THE CURRENT HONG KONG EDUCATIONAL SITUATION
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
FOR THE DEGREE OF Ph.D

1988

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EDUCATION
The current Hong Kong educational situation in comparative perspective

This thesis explores the issue of adaptation within Hong Kong society to political change, with special emphasis on Hong Kong education.

Chapter One introduces the problem: two societies, which differ in political and economic systems and in social structures, will merge under one authority. The People's Republic of China will assume sovereignty over Hong Kong and form 'one country, two systems'. The emergence of the topic as a public issue in Hong Kong resulting in tension and realignment of political power is described. The comparative element is introduced with a discussion of contemporary areas of convergence and divergence between Hong Kong and the PRC.

Chapter Two extends the comparative element in the thesis with a description of Hong Kong in terms of its socio-political, economic, and educational systems. The emphasis is on aspects of these systems which may contradict existing systems of the PRC. The chapter also highlights examples of public response to previous social change in Hong Kong.

Chapter Three discusses the comparable systems of the PRC. The thesis argues in Chapters Two and Three that tension may emerge
because of structural contradictions between the systems in Hong Kong and the PRC.

The preceding macro analysis is grounded by, and narrowed by an empirical investigation into one example of adjustment to the transfer which the thesis argues is occurring in Hong Kong. Chapter Four describes this research and demonstrates that the established culturally-based behavior patterns relating to educational and occupational choices are persisting in the present period of transition.

The thesis concludes in Chapter Five with a discussion of various scenarios possible for Hong Kong education during and after the transition period. In its conclusion the thesis argues that the social change brought about by the transfer of sovereignty can be prepared for, with purposive and selective adjustment.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Several people have provided the encouragement and assistance necessary to the completion of this project. Dr. Robert Cowen, my advisor, not only advised on the intellectual challenges of the project, but was always insightful, accessible and supportive. I am very grateful to him.

I am also very grateful for the help of my family, Bernd, Nicole, Martin and Laura. Each was very generous throughout, offering encouragement, interest, and patience.

Several people were helpful at specific points in the progress of this thesis. In London, many members of the Institute staff were generous with their time in answering my questions. Among them, particularly, Dr. Elwyn Thomas graciously guided me in the early stages of planning the fieldwork.

In Hong Kong, members of the teaching staffs of both Hong Kong University and the Chinese University helped me obtain access to schools and libraries. They also shared their own insights into the current Hong Kong situation. The principals of many secondary schools in Hong Kong invited me in to their schools and graciously ensured that all my requests were met.
Finally, in Hong Kong, Alex Chan Sze Choi made important improvements to the Chinese translation of the survey, as well as assisting me with many logistical aspects of the fieldwork. He, and other former students of mine in Hong Kong, provided skills and contacts without which the fieldwork project would have been difficult to complete.

It is to them, and to all young adults in Hong Kong who face the uncertain future described in my thesis, that it is dedicated.
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Bibliography
INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
AND OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT

On July 1, 1997 the political status of Hong Kong will change. On that date it ceases to be a dependent colony of the United Kingdom and becomes a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. Under terms of the Draft Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Future of Hong Kong, initialled in 1984, Hong Kong is guaranteed the preservation of its economic system, its legal system, and the right to determine its own economic, financial and trade policies, but sovereignty over Hong Kong is transferred from the UK to the PRC. Simply put, non-Hong Kong actors have enacted a decolonization but not, at the same time, provided independence. In its place, control has been transferred to a second external power. Thus, two societies, differing in economic, educational and ideological systems, in class structure and social and economic mobility, will co-exist as one nation under one authority: the PRC assuming sovereignty over Hong Kong forming 'one country, two systems'.

The departing Government of the United Kingdom has 'strongly commended' this Agreement to the people of Hong Kong as providing '...the necessary assurances about Hong Kong's future to allow the territory to continue to flourish and to maintain its unique role in the world as a major trading and financial centre' (1).

Despite these assurances, the participants in the transfer will confront both abstract and practical problems. The PRC must solve
several political, social and ethical dilemmas. For example, it must resolve the ethical dilemma of allowing Hong Kong residents to make money in a communist country (2). Secondly, the PRC faces a sensitive issue when attempting to anticipate the seriousness of the social tensions which will be caused by the existing gap between the standards of living in the two societies. If the gap increases, that problem worsens. They must also formulate, and propagate, an official view of the Hong Kong people: are Hong Kong residents 'bourgeois liberals' or are they benefactors of the new China?

Hong Kong faces the problem of devising strategies which enhance preservation of social and economic 'stability and prosperity' during the lead up to 1997 and the post-merger period. There is, for example, in Hong Kong widespread anxiety that the present standard of living, as well as economic and political stability, will be impossible to maintain under the new government. There is also fear that the existing socio-cultural and economic environment will be unacceptable to the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC). There are also attempts being made by people staying in Hong Kong 1997 to predict, without the benefit of historical models, the effects the institutional differences between the PRC and Hong Kong will have on the transfer and merger process and on their society. Such efforts to predict the effects, and adjust to them, are made more complicated by the probability that social and economic change is likely to be a continuing and continual process.

The merger is without obvious historical precedent. It is an event of decolonization and transfer - and it is this event of decolonization and transfer, a continuing social process, which this thesis will attempt to analyze. The thesis breaks down this process
into three constituent parts. These parts are (a) the definition of the event as a public issue resulting in shifts of interest groups and power alignments within the colony; (b) the existence of implicit and explicit contradictions posed by the profound structural differences between the institutions of Hong Kong and the PRC, and (c) the cohesive effect of the local ideology of Hong Kong society which is likely to affect the process of adjustment. Analysis of these major component issues is made more complex by the possibility of rapid local, social and political innovation in Hong Kong as an increasingly more sophisticated understanding of the process develops.

In general, then, the thesis takes as its central analytic concern the contemporary processes of change in Hong Kong, with a special bias toward the analysis of the emerging tensions within the education system. In particular, the thesis will investigate contradictions involved in the forthcoming Hong Kong and PRC societal merger, and will place a special emphasis on the educational contradictions of the merger situation.

Two forms of educational analysis are involved. A structural analysis, grounded in the historical assumptions and institutional patterns of education in the PRC and Hong Kong, will be presented. Second, an account is given of the contemporary reactions of young Hong Kong people to the educational choices which they judge are facing them. In other words, the thesis is grounded both in a structural analysis and in the perceptions by social actors of the educational situation.

In the literature there are a variety of methodological perspectives in which to frame studies. In the case of this study -
of the processes of education during social and political merger — focus is needed on the separate educational, social and political institutions, and on the relationships between them. The approach of this thesis utilizes a sociological perspective, and, within that approach, the macro-theoretical position of the thesis is structural functionalist(3). This approach views the stability of a society as grounded in the relationship among its systems(4) and the acceptance by individuals within these systems of common goals and values(5).

The thesis attempts to examine how Hong Kong education shapes, and is shaped by, changes in other social institutions. Micro-categories of investigation are used, within an analysis of the changing meaning and role of education in the broader social context. This context includes ideologies, traditions, institutions, language, modes of production, socio-political structures, and international relations(6).

At the most general theoretical level, therefore, the thesis accepts that Hong Kong education system must be analyzed in the context of the society in which it functions(7). However, within this framework, the thesis accepts the argument that education is a process, in continuous social exchange with the surrounding environment(8). Operationally, Hong Kong education is viewed as a participant with other social institutions, in this dynamic event and there exists reciprocal impact between the decolonization/transfer event and the education system.

This approach has been further influenced by the argument of Margaret Archer that analysis of education requires examining the kinds of social interaction within the society, as well as the structures which determine the context in which this interaction
occurs. The relationship between structure and process, in the Hong Kong context, forms the broad link between the chapters of this thesis. The thesis proposes to trace historical and cultural structures which strongly influence the context of interactions which may occur at present; to investigate the kind of interaction occurring within those structures; and finally to outline scenarios for the course of education as its exchange with its evolving context develops.

There is an automatic comparative element in the analysis. Neither the existing Hong Kong system, nor the likely social change precipitated by '1997', can be understood by reference to Hong Kong as a single state. The distribution of its internal power, its economic development, and its unique social system have developed not only from forces present within the colonial state, but also under the influence of forces in the PRC. Overall, the thesis accepts the view of comparative educators that "...national school systems exist within the context of unequal power relations among nations...". However, the thesis also argues that the power relationship between Hong Kong and the PRC is highly complex and cannot be described as simply "unequal". Consequently, a strong comparative theme - of contrasting Hong Kong and the PRC - is useful to deepen understanding of the transfer.

Although some comparative education literature is useful in understanding some aspects of the Hong Kong problem, no one set of literature provides clarification of the whole situation and the existing literature must therefore be extended. In order to clarify this issue, the following section discusses the existing comparative education literature and categorizes it into several broad groups.
There is firstly a considerable body of literature within comparative education on policy studies in a comparative perspective. This literature focuses on educational planning and expansion and usually discusses these themes in the context of the nation-state(11). Some of this literature is concerned with the technical aspects of planning and its outcomes(12). This research has been used to guide policy and improve the educational systems by providing choices among comparatively displayed policies.

Transfer and 'educational borrowing' literature also focuses on a specified state or a group of nations, and, although its aim is to suggest generalizations that can be replicated in other societies(13), most of this literature assumes a stable nation-state of independent political and educational sovereignty, and for this reason the literature is not readily applicable to this study.

Other policy literature which describes the worldwide rapid expansion and spread of schooling has been very persistent in comparative research. However, although Hong Kong has participated in this worldwide expansion, the perspective is incomplete for this analysis because the imminent change is not merely result of expansion of the education system.

A second broad category of literature is about education and development, including the concerns about dependency and education. This literature argues that relations, including political, economic and educational, are unequal between nations. It focuses therefore on these unequal power relationships to explain economic hardships and argues their link to educational systems.

These models are concerned with interpretations of underdevelopment(14) and Erwin Epstein has described these models as
utilizing "...concepts such as neocolonialism, world-systems analysis and dependency theory to argue that education systems are directly affected by international currents and that national schools systems and the relations between school and the nation are no longer worthy subjects of analysis"(15). Although Hong Kong is a newly-industrialized country and is entering an unequal power relationship with the PRC, this literature is not broadly applicable to this thesis. The main concern here is neither the colonial experiences of Hong Kong nor its status as an industrializing territory. Colonialism and industrialization are examined, but as two of several important contexts of the education system. This literature does not, therefore, provide a sufficiently complex contextualization for this investigation.

There is also literature, stemming from world systems or conflict analysis, on how knowledge is generated and used in education systems to make policy and shape society(16). This literature looks at the diminution of cultural, educational, and economic sovereignty, but Kelly and Altbach point out that these models assume independent political nation states(17).

There are other bodies of research(18) but generally, as Kelly and Altbach note, "Research [within comparative education] still focuses on development and on the outcomes of schooling, and is...predominantly quantitative. [It also continues to] "...presume the autonomous nation-state"(19).

These propositions summarize briefly the obstacles to finding an appropriate model within existing comparative education literature in which to ground the thesis. The problem which this thesis addresses involves a society which is not, nor will it become, a nation-state,
and the problem, further, is not grounded in development or the outcomes of schooling issues.

There is a fourth broad category of comparative literature which is about education in the context of colonialism. This literature defines the both colonial context and structure of education and describes the element of 'coercion' in educational transfer. Other parts define some of the psychological attributes of the colonized and their education. Such literature, according to Vandra Lea Masemann, "emphasizes the dissimilar interests of various classes and their differing relationships to (and benefits from) the workings of the education system." (23)

This is the most promising literature for this thesis but it leaves several important themes underexplored. For example, literature on ex-colonies traces the patterns of evolution of education, but does not discuss the options available to them at the time of decolonization. Although this thesis accepts the argument that the political orientation of new elites within society determines how education is utilized in the decolonization period, the power of the literature is diminished because it does not carefully specify the options for the colonized. It often assumes that the end of direct colonization will be followed by other forms of external imperialism which severely limit the options available to the new nation-state. This thesis attempts to discuss the options available to Hong Kong before the end of colonization and, therefore, the literature on colonialism and education is not sufficiently complex to provide a complete base for this thesis.

In summary, Hong Kong education shares many characteristics with other education systems. For example, it is the product of a colonial
tradition, it has expanded rapidly in concert with other systems in
the world, and, it is attempting, with other systems, to provide
answers to questions of achievement, selectivity, and relevance.
However, it differs from all other education systems. The crucial
difference is the fact that, after 1997, Hong Kong education will be
directly subordinate to a socio-political system which is the product
of an unfamiliar ideology. The people of Hong Kong have, however,
been promised local administration of education. The existing
comparative education literature provides analyses of various
elements of this situation but no one single existing framework
provides a model for a complete analysis of the contemporary
situation in Hong Kong.

The introduction continues with a statement of the argument of
the thesis and concludes with a description of the organization of the
chapters.

ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

(a) Argument

The thesis has one broad argument, the understanding and defence
of which require the presentation of four sub-arguments. The broad
argument is that the transfer can be partially prepared for by
selective adjustment to new contexts, particularly in terms of
educational decisions in this decade. (In the context of this thesis,
adjustment is synonymous with adaptation and both terms refer to a
process whereby the course of behaviour is altered in terms of the
demands of the social situation.)
The broad argument links the sub-arguments of the thesis in the following manner: following Archer, the *selective adjustment* is 'social interaction' as it "...involves the exchange of resources or services (wealth, power, or expertise) against one another by the interest groups involved."(27) In the Hong Kong education situation examined in this thesis, this social interaction involves an exchange of expertise, in the form of acquisition of suitable skills, against freedom to pursue a prosperous and stable social environment.

The sub-arguments offer theories about the 'structural contexts' in which the interaction is occurring, and, further, theorize about the potential outcome of the interactions. The effect of the process of interaction in its structural context is "...an internal restructuring of education itself"(28), and the concluding sub-argument theorizes about scenarios of change to Hong Kong education as a result of the transfer.

(b) Organization

The following section describes the organization of the thesis and introduces each of the four sub-arguments in sequence.

The thesis begins with the theme of the first sub-argument: a description of the recent emergence of '1997' as a salient issue for Hong Kong and of the ensuing political shifts within the colony. '1997' is initially analyzed as a double process: (a) the creation of a public problem, and (b) perception of the problem by the public. Therefore, the historical and political events which led up to the Agreement are discussed and a description of the legal, political and economic base of the public problem is included.

'1997' is then defined in terms of the widespread uncertainty about the effects of the transfer originating in the perception that
the post-1997 political system (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) may not enhance their lives. Chapter 1 argues that uncertainty and negative perception about the future have created new structural contexts by bringing about a realignment and consolidation of power and interest groups within the colony which will, in turn, affect the outcome of the ongoing social and political interactions. Both of these factors affect the adaptation process.

In summary, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the events of the past six or seven years, highly complex and unprecedented occurrences, have created a public issue which has provoked a state of tension and uncertainty in Hong Kong, resulting in a new political alignment in the colony: a new structural context. The interacting local actors and structures are the public; information sources; and established and emerging power groups.

Throughout this analysis, the thesis accepts Archer’s statement that "Bargaining power is essentially a matter of numbers and organization; it can obviously vary in strength and plays an important part in determining the relative success of different assertive groups." (29) Therefore, defence of the first sub-argument requires tracing, through research of public statements by community leaders and by speculation in the media, the sequence of events from the increased publicity around the issue to broader public awareness and the emergence of ‘grassroots’ political activity, in response to the uncertainty. This uncertainty will interact with certain political institutions of the Hong Kong Chinese to affect the outcome.

These discussions then link to Chapters 2 and 3, because, although the Agreement to transfer was – in public – the resolution
of a legal problem, other elements such as ideology, dependency, economic interest and political aspiration were also important in the Agreement. The most important aim of chapters 2 and 3 is to provide a structural analysis of the varying ideologies and institutional patterns of Hong Kong and the PRC. These are contexts of the transfer and suggest 'structural contradictions' between Hong Kong and the PRC. The second sub-argument, the theme of these chapters, is that the existence of various structural contradictions between the societies will lead to tension within the Hong Kong community, which, in turn, will persist until adjustment occurs.

Within this organization of Chapters 2 and 3, categories of analysis had to be selected. Frederick Wirt has commented on the importance of the relationship between the argument of a project and the categories or 'units' of analysis requiring comparison: he suggests that the argument guides the researcher to the units of analysis which must be compared to test the theory(30). Since the contradictions are of 1. socio-political assumptions, 2. economic assumptions, 3. educational differences, testing the argument of this thesis requires comparison between political systems, economic systems and socio-cultural systems. (Points of potential convergence are also noted as they comprise part of the new structural context.) The systems are classified by their functional aspects, i.e., how they will broaden or limit the intellectual, economic, and cultural mobility of the members of Hong Kong society. In these chapters, the thesis argues that perceptions of those contradictions in social, economic and political systems are causing tension among individuals in Hong Kong society, prompting them to mobilize in various ways.

Specifically, Chapter 2 is a description of the socio-cultural,
economic, and educational systems of Hong Kong. It describes the period since World War II which co-incided generally with the periods of greatest immigration from China and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. A second aim of Chapter 2 is to describe the emergence, the ideology, and the characteristics of the new Hong Kong middle class, those who will be most affected by takeover. This group exhibits considerable loyalty to "China" and cultural pride, but has adopted many Western traits. They compromise 'a society in transition' in several economic and existential senses of that term.

Chapter 3 is a description of corresponding aspects (socio-cultural, economic and educational) of the society of the PRC, covering the period since its establishment, but emphasizing the period since 1978. This year marked the beginning of implementation of the policies which will affect the future of Hong Kong residents. A second aim of this chapter is, through description of the PRC from a comparative perspective, to focus attention on the differences between Hong Kong and the PRC, and thereby demonstrate that tension is likely and adjustment is necessary.

Chapters 2 and 3 highlight many of the differences between Hong Kong and the PRC, but also suggest the ways in which they are similar. As Thomas B. Gold has pointed out citizens of the PRC are 'caught in two historic streams: traditional Chinese culture and the Leninist traditions of the CP"(31). The Hong Kong Chinese are caught in two historic streams as well; they value the traditional behavioural patterns of China, but have been influenced by Western values under the colonial government and British laws. Yet Hong Kong and the PRC remained different and separate and very few of the events in China had lasting negative effects on Hong Kong government
or politics. Until this decade adaptation to the more powerful PRC has been unnecessary.

The theoretical analysis of the first three chapters is followed by description of empirical research into the reactions of individuals to ongoing events. This empirical research is based on the third sub-argument which proposes a theory about social norms and adaptive behavior in the Hong Kong context. As described above, a crucial aspect of the analysis in Chapter 2 is an attempt to define the conventional assumptions which affect the reactions of Hong Kong people to their social environment. This discussion has been influenced by the suggestion that understanding a society's educational practices can be furthered by analysis of how local political rationales and social theories interact with education(32). The chapter suggests that the political and social norms which have cemented Hong Kong society together in the past will define the nature of the reaction to the new stresses on society. In other words, established behavior patterns will persist in the face of change because they reflect deeply held values(33).

Archer develops this theme of behavior patterns and change further when she suggests that "...rewarding or frustrating experiences condition different action patterns"(34), in other words, a society which has benefitted from existing institutions will 'defend institutional stability'. Thus, this thesis is proposing that the behaviour patterns which have interacted successfully with other institutions in Hong Kong (economic and political) have been positively conditioned by experience and will be applied to the new context with the aim of preserving as many of the rewarding institutions as possible.
Specifically, the argument is that individuals are using their political and social institutions and utilizing established pragmatic behavioral patterns to interact with the new situation. They are reacting pragmatically to the problem by adapting to and preparing for the new social, economic and political realities in this decade. Therefore, a theory about individuals and education is advanced. The theory suggests that unfamiliar and dramatic occurrences in the socio-political and economic contexts, in which individuals function, are causing them to resort to established behaviour patterns which, in the Hong Kong context, will be an attempt to modify the education system to meet the new realities.

The thesis concludes in Chapter 5 with the final sub-argument: that there are various scenarios for Hong Kong education in the new environment of the HKSAR. It addresses the question of what the role of the Hong Kong education system might be during and after the merger period. This analysis of the scenarios of transition is not grounded in existing research on scenarios of decolonization.

These four sub-arguments are interrelated. Three sections of the analysis are documenting research focused on understanding institutional patterns in their cultural, socio-economic and political contexts. The fourth section of the analysis locates and identifies the activity of individuals - selected social actors - in their social, specifically, their educational context.

It is to the first of these sub-arguments that attention now turns.
INTRODUCTION: FOOTNOTES


2. Bloodworth, Dennis, "Prospect of Peking rule doesn't worry Hong Kong", South China Morning Post, 28.3.72.


11. Ibid., pp. 309, 310, and 316.

12. Ibid., p. 316.

Compara, 13, No.1(1983), 43-60 and "Education Transfer", special


15. Erwin H. Epstein, "Currents Right and Left: Ideology in
Comparative Education", in Altbach and Kelly, New Perspectives..., 


17. Ibid., p. 312. Kelly and Altbach note that some recent research
has been stimulated by specific crises. For example, the rise of
student political activism led to studies on student politics; and
the world food crisis and economic recession resulted in research on
educational efficiency. Altbach and Kelly, "Introduction", in New
Perspectives..., op. cit., 1986, p. 6-7. There is also a significant
amount of literature concerned with historical/cultural studies which
seeks to analyze how culture affects curriculum and organization of
schools, Ibid., p. 4, and finally literature about who goes to school
and the different outcomes of education on these groups. Ibid., p. 6.


19. Ibid.


21. Ibid.

22. Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism, New York,
McKay, 1974, pp. 59-63.

23. Vandra Lea Masemann, "Critical Ethnography in the Study of
Comparative Education", in Altbach and Kelly, op. cit., p. 19.

24. Gary L. Theisen, Paul P.W. Achola, and Francis Musa Boakari "The
Underachievement of Cross-national Achievement Studies", in Altbach and
Kelly, op. cit., See p. 43-44 for discussion of this issue.

25. Ibid., p. 45.


27. Archer, op. cit., p. 120.

28. Ibid., p. 60.

29. Ibid., p. 48.

30. Frederick M. Wirt, "Comparing Educational Policies: Theory, Units
of Analysis, and Research Strategies", in Altbach and Kelly, op.
cit., 275-291.

31. Thomas B. Gold, "After Comradeship: Personal Relations in China
Since the Cultural Revolution", The China Quarterly, December 1985,
No. 104, 657-675, p. 674.

32. R. Murray Thomas, Politics and Education, Oxford, Pergamon

33. Brian Holmes, Comparative Education: Some Considerations of

34. Archer, op. cit., p. 6.
CHAPTER I

'ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS'

BACKGROUND TO AND PREPARATION FOR CHANGE

I. PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

The primary purpose of chapter 1 is to demonstrate that recent events related to negotiations for the terms of the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong to the PRC have created a public issue. The chapter argues that the emergence of this issue has, in turn, provoked a state of tension and uncertainty in Hong Kong, resulting in a new political context within the colony. The chapter also introduces the comparative element of the thesis in its concluding overview of the historical convergence and divergence between Hong Kong and the PRC.

Achievement of the primary purpose necessitates a survey of the historical events which led to the recent change in Hong Kong’s political status and which caused shifts in the distribution of power and interest groups. The organization of the chapter is as follows: discussion of the issues and events leading up to the negotiations between the UK and the PRC on the Hong Kong problem is followed by a summary of the points addressed in the Joint Declaration and description of local reactions to it.

The next segment is a description of the drafting and content of the Basic Law. The Basic Law is intended by the PRC to be the constitution of Hong Kong. The make-up of the drafting committees and the content of the Law itself have emerged as highly prominent and controversial topics. This segment also highlights the efforts of the PRC to maintain stability in Hong Kong during the
transition period, as well as to establish influence.

Discussion of another salient issue follows: the number and nature of reforms to the present Government. Finally, the broad areas of divergence and convergence between Hong Kong and the PRC are introduced: although Hong Kong and the PRC are connected by ancient cultural ties and many established commercial links, history has separated them in the political and economic systems.

II EMERGENCE OF THE ISSUE

The following pages present a description of the historical and contemporary events which led up to the signing of the Joint Declaration. This and the following discussion of the Basic Law attempt to demonstrate the creation in Hong Kong of the public issue of '1997' in terms of public statements by community leaders and speculation in the media. This requires tracing, through the media sources, the sequence of events from the initial increased publicity around the issue to broader public awareness, to the eventual emergence of 'grassroots' political activity, and eventually to an increase in tension surrounding the issue. These discussions also demonstrate that, although the event was overtly the resolution of a legal problem, nevertheless ideology, dependency, economic interest and political aspiration were also important elements. These elements were discussed in the media, and contributed to the public concern about the issue.

Role of the Media in Creation of '1997' as a Public Issue

The print and broadcast media have played a significant role in the formation of public attitudes toward the issue and, for this reason, the literature search related to the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law has included print, media and public statements.
It is relevant here to note that Hong Kong is considered to have a free press(1) and to note also that the use by Hong Kong residents of print and broadcast media to obtain information about the political and economic environment has been documented(2).

For example, Joseph Y.S. Cheng describes a study which "shows the preponderant role of the media in informing the public about local affairs..."(3). Emily Lau reports that the media have "played an important role in the dissemination of information and in fostering debates about public issues..." (4). Studies about the specific role of the Hong Kong media related to the '1997' issue have been carried out. A study of the role of the press in problem recognition(5) reported that from early 1983, when the issue began to appear regularly in the press, to December, 1984 (shortly after the Joint Declaration was signed) the number of respondents who reported that '1997' was important to them doubled to nearly two-thirds of all respondents. It has also been reported that almost seventy per cent of items in sampled newspapers - representing a spectrum of political affiliation - focused on the effect of 1997' on Hong Kong's economic prosperity(6). "These newspapers defined the question of 1997 primarily in terms of economic terms."(7) Also within that sample, reports from grassroots Hong Kong sources, when compared to official sources from the PRC, Britain and the Hong Kong Government, were most likely to emphasize political issues and were least likely to be concerned with economic matters.

N. Miners describes the use of the pro-communist Hong Kong press by the PRC to influence public perception of issues(8). E. Lau discusses, in the '1997' context, the significant relationship...
between the Hong Kong mass media and public opinion, which she calls the "...most effective means of checks and balances in Hong Kong" (9). J. Cheng also describes the use of the media by PRC officials to increase public awareness of its stance on this issue and "win the local community's acceptance of its proposal" (10). Cheng writes:

The most important targets of China's united front strategy initially were businessmen, leaders of opinion, academics, and student union activists. Later efforts were concentrated on cultivating the local media and various professional associations (11).

The Hong Kong media has been a significant and influential source of information about '1997', and this research has included data from various Hong Kong and international publications to demonstrate that the issue of the Joint Declaration, Basic Law and, therefore the issue also of '1997', have become highly visible in Hong Kong.

Background to the Issue

Hong Kong is a dependent colony of the UK because of developments resulting from the Opium Wars of the last century. In 1843, overpowered by the superior firepower of the British Navy in battles along the Pearl River between Hong Kong and Canton, China signed and ratified the Treaty of Nanking, ceding in perpetuity the island of Hong Kong to Britain. Less than twenty years later, hostilities had again broken out between China and the West. Again victorious, England demanded the permanent cession of Kowloon. Peking acceded, signing the Convention of Peking in 1860, and the
tiny area of mainland and islands, known collectively as Hong Kong, began to prosper in banking, commerce, and shipping. Under threat of further hostilities with Britain, China agreed in the Convention of 1898, to lease (without rent) the New Territories from July 1, 1898 for a period of 99 years.

Although the People's Republic of China has consistently maintained that these treaties were "unequal" and that Hong Kong is part of China's territory(12) they also maintained that the problem was an historical one which they would solve when they felt it appropriate. Indeed, Anthony Dicks noted in 1983 that "...China has not up to now made any demand, formal or otherwise, for the reincorporation of the territory of Hong Kong into the territory...of the PRC..."(13). However, economic considerations forced both sides to consider the fate of the colony two decades before the expiry of the lease.

After the Hong Kong riots of 1966 and 1967, which coincided with the activities of the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic and which can be regarded as "...revealing Hong Kong's vulnerability to developments in China that [can] spill over into Hong Kong..."(14), Hong Kong settled into a watchful, but beneficial relationship with China. By 1972 the relationship was described as a "...sound and mutually satisfying working relationship...[with Hong Kong]...depending on the communists for most of its food, and the 800 million communists depending on the colony for 40% of its foreign exchange earnings"(15). Indeed that year a formal statement by the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations to the chairperson of the United Nations Committee on Decolonization, asserting that Hong Kong should not be regarded as
a colony but as part of Chinese territory, caused little concern in Hong Kong. Most newspapers described the mood at that time as a mix of fatalism and hope - hope that by the time 1997 arrives those who wish to, will be safely settled in another country.

During the early and mid-seventies the issue was given little prominence and most people were confidently improving their economic position in Hong Kong. Peking periodically offered reassurances to Hong Kong, apparently recognizing the role a stable Hong Kong was playing in its own attempts to modernize. A pro-Peking newspaper noted that Mao's policy had made it clear that the expiry date would have nothing to do with how and when China intended to recover Hong Kong. The decisive factor seemed to be the usefulness of Hong Kong in building China's domestic economy.

A sense of urgency, accompanied by heightened public awareness of this issue, began to develop in Hong Kong in the late 1970's and grew quickly. For example, an article was published listing the advantages to Peking of maintaining the status quo in Hong Kong: the source of foreign exchange earnings, the contacts to the West for banking, technological and commercial expertise, and Peking's own heavy investments in Hong Kong property and business ventures. It continued that, although no one expected the Red Army to march in to Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, the approaching expiry of the lease presented 'critical problems' for Hong Kong which had to be 'tackled soon'. Noting that foreign investors were becoming reluctant to sign long-term agreements, it asked the PRC for assurances that Hong Kong's present administrative and legal system would continue. David Bonavia
notes, at that time, that is "... was chiefly the Hong Kong business community, including big American firms, that pressed the Hong Kong Government to find out, through Britain, what China had in mind for the post-1997 period"(20).

Throughout the remainder of 1978 and early 1979, concern increased and warnings of the effects of this concern on prosperity were expressed. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping eventually attempted to reassure investors by telling them to "put their hearts at ease". Though not a guarantee, the statement, combined with the belief that Hong Kong was a vital link in Peking's intention to modernize China, encouraged investors for a while. By late 1979, however confidence was low again after prolonged silence from both sides. Later, after Prime Minister M. Thatcher announced that she had held discussions with Chairman Hua Guofung about Hong Kong's future, confidence, and the stock market, rose again.

Uncertainty continued throughout 1980. In the commercial sector, investors were more hesitant to sign long term leases and complained of the inability of the Hong Kong Government to grant new ones extending beyond 1997. Many leases involve a fifteen year date, and, as 1982 approached, it became difficult to attract investors. Demands for a "bankable commitment"(21) were made, and there was frequent speculation about the future. A statement by "a leading cadre in Guandung" promised that Hong Kong would retain the status quo after the expiry(22). On the one hand, the view was expressed that it was indisputable that China would regain sovereignty, but another opinion was that people have no idea what will happen in 1997. Uncertainty evolved into worry which
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turn evolved into a 'sense of urgency' about the unknown future.

Both announcements and concerns became far more specific during 1982. Sir (then Mr) Humphrey Atkins, Lord Privy Seal, met with Premier Zhou Ziyang and raised the question of Hong Kong and the imminent expiry of the lease. He was "given significant indications of Chinese policy toward Hong Kong ... which confirmed the view of Her Majesty's Government that negotiations should be opened"(23). Shortly thereafter, the PRC included in its draft constitution for the National People's Congress a provision (Article 30) that "...when absolutely necessary, the nation could set up special administrative regions" whose political systems would be "...set up by law in accordance with conditions existing in these regions"(24). Speculation followed that Hong Kong would become one of these new regions.

The Hong Kong Chinese Press was, at this time, expressing a generally pessimistic view and appeared to reflect the concerns of the community at large. Doubts that the standard of living and stability would be maintained in a Special Administrative Region (SAR), and the opinion that the "Hong Kong people's sense of values, the concept of rule by law, their cultural identification, and the local economic structure, would definitely be unacceptable to the PRC"(25) were aired. The same article concluded by stating that a SAR could not exist too long because its presence would lead to discontent in the PRC. An independent opinion poll conducted around that time revealed that the majority of people favoured retaining the status quo in Hong Kong(26) and were not prepared to adopt the lifestyle and social system of the PRC.

Three months after the announcement of the additions to the
draft constitution, Peking announced the establishment of a State Council committee to study the subject of Hong Kong. This was the first substantial acknowledgement that Hong Kong was not just a British problem(27). Simultaneously, Deng Xiaoping was reported as saying that China would regain sovereignty in 1997, although it would take steps to maintain stability in Hong Kong(28). This report was interpreted as a method of preparing public opinion for an eventual takeover(29), and it had a profound negative effect on confidence in Hong Kong despite its promises of continuity. David Bueno de Mesquita describes the reaction: 'the stock, property and foreign exchange markets went into a virtual free-fall'(30). Asset values on the stock exchanges fell by one-third within a few months, and land values in the choice sections of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon fell to as low as one-fifth of their pre-announcement 1982 prices. The floating exchange rate that had been in effect since 1974 fell from HK6.20 to the US dollar in mid-1982 to a low of HK9.55 to the US dollar on September 24, 1983 and leakage of capital from Hong Kong began.

By the end of 1982, the negotiating positions of the three parties were clear. First, the people of Hong Kong had described themselves as, although proud to be Chinese, wanting to retain the status quo, hold on to what they had achieved, and therefore willing to wait for the PRC to catch up to their lifestyle before reunification with the motherland. They were concerned by declining business confidence and the pessimistic economic climate, and skeptical of the glib statements exhorting them to have confidence issuing from both the UK and the PRC.

Second, the UK undoubtedly saw benefit in improving its
economic ties with China. However, despite having a sense of moral responsibility and duty to the people of Hong Kong and despite the facing a legal issue which needed resolution (the expiry of the lease), it was ‘...slow to develop [its] own stance and anxious not to make any wrong steps...’ (31).

China had long benefitted from Hong Kong’s prosperity, and preferred to reach an agreement which would ensure a future in which the economic vitality of Hong Kong continued to contribute to the Four Modernizations. Yet China had a political issue to contend with and remained adamant on the issues of recovering “sacred territory” and reaffirming its opposition to colonialism.

In this three-edged environment of overlapping, yet confrontational need, discussions between two of the parties, the UK and China, were opened in September, 1982. (The PRC considered itself as ‘solely responsible for the welfare of the local [Hong Kong] population’(32) and the only participant who was a resident of Hong Kong was a London appointed Hong Kong political adviser, Robin MacLaren.

These discussions, described as having the “...common aim of maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong”(33) began unpropitiously, reportedly because of Mrs. Thatcher’s insistence on affirming the validity of the treaties under international law(34). (As noted, the Chinese hold the view that the treaties are illegal, and as such are only a formality at best.)

Negotiations were stalled further for several months because the UK insisted that the sovereignty issue be left aside, and asked instead for discussions of the “...importance of the British administrative role in maintaining the existing systems in Hong
Kong"(34). The PRC made it "...clear that the continuation of British administration after 1997 would not be acceptable to China in any form"(35).

These negotiating conflicts were resolved by acceptance by the UK of China's fundamental assertion that sovereignty over Hong Kong must be regained(36). The confidential negotiations progressed to the issue of what form of Chinese administration would ensure the continuation of stability and prosperity in Hong Kong.

However, events during the two years between the first meeting of Thatcher and Deng and the publication of the Joint Declaration added to local anxiety and scepticism. For example, there were reports that the UK would admit to the UK only a 'few hundred civil servants' after the takeover(37). On the other hand, there were (unofficial) statements from Peking regarding the proposed abolition of the Hong Kong dollar, and the proposed placement of cadres in every Hong Kong Government office(38). During this period there was a marked increase in the number of emigrant and visa applications at Western consulates(39), and in September, 1983, the Hong Kong dollar dropped 14% in 48 hours following a series of accusations and demands by China that Britain change her attitude toward the talks.

On September 26, 1984 a draft agreement between the two governments relating to the future of Hong Kong was initialled. "It consists of a Joint Declaration and Three Annexes. Each part of the agreement has the same status. The whole makes up a formal international agreement, legally binding in all its parts. An international agreement of this kind is the highest form of
commitment between two sovereign states"(40).

On the day of debate by the British Parliament on the draft agreement, 50 of parliament's 635 members attended; the topic did not appear on the front page of any newspaper. An analyst commented: "Hong Kong is in the out tray"(41).

In conclusion, Hong Kong began its existence as a colony when Britain's desire for economic gain prevailed over the territorial integrity of China; Hong Kong will cease to exist as a colony again because the wish for economic gains by both the UK and the PRC is prevailing over Hong Kong's own cultural and territorial integrity. The previous description of the events which led up to the signing of the Joint Declaration has attempted to bring into focus the fact that the event was not merely the resolution of a legal problem, but also an event affected by the nationalism, economic interests and political aspiration of the participating parties. Although one intention of the authors of the Joint Declaration was reassure the people of Hong Kong that nothing would change, as the 1997 date begins to draw closer, nervousness increased. The preceding analysis has shown that the residents and the economy react quickly to local political events related to the issue of 1997. During the first period of uncertainty and negotiations, local reactions, based on fears about the possible loss of their lifestyle, were reflected quickly in various economic measures.

III THE JOINT DECLARATION

The terms of the Joint Declaration (JD) are discussed because the Joint Declaration set forth, after years of speculation, the
type of political entity Hong Kong would become after the UK withdrew. Its publication initially reassured residents by providing relief from speculation. In addition, the JD is referred to by both the PRC and the UK in discussions of post-1997 Hong Kong and, therefore, familiarity with its terms is essential to understanding discussions of the status of Hong Kong. The purpose of this presentation is not an intellectual analysis of the Joint Declaration, but a description of some of its terms which relate to the thesis argument, which includes the description of the creation of a public issue of '1997'.

The Joint Declaration was signed by the UK and the PRC and states that the PRC will resume sovereignty over Hong Kong from July 1, 1997. It sets out basic policies towards Hong Kong after that date. Under these policies, the UK promises to restore Hong Kong to the PRC on that date, and the PRC promises that, for 50 years beyond 1997, the current legal, judicial, and economic characteristics would be preserved. Until 1997, the UK will administer Hong Kong "... with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability..." (42). A Sino-British Joint Liaison Group is to be set up to aid in implementation of the declaration.

Section X of the agreement provides that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

...shall maintain the educational system previously practised in Hong Kong [and] ... shall decide on its own policies in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, including ... policies regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of
funds, the examination system, the system of academic rewards and the recognition of educational and technological qualification. Institutions ... may retain their autonomy. ...Students shall enjoy freedom of choice of education...(43).

The Joint Declaration contains a list of twelve basic policies of the PRC regarding Hong Kong. These include themes such as: administration of the territory, makeup of the government, characteristics of the social, economic and legal systems after the takeover, policing of the Region, taxation, and international relationships. As well as a statement that a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC will be stipulated by the National People's Congress (NPC) of the PRC and shall remain unchangeable for fifty years.

One of the most significant sections of the Joint Declaration relates to the chain-of-command which will be in effect after 1997, making it clear that the ultimate control will be in Peking. As was anticipated, Hong Kong is established as a Special Administrative Region under Article 30 of the Chinese constitution, and the basic policies section suggests that the PRC will have direct authority over Hong Kong. Although the HKSAR is described as having a high degree of autonomy in executive, legislative and judicial areas, the Chief Executive, elected or chosen by local consultation, must then be appointed by the Central People's Government. "Principal officials shall be nominated by the chief executive ... and appointed by the Central People's Government..."(44). The government and legislature of Hong Kong is to be composed of 'local inhabitants', a term which is yet to be defined, and which appears to be open to conflicting
The Joint Declaration promises the development of a Basic Law: a constitution according to which HKSAR is to be governed as a capitalist system. The present constitutional framework is provided by the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions, issued by Britain to Hong Kong in 1888. These documents stipulate the powers of the governor in the colony, and provide for the creation of two advisory bodies (the Executive and Legislative Councils), and stipulate the terms of their legal relationship. After the establishment of the HKSAR, these documents will be replaced by the Basic Law.

Laws and amendments passed after 1997 must be in accord with the Basic Law, but present laws, passed according to the present authority, will remain basically unchanged as far as they do not conflict with the Basic Law. However, this phrase, as well as the term 'local inhabitants', have caused local concern because of the possibility of various and controversial interpretations.

The judicial system will remain in the courts, which are described as remaining independent, while acting in accordance with the laws of the HKSAR. The existing system of management of the public service is to be maintained.

Hong Kong is promised full autonomy in all financial matters, including "...disposing of its financial resources and drawing up its budgets and its final accounts" (45) though they will be reported to the Central People's Government for the record. Its revenues are to be used entirely for the purposes of Hong Kong and not awarded to the Central People's Government. The capitalistic system is to be maintained and Hong Kong is promised independence...
in determining economic and trade policies. However, questions were immediately raised about the 'free market' spirit of certain clauses of the JD because Hong Kong residents are not awarded representation on significant planning commissions (46).

Hong Kong is intended to retain its status as an international finance centre. This is supported through statements that the existing systems of regulation and supervision of deposit-taking companies and financial markets, the free port, the free trade policy shall be unchanged. The Hong Kong dollar is to circulate freely and remain freely convertible. Shipping and Aviation guarantess are adjusted to reflect the new status of Hong Kong (47).

The Joint Declaration was presented to Hong Kong by former Governor Sir Edward Youde on September 27, 1984. He described the agreement as a 'binding commitment on the part of both governments to implement all its provisions' (48). He said it would give confidence to Hong Kong and to the world, enabling Hong Kong to move ahead. Describing the detail in the agreement as sufficient to ensure continuity of the '...systems and circumstances which Hong Kong people find essential', Youde also emphasised that there was no possibility of an amended agreement and that the alternative to this agreement was to have no agreement at all.

Initial reaction to the agreement was generally favourable - and cautious. There was extensive media coverage of its publication and comments reflected relief over the end to years of uncertainty about what form the future would take. They also reflected general satisfaction with the intentions expressed in the document. Local share prices climbed moderately after
publication, and both business people and property developers praised the Joint Declaration for its "pledges of political and economic autonomy" (49).

The Hong Kong Government utilized the media to ensure a favourable public reception for the document and "...kicked off a big PR campaign to champion the agreement" (50). The campaign was evidently successful in arousing interest, as the 1.2M initial printing (one copy for each household) was depleted almost immediately. For their part, the two signatories praised the efforts of the other: the PRC was described as "farsighted" in its new one country, two systems policy by Geoffrey Howe, and the PRC praised Britain for shedding a colony. Sir Philip Hadon-Cave, long-time financial secretary for Hong Kong during some of its most successful 'growth years', assured delegates at a conference on the future of Hong Kong that the declaration "...provides for continuation of the elements for confidence and progress" (51).

In Hong Kong an air of reconciliation prevailed, and the prevalent theme was working together to ensure stability and prosperity (52). There were calls for people to be active, and to "...insist that we do get what we have been promised" (53). The agreement was recommended to the people of Hong Kong by most of the Right- and Left-wing press, academicians, diplomats, big business, traders on the stock market, Tory MP's and the Executive Council. Educators were urged to use the agreement to help introduce civic education in the schools, and, thereby, eliminate the durable political apathy of the Hong Kong people (54). Many felt that Hong Kong could expect a stable period of five to eight years as a result of the declaration, and that prosperity was now
guaranteed at least into the 1990's (55).

There were, however, notes of unrest. An increase in share prices followed publication, but was accompanied by media criticism of the 'loopholes' in the Joint Declaration because it is not legally binding, omitted detail about election mechanisms, and contradicted the fundamentals of socialism. In addition, the Joint Declaration "...should not be difficult to manipulate... if the hardliners come back" (56). Another article expressed doubt about the actual amount of autonomy Hong Kong would ever experience (57). Generally, however, "pragmatism and adaptability once again prevailed" (58) and most residents indicated a willingness to carry on within the terms of the Joint Declaration (59). Attention now shifted to the issue of the Basic Law. There was perhaps greater interest in its formulation because Hong Kong people were to be members of the drafting committees.

Overall, then, the terms of the Joint Declaration promised the return of the exercise of sovereignty over, and administration of, Hong Kong to the PRC with the establishment of a one country, two systems arrangement guaranteeing Hong Kong considerable independence in financial and social matters. However, discussion of the future began to return repeatedly to more immeasurable factors than written guarantees. These factors are confidence in the signatories and the importance of political and economic relationships. Recent conflicting signals from China about its own internal economic and political policies, and loss of confidence in Great Britain's intentions have increased nervousness in Hong Kong.

IV THE BASIC LAW
As mentioned previously, the Basic Law is to be the constitution of the HKSAR, and the following overview of the debate about the Basic Law discusses two themes which have emerged and which are relevant to the thesis. The first is the socio-political change brought about by the process of formulating the Basic Law. On the one hand, tension and anxiety have further increased as a result of the prominence given to uncertainties about the BL, and on the other hand, the politics of internal local power have become more significant.

The second relevant theme is that of the major areas which need to be resolved by the Basic Law.

The section begins with a description of the political activities related to selecting members of the Basic Law committees.

Formulation of the Basic Law

In July 1985, the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) began a series of meetings under news blackout because "...some news that might reach Hong Kong may cause unnecessary disturbance and concern" (60). The objectives were, over five years, to outline a legal system in line with the intention of the Joint Declaration, to describe the structure of the HKSAR government with Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong, and to provide for the retention of the social and economic systems. The text of Basic Law will effectively determine the operation of Hong Kong as a capitalist enclave in a socialist country and most people in Hong Kong acknowledge its importance. The timetable announced included opportunities for comment from Hong Kong on the drafts. The first draft is available in 1988. A consultation period follows the
publication of this draft and review in light of the comments. A revision will be ready in 1989 for further comment, and the final draft is planned to be enacted by the National People's Congress in 1990.

Heated discussion about the make-up of the committee began almost immediately after announcement. Because the people of Hong Kong were not included in the drafting process of the Joint Agreement(61), there was great concern in Hong Kong to obtain local representation in the drafting process of the Basic Law. There were universal calls for membership and participation by Hong Kong people representing the views of Hong Kong. J.Cheng describes the difficulty in selecting members:

The difficulty was how to select a respectable working sample which would be both trusted by the Hong Kong community and acceptable to the Chinese authorities. The choice had to enhance its [the PRC's] united front work in Hong Kong too. This select group, however, must avoid being perceived as a new centre of authority challenging the British administration in Hong Kong(62). The PRC initially refused to allow participation by residents in the discussions, claiming that the mainland negotiators represented the Hong Kong Chinese people. However, as the importance of the Basic Law became more widely covered in the Hong Kong media, local residents became convinced of the necessity of their participation to protect their interests. Apparently realizing that confidence in the Basic Law would be determined partially by the amount of local participation in the drafting, the PRC agreed to invite Hong Kong people to participate in the
drafting process, but reminded them that Beijing retained the right to the final word on its proposals (63).

The final committee of fifty nine included twenty three Hong Kong residents, whom Xu Jiatun, the chief representative of the PRC in Hong Kong, indicated were "...responsible to China and its 1 Billion population" (64). A large number were barristers and solicitors. Management and owners from the industrial and commercial sector were also heavily represented, making it clear that the Chinese Government placed top priority on the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and that radical political reforms would be unlikely" (65).

Thus, although public expression of concern from the local population forced a concession from the PRC about the make-up of the BLOC, the usefulness of the concession was questioned. The Economist questioned Chinese sincerity in its concession about membership and pointed out that only residents who were known to be friendly to the PRC and those with "...enviable records of successful business with the PRC..." were invited (66).

One opinion group in Hong Kong reported that many were unhappy with the selection but "...declined to openly voice [sic] their dissatisfaction either because they do not...want to incur Peking's wrath or simply feel that what they have to say would not make any difference" (67). Another source described the Hong Kong public as reticent to criticize because they were "...uncertain of China's threshold of tolerance..." (68).

In another effort to calm fears and stop the continuing erosion of confidence, the chairman of the BLOC announced at the conclusion of its first meeting in July, 1985, that the committee
had unanimously agreed to set up "an unofficial and widely representative" committee in Hong Kong to collect and collate public opinion and advise the BLDC on the opinions of the people of Hong Kong (The Basic Law Consultative Committee: BLCC).

Initially there was confusion about whether the BLCC would be appointed by the National People's Congress or by the BLDC, and it was eventually announced that the Hong Kong members of the BLDC and two officials from Xinhua would appoint members by democratic consultation, recommendation, and invitation, although reserving the right to veto recommendations. Members of the BLDC would be able to sit on both committees. The (Beijing-appointed) members of the BLDC were to select the group with the task of collecting, analyzing and representing Hong Kong opinion.

This system of selection brought strong, negative public reaction and immediate questions from Hong Kong pressure groups regarding the independence from Peking and the weight of the BLCC. Some adopted a stance of resigned acceptance to the inevitably increasing influence of the NCNA in Hong Kong.

Despite the reservations about the selection procedures, the announcement of the creation of a BLCC set off a period of hectic campaigning by groups and individuals, a type of political activity unusual in its intensity and scope in Hong Kong. The goal was representation on the committee, responding to the early perception that the Basic Law could be shaped in Hong Kong for Hong Kong. There was an early, lively effort to ensure that this committee provide a forum for real Hong Kong representatives.

Eventually one hundred and fifty Hong Kong people were appointed (of whom nine were Educators). There was a mixed
reaction to the initial make-up of this group because representation from the grassroots element was comparatively low. Thirty more places were later allotted to provide places for more members of Hong Kong's political establishment, but also to provide places for local members of the National People's Congress and the CNFCC.

The committee immediately plunged itself into yet more controversy when it began the task of selecting its standing committee. Ignoring its own constitution, which specifies that members shall be selected 'through consultation and election', the group approved, without election, the single slate of nominees presented for the posts. In addition to the fact that this violated the constitution, many of the new standing committee could be considered to be primarily accountable to Beijing, either because they have been appointed by the National People's Congress or because they are local deputies of the National People's Congress or CPPCC. Since, again by constitution, the standing committee has '...full authority to carry out the affairs of the consultative committee when it is not in session' (69), its make-up was seen to be highly important.

All six members of the Drafting Committee who held membership on the Consultative committee were selected to the standing committee. Predictably, public confidence in the BLCC plummeted in the light of the twin faults of the committee ignoring the rule of (its own) law, and the decidedly pro-Peking bent of the standing committee.

The feeling that the PRC was 'orchestrating the whole works (70) was expressed by both English-language newspapers. The
Hong Kong Standard stated that "...the centre of power is obviously swayed to the Chinese side." (71) Lord Kadoorie, albeit indirectly and almost certainly unintentionally, supported this view by explaining that he was probably chosen to be on the BLCC because China believed that his past experience would be useful to the committee (72).

The fact that, after public argument conducted largely in the media, the PRC recognized the "desirability of a formal territory-wide consultative committee" (73) and agreed to the establishment of the BLCC to collect public opinion on the Basic Law, suggests the degree to which public salience of the '1997' issue had developed. The prominent media coverage given to the forceful maneuvering by the PRC to obtain control of the committee, and the Hong Kong Government's use of the media to influence public opinion about the events relating to 1997 (74) show the effectiveness of the media in the development of this issue.

Despite this, the events, highly public, from July to December, 1985 provided an unpleasant glimpse into the future for those staying in Hong Kong. The elements of election by nomination, closed-door consultations, and built-in veto, conflict with the promise of "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" with "a high degree of autonomy". The BLCC greatly discredited itself in the opinion of the people, and it seems likely that many people ultimately concluded that Beijing has indeed already made up its mind about the details of the HKSAR. By the end of the year most of the initial enthusiasm had given way to "enhanced nervousness" and "revived and accentuated... foreboding" (75).
Content of the Basic Law

Miners suggested that "... the Drafting Committee will not have an easy task" (76) because the JD has not been comprehensive or specific in its description of the system of laws and government for the HKSAR. There are four crucial areas which need to be resolved by the Basic Law: (1) Law and the definition of Human Rights within the HKSAR, (2) the political relationship between the HKSAR and Beijing - including the issue of the degree of autonomy, (3) the structure and composition of the government of the SAR (encompassing the issue of pre-1997 political reform in Hong Kong), and (4) residuary powers: the powers not mentioned in the Basic Law. Discussion of these issues in Hong Kong elicits, firstly, a great deal of confusion because of many conflicting signals from Beijing regarding their resolution, and secondly, fear that when decisions are announced, Hong Kong will have lost much of the social security it has had under colonial administration. Whether these are questions that will be answered through the process of writing the Basic Law, or whether fundamental decisions have already been made in the PRC concerning these points is not clear. The following analysis of these issues attempts to explain their fundamental connection to the quality of life in the future HKSAR.

1. Law and the Definition of Human Rights

Because the Basic Law has been described as the constitutional instrument of the HKSAR, outlining legislation and implementing the one country/two systems intention while keeping the spirit of the Joint Declaration, its treatment of the legal
system is of great concern to Hong Kong. Mr. Henry Litton QC wrote that the Chinese law and the English-based law of Hong Kong were incompatible. Noting that Hong Kong had English Common Law, guaranteeing individual personal liberty, freedom of the judiciary from political pressure, predictability of the legal consequences of behaviour, and ready access to courts and legal representation, he emphasized the advantage to Hong Kong that countries with contacts with Hong Kong understand this system better than they do the Chinese Law. The business community has had more experience with it and consequently more confidence in the system(77).

The Attorney General of Hong Kong described the binding link between capitalism and the concepts of the common law. "The success ...is founded upon...the Common Law, upon free enterprise and free trade...the freedom of individuals to move about,...to choose their own occupation. And the cultural and social life...is founded upon...personal freedom, freedom of belief,...speech,...the press"(78).

Liu Yiu-Chu, Hong Kong lawyer and member of the BLDG, described the importance of the legal system in determining the success of the 'one/two' system. In her view, it is important to prevent 'blurring' of the two systems of law within the one nation. Loss of separation between the two systems can occur both unintentionally, as through, for example, the use of inappropriate language, or intentionally, by ignoring the fundamental differences between the two systems in areas of ownership, rights and duties of citizens, and social values. Areas of the law in the latter areas differ between the PRC and Hong Kong because they are linked to the local social and economic system and will require
careful treatment to demonstrate that two distinct and separate legal systems do exist within one nation. She describes the linguistic danger to the intent of the law, if legal terminology from the socialist legal system is borrowed when translating Hong Kong laws into Chinese. In this way, courts interpreting the laws in reaching judgements, will "...inject "socialist" economic-social values into the Hong Kong (or SAR) capitalist legal system unintentionally." (79).

Apprehension and controversy have surrounded the issue of which of the present laws will be preserved in the Basic Law. In order to ensure that many of the present laws will not conflict with the BL, activity has begun to adapt them - and the lawyers who implement them - to the needs of a changed Hong Kong. The (relative) number of local Chinese lawyers in Chambers has doubled since 1981, and the government has adjusted its policy to staff the Attorney General's office with mainly local lawyers (80). Localisation of Hong Kong laws began in August 1986, when the first set of British laws dealing with civil aviation, merchant shipping and admiralty jurisdiction was enacted as Hong Kong law. Before 1997, approximately 120 laws currently binding under British sovereignty will have to be locally enacted.

In order to preserve judicial independence and prevent political manipulation of judges, the government has issued directives to leading judicial officers to take steps to create a judiciary which is truly independent of the government (81). Hong Kong now follows that English tradition of unwritten judicial independence, whereas, in the PRC, judges are not independent, but rather closely representative of party policies. There is doubt as
to whether China will be able to grasp the concept of judicial independence.

Although the importance of maintaining the existing legal system is widely agreed upon, some recent events cause doubt about its feasibility. Rumours about the imminent or planned migration of many lawyers (82) give cause for doubt that it will be possible to maintain the present system. There have been reports (83) that few students were interested in studying law at present because of the feeling that the qualification would be useless after 1997.

Many analysts call for a clear description in the Basic Law of the rights and freedoms which Hong Kong people will enjoy after 1997. There is a fundamental difference between the present philosophy in Hong Kong, which regards individual rights as basic and to be carefully protected from state interference, and that described in the Chinese constitution, which states that the state grants freedoms and rights and that their exercise must not infringe on the interests of the state (84). The Hong Kong residents, in particular, have therefore shown great concern over the possible loss of the rights they now enjoy. A Bill of Rights in the Basic Law to define rights and freedoms, and empower the courts to enforce them has been called for (85).

2. Political Relationship between the Hong K SAR and the PRC

3. The Composition of the HKSAR Government

A difficult area which has attracted the attention of lawyers and politicians is that of defining clearly the power relationship between the HKSAR and Beijing to prevent political manoeuvring. As one political columnist noted that without "... a clear concept of
separation of authority in the power structure, it would be
difficult to outline in detail the relationship between the
Beijing and SAR authorities" (B6).

The Joint Declaration states: "The HKSAR will be directly
under the authority of the CPG of the PRC. The HKSAR will enjoy a
high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs
which are the responsibility of the CPG" (B7). A precise
definition of 'highly autonomous' is regarded as a very delicate
issue - the key objective is to preserve the intention of the
Joint Declaration which seems to promise local administration, but
avoid encroaching on China's sovereignty, thereby provoking
intervention.

The slogan, 'Hong Kong People administering Hong Kong', was
part of a sixteen character slogan widely quoted in Hong Kong
summarizing the Joint Declaration. Reassurance that this is indeed
the intention of the PRC would increase confidence in the future.
However, the fears that the PRC would interfere after 1997 have
been heightened by statements such as that made by Mr. Lu Ping,
that the "spirit" of the concept of 'Hong Kong people
administering Hong Kong' will be written in legal terms into the
Basic Law, and adding that the expression itself can only be
verbal (B8).

Mr. Ji Pengfei, China's State Councillor in charge of Hong
Kong affairs, was described as having set the upper limit for
autonomy: "The central government will administer the SAR in four
areas - defence, foreign affairs, the Basic Law and the
appointment of the SAR's chief executive - the symbolic figure
standing for the central government (B9). But undefined areas
related to the degree of autonomy remain. Among these are the
right to interpretation and the right to amendment.

One analyst suggested that the one/two system would fail if
the PRC exercised the right to rule on individual cases, and,
describing the issue as 'pivotal', called for the power of
interpretation of the Basic Law to go to Hong Kong (90) as
promised in the Joint Declaration. The problem of distinguishing
between the 'judicial' and 'legislative' power of the
interpretation has emerged. Early in the discussions Beijing
announced that Hong Kong courts would be allowed the judicial
power of interpreting the Basic Law after 1997(91) but also
maintained that it is "...Rightfully in the bounds of the Central
Government to judge local legislative and/or administrative acts
to see if they go beyond (the promised) autonomy...to check on any
broadening of autonomy which eroded the power of the PRC"(92).

The importance attributed to giving Hong Kong a right to
counter to making amendments is, then, that since the Basic
Law will be enacted by the National People's Congress, presumably
any amendments will go through the Chinese legislature. However,
doubts have been expressed on whether China might abuse the power
for political ends if it has the sole power over amendments, and,
therefore, proposals have been made to give Hong Kong the right to
"initiate amendments or be fully consulted if the initiation comes
from Beijing..."(93).

4. Residual Powers

The argument over the exercise of residual powers was
resolved in the second meeting of the BLDC with a compromise. "The
National People's Congress and the State Council will authorise
the SAR to exercise other duties and powers" other than those stipulated in the Basic Law. This gives Hong Kong authority to make decisions on residual powers, but also carries a safeguard should the FRC feel its sovereign rights are in danger of being eroded.

The Issue of Reforms to the Hong Kong Government

Chief Secretary Sir David Akers-Jones said that developing "...the Hong Kong system of government will perhaps be the greatest challenge because there are no precedents for what has to be accomplished, no texts of political theory which apply, and no models...[the task is to] take the present colonial system, adapt and mould it so Hong Kong will pass through 1997 without dislocation in its social, economic, or political organization"(94). He described the desirable system as meeting the hopes of local people and providing a high degree of autonomy.

The PRC government voiced their opposition to changes to the existing governmental and political system before the transfer(95) but, despite this, the issue of reforms to the existing system in order to prepare it for local administration has been in the forefront of discussions in the media. The nature and extent of the reforms is very controversial and the public debate has contributed to the tense atmosphere in the colony.

The Joint Declaration provides that

The chief executive of the HKSAR shall be selected by election through consultations held locally and be appointed by the CPG. Principal officials (equivalent to Secretaries) shall be nominated by the chief
This seems to provide for a more democratic form of government after 1997 than Hong Kong has had under colonial rule, and consequently there were soon many calls in Hong Kong for more local participation in government, in order, firstly, to have in place a proven system of government at the time of the takeover, and secondly, to develop a pool of experienced local people able to deal with government after the colonial administrators leave. J. Cheng notes that particularly the younger generation have been demanding the right of political participation, "...arguing that only an elected government can effectively promote the interests of the people and maintain Hong Kong's international status" (97). J. Cheng warns that the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong depend to a great extent on the commitment of youth to Hong Kong. This commitment would be strengthened by satisfaction of their demand for increased local participation (98).

The British government issued a 1984 Green Paper on Democratic Reform in Hong Kong, announcing a 1987 review of options for political reform with the aim of developing political institutions in Hong Kong in order to give the locals opportunities to practise self-government before 1997, eventually developing a highly autonomous political system in accordance with the spirit of the Joint Declaration. Subsequent actions, however, suggest that their initial commitment to further development of political reforms has weakened.
There has been resistance to the reforms outlined in the
Green Paper from several quarters - both internal and external,
all of which have been given extensive media coverage. Beijing was
critical of the proposals(99) and Mr. Xu Jiatun reminded Hong Kong
that there was only one fundamental principle to uphold: support
the capitalist system for the next 62 years, changes should,
therefore, be carefully considered - and gradual(100). Mr. Ji
Pengfei, speaking at a meeting of the BLDC, said that Hong Kong
could have prosperity and stability but not prosperity and
reformation (101). The SCMP described a message sent from China
through channels to proponents of the 'one person, one vote'
that it was unhappy with the latest political developments, and
included a warning that they were detrimental to the transfer of
power. The method of choosing officials by democratic consultation
was preferable, in the opinion of the PRC, to universal
elections(102). Local capitalists and industrialists, upon whose
confidence continued prosperity depends, and Hong Kong BLDC
members warned of the danger of democratic reforms bringing on
'social disorder' and jeopardizing the territory's prosperity and
stability (103). Finally, a leading leftwing paper emphasized that
rights over Hong Kong were returning to China, not to the Hong
Kong people(104).

In a news conference on November 22, 1985, given prominent
and extensive coverage, Mr. Xu Jiatun indirectly criticized Great
Britain for departing from the principles of the Joint Declaration
by initiating political reforms, and stated that political reforms
might mean trouble for Hong Kong. Great Britain has stated that
Hong Kong's political system was a matter for Britain before 1997,
whereas the Chinese are looking for continuity before and after 1997. People's worries about a smooth transition were renewed, as China's uneasiness with the development of representative government seems to indicate that a different system would eventually be implemented. The stock market dropped 49 points in one day.

The ensuing weeks were among the most nervous Hong Kong has experienced, for these messages from China were followed by a concessionary speech by Akers-Jones in which he expressed skepticism about modelling Hong Kong on the one person/one vote system, as there was no support in Hong Kong for direct elections. Soon after this speech, there was a warning from China of 'chaos' if there were changes in the political system incompatible with the Basic Law during the run-up to 1997.

Although polls consistently show that a majority support direct elections, the PRC consistently states that political reforms should converge with the Basic Law. However, waiting until the early 1990's to introduce direct elections would not offer enough time for the 'practice' of democracy and the development of experienced politicians.

Miners has concluded that no changes will be made to the existing system in the run-up to 1997. China is against political reforms in Hong Kong. The Chinese have never had a Western-style democracy and, ideologically, they have rejected the system. In Hong Kong, however, they are forced to deal with the issue very carefully as the initial moves toward reform were made by a well-intentioned Hong Kong government and seem to be what the Hong Kong people want. They must simultaneously consider the
threat from some in the business community that if grassroots
democracy movements are given power, they would leave Hong
Kong(109). These factors, combined with their own fears that
democracy in Hong Kong would "...bring power to the free-lunch 
brigade, those who squander money to satiate electorate's 
demands"(110), force the PRC to step very carefully indeed around 
this issue.

The Hong Kong Government eventually narrowed the aims of the 
review of representative government. The limited brief avoids 
several issues (such as the autonomous position of the governor 
and the formation and powers of Executive Council which is the 
highest policy making body) "...which might bring Britain into 
direct confrontation with China"(111). Worry is growing that the 
eventual reforms will be little more than window dressing (112). 
The Governor of Hong Kong, addressing the opening of the 1986/87 
Legislative Council, stated "Experience over the last year suggest 
that this structure [i.e. the existing] is serving Hong Kong 
well"(113). Such comments heighten the scepticism and concern of 
reformers and of the population at large.

In summary, the drafting of the Basic Law and makeup of its 
committees, as well as the local political activity to gain places 
on these committees, became public issues through the extensive 
publicity they received. The salience of these issues and events 
changed the local political environment by forcing Hong Kong 
residents to react to these issues by increasing their political 
participation in the events. They perceived that the writing of 
the Basic Law is an extremely significant process. The make-up of 
the committees writing the law has been very controversial: Hong
Kong residents became aware of the urgency of sufficient local representation on the committees, and the PRC were careful to include representation from the Party. Therefore, negotiations for committee membership heightened public awareness of, and political involvement in, the '1997' debate. The fierce campaigning within local interest groups to obtain a place on the committee achieved some favourable results for local politicians. For, apparently in response to the political activity, the PRC appeared aware of the necessity to take steps to calm Hong Kong jitters, and concessions were made to increase local representation during the initial planning stages.

V BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA

All the detailed tensions (for example over the Basic Law) which have been discussed in the previous analysis are, of course, predicated on anxieties about the political, economic and sociological discontinuities of the PRC and Hong Kong. Before beginning the studies of the two societies, it is useful to present an analytical overview of their relationship. This linkage section has two functions: to reintroduce the comparative element of the thesis through analysis of the relationship between Hong Kong and China and to emphasize the complexity of the historical and existing relationships and thereby further explain the issues involved in merger.

First, there is a discussion of the areas in which Hong Kong and China have expediently converged: economically and socially. H.A. Turner noted "Throughout its history since 1843, the development of Hong Kong has been...intimately connected with and influenced by its connection with the great continental society of
China, by alternate conflict and rapprochement underlaid by a continuing commercial and cultural reciprocity”(114).

Secondly, there is a description of the areas in which they have historically diverged: in their political and economic systems. Although both sections deal mainly with occurrences after WWII, earlier periods are discussed and for this reason the PRC will be referred to as China.

Economic Convergence

Youngson described the economic relationship:

The network of (economic) connections is...far more extensive and more complex than is usually stretched across any frontier. Hong Kong and China are inseparable, strange as the relationship must in some ways be between a gigantic, poor, centralized, professedly egalitarian and predominantly rural economy and tiny, capitalist, free-wheeling and relatively rich Hong Kong. It is a curious play of contradictions and advantages...(115).

Hong Kong has experienced remarkable economic growth since the early 1950 s and, of the many contributory historical, geographic, and cultural factors, its proximity to China emerges as the pivotal factor. Across the border, as a result of change and upheaval in China, an influx of human resources, business, and capital arrived to power the growth - accompanied by a reliable supply of necessities to fuel it. The necessities included supplies of food, water and natural resources which were available, often at prices lower than the world market, exempting Hong Kong from inflation during its period of greatest economic growth (116). Noting that China provides up to 50% of Hong Kong’s
food and water, and much of the petroleum and yarn supply, A.
Youngson comments on this aspect of the relationship: "[the] 
goodwill of China and the state of the Chinese economy
are...always matters of the utmost importance for Hong
Kong..."(117).

C. Howe suggests that the flow of human resources and skills
from China into Hong Kong is one of four main categories in which
the economic links should be analyzed(118). Among the immigrants
were many capitalists from Shanghai escaping the Communist
takeover. They brought capital, expertise and Chinese business
traditions, all of which contributed to Hong Kong’s rapid
development as a manufacturing economy. The process has been
described as ‘...simply a transfer of economic activity from one
industrial centre to another...’(119). Benefits from this transfer
remain. Describing the current business relationship, an analyst
wrote ‘While most foreign businessmen remain confused by the
gigantic, complicated Chinese trading bureaucracy, shrewd Hong
Kong businessmen have been able to go in and out of the system and
cut out profitable deals”(120).

At the same time as the Shanghai migrations, other Chinese,
poorer and less-skilled, migrated, providing a labour force for
the new manufacturers (121). This influx, which began in
substantial numbers at the end of the Chinese Civil war, has yet
to be significantly reversed. Because of this, China’s human
contribution to the development of Hong Kong is greater than the
reverse, which is just beginning, and is taking a different form
of transfer of skills through investment by Hong Kong firms in
China, and through contacts between (educational)
Howe's second category for analysis of economic links between Hong Kong and the PRC is visible trade. A trade relationship has existed between the two since WWII, and originally consisted primarily of the PRC exporting goods to Hong Kong, its largest export market. However, since its new open-door economic policy began, the ties have multiplied and China has become one of the largest markets for Hong Kong goods. It has been argued about the relationship that it "...is difficult to imagine a more satisfactory bilateral business relationship..." (123). Hong Kong is the second largest trading partner of the PRC (after Japan), and the PRC has recently overtaken the US to become Hong Kong's largest trading partner (124).

Since the late 1970's, Hong Kong has resumed its original role as entrepot for China: the PRC has become, since 1980, both the largest market for, and the largest source of, re-exports from Hong Kong (125). P. Jacobs comments that this contradicts predictions that as China developed economic relationships with the rest of the world Hong Kong's role in the PRC's foreign trade would diminish. He attributes the renewed status of Hong Kong as entrepot to the "...acute infrastructure problems, notable in transport and communications...(in the PRC). The managers of the Chinese economy "...know that they can either find or obtain rapidly through Hong Kong anything they need..." (125). China has been the net beneficiary of visible trade because it...consistently has a trade surplus with Hong Kong [providing] a major source of foreign exchange earnings to finance imports of technological and capital equipment required by the four
Commenting on the irony of a situation in which Hong Kong wants China to keep a distance from the colony's politics but is profiting from renewed closeness in economic relationships, the expanding trade relationship has been described: "Like a strong centripetal force, the burgeoning China trade has pulled Hong Kong...closer than ever to China's economy... . By virtue of... obvious reasons, there seems no other course for Hong Kong but to make the most profit out of it" (128).

Howe's third category is invisible payments (cash remittances by Hong Kong residents to their dependents in China; tourism; profits from investments by corporations, industry, and banks; advertising, etc.). Hong Kong appears to be a net exporter of these services to the PRC (129).

The fourth category is direct investment interests - both China in Hong Kong and Hong Kong in China, primarily in the SEZ's, and in residential developments elsewhere. Since the late 1970's, the activities of the PRC investing in Hong Kong have expanded and existing ones increased (130). They have moved for the first time into property, stockbroking, foreign exchange dealing and manufacturing (131). Jacobs suggests reasons for the new ventures: opportunity to earn foreign exchange, practice for Chinese companies and staff in the skills needed for international trading, opportunity to acquire real estate and hotel management know-how, and lastly, transfer of technology and manufacturing skills to China through investment in the manufacturing sector (132).

The Hong Kong business community has substantial investments...
in residential areas in China, and accounts for 90% of the SEZ total foreign investment (133). It is the latter group of investments which may prove more significant in determining the nature of the economic relationship if the PRC intends, as many analysts are predicting, to develop a 'single great megalopolis' in the area around Hong Kong, Macau and Canton (134). (At least one analyst has speculated about China's plans for a "...strong, technologically advanced economic region ... stretching from Shanghai ... [to provinces adjoining Hong Kong] ... and encompassing Hong Kong" (135). The economic success of the Shenzhen SEZ has meant that Hong Kong money has had a direct impact on the standard of living of this area of China, raising it to almost three times that of most of China and providing employment opportunities in manufacturing in many small, previously depressed villages (136) (137).

The assets of Hong Kong which are potentially most useful to the PRC are the harbour and container port, the well-developed trading and other commercial links with the rest of the world, the well-developed infrastructure in transport and communication, which the PRC lacks, and the financial and related services in Hong Kong which no city in the PRC can equal. The transfer of technology to the PRC through Hong Kong is ongoing, and the educated skilled and labour force, with origins in China, possess the expertise to contribute to the modernization of China.

**Socio-Cultural Convergence**

The labour force from China accounts for the second major area of convergence: the social and cultural aspects of the respective societies. The social connection is perhaps the
strongest because both cultures stem from traditional Chinese society which they have adapted to the 20th century. Only 57% of Hong Kong residents were born there, and many of the rest are first generation (138). The British colonial system has given them the freedom to determine their own cultural and social life (139), and the Hong Kong people have maintained close cultural ties with China. Hong Kong residents, particularly those with recent ties to China, often describe themselves according to the place of origin in China of their families, and links of feelings of loyalty, social connections and business relationships persist between Hong Kong and China.

Turner has described (in Hong Kong)

a network of Peking-orientated associations and agencies, which include trading, commercial and financial organizations, cultural societies, businessmen's associations and clubs, educational bodies, some clan and neighborhood associations, voluntary services, information agencies, and so on. It is at least a reasonably supposition that they are linked...by a combination of national pride with interest and prudence, also...by a leavening of Communist Party membership, and in some cases by more formal links with the Province of Canton's Party (140).

China, for its part, has pointedly never termed the Chinese of Hong Kong as 'overseas Chinese', but refers to them as 'home Chinese'.

In summary, the socio-cultural convergence has resulted from the fact that 98% of the inhabitants of Hong Kong are Chinese. They retain many cultural and familial links with China.

Political Divergence
In contrast to these strong links, there are significant areas of divergence between Hong Kong and the PRC. Analysis of the areas in which they have diverged begins with the differences in their governmental and political systems. The depth of this divergence is best described in a statement by several members of Hong Kong's Legislative and Executive Councils: "The inescapable fact is that the Chinese Government is committed to a political philosophy which is at least incompatible, and at worst hostile, to the philosophy on which the various systems and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong...rest" (141).

Since the 19th century Hong Kong has enjoyed political stability and security because of two historically-determined and interlocking factors. The first is the non-interventionist philosophy of its colonial government, so non-interventionist that it led one observer of the Hong Kong scene to write: "What is remarkable about Hong Kong is that the governmental institutions are generally irrelevant to politics... My own description of Hong Kong in fact is that it is an administrative no-party state" (142). Traditional political institutions, parliament, legislative assemblies, parties, have not emerged as part of the governing process in Hong Kong, but rather the colony is run by a series of bureaucratic institutions grafted onto government (143). The Governor, Executive Council and Legislative Council are distanced politically from the social and economic life of the public and their power is strictly limited by law (144).

There is, however, political activity in Hong Kong. It has been suggested that "...political activity is inevitable in all free countries where individuals and groups are at liberty to
organize in order to press their demands against other groups or against government" (145). However, in Hong Kong, that activity has not been organized by political parties, but has been issue-directed and carried out by individuals or self-interest groups reacting to a specific governmental decree (146). "The political formula in Hong Kong consists of a political arrangement of decision and dialogue as between the bureaucracy and a strongly entrenched elite and interest groups" (147).

A second factor explaining the political stability is the acceptance by the governed of the government. Youngson (148) comments on the link between the refugee background of the Hong Kong people and their contribution to making Hong Kong work politically. Youngson suggests that, upon entering industrial employment in Hong Kong, many refugees felt that they were rising in the world and that their standard of living was much better than that across the border. Eager to work for their wages, and relieved to be free of the political impositions in China, they were not distressed by inequalities in Hong Kong, and have been satisfied, for the most part, to remain uninvolved in government (149).

Ironically, the PRC has also had an indirect input into political stability in Hong Kong: intermittent local calls for changes in government policies have been countered by statements from the Hong Kong Government that China would object to such changes, and that Chinese objections should not be ignored.

In contrast to Hong Kong, although governed by just one party since its founding, the PRC has experienced profound swings in the political arena and the policy is determinedly interventionist.
Hong Kong and the PRC remained so different and separate politically that very few of the upheavals in China have had negative effects on Hong Kong government or politics, the spillover from the GPCR in 1967 being the most notorious exception. On the contrary, it might be said that Hong Kong has benefitted from the differences because it has been perceived as a secure refuge for people escaping the instability and interventionist philosophies of the government in the PRC.

**Economic Divergence**

The divergence of their respective economic systems is also extreme. "No sharper contrast in economic policies and economic performance can be found than in the side-by-side comparison of the incredibly successful record of Hong Kong's free-market economy and the dismal results of the command and control system of economic management employed by its colossal communist neighbor" (150). China, perhaps in an attempt to offset this kind of unfavourable comparison, until recently used the term 'Hongkongism' as an term of abuse "...levied against those [in the PRC] who wanted its affluent lifestyle" (151).

The Hong Kong economy has thrived in an exceptional set of historical circumstances. Financially autonomous from GB since 1958, it has inherited both a colonial government whose fundamental purpose has been "...to provide the best possible environment for a 'laissez-faire economy'" (152) and a work force whose "refugee mentality of deep anxiety" drove them to want to achieve (153). "Measured by most accepted indicators, Hong Kong qualifies as a newly industrialized region" (154). "Hong Kong's enterprises are privately owned; their profits are used for..."
private benefit, with a proportion being remitted overseas" (155).

During the period of Hong Kong's great expansion, China had a government committed to a centrally-controlled socialism and a government which pursued a variety of economic policies - relatively unsuccessful in attracting investment funds from the international community or in sparking initiative within its own business community. The PRC has experienced profound economic unrest since 1949, as development plan after development plan has resulted in chaos rather than growth and quickly abandoned. Although China appears to have adopted a more stable and realistic programme since the late 1970s and is attracting more foreign interest and investment, the standard of living in China remains far below that of Hong Kong.

Although in both Hong Kong and China, the performance of the economic sector has been a central concern of government, and the governments' economic policies have been held accountable for economic performance. In one case the link between government and economy is maximum interventionist, and has had negative effects, and in the other the design is minimal intervention, with highly positive effects.

Many Hong Kong people feel pride in the recent achievements of China, but polls do not reveal a desire to adopt the Chinese system. Indeed, an unease in Hong Kong resulting from recent closer economic ties with China has emerged. "Their foremost concern is that Chinese domination will unleash undesirable actors - such as favouritism and corruption - that usually go hand in hand with absolute power" (156). The article continues to give examples of rules already being bent to accommodate Chinese
needs and examples of Hong Kong people leaning over backwards to please the Chinese.

In summary, despite the differences in the ideology of their respective economic systems, Hong Kong and China have converged economically due to their proximity, the need of Hong Kong for an expanded labour force as well as a site for investment, and the need of China for expertise and capital which are available in Hong Kong. There are also similarities in the social systems, but the political differences are dramatic. Hong Kong, as one of the last remaining colonies, has benefited from the political philosophy of its rulers: non-interventionism during the years that the citizens of China have had to adapt to government which gained more and more control over all aspects of the lives of individuals.

VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Because of events of 140 years ago and because of present economic realities, sovereignty over an established, prosperous community of 5,500,000 people will be transferred by a democratic country to a country governed by a one-party, repressive system. This transfer poses problems for Hong Kong: to retain any of their present social and economic advantages they must seek ways to merge with the PRC and so adapt to its needs and goals that they become useful to it, while not threatening it. The PRC and the UK have guaranteed, in the terms of the Joint Declaration, that the present lifestyle will be preserved, but the people of Hong Kong have generally viewed these guarantees of the PRC and the UK with concern.
The Basic Law is being written to provide a constitution and Hong Kong Residents hope that the Basic Law will resolve the issues of the Law, Human Rights, and also outline the political relationship which will exist between HKSAR and the PRC. Despite the facts that Hong Kong has been a British colony for 140 years and that China has undergone profound social, economic and political upheavals during that period, relationships with the PRC have never been completely severed. Although there are significant differences in their economic and political systems, strong economic and cultural links remain.

In conclusion, tension has arisen because of uncertainty about the various issues involved in transfer. These issues, which have been become highly prominent in this decade, will be resolved by interaction between three separate agents. Firstly, Hong Kong will itself play a significant role in the outcome. Piers Jacobs, present Financial Secretary, suggests that "Hong Kong's continuing success...depends on the attitude of the Hong Kong people...". He continues that they must "...remain confident in their future and prepared to grasp the opportunities that the agreement provides" (157). Questions about whether Hong Kong can mobilize politically and develop local leaders by 1997, about whether it will be able to administer itself, and how successfully it will continue to attract international business are relevant. Hong Kong's prosperity has resulted from factors which, indeed, differentiate it from China: its educational, economic, social systems. Many question whether these systems will retain their integrity. In addition, worries about how many skilled Hong Kong residents will emigrate are often heard: professionals in commerce
and industry, public and social services, people crucial to its relationship with the international community and with China, appear to be at risk.

Secondly, the actions and attitudes of the PRC will determine the fate of Hong Kong. Since the signing of the Joint Declaration, doubts whether China will be able to keep several of the commitments have emerged. Uncertainty about whether or not the one-country, two-systems plan will work is a major concern. Although in the past, acceptance of the significant economic differences between Hong Kong and China was possible within the framework of different political systems, grassroots Chinese tolerance for the disparity in freedoms and affluence may diminish.

Related is the question of how well China understands the relationship between the free market system of Hong Kong and the freedoms of thought and speech which nourish it. Young is pessimistic about this: "The Chinese view of capitalism-in-Hong Kong [is of] a basically economic and functional structure". He adds that China ignores the integral political and social dimension of the economic life of Hong Kong. There are questions about whether this lack of understanding will lead to China feeling threatened by Hong Kong and wanting increasingly more control over it.

The future of internal Chinese politics is significant. Although it is easily demonstrated that it is in the interest of China that Hong Kong prosper, doubt remains about the nature of Chinese policies after the departure of Deng.

Deng has summed up his own attitude towards this question
when responding to questions about the prospective durability of the Hong Kong policy. His response was to ask why anyone would change a policy which has proven correct. But, as early as 1983, the FEER sounded a skeptical note about the consistency of the current modernization policies of the Central People's government, and noted that since the majority of mainlanders lacked confidence in their durability, there is reason for Hong Kong residents to have some doubts about those policies (160)(161).

The third role will be played by the international business community. Although the conditions described in the Joint Declaration are encouraging, and Hong Kong has proven itself capable of generating considerable profits, confidence is very fragile. Some major Hong Kong companies have already, or are in the process of, establishing overseas headquarters and plan to begin diversifying their portfolios outside of Hong Kong. There is a great deal of speculation that these moves indicate a lack of confidence in the colony among the major Hong Kong investors (162). Unless foreign and local investment in Hong Kong continue to grow, the best efforts of the Hong Kong people combined with stability and commitment from the PRC will not be enough.

This complex political and economic transfer, as well as the events surrounding the drafting of the terms of transfer, i.e. the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, have been given extensive media coverage in Hong Kong. The public discussion of all these issues has had two effects on Hong Kong. Firstly, it has made the issue highly visible to residents. Secondly, from this salience has emerged a more politicized society, more convinced of need to explore methods of ensuring their personal futures in a...
This chapter, then, has identified the increasing salience of the public problem of merger and has sketched, in the penultimate section, some of the structural sources of the public problem. It is now time to develop a more systematic and more deeply analytic definition of the contradictions, convergences and divergences of Hong Kong and the PRC. This is the task of Chapters Two and Three.
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making future absorption of Taiwan back into the motherland more justifiable. It is believed that Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution was written as a model for resuming sovereignty over Taiwan, and that Hong Kong was the first to accept the concept purely because of the fact of the expiry of the lease. (FEER, 24.7.86, p. 23.) Although Taiwan was a province of China from only 1885 until 1894, and of the present population only 15% were born in China, the PRC has consistently worked toward its aim of 're-unification' of Taiwan and the mainland. Hong Kong is seen to be a 'test case' for absorption of Taiwan.

162. See: FEER, 24.7.86, p. 83, "It's a red letter day as papers welcome accord"; The Guardian, 28.9.86, and The Economist, 13.9.86.
CHAPTER II
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS: HONG KONG CONTEXT

I PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT OF CHAPTER

The broad purpose of this chapter is to describe the socio-cultural, economic, and educational systems of Hong Kong. Within that description, the chapter attempts to highlight those areas in which Hong Kong society has diverged from the traditional Chinese cultural patterns, and from the present socio-economic and political systems of the PRC. The chapter will note examples of adjustment by Hong Kong residents to previous changes in their socio-economic environment.

The argument of this chapter is that Hong Kong residents have developed a socio-cultural and economic environment which differs in some aspects from that of the PRC. The chapter attempts to demonstrate that these differences in ideologies and in institutional patterns have evolved because of the combination of Chinese, colonial and Western influences on society, and because of the impact of considerable economic development and the ensuing rapid expansion of educational opportunities. These differences between Hong Kong and the PRC, it is argued, comprise the socio-cultural and educational contexts in which the interaction of the transfer is occurring. In these contexts, because of the institutional differences between Hong Kong and the PRC, uncertainty and tension about the outcomes of interaction have developed. Furthermore, the chapter introduces the subordinate argument, dealt with more fully in Chapter 4, that problems arising from interaction in these socio-cultural and educational contexts will be dealt with by utilizing the pragmatic response patterns which have enabled selective adaptation to previous new contexts. Examples of such adaptation are suggested.
The chapter is, therefore, organized broadly as a survey of the economic, social and educational systems of Hong Kong as they have evolved since the end of World War II. However, there is a detailed level of organization which particularly reflects the argument of the chapter. Within this detailed level, categories had to meet the criterion of testing the argument that structural contradictions exist between Hong Kong and the PRC. The categories economic and social, cultural and political, formed the basis of comparison between Hong Kong and the PRC in Chapter 1. The economic and social categories were selected because they are contexts in which Hong Kong and the PRC have strong historical ties. In addition, they, as well as the cultural and political areas, are contexts in which merger will have to occur: economic, because of the interdependent nature of the existing and future relationship; social and cultural, because of the necessity for each side to understand the other in order to achieve 'one country, two systems'; and political, because of the future subordinate relationship of Hong Kong to the PRC. The contradictions which exist within these areas are important to the argument of this thesis and therefore these categories define the organization of this chapter and chapter 3.

The analysis of the education system is emphasized (as compared with the surveys of the economic and socio-cultural systems) for two reasons. First, this study is within the field of education. and secondly because the analysis later closes in on a specific example of adaptation in Chapter 4 - the changes in educational choices and career plans being made by young people.

II HONG KONG ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER PROCESS

This section on the economic system has two purposes. The first is to provide an overview of the various parts of Hong Kong's economic system as transfer approaches. The economic system has become more differentiated and
modernized in the past three decades. These developments have affected society and education, neither of which can be understood without knowledge of such developments in the economic system.

The second purpose is to analyze those parts of the Hong Kong economic system which are relevant to the argument of the chapter. The line of analysis is that the complexity of adjustment facing Hong Kong cannot be fully understood without investigating the structural differences in the economic systems of Hong Kong and the PRC. These differences have resulted, in part, from the rapid and successful diversification of the Hong Kong economy. The argument is a double one. Firstly, the development of the economic system differentiates it from the economic system of the PRC, resulting in structural contradictions which participants will attempt to resolve. Secondly, diversification and modernization in the economic system have affected the social systems, including education, differentiating them from those of parallel systems in the PRC and further complicating the process of preparation for transfer.

The detailed categories in this section are: Hong Kong Government economic policy, the history of the economic system, its major components, and the nature of the labour force. Discussion of each category shows the scope of the economy's diversification and modernization.

**History and Government Policy**

Discussions of the economic system of Hong Kong generally begin with a comment on its success. Against the odds of a geography with very few natural resources, a population which, in the period from 1947 to the present, increased by almost 4 times, and the pervasive sense of 'living on borrowed time', the people of Hong Kong have experienced an increase of around two hundred percent in per capita income at constant value during the past 40 years (1). Hong Kong has become the most affluent society in Asia.
after Japan and Singapore with a *per capita* income about ten times the level of the PRC, and predicted to exceed British levels within a decade — assuming stable internal political conditions.

Many phrases describe the particular characteristics of Hong Kong's economic system which might account for its "miraculous economic development"(2), for example, an "export-propelled economy"(3), a "classic, laissez-faire system"(4), and "entrepot-handler society"(5). The work force is traditionally described as resourceful, energetic, industrious, innately capitalistic, flexible, "the second asset"(6). The prosperity which has been achieved is a result of all these factors, producing a dynamic and, in many ways, a unique society.

Until WWII, Hong Kong's means of supporting itself was an active and successful entrepot trade, with agriculture and fisheries lesser contributors to the system(7). Hong Kong was "primarily a pure trading port"(8), with "some labour-intensive industries"(9). It served "...as a staging post and trans-shipment centre for trade between China and the Western World"(10).

Within three decades, however, the industries were transformed into "skill- and technological-intensive"(11), and Hong Kong had become a city economy, which, in the period from 1965 to 1968 alone, lost 30% of its farmers to the cities and emigration and one, in which, in 1984, less than two percent of the inhabitants remained farmers(12).

Two historical events set the stage for this rapid change. Firstly, after the second World War, Hong Kong experienced a massive increase in its population. Following the Japanese surrender, the citizens of Hong Kong who had left for China during the war began to return — at the rate of almost 100,000 a month. Many had left Hong Kong during the Japanese occupation hoping to find better conditions on the mainland, and returned only after
the re-establishment of British rule. Then, within a few years, at the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War, a second surge of approximately 750,000 refugees entered the colony. Hong Kong was forced to abandon its reliance on its entrepot trade and industrialize quickly as the population increased from half a million at the end of the war to nearly 2.4 million in 1951(13).

Secondly, much of the trade between China and the Western world which was handled in Hong Kong was cut off. A United Nations embargo was placed on the export of strategic goods to China during the Korean War. At the same time, China's newly Communist Government began turning to the USSR and Eastern Europe for more and more of its trade relationships. Faced with economic stagnation because of the rapid decline of potential in its entrepot capacity, Hong Kong turned to developing its manufacturing capabilities, and eventually to offering financial services.

These developments were turned to advantages for Hong Kong. Although much of the basis of the entrepot trade had been withdrawn, Hong Kong turned the commercial expertise developed through its entrepot experiences to developing its financial services. In addition, the massive immigration was both a source of surplus labour for the new industries and a source of skill and capital. Three quarters of a million refugees fled to Hong Kong, some from Shanghai who brought with them millions of dollars in capital as well as expertise in management and an entrepreneurial spirit. The existing non-interventionist political framework provided an excellent backdrop, and Hong Kong's period of rapid growth began(14).

Edward Chen has stated that Hong Kong's "economic transformation was achieved without planning or even premeditation"(15). However, policies of the Hong Kong Government contributed to the prosperity. Hong Kong has almost complete autonomy in its domestic financial affairs, with the ultimate authority for the government's revenue and expenditure proposals resting
with the Legislative Council. Their policies are often characterized as being laissez-faire, generally a policy of complete non-interference by government in the economic dealings of the society. Hong Kong has a free economy in which there is a "basic recognition and respect for private ownership of property"(16). Individuals are free to make contracts between themselves: there is freedom to sell, to purchase, to employ, to work without interference from government.

The term 'positive non-interventionism' is also used to describe the government's policies. The role of government is seen to be one of creating a climate and providing an infrastructure which are conducive to economic growth. Government apparently does not believe it is useful for it to plan the flow of resources, and in Hong Kong, private enterprise has control over the allocation, stabilization and distribution of wealth. The government appears to worry only about growth and permits many other concerns to be dealt with by market forces.

The policies of the government include a system of very low taxes - low even in comparison with other market economies. The income tax and estate duty taxes are very lenient, and there is no land value tax. Very low taxes on business profits coupled with a consistently balanced or surplus budget have attracted considerable foreign investment into the colony.

Other significant aspects of the policy are free trade and free movement of money and capital, which, the government maintain, increase the competitiveness of Hong Kong products and increase Hong Kong's attractiveness as a centre of entrepot trade(17). Although most other free economies have developed a system of contract regulation in order to prevent exploitation of the labour force, in Hong Kong there are very limited protections offered the worker(18). Perhaps, as Cheng Tong Yung has noted, this is perhaps because "there has been belief...that victims of fraud are
themselves willing to be trapped, and thus do not deserve protection from their own gullibility and greed" (19).

Underlying these Government policies is the belief that the most effective allocation of the resources in an economy results from the mechanism of free competition (20). Although it has been suggested that Hong Kong's "...economic success owes nothing to...central economic planning" (21), Government policies, such as the above, and the few wage regulations and the few impediments to the entry of new firms into the colony (22), plus the attitude that economic growth is more important than full employment (23) have contributed greatly to the establishment of Hong Kong as one of the most successful economies of the past three decades.

These historical factors and forces, and governmental economic policy have combined to ensure an influx of labour and capital in an environment conducive to unrestrained pursuit of individual wealth and social mobility. In the Hong Kong economic environment, the individual is free to utilize available resources to attain personal goals, and it is argued that this constitutes a crucial difference between Hong Kong and the PRC society.

Preservation of the capacity for growth is an area of concern for all potential participants in the HKSAR economy: the PRC, Hong Kong, and the international business community. The latter two parties can justifiably assert that individual freedom has been a cornerstone of Hong Kong's past success in this area. The PRC, however, has exhibited considerable ambivalence in formulating a similar policy for its own economy. There are tensions which arise from this contradiction between practice in Hong Kong and persistent philosophical ambivalence in the PRC.

**Major Components of the Economy**

The Hong Kong economy is based mainly in a diversified combination of industry, trade and financial services. Each will be discussed separately.
1. Industrialization

Industrialization is regarded, not only as an end in itself, but also as "...a means to national wealth and power" (24). Hong Kong has been an excellent example of the validity of this statement. Industrialization has taken place very rapidly (25), and the economy has evolved from one based on highly labour-intensive industries such as ship-repair and ship-building, rope-making and cement-production (26) which had a Total Export Value of HK3,716 Million in 1950, to one based on textiles, sophisticated electronics of HK44,833 Million less than 30 years later (27) employing sixty-seven percent of the work force in 1981 (28). The rapid industrialization process has made the residents wealthier, and the accompanying urbanization and prosperity changed their values and expectations in ways which differentiate them from their PRC counterparts.

The particular confluence of factors which produced such development appears to be unique to Hong Kong. The events of the late 1940's are important (29)(30). To repeat, the conclusion of WWII and the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War three years later brought an influx of skilled and unskilled labour and capital into Hong Kong. Much capital was brought by wealthy refugees from Shanghai. In 1947 it was estimated that US50 Million had already been brought into the colony by these refugees. With this capital, many of the new industries were established (31). Capital has, since then, always been in adequate supply (32). A recent survey indicates that 81.4% of the small factories responding to the survey had their own capital (33). Indeed, 90% of the industrial workforce is employed by fellow (local) Chinese (34).

Another contributory factor to the rapid industrialization is suggested by A. Y. C. King and Peter J. L. Man (35). They comment on the "...fast adoption of and adaptation to changing technological development by the
small industries...". They continue "...the small industry in Hong Kong, unlike most of its Asian counterparts, has taken a modern form"(36). It has been suggested that due to intense competition from Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore whose industrial workforce received lower wages, Hong Kong was impelled to turn to the production of higher quality and more sophisticated products(37). An example is found in the electronics industry: in 1961, it had recently entered the industrial 'picture', listed behind 'food, paper and printing, metal, plastics, leather, rubber, and chemicals'(38). It is now second in earnings in exports(39), and employs 90,000 workers.

The Hong Kong Government lists other factors that contribute to Hong Kong's status as a leading industrial centre. It writes of "...consistent economic policies of free enterprise and free trade; an industrious workforce; a sophisticated commercial and industrial infrastructure; a modern and efficient seaport..., one of the world's largest container terminals, ...and excellent world-wide communications"(40).

2. Trade

Increased industrialization has been the basis of the expansion of the trade component of Hong Kong's economy(41). The government's policy of no exchange controls or costs, and of maintaining the open port, combined with the policy of the Four Modernizations, have led to the re-emergence of the entrepot trade as an important contributor to the growth of the economy. There has been significant increase in trade with the PRC, and since 1983 the PRC has been both the largest supplier and receiver of goods re-exported through Hong Kong(42). This factor, and the recent decline in exports of its own goods, have suggested that Hong Kong may revert to its initial role as a trading entrepot between China and the rest of the world(43).

3. Financial Services

Hong Kong is considered one of the world's leading financial centres,
and, indeed, this sector of its economy contributes about two-thirds of its GNP (44). The founding of the Chartered Bank in 1853, followed by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in 1864—their primary function being the financing of the entrepot trade—established a system which now supports one of the highest densities of banking services and related support industries in the world. A wide range of organizations such as foreign exchange markets, stock markets, pension funds, insurance companies, etc., are served by a highly modern world-wide communications and transportation network. As pointed out by A. J. Youngson (44), even geography has worked to Hong Kong's advantage in that it is located in the centre of a region of growing economies, and its time-zone position gives it an advantage in conducting transactions with Western Europe and North America.

The success of industrialization, the emergence of the trade and financial sectors have meant rising incomes, international contacts, and financial security for the residents. Industrialization has also helped bring about increasingly complex social structures (45), and, correspondingly, education has developed and diversified to be able to supply the skilled workforce that the sophisticated technology and research and development require. The workforce is the topic of the following section. Education is dealt with later.

Labour Force

Obstacles have been described as geographical: the lack of natural resources, limited habitable areas; as historical: the extraordinary surge of refugees housing themselves in gravely inadequate housing and squatter areas built from refuse with minimal access to fresh water and electricity. Other obstacles have been political: lack of government regulations on wages, working hours, and conditions; and as the result of rapid industrialization: the pressure to produce competitively, i.e. quickly and
cheaply. However, all types of obstacles were surmounted by the Hong Kong labour force in an atmosphere of 'no time to loa-se'. The labour force has demonstrated the kinds of reactions which this thesis argues will be applied to the challenges posed by 1997: a pragmatic and adaptive attitude toward problem-solving.

Reports about the specific contributions of the labour force, and about their working condition and wages are very general, perhaps, as J. England has noted, because "Despite international accusations of sweated labour leveled at Hong Kong for 20 years, there has been no large-scale study of working conditions and poverty"(48). Indeed the 1961 census (the first since 1931) asked no questions about income and earnings. Information, therefore, is fragmented, which led the same author to write that "Before 1967, and some time after, official policy was characterized by smug satisfaction with indicators of economic growth and by a vast disregard for the human consequences of industrialization"(47). Indeed, there was no minimum wage requirement in Hong Kong as recently as 1986, and, although wages have risen with the degree of industrialization, labour productivity has risen also, and significantly faster(48)(49), leading Keith Hopkins to write that "...labour's share of profit has declined."(50). Arthur Hinton noted that "...the profit motive is allowed to operate comparatively untrammelled by government restriction. This...has meant inadequate sharing through the community as a whole of the profits made."(51).

Despite the inequalities in distribution of the rewards, the Hong Kong labour force has acquired a reputation for its industriousness. There are studies which demonstrate their willingness to work long hours in order to improve their financial situation. For example, Youngson reported in 1982 that, in the textile industry, the average hours worked per spindle has been higher in Hong Kong than in any other country since 1969(52). Other studies
have shown that the Hong Kong worker consistently places a higher value on the opportunity to earn money over other choices such as an increase in leisure time, job stability, prestige etc. (53).

The male head-of-household has not been the single contributor to the success. The 1971 census showed that 65% of children between 10 and 14 were economically active. Later in that decade, it became illegal for children under 15 to be employed (55). Women have always made up a unusually large part of the labour force, comprising more than half of the employment in the manufacturing industry (56). The 1981 Census revealed that there has been a decline since 1961 in the participation rate for males and females in the labour force for the age groups 15-19 and 55 and over (57). This is attributed to both the increased availability in post-primary school places and the higher incomes which enable people to retire earlier. At the time of the most recent census, 97% of the workforce were employed, and 67% (82% men, 50% female) of the population were economically active (58).

There have been several explanations for these trends. M. Topley observed that most of the workforce at the time of her writing in 1969 had come to Hong Kong to improve their standard of living, and suggested that the economic miracle had simply been a case of their 'getting on with it' (59). Youngson feels it is "...plausible to say that Hong Kong society is permeated at all levels with the idea of working and making money, and that there is not much sympathy or public support for those who cannot or do not work" (60). England states that "Hong Kong itself provided an environment within which economic gain has long been accepted as a major social end" (61).

As a result of the effects of history, official policy, successful and rapid industrialization followed by development of an infrastructure of financial services, and the willing workforce, Hong Kong was reshaped from a
two-tiered society: a very wealthy and powerful elite, and masses of unskilled, ill-housed, uneducated coolies, to the present society: a three-tiered system with a new and educated middle class, which enjoyed annual growth in real income rates during the last decade of 6.4% as well as an increase in the education attainment levels of their young people. They are able to enjoy a more sophisticated, varied life-style than their South-East Asian neighbours.

This new, Hong Kong-born, middle-class is comprised of people with a wide range of skills and as their lives have been most transformed by the economic miracle, so is their future closely tied to 1997. Writing about this middle class, T.Y. Cheng warned that "... the morale and enthusiasm for socio-economic development of the vast majority who cannot afford to emigrate will no longer be guaranteed...[if they are dissatisfied with the arrangement for the future]" (62). He also found that a majority of them would prefer to emigrate, not from lack of satisfaction with life in Hong Kong but because of the present uncertainties and lack of confidence in the future (63). He and others have written that the young middle class are, when possible, establishing links overseas, and when this is not possible, as is the case for the majority, are sitting back to 'wait-and-see' (64).

Hong Kong Economy Poised for the 1990's

The purpose of this subsection differs slightly from that of the previous subsection. Its aim is to suggest that recent economic events have increased tension in the colony. Any such tension will affect the social context of the decolonization and transfer process.

In the mid-1980's Hong Kong seemed to have recovered the 'stability and prosperity' which appear to be the main strategic goals of the PRC and Great Britain. Among the favourable signs were the recovery of the property market after the three year slump. In addition, Hong Kong received full membership...
in GATT which is very important as it guarantees full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations, to contract as a separate party. It will retain this status after 1997. By 1987, however, the economy had slumped again – partly in reaction to the world-wide stock market uncertainties.

As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, Hong Kong and China have traditionally been interdependent economically and this interdependence has increased since the open door policy of the Four Modernizations and the signing of the Joint Declaration. Most analysts consider the new economic links with the PRC as potentially, the most useful in determining a favourable future for Hong Kong(65). The Hong Kong Government has acknowledged their importance by stating that the top domestic governmental priority is to improve the infrastructure as "Hong Kong is becoming a major entrepot for China under our eyes"(66).

However, the predictions are not all optimistic. Warning of a trend toward appeasement of the PRC, an analyst indicated that "...special deals for China have been all too frequent in recent years, notably cheap land for the Bank of China and a billion-dollar rescue for China and its local private-sector partners from a failed, speculative land transaction"(67). Another commentator warned investors: "Be careful of some pragmatists, especially in the business community, showing signs of sycophancy towards Beijing"(68).

There are other negative trends which seem to stem from the uncertain political status. Firstly, capital values on property are not up, reflecting the reluctance of local investors to make long-term commitments despite China's promise of recognition of recognition of leases to at least 2047(69). A sustained bull market in Hong Kong is driven by a property boom, and analysts believe that "Hongkong is a long way from another property
boom" (70). Since property sales have traditionally financed much of the
government's capital programmes, this decline in sales has another
potentially destabilizing effect on infrastructure improvement in the
colony.

The scale of manufacturing has been shrinking, due, it is reported, to
the difficulty in obtaining venture capital from previously-generous
banks (71). There are worries about continued Hong Kong access to up-to-date
information technology. China has been subject to more stringent controls on
such access, and Hong Kong is concerned that the HKSAR will have reduced
access to these commodities which are necessary to its survival as a
financial centre (72).

Clearly, uncertainty surrounds the economic future of Hong Kong, and
the confidence of both the local and world economic community in future
political stability and potential for economic growth is crucial. For this
reasons official reports from Great Britain, Beijing, and the Hong Kong
government are unfailingly reassuring and optimistic.

Reassurances and rescues have been necessary to counteract the trend of
business people 'voting with their feet'. Jardine Matheson stunned the Hong
Kong business community in 1984 when it announced it was moving its
headquarters to Bermuda. It "...was seen to have abandoned the colony after
playing a principal role in its creation out of the opium wars in the
1840's..." (73). A second major Hong announced a similar move and New
York-based Citibank transferred its Asian investment banking Asian
headquarters out of Hong Kong, a move which the Financial Times described as
"...symptomatic of a trend which some see as ominous for Hong Kong" (74).
Funds have been leaving the colony since 1982 at an (estimated minimum) rate
of US$3 billion dollars a year, and this has also been attributed to the
unknown political future of the colony (75).
There are four other factors on which future economic growth depends. Firstly, the degree of compliance by both Great Britain and the PRC with the terms of the Joint Declaration is important. Events of the past two years support this view. On those occasions when either the PRC or Great Britain expressed displeasure with the manner in which the other party was complying with the terms of the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong experienced marked economic reversals. Further support is found in the Asian Business profile on Hong Kong for 1986 which concluded with the advice: "Expect continuing tremors through the colony and stock exchange as China continues to elucidate its interpretation of the Sino-British agreement".

Secondly, growth depends on the maintainance and improvement of the existing infrastructure. This will be possible only in an environment of growth and international confidence in the independence of Hong Kong.

Thirdly, J. Bembridge says that the total system must provide incentives to Hong Kong's entrepreneurs and business people. Hong Kong's whole economy depends on increasing external trade; this in turn required the maximum possible freedom for those involved with appropriate framework of laws and regulations.

This seems to depend on the intentions of the PRC. Lastly, Hong Kong will require 'prudent freedom', which is

the ability to operate fearlessly within sound and independently administered law, the possibility of self-improvement for the successful and the certainty of sensitive treatment for the unsuccessful. Above all the burden of direct taxation must remain moderate and public sector expenditure must be constrained.
In conclusion, this overview of the Hong Kong economic system has attempted to show that it has diversified and modernized in areas in which, as will be shown in Chapter 3, the PRC has not yet achieved success. The institutional differences which emerge complicate the transfer by producing contradictions and tension. In an effort to ease the tension, residents have attempted to begin to prepare for transfer, but their preparations are accompanied by public, and often conflicting, interpretations which exacerbate concern and cause further, and more frenetic, economic activity.

The discussion has also shown that the rapid growth and development of the economic system was assisted by the contributions of the residents. The essence of this contribution, it is argued, is their ability to respond to social changes in a manner which enhances the positive aspects of the emerging situation.

In the final analysis, the economic signals and activities suggest that the main post-1997 economic certainties include the availability of the skilled workforce who are better trained than their counterparts in the PRC; and that the economic probabilities include the further tightening of the link between the health of the PRC economy and the prosperity of Hong Kong.

III THE SOCIAL SYSTEM AND THE TRANSFER PROCESS

The preceding section on the economy traced the development of a Hong Kong economic system which differs from that of the PRC. It also suggested that, in the past four decades, Hong Kong residents have successfully adjusted to an evolving economic situation which consisted of negative and positive aspects. This section on the socio-cultural system attempts to highlight those social, cultural and political structures of Hong Kong which differ from the PRC. It continues the argument that contradictions existing between the systems of Hong Kong and the PRC partially define the context in
which the transfer will occur.

Although ninety eight percent of the people of Hong Kong regard themselves as Chinese and speak one of the Chinese languages, many have come to value the freedoms associated with rule by English law, and to "...place great stress on rights and freedoms of individuals as being of basic importance"(81) - which is not a traditional Chinese attitude. They have shed, rapidly, expediently and without compulsion, many traditional values in favour of many of those of the West. Not all of the traditional forms of behaviour have been eclipsed by the process, and elements of the two coexist side-by-side(82).

Certain characteristics of the Chinese culture facilitate adopting some Western behavioural patterns. As T. Geiger has noted, both cultures share a practical and rationalistic approach to problem-solving, and both are achievement-oriented(83). Therefore, given the opportunity to become wealthy by engaging in Western-style economic activity, the psychological switch was eased because their own tradition had prepared them to think and act in ways required for economic success in Western-ruled Hong Kong.

Social and Cultural Orientation

Changes in the economic structure of a society are usually followed by adjustments in the social system(84). Industrialization, for example, causes over time immense accommodations in systems of social stratification and mobility. The technological advances which accompany it must be met with higher educational standards, which in turn raise achievement levels and eventually, increase expectations in life-style. Measuring these shifts is difficult in any situation, and particularly in Hong Kong, because comparatively little research has been done on its social system. Review of the material on Hong Kong shows that "Hong Kong's economic statistics are excellent, as one would expect, but its social statistics are sparse"(85).
This observation is a common one (86). Attempts to describe and explain various social phenomena are, therefore, based on the limited empirical research that exists.

Another difficulty encountered when attempting to describe Hong Kong society is that, as England has noted, Hong Kong is a society in transition in more than the economic sphere (87). It retains a traditional Chinese aspect in some of its patterns of behaviour which are sometimes resisting, sometimes accommodating, the pressures of industrialization. The society which is emerging has been described as "...still in the process of evolution" (88), and "neither modern nor traditional Chinese" (89). J. Cheng describes this cultural duality: "The people of Hong Kong have been "...caught standing with one foot in the West and one in the East,..."(and) do not seem to have a firm purchase in either" (90). This section attempts to draw on existing research and suggest some general social characteristics relevant to the argument of the chapter.

A characteristic which is readily associated with traditional Chinese societies is that of familism: the status of the family as the most significant unit. In the family, the individual's sense of identity was shaped and, undoubtedly, the early immigrants to Hong Kong brought the traditions of the family, as an economic and social organization, with them. In early Hong Kong, a whole lineage lived together in one village under the control of the father or grandfather, and was self-sufficient economically, politically and socially. On the other hand, in Western societies, the individual is the significant unit, and "...the aim of the learning process ... is to develop 'free-standing' adults capable of ... assuming responsibility for their own actions" (91).

Research has suggested an erosion or adjustment in the original strength and focus of the orientation of the Hong Kong individual toward the
family's welfare. The suggestion made in 1969 that "Family life in particular seems to be turning more and more on the western-type significance of the nuclear family and less and less on the Chinese-type significance of the extended family and its strong ties"(92) has been supported by current research. Only ten years later studies of types of families showed that only 1.6% of families had other than a married couple (with or without unmarried children), and the parents of the husband living together. Three quarters of families were nuclear families(93). This study also revealed that "...[some traditional] rules had been slackened with the increasing trend toward the nuclear family structure"(94). Practices such as passing on inheritance to both sons and daughters, accepting the mother's relatives as kin, and newlyweds setting up their own independent family began to emerge at this time(95). These represent a moving away from traditional Chinese arrangements and toward practices more associated with Western society.

Analysis of the relationships within the family show the same trend. Wong Fai-ming wrote that

The relationship between the husband and the wife has been moving toward a companionship type... . The parent-child relations have been closer and more intense as the family moves toward the smaller nuclear type(96).

This contrasts with the traditional view of these relationships: patriarchal and oriented toward the older members rather than toward the children. Indeed, by 1983, a comparative study of attitudes of ethnic Chinese young people living in the United States found that the recent immigrants from Hong Kong held less strongly to the view that offspring should be responsible for the care of their older relatives than did any
other group of Chinese immigrants. The Hong Kong subgroup supported the suggestion that government and other agencies should assume more responsibility for caring for the elderly\(^\text{(97)}\). This differs considerably from the traditional attitude that \"...the emotion most highly valued was the feeling of respect by the younger for the older...\"\(^\text{(98)}\).

J. Cheng suggests that a combination of both industrialization and westernization have brought about these changes\(^\text{(99)}\). He lists four factors. First, large factories have taken the production process outside the family and members now working away from the family have less reason to live with it. Secondly, he suggests that the rapid urbanization and land shortage have created an environment to which the nuclear family is more adaptable. He also argues that the families have been influenced by the western value of love between a husband and wife, displacing perhaps filial piety on the part of the children as an essential value. Fourthly, children, as a consequence, feel less morally obliged to support their parents, and the nuclear family becomes more popular.

There are, however, signs that the traditional values exist side by side with the modern characteristics. Despite having abandoned many of the traditional attitudes about the family's organization, the family remains the centre of people's emotional and social lives. H. Baker noted that, in Hong Kong, \"It is the family which provides the comfort and human warmth ... and to which a person turns when in trouble\"\(^\text{(100)}\). In fact, it was recently shown that eighty six percent of respondents stated that they spent most of their free time with their families\(^\text{(101)}\).

Hong Kong family life has retained another important feature of the traditional-style family. T. Geiger in a description of Chinese socio-cultural background noted that \"...the interests and the sense of loyalty to the family generally took precedence over commitments to...the
welfare of society as a whole"(102). It has recently been reported that in Hong Kong only 13.5% considered society to be more important than their own families(103). The same report, however, continued:

On the other hand, when asked about their felt responsibility to elevate the status of their families, a substantial percentage of them (47.8%) took the rather uninvolved stance of 'having some responsibility'. Hence, contrary to the ideal in traditional China, the status of the family in society is not of much concern to the average Chinese in Hong Kong(104).

Material success is of great importance to most immigrants to Hong Kong and the Chinese immigrants have not ignored the potential for the quick accumulation of wealth upon which Hong Kong has prospered. Again, it is possible to cite studies which comment on the emergent materialism of the Hong Kong Chinese. Lau Siu-kai noted that, in an investigation of criteria for the choice of jobs, only 19.6% were "...definite in not using salary as the only criterion for the acceptance of a given job"(105).

Examining this characteristic against the concept of a 'society in transition' is helpful. Although the poor of China were allowed to show concern about their economic status, traditional Chinese teachings regarded the accumulation of wealth as harmful, and the elite in China were not those who had accumulated great wealth, but those who had become members of the ruling classes through mastery of the Chinese classical writing. This system of social advancement was not transferred to Hong Kong for two reasons. Firstly, most of the immigrants who came were peasants and other ill-educated groups. The scholars were not represented in very large numbers and therefore were not available to teach the traditional attitudes toward materialism(106). In the environment which existed in Hong Kong at the time of the mass influxes of immigrants, the newcomers simply absorbed the
prevailing philosophy, which was materialistic and which, anyway, had immediately apparent value.

Secondly, the route to prestige and power has always been different in Hong Kong compared with in China. No longer was proving mastery of the Confucian classics important as a sign of ability to rule; in fact the immigrants found themselves in a society in which they could never hope to rule(107). "Wealth and the ability to command wealth ...[have replaced]...the traditional methods for acquiring status and leadership"(108).

England cites several studies done over the past two decades in which income is consistently ranked as more important than free time, job satisfactions, job prestige, job stability, or regular work hours in determining job satisfaction(109). Lin found that the people of Hong Kong are no different from people in all societies in demonstrating a positive relationship between life satisfaction and material well-being(110).

However, J. Cheng describes a study done in 1982 in which questions were asked about the things liked and disliked about living in Hong Kong(111). Only thirteen percent of the respondents answered that they liked the fact that one "...can buy or do anything you like when you have money", while forty percent listed the "freer life" as the significant factor in their attitude toward Hong Kong. So that, although the Hong Kong people have been able to profit from the opportunities for material advancement, they consider the liberal atmosphere in Hong Kong as being more attractive than the opportunity for quick wealth.

In conclusion, Hong Kong residents appear to be flexible in adjusting to their social environment. On the one hand, they have chosen to follow the Western model of individualism in economic and career decisions and in some social areas, for example, the nuclear family pattern, but, on the other
hand, they retain some traditional Chinese values, particularly in areas of responsibility and emotional connections. Differences between Hong Kong and the PRC in the means of achieving goals and in the route to social status emerge from the discussion. There are also contradictions in the area of decision-making: citizens of the PRC generally do not make career decisions themselves or within the family unit, whereas, Hong Kong people look to themselves and their families to fulfill this function.

The following section on the Political Orientation of Hong Kong people suggests additional structural contradiction between the social systems.

**Political Orientation**

The colonial status of Hong Kong has persisted for a hundred and forty five years. In an era of almost universal decolonization, there have been few calls from within Hong Kong to join the international community of former colonies who now practise self-rule. The structure of the government is typical of British colonies. Power is vested in the Governor who is assisted by an appointed Executive Council and advised by an Legislative Council. Until 1984, members of the Legislative Council were appointed, providing for indirect elections of 24 of the 50 members. The rest are appointed by the governmor or are civil servants.

Although not accountable to the Hong Kong public, the British have governed without serious resistance, and as far as the Hong Kong people have taken note of them, the British have been considered a beneficial authority, quite, it might be noted, in keeping with the long-accepted Confucian concept of an ideal government of order and hierarchy.

Hong Kong has been very free to determine its internal matters and "... the actual exercise of British (i.e. London) rule has become increasingly minimal in recent decades"(112). The Government has provided a high degree of personal liberty and freedom of expression and communication,
but has not encouraged the establishment of a political system in the conventional sense. The Governor appoints top officials and formal public advisors from prominent spokespersons of business and professional interests. There is an elected body, the Urban Council, but their elections attract little interest (113). The politics that has existed are described by A. Kuan: "The Hong Kong brand of politics has relied in the past on a certain measure of confidence and understanding between a benevolent Government and cooperative social-economic elites" (114).

Hong Kong residents have had a reputation for being indifferent toward government. C. F. Emmons summarizes the reasons in three categories (115). Those that are structural: arguments such as the non-interference by the colonial government in Chinese lifestyles, and the dramatic increases in their life-styles made possible by government policy (116). Although both communists and non-communists are well represented in the communities of Hong Kong, these affiliations were often historical and sentimental rather than aspirational, and neither group attempted to gain nominal control of the government there. They accepted the colonial system, perhaps as the 'best bet' (117).

Those reasons that are situational: as many residents are refugees from China and are likely to avoid government and politics. J. Cheng describes immigrants from China as not liking to be involved in politics, content to be in a stable political and economic environment (118). Cultural reasons are suggested: 'Chinese traditional bureaucratic paternalism and passive acquiescence among the public'. Cheung Tak-shing found that ideological responses were 'conspicuously absent' in an exploratory study he did of the self-concepts of school children (119).

England has noted, and is supported by Cheung (120), that an important characteristic of Hong Kong residents is that they generally plan only for
the short term(121). As political activity often involves long term goals, it is consistent with their reports that residents prefer to spend their time on activities with more immediate reward. Political activity also requires both channels for communication and power, but power has always been in the hands of the richest entrepreneurs(122), and the credibility of the existing channels of communication is low(123). Therefore, until recently, the society exhibited few signs of politicization.

Such lack of political development in an industrializing economy was unusual, especially in one noted for large gaps in standard of living between wealthy and poor. Turner finds it remarkable that no internally-oriented political labour movement has developed in Hong Kong as in other industrial democracies(124). It has been argued that the existing system has worked because both parties have believed in and enjoyed the freedoms guaranteed under the rule of law(125). Until this decade, the Hong Kong people have been confident that the government would not deviate from this rule, and, significantly, the first, serious, local moves toward establishing representative political institutions have begun only in this decade as "... the credibility of Government [began] slipping away and the consensus of the people [began] disappearing..."(126).

In conclusion, some socio-political characteristics of Hong Kong society have been discussed. They have included examples of local adaptability to the demands of changing circumstances - which are like the adaptations made to changing economic circumstances. It is suggested, then, that, where tension in the socio-political structures developed, change occurred. This change, which evolved from and in the special social, economic and political context of Hong Kong, had the aim of increasing the benefits obtained by individual members from society.

The section then described a society, in which, until the present
political developments, neither political conditions nor socio-cultural factors encouraged local people to participate in Government on more than a token basis. This pattern contradicts the highly politicized environment of the PRC, in which a sense of both national and Party commitment is encouraged by the socialist government.

Hong Kong Politics Poised for the 1990’s

The preceding subsection has described the lack of political activity during the past decades, but, as is now suggested, lack of activity did not signify lack of awareness or interest. In the past two years, many Hong Kong residents have matured politically. They have witnessed the emergence of the Sino-British negotiations and the related events as a public issue, the increasing PRC influence in local politics, and the emergence of local ‘grassroots’ political organizations campaigning for local support and power. In addition, they have been drawn into the political arena with two dramatic issues: political reform in Hong Kong and the building of a nuclear plant by the PRC close to the Hong Kong border. In both issues they positioned themselves for direct confrontation with the wishes of Peking.

Political activity on the second issue has ended in defeat for the population of Hong Kong. The PRC, with the consent of the Hong Kong and British governments, decided to proceed with the building of the plant thirty miles from Hong Kong despite the facts that 1 million signatures were gathered supporting a petition to halt building (a display of dissent ‘unprecedented in Hong Kong’ (127) and that seventy percent of the population were against it. However, twenty four of the fifty six indirectly elected legislators joined the majority of legislators in voting not to debate the question before signing contracts, apparently ignoring the voice of the people.
This defeat appears to have strengthened the resolve of leaders of the opposition on the issue. Martin Lee, QC, member of the BLDC and spokesperson for political reform, wrote:

"If any good has come of this initial political failure, it is this: It has now become clear that Hong Kong must go further than indirect elections. ...(only a government with an elected legislature and an executive accountable to it), with a wide base of public support, will give Hong Kong a means of resisting any attempts by China to intervene in its administration." (128).

Lau Siu-kai comments that the "battered [British] government now has to share its decision-making power with a number of joint Sino-British groups" (129). Therefore, he reasons, "...political reform with the purposes of increasing popular participation ... has to be introduced fairly speedily" (130).

Hong Kong political activists in the mid-1980s have attempted to accelerate the transition toward democracy during the years leading up to the handover, and despite the combined efforts of both the PRC government and the colony's capitalist leaders, "...there are signs of growing public insistence that the people of the territory must be allowed to develop a more coherent political voice before China assumes sovereignty" (131). Independent polls suggest that the majority want a direct vote for their own representatives (132).

The PRC itself has accelerated the process of political maturity. Following the controversial selection procedures for members of the BLDC, the performance of the Hong Kong members at the initial meetings was widely reported and drew generally favorable comment from Hong Kong residents. An article entitled "Aggressive tactics pay off" (133) described a
no-punches-pulled attitude in presenting cases' by some of the Hong Kong members which enabled them to 'finally get what they wanted'. Although the senior PRC member commented that "the thinking and working styles ...were considerably different" (134), Hong Kong commentators supported the assertive tactics and suggested that the assertive behaviour of its delegates should give Hong Kong 'solace' (135).

The PRC has announced that any political reform must be linked to the Basic Law, effectively preventing change until 1990 and establishing the political supremacy of the members of the BLDC during the transition. It is believed that, over the next few years, the influence of existing Government bodies is likely to be overshadowed by the BLDC and BLCC (136), although the PRC is likely to be careful to maintain appearances of equilibrium.

In conclusion, Hong Kong is experiencing decolonization from a traditional colonial relationship with one country and subsequent transfer of internal authority to another style of government, the characteristics of which are unknown beyond the guarantees of the Joint Declaration. Under the colonial government, there was a minimum of local political activity and overt indifference toward 'government'. However, residents enjoyed a high degree of personal freedoms in a pluralistic society. These characteristics differ (from those of the PRC) and the degree to which Hong Kong residents will be allowed to retain them is unknown at present.
IV THE EDUCATION SYSTEM AND THE TRANSFER PROCESS

The following sections will describe the Hong Kong education system in detail. One purpose is to provide an overview of education in Hong Kong as the issue of 1997 is beginning to affect the social institutions of the colony. Another purpose is to present additional information related to the third sub-argument of the thesis: that Hong Kong people will react to the contemporary dramatic and unfamiliar social and political events with established, adaptive behavioural patterns. This section traces examples of effective, pragmatic behaviour by Hong Kong residents when faced with social change. The overall aim, however, of this part of Chapter 2 and the corresponding part of Chapter 3 - the education system in the PRC - is to enable comparison of parallel structures in which, the thesis argues, contradictions between the two systems exist.

Following an introductory section, the discussion continues with a brief history of education in Hong Kong, emphasizing the post-War period which has been the period of greatest economic growth, thereby enabling expansion and restatement of aims of the education system. This period also coincides with an era of upheaval and realignment in education in the PRC. The section includes a description of the structure of the school system which has evolved. Discussion of the aims of the education department follows, with emphasis on those aspects which relate to the argument of this and the following chapter.

Background

The children in secondary school in the mid-1980's will be young adults at the time of the handover. The education they are receiving is preparing them for a lifestyle which will probably differ from the one which they now have. Some efforts have been made to begin adaptation to this new lifestyle. For example, left-wing schools in Hong Kong report a ten to twenty percent
increase in applications and attribute this to the "...farsightedness of parents"(137). Many Hong Kong academics and students have been invited to visit Chinese schools, and vice versa, ostensibly to encourage closer understanding and cooperation between the two systems(138).

There has also been a steadily increasing number of Hong Kong students studying at PRC universities. There is the attitude that, although the qualifications are not recognized in Hong Kong, what was learned in the PRC will be useful - and there is the possibility of making potentially valuable contacts. In 1985, for the first time, the Hong Kong Higher Level Examination results became valid for admission to PRC universities, and since 1984 graduates of Hong Kong secondary schools have been accepted to PRC universities on the basis of recommendation from the local school. They need not sit for the PRC entrance exam(139). The Hong Kong Polytechnic, among other institutions, has fostered closer ties with universities in the PRC through technological and student exchanges because of their perception of the great potential for business in China and their students are advised to equip themselves for careers related to this potential(140).

Despite these individual responses, the issue of the effects of 1997 on education has not become a public issue, as have the effects of 1997 on the economy or on the political system. The media and journal articles tend to emphasize the potential economic and political fall-out, and education has received only passing review. A Hong Kong University conference on 1997 convened after the Joint Declaration was published was able to attract only two papers (of twenty eight) on the topic of 'education and 1997', although they "...tried hard to solicit [more]"(141). The editor describes the relative scarcity of papers on social changes in general (a further two within the twenty-eight of the papers offered) as 'regrettable' and 'striking', and, tentatively, explains that social changes will take time to
manifest themselves (142), even though it is widely agreed that "... in the future, China's development will inevitably influence our [educational] development" (143).

A review of the literature and media coverage of the early period of the transition uncovers scattered exhortations, from leading political and education figures to Hong Kong residents, to study carefully current events in Hong Kong in order to contribute to the future. In the middle part of the decade, however, specific themes and issues began to emerge in the literature, and it has become possible to identify educational problems about which some members of the local community are concerned. Language of instruction is the leading issue in this decade. After many years of neglect of Chinese studies by the local population, it now appears to many pragmatic to acquire some skills in the language. Students at Hong Kong University, long a symbol of colonial values, called for the university, "... given the impending political reforms, to recognize Chinese as an official teaching medium, along with English (144).

Questions about who will make education policy are arising. Since there is little indication of what policies or language Peking has in mind for the post-1997 period, many spokespersons are treading gently indeed and parents, at least, seem to be waiting for clearer signals before switching their preference from English language school to a Chinese language school.

Cheng Kai Ming, sums up the complex situation:

in different unsatisfactory areas. However, two points distinguish education from the other sectors. Firstly, it seems difficult for people in education to find anything good enough to be preserved or improved upon. They worry more than others about the no change implications in the Joint statement. Secondly, few new items are found on the agenda - medium of instruction, JSEA, adult education, and all that.
Introduction of a political component in the curriculum could be the only exception (145).

History

The purpose of this section is to provide an example of the link between interaction of government policy and assertive public demands, with its effects on the structure of education. In other words, the aim is to describe the emergence of contemporary Hong Kong education out of the interaction of various social agents. The resulting system, it will be argued in Chapter 5, continues to interact with social agents even as the agents themselves are transformed by the transfer process.

The detailed history of Hong Kong education begins with the establishment of the colony. Gail Schaefer Fu describes the original system as a combination of the upper and middle class children being educated in China and the poorer children being educated in Hong Kong, largely by voluntary agencies (146). The new colonial government was content to encourage such missionary efforts to educate the poorer children, and maintained a policy of non-interference. The first Education Committee Report in 1848 supported the existing policy of allowing the traditional Chinese curriculum and methods, with the exception of permitting the introduction of Christian teaching (147). By the mid-1850's a need was felt to include the teaching of more English in order to create a ‘bond’ between the ‘many thousands of Chinese and the handful of Europeans who rule them’. The inclusion of the western language also offered the opportunity to introduce western standards to the workforce. This dual goal persisted throughout the century. During the 1860’s, a central government school was opened, meeting a call for a shift from religious to secular education in government schools (148).

An 1878 Conference on Education called for "...the teaching of English
as the primary concern of government education and proposed that five hours per day should be given to English instruction, and two and a half hours per day to Chinese lessons: "English lessons being compulsory but Chinese lessons optional" (149). It was not long until the now-frequent criticism was recorded for the first time: that English was being learned for its commercial usefulness to the neglect of Cantonese, the mother language of the students (150).

However, the Hong Kong Chinese of that period established a practice which has persisted to this decade, and which it is hypothesized will persist into the next periods of Hong Kong history: that of selecting schools on the basis of the 'money value' of the curriculum. Schools established in the 19th century which emphasized English language instruction were successful in attracting students despite the fact that the quality of the language instruction was often low. Fu describes a 1901 petition to the government from British parents which "...expressed particular dissatisfaction with the Chinese attitude of studying not for the sake of acquiring knowledge but for the sake of money" (151).

Only half of the Hong Kong Chinese children were in school at the turn of the century. Wealthier Chinese attended either the Anglo schools or private Chinese schools. Those missionary and voluntary schools which taught in Cantonese were less prestigious and served generally the poorer peoples. The latter group, particularly, often had difficulty meeting prescribed standards for government funds and although they were educating the majority of Chinese in their own language quickly acquired an inferior status which has persisted (152). The government continued its policy of "concentrating on the upper classes and of emphasizing the importance of English until at least the 1920s" (153).

The establishment of Hong Kong University in 1911 had two significant
goals: to aid in maintaining good relations with China by "...supplying [its] needs in its move toward modernization and industrialization" and to educate the Chinese population in western learning and in the English language(154). Local parents proved themselves able to adjust to the new social context created by the opening of Hong Kong University and it almost immediately affected the nature of the secondary schools. There was a sixty percent increase in the number of pupils in English medium schools while, in the same period, the Chinese language schools experienced only a ten percent increase(155).

In the 1930's government began moving toward a more equitable system of provision of education in the vernacular and toward the development of technical education. Official reports began to criticize the emphasis on the provision of English at the expense of Cantonese and attempts were made to extend education into the rural areas and to provide for girls(156). During World War II, however, no progress was made in any of these areas(157).

At the end of WWII educators were faced with the ruins of both the physical and intellectual resources of the education system in Hong Kong. Immediately upon beginning to reconstruct, they faced the massive immigration from China which necessitated massive expansion as well as the rebuilding which was already occuring. The events in China also forced qualitative adjustments in policy: students who wanted a Chinese language education had traditionally studied in China(158); with access denied, Hong Kong had to develop its own resources to meet this increased need for education in Chinese.

The 1950's were a period of extensive building programmes, at one point adding 45,000 primary schools places each year(159) The 1935 Burney Report was finally adopted and there was widespread commitment by government, voluntary bodies, business and individuals to widening educational
opportunities (160). By 1965 the goal of free, universal primary education was the immediate aim and was achieved in 1971. In 1974 the goal of free, compulsory junior secondary education was set, and was achieved in 1978. The overall target was nine years of a common course, with expansion of the senior places.

Planners did not ignore the place of English language learning during the period of reform. The 1964-67 Triennial Survey described the aim of schooling as “to provide a broad general (academic) education in English. Chinese will also be taught so students leave with a reasonable knowledge of both cultures.” (161).

In 1963 Hong Kong’s second university, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, was inaugurated. It was established to meet the demand for higher education in the Chinese language. However, as Fu has pointed out, mastery of English has proved to be a pivotal factor in gaining in place in many of the faculties there also (162). By this decade, mastery of English has further increased in importance due to new admissions systems (163). In 1972 the Hong Kong Polytechnic was established which signalled the beginning of an expansion in the provision of places in vocational and technical education.

The 1970’s were years of tremendous growth in Hong Kong, and education reflected this. The economic success of the last decades gave to more Chinese the money to educate their children in Anglo-Chinese schools, and eventually eight percent of children were being sent to schools whose main language of instruction was English. The dual goals of free, universal primary education and free, universal and compulsory secondary education were achieved within 7 years of each other in the 1970’s, and primary and secondary curriculum development committees were established in 1972. As private consumption figures grew, as the sophistication of its exports grew,
as the service industry developed, as Hong Kong people were able to visit other countries, the demand for corresponding improvements in education reflected these widening horizons. As Hong Kong people became more confident and assertive, there were calls for more challenge and depth in education to prepare youth for greater social mobility as well as for jobs requiring more skill and responsibility. Hutchon writes: "In education, this called not just for more free places and for more openings in pre-primary and secondary schools, but for better teaching, a far greater variety of courses, the lifting of the lid on senior, technical and higher education and the expansion of adult education." (164).

In summary, from its early years until the years before the economic boom, education in Hong Kong was effectively directed toward well-to-do, bilingual, Chinese families. The purpose was to train civil servants and local merchants in the linguistic competency and cultural experiences needed to govern the colony and guarantee economic prosperity. Mastery of English became very important in achieving prestige in the colony, and desirable school places were available only to a few. However, education in colonial Hong Kong eventually developed from the provision of 'links' between the colonized and their rulers to a complex system, comprising 2 universities, 2 polytechnics, providing places for all children up to the age 15. Much of the growth occurred after WWII and paralleled the economic boom of those years.

This description has attempted to demonstrate the link between the interaction of colonial government policy and the demands of an ambitious public and the effects of this link on Hong Kong education which, in turn, is part of the context of the new interaction and transfer process. The following section describes the structure of the system which, it is suggested, reflects the values of the colonial rulers, the local culture and
the effects of 20th century modernization.

Structure of School System (165)

The purpose of this subsection is to describe the organization of the school system, the Hong Kong context of the interaction process. The argument is that the wider availability of education in Hong Kong affects the social context of the transfer by adding contradictions in expectations, assumptions, as well as in interests and values between the two societies.

1. Kindergarten

The Hong Kong child can attend two to three years of kindergarten between the ages of three and five. In 1985, 87.4% or 230,000 children in this age group were in pre-primary schooling. Since primary schools expect that Primary 1 children will have already had some schooling, kindergarten has become 'compulsory', at least in practice, and for this reason it is included in this description of the structure of education in Hong Kong.

Kindergartens are all private institutions, although supervised by the Education Department (166). Due to a relative shortage of specialists in Early Childhood Education in the department and a lack of formal attention and of financial aid, supervision and guidance was, until this decade, minimal (167).

Official inattention contrasted sharply with public attitudes. Competition to acquire a place in kindergarten has been fierce because places in the desirable kindergartens (i.e. those with a strong and proven-successful academic orientation) are limited and these places are considered the best gateways to better primary schools (168). Some prestigious kindergartens require testing for admission, and, therefore, children are often taught basic Chinese characters and the English alphabet at very young ages with the hopes of passing such entrance tests.

Kindergarten has traditionally been regarded as the period of preparation
for Primary 1 entrance examinations, and the Education Commission noted that "...many kindergartens are still teaching difficult and formalized curricula through rote learning" (169). The Report by a Visiting Panel describes kindergarten examination papers as containing more than ten different subjects (including one on linguistic competency in English) and lasting two hours (170).

2. Schools

a. Primary education

Kindergarten is followed by six years of primary education. There is a free place available for each child (sometimes necessitating a school to run on a double session programme), although a minority still choose to attend the 94 private primary schools. Government states that, in 1985, 56% were allotted places in schools of their choice, and the remainder allotted places in schools in their own districts, also based on parental choice (171). However, there are several aided primary schools which are extremely sought-after, again because they feed into the desirable secondary schools and competition to get into them is intense.

Teaching is generally done in Chinese, and English is taught to all students. A small number of primary schools use English as the medium of instruction, and the Report by a Visiting Panel notes (172) that functional literacy in English in primary school leavers is confined to children who have attended these schools. Primary schools in Hong Kong follow the same curriculum, but their treatment of it varies considerably. Many still follow the formal subject-matter approach to teaching, but some are gradually adopting, with the encouragement of the Education Department, less-formal, child-centered approaches (173). However, the pupil-teacher average ratio of 28 to 1 (174) and the desire of the community for highly formalized instruction are obstacles to innovation in this area.
Primary school leavers are allotted places in junior secondary schools on the basis of the Secondary Schools Places Allocation System (SSPA). This system is based on district nets and internal school assessments scaled by a centrally administered Academic Aptitude Test. Allocation strives to take account of parental choice (175). Because of the use of a quota system in allocation, the system benefits those children who have attended the preferred primary schools, and depresses the chances for the less privileged children (176).

b. Secondary schools

Secondary Schools in Hong Kong can be either an Anglo-Chinese secondary (a seven-year programme with instruction mainly in English, serving eighty-five percent of the population in 1985, or a Chinese Middle school, a six-year programme with instruction in Chinese with ESL) or a secondary technical school (177).

At present, places in senior secondary school are awarded according to the JSEA, and after two years in senior secondary education a student is awarded the Hong Kong Certificate of Education (HKCE). According to their results on the HKCE, some are able to continue to either one or two years of sixth-form education. The existence of the two categories in sixth-form education is an unresolved situation from the former system in which the Chinese Middle schools and the Anglo Secondary schools were organized differently. The two types of schools were partially fused in order to ensure that graduates entering the job market at the end of Form V were competitive, at least in numbers of years in the classroom. It also corresponds with the differences in admissions requirements to the two universities, and has proved convenient in that sense.

3. Post-School Education

Post-secondary education in Hong Kong is open to all students.
regardless of economic background, who meet academic admissions requirements. A system of Government grants and loans, introduced in the late 1960s, removed the elitist aspects of universities, in particular, by providing to any intellectually qualified candidate an opportunity for a place. However, the supply of places is severely limited, and university places are available for approximately three percent of the relevant age group.

Although limited in supply, tertiary education is diversified in mode, comprised of six technical institutes, three full-time Colleges of Education and the full-time Technical Teachers’ College, the Institute of Language in Education, and two universities. There are two approved post-secondary colleges operating diploma courses: the Hong Kong Polytechnic, a degree-awarding institution, and the City Polytechnic which awards diplomas. The Hong Kong Baptist College will become a degree granting institution in this decade (178).

There are two universities, Hong Kong University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The Chinese University was established to serve students from Chinese middle schools, but only a minority of students come directly from middle schools. Competency in English is a hidden requirement of success at CUHK also, and this has affected the profile of entering students. Its four-year programme differs from the three year programme at HKU and students can, therefore, sit for the entrance exam after one year of post-Form V education. Planning for a third university which will emphasize science, technology and business has begun.

Until this decade there has been little consultation between tertiary institutions and Government to decide how to develop the institutions in ways that would meet the manpower needs of the community. Universities and other institutes have been free to plan their programmes as they believed appropriate to both the manpower needs and the cultural welfare of the
community, and generally attempt, through their curricula, to support the
colony's economic, social and cultural growth. (179)

4. Teacher Education

The issue of teacher supply and quality is prominent in both Hong Kong
and the PRC as both societies have recently attempted to expand and upgrade
their education systems. Teachers in Hong Kong fall into four
classifications: trained or untrained university or equivalent graduates,
and trained or untrained non-graduates. Less than thirty percent are
university graduates, or equivalent, and less than two-thirds of the total
force have had any teacher training. These statistics must be evaluated
against the fact of the rapid expansion of school places which has occurred
in Hong Kong.

Also, statistics relating to teacher quality must be evaluated with the
knowledge that teachers in Hong Kong are expected to be competent in two
languages. Because of the variety of, and conditions in, schools, the
shortage of trained teachers, and the high expectations of the Chinese
society, the issues of teacher preparation and credentials, salary, and job
description are complex indeed.

There are, in short, qualitative and quantitative problems to be solved
by teachers in Hong Kong schools. At present, given the high teacher/pupil
ratios in classroom, it is difficult to solve the qualitative problems. The
best teacher, with 40 students in his or her class, will find it difficult
to experiment with different ways of putting the material across.
Additionally, the number of teachers available who have the skills to teach
creatively is small.

Teacher education in Hong Kong is provided at the non-graduate level by
the three-year programme at the Education Department's three Colleges of
Education, and at the graduate level by the Schools of Education at the
universities. The colleges are small with limited resources and are often a second choice for the students as a diploma from one of them does not carry a great deal of status in Hong Kong. Teaching, especially in the primary schools, is not a prestigious position. Teachers who have graduated from the universities are often in teaching as a second choice occupation, and are waiting for another opportunity to arise in other professions.

5. Administration

Education in Hong Kong is administered by the Education Department which was only very recently (1981) set up as a separate policy branch of the Government Secretariat. The Education Department is administered within the civil service as a strongly centralized system under the Chief Secretary, and the supply of educational facilities is almost entirely controlled by government. This department administers the "...schools, Colleges of Education, the Hong Kong Technical Teachers' College, and the Institute of Language in Education. It also advises schools in teaching method and curriculum development; allocates school places; plans and develops education, including the building of new schools; conducts educational research; and provides adult education, special education, educational television, careers education, student guidance and other miscellaneous services" (180). The Government maintains tight controls over many aspects of schooling. Government-aided schools, for example, must adhere to a prescribed staff structure and report all expenditures. There are criticisms that such a system has led to a decline in flexibility and creativity in schooling (181). There are, however, few controls over curriculum. Schools do submit curriculum layouts and textbooks for approval, but these are matters of quality rather than matters of content (182). The Government does occasionally affect the content indirectly, as in the case of computer studies, by the introduction of a new subject in the public
Since 1984, priorities for allocating education funds have been set according to recommendations from the Education Commission, who have stated that "...the balance between public and private expenditure on education, rates of return on educational investment and the balance of expenditure on different sectors of education" are the issues which must be addressed when determining priorities.(183).

They have noted that these judgements "... have become difficult questions of relative priority and affordability".(184). They also note that "...as our work develops, the judgements which have to be made as to what extra commitments the Government can undertake will become increasingly complex".(185). Apparently 1997 affects many of the financial decisions the Commission is making; later they describe their position as planning financial strategies while "...assessing the consequences of changing circumstances".(186). In this complex political and economic environment they have decided that the most urgent financial issues are the future of the JSEA and 'positive discrimination' in favour of those schools which choose to use Chinese as the medium of instruction. They have justified the great financial impact of these priorities in terms of "...very strong educational and social reasons".(187)(188).

Major Aims

The Hong Kong Education System has articulated a set of aims which demonstrate their practical philosophy of education.(189). In 1963 the chief concern of the policy makers was "...how best to secure value for money...".(190). Almost 20 years later, despite a considerably sounder economic climate, increased expenditure on education was justified as "...essential to the economy of Hong Kong".(191). The Hong Kong Education Commission in 1984 described the task in terms of "...developing the
principal asset of Hong Kong:...its human resources", and of
"...accommodating the needs of the individual as far as possible, [but]
within the constraints of the needs of the community"(192). Cheng Kai-Ming
found "At a macroscopic level, the planning of schooling seeks legitimation
from manpower forecasting and the planning of higher education is hardly
g geared to the social-economic context"(193). Equality is mentioned by the
Board of Education in the same sentence as the desire to achieve greater
efficiency, and both of these aims are listed after apportioning investment,
harmonizing the needs of the community, and making the most of available
resources(194). Accountability seems to be evaluated in economic terms.

In 1981 an overall review of the Hong Kong Education System was
commissioned by the Hong Kong Government in consultation with the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The terms of
reference were, in summary, "to identify the future aims of the education
system, to consider the coherence and effectiveness of the service, to
identify areas which need strengthening and to make recommendations for
priorities in its further development" (195). The Report by a Visiting Panel
and the subsequent reports from the Government provoked debate in Hong Kong
and are the basis for the following discussion.

The Visiting Panel wrote of a "strong attachment in government circles
to what might be called 'technical' planning — for example, trying to assess
manpower requirements and making consequential adaptations to the system..."
(196). The traditional emphasis of planners has been on using resources to
an economic advantage first and foremost, and, in fact, is consistent with
the values of many residents: educational choices made almost exclusively on
a pragmatic basis.

The Panel criticised this approach of 'technocratic planning
techniques', and noted a recent move toward participatory governance. They
encouraged this trend by suggesting that "...strenuous efforts should be devoted to raising the level of parent and community involvement in policy-formation and to engage as much expertise as possible (not only from within the bureaucracy) in planning"(197). However, the following is added to this recommendation:

Any move toward greater participation in education decision making and policy formulation would add to existing pressure for the democratization of the territory’s government generally. This of course is connected with nationalist sentiments but is also an essential pre-requisite to sustaining community development. Thus even the most well-intentioned reforms to educational governance have to be tempered by broader considerations"(198)

The second area of major criticism in the panel’s report was concerned with the need for reforms to streamline the bureaucracy of policy-making. The Report criticized the ‘we/they’ attitude throughout the school system, i.e. the feeling that "responsibility for and knowledge about what in happening lies elsewhere"(199). They suggest that the reason for this is an absence of clearly set out and easily understood aims in the ‘over-administered’ education system, and they recommended establishment of a co-ordinating body, the Education Commission, to review the views of the Board of Education, the University and Polytechnic Grants Committee (UFGC) and the Vocational Training Council. The Commission would then advise the Governor on the issues and suggest policy.

This recommendation was adopted by the Government and an Education Commission was set up in 1984 to co-ordinate and give consolidated advice to the Governor on educational policy. The Commission, itself,
has described its ideology as pragmatic and grounded in an attempt to meet the changing needs of Hong Kong society, as well as meet the growing individual aspirations, but their first set of major policy guidelines, which were accepted by the Governor, did not address the issue of 1997 directly. They included, rather, recommendations for reforms in the examination system, improvement in standards of language teaching, advancement of Chinese as a medium of instruction, upgrading the teaching service, promotion of open and adult education and promotion of research and development in education.

Major Contemporary Issues in Education

The purpose of this subsection is to present an analysis of four major issues in contemporary Hong Kong education. These are language of instruction and the examination system, the relationship between school and work, and the definition and introduction of Civic Education to the curriculum. The line of analysis is that each of these issue represents an alignment of interest groups in the colony, who, it is argued, are participating in the process of transfer.

1. Language of instruction

The issue of the language of instruction in Hong Kong schools has been debated for over 100 years. To many educators, the practice of instruction in a language which is foreign to both teacher and student is questionable. The results of this practice are readily observable in Hong Kong: graduates of English language secondary schools whose competency in English varies widely, whose mastery of the remainder of the curriculum has been negatively affected by instruction in a foreign language, and who are said to be less than literate in both spoken Cantonese and written Chinese. Yet, the choice of English language schools has been made by eighty percent of parents and has been
defended as being a pragmatic reaction to the economic and social realities of the colony. The Visiting Panel wrote of Hong Kong parents:

They criticize a teacher for lack of English competence rather more readily than for teaching of English or Chinese above the level of the student's comprehension. This proves the tremendous drive of the Hong Kong people for advancement and their realization that formal educational qualifications and good knowledge of English are important factors in determining the chances of advancement (201).

English has been the language both of the government and of the major white-collar jobs in Hong Kong; parents have responded to these social realities while the schools have not met the challenge. Complaints about the standard of English of school-leavers are common both from employers and from teachers in tertiary education. The supply of teachers with competency in English falls far short of the demand, and many with competency seem to be clustered in the prestigious schools, putting children who are attending the other schools at an educational disadvantage. The time given to language instruction crowds out other subjects, forcing students to be assigned excessive hours of homework after a difficult school day - to compete and to prepare for the next examination (which will usually be given in the English language.) Language competency affects not only the school-leaver in the workplace, but also has a profound effect on his or her progress through the school system and can be the determining factor in gaining a place in the universities. Students succeed in the system only as well as they can express, in English, what they have learned.

Recommendations from the locally-appointed Education Commission have been made about the promotion of Chinese as the medium of instruction in
Hong Kong schools on the grounds that teaching and learning are more effective in the mother tongue. However, despite these recommendations and other calls for change from local educators(202), based on the perceived need for Government to formulate a language policy which attempts to anticipate the social changes brought about by 1997, no comprehensive language programme has been announced by Government which meets these recommendations.

2. Examination System

Education in Hong Kong has been described as no more than a means to an end: a highly utilitarian experience which offers economic and career advancement to successful students. Being successful, however, requires compromises over personal development and over the sense of personal fulfillment, especially because the number of places for which the students are competing is very small. Fu has written: "There is a tenseness about Hong Kong students. They are aware, subconsciously at first and then very consciously, that families, prestige, and even existence itself depend on how much they "study" and how well they do on their exams"(203). She has described the "...massive stream of centrally organized examinations... a constant stream of internal course examination (even kindergarten children have "mid-term" and "final" exams) but there are also the government and university exams which decisively affect the students' options and possibilities"(204).

Most agree that some form of selection is necessary in a developing economy in order to rank students systematically for assignment to the preferred educational places. However, it has been suggested that the intensity and frequency of examinations in Hong Kong are not defensible conditions in a society with as successful an economy as Hong Kong enjoys(205).
The Visiting Panel enumerated several important factors in the examination issue. These are the frequency of exams; the significance of each examination result for determining educational options which remain open to the student; the constricting effects that non-school based examinations have on curriculum and the character of individual schools, and, lastly, the risk inequality of life chances arising from great differences in quality among schools, and arising also from the fact that examination success often depends not only on competence in that subject but also on fluency in a (foreign) language.

These factors are discussed in the following section.

a. the frequency of exams

The examinations occur with unsurpassed frequency. In the course of a school career, a child may sit eight sets of exams which are not diagnostic classroom tests and which are significant in opening up or closing off educational, and ultimately life, options for the student. As noted in the previous section, a child may be tested and interviewed to determine 'suitability' for certain feeder kindergartens. More formal testing can be required for certain preferred primary schools, and towards the end of primary school there is a period of internal and official testing as the basis of the junior secondary school places allocation scheme.

During Form III, students are evaluated according to the Junior Secondary Education Assessment (JSEA), a series of procedures which lasts from November to May, and on this basis are awarded places in Form 4. The JSEA attempts to allocate students on the basis of an internal assessment, consisting of performance in mid-year and final examinations in Form 3 and a scaling test in Mathematics, English, and Chinese. The results of the scaling test are used to compare schools and calculate differences in standards of marking between schools. Students are eventually allocated
according to performance on the internal examinations and parental choice.

In Form V, students sit for the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination which serves as a general record of attainment and as admission to Form VI or other advanced/technical education depends. After taking that examination, students can follow either a two-year sixth form course in the Anglo-Chinese Schools leading to the Advanced Level Examination to compete for entrance to the HKU, the more advanced courses at the polytechnics, the Baptist College and Lingnan College; or else follow a one-year sixth form (in a Chinese Middle School) leading to the Higher Level Examination for entry to the CUHK and She Yan College. The Chinese University has recently introduced a Provisional Acceptance scheme which permits entrance at the end of Form 6 on the basis of performance on the HK Advanced Level Examination.

Experience has shown that the demand for senior secondary education has been 85% of the 15 year old population. Thus at the post-Form V level there is no comprehensive curriculum, but two different courses, leading to different sets of tertiary opportunities. Many students who have been successful to this stage maximize their chances of a place in higher education by taking the two sets of examinations which have little relationship to each other.

The most recent policy is to phase out the Junior Secondary Education Assessment (JSEA) in 1991 through a progressive expansion of subsidized full-time post-Form 3 educational opportunities. The policy on the issue of Senior Secondary and Tertiary Education since the 1978 White Paper The Development of Senior Secondary and Tertiary Education has been to expand the number of subsidized places to provide enough places for those students to meet the standards of advanced education, and to eliminate the need for this examination.

b. the significance of each examination result for determining
Some inequality of provision of school places might be defended as inevitable after a prolonged period of intensive expansion of services, as Hong Kong has experienced. Hong Kong has moved towards equality of provision in the last decade: more places have been provided and the allocation system has loosened up so that secondary schools are required to accept students from a broader pool of schools. However, performance of schools still varies widely and, there exists wide disparities in the amount of public resources children in different types of schools receive. The competition to obtain a place in the better funded schools is, therefore, intense. At the upper end of the system, there is an extreme shortage of tertiary level places. For example, the Chinese University notes that "over 20,000 students sat the ... public examinations held in 1985 and 1261 were admitted to first year studies in the university".

c. the constricting effects that non-school based examinations have on curriculum and the character of individual schools

A recent example of this is that when the three JSEA-related examinations were introduced, schools responded by putting greater emphasis on these three subjects at the expense of other concerns. Examinations have a constricting effect on school curricula and the character of individual schools. The Visiting Panel noted that public examinations dominate the style and content of learning in the classroom in Hong Kong. Cheng is more direct in stating that "...public examination is the only ruler of curriculum in Hong Kong".

At the post-Form V level, this domination of examination content over curriculum has wider effects. Firstly, those students hoping for places at Hong Kong University tend to choose arts subjects because of the nature of the entrance examination, whatever their individual ability might be.
Secondly, the vast majority of students do not obtain places at the colleges or universities but have not had the benefit of a broad education to prepare them for the workforce (214).

d. the risk inequality of life chances arising from great differences in quality among schools, and also from the fact that examination success often depends not only on competence in that subject but also on fluency in a (foreign) language

Those who pass successfully through the examination process and attain a place at university can expect to earn, as a starting salary, over 200% of the colony's median salary (irrespective of length of service), while a graduate of the Polytechnic earns about 140%, calculated on the same basis (215). Hsia found that households headed by university graduates earn two to three times more than households headed by middle/secondary school graduates, and that the latter in turn earn twice as much as primary school leavers (216).

3. School and Work

Society expects its school system to meet several demands vis-à-vis its labor needs. Firstly, schools should prepare the student for a life of work by giving them basic skills, attitudes, and a common core of information. Schools should also assess and counsel these students, performing a sifting and sorting operation to help youth place themselves in work appropriate to their perceived abilities. In Hong Kong, according to the 1984 Education Commission Report, the expectations beyond the basic ones are that the schools should provide courses related to the needs of industry by helping meet the demand for skilled manpower, and an earlier report (1981) writes of the needs to "develop adaptive human capital" (217).

The issue of the ties between school and work has only been publicly debated in Hong Kong in the past 10-12 years, due probably to emphasis first
on the goal of providing 9 years of free, universal education.

As recently as 1977, T. Y. Cheng wrote that the utilization of manpower in Hong Kong was seriously handicapped by the fact that most workers were products of a secondary school system with an academic emphasis(218). At that time, for example, of a quarter million students in secondary schools, only ten thousand were studying vocational courses although forty eight percent of the school leavers would find jobs in industry(219).

In Hong Kong, although an official bias toward vocational education has emerged, no schools in the system prepare pupils for a specific vocation. Institutions outside the school system provide this service in the form of training centers, technical institutes providing training at the craft level. The Hong Kong Polytechnic, and the universities provide training at the degree and technologist level and a Vocational Training Council has been set up which recommended provision of more places to meet industry's needs. Their consensus seems to be that, by improving the quality and immediacy of the rewards of these programmes, their attractiveness to parents will be increased.

The problem of easing the transition from school to work in Hong Kong has been complicated by two specific factors. The origins of the first can be found in the unsupervised manner in which the economic system functions. This style does not allow for rigid manpower planning, and it has been very difficult for individuals making educational and vocational decisions, as well as for the educational system to plan curricula and enrollment. The only generalities which emerged in the most recent years from examination of the economic and political trends in Hong Kong were that the service sector, trade, banking, tourism, administration, would grow relative to the industrial sector, and that youth leaving school in this decade may have to change jobs several times because of the very rapid pace of modernization in
Hong Kong.

The second problem is rooted in the belief held by most parents that an academic education is the best kind for their children to have. In Hong Kong, ninety eight percent of the population is Chinese who have traditionally valued the study of the Classics, literature, history, and an 'elitist' education. Parents in Hong Kong appear convinced that every child is suited to this kind of education, and therefore, despite recent increased availability of public places in technical and vocational schools, private, academically-based schools continue to proliferate.

In the last decade, the public has begun to understand the purposes of technical education, and there is an increase in the number of technical and vocational students over five years ago. However, it is still regarded as a second class education and, despite government attempts to raise the status by including vocational courses in all junior secondary curricula, it remains a consolation prize in the opinion of most.

4. Civic education

In the political atmosphere of 1984, the government was called upon by local educators to compel schools to include a non-examinable curriculum component which would raise the political awareness of the pupils. In August 1985, the "Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools" were issued by the Education Department, the purpose of which was to assist schools to "...renew their commitment to the preservation of social order and the promotion of civic awareness and responsibility". The Guidelines define Civic Education as "...synonymous with education for citizenship", but add that Civic Education is not synonymous with education for democracy because this term (democracy) is "difficult to interpret". The Guidelines assert that Civic education in Hong Kong is a method of political socialization, i.e. "...a process through which ...
members of a society are induced to accept and conform to traditionally established ways of life" (226). Critics of this philosophy, in the words of the Guidelines, "...would prefer to see young people grow up with reforming zeal, prepared to question established authority and introduce radical changes" (227). The Education Department, and the Government, have chosen, instead, to "... (emphasize) civic education as a politically socializing force for promoting stability and responsibility" (228).

An evaluation of the Civics curriculum guidelines was carried out to determine what actions were taken by schools and to determine school views on the usefulness of the Guidelines. The Report on the evaluation noted that "A fair numbers of the lessons observed in secondary schools included some aspects of civic education" (229). However, further reports indicate that, up to the time of the survey, approximately only a third of the schools had discussed general school policy on civic education. Teachers reported several problems in the implementation of the Guidelines (230). Among them are that the heavy commitment, to teaching the subject syllabuses, left little time for introducing civic education, and there were difficulties experienced in rousing pupils' interests. (Chapter 4 discusses this point with regard to survey findings on student perception of need for skilled professionals in the areas of law and government).

In conclusion, the preceding analysis suggests that the interest groups aligned around these issues consist of parents representing students, local educators, local employers, and Government and school administrators. Each of these participants in the Hong Kong education situation, at present possess an identifiable resource, either expertise, power, or wealth. As Archer has argued, change in education is the product of the exchange of these kinds of resources and the nature of the change is determined by the relative strength of each participant (230). In the rapidly evolving Hong Kong
situation access to some resources by some participants may eventually be limited, thus making speculation about eventual resolution of these issues difficult.

V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Political events which occurred approximately 40 years ago, in Asia generally and in China especially, set off in Hong Kong a period of tremendous population increases, significant economic growth, affecting many of its socio-cultural systems. The millions of Chinese who have emigrated to Hong Kong since the end of World War II arrived, for the most part, with no capital assets, but they, and their children, today comprise the new middle class in the colony. Chapter 2 described the contemporary Hong Kong socio-cultural, economic, and educational contexts which emerged from this social upheaval, and which now comprise the Hong Kong context of the decolonization and transfer process.

The analysis of the economic system suggested that its successful modernization and diversification resulted from the interaction of these historical forces, governmental policies, rapid industrialization, and the availability of an ambitious workforce. In addition, this section suggested that many important links with the PRC economic structure are already in place.

The description of the socio-cultural systems emphasized the adaptability and pragmatism of the people, illustrating how they have accommodated Western influences, colonial government and, yet, not lost certain traditional values of their Chinese heritage. In addition, the political system was discussed. The issue of why the Hong Kong people have not yet developed an effective political infrastructure at the grassroots level was examined, especially as this issue is affecting the transfer
process.

The final, expanded, section on the education system traced its history and structure, and concluded with discussion of the aims and contemporary issues facing the system. The education system reflects its British influences - comprising a mixture of state, aided, and private schools, universal primary and secondary education with school certificate examinations, and optional and separate preparation for university. It has also been influenced by the value systems of Hong Kong, in that it is utilized by the population as a means to economic and social advancement.

Overall, the chapter described the socio-cultural and economic systems of Hong Kong as still evolving from its history, location, as well as from its ethnic and political characteristics. Within the systems, there are areas of contradictions with systems of the PRC. These contradictions, it has been suggested, are likely sources of tension during, and after, the decolonization and transfer of sovereignty. Identification of contradictions is extended in Chapter 3, which, although focused on the socio-cultural and economic systems of the PRC, will refer to those Hong Kong systems, which not only differ from, but also contradict, systems in the PRC system.
CHAPTER 2   FOOTNOTES


2. Economic and Social Research Council - Newsletter 54, Hong Kong, 3.85, p.18.


11. Lin et al., op. cit., p.4.


17. Cheng T.Y., op. cit.,p. 34.


20. Lin et al., op. cit., p. 9.


22. Lin et al., op. cit., p. 15.
Government has accumulated a series of surpluses; with the exceptions of 1959-60, 1965-66 and 1974-75, there have been surpluses every year, and, in April, 1981, free fiscal reserves stood at HK$10,300 million. Government justifies this policy by stating that they are required "to ensure that the government is able to cope with short-lived tendencies for expenditures to exceed revenue" (The Hong Kong Education System, Hong Kong Government Printer, 1981, p.73). There has been heated criticism of this policy by citizens describing the poor living conditions of many people and the overcrowded schools and hospitals.

24. Lin et al., op. cit., p. 31.
25. Ibid., p. 66.
26. Ibid., p. 22.
27. Ibid., Appendix: "Hong Kong's Major Economic Indicators", pp. 389-391.
30. Lin et al., op. cit., p. 56.
31. Ibid., p. 56.
33. Ibid.
34. England and Rear, op. cit., p. 52.
36. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 16.
42. A.J. Youngson, Hong Kong Economic Growth and Policy, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1982, p. 141.
43. Ibid., p. 28.
44. Ibid.
45. Archer, op. cit., p. 115
46. England and Rear, op. cit., p. 370.
47. Ibid., p. 373.
49. T.Y. Cheng, op. cit., p. 281
52. Youngson, op. cit., p. 18.
54. Hong Kong Report on the 1961 Census, Census Commissioner, The Government Printer, Hong Kong, p. xxiv. The 1961 Census showed that 90.5% of all males over 15 were 'economically active', and that 21,674 children under 15 were listed as 'employees'. (In addition, an additional 90,000 were listed as 'not at school', the code indicating: "neither at school, nor during 20 days ending on Census Eve did work exceeding 40 hours". A casual observer in Hong Kong, even in this decade, would conclude that many children still contribute to their families' income through work.
56. Youngson, op. cit., p. 18.
58. Ibid. p. 30.
60. Youngson, op. cit., p. 19.
61. England and Rear, op. cit., p. 60.
63. Ibid., p. 5.
64. Ibid. p. 17.
65. Investors Chronicle, 22.11.85, p. 83
69. "Sum is greater than the parts", FEER, 21.8.86, p.70.
70. "Finally Hong Kong gets back to business", FEER, 5.6.86, p.60.
71. "Gweilo cash drives Hong Kong paper", FEER, 25.10.86, p.89.
72. "Problems loom, says consultant", SCMP, 31.3.86.
73. "Exit the Hongs", Times, 12.10.86. In addition to issuing reassuring statements, the PRC has been involved in several dramatic financial rescues of Hong Kong firms suggesting that they wish to maintain investors confidence in Hong Kong. See, for example, The Economist, 4.10.86, "A Chinese Rescue for Mao’s China?", and FEER, 28.8.86 "Strategy of Stealth".
74. "Hong Kong's pre-eminence under threat", Financial Times, 23.4.86.
75. "Hong Kong: Matter of Time before Index rises again", IHT, 8.7.86.
76. J. Bembridge, Dateline, Hong Kong Government Office, London, 7.3.86.
77. Asian Business, April, 1986, op. cit., p. 43.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. The Economist, 25.10.86, p. 89.
81. Derek Davies, "Fine hopes fade to fears", FEER, 29.5.86, 51-56, p. 56.
84. Archer, op. cit, p. 115.
85. Lethbridge, op. cit., p. 58.
86. England and Rear, op. cit., p. 52.
87. Ibid.
88. Geiger et al, op. cit., p. 35.
89. T. Y. Cheng, op. cit., p. 361.
90. Ibid.
91. Geiger et al., op. cit., p. 36.
94. Ibid., p. 97.
95. Ibid., p. 100.
96. Ibid., p. 119.
98. Geiger et al., p. 36.
102. Geiger et al., op. cit., p. 40.
103. Lau Siu-kai, in King and Lee, op. cit., p. 204.
104. Ibid.
108. Ibid., p. 188.
111. J. Cheng, 1984, op. cit., p. 86. Answers to questions on the same survey about dissatisfaction with the city: sixty seven percent of the responses about areas of dissatisfaction concerned the high crime rate, the congestion and poor living environment. Only eleven percent answered that the hectic pace of life, and six percent the high cost of living disturbed them.
112. Hsin-chi Kuan, "Political Stability and Change in Hong Kong", in Lin,


117. Ibid.

118. see: J. Cheng, 1984, op. cit., p. 16.


120. Ibid.

121. England and Rear, op. cit., p. 16.

122. Derek Davies, Fine hopes..., *FEER*, op. cit., 29.5.86, p. 51.

123. Tak-shing Cheung, in Lin et al., op cit., p. 78.


126. Ibid.

127. Martin C.M. Lee, Q.C., "More voices must be heard, and soon", IHT, 24.10.86.

128. Ibid.


130. Ibid.

131. "Votes-for-all call grows in Hong Kong", *The Sunday Times*, p. 85, 2.11.86.

132. Ibid.

133. "Agressive tactics pay off", SCMP,23.4.86.

134. See both "Clearing the decks for the Basic Law", and "Laws can't be built on distrust", SCMP, 24.4.86 for discussion of this point.
135. Ibid.


137. *Hong Kong Standard*, 19.3.85.

138. "Making friends on the media and cultural fronts", HKS, 10.10.86.


140. "More local students flock to mainland", SCMP, 27.8.85.


142. Ibid.

143. "Making friends on the media and cultural fronts", HKS 10.10.86.

144. Ibid.


146. Gail Schaefer Fu, *A Hong Kong Perspective: English Language Learning and the Chinese Student*, University of Michigan Comparative Education Dissertation Series, Number 28, 1975, p. 41.

147. Ibid., p. 42.


150. Ibid., p. 44.

151. Fu, *A Hong Kong Perspective...*, op cit., p. 52.

152. Report by a..., op. cit., p. 137.


154. Ibid., p. 56.

155. Ibid., p. 57.


157. The Burney Report, 1935, commented on the emphasis on English and suggested a policy of recognition of the principle of equality, greater attention to primary vernacular education and increased subsidies to rural
and urban vernacular schools. Report by a Visiting Panel ..., p. 138. Unfortunately, these reforms were impossible to carry out during the Japanese occupation.

158. Fu, op. cit., p. 62.

159. The Hong Kong Education System, op. cit., p. 11.


161. Ibid.

162. Fu, op. cit., p. 67.

163. Private conversation with principals.


165. The 1981 review, The Hong Kong Education System ..., op. cit., presents a comprehensive overview of most aspects of schooling in Hong Kong, and has been used as a primary source of information on some aspects of the following discussion. The Report from a Visiting Panel ..., op. cit., also has been used as a source for comments on the school system.

166. Those Kindergartens which have established their non-profit-making status, approximately 40%, are assisted by government in the form of rent and rate reimbursement schemes.


168. Ibid., p. 10.


170. Ibid., p. 10. The Report by a Visiting Panel encouraged giving the improvement of the Kindergarten system a very high priority and the Education Commission addressed the problem in its second report (August, 1986). Among its recommendations are that Government assist existing pre-primary schools to ensure that all children have access and that longitudinal studies be done to gauge the long-term effects of pre-primary education on Hong Kong children. Other recommendations are the achievement of a teacher-pupil ratio of 1/15. (Figures for the present ratio in the "better" Kindergartens are 1.5/30; Education Commission Report No.2, op. cit., p. 42), and the requirement that eventually all staff be qualified. At present it is estimated that 23% of staff are trained (Ibid. p. 44) and the Education Commission suggests an interim target of having 40% qualified by 1990. They recommend that there be no formal curriculum, and children learn through play and activities (Ibid., p. 57).


173. Not more than 10% in 1981 according to the findings of the Report by a ..., op. cit., p. 45. Curriculum, Appendix 6, Background Report, 1981.


175. Ibid.


177. A fourth type, the government subsidized prevocational schools, offer a five year course which combines general and technical subjects. Schools are also either government operated, government subsidized, bought places, or private.

178. Ismael, Hong Kong 1986..., op. cit., p. 89.


182. Ibid., p. 533.


185. Ibid., p. 181.

186. Ibid., p. 184.


188. Administration and Financing of Hong Kong schools: The Education Department consists of six divisions. The Schools Division supervises and controls, and advises on and implements policies in all Government schools, supervises aided and private 'bought places' schools. The Advisory Inspectorate Division has the function of inspecting schools, providing in-service training for teachers, developing curriculum, and approving textbooks and other instructional materials. The Planning and Building Division allocates children to places in primary and Secondary schools and is responsible for the school building programmes. The Services Division is concerned with provision of education for children with special needs, and providing guidance services for primary schools. The Further Education Division deals with policies in teacher education, and the administration of the teacher education colleges. (Annual Summary 1984-1985, op. cit., p. 2ff).

In 1986, education accounted for 18% of the total estimated public expenditure (as a proportion of GDP, 3%), and it is the largest single sector
of Government spending. There has been a steady annual increase in gross government spending on education over many years. Much of the real increase has arisen from efforts to comply with the policy objectives set in a 1978 White Paper which called for a qualitative improvement in curriculum development and teacher education. Private expenditure on education is considerable: it accounts for 100% of places in Kindergarten, 12.5% in the primary sector, 3.7% in the junior secondary sector, 61.0% in the senior secondary sector and 46.2% in the sixth-form sectors (The Hong Kong Education System..., op. cit., p. 91). Government points out that the highest single expenditure is staff salaries (78.6% total expenditure) (Ibid.). Government states that it was considered preferable to implement a basic 9 year course as soon as possible, even though its infrastructure had not yet been fully developed (Ibid., p. 92). This has led to a 'confusing variety of financial arrangements'.

189. See, in addition to those sources noted in the following section, on this topic, Fu, op. cit., pp. 42-85.

190. The Hong Kong Education System, op. cit., p. 138.

191. Ibid., p. 142.


195. Report by a ..., op. cit., p. 16.

196. Ibid., p. 16.

197. Ibid., p. 17.

198. Ibid., p. 18.

199. Ibid., p. 15.

200. Education Commission Report No. 1, op. cit., p. 4. As listed in the Education Department's Annual Summary 1984-1985, the policy guidelines are 1. Examination Reform, 2. Improvement in the Standards of Language Teaching, 3. Advancement of Chinese as the Language of Instruction. All of these are discussed in this chapter.

In addition to these aims, there are other aims. Firstly, upgrading of the Teaching Service: The Commission recommends the qualitative improvement and quantitative expansion of the teaching service. In order to comply with the policy statement, the Annual Summary described changes made in the course requirements of teacher-trainees in order to make the "training programmes more flexible and adaptable to the needs of students" (Ibid., p. 20). Individual colleges of teacher education made adjustments in their organization in order to facilitate teachers attending refresher courses, and physical plants were expanded in order to be able to serve more students.

Secondly, promotion of Open and Adult Education. The commission noted the
need to study the importance of open education at different levels. There was no discussion of this issue in the Annual Summary, but the Education Commission Report No. 2, p. 24, endorsed the recommendation of the UPSC that an open university not be established in Hong Kong. They, however, recommended that open education should be developed at the secondary and post-secondary levels, and in the area of management education (see Education Commission Report No. 2, 1986, op. cit., for a detailed discussion of this issue).

Lastly, increased Research in Education. The continuation of existing educational research effort and the coordination of educational research activities for the purpose of planning and formulating educational policies was recommended. At present, the Educational Research Unit has been primarily concerned with the issue of medium of instruction. Research has also been conducted in the areas of academic standards in Primary school, and on aptitude testing for students seeking admission into pre-vocational schools.

201. Report by a ..., op. cit., p. 36.
203. Fu, op. cit., p. 92.
204. Ibid, p. 89-90.
205. Report by a ..., op. cit., p. 32.
206. Ibid.
207. Cheng Kai Ming, in Jao et ai, op. cit.
208. Ibid.
209. see Annual Report 1984-1985, op. cit., Table IV, p. 41.
210. Ismael, Hong Kong 1986..., op. cit., p. 94.
212. Report by a ..., op. cit., p. 33.
214. Report by a ..., op. cit., and others.
215. Grace Chow, Higher education... op. cit., p. 39. The best primary schools, for example, are now allowed to take only 65% of pupils 'by discretion', and the best secondary schools are required to accept the top 20% from across the school system instead of the top 5% which gave the advantage to students in the 'feeder' schools. Cheng Kai Ming, in Jao et al., op. cit., o. 535.
216. Raymond Hsia and Lawrence Chau, Industrialization, Employment and


219. Ibid.

220. For a history of Civic Education in Hong Kong, see Guidelines on Civic Education in School, The Curriculum Development Committee, Education Department, Hong Kong, August, 1985, pp. 1-4.

221. This is occurring amidst concern that government intervention in curriculum could set a precedent and lead to the risk of government dictation of curriculum.


224. Ibid., p. 7.

225. Ibid., p. 8.

226. Ibid., p. 9.

227. Ibid.

228. Ibid.


230. Ibid., p. 13.

231. Archer, Social Origins..., op. cit., p. 120.
CHAPTER 3

'ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS': THE PRC CONTEXT

I PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

The broad purpose of this chapter is to describe the socio-cultural, economic and educational systems of the PRC. Within that description, the chapter attempts to highlight specific areas in which the PRC differs from Hong Kong. The chapter also attempts to demonstrate that there are areas of economic and educational development for which the PRC does not have the resources needed for its continued progress. These are areas in which Hong Kong, as a more advanced economy, could contribute to continued development in the PRC.

The argument of this chapter is that, within the PRC, there are special socio-political and economic institutions which have evolved because of the impact of a socialist ideology on the Chinese culture, and which, therefore, are very different from their parallel institutions in Hong Kong. As suggested in Chapter 2, these differences, or contradictions, between the societies help to define the contexts in which the societies will be required to interact in order to achieve successful merger. The chapter also argues that because the PRC has not achieved economic success equivalent to Hong Kong, Hong Kong gains negotiating power in the transfer process.

This chapter is organized, like Chapter 2, as a broad survey of the economic, socio-cultural and political systems of the PRC. Within this organization, subcategories were chosen to highlight those PRC institutions and ideologies which contradict aspects of Hong Kong's situation.
II THE PRC ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THE TRANSFER PROCESS

This section on the economic system has two purposes which are similar to the corresponding survey of the Hong Kong economic system. The first is to provide an overview of the PRC economic system as the time of merger approaches. The economic system of the PRC has attempted to modernize and diversify since the founding of the State in 1949. A combination of political, geographic and demographic factors have slowed development, with subsequent negative effects on social and educational progress. Therefore, to understand social contradictions, the economic system, and its component parts, are included in this discussion. In other words, analysis of selected parts of the economic system is relevant to the argument of the chapter about structural contradictions between the PRC and Hong Kong.

The line of analysis pursued in this section is to demonstrate that the complexity of the problem facing Hong Kong cannot be fully understood without investigating differences in the economic systems. It argues that these differences cause structural contradiction between the societies.

The detailed categories in this section are history and government policy, and major components of the economic system.

History and Government Policy

The Chinese Communist Party which assumed control over the Chinese nation in 1949 had been since its origin a Marxist party. It was officially founded in 1923 in Shanghai by a group which had been profoundly impressed by the Russian revolution. They saw Russia as providing the best model for modernizing China and for establishing an international position and the declared aim of the Party was to create a fully socialist state in China(1). The economy that they had to contend with, when they came to
power, was as it had been for 2,000 years: an agricultural, iron-age economy(2) with three quarters of the population directly engaged in farm work and four-fifths dependent on the land(3). Farming techniques were primitive and yields low. In the cities were the remnants of a semi-colonial economy "...characterized by extra-territorial rights, the treaty ports, and various spheres of foreign influence (which had been) decisive in both the growth of the factory system and in the establishment of state-controlled enterprises" which had distinctly western characteristics and ties(4).

Most modern industry had been destroyed by wars: three years of Civil War, preceded by resistance against Japanese occupation which lasted from 1937-1945, and which in turn had been preceded by twenty-five years of civil wars. The industry remaining was mainly handicraft production. The situation was critical: industry, agriculture, communications and transport had all been seriously damaged, inflation was widespread, and floods in 1949 affected over a third of the arable land. The immediate task was to restore, as much as possible, normal processes of economic life(5).

However, the Party was united in its intention to undo the damage of the previous wars. A new, regional, organization was quickly established of six economic and military administrative zones which were administered by local functionaries. These officials were chosen as much for their political reliability and class background as for administrative expertise(6). Local government structure was paralleled by, and not always distinguishable from, a network of CCP officials(7) and their overall responsibility was to establish a basis for a collective economy in the countryside.

Their immediate tasks, however, were more basic. Cities, and much of the countryside were experiencing severe shortages of necessities and the
major priority was to restore agricultural and consumer goods production and secure freer movement of commodities. Communications had to be restored and the marketing networks for foodstuffs had to be re-established.

A second urgent task was to stabilize the currency. Depreciation of previous currencies had been one of leading causes for the downfall of earlier governments and the CCP wished to avoid the same error.

In the course of 1949, therefore, the Party attempted to stabilize the economy by making widely available food and other necessities and by controlling inflation. As new areas were occupied by the Red Army, a network of large monopolistic trading companies were formed. These facilitated the desired price controls, and provided a two-directional flow of necessities: they mobilized food for the cities and then sold, directly to the peasants, commodities from the cities. After the official foundation of the new State, state trading companies were established from these companies thereby giving to the government the complete control of the wholesale trade which it wanted in order to prevent exploitation and inflation.

By the 1950's, the CCP had managed to achieve a steady annual growth rate, and had begun to "...[transform] the structure of ownership in industry and agriculture and[bring] about far-reaching changes in the material and social livelihood of [the people]". However, the economy was growing increasingly overcentralized and the bureaucracy was becoming ponderous, resulting in disputes between 'rightist' and 'leftist' elements within the CCP. Opposition to the collectivisation policy was developing within the rightist faction of the Party, which opposed it on the grounds that total collectivisation was undermining the existing production base. Opposition was also developing among the rich peasants, who were losing their early enthusiasm for production under the new system.
The Great Leap Forward Movement was begun under the leadership of the leftists in 1958 to address the problems of overcentralization and the inefficient bureaucracy. People's Communes were formed which would take over all the administrative functions of the member villages, assign work and production quotas and be responsible to the State in meeting quotas. They were "... viewed as decentralized and self-reliant units of state power run and administered by the peasants" (12). In reality, the Party and its bureaucracy continued to dominate at the local level (13).

This programme was, in turn, defeated by a series of major set-backs which occurred in the early 1960's. Agricultural output dropped over several harvests. Even though the Soviets had withdrawn their aid and bad weather had affected several harvests, opponents of collectivisation took the opportunity to attribute the poor performances to the policies of the Great Leap Forward movement (14). They were able to gain power and install a more centralized and flexible system of control over the peasants which de-emphasized the class struggle and rewarded efficiency and initiative. These rightists represented an "urban-oriented, educationally elitist" strategy which stood in opposition to the "rural-oriented, mass-mobilizing" strategy of the Maoists (15).

By 1962, after the first successful harvest for several years, the rightists were confident enough to take credit and openly to criticize Mao for damage to the Chinese economy "... due to the loss of 'material incentive and 'individual initiative' which resulted from a 'hasty process of collectivisation" (16).

By the mid 1960's, despite years of consistently excellent harvests, the leftists regained sufficient political support to inaugurate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In the countryside, most of their hostile activity was directed against those who had aligned themselves with the
rightist wing of the Party. The movement to dismantle the commune system was reversed, and politics and class struggle replaced production as the major concern. Material incentives were eliminated in favour of the 'collective interest'; individual initiative was discouraged in favour of mass-mobilization.

In the early 1970's, the rightists began to re-appear. The authority of factory managers was gradually rehabilitated, the Chinese foreign policy began the moves which led to the present 'open door' policy, and some purged leaders began to be heard in positions of authority (17). At the time of the agreement with the United Kingdom on Hong Kong, many of these leaders were in power and were, once again, imposing their particular interpretation of the aims of the CCP on the economy of China.

The reforms occurring at the time of the signing of the Joint Declaration were rightist. An article in the China Daily, a newspaper which represents the Party's viewpoint, demonstrates how the CCP laid the philosophical groundwork, through the media, for the reversal of policy and the current economic reforms. Describing the dangers of obstructing the development of the new structure by clinging to old ideas (such as the practice of price-freezing and aiming for absolute egalitarianism in distribution), the Party called upon the people to get ideologically and psychologically ready to accept the changes. Such concepts as the importance of 'class struggle', the 'purity' of public ownership, and other 'various leftist ideas' are described as hampering the reforms: "...the goal of a socialist-commodity economy can only be realized when the concepts generated in a ... natural economy are put aside. ... [people who] ... refuse to recognize that producing for market is an innate characteristic of a socialist economy, and not necessarily capitalist, hamper the reforms" (18).
A Chinese economist indicated that China is in the "historical stage of transition from a natural and semi-natural economy to a commodity economy" (19). Also referred to as a 'socialist-market economy', the new system "... is a network of economic policies which have led to the expansion of market forces co-existing with diminished state-planning of distribution" (20). Zhang wrote that the goals are "to enliven the economy, expand the role of the market and of private entrepreneurship in city and country by raising wages and bonuses, stepping up production of consumer goods and propagating the new consumer ideology" (21). More specific goals are to quadruple production by the year 2000 and to modernize China in 75 years (22). Analysts believe that success rests on China's capacity to industrialize, increase its exports, and to attract foreign investment (23). Within the Party, the leftists have criticized the present regime for abandoning the goal of socialism. The response of those promoting the reforms was that the commodity economy is an interim goal on the road to socialism and that "amassing profits and making foreign investments are necessary to achieving socialism 'with Chinese characteristics'" (24). Advocates of the present policy have also attempted, through the media, to win public support for the programmes. As part of this campaign to bring peoples' thinking into line about the relative worth of material vs. moral incentives, Zhang compared getting money to winning a medal for heroism on the battlefield: it is gained in the struggle to achieve a communist state in China. Therefore, he adds, people must change their attitude towards money: money is the wheel of social movement; it must not be looked upon with hatred. He carefully adds that it is necessary to control one's attitude toward money and avoid corruption (25). On this theme Deng has commented that Marxism is flexible and capable of absorbing such innovations. He continued: "China's developing a commodity economy is a
great breakthrough in Marxist political economics"(26).

In order to retain political power the present government must maintain that the new market-economy plays a relatively minor, controlled part in the national economy, and that the Marxist ideology is still the guiding principle. Indeed, at present, privately-owned enterprises cover less than two percent of industrial production and the highest government projection is twenty percent of GDP one day(27).

The following subsections describe two major components of the economic system of the PRC, industry and agriculture. The overall principles of modernization policy are the same for agriculture and industry: to offer material incentives for work, to reduce administrative interference, and to open a role for market forces. However, although these most recent policies are consistent with established practices in Hong Kong, economic policy since the founding of the State has been characterized by lack of prolonged commitment to individual economic programmes. As the following subsection will show, the lack of consistent policy has undermined chances of successful modernization in these areas.

**Major Components of the System**

1. Industrialization

The industries of the PRC employ a workforce of approximately one hundred and twenty three million. Ninety percent of PRC industries are relatively small in scale but these provide fifty percent of the country's industrial output(28). The new policy emphasizes making factories profitable and gearing output to market demand, rather than attempting to follow the guidelines of a central plan. Factories were recently given
greater autonomy in personnel and production planning and by the next year, 1985, industrial growth had soared by twenty three percent by mid year(29).

In order to guarantee success for China's economic reforms, factories must modernize. Lack of modernization has left them generally inefficient and unprofitable, and they have also ignored the factor of market forces in their decision-making and planning(30). These factors are considered significant in holding China's total modernization effort back, and the upgrading of industrial plants, retraining the workforce, and a rational system of wages and prices are necessary improvements.

In an attempt to solve some of these problems, the latest policies have tied income to effort. The iron rice bowl for workers at state enterprises, which was introduced by Mao and guaranteed everyone a job and an equal standard of living, has been eliminated. Formerly, workers were assigned to state enterprises, which then arranged their housing, medical expenses, child-care services, cultural activities, pension, and also gave preferential hiring to other members of the family(31). This commitment to universal employment resulted in over-staffing, depressed productivity, and hoarding of skilled workers by factory leaders(32). New work rules, from October 1, 1986, introduced work contracts for all new workers which describe the worker's job and permit firing the individual if the job is not done. Under the new system, skilled and qualified workers are able to change jobs and be head-hunted by industries needing their skills. Until now, large industries have attracted better technicians and engineers leaving the smaller firms, which are in the majority, without sufficient skilled advisors. Scientists and experts are now being encouraged to leave the bigger factories and work for the smaller(33) and under the new system, this move is easily carried out.
However, problems with these most recent industrial reforms are already emerging. As yet there is no system to help those workers made redundant to find new work, and no system to provide the housing, medical and other services which the workplace had provided (34). It has been reported that as much as thirty percent of the staff and workers in urban enterprises are redundant and there are one hundred and fifty million more surplus workers in the countryside, nearly three times the current industrial workforce (35). Limited unemployment insurance has been introduced with the new regulations, but generally employers have proven reluctant to fire anyone because the consequences are so harsh (36).

The Party itself is proving to be a significant obstacle to the reforms (37). Traditionally, the party secretary and the plant manager shared decision-making. The government directs that the local Party must stay out of management and concern itself with the workers' ideology, but the local cadres are resisting giving up their power and are slowing the pace of reforms. Local officials do have the responsibility to make sure plans developed at the management level are properly executed, but criticisms of these local officials are widespread (38). They have been accused of '...paying only lip service to the need to give enterprises more decision-making power [because of their] entrenched self-interest and corruption' (39).

2. The rural economy

The present reforms in agriculture represent a partial reversal of the collectivization model. The sale of land to individuals is still prohibited, but other assets, such as trucks, and machinery, have been dispersed to individuals. Rural problems have been the most persistent in
every attempt at national development in China. The present regime initiated in 1978 major social and economic rural reforms, known as the Rural Responsibility System (RRS) which has spread rapidly. The communes have been abolished and replaced by small townships. It is primarily a system of allocation of fields to individuals who agree to meet quotas. Family farming has again become the norm. These farmers may keep everything above the quota for private sale. The coercion techniques of previous reform attempts have been replaced by incentives (40).

In addition to reforms concerned directly with agricultural productivity, others are aimed at revitalizing the surrounding areas to encourage revival of small towns. To attract population to work at non-farming occupations in the new townships, workshops and plants have been built. By 1983 the RRS had been adopted by over ninety-eight percent of the rural production teams. It appears to have brought considerable wealth to a few and some improvement in the income of many.

That some peasants have benefitted is not in doubt. Their annual per capita income has nearly tripled to US$107.00 Dollars. However, the new prosperity has not yet reached everyone and the old inequalities have increased. Again the coastal peasants are benefitting sooner than those in remote regions it has been suggested that those coastal peasants were already advantaged, and that the reforms are not helping the more needy. Furthermore, quota problems are arising as farmers prefer to raise the more profitable crops over the necessary grain. Modernization of the farming techniques has left many farmers unemployed and they often migrate to the cities - where there are already problems over providing employment for many urban people (41).

There have been a rush of articles in the Chinese press reminding the eight hundred million rural population of the dangers of feudalism and the
need for farmers to "up-date" their beliefs. Criticizing the concepts of small-scale farming and of patriarchal clanship as standing in the way of modernization, the Party aims to "nudge people out of the 'narrow' mentality of paternalism and factionalism which slow down progress toward a commodity economy". Farmers are criticized for looking down on business people. Acknowledging that this is a long-held attitude, further strengthened by the 'erroneous political guidance' of the leftists, the Party suggests that farmers should put it behind them and recognize the importance of profits and begin to "seek profits by all legal means".

In conclusion, the degree to which the PRC has achieved successful diversification and modernization of its economy falls short of its needs, and, when compared to the experiences of the Hong Kong economy over the same period, far short of the degree of success which Hong Kong has experienced. The PRC remains largely dependent on an relatively simple economic base in agriculture and industry. The following subsection attempts to show that, despite attempts to modernize and place economic growth as the major national goal, the economy is confronted with serious problems. The State is attempting to cope with accelerated growth rate, regional inequalities, unemployment, emigration to the cities - all situations which have been exacerbated by its economic programmes. In addition, the Party has ideological problems brought about by the discrepancy between many new policies and socialist principles.

**PRC Economy Poised for the 1990's**

As noted, the economy has yet been able to achieve significant diversification. However, the modernization reforms in the PRC have shown progress - which has led to other problems. On the one hand, the agricultural reforms have turned China from an importer to a net exporter of grain and cotton, and enabled it to feed itself. But, on the other hand,
the resulting moderate increase in prosperity led to severe problems with foreign exchange and excessive annual growth. The new wealth led to a splurge in buying of foreign goods by individuals and by firms, and the drain on the country's foreign exchange reserve alarmed the officials. The average growth rate during the past five years has been more than ten percent, which the government is attempting to slow down, through restrictions on purchasing foreign goods, to around seven percent, a figure they believe best for their economy (45).

Differences in income between the traditionally prosperous areas and the poor areas are now greater than at any time since 1949 (46). The Party is attempting to use this information as an incentive to the poorer regions and it refers to a survey which demonstrates that those areas in which economic reform began, and in which the door has been opened to the outside world, are already enjoying a higher standard of living, including annual income, chances of employment, and a better diet (47). However, the same wealthier areas experienced double-digit inflation for the first time in 1985 and the party leaders themselves admit to "...many comments and complaints from the masses" about the reforms themselves (48).

Unemployment seems certain to increase particularly in cities as they are being flooded with job-seekers. Economic indicators suggest that finding employment will become even more difficult over the next five years and S. Rosen suggests that, therefore, the Party must prepare the population for an era of limits (49). Although the government has been making attempts to overcome the youth unemployment problem in particular, their basic policies work against these efforts: as the state cuts back by closing inefficient enterprises and reducing the size of the bureaucracy, unemployment rises. In 1980 the state was able to absorb forty percent of all new workers, in 1981, under thirty percent, and in 1982, only twenty
percent of all new workers\(^{(50)}\). These newly unemployed are being urged by
the state to use initiative and create individual enterprises in the
non-state sector of the new economy to solve their problems.

Emigration of peasants to the cities is a serious problem for economic
planners. Recent statistics about the cities of the PRC highlight the fact
that this situation is at crisis point as the PRC enters the 1990's. There
are estimates of from fifty thousand million to one hundred thousand
million emigrants from the rural areas already in the cities. An additional
three hundred and fifty thousand million peasants are expected to leave the
land over the next fifteen years\(^{(51)}\). The danger of these emigrants
becoming a permanent underclass causing political or social problems
undermines growth in the overall economy. The present regime will be aware
that during the Cultural Revolution it was just such groups that provided
manpower for the revolt against the more privileged groups.

The PRC has responded to this situation with a plan to develop more
small cities to ease pressure on the existing large cities. It has been
reported that there were one hundred ninety one city governments in 1978
and that there will be approximately six hundred in the year 2000, with an
additional twenty thousand smaller cities (townships)\(^{(52)}\). This, and other
announcements by the Party, have begun to reverse the official line about
cities. Previously, the official line was that urbanization was an
undesirable consequence of capitalist production methods and, especially
during the Cultural Revolution, there were mass transfers of people from
the urban areas to the countryside\(^{(53)}\). The present government, however, is
pointing out that ninety percent of China's intelligencia live in cities
and that cities were the origins of modern civilization. Marx has been
included in their defence: his remark that the London of his time, with two
and a half million people working together, created far greater wealth than
if they each worked alone is often cited as support for their position(54).

Political leaders are having internal Party problems also. The
adversaries of rightist reformation, although agreeing that modernization
is desirable, believe that the new policies, including westernization of
some techniques, will result in "an unplanned economy, regional
inequalities, corruption and possibly even hunger - all of which will, in
turn, lead to social disorder"(55). These opponents believe reforms are
going too far. They have focused their complaints on public anxiety over
prices, the drop in grain production, and the huge foreign-trade deficit,
plus the rising incidence of economic crime and corruption. And, although
it is possible to explain credibly the economic set-backs they list, they
insist that the idea of the "primacy of the planned economy and the
subordinate role of the market is not obsolete"(56).

Despite an unstable economic period at the beginning of 1987 which
cause criticism of recent freedoms, the Party continued with the campaign
under the slogan "Don't worry, get rich" - to assure people that the
capitalists of yesterday are the models of today. The experience of the
past thirty years, according to a senior Party official, Bo Yibo, has
taught that State, collective and private enterprises are need to build a
socialist country marked by Chinese characteristics'. Adding that this
policy will not change, Bo assured private business people that getting
rich will not cause them trouble(57).

China's leading and most influential economists examined the recent
problems with economic reforms and reported through the media "that it is
not enough simply to place the state enterprise into a market enviroment -
it must have full autonomy to act, extensive and reliable information on
which to base its actions, and finally the enterprise must be able to
articulate and act in its own interests as distinct from the interests of
either that state or its own personnel" (58).

In conclusion, this section on the economy of the PRC has attempted to show that, although there are ongoing attempts to modernize and diversify, the economy remains based in agriculture and small industries. The Party has had to cope with severe economic and ideological problems brought about by the reforms. The relative undiversified Chinese economy contrasts with the complex Hong Kong system which is based in financial services, trade, sophisticated technology-based industry, and tourism. The Hong Kong economy also functions autonomously, in an environment of free and rapid access to information and technology, whereas the PRC system is burdened with a formidable bureaucracy, causing delays and obstacles in transactions, and with many uninformed, unskilled officials and managers (59).

In addition, the successful Hong Kong economy has provided greater individual wealth and higher expectations of educational opportunities and upward social mobility. The thesis argues that these structural contradictions create social contexts in which adjustment by Hong Kong people will have to occur. The unregulated Hong Kong economy permits participants to pursue exclusively self-serving goals, whereas, within the terms of the ideologically-controlled PRC economic system, the collective interest predominates as the goal of economic development. The profit-oriented Hong Kong economic system has encouraged a competitive business style. The tensions arising from these differences will have to be resolved by Hong Kong residents. In this context, Chapter 4 argues that Hong Kong can identify the resources needed for solution, i.e. the expertise developed in the context of its modernized and successful economic system, and begin its adjustment process by initiating the exchange.
This section has the purpose of discussing the socio-cultural institutions and ideologies of the PRC. This section highlights those socio-cultural and political areas in which the PRC society differs from Hong Kong, and which will be the context of social interaction during the transfer process. It is argued that the dominant political institutions combined with the traditional Chinese cultural patterns have created social structures unique to the PRC, and at variance from those of Hong Kong. The comparative element is extended through references to ideologies and institutions of Hong Kong, and the argument of Chapter 2— that these structures will conflict and define the context in which the transfer will occur— is continued.

The subcategories are contemporary socio-cultural institutions, the political system and political issues.

**Contemporary Socio-cultural Institutions**

A major obstacle to a comprehensive understanding of the nature of Hong Kong society is the lack of research by social scientists there. In the PRC a similar problem existed, caused by the "closed-door" policy of the past decades. "China-watchers" had access only to newspapers and a few magazines. Since the official repudiation of the Cultural Revolution and the shift away from the class struggle in favour of modernization, the activities of intellectuals and social scientists have been encouraged. Foreign social scientists are allowed greater access to the country as well. Data are more available.

The first goal of the CCP was to create from the Chinese peasant a new socialist man for the new socialist society. The Cultural Revolution took this goal to extreme and irrational limits, and created, instead of the new
socialist man, economic, political and moral confusion in which the peasants were forced to try to exist. A new class (CCP members) was created, social order and law broken down, the education system was almost destroyed, and the former socialization process of parental and teacher authority was undermined.

In order to function in this bleak environment, individuals had to adjust and redefine many of their attitudes about relationships, and, it has been suggested, revive some of the traditional patterns because "...they are [so] effective for muddling through"(62). So that, although data are more available, making conclusive statements about the nature of socio-cultural institutions in the PRC is problematical because of the profound impact of the events of the past years on the citizens.

T. Gold presents a discussion of several contemporary "dimensions of personal relations" in the PRC which he argues are evolving from the effects of recent historical events on Chinese cultural traits. The following discussion borrows its framework from Gold's discussion. He has written: "The CCP has been able "...neither [to] sustain one consistent set of values to replace those handed down over centuries, nor [to] provide a material base to support those socialist values which they have attempted to promulgate"(63). This resulted in a system of personal relations which refer to traditional Chinese behavioural norms as well as being based in the contemporary political and social environment.

A pre-eminent characteristic of personal relations in the PRC is instrumentalism and the principle that underlies it is guanxi, which is a system of relationships based on reciprocity and social investments(64). Although not without affect, it is primarily a power relationship, based on the proposition that when one has a valued commodity, one has power. The guanxi tie is one of strongest ties of loyalty. The implicit logic is that
both parties shared something in the past, and now it is only coincidence that one is in a favoured position and the other dependent. Guanxi is composed of both vertical and horizontal connections and it has become, in the current political environment, "...extremely significant at the levels of power" (65).

Beverly Hooper has also described the widespread use of guanxi (66). She writes "The use of private 'connections' and the backdoor is rife at all levels to obtain everything from urban transfers to overseas trips" (67). She comments on the "continuing importance of high-level connections and influence in university enrolment" that exists in the highly elitist educational system (68).

Instrumentalism appears to have become dominant because of the economic disarray following the Cultural Revolution. The shortage of necessities and the unrelenting control of the bureaucracy over production and allocation of goods made it necessary to acquire a wide network of channels to acquire necessities, and to defer to authority.

A second dimension of personal behaviour in the contemporary PRC is commoditization: emphasis on the economic aspect of everyday events and relationships (69). This 'cash nexus' is becoming more important as the economy improves and commodities become more available. The government has encouraged this, indirectly, through its admonitions to people to work hard for modernization and its material rewards. The RRS, in reviving the household as an economic unit, necessitates contractual relations between individuals, households and the state. The individual now has an exchange relationship with the State: something which socialist transformation of the 1950's tried to eradicate.

Government efforts to stimulate the urban economy have also contributed to the development of commoditization. Freeing of goods from
State control and schemes for finding and creating jobs outside the state sector for unemployed youth have relied upon, and encouraged, private and collective efforts. The result has been a network of small enterprises, mainly commercial, whose success depends on initiative and individual ambition. Commoditization has extended to academics:

Intellectuals are allowed to "moonlight" and have entered into exchange relationships beyond their research unit or university. Units have begun to pay a training fee to universities as part of the process of recruiting new blood.

Commoditization also has extended to the very personal areas of life: marriage has become a 'commoditized relationship' in the PRC life. Several analysts comment that although the Western romantic ideal is influencing some young people, marriage and divorce remain primarily practical activities.

Us and Them is a third dimension. "Us" is primarily identified by the shared work or study unit, and these ties function as entrance into guanxi ties. The unit regulates most daily activities, including contact with the larger society. Transferring units, even visiting other units, is very difficult, resulting in severe limits on both occupational and geographic mobility, which, in turn, results in this practical and emotional affiliation to one's group. Current economic reforms have encouraged the reemergence of the import of particularistic ties, based on family, kinship, native region, school mates, and army unit.

The traditional Chinese attitude toward individuals was to evaluate them in the context of their social, especially familial, relationships. The family remains the strongest primary connection,
especially in the countryside where the bonds are being strengthened as a production and consumption unit (73). Originally, the Party intended to replace the family with the Party bonds in this pattern. According to Hooper (74), government authorities now urge young people to return, particularly, to the traditional family and kinship ties - despite the criticisms by past regimes.

This discussion of contemporary PRC society concludes with the topic of the problems of contemporary youth in the PRC. The varied problems facing today's youth are attracting a lot of attention and concern. The present youth of China have grown up in traumatic times. They were born during the Cultural Revolution and were attending schools which had been widely discredited when the Gang of Four fell. They are entering adulthood in a time in which many political and economic principles have become controversial and are being reinterpreted. The effect on youth has been to both widen their horizons and increase their frustrations. Therefore, discussion of some of their concerns and how these concerns might affect the transfer process follows.

Amidst reports of rapidly increasing juvenile crime (75) and dissatisfaction, the Party has called for the whole society to work towards preventing and eliminating juvenile delinquency. They report that the crime rate in Peking, for example, is increasing and the age of the criminal is getting younger. The Party has responded through stepping up the work of the Beijing Discipline Inspection Committee of the CCP in order "to clear up crimes and violations of Party discipline" (76).

The present leadership puts the blame for the youth problem on both the Cultural Revolution and the influences from the West (77).
It is widely agreed that the primary legacy of the Cultural Revolution is a 'lost generation'. Everyone who experienced the anarchy and disorder of those times was profoundly affected, and the residual influences of lost years of schooling and stability are apparent today. It is feared that the open door policy is admitting, into China, images of capitalist lifestyles and ideals which are at variance with those of the 'new socialist man'.

There is a third explanation offered for the rise in juvenile crime and disaffection. In most cultures, any gap between aspirations and realities can lead to frustration and a breakdown of moral certitude. Youth in the PRC today, while officially assured that the standard of living is rising, observe that many of their group are not benefitting. As Theresa Munford has summed it up: "The picture which emerges is one of a generation being promised a lot, but getting little" (78). Although the party maintains that the meaning of life lies in doing your job well - whatever that job happens to be, youth see a contradiction between this message and the party's actions: becoming rich brings honour, and material reward goes to those who contribute to modernization. In addition, young people are aware that those who actually benefit from the new prosperity have often done so through use of guanxi rather than because of superior talent.

A new code of behaviour based on the construction of socialist spiritual principles was announced by the Central Committee in September, 1986 (79). It lists the "...country's basic tasks as helping people become well-educated and self-disciplined socialist citizens with lofty ideals and moral integrity, and raising the whole nation's ideological ...standards as well as its educational..."
and scientific levels — all in the interests of socialist modernization." (Aside from noting the recognition it gives to the need for official attention to the behavioural standards, it is interesting to note how the need for this is seen in terms of the new, pragmatic aims of the Party rather than in terms of communist ideology.)

Many of these social trends exist in Hong Kong also. For example, youth unrest in Hong Kong has concerned local social investigators, although the origins of unrest are different. Whereas it has been suggested that the 'youth problem' in the PRC is caused by dissatisfaction about the lack of economic prosperity, in Hong Kong the origin appears to be different. With economic prosperity and compulsory school attendance, local sociologists argue, a new age role has arisen: youth who occupy an intermediate role between childhood and adulthood are 'cut off from full participation in the life of the larger society [and] lack the sense of belonging and are therefore forced to satisfy themselves with conspicuous consumption patterns which signify their own cultural identity"(80). A contradiction exists in the fact that although both societies have a youth problem, one emerged from prosperity, and the other from lack of prosperity. Further, the dimension of guanxi has been examined in the Hong Kong and found to exist there. Lau Siu-kai has written

The Chinese society of Hong King ...[is] blatantly utilitarian in inclination. Utilitarianism and instrumentalism ... influence relationships with outsiders, the government, and society as a whole(81).
He and other social scientists describe a society whose members are generally utilitarian in outlook, who "... shun involvement with [groups] so long as involvement does not explicitly gratify their own private interests".

Lau Siu-kai has also written that "Materialistic value is the primary criterion for the evaluation of any intrinsic good in the world ... [and influences] behaviour in one way or another".

Whether it has become commoditization, i.e. a cash nexus as the basis of every relationship, is not the focus of this section. The suggestion here is that Hong Kong people have been described as materialistic, and although the trait may conflict with the socialistic ideology of the State, it appears not to conflict with the attitudes and practices of the PRC citizenry.

In Hong Kong, like the PRC, the primary "Us" is the family, but this tie is eroding among the young people. Sociologists argue that identification with the family plays a strong positive social role, and its erosion could lead to social problems as Hong Kong youth are set free from the control of family authority with no apparent replacement. The question has been posed whether the PRC will fill the vacuum of allegiance, or allow the impersonal forces of capitalism, which are bringing about this breakdown, to continue to operate.

Political System

With "Marxism still the guiding principle", the most apparent change that will occur in 1997 is the political status of Hong Kong. For this reason, descriptions of the two political systems are essential to understanding what type of system the Hong Kong residents have had, how it has contributed to their economic success and changed their society, and
what political adjustment is facing them in the HKSAR.

The early leaders of the CCP found the rationale for their revolution in Marxism. Sixty years later Marxism remains the "...basis of the leadership given by the Party" (90). All official speeches and interviews maintain that there has been no weakening of commitment to the principles of Marxism. However, there has been the addition of the phrase: "socialism with Chinese characteristics", which is based on "...not using fossilized concepts to interpret life" (91) but rather on proceeding from the reality of the new problems China is experiencing.

Although the CCP maintains that the legitimacy of its government derives from the participation of the masses in government, they have, by making participation the crucial criterion for social and economic advancement, used it to discipline and to manipulate the participants. The governed are permitted the right to access to political processes, but denied the right to determine the nature of the processes. A. Nathan has described the present Chinese system of Socialist Democracy as "participation without influence" (92).

Like communist countries, the PRC has had separate and distinct party and government structures. The party's role has been to hold all power and make all policy decisions, give ideological guidelines and provide organizational guidance. The task of government has been simply to administer according to the party directive (93). Current reforms have not effectively diminished the prominence of the Party, but respond to the perceived need to rectify the image of the Party after the Cultural Revolution. The preamble to the current Chinese constitution contains references to the Chinese people being "...under the leadership of the CCP" (94). There is little question in the minds of China's leaders as to the supremacy of the CCP. Deng has stated that the CCP is the "...core
force uniting the whole country" (95). Therefore, although political reform is currently being debated, from the government's point of view, the people's faith in the Party is still necessary because the Party is the apparatus of both political control and government.

1. The Issue of Political Reform

Discussion of the political system continues here with an expansion of the topic of political reform, because political reform is a leading contemporary issue in the PRC. A recent Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on the Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Society with and Advanced Culture and Ideology stated "The major ... lessons to be drawn from [the history of] China's socialist development are, first, that we should have mustered all our resources to develop the economy and, second, that we should have substantially extended democracy" (96).

Accordingly, the basic goal of reform is to "...strengthen the people's sense of responsibility, give full play to their initiative and make all developments benefit the people and conform to their will" (97). The article describes the first step in reform as being the improvement of the system of electing people's representatives. The Party has stated that high degree of democracy is one of great goals of socialism, and there can be no socialist modernization without democracy. Therefore the Party has taken effective measures to democratise its political life, the political life of the State, economic management and the life of the entire society. Democracy cannot be separated from socialist legality and work discipline. However, it must be remembered that the use of the word "democracy" in the context of a Chinese socialist system is different from the accepted meaning in Western democracies. The width and breadth of CCP democracy are always determined by the overriding aims of
maintaining and strengthening the leadership of the Party while pursuing modernization(98).

The reforms appear to be a response to the pervasive sense at the grass-roots level of wanting to be free of politics after the trauma of the Cultural Revolution. For example, Rosen has noted that the majority of government-directed research into student activities have investigated student motivation and ideals in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution(99). The results of this research generally suggest that present students have a strong distaste for the most radical slogans and activities of the 1970's. Other recent research into student opinions shows that students have "...a distaste for politics courses, and indicate the Deng leadership has been unable to convince students that politics has any relevance to their future"(100).

A second reason for political reform is to remove the party apparatus as an obstacle from the progress of economic recovery. For example, Party leaders hope to raise work efficiency by removing the present highly centralized bureaucracy, which they describe as having the effect of "...concentrating political power enabling abuses of privilege for personal gain and permitting low efficiency"(101). Deng described the need to separate the functions of the party from those of the government and to decentralize administrative powers in order to restore authority to local officials(102).

Contemporary rightist Chinese politics is seen as pragmatic - rather than ideological, which was the hallmark of the leftist regimes. The view is that, in so far as this reform frees the population from the "heavy hand of dogmatism" and encourages the use of reason to make social and economic choices, it can aid economic development(103).

However, if, as Lucian Pye argues, politics "...has to be based on
some shared assumptions that stem from a combination of cultural norms and unarticulated ideological perspectives", the Party must attempt to change the old concepts in favour of an ideology conducive to achieving its goals. Examples of such an effort are common in the Chinese press. The concept of 'pragmatism' is being defended at seminars and meetings organized to re-evaluate the concept of pragmatism: the official policy is that pragmatism is no longer considered an 'import from imperialism'(104), and that the population should remember Marx wrote not simply about class struggle, but also about the growth of society's productivity(105).

Pye points out the "extraordinary flexibility of Chinese pragmatism which has permitted breathtaking turns of policy that have astonished the world"(106). He discusses the nature of Chinese pragmatism which permits both leaders and followers to accept all manner of change as though there were no such thing as friction, inertia or tension. Chinese pragmatism has great potential: it benefits from cultural predispositions which make totally acceptable (that) behavior which is guided by the logic of the existing circumstances and which allows for unsentimental abandonment of past commitments and outdated rationalizations. It benefits also from a culture which emphasizes the here and now. Optimism about the future is more acceptable than articulation of doubts and negativism, therefore, leaders do not need to fear being penalized for inconsistency as contradictions are easily tolerated(107).

2. Obstacles to Political Reform

The Party itself admits that the leading obstacle to its reforms comes from within the Party. The China Daily writes that "...although decentralization of power has already begun, party cadres have proven largely unwilling to yield their power and have prevented in many instances government representatives and technocrats from installing new reforms on a
local level" (108). This, plus "...confusion in Party and government about
the limits of each other's power and functions, are likely to be difficult
obstacles to overcome" (109).

A foreign analyst comments that "...the basic political issue in the
PRC is the succession and the potential revival of the power of the
left" (110). The present leaders cannot be assured that, among the younger
members of the Politburo, there are not leftists with less than 100% com-
mitment to Deng's reforms. "The presence in influential posts of the
Cultural Revolution cadres now in their late 30's and 40's is considered a
problem. They are mainly poorly educated and their reputation for
corruption, self-indulgence and guile is widespread, and Deng went so far
as to propose freezing their political careers" (111).

PRC Society Poised for the 1990's

The 'key link' economic and political reform discussed in previous
sections cannot alone suggest what kind of a society the PRC is becoming.
Other information is needed about the extent and nature of actual reforms
in areas such as human rights, equality of educational opportunity, and the
reinstatement of social and cultural freedom. In addition, information
about the current regime's philosophy about rule of law, independence of
the press and the role of the Party in society is also crucial to analysis
(and will be discussed next). Without such information, present
interpretations of future Chinese political and social institutions are
very tentative. In addition, other changes are affecting the character of
Chinese society. It seems unlikely that the Chinese have been unaffected by
the turbulence and violence, the political, social and economic
disintegration and reintegration of the past century. The PRC society is in
transition as much as that of Hong Kong.

1. Status of the Party
One goal of the current reforms is to rehabilitate the Party in the eyes of the people. The emphasis of Mao's Party on class struggle disturbed most of the country's social, cultural and ethical life and resulted in great hostility toward the Party. Deng has attempted to regain some of the pre-Cultural Revolution legitimacy of the Party by scaling down the totalitarian policies of the party and emphasizing its pastoral responsibilities and its role in improving the lives of the people. He has instructed the Party that it has an "...unshirkable responsibility to promote a new culture" (112) and that it should concern itself with the [socialist] 'spiritual civilization' of the Chinese people. It has been suggested that Deng regards one primary role of the party as being the ideological watchdog of public morals and cultural values, and re-establishing the standards of comradism (113).

Deng has described other, but as yet unimplemented, roles for the Party (114). Among them is acting as an ombudsman in cases when civil authorities fail. The Party is to step in to redress grievances and to protect rights of workers. Despite the campaigns of the past few years to improve its status, the Party is still in such disarray that people no longer fear its power so much. Although membership still confers power, its status has been damaged by bureaucracy, individualism, favouritism, cliques, and abuse of power by cadres (115).

2. Human Rights

The Human Rights situation in the PRC is not clear to many analysts, nor has the PRC played a significant role in the international human rights movement (116). Although there are many references to rights in the constitution, the differences in interpretation of the principles, combined
with the present evolving nature of Chinese society, mean that clear understanding of current practices is difficult. In traditional China no concept of individual rights existed. The PRC has only progressed as far as describing the key CCP precept: the individual's rights are always subordinated to state. Socialism itself represents a focus on and a commitment to the well-being of society as a whole(117), and the "...commitment to socialism permeates the constitution and its conception of rights"(118).

Jonathan Mirsky, in an analysis of Human Rights in the PRC, concludes that the record on human rights is 'dreadful'. Since the Cultural Revolution, he writes, many people who would not be considered criminals in the West have been deprived of their rights. These people have been accused of being counter-revolutionaries and 'reactionaries' who engage in 'feudal superstitious acts'. In 1983, heavier sentences, including the death sentence, were reintroduced (after having been removed in 1979) and a round-up began of 700,000 suspected 'hooligans, counterrevolutionaries, and trouble makers'. There appears to have been, also, a shift from punishment and reform through labour toward more severe penalties such as life imprisonment and execution: since that round-up, 6000 (other sources say 10,000) have been executed.

The response to international appeals has been to describe those arrested and executed as 'evil members of the herd whose executions were welcomed by the masses'. Mirsky continues that these activities have continued into 1986 with assurances from the CCP that more is to come as part of 'party rectification'. Prospects for any letting up of the program are slight. "The Party believes in capital punishment as a deterrent, an educating force"(119).

The prosecutor at the trial of Wei Ching-sheng, the Peking-Spring
activist found guilty of counter-revolutionary crimes of a serious nature, stated: "It is decreed in our constitution that there is freedom of belief. You can believe or not believe in Marxist-Leninism and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung as you wish, but you are absolutely not permitted to oppose them.... If your power has the power to seize our power ... what power would our nine hundred million people have left to speak of?"(120).

Mirskey continues that "...to achieve the economic goals and and to realize Deng's other goal - a strong state, require not only better education but a disciplined orderly, compliant society. There was no foundation for democracy in traditional China, and there is no place for it the PRC"(121).

B. Hooper has pointed out the PRC "...remains a highly controlled society by Western standards [with] strict censorship..., little choice of where [one] lives or works, ...and even the personal lives of individuals are subjected to a level of official interference that many Westerners would regard as intolerable "(122). To cite a specific example: the official status of women is being changed by the Party. Early in the Revolution, they were encouraged to do whatever men could do and were guaranteed economic and social equality in the new State. However, as in Western societies and in Hong Kong(123), legal guarantees were not accompanied by changes in attitudes and, although progress was made in their status, women still occupy a second class position in PRC society. As a new method of coping with the unemployment problems, the present government has apparently determined that women should be encouraged to return to the supportive role at home to manage the house and family.

In Hong Kong, although there are no special safeguards for the fundamental rights of the individual, liberties have been guaranteed by Parliament(124). This is an area of social contradiction between the
societies. The rights of the individual have never been a leading issue in the minds of the local Hong Kong population, probably because individuals in Hong Kong have been able to live and speak freely with minimal control from government. The possibility of losing these liberties contributes to the nervous and apprehensive attitude of Hong Kong people in this decade, for the Hong Kong resident has come to view him or herself as an agent - who makes choices from a plurality of social and economic possibilities. Within the PRC, individual choice is limited by the existence of a single valid economic and political system. Behaviour is, therefore, caused rather than chosen.

3. Hundred Flowers Movement: Spring 1986

The CCP announced the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend" in a resolution from committee meetings in September 1986.

This resolution encourages and supports all efforts and debates that are based on scientific theory and are necessary to stimulate research on Marxist theory. It also ensures academic freedom, discussion, criticism and freedoms which are guided by Marxist principles. The purpose is to create political stability and unity (125).

The Party acknowledged that modernization requires a certain amount of individualisation of lifestyle and thought. The controls that enforced conformity are beginning to be relaxed (126). Many in the PRC remain cautious and unconvinced that the reforms would survive another shift in ideology at the top (127). Jasper Becker recalls that it was Deng who first encouraged, then ruthlessly suppressed the Democracy Wall after it had
outlived its political usefulness to him(128).

The present movement is different from the Peking Spring in that it relaxes restrictions mainly on speech about technical and academic issues. It is different also in that it appears to be motivated less by a wish to loosen control than by a need to stimulate discussion about cultural foundations for the New China and to help integrate the reforms into Chinese society(129).

Writers and artists particularly have a profound distrust of the new reforms. Wang Ming, an author, was denounced during the Cultural Revolution and was recently appointed Cultural Minister in an apparent attempt by the government to prove that the liberalizations can be trusted. Wang, when asked how artists and writers could feel that they dare 'plant a hundred flowers', answered "What do you do when you see the green light and the red light at the same time?"(130).

4. Rule of Law

The law in the PRC is inextricably linked with politics: "...the law and the country are the same"(131). The Party imposes its will through the forty two million Party members and its secret service who function at every level of Chinese society(132). Although the legal system has been liberalized, making the individual more responsible for his/her actions without the excuse of class background or environment to fall back on(133), the system is hampered by a critical shortage of lawyers. The Party announced that in 1985 less than 9% of criminal trials were conducted with lawyers present - and less than that for civil cases(134). There are only twenty thousand lawyers in the whole country, two hundred in Shanghai and one hundred in Peking, and the effectiveness of their training has been
questioned by the Party itself (135). The problem arises from a combination of a low social position and poor pay and benefits (136), and until the situation is corrected the Party seems likely to continue to rely on fear and severe punishment to quiet potential trouble-makers, and to demonstrate to the public that it is serious about removing individuals who threaten the success of the modernization.

On the topic of education and the law in the PRC, Wu Yan has written that that educational laws will be stressed, and that, in the future, educational development is to be be controlled and regulated by laws, which define clearly the jurisdiction and competence of educational institutions "...so that our educational work will be carried out according to laws and regulations" (137).

In the opinion of educators in Hong Kong, this type of state intervention in education can be both advantageous and harmful to the present Hong Kong system (138). In discussions of the possibility increased state intervention in educational policies, Hong Kong educators have noted that there appears, for example, to be a need for governmental 'legitimization' of needed changes, such as language of instruction, which individual schools cannot easily effect - a problem which has been exacerbated by the Hong Kong policy of government non-interventionism. On the other hand, educators are equally hesitant about inviting government "control" over introducing a political component in the curriculum (139). Chapter 5 argues that the dilemma would best be solved by Hong Kong educators addressing and developing strategies for the solution of existing problems while they have relative autonomy.

On the other hand, lawyers in Hong Kong appear to be more pessimistic about the changes 1997 will bring because they believe that restrictions on their activities and/or the abolition of various characteristics of the
English system which contribute to the quality of life in Hong Kong would be harmful (140). Among the many factors which cause concern are the facts that the judiciary in the PRC is not independent, and that the overall interpretation of the social function of the judiciary varies widely from that of Hong Kong. Without the British-style legal system, Hong Kong would diminish in attractiveness as a financial and commercial centre.

There is little reason to believe that the present system would be continued under the HKSAR because the Basic Law is being written under strict control by Peking. The most likely scenario is that the PRC will engage in a prolonged period of evaluation, almost on a case-by-case basis, on the one hand evaluating the effects of its stance on the economy and on the other hand trying to maintain its overall commitment to a socialist philosophy.

5. Freedom of the Press

Although Chapter 2, Article 35 of the 1982 constitution guarantees freedom of the press, the media in the PRC are not free in the western democratic sense, but are primarily a tool of the CCP for disseminating its ideas and ideology. The difference originates in the CCP understanding that the people have freedom of the press by virtue of the fact that the Party controls the press (141). There is an official requirement that eighty percent of news reports be positive (142). Party leaders believe that the press must be the mouthpiece of the Party’s central committee and, despite the "Hundred Flowers Movement", there has been little liberalization of political coverage in the media (143).

Hong Kong has enjoyed a freedom of the press unsurpassed in the South East Asia region. Although there is no specific law which guarantees press
freedom, except in the negative sense that anything not forbidden by law is printable, the Government has not interfered with press freedoms. Despite the non-interventionist tradition of the Government, many in Hong Kong have been worried by 1987 events relating to this issue. In 1987 a Public Ordinance was passed which stipulated that "any person who publishes false news which is likely to cause alarm to the public or a section thereof or disturb public order shall be guilty of an offence" (144). Critics commented on the vagueness of the terms which, it was said, left wide scope for abuse of the law (145). There was widespread concern about the uses the law could be put to in the HKSAR and not least because of 1997, the press adopted an overwhelmingly negative stance toward the passage of the bill (146).

6. Westernization or Modernization

Exposure to western values has been a controversial matter in China since the first contacts between China and the Western world and the present leaders still attempt to find a method to benefit from Western technology while protecting what they do not wish to destroy within their own culture. For this reason, many policy-makers remain ambivalent about the effects of the open-door policy on the stability of the culture. Deng has attempted to silence critics with an old Chinese slogan which advises modernizers 'to use Chinese learning for matters of spirit and western learning for practical matters'. The agenda of the recent plenary session of the CCP (September, 1986) was headed by the adoption of guidelines for building socialist culture and ethics (147). The resolution stated that "...learning from other countries was of purely practical value" and it rejected capitalist ideology and society on grounds of its "...(indefensible) oppression and exploitation, and [its] ugly and decadent
aspects" (148).

The Party has blamed recent crime waves on individualism and increasing materialism which, it says, result from admiration for bourgeois liberalism and western-style democracy (149). The effects of such attacks, however, spill over onto the modernization programme. Private business people and those doing business with foreigners become cautious, and the government is forced to retreat and issue reassuring statements. How the Party resolves the dilemma of encouraging individualism and the open-door policy while maintaining its socialist ideals is of interest to the people of Hong Kong.

Politburo conservatives have already voiced fears that socialism in China will be corrupted by decadent influences from Hong Kong. Hong Kong is the first choice of the young people of the PRC when asked where they would like to study outside China because it has become a source of many modern luxury goods (150).

Modernizers have attempted to offset leftist concern about the potential spiritual pollution by demonstrating the advantages which accrue to the areas near Hong Kong geographically. Yu Youjun described a study done in Guangzhou which, in 1979, adopted special policies and flexible measures to "open its door". These measure included commercial activities with foreign countries, making products according to foreign specifications, and carrying out exchange schemes with foreign countries in culture, science, and technology. The status of ideology and culture was affected by the impact of foreign influence: Yu reported that "due to influence from outside some changes taken place in the ideology, culture, and social life in Guangzhou" (151).

Yu's article, however, suggests how the PRC may justify the existence of a more prosperous, liberal HKSAR. According to Yu, Guangzhou youth have
benefited from foreign influence in that they have a positive and enterprising attitude toward life, manifesting itself in a desire to support oneself and a keener competitive spirit. This is attributed to the traditional ideology of western civilization which emphasizes self-reliance. Second, there has been an unprecedented upsurge in the drive to learn science and culture among the Guanzhou youth, and, thirdly, the ability of the Cantonese to discriminate between the positive and negative aspects of foreign culture has been enhanced. In the early days, according to Yu, they accepted only the "shallow stuff" of foreign culture, but since 1982 the Party has adopted measures to resist penetration and combine guidance with checks, and youth have learned to discriminate 'what suits the conditions of China'.

The conclusion of the report is

With the open door policy comes some penetration; the point is how to understand and deal with it. [The Party] CANNOT present a weak and impotent front and allow it to spread unchecked: this is a right deviation and the sacred obligation of a Communist is to safeguard the purity of communism. But it is also a leftist deviation is to discriminate and renounce all, even to point of criticizing the open door policy. This must be renounced also. The people must believe that it is not inevitable to admit decadent ideology and culture with an open door. It can be resisted through control, vigilance and successful ideological education(152).

In summary, this section had the purpose of testing the argument that
there are areas of contradiction which will be the context of social interaction during the transfer process. It has presented evidence from the socio-cultural institutions and ideologies of the PRC.

It has argued that the dominance of political institutions, combined with the traditional Chinese cultural patterns, have created social structures which differ from those of Hong Kong. The discussion of the socio-cultural institutions attempted to show that the PRC has begun to re-establish an economic basis for relations, resulting in a return to a self-centered ethic based on instrumentalism, the cash nexus and a particularistic commitment to family and friends. The Party, however, attempts to adhere to its original ideology that individualism constitutes an undesirable value, and that the interests of society are higher than those of the individual. This official subordination of individual interests to the interests of society contradicts Hong Kong ideology.

The discussion of the political systems suggested that the PRC is controlled by policies based on the ideological convictions of a powerful minority. This does not contradict the system in Hong Kong, for the discussion of political systems in chapters 2 and 3 shows that neither place has a tradition of democratic government responsive to popular opinion, but rather stresses powerful controlling groups. However, there is contradiction in the relationship of the individuals members of each society to the government. Individuals in Hong Kong expect problems to be solved by themselves or by the family unit. Within the PRC, because of its dominance over all aspects of society, the Party has emerged as the problem-solving agency. The extent and nature of actual reforms in such areas as human rights, rule of law, and the reinstatement of social and cultural freedom is not yet determined. Therefore, it is argued, the contradictions in this area will persist and become an important part of
IV THE EDUCATION SYSTEM OF THE PRC AND THE TRANSFER PROCESS

The elevated status of the educated person in China was established at the time of Confucius, who established a tradition of the superiority of intellectual pursuits and the desirability of scholastic success. This attitude persists in both Hong Kong and the PRC, despite the economic and political pressures in both societies which make holding the old values difficult. The purpose of this analysis, however, is to go beyond this cultural similarity and attempt to highlight those economic and ideological aspects of the Chinese system which are different from Hong Kong, and which, it is argued, comprise structural contradictions between the societies. The contemporary education situation in the PRC is described with a concluding reference to the Hong Kong context.

This next section begins with a brief history of education in the PRC, emphasizing the ideological changes which have occurred in the system. Following the history, there is then a description of the structure of the system. This is not an overall review, but focuses on those aspects relevant to the comparison with Hong Kong. Following the section on structure, the current aims and, finally, the major contemporary issues are discussed.

History (153)

Since the founding of the People’s Republic, the Party has displayed a high commitment to education because it recognized its potential as one of the greatest assets in economic development. As early as the 1920s, the Party had already set up hundreds of schools, and later claimed that these schools significantly lowered the illiteracy rate in the countryside. In this period the political component of education was already apparent: the
readers taught hatred of the KMT and love of the Red Army along with reading skills(154).

The Common Programme of October 1949 indicated that one of the main tasks of education in the PRC was to "... develop an ideology of service to the people"(155). Since then, education has remained a key tool of the Party for instilling loyalty to the Party and for training dedicated individuals to build the new China. However, as this discussion attempts to show, education has continually vacillated between goals of 'redness' and 'expertness'(156). It is argued that these rapid ideological changes which have characterized the PRC educational experience indicate a tight integration of the education system with the political system - especially the Party. Further, this close link between education and government differs from the Hong Kong system, which, although, integrated with Government, allows for negotiation with vested interest and local pressure groups.

Education in the PRC has been involved in every major political campaign and there is a political component at every level of the education process. As described, the economic policies of the PRC have been influenced, alternately, by rightist and leftist management; educational strategies have also been influenced the same way, and have consequently swung between academic curricula and practical-oriented school programmes. For example, during the Great Leap Forward there was "...increased reliance on socialist education as the mainspring of economic motivation"(157) and the 'red' policy of 'walking on two legs' was imposed in an attempt to weaken the Confucian distinction between intellectual learning and manual labor. This policy was basic to the ideology of the PRC at that time(158). However, by 1960, it was being attacked by rightists and an increase in emphasis on academic education prevailed until the mid-sixties. The
Cultural Revolution followed and represented the extremes of the ‘red’ policy. Advancement in school depended purely on class identification and Party recognition. When it became apparent to the Party that educated people were more likely to take a critical view of the Party’s Cultural Revolution activities, schools were closed (159).

However, attempts to undermine the traditional distinction between intellectual and manual pursuits have had very little impact and it has been argued that the "Confucian intellectual tradition remains strong" (160). Indeed, the persecution not only failed to destroy the intellectual tradition, but "welded [it] together more" (161).

The content of contemporary schooling similarly reflects the programmes of the incumbent regime. The new economic programmes, particularly, require a stable social environment as well as a skilled and motivated workforce. Deng has stressed the subordination of education to the process of economic development in order to meet these goals. Higher education, particularly, is "geared toward the formation of an elite army of [experts] for China’s [modernization]" (162). This contrasts with the earlier emphasis on the political and social uses of education (156).

Education in science and technology is seen as a component of economic growth, and is, therefore, a prime sector for investment. As a result, public expenditure on education has increased from its lowest point of 4.24%, under the previous regime, to 5.9% in 1978, and to 10% in 1982 (163). Funding is projected to increase by a further 72% over the next 5 years (164). Despite these recent efforts, the PRC education system currently has many problems which are, in effect, obstacles to development. The system is highly bureaucratized and centralized. Although there are over 180 million school children, 140 million in primary schools, 40 million in junior secondary schools, and 7 million in senior secondary schooling, the
figures from the 1982 Census indicate that there are 235M illiterate and semi-illiterate people, or 32% of the population over 12 years of age(165). Thus, although education is valued by the Chinese and by the Party, educational modernization has been impeded by repeated changes in Party policy. Current policy regards education as one means toward economic prosperity which is now a primary national goal and education is receiving increased funding and research.

This analysis now continues at the next level of specificity - a description of the structure of the education system. The intention is to highlight areas of difference between the Hong Kong education system and the PRC education system.

Structure

1. Kindergarten

In contrast to Hong Kong, where almost 90% of pre-school age children attend kindergarten, in the PRC less than 20% are in nurseries or kindergartens(166). In addition to the difference in the numbers, there is another equally important difference between the systems: the reason parents have for sending young children to such programmes. While in Hong Kong most parents fear that by delaying the beginning of a child’s education they are endangering the child’s chances for places in better primary schools, in the PRC the pressure arises from the needs of working mothers to have desirable child-care situation for children(167). Children often come to kindergarten aged three after having been in a nursery for two or more years. The experience is not regarded as part of formal education, but is designed to introduce both socialization skills
and also general knowledge, health habits, and activities such as drawing, music, stories (169).

2. Schools

a. Primary education

The entry point into the PRC education system for most children is the primary school. Children generally enter the six-year programme aged six (169). Official statistics report an enrolment ratio of ninety five percent, but this is an entrance ratio, in other words, "...counting the percentage of children of school age who have ever attended school" (170). The enrolment ratio figure of seventy seven percent calculated on accepted international standards, however, does compare favourably with the developing world (171). Primary school is not compulsory, nor has the PRC achieved its goal of provision of a place for every child. The favourable figures do not represent the regional disparities in attendance nor should they be interpreted as suggesting that universal primary education is within reach (172).

The highly academic curriculum stresses mathematics and Chinese language skills (173), and politics is introduced early in the child's educational experience. Ronald Price described the content of the textbooks as 'serious and moral' (174), and, in contrast to the Hong Kong primary school network whose aim is preparing the child for a place in the best secondary school available, the PRC primary school still aims to solve basic social problems such as increasing the literacy rate of the country, especially in the rural areas (175), finding methods to keep children in school, and upgrading the quality of schools. One in three entering children failed to complete the five-year primary school cycle, and of the
graduates, it is estimated that approximately three out of four go on to junior middle school (176), admission to which is determined by examination.

b. Secondary schools

Secondary school in the PRC is a six year programme divided into two divisions of three years each. In 1984, about thirty-five percent of the children in this sector attended technical-training and vocational programmes, and although this programme is less popular than the academic curriculum among parents, this figure reflects an increase of twenty-eight percent over the previous year (177). Such figures reflect the government's intention to expand the vocational sector (178), and, as Cheng Kai Ming wrote, is "a very good demonstration of the impact of economic reform on education" (179).

The percentage of the age group of children attending middle school has dropped and J. Cleverly suggests that this is a result of government "curtailing of general middle schooling... designed to reduce the pressure on tertiary institutions" (180), although Cheng Kai Ming interprets it as a "healthy retreat from the unrealistic attendance targets set down during the cultural revolution" (181).

Of the children who complete the intensely competitive academic programme less than five percent are selected to continue to tertiary education (182). The selection process is more complex than that in Hong Kong. Intellectual ability, physical health, and often the political connections of the applicant's parents, play a part in the success of an application (183). Political correctness is also measured and Hooper writes that "Even at the high school level, the path of obedience and conformity is the only sensible one for young people with any aspirations to get ahead in China" (184).
c. Post-School Education

Tertiary Education is made up of over 1000 universities, technical institutes, teachers' colleges, and other colleges and institutions, representing almost a doubling in numbers over 1979 (185). The 41,000 freshmen enrolled in 1987, the most since 1949, were selected by examinations in foreign languages, Chinese political theory, as well as their own major subject (186).

After selection, students are allocated to higher colleges and universities by three methods, of which centralized allocation is the most widespread (187). Based on national production targets, admission decisions are made through consultations between the central and the many local regions. The other two methods, commissioned enrolment and self-supporting enrolment are being experimented with, and offer those regions and individuals who have prospered under the new programmes an opportunity to 'buy' places in the higher education system (188).

Although Rosen has stated that the most important selection criterion is academic achievement (189), other analysts describe the continuing importance of 'correct socialist attitudes' and observe that university admissions procedures remain a major area of corruption in the system (190).

The Party acknowledges the importance of both academic achievement and socialist attitudes. The Minister of Education recently pointed out the importance of several factors in academic programmes. He stressed the importance of the development of high-level specialists who are both socialist-minded and professionally competent. We demand our degree candidates support the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system. [They] must also possess the commitment to serve the socialist cause and the people. This is where they are different from [students] in capitalist...
They study in a programme "...more similar to the model of more economically-developed western and oriental nations in order to compete with [them], although their programme is more structured and more closely controlled than in the West"(192).

At the present time, the preferred fields of study are the areas directly connected with the modernization programmes. These include science and technology, computer studies and engineering, and English language(193). In most cases, fees are paid by the student's work unit or the State, a fact which justifies in the mind the Government its policy of requiring graduates to conform to the job assignments they are given(194).

In conclusion, the preceding subsections have dealt with the history and structure of education in the PRC. Firstly, analysis of the history of education in the PRC suggested that education has been affected by the reversals of official political policy. Education is tightly linked with the powerful political agencies of the PRC, ensuring that any change in political ideology quickly affects educational policy. It is argued that this link is an area of contradiction with the Hong Kong experience. Although Hong Kong education is linked to dominant economic and political agencies, the limited negotiation which exists with local educators and interest groups has meant that policy remained broadly relevant to community needs and generally consistent with values of local educators. The result is that, during the past forty years, Hong Kong education has been guided by a generally acceptable, consistent policy, oriented toward the provision of places, teachers, and materials. These were judged necessary to serve the expanding population and economy. Only recently, as these educational goals are being achieved, and the political situation has
changed, has policy been seen to diverge widely from current needs.

Secondly, the structure of PRC education is similar to the Hong Kong system. However, different assumptions about the role of education are made at each level of the system. The Kindergarten system, for example, serves the working parents need of child-care. This contrasts with Hong Kong, where Kindergarten is very often an academic preparation for Primary School.

In the PRC, primary school is neither compulsory, nor universal and, in contrast to the preparatory, academic role of the Hong Kong primary schools, the function of the PRC primary school is to solve basic social needs.

Both societies have an intensely competitive academic programme in the secondary system because of limited tertiary places. Attempts to undermine the traditional distinction between intellectual and manual pursuits in both societies have had very little impact and the Confucian intellectual tradition has persisted.

Despite the emphasis on academic curriculum in the PRC, the selection process for tertiary places includes a political component, which is not present in the Hong Kong process. Indeed, at a time when introduction to political skills and philosophy are needed in Hong Kong, teachers and administrators are very hesitant - often for political reasons - to introduce them.

This section continues with description of the aims of PRC education. Although the Hong Kong and the PRC have widely different economic systems, the stated aims of their respective education leaders do not reflect those differences. The PRC describes its aims as follows: "The basic functions of education are, firstly to pass on knowledge of nature and skills of production, ensure the reproduction of the labour forces and develop
science and technology; it is a means of promoting the development of social productive forces, and is therefore itself productive"(195). As described in Chapter 2, Hong Kong’s aims have been reported as in terms of developing the human resources available in Hong Kong because they are assets essential to the economic development of the colony.

The secondary aims differ however. The PRC expects education to "...impart a code of conduct and social ideology, train people to have a definite viewpoint and moral character; it is a means of preserving a definite relationship of production, political system and moral custom"(196), whereas the Hong Kong statement speaks vaguely of ‘harmonizing the needs of the community.’

_1. Major Aims_

The purpose of this discussion is to show that, because in the PRC the aims are derived from the economic, political and cultural ideologies of the Party, their achievement is a complex process, involving change in all of those areas. These aims, however complex, reflect the dominant ideology in the PRC and, in this way, it is argued, pose a profound contradiction between Hong Kong and the PRC.

In 1985 the Central Committee of the Communist Party held a national education conference and announced key policy guidelines for educational reforms which are to accompany and support the current economic reforms(197). The Reform Document of this conference and other Chinese academic publications, as well as announcements in the Chinese press, have been the source for the following section.

1. Achievement of Universal Compulsory Education

The right of all citizens to a free education has long been a
principle of the Chinese Communist Party, but recently the enormous cost of such a system has led the Party to be less explicit in its commitments to this target (198). They have avoided the "explicit undertaking by the state to provide all education free of charge" (199). They still, however, appear committed to the eradication of illiteracy and raising the national education standard.

Universal primary education was made a national goal in 1971, and the PRC has set the goal of provision of 9 years of compulsory and universal education. The country has, realistically, been divided into three sections (urban, semi-rural, and remote), according to the prosperity of the region, each with a different target date for achieving the goal (200). Cheng Kai Ming comments that the present enrolment ratios at the Primary school level are high, even "close to ... advanced countries" (201). There are no precise figures available for junior secondary level, but the ratio is presumed to be "significantly lower" (202).

Overall, however, it is unlikely that universal primary education will be achieved soon (203). The regional differences are enormous, and originate as much in economic differences as in cultural resistance. The government itself concedes that the goal may not be reached until well into the next century.

2. Expansion of Supply of Teachers

Potentially the most serious problem facing China's education system is the shortage of qualified, effective teachers, and the development and improvement of teacher training is regarded as fundamental to the achievement of recent social goals (204). Teachers were a main target of anti-intellectual radicals of the Cultural Revolution, and it has been
publicly acknowledged that the majority of teachers - and not only in that age bracket - are untrained or ill-trained (205). It has been estimated that less than half the practising teachers in primary education and only 11% of teachers in junior secondary education are qualified (206). The Party, itself, admits that the teachers colleges offer a poor education: "Some basic subjects such as education and educational psychology are not given enough emphasis and as a result [teachers] do not know enough about teaching..." (207).

Although Deng has attempted to restore teaching as an honourable profession, the Party has complained that "few people want to be teachers, even though "teachers are the key to developing China's education system" (208). There is difficulty recruiting enough students to fill the places at teachers' colleges and many students have entered teachers colleges as a second choice. Other sources report comments from students that they applied to teachers' college because they felt they had a better chance of being admitted, and that they had no intention of teaching after graduation (209). Despite this, there were only fifty seven qualified applicants for eight hundred places at Beijing Teachers College in the September, 1986 term, and the Party suggests that society offer more rewards to teachers and "...strengthen the political and ideological work in teacher colleges" (210).

It has been estimated that twenty five percent more teachers are needed by 1990 to meet the needs of the modernization programme (211). But college graduates are so scarce that government and business find themselves competing for the good students, and those assigned to teaching often simply do not show up (212).

There are several reasons why teaching is an unattractive profession in the PRC. Teacher salaries are twenty to thirty percent lower than
workers, and they receive fewer supplemental benefits. In addition, teachers are not eligible for employee 'perks', such as housing and medical care, nor for the bonuses which have been implemented under the new reform(213). Lastly, since the Cultural Revolution, teachers have a lower social status than people in other trades, so that the prestige which used make up for low income is lost.

3. Improvement of Rural Education

The present reversal of the leftist goals of reducing the economic and social disparities between the rural and urban sectors of China has been criticized as possibly resulting in 'educational apartheid'(214). Although there is a considerable desire by the government to improve schooling on a nation-wide basis, regional disparities in education will not be easy to overcome. Cheng Kai Ming adds, on this topic, "It is an accepted fact that disparity in school attendance is ...a reflection of a disparity in economic growth. If the latter were to remain, little could be done to remove the former"(215).

Statistics about the differences between rural and urban schooling in the PRC show the disparities. John Cleverly notes that over thirty five percent of rural children do not complete even five years of primary schooling, and that, overall, "the higher up the education system, the lower the proportion of peasants' children" - and the proportion is falling in this decade(216). The repetition rate in rural primary schools is over three times that of urban schools, which has been attributed in part to the increased opportunities provided by the new work schemes and also to the difficulties rural children have in competing on the important examinations with urban school children(217). The aims, therefore are still very basic:
"The elimination of illiteracy remains the first aim and strategy of rural education in the Chinese countryside; there is little debate about that point" (218).

There is no widely-available alternative curriculum oriented toward the needs of rural life. At any rate, peasants would not be likely to support such a curriculum because an academic education still offers the best chances of passing the necessary examinations and, eventually, improving economically (219). Until the peasant economy improves, and peasants perceive a direct link between the schooling available in their localities and upward economic mobility, their old attitudes will prevail. Peasants persist with old prejudices against schooling, such as the traditional antagonism toward the education of girls and the obligation of children to contribute to the support of parents instead of attending school (220).

The majority of rural teachers are locally supported and poorly paid making the posting unattractive to better teachers (221). In addition, they are mainly only primary school educated, and with no materials, no status, no job security, and often no reliable income. Thus, normally they regard teaching as a step to a better job (222). The government is attempting to attract and keep better teachers by offering a subsidy to most locally-supported teachers. However, this is not paid directly to the teacher, but to the administrative unit which has some flexibility in allocating the funds. Often the money is used for other needs (223).

4. Expansion of Vocational Education

The present regime has had a policy of increasing the number of trained workers for industry (224) and, to do this, must improve the
vocational elements of the school system. The Party has announced that the policy has brought about desired increases in the number of vocational school students: in 1978 vocational middle and high school students were 5%, and 18.8% respectively in 1980 of the total enrollment, whereas in 1985, they accounted for 36% (225). The goal is equal enrollment in ordinary and vocational schools by 1990 (226).

In some cities and provinces the proportion is reported to be over 60%, although many schools are vocational and technical only in 'cosmetic compliance with higher directives', and it has been suggested that peasants would leave 'en masse' if rural schools were actually converted to agricultural courses (227). Cheng, on the other hand, found a new interest among some coastal area peasants in vocational courses due to the prosperity to be gained from economic crops and commercial activities (228). Such discrepancy in observation results from the inequalities between the traditionally rich and the remote areas of China and serves to highlight the complexity of the task facing the government, not only in policy implementation, but at the very early stage of policy formulation.

Understanding of this problem is important because it is conceivable that Hong Kong would be asked to contribute to the solution of this problem through provision of resources. Hong Kong has recognized the need for educating a greater percentage of youth in vocational skills. In this area, both the PRC and Hong Kong are in the reform stage, and each faces the same difficulty of trying to convince a population which stresses the superiority of an academic education for a better economic future, as compared with a technical and vocational education. Hong Kong authorities are motivated by their perception that education serves the economic prosperity of the colony. In the PRC, although there is also the element of education as a participant in economic development, there is also
accountability to the socialist principle of combining education with productive labour. The fact that the PRC has not yet been able to implement effectively such a combination has caused instability in the system(229), which Hong Kong can best avoid by having in place an established effective structure of vocational education before the merger.

Many of these factors could benefit the HKSAR. The shortage of teachers in the PRC suggests that it is unlikely that an attempt would be made to replace teachers in Hong Kong with politically more "correct" individuals. It is conceivable that Hong Kong teachers, especially in the fields of finance, management, and technology, would be invited to teach in the PRC. Hong Kong and the PRC each have a shortage of well-trained, committed teachers, although each education authority is reacting to the problem in a different way. In Hong Kong the policy of market forces is allowed to apply to the supply of teachers, and, as teachers are relatively poorly paid and do not enjoy a high social status, the problem persists without direct intervention. In the PRC, the problem has been caused by similar factors, but there is a third factor, the political abuse of teachers. Intellectuals have enjoyed periods of official favour, but at other times have been victimized by Party officials. At present, they are in favour, and the State is intervening in the supply problem.

5. Higher Education

China's strategic goal in the development of higher education is: by the end of the century China will have built a well-proportionated, rationally-tiered system embracing a complete range of disciplines and areas...[which] will contribute substantially to China's independent scientific and technological development and to solving major theoretical and practical problems that crop up in the course of socialist modernization(230).
The best route to achieving personal goals in the PRC is through higher education. However, there are places for only a little over one percent of the relevant age group in Chinese higher education institutions and there are only six million college graduates among one billion people (231). The new modernization policies have included an expansion and reconstruction of the system of higher education. Indeed, during the whole post-Cultural Revolution reform to Chinese education, the universities have been particularly emphasized because of their importance to the reform programme (232). Universities, particularly, are regarded as links with the world academic community and "serve as primary channels for the introduction of the scientific and technological knowledge..." (233) which the PRC needs to develop.

The major tasks facing the higher education authorities are finding qualified teachers to cope with increasing enrolments, financing new projects, easing the over-crowding which has resulted from increasing intake, and implementing the new management policy (234).

The last point, implementation of a new management policy, is an attempt to replace an "inept and inert bureaucracy" with effective administration working toward efficient solution of modernization problems (235). To this end, some "rightist" intellectuals have been rehabilitated and many senior positions in departments have been given to returning overseas Chinese and to academics trained in the West (236). Among other reforms which new administrators have introduced are: eliminating the iron-rice bowl system and having reviews of staff members, introducing a monitoring system whereby staff are evaluated on the basis of how closely they meet the (written) expectations of the institution, and, lastly, appointment and promotion on the basis of qualification and performance (237). Such techniques are taken for granted in Western
organizations but are highly innovative in both the traditional and the socialist Chinese practices. They reverse, for example, the socialist policies of giving to the Party supervision of professionals and of guaranteeing security. They deviate from traditional Chinese practices of valuing seniority and stressing personal relationships in staff decisions (238).

An elitist system based on ninety eight key universities has been reinstated. These universities are considered "intellectual growth poles" (239) and will receive additional funding, as well as participate in joint programmes with foreign universities (240). Graduate (advanced degree) programmes have also been instituted. Dropped during the Cultural Revolution as symbols of Western capitalism and revisionism (241), their renewed positive status represents an awareness of the need for Chinese participation in the international educational community and the restoration of the research function of universities and colleges (242).

The PRC is making use of the opportunity which the open-door offers to send students abroad for graduate study. At present there are about thirty thousand graduate students studying abroad - more than half of whom are children of senior cadres (243). China regards overseas training as an important way to produce specialists, but limited funds severely restrict the numbers able to study abroad. The Party recently reminded those 'privileged' students abroad that China wants to be certain that the subjects and activities these students are pursuing are "closely associated with the modernization programme, and that, apart from advanced technology and management, they should endeavour to carefully and only [sic] learn what has proved to be healthy in Western culture" (244).

This summary of higher education reforms is intended to show how reform is moving Chinese universities toward a pragmatic, Western model of
organization. The intent of the planners is to make the system more accountable to the economic planners and manpower forecasters, and in this way, it converges with the Hong Kong model, where tertiary education is not formally accountable to economic needs but where programme planners attempt to meet these needs.

In addition, Hong Kong universities are organized along western management models and the faculties of universities and Polytechnics are usually Chinese who have been partially trained in the West or are Western expatriates. As academic exchange between the PRC and the West increases, the areas of shared experience, outlook and expectation between Hong Kong and the PRC tertiary institutions will also increase.

The period of reformation has too recently begun to make comments on its political effect, or lack of it, on the Hong Kong education arena. The conflict which originates in the difference between the reforms on the one hand and traditional and socialist teaching on the other is causing resistance to the reforms, and as Julia Kwong notes, therefore, "... one has to be cautious in interpreting the scale and scope of the changes" (245). The PRC has begun to take advantage of the tertiary education institutions in Hong Kong through arranging exchanges of students. However, Hong Kong students who graduate from PRC universities usually experience difficulty in finding appropriate employment when they return to Hong Kong because of the lack of recognition there of the PRC qualifications.

6. Decentralization

The state is attempting to disengage itself from administering education at the local levels and at all school levels, (although the
disengagement is proceeding slowly because "years of state regimentation have dulled spontaneity and initiative" and because of the inflexibility of the Party machine(246)). The disengagement is linked to the corresponding delinking of the central government from economic matters, and promise local authorities more "initiative in making use of their own advantages and adopting practices fitting to their own circumstances"(247). Cheng Kai Ming comments that the new economic environment, rather than central political decree, is influencing education reforms(248).

Local areas should prepare to assume more of the financial burden of schooling as well(249). In the rural areas, financing of schools is gradually being assumed by the peasants, and richer peasants are even gradually assuming responsibility for the construction of schools(250).

Unfortunately, a negative effect of the decentralization programme could be a strengthening of the rural-urban dichotomy in standards: rural education, dependent more and more on local resources, will 'lock' those schools into the poorer rural system.

At the tertiary level, the decentralization will eventually increase the decision-making functions of academics which, it is hoped, will improve the quality of the institutions. Until 1984, authority over all policy on syllabus, research, staff appraisal, academic exchange, and capital investment was held by officials of the Party(251).

There is no suggestion that the state is completely abnegating responsibility for schooling. The central ministry still stipulates educational standards(252), and the State Education Commission remains responsible for ensuring that schools fulfill official policies and plans(253), although it is unlikely that the ministry has the resources to supervise or enforce its standards (254).

The HKSAR would benefit from present PRC moves toward decentralizing
the education systems of the various regions of the country, if it is extended to Hong Kong. Although the link between economy and education, which the PRC is trying to achieve, exists in Hong Kong (where education is legitimacized more by man-power forecasts than by social-economic needs of the community(255)) administration of the education system in Hong Kong is highly centralized. As described in Chapter 2, in Hong Kong staff structures and accounts are controlled by a Government Department and the Government determines the curriculum through setting examinations. Leaders in the campaign for decentralization are calling for more flexibility and democracy in decision-making and eventual public accountability of schools.

In summary, the recently-articulated aims of the PRC are the achievement of nine-years of compulsory education, a realignment of secondary schooling to increase enrolment in vocational and technical education, an increase in the quality of rural education and of teaching standards, decentralization of administration, and, finally, more independence for higher education institutions. Whereas these aims are derived directly from the most recent Party ideology of economic pragmatism and socialist modernization, the most recently stated aims of Hong Kong education have evolved through a consultative process between external advisors, local business elites and local educators. Their aims can also be described as pragmatic, but grounded in a capitalist ideology emphasizing a competitive, individualistic approach to problem-solving.

Major Contemporary Issues in Education

The purpose of this section is to highlight those educational issues which the Party is attempting to resolve as they approach the merger. The final resolution of these issues, because it reflects Party ideology, will affect Hong Kong education.
1. Reform

a. Reform of the Political Content of Education

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, reform of the political control and content of education has been an urgent issue. The desired end product of socialist education is a productive labour force with a socialist consciousness, but, under the open-door policy of the PRC, political education largely abandoned its ideological functions, and narrowed political instruction to appropriate forms of social relations consistent with communist morality. These values, Hayhoe suggests, "include discipline, honesty, respect for law and order, social responsibility, patriotism, and a love for socialism and the Communist Party", the majority of which, as she also suggests, are more similar to values taught at western educational institutions than to Maoist values. However, the durability of such reforms is in doubt - within the Party conflicts about the role of ideology in education have recently surfaced again. For example, a leading Chinese educator recently called for colleges to resume assigning people to look after the ideological education of students in order to 'develop their characters'. He also recommended that political workers be assigned to students and that those students who miss political theory classes be criticised. Attempts at reform in higher education began with the introduction of a manager as president of the universities instead of a party secretary, but, unwilling to relinquish total authority, the Party committee has retained control over many non-academic matters.

The Party initially encouraged the democracy which is developing at many universities as a 'good tendency'. It has been careful to remind
students, though, that many existing democracies are afflicted with 'maladies' and China needs 'to create a higher form of democracy' than the bourgeois democracy (261). The Party is, therefore, advising that "students be helped to understand the difference between socialist and bourgeois democracy and understand the relations between democracy and law and discipline"(262). Scientists are reminded that seeking truth is their primary aim but that the "touchstone by which [they] must judge scientific truth is social practice and its effect".

b. The Role of Education in Economic Reform

The present government is attempting reform in all aspects of the education system "...to meet the needs of construction and political democratization of the Party and the state..."(263). Education is regarded as the catalyst for the changes the State wants and the increased spending is expected to "lift economic productivity, improve living standards, enhance China's status as a nation and ensure the right thinking of they young and faith in the future"(264). However, rhetorical support of the reforms is greater than real support. Many economists, with their own party backers, oppose the policy of treating education as a component of economic growth, which therefore ought to receive investment funds. They group education with 'non-productive investments' which should receive additional funding only after there has been an improvement in the country's living standards(265).

Rosen describes two additional aspects of the funding of education controversy. Where should the approved funds be allocated: to higher education or to basic education?; and who should provide the funds? In addition, what percentage should come from the central government and, what percentage from local administrations? Officially, the government appears to prefer a clear division of responsibility with the central government
allocating most of its funds to university and post graduate education while local governments, production units and richer people provide basic education.

The average spending on college students and primary school children in most developed countries is in a ratio of four or five to one, whereas in the PRC, the ratio has reached seventy five to one. Rosen observes that a "dangerous gap is opening up between the elite and the mass sector in education" and questions the social and political consequences (266).

2. Key Schools

In the 1950's a competitive and elite network of 'key schools' was established in which better students were more efficiently trained in order to contribute more to the modernization process (267). Although the policy was criticized during the Cultural Revolution, it has been reinstated as part of the new modernization programme which, in education, represents a return to "conventional elitist policies" (268), including the reintroduction of examinations for university admissions and similar selection practices which are consolidating a pyramidal educational, as well as class, hierarchy.

The primary school curriculum is strongly academic, and is rigidly determined by the fifth year examinations which select for secondary school places, the first choice of most being the key schools. Presently, 'key schools' serve about 20% of students but receive a disproportionately large share of education funds (269). Hooper found that 80% of the parents of children at the key high schools in two major Chinese cities were senior Party or Army officials or professionals (270).

The linkages to the better 'key universities are well-established and
promotion rates from 'key' schools into universities is often around 70-80%(271). Many ordinary primary and secondary schools, denied the advantages that accompany increased funding, have long neglected poor students, misrepresented examination results, limited the number of students sitting for examinations in order to raise their promotion rate(272) which is the main criterion for judging the quality of schools(273).

3. Provision of Specialists

As the Party has implemented its policy of educating more people to secure a prosperous future, it has become more specific in its demands on the education system.

The areas in which trained professionals are urgently needed are: researchers for the development of enterprises and of new products; teachers; agronomists; farmers capable of using advanced techniques; managers; lawyers trained in socialist legal system and architects. Communication workers ..., advertising, publications and consulting services workers, workers and professionals in the service industry, and sociologists and psychologists who are needed for departments such as propaganda and personnel(274).

To meet such diverse needs, educators have begun experimenting with different techniques: some are innovative, but others are revivals of practices which had been repudiated during the Cultural Revolution. The system of key schools has been rehabilitated and the "open-door" policy, although geared toward economic activities, has affected the education system. A 'transfer of intellectual technology'(275), particularly in Western concepts of economics, social sciences and management
education has been initiated. Such courses, based on the primacy of the individual entrepreneur, will gradually replace the traditional political economy courses, and "subordinate China’s education system to the material and social requirements of international corporate relationships". In adjusting the curriculum in higher education to meet the needs of development and reform, the PRC has de-emphasized traditional liberal arts subjects like literature, Chinese history and philosophy, and has emphasized applied social sciences, which Hayhoe has stated is precisely the focus which "could result in dependent scientific relations with the West". She also discusses the

dramatic changes may be expected in a few years when younger scholars (who have studied abroad, return) eager to put into action a whole new intellectual perspective. This group is likely to bring fundamental changes to the Chinese education system.

Western concepts are being introduced through bringing what are termed "foreign experts" into the PRC to teach in universities. Although this is a controversial policy, the policy has been strengthened recently as the Party attempts to reconcile the need for modern expertise with the fear of bourgeois liberalisation - the phrase describing any Western-style ideas or actions.

4. All Work Equally Serves The Revolution

The elitism of the key schools has presented the Deng regime with one of the more difficult problems - convincing young people and students that all work equally serves the revolution, especially as the elite segment of society increases. Educators and intellectuals are speaking out
about the importance of education beyond production and increasing standards of living. However, as long as the limited privileges are divided among very few and upward mobility is a reality only for some, tensions will continue to increase.

Observers have described an upsurge in interest in advanced education in the PRC, reflecting, perhaps, the persistent influences of the Confucian self-cultivation tradition, but also reflecting the new attitudes generated by the reforms. The most popular courses are the most pragmatic (English, business management, and foreign trade). Programmes offering full-time and part-time possibilities, home study, work/study schedules, along with schools of differing quality reflecting the economic and social conditions of those attending them, are proliferating. The Government sanctions the new diversity: "...students should be educated to a level determined by differences in the availability of natural resources, of manpower for production, the economic conditions of the families, and differences in the degree of family encouragement".

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has described the socio-cultural, economic and educational systems of the PRC, highlighting specific areas in which there are differences between PRC and Hong Kong. Because of the impact of socialist ideology on Chinese culture, socio-political and economic institutions which have evolved which contradict parallel institutions in Hong Kong, contradictions which are potential obstacles to successful transfer.

Policy-making for the economic system of the PRC was described as dominated alternately by various factions of the Party, represented as rightists or leftists. Development has been, therefore, slow in comparison
with the Hong Kong system, which has been characterized by stable
government economic policy. It has, therefore, been more successful in
attracting the foreign and local business necessary for diversification and
modernization.

In the PRC, on the other hand, despite attempts to modernize and place
economic growth as the major national goal, the economy is confronted with
serious problems. Unstable growth rates, regional inequalities,
unemployment, emigration to the cities, and ideological problems brought
about by the discrepancy between policies and socialist principles impede
steady progress toward the twin goals which Hong Kong has successfully
achieved.

The difference between the economic status of the two societies is
reflected in the amount of individual wealth, the expectations of
educational opportunities and social mobility, and the degree of freedom to
pursue goals which each society offers. These contradictions create the
contexts in which adjustment by Hong Kong people will be required in order
to resolve the social tensions arising from these differences.

Comparison between the social systems is also complex. Whereas they
differ dramatically in politics, they share an ethnic background which
involves strong behavioural codes. Neither society, despite the influences
of colonialism and industrialization on the one hand, and socialism on the
other, has completely shed these values. However, despite very significant
similarities, the definition of success or merit in each society has
evolved very differently. The Hong Kong group lives and works in a
capitalistic society, regarded by many to be the purest form of capitalism
in the world. There, merit and prestige are awarded to those individuals
who tenaciously and skillfully are well-paid, and able to support their
families better than the immediately preceding generation had done. In the
PRC, merit and prestige are awarded to those who exhibit Party loyalty and are able to contribute to the national development, for the PRC is controlled by policies based on the ideological convictions of a powerful minority. Further, although neither Hong Kong nor the PRC has had democratic government, they differ in the relationship between the individuals and the government. The Party, as government, emerges as the problem-solving agency for individuals, whereas in Hong Kong, people do not expect government to fulfill this function.

Lastly, education is a primary means to social and economic success for both the citizens of Hong Kong and the PRC, and, in both societies, the attitude toward education is highly utilitarian. Political components are not significant parts of Hong Kong education, whereas, in the PRC, children are being prepared in school for life and work in a highly politicized, socialist environment. The Party closely monitors democracy movements at universities and reminds students of the primary importance of adhering to socialist principles. It is possible that the PRC will want to ensure that Hong Kong children grow up as Chinese patriots, with appropriate and acceptable views of history and politics. Some, however, question how the PRC could accomplish such significant reform as their own educational resources are limited; they suggest that it is "...more likely that [the PRC] would utilize the resources available in Hong Kong to strengthen their own system"(287).
CHAPTER 3  FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid. p. 16.

3. Ibid.


5. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid. p. 31.


12. Ibid. p. 35.

13. Ibid.

14 Ibid, p. 36.

15. Theda Skocpol, op. cit., p. 268.


18. "Old economic ideas must be eliminated", China Daily, 2.9.86, p. 4.


22. Risk and Riches..., op. cit., p. 15.

23. Ibid.

27. "Home thoughts from the seaside", The Economist, 4.10.86.
32. Ibid. p. 66.
33. "Experts urged to aid small firms", CD, 25.11.86.
34. "Smashing the bowl", The Economist, 27.9.86, p. 55. Guidelines for the most recent modernization are reminiscent of those adopted for the "self-strengthening" movements of the 19th century and the early 20th century. These were to borrow that which is useful to modernization from Western society and resist that which is decadent and 'backward'. Similarities between today's modernization and the "Self-strengthening" movement of the 19th century are discussed at length in: Grieder, Jerome, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China, The Free Press, New York, 1981, pp. 72-75.
35. Iron rice bowl...op. cit., p. 67.
36. Ibid.
37. A new people's hero... op. cit.
38. Forward to..., op. cit. p. 60.
39. Ibid.
41. Ibid. p. 375.
42. "Forget old ways, farmers are told", CD, 27.11.86.
43. "Feudalism is still a hidden peril", CD, 20.9.86.
44. "Forget old ways..., op. cit. and "Wan Li looks to rural changes", CD, 29.11.86.
45. "Out of disaster a new economy", The Times, 10.10.86, p. 19.
47. "Split found in Living Standards", CD, 25.10.86.

48. Forward to..., op. cit., p. 60.


52. "Urban planners eye new role of cities", CD, 4.9.86.

53. Chinese critics of small..., op. cit.

54. "Urban problems merit more care", CD, 18.9.86.

55. Hooper, op. cit.

56. "Collective efforts are overwhelming state enterprise", FEER, 20.3.86, p. 70.

57. "Don't worry, get rich', Bo assures businesses", CD, 4.12.86.


60. Granting freedom to social scientists for research also benefits the Party. The Party uses studies to provide guidance in improving its ideological work. Other studies are undertaken to highlight and provide discussion of current or future social problems. For example, there have been many arguments in the press about the long-term implications of the one-child family policy. Rosen (Chinese Education, XVIII, No.1, op. cit., p. 4) cites a study of the characteristics of only and non-only children which suggested that although they are basically similar in terms of mental traits and physical development, there are striking differences in terms of their behavior, with non-only children being much better behaved. The Party uses such findings to suggest appropriate nurturing techniques to parents of only children.


63. Ibid.

64. Instrumentalism is also described by Hooper, op. cit., p. 73 and p. 85, and Mary Lee, FEER, 18.9.86, p. 48.
66. Beverly Hooper, op. cit., p. 73, p. 85, etc.
67. Ibid. p. 8.
68. Ibid. p. 55.
70. Gold, op. cit., p. 671.
71. Ibid, p. 664.
72. Hooper, op. cit., p. 34.
73. Gold, op. cit., p. 663.
74. Hooper, op. cit., p. 189ff.
76. "Delinquency rises, more care urged", CD, 24.11.86, p. 3.
77. Hooper, op. cit., p. 123.
78. Theresa Munford, FEER, "Generation of sceptics" 13.3.86, p. 47.
84. Lau Siu-kai, in King and Lee, op. cit.p. 203.
85. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. There are two further dimensions. Friendship, Gold's fourth
dimension, is "valued but still tinged by fear that today's confidence
might provide fodder in some future (political) campaign" (Gold, op. cit.,
p. 665). People approach close friendship with caution. Comradeship is
being encouraged by the Party as 'neighbourliness'. Mutual aid groups still
exist and national campaigns provide models of comradeship for the
citizenry to emulate.

89. "Marxism still the guiding theory", CD, 3.10.86.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
60.
93. "Power structure must decentralize", CD, 3.10.86.
95. "Closed door on Democracy", FEER, 18.9.86. p. 60.
96. "Party outlines development path", CD, 2.10.86.
97. "Political democracy must be ensured", CD, 24.11.86, p. 4.
98. "Party outlines development path", CD, 2.10.86.
100. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. "Forward to uncertainty", FEER, 20.3.86, p. 57.
111. Ibid, p. 59.
112. "Decision on culture", CD, 27.9.86, p. 4.
114. Ibid.
117. Ibid. p. 22.
118. Ibid. p. 25.
121. Ibid.
125. Marxism still the ... op. cit.
126. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
130. "Green Light for Chinese, More or Less", IHT, 29.9.86.
133. "Too few lawyers - even more quitting", CD, 29.11.86, p. 3.
134. "Happy holidays and busy killing fields", FEER, 20.2.86.
135. Too few lawyers..., CD, op. cit.
136. Ibid.


139. Ibid.

140. David Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997, Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, Ltd, 1984, p. 15.


142. Linda Jaivin, "China-by the rules or despite the rules" FEER, 14.8.86, p. 77.

143. "Having to look on the bright side", The Economist, 30.8.86, p. 68.


145. "Judges can curtail press law abuses", HKS, 15.3.97, and SCMP, "Serious threat to freedom of the press, 13.3.87.

146. Ibid.

147. "Decision on culture", CD, 27.9.86.

148. "Problems at the plenum, FEER, 16.10.86, p. 16.

149. Mirsky, op.cit., p. 20.

150. Hooper, op.cit., p. 143.


152. Ibid. Yu's study chooses two virtues as indicative of the degree to which the individual was adhering to traditional Chinese culture. Firstly, respect of the aged and cherishing the young. Yu reported that, in Guangdong Province, 98.25 still believe in these virtues, whereas, he added, in the West, it is common for people only to be concerned about themselves. Secondly, attitudes toward sex. Yu said that this area represents a focal point where the two cultures sharply conflict. 85.65% of youth regard it is a traditional virtue for girls to treasure their premarital chastity, and 85% are opposed to sex outside marriage. However, people in Guangdong Province did not adhere as well to the traditional attitude as those living in Chengdu Province, further from Western influences.

153. China is one of oldest countries with an education system. Schools run by the central government existed from around the 11th century BC and
offered tuition in: "rites, music, archery, chariot riding, history and mathematics" (Education and Science, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1983, p. 1). Decentralization was begun at least 2 centuries BC with public schools under direct control of central government and other schools administered by local authorities (Ibid, p. 2). There are no records of schooling in the area which is now Hong Kong, and it was probably non-existent until the early 18th century when private schools were set up by the local clans. Additional information in, David Faure, James Hayes and Alan Birch, From Village to City, Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1984, p. 62ff, and also Erwin Wickert, The Middle Kingdom: Inside China Today, Harvill Press, London, 1983, p. 280.


156. Ibid., p. 24.


159. Ibid.


162. Chossudovsky, op. cit., p. 100.


165. "Teachers wanted by the millions", The Times, 11.11.86.

166. Cleverly, op. cit., p. 247.

167. Ibid.


170. Hooper, op. cit., p. 45.

172. ibid., p. 258.


175. Pauline Keating, "Mid-Level Education in Contemporary China", in Neville Maxwell and Bruce McFarlane (eds), *China’s Changed Road to Development*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 141.

176. Cleverly, op.cit., p. 236.

177. Ibid., p. 238.

178. Ibid., p. 241.

179. Cheng Kai Ming, China’s Recent..., op.cit., p. 260.


181. Cheng Kai Ming, China’s Recent..., p. 260.

182. Cleverly, op.cit., p. 238.

183. Cheng Kai Ming, China’s Recent..., op.cit., p. 257.


185. Ibid., pp. 51-55.

186. Cheng Kai Ming, China’s Recent..., op.cit., p. 263.

187. Ibid., p. 265.

188. Ibid., p. 264.


190. Hooper, p. 51, 52.


192. Ibid., p. 8.


195. Zou Guang Wei "China’s Educational Aim and Theory", *International*


197. Ibid, p. 190.

198. R. Randle Edwards, "Civil and Social Rights", in Edwards et al, op.cit., p. 70. Hong Kong did not introduce the goal of compulsory, universal education until the 1970's, but then achieved it quickly.

199. Ibid.


201. Cheng, Kai Ming, China's Recent ..., op.cit., p. 257.

202. Ibid.

203. Ibid, p. 258.

204. Pauline Chan, "Education in the Peoples' Republic of China", in Brian Holmes, Equality and Freedom in Education, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1985, p. 192. Although critics of Government have suggested that the speed with which it was achieved was due less to the desire to guarantee every child an equal opportunity than to the fact that the Government's ban on employment of children under 14 left thousands of children in an untenable situation (see Pressure Points, op.cit., p. 87). The fact that the necessary resources were available differentiates the situation from the PRC. And, although the provision is not yet equal in Hong Kong, the community regards education as a right, and campaign now for equality of provision.

205. Cleverly, op.cit., p. 246. In addition, because of the centralized education administration in Hong Kong, potential delays caused by coordinating national and local authorities are avoided.

206. Cheng Kai Ming, China's Recent..., op.cit., p. 259

207. "Teacher shortage is a pressing problem", CD, 25.9.86, p. 4.

208. Ibid.


210. Ibid.

211. Teachers wanted by .... The Times, op.cit.

212. "China's Classroom crisis", Time, 17.11.86, p. 36.

213. Ibid.

215. Cheng Kai Ming, China's Recent..., op.cit., p. 258.


218. Keating, Mid-Level Education..., op.cit., p. 141.


221. Up to three quarters, according to Brown, op.cit., p. 380.

222. Ibid.

223. Ibid.


226. Ibid.


230. Reform of China s...op.cit.

231. Hooper, op.cit., p. 41.


235. Kwong, op.cit., p. 3.


238. Ibid.

239. Ibid.
240. See Chossudorsky, op.cit., p. 93-98 for a description of some programmes.

241. Rosen, 17, No 3, op.cit., p. 16

242. Cleverly, op.cit., p. 244.

243. "Deng’s brave new China reveals first cracks on its face", Time, 12.10.86, p.35.

244. "Study scheme continues", CD, 27.10.86.


248. Cheng Kai Ming, China’s Recent..., op.cit., p. 267

249. Cleverly, op.cit., p. 252.

250. Chossudorsky, op.cit., p. 66


253. Mauger, op.cit., p. 22.

254. Cleverly, op.cit., p. 52.


259. Zhang, op.cit., p. 70.


261. "Students deserve to have a say", CD, 24.11.86, p. 4.


263. Wu, op.cit., p. 16.

265. Stanley Rosen, 17, No.3., op.cit., p. 5.
266. Ibid., p. 5-6.
267. Ibid., p. 11.
271. Ibid., p. 42.
272. "What socialist ethics embody", CD, 10.10.86 and Hooper, op.cit., p. 44.
276. Ibid, p. 100.
277. Ibid, p. 201.
278. "Ed structure needs reforming", CD, 25.11.86, p. 3.
282. "Tinkering with reforms to China's universities", FEER, 23.10.86, 60-62, discusses, in greater depth, university reform and the emerging elitism. In addition, "Graduate Jobs Laid Down by the State", in The Times Higher Education Review, 8.8.86 describes recent changes of policy: two thirds of university graduates in 1986 began work in jobs which had been assigned for them by state. This is a reversal of the policy announced last year which promised students a say in their post-graduate careers. The main reason given for this reversal is that last year's policy failed to fill essential posts in key industries and on government projects, particularly those in backward regions. Graduates avoided the state sector. Newly-assigned jobs are to be mainly in development projects in agriculture, energy, communication, education, transport, textiles, and defence. Ten percent of graduates have been sent to remote, undeveloped regions. In an effort to deter graduates from refusing, the government prohibits employers from recruiting state-assigned graduates. Further, students who refuse assignments are not granted residential permits, and they will have to pay back school fees which had been paid by the State. Students have been reminded that they must place state interest before their own, and follow the Party's and the government's need for planned and
rational distribution of personnel.


284. Ibid.


286. Ibid.

I. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE TO THE SURVEY

The previous chapters examined certain issues which have arisen out of the agreement to transfer sovereignty over Hong Kong to the PRC. These issues were the the emergence of the event as a public issue and the likelihood of social, political and economic contradiction because of structural differences between Hong Kong and the PRC. The thesis argued that a main feature of the transfer is the wish of Hong Kong residents to preserve desirable characteristics of the existing systems in order to enhance the preservation of stability and prosperity in Hong Kong. It has also been suggested that Hong Kong, the less powerful party, can adjust selectively in order to minimize certain of the contradictions resulting from differences between the two systems. This selective adjustment will be grounded in local cultural institutions, utilizing established pragmatic behaviour patterns to respond to the crisis with the objective of preserving existing institutions.

This chapter describes an investigation into one specific adjustment which has been chosen as an example of the many that, it is argued, are occurring. While the main argument of the thesis treats issues involved in transfer from a broad perspective, the fieldwork investigation chooses a specific application of the argument. Hence, thesis material is being dealt with at two levels. The first, and predominant, level (pursued in the earlier chapters) is a broad description of the parties and issues involved. The second level, pursued here, both illustrates and grounds the
argument. It is illustrative of the argument, and is an investigation comprised of a selected sample of secondary school children, a specially designed instrument, and data analysis.

The Nature of Adjustment in the Context of Hong Kong Education

Of the factors which govern the expansion of education, the labour requirements of development and the demands for places in higher education are among the most important. These economic objectives and socio-cultural influences are interrelated. However, it has been argued that the socio-cultural and economic status of Hong Kong can remain viable as long as the economic links between Hong Kong and the PRC continue to strengthen(1). Therefore, the nexus between the socio-cultural, economic, and educational phenomena in the Hong Kong context is complex. This investigation argues that the practicality of strengthening the links is reflected in the education choices and first-job selection plans of Hong Kong youth who are adjusting to the likely economic needs of the HKSAR and of the more powerful PRC.

In other words, as the transfer date draws nearer, awareness of and concern about the transfer increases. This prompts particularly those who will remain in the HKSAR to investigate the economic needs of the PRC. This investigation will lead in most cases to accommodation. Accommodation in turn will lead to change in the educational and occupational choices of Hong Kong youth.

Studies which have recently been carried out in Hong Kong do not contradict the argument. The studies relevant to this discussion are of two types. The first are instruments measuring attitudes about the '1997 issue. L.E. Atwood and P.H. Cheng have studied responses to two questions: what people think Hong Kong will be like after China regains control over
such issues as living conditions, public security, economic conditions and political conditions, and how attitudes about the future changed - do people become more or less positive about life in Hong Kong? - as result of the initialling of the Draft Agreement(2). They reported that, although there was strong agreement that life would be less democratic and that freedom of speech would be lost, there was "considerable indecision as to what the future holds. Yet (there is the attitude that) one can (must) hope for the best, which would be the fulfillment of the Agreement and maintenance of the status quo"(3).

Another type of study which is relevant to this discussion measures the attitudes of Hong Kong people about achievement and success. In one such comparative study of Hong Kong Chinese, Japanese and Korean students, it was found that the Hong Kong Chinese dominated in success orientation and rationality in pursuit of a goal, and that, among the factors listed by Hong Kong Chinese as necessary for an ideal homelife, are effort and planning toward achieving goals, along with diligence(4). The study also found them to be more oriented toward hard work and rational planning than toward harmonious interaction, with more focus on the importance of individual actions in achieving goals than the other Asian societies.

Other studies on attitude measurement indicate that adjustment to this particular challenge has begun. L. Young et al. measured the positions in Hong Kong society of various ethnolinguistic groups(5). This study, described as exploratory only(6), suggested that university students appear to have adjusted, "and in many instances reversed their perceptions of the interethnic structure to meet the demands of an international agreement and in ways that could satisfy their sense of positive identity"(7). The status of the English language within the colony declined, a reversal of the historical perception of English as the key to upward mobility(8).
In summary, residents anticipate change but, probably because of the unprecedented nature of the occurrences, are not clear about the nature of that change. The Hong Kong population has been described in the literature as a group which attempts to achieve through rational and diligent planning. It has been documented that adjustments to the merger are already occurring. These factors support the argument that rational adjustment of educational and occupational plans might be possible, and the hypothesis of the study, which is described in the following section, has been formulated with these factors in mind.

Analysis of the Problem

The fieldwork of the thesis, then, investigates whether rational and pragmatic adjustment of educational and occupation plans is occurring in Hong Kong. The fieldwork of the thesis pursues this analysis in terms of the role residents may play in economic aspects of China's Four Modernizations policy. However, this is just one of two interesting and important areas of investigation of the adjustment problem which have emerged. The other area of investigation is into the nature and degree of political mobilization at the grassroots level which is occurring in the colony. The following brief section describes this issue, and is included to strengthen of the argument of the chapter: that specific adjustment has begun in this decade. It also emphasizes the complexity of adjustment processes facing Hong Kong.

1. Political Mobilization in Hong Kong

Because of the possibility of cultural and economic clashes, and the wish to participate in determining the outcomes of the decolonization and
transfer process, there is a perceived need for increased local political involvement in this decade. Lau Siu-kai wrote:

Despite the resolution of the prickly issue of sovereignty, political changes in the run-up to 1997 and beyond are still perceived to be murky, and the possibility of serious political instability cannot be totally ruled out. Uncertainties and anxieties abound not only because of the vast differences in the political and economic institutions between Hong Kong and China, but also because the maintenance of Hong Kong's political individuality hinges ultimately on China's goodwill and tolerance. Political malaise is further complicated by the lack of trust in China on the part of the majority of the Hong Kong people.

The development of 'representative government' is a very controversial issue, and, although the British indicated that self-government was a possibility, and the PRC has spoken about 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong', the amount of representative government which will be in place in 1997 is not known. However, Lau has written that even the possibility of self-government has been an impetus to the existing political activists who regard it as 'their opportunity to obtain and wield power'. They are opposed by others, mainly professionals and successful business people, who regard democratization of government as a threat to business stability. The two camps are now poised around the existing colonial government "...waiting to fight for the chunks of political power to be transferred downward in accordance with the requirements of a decolonization policy which was peculiar to Hong Kong". Although local government is mentioned in the Joint Declaration, the reaction of the PRC to requests for self-government in other territories which it controls has been to attack local nationalism.
by initiating intense political education to introduce approved
concepts, and by installing cadres committed to communism (12).

2. Hong Kong and the Economic Aspects of the Four Modernizations

Chapters 2 and 3 highlight many of the differences between Hong
Kong and the PRC, but also suggest similarities. As T. Gold has pointed
out, citizens of the PRC are "caught in two historic streams":

traditional Chinese culture and the Leninist traditions of the Communist
Party (13). The Hong Kong Chinese are caught in two historic streams as
well: they value the traditional behavioural patterns of Chinese
culture, but have been influenced by western values under the colonial
government and education systems and under British laws.

Hong Kong has succeeded as an capitalist economic entity, while the
PRC appears to be struggling to define a policy which remains socialist
but is conducive to material success. In this aspect, they appear to be
very different from each other. However, this is not a clear dichotomy
because the PRC, putting aside its earlier goal of economic
self-reliance, has recently embarked on a course of economic policies to
repair the break with the world capitalist system. The PRC has begun to
support and campaign for "... the linkage approach coordinating ...
global economic struggles" (14). Such moves could significantly narrow
the differences, not only in the area of internal economic mechanisms
but also between their respective roles in the world economic system.
There are several policies which could be significant to the Hong Kong
residents.

The first is the new foreign trade policy which "... is based on
the assumptions that the contemporary world economy is an interdependent
The open door policy of the 1980's represents a shift from the view that international trade is inherently unequal, toward the opinion that it is legitimate and realistic in the light of the nature of the current global economy. The entry of the PRC into the global foreign trade system has attracted considerable interest from Western and industrialized countries, and, although the nature of Hong Kong's participation in the international trade portfolio of the PRC may change, (i.e. from being a major market for PRC foreign exchange earnings, to increased PRC reliance on the sophisticated entrepot facilities in Hong Kong), Hong Kong can use the new policy to its own advantage. Hong Kong has well-developed facilities for the transfer of Chinese goods to markets, as well as for handling the transfer of foreign goods into the PRC.

Secondly, the strategy of technology transfer from industrial market economies to China has been adopted in order to offset the problems of poor product quality, productivity, and low technical level. Realization of the benefits to be gained through technology transfer will be a significant step to the PRC's goal of modernization, and the PRC recently applied for the first time for technical aid from the United Nations and was granted an aid package which provided for a wide range of technological support.

The strategy of attracting direct foreign investment has been expanded. Modern manufacturing facilities for promoting exports in the Special Economic Zones and coastal cities, as well as joint ventures, have been set up. Foreign investment is being invited as a means to increase financial strength and thus be able to afford the new technology. The importance of this element was highlighted by the
announcement of a set of incentives for foreign firms operating in the PRC(21). The incentives appear to allow the local authorities greater flexibility in establishing regulations affecting foreign firms in an attempt to respond to the complaints by foreign investors of complicated bureaucracy, high and arbitrary fees, unskilled labour, etc. The need for decentralization of management is implicit in these guidelines.

The SEZs serve a second function in modernization policies: they are seen as experimental projects to test new development policies(22). Apprehensive about spiritual contamination by foreign ways of thinking, the Chinese employ the isolated SEZs to 'test' the new measures before exposing the rest of the country to them(23).

The tourist industry is being expanded. The PRC is now trying to develop its tourism industry(24). In the SEZs, for example, tourism has been placed "in the forefront of [the] development programme"(25), because it is labour-intensive and returns high profits in a short period(26). Cheng Tong Yung describes the new attitude about tourism: "It is now treated as one of the best money spinners" of the modernization policies(27). Tourism has been a major contributor to the Hong Kong economy and investors there are among the most enthusiastic in initiating SEZ tourist schemes(28).

Lastly, foreign culture and trends are being introduced through the large number of scholars and students studying abroad in industrial market economies, and through internally circulated Western literature and journals. Hong Kong has addressed this issue through centres of academic research concerned with the impact of Western technology culture on Chinese society - although in the Hong Kong context.

If the people of Hong Kong identify the areas in which the PRC lacks the expertise to meet the demands generated by the new development
policies, the Hong Kong residents, through skillful use of local resources, can prepare themselves to participate in the modernization of China, benefitting the PRC, while helping to stabilize their own economic and political futures.

This chapter argues that these areas of cooperation are identifiable, and, furthermore, suggests that Hong Kong residents will attempt to begin the interaction process by making education relevant to the economic reality of post-1997 and will respond in the several ways. Firstly, acquire training in managerial and production skills; secondly, seek expertise in computer and light technology; thirdly, look to the professional employment needs in the SEZs; fourthly, acquire training in marketing, financial and related service, and, lastly, seek professional qualifications for the tourist industry. The following section discusses each of these points.

(i.) Acquire training in managerial and production skills. The success of the economic reforms in the PRC depends as much on the modernization of its managerial force as on any other factor. PRC moves to localize decision-making in new areas (such as fee-setting, establishing time-spans for contracts with foreign firms, administration, land-use, deployment of manpower, tax concessions) all require a managerial group as yet non-existent in the PRC: local managers able to make business decisions independently, innovatively, and confidently. M. Goldberg (29) has written that the Party is aware of this need, but that the present educational system is not able to provide managers with the appropriate training to function critically and creatively. He writes '...economic reform can only be built on a foundation of societal reform in ... work attitude, learning methods and philosophy, and much greater appreciation of, and reward for, individual action and
The PRC also has a need for managers who know about technology and can negotiate with foreign businesses. Hong Kong residents have access to training in the most up-to-date-management techniques and in modern technology.

(2) Seek expertise in computer and light technology. Wong and Chu noted that

A truly effective transfer of technology requires time and patience. It involves the training of local personnel, both on the job and abroad, and technical co-operation between foreign ... enterprises and domestic firms.

Modern equipment, parts, and expertise is available in Hong Kong, and is already being utilized by the PRC. Ho Yin-ping has identified trends of developments in the area of technological growth in Hong Kong and suggested that Hong Kong develop knowledge-based and technology-intensive industries which are "...geared toward higher skill levels and higher technology". Hong Kong's usefulness to China, he continues, extends to assisting its modernization in technology because its geographical proximity and cultural affinity "make Hong Kong a singularly convenient source".

(3) Look to the professional employment needs in the SEZ. The current shift to regional specialization (through SEZ's and other schemes) and development of a comprador links between local enterprises and foreign capital. These SEZ's are comprehensively developed and foreign investment is applied to manufacturing, real estate, tourism, and other services. However, impediments to these developments have emerged: bureaucratic hurdles, lack of foreign trade infrastructure, and
a reluctant attitude by foreign businesses (38) and the Shenzhen SEZ depends on Hong Kong for most of its external connections (39). Hong Kong has expertise in all of the areas which the SEZ's hope to develop and could provide at least the interim pool of professionals needed to manage the SEZ's.

(4.) Acquire training in marketing, financial and related service. Hsu argues that, because the PRC will not be able to develop its own infrastructure of marketing and trade experts immediately, "China is likely to continue to depend on Hong Kong as an important foreign exchange earner and a gateway to the West,...so long as China maintains its existing outward-oriented trade policy" (40). Hong Kong possesses a flexible and well-developed support structure of lawyers and financial experts, and is therefore a natural choice for promotion of PRC goods (41) as well as playing a role in supporting financial negotiations between the PRC and foreign customers (42). The ability of Hong Kong to secure and develop overseas markets for the PRC is, therefore, important to its prosperity.

(5.) Seek professional qualifications for the tourist industry. Hong Kong is a primary access and exit point to China due to its extensive system of international air links. Equally important is the nature of the industry in Hong Kong as opposed to that in the PRC. A. Donnithorne suggests that Hong Kong, because it is a competitive market economy, has developed skills which provide a better environment for tourism than the PRC, "...which has not had to trouble too much about consumer tastes" (43).

The survey questions whether, in this decade, educational and occupational decision-making are affected by people's perceptions of the PRC's actual and potential economic development. The Hong Kong people
II. AIM, OBJECTIVES, AND HYPOTHESIS OF THE SURVEY

A. The Aim

The fieldwork of the thesis attempts to test the line of analysis of the preceding section by examining in detail the educational implications of the new unique Hong Kong economic/socio-political nexus. However, rather than presenting a prescription for the 'ideal' educational and occupational structure which would satisfy economic and socio/political requirements, the aim is to demonstrate the readiness of present secondary school children to adapt to the imminent political changes and meet the requirements of the new economic, political, social configurations.

Information about the students' perceptions regarding the colony's labour requirements and about the demand for places in higher education is also generated.

B. The Objectives

The objectives are to obtain two sets of data from present students: 1. their educational and occupational plans and 2. their perceptions of linkages between their plans and 1997.

C. Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that Hong Kong upper secondary school children will be pragmatic in this decade in making educational and occupational choices.
The criteria for pragmatism will be:

1. Educational and occupational choices will reflect the probable impact of 1997 on the Hong Kong economy.
2. These plans will reflect the impact of the PRC's economic policies on Hong Kong.
3. Plans will not always coincide with the personal interests and likes of the students.

The focus therefore is on choice and the relationship between today's choices and the imminent merger. Their answers will reveal whether one segment of society is making decisions which will ease or interfere with 'stability and prosperity' in Hong Kong in the coming decade.

The following assumptions were made when setting the aims, objectives and hypothesis of the survey:

1. Hong Kong school children are aware of the merger.
2. Hong Kong school children and their parents are pragmatic about educational and occupational choices.
3. Hong Kong school children and their parents are aware of the impact of the takeover on future life opportunities.
4. Hong Kong people who have the option of leaving after 1997 may not have given priority to evaluation of the economic nexus of Hong Kong/PRC in guiding their children's educational choices.
5. The slogan 'the future stability and prosperity of Hong Kong' is immediately identified with the 1997 issue.

Variables (TABLE No. 1)

The independent and intervening variables were specified according to the following guidelines.
1. language of instruction: Chapter 2 establishes the importance of this variable.

2. birthplace of parents: T. Au and J. Harackiewicz (44), among others, have established the effect of parental expectations on Hong Kong children's academic performance. The relevant question is whether the children whose parents were born in the PRC respond to the choices differently as compared with those children of Hong Kong-born parents. In their comparative analysis of parental influence on occupational choice of adolescents, D. Podmore and D. Chaney wrote that one change in family relationships that accompanies modernization is "the decline of authority of parents over adolescent family members" (45). In the traditional Chinese family the parent has considerable authority, but the forces of westernization and industrialization tend to mitigate this influence (46). Hong Kong, however, has a dualistic nature, and the western economic system and emerging transitional social system is complemented by traditional behavior patterns. Therefore, differences between responses of children of Hong Kong-born parents and those of China-born parents might be expected since Hong Kong adolescents have been found to be more likely to accept parental authority than other groups (47).

3. gender: Research has found more parental pressure to succeed in careers was put on boys than girls in keeping with traditional Chinese values (48), and Fan reports that students' preferences for occupations were consistent with local gender stereotypes (49).

4. age/educational level: the study accepts the view elaborated in W.M. Williams that "...occupational choices and occupational decisions are
probably best regarded as largely continual processes in that they are
often the result of interaction over a protracted period between
aspiration, preference, self-discovery, influence, opportunity and
experience" (50).

5. socio-economic status: As described, the sample was limited to
those schools in lower and lower middle income residential areas of Hong
Kong. Housing status has been included as a measure of SES in several
studies done there. However, greater control was over measurement of this
variable was wanted, and biographical questions were included on the survey
form in order to further stratify the sample. Social researchers have used
various measures of socioeconomic status, including father's and mother's
education, father's occupation, and family income, when investigating Hong
Kong youth (51). There is, for example, a relationship between education
level and social status, as well as income and social status in Hong Kong.
Ng has cited research which revealed that youth are not knowledgeable about
the total income of their families, or that the answer may be casually
given, which results in inaccuracies (52). The education level of parents
was, therefore, included as an alternate measure of SES.

In addition, the students were asked to provide their parents' occupations. In those cases in which the coder was confident about making a
judgement, (e.g. where the parent's occupation was given as amah or
cleaner, or teacher or manager) a corresponding rating for SES was given.
In those cases where confidence was low because of imprecision in the name
of the parent's occupation, or because students reported not being sure of
parents' occupation, no rating was made.

6. source of influence over decisions: Item 2 asks for the student's
perception of who has the most influence on their occupational choice. In the case of wide variation, it will be investigated as a variable. The role of parents in guiding decisions of their children has been discussed by Lee, who reports that students depend on their parents for discussing career plans and have a positive attitude toward accepting the family's wishes about schooling and careers (53). Occupational guidance in schools in Hong Kong was generally performed by classroom teachers (54). Recently, however, special 'career teachers' have been appointed by the principals or elected by colleagues, but they encounter practical difficulties such as lack of facilities and resources, and attitudinal problems such as their unfavourable status which impede their work (55).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Intervening</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gender</td>
<td>1. Educational Choice</td>
<td>1. Language of Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. SES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. The Instrument Items - Rationale and Description

The instrument was divided into three sections. Following the biographical questions of part 1 described in the previous section, part 2 was made up of items about education plans. Formulation of these items was guided by five internal instrument objectives:

1. that they attempt to determine which choices of courses are most common;
2. that they attempt to determine which courses of study are perceived by students as most useful for ensuring a stable personal future;
3. that they identify a discrepancy between the choices of useful subjects and interesting subjects;
4. that they identify student opinions concerning which courses of study are best serving the future prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and
5. that they attempt to measure the motivation and realism of student plans.

Appropriate to the research questions 1, 2, and 3, items 11 through 13 of the instrument asked the student to report and assess those non-compulsory subjects being prepared for sitting the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination and Hong Kong Higher Level Examination or Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination. Pragmatic choices will reflect the influence on those choices of the local economic situation. For example, the practical qualifications are in areas such as Commercial Subjects, Computer Studies, Technology, Economics, and perhaps Chinese Language.

These items also asked the student to identify the subject most useful to his or her future and, secondly, the most interesting subject in order to measure discrepancy between interests and choices of subjects. If the examinations chosen are also judged useful, and if the choices diverge from interest, the students are being pragmatic and choosing a course with prospects, in their perception, as compared with studying an interesting area.

In addition, which item 14 asks students to report whether his or her own likes and dislikes are most important when choosing courses of study, is included as a check on the reliability of the answers obtained in
questions 17. It permits comparison of results with G. Chow's results in her analysis of interests and choice of major field among entering freshmen at the university.

Items 15 and 16 (asking whether the student believed that study in the PRC or in another foreign country would help the student to achieve career goals) attempt to measure the realism of students' attitudes toward the usefulness of various education credentials. For example, media reports have described the low status and discrimination which Hong Kong graduates of mainland universities have experienced upon return to the Hong Kong job market(56).

Item 17 investigates the basis of choice of course of study. The list provided includes four pragmatic options: my own interest in the area, confidence I can get a good grade, steady job prospects from the area of study, and preparation for a high-salary job. In addition, one altruistic option, usefulness of the area to the future of Hong Kong society, and one external option: my family's advice.

Item 18 (which asks students to evaluate secondary and tertiary subjects on the basis of how important it will be for Hong Kong to have citizens skilled in the area) is inserted to measure student perception of Hong Kong's workforce requirements.

Part 3 asked about occupation plans and formulation of these items was guided by the following objectives:

1. to attempt to determine which choices of occupations are most common
2. to attempt to determine which job characteristics are valued
3. to attempt to determine awareness of the economic and labour needs of Hong Kong;
4. to attempt to identify commitment to the development
to measure the realism of attitudes about and confidence in the future of the labour market in Hong Kong.

Item 19 asks them to indicate which occupation they prefer to pursue, and investigates whether career preferences are based on an adaptive response pattern. Leung et al. report that children in Hong Kong "even at an early age, have well-developed and realistic opinions about which occupation might be most advantageous for them to enter" (57), and Fan has found that students' choice of courses is related to preference for "types of jobs" (58). This item, therefore, is based on the assumption that, firstly, students have begun to consider which jobs they may want, and, secondly, that responses will be representative of student perception of which jobs will suit their perceived needs. Item 20 asks the student who has been most influential in advising them on this choice.

Item 21 is asked to determine values associated with career choice. The list is chosen from two areas: objective job characteristics "being my own boss", "... not all routine, is interesting", "a chance to travel", "good salary", "fringe benefits", "... technical work", "reasonable working hours", "offers me career stability", "good chance of getting promoted", and the individual or subjective perceptions of a job "should not be too difficult", "friendly co-workers", "gives pride in the job", "contributes to Hong Kong society", "contributes to PRC development" and "helping people". The list was constructed with partial reference to the model employed by Birnbaum et al., who, in their study of job characteristics models in Hong Kong, refer to core job dimensions of variety, identity, autonomy and job feedback and found that this model fits Hong Kong (59).

In order to determine awareness of the economic needs of Hong Kong, item 22 asks the student to rank career areas in terms of the long-term
survival of Hong Kong. The list was developed with reference to the
distribution of the working population by industry\(^{(60)}\) which lists
manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, tourism, transport
and communication, financing, real estate and service industries as the
leading categories of employment. The question is to measure the realism of
students about the role of different industries now in Hong Kong in
maintaining its continued prosperity. It is also an internal reliability
check when compared with the results of Question 18.

In accordance with objective number 5, by questioning attitudes about
career timing and location, items 23, 24 and 25 attempt to measure the
degree to which this generation is intimidated by the uncertainties
surrounding the transfer.

Item 26 which asks students to choose the three most respected careers
in Hong Kong is a reliability check. Students whose answers deviated from
the most usual answers were eliminated from the final sample. Item 27
attempted to determine the advice parents are giving students about career
choice by asking what type of work parents have suggested.

To measure confidence in their future in Hong Kong, item 28 asks the
student to measure the likelihood of various explanations for a Hong Kong
student failing to achieve career goals. Students in Hong Kong often report
that the level of competition, both during their schools year and also when
they enter the job market, is very intense. This question attempts to
determine whether a new factor, uncertainty over the future, is affecting
their perceptions of obstacles to achieving goals.

III. EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS

A. The Sample

The selection of the sample was guided by the hypothesis: the focus is
on choices and the relationship between choice and merger. Hence, it was important to attempt to eliminate those students who would not have to make the choices, i.e., those who will emigrate. Hence the sample is a stratified one on two levels: the schools were chosen to fall into the pre-selected category by income level, and within the schools, children were selected according to their responses relating to parental SES.

1. The Schools (TABLE No. 2)

The fieldwork was carried out in March 1987 in 18 upper secondary schools in Forms 3 through 7. These schools were chosen with requirements:

1. that they should serve those Chinese children who will probably not have the option of emigrating, and 2. that they should be in proportion to a cross-section of schools in language, grade, location, and type (Government, aided, private).

To meet the first requirement, schools were limited to those serving lower and lower-middle income groups. The successful candidates for emigration are generally those with either skills and/or finances to establish themselves in a new country(61). It was assumed that children from lower-income families are less likely to have an opportunity to emigrate. Lower, middle-lower income status was determined at three steps in the selection process. Firstly, this condition was specified to the local school administrators assisting in the school selection; secondly, the principals of the schools recommended by the administrators were questioned about the income level of the average family of children attending the school, and thirdly, questions 7-9 on the instrument attempted to obtain information about the socio-economic status of the students.

Responses to initial requests for assistance in obtaining access to schools were not reassuring. One correspondent, a lecturer at a Hong Kong
university, wrote of the difficulties in gaining agreement from principals because of "their conservatism" in the current climate in Hong Kong. However, eventually entry into 18 schools was obtained with assistance from individuals connected with various aspects of the education system. Of the 16 used for the final study, 14 were aided and two were government schools. No private schools were visited because of their reluctance to take part in the project. (Two other aided schools were used for the pilot study.)

Of schools in the final study three use Chinese as the language of instruction and 13 use the English language. This meant that 187 Chinese Middle school children and 977 from English Secondary schools, yielding a ratio 1:5 of Chinese to English instruction in the sample.

The geographic distribution of the schools is five urban schools on Hong Kong island, 2 estate schools in the New Territories New Towns, and 8 urban and estate schools in a wide area of Kowloon (See Table 2). The rural areas were not included in the instrument because of lack of access.
TABLE No. 2 - The Type, Language and Location of Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools used in Survey</th>
<th>Colony Schools (62)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aided</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong Island</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kowloon</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Territories</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The Children (TABLE No. 3)

The attitudes of the present generation of secondary school children toward the takeover are the concern of this survey. Contemporary children are not free to make personal and academic choices based solely on the goal of social and financial advancement. They must consider the uncertainties of 1997 and the changes the territory will undergo before and after that date. However, the thesis argues that they have been influenced by the Hong Kong environment and will respond in a pragmatic, problem-solving approach to the obstacles to achieving their personal goals.

a. Within the stratified sample of schools, children were allocated to the study by the principal according to the convenience of the school schedule on the particular day the researcher was invited. Principals, however, attempted to accommodate the wishes of the researcher in terms of
obtaining an overall proportionate sample of grade levels, sex, and course of study. The sample eventually included a proportionate number of students from each form with one exception. Although the distributions of Forms Three through Five represent the colony-wide enrolments for the 1986 school year, the proportion for Form Six students is higher than the colony proportion.

In the matriculation courses for the 1986/1987 school year, the ratio between Form Six and Form Seven students was 3:2. At the time the survey was conducted, Form Seven students were preparing for examinations and were not available. (See TABLE 3.)

Responses to the question about the level of education students wish to achieve showed that eighty percent wish to complete tertiary education.

Curriculum at this level is strongly academic and is aimed at preparing students for higher education (63).
### TABLE No. 3 The Grade and Gender of the Students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample:</th>
<th>Colony:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 3</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 4</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 5</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 6</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form 7</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Total</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony Total</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The Parents (TABLE No. 4)

As shown in Table No. 4, twenty two percent of students reported that both parents were born in Hong Kong. The recent census showed that of
people of the age group of their parents, thirty nine percent report being born in Hong Kong. The probability of a child having both parents born in Hong Kong would, then, be about half of that number. Since the projected figure and the obtained figure are similar, confidence in the reporting of the respondents is satisfactory.

Asked about the highest level of schooling their parents had attained, approximately 30% were unsure of the schooling of their mothers or their fathers. Of the remainder, the obtained percentages compare favourably with colony-wide percentages. The question about the education attainment of parents was combined with a question asking for the father's and mother's occupation. This was to increase confidence regarding the SES of the participants. There exists in Hong Kong a high relationship between education level and future income. Information from these two questions was used to deselect those students whose family may have reached a higher SES than was wanted in the survey.
# TABLE No. 4 Parental Birthplace and School Achievement

**Birthplace of Parents:**
- both HK born: 22%
- one HK born: 51.7%
- neither HK born: 18.3%
- unsure: 7.2%

**School Achievement of Parents:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obtained Figures</th>
<th>Colony-wide Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Limitations of the Fieldwork Project**

1. Confidentiality, in the opinion of the researcher, must be total because of the political environment in Hong Kong and in the PRC. The traditional reluctance of the Hong Kong people to participate in social research has been increased by the uncertainties surrounding the nature and degree of personal freedom to be available under the coming regime. Personal correspondence with educators in Hong Kong indicates "the traditional conservatism of Hong Kong principals has increased recently and indicates that there could be a risk of embarrassment to those professionals who cooperate with the research. The political situation in Hong Kong has hardened the well-established reluctance of Hong Kong residents to be...
B. Chung and Z. Kwok describe the political fears and discuss other factors(64). "People are usually suspicious when they are being interviewed. Usually they conclude that the interviewers are from the government but under disguise... Another inhibiting factor is the reserved personality of most Chinese. ... They do not like talking about themselves - revealing themselves to other people. All these [factors] are especially true when the 'other people' are strangers"(65).

2. The researcher does not speak or write Chinese at a level commensurate with conducting this investigation without the aid of translators. To mitigate the effects of this - as indicated earlier - the translated survey was back-translated as well as piloted among Hong Kong people.

IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SURVEY

The project was divided into four phases. These are: Phase 1: Design of the Instrument, Phase 2: The Pilot Testing, Phase 3: Administration of the Study, and Phase 4, Coding, Analysis and Interpretation of the Data.

Phase 1: Design of the Instrument

It was decided to use a written instrument rather than an interview technique for two reasons. More students could be reached in the one month available for carrying out the research, and it would be possible to use Chinese in a written format since the researcher does not speak Cantonese. On the other hand, use of a written format meant that the instrument had to be simpler and that no additional information or clarifications could be requested. In addition, strict control over the pace at which the students responded was lost(66).

The instrument has 30 questions of which 12 are biographical. The
issue of question sequence had to be addressed. The biographical questions were placed at the beginning of the instrument because of the desire to reassure the students of the confidentiality of their answers. By making the degree of anonymity clear immediately, reluctance to answer sensitive questions could be partially avoided.

Earlier researchers commented on the difficulty respondents in Hong Kong experience with hypothetical questions (67). Factual questions in the form of dichotomized scales of three points, multiple choice and open-ended questions are suggested formats (68). Therefore, dichotomized scales and multiple-item questions have been used wherever possible. In those items in which a multiple-item indicator was impossible and a single-item question was used, retest questions have been incorporated into the instrument. Open questions were avoided in all but two places because of the need to have the answers translated into English upon coding the data.

All noncognitive tests are susceptible to response set, that is the tendency of the individual to reply in a particular direction, almost independent of content. Therefore during instrument construction, steps were taken to control response set following the guidelines in Mehrens (69) that response is most prevalent on tests that (1) contain ambiguous items, (2) require a disagree/agree column, or (3) lend themselves to responses in either a favourable or unfavourable direction.

The instrument was written in English but translated into Chinese. Chinese is the mother tongue of all of the participants, but it was also hoped, through the use of Chinese, to avoid bias because of comprehension difficulties or because of any negative attitudes toward English. The preparation of the English draft followed closely the guidelines of R. Brislin on the methods of preparing questionnaires which are to be translated (70). Commenting on the importance of clear wording in the
original version, he wrote "Questionnaire wording and translation go hand in hand, since it is difficult for a bilingual to translate poorly written passages into another language"(71).

The English draft of the instrument was commented upon by Lecturers in the Institute of Education. Suggestions were made on the content, relationship of the questions to the hypothesis, format, question sequence, and appropriateness of the questions to statistical analysis and discussions were held about the validity of the instrument.

After translation by a paid professional translation agency in London, the instrument was back-translated into English. Again following guidelines suggested by Brislin(72), the English instrument was revised by the researcher in consultation with the translator, who then translated it again into Chinese. It was then administered to 15 London-based bilingual Hong Kong Chinese who suggested changes in the names of some of the academic subjects; added several colloquialisms unique to Hong Kong, and made suggestions on the Chinese translation. All of these suggestions were incorporated into the version taken to Hong Kong.

The instrument was then examined by a professional translator in Hong Kong who further adapted course names to the present Hong Kong environment. A back-translation was then done which resulted in changes in several of the categories for answers. The instrument was then accepted in its Chinese version as clear and appropriate to the Hong Kong context.

**Phase 2: The Pilot Testing**

The instrument was piloted first among a group of 15 Hong Kong secondary school leavers, and then in two Hong Kong secondary schools - reaching 100 Form 5 students. Following the guidelines in deVaus, the purpose of the pilot study was to evaluate(73):

1. the sensitivity of each item to discriminate
2. the coder reliability and validity of each item
3. freedom from redundancy
4. absence of response set
5. length and convenience of administration
6. acceptability to the students.

The pilot study revealed several things. Firstly, all students completed the instrument, apparently conscientiously but in slightly over the allotted time. The invigilating teachers posed questions relating to two sets of directions. Examination of the scores for discrimination resulted in two questions being eliminated because over a third of answers were in the 'unsure' category or left blank. Other modifications as a result of pilot testing were a reduction in length in order to ensure that students could complete within 25 minutes and a rewriting of the directions on two questions. No evidence of response set was noticed during the pilot study.

Reliability is best ascertained by retesting with the same population (74). This was not possible during the period of the fieldwork, and therefore internal reliability checks on several key questions were included. Coding was carried out by one person which minimizes the element of unreliability introduced by coder differences.

Phase 3: The Survey

Fieldwork took place during March, 1987 and lasted four weeks. Details of this phase follow in section V. After the pilot testing and revision, the instrument was administered in 16 additional schools. In order to remove any effect of having a foreigner in the classroom, the instrument was distributed in all cases by the classroom teachers. They were directed to explain the purpose (as described in the title of the instrument) and assure the students that it was not a test. In most cases, 15-20 minutes
was required for completion.

During each school visit, the principal assigned the teachers to distribute the instrument and explain the necessary instructions. The students were instructed to fill in the forms by themselves, to complete the form, and not to reveal their identity on the form. The principals then answered the researcher's questions about the socio-economic status of the population. The researcher remained at the school in all cases to help in case of doubt about questions or instructions.

Phase 4: Analysis and Interpretation of Results

Data preparation and analysis was completed with the assistance of the computer services of the Institute of Education. Details of interpretation appear in Section V of this chapter.

V: RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SURVEY

This section presents the analysis of data obtained from the questionnaire. It is organized on a question by question basis, followed by a summary.

Education Choices

Responses to Question 11 about preparation for the HKCEE (Figure No. 1, page 274) indicate that Science subjects were chosen most frequently. The predominance of Science can be explained by the fact that, in Hong Kong, it is regarded as a broad academic preparation for tertiary studies in Medicine (a highly sought-after qualification since the opening of the Medical School at CUHK in 1982), Engineering, Technology, Social Sciences, and the other sciences. Admissions policies of tertiary institutions have a great effect on the curricula of secondary schools, and the drive to gain a place at one of the universities is so strong that schools must take the admissions policies into account in planning curricula (75). These admission
policies favour competence in science(76). Fan wrote that "social pressure from school or parents [encourages students to] clog science classes and compete for the very few places in the universities, which, given the unstable economic and political situation, may not ensure them a rewarding career"(77). Interestingly on this point, only 3% of students responded in Question 19 that they are interested in a career in pure science areas, whereas a high percentage indicated science-derived professions in technology, medicine, etc. (Figure No. 11, p. 291).

A.J. Youngson, in an analysis of the role of technical and scientific education in Hong Kong's future economic prosperity, describes the positive side to the heavy emphasis on Science study(78). According to Youngson, education in the "scientific way of thinking" can contribute to economic growth in Hong Kong through its modernizing effect on thinking, and consequently on decreasing the need to import foreign technology.

The percentage of students choosing Science examinations at the HKCEE level has declined significantly over the past 12 years in favour of subjects such as commerce and accounting(79). In summary, then, the preference for science examination courses is derived from the flexibility of the qualification in the Hong Kong education system, its high-status in the Chinese community(80) and its broad usefulness in preparing students for a range of career areas in Hong Kong, including technological skills(81).

The result for Chinese Language is high (Figure No. 2, page 275). Forty-three percent of Form 3 students chose it, although the number dropped respectively to 30%, and 11% across the upper grade levels. No other subject had the same sharp downward pattern of choice. Economics showed an upward trend, rising from 9.5% of choices in Form 3 to 45% in Form 5. The high percentage of responses for English studies continues the
No. 1 % Distribution of examination courses chosen for preparation for the HKCEE - Forms 3-5 - 845 students.

11 non-compulsory examination courses are listed:
1. Commercial Subjects
2. Chinese Language and Literature
3. English Language and Literature
4. Chinese History
5. Science (Biology, Chemistry, Physics)
6. Computer Studies
7. Design and Technology
8. Metalwork
9. Economics
10. Geography
11. Economics
12. History
13. Art and Design
14. Civic Education
Figure No. 2  % Distribution of Chinese Language course chosen for preparation for the HKCEE - Forms 3-5. 845 students
historical preference for English which was described in Chapter 2. Responses, as shown in Figure No. 3, (page 280), on the usefulness of HKCEE examination show that students are planning to prepare for those fields which they consider most practical. This is despite the fact that there are various other factors which affect the choice of subjects for the School Certificate such as school organization, pass rates of various subjects, and the reputation of individual schools in various subjects. The choices in this case also support the hypothesis.

Answers to Question 12, Figure No. 4, (page 281) showed the same pattern, although the question was related to the HKHL or HKAL exams which prepare for entrance to the universities and other forms of higher education. A greater total percentage of choices is given to the subjects which the study argues are pragmatic choices. The results, as shown in Figure No. 5, (page 282), on the usefulness of fifteen part course examination subject courses to their future, suggest that students understand the Hong Kong economic situation: asked to choose one from the list, three courses related to business and economics received over half of the selections. These courses, plus English Language and Literature, represent the top four choices and comprise 59.6% of the total sample. Chapter 2 has described the practical factors involved in English study and it remains a pragmatic choice. The results, when controlled for the variable of language of instruction, show significant differences at the 0.001 level of significance. Although both groups agreed about the usefulness of Business Studies, Principles of Accounts, and Economics, students at Chinese language schools chose humanities courses more often than students at English language schools.
Responses about interests were widely scattered over the course list. The top three choices of 'useful to my future', which represented 51% of that list comprised only 23% of the most interesting choices. Most interesting to the students are the science courses (40.2% of the total), with Chinese History and Language comprising the second largest interest area (12%) (Figure No. 6, page 283).

Eighty percent of students responding to this survey indicated that their own interest in the course was 'very important' or 'important' when selecting what to study. This figure is similar to that obtained by Chow, who reported that 97% of freshmen at university select their major field out of interest (83) - however, three quarters of Chow's group also believed their major course would lead to a promising career (84).

In responding to Question 15, 87% indicated that study in China would not be useful in achieving their career goals, but responding to Question 16, 75% expressed the opinion that study in an Overseas country would help them achieve their goals. This suggests a high degree of realism among the group surveyed. A recent investigation into the employment patterns of Hong Kong students who have graduated from mainland tertiary institutions (85), revealed that these graduates, upon return to Hong Kong, "face discrimination from employers", have a more difficult time finding employment, and "often earn less" than their Hong Kong trained counterparts. There has also been recent acknowledgement by PRC officials that Western training in technology, management and business techniques is desirable as it will contribute to the modernizations. Study in the PRC offers, however, an alternative to those students wanting tertiary education but who fail to gain a place in Hong Kong and do not have the capital to study abroad.

Question 17 asks on what basis the student will choose an area of
study and gives six options asking the student to indicate the importance of each. As Figure No. 7 (page 284) demonstrates, responses show that interest in the subject and its overall usefulness as preparation for a desirable job are of more importance to the students than making a personal contribution to the future of Hong Kong in selecting a course of study. These responses were independent of all variables.

Question 18 asks students to evaluate areas of study according to how important it will be to Hong Kong to have people skilled in the respective areas. Asked to choose the one most important subject, 26.0% of students chose Law and Politics, the subject regarded as most important by the highest number of students (Figure No. 8, p. 285). The next three subjects, Marketing/International Business, Economics and Computer and Technical Studies were regarded by 49.1% of choices to be most important, higher even than Medicine and Health Care (only 4.5%). Law/Politics, Marketing/International Business/Banking, Computer and Technical/Electronic Studies and Economics represent the top 4 choices and account for 65% of all selections. Of the four, three support the hypothesis that attitudes reflect the reality of the effect of the four modernizations. The selection of Law/Politics was unexpected and this factor emerges again in responses to Questions 19 and 22. The debates about the form the government of the HKSAR will take has been receiving extensive media coverage and has become a public issue. Although at the time of the fieldwork, the debate was not as much in the forefront of the news as it became later in the year, this finding is consistent with the findings of a poll conducted in the autumn of 1987(86). This showed that, of the people who are in favour of holding direct elections, 60% are between the ages of 18 and 24 years old. It suggests that that the group responsible for the Hong Kong in the future recognize the need for Hong Kong to develop a capable pool of
politically-skilled individuals.

Boys were more confident of the usefulness of Business studies (0.008 significance level), Mathematics (0.003), Technical Studies (0.02), and Engineering (0.003) (They appear to prefer it as course work also since about 70% of science majors at the Chinese University are male.) However, boys are less confident than girls of the usefulness of Psychology (0.003 significance level), Sociology (0.000) and Social Work (0.003). These differences in attitudes and achievement in science vs. arts courses between girls and boys has been attributed to the "stereo-typed role-playing expected of the children by both parents and teachers"(87)(88).

Question 19 asked the student to indicate which career they were most interested in, should they achieve their education goals (Figure No. 9, page 286). Again, despite the unsettled political and legal future, government, law, and politics emerge as an area of interest. Careers in government have been highly desirable in the colonial environment of Hong Kong as they are well-paying and stable. Chinese society has always respected the professional administrator. However, the present government will cease to exist as these students are beginning their careers, and it is, therefore, unlikely that responses reflect the historical situation.

This factors of government and law has emerged in response to other questions and it is suggested that students are aware of the need for Hong Kong to develop local political and legal expertise in this area. Careers in finance and business were chosen almost equally by boys and girls, but there were significant differences in other areas. Boys chose Science almost six times as often as girls, chose Computer and Technology over ten times as often as girls. Girls preferred careers in translation and tourism.
Figure No. 3 % Distribution of student perception of usefulness of HKCEE examination subjects. M.S. students

Key: all non-compulsory examination courses are listed.
1. Commercial Subjects
2. Chinese Language and Literature
3. English Language and Literature
4. Chinese History
5. Science (Biology, Chemistry, Physics)
6. Computer Studies
7. Design and Technology
8. Metalwork
9. Economics
10. Geography
11. Economics
12. History
13. Art and Design
14. Civic Education
Figure No. 4  % Distribution of examination courses chosen for preparation for HKHL and HKAL examination - Forms 6-7. 320 students

Key: All non-compulsory examination courses are listed.
1. Biology
2. Chemistry
3. Business Studies
4. Chinese History
5. Chinese Language and Literature
6. Economics
7. Economics and Public Affairs
8. English Literature
9. Geography
10. History
11. Other Approved Language
12. Physics
13. Principles of Accounts
14. Religious Studies
15. Sociology
Figure No. 5  % Distribution of student perception of usefulness of HKHL and HKAL examination subjects - Forms 6-7. 320 students

Key: all non-compulsory examination courses are listed.
1. Biology
2. Chemistry
3. Business Studies
4. Chinese History
5. Chinese Language and Literature
6. Economics
7. Economics and Public Affairs
8. English Literature
9. Geography
10. History
11. Other Approved Language
12. Physics
13. Principles of Accounts
14. Religious Studies
15. Sociology
Figure No. 6 % Distribution of students' interest in HKHL and HKAL examination subjects - Forms 6-7. 320 students

Key: all non-compulsory examination courses are listed.
1. Biology
2. Chemistry
3. Business Studies
4. Chinese History
5. Chinese Language and Literature
6. Economics
7. Economics and Public Affairs
8. English Literature
9. Geography
10. History
11. Other Approved Language
12. Physics
13. Principles of Accounts
14. Religious Studies
15. Sociology
Figure No. 7  Basis upon which academic courses are chosen by students - Forms 3-7.

Key: White area: very important  
Black area: important

1. Personal interest in the subject  
2. Confidence in earning a good grade in the course  
3. Possibility of a high-paying job upon completion of the course  
4. Steady job prospects in the area  
5. Skills in the area are useful to the future of Hong Kong  
6. Following parents' advice
Figure No. 8  % Distribution of student perception of the most important skill area in terms of the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong - Forms 3-7. 

Key to Skill Areas:
1. Business Studies
2. Psychology
3. Accounting
4. Translation
5. Banking
6. Architecture
7. Medicine
8. Science
9. Management
10. Law and Legal Studies
11. Engineering
12. Education
13. Technical Studies
14. Computer Studies
15. Mathematics
16. Social Work
17. Economics
18. Sociology
19. Marketing
Figure No. 9 % Distribution of preferred careers - Forms 3-7. NS student.

Key to Career Areas:
1. Science
2. Medicine, Education, Social Work
3. Tourism
4. Finance and Business
5. Government, Law
6. Translation
7. Arts
8. Computer or Electronic Technology
Question 20 asks the students to rank parents, self, friends, career counselor and teachers in terms of who would have greater influence on your job choice (Figure No. 10, page 290).

Students were next asked to report what features are important to them in evaluating the attractiveness of a job. Figure No.11 (page 291) shows that the students value interesting, non-routine work in a friendly work environment, with good promotion prospects. They want a good salary and employment package, and career stability. These objective job characteristics are more important to them than the difficulty of the work, taking pride in the work or opportunities for travel. More of a spread of results was obtained for the factor “contributes to Hong Kong society”, whereas contributing to the PRC received an even less enthusiastic response with 57% rating it not important at all. This aspect is self-centered, consistent with the findings reported by T. S. Cheung and S.Y. Tam who concluded from their research that adolescents in Hong Kong have an ‘egoistic mentality”

The trend is also consistent with Birnbaum’s study of job characteristics models in Hong Kong with reference to ‘core job dimensions’ of variety, identity, autonomy and job feedback, found that this categorization model is applicable to Hong Kong (90). The factor which showed significant relationship to the variable of birthplace of parents was “helping other people”. Responses, significant at the 0.002 level, showed that children of Hong Kong-born parents were most likely to check this as very important and children of two PRC-born parents were most likely to rate it as not important.

Overall, other results are independent of the factor of birthplace of parents, in that for all items, whether the parents were both born in Hong Kong or not, had no significant effect on the values of the child. However,
trends, though not reaching the level of significance of 0.04%, were observable. The factor of promotion prospects was dependent at the 0.05% level, showing that children both of whose parents were born in Hong Kong valued promotion prospects higher than other groups. The factor of contributing to the good of Hong Kong showed 0.05% independence, with children of both Hong Kong-born parents showing the greatest commitment (81%; (1) and (2)) and children with neither parent born in Hong Kong, the least (82%; (2) and (3)).

Examining the effects of the variable of sex, there are several significant results. On the 'helping people' factor, the girls demonstrated (0.002 significant) more positive attitudes towards this. Whereas 65% of 'not important' ratings came from boys, 50% of the 'very important' responses came from girls, although they represented only 43% of the total number of respondents. Significant at the 0.01 level, differences in responses to the factor 'contributes to the development of the PRC', were observable. Boys were 2.5 times more likely to rate this as 'very important', although this response represented only 9% of all the boys rankings. Fifty-four percent of them indicated it was not important, and 60% of girls had the same response.

The factor 'offers me career stability' was significantly (0.008) more important to boys: 48% responded 'very important' and only 40% of girls. Technical work was preferred more by boys also. 74% ranked it 'very important' or 'important', compared with 55% of the girls. There were also significant differences in the responses to 'good salary and benefits' factor. Forty-seven percent of boys as against 37% of girls rated it 'very important' and, in percentage terms, twice as many girls rated it 'not important'. This is significant at the 0.004 level. The opportunity to travel was more important to girls (0.009 significance), and the factor...
not too difficult, although gaining only a 0.05 level of significance, suggested that girls are more concerned about this factor. 40% of boys rated this as "very important" or "important" as compared with 44.4% of girls.

Question 22 asked students to select the five career areas which would make the greatest contribution to the survival of Hong Kong and rank them from 1-5. (Figure No. 19, page 292.)

Financial Services was selected most often for the list, and also received the greatest number of first and second place nominations. Law and Legal Services was the second most often selected and also received the second highest number of combined first and second place nominations. Electronics received the third highest number of first and second place nominations, receiving 226 combined. Manufacturing was selected for the list the third highest number of times and received 198 combined first and second place nominations. Communications and transportation received 152. These represent the top five choices. Students again indicated their concern about provision of people skilled in legal areas (Appendix No. 2).
Figure No. 10 % Distribution of individuals who have influence over career decisions - Forms 3-7. 1165 students

Key: Black: very influential
White: Influential

1. Parents
2. Self
3. School Career counsellor
4. Teachers
5. Friends
Figure No. 11 % Distribution of student perception of important features of jobs - Forms 3-7. 1465 students

Key to Features:
1. should not be too difficult
2. friendly co-workers
3. gives pride in the job
4. good chances of promotion
5. contributes to Hong Kong society
6. not all routine, interesting
7. a chance to travel
8. good salary, fringe benefits
9. technical work
10. reasonable working hours
11. offers career stability
12. contributes to PRC development
13. helping people
14. being my own boss
Figure No. 12. Distribution of student perception of career areas most important to the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong - Forms 3-7. NUS students

Key to Career Areas:
1. financial and business services
2. law and legal services
3. industry and manufacturing
4. electronics and computer technology
5. communications and transport
6. arts and humanities education
7. construction industry
8. tourism services
9. journalism
10. languages/translation
11. community services
12. real estate/housing
13. merchandizing/sales
Overall 28% responded to Question 23 by indicating that the unsettled future of Hong Kong will cause him or her to delay a decision on an occupation, (Table No. 5). Gender appears to affect the results. The responses, when controlled for the gender of the respondent, showed that only 19% of girls answered that they would delay making career plans because of the unsettled future, compared with 35% of boys who indicated they would delay making plans. Responses to Question 24 showed that 39% of students believe that their best career prospects are working for a Hong Kong Chinese firm, whereas 55% believe their best career prospects are working for a foreign firm in Hong Kong.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Will delay making career plans due to unsettled future of Hong Kong:</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Good career prospects are with a Hong Kong-owned firm:</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Good career prospects are with a foreign-owned (not including the PRC) firm:</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 26 asked students to rank 12 careers on the basis of prestige.
in Hong Kong. Each student’s answers were controlled for realism against the results, and those which deviated from the top five in two cases were eliminated (Appendix No. 3).

Question 27 asked students, in an open-ended question, to report the career advice they had been given by their parents. Eighty-one percent of students reported they had been given advice by their parents, but only 26% of this number indicated what had been the nature of the advice. Due to the apparent fault in question design, the results are not thought to be valid and will not be discussed.

Question 28 asked how likely it was that various factors, including the changes occurring in Hong Kong’s government, could prevent a person from achieving career goals (Figure No. 13, page 295). The results support the widespread perception that the intense competition in Hong Kong is felt throughout a person’s school life. Students also appear more convinced of its effects on their achievement; only 8.7% report being unsure about this.

Although not regarded by students to be the greatest obstacle, 57.8% stated that it was very likely or possible that changes in the Hong Kong Government could prevent a student from achieving career goals, and 34% (the highest percentage in this category) reported being uncertain of the effect of this event on achieving goals. Also, a significantly greater (0.04 level) of boys than girls reported that this factor is very likely to interfere with achieving career goals (63% vs. 37%). This is consistent with the findings on Question 23 which asked whether a student would delay making career plans because of the unstable future. Controlled for sex of respondent, boys revealed more uncertainty about the future and a greater likelihood to delay making plans (see also Appendix No. 4).
Figure No. 13  % Distribution of student perception of factors which may impede realization of career goals - Forms 3-7.

Key: White: very likely  
Black: possible

1. lack of interest in the area
2. lack of preparation for the career
3. the high degree of competition in Hong Kong
4. the unsettled nature of the Hong Kong political environment
5. lack of hard work in the career
Students did not, however, feel that the uncertain future of Hong Kong was the most likely explanation for students not achieving career goals. Asked which of the factors was the most likely explanation, 40% reported that the degree of competition in Hong Kong was the biggest obstacle to personal success. (See also Appendix No. 5).

VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this section a summary of main findings, followed by general conclusions, will be presented. In interpreting the results there are several important points to keep in mind. Firstly, the aim of the survey was to determine whether educational choices and occupational plans are pragmatic in this decade of political change in Hong Kong. The objectives were to obtain data about these choices and plans, and about possible linkages between these plans and 1997. Secondly, the sample attempts to reflect a cross-section of Hong Kong school children who will remain in Hong Kong after 1997, and does not claim to represent perceptions of all school children. Although independent and intervening variables did affect some response patterns, the survey's purpose was not to investigate differences between groups, but to investigate a broad response pattern in the relevant age group. Lastly, this survey is intended to be illustrative of - or to ground - one aspect of the argument of the thesis.

Overall, the results show that the students surveyed have a two-pronged attitude toward the problems posed by merger. On the one hand, there is a high percentage of students who plan to obtain qualifications in areas which, the chapter has demonstrated, correspond to Hong Kong's international economic status and to the PRC's recent economic policy. The transfer of Hong Kong to the PRC is eliciting a pragmatic response from students: there is an emphasis on acquiring qualifications in areas related
to Financial Services, Business, Light Technology and Tourism. These plans reflect the probable impact on Hong Kong of the PRC's economic policies, which, as broadly described, emphasize re-linking with the international economic community and the transfer of technology into the PRC. Analysis of the impact of these policies on the Hong Kong economy suggested that it would be pragmatic to acquire several types of skills. These include training in managerial and production skills, expertise in computer and light technology, acquisition of expertise needed by the SEZs, and, lastly, training in marketing, financial and related services. All of these areas are represented in the findings of the survey.

Students' perceptions of the skills which will be necessary for the HKSAR to remain stable and prosperous are, therefore, highly realistic, conforming with opinions of economic analysts. Educational choices coincide more with the pragmatic selections than they do with the reported interests of the students.

On the other hand, equally and consistently high scores for choices in the category of Law, Politics, Government on many questions suggest that students are also concerned about the need for persons skilled in areas needed for Hong Kong to govern itself. Students appear to be concerned about the impact of imminent localization of many aspects of government on the manpower needs of the colony. This dual aspect to the responses is consistent with the suggestion, made in Section 1, that two important issues have emerged in Hong Kong: the issue of local political mobilization and the role of Hong Kong in the economic aspects of China's modernization. In both of these areas, students describe a need for trained people to ensure the future stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Their reported educational choices and occupational plans correspond with probable demands of Hong Kong's economic and political situation, with
variables of medium of instruction, birthplace of parents, and sex were of
varying and scattered influence on the results (91).

In conclusion, Chapter IV described empirical research into the
reactions of secondary school youth to the public issue. The research
suggests that the established, pragmatic behaviours, which have
classified Hong Kong society in the past, are being utilized to meet the
challenges posed by the unfamiliar socio-economic contexts. The research
has indicated that students plan to equip themselves with those
professional skills needed in the emerging economic environment. Students
also, however, perceive a need for people possessing skills to cope with
the changing political environment. These behaviours and perceptions are
adaptive and consistent with previous patterns of response to
socio-economic change - essentially problem-solving in nature and with the
aim of increasing personal reward from the situation.

Fve describes the Chinese as "supreme realists who are quick to adjust
their behaviour in order to exploit the logic of whatever situation they
find themselves in" and who act according to circumstances of the
moment (92). Other social scientists observe that the Chinese believe it is
highly reasonable for people to act according to what makes sense for them
in a particular circumstance (93). Chapter II attempted to demonstrate how
this characteristic has been utilized in the past by Hong Kong residents to
cope with rapid economic and demographic changes. In the present
circumstances of socio-political conflict and change, the survey suggests
that these characteristics are again being applied to new circumstances.

The thesis argued in Chapter I that the issues of transfer of
sovereignty and its effects on the stability of Hong Kong have become
salient in this decade. The results of this survey suggest that students
have been affected by the public nature of the transfer issues, and of the
potential legal and political problems involved in the decolonization and
transfer. Their perception that Hong Kong’s most urgent requirement is for
citizens skilled in Law and Government reveals concern about administration
of legal and political matters of the territory. The relationship between
these socio-political demands of the students and the content of schooling
is, therefore, brought into question, and will be discussed in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 4 FOOTNOTES


3. Ibid.


6. Ibid., p. 466.

7. Ibid.

8. However, the international status of the languages changed also. Chinese was perceived to have a lower international status after the agreement. Ibid., p. 465.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid, p. 5.


16. Kim, in Maxwell and McFarlane, op. cit., p. 221.


19. Joseph Chai, "Industrial Cooperation between China and Hong Kong", in Youngson, China and Hong Kong ..., op. cit., 104-155, p. 130 - 139.

20. "From the top down", FEER, 11.11.86, p. 84.


22. David K.Y. Chu and Kwan-yiu Wong, "Modernization and the Lessons of the Special Economic Zones", in Wong and Chu, (eds), Modernization in China ..., op. cit., 200-217, p. 213. The Government has found it necessary to defend the SEZ's against the criticisms of Party left-wingers. SEZ's (Special Economic Zones) are relatively prosperous economic zones whose special status granting them autonomy in the development of foreign trade have made them more prosperous than the rest of China. See Wong and Chu, op. cit., pp. 35-37.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.


30. Ibid., p. 31.


32. Ibid.

33. Joseph Chai, in Youngson, op. cit., p. 130.

35. Ibid., p. 200.


38. Ibid., p. 10.


41. Ibid., p. 179.


43. Audrey Donnithorne, "Hong Kong as an Economic Model for the Great Cities of China", in A.J. Youngson, *China and Hong Kong The Economic Nexus*, op. cit., 282-310, p. 305.


45. David Podmore and David Chaney, "Parental Influence on the Occupational Choice of Young Adults in Hong Kong, and Comparisons with the United States, the Philippines and Japan", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, XIV, 1-2, 104-111.


52. Ibid. p. 3.

53. Gennie Lee Gen Hwa, An Enquiry into the Cultural Values of Form 5 Students with Special Reference to Special Reference to Certain Sociological and Educational Decisions facing Hong Kong Adolescents, unpublished M.Phil Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1974, p. 97.


56. "China graduates face tough times in HK", SCMP, 8.8.86. Emily Lau also reports that "tens of thousands of well educated and skilled people" are emigrating in 1987 alone, and reports that the emigration problem is likely to continue and worsen in the coming years. The outflow of capital is more difficult to measure, but as Lau notes "easier to achieve". "On to greener pastures", FEER, 18.6.87, p. 22-25.


58. Fan, op. cit., p. 11.


61. See for example "Crashing into China", The Times, 5.1.88, p. 10, and "Blocking the Brain Drain", SCMP, 3.1.88.


65. Ibid. p.307.

An individual exhibiting response set will answer identical questions (but presented in different formats) differently. For example, he may be predisposed to select the neutral category, or the 'true' statement, or he may guess at all items he is unsure of. There are many types of response set: acquiescence, social desirability, guessing. The response set of most concern in noncognitive testing is social desirability, the tendency for an individual to respond favourably to the items that he feels are socially available. All noncognitive tests are susceptible to response set, that is the tendency of the individual to reply in a particular direction, almost independent of content. William Mehrnens and Irvin Lehmann, Measurement and Evaluation in Education and Psychology, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1973, p. 522-523.


71. Ibid, p. 32.

72. Ibid, p. 41.


74. Ibid., 57.

75. K.E. Barker, principal, St. Stephen's Girls College, in "Too much emphasis on science", SCMP, 4.10.87, p.16.

76. Ibid.

77. Fan, op. cit., p. 63.

78. A.J. Youngson, Hong Kong Economic Growth and Policy, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1982, p.142-146.


80. Ibid., p. 72.

81. When controlled for the variable Language of Instruction, interesting differences were discovered. Students attending the Anglo Secondary schools chose Science courses as useful almost twice as often as students attending Chinese Middle Schools, whereas students of Chinese Middle schools chose both Language subjects as well as Sociology and Economics and Public Affairs significantly more often than their Anglo school counterparts. Their evaluations of the courses related to the hypothesis were highly similar, however.

82. Tao, op. cit., p. 75.

84. Ibid., p.14.

85. "China graduates face tough times in HK," SCMP, 8.8.86.

86. "Vox populi", The Economist, 10.10.87, P.56.

87. Barker, in SCMP, op. cit.

88. Language of instruction was also an interesting variable. Chinese middle school children were less confident of the usefulness of Accounting (0.01) and Architecture (0.021), and gave the response 'not sure' more often the students in English language schools when asked about the usefulness of Science (0.05), Engineering (0.008), and Economics, (0.01).


90. GPA was considered as a variable but was not included in the analysis because of the differences among schools in assigning grades: some use number grades and others use letter grades. There is also the question of standards of grading – although it could have been calculated by standardizing the student’s reported GPA against the standing of the school in the JSEA banding scheme, the Education Department was unwilling to make available its own rankings of various schools.

91. Birnbaum, op. cit.

92. Isolating the responses of the Matriculation course students, the results were differed in the following ways: Construction Industry, Tourism, Merchandizing, Real Estate, Technology and Legal Services were less important, i.e. included less often. Manufacturing Industry, Journalism, Translation, Social Services, Financial Services, Education were more important, i.e. included more often in the list of five.


94. Ibid, p. 213
CHAPTER 5
HONG KONG EDUCATION AND LOCAL SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGE

I PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

The preceding chapters have presented the major historical, socio-political and economic events which have led to the creation of the HKSAR. Although from the standpoint of international treaty or geography, the merger is arguably defensible, the residents of Hong Kong remain apprehensive and often pessimistic about their uncertain economic and social future.

The thesis has argued in Chapter 4 that some residents will respond to the uncertainties by attempting to predict the effects of the merger on their lives and begin to adapt now. This adaptation, it has been argued, is characterized by the pragmatism which has been typical of their adjustment to the colonial situation and the economic growth which the colony has experienced. Chapter 4 focused on one event which demonstrates the pragmatism: the indications of adaptation, in the face of the uncertainty, by secondary school children to the new economic and political reality. The results of the survey showed, in part, that those surveyed are attempting to adjust and that they have identified two immediate tasks: the need to provide a pool of men and women with skills corresponding to the international economic status of Hong Kong and the open-door policies of the PRC, and the need to meet the internal changes which localization of the government and legal system will cause.

Chapter 5 is linked to the survey component of the thesis by presenting a discussion of the dual themes of responsibility for, and prospects for, the continued development of the Hong Kong school system in ways which meet the socio-political and economic needs and demands of the
local community. The responsibility of educators originates partially in the evidence suggesting that contemporary youth are willing to adjust to the transfer process, and have already identified specific areas of likely contextual change in Hong Kong.

These themes also link Chapter 5 to the overall argument of the thesis through its suggestion that the tensions caused by the structural contradictions between Hong Kong and the PRC can be partially resolved by appropriate action on the part of the educational system. Providing youth with the opportunity to acknowledge and understand the ideological and institutional contradictions between Hong Kong and the PRC would ease the adjustment problem facing them. The chapter argues, however, that historical and socio-cultural factors are interacting with contemporary events in such a way as to diminish the possibility of this kind of effective response.

The chapter does not, however, argue that Hong Kong education will remain unaffected by the structural contradictions, and three possible scenarios of change are suggested, localization, sinocization, and ad hoc decolonization. Each of these reflects an attempt to deal with the contradictions. Localization involves reform of the educational system - by Hong Kong educators - with the aim of providing youth with the skills and knowledge necessary for realization of self-administration in Hong Kong. Realization of localization could resolve various cultural, political and economic tensions. The second scenario, sinocization, involves reform of the education system - by representatives of the PRC - to meet economic and socio-political needs of the PRC. Reform of this type would, eventually, resolve ideological tensions. Lastly, ad hoc decolonization involves allowing education to decolonize in an ad hoc manner, with the aim of maintaining the capitalist and conservative ideology prevalent in the
colony at present. Carried out by the present administrators, it may not be effective in resolving tensions.

The chapter begins with a statement of the need for change to the education system. The chapter then suggests that the probability of effective, appropriate and purposive change is small because of the nature of the local agents of change. The chapter concludes with the description of three possible scenarios for education in the coming decades, arguing that these scenarios are of two general kinds: those which are purposive, i.e. with education deliberately being adapted to the new environment; and that which is passive and ad hoc, i.e. characterized by the education system being allowed to react to social change without purposive external manipulation.

II THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG EDUCATION

At the time the fieldwork for the thesis was completed, the Hong Kong people were making choices. Those with opportunity and assets were making preparations to obtain resident visas for foreign countries or foreign passports. This, in many cases, required choosing one member of the family to live abroad for several years in order to establish residency requirements. Those with no opportunity to emigrate appear to have adopted an attitude of resignation. A few activists fight for the slender strands of self-determination which were guaranteed by the co-signers of the Joint Declaration: the appointment of a local person as governor, direct elections to the advisory body, the Legislative Council, in the years before 1997, or they campaign for visible guarantees of freedoms such as press and speech — freedoms which are being eroded even as a minority are fighting for more(1).

Consequently, educators and those with responsibility for education
face an ethical problem. Whether Hong Kong residents accept the broad
guideline suggested by J. Piaget, that the purpose of schooling is "...to
create [people] who are capable of new things; not simply of repeating what
others have done - [people] who are critical, inventive, and discoverers
who have minds which can be critical, can verify, and not accept what they
are offered"(2), or accept the very basic principle that education should
prepare youth for life, they should expect the schools of the 1980's and
1990's to prepare youth for 1997. Students should expect to be taught the
historical, political and cultural factors which have brought Hong Kong to
‘1997’.

Schools have this responsibility because they have resources:
teachers, access to information, means of presentation, to explain ‘1997’
to their students.

There is little convincing indication that Hong Kong is likely to
assume the responsibility and attempt, either to create a school system in
the Piagetian model, or to prepare students - skilled in examination,
criticism and participation - to cope better with their environment.
Historically, the Hong Kong Government has been slow to become involved in
provision of relevant social services (including education). It was not
until the mid-sixties that long-term strategies to meet these needs of the
population were first proposed(3), and although most people are
beneficiaries of one or another social programme, the government
consistently insists that “social development must be an appendage to
economic growth" and that it has a secondary place to the needs of the
market(4). The existing programmes have been criticized by local social
scientists for seeming "to be efforts to meet urgent needs or responses to
emergency situations which have the potential of disrupting the social
order, rather than the outcome of a declared comprehensive policy"(5).

No comprehensive policy as yet reflects the profound changes which are
occuring on the social, economic and political levels in Hong Kong. Schools carry on with the curricula and methodology of the boom years of the 50's, 60's and 70's and outwardly appear to ignore the changed world and emerging socio-cultural tensions which the graduates will face.

Indications from the many participants in education signal that little deliberate will be done and that the education scene is, operatively, greatly distanced from the 1997 issue. Each participant: the business community, the Hong Kong Government, the Education Commission, educators, parents, and students, has particular needs and/or has specific characteristics which make taking appropriate or effective and timely action unlikely. These characteristics, or factors, can be sorted into three categories: those related to the possession of power in colonial Hong Kong, those related to the lack of power, and those related to the Hong Kong socio-cultural systems. The following section discusses these inhibiting factors, and describes power alignments, cultural traits, and the colonial experience have affected all those who participate in Hong Kong education.

A. Power and Responsibility in Hong Kong

Actors: local business elites, Hong Kong Government, teachers, parents

1. Local Business Elites and Power in Politics

Many wealthy Hong Kong members of the business community have traditionally cultivated relationships with the colonial hierarchy and have customarily held positions as unofficial advisors to Government. Through these positions, they have gained social status, as well as access to the decision-makers and to the decision-making processes. Some of these individuals, from real estate and financial circles, are members of the
Government and now have been awarded important posts on the Basic Law Committees.

It is widely believed by the local population that the interests of these wealthy residents are generally placed above those of the general community to a much greater extent than is necessary or desirable(6). Miron Mushkat, in his study of the administrative class in Hong Kong, wrote of "... the apparent proclivity of the Government to accommodate business interests at the expense of all others"(7).

The dominant position of this group, the business community, would be probably be threatened by an informed, critical student body with democratic rights. Martin Carnoy has observed: "If democratization of political institutions occurs..., the dissatisfied majority could become increasingly powerful, and, if allowed, would eventually take power..."(8). Democratization of government in the Hong Kong context could result in loss of influence for members of the business community, and, speaking on this topic, F. Gilles observed that it was obvious to him "... that big business [in Hong Kong] is against direct elections more than even the PRC is against them"(9).

Controlling members of the local business community, therefore, are attempting to use the educational institutions to preserve the political-economic and cultural privileges and status they enjoyed under British rule. John Waldon, a 30 year civil servant and former Director of the Office of Home Affairs in Hong Kong has warned: "It is important at this time, of all times, that the Hong Kong community should clearly understand the limitations of the Hong Kong Establishment in safeguarding the interests of the Hong Kong community when it is under pressure"(10). He concludes his essay, "Getting ready for 1998" with the argument that the "... Hong Kong Government’s problem is not that it does not have the
apparatus to achieve responsible and credible government, but that it does not have the determination to face-up to the opposition of vested interests, privileged advisors and high-powered civil servants and introduce the obvious changes that can make it work effectively for the community as a whole"(11).

2. Local Business Elites and Power in the Education System

The influence of the business elites in government extends to education(12). At the highest level of their control over education is the Education Commission, which reported the 'fundamental' challenges of the next decade as:

- how to meet the challenges of mass education up to the senior secondary level at a time of rapid technological and other changes;
- how do we resolve the problems of competing demands of, and for, general education on the one hand and technology and vocational education on the other; how do we strike a balance between quantity and quality in education; how should we apportion investment among school building, curriculum development, and teachers; how can we achieve greater equity and efficiency in the education system; and above all, how do we harmonize the needs of the community and the wishes of the individual within the resources available(13).

This statement was published in October 1984, one month after the Joint Declaration was signed. Despite the prominence of issues surrounding the JD and their effect on the local community, the emphasis of the policy-makers within education continues to be efficiency, resources, balance and investment. There is no mention of preparing students to understand the changes in the Hong Kong Government, to provide an understanding of the new type of system under which they will live their adult lives, nor of meeting the challenges of localization. In the same
report: "We hope, and believe, that the views expressed...in the Report are pragmatic and central to the problems encountered in Hong Kong."

(14)(underlining added)

It is therefore argued that a substantial amount of the lack of responsiveness to the educational problems posed by 1997 on the part of the education system derives from three sources. Firstly, the system is coordinated by individuals who are outside of the education system and who are inside the business and colonial power hierarchy; secondly, the influence of these individuals over education extends to objectives, policy, quality, teacher training, priorities, planning and development, research, selection, financing. Thirdly, the emphasis of official policy has always been on the economic benefits of education to the colony rather than to the individual. "Educational policy, from the beginning, was directed by considerations of economy and utility"(15) or as a "powerful ... method of extending British influence... [into China]"(16).

3. Teachers and Power in the Education System

Teachers have been generally kept out of the policy-making arena in Hong Kong education, and have accepted a dependent role. Carnoy suggests that

Liberation from colonial rule requires a redevelopment of humanness and self-esteem; a redefinition of what it means to be independent. When people are colonized they are dependent and do not even know how to behave in a liberated condition. Decolonization, or liberation, demands personal and societal struggles which go far beyond lowering one flag and raising another(17).

The factors of fear of compromising their positions, plus fear of being labeled political activists, primarily account for the lack of
leadership from teachers in the past and in the present situation. Teachers have been described as 'going very middle of the road' because of the nervousness about being associated with a position on 1997 and the current political situation in Hong Kong(18). Therefore, their focus in the classroom has not been on preparing students for the transfer experience.

Philip Altbach has commented that "...the abolition of the colonial [education] situation requires the colonized to take significant and autonomous initiatives"(19). However, the dependent status of teachers means that they are not able to take appropriate curricular initiatives. School children, therefore, although are aware of the transfer, have not acquired systematic knowledge of the problems involved from their classroom teachers.

4. Parents and Access to Power

Historically, Government has provided few direct channels of communication between itself and the local population, and one legacy of this policy has been the almost negligible development of political institutions in the colony(20). Lau Siu-kai argues that

Between the government and the Chinese society there is only a thin layer of intermediate leaders, who are predominantly leaders of traditionalist Chinese organizations [whose] attitude towards the government is deferential and submissive. They function ... to transmit the government's decisions and advice downward(21).

As a consequence, he suggests, society has no way to convert its social, economic and political issues into demands on the government(22). To refute such criticism, the Hong Kong Government points to the existence of 'pressure groups' - but their leaders are generally the 'intermediate leaders' whom Lau describes. These kinds of groups are part of the colonial
tradition of Britain(23), and, in Hong Kong, serve the following purposes for the Government: to provide advice when the Government is introducing changes, to provide necessary statistics and technical expertise on certain issues, to carry out the jobs government wants done in social services, such as staffing and managing most of the schools, welfare agencies and hospitals, and lastly, to provide legitimacy to the government's rule by "virtually representing" the interests of the people(24).

However, all pressure groups do not enjoy equal access to government, and the system of selectivity favours richer business and employer groups because Government needs their help and, therefore, cannot ignore their views(25). Groups representing the lower income groups are at a disadvantage - linguistically and politically, for the main language of government is English, and, without a direct vote, the poor cannot use their greatest asset: their numbers(26). Nelson Chow comments specifically on the effectiveness of pressure or interest groups in relationship to the development of the education system. Describing their demands as 'modest'(27) given the needs of the system, he suggests that not enough pressure has been placed on Government by such groups because they do not have a "foot-hold in the political arena"(28).

This complex relationship extends to that between parents and policy-makers: parents have neither official nor efficient influence over the schools and policy, nor do they perceive grassroots pressure group activities to be worthwhile. People regard their ability to influence policy through pressure groups as small or very small(29), and have negative opinions about the trustworthiness of pressure group leaders. They believe that activities of pressure groups endanger the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong(30). All of these factors contribute to the inability of parents to effect the philosophical and curriculum changes
needed in the schools.

B. British Colonial Education Philosophy and Responsibility
   actors: Hong Kong Government, educators

1. Political Education and the Curriculum

Although formal civic education could be a means of introducing the principles and procedures of self-government and could thereby assist the citizens of the HKSAR, traditional attitudes toward the inclusion of a political component in the curriculum have not changed. Part of the explanation for lack of effective curricular response is in the British attitude toward the role of civic education in the curriculum. As described in R. Murray Thomas,

   Schools (in England) are not seen as a prime source of political socialization [and] usually shun any direct teaching about the dynamic interplay of the civil service, Parliament, the political parties, foreign affairs, labour unions, and other participants in the political culture.... Some teachers who are themselves deeply interested in politics may deal with civics in a social studies course, but neither of these classes is a required one in British schools(31).

Britain applied this practice to its colonial education system, and, although Hong Kong is a colony in a post-colonial world, the tradition of not teaching political socialization through civics has endured there. Civics has not been taught as an examinable subject in the Anglo-secondary schools since 1965 (1969 in the Chinese schools). At that time Economics and Public Affairs was introduced, which had the "general aim of ... enabling pupils to be well-informed and to become civic-minded enough to act as good citizens in the larger community to which they belong"(32).

This policy has been criticized as a "clear strategy of
depolitanization because it included, until the mid-1970's, a civics education curriculum "...emphasizing a passive role of[sic] citizens". Although the emphasis changed in the 1970's to an active role for students, "the active role recommended for students was in social service, rather than concern for public affairs and politics."

A re-worked Civics Curriculum was introduced in September, 1985. After a review of "[...the role of the Education Department] in educating the public to more effectively[sic] cope with the implications arising from the proposals for developing the local system of government...", the Department decided to continue the 'hidden curriculum' approach to teaching civics and use 'inter-disciplinary' teaching. However, they appear not to have digressed significantly from traditional policy and content as the newly articulated goal is "...[fostering] harmonious relationships between school authorities, staff, pupils and parents". This goal, as articulated, does not address the central problem which is to provide education in political participation skills which would enable the Hong Kong residents to respond to the current political situation effectively. Moreover, the new programme has been criticized locally as being insufficient to meet this need: "The education department does not seem to be in any hurry to introduce political discussion into the classroom".

At the end of 1986 the government reported that sixty percent of secondary schools had civic education programmes (eighty two percent of government schools, sixty two percent of aided schools, and forty two percent of private schools). However, the great majority of these schools present civics as part of the 'hidden curriculum'. Topics described in the hidden curriculum as civic education include a large proportion of lessons such as writing letters of complaint, singing a song about loving one's neighbour, and lessons on filial piety.
On the other hand, Cheng Kai Ming has questioned whether a call for compulsory introduction of a political aspect to the curriculum by the Government sets a precedent of government intervention in the curriculum. He asks whether it is better to preserve a system in which government intervention in curriculum is unlikely or whether the curriculum should be changed in order to raise the political awareness of students (38). Clearly, local educators feel they are facing a political dilemma on this issue.

2. Education Serves the Needs of the Colonial Hierarchy

Carnoy writes that the purpose of colonial schools was to train the colonials for roles in the existing hierarchy (39). Ng Lun Ngai-ha has suggested that this policy has been applied to Hong Kong (40) and concludes that the Hong Kong policy was "...in line with the nineteenth-century British education policy...in other colonies" (41). The policy has not been changed throughout the 20th century.

For example, M. Mushkat found that applicants for positions as administrative officers with the Hong Kong Government from Hong Kong University were as successful as graduates from British Universities and more successful than other local groups (42). Mushkat suggests that this is explained by the fact that the "... general environment of the University of Hong Kong [in terms of its socialization effects] is more likely to produce the kind of graduate that the Government is looking for (the University of Hong Kong is closer to the colonial establishment and operates very much like a British institution)" (43).

On this theme of universities as colonial agents, Altbach has written that, although in most countries universities are centres of intellectual activity,

universities in the Third World are
colonial institutions in that they are almost without exception based on a foreign model and reflect many of the values and organizational patterns of foreign institutions. In many instances the language of instruction remains a foreign language and many of the faculty have been trained outside the country. Foreign models brought to the Third World did not emphasize research or creative intellectual endeavour since colonial powers created universities largely to provide training for the middle levels of the colonial bureaucracy (44).

Further, Carnoy suggests that colonial schools did not help students to develop societal relationships which carried beyond the colonial hierarchy, but tried to fit people to the needs of the hierarchy whether it benefitted them or not (45).

It has also been argued that there is no attempt by colonial schools to prepare colonized for leadership in their own society (46). This policy appears to have been effective in Hong Kong to the extent that, as potential Chinese political leaders arise, they are seen to be absorbed into the colonial government (47). This gives the British the appearance of ruling with the consent and assistance of the locals, and, at the same time, "...effectively emasculates potential political opponents" (48). A result of these practices is that the local leadership, which has become active since the negotiations began, does not exist in sufficient numbers, nor is it able to mobilize sufficient and effective support, to impose its policy on government.

3. Education and the Needs of the Local Culture

Colonial government in Hong Kong has never systematically examined nor tried to meet the needs of the local culture. Those policies which have been recently developed to encourage a cultural identity "...have been
designed and implemented in an ad hoc manner"(49). The government has been criticized for this approach to socio-cultural matters, including education. The impression given is that economic advancement has precedence over other aspects of life in Hong Kong. For example, in her analysis of the decline of Chinese linguistic skills in Hong Kong, H.N.L. Cheng describes the typical policy of "...dominant socio-economic pragmatism [on the part of government]...at the expense of the larger goals of socio-cultural planning"(50).

There has never been a written history encompassing all sociological, economic and political aspects of Hong Kong, although Alan Birch, historian at the Hong Kong University, argued,

If the Hong Kong Government had wished to boost local morale [during the negotiations], a re-examination of its history would have been a vital element in establishing a sense of local solidarity. Presently the history of Hong Kong offends the sense of Chinese nationalism and it raises feeling of guilt in the minds of the British educated "Gweilo" administrators(51).

Paulo Freire has suggested that lack of attention to the culture of the colonized results in lack of contact between the colonized and his/her own past and, consequently failure to understand the significance of his/her position in the history of the culture(52). On this link in Hong Kong between contact with their past and the significance of contemporary events, Birch adds, "It goes without saying that if the local people recognized their past achievements, they are hardly likely to acquiesce in this anticipation of demise"(53).

This neglect has persisted since the last century(54). Whether it developed because "... the colonizer is required to deny the existence of a colonized culture. The native is declared insensible to values. He
represents "... the absence of values" (55) - or because making money in Hong Kong has always been more important to its policy makers than culture, the end result of the policy has been to put the local people at a disadvantage by degrading their cultural and historical past (56). There have been very minimal government efforts to examine and explain the culture of Hong Kong in the past, and, at the present time, no government effort is being made to examine the impact of the current socio-political changes on culture and society.

Indeed, only very recently have colonial administrators first advocated the use of the local language, Cantonese, as the medium of instruction in schools. Despite this, the education system does not yet effectively relate curriculum to local culture and identity, and it has been suggested that "As a colonial government, if the British authorities are not even enthusiastic about cultivating a sense of belonging to Hong Kong, there is no reason to expect them to do anything to encourage the formation of a Chinese identity through political socialization in school" (57).

Because its cultural needs have been ignored, the Hong Kong population is often characterized as having little cultural identity and a sense of rootlessness. The students' sense of belonging to Hong Kong has been weak, and Hong Kong claims little of their loyalty and self-identification (58).

Such factors, it is argued, limit the likelihood of broad and effective mobilization of the community in support of demands for more responsive government.

C. Hong Kong Society

Actors: parents, students, administrators

1. Hong Kong Society and its Chinese Origins

It has been argued throughout that the personality of the Hong Kong resident has been formed by a combination of the effects of colonization,
rapid modernization of the economy and the Chinese culture. Hence, the origins of single traits are often blurred. Attempting to ascribe one or another trait to ethnicity or to status as colonized can be difficult. With that qualification in mind, it is argued here that certain traits which appear to originate in the ethnicity of the population will affect the outcomes of the transfer process. To support this, several comparative investigations into the cultural differences between Hong Kong Chinese and other ethnic communities are the basis of this subsection.

For example, Geert Hofstede has reported on cultural differences between several societies in work-related values. One of Hofstede's 4-dimensional models (59) is the factor of Power Distance which is "...the characteristic of a culture defining the extent to which the less powerful persons in society accept inequality in power and consider it as normal" (60); it is, in other words, a measure of tolerance for the inequality in a society. On this factor, Hong Kong residents received a high score; they are able to tolerate inequality in power distribution (61). On the factor, Uncertainty Avoidance dimension, which is "...the extent to which people within a culture are made nervous by situations which they perceive as unstructured, unclear, or unpredictable, situations which they therefore try to avoid by maintaining strict codes of behavior and a belief in absolute truths" (62), Hong Kong emerges as a society which is unlikely to be aggressive when confronted with personal risks in new situations (63) (64). Indeed, Miners wrote that Hong Kong residents have accepted, almost without question, the self-proclaimed British rule (65), and that it is the exposure to Western culture, along with higher education levels, that have begun to erode these attitudes (66).

Hong Kong residents scored markedly low, comparatively, in social principledness, their score represents a "...strong authoritarian
orientation to defer without question to conventional authority and to accept unconditionally conventional norms and values" (67).

A study on locus of control, defined as a set of generalized beliefs or expectancies about how positive and negative reinforcements are obtained (68) is also relevant. At one extreme of locus of control is internality, the belief that one can obtain rewards and avoid punishments by one's own efforts, skills, acceptance of responsibility. At the opposite extreme is externality, the belief that such reinforcements depend upon such uncontrollable outside factors as chance, luck, the behaviour of those more powerful and complex events in one's surroundings. In this study, the Hong Kong Chinese exhibited a stronger belief in external control of obtaining rewards and avoiding punishment than other groups. They exhibit a general tendency to depend on the behaviour of the more powerful groups around them.

The thesis accepts the argument of O. Mannoni (69) that the original culture of the colonized is significant in determining outcomes and suggests that Mannoni's argument is applicable to the Hong Kong situation. He suggests, first, that the pre-existing psychology of the colonized makes the colonizer-colonized relationship possible (70), and that the roles which the colonizer and colonized adopt are made possible by the psychological characteristics already developed in their respective cultures and which each brings to the new situation (71). In the context of Hong Kong, the psychological profile which emerges from the preceding discussion is of a group likely to defer with little question to Government and unlikely to be aggressive when confronted with risks in new situations. These factors, combined with tolerance for the inequality which exists in Hong Kong society, are important components of the present environment of the transfer process. The implication for the transfer is that these cultural
characteristics are likely to affect the interaction process by minimizing the possibility of assertive demands for educational change.

2. Parents and Decision-making in Education

The attitude of Hong Kong parents is one of 'wait-and-see' - while clinging to the status quo. For example, the 1987 scheme which encouraged secondary schools to shift to the use of Chinese as a teaching medium has been poorly received by parents. The scheme has been described by the Government as providing an opportunity for children to perform better and for teachers to complete the examination syllabus earlier, thereby providing time for teaching of non-examination oriented material. However, in March, 1987 only a quarter of the secondary schools had taken advantage of the scheme. The three quarters who were not willing to switch the medium of instruction point to the continued heavy emphasis on English in Hong Kong for advancement.

A second factor which makes educational decision-making a complex process for parents is the new Chinese University admissions procedure which admits students provisionally after completion of one year of the matriculation course. It appears to penalize Chinese language schools because their programme is a two-year one. The policy, then, by extension, further favours students who have attended English language lower secondary schools(72).

Most parents, in an environment of conflicting signals, are unsure about the type of fundamental educational change needed in the transfer process. Therefore, they will not be able to mobilize and demand effective policy adjustments. Lower income parents, particularly, are described as having little awareness of the educational needs of their children and they continue to rely on their local schools to guide children(73).

3. Society and Colonization
a. Psychological view

Altbach has written that one effect of colonization on the colonized is the recognition by the colonized of the inferior position imposed on him(74). Other analysts write of colonial education being "not only elitist but also conditioning and subjugative"(75). This quality leads the colonized to attempt to reduce the differences between him and the colonizer which the colonizer has defined as being at the origin of second class status. This 'reduction' is attempted in terms of language: the colonized accepts and learns the language of the colonizer as a means of improving his status in the society: "Employment in the modern sector was linked to knowledge of the colonial language and to European style education. Gradually the colonial languages became the medium for commerce, politics, science and government"(76).

In Hong Kong, most senior posts are still reserved for foreigners and English remains the main language for government business, although it is spoken by only two per cent of the population(77). Since Hong Kong residents have accepted that mastery of English is a significant route to success in Hong Kong, it is suggested that interpretations can be made of some of their behaviour in the framework of the relationship between colonized and colonizer.

In Mannoni's view, the colonial relationship is based on each participant playing a pre-determined role in the relationship and, consequently, "... social action by the colonized is only a response to the colonizer not fulfilling his expected role"(78). In this context, Leung Sai-wing found that people judge the Hong Kong Government, non-affectively, for its "instrumental use",(79) and appreciate its instrumental rather than its intrinsic value(80). In other words, in this relationship, as long as the Government continues to fulfilling its role, i.e., retains instrumental
value, the people will be non-critical.

It could be argued that Britain abandoned its role by agreeing to the handover. However, Hong Kong residents have never believed that they would have a great deal of influence over their future, an opinion proved accurate in 1984(81). Therefore, Britain, though departing from its 'pre-determined role' of guaranteeing a secure and stable environment, is seen to be merely handing its role to another agent. Because residents never expected that social action on their part would influence policy, they are able to accept this transfer - as long as another party took up the role of governing the city. In other words, because the role of the colonizer will be assumed by the PRC in the post-1997 period, no assertive 'social action' can be expected of the residents unless the PRC fails to fulfil its role as useful and beneficient ruler.

d. Economic-political view

Franz Fanon and Albert Memmi indicate that the only significant changes to take place in the educational scene [of the colonized] are those initiated by the colonized himself(82). But, rather than being anxious for significant change after decolonization, some societies resist it for economic or political reasons. Le T.K. has pointed out that what has been imposed may later be accepted voluntarily for a number of reasons. (For example) because it corresponds to the needs of the new ruling classes, which are... tied to international capitalism... because reforming methods, the linguistic medium, and content is slow and difficult, given the lack of qualified personnel and popular resistance to reform(83).

The 'ruling classes' described by Le T.K. exist in Hong Kong. Commenting on the lack of grassroots protest about social problems in Hong
Kong, Miners wrote

There seems to be a lack of disaffected intellectuals ready to take up the task. The graduates of Hong Kong University and the Chinese University have little difficulty finding jobs and apparently soon forget any radical aspirations they may have felt in their student days. In other colonial territories political activities seemed to offer rich prizes: there was hope that a successful party leader might end up as prime minister when the British left. But there is little likelihood of this happening in Hong Kong.

Another aspect is suggested by Leung's research into the perceptions of political authority among Hong Kong Chinese. He wrote that political issues are usually not discussed or solved according to political criteria and, furthermore, that the Government seems to regard politics as an unsystematic intrusion into rational setting of goals by professional administrators. The residents themselves have internalized market principles rather than political principles, and public demand for changes to curriculum might be more likely if the changes are seen as having a market value.

4. Students and Success

The colonial child has been described as being alienated from his culture and the economic and social needs of his people. Schooling plays a role in preventing the individual from attaining self-definition. Once the student accepts the school treadmill and the lessons of the pyramidal structure, he or she usually finds that the ruling group's perception of his role in the society must be accepted in order to survive. The role of schools is, according to Carnoy, "to train the colonized for roles that suited the colonizer."
Leung described the young respondents to his survey which was carried out in 1986, as not having an extended scope of concern beyond self, beyond family, and beyond their own generation. They do not have a sense of history. They do not thirst for returning to the motherland. They do not feel ashamed to be under foreign rule. They do not quest for the reconstruction of a stronger China. So long as the society allows their pursuit of individualistic life goals, there will not be any fundamental challenge to the British rule (90).

These findings, the acceptance of the rigidly academic curriculum, and the reluctance to switch from English to Chinese as a language of instruction suggests that Hong Kong youth fit the description of being alienated from his culture and society. The student conforms to the more powerful group's perception of his or her role in the society, roles that encourage development of a self-centered, competitive viewpoint, and, hence, it is argued, they are not likely to become a direct agent of change to the school system.

III PROSPECTS FOR EDUCATION IN HONG KONG

The previous section attempted to demonstrate that, due to historical, economic and cultural factors, the task of achieving appropriate change in Hong Kong education is problematic and highly complex. This thesis, however, does not suggest that the education system will not be affected by the events surrounding '1997'. I. Faegelind has written that "...education is both an agent of change and in turn is changed by society" (91), and Hong Kong society and education system will interact and change because of the events of this and the next decades. The purpose of this section is to investigate three possible modes of change to the education system which
are specific to the current Hong Kong social and economic context.

The section begins with a discussion of categories of change in this context and hypothesizes that there are two applicable categories: those which are systematic and those which are ad hoc. In the first category of change, education is purposefully changed and adapted to a new philosophy. In the second category, change results from ad hoc decision-making under the existing administration, allowing the system to react to social change without purposive manipulation and without immediate philosophical adjustment.

This first category of systematized change includes two scenarios, the first is that administration of the education system would devolve to local educators, and the second possible scenario is that administrative control would be assumed by the PRC.

Each scenario will be discussed in terms of the same themes. They are

1. the forces, actors and ideology involved;
2. the obstacles to its implementation;
3. certain common issues about which, within each specific terms of reference, decisions must be made, including the nature of the relationship between schooling and the local culture, the link between schooling and both internal and external economic growth, the appropriateness of various forms of administration, the system of allocating places and of determining the curriculum, and the question of what in the existing system has permanent value;
4. the benefits and disadvantages of each in the Hong Kong context.

A. LOCALIZATION

Actors: Hong Kong Educators and Local Leaders

Ideology: democratic
Colonial Hong Kong education authorities have historically exhibited a reluctance to reform the educational system in such a way that local society would receive the skills and encouragement necessary for playing a greater role in solving its own problems. The British Government traditionally justified the overall lack of progress within Hong Kong toward localization, or self-administration, by arguing that Hong Kong could never be independent because of its size, because of opposition from China, and the nature of the lease (92). The effects of this reluctance by Government to permit more local control over aspects of local administration, including education, is now one of greatest obstacles to achieving the self-determination which many people desire (93).

The importance of achieving local control of education, and eventually of wider systems, is emphasized by Altbach - who suggests also why it is seldom achieved:

A locally-controlled education system is one necessary means by which a colonized people can address their own cultural and economic needs. The political implications of that control make realization an exceedingly difficult process (94).

Despite the political obstacles to localization inherent in the colonial system, eventual localization of control over education in the HKSAR is one important alternative before the educators, particularly if they wish to ensure that Hong Kong residents are able to address their own needs in the HKSAR. Local educators have begun to comment on this option: Ming Chan and Michael W. Kist wrote that '...because of the depressed public mood over 1997 and the destabilizing influence which colonial education has had on the traditional stabilizing values, [only] an expanded and refined education system with accountability to the local public at
large" can ensure that the prosperity and stability achieved during the last three decades persists in the future (95).

In the present Hong Kong context, the colonial system, as discussed in this thesis, has contributed to the economic mobility of the local population but ignored their cultural and social needs. Neither has it made provisions for a pool of skilled local administrators. Therefore, it is argued that the primary forces which recommend localization are socio/cultural and political. In order to achieve it, the present government must be petitioned by the populace and by enlightened educators - a political action.

Despite the strong arguments in favour of localization of many branches of the administration of Hong Kong, there are two major obstacles to localization. The first is the need to implement it speedily in the present political climate of relative independence and freedom - as each year passes in the countdown to 1997, the political environment becomes more complex and many will react to the increased complexity by maintaining lower political profiles. The second, and equal, obstacle is the reluctance on the part of the business elites who currently control many aspects of colony policy, to accede to the democratic movement because of their conviction that the advocates of democracy are apt to mismanage public funds in their attempt to gain power and maintain public support for their positions (96).

If, however, local educators are successful in gaining control of the administration of education, the following issues would probably be dealt with.

1. Appropriateness of the existing administration.
The present highly centralized administration by business and political elites has already been criticized by local educators as being too rigidly accountable to the Government "...at the expense of flexibility and therefore accountability to the public" (97). Cheng Kai-ming wrote that "The underlying issue [to reform] is the likely change in the policy-making machinery in order that it will be consistent with the representative government and have the capacity to deal with normative issues." (98) Local educators have begun to demand a more active role for educational experts and legitimization of the consultation system to include elected members from all sectors of the educational community (99).

2. The relationship between schooling and society.

As Hong Kong schools have been, as other colonial schools were, "...detached from the local culture in the language and in the social values they taught" (100), localization would investigate, as a fundamental task, methods of strengthening the relationship between schooling and the local culture. Reviewing comments of local educators suggests that these methods could include increased use of the local language as the language of instruction and could include the strengthening the process of democratization in schools (101). Fung Yee-wang has written that the democratizing process in Hong Kong schools is "only in its infancy" (102), and suggests that the importance of democratizing schools, through the introduction of democratic procedures in school management as well as the inclusion of a democratic component in the curriculum, is measured in terms of its beneficial effect on democratizing society (103).

3. The link between schooling and economic growth.
This link has been described as crucial and two-way by local education leaders (104). At present local educators consider it advisable to develop educational plans which recognize the impact of the PRC manpower needs on Hong Kong (105). They have also expressed the goal of strengthening, at the tertiary level, the evolving "unprecedented concentration of interest in subjects which are practical, ... and readily acceptable in the labour market" (106). In addition, the potential contribution of Technical and Vocational Education to economic growth in Hong Kong has recently been defended by administration (107). However, vocational education has been resisted by the local population because of their cultural values, and in fact, recent local research into a link between technical education and economic growth does not support the Government's policy, and generally supports a general education policy for the colony (108).

4. The appropriateness of the existing selection procedures in determining curriculum.

The present selection system has a very high number of procedures designed to select students to fill places in higher education in the colony, and these procedures dictate curriculum to a large extent (109). The effect of examinations on curriculum has led to the creation of 'elite schools' which possess the resources to meet the demands of the examinations for places in tertiary education. In this way, higher education plays a significant role in determining many curricular and funding decisions in the colony. In addition, the existing administration is "extraordinarily generous" in subsidizing higher education compared to the funding allocated to secondary education (110). This situation does not
ensure that a sufficient number of secondary schools receive the resources necessary for remaining competitive in the examination race.

Local educators recognize the need to loosen the link between higher education and lower school curriculum. Cheng Kai-Ming poses the following question:

"Are we going to open up the system so that opportunities are more 'equal' and more readily available by creating more university places; or are we going to maintain disparity and limited places, and consequently the high private rate-of-return?"

5. The determination of aspects of the present system with permanent educational value.

Local administrators are likely to acknowledge that there is much to build upon in the present system: a system which incorporates an international language in the curriculum, has facilities for universal and compulsory secondary education, is free from political indoctrination, and has trained a skilled, international and flexible populace. They have acknowledged that a missing component is training in the political skills and theory needed in order to meet the needs of self-administration promised by the Joint Declaration.

However, there are areas which, under the terms of reference of a local administration, would be perceived as problematic. Among these are Civic Education, Vocational and Technical Education, and Language of Instruction, issues which have been discussed in other sections of the thesis.

In addition, there is the question of focus of the curriculum. Pedro Pak-toa Ng comments that for quite a time, "...a weakness in Hong Kong's
education system has been the overly narrow emphasis on the study of subject matter, without sufficient concern given to how the business of study may relate to life situations\(^{(112)}\) and he argues for broad exposure to a formal and non-formal curriculum, particularly in light of the changing socio-political structure of the colony\(^{(113)}\). The nature of the present policy and the capitalistic system encourages a competitive approach. However the transfer process provides an opportunity to consider, in the midst of societal adjustment, an alternate, more child-centered policy of curriculum design.

They are the areas where reform is necessary, and they relate directly to the challenges posed by ‘1997’. These areas are included in a commentary on this theme made by a local educator who suggests the following major tasks: "[firstly,] the improvement of secondary and sixth-form education, including new language policy, a revised, needs-based curriculum, revised teaching techniques - in quantity and quality -, and, [secondly,] the democratization of education at all levels"\(^{(114)}\). It is also suggested that the democratization goal is the more important "...because it is concerned with the basic attitude of the people. If we get the basic attitudes right, the other problems will not be too difficult to solve"\(^{(115)}\).

**Benefits**

Localization of the education system would benefit society in two crucial areas. Firstly, it could effectively and efficiently prepare students for the societal changes facing them, and, secondly, the installation of an locally-run system is legitimized by accountability to local society. There are other advantages of localization. Designed and carried out
within Hong Kong, education would utilize the local language and reflect local perceptions of cultural and economic needs. This offers the opportunity for a greater part of the population to participate in debate and wield influence within the city (116).

Hong Kong has in place universal and compulsory secondary education, and has the financial assets to develop its education system further. In this way Hong Kong is different from other decolonized education systems. Also, assuming that local teachers are committed to socially-relevant policies and objectives, the potential for rapid expansion and invigoration of the intellectual life of the community is excellent.

Another benefit would be the opportunity for local intellectuals, as well as local institutions of research and education, to develop without the limiting influence of a foreign power and language. Within Hong Kong's 'neighbourhood' of South East Asia, there would be a possibility to establish Chinese language knowledge networks which would strengthen the intellectual infrastructure that area.

Disadvantages

There are two types of potential disadvantages to attempting to localize education in Hong Kong. Firstly, because the political future - in terms of the amount and definition of human rights - is unclear, it is difficult to predict the consequences for participants in public political activity. Secondly, the degree commitment of the local population to the kinds of changes described in the previous paragraphs is unknown. For example, there was very little positive response to the recent opportunity offered by the Government to change the medium of instruction in some schools from English to Cantonese. (Parents pointed out that English
continues to dominate the business, administrative, and legal systems.)
This resistance to change disappointed many proponents of localization of
education, but it has been observed in other decolonized nations. It has
been attributed in other former colonies to the kinds of economic,
power-based, intellectual, and practical reasons(117) which were described
as existing in Hong Kong.

B. SINOCIZATION

Actor: the PRC

Ideology: Central Reform Document of 1985(118)

The Hong Kong education system will come under critical examination by
the PRC, and it is suggested that there are three factors which may
determine the degree and type of influence the PRC will exert over it.
Firstly, the PRC may conclude that, because of the international knowledge
base available in Hong Kong, PRC administration of the Hong Kong education
system will enhance PRC national development. Further, the PRC may
determine that, by controlling the political components of the Hong Kong
curriculum, the state and the newly-unified nation would be strengthened.
Lastly, they determine that sinocization could be effected without
alienating the business and educated elites of Hong Kong - in other words,
having a negative affect on stability and prosperity. In this environment,
sinocization of the system would proceed as a political and economic event
with the PRC as agent. The determining forces fall into two types:
economic/technological and political/ideological(119).

The obstacle to legitimized sinocization would be the establishment in
Hong Kong of an effective localized education system in place of the
colonial system. The presence of a local system would weaken attempts on
the part of the PRC to appeal to the nationalism of the Hong Kong Chinese
in order to justify their activities.
The PRC, within the terms of the Central Reform Document, will address similar themes as the local educators; their deliberations will be affected by both economic/technological and ideological/political considerations. There are five issues which they must attempt to resolve.

1. The nature of the relationship between schooling and the local culture.

It is suggested that the PRC will for ideological/political reasons—in the interests of its own national unity—attempt to reproduce its particular socio-political system in Hong Kong. To achieve this goal without jeopardizing the "stability and prosperity" of Hong Kong, the PRC must convince Hong Kong residents of the ideological justification of such a move. Therefore, introducing an ideological/political component theme to the curriculum is, from the PRC point of view, a logically defensible tactic.

Again from the standpoint of national unity, the PRC might decide to introduce a new medium of instruction (Potunghua) as they have done in other regions of China. Some local educators have already judged the introduction of Potunghua to be useful, describing it as "an added language of wider communication," but there is pessimistic viewpoint. It is, in fact, foreseeable that the PRC would seek to replace the local language in education with Potunghua, thereby further distancing schools from the local culture.

2. The most efficient link between schooling and economic growth.

Despite the economic links between the two societies, complete
convergence of the Hong Kong and PRC economic systems is potentially difficult and unquestionably complex. An example of the complexity is the difference in the ideological view of the individual's place in relation to the economy; PRC society has a collectivist viewpoint of the responsibility of the worker, whereas Hong Kong, a more individualist commitment. Therefore, investigation of the link of the Hong Kong economy with education and the role of the individual in the economy is crucially important to the PRC.

A second difference is in the interpretation of the relationship between the classroom and the workplace: in Hong Kong there exists a dichotomy between the workplace and the classroom, which differs greatly from the PRC's ideal model of schools serving a vocational function.

A third contradiction is the manner of selecting people for various roles in society. Within the socialist education system, the workplace, rather than the schools, selects people for various roles in society. In Hong Kong, education continues to be the primary means of social mobility.

From the economic/technological aspect, the new emphasis on education in scientific and technological fields in the PRC suggests they might recognize the advantage of extending this policy to Hong Kong. Local educators recognize the likelihood of this influence and appear prepared to cooperate, not least because they see ways in which Hong Kong could benefit from cooperation. In an article on the impact of China's manpower needs on Hong Kong, Grace Chow of the Chinese University of Hong Kong wrote:

There is an obvious need for the labour force in Hong Kong to adapt and modify itself, structurally and otherwise, to facilitate compatibility with the immense and relatively conservative labour force of China.
is expected to play its part in the modernization of China by providing expertise in international trade and finance, and by supplying management and technological know-how(123).

However, it is important to note that the link between education and the economy is not perceived as one-way by the PRC and there are examples of educational change enabling economic reform(124). This suggests that the PRC is in a position to examine the impact of the existing education system and its relationship to the economic boom which Hong Kong has experienced with an open mind.

3. The appropriateness of various forms of administration.

The Joint Declaration promised minimal direct administration by the PRC over the HKSAR, and recent overall Party policy favours decentralization of administration of many aspects of mainland society. Specifically, the rationale of the Reform Document stresses autonomy of local PRC education systems(125). For example, the link between higher education and Party bureaucracy in the PRC has recently been weakened(126). All of these signals are, on the surface, reassuring for Hong Kong educators who hope to obtain control over the system. Chapter 2, however, described the concern arising from the vagueness of the term "local residents". Within the terms of the Joint Declaration, it is possible for the PRC to install officials in Hong Kong who are local residents but who have Party allegiances and are willing to comply with central Party preferences concerning Hong Kong's education policies.

4. The system of allocating places and of determining the curriculum.
Higher education is effectively the crucial factor in allocating funds and determining curriculum in the present Hong Kong schools. In the PRC, however, places are allocated according to centralized manpower plans(127), a method which the Reform Document has endorsed(128). Whether the PRC would attempt to impose this system on Hong Kong education is arguable since, on the one hand, Hong Kong schools are training the kinds of experts which the PRC wants from Hong Kong. Also, Hayhoe notes that municipal higher education systems in the PRC are allowed to set guidelines for curricular development consonant with the development needs of their city(129). On the other hand, the Hong Kong education system has provided places for some courses which PRC Curriculum guidelines describe as not "serving economic modernization"(130). Whether such courses would remain on offer is questionable.

5. Determination of elements of the existing system with permanent value.

The PRC is likely to acknowledge that the following components of the existing system are useful in achieving their goals: its position in the international communications network, the provisions for access to modern technology, universal and compulsory education to age fifteen, and an autonomously functioning Western-connected higher education system. In addition, there are areas of the existing system which would perceived as problematic by PRC reformers. These include Language of Instruction, the absence of a political component in the curriculum, and the lack of broad support for Technical and Vocational Education, all of which have been discussed in detail in other sections.
Benefits

Sinocization could provide what has been termed the 'patriotic education' component in the curriculum which some local educators have described as a fundamental requirement for the success of the 'one party, two systems' policy. They emphasize, in this context, that patriotic education should stress a national identity, in other words, concern for, and ties to, China, not support for the Communist Party(131).

Disadvantages

There are disadvantages of several kinds.

On the very practical level, educators in Hong Kong have expressed the fear(132) that the standard of education will deteriorate if, as a result of PRC control over Hong Kong education, more PRC students are allowed to take advantage of the Hong Kong facilities. The infrastructure - libraries, science laboratories, classrooms etc.- would become more overcrowded. At present, schools are being utilized at greater than capacity point, and they are inadequate for the large numbers that they now support.

China has isolated itself once from the "international knowledge network" (133), adopting a policy of self-sufficiency and, although they have re-entered the international network, if they sever ties again - after 1997 - the HKSAR, as dependent part of the PRC, would be negatively affected, experiencing loss of the contacts, support, and partnerships it now enjoys with leading institutions in the industrialized world.

Thirdly, there is the possibility that the relative autonomy from political pressure which the schools now enjoy would be seriously eroded by sinocization. R. M. Thomas has suggested that
Whatever the source of politicization, once the process of breeching the institutional walls separating educational government and its internal politics from the general ongoing political conflicts of the state are underway, additional educational issues are likely to become similarly politicized. The expansion of conflicts about education in the general day-to-day politics ...will eventually surface [sic] questions about the legitimacy of education itself, its structures, internal politics, and governing philosophy(134).

Many in Hong Kong have expressed fear that political indoctrination would be introduced in the classroom(135). If the PRC were to attempt to use education in this way to strengthen its legitimacy, Hong Kong residents would have little political expertise, and little power, to withstand such a move.

There is finally the potential in sinocization of the education system for what has been termed 'internal colonization'(136). At the macro level, it is defined as the "domination of a 'nation' (defined geographically, linguistically, or culturally) within the national borders of another nation-state. [It] entails usurpation and replacement" and implies absorption of the colony into the nation-state(137). Education in such a system "...is characterized by remaking the colonial child in the dominant state's image, trying to integrate the colonized into the colonizer's culture"(138). The cultural and national past of the minor party is rewritten to highlight the similarities rather than differences between the two. In this way internal colonialization is more assimilationist than classical colonial schools and has as its goal the eradication of the local culture through assimilation(139).

C. AD HOC DECOLONIZATION

Actors: Big Business, Elites
Ideology: Conservative and Capitalist

The essence of decolonizing education, in the view of writers such as Freire and A. Memmie is "...utilizing the right and the means to educate oneself"(140). It has been observed that decolonizing countries originally intend to adjust their education systems to reflect their national character(141). However, most states have failed to achieve this goal, because of the resistance of education systems to change (142), or because of difficulties encountered in practising self-determination(143).

Hence, Keith Watson writes that "...the trappings of [post-colonial] school systems, their ethos, methods of instruction, buildings, grade promotion, examinations, certificates, diplomas and degrees, and at tertiary level all the paraphernalia of faculties, administrative structure ... owe much to their colonial/European creators"(144). Furthermore, in former colonies which have been linked to capitalist influences, education continues to produce local elites who serve their own economic interests rather than the interests of the people(145).

Recently, Lau Siu-kai described Hong Kong residents as being in a "state of political lethargy out of a sense of defeatism, powerlessness and aversion to politics, [and] suspicious of the motives of leaders"(146). It is, therefore, suggested that this psychological state may interact negatively with the difficulties inherent in effecting educational change, resulting in an ad hoc decolonization of Hong Kong education, similar to the pattern of other former colonies. In other words, the education system would not adapt in an effective manner to new political contexts. Change would be effected on a reactionary and ad hoc basis rather than on the basis of philosophical commitment to the needs of the community.

This ad hoc decolonization would occur in Hong Kong in the following specific circumstances: 1. if Hong Kong residents become immobilized by
apprehension about possible political retribution for activism and/or by uncertainty about the most advantageous course to follow, or 2. if the local people succumbed to anomie, a possibility suggested by Wong Siu-lung, resulting in the rise of self-seeking rather than social behaviour(147), and/or 3. if the Party determined that it was not politically advantageous for them to interfere immediately with Hong Kong education.

A requirement, however, is the retention of existing economic systems by the HKSAR Government. If the ruling elites perceive that the economic system will be changed by the transfer, their commitment to administering the colony will weaken. Therefore, the social forces which result in ad hoc decolonization would be economic and political.

Ad Hoc Decolonization of education would be primarily an economic event with the business community and other elites as the hidden agents whose ideology was conservative, i.e., aimed at retention of the existing economic system and maintenance of independence from governmental controls and interference.

The most formidable internal obstacle to ad hoc decolonization is presented by groups campaigning for localization of the system. However, established business interests, whose support is necessary to implement localization successfully, are not likely to provide that support because their own interests would be jeopardized. Lau Siu-kai has noted that these groups are ‘dooming’ the movement of the democratic activists in the political arena(148) because democratisation would remove the protection of a government committed to economic growth, and therefore the movement has no relevance to their self-interests(149).

The nature of ad hoc decolonization is further clarified by examining it in context of the issues discussed in the contexts of localization and
I. The link between schooling and the economy.

The existing link between schooling and economic growth - which led to the description of education in Hong Kong as a 'highly utilitarian means to economic ends' (150) - has evolved with the approval of the elites. Civic and business elites have traditionally expected that higher education meet the manpower needs of the economy Hong Kong, and funding for education is largely determined by the ways in which, and the degree to which, the programmes will meet manpower needs in the economy (151).

In addition, as long as local residents perceive education to be the means to achieving economic prosperity, they are likely to utilize it as such and not demand changes. In effect, the link would remain strong.

2. The link between school and society

Within the conservative and capitalist framework of ad hoc decolonization, the link between schooling and the local culture would weaken - as the effective aims of education continued to move further from Hong Kong's social and cultural needs and toward emphasis on individual achievement in a capitalist context. Education would continue to function as a means of social mobility, encouraging the competitiveness of the population, thereby serving the needs of the elites who wish to preserve a capitalistic, competitive system.

3. The appropriateness of existing administration
The existing control of administration by business and political elites would continue. These groups have, in the past, resisted moves toward more representativeness in administration of Hong Kong's institutions on the grounds that a representative government endangers stability, and it is unlikely that they would alter this opinion.

4. The appropriateness of current selection procedures

The role of manpower planning and higher education in legitimizing planning and funding and role of the examination system in allocating places and in determining the curriculum are consistent with the elite ideology.

Adjustment in these areas could occur, however, if the elites perceive that their own political position would be strengthened by compromise with leaders of the democratic groups, who have been particularly critical of these aspects of elite administration. From the perspective of the terms of references of the elites, there is much in the present system which suits their aims, especially, the emphasis on high participation and individual achievement, and the role of the 'hidden curriculum' in imparting their ideology.

Benefits

Retaining the existing pattern of schooling, compatible with Western tertiary institutes and providing local students access to overseas schools, would be beneficial in the present situation in which the number of tertiary places falls far short of local demand. In addition, the existing system is organized coherently, and continued commitment to the
expansion of number of places and the open selection system is advantageous.

**Disadvantages**

Altbach has written of an international knowledge network and describes the operation of this network as including the exchange of books and journals, films and education advice, experts circulating among countries, student exchanges for study and research, and translations of publications (155). "The more 'modern' a nation is in terms of involvement with technology, industrialization and current political and social thought, the more involved it is in an international system of knowledge" (156).

Hong Kong, because of its modernity in the technological and industrial spheres and because of its colonial status, has enjoyed the benefits Altbach describes: close ties with British publishers, favourable status of Hong Kong students in gaining places in UK schools and tertiary institutions, the exchanges of lecturers with the UK, and connections of its industry owners and managers who have been trained in the West. So that, keeping in mind Altbach's criticism of the dependency relationships between colonies and the "centre" nations which control knowledge (157), it must be recognized that "Unless individual intellectuals in the Third World have established paths of access to the multiple institutions that dominate knowledge production, they are barred from free participation in the international intellectual community" (158).

The important question is whether the useful ties (as opposed to those ties which Watson criticizes as being a form of neocolonialism) which exist between Hong Kong and the richer countries would be weakened by
decolonization (159). For, as Altbach later writes, "Knowledge traded in the international marketplace is subject to various pressures of supply and demand, and political or economic power" (160). If, as Hong Kong loses its colonial status, it also begins to lose economic power, the benefits made possible by membership in the industrialized group of nations diminish, then the favourable international status of Hong Kong's intellectuals would also diminish.

A second disadvantage could be experienced if, under ad hoc decolonization, schools abandoned what Watson described (161) as a major purpose of the colonization of secondary schools: the utilization of schools to train those who ran the bureaucratic machinery. Although Watson (162) emphasizes the negative consequences, this provision by education could continue to provide Hong Kong with the clerks and administrators which will be needed if it achieves self-government post-1997. Ad hoc decolonization would not tackle the language issue, i.e., English, because it serves the elites, although the continued use of English as language of instruction causes many children to underachieve.

In summary, this section has argued that there are two broad categories of change possible in the context of Hong Kong education. The first category includes change brought about purposively, with the purpose of toward adaptation of the system to perceived internal or external needs. Decisions are made with the goal of reducing cultural, political and economic contradictions between Hong Kong and the PRC. Within this category it is argued that there are two possible scenarios. Firstly, the system could be modernized from within Hong Kong specifically to meet internal cultural, political and economic needs. Localization would be carried out in Hong Kong by Hong Kong people, and has as its fundamental ideological reference the socio-cultural needs of Hong Kong residents. The second
purposive scenario comprises intervention by the PRC. The PRC may find it to their advantage to *sinocize* education in Hong Kong. This intervention would be implemented with the economic and socio-political needs of the PRC overriding any other consideration. The immediate ideological reference would be the recent Party education *Reform Document*.

The second category of change deals with allowing education to *decolonize* in an ad hoc manner. It is argued that decisions in this category would be based on a capitalist and conservative ideology and would be made by administrators with the dimensions of internal politics and economics as reference points.

IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Chapter 5 examined the issue of relevant change to the Hong Kong education system. In this context, three topics were discussed. Firstly, the need for change to the system. It was argued that the need for change in grounded in the tensions arising from the contradiction between the content of education today and the challenges of the evolving society.

Secondly, it was suggested that necessary and appropriate changes will be difficult to effect, partly because of the distribution of power within the colony and partly because of the nature of Hong Kong society. Power over education is shared by the colonial government with the elite business community, and education has effectively served their needs. Teachers, students and parents have not had sufficient access to power in the colony to effect the changes they might desire now, nor do the exert significant influence on the schools. Relevant aspects of British colonial education philosophy were examined, but as part of a larger network of social dynamics in Hong Kong. It was argued that Hong Kong education has not effectively served the needs of the local culture, and that because
political education has not been part of colonial education practices, it is unlikely that it will be introduced now, in the current crisis. The structure of the system has encouraged students to strive for examination success and, often, to place pragmatism above cultural values. The psychological and the economic-political effects on Hong Kong society were discussed.

Finally, the chapter discussed the issue of change to the education system, and suggested three scenarios for education as its adjusts to the transfer process, localization, sinocization and ad hoc decolonization. Localization category is purposive intervention, oriented toward adaptation of the system to reducing cultural, political and economic contradiction. Its fundamental ideological reference would be the socio-cultural needs of Hong Kong residents. The second scenario comprises intervention from the PRC, who may find it to their economic and political advantage to sinocize education in Hong Kong. Ad hoc decolonization is allowing education to decolonize without intervention. It is argued that decisions in this category would be based on a capitalist and conservative ideology and made with the dimensions of internal politics and economics as reference points.

V. THESIS CONCLUSION

Decolonization of Hong Kong has not resulted in self-rule for its citizens, but in transfer of control over Hong Kong from one external power to another. The intent of the new authority, the PRC, is to merge Hong Kong with the PRC to form 'one country, two systems'. Hong Kong residents quickly became aware of potential difficulties involved in maintaining the existing life style, including standard of living, personal freedoms, and institutional integrity under the new authority. Therefore, the thesis argues, the imminence of the transfer is causing changes in existing social
This thesis began with examination of one transformation which, it argues, is occurring in Hong Kong as part of the transfer process: the emergence of the transfer as a public issue, resulting in realignment of patterns of power within the colony. This change was initiated by the interaction of influences from media, local and international economic leaders, foreign Government representatives, and local political leaders. The thesis argued that the emergence of 1997 as a salient public concern changed the context of the transfer process. But, as the thesis attempted to demonstrate, the resulting change is, indeed, on-going as it is modified and counteracted by the continuing influence of participants and of external events.

The thesis then described the distinctions between the socio-economic infrastructures and the political ideologies of the PRC and Hong Kong. It attempted to highlight the social structures which are unique to each, and which it is argued, also affect the context for transfer. This section focused on the existing differences in socio-political formations, in economic assumptions and in educational systems. The existence of these structural contradictions, it is argued, has an inhibiting effect on the transfer context because the structural contradictions cause tension, and therefore require resolution before successful merger of the societies is possible.

The attempt to resolve these contradictions, and thereby ensure successful merger as well as enhance the possibility of preserving the stability and prosperity enjoyed before the transfer began, will force Hong Kong residents to adapt. The thesis investigated one specific example of the effort to adapt. It was argued that the PRC economic model demands a broad spread of information and expertise to meet the demands of the recent
decentralization of decision-making and expertise, and further, that the Hong Kong residents will refer to their past patterns of adaptation to meet these needs. It was argued that they will adjust their educational and occupational choices accordingly.

Lastly, the thesis argued that, in the present social context, there are several different scenarios of change possible for education. It described the range of participants in the bid for control of education. Specifically, it described the cultural and structural factors associated with each participant, their goals, and it highlighted the resources available to each. Finally, the thesis attempted to show how each scenario would relate to the existing system.

From the research, a perspective about education and intrusive and non-spontaneous social change has emerged. This perspective suggests that such a situation, comprised of some components which are unwanted and neither familiar nor, initially, identifiable, requires examination in time and in context. For example, at the heart of the contextual analysis is not only the unwanted nature of the social change, but also the contradiction posed by the unfamiliar socio-cultural structure, economic practices and political ideologies of the PRC. Also made visible is the sequential impact of the negotiating process on Hong Kong institutions, the social interaction process on Hong Kong, and the effect of internal adjustment on the transfer process.

The impact of the transfer process is, as suggested in Chapter 1, a continuing process. As the research for this thesis was being completed, the government of Hong Kong published a policy document outlining plans for development of representative government in the colony. Reform to the existing undemocratic and unrepresentative structure is necessary in order to have in place a pool of experienced administrators at the time of the
transfer. However, the White Paper: The Development of Representative Government: The Way Forward(163) fell far short of the hopes, though not the expectations, of local people. The White Paper announced that no direct elections would be held until after the promulgation of the Basic Law by the PRC in 1991. At that time less than 20% of members of the Legislative Council, an advisory body, will be directly elected. Direct elections had previously been suggested as a possibility for 1988(164), but the Hong Kong government apparently heeded the objections of Peking that political reform in Hong Kong must converge with the Basic Law. The White Paper demonstrates that, although administrative announcements are issued by the Hong Kong government, policy is made by consultation with London and Peking.

Government prepared the population for the contents of the White Paper through pre-publication leaks to the media(165). Therefore public reaction to the actual publication was muted, further so because the White Paper was released shortly before the beginning of the Chinese New Year holiday. Private reaction to the publication was sharp, however, and is best summarized by the comment of the owner of a small Hong Kong restaurant: "Everybody wants to get out"(165).
CHAPTER 5 FOOTNOTES

1. Neither GB nor the PRC have demonstrated convincing commitment to the promises in the JD which relate to democratic government of the HK S AR. The PRC has intervened, overtly, in the political scene in Hong Kong. A series of heavy-handed signals that it is against democracy for HK culminated when Deng announced that he did not think direct elections were appropriate for Hong Kong. On the other side, the HK Government approved a bill to control the freedom of the press, followed within days by another ordinance giving itself legal powers to censor films on political grounds. The present Governor of Hong Kong has been criticized for "placing himself on the side of the powerful colony voices who want the government to rein back on democratic reform, reflecting Chinese opposition to such moves." (Stephen Vines, "Colony's new governor causes upset", The Telegraph, 31.5.87, p. 8.) Thus, although an opinion poll showed 73% in favour of direct elections ("Colony's changes need to be slow", The Guardian, 30.5.87, p. 15), the governor has given no commitment that their views would be the deciding factor. The Government of Hong Kong cannot continue to pretend that Hong Kong is a city free of politics. And it cannot pretend that it possesses the political talents, the dedication to the local community, and the leadership qualities needed during the next decade.


4. Ibid., p. 478.

5. Ibid.


11. Ibid., p. 82.

12. Members of the Education commission:
Chairman: Dr. the Honourable Lee Quo-wei, CBE JP, Executive Councillor.
chairman Hang Seng Bank, former Legco member,
Raymond Wu, JP, President Hong Kong Med Association, member BLDC,
Maria Tam Wai Chu, JP, BLDC, Legco, Legal Advisor, Newspaper Society; Junior Police Officers Association,
Brian Tisdall JP, member BLDC
Chan Kam-chuen OBE JP, appointed member Legco, Special Advisor to Director
Cable and Wireless PLC
the Hon John Swaine, Barrister, OBE QC JP, Director, Hong Kong and Shanghai
Bank, Steward Royal Jockey Club
the Honourable Peter C Wong, CBE JP, Executive Council, appointed member
Legco, non-executive director Chow Sang Holding Co., Ltd; Commercial Bank of
Hong Kong Ltd., Asia Insurance Co Ltd
the Honourable Yeung Po-kwan, CPM JP, Director, Hang Lung Bank, Overseas
Trust Bank, Hong Kong Industrial and Commercial Bank, Mass Transit Railway
Corp, Principal Ming Yin College.

18. Private conversation, 28.3.86.
19. Philip G. Altbach and Gail P. Kelly, Education and the Colonial Experience
20. Benjamin K.P. Leung, "Democratization", in Jao et. al., Hong Kong and
   1997, op.cit., pp. 75-100, p. 94.
   in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, 1986, op. cit., p. 27.
22. Ibid.
   Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1986, p. 197.
24. Ibid., pp. 197-198.
26. Ibid.
27. Nelson W.S. Chow, "Welfare Development in Hong Kong - The Politics of
   Social Choice", in Jao et.al., Hong Kong and 1997, op. cit., pp. 475-492,
   p. 483.
28. Ibid., p. 484.
30. Ibid, p. 43.


34. Ibid.


36. Frank Gilles, TVB interview, op. cit.


38. Cheng Kai Ming, "Education What is to be Planned?", in Jao et al., op. cit., pp. 531-546, p. 533.


41. Ng describes Sir John Pope Hennessy, Governor of Hong Kong from 1877-1883, considered an enlightened colonial Governor, as of the opinion that government should provide English education and "... leave vernacular education to voluntary or private efforts." This appears inconsistent with his respect for Chinese custom and usage. Ibid., p. 158.

42. Miron Mushkat, op. cit., p. 13ff.

43. Ibid., p. 16.


45. Carnoy wrote that "schooling as a colonial institution attempts to make children fit certain molds, to shape them to perform predetermined roles and tasks based on their social class. Neither children nor adults are brought to understand their relationship to institutions and how they can change those institutions to suit their needs. Martin Carnoy, op. cit.

46. R. Murray Thomas, op. cit., p. 171.

47. Charles F. Emmons, "Public Opinion and Political Participation in Pre-1997 Hong Kong", in Jao et al., op. cit., 53-72, p. 54.

48. Ibid.

49. Tzong-Biau Lin, et. al., 1979, op. cit., p. 137.

50. Helen Ngai-lung Cheng, "Language Education - Policy and Planning", in Jao
51. In 1939, N.H. France, historian at HKU reported that "Hong Kong being nothing but a port with a history of less than a century, a shifting population with its roots in the mainland, is not a fruitful source of historical research." (Alan Birch, "Approaches to Hong Kong History" in David Faure, James Hayes and Alan Birch, From Village to City Studies in the Traditional Roots of Hong Kong Society, Centre Of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1984, pp. 228-236, p. 229). Alan Birch observes that it was colonial myopia which caused France to overlook that "...there had taken root in Hong Kong a Chinese community with its own ... cultural institutions." (Ibid., p. 230.)

52. Paulo Freire cited in Philip G. Altbach and Gail P. Kelly, Education and the Colonial Experience, op. cit., p. 84.


54. Ng Lun, op. cit., p. 69.

55. Martin Carnoy, op. cit.

56. Thomas, op. cit., p. 172

57. Ibid., p. 233.


60. Ibid. p. 307.

61. Great Britain is in the bottom third with the Scandanavian countries, Israel and Austria.


63. Ibid.

64. Hofstede's fourth dimension, Masculinity vs Femininity is not applicable to this discussion.


66. Ibid.


68. Ibid., p. 130.
70. Ibid.

71. He particularly refers to the pre-disposition to be colonized found both in societies who practise ancestor worship and in certain types of child-rearing practices that foster personalities characterized by marked feelings of dependence and inferiority. Cited in Martin Carnoy, op. cit., p. 59.

72. Private conversation.
73. Ibid.

74. Altbach and Kelly, Education and the..., op. cit., p. 86.


76. Altbach and Kelly, Education and..., op. cit., p. 86. Ibid., p. 233.

77. Miners, 1986, op. cit., p. 32.

78. Mannoni quoted in Martin Carnoy, op. cit., p. 60.


80. Ibid., p. 21.


82. Cited in Altbach and Kelly, Education and..., op. cit., p. 83.


85. Leung Sai-wing, op. cit., p. 27.

86. Lau Siu-kai cited in Leung Sai-wing, op. cit., p. 27.

87. Ibid, p. 28.


89. Martin Carnoy, op. cit., p. 3.

90. Leung Sai-wing, op. cit., p. 17.

92. Lau Siu-kai, Decolonization Without Independence..., p. 3.

93. see SCMP, 31,5,87 "Support mounts for elections" for the report of a SCNP-commissioned survey which found that three-quarters of the adult population now favour direct elections but less than half felt that their opinions would affect how Hong Kong was governed and almost two-thirds did not know how the present Legislative Councillors were chosen.


96. Typical of many commentaries on this topic is Ronald Li as quoted in Paul Marriage, "Colourful views of chairman" SCMP, 4/10/87.


98. Ibid. p. 543-544.

99. Ibid.


101. Refer to Chapter 2 for background of this point.


103. Ibid. p. 329.


106. Ibid., p. 38

107. Chung Yue-Ping, op. cit., p. 35

108. Ibid., pp. 33-47.

109. Fung, op. cit., p. 319


111. Ibid.

112 Pedro Pak-tao Ng, "Recent Trends in Work and leisure in Hong Kong and Higher Education's Response", Occasional Papers No. 13, Centre for Hong Kong Studies, CUHK, April 1986. p. 31-34.

113. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

116 Altbach and Kelly, Education and the..., op. cit., p. 235. Altbach notes that "The use of a European language as the central medium for intellectual exchange blocks access to knowledge for large portions of the population. Language becomes a mechanism for social stratification..." and intellectual stratification.

117. Ibid.

118. The Document is described as one of two the "crucial policy documents for structural reforms in education in the coming decade." The second is a speech made by the Vice-Premier Wan Li at the National Education Conference made shortly before publication of the Document. Cheng Kai Ming has written that the recent education reforms in China are determined by the economic reform and he argues that the Document is the 'ideology' of the present education system because it "gives the direction [in which people are expected to run]." This thesis accepts his argument. Cheng Kai Ming, "China's Recent Education Reform: The beginning of an overhaul", Cheng Kai Ming, Comparative Education, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 255-269, esp. pp. 255, 266, 267.

119. Cheng Kai Ming suggests that the pace of educational reform in the PRC is more influenced by the economic environment than by political aspects, and therefore the economic/technological will have precedence over political ideological, at least under the present political environment in the PRC. He has described the current economic trends which "further nurture development in technical/vocational education" in Ibid., p. 266 and p. 267.

120. H.K. Lamb, op. cit., p. 158 and David Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997 The Final Settlement, op. cit., p. 147.
122. Carnoy, op. cit., p. 5.
123. Grace Chow, op. cit.
124. Cheng Kai Ming, China's Recent Education Reform..., op. cit., p. 266.

126. Ibid.
128. Ibid., p. 265.
130. Ibid., p. 220.
131. "Students need to develop their 'sense of democracy,'", SCMP, 18.10,87.
132. Private conversation

133. Altbach and Kelly, Education and the..., op. cit., p... 


137. Ibid., p. 23.

138. Ibid., p. 22.

139. Ibid., p. 29.

140. cited in Altbach and Kelly, Education and the..., op. cit., p. 176.


142. Masemann suggested that "In ex-colonial countries, where schools are derived from foreign models and where the syllabus has strong external roots, a spontaneous approach to the curriculum (development) is unlikely." p. 17 Vandra Lea Masemann "Critical Ethnography in the Study of Comparative Education" in Altbach and Kelly, op. cit., 11-25.


148. Lau Siu-kai, Decolonization without..., op. cit..., p. 13

149. Ibid.


152. Ibid., p. 533.

153. Ibid., p. 536.

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid., see p. 230-231

157. Ibid., p. 231.

158. Ibid.

159. Watson, op. cit., p. 41.


161. Watson, op. cit., p. 36.

162. Ibid., p. 37.


164. Emily Lau, "The grey paper", FEER, 18.2.88.

165. Ibid.

166. Private conversation.
Appendix No. 1 Evaluation of job features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Perceptions of Job</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>friendly co-workers</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contribute to HK society</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>helping people</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gives pride in the job</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>level of difficulty</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contribute to PRC society</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective Job Characteristics</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>not all routine</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>promotion prospects</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>career stability</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good salary, fringe benefits</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be own boss</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reasonable working hours</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technical work</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>travel opportunity</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: 1 = very important
2 = important
3 = not important
Appendix No. 2  Distribution of 14 career areas according to the significance of their contribution to the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong
By rank order from 1 to 5,
1 = most important — 0 = no rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career Area</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Services</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law, Legal Services</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry/Manufacturing</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics and Computer Technology</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications/Transport</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Services</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalism</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and Social Services</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages/Translation</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate/Housing</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandizing</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix No. 3 Prestige rankings for 12 career areas:

Showing number of times selected as one of 3 most prestigious jobs in Hong Kong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career Area</th>
<th>Selections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Administrator</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientist</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditor</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist Officer</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Foreman</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix No. 4 % Distribution of impact of various factors on achievement of career goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of competition in HK</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low interest in the career</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of preparation</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not worked hard enough</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in HK government</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: 1 = very likely to interfere
     2 = likely to interfere
     3 = not likely to interfere
     4 = not sure about its effect

Appendix No. 5 % Distribution of students' perception of the factor most likely to interfere

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of competition in Hong Kong</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of interest in the job</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has not worked hard enough</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of preparation for the job</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsettled future of Hong Kong</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Survey on Education and Occupational Preferences of Secondary School students in Hong Kong, 1987

Dear Student: Your cooperation is appreciated very much. These are questions about the plans you have for your own education and the plans you might already have for your career after finishing school. There are no correct answers to the questions, so do not worry about each answer but please give your personal opinion. Please do not write either your name or the name of your school on this paper.

Biographical Questions
Please circle the appropriate answer:

1. Present Class: Form 3 4 5 6 7
2. your sex: Male Female
3. your school: Anglo Secondary Chinese Middle
4. Your average grade this year: A B C Lower
5. Were both your parents born in Hong Kong? yes no one of them not sure
6. What was the highest level of school your father attended?
   Primary Secondary Higher Not Sure
7. your mother?
   Primary Secondary Higher Not sure
8. What is your father's job?
9. What is your mother's job?
EDUCATION PLANS

10. Which is the highest level you expect to attend in school?

Circle one:  Form 3  4  5  6  7  post-secondary

11. If you are sitting the HKCEE in the future, check the subjects plan to study in preparation.
(Please check at least 1 and not more than 3.)

- Commercial Subjects
- Chinese Language and Literature
- English Language and Literature
- Chinese History
- Science (Geography, Biology, Chemistry, Physics)
- Computer Studies
- Design and Technology
- Metalwork
- Economics
- Geography
- Economics and Public Affairs
- History
- Art and Design
- Civic Education

The subject from the above list most useful to my future is ____________.

12. If you are going to sit the HKHL or HKAL, check the subjects you plan to study in preparation.

- Biology
- Chemistry
- Business studies
- Chinese History
- Chinese Language and Literature
- Economics
- Economics and Public Affairs
- English Literature
- Geography
- History
- Other approved language
- Physics
- Principles of Accounts
- Religious studies
- Sociology

The one subject from the above list which is most useful to my future is ____________.
13. To me, the most interesting subject from the above lists is ___________.

Please answer the following questions by circling 'yes' or 'no'.

14. My own likes and dislikes are most important when choosing what subject to take next.  
   yes  
   no

15. Study in China would help me to achieve my career goals.  
   yes  
   no

16. Study in a Overseas country would help me achieve my career goals.  
   yes  
   no

Please answer the next question by putting a check in the right column

very important/ important/ not important

17. I will choose a area of study based on:

steady job prospects from the area of study
preparation for a high-salary job
my own interest in the area
confidence I can get a good grade
usefulness to the future of Hong Kong society
my family s advice
18. Please check these secondary and tertiary subjects on the basis how important it will be for Hong Kong to have citizens skilled in the area.

very important/important/not important/I am uncertain

- General Business
- Psychology
- Accounting/Book-keeping
- Translation
- Banking
- Architecture
- Medicine/Health Care
- Science
- Marketing/International Business
- Law/politics
- Engineering, Electronics
- Teacher Education
- Technical Studies
- Computer Studies
- Mathematics
- Social Work/Administration
- Economics
- Sociology
- Management

Which one of these subjects will be the most important to the future of Hong Kong?

19. If I achieve my education goals, I am most interested in a job as a

20. Please rank the following in terms of who will have greater influence on your job choice. Number (1) is the person with the most influence, and so on to number 5: the person with the least or no influence.

- parents
- self
- career counsellor
- teachers
- friends
21. What are some of the things a job should offer? Please put a check in the right column.

very important/important/unimportant
should not be too difficult
friendly co-workers
gives pride in the job
good chance of getting promoted
contributes to Hong Kong society
be not all routine, is interesting
a chance to travel
good salary, fringe benefits
be technical work
reasonable working hours
offers me career stability
contributes to PRC development
helping people
being my own boss

22. Please rank the top five career areas in terms of the long-term survival of HK. Put (1) by the career area making the most contribution to the long-term survival, (2) by the second, etc. Choose only 5.

______ merchandizing/sales
______ real estate/housing
______ communications/transport
______ industry/manufacturing
______ construction industry
______ tourism services
______ languages/translation
______ journalism
______ community and social services
______ financial/business services (banking, insurance, import/export, accountancy)
______ arts/humanities education
______ electronics and computer technology
______ the law and legal services

23. Because of the unsettled future of Hong Kong I’ll delay making a decision about a career.

yes no

24. My best career prospects are working for a Hong Kong Chinese firm.

yes no

25. My best career prospects are working for a foreign firm in HK.

yes no
26. Which do you think are the most respected jobs in Hong Kong? (Please choose the top 3)

- general manager
- police
- auditor
- government administrator
- teacher
- hotel or airlines reservations officer
- construction labourer
- architect
- housewife
- factory foreman
- doctor
- scientist

27. What type of work have your parents suggested to you?

- no suggestion

28. In your opinion, how likely or unlikely are any of the following explanations if a Hong Kong student does not achieve his/her career goals? (Please put a check in the right column.)

- very likely/likely/neutral/unlikely

1. He has a career he is not really interested in and therefore does not work as hard as possible.

2. He has not prepared well for the job by not working hard enough in school.

3. The degree of competition in Hong Kong is very high and this can make it difficult to achieve all goals.

4. The changes occurring in Hong Kong's government may affect the job market perhaps making it necessary to change some of the original goals.

5. He has not worked hard enough on the job due to laziness.

Which of the above is the most likely reason? Number ___
各位同學：多謝你願意為本調查填表。填表時不須把你的名字或你學校的名字寫在這份調查表上。此項調查旨在協助日後的教育規劃，因爲部份問題沒有肯定對或肯定錯的答案，所以不必浪費太多時間來考慮回答。

———

個人與家庭背景

請在正確的答案上打圈：

1. 現時班級： FORM 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7

2. 性別： 男 / 女

3. 學校種類： 英文學校 / 中文學校

4. 你今年成績的平均分數： A / B / C / C以下

5. 你父母都在香港出世嗎？ 是 / 否 / 其中一個是 / 不清楚

6. 你父親的最高學歷是什麼？ 小學 / 中學 / 高於中學 / 不清楚

7. 你母親的最高學歷是什麼？ 小學 / 中學 / 高於中學 / 不清楚

8. 你父親的職位是什麼？

9. 你母親的職位是什麼？

— 1 —
10. 你打算在中學讀到幾年級？

請圈一個答案：FORM 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 中學後繼續讀

11. 如果你準備考香港中學會考的話，在你應考科目中，請用“✓”符號標明你最有興趣的科目。請“✓”最少一個，最多三個科目：

A □ 商科
B □ 英國文學
C □ 中國文學
D □ 中國歷史
E □ 科學（生物、化學、物理）
F □ 電腦學
G □ 設計與技術
H □ 金工
I □ 經濟
J □ 地理
K □ 經濟與公共事務
L □ 世界歷史
M □ 美術與設計
N □ 公民教育

上列科目中對於我的將來最有用的一科是__________________。

— 2 —
12. 如果你準備考香港高等程度或香港高級程度考試，請用 " √ " 符號標明你準備參加考試而打算選讀的科目。

① □ 生物 ② □ 化學 ③ □ 商業學 ④ □ 中國歷史 ⑤ □ 中國語文及文學 ⑥ □ 經濟 ⑦ □ 政府及公共事務 ⑧ □ 英國文學 ⑨ □ 地理 ⑩ □ 世界歷史 ⑪ □ 其他認可語文 ⑫ □ 物理 ⑬ □ 會計原理 ⑭ □ 宗教學 ⑮ □ 社會學

我認為上述科目中對我將來最有用的一科是 ________________。
（只填字母，不一定是你所選的科目）

13. 對於我個人來講，上列所有科目中最有興趣的一科是 ________________。
（只填字母，不一定是你所選的科目）

14. 在我下次選科時，我自己的個人愛好是最重要的考慮因素。
   是 / 否

15. 到中國讀書將會幫助我達成自己的事業理想。
   是 / 否

16. 到外國留學將會幫助我達成自己的事業理想。
   是 / 否
17. 回答下列問題時，請在適當的框內打“√”

我選科目的原因是：

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>非常重要</th>
<th>重 要</th>
<th>不 重 要</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>因為這方面的職業穩定</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>可得到較高的薪水</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>我自己對這方面的興趣</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>有把握獲得高分</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>對香港社會的將來有貢獻</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>我父母的建議</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. 下列技術專業人士對香港的重要性：

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>很 重 要</th>
<th>重 要</th>
<th>普 通</th>
<th>不 肯 定</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>①</td>
<td>普通商科</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>②</td>
<td>心理學</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>③</td>
<td>會計／簿計</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>④</td>
<td>翻譯</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>⑤</td>
<td>銀行</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>⑥</td>
<td>建築學</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑦</td>
<td>醫學／保健</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑧</td>
<td>科學</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑨</td>
<td>市場學／國際商業</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑩</td>
<td>法律／政治</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑪</td>
<td>工程／電子</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑫</td>
<td>師範</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑬</td>
<td>技工</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑭</td>
<td>電腦</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑮</td>
<td>數學</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑯</td>
<td>社會工作／行政</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑰</td>
<td>經濟</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑱</td>
<td>社會學</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑲</td>
<td>管理</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

上述科目中哪一科對香港的將來最重要____________________（只填字母）。

- 4 -
職業計劃

19. 如果我能如願完成學業，我最有興趣的職業是______________。

20. 請根據他（們）對你職業選擇的影響力而將下列五種人用“1 - 5”的數字分級。“1”影響力最大，“5”最小，如此類推：

父母
自己
職業指導員
教師
朋友

21. 你對一項職業的要求是什麼，請在適當的框內打“√”符號：

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>非常重要</th>
<th>重 要</th>
<th>不 重 要</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>不太難的工作</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>友善的同事</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>令人引以為傲的工作</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>好的升職機會</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>對香港社會作出貢獻</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>非千篇一律的、有興趣的工作</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>有機會週遊出差</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>高薪金、好福利</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>技術性工作</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>工作時間好</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>穩定的工作</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>對中國的發展作出貢獻</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>可幫助人的工作</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>能夠自己作主的工作</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

（請在此寫下你認為重要的而上面忽略了的因素）
22. 請根據其對香港遠景所能起的作用大小，從以下行業中評選 5 種（“1”代表貢獻最大，“5”代表最小，如此類推）：

- 買賣／推銷
- 地產／房宇
- 通訊／運輸
- 工業／製造業
- 建築
- 旅遊服務
- 語言／翻譯
- 報界
- 社區與社會服務
- 金融／商業服務（銀行、保險、進／出口、會計）
- 人文教育
- 電子與電腦技術
- 法律與法律服務

請在適當答案上打圈

23. 因為香港前途不穩定，所以將延遲作出職業方面的決定。
    是 / 否

24. 在本地資本公司工作能給我最好的職業前途。
    是 / 否

25. 在香港外資公司工作能給我最好的職業前途。
    是 / 否
26. 從下列職業中選出在香港的地位最高的三種：

- 總經理
- 警察
- 核敷師
- 政府行政人員
- 教師
- 酒店或航空公司訂房訂座員
- 建築工人
- 建築師
- 家庭主婦
- 工廠工頭
- 醫生
- 科學家

27. 你父母曾經向你建議過任何職業？____________，或者沒有任何建議。

28. 如果一個香港學生的職業理想不能如願以償，你認爲下列哪一個是最可能的原因，哪一個是最不可能的原因？

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>可能</th>
<th>可能</th>
<th>不知</th>
<th>不可能</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 因為他對他的職業沒有真正的興趣，所以並沒有努力工作</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 他在學校時的學業準備不夠</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 因為香港競爭很劇烈，所以很難達到全部理想</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 香港政府的變動可能影響職業市場趨勢，所以必須改變原定計劃的一部分</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 不努力工作，因為沒有進取心</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

哪一個是最可能的原因？__________________________________________

謝謝！
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