is logically distinct from the subjectivist view of ‘moral knowing’; the former is \textit{impersonal} and the latter \textit{personal}. To say that a specific kind of knowing is impersonal is logically equivalent to saying that to express such knowing requires exclusively the use of textual concepts or of symbols like those defined in a dictionary, and also the rationality of using an algorithm for thinking which uses such symbols. Symbolic manipulation of human thoughts make the thought more precise but its inferences more impersonal and correspondingly more ‘reversible’; ‘every step towards this ideal is achieved by a progressive sacrifice of content’, as Michael Polanyi pointed out the problem.\textsuperscript{22}

The more precisely we use words in moral education, the more intellectual and impersonal the pupil’s moral thinking becomes. This is the logical necessity of a mistaken philosophical epistemology and of its undue application in moral education. Such education then comes to be remote from the personal and humanistic dimensions, because the pupil who is trapped in such an epistemological destiny does not have any opportunity to develop a personal or practical character based on moral virtue and becomes apathetic towards the immense wealth of indefinite meanings of words which involve the personal or the subjective quality of morality.

‘Knowing’ and ‘doing’ in the field of school subject is logically disparate, mainly because such knowing is necessarily impersonal and requires rational thinking to be seen as most invaluable. Thus a great gulf is existing between disciplinary knowledge and practical

\textsuperscript{21} Richard Rorty (1980) \textit{op. cit.}, p. 385.

knowledge. The personal and the practical, in relation to knowledge are conceptually linked with ‘doing’, whereas the impersonal and the theoretical are thus linked with ratiocination in thinking. In fact, theoretical knowledge is impersonal in its character; this is a logical result of the belief that derives from the two premises: pursuing objectivity needs clarity in the meanings of words, and clarity of meaning excludes personal preference in determining them. This unwarranted belief inevitably invites moral dogmas and conflicts in morality under the guise of rationality, and excludes moral ‘imaginations and sympathies’ from the meaning of moral knowing.

Avoidance of vague meanings might be necessary as a prerequisite in the sphere of theoretical enquiries. However, such enquiries lose the personal and dispositional features which are essential in the moral sphere, by adopting such a prerequisite and by eliminating arbitrarily the secondary meanings which comprise in depth the emotional and behavioural bases of the meanings of moral words. In this regard ‘moral knowing’ as defined in the rationalist mode vitiates in its meaning the motivational elements of morality, through its notorious delimitation of the affective meanings of moral words. This is the Socratic irony that is involved in the process of pursuing clarity in knowing; the Socratic conception of knowing in its first stage of development seemed to imply p-knowledge, but it has been shifted into q-knowledge by losing the emotional character of knowing. A large part of moral education today has inherited such Socratic irony; as a result, the moral principles written in texts must be categorised not by p-knowledge, in which knowing and doing are implicative and accord well together, but by q-knowledge, rather which is purely theoretical and does not involve motivational elements.

23 Aristotle contributes to dividing knowledge into the theoretical and the practical in Ethica Nicomachea; he suggested that the theoretical is that of contemplation, whereas the practical is that of doing something.

6.2 Psychological externalism and the difficulties of the dualist conception of moral education

The ‘rationalist legend’ deriving from the Socratic conception, that knowing leads to doing, is hardly acceptable in education, especially because the teacher cannot see in what way there can be communication between the ‘ghost’ and the ‘machine’; that is to say, he does not know how to teach the pupil moral principles so that the pupil's behaviour complies with the principles, even if such a possibility is granted. Many teachers do not even know whether there is any logical link between human knowing and doing in morality; they do not believe that the moral principles stated in texts transmute naturally into the pupil's moral behaviour, whenever the pupil reads them. This would be so particularly when teachers acknowledge the rationalist character of moral statements that constitute the form of moral education as a school discipline in oriental countries in particular.

The modern theorist of moral education has failed to identify the ‘ghost’ and its function, the operation of the ‘machine’ which constitutes the pupil's behaviour. Thus, the theorist recognises that there is a big conceptual difference between knowing and doing in the rationalist conception. For the modern theorist, knowing moral principles discussed in texts on morality is nothing other than understanding their theoretical system, as in the case of interpreting, analysing, comparing and identifying what are implied in general principles and statements. In other words, for the modern theorist, knowing what counts as a person, knowing what counts as anger, knowing when someone feels anger and knowing that some drugs are addictive do not necessarily lead to pupil's action which comply with what is implied by such knowing. This is of course not due to the personal character of the pupil who engages in such rational knowing,
but to the very nature of that kind of knowing. Kierkegaard's distinction between knowing what Christianity is and living in Christianity reveals indirectly the rationalist's erroneous assumption of the relationship between moral knowing and doing.  

Keeping a distance from the rationalist's camp, the modern theorist admits the inadequacy of the rationalist conception of moral knowing in that it seriously lacks motivational power. Thus, the modern theorist raises the problem of inconsistency between the antecedent and the consequent in the rationalist belief that if the pupil knows a certain moral principle, then he will behave in compliance with the principle. The modern theorist, therefore, takes an alternative view that moral motivation does not necessarily exist as a result of the 'moral understanding' and, as a result, dichotomises moral education into two separated parts; one for 'education of moral judgment' and the other for 'education of character', to adopt Paul Hirst's phrases. Hence the two distinctive forms of moral virtues and the two logically different types of moral education, as is proved by the examples of Frankena's MEX and MEY, i.e. moral education which comprises handing down moral principles to the pupil, and that which attempts to ensure the pupil's conduct to the principles. The former is categorised as something which is to do with the cognitive, and the latter with the non-cognitive.

Driving a wedge between the cognitive and the non-cognitive, the modern theorist sets up a dualist conception of moral education. For example, Hirst detaches his 'character training' from the education for moral judgments and puts it outside his strictly defined domain of 'liberal education'. The same case of dichotomisation can be seen in his

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theory of religious education, too; he sharply distinguishes cognitive religious education from non-cognitive Christian nurture which is bound to the primal or traditional concept of religious education.\(^{28}\) For the modern theorist; therefore, the non-cognitive is conceptually external to the cognitive.

Furthermore, 'character training' is considered, as Hirst mentions, to be outside the cognitive domain of morality, if it is simply about fostering approved behaviours caused by external sanctions and not by the agent's autonomous moral choice. Nonetheless, psychologists classify such behaviours as moral actions, though they do not comprise all the ingredients of moral knowing. Moral knowing, for the psychologists, might seem to be secondary in value to moral doing, as it appears in many analyses of moral psychology; amongst them are Kohlberg's theory of moral development and Derek Wright's psychology of moral behaviour. In this sense, the modern theorist's concept of external morality goes back to and relies heavily on this psychological view of human behaviours.

The 'punishment and obedience orientation' at the preconventional level, in Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development, dominates an early stage of the pupil's moral development.\(^{29}\) However, behaviour developed as a result of external constraint as such is not very different from the psychological mechanism of the avoidance of punishment, or that of thoughtless deference to external powers such as social conventions. The pupil behaves very often according to some ordained laws, without knowing the reason why he acts in such a way. Hence comes a serious deficiency in moral knowing.

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autonomy. Nonetheless, such a psychological theory is widely accepted as a ‘developmental theory’ of morality in education. Throughout all the developmental stages of morality, Kohlberg indeed ignores the educational requirement for the growth of moral autonomy; thus, his theory lacks the integrating notion of the growth of moral goodness that is to be aimed at in education.

The Freudian construct of the ‘super-ego’ is another example of a psychological mechanism developed by the pupil's external constraints. Nonetheless, it is used in many cases for the understanding of moral behaviours. Such an externally induced determinant of human character often restricts the pupil's behaviours in the same way that imperialist societies have coerced their subject peoples to live according to the values which the imperialists have establish and regard highly. The hazard is that such values are unwarranted beliefs and the people lose their moral autonomy. Therefore, the characters built up by such aid of psychological mechanisms do not belong to the educational task of pursuing moral goodness, but to training to follow inert conventions and blind habits, as John White convincingly asserts.30

An analogy can be drawn between those developmental theories of character and Derek Wright's theory of the psychological development of morality. Wright defines morality in terms of psychological dispositions or traits.31 Certain psychological dispositions, like humility and compassion, might indeed be accepted as worthy of cultivation in moral education.32 They might be central moral dispositions to be fostered in education, as Aristotle reminds us.

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32 Further moral behaviours to be developed through moral education are listed by Derek Wright as follows; tendency of resistance to temptation, self-concept, traits of introversion-extroversion, reactions to transgression, altruism, etc. See Derek Wright (1983) ibid.
However, the blind state of being dominated by psychological dispositions does not make the pupil free from the constraint of psychological mechanism; it is detrimental to an educational view of morality. Psychological dispositions and traits do not always have moral adequacy.

There is similarity between the view that psychological dispositions should be cultivated and that the pupil's will should be trained. Psychologists ascribe the pupil's moral failures in most cases to 'weakness of will'; thus, for them the weakness of will is the paragon of moral ἀκρασία. However, following David Carr's distinction of its meanings, the 'will' here denotes the case of 'acts of will' or human 'volitions' which are not activities performed by the pupil for a particular reason, and therefore it is used in a different way from when referring to something said to be 'voluntary' or of one's own 'free will'. When they assume the idea of 'free will', teachers believe that such a will is a 'vehicle' which carries what the 'ghost' intends into the 'machine', in another words, it translates mental states into bodily movements. They take the view that the pupil's will must be strengthened in education enough for the means of perfect moral performance. However, an irrelevant belief is implied in the view, because the view covers up the psychological reductionist fallacy which it assumes by taking the will as a psychological device with which the pupil is able to conquer his bad habits. In fact, the will is not an element specific to morality; it is common in other areas, as is suggested by the proverb 'where there is a will there is a way'. The pupil may have a strong will, but he may use it not for moral action; it can be used for other purpose than the moral good. In this regard, the will is not exactly a logical attribute of morality; for the moral psychologist it is therefore conceived as an external means which is outside morality and connects the 'ghost' to the 'machine'. The moral psychologist conceives moral incontinence as something which is

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caused not entirely by the pupil's morality itself, but rather by the weakness of a will that is outside the influence of moral knowing, whilst Socrates argues in *Protagoras* that moral incontinence is a failure of moral cognition.\(^3^4\)

Though the psychological conception of the will may influence greatly the straightening of the pupil's warped dispositions and the overcoming of the separation between knowing and doing, there remains yet a more important question about the validity of the psychologist's claim, because the claim disregards the point that a rift might be opened between the behaviour caused by the strengthened will and that represented by moral notions. A strong will which is trained through a psychological programme and developing the 'virtues of will-power' like persistence, endurance and diligence, may not always be based on a morality which is rooted in the conception of moral knowing or more properly of moral notions. 'Training of will' in the modern theories of moral education is a means devised to supplement simply what is lacking in moral education today, which is the result of concentrating heavily on teaching the process of moral judgment and on reading moral lessons from texts proposed by some great thinkers.

Moral education, as advocated by the modern theorist, seeks the determinants of moral behaviours erroneously as outside moral knowing. Hence comes the moral *externalist* who dichotomises the aim of moral education. Bifurcating morality into logically different parts, the theorist proposes a dualist conception of moral education; education for 'knowing without moral doing' and that for 'doing without moral knowing'. Detaching 'doing' from 'knowing' and vice versa, moral externalism eventually creates logical difficulties in moral education. Holding the horns of a logical dilemma, the teacher confronts the philosophical perplexity of how these two logically different objectives can be achieved in one logical sphere of moral

Psychological determinants of course motivate greatly and more often than not many other kinds of human behaviour as well as the moral. Rellying on moral psychology, the modern moral theorist recommends such determinants to be applied for the improvement of the pupil's moral conducts. However, it would be seriously misleading to adopt such external determinants in moral education without consideration of the nature of moral education itself; because they are logically remote in their nature from the distinctive character of morality, though some of them may in some cases share moral qualities in part. Socrates claims in Plato's *Meno* that the virtues are beneficial when they are learned and trained with intelligence, but harmful when they are learned and trained without it.35 Contrary to the case of epistemological internalism, psychological externalism, which borrows psychological determinants from the external sphere of morality and overlooks this psychological reductionist fallacy, necessarily raises the problem of failing to support cognitive morality or moral autonomy. Thus it distorts the meaning of moral knowing and finally makes the relationship between moral knowing and doing contingent.

6.3 Logical internalism of moral knowing and doing

The psychological theory of moral externalism emerges in its origin from the negative view of the relationship between moral knowing and doing. But unfortunately it removes moral doing from the territory of knowing, and invites external determinants of moral behaviour into moral education instead. Thus, moral externalism loses moral autonomy and the true nature of moral education. By contrast, epistemological moral internalism assumes a positive relationship between moral knowing and doing; but without establishing its view of

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the logical bond between them. The controversial extravagance of these theories results from their different accounts of the nature of moral knowing and moral doing. The epistemologist's conception of moral doing is seriously deficient in the psychologist's view, and conversely the psychological conception of moral doing is deficient in the epistemologist's view. However, the most striking thing is that both theories commonly misconceive the very nature of moral knowing by restricting extremely the meaning of moral knowing.

The epistemologist's internalism can be traced back to Plato's Socratic position on moral knowledge in *Protagoras* and *Meno*, where the meaning of moral knowing is defined for the specific purpose of dialectics. In the Socratic position, virtue is nothing other than knowledge; and this knowledge is claimed to have the feature of τεχνη or craft knowledge. However, Protagoras dissents from Socrates's conception of knowledge. Aristotle, too, disagrees with Socrates, distinguishing moral knowing from craft knowledge. For Aristotle, moral knowing is by its nature concerned with πραχις (action), whereas craft knowledge is based on theoretical knowledge and aims at the work of ποιησις (making), as he expounds in detailed in his *Ethica Nicomachia*. For him, πραχις is achieved not with τεχνη, but with φρονεσις (practical wisdom). Aristotle writes thus:

... practical wisdom cannot be scientific nor art; not science because that which can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action and making are different kinds of thing. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of a capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end.

Nonetheless, moral internalism has dominated the teacher's conception of the nature of moral knowing and its presumed effect on the morality of doing. Since Socrates and especially Descartes, such

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37 Aristotle (1915a) *op. cit.*, 1140b3-7.
predominance of rationalist internalism in the field of moral education has generally shaped the teacher's conception of moral knowing according to the form of rationalism. For this reason, the teacher loses sight of the behavioural side of morality, engaging mainly in teaching cognitive morality in accordance with the rationalist's view. The main trend in moral education consequently and unwillingly transformed the subject of morality into a theoretical discipline. Kant's ethical theory and its application to moral education heightened such an educational trend. Kant chooses rather a narrow concept of morality, in comparing to the other philosophers who have dealt with the issues of the human good. 'Kant deals only with the problems of right or just action', according to Habermas. Kant's moral philosophy claims to explain and understand the normative validity of ethical commands and norms of action.

After Kant's influence on moral philosophy and moral education, teaching rational moral understanding has been replaced in part by teaching 'discourse ethics', and a leading exponent in recent times is Jürgen Habermas. Discourse ethics is a form of practical theory. In this form of argument, the pupil is expected to transform his privately enacted role taking into public affairs and practice; this is, as it were, 'communicative action', to adopt Habermas's phrase. Paying attention to the practical discourse of moral values, Habermas's thesis on communicative actions anticipates that someone's communicative actions should lead, as the outcomes, to justifiable moral actions justly and intersubjectively developed moral opinions. Prima facie, the form of discourse on ethics seems to be shifted to a great extent from theoretical to practical. However, it is still very uncertain whether such practical discourse necessarily implies morality in doing, because the primal purpose of practical discourse is to get mutual recognition and with this to stabilise the individual participants' insubstantial

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39 Ibid., pp. 116-94.
beliefs. It seems therefore that rationalist internalism is reappearing in another form in discourse ethics and in its application to moral education.

Discourse ethics aims at shared understanding on values and interests through intersubjective public discourse. Communicative action in this sense may help as often as not to achieve what moral education aims at, through abstracting, generalising and stretching extensively the culturally transmitted complexity of values. However, practical argument in discourse ethics concentrates mainly on the work of conceptualisation of the meanings of words in preparation for rational discourses in the same way as is usual in the Socratic dialogues, and, at its final stage, it entangles itself greatly with the problem of the motivational neutrality. This assumed inevitability of neutrality in turn restricts the open ended meanings of words employed in the very discourse. Therefore, the defect involved in discourse ethics obscures awareness of the rich and multifarious meanings of the words that are considered to reflect the morality which permeates broadly and deeply our undifferentiated ordinary moral life.

Hare's theory of moral language applies in part the view of the open ended meanings of moral language. Hare claims thus: if the pupil makes or understands a moral judgment, he would thereby address a first-person command to himself, to which he would sincerely assent or upon which he would act or try to act. Relying on the cognizant emotive theory originally developed by Charles Stevenson, Hare's theory espouses the view of 'magnetism' of moral language that appeals to emotional force in use of the language. For this very point, Hare phrases as follows:

.. to guide choices or actions, a moral judgment has to be such that if a person assents to it, he must assent to some imperative sentence derivable from it, ... This is true by my definition of the word evaluative. But to say this is to say that if [a person]

40 R.M. Hare (1952) The Language of Morals, p. 167 (Oxford University Press).
professes to assent to the moral judgments, but does not assent to the imperative, he
must have misunderstood the moral judgment (by taking it to be non-evaluative,
though the speaker intended it to be evaluative). \(^{41}\)

Hare analyses the central moral concept ‘good’ as having both
descriptive and the evaluative meanings, and he sees the former as
classic and the latter as the primary. \(^{42}\) Basing securely on this
analysis, Hare claims further that the evaluative meaning bears the
imperative meaning ‘ought’. However, the Harean imperative
meaning, differing from that of Kant, is *derivative*. In fact, Hare
*derives* the imperative meaning from his theory of evaluative
meaning; but the evaluative and the imperative in a moral judgment
are not logically equivalent. Making an evaluative judgment in a speech-
act and representing morality through the pupil's ordinary life are not
logically identical. In this sense, Harean view of the relationship
between moral judgment and behaviour is contingent. Thus comes the
Ayerite cliché; it is not logically absurd at all to say that one evaluates
doing \(x\) is good but he nonetheless does not do \(x\); it is not misleading
to say that one has the conclusion that he ought to do \(x\) but he does not
do \(x\). Therefore, it would be safer to say that evaluation is a reason-
giving action than that it is an action giving of the reasons which
motivate moral behaviours. \(^{43}\) Emotivism seems to be nearer to the
place where knowing and doing meet for the reunion of morality in a
practical sense in comparing to the rationalist's moral internalism.
Nonetheless, a big logical gulf exists still between the Harean
evaluative meaning and his imperative meaning.

To escape from the theoretical impasse encountered in the above
discussion, it would be a logical alternative to seek a logically internal

\(^{41}\) *Ibid.*, pp. 171-2. The words in square brackets are inserted and the Italics
are preferred.

\(^{42}\) R.M. Hare (1952) *op. cit.*, p. 146.

theory.
relationship between moral knowing and doing, with a view to the careful avoidance of the polemical extremities of both the Socratic or epistemologist error and the modern theorist's fallacy or the psychological reductionism. However, the keystone of the alternative might be not the use of 'moral knowing' in the restricted senses of both epistemological moral internalism and psychological moral externalism, but understanding it in an extensive way to encompass the elements of 'moral doing' in the full sense. This would be to reclaim what Socrates and the epistemological rationalists first held and then lost; it would also be to renounce the psychological reductionism of morality and to restore what the psychologist misses in his understanding of the nature of moral knowing. However, for these purposes, this logical approach presupposes again the use of moral words in their extended meanings, beyond the limit of factual describability.

An examination of the use of moral language might rehabilitate the prime function of language, the function which was first thought to be logically required in shaping the human soul in ancient Greek education before Socrates. Preferring wider meanings of words to precisely and narrowly defined meanings, the pre-disciplinary way of using language in the humanist view of education was inclined to be so extensive as to encompass the whole humanistic strand of morality. In accordance with this view, the extended meanings of words in the moral domain assimilated moral phenomena more perfectly in their breadth and depth, ie. the whole context, and the large areas of actual moral life where knowing and doing are inseparable. It is therefore a conceptual necessity to synthesise the perniciously analysed meanings of 'knowing' in a humanistic view and to rehabilitate the meanings of words eliminated since the Socratic dialectics engaged in the clarification of meanings, including especially that of the word 'knowledge'.

Exhaustively clarified meanings of words may be helpful, for instance in mathematics, but in moral conversations they certainly
obstruct the extensive view of ‘morality’. In contrast to the Socratic ideal of the clarification of the meanings of words, and contrary to the restricted use of knowing in the sciences, the use of an extensive meaning of ‘knowing’ would accommodate a larger range of the moral world, beyond the territory of morality as delimited by the rationalist. The basic idea of this alternative sense of ‘knowing’ is to dissolve the problem of conceptual and behavioural dissonance between moral knowing and doing, which is caused by the use of the restricted meaning of language. The non-rational and non-realistic conception of moral knowing allows the widest human understanding and perception of morality.

The extensive use of ‘moral knowing’ and the meaning of moral notions are logically equivalent. ‘Moral notions’ are inclusive; the meaning of this term is broad and comprehensive; its range embraces the cognitive, the conative and the affective. In the use of ‘moral notions’ the cognitive is partly fused with the affective; this is so particularly if we consider what is not for the purpose of linguistic distinction but for the integrative practice of moral good. Therefore, in the conception of moral notions, the cognitive elements of morality cannot be taken into account without considering the conative; the conative cannot be admitted without first satisfying the prerequisite condition of the affective, and the affective cannot be accepted legitimately without understanding in advance the cognitive; there are logical overlappings and therefore blurred edges between these domains. In the conception of moral notions these domains are not strictly distinguishable. Under the meanings of morally concerned words (or phrases), like rescuing, promise-keeping, and fraternity, are laid some indefinable domains of meanings which constitute the ‘depth-strata’ of such words. Some of them are certainly the cognitive elements; some of them are affective; and still some of them are also conative. This is because moral language is multiplex in its nature; it involves the cognitive and the conative in a certain varying
proportion. In this view of the multiplex conceptual contexts of morality, moral knowing and doing are not logically separable; they have an internal relationship in this logic.

A logical nebula exists between moral virtues. Between fellow-feeling and benevolence there is no clear distinguishing line; nor is there between benevolence and love of persons, or between love of persons and fellow-feeling. The claim that moral words simply name certain facts existing in a moral situation is seriously misleading as it overlooks the important issues of the inclusive character of moral notions and, in addition, of the extensive use of moral words. The meanings of words in moral life are not at all mutually exclusive in their depth meanings; this is simply because moral words are basically all expressions of one and the same reality, i.e. moral goodness.

Moral notions are created by human beings and embedded in their lives and culture, in the form of desiring, wishing, valuing, complying with customs, rule-following, having fellow-feeling, etc. Therefore, living in a culture means performing actions which represent in various types of life; knowing and doing, especially in moral life, are the characteristic representations of moral notions, no matter whether these representations can be described explicitly or implicitly. And language is 'an extension of primitive behaviour', as is expounded by Wittgenstein. Moral language and behaviour are not independent; they are logically inter-dependent.

Highly sophisticated language does not necessarily fit the idea of moral notions, mainly because such language is improper for the form of moral notions. The notional state of moral mind may not be

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adequately described by elaborately defined meanings of words, just because it is complex, vague and compound in its ‘darkness’. Though some notional part of the moral mind appears in an articulated form, it is not yet clearly definable; even the articulated notions are blurred and nebulous in their meanings so that they usually pass only vaguely through the pupil’s mind and remain largely in the pupil’s subconscious. Inaccuracy and vagueness are the critical features of moral notions, as in the case of the poetical image. However, the point is that, by virtue of this vagueness, moral notions are able to involve the multiplicity of morality.

Contrary to scientific ideas, moral notions are indeterminate in their character. Clear definition is in fair detrimental to moral notions, because it abandons a large part of the essential moral substance which is most valuable in laying down the bed-rock of moral notions. Therefore, the more abstract the meanings of moral words are, the more detached they are from the content of moral substance. Having moral notions is unlikely to be a matter of understanding moral statements described in texts; nor is it shown by obeying simply what is recommended by the teacher. Having moral notions is possible, in part if not exclusively, through ‘immersion’ in the ‘pool’ of cultural tradition in which, to apply Oakeshott’s words, ‘a stock of emotions, beliefs, images, ideas, manners of thinking, languages, skills, practices and manners of activity’ is preserved.

Acquiring moral notions in the above sense means doing and perceiving something morally concerned in a characteristic way; ‘moral knowing’ therefore means the wider perception of the public sense of morality which is compound in its form and which is

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47 The word ‘darkness’ comes from Lao-Tzu’s Tao Te Ching, ch. 1, where it means the undifferentiated or unnamed whole of things which is the primal source of conceptualisation.

fundamental in the culture of a society. However, not all perceptions can be conceptualised precisely; some of them are not describable, definable, or structured in the realist or the rationalist way. In this regard, Kant's aphorism, that percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty, is inappropriate. The difficulty of conceptualisation of moral notions comes from this distinctive character of perception. Some part of moral notions may rise to the horizon of articulation, but a much larger part of them sinks deeply below the level where emotion, passions, dispositions and habit are in a state of coalescence. In this sense, 'knowing' in terms of moral notions is different from Socrates's \( \tau \varepsilon \chi \nu \eta \) and also from Aristotle's \( \varphi \rho \omicron \nu \eta \sigma \iota \varsigma \) meaning practical reasoning or 'a reasoned state'. Thus, the broadened meaning of knowing dissolves the dualist dilemma which appeared, for instance, in Richard Peters's view that reason and habit are the elements of paradox in moral education.

In some cases, the pupil's moral behaviours might be the results of his ratiocinations, as is maintained by John Wilson. However, such an interpretation of moral doing is too sophisticated to assure substantial moral behaviour. In practice, 'living', whatever it may be, cannot be analysed or rationalised in that way, saving for a specific purpose of theoretical understanding. Under the conception of moral notions...
notions, moral doing is not a skill produced by τεχνη that is theoretically designed, nor is it a ‘step-child’ of the rationalist’s use of ‘moral knowing’. Moral knowing and doing are inseparable; they are concomitant words in terms of moral behaviour. The form of concomitance of knowing and doing under the conception of moral notions might have some affinity to the example appearing in Yang-ming’s theory of the consistency between knowing and doing in a general sense. Thus, knowing in the conception of moral notions is categorically different from the Socratic concept of επιστήμη. More important still, it is not τεχνη, nor is it exactly Aristotelian φρονησις. The meaning of φρονησις in Aristotle composed of knowing and being disposed to act. However, φρονησις is after all ‘an excellence of the deliberative part the rational soul’ and a cognitive capacity to devise means towards ends, as Joseph Dunne recognises this point. Chuang-Tzu, an ancient Chinese philosopher, characterises indirectly the meaning of knowing in the following words:

People are honest, but they do not know that this is ‘righteousness’; people are humane, but they do not know that this is ‘benevolence’; people are truthful, but they do not know that this is ‘sincerity’; people keep promises, but they do not know that this is ‘fidelity’; people help each other, but they do not know that this is ‘generosity’.

‘Not know that’ in the above quotation does not indeed mean a total ignorance of something; it rather means knowing in a way that is characteristically different from the knowledge which is theoretical, which is written in letters and constructed with clearly defined meanings as is favoured by the rationalist and by the scientific realist.

53 Yang-ming, the Chinese neo-Confucian, claims a positive relationship between knowing and doing. One is immediately delighted as soon as one sees a beautiful flower, and detests something malodorous as soon as one smells it, to epitomise his theory.


55 Chuang-Tzu, Heaven and earth, in idem Chuang-Tzu.
Chuang-Tzu's conception of what the pupil knows implicitly does not require any clearly defined meanings of words or any sentences literally expressed manifestly with symbols; it is rather a conception of the way of life which is embedded in ordinary human behaviours. Knowing may involve the virtue of contemplation of things, in a sense; it may mean making something, in another sense, by developing some sequential procedure in the sense of craft knowledge; but in the sense of morality, knowing is fundamentally different from them. If the teacher confines moral knowing arbitrarily to the theoretical, then certainly there would be the case that his pupil knows what 'honesty' means, but he is not actually honest. The people in Chuang-Tzu's text are honest, humane and true; these are qualities of their lives which imply both knowing and doing. Their ‘knowing’ is not exactly the same as the disciplinary knowing; they perceive palpably and really ‘know’ something about morality which is shown in their honest behaviour, and their actions are expressions of profound moral notions. They do not know the meanings of such words as ‘righteousness’, ‘benevolence’, ‘sincerity’, ‘fidelity’ and ‘generosity’ whose meanings may be precisely defined for a disciplinary purpose; their words may point to immediate things, but do not clearly describe them. For them, ‘knowing’ is not sophisticated enough to be sharply detached from ‘doing’; knowing and doing are logically internal to each other and therefore not distinctive in these people's moral life.

Art criticism and drawing a picture are not logically on a par. The former is theoretical and the latter practical. Art criticism is not necessary for the artist; it is a knowing divorced from the art of representing the artist's aesthetic mind. Drawing is not accomplished by complying with the 'ghost's' commands expressed in the words of texts by art critics; without doubt it is something of the artist's own aesthetic mind. In drawing, doing and knowing that has practical implication are coalesced.

‘Moral knowing’ in Chuang-Tzu's text is not simply rational. Comparable to this specific thought, Mencius's passage about the four
cardinal moral principles reveals the breadth and depth of moral knowing and its secret foundations:

The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of the principle of benevolence. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of the principle of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the beginning of the principle of propriety. The feeling of approving and disapproving is the beginning of the principle of prudential.\(^{56}\)

Beneath these articulated four cardinal moral principles are something what is not yet articulated and theorised, but which composes the foundation of moral notions and from which moral knowing and doing come into being and stand together.

Moral knowing defined in this way expresses itself in variously changing modes of practical activity, beyond the limited scope of the disciplinary study of morality which is constructed with narrowly defined technical terms.\(^{57}\) ‘Moral knowing’ opens its conceptual bound into the ‘darkness’ far beyond the limit of both the epistemologist's and the psychologist's formal analysis. In this regard, the newly defined meaning of ‘moral knowing’ rejects Socratic \textit{romanticism} implied in the Socrates's claims that virtue is knowledge and that all human actions are the outcomes of more or less the rational knowledge.\(^{58}\)

\(^{56}\) Mencius, Kung-sun chau, in idem \textit{Mencius}.


\(^{58}\) Isaiah Berlin (1999) \textit{The Roots of Romanticism} (London: Chatto & Windus) where Isaiah Berlin sees Socrates's aphorism 'virtue is knowledge' as the root of romanticism, which first appeared as a reaction against constraints on human behaviours and against scientific enquiries.
Moral Notions and the Aesthetics of Moral Education

Meno, a pupil of Gorgias the famous rhetorician, asks Socrates in *Meno* an ethical question: whether virtue is the result of teaching or of practice. Both ‘teaching’ and ‘practice’ are subsumed under the activity of education. However, the words are not always used in the same way; ‘teaching’ in education is generally used in relation to understanding of knowledge, explanations of theories and acquisition of skills, whereas ‘practice’ is specifically understood to refer to activity for the improvement of excellence, or ἀρετή in Greek; ‘practice’ is of doing something for the improvement of its quality. These different uses are determined mainly by different objects of education.

The meaning of the phrase ‘teaching children to be good’, which is conspicuous in the discussion of moral education, is not adequately expressed by its conceptual sense. ‘Goodness’ is not the object of teaching, insofar as ‘teaching’ is used in the way properly mentioned above; what the terms ‘goodness’ implies is not a quality which can be explained by teaching. The objects of teaching and those of practice are not the same. Morality seems not to be teachable, because moral quality does not allow theoretical explanation, nor can it be

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2 Cf. Roger Straughan (1982) *Can We Teach Children to be Good?*, pp. 9-10 (London: George Allen & Unwin) where the phrase in inverted commas appears remarkably as the main theme of the work.
Moral notions and the aesthetics of moral education

transmitted through instruction. Morality might be an aspect of the pupil's mind which is 'to grow' in a certain particular way in the situation of moral praxis. Education for developing morality is not merely *telling* the pupil moral principles in words. Moral principles may be a subject to be taught in moral education, as is seen in the case of the modern theorist's idea of moral education. However, a big difference exists between education for developing morality and education which teaches moral principles. The former is for the growth of moral goodness, whereas the latter aims at the clarification of the meaning of moral words and the justification of moral principles in accordance with the shift of the meaning of virtue in Socrates's thinking.

Criticising the Socratic view of 'teaching' as education for moral virtue and refuting to some extent the Aristotelian position on moral 'training', this chapter will characterise the meaning of moral growth from an educational viewpoint, and will propose a logical link between the meaning of moral knowing and education which promotes morality in the pupil's practical moral life.

7.1 Socratic misconception of moral virtue and Protagorean misuse of teaching

The dialogues between Socrates and Meno in Plato's *Meno* attract the teacher who is engaging in moral education. In those dialogues Socrates concludes; 'Virtue is *knowledge* and *teachable*, if it is knowledge'. However, 'virtue is knowledge', the first part of the Socratic conclusion, is not appropriate to accept as a first principle of moral education; this is because 'knowledge' in the Socratic dialogues is restrictively defined by the *rational* system of thinking.

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4 As is shown in the introductory chapter, the central theme of the study is to examine the meanings of virtue and knowing in order to establish a theory of moral
Therefore, no difference between knowledge-based rationality and virtue is accepted by Socrates in *Meno*; knowledge as represented by 'craft-knowledge' and 'virtue' are identical in their character in the Socratic conception of knowledge. For Socrates, the rational mind is the final purpose of the development of moral virtue and also is a sufficient condition for the pupil's performance of moral behaviour; he illustrates this viewpoint in Plato's *Charmides* and *Laches* by giving some examples of crafts.\(^5\) His main idea is that in crafts knowing principles is producing something which it is desired to create; hence, knowing and producing are necessarily related. If this is the case, then the second part of Socrates's conclusion necessarily follows. However, the point is that such a teaching is nothing other than that in engineering or medicine, and this offers a crucial problem, if the teacher applies such a teaching in moral education. For this reason, it seems that the second part of Socrates's conclusion could not stand in moral education.

Aristotle views the aim of the Socratic dialectics as seeking precisely defined meanings of words and as engaging in inductive arguments.\(^6\) In fact, in the process of dialectics, the Socratic conception of knowledge became closer to scientific enquiry. For this very reason, Aristotle criticises the Socratic reductionist fallacy of identifying the nature of virtue with that of craft or scientific knowledge.\(^7\) Socrates in fact ignores the vital difference between craft-knowledge and virtues.\(^8\) Nonetheless, many a philosopher has supposed that Socratic dialectics and its modern versions contributed

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\(^5\) Plato, *Charmides*, 174b11-175a8; Plato, *Laches*, 198d1-199a5.


\(^8\) Aristotle (1915c) *ibid.*, 1216b2-10.
to the theory of concept-formation and the clarification of our thought as resources for the means of logical thinking and the establishment of the rationalist conception of knowledge. But the crucial problem is that Socrates reduced all kinds of virtue to the reason-based knowledge, and consequently detached moral virtue from non-rational part of the mind.\(^9\)

Being separate from the non-rational part of the mind, moral virtue in the Socratic conception of reason-based knowledge merely floats on the surface of the rational level of morality without taking root in the non-rational depth of morality. The nature of moral 'virtue' in Socratic dialectics assumes this reason-based knowledge; it defines the aim of moral education to be the development of rational judgment on moral facts. Therefore, the rationalist educator sees the aim of his moral education as the pursuit of truth, and as critical and rational activities in the same way as other rational enquiries about truth.\(^{10}\) The rationalist view of moral education originates from the Socratic conception of 'virtue', whose nature is misleadingly formulated; for this reason it obstructs the view of the wider range of the meanings of virtue and of moral education. Insofar as Socrates defines virtues as scientific knowledge, as in his dialogues with both Meno and Protagoras, and identifies virtue with craft knowledge that is theoretical in its character, his aim for moral education is seriously confined to the development of the clarification of the meanings of moral words and of the rational way of moral judgment.

For instance, 'justice' as a virtue is discussed in Plato's Republic. The discussion begins with the examination of the meaning of 'justice' defined by Simonides: 'Justice is the re-payment of a debt'. Rejecting

\(^9\) Aristotle also criticises Socrates in the same point. See Aristotle (1915b), \textit{op. cit.}, 1182a15.

and modifying the Simonides's definition, discussion goes on with Thrasymachus's definition; 'Justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger'. Socrates asks again for the meanings of the words 'stronger' and 'interest'. The long and elaborate process of the dialogues about 'justice' concludes, at the end of Republic, in this way; 'Justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice is the defect of the soul'. However, the definition is not yet complete, because its justification proceeds further and further with the matters of the qualities of guardian who undertakes just activity for his people and with the problems related to the conditions of a state in which such a virtue as justice is applied.\footnote{11} Under the spells of scientific knowledge and rational procedures for thinking, Socrates drastically restricts the scope of moral knowing and as a result puts its non-rational aspects outside his conception of 'knowing'.

Socrates's dialectics is a specific kind of teaching that Socrates himself devised, seemingly by accident, through his dialogues with Sophists, to whom he was opposed, because of their conception of knowledge and their way of teaching in particular. According to Jürgen Mittelstrass, Socratic dialectics is philosophical; it aims at the examination of knowledge through the rational or logical clarification of meanings of words and justification of arguments.\footnote{12} For this reason, the Socratic dialectics is entitled by philosophers 'elenchus' (ελένχος). This is a way of refutation which rebuts the moral opinions claimed by one's interlocutor through confirming mutual understanding and justification of opinions along with reason-based conceptualisations and argumentations. Elenchus seems to begin the construction of logical order in human thought, because its goal is to seek rationality in homology of different opinions or value claims.


Therefore, elenchus, which seeks homology became the earliest example of ‘teaching’ which characterises itself as the means of logical compromise.\textsuperscript{13} As Friedrich Nietzsche interprets, Socrates considered moral accomplishments to be ultimately derived from the dialectic of knowledge and therefore teachable.\textsuperscript{14}

The Socratic elenchus does not simply aim at the destruction of the interlocutor's false beliefs, but rather provides rational grounds for agreements on moral opinions. Such a philosophical way of argument on moral values results in the model of teaching often found in contemporary moral education, and in the modern theories of moral education which concentrate on teaching the pupils a way to clarify the vague meanings of moral words and to justify moral judgments. Most recently, David Carr's statement on moral education seems to be another example of this kind of modern theory; his statements prove this point.

I believe that the very possibility of moral education depends upon making sense of the idea of moral enquiry; that moral enquiry depends on making sense of moral knowledge; that moral knowledge is dependent upon the possibility of moral truth; and that this, in turn, requires a substantial account of the objectivity of moral values.\textsuperscript{15}

Such a modern version of Socratic teaching might be invaluable for the education of ethical or moral language at the level of metaethics, even if it does not necessarily satisfy other standards of examination.

\textsuperscript{13} A form of elenchus might be exemplified as follows: i) the interlocutor asserts \( p \), which Socrates considers as having a problem and attempts to refute it; ii) Socrates suggests other premises \( q \) and \( r \) which are logically independent of \( p \), and Socrates obtains agreement that there are \( q \) and \( r \); iii) Socrates argues for \( q \) and \( r \) which entail \( \neg p \), and the interlocutor agrees; iv) thereupon, Socrates claims that \( p \) has been proved false. Cf. Gregory Vlastos (1982) The Socratic elenchus, The Journal of Philosophy, p. 712.


More clear concepts in moral principles or statements evidently appear to be a necessary condition for any form of moral discourse and to be valuable in themselves.\(^{16}\)

However, elenchus as a kind of teaching by no means satisfies the multiplex aim of moral education. In fact, the Socratic model of teaching is more relevant to the academic enquiry of morality or, in a less intensified form, the cognitive approach to understanding moral principles and making moral judgments. However, the critical point is that a big difference exists between the teaching of ethics which concentrates on the way of narrative with ethical or moral language and teaching which aims at the development of a wider range of morality that comprises the behavioural and the dispositional. Narration with moral language at a disciplinary level might be significant for a specific and partial purpose of moral education. However, the development of morality at school cannot be satisfied with such a limited conception of teaching. Moral education must attentively look into the deep stratum of the whole context of morality which is beyond the reach of the Socratic way of teaching.

The problem in Socratic 'teaching' arises from Socrates's narrowly defined meanings of the terms in his proposition 'Virtue is knowledge'. For this reason, a great difficulty appears in applying his view and teaching to the practice of moral education. Such a restricted practice of teaching frustrates moral education, because moral education must not be restricted in its scope to the pursuit of truth by a method which produces for its first purpose trained academics or research specialists. For this reason, if the teacher uses 'teaching' in moral education only according to Socrates's formulation, without making any differentiation, then there might wrongly be only one type of moral education which is limited to the explaining of theories in general or to the justification of moral judgments in particular. The

\(^{16}\) This type of moral education has been developed into the form of 'discourse ethics' discussed in the previous chapter, and it also has some affinity with the higher stages of moral development in Lawrence Kohlberg's theory.
undifferentiated meaning of knowing in any subject leads, in a vicious circle, to the indiscriminate application of a method of teaching.

Socratic dialectics excessively concentrates on the meanings of [moral] words and the rules of ratiocination. The result is teaching which limits itself to the rationalisation of human thought and excludes the edification of the whole human mind. Socratic dialectics is indeed highly suitable for theoretical work, as is shown by the use of the cognitive approach in modern theories of moral education. However, education in general aims not only at the disciplinary development of the pupil, but also, more emphatically, at the development of the person, including dispositional, spiritual and also especially moral growth. Therefore, concerning a single moral statement like ‘Honesty is the best policy’, the teacher must engage in the work of making his pupil understand the meaning of ‘honesty’, have a tendency to pursue the policy in his own conduct, and live honestly. Some part of the teacher's work concerning the statement may be for an academic purpose, but some other part of the work must be devoted to ensuring that the pupil is honest. Being honest is, however, not achieved simply by understanding the meanings of words in the statement; it is to do with the quality of being honest. Morality is a quality in its categorisation. Such quality is not transmitted from one person to another through the way of teaching. Education in morality is not always possible through teaching exclusively with language. Socrates failed to see this impropriety of assuming the teaching of moral quality. Teaching is not always effective in every subject; it is improper especially for work which requires a higher degree of sensitivity and a long period of experience.

Moral virtues are the outcome of mental quality which evolves steadily and successively within a tradition. Alasdair MacIntyre defines

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This might be analogous to the crafts-man's wisdom in 

*Chuang-Tzu*, who lived in the country of Ché in the early history of China. He said, when passing Sir Hwan who was reading a saint's book: ‘I have devoted my life to the work of barrows and I am now too old to do the job. I tried in foolishness to transmit the skill to my son, but I found that with language it is impossible to teach the art’.
virtue by *quality*, but he writes about the various conceptions of virtue as follows.

We thus have at least three very different conceptions of a virtue to confront: a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to discharge his or her social role (Homer); a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to move towards the achievement of the specifically human *telos*, whether natural or supernatural (Aristotle, the New Testament and Aquinas); a virtue is a quality which has utility in achieving earthly and heavenly success (Franklin).

Two points of view at least can be drawn from this quotation in respect of the education of moral virtues. In the first place, MacIntyre characterises the object to be developed in moral education as the *qualitative* in its category. As is mentioned by MacIntyre above, moral virtues are the qualities which enable the pupil to discharge his social roles, to move towards the achievement of human *telos*, and to have utility in actual moral life. These qualities are not observable, nor countable, nor mechanistic because they are not functions which are skilfully operated by applying skills. Moral virtues are, therefore, not objects of teaching in the same way as in other cases where certain ‘sciences’ are thought to be capable of being taught through observation and explanation. Morality should not be seen as either technique or expertise; it must be seen as mental quality. Therefore, education for morality must be distinctive, in compliance with the qualitative character of morality. In this regard, it seems that Aristotle appears to be very careful with the word ‘teaching’ in the matter of the development of moral behaviour, when he claims that; ‘... intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to *teaching*, while moral virtue comes about as a result of *habit*, ...’

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20 Aristotle (1915a) *op. cit.*, 1103a15. (Italics mine) As a reason why Aristotle says that moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, he indicates here the point that the Greek ‘ηθική’ is derived from the word ‘εθικ’ which means ‘habit’.
In the second place, the sentences quoted above continue with the assertion that 'there is no single, central, core conception of the virtues which might make a claim for universal allegiance'. This assertion conspicuously conflicts with Socratic and the rationalist attempts to establish simply and narrowly a scientific or cognitive approach to moral education. By contrast, intellectual virtues may be acquired through teaching, as is claimed by Aristotle. And the potentiality of this type of teaching does not go much beyond syllogistic ratiocination in a strict sense, since it is confined by the logic of practical judgment. However, as Aristotle implied, not all moral virtues are intellectual so as to be taught in this way. For instance, the virtues of character are too esoteric to be an object of teaching; the Apollonian Greek called such virtues σωφροσύνη, which means ‘temperance’ and therefore the possibility of teaching is excluded.

Two big educational misreadings are therefore engraved in the history of education. One of them is the misconception that all moral virtues are something can be clearly conceptualised and rationalised enough to be taught. As a result, education has come to neglect other dimensions of moral virtues like the non-rational level. The other is the misuse of ‘teaching’, not only in every school subject but especially in the educational development of moral virtues; the error comes from ignorance of the conceptual complexity of moral words.

The distinction between ‘learning’ and ‘having’ is very important for the prospect of moral education. ‘Learning’ is comparatively the most proper term, in its use, for the work of understanding knowledge such as scientific, while ‘having’ is used for being in a certain state of quality; therefore, unlike ‘learning’, ‘having’ does not essentially require the acts of teaching such as explanation, demonstration and justification. These acts are not always necessary, nor sufficient, nor

\[21\] Ibid.
\[22\] Ibid.

even possible to ensure 'having' moral virtue. 'Learning' means 'an activity possible only to an intelligence capable of choice and self-direction in relation to one's own impulses and to the world around him'.

Therefore, it is tied very closely with teaching, which is a deliberate and intentional activity and it has a component of instruction which conveys information from one person to another. On the standard use of the term 'teaching', Scheffler writes as follows.

To teach, in the standard sense, is at some points at least to submit oneself to the understanding and independent judgment of the pupil, to his demand for reasons, to his sense of what constitutes an adequate explanation. To teach someone that such and such is the case is not merely to try to get him to believe it: deception, for example, is not a method or a mode of teaching. Teaching involves further that, if we try to get the student to believe that such and such is the case, we try also to get him to believe it for reasons that within the limits of his capacity to grasp, are our reasons. Teaching, in this way, requires us to reveal our reasons to the student and, by so doing, to submit them to his evaluation and criticism.

'Teaching' seems to be possible in moral education exclusively for the purposes of the pupil's learning of the concepts of moral words and the method of ratiocination about moral judgments, because it accompanies, as the sentences quoted above imply, understanding, judgment, and explanation. For instance, the meaning of 'commiseration' and its proper use in linguistic expressions may be 'taught' just for that purpose, even though the word has much conceptual laxity; 'teaching' may be only partly effective even in such a context. But teaching linguistic expressions is not a final purpose of moral education; it cannot achieve the development of the moral


25 Ibid., pp. 46-7.

26 Israel Scheffler (1960) op. cit., p. 57 (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas).
quality which is fundamental in the whole context of morality. More importantly, linguistic meanings are not immutable and may not correspond with the moralities to which they refer; the meanings of moral words develop and therefore are varied. Teaching in moral education may be possible only if there are some moral concepts which are sharply defined and some arguments which are logically coherent. However, moral words and statements do not satisfy such conditions of definition and logical coherency. Moral language is not logical, in addition to not being definable.  

‘Quality’ is a term that is used to evaluate the state of things. If the term is used for human beings, then it usually concerns the ‘quality of being human’. Having the qualities that distinguish human beings from animals is acquiring the mental characters of moral quality. However, this quality is not static, or native; it is always becoming either better or worse, unlike the quality of things like whiteness and blackness which are physical in their essence. Becoming, referring to mental state, means possessing something of the quality of the mind. Moral sympathy, for instance, is something which is possessed by the pupil in one way or another.

However, possessing sympathy, for instance, is different in its essence, from understanding the lexical meaning of ‘sympathy’, though understanding the meaning may be helpful sometimes in possessing the quality of sympathy. Many differences exist between possessing the quality of commiseration and understanding the principle of benevolence, between being able to feel the emotion of shame and understanding the principle of righteousness, between possessing the quality of complaisance and understanding the principle of propriety, between possessing the attitudes of valuing wisdom and understanding the principle of wisdom. For the latter, ‘teaching’ may be helpful, but


for the former it would be logically inappropriate; the former do not rely exclusively on language or concepts in which teaching may be helpful, whereas the latter are matters of understanding language and concepts. Becoming just, courageous, temperate and charitable are matters of possessing qualities which are necessarily far beyond conceptual understanding and sociological debates on their values.

**Becoming** sympathetic is one thing; **understanding** the principle of benevolence is quite another. Having the quality of commiseration and understanding the principle of benevolence are far from the same thing in moral education. Becoming sympathetic is a matter of possessing a quality, whereas understanding the principle of benevolence is a matter of cognition of a value system. The final purpose of moral education is the *edification* of the pupil's moral character which includes the qualities of commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and complaisance, approving and disapproving. Having such qualities are beyond what the Socratic dialectics can contribute to. ‘Teaching’ in the second part of Socratic conclusion cannot stand in moral education.

Contrary to Socrates, Protagoras acknowledges accurately the importance of the non-rational part of morality, that is to say, the nature of moral quality, and for this reason denies, in his dialogues with Socrates in *Protagoras*, Socrates's argument ‘**Virtue is knowledge**’. If this is the position which Protagoras adopts, then he must negate accordingly the use ‘teaching’ in the development of moral virtue. Nonetheless, Protagoras still uses the word ‘teaching’ incoherently. In fact, Protagoras claims that he can *teach* all Athenian virtues like justice, piety, shame and courage.  

However, Protagoras's use of ‘teaching’ is regarded in many

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respects as not the same as Socrates's, in that it goes beyond Socrates's limitation of its objects by admitting the existence and relevancy of the non-rational base of moral quality. For the non-rational part of morality, it seems, the use of 'teaching' by Protagoras goes beyond the usual meaning of teaching; thus, persuasion about moral opinions and also inculcation of moral beliefs are the distinguishing feature of Protagorean teaching in moral education. Protagoras insists that the development of moral virtue is a matter of habituation and it consists in the shaping of the pupil's mode of behaviour. Therefore, the teaching in Protagorean education may be assessed as value-neutral, and is thus very close to training in a technical skill rather than an education emphasising profound ethical consideration of its process. Protagoras's value-free conception of 'teaching' reappears in Gorgias's conception. Gorgias develops the theory and practice of persuasive speech and uses them in his teaching. The meaning of 'teaching' defined by both Protagoras and Gorgias in this way does not satisfy the ethical conditions which the word 'education' today implies; the Protagorean use of 'teaching' does not reflect the values and the moral demands on which every educational activity should stand; it is so to speak apathetic in relation to the demand for moral interference in education, and we see such a similar tendency in some educational theories proposed in educational psychology and technology.

In any case, whether it is of Socrates or of Protagoras, 'teaching', defined by the two extremes of its meaning, is inappropriate to use in the development of moral virtues. Teaching cannot be done in any case without considering its objects seriously and rigorously in advance. The same type of teaching is not available for everything in education. What is more, there are some things which are teachable and some other things which are impossible to achieve with teaching.

Of course, 'teaching' may be used in a various ways. Israel Scheffler derives the various meanings of teaching from the everyday

use of it.\textsuperscript{33} For him, 'teaching' is rational engagement as a mode of cultural renewal.\textsuperscript{34} Paul Komisar sees 'teaching' as an intellectual act providing for the pupil's accommodation of new ideas about things.\textsuperscript{35} Thomas Green's analysis of the concept of 'teaching' is equally rationalist, seeing it as giving reasons and evidence for the activity of the pursuit of truth.\textsuperscript{36} Though Michael Oakeshott's use of 'teaching' is vague to some degree, it is in its final sense the deliberate and intentional initiation of the pupil into the world of human rational achievement.\textsuperscript{37}

All these ideas of 'teaching' may be used consistently for the educational enterprise of explaining theories and of showing evidence in the pursuit of truth. However, not all these common usages of 'teaching' can be entirely used as proper methods of the development of moral virtue, since virtue cannot be measured legitimately by the standard of the rationalist conception of morality nor by the persuasion or inculcation which Protagoras adopted as a way of teaching.\textsuperscript{38} It is certain that for both Socrates and Protagoras, who were rivals at the time of the birth of Western culture, the use of 'teaching' was driven to opposing extremes, losing its golden mean.

\textsuperscript{33} The family of 'teaching' in Scheffler's definition includes training, conditioning, preaching, persuading, indoctrinating, propagandising, inculcating, haranguing, inspiring, insinuating, etc. Israel Scheffler (1960) \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 79-80.

\textsuperscript{34} Israel Scheffler (1960) \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 58-9.

\textsuperscript{35} B. Paul Komisar (1968) \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 70-88.

\textsuperscript{36} Thomas F. Green (1968) \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{37} Michael Oakeshott (1989) Learning and teaching, in Timothy Fuller (ed.) \textit{The Voice of Liberal Learning}, p. 57 (Yale University Press).

\textsuperscript{38} Plato, \textit{Protagoras}, 334c.
7.2 Education of morality: beyond the letter

Meno's question to Socrates in *Meno* must be re-examined thoroughly for the purpose of education in morality. Meno asks: "Can you tell me, Socrates, whether excellence [virtue] can be taught? Or can it not be taught, but acquired through practice? Or can it neither be acquired through practice or learned, but is something which men possess by nature or in some other way?" Moral quality is categorically different from the nature of subjects in education.

Different contents of education yield in logic different ways of education. Education for 'commiseration' and that of understanding the term 'bachelor' are not the same in their logic. 'Commiseration' does not allow a clear-cut circumscription of attributes in the same way as in the case of 'bachelor'. This point shows explicitly the inadequacy of teaching meanings of notional words and ratiocination about moral inference from such words, because drawing a clear distinguishing line between the inclusions and the exclusions of the word 'commiseration' is impossible in comparison with the case of 'bachelor' or other terms in natural sciences and mathematics. They are different contents of education. However, the difficulty of teaching does not exist merely in the deficiency of clarity of the meanings of the moral words, but rather in the fact that teaching *itself* is not fit for the development of morality.

Moral qualities in the making by the pupil in moral education are unlikely to be the object of 'teaching'. Most moral qualities cannot be *told* and *defined* by the teacher, nor are they developed by ratiocination with logical rules; this is because of their qualitative characteristics. In this regard, Hirst's argument that 'understanding a form of thought necessarily involves mastering the use of the appropriate language game' may be not plausible for all subjects in

education. His point may be applied restrictively to the rationalist view of education. Not all contents and aims of education are concerned with understanding, nor do they necessarily involve mastering the use of an appropriate language game. In fact, the education of moral qualities does not necessarily require precisely defined concepts to be employed.

‘Benevolence’, for instance, may be definable at the level of lexical meaning. However, the teacher faces a difficulty when he is asked to tell the pupil the morality of benevolence. What is more, he would be driven into a hopeless impasse, if he is asked to teach the pupil to be benevolent or to be in a state of benevolence. ‘Teaching’ is not proper for the development of such states of moral qualities. Some sorts of content in school subjects can be taught, but some other kinds cannot. Oakeshott explains an instance as follows.

Technical knowledge can be learned from a book; it can be learned in a correspondence course. Moreover, much of it can be learned by heart, repeated by rote, and applied mechanically: the logic of the syllogism is a technique of this kind. Technical knowledge, in short, can be both taught and learned in the simplest meanings of these words. On the other hand, practical knowledge can neither be taught nor learned, but only imparted and acquired. It exists only in practice, and the only way acquire it is by apprenticeship to a master - not because the master can teach it (he cannot), but because it can be acquired only by continuous contact with one who is perpetually practising it.

Moral qualities cannot easily be conveyed by telling in teaching of one person by another. In this matter, John Dewey settles his position thus; when a moral precept is told by the teacher, it is, to the pupil to whom

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41 Cf. Paul H. Hirst (1974) Realms of meaning and forms of knowledge, in idem ibid., p. 58, where Hirst writes: ‘To have an experience at all is surely for some concepts to be employed under which one becomes aware of the occurrence’.

it is told, a given fact which is told, not a moral example embodied by
the pupil. Nonetheless, moral education has been until now engaging
in telling principles to the pupil and persuading them to do something
morally relevant; it seems to be a revival both of the Socratic and of
the Protagorean conceptions of teaching. It is indeed the Socratic
routine in his dialogues with Meno: ‘Before we try to find out in what
way men come to possess excellence, we first try to enquire into what
excellence is in itself’. However, in this process, the teacher usually
encounters a logical impasse in the way of defining the meanings of
words in his dialogues with his pupil, as is the case of Socrates.

Though Socratic dialectics may be taken as necessary in part for
the development of logical argument, it remains as something which
falls short in the case of the development of morality, because of its
confinement to telling principles and its loss of the sense of the moral
aim. The dialectical way of teaching in moral education involves the
most crucial problem related to the aim of moral education, as Jane
Austin depicts the issue which greatly concerned her novel Mansfield
Park:

... they had never been properly taught to govern their inclinations and tempers, by
that sense of duty which can alone suffice. They had been instructed theoretically in
their religion, but never required to bring it into daily practice... had meant them to be
good, but ... cares had been directed to the understanding..., not the disposition ...

Moral inclinations, tempers, practice, cares and dispositions are all
outside the reign of Socratic dialectics. However, without ‘having’
these states of mind, the pupil could not become just, sympathetic and
fair. Becoming just is not the object of teaching about words; it cannot
be captured by clearly defined concepts, like the scientific changes
which are described and understood and can be the object of
ratiocination with words. Becoming virtuous is not a matter of purely

\footnote{Quoted from John Dewey and modified in part for the textual coherence. John Dewey (1916) \textit{Democracy and Education}, p. 159 (New York: The Free Press).}

\footnote{Plato, \textit{Meno}, 100b5.}
reflective thought, contrary to the claims of the rationalist and the realist; it is not a matter of the 'verbal expressions'; in this regard, Oakeshott's argument is not valid when he says that 'what the poet says and what he wants to say are not two things'.\textsuperscript{45} What the poet says and what he wants to say are not the same thing. Becoming virtuous is something which is formed through the complex experience in moral praxis, in which moral reflection may or may not be given subsequently and partially.

The primary growth of moral qualities cannot be achieved without first entering into the existing cultural inheritance of moral praxis, where, according to Oakeshott's exemplification, feelings, emotions, images, visions, thoughts, beliefs, ideas, understandings, intellectual and practical enterprises, languages, relationships, organisations, moral canons and maxims of conduct, procedures, rituals, even music, which Dilthey called a 'geistige Welt' are furnishing.\textsuperscript{46} Reverence for life, humane beliefs, feelings of sympathy and fraternity, moral disposition, moral sentiment, desiring, deciding and intending are more subtle examples. Many of them are in a primary state, and the rest only in the abstract or institutionalised form of symbols. The primary existence of moral qualities is more important and basic than their abstract presence in the education of morality.

This feature, of the primary presence of moral qualities, is not best understood as having a cognitive quality; it is rather something dispositional and emotional.\textsuperscript{47} In this dispositional view, moral feeling and emotion are closely related; emotion is a species of feeling, though not all feelings are emotional; a certain emotion such as envy is distinguishable from a feeling such as pain, precisely by the fact that the former involves some kind of understanding and lasts more longer than the latter. Emotions are something dispositional that is formed

\textsuperscript{45} Michael Oakeshott (1962) \textit{op. cit.}, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{46} Michael Oakeshott (1989) \textit{op. cit.}, p. 45.

through *feeling*; however, the most important point here is that such emotions involve a wider range of moral elements.\(^{48}\) Therefore, the feeling of admiration for a certain person or a historical event remains more often than not at the 'heart' of the pupil's mind as a permanent moral quality and canalises itself into his actual moral life.

Mencius's four beginnings of moral virtues are not very different from emotional states; compassion and commiseration (the beginning of benevolence), shame and dislike (the beginning of justice), modesty and complaisance (the beginning of propriety), approving and disapproving (the beginning of wisdom) are all expressive modes of emotional states. However, the basic emotions of morality are shared, for instance, by Chu-tze's seven feelings; joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, wickedness and desire. With these feelings, the mythical heroes in the classics express moral goodness and the wickedness, and enlighten the cultural and spiritual values of a certain period of time in history, whether they are Oriental or Western. Mythical literature expresses *mutatis mutandis* prime moral ideals implied in the tragedies in myths and legends. For instance, in the depth of 'shame', the primitive meanings of moralities are retained, as the people feel fear of one's misdeed. Various kinds of shame are deeply and broadly expressed in the tragedies in myths.

Tragedy is a form of art. Arts manifest various primitive emotions; they manifest them with the feelings like joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, wickedness and desire. Emotions in tragedies are not something which heroes and heroines simply want, nor are they a result simply of avoiding fears. They reflect the morality, for instance, of the ancient Greeks. In the Oedipus story are expressed the feelings of guilt and shame which manifest a certain type of moral complex. In this way, tragic heroes and heroines show moral responsibilities and condemnations; they are expressions of moral

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necessity and fear, insofar as humanitarian outcomes are part of the events constructing the tragedy; such a model is to be found in Homer, above all in Achilles in the *Iliad*. Like the gods, men desire honour. Therefore, the chief word for shame (αἰδως) often means regard for the honour or the respect due to another.

Between shame and guilt there is not gulf, in their moral contexts. Guilt is often felt when one offends against one's inner judging voice; it reflects in this respect the moral sentiment. As Friedrich Nietzsche claims, shame and guilt are the emotional bases of morality, which is formed through cultural transition from one period to another in a society. Such emotions underly the moral notions which are spread deeply beneath legends and tragedies as particular elements of culture and value. Such elements of legends and tragedies are also addressed in the form of arts rather than by systematic disciplinary theories. For this reason, many philosophers like Iris Murdoch and Martha Nussbaum turned their interests to literature for moral guidance. A large part of a tradition is composed of such moral emotions; it grounds the moral necessities of the pupil and also sustains the cultural traditions of a society and its change.

Acquiring an inherited morality means coming to possess moral qualities. Moral education hardly suffices by itself without putting the pupil into the complexity of tradition in which he appreciates the dynamics of its rules, obligations, rights, and demands in a community, as Scheffler points out. Immersion in a moral tradition means contact with the moral elements that are spread broadly in the

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depths of culture and the human ethos composed of moral notions. David Carr emphasises this point. He and Jan Steutel recommend education in virtue, comprising training, example and narrative, restating the time-honoured view ‘that the literary heritage of human culture has an important part to play in the development of moral sensibilities, and it is surely significant that virtue ethicists have recently made much of the importance of narrative in general for the formation of personal and cultural moral identity’. Christopher Winch accepts the point and writes as follows.

Membership of a community is an inescapable requirement for moral learning... As a child grows and becomes an active member of a wider community, the members of that community also assume importance in his moral education. Of particular importance are teachers during the years of schooling and workmates and companions in the early years of employment and homemaking. School and workplace, as well as family, form the practical context in which moral learning takes place in a variety of situations of increasing complexity and moral depth. It is therefore of great importance that teachers are both moral exemplars and that they possess the practical moral wisdom to promote the moral learning of children.

Human beings share the depth of morality, though it does not arise on the horizon of lingual expression. Therefore, the non-verbal base of moral traditions logically requires a specific mode of experience which surpasses the range of moral language. Such experience mediates between the role of language and that of non-language. The mediatorial role of experience enriches the effect of moral education; it oscillates between the morality which may be expressible in the

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literal form and the depth of morality which is beyond the letter. The mediatorial role of experience is basic in Cicero's *De Oratore* and in Isocrates's rhetoric. Contrary to Socrates and Plato, Isocrates, in his basic idea of rhetoric, argues that the practical and the theoretical or βιος θεωρετικος and βιος πρακτικος are not separable. This view is recapitulated in Martianus Capella's *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* which addresses the marriage between dialectics and rhetoric, or the theoretical and the practical, or thinking and doing. The all-comprising experience of morality demolishes the barrier of language erected between the two worlds of extremity; i.e. the world of arbitrarily defined concepts and the world of depth of moral emotions. But the final purpose of such experience as part of moral education is to make the pupil perceive the meanings of moral words, which extend far into the depth of morality beyond the lexical meanings.

Experiencing this moral depth is having the feelings, emotions and perceptions of things around the pupil's moral life; it gives therefore beyond reading moral principles registered in texts and the technique of ratiocination about moral judgment. Moral experience, at its initial stage, is emotional; it is, as Sartre suggests, a particular way of apprehending the moral world. Therefore, it is rather an aesthetic awareness of what underlies the texts and moral conversations; Oakeshott and Habermas both emphasise this point of view. Instead of 'curriculum as fact', 'curriculum as practice' is appropriate for this model of moral education. In fact, experience of moral goodness is more complex than the experience of learning the language game of


‘yellow’. Seeing moral goodness is different from seeing a flower. This is the difference between the notional experience and the colour-experience. The colour can be seen through the eye that is physical, but the former cannot be seen in the same way; the colour has a ‘simple property’, but moral goodness does not. Therefore, the experience of the latter can occur with physical perceptions, but the former requires ‘notional perceptions’ which need the help of Rousseau’s ‘sixth sense’ in his *Emile*. Much of these ‘notional perceptions’, if not all, might be in the world of Wittgenstein’s ‘silence’ which appears in the last part of his *Tractatus*.

Notional perception does not merely aim to acquire the realist meanings of words which refer to the objects of physical seeing; it is rather a particular way of perceiving things which transcends such a realistic idea of seeing things, simply because the objects of notional perception are the non-physical; morality does not depend on any concrete sense datum. Notional experience is not of the world which the pupil sees directly; it may be an example of those entities Colin McGinn defines, as to be distinguished from the purely external things which are perceptible simply by the sensory organs.

As Dewey writes, the ‘experience like notional perception is primarily a process of undergoing: a process of standing something, of suffering and passion, of affection, in the literal sense of these words’. Therefore, the experience is primarily non-lingual or non-

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62 Rousseau’s sixth sense, added to the other five senses of the external and physical things, is the perception of the non-external; thus, it has no special sense organ. J.J. Rousseau (1911) *Émile*, p. 122 (London: Dent). Buddhist’s sixth sense in the *Diamond Sutra* might also be to this sort of sense.


64 John Dewey (1917) Creative intelligence, in John Dewey & et al. (eds)
rational, because of the tacit character of the objects of such experience. The nature of this moral experience is not a matter of how things are, but of how things seem to the pupil. Thus, if the pupil has enough moral sensibility and sees a creature, for instance, which is in a miserable plight, the creature would not remain in the pupil's mind as just a realist's picture; the pupil would instead in this specific case create a moral image in the light of his own or public notion of moral goodness. The pupil first imagines and finally possesses his own mental images of the moral world. 'Sympathy is a function of imagination'. On the procedure of imagination, John Kekes writes as follows:

Imagination is a general label for a wide variety of human activities, among which the following are particularly important: the formation of images, like the face of an absent friend; resourceful problem solving, exemplified, for instance, by non-linear thinking; ... and the mental exploration of what it would be like to realise particular possibilities, ...

Just as a picture is drawn by an artist, moral images are formulated by the pupil as a mental activity. Things in themselves are not 'right' or 'wrong', nor 'good' or 'bad'. In this specific case the pupil sees things and draws moral images of them in the light of his own moral notions. Therefore, moral images drawn by the pupil are notional. And the power of the pupil's moral imagination is not restricted to the work of drawing moral images in his mind; rather it leads his bodily behaviour in accordance with the images he draws.


However, moral imagination has two conditions as prerequisite. In the first place, it must not be confined by the meanings of words that are arbitrarily defined. The meanings of words must be vague enough to empower moral imagination. Vagueness in meaning opens widely onto the limitless horizon of imagination. Therefore, the pre-linguistic mode of experience allows much capacity for the moral imagination, not confined by the fixed or static meanings of words.

In the second place, moral imagination needs in a factual sense a specific situation which offers the pupil personal experience that brings affective responses to the facts he encounters, such as the processes of standing something, of suffering and passion, of affection, and of ordering things disordered. Such a personal experience is beyond the world of language; it is therefore quite different from reading, for instance, a Kantian moral principle stated in the texts about morality. According to Dewey, 'the world in which we immediately live, that in which we strive, succeed, and are defeated, is pre-eminently a qualitative and undifferentiated world'.68 Such a world is 'a complex existence that is held together, in spite of its internal complexity'.69 The internal complexity cannot be understood solely by linguistic analysis; it is rather pre-linguistic.

Thus, in the world of experience aforementioned, the quality is more than the sum of its constituents, because what the pupil perceives is what it is, as is explained by Husserl.70 Such a world is not available thing clearly defined words, nor pure sensory perception. It is composed of qualities in their immediate appearance; it is 'an anoetic occurrence: it occurs apart from the existence and employment of

69 Ibid., p. 246.
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Therefore, the world of experience is qualitative, and the qualitative experience of morality is something felt, rather than scientific or analytic. Consciousness of morality in experience implies what the pupil actually perceives. Perception of moral qualities is final; it does not require afterwards any logical ratiocination or scientific examination. These points all mean that moral qualities are part of the immediacy of experience. The immediacy of moral apprehension is possible largely because of feelings that are sensitive to the thing morally relevant. Therefore, moral suppleness is the logical presupposition of the immediacy of moral experience.

Moral sensation and imagination are the central function of moral experience. It seemed to some that rhetoric might be the specific means to animate the pupil's exuberant moral sensation and imagination in the classroom. Isocrates, amongst other rhetorical educators, acknowledged this point and took his newly characterised rhetoric, not the Protagorean, as the most important subject which proffers an indirect experience for the empowerment of moral sensitivity and imagination. Thus, he preferred rhetoric, for the purpose of more exact and perfect perceptions of morality, to the Socratic dialectics which depended exclusively on the rigorous use of language and logic. St. Augustine too denied the Socratic educational belief that the teacher could transmit knowledge by using precisely defined words. For him words are no more than the means of looking at things. Both Isocrates and St. Augustine seem to recognise the particular power of words, which goes beyond what the lexical meanings of words could provide. They see the other side of the

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73 John Dewey (1925) *op. cit.*, p. 303.

factual and logical meanings of words which was ignored, or rejected intentionally, by both Socrates and Plato, and later by the realists and the rationalists. In this ignored dimension of words Isocrates, amongst others, it seems, perceived the unrestricted field of moral sensibility. Rhetoric, as Isocrates maintains when he defines his new type of rhetoric, opens infinitely the humanist and emotional experience of moral world, like exemples in the world of compassionate imagination in literary works. Rhetoric does not aim at the pursuit of truth, unlike dialectics; it seeks the edification of human character. Rhetoric is a kind of teaching, as dialectics is, but much broader and more comprehensive. According to Olivier Reboul, rhetoric pursues παιδεία, which comprises ethos and pathos. Therefore, rhetoric does not confine human reason to the narrow limits of logos, nor does it distinguish the emotional from the cognitive, contrary to the case of dialectics. Rhetoric develops a human way of thinking free from the impasse of logicism and positivism, which are confined by formal arguments.

In literary works, such as the ancient Greek tragedies, resides a broad range of moral imagination, as Martha Nussbaum maintains. The poetic and visual resources in the literary works, as in the cases which the rhetorical way of experience carries, represent moral conflicts in which the pupil feels righteousness against injustice and sympathy against indifference. However, this can be done, not by the logical analysis of literature, but by appreciation of the literary resources, with humanistic conceptions of things inherited through the process of cultural evolution. In fact, many of humanistic notions are contained beyond the clearly defined meanings of words, of the

75 Olivier Reboul (1989) *La Rhétorique*, ch. 4 (Presses Universitaires de France) where Reboul maintains that rhetoric is implied in all processes of education and therefore it is essentially a theory of education.


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As Rousseau grasped, the pupil often fails to see the hidden meanings in moral discourse conducted with his teacher or in reading texts.\textsuperscript{78} Thus, the moralities carried by the words as the additional meanings 'cunning' and 'flattery', for instance, in the fable \textit{The Fox and The Crow} could not be recognised and felt by the pupil as indicating something morally wrong. The pupil tends to see only the [non-moral] facts of the fable, contrary to the teacher's expectation. Such a tendency predominates in a society where some official or distorted value is prevailing, like an orthodox religious dogma, and in a society where value-free and factual views of things are influential. Losing any moral base, such a dogmatic view of things obscures the pupil's moral vision and also obstructs the development of the humanist approach in moral education.

7.3 Having moral experience
and the meaning of moral knowing

In \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, Wittgenstein mentions that we talk, utter words, and only later get a picture of life.\textsuperscript{79} A picture of a moral world, for instance, can be drawn while 'talking' and 'uttering words' in an ordinary life. But such a possibility can be seen \textit{not} in the situation where the pupil uses words which are stripped of all vague meanings so as to convey only sharply and technically refined concepts, \textit{but} in the case where the pupil perceives and acquires words which carry the depth of a social and cultural ethos. All human activities involve in fact such moral depth in practical life. David Carr addresses this point clearly in his conception of 'education', when he writes; '... education is at heart a moral practice which is deeply

\textsuperscript{78} J.J. Rousseau (1911) \textit{op. cit.}

implicated in values and conflicts of value... What the pupil understands as the meaning of 'flower' is different from the emotional and complex sensum which he perceives as he sees a flower.

Wittgenstein's argument above suggests a very important point: that without having experience the pupil cannot have his own moral mind. In fact, moral imagination, as drawing a picture of the moral world in the pupil's mind, requires the situation of moral experience. This can be attested by the fact that the poet first feels, for instance, the scenic beauty of moonlight above the spires of Merton College at Oxford; only then he can have in mind the image of the scenery; and he finally may or may not represent it in a poetic form. Without first having such feelings and imaginations, the poet could not write a poem at all.

Having such perceptions and imaginations means experiencing the depth of the cultural traditions in which moral qualities are enshrined. Such experience constitutes the educational cultivation of moral sensibilities and qualities. After and only after recognising such qualities, the pupil may reconstruct or invent his own or public moral world. In the depth of traditions exists the 'darkness' which underlies the moral world that does not allow both the realist and the rationalist approaches. Reading the darkness is experiencing the moral world of sentience or that of inarticulate intelligence. The extensive imprecision of language is at the base of the depth of moral traditions.

Experience of this moral depth might be very analogous to the claim which Isocrates emphasised concerning education in rhetoric. For Isocrates and the orators, the rhetorical expression of moral


81 The word 'darkness'. Lao-Tzu uses it in his Tao Te Ching, means there the undifferentiated world from which all things are beginning to exist in a particular way, perhaps by language and logical rules. The nearest expression of the word in Greek might be χάος which means what is indefinite and extended infinitely.

culture is much more profound for moral education than what the rationalist approach contributes. For Isocrates, the broader conception of human knowledge of things is more effective for edification of the pupil's character than the intellectual mastery of concepts and theories. Using refined meanings of words is hazardous to the expression of complex moral praxis.

Without denial, the humanist view of language in moral education values the less precise meanings of words and for this reason, it accommodates more personal and affective experience; thus, it admits the inaccuracy and ambiguity of language, as in the case of Isocrates's line of rhetoricians and poets admitting the experience of the subconscious layers of the moral mind. In this prime mode of experience, the pupil perceives a moral ethos or embodies the basic, primitive moral behaviour implied in that ethos. This is the experience of the moral elements represented by less precisely defined words and symbols; but language is an extension of 'primitive behaviour'; it is not the behaviour itself.

For the pupil it is very uncertain where the moral ethos originates. But it is certain that he lives within that ethos, though its process cannot be easily and clearly theorised. The power of the social ethos forms an order or climate in which the pupil takes an individual part, as Emile Durkheim suggests. The social climate extends infinitely beyond the school's culture. Therefore, living in this culture means that the individual pupil has a share in the social order and loses himself within the infinity of morality.

Engaging one's moral life means being within one's social climate.


If the pupil is not apathetic, lacking moral sensitivity, than he will not fail to perceive the moral elements which are implied intensely and infinitely in his culture. Thus, the mode of the pupil's moral experience must be opened broadly for the perception of what is profound and amorphous in the form of moral culture. This suggests that moral experience in school must not be restricted by a fixed programme, like reading texts or discussions aimed at clarifying values. A big difference exists indeed between what is read in texts and what is grasped in various forms of life. 'Printed words' in texts are abstractions and distillations of such experience. Anthony O'Hear, it seems, acknowledges this very point, when he asserts that 'school is not the right place for moral education'; he claims indirectly that the place of moral education must be in the informal circumstances in which moral practice is not restricted by the limits of texts.

Having moral feelings in such amorphous forms of experience means having the mind opened for the imagination of the world of moral life and, as a result, for building that very world. Thus, having moral experience is not merely a result of telling the pupil that doing 'x' is good. Transmission of information and experience of moral value are different; the words of the former are much more clear-cut in their meanings and thereupon appropriate for transmission, but those of the latter are certainly not like that. The model of transmission of values through reading texts is inadequate in moral education. Transmission of values in the same way as that of information might result in the type q which falls outside the pupil's moral consciousness or moral autonomy. What is more, it is

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inadequate for the development of the power of creation of one's moral world through imagination.

The imaginative power of the moral mind is an essential element of 'moral knowing', with which the pupil attempts to recreate morally ideal world. According to John Kekes, moral imagination has the power of both the exploratory and the corrective; the power of the exploratory as trying to open a new image of moral life and that of the corrective as redirecting one's life towards a more perfect one, through reflecting on the morally problematic issues around one's life.\(^8^9\) Therefore, the power of moral imagination implies 'moral doing'. All these characters of moral perceptions and imaginations are subsumed under the meaning of moral knowing. In this regard, 'moral knowing' and 'moral doing' are logically linked concepts.

Doing in a moral situation is in its logic not altogether different from moral knowing; they are logically on a par; they happen pari passu. The meaning of 'moral doing' interpreted thus far and that of 'knowing moral way of life' are logically identical. Moral knowing in this sense is personal experience, but it becomes intersubjective through the continuous experience in moral praxis.\(^9^0\) Therefore, there should not be any confusion between reflection based on rational thinking about the meaning of virtue, constructed by Socrates, and that of the notional, which is less ordered, abstrusely articulated and roughly defined. Having moral experience thus means establishing in one's mind a certain type of order in the state of such notional chaos in morality.

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Conclusion: Knowing, Doing and the Moral Notions

Criticising and re-creating the meaning of 'moral knowing' implied in the Socratic proposition 'Virtue is knowledge', the philosophical approach to the re-formulation of the theories of moral education has explored a much broader field of ideas in education and philosophy which are related negatively or positively to the development of morality in education. Amongst them, the realist conception of knowledge and the rationalist's assertion of the objectivity of thoughts have been seriously examined.

The results of the research will be manifested in this concluding chapter. In the first section there are general considerations of the main theme of the study, which concentrated on the formulation of logical relationships between the three key concepts, 'knowing', 'doing' and 'moral mind', as suggested by the title of the study; these considerations will be epitomised and systematically arranged.

The specific positive position about the nature of morality and moral education developed in the study will be revealed in the second section. In this final section, certain practical questions that are related to the position will be raised and examined with reference to their implications for moral education. Examination of such questions will
be concentrated on the following themes: the nature of moral knowing, the distinctiveness of the forms of moral education, and ideas on the relations between moral education, cultural difference and value diversity. With these themes, the conclusion will elucidate the precise character of moral education which is seen as emerging from the argument developed in the thesis.

8.1 The relationship between knowing, doing and moral mind

The Socratic proposition, 'Virtue is knowledge', has so far contributed to moral education in two ways. On the positive side, it has greatly clarified the meaning of virtue, devised ways to develop the virtues in various fields of discipline, and finally characterised more specifically the nature of 'knowledge'. On the negative side, it has caused many difficult questions about education. Plato's Socrates finds no difference between 'virtue' and 'knowledge', as his proposition tells us of the identity between virtue and knowledge. 'Virtue' is a species of 'knowledge'. However, the critical point is that he defines the meaning of knowledge very narrowly by reducing it to the scientific. Thus, the logical problem concluded is the very fact that doing elements of virtue are removed from his defined meaning of knowing. This is how Socrates's meanings of 'knowledge' and 'virtue' were transient. From this process follows the invalid conclusion: 'virtue is a species of knowledge' which is defined as scientific. Hence comes the *reductio ad absurdum*; and from this erroneous reduction follows again the burning point: the meaning of virtue is spuriously simplified by losing its doing elements in terms of morality.

If we replace 'virtue' in the Socratic proposition by a specific virtue, like 'moral virtue', then a big logical clash in the Socratic
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proposition would necessarily result. This is so particularly if we examine the proposition with the meaning of ‘virtue’ which is engraved in Socratic belief: ‘If the pupil knows what a moral statement means, then the pupil would necessarily comply with the meaning implied by the moral statement’. Socrates's theory of knowledge and virtue seems to imply the positive relationship between moral knowledge and doing. However, the positive relationship between knowing and doing is refuted by the model of the Socratic reduction of the meaning of ‘knowledge’. In fact, in education the Socratic conditional argument of the relationship between knowledge and doing does not stand safely; ‘knowing’ and ‘doing’ are not always correspondent; they are contingent. This fact indirectly reveals that the ‘knowing’ which Socrates defined narrowly does not necessarily imply ‘doing’. This is the logical labyrinth which, ironically, is invited by the reduction of the meaning of knowledge.

As the Socratic proposition in moral education is contingent, as is suggested above, ‘knowing’ in the proposition does not logically imply ‘doing’. Nonetheless, Socrates appears to be a paragon of the rationalist and necessarily of the moral internalist; he believes that there must be ‘clear and distinct ideas’ and ‘the correspondence between one’s rational mind and behaviour’. However, Socrates confines the meaning of knowledge to the scientific, defines ‘virtue’, in his dialogues with Sophists very narrowly, and identifies it with ‘knowledge’. And in this process, Socrates loses ironically the behavioural attributes in the meanings of both knowledge and virtue. Much later, Cartesian doctrines affirmed the rationalist conviction by saying that ‘mind and body are harnessed together’. In this sense, the intellectualist legend seems to originate from Socrates's paradoxical assumption of the unity of virtue and knowledge defended by his theoretical artifice.

Narrowing the meanings of virtue and knowledge and identifying them, Socrates committed himself to the rationalist fallacy. Thus, Socrates's conception of moral knowing that is assumed to involve
moral doing, no longer sustains itself; on the contrary it has transmuted in knowing which is only *theoretical* and therefore nothing to do with moral doing. The historic Socrates, it seems, paid great attention to the clarity of the meanings of words, in order to avoid ambivalent meanings of terms in arguments. As a result, the Socrates's dialectics has contributed greatly to the development of logical and scientific thinking which bases on rationality. However, the newly born conception of knowledge in the development of Socratic dialectics became *scarcely* associated with the 'knowing' (p-knowledge) which comprises in its concept 'moral doing'. Ironically indeed, Socrates's p-knowledge has lost its embryonic conception and shifted into theoretical knowledge (q-knowledge) which is not logically associated with moral doing.

The realist conception of the meanings of words confines them to clarity of description. Descriptivism may be possible for certain disciplinary fields where some measurements of real things are necessary, where the referents are simple in their structure and concrete in their appearance without having many compound elements and attributes, and where no human interests interfere, as is the case in the fields of mathematics and natural sciences where terms are established by arbitrariness. Nonetheless, the q-knowledge deviated from p-knowledge which has dominated in theories of education, including curriculum theory, and the theories of moral education in particular. All school subjects, including morals, became knowledge-based, without reference to the implication of p-knowledge. This unexpected result has been generated by Socratic dialectics, which were developed in the process of arguments with Sophists about the use of words.

Relying exclusively on the faculty of reason within the distorted conception of knowledge, Socrates and his disciples turned away from the faculty of human affections and passions. The newly developed conception of knowledge took advantage of the deep and broad meaning of knowledge. This means that the precisely defined meanings
of words, in comparison with their ordinary use, lost the richness of the meanings which words convey. The 'knowledge' defined by Socrates is too narrow to cover the meaning of virtue, which involves moral action.

In moral education, there must be language which is less precise than the usual or even vague compared to scientific language, as Isocrates explained, for the sake of expression and appreciation of the subtlety of moral phenomena. Therefore, this position must reject the Socratic attempt which claims to keep the clarity of meanings of words and the coherency of rational discourse. Reducing all kinds of knowing to the rational is inadequate, especially in education, where central activities are concerned with the art of living. Socratic irony and tragedy originated from very Socrates's redundant interpretation of his proposition 'Virtue is knowledge', and thereupon was destined to provoke the educational confusion in theory and practice and in planning curriculum.

By common consent, conceptual clarity and unbreakable and infallible logical conclusions are 'hallmarks' of Socratic thought about knowing. Both Socrates and Plato place a great and excessive emphasis on the rationality of human thoughts at the expense of affective or non-rational meanings of knowing. Therefore, they seem to take the wrong way in considering that they could organise human life in terms of this kind of rationality; they presumed that such assumed absolute knowledge, based on the rational order of thought and on the precisely and narrowly defined use of words, can avoid human miseries by the help of logically reasoned conclusions.

The Socratic idea of the clarity of meanings developed into realism and rationalism. Realism in general involves great difficulties in application to educational practice, when one evaluates the referential theory which is basic in realism. The realist supposes that words must have clear meanings which correspond with referents. However, in education, not all words in school texts need to have such clarity in their referents. Many words, even in school texts, are beyond such
realist limitations. In fact, the referents of some words are not clearly seen, contrary to what realist principles demand.

Certain subjects are beyond the realist's limitations; amongst these are remarkably the subjects of arts and morality. Moral education, differing from other subjects, deals with a deep and broad extent of content, which ranges across the whole spectrum of human perception and understanding, i.e. from the pre-linguistic to the highly abstract. However, the distinctive part of the whole gamut of morality is the pre-linguistic and pre-theoretical. This is what the pupil knows, but cannot do with language, contrary to the realist's view of knowing. Moral language in the texts could not describe this part of morality explicitly: it is the area of 'darkness' which is tacit but from which moral order originates. It is therefore the ground on which the compound and complex structure of morality is based. Though the deepest level of morality is conceived as the ineffable, it is not at all the same as what Wittgensteinian 'silence' means. Such morality appears and expresses itself in various ways, in addition to formal language, like the forms of life, non-linguistic cultural heritages, and something fused in the whole range of extensive literature and arts; without these, morality could not be expressible and perceptible. This is a world that is far from the realist conception of reality; it is the world which the realist could not suppose to be. It exists far beyond the horizon of the realist conception of reality.

Even the part of morality which is coextensive with words is still too vague to be described meaningfully, because the moralities are too vague to describe. In this regard, moralities do not allow of their nature the realist belief in the describability of reality. For this reason, the words used in moral representations have been employed for long periods in which there has been change in their meanings. However, the striking point is that, during this period, something is added to the lexical meanings. As such, the words convey additional meanings which are the most prominent feature of moral language and which form the ground of moral notions. Without recognising and using
these added meanings, the manipulation of moral words is futile and insignificant in the domain of moral knowing.

The idea of moral notions rejects the realist's view of the rigidity of the meanings of moral words and of the statements constructed with the words. It denies, inevitably, the highest form of certainty of human thoughts which the realist tries to establish. The idea of moral notions, on the contrary, appreciates greatly the openness of the meanings of words, which allows thus the additional meanings, the vagueness of definition and the inclusion of emotions; it goes, therefore, in part, beyond the world of letters or language, and of conceptualisation. Moral notions are characterisable as implying a certain level of knowing which is constituted mainly by the images of moral goodness which guide the creation of moral worlds; they are the notions of 'right' and 'ought' with which human actions must comply.

The idea of additional meanings opens the possibility and significance of personal knowing, and it also rejects the overspreading view of the scientific use of words and the impersonal view of knowing things, especially including that of having a morality. By virtue of this kind of view, it seems, the pupil concretely perceives humanity in general, and moral quality in particular, through accommodating and appreciating moral notions accompanied by the use of words in moral utterances and in other forms of moral conversations. The effects of this sort of perception can be derived in most cases from literature and arts. The acceptance of accompanying meanings might be the prerequisite of the relief of subjective and personal understanding from its drowning in the extremity of objective and scientific thought which originates from the 'Socratic tragedy'. This objectivism would be quite out of place, if the teacher applies it in the education of morality without giving deep consideration to the nature of the moral quality of the mind; this is true for other school subjects. The idea of additional meanings lessens the impact of the extremity of objectivism and scientism, and rehabilitates the forgotten part of the mind which is non-rational and
subjective. This view was once praised by Isocrates, especially in his modified view of rhetoric which manifests humanity as based deeply in the darkness of the human mind.

An increased conceptional clarification is not impossible in the development of the moral quality. Mencius's four names of cardinal virtues, 'benevolence', 'righteousness', 'propriety' and 'prudence', might be examples of words which express roughly their meanings and are usable in disciplinary discourses on morality. However, what they express is still not very clear and fails to manifest the abundant meanings which usually accompany them when they are used properly in each specific tradition. Symbolising morality in the written word is possible in part; it seems that from the depth of informal moral notions some formalised thoughts arise, which may be represented in letters. Thus, moral knowing is of its nature unique and spans the whole gamut of human knowing, from the pre-linguistic to the symbolic, from the concrete to the abstract.

Nonetheless, the oversimplified symbolisation of moral notions would hinder the moral quality of the mind, seriously damage moral depth and consequently undermine the base of moral education. Scientific representation of issues in moral education neglects the extended meanings of moral words and disregards the blurred edge of the defined meanings with which the pupil sees things from a moral point of view. Hence comes the abandonment of the edification of moral character and the loss of the light that shines on things with the light of morality. The realist view of moral education thus eliminates the quality of humanity and leads the teacher to the wrong place, where the prospect for the edification of the moral mind is hopelessly barren, as Kierkegaard anxiously noted. Excessively refining the meanings of words, moral education loses the depth of morality which is conveyed by the accompanying meanings; Socrates committed this error. To see an issue according to refined concepts only is to lose the 'thing per se'.

Moral virtues have specific qualities. For this reason, the realist
attempt to deserve the complex quality of morality is futile. Moral virtues cannot be given names in the strict sense; once one names a moral quality, he loses many elements of the moral system that are associated with the name given; language is always too vague to name such things. Morality avoids language. Therefore, symbolisation of the moral quality is logically hazardous. The more pre-linguistic the moral quality is, the closer it is to the practical and the humanistic rather than the theoretical and the scientific.

Moral statements are pseudo-factual; they consist not in words whose meanings are factual but in words whose meanings are accompanied by moral notions. In this respect, moral education must not fail to recognise this feature of moral statements and to give much attention to the area of accompanying meanings rather than to what is defined by factual attributes. ‘X is good’ can be taken as something other than a moral statement; if the pupil could not understand the meanings which accompany the factual meaning of the subject ‘x’, then the statement can be seen otherwise, for instance, as merely sociological. Insofar as moral notions are of their nature coextensive with the factual meanings of words in moral statements, the statements must have extensive meanings. Such statements are not confined by the meaning of knowledge as specifically defined by the rationalist, and do not allow the realist criteria of testing for truth. To preserve the character of knowledge that does not imply the logical gulf between moral knowing and doing, the breadth of meaning of knowing must be extended much wider than the realist and the rationalist views of the meaning of knowing.

The extended view of the meaning of ‘knowledge’ rejects not only the intellectualist's idea, but also the modern theorist's belief on moral education. Broadening the meaning of knowledge, beyond the Socratic restriction, offers a logical condition in which the distorted meaning of ‘moral knowing’ is overcome and such knowing stands more safely. As a result, the scope of ‘knowing’ in education accommodates the whole stratum of moral life that is textured crisscross with feelings,
emotions and beliefs. To embrace all elements of morality, in depth and breadth, it would be a logical necessity that the meaning of 'moral knowing' should not be restricted by the realist and rationalist conception of knowledge. For this reason, a newly defined 'educational epistemology' must be introduced in the place where philosophical epistemology has dominated until now.

The scope of moral knowing must be beyond the world of textual abstractions, because with this extended scope of moral knowing moral statements can really extend far beyond even Aristotle's conception of 'practical wisdom' which is still confined by the logical form of reason. The extended meaning of 'moral knowing' logically opens itself to the whole inter-context of literature, philosophy, history and other areas of humane study. This is because these arts include the limitless field of moral notions and imaginations.

Moral statements are of their nature not sociological and the anthropological, nor are they the psychological projection of moral emotions. Therefore, it would be much safer to state that they are expressions of one's undetermined moral notions. For this reason, the statement 'X is good' is far from being a rationalised and objectified sentence; it is not an example of Socrates's 'science', nor Aristotle's 'episteme', nor his 'techne', nor his 'phronesis', precisely because of its emotional quality and its indeterminacy. It is a particular form of human expression that is distinct from any theorised type of rational thought. The theoretical, contrary to the notional, is limited to understanding things; it is developed with precisely and arbitrarily defined words.

In the form of moral statements, doing and knowing are inseparable if they are examined in terms of moral notions; this is because 'moral notions' involve the emotions which motivate actual moral behaviours; moral knowing and moral doing are therefore logically tied together in this conceptual sense. Both 'moral knowing' and 'moral doing' are components of 'moral notions', and therefore they are not separable in this logic; they are logically consistent.
Since the realist and rationalist attitudes have dominated the teachers' ideas of teaching and learning, school curriculum policy has been governed by the scientific view of knowledge. Thus, the statements in school texts are confidently restricted to those which are justifiable according to both the realist and the rationalist principles. Constantly, the non-rational, the pre-disciplinary and the pre-linguistic understandings of things which belong to the primordial form of knowing are unfortunately excluded from the concern of school learning. Thus, the place of education in virtue has been replaced by discourse about ethics, as is observed plainly in the form of ethics developed by Socrates and by all the rationalists who succeeded him.

Discourse about ethics as an approach to moral education goes far away from practical effects on the pupil's moral life, mainly because it has no connection with morality in practice. The more one tries to refine the meanings of words for rational moral discourse, the further this comes from practical moral life. The rationalist myth of the curriculum must therefore be abandoned. For this purpose, moral education and education in the other humanities, amongst others, need to appreciate the extensive meaning of knowledge, accommodate the vague meanings of the words which they employ, and avoid the tight logical operation of thinking with carefully defined words. Instead of rejecting any practical quality of the school curriculum, education must bring it back into praxis which is rooted in the pre-disciplinary level of knowing. This can be guided by an educational philosophy which proposes a new and broad conception of knowledge.

Knowing and doing, in moral education, share moral notions as coefficients in their character. Therefore, 'knowing' without 'doing' is meaningless in moral education and vice versa, according to the view of moral notions. In this regard, the development of moral notions is at the heart of moral education. However, 'teaching' is not a proper word in relation to the development of moral quality, because the content of teaching in education has been conceived as something purely rational which is proper for the work of explanation and
understanding. The development of moral quality requires the perception of morality, which is possible not through the activity of teaching but through the experience of the moral culture which is widely spread in moral praxis and accompanied by the words used in moral dialogues.

Developing moral notions requires very comprehensive ways of education: the attainment of the moral meanings involved in moral praxis, in which the pupil engages his life and which are added to the language which the pupil uses. Without perceiving the moralities built into the practical moral situation and the words used in moral colloquies, moral knowing would be meaningless and sterile, and moral motivation must decline. A broad conception of moral experience is therefore necessary, especially for the full perception of the moral dimension which is all around the pupil. Such a conception of moral experience values the moral imagination in the existential experience of the world. Such an imagination ‘aims to construct the world as it should be out of the world as it is’, instead of inculcating blindly the moral ideas encapsulated in texts.

The debate between the rationalist and the non-rationalist or the realist and the non-realist involves the difficulty of educational understanding of the meaning of knowing. It would be absurd to suppose that there is an ordered body of moral knowledge to which education must submit itself. On the contrary, moral knowing is notional, and therefore less ordered than scientific knowledge. Moral education makes the pupil have his own view of the moral world and build it from the chaotic or disorderly moral world. About this characteristic, Isaiah Berlin wrote suggestively:

You create values, you create goals, you create ends, and in the end you create your own vision of the universe, exactly as artists create works of art - and before the artist has created a work of art, it does not exist, it is not anywhere.

The Socratic proposition, 'Virtue is knowledge' must be redefined and re-incorporated in accordance with the non-rationalist and non-realist meanings of 'knowledge'. Prima facie the proposition appears not to raise any educational problem. However, the words constituting the proposition are too narrowly defined by the realist and the rationalist, neglecting the specific features which moral words imply in their specific use. Therefore, the proposition must be misleading, if the words 'virtue' and 'knowledge' in the proposition are tested against the non-rational and the non-realist views on the nature of moral knowledge.

As the title of the study suggests, the relationship between 'knowing', 'doing' and 'moral mind' must be re-formulated in a positive way as this philosophical examination contributes by disclosing the logical labyrinth between the three concepts. Education must go beyond the scientific myth which believes that all school subjects must be taught in accordance with the logic of rationalism and realism. The realist conception of 'virtue' and the rationalist definition of 'knowledge' should be re-examined in view of the uniqueness of moral education, in order to recover the forgotten part of morality implied in the vagueness of language, to achieve the educational aim of edifying the human mind rather than to develop the power of mechanical rationalisation, and finally to rehabilitate the humanist pedagogics after the 'educational tragedy' which originated from the philosophical era of Socrates.

8.2 The meaning of moral knowing and its implications for moral education

The varying contexts of moral education and their problems

The development of moral mind in education is logically related to
how schools prepare the environment in which the pupils experience the moralities involved in the environment, how school teachers understand the meaning of ‘moral knowing’, and how the teachers perform their educational activities for the development of their pupils' moral mind in accordance with the meaning of moral knowing.

The moral environment of schools should be seen as the culture in which school children's moral mind can be grown. Such a school environment is usually constituted by all the practical curriculum activities. The study of the moral environment must include, amongst other areas, the practical curriculum activities of moral education, because it seems that there exist varying contexts in regard to the practical moral curriculum in different societies. For instance, in Oriental societies, understanding of the meanings of moral principles is claimed as an aim of moral education. Therefore, moral principles, considered as knowledge, constitute moral subjects for study in such societies, including China, Japan and Korea, whether the principles are quoted from Confucian classics or Kantian maxims. The demands of moral education in Oriental societies might be different from those of other societies. However, it seems that teaching moral principles involved in Confucian classics and Kantian maxims does not improve pupils' practical moralities as much as has been expected by the advocates of such education, except for the development of the learned man's scholastic virtue, i.e. 'the learned ignorant'.

Value clarification might be another distinguishing context of the moral education which is carried on in Oriental societies. Value clarification is necessary for the resolution of value conflicts and for the clarification of the meanings of words that are used in value statements. For value clarification, the teachers use the model of Socratic dialectics; and in this model teachers and their pupils first seek agreed meanings of words they use, as is shown by the case of Socrates with his interlocutors in Plato's *Dialogues*.

However, the point is that education for understanding the meanings of moral principles and for value clarification necessarily
Conclusion: knowing, doing, and the moral notions

deals with the form of moral statement ‘X is good’, and that the meanings of X-words in this form of moral judgment are necessarily the objects of clarification. ‘X is good’ statements appear not only in the Confucian classics and Kantian maxims, but also they are used in every moral conversation whether it is carried on in our ordinary life or in education. Hence the examples of ‘X is good’ statements like ‘rescuing from drowning is good’, ‘helping elderly people is good’, ‘the murder in the cathedral was wrong’ appear in our moral conversations, which are mainly constituted by moral judgments. In this respect, it seems, no strikingly different feature can be found in different societies.

Thus, education for understanding the meanings of moral principles and that for value clarification are inevitable in moral education. However, the problem in the case is that clarification of the meanings of X-words sometimes loses the moral notions or normative meanings which are accompanied by X-words. And the problem bifurcates into several crucial problems which need to be resolved in education. One of the problems is the defect that understanding the meanings of X-words is usually confined to the clarification of their literal meanings, losing the moral meanings which are below the surface meanings of X-words, the meanings which are usually accompanied by X-words. Therefore, the result of the lesson might be that the pupil only knows the lexical meaning of ‘murder’ in the given X-statement; for instance, in the example of the moral judgment ‘the murder in the cathedral was wrong’ he knows that the terms ‘murder’ applies to the historical event which happened at Canterbury.

Another problem is that many controversial meanings are found as the surface meanings of X-words, because on the surface different values, political whims, social and political ideologies, religious beliefs and individual interests collect and float. Thus, in many cases and in theoretical perspectives, the task of clarification of the meanings of X-words often ends unsatisfactorily with the encounter with this problem, as is seen in Socrates's dialogues.
Yet another problem is that clarification of meanings of X-words may transform the pupil's mind towards adopting a rationalist or theoretical inclination. This is because clarification of meanings of words in moral education transforms at its final stage into an education in analytic thinking, which is far from education for the development of moral activity. This transformation is seen both in the developmental process of Socrates's dialogues and in moral education in Oriental societies.

The nature of moral knowing

The problems of moral education, as examined in the analysis of their varying contexts, have distorted moral education itself and the meaning of moral knowing. Therefore, the problems necessarily require examination of the meaning of 'moral knowing', which needs to re-define the purpose of the development of the pupil's morality in an effective way. This is because the meanings of the statements 'X is good' obscure the sight of the pupil so that he will not see the moral meanings hidden in the statements. In fact, many a different meaning may be muddled in confusion over the statements of the form 'X is good'; as a result, there are many disagreements on the surface meanings. For example, the judgment, 'the murder in the cathedral was wrong' may be made from various perspectives, such as the political, the religious, and the moral. Many different and controversial views - political ideologies, religious claims, and sectional interests - may be intermingled in the form of an 'X is good' statement; therefore, such a statement does not truly open the eye of morality. The deeper moral meanings that accompany the 'X-words' of the statements do not float on the surface, and are not superior to others in power.

In this regard, the essential nature of moral knowing must be sought in the deep stratum of the meanings of the statement 'X is
good’, that is to say, in the accompanying or additional meanings of ‘X-words’. If this is accepted, it might be the clue to finding how the meaning of moral knowing can be re-defined in moral education. This is the reason why the present study has examined the depth stratum of the statement ‘X is good’, and endeavours to re-define the meaning of moral knowing in specific contexts.

The logic of the clue entails that ‘moral knowing’ must be characterised by the power with which the pupil can see things or understand the meanings of the statement ‘X is good’. The metaphor of the ‘power’ with which the pupil sees things is equivalent in its meaning to ‘moral mind’ or ‘moral notions’, in other words. Therefore, the meaning of ‘moral knowing’ might be defined as the power of seeing things with moral notions, and the meaning should be extended in this way; this is due to the nature of the objects of notional seeing, which are in actuality not only pre-theoretical in their form, but also tacit in their character. However, from this claim of the tacitness of moral notions it does not necessarily follow that we must deny the existence of moral notions that are articulated. In this respect, the nature of moral knowing is distinct from the meanings of knowing in the sciences.

Moral notions have to be developed in a very distinctive way, compared to other domains of education. This is because ‘moral knowing’ requires the pupil to perceive the pre-theoretical domain and the tacit elements of morality. Necessarily the pre-theoretical and the tacit, as facets of moral notions, are composed of emotions, images, and perceptions. Thus, the logic of human development dictates that education in early and developing moral knowing must be sought in the arts and the aesthetic domain, because these domains are characteristically composed of emotions, images, and perceptions. Therefore, the teacher must first initiate the pupil into the arts and the aesthetic domain.

The role of the arts and the aesthetic domain can be explored for the development of the pupil's moral notions. De facto, the
experiences of commiseration, shame and dislike, complaisance, and right and wrong, which constitute the moral notions, are fundamental in literature; they exist in a state of emotion. Such experiences also extend further into the depths of literature; they communicate feelings like joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, wickedness and desire. Literature, whether it is prose or poetry, aims at the expressions of human emotions and feelings which are hidden in deep levels of the human mind. And these emotions and feelings are understood as the basic notions of morality, as Mencius explains; moralities are based in literature, as Iris Murdoch advocates and Dostoevsky's and Tolstoy's works reveal.

However, such emotions and feelings are not the objects of teaching, they are objects of experience; the teacher is unable to teach joy and sorrow, shame and dislike. Through literature, the pupil may have such existential experiences, though they are indirect in form, and many of them are of ‘what cannot be said’. Giving the opportunities to experience ‘what cannot be said’, the teacher is able to magnify the pupil's imaginative power of understanding morality; this is the distinctive character of ‘moral knowing’, because with this power the pupil sees and creates his own moral world. Moral imagination has the exploratory power to open a new image of the public or individual moral world.

However, moral imagination in literature or in other places depends on moral sensations, as was suggested by Rousseau; imagination does not arise in a vacuum. And literature and the aesthetic domain are the most proper field in which the pupil's moral sensitivity can be cultivated, because such worlds are to be perceived in an epistemological sense; ‘aesthetic’ means perceiving, in its etymological origin. Through this process of experiencing, the pupil finally acquires his own moral emotions, and much of their quality can be articulated through notional words like ‘human dignity’ and ‘justice’. However, much of their quality may still evade articulation.

Indeed, there are innumerable resources to be taken for materials
for moral education. The pupil can feel the moral goodness and wickedness expressed by certain mythical heroes, for instance. Mythical literature can therefore be recommended for this purpose; it expresses directly or indirectly and explicitly or implicitly, the prime moral ideals implied in its tragedies and legends. In the depth of 'shame', the primitive meanings of moralities are retained. The pupil who engages with such literature may express his feeling in speech or writing. However, such expressions of the pupil's feelings are not always important or possible.

The materials for moral experiences are not confined to tragedies or legends in the classics; they can be extended into the humanities generally, if the teacher chooses the resources carefully in terms of morality. Subjects in the humanities, amongst other school subjects, manifest emotions which are available for the development of the pupil's moral notions. Rhetoric, as in classical schooling, is another illustration of subjects which have a humanitarian predilection. This is the reason why Isocrates takes rhetoric as the most important subject for inspiring the humanitarian spirit of the pupil. Thus, Isocrates's rhetoric is comparable, in this regard, to the Socratic dialectics which takes the rigorous logical use of language as its hallmark. Rhetoric is far from the exclusive pursuit of logical necessity; it comprises also ethos and pathos; in this regard, it can be taken in education as an example for the edification of human character. Poetry and drama can be seen as the modern representatives of rhetoric and they carry in themselves a grand view of humanism. Rhetoric was the prologue to all human studies in ancient Greece. To initiate the pupil into such subjects is to build the pupil's mind in a humanistic direction.

Moral responsibilities and condemnations are widespread in historical study; so are shame and guilt. From history the young student may learn to form noble moral notions, like 'fraternity' and 'human dignity' which are basic for humanitarian moralities. In fact, history, if the pupil listens to what history tells him, is not a series of events, but the record of human spirits; knowing 'what is history' is in
its final sense 'to be moral'. Such spiritual experiences of the pupil in such subjects are invaluable, because the teacher cannot otherwise teach his pupil 'to be just' and 'to be fair'. In such experiences, the pupil feels for example the shame and guilt in historical events; such experiences extend to the extreme of synoptic and synnoetic awareness.

In this regard, a certain kind of school environment must be prepared in order to achieve such purposes. First, it must be allowed that the teacher selects the contents of subjects with a consideration of moral perspectives; this must be the principle of curriculum selection. Secondly, the teacher must lead the pupil into the depth of the moral world which is based in his subject, without confining his teaching to the objectives which are established for each unit of the subject. Thirdly, the teacher must prepare practical curriculum activities in which the pupil participates; for this a certain kind of rhetorical experience and performance of drama are advocated.

The distinctiveness of the form of moral education

The distinctive form of moral education which is advocated here can be ensured in accordance with the meaning of moral knowing defined by the study. Every subject on the school timetable requires a particular type of teaching, as conveyed by the distinctive nature of knowledge characterising the subject. Moral education might formulate its distinctive type in the same way as other school subjects, though morality cannot be an independent subject to be taught at school. However, the distinctiveness of the form of moral education which has been developed in this study might be phrased in three subdivisions; the aim, the contents and the method of moral education.

In the first place, the newly defined meaning of 'moral knowing' suggests an aim of moral education which is broadened to accommodate a very broad field of objectives. Thus, such education
prepares a locus in which both the internalist and the externalist conceptions of moral education are reconciled; the need for this is implied by the logical intertwining of the three key concepts ‘knowing’, ‘doing’ and ‘moral mind’.

Moral internalism has been dominant in moral education and has shaped the teacher’s conception of the nature of moral knowing. Thus, some teachers believe that moral education is to help the pupils to understand theoretically formulated moral principles or thoughts, as can be seen in several Oriental countries; thus, their moral education has been transformed into a form of theoretical enquiry about morality, that is to say, ‘ethics’ or ‘discourse ethics’, as Habermas advocates in his theory of communicative action. However, education through discussion about moralities raises the problem of motivational neutrality. On the contrary, moral externalism mitigates the cognitive side of morality and emphasises, accordingly, the systematic training of moral behaviour, i.e. habit formation or character building. Differing from those two forms of moral education, this study suggests a form of moral education in which the two aims - knowing and doing - coalesce.

In the second place, the enlarged meaning of ‘moral knowing’ must be distinguishable from other forms of knowing, in that it opens much broader contents of morality, inasmuch as the meaning of moral knowing is extended. ‘Moral knowing’ encompasses ‘moral doing’, both being integral qualities of morality; they are fastened together. And the internal relationship between moral knowing and doing extends its scope to the whole context of morality which includes the large areas of actual human moral life where moral knowing and doing coalesce. This integration probably means the moral virtue that Socrates first assumed to have the inclusive meaning of knowing, i.e. σωφροσύνη.

For the purpose of including the broadest domain as its contents, the moral education allows even the undifferentiated meanings of words with which a great part of human practical moral life is
textured. Thus, this idea blazes a trail to the enlarged contents of moral knowing; ie. to the common-sense or pre-theoretical world. For instance, moral knowing as common sense is characteristically embodied in all the practical capabilities of ordinary language and it opens on the vast pre-theoretical world; thus it does not limit the scope of knowing to disciplinary knowing; it ranges over a wider domain and thereby touches more widely and deeply the underlying grounds on which human moral life rests. Therefore, pre-theoretical knowing must be taken as important content for moral education; this is so, in particular, for 'the development of moral mind' in its most fundamental sense. This kind of content can be found in the arts and the aesthetic domain in particular; they provide indirect but existential experiences for the pupil. Such existential experiences as moral contents are articulated in some cases, but ineffable in other cases, because existential experience includes perceiving rather than exclusively rational thinking where language and symbols are necessary. Moral awareness thus extends to the extreme of pre-theoretical experiences where sensations, imagination, and synoptic or synnoetic awareness are combined. The form of moral education is thus characterisable by its broadened contents.

The most striking feature of the form of moral education, as far as its contents are concerned, might be the requirement for the sovereignty of moral goodness over all school subjects which are morally relevant. This is because most subjects share certain common moralities in their depth, as is seen in the humanities, for instance. It seems valid to say that education implies living, living implies moral life and therefore school subjects are the contents of life. All these contents which are derived by the extended meaning of moral knowing characterise the form of moral education.

In the third place, the form of moral education is characterised by the teacher's distinctive role in initiating his pupil into the world defined by the meaning of moral knowing or moral notions, in particular. As is suggested by the meaning of moral notions, the
contents of moral education range from the affective to the cognitive and from the ineffable to the articulated. However, the distinctive type of moral education can be found in the teacher's role in illuminating the tacitness and inarticulability of the moral domain. But, it is logically impossible to ‘teach’ the moralities in the domain of tacitness and inarticulability, just because ‘teaching’ is nothing to do with the tacit and with the moral character. ‘Practicing’ relates rather to the activity for the improvement of excellence, whereas ‘teaching’ is mainly used in relation to understanding of knowledge, explanations of theories and acquisition of skills. For instance, ‘to be good’ is not the object of teaching; this is because ‘becoming good’ is not something to be acquired by the pupil's understanding of the meaning of ‘goodness’ or by the teacher's perspicuous explanation of the meaning. Such an object, if it is not simply a matter of ethical or philosophical enquiry into its meaning, must be something which is to be developed through the pupil's moral practice. Therefore, the role of the teacher must be sought in the pupil's practicing activities in the morally relevant subjects or in other planned activities.

In the arts and aesthetic education, the teacher must help his pupil to feel something of moralities which are based in a piece of literature or in an event of history. Through the teacher's educational planning and his direct guidance of practice, the pupil can perceive moral realities which are accompanied by literature. With this practice the pupil's power of moral imagination can be developed and, as a result, he could create his moral life. The teacher may tell his pupil historical stories so that the pupil may feel hidden moral elements in those stories, which he could not feel without the teacher's help. Many tacit elements are hidden in the depth of humanities subjects. Planning an educational programme in relation to the practice of moral sensations and imagination and guiding such a practice must be one of the most precious educational activities the teacher should prepare. Such a practice can be extended to the extra-curricular activities in which the pupil actually participates as a figure in a drama and crudely
experiences naive human tragedies which are unable to be taught by the teacher. In fact, many educational resources for the practice of moral perceptions and imagination can be found in the arts.

Imagination usually arises in the situation of 'what cannot be said'. Therefore, the teacher must conceive that the pre-linguistic mode of experience allows more capacity for moral imagination than other modes of experience. In this regard, there is a laborious responsibility on the teacher: for the understanding of the meanings of X-words in a moral sense, not for the sake of clarity in meaning, but as part of the experience of the basic moralities, the teacher must help his pupil to see the meanings which exist in a state of emotion.

The role of culture in moral education

Culture is the resource of the school curriculum. Education is carried on within culture. Moral education is not an exception. In fact, moral education is the cultural experiences prepared for the pupil; the pupil's cultural experiences consist of feelings, emotions, images, visions, thoughts, beliefs, ideas, understandings, languages, relationships, organisations, moral canons and maxims of conduct, procedures, rituals. These cultural ingredients are available for educational resources, if they are chosen in the right way by educational criteria. With these experiences the pupil acquires the mind of reverence for life, humane beliefs, feelings of sympathy and fraternity, moral disposition and moral sentiment. Therefore, the pupil's moral mind cannot be formed without experiencing moralities which are embedded in the existing cultural inheritance. This is so particularly for the primal moralities which are hidden beneath the culture.

The pupil grows in his culture; therefore, he must first be able to perceive the cultural components which are based in depth in his culture. However, the teacher must initiate his pupil into other cultures and value diversity where he can see cultural controversiality. This is
for the purposes of seeking common understanding across cultural contexts and of creating new common culture. Education in multicultural contexts might be helpful for this purpose.

A good deal of cultural differences and value diversities are expressed in the moral statement ‘X is good’. Thus, such differences and diversities blur and confuse the eye of the pupil who is seeking the moral meaning of the statement. This is not exceptional for the statement ‘the murder in the cathedral was wrong’. As indicated above, the statement can be seen in different ways by different people. In fact, the meanings of all X-words in statements of the form ‘X is good’ are coloured by different cultural differences and value diversities; as a result such statements are conflicting and understood in many different ways.

Cultural differences are floating on the surface of the statement ‘X is good’. Therefore, some conflicts always appear between different cultural differences on the surface of the statement and the moral notions in the depth of the statement. It is therefore necessary in moral education to enter into the depth stratum of the statement where the pupil can touch and examine the common ground of moral values. Reading moral notions in depth is the way to having common moral ground on which the pupil sees the world through his moral eyes, ie. through moral notions. Moral education is to help the pupil to see the surface from the depth.

Moral notions are human creations, but they are examined commonly through human intellectual history, though there are still many notions which are in the process of examination. Moral education in general deals with the surface meanings of the statement ‘X is good’; however, this must be frustrating for the pupil who has not acquired the moral notions, because he could not differentiate one value from another in the surface meanings of the statements ‘X is good’, where cultural differences and value diversities are multiplex. However, ‘moral notions’ are agreed moral values formed through long human traditions, as in the cases of ‘human dignity’, ‘fairness’,
and 'respect for persons'. From this consideration, the study derives a logical conclusion that moral education is the initiation into the world of moral notions. Therefore, moral education should be arranged so that the pupil sees the depth stratum of culture rather than that appearing on the surface, because only in the depth stratum can many different opinions and value conflicts be brought into consonance.

However, some moral notions are 'what can be said' and others are 'what cannot be said'. 'What can be said' and 'what cannot be said' are decided not by the deficiency of language, but by the complexity of the meaning which is to be articulated. This character might be similar to the images of a poet; certain images can be phrased in poetry, others are difficult, and still others impossible. Normative ethics and morality are struggling to articulate certain moralities; hence many words for moral notions appear. And in this process there emerges a tension between 'what is to be said' and 'what is difficult to be said', because many meanings elude articulation.

Nonetheless, a degree of articulation of morality is demanded in ethics and moral education. The demand for articulation of tacit morality can be realised in three ways in developmental contexts; the first case is that some moralities are articulated as is proved by the words 'commiseration' and 'benevolence'; the second case is that some moralities are understandable through experiences, though they are still in a tacit state; the third case is that some moralities are expressible indirectly in the arts, that is to say, in literature. The teacher may plan his moral education with the view these developmental contexts provide. In these ways, there could certainly be a degree of reconciliation between the demand for the articulation of morality and its tacitness. Therefore, an integrated theory of moral education is possible, to avoid the education which creates 'the learned ignorant', by virtue of the re-established extended meaning of moral knowing. This meaning was presumed to be present in ancient Greece but lost in the developmental process of Socratic dialectics.
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