On the Concept of Education

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Abstract of Thesis

There are three parts to the thesis, the first two dealing with others' views of education, the third with the author's own view. Loyola, Locke, Elyot, Quintilian and Dewey all assume that education is to be explained by reference to its relations with other things. Their point of view is that of the "outsider" or "spectator". Spectator views come to grief because rather than show they simply assume that it is education that stands in the required relation. And, typically, they "miss the point".

Downie et al, Telfer, Oakeshott and Peters all assume that their views of education can be intrinsically justified, that is, by appeal to the nature of education itself. Their point of view is that of the "participant". Participant views come to grief because rather than show they simply assume that that to which they appeal is indeed the nature of education. And, typically, what they assume to be education is only one aspect of it.

Education, I think, is, in a phrase, preparation for independence. This thesis is a direct development of Peters's view, at least that view expressed in "The Justification of Education". It is, I argue, an improvement on that view because it takes better account of the relationships between education and upbringing (the most closely related extrinsic concept) and education and training (the most closely related intrinsic concept), and because it involves a more plausible order of explanation as between rationality (which Peters takes to be fundamental) and autonomy or independence.

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Introduction

The concept of education is not a topic which has received much in the way of sustained philosophical treatment. Traditionally, what concern there was was generated only by a prior concern with The Good Man or The Good Society. Education was not seen for what it is, but merely as the necessary and sufficient means of developing such men and such societies. And today, though educational issues generally do receive independent treatment, the topic of education itself is only raised, if at all, as a way of introducing other, less fundamental issues, the concern, even then, not so much conceptual investigation, as characterization of the approach to be taken in dealing with the other issues.

Nonetheless, there have been many who have contributed to our understanding of the concept by investigating either certain <u>kinds</u> of education or certain, important <u>aspects</u> of education generally. Locke and Loyola consider the education of, respectively, virtuous and religious persons, while Elyot and Quintilian give accounts of the education of governors. (Chapter 1) Downie et al, and Telfer, emphasize the theoretical, rather than the practical aspects of education, while Oakeshott is concerned with initiation into a "human" rather than just a "local" world. (Chapter 3)

Institutions of education have been, relative to other institutions, slow in developing. It is not surprising, then, that the development of an independent conception of education should have been even slower. Education, in The Republic, is, as it were, the 'servant' of a certain social order. In Democracy and Education Dewey makes much of the independent "growth" of the child, but he also places education in the Platonic context of serving to maintain over the generations a certain, albeit very different, kind of society. (Chapter 2) Peters, on the other hand, concentrates his attention on the concept of education as that concept is held by educators themselves. Education is not made to serve such "instrumental" ends as social continuity. The investigation is intrinsic rather than extrinsic. (Chapter 4)

The author's own contribution to understanding the concept of education is made in Chapter 5. After examining the relationships between education and upbringing, training and freedom, it is argued that education, in a phrase, is preparation for independence. In the final chapter the notion of preparation for independence is used to help clarify the recent debate on "indoctrination", that is, on mis-education.

Two final notes. First, as the views of others are all discussed in the text, it seems advisable to include there the references as well. In order to avoid lengthy bracketing certain short-hand conventions have been adopted. Most are understandable in context, but note should be made of least one. "(10)" means "(p. 10)" in the book, chapter or article mentioned in the text, with respect to which further information is found in the bibliography. Second, I have tried always to use 'English English', but where I have failed the usage is (or so I will claim) correct 'North American English'. It is not, for example, 'Author English'.

Section I The Spectator

Chapter 1 Individuals, Social Roles

Education for the spectator is a phenomenon in the world, a human phenomenon. This is not to imply that without man education could not exist. Something very like it occurs in other species as well. The spectator's interest, however, is limited. He is interested in education only insofar as it is a human phenomenon.

Only individual humans can be educated or uneducated. The descriptions, "an educated class" and "an uneducated people", for example, are generalizations based on the evidence of individual cases. If most members of the class were uneducated, and most of the people educated, neither description would be correct.

No one is at birth, and yet some individuals become educated. Most undergo a series of changes as a result of which they become at least better educated than they were at birth. This is the process of education. The process begins roughly at birth and can, but need not, end only in death. Some individuals are no better educated at the end than they were years, perhaps even decades, before. For most, however, the process is continuous, if not usually evenly-paced, throughout life.

The process of education in the individual depends upon cooperation among individuals. It is true that for individuals to become educated they must survive, at least for a time; and it is also true that their survival depends upon cooperation. But this is not the point. To become educated the individual must do some things--though not necessarily any one list of things--rather than others. The uneducated do not know what these are. They must cooperate with those who do. Further, on most, if not all, accounts of what is involved in education, without cooperation an individual <u>could not</u> become educated. Without cooperation he could not, for example, learn a language.

The process as a whole depends upon cooperation. Some aspects, however, need not. The process can continue,

for example, after cooperation has ended. Under the guidance of another an individual learns to do some things rather than others, as a result of which he becomes better educated. He might then continue doing these things on his own initiative, thus progressing still further. And, in fact, those who had cooperated with him might have wanted and taken steps to ensure this would happen. The individual would have been "learning how to learn".

Education for the spectator is a puzzle. He wants to understand it. Why does the individual do what he does? Why do others cooperate with him? What <u>is</u> education?

"Things"--objects, events, states of affairs--can be distinguished from relations between things. Education for the spectator is a "thing" which is to be described and explained by reference to its relations with other things. "Seeing" education is seeing it "whole". Seeing it whole is seeing how, as a whole, it relates to other things. The only point of view from which this can be done is that of the "outsider" or "spectator".

Describing education in terms of its relations with other things is not, however, a task which can ever be completed. One can truly predicate of education an infinite number of relational properties because there are an infinite number of things to which it stands in relation. An exhaustive description is impossible. All actual description must be selective. On what basis, then, does the spectator make his selection? To describe a thing to someone is to inform him about it. But is the basis what others do not already know? Few will find at all informative any of the statements made below, nor is there any suggestion this is what their authors intend. A relational property (for the most part truly) is predicated of education. This might be called "description". But why does the spectator give the description he does, rather than any other?

The spectator wants to know why the individual, and those with whom he cooperates, do what they do. He wants an explanation of education. Explanations can seem, like descriptions, true or false, informative or uninformative.

A teacher asks for a particular explanation. A student, however, gives another. The teacher says, That is not the right explanation. The television weatherman smiles and says that the "cause" of our wet weather is the presense overhead of rainclouds. We say, Tell us something we don't already know. These examples obscure an important difference between explanation and description. Description is related to knowledge, explanation to understanding. If one seeks knowledge it must be accepted that of two conflicting statements (or descriptions) only one can be what one is after. If, on the other hand, one seeks understanding, it must be accepted that between two conflicting statements (or explanations) there might be nothing to choose. The former cannot both be <u>true</u>, but the latter might be equally <u>good</u>. The teacher in our first example was looking for a particular explanation. The student was not asked to explain anything, but to describe the explanation his teacher had in mind. And, rather than try to (perhaps because he couldn't) explain our wet weather, the weatherman smiled and described a rather obvious causal link between it and rainclouds.

One wants something explained because one is puzzled by it. A person might know "all there is to know" and still not understand, or understand even though he knows relatively little. Explanations are made using statements. These latter might be true or false, but the former can be only good or bad, better or worse than others. There are many kinds of explanation, each having to be judged at least in part by use of criteria relevant only to the sort of understanding being aimed at. There are, however, criteria all explanation should meet. Some of the most important of these are the following: <u>comprehensiveness</u>: does it account for all it should, or does it leave something unaccounted for: <u>completeness</u>: does it answer all the questions it should, or does it raise, and fail to answer, further questions: <u>simplicity</u>: is the explanation itself understandable, or does it create, rather than solve, mis-understanding: <u>internal consistency</u>: is it one explanation, or does it embody two or more conflicting explanations: <u>internal coherence</u>: is it one explanation, or does it embody two or

more unrelated explanations: and finally, implications and consequences: does it help rather than hinder attempts to understand other, related phenomena, does it imply (and are there) problems in other, related explanations. Two conflicting explanations, as has been said, might be equally good. What one sacrifices in completeness (or "depth"), for instance, it might make up for in comprehensiveness (or "breadth"). There might be nothing to choose between a shallow but comprehensive explanation and one which, though profound, is partial. Evaluating explanation is not a simple task. It can be said, however, that the best possible explanation is the one which on the whole sacrifices the least.

Spectator accounts have the form, Education is X, "X" standing in place of some relational property. They are sometimes criticized because, it is said, they assume education is one thing, whereas in fact it is a complex of many things. Some spectator accounts no doubt are less simple than simple-minded, but as a general point the criticism is not well-founded. First, Education is X is not itself an explanation--it stands in place of one. And what it stands in place of might be very complex. Second, all explanation should be as simple as is possible. Education is X is a spare and partial description, but, straightforwardly elaborated, it might make a very good explanation. Third, and most important, unless an explanation can be reduced such that it has the form, Education is X, it must be internally inconsistent or incoherent. If it is said, Education is X or Y, the question arises, Which is it? And if it is said, Education is X and Y, the questions arises, How are X and Y related? Phenomena need not, but explanations of phenomena should have "essences". And, though education need not have a single overall "aim", explanations of education should.

Education for the spectator is something which has a certain relationship with something else. The relationship is, means to a certain end or, part of a certain whole. And the end or whole can be described as "individual" or "social". Education is either, (i) the means by which a

certain sort of individual is developed, (ii) something which plays a certain part in the life of the individual, (iii) the means by which a certain sort of society is developed (or maintained), or (iv) something which plays a certain part in society. Loyola and Locke think of education as the means by which a certain sort of individual is developed, Elyot and Quintilian as playing a certain part in society. Dewey (discussed in Chapter 2) gives both sorts of account, relating the latter to the general, but not distinctively educational aim of social maintenance. A view of education as something which plays a part in the life of the individual, namely, the part of upbringing, is discussed in Chapter 5.

Perhaps most influential in the history of educational thought is the view that education is the means by which a certain sort of individual is developed. The educated person has been understood in many ways. Can he be understood as a religious or a virtuous person? Today moral and religious education are possible aspects of education. The view that education is nothing but them is generally not taken seriously. Today, however, morality and religion are parts, whereas traditionally they were seen as ways of life. Everything one thought and did was moral or immoral, religious or irreligious. Nothing could be non-moral or non-religious.

In the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, Loyola says that "the end of learning acquired in this Society is, with the help of God, to aid the souls of its own members and those of their neighbours. This, therefore, is the criterion to be used in deciding, both in general and in the case of individual persons, what subjects members of the Society ought to learn, and how far they ought to progress in them." (Rusk, 73) And he goes on to say that "the humane letters of the various languages, and logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, scholastic theology, positive theology, and Sacred Scripture are helpful." (Ibid) Education for Loyola is the means by which a religious person is developed.

On the other hand, in his Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman, Locke says it is "virtue

...which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education...All other accomplishments should give way and be postponed to this." (Rusk, 142) The implication, however, is that, though the most important, the development of virtue is nonetheless only a part of education. But, elsewhere Locke explains that "our business...is not to know all things, but (only) those which concern our conduct." "The extent of knowledge of things knowable is so vast...that the whole time of our life is not enough to acquaint us with all those things, I will not say which we are capable of knowing, but which it would be not only convenient but very advantageous to know." (Ibid, 139) We cannot learn all there is to be learned. We must be selective. On what basis, then, is selection to be made? Locke thinks very little of what he calls "learning", but which now might be called "learning for learning's sake". "This may seem strange in the mouth of a bookish man; and this making usually the chief, if not only hustle and stir about children, this being almost alone which is thought on when people talk of education, makes it a greater paradox." But, "a gentleman's proper calling is in the service of his country, and so is most properly concerned in moral and political knowledge; and thus the studies which more immediately belong to his calling are those which treat of virtues and vices, of civil society and the arts of government." (Ibid, 142-3) The criterion for selecting what is to be learned makes reference to the "gentleman". Education is to be moral and political. When Locke says "virtue...is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education" he is saying that, in the education of the gentleman, moral is to take precedence over political learning (just as both are to take precedence over, or, more accurately, to supercede, learning for learning's sake).

Locke of course is concerned only with the education of the gentleman. He does not deny, however, that someone other than a gentleman can be educated. He only says that "a prince, a nobleman and an ordinary gentleman's son, should have different ways of breeding" (Ibid, 137); but, the principle involved--education should differ according to the "station if life" into which the educand is born--

applies to everyone, gentlemen and others alike. To generalize, then, because not everyone will come to be "in the service of his country", at least not in the way Locke intends, not everyone need engage in "studies...which treat of...civil society and the arts of government". But, because everyone, regardless of his station, can be either good or bad, everyone should engage in "studies...which treat of virtues and vices". For Locke, then, the educated gentleman is the virtuous gentleman, the educated person a virtuous person. Everyone does what it is "given" he should do, but only the educated person does it virtuously. And education is the means by which a virtuous person is developed.

These traditional accounts are both strong and weak. They are strong in that there is little doubt individuals who develop in the ways prescribed do in fact become educated. On the contrary, the 17th century Virtuous Man and, for example, men and women today educated at Jesuit schools and colleges, on the whole are very well educated. The accounts, however, are also weak. There is equally little doubt not everyone who does <u>not</u> develop in the ways prescribed is uneducated. The accounts describe two kinds of education. There can be other kinds.

Not everyone who is educable has the potential to develop into a religious person. And, in fact, not surprisingly, the Society, according to Loyola, is not to undertake the education of just anyone. "It is needful" he says "that those who are admitted to aid the Society in spiritual concerns be furnished with these following gifts of God. As regards their intellect: of sound doctrine, or apt to learn it; of discretion in the manner of business, or, at least, of capacity and judgment to attain to it. As to memory: of aptitude to perceive, and also to retain perceptions. As to intentions: that they be studious of all virtue and spiritual perfection; calm, steadfast, strenuous in what they undertake for God's service; burning with zeal for the salvation of souls, and therefore attached to our men to the attainment of the ultimate end, from the hand of God, our Creator and Lord." And, Loyola goes on, "In externals: facility of language, so needful in our intercourse

with our neighbour, is most desirable. A comely presense, for the edification of those with whom we have to deal. Good health, and strength to undergo the labours of the Institute." (Rusk, 70-1)

Religious life in the 16th century depended for many on living in a separate community. Virtuous life in the 17th century might have been a luxury reserved for the gentleman, that is, for the politically dominant and economically independent. Virtue for the very poor might mean starvation, for the politically dependent it might be considered "criminal". But, of those who, because of the sort of person they are, are incapable of being religious or virtuous, and of those who, because of the circumstances in which they live, are simply unable to be either, not all of them necessarily are badly educated. They might have received a non-religious, non-moral, but nonetheless an equally good education. The general view, of which these are but two instances, is that education is the means by which a certain sort of individual is developed. The view fails because education, at least in part, depends on the sort of person educated, and on the sort of society in which it takes place. Thus, for example, neither Loyola nor Locke could be taken seriously if they were supposed to be prescribing for contemporary Russia. The view implicitly denies what is in fact obvious, namely, many different sorts of individual can all be equally well educated.

In The Language of Education, Scheffler discusses, amongst others, the "shaping, forming or molding" metaphor. "The child," he says, "in one variant of this metaphor, is clay and the teacher imposes a fixed mold on this clay, shaping it to the specification of the mold. The teacher's initiative, power, and responsibility are here brought into sharp focus. For the final shape of the clay is wholely a product of his choice of the given mold. There is no independent progression toward any given shape...Nor is there any mold to which the clay will not conform. The clay neither selects nor rejects any sequence of stages or any final shape for itself." (50-1) Education, according to the metaphor, is the development of a certain sort of person, a person with a certain "shape".

Scheffler says that though the "molding metaphor does not fit the biological-temperamental develpment of the child", it "does...seem more appropriate than the growth metaphor (discussed in Chapter 2) as regards cultural, personal, and moral development." "But, even here, the molding metaphor has its limitations": "In the case of the clay, the final shape is wholely a function of the mold chosen"--"the clay neither selects nor rejects any given mold": "the clay is...homogeneous throughout, and thoroughly plastic": "the shape of the mold is fixed before the molding process and remains constant throughout". "Each of these points represents a dissimilarity with respect to teaching. For, even if there are no laws of cultural, moral, and personal development, there are nevertheless limits imposed by the nature of the pupils" (and, it should be added, the nature of the society in which they live). "Further, these limits vary from student to student and from group to group. The student population is not thoroughly homogeneous nor thoroughly plastic." "Finally, if the teacher is indeed to pay attention to the nature of his students, he will modify his methods and aims in the course of his teaching and in response to the process itself. His teaching is, then, not compatable to a fixed mode, but rather to a plan modifiable by its own attempted execution." (51) That is, assuming the teacher is to "pay attention to the nature of students", and assuming these not to be "thoroughly homogeneous nor thoroughly plastic", education cannot be the development of a certain sort of person.

Thomas Elyot, in concluding The Governour, modestly proclaims: "Now all ye readers that desire to have your children to be governours, or in any other authority in the public weale of your country, if ye bring them up and instruct them in such form as in this book is declared, they shall then seem to all men worthy to be in authority, honour and noblesse, and all that is under their governance shall prosper and come to perfection." (Rusk, 62-3) Education, for Elyot, is that part of society the function of which is to prepare the young to occupy positions of

authority, those subject to authority being, of course, not in need of education. In the many centuries which preceeded universal, compulsory schooling, it was, perhaps, the single most influential view of education.

Who, then, is best prepared to be in a position of authority? Who is the educated person? Quintilian, not without reason, thinks he must be an "orator". And, in the Institutio Oratoria, he says that "the perfect orator must be a man of integrity, the good man, otherwise he cannot pretend to that character...We therefore not only require in him a consummate talent for speaking, but all the virtuous endowments of mind. For an upright and an honest life cannot be restricted to philosophers alone; because the man who acts in a real civic capacity, who has talents for the administration of public and private concerns, who can govern cities by his counsels, maintain them by his laws, and meliorate them by his judgments, cannot, indeed, be anything but the orator...Let therefore the orator be as the real sage, not only perfect in morals, but also in science, and in all the requisites and powers of elocution." (Rusk, 40)

Between authorities (or leaders) and those subject to authority (followers) there is a relationship of mutual dependence. Without followers to follow there is no one for the leader to lead. Elyot and Quintilian take followers for granted. They assume (correctly) that leaders must be prepared for what they do, but they also assume (incorrectly) that followers take care of themselves. Enlisted men might throw down their arms--or turn them on their officers. People might take to the streets--perhaps for the palace. And workers might leave their machines--running, at least until tools find their way down to the gears. One might become prepared for followership as a result of having been born into a family of followers. This is "home education". Regular church attendance might prepare humble servants, people believing they serve God best in serving others well. This is "religious education". Or, as a result of one's early experience of others one might learn it is better to be the apparently-contented follower than the transparently-frustrated leader. This is the "School of

Life".

Further, good leadership depends in large part on good followership. If leaders, as Quintilian says, must be good speakers, followers must be good listeners. And, if leaders must be virtuous and knowledgable, followers must at least pretend not to despise what for them might be moralism and knowingness. Good followers must be prepared. Would this be education? Given followers of a certain, not-uncommon description, a good leader would have to be ignorant, immoral and all but mute: the brutalized might follow only the brute. Would he be educated?

Given that leaders and followers are mutually dependent, one can assume that preparing leaders also involves preparing followers, or that it does not. If it does, then the view that education is that part of society the function of which is to prepare the young to occupy positions of authority is incoherent. It says that education prepares <u>both</u> leaders <u>and</u> followers, and thus embodies two distinct and unrelated explanations. If preparing leaders is not taken to involve preparing followers as well, then the view is inconsistent. It allows that education prepares <u>either</u> knowledgable, virtuous, well-spoken, <u>or</u> ignorant, immoral, mumble-mouthed persons, and thus embodies two distinct and conflicting explanations. One only escapes these difficulties by allowing that <u>both</u> sorts of leader are <u>equally</u> well educated, not a move, one suspects, either Elyot or Quintilian would be prepared to make.

The general view, of which the above is an instance, is that education is that part of society the function of which is to prepare a person to occupy a certain social role. The view fails, and for the same reason as the view that education is the means by which a certain sort of individual is developed. Education depends, in part, on the sort of individual being educated and on the sort of society in which education takes place. Some individuals can neither lead nor follow. They can only cope as one equal amongst many. Such individuals, however, are not necessarily badly educated. Further, a particular society might not be one of leaders and followers. In some democracies and, perhaps more clearly, in relatively autonomous

communes, no individual leads (though all contribute) and what people follow is not an individual but decisions taken by the group as a whole. Such behavior is not uncommon. Even in a rigidly hierarchical society it might be that within each level of the hierarchy the dominant mode of behavior is democratic or communal. Education in such societies, however, is not impossible. The views that education develops a certain kind of individual, or prepares individuals to occupy a certain social role. both fail, then, for lack of comprehensiveness. The individual described might well be educated. But others not described are educated as well. Preparing a person for a particular social role might well be educating him (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of the difference between education and training), but preparing him for another role might be educating him as well.

Chapter 2 Individual Development, Social Preparation

Education is not the means by which a particular individual is developed. Nor is it that part of society the function of which is to prepare individuals to occupy a particular social role. In Democracy and Education, Dewey gives both individual and social accounts of education. He says that education is individual development, or "growth", but not the development of any particular individual. He also says that education is the means by which is achieved social continuity over the generations, education being that part of society the function of which is to prepare the young to take their place in society itself, not in a particular social role. This is what Dewey says specifically about the nature of education. On the basis of a detailed analysis of what he says about other, less fundamental aspects of education, one might conclude that, with respect to the above, what he says is not exactly what he means. There clearly is a thesis to be written here, but this is not it.

Central to Dewey's conception of education is the notion of growth. In Democracy and Education he says, "the educative process is a continuous process of growth, having as its aim at every stage an added capacity of growth." (54) "Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself. The criterion of value of school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective" (53). Again, "since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education. It is a commonplace to say that education should not cease when one leaves school. The point of this commonplace is that the purpose of school education is to ensure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that ensure growth. The inclination to learn from life itself and to make the conditions of life such that all will learn in the process of living is

the finest product of schooling." (51) "Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, this means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming." (59)

Education, like life, is said to be a continuous process of growth and, again like life, is to be understood for what it is, not (at least so Dewey says here) for what relations it might have with other things. The process cannot be taken for granted. The purpose of school education is to provide conditions which are necessary for growth, but which otherwise might not obtain, and to ensure that the young, on reaching maturity, will continue to grow when the special conditions provided by the school are removed. Finally, Dewey suggests that the school will have truly fulfilled its purpose only when it so changes society that "all will learn (grow, become educated) in the process of living" in it, when society itself becomes "educational".

In The Language of Education, Scheffler devotes a chapter to what he calls "Educational Metaphors". As well as the metaphor of "molding" or "shaping", he discusses that of "growth". He says that "there is an obvious analogy between the growing child and the growing plant, between the gardener and the teacher." "The developing organism goes through phases that are relatively independent of the efforts of the gardener or teacher", though "in both cases ...the development may be helped or hindered by these efforts." "In neither case is the gardener or teacher indispensable to the development of the organism and, after they leave, the organism continues to mature." "The growth metaphor" he says "embodies a modest conception of the teacher's role, which is to study and then to indirectly help the development of the child, rather than to shape him into some preconceived form." (49)

All metaphors break down at some point. "Where" Scheffler asks "does the growth metaphor break down? It does seem plausible with respect to certain aspects of the development of the child, that is, the biological or con-

stitutional aspects." (Ibid) "If we once ask, however, how (the) capacities (of the child) are to be exercised, toward what the...energy of the child is to be directed, what sorts of conduct and what types of sensitivity are to be fostered, we begin to see the limits of the growth metaphor." "For these aspects of development, there are no independent sequences of stages pointing to a single state of maturity. That is why, with regard to these aspects, it makes no literal sense to say, 'Let us develop all the potentialities of every child'. They conflict and so all cannot be developed." We must "decide in one way rather than another...responsibility for such a decision cannot be evaded." (50) Dewey is right in thinking that education is not the development of a particular individual. Is he wrong, however, because he thinks the development of <u>any</u> individual is education?

In Experience and Education, Dewey as it were "anticipates" Scheffler's criticism. He says, "the objection made is that growth might take many different directions: a man, for example, who starts out on a career of burglary may grow in that direction, and by practice may grow into a highly expert burglar. Hence it is argued that 'growth' is not enough; we must also specify the direction in which growth takes place" (28). "But" Dewey says, "the question is whether growth in this direction promotes or retards growth in general. Does this form of growth create conditions for further growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off a person...from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth in new directions?" (29) Dewey denies that education is growth is any direction, that becoming educated is developing into any kind of individual. Scheffler asks for a criterion by which we can distinguish educational from non- and from mis-educational growth. Dewey says we must ask "whether growth in <u>this</u> direction promotes...growth <u>in general</u>." It will be recalled that, for Dewey, "the educative process is a continuous process of growth, having as its aim at every stage <u>an added capacity of growth</u>." If growth in a particular direction fails to promote general growth, it is non-educational. If it retards general growth, it is mis-educational.

It would appear that Dewey views education as that part of the life of the individual the purpose of which is to prepare him for the future, that educational growth prepares the individual for future growth. Dewey, however, denies this. "Education" he says "means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth...regardless of age." "Since life means growth, a living creature lives as truly and positively at one stage as at another, with the same intrinsic fullness and the same absolute claims." "Living has its own intrinsic quality and" he says "the business of education is with that quality." (Democracy and Education, 51) There is, however, "the idea that education is a process of preparation or getting ready. What is to be prepared for is, of course, the responsibilities and privileges of adult life. Children" he says "are not regarded as social members in full and regular standing. They are looked upon as candidates; they are placed on the waiting list. The conception is only carried a little further when the life of adults is considered as not having meaning on its own account, but as a preparatory probation for 'another life'." (Ibid, 54)

But, should children be regarded as "social members in full and regular standing", that is, as having all the "responsibilities and privileges" of adults? And to suggest that the preparation view has children as "candidates" on a "waiting list" is to suggest that for want of preparation some children will be "rejected". But, if adulthood is viewed not as an achievement but as something which, as Langeveld says, is "thrust upon" children, then the notions of winning, losing and competition do not apply. Finally, Dewey associates the preparation view with a view of adulthood as a "preparatory probation for 'another life'." But, if there <u>is</u> another life, the association is far from being discreditable. And, if there is not, the association should be with preparation for death, which again is not, as Dewey apparently would have us believe, discreditable.

Education, it will be argued in Chapter 5, is best understood as a kind of preparation. Dewey disagrees. Why? Dewey thinks the idea of preparation is "but another form of the notion of the negative or privative character of

of growth", which latter he says has been "already criticized" (op cit). The criticism here being referred to is as follows. "Our tendency to take immaturity as mere lack, and growth as something which fills up the gap between the immature and the mature is due to regarding childhood comparatively, instead of intrinsically. We treat it simply as a privation because we are measuring it by adulthood as fixed standard. This fixes attention upon what the child has not, and will not have till he becomes a man." (Ibid, 42) Yes? Dewey admits that the "comparative standpoint is legitimate enough for some purposes", though he does not say which ones. "But", he goes on, "if we make it final, the question arises whether we are not guilty of overweening presumption. Children, if they could express themselves articulately..., would tell a different tale; and there is excellent adult authority for the conviction that for certain moral and intellectual purposes adults must become as little children." (op cit) But, if this is the case, the implication is that children, at least in some respects, are not to grow; whereas, in preparing children for an adulthood so conceived, the educator would want to ensure, as part of his preparation, that certain qualities of the child remain unchanged.

There are two possible preparation views. Dewey here criticizes the view that education is preparing an adult (as a chemist prepares, makes or develops a compound). A second view, however, is that education is preparation for adulthood (as a chemist prepares, or gets ready, to open his shop). "Adult", in the former, refers to qualities a person might have (e.g., a mature attitude). "Adulthood", in the latter, refers to a state of affairs in which a person might be (e.g., one in which, according to Langeveld, a person is held to be responsible for what he does). Dewey trades on this ambiguity in the notion of preparation. He begins by describing the view, "preparation or getting ready...for...the responsibilities and privileges of adult life": goes on to say that the preparation view is "but another form of the notion of the...privative character of growth": and then criticizes the view because he says "for certain moral and intellectual purposes adults must become

as little children." One can, however, prepare a person *for* adulthood by *preparing* (or making) a person with the qualities of a child.

Dewey's second criticism is as follows. "The seriousness of the assumption of the negative quality of the possibilities of immaturity is apparent when we reflect that it sets up as an ideal and standard a static end. The fulfillment of growing is taken to mean an *accomplished* growth: that is to say, an Ungrowth, something which is no longer growing. The futility of the assumption is seen in the fact that every adult resents the imputation of having no further possibilities of growth; and so far as he finds that they are closed to him mourns the fact as evidence of loss...Why an unequal measure for child and man?" (Ibid, 42) The criticism is well-taken, at least as it applies to "the assumption of the negative quality of the possibilities of immaturity". But, is the preparation (or getting ready) view, as Dewey says that it is, "another form of the of the notion of the negative...character of growth"? Dewey says, correctly, that "normal child and adult alike...are engaged in growing. The difference between them is not the difference between growth and no growth, but between modes of growth appropriate to different conditions." (Ibid, 50) But, if this is the case, a possible preparation view is, in Dewey's terms, *of* those growing in a child's mode *for* growth in an adult mode.

Dewey does not say what exactly he takes to be the difference between the two "conditions", or the "modes of growth" appropriate to each. It is at least suggestive, however, to compare his remarks on school education and his "technical definition" of education generally. The significant difference is that, in the former, growth is directed by someone other than the educand, whereas, in the latter, ultimately growth is to be self-directed. The school, according to Dewey, has three main functions: (i) to, as it were, break "into portions" a complex civilization in order that it may be "assimilated piecemeal, in a gradual and graded way": "to eliminate, so far as is possible, the unworthy features of the existing environment from influence on mental habitudes": and (iii) "to balance the

various elements of the school environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the group in which he was born, and to come into living contact with a broader environment." (Ibid, 20) (With respect to (iii), see also Oakeshott in Chapter 3.) The implication is that the child has need of a specifically educational institution because, left to his own devices, in a social environment Dewey no doubt sees as significantly mis-educational, he would not grow in a way appropriate to his condition. He would not be able to assimilate a complex civilization, resist unworthy features of the social environment, or escape from the limitations of the social group into which he was born. Later, having had the main features of the thesis reviewed for us, "we reach a technical definition of education." Education "is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience." (89-90) Education is growth which leads to further growth. But it is also, Dewey implies, growth which leads to (or prepares one for) specifically self-directed growth, growth for which the educand rather than the educator is responsible.

In fact, Dewey says that "it is not...a question whether education should prepare for the future. If education is growth, it must progressively realize present possibilities, and thus make individuals better fitted to cope with later requirements. Growing is not something completed in odd moments; it is a continuous leading into the future." Dewey goes on to say, however, that "if the environment, in school and out, supplies conditions which utilize adequately the present capacities of the immature, the future which grows out of the present is surely taken care of. The mistake is not in attaching importance to preparation for future need, but in making it the mainspring of present effort. Because the need of preparation for a continually developing life is great, it is imperative that every energy should be bent to making the present experience as rich and significant as possible. Then as the present experience merges insensibly into the future, the

future is taken care of." (Ibid, 56) Two points should be made here. First, one need only think of the history of many veterans before one realizes that "rich and significant" present experience does not always make individuals "better fitted to cope with later requirements", especially the requirements of a life which, in comparison, is poor and insignificant.

But, Dewey also says--and this third would also appear to be his fundamental criticism--that "the mistake" is in "making (preparation) the mainspring of present effort." Dewey thinks there are "evil consequences which flow from putting education on (the) basis of (preparation for the future)". "In the first place, it involves loss of impetus...To get ready for something, one knows not what nor why, is to throw away leverage that exists, and to seek for motive power in a vague chance." "In the second place, a premium is placed on shilly-shallying and procrastination. The future prepared for is a long way off...Why be in a hurry about getting ready for it?" "A third undesirable result is the substitution of a conventional average standard of expectation and requirement for a standard which concerns the specific powers of the individual under instruction. For a severe and definite judgment based upon the strong and weak points of the individual is substituted a vague and wavering opinion concerning what youth might be expected, upon the average, to become in some more or less remote future." "Finally, the principle of preparation makes necessary recourse on a large scale to the use of adventitious motives of pleasure and pain. The future having no stimulating and directing power when severed from the possibilities of the present, something must be hitched to it to make it work." (Ibid, 55)

The first, second and fourth points all concern a possible problem of motivation. The third does not. Here, Dewey again confuses preparation, or getting ready, <u>for</u> adulthood, and preparing or making what he says must be an "average" adult. In fact, if preparation, in the former sense, is, as Langeveld says it is, preparation for taking responsibility for what one does, the only limitations which should (ideally) prevent a person from becoming well

prepared for adulthood are his own "strong and weak points". Making a success of a life for which one has assumed responsibility is not an easy task. The person who is well prepared, however, is the one who lives that life which emphasizes his strong points, and minimizes the influence of whatever weak points he might have.

Dewey's criticisms of the preparation view are based on two fundamental confusions. He confuses, as has been said, preparing with preparation for. But, he also confuses the general purpose of an enterprise (e.g., preparation), and the possible motivation of a participant (e.g., preparation, interest, fulfillment). The soccer player might be motivated by monetary gain, the desire to achieve excellence or dislike for his opponents. But, the purpose in playing the game of soccer is simply to score more goals than the other team, that is, to win. Regardless of the educand's motivation, the purpose of education might still be preparatory. Further, if the latter is to be achieved it might be best to allow for individual differences with respect to the former. Some soccer players are best motivated by the desire to win. Some students are best motivated by the desire to prepare themselves for the future. But, just as the desire to win might encourage some players to be overly aggressive, and thus of less value to their teams than they would have been otherwise, motivated only by preparation "for something, one knows not what nor why", for something which, in any case, is "a long way off", some students, if there is not to be "shilly-shallying and procrastination", will have to be whipped on by "adventitious motives of pleasure and pain". In fact, Dewey himself makes use of the motivation/purpose distinction when he says that the best preparation for the future is a "rich and significant" present, that is, for Dewey, a present which consists in actions not one of which, taken individually, is motivated by the desire to prepare. He might be right. But, in being right he has no argument against the view that education is a kind of preparation.

Education, for Dewey, is not the development or growth of a particular individual, neither is it the development of just any individual. But, of the sort of person

he has in mind, Dewey both asserts and denies that he develops in such a way that he is well prepared for future development; he both asserts and denies that education is that part of the life of the individual the purpose of which is to prepare him for the future. Why? It will be recalled that, for Dewey, "growth is the characteristic of life" (emphasis mine). A person has reached physical maturity--is he dead? A person, though active, has ceased developing mentally--is he dead of mind? A person develops only sporadically--is he alive only now and again? Schools according to Dewey are to create the desire for continued growth--are schools for the dead, and, if so, what does Dewey propose they do about it? Dewey, of course, is making a philosophical rather than an empirical claim. "Growth is the characteristic of life" is, in a phrase, his philosophy of life. People are even advised to live in a continuing, "rich and significant" present, and that, if they do, the future will "take care of itself". All very well. But, from a philosophy of life Dewey deduces a philosophy of education. He says that "since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing". And, "Life is development,...developing...is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, this means..." But, the deduction cannot be made. For the argument to be valid it must be assumed that education is "all one" with life. Education, however, is an aspect of, not the same as life. Dewey might have concluded it is that aspect the purpose of which is to prepare for the future. But, if one is thinking, as Dewey is, of education as life, to say it is a kind of preparation is clearly only part of the story. (That it is part of the story might lead one to doubt Dewey's philosophy of life. But that is another matter.)

In Democracy and Education Dewey says that education is growth. The claim, as it stands, is incomplete because, as Scheffler says, it only serves to raise, and to fail to answer, the further question: growth in what direction? In Experience and Education Dewey says that educational growth is growth which invites, rather than precludes, further growth, a claim which we have tried to interpret, education is preparation for the future, that is, in Dewey's terms,

for future life, future growth. Dewey, it was argued for the wrong reasons, denies this. Scheffler's criticism, then, though differently applied, remains valid. The preparation view would have allowed for a plausible distinction between educational and non- and mis-educational growth. For, depending on the sort of future life the educand comes to live, he was either prepared well, not at all, or very badly. Dewey's view, on the other hand, does not allow for a plausible distinction. For, if educational growth is simply growth which invites future growth, the implication is that future growth of whatever sort is evidence of (successful) education. One is again forced to ask, (future) growth in what direction? And, to avoid an infinite regress, one must, at some point, give an answer Dewey has failed to give. Dewey, I think, is right when he implies that having the capacity for further growth is evidence of (successful) education. He is wrong, however, in thinking it sufficient, let alone the only possible evidence. But, is this what he thinks?

Education, it was argued in Chapter 1, is not that part of society the function of which is to prepare a person to occupy a particular social role. Is it (amongst others) the means by which is achieved social continuity over the generations, education being that part of society the function of which is to "prepare" the young to take their place in society itself, rather than in a particular social role? Dewey begins Democracy and Education with the observation that "the most notable distinction between living and inanimate beings is that the former maintain themselves by renewal." That is, "the living thing...tries to turn the energies which act upon it into means of its own further existence." (1) Dewey then derives what he calls "the principle of continuity through renewal" (2). He claims that the principle applies to all and only living things, a claim he supports with evidence from plant, animal and from individual human life. The principle is then applied to human social life. The continuity of social life over the generations, it is said, is only possible if it is renewed in each succeeding generation. Dewey then

says, "Education, in its broadest sense is the means of this social continuity of life." "Every one of the constituent elements of the social group, in a modern city as in a savage tribe, is born...helpless, without language, beliefs, ideas, or social standards. Each individual, each unit who is the carrier of the life-experience of his group, in time passes away. Yet the life of the group goes on." (2)

Dewey distinguishes "mature" and "immature" members of a society. The mature are either those "who possess the knowledge and customs of the group" (3), or, alternatively, those who are "able...to share in its common life" (8). The immature are those who, though they neither possess the one nor share in the other, because "immaturity designates a positive force or ability" (50), are capable of achieving both. There is a "gap" between the mature and the immature, and, Dewey says, "education, and education alone, spans the gap." (3) Education is thus concerned either with the "transmission" to the immature of the knowledge and customs possessed by the mature, or with the "initiation" of the one by the other into the common life of the group, education, amongst other things, serving the purpose of social continuity over the generations.

Education, according to Dewey, is a social necessity. "The primary ineluctable facts of the birth and death of each one of the constituent members in a social group determine the necessity of education. On the one hand, there is the contrast between the immaturity of the new-born members of the group--its future sole representatives--and the maturity of the adult members who possess the knowledge and customs of the group. On the other hand, there is the necessity that these immature members be not merely physically preserved in adequate numbers, but that they be initiated into the interests, purposes, information, skill, and practices of the mature members: otherwise the group will cease its characteristic life." (Ibid) "Even in a savage tribe, the achievements of adults are far beyond what the immature members would be capable of if left to themselves. With the growth of civilization, the gap between the original capacities of the immature and the

standards and customs of the elders increases...Deliberate effort and the taking of thoughtful pains are required. Beings who are born not only unaware of, but quite indifferent to, the aims and habits of the social group have to be rendered cognizant of them and actively interested. Education, and education alone, spans the gap." (Ibid)

The continuity of a social group depends on at least some members being mature. All, however, inevitably die, and all new-born members are immature. If the "characteristic life" of the group is not to come to an end, its knowledge and customs must be transmitted, new members must be initiated into its shared life. It is, Dewey claims, a matter of "necessity". "If the members who compose a society (i.e., the mature members) lived on continuously, they might educate the new-born members, but it would be a task" Dewey says "directed by personal interest rather than social need. Now it is a work of necessity." (4) Education, for Dewey, is the means by which a society is maintained over the generations. It is, specifically, that part of society the function of which is--not to put too fine a point on it--to socialize new members.

Dewey's argument is twice invalid. There is, however, a second related argument he might have used. First, he fails to show the principle of continuity through renewal to apply to all living things, and thus that it applies, as he says it does, to human social life. Dewey illustrates the principle's application to plant, animal and to individual human life. But--supposing this to be an argument--even assuming he could illustrate its application to all living things as it were one by one, to complete the argument he would have to show that it applies to human social life. And in doing this he would be assuming the truth of what the argument purports to demonstrate. Independent support for the principle might come from an analysis of what it is for something to be a living being. But, rather than analyse, Dewey only assumes that "the most notable distinction between living and inanimate beings is that the former maintain themselves by renewal."

Second, and more important, the principle is said to

apply to all and only living things. Human social "life", however, is not itself a living thing. Dewey confuses a characteristic of human life, that is, society, social behavior, social life, and a form life might take, that is, plant, animal, human. A society cannot "turn the energies which act upon it into means of its own further existence". Neither energies, nor anything else for that matter, can act upon it, because society does not "exist" in the sense that would be required.

The argument Dewey appears to give, however, is not necessary. Though societies are not living things, humans are. And with this in mind the argument can be reconstructed as follows. Society is a human necessity. Given the sort of creature he is, and given the sort of world in which he must live, without cooperative or social behavior man could not survive. But, as all men die, and as all men are born non- or only potentially-social, the continuity of the species over the generations depends upon renewal in the young of social behavior. Dewey's "argument" is both invalid and unnecessary. It is invalid because it attempts a deduction common sense alone shows cannot be made. In a deductive argument no more can be said in the conclusion than is said in the premises. And to speak of society in his conclusion is clearly to say more than can be said of any and all living things. The argument is unnecessary--in fact it is less argument than perhaps illuminating analogy --because the facts of individual birth and death, immaturity and the uninevitability of maturity, at least as Dewey understands it--these facts alone, quite apart from a principle thought to apply more generally, are sufficient to establish the necessity of education, or, at least of socialization, if society is to continue over the generations.

The first point to be made about Dewey's account of the social nature of education--a point which is made by both Archambault, in his Introduction to John Dewey on Education, and Frankena, in the relevant chapter of Three Historical Philosophies of Education--is that it is perhaps best described as "vague". Dewey, as do many other philosophers, treats the topic of the nature of education

only by way of introducing more detailed discussion of less fundamental (though not for that reason necessarily less important) topics. Introductions, of course, only introduce problems; they are not themselves intended to be problematic. When looked at critically, however, they typically seem cursory, inadequately argued, vague. Dewey says that education is the means of social continuity. But, what is "social continuity"? To identify an instance of continuity one would have to be able to distinguish those changes as a result of which a society ceases to exist, and those changes which do not have this result. One would have to know what it is for something to be a society. Dewey does not, however, at least not in Democracy of Education, give us his social philosophy. He implies that a society exists when a group "shares a common life". But, is the latter any more readily understandable than the former? A group might share a common life either if they all live much the same life, or if their lives are governed by rules (laws, conventions) they have all played a part in creating. And there are other plausible candidates. What, then, does Dewey mean by a group which "shares a common life"? Dewey also implies that a society exists when a group shares "common knowledge and customs". But, even if one has an independent understanding of "knowledge" and "customs", neither "common knowledge" nor "common customs" is any clearer than what they might be used to explain. If a society is not a group each member of which has the same knowledge and customs--perhaps the least plausible of all possible alternatives--then "common" is left undefined and thus open to a wide variety of interpretations.

Without a clear understanding of what it is to share a common life it cannot be determined into what the immature are to be initiated, nor what is to count as successful initiation. Would success involve getting them to live much the same kind of life as the mature? Or would it involve preparing them to take part in determining under what rules the group is to live? Again, without a clear understanding of "common knowledge and customs" it cannot be determined what is to be transmitted to the immature, nor, of course, what is to count as successful transmis-

sion. If it is not to be whatever knowledge and customs, if any, happen to be in the possession of each and every member of the group, it is not clear what it <u>is</u> to be. Educators make decisions about what they are to do: they consider a range of possibilities: argue the merits of various courses of action: decide one way rather than any other. On Dewey's account, however, just because it is vague, within very wide limits all argument is non-rational (if not irrational) and, again within wide limits, all decisions are arbitrary. One course of action cannot be shown to be more or less educational valuable than any other.

A vague account is always incomplete. It raises as many questions as it answers. Consider the question, who is to be educated? Dewey says the immature. But, does he mean all the immature? or is he simply observing that because, on his account, only the immature are uneducated, only they can be educated, and thus leaving the question only partially answered? Depending on what exactly Dewey means by "social continuity" each of the following is possible: all the immature: one immature male and one immature female: none of the immature. The second is possible because, on one interpretation, it would only take one mature male, and one mature female, to carry on the customs and knowledge, the shared life of the group. The third is possible because, on another interpretation, social continuity might be guaranteed, not by education, but by selective immigration. This would be analogous to the situation, which Dewey mentions, in which the mature live on forever. In such a situation, Dewey says, education "might" occur, "but it would be a task directed by personal interest rather than social need." But, would it? or would a need arise even here because of changes which might result as over time the percentage of immature (or uneducated) members of the group increases? Who is to be educated? is an answerable question. But, because Dewey's account of the social nature of education is vague, no definite answer is suggested, let alone implied.

The second point to be made is that, even if it were not vague, Dewey's account would still be problematic.

Assume, for the moment, that education is to be understood as something which has a certain social function. Why, it might be asked, is that function the continuity of social life over the generations? Social life, or behavior, can be distinguished from a particular form social behavior might take, society in general from a particular society. Without society generally, of course, there cannot be a particular society, but society generally does not depend on there being any particular society--only that there be at least one. And, though a particular society cannot survive the demise of society generally, society might well continue even if a particular society does not.

Given the procedure he follows, it is almost impossible to decide (as Frankena finds) whether and, if so, in what way, Dewey might be a social relativist. He begins Democracy and Education by discussing a general, non-socially relative concept of education. He then proceeds to a discussion of education in a particular, what he calls a "progressive" and "democratic" society. In the latter, education is said to involve, depending on how one interprets him, either preparing (or making) progressive, democratic individuals, or preparing (or getting ready) an individual to participate democratically in making decisions which will determine how the society is to progress.

The Republic, in contrast, is static and oligarchic. Education involves selecting and preparing individuals to occupy a certain number of pre-determined social roles, the point being that these roles, and thus the Republic, are to be continued over the generations. "Social continuity", in the Republic, has a specifiable meaning. In a progressive, democratic society, on the other hand, what meaning it has is limited. Within very wide limits, what roles are to continue is a matter for individual choice, and thus cannot be pre-determined. Given that he discusses education in a progressive, democratic society, and given that he does not discuss it as he thinks it might take place in a non-progressive, non-democratic society, though it is clear Dewey is, in some sense, a social relativist, it is not clear what exactly that sense is. Would he, for example, presribe for the Republic, assuming it to exist, prepara-

tion for already-existing social roles, as Plato does, or would he prescribe preparation for making decisions, perhaps radical ones, concerning what future roles there will be? It is, I think, reasonable to assume the former.

Dewey assumes, correctly, that no one lives just in society generally. To play soccer is to play in a particular position. To be in society is to be in a particular society. But, Dewey also assumes, incorrectly, that "social continuity" must refer to the continuity of that particular society. Education, it is assumed, can only succeed, or not, in continuing the society in which it takes place. And, applying the criterion as it were society by society, education (in the non-socially relative sense) guarantees social continuity only by guaranteeing the continuity of particular societies. Thus, for Dewey, education is the transmission of the knowledge and customs, or initiation into the shared life, of the group within which education takes place.

In Dewey's social ontology individual societies are assumed to be isolated. He speaks of a group without reference to other groups, and of a "progressive", "democratic" country, that is, of the United States, without reference to other countries. (It is, if you will, a view of the world from the point of view of "isolationist" America prior to 1917.) Individuals depend for their survival solely on the continuity of the society into which they happen to have been born. There is not, for example, the possibility of emigration. And, though a society might progress, there is not the possibility of radical transformation, that is, change which is such that a new society comes into being.

The social world is not now, nor was it in Dewey's time, as this ontology describes it. Individual societies are not isolated, nor are they incapable of radical transformation. A group of people might emigrate because they cannot forsee that the society into which they were born, a society in which they have no place, will do anything other than continue as it is. One thinks of many of the Europeans who populated America. A group might collectively decide that the form of the society in which

they live has been imposed upon them against their will, and that its continued existence is neither necessary nor justified. They might then adopt, even create for themselves, a radically new society. One thinks of, amongst many other examples, revolutionary America. More commonly, a group might be forced by external pressures to change the sort of society they have--as has happened in Eastern Europe, or, more positively, ceasing opportunities made available by general changes in the social order, a group might transform their society in a way they think to be to their advantage--as has happened in some "Third World" countries where, due to, for example, Soviet-American rivalry, funds and expertise are available for industrial development.

In some societies education, as Dewey says, is used to guarantee social continuity. In others, however, it becomes an instrument of social change. In contrast to how it might have been used, indeed, to how perhaps it is still used in the United States, one thinks of how it was used in Russia after 1917, in China after 1949, and in Kampuchia between 1975 and 1979. If education generally is to be understood as something which has a certain social function, then, that function cannot be social continuity over the generations.

Education does not necessarily concern the continuity of a particular society, that is, of the society in which it takes place. Might it concern the continuity of society generally? Rather than prepare or make a person of a certain social type; rather than prepare or get a person ready for life in a particular society; perhaps education concerns making social persons, getting people ready for society generally.

In Philosophy of Education, McClellan says that "looked at in one way, education is simply a natural phenomenon, subject to study by the methods of natural science. Education is a necessary condition for the survival of the human species: marvellous as our genetic processes are, they do not ensure the learning of the myriad skills, knowledge, and other dispositions which make

it possible for people to live in societies. And people either live in societies, or they do not live at all. If we mean by 'education' whatever happens to a bunch of human protoplasm such that it eventually becomes a person-in-society (and we have to put it that broadly to account for the succession of social roles that constitute being a person-in-society...), then education is clearly an object for study by the social sciences." (11-12) Such a view, though it overcomes the problems mentioned with respect to Dewey's social account, itself raises at least four new problems. Two of these are mentioned by McClellan.

"If we use the term ('education')" he says "just as a social scientist might use it...then a sentence constructed on the model 'B is an educated person' can go wrong in only two ways: (i) the name for 'B' does not designate a person at all, or (ii) the name for 'B' designates some feral person who has no role whatsoever in human society...In either case, if two persons should disagree on whether B is an educated person, their dispute would be equivalent to disagreement on whether B is a person-in-society. But that simply is not what we ordinarily mean when we affirm or deny that a person is educated." (13) "When we talk about education, we ordinarily mean a particular way of becoming a person-in-society. When we say that a person is educated or uneducated, we ordinarily mean that he's one kind of person-in-society or that he's not." (14) One need not hold with McClellan that education is a "particular" way of becoming a person-in-society, nor that being educated is being one "kind" of person-in-society. The criticisms he makes are valid given only that education is not any way of becoming a person-in-society, that being educated is not being any person-in-society, points argued in general terms in Chapter 1.

In effect, McClellan argues that, in two respects, the view is incomplete. It is incomplete in a third respect as well. Education, it was argued above, is not necessarily concerned with a particular society. What was not argued, but which is, nonetheless, quite obvious, is that education depends, at least to a certain extent, on the society in which it takes place. There is a difference between English,

American and Soviet education, for example, and criticism would be justified if they occured in, respectively, China, England and the United States. The view that becoming educated is becoming a person in society, McClellan says, raises and fails to answer the questions, what <u>way</u> of becoming? becoming what <u>kind</u> of person? The third question it raises and fails to answer is, to use McClellan's terminology, becoming a person in <u>what</u> society? All three questions, however, can be re-stated in (it was argued in Chapter 1) a more justifiable form. The questions are: by what criteria is it to be decided: in what way does an educated person become a person-in-society? what kind of person-in-society is an educated person? and, an educated person is one who has become a person in what society?

Education depends on the society in which it takes place. It also depends on the person being educated. This brings us to the final problem with the view which identifies education with what might be called "socialization". It is true, as McClellan says, that in order to survive people must live in societies. What is not the case, however, is that all people must be social, or that all people must be well prepared to cope with society. Society, upon which everyone depends, does not itself depend on everyone. The question then arises whether the educated person must be "socialized". McClellan argues, in effect, that the socialized need not be educated. Must the non-social, or even the anti-social, be uneducated? If one thinks of education from the point of view of the person being educated, it seems possible--indeed, it seems actually to be not-infrequent--that education can proceed regardless of the fact that the person in question is both unable and unwilling to cooperate with others. And if, despite these admitted shortcomings, the educator can forsee the possibility of an adequate future for his pupil, he might try to educate <u>without</u> socializing him. The person would receive only a particular kind, not a general education, but in its way, because of its appropriateness, it might be better than any alternative. One thinks of academic education for the "lone intellectual". The view that becoming educated is becoming a person-in-society,

then, is not only thrice-incomplete, it also lacks comprehensiveness, failing, as it does, to account for the possibility of what might be called a "non-social" education.

There is a third and, with respect to the first two, a more fundamental point to be made concerning Dewey's social analysis of education. It has already been argued to be vague, and thus incomplete, and also, given the place it accords to social continuity, at best only part of the story, that is, uncomprehensive. The third point is as follows. Education, for Dewey, is, as has been seen, socially fundamental. Without education society could not exist, because education, and education alone, renews social life over the generations, thus ensuring its continuity. Dewey, however, does not just claim that education is socially fundamental. He also claims it is fundamentally social. The transmission of knowledge occurs in training. Upbringing is at least partially concerned with the transmission of customs. And initiation into a shared life occurs when a person joins a club. For Dewey, however, education is the means of social continuity, rather than, say, the continuity of certain skills, family customs or the traditions of a particular club. Again, it might be argued that education is fundamentally a human enterprise. The relationship between education and society, on this argument, would be indirect. Society is an important, but only one of many important features of human life. The relationship for Dewey, however, is direct. Education is a social enterprise.

There is, then, in Dewey's argument (as we have re-constructed it) a certain order of explanation. Empirically, human continuity is explained by reference to social continuity, and the latter by reference to education. And, philosophically, society must be pre-supposed to explain human continuity, and education to explain social continuity. In assuming one order of explanation, Dewey implicitly denies a second. This is, empirically, social continuity is explained by reference to human continuity, and the latter by reference to education. Or, philosophically, man must be pre-supposed to explain social continuity,

and education to explain human continuity. Given this second order of explanation education might either be an instantiation of social behavior, or even have as one of its aims the development of social behavior. It would, nonetheless, fundamentally be a human not a social enterprise.

Finally, in giving one order of explanation Dewey is assuming, perhaps incorrectly, that a single order of explanation is possible. Human and social continuity, rather than one depending on the other, or vice versa, might be mutually-dependent. If this is the case neither can be used to explain the other without its being at the same time used to explain itself. Similarly, if education and man, or education and society, are mutually-dependent, neither of the latter can be used to explain education without education at the same time being used to explain itself.

Dewey--if perhaps only in the introductory chapters of Democracy and Education--is part of what might be called the "Platonic Tradition". The Tradition's primary concern is society. The concern with education is only secondary. The primary concern is the question, how is the ideal society to be conceived? But, secondarily, given the ideal society, the questions arise, how is it to be realized? and, once realized, how is it to be maintained? The ideal society is seen to be one composed of variously-conceived ideal individuals. All individuals at birth fall short of these ideals, and thus the questions of the realization and the maintenance of the society become, at least in part, questions of how ideal individuals are to be developed, that is, questions concerning education. Education, in the Tradition, is seen to be the necessary and sufficient means by which ideal individuals are developed, and thus one of the means of realizing and maintaining the ideal society.

The Tradition, however, is either meaningless or self-contradictory. Education cannot be both a means to and a part of the ideal society. Nothing can be a means to itself. But, if education is a means to, and thus not a part of the society, then it is not clear to what, in the Tradition, 'education' could refer. And if, on the other

hand, education is not a means to, but a part of the ideal society, because what it would involve is, on any plausible account, somewhat less than ideal, it must be supposed that the ideal society contains a less-than-ideal part. The same point can be made with reference to the person being educated. Education, according to the Tradition, is the development of ideal individuals. But, if, as is obvious, only less-than-ideal individuals can be so developed, either children, or others, are not part of society, or the ideal society is more than half composed of less-than-ideal individuals. The ideal society is of course unrealizable. But, in the modern equivalent--the best of all possible societies--the problems mentioned above remain, even if they are not problems of meaninglessness and self-contradiction. Put briefly, the problem is taking education and the educand seriously enough to allow the possibility that society could have as one of its purposes the education of the young.

Consider two implications of the Tradition. First, if the Tradition were sound it would have the implication that a distinctive philosophy of education is impossible. When education is seen as the means to a certain kind of society, though there remains the question of how that society is to be conceived, the question of education becomes empirical rather than philosophical. Education becomes whatever is, empirically, necessary and sufficient to realize and to maintain over the generations what is seen to be the ideal or the best possible society. Social philosophy displaces philosophy of education.

Second, and perhaps more important, 'education', as it is understood in the Tradition, would involve mis-education. Suppose the Republic to be the best of all possible societies. The problem for the educational theorist concerns its realization and maintenance. One of the questions to be asked, as indeed Plato does, is, how are individuals to be developed who believe that their's is the best of all possible societies, that is, individuals who will have no reason to change their society, thus making it less than the best? The belief, we are assuming, is true, and thus individuals might come to accept it as a result

of rational argument and persuasion. What means are to be employed, however, with those who, for whatever reason, are unable or unwilling to accept it? Plato suggests that the educator tell stories (what he calls "expedient" (159) fictions) which, though not themselves true, would, perhaps, result in the recalcitrant holding the correct belief. (78, 158ff.) And yet, one would have thought, education centrally concerns the transmission of knowledge, that is, not just true belief, but true belief rationally supported. (See the discussions in Chapters 4 and 6.) Further, suppose fiction <u>not</u> to be "expedient", suppose, in other words, the educand remains recalcitrant. What then? Plato does not say. But, if the continuity of the best of all possible societies is to be guaranteed, it seems inevitable that at least some educands will have to be indoctrinated with the belief. 'Education' will involve mis-education. Indeed, as any significant change in the society might result in its becoming less than the best, one would suppose indoctrination would have to be relatively wide-spread, involving not just the recalcitrant, but anyone who has doubts. Social continuity would have to be made predictable.

Understanding education, however, is not just a matter of first understanding society and then conducting the appropriate empirical research. Education is a part of society, and thus one cannot understand the latter without at the same time understanding the former. And, though it is true education depends in part on society, it is also and equally true that society in part depends on education. It makes just as much sense--that is, very little--to set about understanding society by first understanding education and then conducting empirical research to determine what results its produces, the results, of course, being 'society'. Education and society are two mutually-dependent human phenomena. And it is only because there are two distinct, interacting phenomena that distinct, and sometimes conflicting philosophies are possible. "Expedient" fictions are problemmatic for Plato only because, though they might be socially desirable, they might also be educationally undesirable. And, in order to realize and maintain a progressive, democratic society, Dewey might

have to indoctrinate progressive, democratic beliefs. It will be recalled, however, that he says education involves the transmission of knowledge. Neither Dewey nor, for that matter, Plato are wholely a part of what we have called the Platonic Tradition. Both, at least in some aspects of their work, accept that the socially and educationally desirable might conflict, and thus their theories are distinctively philosophical rather than merely empirical. At the theoretical level, the conflict is between the Platonic and what would have to be called the "Anti-Platonic" Traditions, each of which, when taken separately and thus without the possibility of conflict, is equally implausible. According to the Anti-Platonic Tradition society would be the means of educational continuity, the "whole point" of society being, say, to guarantee the continuity of knowledge over the generations. But, society, it must be admitted, has non-educational aims. And education, contrary to the Platonic Tradition, must be admitted to have non-social aims.

Dewey says that education is the means of social continuity over the generations. This is (so far as it goes) true; but it is not, as we have been arguing, a very good explanation of education. Dewey, in fact, no doubt unintentionally, admits that this is the case. He says, it will be recalled, that education <u>might</u> occur even in a society in which adult members live on forever, that is, in a society in which it is <u>not</u> education which guarantees social continuity over the generations. Dewey also says--and this perhaps is what he has in mind--that education is the transmission of common knowledge and customs, an initiation into a shared life. These claims will be discussed in Chapter 4. Imagine now, however, a society composed of 100,000,000 educated adults, and 1 uneducated child, a child who, it is known, will not outlive the last of his--it must be added--sterile elders. Transmitting knowledge and customs, initiating him into the life his elders share, cannot serve the purposes of the society. And yet if in doing so the child, as Dewey says he is, is becoming educated, then education cannot at least fundamentally be a social enterprise at all.

There are many possible relationships between education and society. Education is, for the most part, an instantiation of social behavior: the possibility of education depends on the existence of society: a general, though not universal aim of education is the development of social behavior: educational practice, especially on a large scale, clearly has social consequences. Education is a part of society. It is not, however, fundamentally social. Dewey gives a social account of the direction in which individual development or growth must go if the latter is to be educational. The account is, depending on how it is interpreted, either uncomprehensive or incomplete. It is incomplete if it is interpreted as emphasizing social continuity, for then, as we have argued, though it says to what education is a means, it does not say specifically the sort of means it is. If it is interpreted as emphasizing the transmission of common knowledge and customs, and the initiation of the young into the shared life of their elders, it is then both incomplete (because vague) and, as will be argued in Chapter 4, uncomprehensive, education involving more than just these.

Education, for the spectator, is explained in terms of its relations with other things. The explicanda are other than, or extrinsic to, education itself. Extrinsic explanation assumes (correctly) that education is in part what it is because the individual and society are what they are, and thus the former can in part be explained in terms of the latter. But, it also assumes (incorrectly) that the individual and society are <u>not</u> what they are in part because education is what it is. It denies that the former can in part be explained in terms of the latter. Society and the individual are seen as independent phenomena, education being dependent on them. Given a certain kind of individual, a certain kind of society, education follows. But, the individual, society and education are mutually-dependent. It is equally true--that is, it is false, that given a certain kind of education, the individual and

society follow.

This has always been the case, but there is good reason why it has not always been seen to be the case. Traditionally education served family, church, country. It was whatever was thought to be required to develop a good son, a good man, a good citizen. Now, however, education has been for the most part institutionalized. It has acquired a "life", that is, a history of its own. It has acquired a definite place both in society generally and in the life of the individual. It has established an independent existence. And what is true of social practice is also true of social theory. Traditional theorists re-made society by re-making man; and they accomplished the latter by the simple expedient of describing 'education' in a certain way. Now, however, it is recognized that such schemes are for the most part either impossible or at least undesirable. They depend, not on education, but on something which, when seen for what it is, is either impossible or, because it involves individuals spending a good part of their lives doing certain, usually quite disagreeable things, make men and their societies on the whole worse rather than better.

Given a relationship, not of dependence and independence, but of mutual-dependence, extrinsic explanation of itself is impossible. In seeking an explanation in terms of some greater whole one <u>assigns</u> rather than examines the part education is to play. Our social explanations, for example, ranged from socialization to the maintenance of a certain pattern of social roles. There is no way of deciding which is correct. To know that X is a part of Y is to know only what part X <u>could</u>, not what part it does play. And both the above are possible. Similarly, in seeking explanation in terms of what results from education, selection from all which might result is <u>arbitrary</u>. Our individual explanations, for example, ranged from growth or development to the development of virtuous or religious persons. All are, in a sense, "correct". All can and have resulted from education. To know that Y results from X is not to know it is the <u>only</u> result, nor that it can <u>only</u> result from X. But, it is only the latter which could fully

explain X.

If something seems mysterious, and thus invites explanation, one way to explain it is to show how it relates to other things, things already understood. And for particular purposes the result may very well be a good explanation. If, however, a perfectly general, philosophical understanding is desired, extrinsic explanation can be at best only partial, at worst misleading. Further, unless there is already some understanding of what the thing is apart from how it relates to other things, it cannot be known what part in a general explanation a particular extrinsic explanation is to play. It is only because we already have some understanding of education that we can single out for criticism, because they are more important than others, a few of the infinite number of extrinsic explanations that might be given of education. Extrinsic explanation assumes, but a possible explanation must examine, the part education plays in other things, the means it is which results in other things. Extrinsic explanation must be complemented by intrinsic explanation.

Section II The Participant

Chapter 3 Self-Realization, Autonomy

Education for the spectator is a phenomenon in the world. It is something which happens. For the participant, on the other hand, it is something done. It is something "we" do. The process of education occurs in individuals. It only occurs, however, as a result of what individuals do. Education is to be distinguished from maturation. Only the mature, perhaps, are educated, but then maturity is a pre-condition of, neither the same as nor part of what it is to be educated. If it were discovered that much of what is now thought to result from what individuals do in fact results from, say, the maturation of the brain, rather than change his notion of education the participant would accept that its range of application is rather more limited than once he thought it was.

The process of becoming educated results directly from what the individual does, only indirectly from what others might do. If the individual does nothing he cannot become educated. Changes might be affected by hypnosis, injections, or by lecturing the individual when he is not listening, but these cannot be the changes which occur in his becoming educated. Education, for the participant, necessarily involves 'learning'. Learning only results from 'experience'. And experience necessarily involves doing, even if it is only listening or--assuming consciousness to be in the required sense 'intentional'--being aware.

The individual might become educated without intending to do so. If studying is acting with the intention to learn, the individual need not be a student. Even in school, where he occupies the <u>role</u> of student, and where much is learned because the <u>teacher</u> intends it should be, the individual in fact studies very little. The teacher wants him to learn to read better, learn to solve a certain kind of mathematical problem, learn to play and to appreciate music. The student, however, reads stories, solves, or tries to solve, algebraic problems, listens to and plays classical music. He learns from what he does, but

what he does is not done with the intention to learn.

The individual, to become educated, must cooperate with others. Those with whom he cooperates, however, need not intend that he should learn. If teaching is acting with the intention that, as a result, someone else acts, the result of which is that the latter learns, the person with whom the individual cooperates need not be a teacher. The parent, for example, loves, cares for, befriends, amuses, excites, comforts and disciplines the child. The child learns from what he does, even though this is not what the parent intends.

Education for the participant, however, is something we do. The educator is a teacher, and the educand a student. The participant wants to know what we <u>should</u> do. What should the student do to become educated? What should be done by the teacher to help?

Education for the participant, unlike the spectator, is something we do, something which, if we decide, can be changed or stopped altogether. The participant, unlike the spectator, is involved in and thus responsible for education. Depending on whether he thinks it justified, not all it should be, or unjustified, he will prescribe its continuation, changes, or its termination. He is sometimes criticized for this. The philosopher, it is said, is not competent to prescribe.

Philosophy is seen, by the critic, as a kind of conceptual investigation. And, he says, prescription depends in part on empirical investigation. Not being competent to make judgments on empirical matters, the philosopher cannot know whether his prescription is sound. He therefore ought not to make it. But, what does this argument establish? It does not question the assumption that prescription also in part depends on conceptual investigation. Not being competent to make judgments on conceptual matters, the empirical investigator cannot know whether <u>his</u> prescription is sound. Therefore, neither he nor the philosopher should prescribe. The argument establishes two things. First, neither the empirical nor the conceptual investigator should prescribe. But, second,

prescription should not be made without the prior participation of both. The philosopher is not the only, but he is a participant.

The most fundamental issue the participant can raise concerns the justification of education itself. The issue can be raised in either one of two ways. First, participants agree on what education is. They ask, is it always justified? and, if not, under what conditions, if any, is it justified? Second, and more commonly, participants do not agree on what education is. They ask, can it be understood in such a way that it is always justified? Regardless of how it is raised, the issue is resolved in one of three ways. In either all, only some, or in no circumstances should a person educate or, at least, do that which can be understood as educating.

Justification can be too strong or too weak. It is too strong when it justifies more, and too weak when it justifies less than it can. The former implies that a person should do what in fact he should not. 'Education is unconditionally justified' might be an example of this sort of error. The latter implies that a person should not do what in fact he should. Failure to give a sufficiently strong justification is evidence of the (mistaken) belief that such a justification cannot be made. 'Education is never justified' might be an example of this sort of error. Assuming the nature of education to be problematic, a strong justification is the same as justifying a 'wide', and a weak justification is the same as justifying a 'narrow' concept of education. Both fail because it is not education they have shown to be justified.

Justification, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, always has the form, X is justified because it is, or is related to Y, and Y is justified. All justification, then, is open to criticism on one or both of two grounds. First, what X is said to be, or what it is said to be related to, that is, Y, might not be justified. Second, X might not be, or it might not be related to Y. It might be argued, for example, that education is justified because it is the same as socialization. The argument fails to support the conclusion either if education is not socialization, or if social-

ization is not itself justified.

The spectator, as we have seen, attempts extrinsic explanation of education. The participant, on the other hand, attempts intrinsic justification. He does not want to know how education relates to other things, or even whether in being so related it is for that reason justified. He wants to know whether what he does is in itself justified. To this end he is inevitably forced to raise and to answer the question, what _is_ education? or, to make it personal, what _am_ I doing?

In "Education and Self-Realization" Telfer asks whether the aims of education can be "summed up" as, or whether _the_ aim of education is, self-realization. (216) She assumes education is justified and asks whether self-realization is justified as well. In Education and Personal Relationships Downie, Loudfoot and Telfer examine several arguments which purport to _show_ education justified. One, the "redescription argument", is as follows. "If we assume that the educated man and the self-realized man are one and the same, then if we assume, as it is natural to do, that self-realization is a state which does not require further justification we have _ipso facto_ shown that educatedness does not require further justification." (56) What is it, then, to be self-realized?

Both Telfer and Downie et al make two preliminary claims. First, 'self' in 'self-realization' does not refer to an agent, and thus self-realization is not realization _by_ the self (of something else). The self is what is realized. Second, 'realization' does not refer to the process of becoming aware, and thus self-realization is not becoming self-aware or acquiring self-knowledge. Realization is becoming real or actual. Self-realization, then, is the "process whereby some aspects of the potential self become actualized or made real." (Telfer, 217) The question, what is it to be self-realized? becomes, for Telfer and for Downie et al, what is it to have actualized "some aspects" of the self?

The authors, though they reach, as one might suppose, similar conclusions, now follow different lines of argument.

First, Downie et al. They say, "presumably a person achieves self-realization when he fulfills his nature as a person, or, in Mill's phrase, the 'distinctive endowment of a human being'." (56) They might have presumed otherwise. 'Self-realization' might refer to the actualization, not of personhood, but, as Telfer suggests, of a person's "individual self". "Traditionally it has been assumed" Downie et al continue, "that basic to the distinctive endowment of a human being is his reason, and we accept the traditional assumption and shall try to explain our version of it." (57) They might have accepted otherwise, say the modern "assumption" that man's distinctive endowment is his capacity for language. "We hold in the first place that reason has a theoretical aspect", and, in the second, that there are "practical aspects of reason" as well. (Ibid) They might hold otherwise, for instance, that theoretical and practical reason are essentially the same.

"If we assume that this characterization of the nature of a person is roughly acceptable we can now raise the question of whether the state of educatedness will constitute the realization or fulfillment of this nature." (59) "Now there is clearly no difficulty at all about saying that educatedness realizes the aspects of the person involving theoretical reason." (61) And practical reason? "It must by now be clear that we do not accept that on our account of the educated man the whole nature of a person can be realized through education. We are adopting a narrow view of what it is to be educated, and therefore if it emerges, as it will. that education cannot bring about the realization of all aspects of the self our withers remain unwrung, for on our view education is not of the whole man." (68)

They might have adopted otherwise. Some theorists (Rousseau for example--see Chapter 4) argue that being educated involves being able to choose and to act for oneself <u>generally</u>. Downie et al, on the other hand, say that "outside the sphere of intellectual activity the educated man is logically no more likely than any other to stick to his guns, form his own plans and so forth." (69) And some theorists (Dewey for example) argue that being morally educ-

ated involves choosing and acting morally. But, Downie et al say that "whereas the educated man is necessarily well-eqipped to know what he ought to do, he is no better able to do it than the less well-educated." (Ibid) How, then, do they justify their view?

"By 'education' we mean 'the cultivation of the mind, or theoretical reason, and the transmission of culture'." "This narrow, descriptive account...will rule out as part of education various activities which go on in schools, so a question might be raised as to the justification of our stipulation. The justification is that a number of activities have in common that they exercise...theoretical reason and it is convenient to use the term 'education' as a way of referring to (them). The term...is, of course, used in other ways, but our view is that clarity is a casualty of the attempt to broaden the concept of education." The "alternative for school policy and individual choice can be considered more clearly if, for example, we contrast the benefits to society of spending money on education with those of spending it on outdoor adventure courses, rather than say that (the latter) are 'part of education'." (5) A "narrow" definition is justified, they say, on the ground of "clarity". They do not say, nor is it obvious, why this should be the case. A broad definition is not necessarily, nor is its being broad a reason for thinking it vague. More important, though clarity (or simplicity) is one, it is not the only criterion of good "definition". Some theorists would argue that Downie et al have given a definition which, though perhaps clear, is also partial. What Downie et al take to be an issue of "social policy and irdividual choice" other theorists would take to be an educational issue.

This might be little more than a verbal quibble. Here, however, it is much more. Rather than justify their view, Downie et al simply assume it is justified. No mention is made of those theorists with whom they are in disagreement, nor are their arguments taken up and rebuted. And what "justification" is offered is in fact only a reason for "stipulation". This is unfortunate. The view Downie et al arrive at through presumption, acceptance, holding, adoption and assumption, rather than through argu-

ment, is one which is both important and at least potentially justifiable. Even if, as will be shown below, the actualization of what might be called the "theoretical self" has no important connection with self-realization, the notion that the former, to the exclusion of the "practical self", constitutes the whole of education is, in fact, one of the recurring themes in the history of educational thought, a view held with more reason than Downie et al seem willing to allow.

What is it to actualize the self? Both Downie et al and Telfer assume that the problem is solved in discovering that aspect of the self which is actualized. But, whereas Downie et al assume this to be an individual's personhood, Telfer considers, rather than assumes, several possibilities. The criterion with reference to which candidates are accepted and rejected is that of prescribability. Not all aspects of the self will do, Telfer says, for then it would be "vacuous" to say that people "ought to realize themselves", that is, one would then be prescribing what people cannot do. Telfer considers, either singly or in combination, prescribing actualization of the "higher", "balanced", "individual" and "autonomous" selves. The argument is cursory and unsystematic, but, in rejecting at least some candidates two reasons (if not two justifications) are given.

First, in one sense of "higher", and on a substantive rendering of "balanced", two possibilities are rejected because, it is said, not everyone can actualize the aspect of self in question. (219-20, 221-22) Telfer does not say why this is a reason. She might have in mind, however, the view that prescription must be universalizable. Assuming this to be the case, she would have to argue that the population <u>in which</u> actualization is possible, though included in, is not exhaustive of, the population <u>for which</u> the prescription is universal. Thus, for example, if education can be prescribed for all men, and if all men cannot actualize their "higher" or "balanced" selves, then education cannot be the same as the actualization of these aspects of the self.

Second, in one sense of "independent"--"idiosyncra-

tic" rather than "autonomous"--the actualization of a person's independent self, it is said, might be only a "trivial" achievement. (221) The view rejected is that "everyone starts with his own unique combination of potentialities--his own personality--and what is most important is that he should foster this uniqueness by concentrating on what is 'given' in this way." (Ibid) Perhaps, though, the "idiosyncratic self" shares something of the importance psychologists claim for 'personal identity'. And, if this is the case, perhaps the possibility of triviality is only that, granted the importance of identity, the individual involved might himself be trivial. Would Telfer prescribe that all men should become important? A person can never become more than he has the potential to become. He can only become less. To develop only those potentialities unique to the individual concerned would be, one might say, "idiosyncratic". But, to develop all the potentialities a person has, his "unique combination", would be, if it were possible--and, as Scheffler says, it is not--it is to do no less than can be done.

There is one view Telfer does not reject, at least not completely. Though necessary, it is not, she says, sufficient for education. "I have suggested that the achievement of...intellectual self-realization--which is a narrow form of the realization of the higher self--is a necessary condition of being educated." "What is missing is quite simply the requirement that the educated person must have a certain range of knowledge." (Ibid) In support of this conclusion Telfer "appeal(s)...to what seems to me a rough concensus on what kind of person we would call educated" (226), an appeal which, she notes, is also made by Peters. This characteristically participant argument will be discussed fully in Chapter 4. Two difficulties, however, should be noted here. First, not everyone would agree with Telfer's "rough concensus". In response to their criticisms Telfer would seem to be in a position where she can only repeat herself: "Well, we call such and such a person educated!" Second, assuming the argument to be valid, it is open to criticism only on the ground that it misrepresents the sort of person "we" would call educated. But,

who are "we"? Telfer does not say. Not knowing how he might show her wrong, the potential critic cannot know whether she is right.

Both Downie et al and Telfer assume that the problem, what is it to actualize the self? is to be interpreted, what aspect of the self is actualized? Downie et al discuss the actualization of personhood, Telfer those of the higher, balanced, independent and autonomous selves. Downie et al conclude that education is justified because being educated is having actualized what we called the "theoretical self", the latter being, we are to assume, itself justified. Telfer concludes that education, at least in part, is justified. Becoming educated necessarily involves, but is not exhausted by, the actualization of the "intellectual self", the latter being, again we are to assume, itself justified. Downie et al deny, and Telfer--for whom the intellectual and theoretical selves are much the same--hesitates to accept, that the notion of education is such that becoming educated might also involve, to use their language, the actualization of the "practical self".

Self-realization is here used to help analyse, and thus to help intrinsically justify education. If, however, one assumes, as Downie et al and Telfer do, that self-realization is the actualization of some aspect of the self, analysis is impossible. This is the case because one then allows the possibility of interpreting the problem as, what is it to actualize the educated self? Rather than help to solve, one merely re-states the problem. And, if one considers, as Downie et al and Telfer do, any other aspect, the problem again remains unsolved. It can always be asked what connection, if any, exists between education and the actualization of that aspect. In neither case has the notion of self-realization done any analytical work at all.

Nonetheless, even if self-realization has not helped them get there, Downie et al and Telfer are clearly on to something important. The theory/practice distinction is not, as it were, a particularly "happy" one. Some people "do theory", that is, they theorize, others, doing non-theoretical work, are, nonetheless, only able to do it because they have an understanding of theory. Something should be said,

however, about the relevance of the distinction to thought about education. The position Downie et al and Telfer adopt cannot be dismissed simply by pointing out that very few people ever become able to do theoretical work, though it must be said that Telfer, the only one who actually attempts to argue for the position, does not say why the actualization of the "intellectual self" is any more prescribable than those of the "balanced" or, for that matter, the "higher" (of which the intellectual is a part) selves. It is at least arguable that everyone, not just the theorist, can profit from an understanding of theory and, further, that everyone can have at least some, if perhaps only intuitive, understanding of theory. To understand the theory "behind" something's occurring, or one's doing something, in a certain way, is to be in a position to stop its occuring, to do it in a different, perhaps better way. Not to have an understanding of theory is to be, as it were, a slave to one's skills, a victim of chance. The difference is one between, as Oakeshott might say, having or not having a certain kind of "autonomy", or, as I would say, a certain kind of "independence".

So far, however, only the weak aspect of the Downie et al/Telfer thesis has been accounted for. Skills, "practice", give a person a different, but equally valuable sort of autonomy or independence. Being able to do things for himself, he is not dependent on others to have them done for him. Why, then, is education seen to be the actualization only of the theoretical self? In the absence of an argument to the contrary, let it be said that the view is not uninfluenced by the approach from which it derives. Many so-called "life skills" are precisely the sort of thing a child learns without having to be taught. For the participant, then, their acquisition cannot count as part of the child's education. Further, many more of these skills are the sorts of things a child learns at home, and thus has no need to be taught them in school. Would the Downie et al/Telfer thesis seem at all plausible if the parent was accepted as a full participant in the education of his child?

But, what of self-realization? If it is no help to

ask, what aspect of the self is actualized?, what is it to actualize the self--itself? Can any sense be made of the claim that a person has not actualized his self? that a person is not himself? It might be thought that each individual has as it were a "personal destiny", a way of being that is uniquely and appropriately his. But, if it is destiny, what can stop him achieving it? What need is there for an educator? And if he can fail, what sense is to be made, in this context, of "destiny"? The educand is developing. The question arises, as Scheffler says, in what direction is he to develop? If the thought behind self-realization is that the educand is to develop in that direction which is most appropriate, given the sort of person he is, the thought is both blamelessly correct and only part of the story. The educator must take into account other factors as well--for example, the sort of society in which the educand lives--factors which might lead to conflict and thus compromise.

There are, however, individuals about whom it might be said that they have not realized "themselves". Ambitions outstrip achievement--dreamers and deadbeats: wants and desires take second place to the wants and desires of others--the timid and the despairing: minor characters from long forgotten novels--"caricatures", "stereotypes", people who are "two-dimensional", "flat". Each of these qualities, it must be admitted, might be evidence of educational failure. But, until it is known: what dreams are unrealized: what wants and what desires remain unsatisfied: and until it is known what sort of person would be three-dimensional, rounded--it cannot be known whether or not the person in question is educated. Self-realization, used to help analyse education, is a tool too blunt to serve its purpose.It cannot help one to better understand the content of education. There is thus no obvious contradiction in saying of a person, he is both fully-realized and quite uneducated, a person who, one might say, has realized his "uneducated self", has fully developed in the direction of "vast" ignorance, "limitless" mis-understanding, woeful ineptitude, a person who, nonetheless, has achieved all his ambitions, wants and desires, is three-dimensional, rounded.

In "Education: The Engagement and its Frustration", Oakeshott says that "education in its most general significance may be recognized as a specific transaction between the generations of human beings in which new-comers to the scene are initiated into the world they are to inhabit." (43) "If a human life...were a process in which an organism reacted to its circumstances in terms of a genetic equipment, there would be no room for a transaction between the generations designed expressly to initiate the new-comer into what was going on and thus enable him to participate in it. But such is not the case." (45) "Thus, for example, when in a late medieval formulation of the duties of human beings there appears the precept that parents should educate their children, education was being recognized as a moral transaction, something that may (but ought not to) be neglected, and distinguished from the unavoidable natural processes in which all living things grow up..." (43) For Oakeshott, then, education "in its most general significance" is to be understood as follows. It is, first, something done, unlike a process which simply occurs. Second, it involves initiating "new-comers" into "the world they are to inhabit". And third, its purpose is to enable new-comers to "participate" in that world.

Education "in its most general significance", however, is to be distinguished from education "properly speaking". "Education, properly speaking, begins when...there supervenes the deliberate initiation of a new-comer into a <u>human</u> inheritance of sentiments, beliefs, imaginings, understandings and activities." (48) (emphasis mine) And education properly speaking is to be contrasted with "socialization", that is, with "the apprenticeship of the new-comer to adult life (which is) an initiation, not into the <u>grandeurs</u> of human understanding, but into the skills, activities and enterprises which constitute the <u>local</u> world into which he is...actually born." (second emphasis mine) "This I will call the substitution of 'socialization' for education." (59) Why? "Socialization" is to be "recognized as a frustration of the educational engagement...because it attributes to the teacher and learner which comprise this

apprenticeship an extrinsic 'end' or 'purpose'; namely, the integration of the new-comer into a current 'society' recognized as the manifold skills, activities, enterprises, understandings, sentiments and beliefs required to keep it going." (59) Education "properly speaking", on the other hand, "cannot be said to have any extrinsic 'end' or 'purpose'. For the teacher it is part of his engagement of being human; for the learner it is the engagement of becoming human." (51) (It might be imagined that Oakeshott, the participant, is arguing with Dewey, the spectator, Oakeshott claiming that Dewey fails to distinguish "education properly speaking" from "socialization".)

Oakeshott says that "socialization", but not "education properly speaking", has an "extrinsic 'end' or 'purpose'." It is to "keep...going" the "current 'society'". But, he then seems to contradict himself. He says that he wants to "display education (i.e., education proper) as a human engagement of a certain kind and as a transaction upon which a recognizably human life <u>depends for its continuance</u>." (43) (emphasis mine) If both have extrinsic ends, the fact that socialization has them cannot be a reason for preferring "education". Oakeshott might say that human continuity is an effect, not the end, of "education". But, the advocate of socialization might respond, social continuity is, likewise, only an effect, the aim being to initiate the new-comer into his society. More important, though socialization is said to have an extrinsic end or purpose, Oakeshott does not say to what it is extrinsic. Extrinsic to education? If this is the case, Oakeshott has succeeded in saying, "education" is to be preferred to "socialization" because the latter is extrinsic to, other than, not education. Rather than argue for he would merely have restated his claim.

Oakeshott does not deny that without "local worlds" there can be no "human world". Nor does he deny that the new-comer only enters the latter by entering one of the former, the route to his "human inheritance" running in and through one of its local variants. Perhaps Oakeshott is arguing that education includes, but extends beyond, "socialization", that only socialization plus something

more is "education proper", that socialization is poor, not something other than education. In what respects, then, does "socialization" fall short of "education proper"?

A person can come to participate in his local world without anyone's intending that he should. But, "education, properly speaking, begins when...there supervenes deliberate initiation" (48). "Socialization" can occur with or without schools, and the learning involved need not result from any intention to learn. But, "education, properly speaking, begins when...the transaction (between the generations) becomes 'schooling', and when learning becomes learning by study, and not by chance, in conditions of direction and restraint. It begins with the appearance of a teacher with something to impart which is not immediately connected with the current wants or 'interests' of the learner." (Ibid) Whereas Dewey thinks of schooling as only a possible aspect of education, Oakeshott identifies it with "education proper". Nonetheless, their understanding of 'school' is remarkably similar. "The idea 'School'", Oakeshott says, "is that of a place apart where a prepared new-comer may encounter (an "historic inheritance of human understandings and imaginings") unqualified by the particularities, the neglects, the abridgements and the corruptions it suffers in current use..." "To corrupt 'School' by depriving it of its character as a serious engagement to learn by study, and to abolish it either by assimilation to the activities, 'interests', particularities and abridgments of a local world, or by substituting in its place a factory for turning out zombies, are...two sides of the current project to destroy education." (58)

Rather tired, participant rhetoric, at least here, stands in place of justification. How <u>does</u> Oakeshott justify his preference for education proper over socialization? He says that "an educational engagement is at once a discipline and a release; and it is the one in virtue of being the other. It is a difficult engagement of learning by study in a continuous and exacting redirection of attention and refinement of understanding which calls for humility, patience and courage. And its reward is an emancipation from the mere 'fact of living', from the immed-

iate contingencies of place and time of birth, from the tyranny of the moment and from the servitude of a merely current condition; it is the reward of a human identity and of a character capable in some measure of the moral and intellectual adventure which constitutes a specifically human life." (74) Through the now empty participant rhetoric the following justification flies into view. The socialized, according to Oakeshott, are determined by the here and now, the "merely current condition". The educated, on the other hand, are self-determining, are capable of the "moral and intellectual adventure which constitutes a specifically human life." Elsewhere, Oakeshott says that the educated are "autonomous" (51). A pre-condition of autonomy from the here and now is understanding of possible alternatives. Initiation into the local world is thus to be extended to include initiation into the human world generally, learning by chance--necessarily, only of the local world--supplemented by learning through study, that is, by 'schooling'.

In justifying "education proper", Oakeshott first draws a distinction between it and what he calls "socialization". He then argues that the former, but not the latter, is justified because its purpose is, as he says, "emancipation", something which, we are to assume, is justified. Education is seen as a kind of liberation, either a preparation for autonomy, or the making of an autonomous person. It has been already argued (in Chapter 1) that education is not the making of any one kind of person. Is it then preparation for autonomy? What is autonomy? In On Liberty Mill speaks of "thenotion of autonomy, or self-direction, according to which an individual's thought and action is his own, and not determined by agencies or causes outside his control." Mill gives both an equivalent--self-direction --and a definition of 'autonomy'. The latter is ambiguous. It contains two propositions--thought and action are his own, not determined by agencies or causes outside his control--which, though admittedly in conjunction, can be related in either one of two ways.

The relationship might be either a simple conjuction (X and Y), or it might be an explanatory conjunction

(X, that is, Y). If it is a simple conjunction then Mill is asserting both, not determined by agencies or causes outside his control and, thought and action are his own. But, on this interpretation autonomy is the same as independence. Not to be determined by agencies and causes outside one's control, as will be seen in Chapter 5, is to be independent, and one's thought and action being one's own is vacuous. If, on the other hand, it is an explanatory conjunction, as indeed seems more plausible, then Mill is asserting, thought and action are his own, that is, determined by agencies and causes within his control. On this second interpretation, however, autonomy is the same as freedom. (See Chapter 5.) There remain two further possibilities. First, autonomy might be explicated in terms of self-direction or, second, there might be a non-vacuous, and thus non-conflating sense in which a person's thought and action can be "his own".

Thought and action being his own cannot simply be a matter of whose they are. They are (analytically) his, it being he and no other who does his own acting and thinking. It might, however, be a question of the relationship between thought and action and the person whose thought and action they are. If there is "agreement" or "fit", if, that is, the thought and action accurately reflect the sort of person he is, then, and only then, can they be said to be "his own". The question is thus one of authenticity. The individual is the unique product of a unique history, and in his thought and action this is either reflected or not. But, because authenticity is not directly concerned with the sort of person one is, but only with the relationship between who one is and how one thinks and acts, it is always possible for the educated to be inauthentic, and the uneducated authentic. The well educated Soviet dissident might be just that person who, amongst other talents, has a trained capacity for perhaps near-constant inauthenticity. And perhaps the most authentic individuals of all, that is, very young children, are also the least well educated. If, for an adult, authenticity is an achievement, it is only because in growing up he was also able to achieve inauthenticity. Authenticity, however, is clearly not the same as autonomy.

'Autonomy', I believe, originally referred to the self-government of Greek city-states. Might it be, more generally, that autonomy is, as the Concise Oxford say it is, self-direction? Self-government, to return for the moment to the original, is of course not necessarily wise government. It is an open question whether, for example, the newly-autonomous nations are better governed now than they were as European colonies. But, in deciding <u>who</u> is to do something, though it is a relevant consideration, it is not always over-riding to ask, <u>what</u> would be done? It might be rational to sacrifice at least some wisdom in government if as a result government comes into the hands of those who are subject to its authority. Self-government, or political autonomy, is essentially an inter-personal notion. Self-direction, on the other hand, is essentially personal. Sometimes, however, when an individual is said to be "autonomous" the analogy with political autonomy proves irresistable. Aspects of the individual are assigned the roles of governor and governed. Reason, for example, governs what are no doubt "masses" of passions. What might have been thought "missing" in political autonomy, namely, wise, good or rational government, is thus "found" in personal autonomy. The autonomous person is the person "ruled by reason". Dearden, for example, in "Autonomy as an Educational Ideal", says that "autonomy is in one way or another an activity of man as a rational animal", and goes on to criticize "contemporary versions of autonomy" which "break this connection" (4). But, what <u>is</u> the connection? There are two significant possibilities. First, 'autonomous' might refer to a certain sort of person, a rational person, or, second, it might refer, as it does in political autonomy, to the sort of relationship a person has with other persons, in which case the connection with rationality is indirect. And, if education is not the making of a certain sort of person, the place of rationality in education needs further justification. In preparing a colony for political autonomy one of the main concerns would be to develop wise or rational governors. Perhaps, then, it is in <u>preparing</u> persons for self-direction, or personal autonomy, that makes rationality educationally relevant.

Personal, like political autonomy is self- as opposed to other-direction. The autonomy of former colonies is comparable with the child's growing autonomy from parents and teachers. Autonomy is closely related, but not the same as independence. They are similar in that both involve doing for oneself what might otherwise be done by others. They are, however, dissimilar in that independence, unlike autonomy, also involves not needing to be done by anyone, including oneself, what might otherwise be done by others. A nation becomes autonomous when it becomes self-governing, but, on the analogy with the individual, it becomes independent either when it can govern itself or when it is not in need of governing at all. Many former colonies have acquired both autonomous government and an increased dependence on government. Whereas, before, what little government there was, and was needed, was in the hands of others, now, though self-governed, the nations have so altered (perhaps for the better, perhaps not) as to be much more dependent on government.

The reason for preferring independence to autonomy in giving a general explanation of education is that the educand inevitably will be faced with a situation in which, either because he has not the talents required, or because his behavior is socially restricted, he will not be able to direct himself in all things. But, if the educand is such, or his society is such, that in some respects he cannot be autonomous, it is not here that the educator finds the limits of his responsibility. It is true that part of what is learned in schools, for example, consists in the sorts of skills, attitudes and understanding which, when acquired, equip the student for the sort of learning he will have to do when, having left school, he is to direct his own affairs. But, a second part of what is learned in schools consists in those things few students could or would want to learn on their own, but which, nonetheless, are essential if the student is to cope on his own and which, once learned, are unlikely to be forgotten. Learning to read and to write would only be the most obvious examples. And what applies to other- as opposed to self-directed learning also applies to other aspects of life. If one becomes ill or

suffers injury, for example, one relies either on oneself or on others for help. A part, but only a part, of the health educator's responsibility is to teach one what to do when these happen. A second, and perhaps more important part, however, would be to teach one how to live such that the chances of suffering illness and injury are minimized. One is then no longer dependent on anyone, including oneself, for help when they occur. An individual's progress might be likened to his walking a road. At first he walks only with the help of others. He becomes autonomous when he can walk the road alone. He becomes independent either when walking alone or when, with the help of others, he has arrived.

Chapter 4 Knowledge, Understanding, Rationality

If I understand him correctly Peters has given one and is, and has been for some years, developing a second analysis of the concept of education. The first, "begun" in Authority, Responsibility and Education (1959), and "completed" in "The Justification of Education" (1973), is the main subject of this chapter. The second, of which for example "Democratic Values and Educational Aims" (1979) is a part, is I think as yet incomplete and is, in any case, not sufficiently well understood to be dealt with here. I will thus in large part be defending a thesis the author himself no longer finds convincing.

In Ethics and Education Peters concludes a preliminary analysis by giving three criteria which he says are "implicit in central cases of 'education'" (45). These are: "(i) that 'education' implies the transmission of what is worth-while to those who become committed to it; (ii) that 'education' must involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective, which are not inert; (iii) that 'education' at least rules out some procedures of transmission, on the grounds that they lack wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner." (Ibid) The analysis which is given in support of these conclusions makes reference to how "we" use the terms 'education' and its cognates.

(i) "'Education'...implies that something worth while is being or has been intentionally transmitted...It would be a logical contradiction to say that a man had been educated but that he had in no way changed for the better... This is a purely conceptual point" (25), that is, a point concerning "our" concept of education. And "commitment"? The commitment criterion is the same as the second of the two "non-inertness" criteria. See (ii) below.

(ii) "We do not call a person 'educated' who has simply mastered a skill...He must also have some body of knowledge and some kind of conceptual scheme to raise this above the level of disjointed facts. This implies the understanding of principles for the organization of facts."

Further, "we would not call a man who was merely well informed an educated man. He must also have some understanding of the 'reason why' of things." But, even so, "what... is lacking which might make us withhold the description of being 'educated' from such a man? It is surely a lack of what might be called 'cognitive perspective'." There is a "conceptual connection between 'education' and seeing what is being done in a perspective that is not too limited." (32) Finally, the "kind of knowledge which an educated man must have...cannot be inert in two senses. Firstly, it must characterize his way of looking at things rather than be hived off...'Education' implies that a man's outlook is transformed by what he knows." Secondly, "it must involve the kind of commitment that comes from being on the inside of a form of thought and awareness...All forms of thought and awareness have their own internal standards of appraisal. To be on the inside of them is both to understand and to care." (31)

(iii) Though "a child might be conditioned...or induced to do something by hypnotic suggestion...we would not describe this as 'education' if he was not conscious of something to be learnt or understood. The central uses of 'education' are tasks in which the individual who is being educated is being led or induced to come up to some standard, to achieve something. This must be presented to him as something which he has to grasp." (41)

On the basis of an analysis of how "we" use the terms 'education' and its cognates, Peters gives criteria for what he calls "central cases of education". "Central" to "our" concept of education are: worthwhileness: non-inert knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective: wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner. The implications are that there are other, "peripheral" elements in our concept, and other concepts entirely. Peters does not say, at least not in Ethics and Education, what it is for a "case" of education to be "towards the centre". Nor does he say to whom "we" is intended to refer. First, who are "we"?

The first two chapters of Ethics and Education--"Criteria of Education" and "Education as Initiation"--are

developed from the earlier work, "Education as Initiation" in Authority, Responsibility and Education. Education, Peters says in the latter, has been taken to be "a commodity in which it is profitable to invest": school has been said to have "a role of acting as a socialization agency in the community" (81): and of teachers it has been proposed that "their main concern should be for the mental health of children." (82) But, Peters says, "these economic and sociological descriptions of education...are made from the point of view of a spectator pointing to the 'function' or effects of education in a social or economic system. They are not descriptions of it from the point of view of someone engaged in the enterprise." (83) (emphases mine) "Education is different from social work, psychiatry, and real estate. Everything is what it is and not some other thing." (82) The implication is that Peters intends his description to be made from the point of view of "someone engaged in the enterprise", that is, from the point of view of a participant.

In a later work ("Aims of Education--A Conceptual Inquiry") Peters distinguishes two uses of the term 'education', one of which implies worthwhileness, and a "derivative" use with respect to which the worthwhileness criterion does not apply. He says, "anthropologists can talk of the moral system of a tribe; so also can we talk as sociologists or economists of the educational system of a community. In employing the concept in this derivative sense, we do not think that what is going on is worth while, but members of the society, whose system it is, must think it is worth while." (16) Peters's claim concerning the worthwhileness of education is, in the same article, taken up and criticized by Dray. Dray says that "at one point (Peters) endeavours to display this aspect by claiming that it would be logically contradictory for a father to say, 'My son has been educated but nothing desirable has happened to him'. I find this difficult to accept." It does not "seem to violate the logic of the concept to imagine the same judgment being expressed by an anti-intellectual religious fundamentalist, who has no difficulty recognizing the marks of the educated man in his university-trained son,

but thinks them in themselves all to the bad." (36) In his "Reply" Peters merely points to the distinction mentioned above. He says that the father is "using 'education' in an external, descriptive sort of way" (40-1), that is, as a sociologist, economist or, generally, as a "spectator" might use it. The implication is that Dray's criticism is ill-founded because it misses the point. It assumes, incorrectly, that Peters's analysis is intended to cover those aspects of the concept which are revealed in "external, descriptive" uses of 'education'.

In "Further Thoughts on the Concept of Education", the final part of "Aims in Education", Peters reconsiders the "serious objection" to the "desirability condition" that "many regard being educated as a bad state to be in". "Their objection is not to a particular system of education, but to any sort of education. They appreciate that 'education' has something to do with the transmission of knowledge and understanding...And this is why they are against it; for they think of it either as useless or as corrupting." (50) Peters says that "it could be argued, with some cogency, that people who think that being educated is a bad state to be in lack our concept of being educated... They have a concept of education; for they use the term to refer to what goes on in schools and universities. But they have not our concept. The only trouble about this way of dealing with the objection is that people who lack our concept of education are, at the moment, rather numerous. 'We', in this context, are in the main educated people and those who are professionally concerned with education." "So it is doubtful whether the desirability condition of 'education' is a logically necessary condition of the term that is in current use." (51)

The question of whose concept of education the philosopher is to analyse is taken up below. The point to be made here is that the concept for which, in "Criteria of Education", Peters claims worthwhileness, non-inert knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective, and wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner all to be criteria, is that concept held by "educated people and those who are professionally concerned with education",

that is, by those who are or have been participants in education.

What is it for a "case" of education to be "towards the centre"? Peters's description of the participant's concept is not intended to be arbitrary: it is at least a philosophical description. Nor is it intended to be complete: there are other, "peripheral" elements he does not mention. Further, Peters does not employ the triangle metaphor: knowledge, etc. are not said to be "basic" to the concept: the intention then is not to give a description which, straightforwardly elaborated, results in a complete description. The metaphor used is that of the circle. The implication is that those elements of the concept implied in some but not in all uses of 'education' are "peripheral", whereas those elements implied in all participant uses are "central". The latter are central because, unlike peripheral elements, if they are not implied 'education' is being used to refer to something other than education. From the point of view of the participant, then, knowledge, etc., are logically necessary conditions of education.

This interpretation is implied by two, but only two, of the arguments Peters uses to support his criteria. With respect to the worthwhileness criterion he says that "it would be a logical contradiction to say that a man had been educated but that he had in no way changed for the better". With respect to the wittingness, voluntariness criterion he says that "a child might be conditioned...or induced to do something by hypnotic suggestion...(but) we would not describe this as 'education' if he was not conscious of something to be learnt or understood." (emphasis mine) Would not, or could not? Conditioning might involve a kind of learning, that is, learning without necessarily coming to understand. (See Chapter 6.) Being "induced to do something by hypnotic suggestion", however, does not involve learning. Though the point is somewhat obscured in "Criteria of Education", it is I think being made. The point, made clearly in "Democratic Values and Educational Aims", is that though "the concept of education may be contestable... it is not completely so. We cannot call anything we like education...At least it denotes some kind of learning..."

(463) And it is, I think, the logical necessity of learning that the wittingness, voluntariness criterion is intended to express. (See below, pp. 84-5.)

Peters, in the above, is explicitly concerned with the distinction between education and non-education. In arguing for the various knowledge criteria, however, he uses a distinction between sufficient and insufficient education. He says: "we do not call a person 'educated' who has simply mastered a skill...He must also have some body of knowledge...": "we would not call a man who was merely well-informed an educated man. He must also have some understanding...": "what is lacking which might make us withhold the description of being 'educated'...is surely...what might be called 'cognitive perspective'". To argue that knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective are "central", in the sense that any enterprise which ignors them cannot be education, Peters would have had to continue employing the education/non-education distinction. He would have had to contrast knowledge with false and unevidenced belief, not, as he does, with practical knowledge: understanding with either a lack of it or with mis-understanding, not with "mere information": cognitive perspective with, for example, the perspective of an infant, not that of a "narrow specialist". Had he employed the education/non-education distinction Peters would have been in a position to say (what I think he would want to say): for instance, It would be a logical contradiction to say that a person is educated but that he knows nothing, understands even less, and has a perspective on things which allows room for little more than the protuberance positioned in front of him. Finally, with respect to the two non-inertness criteria, Peters uses the term "must": the "kind of knowledge which an educated man must have must also satisfy further requirement...It cannot be inert in two senses..."

In his "Further Thoughts", in "Aims of Education", Peters says that he will be "probing to see whether any conditions that even begin to look like logically necessary conditions have been provided (by the author) for the use of the term 'education'." (50) Later, under the heading "Objections to knowledge conditions", he says, "we might

talk of Spartan education, or of education in some even more primitive tribe, when we know that they have nothing to pass on except simple skills and folk-lore...As there are a lot of people who talk in a quite unabashed way about Spartan education, it is difficult to maintain that the knowledge conditions are logically necessary conditions of the term in general use." (52) "It looks, therefore, as if the concept of 'education' is a very fluid one", one which includes an "older and undifferentiated concept which refers just to any process of bringing up or rearing in which the connection...with knowledge is purely contingent." (55) The implication is that in the earlier "Criteria of Education" Peters intended the knowledge criteria to be logically necessary conditions for the participant's use of 'education'.

The connection between education and knowledge will be discussed below. It should be noted here, however, that Peters is wrong in thinking that "talk of...education in some...primitive tribe" implies that knowledge is not a necessary condition of 'education'. There is a difference between transmitting "simple skills", that is, practical knowledge, and transmitting "folk-lore", that is, what is (albeit incorrectly) <u>assumed</u> to be true, and transmitting ways of doing things known not to work, and beliefs known to be false. The former, to use Peters's own argument, might be insufficient or even bad education, but it is education nonetheless. To seriously doubt the logical necessity of the knowledge conditions it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that one would have to doubt whether the <u>following</u> is a contradiction: The tribe succeeded in educating their young, but as a result not one of them escaped mental incapacitation. This is not the doubt that occurs to Peters.

Peters gives three, or rather three groups of criteria for education. Taken together, how good an understanding do they represent? First, the worthwhileness criterion. Peters says that one of the criteria "implicit in central cases of 'education'" is the "transmission of what is worthwhile". That is, from the point of view of "educated people

and those who are professionally concerned with education", worthwhileness is a logically necessary condition for the use of the term 'education'. Meaning and necessity are contextually-bound. A speaker's meaning is related to his intention, and to his belief that the hearer will recognize that intention. And a speaker uses the term "necessarily" when he thinks that, because of his other beliefs, the hearer, to be consistent, must accept what he (the speaker) is saying. "Education is worthwhile" might be, as Peters implies, analytically true. Depending on the context in which it is used, however, it might also be: synthetically true, as, for example, when understood as a qualification for the "Good Life": synthetically false--when, say, identified with schooling and "thus" thought to do more harm than good: analytically false, as, for example, in Dray's illustration where education is believed to be incompatable with faith, and thus intrinsically evil.

"Education is worthwhile" is, however, at least in some contexts, analytically true. The context required is one in which people share a belief, and believe they share a belief, in the worthwhileness of education. The first condition might be met in any context. But the second, apart from personal knowledge, is likely to be met only amongst "educated people and those professionally concerned with education" and, of these, especially the latter. Educators, at least in a minimal sense, have 'committed' themselves to the worth of education. Evidence of their commitment comes in public, not to say, communal activity, and thus a context exists in which both conditions are met. A particular educator might not believe that education is worthwhile. But he knows that, apart from personal knowledge, other educators will assume he does. Even he will be able to make use of the linguistic convention amongst educators which links 'worth' and 'education' analytically.

Conceptual analysis only clarifies belief. It cannot itself determine whether belief is true. Educators on the whole believe education to be worthwhile. Others do not. The philosopher, in trying to understand something, must begin somewhere. If he begins with someone else's understanding, or concept, his beginning is only as good as the

understanding of the person he selects. The philosopher of history makes a poor start if he begins with the views of those who have no knowledge of or interest in the past. The aesthetician makes an especially poor start if he begins with the views of those for whom, say, literature is a "closed book", disastrous if they themselves closed the book. Peters begins his enquiry into education by noting that many theorists seem unable to distinguish education from "social work, psychiatry and real estate". He does not stop to analyse <u>their</u> concept of education. Instead, he analyses the concept held by educators, that is, by those who are interested in, committed to and who have experience of education.

The wide-spread institutionalization of education is, as was noted in Chapter 2, only a relatively recent phenomenon. It is only recently that a distinct participant's concept of education has emerged, the institutions providing the sort of context in which a shared understanding can develop. A part of that understanding is the view that education, because of what it is, is worthwhile. In "Aims of Education" Peters says that "the concept of 'education' is a very fluid one. At one end of the continuum is the older undifferentiated concept...in which the connection...with what is desirable...is purely contingent...The more recent and more specific concept...(involves) the development of states of a person that...<u>are</u> desirable." (55) (emphasis mine) And there seems little question that Peters is correct. To begin, as Peters does, with an analysis of the "more recent and more specific concept" is just to begin. It is, nonetheless, without doubt to begin well.

Whether the participant is correct in thinking that education is intrinsically worthwhile depends of course on what he takes education to be, and whether the <u>latter</u> is intrinsically worthwhile. Thus, second, the knowledge conditions.

Peters says that, for the educator, "'education' <u>must</u> involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective, which are not inert." Why? Why is it that education <u>cannot</u> involve false beliefs, mis-understand-

ings, narrow perspective, all of which are inert? It might be argued that only the former are worthwhile, and, as Peters says, "'education' implies the transmission of what is worthwhile". It will be recalled, however, that Peters's earlier emphasis on the distinctiveness of education--its being other than social work, psychiatry and real estate--was made in terms of its descriptive, not its evaluative features. Peters was not implying that social work, psychiatry and real estate are not worthwhile. Further, if it is assumed that worthwhileness is the more fundamental condition it cannot be argued that education is worthwhile because it involves knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective. But, as will be seen below, this is just what Peters does. And finally, so far there is warrant for claiming that education is worthwhile only from the point of view of the educator. The claim is open to sceptical, even cynical interpretation.

The educational situation, as Peters describes it, involves: a 'transmitter' (the educator): a 'receiver' (the educand): a 'message' (non-inert knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective). What the educand is to receive will in part depend both on what he already has and on what he is likely to get either on his own or from persons other than the educator. The educator, then, supplements or corrects what the educand already has or is likely to get elsewhere. In what sort of state does Peters suppose the educand to be prior to his encounter with the educator? He is without, and otherwise is unlikely to acquire: skill, or at least sufficient skill--or practical knowledge: true, or at least well-supported true belief--or propositional knowledge: understanding, that is, he lacks understanding or is confused, mystified, mis-understands: cognitive perspective, that is, what he understands is understood in only a limited number of ways: and, finally, even if he has knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective, they are not, at least in some ways, evidenced in his thought and action, that is, they are inert.

What sort of state is this to be in? Unskilled, the educand cannot do--at least not well--what he, what others want him to do, what he should do. Ignorant, he does not

know what to do or, if he does, cannot do it. Believing what is false, he thinks he is, but is not, acting in this world. He does what he cannot do, limits himself to what he cannot do. Believing what he cannot support, he is not in a position to alter his beliefs in the light of contrary evidence. Inevitably, as the world changes his beliefs become outmoded. Not understanding how things are, and thus how they might be, both action and inaction are inappropriate, perhaps tragic. Without cognitive perspective, he acts on an insufficient basis of belief, doing well a matter more of luck than calculation. And, finally, if what knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective he has is inert, though the educand is able to act correctly, appropriately, effectively, rationally, in fact he does not. He acts as if he were without knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective.

The educand, prior to his encounter with the educator, is assumed to be in a certain state. Given this state, the educator, according to Peters, is to transmit skills the educand otherwise would not acquire, or improve those skills he already has: transmit what knowledge and understanding the educand otherwise is unlikely to come by: correct false and support unevidenced belief: exorcise confusion, mystification, mis-understanding: widen the educand's perspective on things by initiating him into ways of thinking which otherwise he would not acquire, or acquire only imperfectly. The educand, then, to use Sidney Hook's terms, is "powerless", and education is "power".

Peters says that non-inert knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective are, from the point of view of the educator, necessary to education. What does he not say? And why does he not say it? Peters's account of what is transmitted in education is, insofar as we now have it, open to criticism on at least two grounds. It might be criticized, first, for not being comprehensive, for being, as is sometimes said, "narrowly cognitive". And, second, it might be criticized for being incomplete, for not saying, and for not giving a criterion by which it can be decided, what knowledge, etc., is to be transmitted.

Consider the following three cases. First, there are

two adults, one good, the other morally evil. The latter does his evil deeds not because he lacks knowledge and understanding--he is in fact what is sometimes called a "sophisticated egoist"--but because he is a sadist, that is, like the good man he does what he does because it pleases him to do so. Assuming an equality of knowledge, etc., are we to assume that these two are equally well educated? Second, there are two adults, one law-abiding, the other a criminal. The latter, unlike most criminals, has a high level of knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective. He knows the risks he takes, but takes them regardless. Crime is his "way of life", the only way of life in which he can, pace Dewey, fully realize himself. Is he then better educated than his law-abiding, but less knowledgeable friend? Finally, there are two adults, one active in a number of different ways, the other more less chronically inactive. In "Aims of Education", responding to criticism by Woods, Peters says that if a person's "outlook...on life generally was very little influenced by 'the matters he had proper time for in his youth', I would say that he was uneducated. If, however, the precipitates of them were not altogether 'inert', why, in my view, should he not be called educated?" (47) (emphasis mine) In other words, even if a person does very little, if what he does do is characterized or informed by knowledge, etc., then Peters would say the person is educated. But is the knowledgeable layabout as well educated as his far more active and equally knowledgeable neighbour?

Some theorists--including Peters (see, for example, his writings on moral education)--would count what a person does as direct evidence of education or its lack. Typically, if not universally, evil, criminal or just lack of behavior are all thought to be reasons for supposing a person badly educated. And thus, as was seen in Chapter 1, for some theorists education becomes the development of persons who both act and act for example virtuously and within the law. But, deciding to act one way or another can be distinguished from the basis upon which decisions are made. The educator's role, Peters implies, is not to decide for the educand what subsequently he is to do; rather it is to tran-

smit to him the knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective with which the educand can decide for himself. The educand subsequently might turn to evil, crime or to inactivity. That is his responsibility. It is only if he does so because he lacks knowledge, etc. that it becomes the responsibility of the educator as well. Thus, subsequent evil, crime or inactivity, at least in "Criteria of Education", would only count as indirect evidence of a lack of education. In "Criteria of Education", then, there is an implicit respect for freedom of choice. And what is here implicit is, as will be seen below, made explicit in "The Justification of Education".

Suppose, at least for the moment, that respect for freedom of choice is as it were "built into" the concept of education. It might still be the case--as his later writings on moral education would seem to indicate--that Peters's analysis is "narrowly cognitive", the reason being that the notion of decision-making is itself narrowly cognitive. There is a difference between deciding to do something and doing it. A person might decide to do X but, for reasons other than having decided to do so, do Y. He might, for example, lack persistence, emotional strength, courage, all of which, as it happens, are required if he is to carry out his decision to do X. And thus, without intending to do so, the person might find he has succeeded in doing only Y. Supposing Y to be disastrous, some theorists would argue that responsibility for its being done must be shared between the educand and the educator, that, short of determining for him that he is to do X, the educator has a responsibility to help the educand in learning how to act with persistence, strength and courage.

Peters's analysis in "Criteria of Education" might be "narrowly cognitive" in a second respect. Good decision-making does not just depend on knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective. The educator cannot forsee every situation the educand subsequently will find himself in. He cannot transmit to him, then, all the knowledge, etc. he will require to make good decisions. What the educator might do, however, what some theorists argue he should do, is help the educand to develop in such a way that, when

faced with having to make a decision, he at least will possess those qualities which are needed to acquire the necessary knowledge and understanding. Many qualities are needed, or at least are desirable, not all of which Peters might be taken to have included under the category of skills or practical knowledge. Some of these are: curiosity: imagination and sensitivity: a talent for learning from mistakes, the ability to learn from others: belief that not all is vanity, that at least some things "make a difference". Lacking any one of these qualities, the educand's freedom of choice is as it were 'self-limited', a state of affairs for which, it might be argued, the educator must share responsibility.

Peters gives criteria which, he says, are "necessary" to 'education'. The criteria he gives might fulfill this condition without, as is being suggested, constituting a comprehensive account of education. Nor need the account be complete. What knowledge and understanding, cognitive perspective over what range, is to be transmitted? There are distinctions between educationally relevant and irrelevant, and educationally important and unimportant knowledge and understanding. That is, knowledge and understanding of language, science and mathematics can be distinguished from both knowing how many hairs there are on one's head and from the significance of that number for groups, both ancient and modern, for whom such things seem to matter a great deal. Similarly, being able to see things from a religious, sociological or psychological perspective, can be distinguished from seeing things, or at least some things, under the aspect of galactic movements, and from seeing them from the point of view of the man down the road who interprets world events according to moods induced by prompt or tardy delivery of the morning post. In "Criteria of Education" at least Peters does not give criteria by which such distinctions are to be made.

Peters in effect responds to these criticisms in "The Justification of Education", a response considered below. P.S. Wilson, in "Interests and Educational Values", considers the second and third of the three criticisms. He begins

by accepting the distinction between what he calls educational and non-educational learning. It will be recalled that Peters does not argue that the distinction is one between worthwhile and non-worthwhile learning. There is a reason for this, a reason Wilson brings out. He says that "it's no help to say that what distinguishes educational from non-educational learning is that educational learning is valuable. Valuable for what? Educational learning might be valuable for all sorts of non-educational reasons, such as financial ones, as well as for educational ones." (181-82) The argument leads either to absurdity--all valuable learning is educationally valuable learning, or to vacuity--all educationally valuable learning is educationally valuable learning. Even if all educational learning is valuable, not all valuable learning is specifically educationally valuable. It remains an open question, then, what is it for learning specifically to be of <u>educational</u> value.

Wilson thinks that "my knowledge has to be instrumental <u>to</u> <u>something</u> (that is, it has to have <u>some</u> sort of pay off, whether intrinsic or extrinsic to the subject matter which I am learning), or my reasons for valuing it cease to be intelligible..." (189) He contrasts "instrumental" learning with "learning for learning's sake". And, "to say that educational learning is learning for learning's sake is" he claims "no more informative than to say that people are in the market for money." (Ibid) Wilson wants to know "what distinctively <u>educational</u> reason do people learn or get knowledge for?" because he thinks "lack of an answer here reduces...educational pursuits to matters of idle curiosity" (Ibid).

It might be objected, however, that curiosity <u>is</u> an "intelligible" motivation, and that "for the sake of learning itself" <u>is</u> an intelligible reason for learning. The objection, though well-taken, is beside the point. The point Wilson is making, if not the arguments he uses to support it, is that neither curiosity nor for the sake of learning itself is the distinctively <u>educational</u> reason for learning. If Wilson were wrong the implication would be that, because anything can be learned out of mere curiosity or merely for its own sake, all learning must be educationally relevant

and all must be of equal educational importance--at least potentially.

"What distinctively educational reason", then, "do people learn or get knowledge for?" "It seems to me that (the) question (is) to be answered...by picking the distinctive feature common...to knowledge, namely, that the more you have, the more you can therefore get." (190) It will be recalled that Dewey, in anticipating Scheffler's criticism, says that distinctively educational growth is growth which gives the educand an "added capacity of growth". Similarly, Wilson says that "if knowledge is distinctive of education ...to value something educationally is to value knowledge of it because, the more you have of that form of knowledge, the more you can therefore get. To have an educational reason for doing something, therefore, is to want to learn something (that is, to get knowledge of it) because this learning will put you in a position, thereby, to learn more." (Ibid) This, then, is Wilson's criterion for distinguishing educationally relevant and important knowledge. Knowledge is educationally relevant if it gives the educand what might be called an "added capacity" for acquiring more knowledge, and it is the more educationally important the greater the capacity it adds. Further, Wilson's criterion can be used to account for the fact that educators transmit, as well as knowledge, those qualities which are necessary, or at least desirable, if the educand, on his own, is to avail himself of this added capacity.

It will be argued in Chapter 5 that the sort of criterion both Dewey and Wilson employ is of fundamental educational importance, an importance suggested by the phrase, "learning how to learn". The criterion is of fundamental educational importance. It cannot be, however, educationally fundamental. The greater the educand's capacity to learn the better he is educated. But, of two educand's with equal capacity--and who have acquired as well the same sorts of knowledge--the one who has acquired more is better educated than the one who has acquired less. And, acquiring knowledge is not, pace Wilson, always acquiring an added capacity for knowledge. Whether it is would depend on both the sort of knowledge and the sort of

thing it is knowledge of. Knowledge which is little more than information is not the same as knowledge which forms a part of a general explanation. And knowledge of some, more or less arbitrary code, such as highway signs, is not the same as, for example, knowledge of human psychology. Wilson's criterion does not take account of the fact that the person who knows more but does not have a greater capacity might, nonetheless, be the better educated.

Children are taught how to read in part because, being able to read, they can acquire knowledge and understanding. But, being able to read is in itself educationally important. Even if it were known the educand would not use his ability for the specific purpose of acquiring more knowledge he would still be taught how to do it, because being able to read serves many purposes, only one of which is the acquisition of knowledge. Children are taught how to "think scientifically" because, in being able to do so, they can thereby acquire scientific knowledge and understanding. But, they are also taught the knowledge and understanding which is the result of <u>scientists</u> thinking scientifically. Indeed, of the two general purposes science education serves, it is the latter which has been, at least historically, the more important. And if the educand acquired scientific knowledge and understanding, but not the ability to think scientifically, he would still be better educated than he would have been had he acquired nothing at all.

It would be misleading to conclude that "learning how to learn" is only one of many things the educand acquires. It is not, however, as Wilson suggests, the only thing. Emphasis on the "manner" in which the educand comes to think is associated specifically with Dewey and generally with what is called "progressive" education. Emphasis on what he thinks, the "matter" or "content", though associated with no one individual theorist, is linked generally with what is called "traditional" education. "Manner" and "matter" are, of course, inextricably bound, and thus, in a trivial sense, education can be neither progressive nor traditional without at the same time being the other. It can be argued, however, as Wilson does, that the aim of

education involves only the one, the other being a necessary means. And thus, if the educand could learn how to learn, without at the same time learning that something is the case, or if he could learn that without at the same time learning how, then, so far as his education is concerned, so he should do. Some reason has been given for thinking education cannot be equated with either progressive or traditional education. The relationship between the three is explained in Chapter 5.

Peters makes neither mistake. In Ethics and Education he says that "the traditional view of 'education'...emphasized the matter and cognitive perspective of 'education' rather than its manner; the child-centred view drew attention to questions concerned with its manner and rather evaded the question of its matter; views which build up an account of 'education' by extrapolating what is involved in acquiring skills ignore its cognitive perspective. All such views are inadequate in the way in which caricatures are; they distort the features of the concept in a particular direction." (46) "Manner" is here used with a different referrent--manner in educating, not the educand's manner of thinking. But, the educator, in emphasizing the first sort of manner, must also be emphasizing the manner in which the educand comes to think. The educational situation involves the educator and the educand working together. The progressive, or "child-centred", emphasis is on how both do what they do. The progressive (and the traditionalist as well) has a criterion by which educationally relevant and important knowledge can be distinguished. Peters is correct in thinking that neither possesses the whole truth. He has not, however, at least as yet, told us what that truth is.

By way of summing up his preliminary discussion of the concept of education Peters gives three "Criteria of Education". The third, the "process" criterion is that "'education' at least rules out some procedures of transmission, on the grounds that they lack wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner." Earlier on Peters says that "'education' implies that something...is being...transmitted in a morally acceptable manner" (25),

but the distinction of which the process criterion makes use is not that between "voluntary", or moral, and involuntary, or immoral. It is, rather, the distinction between learning and conditioning or hypnosis. The point of the criterion is that, though "a child might be conditioned... or induced to do something by hypnotic suggestion...we would not describe this as 'education' if he has not conscious of something to be learnt or understood. The central uses of 'education' are tasks in which the individual who is being educated is being led or induced to come up to some standard, to achieve something. This must be presented to him as something which he has to grasp." (41) Peters is not saying that if an activity is involuntary, that is, if it is compulsory, it cannot be an educational activity. On this criterion most schooling would have to be ruled out. He is saying that education must involve learning, and that learning, insofar as it is distinguishable from conditioning and hypnosis, involves being aware of something to be grasped or understood. It is only by interpreting Peters in this way that the process criterion becomes a distinctively educational, rather than a general moral criterion.

In Philosophy of Education McClellan says, I think correctly, that "if we take Peters' definition as I think we should take it, it is directed not toward the use of the word 'education' in English but toward the <u>concept</u> of education as that concept is slowly penetrating our social consciousness." And, "it does reflect quite accurately, I believe, the most general beliefs about education held (or coming to be held) by the concerned and reflective segments of our society" (20), that is, by those who, because they <u>are</u> concerned, and because they <u>have</u> reflected on the object of their concern, are in the best position to understand education. "But", McClellan goes on, "these beliefs are themselves confused and superficial." "Consider just one obvious question: What are we to do when conflicts arise from the application of these three very different sets of criteria? Many different conflicts might arise, but one <u>must</u> arise: criterion (i) mandates pedagogical intentions that will inevitably require pedagogical actions

prohibited by (iii). To speak vulgarly, if you start out committed to transmitting what's worth while to kids in such a way that the kids will become committed to it, you're inevitably going to violate their 'wittingness and voluntariness'." (Ibid) The "conflict" to which McClellan refers is, one suspects, one between education and morality. As such, it is beyond the scope of this paper. McClellan might be referring, however, to a conflict intrinsic to Peters's analysis of education. What might this conflict be?

It should be noted first that, in the example McClellan gives, there is a sense in which there is no conflict at all. According to Peters, for something to be education it must satisfy all three criteria. In McClellan's example, however, something is said to satisfy (i) and, one supposes, (ii), but not (iii). There is no conflict here: the thing in question is simply not education. McClellan is being misleading when he says that educators "start out" to satisfy (i) and (ii) and then find themselves, "inevitably", violating (iii). Educators, according to Peters, start out to satisfy all three criteria.

The question remains, however, if, and in what sense, it is "inevitable" that in transmitting what is worthwhile to those who are to become committed to it, the latter's wittingness and voluntariness will be violated. McClellan might be using "inevitable" in the sense of "logically inevitable". If this is the case he is claiming that education, as Peters understands it, is logically impossible. Why might this be the case? The educand is initiated into, say, science. He cannot know what science is for, if he did, he would be initiated into it already. Therefore, it might be argued, the educand cannot be initiated into science, or, to generalize, into any worthwhile activity, without his wittingness and voluntariness being violated. A person, however, can be aware of what he is doing. And, rather than a single doing, initiation into science is a process which involves countless doings, of all of which the educand can be aware while he is doing them. He cannot, of course, know towards what his doings are intended to lead him. But, this does not imply that education, as Peters describes it, is impossible. Peters says that the educand must be "conscious"

only of "something to be learnt of understood". He does not say what exactly that something must be, nor is it plausible to assume that he thinks the educand, unlike the rest of mankind, must be aware of what his actions are leading him to.

There is, however, a second sense in which it would be right for McClellan to say that conflict is "inevitable". The educator is often faced with the following situation. On the one hand, to initiate an educand into a worthwhile activity he must, for any one of a number of reasons, present it to him in such a way that he (the educand) is not conscious of something to be learnt or understood. The child, for example, plays, as a result of which he learns. On the other hand, to respect the wittingness and voluntariness of the educand, the educator can only initiate him into those activities which have little if any educational worth. The educand is not a good "learner", for whatever reason, not a willing learner. The educator, then, is faced with a dilemma, a "conflict", a conflict which, given the sort of creature man happens to be, is inevitable.

The question arises, what is the educator to do? And, for our purposes more important, how is he to decide? Peters gives three criteria which he says are necessary to education. The process criterion, at least as stated, might not in fact, as is suggested above, be necessary. Whether it is would depend on further clarification of what exactly Peters takes to be involved in learning. But, this is not the problem McClellan's criticism raises. The problem is that in giving an account of education in which there is more than one criterion, Peters's analysis is open to the criticism of being incoherent. Because there is no obvious internal connection between initiation into worthwhile activities and wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the initiate, the educator, when faced with the above-mentioned dilemma, has no better understanding of what he is to do after as he had before reading Peters. What the educator needs is a more fundamental criterion, a criterion on the basis of which he can make his decision. (It is for just this criterion Peters is looking in "The Justification of Education".)

The point of the process criterion is to distinguish learning, or perhaps educational learning, from the sorts of things a person can acquire from either hypnosis or conditioning. Peters says that "Conditioning...is of reactions, such as salivation and eye-blinks, and of simple movements which are not seen as bringing about anything by the subject. Movements of a random sort are made which are positively or negatively reinforced. If the movements form part of an action, in the sense of being seen by the subject as bringing something about which may be pleasant or unpleasant, it is only by analogy that the concept of conditioning is applied." (42) In conditioning there is nothing to be "learnt" or "understood" because, whereas the latter always do have, "conditioning...in a strict sense, has no connection with beliefs." (Ibid)

It will be recalled that, with the exception of the worthwhileness condition, Peters's arguments for the "Criteria of Education" have the form, Being educated is not just being X (e.g., skilled, informed), it also involves Y (e.g., knowledge, understanding). It will also be recalled that a possible interpretation of the process criterion is, simply, education must involve learning. A second interpretation is also possible. According to this Peters is saying, education cannot <u>just</u> involve conditioning, it must <u>also</u> involve "learning", that is, the learning involved in acquiring beliefs. Assuming this interpretation to be correct, and leaving aside the incongruent worthwhileness condition, it can be argued that Peters has shown <u>none</u> of his criteria to be necessary to education, only, perhaps, to <u>good</u> education. The argument is strengthened when it is realized that between "conditioning", as Peters describes it, and the sort of learning which comes about when the educand is "<u>conscious</u> of something to be learnt or understood", is learning which is, as Peters notes, "on the fringe of things to which the learner <u>is</u> attending" (41n), learning which, nonetheless, may very well be educational. There is then a more fundamental criterion implicit in Peters's account. It is the criterion by use of which he distinguishes good from bad education, "learning", knowledge and understanding, from "conditioning", skills and

information.

Before turning to "The Justification of Education" there are two further elements of Peters's preliminary account which should be considered. In Chapters 1 and 2 there was discussion of two answers to the question, to what category does education belong? or, what sort of thing is education? There was discussion of education both as a kind of development and as a kind of preparation. In "Criteria of Education" Peters says education is a kind of transmission, that is, transmission of non-inert knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective. In "Education as Initiation" (Chapter 2 of Ethics and Education), on the other hand, the place which earlier had been occupied by transmission, is now held by initiation, as in initiation into worthwhile activities. Both notions are of interest, but it is only with the latter that Peters attempts a "definition" or an "account of the synthetic nature" of education. (46)

'Transmission' is, from several points of view, an apparently adequate characterization of education. To transmit is to pass or hand on. It pre-supposes someone who has something someone else has not, and that the thing in question is such that it can be passed or handed from the one to the other. It is true that having passed on a material object--a bucket of water in fighting a fire, for instance--a person then no longer possesses it. But, in transmitting a message, for instance, by wireless, there is no comparable implication. A teacher knows X. A learner does not. The teacher intends that the learner, as a result of some activity, will come to know, to possess, X. It can be said, if perhaps only metaphorically, that the teacher "transmitted" X to the learner, there being no implication that in doing so he thereby ceased knowing it.

Dewey, in speaking of the function of the school, says it is "one important method of the transmission which forms the dispositions of the young." (Democracy and Education, p. 4) Further, "as a society becomes more enlightened, it realizes that it is responsible not to transmit and conserve the whole of its existing achieve-

ments, but only such as make for a better future society. The school is the chief agency for the accomplishment of this end." (Ibid, p. 20) Rather than, as in Dewey, a means of social improvement, school education, or education generally, can be seen as the means by which a society's distinctive way of life is perpetuated, that is, the means of social continuity--Dewey's main thesis. In "The Concept of Education Today" Frankena distinguishes, amongst others, what he calls (here echoing McClellan) a "social science" concept of education. "Education" Frankena says, is "thought of as a process of 'enculturation' or 'socialization'." It is defined as "the transmission to the young of the dispositions or states of mind...that are regarded as desirable by their elders." (20) In both cases education involves transmitting to the young what their elders already possess.

Teachers, or adults generally, can be seen as transmitters, learners and children as receivers. It might be supposed, then, that the distinctive roles of educator and educand are, similarly, those of transmitter and receiver, and that education is a kind of transmission. Indeed, both participant and, as above, spectator accounts can and do lead to the same conclusion. Peters says that 'education' implies "the transmission of what is worthwhile to those who become committed to it": that what is transmitted is "knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective, which are not inert": that it "rules out some procedures of transmission, on the grounds that they lack wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner." There is little doubt that education involves transmission. But is education itself a kind of transmission?

The theorists quoted above are all prepared, in clarifying at least some aspects of education, to make use of the notion of transmission. But, when they come to characterize the sort of thing education is generally not one of them is prepared to say it is a kind of transmission. Dewey uses "transmission" in discussing some functions of the school, but he also says that school "is only one means, and, compared with other agencies, a relatively superficial means" of forming "the dispositions of the young." (Democra-

cy and Education, p. 4) And, in his discussion of education generally, "transmission" does not occur. "Education", he says, is "a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating, process. All of these words mean that it implies attention to the conditions of growth. We also speak of rearing, raising, bringing up--words which express the difference of level which education aims to cover...When we have the outcome of the process in mind, we speak of education as shaping, forming, molding activity." (Ibid, p. 10) Of the three concepts Frankena distinguishes, it is the "normative", rather than the social science concept he favours. In this concept "fostering" has the place which otherwise might have been occupied by transmission. According to the normative concept, "education is the enterprise, or any enterprise, in which anyone fosters desirable dispositions in anyone by satisfactory methods." (21) Finally, in "Criteria of Education" Peters is primarily concerned with the question, who is the educated man? He is, according to Peters, the man of understanding, knowledge, cognitive perspective. But when, at the end of the chapter, he says that education is the transmission of these qualities, 'transmission' is functioning as little more than a place-holder. There is no attempt to defend the place it holds, and, in the following chapter, Peters discusses "Education as Initiation", not as transmission.

The educator, according to the transmission view, is a transmitter, the educand a receiver. Both implications are open to criticism. Frankena's social science concept is only a kind of transmission view--it specifies that what is transmitted to the young are the "dispositions, or states of mind...that are regarded as desirable by their elders." Two of the three criticisms Frankena levels against the view, however, can be made, without substantial alteration, against any transmission view. These criticisms of the social science concept are, first, that it "takes too passive a view of the role of those who are being educated" and, second, that it "defines education as essentially conservative or traditional, since it limits education by definition to the cultivation of dispositions already regarded as desirable by society", the latter despite the

fact that one can speak of "educating society" and of the "younger generation...educating its elders" (22-3). Is 'receiver' an adequate description of the educand? and, if not, is it for the reasons Frankena gives?

If reception is thought of as in receiving a message by wireless, Frankena's criticism that it "takes too passive a view of the role of those who are being educated" is no doubt well taken. Listening is experiencing, and from listening a person can learn; but it is not the only, nor is it generally the best way to learn. When compared, for example, with listening and thinking about what one is listening to, listening can be criticized for being "too passive". 'Reception', however, might only imply 'coming to possess'. It need not imply anything about how this is done. A way of life is 'transmitted' from one generation to the next. And yet coming to possess a way of life involves much more than just listening to what one's elders say. Frankena might have argued, also, that 'transmitter' takes "too passive a view" of the role of the educator. But, 'transmitting', like 'receiving', need not imply anything about means. A way of life is not transmitted just by chatting about it. A minimal description of the difference between the educated and the uneducated is that the former has something the latter has not. 'Receiver', then, might under-describe, but it does not, as Frankena implies, mis-describe the role of the educand.

'Transmitter', on the other hand, is, at least in part, a mis-description of the role of the educator. A person can transmit only what he already has. And thus, according to the social science concept, education is limited "by definition to the cultivation of dispositions already regarded as desirable by society". At least part of what the educand receives, however, is not received as a result of another's transmitting it to him. Not being transmitted learning, neither can it be, according to the view under discussion, educational learning. The implication is that of two people, both of whom know X, knowing X counts as educational only for the person who has acquired his knowledge from another. And, deciding whether a person is educated is not just a matter of deciding what he knows, it

also involves discovering by what means he acquired his knowledge. Frankena says that the social science concept defines education "as essentially conservative or traditional". Transmission views generally limit the scope of educationally relevant knowledge to what is already known. The implication is that true 'discovery learning' is non-educational, but that if by chance the educand should transmit his discovery to another, then at least the latter, if not the educand, will have benefitted educationally. None of this makes much sense because being educated is a matter of what one knows, understands, etc., not the history of its acquisition.

Education without a transmitter is, according to the transmission view, impossible. Self-transmission of course is impossible, but is self-education? A person on his own, without the aid of the many, shall we say, "transmission media", could not acquire all the knowledge, etc., of the recognizably educated person. (See above, p. 7) But, of what one person learns about nature, for example, by studying science, at least part can be learned by another through studying Her directly. And, what one can learn about human nature from a study of psychology and sociology, another can learn from personal experience and from reflection on that experience. If education cannot do without the many transmitters, not all aspects of education need always involve them. The teacher acts with the intention that the pupil learn X. In order so to act the teacher must already know X. But, a second teacher acts with the intention that the pupil learn about X. Because the intention does not specify what is to be learned, the pupil might very well learn something the teacher does not already know. The second teacher would then have to verify what was learned in order to determine whether he (the teacher) has succeeded in fulfilling his intention. The teacher is often a transmitter of knowledge. But, he is also, just as often, an organizer of learning activities.

Finally, the transmission view rules out certain kinds of knowledge which otherwise would be thought educationally relevant. One of the functions of school- as opposed to home-education is to bring together the young so

that, by way of preparing them for adult life, they can acquire experience of both working and playing as members of a group. The knowledge and understanding the educand acquires in this way, knowledge of himself and others, both as individuals and as members of a group, does not 'exist' prior to its acquisition and thus cannot be transmitted. The teacher can do little more than--though this in itself is to do a great deal--provide an environment of activity within which such knowledge and understanding can develop, and correct the pupil when it is clear he is going wrong. The chances of the educand discovering for himself any significant truth about the world that was not previously known to anyone are so slight as to be negligible (though not of course impossible). He is in this respect for the most part in the position of being a receiver of intentional or unintentional 'transmissions' from others. With respect to what might be called his 'personal world', however, the educand's position is reversed. He is, of necessity, an 'explorer', not the receiver of others' 'discoveries'.

Transmission views can be compared with developmental and contrasted with preparation views. Transmission views pre-suppose prior knowledge of what qualities the educand must acquire before he can become educated. If education, for the spectator, is the development of a certain sort of person (as it is for Locke, Quintilian, Elyot), then it is, for the participant, the transmission of those qualities which together constitute being that sort of person (qualities of virtue, leadership or, as in Peters, knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective). If, on the other hand, education, for the spectator, is preparation for a certain state of affairs, then it is, for the participant, more than just transmission. Preparation always depends, at least in part, on the person being prepared. As the educand is not fully developed, and as it cannot accurately be predicted what sort of person he will be when he is fully developed, complete prior knowledge of what he will need when he is in the state of affairs preparation anticipates is impossible. Further, regardless of how he does develop, and regardless of what exactly is the state of affairs for

which preparations are made, one thing the educand will need is at least some self-knowledge and understanding, the acquisition of which, as noted above, is at least as much a matter of discovery as it is of reception from others.

It will be recalled that, for Dewey, "the primary ineluctable facts of the birth and death of each one of the constituent members of a social group determine the necessity of education." "There is the necessity" he says that the "immature members be not merely physically perserved in adequate numbers, but that they be initiated into the interests, purposes, information, skill and practices of the mature members: otherwise the group will cease its characteristic life." (emphasis mine) The implication is that, according to Dewey, such an initiation is education. Within Dewey's "general", or spectator, concept, Oakeshott, it will be recalled, wants to distinguish a "proper", or participant, concept of education. He says that though "education in its most general significance" is a "transaction...in which new-comers to the scene are initiated into the world they are to inhabit", that is, their "local world", "education, properly speaking, begins when...there supervenes initiation...into a human inheritance of sentiments, beliefs, imaginings...", and so on. Both Dewey and Oakeshott use the notion of initiation. Only Peters, however, attempts to justify its use.

In Ethics and Education Peters follows his account of the "Criteria of Education" with a chapter entitled "Education as Initiation". In introducing the latter he says that "so far three main criteria of 'education' have been considered, the first concerning its matter, the second its manner, and the third its cognitive perspective. No attempt has been made either to produce a definition of 'education' or to attempt any account of a synthetic nature which pays due attention to all three criteria." (46) Peters then goes on to give a "synthetic sketch rather than a definition" (Ibid) of education. He says, first, that "an educated man is one who has achieved a state of mind which is characterized by a mastery of and care for the worthwhile things that have been transmitted, which are viewed

in some kind of cognitive perspective. The requirement built into 'education' that it should be of the 'whole man' implies the possibility of a man being trained in some more limited respect. In other words the concept of 'education' presupposes not only the development of beliefs but also the differentiation of mind in respects which can be developed to the exclusion of others." (46-7) "How then" he asks "is the development of such a differentiated mind to be conceived?" (47) After giving what he says has been a "necessarily brief and selective" (51) account of the differentiated mind, Peters concludes that the "process of initiation into such modes of thought and awareness is the process of education." (Ibid)

Peters claims that initiation "is a peculiarly apt description of the essential feature of education". This "consists in experienced persons turning the eye of others outwards to what is essentially independent of persons", that is, to "differentiated modes of thought and awareness" in which "both the content and the procedures are intersubjective". "'Initiation', too, even when connected with various ceremonies and rites, suggests an avenue of access to a body of belief, perhaps to mysteries that are not revealed to the young." "Furthermore...just as 'education' requires that those who are educated should be brought to this state by various processes which only have in common the minimum requirements of wittingness and voluntariness, so too does 'initiation' convey the same suggestion of being placed on the inside of a form of thought and awareness by a wide variety of processes which at least involve some kind of consciousness and consent on the part of the initiate." (54) "'Education', however, is more specific in that it requires...that something worth while should be... transmitted. Initiation, on the other hand, can be into things that are not worth while". "'Education', therefore, has to be described as initiation into activities or modes of thought and conduct that are worth while in order to do justice to (the) criteria that are built into it." (55)

What is it to have been "initiated" into activities or modes of thought and conduct? Peters says it is to be a participant in (53), or to be "on the inside" of them.

(52, 53, 54, 62) And by getting "on the inside" of something he means "incorporat(ing) it into (one's) own mental structure" (52). What would count as <u>successful</u> initiation? Peters says that "the final reward of a teacher (is) the emergence of a pupil who has developed enough skill and judgment to correct him" (60). "The cardinal function of the teacher, in the early stages, is to get the pupil on the inside of the form of thought or awareness with which he is concerned. At a later stage, when the pupil has built into his mind both the concepts and the modes of exploration involved, the difference between teacher and taught is obviously one of degree. For both are participating in the shared experience of exploring a common world. The teacher is simply more familiar with its contours and more skilled in finding and cutting pathways. The good teacher is a guide who helps others dispense with his services." (53)

Peters's contention, in "Criteria of Education", that education is the transmission of knowledge and understanding rather than something else, something which makes such transmission educationally relevant, has been criticized above. There are distinctions between educationally relevant and irrelevant, and educationally important and unimportant knowledge and understanding, distinctions which can be accounted for only by supposing that education is something other than the transmission of knowledge and understanding. In "Education as Initiation", where Peters attempts only a "synthetic sketch", not a "definition" of education, though the language has changed the problem, as will be seen, remains the same. The problem arises with the person who, though once a "participant", once "on the inside", once having had "built into his mind" certain concepts and modes of exploration, in time stops participating, comes "outside", no longer has the concepts and modes of exploration he once had. If education is taken to be fundamentally a kind of initiation, two things, only the second of which is at all plausible, can be said of such a person. It can be said, first, that though he was once, he no longer is educated, or, second, that though he once <u>seemed</u> to be, it is now clear that he is not, and never was educated. If, on the other hand, education is not, at least

not fundamentally, a kind of initiation, but something which makes initiation educationally relevant, whether the person in question is educated would depend on why it was he ceased to be a participant. It might be that the aim of education is served even by initiation which subsequently is rejected.

In "Aims of Education--A Conceptual Inquiry" Dray raises what is, substantially, the same problem. He says that, "although at one point (Peters) makes it a criterion of being educated only that a person be capable of pursuing worth-while activity 'for what there is in it', he goes on almost immediately to tell us that what is required is commitment 'to what is internal in worth-while activities'. This seems to me to interpret the concept in far too behavioral a way. One paradoxical consequence would be the impropriety of calling a man educated who revolts against his own culture. It would require Jews, for example, to say that St. Paul suddenly lost his education on the road to Damascus, whereas they are much more likely to regard him as an educated renegade. And it would make questions about a man's character logically redundant, once we have assurance that his moral education is impeccable, whereas I should want to leave logical room for saying that it was, in part, the excellence of a man's moral education that enabled him to be so wicked: he fully grasped the moral enormity of what he nevertheless chose to do." (37) Peters's claim, if true, would of course not "require" Jews to say of St. Paul that he had "suddenly lost his education" on the road to Damascus. They might say, on the basis of this new evidence, that afterall St. Paul is not so well educated as we thought he was. This, however, does not contradict Dray's main point. Of some people at least who lose or who renounce their commitment to those worthwhile activities or modes of thought and awareness into which, by way of educating them, they have been initiated, it would be more accurate to say that they were "educated renegades" than that they were uneducated people, whether renegades or not.

Dray gives what he takes to be a counter-example to what, in "Criteria of Education", Peters says is the second of the two "non-inertness" criteria. (See above, p. 68) The

counter-example, however, is not altogether clear. What is it for a person to "revolt against his own culture"? The criticism can be interpreted in a number of ways, one of which is to be found in Peters's "Reply" in "Aims of Education". He says that "Professor Dray's ingenious objections to my suggestion that an educated person is one who is 'committed' to what is internal to worth-while activities involve a too substantive rendering of what I had in mind." (41) Peters distinguishes, within such activities, their (propositional) "content" and what might be called the 'mental virtues' without which a person cannot be truly "on the inside" of them. He then says, "I am not sure to what extent (the educated person) would have to accept any particular <u>content</u>, for example, the law of supply and demand if he had been initiated into economics. But in the case of science, for instance, a man must think that, to a certain extent, truth matters and that relevant evidence must be produced for assumptions; in the case of morals, the suffering of others, or fairness, must not be matters of indifference to him." And "what sort of philosophical education would a person have had if he did not bother much about consistency or cogency in argument?" Generally speaking, "a person must care, to a certain extent, about the point of the activity and not be unmoved by the various standards of excellence within it." (Ibid)

This interpretation of the criticism is suggested by Dray's example of St. Paul on the Damascus road. Paul revolted against one religion, one culture, not against religion or culture as such. And thus Peters is invited to reply as follows. "What the Jews would have said about Paul ...I am not sure. It would depend on the extent to which they believed in indoctrination, with the rigid insistence in an unshakable <u>content</u> of belief that goes with it. But certainly they would have said that he was not educated if he had been quite insensitive to all aspects of religious experience." (41-2) It is not clear whether Dray would think this an adequate reply. There is, however, a second interpretation of his criticism which makes the distinction Peters draws irrelevant, and thus his reply beside the point.

Peters assumes (perhaps correctly) that the case under discussion is one in which it might or might not be denied that a person (St. Paul) is educated, the reason being that his initiation into worthwhile activity has been inadequate. He speaks of a person who might have acquired a certain body of belief, but for whom truth, relevant evidence, consistent and cogent argument do not matter, of a person who is indifferent to fairness or to the suffering of others, of a person who is insensitive to religious experience. The question, for Peters, which Dray's criticism raises is what evidence is to count for or against successful initiation. This, however, is to assume the truth of what, on a second interpretation of the criticism, is in fact being contended. For on this interpretation the question is not what counts as successful initiation in education, but whether education is fundamentally initiation at all.

Imagine a person who has been successfully initiated into some worthwhile activity. He possesses the appropriate body of knowledge and the relevant mental virtues. He then renounces or "revolts against" the activity. Imagine, for example, a Paul who, though sensitive to all aspects of religious experience, and possessing all the other virtues of the person who has been successfully initiated into religion, renounces and revolts against all Gods and all religions. Further, imagine that the person revolts neither whimsically, nor as a result of having acquired a commitment to a new and conflicting worthwhile activity. Rather, imagine that what were once little more than niggling uncertainties develop over time into nagging doubts, and then that doubt, inexplicably and as it were "overnight", transforms itself into loss of commitment. Loss of commitment is followed by lessening engagement in the activity, and lessening engagement by a slow deterioration of those virtues which were specific to the activity. Finally, given that the length of time a person remains committed to an activity is one criterion by which success in initiation is judged, imagine that the loss of commitment occurs quite late in the person's life, and only after years of exemplary and fruitful devotion to the activity in question. With

respect to a case such as this it would be highly implausible to say that though it once "appeared" as if he was, it is now clear the person is not, and never was, successfully initiated. The question remains, however, of whether he was and thus still is successfully educated.

A person who becomes indifferent to religious experience, and, say, adopts another way of life: a person who becomes indifferent to fairness and to the suffering of others--even employs, as Dray suggests, his moral education in being "wicked"-- but who, nonetheless, keeps mostly to himself: a person who becomes unconcerned about cogency and consistency in argument and who, as a result, stops arguing: a person who comes to be one for whom truth and evidence matter little and, as a consequence, relies solely on faith: such a person need not have been badly, or even inadequately educated. There is the revolt against science, philosophy and religion that only the true scientist, philosopher, only the truly religious person can make. One thinks of Augustine's revolt against the hedonistic, and Tolstoy's revolt against the literary life, and one does so without the least temptation to doubt whether they truly had been "participants", had truly been "on the inside" of those lives. And, given the sorts of activity and modes of thought and awareness Peters takes to be worthwhile--philosophy, science, economics, morality, etc.--and given what he says counts as successful initiation into them, if it is to be possible at all education can be, at best, initiation into only a very small number of such activities and modes of thought and awareness. Such being the case, revolt against those activities into which, by way of education, a person is initiated, far from being just a thecretical possibility, or, perhaps, a possibility only for the "great", is in fact thoroughly commonplace: as the academically educated go into business, the vocationally educated go on the dole, and over the years neither is likely to lose his education.

Education, then, is not itself initiation. It is something with respect to which initiation is relevant. What? In "The Justification of Education" Peters imagines a situation in which a person must decide for himself what to

think and what to do. The educated person is the one who has been well prepared for such a situation. He has the knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective with which to do well. And how does he come to be well prepared? According to Peters, correctly I think, by being initiated into what he calls worthwhile activity and modes of thought and awareness, that is, those activities and modes best suited to prepare the educand to think and act for himself. If the educand subsequently should revolt against these activities and modes of thought this is not necessarily evidence of inadequate preparation. The point is that it would depend on the reasons for the revolt whether or not it was, for the person involved, a good decision to make. To take just one of the cases mentioned above: a person might find that as a result of having certain experiences, experiences his former educator could not have anticipated his having, he is no longer able to feel anything other than indifference in the face of the suffering of others. What is he to do? Without further description of what is involved it seems it would be best if, as much as is possible, the person kept to himself, or, at least, avoided situations which might call for action to ameliorate suffering. And if he is prepared to do this one would think that rather than being inadequate, in fact the person's moral education had been especially, indeed, uniquely good. It will be recalled that, according to Peters, the good teacher is the one who sees his pupil through to the point where he (the teacher) is corrected, and his services are dispensed with. In the above case the moral educator's services are dispensed with, but only after a decision has been made to avoid as much as possible situations which are likely to prove morally problematic. The decision, given the circumstances, is evidence of good rather than bad preparation, of useful rather than useless initiation.

Peters discusses the justification of education in "Worth-While Activities" (Ethics and Education) and, later, in "The Justification of Education". The problems raised in the latter are, "What...are the values which are specific to being educated and what sort of justification can be

given for them?" (239) Peters then says that "it is to these limited questions that I propose to address myself... rather than to wider questions of value with which I was concerned in Ethics and Education, and with which, in places, I confused these limited questions--owing perhaps to certain inadequacies in the analysis of the concept of 'education' with which I was then working." (Ibid) Peters does not say what inadequacies there are in his earlier analysis, nor does he say how these might have led him to confuse "wider" and more "limited" questions of value. It is clear, however, that he intends "The Justification of Education" to supersede "Worth-While Activities".

The "values specific to being educated" are, for the most part, the same as the "Criteria of Education". Peters says, "(a) the educated man is not one who merely possesses specialized skills...he...also possesses a considerable body of knowledge together with understanding...He knows the reason why of things as well as that certain things are the case...(b) There is the suggestion, too, that his understanding is not narrowly specialized. He not only has breadth of understanding but is also capable of connecting up these different ways of interpreting his experience so that he achieves some kind of cognitive perspective." (240) And, (d) The processes of education are "processes of learning, and this always involves some kind of content to be mastered, understood, remembered. This content...must be intimated...in the learning situation. There must, therefore, be some link of a logical rather than a causal sort between the 'means' and the 'end' if it is to be a process of learning." (241)

Two values are added to the earlier "criteria", and no explicit mention is made of the two non-inertness criteria. The additional values are, "(c) In contrast...to the instrumentality so often associated with specialized knowledge, the educated person is one who is capable, to a certain extent, of doing and knowing things for their own sake" (240). And, under (a), Peters adds to the knowledge and understanding criteria the requirement that "the educated man...has a developed capacity to reason, to justify his beliefs and conduct." (Ibid) Of the neglected non-

inertness criteria, one, the commitment criterion, is open to the sort of criticism Dray levels against it, and is, perhaps, deliberately dropped, whereas the second can be construed as being redundant. In "Criteria of Education" (see above, p. 68) Peters says that "the kind of knowledge which an educated man must have...must characterize his way of looking at things rather than be hived off...'Education' implies that a man's outlook is transformed by what he knows." But, without saying <u>how</u> a man's outlook is transformed, this is to say no more than what is in any case pre-supposed by the process criterion, namely, that rather than having been "hived off", the educand has <u>learned</u> something from what his educator has transmitted.

Peters considers four different justifications of education, only one of which will be taken up and examined in detail. He considers both "instrumental" (or extrinsic) and "non-instrumental" (or intrinsic) justification, the former in terms of either social or individual benefit, and the latter in terms of either "absence of boredom" or rationality. For our purposes only the last is relevant. In extrinsic justification it is argued that education is justified because it stands in a certain relation to something else, something which, it must be shown, is itself justified. Thus Peters is forced to ask, "What, in the end, constitutes social benefit? On what is the individual going to spend his wages?...What account is to be given of the states of affairs in relation to which other things are to be thought of as instrumental?" (246) In following these justifications, though one might come better to understand what benefits society and the individual, rather than explore they simply assume an understanding of education, and are thus, for our purposes, irrelevant.

Peters considers two sorts of intrinsic justification. He says that "questions about the intrinsic value of states of mind and of activities are often put by asking whether they are 'worth while'." However, the term 'worth while' is ambiguous. "(a) It can be used to indicate that an activity is likely to prove absorbing, to be an enjoyable way of passing the time. (b) Alternatively it can point to 'worth' that has little to do with absorption or

enjoyment. Socrates obviously regarded questioning young men as being worth while; for it was an activity in which they came to grasp what was true, which, for him was a state of mind of ultimate value. But at times he may have found it a bit boring." (247-8) The argument from "absence of boredom" (248), like, and for much the same reason as, the extrinsic arguments, will not be detailed here. To make the argument, though one must consider what it is to be educated, one need do no more than re-consider the "values specific to education". That is, whether the activities and modes of thought characteristic of the educated man are "likely to prove absorbing" depends for its answer less on having a better understanding of education than it does on at least some understanding of human psychology. Besides, a stronger justification of education would seem to be possible.

Peters develops, in some detail, a second and a much stronger intrinsic justification of education. There are three parts to the argument. These are, in outline: (i) the values specific to education are generally rational values: (ii) justification is an activity which, if undertaken seriously, pre-supposes the rational values: and thus (iii) serious questioning of the justification of education is impossible, pre-supposing, as it does, the value of what it purports to question.

Peters begins with the observation that (i) "To 'know' implies that what is said or thought is true..." He then asks, (ii) "How...is the concern for truth relevant to the attempt to justify knowledge and understanding? Surely" he says "because the activity of justification itself would be unintelligible without it." "If a justification is sought for doing X rather than Y...such probing must be conducted at least on the presupposition that obvious misconceptions of what is involved in these activities are to be removed. There is a presumption, in other words, that it is undesirable to believe what is false and desirable to believe what is true" (and so on) (252). And thus, (iii) "There are links of this sort between justification and forms of knowledge in that to ask for reasons for believing or doing anything is to ask for what is only to be found in

knowledge and understanding." (253) (emphasis mine) Under (i)--which is only outlined and then illustrated in the above--Peters says that the educational values are also rational values. He does not claim, at least not as yet, that all educational values are also rational values. With this qualification in mind, what he says under (i) seems at least plausible.

Under (ii) Peters attempts to explain--not of course to justify--the value of rationality itself. "Human beings" he says--here echoing what Kant says in "Education"--"do not just veer towards goals like moths towards a light; they are not just programmed by an instinctive equipment. They conceive of ends, deliberate about them and about the means to them." "Man is...a creature who lives under the demands of reason...Any man who emerges from infancy tries to perceive, to remember, to infer, to learn, and to regulate his wants. If he is to do this he must have recourse to some procedure of assessment." (254) In other words, man, not being blessed with a particularly well-developed instinctive endowment, is forced to rely on his reason, his powers of "assessment". Further, the individual must rely either on his own or on the powers of others. "In their early years all human beings are initiated into human life by their elders and rely for a long time on procedures (of assessment) connected with authority and custom...Many manage most of their lives on such procedures." (254-5) But, "this fact" Peters says "is a reflection of human psychology rather than of the logic of the situation; for ultimately such procedures are inappropriate to the demand that they are meant to serve. For belief is the attitude which is appropriate to what is true, and no statement is true just because an individual or group proclaims it. For the person whose word is believed has himself to have some procedure for determining what is true...There may be good reasons, in certain spheres of life, for relying on authorities; but such authorities, logically speaking, can only be regarded as provisional." "Thus those who rely permanently and perpetually on custom or authority are criticizable because they are relying on procedures of assessment which are not ultimately appropriate to the nature of belief and conduct.

To say, therefore, that men ought to rely more on their reason, that they ought to be more concerned with first-hand justification, is to claim that they are systematically falling down on a job on which they are already engaged." (255)

Under (iii), the final part of his argument, Peters uses the notion of the "demands of reason" to justify the "values specific to education". Peters's preliminary analysis of the "Criteria of Education", it will be recalled, failed to account for the distinctions between educationally relevant and irrelevant, and educationally important and unimportant knowledge and understanding. "This argument", however--that is, the argument concerning the value of rational procedures of assessment--"does not make a case for the pursuit of any kind of knowledge. It only points to the importance of knowledge that is relevant to the assessment of belief, conduct and feeling. It does not show, for instance, that there is value in amassing a vast store of information, in learning by heart every tenth name in the telephone directory. And this accords well with the account of the sort of knowledge that was ascribed to the educated person. For to be educated is to have one's view of the world transformed by the development and systemization of conceptual schemes. It is to be disposed to ask the reason why of things. It is not to have a store of what Whitehead called 'inert ideas'." (256)

Further, "this type of argument for the value of knowledge helps to explain the value inherent in being educated...of what was called 'cognitive perspective'. What was suggested is that an educated person is not one who has his mind composed of <u>disconnected</u> items of knowledge. What he knows and understands should be seen to be interrelated in terms of consistency, relevance, evidence, implication" (261), that is, interrelated in those respects which are required for rational assessment of belief and conduct. Cognitive perspective is associated with breadth of understanding. Peters's "basic argument" here is, quite simply, that "it would be unreasonable...to deprive anyone of access in an arbitrary way to forms of understanding which might throw light on alternatives open to him." (256)

Finally, how is the non-instrumental attitude to be justified? "This is not difficult" Peters says, "for the justification of it is implicit in what has already been said. It is presupposed by the determination to search for justification. Anyone who asks the question about his life 'Why do this rather than that?' has already reached the stage at which he sees that instrumental justification must reach a stopping place in activities that must be regarded as providing end-points for such justification." (262) It will be argued below that all possible justification is in part intrinsic justification. The rational assessment of alternatives, then, must always involve intrinsic assessment.

It is in "The Justification of Education", not in "Criteria of Education", that Peters gives his most general and most fundamental account of education. It is, roughly, that the educated person is one who is both <u>able</u> (he has the required knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective, and so on) and <u>willing</u> (his knowledge, etc. are not inert), that is, he is <u>prepared</u> to base his beliefs and his conduct on a rational assessment of the alternatives open to him. It is this criterion Peters uses to answer at least some of the questions "Criteria of Education" only raised, such questions as Cognitive perspective over what range? and Transmission of what knowledge and understanding? The criterion, as has been anticipated, can also be used to overcome problems in the use of the notions transmission and initiation. Preparation for rational assessment marks no distinction between knowledge and understanding acquired by discovery, and that acquired as a result of others' transmission. And, rather than make irrelevant to education, such a conception emphasizes the importance of the acquisition of self-knowledge and understanding, the alternatives open to a person depending in large part on the sort of person in question. Finally, as the educand develops, and as the society in which he lives changes, a situation might arise in which it would be rational for the educand to revolt against just those activities and modes of thought into which, by way of education, he had been initiated. And, depending on the circumstances, depending in particular on

whether the educator was in a position to predict the course both of educand development and of social change, such revolt need not be evidence of inadequate preparation.

How well does the criterion deal with McClellan's criticism of the "Criteria of Education"? The criticism, it will be recalled, is that "if you start out committed to transmitting what's worth while to kids in such a way that the kids will become committed to it, you're inevitably going to violate their 'wittingness and voluntariness'." On the basis of the description of the problem McClellan gives no straightforward solution is possible. But, in using Peters's fundamental criterion, it at least can be seen what courses of action are open to the educator. He might begin with learning activities in which the educand is interested, and then, over time, slowly transform the activities in such a way that, wittingly and voluntarily, the educand becomes involved in activities of greater and greater educational value. He might, on the other hand, risk initial violation of wittingness and voluntariness by initiating the educand into educationally valuable activities which he (the educator) thinks will eventually prove to be of interest to the educand. What the educator should keep in mind, according to Peters, is that education prepares a person to think and act rationally. In each case he must decide whether it would be more helpful if the educand were allowed to go more or less his own way, make mistakes, hopefully learn from his mistakes, as a result make more and more rational decisions, or whether it would be better if he were to submit to the (no doubt better informed) decisions of the educator, acquire as a result what in the future will give him the basis for rational decision-making, that is, go the educator's way. The difference here is closely related to the difference between progressive and traditional education. And the former, like the latter, would depend for their appropriateness both on the sort of person the educand is and the sort of society in which he lives, for rational action is always someone's action in some particular social context.

The criterion Peters gives in "The Justification of Education" overcomes some, but only some, of the difficult-

ies with his "Criteria of Education". Two problems remain. First, like the "Criteria", the criterion is narrowly cognitive. People rather than minds are educated or uneducated. Having made a rational assessment of the alternatives open to them people, being people, then believe and act non-rationally. Peters might say that it is precisely his non-inertness criterion--the educand being willing as well as able--which rules this possibility out. But, if it does, he still can be criticized for failing to say just what must be transmitted or otherwise acquired apart from knowledge, understanding, etc. if the educand is to both decide and act rationally. The second problem, however, is more fundamental and is not to be dismissed so easily. The problem is whether Peters is correct in saying that what is fundamental to education is rationality, or whether fundamentally education is something else, something which makes preparation for rational assessment both educationally relevant and important.

Peters is a 'rationalist'. The values specific to education are, he says, rational values. Peters sees the individual faced with a situation in which he must choose what to think and what to do. The educated person believes and acts on the basis of a rational assessment of alternatives. The uneducated, according to Peters, believe and act, amongst others, on the basis of authority or of custom. Rousseau, on the other hand, though he thinks rationality of great educational importance, does not think that fundamentally education concerns rationality. In the Emile he says "there are two kinds of dependence; dependence on things which is the work of nature and dependence on men which is the work of society. Dependence on things, being non-moral, does no injury to liberty, and begets no vices, dependence on men, being out of order, gives rise to every kind of vice." (49) What then of children? "Mankind has its place in the sequence of things; childhood has its place in the sequence of human life; the man must be treated as a man and the child as a child. Give each his place, and keep him there." (44) "The only useful habit for children is to be accustomed to submit without

difficulty to necessity, and the only useful habit for man is to submit without difficulty to the rule of reason. Every other habit is a vice." (125n)

Education, according to Rousseau, is preparation _of_ a person in a state of necessity _for_ a state of "liberty". And being free is (or at least importantly involves) submitting only to the rule of reason. "No doubt (man) must submit to the rules (of society); but the chief rule is this--be able to break the rule(s) if necessary." (94) "When I want to train a natural man, I do not want to make him a savage and to send him back to the woods, but that living in the whirl of social life it is enough that he should not let himself be carried away by the passions and prejudices of men; let him see with his eyes and feel with his heart, let him own no sway but that of reason." (217) Rationality, for Rousseau, is of great educational importance. For without it men cannot free themselves from dependence on other men, they cannot help but be "carried away by the passions and prejudices of (other) men", something which, Rousseau thinks, "gives rise to every kind of vice." Rationality is, as it were, one of the "weapons" with which the individual "defends" his liberty.

For Peters, on the other hand, it is rationality, not, as he puts it, freedom from "authority" and "custom", which is fundamental. "Those who rely permanently and perpetually on custom and authority" we have quoted him as arguing, "are criticizable because they are relying on procedures of assessment which are not ultimately _appropriate_ to the nature of belief and conduct." (emphasis mine) And by "appropriate" Peters means "logically appropriate". The person who relies on custom or authority is criticizable, he says, because "belief is the attitude which is appropriate to what is true, and no statement is true just because an individual or group proclaims it." What Peters says is no doubt _true_. The second problem with his criterion, however, is not that values specific to education might be non- or ir-rational values. The problem concerns whether they are, _fundamentally_, rational values.

What difference would it make if one accepted Rousseau's rather than Peters's order of justification?

Acceptance of Rousseau's view implies the belief that the educational value of rationality is in need of justification--and it is to accept a certain sort of justification. Peters says, I think correctly, that a general justification of the rational values pre-supposes acceptance of the very values apparently in question. The problem remains, however, of whether a specifically educational justification is needed. No one can base all his beliefs and actions on a rational assessment of alternatives. There is always some question still to be asked, some problem still to be solved. Inevitably a person must rely, at least to a certain extent, on what he takes to be authoritative, or the product of the collective experience of those who have gone before him. If he tries to make of himself an authority in one sphere, he only confirms his continued dependence in others. If he tries to make himself competent in many spheres, he only succeeds in remaining, though to a lesser extent, dependent in all of them.

What is he to do? How is he to decide? It is not decisive to say, as Peters might, that he should concentrate his efforts in those spheres which are most relevant to his belief and action. These are not wholely pre-determined. Indeed, they are in part determined by the sort of education he gets. Some progress is made when one takes into consideration the sort of person he is, and the sort of society in which it is anticipated he will live. Some, but not all. He might develop in any one of a number of ways. He might come to occupy any one of a number of positions in society. And both depend in part on his education. Finally, if one concentrates on those spheres in which everyone, somehow, must think and act, one then neglects those other areas which might become uniquely his or his but not everyone's, areas which for him might be the more important.

The Rousseavian response to the question Peters leaves open is that the person should "concentrate" development of rational belief and conduct in those spheres in which he is best able to think and act freely. Consider the following two beliefs: "I am ill because the doctor has said that I am", "I have five toes because teacher, who has counted them, tells me I have". The two beliefs have the

same logical status, and thus Peters's criterion cannot be used to distinguish them. But, Peters also says, what is without question true, that "there may be good reasons, in certain spheres of life, for relying on authorities". Accepting Rousseau's rather than Peters's criterion allows one to take account of these spheres. Though it is logically inappropriate, it might be educationally appropriate to distinguish between reliance on medical authority in matters medical and reliance on teacher authority in matters, such as counting, with respect to which one is an "authority" as well, it being in only the latter that freedom might be possible.

A second implication of accepting Rousseau's order of justification is a belief that education is a more comprehensive enterprise than Peters says it is. Rationality is an aspect of human thought and conduct. "Liberty", on the other hand, is a possible characteristic of human relationships. People as such, and not just aspects of their thought and behavior, as it were 'relate', and thus Rousseau's is the more comprehensive of the two views. This might be a reason for preferring Rousseau's view. It might not. Short and simple answers being in short supply, all one can do is develop the Rousseavian view, as Peters has done his, and compare the two as completed accounts. This will be done in Chapters 5 and 6, where attention will be focussed on two main differentia: it will be accepted that the ideally rational person is also very well educated, but it will also be argued that education has a place even in those spheres where the individual cannot be or just is not rational (at least in the sense in which Peters uses "rational"), and that education being thus a more comprehensive enterprise is a view which is consistent with other and equally important beliefs about education. Before doing that, however, at least some of the differences between the two accounts can be illustrated.

Peters sees education from the point of view of the participant. Rousseau (like Dewey) takes the wider, spectator view. The former limits education to the sorts of things that can occur in, and result from, human activity, activity such as transmission and initiation. The latter, on the

other hand, extends education to include anything that might happen to humans, whether in or resulting from activity or not. Left to his own devices a child will acquire information, skills, practical understanding. But, Peters says, education must also include propositional knowledge, theoretical understanding, cognitive perspective: in other words, just those sorts of thing that are likely only to result from deliberate transmission and initiation. Peters emphasizes the latter, Rousseau (and Dewey) give about equal emphasis to both. The argument here concerns the relationship between education and training, and in Chapter 5 I will argue that the implicit Rousseavian view is preferable to the view Peters makes explicit in "Criteria of Education".

A child can acquire many things from deliberate transmission and initiation; but the sort of person he becomes is less a matter of human intention than it is of what happens to him, given the sort of person he already is, and given the sort of social environment in which he grows up. Peters emphasizes those qualities a child acquires as a result of deliberate activity and, in "Aims of Education", he distinguishes this, "more recent and more specific concept" from one which is "older and undifferentiated", and which, he says, "refers just to any process of bringing up or rearing" (55). Rousseau, on the other hand, is both Emile's teacher and his parent, he both transmits and initiates and rears or brings up. In Chapter 5 I will argue that the relationship between education and upbringing is better accounted for in Rousseau's than in Peters's view.

The participant is concerned with intrinsic justification of education. Being a participant in, and thus responsible for, something, he wants to know whether he is justified in doing what he does. An intrinsic justification of the claim, W has value, is the same as a justification of the claim, W has intrinsic value or, W has non-extrinsic value. Consider first extrinsic justification. For "W has value" to be extrinsically justified it must be the case that both, W stands in a certain relation to X, and X has

value. (It must also be the case that W has value in part because it stands in relation to X. Assume that this is so.) Supposing that W stands in the required relation to X, for X, and thus for W, to have value it must be the case that either, X has intrinsic value or that both, X stands in a certain relation to Y, and Y has value. Again, supposing that X stands in the required relation to Y, for Y, and thus for both X and W, to have value it must be the case that either Y has intrinsic value or that both, Y stands in a certain relation to Z, and Z has value. And so on. Extrinsic justification either makes reference at some point to intrinsic value or it does not. If it does not, I will call the justification "systematically extrinsic".

But, systematically extrinsic justification is not possible. If, as in the above, no two elements of the justification are the same, there must be infinite regress. There is still need for thinking Z has value. Whatever might be appealed to can itself only be justified by appeal to something else--and so on, without possibility of stopping. If, on the other hand, two elements of the justification are the same; if, for example, it is argued that Z has value because it stands in relation to W, and W has value; then justification is assumed rather than demonstrated. It might be objected that rather than having shown it impossible the argument only shows that systematically extrinsic justification cannot give warrant for certainty. But, in such a justification the truth of each element (e.g., W has value) depends solely on the truth of the succeeding element (X has value). One starts with warrant for claiming only that "W has value" might or might not be true, and one ends with warrant for claiming only that, for instance, "Z has value" might or might not be true. But, because the truth of each element depends solely on the truth of the succeeding element (and there being the required relation), if it can be claimed of the final element only that it might or might not be true, there is warrant for claiming of the first element--that is, that which is to be justified--only that it might or might not be true. In the end everything depends on the final element, but this dependence is always misplaced. The only reason it is final is that there is

nothing to be said either for or against it.

If systematically extrinsic justification is impossible, all possible justification must be at least in part intrinsic. The ontology of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is, there are only things and relations between things. To make it an evaluative distinction one need only add, only things can have value. If a thing is not valuable because of what it is, if it does not have intrinsic value, it must be valuable (assuming that it is) because it stands in some relation, whether direct or not, to something which is valuable because of what it is. Just as one might explain something by showing how it relates to something already understood (that is, as in Part I above, explain it extrinsically), one might justify something by showing that it relates to something already assumed to be justified. But, it is only because one assumes the latter justified that one thinks systematically extrinsic justification possible. Systematically extrinsic justification for some limited purposes might be all that is needed. But, a general, philosophical justification must always be at least in part intrinsic. What, then, is intrinsic justification?

In intrinsic justification one shows a thing to have value because of the sort of thing it is, not because it stands in relation to something else of value. One argues, W has value because W is x, y, and z, and because x, y, and z have value. Downie, Loudfoot and Telfer argue that education is justified because it involves self-realization. Oakeshott argues that "education proper" is justified because its very aim is personal autonomy. And Peters argues that education, as it is understood in "Criteria of Education", is justified because fundamentally it involves preparing a person to make a rational assessment of alternatives.

To justify an intrinsic value claim it must be shown that both, the thing in question is such and such, and it has value because it is such and such. Intrinsic justification goes wrong, then, if it assumes that the thing in question is or involves something it is (or does) not. A particular justification might assume the thing is more than it is, that is, it includes extrinsic elements, or that

it is less than it is, that is, it excludes intrinsic elements. Intrinsic justification of education depends for its validity on a correct analysis of education, but it is just here, we have argued, that Downie et al, Oakeshott, and Peters (see Chapter 5) go wrong. All fail for lack of comprehensiveness, for excluding elements which are in fact intrinsic. Downie et al include the theoretical but exclude the practical. Oakeshott includes "education proper" but excludes education "generally" (perhaps because he does not see how important for autonomy the latter is as well). And Peters includes knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective, and then the specifically rational virtues generally, but excludes the possibility of education consisting solely in information, skills, practical understanding (perhaps because he over-emphasizes the education/training and education/upbringing distinctions).

There is a reason for the participant's characteristic failure to give a general account of education, a reason connected with the fact that he also, and also characteristically, fails to give a fundamental account. The participant typically begins with an account of how he thinks education should be (here implicitly or explicitly arguing with other participants who do not share his view). Downie et al think education should involve the realization only of the theoretical "self" (perhaps arguing with Dewey and Rousseau). Oakeshott thinks education should only involve schooling (clearly arguing with educational 'de-schoolers'). Peters thinks education should always involve perspective, propositional knowledge, theoretical understanding (perhaps arguing with a theorist such as Pestalozzi). One sides with the teacher of academic subjects, and opposes the teacher of of practical subjects. One sides with the traditional educator, and opposes the progressive. And one sides with "educated people and those who are professionally concerned with education", and opposes (though not without the significant qualification mentioned above) trainers and parents.

Having stated his position, the participant then tries to justify it. He appeals to what he takes to be the nature of education. One simply asserts that education does not involve the "whole man". One appeals, quite plausibly,

to the notion of autonomy. And one, again quite plausibly, appeals to the notion of rational belief and conduct. But, how does the participant know that he is now dealing with the nature of education? How does he know he is not dealing with a feature which is only more fundamental than those with which he opened his account? The spectator, the analyst who deals in extrinsic explanation, can only assume education to be that which stands in the specified relation to something else. He can only do so because he assumes rather than examines the nature of education. Similarly, the participant can only assume that his justification makes appeal to what is most fundamental in education. He can only do so because he assumes rather than examines the fundamental differences between education and other things, it being in only this way that the nature of education is revealed. Further, having typically failed to reach the fundamental, the participant is forced to argue that education excludes elements which are in fact intrinsic to it. He claims to be education what is in fact only one of two or more aspects of education, all of which are deducible from what is in fact the nature of education.

Section III Preparation for Independence

Chapter 5 Education

Extrinsic or spectator views typically fail because they miss the point. If education is explained solely in terms of how it relates to only one of an indefinite number of other things, the chances of the relationship proving particularly illuminating are not very great. Some failures, however, are more illuminating than others. In Chapters 1 and 2 we discussed views in which education is explained either in terms of the development of a certain kind of individual (one who is virtuous, religious), or in terms of preparing an individual for a certain kind of social situation (the occupation of a social role, membership in society itself). We concluded that education is not the development of a particular individual, but neither is it the development of just any individual; and that if education is a kind of preparation it is not preparation for any of the situations we have so far considered. We also concluded that of the two a preparation view would have more explanatory power. If education is preparation for a certain state of affairs, educational development can be distinguished from development which is either non- or mis-educational, and many, but not all kinds of development might be equally educational.

Intrinsic or participant views typically fail because, even though by definition they cannot "miss the point", the accounts they offer are at best either incomplete or partial. In focusing attention on one, more or less fundamental aspect of education, but not, as extrinsic views do, on how education as a whole is to be distinguished from other things, intrinsic views cannot but fail in giving a general account of education. Nonetheless, we found that there was reason to emphasize the theoretical as opposed to the practical, and initiation into a "human" as opposed to a "local" inheritance, the reason being their connection with autonomy. And we concluded that though a view stated simply in terms of the acquisition of knowledge

and understanding only served to raise problems it itself could not solve--problems both of completeness (what knowledge? what understanding?) and of possible partiality (why not other mental qualities?)--if, more fundamentally, education anticipates a situation in which a person is to think and act for himself, rather than relying on the authority or customs of others--in other words, a situation very like one of autonomy--then preparation for such a situation would justify both the acquisition of knowledge and understanding generally (as well as other mental qualities), and a distinction between knowledge and understanding which is more or less educationally important. On the basis of our investigation so far, then, we have at least some reason to believe both that education is a kind of preparation and that what it prepares for is a situation very like one of autonomy, very like one of having to think and act for oneself.

Of those notions intrinsic to education perhaps the most illuminating is that of training. Indeed, education and training are often confused. In the first part of this chapter it will be argued that education, like training, is a kind of preparation, but that whereas training is preparation to do something, education is preparation for a certain kind of situation. Of those notions extrinsic to education perhaps the most useful is that of upbringing. Upbringing, as Peters says, is an older and undifferentiated concept of education itself. In the second part of this chapter it will be argued that education is a part of upbringing, specifically the part of preparing a child for adulthood. Education, however, is not confined to childhood, and thus a general account cannot employ the term 'adult'. It will be argued that childhood is a situation of dependence, adulthood one of independence. And in the third and final part of the chapter it will be argued that education generally is preparation for independence, not, as Rousseau thinks, for "liberty" or freedom.

Education and training are closely enough related to be often confused. In "Criteria of Education" Peters distinguishes them in terms of different but related states of

mind. He says, "'trained' suggests the development of competence in a limited skill or mode of thought whereas 'educated' suggests a linkage with a wider set of beliefs." (32) In support of this "hypothesis" Peters adduces the following evidence. First, "we talk more naturally of educating the emotions than we do of training them...because (whereas) the different emotions are differentiated by their cognitive core" (Ibid), and thus, if "we are contemplating changing people's emotional attitudes...our main task consists in trying to get them to see the world differently", if "we speak, as we sometimes do, of training the emotions, the implications are different." "We think, for instance, of schooling a person not to give way to grief in a public place and to show courage in the face of danger and adversity. There is no suggestion of transforming a person's appraisal of the situation by working on his beliefs." "'Training' suggests the acquisition of appropriate...habits of response in limited conventional situations; it lacks the wider cognitive implications of 'education'." (33)

Second, "we speak of 'training the will' rather than of 'educating' it. For 'will' is associated with holding steadfast to some principle, purpose or plan in the face of temptation and distraction. Its sphere of operation is defined by the purpose at hand; it is a reinforcement of purpose, not a source of alternative purposes." (Ibid) With education, on the other hand, there is no comparable "purpose at hand" to "define" its "sphere of operation". Third, "we talk naturally of 'the training of character'... because, in one sense of 'character', when we talk of people as 'having character', what we have in mind is the development of persistence, incorruptability, and integrity in relation to their practice of principles." "We might, on the other hand, be thinking of 'character' in a more non-commital sense, as when we speak of a person's character or character-traits. 'The training of character' would then suggest efforts to ensure reliability of response in accordance with a code. This would essentially be a rather limited sort of operation. It would not suggest any endeavour to get the trainee to understand the 'reason why'

of things. When, on the other hand, we speak of 'moral education' we immediately envisage tackling people's beliefs." (34)

Finally, "to make the...point even more sharply: 'sex education' consists in initiating adolescents into a complicated set of beliefs about the working of the body, personal relationships, and social institutions. 'Sex training' consists in passing on various skills to do with making love." And, "'physical training' suggests merely disciplining the body in relation to a narrowly conceived end such as physical fitness", whereas "'physical education' suggests the cultivation of physical fitness as a necessary foundation for a balanced way of life." (Ibid) In conclusion Peters says that "the general point...illustrated by these examples is that the concept of 'training' has application when a skill or competence has to be acquired which is to be exercised in relation to a specific end or function or in accordance with the canons of some specific mode of thought or practice." "With 'education', however, the matter is very different; for a person is never described as 'educated' in relation to any specific end, function, or mode of thought." (Ibid)

The hypothesis to be tested was that education and training are to be distinguished as resulting in two distinct but related states of mind. Belief and understanding are to be contrasted with skill and competence. In testing the hypothesis the difference is explained in terms of different purposes education and training are said to have. Training, it is said, is concerned with a "purpose at hand", a "narrowly conceived end", "a specific end or function". Education, on the other hand, is said to concern non-specific ends--in the case of physical education, for example, a "balanced way of life". If we accept the explanation, however, we must reject the hypothesis. For whatever state of mind would count as 'trained' depends solely on the "end" or "function" involved. Training a competent lover is not the same as training a competent lawyer. The former, perhaps, need only involve the acquisition of skills and competences; but in training a lawyer not only is the first requirement the acquisition of knowledge and understanding,

there is little if any scope for the acquisition of skills and competences. It might be objected that 'legal education' has still wider "cognitive implications", and this no doubt would have been plausible when law students did little more than read and study important cases. But, legal training has come to involve the acquisition of a general knowledge and understanding of the law: legal education has become a part, and only a part, of legal training. Training does always take a specific end or function, but some ends are more specific than others. And education generally is indeed non-specific and non-functional. But, what mental qualities are acquired in training depends solely on the end or function involved-- a point which, incidentally, Peters neither denies nor I think would find objectionable. In fact, he seems to accept the point when, in Democratic Values and Educational Aims, he says, "by training is meant knowledge and skill devised to bring about some specific end." (464) (emphasis mine)

Training is a kind of preparation or getting ready. It is preparation to do something, to perform some function. Peters makes the point that "if it is said that a person is 'trained' the questions 'To do what?', 'For what?', 'As what?', 'In what?' are appropriate; for a person cannot be trained in a general sort of way." ("Criteria of Education", p. 34) And, in being trained for, in or as something, the "something" refers to some behavior, or set of behaviors. To train in the law is to prepare for legal practice: to train as a swimmer is to prepare to swim competitively: to train for a race is to prepare to run in it. A person cannot be trained in a general sort of way for, if he could, it should make sense for him to be both trained (successfully) and not able to do anything. In preparing to do something the qualities developed depend solely on what is to be done. Whatever might effect performance is relevant. General knowledge and understanding of the world might be of little use to the sprinter, but all important to the metaphysician. Skills and competences might be of only limited value to the historian, but essential for the lathe operator. Consider Peters's example of "training the emotions". To train the emotions is to prepare a person to act in certain ways,

e.g., "not to give way to grief in a public place", "to show courage in the face of danger and adversity". There is no suggestion of "transforming a person's appraisal of the situation by working on his beliefs" because, first, there are more straightforward ways of getting him to act in the required way and, second, there is no guarantee that he will so act even if there were to be success in changing his beliefs. And yet, if it is a person's appraisal of the situation which prevents him from acting, training can involve changing a person's beliefs. The rugby football coach gets the player to tackle coolly, and thus efficiently, by getting him to see his opponent merely as a moving body to be stopped, not, for instance, as is often the case, as a 'criminal' to be 'punished'. Again, consider Peters's example of "training the will". Not only is the will to act directly related to the act itself, but being well prepared to do something, being well trained, is being both able and willing to do it. In sport this is known as the "problem of motivation". The "specific end or function" training always takes, then, is some behavior or set of behaviors, the reason being that training is always preparation to do something.

Education, like training, is a kind of preparation, but rather than preparation to do something, it is preparation for some state of affairs. The important difference between the two is that whereas training anticipates acting in a certain way, education anticipates a situation in which any one of a number of different actions is possible. In training a person one wants to so act that, as a result of what one does, he does something well. In educating him, on the other hand, one wants so to act that, as a result, in the situation anticipated he does well. Given that a number of things he might do might all be equally good, in educating, unlike in training him, one cannot anticipate that he will do any one thing. Education is, in this sense, "non-specific" and "non-functional". Sex training anticipates a lover, sex education cannot. For neither chastity nor less-than-skillful loving need indicate less-than-adequate preparation for life as a mature sexual being. And whereas physical training anticipates use of the body in a number of

quite definite ways, physical education can only assume that in a "balanced way of life" the body must be used (in some way) and thus that it should be healthy and its 'owner' sufficiently knowledgeable to keep it healthy. In training generally what the trainee is to do is already decided: it is only after a decision has been made that training for it can begin. In education, on the other hand, what the educand is to do remains open--or, at least, it does within certain limits. Though there are, in any situation, things which should not be done, within these limits it is the educand, not the educator, who chooses what he is to do. Preparing a person to meet a situation is preparing him to make what would count, given the sort of situation, and given the sort of person he is, as a good <u>choice</u> about what he is to do.

Consider the difference between vocational education and training. Vocational training is preparation to take up a particular vocation. Vocational education, on the other hand, is preparation for a situation in which it is assumed that, in order to do well, the educand must have a vocation, but which vocation is not specified. In the former the concern is that the trainee come both to want and to be able to do what the vocation will demand of him. Or, if this is not possible, as for the most part it is not, the concern is that the trainee will so be prepared that on taking up and practising the vocation he will be willing and able to learn what is required of him. In vocational education, however, the concern is only that the educand want and be able to take up a vocation, if available, one for which he is suited. Rather than concentrate on a particular vocation, one might want him to acquire some familiarity with a wide range, the point being that he acquire the knowledge and understanding on which to base what for him would be a good choice.

Vocational education can be contrasted with liberal education. In the former, but not the latter, the situation anticipated is one in which the educand will have a vocation. In liberal education what is anticipated is the most general of all possible situations, namely, one in which as a human being the educand confronts other human beings.

There is nothing the educand must do: there is no liberal training to correspond to liberal education. In a society such as ours, however, few have either the means or the talents to live well without at least some sort of vocation, and so, whether in school or graduate school or on the job itself, liberal education gives over to both vocational education and training. Finally, consider the difference between education and training within a particular vocation. As long as the teacher was someone who did this, that and the other thing, teacher training was adequate. Now, however, the teacher is a professional, that is, someone who assumes a greater responsibility and a greater freedom in deciding what he is to do. What is required is not preparation to do anything in particular, but preparation for a situation in which he is, within limits of course, to decide for himself what he is to do. If he is to choose what to teach, he must understand the principles involved in making such a choice: he must understand curriculum theory. If he is to choose how to teach, he must have knowledge of learning theory. Teacher training must become teacher education.

Preparation is always for something in the future. And for anything in the future one can be either prepared or not, either well or ill prepared. Depending on what it is for, however, preparation, like education, might be lifelong. The situation prepared for might be one a person is in until released by death, and a person might go on until then becoming better and better able to deal with it. A person's future consists in doings and happenings, in things he does and in things which happen to him. Being prepared to do something, assuming it can be done, is, at its widest, having done prior what is sufficient to ensure doing it successfully. 'He was prepared to do X' is sufficient (though of course not particularly illuminating) explanation of his having done it successfully. And 'He was not prepared to do X' is sufficient (if unilluminating) explanation for his not succeeding in doing it. Two sorts of failure in preparation can be distinguished. Either the person failed to prepare himself (that is, trained himself) to do X, or he failed to prepare 'the world' for his doing it. With respect to the second sort of failure: if he is prevented from doing X, for

example, by someone's interfering, because prior to doing it he did not take steps to forstall interference, it can be said that he failed to prepare adequately to do X.

Preparing for something's happening, on the other hand, is doing prior to its occurrence what is sufficient either to maximize the value or to minimize the dis-value of its happening. 'He was prepared for X' and 'He was not prepared for X' are sufficient explanations for its going either well or ill for him. A happening might be an event or a state of affairs. The reason education is said both to stop at a certain time (e.g., at the age of 16) and also to be life-long is that it is preparation for a state of affairs which, unlike events in a person's life, at least in the case of educating children, begins at a certain time (it is argued below when they reach adulthood), a beginning for which preparations are made, and then continues until death during which time adults typically become even better prepared for, and thus better able to cope in adulthood. ('On-the-job education' one might say.) The state of affairs is given; what is not given is the person's own state and the state of his 'world'. To prepare for a trip abroad, not only might one read-up on the various countries one plans to visit, sample locally what passes for the various national foods and drinks; one might also purchase sun hat and sandals, put in a few hours under the sun lamp. One cannot acquire an education in the shops, however, the difference between being educated and uneducated being a difference in the sort of person one is, not the sort of hat one wears. Education is preparation <u>for</u> a certain kind of situation. It must be assumed, however, that it is always preparation <u>of</u> a person. This is not to suggest that the state of one's 'world' is educationally irrelevant. But, insofar as it is, education is preparing a person for that world, not so altering it that, unchanged, he is prepared for it, not, for example, eliminating the 'adult world' (as attractive as that alternative might be), but preparing children for it.

One can prepare oneself for some states of affairs simply by clenching one's teeth. For what, then, is education a preparation?

The Concise Oxford Dictionary says that education is the bringing up (of the young). In "Aims of Education--A Conceptual Inquiry" Peters distinguishes an "older and undifferentiated" concept of education which he says "refers to any process of bringing up or rearing" (55). And Dewey, in Democracy and Education, says that education is "a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating process. All these words mean that it implies attention to the conditions of growth. We also speak of rearing, raising, bringing up--words which express the difference of level which education aims to cover. Etymologically" he says "the word education means just a process of leading or bringing up." (10) What is it, then, to 'bring up' the young?

X's bringing up Y implies changing the spatial relationship in which they stand by changing Y's relative position. Bringing up implies raising, but, unlike raising, <u>bringing</u> up implies that the level to which Y is brought is the one on which X already stands. Further, bringing up implies bringing to, but, unlike bringing to, bringing <u>up</u> implies a certain direction Y must travel. Bringing up the young, then, is so changing their spatial location that they come to stand on the same level as the 'old', the direction of movement being up. Why 'up'? Age might be associated greater, and youth with lesser physical stature. Or, growing old might be likened to climbing a ladder, scaling a mountain. Are we then to suppose that the old <u>make</u> the young bigger or older? The old are assumed to be 'above' the young. And people generally are 'above' or 'below' others, they 'go up' or 'come down' in the world, 'fall below' or 'come up to' standards. 'Up' is used as a metaphor for betterment or improvement. In bringing up the young, then, the old are raising them to a standard which they (their 'betters') have attained already.

Who are the 'old'? The 'young' are children, the 'old' adults: parents bring up their children to be adults. It is not, however, as has been said, what age, but rather what standard must be achieved before the young become adult. In "Some Recent Developments in Philosophy of Education in Europe" Langeveld says, for example, that "adults

are...defined by their responsibility." (100-01) "If education...is a process, among other things, of weaning in a figurative as well as in a literal sense, then evidently it is not supposed to go on for ever. It seems to be a process of emancipation. Morally, the child gradually ceases to be carried around and has to stand on his own feet. This means not only to go when and where he wants, but also to cope with the consequences of that freedom, that is, to be responsible." (100) "We must ask what it is...that (educators) are engaged in." "It is" says Langeveld "helping people to take responsibility for their own acts...Children don't stay small and they can't run a world...It is precisely the children or the young in general who can <u>not</u> be held responsible. They did not ask for their lives, they live initially in complete dependency...The aim of education, then, is not just independence or self-reliance, but taking and bearing complete responsibility." (85-6)

If being adult is, as Langeveld says it is, being responsible, then there are some quite close, but inexact, connections between some of the views we have discussed and the notion of upbringing. Thus, for example, the person who assumes responsibility for what he does is closely related to the person who, as Peters describes him, bases his thought and action on his own assessment of alternatives. In taking responsibility, however, he might either succeed or fail. Whether he does depends, as Peters suggests, in part on the sort of belief or action involved: choosing a doctor is not the same as conducting one's own open heart operation. But, whether one succeeds depends generally on how well one is <u>prepared</u> to assume responsibility. And upbringing, though it includes, as we shall see, preparation (as well as education), also extends beyond it. Again, we have discussed education in terms of learning, of acquiring knowledge and understanding, and the adult, the more experienced of the two, has learned more, has acquired more knowledge and understanding than the child. But, he will also have <u>mis</u>-learned more, have acquired, for instance, more false beliefs and more and better ways to <u>mis</u>-understand. It is only the adult prepared to assume responsibility who, because of the connection between having knowledge

and understanding, rather than their contraries, and thinking and acting well, will have had his false beliefs corrected and his mis-understandings eliminated, only he who will have learned without mis-learning.

Whether a person is well brought up depends in part, but only in part, on how well he has been prepared to assume responsibility. The child is brought up; he does not bring himself up. When he assumes (or has thrust upon) responsibility for what he <u>does</u>, it is not he but his parents who are responsible for the sort of person he <u>is</u>. Our upbringing explains the young adult we once were. We speak of the sort of home and community in which we lived, family customs and practices, parental rules and whims to which we were subject. We speak of ourselves as the products of a world over which we had no (or only very little) control. Our education was a part, but only a part of that world. The sort of person we became was determined by everything which happened in it, and yet not everything happened as it did just because we were being educated. Some parents think occasionally of themselves and, when they think of us, it is not always of our future. And being educated is not being a certain sort of person; it is, we have argued, being a person (any person) who meets certain (as yet unspecified) requirements. Further, once we assume responsibility, once we become adult, our upbringing ceases: we have been brought up. But, is Langeveld correct when he says that <u>education</u> "always tries to free the older generation from its task of looking after children", that "<u>education</u> is never a life-long process"? What are we to think of the "Dutchman" when we hear that "'adult education' is good English but I am a Dutchman if I believe that it really makes sense in essentially educational terms"? (100) This could be the case only if 'adult' is being used to refer to a certain kind of person, and if being educated is being that kind of person. A person is either adult or not, educated or uneducated: 'adult education' is self-contradictory. Upbringing might cease when a person becomes adult, but education need not. A person who <u>has</u> responsibility need not <u>be</u> responsible; the adult might be educated, uneducated, mis-educated. In fact, Langeveld seems to accept

this distinction. He says that "education is preparatory. Adulthood is not only a matter of mature personality, it is also a social attribute, the recognition by society that a person has reached an age and position roughly defined by custom or law. Adulthood is not only assumed by the young person, it is also, irrespective of his wishes, conferred on him." (101) At a certain age the youth becomes adult, acquires responsibility; but it might only be as he grows old that he acquires a "mature personality", becomes responsible in his belief and conduct. Education, then, is not only only a part of upbringing, it is also something which can continue long after upbringing has been brought to a close.

It is the child who is brought up. But, what is a child? Relative to other humans he is younger, weaker, slower, physically smaller and less well developed. He is less experienced, less knowledgeable, less able, lacking in understanding, immature. And unlike the adult he is unable to bring children into the world. Dewey says that for some purposes the adult should be as the "little child", the implication being that the latter has "positive" as well as "negative" qualities, qualities the adult lacks, rather than those which, relative to the adult, are defined as lacks. The child is sometimes said to be 'imaginative', adults presumably being 'realistic'; but might not the 'imagination' of the child, unlike that of the adult, merely be ignorance, or, more plausibly, the wilful ignorance of the person who naively re-makes the world in accordance with his own wishes? The child is said to be 'innocent', the adult no doubt 'corrupt'; but rather than the positive ethical quality an adult might possess, might not 'innocence' in the child merely be inexperience? The child 'plays' while the adult 'works'; but are these descriptions of two different and, depending on the circumstances, equally valuable attitudes--as, for example, 'childlike' and 'mature' might describe adult attitudes--or are they rather, as Dearden suggests, descriptions of two different, and opposed kinds of moral status, the one non-serious, or non-moral, the other "serious"? The ability to imagine how things might be, while at the same time knowing how things

in fact are: innocence co-existent with experience: the ability to be both serious and non-serious depending on circumstances--all are positive qualities a person might have. It is not clear, however, they are qualities which distinguish the child.

Children are adults, only less so. And yet 'child' and 'adult' are contradictories, not contraries. A person is either child or adult. And, assuming adolescents to be children, all persons are either adult or child. Being adult is being not-child, and vice versa. The child is young, weak, slow, inexperienced, ignorant, unable and morally not-responsible--in a word, he is immature. The adult is old, strong, fast, experienced, knowledgeable, able and morally responsible--that is, mature. The realities from which 'child' and 'adult', like 'masculine' and 'feminine', derive are only different, but the terms themselves are opposites. When we describe a six-year-old as a 'little adult', or a sixty-year-old as 'childlike', the force of the description depends on the fact that in doing so the hearer's expectations are contradicted. A child is one sort of person, living one sort of life; and adult is and lives another. Preparation for adulthood, then, is preparation for not-childhood.

What sort of life is childhood? Adults are mutually-dependent. Cooperation amongst equals, even amongst leaders and followers, is necessary if all are to survive. Children, on the other hand, are dependent. They depend on adults, but adults do not, at least not in the same way, depend on them. Though an adult might find himself in a situation in which to survive he must depend on a child, the child, as we have described him, is unlikely to be of much help. When old and unable to care for himself a parent might depend on his child, but if his dependence is not to have been misplaced by then his child had best be an adult. The child, on the other hand, in a simple and straightforward way, depends for his survival on the adult. He must eat, eat the right things, but at first he does not understand, does not know what it edible. The adult must explain nutrition to him, or at least show him what to eat, if necessary, compel him to eat it. The child must care for

his health, but at first he does not know what risks injury or disease. He depends on the adult to protect him, to restrict him, to tell him what risks there are. As Peters and Kant point out, humans are not particularly well-endowed as far as instinct is concerned. Survival is a matter of learning. But, as learning by trial and error, at least at first, might be fatal, the child depends on the adult to tell him how he (the adult) managed to survive as long as he has.

To survive to adulthood the child must endure a situation which is, with respect to freedom, ambiguous. Protected from the possible consequences of his own ignorance and wilfulness, protected from those who might take advantage of his weakness and stupidity, the child is free from many things the adult is not. Unlike the adult, however, he is not free from the authority a parent must assume if he (the parent) is to provide adequate protection. The necessity of protection creates a situation in which the child is not free to do those things which place his survival at risk. He is, however, free to do some things which, if done by an adult, would place him at risk, but which, because of the protection of the adult, the child can do safely, if not always with impunity. Being dependent on the adult, it is the latter who assumes responsibility both for the child and for what he does. But, irresponsibility involves both freedom and bondage: the child is not responsible, but responsibility still exists and it exists with another, one who might have to coerce the child in order to meet his responsibilities. The child is, as it were, free to do what he pleases, but only in a padded cell for which the adult holds the key.

How does this situation come about? Adults (for the most part) knowingly and voluntarily act such that as a result of their action a being comes into a world in which without care he will not survive, without nurture he will continue to need care, and who will eventually face a situation in which, his parents having pre-deceased him, he must, but without preparation he cannot, care for himself. It is as if without his consent an adult were to be transported to the antipodes where, without the possibility of

escape, he depends for his survival solely on his ageing and progressively weakening kidnapper. In becoming a parent one assumes responsibility for care, nurture and preparation of one's child. Few are compelled to become parents; but, if they are, though they are not, those who compelled them are responsible for the child. Few have intercourse without at the same time knowing that pregnancy and birth are possible; but, when knowledge was neither definite nor widespread, it was not so much the adult who was seen to have responsibility for the child, but the child who had a duty to the adult because of all that the latter (no doubt solely out of the goodness of his heart) did for him. Adults have children to propagate the species, contribute to the national cause, continue the family name, to have someone to love, someone who will love in return, someone to help around the house, even someone just to care for and nurture. There are all sorts of reasons adults have for wanting children, but they have them because they want them, not because they are compelled to have them--because the 'urge' is 'irresistable'--and not because they are prone repeatedly to make silly mistakes.

The situation of the child, as we have so far described it, is one in which, having been, without his knowledge or consent, brought into a world where on his own he cannot survive, those responsible for his entrance assume an obligation to care for, to nurture (or bring up), and to prepare him for the time when (as it must be anticipated), the responsible parties being dead, the child must care for himself. The situation, of course, is not as simple as this. Given the sort of creatures they are, and given the the sort of world in which they are condemned to live, in order to survive humans must cooperate with each other. We are, and we make ourselves mutually-dependent, and we acknowledge our dependence in cooperative, as opposed to purely self-seeking thought and behavior. Cooperative individuals become members of a community when they acknowledge themselves 'parts' of a greater 'whole', that is, individuals with a part to play in something upon which all depend. Parts are defined in terms of rights and duties: individuals become subject to praise and blame, reward and

punishment, depending on how well they fulfill their duties, how well they exercise their rights. Individuals restrict and control their behavior (or others do it for them) in order that the community, without which they could not survive, be preserved. Communal, as opposed to merely cooperative behavior is intended to be, amongst other things, predictable, life in a community more secure. In the former everyone is 'in it together'. In the latter there is nothing to be 'in'. Contributing to something seen to be separate from, but something upon which all individuals depend is, for everyone but the supremely strong and the supremely confident, a better arrangement than having to scratch another's back in the hope that he will scratch one's own in return.

In a community the situation of the child is as follows. He enters unable to fulfill the duties, or make good use of the rights, which members assume, and yet his very membership, apart from which he cannot survive, depends on his being able to do so. If the community is to assume, as it must assume, the right to expect the child to fulfill his duties, and to make responsible use of his rights, it must also assume an obligation to prepare him to do so. Whether the child lives up to expectation depends on the situation he is in, the life and experience he has, the things he learns. The situation in turn depends on adult behavior, behavior which is subject to communal control and restriction. Two general sorts of situation can be distinguished. In the first, the knowledge and abilities to be acquired by the child, and the demands placed by the community on adults, are such that at home, without much in the way of formal instruction, and what there is given by parents or other family members themselves, the child can be adequately prepared to assume the rights and duties of full membership in the community. In the second, either the knowledge and abilities to be acquired, or the demands placed by the community on adults, are such that home preparation is impossible. Not all adults, for example, have the knowledge and abilities to transmit, or, if they have, they have not the time or the talent, or the time to acquire the talent, to do the transmitting. The responsibil-

ity of the community in the first situation is to ensure that home preparation continues to be possible. In the second, in order to fulfill its responsibility the community must become more directly involved. It must assume direct responsibility for those aspects of the child's preparation which, because of the sort of community it is, the parent at home can not. Social preparation, transmission of specialized knowledge and advanced understanding, would be typical examples.

As a community assumes more and more of the responsibility for preparation, it also assumes more rights in determining in what sort of situation the child is to be. It might, for example, restrict the freedom of adults in choosing whether to have children. Some adults, their likely offspring, or the arrangements a community is in a position to make, might be such that adequate preparation would be impossible, or at least highly unlikely. If, on the other hand, the community allows wide freedom of choice with respect to becoming a parent, it might limit freedom in the exercise of parental authority. Most important, it might restrict the length of time during which that authority can, by custom or by law, be exercised. Parents might want to free themselves of responsibility for their children as soon as they are big enough and strong enough at least to make it sufficient distance from home that, being out of sight and mind, whatever might happen to them need not be of concern. (No doubt the 'urge' was 'irresistable'.) Other parents might want to make their children dependent on them for as long as they (the parents) continue to live, might want servants they could not otherwise afford, or subjects for an authority they would not otherwise be able to exercise. In its own interests, however, and in the interests of children of course, the community might assume the right to decide on an age between the above extremes when the child <u>shall</u> be (by law or by custom), and when it is assumed that he <u>will</u> be, prepared for adulthood, adulthood then being something both conferred (or thrust) upon, and something achieved by the child.

Children, given the sort of situation they are in, and given the sort of creatures they are, are, as Langeveld

says, not responsible for what they think and do. More fundamentally, however, they are, and their situation makes them, dependent creatures. Not only are they dependent on adults to care for, to nurture and to prepare them; they are dependent on adults to take responsibility for them, it being adults who are responsible for their being and their being dependent. Education is a kind of preparation. Its place in the bringing up of children, we have argued, is in preparing them for adulthood. If childhood is a situation of dependence then adulthood, the contradictory of childhood, is a situation of independence. Education generally, not merely child education, then, must be preparation for independence, a part of which, but only a part, is preparation to take responsibility. And child education must be preparation for a situation in which the child is no longer dependent on the parental adult, a part of which would involve him in taking responsibility for his own care and, if the word can be so used, his further 'nurture'.

Independence is the contradictory of dependence. "X is dependent on (or independent of) Y" is the same as "X is (or is not) contingent on Y". Contingency (or dependence) can be either logical or empirical. The truth of a conclusion is contingent upon the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument. The life of a plant, on the other hand, is contingent upon carbon dioxide in the air and nutrients in the soil. Only empirical entities, that is, persons, can be educated or uneducated, and thus our concern is empirical, not logical contingency. X is (empirically) contingent on Y if, without Y, X could not exist. For our purposes, then, "X is independent of (or dependent on) Y" is the same as "Without Y, X could (or could not) exist." No one thing, in a closed causal system, is independent of everything. There is nothing of which it can be said that regardless of what else changes it would still exist. Independence, then, is always <u>of something</u>. Conversely, no one thing is dependent on everything. An event, for instance, can not depend on contemporaneous or future events. Dependence is always <u>on something</u>. Further, no one thing is everything, and thus nothing can depend or not depend on

something else for everything. Both dependence and independence are always <u>for something</u>. "X is dependent (or independent)" is logically incomplete. It is elliptical for "X is dependent on (or independent of) Y for (or with respect to) Z."

How can a person be independent? Of what, and with respect to what, can a person be non-contingent? Consider the following possibility. X is independent of Y with respect to Z. Let 'X' refer to the self, 'Y' to everything other than the self, 'Z' to everything with respect to which the self can be independent of everything else. The self is thus non-contingent, sufficient unto itself, self-sufficient. Self-sufficiency is a species of independence, the least qualified species imaginable. Nothing, and thus no one, is literally self-sufficient, and yet the term is used to describe the situation in which at least some people find themselves. The notion of personal self-sufficiency involves distinctions between a person and all other persons, and between who a person is and what he does. A person is self-sufficient if he does not depend on others for what he does. Being self-sufficient is <u>not</u> a matter of a person's relationship with the natural environment--everyone is dependent in this respect. Nor is it a matter of how a person came to be the sort of person he is--the concern is what Crusoe does, not his history, the latter involving, as it does for everyone, dependence on others for the sort of person he came to be.

In a mutually-dependent world, unlike the world in which Crusoe, at least at first, found himself, there is nothing a person does which is not at least in some way dependent on what others do. Though we do not always depend on active cooperation, we always do depend on non-interference. We, on our island, depend on others much as Crusoe, on his, depends on nature. We are our own environment. How can independence in a mutually-dependent world be understood? Independence is closely related to freedom or liberty. Rousseau characterizes the situation for which education prepares as one of freedom, the situation of the educand presumably being one of a lack of liberty. We have seen, however, that the situations of both adult and child

are, with respect to freedom, ambiguous. Whether the one is free, and the other not, depends on what they are supposed to be free from and free to do. How, then, is independence to be distinguished from freedom?

The contradictory of freedom is compulsion. To be compelled to do something is to be in a situation in which one has as we say 'no choice' but to do it. 'No choice' is doubly ambiguous. First, it can be intended either literally or as an ellipsis for 'no reasonable choice'. There is literally no choice involved in psychotic and in physically-forced behavior; but when a person is told to "Dance!" by someone holding a Colt 45 to his (the dancer's) head, though he chooses to dance rather than die, because the choice was not a reasonable one he was compelled, he had 'no choice' but to dance. Second, 'choice' can be intended in any one of three ways. It can be a <u>choice</u> made, an <u>option</u> one might choose, or it can be the act of <u>choosing</u> itself. Thus, 'no reasonable choice' can mean, not making a reasonable choice, not having a reasonable option, or it can mean not being in a situation in which it is reasonable to make a choice. Being compelled to do something cannot mean not making a reasonable choice. We choose either reasonably or not. We cannot be blamed for choosing reasonably; but, on this interpretation, neither can we be blamed for not doing so: we were 'compelled' to choose unreasonably. Being compelled to do something cannot mean not having a reasonable option. In the classic compulsory situation there is only one thing a person can do. But, on this second interpretation, if it is reasonable then he is <u>not</u> compelled. Conversely, if a person has to choose from a large number of unreasonable options, whatever he does he must, according to this view, be compelled to do it. But, a person can be blamed for not choosing the least evil thing to do, the implication being that in this situation he is not compelled. To be compelled to do something, then, is either to be in a situation in which there is literally no choice about what one is to do, or, if there is, to be in a situation in which choosing itself is unreasonable.

The whole point of compulsion is to get a person to do something. If not by force, or by drugs, one creates a

situation in which doing the thing is so much to be preferred to doing anything else that the person will do it as it were 'without thinking' (possibly of something else). It is essentially a matter of circumventing a person's independent judgment, of acting 'through' him rather than allowing him to act himself. The clearest cases of compulsion involve such things as physical force, brain washing, drug 'therapy'--cases where there is literally no choice. The sorts of cases we are concerned with, however, are at best 'either/or', 'do or die' cases. The exercise of independent judgment is possible--a person has a clear head, time to think, all the relevant facts to think about. But, though possible, independent judgment is pointless. A judgment has been made already--by someone else: one is presented with a fait accompli: one complies. The cowboy does not <u>choose</u> to dance; he complies with the choice of the gunman. Given the situation he faces, the only way to exercise independent judgment would be by <u>not</u> dancing. The situation is such that it is not reasonable for <u>him</u> to choose, and thus if he dances, if he complies with the other's decision, he was compelled to do so, compelled to dance rather than anything else. If, on the other hand, he does not dance, as it was reasonable for him to choose between compliance and resistance, between life and death, his resistance was voluntary. To be compelled is always to be compelled to do something. It is to be in a situation which precludes doing anything else. The dancer could not reasonably have done anything else. The dead cowboy could.

To be free, then, is to be in a situation which invites, rather than precludes, choosing what to do. If a person's doing something cannot satisfactorily be explained without reference to his choices then he was, at least to some extent, free. As many have argued, rather than contradicting, freedom assumes determinism, freedom concerning whether an act of choice must be <u>included</u> in the causal chain to explain what was done. Included where? There are two possibilities. First, a person chooses to do something, and he does it. Second, he chooses and acts to create a situation in which he is compelled to do something, and he does it--as, for example, in choosing to play and playing a

game, by the rules of which one is subsequently compelled to make a particular move. One is not compelled to continue playing, but, if one decides to do so, the move is compulsory. And, finally, what compels? Of interest are three possibilities. One can be compelled by one's own nature (as in psychotic behavior), by other persons (as in physically-forced behavior), or one can be compelled as we say by 'circumstances' (that is, anything other than ourselves and other persons).

'Compulsion' refers, in some contexts, to a kind of dependence, 'freedom' to a kind of independence. For X to be compelled by Y to do Z is the same as his being (solely) dependent on Y for doing it, the point being that without Y, and only without Y, Z would not have been done. Conversely, for X to be free of or from Y with respect to the doing of Z can be the same as being independent of Y, the point being that, in other circumstances, he would have been dependent on Y for doing it. But, freedom and independence are not the same in all contexts. Freedom concerns whether a person is either in a situation which invites his choosing what to do or whether he has chosen the situation he is in (regardless of how inviting). In both cases freedom primarily concerns the nature of the situation, not the nature of the person who is in it. Becoming free is essentially a matter of so changing one's situation that one's nature, other persons and circumstances no longer compel. If compelled by his nature to drink alcohol, whenever drink is put in front of him, a person becomes free by avoiding situations in which he will be offered drink. If compelled by someone to do things he does not want to do, a person becomes free by avoiding the other's company. And if, given certain circumstances, he must do work he does not enjoy, a person might free himself by so altering his circumstances that he no longer need work at all. Of course the alcoholic might be 'cured', the timid might learn to stand up to the bully, the worker might so change himself that material things no longer seem important. Freedom is a relational notion and thus whether a person is free in part depends on the sort of person he is. But, the important point is that, being a relational notion, freedom can and typically does depend

on other persons and on the situation in which a person finds himself. Being educated, on the other hand, does not depend on others, or on the situation one is in. The difference between being educated and uneducated is a difference in the sort of person one is. One can become free by avoiding bars, moving to another town, or by robbing a bank; but in doing none of these is one necessarily changed, and thus one need not become better educated.

Independence concerns whether a person is in a situation in which he does not depend on others for what he does. X is independent of Y with respect to the doing of Z either if he can do Z himself or if he does not need Z done by anyone. Becoming independent is essentially a matter of so changing oneself that one no longer needs things done or, if one does, one can do them oneself. Independence is not a relational notion: it is personal rather than, as is freedom, inter-personal. Though a person is always independent of someone else, whether he is independent depends not on the sort of person the other is, but rather on the sort of person he is himself. A person becomes independent of his parents when he can care for and direct himself. A person becomes independent of his teachers when he has learned all they know. On the other hand, a person becomes free of, but no less dependent on, parents and teachers when, unable to care for or to direct himself, not knowing very much, he either runs away or is abandoned by them. Broadly speaking, then, whereas freedom is essentially a political and moral notion, independence is essentially educational.

Consider the difference between being free from and independent of authority. To be free is to be in a situation which invites choosing what to do. An authority, like the state, makes choices on behalf of one. To become free from authority a person can do either one of two things. First, he can take control of the state, that is, put himself in the position to make choices. Or, second, he can abolish the state entirely, that is, render the situation one in which no one makes choices on behalf of him, not even himself. To be independent, on the other hand, is not to be dependent on others for what one does. Authorities, like the state, do for one what one cannot do for oneself. To become indepen-

dent of authority a person can do either one of two things. First, he can become the sort of person who does not need done what the state would otherwise do for him, for example, a healthy person, and thus not in need of the NHS. Or, second, he can become the sort of person who can do for himself what the state would otherwise do for him, for example, knowledgeable about, and skilled at nursing himself, and thus, again, not in need of the health service. The significant freedom in a mutually-dependent world is well illustrated by taking control of rather than abolishing authority. In such a world being free is largely a matter of having at least some control over the things upon which one depends. The significant form of independence, on the other hand, is quite different. Rather than take control of that upon which he depends, a person becomes <u>independent</u> of that over which he has <u>no</u> control--he stays healthy or learns to nurse himself, he does not form the ambition of becoming Health Minister. Freedom and independence are sometimes confused because together they suggest as an ideal a situation in which a person depends <u>only</u> on what he controls.

Education is preparation for independence. How is preparing a person for independence to be distinguished from preparing or making an independent sort of person? Given the sort of educand involved, and given the sort of society in which he must live, preparing an independent sort of person might be a very bad way of preparing him for independence. Some people are simply not able to go it alone, and in some societies going it alone is a crime, and thus to develop an independent person would be a way of crippling the educand both personally and socially. Emile, and some Soviet dissidents, however, <u>are</u> able--indeed, it might be that they are <u>un</u>able <u>not</u> to go it alone. The educator would be concerned here that they know exactly what they are getting themselves into, and that they be as well prepared as possible. On the other hand, there are some societies in which <u>not</u> to go it alone is, if not a crime, certainly very much despised. The educand who is either unable or unwilling to do so must know that this is the case and be prepared to live with it--if, that is, like

the dissident, he has not the choice of life in another, more congenial society. Education, as has been said, is not preparing any one sort of person. It is not even necessarily preparing an independent sort of person.

Independence is not seen as a personal ideal--it is, rather, a situation everyone to some extent must face. And even if it were an ideal the aim of education, as has been argued, can not be deduced from it, for it makes just as much sense to reverse the argument and claim that personal ideals can be deduced from the aim of education. Similarly, the aim of education can not be deduced from some supposed social ideal. Society, we argued, depends as much on education as education depends on society. But, if education is preparation for independence would not a society of ideally educated persons be one of a certain kind, namely, an anarchistic society? And if this is the case is there not, contrary to what was said above, a direct dependency relationship between education and society? It is true that if all individuals were ideally well prepared for independence then, because they would have no need for authorities, a society composed solely of such individuals would indeed be anarchistic. But, how are these individuals to be prepared for independence? They are not born prepared and so they must learn. And, what conditions would be necessary before such learning could take place? More important, what but some sort of authority could ensure that these conditions actually obtained? Education and society are mutually-dependent. It is only by supposing us to be other than we are that a relationship of simple, rather than mutual dependence can seem plausible.

Education is preparation for independence. This is a view arrived at primarily by our attempts to overcome the weaknesses of other, rival theses, while at the same time recognizing and fully accounting for the strengths which justified our considering them in the first place. Elyot and Quintilian think education is preparation for leadership. Education, of course, can be practised in an equalitarian society; but, in thinking of education only in a hierarchical society, because the scope of independence is so much greater for the leader than it is for the follower,

it is understandable that Elyot and Quintilian should overlook preparation for followership. Locke thinks education is the development of a virtuous person. At times this seems to mean little more than that the educated person does what he does <u>well</u>, and of course doing well is evidence of having been well prepared to do it. At other times, however, Locke speaks specifically of moral virtue. This is to narrow the scope of educational development (perhaps to bring it into line with a personal ideal), but, nonetheless, there is only a very subtle difference between developing a moral person and preparing a person for moral independence. There is always the possibility, in the latter, that the prepared person will act immorally, but, generally speaking, so acting is evidence of some failure of preparation. Acting morally is, if nothing else, at least as good a strategy as others.

Dewey emphasizes growth itself, rather than growth in any particular direction, and also social growth within a particular society rather than social growth itself. Unlike Elyot and Quintilian, Dewey is thinking of education in what he calls a democratic and progressive society. In such a society the educator cannot predict, at least with any hope of detailed accuracy, what sort of situation the child will find himself in when the independence of adulthood is thrust or conferred upon him. The educator cannot foresee what sort of person the educand will have become, nor can he foresee how society might have changed. If he could, as Elyot and Quintilian could, the educator would prepare the child for independence in the sense of equiping him with all he will need to face the situation. As it is, the educator, according to Dewey, can only prepare him for independence in the sense that when the educand comes to need something he will have the ability and the knowledge to get it for himself. Thus, for Dewey, school or child education and, at least according to his "technical definition", education generally, is aided growth which prepares a person for future unaided growth. In emphasizing development within a particular society, Dewey recognizes that for most people the society into which they were born is likely to remain a permanent feature of their lives, something with which they must learn

to cope. But, learning how to cope with society--like learning how to cope with morality--is not necessarily becoming a person of a certain social 'stamp'. Just as emigration is a possibility for the few, working to change society is the way many come to cope, the way many come to 'fit in'.

Downie et al and Telfer restrict the scope of education to exclude the practical, and Oakeshott to exclude initiation into a merely "local", as opposed to a "human" inheritance. The concern of both is intellectual and cultural independence (or "autonomy"), that is, the concern is with preparing a person to think for himself, rather than leaving him in a position where, if he is to think at all, he must depend for his thoughts on others. Needless to say, 'thinking' does not exhaust the possibilities of independence. And those for whom there are other and no doubt more important things to be getting on with need not, on the whole, be any less well prepared for independence than those who flourish, if not on "outdoor adventure courses", at least in "School".

Finally, Langeveld thinks 'adult education' self-contradictory. It is with children that education is clearly most important. In all societies, whether by custom or law, an age is fixed when, regardless of whether his parents are still able and willing to care for and to direct him, it is assumed the child can take care of himself, it is assumed, that is, that he is responsible for what he does. And if he should fail, the punishments and penalties can be very hard indeed. But, if only in a different and perhaps less important way, adult preparation for independence is still possible. Adult education sewing classes, for example, would not have fulfilled their purpose if the student, on arriving back home, found he could not sew properly independently of his instructor. And, more seriously, recidivism (at least where crime is not a 'way of life', with prison an integral part) pointedly comments on inmates' social education, and on the supposed educational value of punishment itself, the recidivist having failed in trying to live independently of the "padded cell for which (another) holds the key."

Chapter 6 Mis-education

Education is preparation for independence. Preparation for dependence is mis-education. Indoctrination, as will be seen, is preparation for a certain kind of dependence. It is, roughly, so acting that a person comes and continues to be dependent on one for the beliefs he holds. Indoctrination, however, is also preparation for a certain kind of independence. Being dependent on the one, a person is not dependent either on himself or others. The question arises, then, of what place, if any, indoctrination might have in education?

For the participant 'indoctrination' is, to use Cooper's phrase, an "evaluative term", that is, a term used to express, in this case, a negative evaluation. Snook will "assume that indoctrination is always blameworthy." (1972a, p. 4) Hare says, "I believe in a distinction between education and indoctrination; and I believe that indoctrination is a bad thing." (Hollins, p. 47) There are of course spectator, and thus non-evaluative, uses of the term. Flew recognizes this but says he will consider indoctrination only "where it is taken to be a bad thing." (Snook 1972b, p. 86)

Wilson and White are less complacent. Wilson admits that "'indoctrination' represents, to most of us, something pernicious, though we are not quite sure what: an area whose features, if we only knew what they were, we do not want to cross." (Hollins, p. 26) But Wilson does not think indoctrination always unjustified, always a "bad thing". There are, he says, occasions when it is "absolutely necessary" (Snook, 1972b, pp. 20-4), though what these might be he does not say. White agrees that 'indoctrination' "has come to be used pejoratively in most cases". But, he points out, "not in all: the American Army clearly approves of the Indoctrination Courses it arranges for its troops." (Ibid, p. 120) Wilson, however, thinks indoctrination on occasion might be "absolutely necessary" in education. It is not clear White agrees, for in concluding one of his articles he warns that the "moral educator has to be careful that his

pupils do not grow up indoctrinated..." (Ibid, p. 130)

Most of the authors whose work will be discussed assume that indoctrination is a bad thing, bad both morally and educationally. They want to know why. The approach here will be different. Rather than assumed, it will be asked whether, and in what way, indoctrination is specifically mis-educational, the point being to show that this is the same as asking whether, and in what way, indoctrination is preparation for dependence.

Indoctrination is often contrasted with conditioning. (See, for example, Snook 1972a, p. 104ff.) It is said that whereas only behavior can be conditioned, only belief can be indoctrinated. (Wilson in Hollins, p. 17ff.) The significant difference between the two is as follows. Belief (that X) implies some understanding (of X). In classical stimulus-response conditioning, on the other hand, the sort of response obtained is wholly explicable in terms of the stimulous given (and the organism in question). It is because there is no need to posit some intervening variable such as understanding (or intelligence) it is thought the response is conditioned.

Either verbal or (it is inferred) mental behavior might be conditioned. And yet it is primarily on the basis of verbal (and inferred mental) behavior that a person is thought to be indoctrinated. The difference between the two is that in indoctrination, but not in conditioning, to satisfactorily explain observed behavior one must assume the existence of belief (and thus of understanding). A person is asked, "Do you believe in God?" He says, "I believe in God." The question is repeated, and so is the answer. If forced to choose between the two, and if the person involved is only 18 months old, one would say "I believe in God" is a conditioned response, not that the child is indoctrinated to believe in God. Again, the US Army claims to indoctrinate its troops. If soldiers came to believe that the 'chain of command' is something to be broken, 'platoon loyalty' a subject suitable for mockery, or if they failed completely to understand what these phrases, at least for their officers, are supposed to mean,

one would suppose the Indoctrination Courses not to have fulfilled expectations.

People are said to be indoctrinated to 'think' in certain ways. Hare, for example, says that the indoctrinated person does not think for himself; he is a person who, as both Hare and Wilson suggest, allows another, in his absense, to do his thinking for him. 'Thinking' is ambiguous. What a person thinks is not the same as how he thinks. What is thought is roughly equivalent to what is believed, whereas 'how' refers to mental performance or behavior. A person 'thinks politically'. His vocabulary extends not far beyond, 'input', 'output', 'decision-making', 'consensus', 'power'. If forced to choose between the two, and if, thinking ill (or well) of himself, he comes to speak in such a way that others confirm his self-perception, one would say the person had been conditioned to speak (and to think) politically, not, at least not necessarily, that he had been indoctrinated to believe anything in particular. If, however, it were discovered that he speaks as he does because he believes men and societies to be little more than political phenomena, one would have reason, though not as yet sufficient reason, for thinking him indoctrinated.

Indoctrination has 'advantages', advantages which arise because, unlike conditioning, it involves at least some understanding. The US Army wants its troops to obey orders and to identity their personal interest with the interests of their platoon. A soldier might be conditioned to behave in militarily desirable ways, but the scope of conditioning is limited. Some behaviors require understanding the conditioned person does not have. To obey an order to repair his rifle, for example, the soldier must understand what is or what is likely to be wrong with it. Further, because he does not understand what he is doing the conditioned person cannot adapt his behavior in the light of relevant differences between the situation in which he is to act and the situation as it was foreseen when he was conditioned. Having been conditioned always to stay with his platoon, the soldier is unable to act appropriately when, for his platoon to survive, he must leave it and make contact with company command. The scope of conditioning is

limited, but not necessarily so. If one had both unlimited time in which to complete it, and perfect knowledge of the situations it is intended to anticipate, a person could be conditioned to do anything and everything. Wars, however, will not wait.

The advantage of indoctrination is obvious enough. Had the soldier been indoctrinated to believe in the chain of command, and in platoon loyalty, neither of the above-mentioned problems need have arisen. In fact, the successfully indoctrinated soldier is something of a military ideal. In situations in which the lives of many depend on the behavior of a few, the indoctrinated soldier above all else is dependable. And, further, it is only his native capacity and the quality of his training, not the fact of his having been indoctrinated, upon which depends how <u>intelligently</u> reliable the soldier is. Indoctrination, of course, is not unproblematic, not even in the army. The US Army indoctrinates in order to overcome the very real problem of soldiers acting on their own initiative, perhaps foolishly. There are, however, occasions when a command should not be obeyed, when loyalty would be inappropriate, and it is with occasions such as these that the indoctrinated soldier is not able to cope.

Conditioning is not the same as indoctrination, but neither is it a particularly good behavioral analogy. The indoctrinated person has at least some understanding of the object of his belief, but the conditioned person does not understand, or at least it is not because he understands that he thinks and behaves as he does. A better analogy would be with the person who does what he does because that is how he was trained to do it and because, having been trained, the behavior has become habitual. As Hare and Wilson might say, he does not 'think' (manner, not content) for himself, but allows in his absence his trainer to do his thinking for him. The indoctrinated person, as will be seen, cannot adapt his beliefs, nor can the 'trained' person adapt his behavior, should adaptation become necessary. But, the indoctrinated person, in changing circumstances, can intelligently adapt his (primarily verbal) <u>behavior</u> so as to remain consistent with his unchanging belief. And, similar-

ly, the 'trained' person, unlike the person who has been conditioned, can intelligently adapt his other behaviors in order to protect and to preserve his habit. One thinks of the skilled argument of the doctrinaire, of the ingenious defenses of the alcoholic. And one can contrast both of these with the person who, conditioned to respond to argument, to the offer of a drink, when left to his own devices, and without the above stimuli, seems to lose his taste for argument and drink entirely.

Indoctrination poses much the same problem for the educator as it does for the army. It is better that the educand come to do his own thinking (content, not manner). But, if the alternative is that, as it were, no one does any thinking at all, it might be better that the educator acting as an indoctrinator come and continue to do the educand's thinking for him. With this in mind, let us turn to the literature, literature, it should be noted, relevant not just tc the problem of indoctrination, but to the problem of mis-education generally.

Indoctrinating someone involves getting him to believe something. So too would convincing him that his shoes are unlaced. What more does indoctrination involve? Gregory and Woods, Flew, and Wilson all think indoctrination involves getting someone to hold a certain kind of belief. They give epistemological accounts of indoctrination. White, Snook, Hare and Moore, on the other hand, think indoctrination involves getting someone to hold a belief in a certain way. They give psychological accounts of indoctrination. Thus, Gregory and Woods, and Flew, think indoctrination must involve doctrine, Wilson, uncertain belief. Snook and Moore, however, think it involves getting a person to believe something regardless of the evidence, White, fixedly or unshakably. Hare does not attempt a definition of indoctrination. He does say, however, that in indoctrinating one is trying to prevent another thinking for himself. Contained in each view, I think, is a partial account of mis-education. I will argue, however, that only White gives an adequate account of indoctrination, indoctrination being only one, though perhaps the most serious form of mis-education.

Indoctrination, it is said, must involve doctrine. Why? Flew distinguishes doctrine from the sorts of belief a child would acquire in learning to speak French, or learning the multiplication tables. Suppose the beliefs acquired in studying the latter were false. "The faults involved" he says "would not be indoctrination; they would be arithmetical incompetence or malicious dishonesty. Before we can speak of indoctrination we have to be dealing with the imparting of beliefs, whether true or false, which either themselves are, or at least which are closely connected with others which unequivocally are, of that subsort, whatever it may be, which can correctly be described as doctrinal." (Snook, 1972b, pp. 70-1)

Indoctrination, of course, is not the same as "incompetence or malicious dishonesty". As Cooper points out, indoctrinators, more often than not, are quite "sincere", that is, they believe what they teach to be true. And, whether sincere or not, they can be very competent in carrying out their chosen task. But, the fact that indoctrination is not the same as incompetence or lying is not itself a reason for thinking it must involve doctrine. For the argument to be valid one must assume there to be only five relevant possibilities: (i) teaching what is thought (correctly) to be false, i.e., dishonesty or lying: (ii) teaching what is thought (incorrectly) to be true, i.e., incompetence: (iii) teaching what is thought (incorrectly) to be false, i.e., incompetent dishonesty: (iv) teaching what is thought (correctly) to be true: and (v) teaching what is, or is not thought to be (correctly or incorrectly) not known to be true or false, i.e., at least for some, possibly including Flew, indoctrination.

The argument, as stated, is invalid, for there remain an indefinite number of further possibilities. Flew assumes that indoctrination requires an epistemological analysis. And it is only in accepting this assumption that his argument can be found convincing. It might be, however, that indoctrination has nothing at all to do with the epistemological status of the belief in question. Whether or not it does in part depends, at least in this case, on the purpose to which the analysis is put. Flew makes it clear he is

interested in indoctrination primarily as an epistemological problem. He distinguishes what he calls "primary" and "secondary" senses of 'indoctrination'. In its secondary sense 'indoctrination' refers to "certain means and manners of teaching" (Ibid, p. 86). In its primary sense, on the other hand, it refers, as one would suppose from his earlier remarks, to the "matter of trying to implant firm convictions of the truth of doctrines which are in fact false or at least not known to be true" (op cit). "The development of the second notion" Flew says "is likely to have an especial professional appeal to philosophers. For one of the main concerns of philosophy is the examination of precisely this sort of question about various kinds of proposition and the sorting out of the often unhappy and confused diplomatic relations between disciplines." (Ibid, p. 87) The general problem this sort of analysis raises is whether doing epistemology, doing "philosophy", has any direct bearing on philosophy of education; whether educational conclusions, conclusions, for example, about "means and manners of teaching", can be drawn from epistemological premises.

Wilson thinks they can. Indoctrination, he implies, is an epistemological concept, a concept which involves what Gregory and Woods, though not Wilson, would call 'doctrine'. Wilson says that "the concept of indoctrination concerns the truth and evidence of belief." (Hollins, p. 28) "Suppose", he argues, "we could teach four-year-old children all their mathematical tables while they are asleep, or by hypnosis? Or suppose that a boy could master A Level physics by having an electric charge passed through his brain cells? Is this indoctrination or not?" If we "want to keep the word 'indoctrination' as the name of a forbidden area, we shall probably want to say that these cases are not cases of indoctrination." "Then what is the difference between hypnotizing a boy to believe in Communism and hypnotizing him to master A Level physics?" (Ibid, p. 26) "Our objection is surely founded on the fact (that some beliefs are) <u>uncertain</u> ...that we have no logical right to be sure of an answer... Religious, political and moral beliefs are uncertain, in a sense in which mathematics and Latin grammar (and, one sup-

poses, A Level physics) are not." (Ibid, p. 27)

Wilson thinks "the importance of evidence implies that we must grade our teaching to fit the logical status of the beliefs which we are putting forward." (Ibid, pp. 28-29) (emphasis mine) "If they are certain...they can be taught as certainties: if they are merely probable...they must be taught as probabilities: and if they are totally uncertain, they must not be taught at all--at least in the sense that we must not persuade people to adopt them." "To avoid indoctrination, we must be more concerned with putting forward the evidence for beliefs than with inculcating the beliefs themselves." (Ibid, p. 29)

Hare and Cooper, the former in response to Wilson, the latter to Snook, both give counter-instances to epistemological analyses of education. Suppose, Hare says, a child "senses that I disapprove very strongly of lying and therefore stops doing it...Have I, by using this non-rational method of affecting the child's behavior, been indoctrinating the child? I do not think so. For I do not want the child to remain such that non-rational persuasion or influence is the only kind of moral communication I can have with it." (Ibid, pp. 50-1) "We cannot help influencing our children; the only question is, how, and in what direction...And, if we are to influence them anyway, what can we do but try to influence them in the best direction we can think of? But, indoctrination only begins when we are trying to stop the growth in our children of the capacity to think for themselves..." (Ibid, p. 52) That is, it might be justifiable, because inevitable, not only to inculcate what Wilson calls "uncertain"--in this case, moral--beliefs, but to do so on a basis--here, fear of disapproval and punishment--other than that of what evidence, or what reason there might be to hold them.

Though not consistent with his psychological analysis of indoctrination, Snook claims that the deliberate teaching of what is false must be indoctrination. (1972a, p. 36) Cooper, however, remembers that "during my first year of Economics, I was taught the theory of Perfect Competition, and taught it as if it were true. This may have been a useful tactic on my teacher's part, for had we known that

the theory was not true, we might have paid less attention during those long months." (44) Cooper's point is that "a teacher could sincerely and truthfully say, 'I am teaching him (Mr. Cooper) that P, which is false; but it is certainly not my intention that he will continue to believe P once he encounters (say in his second year) the evidence which shows it to be false." (Ibid) And such a case, he suggests, need not be one of indoctrination.

Neither counter-instance is entirely convincing. For it is clear that in both the over-all aim is that the child or pupil, when independent of parent or teacher, believe only what is true, or at least rationally supportable, because it is true or rationally supportable. Suppose, however, that the child to whom Mr. Hare shows his disapproval of lying were to come to maturity, through no fault of Mr. Hare's, without the ability to engage in rational moral thought and discussion. Would Mr. Hare have better fulfilled his duties as the child's moral educator had he shown no disapproval of lying, the consequence being that the child comes to maturity believing that honesty and deceit are matters of indifference? Given only that for most people these are not matters of indifference, and thus the likelihood the child will have to live with those who neither trust nor respect him, there is reason to believe that as a moral educator Mr. Hare would have failed. And suppose--try--Mr. Cooper's Economics course were conducted in a rigid, intolerant, authoritarian, Orthodox Capitalist society, a society in which doubts concerning the theory of Perfect Competition were treated as heresies punishable by death. Would the teacher have better fulfilled his duties as Mr. Cooper's economics educator had he taught the theory as something uncertain?

Both Hare and Cooper think that non-rational belief has at least some part to play in education. They see the educand, not just as someone who thinks and acts, whether well or ill, but also as someone whose thought and action develops over time. They claim that the transmission of non-rational belief is at least sometimes justified because it is either necessary (Hare) or desirable (Cooper) for devel-

opment which is educationally valuable. We argued, however, that their counter-instances to epistemological analyses of 'indoctrination' (or, at least, of mis-education) are not entirely convincing. The reason for this is that both Hare and Cooper limit themselves to a consideration of the development of the educand's capacity for rational thought and action. They do not consider the educand's development as a person, as, simply, a thinking and acting being. The consequence, as we pointed out, is that they overlook the problems of rational development itself, problems which arise because the educand will never be or become an ideally rational person, nor will he ever live in an ideally rational society. The problem is the same one Peters overlooks in "The Justification of Education". And it is the problem which psychological analyses of indoctrination are intended to overcome.

Consider first, however, doctrine itself. Doctrine is closely related to dogma, doctrinaire to dogmatic. In fact Cooper speaks of doctrines simply as "dogmatically held beliefs" (51). Both are beliefs, or sets of beliefs, at least held tc be, if not actually true. To be dogmatic is to hold belief as true regardless of evidence to the contrary available to one. A person can be dogmatic about any belief for any reason. The doctrinaire, on the other hand, though they are dogmatic, and though they can hold, if sometimes only with great ingenuity, any belief as doctrine, unlike the merely dogmatic, the merely closed-minded, there is a specific reason for their dogmatism. Doctrines, like principles, function as guides to thought and action. They differ from principles, however, in at least one important respect. The doctrinairian, unlike the man of principle, does not allow that his belief can conflict with other beliefs he might hold. As a consequence, he can deduce a 'code', a set of prescriptions, that is, a 'doctrine', to guide his day-to-day thought and action in as minute detail as he wishes. One thinks of Church Doctrine. The doctrinairian, then, much more than the man of principle, is open to the pragmatic criticism of being, in the words of the Concise Oxford, a pedantic theorist, a person who applies what they call "principles" without allowing for sometimes-recalcitrant ex-

perience. And thus the truly doctrinaire have always sought to 'tame' experience by living in a separate community within which experience can be more effectively controlled; whereas the man of principle, the man who accepts that principles can conflict, is typically more tolerant of the confusions and ambiguities of what he might call, with some justification, the 'real world'.

The propositional content of doctrine might be true, false, or not known to be either. The reason it is sometimes thought, for example, by Gregory and Woods, to be the latter, is confusion between uncertain and <u>irrelevant</u> epistemological status. Doctrine, as guide to thought and action, is judged by its affective, not its epistemological status. Only a philosopher would worry whether there 'really' is a God. For others, He either 'works' or not. Doctrine typically does contain statements about the world which purport to be true, but which, when taken out of context, often seem unverifiable, if not ludicrously false. But doctrine, to be affective, must be convincing. And, perhaps unfortunately, it is not always truth that convinces. The Monroe Doctrine was designed to guide American foreign policy. One can reject most of its propositional content and yet still hold it well worth retaining, if, that is, one thinks it 'works'. There is, then, a difference between <u>believing a doctrine</u>, that is, believing the propositional content to be true, and believing <u>in</u> a doctrine, that is, guiding one's thought and action by reference to it. And, further, because neither individuals nor societies are ideally rational, it is not always, as it were, 'pragmatically irrational' to believe in something which is either false or not known to be true.

Indoctrination (or at least a certain kind of miseducation) involves belief. A person can believe that something is the case (propositional belief), that something is good or ought to be the case (normative belief), or he can believe in something (belief, or commitment). Epistemological analyses limit the scope of indoctrination to propositional belief. Flew admits that the "sort of belief system which constitutes the content of indoctrination typically carries, or is thought to carry, normative implications. Yet

any norms as such" he says "are precisely not claims about what is but about what ought to be the case. Norms, therefore, provide a possible content for indoctrination only to the extent that they are, wrongly, thought to be and presented as a kind of fact." (Snook 1972b, p. 82)

Flew seems to be saying, at least on one reading, that it is in only a derivative sense that a person can be indoctrinated with what would commonly be taken as primary instances of indoctrinated belief. One thinks of, belief in God, authority, ideology, belief that a person should do what ideologists, authorities, God (or at least His interpretors) want him to. And if, as Flew believes, indoctrination must involve doctrine, then it must involve, as we have seen, beliefs which do have "normative implications", that is, implications for thought and action.

There is, however, a second and more convincing reading. The doctrinairian, the indoctrinated person, and the person who holds normative belief "as a kind of fact", all have at least one thing in common, namely, they are certain what they believe is true. Propositional belief is not just true, it is indubitable: it is not just that something should be done, it must be: God is not thought just to exist, his existence is believed in. The doctrinairian does not doubt--if he has one--the basis of his belief: the indoctrinated person, as Wilson says, is certain of what may very well be uncertain: and there is a difference, as Flew points out, between normative belief, which is more or less well-reasoned, and propositional belief, which can be, at least in a sense, 'certain', that is, a 'fact'. But, neither well-reasoned normative, nor true propositional belief is 'certain' in the sense of being beyond doubt. And thus, if one of the characteristic features of the indoctrinated person is that he has an unwarranted certainty, it must be allowed that any belief--pace Snook, including true propositional belief, pace Flew, at least on the former reading, including normative belief--it must be allowed that any belief can be indoctrinated. This is to argue that here certainty is to be taken as, and thus that indoctrination is, a psychological rather than an epistemological concept. And, indeed, if it were discovered that a person's belief is

true, is a 'fact'--there is a God, there is Perfect Competition-- this would not in the least incline one to revise one's previous judgment, now denying that the person is, or was, indoctrinated. For indoctrination is less a matter of 'getting it wrong' than it is of how a person might 'get it right'.

Unwarranted certainty is a kind of mis-understanding, and thus, if education were simply the development of knowledge and understanding, the transmission of doctrine would be mis-educational. It was argued in Chapter 4, however, that education only involves knowledge and understanding, and it only does so, it was argued in Chapter 5, because their development is essential in preparing a person for independence. If the prospective educated person were supposed either not to act or think at all, or to act and think only under the compulsion of another, questions concerning what he believes need never arise. Not acting, there is nothing to understand, nothing for which the educator can take responsibility. Acting only under the compulsion of another, it is the latter's beliefs which explain what is done, and it is he who assumes responsibility for it. In fact, however, it is supposed the prospective educated person both thinks and acts, and thinks and acts for himself. Understanding what he does involves understanding what he believes. It is he who is responsible, and it is he for whom the educator is at least partially responsible. The development of knowledge and understanding is essential in education because it is upon such development that the educand depends when he comes to think and act for himself. Having acquired, ideally, all and only knowledge and understanding, the now educated person is well prepared for independence in that he already possesses, and thus no longer depends on anyone, including himself, for the acquisition of what he needs to think and act well.

Knowledge and understanding, however, are limited in at least two respects. First, of the knowable little is known, of the known little is knowable by the individual, and of the knowable little is worth knowing. Second, and more important, being well prepared for independence involves having more than just knowledge and understanding.

Is it then impossible to imagine cases in which to think and act well a person must be doctrinaire about at least something? If as a result of religious education a person comes to believe without doubt in the existence of God must the case be one of educational failure? Or, to take up a case described by White, if as a result of his schooling a person comes to believe without doubt that, though not for the army or the university, he <u>is</u> fitted for "hewing wood" and "drawing water", must his schooling have been mis-educational?

Other than because they have good reason, and because they do not, people typically believe because either they or others <u>want</u> them to. If we do not, if we can not make of ourselves something the world can live with, we make of the world something we can live with. For the educator, as opposed to either the partisan, the already doctrinaire, or the purely rational, there is a genuine dilemma. He knows, on the one hand, that unwarranted certainty, for example, in the existence of God, can play a central role in an otherwise satisfactory life, indeed, that it can be essential to it. He also knows, however, that just because certainty <u>is</u> unwarranted any life which depends on it is always vulnerable. But, depending on the child, and on the society in which it is anticipated he will live, the dilemma need not be insoluble. If not to hold with certainty a particular religious, political or social belief is, in effect, to disqualify the child from ever participating in society, the responsible educator will do his best to convince him of its truth if he is responsive and, if not, at least to teach him behaviors which are <u>consistent</u> with his holding the belief to be true. Again, if without certainty the child is or is likely to become mentally or emotionally unstable, and thus unable to cope with live on his own, the responsible educator will either encourage certainty in beliefs the child might already have or try as it were to 'give' the child the sort of belief with which he then can cope. One thinks of 'belief in self', 'belief in man', 'belief in God'. Assuming, on the other hand, a more tolerant society, and assuming a child for whom it seems he and his world are as they should be, the responsible educator will get on with

the perhaps more agreeable task of developing the child's knowledge and understanding of that world. There is no dilemma because what the child wants, what the child needs to believe happens also to be both rationally supportable and open to doubt, to possible revision--perhaps by the child himself.

The imparting of doctrine, then, can have a place, if perhaps only a very limited one, in educating the young. As Wilson says, it can at times, and with certain children, be absolutely necessary. Nonetheless, the justification commonly given to extend its scope, justifications in terms of either individual or social good, are explicitly non-educational and implicitly mis-educational. Consider the doctrine of 'natural inferiority'. Its transmission is typically justified on the ground that, if they did not believe it, women, members of racial minorities, peasants, workers--those to whom it might be transmitted would so act as to destroy the (perhaps admittedly unjust) society in which they live, leaving only chaos and disorder (or an even more unjust society), circumstances in which everyone, including women, etc., would be worse off than once they were. But, such non-educational justification implies the need for mis-educational upbringing. Being 'inferior', women, etc. are in some ways not to act at all (e.g., vote, occupy certain political, social and occupational positions) and, in other ways, are to act only under the direction, if not always the compulsion of others, of, say, white, middle and upper class, husbands or fathers, employers and land owners. The doctrine serves the purpose of preparing them, not for independence, but, with respect to both what they will be permitted to do, and to what must be done, but will be done by others, preparation for dependence. With respect to the latter, subsidiary lies and confusions might be transmitted, or knowledge and understanding simply withheld, the purpose being to make the 'inferior' inferior. It is only with respect to the former, that is, to those areas of quasi-independent activity, that knowledge and understanding, at least of a sort, are transmitted. Imparting doctrine, then, though it can enhance, typically serves the purpose of limiting either action itself or at least independent action.

If knowledge is power, unwarranted certainty can be weakness, its transmission intended to incapacitate.

Indoctrination is a psychological rather than an epistemological concept. A soldier in the US Army is certain that he should always respect the chain of command. A second soldier, on discovering that this is the case, merely points out to the first that, rationally, he should either discard the belief or at least suspend judgment concerning its epistemological status. He points out, for example, that on occasion respecting the chain of command can lead to disaster. The first soldier suspends judgment. In a case such as this one would say that the army's Indoctrination Course had failed, that if the soldier could lose his belief in such manner he had not been successfully indoctrinated. It is, one suspects, for reasons such as this that Snook, Moore and White all assume that indoctrination is a psychological rather than an epistemological concept, that what matters in indoctrination is not the kind of belief, but the way in which it is held, and further, that the way it is held makes it highly unlikely that a person would discard the belief, or suspend judgment, as a result simply of a another person's pointing out to him that he should. Disregarding Snook's somewhat mysterious claim that transmitting false belief "must be subsumed under 'indoctrination'", all three imply that beliefs of any kind can be indoctrinated, the difference between being indoctrinated and being in the state of mind of the soldier described above being, according to Snook and Moore, that the belief is held "regardless of the evidence" and, according to White, "fixedly" or "unshakably".

Snook says that "A person indoctrinates P (a proposition or set of propositions) if he teaches with the intention that the pupil or pupils believe P regardless of the evidence." (1972a, p. 47) Moore, though he seems to think "behavior" as well as belief can be indoctrinated, and, unlike Snook, that indoctrination might be unintentional, holds a similar view. He says that "The child naturally models his behavior and, within limits, his consequent value reactions on that of others, chiefly adults...These observed

patterns in others, even where no intentional teaching is done, are 'authoritative' for the child; and he is being 'indoctrinated' in terms of what he imitates where no reasons are furnished him for doing so." (Snook 1972b, pp. 96-7) The view Snook and Moore hold is, in psychological terms, the equivalent of Gregory and Woods's view that indoctrination involves belief not known to be true or false. It is not, however, that the belief is not known per se; it is not known perhaps only, but certainly always, by the person who holds it. It is not known because the person has no reason, no evidence, for thinking it true.

In Chapter 4 a brief explanation was given in support of the participant's intuition that truth is of fundamental educational importance. What is held to be true, however, changes over time, in the lifetime of the individual perhaps several times. The person who holds propositional belief because he has reason to think it true is in a position to change his belief in the light of new, conflicting evidence. The person who holds belief regardless of the evidence, on the other hand, is in a less advantageous position. He might hold it because he or because someone else wants him to. In either case, should reality impinge--or should it fail to--the result might be disastrous. One thinks of the belief acquired in adolescence that one is (or is not) 'like everyone else', and then of discovering (or failing to discover) in adult life that the belief is, and always was, completely without foundation.

But, just as Hare and Cooper argue that there is a place in education for transmitting as certain beliefs which are uncertain, Moore thinks it both inevitable and desirable that the child "models" his behavior and his "value reactions" on those of adults, in so doing acquiring beliefs without at the same time acquiring reasons for thinking them true. "Only by isolating him from other persons, especially from adults, could we keep him from learning in this way." (Ibid, p. 96) And, in any case, "This natural imitative process is valuable, even essential, as giving the child a head start in living in terms of behavior patterns (and, one should add, beliefs) presumably tested and adopted by more mature persons. If a child had to learn every behavior item

(and belief) for himself through trial and error, he would be hopelessly bogged down from the beginning in a world as complex as ours." (Ibid, p. 97) Unlike Hare or Cooper, however, Moore goes on to suggest that such learning can, and in some cases should remain unchanged even after education has been completed. We should "frankly admit" he says "that learning necessarily begins with an authoritative and indoctrinative situation, and that for lack of time, native capacity or the requisite training to think everything out for oneself, learning even for the rationally mature individual must continue to include an ingredient of the unreasoned, the merely accepted. The extent to which everyone of us must depend, and wisely so, on the authoritative pronouncements of those who are more expert than are we in most of the problems we face is evidence enough of the truth of this contention." (op cit)

Moore, of course, is quite right, at least as far as he goes. In preparing a person for independence it is just as important that the beliefs he holds be true, or at least the best available, as that they have a sound evidential backing for the person who holds them. The latter, as we have said, would be preferable, but the former would be preferable to having only false beliefs or no beliefs at all. And, because a person always develops in one way, rather than in any other, there will always be areas with respect to which it would be "wise" for him to rely on the authority of others, just as others might rely on him in that area in which he is authoritative. But, if it is the case, as certainly it is, that everyone always relies on at least one other with respect to at least one area of belief, then living with authorities is just one more fact of life for which the individual can be either well or ill prepared. Who is one to rely on, and for what? There is a difference between relying on a NASA scientist for information about Jupiter and Saturn, and relying on a near-total stranger to tell one who one is, what one feels, how best to conduct one's life. Being well prepared for independence involves knowing in what respects one's independence is limited, knowing who to depend on, and for what. It is an especially important part of preparation just because, as

Moore points out, if preparation is to be successful the educand himself must be subject to authority. Perhaps the most common educational failure is in, albeit unintentionally, conditioning the young always to rely on the authority of their elders for precisely those things which, it was intended, would free them from dependence on authority. The result is not just a continuation of a 'child-like' approach to life. It might also be the attempt, on the part of the educand, to so radically alter his life that his elders no longer count as relevant authorities. The latter, of course, might be a first step towards independence, but then it is a first step taken without the help of those whose job it was to help. One thinks of those societies in which education is largely academic education, the result being, for the minority, scholarship which is derivative rather than original and, for the vast majority, an approach to life which is anti-theoretical, anti-intellectual, that is, so approached as to render the authority of their teachers irrelevant.

Generally speaking, then, Moore is quite right. But, is either he or Snook talking about something which is, unambiguously, indoctrination. Indoctrinated belief is, it is true, not rationally held. But, wherein lies the lack of rationality? If our soldier is pleased to change his belief just because another soldier gives him reason to do so, reason he has not the means to counter because, as Snook and Moore say, he had no reason to hold it in the first place, the Indoctrination Course would still seem to have been a failure. And, in fact, Snook, if not also Moore, gives a description of indoctrination which, though not--as at first sight it might appear to be--inconsistent with his definition, does go beyond it in a way which seems to me, as it would to White, quite convincing. White speaks specifically of "fixed" or "unshakable" belief. And, after giving his description, Snook says that White's is "close to being a correct analysis". (1972a, p. 46)

"Indoctrination" Snook says "is concerned with the handing on of beliefs. These beliefs are typically regarded by the indoctrinator as of some importance. He wants the pupils to accept these beliefs fully..." (emphasis mine) "Furthermore, the indoctrinator wants the students to be

able to justify their beliefs to themselves and to defend them against criticisms...In this situation, the indoctrinator who did not attempt to give arguments, meet objections, answer questions, would be obviously inefficient." (Ibid, pp. 25-6) This is not to say, however, that the indoctrinated person holds his beliefs for what reason there might be to hold them. "A truly indoctrinated person", Snook goes on to say, "thrives on arguments for, as...Passmore points out, the drill in stock objections is often an important feature of indoctrination..." (Ibid, p. 39) (emphasis mine) The point being made, implicitly, and perhaps unintentionally, is that for the indoctrinator it is not enough simply that the pupil come to believe without reason, he must believe "fully", he must be able to resist those who would try to change his belief, resist the temptation to do so himself.

In all of these respects the indoctrinated person is distinguishable from the person who, as Moore describes him, merely relies on "experts" or "authorities". The latter, should he decide, might seek a 'second opinion' and if, even then, not satisfied might defer taking whatever action with respect to which he sought out expert opinion in the first place. The successfully indoctrinated person, on the other hand, knows only the one opinion, and he acts in accordance with it regardless of the consequences. Further, if not satisfied with any authority the first person might decide to, and then be successful in, becoming an authority himself. But, this, according to Snook, would be to give in to the 'temptation' to doubt the truth of what the indoctrinator manqué has taught, and, further, perhaps in the end to go against him. It is for precisely this reason that rather than simply teach, the US Army tries to indoctrinate. They do, of course, want soldiers to rely on the authority of their officers, but in order to get what they take to be satisfactory results they take steps to ensure that that authority will never be doubted, that it will be relied on even when it is doubtful, even when the soldier might himself assume authority. And, as Snook implies, perhaps the best way of doing this is to get the soldier to hold his beliefs in such a way that, far from seeing himself as relying on authority, having justified his beliefs to himself he

thinks they are his own, he thinks he has arrived at them independently of authority. There is, afterall, no belief quite so strongly and enduringly held as the belief that, "I, and no one else, am right!". And such a belief is just the opposite of the one held by the person who relies on authorities.

Though he does not say, it is perhaps for reasons such as these that White defines indoctrination as follows. "Indoctrinating someone is trying to get him to believe that a proposition 'p' is true, in such a way that nothing will shake that belief." (Snook 1972b, p. 120) White also uses the phrase "unshakable belief", the ambiguity of which, in a later article, he clarifies as follows. "It might be argued that if a teacher...is reinforcing his students' belief in the Laws of Thought, he is indoctrinating them, since the Laws of Thought are in fact unshakable--they cannot but be true if assertive discourse is to exist." (Ibid, p. 199) "Now there is clearly something wrong in calling this 'indoctrination'. The argument shows up the inadequacy of the earlier definition (or, at least, the earlier phrase) as it stands: the phrase 'unshakable belief' had better be removed. The crucial thing in indoctrination is that the indoctrinator tries to implant beliefs unshakably, i.e., in such a way that they will never be questioned." (Ibid, pp. 199-200) The ideal situation for the indoctrinator, then, is that, as a result of his activities, a person comes to believe something and thereafter, regardless of what happens to him, continues to believe.

One further point of clarification. Snook says that "According to White...indoctrination requires an intention of a certain sort, namely the intention that the child believes what is taught in such a way that nothing will shake his belief. I want to argue that this is close to being a correct analysis...but that...the criterion is still inadequate." "Teachers of mathematics, chemistry, and Latin have to teach many things which they do not expect to be questioned, much less rejected. White's account does not cover our unwillingness to call these teachers indoctrinators." (1972a, p. 46) Perhaps because, according to White's

definition, they are not indoctrinators. There is a difference between teaching without expecting questions or rejection, and teaching with the intention that whatever questions, whatever temptations for rejection might occur either then or at any time in the future, these questions and temptations, should they arise--itself a sign of inefficient indoctrination--will be dispatched immediately and without trace. It is just the sort of "questions" Snook might have in mind which could lead a person into philosophy of maths or science, or into philology and history, but the indoctrinator, according to White, is precisely that teacher who renders such development impossible.

Might indoctrination, or at least indoctrination as it is understood here, play a part in education, a part in preparing a person for independence? White himself apparantly thinks not. Or, at least, he says that the "moral educator has to be careful that his pupils do not grow up indoctrinated..." (Snook 1972b, p. 130) To indoctrinate with justification the teacher would have to have good reason to believe that, given the sort of child he is dealing with, and given the sort of society in which he lives, the child must hold, or at least it would be desirable that he did hold, for the rest of his life, and inspite of any temptation there might be to reject it, the belief in question. This would be, as Wilson says, to restrict the child's freedom of choice, to diminish his "personality". It might be, however, as Wilson also says, "absolutely necessary". The child is made as it were 'eternally' dependent on his teacher for the belief in question, and thus, other considerations aside, is mis-educated. But, if without the belief, if ever without the belief, the child were to be made dependent on others, in the extreme, for everything other than the belief, then the educational value of indoctrination would by far outweigh its educational disvalue. The difficulty, of course, is in trying to find such a belief, or in trying to justify the indoctrination of a belief which one supposes to have been already "found".

Indoctrinators, perhaps fortunately, are not a very sophisticated breed, the state of their art not being conspicuously well-refined. Intentional indoctrination is less

of a worry than, if Snook will allow it, indoctrination which is the unintended consequence of what is, nonetheless, intentional action, that is, indoctrination as 'side-effect'. Children, perhaps more so than adults, will resist either mental or behavioral coercion once they recognize that that is the intention. Thus the development in parents and teachers, not the art of the actor, but the art of acting through indirection. What will always be a side-effect of intentional action is the basis upon which that action rests. Even when the basis is brought up for discussion, the basis upon which the discussion rests is still unexamined, and so on. In education the action is typically a direction from the educator to the educand to involve himself in some activity. The basis upon which the action rests is that the activity in question is worthwhile. But, here doubts, even resistance on the part of the educand are commonplace. What is not so common, because, from the point of view of the educand it is more obscure, is doubt concerning the worth of the environment which is necessary if the activity is to take place at all. And if that environment constitutes the whole of his 'world' prior to his achieving independence, it is likely, indeed inevitable, that he will acquire a more or less "fixed" and "unshakable" belief in its worthwhileness. For 'gifted' children in a 'special' environment, for 'ordinary' children in an 'all in' environment, such indoctrination need not be the greatest of worries. There are, of course, serious problems to face, problems of being extra-ordinary adults in an ordinary world, problems of being ordinary adults in a world in which not everyone is ordinary as well: but these are problems which occur with, not in the absense of indoctrination, in fact, they are just the sort of problems which, if serious enough, would lead one to object to indoctrination in the first place. But, for ordinary children in a special environment, and for gifted children in an all-in environment, indoctrination of the sort described will always be a problem. Without extra-ordinary means, the first are condemned always to seek what is beyond them, and, with special gifts, the second are condemned always to deny them, in fact, to pretend they do not exist and, like the first, always to fail.

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