THE SOCIOLOGY OF MORALITY AND EDUCATION: A THEORETICAL CRITIQUE APPLIED TO AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MORAL JUDGEMENT MAKING IN A GIRLS' COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL

MORAL JUDGEMENT IN A GIRLS' COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL: A CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF MORALITY IN EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

The study examines the reasons for Sociology's lack of contribution towards the theory and practice of moral education and sets out to suggest an approach to the sociology of morality which would be relevant to educational research.

Part I discusses the sociology of morality's theoretical heritage, the American pragmatic tradition, and the ethical foundations of the sociological traditions derived from Marx, Durkheim and Weber. The inadequacies of the founding fathers' conceptualisation of morality and the effect of this theory on sociological practice is discussed with reference to studies in deviance and education.

The critical theory of Jürgen Habermas is reviewed and it is suggested that his work could provide a basis for a sociological study of morality in which theory relates to practice and where morality is seen both socially and universalistically.

Part II describes an attempt to put Habermas' moral theory into practice in an empirical study of moral judgement in a girls' comprehensive school. A theoretical scheme for conceptualising and analysing procedures of moral judgement is presented. The scheme incorporates conceptualisations of Habermas and Schutz and allows moral judgement to be approached as a procedure involving the ideal and the real and relating beliefs and practices. The basis of the scheme is the assessment of the style of the judgemental procedures according to Habermas' distinction between work and interaction. This approach is contrasted with the essentially Kantian scheme of Lawrence Kohlberg.

A study is conducted in the sixth form of Greenbank School when the scheme is applied. An intensive phase investigates the relationships of home and school to the function of moral consciousness. It allows certain observations about the function of comprehensive education to be made.
The study illustrates the potential of Habermasian theory for a sociology of morality and helps to pinpoint weaknesses in his formulations. It serves as a practical critique of Kantian based approaches to morality.
I should like to express my appreciation to my mentor, John Hayes, for his guidance and management and to Professor Basil Bernstein for his criticism and advice.

I am most grateful to the headmistress, the head of Religious Studies and the staff and girls of the sixth form of "Greenbank" School for their friendly co-operation, especially the sixteen girls and their families who participated in the intensive study. I should like to thank Mr. Lewis, Religious Studies Adviser for ILEA for arranging for me to conduct the study at "Greenbank".

Finally I would like to thank Christine for helping me put everything together.
Pure communication is absolute. And yet you and I can never be the same; we have our own identities. But the more I am in communion with you, the more does my own identity expand. The more I am in community, the more all-embracing is my own identity.

Martin Israel
"Dialogue 3", *This Time-Bound Ladder*,
E. Robinson (ed.),
Religious Experience Research Unit,
Manchester College,
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PART I: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Chapter 1: Introduction

"The moral responsibility of the school, and of those who conduct it, is to society. The school is fundamentally an institution erected by society... to exercise a certain specific function in maintaining the life and advancing the welfare of society." Thus wrote John Dewey over seventy years ago. At the same time, at the Sorbonne, Emile Durkheim was delivering his famous course of lectures on moral education. Durkheim's aim was to formulate moral education not for all men everywhere but for men of his own time and in his own country. Both great educators were writing in response to what they believed was a pressing need for their time: to clarify the relationship between education and morality in modern secular society. Both saw morality in the field of education to be, essentially, a social affair.

For fifty years Dewey remained the unchallenged authority on moral education in the English speaking world. In 1958, W.K. Frankena's paper "Towards a philosophy of moral education" was printed in the Harvard Educational Review and, in Britain the following year, the first of R.S. Peter's works relating education and morality was published, Authority, Responsibility and Education. These writers brought new insights from twentieth century moral philosophy to the field of education. Both stressed rational and cognitive aspects of morality; neither was interested in the social.

In Britain, the upsurge of interest in secular moral education of the 60's challenged sociologists to enter the field and A.H. Halsey contributed to the collection, Moral Education in a Changing Society with his essay "The Sociology of Moral Education". This was followed by a series of
studies by Barry Sugarman who represented Sociology on the interdisciplinary research unit set up to investigate moral education by the Farmington Trust. But Sociology's involvement in moral education was short lived. The unit was disbanded in 1970 and the publication of its journal, Moral Education ceased. Thereafter, sociologists contributed little to furthering an understanding of morality in education. The Social Morality Council's publication The Journal of Moral Education, which replaced the Farmington projects' journal was strongly orientated towards Philosophy and Psychology, but neglected Sociology which was not represented on its editorial board. It sought to answer such questions as, "What does it mean to be morally educated?" or "How shall morality be assessed?" not "How does morality relate to social reality?". The only social emphasis came from comparative studies of moral educational practices which did not attempt to define what they meant by morality.

In an attempt to revive interest in a sociological approach to morality in education, P.W. Musgrave contributed "Sociology and Moral Education: New Directions". He pointed out that previous studies had focussed on societal and institutional aspects of morality. He called for an adequate definition of morality in sociological terms which would allow a focus at the interpersonal level with an emphasis on the sociological construction of moral reality. Although Musgrave's recent publication The Moral Curriculum has prepared the ground for a "new directional" approach, no-one yet has provided the necessary theoretical base.

Sociology's failure to enter the field of moral education has not been from lack of interest in education: the Sociology of Education is a flourishing subject. Nor can it be attributed to an educational disinterest in morality: the research output in this field from philosophers and psychologists is plentiful. It stems from Sociology's theoretical
weakness in the field of morality, of its failure adequately to conceptualise
the moral in social terms. Halsey's and Sugarman's approach to moral
education was from the perspective of structural functionalism.
Functionalism can relate education and society but it cannot relate these
to morality. The social and the moral, to functionalism, are theoretically
indistinguishable. The essentially phenomenological approach, advocated
by Musgrave, can look at moral meanings in an educational setting but it
cannot relate morality to society. Seventy years ago Dewey had stated:

Moral principles need to be brought down to the ground
through their statement in social and in psychological
terms. . . We need to translate the moral into the
conditions and forces of our community life, and into
the impulses and habits of the individual. 11

Sociology has not yet met Dewey's challenge.

The Sociology of morality's theoretical problems have their roots in
the American pragmatic tradition of which the philosophical system known
as Pragmatism was but one outward sign. Sociology was to concern itself
with moral matters through attempts to solve the social problem of crime
and delinquency. The sociologists of the Chicago school, under the
leadership of Robert Park saw delinquency as an undesirable situation
caused by the pathological disorganisation of the urban environment.12 They
did not seek to define morality. They were attempting to define and
control a practical situation. These ends were social and political
rather than theoretical.

Sociological studies of deviance took a more theoretical turn with
the writings of Robert Merton who worked in an essentially Durkheimian
framework. His central thesis was "that aberrant behavior may be
regarded sociologically as a symptom of dissociation between culturally
prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing these
aspirations."13 Deviance is now seen in functional terms, following and
modifying Durkheim's own interpretations of deviant behaviour in Suicide.14
It is now discussed not only as a social problem which is in itself
morally undesirable but as morally undesirable behaviour. Whilst deviance studies did not attempt to define morality per se, the Durkheimian connection meant that social deviance had distinct moral overtones. Durkheim had replaced the traditional relationship of morality with God by a relationship with society, "the one empirically observable moral being to which one wills can be linked." It was society that must provide "the objective for moral behavior." Deviance from societal norms was moral deviance which must be punished in order to uphold the "authority of moral law." A moral, that is, a social violation, "demoralizes" society.

Sociology entered a phase where the social "cause" of deviant behaviour was associated with responsibility or "blame". Reactions away from functionalist approaches tended to emphasise a shift of responsibility from the deviant or his immediate culture or environment to agencies of the wider social order. Thus Aaron Cicourel, in suggesting that what constituted the problem of delinquency was related to the definitions of those concerned with juvenile justice shifted much of the responsibility from the delinquents as individuals to the practices of the official agencies. Later ethnomethodological studies by J.D. Douglas and his associates together with studies by Howard Becker from the perspective of symbolic interaction were to remove deviant behaviour from its social context and thus fully remove responsibility for the deviant. Deviants were deviant in name only, thus labelled by a society which considered them as having deviated from its norms. To ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism a social norm bore no moral connotation and thus deviance was unrelated to morality. If functionalism had related the social and the moral in such a fashion that they were indistinguishable, then the "new directives" to sociology had no way of conceptualising morality at all. It's theoretical influences were largely Weberian, thus keeping fact and value distinct, and phenomenological, thus observing the topic in isolation from its context. To the "new" forms of sociology behaviour was to be
described as behaviour and not to be evaluated.

But if these studies sought to detach the social from the moral, they failed to overcome another assumption connected with America's pragmatic heritage. In describing behaviour they continued to assume the simple relationship between belief and action that the pragmatic tradition had emphasised and which had been accepted by Parsons in his functionalist formulations. Thus A.K. Cohen and D. Matza, whilst engaged in critique of the functionalist approach to deviance, continued to regard behaviour as in some way directly related to values.

Because the sociology of education developed on a functionalist foundation, it too, equated the morally desirable with the socially desirable. Parsons' pioneer study, "The School Class as a Social System" relates the school experience to its primary functions in society as an agency of socialization and allocation. There is a tacit understanding that what is "good" for society is "good" for the children.

It was British Sociology which was to spell out this approach in specifically moral terms and it was these attempts that led the sociology of morality down a blind alley. When Halsey responded to the challenge of the movement for secular moral education with his paper, "The Sociology of Moral Education", he relied heavily on Parsons' study of the school class and made explicit what in Parsons had been implicit. Thus moral education is defined in terms of "the preparation of individuals for participation in social life and acceptance of social rules; in short the problems of role allocation and socialization." Halsey accepted Parsons' major criterion for both socialisation and selection - achievement. The competition of the school with its goal of achievement was seen as morally desirable because it was socially desirable.

Sugarman's studies, which followed that of Halsey took the argument to its logical conclusion. Being part of a moral education team, Sugarman defined morality in terms of John Wilson's "morally educated
person" and the sociology of morality as a study of the "social factors or pre-conditions" which affect the behaviour of this morally educated person. The morally educated person was defined in universal moral terms. In addition to his "concern for other people" he was typified by the universalistic quality of his moral thought. Unfortunately the environment which was to foster his development was discussed in the functionalist terms of Parsons. As well as teaching "universalism", the main moral function of the school was seen in terms of the development of "individualism, the achievement a mastery overtaken and functional specificity." It is clear that Sugarman, like Parsons and his fellow functionalists had confused universal morality with social norms. The Sociology of Morality was in a situation of total contradiction yet there was no theory on which to base an adequate critique. Common sense alone could suggest that universalistic aims could not be fulfilled through socially relativistic methods. Musgrave's attempt to revitalise Sociology's interest in moral education could not succeed because his interactive approach lacked the tools with which to critique functionalism. Musgrave could and did make a useful contribution to the investigation of moral meanings at the interactive level but he lacked a theoretical framework broad enough to support a fully operative Sociology of Morality.

We have suggested that Sociology lacks a theoretical basis from which to mount a study of morality. If we assume that educational study is necessary and worthwhile and that the theory and practice of moral education is likewise necessary, the question arises: "Does it matter whether Sociology contributes to the study of morality in education?" We observed above, that The Journal of Moral Education had a distinct Philosophical and Psychological bias. Does this matter? We would suggest that it matters a great deal. Studies in moral education are either relativist as in the case of most sociological studies or universalistic. The Journal of
Moral Education emphasises the latter approach. In effect, however, this means that such studies are based on essentially Kantian conceptions of the moral. The work of R.S. Peters and that of Lawrence Kohlberg which will be discussed later in this study, both exhibit strong Kantian features. Whilst Kant's emphasis on autonomy and on the necessity for a universalistic definition of what is considered "right" action is true for any society, we consider that there are certain aspects of Kantian theory which are inadequate as a basis for an investigation of morality in education.

In the first place the Kantian approach is not suitable for a society where there is rapid social change, where norms and values are in a state of flux and where, as McIntyre suggests the only widely shared moral good is tolerance. Kantian action is based on a judgement of what is universally right behaviour. No child can be expected to look on our pluralistic society and apply Kant's categorical imperative. While this may not be asked in so many words it is implied by Kohlberg's formulations of moral development. Kohlberg's highest stages are assessed in terms of a person's generalised understanding of justice in various social situations. This approach could only be justified in social situations where behaviour is related to certain stable norms. This is no longer the case in British society.

In the second place, the Kantian ideal does not connect with reality. We would agree with ethic's traditional distinction between fact and value but value and fact must be related. If we consider the moral statement: "I ought to love my neighbour" it can be seen that the practical response is not the Kantian "I will love my neighbour" but the question: "Who is my neighbour?" If the question is settled as: "My neighbour means all needy people and loving him means meeting his needs", the questions still come: "What are his needs? "How can they be met?" Morality is
essentially a practical affair and moral action involves concrete practical considerations. Good intentions are not enough in today's world. Morality must be able to ask: "Is sending 'aid' meeting my neighbours' need?" and critically to evaluate the replies.

Finally the Kantian approach to the moral is individualistic and anti-social. While individual autonomy is essential to moral action (one must act in accord with what one believes to be right and not in accord with external coercion) the Kantian approach defines what is right individualistically. The individual comes to a private decision about what action is right based on his own private judgement. Yet morality involves the way people behave in relation to each other. It is about evaluations of human conduct, about what sorts of actions and practices of human society are considered desirable. It can involve individual or group behaviour, but it can never involve solitary behaviour which affects no-one but the individual himself.

The Kantian approach gives an inadequate description of morality. This however, does not in itself provide the reason for the necessity of the involvement of Sociology in the study of moral education. To the contention that current Kantian approaches to moral education are inadequate we would add the suggestion that a sociological approach, developed as a critique of Kant and grounded in the socially real, could provide an adequate theoretical base for studying morality in education. Moreover we contend that Sociology's involvement is essential because theory matters and moral aspects of education matter.

Theory matters because the nature of the theory will govern the research practice. It will define what the problem is and it will define the nature of the data. In deviance studies, for example, the sociologists of the Chicago school saw the problem as one of social disorganisation, their theoretical basis being an ecological model. Cicourel saw the problem as being one of the way the situation was defined,
Merton as one of relating an individual's expectations to social norms. To functionalist research "moral" values are seen as any values which assist the cohesion and the goals of society. To Kantian based research, a moral value would be in some way connected with universal moral principles. Theory matters, moreover, because it will determine the validity of the findings - how true they are to social reality. Valid findings will be comprehensible in terms of a coherent way of looking at the world. They will be understandable in broadly general terms.

The research findings themselves matter because what is believed about the relationship of morality to education will shape educational practice. Moral development is considered as desirable by educational authorities and their theoretical understanding of how this occurs will influence their educational practice. In Chapter 6 we refer to Brian Crittenden's work, Form and Content in Moral Education, subtitled "An Essay on Aspects of the Mackay Report". Crittenden explains the purpose of the book as being to examine the theoretical foundations of the Mackay Report - "The Report on the Committee on Religious Education in the Public Schools of the Province of Ontario". This report, which had accepted the theory of Lawrence Kohlbey, equated moral education "with the acquisition of skills in moral reasoning" and suggested a change in educational practices to foster such skills.

The question now arises: What must an adequately theorised Sociology of Morality be like? What theoretical aspects are needed? Put in simplest terms, an adequate theory must be truly social and truly moral.

To be truly moral it must be capable of expression in universal terms. Whilst being aware of an individual's moral beliefs and practices it must not lose sight of the universal nature of morality. Truth, freedom and justice must transcend the social even although they may be described in social terms. Our conceptualisation would need to go further than that of Winch and other social relativists. In Ethics and Action Winch allows
that truth and integrity are universal but otherwise morality is socially
determined and can only be understood in its specific social context. If
the moral is to be considered in universal terms then there must be an
adequate conceptualisation for moral deviance. Morally deviant behaviour
must be capable of being defined in non relativist terms, i.e. in terms
other than in deviance from social norms.

If our theory is truly moral then it will be capable of mounting a
critique not only upon social actions and social practices but upon the
practice of sociology itself. We observed above that Musgrave's approach
to the moral in interactive terms was not invalid in the sense of Parsons'
approach but it was unable to show how moral value differed from what was
valuable to society, it could not critique functionalism. Our theory must
be capable of critique - critique of interactive practices of the classroom,
critique of political practices, critique of Parsonian functionalism and
so on.

To be truly social the theory must relate to society as it is. It
must be capable of application at the different level of society. It must
relate moral change to changes in the actual social structure. It must
also relate ideology to action in a way which is neither deterministic
nor inconsequential. But above all it must be capable of describing
morality in terms of real social living. Society is not only social
institutions, it is made up of dynamic human relationships. The essential
ingredient of social behaviour, the evaluation of which is the stuff of
morality, is human communication. An adequate theory of morality must in
some way conceptualise not only individual moral choice but actual social
interaction.

The task of this thesis is to search for such a way theoretically to
conceptualise the moral in social terms. Moreover as a sociological
theory without sociological practice is a theory of uncertain worth, we
shall endeavour to ensure that our conceptualisation of morality is tried and tested in practice. Because the field of our study is education, we shall test our theoretical formulations in an educational setting.

In Part I of this study we examine the theoretical heritage of the Sociology of Morality, first by looking at the influence of the American pragmatist philosophers and then at that of the founding fathers of Sociology, Marx, Durkheim and Weber. Their theoretical approach to the moral is examined and their effect on modern sociological practice is discussed with special reference to studies in education. We then look at the work of Jürgen Habermas and assess his potential contribution to the Sociology of Morality. The critical theoretical tradition to which Habermas belongs has a pronounced Hegelian strand. This gives an Hegelian emphasis to our critique of Kantian morality.

In Part II we discuss our endeavours to put theory into practice, examining first Habermas' theory with reference to its suitability as a basis for empirical research and then using it to formulate a conceptual scheme with which to analyse moral judgemental procedures. The study of moral judgement in Greenbank Comprehensive School, illustrates the use of the Habermasian conceptual framework and enables us to observe the relationships that obtain between a Habermasian theory of morality and sociological practice. The study allows us to make certain observations about the relationship of home and school in the formation of moral consciousness and enables us to suggest a way in which comprehensive education may function as an aid to social progress.
Notes: Chapter 1


5 Frankena wrote: "As recent ethical writers have been pointing out, it is the very genius of morality to appeal to reason." Frankena, W.K., op.cit., p.305.


7 This is the central question which concerned John Wilson, leader of the Farmington Trust's team. Wilson continued to influence The Journal of Moral Education, after publication of Moral Education ceased.

8 The assessment of morality is central to the Kohlley debate for which The Journal of Moral Education provides a platform, especially for critiques from a philosophical perspective.


13 Merton, R.K., Social Theory and Social Structure, New York, Free Press, 1968, p.188.

14 Durkheim, E., Suicide, Chicago, Free Press, 1951.

15 Durkheim, E., Moral Education, op.cit., p.65.

16 Ibid., p.166.


22. Cohen's and Matza's work on deviance is discussed in Chapter 2 with regard to the belief/action relationship.


29. Kohlberg's work is discussed in Chapter 5.


Chapter 2: The Moral Heritage of Sociology I: The Relationship of Belief to Action - The Pragmatic Tradition

Introduction: The Philosophical Perspective

The relationship between belief and action has proved to be a philosophical bone of contention from the earliest times. Plato saw no essential problem. There is one good, knowledge of which constitutes virtue. While this knowledge of the good may not be easily taught or acquired, once good is known it will be pursued. The cry of the apostle Paul has not yet been heard: "I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. . . . For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do." 1 Aristotle, however, may have experienced something of the Pauline dilemma as he distinguishes intellectual from moral "virtue", the former being induced through teaching and the latter acquired as habit. In his Ethics he writes: "The moral virtues we get by first exercising them; we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts." 2

The Platonic tradition, either in its Kantian mode or variously modified and modernised has emerged in the thought of the early American pragmatists and the "liberal arts education" tradition and more recently in such educational writers as Piaget, Kohlberg and Peters.

It is the Aristotelian tradition that Kohlberg blames for "the Boy Scout approach to moral education which has dominated American practices in this field", which was encouraged by Dewey and which has characterised British Public School morality. What Kohlberg calls the "bag of virtues" approach, 3 where character is built through practising such virtues as honesty, service and self-control may have a real place in the education of young children (as Peters contends) but is not really relevant to the
problems of belief and action relationships, which appear in the writings of researchers in the fields of morality and sociology.

The work of the early American pragmatists C.S. Peirce and William James, making as they did, an essential connection between belief and action, is not only important for the understanding of the American sociological tradition, but relevant to discussions of moral issues in general. It is to Peirce and James that we shall now turn.

The pragmatic inheritance

C.S. Peirce, the father of pragmatism, is still considered by some to be the most important philosopher the U.S. has produced. His theory of belief is an essential element of his theory of meaning which was developed as a critique of Descartes and all rationalistic approaches to knowledge. Meaning no longer resides in the "mind" but is identified with actions and reactions in the physical world - "Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects". Thought, moreover was bound up with belief - its function was to produce belief. While thought culminates in fixed belief, the belief must manifest itself in action, so that the deed is the ultimate effect of the thought. A belief will, of necessity, issue in consistent action so that we are acting in accordance with beliefs whenever we act habitually. Peirce's formula for relating belief to action is expressed as follows: "Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions", and "The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions." The idea that belief must result in appropriate action if it is indeed genuine belief was not new. Peirce himself claims to have appropriated this concept of belief from Alexander Bain, an Englishman. And of course St. James' contention (James, Ch. 2: 10b) that the presence of faith was confirmed by "works" had long been a tenet of
puritanism as well as a catholic doctrine. But Peirce said more than that belief without action is empty and dead. He said that action indicates belief and that its failure or inconsistency, calling into question such a belief, stimulates the process of reflective thought in order to establish a new belief. Belief is thus constantly being modified while a changing world makes us face situations where we are unsure of what to do. Doubt leads to the turning of one's mind to the situation and the problem inherent in it and the thought will result in the fixing of a new, more adequate belief. There is no place, incidently, for the type of discourse which characterised medieval schoolmen - opinion or belief is never directly set against another opinion or belief. All belief must be subject to the universal method of enquiry and test in the practical (not necessarily material) world.

While a belief may be identified with a habit or disposition to act in a certain way, it cannot be identified with the action itself as no one act ever exhausts the meaning of the belief. Peirce's theory of belief is summarised by U.S. philosopher J.E. Smith as follows:

Life embraces both belief and action. Each implies the other; when we act, we are expressing habits which are essentially beliefs and when we believe, we are committed to following certain courses of action when the appropriate circumstances arise.8

Whilst Peirce was a profound and original thinker, his works were somewhat erudite and specialised and consequently were not widely read. It was William James, no less remarkable as a thinker, although considerably less incisive and much more readable, who popularised the pragmatist mode of thought. Like Peirce, James asserted that what we believe and the way we act are interdependent. But he was, at base, a convinced "voluntarist", emphasising the role of the will in thinking and in the pursuit of knowledge. As Smith puts it: "Human intentions, purposes, plans, and goals are the dominant powers in his universe" where, in order to have a sense of being "at home in a world no longer strange"
the philosopher relates all his thinking with his own aims and hopes, fears
and desires. So belief is no longer fixated thought that emerges without
further ado in habituated action. "Motives" and "goals" are introduced.
Or in Jones' words "purpose, effort and the will to believe." The
emphasis on "the will to believe" did not mean that truth no longer
mattered but was an attempt to express the connection between what James
called "our passionate nature" and the beliefs we hold. The individual
is seeking not so much to discover truth as to work out his destiny.
Where our belief and knowledge is inadequate or irrelevant to the task
in hand we will be guided by our purpose - our aims and goals. By saying
that our ideas are our plans of action, James was emphasising not the
concept of a blueprint but of an all-over purpose that would provide the
basis of judgements of life-choices. Man is an individual, an active being,
who shapes the world as he is being shaped. His belief, the essential
thrust to his action is no longer seen only in cognitive terms - it
incorporates desire and is transformed into intentionality. As James
expresses it in "The Experience of Activity":

\[
\text{Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort} \\
\text{as we go, hanging on, and finally achieving our} \\
\text{intention - this is action, this is effectuation.} \quad \text{10}
\]

So for both Peirce and James belief and action were intimately
connected and believing was in no way the same as saying that we
believed. But to James, believing was more than an intellectual
activity, it involved the will, and the clear-cut relationship between
thought, belief and action was transformed to a complex system where
aims, purposes, ultimate values and effort directed and gave impetus to
the action. The added insight of the involvement of the will in belief
has, however, cost the theory its reflexivity. Peirce saw that lack of
an appropriate (habituated) action would lead to doubt or uncertainty
as to how to act, which in turn would lead to a re-examination of the
relevant belief, through reflective thought. But there is little room in James' construction for action to affect belief. When action is uncertain, then one's steadfast intention, in line with one's values and goals will, with appropriate effort, find an alternative practical solution. We shall see later how this pragmatic tradition, especially James' variant of it, has remained viable in the work of American sociologists. In the meantime we shall see how present day philosophers, working in the field of moral education, have dealt with problems inherent in the relationship between belief and action.

Moral Educationists and the Belief/Action Relationship

Writers in the field of moral education are challenged by a mass of empirical findings which have emerged from the realms of adolescent psychology and the sociology of juvenile delinquency. Typical of the response to the apparent discrepancies and obvious complexities of the belief/action relationship is that of Norman Bull who, in Moral Education poses the question: "What relationship is there, if any, between moral judgment and actual conduct?" - his conclusion is:

No claim could be made for a strong correlation between moral judgment and moral behaviour. . . . Yet it remains true that moral knowledge and understanding are pre-requisites of moral action. No one can act upon a moral principle, or precept, or rule, unless he is first aware of it. He must for example have learnt respect for the property of others if he is to know that he should resist the temptation to take it when safe opportunity offers. . . .

Moral judgments derive from moral concepts. . . . It can at least be held that they furnish evidence of potential moral action; and the more so as moral principles become interiorised and a sense of guilt becomes a reality of moral experience and so of moral control. 11

But Bull considers that moral judgements are not only cognitive functions but "orectic" (i.e. conative and affective) as well. "They involve. . . not only the mind, but also appetite and desire, feeling and striving, emotions and will." 12

These somewhat extensive extracts are quoted not because Bull has
solved the problems but because his work illustrates the particular areas of tension that educational philosophers are attempting to clarify. In the first place, although Bull believes that moral principles are prior to moral action he makes only a weak case for their priority. His use of the word "correlation" indicates the problem - social scientific research has produced a mass of evidence to the contrary. We also note the use of concepts associated with the study of psychology (e.g. "sense of guilt"), in support of philosophical concepts such as moral judgement and moral principles. Finally we have the problem of the place of the will and the emotions - conative and affective elements. Where do they fit into the belief/action relationship? Do they influence belief and thereby action, or do they in some way moderate the way in which belief affects behaviour?

A brief look will first be taken at the disjunction between moral belief (or moral understanding), and action consistent with the belief. Frankena 13 suggests that Plato was not unaware of the problem, as is indicated by Socrates' concern that the most virtuous parents so often had vicious sons - although it appears that the defect was seen to be in the method of transmission of "virtue". Frankena sees the problem of "producing virtue in the next generation to be twofold. The first aspect, "Moral Education X" (MEX) is concerned with handing on a "knowledge of good and evil or "knowing how" to act. The second, "Moral Education Y" (MEY) aims to ensure that the conduct of the young will conform to this "knowledge". Whilst MEX deals in the formation of right ideas, MEY is concerned with the formation of right habits. 14 The development of dispositions to think and act rightly is thus seen as a double task. Unlike Peirce, Frankena does not consider that right ideas will be directly expressed as right habits.

Wilson's work on moral components, developed when with the Farmington
Trust's Moral Education project, has extended the above approach, probably to its limit. He has produced a "phenomenological description of morality" where the latter is broken down into a series of basic components. Whilst various components are built into a moral judgement, components which include ways of thinking, understanding and perceiving oneself and others, Wilson has maintained a separate major category, KRAT to refer to the ability to translate these beliefs and understandings into action. In his most recent work on this topic, he has sub-divided the component, KRAT, into two aspects, the first referring to the awareness that a situation requiring moral action exists and including the decision to act, and the second referring to the translation of the decision into action.

In his paper on the "Platonic view", referred to above, Kohlberg commented that American educational psychology, like Aristotle, divided "the personality up into cognitive abilities, passions or motives, and traits of character". But while moral educators, following educational psychology, may be agreed that affective and conative elements in the personality affect moral behaviour, there is no agreement as to how they affect it or how they relate to the cognitive elements. Kohlberg, taking the Platonic view, believes that such issues are extraneous to the phenomenon of moral development, which is essentially a cognitive matter and are thus not the province of the moral educator. But Kohlberg's position in this regard is an isolated one.

There are two alternatives to assimilating affective and conative elements into the moral beliefs/moral action relationship. One either inserts them between the belief complex and the action complex of the relationship or one incorporates them in the belief complex, consisting as it does of thought, ideas, dispositions and so on.

In "Education for Moral Responsibility", Gustafson gives an example of the former alternative. He sees responsible moral action as involving
moral decision making, reflection about one's moral commitments and beliefs, one's unconscious determinants - character, disposition, attitudes and emotions and "willing", i.e. "determination of capacities and powers" in order to achieve one's intentions. His definition of moral action is reminiscent of William James, except that one feels that the "will" may have cut free from belief, and, guided by unconscious forces may be acting as an intermediary between belief and action. "Moral actions", according to Gustafson, "are interventions through the exercise of some form of power in accord with intentions, rules, and ends, which are subject to qualitative judgments of good or bad, or right or wrong." Such an approach does little to solve the problem of the place of affective and conative elements and tends to blur the relationship between action and belief.

Wilson's solution to the problem is one of a limited incorporation into what was referred to above as the belief complex. His first two components, PHIL and EMP each has its own affective element, converted to a relatively cognitive form. PHIL, may even have a touch of the conative in the form of other people's interests "actually" counting with one, but on the whole the conative is most strongly associated with the component KRAT. In Wilson's own terms:

PHIL refers to the degree to which one can identify with other people, in the sense of being such that other people's feelings and interests actually count or weigh with one, or are accepted as of equal validity to one's own... EMP refers to awareness or insight into one's own and other people's feelings: i.e. the ability to know what those feelings are and describe them correctly. PHIL thus presupposes concern and EMP, while stressing an aspect of consciousness, awareness of feelings, must imply previous experience of one's own feelings and emotions and the experience of empathy with others. Wilson thus shows that aspects of the personality such as the will and the emotions have their place, but do not change the essentially cognitive
nature of moral judgement, nor its close relationship with moral action.

R.S. Peters has concentrated on the rational aspects of morality to such an extent that it has sometimes appeared that he has little room for affective and conative elements. But whilst these elements are brought firmly within the realm of rationality they are not neglected. It could be said, even, that Peters has found an ordered place for many of the unruly elements spawned by American Psychology. Although he argues that being moral is most essentially concerned with moral principles he holds that the "passions" are directly involved. For people to be consistent in applying their principles to life's concrete situations they must be "passionately devoted to fairness, freedom, and the pursuit of truth" and "have a genuine respect for others". In addition, Peters stresses the need for "a development of the imagination" so that one knows how to treat a person as a person and how to assess his interests. 20

Of particular significance to the topic under discussion is his work in clarifying and distinguishing between the concept of motivation and the emotions. It was noted earlier, that Bull and Gustafson both included the emotions as a relevant factor in moral behaviour and "motivation" has long been associated with moral behaviour, especially moral misbehaviour. In dealing with motives and motivation Peters totally by-passed both the utilitarian tradition (Bentham held that a motive was a "pleasure, pain or other event that prompts to action") and the behaviourist tradition. Peters sees a "motive" as the reason for an action which results from an appraisal of a situation where relevant action is possible. The appraisal is based on one's beliefs. Emotions are seen as arising from similar appraisals in cases where appropriate action is impossible. They are thus a by-product of our passivity. Both motives and emotions have their sources in the cognitive sphere and both can be stabilised in settled dispositions. In the case of motives, of
dispositions to act in certain ways. In the case of emotions, of
dispositions to respond to our appraisals, when suitable action is not
possible, by experiencing the relevant sentiment. Such factors as love,
respect, a sense of justice and a concern for truth can act as "self-
transcending emotions" which can displace "self-referential" emotions such
as jealousy or pride. Self transcending emotions such as these will also
promote positive appraisals which will result in altruistic action
where action is appropriate. 21 Not only by these theories does Peters
restress the primacy of the cognitive and re-establish the connection
between belief and the realm of motives and emotions, but he also suggests
a mechanism for a degree of feed-back from the emotions to thought and
thence to belief.

Writing more recently, P.H. Hirst gives his backing to Peters' findings,
stressing that while the emotions are morally significant, they owe their
significance to the implicit moral principles involved. "It is widely
accepted", he asserts, "that all emotions, at least in adult life, are
tied to particular self-referring beliefs about a situation." And,
continuing the assertion, "it is in terms of the moral rules or principles
they embody that emotions came to have any moral character they possess.
They voice conscious or unconscious moral beliefs." 22

We have seen in the above section how philosophers of education have
dealt with the two essential problems in the relationship between belief
and action that face moral education, namely the discontinuity that exists
between moral judgement and moral action and the place of the will and the
emotions. Wilson has suggested that the translation of judgement into
action is a separate aspect of moral development and will require
separate attention by educators. Peters, above all others, has asserted
that the affective elements of the personality function in the zone of
belief, at the cognitive level, influencing moral behaviour through their
role in appraising a situation. So the moral educator, who accepts these findings, will see the need to educate the emotions, realising that feelings affect judgement, rather than seeking to repress and control emotional elements as forces that may interfere with rational action.

We shall now turn to the realm of sociology, observing how the pragmatic tradition has influenced the American work on moral issues and noting some of the problems that have emerged as a result. We shall finally discuss attempts to find alternative ways of expressing the belief-action relationship in order to overcome these problems.

Sociology and the Pragmatic Tradition

The earliest tradition of American sociology contains reference to morals and morality. Summer's work on pathways and mores, Cooley's on human nature and primary groups, Mead's interest in the moral development of the individual are a few examples in addition to the mass of work on deviance and moral delinquency typified by the Chicago school. But little attention was paid to the relationship between belief, or even individual intentionality, and social action until the era of Talcott Parsons.

The influential work, Towards a General Theory of Action (ed. Parsons and Shils), incorporates not only the insights of Parsons himself but his reflections on Weber with his stress on the actors' intentionality, and on Durkheim with his stress on the moral nature of society.

The general theory of action is complex and many-faceted. The action of an individual or collectivity of actors is preceded by the actors' orientation to action. There are three categories of motivational orientation: cognition, cathexis and evaluation and accordingly in society there are three major classes of "culture patterns": systems of ideas or beliefs (cognitive interests); systems of expressive symbols (cathetic interests), and systems of value-orientations (when "consequences" and
"implications" are interests). There are three types of action depending on which set of symbols are orientating the actor. Instrumental action emerges from orientation by cognitive symbols, beliefs and ideas. Orientation by expressive symbols (cathectic), such as aesthetic or personal appreciations gives rise to expressive action and motivation by value standards or evaluating symbols (standards of value-orientations) to acts of evaluation, which in the case of moral standards, results in moral action. These value standards which permeate the culture and are assessible to all individuals in society are variously called "patterns of value-orientation", "normative ideas" or "evaluative systems". A great deal of further analysis of these moral standards ensues as they are seen to be of the utmost significance being "the predominant norms which are institutionalized in the American society and which embody the predominant value-orientation of the culture." 24

Yet for all its complexity the theory assumes a very simple relationship between what has been absorbed by the minds of individuals from the parent culture and the action that ensues. The very fact that action itself is classified in terms of the "orientating" symbol systems shows the strength of the pragmatic presupposition. The contribution of Clyde Kluckholm et al, "Value and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action" 25 further explores both the meaning of "values" and the relationship of values to action. It is here we see a strong reflection of the thought of William James.

According to Kluckholm et al., the literature of learning shows the confused state of the concept of values, where they are variously "considered as attitudes, motivations, objects, measurable quantities, substantive areas of behavior, affect-laden customs or traditions and relationships such as those between individuals, groups, objects, events." 26 Their definition of value is as follows: "A value is a conception, explicit or implied, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the
desirable, which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action." \(^{27}\) They point out that affective ("desirable"), cognitive ("conception") and conative ("selection") elements are all essential for the notion of value. That value is clearly a function of the mind which when operative culminates in action is shown by the condensed form of the definition: "Values are ideas formulating action and commitments." They instigate "behaviour... within the individual." \(^{28}\)

The parallel with James is unmistakable - for James, "ideas" were "plans of action" and the individual acted freely in line with his own choice and intention, the only constraint being the thrust of his own will. A further extract from Kluckholm et al illustrates the continuation of the Peircean tradition where belief leads not to idiosyncratic action but a disposition to settled habit:

Values are operative when an individual selects one line of thought or action rather than another, insofar as this selection is influenced by generalized codes rather than determined simply by impulse or by a purely rational calculus of temporary expediency. \(^{29}\)

As with James, values are seen to imply means and goals; thus action is not only instigated but directed. Unlike James, however, they have to face the problem of motivation (imposed on them, one presumes, by the prevailing psychological paradigm). Motivation is seen to be partly "biological" and partly "situational". With general "situational conditions" and "available means for action", motivation is seen to be a factor which will have a direct effect on the actors' choice of action. His values, in fact must reach a compromise with these other factors. The concept of "value orientation" defined as "a set of linked propositions embracing both value and existential elements" \(^{30}\) is the answer to this problem. "Value orientations" is now such a complex set of ideas, dispositions and extraneous factors that there is no reason to doubt that everything has not been taken care of and that immediate and relevant
action should not ensue. How to determine a value orientation in the first place is another matter.

The concept of value-orientation was further developed by Florence Kluckholm in association with F.L. Stodtbeck and thereafter became a standard theoretical tool for empirical research in the moral and educational spheres. Value orientations have been investigated in association with educational achievement, have been dissected and measured (e.g. as adolescent instrumental and expressive value orientations) and have been used to determine the relationship between social class and behaviour in the school. Not surprisingly, these studies have produced few clear-cut results. As the researcher has to negotiate the problem of determining "value-orientation" in the first place, usually along the five axes suggested by Florence Kluckholm and then relate these findings to other variables, the validity and reliability are low. Yet this type of research uses a statistical approach. The weakness of the concept of value-orientation together with the impossible task of determining such a diffuse item by positivistic methods has meant that such research throws little light on the relationship of beliefs to behaviour. Suffice to say that the pragmatic assumptions continue to be fundamental to this type of research.

Robert Merton's work on anomie in the American social structure is another example of a seminal theory in the pragmatic tradition. Merton's anomie theory attempts to explain various deviant patterns of behaviour by assuming that certain individuals experience a disjunction between the goals they have internalised from the dominant American culture and the appropriate institutionalised means of attaining these goals. The normalness that results will be responded to by a variety of adaptations, the most typically "American" being "innovation" where an individual chooses alternate ways, usually involving illicit action, in order to reach
the desired goals. Whilst the assumption that the pervading ideology will be accepted and internalised by all members of the society is not in the tradition of the pragmatists, the emphasis on goals as an essential aspect of the individual's belief system is thoroughly Jamesian, as is the assumption that the individual is free to adapt his behaviour when institutionalised means fail. Also in the pragmatic tradition is the assumption that a settled disposition (e.g. acceptance of goals) will express itself in consistent and appropriate action. It is when the appropriate action is frustrated, when the individual realises that the action into which he is being forced by the agents of society is not in line with his beliefs about his future state that deviant behaviour will result. Throughout the process the emphasis has been on what is assumed to be "in the head" of the individual. Action, whether of the conformist or the deviant springs from the realm of belief.

The American theory of anomie proved to be most attractive to sociologists of deviance. It was built into further, more complex theories and Merton's classification of adaptations was widely used as an explanatory tool. When it fell out of favour as a deviance theory its inadequacies were seen to be in its inability to specify the cause of strain on sections of society and its inability to explain why an individual should suddenly start on a deviant career. But it would seem that there are greater weaknesses in its basic assumption that a specific aspect of the culture could have such a place of dominance within an individual's belief system that all other beliefs count little. This points to an essential limitation of the pragmatic tradition - beliefs tend to be seen as simple units which function independently of each other to produce action. The very basic assumption that an individual has internalised a particular set of beliefs is fraught with problems as was later shown by the obvious resistance to dominant beliefs by counter-culture members. The strength of the theory when it first appeared lay in the general acceptance of the pervasiveness
of the Great American Dream and the unquestioning assumption that belief and action were simply and directly related.

Perhaps the most outstanding example of a sociological work in a pure pragmatist mould is A.K. Cohen's *Delinquent Boys*. In addition to the pragmatic tradition, he draws upon Merton's theory of adaptation, which emerges as "problem solving" and Parsons' theory of action. He sets out his assumptions in his section "Facts the Theory Must Fit":

All human action. . . is an ongoing series of efforts to solve problems. 38
Each choice is an act, each act is a choice.
Most problems are familiar and recurrent and we have on hand for them ready solutions, habitual modes of action. . .

All problems are seen to arise from and be solved by changes in either (or both) "the actor's 'frame of reference' and the 'situation' he confronts." 39
The frame of reference is made up of "the interests, preconceptions, stereotypes and values we bring to the situation." 40

The particular problem he sets out to solve is that of the working class juvenile delinquent whom he sees as being subject to "middle class norms", manifestations of "the dominant American value system", 41 especially through the educational process he has to undergo. The prevailing middle-class ethic "prescribes an obligation to strive, by dint of rational, ascetic, self-disciplined and independent activity, to achieve in worldly affairs". 42

While working-class boys who achieve in the school system, thus gaining status, are happy to internalise middle-class values and conform to middle-class norms, the unsuccessful working-class boy, frustrated by low status and conscious of his inadequacy in the light of the middle-class standards he has partially internalised, faces a problem of adjustment. His answer is to invert the very norms that proved him a failure and substitute an alternate set, in terms of which he can be a
success. A group of such boys who have undergone "reaction formation" and accepted an alternate set of norms, constitutes a delinquent subculture. This "solution" is reminiscent of Merton's rebel who adapts to the situation of anomie by finding new goals. Just as the goals would be part of his belief system so would the inverted norms be believed to be the right way to behave, at least in the context of the gang.

Although Cohen refers to various empirical findings in the field of deviance, he produces no evidence for any change in the moral beliefs of his delinquent boys. But there is plenty of evidence that gang members have habituated patterns of conduct diametrically opposed to the norms of the "respectable culture". Cohen has thus assumed that these boys must have an opposing set of values as delinquent action must have its source in delinquent belief.

Now although Delinquent Boys has many insightful observations such as the manner in which the delinquent directs the "subterranean currents of our cultural tradition" to his own use, his central thesis, which results from his pragmatic assumptions, has attracted such profound criticism that its value has been seriously diminished. Critics ask, how can "reaction formation" occur if middle class values were never fully internalised, and why do young delinquents show guilt when caught if their values are inverted, and why doesn't working class culture have any influence on them?

But Matza attacks the key problem, as well as showing that Cohen's theory does not fit the facts. He sees the theory as asserting that, "delinquency is fundamentally the transformation of beliefs into action". Furthermore where action is seen as necessarily emerging from values and norms and the complexity of belief structures is ignored, there is no room for the modification of belief by re-examination in the light of experience. Matza sees beliefs becoming independent variables and the whole approach settling down into hard determinism.
Some of the problems which emerge from these strands of sociology are partly due to the positivistic tradition to which they belong but some stem from the pragmatic assumptions made by social theorists. By making the assumption in the above contexts the theorists have drawn attention away from the action itself to causal factors in the minds of the actors - so the subjective meaning and wider significance of the action may be lost. Again, there is a tendency for circular argument, as the action is explained in terms of belief, so belief (or norms or values) is assumed to be consistent with the action. The researcher has no need to find out what the actor is really thinking or what are his actual concerns. In addition to these drawbacks, the pragmatists have tended to see the belief/action relationship in single-track terms. Peirce, in particular, saw each belief as contributing to its particular habituated action. Complexity of belief structure as in a web of belief or unconscious beliefs were not really visualised. So it does not appear strange to Merton or Cohen to ignore all other beliefs and/or cultural influences except those under investigation. But beliefs are not separate from each other, and whatever the relationship between belief and action may be, it is not one of simple determinism. A final weakness which stems from the pragmatists themselves and is reflected in the work of the above sociologists is the insistence that belief can only be demonstrated in action. There is no allowance for a reflexive consciousness, and moral discourse is not accepted as being meaningful. The subject is seldom asked to give his own account of his behaviour as the state of his understanding is assumed from his actions.

We shall now examine how some sociologists have responded to the problems inherent in assuming a direct relationship between belief and action. On the whole it has been those influenced by phenomenological and interactional schools who have tackled these problems. A Marxist critique does not seem able to reach the basic issues involved, for there is within
Marxist tradition a strand of hard determinism (however much it is softened or re-interpreted) and an embedded approach to the intimate relationship between theory and practice that interferes with new ways of looking at old problems such as pragmatism.

The Sociological critique of Pragmatism

In Delinquency and Drift, Matza sets out to give a practical critique of the positive tradition of deviance theories making the pragmatism of Cohen's account a special target. Attacking the very assumption that delinquent action implies delinquent belief, he sets out to show that this is far from the case in real life. His account suggests an alternative mechanism for the process of becoming deviant which does not require any change in the fundamental beliefs and values of the delinquent.

Matza's theory allows the juvenile to choose deviance, rather than have it thrust upon him by a psychological upheaval, allows for the essential influences of the home and culture to have their place and takes into consideration the evidence that most juveniles who have been associated with delinquent gangs at one stage revert into ordinary citizens. Of equal significance is the fact that Matza's juvenile exists in a complex and compromising world where the law does not act consistently and where one has no temptation to assume that all individuals will accept and internalise the dominant ideology.

According to Matza, adolescents, being midway between adult freedom and childhood control can choose to go into "drift", taking a moral holiday or entering a kind of moral limbo. Yet as they remain part of conventional society they need mechanisms to deal with its moral hold on them. The main mechanisms are neutralization where the adolescent "neutralises" the moral bind of the law, and subterranean convergence where he receives cultural support in his delinquency from deviant strands
within main-stream society. Such deviant strands may be non-respectable elements such as the "pursuit of fun and thrill" or the cult of male bravado, or exist as part of respectable ideology which can be exploited, such as behaviourist assumptions that children are never personally responsible for their "crimes".

Matza summarises the usual techniques of neutralization as consisting of "negation of responsibility, the sense of injustice, the assertion of tact, and the primacy of custom". While he need not internalise any new values, the presence of the adolescent in the delinquent subculture gives him access to ways of believing about his behaviour that "function as extenuating circumstances under which delinquency is permissible." Matza sees the technique of neutralization not only as being excuses when caught but as everyday methods of coping with illegal behaviour, while still holding conventional beliefs about right and wrong. So gang members hold that they act in self-defence when they attack their rivals, that the drunk deserved to be rolled, that insurance will pay for the damaged car and that the law is not acting "fairly" in apprehending them on suspicion.

Critics of Matza tend to pick on minor discrepancies of his theory and overlook his main purpose in attempting to show how delinquent behaviour does not necessarily presuppose delinquent belief. Matza has shown how delinquents could behave in a fashion which is inconsistent with their moral beliefs. But he does not prove that they do, in fact, use his suggested mechanisms. Box expresses the obvious weakness in Matza's account as seen by those used to dealing with adolescents in real life. He finds it doubtful whether "neutralization" really precedes deviant action and is not just a rationalisation after the event e.g. how much is "I was pushed" really a description of intentional action or how much is excuse. He also notes inconsistencies in Matza's argument such as his use of the concept of fatalism to neutralize the legal bind but at the same time
keep it as an impetus to bring about action that will restore the adolescent's "humanistic mood" and help him regain control of his world. Other critics point out that Matza has avoided the whole question of delinquent aetiology - we are given no indication of why an adolescent should decide to commence drifting.

But Matza's real task is not to produce a final and all-embracing theory of deviance but to strike a blow against positivistic and pragmatic interpretations. One could criticise Matza for continuing to express his arguments on the basis of the real existence of sub-cultures whilst in the process of undermining the sub-cultural theories of writers such as A. Cohen and Clow and Ohlin, but Matza's sub-cultures do not presuppose an ideological consensus, and the term is probably used for convenience or from habit. One does feel, however, that Matza has made an unjustified assumption in his very basic concept that adolescents experience the "bind of the law". He would see, for example, loyalty to peers as a method of semi-cancelling or neutralising the bind of the law. It could be argued that to support friends is illegal activity or to refuse to tell the truth about such exploits to the authorities constituted action in accordance with immediately relevant moral beliefs. It may be considered wrong to steal cars but few adolescents will consider this as wrong as being disloyal to friends. Matza seems to assume that the law has consistent pre-eminence in and relevance to the adolescent consciousness.

Perhaps Matza has been more influenced by positivism than he intended. In "Accounts" Lyman and Scott suggest that people use linguistic devices when their actions are subjected to valuative inquiry, when their motives, in particular, are called for. Such "accounts" fall into two major categories - excuses and justifications. Matza's "techniques of neutralization" are excellent examples of "justification" accounts. The account can tell us a lot about the individual who gives it, but it is a
two-way phenomenon and tells us just as much about the situation and the person or agency to whom the account is given. Every account, in fact, is a manifestation of the underlying "negotiation of identities". While Matza is fully aware of the part played by the agencies of juvenile justice in forming the content of the "techniques of neutralisation" he jumps to the conclusion that the accounts of the young delinquents are "true" expressions of what is in their consciousness and uses this to give a general explanation of these beliefs and behaviour.

C. Wright Mills, discussing "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive" extends this idea. He sees motives not as subjective "springs" of action, but as "typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in delimited societal situations", 53 "the terms with which interpretation of conduct by social actors proceeds". 54 Motives are words, given in response to questions concerning an actor's "social and lingual conduct". There are no "real motives", no actual unconscious causes of an action, according to Mills' view. But motives are important. They are social phenomena to be explained i.e. there are reasons for people's "reasons". Seeing things this way, one would not say with Box, "but aren't the kids just making excuses" nor incorporate such accounts into a general theory of deviant behaviour as Matza has done, but seek to understand the situation in its varied facets. As Lyman concludes, Sociology should take linguistic utterances more seriously.

Becker's challenge to the pragmatic assumption that action implies belief takes the form of showing how action can help formulate belief. In fact "instead of the deviant motives leading to the deviant behavior, it is the other way round; the deviant behavior in time produces the deviant motivation". 55 In "Becoming a marihuana user", Becker shows how a mild curiosity about the drug with no preconceptions of its properties or value is all that is needed to start the process whereby marihuana is seen as an
agent of pleasure. The process involves not only the act of smoking, but the individual's interpretation of his physical sensations in a social setting. He gradually learns to understand the effects of marihuana on his mind and body and as he does he develops both definite patterns of action (e.g. regular social use of "pot" for pleasure) and a distinct conceptual attitude to the drug.

Of course, it is easy to argue that the potential user has had to have certain beliefs to start with and that these have led to his action. Becher does point out that the novice must have faith (developed from his observations of users who do get high) "that the drug actually will produce some new experience" and this must lead him to continue "to experiment with it until it does". But Becker does show, that contrary to the assumptions of many post-Parsonian sociologists, the belief/action relationship is a complex one and is in no way deterministic. This reflexivity of the belief/action relation reminds us of Peirce whose theory did allow for change and modification of beliefs, even though this aspect was increasingly lost sight of in later works which followed the pragmatic tradition. In Peirce's view, however, action had no direct effect on belief. It was only when a habituated action was considered to be inappropriate to a changed situation that doubt arose and through reflective thought a new settled idea or belief was able to replace the old. The primacy of belief over action was not challenged. Becker's marihuana user does not modify his concepts via reflective thought - the interrelationship between action and belief is on a much more practical level. Neither is action or belief seen as a simple and single phenomenon. Many actions are involved varying in quality from the company the user keeps and his frequentness of joining them, to his technique of drawing in the smoke. And many conceptions and beliefs will be involved too. These may extend from such items as a consciousness of the drug's effects to an assessment of the degree of danger
from police detection that the practice entails.

We seemed to have strayed back into the realm of Aristotle here, where moral education is seen as training in habits at least until they were well established and the pupil is ready for reflection. But while this approach is scorned by most modern moral educators there are some empirical findings consistent with it. In "Becoming a Freak: Pathways into the Counter-Culture", Wieder and Zimmerman describe how youngsters who have chosen to be "freaks" work to "bring their feelings into line", that is to modify their unconscious beliefs and attitudes. 57 Freaks take deliberate action to overcome their prejudices which they ascribe to the induced effects of their cultural past. A person with a "hang-up over possessions" i.e. with deeply rooted beliefs about the sacredness of property may give everything away with abandon and insist on others wearing his things and one who has a residual attitude that nakedness is shameful, may force herself to appear nude in public.

C. Wright Mills, in "Language, Logic and Culture" makes a pertinent comment about the efficacy of action:

Social habits are not only overt and social actions which recur - they leave residues, "apperceptive masses", which conform to dominant and recurring activities and are built by them. In human communities, such dominant fields of behavior have implications in terms of systems of value. 58

We are here in a different world from that of the pragmatists - much less ordered than that of either Peirce or Parsons but rather closer to the real world in which we live.

In "Words and Deeds" 59 Deutscher points to the fact that we still know very little about the relationship between "what people say and what they do - attitudes and behavior, sentiments and acts, verbalizations and interactions, words and deeds." He sees part of the problem in our methodology: "We have not developed a technology for observing, ordering, analyzing and interpreting overt behaviour - especially as it relates to attitudes, norms,
opinions and values." 60 On the research to date he concludes in fact that "the empirical evidence can best be summarized as reflecting wide variation in the relationship between attitudes and behaviors."

He does not find the inconsistency in empirical findings to be surprising for there will always be a conflict between man's private self and his social duty, as Durkheim showed. As Deutscher put it "the dialectic between man's private self and his social self must create occasional and sometimes radical inconsistencies between what he says and what he does; either way, inconsistency between attitudes and behavior may be assumed." 61 In addition to this is the problem pointed to by symbolic interaction, that a respondent discussing his action with his interviewer is in a definite symbolic situation, quite different from that of the original action.

Deutscher does not expect that a simple clear-cut answer will emerge as a result of even greatly improved techniques of investigation, for the relationship between action and the realm of belief is not a simple one. He points out: "We need to recognize that change probably occurs in both directions - from thought to act and from act to thought - sometimes separately, sometimes simultaneously and sometimes sequentially." 62

Deutscher's suggestion that there will always be tension between an individual's private and social behaviour indicates that moral educators are not likely to overcome their problems by paying special attention to "KRAT" even if their pupils' understanding of social principles and the actual needs of others is impeccable. It is true that we still know little of what relates the belief that one ought to do something, and actually doing it. The work of Peters and Hirst, in showing the wide range of elements in moral judgement making is valuable as it clarifies the constituent concepts and effectively challenges behaviourism. But it does not explain the complexity and flexibility of an individual's system of
belief nor how beliefs came to be developed, modified and changed. There is room for more work at the empirical level, work which keeps in mind the insights of Lyman and Mills and Deutscher on the interpretation of "accounts" and "motives" and shows awareness that whilst the realms of thought and action are related, the relationship is not as simple as the pragmatists implied.
Notes: Chapter 2


3 Ibid.

4 Scheffler, I., Conditions of Knowledge, Chicago, Scott Foresman, 1965, p.39.


7 Bain's definition of belief was "that upon which a man is prepared to act". Cited by Peirce, C.S., Pragmatism in Retrospect: A Last Formulation", in J. Buchler (ed.), op.cit., p.270.


9 Smith, J.E., op.cit., p.41.

10 James, W., Essays in Radical Empiricism quoted by Smith, J.E., op.cit., p.67.


12 Ibid., p.7.


14 Ibid., p.301.


24. Ibid., p.79.

25. Ibid., p.388ff.

26. Ibid., p.390.

27. Ibid., p.395.

28. Ibid., p.396.

29. Ibid., p.402.

30. Ibid., p.409.


50. Box, S., *op.cit.*, Ch. 4.

51. Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J., *op.cit.*, Ch. 6.


60 Ibid., p.242.

61 Ibid., p.253.

62 Ibid., p.252.
Chapter 3: The Moral Heritage of Sociology II: The Contribution of the Founding Fathers - Marx, Durkheim and Weber

The Philosophical Background

"If Renaissance Europe gave rise to a concern with history," suggests Anthony Giddens, "it was industrial Europe which provided the conditions for the emergence of sociology."¹ Giddens sees the catalyst between these two complex sets of events as being the French Revolution of 1789. He points out that the French Revolution provided a political climate which, together with the economic changes resulting from the Industrial Revolution, produced the context out of which sociology was born.

In nineteenth century western Europe, Britain, France and Germany were the most economically prosperous countries and all became increasingly industrialised as the century progressed. If Britain was the technological and economic leader during this period, it was Germany and France which produced the philosophers who sought to understand the changes in social terms.

Marx, Durkheim and Weber, although by no means the first, or only sociologists of their time, can be considered as the founding fathers of modern sociology. From these three authors can be traced the various branches of modern social theory, albeit with modifications and added theoretical insight.² The Germany and France of their day not only lagged behind Britain in technological development but were also less equipped philosophically than Britain to accept the outcomes of technological progress.

The dominant philosophy of Britain, utilitarianism, was well suited to her economic and political situation. Developed by Bentham and refined by J.S. Mill, utilitarianism gave the individualism of Hobbs and Hume a
positive and dynamic dimension. Utilitarianism asserts that the only end worthwhile in itself is happiness. Actions are right only in so far as they produce happiness; the right action is the one which will lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Bentham had seen in the principle of utility the key to the provision of a sound theoretical foundation for any legal system. It was a reaction from intuitionism and a replacement of the commonly held theories of "natural law" and "original contract". It was essentially a pragmatic theory, devised to evaluate various types of action in society.

It was particularly well suited to the economic climate of nineteenth century Britain. It retained the stress on individualism, which favoured the successful economic policies of "laissez-faire". It was entirely secular, thus by-passing problems of ultimate good or divine justice and aligning itself with progressive elements of society. It was concerned with ends, not means, with ultimate outcomes rather than with intentions. It was a practical doctrine which could be used to provide a practical guide for action. It was an ideal basis for developing capitalism: it justified all practices in terms of progress and the benefits it would bring. It also was the basis for reform, acting as an inbuilt corrective to undesirable side effects of the capitalistic enterprise. It is not surprising that whilst the church complained, progressive thinkers had no difficulty in explaining problems due to rapid social change or suggesting practical solutions.

In France and Germany, however, progressive thinkers were faced with problems of social change related to increasing industrialisation and developing capitalism. The dominant secular ethical system was Kantian. Kant's approach to morality had been developed in an atmosphere of eighteenth century "enlightenment" philosophy, which had attacked the authority of the church and questioned the nature and justification of
government. His essential problem was the nature of knowledge and its relationship to rationality. Social changes did not interest him: of greater interest was the problem set the philosophy of knowledge by the "discovery" of the causal laws of the universe by natural science.

Kant's essential distinction, of significance to ethics, is between pure or theoretical reason and practical reason. Theoretical knowledge can only come from sense impressions received from phenomena, the outwardness of reality. Noumena, true reality which can be apprehended through the understanding, cannot be known theoretically. Impressions gained from phenomena, though the senses are ordered by the "categories" (conceptual forms) of understanding, which are innate to the human mind. **A priori** arguments, typical of metaphysics, can give no new theoretical knowledge. Outside Mathematics, **a priori** arguments, unsupported by sensuous knowledge, can lead to error.

Practical reason is obedience to "pure" moral law which is perceived **a priori**. It must be kept free from all sense experience. It is unconnected with the phenomenal world. It belongs to the non-theoretical noumenous world. For Kant, rational action is acting from the motive of obedience to the moral law (i.e. **a priori** command of reason). Action connected with desires or practical outcomes is not rational. The only good is the good "will", that is, the pure intention to act according to duty, or obedience to the moral law. Kant's categorical imperative is a compass whereby the individual can perceive his duty. This can be formulated as: "So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim." Following this formula will ensure autonomy, self-guided action. The autonomous, rationally moral man must also follow the formula of the kingdom of ends: "So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends." The kingdom of ends is an **ideal** kingdom where people are treated as ends in themselves and not as means to ends.
Kantian morality is thus a private and subjective matter. Because no-one can be entirely pure in his intention to do his duty, being moved perhaps by pity or compassion, moral action cannot be truly rational in practice. It can only approach the rationality of obedience to the moral law. In the phenomenal world of appearances which man as an active sense-experiencing creature inhabits, the only sure reason is pure or theoretical reason. In this world necessity reigns. Freedom belongs to the ideal realm. Marx, Durkheim and Weber were conscious of the need to explain social change in social terms in a world of changing ideas and practices. They were aware of the Kantian dichotomy between the world of experience and the ideal world. Marx and Durkheim were to engage in continuous debate with Kant and Kantians. Weber, in his critique of Marx, reverted to a neo-Kantian position. Marx's debate with Kant follows in the Hegelian tradition of attempting to bridge the gap between true reality, the Kantian "ideal" and experienced, material reality. Hegel had shown that the ideal was expressed in the material real in the process of history. Value became fact. Marx reversed the Hegelian formulation to show that fact gave rise to ideals; the phenomenal world of sensuous experience was the real world. Durkheim, too, wanted to get rid of the noumenous. The realm of morality, the realm of ideas and ideals was a social phenomenon, growing from common social experience. It was binding not because of an ideal metaphysical kingdom existing beyond man but because of a real society existing beyond the individual.

Weber believed that attempts to bridge the Kantian distinction between scientific rationality and the realm of morality led to confusion. The only hope for society was to attempt to understand its changes in their rationality. It was, perhaps, his observations that socialism had little connection with morality, that led him to reaffirm the Kantian distinction in his implicit critique of Marx. The moral realm was, to
Weber of vital importance, but in modern rational society it belonged to
the privacy of the individual conscience.

Both Marx and Durkheim saw utilitarianism as the antithesis to their
own approach to the social. For Marx, the doctrine of utility was the
ally of the British economic system. It was Benthamite morality that
legitimated the partnership of property and "justice". His attack on
utilitarianism is implicit in his attack on capitalism. Durkheim's
debate with utilitarianism was a constant aspect of his work. Utility
represented the type of secular individualism which he was attempting
to transcend. The utilitarian individual was unrelated to the social whole,
his actions were uncontrolled by society. Durkheim was also influenced by the
general approval of utility. If Marx saw that utilitarianism defied justice,
then Durkheim was to stress its anti-social nature. As a neo-Kantian,
Weber's interest did not extend to politico-legal moral systems.
Utilitarianism, with other moral forms was non-rational and not significant
to the process of societal rationalisation which concerned him. The way
Marx, Durkheim and Weber approached morality and how this affected their
theoretical formulations is now discussed. We review in each case, how
sociologists working in the tradition of a founding father have treated the
moral, referring in particular to the Sociology of Education.

**MARX**

**Marx and Morality**

The communists do not preach morality at all... They do not put
people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much as self-sacrifice, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals. Hence, the communists by no means want... to do away with the "private individual" for the sake of the "general", self-sacrificing man...
This extract from Marx's critique of Sturmer, in *The German Ideology*, has come to exemplify his renunciation of the practice of moralising about the state of society. For here Marx expresses his distrust of conventional moral language which could so easily divert attention from an unjust situation. The French bourgeoisie had rallied the masses with the call to liberty, equality and fraternity whilst they appropriated the peasants' rights in the name of these very principles. Marx's focus is not on the world of ideals but on the world of definite circumstances, the world of "human sense activity" where "man must prove the truth... of his thinking in practice."^

But the opening extract also contains suggestions of Marx's positive approaches to value. The communists see egoism as being justified ("necessary") in terms of their end - communism - where man will realise his liberated social being. The very concept of man's restoration and fulfilment is a moral one, based on the concept of what is understood to be man's "true" nature. Moreover communists, through their study of history have shown that the interest of the "general, self-sacrificing man" is actually created by "private individuals" - the concept of general interest is a ploy to legitimate the interests of a powerful private minority. Such a situation cannot be exposed by using the language of morality, by condemning it as unfair or unjust. Such a situation requires a specialised critique.

To understand how this critique developed and how it incorporates value we need to return to its origins in Hegel and in the reaction called forth by Hegelian philosophy. We shall then turn to the moral concepts that underline Marx's concept of man and his goal.

Although Marx's approach to moral language and the realm of value is coloured by his historical observations it has its roots in Hegel and his critique of Kant. Hegel had rejected Kant's insistence that autonomous
thought dealt only with appearances and was thus subjective - the moral realm being knowable through introspection alone. Thought was infinite and objective dealing with the "noumenal", the realm of things-in-themselves. Reality was rational and the absolute could be known. Value was thus not a category distinct from fact - "is" and "ought" merged as history progressed and as it was increasingly understood by the philosophical mind. A theory of ethics and hence a theory of politics was possible, both being grounded in the understanding of history. Essentially the world was in the process of becoming what it "ought to be", namely reasonable. 10

Hegel's attempt to bridge the gap between fact and value, which had been widening since the fall of Aquinas' Aristotelianism and had reached the proportions of a chasm with the Kantian distinction between natural science as theoretical and morality as practical-atheoretical, was an important philosophical achievement but left his followers with immediate problems. As Lichtheim expresses it:

If the world was not to be confronted with subjective demands issuing from the "vanity" of the individual ego, then how could there be any kind of practice which did not result in conformity with whatever happened to be established. 11

In other words, if Kantian subjective autonomy is invalid, where does freedom escape the bounds of necessity? The Hegelians derived the concept of a critique which would be grounded in the logic of the historical process (to preserve the fact-value relation) but would transcend history. Critical understanding was gained by confronting the empirical reality with its own logic, (its own norms) not by applying moral commandments, the source of which was the noumenous world "beyond". But their answer also left them with the further problem as by expressing action as critical understanding they were left in the realm of theory. How could they transpose theory to practice?
Marx saw these attempts as mere "ideology" and set out to base his critique in the real movement of empirical history. The "essence of man" is replaced by man's "real nature" which is "the totality of social relations". And as all social life is essentially practical, a revolutionary critique will solve theory's problems "in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice". By making praxis the central focus for his critique Marx thus made a definite break with Hegelian philosophy, for now consciousness including moral consciousness, the realm of human values, is dependent on praxis-practical human activity. But the Hegelian relation between fact and value remains. In praxis as a concept, "is" and "ought" are united - man's very humanity is defined in terms of his ability to bring about change to his natural environment through his social labour. Man is, in fundamental social labour, in the activity of production, what he ought to be. But history shows the increasing alienation of man's practical activity in production and as man is separated from his "species-being" so we have "is" being separated from "ought". "Ought" is now partially at least, a future category, to be re-united with "is" through the overcoming of alienated labour, the emancipation of praxis. But Marx has no doubt that this "ought" of the future is no ideal category: it is as firmly linked to "is" by history as it was in Hegel's conceptualisation. Marx's problem is how to make a real and practical connection between his critique and the emancipation of praxis - how to relate his theory to revolutionary praxis.

There are two distinct phases of Marx's critique. In the earlier phase, although he sees the problem of social critique as needing a practical solution and stresses the need to transcend philosophy, he still presents his critique in a philosophical form. In his later phase, however, typified by *Capital*, he dissolves the philosophical form altogether, transforming his critique into the form of a critique of political economy in its own
terms. Whilst praxis is central to the application of the critique throughout, both its conceptualisation and its articulation with theory differ with the two approaches.

Marx's earlier, philosophical approach to praxis is well illustrated in the Introduction to his proposed *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Criticism can only become an effective weapon when it is sufficiently radical to seize the masses, inspiring them to practical revolutionary action. The "weapon of criticism" will thus be supplanted by the "criticism of weapons". The only way that theory can motivate people is to speak to the level of their deepest needs and show how those needs can be actualised. The rest must come from the people as: "It is not enough that thought should tend towards reality, reality must also tend towards thought."

The practical task of emancipation will be carried out by the proletariat, for this social group alone embodies radical needs. He sees the proletariat as the universal class having no particular goals of its own and owning nothing, having no structural attachment to capitalism. The proletariat has "a universal character because of its universal sufferings and lays claim to no particular right, because it is the object of no particular injustice but of injustice in general." It cannot free itself without freeing humanity as a whole. The relationship between theory and practice is thus summed up as follows: "As philosophy finds in the proletariat its material weapons so the proletariat finds in philosophy its intellectual weapons. . . Philosophy cannot realize itself without transcending the proletariat, the proletariat cannot transcend itself without realizing philosophy."

The radical needs which are the essential link with philosophy and the proletariat are none other than the need to live as fully human, socially related, beings in a society characterised by its co-operative mode of production - the society of associated producers. Before this can be
actualised, the proletariat must become aware of their right to, and need of, freedom, justice and equality, not as abstract "bourgeois" ideals but as characteristics of a real form of social production which can only be realised when capitalism has been superseded. To this end Marx expresses a desire to "arouse in the breasts of these men that feeling of human freedom that characterizes a man. It is only this feeling... that can turn the society of men into a community for the realization of their highest end, a democratic state."  

Most of Marx's analyses of the condition of man under capitalism in his early writings can be seen as attempts to make critique potentially practical through confronting the actual situation with its own norms. Or to put it another way, the situation is shown as being what it ought not to be by demonstrating how it differs from what in reality it is. In his analysis of alienated labour, for example, Marx states that because a man's work is imposed and not voluntary, it will not satisfy his essential need to express himself through labour but can only act as "a means for satisfying other needs." Similarly the alienation of the worker from his product gives the world of commodities power over him and leaves him diminished in his humanity and alienated from his fellow men. The norm is here assumed - man's essential nature is social, his essence being expressed through freely chosen social labour. Through distortion of his labour relations he loses his humanity. This can be restored only through his own revolutionary activity.

Marx's critique developed from a critique of political economy in terms of philosophy to a critique of political economy in its own terms. In Capital social theory is expressed as a systematic analysis of the process of capitalist reproduction - the second phase of Marxian critique. Marx's change of tactics was, at least in part due to the failure of the Parisian proletariat to sustain its revolution. They must be provided with
stronger weapons. The emphasis on praxis now shifted to the potential action of Capital's worker readers, who, realising the essentially exploitative nature of capitalism would be moved to unite to overthrow it. Capital can be seen as continuing Marx's critique of ideology. What appeared as justice in action, the idea of a fair day's work for a fair day's pay is shown to be nothing but an ideology which legitimates the exchange relations of the market place which act in the interests of capital. The ideology of "justice" masks the actual situation of exploitation which Marx analyses in his value theory of labour. 23 Marx's critique in Capital demonstrates the existence of two classes in fundamental opposition, defined by their relationship to the ownership of the means of production. Only through the proletariat coalescing into a self-conscious working class and, united, engaging in what is essentially a class struggle, can capitalism be overcome. Revolutionary praxis is to be found in united working class action, as it struggles to free itself from the fetishism of the commodity form which characterises its labour process.

By emphasising that the social basis of the capitalist mode of production consists of two classes which are irreconcilably in opposition, and by focussing his critique on the defetishisation of labour relations, Marx has lost the power to critique the gap between "is" and "ought" in individual praxis. Cohen suggests that there is a fundamental contradiction between Marx's early critique that focussed on the radical needs of individuals and his later critique in its economic form, that emphasises class interests. She considers that the later critique "is incapable of uncovering norms and values that could inform the praxis of individuals struggling around radical needs." 24 It is true that Marx still uses morally loaded language in Capital as he strives to develop in the workers awareness and understanding of the nature of their exploitation and to put into their hands the means of liberation. 25 But
by replacing individual needs by class interests, Marx has made it impossible to guide or to evaluate the actual methods whereby these workers carry on the process of revolutionary praxis. The class struggle has been placed beyond the reach of the practical application of moral knowledge.

Not only does Marx leave praxis uninformed by a noemative critique but the very nature of the mechanism of the capitalist transformation is ambiguous. The "Theses" had indicated that people were to be actively engaged in working to change the world but from the time of the *German Ideology*, Marx had given the impression that change is inevitable - that communism is an historical fact that will come.\(^{26}\) This ambiguity can be seen as another form of the contradiction between the philosophical approach to the proletariat (the theory of radical needs and radical praxis) and the critique of political economy and the class analysis associated with it.\(^{27}\) Whilst the elements of the self-determination of class struggle and the deterministic theory of historical materialism (based on the developmental logic of productive forces, i.e. technological progress, and its opposition to the relations of production) are both present to some extent throughout Marx's later writings, his abandonment of a philosophical critique allowed *Capital* to be interpreted as a scientific theory of history. Such a scientific theory would inevitably detach any remaining value from the historical "facts". The "is" of history would move inexorably towards the goal of emancipation but in no way be influenced by the latter's values.\(^{28}\) Scientific socialism lost any concept of a morality implicit in Marx's theory, for as the emphasis on praxis diminished so did the need to include its moral elements. The puritan form of moral consciousness that is promoted in many Marxist states and is apparently seen as necessary for social control, is not itself derived from Marx's writings.

The upsurge of humanist Marxism, with its re-emphasis on praxis, has, in
recent years led to an interest in Marx's actual moral ideas. What does Marx really mean when he uses words like truth, freedom and justice and what moral concepts are implicit in his moralising-free method of describing the social formation of the future? We shall turn briefly to an examination of the implicit moral concepts in Marx, reviewing the recent attempts of moral philosophers to elucidate a coherent Marxian morality.

Freedom as an ideal has been a dominant theme of Marx since his earliest writings. Freedom is one of man's radical needs, as it is part of his nature to direct his own activities - "that feeling of human freedom that characterises a man." If praxis is the underlying theme of Marx's works, then freedom is the moral principle that above all characterises praxis. Kamenka describes Marx's concept of freedom, in his view, the key to understanding Marx's ethical basis, as follows:

To be truly self-determined and free from contradiction is to be truly real and truly good. To exhibit dependence (determination from without), division, instability and "self-contradiction" is to fall short, to be evil. . .

Marx never, however, fully explicates his concept of freedom in terms of actual society. Freedom is visualised in terms of the free social individual living in a society where "the necessary or true needs" of all members could be met - the possibility of continued scarcity is not considered. Moreover servility and dependence are seen as temporary phenomena, as being related to the alienation of labour rather than stemming from any positive human characteristics. Yet, Kamenka argues, there is no evidence for this, on the contrary, some form of human dependence appears to be a permanent feature of social interaction. Freedom for Marx is essentially an idealistic notion of self-determination and not an adequate concept of what it would mean for an individual to be "free" within a human society.

There is continuous debate amongst philosophers about the existence and nature of theories of truth and justice in Marx. Kolakowski and
other advocates of the pragmatist/relativist theory of truth in Marx are
to be understood as the science of social formations. 35

Attempts to discover a coherent concept of justice behind Marx's
critique of capitalism, such as that of Ralph Dahrendorf, have been,
on the whole, unsuccessful. 36 A.W. Wood, attacking these attempts, argues
that nowhere does Marx give any clear conception of right or justice.
Marx sees the juridical point of view as essentially one-sided, and
universal principle, abstracted from a concrete historical context as
empty and useless, whilst applied to such a context they are misleading
and distorting. 37 Wood does believe that Marx's critique contains an
implicit critique of justice but only as part of his critique of bourgeois
ideology, and not as the fundamental basis to his condemnation of
capitalism as some philosophers have wished to argue. In Marx's view,
Wood reminds us, capitalism "was breaking down because it was irrational"
not because it was unjust. 38

Failure to discover any particular moral or social principle underlying
Marx's critique of capitalism has led radical philosophers into attempts to
redefine morality to fit their espoused version of Marxism. The activist
Marxists who desire some guidelines for their praxis, believe that "moral
ideology" should be superseded by a "naturalistic practical reason" 39
or by a "radical-materialist conception of morality" that will recharge it
"for an assault into the homes and into the schools." 40 From a position
of scientific Marxism, however, it can be argued that morality is neither more nor less than Marxism itself. For, if one sets out from the classical definition of morality as "a scientific investigation of the social order which can generate norms for action", then if Marx's interpretation of society is true and is believed to be true, knowledge of life would be "scientific knowledge", capable of controlling everyday actions, and judgements based on this science would be moral judgements.41

It can thus be seen that attempts to connect Marx too directly with morality lead either to a distortion of Marx's thought (as Wood claims to result from Dahrendorf's approach) or, in the case of the radical philosophers, to a distortion of the concept of morality. For whilst judgement about everyday actions are indeed an aspect of the moral realm, to brand such universals as freedom and justice as ideologies and to limit morality to practical guidelines is to lose touch with the criteria by which these practical guidelines can claim moral status. So conceptualised, moral argument could bear no relationship to truth. Although Marx does have a concept of what man is, and thus what man ought to be when liberated and restored, one cannot derive a coherent theory of morality or even an elucidated set of moral principles from his concept of man.42 This is not surprising, for Marx was attempting to supersede the philosophical form of morality. While it is not untrue to describe his aim as emancipation and his underlying theme as the ideal of freedom, this philosophical form, found at its best in Kamenka, loses Marx's main driving force. Marx was aiming at a particular form of liberated society and his constant theme was not the ideal of freedom as much as the actuality of praxis.

It is however, the concept of praxis that has raised endless barriers for Marxists searching for an ethic inherent to Marx and thus suitable to guide both Marxist political action and everyday life under Marxism. In the first place, because of the ambiguities in Marx's thought, such scholars
must contend with those scientific Marxists who believe that praxis is irrelevant as Marxism is the science of history and human action cannot change the course of history. But scientific Marxism aside, if the critique of the mature Marx is taken into consideration, one must define praxis in terms of the class struggle, and as we saw above, not only is a class unmotivated by needs in the way that an individual is, there can be no way of applying any type of normative or ideological critique to a class such as the proletariat as it engages in struggle. A critique of political economy in its economic form may unmask private interests that masquerade as the general good, but it cannot act as a critique of united class praxis. Analysis of Marx's philosophical works via themes such as radical needs or alienation which shed light on praxis and show the continuation of the humanist thread running through his later writings, has helped combat the scientific Marxist school but has not related praxis to ethics.

Karel Kosik is one Marxist philosopher who has made a serious attempt to grasp the moral within Marxism, ("the relation between the individual and society, between man and reality") by re-examining the concept of praxis. He believes that there is an implied morality in praxis, that it transcends the moment of labour by involving the moment of "recognition". Recognition is the process of realising human freedom. Revolutionary praxis if pursued via a dialectic that attempts to reveal contradictions and transcend them, will itself be "moral" activity. Only thus can one prevent social politics from degenerating "into social engineering, which is in turn based on the scientific mechanism of economic forces." Kosik's concern to explicate the implicitly moral within praxis and thus to restore morality to politics is important and necessary but he fails to show how such a dialectic is to proceed or by what means it is to reveal contradictions. Marx's failure to give any thought to political education or to give any guidelines for the moral
conduct of members of socialist society strengthens the position of the social engineers.

Marx then, has made a potential contribution towards understanding the meaning of morality in modern society but the potential cannot yet be fully realised. He has shown that norms and moral codes spring from social activities and not vice versa, so that morality does not come from some transcendent realm but is a product of man. He has further shown that moral ideals can be treacherous when they hide the truth of an unjust social situation. He has developed the tool of critique to expose the masking of interests. He has suggested that fact and value are related in praxis. But his emphasis on class interests and his stress on the importance of technological development as the prime mover in historical materialism has confused the concept of praxis. This has left his followers with a serious problem if they wish to articulate morality within Marxism. As it stands, Marx's concept of praxis cannot give rise to an adequate conceptualisation of morality.

We shall now turn to Marxist sociology to see how it has taken possession of and built upon Marx's thought, how it has treated the moral and in what ways Marx's theoretical inadequacies have affected its development. We shall look at this with particular reference to sociological studies in the field of education.

Marx and the Moral in the Sociology of Education

Whether or not there can be said to be a Marxist sociology is a contentious issue, but there are certainly Marxists working as professional sociologists and sociologists who approach the discipline from, at least in part, a Marxist perspective. For there is not one but many Marxisms and the approach taken to the study of sociology and within sociology to the moral, will vary with the theoretical foundations of the form of Marxist thought the student embraces.
Bottomore places the major division in Marxism between those who conceive of it as a philosophical world view or philosophy of history and those who conceive of it primarily as an objective science of society. Goldmann sees the orthodox school of Marxism as falling into the second category, its most extreme expression being Max Adler's belief that Marx was the true founder of sociology. "Marxism", asserted Adler, "is a system of sociological knowledge. It bases socialism on the causal knowledge of the processes of social life. Marxism and sociology are one and the same thing." To such a position, the moral is at best an implicit and involuntary feature of Marx's writings and has no place in Marxist analysis. Fact and value are radically separated and any idea of an ethical foundation to socialism is rejected.

Goldmann, himself, with Lukács and other humanist Marxists such as Gramsci would tend to see Marxism as a unified philosophy of history. For Goldmann there is no dichotomy between fact and value as both move together. "The idea of progress towards socialism is in fact for Marx both part of his theoretical construction, and of his scale of values. . . ." There will be, however, little chance of such Marxists undertaking empirical investigations relating to morality as they are philosophers rather than social scientists and as we saw in the last section any philosophical endeavours must contend with insoluble contradictions.

The situation of the various Marxisms is however anything but the simple division above. The theoretical variants of Marxism in particular are many and complex, as is demonstrated by the different forms of structural Marxism. Althusser's Marxism, for example, is anti-humanist and anti-empirical in addition to being anti-economistic. For him, men relate to their real conditions of existence via a set of illusory representations of reality - the medium of ideology. Ideology is permanent and has no history yet it is the cement of social cohesion in every
period of history. It is of necessity distorted – an ensemble of false beliefs. Even the concept of an idea is ideological – people are deluded in their belief that they are free subjects possessing beliefs and ideas and showing them in action.\textsuperscript{51} For Althusser, a person's ideas "are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of this subject."\textsuperscript{52}

In Althusserian Marxism the moral is even less accessible than the empirical. Morality becomes part of the distorted world of ideology embedded in attitudes and practices reproduced by the various institutions serving the state.

Perry Anderson has suggested that the proliferation of theoretical variants in Western Marxism may be related to the fact that they have been created by isolated scholars, usually in universities, whose theory is unrelated to a revolutionary mass movement.\textsuperscript{53} In his Afterword, Anderson attempts to correct the impression he may have given of activism – "Marxist theory is thus not, despite every laudable temptation, to be equated with a revolutionary sociology."\textsuperscript{54} Because Marxism claims to be a "science of history" it cannot be confined to the contemporary – it is incompatible with any philosophical pragmatism. This places a limit on the unity of theory and practice\textsuperscript{55} and suggests that the relationship is more complex than classical Marxism foresaw.

Sociological activism is by no means rare, however, amongst sociologists of a general Marxist persuasion. Whilst they do not attempt to explicate the moral in Marx and have no conceptual framework in which to discuss the morality in or of a social situation, their entire endeavour is a moral exercise. By practicing their sociology they are attempting to engage in revolutionary praxis. Like Marx, they are approaching "ought" through "is", whilst blurring the distinction.
There have been few attempts by Marxist scholars to apply a Marxist analysis to some form of social life specifically in order to explicate aspects of the moral. It is not surprising, then, that critiques of the morality within Marxism or of Marxist practices are almost unknown. Maria Ossowska is one Marxist who has concentrated on the moral as an aspect of the social. In England, a group of sociologists has attempted to devise a radical Marx-based theory in the field of deviance. Both have met with problems stemming from the limitations of their theory in dealing with the moral.

Ossowska takes a modern Eastern European position where Marxism is a philosophical and historical world view and where morality is a form of ideology, determined by factors of social life. In *Social Determinants of Moral Ideas*, Ossowska uses the term "moral" in a "neutral" sense to denote a particular kind of value judgment to do with action, or for distinguishing right from wrong. Her discussion of descriptive ethics is brief - she notes, en passant, that the sociology of morality is a neglected field, not listed in Sociological Abstracts. The bulk of her discussion is of moral phenomena which belong to the normative realm and various factors are suggested which are determinants for moral codes and ideas. Much of this is a review and as sixteen factors are dealt with, the treatment is brief. Morality on the whole, exists in society as clusters of approved virtues and she discusses the development of two European ideal types, the nobility ethos and the bourgeois ethos. About the concept of morality itself, she concludes (in the light of her discussion of the evolution of these ideal types): The duality of civic and self-regarding virtues to which I pointed above make difficult not only a definition of morality which would aspire to finding some common features in the content of moral judgments but also one which would confine itself to certain formal traits.
Ossowski's problem in defining the concept of morality and her need to confine herself to an atheoretical description of codes and virtues shows up the weakness of her type of world-view Marxism for dealing with the moral. For not only does she fail to define a "moral idea" but she fails to theorise the way in which these ideas are in fact determined by the social.

A possible critique of the moral in society from a Marxian position would be in the field of deviance and criminology. Taylor, Walton and Young show how there is a swing away from theories about law breakers "towards social theories of rule-creation and rule-breaking, located in a wider, more complex moral and social dynamic. . ."59 The adequacy of such theories must be assessed in terms of their "utility in demasking the moral and ideological veneer of an unequal society and in terms of its ability to enliven the critical debate. . ."60

However much their aim may appear to be true to the Marxian historical critique the radical deviance theorists have not yet achieved it. Hirst points out that whilst radical deviance theory does question value assumptions of established interests and the ideological stand of orthodox criminology, it rarely questions its own position's assumptions and interests.61 He suggests that radicals, by attempting to apply Marxism to a pre-given field of sociology are actually engaging in a more or less revisionist activity - i.e. it must modify and distort Marxist concepts to suit its own pre-Marxist purpose." The objects of Marxism are specified by its own concepts: the mode of production, the class struggle, the state, ideology etc.", Hirst asserts.62 As Marxism has a quite different view of crime and deviancy from that of the radicals (crime is not for Marx a radical activity nor a form of rebellion but a reactionary, anti-working class activity), it is senseless to speak in terms of a "Marxist" theory of deviance. Now even if some consider that Hirst is being unnecessarily purist in his approach it must be accepted that this field has produced
few studies and has few proponents.  

In the Sociology of Education, there has been no attempt to develop a Marxist critique of the moral per se. Many studies however have an implicit moral content and others, whilst in no way explicating the moral, contain a moral imperative. The moral content of such studies can be seen to fall into two categories - the category of critique and the category of praxis.

Studies in the first category are essentially critiques of educational ideology, of societal and pedagogical assumptions about education. Such assumptions are frequently moral or have moral overtones. It has been widely believed in the United States that education is for liberty and equality. Clarence Karier and Michael Apple have shown that two commonly accepted agents of "liberty", the system of psychological testing and the content of the liberal curriculum actually militate against the social mobility of the economically disadvantaged. Bowles and Gintis have attempted to show that education is a reflection of the American economy, a vast machine for reproducing the social division of labour.

A much deeper and more sophisticated critique of an educational system is Bourdieu's work on education in France. He reveals the social nature of scholastic excellence and exposes the myth of equality of educational opportunity. But profound as Bourdieu's work may be, as a Marxist critique it does not come to grips with elements of the moral. As with the Americans, his moral judgement lies in the exposure that education is not what it claims to be or what it is believed to be. The above critiques are not so much judgements about justice as about truth.

In England we have had a shorter tradition of the widespread acceptance of the ideology of equality of educational opportunity than in the U.S. but there has been a strong belief in working class movements that education acts in the interests of the working class.
Many Marxist orientated studies have argued that "the school is an instrument of social control perpetuating the hegemony of the ruling class." The Birmingham centre for cultural studies has worked in this area. 

Paul Willis' research into the transition from school to work for working class youths tries to do more than merely describe an aspect of the differential function of schools in reproducing the division of labour and thus expose the liberal-democratic myth of "equality". His "lads" are part of a wider working class culture which articulates with that of school and work in a complex network of ideologies and practices. And this working class is not a powerless group of the oppressed but a group with potential for struggle, in the Thompsonian tradition. Willis brings the notion of self-determination and autonomy into his account, even though such factors are not directed towards liberty and fulfilment. He suggests that, in fact, "it is the partly 'autonomous' counter-cultures of the working class at the site of the school which behind the back of official policy ensure the continuity of its own underprivelege. . ." Even if we ignore the theoretical problems that accompany the use of the phrase "working class culture" as a general category, what came out strongly is Willis' lack of clarity in his expression of the moral. Like Marx, he appears to view self-determination as a "goal" but fails to explain why this is at times to be seen as "joyous, creative and attractive" and yet also contains "an element of self damnation". Because of this ambiguity in his underlying concept of the "desirable" his work fails to make it clear whether he is attempting a Marxist critique of the ideology of education or whether he is pointing to a supposed feature of the seeds of emancipation within working class consciousness.

The "Marxism as critique" approach which comes closest to making a moral statement about education is to be found in studies which set out to show that educational practices can be seen as aspects of alienation. We are not referring here, to early U.S. studies influenced by writers
such as Lukacs or Fromm which tended to see alienation in psychological
terms, but to the work of sociologists such as Michael Young and his
followers. Here alienation is seen in its classical Marxist sense of a
specific mode of distortion of the means of achieving objectification under
capitalism. Young starts out from the Marxist assumption that a central
part of men's historical possibilities for fulfilment as human beings is
their appropriation and transformation of the natural world of which they
are part. He suggests that one part of this human possibility, the
professional practice of scientists and science educators has become
separated off, during the last two centuries, and has developed an
independent existence. This separation is a feature of man's alienation.
He shows this process existing at various levels of scientific knowledge and
its transmission for the Nuffield Science Projects stress on Science as
"commodity knowledge", to actual classroom practices.

Like the more general critiques, these studies can be said to have
the moral purpose of showing up undesirable elements in the educational
system and thus clearing the way for possible action. As Hextall and Sarup
put it at the conclusion of their study: "One starts by taking
responsibility for making oneself knowledgeable. Then, it will be possible
for knowledge and action to be joined." This is the voice of the early
Marx when the stress is still on critique at the philosophical level. The
assumptions are almost Platonic, in reverse - if one knows what is wrong
one will take steps to right it. As we saw in the previous section, critique
which does not give guidelines for remedial action, cannot be called
morally sufficient.

Hirst points out that to use alienation in an explanatory sense, as
Marxist studies of deviance have done is improper. He stresses that
alienation does not exist as an isolated concept but must always be seen
in relation to "man's-being-towards-communism." Young's studies are
contextualised in Marxism and have the implicit morality of all such critique, with the same problem of how to bring about change.

The category of praxis, like Marx's later work, focussed on the need for the working class to take practical steps towards their own emancipation. Like Marx's later work, it loses all purchase on the concept of morality. Whilst the sociology of critique has an implicit moral force, the sociology of praxis degenerates into a general activism. This approach is typified by Frith and Corrigan's, "The Politics of Education". Here politics means organized working-class politics. The call for praxis sounds clearly. "Bring Politics into the Classroom!" 'Bring the Classroom into Politics!!" The only good is the implied socialist end and how this end is to be reached we are not told. For if working class involvement as praxis is to succeed then it needs direction and a means of criticising its own methods.

We appear, then, to be left with more than pointers to guide Sociology in the task of making use of Marx's insight into the social nature of morality. Marx's great contribution to a sociology of morality was his insistence that the moral reals be understood in terms of real human activity and not in terms of a future ideal. Injustice must be exposed not through moralistic argument but through a critique which reveals the nature of the exploitation in real material terms and unmask moral ideas which are serving to legitimate the injustice.

So far, Marxists working in the Sociology of Education have made little progress in applying these insights, have done little to clarify their concept of morality and have not engaged in a morally adequate critique of any aspect of education. We contribute this lack of progress not to the sloth or disinterest of the sociologists but to Marx's theoretical weakness. Marx's ambiguous concept of praxis was inadequate as a base for a coherent sociology of morality and he left no moral guidelines within his model of emancipated society which could direct the emancipatory activity of either pen or proletariat.
"Durkheim believes that the moral ideal is a social ideal, that society, the object of moral action, also confers its value on moral action," wrote Aron at the conclusion of his essay on Durkheim. Indeed Durkheim does appear to believe that the moral realm is a function of the social. But why? He cannot, in all honesty be said to have "discovered" the relationship, however much his empirically based examples in works such as The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, appear to give substance to the idea. Is it perhaps that Durkheim is merely a moral philosopher who has become aware of the reality of social forces and that Durkheimian sociology is merely a by-product of his moral philosophy? Or does Durkheim's preoccupation with morality make better sense when seen in the context of his passion to establish a science of society. A science which attempts to complete the project begun by Comte "to occupy the last space in knowledge created by the order of the real, a space which has always existed but for which until now man has been unready and unequal." Giddens states that Durkheim began his intellectual career with an attempt to found a "science of morality", that this led him to look to sociology for method and that thence he was led, by the moral nature of social facts, back to moral philosophy. But we propose a more active Durkheim who pursued knowledge and tried to get to grips with empirical reality in a way that Kant and the "moralists" never could. For Durkheim, trained in philosophy and history, morality must have presented both an opportunity and a challenge. An opportunity, because if the moral could be studied objectively it could help answer the question that emerged from his early studies and would remain pertinent to his later work - the question of the relationship of the individual to "social solidarity". Morality, unlike art, was present in all societies - "the least indispensable,
the strictly necessary, the daily bread without which societies cannot exist" and so would allow a comparative study of societies. Moreover moral phenomena whilst in themselves inaccessible can be studied via external indices which act as visible symbols. So that law and custom are symbols of the moral bonds which provide society with its solidarity and the nature and characteristics of the latter can be understood through an empirical investigation of the former. So moral facts lend themselves readily, if indirectly, to scientific study in the world of social reality.

But to study moral facts as social facts is also a challenge. Morality has always been the exclusive province of philosophers who, since the Reformation, have sought to expound it with reference to the individual. Both the Kantian imperative and the utilitarian ethic were expressed in terms of individual action and bore no direct relationship to the social. Individualism and idealism could be challenged at the same time if one managed to study morality as a science. Morality was even more of a challenge because it had traditionally been intimately connected with religion, until recently, in France, being strongly under the sway of the Catholic Church. As a student at the Ecole Normal, and later as a teacher in the provinces, Durkheim was made aware of France's educational heritage and of the effect of the Jesuit Colleges on the national character and of their essentially moral approach to education. Durkheim was a convinced and dedicated secularist and both in philosophy and education was quick to translate the religio-moral into secular moral terms. To isolate the moral and treat it as science was to help free it from religion. The end of the road for this process, when Durkheim had returned to a philosophical study of morality, is seen in this comment. "Kant postulates God, since without this hypothesis morality is unintelligible. We postulate a society specifically distinct from individuals, since otherwise morality has no object and duty no roots. Let us add that this postulate is easily verified by experience."
Even though Durkheim left the scientific study of morality to return to its philosophical exposition, it would appear that he considered that he had successfully described value in terms of fact⁹² and that his empirical investigations into the realm of the ideal had been fruitful.⁹³ In his essay "Value Judgments and Judgments of Reality", published with "The Determination of Moral Facts" (quoted above) posthumously, Durkheim states that sociology's particular field of study is the ideal and that the method of study must be the scientific method.⁹⁴ Judgments of value and judgments of fact are of the same order because whilst the former refers to ideals and the latter to concepts, both ideals and concepts are constructs of the human mind and both exist in society in symbolic form - "concrete realizations".⁹⁵ Now Durkheim believed that he had already demonstrated this empirically in The Elementary Forms - religious beliefs, moral values and concepts of the cosmos are all to be seen as symbolic representations of collective social practice. His thesis is that the earliest forms of collective understanding were religious beliefs and that "religious conceptions are the result of determined social causes."⁹⁶ Once man had the "idea that there are internal connections between things" in religious terms, science and philosophy become possible.⁹⁷ After giving numerous examples of the close relationship that exists in primitive societies between the experience of their natural and social world and their symbolic expressions through totem, rites and ceremonies (their ideal world) he draws the following conclusions:

The formation of the ideal world is therefore not an irreducible fact which escapes science; it depends upon conditions which observation can touch; it is a natural product of social life. For a society to become conscious of itself and maintain at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it thus attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself. . . . A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself without at the same time creating an ideal. . . . The collective ideal which religion expresses is far from being due to a vague innate power of the individual, but it is rather at the school of collective life that the individual has learned to idealize.⁹⁸
Secular concepts are formed by a similar process to religious concepts, being "the manner in which society represents things" and the value attributed to secular knowledge will itself depend upon the idea which we collectively form of its nature and role in life."

We have been illustrating our suggestion that far from really founding a science of morality, Durkheim merely assumed the moral as a social fact. Then, after using "moral facts" to help explain the nature and the evolution of social cohesion and to assist him in his critique of egoism and utilitarianism, he relegated morality with religion to the realm of the ideal, one which was not of a different order from the realm of scientific fact. Both are socially created, accessible to empirical investigation and both are interconnected. This is not to condemn Durkheim's treatment of the moral. He was a philosopher and a sociologist - he did not wish to be a moralist.

He may indeed appear to be something of a "moralist" when he approaches education but it is suggested that even in Moral Education he was making use of moral language and concepts to answer the question: "How is the secular school to shape children according to the needs of society?" At the same time by seeing the school as a micro-society he could expound the two-fold manner by which the individual was in society and yet had society in him (discussed as "moral" bonds) and yet could still retain his autonomy as an individual. But autonomy will not mean individual decisions according to conscience as the Protestant ethos stresses, it will involve the knowledge of the "laws of morality" which means the socially accepted moral rules. Because, as Durkheim has expressed from the start: "To act morally is to act in terms of the collective interest... the domain of the moral begins where the domain of the social begins." Morality and moral language are then not only products of the social but agents of the social. They are of strategic interest to Durkheim in his elucidation of the nature of social solidarity and the
limits of individualism. 101

It could be said that Durkheim is closest to being a moralist when he
is not using moral language but speaking of his vision of education based
on a concept of human nature which is "infinitely flexible", having within it
a "multitude of unrealised potentialities" through which individuals can
"achieve real self knowledge" and learn to act with knowledge and under-
standing. 102 This vision of education is one not of socialisation but of
emancipation. "Here we have a first goal which deserves to be methodically
and systematically sought after. It contains everything which is necessary
to attract someone engaged in an activity which he would like to regard as
useful. But how are we to attain this goal? This education in the world of
persons, via what disciplines and with what methods is it most suitably
carried out?"103

Durkheim's main concern, then, was not what was the essential nature
of morality but what was the essential nature of society. Society becomes
the totality and morality is ultimately expressed in terms of the whole.
But first the nature of the cohesive forces within society had been
explained by means of the more readily accessible moral "facts". For
society itself is less suitable as a subject for scientific investigation
than practices and beliefs within it. It was not until Durkheim began his
investigations of the beliefs and practices of primitive societies that
he was able to observe a society as an entity, as a unit. The moral now can
be described less in terms of its function in society and more in terms of its
creation by and symbolic relationship to, society. We must not expect, then,
that Durkheim's conceptualisation of morality will either be totally
consistent or explicit. Nor is it likely to be totally inclusive. For
his is not a study of morality but of society. We turn now to his explicit
moral concepts, from his early works, through to his mature works.

Prior to The Division of Labour, Durkheim had conceptualised morality
in terms of "the facts of the moral life". First amongst these were obligatory rules of conduct but also included were "sentiments of sympathy and love, feelings of ultimate loyalty and disinterested devotion, emotional reactions of remorse and regret, and the conscious pursuit of order, harmony, solidarity and well-being."\(^\text{104}\) In the *Division of Labour* the moral is seen in terms of the types of relationships existing between participating members of a society. The central problem is: "What are the bonds which unite men one with another and how do they change in nature as society develops." Of his two ideal societal types those exhibiting "mechanical solidarity" have such bonds between individuals but specifically defined norms covering every facet of daily life and a collective consciousness which is absolute religion and transcendental, related to the interests of society as a whole. More advanced societies, typified by their "organic solidarity" exhibit the phenomena of collective consciousness to a small degree and in nature it tends to be secular, human-oriented and abstract. Members are bonded together by the diversity of individual social roles creating the need for a co-operative interdependence. Norms are more general and tend to relate to a person's differentiated status through work, family etc. Supreme value is attached to the individual dignity as well as certain secular ideals such as equality of opportunity and social justice.\(^\text{105}\) Moral solidarity in primitive societies thus depends on a psychological resemblance produced by shared beliefs and in advanced societies it depends not on similarity but on heterogeneity. But in addition to their bonds of economic interdependence, individuals in advanced societies have stronger individual personalities, are tied to each other with bonds of mutual concern and have a sense of dependence on and devotion to society as a whole. Durkheim affirms that co-operation has just as much "intrinsic morality" as a community of beliefs.\(^\text{106}\) In the *Division of Labour*, then, we have various aspects of the moral being used in
the analysis of societal types but not a great deal of conceptual clarity in what is meant by morality. At this stage one can distinguish these principal types of moral phenomena - interpersonal sympathy, group loyalty and moral obligation.  

In *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim introduces the concept of the normal as opposed to the pathological in society as the principal empirical method for ascertaining the value of its rules and institutions. In practice "the normal type merges with the average type." In addition to a social phenomenon being normal and thus desirable if it exists in the average society it must also serve a useful social function. Thus not only moral rules such as those of respecting private property are seen as desirable but crime itself is normal and necessary - "a factor in public health, an integral part of all healthy societies."  

If society were perfectly controlled by collective sentiments there could be no individuality and thus no change. "To make progress, individual originality must be able to express itself. In order that the originality of the idealist whose dreams transcend his century may find expression, it is necessary that the originality of the criminal, who is below the level of his time shall also be possible. One does not occur without the other."  

Durkheim also believes in the possibility of the functional rebel - someone like Socrates who is morally ahead of his time, "an anticipation of future morality" and who although defined as a criminal "plays a definite role in social life."  

Durkheim's moral theory has a major development in *Suicide* where we see an increasing emphasis on the idealistic nature of group life - an individual is attached to a group in terms of its shared ideals and ends. Durkheim's categories of egoistic and altruistic suicide are defined as suffering from too little and too much shared group ideals and beliefs.
respectively. Anomie and fatalistic categories however are classified according to their degree of normative control, the former being insufficiently regulated and the latter overregulated and lacking in individuation. As norms in an advanced society are partially related to one's position in the division of labour, the individual suffering from anomie will lack the relevant norms for the place he occupies in society. Both the ideals and ends of group life and practice and social norms are seen as collective representatives.

These concepts are the basis of his argument in *Moral Education*. The moral aspect of regulation by norms is discussed as "discipline". Here regularity and the acceptance of authority are essential. Regular habits will predetermine the child to appropriate modes of response needed for order and organization, and authority will give him the necessary limits to enable him to attain worthwhile goals and the feeling that beyond him are forces that set bounds for him. Attachment is seen as personal commitment to social groups as well as to shared group aims and ideals. Thus "a bond of constant communication is established between the consciousness of the child and others' consciousness."

These two aspects of social bonding are offset by autonomy or self-determination. The individual must not merely have his behaviour regulated by rules not of his own making. "We are not free if the law by which we regulate our behavior is imposed on us, if we have not freely desired it." But this cannot mean licence to disobey rules, so autonomy is best reached through a rational acceptance and understanding of rules.

In *Education and Sociology* education is defined as consisting "of a methodical socialization of the young generation", where the "social being" is constituted in each individual. "The social being" is defined as a system of ideas, sentiments and practices which express in us, not our personality, but the group or different groups of which we are part; these
are religious beliefs, moral beliefs and practices, national and professional tradition, collective opinions of every kind."  

This concept of the social being is characteristic of Durkheim's mature work, where the moral is defined and described entirely in terms of society. Man is "homo duplex" having in one personality his individuality together with "everything in us that expresses something other than ourselves." In him is the "sacred", all that represents the social and the "profane", his individual self. Moral rules are nothing but "norms that have been elaborated by society" yet this makes them sacred and gives them their obligatory character, the "authority of society". The moral problem for the individual is that "the interests of the whole are not necessarily those of the part" so he is "required to make perpetual and costly sacrifices.

Autonomy has now become an aspect of society, no longer to be defined in terms of individual knowledge for all knowledge is social. "For man freedom consists in deliverance from blind, unthinking physical forces; this he achieves by opposing against them the great and intelligent force which is society, under whose protection he shelters. By putting himself under the wing of society, he makes himself also, to a certain extent dependent upon it. But this is a liberating dependence. There is no paradox here." The moral authority of society stems from the fact that society is "a higher and richer conscience than our own, one upon which we feel that our own depends," and from which is derived "all the essentials of our mental life." In a secular world, in fact, society replaces God as the highest imaginable "being", the source of what makes us human, our mental and moral sensibility. "The believer bows before his God, because it is from God that he believes he holds his being, particularly his mental being, his soul. We have the same reasons for experiencing this feeling before the collective." So ultimately, society as the source of all collective
representations is the source of all forms of knowledge - concepts, ideals and values - as well as being the custodian of the symbolic and institutionalised forms of these representations. In this and this alone lies its moral authority.

If one analyses the way Durkheim conceptualises the moral it is hard to escape the conclusion that in his middle period at least he was a rule utilitarian. Wallwork classifies much of Durkheim's treatment of the moral as utilitarian. Conventional rules and institutions are "useful" in the sense of being necessary for peaceful social solidarity where this state is seen as having intrinsic value. "Rules are justified if and only if they share in the intrinsic value of social solidarity, assuming that solidarity includes peace, trust, mutuality, and cooperation." In *Moral Education* Durkheim justifies discipline in terms of its "social utility" and translates the famous Kantian ideal of autonomy into an understanding of the reasons for rules. Giddens sees some of this aspect in Durkheim, pointing out that he "drew upon utilitarianism in order to criticize Kant." It is understandable that philosopher-protagonists of Durkheim would want to gloss over the notion of normality as a criterion for desirability which is put forward in the *Rules*. As Wallwork comments, after mentioning Durkheim's "getting entangled in complex logical gymnastics: "In any case, it is a matter of record that Durkheim placed considerably less stress on the test of normality after 1897." Durkheim's concept here, appears both crudely utilitarian and relativist. Not only must the phenomena be necessary to a society but relates to one particular type of society and not to human society in general.

When we come to Durkheim's mature work we are led to the conclusion that his position is now one of ethical relativism. Giddens believes that Durkheim probably never held moral relativistic views although it might be
taken that he does imply that there can be no universal theory of morality. 
An analysis of what he actually writes about the relationship of the moral
to society, especially the social genesis of the moral and the moral
authority of society would appear to leave us in no doubt. It is true that
he does allege at various points in his writings, that a moral principle
is right because it is universally acknowledged by the moral conscience of
mankind. But on the whole his argument, expressed most clearly in the
essays of *Sociology and Philosophy* but well backed by his discussions in
*The Elementary Forms* is that value judgements are valid if and only if they
correctly represent changing collective ideals. As Wallwork points out:
"The problem with this argument lies with the underlying assumption that the
statement "X is right or good" means "X is approved by my society." These
statements, however, are not synonymous, for it is one thing to say that
murder is disapproved by my society, but it is quite a different thing to
assert that murder is wrong for reasons that rational men will accept."

A separate criticism can be levied at Durkheim's treatment of moral
education, which gains added significance in the light of Durkheim's
familiarity with the works of John Dewey. Durkheim's form of socialisation
whilst humane, has much in common with conditioning - the child is to be
moulded to fulfil the needs of society. Furthermore some of the features of
Jesuit education have been transposed to the secular setting. The teacher
must interpret societal ideals as the priest interpreted his God and the
child must be aware of forces beyond him exercising silent control. It
is this approach that has led Kohlberg to classify Durkheim as having a
"construction" of morality at "stage 4". In other words Durkheim's
approach to moral education is limited to inculcating habits and a respect
for rules; it does not attempt to develop an understanding of principled
morality. Moreover his approach to the development of autonomy is
thoroughly inadequate and takes no account of the child's need to
experiment or use his creative initiative.  

The most serious criticism of Durkheim's definitions of morality is that at no time do they adequately explicate justice. Utilitarianism is well-known for paying little attention to the concept of justice and Durkheim himself realised it as a limited theory of morality which "denies its specific characteristics and reduces its fundamental ideas to those of economic techniques." But when Durkheim made the collective the measure of good and the source of moral authority he did not allow the possibility of an unjust society. Ginsberg sees two questions arising: "First, if morality comes from the group and is obligatory for that reason, has then the individual no right to criticise it? Must he accept as binding every demand that society at any time makes upon him? Second, if Durkheim's account of obligation answers the question of fact, does it also answer the question of jurisdiction? Ought we to obey the commands of society merely because they are commands?" He adds: "To both these questions Durkheim offers answers, but they fail, I think, to carry conviction."  

Not only does Durkheim fail to allow for a just relationship to obtain between individuals and the community but he ignores the need to include interpersonal relationships as being part of the moral reals. Morality is what is in a society: Durkheim does not allow for the presence of any ultimate "what ought to be." This was of course part of his aim, but by defining the moral as social facts, he then limits it to those aspects which can be described in social terms. This means that the moral realm is reduced to ideals and values and socially sanctioned rules of conduct. And as we saw above, he stresses that whilst judgements of fact and judgements of value are not the same they are of the same order, as they both refer to social constructs, concepts and ideals respectively, both of which are accessible to sociological investigation.
But we return to our original thesis, that Durkheim was interested in sociology, not morality in defining the limits to individualism and the way that individuals relate to the social whole. We do not believe that Durkheim's major concern was to found a science of morality although it would have been a crowning triumph to his secularism had he succeeded. But to do Durkheim justice, he does not claim to have established such a science, in fact he had only started on his proposed task when he died. As he protested during the discussion of his paper "The Determination of Moral Facts": "I cannot attempt to explain the general characteristics of moral facts until I have passed carefully in review the details of moral rules (domestic, civic, professional or contractual) and have shown both the causes that give rise to them and the functions which they perform, in so far as the data of science at present permit. Thus I collect on my way a number of ideas which arise directly from the study of moral facts, and when I come to pose the general question its solution is already prepared; the solution rests on concrete realities and the mind is thus bound to see it from the correct point of view."137

We have quoted at length to show how far from any attempt to theorise the moral Durkheim was but also to point to what we believe was his overriding interest - the establishment of a science of society. This meant submitting every aspect of the socially real to scientific scrutiny, even those aspects that had previously been thought inaccessible because of their metaphysical nature. Durkheim's great faith lay not in the moral realm but in the concrete and real which he believed was available and open to be understood by the human mind. He criticised both empiricism and rationalism and struggled, through social science to escape the limitations of both.

In his approach to social facts, Durkheim returned to the pre-Kantian position of Descartes and from this position attempted to bridge the
empiricism/rationalism gap. For Kant, the mind of man, equipped with innate categories of understanding (rationalism) received and processed impressions of phenomena through the senses (empiricism). This put the mind outside society - God still had some power, as originator of the mind of man.

Durkheim believed that what was received through the senses related to the reality of the social world, the phenomenal was real. But unlike the empiricists, the sense impressions did not form the understanding directly. The minds of men were able to interpret perceptions through the concepts they had received from society. He develops this theme in *The Elementary Forms*, as it is in primitive societies that collective representations, concepts formed through corporate religious expression and shared by societal members, are at their strongest. Durkheim attempts to show that such collective representations act as categories to interpret sense experience. The categories are not innate but socially formed. The mind of man as well as his sensuous experience is related to the greater social whole.¹³⁸

He cannot be said to have been entirely successful. The Kantian categories are capacities for understanding - "pure concepts" or conceptual forms. Durkheim's "categories" are not of the nature of capacities but they do point to the social formation of much of what we perceive as real.

Durkheim's approach to morality is generally relativistic but his approach to truth is certainly not relativist. His lectures on pragmatism deplore its tendency to destroy the "obligatory and necessary character" of truth.¹³⁹ Yet he honoured the attempt to bridge the "epistemological abyss" between reality and the mind, "to connect thought with existence, to connect thought with life"¹⁴⁰ which he saw as the fundamental idea of pragmatism. He believes that sociology has managed to bridge this gap without subjectivism and without hard-line relativism. For although truth,
reason and morality are understood as the results of human history, the relationship is between the physical environment on the one hand and man on the other and the physical environment presents a "relative fixity".141

Behind Durkheim's search for an epistemological solution to the empiricist/rationalist problem was his own desire to understand man as a creative individual. The empiricists' reality is composed of sensory things, with thought doing nothing but translating sensations from the external world while the rationalists' reality is "an organized system of ideas which exist by themselves and which the mind must reproduce."142 Even Kant's moral law, which appears to open up the intelligible world is characterised by fixity and impersonality. "In one sense we discover the moral law within ourselves, but we do not invent it - we only find it. It is not we who have made it, nor is it our own mind that has given birth to it. It is, therefore, a reality that is outside ourselves, one that is imposed on us."143

So for the immutable categories of understanding and the transcendental moral law, both beyond man and totally inaccessible, Durkheim has substituted society itself, source of concepts and ideals, which although it stands in a "social" relationship to man, is not only essentially a human product but allows the individual the chance to express himself and even to effect change. By making the ideal a product of the social, Durkheim can now conceive of three ways in which individuals can contribute to moral change. Firstly as the man who, like Socrates, is "ahead of his time while at the same time expressing its spirit",144 the functional rebel; secondly, through a group of individual minds which "enter into close relation with and work upon each other" and produce new sentiments, typified by movements such as the Reformation and the Renaissance;145 and thirdly through the sociological study of values and ideals, which can be explained, thus "giving man a greater control" of them.146
Durkheim believed fervently that society was evolving and that this change would involve moral change which would be in the nature of an advance. "For by showing that this moral order came into being at a particular time under particular circumstances, history justifies us in believing that the day may eventually come when it will give way to a different moral order based on different ethical principles. Amongst all the advances accomplished in the past, there is scarcely one to which this *ne plus ultra* argument has not been raised in opposition; and yet historically evolution has always played havoc with the restrictions which men have sought to impose on it." Evolution allows the individual the necessary chance to influence history. But it must be noted that not only does Durkheim willingly accept changing ethical principles but he sees evolution as desirable in itself not because it moves towards any desirable moral goal.

Durkheim had shown in the *Division of Labour* how advanced societies needed individual ambition and initiative and he pointed out in the *Rules* how this individuality, though necessary for progress would also produce criminals. In *Suicide* he investigates the ways in which the individual can come adrift from social control. In his later works he tries to understand the origin and nature of the obligatory power of the ideal in terms of the social.

If we look at Durkheim's developing treatment of the individual and his relationship to society, of his need for individuality and yet for bounds and limits and if we see this in the context of his desire to put reality on an epistemological foundation which will allow it to be accessible to investigation and open to change, we find a consistency which is lacking in his treatment of "morality". By seeing Durkheim's individualist as the key to advanced society, his approach to education appears less oppressive. If the individual is not to come adrift in society, he will need to be thoroughly socialised, not to lose his
Individuality but to give it direction and control - the child needs discipline to help him reach his goal. But he also must be given a version of his own human potential.

Aron concludes his essay on Durkheim with statements that give weight to the above view. "Durkheim wants to stabilize a society whose highest principle is respect for the human person and fulfilment of personal autonomy. . . . A sociologist justifying rationalist individualism but also preaching respect for collective norms - such, it seems to me, is Durkheim." 148

We would accept Aron's conclusions as true in fact, but would emphasise that Durkheim's greatness as a sociologist went beyond these immediate concerns, and perhaps the areas where he was conscious of little success will prove to be relevant to morality in the future. 149 Yet we look in vain for a consistent theory of the moral, or for that matter for a conceptually coherent approach to morality. Durkheim has many, often contradictory approaches to the moral, none of which touches upon the essential nature of morality nor upon the most basic of all moral matters - the principle of justice. This is not surprising as the study of the moral is always peripheral to his main concerns, the development of a science of society which will make all aspects of social reality accessible to the sociologist and allow a socially related study of the individual.

What is surprising is that so many sociologists have seen in Durkheim's work a ready-made sociology of morality and even a ready-made sociology of moral education.

Durkheimian Sociology and the Functional Moral

One of the greatest drawbacks for the future of Durkheimian sociological theory was that only some of Durkheim's works had been
translated into English at a time when American sociologists were looking for a general social theory. For many of his works remained untranslated until the 1960's or later, thus giving a lop-sided view of his concerns. Durkheim's work had been known to English-speaking anthropologists since the publication of *The Elementary Forms* in 1915 and it was the anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown who credited Durkheim with being the founder of structural functionalism, which was to be made known to sociologists through the work of Talcott Parsons. Unfortunately, Parsons' Durkheimian knowledge was mainly confined to *The Division of Labour* and *The Rules*. He read into Durkheim's idea of socialization Freudian insights that were unknown to Durkheim and built up theory that was a fusion of aspects of Weber and Pareto as well as of Durkheim. The leading example of the latter is his great theoretical work *The Structure of Social Action* which became the standard text for functional sociology.

Parsonian functionalism starts with the concept of the generalised social system. Within the social system various social phenomena are functionally related. Moral phenomena, such as norms, are likewise seen in terms of their function in maintaining social stability, an "inherent need of every stable social system" being the "set of norms governing relations of superiority and inferiority." Discussing the role of norms in social stratification, Parsons writes:

As with all other major structural elements of the social system, the norms governing its stratification tend to become institutionalized; that is, moral sentiments crystallize about them and the whole system of motivational elements (including both disinterested and self-interested components) tends to be structured in conformity to them. There is a system of sanctions, both formal and informal in support; so that deviant tendencies are met with varying degrees and kinds of disapproval, withdrawal of co-operation, and positive infliction of punishment. Conversely, there are rewards for conformity and institutionalized achievements.

From this example of Parsonian functionalism it can be noted that
some of Durkheim's major concerns have been lost. Durkheim's society was capable of change and his social individual had a dynamic part to play in social change; Parsons' socially individual is totally socialised. Moreover there is no mention in functionalism of the symbolic aspects of societal representations and thus nothing out of which a sociology of knowledge can be developed.

Functionalism was the dominant sociological perspective from which studies in education developed. As its social perspective is essentially Durkheimian, we must look to functionalism in order to see how Durkheim's understanding of the moral has influenced work in the realm of education. There are two main strands in functionalist sociology of education as it approaches the moral. The first stresses education as connected with society as a whole - especially the maintenance of social order and social equilibrium. The second concentrates on values as related to the educational task and ultimately to the stability of society.

In Parsons' now classic paper, "The School Class as a Social System: Some of its functions in American Society" we have a typical example of the "social whole" strand. Here Parsons analyses the elementary and secondary school class as a social system and relates its practices to its primary function in society as an agent of socialisation and allocation. Through socialisation the school class inculcates in its pupils both the commitments and capacities for successful performance of their future adult roles. Its task of allocation is to separate out and suitably train the "human resources" for work within the role-structure of adult society and thus to maintain a stable society.

The emphasis on values emerged from the Parsons theory of social action, where in the pragmatic tradition values were seen as directly expressed through action. The theory of values and "value-orientation" was developed by Kluckholm and became related to education in terms of
value inculcation being part of the school's socialising function and of the relationship of familial values to educational achievement. 156 The role of socialisation is typically described as follows: "From the standpoint of the layer society, one of the objectives of the socialisation process is to produce individuals who will not only conform to the socially prescribed rules of conduct but will, as members of society, accept them as their own values."157

The main criticism of the structural functionalist approach came from sociologists who saw functionalism as being interested in the social order to the extent that man was being described as lacking all autonomy, a totally determined unit in the social whole. Wrong in the U.S. asserted that this model makes man a thoroughly socialised being, a fact which is quite untrue to social reality. 158 Dawe 159 in Britain argued more strongly for a change of theoretical basis that allowed sociology to describe man as the social actor whose individual actions were meaningful and socially creative. It could be said that such criticisms were putting back some of Durkheim's original insight into the Durkheimian distillation that was structural functionalism. But no voices were raised in protest at the way functionalism conceptualised the moral and it became the basis of work on moral development and moral education.

Parsonian functionalism sees morality totally in relation to the well-being of the social whole. There is no moral law which transcends the social - no ultimate justice, no stress on means as being as morally relevant as ends. There is not even rule utility. The end is social cohesion and stability. We have here a double degeneration of Durkheim's mature ethically relativist position. In Durkheim's society, a state of change existed, society was evolving towards something better, the nature of which was never conceptualised but which would allow some chance for individuals to realise their potential. Then, whilst Durkheim's
societal norms and values were external to the individual they had been socially created by individual humans. Parsons' society has no beginning nor future - it is. It has its own goals but these are beyond both moral judgement and individual challenge. Individual autonomy whilst a contradictory concept for Durkheim, at least exists. It has no place in Parsonian functionalism.

It is thus unfortunate that an English sociologist with a high reputation in the field of education should have chosen Parsons' paper, "The School Class as a Social System" on which to base his contribution to Niblett's influential work on moral education. Halsey's "Sociology of Moral Education" sees the American educational system as favouring equality of opportunity and thus as a challenge to the British system. But by contextualising his discussion within structural functionalism, he limited his moral parameter to that single good, equality. The way the school system is organised to allow the goal to be pursued or the process of the schooling itself is beyond his critique. Needless to say the very social "ideal" of equality and its possible oppressive function are completely beyond the scope of such analysis.

Research into the value aspect of functionalism is not immune from the above limitations. By focussing on the beliefs of individuals, such work may appear to be connected with individual identity which would allow some discussion of autonomy to be introduced. But within the functionalist perspective, individual values are seen as relating to the well-being of the whole. In practice, an even greater problem is that by assuming social stability to be an ultimate desirable and by accepting Parsons' conclusion that the schools' main function is to socialise and allocate manpower for the social system, it follows that the major school value associated with the process of selection and allocation, the achievement ideal is also desirable.

This conflation of the moral and the social is a feature of Sugarman's
work. An example is his educational study entitled: "Social class and values as related to achievement and conduct in school." This, and other works by Sugarman, more directly on the topic of moral education are characterised by the fact that they fail to make any critique of the moral in society. There may be some moral content but it is at the individual level, an elucidation of Wilson's "morally educated person" and entirely unrelated to society. In fact we could say that Sugarman's work ran into difficulties once it introduced Wilson's philosophical analysis. There is a distinct contradiction that arises in The School and Moral Development between the juxtaposing of Wilson's morally educated individual and the reiterated Parsonian assertion that, in the school, children learn "universalism, individualism, the achievement or 'mastery' orientation and functional specificity or narrow relationships" to a higher degree than they would by remaining within the family. Whilst Wilson's attributes are related to the traditional philosophical moral goods of fairness, respect, concern and truth, the Parsonian goods are linked to the existing society with all its injustices. There is no conceptual structure, however, with which Sugarman could assess these latter goods and perceive moral defects in the school system or even note the contradiction which exists between individual achievement orientation and concern for others. It is suggested that such contradictions led to the natural death of functionalist studies of the sociology of moral education.

Some work of elucidating values goes on: attempts to measure the values of adolescents in particular being still viable. But these studies, which typically compare adolescent values with adult values (specifically or in general) neither make any theoretically based moral judgements on the nature of the values nor do they seek to relate them to the structure or function of society.
education and morality is the work connecting anomie and deviance. Whilst this work grew out of functionalism it became theoretically isolated and the concept of anomie was applied to various theories of deviance and even entered the vocabulary of everyday life. Merton's concept of anomie was different from Durkheim's in that whereas Durkheim's anomic individual suffered from too little normative regulation, Merton's suffered from an inappropriate internal value system. The main difference lay in the fact that Merton's individual was described in terms of socialisation being understood as the internalisation of norms and values where Durkheim did not see socialisation in psychological terms. Moreover Merton's individual was the product of a society typified by an open, achievement-oriented education system. He had internalised the American dream of money and status, but his position in life through social circumstance or lack of ability failed to live up to his expectations. So, frustrated, he tries to overcome the tension between the internal and external disjunction. One solution is to turn to crime.

Anomie was discussed as a cause of juvenile delinquency, and when it failed to explain the facts was added to other deviance theories such as Sutherland's differential association theory. As an explanatory theory it was not successful but as a moral comment on society Merton's anomie may have made a contribution. However much the concept differed from Durkheim's own it did allow the individual to be seen as more than a passive unit of society and thus as potentially in conflict with society. This may have helped create awareness amongst sociologists that structural functionalism did not allow an important aspect of the social reality to emerge, the existence of the individual in conflict with society and perhaps even to show something of the injustice of an educational system that promises equality and future prosperity for all as possible then denies their realisation. But in itself anomie was powerless to critique injustice.
There is one aspect of Durkheim's work which has so far not been put to use in explicating the moral in education but which could possibly be developed as an adjunct to a sociological approach to morality. This is the Durkheimian insight into symbolic expression and its relation to the realm of the ideal. Where this aspect of Durkheimian theory is released from the context of a consensual society it takes on a new meaning. Holzner, for example, discusses ideology in Durkheimian terms with phenomenological and Marxist overtones: "By 'ideology' we mean a limited aspect of the interpretive order of faiths and beliefs, namely, those reality constructs and values which serve to legitimate the claims for power and prestige and the activities of groups and their members. Ideologies are thus, legitimating symbolizations: that is, they enable a group or a person to justify their activities."168 In other words, Durkheim could possibly (in spite of his inability to cope with it in his lifetime) be able to help discussion of the differential sources of power in society, posthumously.

Symbolic power is an important strand in the world of Pierre Bourdieu. He sees "symbolic systems" (art, religion and language) as amenable to structural analysis.169 Symbolic systems can be instruments of domination through which the dominant culture contributes to the real integration of the dominant class. But any critique of symbolic power would then be in Marxist terms. Durkheim was not only unable to make the sources of power explicit in society but would have been totally unable to comment on the moral nature of domination. The most he could say, in moral language, was that if the needs of society (not in terms of its consensus but of its peaceful evolution) were being met by means of symbolic violence, then this was desirable.

So Durkheim's concepts of morality have not proved fruitful for the critique of the moral within the sociology of education nor for the sociologist to contribute to the study of moral education. Whilst some of
the problem lies with the thoroughly amoral theory of structural functionalism, at base the ultimate responsibility rests with Durkheim himself and the inconsistency and theoretical inadequacy of his elucidation of morality.

WEBER

Weber and the Realm of Value

Unlike Durkheim, Weber believed that ethics, "the kingdom of absolute value" was not of this world. The realms of fact and value must be ever kept apart. The social scientist must analyse and teach facts - value-judgements have no place in the lecture hall and values, themselves, are not open to empirical investigation. The only evaluations that the teacher of a social science is justified in giving are those which are relevant to the discipline itself, the "inherent norms" of every "professional task". He must limit himself to the scientifically demonstrable, facts.

Weber's separation of fact and value was essentially, a Kantian position and in one sense it typifies the separation of the nomothetic and ideographic traditions of German scholarship. But it also reflected the practical and epistemological tensions that Weber perpetually experienced. It can be suggested that much of his theoretical sociology reflects his attempt to resolve these tensions.

The practical tensions can be described at the level of Weber's personal sense of vocation and also in terms of the professional academic situation at the time. Giddens has pointed out that throughout his life, Weber was drawn towards two conflicting vocational expressions; the "passive disciplined life of the scholar" and the "active and practical vocation of the politician". The fact/value dichotomy reflects his desire to draw a clear-cut distinction between these competing inspirations - the one typified by "factual or scientific knowledge" and the other by "normative or value judgements". Gouldner has suggested that among the "motives
originally inducing" Weber to formulate the concept of value-free sociology was his desire to maintain both the cohesion and autonomy of the university, especially in the realm of the newer social science disciplines. University lecturers who introduced value-laden arguments into their lectures attracted more students than colleagues who limited themselves to fact. This situation caused an unprofessional element of competition and was likely to influence university authorities in their selection of staff. Moreover value-laden argument masked the facts and confused the students, weakening their "taste for sober empirical analysis", as Weber points out in his discussion of the situation. But, above all, polemic in the social sciences was by nature political and Weber had seen many excellent academics removed from or denied university positions because of their unacceptable political views. And if political values were denied then all values should be banned from the lecture hall. As Weber put it: "In view of the fact that certain value-questions which are of decisive political significance are permanently banned from university discussion, it seems to me to be only in accord with the dignity of a representative of science to be silent as well about such value-problems as he is allowed to treat.

At the epistemological level the situation is more complex as Weber inherited two conflicting approaches to knowledge, the ideographic and the nomothetic, the former as an historian and the latter through his study of the science of economics. Interwoven with this tension, which he sought to resolve in his sociological methodology was the European traditional belief in the reality of the inner realm, exemplified by Christian faith and the realm of technology and science exemplified by the capitalistic notion of progress. These aspects of reality were related in his work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* but also appear at every stage of his writings as the irrational and the rational elements of life. Only the material world of progress is rational, the inner level
of personal faith and conviction is irrational.

Like Kant, Weber accepted the realm of the moral to be that of inner reality. It was not accessible to theoretical knowledge; it could not be scientifically evaluated. But this does not mean that the moral is powerless or unimportant. Its power lies in its motivational force. Whilst the ancient Christian systems of beliefs and ideals tended to be reactionary, Weber saw in Calvinistic religion a force for radical progress. Other forms of Christianity had stressed the view that "faithful work... is something highly pleasing to God", but the Calvinistic forms added the radical element of a "calling". "Not only did [Protestant asceticism] powerfully add a whole new depth to the view, it also created for that ideal something which was absolutely essential if it was to be effective, namely a psychological stimulus in the form of the conception of such work as a calling, as the most excellent, indeed often in the end the only, means of becoming sure of one's state of grace."177

Although powerful, the inner ideal is seen as irrational, its motivational force not springing from a knowledge of God's will or purpose, as typified by the theology of Aquinas, but from the very ignorance of God's will and mind. God's ways are past finding out. One's motivation is connected, not with knowledge but with irrational "psychological" needs, the need to prove to oneself and others that one belongs to God's elect.

But although irrational, the realm of the moral is important, ultimately more so than science itself. Weber was concerned about the increasing industrialisation of society and the relentless development of capitalism. He saw capitalism as a unique configuration which was inexorably bound up with progress. But with progress came an increasing bureaucracy and an increase in formal rationality which usurped morality's traditional role. The moral could not compete openly with rational progress. It must keep to its own domain, the realm of intention and motive, the domain of the individual conscience. The
science of economics must travel the path of rationality. Weber states this clearly in his essay "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" which was written to present and defend his editorial policy with its "insistence on the rigorous distinction between empirical knowledge and value-judgments":

It is true that we regard as objectively valuable those innermost elements of the "personality", those highest and most ultimate value-judgments which determine our conduct and give meaning and significance to our life. . . . Certainly, the dignity of the "personality" lies in the fact that for it there exist values about which it organizes its life; - even if these values are in certain cases concentrated exclusively within the sphere of the person's "individuality" then "self-realization" in those interests for which it claims validity as values, is the idea with respect to which its whole existence is oriented. Only on the assumption of belief in the validity of values is the attempt to espouse value-judgments meaningful. However to judge the validity of such values is a matter of faith. It may perhaps be a task for the speculative interpretation of life and the universe in quest of their meaning. But it certainly does not fall within the province of an empirical science in the sense in which it is to be practiced here. 178

Weber, thus makes it clear that he is not undervaluing the realm of value. But value is not of the same nature as empirical reality. It cannot be rationally evaluated. One can judge a scientific fact by putting it to the test against empirical reality. Judgements of value are tried out in terms of faith, with regard to one's personal meanings. To confuse scientific understanding with personal value is to underrate both aspects of life.

Like Comte, Weber sees the progress of rationality as typified by the movement from religion to science. But this science is not the prerogative of the theoretical scientist it is embedded in the being and practice of capitalism. Capitalism is the incorporation of technical reason and progress in the capitalist enterprise is marked by a continuous rationalisation of all aspects of life. Marcuse has
listed three elements that are characteristic of Weber's concept of reason. Firstly there is the "progressive mathematization of experience and knowledge" which starting from the natural sciences extends to "other sciences and to the 'conduct of life' itself". Secondly there is stress on the necessity of rational experiments and rational proofs in the organization of both science and life. Thirdly there is the development of "a universal technically trained organization of officials" that Weber saw as becoming the "absolutely inescapable condition" of the modern world.179

It is in this third aspect of rational progress that Weber experienced profound disquiet. Whilst bureaucracy was an inevitable outcome of technical rationality he saw it as posing a serious threat to democracy, in itself a rational form of government. The only way he saw to combat the development of bureaucratic despotism with its possible outcome in the "socialism of the future"180 was to maintain a form of democracy under charismatic leadership. Whilst the bureaucratic political official is outside the realm of value judgement, the morality appropriate to his office being that of conscientious obedience to his superiors,181 the charismatic leader exercises personal responsibility and thus must engage in making moral judgements. But he does this as an individual, democratically elected to his office, who is now in a position to turn to both the voters and the bureaucratic party machinery and say "Now shut up and do what I say."182 Charismatic leadership was thus, by means of its partially autonomous nature, a morally evaluating activity. So, at the same time it was an irrational form of leadership, militating against rational progress.

The tension between democracy and bureaucracy, and the dilemma of the only alternative to rational despotism being a form of leadership which is irrational, led Weber to his study of legitimate authority. If a "state"
is, by definition, a community in which "the administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force" within its given territory it follows that for the state to exist its members must obey the authority of those in power. Weber asks the questions: "When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest?" He suggests that there are three inner justifications for domination, and hence three "legitimations of domination". His three types of legitimation are traditional authority, as exercised by "the patriarch and the patrimonial prince of yore", charismatic authority, as exercised by the prophet or the elected war lord or political party leader and "domination by virtue of 'legality'." Only the legal form of authority is rational, its 'legality' being attributed by Weber to "the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' based on rationally created rules." Whilst the belief in the legality of an order was traditionally established by voluntary agreement, Weber sees the modern rational form as being based on the formal correctness of rules "which have been imposed by accepted procedure" whilst its functioning within a social group will be dependent on the willingness of individuals with deviant wishes to give way to the majority.

In his classification of legitimate authority Weber has continued to keep value and fact separate. Traditional and charismatic authority are value laden personal forms, where obedience is owed to the person of a chief or political leader. The leader exercises personal responsibility and the obeying individual exercises personal trust. The bond is a moral one, but it is a private irrational morality, the inaccessible Weberian morality of the individual conscience. Whether such leadership is benevolent or oppressive is the personal concern of the individual
leader - the individuals under authority are morally impotent. Under the modern irrational form, the only way those under authority can express moral disapproval is by voting out or overthrowing the charismatic leader.

On the other hand, the rational form of authority is expressed in morally neutral terms. Legitimacy is based on rules, the "correctness" of which is a function of the procedure of their formation and implementation. There is no room for the moral at any level here. This model of "legitimate" domination postulates an amoral bureaucracy ordering a passive population, whose (private) morality is inappropriate to evaluate or effect change in official policy. Within the Weberian framework of legitimation it is impossible for the citizen or the social scientist to assess the justice of a regime. Weber believed that as society became increasingly rational at the technological level so it would become rational at the level of government. He considered that morality only belonged to less developed political forms. Fully rational government would have no conceptual phase for the moral. Under his approach to rationally legitimate authority, the possibility of domination did not arise. Domination was the situation that obtained under charismatic authority. While Weber continued to assert that individuals had moral motivation he allowed the rational "body politic" to have none. According to his concept of legitimation, authority was legitimate in terms of the acceptance of its legal status. There is no room for negotiation, no room for discussion. Weber's concept of legitimate authority is an illustration of a social concept, which because it is designed to be free of value can serve to condone domination. Because it cannot conceptualise domination within its framework, Weber's rational authority can actually legitimate domination. To Weber progress in rationality is progress towards truth. He cannot, however, conceive of truth and justice progressing together.
Weber's methodology for the study of sociology is an attempt to resolve the tensions between fact and value inherent in cultural investigation. If sociology were indeed a science one would need to investigate causes, and because Weber believed that social life depended on regularities of human conduct he saw this as logically possible. But social life is a cultural phenomenon and thus it not only contains value knowledge but brings up the problem of evaluating the values - as the values which are considered culturally significant "alone are objects of causal explanation." The ideographic, historical method is inadequate because it deals only with describing individual facts and their causes and not with causal interrelationships. But the nomological method of the natural sciences, which seeks the knowledge of recurrent causal sequences is meaningless when applied to cultural phenomena. This, according to Weber, is partly so because knowledge of social laws only aids knowledge of social reality and is not to be equated with moral knowledge and especially "because knowledge of cultural events is inconceivable except on the basis of the significance which the concrete constellations of reality have for us in certain individual concrete situations".

Weber's solution to the problem of the scientific investigation of the causal relationships of the cultural (and thus subjective and moral) realm was firstly to use the operation of Verstehen. This method sought to understand individual human action by applying to it a generalisation based on personal experience. Weber was never completely clear about either the concept or its application and sociologists have interpreted it variously. Verstehen gains its historical dimension by being used in association with Weber's "ideal-type". The ideal-type is neither a description of reality nor a hypothesis, although it aids in the construction of hypotheses. It is an "analytical construct" formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, . . . concrete individual phenomena."\textsuperscript{191} Ideal-types are to be used as a means to understanding concrete cultural phenomena "in their interdependence, their causal conditions and their significance."\textsuperscript{192} But ideal-types are also a means of maintaining the dichotomy between fact and value, as we saw above with the ideal-types of legitimate authority.

The ideal-type essential to sociological investigation is that of social action. Now, as we saw above, regularities of human conduct can only be explained if the subjective value meanings of individuals are considered, as all value is seen as lying at the level of individual personality. So the individual is the unit of sociological investigation. With perfect consistency, Weber places moral elements of human behaviour in the irrational classification of traditional and affective action. Rational action has two pure types, both defined in terms of means-ends relationship - \textit{zweckrational} in terms of rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends and \textit{wertrational} in terms of rational orientation to an absolute value. Weber describes the latter as "involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behaviour, entirely for its own sake"\textsuperscript{193} and some sociologists have seen this as indicating the presence of the moral. But there is no room here for moral choice or evaluation. The action is only typed as rational because the moral objectives or ends are "given". As Giddens points out: "Weber wholly rejects the conception that the sphere of the 'rational' can extend to the evaluation of competing ethical standards. What he often refers to as the 'ethical irrationality of the world' is fundamental to his epistemology. Statements of fact, and judgments of value, are separated by an absolute logical gulf: there is no way in which scientific rationalism can provide a validation of one ethical ideal compared to another."\textsuperscript{194}
But whilst fact and value are to be separated as aspects of objective empirical knowledge and subjective individual faith, respectively, Weber still believes that he has not finished with value.

The belief which we all have in some form or other, in the meta-empirical validity of ultimate and final values, in which the meaning of our existence is rooted, is not incompatible with the incessant changefulness of the concrete viewpoint, from which empirical reality gets its significance. Both these views, are, on the contrary in harmony with each other. Life with its irrational reality and its store of possible meanings is inexhaustible. The concrete form in which value-relevance occurs remains perpetually in flux, ever subject to change in the dimly seen future of human culture. 195

Weber makes one or two sorties in an attempt to shed a little more light on value relevance. In his essay "Science as Vocation" 196 he poses Tolstoi's problem: "Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: 'What shall we do and how shall we live?'" 197 and points out the moral nature of the purpose of the individual scientific task. But above that, science's only connection with value is through its contribution to "clarity" in sorting out means from ends. It can thus force the individual "to give himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his conduct." Here the teacher of science "stands in the service of 'moral' forces; he fulfils the duty of bringing about self-clarification and a sense of responsibility." 198 This is indeed a moral purpose.

But Weber can say no more than this about the realm of value. It is impossible to bridge the epistemological gap which he has, in effect, through his methodology, widened into a yawning chasm. Value cannot be rationally assessed: one cannot critique value. So Weber returns value to where he found it, in the conscience of the individual, with the vain hope that the world will meet the "demands of the day" if each individual "finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibers of his very life." 199
Weber, Sociology and the Value-Free Tradition

Weberian sociology entered Anglo-American social theory via Talcott Parsons, first through his translations and secondly through his own writings which incorporated and interpreted Weberian theoretical concepts and methodology. Since the appearance of *The Structure of Social Action* in 1937 Weberian theory has been deeply embedded in American sociology, firstly in the context of Parsons' structural-functionalist perspective and then breaking free and fusing with Meadian insights in interactional studies. But whether in the Durkheimian framework or in Meadian partnership Weberian theory kept its emphasis on value freedom.

The logical development of value-freedom within Parsonian theory is shown in Parsons' later work on power where power is seen as a "circulating medium" in the same sense as money. Power is defined as "generalised capacity to serve the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals." The collective goals rest upon the common value-system which according to Parsons is characterized by the primacy of values of "instrumental activism" and the main collective goal is the furtherance of economic productivity. Giddens points out that power "becomes a facility for the achievement of collective goals through the 'agreement' of the members of a society to legitimize leadership positions - and to give those in such positions a mandate to develop policies and implement decisions in the furtherance of the goals of the system." The sole right of the member of society is to vote in an election to put a certain government in power.

Power is derived from authority and authority is the institutionalized legitimation which underlies power. Authority is defined as "the institutionalization of the rights of 'leaders' to expect support from the members of the collectivity." Giddens adds: "By speaking of
'binding obligations', Parsons deliberately brings legitimation into the very definition of power, so that, for him, there is no such thing as illegitimate power." Talcott Parsons' discussion on power has been used to illustrate how Weber's value-free definition of legitimate authority has no safeguards from reduction to the formula - "all authority is legitimate if it generates power," which can further be reduced to the adage "all might is right".

Until the end of the 1950's, value-free sociology reigned supreme, over both the theoretically based work of the structural-functionalists and weakly theoretical survey-based sociology, with its scientific analyses of official statistics and statistical analysis of empirical data. But in 1961, the "myth" of value-free sociology was attacked by Alvin Gouldner with an uncompromising polemic. "Today," he wrote, "all the powers of sociology, from Parsons to Lundberg, have entered into a tacit alliance to bind us to the dogma that 'Thou shalt not commit a value judgment', especially as sociologists. Where is the introductory textbook, where the lecture course on principles, that does not affirm or imply this rule?" He points out that value-free sociology has this latent meaning: "Thou shalt not commit a critical or negative value judgment - especially of one's own society" and that sociologists who refrain from social criticism give the worthy appearance of upholders of professionalism. He commends sociologists of the past, forthright in their social criticism, and looks with interest to the expression of resistance to value-free "professional" sociology in the work of ex-Chicagoans such as Howard Becker and Irving Goffman who speak on behalf of the underworld. He calls for a re-awakening of sociology's social conscience, to become, like Weber, aware of values as ends, of science as only supplying the means. His cry, in effect, is to return to the true Weber with his unresolved tension and his vision of ultimate meaning.
Six years later, however, Gouldner finds himself attempting to stem the tide of value-slanted sociological research. His particular target is Becker and those working in the field of social deviance. In "Whose side are we on?" Becker had asserted that it was impossible for research to be uncontaminated by personal and political sympathies using the notion of a "hierarchy of credibility" to explain how accusations of bias are more common if one gives an account from a subordinate viewpoint.

Gouldner realises the complex web of repercussions that can result from a partisan sociology and calls sociologists not to social criticism but to "personal authenticity" which must involve a deep knowledge of the self.

Again the profession is reminded of the Weberian vision: "It is to values, not to factions, that sociologists must give their basic commitment."

In the period between these two papers by Gouldner, sociologists working in the field of deviance, in particular symbolic interactionists, had become very aware of value as a hidden factor in nearly every aspect of their work. They had begun to question the reliability of official records and statistics and see the inbuilt bias in the ways behaviour is recorded and classified. Labelling theorists had become aware of the effect the evaluations of young people's behaviour and scholastic performance can have on their future careers, and so labelling theory found its way into the everyday world of the sociology of education.

Yet although symbolic interaction can show the affect of an evaluation on an individual child or group and can by implication point to the undesirable nature of a particular value judgement in an educational situation, it can do so only in terms of the demonstrated gap between the situation and a recognisable educational aim. It has no standard with which to assess value in a practical situation. It can make no moral judgements. Eggleston sums up both the possibilities and the limitations of an interactional approach to the sociology of education:
In these approaches to the study of the school we can see with far greater clarity the ways in which individual teachers and students' definitions of the situation help to determine its social arrangements; how perceptions of achievement cannot only define achievement, but also identify those who achieve; how expectations about schooling can determine the nature and evaluation of schools.\textsuperscript{213}

Classroom interactional studies that aim at objectivity are at their most useful when helping teachers gain insights into social processes that necessarily accompany group learning and also could be used in an evaluation of the process of schooling according to certain specified moral criteria. But just as Parsons' treatment of the Weberian "value-free" concept of legitimate authority led to his theoretical legitimation of oppression, so the use of the concept of legitimation in a symbolic interactional context can undervalue such desirables as academic discipline and define as trivial the notion of legitimate authority in the classroom.

An example of such a study is Carl Werthman's "Delinquents in schools: a test for the legitimacy of authority".\textsuperscript{214} The concept of the legitimation of authority as presented here is that of the subjective acceptance of the authority of an individual teacher by gang-member students. Authority is seen as providing the necessary stable basis for interaction between teacher and students. Gang members are characterised by their refusal to accept authority as legitimate unless the manner in which it is exercised complies with their preconceptions of what is "suitable".\textsuperscript{215} Whilst some features of the criteria for "suitability" are discussed, the criteria themselves will be arbitrary as each gang is different owing to the variation of attitudes of individual members. Whether or not the teacher's authority is accepted as legitimate by the students depends not only on their shifting criteria but on his own personality and the way he interprets their behaviour. His reaction to the students' challenge of his authority in his task of assessing their work will lead to their acceptance or rejection of his authority exercised in maintaining discipline.
A purely arbitrary and subjective treatment of legitimation and authority such as this, not only trivialises the concepts that rightly belong to the wider context of discussions of "the just society" but give sociologists a false moral glow that in some way they are contributing to fairness and understanding. It is more likely that they are contributing to the fear of teachers to exercise any authority over their pupils to the spread of the belief that all must be freely negotiated in the classroom.

When phenomenological perspectives are added to those of symbolic interaction we find that value is now inextricably woven into the very fabric of the world of meanings, intersubjectively constructed by the social actors. Dawe\textsuperscript{216} asserts that Weber has been misunderstood. Weber's sociology is "demonstrably rooted in and permeated by his moral vision." There is a continuity between his work on meaning and social phenomenology's "attempt to recover for sociology the sensitivity to meaning."\textsuperscript{217} Now, because Weber's "ethical world is that of autonomous individual choice from an infinity of possible values", a "bleak world where moral choice faces morally isolated individuals", it follows that each individual will need to "impose [his] own meaning upon an otherwise meaningless world."\textsuperscript{218}

In phenomenological terms, Weber's sociology of domination becomes a struggle to impose meanings, for at its heart is legitimation and legitimacy is seen as "the acceptance by one group, on whatever basis, of a meaning imposed on them by another group."\textsuperscript{219} In fact, for Dawe, "the sociology is entailed by the ethic".\textsuperscript{220} And the sociologist will need not only to be aware of this but of his own values, for "he, too, must impose meaning and, therefore, negate other meanings."\textsuperscript{221} Dawe stresses that if one is to convey the meaning and value in which social relationships are rooted, one must use the language of meaning and value. In fact we must "allow value to surface, through our terminology, at every stage of our work."\textsuperscript{222} The real substance of Weber's doctrine of ethical
neutrality thus becomes "an injunction to social science not to retreat from value, but to confront it, to reveal and proclaim it as value, and thereby to preserve the possibility of moral consciousness, moral choice and moral action."²²³

These extracts from Dawe show a confusion of "meaning" with "value". Dawe uses the terms almost synonymously. Value, in Dawe's sense has lost all connection with the moral. Behind the irrational and individual value of Weber lay the Kantian moral law, the realm of ultimate reality. For Dawe both value and meaning are individual and relative, they do not connect with any universal reality. Meaning has no relationship with truth. Weber, however, did not confuse meaning with value - meaning or significance, is linked with culture, not ideals. It does relate to scientific endeavour. Value belongs to the private realm of personal understanding.

One searches in vain for an example of the methodology advocated by Dawe in its entirety. For, in practice, without a consensually accepted conceptual framework in which to evaluate the moral we would run into a tangle of objectivity and subjectivity. But one does find Dawes' general approach to value in some of the work of the "new" sociologists of education. In Keddie's study of classroom knowledge ²²⁴ for example, we have an account from the author's personal observation of how knowledge is defined and evaluated by teachers and pupils. Interwoven into the account are subjective assessments of interpersonal relationships, as shown here: "By inference, teachers feel that A stream pupils are more like themselves, at least in ways that count in school."²²⁵ But we also have objective conclusions drawn from these observations: "The school may be seen as maintaining the social order through the taken for granted categories of its superordinates who process pupils and knowledge in mutually confirming ways. The ability to maintain these categories as consensual, when there are among the clients in school conflicting definitions of the situation,
resides in the unequal distribution of power."²²⁶ Value here is both implicit and explicit. There is the negative connotation of "taken for granted" and disapproval in the concept of "processing", rather than educating. Judgement is explicit in the use of the term "unequal" where equality is the unwritten ideal. But when we get to the concept of power, Keddie herself suggests that we need to look outside the school. All in all, the study appears to pass judgement on school practices but the source of the problems or the nature of their remedy and to what extent light is thrown on the wider social situation is impossible to assess.

Bill Williamson comments on the tendency in recent work in the sociology of education to see the content of what the school transmits in terms of the power system in society. "The new sociologists in this respect are trapped by the same problems as their colleagues in political sociology. They cannot find the power centre! And like some of their colleagues in the field of modern deviance studies they solve the problem by examining the minutiae of interaction sequences in schools." He adds that people might assume that the message of the new sociology is "that teachers are not the nice people they are cracked up to be."²²⁷

It is clear that the attempt to bring value back into sociology has brought with it conceptual ambiguities and in many cases, through frustration, has led researchers to the study of trivia. Gerald Bernbaum comments on the difficulty of distinguishing between "science" and "ideology" in the new sociology of education. Whatever might have been the limitations of the "old" sociology of education, it "never totally conflated questions of truth and commitment, and it might even be that the tensions that have existed between the two have been the major means by which some educational hypocrisy and muddle have been cleared away."²²⁸

Yet whether sociologists prefer the old or the new, the fact stands out clearly - Weberian social theory is not built to assess the moral.
Weber's basic concept of the moral is such that it is inaccessible not only to him but to us. So the sociology of education is left with little to offer professional educators in the way of tools with which to evaluate value. And as David Hargreaves points out, in the face of the pressure groups which are "fighting for particular forms of structure, roles and content in education" it is the teacher who suffers. "The teacher has to choose where he stands, and be prepared to defend his chosen territory." The sociology of education can give him little help in making his choice.
Notes: Chapter 3


2. Ibid., p.vii.


4. Ibid., p.35.

5. Ibid., p.42.


8. Marx, K., *Capital*, Vol. I, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976, p.903. "During the very first storms of the revolution the French bourgeoisie dared to take away from the workers the right of association they had just acquired. By a decree of 14 June 1792 they declared that every combination of the workers was 'an assault on liberty and the declaration of the rights of man', punishable by a fine. . ."


11. Lichtheim, *From Marx to Hegel*, London, Orbach & Chambers, 1971, p.7. This problem was seen as urgent when it became increasingly apparent to the Young Hegelians that the Prussian State was far from being the embodiment of enlightenment that Hegel had envisaged.


15. Ibid., pp.122-123.
16 Ibid., p.127.
17 Marx, K., Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Bottomore, T. and Rubel, M., op.cit., p.185.
18 Marx, K., in D. McLellan, op.cit., p.129.
21 In Heller's terms: "ought is used to stimulate needs. Heller, ch. IV.
22 Marx, K., Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in Bottomore, T. and Rubel, M., op.cit., p.177.
25 We find, for example, this passage in Capital I (Penguin, p.799): "... all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become means of domination and exploitation of the producers; they distort the worker into a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, they destroy the actual content of his labour by turning it into a torment; they alienate from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an independent power; they deform the conditions under which he works, subject him during the labour process to a despotism more hateful for its meanness; they transform his life-time into working-time, and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the juggernaut of capital."
26 If his readers have not understood their exploitation in terms of Marx's analysis of value, they are here invited to respond at the affective level.
27 Lobkowicz, N., op.cit., chapter 25.
28 Or in Lobkowicz's words: "the ought really is an is, a potentiality of history which reaches its maturity quite independently of whether people have ideals or do not have them. Lobkowicz, op.cit., p.408.
29 Marx, K., "A Correspondence of 1843", op.cit., p.75.
31 Heller, A., op.cit., ch. I.

32 Kamenka, E., op.cit., p.196.


35 Collier, A., op.cit.


37 Ibid., pp.255-257.

38 Ibid., p.281.


"Marx regards the social movement as a natural process guided by laws which are not merely independent of the will, the consciousness, and the purposes of men, but, conversely, determine their will, their consciousness and their purpose. . ."


46 Kosik, K., op.cit., p.85.


63 Bottomore, T., *op.cit.*, p.73.


Bourdieu also acknowledges his debt to Durkheim. Certain of his insights into the moral can be found to be essentially Durkheimian. See his essays in Peristiany, J.G. (ed.) Honour and Shame, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965.


Willis, P., "The Class Significance of School Counter-Culture", op.cit., p.194.


Hirst, P.Q., op.cit.


84 In *The Division of Labor in Society*, New York, Free Press, 1964, p.44, Durkheim refers to "moralists" as follows:

"... we shall not resort to the ordinary method of moralists, who, when they wish to decide the moral value of any precept begin by putting forward a general formula of morality in order thus to confront the maxim in question with it. We know today what these summary generalizations are worth."

85 According to Hirst, P.Q., *Durkheim, Bernard and Epistemology*, op.cit., p.169, such an attempt "could not but be a failure", owing to the inadequacy of its epistemological foundations.

86 Durkheim does not define "social solidarity" but it is basic to much of his work. He first refers to it in *The Division of Labour in Society*, op.cit., p.37 (Preface to the first edition).


88 Ibid., pp.64-65.


90 In the discussion of this paper (Note 91) Durkheim replied:

"This characteristic, sacredness, can be expressed, I believe - and I feel bound to express it - in secular terms. That is, in fact, the distinctive mark of my attitude. Instead of joining with the utilitarians in misunderstanding and denying the religious element in morality, or hypostatizing with theology a transcendent Being, I feel it necessary to translate it in rational language without thereby destroying any of its peculiar characteristics. You will see that, from this point of view, I escape the objection you have made since, confronted with the sacred, of which I affirm the existence, my secular reason retains all its independence."


92 It is uncertain how sure Durkheim really was that he had verified this hypothesis. In "The Determination of Moral Facts", in *Sociology and Philosophy*, London, Cohen & West, 1953, p.56, he writes:

"All I can say is that up to the present I have not found in my researches a single moral fact that is not the product of particular social facts."


95 Ibid., p.94.


97 Ibid., p.237.

98 Ibid., pp.422-423.

99 Ibid., p.438.


"Our whole present-day moral system is dominated by the cult of the individual person."

102 Ibid., pp.328, 330.

103 Ibid., p.331.

104 Wallwork, E., op.cit., p.27.

105 These distinctions are summarised in Lukes, S., op.cit., p.158.


107 Wallwork, E., op.cit., p.46.


109 Ibid., p.67.

110 Ibid., p.71.

111 Ibid.


114 Ibid., p.112.


117 Ibid., p.338.

118 Ibid.

119 Durkheim still allows man to have his present experiential knowledge as a function of his individual nature. But the way he conceptualises his experience comes to him from society, together with his ideals and values.

120 Durkheim, E., Sociology and Philosophy, op.cit., p.72.

121 Ibid., p.73.


123 Ibid.

124 Giddens, A., Durkheim, op.cit., p.65.


126 Giddens, A., Durkheim, op. cit., p.54.

127 Wallwork, E., op.cit., points this out, p.175.


130 Durkheim, E., Education and Sociology, op.cit., p.89.

131 Durkheim, E., Moral Education, op.cit., p.220.


133 Wallwork, E., op.cit., p.140 defines autonomy as "willful exploration, spontaneous initiative, competent mastery and creative self-actualization", after Erikson. Durkheim wrote when psychology was less developed but should have been familiar with the writings of Pestalozzi and was familiar with those of Dewey. Both stressed experiment and creativity.

134 Durkheim, E., Sociology and Philosophy, op.cit., p.62.


137 Ibid., p.39.


139 Durkheim, E., "Pragmatism and Sociology", op.cit., p.306.

140 Ibid., p.406.

141 Ibid., p.432.

142 Ibid., p.400.

143 Ibid., p.401.


145 Ibid., p.91.

146 Ibid., p.96.


149 In a note to his essay "Individual and Collective Representations", *Sociology and Philosophy*, op.cit., p.32, Durkheim writes: "A special branch of sociology, which does not yet exist, should be devoted to research into the laws of collective ideation."


Ibid., p.195.


Ibid., p.5.


176. By asserting the power of the realm of ideas to influence progress, Weber was having a silent altercation with Marx.


   "It is the nature of officials of high moral standing to be poor politicians, and above all, in the political sense of the word, to be unresponsible politicians."

182. Giddens, in *Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber, op.cit.*, quotes from Marianne Weber's *Max Weber: ein Lebensbild* (Heidelberg 1950) pp.664-665, the following: "In a democracy, the people choose a leader whom they trust; the leader who is chosen then says, 'Now shut up and do what I say!'


188 Weber, M., "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy", op.cit., p.78.

189 Ibid., p.80.

190 Talcott Parsons discusses problems of Verstehen in The Structure of Social Action, op.cit., esp. chs. 2 and 19.


192 Ibid., p.92.


197 Ibid., p.143.

198 Ibid., p.152.

199 Ibid., p.156.


203 Ibid., p.260.


206 Gouldner, A.W., "The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology in the Welfare State" in For Sociology, op.cit.

133


209 Ibid., p.68.


212 e.g. Delamont, S., Interaction in the Classroom, London, Methuen, 1976.

213 Eggleston, J., Editors' introduction to Delamont, S., op.cit.


215 Ibid., p.40.


217 Ibid., p.38.

218 Ibid., p.42.

219 Ibid., p.44.

220 Ibid.

221 Ibid., p.45.

222 Ibid., p.55.

223 Ibid., p.62.


225 Ibid., p.134.

226 Ibid., p.156.


Chapter 4: The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas: Its significance for the sociology of morality

In the last chapter it was shown that whilst Marx, Durkheim and Weber had distinctly moral motivations in their approach to social theory and each to a different degree gave a critique of morality in society, none of them provided an adequate basis for a theoretically coherent sociology of morality. Durkheim, whilst making morality central to his concept of social change and pioneering the study of secular moral education, was essentially a relativist and failed to explicate the moral in universal terms. Marx provided an immanent critique of bourgeois "justice" as the legitimating ideology of labour exchange under capitalism and was motivated by a concern for liberty but his assumption that revolutionary praxis bore no relation to moral universals left no possibility of applying a critique to the means whereby the desired and predicted state of emancipation was to be brought about. Weber was aware of the intimate connection between religious and moral beliefs and social change, yet held the sphere of the moral to be essentially irrational and thus saw the task of modern social science as providing the theoretical foundations for the understanding of the process of the increasing rationalisation of society in value-free terms. Morality was a private and individual matter, important to the sociologist in the understanding of the motives of social actors and for the guidance of his own professional conduct - it was not to be confused with social fact nor incorporated into social theory. It was further shown that building on these foundations, sociologists either tended to ignore the moral, thus rendering injustice invisible or to approach the moral as a means to the end of understanding society in functionalist terms. It was functionalism's inability to deal with morality per se that led to
sociology's almost total retreat from the arena of moral education.

During the last few years, however, the moral insights of the founding fathers have been criticised and extended and the whole realm of the moral within the sociological has been re-opened through the writings of the critical theorists, in particular, of Jürgen Habermas.

Like the earlier critical theorists Habermas has taken Marxist theory as a starting point and used Weberian insights in his critique of Marx and of instrumental rationality and positivism. His interests, like theirs are wide. They include linguistic philosophy, sociology, psycho-analysis, social psychology and many aspects of political and philosophical thought. But he has broken with the pessimism of earlier members of the Frankfurt School and whilst sharing their debt to Hegel, Habermas has endeavoured to ground his critical theory empirically. Above all Habermas has sought to show the interrelatedness of theory and practice and has theorised the relationship of truth to justice. Whilst he agrees with Durkheim that values and norms are the essential factors of social integration he maintains that social norms bear a direct relation to truth. The moral realm is not, as Weber insists, irrational. Where norms express generalisable interests, they are indeed, rational. Here Habermas shows his greatest difference from Weber and Kant in his approach to the moral, shifting the emphasis from the individual reflecting moral consciousness to the community of subjects in dialogue. Habermas can be seen as having brought morality back into the political sphere. He has not only shown that the political has at base a moral dimension but has restored to morality its political dimension - from being an individual and irrational phenomenon it can be seen as a rational universal and communicative phenomenon, not abstract in the Marxist sense but concretised in human practical activity.

In order to give substance to the above claims, we shall first look
at the way Habermas has come to theorise the moral through his critique of rationality, in the context of his critical theorist heritage. We shall examine briefly his main deviations from traditional critical theory including his characterisation of advanced capitalism and his concern for the re-establishment of a dynamic relationship of theory to practice. And we shall consider the main aspects of his critiques of Marx, Weber and Kant in their approach to the moral. We shall then look at the development of his work on universal pragmatics (his theory of communicative competence) with special reference to its explication of the moral. We shall next review his work on social evolution, which incorporates both his communication theory and his crisis theory and where the moral sphere takes precedence over the technical-economic sphere. Finally, we shall note the place Habermas affords institutional systems in his various schema and attempt to evaluate what relevance the work of Habermas might have for the sociology of morality.

Habermas' Critical Theory: his critique of rationality

The founders of critical theory had sought to bring the basic contradictions of capitalist society to consciousness. They had emerged in the Germany of the early thirties when capitalism appeared on the verge of collapse and neither fascism nor communism provided acceptable alternatives. The paradigm for their critique was Marx's Critique of Political Economy but from the beginning they shifted the critical focus from the infra-structure to the superstructure. Essentially their critique was of "instrumental reason" or one-dimensional rationality which, with the emergence of organized capitalism was an increasing threat to emancipation. Critical theory according to Hockenheimer's earliest writings saw men as the producers of all their historical life forms. Truth was objective in the metaphysical sense of being inherent in the
essence of human reality as the "goal of a rational society" was "invested in every man". Critical theory was concerned to "accelerate a development which should lead to a society without injustice." But Critical theorists were philosophers and like Hegel, whose philosophy they reintroduced into Marxism they neither had direct political connections nor attempted to provide a theory to guide political practice. They maintained the belief that the proletariat, through enlightenment and realised class consciousness, would act, in due course, as the agent of revolution. In its later stages, when history had shown the proletariats' inability to meet the fascist challenge, critical theory retreated into the realm of pure theory and exclusive individualism, earning the criticism that their work was an example of "the substitution of theory as a surrogate for politics".

Emerging from this tradition, Jürgen Habermas maintained a concern for the continued effective critique of positivism and instrumental rationality and for the telos of emancipation but brought to his work an awareness of the overriding need to re-establish the connections of theory and practice. This required from the beginning an intention to give his research a firm empirical foundation but would also require re-examination of the assumptions of the critical theorists and a thorough critical examination of the writings of Marx himself. Habermas' early work continued in the philosophical vein of the founders of critical theory, extending several of Adorno's ideas, developed during the latter's critique of fascism. Adorno had rejected the Marxian idea of emancipation via a mass social movement brought to self-consciousness through a theoretical understanding of the nature of its exploitation under capital. He believed that the experience of oppression could only be formulated on an individual basis. Adorno accepted Marx's notion of philosophy's practical self-realisation, present in his early writings, together with the Marxian
concept of the reflective relation existing in history between social practice and consciousness. Habermas incorporated these ideas into his theory of historical self-consciousness and later was to develop Adorno's notion of dialectic "as the reconstruction of what is systematically suppressed in communicative power relations."^5

In his critique of positivism Habermas sought to radicalise epistemology as he endeavoured to show that all forms of knowledge, including the natural sciences were "intertwined with the objective self-formation process of the human species."^6 "A radical critique of knowledge" has, in Habermas' words, "to be social theory".^7 His analysis of knowledge as the empirical-analytic sciences, the historical-hermeneutic sciences and the critical social sciences with their technical, practical and emancipatory constituent interests, was the start of his long connection with language theory for it led to questions about truth and experience and their relationship which could only be answered by research into human communication.

Habermas believed that knowledge constituent interests preserved "the latent nexus between action and theoretical knowledge".^8 through the discursive verification of their truth claims. To follow this line of thought, he would need a coherent theory of communication.

From the beginning, Habermas sought to extend critical theory without depending on the action of a politicised proletariat. His characterisation of advanced capitalism gives the rationale for this approach. As capitalism advanced, two tendencies became dominant, an increase in state intervention and the interdependence of research and technology.^9 This led to the formation of "organized or state-regulated capitalism" which Habermas sees as being characterised by two types of phenomena: firstly by "the process of economic concentration - the rise of national and, subsequently, of multinational corporations - and to the
organization of markets for goods, capital, and labor" and secondly, by "the fact that the state intervenes in the market as functional gaps develop." On one hand, the economic system being re-coupled to the political system causes the repoliticisation of the relations of production (via unions and their actions in pay claims etc.). But on the other the administrative system is increasingly separated from the public realm which results in an effective depoliticisation of the masses. Under this condition class conflict becomes latent.

This change in the nature of capitalism, whilst not invalidating Marx's theories, will affect the way they are applied to present-day situations. Habermas' critique of Marx is focussed on what could be considered Marx's tendency towards positivism, his lack of distinction between the meanings of techne and praxis. While Marx clearly intends, in his early writings that work be considered as "social labour", involving not only the productive relationship between man and nature but the interaction of man and man, Habermas contends that the bulk of Marx's theorising on labour refers almost exclusively to technical labour - communicative action is reduced to instrumental action. Habermas' analysis of the German Ideology revealed that this tendency is due to a theoretical deficiency:

. . . Marx does not actually explicate the interrelationship of interaction and labor, but instead, under the unspecific title of social praxis, reduces the one to the other, namely: communicative action to instrumental action. . . For Marx instrumental action, the productive activity which regulates the material interchange of the human species with its natural environment, becomes the paradigm for the generation of all the categories; everything is resolved into the self-movement of production. Because of this, Marx's brilliant insight into the dialectical relationship between the forces of production and the relations of production could very quickly be misinterpreted in a mechanistic manner.

The corollary of this tendency to subsume the category of social interaction under the umbrella of production is that for Marx, the whole
realm of morality is subject to production and its definite relations. Morality "is an institutional framework constructed out of cultural tradition; but it is a framework for processes of production. Marx takes the dialectic of the moral life, which operates on the basis of social labor, as the law of motion of a defined conflict between definite parties."

This conflict, moreover is always "about the organization of the appropriation of socially created products" whilst the parties at conflict are classes, "determined by their position in the process of production."

The factor which will determine the revolutionary transformation of the conflict is the developmental level of the forces of production. Thus the whole moral area of social interaction is lost in any Marxist analysis. Habermas considers that had Marx "not thrown together interaction and work under the label of social practice" but had theorised the relationship of instrumental and communicative action within his theory of materialism he would have surpassed "Hegel's critique of the subjectivism of Kant's epistemology... materialistically." He concludes that ultimately a "radical critique of knowledge can be carried out only in the form of a reconstruction of the history of the species." Whilst still using a philosophical approach, Habermas saw this in terms of "the self-reflection of the knowing subject" but once he had taken the linguistic turn, he would be able to embark on a reconstruction of historical materialism with a rich theory of the moral which was to provide a critique of Kantian individualism.

While Habermas introduced his "fundamental distinction" between work and interaction in a critique of Marx, in the context of his critique of Hegel's moral theory, he developed it in order to reformulate Weber's "subjective approach" to rationalisation. Habermas' early critique of Weber was in terms of Weber's neo-Kantian espousal of value-freedom in social science. The "very term 'values'... in relation to which science is supposed to preserve neutrality", in the opinion of Habermas, renounced
"the connection between the two that theory had intended." As Habermas sought to incorporate Weberian insights into the progress of instrumental rationality, his critique deepened and led him to further theoretical development.

In his essay, "Technology and Science as Ideology", Habermas shows that rationalization can be theorised along two dimensions - the dimension of systems of purposive-rational action and the dimension of the institutional framework, characterised by symbolic interaction, the former being typified by "work" and the latter by "interaction". Purposive-rational action is understood as instrumental action, governed by technical rules based on empirical knowledge or rational choice governed by strategies based on analytic knowledge. Whilst instrumental action implies conditional predictions about observable events, which can prove correct or incorrect, strategic action implies deductions based on values and maxims. Both sub-types of purposive-rational action aim to realise defined goals under given conditions.

Symbolic interaction or communicative action is governed by consensual social norms, defining reciprocal expectations about behaviour and enforced through sanctions. Their meaning is objectified in everyday language communication. Whilst learned rules of purposive-rational action supply one with skills, required for problem solving, internalised norms give rise to one's personality structure and the motivations needed to conform to social norms. Habermas points out that "while the validity of technical rules and strategies depends on that of empirically true or analytically correct propositions, the validity of social norms is grounded only in the intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding of intentions and secured by the general recognition of obligations." Rationalisation can occur on each of the above levels. At the level of systems of purposive-rational action we have the extension of the
power of technical control and the growth of productive forces. This is the zone of scientific-technical progress, typified by Weber as moving into the political sphere as bureaucratisation. But at the level of the institutional framework (or as Habermas is later to describe it, the "socio-cultural system"), rationalization will occur in the medium of symbolic interaction itself, through the removal of distortion in and restrictions on, communication. The rationalisation of communication would involve the rationalisation of social norms and would furnish individuals with "the opportunity for further emancipation and progressive individuation". And to theorise this level of rationalisation one needs a theory of language. Weber saw the moral realm in advanced societies as being private and individual, not subject to rationalisation, because essentially irrational. Habermas can show that morality can be rational only by showing how normative-validity claims can be justified which will require a way of determining the generalisability of interests.

If Weber's concept of rationalization led Habermas towards providing a theory adequate for determining the validity of norms then it was his concept of legitimate authority which directed Habermas' attention to the relation of legitimation to truth. To Weber, rational authority was characterised by being constituted according to law which was accepted as valid by the people - it had no immanent relation to truth as the people's acceptance was not considered to be rationally based. There was thus, according to Weber, no way in which such a rational authority could display domination. Considering the ambiguities in Weber's formulation led Habermas "to problems concerning the possibility of justifying norms of action and evaluation in general. Habermas' theory of communication with its relationship of truth to norms and their validification through discourse would not only provide a definitive critique of the Weberian doctrine of value-freedom but provide
an adequate critique of Kant - in terms of both his separation of theoretical and practical reason and of his individualistic and subjective (rather than intersubjective) basis of morality.\textsuperscript{27} We shall turn now to a consideration of Habermas' language theory, "universal pragmatics", particularly paying attention to its significance for the conceptualising and theorising of rational morality.

**Universal pragmatics: the moral expressed in linguistic terms**

Habermas' move from the theory of cognitive interests to the theory of communicative competence can be demonstrated through his analysis of systematically distorted communication. The concept of distorted communication had arisen from Habermas' critique of Marx where all previous history rather than the history of class struggle was seen as the history of systematically distorted communication, consisting essentially of dissociated symbols and suppressed motives.\textsuperscript{28} Habermas considered that Marx "was not able to see that power and ideology are distorted communication because he made the assumption that men distinguished themselves from animals when they began to produce their means of subsistence,"\textsuperscript{29} i.e. because he failed to demarcate the dimension of symbolic interaction when he made production his all-embracing category of action. Habermas turned to psychoanalysis as a paradigm for the analysis of systematically distorted communication and was able to identify some of the structural conditions to which normal communication conforms, conditions governing intersubjectivity and the relationship of the private to the public world. From the analysis he concluded that a theory of communicative competence was presupposed.\textsuperscript{30}

Habermas developed his theory of communicative competence in terms of "universal pragmatics" incorporating Chomsky's work on linguistic competence and building on the pragmatic theories of speech of Austin and
Universal pragmatics attempts to reconstruct the general structures of speech exhibited in the everyday communication of competent adult speakers. The unit of speech is the speech act, "the smallest [verbal] utterance sequence which is comprehensible and acceptable to at least one other competent actor within a communications context." So universal pragmatics looks for the rules governing sentence use in utterances, regardless of their context. Following Austin, Habermas makes a distinction between the propositional content of a speech act and its illocutionary forces. The illocutionary force is the extent to which a speech act does something in saying something. A speech act is successful in the illocutionary sense "if the intended relationship between a speaker and a hearer is brought about" and if one understands and accepts the contents uttered in the communicative role indicated by the other. Habermas points out that we can intuitively distinguish between four areas of life experience - "the objectivity of external nature, the normative character of society, the intersubjectivity of language and the subjectivity of internal nature" - and that these areas will be distinguished in speech. The first area is typified by propositional language, the second and third by interpersonal communication and the last by expressive language use. Speech acts of the first type are classified as constative, of the second as regulative and of the third, as representative.

Communication must be transacted at both the level of objects in the world, as states of affairs (the propositional components of the speech-acts) and at the level of intersubjectivity (illocutionary acts). Each type of speech act has its own inbuilt validity claims. Constative speech acts have an implicit claim to truth, in their case, propositional truth. Less obviously, though, non-constative speech acts share this claim which belongs to the meanings of the propositions they can be shown to express. Thus "truth claims are validity claims... which are built into
Through the illocutionary force of speech acts, normative validity claims, claims to rightness or legitimacy, are universally built into the structures of speech. Habermas explained it as follows: "The illocutionary force of a speech act, which brings about an interpersonal relationship between consensually interacting participants, arises from the binding force of acknowledged norms of action; to the extent that a speech act is part of consensual interaction it actualizes an already established value-pattern. The validity of a normative background of institutions, roles, socioculturally accepted forms of life and so on, is always already presupposed." 

Expressive language, which belongs to the inner subjective world has a claim to veracity, to the true self-representation of the subject. Insofar that all speakers are expressing the intention of meaning what they say, then the veracity claim is also universally implied in all possible speech. Similarly the essential presupposition for any communication to exist, comprehensibility, is also universally implied in speech.

Habermas asserts that anyone acting communicatively must raise universal validity claims in performing any speech action. If he wants to reach an understanding, then he must share knowledge, mutual trust and accord with any others, for agreement is based "on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness." The following procedure will be required:

The speaker must choose a comprehensible expression so that speaker and hearer can understand one another. The speaker must have the intention of communicating a true proposition (or a propositional content, the existential presuppositions of which are satisfied) so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker. The speaker must want to express his intentions truthfully so that the hearer can believe the utterance of the speaker (can trust him). Finally the speaker must choose an utterance that is right so that the hearer can accept the utterance and speaker and hearer can agree with one another in the utterance with respect to a recognised normative background. Moreover, communicative action can continue undisturbed only as long as participants suppose that the validity claims they reciprocally raise are justified.
Habermas has developed his theory to cover an analysis of dialogue constitutive universals and to explore various aspects of semiotics. It is by no means complete. It is, however, through his typification of discourse and the ideal speech situation that we find significant points of interest for the sociology of morality, rather than in recent extensions to the theory of universal pragmatics.

Discourse has long been a subject of interest to Habermas with regard to the relation of theory and praxis in an evolutionary historical perspective. Institutionalised discourse, can, he believes, become "a systematically relevant mechanism of learning" for a society. Yet he has noted a tendency "to reject as illusion the claim that political and practical questions may be clarified discursively and to deny... the truth value of such questions." He thus made the "framework of the logic of discourse" the basis of the redemption or criticism of validity claims. Theoretical discourse serves to verify truth claims of assertions, using different rules of argument from practical discourse which serves to justify recommended norms. "However," Habermas asserts, "in both cases the goal is the same: a rationally motivated decision about the recognition (or rejection) of validity claims."

Discourse, according to Habermas' characterisation, is a particular form of communication which will be capable of leading to a consensus that expresses a "rational will". The formal properties of discourse guarantees that a consensus can only arise through appropriately interpreted needs that can be communicatively shared - generalisable interests. Norms which express generalisable interests, being based on a rational consensus are thus justifiable. For a rational will to be expressed through discourse the following conditions must obtain; the discussion must be limited to the validity claims of assertions, recommendations or warnings; the participants, themes and contributions must not be restricted apart from reference to the goal of testing the
validity claims; no force may be applied save that of better argument; and only motive present shall be the co-operative search for truth. In order to characterise a situation under which norms which regulate generalisable interests could be determined, Habermas has thus introduced the idea of the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech situation can be seen as a way of expressing universal moral principles. In determining the truth of an assertion or the appropriateness of a norm through theoretical or practical discourse, no governing moral principles need be applied - the universals are built into the situation, "based only on fundamental norms of rational speech that we must always presuppose if we discourse at all."

The ideal speech situation can be seen as an idealisation which is "determined by pure intersubjectivity." This pure intersubjectivity is characterised by complete symmetry in the distribution of "assertion and disputation" (unrestricted discussion), "revelation and hiding" (based on the mutuality of unimpaired self-representation, including the acknowledgement and self-representation of the "other") and "prescription and following" (universal understanding and the necessity of universalist norms). These three symmetries thus represent a linguistic conceptualisation of the ideas of truth, freedom and justice. According to this typification, truth cannot be analysed independently of freedom and justice.

It must be stressed, that while the theory of universal pragmatics refers to all speech acts entered into by competent adult speakers and has demonstrated, with increasing precision, the fundamental relationship of truth to social norms and their implicit validity claims in all acts of verbal communication, the ideal speech situation, wherein truth and justice co-exist has more in common with an "ideal construct" than with a "reconstruction." For whilst the universal rules of a communicative
ethic can be derived from the basic norms of rational speech via universal pragmatics, the actual truth of an assertion or the fairness (generalisability) of a norm can only be determined under ideal circumstances. While Habermas conceives of the possibility of social norms being actually criticised by institutionalised forms of discourse under conditions that approximate total openness, he stresses that his theory does not need the actualisation of the ideal speech situation. It is sufficient that "the expectation of discursive redemption of normative-validity claims is already contained in the structure of intersubjectivity." 47 It is worth noting that in his earlier work on the discourse theory of truth, Habermas made it clear that, unlike Peirce, he was not envisaging an actual, potential situation.

I may ascribe a predicate to an object if and only if every other person who could enter into a dialogue with me would ascribe the same predicate to the same object. . . .The condition of the truth of statements is the potential agreement of all others." 48

Even without further theoretical advances within universal pragmatics, Habermas has already demonstrated the fundamental relationship that exists between fact and value in ordinary acts of communication. "Is" and "ought" increasingly converge as the ideal speech situation is approached but propositional truth and universal social values such as justice and freedom are kept conceptually distinct, although interdependent. For Marx, however, value tended to be fact or at least to emerge directly from it. What is coming into being and what ought to be were confused. There was a telos but there was no guiding theory for the means to this end as the telos was hazy. Habermas' ideal speech situation presupposes a telos which is moral in essence as "justice" is essential to the process of discourse. The ideal speech situation is ideal in the sense that it is never to be perfectly realised but it is grounded in the concrete human situation of interaction and intersubjectivity which brings
it into the realm of praxis. By showing that discourse presupposes the activity of what are described by philosophers as universal moral principles Habermas brings the realm of the moral back into that of the political. Political action can never be value free. Moreover, even if the ideal speech situation is never actually realised, it can serve as a model for the practical institutionalisation of discourse and act as a guide for the critique of systematically distorted communication. 49 As Habermas commented with respect to the practical purpose of his ideal speech situation in the context of its anticipatory rather than its actual or empirical nature: "This anticipation alone is the warrant which permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the claim to a rational consensus. At the same time it is a critical standard against which every actually realised consensus can be called into question and checked. . ." 50

If politics is to have a moral challenge, then philosophy has a potential political challenge. For, potentially at least, Habermas has put the political back into moral theory to an extent unknown since the time of Plato and Aristotle, and has extended the critique of Kant, commenced by Hegel. Under Kant's moral law, the individual autonomous will is the active principle, even though morality itself is universal. Habermas considers that according to Kant, moral action is thus cut off from the domain of morality - Kantian moral actions being in Habermasian terms, strategic action. 51 Habermas, having replaced the individual will with the discursively generated rational (corporate) will, has moved moral action back into the universal realm of morality. If moral philosophy is to continue as an agent of truth it cannot be content to restrict its argument to the level of the individual. It must take seriously the relationship of ethics to politics.

These ideas of Habermas are not without their problems and critics.
Dick Howard, in "A Politics in Search of the Political"\textsuperscript{52} has mounted a strong attack on Habermas' moral/political relation. It is in part theoretical - he sees a clash between the individual commitment to reason in discourse and the need for \textit{universal} norms - but largely practical. How, for example, do we tell which interests are generalisable? Who gets this "good of all" plan going? Who "breaks" individualism?\textsuperscript{53} It is clear that he considers that Habermas is an idealist who has betrayed "the entire thrust of Marx's dialectical critique" which is "to refute this philosophical stance." Habermas' idealism "is precisely that attitude which believes that it can abstract itself from the social and historical conditions of its time."\textsuperscript{54} Such criticism was common with Habermas' earlier philosophical writings but became less deserved when the ideal was grounded in linguistic theory. It does highlight the fact, however, that even universal pragmatics needs to be embedded in a social and historical context. Wellmer considers that the theory of universal pragmatics does provide a way of explicating social injustice (systematically distorted communication) but doubts if it can be usefully developed in isolation" as a "transcendental pragmatics" of communication prior to and independent of the work of historical reconstruction itself.\textsuperscript{55}

Whether or not Habermas' connection between truth, freedom and justice is ultimately considered defensible by philosophy, will have to await the outcome of debate by the philosophical fraternity. There are many fundamental questions which arise from a discourse theory of truth which McCarthy has shown are to some extent reflected in Habermas' own versions of the consensus theory.\textsuperscript{56} Whatever the outcome, universal pragmatics is essential for Habermas' work in reformulating historical materialism, to which we now turn.
Social evolution: the moral built into reconstructed historical materialism

The historical materialism that Habermas is in the process of reconstructing is that codified by Stalin in 1938, rather than any specific formulation by Marx himself, although Habermas considers that historical materialism is the theoretical framework for all Marx's work. Marx had drawn an analytical distinction between two different, dialectically related, "dimensions" of the reproductive process of societies - the technological dimension and the institutional dimension. The first was the location of the forces of production and the second of the relations of production. The institutional dimension comprised the symbolically mediated forms of social interaction, i.e. forms of social integration (domination) in addition to forms of social conflict (class struggle). But because Marx saw the category of labour as pre-eminent, conceiving man as essentially a "tool making animal", he tended to reduce the institutional dimension to that of the technological. Production was the premier category. So in Marx's scheme, changes in the forces of production (technological changes), were the main instrumental factors in social evolution. Social changes would be felt firstly at the substructural level, as the relations of production were transformed and adapted under the challenge of the more highly developed technical forces. They would later be felt at the level of the superstructure as changes in the institutional framework affected the political and ideological dimensions.

We saw earlier that Habermas' critique of Marx was based on Marx's reduction of communicative action to instrumental action. In addition to this, Habermas had concluded from his analysis of advanced capitalism, that due to the repoliticisation of the relations of production (or the recoupling of the uncoupled state from society), state and society could be no longer related as superstructure to base. As well as these factors,
Habermas believes that Marx's formulation of five or six clearly distinguished modes of production which he linked to the history of the species is too dogmatic a version of history and is philosophically unsound. He proposes a weaker model where the bearers of evolution are "societies and the acting subjects integrated into them." Social evolution will thus "be discerned in those structures that are replaced by more comprehensive structures in accord with a pattern that is to be rationally reconstructed. In the course of this structure-forming process, societies and individuals, together with their ego and group identities, undergo change." 61

Habermas' aim is to reformulate Marx's theory in a non-technologically deterministic manner by restoring the symbolically mediated dimension of communicative action to human reproduction and by keeping it analytically distinct from the dimensions of instrumental and strategic action. This has meant a re-interpretation of some of Marx's original categories and their relationships as well as the formulation of new categories. The main concepts and features of his reconstruction, as it stands at present are indicated below.

The relations of production are no longer part of the economic base of a social formation, although they are still defined "by means of their function of regulating access to the means of production and thereby indirectly regulating the distribution of social wealth." 62 The relations of production are interconnected with various institutions. It is this institutional core "around which the relations of production crystallise" that "lays down a specific form of social integration." 63 Social integration is considered in the Durkheimian sense of "the unity of a social life-world through norms and values." 64 We shall thus find the relevant factors for social integration to be institutions (especially those such as the family and school, connected with socialisation) world
views and moral beliefs and individual identity (with the incorporated norms of the personality structure).\textsuperscript{65} Rather than the relations of production being directly threatened by the forces of production it is the form of social integration which is threatened by problems emerging in the economic domain. These systems problems may be transferred from the economic to the political domain\textsuperscript{66} but will only endanger the identity of society if they cannot be solved "in accord with the dominant form of social integration."\textsuperscript{67}

Whilst Marx only conceived of knowledge functioning in social evolution in the instrumental and strategic sense, namely technological knowledge which would lead to improved technologies of production and organizational knowledge for the creation of a more efficient labour force, Habermas adds the communicative category of moral-practical knowledge to the Marxian category of cognitive-technical knowledge. Whilst the latter is necessary for further development of the forces of production and thus for a move to a more highly developed mode of production, the former is essential for the development of new forms of social integration which must be formed prior to the further utilisation of technical knowledge.

Habermas has summarised his evolutionary outline, leaving out the "how" of this fundamental development of new form of social integration, (thus omitting reference to moral-practical knowledge), as follows:-

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] The system problems that cannot be solved without evolutionary innovations arise in the basic domain of a society.
  \item[b)] Each new mode of production means a new form of social integration, which crystallizes around a new institutional core.
  \item[c)] An endogenous learning mechanism provides for the accumulation of a cognitive potential that can be used for solving crisis-inducing system problems.
  \item[d)] This knowledge, however, can be implemented to develop the forces of production only when the evolutionary step to a new institutional framework and a new form of social integration has been taken.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{itemize}
While for Marx the generative mechanism of historical materialism is through "social conflict, struggle, social movements, and political confrontations (which, when they take place under the conditions of a class structure, can be analysed as class struggles)" the "how" for Habermas will concentrate on changes in the form of social integration, on the development of moral-practical knowledge in a society and on the relation between them.

The crisis tendencies which threaten the form of social integration have been discussed in some depth by Habermas within the concept of legitimation. By legitimacy, Habermas understands "the worthiness of a political order to be recognized", the claim to legitimacy being "related to the social-integrative preservation of a normatively determined social identity." Legitimation problems arise in advanced capitalist society as a result of a fundamental "conflict between the social welfare responsibilities of mass democracies and the functional conditions of capitalist society. The state is forced to deal with the dysfunctional side effects of the economic process under a number of restrictive conditions - balancing a policy of economic stability against a policy of social reform in a world economy that increasingly limits the individual states' latitude for action and without being able effectively to control social integration or to "plan ideology". If the state fails to keep the situation balanced manifestations of delegitimation appear - economic instability, political breakdown or "disintegration of the motivational patterns essential to capitalist society and the spread of dysfunctional patterns." It is at the motivation crisis level when the normative and value structures of society are unable to cope with threats to their stability that Habermas sees the potential for evolutionary advance.

Whether or not the form of social integration can be transformed
to a "higher" level or whether social disintegration results will depend on the activity of two partially theorised concepts, the "learning level" and the "organisational principle".

Organisational principles are "highly abstract principles of social organization" which can be readily exemplified within social evolution but which are difficult to define. By definition they are "innovations that become possible through developmental-logically reconstructible stages of learning, and which institutionalize new levels of societal learning, and which "circumscribe ranges of possibility". They are exemplified by kinship relations in primitive social formations and wage labour tied to market economy in liberal-capitalist social formations. Until the whole area has been further theorised, Habermas considers it adequate that organisational principles be characterised "through the institutional core that determines the dominant form of social integration."

A learning level is defined as the "structural conditions of the possibility of cognitive-technical and moral-practical learning processes", or alternately as "structures of consciousness". For a "theory of learning levels", Habermas turned to the developmental psychology of Piaget and Kohlberg, finding in the developmental stages of moral consciousness, a correspondence with the stages of interactive competence. Hence Habermas' interactive stages whereby a child moves from symbolically mediated interaction through propositionally differentiated speech to argumentative speech or discourse correspond to Piaget's preconventional, conventional and postconventional stages of moral development. By typifying social integration as functioning in the levels of a) general structures of action, b) structures of world views determinate for morality and law and c) structures of institutionalised law and of binding moral representations Habermas shows that there has been a development in moral consciousness (moral-
practical learning level) from Neolithic societies through to the modern
age.

Habermas' incorporation of Piaget/Kohlberg moral development theory
into his reformulation of historical materialism has resulted in a
critique of the Kantian individualism implicit in Kohlberg's highest
stage of principled morality. At the same time he has attempted to
demonstrate the developmental logic of the Kohlbergian sequence by
connecting moral consciousness with general qualifications for role
behaviour.80 He concludes that there should be a seventh stage of moral
development, characterised not by autonomy and a formalistic ethic of
duty but by an unconstrained ego identity and a universal ethics of
speech. It is clear that this stage whose "inner nature is rendered
communicatively fluid and transparent to the extent that needs can,
through aesthetic forms of expression, be kept articulable..."81
is in one sense, like perfectly undistorted communication itself, an ideal
situation.

Habermas' plan is to use this rationally constructed developmental
logic to represent rules for possible problem solving in a society. That
is, he looks to developmental psychology for learning mechanisms at the
individual level and then attempts to "explain sociologically how
individual learning processes find their way into a society's collectively
accessible store of knowledge."82 His thesis is that "individually
acquired learning abilities and information must be latently available
in world views before they can be used in a socially significant way,
that is, before they can be transposed into societal learning processes."83

From world views (determinate for morality and law), we must move to the
institutional embodiment of rationality structures in these world views
through the learning of individuals or marginal social groups until the
societal lump has been sufficiently leavened (the moral-practical insight
has been sufficiently widely shared) for a new set of social institutions, which will include more permanent structures such as institutionalised law and binding moral representations.

Although his formulation is not claimed to be a theory and is still at the developmental stage it holds firm to several points which are important to an understanding of his approach to the moral. Firstly, he holds firm to the priority of moral-practical learning over cognitive-technical learning in affecting social integration and believes that the essential role of technical learning is in the formation of a new mode of production. Secondly he lays stress on the priority of individual moral learning over institutional change - social change must take place from the grass roots upwards.

It is premature to criticise Habermas' relationship to the empirical at this stage but it is perhaps unfortunate that he accepts Kohlberg's work as essentially sound at the empirical level because its developmental logic shares the rationality of his own theory of developing communicative competence. On the whole his theory is reconstructive rather than empirical and it does not stand or fall by the validity of developmental psychology.

His greatest difficulty at the theoretical level is how to theorise the relationship between individual and corporate moral consciousness. The genetic epistemologists claim that both cognitive and moral development take place as an orgasmic response to problem situations and that the mechanisms of assimilation and adaptation are innate to humans. Kohlberg, moreover, asserts that one individual can influence the moral developmental level of another through discursive interaction, but this is still very tentative. The relationship between the individual and societal levels of development, however, has always been tenuous. Habermas does not appear to have any theoretical sources at his disposal to help him move from the level of societally embedded world
views through the necessary individual leaps in moral-practical learning levels to the sufficiently wide acceptance by members of society for the new knowledge to become institutionalised and thus form the basis of a new type of social integration. It is obvious that he has something different in mind from Durkheim's functional rebel, but with Durkheim he shares the problem of how to theorise institutional change.

Habermas turns to Weber for insight into the rationalisation of structures of consciousness and observes that whilst Weber was strong on the transformation of structures of world views into universalistic value-orientations and had investigated the "institutional embodiment of the universalistic principles in the various areas of life" he had failed to analyse the structures of consciousness themselves. Whilst Habermas has at his disposal cognitive psychological knowledge, he appears to take the mechanism of institutionalisation of this knowledge and the relationship between the institutionalised forms of being of little importance. He refers at various times to processes of socialisation, to enterprises and public administrations, to institutions of jurisprudence and so on but he appears to take their function and interrelationships as unproblematic. At other times he appears to see the transmission of moral learning as a type of osmosis which permeates society. He suggests, for example, that "norm and value-forming communications" may be "diffuse" rather than institutionalized, appearing under a variety of definitions but penetrating into the "pores of spheres of life which are formally organized."

Habermas' tentative reformulation of historical materialism, in spite of its unresolved difficulties is important in that it seeks to restore the emphasis on human symbolic activity in the historical dimension and show that rationalisation is not confined to the technological sphere. It also gives a context to his valuable work on
universal pragmatics. While Habermas does not intend it to be considered a "theory of history", history not being theoretical as such, it is clearly not yet a theory of evolution. In fact, McCarthy doubts that it is capable of becoming one even if it were shown to fit the empirical facts and even if the "relevant hierarchical relations of dependence and interdependence among the different stages of morality and legality" could be demonstrated. For "hierarchical structural patterns do not of themselves supply an account of how and why developments actually come about."  

Habermas himself considers that evolutionary theory will find its application not in history writing but in practical discourse. It may be that in fact the whole venture of the reconstruction of historical materialism will prove its worth, through highlighting and contextualising Habermas' theory of communicative competence. For only through the context of historical materialism, reworked to include the dimension of symbolic interaction can we conceptualise the coming into being of a more advanced stage of moral consciousness than we have at present and thus of a stabilised form of social production that allows for human emancipation.

We shall now look at some of the implications of Habermas' ideas for a sociology of morality. We shall first look at the possibility of applying his better developed theories and concepts to the investigation of morality and then discuss the significance of his considerations about present-day society.

Habermas' theories and the empirical world - their significance for a sociology of morality

Habermas' theory of universal pragmatics including his characterisation of discourse under ideal conditions gives us a theory of both distorted
and undistorted communication. With these theories we can apply a
critique to determine whether norms are generalisable and thus rational,
or particularistic and thus stabilised by force. This will involve,
firstly, the investigation of the validity claims of norms to ascertain
whether they are indeed applicable to all those concerned, that is,
"right" under the given circumstances. The appropriate model for this
"practical discourse" is the communication community of those
affected, who test the appropriateness of the norm in rational argument.
A norm that is (or could be) grounded in a consensus of all affected
parties, discursively obtained, will be itself rational - in ethical
terms, a "just" norm.92 Should a norm fail to be recognised as valid
it will indicate its inappropriateness to all concerned, that is, its
interest bias. And interest bias, incorporated in norms, is an indicator
of embedded power relations. Such a critique would have significance
for investigating power relations in a particular social formation at a
particular stage of history. By applying the ideal speech situation in
theory one could reconstruct the norms which would regulate generalised
needs, thus testing the validity of existing norms through comparison.
Similarly one can apply such a critique to a situation which claims to
act as a substantive democracy, asking: "Is this realised consensus a
'true' consensus?" Thus through the application of discourse theory
we can locate normative power in a society and pinpoint social injustice.

But as Marx had shown, there is no point in demonstrating the
situation of injustice if we cannot unmask the ideology that legitimates
it. Any invalid norms which are commonly accepted as representing
generalised interests will point to the presence of a dominant ideology
which has the double function of proving the legitimacy of the norm system
and of preventing the open testing of the norm's validity through rational
discussion. This approach could become the basis of a dynamic critical
social theory. Habermas has summarised it as follows: - "A social theory
critical of ideology can, therefore, identify the normative power built into the institutional system of a society only if it starts from the model of the suppression of generalizable interests and compares normative structures existing at a given time with the hypothetical state of a system of norms formed, ceteris paribus, discursively.93

Furthermore universal pragmatics gives us a means of mounting a moral critique within the realm of social science itself. Habermas had shown that Weber's typification of legitimate authority was deficient because of his inability to conceptualise rationality within the moral realm. Weber's concept of legitimation bore no relationship to truth and thus, used as a tool for sociological analysis it could effectively mask latent forces embedded in institutional structures which served minority interests. Such a critique is especially apposite to Parsonian functionalism. We noted in the previous chapter that for Parsons, the well-being of the social whole was taken, implicitly, as the highest good. When the morally relativist position was applied to education we found that values such as achievement were ranked equally with moral universals such as fairness and honesty. Within the wider society, power was defined by its relation to legitimate authority and legitimate authority by its ability to generate power. We saw, that in effect, the Parsonian position supported the adage "all might is right".

But, in our previous discussion we could do no more than criticise functionalism in moral terms. So we noted that it failed to discriminate values considered as "moral" by philosophers from those which were expedient for the economy and that it masked the presence of injustice in society. But a Habermasian critique would explicate the nature of the injustice using the model of the suppression of generalisable interests to show the existence of ideologies serving to legitimate the power structures which a Parsonian analysis had seen as self-legitimating. It
would thus show the inherent flaws of structural functionalist theory using the language of social science and point to the possibility that functionalism itself could act as a legitimating ideology in the modern technocratic state. 94

Wellmer has pointed out the implications of Habermas' communicative theory for hermeneutic sociology. Because from this perspective distorted communication is taken to be in fact undistorted, the existing self-interpretations of groups and groups is elevated "to a position where they cannot be questioned, and... prevent questions concerning the truth of fundamental beliefs and the justice of fundamental norms from even being raised by the hermeneutically proceeding social scientist." 95 Thus hermeneutic sociology may not only be untrue to the underlying social situation but may have the unintentional result of perpetuating an unjust status quo.

Because Habermas' communication theory shows that judgements of value can be rational and that norms have a relation to truth it is a good corrective to subjectivist approaches to sociology which tend to confuse value with subjective meaning. We noted in the last chapter how this approach, typified by Dawe, had its roots in Weber's belief that in modern rational society the domain of the moral was the private conscience. In attempting to stress the importance of the moral realm to Weber, Dawe equated "the language of meaning" with the language of "value". 96 Habermas makes it plain that the language of value is something which can be defined and discussed objectively. In fact "language" use is the key to the rationalisation of institutionalised values (norms). The moral realm is certainly not part of a universe of subjective meaning. Habermas makes a clear distinction between value and meaning at the sociological level.

Just as Habermas' distinction between communicative action and
strategic and instrumental action was developed as a tool with which to
critique positivism and one-dimensional technological progress, so this
distinction will have value to sociology. Within the educational system
it could be used to examine the curriculum to see whether the ideology
of science and technology held sway at this level. Or at the level of
moral education it could be used in analysing the making of moral
choices or moral judgements.

Habermas' own application of his theories to the future of our
society can also be starting points for research in the sociology of
morality. Habermas claims that there is a theoretical stage of moral
development beyond that typified by Kohlberg as stage six. Even if one
does not attach the same degree of validity to Kohlberg's work as does
Habermas, one can still consider his seventh stage of "communicative
ethics" as that of a different type from the principled morality
advocated by many moral educators. Principled morality has been
traditionally described from the point of view of an individual in a
conflict of interests. Guided by inner principles"each 'individual'
must will in such a manner as to make the best reply to the corresponding
demands of the others." Principled morality stresses the need for
autonomy and thus for rationality. In the works of Professor Peters:
"Autonomy implies the ability and determination to regulate one's life
by rules which one has accepted for oneself - presumably because the
reasons for them are both apparent and convincing." Habermas defines
principled autonomous morality as the "formalistic ethics of duty",
seeing it superseded by the "universal ethics of speech." Here we find
the emphasis is not on individuals, negotiating interests or privately
applying their own inner rules but on individuals in open, interpretive
communication with other individuals, where others are seen in co-
operation rather than in competition. It may be a utopian notion, but
arguably no more utopian than the Kantian autonomous, perfectly rational and purely willed individual. But as an ideal it gives us a different perspective from which to view morality and opens up the possibility of looking at the moral in terms of interaction and communication. In other words we have an ideal which is expressed in sociological rather than philosophical language and which introduces the possibility of a sociological study of morality at the empirical level.

Habermas' theory of communicative morality could be of great interest to students of deviance and juvenile delinquency. If the ideal speech situation defines perfect (theoretical) moral behaviour as that which shows itself in perfectly symmetrical relationships then it also defines moral deviance in communicative terms. Moral deviance is defined as distortion to communication. The deviant is someone whose interactive relationships are inconsistent with those described by the rules of competent communication.

Behind traditional approaches to deviance has been the unresolved problem of the relationship of societal deviance to moral deviance and the subsequent confusion of social cause with blame. To Durkheim, deviance was a normal social phenomenon which usually, but not always, indicated moral inadequacy. From the time of the Chicago studies, deviance was seen as an essentially undesirable social problem and whilst the investigation emphasised cause there were often overtones of blame. Thus, when Cicourel considered that the system of justice was a causative factor in producing deviance there was a shift of responsibility, in the moral sense, to the juvenile justice system. Attempts to describe practices usually considered deviant as voluntary styles of behaviour, as in Becker's studies, not only discussed the phenomena out of their social context but denied any consideration of their morality. This confusion of moral deviance with social deviance and the loss of any
connection of deviance with morality in symbolic interactive and ethnomethodological studies was referred to in our Introduction.

To define moral deviance in terms of distortion of communication gives it universal moral significance. It is real and it is undesirable if it is indeed moral deviance. Yet this does not mean that the individual is totally responsible for his moral inadequacy. For essentially all social repression can also be described in terms of distorted communication. So to say that a young person shows distortion or a high degree of incompetence in his social communication is to state a "moral" fact, not to impute blame. Distortion of communication provides a theoretical link between individual or group deviance and social injustice.

Habermas asserts that "only communicative ethics is universal... only communicative ethics guarantees autonomy." Yet his characterisation of today's advanced capitalistic society leaves great doubt as to whether the present weakening of the moral structures of social integration are a sign of potential progress or of societal disintegration. He has described the increasing collapse of world views with an integrative force, such as the weakening of the traditional values of justice and equality that undergirded liberal capitalism, which although exposed by Marx as part of bourgeois democracy were at least a remnant of universalistic belief. Democracy no longer has the goal of rationalising authority through the participation of citizens - no one expects equal rights. He has also described the weakening of the very values needed to maintain legitimation of the capitalist mode of production - possessive individualism and achievement orientation.

He asks the following questions:

If world-views have foundered... what fulfills the moral-practical task of constituting ego- and group-identity?

Could a universalistic linguistic ethics no longer connected to cognitive interpretations of nature and society (a) adequately
stabilize itself and (b) structurally secure the identities of individuals and collectives in the framework of a world society? Or is a universal morality without cognitive roots condemned to shrink to a grandiose tautology...? 101

and

Are we dealing with reactions uncontrollable in the long run, against the continued violation of normative structures... Or are we dealing with the birth pangs of a fundamentally new mode of socialization." 102

Whilst Habermas believes that formal education has a part to play in social integration by mediating achievement ideology and occupational success he is not sure of its actual power because "the expansion of the education system is becoming increasingly independent of changes in the occupational system," 103 which decreases the support to any intrinsic motivation to succeed.

Whilst the questions Habermas asks are a challenge to the sociologist of morality they also highlight the weakness displayed in Habermasian theory with regard to institutions. Habermas does not appear to see the educational system or even the family as transmitters of any worthwhile values or world views that could either act in the continued maintenance of social cohesion in the present manner or give rise to a new form of social integration. His only opportunity for social progress is seen in the development of a universal linguistic ethic unconnected to cognitive interpretations and thus, it is inferred unconnected with institutions such as schooling.

Cohen points out that Habermas has completely under-emphasised the very analytical path that could have answered his questions, namely, "the institutions of democratic traditions or national and political cultures of particular societies", whereby he might have been able to "locate action-orienting, emancipatory norms in objective institutions." 104

It is true that Habermas has demonstrated the relative weakness of institutions under late capitalism. He makes it clear that today's
democratic procedures are true to democracy in form only, not in substance, because the public realm is thoroughly depoliticised. But he has not shown that there are no residual traces of substantive democratic tradition. He sees little chance of the schools maintaining their positions as transmitters of class specific moral consciousness unsupported by religious traditions. The main ideological task of the schools is to maintain the achievement orientation and their role here is declining. He does not see them as having any potential for emancipation. We would agree with Cohen when she asserts: "Habermas has failed to assess the holding power of democratic traditions, and to analyse the possible institutional bases within late capitalism that could secure individuation, or autonomy, as norms to be radicalized."

We would suggest then, that a sociology of morality should make use of Habermas' concept of communicative ethics and seek to investigate morality in society from an interactive perspective. But it must not overlook the power of basic societal institutions, such as the family and the school, to transmit values and world views that may either help maintain capitalism as it is, or act as reorganising structures for new moral practical learning.
Notes: Chapter 4

Abbreviations of Habermas' Major Publications


1 C.E.S., p.144.


4 Therborn, G., op.cit., p.73.


6 K.H.I., p.5.

7 Habermas, J., "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests" in K.H.I., p.354.

8 Ibid., p.370.

9 Habermas, J., "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'" in T.R.S., p.100.

10 L.C., p.33.

11 Ibid., pp.36-37.

12 T.P., pp.195-198. The "four facts" of this earlier formulation do not speak against Max himself as claimed by G. Therborn, "Jürgen Habermas: A New Eclecticism", New Left Review, No. 67, May/June, 1971. Habermas' confrontation is with Marxism. "Together the four historical facts
indicated above form an insuperable barrier to any theoretical acceptance of Marxism, especially in the form codified by Stalin - "Diamat..." (p.198).


14 K.H.I., p.57.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., p.62.

17 Ibid., p.63.

18 Ibid.

19 Habermas, J., "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'", op.cit., p.91, and explanatory footnote 12.

20 Appendix to K.H.I., p.303.

21 T.R.S., p.91ff.

22 Ibid., p.92.

23 L.C., p.74ff.

24 T.R.S., p.119.

25 L.C., p.97.

26 Ibid., p.101.

27 Habermas' earlier critique of Kant is clearly expressed in "Labor and Interaction", in T.P., esp. pp.150-151.

28 T.R.S., p.96.

29 K.H.I., p.282.


33 Ibid., p.156.

34 Ibid., p.155.

35 Ibid., p.159.

36 Ibid., p.158.

37 Ibid.

38 C.E.S., p.3.

39 Ibid., pp.2-3.

40 T.P., p.25.

41 Ibid., p.26.

42 L.C., p.107.

43 Ibid., p.110.


45 Ibid.

46 Habermas, J., "Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interest", op.cit., pp.337-38. Habermas denies that it is a "mere construct".

47 L.C., p.110 (our emphasis). This expectation is limited in practice to communicative speech acts. In strategic action the normative background consensus is lacking and so "the truthfulness of expressed intentions is not expected, and the norm-conformity of an utterance (or the rightness of the norm itself) is presupposed in a different sense than in communicative action - namely contingently." C.E.S., p.118.


T.P., pp.150-151.


Ibid., p.281.

Ibid.


It is worth noting Habermas' characterisation of the "forces of production" of Marxist theory. One notes his stress on knowledge, whilst maintaining the classic formulation.

"The forces of production consist of (1) the labor power of those engaged in production, the producers: (2) technically useful knowledge insofar as it can be converted into instruments of labor that heighten productivity, that is, into technologies of production; (3) organizational knowledge insofar as it applied to set labor power efficiently into motion, to qualify labor power, and to effectively co-ordinate the cooperation of laborers in accord with the division of labor (mobilization, qualification, and organization of labor power). Productive forces determine the degree of possible control over natural processes."

C.E.S., p.138.


C.E.S., p.140.

Ibid., p.144.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


L.C., Part I.

C.E.S., p.144.

Ibid., p.147.
173

69 Ibid.

70 C.E.S., p.182.

71 McCarthy, T., "Introduction" to C.E.S., p.xxiv.

72 Ibid.

73 C.E.S., p.153.

74 L.C., pp.17-18.

75 C.E.S., p.153.


77 C.E.S., p.154.

78 Habermas, J., "History and Evolution", Telos, No. 39, 1979, p.31.

79 C.E.S., pp.154-156.

80 Ibid., pp.82-83.

81 Ibid., p.93.

82 Ibid., p.121.

83 Ibid.


86 Habermas, J., "History and Evolution", op.cit., pp.35-36.

87 Ibid., p.36, specifically, also throughout L.C.


89 Habermas, J., "History and Evolution", op.cit., p.8.


91 Habermas, J., "History and Evolution", op.cit., p.8.
92 L.C., p.105.

93 Ibid., p.113.


95 Wellmer, A., op.cit., p.255.


97 Boyd, D.R., "An Interpretation of Principled Morality", J.Moral Educ., Vol.8, No. 2, 1979, p.120.


99 L.C., p. 89.

100 Ibid., pp.75-94.

101 Ibid., p.120.

102 Ibid., p.129.

103 Ibid., p.82.


105 L.C., p.36.

106 Ibid., p.77.

107 Ibid., pp.81-82.

108 Cohen, J., op.cit., p.94.
PART II: MORAL THEORY IN PRACTICE:

MORAL JUDGEMENT AT GREENBANK SCHOOL
The work of Jürgen Habermas contains an approach to the moral which is of significance for the sociology of morality. Defined in relation to human communicative processes, the universal moral principles of truth, justice and freedom are shown to be intimately connected and socially real, and language dealing with appropriate moral standards can bear the mark of rationality. Moreover, Habermas has given primacy to rationalisation at the moral and interactive level over rationalisation at the technological and instrumental level. In his reformulation of historical materialism, moral practical learning is the limiting condition for the technical learning necessary for the constitution of a more highly developed mode of production. Instead of morality being seen as a remnant of past generations, it can be seen as a key to the future.

In the last section we looked briefly at the significance of Habermas' work for an applied study of morality within sociology. We noted that through the use of communication theory, critiques could be mounted both on historical social situations and on sociological theory. There is also the possibility that an investigation of changes at the moral level in late capitalist societies could act as a key to understanding the direction of social evolution - i.e. are we experiencing progress or regress? But there is a marked distinction between the possible application of a theory and a theoretical basis for empirical research. Habermas has always attempted to relate theory and practice and to ground his theory in the empirically real. While we may consider that his theory is suitable to be applied with some effect, as critique, to both political and sociological practice, the same situation does not necessarily obtain for empirical studies.
It is important that we evaluate the empirical possibilities of Habermasian theory and that we do so both theoretically and practically. In the first place Habermas' approach to the moral has stressed its rational and objective nature. If Habermas' theory is true, in its own terms, it must be able to be applied at the empirical level. To have validity as critique it must be true to the concrete historical situation. Secondly, the sociology of morality is urgently in need of theoretical revitalisation, and as no well-established social theory describes the moral in universal terms we need to look to recently developed theory for a suitable basis for empirical research. Morality is an important topic for education, yet sociology has been unable to make any significant contribution to understanding their relationship. There is need for a theoretical framework in which to conceptualise and investigate moral phenomena in the sphere of education. Habermasian theory appears to hold out such promise to these endeavours that it cannot be left untried.

We shall turn first to the hopes that Habermas' work holds out for an empirical study of the sociology of morality in the field of education. We shall then look at the problems it poses for such empirical research, attempting to assess which aspects of Habermasian theory and conjecture could be appropriately used in a study.

Possibilities of Habermasian theory for empirical research

Habermas holds out hope for a sociology of morality because he describes the social situation under advanced capitalism as one which is morally recognisable, yet which does not of necessity spell doom and disintegration. He describes the existence of remnants of the universalistic moral values and the decline of specifically bourgeois value orientations such as possessive individualism in terms which match well with observations of social philosophers such as MacIntyre. Yet MacIntyre sounds a pessimistic note. Two types of people exist in our
society, those who speak from within one of the surviving remnants of morality and those who stand outside all of them. There is no moral communication between the two for "there exists no court of appeal, no impersonal neutral standard." From this stance there can be no general empirical investigation of morality in present day society, only a study of the morality of distinctive minority subcultures. So Habermas' acceptance of remnant morality as part of an interrelated system, which, whilst it may be in a state of flux, is open to rational investigation in universal moral terms, makes empirical research seem more feasible.

Habermas' conceptualisation of the moral in terms of communication theory has application to the sociology of education. If truth, freedom and justice are defined in terms of the ideal speech situation then there will be a direct relationship between distortion of communication and the repression of these principles at the theoretical level. Habermas has given some guidelines, derived from psychoanalytic exchanges and expectations, which could be of help in using this conceptualisation in an empirical study of some aspect of education. An evaluation of classroom practices in Moral Education lessons would be a possibility, where the moral principles assessed in teacher/class interaction were compared with those being intentionally transmitted or generated. Similarly, such an approach to the moral could have application in studies of primary socialisation. If the moral is seen in terms of communication, then it would be possible to assess socialisation patterns and practices in these terms. This would give a theoretically meaningful base from which to relate socialisation practices to children's moral behaviour. The inconsistent results of past studies have been to a large degree owing to a lack of standardisation in describing such practices.

The theory of generalisable interests, where the validity of norms
is tested under the conditions of an hypothetical ideal speech situation, would not be likely to have direct application at the empirical level to educational systems. Hopper has suggested that educational systems can be classified according to their ideologies of legitimation concerning educational selection. His study shows that educational systems contain various ideological elements which can be seen to represent conflicting values. Where such a complex system of values obtains, practical discourse concerning norms would not be meaningful. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the term "system" can be realistically applied to education in Britain. When differences in policy and practice between the independent and state sectors, between one local authority and another and between individual schools are considered, it can be seen that "several educational systems in a more concrete sense" exist. The norms of a particular educational institution could only be tested for validity in the light of its own educational aims and definitions.

Whilst communication theory gives a way of conceptualising the moral within specific situations it does not have great significance for a study of education that attempts to see morality in relation to the social formation. Habermas' reformulation of historical materialism would appear to have more to offer here. Central to the process of social evolution is the concept of learning processes which act both at the level of technically useful knowledge and of moral-practical consciousness. While learning is accomplished by individuals, the individuals acquire their competences socially ("by growing into the symbolic structures of their life-worlds"). As moral-practical learning is postulated as being an essential precondition for the further development of cognitive potential, this whole field of learning relations would be a fertile one for empirical study.

Habermas' ambivalence towards the possible functioning of traditional institutions during a period of moral upheaval suggests another avenue for
investigation. Are schools functioning in society as guardians of the universalistic morality which typified the bourgeoisie under liberal capitalism? If so, how is it transmitted and are any groups of pupils more or less prone to its influence?

Is the presence and transmission of universal morality connected in any way with the development of autonomy in individuals as Cohen has suggested? But more interesting than the transmission of a morality (which in terms of Habermas' thought may function either to help maintain the status quo or to be a basis for further moral-practical learning) is the relation of schooling to the generation of a more advanced form of morality.

Habermas' crisis tendencies could be an indication of the generation of a higher form of social integration or they could indicate social disintegration; the former state will involve the gradual incorporation of an ethic of communication, the latter the end of the individual as we have come to know him. Earlier critical theorists described the situation of increasing bondage that awaited mankind. Habermas gives us a choice - it might mean progress, it could mean regress. Such a tantalising situation stimulates a sociologist to one of two responses - either to seek alternate theory or to attempt to settle the question through empirical investigation. An empirical investigation of this nature would need to be spread over a considerable period of time and would need to consider not only the young people, whose moral development would be a major focal point, but parents, schools and other agents of socialisation or sources of world views. And we would need to have some idea of how communicative morality could be characterised and recognised at the empirical level before attempting the wider task of determining whether there is a swing towards an ethic of communication and, if so, which factors promote or retard the change.
Problems of Habermasian theory for empirical research

The immediate difficulty experienced by the sociologist who attempts to apply Habermas' insights to the empirical is that his formulations are insufficiently theorised. To read Habermas' ideas may be stimulating but to work through his discussions looking for a thoroughly theorised concept is a frustrating experience. The problem is not so much that his ongoing work on universal pragmatics is incomplete or that his work on social evolution has not yet, and probably never will, become a theory. Such work remains incomplete to some extent throughout a theorist's lifetime. But Habermas has a marked tendency to treat an important concept in parenthesis and to suggest guidelines for developing a relationship which he declines to follow to completion. At best, we are referred to the work that stimulated his idea in the first place, usually in German and lacking an English translation.

Habermas' formulation of the ideal speech situation and his work on distorted communication is a case in point. Discussing the symmetries which must exist for unconstrained communication, Habermas comments: "These three symmetries represent, by the way, a linguistic conceptualization for that which we traditionally apprehend as the ideas of truth, freedom, and justice." Although he has often referred to universal principles, in passing, as expressed by the ideal speech situation, only this once does he go so far as to describe them, and then in roughly formulated terms. He similarly fails to fulfil the promise given by his introduction of the psychoanalytic dimension to the topic of distorted communication. "All three categories" he states firmly "- ego, id, and superego - reflect fundamental experiences typical of a systematically distorted communication." But after less than a page of explication, he writes the following: "I have delineated only some of the assumptions, which extend to the structure of normal communication and to the mechanisms of systematical distortion of communication. These
assumptions would have to be developed within the frame of a theory of communicative competence, which is lacking as of now." Habermas did develop further his theory of communicative competence as universal pragmatics, but he has not returned to theorise this politically relevant concept of systematically distorted communication, still referring readers of his most recent publications to his original essay.

His work relating ego identity to moral development, with its suggestion of a third level of principled morality - universal ethics of speech - is of the utmost importance to the sociology of morality, but once again when a relationship needs to be theorised, he tends to sketch an outline and proceed on assumptions. Discussing the relationship between the developmental hierarchy of role competence and the Piagetian cognitive developmental stages he comments: "This provides initial grounds for the conjecture that a deeper analysis could identify a developmental-logical pattern in Piaget's sense. In the present context, I shall have to let the matter rest with this conjecture. Of all his work of significance to an empirical study of morality, the relationship of moral development to ego identity and the demonstration of the sequential logic of the moral types represented by Kohlberg's stages, come closest to adequate theorisation.

Habermas' tendency to theoretical imprecision is not helped by his reluctance to answer his critics and engage in the cut and thrust of scholarly debate. Central to his critique of Marx and fundamental to his reconstruction of historical materialism is his distinction between work and interaction. His somewhat sketchy definitions have led to misunderstandings of his meaning, a situation which has been augmented by the tendency to describe his conceptualisation of the distinction variously as his work develops. Yet in spite of clearly-
presented criticism from his supporters, stressing that it was imperative that he theorised a dialectical relationship between work and action, he has continued to make use of the concepts in their unrelated, semi-theorised state. So, several years after Keane had criticised him for making "a compromise between, rather than a dialectical synthesis of, the two interests," he is still being criticised and to some extent misunderstood, for his distinction between instrumental and strategic action. While developing theoretical conceptualisations which are always incompletely explicated may be a sign of a brilliant and open mind which is constantly exploring new areas, it creates quite a problem for the sociologist wishing to use such theory to undergird an empirical study.

A further problem for empirical research is Habermas' habit of incorporating the formulations of a wide range of theorists into his own constructions and reconstructions. In certain cases his interaction with the theorist is essentially a critical one but more frequently he accepts a mass of theory without question, and builds upon it. A clear example of the latter is his incorporation of Austin's theory of speech acts into his theory of universal pragmatics. Where the theorist has derived his formulation directly or indirectly from empirical investigations, Habermas tends to take the theory as an indication of empirical reality, and, once part of his own theory, as solid fact. The work of Piaget and Kohlberg for example has become an integral part of his reformulation of historical materialism and his typification of emancipated morality, the communicative ethic, is classified by its supposed position in relation to Kohlberg's six stages of moral development. It appears likely that Habermas has turned to cognitive psychology less to ground this formulation empirically than to give some substance to his concept of moral-practical development. But merely because they fit well into his conceptualisation does not justify the uncritical acceptance
of Piagetian and Kohlbergian psychological theories. In his recent review of *Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus*, J.P. Amason has aptly commented: "While the adequacy of the psychological evidence cannot be discussed here, it is obvious that highly speculative extrapolations of psychological discoveries would only be justified insofar as they are presented as hypotheses, to be confronted with historical realities."²²

While we do not consider that Habermas' essential thesis within his formulation of social evolution nor his proposed universal ethics of speech will be invalidated if aspects of his incorporated cognitive psychology are discredited, the validity of these psychological components will be important for an empirical study of morality. For the sociology of morality the question then is: Do we take Habermas' concept of communicative morality, with its overtones of emancipation and social reformation, in its Kohlbergian context? - Or do we seek to extricate it from its psychological setting? It would be unnecessarily eclectic to attempt to take the universal ethics of speech out of its context, unless we had good grounds for doubting the validity of Kohlberg's stage theory. But if we entertain serious doubts about Kohlberg's work we will need to uncouple Habermasian theory and recontextualise it.

Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development is an elaboration of Piaget's cognitive development theory, which Piaget considered obtained in cognitive areas of moral development such as moral judgement. Although Piaget's work on moral judgement in children was well illustrated it was a highly generalised account and did not include older adolescents.²³ Kohlberg expanded the 3-stage Piagetian model on the basis of longitudinal and cross-cultural empirical studies and has continued to refine his tools of investigation and modify his scheme as a
The validity of Kohlberg's empirical research has been the focus of mounting criticism during the last ten years. Critics have stressed that his developmental model has not been substantiated and that the complex system he has evolved does not reflect reality.

In their comprehensive review, Kurtines and Greif refer to "a multitude of problems" which have beset Kohlberg's research. Problems include the arbitrary nature of the stages, the lack of standardisation of their measurement and the lack of connection between moral judgement and moral action. They emphasise the lack of evidence to support a theory of progressive development through stages - either the stages do not exist or the measuring device is inadequate to demonstrate their existence. Don Locke's recent critique supports these doubts. He concludes that in spite of the originality of Kohlberg's analysis "his insights and evidence cannot begin to support the enormous theoretical weight he wishes to place on them." 25

In addition to criticism at the empirical level, Kohlberg's work has been criticised from a theoretical perspective. R.S. Peters has summarised what philosophers see as the main theoretical weaknesses in his paper "The Place of Kohlberg's Theory in Moral Education". 26 These are: i) Kohlberg's failure to show that his stages form a logical hierarchical sequence; ii) the vagueness of Kohlberg's account of "cognitive stimulation" as a determinant of stage to stage progress; and iii) that he fails to account for concern for human welfare, which, Peters claims is as fundamental to morality as the principle of justice - Kohlberg's sole criterion.

Critique of the "stage" aspect of Kohlberg's theory (points (i) and (ii) above) has questioned both the hierarchical logic of the stages and their constitution as structural wholes each representing a unified
pattern of thought. Locke argues that Kohlberg's own evidence "unambiguously implies a developmental continuum, not discrete stage structures." Weinreich comes to a similar conclusion through her own attempt to replicate Kohlberg's original study of moral development with a British sample. She points out that Kohlberg's system is really a description of six types of moral ideology which follow a sequence showing "increasing sophistication of what is generally accepted as 'moral' understanding." She sees no reason to suppose that any individual adolescent can be said to be "in" or to pass through a particular stage. And Gibbs, who has worked with Kohlberg, considers that the higher levels of moral reasoning are not developmental stages in the sense of stages 1 to 4 but "existential or reflective extensions of earlier stages," stage 5 being the meta ethics of stage 2 and stage 6 of stage 3.

Kohlberg's neglect of concern for human welfare (point (vii) above) is borne out by his scorn for what he refers to as the Aristotelian "bag of virtues" approach to morality together with his concentration on the Platonic ideal form of justice and his neglect of affective elements of morality. Although his more recent work has widened moral development to include affective elements, it is still largely defined in cognitive-structural terms.

Crittenden refers to Kohlberg's work as "an uneasy mixture of form and content", arguing that whilst claiming to define morality according to the formal characteristics of justice, Kohlberg proceeds "to extend the concept of justice to include the moral questions of courage, prudence, temperance, love, generosity, compassion and so on." Peters' critique of contents notes that in the later stages certain virtues are made to appear as principles. "But why just these ?" he asks. Because Kohlberg has failed to specify which moral principles characterise the principled stages, Peters sees no logical reason "why he
should not come up with any type of ethical position." Similarly Gibbs notes that principles are not equally valid or adequate, the historically recurrent doctrine of "might makes right" being a case in point. Peters' major emphasis in his critique of content, however, is that Kohlberg gives no account of the development of benevolence or concern for others. He stresses, moreover, that content "vitally affects the application of principles both in the lives of societies and individuals", the application of justice, for example, depending "on whether need is thought more important than desert." Habermas himself deals with some of the above criticisms of Kohlberg in his essay, "Moral Development and Ego Identity". He appears aware that Kohlberg's cognitive emphasis represents only one aspect of moral development which, as Kohlberg has recently begun to do, he places within the wider context of ego development. The cognitive side of moral consciousness is accepted by Habermas as being shown by "the ability to make moral judgments". Habermas sets out to show that "Kohlberg's stages of moral consciousness satisfy the formal conditions for a developmental logic by reformulating these stages within a general action-theoretic framework." By connecting moral consciousness with general qualifications for role behaviour (interactive competence) and showing the hierarchical sequence of the latter, he infers a similar sequence for the former. He notes that there are three main levels of interactive competence, distinguished by degrees of reflexivity: "the simple behavioural expectation of the first level becomes reflexive at the next level - expectations can be reciprocally expected; and the reflexive behavioural expectation of the second level again becomes reflexive at the third level - norms can be normed." Assuming that moral consciousness "signifies the ability to make use of interactive competence for consciously processing morally relevant conflicts of action"
i.e. accepting the limitations of Kohlberg's cognitive approach, he then shows that the first four moral stages have an orderly sequence. Stages 5 and 6 are stages 2 and 3 raised to principles, so that the egocentric utility of stage 2, for example, becomes the principled "contractual-legalistic orientation" of stage 5. Habermas thus demonstrates the need for a further stage of moral consciousness. Kohlberg's stage 6, the conscience orientation, is still limited by the atomistic individual who is "supposed to test morally the generalizability of the norm in question." Habermas asserts there is room for his communicative ethic to crown the sequence and take possession of the logical niche it inherits as the meta-ethics of stage 4. "Only at the level of a universal ethics of speech," claims Habermas, "can need interpretations themselves - that is, what each individual thinks he should understand and represent as his 'true' interests - also become the object of practical discourse." The principle of justification of norms is no longer to be applied individualistically: it is to be a "communally followed procedure of redeeming normative validity claims discursively."  

Habermas' work on providing a logical basis for the Kohlbergian sequence goes a long way to meeting the challenge of Peters, Locke and the other philosophers. Although by no means conclusive, it goes further than Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner's socialisation model to which Peters admits he is attracted and shows an interesting concurrence with Gibbs' derivation of stages 5 and 6, although neither refers to the other's work. But it would be wrong to conclude that Habermas necessarily accepts Kohlbergian theory in its entirety. It is doubtful, for example, that Habermas means the same thing by the word "stage" as does Kohlberg. Kohlberg's concept of stage is essentially that of Piaget, where the individual, through cognitive stimulation and the processes of assimilation and adaptation, responds to his social
environment by a series of distinct cognitive leaps. Habermas, however, tends to look at the stages as typifications, referring, for example, to the "descriptive sequence of moral types". There is no reason to believe that, because Habermas accepts Kohlberg's sequence, and later incorporates it in his own formulations, he also accepts Kohlberg's entire developmental theory. Habermas' discussion of moral-practical learning, the key to social evolution, may be inexact, but it in no way limits moral learning to the cognitive dimension, as it is conceptualised within the framework of ego-identity. Habermas also clearly includes content in his idea of cognitive morality; for if the higher stages are reflections on norms, they are not so much represented by the form of justice as by a dialectical relationship between form and content, where content is seen as the principles and norms of social practice.

There is much in cognitive developmental moral theory, as typified by Kohlberg's work, that fits in well with Habermas' own approach to social evolution and gives immediate promise of contributing to an understanding of how moral-practical learning might advance. The basic motivation for development is social interaction rather than internalisation of rules, stimulus-response mechanisms or modelling - typical of socialisation theories. This means that an individual can develop further than those responsible for his socialisation, an important point for evolutionary development. Moreover, cognitive development theory deals with morality in universal terms because, as Kohlberg explains, "all cultures have common sources of social interaction, role taking and social conflict, which require moral integration." 

In spite of these advantages, we believe that Habermas has made a serious mistake in accepting, modifying and incorporating Kohlberg's work into his own formulations. The critiques cited above have asserted the weakness of Kohlberg's empirical foundations and have questioned certain theoretical aspects of his developmental scheme. They have not, however,
Kohlberg's basic assumptions make his work incompatible with that of Habermas.

Following Piaget, Kohlberg's approach is essentially Kantian. He believes that a judgement is made by an individual applying his understanding of the principle of justice to a practical situation. It is true that Kohlberg replaces Kant's innate principles with principles derived from an individual's experience. Once principles have formed, however, it is through their interaction at the ideal level that judgements are made. Habermas, on the other hand, sees moral judgement as an actual interactive process, where individuals engage in practical discourse to test the appropriateness of norms.

Kohlberg holds that there is a direct relationship between moral judgement and moral action. Moral action is seen as the "application" of values to behaviour. The more highly "developed" the individual is morally i.e. the more principled his reasons for judgement, the more likely it is that his action will show "correspondence" with his judgements. In fact he considers that "... the maturity of moral thought should predict to maturity of moral action" and that "specific forms of moral action require specific forms of moral thought as prerequisites." This linear relationship of thought to moral action is at variance with Habermas' own approach which stresses the dialectical and reflexive relationship that exists between the ideal and the practical, between thought and action. For Kohlberg the situation to be judged is separated from the mental activity of judgement even though the principles may be considered to "correctly define that situation." For Habermas, the situation is actively involved in the judgemental process. When norms are being examined with regard to the generalisability of the interests they represent, the interests are actual and refer to concrete situations.
Habermas' critique of Kohlberg focussed on a demonstration of the moral inadequacy of the sixth developmental stage and its replacement as the moral pinnacle by a seventh stage, the universal ethics of speech. He appears to be unaware, however, that by accepting Kohlberg's developmental scheme as the foundations for the universal speech ethic he cannot escape accepting the basic assumptions of Kohlbergian theory. Habermas himself places great emphasis on the interrelationship between theory and practice. His inheritance of an interest in the theory/practice relationship from his Frankfurt School predecessors, and his development of it through linguistic theory, was discussed in chapter 4. We can only conclude that Habermas did not fully consider the consequences of his acceptance of a Kohlbergian base for the ethics of speech and for his incorporation of the cognitive psychological scheme of moral development into his formulations of social evolution.

In the Introduction we pointed out that moral theory will have an influence on research practice and that it is essential that a sociological investigation of morality has an adequate theoretical base. We consider that it is impossible to engage in empirical research with a theoretical perspective containing conflicting elements. How, for example, are we to regard the social context of a moral situation from a theoretical position that is both Kantian and Hegelian in derivation. For one, the social situation is inconsequential, for the other it exists in a dialectical relation with the ideal. To incorporate Kohlbergian theory into that of Habermas is to attempt to graft Kant onto Hegel. It would be impossible to mount an empirical study on such a base.

We shall proceed with our task of applying Habermas' theories and formulations to a study of morality at the empirical level but shall do so without recourse to Kohlberg's scheme. Our main aim is to investigate Habermas' moral theory as a suitable basis for a viable Sociology of
Morality. To include Kohlbergian formulations or assumptions would make this task inoperable.

Habermas' theory appears to meet most of the criteria for an adequate Sociology of Morality outlined in our Introduction. It is fully social and fully moral. It relates to both the social structure, through social evolution and to social relationships at the level of interaction, through the ideal speech situation and practical discourse. It is essentially universalistic. It can be used as critique. Its drawbacks have already been outlined in this chapter. Because of the incomplete nature of Habermas' theories and formulations it will be necessary to choose the areas of theory which appear most pertinent to the educational situation and investigate how they can be put into practice.

We shall accept Habermas' formulation of social evolution as the broad context for a study of morality in education. This will give us a framework that will make education meaningful in moral terms. If education is contributing to moral development, seen in terms of a universal ethics of speech, then it is contributing to a more desirable system of social integration and social progress. If not, then although education may contribute to technological learning, it will not be contributing to new and necessary forms of social integration, and progress, should it occur, will do so in spite of the educational system. Moral-practical learning would need to be transmitted through channels entirely unconnected with education.

Because the key to social evolution is the development of a universal ethics of speech (communicative morality) our task will be to characterise this moral form in empirical reality and to look for influences that encourage its generation. We shall limit our search to a single educational institution and the influential factors to those of school and home. The study and its location, Greenbank Comprehensive School, is outlined
and discussed in chapters 7 and 8.

The first step in our attempt to put Habermas' moral theory into practice will be to formulate a means whereby his theory can be applied to the study of moral consciousness. As Habermas sees the making of moral judgements as an indication of moral consciousness, we shall start by attempting to formulate a theoretical scheme for examining moral judgement from the perspective of Habermasian rather than Kohlbergian theory. This theoretical formulation is discussed in the following chapter.
Notes: Chapter 5


3 Bronfenbrenner, U., in "Socialization and Social Class through Time and Space" in E. Maccoby, T. Newcomb and E. Hartley (eds.) *Readings in Social Psychology*, London, Methuen, 1961, discusses the problems caused by lack of comparability of family practices in studies attempting to relate socialisation with social class. "Permissiveness", for example, has lacked practical criteria.


"Neither early parental handling of basic drives nor amount of various types of discipline have been found to directly correlate with moral attitudes or behavior in the studies surveyed", p.363. Kohlberg sees the problem as being based on the ways moral attitudes and moral behaviour have been assessed.


5 Ibid., p.40.


7 Ibid., p.154.


10 Habermas, J., "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", op.cit., p.144 (our emphasis).

11 Ibid., p.129.

12 Ibid.

13 See Note 33 to Chapter 3, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, op.cit.

14 In his essay "Moral Development and Ego Identity", *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, op.cit., Habermas writes: "This derivation as well can only be sketched here. I shall proceed on the assumption that 'moral consciousness' signifies the ability to make use of interactive competence...", pp.87-88.
Critics are answered, often perfunctorily in footnotes. See, for example, note 5 to Chapter 1, Communication and the Evolution of Society, op.cit., "... Bar-Hillel has, I feel, misunderstood me on so many points that it would not be fruitful to reply in detail."


Habermas' critique of Luhmann in Legitimation Crisis, p.130 ff is a case in point.


Whilst his essay, "Moral Development and Ego Identity", op.cit., did not question the empirical findings of Piaget and Kohlberg, it considered their theories semi-critically. But in his later essay, "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", his acceptance of their work is almost complete; viz. "In the Piagetian research tradition, developmental stages of moral consciousness have been uncovered which correspond to the stages of interactive competence." Communication and the Evolution of Society, op.cit., p.156 (our emphasis).


33 Peters, R.S., op.cit., p.154.

34 Ibid., p.149.

35 Gibbs, J.C., op.cit., p.57.

36 Peters, R.S., op.cit., p.154.


38 Kohlberg, L., "Moral Stages and Moralization", op.cit., p.52.

39 Habermas, J., Communication and the Evolution of Society, op.cit., p.78.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., p.82.

42 Ibid., p.86.

43 Ibid., p.88 (Habermas' emphasis).

44 Ibid., p.90.

45 Ibid., (Habermas' emphasis).


47 Peters, R.S., op.cit., p.150.

48 Habermas, J., Communication and the Evolution of Society, op.cit., p.82.


51 Ibid., p.223.


53 Kohlberg, L., "From Is to Ought", op.cit., p.228 (our emphasis).

54 Ibid., p.231.


56 Ibid., p.78.
Moral Judgement Making as an Indication of Moral Consciousness

In the context of his concept of social evolution, Habermas discusses morality at the personal level in terms of moral consciousness. Moral consciousness is considered to be capable of development into higher forms both in the individual and societal sense. Although strictly speaking, moral consciousness is a characteristic of individuals, society, too, can have its form of morality exhibited by its institutionalised norms, world-views and legal systems. Habermas also discusses societal morality in terms of "motivation", which includes personality structures resulting from socialisation practices as well as moral systems (norms and values) and world-views which are part of the cultural tradition. As moral consciousness is considered to be an aspect of ego identity it has affective as well as cognitive levels and we can take it that when Habermas uses the term "motivation", he is considering what we could express as the action orientation of moral consciousness.

Moral consciousness is described as expressing itself in judgements about morally relevant conflicts of action. It is closely related to interactive competence. Habermas expressed it thus: "... 'moral consciousness' signifies the ability to make use of interactive competence for consciously processing morally relevant conflicts of action." He accepts that by considering the ability to make moral judgements as an indication of moral consciousness he is only dealing with the cognitive side of moral consciousness. But the affective side, especially "the ability to give one's own needs their due" is an important aspect of moral consciousness, and, Habermas stresses, essential for the
practice of communicative morality. Whether he really considers that conventional and principled types of moral judgement are entirely functions of the cognitive domain or whether he is merely limiting his definition to accommodate Kohlberg, is impossible to tell. But it would appear that he considers the making of moral judgements to be directly connected with moral consciousness and a suitable vehicle for its study at the empirical level.

From a Habermasian perspective, however, a moral judgement could not be considered a simple or one-directional activity. As moral judgements are essentially discursive phenomena concerning practical situations they will involve a complex series of procedures in order to resolve the problems. We shall thus use the phrase "moral judgement procedures" in preference to "moral judgement making" in order to emphasise the procedural nature of judgement in terms of Habermas' theory. We shall accept Kohlberg's definition of moral judgement as judgements about the good and the right of action and argue that not all judgements of "good" or "right" are necessarily moral judgements as they may fall into categories of aesthetic or technologically fitting goodness or rightness. Kohlberg, however, following Kant and Hare, disqualifies prudential judgements from the category of moral judgement because moral judgements "tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and to be grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds." We cannot accept this Kantian contention for the following reasons: In Habermas' terms a moral judgement would be universal and inclusive not because it was objective and impersonal but because it was universally inter-personal. The ideal does not exist in a transcendent moral realm beyond human activity. An "ideal" judgement is the judgement that would be made if all people had the opportunity to present and discuss their interests under "ideal" conditions. Principles such as justice take on the nature of
objectivity because they are built into the very substance of humanity -
human communication. Thus prudence may be just as much part of a moral
choice as the application of a basic universal principle such as justice.

The object of our study is to assess morality in both its rationality
and its concrete reality. We shall use procedures of moral judgement as
the basic material of the research, for it is in the making of moral
judgements that one is closer to giving, or being prepared to give, reasons
for one's choices than in any other moral activity.

As Frankena put it in his classic paper on moral education:
"... it is the very genius of morality to appeal to reason. To make
a moral judgment is to claim that it is justified, that a case can be
made for it." There is a good case to be made for the argument that
the primary function of morality is to adjudicate conflicts of interest.
For although one can make moral judgements about the good life (what
kinds of things are intrinsically worthwhile doing etc.) or about the
worthiness of people, morality is essentially a practical tool that
deals with situations of conflict. In a situation involving a conflict
of interests, a judgement is less likely to be based on a well-worn
paradigm and more likely to involve the reflection which is necessary to
moral thinking. Indeed we found in Phase I of the study that the girls
more readily backed up their judgements with reasons when faced with a
conflict which they found relevant than when they were judging a problem
which did not relate to their own lives.

The Conceptual-analytic scheme

This chapter discusses the theoretical associations of the
components of the scheme devised to conceptualise and analyse moral
judgement making from a Habermasian perspective (See Fig. I). The scheme
was developed through discussions with sixth formers at Greenbank School
A scheme for conceptualising and analysing procedures of moral judgement making.

**Logical Form**
- **Monothetic**
  - "Recipe judgements" - habitual or intuitional.
- **Polythetic**
  - "Reflective judgements" - stepwise procedure.

**Related Elements**

**Reference**
- Internal Elements: CONTENT
  - Beliefs and Values.

**Relevance**
- External Elements: CONTEXT
  - Situational elements which relate to experience.

**Strategic/Instrumental**
- Logic of Work

**Communicative**
- Logic of Interaction

**Figure 1**
during Phase I of the study (described fully in Chapter 7). It grew out of the belief that Kohlberg's approach was both empirically and theoretically inadequate and that it was contradictory to Habermas' critical theoretical position.

In the Introduction we outlined why we believed Kantian approaches to morality to be insufficient for an adequate description of moral phenomena. In Chapter 5 we discussed the particular limitations of Kohlberg's work. Kohlberg's work is typical of a Kantian approach to empirical moral research.

This scheme is an attempt to replace Kantian-based approaches to moral judgement with one which is based on Habermas' theory. It can be seen as essentially Habermasian in two ways:-

1. It treats moral judgement as a complex interactive procedure. Even though it may be assessed as an individual activity, the judgement of a morally relevant situation will involve a reflexive interrelationship between elements of the situation in association with a person's past experience and belief system. It will take into consideration other people's beliefs and interests. It is neither a solitary process nor a one-directional process of applying a principle or a belief to a situation, typical of the Kantian approach.

2. It incorporates Habermas' distinction between work and interaction applying it to the way in which the judgement is made. The active style of the judgemental procedures is referred to as the "logical form".

The components of the scheme and their relationship are now considered.
Monothetic and Polythetic Judgements

In emphasising the rational basis of moral judgement, philosophers of education have at times given the impression that judgements are made by the application of moral principles "objectively and impartially". This approach ignores an important aspect of moral judgement, that of its relationship to the inner life of experience and imagination.

Dewey saw that many everyday choices of action involved deliberation, "a dramatic rehearsal in imagination of various competing possible lines of action." This involved an experimental selection and combination "of habits and impulses to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon." Schutz has described this experience as one of "projection" where we need to visualise the state of affairs to be brought about by our future action before we can "draft the single steps" of action from which this state of affairs will result. The practicality of the project will depend on the actor's experience, beliefs and assumptions referring to his physical and social world.

However, Schutz does not suggest that all application of experience is made through deliberation and an imaginary projection into the future. Discussing reflective thinking, he calls upon Husserl's distinction between the ways we grasp the meaning of previous experience. We may use a logical, step by step process to understand its meaning or grasp it in a flash, intuitively. The former stepwise process is referred to as polythetic and the latter as monothetic.

Musgrave has applied this distinction to the making of decisions, typifying decisions made by the monothetic process as routine or "recipe" decisions and those made polythetically as "reflective" decisions. His work has shown that some teenagers tackle some moral decisions in a routine manner and others in a more reflective manner and that "these two types of decisions do seem to be of a very different kind."
In the preliminary phase of the present study (group discussions of dilemmas, social problems and personal relationships) it was noted that sometimes pupils made judgements that they found difficult to justify. On being encouraged by the group to give reasons, their answers varied from the direct application of principles in an undiscriminating fashion: "It's only fair," through citing an experienced paradigm: "My little sister acts like that and I can't stand it!" to the inconsidered: "I don't know really - my Dad's terribly against it." The only thing that such approaches have in common is that they are non-reflective. It is impossible to tell without some detailed questioning whether the judgement is being made in accordance with a well-taught or a tried and tested recipe, a deeply believed principle, or merely arbitrarily. For analytic purposes then, it seemed wise to discriminate between judgements that appear to have been made reflectively, or at least can give reasoned grounds for their conclusions and judgements which give the appearance of being intuitive.

It was thus decided to apply Schutz's categories of monothetic and polythetic thought to moral judgement making. Monothetic judgements will include intuitive or habitual judgements, those made by unreflective application of a maxim or principle. They are not suitable for analysis in terms of their style or form. Polythetic judgements are those which give grounds for their conclusions and show evidence of consideration or reflection. The procedures whereby the judgement was made is thus open to analysis.

Form and Content in Moral Judgement

In Chapter 5 we referred to criticism that has been directed at Kohlberg for his concentration on the form of judgement making whilst neglecting content or "virtues", for his confusion of form and content in
the principled stages and for his emphasis on cognitive aspects to the
detriment of an understanding of the influence of affective elements.
But although these correctives are now being applied to Kohlberg, he in
his turn acted as a strong and necessary corrective to the anti-rational
and relativist approach to morality which had become psychology's
orthodoxy since it had started to question the pragmatic assumptions of
American education. Until Hartshorne's and May's classic experiments
in the relationship of moral knowledge to moral conduct it was assumed
that character-education classes and religious instruction programmes
would lead directly to approved behaviour.18 Hartshorne and May's
experimental tests of "honesty" (cheating, lying and stealing) and
"service" (giving up objects for others' welfare) led them to conclude
that there was no connection between conventional moral education and
moral behaviour and that there was no such thing as "moral character" or
"conscience".19 These findings were accepted by research psychologists
who favoured two interpretations that Kohlberg expresses as follows:
"the interpretation that moral behavior is purely a matter of immediate
situational forces and rewards and the interpretation that moral
character is a matter of deep emotions fixed in earliest childhood in
the home."20 By denying any cognitive element to moral behaviour, the
psychological tradition was claiming that morality was irrational and
that whilst moral conduct may be influenced by operant conditioning it
would not be influenced by general educational methods. Like
Dewey, Kohlberg believed that the school has a responsibility for moral
education, that "the serious business of the school is, and should be,
intellectual" and that the two are interconnected.22 Following
Piaget's work on moral judgement he set out to probe the reasons for
the child's moral choices and believed that through a cognitive
developmental approach to morality he had the basis for a critique of
both Hartshorne and May and orthodox psychology. This led him to break
with all traces of an Aristotelian approach to the moral, thus weakening,
although not breaking his allegiance to Dewey. Aristotle had seen virtue
to be of two kinds, intellectual and moral, the former being developed
through education and the latter being acquired through habit. Kohlberg
equated the approach of American educational psychology with that of
Aristotle. Personality was divided up into cognitive abilities,
passions or motives and traits of character, moral character consisting
of "a bag of virtues and vices". 23

Kohlberg believed that by adopting a purely Platonic stance he
could bridge the gap between the "is" of the psychologists and the
"ought" of the philosophers. 24 He would concentrate on the ideal form
of the good, the one ultimate virtue, justice. Justice, he saw in terms
of equality, rather than as "Plato's hierarchy". It was the prime moral
principle. An understanding of justice meant knowledge of ultimate
goodness and as according to Plato: "He who knows the good chooses the
good", knowledge of the principles of justice would predict virtuous
action. 25 Because he was dealing with ultimate virtue and not virtues
in general, he considered that he was defining morality in terms of its
"formal characteristics" rather than "in terms of its content". 25

Kohlberg's six moral stages are defined in terms of increasing maturity
in understanding the concept of justice. Each stage represents a
distinct way of apprehending the form or nature of justice and change
from a lower to a higher level of understanding is taken as an indication
of moral development.

The fact that the criteria for Kohlberg's stages represent an
"uneasy mixture of form and content" 27 was referred to in the last
chapter. Crittenden suggests that Kohlberg is, in actuality, extending
the concept of justice to include the moral question of courage,
prudence, temperance, love, generosity, compassion and so on." 28 Crittenden does not consider that it is possible to separate form and content in moral analysis, for not only do we hold moral beliefs that influence our judgements but the grounds on which we hold these beliefs will also influence our perception of the situation and thereby the judgements we reach. Crittenden sums it up as follows: "Our reasons, if we have any, for holding moral principles and standards do make a difference to the way we interpret morality and make moral judgments." 29

R.S. Peters considers that if reasoned morality is to be understood "it is important to make a distinction between the form and content of the moral consciousness". 30 To Peters the form of moral consciousness is supplied by fundamental principles of impartiality, consideration of people's interests, honesty and freedom. These principles "sensitize us to what is relevant when we think about what is right or wrong". 31 The content of morality will be rules and habits that are taught through practical situations. In the Platonic-Aristotelian partnership of Peters, the form of rational morality (autonomous and principled) has to "evolve out of conventional mores". 32

It can be seen, then, that typifying and distinguishing between form and content in the practice of morality is far from a simple matter. Whilst Kohlberg believes that the form is a sufficient basis for judging moral development and that content concerns trivial virtues, Crittenden believes that form and content are closely interrelated and cannot be separated. Peters believes that concrete moral content will, through training, provide a foundation for the development of the more abstract form.

In this study we are concentrating on moral judgement making as an active process. Form is seen not in a static Platonic sense as something existing over and above the practice of everyday morality but as the
shape or style of the judgemental procedures. Thus, whereas Kohlberg's "uneasy mixture" (the elements of which were in practice indistinguishable), as well as Crittenden's "beliefs" and Peters' "rules and habits" are all subsumed under "content", in our sense form and content can be distinguished. As we are thinking in terms of a dynamic model of judgement making, we are not concerned with analysing structures of moral consciousness, per se; thus although what is believed to be a virtue will concern us, virtues as character traits and moral habits will be outside our scheme.

We have classified the content of a moral judgement as "reference" - what an individual refers to from his knowledge, experience and beliefs when he is making his moral choice. It will be related to our logical style or "form".

It is considered that a dynamic model of this type is essential for conceptualising Habermas' idea of communicative morality. Habermas sees moral judgement making in active terms, even when accepting the Kohlbergian hierarchy, translating the stages into levels of interactive competence. Communicative morality is described both in terms of how moral judgements and decisions are made, (what constitutes the moral process) and in terms of the general political orientation of individuals who demonstrate this type of morality. This political orientation will involve beliefs and understandings as essential to the constitution of an individual's world view.

But any moral judgement is made in terms of social situations which themselves have bearing on the judgement. There is no doubt from the Kohlbergian studies that there are situational factors which influence judgement. Although Locke has found that the topic or issue about which the dilemma centres tends to affect the way the subject makes his judgement and that it appears to be the topic itself rather than its context which is the influential factor, a recent British study of
adolescent moral judgement has concluded that the context in which issues were presented was an important influence. Experience gained from the first stage of this study showed that pupils varied both in the style and content of their judgements depending on which aspect of their experience they drew on. It could be that the topic under consideration was taken to be relevant to family experience or it could be seen as relating more to the experience of classroom or school common room. Topic and context could not be clearly distinguished as the pupils' assessments of the total situation depended on the way an issue was contextualised, not only in the problem or dilemma under consideration, but in the experience and understanding of each individual.

The factor of relevance was thus considered to be necessary for the scheme. A moral judgement must be conceptualised not only in terms of its logical form and the internal elements of the understanding to which it refers, but in terms of the way the situation is perceived and what aspects of experience are considered relevant in its assessment.

Before looking at how it is proposed that we analyse the logical form of the judgements, we shall discuss the related elements of reference and relevance in a little more detail.

Reference and Relevance

Reference: Philosophers have analysed moral content in various ways; the sociologist needs to choose not only which analysis he accepts but to what extent he intends to predefine content in advance of his study. Frankena, for example, makes a distinction in terms of obligation and moral value judgements based on ideas of what is right being essentially different from those based on ideas of what is good. For Hare, no judgement can be defined as a moral judgement unless it is based on moral principles, where a moral principle is a prescriptive statement which
guides moral decision making. Many philosophers make a distinction between moral principles and moral rules. For Dewey a principle was a "method and scheme for judging" whilst moral rules "of themselves tell agents just what course of action to pursue" - a principle is primarily intellectual, a rule is primarily practical. Boyd considers that most philosophers accept that moral principles are more fundamental than rules and can serve as grounds of support for them. Peters accepts this distinction but shows that in practice moral principles are no more fundamental to moral judgements than moral rules. Both principles and internalised rules can be described as character traits. Character traits such as justice and honesty may also function as principles but higher order traits such as courage, determination and integrity which do not act as principles are just as important to moral activity. Moreover, there is a class of traits to which compassion belongs, which are also motives for action. This class is, in Peters' consideration, more important for moral judgements than an understanding of justice.

Each of these philosophical approaches to moral judgement will influence how we view content. In Hare and Frankena's approaches, the judgement is defined in terms of its ideal content. Thus for Hare the moral nature of the judgement depends on the moral nature of the concept on which it is based whilst for Frankena a distinction is made depending on the class of moral idea behind the judgement. These approaches may have a place in analytical moral philosophy but they would be most misleading to an empirical study. They would support the notion that there is a simple and direct relationship between an individual's moral concepts and his judgement making activity, leading a researcher to look for distinct moral principles or moral beliefs behind each judgement. The accepted philosophical approach to principles and rules is not necessarily misleading, but care must be taken not to consider
principles as more influential to judgement than concrete rules or paradigms, simply because they are more highly generalised. Peters' plea for pluralism in approaching moral development is a corrective to any tendency to give principles pride of place in an analysis of the content of a moral judgement.

Kitwood's empirical investigations into adolescent values have led him to advise researchers against using methods "which assume, a priori the existence of global value dimensions and attempt to measure them or extract them mathematically from the situational context." He believes that such approaches force the phenomena into an inappropriate theory and thus tend to misrepresent the actualities of social life. He also warns against assuming "the presence of a coherent personal value system, unique to each individual", particularly when working with adolescents.

Kitwood's advice will be followed but this does not mean that there is no philosophical framework for our approach to content. We consider that when adolescents give reasons for their moral judgements they are referring to their own belief system. We do not define beliefs used for moral judgement making as "moral beliefs". The beliefs referred to will include concepts of what constitutes "good" or "bad" people or situations, principles, paradigms and rules for right or appropriate conduct as well as beliefs about the nature of the world, society and themselves. Our approach to the way beliefs are held will be that of Quine and Ullian. In the Web of Belief, beliefs are discussed as constituting a loosely connected system, a network or web, perpetually in flux. Beliefs may come through direct experience or they may come indirectly, because the supplier of the information is trusted. Previous beliefs will usually affect the acceptance of new beliefs but where a belief is not challenged it may be held even although it is inconsistent with others. As Quine and
Lillian put it: "As long as a belief whose causes are undetected is not challenged by other persons, and engenders no conflict that would prompt us to wonder about it ourselves, we are apt to go on holding it without thought of evidence." 43

It is realised that beliefs are not held in a cognitive system, isolated from affective elements, but, depending on the way they are interconnected and the experiences associated with their formation, they will be held with various degrees of emotive intensity. However, the task of this scheme is to relate the major elements of moral judgement making, viewed in its cognitive dimension.

This flexible approach will be needed if we are to investigate Habermas' loosely conceptualised formulations at the empirical level. One would expect that subjects tending towards the use of a communicative morality would refer more to concepts of mutuality, sharing an open exchange than they would to set rules or paradigms. On the other hand, if the breakdown in traditional morality is associated with a marked tendency to accept an ideology of science and technology, as Habermas suggests, one might expect traditional moral justifications to be replaced by justifications when technological progress is seen as the desirable (or inevitable) goal and thus as a valid reason for choice.

Habermas stresses the political dimension of communicative morality and lays emphasis on the need to hold a world view consistent with this ethic. Such world views may be only tentatively formed in adolescents but will consist essentially of interrelated elements of the individual's belief system. An individual's world view may be reconstructed by piecing together the criteria for choice and the reasons given for judgement of questions which involve not only the subject's intimate and wider world but her own hopes and expectations for her future life.
Relevance: The decision to involve the concept of relevance was influenced by experience gained through the group discussions of the first stage of the research. We are not using the concept in the sense of the problems themselves being seen as "morally relevant", although Habermas' use of the term was accepted and utilised when the situations for judgement were being designed. Habermas' consideration that moral consciousness expresses itself in judgements about "morally relevant conflicts of action" makes moral relevance a function of the capability of the action conflicts to be consensually resolved. Our use of the concept of relevance is in the Schutzian sense of those aspects of the experience (or that part of the belief network, in Quinean terms), which an individual considers relevant to the problem. This will involve the way the individual interprets the nature of the problem which will draw upon his experience of previous problem situations which appears relevant. Schutz refers to two sets of experiences which are used in deliberation about projected action. The first set "consists of the actor's experiences and his opinions, beliefs, assumptions, referring to the world, the physical and social one, which he takes for granted beyond question at the moment of his projecting." The second set consists of the experiences which the actor has of his biographically determined situation at the moment of projecting. This concerns his assessment of the situation in terms of the extent its factors are imposed on him and the extent to which they are capable of being brought within his control. What he chooses to do will be affected by his prevailing system of interests, depending on what is considered relevant at the time. 

Schutz's discussions of processes of projection and deliberation warn us against over-simplifying the way we conceive of individuals' calling upon their experience and using it for making decisions or judgements. In judgement making, within a research situation, the problem
is made more complex by the extent to which judgement is associated with any real action. A fictional dilemma may, for example, be associated with experience of action via the subject's memory of a similar situation or it may be purely hypothetical.

Musgrave has introduced this concept of relevance into his conceptualisation of the process of moral decision-making. From Schutz's insights, he extracts three elements which he considers are crucial to the analysis of moral decisions. Firstly, the structure of the knowledge at hand to the process; secondly, the factors considered by the actor to be relevant to that situation; and thirdly, the likely interpretations of others of the actor's possible behaviour. 47

The first element, in particular, was recognised during the first phase of research. Some problems, for example those dealing with family relationships were discussed in terms of the pupils' direct experience of family life. Wider social issues called upon knowledge gained from wider levels of experience which included the school, the media and institutions outside the home. But it was also noted that Musgrave's second element now became apparent. Some pupils introduced parental opinions into discussions on social problems whilst others considered a previous class discussion or a novel contained material relevant to the problem. With most pupils, direct personal experience of a situation related to the problem under discussion appeared most relevant. A discussion on euthanasia, for example, was contributed to by pupils having experienced the suffering of terminally ill relatives. This personal experience, even if indirect, was frequently considered by the groups to be more relevant to judging a problem situation than what could be considered as moral argument.

Kitwood considers that mid-adolescence is characterised by what he terms "the morality of inter-personal perspectives". He gives evidence for thinking that a "considerable part of the life which many
contemporary English adolescents count as real and significant" is conducted at the level of inter-personal perspectives. The young people possess acute insight into the feelings and perceptions of others in so far as these relate to themselves. This skill, developed through experience, is used as the basis for making decisions about the practical moral problems that are met in their day to day lives.

It is important that we do not confuse this aspect of adolescent morality with Habermas' communicative morality. This adolescent morality is typified by its particularism not by its universality. Although other people's feelings and interests are taken into account in making a judgement there are inevitably categories of people who are not perceived as people in the same sense as those significant to the individual who is judging. Distinctions are made between people because of their relationship to the moral agent rather than on more general criteria.

It was thus decided to ensure that the nature of the problems and situations to be assessed and judged would emphasise two distinct zones of relevance. The first would relate directly to immediate experience of home, family and friends. The second would be difficult to conceptualise and assess without reference to wider knowledge, either gained directly from experience in the wider world or from the media and the school curriculum. This does not mean that the first, or inner zone of relevance was isolated from a pupil's wider knowledge or understanding. Nor does it mean that the second, or outer zone would not be a suitable context for re-expressing parental opinions. It is an attempt, however, to provide a method of distinguishing pupils able to sustain the logic of their judgement making procedures in contexts which require reference to different aspects of experience. Communicative morality would be used consistently, irrespective of relevance zone and would not be limited
The Logical Forms of Judgement Making

The logical form or style of the procedures whereby moral judgements are made is the key aspect of the scheme. It refers directly to Habermas' distinction between work and interaction. It was shown earlier that Habermas developed this distinction as a dual critique of Marx and Weber. Work is seen in terms of purposive-rational action, interaction in terms of the symbolically mediated communication fundamental to social exchange. By considering Habermas' typification in terms of the logic of the judgemental procedures we derive the following formulation. 51

**Strategic/instrumental logic** follows the approach that Weber typified as Zweckrationalität. It is the logic of technology where choice is made in accordance with goals or outcomes. It may be truly instrumental, proceeding as if by following technical rules or it may be strategic. The logic of strategy is shown in evaluating possible alternative choices by making deductions from one's own value system. Strategic/instrumental logic will be orientated towards a successful outcome to a problem situation. It is the logic of utilitarianism but it may be used in association with moral maxims or principles or with further practical outcomes. 52

**Communicative logic** is the logic of reciprocity and consensus, of mutual recognition and understanding. Intersubjectivity is important for the understanding of intention which is essential for the reaching of a consensus. Thus the emphasis will be on reaching understanding and on involving other people's interests rather than on solving a problem. The logic of communication is not end-orientated, except where the end is seen in terms of mutuality and understanding.

One cannot further typify these logics in abstract terms. For applying
the distinction to a series of problems the criteria need to be identified within the terms of the problem situations. By viewing moral judgement making procedurally one is thus able to distinguish between pupils who have a tendency to use a strategic/instrumental approach to judgements from those who tend towards the use of a communicative logic. This can be determined in different contexts - zones of relevance. The internal elements of the subject's belief system can be related to the form of logic habitually used.

By using this scheme, further understanding of what constitutes Habermas' communicative ethic in the empirical reality of the school will be sought.
Notes: Chapter 6


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., p.88.

5 Ibid., p.78.


9 Ibid., p.113.


12 Schutz, A., *op.cit.*, p.68.

13 Ibid., p.74.


16 Ibid., p.42.

17 Discussed in Chapter 7.

19 Ibid., p.2.
20 Ibid.
22 Kohlberg, L., op. cit., p.23.
24 Kohlberg, L., "From Is to Ought", in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology, New York, Academic Press, 1971, p.32. Kohlberg quotes four elements of the Platonic view: "... I have found a no more recent summary statement of the implications of our studies than that made by Socrates: First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture. Second, the name of the ideal form is justice. Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses the good. Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs."
28 Ibid., p.18.
29 Ibid., p.23.
31 Ibid., p.144.
32 Ibid., p.156.


38 Boyd, D., op.cit., p.118.


41 Ibid., p.223.


43 Ibid., p.7.

44 Habermas, J., Communication and the Evolution of Society, op.cit., p.78.


46 Ibid., p.77.


50 Kitwood, T.M., "The Morality of Inter-Personal Perspectives", op.cit., p.196.


52 Habermas, J., Communication and the Evolution of Society, op.cit., p.41.
Chapter 7: The Empirical Study: The Procedures and the General Phases of the Study

The Context of the Study - Greenbank School

Greenbank School is a large girls' comprehensive school, situated south of the Thames in Greater London. Purpose built as a comprehensive, it has had a continuous history of commitment to "comprehensive" ideals - streamed when founded, moving to banding and now "mixed ability" for the first three years. It offered a highly suitable location for research, particularly in terms of its distinctive comprehensive ethos and the nature of its sixth form. As our immediate research target was the identification and characterisation of communicative morality, it seemed advisable to begin the search in a place which was generally in sympathy with open communication. Grammar schools have been characterised by their emphasis on "middle class" values, which includes an orientation towards achievement. As traditional "bourgeois" values are, in Habermas' opinion, declining, and social evolution will require their replacement by a new communicative morality it is important to see if there is any relationship between new moral forms and the new educational forms i.e. comprehensive schools.

The nature of the sixth form was the other factor that made the school a most suitable location. As this was to be a pioneering study, it was considered desirable to have as wide a range of pupils, in terms of intelligence, subjects studied, career orientation and social background as possible. Any factors which appeared to influence the moral type could be indicated as suitable for further study. It had been decided to work with sixth formers because, whilst still in a formal learning environment, they are old enough to have begun to think things out for themselves, to have challenged the values of their childhood
and to have their own perspective on life. Girls only were preferred in view of the researcher's own biography, which has included many years of experience with schoolgirls, as a teacher and as a headmistress. It was believed that such experience would facilitate the development of a rapport between researcher and subjects that would engender the type of reflective thinking the study required.

The practical advantage of Greenbank School was that having a reputation as an early established comprehensive school it was used to having frequent visitors in addition to student teachers and occasional research students. A stranger did not stand out. Moreover, its flexible Religious Studies Department would welcome the presence of an observer.

Greenbank's sixth formers occupied a separate sixth form block with a large common room extending into a study area, and a series of tutorial rooms. At the beginning of the 1978 school year, there were 180 sixth formers, 133 in the lower sixth and 47 in the upper sixth. Of the lower sixth girls, 49 were studying at least one subject at A level whilst 84 were taking various combinations of O-levels, C.E.E's, C.S.E's and R.S.A. commercial courses. Of the upper sixth, 35 were taking A levels and 12 were doing one year courses. This very mixed group was unsegregated and had access to the same facilities. They had a weekly meeting in the common room area with their year heads. Apart from a half day off per week each girl was supposed to be at school during the school day. Girls met briefly twice daily with tutors for roll call and could be contacted via tutors or via notes in their pigeon holes. The sixth form was thus a collection of girls who shared a similar general environment but who varied greatly in academic interests and levels of achievement. There was, in addition, a racial and class mix.
It was stated above that Greenbank has a distinctive "comprehensive" ethos. In the absence of any established theory on what constitutes an ethos, we would suggest that a school's ethos is expressed through its daily organization and the style of its human relationships. The way a school is structured to regulate or foster such relationships gives one indicator of its ethos. The truly comprehensive nature of Greenbank's sixth form, both in constitution and in access to staff and facilities, is one indication of the school's comprehensive ethos. The single major indicator of a school's ethos, however, is its head. Ultimately the head either orders the school in accordance with her educational ideals or fails to be truly "head" of the school. The extent to which a head's ideas indicate the school's ethos will depend on whether she is seen as putting them into practice by staff and pupils. We shall describe Greenbank's ethos by showing what the head believes and how she attempts to put her beliefs into practice. The actuality of her vision from the pupils' viewpoint emerges in interviews with some of the pupils. (Discussed in Chapter 8).

The headmistress of Greenbank was fully committed to comprehensive education. In a press statement on comprehensive schooling she wrote: "Teaching people to read beyond the basic needs is an extremely risky business unless one also develops understanding, enlarges sympathies, strengthens judgment, increases tolerance. This cannot be done by separating people from each other - certainly not at the age of ten. Real learning only takes place when there is a strong sense of security and of being valued for oneself. My experience, as Head of a selective school, suggested to me that the 80% had little sense of being valued and the 20% were often lacking a sense of security because they felt a strong, even if unnecessary obligation to continue to justify themselves."
She believes that a comprehensive school is an ideal place to develop
talent, the duty of all teachers being to find and encourage this talent.
In a prize night report she wrote: "I seriously believe that
comprehensive schools, in refusing to accept any limitation on talent
at the age of 10+, start from a better vantage point than others; but
only, of course, if they keep an open mind once the pupils are in the
school! ... In accepting all children at 11+ they are saying, in a
voice which I am sure children appreciate... that the school does
not know what talents they have, does not know whether they have any
that will ever be recognised on a certificate, but they are welcome to
enter the school anyway. I believe that that single act of faith releases
talents which might never be revealed - and even if it does not, a girl
has been valued for herself." Development of talent extends to non-
amademic fields both via the curriculum and through extra-curricular
activities. The Drama department is strong and Drama is a compulsory
subject for the first three years. Music, Sport and Gymnastics are
likewise important and have a large after-school following. Notable
is the emphasis on Dance which is essentially extra-curricular but can be
taken as a C.S.E. subject. It is not unusual for girls doing a full
set of O-level subjects to include C.S.E. Dance.

While the Head values the self-denial and perseverance of those who
develop their talents as well as the humility and endurance of those
with little talent, she considers that the greatest virtue is tolerance.
And tolerance, which she sees as "allowing the same freedom and grace
to the people you do not like as to the people you do", is basic to
comprehensive education. Tolerance should be encouraged to develop
between staff and pupils as well as amongst the pupils. In the school
prospectus, she describes the benefits which result from a second year
residential course: "Staff and girls meet in an informal situation and
relationships become more personal. Consequently a greater understanding arises and once back at school both staff and girls see each other in a more tolerant and friendly light."

Her belief in non-streaming has little to do with egalitarian ideals - she believes it to be educationally better. "Streaming is still a fairly crude tool, banding has some refinement, setting is more sophisticated and non-streaming is a precision instrument. Selection and streaming are about imposing limits... Unstreaming forces the recognition of every pupil as an individual and does not allow the lumping together of children into classes whose members are supposed to be able to be treated as though they are all the same." She sees it as the responsibility of the head to encourage staff to acquire the skills needed for this precision work.

The school is run on strongly departmental lines with a high degree of autonomy for each subject team. Subject teachers occupy the subject zones in the main staff area, meet formally once weekly and informally frequently. Pastoral care is organized on a form and tutor-group basis, co-ordinated by year heads. Subject heads meet with the headmistress, deputies and year heads to negotiate time allocations for their subject and work out details of school policy. These meetings are long and continue until there is consensus. The head believes in reason and feels that "even if a decision takes hours before an agreement is reached it will be worth it as in the end reason will prevail." Some subject heads admire her tact and perseverance and appreciate her trust; others feel they waste a lot of time and would get through the agenda faster if the headmistress took a "firmer stand". The ordinary teachers do not know the head very well but most think highly of her and some have commented on her kindness and personal interest in their activities. They consider they are lucky to be at Greenbank and to have the professional
freedom they enjoy. Complaints about senior staff personnel were heard, sometimes, in the staffroom, but never about the head.

At her interview the head stressed the importance of staff attitudes and relationship. She selects staff for being good teachers but also for being "real human beings" who "will treat the children as people". Children should be able to discuss anything openly with teachers. She aims at a non-differentiated staff-room. She has noted that in many comprehensive schools, even though the children are mixed ability the staff assess themselves A B C D or E as teachers and separate themselves out. She tries to give an example by never pretending to be the "completely competent teacher". She knows she must be able to teach as well as the best on her staff, (and she has some marvellous teachers), but if she has problems she shares them, to help her best teachers to do the same. For example, she takes the weakest group of fifth years' for English. If a girl keeps not doing work or not having a book she mentions it at [Departmental] meetings. "Something is wrong with the girl, how can we help her", instead of thinking: "I'm slipping as a teacher and mustn't let on." This approach, she believes, helps promote sharing between senior and junior staff. As well as a mixing of able and less able staff, she also wants a mixing of old and young. She thinks her staff is marvellous and particularly likes the way members of a department co-operate together and get on. She sometimes wonders why the girls don't vandalise the place at all. "Do they lack imagination? Haven't they thought of it? Or perhaps it's just that they don't have a need to take their feelings out on the buildings. They can express their feelings to the teachers."

The above description of the head's attitude to the staff, taken almost verbatim from an interview, shows something of her personality. She is a strong minded woman with a ready wit, ready to fight for what
she believes in. She is highly practical and tries to put into practice things she feels strongly about. Trust, co-operation and tolerance are basic to her way of life, but so are initiative and perseverance. A combination of these character traits can be seen in her approach to the primary schools in Greenbank's area. Their head teachers and staff are treated as colleagues and invited to Greenbank's "select gatherings". But since the problem of "falling rolls" has become apparent, she has also visited every primary school within a wide radius to recruit future pupils for Greenbank and thus ensure its viability.

**Purpose and approach**

The main purpose of this study is to extend the relationship of Habermasian theory and practice to the realm of empirical reality — in this case to moral reality. In Part I, we criticised the traditional strands of sociology for their inability to grasp the moral in social terms without sliding into relativism, or losing sight of morality altogether. Habermas offered a solution with a theory that not only treats morality as rational and universal but gives it pride of place in society's development. But to what extent is Habermasian theory applicable to sociological practice? And what would be the characteristics of an empirical study of the sociology of morality conducted in Habermasian terms?

One theoretical discussion of the potential of Habermasian theory as a basis for empirical research (Ch. 5) showed that whilst Habermas' work gave many indications of fruitful areas for study, there were problems in applying his theory. The most serious problem was his incorporation of cognitive psychology into his formulation of the social evolutionary process; in particular his uncritical acceptance of the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. Not only was Kohlberg's work questionable
at both the methodological and the analytical level but we considered his theoretical approach to moral judgement to be inconsistent with Habermas' own approach. For Kohlberg, moral judgement is seen in terms of the application of an individual's concept of justice where a relevant situation for studying judgement is one that elicits a choice on the basis of what is right or fair and leads the subject to reveal the level of his understanding. For Habermas, however, moral judgement is the process of judging between conflicts of interest in the practical realm - "action conflicts". A conflict of action is "morally relevant" if it is capable of consensual resolution. The morality of a judgement is not defined in relation to a subject's ideals.

In Chapter 6, we outlined a conceptual scheme suitable for analysing moral judgements from a Habermasian perspective without relying on Kohlberg's formulations. This scheme focuses on the logic used in the judgement process, allowing the logical form to be related to the general context, and to the elements of the subject's belief system referred to as grounds for choice. In order to investigate and evaluate the practicality of Habermas' theory for empirical research in the sociology of morality, we aim to apply the scheme to a school study. The theoretical context will be Habermas' formulation of moral evolution as the key to social evolution, the practical context, Greenbank Comprehensive School. The specific task will be to investigate tendencies towards the use of a universal ethics of speech (communicative morality) in pupils and to look for factors connected with its generation in home and school.

The procedures involved in this task are as follows:-

i) The formulation of a series of conflict situations, contextualised at the two major zones of relevance, to elicit moral judgements;

ii) The administration of a questionnaire containing the above material;

iii) The analysis of responses in terms of logical form and content;
iv) Consideration of the results from iii) together with background information to:-
   a) guide investigation into school influence,
   b) select pupils for intensive study in relation to home and school;

v) The conducting of an intensive study of selected pupils to include interviews of pupils, their tutors and their parents;

vi) Consideration of the relationships observed in this study in terms of Habermasian theory.

These procedures were carried out in three main phases of research. The first phase, which lasted for two terms was a period of observation and interaction. During this period the conceptual scheme and the questionnaire were constructed. The second phase, which lasted one term, consisted of getting to know the subjects in their context and of administering the questionnaire. The third phase was spent with the intensive-study pupils, mainly at the school, and included visits to their homes and interviews with their parents and tutors. The interviews were conducted over a period of one term, but informal contact continued, reports were obtained on all these pupils after a further two terms and all members of the "communicative" group were followed up approximately a year after their first interview.

The Study in Action: Phase I

Phase I was the period of observing the school world in general and in particular the life worlds of some of its sixth formers, through a lattice of projected Habermasian concepts. Habermas' works currently available in English (January 1978) had been read and particular attention had been directed to his essay, "Technology and Science as Ideology" and Legitimation Crisis. There was no precedent
for approaching morality at the empirical level from the perspective. Observation, informal interaction and a trial and error approach to the subject matter of morality would be necessary. At the same time, intuition, constant reflection by oneself and one's sixth form assistants, together with cross relating to other bodies of sociological understanding would be essential.

The aim of attempting to "operationalise" Habermasian theory, and using his concepts, to seek communicative morality in real-life terms was present at this stage, as was the intention of focussing on moral judgement as a key to moral consciousness. The scheme for conceptualising and analysing moral judgement in terms of Habermas' distinction between work and interaction (discussed in Ch. 6) emerged during this phase. At the end of it, the questionnaire, which included the situations on which judgement would be based, was constructed.

During this period, approximately two days per week were spent at the school at the official level, observing in the Religious Studies department. However, as Religious Studies staff shared a room, off the main staff area with the Drama staff, and both were frequently visited by friends, from English and Physical Education departments, in particular, observing spread unofficially into these areas. Lessons were observed in these subjects, with girls from first to fifth year and occasionally lessons were taken to relieve Religious Studies staff covering for other teachers absent through illness. During Phase II and III informal staff contact continued and Art, Music and Social Studies departments were visited. The informal contacts and wide observation were considered important, partly to become familiar with the normal routines and expectations of staff and pupils and partly to have some idea of the background experience of sixth formers in lower years.

Contact with sixth formers was solely through the Religious Studies
department. Two groups were joined; the first, a group of mixed lower and upper sixth girls who had elected to study World Religions on their Liberal Studies afternoon and the second, the lower sixth Religious Studies A level group preparing for the paper on Islam. The first group was attended as an observer for five weeks and when the upper sixth members retired from the group the five remaining lower sixth girls chose to help me investigate moral thinking rather than continue their course. They spent four hours in tape recorded sessions discussing themselves, their relations with their parents and their opinions of current social issues and problems. The group studying Islam for A level religious studies consisted of three girls, who accepted me as a friend of their teacher, who was interested in the subject and who was doing research in education. By the fourth lesson they had agreed to meet with me once weekly in their lunch hour in a vacant tutorial room to help me gain background for the research. The Islam lessons were attended twice weekly for two terms and during most weeks the groups met informally, except when illness, exams or other commitments intervened. Four months after we had first met I asked them why they had given their time so freely. They answered that they had found it "interesting" and they liked "helping" and "doing something constructive for a change". But they would have been more reluctant to help a teacher and would have found it more difficult to discuss how they felt about things. If someone they had not known had come and said "Right, I'm from so and so and I want to know what you think and you've got to discuss it, I want to know everything about you - " the response would be resentment. "Why should I tell somebody else what I think !"¹² This insight was applied to phase II the following school year and led to a shift from staffroom to sixth form common room for morning coffee drinking and the resolve to be as open as possible about research aims with the girls, asking for
their help and treating them as collaborators rather than research material. Discussions with the Liberal Studies group (five girls - three English and two Asian) centred on modern social problems and how the girls differed from their parents in their approach to such matters. It was during sessions with this group that the tendency to make evaluative statements that could not be justified was noted. This was in contrast to the Religious Studies group which consisted to some extent of trained moralists. Their O level course had included a section on moral problems and the girls had learnt to justify their judgements. The tendency of some girls in the first group to apply principles or paradigms unreflectingly when judging a moral situation led to the decision to follow Musgrave's precedent of applying the Schutzean monothetic/polythetic distinction to moral thought. This distinction and its relationship to the analytic scheme was discussed in Chapter 6.

The group of three discussed how they perceived their own changes in beliefs, attitudes and social behaviour and how they saw themselves in relation to their families. They also discussed issues, such as immigration, where they differed from their parents or where their parents held strong views and they supported their parents' beliefs. Kohlberg's dilemmas were discussed thoughtfully and comments were made as to the extent they represented realistic dilemmas. The girls produced situations from their own experience of when they had found themselves in a moral dilemma and these dilemmas were analysed by the group.

Two facts emerged from these discussions that influenced the research stage:-

i) That situations the girls found to be morally challenging tended to involve conflicts of loyalties rather than conflicts of duty or right;

ii) That the girls' approach to a topic was influenced by the source
of their experience of the topic.

With regard to i), a typical personal dilemma might involve the impossibility of being loyal to a friend and loyal to parents at the same time. Breaking trust with one was opposed by the need to show care to the other or to prevent the other getting hurt. Real life dilemmas seldom involved seeing problems in terms of what was one's duty. There was no strong belief that the law was necessarily right. Thus Kohlberg's dilemmas that had the concept of filial duty or obedience to the law as one of the "horns" were not seen as real life dilemmas.

The second fact was noted in discussions about general social problems. The group had discussed the problem of abortion law reform in a thoroughly rational fashion. Principles were applied and all aspects were examined. The girls had studied the problem in Religious Studies the previous year. Immigration, however, was handled contentiously and irrationally, one girl airing her father's right wing views whilst the others alternately pleaded for justice and derided her scornfully. Yet later, the girl who had argued for forced repatriation admitted that had she realised the tape recorder was on, she would have modified her argument. She was ashamed to be recorded sounding so callous, even though she felt that she and her father were right.

Such responses made one aware of contextual complications which involved not so much the way the topic was contextualised in the discussion but the way it related to a girl's inner world of experience. It was decided that what was being observed was the same phenomenon Schutz has discussed as "relevance". So relevance was introduced as a factor to be considered. This also underlined the problem, never entirely absent in research with a hermeneutic dimension, of the interaction of the subject's self-image with his or her understanding of the researcher's expectations. In this case the girl was an active member
of an evangelical church whose behaviour in lessons constantly pointed to her need to give the right answers. She felt she had not put forward a properly Christian argument on immigration, which, as the preliminary research was being conducted under the aegis of Religious Studies, was at least for her, the expected response. To minimise this source of invalidity one can stress the subject's anonymity, remain as dissociated as possible from specific group interests (e.g. staff, church, political interests) and emphasise the openness of the research's intentions. Even then, the subjects will have preconceptions of what sociology is about and what sociological research is looking for, which can lead them to angle their responses accordingly. To some extent "self-image" and "preconception" interaction can be overcome by the form of the questionnaire. Some questionnaires are constructed with an emphasis on ease of analysis of the information so collected, but with little thought to the process of answering the questionnaire or to what the responses represent. A questionnaire designed to minimise the above effects will first aim to be inherently interesting, holding the subject's attention and challenging him to think out the answers. Secondly it must be sufficiently varied in form to present the subjects from making assumptions about its intentions. Some items not intended for analysis and scoring may effectively be included to this end.

Attention to the tapes of the above discussions with both groups led to the observation that with the exception of the repetition of whole patterns of argument (derived from home or school lessons, for example), the girls each tended to use a consistent style when approaching a problem. One girl in particular saw all situations in relation to their ends, usually practical outcomes, which themselves were evaluated in terms of further ends. There was a strong emphasis on cause and effect and a temporal dimension that brought to mind the purposive-rational action of
technological progress. Her approach was contrasted with that of another in her group who was highly aware of interrelationships that existed between people, and believed in the need to involve all those concerned in making a decision. This girl had told the group how she had discussed Kohlberg's dilemmas at a party the night before, and that everyone had been very interested. The contrast between these two girls appeared more marked because it was the former girl who possessed a religious faith and tended to have the right "moral" answers. The outcome of these observations was the decision to analyse moral judgement primarily in terms of the manner or style used in the making of the judgement. As already outlined, this logical style or form, typified in terms of Habermas' work and interaction distinction, was built into the scheme for conceptualising and analysing moral judgement procedures.

The questionnaire and its morally relevant conflict situations

The questionnaire (see Appendix A) was constructed with the intention of stimulating thought and maximising reflectivity. The questions are as life-like as possible taking into consideration the general nature of the school and its neighbourhood. The questions to be answered concern conflicts of interests and loyalties or potential conflicts of values. Where questions refer to conflicts of interest Habermas' definition of morally relevant situations in terms of their potentiality for consensus has been accepted and the situations themselves are capable of consensual resolution. The problem of the Bloggs family (Section B, Q. 4), for example, could be approached discursively by any group of people knowing the facts. It also contains a dimension of internal resolution, however, where the people involved in the story can be advised to seek a consensus amongst themselves.

The questions are not all intended for analysis. They are of several
types. The background questions in section A are designed for use in grading the respondents according to school achievement, subject orientation and general scientific/technological bias. Section B includes questions for analysis, questions designed to help focus the respondent's thoughts and questions intended for follow-up interviews of those selected for the intensive study. Q.1, for example, ("helpful hints" for a younger sister or girl-next-door) is designed to focus attention on home, school and neighbourhood, the relevance zone of the next questions. Q.6 which follows naturally from the previous family-centred problems, is intended to stimulate thought about how girls actually deal with problem decisions. It will serve as a basis for future follow-up about patterns of communication in the family. Q.8(a) on controversial social and political issues, asks the respondents to consider which issues have been discussed with friends and family and Q.8(b) starts by asking for their order of importance for British society. The issues themselves were based on those chosen by members of the two discussion groups and some of their parents from a list of twenty-five social problems, as those they were interested in but were least sure about, i.e. the most truly controversial topics. (On some socially controversial matters, such as abortion, individuals tended to have very definite viewpoints. To them the matter was not open to debate.) The preliminary questions (Q.8(a) and Q.8(b) - 1st part) will be used in follow-up interviews on family relations but are primarily intended to force the pupils to reflect about the problems before starting to write. In particular, they are designed to encourage respondents to realise the many sources of knowledge about these problems and prevent the regurgitation of what their fathers said the previous night or their teachers said the previous day.

The questions to be analysed (2 - 5; 7, 8 b & c) are designed to lay particular emphasis on each of the two major zones of relevance.
Questions 2 - 5 refer to the zone of experience of personal relationships in home and school. Questions 7 and 8 refer to the zone of wider knowledge, gained from school study, the media, private reading, discussions with family and friends etc. The first set of contextualisation is referred to as the inner zone of relevance: the second as the outer zone of relevance.

In the inner zone, Q.2 and Q.3 refer not to actual conflict of interests but to potential conflicts of value. The first part of Q.2 serves to focus attention on a particular friendship, the second part then introduces the potential conflict between valuing close friends and a wide circle of friends. This question is to highlight the manner in which girls make judgements about those close to them. Question 3 switches the attention from friends to consociates as they relate to the school learning situation. Here, the potential conflict may be between the value of congeniality and the value of school progress but is also likely to involve various ways in which learning is understood and appreciated. Questions 4 and 5 involve conflicts of interests and loyalties in the context of neighbours and wider family. Question 4 deals not only with the needs of two children, which apparently cannot both be satisfied, but introduces a potential conflict between values such as achievement and the intrinsic worthwhileness of pursuing self-developing interests. Question 5 represents a conflict of loyalties - the teenage code of not telling on a peer conflicts with family loyalty. (This type of conflict had appeared meaningful to girls in the discussion groups of Phase I, including the two Asian members. Questionnaire responses indicated, however, that for some Asian girls family loyalty was so strong that no peer loyalty came into conflict with it.)

The zone of outer relevance is introduced with Q.7, a question about the neutron bomb. The obvious conflict is between valuing lives in themselves against the need for quick and decisive warfare but background
knowledge will add other dimensions. The issue had been widely discussed in the media. Q.8 refers to a series of conflict situations which again cannot be discussed without a certain degree of familiarity with at least some of the issues.

The questionnaire completed, the study could now move on to its administration in phase II, after a suitable period had elapsed for the matter to have been cleared through official ILEA channels.

The Study in Action: Phase II

Administration of questionnaire

Phase I had focussed on morally relevant situations in terms of Habermasian theory and had pursued the idea of relevance to include the contextualisation of a situation in the mind and memory of the moral agent (Schutz). Phase II now sought to elicit empirical evidence of moral consciousness through written moral judgements. The questionnaire form was chosen because it would give rise to a large amount of written material in the minimum time and, via analysis, lead to identification of girls tending towards the two polarised judgemental styles based on Habermas' distinction between work and interaction. It would also allow preliminary evidence of values referred to in judgemental procedures to be collected. If Phase I looked at empirical moral thought through a lattice of Habermasian concepts, Phase II commences the collection of data, defined in Habermasian terms.

Phase II commenced about a month after the new school year had begun. The combined sixth form (seven of the eight discussion group girls were now in the upper sixth, one having left) was told of the project and volunteers were recruited. Girls were asked to do the questionnaire with the understanding that on the basis of their answers, and possibly their subject emphasis, a number would be invited to become part of an
extended study with their parents. We were aiming for one hundred initial volunteers. Sixth form meetings were attended regularly to keep contact and make arrangements for times when the girls were free to do the questionnaire. Groups of girls, ranging from two to nine in number, did the questionnaire in twenty separate sessions either in spare periods or after school. The venue was usually a spare tutorial room during the school day or the common room after school. The procedure was kept standard. Girls took numbered questionnaires and signed for them. Confidentiality was stressed and girls were assured that they would not have to go any further than the questionnaire stage unless they wanted to. It was emphasised that they were not to let the questionnaire "strait-jacket" them - they could choose to withhold information if desired, they need not fill all the space provided, or if they wished they could use the backs of the pages also. If they thought a question was meaningless they could say so. They could take as long as they liked to complete it. They were asked not to discuss the questions with other girls and readily agreed.

Most girls took from three quarters to one hour to complete the questionnaire although one "got rather carried away" and took eighty minutes. There was no evidence that they had divulged any part of the questionnaire's contents during the six weeks of its administration. There was a steady trickle of positive feedback from the respondents, especially in the early stages, which encouraged others to volunteer. Tutors reported that girls had told them that it was interesting and made them think. By the end of term, eighty four girls had attempted the questionnaire and many hours had been spent in informal discussion with these and other sixth formers, especially with the lower sixth girls, as they had more time to spare. Upper sixth girls spent much less time at school, although officially they were only allowed one half day off per week, and they often missed the weekly year group meetings.
Although it had not been intended to include any of the original discussion group girls in the questionnaire, six out of the remaining seven were keen to be involved, so were included. Their original task had been to help me translate Habermas' ideas into formulations through which the empirical could be grasped: they had had no direct hand in the questionnaire nor did they know the underlying purpose of the project.

Table I shows the constitution of the group in terms of whether they were in the first or second year of the sixth form and whether they were taking two-year courses and thus studying at least one subject at A level, or whether they were taking one year courses which included subjects for C.S.E., C.E.E., G.C.E. O level and various R.S.A. courses. The upper sixth's total numbers quoted are those at the beginning of the term. By the time the eighty four girls had done the questionnaire the numbers would have been lower than those recorded. Upper sixth girls frequently found jobs and dropped out during their first term only telling the school after the event. The head of sixth form described the upper sixth as "a fluid group with a high drop-out rate" where numbers change from week to week.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Course direction</th>
<th>Upper Sixth</th>
<th>Lower Sixth</th>
<th>Total Sixth Formers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 year</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>2 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number attempting questionnaires</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number available (beginning of term)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion attempting questionnaires</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE I**
It can be seen from Table I that the highest proportion of girls attempting the questionnaire came from the two year courses. More than half of the upper sixth (54% is a conservative figure) and 63% of the lower sixth girls taking two-year A level based courses, attempted the questionnaire. Most of the one-year pupils found the last two questions very difficult and many one-year course girls were not sufficiently confident to attempt it at all. Until the last of the six weeks during which the questionnaire was being conducted, only thirteen of these girls had come forward. An additional twenty one attempted it during the last full week of term when I was stationed full-time in the sixth form common room. They now had confidence in me as a person, had seen that others had survived the experience and had few end of term commitments, such as last minute essays or projects to hand in. The upper sixth girls doing one-year courses were all doing R.S.A. commercial subjects and spent most of their time in the commercial department, the two attempting the questionnaire taking a lower proportion of commercial subjects and spending some time in the sixth form block. Many of the one-year course girls, including a number attempting the questionnaire, were of a very low academic level indeed. Only eleven of the eighty four girls were taking four or more O levels and thirty were taking no subjects at O level. Whilst as a group they could be considered as "low achievers", compared with girls taking one or more subjects at A level, their reasons for low achievement and their potential for further achievement varied greatly within the group. Those repeating O levels or doing one or more O levels after a background of C.S.E. subjects had, in most cases, some career plans and were by no means below average academic ability. Many, however, had been unable to find jobs after their fifth year, had few C.S.E. qualifications and were staying on at school to gain extra maturity in a sheltered environment. Some Asian girls, in particular, had problems with English, and were taking a non-examination Basic English
course. It was mainly girls of this latter type who comprised the twenty-one who responded during the last week of term. Five one-year course girls did not attempt the last two questions. (Table III shows the occurrence of unattempted questions). Many, however, had difficulty in managing the ideas in these questions and had problems of written self expression throughout the questionnaire. Difficulties in assessing such questionnaire responses will be referred to below.

The fifty girls taking two-year (A-level based) courses were classified, on the basis of the academic information given in the questionnaires, into those with a science emphasis and those with a humanities emphasis. Both groups were further classified mainly on the basis of achievement at O level. This classification was done in order to get a preliminary indication of whether it would be fruitful to follow up the effect of science-orientated study and of school achievement on moral consciousness. Results of the questionnaire analysis in terms of these categories are given in Table IV and the possibility of bias is discussed in Appendix B.

The two-year course respondents were classified as having a science or humanities emphasis on the basis of their A level subjects. Those classified as science-based were taking A levels in Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics or Biology. If Biology or Mathematics was the only A level from the above list and was taken in conjunction with humanities subjects (at O or A level), the respondent was classified as having a humanities bias. If Biology or Mathematics was taken in conjunction with at least two science subjects at O level (Geology now included) the girl was classified as science-biased. Geography was treated as a humanities subject. However, in cases where it accompanied Biology as an A level subject, where there were no other humanities A levels being taken and where there was an additional science subject being studied at O
level, the respondent was classified as science-biased.

The humanities-biased girls, like those taking one-year courses were wide ranging in ability and academic background. Some were keen humanities students who were aiming at an Arts-based university course. Many, however, were taking a single A level whilst re-taking O levels needed for their careers, or whilst making up their minds on what to do in the future. They were sub-divided on the basis of their academic achievement level. Class I humanities students were doing at least two subjects at A level and had gained at least six O level passes at grade C or better (or C.S.E. grade 1). Class II humanities students were doing one or two A levels accompanied by C.S.E. or O level subjects. They did not have the prerequisite six O levels.

Respondents classified as science-biased had stronger academic backgrounds than the humanities-biased girls. Most intended to follow a career in a scientific- or technologically-based field. At an all-girls school this is a common occurrence. The sub-classification thus was slanted to show not only academic achievement but the degree of scientific commitment. A student wishing to continue with Biology, for example, must take other sciences at A level to gain entry into biologically-based careers. Class I science students were classified on the basis of taking at least two sciences at A level, one of which was Chemistry or Physics. All had the prerequisite six O levels at grade C or better. Class II science students did not have both these requirements, several attempting to qualify for a science-based career with weak backgrounds and (according to tutors) little hope of success, and others having stronger backgrounds but not Chemistry or Physics at A level. Table II shows how the girls divided up according to the above classification.
SCHOOL RELATIONS

CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO YEAR, SUBJECT-BIAS
AND ACHIEVEMENT LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of respondents</th>
<th>Science-Biased</th>
<th>Humanities-Biased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>Class II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Sixth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Sixth</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sixth Form</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Proportion of respondents (%) | 14% | 16% | 30% | 28% | 42% | 70% | 100% |

| TABLE II |

It will be noted that 30% of the respondents taking A levels were science-biased and 70% were humanities-biased. This was approximately the same proportion that existed in the sixth form as a whole. Sixth form classes in Physics and Chemistry at Greenbank were small and although more girls studied Biology in the lower sixth, Biology passes at A level were few. In the 1978 A level examinations, of the twenty-seven girls who passed some subjects twenty gained passes in humanities subjects only, four passed in Chemistry (with Physics, Biology or Mathematics as accompanying subjects) and three included Biology without accompanying Sciences. Thus 74% passed in humanities and 26% in sciences, including Biology. We shall keep this information in mind when we come to look at the analysis of moral judgement in relation to school subject bias and experience of achievement.

Analysis of Questionnaire

The questionnaire responses (which represented moral judgements) were analysed in terms of their form and content according to the scheme
discussed in Chapter 6. This necessitated selecting sets of criteria for distinguishing between the two logical forms. Here we moved into a further stage in translating Habermasian theory into practice. The moral and interaction distinction is now spelt out as detailed sets of criteria whereby everyday judgements of personal and political problems can be logically typified.

The respondents' judgements were analysed at the end of the school term. Although by now the head and deputy head of sixth form had given their opinions on the eighty four respondents and many of them were well known to me, contact with them had not included written work, so their writing was not familiar. This meant that, during analysis, the respondents remained anonymous. Because Habermas has only left general guidelines for characterising communicative, strategic and instrumental action, it was necessary to look for more specific criteria in the terms of the conflict situations. To characterise communicative logic, we thus looked for the limiting conditions needed for the communicative ethic to be put into practice, in terms of the way individuals, activities and situations were approached. We saw strategic/instrumental logic as purposive-rational approaches which acted in contradiction to the above communicative ones. These factors were looked for during the first reading through of the girls' responses. Some basic criteria were isolated and the answers were assessed and reassessed while the system of evaluation was being refined. The assessment and scoring of the answers was checked by an assistant who was an experienced English teacher. One general approach probably had more in common with practiced school marking procedures than with sociological methodology. With the open-endedness of the questions it was quite impossible to make a detailed analysis of codified responses and we found it sufficient to work from a set of criteria extracted from the girls' responses.
Analysing the logical form: It will be recalled that the initial categorisation of moral judgements was in terms of a monothetic or a polythetic approach. It was pointed out that the distinction into strategic/instrumental and communicative logical form could only be made with a stepwise or polythetic form of judgement. The questions were designed to minimise the direct application of "recipes", whether as moral principles or paradigms for action. Monothetic responses were still quite common, however, either because of the respondents' keenness to solve the issue by applying practical paradigms or because of an inability to think the problem through. Classification as monothetic meant that the question was not analysed further and gained a score of 0. As we were working with a continuous scale for scoring, where strategic and instrumental logic scored on the minus axis and communicative logic on the positive (see below), a monothetic judgement scored the same as one that was equally balanced for the two opposing logical approaches.

Monothetic judgements were most common with regard to the problem of the Bloggs family (Q.4). The dilemma was by-passed in the respondents' enthusiasm to solve the problem. Student 74, for example gave her reason for judgement as one word - "equality" and advised Mrs Bloggs "to take each child in turn, e.g. 1 month swimming, next month training", whilst student 51 answered that, "She should give an equal chance to both children". Some respondents elaborated on such by-passes but where they answered with a series of recipe solutions they sometimes strung them together in such a way that one scoring criteria applied. Few monothetic judgements were given with the other situations in the zone of inner relevance (Q.2 - 5) but they appeared again in Q.7 responses. Some gave a judgement in terms of right and wrong without analysing the question. Student 40 gave her opinion as, "I think it too is immoral and should be banned" and her reason for judgement as, "I think it is totally wrong, that property is more important than a human life". There was also the
overriding interest that ruled out any controversy: "A Bomb is a bomb - I pray there will never be a war in my lifetime. Ban all Bombs." The rationale for this opinion was the simple statement: "I am a pacifist" (Student 41). Such responses were more commonly given by girls with weak academic backgrounds. Whilst a monothetic response was scored as if it were an ambivalent or neutral response, it was separately recorded on each respondent's record card for follow-up at interview (should the respondent become part of the intensive study). Table III shows the distribution of monothetic responses over the questions.

The analysis of polythetic judgements was based on a set of criteria relating to these areas - interpersonal relationships, human activities and the relationship of people to the world. In each case an aspect that was basic to communicative morality was contrasted with the corresponding aspect which typified strategic or instrumental action. The logic was assessed as the way people, activities and the wider environmental relations were approached in the discussion. The following were our guidelines in these three areas:

A. **Interpersonal relationships.** If people are to be able to enter into discursive norm formation they must treat other people as responsible and rational. Other humans must be approached as autonomous, as subjects not objects, as ends in themselves and not as means to ends. There must be an expectation of mutuality. A communicative approach, whether directly or indirectly focussed on human relationship must deal with people in these ways. Strategic or instrumental approaches will see people as atomistic individuals or collectives, as objects rather than subjects they will use them as pawns or see them as using each other as a means to an end. We can thus make the following distinctions in a rather more embodied form, i.e. as actual indicators that emerged from the responses.
COMMUNICATIVE LOGIC  
1. - emphasis on mutuality.  
2. - discussion or sharing of ideas seen as good in terms of common interests, or the resolution of interests.  
3. - others treated as reasonable people, capable of making their own choices.  
4. - peoples' lives seen as valuable to the people themselves.  
5. - relationships seen as reflexive.  
6. - people treated as subjects, able to change themselves (rational autonomy).  
7. - human needs take precedence over principles.

STRATEGIC/INSTRUMENTAL LOGIC  
1. - emphasis on reciprocity, exchanges between atomistic individuals.  
2. - discussion seen in terms of its usefulness to a private purpose, or regarded as unimportant.  
3. - others are manipulated for their own good.  
4. - peoples' lives seen in terms of their value to others (e.g. friends, family).  
5. - relationships seen as non-reflexive, one-directional.  
6. - people seen as objects which are changed by outside circumstances, but unable to co-operate in their own change.  
7. - principles take precedence over human needs.

Points 1 and 2 tended to emerge in response to Q.2 and Q.3. Student 34, for example, who proved to be consistently communicative in her logic, distinguishes the nature of friends and acquaintances in terms of the style of communication. Acquaintances are defined as having fun with each other, whilst close friendship involves "trust and complete confidence" for the sharing of problems. She responds to Q.3 as follows:

If classes are small you find that as time progresses you get to know the other girls better. Some girls you may never have spoken to before become a part of the group. The group is very much a unit. If the group can communicate with each other you find the work is made a little easier to understand because you can talk about it together.

This stress on mutuality and sharing of ideas is contrasted by the following responses. Student 74 prefers a wide circle of friends "because you got more people to turn to and if one is not understanding, then you got someone else. . .", whilst student 54 feels that a few close friends will mean "there is less people to upset". A small class should get on,
in the opinion of student 2 to overcome boredom, otherwise "there would be no-one to talk to about my holidays, boyfriend etc." These responses also illustrate point 5: friendship is seen as one-directional. The extreme negation of point 2 is shown by a total unawareness of the efficacy of sharing ideas. It is immaterial whether or not you get on with your classmates because, ". . . you are in a lesson to work and communicate with the teacher", (student 31), and ". . . you are not there to talk but the work for the exams that you desire" (student 75).

Point 3 and its related point 6 (rational autonomy) are illustrated by the responses to the problem of the potentially delinquent cousin (Q.5). Student 14 will talk to her cousin and "perhaps to his friends" but she respects his autonomy: ". . . I certainly would not tell his parents because if he wants them to know it's his job in telling them." Student 18 has no such worries. She will try to "stop him" and "make him see that he is wrong". If she fails, ". . . it might be an idea to contact the police without him finding out who it was that did it." This student may not respect her cousin's autonomy but she considers him potentially capable of being changed, even if not of changing himself. Student 45, however, would tell her parents and hope they would tell his parents because she ". . . wouldn't want his bad character reflecting onto our part of family . . ." This emphasis on people's lives (or welfare) as being approached in terms of their meaning for others (point 4), was seen more commonly in discussions on euthanasia where an individual's suffering was seen in terms of the distress it caused relatives.

True strategic logic where people's needs must give way to a rule, such as a moral principle (point 7) is shown in this approach to the Bloggs problem (Q.4). Student 70 writes: "Talk to both the children, explain the situation and tell them that until her finances improve neither will continue their activities. This way the solution is fair."
Communicative responses to this problem included that of student 14 who advised Mrs Bloggs to discuss the matter with the children to "ask their feelings about the situation" and student 7 who advises that the problem be discussed with the manager of the county team "to see what he could suggest.

8. **Human Activities.** Communicative morality is based on action as seen as interaction not action in the production sense which results in a product external to it. A norm that may be the agreed outcome of discourse is not its product in the same way that labour produces commodities. So, to communicative logic, human activities are seen in terms of their intrinsic nature, not in terms of external outcomes. Strategic/instrumental logic sets external goals to its activities, evaluating them in terms of outcomes.

Criteria for distinguishing human activities emerged from the responses as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>COMMUNICATIVE LOGIC</strong></th>
<th><strong>STRATEGIC/INSTRUMENTAL LOGIC</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ACTIVITIES (WORK, HOBBIES, SPORTS &amp;c.) worthwhile pursuing for themselves. [Solitary pursuits - inherently worthwhile. Shared activities - inherently worthwhile and/or worthwhile in terms of social interaction.]</td>
<td>1. ACTIVITIES (WORK, HOBBIES, SPORTS &amp;c.) worthwhile in terms of extrinsic criteria - achievement, success or improved social status (shared activities).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Knowledge valued in relation to understanding.</td>
<td>2. Knowledge valued in relation to external ends of power or progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Human activities seen interactionally - doing and understanding are never entirely private matters.</td>
<td>3. Human activities seen individualistically - doing and understanding are private matters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This set of criteria emerged most strongly in the responses to the Bloggs problem (Q.4). The strategic/instrumental response saw no real problem as only one child had achieved (seen in terms of standard or recognition). So student 83 advises Mrs Bloggs to: "Tell the younger child to give up swimming and support the elder child" because, "the
elder girl has proved she is serious about gymnastics by getting as far as the county team - the younger one is only enjoying swimming - it could be a flash in the pan." Another comes to a similar decision because, "the older child had obviously been training hard to achieve a place in the county's team, so the opportunity cannot be lost." (Student 31). The reason may be expressed in the more moral language of "being serious" or "training hard" but the real criterion is achievement. This approach was contrasted by those who saw the situation as a real dilemma because both children had real needs at stake. So student 37 takes into consideration, "the happiness of the two children, in doing something because they want to do it", whilst student 67 considers it important, "not to dampen the younger child's interest", although neither can see any resolution to the dilemma.

Applied to school work this extrinsic evaluation of activities was noted in the students who saw lessons in terms of examination outcomes, e.g. student 76 who was not in class to talk but to work for the desired exams. The question about small classes (Q.3) also highlighted point 3. Thus, student 18 thinks relationships in class are important as they help in her own task of learning. It is a very practical matter. "You also tend to like to compare work when you are in so small a class and if you don't get on well you might be afraid to share your mark especially if it was bad." Point 2, knowledge, in terms of understanding or usefulness, emerged at one level in the same question, but was also implicit in some responses that considered the problem of the neutron bomb.

C. The relationship of people to the world. Communicative morality works at the level of human interaction but it will involve an approach to the world. The world must be seen as capable of being changed through human action. This human action must not be of the instrumental type based on
a direct cause and effect relationship. The relationship between human action and the world will be seen as a complex network of dynamic inter-reactions where people co-operate to bring about change.

In the context of the questionnaire, these aspects mainly emerged in responses to the last two questions (Q.7 and Q.8). Perhaps because the situations were all ones that were directly or indirectly connected with technological progress, the criteria were primarily seen in terms of strategic/instrumental logic to which, in this instance, we contrasted the communicative approach. Criteria emerged from the responses thus:

**STRATEGIC/INSTRUMENTAL LOGIC**

1. People related to the world linearly, cause-effect relationships. (People obey same laws as physical world).
2. World events determine change. People are powerless.
3. Progress means technological progress. Progress is inevitable (fatalistic attitude).
4. Situation need not involve people - can be seen in terms of money or property.

**COMMUNICATIVE LOGIC**

1. People have complex patterns of inter-relationships with each other and the world.
2. People can affect change via communicative action.
3. Progress means human co-operation.
4. All situations involve people.

The determinism of point 2 was demonstrated by responses to the question on the neutron bomb (Q.7). Student 9, for example, believes it to be "necessary if not for now, for the future. The neutron bomb is "essential" in regard to the arms race because "we are faced with very real confrontations."

It was realised that there can be a passive instrumentality as well as an active instrumentality. This is referred to in point 3 as fatalism. Whilst active instrumentality achieves its end through the methods of technology, passive instrumentality is the victim of technology. It is fatalistic in that it doubts the power of human action and allows itself to become an object, a pawn in the game. Student 45 combines a belief in
technological progress with such a fatalism. The neutron bomb should not be banned because, "You can't stop scientific advancement in my opinion. It would carry on illegally if necessary... it's human nature to go against law." A stronger fatalism still is shown by student 1 who connects progress with disaster. "People will keep on inventing new ideas creating new wars this will always happen until man no longer has a world left." Student 76 has more hope for the human race which "is only just beginning to expand its ideas and so has a long way to go before it is completely good." In the meantime she considers it advisable to ban the Bomb. A more truly communicative approach comes from student 64 who thinks, "that we are civilised enough now to sort our differences by talking rather than by killing each other."

Linear or cause/effect approaches (point 1) were used when discussing the arms race and commonly in discussing the problem of law and order. More police powers or longer sentences will automatically lead to fewer crimes. A few extended this reasoning to immigration. So, to student 70, as many of Britain's problems "stem from not enough houses/jobs/health service etc." immigration control will overcome these problems. There is a linear relationship; fewer immigrants leads to more jobs.

Student 28 illustrates point 4, the "peopleless" approach, most succinctly. She believes production of the neutron bomb should be stopped, "Because a vast amount of money is being spent on the development, and it may never be used."

The assessment of the polythetic judgments was made according to a continuous scale where -3 represented the maximum degree of strategic/instrumentality, +3 maximum communicability and 0 was a neutral position. Responses to each of the six questions were assessed in terms of the above criteria, instances of any procedural step in terms of these approaches
being noted. The question was then given a score for the degree of communicability and/or strategic/instrumentality on the basis of instances of use of the relevant logic. For each of the two axes (+: communicative; -: strategic/instrumental) for each question, judgements were assessed on a 1 - 3 scale. On each scale, approximately 60-70% respondents using that logical form were graded 1, 20-30% were graded 2 and 0-10% were graded 3. The two scores were then added, the figure now indicating a resultant degree of communicability or strategic/instrumentality in the response. As the criteria had been determined on the basis of the two approaches being opposed, this procedure was considered justified. It was quite common for respondents to have one unit of communicability cancelled by one unit of strategic/instrumentality, such responses showing an ambivalent approach. It was unknown for girls to show a high degree of both opposing logics within the same question but a number had 2 units in one direction accompanied by 1 unit in the opposite direction, giving them a resultant score of + or -1. The question showing the highest occurrence of ambivalence was Q.8, the most open question on social problems. Here there was evidence, in many cases, of portions of school knowledge juxtaposed with parental opinions. Some respondents were honest here, student 40 for example, adding this codis to her answer to Q.8c): "My parents have taught this to me and I am not sure whether or not I feel the same way, I think I am confused."

The number of respondents gaining a resultant score in each category for each of the six questions is shown in Table III. It can be seen, immediately, that there is a considerable variation in response from question to question. This is particularly apparent with the large numbers of monothetic responses in Q.4 and Q.7 compared with the other questions. These questions posed very relevant problems which appeared to provoke an emotive response from many girls so that they attempted to escape the dilemma by applying a moral or practical recipe without thinking the
situation through. Question 5 elicited the lowest proportion of monothetic responses, probably because it gave the girls a series of alternatives which helped them think their judgements through. Some questions were more prone to elicit communicative responses than others. Q.5 for example had no truly instrumental factors associated with it - it was a question that opposed strategic to communicative logic. Responses cluster around the moderate communicative score of 1. Q.3, however, dealing with a school situation, introduced implicitly the truly instrumental factor of examination success. Responses cluster around the moderate strategic/instrumental score of 1.

### LOGICAL FORM OF JUDGEMENT

**RESULTANT SCORES FOR 84 SIXTH FORM RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q.</th>
<th>Mono-</th>
<th>Strategic/</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Communicative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>omi-</td>
<td>thetic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ted</td>
<td>responses</td>
<td>-3 -2 -1 0</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.2</td>
<td>friends</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 10 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.3</td>
<td>small classes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 35 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.4</td>
<td>the Bloggs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>- 5 11 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.5</td>
<td>the cousin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 13 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.7</td>
<td>neutron bomb</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>- 6 18 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.8</td>
<td>social problem</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8 5 8 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE III**

We have made no attempt to put these raw scores in a more sophisticated form or to further scale them in any way. The questionnaire was no more
than a crude tool and if such an approach were to be standardised, the
questions themselves, as well as the scoring, would need considerable
refining. The task of the questionnaire was to enable us to distinguish
between individuals who showed a consistently high use of communicative
logic from those who showed a consistent use of strategic/instrumental
logic. Consistency was to be assessed in terms of the maintenance of the
same logical approach in both the inner zone of relevance and the outer
relevance zone. The inner zone was represented on the questionnaire
by Qs 2-5 and the outer zone by Qs 7-8, so by comparing each student's
mean for the two sections we could get an indication of those showing
some consistency. No comparative analysis was made across the two zones,
first because the questionnaire itself, with its scoring system, was by
no means a sensitive instrument and secondly because the first mean
resulted from four questions and the second from only two questions.

Respondents were classified as "consistently communicative" if
their mean score for both sections was 0.5 or greater and consistently
strategic/instrumental "if their mean scores for both were -0.5 or less.
Respondents showing a resultant communicative score of at least 0.5
in one section and a strategic instrumental score of -0.5 or less in
the other (or 0 in one section and + or -1 in the other) were classified
as "inconsistent" and the remainder as "neutral". Of the eighty four
respondents, twenty two were thus classified as consistently communicative
and eleven as consistently strategic/instrumental. Twenty four were
classified as inconsistent and twenty seven as neutral. Of those
respondents classified as consistently communicative, ten had totals for
the two means in excess of 2 and of those consistently strategic/instrumental, four had totals of less than -2. These girls, at least,
would be sought for the follow-up study as their responses were good
examples of the two logical extremes.
Table IV shows the number of respondents in each category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of 6th Form</th>
<th>Classification in terms of logical form</th>
<th>Humanities-biased</th>
<th>Science-biased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper 6th</td>
<td>Consistently communicative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistently strategic/instrumental</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inconsistent</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower 6th</td>
<td>Consistently communicative</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistently strategic/instrumental</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inconsistent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE IV**

Table IV shows that individuals who were classified as consistently communicative or consistently strategic/instrumental come from a wide range of subject and achievement backgrounds. There does not seem to be any immediate connection between the logical form of the moral judgement process, as we assessed it, and the school relations as we classified them. Appendix B shows the results of a preliminary examination of these relationships which concluded that it would not be fruitful to attempt to look further at school influence on moral judgement in these terms. The table points to the inability of the questionnaire to discriminate effectively between girls taking one-year
courses, who we have already described as being, in many cases, of very low ability. The high proportion classed as "neutral" was partly owing to the larger number of monothetic responses but also to the fact that these girls tended to write less and be much less committed in their views. In the last two questions (Q.7 and Q.8) many had trouble with their answers because they lacked background knowledge.

The analysis of the judgements in terms of content, i.e. material referred to in substantiating the judgements, was done concurrently with the analysis of the logical form. The relationship between form and value content was discussed and schematised in Chapter 6. We are here continuing to analyse our empirical data in terms of the scheme devised from Habermasian theory. In the context of the responses it was impossible to make any fine philosophical distinctions. We noted concepts referred to by the respondents in the context of being "goods" (or desirables) as "bads" (undesirables). It was mentioned in the last chapter that we expected this reference matter to include beliefs, values, principles, paradigms and so on. Respondents, in fact, made their judgements with reference to what they found valuable or believed in rather than to beliefs about the world. Most values were referred to in positive terms but some negative values were referred to, especially in response to Q.7 (neutron bomb).

These positive and negative values are listed, in order of popularity, in Table V. Negative values have not been translated into their positive forms as it is easy to change meanings. Loving peace is different from hating war. In most cases the actual phrase used by the respondents has been recorded but in a few cases when the meaning was quite clear it has been grouped under a more common phrase, e.g. "doing what you enjoy", was subsumed under the phrase "pursuing interests". Achievement was commonly mentioned by name but we included such phrases as "doing well at
it" and "reached the top" as clearly indicating achievement rather than pursuit of interests. Conceptual distinctions have been made so that, for example, trust is not confused with understanding. Both were commonly referred to in the context of Q.2 a) which asked for meaningful aspects of a friendship. Thus, as we have recorded the number of respondents referring (once or more than once) to each concept or value, "trust" and "understanding" may or may not have been referred to by the same girl. Table V records these values according to the prevailing logic used by the respondents.

It will be noted first that the proportions of the highly and consistently polarised respondents are greater in referring to values in making judgements than are those of the remainder. This is largely on account of the large numbers of more academically limited girls whose final scores tended to place them in the neutral group. Many referred to values when the question was appropriately worded, as with Q.2a) about the meaningfulness of friendship but otherwise tended to be sparse with reference matter. This is a limitation of a written questionnaire.

The two most generally referred to values were trust and independence which were highly regarded. Fairness was also widely accepted and was probably the underlying reason for many of the monothetic responses to the Bloggs problem, but when it was not specifically mentioned it was not recorded. Human life is highly regarded. It was more commonly referred to in its negative form of destruction of human life being an evil. Altogether half the respondents referred to the value of human life, whilst others referred indirectly and thus less strongly, in terms of the destruction of the world being a terrible thing.
CONCEPTS REFERRED TO IN MAKING JUDGEMENTS RELATED TO RESPONDENTS' PREVAILING LOGIC

(each number represents one respondent who referred to the value once or more than once).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITIVE VALUES</th>
<th>CONSISTENTLY COMMUNICATIVE RESPONDENTS N=22 (%)</th>
<th>CONSISTENTLY STRAT./INSTRUMENTAL RESPONDENTS N=11 (%)</th>
<th>OTHERS N=51 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>9 (41)</td>
<td>2 (18)</td>
<td>15 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>5 (23)</td>
<td>4 (36)</td>
<td>13 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 (64)</td>
<td>12 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding others</td>
<td>6 (27)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>12 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sincerity/honesty</td>
<td>7 (32)</td>
<td>3 (27)</td>
<td>8 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion/communication</td>
<td>9 (41)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>5 (23)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>9 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human life</td>
<td>5 (23)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindness/caring</td>
<td>1 (4)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony</td>
<td>6 (27)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>4 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humour</td>
<td>2 (9)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>6 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuing interests</td>
<td>6 (27)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grasping opportunities</td>
<td>1 (4)</td>
<td>5 (45)</td>
<td>2 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal relationship/sociability</td>
<td>4 (18)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>2 (9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>5 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>2 (9)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (27)</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of life</td>
<td>3 (14)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NEGATIVE VALUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSISTENTLY COMMUNICATIVE RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>CONSISTENTLY STRAT./INSTRUMENTAL RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>OTHERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=22 (%)</td>
<td>N=11 (%)</td>
<td>N=51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroying human life</td>
<td>10 (45)</td>
<td>3 (27)</td>
<td>16 (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>5 (9)</td>
<td>3 (27)</td>
<td>4 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>3 (23)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>7 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissension/tension</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>10 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice/racism</td>
<td>5 (23)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroying world</td>
<td>2 (9)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE V**

Whilst it is realised that with only eleven respondents occupying the strategic/instrumental category we cannot talk of "statistical significance", it is interesting to look at the values referred to by members of the two polarised groups where they are proportionately higher than those of the control group. Thus, consistently communicative respondents emphasised trust, understanding others, sincerity or honesty, discussion or communication, harmony, the pursuit of interests and the value of human life. Strategic/instrumental respondents consistently emphasised achievement and grasping opportunities, and also referred to independence, sincerity or honesty. Violence was considered as bad as the destruction of human life and no-one mentioned human life or quality of life in positive terms. It is interesting that of the four respondents referring to order as a social "good", three of them were in the strategic/instrumental category.

To some extent the ideas and values that we recorded as most commonly referred to by these groups were bound up with the scoring of the logical form. Hence a girl referring to the need to communicate in a
small group was quite likely to receive a point on the communicative axis whilst one who saw the small class in terms of examination success might refer to achievement in this context. And achievement being an extrinsic factor will tend to be approached as a goal and thus lead to a score on the strategic/instrumental axis. But first, it must be stressed that in scoring for the logical form, points were not given because a respondent referred to communication or achievement: the way the value was approached was all important. Hence it was quite possible to mention class discussion in terms of its efficacy for bringing about an atmosphere of harmony which would lead to better results, or as the highly instrumental student 18 put it, "It helps the teacher if you all get on well because its harder to teach a divided class than a united one." Here discussion was not seen as a desirable state of affairs in itself but as a means to an end. Although the concept of achievement and the nature of the questions may have meant that it was associated with a score on the strategic/instrumental axis there was no direct connection between the concept "grasping opportunities" and logical form. An opportunity can be grasped for improving community relationships just as well as for some extrinsic and linear end. Yet this was a popular value for strategic/instrumentalists. Secondly, it must be emphasised that to be classified as consistently polarised in the use of either logic, a respondent had to maintain the approach across a series of questions. Only two out of the six questions were suitable for reference to be made to achievement, for example. The value of "trust" was not directly associated with scoring of logical form although it tended to be elicited by the questions on friendship and family relationships. It was highly valued by those who favoured a communicative logical approach. It is interesting to note that the consistently polarised respondents thought highly of sincerity and that those who stressed the comfortable values of kindness and caring were not strongly polarised. It was the
control group, too, who alluded to dissension in negative terms whilst there was a wide scattering in this group of reference to such "bads" as "boredom", "loneliness", "unpleasantness", "insecurity" and "wasting money". These concepts are not related to commitment as are the stronger values and virtues emphasised by the polarised groups.

We thus have the beginnings of an association between values and virtues and a tendency towards a particular logical approach of the making of moral judgements. Communicative logic tends to be used in association with an attitude of trust where understanding of others and of situations is sought through discussion. Harmony, rather than order is seen as important in the social sphere. Activities are seen in terms of their intrinsic worthwhileness. Personal traits of sincerity and independence are valued as is fairness but the greatest value of all is placed on human life. Strategic/instrumental logic is associated with extrinsic values such as achievement and to this end independence and sincerity are important. Understanding and discussion are not valued in themselves. Social order is important and such things as violence which interfere with order are considered as social evils.

We do not claim that this is any more than a beginning. We have already noted the limitations of the questionnaire both as a general method and in this particular case. There is always a problem of interpretation in addition to the problem of written expression. We thus do not intend to extract any further significance from the reference material we gleaned from the questionnaire responses. They were useful, however, in relationship to the interview approach of the intensive study because we believe that when one is considering moral consciousness in general, rather than specific moral judgements, a person's values are only meaningful when related to his world view or system of beliefs.

The relationship of context in terms of relevance level has already been briefly referred to. The two distinct relevance levels were built
into the questionnaire to help us isolate consistent users of the polarised logical forms. It was particularly important to include the outer zone of wider issues, first to discriminate a tendency towards communicative morality from the adolescent morality of interpersonal relationships and secondly to give a chance for school influences to be observed.

In Chapter 6 we drew attention to Kitwood's conclusion that much adolescent morality is based, almost entirely, on the experience of personal relationships with friends. While this type of morality proves adequate for solving day to day practical problems it is essentially particularistic and not suitable for application to wider issues. If all questions were focussed on familiar everyday situations it would be possible to confuse this restricted form with the universalistic communicative morality. School knowledge is particularly associated with an understanding of the wider world. This knowledge would be largely elicited with respect to the outer zone of relevance. Consistency in use of logic throughout the two zones will show a consistency in approach to morality in terms of one's understanding which is largely centred on home and friends and of one's understanding which has been exposed to school influences.

The wider issues did elicit a different set of values from those of the inner relevance zone. Responses to Q.7 and Q.8 were often given with reference to the value of human life which was not a suitable basis for judgements in the personal sphere. Some values were maintained throughout the two sections so that trust and communication were seen (almost entirely, now, by committed "communicators") with relation to international problems and issues such as euthanasia. There was, however, no way of relating the reference matter to the experience to which it related, unless the respondent volunteered the information. The "focussing" section of Q.8 was meant to stimulate awareness of the source
of the knowledge in the respondent herself and in some cases it gave a clue to the origin of the concepts expressed.

Some respondents gave full details of the context of their knowledge. Student 23, for example knew that the neutron bomb was in the long run a "good idea" even though she realised it would cause "tension and pressure on people suffering as a cause from it being developed". She cannot really remember why she believes this but knows it is the right answer: "I've come to this conclusion, because I have done History and already discussed it with my teacher. And we all came to the conclusion that it is something good." "But not good in the sense that it kills the people and leaves their property behind." Student 23 had received a 5 for C.S.E. History the previous year and was not studying the subject currently.

Serious students of History (i.e. A level candidates) did not refer to the source of their ideas. It is possible that one A level History student who discussed the neutron bomb in very deterministic terms was influenced by the cause and effect approach of exam-orientated History. Student 9, quoted above for her use of strategic/instrumental logic in Q.7, discussed a series of issues in Q.8 in highly communicative terms. "The 5% Pay Policy problem has got to be discussed", she declared. Her arguments were many and varied. "... I do not believe in the Tory free pay bargaining system whereby people can work for as much as they want - what about people with set wages, e.g. teachers? Besides it is not more [wages] that we want but more of the necessary requirements for life which we have to work for - but need." On checking back to Q.8a) one learnt that Government Pay Policy had been discussed with the Young Socialists. It was this girl (classified as consistently communicative in spite of her lapse in Q.7) that tutors later told me was "going through a rather Bolshie stage." Another communicative respondent referred to the Young Socialists as the source of her knowledge on the
same topic and I later discovered she had gone with student 9 to two
of their meetings. Student 9 also referred to a "school discussion group".
Only two other girls (students 33 and 36) referred specifically to this
group but many respondents whom I later discovered belonged to this group,
referred to their discussions "with friends" which would include this
group. The group was the product of this particular lower sixth form
where the most able academically were also interested in social issues.
There is an undoubted connection between this group and the fact that 7
out of the 9 highly achieving ('Class I') respondents from the lower sixth
were classified as consistently communicative. The seven either belonged
to the group or had friends who did. But a questionnaire and reasonable
background knowledge can say no more than that. These girls approved of
all forms of social interchange, including talking with sociologists and
co-operating in questionnaires. There were some high achievers who did
not attempt the questionnaire.

Sixteen respondents (showing all ranges of logical form) referred
specifically to school lessons as sources of knowledge of the issues of
Q.8. English lessons were mentioned by five girls and five
referred to Sociology lessons e.g. student 72 states, "All these topics
have come up in my sociology lessons." A large number of respondents
referred with various degrees of specificity, to discussions with
families. Student 56 answers question 8a) (which asks which issues have
been discussed) as follows: "Immigration, which my dad is always on
about because he is very colour prejudice which I am not."

It was easy to hear "dad's" voice in some of the responses to Q.8.
Student 1 considers that Government pay policy is the most important problem
for British society to face and solve, "because I think trade unions
should be abolished and they cause about 80% of the trouble if there is
more pay rises there is going to be more and more inflation and that will
continuously be a vicious circle." Student 1 had responded with a
considerable degree of communicative logic to Q's 2 - 5, now in Q.7 and Q.8 she shows a distinct reversal of form. Her answer to Q.8a) shows a certain tendency towards emotion: "i) sister, ii) family friends, iii) family close friends school friends sisters everyone I always get so annoyed iv and v with friends in mass media." No mention of father. In fact, the father does belong to a union but seldom expresses his views on such matters. Because student 1 was followed up in the intensive study I formed an opinion about the complex relationship that exists between her opinions and her father. 18 But there is no way that a knowledge of a student's school background and a written questionnaire could make this connection.

Student 5 has discussed violent crime and terrorism with "Mum + Dad + friends". Her opinion is as follows: "It is about the crime and terrorism was kept to a minimum by bringing back the death penalty. Innocent people are being mugged, raped, killed etc. for the sake of kicks for people." This is a most atypical approach in a sixth form of a girls' Comprehensive such as Greenbank. She was the only lower sixth I met who believed in "bringing back the death penalty". Yet neither of her parents were in favour of capital punishment, although in two-thirds of the families visited, one parent at least wanted it re-introduced. There is no way that family influences can be assessed without personal knowledge of the family. Similarly it is easy to oversimplify school influences. The preliminary analysis of logical form related to school achievement and subject bias (Appendix B) gave no indication of any clear-cut relationships. But similar relationships have been shown to occur - the Kohlbergian relationship of moral development to intelligence, for example. If such relationships do appear to exist, then further statistics based on questionnaires or analyses of dilemmas will not help to understand their nature. For this we need different tools and in some cases more adequate theory. We turn then to the next phase
of the Greenbank study.

The Study in Action: Phase III

Phase III, the intensive study, which followed up sixteen girls in relation to home and school is discussed in Chapter 8. In this phase our method changes from analysis of written judgements to direct interaction with our subjects and their families and observation of their own interactional patterns. We here attempt to relate reflexively whilst we constantly apply Habermas' insights on the interrelatedness of theory and practice in the moral sphere. At this stage we had distinguished between pupils tending to use communicative logic in making moral judgements and isolated a contrasting group of strategic/instrumental judgement makers. It was now our task to choose a group of respondents who showed strong tendencies towards communicability and study them in relationship to those who showed strong strategic/instrumental tendencies. We were also interested to include a few girls like students 1 and 2, quoted above, who were inconsistent in their approach. The pupils would need to be willing to be interviewed, for their progress and attitude to be discussed with their tutors, records looked at, etc., for their parents to be approached and for their homes to be visited if their parents were willing.

By the beginning of the school's second term we had isolated twenty one girls who looked promising. Some had already indicated that they were willing to "carry on" should they be chosen. Some, who showed strongly polarised logic use, had explained that either because of pressure of work or their family situation they did not wish to continue. A mixture of upper and lower sixth was desired and also it was considered desirable to include both humanities and science students. Nine strongly communicative and seven strongly strategic/instrumental logic users were selected, together with five who had been inconsistent. The girls were
approached informally and given a chance to discuss the matter with their parents. If the girls were happy to be part of the intensive study and if they were willing for their parents to be approached they were given two letters to take home. One was from the headmistress commending me and the study to the parents, each one personally addressed and signed. "As home influences are naturally strongest," she wrote, "she would welcome your participation and I would wish to underline the invitation if you feel that you are able to co-operate." After stressing confidentiality and anonymity she added, "I trust that you will feel able to participate. I hope each girl will increase her own self-awareness and that the research will further understanding of students of this age range".19 Enclosed was a letter from me saying that I had selected their daughter for follow-up interview and would like to talk with them, too. I would ring to see if they were agreeable and if so to arrange a convenient time to visit them. Letters were only sent when girls had already given their own consent and said they thought "it would be O.K." with their parents. Sixteen girls and their parents agreed to participate (although one father, whilst agreeing in principle refused to meet me when it came to the point). The full text of the letters is given in Appendix C.

Of the nine "communicatives", one had left and one did not wish to participate. The seven others accepted. Three of the strategic/instrumental group felt unable to accept and two of the inconsistent group were keen to take part but their parents were not. Two "reserve" inconsistent respondents were selected and accepted. We thus had a group of sixteen made up of seven classified as "communicative", four as "strategic/instrumental" and five as "inconsistent". Table VI shows the constitution of this group in terms of logical form and school classification. The girls have been given code names which will be used from now on. Further information, on their backgrounds is given in Appendix D.
### THE INTENSIVE STUDY GIRLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q'aire Code Name Logical Category for Intensive Study</th>
<th>Logical Questionnaire Score</th>
<th>Yr. in Course</th>
<th>Subject Bias</th>
<th>Achievement level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q2-5 - Q6 &amp; 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>6th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(U or L)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2 yr only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Amy Inconsist.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>L Science (0 level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Betty Inconsist.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>L Humanities (0 level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Cathy Communic.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Science II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Diane Communic.</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Humanities II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Eliza Inconsist.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Science II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Frances Communic.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Humanities I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Georgina Strat/Inst.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>U Humanities I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Heather Inconsist.</td>
<td>-1.25</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Humanities II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Joy Strat/Inst.</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Humanities II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Kate Strat/Inst.</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Humanities II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Lucy Communic.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Science II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Mary Communic.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Science I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 Naomi Communic.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Humanities I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 Olive Inconsist.</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>U Science I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 Patience Strat/Inst.</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>U Humanities I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82 Queenie Communic.</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L Humanities I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE VI**

It will be noted that every combination of school classification is included. Only three upper sixth girls were in the study, several having refused owing to pressure of work. All but two are taking two-year courses. Questionnaire scores vary, but all those classified as "consistent" had a strong score in the same direction in both relevance zones. Thus we have a group (5 girls) who showed inconsistent use of logic (which, as this and non-polarised approaches were common, can be considered as a "control" group), and two groups showing oppositely polarised use of logic, typifying communicative logic use and strategic/instrumental logic use.
Communicative logic (7 girls) is characterised by its active reflexivity, where situations and people in them are approached in interrelational terms and where solutions to problems are sought in terms of consensus through discourse or in terms of co-operative action. Associated with it are values of trust, understanding, sincerity and harmony, whilst valued activities are discussion and the pursuit of interests. Lucy, for example, had referred to trust, communication development, peace, human life and tolerance as positive values: Frances had referred to independence, discussion, trust, fairness and harmony.

Strategic/instrumental logic (4 girls) is characterised as goal-orientated, where outcomes to problems are sought by technical means or through the application of rules. Associated with it are the values of achievement, independence, grasping opportunities, sincerity and social order. Georgina, for example had referred to achievement, grasping opportunities and social order; Patience had referred to honesty, reliability, social respectability, achievement and (technological) progress.

As well as informal discussion and informal follow-up to home visits, each girl had a taped interview lasting approximately one hour and each family was visited at least once, for from two to four hours. During this period a tape recorded interview was obtained. Girls who differed significantly from their parents on social and moral issues had additional taped interviews. Girls' school reports were read and their progress and general attitude was discussed with their tutors. Tutors who had been with the girls, in most cases, since first form, gave their personal observations of the girls' parents and of her relationship to them. Contact with the sixteen girls was maintained throughout the term and follow-up reports obtained on all the girls after the summer
holidays. The seven in the communicative group were again followed up approximately one year after their initial interview.

The purpose of Phase III

The first purpose of the intensive study was to gain insight into the general contexts of the girls' beliefs and values - their world views and overall aims of life. Only one girl of the sixteen (Naomi) had given sufficient information in her questionnaire-response for her values to be seen in relation to a coherent world view. Now communicative morality cannot be characterised in empirical reality only in terms of use of communicative logic with reference to "communicative" values. Habermas has made it clear that communicative morality has a political dimension. It will need to be associated with a world view which will include a belief in human progress through co-operative human interaction. For communicative morality to be practiced not only in judgemental procedures but in co-operative political action, there will also need to be motivational factors operating. This motivational aspect of morality was stressed by Habermas in his earlier discussions but has received little emphasis since cognitive psychology was incorporated into his formulations. As our analytical scheme was constructed in relation to moral consciousness rather than to communicative morality in action, motivation was not stressed. It will, however, be referred to in connection with the girls' world views at the end of Chapter 8.

The second purpose of the intensive study is to investigate the part that home and school might play in the generation of communicative morality. It was shown above, that although the questionnaire gave rise to some background information connected with the girls' beliefs, it was not possible to interpret the relationship of a girl's home or school experience to her beliefs from the information given. School influence cannot be described solely in terms of a girl's progress and reputation.
Her own perceptions of how the school has influenced her must be sought. Home influences are even more complex and no conclusions can be made without the co-operation of the girl and her parents and their participation in reflexive interviews.

The overriding aim of the empirical study at Greenbank also pertains to Phase III; that is to design and test an approach to the study of morality in the concrete situation, based on the insights and theories of Habermas.
Notes: Chapter 7


2 Erikson sees later adolescents as developing a "sense of inner identity". Earlier adolescents are characterised by their search for identity where they "define, overdefine, and redefine themselves and each other in often ruthless comparison, while a search... can be recognised in the restless testing of the newest in possibilities and the oldest in values." Erikson, E.H., *Identity: Youth and Crisis*, London, Faber & Faber, 1968, p.87.

3 Rutter, M., Maugham, B., Mortimore, P. and Ouston, J., in *Fifteen Thousand Hours*, London, Open Books, 1979, suggest that "some kind of overall school 'ethos'" may exert influence, but they do not explain what this 'ethos' may be. pp.182-184.

4 "Head Mistress's Statement" - press release to launch a fund raising drive which opened 10.11.78.

5 "Head Mistress's Report: Presentation and Reception Evening, Thursday, 16th November, 1978."

6 Ibid.

7 Interview with headmistress, 2.2.79.

8 These two extreme positions were expressed by the head of the Religious Studies department and the head of Sixth form, respectively. Both are influential staff members.

9 Interview with headmistress, 2.2.79.

10 "Head Mistress's Report", *op.cit.*


12 Taped discussion with Religious Studies group, 24.5.78.

13 Chapter 6 discusses how the idea of relevance was built into the analytic scheme. While the introduction of Schutzian insights into the scheme was being considered, it was noted that Musgrave had recently referred to Schutz in his account of adolescent moral decision making.

15. This was confirmed by the head of sixth form. A detailed analysis of all sixth formers' courses was not justified and a full subject analysis was not at hand. We were not attempting to get proportionate samples but merely checking for tendencies amongst those who had already volunteered.

16. All quotes are given as written. Reference to errors in pupils' work will be omitted from now on.


18. Student 1 became Amy of the intensive study. Her relationship with her father is discussed towards the end of chapter 8.

19. This approach of the headmistress is a further indication of her beliefs and concerns.

Chapter 8: The Intensive Study: Investigating Relationships

The Practical Approach

Phase III, the intensive study, continues the attempt to characterise communicative morality amongst Greenbank's sixth formers and to investigate generative influences in home and school. In the previous chapter, we discussed the earlier phases of the study where the conceptual scheme and the questionnaire were devised and applied. Sixteen girls and their families comprised the intensive phase. The girls were classified according to their predominant logical approach to moral judgemental procedures: 7 in the "communicative" group, 4 in the "strategic/instrumental" group and 5 in the "control" group. The characteristics of communicative and strategic/instrumental logic use were summarised at the end of the previous chapter.

I. Theoretical antecedents

Most sociological studies of the influence of home and school on moral development are of little relevance to this study because of their different conceptualisation of morality. Such studies have largely been in the socialisation tradition and have concentrated on the transmission of norms and values following on from the pioneer work of Parsons. Such work had two hidden assumptions: that there was a direct relationship between methods of child training and acquisition of norms and values and that there was a linear relationship between moral beliefs and moral practice. Many studies were further complicated by the insertion of a third inadequately theorised concept, class. When such studies proved contradictory and inconclusive, attention began to be directed towards the schools as moral agents. We have already
referred to Parsons' classic paper that considered the school as a major agent in the moral formation of the young and have pointed out that this approach is based on a faulty concept of morality. Subsequent research challenged Parsons' contention that the school's normative influence is related to its selective mechanism and its dominant value of achievement, and substituted peer group pressure or the "hidden curriculum" as the affective agents. Others argued for a complex interrelationship between home and school in the transmission of morality to the young. However, all of these socialisation theories have in common the concept that moral development is synonymous with the acceptance of norms or principles of conduct and with training in how to act according to them. Thus, whether such studies find the school or the home to be a greater influence, will bear little relationship to our typification of the development of communication morality, where both moral judgement and its practical outcomes are understood as complex reflexive processes.

Whilst the functionalist approach to moral transmission bears little relation to our formulation of morality, we cannot dismiss the possibility that the value component of communicative morality may be transmitted by home or school. In King's conceptualisation, education is seen as a process of cultural transmission with various degrees of continuity existing between the culture of the pupils' families and the culture transmitted by schools. Accordingly, the higher the degree of cultural continuity the higher will be the degree of involvement of the pupil in the school. For King, the dominant values of the school's culture had middle class connotations and whilst his empirical study did not show a very significant relationship between the pupils' values and their school involvement, there was some evidence that there was a connection.

Thus, although we are attempting to observe and understand an aspect
of empirical reality in Habermasian terms and are not stressing class, it would be foolish to be so intent upon one theoretical framework that we failed to notice an obvious connection. However, as we do not see values as existing in isolation but as part of loosely connected sets of beliefs, we shall take note of any ideological continuities that exist between home and school and see if there is any apparent relationship between them and the girls' belief systems or logical approach to moral judgement.

II. The Tasks

The task of this phase is to investigate relationships: first, the relationship that exists between a girl's interconnected system of beliefs or world view and her style of judgement; second between these aspects of her moral consciousness and her school experience and finally between her moral consciousness and her experience at home. The main research tool is now the semi-structured interview, the success of which will depend on the subjects' ability to reflect about themselves and their relationships and the interviewer's skill in helping them to make this process authentic. This will partly depend on the subjects' insights and partly on the degree of trust that exists between subject and interviewer.

In the girls' interviews there was a possibility of establishing a relationship of trust, the basis of which was a shared aim of exploration and discovery. The girls were interested in understanding themselves and clarifying their ideas and believed that the researcher was interested in the way they thought and felt. If they had not been prepared to co-operate in the interviews, they would not have accepted the invitation to continue with the study. The biggest threat to inauthenticity was either that the girl lacked any real insight or self perception and tried to give answers she thought were wanted or that in attempting to protect a vulnerable self from exposure, she reacted by projecting an
untrue, yet consistent image of herself. Lack of insight would certainly have been a problem with many of the original respondents, particularly with some of the younger girls. The sixteen girls who had been selected, however, were all at least seventeen years of age by the time of their interviews and informal discussion had indicated that they were not without insight. The biggest potential problem was that they would seek to present a preferred self-image that would result in masking not only the way they really saw themselves and the world, but the way they really related to home and school. This problem is never entirely absent from any interview, based as it is on a face to face relationship that involves the presentation of self by verbal means.9

III. The Techniques

With the girls' interviews, several approaches were merged to help the girl reflect on her own behalf and attitudes and to minimise inauthenticity. The first stage of the interview was conducted without the use of the tape recorder. Questions concerned interests and activities, details of parental background. Answers were written down briefly on the pupil's card, in her sight. She was then given the "Beliefs and World Views" card (see Appendix E) to complete and only when she had nearly finished it was the tape-recorder switched on (with her knowledge but without her focussed attention). Discussion of the pupil's own views and of how she saw them differing from her parents' beliefs, developed in relation to her responses to the items on the card. This discussion led naturally to beliefs not included on the list. The first insight into how the pupil saw her personal relationship with her parents was gained at this stage. A similar focussing device was used in relation to the pupil's ideals and aims for their lives, where the television series "The Good Life" was discussed and her version of the good life was sought. The second insight into family relationships
usually emerged here, as pupils compared their aspirations with their home experience. The third window into family relations and parental practices was obtained through discussion of the concepts of duty and obligation. The idea of obligation or indebtedness to parents led to questions about family norms and sanctions. This topic also elicited some attitudes and beliefs about the school and its function. Further insights into the girls' school experience were gained through a general discussion of comprehensive education and whether or not it was desirable.

This approach aided reflection by encouraging an interplay between the concrete and the abstract for each concept or set of concepts that was considered. Direct questions about relations with home and school were avoided because these can be emotionally charged topics, and one risks evasion or distortion through self-pity or self-dramatisation. In some cases, feelings of resentment emerged indirectly that gave indications of family relations for later follow-up. The pictures of family relationships revealed by the girls' interviews were remarkably similar to those observed in family interviews and described by tutors.

There was no possibility of developing the same type of relationship with the parents as with the girls. The approach to the parents was one of interest in their daughters' background and of general interest in the way parents and offspring viewed social and moral issues. They were thus asked details of their daughters' upbringing, schooling, relationship with brothers and sisters, where she had had problems etc. Their own schooling and family background was elicited in this context if it had not been described when they discussed their occupations, interests and hobbies. They were asked to respond to the "Beliefs and World Views" check list and to Q.4 (The Bloggs) and Q.8 (Social Problems) of the questionnaire in the context of a comparison with their daughters' ideas. Finally, knowledge was sought on their attitude to the
problems of youth and in this respect their own approach to private and public morality was elicited. The interview schedules for the girls and for their parents are found in Appendix E.

No attempt was made to assess the moral consciousness of parents. In the first place, adults of this generation have had to adjust to a changing world through trial and error and tend to have recipes for making judgements and decisions that are far from reflexive. 12 Secondly, each parent has his or her own moral beliefs and paradigms for action which relate in a large part to his or her experiences before marriage. One cannot speak in terms of a "family" approach to moral judgement, or of the moral consciousness of a family. But families do have patterns of interaction and they have certain shared beliefs and basic assumptions which impinge upon family life.

We shall be looking at the family from two perspectives. The first will be on the level of beliefs and values. We shall begin by noting the similarities and dissimilarities existing between the pupil's and her parents' beliefs about the world and then look at the degree to which the parents ascribe to what Habermas sees as the fundamental legitimating values of capitalism. The second perspective will be to observe the family patterns of communication and to look for aspects of family relationships showing a distinct level of distortion. The derivation of this scheme from Habermas' theory, and details of how it was put into practice in assessing families are described below in the section dealing with the relationship of home to a daughter's consciousness.

The approach to the school will be in terms of the pupil's understanding of her school experience related to her school history and her tutor's opinion of her. This is seen in the context of the dominant values expressed by the school through its organisation and the pronouncements of its head. These are taken as indicators of the
school's ethos. No attempt was made to elicit the views of the whole staff, as many who have taught the present sixth formers are no longer at Greenbank. Tutor's opinion was noted only incidentally as they were interested in discovering what their charges had been doing in the study, and most volunteered their own views of the world view list.

Values in context - belief systems and world views

The extent to which beliefs are part of a coherent world view will vary with each girl. Our aim is first to see whether any generalised world view is shared by girls who share a similar style of moral judgement and then to see in what ways girls sharing the communicative style differ from each other in their beliefs and in how they view the world.

The sections of the girls' interviews (see Appendix E for schedule) which aimed at eliciting world views and morally significant beliefs were the check list ("Beliefs and World Views") and its related discussion, and the section on the "good life" which included personal aims and ideals with related questions on duty or obligation.

The check list (see Appendix E) was designed partially to act as a basis for discussion and to encourage the girls to reflect on their beliefs, and partly to highlight tendencies to the acceptance of an ideology of science and technology. If all Habermas' considerations are to be accepted, one would expect that the present generation, if no longer holding to traditional "bourgeois" ideology will have replaced it with a technological ideology. Gouldner contrasts the older ideologies of nationalism, "laissez faire" individualism and socialism with "the supposedly modern ideology which seeks to ground the legitimacy of modern neocapitalism and bureaucratic socialism in the idea of a technologically guided society." This contrast is the basis of the check-list.
In the order in which they are presented in Appendix C (subjects saw them in alphabetical order) the statements represent the following ideologies or positions of belief: nationalism; laissez-faire individualism; the Judeo-Christian position; egalitarianism; the ideology of efficiency; technocracy; faith in technological progress and a positivistic approach to science as truth. It will be noted that the first five statements represent traditional value stances and the next five represent modern technologically-linked positions. The latter five range in commitment to science/technology from the awareness of its dangers shown by the conservationists, to espousal of it as an ideal. The statements came from a number of representative sources, No. 1 (nationalism) coming from a National Front pamphlet, No. 5 (egalitarianism) from a policy speech by Hugh Gaitskell, No. 6 (conservationism) from a "Friends of the Earth" leaflet, and so on. The girls were told that they had been collected from various sources and that they represented "ideas common in Britain today". They were asked to mark any they agreed with and, if they wished, to alter any statement to bring it into line with their own ideas.

An analysis of the girls' responses in relation to their parents' responses is shown in Table VIII. The statements that received almost total support were No. 6 on conservation and No. 5 - egalitarianism. All but one girl believed in conservation and all but two were egalitarians. The seven in the communicative group were unanimous on these beliefs and also strongly supported statement 4 (ethical humanism). Only one of this group argued with any right wing political statement (Nos. 1 and 2) and only two agreed with any of the statements with a strong technological emphasis (Nos. 7 to 10). Of the nine girls remaining, there were four agreements with the right wing statements (from two girls) and ten agreements with technologically oriented statements. There was no obvious relationship between girls classified as strategic/
in instrumental with the technological ideologies, only one of them, Patience, showing a commitment to this ideology. Numbers are small however and as all in the "inconsistent" group, except Eliza, had shown a marked degree of strategic/instrumental logic in one section of their questionnaire responses there may be a connection. The low commitment of the seven in the communicative group to technological ideologies is noteworthy.

The discussion which followed the completion of the "Beliefs and World Views" check list encouraged the girl to expound on and give reasons for her choices and to talk about any other concerns she had for Britain or the world. If she could not think of anything she was prompted by referring to the books and recreational interests previously discussed. Did these indicate concerns or strong beliefs of any kind? She was then led to a consideration of the claims of the science fiction cult in terms of the reality of the experiences described in recent films and reports in the media. This followed the preliminary findings of research into the beliefs of young people which considered that a "mild form of science fiction" had replaced religion in young people's beliefs. It was felt that should acceptance of the ideology of science and technology not be revealed through agreements with the relevant statements on the "Beliefs and World Views" list, it might be elicited in this more popular fashion.

Discussion of the girl's life aims and aspirations was introduced with reference to the television series, "The Good Life". The idea of duty or obligation was discussed in this context and terminology was adjusted until the concept was expressed in a form which the girl found acceptable. The discussion was usually in terms of how a girl felt she "ought" to act in relation to various areas of life, or of under what conditions the word "ought" had meaning for her. Some extended sections of interviews are included in Appendix E. They include two strongly
contrasted openings (Eliza and Cathy) where underlying concerns are sought and parental opinions considered, and the section on the good life with the accompanying discussion of obligation from Georgina's interview.

Table VII shows a summary of the girls' beliefs about the world and how they see their beliefs relating to their own lives. Of those who expressed particular concern for Britain or the world, only five also believed that there was anything that people could do about it. All five belonged to the communicative group. Of those who despaired of man's potential for change, notable were Amy, Heather and Patience. Amy is deeply concerned about the problems of nuclear reactors but nothing can be done to channel money into alternative sources of energy. Tragic results are inevitable: "... it'll take an accident to make everybody realise what is going on." Heather pins all her hopes on science because governments "make a mess of it". When the comment was made that she did not seem to have much faith in man's ability to make improvements, she answered: "Yeah. I don't think you can achieve much through just discussing things. I mean it depends what you're talking about. If it's really major, I think you'd be better off to bung the question in the computer and see what they say." Patience, also strongly orientated towards an ideology of science had indicated a desire for a classless society (item 5 in the check list), but has little faith in politics. She comments: "I'll be able to get a vote in - I'll be eighteen in August - but I can't see the point of voting because I don't think any party appeals to me. I don't think any one party can satisfy the problems - I think we're just in a right mess." She adds, after further thought, "I'll probably vote Conservative". To the immediate challenge, "Even though Conservatives aren't pushing [No. 5] that you said you were quite keen on?" she replies, "I don't think it's possible anyway."

Of these three, only Patience belongs to the strategic/instrumental group, although the other two had shown a strong tendency to instrumentality
in some parts of their questionnaire responses. Amy and Heather had also shown a strong tendency to believe in UFO's and associated phenomena which connected with their not very knowledgeable faith in Science. [All other girls had been agnostic or open minded on this topic, which thus failed to elicit tendencies not already revealed by the checklist.]

All but two of the seven in the communicative group expressed a strong concern for some problem of humanity and believed that change could be effected through joint human action. Queenie, for example, who is concerned about political apathy and ignorance, believes that the man-in-the-street could have a say if he wanted to. "They don't want to. They think, 'We'll leave it to someone else'." Naomi finds so much in the world that needs changing and so many ways in which to express concern that it is difficult to decide on priorities. Discussing her outside-school activities she answers: "Outside school? Well, there's this voluntary organization bit with the old biddies and there's the Friends of the Earth which I go to, and then there's the odd sort of things that I go to, lectures and things like that... I'd like to do a bit with Amnesty International as well. But there's so many other things that have to be sorted out first, well not first, but there's so much to be done, but you can't go out and change the world in a day." Frances, academically outstanding, a pacifist and ardent socialist, makes the following statement to summarise the opinions she has been forcefully expressing: "What I think is that it's people who are important rather than machines, rather than buildings, rather than anything. People are important and people have got to live, be able to live, with their world, rather than destroying it and I mean to live with that world. They've got to respect nature and they've got to respect other people around them and they've got to sort of love other people, care for other..."
### BELIEFS ABOUT THE WORLD IN RELATION TO SELF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Girl</th>
<th>Expressed political or world concern (with agreed &quot;check-list&quot; items)</th>
<th>Joint &quot;Good human Life&quot; action seen in can terms of effect inter-relationships</th>
<th>&quot;Good Life has extends to wider (political) family &amp; friends</th>
<th>Obligation Obligation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amy</td>
<td>6, 9 Nuclear power threat Union power threat</td>
<td>Strong Disbelief</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betty</td>
<td>5, 7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>√ to vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cathy*</td>
<td>3, 4, 5, 6, 8 Need to share resources with 3rd World</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td></td>
<td>to translate beliefs into action (including concern for 3rd World)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diane*</td>
<td>5, 6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliza</td>
<td>4, 5, 6, 7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frances*</td>
<td>4, 5, 6 Social injustice &amp; inequality, world peace</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td>to fight for justice and equality and world peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgina +</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>√ God and her Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heather</td>
<td>5, 6, 8, 9, 10</td>
<td>Strong Disbelief</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy +</td>
<td>1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 Government should represent all people.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration should be limited.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kate +</td>
<td>1, 4, 5, 6, 9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy *</td>
<td>5, 6 Racial integration</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√ school, consider-ation of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary *</td>
<td>1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√ Integrity in rela- tionships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rhl</td>
<td>Expressed political or Joint human action can effect change</td>
<td>&quot;Good Life has seen in wider terms of (political) inter-dimension relationship</td>
<td>Obligation extends beyond wider family &amp; friends</td>
<td>Obligation to be as authentic and helpful as is humanly possible.</td>
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<tr>
<td>live</td>
<td>4, 5, 6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patience</td>
<td>5, 6, 8, 9, 10</td>
<td>Strong Disbelief</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ueenie*</td>
<td>4, 5, 6</td>
<td>Education for political understanding and social action. World conservation.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Communicative group.
Strategic/Instrumental group.

- Nationalism.
- Laissez-faire.
- Judeo-Christian.
- Ethical humanism.
- Egalitarianism.
- Conservationist.
- Efficiency.
- Technocracy.
- Technical progress.
- Positivism.

TABLE VII
people and also they've got to realise themselves that they are individuals and that they are important as being an individual and that people are important." Of the communicative group only Diane and Mary failed to express political or world concern. Both Diane, a student of Art and Mary, a science student are dedicated to their areas of study and are conscious of their lack of knowledge and understanding in the sphere of politics and world affairs. Both are concerned for the people they know and find human relationships to be personally important. Both can extend their logic of moral judgement from the familiar sphere of personal relationships into the sphere of wider social problems, but neither has any real political insights or awareness.

The discussion of the "good life" highlighted one aspect shared by all girls in the communicative group and by none of the others. This was in their conceptualisation of the "good life" in terms of interrelationships. Apart from their unanimous support of conservation and egalitarianism this was the only belief the whole group had in common and can thus be considered to be a characteristic belief that accompanies the use of communicative logic in moral judgement procedures. With the apolitical Diane and Mary, and with Lucy, whose concern for racial integration did not extend far beyond her personal experience, this aspect of the good life was largely expressed through the intentions and aspirations they held for their future families. They wanted their children to experience the sorts of relationships they had experienced in their families - openness, being able to talk things through, mutual respect. Good human relationships, characterised by mutual understanding and genuineness were also desired with friends and work mates. For Diane and Mary, in particular, career satisfaction was a very important part of the good life but it was not the whole of life in any sense.

Cathy, Frances, Naomi and Queenie, who had earlier expressed
concern about the wider world, saw the "good life", not only as involving interrelationships but as involving their own participation in helping to make the world a better place. Naomi found the phrase "the good life" was seductively idealistic, but thinking about it made her more aware of life's contradictions. She answers: "That's quite a difficult question, really, because there is the ideal which would merely be ... to live in harmony with nature and everything, altogether as a whole, and sort of just produce what you need and live happily in the countryside somewhere and it sounds very idealistic and 'how wonderful', and then if you think about it now, living in the middle of London, then that's quite unrealistic in a way because when you walk through [depressed nearby region] you see all those people who are bitter, grey-faced and things like that and you cannot say, 'Well, wouldn't it be nice if you had a nice house', when you're taught all the time to get your qualifications, strive for this and strive for that and when you get so much money you'll be happy! It's a hard question, cause there are so many things interrelated, you can't just say, 'This would be a nice life'."

Naomi prefers to think in terms of present realities where she tries to practice the things she believes in ("co-operating", "communicating together") and attempts to make a practical contribution. "I mean its important to discuss issues but you must also develop from there and be able to do something as well," she said, when discussing a Friends of the Earth petition for which she'd collected signatures.

For Cathy discussion of "the good life" led to a consideration of her plans for her life. She was unclear about the details but was not fussed about it. "I'm at that stage where I'm trying to decide but I'm not trying to think, 'Oh how on earth do I look on life?' I'm just letting it come naturally," she explained. Her aim in life is to put into practice her beliefs about the need to share technological resources with people in the Third World - "I want to work in poor areas, if I can, if I'm brave enough." She sees herself as helping people but it will be "a sort of two-way relationship." She does not
pretend that she is not "selfish to a certain extent." Through "a lot of deep thinking. . . trying to interpretate [sic]" her actions and through help from "other people around" her, she is trying to sort out her priorities and plans. Queenie, who believes that "... everyone has to want a better place to live and have to make the effort to do it", is going to try to contribute to improving the environment by taking up the study of Environmental Science. She also will not be content unless she is trying "to see that people do get on with each other." Frances will not be satisfied with any form of life that does not involve furthering the cause of justice and peace, although she realises that "you can't save the world in a lifetime." Although a "first" at Oxford would be "nice", things like that are "not ultimately important". Instead, she sees "achievement" in terms of "living a worthwhile life, feeling that perhaps I've helped somebody at some point in my life, you know. . ."

These four girls are not claiming to be altruistic, in a self-sacrificial way. It is rather that their understanding of life has a dimension which seems to be lacking in the non-communicative groups and which in the three others of the communicative group has not (yet ?) extended to the wider social world.

Most of the other girls described their idea of the "good life" in terms of career interests, marriage plans or, perhaps, travel. Georgina, whose discussion of the "good life" is quoted fully in Appendix E, wants a career in nursing, marriage, a home in Norfolk and a loving husband and family who share her religious beliefs. There is kindness and consideration in her form of the good life but no real interaction, no mutuality. Her children's progress is seen in terms of achievement. Patience, another member of the strategic/instrumental group, had a similar approach. To the question, "Now, outline the sort of 'good life' that you see for yourself - in what terms do you see yourself as being happy ?" Patience replied, "I want to be successful in a career first of all. I want to get married and have children - rear
children." To the ensuing question: "Now tell me something about the sort of attitudes you'd like to see in your family?" Patience responded: "I think respect for the parents is very important. Well I'd want them well behaved and I want to be boss of the house." She has plans for the children: "If they've got the brains to go to University I'd like them to go." Asked what if they had brains but decided to "throw it in" she replied that she would "be very upset". Both girls were strongly oriented towards achievement.

Both the girls classified as "strategic/instrumental" and those classified as "inconsistent" saw themselves as pursuing lives which lacked any inter-relational dimension. Some are clearly lacking confidence in their ability to relate to people. Thus Eliza who has said she does not want to get married, explains why. "Well I'd like to get married but I get fed up with people very quickly - specially boys - and it would be amazing if I found somebody I could settle down with. I don't think I could - I get bored with people. So, I'd like to say I'd be married but I'd probably live in sin. I wouldn't get married unless I was really sure." All these girls saw the "good life" as the fulfilment of their own private ambitions, other people only entered their world in a direct relationship to themselves as spouses or offspring. Their ambitions did not seem to be related to what they saw as being wrong with their country or the world.

The discussion of duty and obligation found one belief (or non-belief) that was shared by all sixteen girls. Not one believed she had a duty to her country. Some, like Naomi, saw the word "duty" as having connotations of external compulsion - "like in war, 'It's our duty to defend Britain and the Fatherland' or whatever, which is really rubbish." She was happy to consider the concept in terms of ought and summarised her belief as: "I think I 'ought' to help as many people as I could - in whatever way I can." Others, like Joy had never thought about the subject: "I usually take [life] as it comes. I don't feel as though I 'ought' to do anything."

For many girls, their only sense of obligation was to their parents.
Eliza sees this in reciprocal terms: "I think if they've got the decency to let me stay on at school - because I want to go to College afterwards if I possibly can and I think they'll let me. And if they do that for me . . . then I should pay them back - in passing or whatever." Patience sees parental obligation as the product of respect: "I think a lot of it's to do with respect - for parents. Because they've had a lot of experience in the world they know better than I do sort of thing. So if I want to do something and they say, 'Don't' I feel obliged to not do it." Some, like Amy and Betty extended duty to friends - Amy because they relied on her, and Betty because: "If they've been good to you I think you ought to repay them."

Several girls saw duty extending beyond their families to certain specific fields. Betty believes she has a duty to vote, otherwise one has no right to complain if "something goes wrong with the government". Georgina sees an obligation towards God and her church but does not see God as being very concerned with the wider world. Olive believes one has "a duty to the people you work with and the people you live with, so that things run smoothly and you don't upset them too much."

Of the communicative group, all but Diane saw obligation as not only extending beyond family and friends but as extending into various positive dimensions of interpersonal relationships. To Diane the concept of obligation is alien in every form. She accepts the idea of "responsibility" and feels a responsibility to herself and her family. She believes that people are important and "you've got to understand people", but she cannot accept "ought". The others accepted the concept in one of its forms. Lucy thinks that consideration of others is most important and to this end one should learn self control. One has an obligation at school, for example, to consider other students and teachers, even if you "don't like them". Mary believes she has a duty to act with integrity in all her relationships and "not put on a false front".
The four from the communicative group who had seen the good life as necessarily involving their own action in helping to further what they believed to be right, followed through this approach when discussing duty and obligation. Naomi's summary was quoted above but earlier she expressed how she works out what her "ought" is in practice: "We've got to start at the beginning really. 'Am I happy with the situation? 'No.' Therefore something is going wrong. Well, how can I change it?" Queenie, like Naomi, tries to work out her aims in daily life. Apart from her sense of obligation to be politically aware and environmentally concerned, she feels a responsibility to encourage co-operation at school which "is like another little society, you're all part of it and you should try to keep it as one place..." Frances believes that essentially one's duty is "towards people and you've got a duty towards the world." She does not believe that she has "a duty towards the school as an entity" but she has "a duty towards those people in the school." But "it's a give and take thing in the whole society, you've got to give and you've got to take..." To Cathy, duty means following what she believes in, not acting because "you feel it's your duty to do something." She refers to her intention to work in the Third World. "Well obviously I've got strong ideas about not being centred in places there's already a lot of - help. I feel it ought to be spread out, so I feel it's my duty to work elsewhere."

Whilst all seven in the communicative group saw the "good life" in interrelational terms and all but Diane considered that their duty extended to people beyond their family and friends, only Cathy, Frances, Naomi and Queenie considered that life could be satisfying only if it involved them in purposeful social action. Moreover, not only did these four conceive of a desirable life in these terms but they felt obliged to put their beliefs about themselves in relation to their world views, into practice. The seven girls had been selected for their tendency towards the use of communicative logic in moral judgement procedures. We would now say, that of these seven, four
show a world-view which is commensurate with that which characterises Habermas' proposed universal ethics of speech. This way of looking at the world is an interactive one. It involves not only the way the girls see the world but how they see themselves and their actions in relation to the world and its needs. Their specific world views differ in emphasis but all believe that they have a responsibility to other people which involves not only enjoying, but fostering, human relationships. They also believe that what they do in life can help bring about change and that they should co-operate with others to help correct what they see as wrong. Their sense of responsibility extends to the realm of nature. They consider they have an obligation to help preserve the earth's resources and protect its life forms.

There were no particular aspects of belief which distinguished the girls classified as strategic/instrumental in logic from the control group but they did share a characteristic cluster of beliefs and attitudes. They all doubted man's ability to bring about change in the world. They did not see themselves as having any necessary relationship with the world or with other people - the concept of co-operation or mutuality being foreign to their thinking. They all emphasised achievement not only with respect to their careers but as a desirable aspect of life. These beliefs were also held, in various degrees by members of the control group, with the exception of Eliza (who lacked any tendency towards strategic/instrumental logic use). It thus looks as if these attitudes and beliefs could be associated with the use of strategic/instrumental logic. It is considered probable that a wider survey would find a connection between strategic/instrumental logic and the ideology of science and technology, but this has not yet been demonstrated.

The Relationship of the School to Moral Judgement

Although we have described the moral consciousness of four of the seven in the communicative group as possessing an aspect largely undeveloped in the
other three, we shall still look at the whole group as representative of communicative morality. The logical use of this group is quite distinctive and members share an approach to other people and an evaluation of life in interrelational terms which emphasises the similarity of their morally relevant beliefs. As a group they share a moral approach which is quite characteristic and which is markedly different from girls in the other groups.

We decided earlier that there were no indications that choice of subjects or degrees of school achievement was an influential factor in the development of communicative morality (see Appendix B). We shall turn then, to the general ethos of the school.

The headmistress was described in the previous chapter as committed to comprehensive education and as believing that it was a school's duty to develop the pupils' talents. Full participation in school life, and making use of opportunities (which, in practice at Greenbank refers especially to music, dance and sport) are encouraged but there is little emphasis on achievement of external goals. The head also believed relationships between staff and staff, and staff and girls to be vital and observation bore out her claims that these relationships were excellent. Staff were available to see girls at any time and class discussions were friendly affairs, which tended to lack rivalry and encourage tolerance. Of all the sixth form tutors who viewed the "Beliefs and World Views" check list, those who volunteered their own responses were in agreement with items 4, 5 and 6, those most supported by the pupils ("Greenbank Preferred" items of Appendix E). Was it possible that the school was generating the communicative style of moral judgement in some way that was not directly related to subject orientation or school success? We saw from the general study that the values associated with use of communicative logic were trust, understanding others, sincerity, discussion, harmony, the pursuit of interests and human life. The intensive study showed how viewing life in terms of the importance of inter-
relationships was overwhelmingly linked with communicability. Greenbank's emphasis on development of talent rather than on achievement, and its practice of openness in relationship, and the value placed (in everyday administration) on discussion and harmony meant that there was a high degree of similarity between Greenbank's official ideals and those associated with communicative logic use. Was there a tendency towards the generation of an officially approved ideal type? If so it must be transmitted through the teaching staff, as the girls saw little of the headmistress and had almost no contact with girls of other years - there was no house system or prefect system and assemblies were essentially year-based. If there was a connection between an approved ideal type and communicative logic formation what was its nature?

An obvious possibility was that staff approval was assisting the formation of communicative logic. There is a certain amount of evidence to this effect. The hear heads' reports indicated that they did not hold the girls tending towards strategic/instrumental logic use in high esteem. Of the four intensive study subjects Georgina was "isolated, anxious to please" and "insensitive", Joy was "weak", "well intentioned" but "elusive", Kate "could be idle" and Patience was "vague", "woolly" and "disorganized". On the whole, the communicative group was highly approved, all but Queenie and Lucy having outstanding commendations at the start of the intensive study. On the other hand, the assessments twelve months after the study had begun, showed that whilst Lucy was now being appreciated, Frances and Naomi were giving some cause for concern. Frances was getting too politically committed and tended to be "a bit rigid" and Naomi's career choice of work with sub-normal children in preference to a University future was considered a disappointment. In the wider study, many pleasant, intelligent girls in the upper sixth who were highly approved had not demonstrated communicative logic use.

On the whole, it was apparent that Georgina, Joy, Kate and Patience did not exhibit the official ideals. Georgina and Patience were competitive and
anxious to achieve. Joy was mother-dominated and lacked "openness" and Kate did not participate in school affairs. Only Joy had been involved in extra-curricular activities to any extent and that had now ceased. Of the seven girls in the communicative group, all were involved in extra-curricular activities to a high degree. In addition to the discussion group to which three belonged, five of them were very active in the dance group or the school choir, in spite of the pressures of sixth form.17

Form tutors, however, who were more intimately connected with their pupils were positive about them and did not make the same distinctions as the year heads. Georgina's tutor had known her since she was eleven, thought highly of her and admired her ambition, although she always was "a loner" who "does not mix". Only Patience did not receive a positive and understanding comment from her tutor which was largely because "she tends to be right on the periphery" and was "not very punctual" so her tutor had not got to know her, being herself, new to the form. It is quite possible that the year heads were assessing the girls, to some extent, on whether they conformed to Greenbank's "official ideal type", not knowing them well as individuals. In some cases they may have been influenced by appearances. Queenie, for example, who felt (quite correctly) that the year head did not like her, was assessed as being "meek and mild" and as someone who "never shows enthusiasm". But throughout the study and whenever she was seen later and in follow-up correspondence she showed both commitment and an enthusiasm.

The connection between the headmistress' ideals of participation, development of talents and good relationships, and the pupils' style of moral judgement is not, apparently, a direct one. Whilst communicative logic is closer to the ideal than is strategic/instrumental log, not all girls showing a communicative approach are approved. The school is part
of the educational system and as such, subscribes to external goals, of
necessity, so there will always be some emphasis on achievement and some
approval of a strategic/instrumental approach. Over-emphasis on a
communicative approach will tend to be considered unrealistic or
unbalanced.

However, this is not to say that the school's general ethos has no
effect on the girls' values or approach to others. The key to the
problem is found in the way the girls view the effect the school has
had on them. The three aspects of the school that had been felt to be
possibly influential were, i) the overall ethos and egalitarian nature
of the school, ii) the effect of interaction with staff (including
their specific knowledge) in a discursive atmosphere and iii) inter-
relationships with other sixth formers through informal discussion and
the semi-structured discussion groups.

None of these aspects were believed by all the girls to have
influenced their approach to life or changed them in any way. There
was a marked difference in how girls perceived their relationship to the
school. Their perception related directly to their moral judgement style.
Those in the communicative group felt they had gained from the school in
various ways. Of the others, all but Amy felt the school had done little
for them. Amy felt the school had given her confidence and found it
wonderful that she could talk to the teachers "about anything" when she
found it so hard to communicate with her parents. Betty, Eliza and Joy
felt the school had had little effect but they appreciated the friends
they had made there. Kate was appreciative because: "It's given me the
opportunities that I want - for Art. What I want to do anyway." Olive
felt that by attending a "big" school she had seen "such a variety of
different people from different backgrounds which has widened by
experience." Georgina felt she had learnt tolerance and that her A level
Religious studies had strengthened her own belief, through opposition. Heather felt it had had little effect upon her whilst Patience thought she was more influenced by her parents than by the school. When asked if she thought she had a duty to her school she replied, "No. They've got a duty to me." Speaking of her last school she said: "I disagreed with my last head of House. He thought school was where you could develop personality and develop your interest and that in society. But I felt school is just to get qualifications. I saw it purely as a place to study. I ignored the other side of school life." She felt Greenbank was letting her down because "... it doesn't seem to be pushing enough academically." Her lack of co-operation in her tutor group was caused by her beliefs about and attitude to, Greenbank. She considered any discussions to be a waste of school time.

Of the seven in the communicative group all felt they had benefited greatly from the school. All but Mary felt this had something to do with the particular nature of Greenbank as a large egalitarian comprehensive school. Mary felt she would have benefited equally well from any good school. Cathy felt that the school had been an "opener" to her. "I'm glad they sent me to this school," she said. "I think it's been a big opener for me - you know - to see how different people react to things and I'm glad I've been to a comprehensive school rather than a grammar school because many of my friends who've been to a grammar school, they're so self centred - they don't really pay any attention to what's going on outside." Diane has valued the relationship with teachers as well as the opportunities for self expression. Frances has found that the school has given her the ability to be herself and to "realise the importance of being yourself and the importance of other people, whether they're brilliant and they're going to get firsts at Oxford or whether they're going to work in the local biscuit factory or something, but they're important and they're worthwhile human beings for being what they are. . . ."
At a grammar school she would have been sheltered and got in an academic rut. But at Greenbank, "... immigration is people I've got to know and prejudice is something that happens on the doorstep." Lucy, too, has learnt a lot from having Pakistani girls in her tutor group. She does not blame her father for being racist because when he was little "they didn't know what a black person was" but she is grateful that she has had the opportunity of getting to know some immigrants as people. Naomi has valued all the relationships, especially with teachers, where in some classes they show themselves to be "human beings" and teacher and pupils can "sit down and have a good chat." Queenie commented especially on two aspects of school life that she felt had had a strong effect on how she saw the world. The first were her Modern History lessons that had made her aware about how easily wars can start, and the second were her discussions with Naomi. Naomi had given her a new insight into how she could do something about the environment and taught her "to sort of think about the world in general and about what other people are doing to it."

Naomi's superficial influence on the sixth form was enormous - the common room was full of posters she had put up and piles of "Save the Whale" and "Friends of the Earth" pamphlets lay around. Yet Queenie, who was not a special friend, seemed to have absorbed much of Naomi's vision. It was also apparent that Frances and Naomi, quite opposite in personality types and in the way they approached life (Frances essentially cerebral, Naomi intuitive), had widened each other's horizons through their membership of the discussion group. Yet when it was suggested to Eliza that perhaps her friendship with Frances may have been partly instrumental in shaping her opinions, which were different from her parents, she was quite convinced that this was not so. She could only change her views through direct experience, never through discussion. And she gave a credible account of what had helped her develop some more tolerant
opinions. The only girls who believed that they could gain understanding through discussion, amongst the sixteen, were the girls of the communicative group (with the exception of Diane) together with Amy who had been helped greatly by discussions with teachers in the Media Centre.

The communicative group appeared to have been affected by the school in all three ways. All seven girls were developing their talents - of the two not involved in Music or Dance activities, Queenie was in the discussion group and Diane was deeply involved in the Art Department - and were appreciative of the school's egalitarian ethos; all were conscious of the quality of staff relationships and all (but Diane) felt that informal discussion with their peers had helped develop their views on life.

A clear illustration of the ability of the communicative type to extend her understanding from school lessons in a way that does not seem possible to the strategic/instrumental type is shown in Lucy and Georgina's second interviews. Both girls were studying A level English. Lucy, one of the communicative group had just recalled how her O level History had given her "both sides of the story" which had countered her father's approach of "goody-Britons and baddy-Germans":-

- And your English? Do you notice that it gives you insights into people or -

L: Yeah. It shows how complex the human feelings are and things like how deep characters are. Before you did English you used to read a book and never look deeply into the characters. But when you go through it now you think, 'Oh I'd never have thought of that! You know it teaches you a lot.

- So if you're thinking about a person you think you'd be less likely to put them into "good" categories or "bad" categories?
L. Yeah. I think so. I don't think you should judge people on first appearances sort of thing.

- So in your case you think you have got something out of your school humanities studies?


Georgina has been talking about her English. She feels she is gaining in self expression and has gained some confidence. Lucy had made the above statement the day before. We try the same approach:-

- And has it changed the way you look at outside situations or outside people at all? Your study of English?

G. Um - [looks puzzled]

- Well. You have to analyse characters -

G. I have to analyse characters but I don't think that's - they aren't really related to reality. They are not alive. Not in people I see particularly. I don't go round saying, 'Ah, there's an Antony - just like Antony!', [in Anthony and Cleopatra]. The characters are real within the books themselves - some of them jump out at you - as characters. But not as characters that you actually know as individuals.

- So you find that your study of English helps you in your understanding of other books you read but it doesn't have a great deal of direct relationship to the ordinary people you meet?

G. Not really. Apart from the fact that it just gives me that edge to be able to discuss perhaps clearer.

- You can express yourself better?

G. Yes. It's definitely helped my expression.

The school, then, appears to be acting as an agent of reinforcement on those already disposed to respond to its influence. Those whom we
assessed as communicative had felt themselves to have been influenced by
the school, its organization, its teachers and the discussions of pupils. But other pupils, especially those we had found to exhibit strategic/instrumental logic, do not find themselves affected in the same way by what appear to be similar experiences.

The school's general philosophy of comprehensiveness, carried through in its daily running to a considerable, if variable extent had features in common with communicative morality. But it cannot be said to be generating this form of morality even though it may be seen as fostering its development amongst certain of its pupils.

The Relationship of Home to Moral Judgement

Since the school does not appear to have a directly generative function in the formation of communicative morality it is important that the home is observed with this end in view. Two aspects of family life were considered to be important. The first was the dominant ideology embedded in family practices as well as openly expressed by the parents, and the second was the level of distortion of communication. These aspects were both basic to our Habermasian conceptual framework and so it appeared logical to apply them to the study as it relates to family life. We saw in Chapter 4 that Habermas considers that the major ideologies which serve to legitimate capitalism are the orientation towards achievement and possessive individualism. The ideology of achievement has been long associated with the educational system. As Habermas has expressed morality in terms of communication theoretically it appeared important to attempt to translate this aspect of his theory into practice to see whether the level of communicative competence within a family affected the form of the daughter's morality.

The necessity of looking for more fundamental factors than the
transmission of beliefs or ideologies is emphasised by the results shown in Table VIII. This table shows the responses of parents and daughters to the "Beliefs and World Views" check list. No evidence is apparent that any relationship exists between a continuity of belief between parent and daughter and her logical style of moral judgement. All girls show a considerable degree of disagreement with their parents. Only Frances is in perfect agreement, a fact she predicted in her interviews. [Frances' parents had chosen Greenbank because its overall educational ideals matched their own.] Of the other girls, those belonging to the communicative group have a lower degree of disagreement than those belonging to the other groups. But Lucy shows a considerable variation, having rejected both parental right wing and scientistic views. It can be noted that Joy and Georgina, both tending towards strategic/instrumental logic use, have accepted their parents' right wing views, but so has the communicative Mary. Most other girls have rejected their parents' right wing beliefs.

We commented above, that a wider study might show a relationship to exist between a young person's acceptance of an ideology of science and technology. But there is no obvious transmission of technological ideology by the family. Some girls, such as Cathy, Heather, Joy and Kate show a certain degree of continuity. Others, such as Georgina and Lucy have rejected their parents espousal of science, whilst Patience has developed a trust in science that is absent in her family.

It does not appear that parental beliefs are being transmitted to any obvious extent. This does not mean that very fundamental ideologies and values are not being transmitted, or are not in some way having direct bearing on the daughters' moral development, but actual beliefs about the world do not appear to have continuity.

We shall turn, then, to the scheme we shall use to evaluate the families in terms of ideology and interaction. The ideologies expressed
### TABLE VIII

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Daughter</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Laissé-Faire</th>
<th>Judeo-Christian</th>
<th>Ethical Humanism</th>
<th>Egalitarianism</th>
<th>Conservationist</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Technocracy</th>
<th>Technological Progress</th>
<th>Positivism</th>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Girls classified as communicative in judgement logic.
+ = Girls classified as strategic/instrumental in judgement logic.
✓/✓ = Agreement by daughter and both parents
✓ = Agreement by daughter and one parent, (M) or (F).
F = Father's response only.
M = Mother's response only.
D = Daughter's response only.

[For "Beliefs and World Views" list of statements see Appendix E(iii)].
by Habermas as both "achievement orientation" and "possessive individualism" will be subsumed under the heading "possessive individualism". For its conceptualisation we shall turn to the two authors to whom Habermas refers in its regard, C.B. Macpherson and Claus Offe. To analyse the level of distortion of communication we shall utilise Habermas' interpretation of the traditional principles of truth, freedom and justice in terms of communicative competence.

Assessing possessive individualism in the family

C.B. Macpherson has described how possessive individualism became the dominant ideology of capitalism. It is based on the Hobbesian idea that a man's humanity is characterised by his freedom from dependence on the will of others. Within this framework individuals are regarded as proprietors of themselves. They relate to each other in a series of market relationships. Political society is thus a contrivance for the protection of the individual's property, including his own person, and for the maintenance of orderly exchange relations. Lukes has shown how individualism has appeared in different forms and in various ways throughout Europe's history. It can be considered to be a more highly evolved moral state than forms of collectivism as it implies a sense of responsibility for one's own actions and stresses autonomy of conscience. It is individualism in this sense to which Habermas refers when he equates social regress with "the end of the individual". In the context of possessivism these morally liberating aspects of individualism are suppressed. Possessive individualism is the fundamental ideology of what Offe discusses as the "achieving society". Elsewhere he describes the elements of possessive individualism in terms of two related norms with which the individual actors must comply, if they can be said to hold this ideology:
First, they must be willing to utilize the opportunities open to them, and they must constantly strive to improve their exchange position (possessiveness), and second, they must be willing to accept whatever material outcome emerges from their particular exchange relationship - particularly if this outcome is unfavorable to them. Such outcomes must, in other words, be attributed to either natural events or to the virtues and failures of the individual (individualism). 23

Basing our understanding on Offa's definition, it can be seen that we can observe the ideology of possessive individualism within families in four different dimensions:

1. The parents' attitude to the utilisation of opportunities and achievement;
2. Their attitude to acquisition;
3. Their attitude to ability and progress of individuals.
4. Their ideal for the relationship of the individual to society - competition or co-operation.

We shall now indicate the assessment scheme that was devised to give an estimate of the degree of possessive individualism embodied in parental beliefs and practices.

1. Attitude to the utilisation of opportunities and achievement

This aspect can be assessed as follows:-

a) The parents' attitude to their own careers. This was, in the study, the parents' attitude to the father's career. Ambitious parents, with the desire (and opportunity) to improve their social position, or a wife who is active in encouraging her husband to improve his earning/status level, demonstrate this aspect of possessivism. It will be lacking where there is no opportunity for advancement or where the parent finds a job both rewarding and fulfilling. Assessment was largely via parental interview when the parents' occupations were discussed. The daughter sometimes shed light on her father's approach to his own job or career. (Item 1 on possessive individualism scale).
b) **Parents' attitudes to their children's educational career.** 
This was evaluated in terms of whether the children are directed towards academic or sporting success. The attitude of parents to their sons is significant here as some parents lack ambition for their daughters. This aspect was assessed at the parental interview through discussion of the various children's activities. The daughter's assessment of the sort of pressure she received towards her goals was taken into consideration (Item 2).

c) **Parental evaluation of achievement versus equality.** This was assessed by discussion of the Bloggs dilemma (Q.4 on the pupils' questionnaire). A decision to grasp the opportunity for further achievement rather than to consider the needs of the children equally was seen as demonstrating this aspect of possessive individualism (Item 3).

2. **Attitude to acquisition**

An acquisitive attitude in a family would be shown by the family possessions being related to its improved exchange position (status linked) rather than to family needs or family interests.

This was assessed by the visit to the family home, where in most cases one's attention was actively directed to significant family possessions. A family who showed one the new organ (that no-one could play) was contrasted by families where treasured possessions were the creations of family members. The actual comfort-level or expensiveness of items in use did not count in the assessment (Item 4).

3. **Attitude to ability and progress of individuals**

a) **How parents saw "ability" within the educational process.** The ideology of individualism was apparent when parents saw ability as a fixed property of an individual which would determine his or her academic
or educational outcomes. This aspect was assessed via the discussion of comprehensive versus selective education and in particular of the desirability of streaming. This aspect was not necessarily linked with achievement, although it could be. Some parents were pro-streaming because the child was kept with others of his or her own ability and when the child was "weak" or a "plodder" it would be disadvantaged by contact with "bright" children. It was better to get the right sort of education for one's own level. (Item 5).

b) Attitude to the school over daughter's "progress". This aspect is seen in terms of individualism per se rather than in terms of achievement. It is shown by parents whose approach to the school is one of ensuring that their daughter gets her "rights" as an individual and that her merits are recognised. This item was assessed mainly via the related experience of tutors and year heads but was aided by the way the parents discussed their involvement in the school.

[All parents will tend to see a school largely in terms of their own children's progress, development or happiness so it may be that we are assessing the overt rather than covert approach to the school. Moreover, by assessing motives via action we are treading on unreliable ground.] (Item 6)

4. Ideal relationship of individual to society - competition or co-operation.

a) Whether open competition is seen as generally desirable. This was assessed by the parents' response to the statement on "laissez-faire" individualism from the "Belief and World Views" check list and their own comments on their response. Here we are assessing the ideal of competition in the economic sphere. (Item 7).

b) Whether the function of the state is seen in individualistic or
relational terms. Is the state seen in Hobbesian terms as protecting individuals from each other or in terms of ordering the well-being of everyone. This political aspect of competition versus co-operation was assessed largely via the discussion on law and order, backed, in most cases by discussion on the unions. When the parents gave their opinions on "what ought to be done" were they seeing the problems as belonging to the community or were they looking at them from a privatised and individualistic viewpoint? Is the main problem of law and order seen in terms of keeping criminals from attacking one's own person or property e.g. "If someone raped my daughter I'd kill 'im." (Georgina's father), or is law seen in terms of ordering the common life? (Item 8).

Assessing distorted communication in the family

Habermas' concept of the ideal speech situation gives a framework in which can be described sets of dynamic family interrelationships and interactions that are potentially generative of moral logic. In chapter 4 we referred to Habermas' theory of communicative competence in the context of which he shows how the traditional ideas of truth, freedom and justice can be apprehended in terms of linguistic communication and their negation in terms of the constraints which prevent the ideal speech situation from being achieved.24 Thus truth is seen as the outcome of unrestricted discussion through the development of an unconstrained consensus; freedom is seen in terms of "the mutuality of unimpaired self-representation"; and justice is seen in the generation of universal understanding and universalised norms.

We shall use these broad principles of the ideal speech situation to assess constraints to interaction which exist in the family. The aspects of such communication distortion which are observable in the families being studied will be assessed with relation to Habermas'
conceptualisation of truth, freedom and justice.

1. **Truth.** If truth is understood in terms of unconstrained consensus we can locate three aspects of family interaction where distortion of communication may be present.

   a) **Open Discussion.** Where truth has become established or sedimmented within the family, discussion of new ideas or understandings will be meaningless. The parents will resist the daughter's attempts to share her insights with them either by refusing to listen or to enter into discussion or by non-dialectical pronouncements which attempt to "put her straight". This aspect was assessed by the way the daughter perceived the degree of open discussion in the family especially with regard to social issues and controversial points of view. [The validity of the girl's judgement was tested at the interview if it was suspected that she could be exaggerating or showing neurotic tendencies, i.e. their attitudes to topics in which the daughter had described them as being thoroughly recalcitrant, were checked.] (Item 1 on Distortion of Communication scale).

   b) **The husband and wife's relationship to truth** may be asymmetrical. One parent may be the authority on family matters defining the situation regarding family history, family norms and habits and family relationships. Again, one parent may define family beliefs and attitudes on social and political issues. While it is likely that the parent who spends more time at home will be more knowledgeable about family affairs and the parent who spends more time in the outside world may be more politically aware, distortion will occur if the more knowledgeable parent acts as if he or she possesses the monopoly on truth in that area and refuses to be challenged.

   This aspect was assessed from the parental interview. When both family matters and social and political affairs were under discussion a
point was made of directing questions to the husband and wife alternately if they did not interact spontaneously when the questions were first put. The "Beliefs and World Views" check list was of assistance in some cases, as it was possible for there to be an apparent family consensus during interview, whilst one parent showed a very different pattern of beliefs in his or her check-list responses. [Evidence from tutors of their experience of parents was used as additional information]. (Item 2).

c) Parental monopoly of truth. This aspect stresses the situation where parents cannot see the possibility of a reciprocal relationship existing between them and their daughter with regard to truth. Truth is not necessarily sedimented - the parents may have an open attitude to truth in relation to each other, to their jobs or other adults. However, they cannot conceive of a change in their ideas or understanding through interaction with their children. (In this case with the 6th Form daughter).

At the parental interview the question, "Do you think you have learnt anything from your children", led to a discussion on this topic. If the question was not responded to in its open-ended form it was extended in the form of questions on the possible impact of the children's school knowledge on the parents' ideas. (Item 3).

2. Freedom. The focus is now on unimpaired self-representation. This aspect is observed in terms of the extent to which family members are free to become themselves (develop their own identities) or whether family interaction inhibits this freedom. As Habermas writes: "In normal communications an intersubjectivity, guaranteeing ego-identity develops and is maintained in the relation between individuals who acknowledge one another." Only the subject-daughters were available for assessment here as multi-faceted observation together with the subjects' self reflection is required. Two aspects were observable:-
a) The *daughter's ego-identity* will tend to lack continuity between home and school where freedom is distorted. Whilst different aspects of an adolescent will tend to predominate in situations as different as home, class-room or amongst peers, a severe disjunction between the self as expressed at home and the self as expressed at school will indicate constraints operating in either home or school. Thorough knowledge of the school situation and of the student's relations with staff and pupils should help distinguish in which locus the constraints are acting.

The assessment of this aspect was, in the first place, based on subjective impression. Was the general personality of the girl who was known at school continuous with that displayed by the girl in her home. The girl's home personality was revealed largely from the manner in which the parents' discussed their children. Did they seem to think, for example, that their daughter was quiet and shy when at school she was quite relaxed. Although the girls were seen in the context of their families, this behaviour was not assessed, as the presence of a visitor would tend to influence them. Follow-up talks with the girls, showed whether they accepted their parents' assessment of themselves and whether or not they felt they were the "same person" at home and school. Tutors were another source of input here, especially when they had noted that parents failed to understand that a girl was a person in her own right and tended to project their own desires onto their daughter. (Item 4).

b) *Whether the girl felt she was accepted* as a person by her parents was the second aspect of freedom distortion. A girl who does not believe she is accepted by her parents as a person or who feels that her individuality is not acknowledged, will not be free to take them into her confidence or consult them on matters to do with her private life on which she requires advice.

This aspect of freedom was assessed by the girl's response to the
questionnaire item which asked whether family members would be consulted in a moral dilemma (Q.6), followed up in the girl's interview (Item 5).

3. Justice. In terms of the ideal speech situation, justice is that process whereby, through discourse, the suitability of norms is tested and universalised norms are sought. The concept of equality is inherent in this concept of justice, as it is essential to the intersubjective recognition of norms. For in "undistorted communication" not only is there an absence of constraint to self-representation but "the communicated meanings are identical for all members of the language community." It is thus possible to observe injustice operating as a distortion within a family's patterns of communication by focussing on the way norms are generated and sanctioned and on whether the needs and interests of the children are equally considered. We can discern:

a) whether family norms, which concern older adolescent members, including the sixth form daughter, are discussed and agreed upon or whether they are arbitrary or traditional rules formulated or retained by the parents without consulting their children. Rules of conduct accepted by parents as right because they were brought up to obey them, have, in the context of their own families the nature of what Habermas refers to as "pre-linguistically fixed motivations". As such these may be barriers to the exercise of justice in the family.

The norm found to be relevant to all families which was discussed with all parents and daughters was that which concerned the daughters' evening leisure activities. All families had formal or informal rules covering the frequency, duration and nature of evening outings. The situation was considered to involve distortion, if such rules were applied to the daughter without adequate discussion. What was "adequate" tended to be relative to the group of sixteen, but both discussions with parents
and daughters were involved in the assessment. (Item 6).

b) Whether these norms are sanctioned by agreed-upon procedures which are considered by the daughter to be "fair" or whether they are enforced by arbitrary punishment or psychological pressure. Arbitrary sanctioning of norms is as much a feature of distorted communication as arbitrary norm formation. Both are aspects of the repressive norm which, in Habermasian terms, is basic to the unjust society. As with a) (norm formation) the sanctioning of norms to do with evening outings was discussed with parents and daughters but it was the daughter's perception which was considered to be especially significant.

[It is realised that whilst this approach to norms may now be suitable, it would not be for very young children and that in the case of sixth formers, morally generative forces in the family were at work many years ago. It is felt however, that if the distortion due to this particular injustice is now present, it is probable that some similar form of injustice was active in the family when the subjects were younger.] (Item 7).

c) Whether the parents are discriminatory in the treatment of their children or whether a reasonable degree of fairness is operating. Whilst children's needs are different, one or more members of the family can be favourites or there may be differential expectations in school-work or sport for sons and daughters.

Inequality within the family was observed informally during the interviews with the girls when family norms were under discussion. It was most readily observed, though, in the situation of parental interviews when, as all the children were being discussed, favouritism and unequal consideration of the interests of one or more members of the family were noted. The problem of the Bloggs family, which emphasised the tension between equality of opportunity and the fostering of talent, frequently led
parents to discuss their actual differential treatment of their children. (Item 8).

The Ideology/Interaction Grid

The families were assessed, comparatively, on each of the eight items taken as indicating the ideology of possessive individualism and on the eight items which indicated distortion of communication. By making the presence of each factor equivalent to one unit on the Ideology Scale or on the Interaction Scale and presenting the scales as intersecting axes, the position of each family can be plotted on the resultant grid.

Each factor was evaluated in terms of 0 = absent, 1 = present. Where the factor was clearly present or absent, as in the case of agreement with an item of the "Belief and World Views" check list there was no need for a subjective assessment. Mostly, however, assessment was made relative to the group of sixteen girls, with a subjective judgement being made of the position of the point between a high and a low manifestation of the observed factor. In some cases half units were used. An example of the use of half units is item 5 on the Interaction Scale. If a girl believed it was impossible to discuss personal problems with all family members, one unit was added to the scale, but if she felt she could discuss a problem with one parent or an older sibling, a half unit would be added. Similarly with item 3 on the Ideology Scale, where the Bloggs family was discussed. Parental difference as to whether equality or achievement should be stressed, or agreement at a point of compromise was awarded a half point.

In some cases it was impossible to assess an item, either because the situation did not exist e.g. an only child could not be treated unequally, or because the parents had not given sufficient information
for an assessment to be made. This latter problem only occurred in relation to the Ideology Scale. In this case an average for the 7 items scored was made. One girl, Naomi, had lived with one parent for the last three years and had little contact with the other. Assessment was made with regard to the present family of mother and children (even though in Appendix D, her family's social class still relates to her absent father).

The relative position of the families with respect to these scales is shown in Figure II. Appendix F shows how each family scored on each item and gives a detailed account of how the assessment of one of the families was carried out. No attempt was made to isolate specific sets of criteria for the assessments of either possessive individualism or distortion of communication. With only sixteen families, all coming from one area of London, such criteria would lack any meaning. As all the items were assessed in relation to the sixteen families, the positions of the families as they relate to each other on the interacting scales should reflect the theoretical elements on which the scales were based.

It will be noted from figure II that the families of the girls who belonged to the communicative group are clustered together in the lower left quadrant. This quadrant represents a low degree of distortion of communication and a low degree of possessive individualism. All girls who showed consistent use of strategic/instrumental logic belong to families positioned in the upper right quadrant. These families show both a high degree of distortion of communication and a high level of possessive individualism. The other families all show a high level of distortion, but only a low level of possessive individualism - Betty's family to a lesser extent.

This very rough measure, gives a distinct indication that the family beliefs and practices bear a direct relation to the phenomenon which we
POSITION OF SUBJECTS' FAMILIES ON IDEOLOGY/INTERACTION SCALES

FIGURE 2
have classified as the logical form used in the making of moral judgements. The relationship, it will be noted, is to the type of logic, not to the world view or system of belief. Whilst it was shown that Cathy, Frances, Naomi and Queenie shared a political concern and an obligation to put their political beliefs into practice that was much less developed in Diane, Mary and Lucy, this distinction is not reflected here.

It can be seen that the Interaction Scale discriminated more effectively between families than the Ideology Scale. There is a marked difference on the Interaction Scale between the families of the communicative group and those of both other groups. Families assessed as "low" on one factor indicating distortion of communication, tended to be "low" on most factors. As all daughters of families showing a high degree of communicative competence (low distortion) have shown a consistently high degree of communicative logic in making moral judgements it can be assumed that the phenomena are connected. The practical patterns gained at home appear to have extended into the daughters' practical morality. These families also showed a low level of possessive individualism as did their daughters. Yet, in general, a comparison of parents' and daughters' patterns of beliefs had led to the conclusion that ideologies are not directly transmitted. As more of our parents showed a high degree of possessive individualism together with low distortion of communication it is impossible to comment further. One would not expect Greenbank parents to combine these categories. Parents whose patterns of communication were open and who were highly oriented towards possessive individualism would be likely to be consciously ambitious and thus unlikely to choose a school with such a different ethos from their own. Parents valuing achievement would most likely choose an achievement-orientated school for their children, unless they believed them to be potential failures.
Of the girls coming from families showing a high degree of distortion it is the ideology of possessive individualism that appears to be associated with the distinction between those showing consistent use of strategic/instrumental logic and those with inconsistent use. Thus Heather and Amy come from families showing a high degree of distorted communication and while both girls showed a marked tendency towards strategic/instrumentality in one section of their questionnaire they were predominantly communicative in the other section. The families of Joy and Patience (both girls classified as strategic/instrumental) also showed high distortion of communication but exhibited a much higher level of possessive individualism than Heather's or Amy's families. It is interesting to speculate upon a mechanism whereby such an ideology may be accepted by a daughter when other beliefs are questioned. If a child's natural desire to communicate with parents is thwarted will the child be more open to indoctrination via a desire to please the parents? Amy discussed her agony of separation from her father. She had discovered that she could please him by making him cakes. She now cooks the supper every night and although the parents do not communicate with her in the way she would like, she does receive their praise. Her father, a manual worker, is not ambitious and is not particularly interested in her academic progress. Amy has intelligence but has never really extended herself, until recently when she discovered in photography and television technology. She has lacked external goals.

Georgina, classified as consistently strategic/instrumental, had been a poor achiever in primary school and was seen by her parents as a "plodder". Her mother is intensely ambitious and shows great disappointment that her husband has not "got on". Georgina finds communication with either parent very difficult, but appears to have set out to achieve academically, as a way of pleasing them. She basks in their approval of
her academic attainments (she now has two A levels), yet away from them
she lacks confidence and feels that they do not really understand her as
a person. She never discusses personal problems with them.

As well as this indirect connection between the parents' ideology
and the daughters' desire to please them via achievement, there is the
relationship between the ideology of individualism and the practice of
competitivism. It is quite likely that competitive attitudes are
catched by the child in a family where communication is low and individualistic
competitive behaviour is constantly approved.

We do not believe that our rough scales and very general criteria
should be subject to a high degree of analysis or speculation. What does
appear to have been shown is that communicative logic is directly related
to the home environment and appears to be associated, above all, with a
low level of distortion of communication in the family.

We have thus shown that it makes sense to translate Habermas' typification of morality in terms of communicative competence into
empirical reality. There is a connection between the active, practical
patterns of communication in a family and the way the daughter makes her
judgements about everyday practical concerns or about social problems
in the wider world.

The Home/School Relationship and Moral Judgement

At Greenbank School, co-operative relationships and open
communication are officially valued and their practice is encouraged.
Yet, of the sixteen in the intensive study, only those girls classified
as consistently communicative seemed fully aware of this aspect of the
school. 28 We have now seen that the essential style that characterises
the making of moral judgements is most probably generated at home. It
is suggested, then, that Greenbank's comprehensive ethos serves to further
the developments of the communicative ethic in those already disposed
to it and helps them move from particularism to universalism.

Communicative Lucy, for example, disagrees with many beliefs held by
her parents. Her parents are racist and would like to reintroduce capital
punishment. Yet relationships are open and communication is a reality.
Lucy argues with her father and hopes her children will be able to
discuss these problems with her, as openly as she can with her mother.
Through the school, Lucy has discovered that Pakistanis are "real
people" and has made friends with several. She is now strongly anti-
racist. She has learnt not to "judge a sausage by its skin" and now refuses
to categorise people. She will not ostracise neighbouring youths when they
return from Borstal, although her father tells her they are worthless.
Yet she also refuses to blame her father for his "narrow-minded"
attitude. He has lacked the opportunities and experience she has enjoyed.
It is Lucy, essentially practiced in communication and secure in her
human relationships who can deepen her understanding of people from a
study of A level English. Lucy had referred to this aspect of English
in her second interview, quoted above. Georgina, on the other hand,
strongly orientated towards external goals, saw the practical outcomes
of the study of English (excluding examination success) as limited
to improving her self-expression. Yet although Georgina is unable to
develop relationally through her school life, she believes that being
there has made her more "tolerant".

A similar broadening of frames of reference as seen with Lucy can be
found in Cathy. Cathy comes from a family which not only shows a high
degree of communicative competence but is involved in local activities
to a greater extent than any of the other sixteen families. Father
helps with the church, mother with the Girl Guides and the whole family
belongs to several clubs concerned with nature conservation. Yet Cathy
has decided that she wants to work for the benefit of the Third World. Her enthusiasm has led to increasingly good academic results and she is expected to qualify for her chosen University, where the Geography courses feature the Third World. Cathy, like Georgina, was not a potential Grammar School pupil and has only recently decided that knowledge, as well as willingness, is needed if she is to be effective. Her father said at the interview that he believed Cathy’s concern had emerged from her studies of Biology and Geography. Neither parents had a University education. Both are concerned for their immediate world. Through her experience as a pupil of Greenbank (she had found it an "opener", preventing self-centredness), Cathy has widened her horizons whilst maintaining her general approach to life. Her studies have given a truly universal aspect to her world view.

It is likely that any subject studied at an advanced level, in a spirit of enquiry will have the potential to extend a pupil’s view of the world from the particularistic concerns of family life to a more universalistic approach. Because of their stress on understanding human action, we would expect subjects such as History and Sociology to have a universalising effect on a student’s understanding and one is not surprised when Queenie attributes much of her political concern to her study of History and Naomi feels she has developed her understanding of human relationships through her study of Sociology. But other subjects can be similarly effective. Frances’ French teacher reported that Frances was showing an ability and a willingness to extend her understanding of motive and purpose through French literature discussions. Mary’s studies are restricted to Science subjects. She comes from a home where horizons are not wide and where her parents, both originally "East enders", hold strong and non-liberal opinions e.g. anti-Common Market, anti-immigration. Although Mary shares many of these opinions she shows a breadth of vision
and an ability to make judgements on wider social issues that is lacking in her parents. Her family shows a high degree of communicative competence at the everyday interactive level but Mary's greater intellectual development has enabled her to extend the communicative form into the universalistic dimension.

The informal discussions amongst sixth formers or the more formal discussions held in Liberal Studies groups or in the lower sixth discussion group on current affairs can have a similar universalising effect for those already practicing a communicative mode in relation to knowledge. Work with the groups in Phase I had revealed the unexpected fact that many girls felt that discussion led to a consolidation of their own opinions rather than acting as a challenge to belief. The effect of discussion on their ideas and opinions was followed up in the girls' first interview in the intensive study phase. It was the girls who had already been classified as communicative in making moral judgements who expressed a belief that discussion with others was important in developing their ideas and understanding of life. Outstanding examples here were Queenie and Naomi. Queenie was reported above, as having caught her awareness of environmental needs from Naomi, particularly through the discussion group. Frances, too, had provided political stimulation but her interest rather than the ideas themselves had provided the stimulus as "hers' are so definite ideas, there's no room for anyone else to put in an idea", Queenie had commented. Naomi, herself, had always had an open and communicative relationship with her mother but as a child had accepted the family evaluation that money meant happiness and achievement was needed for both. It was through informal discussion with her friends and their parents that she became aware of the lack of reciprocity between her own parents and after they split she gradually re-built her system of values, based on the intrinsic worth of co-operative human interaction.
To Naomi, it was the discussions in class and common-room and with friends away from the school that helped develop her present world view. Yet interviews with her mother show that Naomi already possessed a high degree of interactive competence before she began to re-build her belief system.

We are stressing here that there is a continuity between the degree of communicative competence of a family and the daughter's ability to extend her world view and system of beliefs into the universalistic dimension through communicative action at school. Children of families where there is a high level of communicative competence will, as individuals, show a high level of interactive competence and will make judgements on matters of morality affecting themselves and the wider world, according to communicative logic. It is the judgements on wider issues, in particular, where the school can be seen to play a part. 29

We are not claiming that the school has no effect on the beliefs and world views of pupils showing lower levels of communicative competence but insofar as they are less open to extending their knowledge through discursive means, they are less likely to be affected by the particular "comprehensive ethos" of a school such as Greenbank. It must also be recognised that because Greenbank is part of a wider school system and has an accepted function of selection and certification for future training and employment, it is inevitably linked with individualism and instrumentality. It is not surprising that more sixth formers who attempted the questionnaire were classified as "neutral" or "inconsistent" than showed strongly polarised logic use. Most families, sufficiently successful in a capitalistic system to have a daughter in the sixth form would be likely to show a certain degree of possessive individualism, and distortion of communication, being itself the inevitable result of an imperfectly just society, is likely to be the norm. 30
Beliefs, World Views and Motivation

In Chapter 7 we noted that in their questionnaire responses, girls' consistent in use of communicative logic emphasised the values of trust, understanding others, sincerity, discussion, harmony, the pursuit of interests and the value of human life. Those tending to use strategic/instrumental logic emphasised achievement, grasping opportunities and independence and also valued order and sincerity.

Through the interviews of the intensive study we discovered that the values isolated as reference matter of moral judgements did indeed fit into the girls' general view of themselves in relation to their world. All the communicative girls saw human relationships and co-operation as ultimately desirable and most expressed the belief that joint human action could effect change in the world. Most of them also felt a sense of obligation to act in a considerate and co-operative way and to relate honestly and openly with other people, irrespective of who they were. Only four of them, however, saw themselves as necessarily concerned with joint human endeavour (political dimension) and felt a sense of personal obligation to work to help right what they saw was wrong with the world.

The strategic/instrumental girls, and indeed most of the non-aligned (control) group, wanted a happy and fulfilling existence in a stable world but did not see themselves as being necessarily concerned with improving the world. Their sense of obligation was largely in return for what they had received - feeling in debt to their families, they saw themselves as reciprocally obliged to their families in various ways. The strategic/instrumental group were noticeably more concerned with their careers and less concerned with the people with whom they would be sharing their lives.

To a large extent, the girls' view of the good life, what they see as ultimately desirable in life, will carry its own motivational force.
As the philosophers of education have shown, motivation has a strong cognitive element and what one believes to be desirable will influence one's choices for action. It is this cognitive aspect of motivation that Habermas stresses when he writes, "I shall proceed on the assumption that 'moral consciousness' signifies the ability to make use of interactive competence for consciously processing morally relevant conflicts of action." It is understandable then, that the communicative girls, seeing human discursive relationships as desirable, are more likely to make judgements with reference to co-operation and people's needs than those whose aims focus on achievement seen as career success. Yet when we talk in terms of a sense of obligation we are moving into a motivational level that cannot be fully described in cognitive terms. Because our scheme was designed to analyse moral consciousness in cognitive terms we have concentrated on the girls' conscious sense of obligation. We thus reported that Diane, outstanding amongst the sixteen for her consideration and sensitivity to others, was not aware of any sense of obligation.

Again, if we seek to characterise the four girls whom we believe to exhibit the Habermasian ideal of communicative morality (Cathy, Frances, Naomi and Queenie) we describe them as having a political dimension to their world views and believing they have a duty to put their concerns into practice. Yet, for communicative morality to be an evolutionary force it must transcend the cognitive dimension. Moral action, as well as moral judgement, will be required.

Habermas is aware of "the frequent discrepancies between moral judgement and moral action" but does not offer any explanation for the discrepancy beyond an inadequacy in the individual's "motivational structure". The motivation structure is not described although he refers to "superego formation" and the "authority of conscience". The authority of conscience that gives rise to what Peters refers to as "authority guilt" is connected with rules internalised in childhood and
is not likely to motivate any to act out their obligations, unless the
obligations are grounded at a very basic level. Duty to family based on
reciprocity could be a case in point. Peters also refers to the
"humanistic conscience", postulated by Money-Kyrle as originating in
the 'guilt' experienced by the child when he hates or hurts the mother
he loves. Such a conscience may explain why one feels an obligation
to be considerate of others. There is also shame which in Peters' terms
is connected with "our own loss of self-esteem and our disappointment in
being unable to live up to our ideals." Such negative motivations are
indeed part of the personality structure and to some extent help bridge
the gap between one's judgement and one's action, but they are hardly a
powerful force sufficient to cause an individual to act co-operatively
for the general good rather than in accordance with his own interests.

By returning to "the four" and examining what they have said and
written, one is struck by the fact that they are strongly motivated to
act out their world concerns and so far have been putting them into
practice. What distinguishes Mary from Frances can only partly be
described in cognitive terms, by referring, for example, to Mary's
narrower horizons and Frances' broad political concerns. Mary is quite
as aware as Frances that the world has problems and she would like to
help make the world a better place. She is just as considerate of others
in everyday practice or communicative in her judgements on paper. The
difference lies in the level at which the two girls are satisfied. Mary
feels she will be satisfied if she fulfils her career aims and settles
down with a happy family around her. Frances on the other hand is for ever
seeking further involvement with the world and deeper levels of
satisfaction. Her letters about last summer's vacation indicates this.
She had received an ILEA award to go to Germany and decided to join a
work camp because she "wanted to do something more interesting and
profitable than staying with a penfriend." She learnt a lot and found
the experience worthwhile but was disappointed that the work itself, in a forest, lacked social purpose. "I did not feel the work was particularly useful," she wrote, "and this meant that the experience was slightly less satisfying." When she does voluntary work in the future she will "make sure it is concerned with a social project."

When Frances makes such decisions in terms of what is most satisfying, she is clearly being motivated by powerful positive forces. These can most generally be described as the fulfilment of deep needs. Mary and Frances are both motivated by their needs but whilst Mary is concentrating on needs of achievement, security and love, Frances may be experiencing what Maslow describes as self-actualising needs. It may also be that Frances understands achievement in different terms (we quoted her above as believing that a helpful life was a greater achievement than a "first" at Oxford), and that her self-esteem needs can only be satisfied when she feels she has helped the world. It is not our place to discuss the mechanisms of positive motivation. We are stressing, however, that to characterise Habermas' communicative ethic in empirical reality we would need to go beyond cognitive understanding and negative motivations such as guilt and shame. Communicative morality is positively motivated by needs that are only satisfied through co-operative human action, by a desire for truth and justice only to be met through discursive, consensus orientated activity.

**Summary - Habermas in Practice**

The purpose of the empirical study, as a whole, was to extend the relationship of Habermas' theory into the realm of empirical reality - to "operationalise" Habermas. We had already shown how Habermas theorised morality in practical terms, as undistorted human communication and posited moral consciousness as a limiting condition of social evolution.
We had devised a scheme to investigate moral consciousness from a Habermasian perspective through the analysis of the procedures used in the making of moral judgements. We thus set out to use this scheme to investigate the moral consciousness of sixth formers in Greenbank Comprehensive School. Keeping in mind Habermas' formulation of social evolution, we gave ourselves the specific task of discovering tendencies towards the practice of communicative morality and of looking for factors assisting the development of this moral form in home and school.

During Phase I we devised the scheme for conceptualising and analysing the making of moral judgements. Moral judgements were seen as procedural and as being distinguished by their style or logic which was related to the moral agents' value system and the way the situation being judged was contextualised in her experience. This scheme was discussed in Chapter 6. The phase ended with the construction of a questionnaire which contained morally relevant conflict situations designed to draw upon two separate dimensions of experience (relevance zones) the direct personal experience of family and friends and the less personal experience of the wider world gained particularly from school, books and the media.

During this phase we were selecting sections of Habermasian theory together with insights from his semi-theoretical formulations and constructing from them a particular purpose for the empirical endeavour together with a general method of conducting the enquiry. The purpose was derived from his formulation of social evolution, the methodology from the fundamental distinction between work and interaction used in his critiques of Marx and his reformulation of rationalisation. This then was a period of engaging in practical interaction whilst selecting theory considered applicable to our task.

Phase II was the period where data was collected and analysed according to the theoretical scheme. The data consisted of the judgements made by the eighty four sixth formers in response to the
morally relevant situations of the questionnaire. The major analysis was of the style or logical form of the girls' judgements. During the analysis we isolated three sets of criteria for distinguishing between communicative and strategic/instrumental logic. These referred to interpersonal relationships, human activities and relationships of people to the world. In this way Habermas' general typification was particularised and applied to judgements of practical situations. The values referred to during judgmental procedures for substantiating judgements were analysed and were seen to relate systematically to the logical type in terms of the concept of communicative morality.

In Phase III, the phase of the intensive study, a reflexive relationship was established with sixteen pupils and their families with attention focussing on the distinctions between the seven showing consistent use of communicative logic and the remainder. This included a group strongly polarised towards use of strategic/instrumental logic and a group showing mixed logical form. The most fundamental influence in generating the logical form of communicative morality was shown to be the family, but the school played an important part in helping develop the systems of beliefs and world views of girls already possessing the communicative form. The school assisted the transformation of the girls' values from particularistic to universal concerns and encouraged the development of the political dimension necessary for the universal ethics of speech (communicative morality).

In this phase we utilised and applied Habermas' definition of moral principles in terms of the ideal speech situation. Truth, freedom and justice were translated into necessary conditions for undistorted communication. Observations of distortions to communication in the family were thus observations of their tendency to negate or suppress fundamental moral principles in family interaction. The families which
showed low distortion (i.e. a high degree of communicative competence), were the families of the girls showing consistent use of communicative logic. As Habermas has described moral development in terms of development of interactive competence it can be supposed that these girls also possessed a high level of (potential, at least) interactive competence. It would be just as wrong, however, to conclude that a family's communicative competence is directly transmitted to the daughter as interactive competence and that this shapes her cognitive style of making judgements as to conclude that a family's moral beliefs and values are transmitted at the cognitive level and directly lead to moral action. There is a reflexive relationship between cognitive understanding and practical interaction that exists at both the family level and at the individual's judgement making level. There is likewise a reflexive relationship between the individual's conscious awareness of her moral approach and the actual way she relates to others and comes to make her judgements. Hence Frances showed a high level of awareness of her moral motivations, whilst Diane, a highly intuitive and expressive girl, and much less analytical than Frances, showed little conscious understanding of her moral beliefs and motivations. The interrelationship between moral theory and moral practice at the level of interaction was also used to explain a possible mechanism for the transmission of goal directedness or achievement orientation from parents to child without necessarily being accepted by the child at the cognitive level.

This phase then, investigated the relationships existing between home, school and communicative morality at one level. At the other, however, it investigated the use of Habermas' theoretical relationship between moral theory and human practice in empirical reality. By using his relationship between theory and practice within morality, the real and actual relationships existing between family, daughter and school were capable of being observed and discussed.
A summary of the characteristics of communicative and strategic/instrumental morality with their relationships to home and school in terms of ideal types is given in Appendix G.
Notes: Chapter 8


2 See discussion in Chapter 2 of this study.

3 See reviews by the following:


9 For an excellent discussion of this aspect see Lyman, S.M. and Scott, M.B., A Sociology of the Absurd, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970, Ch. 5: "Accounts".

10 See sections from Eliza's and Georgina's interviews (Appendix E), where both girls show resentment - Eliza, overtly, in regard to her father's refusal to listen to her ideas or plans; Georgina, covertly, about her parents' lack of recognition of her "adult" status.

11 See letters to parents by headmistress and research student, Appendix C.


16 Francis had received the highest O level results in the school the previous year. She was considered by the year head as the outstanding academic student in sixth form.

17 Diane's interest in art extended to extra-curricular activities. Lucy and Mary were in the school choir and Cathy, Frances and Naomi were active in the Dance group. All but Lucy carried these activities on into their Upper Sixth Year.


21 Habermas, J., Legitimation Crisis, op.cit., p.117.


25 Ibid., p.143.

26 Ibid., p.122.

27 Ibid., p.146.

28 Amy, too, had become aware of the possibilities of interacting with teachers, through her work in the Media Resources Centre. But she has not accepted much of Greenbank's ethos, e.g. keeps away from the common room and other girls and is very racist.
A Note on "framing":

We are aware of the similarity between our suggestion of a continuity between the level of communicative competence of the home and the communicative ethos of the school and Professor Basil Bernstein's work on cultural transmission. We are of course observing the same general area of relationships - the nexus between primary and secondary socialisation. But one theoretical perspective is different and we do not believe that we are discussing the same phenomena as Professor Bernstein. There are similarities between our typification of the highly communicatively competent family and Bernstein's weakly framed family of the new middle class where relationships are personal and the linguistic code elaborated. (Bernstein, B., Class Codes and Control, Vol.III, Ch. 6. "Class and Pedagogies: Visible and Invisible", London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975). But the similarity finishes with the emphasis on the openness of communication.

In the first place our highly communicative families by no means typify elaborated code use nor are they strongly represented by members of the new middle class. [Appendix D shows the family's social class]. Frances' family are typical of the new middle class, exhibiting a personal form of an elaborated code and weak classification and framing. They chose Greenbank because, compared with other schools its general structure and approach appealed to them. But Lucy, Mary and Queenie come from homes where framing is quite strong, and particularly with Lucy and Mary, the code is quite restricted. School studies have helped these girls transcend the particularism of home life. Most girls attended relatively highly classified and framed primary schools.

Secondly, although Greenbank is weakly framed in comparison with many neighbouring schools it in no way approaches the "invisible pedagogy". Knowledge is strongly classified and strongly framed - subject departments are almost autonomous. Only staff and student relationships show relatively weak framing and only at the sixth form level do pupils seem to become aware of a comparatively weak hierarchy (by comparing their situation with friends at other local schools).

Finally, by using Habermas' typification of moral principles in terms of the ideal speech situation we attempted to go more deeply into distortion of communication than looking at the type of control operating. Covert forms of control were assessed for distortion as well as overt forms of control. Thus the continuity of personal identity at home and school was taken as a measure of an aspect of freedom. Control of the daughter's evenings' out by emotional pressure was considered as showing distortion just as much as the non-discursive application of arbitrary rules. Our scheme failed to distinguish distortion in its overt and covert forms but did not confuse covert control with freedom from distortion.

30 Habermas, J., "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'", op.cit., p.96.


33 Ibid., p.91.


This essay has been concerned with the sociological study of morality in the field of education. Its underlying theme has been the relationship of theory to practice. This theme sprang from the nature of the topic; morality, but has found expression in observations of the sociological enterprise. Morality concerns beliefs and theories about practical human activity. It is a theoretical consideration of the practical in terms of worthwhileness or value. Sociology theoretically considers human social activity. It must thus include the consideration of man's efforts to evaluate his action; it must be able to theorise the moral. It must not only theorise about morality but be able to investigate it empirically. Its theoretical understanding of the nature of morality within society will influence its empirical research - its theory of the moral will shape its sociological practice.

In the Introduction we pointed out that Sociology had made little progress in the study of morality in education since the time of Dewey and Durkheim. Within the general field of education, sociological studies had investigated both positive and negative aspects of morality, focussing on both moral education and juvenile deviance. It was considered that both aspects lacked an adequate theory of morality and were thus unable to deal with moral reality in social terms. The approach to moral education was largely functionalist and morality was confused with societal goals. Deviance studies saw deviance as a social rather than a moral problem but traditional approaches to deviance tended to conflate the problems as they tended to accept functionalist assumptions. A basic assumption of functionalism and particularly pertinent to the sociology of morality was that a direct linear relationship existed between moral beliefs and values and morally relevant action.
In Chapter 2, we discussed the relationship between belief and action and showed how assumptions which prevailed in America's sociological tradition had their roots in its pragmatic heritage. The assumption that belief and action were directly and unreflexively related was illustrated by deviance studies and we showed its connection with an oversimplified view of motivation. Such assumptions affect sociological practice and lead not only to a false understanding of the phenomena but draw attention away from the belief/action relationship, study of which would demand an adequate social theory of morality.

In Chapter 3 we examined the contribution of Marx, Durkheim and Weber to Sociology's understanding of the moral. We considered that it was the founding fathers' inability adequately to conceptualise and theorise the moral within society that was largely responsible for the lack of progress in the sociology of morality today. They were aware that modern industrial developments had brought with them rapid social change and they all attempted to interpret the fundamental relationships that existed under capitalism. This meant an examination of the place and nature of morality in modern society, and, as Kant still dominated academic thought in Europe, it meant grappling with Kantian ideas, either through critique or re-interpretation.

Marx saw conventional ethics as serving the interests of those in power and sought to replace moral theorising with a critique of practical human activity. His contribution to the sociology of morality is his insistence that man's humanity be discussed not in terms of intentionality or ideal action but as co-operative activity, praxis. But in his endeavour to eradicate all non-philosophical elements from his critique, Marx disconnected his concept of praxis from moral universals and left his followers with the reality of a revolutionary proletariat but with no guiding lines for its emancipatory activity.
Durkheim moved morality from the Kantian realm of the individual conscience to function as the principal cohesive mechanism of society. But Durkheim's morality was contained by the society it served and could not transcend relativism. Moreover man's only degree of freedom is as an individual acting in spite of the society of which he is an integral part. Modern man's relationships are essentially contractual, his only practical co-operative activity being associated with his position in the division of labour, as a member of a trade guild. Just as we saw how Marxist sociologists were unable to give a critique of the justice of political practices, so we noted that functionalist sociology, following Durkheim's approach to morality, was incapable of evaluating social practices except in terms of their contribution to social cohesion.

Weber's neo-Kantian approach, which emphasised the separation of fact and value, led him to see social change in terms of technological and bureaucratic progress, the outward expression of Zweckrationalitat. Industrial man was decreasingly influenced by morality which now was limited to the arena of his private conscience. Morality was neither social nor rational. Its importance lay in its connection with individual motivation and individual action. It could only be investigated at the individual level through the quasi-scientific operation of Verstehen. The Weberian approach to the moral has been of tremendous influence in all aspects of Sociology. Incorporated into Parsonian functionalism, it reinforced the non-humanistic aspects of the Durkheimian strands to such an extent that society became not only the measure of morality but the determinant of individual consciousness. When the Weberian tradition reappeared in its symbolic interactive and phenomenological forms and challenged the determinism of functionalism, it could not attack the injustices that functionalism masked and indeed condoned. In Weberian thought there could be no connection between what people believed to be
right and what was indeed legitimate. Legitimacy depended on the rational action of the law and was unrelated to people's norms and values, for there could be no co-operative or representative "moral" action. Morality was individual and irrational.

It was the realisation of the falseness of the above concept which led Jürgen Habermas to extend his discourse theory from the validity of truth claims to the rationality of norms. Social norms can be considered rational if, through practical discourse focussing on the generalisability of interests, a consensus is reached that a norm is appropriate to all whom the situation concerns. Through the rules of normal communication, Habermas had already concluded that norms had a direct relationship to truth. Now, by defining their rationality in terms of discourse theory, Habermas has taken norms from the Parsonian realm of societal "givenness" where they are unconsciously internalised by oversocialised individuals to the realm of conscious interaction where norms are examined for their repressive possibilities or their suitability. Thus, human practice takes precedence over societal pressure.

In Chapter 4 we discussed the remarkable contribution Habermas is making to the sociology of morality. We noted that Habermas' communicative theory of morality meets the requirements of a theory through which morality can be investigated in social terms. The traditional ethical concepts of truth, freedom and justice are theoretically related in terms of human interaction through the device of the ideal speech situation. Practical morality is thus considered as communicative human action. Moral deviance, for example, is described in terms of imperfect communication. It is deviance not from the norm but from the ideal. Moral deviance is not, then, a property to be ascribed to an individual in status terms although it may describe an individual's behaviour (in terms of his role in communicative action). As distortion to communication is seen as essentially a societal phenomenon, the expressed outcome of
oppression and social injustice, we see that communicative moral theory gives us a connection between social morality and individual morality without positing a simple cause and effect relationship. If an individual shows systematic distortion in his communicative ability or a low level of interactive or communicative competence we are observing a moral fact about the individual - he shows evidence of moral damage or moral immaturity. Because communicative theory considers individuals as responsible and autonomous we would expect him to be capable of change or growth. But because distortion of communication is essentially social, we would look to family and societal relationships in order to bring the individual's problem into perspective.

Habermas has provided an effective critique of Kantian ethics following the tradition of Hegel and Marx. Where Hegel tried to show that value and fact merged in history, Habermas has shown their perfect theoretical fusion in the ideal speech situation. Habermas does not make the mistake of Marx, losing all purchase on value through a translation of morality into practical human activity (the dimension of fact). He maintains the essentially Hegelian dialectical approach of a dynamic exchange between the realm of the ideal and the realm of the real, between value and fact, between theory and practice. We stressed in Chapter 4, that the Habermasian critique of Kant was essentially a replacement of Kantian individual (though universalistic) will-directed action by cooperative, communicative interaction. To Habermas, Kantian moral action is not wrong because it is individual action, for individual autonomy is essential to morality. Kantian action is less than perfectly moral because it is performed by the individual with reference to himself and his private understanding alone. When one acts in accordance with Kantian ethics one follows a rule or maxim based on what one believes is right for all men. This, in Habermasian terms is strategic action. The relationship between the understanding and the action is linear, the
For Habermas, the entire enterprise must be reflexive. Moral thought is reflexive thought: it involves what is true as well as what is right and relates the two. It considers the situation in ideal terms, i.e. in terms of what would be a desirable state of affairs but also considers the actual practical situation as it concerns everyone involved or affected. And this type of reflexivity, where there is a constant dialectical relationship between fact and value, the ideal and the real, theory and practice, must occur at the practical level, through dialectical human symbolic exchange - discourse. The paradigm of discourse is basic to all Habermasian theory. If Hegel attempted to pursue his dialectical course by giving precedence to the ideal and finally came to rest in the concrete (the Prussian state), then Marx can be seen to have pursued a materialist dialectic which resulted in an idealised proletariat which lacked reflexivity and thus practical direction. Habermas has attempted to ensure a viable reflexivity by basing his theory on the very source of all dialectical action, practical human communication. So while actual human communication is both the topic of his research (as in universal pragmatics) or an essential ingredient to his theories and formulations (ideal speech situation, social evolution) it is also the basic model for the way he approaches all relationships.

Thus moral action, whilst it can be described in terms of human communication must also bear a reflexive (communicative-type) relationship to belief. And beliefs are not to be considered as "moral beliefs" in the Parsonian sense of being defined in terms of leading to "moral" action. All action can be evaluated from a communicative approach and all beliefs to which an actor refers when considering
how to act, can be defined as morally relevant. The beliefs themselves
will be complexly interrelated, often inconsistent, and will to some
extent be associated with the practical experiences which led to their
acceptance. The belief and the action will relate in a reflexive
fashion, as if the actor and the situation were carrying out a dialogue.
So an individual may come to a solitary evaluation of a morally relevant
situation, but if fully moral in the communicative sense, his model for
his evaluation must be that of practical discourse. These ideas are
basic to the conceptual scheme discussed in Chapter 6.

If Habermas' theory is to be of use to the sociology of morality it
must be put to the test in empirical reality. Our attempt to
"operationalise" Habermasian theory and apply it to a study of moral
judgement making in a girls' comprehensive school has been the task of
Part II of this thesis. In Chapter 5 we discussed the theoretical problems
of the enterprise - Habermas was frequently indecisive and even
contradictory in his formulations. We believed that his greatest
contradiction was the acceptance of cognitive psychology into his
reformulation of historical materialism and we decided to carry out the
empirical section of the study without the inclusion of Piagetian or
Kohlbergian concepts. The steps whereby we increasingly concretised
Habermas's ideas and the relationship we observed are described in
Chapters 7 and 8 and summarised at the end of Chapter 8.

Now, at the close of the study, we return to our underlying
relationship between theory and practice. Our reflections above, have
been a continuation of Habermasian discursive theory. But, if Habermas'
relationship between theory and practice is true, it should be borne out
in the practical empirical situation. The theoretical approach should be
found to influence the sociological research practices. The practical
experience of the research should throw light on the theoretical
formulations. Finally, the experience of interrelating theory and practice in an empirical situation should lead to some understanding of the situation itself, in our case the relation of comprehensive education to morality.

We shall turn our attention, then, to three questions:-

1. How have the practices of the empirical study been influenced by Habermas' theory?

2. How have the empirical observations shed light on Habermas' theoretical formulations?

3. Has the study indicated any role for comprehensive education in moral development or moral evolution?

1. The influence of the theory on research practice

Habermas' theory lays emphasis on reflexive procedural activity. At the same time it tends to function at a high level of generalisation. Thus, in order to carry out an investigation of actual particular phenomena the researcher was forced to engage in an ongoing reflexive relationship between theoretical considerations and research practices. At no stage was one able to make a simple application of Habermasian theory to the empirical situation.

During the first phase of the study we engaged in interaction and dialogue with two groups of students whilst we searched for situations which would be morally relevant to them. It was during this period of being tuned in to the girls' moral wavelengths that we sought to interrelate elements of Habermas' theory in a way that would allow us to describe moral judgement making in reflexive and procedural terms. The practical problem of an inconsistency which appeared related to the context of the girls' experience here induced us to be deflected from Habermas and to build Schutzean insights into our analytical scheme. In this case theoretical consideration was dictated by explanatory need.
At the beginning of the second phase we had a model with which to analyse judgemental procedures and a series of questions intended to stimulate moral evaluatory activity. The second phase, though accompanied by interaction at the informal level was less reflexive at the formal level - the situations were presented and the pupils responded. Analysis of the responses, however, forced interaction between the girls' ways of evaluating the practical situations, which reflected their moral consciousness), and Habermas' theoretical constructions. From this activity we devised the set of criteria used to distinguish the communicative form of judgement making from the strategic/instrumental form.

During the third, intensive phase we set out to investigate relationships between the subjects' beliefs and world views and their ways of making judgements and between their moral approach and their experience of home and school. Our role with the pupils was to assist them to reflect upon their ideas and their experience; with the families it was to facilitate idea sharing and interaction. The Habermasian interrelationship of value and fact (derived from the ideal speech situation) allowed us to concentrate less on the value "content" of parental world views and more on the communicative competence exhibited through family interaction and family practices. During the final research procedures of the analysis of the parental tapes we were continuing to typify the value/fact relationship in terms of practical family activities.

In Chapter 7, when we outlined our methodology, we referred not to "aims" of investigation but to "procedures". The procedural nature of the study was influenced by its exploratory approach and the highly generalised form of the theory to which we referred, as to some extent was the constant interchange between theoretical considerations and the
practical research activities. We consider, however, that it was the theoretical emphasis on the interrelationship between theory and practice that was largely responsible for the reflexivity of the research.

2. **The empirical observations as critique to Habermas' theory**

The intensive phase of the empirical study highlighted two weaknesses in Habermasian theory. First, it showed the power of the family and school in affecting moral consciousness, thus underlining Habermas' neglect of institutions in his formulation of social evolution. Secondly, it drew attention to the importance of motivation in moral action and pointed to Habermas' failure to provide a generative force for moral evolution and to his acceptance of cognitive psychology as a substitute.

In Chapter 4, we referred to Habermas' theoretical weakness with respect to the role of institutions in the evolution of moral consciousness. He saw neither the educational system nor the family as transmitters of worthwhile values or world views: the family was associated with declining bourgeois values and the main ideological task of the schools was to maintain achievement orientation and their role here was declining. Moreover, he saw the development of a universal ethics of speech as unconnected with cognitive interpretations. We agreed with Jean Cohen's assertion: "Habermas has failed to assess the holding power of democratic traditions, and to analyse the possible institutional bases within late capitalism that could secure individuation, or autonomy, as norms to be radicalized." 3

The study gave substance to our theoretical critique. Some homes were indeed generating the moral approach which Habermas claims is fundamental to capitalism. Parents were highly possessive and individualistic and the daughters were goal orientated in their moral judgements. Other homes perhaps typified what Habermas sees as the
current situation, distorted in communication yet lacking a powerful orientation towards achievement. Yet the families of the seven girls we had selected as tending towards a consistent use of communicative logic combined a low adherence to the values of capitalism with a high degree of competence in interactive practice which could be considered as typifying a social democratic tradition. These families were contributing to the generation of communicative morality by the interactive patterns they engendered in their children.

The school, moreover, did have a function in the development of world views consistent with the universal ethics of speech. The school's role was not only associated with its general ethos or extracurricular activities: evidence was found of its influence on girls' world views through participation in its academic curriculum. In Chapter 8, we dismissed the limitations of this influence and we are, of course, concerned with only one school, of a particular type. Yet we consider that our observations indicate a distinct potential for development of communicative morality that Habermas has overlooked. We shall return to this potential in the next section when we discuss comprehensive education.

In Chapter 5 we discussed Habermas' incorporation of the theories of the cognitive psychologists, Piaget and Kohlberg into his formulation of social evolution. We considered that such theory was essentially contradictory to Habermas' Hegelian approach. Piaget and Kohlberg are essentially Kantian. Although Habermas showed that Kohlberg's sixth stage was morally inadequate, being rule-bound and individualistic, he could not correct the essentially linear relationship which exists between Kantian moral judgement and Kantian action. Moreover for the cognitive psychologists progress happens in spite of human co-operation rather than because of it. Whilst adaptation and assimilation, the mechanisms for cognitive development are complex interrelationships which exist between
an individual and his environment there is little room for individual freedom. Development is something that happens to one.

Our study of the seven girls who systematically used communicative logic in making moral judgements had led us to consider their differences as well as their similarities. Four had possessed world views with a universal dimension but their difference was also pronounced in their feelings of obligation to pursue their ideals and their need to engage in what they considered to be worthwhile social action. We considered that these four girls showed characteristics typical of communicative morality. Their difference from the other three, with whom they shared their communicative approach to judgement, was not only at the cognitive level but at the level of motivation. It was in seeking to understand motivation in Habermasian terms, in the light of our empirical findings, that we discovered his conceptual weakness on this topic. We concluded that his introduction of cognitive psychology into his formulation of social evolution was connected with his inadequate theoretical grasp of a concept of motivation.

In *Legitimation Crisis* Habermas frequently referred to the term "motivation" to express active tendencies of the socio-cultural system which depended on its incorporated beliefs, norms and values. However in spite of the importance given the general area of "motivation" within his crisis theory, his concept of motivation is very imprecise. He accepts, with Freud, Durkheim and Mead that "motivations are shaped through the internalization of symbolically represented structures of expectation". He is aware that "the sociological concept of internalization (Parsons) raises a series of problems at the psychological level" and decides to leave the matter where it is. He concentrates instead on "the values and norms in accordance with which the motives are formed" and shows how they can be seen to be related to truth.
Habermas thus decides to lay aside the concept of motivation in its full sense and concentrate only on the cognitive elements connected with it. However, his theory of social evolution needs a propelling force, so in the absence of a dynamic model of motivation Habermas must turn to the only developmental view of morality that stresses only cognitive elements, namely cognitive psychology. He thus is forced to accept a theory which is not only questionable at its empirical source but is fundamentally in conflict with his own. Moreover, cognitive psychology only explains moral development at the individual level, and Habermas is still left with no connection between the individual and the social levels of moral development.

Whilst it is understandable that Habermas saw problems in Parsons' concept of internalisation it is more difficult to understand why, after considering the Parsonian inadequacies, he failed to search for an adequate concept of motivation. In the previous chapter we observed that the four girls who characterised communicative morality could be described as being motivated in terms of their needs. We referred to the concepts of Maslow and his needs theory of motivation. Maslow's concept of motivation by self-actualising needs is, in practice, as individualistic as is Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Yet self-actualisation refers, in Maslow's terms to "man's desire for self-fulfillment... to the tendency for him to become actualized in what he is potentially." Now, although Maslow may interpret self-actualisation as an idiosyncratic phenomenon, we would suggest that with a Marxist twist (or a linguistic turn) self-actualisation can become a communicative phenomenon. If man has a basic need to fulfil his potential then he has a basic need to be fulfilled in purposeful social interaction. Marx, who knew very little psychology, considered that man's radical needs could be a revolutionary force. A Habermasian approach to needs could answer the problem of evolutionary force.
We consider that it would be better for Habermas to erase all reference to cognitive psychology from his developing formulation of social evolution and replace it with a reformulation of Marx's theory of needs built into a theory of motivation. Such an approach would be essentially in harmony with his own theoretical foundations and would extend the developmental force from the cognitive level to the level of the deep personality structure. Above all it would remove the problem of transition from development at the individual level to development at the social level. If self-actualising needs are given a communicative dimension then motivation is motivation towards communicative action.

3. Comprehensive education and moral evolution

The intensive study indicated that although the girls' families appeared to be the major influential factors in the development of their general moral approach (shown as the logical form of judgement making), the school had a function in the development of the girls' belief systems and world views.

In our discussion of the empirical study (Chs. 7 and 8) we pointed out that although the study was limited to one school, it was a school that by public reputation, in its organisation structures and in the personal opinions and pronouncements of its head could be considered to typify the comprehensive ideal. We shall take our experience of this school, then, and from it suggest ways in which a comprehensive school with a similar approach can function in fostering communicative morality.

First, a comprehensive school will challenge its pupils' preconceptions about the rightness of family norms and values. Keniston suggests that an individual is more likely to question conventional moral systems when personally confronted with alternative moral values "especially when these are concretely epitomized in the people, the
institutions, and the cultures among which he lives." We found that many of the girls of the intensive study had been influenced by the school in questioning parental values. Lucy and Naomi cited aspects of their school experience as having led them to reject family values. Georgina believed she had become more tolerant. The varied composition of the school gives a wide experience of attitudes and values which is lacking in a school which emphasises a narrower curriculum and a narrower range of abilities and interests.

Secondly, a comprehensive school can help to develop in pupils already predisposed by family experience to its influence a self awareness and world view consistent with the communicative approach. The comprehensive ethos is an ideal environment for developing a universal world view and a broad awareness of societal problems. Cathy felt that a grammar school would not have made her be open to the world in the way Greenbank had. The mixed social, economic, and academic backgrounds of the fellow pupils, the broad approach to the curriculum and the general ethos of communication all help pupils to broaden their understanding of the world and of their relationships with others.

Finally, a comprehensive school may help stimulate its pupils' radical (communicative) needs. Where potential is seen in broad terms as in the vision of Greenbank's head, and where individuals are encouraged to develop a variety of talents and skills, physical and social as well as academic, pupils can become aware of undeveloped potential. A school strongly orientated towards success along a narrow academic course can satisfy its pupils' needs to achieve and stultify their more varied social needs. Awareness of a wide spectrum of needs can challenge individuals to develop their communicative potential as well as their particular interests.

If Habermas is correct, evolution of new forms of social integration
must precede the institution of new economic forms, new modes of production. Change at the socio-moral level must precede full development of technological potential.

We are currently facing a period of technological upheaval through the introduction of the microcomputer, the "silicon chip". If Western society is to survive this revolution without breakdown and subsequent totalitarian takeover it must develop new and viable forms of social integration. These will need to be based on co-operative interaction and discursive will formation. The underlying morality of the new society can no longer be the individualistic morality of utility but must move towards the morality of communication, the universal ethics of speech.

We believe that a comprehensive education which is structured to conduct teaching and learning in a discursive and co-operative way and which seeks to foster the potential abilities of all pupils, whatever their type, can play a positive part in the development of communicative morality and thus contribute to social evolution and societal progress. If in the interests of improved productivity, Britain were to return to an academically segregated form of education with a renewed emphasis on achievement and individual competition, we believe that she could be heading for social regress.
Chapter 9: Notes

1 It can be assumed from this description that Habermas would also consider William James to be an advocate of strategic action (see Chapter 2). For Habermas, discourse gives rise to a rational will, namely a consensual and co-operative will. The relation of this "will" to action will continue to be dialectical, through practical co-operative interaction, interrelated with discursive evaluation.

2 In the formulation of the ideal speech situation we find that the following relationship holds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Realm of Theory (Value)</th>
<th>Realm of Practice (Fact)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRUTH, FREEDOM, JUSTICE</td>
<td>IDEAL SPEECH SITUATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Principles</td>
<td>Undistorted (perfectly competent) communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be noted that morality is defined in socially interactive (or political) terms and that the political sphere is given a moral dimension.


5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.


APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
[GREENBANK] SCHOOL
SIXTH FORM QUESTIONNAIRE, Nov. 1978

This questionnaire is designed to help me discover how sixth-formers are thinking about moral and social issues. You are asked to answer the questions as thoughtfully and honestly as you can - there are no right or wrong answers. Your opinions are quite confidential. Your papers will not be shown to anyone connected with the school. Some details of your school "history", your career plans and your connections with science or technology are asked for as they may have some relevance in analysing your ideas. I am most grateful for your help in sharing your ideas and opinions with me.

SECTION A - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. How old are you? __ yrs. __ mths.

2. Are you in the upper or lower 6th? upper/lower

3. If lower, do you intend to spend one year or two years in the 6th form? one/two

4. Have you been at [Greebank] since first year? YES/NO
   If not, when did you start at [Greenbank]? 19__

5. What were your fifth year results?

   CSE
   Subject Grade
   ______________________
   ______________________

   O LEVEL
   Subject Grade
   ______________________
   ______________________

6. What subjects are you taking this year?

   A LEVEL O LEVEL CSE
   ______________________
   ______________________
   ______________________
   Any others (apart from Lib. Studies)

7. What are your present career/job hopes or plans? ______________________

8. Are any members of your family scientists or technicians of any kind? (This includes jobs like being an engineer, a motor mechanic, a television or laboratory technician, working with computers, industrial chemistry, &c.) YES/NO
   If so, please mention their relationship (father, mother, brother &c.) and state what job they do. ______________________
SECTION B - IDEAS AND OPINIONS

Some of the following questions deal with matters of fact and some refer to imaginary situations. These latter are to stimulate your thinking. In either case, it is your ideas themselves and the way you are thinking about social issues that are of interest.

1. A younger sister or girl-next-door is just starting at [Greenbank]. Are there any 'helpful hints' you would have for her?

2. a) Think of a friendship you have. What do you think are the aspects of this friendship most meaningful to you?

   b) Some people think it's better to have a wide circle of friends than a few close friends. What do you think and why?

3. Some of your sixth form classes may be very small. If you were in a class of, say, four or five, do you think it would be important to all get on well with each other? If so, why? Or, if you don't think it matters, why not?

4. Your neighbour, Mrs Bloggs, is a widow with two children. The elder one, who is fourteen, belongs to a gymnastics club and has been selected for the county team. The younger child, aged twelve, belongs to a swimming club and is keen to improve. Mrs Bloggs can only cope with the additional expense of supporting a county team member if the younger child gives up swimming training. She asks your advice.
   a) What would you advise Mrs Bloggs to do?
   b) What sorts of things did you take into account when deciding how to advise her?

5. Your cousin, aged sixteen, has been going around with a group which has recently taken to 'nicking' cars for fun. He tells you about it. His parents have no idea of what's going on. Would you:
   a) keep out of it, not wanting to interfere? YES/NO
   b) tell his parents? YES/NO
   c) try to "talk some sense" into him? YES/NO
   d) take any other action? YES/NO

   What are your reasons for your choice(s)?

6. If you really were in a situation similar to (5), or had some other personal decision that you found difficult, would you tend to discuss it with someone else or would you keep it to yourself and try to work it out alone?

   If you do discuss problems with others, is it mainly with parents, other family members, school friends, or friends outside school?

   Can you give any examples of the sorts of problems you discuss with your parents and those you discuss with your friends or your brothers and sisters?

7. The neutron bomb has been designed to destroy the maximum number of human lives while causing only minimal damage to property. It is believed that its use could revolutionise modern warfare. Some people think it is quite immoral and its development should be banned. What is your opinion about the production of the neutron bomb by Western powers?
Try to work out why you have come to this decision.

8. There are other controversial social and political issues that have appeared recently in the news. Such issues include:

i) euthanasia (mercy killing) - whether, and under what circumstances it should be legal for a doctor to end someone's life;

ii) violent crime and terrorism - whether "police" powers should be extended to make the prevention and punishment of such crimes more effective, even if it means depriving ordinary people of some of their civil liberties;

iii) immigration - whether further restrictions are necessary in the interests of harmonious race relations;

iv) the effect of media on public opinion - is the public being manipulated by "slanted" reporting, in the papers and on TV?

v) Government pay policy - whether unions should accept the 5% limit or fight for the right to negotiate wage increases freely.

a) Have you discussed any of these issues in the last six months or so with your family or friends? YES/NO

If so, which ones (just write down their numbers), and with what sorts of people?

b) Which problems do you think are most important for British society to face and solve? If you can, place the above list in order of importance, quoting the relevant numbers. If you think that only a few of these issues are really important to Britain, then write only those numbers down.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Now give your reasons for selecting the first two on your list.

---

c) Give your personal opinion about any one of the above issues, from as many angles as possible, giving reasons wherever you can, to back up your ideas.
APPENDIX B

POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF SUBJECT BIAS AND SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT ON LOGICAL FORM OF JUDGMENT MAKING PROCEDURES

SUBJECT BIAS: LOGICAL FORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistently communicative</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistently strategic/instrumental</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent or neutral</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table (i)**

Table (i) shows that there is no evidence that pupils with science-biased courses of study have any greater tendency to use a strategic/instrumental style in making moral judgements than those studying humanities subjects. With both groups, pupils making consistent use of strategic/instrumental logic are in the minority.

SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: LOGICAL FORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of logical form (from questionnaire responses)</th>
<th>LOW ACHIEVERS</th>
<th>MODERATE ACHIEVERS</th>
<th>HIGH ACHIEVERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 yr.course pupils (N=34)</td>
<td>Upper &amp; Lower 6th Class II pupils (Science and Humanities) (N=29)</td>
<td>Upper &amp; Lower 6th Class I pupils (Science and Humanities) (N=21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistently communicative</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistently strat./instrum.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent or neutral</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table (ii)**

Table (ii) compares the proportion of respondents in each major category of logical form according to their level of achievement in their fifth year. No distinction is made between upper and lower sixth pupils.

The low achievers are not strongly aligned. Few show consistent use of strategic/instrumental logic (6%). The proportion of consistent users
of communicative logic was higher (15%) but by far the largest number of responses were neutral or inconsistent. The higher tendency of this group to give monothetic responses was partly responsible for this result.

The moderate achievers are more strongly polarised, 52% showing consistent logic use. In the case of this group, nearly equal proportions use communicative logic as use strategic/instrumental logic. So here, increased achievement has resulted in increased polarisation and an increased proportion of strategic/instrumental logic use.

The high achievers, however, whilst showing the same degree of consistent logic use as the moderate achievers are highly polarised towards communicative logic use, 43% using communicative logic and only 9% using strategic/instrumental logic.

Whatever factors are associated with this phenomenon, it can be seen from Table (iii) that it is not purely a matter of achievement. The bias towards strategic/instrumentality is to be found in the upper sixth pupils. The upper sixth pupils, as a group, are higher achievers than the lower sixth, twelve of the nineteen girls in the upper sixth being categorised as "Class I" whilst only nine of the thirty one lower sixth girls were so classified. Yet Table (iii) shows that whilst 45% of the lower sixth girls showed consistently communicative logic, only 16% of the upper sixth girls were communicative in logic use.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of logical form (from questionnaire responses)</th>
<th>% RESPONDENTS IN EACH CATEGORY</th>
<th>YEAR GROUP: LOGICAL FORM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPPER SIXTH (Humanities and Science) N=19</td>
<td>LOWER SIXTH (Humanities and Science) N=31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistently communicative</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistently strat./ instrumental</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent or neutral</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TABLE (iii) |

There is thus no clear-cut connection between school achievement and logic use but there is a marked difference in response between the two years of sixth formers. This could be seen as a bias towards strategic/instrumentally in the upper sixth group or a bias towards communicability amongst the lower sixths.

NOTE While we consider that these figures do not indicate any connection between science subject bias or school achievement level and the logical form of judgement it must be stressed that this applies only to the Greenbank School situation.

Greenbank School is best known for its music, dance and comprehensive ethos. It does not have a good name for science nor are
its science results at O or A level of the same standard as its humanities results. It is quite likely that girls who show an inclination towards science or mathematics in primary school, or whose parents are strongly biased towards science, would not be sent to Greenbank.

Moreover, Greenbank does not equate academic achievement with success in life and it rewards (formally and informally) many forms of progress and achievement in addition to academic results. For example, a prize was awarded to Naomi in the sixth form for her contribution to dance. It is quite likely that a school which strongly emphasised academic achievement as its major educational aim would foster instrumental judgement making amongst its pupils in the same way that Greenbank encouraged the development of communicability.
APPENDIX C

LETTERS TO PARENTS OF SELECTED SIXTH FORMERS FROM GREENBANK'S HEADMISTRESS AND RESEARCH STUDENT

1) Letter from Headmistress

Greenbank School &c.

February 1980

Dear Mr and Mrs ---

I am enclosing a letter from Miss Gronowski, who is a Ph.D. student at the Institute of Education, University of London, and working on moral decision making among 16-18 year old students. As you may know, she has already interviewed 80 Sixth Formers from [Greenbank] and would like to follow this with a further questionnaire on 20 of these. As home influences are naturally strongest, she would welcome your participation and I would wish to underline the invitation if you feel that you are able to co-operate.

The project has the approval of the I.L.E.A. Research and Statistics Department, as well as the Religious Education Inspectorate, and I can assure you that the replies are completely confidential between you and Miss Gronowski. In the final thesis all contributions are, of course, anonymous.

I trust that you will feel able to participate. I hope each girl will increase her own self-awareness and that the research will further understanding of students of this age range.

Yours sincerely,

(Headmistress)

2) Letter from Research Student

University of London
Institute of Education,
Department of the Sociology of Education,
57 Gordon Square,
London WC1H 0BT

Dear Mr and Mrs ---

I am currently doing a research project at London University's Institute of Education on social and moral values in young people and have just conducted a questionnaire amongst [Greenbank] School's sixth formers (with the full support of the school and the I.L.E.A.).

Your daughter ---, was one of my volunteers and I have selected her for a follow-up interview.
It would be a great help if I could have a talk with you too, partly because I should like to include the opinions of a small group of parents in my study and partly to compare your views on social and moral issues with those of ---. I am particularly interested in what you see as the major problems of today's younger generation. I would also like your opinion on several items of the questionnaire, answered by the girls, and your general attitude to current social problems.

I shall give you a ring within the next few days to see if you are agreeable to this and if so, to arrange a convenient time when I can come to see you.

With best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
## APPENDIX D

### ACADEMIC AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF INTENSIVE STUDY SUBJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Parents' place of birth</th>
<th>Social Class of Family **</th>
<th>Position in family (7 pt. scale)</th>
<th>Classification by primary school for sec.sch. entry band 1, 2, 3</th>
<th>0 level passes (Grade C+ or CSE Grade I)</th>
<th>A Levels being taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amy</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-- 0 levels(Science)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betty</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Biology, Geog., Food and Nutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cathy</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ISSB*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diane</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Art, History of Art.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliza</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Food and Nutrition, (Science 0 levels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frances</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>English, History, French, German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgina</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>English, Religious Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heather</td>
<td>Eire</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>IB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>English, Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kate</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IBSS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Art, Geog., Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>English, Biology (Science 0 levels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chemistry, Physics, Pure/Applied Maths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naomi</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>IB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>English, History of Art, Sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olive</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Biology (taken), Geog.(taken) Chemistry (Science 0 levels)+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patience</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IBB</td>
<td>Not available ++</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>English, History, German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queenie</td>
<td>Eng.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>BI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Biology, History, Geog.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**All girls except Patience entered [Greenbank] in the first year. Patience transferred after completing 0 levels at a country comprehensive school.**

**Social class is described in accordance with Glass' 7 point scale.**


* This indicates that Cathy (the individual being studied) has two younger sisters followed by a brother.

+ Olive is doing a 3rd yr in 6th Form preparing to read biology at University.
Appendix E
Pupil and Parent Interviews

i) Girls' Interview Schedule

Background

[Take notes]

Check school information from questionnaire.
Brothers and sisters - schools and ages?
Parents' jobs and educational background?

Interests and activities

School clubs, groups or special activities?
Outside school activities - clubs, societies, organizations?
Hobbies and interests?
General reading?

Beliefs and World Views

"The Beliefs and World Views" check-list is completed by girl.

[Start tapes]

(The girl is given a card with the statements, bearing her code number. She is asked to tick any she agrees with. Section of any statement may be crossed out if the rest is agreed with and a tick given the remainder).

The girl is asked to comment on her choice. Any other strong views or beliefs not on card? Opinion of science fiction is sought - fact or fiction?

(Introduced with reference to the film Close Encounter of The Third Kind and/or television documentary on Van D'nniken's Chariots of the Gods).

Perceived difference from parents

The girl is asked to predict her parents' response to the check list. If differences are perceived, to what does the girl attribute her different beliefs?
If the girl sees herself as essentially similar to parents in belief, then does she have a personal perspective and how is she developing it?
What part has discussion or working things out with others played?
(Refer to responses to Q.6 and Q.8(a) from questionnaire).
What part has the school played?
How does she feel about comprehensive schools generally? OR Is she glad she was sent to a comprehensive school?

The Good Life

(Introduced with reference to the television series The Good Life)

Personal aims and ideals for life - if the girl only talks about career
and marriage, then the question of her relationships with other people in the "good life" is introduced.

The concepts of duty and obligation are introduced, again with reference to "The Good Life". Do the terms mean anything? If not, what about "ought"? Is there anything you feel you ought to do or ways you feel you ought to act with respect to country? school? family? etc.

ii) Parents' Interview Schedule

Background

[Take notes]

Check jobs, referring to daughters' description. Training and schooling should come in here. If not refer later to parents' schooling in section on comprehensive education.


Family Life

[Start tape]

General approach to upbringing? Grandparents? Attitude to behaviour, manners, obedience? Attitude to "right" and "wrong"? Any problems with daughter? How did she compare with others? What about now daughter is older? Rules? What about going out at night etc.?

Questionnaire

Parents are each given a card with Q.4 (The Bloggs) and Q.8 (Social Problems). They are asked for their opinions, each question being dealt with and discussed separately. If immigration and law and order are not referred to among the most important problems, parents are asked to comment on these, specifically.

"Beliefs and World Views" Check List

Parents are asked to indicate their agreement separately. Clarification given if necessary but no discussion. Parents' cards bear their daughter's code number (in different colours.)

Young People Today

Taking the check lists back, without comment, parents are asked for their opinions of today's young people. Their views and ideas? Do they clash with their daughter's ideas? Does she express them? Does their daughter influence their ideas? (Or do the other children?) Where do they see young people's strengths and weaknesses today? Do they lack standards? Sense of duty? Have they any suggestions to improve the situation?

Comprehensive Education

How do they feel about it? Experience of streaming? How have they found [Greenbank]? And how does it compare with their other children's schools?
iii) "Beliefs and World Views" Check List

[Nationalism]
1. If Britain becomes just a part of Europe she will be selling her birthright. We need to restore a sense of pride and respect in being British and seek to maintain our traditional values.

["Laissez-Faire"]
2. The government should stop interfering with the economy. If they allowed more open competition everyone would be much better off.

[Judeo-Christian]
3. One's life is not complete unless one acknowledges one's Creator.

[Ethical Humanism]
4. Man needs to develop his intellectual resources, not only to increase his knowledge and understanding of the world, but also to solve the moral problems of how to use that knowledge.

[Egalitarianism]
5. We must strive for a classless society - one in which though people develop differently there is equal opportunity for all to develop.

[Conservationist]
6. The public must be made aware of the extent to which we waste our natural resources and squander our energy reserves. We must learn to live with, rather than at the expense of, our natural environment.

[Efficiency]
7. The only valid justification for Comprehensive Education is that it is a more efficient method of preparing young people for jobs which meet the needs of society.

[Technocracy]
8. As politics is a science, the government should stop trying to please everybody and leave the decision-making to those with the technical expertise.

[Technological progress]
9. Our future hope lies not in politics nor in forms of government but in scientific and technological development through which we can increasingly control the world in which we live.

[Positivism]
10. Scientific knowledge is the only certain and unbiased knowledge. Science alone transcends all barriers. It is the truly international language.

[These statements were presented to the subjects in alphabetical order of statement's first word, namely 8, 1, 4, 3, 9, 10, 2, 7, 6, 5].
iv) Sections of Pupils' Interviews

Two opening sections and one section on the "good life" are appended. Cathy and Eliza have experienced different relationships with their parents. Cathy predicts that her parents will hold similar views to hers. Eliza predicts that her parents will hold different views. Cathy is thus encouraged to reflect how (and if) she is coming to her own opinions. Eliza is encouraged to work out where and when the differences are manifested. (After the parental interviews showed that the daughters' assessment have been correct, Eliza had another interview to try to work out how she had come to her different view of the world. Cathy's growing sense of vocation was followed up informally).

Cathy had shown herself to be consistently communicative, whilst Eliza is inconsistent.

The section on the "good life" from Georgina's first interview follows. This shows the way duty and/or obligation are introduced, in Georgina's case the terms being accepted without any problems. This had been anticipated as Georgina has fairly traditional values. Whilst Georgina is intensely loyal to her parents in direct discussion of home life, a certain degree of resentment shows through when she is offguard. Consistently strategic/instrumental in making judgements, Georgina shows the same goal directedness and lack of awareness of mutuality of relationships when discussing the "good life".

Cathy

[Cathy has given information about her interests, hobbies, leisure activities etc. and has completed the "Belief and World Views" check list agreeing with Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 (omitting middle sentence). We began to discuss her responses informally. The tape recorder is turned on.]

- Now would you say that these covered your attitudes to life? Are there any other strong views you've got?

C Um. I think technology shouldn't be centred in certain parts where it isn't needed. It should be spread.

- Industry, do you mean, should be decentralised? What do you mean by this exactly?

C Well - like - take nurses, for example. Most of them are working in areas where things are easy and it's not a poor area. There ought to be more spread over poor areas where it's needed.

- So you're really bringing in the concept of concentration of the benefits of technology in certain parts of the world but not in other parts of the world -

C Yes.

- Or even in certain parts of this country, because London is relatively well off for hospitals, for example, whereas some of the other areas aren't.
C Yeah.
- And you would have a concern, then, for the Third World?
  [C had referred to the Third World in her questionnaire response].
C Mmm. Yes!
- I wonder if you could express it more - do you think that people
  who have skills have a responsibility to share them? Or resources?
C Yes. But it depends a lot on the people, I suppose. They want to have
  a very normal life - I mean - there's got to be people like that.
- What? People who will just accept things as they are and then
  people who will level things up a bit?
C If you don't have that balance it'll be all topsy turvy.
- You mean, you can't have everybody racing off trying to fix the
  other half of the world -
C Yes!
- Have you seen the movie, *Close Encounters of the Third Kind*?
C No.
- I haven't either - but there's a lot of stuff floating around about
  UFOs and people from outer space and, "Is the world being influenced
  from outside?" Now what's your opinion of these sorts of ideas?
C Um. I believe that there's life on other planets of course.
- Why do you say, "of course"?
C Oh just, you know, I don't think life is just on earth. I think
  there must be life elsewhere.
- But not necessarily on other planets in our solar system? It
  could be other planets of other suns?
C Oh yes. So there's a possibility, yes. I'm not going to say:
  "Oh yes I believe in UFO's", 'cos I've never seen one.
- So you remain agnostic on it - neither coming down one way or the
  other?
C Mmm.
- And what about things like astrology? Do you follow your stars?
C No. My father is very keen on astronomy - star gazing.
- Astronomy rather than astrology? Serious knowledge and understanding
  of the stars?
C Yes.
- Rather than trying to have some - er - pseudo science.
- And what sort of science have you done yourself?

C  Biology.

- And you're doing it at A level.

C  Yes I'm doing three A levels at the moment, Biology, Geography and Home Economics.

- Now you've said that your mother has had international experience, your father's had a lot of science experience and is also a practicing churchman and there's an interest in both science and other people in your family. Now if you look at this [check list] again, how would you predict how your parents would answer?

C  I'm not sure about my Mum - she might miss the first one [No. 8] - she's a bit stubborn with her beliefs. My Dad probably would go along with it. The second one [No. 1] - no I don't think they would. My Mum is very stubbornly labour. My Dad - he swaps around a lot - on the state of the country. . .[she goes through the list slowly, predicting their assent on [No. 3], rejection of [No. 9], she's unsure of [No. 10] as it is a bit "too strong", and rejects [No. 2 and No. 7] although [No. 7] is an efficient method of education but only one. Like her, they would believe [No. 6 and No. 5].

- That's interesting. So you would feel that you are fairly close to your parents in these opinions, generally?

C  Yes.

- Would you say there are any ways in which you are feeling your way towards a different approach to life or the world than you've had when you were brought up?

C  No. No. I think my parents have always had me this way - they've intended - you know, they've always - like I was talking to my Mum saying what I'd like to do and she was saying, "Oh I wish I'd had that opportunity, when I was your age." Or at least she didn't recognise it. So I mean - we're very close that way.

- I noticed from your questionnaire that you discuss social and political things with your parents quite frequently -

C  Mmm. Yes.

- And most of your ordinary everyday life you also discuss quite happily with them?

C  Yes.

- Quite a lot of people mention that they only discuss school and career with their parents - that they don't discuss their own ideas about things or how they see problems of their everyday life at all -
C: No. I discuss that with my parents as well.
- You would?
C: Mmm.
- Now has school, then, given you any different dimension? Say, being at this school?
C: I'm glad they sent me to this school. I think it's been a big opener for me - you know - to see how different people react to things and I'm glad I've been to a comprehensive school rather than a grammar school because many of my friends who've been to a grammar school they're so self centred - they don't really pay any attention to what's going on outside.
- So this really is a different dimension because your parents were both grammar school educated - in what ways do you think that it's been good? You said it may have made you less self centred -
C: Yes.
- Anything else that it's given you?
C: I mean I've seen more of people - [inaudible] - smoking, taking drugs and things - at this school - and it makes you think - you know -
- It makes you aware of the sorts of complexities of the life you are going to be living in?
C: Yes.
- Would you say that you now know where you're going completely? Or are you still in a state of flux, working out what you believe in and what you want out of life?
C: Oh. I'm at that stage where I'm trying to decide. But I'm not trying to think, "Oh, how on earth do I look at life?" I'm just letting it come naturally.
- Mmm - Do you watch The Good Life at all?
C: Yes, I watch it sometimes.
- What's rather good about that is that it puts into very strong contrast two different approaches to what life's all about. . . If I said: "Paint me a picture of 'the good life as I see it'", perhaps in terms of your own future - how would you describe it?
C: How I'd like to lead my life?
- Yes. How you'd like things to happen - what sorts of experiences - what sorts of attitudes -
C: Well I don't want to live in this country. I want to work in poor areas, if I can - if I'm brave enough. I don't think I could stand a sort of nine to five job - you know - getting married when you're young - I don't particularly want to get married. I'd like to
have an active life. I wouldn't want to stay in one place for a
great long time -
- What's the sort of approach to other people you see?
C Helping people. But obviously you're quite [inaudible] - if you
help people to such an extent they respond - then it's very rewarding.
- So it's a sort of two-way relationship?
C Yes. Yes. Well I am selfish to a certain extent.
- Well you are interested in yourself because you are the only person
you have a certain amount of control over - Do you see you getting to
know yourself as an individual or as part of a group or what?
C I always see myself as an individual but I do a lot of deep thinking
- if that's what you could call it - trying to interpretate [sic] my actions.
- And the resources you'd have to help you interpret would be what?
What you've observed your parents doing?
C Friends, really, I think. Not my parents, I'd say - but friends.
- So although you see yourself as an individual in your thinking
somehow your judgements are being made because of -
C Other people - around me.
- So you don't see yourself as an individual in isolation?
C No. No.
- You're an individual but -
C In a group. I mean I'm not reserved or anything. I am generally
quiet but I'm not really reserved. I'm quite friendly.

[The discussion was then steered back to The Good Life and Cathy's
concept of duty].
Eliza

[Eliza has completed the preliminaries and done the check-lists, agreeing with statements Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and we have gone through them. The tape recorder is turned on.]

- Now would you say you had any strong views or beliefs that aren't covered here? This doesn't cover an awful lot of things that one might have views about. [Pause] Is there anything else? [Pause] For example you like reading the "Vet" books. Do you have strong views about animals of any sort?

E No, not really. I don't know. No. I think it's not very fair about all the government and everything. In fact I don't understand politics at all. I think it's a load of rubbish actually.

- What do you mean by "It's not very fair about the government"? Do you think people are being hard on the government?

E Well. Not only that. They don't give everybody a fair chance. Well I don't think so, anyway.

- The government isn't giving everyone a fair chance?

E No!

- In what way?

E Well, they say about all this election. Up in Scotland. I don't know if you saw it on the telo, but I watched some things. About if people don't vote, then they vote for "No". I think it's just unfair. I don't believe in it anyway.

- So you think that people aren't really given a chance to get what they want done in the country. Somehow the government are organising things without giving people a fair say?


- So you do feel there's a basic unfairness in the situation of government?

E Yeah.

- Have you got any answers to the problem or not?

E No I haven't.

- You haven't got any particular other hobby horses that you feel strongly about at all?

E No.

- O.K, now you said you liked Science Fiction. Have you seen Close Encounters of the Third Kind?
No - more *Star Wars*.

- Now what about - did you see that van Däniken thing about *Chariots of the Gods* on tele?

No, I didn't.

- O.K. Now you like *reading* Science Fiction. Now when you come to something on tele or something in the papers about UFO's do you look on them as fiction or do you think: "Ooh, probably something in that"?

Yes - well if it's really sort of outstanding like lately there's supposed to be a lot of them. But I still don't believe in flying saucers and things like that.

- You wouldn't say this would really be part of your way of believing things?

No.

- So you like reading it for fun?

Yeah. That's it.

- Goody. Now you said before you would disagree with your father on these [indicating check list]. Now would you like to predict how you think your father would answer this. I hope I will get a chance of him actually doing it because this would be very interesting - to what extent a daughter can know how her father responds.

Well I don't think he understands politics deeply and I don't think he's that interested in it actually.

- But he does have opinions?

He does. But he doesn't vote. Nor does my Mum. Mum doesn't vote neither.

- Are you going to vote?

I don't know. If I find out a bit more what I'm going to vote for - then, maybe.

- But you wouldn't see any point in voting if you didn't know what you were voting for?

No - I wouldn't. It'd be silly.

- Do you think your parents don't vote because they don't understand the situation or do you think they think it's not worth it because it won't get them anywhere?

Um. Both really. A bit of both. I don't think they understand it, 'specially my Mum. She doesn't understand it fully but I don't really know actually. I know that they used to vote and I know what she used to vote for - but they've just stopped.

- What did they vote before?
- Have they got disillusioned do you think? With the Labour Party?
  - I think so. Yes.
- But they don't want to swing and p'raps vote for Margaret Thatcher instead.
  - No!
- O.K. Well - any of these some of the opinions you've heard your father holding forth on?
  - I think he would agree with that one.
- No. [2]? That's really a "father's favourite", no. [2].
  - Yeah. I think he'd agree with that one.
- Now he's a technician - does he believe the government should be leaving things more - [indicating No. 8].
  - No. I don't think so.
- Anything else that he'd go along with? [She points to no. 2]. Number [2]?
- You think he'd feel the government is interfering and if they left people to get on with it, they'd be able to work things out in open competition?
  - Yeah.
- What about those that you're definitely on about? No. [7]?
  - Yeah, they would.
- It means Comprehensives need to prove themselves by efficiency in preparing people for the job market rather than proving themselves because of giving equal chances. That's really what that's getting at. Um - would they come down on No. [6] or would they be neutral?
  - I don't really think they'd bother with it actually. They wouldn't kind of take that much interest. They don't seem to anyway.
- No. Well that's what you tend to expect -
  - Well my Dad doesn't like - he thinks he knows everything, but he doesn't. And that's what we disagree on. I try to tell him something and he doesn't want to know - he thinks he's right all the time.
- What sort of things do you try to tell him? Where he's wrong with some fact? If he comes out with something -
E Yeah. Say if I've learnt it at school and he goes against it and I know that I'm right but he won't have it. He's got to be right all the time and he's not. He doesn't like that.

- What things would you disagree with particularly - with your parents?

E I think - what I want to do he disagrees with quite a bit. I wanted to go into the forces, first of all. But because he's been in the army he thinks that it's still the same as what it was when he was in it. He said he wouldn't like me to do that. And then I said that I wouldn't mind going into catering - 'cos I like cooking - and he said that's no good. He thinks he knows everything. He said that's not good - the money isn't all that and it's slave labour. We disagree on things like that. Little things but we niggle each other.

- And do you watch television together?

E Yeah. But we don't like the same programmes. I want one side and he wants the other.

- Do you ever watch the News together or Panorama together?

E The News we would - but nothing like Panorama.

- Then is there anything that you've come across at school, been studying at school where you'd actually feel that you're right and he's wrong?

E Lots of things.

- Such as?

E In English, for instance. . .

[A long discussion about her relationships with both parents continued with details of norms and sanctions emerging naturally. The section on The Good Life then followed].
Georgina

[Georgina has indicated her own opinions, which she considers are "fairly close" to her parents. The whole family belongs to an evangelical church but she believes she is more "broad-minded" than her parents, whilst holding the same values. "I know where I stand on most things - in all things probably. You know, I've got my own standards - how far I go myself - and I don't go beyond it." We have been discussing what extra-familial influences she has been conscious of. . .]

- Would you think that reading has influenced you much or do you think school -

G To a certain extent I think what you read and what you see in the media does affect what you think sometimes - you know - what I read sometimes does affect what I think. I think sometimes you realise after you've read it, or when you hear something else on the television. But the press or the television to some extent tend to blow up the situation.

- Ah - now talking about television - do you watch The Good Life at all ?

G Yes.

- Now, that throws very much into focus two different attitudes to life generally. Now if I asked you what was your idea of the "good life" - I know that in your career you're wanting to do nursing as a first step - now if I said "Map out for yourself the sort of future life that you'd like to have - what's your idea of the good life ?" what would you describe ?

G Um. Finishing my training, doing a couple of years general nursing, specialising in orthopaedics - bones - or some other things if I didn't do bones - getting out of London as quickly as I could afterwards and going to live in Norfolk - Norwich, somewhere up there 'cos I love it up there - er - getting married - having four kids, all boys if possible - um -

- What would be your aim for your kids ?

G Make sure that they were all brought up well so that they -

- What do you mean by that ?

G So that they had the chance to sort of - that they knew the moral standards and everything like that, they knew what was right and what was wrong - um, also that they had the chance to hear about Christianity and religion and also had the chance to hear other things - but mostly that they should become Christians.

- Would you want them to be successful in their jobs ?

G Yes.

- What sorts of things would you think that you'd like them to be doing ?
What they wanted to do. Not what I wanted them to do, what they wanted to do.

And to be good at what they -

Yes. To be good at what they did. To get a good education so they could get the jobs they wanted.

And then -

To achieve the ultimate - all that they can do.

All that they want -

Also I do want to marry a Christian.

And what are some of the values in your own home that you would like to see?

Um -

You know - with your family as they were being brought up -

That they should help in the home, be polite, you know - not sort of - be sort of courteous. And keep people comp - you know, if a person is going to be on their own during some time to sort of keep the people company. But to be able to have some flexibility - when they get to fifteen or something like that, to be allowed certain flexibility - you know, in the hours that they go out and the people they mix with and when they get to adult - you know - eighteen - to be respected for the views that they hold - even though I might not agree with them.

And how would you like to see your family? Mainly as a family unit, close together, with hobbies and interests or would you like to see lots of people from outside coming in, having a sort of, convivial, "hail-fellow-well-met" -

I think a mixture - um - I'd like us to be close as a family, you know, 'cos that's one of the things that's important to people, you know, the social thing is the family - as a unit - but also it's important that you're close and have each other - but also that they could bring their friends in at any time - so that you have a sort of "open house" kind of thing, you know - any time anybody wanted to come in they could do.

Now the words "duty" and "obligation" - In The Good Life they come over strongly for Margot and Gerry. He feels strongly about duty to his work and she feels she has a civic duty to uphold culture and so on. The other two don't think in those terms so much, although obviously they have obligations to each other. Now what would you say you see as your duty in life or your obligation? Do you think that there are any duties or obligations that you have as [Georgina], as a person?

There are obviously duties and obligations for anybody.

Well, what would you say yours were?
For me? I've got an obligation to live my life for God. I've got an obligation to my parents too, in a way, in a sense, because they've brought me up and they've supported me at school. Also I've got an obligation for their sakes to do well in everything I do. I've got an obligation to people at Church, in the things I do, which is Sunday School teaching. But I mean you've got an obligation to anyone - if you're being respectful - to let people know if you're not going to be in or you're going anywhere. But I don't think - there are certain things that aren't duties or obligations. You shouldn't be obliged to do certain things at all.

- In what way? You mean for your family or society?

G In some sense your family - outside obligations, you know, pressures put on you: "You must do so and so".

- What would be an example of that?

G "You must be - " I can't really explain it. "You must do so and so -" or "so much work by such and such a time", you know - or your parents, "You must be in by such and such a time". Especially when you get to my age.

- You resent that a bit?

G In a way - it's putting training longer. But in another sense I realise that my parents do get worried so therefore though p'raps I resent it, I do realise, you know, being an adult now, although I resent it I come in at that time because I realise that they get worried.

- Now is there anything else that you'd like to put on tape about life or living or the things you feel you hold to. Do you think you've covered most of your aims and ideals and what you feel strongly about?

G Um. I think so. I think in some ways if I hadn't been a nurse I would have liked to have been cleverer in a way. I sometimes feel as though I'm a bit stupid. I would have liked to have been more practical. I feel strongly that I should be more practical.

- And why would you want to be more practical?

G I don't know. Well my parents - my Mum says, "You're not very practical." I mean I'm not very good at doing practical things - like cooking.

[The discussion moved on to Georgina's problems with her mother and her desire for independence.]
### APPENDIX F

**SCORES FOR FAMILIES ON IDEOLOGY AND INTERACTION SCALES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAMILY (identified by daughter)</th>
<th>IDEOLOGY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM</th>
<th>TOTAL SCORE</th>
<th>DISTORTION OF COMMUNICATION TOTAL SCORE</th>
<th>INTERACTION TOTAL SCALE</th>
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A Detailed Account of the Assessment of Ideology of Possessive Individualism and Distortion of Communication in Diane's Family (Family D)

Both parents attended secondary modern schools. Mr. D is a skilled technician, Mrs. D did some hairdressing training after leaving school. At present she does not go out to work. When the children were younger the parents had a small shop and both worked in it. Mr. D plays table tennis and goes to "keep fit" classes during the week. On Saturdays he runs a "junk" stall at the local market. Mrs. D is interested in handicrafts and pottery and attends local classes. Both are only involved with the community through their hobbies. There are two younger children, a daughter (15) who attends [Greenbank] and a son (12) who attends a mixed comprehensive. The parents attend school concerts when the children are in them and go to all parent/teacher meetings to which they are invited. They do not go to parents' social functions.

The family go their own ways during the week and on Saturdays and tend to do things together on Sundays - going fossil hunting, going to the beach etc. The children ask for family outings and the eldest daughter (Diane) still likes to go. The parents feel they are lucky with their children.

Ideology scale

Achievement

1. Mr. D. enjoys his job as a telephone technician. He likes the companionship as well as the work itself. He does not think in terms of advancement. He runs his stall at the market "for the fun of it". But it brings in extra income which is useful. So although it's not "necessary" it means that "if they want to stay on at school they can". Mrs. D. is happy with the chance she has been having to do crafts now that they no longer have the shop and the children are older. She does not appear ambitious for her husband.

Score = 0

2. Diane sees her parents as giving her "encouragement" but as never having "pushed". "Mum and Dad have always said to me, 'Try your best and you can't do any more than that.'" Mr D's attitude to Diane's work has been: "If you want to do it, that's it." Mrs D has said to Diane, if she got worried about exams, "You can only do your best, if you don't pass you don't pass. It won't worry us." Diane qualified for a grammar school, but Diane wanted [Greenbank] so she and her mother had a look over [Greenbank] and both liked it. Mr and Mrs D agreed that it would give Diane the opportunity "of doing the things she was interested in - art and craft." Their son did not like the sound of a large mixed comprehensive school so they took him to see an "academic school". But there was no woodwork or craft and he decided on the comprehensive school after all, and has been very happy there.

Score = 0

3. The Bloggs' problem - Mrs D: "What would you say, Ed? It doesn't seem fair to stop the younger one doing something. On the other hand if the other one has been picked for the county team it's an awful shame to stop the opportunity of being able to get on. . ."

Mr D refused to pick up the "opportunity" angle - the important thing is the activity itself: "It's not a very good question because they could still go swimming couldn't they. . ." They discuss the problem together. Mrs D has expressed concern for achievement. Mr D has not.

Score = \frac{1}{2}
4. Acquisition

The interview took place in the kitchen because there was something good on television and the children wanted to watch it in the sitting room. Other families had moved the children and television out so the interview could be in the best room. The kitchen was very pleasant because Mr D had decorated it and Mrs D had a well tended collection of indoor plants. Everything that was referred to in the house was made by a family member. Mr D proudly showed Mrs D's pottery class work and Mrs D showed Diane's art work, especially the surprise painting done and framed for them as a Christmas present. The house is part of a council estate. The type of position-linked possessiveness, associated with capitalism, appeared absent to a marked degree.

Score = 0

5. Individual ability and progress

They like the comprehensive schools their children attend because the children are happy, busy and "come on well". Mrs D thinks streaming is a good idea, "Because then if they're streamed you get all the ones which are really quite good, which means that they're eager to work, all together and the one's who aren't so keen in together as well... from what I've heard from the children anyway." Although not very strong, it was considered that the attitude of seeing ability as a fixed property was present in Mrs D.

Mr D did not think that streaming mattered. What makes a good school is the whole approach of the teachers - to parents and children. The atmosphere of a school makes a big difference to how the children do. Mr D did not receive a score for this factor.

Score = \frac{1}{2}

6. The parents have an excellent name at [Greenbank] - both girls were known to the year head. Diane's tutor has found the parents most co-operative. She finds Diane herself "a sociable and respected member of the tutor group" and is "grateful for the part she has played in extra-curricular school activities." The parents consider themselves very "lucky" to have children who are so little trouble and who are so happy at school. They seem pleased and a little surprised that the school appreciates their children. Mr D considered his son's school to be "good" because - "everyone's helpful up there, you know, the teachers. If ever you want to go in there they talk to you."

Of all the [Greenbank] parents the D family, together with the M family were considered the most openly co-operative by the year heads.

Score = 0

Competition v. Co-operation


Score = 0

8. Political aspects

Crime was discussed in terms of justice and the well-being of all. Mr D feels that juvenile delinquency results from parents not controlling
their children. Mrs D feels that law enforcement lacks fairness. They discussed together whether the death penalty should be reintroduced but decided against it. A big problem was, "there's always someone who's not guilty - you can't have one person hanged even if it's going to stop further crime."

Mr D goes to his union's meetings but feels he doesn't really pull his weight: "It's not the union's fault because we are the union, aren't we? We don't care. And if we don't go to the meetings it's our own fault..."

The family looks on society as essentially based on co-operation, everyone needs to pull his weight. Mr D votes but Mrs D does not because she does not understand it.

Score = 0
Total for Ideology scale = 1

Distortion of Communication Scale

Truth

1. Diane perceived a high degree of openness as existing at home. Political issues, however, are not discussed. Her father is "more into kind of politics" than her mother. Family matters are discussed freely. Disagreements are open. She has some disagreements with her parents and "they argue now and again but not like some people." Arguments tend to centre on family discipline where father sometimes is a bit "easy going" and mother feels she wants backing.

These observations of Diane were borne out in the interview.

Score = 0

2. Parents appear to work things out together. They see the job of disciplining the children as being largely Mrs D's, because she is with them more. She admits to wanting backing, sometimes. This agrees with Diane's comment: "My mother's not the dominant one in the family or anything. I mean she doesn't put my Dad down or anything." With family F, the parents showed an outstanding degree of interaction at the interview. They used the term "we" frequently and they discussed items together, such as the desirability of single sex schooling versus mixed schooling. Both modified their expressed views at the interview during discussion. Neither appeared to have a monopoly on truth.

Score = 0

3. The possibility of their own children actually causing a change in their opinions, however, had escaped them. They "would have missed a lot without" their children's company but have not thought of any difference that living with growing-up children may have made to their ideas. The parents have shared interests and have set the pace. As Mrs D put it: "They've done things because they interested us and they've joined in and enjoyed them."

Score = 1

Freedom

Diane's personality is continuous at home and at school. She is modest and fairly quiet but is self-assured and appears to possess an
inner calm. She is devoted to Art but relates to other people and has worked on joint artistic endeavours at school. People mean a lot to her. She had got to know the B's (Betty's parents) during a holiday away with them. The B's referred to her at their interview in similar terms to the year heads and her tutor. Her parents relate to her as if she is a person who matters and seem realistic about her. She was seen to be perfectly at ease in their company during the evening the interviewer spent in their home.

Score = 0

5. Diane is very close to her mother and discusses anything with her. But she feels that both parents have encouraged her to pursue her interest in art and she feels she has a definite relationship with her father. She has never had a problem that she is unable to discuss with her parents.

Score = 0

Justice

6. The parents tend to have brought children up by "instinct". Mrs D was firm with them when they were young because they were with her in the shop. She always acted on the spot. "We've never had rules, really, have we, its just..." said Mrs D, and Mr D finished the sentence, "...sort of been alright, they've been alright."

Diane feels that she and her parents have an understanding about her nights' out: "I always tell my Mum what time I'll be home, more or less or if not she knows that I'll be staying at my friends or how I'll be getting home." Mrs D hasn't insisted but, "She'd like to know. She'd worry if she didn't know what time I was going to come home." Although Diane feels she can discuss anything with her mother, in this case, the norm is not really being openly negotiated and Diane's fear of her mother's worrying does indicate a certain degree of coercion associated with family norms.

Score = 1/2

7. The family believes in trust, however, and no undue coercion is noted. Mr D says "If you don't trust them there's just no point. You've got to be trusted haven't you?" D feels she is trusted and has no tension about family sanctions. She does not see her parents as ever being unfair.

Score = 0

8. There is no sign of favouritism amongst the children. They are all seen as individuals and as equally members of the family. The son used to be very "antisocial", have tantrums and tend to go off alone, but he "grew out of it". His mother felt it was a combination of temperament and being the youngest. There is no feeling from his sisters that he is being unduly spoilt.

Score = 0

Total for Interaction Scale = 1.5
APPENDIX G

The Ideal Types of Morality - "Strategic/Instrumental Stephanie and "Communicative Connie"

Stephanie and Connie are two hypothetical Greenbank sixth formers. Stephanie is highly polarised to strategic instrumental use of logic in making judgements of morally relevant situations. Connie is highly communicative in her judgemental logic.

STEPHANIE

Moral Judgement. Stephanie judges a situation in terms of its outcomes. This is usually in terms of her aims and goals. Her career plans guide many of her judgements. She co-operates at school so that the teachers have a better chance of getting their message across and she and the other pupils can get through their exams. When in doubt she falls back on what she knows is "right". Her parents got this through to her. She knows that one ought to tell the truth and tries to follow this principle in practice. She has chosen her school subjects because she is good at them. She plays tennis to keep fit and because she makes worthwhile social contacts. She disapproves of Russia entering Afghanistan because it may cause a third world war.

She tends to justify her personal choices with reference to the importance of achievement and success. "One must grasp one's opportunities". She believes that politics is a waste of time. It doesn't matter what party is in as long as the country is well governed and everyone can go about his or her business without hindrance.

Home and School. Stephanie appreciates all her parents have done for her and hopes to repay them some day. They have encouraged her to do well and have taught her to know right from wrong.

She sees that there is not too much friction at home by keeping within the limits her father sets. It isn't so much that he gets mad if she comes in late but she knows her Mum is a terrible worrier.

They don't discuss things much at home - her father has his own political views and her mother doesn't understand politics. She doesn't tell them about her school work because it doesn't interest them. Her mother goes to the school on parent's nights to see that she's getting on with her teachers. Her father has always taken notice of her school reports. When she was younger her mother made the rules and her father saw that the children obeyed their mother.

Stephanie sees school as a place to work and get qualifications to help one get a good job. The teachers are there to get you through your exams. School work does not have anything to do with everyday life. Why should it?
CONNIE

Moral Judgement. Connie judges a situation by discussing it and working out a solution with others. In judging a problem on her own she tries to consider all facets of the situation and imagines she is consulting the other people concerned. Her personal choices are made in terms of what she considers worthwhile doing. She will not be satisfied with a job that does not allow her to co-operate with others or do something she knows really interests her. She has chosen her school subjects because she is interested in them and wants to pursue them further. She belongs to the dance group because she enjoys dancing itself and especially likes co-operating creatively with others.

She believes that people should be active in politics. She is on the sixth form council and belongs to a local environmental action group. She hates all forms of oppression so disapproves of Russia entering Afghanistan. On the other hand, other powers may be showing domination in less dramatic ways. If people are unable to express their needs and do something about them for any reason, then they are not free.

She justifies her moral choices in terms of the worthwhileness of human life and human relationships. Mutual trust and understanding are highly valued.

Home and School. Connie appreciates the open relationships that exist at home. Her parents have always worked things out together. They argue sometimes but usually resolve things. They have come to an agreement with her about the hours she keeps. When she was younger they decided on family rules together but increasingly have brought her in on family matters. Sometimes there are tensions but they discuss the situation. She argues with her father about his old fashioned political views and with her mother about her lack of awareness of feminist issues.

She tells her parents about her school work quite often and listens to them as well when they have something to tell. Her parents both go to school evenings and enjoy finding out how the school works and how their daughter is going in it.

She finds a large comprehensive school is a challenging experience and is pleased she came to Greenbank. She has had to widen her horizons and feels she has had opportunities to discover interests and get to know more sorts of people than she would have at a grammar school. She has enjoyed the discussions in class with other pupils and teachers. It helps one understand both the work and other people better.


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