A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO SOME ASPECTS OF THE TEACHER'S ROLE

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In this thesis an investigation is conducted into the justification for various aspects of the teacher's role in schools, being concerned in particular to find out whether certain aspects are in some way necessary for the role as a justifiable one in a justifiable institution. That thesis is, itself, an instantiation of a further thesis concerned with the prescriptive implications of philosophy of education, which is discussed in the first section.

The second section discusses what it is to be teaching someone something, raising objections to the current orthodox analysis of the concept of teaching, which is argued to be inadequate to account for our current understanding of it. Various terms of art are considered and found unsatisfactory, and a new schema for analysing teaching is introduced. An alternative analysis which does not embody certain important assumptions of the orthodox analysis is presented. Objections to it are considered.

The third section examines the concept of role, using as its basis an analysis presented by R.S. Downie. This analysis is considered to be too crude for the investigation of this thesis, and an alternative analysis is again developed for application here. Some of the problems of role concepts are discussed in relation to the social sciences.

The fourth section applies the above analyses to a consideration of the teacher's role in respect of the following aspects: (a) the teaching of understanding, beliefs and skills (including the specifying of low-level objectives) (b) the teaching of values (c) assessment and evaluation (d) authority in the sphere of knowledge and, briefly, the personal/impersonal dimension of the teacher-pupil relationship. Particular attention is given to the psychological concept of interest.
The final section collects together the prescriptive implications of the work of sections II - IV, for teachers themselves and for those who are concerned to provide the conditions under which teachers are expected to fulfil their roles.

References are numbered consecutively for each section and bound in at the end of each.
In presenting this thesis, I would like to thank all those people who have helped me reach this point. In particular, I thank my supervisors, Professor R.S. Peters without whose criticisms the work on teaching would have been far less closely argued, and Mrs. P.A. White, who supervised the remainder of the thesis, and whose advice and encouragement have been invaluable. I am indebted to more fellow students than I can name for discussions on philosophy of education, in particular Catherine Beattie, Suzanne Castell, Peter Jackson and Peter Scrimshaw. All the flaws in the arguments presented here, however, are all my own work.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This thesis is in major part a consideration from a philosophical point of view of some aspects of the role of the teacher in a school. The aspects chosen are ones which have, at different times and by different people, been suggested as ones which should be eliminated from the role - or, to use the currently fashionable jargon, are "negotiable". These include the teaching of propositional knowledge (e.g. by those who claim that since knowledge is now so quickly obsolescent, children should simply 'learn how to learn'), the planning of low-level objectives (e.g. by those who propose widespread use of enquiry, as opposed to discovery, methods), the teaching of values (e.g. by those who claim that schools ought not to 'impose middle-class values' on children), the assessment aspect (e.g. by those who hold that the criteria must ultimately be arbitrary) and the authority aspect (e.g. by those who fear indoctrination). The investigation will seek to establish whether these aspects are necessarily or merely contingently associated with the role. Particular attention is paid to the psychological concept of interest, both because of its relationship with the value of what it learned and because it can be clearly demonstrated that the teaching of interest is an instance of the teaching of values which cannot involve imposition.

This detailed working out is an instantiation of a wider thesis regarding the prescriptive implications of much philosophical work, which is set out and discussed in Section I.

The other main centre of interest of this thesis is the development of an analytic scheme of what I have called "perficience" verbs and an explanation of their logic. This constitutes Section II of this thesis, which concludes by offering a new analysis of teaching which not only serves as a foundation for the work described above but is also offered in its own right as a valid analysis, to be preferred to the current orthodox one as a way of understanding teaching.

Section III is devoted to an analysis and discussion of concepts of role, as a further basis to Section IV, which contains the work.
discussed in the first paragraph above, and Section V spells out the prescriptive implications of the justificatory work of Sections II - IV.
SECTION I

Philosophy of Education and the Status of this Thesis
CHAPTER 1: On the Nature of Philosophy of Education and its Practice in Colleges and Departments of Education

Philosophy used to be thought of as providing a comprehensive understanding of the universe, and philosophers as constructing metaphysical and ethical systems and thus prescribing the Good Life for Man. Now philosophy is more modest, and is generally no longer understood in this way. The view of philosophy as a second-order activity (the 'under-labourer' view) has been applied to Philosophy of Education by O'Connor, who suggests that Philosophy of Education has no problems of its own but consists simply of those aspects of philosophy which are of particular concern to students of education.

Hirst and Peters stress the importance of the use of these 'under-labourer' methods to solve important practical or theoretical questions. They write, "To do conceptual analysis, unless something depends on getting clearer about the structure underlying how we speak, may be a fascinating pastime, but it is not philosophy."

However, Wittgenstein wrote of philosophy as he conceived of it that it left everything as it was (though the changes in his own thinking and of people's conception of philosophy which resulted from his philosophizing might be adduced as evidence for rejecting the claim). But if what he said is true of philosophy now, and if Philosophy of Education is being properly philosophical, then it, too, must leave everything as it is.

This is not regarded as being an objection to philosophy by some of those who believe it to be true of philosophy as it is conceived of now. For example, A.J. Ayer, when asked about this by Brian Magee in a radio interview said that he did not regard it as an objection to philosophy because, as he put it in his incisive way, "that's where things are". But many would clearly regard it as an objection to philosophy, for this way of understanding philosophy, including the Philosophy of Education, makes it essentially and
necessarily conservative. This is important to those who teach the Philosophy of Education to intending teachers, for it may mean that some of them are unwilling to give this activity their serious attention. To those who feel that philosophy of education, seen, as Ayer put it\(^5\), as having as its point clarification, elucidation and justification, is important there are grounds for concern if students are unwilling to consider it seriously.

I believe, however, that Ayer is wrong in agreeing with Wittgenstein that philosophy, conceived of in this way, necessarily leaves everything as it is. This does not seem to be merely an empirical point, but rather a point based on beliefs about the nature of philosophy (and, a fortiori, philosophy of education). In this Chapter I shall argue that it is not the case that philosophy of education necessarily leaves everything as it is (and thus to claim that it is not necessarily conservative), that much work in philosophy of education has direct prescriptive implications for practice (though not all of the same kind) and that, rather than constituting an objection to philosophy of education, this constitutes the main justification for including philosophizing about education and school practices as part of the professional training of teachers. This thesis itself, as a consideration of justifications, is seen as having prescriptive implications, so that though a case is argued for the above claims in this chapter, their instantiation and illustration in this thesis is also offered as grounds for their acceptance.

The main point to be made here is that if an activity which investigated social practices was necessarily conservative, there would be a sense in which its enquiries would be spurious. This chapter thus seeks to defend philosophy of education against charges such as that of Adelstein, who has attacked philosophy and the method of conceptual analysis as being necessarily conservative. He writes\(^6\), "It defends only the status quo, because it takes the status quo as its starting point." Though he uses Gellner's book, "Words and Things"\(^7\) in support, he does not appear to know of
Gellner's own speculation that the society of Moroccan Berbers could be undermined by subjecting one of its concepts, baraka, to the techniques of analysis developed by Ryle and Austin.

I am not here concerned to discuss whether or not conceptual analysis could undermine our educational system, but only to indicate some of the ways in which it need not leave everything as it is, even though it takes the status quo as its starting point. A major part of this thesis is concerned with analysis of the concepts of teaching and role, and the prescriptive implications which, I shall suggest, necessarily derive from an acceptance of these analyses, coupled with a formal belief about what justifies schools, do not support the status quo in any simple way.

Contextual implications for practice

I start this discussion by using as an example the work of P.S. Wilson. Wilson makes it clear that what he is doing is conducting a serious investigation into the meanings of educational language. In a footnote to his paper "Interests and Educational Values", he explicitly disclaims any intention of engaging in educational evaluation, adding "let alone a proselytizing or missionary venture on behalf of any particular brand of educational activity". There is no suggestion here that he, or any other writer, intends to prescribe for others what they should do, in that the search for prescriptions was the reason he engaged in his enquiry (though, of course, some writers may in fact have such reasons).

However, in my view the reader of "Interest and Discipline in Education" may be forgiven if he finishes reading it with the feeling he has been given prescriptions for what is worth doing. What the teacher ought to do is help children learn through interest, for education is the development of interests, and children ought to be educated and not merely 'schooled'. So the question which this work has raised in my mind is whether Wilson, in claiming that a child-
centred view of what education is is justified (e.g., because of its usefulness in picking out a distinction with 'schooling' which is of importance) is implicitly prescribing what ought to be done, whether he intends this or not. Though there is clearly a difference between justifying and prescribing — one can prescribe without justifying — to justify something is implicitly to prescribe it, ceteris paribus. If this is the case, then questions can be raised about the suggestion that philosophy must leave everything as it is, for it is accepted that justifying (or showing that there is no justification for) something is a philosophical activity.

Now it may be true that all Wilson is saying is that if a teacher is not helping children to learn what they value for reasons which are intrinsically instrumental to their own learning goals (i.e., interest), then it is not appropriate to describe him as educating them. That is, as Peters says of his own analysis of education in "Ethics and Education", what he is doing is laying out criteria by virtue of which what people do in schools (and elsewhere) may be assessed as educational or not educational. So, it might be suggested, I am quite mistaken to regard this analysis as in any way prescriptive, a claim that this is what a teacher or educator ought to do. It is rather that this is what he must (logically) do if he is to be educating in the sense in which child-centred theorists use the term.

So, according to this argument, what is being justified is the analysis. Wilson is giving us reasons for believing that this is what educating is. If the reader accepts that educating, in this sense, is what he ought to do, then he is prescribing for himself. It is not Wilson who is being prescriptive. Or, at the most, he is prescribing language use, not prescribing what ought to be done.

Such an argument, however, leaves out the central and important connection between a person's concepts and his actions, as already discussed, in different contexts, by Pring and Hirst. Given that a person accepts that he ought to be educating, or that he ought to be teaching, or that he ought not to be indoctrinating, then the understanding he has of each of these concepts affects his actions 'in its name' (as Hirst put it). I shall use the term 'contextual implication' to refer to the implications of an analysis offered and
accepted in a context (in this case, teacher training and education) where there are both normative beliefs involved in the concept and commitment to action. Thus a person writing for students in Colleges and Departments of Education should know that students who accept the analysis (e.g. of educating) and believe that educating is what they ought to be doing, will conclude that what is delineated by the analysis is what they ought to be doing.

Thus if there are, so to speak, competing concepts of education, Wilson or Peters, by convincing such people of the validity of their analysis ("I have shown that this is what we really mean when we use the term 'education'") significantly alter their conception of what they should do. In this way, the analysis of key educational terms may not leave everything as it was.

It might be suggested that, even if true, this is no more than an empirical claim. It is clearly not necessarily the case that any change in practice will take place as a result of conceptual analysis. For, as Hirst and Peters have pointed out in respect of their own analysis of education 15, it could always be argued that if this is what education is, then it ought not to get very high priority in schools. My claim, however, is that within the 'form of life' which is our institutionalized school system, there is the assumption that education is what the schools are primarily for. Given that conceptual analysis is being practised in this context, the prescriptive implications arise not only from the normative assumptions about educating (or teaching or indoctrinating) which prevail in the context within which the analysing is done but also from the nature of conceptual analysis. This is because the relationship between thought and action is not merely a contingent one. It is my belief that this claim holds for much work in social philosophy and in ethics 16.

It is interesting that in a recent book Barrow accepts the normative aspect of the concept of education as over-riding 17 and suggests that the descriptive aspect be adjusted to fit this whilst at the same time accepting the descriptive analysis of indoctrination and suggesting that it is not wrong 18. As he indicates, claims
about what ought to be done are often made implicitly through the 
normative component of a concept. But the prescriptions involved 
are not thereby justified, as Barrow realizes (and indicates by 
additionally explaining why he believes indoctrination to be justifiable).

Convincing people that teaching involves "displaying the underlying 
rationale of the subject matter" might make a great difference to 
what actually did go on in schools, even though the analysis is not 
descriptive. But displaying the underlying rationale is justifiably 
demanded or not independently of whether it is called 'teaching'. 
So though it is the case that conceptual analysis may not leave 
everything as it is, conceptual analysis cannot by itself justify 
people's changing what they do. Except for a person who takes an 
极端 position on the fact/value issue, on any analysis of an activity 
X or social practice Y it is always appropriate to ask "But ought it 
to be done?" and seek a rational justification for engaging or refusing 
to engage in it. To analyse a concept which denotes a social practice 
is not to offer a justification for the social practice which it 
denotes. Therefore, Peters, for example, has gone on to consider 
the justification for education in the sense which interests him.

Logical implications for practice.

I have suggested above that conceptual analysis and the justification 
of social practices are different philosophical activities. But of 
course there is a relationship between them, for, on this view, the 
former delineates what it is that is being justified. Alternatively, 
an attempt may be made to explicate the conditions under which a given 
social practice (as delineated by analysis) is justifiable. This 
distinction between analysis and justification is of importance because 
of the difference between what people (logically) must do qua X and what 
they ought to do. It is fallacious to argue that certain things or 
kinds of things are what a person ought (morally) to do because he has 
taken a role as an X (e.g. torturer) because this is what, in this 
case, torturing is. Rather we might wish to argue that if this is 
what torturing is, the social role of a torturer is an unjustifiable
one. Any assumption, as, for example, Scheffler and Hirst both seem to me to make, that one can get from an analysis of teaching alone an understanding of what a teacher's obligations are, is fallacious. It rests on unstated premises that the social role of teacher is a justifiable one and is associated with an obligation to teach in that sense rather than an obligation to teach in some other sense.

I suggest that the claim that an adequate justification has been offered for a social practice (clearly delineated by analysis) or for aspects of a social role, implies the claim that, ceteris paribus, those practices should be engaged in. For there would be a contradiction involved in suggesting that a practice had been adequately justified as worth engaging in but that no-one ought to do so. Similarly, a claim that a practice is unjustifiable clearly implies that it should not be engaged in. There would be a contradiction involved in claiming to have shown (as for example Dearden\textsuperscript{21} has in respect of competition in school work, and Bailey\textsuperscript{22} has in respect of compelling children to participate in competitive games) that the practice is unjustifiable but that it is permissible to continue promoting it.

Here, however, the implications are of a different logical order from the prescriptive implications of analysis in a context closely tied to normative practice. These are instances of logical implication. If one accepts the premises and the arguments, then, if one is rational, one must accept the conclusions, including the prescriptive implications. In the previous kind of case, it is not irrational to deny the normative claim (and thereby reject the prescription), as Barrow has done for indoctrination.

This argument must not be taken as suggesting that all work involving consideration of the justification of social practices necessarily has prescriptive implications, for a philosopher may simply lay out the arguments and draw no conclusions whatever. The prescriptive implications, on this account, are derived from the formulation of judgments and conclusions. As long as it is considered to be part of philosophy to draw conclusions of this type (and, indeed, it might be argued that to fail to draw a conclusion at all is to fail to complete
one's philosophical investigation), then, on my argument, such philosophical work is necessarily prescriptive in the particular sense which does not imply that it was the intention with which the philosopher undertook the work to prescribe. It is to say that it is part of the nature of the philosophical activity of investigating the justifications for social practices that it has prescriptive implications. Thus it is not the case that to say of a philosopher that he is being prescriptive in this sense is somehow to have a complaint against him, as some people seem to suppose, and as might be suggested in some cases of prescribing via contextual implication. And, of course, it is not to suggest that only "professional" philosophers can or should do this. It is rather to claim that when a person engages in an attempt to justify a social practice, he is engaged in a philosophical activity.

I have already pointed out that conceptual analysis is not necessarily conservative, for, as Gellner made clear, analysis may show that the concept embodies some inherent contradictions; or, by virtue of the examples of usage he chooses, a philosopher may offer a programmatic analysis which he believed to be and which was accepted as reportative, and which itself brings about change in language usage and thus in social practice. The philosophical activity of examining justifications for social practices is also not necessarily conservative. For philosophical work may justify, and thus, on this account, implicitly prescribe, either the maintenance of the status quo (by claiming that social practices which are widely engaged in are not justifiable, or that social practices which are not widely engaged in are more justifiable than practices which are engaged in).

So philosophy of education itself is neither essentially and necessarily conservative, nor essentially and necessarily radical nor essentially and necessarily liberal, nor anything else. This is, however, not to say that particular philosophical writings are neutral. Philosophy is neutral only in the sense that, as an activity, it has no bias. Any individual piece of work in philosophy which draws a conclusion about the justifiability of social practices is not neutral.
Elsewhere²⁴ I discuss other ways in which philosophy of education may have prescriptive implications. Here I have concentrated on discussing the justification of social practices and the relationship with analysis, since this is what is being instantiated in the rest of the thesis.

Philosophy of education and professional training for teachers

It must be wondered whether the view that much philosophical work has prescriptive implications for practice involves a radical change in one's conception of philosophy of education. For philosophy is conceived of as seeking knowledge and understanding (theoretical knowledge) and the view put forward here is that it issues often in practical judgments. It is still a matter of philosophical controversy, after all, as to whether prescriptions can be true or false, so that this may seem, at first sight, a strange conception of philosophy. But I am not suggesting that philosophy of education can appropriately be conceived of as a search for prescriptions, for it still seems more appropriately conceived of as a search for knowledge and understanding. It can be practised by those who have a serious concern for truth, or those who are interested in the philosophical problems arising in educational discourse even if they are not interested in problems of practice, or by those who would not presume to prescribe for others. I do suggest, however, that philosophers should be aware of the prescriptive implications of some of their work, particularly if they publish it in the context of teacher training and education.

To make the point, then, in another way, it is not that philosophy of education is a search for prescriptions. It is rather that to understand that something is justifiable (theoretical knowledge) is to understand both that it ought (ceteris paribus) to be done and why it ought to be done. Given the nature of the philosophical enterprise of justification in areas to do with social practices, prescriptive implications are unavoidable.

Must the philosopher of education, then, justify prescribing in this (non-intended) way? I suggest that it is inappropriate to ask for justifications of what is unavoidable. Rather, philosophers should
acknowledge openly what they are (necessarily) doing, not claim a neutrality of value where no such neutrality is possible.

If the above account of philosophy of education is accepted and the prescriptive implications of any investigation of justifications which draws conclusions are seen to be necessary, then this thesis itself, as an examination of justifications, will unavoidably have, as part of its conclusions, prescriptions about what, ceteris paribus, teachers ought to do, about what members of society can justifiably expect teachers to do (i.e. what they ought and ought not to expect of teachers) and about characteristics which teachers need to have (who we ought to choose as our teachers) etc. I argue that if there is any justification for students in Colleges and Departments of Education to study philosophy of education as part of a professional training, it is because of the prescriptive implications of this kind.

Of course, philosophizing about education could be justified as worth doing for its interest and/or for its educational value. I have no wish to deny that reflective consideration (philosophy itself) as a search for understanding is worth doing for its own sake. But I do not think this would be adequate for suggesting that philosophy, including philosophy of education, should have any special status or even be a compulsory part of the curriculum in a professional training. For, given that there may be many kinds of intellectual enquiry which provide interest and educational value, why should philosophy of education be put forward as having any special claims?

The traditional answer to this is that it is not right for anyone to go into the schools to work without having seriously and critically reflected on the professional activities in which he is going to be engaged. But if we ask why this is important, the only answer that could have any force is that philosophizing has practical implications; for if there were no practical implications for what a person was going to do as a teacher in school, what would be the virtue in his having seriously reflected? If his reflections could make no difference to what he was going to do, why would the fact that he was going into the schools to work constitute a reason for doing or not doing any philosophizing? This is why it seems to me that the prescriptive
implications of philosophy of education ought to be made clear, for anyone who believes that philosophy must leave everything as it is can see no practical point in doing it. And professional training is essentially practical.

The conclusion to which I have come is that student teachers and teachers ought to engage in philosophizing about education because of its prescriptive implications for the practice of their professional role. That is, the prescriptive implications of much work in philosophy of education constitute, on my view, the main justification for including it in a course of professional training. It is to be imagined that there will be immediate objections "But who are these philosophers, that they should set themselves up as being in some special position to tell us what to do!" And there may be objections about reactionary philosophers 'imposing' reactionary views, or liberal philosophers 'imposing' liberal views, and perhaps even of radical philosophers 'imposing' radical views (though this last is perhaps not so likely as this role seems to have been given to the sociologists).

But of course nothing has been said about anyone 'imposing' anything. Philosophers must put forward their views and the conclusions they have come to with intellectual honesty. Students must then look at the arguments and judge them for themselves. Indeed, given that it is possible that one philosopher will claim that social practice X is justifiable and another that it is unjustifiable, there is no choice but that they decide whether or not they think they ought to engage in it by evaluating the arguments for themselves. It is only by philosophizing for themselves that they can decide which prescriptions to accept and act on.

This is, of course, not a new point. Barrow has suggested that 'liberal philosophers of education' would be pleased if students disagreed with views (e.g. on the value of autonomy) put forward in articles and textbooks, because this would mean that more students were doing philosophy. But if this is to be more than empire-building, it must be admitted that the value of philosophy of education as part of a professional training cannot lie in our future teachers becoming clearer about how key educational words are used, or whether the
'liberal philosophers' are right to value autonomy. The value must lie in its relationship with the students' own values and actions, and in what they come to believe it is justifiable for them to do as teachers.

At a time when many sociologists present their ideas on the way in which roles are "negotiated" as the teacher and pupils each try "to make their own definition of the situation prevail"\(^2\), it seems important to consider arguments which suggest that there are limits to the ways in which the role of the teacher can justifiably be 'redefined'. So, on my own account, in claiming that certain aspects of the teacher's role are conceptually demanded and cannot be abandoned by anyone with a certain understanding of teaching and certain assumptions about what justifies A's teaching B X, I must recognize that I am prescribing for teachers some of the limits within which they must rationally see their role if they share these premises. There is, however, no suggestion that these be accepted in any simple-minded fashion. Their validity rests on the validity of the arguments which I present here, and which teachers must assess for themselves.

Notes and references for Section I.

Chapter 1

5. Ibid.
10. Wilson, "Interests and Educational Values" op. cit., p.194
11. Wilson, Interest and Discipline in Education op. cit.
15. Hirst & Peters, The Logic of Education op. cit., p.15
16. Similarly, it might be argued that an analysis of moral language in a context in which it is agreed that it is desirable that people be moral has prescriptive implications of this kind. So, for example, I would argue that there are prescriptive implications involved in Hare's claim that universalisability is implied by the use of moral language. In the context, the implication is that people should regularly decide whether they would be willing to universalise their provisional answers to the question "What ought I to do?" There is the further implication that moral educators should teach children to do this. Hare himself has suggested (in "Language and Moral Education" in Langford G. & O'Connor D.J. (eds) New Essays in the Philosophy of Education. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1973. pp. 149-166) that his analysis has the "practical consequences" that we should try to teach children to understand the feelings of other people, and the skills needed to discover what the effects of their actions are going to be.
18. Ibid. p.183


23. Gellner in *Rationality* op. cit., p. 47


SECTION II

Teaching
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION II

Teaching, we are told, is an activity. This is the explicitly stated premise from which an influential recent analysis of the concept of teaching has started. The current orthodoxy is that teaching, in central cases, implies intention on the part of the person of whom teaching is to be attributed, but does not imply that anyone learns anything.

This section of the thesis defends the now unfashionable view that teaching, in the central sense, implies learning on the part of the person being taught, claiming that other senses are necessarily derived from this one.

In Chapter 2 I consider a range of objections to the standard analysis, objections which seem sufficiently powerful to call for a new analysis. In Chapter 3 I examine in detail the philosophical terms of art which have been, or might be, considered appropriate for discussing teaching (and learning), bearing in mind Austin's injunction about keeping the distinction between what a person is doing and what he is trying to do, as well as the further distinction between the z a person is bringing about in doing x and what he is doing (Y-ing) in bringing z about. As a result of these discussions, I conclude that new terms of art are required for understanding a certain kind of concepts (of a transactional nature between persons), including teaching.

In this Chapter I develop the idea of a "perlocutionary-type" verb which I call a perficience, and give an account of the logic of such terms in our language. I use this concept to suggest an alternative analysis of teaching, presented in Chapter 4, and argue that all other concepts of teaching presuppose an understanding of the sense I call the 'outcome' sense. I shall later also argue that this is the sense which is most important in schools. There is a section on trying.

It must be emphasized that the work of this section is concerned with the concept of teaching, and I have tried at this stage to keep
this separate from considerations about teachers in schools, though this has not been entirely possible because of necessary reference to published work. I shall argue later that it is a logical point that teaching institutions could not be set up and understood, and teachers appointed, without an understanding of the 'outcome' sense. Therefore current conceptions of the role of the teacher cannot be the basis of an analysis of teaching. It is rather that any satisfactory analysis of teaching must be capable of appropriate application in schools.

It is my belief that considerations about what teachers ought (logically and morally) to do are introduced through the concept of role and through consideration of what it is justifiable to teach. Since it is admitted that not everything teachers do in their role capacity is teaching anyone anything (in any sense) we must find independent criteria, as Scheffler has suggested, for picking out instances where a teacher is teaching his pupils something.

The following grounds are given for attaching importance to this new analysis in its own right, aside from its place as a foundation of this thesis:

(i) It is claimed that this analysis is the one which is demanded by the logical relationship between an attempt and its goal. If this is so, it would be expected to give a better account of current usage than the 'activity' analysis, which is shown here to embody internal contradictions.

(ii) It is important that this analysis enables us, as the 'activity' analysis does not, seriously to discuss the merits of genuinely open-ended or 'enquiry' (as opposed to 'discovery') teaching, which, by definition, involves pupils learning Xs which are not intended. Those who support this must reject one of the assumptions implicit in the 'activity' analysis, that to teach an X a person must intend his pupils to learn that X, for with this assumption open-ended teaching is either logically impossible and the use of the term confused, or can only be said to be 'teaching' on some weakened use of the term.

(iii) It is important that any analysis should leave us with language for discussing that relationship between teachers' acts and pupils' learning which has led "deschoolers" and others to talk of the "hidden curriculum" of schools, through which dispositions and values are
taught; and should accommodate such serious models of teaching as the Buber or 'dialogue' model suggested by Scudder⁴. The 'activity' analysis is inadequate for doing these things.

(iv) It is suggest that a well-supported alternative to the orthodox analysis (or at least well-formulated objections to it) should be available for consideration by College of Education students. This is in relation to the points made about the contextual implications of analysis in Chapter 1.

In developing the concept of a perfience verb as an analytic tool, I shall be employing a distinction between what I shall call a contingent consequence of an act and a logical consequence of an outcome. This distinction, and the concept of a perficience itself, I believe to be of wider application than this thesis alone. If this is so, then this section, besides being important as a foundation for this work on the role of the teacher, may be seen as work which, if valid, should have wider applications within the philosophy of action.
CHAPTER 2: A Critical Review of some of the Previous Analyses of Teaching

Introduction

The literature on the concept of teaching is now so extensive that it would be impossible to review it quickly in one chapter of a thesis. However, some of the discussions are more relevant to the problem being considered here than others. No examination is made, therefore, of the distinctive differences between the views of B.O. Smith and I. Scheffler, but the work of P.H. Hirst is discussed in detail.

The assumption made here is that whatever can be learned could be taught. (This must not be taken as suggesting that whatever is learned must be taught.) I see no reason to believe that we can decide a priori that certain things which can be learned cannot be taught. The claim is, however, formal in this respect. It is open to the results of further investigations of what is learned, as distinguished from what is innate or acquired in ways other than by learning. No analysis of learning is presented here, but many questions concerning learning are discussed in relation to Hirst's work on teaching and Kenny's activity/performance distinction. Since there is agreement here with the general position that the concept of teaching is parasitic on the concept of learning, if enquiries on the nature of learning suggest important modifications in our understanding of it, the formal analysis of teaching given would necessarily accommodate itself to them.

Whether we can decide a priori what can be taught is controversial. For example, Powell suggests that we cannot teach people to be witty, but Ryle argues that a sense of humour is an educable thing. Powell's argument is that a sense of humour cannot be taught because it is, strictly speaking, not an activity, far less a rule-governed one, the success of which can be guaranteed by following a formula.

There seems to be no reason for believing that only those things which are fully rule-governed can be taught, for, as Oakeshott suggests, judgment and 'practical knowledge' are taught by imparting, nor that if success cannot be guaranteed, no teaching is possible. Indeed, if this were the case, then no teaching at all would be possible and nothing
could be taught, since success can never be guaranteed in a contingent world.

Powell's view seems to be, in part, shared by Pincoffs, who, looking at the conditions in which people might fail in their activities, classifies teleological activities as "people-dependent" and "world-dependent", suggesting that whether or not activities can be taught is a matter of how dependent they are.

The onus seems to be on those who claim that certain things can be learned but not taught to tell us why. We cannot guarantee virtue, vice or wit, but this is not relevant. We cannot guarantee that a language-speaker will not make an occasional slip of the tongue, but this is not to say that he hasn't learned to speak the language or that he could not have been taught it. What I have learned to do, I am usually able to do, and, as Ryle suggests, being original in any sphere, being witty or being virtuous are not things a new-born baby can do or be. Insofar as they must be learned, it is assumed here to be the case that they may be taught, though this is not to say that we are entirely knowledgeable about how we teach these things. There are many things we do - and our teaching may well often be like this - that we do without knowing how we do them. If this were not so, we would have nothing to discover by observation about how it may be done.

Teaching and Learning:

In 1933 John Dewey suggested that teaching can be compared to selling commodities. No-one, he said, can sell unless someone buys. Thus he argued that there must be some exact equation between teaching and learning. Following Dewey, William Kilpatrick equally argued that unless the child (sic) learned, the teacher had not taught.

This assertion appears to have been accepted for over twenty years, in spite of the many ways in which teaching is clearly unlike selling. Of philosophical importance is that it is a conceptual truth that no-one can buy unless someone else sells to him. However, there seem to be no grounds for a parallel claim that no-one can learn unless someone
teaches him. (If this were so, no new knowledge could, on some accounts, be created.) This is because whereas selling and buying can only be understood in terms of one another, teaching is conceptually parasitic on learning. The implication is one way only. We need to understand what learning is before we could understand what teaching is, but an understanding of teaching is not required for an understanding of learning. To say this is to disagree with the implications of Smith's claim that a learner can be defined as one who is receiving instruction, (i.e. that learning is receiving instruction). We rather understand learning in the way suggested by Hirst, as coming to a new state - coming to believe P, know Q, understand R, appreciate S, or acquiring new skills, capacities etc., and a learner primarily as one who is doing this.

In 1954 Broudy argued against Dewey's analogy, but on different grounds from those I have suggested above. He says, "Many educators glibly pronounce the dictum 'If there is no learning, there is no teaching.' This is a way of speaking because no educator (sic) really believes it is true, or if he did he would in all honesty refuse to take most of his salary...... To teach is deliberately to try to promote certain learnings. When other factors intrude to prevent such learning, the teaching fails...... As long as the effort was there, there was teaching." (my italics).

Two points may be made about this. Firstly, Broudy speaks of "the effort". This, of course, is misleading. In practice people can put more or less effort into their attempts. We speak, with justification, of people, including ourselves, as "trying hard", "not making much effort", "putting more into it than they/I used to", etc. Broudy presumably does not want to suggest that there are quantitative differences in teaching to match the differences in effort, since he wishes to say that either teaching is going on or it is not. But if the grounds of his claim are something to do with people being entitled to claim their pay, it would be at least controversial as to how much effort a person must make before we are willing to say he is teaching. At the very least, the issue is more
complex than Broudy accepts, for the responsibilities of an institutionalized role are not decided by analysis.

Secondly, this way of putting the point suggest that Broudy is arguing against the suggestion that teaching implies learning on social and moral, rather than logical and usage, grounds, and that he is working from the role concept of teacher in an institution to teaching. If it were the teacher's duty to teach in the sense which implies learning, then, according to Broudy, if pupils fail to learn, the teacher has failed in his responsibility and therefore does not deserve to be paid (which I take to imply 'is blameworthy'). I consider Broudy to be mistaken in implying that it follows from the fact that a person has failed to fulfil his obligations that he deserves to be blamed. Indeed, as Austin has pointed out, this is precisely the function of excuses in our language. If a person has an excuse for failing to fulfil his obligation, he is always considered less blameworthy, and sometimes blameless, even though he has still failed to fulfil it. Alternatively, he may justify failing in an obligation X by appealing to another obligation Y and claiming priority for Y. If his justification is accepted, once again he is not considered blameworthy for failing to fulfil X.

What Broudy said was accepted by Scheffler, although it is clear that it would be more usual to say "the attempt fails" rather than, as Broudy put it, "the teaching fails". Scheffler then used the same argument as Broudy to claim that there was justification for calling what people do 'teaching' although no learning has taken place. My first point is that it is important to remember the kind of justification it is. The usage seems to be accounted for by Scheffler and Broudy as protecting people from charges of failing to fulfil role obligations - and this without any account of what role obligations are in general or how those of the teacher are to be understood! Since people might well accept my view that there was no justification for the claim that if they had not taught anybody anything they necessarily did not deserve to be paid, and since Dewey's analysis was the currently accepted one, the analysis of Broudy and Scheffler must have been prescriptive for its time. But Scheffler is most concerned that he should not be stipulating.
It is interesting to note an important distinction between Dewey's view and the Broudy/Scheffler position. The latter makes the teacher the final authority on whether or not he is fulfilling his role obligations. This position would seem at least to require some comment, which neither Broudy nor Scheffler provide, since ordinarily it is a matter for decision of a public kind. On Dewey's view a teacher would not necessarily be the authority on whether he is teaching or not, as he is in no different position from others to assess whether or not learning is going on, and sometimes in a weaker position than the learner or an impartial observer.

Nothing at this stage turns on whether or not Scheffler's analysis is in fact prescriptive or descriptive. The claim is rather that the kind of reasoning which Broudy and Scheffler have offered is inappropriate for deciding whether or not teaching is an activity. And it is on this argument that the original claim by Scheffler that teaching is an activity is based, that it is the agent's view of what he is doing that is necessarily correct here.

A point which needs to be considered is that it is possible for people to fail to be doing what they sincerely think and claim to be doing. The special case to be noted here is where the reason for their failure to be doing it is that it is logically impossible of achievement. This is best illustrated by the example of squaring the circle. People who believed that it was possible to square the circle could make the claim that they were engaged in doing it, and this form of language would be used by anyone who accepted that it was possible of achievement. However, those who recognize the logical impossibility do not wish to imply that they accept its possibility, as happens if they accept a claim "He is squaring the circle." To accept a claim "P is X-ing" is to accept the truth of its assumptions, in this case that X-ing is possible of achievement.

There is a similarity to our usage in the acceptance of knowledge claims here. In the same way that we may reject e.g. the claim that
the Greeks knew that there were gods living on Mount Olympus because that would commit us to the belief that this was true, so we reject the claim that A was squaring the circle, instead adopting such usages as "A was trying to square the circle," or "A thought he was squaring the circle", etc. Where we believe that what a person is trying to achieve is logically impossible of achievement, we accept not only the usual idea that persons can be failing to achieve what they are aiming at, but also that they cannot be doing what they think they are doing. This is true even where a description of what they are doing is delineated in terms of their purpose or point.

The application of this to teaching relates to a claim that it is logically impossible to teach someone that which they have already learned and not forgotten (or whatever alternative formulation is necessary for some Xs (e.g. habits) which cannot be referred to in this way). If my claim that we cannot speak of a person's doing what is logically impossible, but only of his trying to do it, is correct, it would follow that we could not say that A is teaching B X where we believe that B already knows X. And it would be usual for A to withdraw his claim to have been teaching B X if he later learned that B already knew X. If teaching were an activity, delineated by the purpose or point of the agent at the time he was acting, we could not speak in this way. We would not withdraw to full 'trying to teach' claims or speak of what they 'thought they were doing'. The interesting point about this is that, for most Xs, teaching B X must finish when B learns the X. This may happen without the person who is attempting to teach B X being aware of it. Therefore it is possible that, in ignorance of the occurrence of the outcome, he continues in his attempt, although (if what I have argued above is correct) he can no longer be teaching X to B.

This discussion has produced a clear counter-example, supported by argument as well as by usage, to Broudy's claim that if the effort is there, there is teaching. Of course it is clear that Broudy did not have such a type of case in mind.
If we describe these cases as instances of trying to teach B X (or thinking that one is teaching B X) rather than as instances of teaching B X unsuccessfully — and it is my contention that this latter description is completely inappropriate as a description of what a person is doing when B already knows the X — this clearly suggests that the central sense of teaching cannot be the 'task' sense. I suggest that it is an 'outcome' sense, not in the sense of a final outcome, but in terms of the kind of 'uptake' which, I suggest, must be going on for anyone to be teaching someone in the central sense. But this 'uptake' (communication) itself is not sufficient, for there is a further, independent, condition of the ability of the recipient to learn (i.e. that he does not already know X).

Though I suggest that clarity of understanding is increased by returning to the attempt/outcome distinction, the further point must be made that the occurrence of the outcome is not a sufficient condition for the correct application of the so-called 'achievement' term. It must be the case that what is done by A is instrumental in bringing about the outcome. The 'outcome' sense of the term is used correctly if the speaker believes that the actions of an appropriate kind by A have been instrumental in bringing about the outcome, but my point is that if it is discovered that this belief is mistaken, the attribution is withdrawn. This point, like the previous one, has suggested to me that the logic of the term 'teach' is similar in many ways to the logic of 'know'.

The Scheffler Analysis

Scheffler's discussion of teaching is well-known, and I make no further comments concerning my agreement with Cooper, who points out that Scheffler's analysis is far more appropriate to e.g. the teaching of philosophy than it is to e.g. the teaching of art and poetry appreciation, and, I might add, swimming. Certainly, in claiming that making clear the underlying rationale and submitting oneself to the independent judgment of pupils is a necessary condition of teaching, Scheffler is restricting the range of applications of the term. His claim that his analysis is descriptive ("the everyday, standard use") thereby fails, but if he is being prescriptive and suggesting the value of adopting such a narrower concept of teaching,
he gives us no justification for adopting such a use. One might hazard a guess that this is what he wishes to see going on in schools, but what people mean by a term is one question and what ought to go on in school is another. It might even be suggested that Scheffler has equated the meaning of 'teaching' and the meaning of 'educating' in the more specific sense delineated by Peters (except that Scheffler claims that teaching is an activity and Peters denies that educating is).

Scheffler, like Broudy, points to the ways in which a person who is designated "teacher" may speak in arguing that teaching without learning can take place. He writes, "We say, 'I was teaching P to X the whole afternoon but he learned nothing.'" Here, he claims, is the single case which is sufficient to falsify the claim that teaching implies learning. It is not clear whether Scheffler always accepts that the sense in which teaching does not imply learning is elliptical for 'try to teach'. However, it is certainly not true that everyone would assent to Scheffler's claim to have found a counter-example.

Since, for Dewey, teaching implies learning, he could presumably have denied that this counted as a counter-example by claiming that the term was being misused. This denial has recently been revived by Postman and Weingartner. They write, "From our point of view, it is on the same level as a salesman's remarking, 'I sold it to him but he didn't buy it' - which is to say, it makes no sense. It seems to mean that 'teaching' is what a 'teacher' does, which, in turn, may or may not bear any relationship to what those being 'taught' do."

Though it is difficult to agree with Postman and Weingartner that the remark is meaningless (it is clearly possible to make sense of it), they have brought up a point which has not previously been discussed and which ought to contribute something to our understanding of teaching. This is a consideration of what it is to be 'being taught'. For to say that B is being taught X by A is normally an alternative way of saying that A is teaching B X. This point is taken up more fully later in this chapter, since it ties up more closely with the analysis offered by Hirst which further develops Scheffler's claim that teaching is an activity.
The position taken in this thesis is that it is possible to make sense of the claim to have been teaching somebody though he hasn't learned anything, but that this is only a derivative sense of teach. This, I suggest, is implied by the use of the term 'but', which normally suggests that one of the usual conditions (of teaching) may be missing. However, Scheffler writes as if the 'task' sense of teaching is central. Here he does not seem to take fully Ryle's point\(^\text{25}\) that it is 'achievement' verbs that are often borrowed for 'task' use, not vice versa. According to Ryle, they are then being used "to signify the performance of the corresponding task activities when the hopes of success are good....... 'Hear' is sometimes used as a synonym of 'listen' and 'mend' as a synonym of 'try to mend'." Ryle, by his use of the term 'borrow', implies that it is the 'achievement' sense which is prior. This must be understood before the notion of an attempt can be understood. A person whose activities are unified by his goal or purpose, the bringing about of which is X-ing in an 'achievement' sense could not be engaged in an attempt unless he understood the 'achievement' sense, though this is not to say that he has to have the word X-ing in his vocabulary but only that he must understand the concept.

This point can be made weakly or strongly, and the strong claim, which I feel can stand, says something not only about language but also about action. The weaker claim is that one needs to understand the 'achievement' sense of teaching in order to say of anyone (including himself) that he is teaching in a 'task' or 'attempt' sense. But the stronger claim is that understanding this sense is a necessary condition of anyone's even making such an attempt. A person needs to understand the 'outcome' sense of 'teach' before he can even try.

I suggest, then, that Scheffler's work is incomplete. Though he may have shown that there are two senses of the word 'teaching' in common use, one implying that learning is taking place and the other not implying this, he has not tried to show how the two are related and which has logical priority. From Ryle's work, it seems it must be the 'achievement' sense, and since Scheffler's discussion is based on Ryle's distinction, one might have expected him to accept this. Much that Smith and Scheffler say, however, indicates that they do not, but no reasons have been given.
On the basis of the arguments set out here, I suggest that the attempt sense must be analysed in terms of the outcome sense and that the choice of analysing the outcome sense in terms of the attempt sense is not open to us, as Hirst, for example, believes can be done. We must understand 'bringing about learning by the performance of certain kinds of acts' before we can understand 'trying to bring about learning by the performance of certain kinds of acts', for the one entails the other. Thus teaching cannot be primarily understood as an activity, though people can engage in acts and activities the point of which is to teach.

I have abandoned the use of the term 'achievement' and prefer to speak of 'outcomes' only. Whether or not something is an achievement in the context depends on the purposes and goals of the agent of whom X-ing is predicated. Until we know we cannot speak of his achievements. 'Hit' is an 'achievement' verb for Ryle. But we cannot tell from A's hitting a tree with his arrow that it was an achievement for him, for it is only his achievement if he was aiming at that tree and not the next one. We understand his hitting the tree, however, as an outcome of his shooting independently of understanding the concept of aiming (trying to hit) for we can use the term in respect of what went on without consideration of what he was trying to do.

The same can be said of teaching. It is pre-judging the issue to say that in 'standard' cases teaching is intentional. The question is which cases are to be taken as standard. Ryle suggests 26 that we dispense with the "familiar sense of taught" in which we were taught virtues, and simply ask the question "Can virtue be learned?" But this sense cannot be dispensed with, I suggest, for there are good reasons for accepting that this, too, is an exemplar of the standard case, for what all instances have in common is the relationship between the performance of certain kinds of action and the responses of learners. If we speak only of learning, what we are doing that brings this learning about falls out of sight. We need to ask, "What am I teaching my children?" and not simply "What are they learning?" Their learning is often our responsibility in more than one sense of the word.

There are good grounds, therefore, for accepting that teaching in its central sense involves an outcome of learning which can be seen as
an achievement only in relation to attempts. But it is not the case that anything which one might do that was instrumental in bringing about learning would be an instance of teaching. Further conditions are necessary.

Macmillan and McClellan argue that, because of this, the task/achievement analysis is inappropriate to teaching. Wherever the analysis is appropriate, they say, trying to achieve is necessarily doing the task. To try to get people to learn, they suggest, is not necessarily to be teaching, "for there are restrictions on motive and manner in teaching which do not apply, say, to propagandizing, conditioning, hypnosis..., each of which (under suitable conditions) could be an instance of trying to get someone to learn something." Similarly, it is agreed that turning up the radiators cannot, by itself, be teaching anyone French, as Hirst and Peters argue.

Scheffler moved from the claim that there is a task sense of 'teaching' to the claim that teaching is an activity, and a parallel objection must be considered here. If one conceives of an activity simply in terms of point or purpose (i.e. as acts performed with the intention of bringing about a certain state of affairs), then the objection has great force. On this analysis of an activity (which, I suggest, must be a technical sense, since it would exclude many things which would normally be classed as activities on our understanding of the term in ordinary language - e.g. going swimming, walking in the park), there seem to be no conditions limiting the means which can be employed to bring about the required state of affairs. Indeed, it is not even necessary that it is the case that what the agent considers will bring about the state of affairs in question should be a possible (or even a plausible) method of doing so. For, logically, provided that the agent believes that the state of affairs desired could be an outcome or consequence of the acts he performs, he is employing a means to an end. This is indicated by the kinds of answer he would give to questions like "Why are you doing X?" But in cases where the relationship between the means and the end is purely contingent (and some argue that this is necessarily the case), what A views as a means to the end Z need not be an appropriate method of
attaining \( Z \). This is not entailed by his employing \( X \) as a means.

If Scheffler and Hirst and Peters are right in suggesting (with different kinds of cases in mind) that there are limitations on the means used for bringing about learning, teaching cannot be an activity in this simple sense.

Hirst refers in his paper\(^{29}\) to this concept of an activity and the above objection will be considered in relation to his position. It must be noted, however, that Hirst clearly holds a more restricted view of what can count as an instance of a given activity than Kenny, for example, seems committed to in his discussion\(^{30}\) (which is dealt with in detail in the next chapter). The Kenny analysis seems to allow of no conditions limiting what could count as an instance of a given activity, but Hirst suggests that, at least in some cases, not just anything can count as an instance of the activity in question. It is to this analysis that we now turn.

**The Analysis of P.H. Hirst**

The earlier discussions, accepting the task/achievement distinction, have been further developed by Hirst in a recent book (in collaboration with Peters)\(^{31}\), and in the article already referred to. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to pointing out the difficulties involved in accepting this analysis as grounds for consideration being given to an alternative. The three conditions, indicated in the book and article as "logically necessary conditions for the central cases of 'teaching'", are set out below. It is to these conditions that the rest of the discussion refers.

(i) Activities must be conducted or acts performed with the primary intention of bringing about the learning of \( X \).

(ii) They must indicate or exhibit, explicitly or implicitly, that \( X \).

(iii) They must do this in a way which is intelligible to, and within the capacities of, the learners.

I understand Hirst to be claiming to be giving a descriptive account of the meaning of teaching, a general account that is compatible with
the normal application of the term. That is, where Hirst suggests correctly that we would not call giving an account of the Philosophical Investigations to six year olds teaching, his analysis, if it is to be successful, must exclude all such cases. I question whether it is successful, for it does not necessarily exclude all such cases, and I question whether it is descriptive, as will be seen.

My own view is that an analysis of teaching which indicates what a person must do if he is to try to teach, and which enables us to discover what, if anything, we are teaching, more closely fits our current usage than one which refuses to allow us to predicate teaching X (in any central sense) of a person who does not intend to bring about that specific learning. And I am disquieted at the discrepancy between the later discussion which suggests that to be teaching, the bringing about of learning must be one's primary intention and the earlier one which suggests that teaching "in a fully intentional sense" occur by definition as soon as a person's activity "is influenced by any consideration of the would-be learners."

Though the main burden of the rest of the chapter is the pointing out of difficulties of the Hirst analysis of teaching as it stands, this should not be taken as suggesting that the analysis has been of little importance in our becoming clearer about teaching.

The first reason for this importance is that Hirst has been the first person to lay the appropriate stress on the bringing of Xs into the "view" of the pupils, which I consider now to be the most important aspect of understanding teaching. It was Scheffler, of course, who pointed out that one could not simply teach a person but had to be teaching him something. However, he developed the point by directing his attention to the manner involved and the making available of the underlying rationale, in a way which I have already suggested was stipulative (at least in respect of English as opposed to American use of the term).

Hirst developed the point in a different direction, suggesting that the explicit or implicit indication of the Xs to be learned was a necessary condition of teaching those Xs. This additionally emphasizes the very important, often internal, relationship between
what is displayed and what is taught, a point which had not been clearly brought out before in relation to teaching of a non-intentional kind, though there has been some discussion of it in relation to education, and in respect of means-end reasoning in Macmillan and McClellan's article already referred to\(^3\) and by Sockett\(^3\). However, the Hirst formulation is not entirely appropriate in respect of teaching dispositions, attitudes etc., which he mentions specifically in his article. Whilst having a cognitive aspect, these may also have an aspect of "feeling" and this produces difficulties in respect of indication. I can, for example, indicate only my enthusiasm for history, when what I may be trying to bring about is B's enthusiasm. This I necessarily cannot indicate, since he is by definition not yet enthusiastic. But it surely does not follow from this that I cannot teach him to be enthusiastic about history. If this were the conclusion, it would clearly show Hirst's paper could not be presenting a descriptive analysis. But he cannot be suggesting this, since he gives such examples himself.

The second important aspect introduced by Hirst is concerned with the availability of what is being indicated to the pupil's understanding. This is another aspect in which I am not in full agreement with him, but I suggest that bringing this to the forefront of the discussion is a major advance in understanding what, on our present usage, teaching involves.

Hirst opens his article as follows: "The question with which this paper is concerned is simply 'What is teaching?' How do we distinguish teaching from other activities? That is, I think, a very important question...." It surely cannot be denied, however, that there are two questions here, not one as Hirst suggests. The question "What is teaching?" is a general question. It is only if one answers this question with the general answer that teaching is an activity that it becomes equivalent to the problem of distinguishing teaching from other activities.

Hirst, in conflating the two questions, assumes that teaching in its central sense is an activity, but nowhere justifies this assumption. This section seeks to spell out some of the implications of the assumption, and by indicating that some are untenable, gives the grounds for rejecting the assumption.
Normally we speak of teaching as something we do. Certainly, it does not seem to be something that happens to us. But, at least in philosophical terms, not everything we do is referred to as an activity. Kenny, for example, distinguishes between activities and performances, where performance verbs also refer to things we do. Hirst has not told us what his use of the term 'activity' contrasts activities with. We do not know whether or not he has considered the possibility of teaching as a performance.

Furthermore, since not everything we do is done intentionally, some investigation into the necessity of intention in central cases of teaching, rather than its assumption seems required. And even if teaching were something we could only do intentionally (like murder) it would not follow that it was necessarily an activity, so that this would need to be argued for.

In assuming that teaching is to be classified as an activity, Hirst necessitates particular answers to questions which previously puzzled philosophers of education and worry teachers. Firstly, the assumption that teaching in its central sense is an activity makes it logically necessary for teaching in this sense to be intentional. It is not possible, given the way Hirst has explained his understanding of an activity, to engage in any activity non-intentionally. Secondly, on this definition, the bringing about of an end-state of affairs which is aimed at is not a necessary condition of being engaged in that activity. Thus the assignation of teaching to the class of activities (rather than some other class) gives a necessarily affirmative answer to the question "Must teaching be intentional?" and a necessarily negative answer to the question "Does teaching imply learning?" These questions, to which earlier discussions have been addressed, are simply answered a priori if it is accepted that the proper question to ask is "How do we distinguish teaching from other activities?" And the person who is worried about what he is teaching children is simply a victim of confusion, or, as Hirst put it, "misunderstands". 36

I suggest that phrasing the question in this way, thus assuming the answer "teaching is an activity" to the question "How do we classify teaching?" or "What is teaching?" is a mistake. We must
start, as Hirst originally says, with the open question, "What is teaching?" or preferably, "What is it for A to be teaching B X?"

We can then distinguish a far wider range of questions which it is possible to ask.

None of this excludes the possibility that A's teaching B X is sometimes the successful upshot of his attempt to teach B X but there is the assumption that we do understand teaching in such a way that it is not necessarily the successful upshot of a teaching attempt. If this assumption could be shown to be false, any questions which presuppose it would be shown to be pseudo-questions. My suggestion is that it is Hirst's claim that the two questions are equivalent that requires support. It must be shown to be true and not simply assumed. This section implicitly indicates why it is unhelpful to regard them as equivalent.

It does not seem to me that we do accept that a normal person knows (infallibly and indubitably) when he is teaching, whom he is teaching and what he is teaching, as on Hirst's analysis he does. Wall and King seem to have a point when they express the worries of teachers about this. Clearly they do not have Hirst's concept of teaching. If Hirst wished to prescribe a concept where such doubts have no place, this is fair enough, though we would need grounds for deciding to adopt it. But surely this is not what he sees himself as doing. On what grounds, however, can it be decided a priori that teaching is one of the things where the agent knows better than others what he is doing? For though sometimes an agent knows best what he is doing, there are other times when others know better than he.

Hirst discusses in detail why an analysis of teaching is important, and though I am in agreement with much of what he says, the reasons underlying my agreement are sometimes different from his. Firstly, says Hirst, a lot of new educational methods are being canvassed in which there is almost exclusive emphasis on the activities of the pupil and the significance of the teacher is far from clear. (Here the introduction of the ordinary language use of 'activity' confuses.) This, Hirst suggests, arises from a misunderstanding of what teaching is (my emphasis). I take this to mean that Hirst sees his analysis as
providing an understanding of our normal usage. But his analysis is not in accordance with ordinary language in many respects (e.g. we don't say that a person has been teaching all afternoon when he has been writing a text-book). Thus it must be prescriptive. But a failure to use the term in accordance with a prescription cannot be described as misunderstanding. There are difficulties over the way he makes his claim.

But it is surely a most important point he is making. The significance of the teacher must be indicated, for if the teacher had no significance, there would be no point employing teachers rather than anyone else (or perhaps no-one) in a classroom. However, this seems a problem not only about what teaching is but also involving the larger issue of what is involved in the role of the teacher in a school. That is, an analysis of teaching, though necessary, cannot be sufficient for determining what teachers should be professionally committed to. This is not to disagree with Hirst about the importance of analysis, but about what follows from it.

Secondly Hirst argues that we need a fuller understanding of what teaching is in order to distinguish it from such things as indoctrinating, preaching, advertising and propagandizing which are, in his view, in the same logical band as teaching. But in claiming that they are all classifiable as activities, Hirst has prejudged the issue, and decided the difference a priori. For if they are all activities and what distinguishes any activity is its purpose or point, then indoctrination, preaching and teaching are distinguished by their different aims or purposes. But this is precisely what is open to question.

It may be that the insistence on intentionality here is seen as necessary for avoiding a functionalist account of human goings-on, with mechanistic and behaviourist assumptions about human affairs which would be unacceptable. It is my intention to indicate why abandoning the criterion of intentionality does not commit us to a mechanistic account.

Thirdly, in Hirst's view, we need a great deal of carefully
controlled empirical research on the effectiveness of different teaching methods, and he says, rightly, that without the clearest conception of what teaching is, it is impossible to assess what goes on in the classroom. However, as will be shown, the analysis he presents raises extraordinary difficulties for empirical researchers concerned to judge the effectiveness of methods, difficulties which he may not realize are implied, and which appear to render irrelevant some of the empirical data which reason would indicate were essential to such enquiry - such as how well the teacher judges the actual conceptual frameworks and existing beliefs of pupils and their grasp of his language. If I am correct in suggesting that this is the consequence of a proper application of Hirst's analysis, then some amendment of the analysis is clearly needed. For on this account as it stands, many teachers who are good judges of their pupils' understandings and cognitive states but who do not see the need for clearly specifying their objectives, or even feel that there are good reasons for refraining from such specification, will be excluded from any investigation, no matter how effective what they do is in promoting learning; while teachers who are very poor judges of their pupils' cognitive states but who have very clear objectives will be ideal subjects. Hirst may really be wanting to indicate simply that you cannot fairly judge the effectiveness of attempts to teach new curriculum projects or use new methods unless the teachers who are using them understand what they are intended to do. But this is a long way from claiming that any teacher whose aims are specified at a high level of generality, or rather fuzzily, are professional frauds and are not ("logically are not") teaching their pupils whatever it is that the pupils come to learn through the various activities these teachers engage in.

Hirst describes teachers with "fuzzy" intentions as "a category of professional teachers who are in fact frauds because their intentions are never clear." It doesn't seem to be a logical point about the meaning of teaching that one is a professional fraud because one hasn't formulated one's intentions clearly. It seems rather to be a moral judgment concerning what it is to fill a professional role. Though this is, of course, a very important matter, it must not be confused with the problem of whether or not teaching is an activity. As already suggested, it does not seem that
one can answer questions about existing meanings by making moral judgments.

Hirst seems to be suggesting that in order to be teaching at all in the sense which he sees as relevant to filling the professional role of teacher, a person must be very clear about what it is that he intends his pupils to learn, a vague formulation being identified with "having fuzzy intentions". I may misunderstand him here, but it seems to me that specifying that one wanted one's pupils to learn "something about pond life" would be an example of what Hirst means. My point is that if this is an example of having fuzzy intentions, it is difficult to see why this necessarily leads to fuzzy things being done "in the name of teaching" or why a person with such intentions should be designated as a professional fraud.

Let us consider the example of a person who is interested and knowledgeable about pond life and ways of investigating it, taking his pupils to a pond where they engage in observation, discussion etc. with each other and with him, during which time the teacher never formulates his intentions less fuzzily. As a result of this and other activities, the pupils come to know a great many things about pond plant and animal life, as well as skills associated with pond exploration and perhaps even some understanding of what is involved in scientific method. Neither the fuzziness of the intentions of such a teacher, nor his major concern with interesting his pupils rather than getting them to learn specific propositions and skills, nor the fact that different groups of pupils with whom he engages in these activities may learn different things, seem to be sufficient grounds for refusing to predicate teaching of those propositions and skills etc. to him. Usage does not support this position. Nor would he normally be considered to be a professional fraud.

My point here, though, is rather that, on Hirst's account, those persons engaged in empirical research on teaching methods (i.e. the value of practical activity at the pond-face) will be precluded from including the activities of such a group in their research. For as soon as the investigators engaged in what must, on Hirst's account, necessarily be their first step, that of ascertaining the teacher's primary intentions, and discover that this teacher cannot specify precisely what it is
that the pupils are to learn, or indicates that his primary intention is to sustain his pupils' interest in pond life, to carry out the orders of his Head of Department etc., then no matter how conducive the activities are to learning, according to Hirst he cannot (logically cannot) be teaching in the central sense, the sense necessary for him to be included in the research project. The investigators must exclude him — or alternatively, perhaps, attribute to him unconscious intentions, or subject him to psychoanalysis in order to show that his primary intention was "really" the bringing about of certain particular specified (not merely specifiable) Xs. This may sound a ridiculous interpretation of Hirst's position, but if the logic of the position leads to this, then surely there is something wrong with it.

Furthermore, in assessing the effectiveness of a method of teaching (that is, whether it helps children learn) it is not necessary, as Hirst implies, to know the primary intention of the person performing the acts. For if this were true, we could not assess the adequacy of instruction as a method of teaching a child how to lay the table by looking at cases where the primary intention of the mother doing the instructing is not that the child learns how to lay the table but that the table should be laid. In many instances of teaching in the world in general, A's teaching B X is a part of his ensuring that Y is done. It is possibly only in schools that we do not come across this often, but there is no reason why it should not happen there more. The question being asked is why we must insist that A's primary intention be that B learns X rather than e.g. that Y is done before we may say that A is teaching B X in a central sense. No reasons have been given. It is true by definition if central senses of teaching are activity senses.

In making this claim, Hirst is presumably committed to challenging as confused such suggestions as King's, when he writes, "Teachers seldom,... really know whom they are teaching.... They do not always know if they are teaching anything at all." And Wall's, in writing about "those things.... which parent or teacher think they are teaching." Wall clearly considers it possible to believe mistakenly that one is teaching someone something when one is not, in the sense of having wrong beliefs about what one is doing. When Labov writes, "Bereiter and
Engelmann believe that they are teaching him an entirely new language whereas in fact they are only teaching him to produce slightly different forms of the language he already has," he indicates the same belief. White, too, writes of "the teacher who says, 'I thought I was teaching Jones mathematics, but I now see I have only taught him to hate the subject,'" in his paper on indoctrination.

If teaching is an activity, it is impossible (with reservations which have no relevance to the kinds of instances these writers discuss) to make a distinction between what you are doing and what you think (believe) you are doing. Given that the teacher is not having some kind of hallucination or delusion that he is displaying or indicating an X which he is, in fact, not indicating (Hirst's condition (ii)), then, on the activity analysis, a sincere teaching claim cannot be rejected. This must be so because we normally accept the teacher as the authority on what his intentions in respect of learning are and on his beliefs about what concepts, etc. his pupils can understand. The point is that Wall, King, Labov and White quite intelligibly reject what Hirst asserts—that anyone who is teaching necessarily knows what and whom he is teaching. They would also reject what is further implied by Hirst's analysis—that to know whether and what you are teaching B in the central "achievement" sense (teaching successfully, in Hirst's terms) a person must, as a necessary condition of knowing this, be clear about what his primary intentions were and that they must have been concerned with B's learning that specific X.

It is undeniable that there is a well-known sense of teaching (which I shall suggest is the central sense) in which we accept the possibility of discovering (and the discovery can be made by anyone, pupil, teacher or observer) that a person is teaching another e.g. to love poetry, to be dishonest, competitive or co-operative, that his father can't be trusted, to produce slightly different forms of the language he has, etc. The problems we have in respect of teaching as what is going on cannot be made to disappear by suggesting that Wall, King, Labov and White are using a derivative sense of teaching.

In his paper, Hirst refers to the teaching enterprise, and then to
the more specific activities "which are specifically called teaching activities" and which "do not include in their number the sharpening of pencils, the opening of windows and all other such activities which might form a legitimate part of the teaching enterprise as a whole."\(^{43}\) But the idea of a teaching enterprise as used here seems to be doing no useful work. The more usual formulation would be to say that these are all legitimate parts of the teacher's role (of which teaching is only a part). There does seem to be an important sense in which we do speak of a teaching enterprise, but this is not it.

It is not clear whether Hirst is smuggling a content into his analysis by his claim that, for example, sharpening pencils is not a teaching activity, or whether this is simply careless formulation. Clearly sharpening pencils could be a teaching activity on Hirst's own analysis, as a demonstration by a person intending that a child learns how to sharpen a pencil. So his claim that sharpening pencils is not a teaching activity must indicate some assumptions about the content to be taught in schools, or the intentions of the teachers working there. It is thus not relevant to the analysis. There is no such objection, however, to be made of Hirst's later\(^{44}\), more specific, claim that "sharpening pencils cannot be itself teaching Pythagoras's theorem," with which I fully agree.

What I disagree with here is Hirst's assertion that there are considerable differences between what could be an instance of work and an instance of teaching, so that teaching is more like gardening than like working. It is difficult to see how any acts can be regarded as being excluded a priori as teaching acts on logical grounds, any more than they can be excluded in the case of work. For example, if it is the case that thinking through a mathematical proof could not be an instance of teaching anyone anything, this is only so because of the contingent fact that there is not normally telepathic communication between people. Were this the case, then covert thinking could be as suitable for teaching as telling might be. Though in performing any act, a person is never necessarily teaching anyone anything, there is, I suggest, no a priori exclusion of any act as being an act through which one could not possibly teach anyone anything.

Hirst seems to me to have had a most important insight in his
suggestion that teaching involves bringing what is learned into the "view" of the learner, and if this is so, teaching clearly involves acts and activities on the part of the teacher. But the acceptance of this claim does not commit us to the belief that teaching is itself an activity.

Hirst points out that it is not the case that an activity which counts as a case of teaching someone something in one context would necessarily be a case of teaching anyone anything in another context. I accept this, but disagree that it supports the view that teaching is an activity. Planning activities with an end in view is not enough to ensure that there is a corresponding "super-activity", as Peters points out when discussing the suggestion that education is an activity. Hirst is right in his claim that we cannot hope to get clear about what teaching is simply by producing an exhaustive list of activities. But the fact that teaching activities are polymorphous does not show that teaching is an activity, much less a polymorphous activity. Peters refers often to educational processes, but is clearly aware that this does not imply that education is itself therefore a process. If this is the form of inference Hirst is using, it is invalid.

My concern here is with intention not because I dispute that there are uses in which intention is implied and uses in which it is not, but because of the claim that the intentional use is the central use and that understanding this is necessary for understanding all uses of the term, which are explained in terms of their derivation from this use. Hirst says that his paper is restricted to a school context and claims that "in schools we are not primarily concerned with unintended learning." I have already suggested that we need first to understand teaching apart from a school context in order to understand what a school might be, but additionally it seems to me quite wrong to suggest that schools are not equally concerned with some unintended learnings as they are with intended learnings. Certain unintended learnings are very much the concern of the teacher. Firstly, there are the unintended learnings which are the outcomes of his own actions and for which he may feel responsible. If they are undesirable, he needs to be concerned both about them and about how they were brought about if he is to avoid bringing them about in the future. But, more relevant to Hirst's claim here, as I see it, is that if a school is seen as an
institution established to promote certain learning achievements by pupils, then the teachers must be concerned with those unintended learnings which represent not simply a failure to get people to learn what is attempted but their learning of something which is in some sense opposite to that which was intended (whether through their teaching or not). For example, if a teacher is trying to teach a child that a three-sided figure is called a triangle, there is a distinction between a failure to learn anything and the pupil's coming to believe that it is called a rectangle. The latter is an unintended learning which the mathematics teacher must be primarily concerned about, for it then prevents the child from learning that a four-sided figure is called a rectangle.

This is not only the case with propositional learning. If we intend a student to learn to find A interesting, we necessarily intend that he does not learn to find B boring. Finding B boring, if it occurs, is learning we did not intend. If we intend him to learn to become autonomous, we must be concerned if, unintended by us, he learns to become conformist. If pupils learn these alternatives through our acts, actions and activities, it begs the questions of responsibility to say that we have not taught them in the same sense and that this sense is unimportant in schools. This is one of the points which, it seems to me, deschoolers are trying to make.

Of course, if we accept that the original sense has primary intentionality concerned with learning as a necessary condition, then it is necessarily but trivially true that we have taught them in a different sense. This does not mean that we are justified in claiming that we are not equally concerned in the school context with the other sense, nor does it itself show that the central sense is the one which involves intention. Hirst and Peters write, "It is not that teaching" - or do they mean 'teaching' - "in most of its uses, implies that anybody necessarily learns anything." This is presumably a philosophical claim about a number of different concepts of teaching. But it has not been substantiated by an examination of the different concepts of teaching, and may be mistaken. But even if true, it does not, of itself, show that all our understanding of teaching is derived from intentional senses.

Hirst has written of a person "teaching in the fullest sense of the
word (my italics) and yet, in spite of the intention and the appropriateness of the activities involved, the pupils may learn absolutely nothing. Here the notion of teaching is simply (my italics) that of trying to get people to learn and no more (my italics).

Perhaps due to incautious wording, he is at this point open to the charge of Macmillan and McClellan, as discussed already.

The claim of this thesis is that there is no sense of teaching which is no more than trying to bring about learning, for this would allow turning up the radiators to be a case of teaching Pythagoras's theorem. What I am suggesting is that the so-called task sense is elliptical for attempting to teach in the outcome sense, with the restriction that the acts performed must constitute an attempt to bring an X to be learned into the 'view' of the pupil as Hirst suggests. But Hirst has specifically denied that his account sees the activity sense in this way. He does not accept an account of the task sense as elliptical in this way, for on his account the outcome sense is understood primarily as used to denote a successfully completed activity and can only be understood once the activity sense is understood. There is one disagreement between us here.

The other disagreement seems to be that on Hirst's account, the achievement sense is used to denote a successfully completed activity. I would argue that any adequate analysis must cover the sorts of uses where there is no implication that anything has been completed, though the teaching attempts are successful - as, for example, in teaching philosophy.

Learning and Being Taught

Learning is also characterized as an activity by Hirst, who notes that the achievements of learning are new states of the person not necessarily involving knowledge. He distinguishes the possibility of non-intentional learning, and by this he means learning as the result of causal processes. Here there is a difficulty, for clearly not all instances of learning are covered by this classification of intentional learning and learning which has resulted from causal processes.
If this classification were intended as exhaustive, what can be said by Hirst about the kind of learning which is often described as "casual", in which the doings of the agent are not primarily directed towards the achievement of learning? That is, learning is not his activity (in Hirst's sense of the term). However, it is clearly not causal in the sense I take him to mean from his examples of hypnotism, sleep-learning and conditioning. If a person is engaged in activities with the primary intention of enjoying himself, pleasing others, obeying instructions, etc., or if he non-intentionally learns X in the course of trying to learn Y, his activities result in learning which doesn't seem to be causal in Hirst's sense.

For example, some children's play brings about learning, though it is not primarily engaged in in order that learning will occur. Children may be learning while watching television, though they are primarily watching for pleasure. On this account, learning activities are polymorphous. But one can assert this at the same time as it is denied that learning is a polymorphous activity. There is, in my view, a parallel here with teaching, which, in view of the conceptual relationship between them, is perhaps not surprising.

The Hirst account of teaching and learning as activities would be thought by some (e.g. Scudder) to have missed out entirely the personal nature of many teaching/learning transactions. The teacher and the pupil, on this account, each has his own goal, and that they happen to be identical is a contingent fact which simply makes success for both more likely. For the learner, his teacher is simply a means to his end. Who he is does not matter at all, as long as he has the requisite knowledge and skill. Though teaching and learning may often be like this, on Hirst's analysis this is necessarily so, even for very young children. That is, the account seems to leave no room for the interpersonal psychological factors involved.

I return, now, to the point mentioned earlier, our understanding of the concept of being taught. On the activity analysis, we have to say that A is teaching B X (given that the conditions mentioned on page 38 are fulfilled) whatever B is doing - whether or not B is actually attending to anything relating to A or to the X which A is trying to teach him. That is, on this analysis, to say of B that he is being
taught by A is merely to say of him that he is the object of A's intention and effort. But there are difficulties here. For A's intention and effort must be directed not towards B as he actually is (and clearly some sense can be made of this) but B as A believes him to be. But when I say of B that he is being taught by A, the B I refer to is the person in the world, not B as A believes him to be.

It is scarcely plausible that each person who says "B is being taught by A" is referring to his own conception of B, for if this were so, there would be no common subject of discussion. All speakers use the name 'B' to refer to the person himself. This is not to say that each speaker's conception of B does not come into his making the statement, but that, given that each speaker may have a different conception of B, their agreement in discussion only makes sense given an assumed ontological existence of B as a common subject of reference.

The second, and related point, is that to say "B is being taught by A" is to make some claim about B, not merely a claim about A as is the case if teaching is A's activity. That is, when we say "B is being taught by A" we say more than that B is the object of A's intention and effort. There is an analogy here, I suggest, with a claim like "A is hurting B" and the corresponding "B is being hurt by A." There is a clear sense in which "hurting B" can be the purpose or point of whatever activities A is engaged in, so that B is the object of A's intention and effort. But our claim "B is being hurt by A" says more than this. It tells us something about B himself in that it indicates he is responding in some way to what A is doing. We cannot say "A is hurting B but B is not aware of what A is doing in any way."

It is my suggestion that when we say B is being taught by A we make a similar claim. This is not yet to suggest that bringing about learning is necessary. It makes so far only the weaker claim that it involves a contradiction to say "B is being taught X by A and he is unconscious," "B is being taught X by A and he is in a dream" or "B is being taught X by A and he is quite unaware of A's presence." On the Hirstean analysis of teaching, these claims are quite sensible for "B is being taught X by A" means only that B is the object of A's intentions and effort. I suggest that in such instances we are not
in a position to make "being taught" claims about B, and can only say such things as "A is trying to teach B X but ......."

From the argument that we cannot make claims of the kind suggested above, we must conclude that some kind of "uptake" is necessary for someone to be being taught. If this is so, it explains how we can understand what it is for B to refuse to be taught by A, something which is impossible on the activity analysis. If this analysis is rejected, we can accept that B can refuse to be taught by A by, for example, deliberately refraining from paying attention to A or to what A is saying or doing in making his teaching attempt. When B has deliberately "tuned out", we cannot be saying anything true about him if we make the claim that he is being taught by A.

That our language does, in fact, function in this way can be seen from a hypothetical discussion of a group of people whom A was trying to teach. If we wanted to say something about B, we would say of him that he (at least) was not being taught by A. The distinction, I feel, between teaching and certain other verbs is brought out by a comparison of "B is being shot at by A" and "B is being embarrassed by A." The basis of my argument about teaching is a claim that we understand teaching as having a logic more similar to the second example than the first. If this is so, and pupils are not being taught in the most usual sense when they have "tuned out", teaching them cannot be an activity of mine, for it makes no sense to say that my activity stops when pupils "tune out".

Can we argue a priori that my teaching B cannot stop when B ceases e.g. to attend? The above discussion suggests reasons for being willing to say that it does stop. An additional reason is that supporting the view that my teaching B cannot occur when B ceases to attend though accepting that my trying to teach does not, is that this, at least, does relate my teaching B to things that are going on in the world other than my own actions. The activity analysis makes my teaching B X independent of whatever else is going on in the world at the time. Surely arguments are needed to persuade us to accept this idealist position. Such arguments have not been given.

Clearly there must be a description under which what I am doing
does not stop when B ceases to attend, but I suggest that "teaching B" (in a non-elliptical sense, with the implication that B is being taught) is not an appropriate description. The appropriate description must have no reference to B that implies "uptake". That is, the description of what I am doing as "proving P" or "translating Q" or "explaining R" or "setting up a discovery situation" remains valid as a description whatever B is doing, and these acts constitute the pedagogic activity through which A attempts to teach B X. On this argument, teaching B X is what A is trying to do. A is not merely trying to bring about B's learning X but also to bring it about that he (A) is teaching B X. This distinction picks out the contingent (though not merely contingent) relationship between A's acts and B's learning. For B's learning X may occur without its being the case that A is teaching B X, even though he may be trying to do so. A simple example of this is the case where B is not attending to what A is doing (e.g., explaining X) but is reading the explanation in a book without A's knowledge while A explains it verbally.

I turn now to Hirst's suggestion that it must be possible for the pupil to learn the X presented and his claim that this is a logical point, and the discussion which follows points to the ambiguous nature of the claim. Hirst seems to suggest that the pupil must be able to see the meaning involved in any act the teacher performs. Does this refer only to the pupil's capacities, or also to the empirical conditions needed? To put the latter question another way, seeing the meaning involved in the act presupposes seeing the act. It is self-contradictory to speak of the possibility of a person's seeing the meanings involved in acts he does not see. Does Hirst mean, then, that if B had been attending, he could have understood? But this is not simply a matter of having the appropriate conceptual frameworks, but also of understanding the language. Was A teaching B, on Hirst's account, if he mistakenly believed that B spoke English? Again, it is logically impossible for B to understand a language he does not understand.

If we understand teaching as an activity, then a lecturer who sincerely believes that his audience speaks English and delivers a talk on the battle of Waterloo to them can be taken as a paradigm case of teaching, even if the audience does not understand English. Would Hirst say that his third condition was fulfilled or not? This
example indicates that his formulation is ambiguous.

Do we gain insight into Hirst's intentions in this matter by taking one of his own examples? He says it would not be a case of teaching if a person presented the idea of a private language by reading from "Philosophical Investigations" to six year olds. However, although he describes this as "definitely" not teaching, on the argument he presents, he cannot do so. Surely if the person doing these things believed that the understanding of the position was within the capacity of those children (because he had not considered the differences between six year olds and undergraduates to be significant here) he must be said to be teaching them the private language argument if teaching is, as Hirst suggests, his activity. Hirst says, "We are inclined to think that there could be teaching even when the present state of pupils is grossly misjudged." But his analysis must then allow that teaching occurs no matter how grossly misjudged the present state of pupils is. Surely he can never say from the position of an observer that any activities which indicate or display the Xs (that is, which fulfil his condition (ii)) "definitely" are not teaching. If he believes that observers are ever in a position to do this, regardless of the sincerity of the beliefs of the "teacher", then his position lapses into inconsistency.

Hirst actually writes, "It must be possible, and this seems to me a logical point, for learning to take place." This looks, on first reading, to be an objective demand - that it must be possible for the pupil to learn. This would mean that there were necessary conditions of A’s teaching B X which depended on B’s capacity to learn, on something that was the case, independent of A's beliefs about the matter.

The difficulty arises because he goes on to say that teaching could take place even though the state of the pupils may be grossly misjudged. For the teacher’s belief that his pupils can understand does not entail that they can understand. If we are to accept that teaching can occur when the cognitive states of pupils have been grossly misjudged, then Hirst's condition (iii) is not an objective demand but rather a subjective one, a demand that the teacher must believe that the pupils could understand. For it is only on this understanding of condition (iii) that teaching could occur when the cognitive state of pupils has been grossly
misjudged. In order to be consistent, Hirst must withdraw either this claim or the claim that a third party can judge any activities as "definitely" not teaching on the basis of condition (iii)'s not being met.

If we are to adhere to the claim that a person may be teaching certain children even when he presents material which they are incapable of understanding because of misjudgment on his part, we must rephrase Hirst's third necessary condition to read, "is, in the opinion of A, intelligible to and within the capacities of the learner". The stronger, objective claim that it must be within the capacities of the learner is incompatible with teaching's being an activity. The weaker, subjective claim is incompatible with anyone's being able to tell a person who has sincere beliefs (no matter how ridiculous) about his pupils' cognitive states and who is indicating Xs in ways compatible with these, that he is mistaken.

It seems to me more consistent with our understanding of teaching to accept Hirst's example, and claim that a person delivering an exposition of Wittgenstein to six year olds is not teaching them on the grounds that they are not understanding him. Certainly if it were claimed that these six year olds were entitled to teaching during the time when this was going on, it would not be generally accepted that they were receiving that to which they were entitled.

Finally, if the subjective interpretation necessary for claiming that teaching is an activity is adhered to, a person 'logically can' teach another something they already know. All that is necessary is A's belief that B does not know the X (as required by condition (i) for A to have a sincere intention). The arguments used above in respect of condition (iii) apply analogously to a misjudgment in respect of condition (i). I have already argued that I withdraw my claim to have been teaching B X at time t when I learn that B already knew the X at that time, and retreat to "was trying to..." or "thought I was..." claims.

I suggested earlier that there were some unexpected implications involved in the activity analysis in relation to empirical investigations of teaching. Researchers first have to investigate which of a person's intentions are primary, so that teachers who were primarily concerned to
avoid riots, keep children interested, etc. could be excluded (as professional frauds). Investigations are also needed of the detail in which teachers have specified that which is to be learned, so that teachers with 'fuzzy' intentions can be excluded. Now it is clear that they must additionally investigate the teachers' beliefs about the conceptual frameworks of their pupils, so as to eliminate any teachers who present Xs in ways which are inconsistent with those beliefs (e.g. because they are using curriculum project materials) even if their beliefs are wrong and the children do understand and are learning.

My own view is that what is required is rather for investigators to ascertain for themselves as far as possible how intelligible the teacher is to his pupils, and eliminate from any investigations teachers who present Xs in ways which are incomprehensible to their pupils, whatever the teachers' beliefs on the matter. For surely it is a mistake to suggest that one can judge the effectiveness of new teaching methods when they are being used in situations in which they are bound to fail. It may not be the method which is poor but the teacher's judgment. It is not only the teacher's beliefs about the situation which are relevant to research. Also relevant is how things are. Analysis must surely square with common sense on this. If analysis suggests that the actual states of pupils and what they are doing is irrelevant to deciding whether or not a person is teaching them (as this one does) then surely there is something wrong with the analysis. It is surely not consistent with our usual understanding of what teaching is to suggest that nothing that could be discovered about pupils' actuality is relevant to deciding whether or not they are being taught.

It follows from the claim that teaching is an activity that writing a textbook, making work-cards or films, etc. are teaching activities. If so, it would be appropriate to say that a person who spends time doing these things is teaching (something to someone) while he is engaged in doing them. If this were the case, there could be no ontological assumptions in our use of the term 'teaching', for all that is needed on this analysis is that the presentation is directed towards some hoped-for or putative pupils.

Our usual application of the term, which accepts Scheffler's point
that a person can't just be teaching but must be teaching someone, has the implication that more than merely putative pupils are required. There is no support in the language for calling writing a text-book; preparing a work-sheet or handout, or constructing a programme for a teaching machine instances of teaching (although Hirst's three criteria are adequately met). If you ask a person who has spent the afternoon doing any of these things, it is not the case that he would reply, "teaching". To assert that this is teaching is thus to prescribe many adjustments in our language usage, and indicates the incorrectness of any claim that Hirst is giving an account of our current understanding of what teaching is, as embodied in ordinary language.

Since a prescription requires some justification for its acceptance and none has been offered, we may ask why we should accept that any of these are usefully described as instances of teaching someone, though I clearly accept that the point of doing these things may be that someone should learn from them at some time in the future. That is, I suggest that a useful distinction can be made between what one is doing and the point of doing it. Though it is acceptable to say that someone has been engaging in activities the point of which is to teach someone something in the future, I suggest that this cannot be equated with saying that one was engaged in teaching all afternoon. This seems to me quite unacceptable, and since it follows from the activity analysis, that analysis must also be unacceptable.

If teaching were an activity, it must always be engaged in for a period of time, so that we can say when A was teaching B X. But can we intelligibly ask when A was teaching hoped-for pupils? Isn't this like asking when A was shooting at hoped-for targets or treating hoped-for patients? The question "When were you teaching them?" indicates the ontological assumptions which lie behind the language of teaching. Indeed, were this not so, we would have to accept that a person who believed in elves and wrote a book designed to teach them the latest techniques of shoe-making was teaching elves shoe-making. I have already argued, in respect of a different point, that in accepting such claims, one is committing oneself to the truth of their assumptions - in this case that elves existed. We would not normally do this.

Consider a book written for putative pupils of a given age-group, which is later used by such pupils. What, then, is the appropriate answer, if any, to be given to the question "When was A teaching those pupils?"
On the activity analysis we must say he was teaching them whilst writing the book - when they were, perhaps, asleep, doing something else or even not born yet. On the other hand, if we are to say they are being taught by him, the time at which this is occurring can only be when they engage themselves with the book, not when it was being written. How can these two claims be reconciled?

One attempt to reconcile them is to suggest that the pupils' being taught is the upshot of A's teaching them. Certainly this overcomes the difficulty over time, for the upshot of an activity need not occur when the activity occurs and can occur after the agent's death. But "A is X-ing B" and "B is being X-ed by A" are normally taken as alternative descriptions of the same goings-on, such that they not only describe the same events, but also have the same meaning. (Contrast Kenny's example of "Nero committed arson" and "Rome was burnt", which describe the same event but do not have the same meaning.) This being the case, it is impossible that one should be the upshot of the other, and this attempt to reconcile the two claims fails.

The other possibility, then, is to reject the claim that A was teaching those pupils when he is writing a book, or that he was teaching hoped-for pupils, and say rather that if any person is being taught it is when he uses this material. I argue here not only that we do not say the former (which is consistent with the activity analysis) but also that it would be completely inappropriate for us to do so. I argue that for any valid teaching claim, the persons who are the objects of the claim must have an ontological status and not merely be an intensional object. This is to assert that a person cannot be teaching a person who does not exist (as he might love a person who does not exist). Since this is inconsistent with teaching's being an activity (on Hirst's understanding of it) if these arguments are valid, teaching cannot be an activity in that sense.

Non-intentional teaching

If teaching were an activity, it would be trivially true that an enthusiast talking about his hobby or interests, indicating or explaining or showing Xs to another person who learns, and doing so with no thought
of bringing about learning, cannot be teaching in the sense that Hirst discusses. He may simply enjoy discussing his interests with others. Similarly, we speak of a mother teaching her children a great deal when they are engaged in what is, to all of them, a pleasant social activity, and it is trivially true that she cannot be teaching them in the 'activity' sense. What is it, asks Hirst, that leads us to speak of teaching in these contexts?

My own view is that this is a misleading question, and that it is these cases that enable us to understand what teaching is and hence to understand and to make teaching attempts. No reason has been given to explain why it is these cases that require special explanation, except that it is required in order to make them square with the analysis.

According to Hirst, his analysis helps us to understand why at times we speak of teaching in a non-intentional sense. "The situation is interpreted as a teaching situation by the learner, when from the intentional point of view, it is no such thing." This explanation cannot be correct in the case of the mother and the young child, for such an interpretation would be beyond the capacities of such a child. The explanation, as I understand it, is that though the displayer of Xs may not see the situation as a teaching one (that is, he is not engaged in the activity of teaching), the learner is engaged in the activity of learning. This explanation must be incorrect in the case of a young child, who cannot be engaged in the activity of learning until he has the concept of learning. This understanding is necessary for him to have learning as the point or purpose of his doings. But the explanation additionally lacks plausibility because we are equally happy to speak of learning and teaching even when we accept that both child and mother are engaged in activities with the primary point of enjoying themselves.

An additional difficulty arises in respect of the claim that learning must be the point of the learner's doings if the Xs which are being claimed to have been taught and learned are propositional. It was suggested that since teaching X is an activity, the Xs must be clearly delineated, not "fuzzy". Presumably the same must be true of learning, if learning, too, is an activity. But the learning of
propositions cannot be an activity if it is required that the propositions be tightly and clearly specified in the formulation of the intention. For this would require that he had already learned the propositions which it was his intention to learn. This is self-contradictory. But if it is not required that the learner have clearly formulated the propositions he intends to learn in order for him to be engaged in the activity (in Hirst's sense) of learning them, then we can ask for a reason to be given as grounds for the claim that for a person to be teaching those propositions he must have clear intentions in respect of them.

I suggest that we always understand the 'outcome' sense of teaching in the same way, and that there are not two distinct senses depending on whether intentional or non-intentional teaching is involved. This is best illustrated by an example. Consider a case where A is trying to teach B X through discussion, and C, B's friend, joins in. The only difference in the situation of A in respect of B and C is, ex hypothesi, that he has no intention of bringing about C's learning. His principal intention in keeping C included in the discussion is to keep B from leaving to play with C. Now if the outcome sense had the meaning Hirst suggests, that it is used to denote a successfully completed activity, then the claims "A is teaching B X" and "A is teaching C X" (denoting outcomes in each case) must be using different senses of teach, one a central sense and the other a derivative sense. This would mean that the claim "A taught B and C X" in this context would be what might be described as a "conceptual mess". That it does not seem to be so surely indicates that there are not two outcome or achievement senses, one associated with attempts and one derivatively associated with the absence of an attempt. Additionally, the truth of the statement that A taught B and C X does not seem to require that either had the intention of learning X. Learning does not have to be C's activity.

The final objection to the analysis of teaching as an activity is that it generates a paradox in the idea of teaching by example in the moral sphere. Teaching by example, one of the paradigms of teaching in this area, is made logically impossible by this analysis.

On the activity analysis, for a person to be teaching another e.g. to be honest by example, he must be performing his honest act with the primary intention of bringing about the child's learning. But if his
primary intention, his main reason for doing it, were to bring about the child's learning, it would not be, primarily, a moral act. For this requires, on most accounts of morality, that the act be done primarily because it is the honest thing to do. If both moral acts and teaching acts are defined in terms of the primacy of the moral or teaching intention (the answer the agent gives to the question "Why are you doing this?") teaching by example in the moral sphere is made logically impossible.

Of course, we may say, "All right, then he was teaching in a different sense." But surely, at that stage, questions start to be raised about the point of that particular philosophical enterprise. Are we involved in the area of persuasive definition? If so, how are we to justify the new usages? Or are we trying to get clear about the language we use now?

I have argued that a conceptual analysis of teaching is important as a preliminary to looking at the teacher's role (and for other reasons). Since it is often suggested that it is part of the role of the teacher to teach by example in the area of morality, the analysis of teaching which is applied for the investigation must at least allow for this. A person needs to live up to his principles as a part of teaching them to anyone else.

Conclusion

My ultimate concern is for justifying certain kinds of practices as part of the teacher's role, and insofar as justifying implicitly prescribes, to be involved in prescribing certain things for the role of the teacher and suggesting that there are certain capacities and characteristics which teachers ought to have.

For this reason, it seems important to develop an understanding of teaching as we use the term in general, before we focus on the schools. Since I am convinced that the current orthodox analysis is stipulative and incoherent, for the reasons given in this chapter, I must propose an alternative analysis, for I cannot use an analysis which I believe to be incoherent as the basis of my justificatory enterprise.
The approach of this chapter has been polemical. My main aim has been to indicate the many difficulties involved in the analysis of teaching as an activity, and if the attack has seemed unusually spirited, it is because the analysis is so well established in educational circles. This is why it has seemed to me so important to make explicit the contradictions which, in my view, it contains, and this is what I have tried to do here.

The criterion I have concentrated on has been primarily the first, which suggests that as a necessary condition for teaching a particular $X$, one must intend a particular person (or group of persons) $B$, to learn that $X$, clearly not fuzzily specified (as, for example, about $P$). I have criticized also the second criterion, insofar as it does not accommodate teaching by eliciting, and I have further suggested that the third criterion is ambiguous, as it is not clear from its formulation whether it is intended as an objective or a subjective demand.

Following my argument in Chapter I, I suggest that analysing teaching in this way functions (whether intended or not) as a method of prescribing the professional role of teachers for those who accept that the primary role of the teacher is to teach (for what else could his obligation be?) That is, they argue along the following syllogistic lines:

(i) I ought to teach
(ii) This is what teaching is (i.e. I accept the analysis)
Therefore (iii) This is what I ought to do

I earlier argued, against Scheffler and Broudy, that what we mean by terms and what ought to go on in schools are different questions. Similarly, since this is not argued, by Hirst, to be the only sense of teach, we can ask why it is the case that teachers ought to teach in this sense (a prescription to be specific about one's objectives and not have fuzzy aims). A justification is required but is not provided. Conceptual analysis cannot itself justify a claim that this is what teachers ought to do. This can only be done through consideration of what is involved in the role of the teacher in school.

What is involved in the role of the teacher is, as indicated in the
General Introduction, a controversial matter. Thus, in addition to the objections I have raised to the analysis on account of its internal inconsistencies and its failure to square with common sense in several important matters, I raise the objection that it conceals very real moral problems about the teacher's role. In insisting that teachers must teach in this sense certain questions are ruled out or answered a priori.

I hope, therefore, to have indicated that the range of objections to this analysis are sufficiently coherent and important to justify serious attention being given to an alternative analysis.
CHAPTER 3: Terms of Art for Discussing Teaching and Learning

Introduction

Most of the discussions on teaching have involved philosophical terms of art, and it is clear that discussions on teaching require a schema which is adequate to discussions of the majority, if not all, uses of the term. After a careful examination of those terms of art which are in current use in philosophy, I have come to the conclusion that none of these are helpful in coming to understand the concept of teaching as it is centrally used, and the relation of this concept to other concepts of teaching. The main objection is that the schemas which represent, as it were, the current philosophical frameworks, are all dichotomous, whereas the concept of teaching seems to me to require a three-fold schema. Teaching claims refer sometimes to attempts, sometimes to protracted goings-on and sometimes to final upshots (new states in learners) having been brought about. It has therefore seemed to me necessary to develop a new schema which, I shall argue, is helpful not only for discussing teaching but also a number of concepts which refer to interpersonal transactions.

Rather than simply to assert that existing terms of art are unsatisfactory, I have felt it necessary to devote the first section of this chapter to an examination of them, in order to justify my claim that a new schema is necessary. The first section of the chapter, which examines the Kenny activity/performance distinction, the Vendler activity/accomplishment distinction and the Ryle task/achievement distinction (all descended from Aristotle), is thus negative rather than positive in character. It is also somewhat complex, and may be found difficult to follow, but this, I believe, is a result of the nature of the discussion and the kinds of distinctions being discussed.

Having indicated the inadequacy of these terms of art for my purpose, in the second part of the chapter I develop a schema which seems to me to be more satisfactory for fully understanding the
language of teaching. I do this through a consideration of the class of verbs which can fill in for X in "A is X-ing B" where B is a person and where some response in B is required for the claim "A is X-ing B" to be true, as well as actions performed by A which bring about the response. The logic of this class of verbs, which I call "perficience verbs" is explored in the final section of this chapter.

Activities and Performances - the Kenny distinction

In "Action, Emotion and Will" 57, Kenny lays out the criteria for what he calls "activity verbs". He is concerned to distinguish them from, on the one hand, "static verbs" and, on the other, from other "non-static verbs" which he designates as "performance verbs". No consideration of states is necessary here, and no further reference will be made to static verbs. It is the distinction between activity and performance verbs which concerns me.

For Kenny, the defining characteristic is the difference in implication involved in the claim "A is X-ing". Where "A is X-ing" implies "A has X-ed", Kenny calls the verb an activity verb. Where "A is X-ing" implies "A has not X-ed", he calls the verb a performance verb. The other distinguishing characteristic is the implication of "A has X-ed". It is only for performance verbs that "A has X-ed" has any necessary implication, implying that "A is not X-ing". For activity verbs, "A has X-ed" neither implies nor excludes "A is X-ing".

From these defining characteristics, Kenny gives an account of other features which serve to distinguish performances and activities. Activities, he says 58, go on for a time. Only performances take time. Only performances can be complete or incomplete. Activities may be prolonged indefinitely or they may cease. Only performances come to a definite end and are finished.

Now many of the things which have been said in the previous chapter seem to point to the use of teach as a performance rather than as an activity verb. Teaching a person to swim takes time. I may teach Peter how to swim in three months. And I may intelligibly say that I haven't finished teaching Peter how to swim yet. "I am teaching
Peter how to swim" implies "I have not taught Peter how to swim"
(or at least that I haven't finished doing so) rather than "I have
taught Peter how to swim", which, on Kenny's criteria, would need
to be the case if teaching were an activity.

My claim that I have taught Peter how to swim has the implication
that I am not now teaching him how to swim (though, of course, I may
be teaching him to swim better). Also, according to Kenny, activity
verbs cannot be qualified by the adverbs quickly and slowly, for
only that which takes time can be so qualified. So, again, since it
is quite intelligible to say that I have never taught anyone how to
swim as quickly as I have taught Peter, the indications are that 'teach',
by the criteria suggested by Kenny, is a performance verb. And,
according to Kenny, performances are describable as "bringing it about
that p" in contrast with activities which, according to Kenny, in many
but not all cases are describable as "attempting to bring it about that
p."

It seems important at this stage to question whether this performance
use of the verb 'teach' is to be identified with Ryle's achievement
sense (to be discussed in detail later). It does not seem possible to
identify the two. According to Ryle, achievement verbs "signify not
merely that some performance has been gone through but also that
something has been brought off by the agent going through it". And
also, of the application of an achievement verb to an agent, that the
latter "is not being said to have done two things but to have done
one thing with a certain upshot." The principle here is that
achievement verbs usually mark termini, though they may mark the
maintenance of a certain upshot. Kenny makes it clear that the use
of a performance verb does not necessarily imply that the final terminus
will be brought about, and teaching claims clearly cannot refer to the
maintenance of a certain upshot. For these reasons it seems that no
identification can be made. Many of Kenny's performance verbs
involve an agent in doing something in which the bringing about of
progress towards some final state is a necessary part, rather than
doing something with a certain final upshot or the maintenance of an
upshot (like Ryle's "keeping the hawk in view"). It is impossible that
a performance should occur without something's being brought about, but
that something is not necessarily either the maintenance of a given
upshot or the bringing about of a final upshot. The occurrence of the
final terminus, the attainment of a new state, is what brings the performance to its end.

Ryle’s achievement verbs, Kenny points out, fall into all three categories, ‘know’ being a state, ‘cure’ being a performance, and ‘keep a secret’ an activity. The achievement sense of ‘teach’ would thus fall into Kenny’s performance category. But the above discussion indicates that though it may be possible to assign achievement uses of verbs such as ‘teach’ and ‘learn’ to the performance category, this does not mean that achievement uses can be identified with performance uses.

However, there are good reasons for suggesting that all uses of the verbs ‘teach’ and ‘learn’ cannot be performance uses, and these do not rest on the distinction between attempts and achievements. Activities, Kenny says, go on for a time, and I may have taught Peter swimming for an hour this morning. From a logical point of view, I can go on teaching him swimming indefinitely, or I may decide to stop. This seems to be an activity use of ‘teach’.

Kenny leads us to believe that his distinction between performances and activities corresponds to Aristotle’s distinction between kinesis and energeia. This restricts performance verbs to verbs with a limit, since it is implied that energeia need have no limit. This is why activities, in the Kenny sense, may be prolonged indefinitely. There is no logical necessity for them to end.

It was earlier suggested that A’s teaching B X must finish when B learns X. So, if this is accepted, provided that the specification of the object of teaching specifies a limit (and there are criteria by virtue of which B is judged to have learned X), then teaching can be terminated necessarily. A has not the option of teaching Peter how to swim after he has learned how to swim. He has not got the choice of prolonging his teaching of that X indefinitely or not. Where the object of teaching (content) specifies a limit, then, teaching is a performance verb.

But not all uses of ‘teaching’ specify content with a limit. Teaching philosophy or science could be prolonged indefinitely, no matter how
much the pupil learned - at least on any account of teaching which allows it possible to teach that which one does not know, as, for example, on a mutual enquiry model of teaching. Even if this is not accepted, in practice it would be possible for an authority on philosophy to prolong his teaching for a considerable time. If the teaching is ended necessarily, it is because of limitations in the agent, not in the object of the teaching (content).

Whatever the position taken on this, the application of the Kenny distinction suggests that teach has an activity use in "A is teaching B philosophy" and a performance use in "A is teaching B what is meant in philosophy by a conceptual relationship." In the latter case the teaching necessarily finishes when B grasps the meaning of the term 'conceptual relationship'. But A can continue teaching B philosophy indefinitely, in that there can be no analogical time after which he (logically) cannot continue teaching B the philosophy he knows, as there is after which he cannot (logically) continue teaching the meaning of the term 'conceptual relationship'.

It might be objected that this argument rests on a possibly controversial premise about teaching having to stop when B learns a specified X. But there can be no controversy if the above argument is applied to possible activity and performance uses of 'learn'. For it is necessarily true that when I have learned what a conceptual relationship is, my learning of this must cease. The 'learn' in "I am learning the meaning of a conceptual relationship in philosophy" is a performance verb in that it fulfils the Kenny tense implication criteria, and is identifiable as kinesis by virtue of the limit. On the other hand, there is no time when it is necessary for there to be a termination in the case of learning philosophy. The 'learn' in "I am learning philosophy" clearly cannot be a performance verb but must be an activity use.

Both the 'teach' in "A is teaching B philosophy" and the 'learn' in "A is learning philosophy" fulfil the criteria for being activity uses. One can learn or teach philosophy for a time, and it doesn't make sense to ask whether one's learning or teaching of philosophy (as opposed to a specific item or even course in philosophy) is complete or incomplete. In the sphere of knowledge, it is normally suggested
that the impossibility of achieving a final end is a characteristic of importance. Both claims are consistent with the Kenny criteria for an activity use, because "A is teaching B philosophy" and "A is learning philosophy" both neither imply nor exclude, respectively, "A has taught B philosophy" and "A has learned philosophy". They do not fulfil the criterion Kenny lays down for performances in that "A is teaching B philosophy" and "A is learning philosophy" do not imply, respectively, "A has not taught B philosophy" and "A has not learned philosophy".

Kenny has suggested that activity uses can sometimes be formulated as attempts to bring it about that p, and it would clearly be wrong to deny that "A is teaching B philosophy" and "A is learning philosophy" can be understood as "A is attempting to bring it about that B learns philosophy" and "A is attempting to bring it about that he knows/understands philosophy", respectively, with no implication of success at all. This might be described as "mere attempts". But they can also be interpreted, in appropriate contexts, as "A is bringing it about that B learns philosophy" and "B is bringing it about that he knows/understands philosophy", respectively, not as mere attempts. But I hope to have shown above that because there is no terminus implied in the description the use cannot be a performance use, for the concept of a performance requires the possibility of a final terminus. And yet it cannot be simply described as an 'achievement' use, because it neither marks the maintenance of a steady state nor the reaching of a terminus. There thus seem to be uses of 'teach' and 'learn' which can be classified as (a) mere attempts (b) activities (c) performances and (d) achievements.

The examination of these different uses in depth has, additionally, brought to light a paradox. I have argued that the 'learn' in "A is learning philosophy" is an activity use (which may or may not involve an attempt, for it might be said of A when is is learning philosophy through discussions with his friends, with no intention of learning philosophy). I have also argued that the 'learn' in "A is learning the meaning of 'conceptual relationship' in philosophy" is a performance use. But the meaning of learn is identical in the two uses. It does not have different senses when it has different objects. The puzzle
arises because "A is learning what a conceptual relationship is in philosophy" entails "A is learning philosophy". If 'learn' has an activity use in the latter case and a performance use in the former, and if the meaning of a word is closely related to, if not to be identified with, its use, it would follow that 'learn' both has and has not two different meanings in the same context. It can be seen that there is a parallel if the two claims "A is teaching B philosophy" and "A is teaching B to understand what is meant by a conceptual relationship in philosophy" are considered. Thus the inapplicability of Kenny's activity/performance distinction to "teaching" and "learning" has been shown by a reductio ad absurdum.

Activities, accomplishments and achievements - the Vendler distinctions

I turn now to an alternative attempt to provide a schema for classifying verbs, again by virtue of their time schema, the one proposed by Vendler.

Vendler also uses the term 'activity' and proposes a distinction between 'activities' and what he calls 'accomplishments'. At first the distinction seems to be identical with that proposed by Kenny and already discussed, except for terminology. If that were the case, its inapplicability to 'teaching' and 'learning' would be shown by the same reductio. However, on closer examination, the distinctions do not appear to be the same, although both are based on the Aristotelian distinction between kinesis and energeia, and some discussion of the Vendler distinctions is required.

Examples of activities, for Vendler, are 'running' and 'pushing a cart'. Like Kenny (and in contrast to Hirst), Vendler does not define activities in terms of the agent's purpose or point. The identifying feature of an activity, for Vendler - as indicated by consideration of statements such as "A was running (X-ing) at time t" - is that time instant t is "on a time stretch through which A was running" (or X-ing) (his italics). The identifying feature of an accomplishment (Vendler's examples of which are 'drawing a circle' and 'running a mile') is that when one says "A was drawing a circle (X-ing) at time t" one means that "t is on the time stretch in which A drew that circle" (X-ed) (his italics). The central notion involved in Vendler's distinction
is the set terminal point which running a mile and drawing a circle share, in contrast to running or pushing a cart, and which, he says, "casts its shadow backward, giving a new colour to all that went before." "In other words," writes Vendler, "if someone stops running a mile, he did not run a mile; if one stops drawing a circle, he did not draw a circle."

It is clear from some of Vendler's remarks that he does not conceive of accomplishment verbs in precisely the same way as Kenny does of performance verbs, even though both start from the energeia/kinesis distinction. For Vendler continues, "If I say of a person...that he is drawing a circle, then I do claim that....he will keep drawing until he has drawn the circle. If they do not complete their activities (sic) my statement will turn out to be false." But Kenny does not claim this of performance verbs, for he suggests that a man may be walking to the pub and yet never walk there. That is, I assume that if Kenny says of someone that he is X-ing (where X is a performance verb) he does not claim that he will keep X-ing until he has X-ed.

It is clear that claims can sometimes be made with the kinds of implications suggested by Vendler, though perhaps this occurs less often than with the kinds of implications suggested by Kenny. Perhaps the difficulty is that neither has paid attention here to the intentions of the speaker. For though a statement such as "A is drawing a circle" may be uttered with the intention of implying that if the agent does not complete the circle, the claim that he was drawing it was false, it is not necessary for it to have this implication. If a person dropped dead before he finished the drawing, we could, without abuse of language, say he was drawing a circle when he died, and not merely, as Vendler suggests in a footnote, that he was trying to draw a circle.

However, we do not need to produce such dramatic cases to indicate that usage does not support Vendler in all cases, for if a person is said to have been writing a letter (Vendler's own example) between $t_1$ and $t_2$, there is surely no necessary implication that the letter was finished during this period. Distinctions surely need to be drawn between the logical possibility of a
climax, the intention to produce that climax and the occurrence of the climax. In general, the logical possibility of the climax is the only condition necessary for us to describe anyone as doing in terms that include it; we assume the intention to produce it if we say of him that he was trying to do it; and the occurrence of it is necessary for it to be said truly of anyone that he has done it.

Vendler's suggestion that, if the final upshot is not achieved, we can only make "trying" claims is consistent with Ryle's suggestion that we "borrow" achievement verbs to denote tasks when the hope of success is good. But it is a significant omission to neglect failure to finish something as a special kind of failure which merits marking out on its own. In some cases, such as writing a letter, we do not withdraw to merely "trying" claims if the final upshot is not achieved.

Some of the terms Vendler calls accomplishment verbs do, in normal contexts, imply that the climax will occur, but some of them are often used to indicate progress towards a climax without implying that the climax necessarily will occur or has occurred. But if this is accepted, they are not accomplishment verbs on Vendler's criteria. They do not meet the distinguishing time schema. According to Vendler, the identifying feature of accomplishments is that "A was X-ing at time t" means that t was on the time stretch in which A X-ed. If it were accepted that it could be true that A was X-ing (e.g. writing a letter) at time t, between t₁ and t₂ even though he had not finished X-ing (writing the letter) at t₂ (and, indeed, perhaps never finished it) the criterion is not met. A reformulated criterion is therefore needed if writing a letter, for example, is to be retained as an accomplishment.

What Vendler seems to have done is to conflate two different possibilities, uses of verbs in ways which meet his conditions, like 'running a mile' where, if the person never finishes the mile, we do not say he was running a mile between t₁ and t₂, and uses which do not, like 'writing a letter' where we do say that a person was writing a letter between t₁ and t₂ even if the letter is unfinished.

On Vendler's account of activities, the time schema indicates a continuous time stretch throughout which the activities were being
performed. He says, "'A was running at time t' means that time instant t is on a time stretch throughout which (my italics) A was running". And he also says, "If someone has been running for half an hour, then it must be true that he has been running for every period within that half-hour." But such continual, uninterrupted goings-on are the exception rather than the rule. To say of a person (using Vendler's examples) that he has been walking, swimming or pushing a cart for half an hour surely does not necessarily imply uninterrupted activity as Vendler suggests. For we would not withdraw the claim that A has been running for half an hour if he had paused for a moment to catch his breath, swimming for half an hour if he has stopped at the side of the pool to chat with a spectator, etc. Learning philosophy, having no logical terminus or climax, appears to be an activity in Vendler's terms (as it did in Kenny's) but "A has been learning philosophy for a year" can surely carry no implication of an uninterrupted stretch of time, at least not in the sense in which, it seems to me, Vendler must be interpreted. It is inappropriate to say that any instant t during the time when A was learning philosophy lies on a time stretch throughout which A was learning philosophy. There is a sense in which it can be said of him that he was learning philosophy throughout the year, but this is a sense which is necessarily parasitic on actual occurrences, which may be sporadic, of A's learning philosophy.

"A is learning philosophy", said of A whilst asleep, depends on the claim "A is learning philosophy" in respect of A's doings whilst conscious. White discusses a similar example - where we say "He is learning to walk" of a child asleep - to refute the suggestion that learning is a process. But, in my view, no satisfactory argument has been produced to suggest that this is an 'achievement' use of learn, either in Hyle's standard sense, or in Vendler's sense, or that it is a case of an 'achievement' verb being borrowed for a 'task' use. The similarities with Vendler's accomplishment verbs are sufficiently great that consideration had to be given to the idea that 'learn' might be an accomplishment verb. However, enough has been said to suggest that, for this to be so, Vendler's criteria would need modification.
I have suggested that the interest lies in the fact that we do not always withdraw the predication of X-ing when the climax involved in the claim is not attained, and an examination of the factors which lead us to withdraw the claim in some cases but not in others. For example, the use of 'learn' in "A is learning to play the Moonlight Sonata" would seem to be an accomplishment use. But though this implies the possibility of the achievement of a state of affairs when, according to specifiable criteria, A can be said to be able to play the Moonlight Sonata, it is not a necessary implication of the claim that this must occur. A person may give up before he accomplishes this, as I may give up writing my letter, but we do not have to withdraw the "was learning" claim or the "was writing a letter" claim even though he never learned to play the sonata and I did not write the letter. In the latter case, the partly finished letter is evidence that I was writing a letter (not merely trying to write one) and the difference in the standard of the child's performance between the first and final attempts to play the Moonlight Sonata is evidence that he was learning something.

On the other hand, there are cases where we do withdraw the "was learning" claim, and these are instances of complete and utter failure. If we say of a child "He is learning to play the note C on the trumpet" or, of a deaf person, "He is learning to lip-read", we tend to withdraw the ascription and retreat to "try-to" constructions, as Vendler and Ryle suggest, if the child never manages to produce a sound on the trumpet or the deaf person to interpret a single word.

The reductio ad absurdum argument directed against the application of the Kenny distinction equally indicates that the Vendler activity/accomplishment distinction is inapplicable to teaching and learning. But the discussion has indicated again the necessity for a schema which differentiates between complete and utter failure (mere attempts), progress in bringing something about (whether a final outcome or not) and the attainment of a final outcome or terminus.

Intentional vs Instrumental Analysis

Hirst maintains \textsuperscript{70}, and with this I agree, that it is impossible to characterize teaching by producing an exhaustive list of activities
which constitute it. From this he has concluded that teaching is a polymorphous activity. I have questioned whether a satisfactory analysis of teaching as an activity in Hirst's sense (as defined in terms of purpose or point) can be given in the previous chapter, and in this chapter have argued that neither the Kenny activity/performance distinction nor the Vendler activity/accomplishment distinction can usefully be applied to teaching and learning. Since I am involved in questioning the assumption that teaching and learning are activities (in their central senses), I am necessarily involved in questioning whether they can be polymorphous activities.

The main force of arguments that teaching (and other concepts) should be analysed as activities lies in the claim that intention is necessary to our understanding of these terms. It is not that all cases of teaching are necessarily intentional, according to this argument, for explanations can be offered of why we apply the term teaching when one of the criteria which are necessary for central cases are missing. However, the analysis is intentional, not instrumental.

This section suggests that the polymorphous character of teaching activities (in the ordinary language sense), what makes a wide variety of different activities instances of teaching, can be explained by an instrumental rather than an intentional analysis of teaching. It is not that what the activities have in common is that they are done by an agent with the same primary intention in each case, but that they serve the same function, the bringing about of learning.

I explore this problem with reference to Hirst's brief account of the polymorphous activity of gardening. He suggests that mowing the lawn is an activity which is necessarily a form of gardening. If Hirst accepts the Kenny activity/performance distinction, mowing the lawn is a performance rather than an activity. It is clearly parallel to Kenny's example of washing the dishes, and is describable as bringing it about that the lawn is cut. However, since it is not clear whether or not Hirst is using Kenny's account as the basis of his work, the term 'activity' will be used loosely here.
Given Hirst's account of an activity in terms of the agent's primary point or purpose, it is not plausible that any of the various "sub-activities" could ever necessarily be a case of the activity in question (i.e. so that a person mowing the lawn is necessarily gardening). Either there is no necessity for e.g. mowing the lawn to be an instance of gardening, or gardening is not an activity in this sense. For a person may mow his lawn with a variety of primary intentions - annoying his neighbour with the sound of the mower, collecting the grass cuttings to take into school for an experiment in science, pleasing his mother who asked him to mow the lawn, or improving his garden. If the agent's point or purpose in mowing the lawn was not primarily to promote the welfare of his garden, then, on an activity analysis of gardening, this agent was not gardening.

Thus it must follow that no activity (in Hirst's sense) could be analysed in terms of other activities or performances which are necessarily instances of the activity in question. The most that such a list of gardening activities might do would be to suggest that gardening, independently understood in terms of point or purpose, could not include activities or performances other than those on the list. But the difficulty in formulating the list is a logical difficulty. Firstly, it would be impossible to claim that one could ever know the limitations on what might promote the welfare of a garden. This will be dependent on, for example, discoveries in science. But, perhaps more importantly, as already suggested, for an agent's particular activity (in this sense) it is his subjective beliefs about appropriate means to ends which are relevant.

Now it might be suggested here that one could make a standard philosophical move by distinguishing between the point or purpose of the agent and the point or purpose of the activity. What makes gardening gardening, on this account, is that the point of gardening activities is the benefit of the garden. So, though the primary point or purpose of a particular agent may be different (e.g. pleasing his mother, annoying his neighbour), he is gardening, in a slightly weakened sense, because in standard cases an agent gardens to promote the welfare of his garden, as in standard cases he runs the race to win.

However, the distinguishing between the point of an activity and the point of a person in this way seems to me to be an entirely false
distinction. For, on Hirst's own analysis, a person who hasn't as his primary intention the benefiting of his garden (as evidenced by the kind of answer he gives to questions like "Why are you mowing the lawn?") is not engaged in the activity of gardening at all. He may rather be engaged in the activity of pleasing his mother or preparing for his job. On the other hand, Hirst does seem to be correct in suggesting that this lawn-mower is necessarily gardening, for if he were asked "Why are you gardening?", he would probably answer "To please my mother", accepting the description of what he was doing, rather than answering, "I'm not gardening."

That is, it is certainly the case that there is a sense in which we assert that our lawn-mower is gardening, though it is trivially true that we can distinguish this sense from the sense where it is implied that the agent's primary purpose is to contribute to the welfare of his garden. My suggestion is that gardening is essentially understood in functional (i.e. instrumental) rather than purposive terms. This is necessary if an activity or performance like mowing the lawn or pruning the roses is to be counted as necessarily an instance of gardening. If we wish to assert this, it is because we know that mowing the lawn, pruning the roses, spraying the green-fly etc., do in fact contribute to the welfare of the garden, not because any given individual's point in doing it must be for this end. But it doesn't seem to me helpful to say that this is "the" point of gardening because only agents have points or purposes.

If we accept the claim that mowing the lawn is necessarily an instance of gardening, then we must modify the claim that gardening is analysable as an activity. The necessity for mowing the lawn to be gardening cannot be because of its point or purpose, for it can have no point or purpose apart from the agency of people, and they can engage in it for a wide variety of purposes. If a man mowing a lawn is necessarily gardening, it can only be because he is (de facto) contributing to the welfare of his garden. It necessitates the analysis of gardening in instrumental (i.e. functional) rather than purposive terms. That activity which contributes to the welfare of a garden is necessarily a gardening activity.
The important thing to note here, however, is that this suggestion does not separate the concept of gardening from men's intentions and purposes. For if nobody were interested in bringing about the welfare of a garden, we would clearly not have such a concept as gardening at all. The whole idea of a garden's 'welfare' presupposes such an interest.

There is thus no implication in the claim that gardening (as one example of a large category of terms) is analysable in functional rather than in purposive terms that a general account of human behaviour must or could be given in functional terms. There is no conflict, as I see it, between this view of the analysis of certain verbs, and the view that we must take into account the descriptions which people give or assent to of what they are doing, or the purposes which they have in doing things, in understanding human behaviour. The point I am making is that in order to perform actions as an engagement in an activity in Hirst's sense, one must have the concept in question. Nothing has been said to suggest that one must understand this concept in terms of intentions rather than functionally.

It is a matter of logic that one cannot garden as one's activity (in Hirst's sense) without having the concept of gardening. One cannot educate as one's activity (in Langford's sense) without an understanding of what it is to educate. One cannot teach as one's activity (as Hirst suggests) without having an understanding of what teaching is. Peters claims that a person may educate another without this being his intention. I have suggested that the same is true of teaching. But none of this denies that on many occasions people engage in activities or performances of which gardening, educating or teaching is the point. The claim here is that these terms are not analysable as activities, for it is through the notion of their outcomes that we understand them.

Kenny has pointed out that if we want to know if A has washed the dishes, we look at the dishes. If we want to know if A has educated B we must look at B. But if we want to know what A was attempting, then, of course, we look at them and not at the objects of their efforts. My argument merely suggests that in order to engage in attempts, one must understand an 'outcome' sense. This can be understood instrumentally, with reference to changes being brought about and
acts through which this is done. Nothing has been said to suggest that intention to bring these things about must be the agent's prime reason for performing the acts.

This whole account rests on assumptions which I believe are generally held concerning what we can say of other people's doings without conducting a full-scale investigation into the way they view what they are doing. The first is that it is possible sometimes to deny that A is X-ing (e.g. helping B) when A would describe himself as X-ing. The second is that we can say of a person that he is Y-ing (e.g. hurting C) where he would not describe himself as Y-ing if we asked him what he was doing because Y-ing may not be the primary point or purpose in what he is doing. Of course, it is possible to reject these assumptions and accept that no descriptions of what a person is doing are valid except the ones he himself gives. This, however, I take to be an extreme metaphysical position which ordinary language and usage reject.

Task and Achievement Verbs - the Ryle distinction

In discussing the activity/performance distinction and the possibility of its application to teaching, I mentioned the Ryle distinction between task and achievement verbs and suggested that though some of Ryle's achievement verbs fall into the category of performances, there is a distinction between performance uses and achievement uses which is important in understanding teaching and learning. Ryle himself has noted the difference between the different possible sorts of achievements, pointing out that some achievement verbs signify more or less sudden climaxes whereas others signify more or less protracted proceedings. He writes, "The sort of success which consists in descrying the hawk differs in this way from the sort of success which consists in keeping it in view." However, this distinction was of less importance to Ryle than the task/achievement distinction, and the differences which led to Kenny's comment that some of Ryle's achievement verbs, like keeping a secret or keeping the hawk in view, were activities whilst others like curing were performances were blurred by the use of one term.
But in the kind of case where there is a final upshot, there is a further blurring. It is not that verbs like 'cure' are always used to signify a sudden climax, even though there will be an instant when the patient meets the criteria for being physically fit again and is pronounced cured. 'Curing' may be said to be going on as the patient gradually recovers from his illness because of the doctor's treatment. That is, it could be said that there are two, not one, achievement-type senses of 'curing', one signifying the final upshot at which the illness is pronounced terminated, the other signifying the continuing and mounting success of the treatment. Vendler would have probably called the first sense an achievement sense and the second an accomplishment sense. However, this does not fully accord with ordinary language, in that should the final recovery of the patient not occur through the doctor's efforts - perhaps because the doctor died - we do not necessarily withdraw the claim that the doctor was curing as well as treating him.

This point is also not appreciated by Ryle, who suggests that we withdraw the use of an achievement verb borrowed for task use if the outcome fails to occur. He writes, "I withdraw my claim to have seen a misprint or convinced the voter if I find there was no misprint, or that the voter has cast his vote for my opponent." I think Ryle has simply failed to take into account the different kinds of circumstances in which the upshot fails to occur, and which we do allow for in our language. We do not say of the man who is called away just as he is about to solder the final wire that he was merely trying to mend the radio. He was mending it in a sense which implies progress (and thus differs from keeping the hawk in view), even though he never brought about the upshot of getting it mended. True, we cannot say of him that he has mended the radio. His attempt was unsuccessful because unfinished. The sense in which we say of him that he was mending the radio is not logically equivalent to the claim that he was merely trying to mend it. It is not a sense which simply implies that the chances of success are good (as when we say of a runner who is out in front that he is winning). It is a sense which implies that the task is partly accomplished, that the final outcome is partly brought about.
Failure to finish what is partly achieved is a rather special kind of failure, a kind which seems to require special note. There is no philosophical terminology for presenting adequately the distinctions between mere attempts, partially completed attempts, and final achievements.

The general difficulty of the contrast between task and achievement verbs as originally presented by Ryle, in addition to the above, has been commented on by Scheffler. He points out that if for achievement verbs like spell and persuade, when there seems to be lacking a corresponding different task verb, the constructions try to spell and try to persuade are allowed, as Ryle suggests, such verbs as walk and run also turn out to be achievement verbs rather than task, performance or activity verbs as one should intuitively judge them to be. Indeed, comments Scheffler, it is difficult to see how we could prevent performances generally turning into achievements once try constructions are allowed. "Not only would winning be an achievement, but running would also be an achievement; surely, running involves some state of affairs over and above the 'subservient task' of trying to run. The notion of two exclusive categories would collapse." (I shall comment on this later, since it seems that this argument rests on certain ambiguities in the notion of trying.)

At any rate, Scheffler concludes that we should give up construing the suggested task/achievement contrast as an absolute and general distinction between two classes, whether words or things. He suggests, instead, that the distinction be relativised, so that we can speak of a task/achievement relationship as holding between two verbs or word-users, or even non-linguistic things. "We could no longer make lists of verbs as being absolutely achievement verbs or task verbs, but we could relate pairs of verbs as standing in the requisite relationship and allow for the same verb to relate quite differently to others."79

Certainly it seems that the use of a term in an utterance is related to the intention of the speaker, and if try-to constructions, used elliptically, can constitute examples of task uses, any verb X
might be employed, even if idiosyncratically, by a person in a task sense. But this suggestion still does not take adequate account of the ways we use achievement verbs, as already discussed. If we say of a runner who is out in front "He is winning", thus marking, as Ryle suggests, that the chances of his finally winning are high, there is no relationship with the runner's intentions. Our claim neither implies nor presupposes that the runner is attempting to win, any more than our use of one of Ryle's 'failure' words of the kind that mark final terminations, such as lose, means or implies or presupposes that the person of whom it is predicated is trying not to lose.

It seems to me that what Ryle is rather pointing out is the important feature of our use of achievement terms as a means of making an assessment of the probability of final outcomes. If we are convinced that the likelihood of the final achievement is remote (e.g. because the radio is really drastically broken) we tend not to use the elliptical form, but to maintain the full usage "He is trying to mend the radio." If we are convinced of the incompetence of an agent (including ourselves) we tend again to use the full expression. The third kind of instance where we tend to use the full expression is where the likelihood is remote because of constant interruptions. The converse of this is that we do borrow achievement verbs where no difficulty is involved, where we are convinced of competence, or where progress is being made.

Some verbs, then, seem to have a three-fold use. One is the full achievement sense where the final upshot occurs. One is a borrowing for a "mere" task use, so that the task sense, X-ing, is entirely equivalent to trying-to-X. In some contexts this use carries with it implications of a likelihood of success, as in the instance of the runner who is in the lead. But there is also a further sense, which is not properly an achievement use in Ryle's sense, for it marks neither the reaching of a final upshot nor the maintenance of a success state like keeping the plane in view. Rather it is used to indicate that some progressive bringing about is going on. The distinction is easy to see. The runner who was winning but who loses has not won. But the person who was learning
X has learned something though he never finishes his learning and may never achieve learning X.

Thus a sentence such as "A was X-ing yesterday" can have at least three standard interpretations. If a limit is specified within the term 'X-ing', it may mean that A terminated his X-ing by reaching that limit; or that A made progress towards that limit but did not reach it; or that A tried to X and failed utterly. The middle case can be distinguished both from the 'mere' task sense, and also from the sense covered by Ryle as 'achievements'. My argument is that this is the fundamental sense. It has already been shown that attempt uses are logically derivative from achievement uses of some kind, and that this is the only one possible when the X-ing does not specify a limit (e.g. learning philosophy).

Attempts, bringings-about and terminations

It is worth commenting on the use of the term 'achievement verb' as a form of art, and suggesting that it is, in many ways, an inappropriate choice. The comment Ryle makes of the exceptional case where no effort has been made to bring about the outcome denoted by an achievement verb is that it is "lucky". But two objections can be raised. Firstly, what is an achievement must be an achievement for a person, and can therefore not be thus separated from his own intentions, aims and purposes. Secondly, intention and good luck do not exhaust the possibilities. There is also bad luck. The use of the terms 'luck' and 'achievement' seem to imply that where outcomes, such as winning, occur, the person who has made no effort to achieve them will be pleased. This may not be the case. Winning is not, in any personal sense, an achievement for someone who, for reasons of his own, is trying to lose the race, though it is an achievement by public criteria and the rules of the competition.

The elucidation of terms like this rests, therefore, on discussions of 'the standard case'. This allows us to characterize a verb, X-ing, as an 'achievement' verb without the implication that on every occasion
when we predicate X-ing of someone, it is an achievement for him. But the problem, then, is that, if we accept Scheffler's suggestion about relativising the distinction, there is nothing that winning is an achievement relative to in the case of a man who was trying to lose. Even more difficulties arise where there are disputes about what is to be taken as the standard case.

It seems to me unfortunate that an individual's failures may be described in 'achievement' terms and his successes by 'failure' terms, for it seems to me the implications of intention cannot be eradicated from the term 'achievement'. But clearly there are difficulties in objecting to a writer's choice of terminology. Similar objections can be raised to Kenny's use of the term 'activity' such that living at Rome is an activity, whereas walking to the shops is not an activity. Similarly, for Hirst running would not be an activity. Because in normal usage the latter two, but not the first, would be an activity, there is always the risk of slippage. I have already indicated where Hirst and Vendler use the term 'activity' in its ordinary language sense in the same paragraph as their respective technical senses. This may lead to confusion.

In view of this, and of Scheffler's suggestion that these categories are relative, I shall, for the purposes of this thesis, maintain only the ordinary language use of activity, and write only of attempts and outcomes. Final outcomes will be called terminations. Thus, taking a Ryle example, treating is attempting to cure. The treatment can be terminated because of something internally related to it, the attainment of a new state (health) in the patient. The termination use of the term 'cure' marks the final upshot of the acts which constitute the attempt, so that, as Ryle says, the doctor has done one thing, not two, when he has treated and cured his patient.

The terminology of terminations leaves room for a further class of outcome verb-uses, a 'bringing-about' sense which can include bringings-about which may logically have no terminus (e.g. learning philosophy) as well as bringings-about that do (e.g. learning the meaning of necessary relationships in philosophy). This explains the use of 'cure' to speak of what is going on while the patient is
being treated and getting better, though is not yet well. This class of verbs does not merely indicate "that the hopes of success are good", though this will be the case if progress is being made towards the final outcome. They are rather defined as the growing development towards a final outcome, or the maintenance of an outcome.

It is worth emphasizing at this stage that no radically different position is being taken up on any wider issues. There is no suggestion that there are three different things an agent is doing if he tries, gradually brings about, and finally terminates his attempts by achieving (if intended) a final terminus. It is rather that a range of descriptions or appraisals can be applied to his doing, including descriptions in terms of outcomes he does not primarily intend. That is, it is not necessary that the agent himself would apply these descriptions. But, on the other hand, given that he understands the concepts, he should normally recognize the appropriateness of their application to him if this is done correctly, and he shares the beliefs of the speaker about related states of affairs.

So far in this chapter, I have discussed in depth the terminology of 'task', 'achievement', 'accomplishment', 'activity' and 'performance' which represent current philosophical frameworks for analysing verbs. Learning and teaching have been shown to have uses which fall into all these categories, including the three different senses of 'activity' as used by Hirst, Kenny and Vendler. Some of the distinctions have been shown to be inapplicable because they involve us in a reductio ad absurdum, and this has not involved either the question of intention or the question of success because the features involved were the marking out of a limit within the objects of teaching and learning.

I have suggested a return to the 'attempt' and 'outcome' terminology, and propose the use of terms of art which mark out the three-fold distinction between no progress or outcome, some progress and the achievement of terminal states where this is logically possible. I have here developed a trichotomous schema which fits only a narrow class of verbs, those which can fill for X in "A is X-ing B" where B is a person. The development of the logic of what I shall call
'perficience' verbs can be clearly seen to be built on, and suggested by, the work discussed in this chapter. They are the sub-class of Hyle's class concerned with interpersonal transactions.

**Actions, interactions and transactions**

It might be immediately objected that the category I have suggested is 'missing' is not missing but is one of the most discussed categories in philosophy, none other than the category of actions. For, as White says, an action is the bringing about of something. On accounts of action such as White's, "A is raising his arm" means "A is bringing it about that his arm is raised (i.e. above the level where it was before)." Kenny, too, writes, "It is thus clear that the form of description 'A is bringing it about that p' is the fundamental one for the description of voluntary human action."

White points out, additionally, that not every change that he brings about need be known to the agent. "It does not follow that I have not done X just because I did not realize or did not intend, in doing Y, that I would bring X about," he writes. (Here it might have been more accurate to have said "...in doing Y that I would do Z i.e. bring X about.)

The category of verbs which I have described as missing and which interest me here is, I think, indicated by White's formulation above and fall within it. However, it is far more restricted than the category of actions. Firstly, it is restricted to verbs which can fill in within the utterance "A is X-ing B" where B is a human being. Secondly, there is the restriction that one can only do X by doing something else, Y. This is indicated by the fact that it is always logically appropriate, when discussing X-ing claims, to ask "How did A X B?" The third restriction is that X-ing requires what I shall call a response from B, so that verbs such as splash are excluded from the discussion. Where the response is produced by mechanistic sequences of events, I shall speak of interactions, distinguishing them from the verbs in which I am primarily interested, where the responses involve understanding and, I am assuming, no mechanistic account can fully explain. The latter I shall distinguish as transactional.
The verbs I am considering here therefore necessitate that their object, B, is capable of the appropriate kind of response. Thus "a being capable of feeling pain" is a description of the formal object of hurting, "a being capable of dying" is a description of the formal object of killing, and "a being capable of learning" is a description of the formal object of teaching. 'Teach', of course, takes two objects, and I have already suggested that the formal object of teaching in terms of content is "that which can be learned" - e.g. beliefs, skills, capacities, attitudes, virtues, etc. Given that within the context of this thesis the concept of learning is restricted by the rejection of a behaviourist analysis of learning and by distinguishing learning from conditioning, the formal object of teaching is thus further restricted to "a being capable of understanding". This restriction is done stipulatively, and without further discussion.

As indicated above, the general category in which I am interested is the category of interpersonal transactions, where the X in "A is X-ing B" may be filled by such verbs as amusing, embarrassing, boring, pleasing, etc. I shall discuss the category generally with reference to examples such as teaching, since I believe it is of wider application within the philosophy of action, and then try to show that 'teach' is a member of the class. Some comments made by Peters suggest that education, too, is a member of this class. The category of interactions is considered at the same time, since the logical attributes seem to me to be the same as those of transactions.

The following section, like the earlier parts of this chapter, may be difficult to follow, but this is again due to the rather intricate relationships being explored. This section is positive, rather than negative.

Perficiences and perficienary attempts

I start this section by repeating, in more general terms, the argument already used in relation to teaching, concerned with the logical relationship between attempt and bringing-about uses of the same term. The argument is that the 'bringing about' sense (as a partial achievement) must be understood by anyone who employs an
'attempt' sense, and, more importantly, by anyone who makes an attempt.

This can be understood as a development of Ryle's point that it is 'achievement-type' verbs that are borrowed for 'task' uses and not vice versa. I make this point again specifically, because it has been suggested that I have misunderstood the proponents of 'activity' analyses, in that they accept the logical priority of the 'achievement' sense and the analysis of the 'task' sense is equivalent to 'trying-to-teach'. As already mentioned, Hirst has specifically denied that he understands the 'activity' sense as an attempt to teach. Rather, he says, the outcome sense must be understood as the successful upshot of teaching, already understood. Smith, in a footnote to his influential article, rejects the buying-selling analogy partly by denying that the 'task' sense of teach resembles a sense of 'sell' which is reducible to 'trying-to-sell'. This also seems to be the implication of Joan Cooper's search for criteria for successful teaching. I conclude, therefore, that my analysis is genuinely an alternative view.

My argument is that if a person is doing something intended to bring about a given state of affairs, he must understand what X-ing, bringing about that state of affairs, is. For, unless he did so, he could not (logically) conceive of what he was doing as X-ing in an attempt sense. The ability to conceive of what one is doing in a given way is, on the analysis of an activity used, a necessary condition for doing it intentionally. This is not to suggest that this is all that is required to make an attempt, a matter which is discussed later in relation to making teaching attempts. The point is to claim the logical priority of a 'bringing about' sense over an attempt sense. The 'bringing about' sense I shall from now on refer to exclusively as the 'outcome' sense, with the proviso that there is nothing implied in this use about any final termination.

Austin, in an analysis of speech acts, distinguishes the perlocutionary effect of locutions as consequences in a respondent brought about by what was said. For Austin, there is a distinction
between perlocutions and illocutions, in which there is a dependence on a convention. Perlocutionary effects, according to Austin, may be intentional or non-intentional, and he points to the usual disclaimers for effects or outcomes which were not intended. He suggests that it is important to distinguish between the act of doing X and the act of attempting to do X, since an unintended perlocutionary effect may be 'achieved' or an intended perlocutionary effect may not occur (if the desired response is not forthcoming).

With regard to perlocutionary sequels, says Austin, it would often be absurd for the person addressed to ask "Are you X-ing me?" Giving the example of tempting, Austin claims that in a perlocutionary use, this is often a question which the person being tempted rather than the person tempting is in a privileged position to answer. The original speaker, like any other observer, must rely on publicly observable evidence in order to claim that the effect had occurred. The person who is allegedly tempted is in a logically different position.

It seems here that no general answer may be given to the question as to who is the authority as to whether A is X-ing B, since this will depend on what answer is to be given, in general, to the question as to who is the authority on whether a person is e.g. embarrassed, angry, amused, hurt, etc. Anyone who accepts, for example, certain positions in psychoanalytic theory, might wish to argue that a person is not always the authority on his own feelings or emotions. Wittgenstein writes of the public criteria required (in a man's behaviour) for distinguishing between thinking one has understood and understanding. The most which can be said in general terms is that whereas for illocutions, the speaker is the authority on the illocutionary effect intended, this is not the case for perlocutions. It is worth considering the contexts in which a person might ask "Are you teaching me X?"

One of the difficulties of discussions on perlocutionary effects is that they necessitate distinguishing the consequences of an act from the act itself. Feinberg, discussing this in some detail, has suggested the expression "the accordion effect" to cover the fact that choice is open to us. He writes, "This well-known feature of
our language, whereby a man's action can be described as narrowly or broadly as we please I propose to call the "accordion effect", because an act...can be squeezed down to a minimum or else stretched out.... We can usually replace any ascription to a person of causal responsibility by an ascription of agency or authorship.

We can, if we wish, puff out an action to include an effect, and more often than not our language obliges us by providing a relatively complex action word for this purpose. Instead of saying Smith did A (a relatively simple act) and thereby caused X in Y, we might say something of the form 'Smith X-ed Y'.

So, for example, we can say that Jones opened the door and thereby caused Smith, who was inside, to be startled, thus treating Jones's act as the cause of a subsequent effect, Smith's death of a heart attack, says Feinberg. Or, he suggests, we can say simply, "Jones startled Smith", incorporating the consequences into the more complex action and treating Smith's death as the consequences of that. Or, he points out, there is the third possibility, that "We can say that Jones's opening the door caused his death, or that Jones's startling him caused his death, or simply that Jones killed him (by doing those things)."

This notion ascribes to A causal responsibility for B's being X-ed, and the analysis can be extended to cases where reasons and understandings are involved, as well as the more mechanistic cases of interaction as in Feinberg's example. Language for discussing this is suggested by Harre and Secord, who speak of 'causal mechanisms' whereby A can be said to be causally responsible for an event in the world where this event involves a response by B based on an intelligible interpretation of A's act, both where the consequences were intended and where they were not.

So, for example, if A embarrasses B, A must do something which B interprets in a certain way and is thereby embarrassed. When we use the term 'cause' here, as in "A caused B to be embarrassed", we must not let it hide the fact that an appraisal by B is involved, and that he might not have been embarrassed if he had seen the situation differently. What A did was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for B's being embarrassed. There may be advantages to saying that A's action was the reason that B was embarrassed, but
this does not imply that B's embarrassment was the reason for A's act.

If A convinces B, he must say something which B treats as a sufficient reason for changing his views. Thus these examples indicate that Feinberg's analysis can be seen as an extension of Austin's analysis of perlocutionary effects, including acts which are not speech acts more explicitly than Austin. Austin accepted that there was a possibility of both illocutionary and perlocutionary effects being brought about by non-linguistic means, but the focus of his work was, of course, speech as action. The focus here, however, is on the whole class of actions which can bring about these kinds of outcomes, and since the term 'perlocutionary' act is so closely tied to speech, an associated term which is of more general application is needed. In order to stress the analogy with speech acts, I propose using the term *perficienary* acts and outcomes (rather than effects, in order to avoid implications of causes in either a Humean or a mechanistic sense).

Thus Austin's "By saying P, A was Y-ing B" is extended to "By X-ing, A was Y-ing B." Y is the perficience verb, and some condition in B (a response) is the perficient outcome. The distinctiveness of perficienary transactions and interactions lies in the criteria which are applied for judging the truth or falsity of "A is Y-ing B" claims. The outcome in B and the instrumentality of A's acts in bringing it about are the conditions of the truth of the claim, rather than the intention of A that the outcome should occur. That is, perficiences may be intentional or non-intentional. As defined, many examples of such verbs can be found - hurt (physically, as an interaction, or psychologically, as a transaction), offend, upset, interrupt, dominate, embarrass, bore, humiliate (all usually undesired by B), interest, satisfy, amuse, entertain, please, convince, persuade, or encourage.

It should be noted that if, under certain conditions, A is told that he is X-ing B, where X is one of these verbs, it is intelligible for him to reply that he didn't intend to, but unacceptable for him to deny that he has done it. If B, for example, is frightened by
something A is doing, A can't deny that he is frightening B, though he may say he didn't intend to. B's being frightened may be rational or irrational, justified or unjustified, but A's frightening B does not depend on A's intentions, nor is A a special authority on whether or not he is frightening B.

Thus, on this analysis, if B is offended by something A says or does, A is offending him, whether or not A intends it. B may be over-sensitive, but this does not affect the claim that A is offending him. (Whether or not we say that offending is an action of A's depends on whether or not we insist that an act be described in the terms in which A himself conceives of it.)

The converse of this argument is that A is not e.g. humiliating B if B is unperturbed by what A is doing, no matter what A's intention in the matter. If A was trying to humiliate B, he has failed in his attempt. Similarly, if B dies as a result of A's shooting him, A has killed him, on this account, even though he may not have intended this. If A was trying to kill B, but B does not die, A has failed in his attempt. The outcome dominates our understanding of perficences, but they can all (logically) be attempted, and perficence verbs can therefore all be used in an 'attempt' sense. Attempt claims are made from the agent's perspective, but the transactional claims are judged by public criteria. Since attention is directed both towards the outcome in B and the actions performed by A which bring about this outcome, perficence verbs all have a Janus-quality. I suggest that transactional claims of this kind are central to understanding interpersonal relationships.

A perficence verb is used correctly in the transactional sense when the speaker believes (or, in exceptional cases, is trying to get people to think he believes) that the person of whom it is predicated is being instrumental through appropriate acts in bringing about the logically required outcome. But the claim is only true when it is the case that the person of whom it is predicated actually is instrumental in bringing about the outcome. That is, the outcome must have been occurring because of what he did. This point emphasizes the realist presuppositions of this analysis, as, indeed, might have been expected in the light of the remarks on the ontological
assumptions embedded in our ordinary-language use of 'teach' in Chapter 2. More will be said about what could be counted as an appropriate way of bringing about the perficient outcome, in a given context, in the case of teaching later.

The logic of perficience verbs

Perficienary acts have been defined as those which bring about a perficient outcome in a patient or respondent, so that by X-ing, A may Y B (where Y is the perficience verb). However, it must be noted that the perficienary transaction is not, on this account, itself an outcome of the act X. It is rather that, in the context, the act X constituted part of the transaction. Both A's act X and the appropriate outcome or response in B are integral to the perficienary transaction.

An alternative way of bringing out this point is through a consideration of the distinction between the contingent consequences of an act, and the logical consequence of an outcome. If I kill you, intentionally or non-intentionally, by shooting you, my killing you is the logical consequence of your dying from my shot. It is a matter of logic that if you remain alive I cannot have killed you. However, whether or not you die from my shot is a wholly contingent matter. Thus, if I shoot you, both contingent and conceptual factors are involved in determining whether or not my act of shooting is an instance of killing. Your dying is a contingent, not a logical, consequence of my shooting you, but my killing you is a logical, not a contingent, consequence of your dying from my shot.

I suggest that the above schema picks out what is distinctive about the category of verbs on which I have focused my attention. Boring, interesting or entertaining someone are things I do by virtue of their (contingent) response to what I am doing - and my doings are necessarily describable in other terms - e.g. telling jokes, playing music, singing, dancing, describing, demonstrating, etc. However, my boring, interesting or entertaining someone is not a contingent consequence of my doing these things, it is concomitant with them. These doings constitute the boring, interesting or entertaining. As Ryle would probably say, I am doing one thing,
not two, if I bore or entertain you with my jokes. It is the
talking, dancing, telling jokes or whatever which is itself
boring or entertaining you. Thus it can be seen that perficience
verbs are all polymorphous concepts.

This can all be rephrased in the language of necessary and
sufficient conditions. Though B's being bored is a contingent
consequence of A's talking, etc., it is a logically necessary
condition of A's boring him. Similarly, B's dying from A's
shot is a logically sufficient condition for A's killing him,
though A does one thing, not two, when he shoots and kills B.
B's suffering pain is a logically necessary condition of A's
hurting him, but A can't simply hurt B - he must do something
to him which contingently brings about his pain.

Perficience verbs all offer examples of Feinberg's accordion
effect. In such cases, the contingent consequences of A's X-ing
logically transform his X-ing into the perficienary transaction,
Y-ing B, which may, as already suggested, have been the agent's
purpose in acting (intentional perficences) or not envisaged by
him (non-intentional perficences). Though extremes of this kind
can be distinguished, clearly instances can lie on a continuum,
ranging from cases where Y-ing B was the primary intention of the
agent's X-ing, through instances where it was not his purpose but
he was aware that he was doing it, to cases where the possibility
of Y-ing B had not even been considered by A. Given this account,
perficience verbs can still clearly be contrasted with verbs
where intention is critical. I can't murder or lie to you non-
intentionally, since intention is part of the meaning of murdering
or lying, as it is in Feinberg's example of breaking faith.
Indeed, perficience verbs such as kill or mislead are often used
to retreat to from verbs like murder, lie and deceive where
intention is a necessary condition (defining characteristic).
On the other hand, it is claimed, we normally distinguish
perficienary attempts which completely fail to achieve the desired
outcome by widespread use of the language of trying.
The Distinguishing Features of Perficienary Transactions

It is a feature of attempts and activities that the time spent on them is in the control of the agent. Attempts and activities finish when the agent decides to stop them, though this isn't necessarily when he reaches the final goal he set himself, if any. Activities and attempts may be abandoned or interrupted by circumstances external to them. However, there is no time when they can be necessarily terminated by something internal to them, and without the agent's being aware of it.

The principal distinctive feature of a perficienary transaction is that the ending of the transaction is not necessarily within the control of the agent. There is clearly one sense in which it is within the control of the agent, in that he may cease performing the acts which constitute the transaction once he is aware that they do so. The main point here is that a perficienary transaction may be terminated by something internal to it in respect of the respondent without the agent's knowing of the termination. They may continue after the agent would like them to stop, or stop when he is trying to continue them. From the logical relationships outlined earlier, it can be seen that some appropriate response in B is a necessary condition for A to be Y-ing him (where Y is a perficience verb), so that the Y-ing is terminated, for example, if there is an appropriate terminal change in the respondent (e.g. when a new state is brought about in him, an old state terminated, something new - e.g. a skill - produced or developed by him, or perhaps by his decision to cease attending to A's doings). To illustrate this by an interaction, my hurting you stops when you cease to feel pain, though I can carry on with my activity of hitting you, or my attempt to hurt you. My dominating you stops when you cease to submit, though I can continue my activity of giving you orders or my attempt to dominate you. Transactions, in particular, require consciousness of A and A's actions by B, so that they always necessarily cease if B becomes unconscious or unaware of A's acts. The distinctiveness of a perficienary transaction lies in this feature. They are differentiated as a class from e.g. activities and attempts in that they can be terminated by something internal to them. Both contingent and logical factors are involved in the termination.
The contingent factor is the change in $B$, (e.g. when he ceases to respond). The conceptual factor is the logical relationship of the response in question to the perficience.
CHAPTER 4: An Alternative Analysis of Teaching

Introduction

In Chapter 2, I discussed the implications of the activity analysis of teaching, and suggested that for various reasons it could not be used as the basis for a justificatory enterprise concerned with the responsibilities of teachers. In Chapter 3, I developed a new conceptual schema for discussing certain kinds of transactional verbs. This chapter applies the analysis of Chapter 3 to the concept of teaching, and in the discussions, implicitly indicates the usefulness of the schema.

The objections to the analysis which might be raised are considered carefully, and I conclude that the analysis can provide satisfactory answers to these objections. A summary is provided of the reasons for preferring this analysis to the orthodox activity analysis.

Although it is not being suggested that the responsibilities of a teacher's role ultimately turn on language usage, for this would clearly be wrong, the choice between the two analyses is not simply a verbal one. It is my contention that the activity analysis of teaching effectively conceals some of the areas in which it might be appropriate to hold teachers responsible, and rules out a priori suggestions that a teaching role could be properly fulfilled by a person who had "fuzzy" intentions or who engaged in genuinely open-ended enquiry on the grounds that they were employed to teach and these activities are ruled out by virtue of the meaning of teaching.

I argue that the area of responsibility is a matter for ethical decision and not for analysis. It is a separate issue from the questions about the meaning of teaching as discussed in this section, and is dealt with in detail in the latter half of the thesis. Nonetheless, it follows that the claims "Teachers are prima facie responsible for what they teach" and "The teacher's obligation is to teach his pupils something worth learning" make different claims on the different analyses. The alternative analyses have different implications for the role, and it is argued that the perficience
analysis, rather than the activity analysis, explains and justifies the teacher's role in schools.

Since it is being claimed here that there is a derivative sense of 'teach' which is elliptical for 'trying to teach', the chapter includes a section on trying.

Teaching as a Perficienary Transaction

It is suggested here that the primary sense in which we understand teaching is as a perficienary transaction. That is, it is claimed that the primary sense in which the claim "A is teaching B X" is understood in most contexts, including the school context, is that A is engaging in acts and/or activities which are bringing the X into the 'view' of B so that B is learning X, in the sense of developing the understanding, knowledge, skill, attitude etc. denoted by the X, the acquisition of which will (for some Xs at least) terminate B's learning, and thus, necessarily, A's teaching of that X to B.

In the same way that we normally need to look at a whole situation, not merely at an individual agent, to see whether A is comforting, helping, hindering, inspiring, assisting, alarming, antagonizing, convincing or persuading B rather than at the intention of the agent, I suggest that we discover in this way whether teaching is going on or not. Perry has already suggested that we should do this to see whether training or educating is going on \(^{101}\), so the suggestion is not a new one. In order to teach B X in this central sense, it is necessary that A engages in acts or activities which constitute the teaching, and these acts and activities must have some relationship with the X being taught which is not simply fortuitous. (It will later be argued that in the case of propositions there must be some internal relationship, and that, though in the case of physical skills the connection may be a contingent one, the contingency is of a non-fortuitous kind. In the case of other Xs, there may be both internal and contingent relationships.)

The first condition which is claimed to be necessary for A to be teaching B X in this sense is that B does not already know (etc.) the
X concerned. The second condition is that for A to be teaching B X (as contrasted with B's simply learning X) is that A is engaging in appropriate acts - appropriate in the sense that they are related to the X - which actually are instrumental to (i.e., bringing about) B's learning of X. As Hirst has suggested, an important feature of teaching is that the acts A performs must be ones which in some way bring the X into the view of the pupil such that he can learn from them. Thus, though turning up the radiators may help bring about B's learning to appreciate Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, turning up the radiators, having no relationship of a non-fortuitous kind with Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, cannot be an instance of teaching anyone to appreciate that symphony. In order to be learned, the X must be brought by A's acts to B's attention and comprehension, and thus what A does in respect of that X must be de facto intelligible to B - not, as I take Hirst to suggest, believed by A to be intelligible. The concepts, language and symbolic systems used must be ones which B actually understands. The third condition, as well as the first, is, perhaps, implied by the second (that B is learning the X) but it seems important here to state both explicitly.

The acts which A engages in which constitute his teaching B X may explicitly exhibit the X to B, but, as all writers on teaching have emphasized, a wide range of acts would be appropriate, depending on the X being taught, and also upon whom B is. Teaching acts may display, clarify, exemplify or otherwise indicate the X, or they may, in some way, help B to draw explicit understanding from what he already knows by his own thinking or reflection (that is, teaching acts may be maieutic). A may teach B an X without indicating or displaying it himself, either explicitly or implicitly (through structured apparatus or leading questions). This kind of method of bringing an X into the view of learners I shall call eliciting, and this may be extremely important in relation to teaching such Xs as interest, appreciation etc. It is also central to some conceptions of teaching by discussion, and can be seen to be involved in the teaching of some skills, in instances where the teaching is not done by demonstrating the skill (i.e., where no showing is involved).
teaching, or by B's ceasing to attend. But additionally, for many Xs, there is a necessary termination of the teaching of X when B learns that X. It is only in such instances, where the description 'teaching X' itself involves a limit, that we use the term 'teach' in the 'final achievement' sense which, as Ryle notes, implies that the outcome has been brought about, and that the teaching has terminated in a successful final upshot. This means that, in saying "A has taught B X (e.g. to ride a bicycle)", we imply not only that there was a period of time during which occurred instance(s) of A's teaching B to ride a bicycle, but also that the teaching has resulted in B's being able to ride the bicycle. However, on the analysis presented here, there is no contradiction involved in claiming that A was teaching B to ride a bicycle at time t (in a more than 'mere attempt' sense of teach) even though B never reached the stage of being a skilled bicycle rider. As in the example of learning to play the Moonlight Sonata given in the previous chapter, B may be learning to ride a bicycle at time t even though he never completes his learning. Thus we may speak of teaching in a sense which is non-elliptical, as long as there is some kind of 'uptake', a response of the learner involving the learning of something which represents a partial learning of the X, even though B never learns X itself, and we can never claim that A has taught B X.

This is a contingent world. Teaching is, in a sense, thus people-dependent, and, as Kenny has pointed out in respect of performances, for any perficienary transaction involving a termination, for a variety of different reasons the termination may never be reached. This is not central to our understanding of teaching and learning. My claim here is that the differences between the kinds of instance where there is a limit (e.g. learning that Henry VIII had six wives) and those where there is not (e.g. learning history) do not lie in there being different senses of teach and learn but in the objects of teaching and learning.

It is therefore suggested that the central sense of teaching must be the one used in the claim that A is engaged in the perficienary transaction of teaching B X (whatever the X), and that this occurs when the following criteria are met:

(i) A has not yet learned (or has learned and forgotten) X, or has not yet completed his learning of X (i.e. has more to learn in respect of X).
(ii) A is engaged in a transaction with B, involving meanings and necessitating 'uptake'
(iii) A's actions or activities display, clarify, exhibit, exemplify, elicit, confirm or otherwise bring into B's 'view' the X
(iv) A is using concepts, language or symbols which B understands (B is having 'uptake' and A is communicating meanings to him)
(v) A's acts are instrumental in bringing about some learning by B (that is, B is learning X)

Not only is it being suggested that this is the central sense of teaching (in that this sense must be understood in order for other senses to be understood) but also that this is the sense we are mainly concerned with in schools, a point which will later be supported with argument.

It is not being suggested that this is the only sense in which the term 'teaching' is used. It is accepted that it is sometimes used to speak of completely unsuccessful attempts (where, I have suggested, it is entirely equivalent to 'trying to teach (in the central sense)'). What is involved in trying to teach is discussed later in this chapter, as are other concepts of teaching - e.g., more specific concepts such as that of Scheffler, or purely institutional concepts.

Objections to the perfectionism analysis

All analyses of teaching suggest that teaching is conceptually parasitic on learning. However, vigorous objections have been raised to suggestions which have earlier been made by philosophers that teaching, in its central sense, implies learning. Learning, it is said, is necessary only for correct application of the 'achievement' sense of teaching, seen as a successful final upshot of an attempt to bring about learning. It is claimed that what is required of teachers in schools is the intention to bring about learning X, together with appropriate acts which, in the view of the teacher, indicate the X in ways that the pupils can understand.
The first objection which might be raised to the analysis presented here is that it raises the problem that a teacher may not know what he is doing. On the activity analysis, there is no problem of knowledge, for the teacher's knowledge of his own beliefs about the cognitive states of pupils, his own intentions in respect of their learning and his performance of the requisite indicative acts, provides the sufficient conditions of his being able to say of himself, infallibly, that he was teaching B X. Others too, with knowledge of his intentions, are in a position to say of him that he is teaching B X, but since they are not the authorities on his beliefs and intentions, they are not infallible, though they may know that he is teaching B X.

To this objection, the answer is that there is acknowledged to be a problem of knowledge here. Teachers and parents do worry about what they are teaching their children. I have earlier claimed that the distinction between what A is doing and what he is trying to do is a useful one. On the analysis presented here, there is nobody who is necessarily the authority on whether A is teaching B X. This is a matter for discovery, for what must be known is (a) that B is learning X and (b) that it is through A's acts that he is learning it. The raising of the problem of knowledge here is claimed to be an advantage of, not an objection to, the analysis. On this analysis, though not on the activity one, the worry of parents or teachers "What am I teaching my children?" (by which is meant more than "What part of what I am trying to get them to learn are they learning?) makes sense. Here, it is suggested, is one of the kinds of instance where it is already acknowledged that others may know what you are doing better than you do. (This, it was suggested, is true of all perficiences.)

The second objection which might be raised to this analysis is that it is stipulative, not reportative or descriptive. Komisar discusses this sort of approach in detail. "Suppose," he says, "a new meaning of teaching is stipulated by introducing a distinction between instruction and teaching."

"Instruction," he suggests, "is then defined stipulatively as any activity done by a teacher to produce learning. When the activity
is successful, and the expected learning is achieved, then we can say that the teacher was teaching, not merely (?) instructing."

"Of course," adds Komisar, "any such move... has no effect on the standard thesis... (which) incorporates a reportative definition (what a concept does mean), then no stipulative definition (what teaching should mean) can endanger it."

This objection is answered by the claim that the orthodox analysis is not reportative of the language usage of many people. Many would wish to deny that 'teach' is properly used for mere attempts, and that there is any sense of teaching in which a person in a classroom e.g. demonstrating an experiment or writing and explaining the solving of quadratic equations on the blackboard is teaching them, if not one child in the classroom is paying any attention to what is being said or done. That is, it seems to be the case that many pupils, trainee teachers and practicing teachers simply do not use the term 'teach' as an ellipsis for 'unsuccessfully try to teach', because they see some kind of 'uptake' as necessary. In cases of complete failure, they use the full 'try to teach' form. Indeed, this assumption is needed to explain widespread discussions on how to obtain the conditions necessary for teaching to go on - which (with some methods of teaching, at least,) would seem, on the standard analysis, to be nil. One can try to bring about learning, as it were, no matter what else is happening, so long as one is not being physically prevented from performing the indicative acts. An alternative answer might be that 'teach' is properly used for mere attempts, but that this sense is derivative and has been clearly shown by arguments to be derivative.

But what position does all this leave us in with respect to philosophical problems? It seems to me clear that an analysis cannot stand or fall on language usage alone, which is why I have tried to show that it is the implications of the activity analysis that are unacceptable rather than simply the usage that it delineates. But, as Komisar points out, language must square with usage. It therefore seems to me to be a valid reply to a charge that the analysis is stipulative that it is not so, but reportative.
usage indicates a trichotomous rather than a dichotomous understanding of teaching, in which the perficience sense 'wears the trousers'. Indeed, since the analysis is developed from a claim about the logical relationship between a goal and an attempt, it would be strange if the analysis did not square with usage.

Thus the reply to any charge that the analysis is stipulative would be that it is reportative; it is not giving an account of what, on my view, teaching should mean.

Komisar's second objection\textsuperscript{107} to a claim that teaching (in central cases) implies learning is that this concept has the disadvantage that one can speak of teaching (in this sense) only retrospectively. This, I believe, is simply a mistake. To take a non-school example, if we watch a man walking round an art gallery, for example, talking to his companion about the pictures, and see his companion understanding what is said, asking questions, looking interested and seeming to be learning, we can make teaching claims on the basis of our observations. Though teaching (on this analysis) necessitates learning as knowledge necessitates truth, neither teaching claims nor knowledge claims are infallible. We can speak of A's teaching B X when we have good reasons for believing that B is learning X through what A is doing, and this can be while it is going on. If it is true that B is learning X through A's actions (that is, that the criteria given on pages 103-104 are met) then we know that A is teaching B X while it is going on.

It is worth noting that Komisar himself is inconsistent about the relationship between learning and teaching. "Learningless teaching," he says\textsuperscript{108}, "will have to stop after a time - when it is chronic." But if at some time there is no teaching because there is no learning, what difference does it make whether it is the first, twentieth or fiftieth time? And elsewhere\textsuperscript{109} Komisar says, "So the obvious is true, to teach and leave the learner unaffected is not to have been teaching (my italics) at all." What does Komisar mean here? Is this not to have been teaching even in a 'task' sense? Or is it to suggest that we don't use the term 'teach' in a mere 'task' sense? Kyle, too, writes\textsuperscript{110} that A cannot teach B without communicating.
with him. So my claim that the analysis offered here is reportative has support from the language use of even those who deny that teaching implies learning.

Henderson has ridiculed the suggestion that if no pupils learn, there has been no teaching, by suggesting that anyone who wants to hold this view is committed to the view that if the patient doesn't recover, the surgeon hasn't operated, or that if nobody appreciates the painting, the artist hasn't painted it. The second analogy is rejected immediately, since the painting of any particular picture is a logically necessary condition of anyone's ever coming to appreciate it. However, since I have myself used the analogy between teaching and curing, I must examine the first example carefully to see whether the objection is valid.

There seems to be a reasonable analogy between operating and curing, on the one hand, and giving lessons or engaging in pedagogy, and teaching in the outcome sense, on the other. The analogue for learning in the former case is recovering, and the analogue for operating is one of the more specific act descriptions (explaining, demonstrating, setting up discovery situations etc.) Operating is, after all, one specific type of treating. Operations are techniques developed to bring about recovery (in general) in the same way that pedagogy represents the techniques developed to bring about learning. Clearly this discussion refers only to institutional teaching attempts. Again, this objection is met by suggesting that the use of the terms 'giving lessons' or 'pedagogic activities' is not stipulative. Thus Henderson's objection is trivial, for, in the same way that we would not deny that the surgeon has operated if the patient does not recover (though we do deny that the surgeon has cured him), so we may deny that the pupil has been taught if he hasn't learned it without denying that the teacher gave the lesson. Indeed, Hirst's account accepts the distinction between giving lessons and teaching in a task sense. It is clear that no intentions can be logically demanded of the surgeon by virtue of the fact that he operated, in respect of curing the patient; for his primary intention might have been to improve his operating technique or to obtain the patient's diseased gall bladder for experimental purposes. But if the patient recovers from his illness because of the operation, the surgeon has
cured him, and this is independent of his primary intention in operating. Similarly, a doctor whose patient was recovering from an illness as a result of the treatment was curing his patient although the patient was knocked down by a car and never fully recovered. This particular objection to the thesis that teaching implies learning, then, needs no further discussion.

Henderson's second objection is that such an understanding imposes a difficulty on doing any significant research on methods of teaching. This, again, seems to be a point implied by Hirst's article, which has already been discussed. It is not an objection to this analysis, but rather a point in its favour, that it permits us to include in investigations persons who are admitted to be very good teachers, even though they formulate their objectives 'fuzzily' or at a high level of generality. It also permits us to include instances outside of school not involving pedagogy, where, as discussed, the intention of the person doing the teaching may be primarily not that A learns X but that Z is done.

Another objection which is raised to the suggestion that teaching implies learning is that this renders unsuccessful teaching a logical impossibility, and, it is claimed, we do speak of unsuccessful teaching. I have earlier pointed out that we more usually speak of unsuccessful attempts to X, rather than unsuccessful X-ing, and the idea of unsuccessful teaching can only have application in respect of teaching attempts. The objection, however, has, I suggest, been answered implicitly already through the extensive discussions of unfinished teaching. Unfinished teaching is necessarily unsuccessful in terms of the goal. Ryle takes this point, when he says, "Did you succeed in swimming your first lesson? If not, had you learned nothing at all that first lesson?" If A is teaching B X but the teaching is discontinued before B learns X to the appropriate standard of success, then we might say that A's teaching (not merely his teaching attempt) was unsuccessful.

In schools, we are asked to teach classes, and, under many sets of conditions, it is impossible for a teacher to teach the whole class. Depending on what is to be counted as success, here again is a case
where a person can be teaching in the outcome sense, though not entirely successfully. The main problem here, though, is whose criteria are to be applied. If teaching is an activity, it would seem that we must use the criteria of the person who is trying to teach B X as the basis of our judgment whether he has succeeded or failed in his attempt. (On this account, the surest way to be a successful teacher is never to try to teach anything too difficult. That would make 100% success easier to attain. Of course, it also produces the paradox that the successful teacher could teach his pupils much less than the unsuccessful teacher in the hypothetical case of the pupils being identical.) But, as Cooper's article indicates, a Headmaster who says "Miss A is teaching Class 2 successfully" is applying his criteria, not the teacher's. We do not know that she might, by her own criteria, judge herself a failure. In my view, much confusion has been introduced into such discussions of teaching by a continual swing from talk about successful or unsuccessful teaching attempts to talk of successful or unsuccessful teachers (in the role sense) and vice versa. The teacher referred to elsewhere in Cooper's article, whom, Cooper suggests, we wouldn't call successful if he only taught his pupils P.E. (that is, they only learned P.E.) might be entirely successful by his own criteria if he wasn't trying to get them to learn anything else. This indicates the sorts of ways in which discussions of what teaching is have been influenced by unargued assumptions about the role of the teacher.

If we exclude the idea of a successful teacher in role terms at this stage, it can be seen that though, on the account of teaching given here, all teaching in the central sense involves learning, it does not follow that all teaching (in that sense) must be successful. Indeed, since the idea of success is conceptually tied to an agent's intentions and purposes, it is inappropriate to discuss non-intentional teaching in success terms. Since we can't speak of failure here, it is inappropriate to speak of success.

I consider the most serious objection to this analysis to be the one raised by Fleming, who cast doubt on the analysis by examining again the Austinian distinction on which it is based.

He pointed out that Austin saw three sub-classes as illocutionary effects - namely (1) "securing uptake", by which he meant "bringing
about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution;" (ii) "taking effect", as when the naming of a ship has the effect of naming it; and (iii) "inviting responses."

Fleming suggested that the perfection analysis of teaching is seriously weakened by its failure to take into proper account Austin’s first suggestion, as put by Searle, that "the characteristic intended effect of meaning is understanding but understanding is not... a perlocutionary (my italics) effect."

Fleming pointed out that there is a large class of acts whose intention is to bring about understanding, which we would include as teaching attempts. He is quite correct in suggesting that very much of the talk about teaching expresses concern that pupils do not simply learn to repeat propositions or to perform manipulative tricks (e.g. in mathematics) but to know $P$ (which presupposes understanding $P$) or simply to understand $Q$. Thus, he suggested, this kind of teaching could not be a member of a class of perficienary transactions. Because it aims at understanding, he claimed, it could not be a perficienary (or perlocutionary) attempt. Thus if teaching is a perficience, bringing about understanding would not be teaching at all.

I certainly agree that Fleming is right in suggesting that an analysis of teaching which excluded the bringing about of understanding as instances of teaching would have to be rejected, for it would on that account be inadequate to our understanding of teaching. But I do not think that his objection is valid because it takes too simplistic a view of what might be involved in teaching someone to understand something. Understanding the meaning of an utterance $U$ may be an illocutionary rather than a perlocutionary effect, but when a teacher speaks of teaching children to understand something, he doesn’t mean merely that they should understand the meaning of what he is saying. Nor does he refer particularly to their understanding of his intention in saying what he does. What teachers are generally concerned with, I believe, when they talk of 'teaching for understanding' as understanding at a different level from the understanding of utterances. If, for example, they are concerned that children should understand that Columbus discovered America as a historical fact, they do not simply want pupils to understand what they mean when they
utter the words "Columbus discovered America", nor that the pupils should appreciate that their main intention in uttering them is that the pupils should understand it. Similarly, the science teacher who wants pupils to understand Le Chatelier's principle does not simply want them to understand the meaning of the utterance "When a constraint is applied to a chemical system in equilibrium, changes take place within the system which tend to remove the constraint." His concern here is that the pupil integrate that which is understood into a body of beliefs and concepts so that he understands the place of this principle in a body of chemical theory as currently understood, the kinds of reactions to which it is applicable, and how it can be used to predict and control chemical changes, etc. He is not concerned that they understand that this is his intention so much as that they understand this. The understanding involved is not mere uptake of illocutionary meaning and/or force. In the very large areas of learning where teachers customarily seek understanding, learning involves understanding and understanding involves learning. More than understanding the meaning of utterances is required.

Even if we accept Searle's suggestion that understanding the meaning and force of utterances is an illocutionary and not a perlocutionary effect, the illocutionary effect of understanding can be at the most necessary but never sufficient for learning. For example, what is said may not be new to the pupil at all, and he can therefore not learn from it. But even if what is said is new to the pupil, understanding the meaning of the utterance may not involve learning anything, for learning, even where what is achieved is understanding, also involves integrating the proposition in some way in one's conceptual and propositional framework, and remembering it. It does involve a response. The is the point which is being made when it is stressed that learning is not a passive process, even when it is, as already discussed, casual rather than intentional. (I have already explained that I am not concerned here with causal learning.)

The objection is thus countered by pointing out that though teaching, as analysed here, may presuppose the securing of illocutionary effects, it cannot, for the reasons given above, be identified with it. Teaching pupils to understand human activities, scientific theories, society or themselves is not simply a matter of securing illocutionary uptake. Fleming may have forgotten that perlocutionary
effects can be responses brought about by understanding meanings, not e.g. just by the tone of one's voice. If I say "There's a bull" with the intention merely of informing, and I frighten or warn B because he knows that bulls are dangerous, my frightening or warning B involves his understanding of what the utterance means. It is not the less a perlocutionary outcome because of that.

Understanding A's utterance is, for Searle, illocutionary uptake because it is not seen by him as a response. I have suggested that learning, additionally, requires responses even when what is learned is delineated in terms of understandings, for it is never merely an understanding of the utterance. If having an understanding of the illocutionary meaning and/or force of speech acts is thus presupposed by teaching outcomes as perficiences, then Fleming is right in suggesting that illocutionary-type acts, including illocutions, are important in teaching. But I think that he is wrong in suggesting that if illocutionary uptake is a necessary precondition of any perciенary outcome of teaching (including teaching people to understand X) this invalidates the perciенence analysis. For though understanding an utterance may not be a response in itself, acknowledging that what is understood is new and incorporating the meanings into one's system of beliefs and concepts is a response, and it is this sort of thing which is being referred to by talk of teaching children to understand something. It is because learners have to make an active response that the perciенence analysis is appropriate.

A final objection which has been raised to the view that teaching in the central sense implies learning is that such a concept would denigrate the work of those who are expected to teach "slow learners" or children who have brain damage. Since clearly much less learning is likely in these circumstances than with 'bright' children who are eager to learn the subject matter a teacher is trying to teach, they argue that on this analysis much less teaching is likely to go on. I do not accept that the objects of teaching (e.g. knowledge, skills, etc.) can usefully be compared to commodities here, and suggest that
we cannot accept Dewey's 'exact equation of teaching and learning' in this way. If children (or adults) find learning X difficult, for any reason, then teaching them will be correspondingly more difficult. Nobody is denigrated by the suggestion that it is more difficult to teach children with handicaps. Quite the reverse is true, for problems are encountered in teaching when problems are encountered in learning. But this objection is irrelevant if, as suggested, the analysis offered here is descriptive.

This section has considered the various objections which might be raised to the suggestion that our normal claim "A is teaching B X" implies that B is learning X, and that the distinctions introduced by Austin in his work in the philosophy of language can usefully be brought into philosophy of education and developed to give terms of art for discussing teaching. I have concluded that these objections do not stand up, and that, at the very least, this analysis represents a viable alternative to the activity analysis. The question remains, then, whether and why this analysis is to be preferred to the activity analysis.

**Reasons for preferring the perficience analysis of teaching.**

The main reason I suggest for preferring the perficience analysis to the activity analysis is that the former is, and the latter is not, consistent with the relationship between an outcome and an attempt. That is, as already suggested, understanding "bringing about learning by the performance of certain kinds of acts" is logically prior to understanding "trying to bring about learning by the performance of certain kinds of acts".

If the above claim is true, one should not be surprised at the second claim I make here which is that the analysis presented here matches up better with our ordinary use of language, since it is consistent, as the activity analysis is not, with our ordinary language usage in respect of completely (not just grossly) misjudged states of learners, instances where attempts are made to teach people what they already know, and in respect of writing text-books for putative learners where it is not usual to claim to have been teaching anyone
whilst doing so. It is also more helpful than the activity analysis in respect of the latter's own examples. It provides criteria for being able to say, for example, why a person giving an account of the Private Language argument to a group of six year olds could 'definitely' not be teaching them; for it seems that we do, in talking of teaching in general, use as a criterion what we take to be, objectively, the actual cognitive states of learners, rather than the beliefs of the person attempting to teach. To account for such usages, the activity analysis is inconsistent, sometimes appealing to objective criteria, sometimes to subjective ones.

A further advantage of the perficience analysis is that it squares with common usage, in that it enables us to say legitimately what we do in fact say, that a person may teach Xs (propositions) that he does not himself know whilst teaching them. I claim, for example, to have taught a group of VIth form biology students to have some understanding of the structure of D.N.A. and to know certain propositions relating to this structure, though at the start of the discussions, carried out with the aid of some books, I had only the vaguest ideas about the structure of D.N.A. I certainly had no propositional knowledge about the structure of D.N.A., but I can, I suggest, validly claim to have taught them the propositions they learned because my understanding of chemistry and of the symbols employed was such that I was able to help them interpret the explanations given in the book which they were not able to interpret for themselves. But I could (logically) not have intended to teach those propositions because I had no idea what they might be. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to say that I taught them intentionally. It seems to me that the demand that to teach an X, one must intend to teach that X, clearly, not fuzzily, specified, tends to rule out activities of the above kind, where the teacher has only vague aims concerned with 'teaching about', and the guiding of genuinely open-ended enquiry from the category of teaching.

There are many areas including those with tightly structured conceptual schemes, such as science and mathematics, where a great deal of learning, guided by a person who has an understanding of general principles, can go on without the specification of learning goals. Indeed, it might be true that for some people the pre-
specification of aims might restrict the possibilities of teaching. I argue that this kind of guiding activity where propositions are learned through the help of others warrants the ascription of teaching those propositions in a central, not derivative sense. This is not possible if an intention to teach specific propositions is a necessary condition of teaching them. The same may be true of skills, and certainly seems to be true of dispositions. Our claim that A taught us to enjoy, or be interested in, philosophy does not depend, in ordinary usage, for its truth on A's having this specific intention. The claim is that the perficience analysis is preferable because it is appropriate to the attributions of teaching we do make of people who act in the ways described above in bringing about learning, and whom we could not describe as teaching those Xs in the 'important' sense of teaching on the activity analysis.

It is worth noting that nothing can be said a priori about which analysis is preferable in relation specifically to discussions of a professional role. This would depend on what is to be said about the concepts of role and of school. However, this analysis is clearly not going to be less demanding than the activity analysis, for there is no implication that vague bumbling or hopeful intentions can constitute teaching. The suggestion that teaching X can go on without the learning of that X being A's primary intention or even his intention at all makes the analysis consistent with our general usage. Whether a person who is employed as a teacher in school should or should not have intentions concerned with learning, tightly structured and clearly formulated intentions concerned with learning, etc. I take to be a different question.

Fourthly, it is suggested that this analysis is to be preferred as an account of why we understand the possibility of persons teaching through books, programmes, films and resource packs. The development of technology, from printing onwards, has permitted transactions with persons who are not directly present. I have suggested that in making work-cards, films, programmes or handouts, a person is not yet teaching anyone anything, and pointed out that nobody does describe themselves as teaching whilst doing these things. But the makers are teaching agents when learners use the resources they have made and
learn through them. This, I have suggested, accounts for our wish to be able to describe such activities using the language of teaching. Related to this is the claim that the pericience analysis, rather than the activity analysis, must be preferred by people with certain assumptions of an ontological nature—such as, that teaching must be of existent persons and not merely intensional objects (which would include 'anyone' in whose possible existence the agent believed).

Fifthly, I suggest that it is a value of this analysis that it focuses our attention, in application, on the actual outcomes of acts insofar as they depend on meanings, both intended and non-intentional, instead of that subset which are intended learning outcomes. For non-verbal teaching, in particular, requires that the teacher's behaviour be interpreted as actions for teaching to be going on, on this account. Thus it requires understanding (as opposed to not understanding) but also takes account of the possibility of misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the agent's actions. It thus emphasizes what every teacher implicitly knows—that it is the way pupils interpret what you are doing that is important in teaching, not simply the agent's interpretation. For what is 'brought into view' is necessarily related to pupils' interpretations rather than teachers'. A person can only teach what he intended if he and his pupils share the same understandings.

Finally, this analysis explains more effectively our widespread use of the term 'teach' to ascribe responsibility, to commend and to blame (though it is not being suggested that whether or not a person can be held responsible, or rightly commended or blamed turns on whether or not what he has done is called 'teaching'). I may blame my child's teacher for the consequence of her acts by saying e.g. that she has taught my daughter to be a tell-tale, or that telling tales on her friends is the right thing to do; or I may commend her for teaching my child to be interested in X, a subject which has previously bored him. In doing so, I make no assumptions about the teacher's intentions, insofar as I do not necessarily withdraw my claim if I know that her intentions in the first instance were to get information about what the children were doing, not to get my child to believe anything, and that this 'doing' was not seen under the description I give; and in the second place was to get him through an examination. The important feature of teaching, on this
view, which all instances have in common, is the performance of acts by an agent which, being interpreted, bring new Xs into the view of someone whose response is learning.

For all the above reasons, I suggest that the analysis of teaching as a perficienary transaction is to be preferred as an account of the concept. The choice is not a merely semantic one, for the activity analysis embodies certain assumptions which have implications for the role of the teacher that are different from the implications of the perficience analysis. The adoption of the perficience analysis is not being advocated simply because it permits us to question these aspects of the role, though clearly this is the main purpose for which it is being utilised in this thesis.

**Trying, and trying to teach**

I have suggested that it is only by virtue of understanding teaching as a transaction that one can understand teaching in a 'task' sense, or as I prefer to call it, the idea of trying to teach. This section looks more closely at the question of the relationship between teaching and attempts to teach.

It is clear that the presupposition involved in all such questions as "What are you trying to teach them?" or such assertions as "I was trying to teach them X but they didn't learn it," is that trying is no part of the meaning of teaching. For in one sense, trying is, as White suggests, the idea of intention-in-action. This presents some difficulty for the activity analysis.

The criteria for teaching, on this analysis, involve both intention and action, since condition (i) of Hirst's three is an intention criterion and condition (ii) an act criterion, demanding the performance of an indicative act. On this analysis, teaching means trying to bring about learning by the performance of certain kinds of acts. Trying is part of the meaning of teaching.

If this is the meaning of teaching involved in the use of the
word in the above sentences, which represent fairly typical utterances, they would be translatable, respectively, as "What are you trying to try to get them to learn?" and "I was trying to try to get them to learn X but they didn't learn it." The proponents of the activity analysis are thus involved in the problem of whether it is possible to try to try, to which the standard philosophical answer seems to be that it is not. Acceptance of the view that one could try to try would involve an infinite regress, for 'try' is being used in the same sense in both places.

However, it is worth noting that many writers who accept an activity analysis of teaching (which involves the view that teaching necessarily involves trying) still use the above constructions extensively in their writings and speech. Either they have failed to notice that their use of teaching in these constructions cannot have presuppositions concerned with trying, or they accept the possibility of trying to try. The move of suggesting that in these special contexts the 'trying' condition of teaching is missing (i.e. that this is a 'derivative' sense that doesn't involve trying) seems to me unacceptable. I have suggested that central uses of teaching do not necessarily involve trying, so the analysis offered here has no problems with the uses given above. Clearly it is possible to try to teach and to fail in one's attempt. (It is, however, also worth noticing that this objection also holds in respect of analyses of learning as an activity, for we also ask people e.g. what they are trying to learn. Questions about trying thus raise problems for the activity analysis of teaching at two different levels for anyone who also accepts that central senses of learning also involve trying.)

However, there is another sense in which a person may say, "I was trying to teach B X all morning." This is in the context of a constant stream of interruptions, and what the speaker wishes to indicate is that he has been unable to perform the actions which would have constituted the attempt. Thus the perficience analysis is faced with the same problem in relation to different contexts. Does the perficience analysis here involve an infinite regress of tryings? For if teaching is seen only as the goal of A's acts and activities, rather than as a description or appraisal of them, the
sentence seems to be only translatable as "I was trying to try to teach B X all morning." I hope to show, however, that no regress is involved here.

It is important to distinguish two ways in which a person may fail to achieve a desired upshot. Firstly he may perform the acts which constitute his attempt, but these acts may fail to bring about the result which was desired. This is the more usual situation. But it is to be clearly distinguished from the situation in which the failure to achieve the result is due to a failure to perform the acts which were to have constituted the attempt. If the two uses of 'try' in the construction under discussion are different, then no regress is involved.

"Try to" is a construction normally followed by a verb X, and it is true that we can as often say of someone that he tried and succeeded as that he tried and failed. But trying is, nonetheless, a notion which draws attention to difficulties, for when something is so simple that it requires no effort, there is little point in talk of trying. This is perhaps why Scheffler's comments, already referred to, that running surely involves something over and above the subservient task of trying to run sound so odd. For we do not normally talk of trying to walk or run, though there may be good reasons for speaking in this way of someone who is recovering from paralysis. Doctors do ask paralysed patients to try to e.g. wiggle their toes, and though the person concerned could give no account of what he did to try, and the doctor be unable to tell him what to do to try, we can distinguish between the case of the man who tried and failed and the man who did not try. This seems to involve rejecting Danto's suggestion that, for the case of moving one's arm, one loses the power of trying together with the power of doing. But this does not involve us as construing trying as a kind of willing, as some kind of mental cause. A paralysed person himself is aware of whether or not he tried.

The important thing here seems to be to distinguish the problem of knowledge from the problem of meaning. There are surely problems
as to what would count as evidence that a paralysed man had tried
to wiggle his toes. It would seem that one could have no alternative
here but to accept his word. But this does not prevent us from
understanding the difference between trying to run and failing, and
not bothering to try. This indicates that a special account is needed
to provide a context in which walk and run would be task verbs, and
perhaps this is the point Scheffler is trying to make when he suggests
that the task/achievement distinction be best understood as a
relativised one.

My suggestion here is that the sense in which we speak of trying
to teach to imply additional difficulties (such as interruptions) thus
refers to a context in which difficulties arise in actually performing
the actions which are to constitute a teaching attempt. Seen in this
way, there is no regress, for the 'try' in the sense of teach which is
equivalent to try-to-teach refers either only to the bringing about
of the perficienary outcome of teaching which is the logical
consequence of the pupils' learning from his acts, or to this and
the bringing about of some final upshot, whereby the learning is
terminated by the attainment of some specified end-state by the pupil.
In the other use, the 'try' refers to attempts to perform certain
acts, and implies difficulties in their successful performance.
Interruptions have been given as one example, but of course there are
other reasons why actions which are attempted may not be performed
successfully, such as lack of skill or resources on the part of the
agent. Research into teaching needs to take these distinctions into
account.

Given that attempts are made by virtue of the acts which constitute
the attempts being successfully performed, there are a number of
different kinds of reasons why the attempt may fail. In order to
discover whether the attempt is successful or not in terms of its
goal, it is necessary for a researcher to know what the goal is.
Similarly, it is necessary for him to know whether or not pupils
already know the X which the agent is attempting to teach, since it
is logically impossible that they learn what they already know or
can do, and pupils who have previously learned the X must be excluded
from the investigation. The failure to teach in these circumstances is due to a special kind of ignorance on the teacher's part, since he is unaware of the logical impossibility of achieving what he is trying to do.

The attempt may fail because of a different kind of ignorance, an ignorance to do with the actual instrumentality of the actions being performed to the bringing about of the desired outcome. The agent's belief that actions X, Y and Z could have certain consequences may simply be false. On this kind of account, a witch-doctor engaging in certain rituals considered appropriate in his society will fail in his attempt to cause it to rain, even though it may rain. He may be accounted a very successful witch-doctor if rain usually occurs when he performs his ritual, but anyone who denies that there is a causal relationship between the ritual and the rain is committed to saying that he failed to make it rain. The parallel with teaching is not completely straightforward, since the instrumentality involved in teaching is not causal in this sense. It is rather that certain acts are appropriate to the learning of Xs and conducive to that learning, and others are not. For example, the person who believes that you cannot get children to appreciate Shakespeare's plays by instructing them to appreciate them is committed to saying that any teaching attempt which consists only of such instruction must fail. Since appreciation, like interest, cannot be compelled, the attempt fails even if pupils do come to appreciate Shakespeare's plays. For, on the account given here, a teacher may teach his pupils something through things that he does that do not constitute the attempt, and which could not constitute his attempt if he were unaware that these were acts that were conducive to such learning. It is therefore appropriate to say that his attempt fails even if he teaches what he intended. The ignorance involved in this kind of failure is of a different kind from that of the first example.

A teaching attempt may fail even though the acts are appropriate and would, all other conditions being right, have been conducive to bringing about the desired outcome, because some other empirical condition necessary for the required outcome to occur is not met. So, in the way that a person planting seeds in an attempt to produce crops may
fail because of missing minerals in the soil, a teaching attempt may fail because of children's inattention to their doings, their tiredness, etc. Already mentioned is the fact that teaching attempts may fail because the teacher has incorrect beliefs about what his pupils can understand. This account is not intended to be exhaustive.

The important point that is being made here is that for teaching attempts to succeed, the teacher must (i) perform the actions which constitute the attempt and (ii) the bringing about of the learning outcome desired must be through those acts. For the teacher may teach what he intended and yet not succeed in his teaching attempt if the acts through which the teaching is actually brought about are not themselves being performed with the intention of bringing about the learning of X.

This distinction seems to me to be important for empirical research on teaching methods, and has implications concerned with the understanding of the subject matter required of people who engage in research, and for research methodology, which, I suggest, must include in addition to the usual investigations as to whether the pupils have learned the X, investigations as to which acts brought this learning about. For a teacher may adopt a new method, the method under research, but it may be through acts which fulfil the criteria suggested for teaching but which the teacher is not performing as part of the new method that he brings about the learning. The researcher needs to take account of how the teacher's actions are interpreted by his pupils, which may be of particular importance when the new method (e.g. discussion) is misunderstood by the pupils used to the old one (e.g. instruction). The interpretations need to be brought into line before it is possible for the method to succeed. Research which only takes account of the teacher's perspective (i.e. what he intends to get children to learn and his views on their cognitive states, and what counts as an indicative act) may give invalid conclusions, for it has failed to understand the difficulties of innovation.

However, the comments above about a person teaching through actions which are not part of the 'method', or teaching related Xs (either desirable or undesirable) are intended to point to something
else important. It is, I suggest, not good enough to say simply, "How nice we have all this spin-off!" or "Too bad he's learned all these other things," and to refuse to call this 'teaching'. The plausible hypothesis that we could come to understand more about teaching (and thus what to do in our teaching attempts) from looking at non-intentional teaching than at teaching attempts should not be made false by definition.

Finally, it is worth noting the failure of teaching attempts because they have not been carried on long enough. Attempts may be abandoned (for a variety of reasons including lack of time) when 'on the brink' of success. Research into teaching methods should not brand methods as failures when this is the reason for the failure.

Other concepts of teaching and their relationships

I have suggested that the concept of teaching as a perficienary transaction is the central concept of teaching, and that it is only by virtue of understanding this that one can understand what is involved in engaging in a perficienary attempt, and the notion of trying to teach has been explored. But no discussion on the concept of teaching would be complete without reference to some, at least, of the many other suggestions which have been made regarding more specific concepts of teaching than the two already discussed.

The first of these is Scheffler's well-known suggestion that teaching involves submitting oneself to the independent judgment of pupils and making available to them the underlying rationale of what is to be learned. Cooper has pointed out that this analysis is stipulative regarding general usage, being far more appropriate in respect of philosophy than in respect of many other subject matters. Without commenting on the possible intentions Scheffler might have had in introducing this analysis, it is interesting to note that, as Smith pointed out in respect of other definitions of teaching, "it smuggles in its own particular view of how teaching is to be carried on." By his analysis, Scheffler is implicitly recommending to teachers who see their job as to teach the practice of providing the underlying rationale for beliefs etc. These practices cannot,
however, be shown to be justifiable by bending the ordinary language uses of terms. This is not to deny that good reasons could be provided for teaching the underlying rationale for beliefs, but rather to suggest that "the underlying rationale for beliefs" is an appropriate object for the verb 'teach' (the formal object of which is "that which can be understood and/or learned"), rather than a part of the meaning of the term in common usage. Additionally such a view renders it possible for a person to teach the underlying rationale of that which he does not himself accept as true (e.g. astrology, Freudian theory) which would seem, on Scheffler's view, to be logically impossible.

Bantock and Jackson have suggested that teaching is a moral activity (which cuts out Fagan), and Aiken seems to ascribe to teaching the evaluative nature which, in the context of English philosophy of education is normally ascribed to education, in that he contrasts teaching with 'merely educating' on the one hand and with 'indoctrination' on the other. However, Neill appears to equate teaching with instruction, as does much non-philosophical writing on schools, though this is not surprising in view of the predominance of instruction as a teaching method. Musgrove and Taylor, on the other hand, contrast teaching with lecturing or instruction. Again, it might be suggested that discussions such as these smuggle in either value judgments or a particular view about how children learn best. These defects, I suggest, have only been avoided by Hirst, who said of his discussion on teaching, "I have been concerned with teaching and learning in general, whatever the ends concerned, be they bad habits, perversions, concepts, physical skills, etc." The advantage of this is that it enables us to consider separately both the objects of teaching (content) and the manner in terms of justification. The analysis of teaching presented here has similarly been in general terms, for, as already suggested, it seems particularly important that the value judgments should be separated from the problems of meaning.

Finally it is worth noting that the development of institutions such as schools, specifically concerned with teaching/learning
has led to the development of many derivative, or, as I prefer to call them, 'institutionalized' uses of 'teach' and 'learn' primarily associated with the giving or taking of courses or lessons and associated with pedagogy. For example, one commonly finds talk about a person who is learning French at school, but isn't learning any French, and a teacher who is teaching children French but they aren't learning it. It does not seem to me to be true to say that these uses are always equivalent to 'trying-to-learn' or 'trying-to-teach' respectively, for the giving or attending of French lessons may be a routine. It does not seem to me important to the understanding of the role of the teacher to consider these types of utterance in an analytic way, asking whether anything more than a mere attempt or even whether a mere attempt is involved. The point being made is that these senses must be derivative, and the attenuation of uses is shown by the fact that there is now a school sense of teach which involves no more than sitting in a classroom keeping an eye on a group of children. The sense of teaching equivalent to giving lessons is to be found in philosophical literature.  

It does not seem to me to be important to argue about whether or not a teacher can properly be said to be teaching the whole class when five children are not attending or when he believes that what he is doing is conceptually inappropriate for five of the children. Whether or not the situation is one which should be encouraged or discouraged does not turn on the language we use to describe it. Deciding that one cannot, logically, punish the innocent does not decide the question of whether or not pain should be inflicted on the innocent e.g. to deter rule-breaking. My interest here is to investigate what is necessary to the role of the teacher and what is contingent, and the kinds of justification which can be given for different aspects of the teacher's role, and it is claimed that for this we must examine the understanding of teaching which these institutions presuppose rather than the senses which have developed within them. For the latter may well embody the very assumptions which are up for question.  

It might be, however, that some stipulation is in order in this area. For example, we may be bewitched by our own language into believing, for example, that all primary school children are learning French (in the sense of acquiring skills and vocabulary for understanding the language and communicating with others in it)
because all are now learning French (attending French lessons). If we were becoming satisfied with schools and what was going on in them as a result of talking in this way, in my view this would be sufficient grounds for being prescriptive and suggesting that certain institutionalised uses of terms be abandoned.

Indeed, the original comments made by Scheffler on the Dewey analysis of teaching were made in the light of its use as a slogan, and Komisar points out that if teaching implied learning, the slogan "No Learning then No Teaching" could become a crisp rule of pedagogic language. The last thing I would support would be that if this analysis were accepted, it should be used as the basis of slogans of this kind. My point in presenting the analysis is more serious than this. Insofar as I am right in claiming that all our understanding of teaching (particularly our understanding of its institutionalised senses) presupposes an understanding of the concept of teaching which implies learning, then investigations into what is justifiable for teachers must be based on this sense and not on institutionalised senses which may embody assumptions which are up for question. If this point is accepted, then this in itself would be adequate justification for the lengthy attempt I have made to establish the entitlement of this analysis for serious consideration.

Conclusion

This section has examined in detail the various terms of art which have been suggested as giving an adequate account of teaching, and concluded that none of them are adequate for this purpose. Therefore the concept of a perficience was developed, and it was suggested that the schema 'perficienary attempt/perficienary transaction/ perficienary termination' was one which could fully account for our current concept of teaching B X. The advantages of this analysis were discussed, and the idea of teaching attempts explored. The centrality of teaching acts was emphasized, insofar as I suggest that we cannot claim satisfactorily that A has taught B X (or that he is teaching B X) until we can give some account of how this was (or is being) done.

My suggestion, at this stage, is that intention to bring about the learning of particular Xs by B is not a necessary condition of
A's teaching B that X in the central and fundamentally important (outcome) sense of teach. In the early stages of my consideration of problems in this area, I was of the view that it was useful to make a fairly sharp distinction between intentional and non-intentional teaching. In my original paper I distinguished three categories, as follows:

(a) non-intentional perficiences
(b) intentional perficiences (successful perficienary attempts)
(c) unsuccessful perficienary attempts

However, it now seems to me to contribute more to our understanding if we recognize that though this distinction may have its uses, there are often difficulties in deciding whether the action was intentional under that particular description or not. We use the term 'teaching' in discussing outcomes by applying it across a continuum of instances, ranging from those where the bringing about of the learning of tightly specified Xs is the primary concern of the agent, through cases where the intention to bring about learning exists but what is to be learned is formulated at a high level of generality, cases where it is of incidental concern though the agent is aware of the likely outcome of his acts, to cases where it is of no relevance in that the person of who teaching is predicated has not considered the possibility of bringing about that learning. There are also cases where an insistence on intention requires us to postulate unconscious intentions. At this stage the difficulties in respect of empirical investigation become extreme.

I also suggest that it is to miss the philosophical importance of discussions on teaching as an area within social philosophy to discuss at length whether or not a person is teaching, on Hirst's analysis, when they deliberately demonstrate the correct pronunciation of a word in front of a Frenchman with a poor accent with the intention of bringing it about that he learns to pronounce it correctly, although the Frenchman has no idea of this purpose and may not even be listening to his talking; or whether, on the analysis presented here, we would have to call it 'teaching' if a great many people sitting in a bus learned the practice of leaping off while the bus is in motion because I perform this act regularly on the 8:15 a.m. Both analyses have problems with such cases which no-one has previously considered calling teaching. Discussions on such cases, which was a primary focus when the paper on teaching just referred to was presented, seem to me to be
of little relevance in that, since both analyses have borderline cases of this kind where they conflict with language usage, the existence of such cases cannot provide a criterion for choosing between the analyses.

My claim is that our fundamental understanding of teaching arises from our standard predication of teaching of persons when we see that they are performing acts which are instrumental in the ways discussed in bringing about learning. We do this without consideration of whether or not their primary intention in performing those acts is that the specified others should learn those Xs. It is not, as Hirst suggests, that we have to provide some kind of special explanation of why we use the term 'teach' in cases where it is not the agent's intention to bring about learning. It is simply that these are instances of the standard case.

Secondly, I have shown that an understanding of this sense is logically required of anyone as a precondition of engaging in a teaching attempt. This analysis, on my view, should be preferred for these reasons alone. But, more importantly, on this view and on this view alone, is it a separate and controversial question as to how far the role of the teacher requires him to engage in teaching attempts directed towards highly specified Xs and how far he might be justified (e.g. by teaching his pupils a lot in the outcome sense) in having only generally ("fuzzily") formulated objectives. The question cannot be legislated out of existence by the assertion that teachers must teach and that teaching (logically) requires tightly specified rather than fuzzy intentions. It is my view that it is an empirical matter to determine whether the tight and clear specification of learning objectives helps or hinders teaching, and that this might vary from teacher to teacher, or even for the same teacher in respect of different content or different groups of pupils. This analysis thus opens up an area of empirical research which is excluded a priori by the activity analysis of teaching. Additionally, if it is concluded that the framing of low-level objectives is not demanded by the nature of teaching, then it is necessarily the case that the framing of behavioural objectives is not necessary. This may have important implications for policy making.
I will later argue in more detail that the only valid justification for making teaching attempts involving clearly specified low-level objectives rather than working in school with only general high-level aims can be that the former teach more or more valuable Xs than the latter. It seems at least possible that this is done in some instances by intentionally keeping aims "fuzzy" rather than by carefully thinking out at a low level what it is that one wants children to learn, for it may be that, for various reasons, the latter could militate against teaching for some people in some circumstances. This at least seems a matter worthy of empirical investigation. I do not believe I have misunderstood Hirst's article when I suggest that the possibility of testing this hypothesis, and claiming that teachers might fulfil their professional role better without clearly specifying low-level objectives does not exist on the understanding of teaching he presents. It is necessarily mistaken.\(^\text{[135]}\)

Finally it must be pointed out that the activity analysis necessarily leaves out of discussions of teaching the main concern of those who attack the institution of schooling through discussions of 'the hidden curriculum'. These discussions are couched in the language of teaching, and if philosophers of education are to show willingness to meet and answer the objections raised by deschoolers to schools, and to engage in discussions with them, we cannot do so by forcing them to change their language, or by analysing their problems out of existence. They are not philosophical problems which, as Wittgenstein suggests, may dissolve on analysis, but conflicts of persons and of values. It is clear that the activity analysis patently fails to provide a context in which fruitful discussions on the hidden curriculum can go on. For a 'hidden curriculum' is not a curriculum at all, in Hirst's sense of the term. The relationship between curriculum and teaching is, for him, conceptual, for, as he says\(^\text{[136]}\), "I see a curriculum arising only in a teaching situation, where a set of objectives is clearly specifiable."

The perficience analysis of teaching is such that someone who supports it has language for discussing the issues concerned with both Hirst and with the deschoolers.
The final section of this thesis asks questions about a justifiable role for teachers, and treats as problematic the specific intentionality which Hirst takes to be a necessary feature of school. He writes, "the greater the degree of specificity the better, and ... as tight a description of what is to be learned as is available." He describes discussions which focus on children's interests as 'unsatisfactory' because they "can be used to evade the detailed specification of what is being aimed at and even to suggest that specification is unnecessary or undesirable." I am not convinced that the tight specification of objectives is desirable, or that a greater degree of specificity is necessarily better than specifying to a lesser degree. This seems, at least, a point which it should be possible to question, but the activity analysis of teaching rules this out a priori if it is accepted that a teacher's responsibility is to teach in this sense. An alternative viable analysis is important for any serious consideration of these questions, and this new analysis, besides being important for the reasons already discussed, is the indispensable foundation of the rest of this thesis.

Notes and references for Section II

Introduction

Chapter 2


26. Ryle in Education and the Development of Reason, op. cit., p. 441
29. Hirst in The Philosophy of Education, op. cit.,
32. Ibid., p. 82.
39. Ibid., p. 16.
42. White J.P., "Indoctrination" in Proceedings of the Philosophy of
44. Ibid., p. 173.
48. See p. 37 of this thesis.
49. In discussion on several occasions
51. Scudder in Contemporary Thought on Teaching, op. cit.
52. Esland G. et al., in The Social Organisation of Teaching and Learning, Open University Press, 1972, define pedagogy as "the means by which a teacher seeks to communicate his subject matter to his pupil." Smith, in Concepts of Teaching, points to the useful distinction between the ways in which teaching is done and teaching itself. op. cit., p. 13.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 173.
56. In case it is objected here that we are concerned with the meaning of 'teach' in the proposition and not with the truth of the proposition, my point is that we are unable to say whether it is true or false unless we understand what it means, and this includes understanding the meaning of 'teach' in the utterance. If it is true, ex hypothesi, that A does not have the intention that C learns X and Hirst is right that we can only understand the use of 'teach' here because C is engaged in the activity of learning, the proposition could not be understood if this were not the case. Yet we not only understand it but judge it true or false when neither A nor C has any intention concerning learning.

Chapter 3
58. Ibid., p. 176.
60. Ibid., p. 144.
62. Ibid., footnote, p. 173.
63. For a discussion on the relationship between Kenny's categories and Aristotle's, the reader is referred to "States, Activities and Performances" between Potts T.C. and Taylor C.C.W., in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XXXIX, 1965, pp. 65-102. This is, however, not important in relation to this thesis.

64. Walton J., "Four Theories of Teaching" in Contemporary Thought on Teaching, op. cit., pp. 193-196.


66. Ibid., p. 145.

67. Ibid., p. 149.

68. Ibid.


71. Ibid., p. 166.


76. Ibid., p. 144.

77. Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 32.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., p. 33.


81. See pages 42 and 73 of this thesis.


84. White, The Philosophy of Action, op. cit., p. 3.

85. The term is used in the way employed by Kenny, Action Emotion and Will, op. cit., p. 189.


90. Austin in How to Do Things with Words, op. cit.
91. Ibid., p. 106.
92. Ibid., p. 125.
    Part 1, para. 269.
97. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, op. cit.
98. to do through doing, in contrast to 'through speaking'

Chapter 4.
102. The idea of 'uptake' is in the sense used by Austin in How to Do Things with Words. It is the precondition of a response.
103. Pincoffs in The Monist, op. cit., uses this term, but I am not using it in the same sense as he is, for what helps teaching attempts to succeed is co-operation, not competition.
106. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
107. Ibid., p. 66.
108. Ibid., p. 67.
112. Ibid.
115. Ibid., p. 16.
119. White in "Indoctrination" op. cit. p. 118.
120. Page 38 this thesis
121. I am taking it for granted that intention is, on Hirst's view, part of the meaning of teaching because, as I understand it, he holds a view of language in which understanding the conditions for the correct application of a concept is understanding its meaning. This is closely related to understanding the kinds of tests through which the truth of assertions is established.
indicate he thinks mainly of teaching propositions. The Oxford English Dictionary also offers 'instruction' as a definition.


132. e.g. Pincoffs in The Monist, op. cit. p. 122.


135. Hirst P.H., "Curriculum Integration", in Knowledge and the Curriculum, op. cit., p. 132.

136. Hirst in Knowledge and the Curriculum, op. cit., p. 16.
CHAPTER 5: The Concept of Role

Introduction

A great deal of the work in sociology and social psychology devoted to role, and in particular to the role of the teacher, seems contradictory and confusing. There is reference to role expectations, role set, role conflict, role playing, role distance, role selection, achieved and ascribed roles, role performance, role enactment, role distance - and many more. The first question which arises, then, is whether the same concept of role is being used throughout.

Different writers certainly define their terms in ways which are inconsistent with one another. For example, as Banton¹ has already pointed out, what Linton² and Newcomb³ define as a role, Davis⁴ calls a status. For Linton, however, the 'status' was a model for organizing the attitudes and behaviour of the individual, and the 'role' represented the dynamic aspects of this status. Again, what Davis⁵ defines as a role, Newcomb⁶ calls role behaviour, and Sarbin⁷ role enactment. There is a decision to be taken here. Are we to say that there are several concepts of role used by sociologists, or that there is one concept for which different writers use different terminology - i.e. that they speak different languages. In spite of the difficulties involved, I shall take the latter position, and the reader must remember this.

Levinson⁸ has suggested that there are three different senses in which the term 'role' has been used by different writers, or by the same writer on different occasions. Firstly, he suggests, role may be defined or understood as the structurally given demands (norms, expectations, responsibilities and the like) associated with a given social position (or, since there is no agreed terminology here, one could equally say status). In this sense, a role is something outside any given individual - a set of pressures and facilitations that channel, guide, impede and support his functioning. These, says Levinson, may be more precisely called role expectations or role set.
Secondly, according to Levinson, role may be understood as the member's own orientation or conception of the part he is to play in the organization (or institution) - that is, his inner definition of what someone in his social position is supposed to do or think about it. This, Levinson suggests, can be called role conception, which, since it seems to refer to particular individuals, seems to me to be a psychological concept whereas the first sense seems clearly sociological. This sense is what Banton calls role cognition.

Finally, according to Levinson, role is commonly defined as the action of the individual member. In this sense, role refers to the ways in which individual occupants of the position actually act, and here Levinson suggests the consistent use of the term role performance. Perhaps because it was not of any concern to him - his aim seemingly being to urge consistency in usage among sociologists - he has begged here a number of important questions.

For example, if a person is to be guided (or as Levinson put it, impeded or supported) by his role set, what description do we apply if it is part of his role set both to do and not to do X? This simply means that people have conflicting expectations, and, given the definition of role set, is logically possible for any role, and, in the case of teachers, is empirically most likely. Does a person's role conception include expectations about his role partners' actions towards him in standard role situations? If so, then one cannot define role conception simply in terms of one's own role. But if not, then mustn't he necessarily have an infinite role conception, since he will have to have an 'inner definition' of what someone in his social position is supposed to do in an infinite number of possible role situations. Or, to take a different kind of example, one might wonder whether the expectations of Xs themselves about the role of an X have a different logical status in a role set from the expectations of other groups.

The references to action rather than behaviour suggest that whether or not a person is conforming to expectations is not a matter for merely 'behavioural' observation. But it is not clear whether Levinson interprets the term 'action' as including the kinds of description the agent himself would be prepared to give of what he is doing, or whether he believes that, in a given context, there can
be no disagreement about what an individual's actions are.

Further questions which might be raised are ones concerning the relationship between these three different senses of role. And - in connection with role performance which Levinson defines as referring to the ways in which members of a position act - there is the question of how many members must act in any particular way for it to be a non-idiosyncratic role performance. Finally (with no suggestion that the difficulties are anywhere near exhausted) questions must be asked about the justification of roles and of the obligations and expectations which different people ascribe to them. The analysis offered by Levinson may help sociologists reach some terminological agreement, but it takes no account of the questions which one might ask about role which are not sociological questions. The analysis he presents seems far too crude to allow this.

The inconsistency in usage, the over-simplicity of previous analyses and the impossibility of using them to ask important philosophical questions constitute, in themselves, sufficient reason for a new attempt at analysis. There is, however, particular urgency in respect of the fact that Colleges and Departments of Education are supposed to prepare teachers to fill a role in society. It is surely important to examine that role and ensure that it is a justifiable one. Since the teacher's role set is a set of conflicting expectations - one group expecting teachers to do X and another expecting them not to do X - a role set is, by its very nature, not something that can be justified.

Furthermore, it may be that it is through sociological writings that intending teachers learn their role conception. The work of social psychologists and sociologists on role is claimed to be purely descriptive and, insofar as it is accepted that this can be the case, value-free. Writers do not examine the justifications for the different aspects of roles which they describe, though they sometimes allow themselves a value comment. The examination of justifications, however, is a philosophical, not a sociological enquiry, and as far as I can see, philosophical writing on the role of the teacher is fairly limited. Thus, if the writings of sociologists and
on the role of the teacher (such as "The Role of the Teacher" by Hoyle\textsuperscript{11}) are the full extent of a student teacher's work in this area, it would not be surprising if he took it as not merely descriptive, but also as prescriptive, no matter what the intention of the authors\textsuperscript{12}. Thus the writings of social scientists would teach intending teachers, at least in part, their conceptions of their own future roles, conceptions which may then be the subject of further empirical investigation. Not only is the uncritical acceptance of descriptive writings as prescriptive undesirable, but, in this case, perhaps it also acts as a sociological self-fulfilling prophecy.

This chapter offers an analysis of the concepts of role as a necessary preliminary to the further task, undertaken in Section III, of examining the kinds of justification which can be offered for various aspects of the teacher's role, and their adequacy, with particular attention to conceptual demands. Because of the suggestion of de-schoolers such as Reimer\textsuperscript{13} and Illich\textsuperscript{14} that schools are pernicious institutions (and thus that the role of the teacher in a school is a pernicious role) there is a discussion on role and the Naturalistic Fallacy.

Concepts of role - a new analysis

This section looks at the different senses which can be distinguished of the term 'role' (and thus implies different meanings for role set, role conception etc.). It takes as its starting point the analysis of R.S. Downie\textsuperscript{15}, but claims to be an improvement on Downie's in that it makes an important distinction between the sense which is the legitimate interest of the legal theorist and the sense which is the legitimate interest of the philosopher alone, in that questions related to it are questions in moral, social and political philosophy (not in that only professional philosophers may be interested in them).

Sense (1) - Theatrical

Setting aside for the moment Downie's first sense of role as a
mere class concept, the original use of the term 'role' as a part in a play may be distinguished. Parts in plays are, of course, still called roles. When roles in plays were all stereotypes, the audience had standard expectations about the ways in which characters would behave, and although roles in plays are not now stereotypes in the same way, they can still only be understood in terms of expectations. When the plays are particularly well-known to the audience, the audience shares the expectations each actor has of what other actors will do. But, importantly, even when the audience has not expectations, "from the inside" (that is, from the point of view of other actors) this is the only way in which roles can be understood, including each actor's own. It must be assumed that they, and other actors, will behave in ways related (to variable extents) to a script or rehearsal pattern. Extreme deviations by any one actor would make it is some degree impossible for anyone else to fill his role in the agreed manner. This is true even of improvised drama, where no sense could be made of what is going on unless those participating characterized themselves in some way.

This suggests that the relation between role and expectations is conceptual rather than contingent. We would be unable to understand what a role would be apart from understanding its relationship with other roles and expectations, rigid or diffuse, of how those in other roles will or should act or behave.

It is interesting to note that this sense is being brought closer to other senses the more one tends to look upon life as the acting out of social "plays" (as, for example, does Goffman) and thinks of those who enact roles as "actors" rather than as "agents". The rather closer relationship between this sense and the use of the term 'role' by symbolic interactionists (as opposed to functionalists or social phenomenologists) will be referred to again later.

Sense (2) – Descriptive Expectations

This sense of the term is an ordinary language usage, though, of course, discussions involving the concept may not employ the "short-hand" term 'role'. The more technical use of the term in this sense was its use by social anthropologists with reference to primitive societies.
where certain patterns of behaviour were ritualized. However, it can also be used with reference to similarly ritualized patterns of behaviour in our own society. To take an out-of-school example, even a non-religious person would be just as astonished to learn of a sermon given in a Christian church in which agape love and the Good Samaritan were condemned as the actor playing Polonius would be if Hamlet killed his uncle in the first few moments of the play.

This use of the concept of role by social scientists to indicate expected (anticipated) patterns of behaviour is identical with one of its uses in the public language. A description of what it is to be a hospital doctor can be given (and whether the term 'role' is used seems to me to be irrelevant since the concept can be employed without a single-term connotation) in terms of a description of what one would expect to find, in the sense of directly observable (though not unconceptualized) features of the hospital doctor, such as asking about one's pains, possibly wearing a white coat, carrying a stethoscope, etc. A person whose expectations include these must (logically) feel surprise if they are missing. This indicates that the point of role expectations for a person is to enable him to predict roughly what a role filler will do. This enables him to prepare himself for what is to happen, and thus to experience, in general, what occurs as mediated through that set of expectations which functions as a conceptual framework in respect of the social world. Of course, if his expectations are not fulfilled, he may conclude either that his expectations were mistaken, or that this doctor, for example, was not behaving appropriately. It seems a contingent fact that most people, on the first occasion of having their expectations unmet, will think the latter.

This second sense of role I call the sense of descriptive expectations. In principle this could include attributes; for example, it might be expected that hospital doctors be friendly or impersonal, patient or brusque, etc. The term "descriptive" is used to imply the absence of evaluation. This is just the way (it is believed that) things are.

In this sense, all jobs are necessarily roles, whether paid or
not, including their temporary assumption e.g. in a commune, though, of course, not all roles are jobs. The point being emphasized here is that because the unfulfilled expectations are logically associated with surprise, the relation of role with expectations is again a conceptual one. I suggest that such a conception is necessary to social life, if by social life is meant some understanding of social activity that avoids treating each situation as entirely new. The latter is something which may not be simply empirically impossible but logically impossible because one cannot conceive of or experience a situation without the use of class concepts which pick out similarities to other experiences and situations.

Downie stigmatizes social scientists for using a concept of role which he describes as "merely a class concept". This use is included in my sense of role as descriptive expectations, and it should be clear that I believe Downie's dismissal of this use as being uninformative to be somewhat hasty. Downie claims that to say a person has a role in this broad sense (e.g. of opera fan) adds nothing by way of description or explanation. However, this does not seem to be correct. To tell us that a person has certain aims by virtue of which he is a football or opera fan is to classify him (for those who understand what football or opera is), but yet tells us nothing about the ways in which he can be expected to behave. Aims may be identical across cultures or sub-cultures, whilst behaviour expected within different cultures or sub-cultures may be quite different. Opera fans, presumably, have similar aims in Italy and in Britain, but the description of the role of an opera fan is not necessarily the same simply because of this. To say that someone is an opera fan tells us nothing about whether we can expect him to react throughout the opera with enthusiastic shouting, or to be quietly contained during the performance, with applause (and perhaps a small amount of verbal applause) confined, in general, to the ends of the acts. Thus I argue that the role description, in this sense of descriptive expectations, does tell us more than the class concept alone, especially if the latter is understood, as Downie suggests, in terms of aims. Talk of the social role of 'old man' (and this is done with reference to a social context) or 'father', by implication suggests much more than the biological class concept which it presupposes.
However, even this apparently simple concept involves many difficulties. When any individual gives his account of a role (e.g. hospital doctor) in the sense of descriptive expectations, by explaining what behaviour he anticipates in a hospital doctor, and, perhaps, the expected attributes of a doctor, he can be seen by a social scientist as giving his personal expectations. The problem arises in respect of what is to be said if such a person's expectations are completely at variance with the consensus of opinion of any group to which he might belong. Because of the way in which the term 'role' has been defined (as discussed in the introduction), several possible descriptions of him can be given.

It could be said, for example, that his account of the role is "incorrect", which assumes that a "correct" account of the role can be given as the sum of the expectations held of it in the society without including him. But how does one justify excluding him? Or it could be said, without implying any evaluation, simply that he was a "deviant" from his group(s). But what is to be said if his description is consensual with that of the majority of one group to which he belongs but deviant from another? Of course, his description can be both correct from one perspective and incorrect from another, but what could be meant by saying that he is both correct and incorrect, or that he is both deviant and non-deviant? Perhaps he could be said to have given a description which is incomplete rather than incorrect. But the difficulty with this is that it would follow that in that case it could be that there are roles which nobody in the society can give a full account of. This would be the case if it were a part of an Xs role set both to do Z and not-Z, and the member must have one belief or the other about what Xs will do. This puts the observer in a privileged position.

It must be remembered that the role set is not an account of what Xs actually do. A role is not investigated by finding out by observation whether or not most or all incumbents of the role do Z. This again indicates that the relationship between role and expectations is conceptual. The relationship between practices and expectations is contingent. If the expectations change, the
role is necessarily changed. But the relationship between expectations and practices is such that there can be a change in expectations followed by a change in practices, a change in practices followed by a change in expectations, or a change in one without any change in the other (leading to increased incongruity which will necessarily alter the amount of surprise felt). The relationship between role set and role performance (what people actually do in fulfilling a role) is thus shown to be a contingent one.

Role performance and role enactment are thus derivative concepts for they presuppose a sense of role involving expectations. It could be argued that we could not have a concept of role involving expectations without a prior understanding of what it would be for individuals actually to enact roles. But one could only look at what a particular individual was doing as role enactment if one had a set of expectations about what he would do as a role-filler. For otherwise it would be impossible to differentiate what he was doing as a role-filler from behaviour which was personal. Furthermore, a role may be conceptualized in advance of anyone's actually performing it, so that there has been no role enactment. In the absence of such conceptualization and expectations, there is no role to be enacted. As Levinson suggested, the term 'role' is sometimes used as an abbreviation of 'role enactment', but it could also be that the use indicated a failure to differentiate between expectations and practices because they happened to be congruent. What is required for understanding this sense of role is the grasping of the features of (for this sense) behaviour which are picked out as common to all/most individuals enacting a role regardless of who they are.

It can immediately be objected that some roles could not be defined in terms of any shared behaviour, since there may be no "bit of behaviour" which is either necessary and/or sufficient for filling the role. Perhaps it might be possible here to speak of 'family resemblances', though this is difficult to imagine. Other roles (e.g. ticket collector) may be capable of being more tightly delineated, perhaps even in terms of necessary and sufficient behaviours. The difference that it makes to abandon this positivist conception and discuss all this in terms of actions rather than
behaviour will be discussed in the next section.

This sense of role seems to be that defined by Newcomb as follows: "The ways of behaving which are expected of any individual who occupies a certain position constitute the role associated with that position." He fails to appreciate the distinction between expectations and practices to which I just referred, which is of importance since it assumes the possibility that people may not do what is expected of them. This is indicated by his further comment that "it refers to the behaviour of the occupants of a position - not to all their behaviour, as persons, but to what they do as occupants of the position." But the question is how one is to know, from an "externalist" position such as Newcomb's (or any social scientist or observer), whether a given 'bit' of behaviour is done by the individual as an occupant of a position or, as Newcomb put it, "as a person". This surely cannot be known by observation of the behaviour.

However, the definition is defective in another way, in that it does not specify whose expectations are to count. This might be interpreted as presupposing consensus among the whole of the community, as may the definition of Havighurst and Neugarten, who similarly say, "A role is a coherent pattern of behaviour common to all persons who fill the same position or place in society, and a pattern of behaviour expected by other members of society." Gross and his associates discuss the problems of consensus in detail, and other sociologists have commented on the fact that different groups in a society may have different sets of expectations. This led Merton to suggest the notion of role set, already referred to, to relate the status or position to the expectations of each of the other groups "with whom the incumbent of the status has to deal."

Dividing the whole society into sets of groups and considering the expectations of each group does nothing to overcome the logical possibility of lack of consensus (complete agreement). However a group is defined, it is possible that there will be no consensus within it - unless it is defined by such consensus, in which case the whole idea involves a vicious circularity. Thus there is the problem of explaining what is to count as consensus - majority opinion, 75% of respondents, etc., with the burden of justifying the dividing
line, or showing that it is not merely arbitrary. Additionally, such ways of proceeding involve what might be called "the aggregative fallacy", arising because of the possibility that many persons (if not all) are members of more than one group. As already pointed out, any individual's expectations may be at variance with e.g. majority opinion in one or more of his groups, but not of others. Therefore they will, at the same time, be used both to determine what is to be counted as the expectations of one set of people and to oppose what is to count as the expectations of another set.

Finally, any social scientist who wants to do work of this kind is faced with the problem of providing non-arbitrary criteria for his choice of group. For example, if he is examining parents' expectations of the teacher's role behaviours, he will need to justify sub-grouping parents further into groups of one kind rather than another - e.g. by social class rather than the age of their children, their own schooling, the Authoritarianism scale, their political leanings, their religion, their interest in their children's education, the size of their families etc. Presumably he does this to suit the kinds of question he wants to answer, by reference, in fact, to his research interests. His data is thus collected to answer specific questions or kinds of questions, and cannot be used outside this work range.

Of course, it is interesting for teachers to know what other people expect of them, but questions can be asked about whether it is right to teach College of Education students about this sort of research if it is known (and this is a contingent matter) that this has a general influence on what Levinson called their 'role conception'. For, even in a democracy, it does not follow that because groups of persons (divided, somewhat arbitrarily, to suit a researcher's interests) have certain expectations, those expectations are necessarily justifiable. Since the justifiability of the expectations is never discussed, the implicit assumption is that they are justified.

The limited nature of the data and the aggregative fallacy were perhaps not noted because early studies utilizing the concept of role concerned themselves primarily with societies in which, as a contingent matter, there was little difference between expectations of what role incumbents would do and what they actually did, and also between the expectations of such different groups as were identified
about what behaviours constituted a role. But in a pluralist society, though it may be the case that there is consensus, the fact that there is no necessity becomes important if the data is not being treated as simply interesting to know, but is being used as the basis for recommending action.

There is finally the difficulty that measurements, about the techniques of which and the statistical methods involved there is often controversy, are made at a given time, and may be invalid only a short time later as people's expectations change.

Role set, as can be seen, has been presented as an objectively determined set of sets of expectations. What it is difficult to understand, however, is the claim which is implied by much of the work of symbolic interactionists that this concept has explanatory force. Firstly, there is the moral question as to how far a person filling the role of an X should act on the basis of the expectations which others have of his role. There could be no explanatory force if role incumbents did not feel that this was what they ought to do. Secondly there is the logical point that even if all role-fillers accepted that this was what they ought to do, they cannot act on the basis of these actual expectations. Each role-filler must act on the basis of his own beliefs (which may be wrong) about the expectations others have of him.

The principal difficulty with a concept of role which defines it in terms of behaviour is that it seems to bear little relationship with coming to understand from "the inside" what it is to be an X - such features as the way the agents view the behaviour (i.e. what the actions are), the purposes of role incumbents insofar as they are associated with the role, the part incumbents see themselves as fulfilling in the larger community, or even within a limited institution. It offers merely ways of recognizing individuals as Xs (for example, being able to tell that a woman is married by the way she wears her hair), of enabling people to "play the role of" an X, or to be counterfeit Xs. This is of importance if "role-playing" is suggested as having educational value in schools, for role-playing on this conception of role could have no educative value. Students have recounted how children asked to play the role of the
school caretaker just rush around shouting. They obviously have this behaviouristic conception of role.

The adoption of behaviour which others are believed to have assigned, so that an individual may see himself as nothing but what his label says he is, is Sartre's "mauvaise foi". Downie, commenting on this, suggests that we could speak of "playing the role of the X" in the case of a person behaving as he thinks an ideal X would act, and that this could be a morally good thing to do and not necessarily involve any kind of insincerity. But Downie, though correct in suggesting that it might not involve any kind of insincerity to act as one thought an ideal X would act, would be clearly mistaken if he were thinking that one could have a concept of an ideal X merely in terms of external behaviour. (He is probably not thinking this, because he speaks of actions rather than behaviour.) Unless you could relate the behaviour to something beyond itself, you would, logically, be unable to find criteria for formulating an ideal in Downie's sense. The idea of an ideal X, therefore, cannot be related to this behavioural sense of role but must rather be related to a further sense.

Some sociologists also see role as an ideal pattern of conduct which actual behaviour never quite fulfils (though this is surely a different sense of 'ideal'). Newcomb uses the term 'role behaviour' to refer to the way in which particular people translate their ideals of a role into behaviour. Banton, however, talks instead about translating roles into action. If he is using the term 'action' in the usual philosopher's sense, his discussion would not fall, without qualification, under this sense of role, in terms of behaviour, since people's actions are incomprehensible without some reference to the way in which they see what they are doing, and perhaps to their aims and purposes.

For conceptual clarity, therefore, the sense of role as descriptive expectations must be subdivided into a sense (2a) in terms of action, which takes account of how the agent sees what he is doing, and one in terms of behaviour, which does not. In the first sense (2a), it is impossible for a person who is acting in a role to be unaware of it. This raises the first difficulty for a sociologist who employs this concept, for it is possible for an
observer such as himself to be mistaken. This is presumably why there was, for such a long time, attempts to avoid a concept based on action. The second difficulty is that even when there is no disagreement about expectations, there may be disagreement on what counts as fulfilling them. For example, a teacher, the pupils and a group of observers may all be agreed that a teacher will speak firmly to his class. Where they may be in disagreement is on what is to count as "speaking firmly". Thus a teacher may act in accordance with the expectations everyone has of his role, yet at the same time live up to the expectations of one group whilst failing to meet the expectations of others even when the expectations are the same.

Finally there is the problem for functionalist sociologists that the spelling out of role in terms of actions necessarily blurs the distinction between role and function made by some\(^{34}\), where function refers specifically to the consequences of what is done. This relates to some of the discussions of Chapter 3, in that there may be a number of correct descriptions of an action, some of which may encompass consequences through several stages of a causal chain. Thus there are the usual problems in saying where the act can rightly be said to end and the consequences begin. It is these sorts of difficulties which have tended to push positivist sociologists towards the conceptualization of roles in terms of observable behaviour, in preference to a concept based on actions. This sense (2b) is the one discussed in detail, and the advantages, such functionalists believed, was that all consequences could be described in functional terms.

For functionalist sociologists, using this sense of descriptive expectations, it follows that a person with a given role may be unaware that he has it, with consequent methodological difficulties for those who stress the explanatory value of the concept. Perhaps the most usual example is the reference to "the role of the criminal in a society as a unifying force for that society"\(^{35}\), where the unintended (from the criminals' point of view) consequences were stressed. Again, this usage blurs the distinction between role and function, here seeing the function as part of the role. Merton refers\(^{36}\) to this as "latent consequences", though, as Ryan\(^{37}\) has pointed out, Merton's use of the terms 'latent' and 'manifest' merely
offers simplified language for expressing the distinction between intended and unintended, recognized and unrecognized, useful consequences and adds little.

Here it seems important to point out that this may be either a question of different values (what the consequences are useful for) or of looking from different perspectives, since something can be functional for one part of a system, whilst being disfunctional for another. Institutions as well as people are described as filling roles in this sense, an example being attempts to understand and explain schools as agents of social mobility or of selection, whilst accepting that teachers (actual agents) are possibly unaware of this role the institution had. The theoretical difficulties of a position which takes no account of the way the agent views what he is doing has been discussed at length by many philosophers, among them Winch and Ryan, and cannot be developed further here.

The main point to be stressed about this sense of role, whether one is talking about role set, role cognition or role performance, is that it is not invested with normative overtones in any evaluative sense, no implication that the aspects discussed are either desirable or undesirable. The account is an account of the way the world is expected to be.

**Sense (3) Normative expectations**

The sense of role discussed above can be conceptually distinguished from a third sense by contrasting the surprise which is the logical accompaniment of failure to fulfil role expectations in the descriptive sense with the kind of failure which is associated with moral indignation. It is clear that there is no conceptual relationship between expectations of a descriptive kind and those of a normative kind, since there is no contradiction involved in my saying that an X ought to do P, but I don't expect Xs to do it. The distinction, then, is between expectations about what Xs are likely to do and expectations about what Xs ought to do. (Presumably the degree of congruence here would also be a matter for empirical investigation.) Banton quite explicitly distinguishes between expectations and norms as two
different senses of role; the point of calling them normative expectations is to emphasize that norms are expectations, though not simply expectations of behaviour. I wish to emphasize that expectations about what incumbents will do and about what they ought to do may be contrasted with one another. This can be so even when actions are referred to, since the agent's way of viewing what he does, and his aims and purposes, have no necessary relationship with what he sees his obligations to be. To assume this is to assume that everyone's every action is moral. This is why there may be role cognitions in both senses.

In addition, both descriptive and normative expectations can be contrasted with doings. Thus one might believe that Xs ought to do P, as well as believing that most Xs will not do P (that is, that Xs tend not to do P, or even to do not-P), and be wrong on either or both counts. For example, group A may be agreed that infant school teachers ought not to rush away from their classrooms at the end of the day, but also be agreed that most teachers are likely to do so. It may, on the other hand, be the case that infant school teachers do not see it as part of their obligation to remain in school after 3:30 p.m., but in fact do so simply because they have things to do which prevent them from leaving at that time.

Downie claims\(^2\) that the descriptive sense of role is "the sociologists' sense" and makes the distinction between descriptions and norms his criterion for calling the third sense distinguished here "the point of view of the political and legal theorist". It is not clear whether he intends to be prescriptive, but, if so, his prescription is unjustified. Many sociological studies (e.g., Gross's study of school superintendents\(^3\)) are on normative rather than descriptive aspects of role. This seems quite proper, since the moral beliefs of individuals and groups at any particular time about what role incumbents ought to do constitute an 'is' which is open to empirical enquiries of different sorts - sociological, psychological, historical, etc.

It has already been pointed out that the distinction can be seen to be a valid one as there is no logical inconsistency in an empirical claim that a given group (including possibly As themselves)
hold both the descriptive expectation that As will do X and the
normative expectation that As ought not to do X, cynically believing
that most As will not fulfil their obligations. Also, since both
senses can include attributes, there is no contradiction involved in
e.g. believing that doctors ought to be intelligent, patient and
competent, but that most doctors will turn out not to be so.

Gross 44 suggests a distinction within the normative concept
of role which is of interest, between obligations seen as mandatory
and those seen as discretionary. Here the existence of a legal
requirement that incumbents do X usually provides the grounds for
the obligation's being seen as mandatory, but this is clearly not
necessary. Incumbents (and others) may not see the legal requirements
as mandatory, and mandatory requirements need not be restricted to
those prescribed by law. Indeed, many roles have no obligations
prescribed by law, but merely by custom, or agreed rules within a
group. These points must all count against Downie's suggestion that
this can be considered the sense of the legal theorist, whilst the
sociologist is restricted to discussing the descriptive aspects of
roles. All that can be said is that, insofar as legal theorists
are interested in roles, it must be in this sense that their interest
lies.

It therefore seems more helpful to view this sense of role as
being defined by the criterion of norms in general as expectations,
rather than as the sense of the legal theorist, since it is wider than
any sense of the legal theorist and is of concern to anyone who is
interested in normative states of affairs, be they legal theorist,
sociologist, psychologist or historian, etc. Similarly, I suggest
that there is no one sense which can be "assigned" to social scientists,
who, as we have seen, may employ a descriptive interpretation, a
normative interpretation or, like Goffman, lean towards the "drama-
turgical" sense. Much of Goffman's writing seems to see life as
a theatre with roughly scripted parts, so that the sense in which
he uses the term is nearer to the sense which I have called "theatrical".

My positive thesis here is that the difference of the interest
of the social philosopher from the interest of the sociologist does
not lie in the "fact" (if it were the case, which I have indicated
ought to be the obligation, this is not necessarily so, and a person is not contradicting himself if he accepts that it is at the moment part of the role of an X (in sense (3)) to Z but denies that it is a part of the role (i.e. that which can be justified). There clearly must be a further sense of role which Downie has failed to distinguish.

Sense (4) - Evaluative:

It has been stressed already that the accepted obligations (legal, social, etc.) or claimed obligations within a society for a particular role themselves constitute an 'is' which is always open to further evaluation in moral terms, and whose possible justifications can be examined critically by social philosophers among others (though, of course, not by those who hold extreme relativist positions in ethics). Both phenomenological sociologists and philosophers examine assumptions, but the examination of the validity of the arguments and presuppositions, and of their logical status is a philosophical enterprise (whoever does it). The sociological enterprise seems rather to be concerned with how it has come about that certain groups of people hold these particular assumptions. Though the subject matter of the sociologists and philosophers may appear to be the same, the sorts of investigations carried out by philosophers and social scientists are not identical (though, of course, some sociologists may additionally carry out philosophical investigations of their own concepts). That is, I am arguing that there is an epistemological demarcation, though from a 'professional' point of view there may be none.

To put the point another way, the term 'role' may be used by a person who recognizes existing normative expectations to discuss, not obligations and expectations which are given, but a view of obligations and expectations which ought to be given, or to see how far existing roles conform to an ideal or proper conception of them. This idea of an ideal is not to be identified with Downie's reference to an ideal (already mentioned), since for him this constitutes a refinement and perfection of an existing 'is' (the normative expectations) which is accepted. In contrast, this fourth conception of role is one which often criticizes such an ideal, and possibly uses the term 'role' in an attempt to re-define what is to be normatively accepted. Such
is open to doubt) that one examines norms and the other behaviour. It lies rather in the nature of the problems which concern them. The sociologist concerned with norms is, presumably, interested in relating them to other empirical factors in society — power structures, educational institutions, family patterns — with a further concern, in some cases, for formulating general laws and/or finding correlations and causal relationships.

The concern of the social and moral philosopher with these norms, however, is different. He would be concerned to understand the nature of the normative claims, the meanings involved in the concepts being employed at a particular time. Secondly, and this is the point of this analysis as far as this thesis goes, social philosophers may be concerned with the justifications of norms (that is, the justifications offered for the social practices which are normatively part of the role). There is a clear distinction, I believe, between the interest of the social philosopher and the empirical researcher. For it does not follow from the fact that people have certain normative expectations that these expectations are justifiable.

I therefore suggest that there must be a fourth sense of role which is clearly not the province of the sociologist as long as he claims (rightly or wrongly) to be engaged in non-evaluative work. It might be immediately be objected that I have not shown the need for a further sense of role, but simply that Downie is mistaken in suggesting that the different senses form the subject matter for particular interest groups. My claim that there is a further sense of role, however, does not derive from such a premise. It derives from the possibility which is open to philosophers but not to any empirical workers to consider hypothetical roles, ideals and the justifications of practices which are not yet engaged in, and to delineate a role for an X which is not normatively accepted (e.g. in that certain obligations are denied). Thus, for example, it might be claimed that it is not part of the role of an X to Z, not in the descriptive sense (Xs can be expected to Z), not in the normative sense (it is an obligation of Xs to Z), but in a further sense (which I shall call the evaluative sense) in which the claim means that it ought to be an obligation of Xs to Z. Though there may be congruity for an evaluator between what is the obligation and what (he argues)
discussions could, in fact, alter either or both the normative and
descriptive aspects of the role set, role filler's cognitions and
role performances. Indeed, social psychologists and sociologists
might well empirically investigate the claim that discussions using
this sense of role account, in part, for changes in social roles
over periods of time.

For example, a few years ago it could have been said, correctly,
in both descriptive and normative senses, that it was part of the
teacher's role to supervise school dinners. The claim that the N.U.T.
made - that "it was not part of the teacher's role" - was a claim that
it was not a proper part. They were not suggesting that the legal
obligation and the expectations held by the community that teachers
would supervise school dinners did not exist, but rather that they
were not justifiable. Thus, in principle, similar claims could be
made about the other aspects of the teacher's role as discussed in
books like Hoyle's 46 - that is, that it is no proper part of the
teacher's role (that is, that it is not the teacher's role (4)) to
be e.g. policeman, judge, detective, friend, therapist, agent of
selection for society, etc. Such claims are now being made in
respect of examinations, when it suggested that it is not the role
of the school to provide employers with selection procedures in
the form of examination results, and that therefore they should have
to develop their own forms of examination or aptitude tests in order
to free the schools from the pressures of examinations. In the
general introduction I explained that the aspects of the teacher's
role which were to be examined in this thesis were those which were
coming under challenge in this way.

These examples seem to me quite sufficient to substantiate the
claim that the fourth sense of 'role' which I distinguished analytically
is clearly understood and used in our language, and that it is not to
be identified with any of the other three senses, in particular sense
(3). Sense (4) is thus the primary sense in which the social
philosopher is interested, and his interest in sense (3) is instrumental
to consideration of sense (4).

There is, however, a sense in which role (4) is parasitic on
role (3), though not, perhaps, in the more usual sense of parasitic.
It is more in the way in which the concept of ought might be argued to be parasitic on the concept of is. That is, unless one could distinguish between what is and what might be, unless one could imagine what it would be like for things to be otherwise than what they are, one could not have the concept of an ideal, or certain conceptions of ought. Thus, in general, one could not consider the justifiability of a social role without having already the normative concept of role which I have called sense (3).

To speak of role (4), then, is to suggest that certain expectations which might be held of the role are justifiable and others unjustifiable (where the might neither implies that they are held by anyone nor that they are not). Thus, on the argument of Chapter 1, the drawing of a conclusion about the justifiability of some aspect of a role is to imply the prescription that the community ought to hold such expectations. The sense in which they 'ought' would vary. Some aspects of the role (4) of an X might be shown to be in some way necessary to the role, and these would thus be aspects which (logically) ought to be institutionalized as role obligations. Other aspects of the role might be shown to be justifiable on moral grounds, and, except for the moral subjectivist, would suggest that people ought (morally) to hold such expectations. Again, some might be argued to be permissible, whereas others might be argued to be obligatory.

It should be pointed out that a discussion which showed that certain aspects of a role were logically (conceptually) demanded would not, if accepted, necessarily end disagreement over a role as actually instantiated in the social life of a community. For the discussion will necessarily be at a high order of generality. But it must be more than formal, for if it were merely formal, there would be no limit on the ways in which it might be translated into practice given appropriate beliefs. If there was no disagreement in respect of empirical beliefs, claims about role (4) would have to have substantive implications to be of interest, for if this were not so, any existing role (3) would be justifiable, and the distinction between role (3) and role (4) would collapse.

A philosopher can approach the question of the justification of different aspects of particular social roles in two different ways.
Firstly, he can take an account of the norms which are held by groups about the existing role and examine the possible justifications for each aspect in turn. Alternatively, he can make assumptions about what would justify the institution (e.g. the legal system, the State school system, the nuclear family) within which the role is located (that is, give an account of the role of the institution) and see which aspects follow necessarily from those assumptions and an analysis, and which are merely contingent. Only for contingent aspects can the case for abolition or retention be argued. For necessary aspects, the only discussion possible is about the ways in which they can justifiably be instantiated.

It may be that the second of these two approaches will suggest that certain Zs (responsibilities, rights, intentions, attributes, or whatever) are, given those assumptions, inescapably part of the role. Here the claim would be that they are conceptually demanded. If the arguments are accepted as valid, it would be self-contradictory for a person to accept the assumptions and deny that Z was part of the role of an X, even if Z is not a part of the role.

This clearly indicates the validity of the suggestion that there is a fourth, evaluative sense of role. For it is an empirical possibility that Z is not a part of the role of an X at the time of the discussion simply because people have failed to spell out the implications of their own assumptions. This thesis thus concentrates on the role of the teacher, using the second approach to justification outlined above.

Role re-definition

Some writings on role - discussions of the normative aspects of a role - suggest that there are only two options open - that, in principle, roles must be either accepted or rejected. Downie, for example, specifically asserts this. He writes, "A man may reject or accept the social role of son, though the biological role is thrust upon him." It seems to me to be stretching the concept of role untenably to speak of the biological role of son, since, in biological terms, 'son' seems to indicate a relationship only - that
one is the male offspring of a particular male and/or female. To speak of the biological role of son adds nothing, and if, as suggested here, we understand the concept of role in terms of expectations, confuses the issue.

I argue that Downie is mistaken in suggesting that there are only these two options, but he is not alone in this view. Ruddock discusses the case of a teacher who was asked to teach 19th century history, of which she knew little, saying, "In fact, she declared her position openly to them and invited them all to help her, to help each other and to help themselves. They responded strongly, and the results were very good." The significant sentence is the following: "It will be seen that this was a teacher not in the role of the teacher, and the pupils' roles were also abandoned." However, since the teacher in question still, presumably, accepted that it was a responsibility of her role to help her pupils learn the 19th century history in question, it is difficult to see why he should speak of her role being abandoned at that level of description. It is only at a very low level of description that this claim could be made.

Ruddock and Downie seem to have an inflexible view of role, which must be contrasted with the view that sees roles in a constant process of re-definition, where one may talk of (suddenly or slowly) abandoning the traditional role in favour of a new formulation (perhaps only implicit and unexpressed) of the role of an X. However changed, there must still be some common feature with the old X if it is to be recognized as a new X and not some entirely new role. I suggest that this common feature must be within the area fundamental to being an X (connected, that is, with defining features of Xs) and not some peripheral area. For surely if no fundamental features remain in common, we would not speak of redefining the role of an X but of creating a new role.

The concept of role is not generally seen as inflexibly as Downie and Ruddock suggest. Indeed, that there is meaning in the discussions of Musgrove and Taylor and others on claims that "the role of the teacher is due for re-definition" presupposes this. The difficulties seem to be that neither side has specified the level of description at which they are working. In particular, Ruddock's claim and the narrow view in general would have difficulty
in coping with the necessity for role-players to alter actions (as described in fairly low-level terms) in the light of new problems, new techniques or new evaluations. If we accept this view, we are left with no language appropriate for the new relationship. In the case of the history teacher example, at a high level of description and obligation there was no change. The teacher and pupils did not 'abandon' their roles in the same sense as they would have done if they had spent the history lessons playing canasta. We also need to be able to distinguish between the cases where the intention is appropriate but the means selected for realising it inappropriate, and cases where it is the intention itself which is judged inappropriate.

However, the continual change/re-definition view has its own difficulties. Who should be entitled to do the re-defining? Or is it simply a matter of power - of some 'imposing' their definitions on others, or reaching a power equilibrium? If Musgrove and Taylor believe that the role of teacher should involve a contractual relationship between parents and teachers, surely they should offer some justification for this - claiming an analogy with a social worker-client or solicitor-client model is insufficient. It assumes a particular view of the parent-child relationship involving rights almost akin to ownership which might well be challenged (e.g. by persons concerned to promote children's rights). Shipman writes of gradual modifications of roles within a school, and Esland of their being negotiated between each group of pupils and teacher. Not only does this kind of talk fail to differentiate between changes based on power and other kinds of changes, but it raises difficulties for talk of justifications. Modifications which take place gradually, un-noticed and unplanned need to be distinguished from those which are deliberately chosen as part of a policy, for in some circumstances that something has been chosen after serious deliberation and with the consent of all parties is justification enough.

The re-definition or modification of roles, could be based on many different kinds of grounds - the results of empirical discovery, changes in moral view, economic considerations, expediency, etc., and even when carried out intentionally, might be unjustifiable. I have also suggested that changes might result from the spelling out of what is implied in assumptions which have been held all the time. It is quite clear that at certain levels, the teacher's role is capable of re-definition. The questions which arise are concerned with how far changes can yet leave
the role recognizably the role of the teacher.

The investigations of the teacher's role in this country and others deemed to be culturally similar, such as America, have, quite understandably, concentrated on the more traditional kinds of schooling, carried on in a building designed in ways which structurally push the organization into one where a single teacher has responsibility for a class. Though the various aspects of the teacher's role have been described in relation to this, the presuppositions of a claim that a teacher has responsibility for his class have not been examined. For it is usually taken to follow from this that the obligations of a teacher involve 'controlling' his class, and the presuppositions, e.g. that the children cannot be self-controlled, and would not voluntarily accept reasonable standards but require having them imposed on them have not been examined. Should any of the assumptions which underpin the teacher's role be incorrect, then that role requires re-definition. The importance of the possibility of role re-definition for this thesis is clear. For it may turn out that certain practices which could be shown to be conceptually demanded of the role are not part of the role, or that practices which are part of the role are unjustifiable. The prescriptive implication would be that the role should be re-defined to be a justifiable one, if it is not so now.

Sense (5) Consequential description

Finally, a further sense of role, related to sense (2), may be distinguished, particularly in ordinary language usage. Here role simply refers to the part actually played by X (whether functional or disfunctional) in whatever is the subject of discussion. That is, here role means simply 'function' in the ordinary language, as opposed to the sociologist's sense. That is, whereas the sociological use excludes unwanted, unvalued consequences, the ordinary language use refers to consequences without any evaluation. So one might ask, "What is the role of radical teachers in school X?" and answer that they are continually producing confrontations without committing oneself to judgments about the desirability or undesirability of the consequences produced from any point of view. It is worth noting that since the non-evaluative use in ordinary language requires
contrasting with the sociological use, there is a sense in which it calls into question the sociologists' claim that their work is value-free. This final sense of role is mentioned specifically, because unlike the others it seems to be a retrospective use. Since the other senses were claimed to have a conceptual relationship with expectations, this sense is clearly very different.

The redundancy of the role concept in sociology

Since the foregoing section of this chapter was written, my attention has been drawn to an article by Coulson suggesting that role is a redundant concept in sociology. Coulson discusses some of the difficulties of the role concepts which I have mentioned, with far more detailed reference to published work. I mention this paper because Coulson sets up the opposition 'roles or expectations' and suggests that role concepts should be replaced by what she calls "a structured network of expectations". This concept is seen as an alternative to role concepts because Coulson is a social phenomenologist and views role concepts as being essentially functionalist. It is also sometimes suggested that an objection is that roles involve a reification.

I have indicated my belief that the concept of role and the concept of expectations are inextricably linked, and that class concepts unavoidably involve one in expectations. On this view, the concept of role (though not role terminology) is seen as fundamental to all social life. This is to agree with a suggestion of Nadel's, who wrote, "the role concept is not an invention of anthropologists but is employed by the very people they study.... it is the existence of names describing classes of people which makes us think of roles".

The paper by Levinson to which I referred at the beginning of this chapter was concerned to urge social scientists to give up a unitary conception of social role in favour of what he called 'independent conceptual status' to the three aspects of role theory he separated out, and to secure agreement among them regarding role terminology. Coulson's paper seems to be an attempt to persuade sociologists to give up this language entirely. She suggests, as I
have said, that the language of expectations is an alternative. My own view is that she is not suggesting alternative concepts but merely alternative terminology. I hope to have shown that this must be the case by demonstrating the conceptual connection between four central senses of role and expectations.

At the beginning of the chapter, I also pointed to the divergencies of language use by sociologists which is Coulson's starting point as well. I asked the question, "Are we to say that there are many concepts of role, or that there is one concept" - or rather, as I hope to have shown, several concepts - "for which different sociologists use different terminology, i.e. that they speak different languages?" My answer was that it seemed useful to take the latter position.

In considering Coulson's suggestion that "the role concept" is redundant in sociology and should be replaced by concepts involving the language of expectations, I have come to the conclusion that she is proposing no more than a changed terminology. The distinctions which this alternative terminology is to pick out remain, I suggest, roughly the same distinctions. Whether the language used to express our interest in these distinctions is the language of role or the language of expectation is of less importance than that it is impossible to do without the concepts. They were understood before the language of 'role' was invented, through the relationship of class concepts of the kind involving behaviour, action, obligation, right and/or responsibilities with expectations. They will be understood if the language is changed, for, it seems to me, they are fundamental to social life and basic to even the most primitive understanding of it.

Role and the Naturalistic Fallacy

A position has been taken up in this chapter which suggests that there are two senses of role which might be called 'first-order' and 'second-order' normative senses. Sense (3), the sense of normative expectations, is a first-order use of the term 'role' to denote obligations which are associated with particular positions in a society according to legal, customary or accepted moral criteria. The fourth or evaluative sense is second-order, in that it implied that these norms were themselves open to evaluation. This position is sufficiently
Firstly, it presupposes a fundamentally non-relativist position in ethics, for to accept relativism in the sense explained by e.g. Brandt or Hospers, or a moral position of a fundamentally relativist kind as held by Beardsmore or Hounce and Phillips requires one to reject the possibility of evaluating norms. I am not suggesting that there are no problems involved in this assumption, but merely making explicit the position taken in this thesis. Of course, to claim that the analysis is non-relativist does not imply that the roles must always be the same, for circumstances may differ.

Secondly, this distinction is important in respect of some recent discussions on the Naturalistic Fallacy which have a direct application to the role of the teacher and therefore merit discussion in this thesis. Dorothy Emmet suggests that the concept of role provides a link between factual descriptions and moral pronouncements, so that the non-deducibility aspect of the Naturalistic Fallacy may be brought into question. From the empirical fact that the person is an X, says Emmet, it follows that he ought to do P. "If," she says, "we choose to ignore what is presupposed as background to the situation, these entailments (i.e. of 'ought's from 'is'es) can be found." In this connection she quotes Prior's examples of undertakers and Church officers and Searle's 'promising' paper. One wonders, however, whether she would have been equally happy with examples such as the role of slave-dealer, concentration camp Commandant, or slave.

But the question is really whether we are entitled to ignore what is presupposed as background to the situation simply because we wish to find entailments. Earlier in her book Emmet writes, "Whenever an ethical proposition appears to follow from statements of fact, there is some value judgment, explicit or assumed, lurking in the background, or" (and this is the more relevant in respect of my earlier discussion) "there is a tacit commitment to accepting the norms of some role or institution which is being referred to." On the analysis of role offered here, it is one of the meanings of role (and the meaning to which Emmet refers) that a role is a cluster of rights and obligations, and thus of responsibilities. One can immediately ask, therefore, whether it can be validly claimed that an 'ought' is being derived from an 'is' here. For Emmet's 'is' is of a special kind. Where 'ought's of a non-criticizable kind (in contrast to my sense (3) which is criticizable) are part of the meaning of 'role' as used by Emmet in her argument, the
other 'oughts' have been deduced, not from an 'is' as Emmet implies, but from an 'ought'. Even then, it is subject to a ceteris paribus, as the discussions on Searle's "promising" article show.

Emmet further argues that "to accept the role is to accept the obligation". This apparently simple suggestion is fraught with difficulties because of intra-role conflict. However, even without these complications, Emmet's suggestions would have to be rejected. For the question "Ought he to accept the role?" can always be put. Some roles might be pernicious, or some institutions (which would imply that roles within them are pernicious). Illich and Reimer, as I have mentioned, suggest that this is true of schools.

The most, therefore, that one could deduce on Emmet's argument would be the claim, "If it is the case that he ought to have accepted the role then, ceteris paribus, he ought to do P." (For, otherwise, one is committed to the view that the Commandant of Belsen ought to have exterminated millions of Jews. This is related to comments in Chapter 1 about being unable to show that P is what teachers ought or ought not to do by an analysis of such concepts as education, teaching or indoctrination.)

But the above proposition derives no value judgment from fact (even if Emmet's earlier claim were correct, which I argued was not the case) since in order to assert that A ought to do P, one has first to assert the value judgment that the role was one which A ought to have accepted (or, perhaps, less strongly, that it was not one which he ought to have rejected).

What I am arguing here, then, is that to claim that X, Y and Z are currently obligations of the teacher's role (that X, Y and Z are part of the teacher's role (3)) is not, in itself, to be committed to the moral judgment that persons who occupy the role position should do X, Y and Z. In arguing that, one would be committed at least to the further judgment that the institution and the role (or those aspects of it) are morally justifiable.

In my view, the arguments of this chapter suggest that Emmet's claim that moral obligations can be deduced from a tacit commitment
to a role (3) are very dubious.

Role Conflict

Suppose it is accepted that a given role (3) is not pernicious. There are still great difficulties in respect of Emmet's claim that to choose the role is prima facie to be committed to certain obligations which are inherent in the role.

Intra-role conflict has interested social scientists mainly in the kinds of situation where there are conflicting expectations of what an X will or ought to do - as might be held by a Headmaster and the pupils of a teacher. The first problem to be faced is whether these expectations are to be viewed from the point of view of the agent (in this case, the teacher) or that of an outside observer. Jacobson, Charters and Lieberman define role conflict as "the situation in which there are differences between criterion groups with respect to a social role." As Gross says, it is the objective assessment by an investigator which is involved here, and problematic whether the subject sees the discrepancies. The crucial issue is that conflicting sets of expectations as noted by an observer offer only potential sources of difficulty to the agent.

Parsons, on the other hand, in referring to "the agent choosing between sets of expectations", clearly assumes that the agent has perceived the conflict, since without such perception there could be no question of choice. Since the concept is that of role conflict, it can be argued that logically only the point of view of the agent is valid here. It is only he who could experience conflict, and no meaning can be given to the idea of conflict within a role which is not experience (except in a trivial sense meaning merely conflicting).

It seems, however, equally mistaken to suggest that there is any necessary relation between the actual existence of conflicting expectations and role conflict as subjectively defined e.g. by Parsons, Gross and Musgrove and Taylor. An agent will subjectively experience role conflict if he believes that conflicting expectations are held, even if this is not the case. That is, there is no
necessary relationship between role conflict and role set. Conflicting sets of expectations are neither empirically necessary nor sufficient for an agent to experience role conflict. There can only be a possible relationship between them if the agent perceives them correctly.

Two further related points have been neglected by these writers both in this connection and in relation to dilemmas of a prudential kind engendered by sanctions. Possible sanctions, like expectations, may be correctly perceived, incorrectly inferred (misperceived) or imagined. The agent may attribute to others the power to apply sanctions which they do not have, so that actual power or authority to administer sanctions is, again, neither a necessary nor a sufficient empirical condition for role conflict of a prudential kind. Additionally the perception or imagination of expectations or sanctions is itself not sufficient to provoke conflict, since the incumbent may perceive them but be indifferent. In order for conflict to be experienced, they must mean something to him - he must fear the sanctions, and the expectations must be from those who, in Meadian terms, are 'significant others'.

It should also be pointed out that an agent's own role conception could be sufficient to engender role conflict if he sees them as incompatible with only one other set of expectations providing those are from someone who matters to him. Additionally, his knowledge of guilt feelings he might experience could provide as effective a sanction as the kinds of external sanctions Gross discusses. It therefore seems that empirical studies have taken insufficient account of the subjective elements of role conflict, even where they have expressly attempted to do so.

I return, then, to Emmet's claim that "to accept the role is to accept the obligations of the role". Enough has been said about the role of the teacher in a pluralistic society to show that a full understanding of it in terms of the expectations of others involves role conflict. Accepting a given role (3) may (by virtue of our understanding of role (3)) be accepting a set of equally legitimate and possibly conflicting obligations. If a role is accepted with a knowledge of the expectations (which might be claimed to be a
necessary condition for fully understanding what one is undertaking) then to accept the role (3) is not to accept a tidy set of *prima facie* obligations simply, but also a set of *prima facie* prudential and moral dilemmas.

One way of approaching the moral dilemmas is to consider how far the various expectations which might be held of a role are justifiable - that is, to examine the role (4). Though it cannot be imagined that such consideration will solve all the problems, it may well be helpful. The next section therefore attempts a study of the role (4) of the teacher.

**Notes and References for Section III**

**Chapter 5**

5. Ibid., p. 90.
10. Comments on the teacher's role are often found as illustrations in more general philosophical writing on role. Since this section was written, the role of the teacher has been dealt with more fully in Downie R.S., Loudfoot E.M. & Telfer E., *Education and Personal Relationships*, Methuen, 1974. These writers are considering 'teacher' as a job, and they distinguish between role-jobs, aim-jobs and skill-jobs, claiming that the job of teacher cannot be defined exclusively by reference to any one of the three categories (pp. 3-4). I do not feel this distinction is particularly helpful, as the approach of this...
thesis is to try to derive aspects of the teacher's role (4) from justifiable aims, and the obligation to exercise skills would count as part of the role. These writers, however, do not distinguish between role (3) and role (4) (as analysed in this chapter of this thesis) but rather seem to offer justifications for existing rights and obligations. As suggested in Chapter 1 of this thesis, such justifications of the teacher's role as it is seen by many now have the implication of prescribing that teachers should see their role in this way.


12. In contrast to the suggestions made in the first chapter of this thesis, where it was claimed that prescriptions are implied by justifications, it is accepted here that no prescriptions can follow simply from descriptions. That is, the deductive aspect of the Naturalistic Fallacy is accepted. For a fuller discussion, see the main body of this chapter, pp. 165 - 168.


18. which need have no relationship with his function or purpose.

19. Following Downie, Roles and Values, op. cit., p 126.

20. Downie, Roles and Values, op. cit., p. 121.


22. The impersonal aspects of a role (as implied by the expression "regardless of who they are") are briefly discussed in Chapter 9 of this thesis.


24. This could be only those fulfilling some complementary role, all those who occupy roles with which the role incumbent being considered had to deal, or all members of the society.


29. The claim that role set acts as a set of pressures on the individual thus assumes that the beliefs that role-fillers have about the expectations of others are true.


34. Where function is defined as "the consequences of the existence or operation of a unit (a custom, attitude, institution, etc.) for other units in a (social, cultural or personality) system or for the system as a whole." Theodorson & Theodorson, *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology*, Methuen, 1970.


43. Gross et al., *Explorations in Role Analysis*, op. cit.

44. Ibid., p. 60. p. 206.


47. Downie, *Roles and Values*, op. cit., p. 130.


54. Ibid., p. 120

55. Ibid., p. 127.


62. Ibid., p. 45.


65. Emmet, Rules, Roles and Relations, op. cit., p. 42.

66. See the following articles in The Is-Ought Question, op. cit.
   Flew A., "On not deriving 'ought' from 'is'", pp. 135-143.
   Hare R.M., "The Promising Game", pp. 144-156.
   McClellan J.B. & Komisar B.P., "On deriving 'ought' from 'is'", pp. 157-162.
   Thomson J., "How not to derive 'ought' from 'is'", pp. 163-167.
   Hudson W.D., "The 'is-ought' controversy", pp. 168-172.
   See also Cooper N., "Two Concepts of Morality" in Wallace G. & Walker A.D.M. (eds), The Definition of Morality, Methuen, 1970. pp. 75-77.

67. Emmet, Rules, Roles and Relations, op. cit.


69. Ibid., p. 245.


71. Ibid.


73. Musgrove & Taylor, Society and the Teacher's Role, op. cit., Ch. 4.


75. A detailed analysis of five possible types of role conflict can be found in Wilson, "The Teacher's Role - a Sociological Analysis", op. cit.
The Role (4) of the Teacher in Schools
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION IV

It has been suggested that a major objection to the analysis of teaching given in the second section of this thesis might be that it did not render intelligible how there could be institutions, namely schools, staffed by teachers, if the intention to bring about learning was not as important in our understanding of the concept of teaching as the actual outcome. It is necessary to consider this objection before attempting to apply the analysis to the different aspects of the teacher's possible role in schools.

The concept of a perficience was introduced in order to overcome certain logical difficulties which I believe are encountered in understanding the language which is used to discuss inter-personal transactions - those types of goings-on which embody implications about responses, where the performance of actions by agent A brings about an outcome in another person, B, by a means which involves some kind of understanding of what A is doing on B's part. The claim was made that a person who failed to understand that the performance of certain kinds of acts was a way through which these outcomes could be brought about could not perform that kind of act with the intention of thereby bringing about the outcome. That is, I have claimed that for perficience verbs, the outcome sense is logically prior to any attempt sense and that an understanding of the outcome sense of these verbs (which, I suggest, include teaching) is presupposed by the concept of a teaching attempt. The analysis is required, in my view, to enable us to understand teaching attempts, so that if it is to be argued that schools are places where teaching attempts are made, the analysis helps us understand schools.

This section discusses the role of a teacher in schools and, in particular, whether various aspects of it are merely contingent. It is clear that difficulties are involved here because assumptions must first be made about the role of schools in a society for this to be possible. Though sociologists may investigate the expectations which people actually hold of schools, or it may be accepted that certain obligations are associated with schools in our society, this
is not the perspective from which I shall proceed; for questions can still be asked about the justifiability of these expectations or obligations. I propose rather to make certain (formal) assumptions about the kind of institution a school ought to be (i.e. about its role as discussed in the previous chapter), and argue from this to some conclusions about what is necessarily involved in the role of the teacher within a school, given an understanding of teaching as a perficienary transaction.

My first assumption is that the concepts of teaching and learning are central to the concept of school. Schools are primarily institutions set up for the purpose of promoting learning through teaching of individuals who attend them. The justification usually given for setting up institutions which all children are required to attend is, in a democratic society, that the learning of certain things is sufficiently important that some attempt must be made to ensure that all have the opportunity of learning them. Universal schooling is thus necessarily associated with the principle of impartiality in a society where, for example, the range of human activities is so wide, the knowledge and skills so complex, or the resources necessary for learning them so complicated, expensive or not generally available, that the learning cannot be left for the child to acquire by chance. The role of the school involves the promotion of learning which is worthwhile for the individual pupils and for the community.

The justification of schools as institutions within a community must be a consequentialist one, resting on the worthwhileness of the learning which they promote. Indeed, this is presupposed by the attacks on schools by deschoolers, who claim that they are places where children are taught to be passive and consequent by acts that penalize initiative and destroy curiosity and the desire to learn; to be competitive rather than co-operative, uncritical rather than critical; and that the knowledge which they do acquire is 'dead' and 'useless'. Their claim is the strong one, that no matter what might be learned in school that was worthwhile, its value would be outweighed by the learning of that which was worthless or even positively harmful. However, if Illich wishes to claim not only that this is true of
schools now (that is, that their role (3) is pernicious) but that any school system would be pernicious (that is, that there is no role (4) for schools), more is required than an indictment of schools as they are at present. This he fails to provide. Indeed, the more detail he gives us of his own alternatives, the more much of it sounds like a re-constituted school system.

Although Illich stresses that his aim of "deschooling society" is not to be confused with "transforming the whole world into a classroom" or "establishing new free schools, independent of the system", both of which he deplores, he advocates not only "the provision of institutions", and "a good educational system", but also that children should have "confrontation or criticism by an experienced elder who really cares". He later calls such people "professional personnel" and suggests that they be paid from public funds and be given the buildings which had previously belonged to the school system to work in. Why, one wonders, can these institutions, have a role (4) when schools, apparently, cannot?

I take it, therefore, that even Illich would agree that schools were justifiable institutions if they did bring about learning through teaching of that which (he accepted) was worthwhile, at least on balance, and that it is simply that he does not believe that this can be done. I assume that it can be done, and that it follows from this that the role (4) of schools is associated with an obligation to be organized in such a way that the children who attend do actually get taught that which is worthwhile. Now there is a sense in which a claim like this evades almost as many issues as it solves, since no attempt is being made in this thesis to give a general account of the criteria by virtue of which learning may be assessed as worthwhile or not. However, a position is taken on this issue, in that certain conditions are argued to be necessary for learning to be worthwhile. Here, however, it is merely claimed that the justification in a democratic society for supporting and expending a great deal of money on institutions for the promotion of learning by younger members of the community (if not older ones as well) must
be the expectation that something that is worth learning will be learned there. The suggestion that schooling should be compulsory, coupled with the claim that without compelling attendance, some children would not attend and would thus be deprived of the benefits of schooling, clearly shows the evaluative assumptions which are made in respect of the learning which ought to occur.

I wish to emphasize the form of the argument being used here. It is not being claimed that it is part of our understanding of what a school is that what is learned and taught there (if anything) is worthwhile. The point is rather that unless something worthwhile is learned there, there is inadequate justification for schooling and, in particular, for compulsory schooling. It is part of our understanding, not of what a school is, but of what a school ought to be.

It was suggested earlier that most learning, since mediated through language and other symbolic systems, involves teaching transactions (formal or informal, direct or indirect). There are, of course, assumptions in this position concerning the dependence of each individual on a community which involve the rejection of any extreme individualistic position in epistemology. On such an account, teaching itself does not require justification, since it is only through this that much learning (and most early learning) can take place. What require justification are the content and manner of teaching, and the making of unsolicited teaching attempts.

The recognition of the importance of teaching (though not necessarily teaching attempts) for learning is, I suggest, a necessary precondition for the deliberate establishment of schools, staffed by 'teachers' whose role (4) must therefore involve an obligation to bring about, through teaching, the worthwhile learning which is the primary justification of the institution. It follows therefore that the role (4) of the teacher involves the intention to bring about learning. For clearly men believe that outcomes of a certain kind are brought about more effectively if attempts are made to bring them about than by chance.
I argue therefore that the institution of school can only be understood in terms of general aims connected with learning and its bringing about, and the engagement of 'teachers' to work within them only on the understanding of the importance of teaching transactions in bringing about learning. That is, it is through the concept of role that one understands how, even though the central concept of teaching does not, on my account, involve intentions on the part of the agent primarily concerned with learning, the idea of a teacher in a school is unintelligible without reference to such intentions. Since, on my argument, making a teaching attempt presupposes an understanding of the perfunctory transaction of teaching, it is clear that my earlier account, far from rendering it unintelligible that there could be institutions such as schools staffed by teachers, can be argued to be presupposed by the existence of such institutions.

The role (4) of the teacher, on this view, necessarily involves a general intention to teach (in the outcome sense) something worth learning to the pupils. Or, to put this another way, it is being claimed that a person who accepts the role (4) of a teacher ought to have such intentions. It can therefore be seen that the claim that the intention to bring about learning is not a necessary condition of teaching in its logically prior sense does not entail the claim that intention to bring about learning is not a necessary part of the teacher's role in a school. But this latter claim rests not on a claim about its being part of the meaning of 'teaching' but rather on the assumption that outcomes are achieved more often by those who attempt to bring them about than by accident. The specificity of the intentions concerning learning required of teachers as part of their role (4) then becomes a topic for discussion, justification and empirical investigation, rather than an a priori of analysis.

The necessity for an alternative analysis is now clear. For on the Hirstean analysis, in order to teach a pupil an X, a person must have an intention to teach him that X, and, he has suggested, as clearly and tightly specified as possible. So, insofar and to the extent that anyone might want to argue that a teacher should or need
not have low-level, tightly and clearly specified objectives (learning outcomes) in mind, to that extent, on a Hirstean analysis, it is being argued that he should or need not teach. On that analysis, it is not open to anyone to argue this, for if it were argued, this would be to claim that the role of the teacher need involve no teaching. I suggest, therefore, that the Hirstean analysis is inadequate for a genuine asking of this question, for it rules out of court one possible answer in advance - the conclusion that teachers need not or ought not to teach being, if not self-contradictory, rather foolish, for if they are not under an obligation in relation to teaching, what could be distinctive about the role of a teacher?

The analysis of teaching offered in the first section thus permits us to formulate the following questions: (a) Does the role of the teacher necessarily involve him in clearly and tightly specifying the learning which he wishes the children to achieve? (b) Does the role of the teacher necessarily involve him in assessing what he is teaching and evaluating that learning as worthwhile or not? (c) May a teacher opt out of teaching in certain areas - most importantly, the area of morality and of values in general. Put in similar terms to the first two, this question asks whether teaching in the area of morality and of values is a necessary part of the teacher's role. These are the problems discussed in the first two chapters of this section.

The third chapter considers the authority aspect of the teacher's role but in only certain, limited respects. There is a general discussion of authority as an epistemologically rooted concept, and a consideration of problems related to children's being expected to learn certain things 'on authority'. The question here is again whether the relationship between the teacher's role and authority in this sense is a necessary one. Since there are implications in the answer for the pupil-teacher relationship, the final section of that chapter briefly considers this.

The procedure I am adopting is not that of simply examining accounts given by sociologists of the teacher's existing role and
trying to justify either the descriptive or normative expectations that people hold of it. I am rather starting with certain assumptions (already stated) about what would justify schools as institutions, and what I suggest is our current understanding of what it is for A to teach B something, and investigating, with an open mind, whether certain aspects which it is currently being suggested should (or should not) be part of the teacher's role (i.e. are not part of the teacher's role (4)) are necessitated by those assumptions and understandings. Since the necessity involved in each case is dependent on our current understanding of the term 'teaching', (which might have been different, or could change - e.g. we might have used, or come to use, the term in such a way that giving someone a pill the result of which is that he can speak French can count as an instance of teaching), it cannot be a matter of strict logical necessity. I speak here, therefore, of conceptual necessity.

The basis of the discussion are therefore the following: (a) the analysis of teaching developed in Section II, which I suggest is neutral and embodies no value judgments; (b) the claim that the school's role (4) involves teaching its pupils something which is of value to them; (c) the assumption that teachers are prima facie responsible for what they teach and (d) the judgment that it is part of any justifiable role that an incumbent should try to know what he is doing and to consider whether or not he is fulfilling his obligations. Also presupposed is the value position that an agent may sometimes be morally responsible for the non-intended consequences of his actions.

The qualification which must be added is clear. For I am here concerned with only one aspect of what a school might do (though clearly the aspect which I believe is the most important). The claims derived from discussions of this aspect can be accepted as over-riding only insofar as it is accepted that this purpose of the school is logically over-riding. On this account, if the pupils learn nothing worthwhile, the schools have failed to fulfil their role. It is a further, open, question, far beyond the scope of this thesis, as to whether or how far anyone may be held blameworthy for this.

There is no conflict, it should be noted, between this position
and one which claims that schools ought to be agencies of societal change (on the one hand) or preserve and transmit the status quo, (on the other), as long as suggestions in this regard argue that the change (or lack of it) should be brought about by what is learned through teaching in the schools. In such cases, the disagreement will be on a different level - disagreements about what learning is worthwhile (which may include the manner in which what is learned is believed, i.e. rationally or irrationally), and/or as to what actions are to be counted as socially responsible or irresponsible.

There would, however, be a conflict between this position and one which claimed e.g. that the major obligation of the school was to make children happy, and which therefore used no criterion concerned with learning to support a claim that the schools and their teachers had succeeded or failed in their roles. However, the strong conceptual connection between schools, learning and teaching seem to me to be such that the onus would be on such a person to show why any other aim than learning through teaching should be considered over-riding. In my view, to suggest this would be to deny what is distinctive of schools, and I am not here concerned to argue the point. I have merely tried to make clear the form of the arguments of this section, and the set of assumptions on which they are based.
Chapter 6: Bringing about capacity-enlarging learning

Introduction

It was explained in the introduction to this section that no sustained argument will be presented concerning what constitutes worthwhile learning, but that some comments will be made on criteria which, it is argued, are necessary for learning to be of value.

The first criterion suggested is that, in order to be valuable, the learning a person does must have as its outcome knowledge, understanding, skills etc. which are psychologically and socially operative, by which is meant that it must not be 'inert'. This sort of point has consistently been made by philosophers in relation to education, examples being Whitehead, Peters and Freire. I have no wish to be entangled in the analyses of education, which many have suggested is what Gallie has called "an essentially contested concept". For one could either adopt a 'tight' analysis of education, as do Peters and Downie et al., and then have to deal with the claim that education is not the only business of the school or not its business at all, or adopt an analysis such that whatever learning is considered to be the business of the school is to be called 'education', the position taken by Barrow. Since nothing definitive therefore follows for the role (4) of the teacher from any analysis of education, the arguments in this thesis are being put forward without the use of the term 'education' except insofar as it is needed to discuss the writings of others. There is no discussion, therefore, about whether any learning ought to be considered intrinsically or instrumentally worthwhile, or educationally worthwhile.

Although there are always objections to a suggestion that any claim is self-evidently true, there is a sense in which, I believe, the above point about inert knowledge may be taken as self-evident. For it seems to me that the onus would be on anyone who claimed that knowledge etc. that was inert was valuable to explain what he could mean by such a claim. Though it may not be sufficient for learning to be valuable that it is not inert, it is argued here that,
prima facie, to be worthwhile the learning must, in some way inform a person's view of the world and/or increase his capacity for experience and/or increase his capacity for responsible social action. All these require that the learning be psychologically available to the learner, and the latter that it can be used instrumentally in a morally acceptable way to pursue some justifiable goal (e.g. happiness, friendship, truth, justice, work or leisure activities). It can be seen, therefore, that learning which is psychologically available only to the extent that it can be produced to provide an answer to a set of questions (e.g. as asked by a teacher or an examiner) does not adequately fulfil this criterion, even though it may be, in a sense, being used to pursue a justifiable goal, being a 'ticket' (as White put it) to higher education or some career to which it bears no internal relationship. The arguments against 'compartmentalising' knowledge are relevant here, since school learning, to be worthwhile, cannot be separated from other learning and knowledge. What is learned in school needs, to be non-inert in the sense meant, to be grounded in and emeshed with what is learned elsewhere, enabling the pupils to constructively criticize and extend the latter. In this extended sense of the term, school learning must be useful to be of value.

Though specific learnings are being justified pragmatically, the justification rests ultimately on the basis of a non-instrumental value judgment about persons as such - rational (as opposed to non-rational) social beings with interests, values, intentions, purposes, feelings, knowledge, understandings and skills; a judgment about the importance of consciousness in a person's life (as opposed to apathy); and it involves having a view of what is to count as being a human agent in a social community. These are normative assumptions which no attempt is being made here to justify. But if they are accepted, then it is clear that learning which is not, in some sense, 'alive' cannot contribute to the consciousness of a person and thus to his life.

Though it is being claimed that social and psychological non-inertness is a necessary condition for learning to be worthwhile, it
is not being suggested that all non-inert learning is worth having, nor is a subjectivist position on value being taken that suggests that no distinction can be made between what a person values and what he ought to value. This can be seen by consideration of two possible ways in which a person could be said to be wrong to value having learned X.

Much learning is valued by people instrumentally, and thus there is a sense in which a person is right to value learning X instrumentally. This is if he is correct in his belief that this learning will help him achieve some goal he is pursuing. In a similar sense, he is wrong to disvalue learning which, in fact, might have helped him to achieve his goal, or to value learning which he erroneously believes will help him achieve it. But this position remains essentially subjectivist, since the question of whether or not the individual should have valued the learning is settled with reference to its instrumentality towards his goals. It remains subjective as long as it is implied that no objective judgments can be made regarding the worthwhileness of goals.

The subjectivist position is rejected here, since it is assumed possible to say objectively that there are some goals which ought not to be pursued. Given this assumption, it cannot be sufficient for learning to be in any non-subjective sense worthwhile that it is useful to a person for pursuing his goals. Since it would be impossible to make an exhaustive list of goals which might be justifiable and whose pursuit would be a responsible social activity (for these cannot be described, let alone evaluated, without a context), the criterion suggested - that learning which increases a person's understanding of the world and his capacity for experience and responsible social action within it is worthwhile - is formal. Further criteria would be required for its concrete application in a given society, in the sense of giving a substantive account in terms of propositions and skills.

The criterion that it is necessary for learning to be worthwhile that it is not inert is, however, claimed to be a substantive criterion.
Furthermore, it is possible to know that a person's learning is merely rote, lacks understanding, or is seen by him as pointless, and is thus at that time inert, and therefore of no value to him.

Though the first criterion is formal, there are certain important substantive implications due to factors of human life which all societies have in common. Though no specific knowledge, understanding or skill can be said a priori to be of no value, it can be argued that some special account needs to be provided to suggest that some learning is of value, whereas other non-inert learning can be taken a priori to be of value without the provision of a special account. Skill in wiggling one's ears would be an example of a skill in the first category, whereas learning one's native language and to communicate with others, to understand other people and the society in which one lives, and moral understanding would come into the second. The reason that no special account would have to be given for the potential value of the latter is that these are things which are partly constitutive of what is meant by being a human agent. Similarly, the value of knowledge (e.g. of the physical world, and of other people, and of how to find out these things) which enables a person to predict the possible consequences of his actions, and thus know what he is doing \( ^{14} \), requires no special justification since a failure to consider the consequences of one's actions is constitutive of what is meant by acting irresponsibly.

It can be seen that the position taken in this thesis is neither that taken by Peters\(^{15} \) or White\(^{16} \), nor that taken by Wilson\(^{17} \). Peters and White argue that there is some learning which is valuable to anyone who has it (the former that it can be intrinsically valuable, the latter that it can be educationally valuable), no matter who they are. Against this, it is argued that learning cannot be evaluated as worthwhile or not independently of a consideration of the individual learner, since a necessary condition of learning's being worthwhile to an individual is that it should be 'alive' for him and available to him for 'use' in certain kinds of ways. This denies the claim that there is learning which can be specified (proposition X, skill
Y or how to engage in activity Z) which is necessarily of value to anyone who learns it.

On the other hand, as against Wilson, it is denied that the non-inertness of knowledge, understanding, skills etc., provides a sufficient condition for its value in any objective sense. Thus a child's interest in learning X (a sufficient condition for the non-inertness of X), which entails that he values learning about X, is not, on my view, a sufficient condition for its being valuable. A distinction is accepted here between what an individual does value and what is worth valuing (what he ought to, or would be right to, value).¹⁸

Even though the position being adopted here might, at first sight, have appeared to be the same as one of the more orthodox positions, I have attempted above to indicate that it cannot be viewed in this way since on this account there are both subjective and objective criteria to be satisfied for worthwhileness.

**Increasing a person's capacity for responsible social action**

If a human being is seen primarily as a person who has experiences and performs actions in a social context, then it can be argued that, prima facie, learning which increases one's capacity for experience and for responsible social action is worthwhile. This suggestion does not formally commit the Naturalistic Fallacy, since it has already been pointed out that this concept of a person is an evaluative rather than a merely descriptive one.

Increasing a person's capacity for responsible social action implies either increasing the capacity for action of a socially (i.e. morally) responsible person, or increasing the social (i.e. moral) responsibility of an agent, or both. This chapter is concerned with learning which might increase a person's capacity for experience or action, and the next with the learning of values. Since actions
can be performed in a variety of contexts, the same act may be
sometimes responsible and sometimes irresponsible (unless, of
course, one uses a concept of action which rules out the possibility
by definition). It follows from this that we cannot be sure that
any given increase in a person's capacity for action will be
desirable in the long run. But it cannot follow from this that
attempts to help people increase their capacity for action are
unjustifiable. It merely indicates that learning needs to be
viewed in a moral context, and that in teaching people there are
inescapable risks. In the same way that no guarantees can ever
be offered that teaching attempts will be successful, no guarantees
can be offered that what is learned will be used by the learner in
a responsible manner. It would be unjustifiable to suggest that
because we cannot be certain of this, we should never try to teach
anyone anything. For the justification of teaching attempts must
be instrumental since teaching attempts involve trying to change
people.

Learning which increases a person's capacity for action,
including expressive acts, involves the acquisition of concepts,
knowledge and beliefs, understandings and skills. Traditionally,
discussions of learning have separated 'learning that' and 'learning
how to'\(^\text{19}\) following Ryle's distinction\(^\text{20}\) between knowing how and
knowing that. A brief reference to this distinction will be made
later in discussing the nature of the relationship of the teacher's
acts to the learning outcome in the cases of propositional and
physical skill learning. At this stage of the discussion I shall
not separate concept learning, learning to understand, propositional
learning and skill learning, in an attempt to avoid the difficulties
involved in separating them because the formal distinction is sometimes
unteachable in practice.

Learning a concept, for example, involves both learning that and
learning how to. A person cannot learn a concept in isolation but
learns it in use within a framework of concepts related in some way
to human beliefs, purposes and activities\(^\text{21}\). It may be possible to
give a formal account of learning a concept as learning a principle,
but in practice this involves learning how to use the relevant language and that given instances are instances, how to use the concept and to recognize instances which one has not encountered before as falling under the concept. As Hirst says, "To learn a new concept is to learn how to use the concept in relation to others and how to apply it. It is not to learn a series of truths about its relations with other concepts. Learning a concept is like learning to play tennis, not like learning to state the rules and principles that govern play." But additionally, as Hamlyn points out, "..in the process of acquiring concepts (there is) a delicate balance between a kind of abstract understanding of what it is to be an X and a knowledge of what things conform to this criterion."

Similarly, there are cases where, given the motor skills a person already possess, the acquisition of propositional knowledge is sufficient to give him new know-how. If I learn that turning the key starts the car engine, I now know how to start the car. The distinction rests on those cases where the reduction is untenable (no amount of learning of propositions will teach me how to swim) but it does not follow from the fact that not all cases of learning-how-to can be reduced to learning-that that none of them can. Concept learning, skill learning and learning-that will, for these reasons, not be considered separately.

The first requirement of the performance of an intentional action is that the person must have some conception of what it is that he is doing or trying to do. Since there is a relationship between having a conception and having some kind of language in which to formulate this, there are indications here that learning to perform new actions (and also to have new experiences) often involves the acquisition of new language. I do not wish to suggest that having appropriate language is a necessary condition of performing any actions or having any experiences at all, since it would follow from this that pre-linguistic children could not perform actions or have experiences and it seems undeniable that they do do these things when they have
not yet acquired the requisite language that would enable them to give an answer to the questions "What are you trying to do?" or "What are you experiencing?"

However, it is equally clear that some actions or experiences are impossible for a person with a limited range of understandings and a limited vocabulary. Being able to write another's name is not a sufficient condition for being able to forge a cheque, and a very young child cannot experience hope. There are thus seen to be limitations on the range of actions and experiences open to children by virtue of the limited range of intentions which they can formulate or concepts which they have. For this reason, learning new concepts may be a necessary condition of learning to perform new acts, and teaching children new concepts may increase their capacity for action and the range of experiences possible for them.

But learning new concepts is not sufficient to ensure that the actions which a child can formulate an intention to perform can be successfully performed. The child may lack requisite knowledge - e.g. of the physical world, of the beliefs, intentions or character of others, or even of his own character. Equally relevant to the successful performance of actions is the possession of skills, for even with the requisite knowledge-that, a person may lack the skill (know-how) required to perform the action (not all know-how being reducible to know-that). It follows, therefore, that people in general can perform only a limited selection of those actions potentially available in the society to which they belong, and not all members of the society can experience the full range of potential experiences.

Additionally, it is clear that relevant learning is not always sufficient for a person to be able to perform a given action, for the performance of some acts (e.g. conducting a Mass, performing a legal marriage) are further restricted by other conditions (i.e. the possession of relevant authority) necessary for this to be done. Other acts require complementary action by others for their successful performance (e.g. buying, accompanying on the piano). These points,
however, do not undermine the relevant claim, that for the performance of a given act, a person must have the appropriate concepts, knowledge—that and skills. As Hamlyn also points out, 24 concepts can be viewed as both tools and as keys.

Thus the teaching of concepts, know-how and know-that to people who do not have them is teaching them how to perform new actions which previously they were unable to perform, and increasing the range of experiences open to them.

Knowledge and Teaching

It is a commonplace assertion that it is impossible to teach that which one does not know. Dearden 25 states categorically, "To teach something in ignorance of it is not just difficult; it is logically impossible." So widely is this view accepted that Ryle devotes two papers 26 to exploring how it is possible for a person to teach himself something. "There is a semblance of a conceptual paradox," he writes, 27 "Here his teacher was as ignorant as the pupil, for they were the same boy. So how can the one learn something from the other?"

This contention must produce great insecurity in a teacher at a time when demands are being put forward for open-ended and flexible curricula. One may be forgiven for wondering how, if it is logically impossible to teach what one does not know, what justification there could be for promoting situations in which teachers will be unable to teach. Indeed, Dearden's point is made precisely to indicate that such demands are misguided.

However, the assertion that it is logically impossible to teach that which one does not know seems to me to be a mistaken one in respect of both propositions and skills, and I shall try to show this by examples of intentional teaching so that it cannot be claimed that I have indicated that Dearden is mistaken simply by using a different concept of teaching. In suggesting this, however, I am not implying that ignorance is something to be deliberately sought after as a qualification for teachers. 28 As Passmore suggests 29 in a discussion of Plato's
"Theaetetus", to teach one must know something which the learners do not know. Indeed, it may turn out that much more knowledge and understanding is required if a person is to teach what he himself does not know than if he is to teach what he does know. But before any investigation of what might be involved in teaching that which one does not know can start, it is necessary to indicate how it is possible for a person to teach an X "in ignorance of it", and to show that Dearden is mistaken in his claim.

There is nothing new in an example of a person teaching another a skill he does not possess. A man may have been paralysed from birth and not know how to swim, never having been in a position to have even tried to swim. Nonetheless, he may be a most efficient and effective swimming teacher, in a position to teach swimming by instruction and elicit swimming skills from pupils, having learned to do this from other people who could teach swimming. Now he could clearly not do this without having some understanding of what was involved in swimming and what techniques were effective for keeping afloat and propelling oneself through the water, but this surely is, for him, entirely theoretical knowledge (neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for knowing how to swim). He can thus teach someone to do that which he himself does not know how to do.

Similarly, a person who does not know how to play the trumpet but who has at his disposal an elementary instruction book and can hear whether or not the pupil is blowing the correct note, can teach the child the first skills of trumpet-playing, without himself knowing how (in the sense of being able) to play the trumpet. Though he himself may not know what to do with his lips in order to produce the required note, he can tell whether or not the child is doing the right thing and guide his learning to play. Again, it may not be necessary to the teaching of a skill that the teacher knows how to do it, for he can sometimes teach the skill if he has other, requisite knowledge.

Of course, in this type of instance, certain methods of teaching are not open. The person who does not know how to Y cannot teach A
to Y by demonstrating Y-ing himself, for example. But since teaching activities are polymorphous, it remains possible for a person who does not know how to Y to teach others how to Y.

A quite different kind of example is that of a person who, e.g., because instructed to do so, teaches content X as true though he himself does not believe it (e.g., he is agnostic). If it is the case that X is true, and that the grounds which the teacher indicates as grounds are good grounds for the belief, the pupil who learns X (a theory, proposition, explanation, etc.) can be said to know X and to have been taught it by a person who did not himself know it. A may teach by the performance of exactly the same acts which a person B who did know X could have performed. It is clearly not being suggested that anyone, irrespective of what they did or did not know, could have performed these actions (as the comments in the previous section of this chapter indicate) but merely to illustrate that though to teach X one must know something (as a necessary precondition for performing appropriate actions), it is not necessarily X that one must know.

Finally, one may take an example of a teacher whose pupils were working with books or structured apparatus, and seemed unable to learn an X which the apparatus had been designed to teach (e.g., because it assumed knowledge or understanding which the pupils did not have). By working with the pupils and the apparatus, a teacher who did not know that X may still be instrumental in bringing about the learning of X which the pupils were unable to achieve alone. This, like the three previous examples, is quite acceptably and generally considered a case of teaching, and though it may be the case that at the end both teacher and pupils have learned the X, it remains an example of teaching where a teacher has taught pupils what, at the start, he himself did not know or understand. In this example, again, it is clear that in order to teach X, the teacher must have known something that the pupils did not know (for otherwise he could not have helped them to do what they could not have done alone) but what he needed to know in order to teach them X was not necessarily X.

I conclude from consideration of the above examples that Dearden is wrong. To teach something in ignorance of it is not logically impossible. But it may be difficult.
Formulating teaching aims and objectives

A teacher who believes that he (logically) cannot teach what he doesn't know must limit his teaching aims at any time to that which he knows at that time. Similarly, if he believes, with Hirst, that in order to teach a particular X (proposition or skill) he must intend pupils to learn that particular X, he is required, if rational, to formulate his aims clearly and tightly. The tight formulation of objectives is the only reasonable course of action for a teacher under these conditions for otherwise there is the tacit acceptance that it does not matter whether he teaches his pupils relatively little or rather more.

If, as has happened, teachers are willing to try an "open-ended approach", or "enquiry" as opposed to discovery teaching, or to formulate their aims "fuzzily" or at a high level of generality only (as in the example given in Section II of teaching about pond life) they have laid themselves open to charges (i.e. by Hirst) of being professional frauds. These charges are based on claims about the nature of teaching. Indeed, some of the suggestions that teachers should formulate their aims behaviourally seem to be based on a similar belief, that the nature of teaching demands it.

However, if it is accepted that it is possible to teach without the tight formulation of objectives, whether behaviourally or propositionally, and that it is possible for a person to teach that which he does not know (provided that there are other, related things that he does know which enable him to perform the necessary teaching acts) it is then possible to ask whether the tightest possible formulation of aims (as advocated by Hirst) is a help to teaching children that which it is worthwhile for them to learn or not. This is to question whether it is a necessary part of the teacher's role.

There is no suggestion here that a teacher should adopt a laissez-faire attitude to what goes on in a classroom, or that he could be teaching his pupils if he simply turns them loose to do what they like, but rather that there is not necessarily a definitive
answer to the question about the formulation of aims. For it might be empirically the case that a tight formulation of aims militates, in some instances against the achievement of those aims, or that more worthwhile learning is promoted by teachers in some instances if their primary intentions are concerned with sustaining children's interest, or helping them achieve some desired practical end (e.g. making something). In other cases, the tight formulation of aims may help children's learning. The point which is being made here is that, on my view, this is an empirical, not a conceptual, problem. The tight specification of objectives (and thus, a fortiori, the specification of behavioural objectives) is not demanded by the nature of teaching, but is a matter for sustained empirical investigation.

Whitty and Young\(^32\) have given an account of a girl who, in pursuit of an aim of designing a boat hull, studied what would have been traditional 'A' Level Physics work in viscosity. I can see no reason why it should be construed as a failure of role obligation if teachers formulated their aims "fuzzily" in terms of whatever the pupils need to know in order to achieve some appropriate (and not necessarily learning) goal. Since the learning is intrinsically instrumental\(^33\) to the pupil in achieving his goal, it is necessarily non-inert.

That impressive teaching and learning can occur governed by its usefulness in solving problems (this Dewey-based conception of the teacher's role) has been illustrated on television by the Young Scientist of the Year programmes, where the goal has sometimes been practical (e.g. to design X) and sometimes theoretical (to find out Y). Given that skills and theoretical knowledge can be needed for achieving either, I suggest that this kind of view and the structured curriculum view can be understood not as alternative conceptions of the teacher's role, somehow in competition with one another, as is sometimes suggested, but rather as different ways of conceiving the means of achieving the same goal - that of worthwhile learning. I suggest that the advantage of the former kinds of methods is that learning is less likely to be inert, from which it follows that the probability of the means achieving the end is higher. However, since the demands on a teacher's knowledge, imagination and flexibility may
be much greater than in the use of a tightly structured curriculum, it may be that for some people and in some circumstances the latter may be more appropriate, whilst in others the former may be.

Recent writings in the sociology of knowledge (e.g. Keddie\textsuperscript{34}) have pointed out that because the teacher has traditionally decided (on the basis of objectives worked out at both lesson level and over longer periods) what will and what will not be discussed in the classroom, educational failure has been created in the classroom. Flew\textsuperscript{35} and others, looking at Keddie's examples of questions asked by 'lower stream' pupils, have admitted that they are sometimes more interesting and sensitive than those asked by pupils in 'higher streams' who accepted the problems as given, often whether they were interested in them or not. They have, however, attacked Keddie as trying to make a case by using "bad teachers" for her examples, with the implication that a "better" teacher would have allowed the questions to be discussed. This seems to me to misunderstand the position.

I suggest that it is helpful to view Keddie's point in terms of the institutionalized role of the teacher, and avoid discussions in the emotive language of "creating educational failures". If it is the case that children cannot see the point of the work-cards and the questions on them in relation to the material that the teacher has presented, then it may be the case that their failure to see the
point prevents their learning anything from the material in a way which is non-inert, a condition which has been suggested as being necessary for the learning to be worthwhile. If this is sometimes the case, then the teacher's role (3) may have been institutionalized in a manner which, for some teachers and some children in some situations, acts against the achievement of that which constitutes the justification of schooling. If this is so, this is a reason for wondering whether this type of institutionalization of the teacher's role is justifiable. The insistence by teachers that pupils engage in activities which it is hoped will promote the learning which the teacher intends may have the opposite consequences in the long run from those which are intended. It is therefore suggested that research is needed as to how extensive such consequences are, that teachers will learn to assess more carefully the unintended consequences of their own actions and that considerable attention should be given to the question of the exercise of judgment as to when and how the teacher should be flexible in the classroom. Teachers need to listen to their pupils to see what sense they can make of the material, and, as Barnes writes, "If we are honest, we may... admit that our determination to teach what we want to teach can also add to this failure to listen: the voice of our own intentions is so loud that it blots out the voices of our pupils."

I suggest that much of this can be attributed to an institutionalization of the teacher's role which is based on an understanding of teaching in which the teacher's intentions are central. This understanding leads teachers to discourage pupils' digressions from specified subject matters, even if it is the case that such digressions are fruitful, or even needed for any worthwhile learning to take place at all. For it may be that without such a digression, pupils will be unwilling to consider the preferred subject matter or unable to see the point of it. They may need to engage in tentative or exploratory talk to help them relate the subject matter of the lesson to what they already know of the world. And, to make a more positive point, valuable teaching and learning may go on during such deviations (though, of course, the teacher could not know in advance what it might be).
To argue this is not necessarily to deny that there may be circumstances in which it would be right for the teacher to insist that pupils work on material which is offered with the intention of teaching a specified X. It is, however, to deny that this is necessarily the teacher's role, as, it seems to me, Hirst's analysis of teaching and his comments on "professional frauds" seem to suggest. Nor is to be taken as supporting an extreme position which suggests that the initiative in any enterprise must always come from the pupils. It is not being suggested, either, that teachers should not plan lessons or prepare materials for pupils to work with, or adopt curriculum packages. It implies that rather than having a lesson plan to which he will adhere, a teacher should have a wide range of possibilities for pupils to follow and also be open to pursuing lines of thought or investigations which he himself had never thought of. For doing this may be the only way in which a teacher may sometimes teach anything at all (a necessary condition for teaching anything worthwhile).

In suggesting that a person can teach an X that he does not know, I am also not to be taken as suggesting that ignorance is a quality to be sought in teachers. I would certainly argue that, all other things being equal, it is more appropriate to choose A rather than B as e.g. a history teacher if A has a greater historical understanding than B. The claim that it is possible for a person to teach that which he does not know is rather to be interpreted as suggesting that restrictions which an activity analysis of teaching imposes on teachers in terms of what they can try to teach or areas in which they are to be considered capable of teaching their pupils are unjustifiable. All other things being equal, the contributions of a person with greater historical understanding to such activities as an unstructured discussion (i.e. one which was not aimed at teaching children to believe certain propositions) are likely to be greater if his own understanding is wider and deeper than if it is shallower. He may teach his pupils much in the way of historical understanding by comments which get them to reflect on what they have said in the light of available evidence (what is learned is elicited rather than indicated). And much teaching may be required to help pupils see a problem as a problem, which is important for pupils to come to see the point of what they are to do.
"Learning How to Learn"

Much has been said recently about the importance of pupils being taught 'how to learn'. As stated, of course, the idea of "learning how to learn" is merely a slogan. It cannot be taken literally, for taken literally it involves a vicious regress such that it would be impossible for anyone ever to start learning. It is more sympathetically interpreted as suggesting that it is desirable that persons should acquire the ability to learn whatever they will later choose to learn, and implying that there are skills involved in learning complex Xs which may be generalisable, and which it is important to be explicitly aware of. In particular, learning in any content area involves coming to an understanding of a co-ordinated network of concepts, the propositions in which they are embodied and through which they are learned. The implication is that this should lead to a development of the individual's ability to structure what is being learned in an internally consistent and disciplined way, and that this is achieved better by pupils structuring their own thinking than having the teacher structure their thinking for them.

It has already been suggested that new learning helps an individual perform actions previously not open to him. Most important among these are acts appropriate to finding out what is and is not true, and to generating new knowledge. For the learning of propositions alone is inadequate. Propositions now believed to be true may be shown to be false, or new grounds may be discovered to support propositions now believed to be false. Propositional learning will be rigid and inflexible unless accompanied by an understanding of what is involved in evaluating the truth of propositions. Since these skills are, by definition, of a high order of generality, and must be applied, with modification where appropriate, to subject matter other than that through which they were learned, the slogan is best interpreted as suggesting that in a rapidly changing society, learning the skills of acquiring knowledge etc. is more important than learning any particular subject matter. In 1958 Margaret Mead wrote 40, "No-one will live all his life in the world into which he was born, and no-one will die in the world in which he worked in his maturity."
In such a rapidly changing society (where it is necessarily the case that what is true of that society is changing) emphasis on the need to learn, and thus on the skills involved in learning, is understandable. But it seems a mistake to interpret this, as some do, as implying that no propositional learning is of any value to children. Firstly, one cannot simply learn the skills of learning, even in a particular content area. These skills must be developed in use, and some are only developed in the course of learning—that. Secondly, it is being suggested that these skills are valuable instrumentally. This presupposes that, at any given time, some knowledge—that is valuable. I have already suggested that socially responsible actions require knowledge—that for their performance. Rational action, such as taking means to ends, requires beliefs about the world, and though some ends may be achieved fortuitously, in general people employ means to ends successfully only if the beliefs underlying the choice of means are true beliefs. Moral action demands a consideration of the accompanying consequences of possible methods of attaining one's ends, and for this, too, knowledge about the world and other people is needed.

This discussion of what learning can be considered as worthwhile without further justification is admittedly loose in the sense of being high order. This is, however, unavoidable, since at a lower level of description, what is worth learning changes. I am suggesting, primarily, that if a teacher succeeded, through his various activities which fulfil the criteria suggested for being teaching, in bringing about learning which was not inert and which conformed with other criteria to do with being non-trivial, non-harmful and non-immoral, he would have fulfilled his role. (What learning fulfills these criteria will undoubtedly often be a matter of dispute.)

If this is accepted, then, given some agreement on the value issue (which I suggest is possible since some things are valuable in any society), it is a matter for empirical investigation to determine under what circumstances tightly structured, closely adhered-to curricula would promote this. If it could be shown that only through such curricula could teachers fulfil their role (as outlined here in general terms), then this would justify the tight specification and regular adherence to low-level objectives in the classroom. But the justification would then be an ethical and empirical one (i.e. of the appropriate kind), and not be written into the role through an analysis
The teacher's enactment of his role

It has been accepted that a general intention to bring about worthwhile learning should be part of any teacher's conception of his role, but it is claimed that this does not entail that this intention should be, as it were, to the forefront of his mind throughout the time he enacts his role, nor that, in order to be teaching (and thus doing what he is employed to do) he needs to consciously direct all his actions towards the learning by his pupils of some specific Xs. These comments, which can be interpreted as suggesting that a teacher need not always be consciously enacting his role, bear some relationship to what Sartre has to say about role-playing: "The attentive pupil who wishes to be attentive, his eyes riveted on the teacher, his ears wide open, so exhausts himself in playing the attentive role that he ends up no longer hearing anything."

What Sartre says of the pupil may be enlightening for a teacher's conception of his role, for to adequately enact the teaching role in a school, it may be important for the teacher to lose consciousness of his role. If he is constantly thinking of himself as a teacher, and continually thinking of what he is doing from his own point of view, if he is over-concerned with his own conception of what he is doing and acting in the ways he thinks a teacher ought to act, he may lose his ability to engage in genuine dialogue with his pupils, or his concern with his own self may effectively block his ability to fulfil his role. For pupils do not learn through some kind of direct confrontation with "knowledge", but rather in a transaction with a person who helps them create knowledge for themselves. Though teaching has been analysed as an instrumental transaction, it does not follow that a teacher should view himself as merely an instrument.

The idea of a teacher as a person whose role involves him in choosing objectives and employing means to reach them, as suggested by the activity analysis of teaching, has produced some interesting discussions which are helpful in understanding the sorts of actions
a teacher must engage in if he is to be teaching. As already suggested, though there is nothing he can do which guarantees that he is teaching anyone anything at all, much less anything worthwhile, this cannot be taken as implying that it does not matter what he does. For not any action can be instrumental, in the sense used, in bring about the learning of a given X. Philosophical work done from the point of view of means taken towards an intended end must be relevant for any consideration of teaching acts.

If act A is performed as a means to a given end B and can succeed in bringing about that end (i.e. is appropriate as a means), then it must be possible for that outcome to be brought about by act A even if it were performed without that specific intention. If there are logical relationships which a person who wishes to adopt a means to an end must respect, these logical relationships must be relevant in picking out the acts which teach B X from the range of actions which the teacher may perform.

This assumption has already been made, in the repeated claim that turning up the radiators cannot be an action by virtue of which a person can teach a child e.g. Pythagoras's theorem, for it was denied that all acts which are instrumental in bringing about learning outcomes are teaching acts. It has been argued that being taught involves understanding meanings, and, as a corollary, it has been denied that anything of importance can be learned about teaching by going into classrooms and observing some kind of "raw behaviour". In that sense, therefore, this thesis is anti-positivist. The same logical limits which are restrictive on what can be chosen as means by those who understand what they are trying to do and are aware of all the empirical facts involved must be restrictive equally of what can be counted as teaching acts from the point of view of the observer, who needs, as do the pupils, an understanding of the act. The argument is that in both kinds of case the limits arise because not just any action can be instrumental in the sense meant.

It is worth noting, however, that the limits are different in the case of conceptual or belief learning than in the case of learning physical skills, though in all cases of teaching the relationship must be more than a fortuitous one.
In the case of physical skills, it makes sense to speak of a merely contingent relationship. Though keeping on pedalling hard may be instrumental to learning how to balance on a bicycle, and turning one's head and looking down one's arm may be a way of bringing one's body into a twist whilst diving, the relationship is a contingent one, resting on the structure of the physical world. Though a line between physical skills and skills with a significant cognitive component may be hard to draw, examples of the latter may easily be found. The relationship between acts which, explicitly or implicitly, display, clarify, exhibit, elicit or otherwise bring into a learner's view an X which he learns and that X itself cannot, in such cases, be an entirely contingent one. There must be internal relationships as well. A detailed examination of the epistemological considerations involved is, however, outside the scope of this thesis.

The claim which is made here is that in order to evaluate a teacher's performance and decide whom, whether and what he is teaching (and thus if he is adequately fulfilling his role), one needs to be able to view the teacher's actions through the conceptual frameworks and meaning structures of the pupils rather than simply through those of the teacher himself. No proper judgments on this can be made, in my view, either by employing the activity analysis of teaching, by observing only what the teacher does (from his point of view) or simply by seeing how well pupils perform on tests. In view of the implausibility of having teams of investigators examining all our classrooms, there is the implication that teachers and their pupils may have, in the end, to act as researchers themselves. In the interests of promoting non-inert, non-immoral and non-trivial learning, they will have to discover for themselves how far, in their circumstances, rational curriculum plans assist the teacher in fulfilling his role. There may be more merit than, for example, Hirst and Peters have allowed in the progressive suggestion, which they describe as "weak on content", that teachers should be freed from the use of pre-specified curricula, even that pre-specified by themselves. Some teachers may fulfil their roles more effectively if they deliberately keep their aims "fuzzy" and reject rational curriculum planning. Whether or not this is possible is, however, an empirical and not a logical matter.
My conclusion, therefore, is that it is not a necessary part of the teacher's role that he adopt a pre-planned curriculum for his pupils to follow. Because it has yet to be shown that more teaching of what is worthwhile is promoted by the use of such a curriculum than by open-ended enquiry, it cannot be an obligation of the teacher's role (4) that he specify his objectives as tightly as the nature of the subject matter allows. If, in following pupils' own interests, and pursuing fruitful deviations from his original plans, he is instrumental (in the relevant sense) in bringing about worthwhile learning, then he is fulfilling his obligations as a teacher. Aside from the support of common usage, which does not investigate a person's primary intentions to find out if they are teaching, I suggest that a claim that "this may be worthwhile but it is not teaching" can only be understood as denying that such a teacher is fulfilling his role. I can see no reason for suggesting this, or for adopting a language use which implies it.

If a teacher fails to fulfil his obligation (to bring about worthwhile learning) there is no implication that he must be blame-worthy, for many kinds of circumstances can be responsible for pupils' failure to learn. The suggestion that the teacher has fulfilled his obligation if he has tried seems to me unhelpful. Though I do not accept a maieutic view of teaching in general, the classroom can better be compared with a maternity ward than with a geriatric ward. In the standard case, it is reasonable to expect a teacher to bring about worthwhile learning, given adequate facilities (of which more later). If this were not so, then what justification could there be for compulsory schooling?

Interest and non-inert learning

The concept of interest is one which is central to child-centred views of education, and it is of great importance in relation to the criterion of non-inertness which I have suggested is necessary for children's learning to be of value to them. Much has been written about the distinction between the normative and the psychological concepts of interest 45, and Wilson has recently discussed the relationship between interest in the psychological sense and value 46. Attempts to
elucidate the importance of interest, in the psychological sense, for learning have concerned themselves mainly with the motivational aspects of interest\textsuperscript{47}, and though this is not the aspect I wish to discuss here, there is no doubt that this is of importance. To be interested in X is to have a reason for wanting to pursue activities appropriate to that interest.

There is much that I agree with in Wilson's account of interest, and it is therefore with his discussion that I start. He offers a dispositional account of interests\textsuperscript{48}, so that being interested in P is having a disposition to notice, to pay attention to, and to engage in some activity appropriate to one's interest. But this cannot be a complete account of interest, as Wilson himself sees, for if I like chocolates, I am indeed disposed to notice, pay attention to appropriate activity (eating) with respect to them. A dispositional account on its own does not serve to pick out being interested in P from liking P, to take but one example.

Clearly something further is needed to fill out this account, for we know from our own experience that to be interested in something is not merely to have tendencies to do things. It is, in a very important way, to see something in a certain light, to have a view of it which in some ways accounts for the disposition to act appropriately. If interest was simply a disposition to act (appropriately), then accounts of behaviourist psychologists would be adequate as explanations of the creation or engendering of interest; for engendering of interest would simply involve the 'reinforcement' of (what the psychologist considered to be) appropriate behaviour, so that we simply found ourselves 'disposed' to act. If, on the other hand, being interested in P involves seeing P in some particular light - as having a point or significance, of being capable of variety or of being understood and performed better, for example - then this cognitive component which is involved in interest, and a 'proneness' not simply to act appropriately but to decide to do what one sees oneself as appropriate, makes interest understandable as something which can be taught rather than something that is conditioned.

I am not sure how far I am further in disagreement with Wilson,
for though we are agreed that exactly the same observable behaviour may be engaged in by a child who is interested in P, side by side with a child who is bored, he denies that there is any "internal" or "private" going-on, which, if disclosed or discovered would provide an infallible mode of distinguishing between the two. If I am correct in my suggestion that being interested in P is not simply to have a psychological disposition or proneness, but also, as suggested, to view P, the object of one's interest, in a certain light, then such an additional condition necessary to feeling interest in something would, indeed, refer to some "private" going-on; the difference in attitude, in the way the child viewed what he was doing, would, in principle, be sufficient to distinguish an interested child from a bored one. Of course, this does not, in practice, give us an infallible method for distinguishing between the two children, but then we have very few infallible methods for anything. It certainly is the case that there are instances in which we can know that a child is interested in something. His actions in respect of it provide us with the grounds of our belief, but whether or not we know that the child is interested in P does not rest on the infallibility of our inferences from his actions, but on the truth or otherwise of our belief that he has these dispositions and this attitude towards P which are constitutive of an interest in it.

On such an analysis of interest, a person who is interested in P is necessarily motivated to (has a reason for) engaging in activities related to P, or, as Wilson puts it, "wanting to become more skilful, more informed, more understanding, more appreciative, more experienced, etc." at P. However, it doesn't follow, as it seems to me that Wilson implies, that if a person is interested in an activity, he must necessarily be pursuing it for its interest. If I am doing P for its interest, then I must necessarily expect to find P interesting, but if I am finding P interesting, nothing follows about my reasons for doing P. I may be engaging in P for any number of different reasons. All that can be said is that if I am interested in P, my interest would provide me with a reason for continuing to do P if the reasons for which I actually am doing P are no longer operative. That is, though an interest in P can provide motivation for doing P, it is not necessarily the case that my doing of P at any time is motivated by my interest in P, even though I am finding P interesting.
Nor is there any reason to suppose that if I am doing \( P \) as part of my interest in \( Q \), I am necessarily finding \( P \) interesting. I may be doing it because of my interest in \( Q \) (that is, my interest in \( Q \) is my reason for doing \( P \)) but this cannot ensure that I am not bored by \( P \). A further complexity is that though a person's interest in \( P \) gives him a reason for pursuing \( Q \) as part of his interest, he may also have a reason related in some way to \( Q \), against pursuing \( Q \). For example, he may find \( Q \) itself boring or difficult, and if this is so, as far as he is concerned, there is a reason against pursuing \( Q \). The motivational aspect of interest is therefore seen to be more complex than child-centred theorists suggest. Interest is a matter of degree, and thus gives one strong or weak reasons for acting, which must be weighed up against other reasons against acting. That is, an interest in \( P \) is not a sufficient reason for action, in all cases.

As already suggested, an interest in \( P \) may be a reason for an agent's pursuit of \( Q \) if the latter is necessary for the development of his interest in \( P \), both where the relationship of \( P \) to \( Q \) is an internal one and where it is not. But if \( Q \) is boring or difficult, for example, then he also has a reason against pursuing \( Q \). Whether he decides to pursue \( Q \), then, is a contingent matter, depending on how he evaluates his interest in \( P \) in relation to his boredom with, or difficulty in doing, \( Q \). And it is worth noting that if \( Q \) is necessary for his pursuit of \( P \), then abandoning \( Q \) necessitates abandoning \( P \). If the necessity is of a conceptual kind (e.g. as mathematics is for the pursuit of certain scientific activities) there can be no substitute. This kind of discussion suggests that it is a mistake to talk of interest as if there could never be any problems of motivation in classrooms where children are allowed to pursue their interests.

"Making their lessons interesting" is sometimes said to be an obligation of the teacher's role (3) and Wilson has some scathing things to say about this. He quotes from Dewey 51, "When things have to be made interesting, it is because interest itself is wanting. Moreover, the phrase is a misnomer. The thing, the object, is no more interesting than it was before. The appeal is simply made to the child's love of something else." 52

Wilson discusses this manipulative use of children's interests by teachers to which Dewey seems to be referring 53, where the latter use
children's existing interests to make them do or learn other things that they are not interested in doing or learning, this being the price the child has to pay in order to be allowed to do the things he does find interesting afterwards. The way in which he makes this point seems unnecessarily tortuous. It would seem sufficient to simply query whether it is moral to manipulate children "for their own good" in this way (and thus be asking whether doing this can be regarded as part of the teacher's role (4)) than to engage in stipulation in respect of the standard usage of the term 'education' as a way of making the same point. For it doesn't seem that many people are willing to regard the learning of e.g. the skills of teacher-baiting as part of someone's education. Such manipulation certainly seems to require justification, for there is an obvious incompatibility between such manipulation of a child and treating him with respect as a person. Wilson seems to have a point when he comments, "And would it not be begging the question yet again to reply merely that children, as a matter of 'fact', are not 'really' persons...and that they do not merit or need treatment as persons, therefore, while they are being educated." (Here he seems to be using the term 'education' in a more usual sense, since, in the sense in which he himself generally uses the term, it seems logically impossible for a child who is being manipulated into learning to be being educated.)

The question raised here, then, is whether or not we can justify institutionalizing as a standard role obligation of a teacher either the manipulation or the coercion of children into learning what we think it is good for them to learn. If the answer to this question is "No", it would not follow that there could never be circumstances in which such manipulation or coercion might be right, for there is a parallel in our acceptance that though, in general, one ought to tell the truth, there may be situations in which telling a lie might be the right thing to do. If we agree with Wilson that this ought not to be done in the standard case, then of course some further account of the ways in which it is justifiable for the teacher to act in the standard situation must be given. It does seem, prima facie, that there is nothing about children that makes them obvious candidates for manipulation or coercion in schools. Clearly there is some relationship between the view that manipulation or coercion is,
in many, if not most, instances necessary and the view that pupils must learn what the teacher intends them to learn. They must be made to learn what he intends, for otherwise, on this view, he is not teaching them anything they learn. If this position is abandoned, as I suggest it is logically permissible and empirically justifiable to do, at least in some cases, it may be that our views on manipulation or coercion lose some of their support.

Wilson accepts the activity analysis of teaching insofar as teaching is attempting to bring about learning. His work thus implies that it is an educator's (and thus a teacher insofar as he is an educator) obligation to try to bring about the learning by children of that which they are interested in learning, unless it is the case that the activities in which the child wishes to engage are immoral or harmful, in which case it is the teacher's obligation to stop him. It seems that Wilson assumes that in this way motivational problems will be avoided, but I have earlier pointed out that though interest in learning may be a reason for the child's engaging in appropriate learning activities, from the child's point of view it is not necessarily an over-riding reason. Thus it does not follow that pursuing a child-centred course of action will ensure that all children will engage in learning activities and therefore that the school will fulfil its responsibilities in respect of all children.

It is worth commenting that this position, as it stands, seems to involve a very considerable reduction, if not an elimination of, teacher autonomy. The same objections which can be raised to the 'traditional view' by child centred theorists in respect of the child's pursuing activities which he does not value simply because the teacher values them (i.e. that this view defines for the pupil a role in which he is not respected as a person) seem to be open to the child-centred conception of the teacher's role. If the only activities a teacher can pursue must be the ones the child values, and he must pursue them even if he does not value them himself, then a role has been defined for the teacher in which he does not seem to be respected as a person.

This discussion, however, points to a more positive point which can be made about interests, and this relates to the earlier suggestion
that a necessary condition of worthwhileness of learning was that what was learned was not inert. If we accept the modified account I have given of being interested in something, it is clear that the dispositional aspect of interest makes it necessarily the case that what is learned with (not through) interest is not "dead" or "inert". However, since this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for learning's being worth promoting in school (some interesting activities being harmful, immoral or trivial) further criteria must be employed to judge which of children's existing interests should be promoted, and also to justify attempts to teach them new interests. Teaching new interests is justifiable and therefore part of the teacher's role (4) because of the non-inertness of the learning involved, but, given that it is accepted that all interests are not equally worthwhile, reference needs to be made to other criteria of value to justify trying to teach the interest of this new activity rather than that one. The teacher's own interests (as suggested by some of the writings of free-schoolers and deschoolers) would be too arbitrary, though it is clear that the teacher must understand the interest of X in order to teach children to be interested in X. This point, too, has practical implications which will be discussed later.

The original Dewey comment quoted earlier can now be interpreted as suggesting that it is a mistake first to choose content (subject matter or problem) and then try to "make" it interesting. Rather the teacher and pupils must choose subject matter for its interest. The activities engaged in must also be ones which reveal rather than conceal the subject matter's potential for interest. It is not a matter of "making" the inherently uninteresting interesting, but of helping children to see what there is about an enquiry or subject which is interesting.

**Teaching new interests**

It seems to me that when teachers talk about making their lessons interesting, they are often talking about teaching children the interest of something. Interest cannot be coerced, and Wilson is clearly right in his suggestion that we can't make children interested in things any more than we can make them like strawberry jam if they
don't. But one can't choose to feel interested in something either, so Wilson is correct when he suggests that teaching children the interest of something involves the teacher in communicating to his pupils whatever it is about the subject matter that he himself finds interesting, and that this must be related to its point. But interest, then, is taught by eliciting.

What else can be said philosophically about teaching the interest of something? White says of the relationship between interest and attention, "We may attend because we are interested. We are not interested because we attend." But when it comes to learning to be interested in something, we can get no guidance, as Wilson seems to suggest by quoting White's comment, from the claim that we are not interested because we attend but attend because we are interested. Attending to X is a necessary condition of learning what it is about X that is interesting. It is true that we don't become interested simply because we attend, but attention to X is not simply a necessary empirical condition for becoming interested in X. There is a contradiction involved in suggesting that I could be learning (or being taught) the interest of P without attending to P in any way. The comments White makes, important though they might be when it comes to considering what interest is, have no implications, as Wilson seems to think, for the teaching of interest.

Wilson says of teaching the interest of something, "We cannot get children interested in something by getting them to do anything." Now if it were the case that he meant that getting children to do something is not sufficient to ensure that they come to see the interest of the activity, there would be no disagreement between us. But this doesn't seem to be his point, for he contrasts "getting them to do it" with "teaching them the interest of it." The point is that we cannot teach children what is interesting about P without getting them to do something related to P. The argument is the same as the one above, and the claim is that children must do something related to P as a necessary part of our teaching them the interest of P.

Thus the discussion of the importance of interest has led us to
two conclusions: there are good reasons for including in our concept of the teacher's role (4) obligations concerned with teaching children the interest of and sustaining their interest in learning that which is accepted as worthwhile on grounds other than interest. I have earlier suggested that there are certain kinds of learning which need no special justification, such as learning about the physical world, learning about other people, learning about one's own society (including the understanding of it provided by the study of other societies), moral learning, and possibly the expressive arts. In order to teach children the interest of these activities, teachers must engage with children in activities through which they can learn the interest of knowing, understanding or doing these things. Such an interest is important for it ensures that whatever is learned with interest is not inert, in that it is not dominated by or restricted to wanting to give "right answers" to the teacher, and is available for use by pupils in the enlargement of their capacity for experience and the performance of responsible social action.

Some children will be willing to engage in the activities which are necessary if they are to learn to find the subject matter, skills and ways of looking at the world interesting because they are instrumental to goals which they already have. Other children will already be interested in doing them. But some will need other reasons for engaging in these activities. If we find it objectionable to institutionalize as the teacher's standard role either coercion or manipulation because of the lack of respect this shows for pupils as persons, some further account is necessary to cover this aspect of the teacher's role. Finally, if teaching is centrally concerned with interest in schools, there will be implications for the conditions under which schooling needs to be conducted in order to achieve such goals, as briefly mentioned by Wilson on his book 62. These problems will be returned to later.
CHAPTER 7: (a) The Teaching of Values and (b) Assessment

PART (a): The Teaching of Values

Introduction

Whether or not it is part of the role of the school to teach values, and, if so, what values a school ought to teach, is an important topic of current concern. There have been suggestions that schools are simply the instruments whereby a ruling class imposes its values on children, and counter-suggestions that schools can be instrumental in changing the values of a society. Both of these positions imply that it is a matter of choice whether or not the schools teach values, and a matter of decision as to what values are taught. On the other hand, there are claims that the schools cannot but reflect the values of a society.

Most of the roles which have been suggested in the past for schools - education, indoctrination, socialization, enculturation, training in citizenship, adjustment - have implicit in the meanings of the terms used the teaching of values. The 1944 Education Act includes "the moral development of the community" as one of the ultimate purposes of schools, and the Plowden Report states that "a school must transmit values and attitudes". Durkheim saw the goal of the schools as the maintenance of a moral consensus in a secular society. Oeser's list of the teacher's sub-roles includes reference to the teaching of values, as does Hoyle's. There is no doubt that the teaching of values is part of the role of the school and of the teachers within it.

Today, however, there are some people who suggest that the schools should accept more responsibility for moral teaching, because the family, where, according to the proponents of this view, this really belongs is failing in its task. It is not clear whether the claim is that the families concerned are failing to teach their children any values, or that the values which the families are teaching are, in some way, the wrong values. Is the suggestion that the schools should step in to fill a gap - or that they should teach their pupils...
to give up the values they have in favour of other values? If the latter, it is presupposed that there is some way of showing that some values are more justifiable than others.

Both the position that schools should increase their concern over the teaching of values, and the contrary view that they should give up the teaching of values (e.g. because they have no right to 'impose' their preferences on children) share the assumption that it is a matter of choice whether the school teaches values or not. As suggested earlier, this thesis asks and attempts to answer the question as to whether or not teaching in the area of values and of morality is in some way a necessary part of the role of the school, or whether it is entirely contingent, and therefore a matter of choice. It can be seen that the necessity involved cannot be quite a matter of strict logical necessity, but it is not a matter of simple empirical necessity either. The case being argued here is that the school cannot opt out of the teaching of values, so that it is, in that sense, necessary for them to make decisions in the light of what values are taught and what values one can justify teaching.

The implication of this, if the arguments which follow are valid, is that empirical investigations are required to ascertain what values teachers in schools do teach, and how they teach them. For unless this is known, it would be impossible to decide whether or not the values being taught are justifiable, and thus to ask whether or not teachers should choose to continue or to cease performing the actions through which these values are taught. For changes in the kinds of actions embodying etc. values which teachers perform could alter what values are taught in schools.

On the account of teaching given earlier, even if it is the case that schools cannot opt out of teaching in the area of values and of morality, some choice is open to them regarding what values are to be taught once it is understood how values are taught. And, in the light of claims that schools "impose middle class values on children", it is important to enquire whether all values are 'imposed' or whether the teaching of some values can be clearly shown not to be a matter of imposition.
On the Scheffler/Hirst analysis of teaching, it is clear that a person can only be involved in teaching (in the sense important in schools) in the area of morality and values by his own decision. However, the discussions of role in Chapter 5 indicate that a decision to try to bring about the learning of values, taken by an individual teacher, is not sufficient to make it a part of the role of a teacher, either in the sense of normative expectations or in the sense of descriptive expectations. Similarly, a decision to refrain from teaching values is not sufficient to exclude it from the role.

If a teacher claims that it is part of the teacher's role to try to teach values, there are two ways of interpreting this. Firstly, it may be interpreted as an empirical claim, that groups of people in the community hold the expectations of teachers that they will, or ought to, try to teach values. Like any empirical claim, this may be mistaken. It is also the case that expectations change, so if it is a part of the teacher's role (2) or (3) at one time, it does not follow that it will continue to be so in the future. In distinguishing the evaluative sense of role (role (4)), I pointed out that simply because groups of people expect something of the teacher, it does not follow that what they expect of him is justifiable. Thus an alternative interpretation of the claim may involve sense (4) and be a suggestion that this is what others ought to expect him to assume an obligation to do; this implies neither that they do nor that they do not now have such an expectation.

Various objections might be raised to the suggestion that it is part of the teacher's role (4) to try to teach values. For example, it might be argued that values are not 'taught' but 'caught'. If it is impossible to teach values, it would follow that it would be foolish to attempt to do so, for such an attempt would be bound to fail. It could therefore not justifiably be part of a teacher's role. On such an argument, it might be claimed that the school and its teachers could not be held responsible for the values that pupils learn there, on the grounds that no-one could be responsible if the values are merely 'picked up'. This objection is sophistic. For though the school and its teachers cannot be held responsible for everything that pupils learn there, the distinction between values being
'taught' and 'caught' as used here is unacceptable. Values are not like measles, caught unwittingly from someone who has them, nor, on the other hand, like stones to be picked up casually because they are lying around. Values involve meanings, and, I suggest, we are taught values (by our parents, friends and others) in the same informal way that we are taught our native language. Indeed, this is not surprising since we employ language, including moral language, to communicate and think about values with.

Hare has pointed out that learning moral values (and, I would add, values generally) is not like learning-that, nor is it like learning-how-to. To learn to value something new is to adopt, in many cases, new ways of acting, or even new ways of living, and to learn new moral values may be to learn to be a different kind of person. Learning values is an example of what Scheffler has distinguished as learning-to or learning-to-be. Hare suggests that values are not taught simply by telling or informing children that this is what they ought to accept as being of worth, or what they ought to accept as a way to live. This is not to be taken as implying that there is no learning-that involved in learning-to, but simply as a claim that learning-to is not reducible to learning-that and learning-how-to. Therefore teaching-to is not reducible to teaching-that and teaching-how-to. Nonetheless, values are claimed to be teachable, as other learnings-to-be are. We can teach others to be impartial, punctual or honest, to appreciate music, to experience the pleasure of X-ing, or to be interested in P.

Other, more serious, objections to the view that schools should teach values as part of their role would be moral ones. On the one hand, it might be suggested that parents ought to have the responsibility of teaching their children values, for, on this view, the schools would be having quite enough expected of them if they were responsible only for teaching-that and teaching-how-to. An extension of this argument sometimes offered is the claim that if it were accepted that value teaching was the schools' responsibility, then the parents would simply opt out of value teaching altogether. Since, it is argued, parents play a far more significant part in their children's lives than schools do and, anyway, the up-bringing of children is, in our society, primarily their responsibility, anything which might lead parents to take this
attitude would be unjustifiable.

On the other hand, there is the objection that since, in a pluralist society, there are conflicts of values, the values a school might teach could be in conflict with the values which parents wished to have their children taught. Such an objection is concerned with the rights of the parents to have their children taught only values which they accept. This position has received support, for example, from Musgrove and Taylor in an influential book. They write:

"During the past hundred years there has grown up in our midst a new despotism: the rule of the teachers. Today they claim (sic) to decide what kind of people we shall be. This is not a joint and generally agreed decision, even among the teachers themselves. One school has decided (sic) that Englishmen shall be decorous and self-restrained; another that they shall show greater spontaneity and even gaiety; a third that they shall be rooted in the ancient values of their locality; a fourth that they shall have broad horizons, that they shall be "universal men"....

"Even within a given school, one teacher may be organizing his work and modifying his methods to produce Englishmen who approximate to the Pueblo Indians, encouraging co-operation and discouraging competition, using group methods, placing stress on creativity; he aims (sic) to produce human beings who place the common good above individual reputation; next door his colleague aims (sic) to produce Englishmen who approximate to the Commanches; courageous, individualistic, enterprising, full of dash and initiative; for him mark lists and orders of merit are important instruments of policy. Individual work is encouraged. Punishment is inflicted to produce stoicism, rather than effect reformation. It is conceivable that the parents of these children want neither Pueblos nor Commanches. This is an irrelevance. Only if children are being trained to be neo-Nazis of Polyginists would protest be likely, or even seem to be in order.

"A school will decide in a hundred ways what kind of human beings to produce (sic) when it decides to run a Scout Troop rather than a Combined Cadet Force; to stream or to de-stream; to teach Chinese and Persian rather than commercial French; to enforce or to abolish school uniform; to have prefects elected or nominated; to let boys sit with girls. These vital decisions - and a thousand others - will be made by the teachers themselves; they need the ratification of no higher authority. They are, in the strict sense, irresponsible."

Musgrove and Taylor are quite right in suggesting that by marking out one pattern of conduct which they approve and one which
they disapprove, one which is deemed to merit punishment, one deemed to merit reward, teachers may be teaching pupils values and/or dispositions of a moral type. They may, however, be wrong in their belief that teachers do these things in order to produce Englishmen of the type they have decided. They may not see themselves "producing" people at all. They may have made no conscious decision to produce particular types of person - indeed they may believe it wrong to "mould" children. The teacher who uses mark lists, stars or orders of merit may do this because it is the school custom, because he is told to, because he believes that there is considerable motivational value in mark lists or orders of merit, because the college where he trained approved of them (or perhaps because it disapproved of them), or for many other reasons. I am not suggesting that they are not being used deliberately, but the teacher's using them intentionally does not indicate that he has carefully-thought-out intentions to "produce" particular kinds of people and is using them as a means to this end. However, the outcome will be the same, since this is not determined by the teacher's intentions. The decisions, as Musgrove and Taylor suggest, provide the framework of schooling, and thus structure the situations in which teachers act. In this way they may impart values to children who do not hold them already - that is, they may teach children new values.

Musgrove and Taylor, categorizing the present position as "arrogant disdain of their clients"\textsuperscript{78}, and contrasting it with the American position which they categorize (equally scathingly, it appears) as "subservience to local communities and 'subcultures'"\textsuperscript{79}, offer their own solution. They suggest that there should be available, in the public sector of the school system as well as in the private, a choice of possibilities, so that the parents rather than teachers will 'decide' what sort of people the children will become.

This position is open to several objections. Firstly, it ignores the point that there may be conflict between parents' ideas on what sort of children they want their children to become and the conditions which facilitate the teaching and learning which the parents also desire for their children and which may embody a different set of values. For example, there is conflict in a desire to discourage competitiveness and a desire that children learn "a lot" for anyone who
believes that children only "learn a lot" in a competitive situation, for this may teach them to be competitive.

Secondly, this particular judgment made by Musgrove and Taylor fits inadequately with their own other judgment that "justice requires the elimination of parents from direct involvement in education and the disregard by teachers of local community traditions and values." The debate about community education, which Merson and Campbell have called "instruction for inequality," is far from finished. Discussions about voucher systems suggest that the poor and the ill-informed will end up with the worst schools.

Thirdly, it has been argued already that it is possible for people to value what ought not to be valued, and that not all values are justifiable. So from the fact that their parents value X it cannot be concluded that their children ought to be taught to value X (which argument would, additionally, commit the Naturalistic Fallacy).

Finally, the whole basis of this judgment itself can be questioned for it seems to assume that children are parents' property, with which they are entitled to do as they wish, enlisting the co-operation of the teachers in a contractual arrangement to do so. They neglect the difficulties inherent in any 'rights' claims, including the 'rights' claims of parents. Furthermore, in considering only the relationship of parents' rights and teachers' rights, they pay only lip service to the rights of the child (who, at the age of thirteen or fourteen is conceded a "right to choose what he will become"). As Roe says, one can "have sympathy with a child who interprets a holy alliance between his parents and teachers for the most noble educational purposes (as advocated by most text-books) as an unholy conspiracy against him." With this view many might agree.

There can thus be seen to be two alternative positions stressing parents' rights in the teaching of values. The first suggests that the school should refrain from teaching values at all. The second suggests that the parents should be able to back up the values which they are trying to teach at home by choosing a school with the same values. The values taught are thus seen as, in the long run, the most important part of what a school teaches, more important than knowledge-that or knowledge-how, as embodied in the curriculum.
Barrow, too, has recently argued that the role (4) of the school is primarily concerned with teaching 'virtues' - that is, value teaching. This has always been a primary concern of the public schools here, and there have been recent reports of groups of American Indians asking for separate schooling for their children because they object to the teaching of competitiveness which, they claim, goes on in ordinary schools. Deschoolers have referred to this implicit teaching of values as "the hidden curriculum", and claim that, however much teachers have the intention of teaching their pupils to be autonomous, the schools will, as they always have done, continue to teach the value of conformity. The values of the school, as a means of consensus, and their transmission through ritual, are discussed by Bernstein et al., who call the activities, procedures and judgments involved in the transmission of values "the expressive culture of the school."

If it is accepted that schools have always taught values implicitly in this kind of way, a person who finds this in some ways objectionable can, theoretically, propose two possible solutions. One is that the school should give up value teaching. The other is to teach values explicitly rather than implicitly and make value teaching part of the school curriculum.

The latter view has seen the production of a number of curriculum projects for value teaching, most of them taking as their basis the claim that rational discussion of values is possible. Though some of these claim to be neutral between values, clearly they cannot be seen as neutral in respect of the values of autonomy, truth and rationality; thus, the logical possibility of conflict with parents' values remains. Others explicitly seek to teach a way of life (e.g. the teaching of a rational morality as against a religious one, or of a 'considerate life-style') which, again, may conflict with parents' values, particularly in a pluralist society. Thus, whatever the position taken on values by the curriculum project or the teacher, it is still open to those who believe, with Musgrove and Taylor, that parents are entitled to decide which values their children shall learn, to deny that such explicit curriculum projects are part of the role (4) of the school, and argue that in a school which caters to the whole community, value teaching should be given up. The most that might uncontroversially be supported might be the teaching of moral concepts. Even here there is difficulty because of fundamental disagreements on issues related to the
meaning of moral language; and if MacIntyre\textsuperscript{91}, for example, among others, is right, it may be that different groups have different moral concepts.

How plausible is the suggestion that schools ought to give up teaching values altogether? On the Hirst/Scheffler analysis of teaching, this position is plausible enough. Value teaching, like any other teaching, logically requires an intention to bring about learning. If all teachers accept that it is unjustifiable to try to bring about the learning of values by children in schools, on the basis of some such argument as above, value teaching could simply be crossed off the list of teachers' responsibilities, and teachers could refrain from teaching values in the same way as they could refrain from teaching mathematics - by deciding not to do so. This is the position adopted by Neill at Summerhill, for example.

Neill suggests in all his writings that the teaching of values is wrong, and in his school, where a child's freedom to choose is made the highest value, there is both fear of, as well as moral disapproval of, 'moulding' the child, which is equated with teaching him values. Yet one is continually made aware in his writings that Neill has very strong moral views\textsuperscript{92}, that he takes it for granted that his pupils will "think of the consequences for Summerhill" of doing X (a moral position for both them and him). Can it be consistently maintained that the question of responsibility is solved by a nominal 'opting-out' in this way? Does not the intention-based analysis of teaching help cover up the very real inconsistencies in Neill's position? Is he not teaching his pupils values, implicitly rather than explicitly, teaching them, as Ryle put it\textsuperscript{93}, "in a familiar sense of 'taught'(to) treat, and sincerely to treat, certain things as of overwhelming importance"? The values which Neill's school teaches are not the same as those of, for example, the public schools, but the children who are 'successes' at Summerhill learn Neill's values though Neill claims not to intend this. Neill surely has some responsibility here, and I wonder whether his refusal to admit to teaching values is merely semantic, or whether it is a way of abdicating responsibility. The question is whether it is important to deny what Neill claims, and what Hirst and Scheffler could claim, that whether or not we teach children values is a matter of choice.
Value teaching on a pericience analysis of teaching

On the analysis of this thesis, we can speak of someone teaching values without the implication that he performed the acts which were the instrument of value teaching in order to get others to learn values. Indeed, it was earlier claimed that this analysis was needed in order to make sense of the idea of a moral person's teaching moral values by example. It was suggested that there was a paradox involved in the suggestion that a claim that A was e.g. teaching B to be considerate by example necessarily implied that A was being considerate with the intention of getting B to learn to be considerate.

On this analysis, what values are being taught is discovered. Of course, there will often be a relationship between what is being taught by A and what A is trying to teach, if anything, since teaching attempts are often successful. However, it is not sufficient to support the claim that A is teaching B to value X by showing simply that B is learning to value X. To know that A is teaching B to value X, grounds are required for believing that it is A's actions of a certain kind which are bringing about the learning. Most moral teaching seems to go on either implicitly (thus involving pupils in interpreting their teachers' actions on a moral dimension) or through discussions in which people's primary intention is to decide what they ought to do, or whether, in a particular case, what has been done is morally justifiable. One objection to a claim that schools might teach values only through special curriculum projects might be that only in the ways previously mentioned (and in similar ways) can morality be taught as something that is lived. On such a view, curriculum projects could, at the most, help in moral teaching, but they could not constitute it on their own.

Particularly if Piaget94 and Kohlberg95 are right and moral learning takes place in stages, a person who seeks a significant relationship with children cannot 'opt out' in the area of moral and value learning. A teacher who refuses to condemn or stop bullying can be seen by children as giving it his tacit approval, and he may thus teach them that there is nothing wrong with bullying, that there is no need to have moral concern for it. Telling children that they
should be concerned is not the way in which concern is taught. Similarly, it is arguable that no teacher should be seen by children to be indifferent e.g. to injustice, racism, violence or cruelty, for this may either teach these as acceptable values, or may teach children actively to disvalue concern for these kinds of actions. We must not forget that teaching children to disvalue something is also teaching values.

Many writers have commented on the teaching of values through the operation of punishment systems in schools, and Wilson casts doubt on whether children can be taught new values by the operation of such systems (or, as he calls them, penalties). Giving children as a reason for obeying a justifiable rule the punishment which will accrue if they disobey will be more likely to teach them to be prudent than to be moral. Indeed, it may be true that, as deschoolers argue, the schools' and teachers' operation of a punishment system is the main way in which the value of conformity is taught, even if the schools have the declared aims of developing autonomy. If teachers themselves really value conforming behaviour by children (for it makes their lives much easier) it should not be found surprising if they non-intentionally teach it as a value, for their actions embody their values. The operation of the punishment system often makes it clear that teachers will insist that pupils do X or refrain from doing Y even if the pupils believe (possibly justifiably) that X is wrong or that they ought to do Y. If this is the case, it is impossible that the schools could teach the value of moral integrity.

It is not being suggested here that all teachers must, at some stage in fulfilling their roles, necessarily bring about the learning of values, simply because they may have extensive close contact with children and be viewed by them as "significant others" at a stage in their moral development where this is critical. I am only suggesting that it is impossible to avoid the possibility of this. The claim is a negative one only, for the teaching may not occur because other conditions necessary for teaching are missing - for example, there may be an identity of the teacher's values and the child's, so that, logically, the child cannot be taught them. But since, on this account, it is impossible to ensure avoiding the teaching of values, it is argued to be impossible for the teacher to
'opt out' of value teaching in the same way that he can 'opt out' of mathematics teaching. He does the latter, on the perfricence analysis, not by refraining from having any intention to teach in the area of mathematics but by refraining from performing any mathematical acts.

The reason he cannot opt out of value teaching is that one cannot, in the same way, refrain from acting in ways related to values, because of the relationship between valuing and action. The significant factor is the nature of values, and the way that valuing pervades all aspects of life. Since 'ought' in some sense implies 'can', the conclusion must be that since it is impossible to ensure that one teaches no values, there can be no question of justifying either the inclusion or elimination of value teaching from the teacher's role. The proper question is therefore not whether or not to teach values, but, insofar as it is possible to choose, how to ensure that that which we may teach children to value is justifiable, and that where possible they learn to assess values rationally. It is this latter aspect which justifies explicit discussions on value issues, for the implicit teaching of values may leave pupils unclear about the justifications and unaware that there is not universal agreement on all value issues. This does not, itself, suggest that value curriculum projects should be used, and there is no space to discuss this issue here. Certainly, however, they could never succeed if pupils came to view them as embodying content to be mastered in the same way as e.g. mathematics or swimming.

Interests and valuing

In the previous chapter I suggested that interest (in the psychological sense) was important for learning because it ensured the non-inertness of what is learned. It is, additionally, important in another way, for interest is a value. This point has been raised by Wilson, who offers an analysis of valuing, suggesting that "valuing is having a reason for action." However, it is by no means clear what he means here. What is the meaning of the 'is' in the claim that valuing is (my italics) having a reason for action? There are several possible interpretations.
(a) Perhaps he is suggesting that what I mean when I say I value something is that I have a reason for acting. But this sounds implausible, for when I say I value something, I am referring in some way to the way I view what I claim to value, that I see it, for example, as worth having. When I say that I value the friendship that I had with someone in the past, I need mean nothing about acting at all.

(b) Perhaps he is suggesting that when I have a reason for acting I am necessarily valuing something, so that valuing something is simply an alternative description of what I am doing when I am acting for a reason. But the problem with this is that reasons for action relate to purposes, and purposes presuppose valuing. If I value something, then I have a reason for action where action is appropriate. But presupposition relationships are not usually explicated using the term 'is'.

(c) Perhaps it is a mistake to think that the 'is' denotes an equivalence at all. Perhaps the suggestion is rather that valuing is a necessary condition of having reasons for action. But since, on a commonly accepted view of meaning, giving necessary conditions would be explicating meaning, this returns us to (a).

Perhaps there is some assistance to be gained from Wilson's claim that values are explanatory reasons. If I am asked why I am saving something from a burning house, to answer that it is because I value it, as Wilson says, to give an explanatory reason. But this is precisely why valuing cannot mean having a reason for action. For if it did, my assertion that I value the P that I am saving from the burning house could be no explanation at all. It would reduce to the tautology that the reason I saved P was that I had a reason for saving it. The fact that reference to valuing can function as an explanation surely indicates that further explication of the notion of valuing is required. I have already suggested that this involves seeing something as worth having, as worth acting to support, gain or keep where action is appropriate, and if I am correct in this suggestion, this would account for the explanatory force of valuing claims.
My suggestion is that when we say that a person values P, we mean that he sees P as being of worth, so that in circumstances where it is appropriate for him to act to support, gain or keep P, he has a reason for action. On such an account, for example, to value truth or honesty is to see it as of worth, and thus, on occasions where there is a choice between truth or falsity, honesty or dishonesty, to have a reason for acting in ways appropriate to truth or honesty. The analysis is the same as for material values. It would not follow, though, from the fact that a person valued P that he would always act, where appropriate, to support, gain or keep P, for (as parallel to the discussions on interest as a reason for action), there may be other reasons, which over-ride the reason provided by the fact that one values P, against performing the action which is appropriate for a person who values P. This is simply to say that values may conflict with one another, or, if one wishes to suggest that desires can be distinguished from e.g. moral values (thus distinguishing between different kinds of pro-attitudes\textsuperscript{101}), to say that a person's desires may conflict with his values. Valuing P is not always a sufficient condition for appropriate action.

It was earlier suggested that finding P interesting could not be analysed simply as a psychological proneness, and this is an important point if one wishes to suggest, as Wilson does\textsuperscript{102}, that interest in the psychological sense is a value. I earlier suggested that being interested in P involved seeing P in a certain light, and that this was related to having a disposition to act in ways appropriate to P. If the way of acting which is appropriate to an interest in P is, as Wilson put it, to do things which enable one to "become more skilful, more informed, more understanding, more appreciative etc.\textsuperscript{103} of P", then learning more about P is a way of acting which is appropriate to an interest in P. Put in another way, an interest in P gives one a reason for wanting to learn more in respect of P, and a person who is interested in P must see P as something in relation to which it is worth learning more. To learn to be interested in P is thus to learn to value P, and also to learn to value learning more in respect of P. Teaching a child the interest of P is thus teaching him values. Insofar as he also learns that certain of what are commonly known as "the intellectual virtues" - clarity, honesty, imagination, etc. - are important for the development
of his interests (whatever they are) he will additionally learn to value them. These are values which it is surely justifiable to teach, and the important things to note here is that (a) since this learning is an accompaniment of his learning of interest, and the learning of interest cannot be coerced, he must come freely to value these intellectual virtues and the skills of learning and (b) that the child who learns these values in this way learns to value them rationally.

If the P which a teacher teaches a child to be interested in can be shown to be, prima facie, worth valuing, then his subsequent learning in respect of P will necessarily fulfil the other criterion necessary for his learning of P to be worthwhile, that it should not be inert. This is so because interest, as we have said, involves dispositions to act. The relationships between a child's interest in P, the non-inertness of his learning and the values he has been taught are not merely contingent ones.

Teaching a child the interest of P is, of course, not claimed to be the only way of ensuring that he values learning about P, but it is an important way, and the non-contingency of the relationship is one of the factors which makes it important. For, in contrast, where the P that is learned is valued only because it is being used instrumentally to achieve some goal, if the goal is abandoned the learner has no further reason to value knowing etc. about P. There is also no reason for the learning related to P to remain non-inert. In contrast to Wilson, I suggest that there are two senses in which we can speak of the instrumentality of learning in relation to interest, one related to the reasons for which a person learns P, and the other related to what it can be used for. Learning through interest may be instrumental in the sense that it was learned in order to enable the learner to pursue further knowledge etc., as Wilson suggests, but it may be non-instrumental in that sense in that it may simply be learned for its own sake, or, as Holt might say, through curiosity and in pursuit of no further goal.

But learning through interest which is non-instrumental, in the sense that the agent did not have as his reason for learning the pursuit of some further goal, may yet be instrumental in a different
sense, in that it does enable one to learn more, and could be argued to be valuable for this reason. Finally, the learning may be instrumental for pursuing some morally acceptable goal to which it is intrinsically related, as, for example, mathematics might be to a career as a design engineer, and may be valued for this reason. (It is worth pointing to the contrast between learning P to pass an examination to qualify for a job to which P is not related. In the previous example, the learning has a permanent value, whilst in the latter one, it may become inert or be forgotten as soon as the examination has been passed. The learner has no permanent reason for valuing it.)

But the main point about interest, value and the non-inertness of learning is that even if the learner decides to learn no more, that which was learned through interest does not thereby become inert because the goal to which it was instrumental (further learning) has been abandoned. On my account, one can give up pursuing an interest (because other reasons against learning more over-ride the reasons for learning provided by the interest itself) without losing interest. As long as one remains interested in P, what has been learned remains non-inert and valued. On this point, however, I imagine Wilson would disagree, since he seems to imply 106 that an interest will necessarily be evidenced in action at some time or other, and would, presumably, wish to say that if there was never any evidence of an interest in action, that interest must have been lost.

One final point can be made about the teaching of new interests, which is of great importance at a time when all teaching of values is coming under fire by virtue of the claim, already mentioned, that schools should not 'impose (middle-class) values on their pupils'. It is that the teaching of interest provides an example of the teaching of values where talk of 'imposition' is conceptually out of place. The teaching of interest cannot be regarded as the imposition of values. It has already been pointed out that interest is something which cannot be compelled, and it follows from this that though teaching children new interests is necessarily teaching them new values, the charge that they have imposed their values on children can be emphatically rejected.
One answer, then, to the question of what values a school may justifiably teach a child is (a) the interest of (or a greater interest in) important human activities, such as coming to understand other people, the natural and social world in which he lives, moral considerations, etc., (all of which are claimed to be constitutive of responsible human agency) and (b) through the child's interest in other things, the value of intellectual and other virtues which are instrumental to pursuing any interest. Not only are these justifiable in their own right, but the teaching of them does not involve the imposition of values by teachers on their pupils.

Though for the purposes of analysis, the teaching of values such as the interest of P has been separated from the teaching of knowledge and skills, in the teaching of anything of any complexity there is a necessary inter-relation of fact and value. As I have already suggested, a person cannot teach or be taught the interest of P without doing something related to P, so that the interest (and thus the value) of P must be taught in the context of activity related to P. It cannot be taught in isolation (as Oakeshott has commented in relation to judgment). Similarly, in engaging in activities related to learning more about certain kinds of subject matter, children may be taught the values embodied in different modes of enquiry, such as impartiality, consistency, coherence, relevance, respect for and co-operation with others, or critical concern. Much lip-service is paid to the teaching of such values in schools, but classroom activities are not always conducted in ways which embody them, so that, for this reason, they are often not taught. Again, it may tentatively be suggested that teachers' concern that pupils learn tightly specified content may militate against the teaching of these values, however sincerely they intend to teach them, because of certain testing and examination procedures which are used.

With regard to these latter values, I suggest that no special justification is required for teaching them (that is, for teaching children to value them and thus act in ways appropriate to them when action is required) for they are intrinsic to what I have elsewhere described as 'important human activities'. Without these particular values, talk of attempts to understand oneself and one's society, the natural world, etc., and the idea of acting responsibly within it is self-contradictory (as MacIntyre has pointed out
in relation to the views of Lawrence and Tolstoy). This is, of course, not to deny that there may be disagreements about e.g. what is to count as understanding (as opposed to misunderstanding) and what is to count as responsible. But it is only with these values that existing norms and criteria can themselves be constructively evaluated and criticized, or criteria for a better society developed.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the teaching of values is intrinsic to the teaching of anything else that is worth learning, and that the role of the teacher cannot be divorced from responsibility in this respect. In particular, it was earlier suggested that (unless this is rendered impossible by definition) any act or activity can be performed or engaged in either responsibly or irresponsibly (scientific activity providing a paradigm here), and therefore it is argued that teaching children merely how to engage in any activity, and the interest of it, would be unjustifiable unless they are also taught to view any subsequent performance of the activity in a social context and from a moral point of view. (For example, a child could come to use his understanding of other people simply to manipulate them to his own advantage and without any respect for them as persons.)

Since I earlier suggested that one way in which a teacher may help a pupil increase his capacity for responsible social action is to increase his capacity for taking responsibility, this clearly involves teaching in the moral sphere. It is in this connection that perhaps some reservation should be made about the importance of interest, particularly in view of what might be involved in becoming interested in moral education projects. It is something to do with the sui generis nature of morality, perhaps, that interest seems inadequate here, for teaching children to be responsible involves teaching moral dispositions. How the teaching of moral and social responsibility as evidence in action is best carried out must be a matter for further investigation, but there is no reason to assume that putting interesting moral education projects on the curriculum will, of itself, lead to moral learning of a socially operative kind. This would seem to require that all teachers realize that they cannot opt out of teaching in the moral sphere.

Finally, it could not be possible to exclude from the teacher's
role (4) the possibility of teaching by example in the moral sphere, for this would imply that it would be a morally justifiable part of a teacher's role to act immorally. Though teachers are human, and like anyone else, individual teachers may act immorally on occasions, if schools are to be justifiable institutions and the teacher's role within them is to be a morally justifiable one, they must be places where children are treated morally. In particular, it is suggested that treating them with respect as persons, not subject to sarcasm or contempt, nor having their views held up to ridicule (acts which certainly now seem to be acceptable in some quarters as part of a teacher's role (2) or even (3)), is important, not simply for its own sake, but also because it may be necessary for responsible development. Thus an obligation to treat children with respect is necessarily a part of a teacher's role (4), and it may be that it would be in his fulfillment of this obligation that he would be most likely to fulfill his obligation to teach moral values of a fundamental kind.

PART (b): Assessment

Introduction

Until recently nobody would have thought of suggesting that perhaps it was not the case that a teacher should be a judge of achievement and an assessor of his pupils' learning. Indeed, it might have been suggested not that assessment was a part of a teacher's role, but that it was a part of teaching itself. The plausibility of this view, on alternative analyses of teaching, is examined below.

Nowadays, however, it is often argued that assessment is not a part of the teacher's role (4) at all, and many young teachers seem to feel that it would be wrong for them to judge or assess the work of their pupils in any way, even when by assessment is meant something very informal, such as the application of some criteria to see what children have learned, or to judge something they have produced. There seem to be a number of different perspectives on this.

The first kind of view emphasizes subjectivity in knowledge and understanding, and is argued by teachers particularly in the case of
Only the pupil, they suggest, can be the judge of his own work, since only he knows how far it achieves his goals. There are no objective criteria for judgment, nor even intersubjective ones. This view is often accompanied by a reluctance to intervene in any way, and could, in extreme instances, prevent the teacher from performing any teaching acts at all. Such a view of the teacher's role seems to reduce it to that of a provider of materials, and it might be asked in what sense such a role could be described as that of a teacher. This view, it seems, can be held most strongly in the arts, and only with some difficulty in the sciences and mathematics.

The second kind of view stems from recent work in the sociology of knowledge, and is related to a relativist view of standards as opposed to a subjectivist view (mentioned above). The teacher who thought that whatever standards he used were merely those arbitrarily developed by a sub-group (the ruling class, the 'establishment' within the discipline) of a society might argue that there was no justification for 'imposing' them upon his pupils. Since, on this view, all standards are ultimately arbitrary, the pupils' own standards are neither to be preferred nor to be denigrated. They cannot be compared as better or worse sets of criteria, but are simply different. From this view, too, it follows that teachers should refrain from assessing or judging children's work and learning. Both these views are fundamentally rooted in epistemological considerations.

A third perspective also suggests that teachers should not evaluate their pupils' work and that self-evaluation by pupils is more appropriate. This position stems from the work of Rogers, who insists that a teacher should never suggest that this rather than that is 'right' or 'better'. On this view, the pupils themselves should be the judges of their own and other children's work. For Rogers, the term 'teacher' has authoritarian overtones, and he prefers the term 'facilitator'. The use of assessment and the judging by facilitators of their pupils' work, however, remains authoritarian, and his objection to assessment is thus based on moral rather than epistemological grounds. However, there does seem to be evidence that when pupils are asked to judge other pupils' work, they are less likely than the teachers to use criteria appropriate to what is being
judged, but rather to praise or condemn on the basis of a child's popularity.

Finally, there has been some evidence¹¹³ that judging pupils may act as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Pupils, it is suggested, come to work at the level which is expected of them as a result of assessment of their past work. Therefore, it might be argued, a way to avoid this is to avoid judging their work at all. This may bear some relation to suggestions of people like Holt¹¹⁴ that because assessment involves the teacher in asking questions to which there are 'right' answers, some pupils become simply seekers after 'right' answers in order to measure up to teachers' expectations of 'the good pupil', whilst others see themselves as unlikely to succeed and give up trying.

Anti-assessment and anti-evaluation positions, however, are opposed by those who argue that not enough attention is being given to assessing and judging achievements, culminating in the suggestion in the latest Black Paper¹¹⁵ that standardized tests of achievement should be given to all children at 7, 11 and 14, and that passing on these tests should be mandatory for transfer to the next "stage" of the school system. Several different kinds of argument are provided as backing for this.

The first is motivational. It has often been argued that some kind of extrinsic target is necessary for children to be motivated to learn (there being some kind of assumption here that children are "naturally" lazy). As a corollary, it is sometimes suggested that these "targets" are necessary for teachers, too, to be motivated. The abandonment of the 11+ was regretted by many primary school teachers, who saw in this examination a goal towards which both they and their pupils could orient their work. A different argument related to motivation is used by psychologists who stress 'the need for achievement'¹¹⁶. By definition, people must have some standard by which they can measure whether they have achieved or not, and which they can aim at, for otherwise their need for achievement must necessarily be frustrated. To deprive people of the chance to achieve is thus to neglect the most important source of motivation.
A different argument is based on a Skinnerian claim that knowledge of results is the most important form of reinforcement, and that without it, teaching attempts must be inefficient. Such assessment claims are often associated with programmed learning techniques, and the introduction of "business efficiency" techniques and language into the schoolroom (though whether or not this is appropriate is another matter). Similarly, there have been extensive developments, especially in the U.S.A., of curricula linked to behavioural objectives, and there is currently flourishing a new language of 'performance-based' or 'competence-based' teaching, linked with an accountability movement and sometimes a modern form of 'payment-by-results' whereby teachers contract to bring about certain pre-specified learning in a given time.

The existence of these conflicts over assessment and evaluation is clearly sufficient to suggest that the judging of achievement, clearly a part of the teacher's role (2) and (3) in our society, should come under more careful scrutiny. Is this an aspect of the teacher's role which is justifiable? Is it associated with the role of the teacher merely contingently, so that, if desired, it could be abandoned, or is it implied for the teacher's role (4) by the set of assumptions suggested - that we understand teaching in a certain way, and that the school should teach something that is, in some sense, worthwhile?

Since so many teachers give an account of what they are doing which makes explicit reference to "feed-back", the answer which one is tempted to give is that it is too important to be abandoned, and that it is in some way necessary to the teacher's role. But this would be hasty, and the arguments for and against this must be discussed fully. These are discussed below on both an 'activity' analysis of teaching and on a 'proficiency' analysis. Even though the former has been rejected, it is interesting to see whether the implications for the teacher's role are different or similar on the two analyses (and thus whether it makes any substantive difference to the way the teacher sees his role which analysis he accepts).

Assessment and teaching as an activity

On the intention-based (Scheffler-Hirst) analysis of teaching,
the learning of $X$s by $B$ is not a necessary condition of $A$'s teaching them to him. If $A$ is teaching $B$ $X$ irrespective of whether he is learning it or not, it cannot conceivably be a part of teaching $B$ $X$ to find out whether or not he is learning it. Assessment of whether $B$ is learning $X$ is not constitutive of teaching him it.

An attempt to defend the view that assessment is constitutive of teaching might be made by arguing that if $A$ does not try to find out whether or not the pupil is learning $X$, he couldn't seriously intend him to learn it. But this seems to be writing far more into the concept of intending than is warranted. I intend my friend to get the letter I have posted to him, but this does not imply that I must ring him up to find out if he received it. There are some things which one may take for granted, and someone with confidence in his own ability to bring about the learning he intends may not merely take it for granted that his pupils are learning, but also be justified in doing so.

This argument also fails because it does not accept a distinction between intending something seriously and being concerned that it happens. It is at least logically possible (though perhaps psychologically unlikely) that a serious intention may involve no more than a disposition to do one's best, without a concern to find out whether or not the result sought occurred. I may enter the essay competition, writing the best essay I can and seriously trying to win, but, having done my best, decide to forget the matter. It is concern about the result, not a serious intention to bring $P$ about, that necessitates my attempt to find out whether $P$ has occurred or not (e.g. that $B$ has learned the $X$ I was trying to teach him). It is easy to find convincing school examples. A teacher may think the $X$ he is trying to teach trivial, but be trying to teach it just the same because he is paid to do so. For a person who holds the view that "it is better to travel hopefully than to arrive", which, in the case of teaching, gives more importance to the engagement in activities than to what is learned by them, it would be irrational to spend a lot of time finding out what had been learned. The activities (sic) of teaching and learning may be seen as important in themselves. Or a child-centred teacher who believes it of fundamental importance that schooling should be pleasurable for children, could not ask them to engage in activities
designed for assessment rather than carrying on learning what they are interested in if these assessment activities are seen by the children as unpleasant.

Put in 'activity' language, Holt's other point is that assessment prevents successful teaching. If a teacher believes this and seriously intends his pupils to learn X, it would be irrational of him to set up assessment situations in his classroom. Holt suggests that in such classrooms, pupils are so concerned to get 'right answers' that they become fearful and incapable of genuine learning. They prefer picking up clues from the teacher, through his actions, tone of voice, etc., to enable them to give the expected answer, rather than trying to understand. Indeed, according to Holt, they seem often to be unable to make this distinction. The principal difficulty with assessing learning is that it is only through what the pupil does that one could judge whether or not he had learned anything, but being able to give the right answer is not a sufficient condition of having learned, or learned with understanding.

It is interesting to note the two opposed psychological positions - one that being tested, judged and assessed, particularly in relation to other people, acts as a powerful motivating influence for children, the other that testing is an inhibiting influence on learning. It may be that neither of these beliefs is true for all children, and it would seem therefore that there are important reasons for finding out more about their truth for different children and under different conditions.

It can thus be seen that an intention that pupils learn an X does not imply the necessity of assessment of whether or not they have learned the X unless it is accompanied by a belief that pupils will only learn that X if they are tested to see whether or not they have learned it. Since this is not a position that many people hold in general, thus far no adequate justification has been offered for the suggestion that it is part of a teacher's role to assess and judge their pupils' learning.

The problem may be approached in a different way. According to
the activity analysis, if A is to be teaching X to B, he must present X to B in a way that he believes B will understand, that employs concepts that he believes B has, to some extent, grasped, etc. It might, then, be the case that though assessing whether or not B has learned X is not a necessary part of teaching X to B, it is a necessary part of the teacher's role on that analysis because it is a precondition of teaching X to B that A has assessed B's conceptual structure and current knowledge and understanding. This might be taken as being implied, for example, by Hirst's use of the term 'misjudging'.

This argument, however, cannot be supported. Although it is true that if A is trying to get B to learn X (teaching B X on the activity analysis), it is presupposed that A has beliefs about the cognitive states, knowledge and skills, etc. of his pupils, on which he bases his pedagogic activities, this does not imply the necessity of judging or assessing. A may have firm (and true) beliefs about e.g. the "averageness" of B, and rely on what he already believes "average" pupils are able to learn. Or he might rely on information he is given about the content of the curriculum studied the previous year as a basis of his beliefs about his pupils knowledge and understanding. There is no reason why a teacher who relies on these methods must be wrong about what his pupils are capable of understanding (though, of course, on an activity analysis he would still be teaching them even if he were incorrect).

It might be argued that, even though one might be correct in this way, personal assessment is more reliable, but this is an empirical claim which might be true only for some teachers. Certainly it is not enough to justify assessment as necessary to the teacher's role. If true, it provides a reason for suggesting that assessment is part of a teacher's role if he is engaged in a teaching enterprise, a sustained attempt to teach a structured curriculum, though Holt's claim about assessment inhibiting learning provides a reason against, if true. The teacher is justified in assessing whether or not his pupils have learned any particular X in order to assure himself reliably about the pupils' cognitive states before proceeding to the teaching of Y. On this argument, it is not necessary for him in order that he can teach his pupils Y, but is
justified because it increases his chances of teaching them that particular Y successfully, and thus succeeding over-all in his teaching enterprise.

If this is the argument, several objections can be raised to it. Firstly, there is the logical objection that it may presuppose what Dearden has called "the fallacy of perfected steps." Hirst, too, has pointed out that one can begin to build higher order concepts on partial knowledge of simpler concepts. Secondly, it makes some assumptions about pupils - that they will not act either as Holt has suggested (giving the impression that they know X when they don't) or in the way illustrated by Kohl (pretending to lack knowledge, skills etc. which they have). These writers question whether tests will reliably inform the teacher about the pupils' level of understanding. Thirdly, it assumes the relative unimportance of any psychological side-effects of tests, such as reducing either the child's ability or desire to learn. It is worth noting that the more extended the teaching enterprise, the more testing will be required, on this argument, so that if there are these side-effects, they will be cumulative. Finally, it must be pointed out that this only justifies assessment in the case of structured curricula, and that it offers no justification for assessment in the case of open-ended teaching attempts. This is not surprising, since open-ended teaching is a contradiction on the activity analysis.

The conclusion of this argument is that assessment, like the pre-specification of objectives is, at the most, a permitted but not demanded aspect of the teacher's role. It is only justifiable if it promotes success in the teaching enterprise, and whether this is so or not is a matter for further empirical investigation.

It should be noted that all these arguments stress again that it is not simply the teacher's perspective on what he is doing that is important. His reasons for assessing may be entirely laudable and the assessment intended in the best interests of his pupils. However, on this account, whether or not his testing is justifiable as part of his role will rest on the outcomes of his assessing procedures, and that will depend also on how the pupils interpret what the teacher is
doing, and their attitudes to it.

This discussion of assessment from the point of view of the activity analysis should not be taken as implying that those who support it would agree with the conclusions drawn here about the implications of the analysis for assessment as part of the teacher's role (4).

Assessment and teaching as a perficience

A parallel discussion to that of the relationship between assessment and teaching is required for the perficience analysis. Is assessment either a part of teaching or a precondition of it in the case of intentional teaching, or is the relationship again merely a strong contingent one? In cases of non-intentional teaching, of course, it makes little sense to suggest either of these two necessary relationships, since the idea of assessing either as a part of or a pre-condition of what one is not necessarily aware of doing is incoherent.

Given that it is accepted as a part of a teacher's role (4) that teachers intend to teach something worthwhile, and that, on this analysis, pupils must be learning something worthwhile for the teacher to be teaching it to them, there is still no necessity for assessment. B can be learning as a result of A's activities without A's knowing whether or not B is learning an intended X, related Xs, or any other Xs.

There is, however, a difference here which is of psychological importance. On the activity analysis, a teacher always knows what he is teaching (though not whether he is being successful). On the perficience analysis, some kind of judgment and assessment is necessary (though not necessarily by A himself) to provide grounds for A to know he is teaching B X even when this is the case, since to know he is teaching A must have grounds for believing this true statement. Thus, though there is no conceptual relationship between teaching and assessment, there is a necessary relationship between assessing that B has learned X through A's actions and knowing that
A has taught B X. Since, on this view, assessment is not necessary for teaching itself, it would only be justified by this argument on the basis of a claim that it was important to know if and what one was teaching. Anyone who argued that the important thing was to teach the pupils worthwhile Xs rather than to know whether or not one was doing so would not accept that this argument justified the claim that assessing was part of the teacher's role.

Although the demands of the perficience analysis in respect of the teacher's doing things which are appropriate to his pupils' cognitive states is more severe than that of the activity analysis, because it is an objective rather than a subjective demand, the arguments used in discussing the activity analysis can be applied directly to the perficience analysis. A teacher can be objectively correct about the concepts etc. his pupils understand without himself engaging in assessment. It must be concluded that, as on the activity analysis, assessment cannot be demanded of the teacher as a necessary pre-condition of teaching. The strongest argument for assessment is the claim that it reliably informs the teacher about what his pupils know, and, as we have seen, this claim has been seriously queried by Holt. As far as I know, there have been no investigations into ways of distinguishing between what Holt has called pupils' real and apparent learning.

There is thus no difference in the conclusions drawn from an activity analysis and a perficience analysis of teaching on the assumption that it is a teacher's role to teach his pupils something worth learning. On neither account is assessment necessary for a teacher to do this, in the different senses of 'teach' deemed important.

A discussion in terms of role itself

Though it has been shown that a person may teach, in the relevant senses of teach, without assessing his pupils and their learning, the foregoing discussion does not exhaust the ways in which it might be argued that the assessment and judgment of his pupils might be a part of a teacher's role (4). For something might be demanded for
the role of the teacher by virtue of what we understand by 'role', not simply by virtue of what we understand by 'teaching'. Indeed, to a teacher, the suggestion that assessment and evaluation are not necessary may sound as strange as the naive dualist suggestion that there is only a contingent relationship between my mind and my body. Interestingly, it is at this stage that the differences between subscribing to an activity and a pericience analysis of teaching become apparent. I shall show below that, though it is clear from the above discussions that no relationship of an internal kind can be shown by a consideration of the concept of teaching alone, however analysed, and assessment, such a relationship can be shown through the concept of a teaching role, for a pericience but not for an activity analysis, assuming that it is a part of any role (4) that a role-filler should try to know if he is fulfilling it.

I start, as before, with a discussion of the activity analysis, in order to substantiate the claim made earlier that the understanding of teaching put forward in this thesis has different practical implications from the activity analysis (i.e. is a substantive difference) and the dispute over how we understand teaching is not merely a semantic one.

Let us assume that a teacher in a school is being asked to teach a curriculum project embodying subject matter of the kind which, I have argued, requires no special justification to be considered worthwhile if learned non-inertly by a group of pupils. It seems to me that proponents of the activity analysis must accept that the teacher has fulfilled his role if he engages in the pedagogic activities deemed appropriate to that project (and probably set out in some way in a Teachers' Guide) with the primary intention of bringing about that learning. I take this to be indisputable on the basis of Broudy's and Scheffler's claims that it is not necessary for the pupils to learn for it to be right for the teacher to claim his salary, and Hirst's suggestion that we allow that teaching has been going on even when not only do the pupils not learn anything but their cognitive states have been grossly misjudged.

Since, on this view, the teacher is fulfilling his role whether
his pupils learn or not, there is no need for pupil assessment in order to find out if this is the case. The only assessment appropriate would be in respect of whether or not the teacher is performing the appropriate indicative acts, had the appropriate intentions and had a set of beliefs (not necessarily correct) about the pupils' cognitive states that substantiated his claim that he considered his acts appropriate for the pupils as well as the subject matter. It seems to me that it is the case that this is the view many people have of the teacher's role (2). Many people don't expect the children to learn anything. They have lost confidence in the schools. For Broudy, Scheffler and First, this is the teacher's role (3). Teaching, in the attempt or activity sense, is the limit of the teacher's obligations. However, I believe that this belief is open to question. Is it right that, in the standard case, the limit of our normative expectations of teachers is that they should go into schools to perform some kind of activity? Can we not expect more of our teachers than this? Is it not part of their obligation to achieve something? (I have earlier argued that it would not follow from such a claim that a teacher who failed to bring about worthwhile learning would necessarily be blameworthy. My point is that role discussions concern what we are entitled to expect in general.)

Perhaps proponents of the activity analysis would argue that we should hold the normative expectation that teachers should teach (in the activity sense) as effectively as they can. This does not entail assessment of pupils as part of the role (4), because it is not a logical point that teachers who judged or evaluated pupils' learning would be enabled thereby to teach more effectively. In addition, a teacher who believed that assessment and evaluation militated against learning would be doing what he believed was most effective if he refrained from testing, not if he tested. And, as already pointed out, the activity analysis lays stress on the teacher's beliefs about what he is doing, the way he sees what he does.

The paradoxical conclusion of the activity analysis, on my view, is that it follows from it that the full responsibilities of a teaching role can be fulfilled by anyone with knowledge of the Xs to be taught. Nothing else is required of him. The conditions necessary are to have
a set of beliefs (which may be wildly mistaken) about the pupils' cognitive states, a clear and tightly structured set of intentions, and the ability to perform a set of appropriate indicative acts. The teacher whose pupils learn something worthwhile is fulfilling his role, but so, equally, may be the one whose pupils learn nothing, through no fault of their own. Thus it is possible to argue that talk of "the schools failing the pupils" would be grossly out of place ("for logical reasons") even if no pupils learned anything because their teachers' understanding of them was poor, and he could not communicate with them.

The teacher, and those to whom he is accountable, do not need to know what, if anything, the pupils are learning, and they do not need to learn anything, in order to know whether or not the teacher is fulfilling his role (and, also, that the schools are fulfilling theirs). This is because the obligation of teaching is that of engaging in an activity, not that of bringing about outcomes. Whether this is the view of proponents of the activity analysis, I do not know. But it seems to me to follow from the analysis. This view, I suggest, is quite unjustifiable.

On the analysis of this thesis, the person who accepts the role (4) of teacher in a school undertakes to teach in the sense of bringing about those outcomes of worthwhile learning by pupils which, on the account presented here, the justification of schools as institutions and the requirement that pupils attend. If he is failing to teach his pupils anything worthwhile (or if he teaches them more that can be shown to be harmful than that can be shown to be valuable) he is not fulfilling his role obligations. As suggested earlier, and at the risk of repetition, it does not follow from this that he is necessarily blameworthy, nor that he does not deserve to be paid. Not all cases of failure to fulfil obligations are blameworthy.

I have suggested that it is part of the obligations of any role (4) that the agent try to find out whether or not he is fulfilling it. On the perficience analysis of teaching, assessment of (a) what pupils are learning (b) whether they are learning it through acts by the teacher which satisfy the criteria for them to be teaching acts and (c) whether what is learned is non-immoral, non-trivial and non-inert
(i.e. an evaluation of whether it is worthwhile to the particular pupils) are necessary for ascertaining this. Such assessments can be carried out by teachers, pupils or outside observers, provided they have the appropriate knowledge and skills to do so.

The first point that can be made about this is that it does square with our generally held belief that whether or not an individual is fulfilling a role is a public matter and does not rest (as it does in the case of the activity analysis) ultimately on his own say-so (his claims about his intentions and beliefs). For, given that he has actually performed the indicative acts, no claim that they were in fact completely inappropriate to his pupils can undermine his claim to fulfil his role.

On the other hand, a teacher who accepts that role obligations involve him in teaching his pupils something worthwhile in the sense that they learn something worthwhile, assessments of the three kinds mentioned are necessary for him to know whether he is fulfilling his role or not. There is no epistemological position which suggests that A can come to know what B is learning except through his observation of B's actions. The teacher needs also to 'observe' his own actions, in the sense that he has to try to 'look at them from the outside', to see whether they may be plausibly interpreted in ways other than the ways he intended and thus bring about a variety of non-intended perficienary outcomes, including ones which might inhibit further learning (as Holt suggests).

Finally, he must try to understand how his pupils are interpreting them, what, if anything, they are learning, and whether or not this is inert. This necessarily involves him in further assessment - of what they already knew, of how their new learning is being brought about, and some evaluation of it as worthwhile or trivial, including understanding their valuations of it. For if all the pupils' learning was inert and/or trivial, the criteria which, it is argued, must be met to justify their compulsory attendance at school would not be satisfied. Though there are great difficulties associated with teacher accountability, it is not unreasonable that teachers should be asked for justifications, since people are no longer willing to take the value of particular learnings on authority. Before a teacher
could consider justifications, he would need to know what he was teaching and to whom he was teaching it. Assessment is thus, on these grounds, necessary to the teacher's role (4).

There is another way in which assessment can be argued to be a necessary part of the teacher's role. This rests on the claim made in section II that it is logically impossible to teach people what they already know. Assessment of what pupils already know is a necessary part of the teacher's role if he wishes to find out what he should avoid dealing with as subject matter. Of course, it is possible to teach people without first assessing what they know because one can assume ignorance and be correct. The justification, like the previous one, rests on an obligation claimed for the teacher's role (4) to try to know what he is doing as part of his role. Any counter-argument that what is important is that certain worthwhile things are taught, not that anyone knows about it, must be rejected. Both are important in schools. Again, there may be implications here for the conditions under which people are expected to teach.

There is no suggestion here that because assessment and judgment of pupils' achievements are a necessary part of the teacher's role, only he should judge. That is, there is no implication that the claim that pupils ought to judge their own or other pupils' work should be rejected because of this. Indeed, if interest is of the importance I have suggested, and interest involves the child in "wanting to become more skilful, more informed, more experienced (more knowledgeable, in other words)" (27), then the child himself will need to assess this to know if he is achieving what he wants. That is, the child's assessment of his own learning is clearly as important as the teacher's, on this account.

We do, however, need to look at the question of whether or not the teacher should communicate his assessments and evaluations to his pupils (which I shall call 'grading'), and at what is to be said if the empirical claims about the inhibiting effects of assessment on learning discussed earlier are true in the majority of instances. But even if these claims were mistaken, a justification for the suggestion that teachers need not always grade can be offered in terms of teaching. There is no contradiction involved in suggesting
(except where the consequences would be disastrous) that a teacher should encourage his pupils to make and rely on their own judgments even if these might sometimes be wrong. Such acts could be teaching acts, in that pupils could learn judgment partly by having the experience of the consequences of making poor judgments. What might be more important was the teacher's ability to make public, and have discussion about, the criteria which might be used. These two kinds of acts - making public and discussing criteria of judgment, and allowing pupils to experience the consequences of making poor judgments - are ways of bringing to the pupils' 'views' the ways in which their judgments were mistaken. But to choose to do this, the teacher needs still to make judgments himself.

I have argued here that assessment of pupils' learning is not merely a contingent part of the teacher's role (4) on a perificience analysis of teaching, but a conceptually demanded part, demanded by this conception of teaching and the concept of a responsible role-filler. If it is not a merely contingent matter, the question of justifying assessment per se does not arise. The proper question is therefore not whether or not a teacher ought to assess and evaluate children's learning, but how to ensure that the assessing and evaluating they ought to do helps (if possible) and certainly hinders as little as possible the learning of what is worthwhile which is the justifiable aim of schools. In the end, I argue, this matter is one for empirical investigation, but a few further comments can be made at this stage.

What does the teacher assess and evaluate?

What the teacher must evaluate in his attempt to find out what his pupils are learning are the pupils' activities and performances and the products of these. We have to judge if a child is learning how to swim by watching how he performs in the water, to assess if he can do certain mathematical calculations by whether or not he does them correctly and what he says about his reasons for doing the things he does, whether he understands a scientific principle by seeing whether he can apply it and solve problems to which it is relevant.
But we must remember that it does not follow necessarily from a child's failure to perform that he cannot, for he may be unwilling, or uninterested, or the context may inhibit him. Nor does his success always indicate understanding. We must remember not to confuse that which we take as evidence for understanding for the understanding itself.

Observations of classrooms show the prevalence of questioning in lessons, whereby teachers ask their pupils questions to which they already know the answers in order to find out whether their pupils know. The normal convention for the speech act of questioning (the assumption that the questioner does not know the answer) is missing. Searle has classified these kinds of questions as "exam questions" and empirical studies indicate that such questions are understood well by children as requiring them to re-produce for the teacher what he has previously said to them. That is, the illocutionary force of questioning in schools is not the same as it is elsewhere. Holt's analysis makes sense to us because we so readily understand how it is that pupils see themselves as being constantly tested; so that, if Holt is right, their main desire is often simply to give an acceptable answer and thus relieve the tension of the testing situation. This may also be related to situations in which the criteria for judging answers as correct or incorrect are not available, so that pupils can be more successful at getting right answers by attending to the teacher's manner and the clues it gives than to the subject matter itself. For Holt's claim that assessment must militate against learning to turn out to be wrong, children must either not interpret assessment by teachers as threatening, or teachers must make their judgments in ways which the children do not recognize as assessment.

It is surely naive to assume that because a teacher is assessing pupils' learning and making judgments about their difficulties, the pupils must know either that this is being done or what the assessment is. In all Holt's examples, the pupil is being engaged in what might be called "typical school question-and-answer sessions." He is not merely being asked for answers, but is being asked for them in a competitive and public situation. It is clear to him that he is being judge through his answers, assessed and tested not only in the eyes of the teacher but also in the eyes of his peers, and he can be forgiven for
assuming that failure will in some way diminish him, in the eyes of the teacher at least, as "stupid".

But written tests and 'conversations' which consist of complex sentences from the teacher alternating with single words or short phrases from various pupils is not the only way in which a teacher can find out what his pupils are learning. Pupils can produce e.g. written work as part of the business of coming to understand, and show that they understand X by using that learning in the doing of Y. From the pupil's point of view, he is simply learning X or doing Y. If a child is interested in learning X or doing Y, he will not see himself simply as being tested, or the teacher as concerned to evaluate and possibly condemn him, but rather see the situation as one in which the teacher is concerned with teaching him and helping him achieve a goal he desires for himself. In such a case, even if he realises evaluation is going on, he need not resent it, for he may see it as helpful. This necessitates his being able to distinguish between constructive and destructive criticism. It is the latter which always involves the possibility of the pupil seeing himself judged a failure no matter how hard he is trying. It is analytic that what is seen as constructive criticism involves seeing oneself as being helped. It is not, as Downie suggests\(^\text{130}\) that criticism is always resented unless there is some special relationship to mediate it, as we know from our own experience. If one is being criticized as a pupil, it is oneself that is being criticized. For criticism not to be resented, it must be seen as constructively helpful towards a desired goal.

It must be noted that the suggestion that teachers must learn to evaluate their pupils' learning without undesirable side-effects does not imply the need for prespecification of specific responses to questions, much less responses specified in behavioural terms. Pupils' work as part of their learning can be used by teachers as the basis for judgment, as opposed to work specially done to be judged. In this way, pupils can be encouraged to explore, reshape, re-interpret, make suggestions, be critical, etc., and this will enable the teacher to assess how far his pupils are thinking for themselves and the way in which they are learning, not simply what they are learning.
The main conclusion seems to be that an analytic scheme which sees teaching as one activity and assessing as another is unhelpful in understanding the teacher's role. He needs to assess, but he does not thereby need to engage in separate activities of assessing. Even if he is using diagnostic tests, he may teach whilst using them. This discussion does not suggest that objective tests should be condemned out of hand, though the extent of their usefulness needs to be investigated, and it does not follow that all psychometric testing (e.g. of I.Q.) has much to offer. Objective tests can be useful for finding out where pupils' difficulties lie, and sometimes for self-referential comparison (i.e. for noting improvements on past performances). But such tests can only be subsidiary, at the best, to the teacher's informal assessments carried out as his pupils are being taught.

It might be argued that if pupils are interested in their learning, they render such assessment unnecessary. They are the most likely, it is sometimes argued, to know things about their own difficulties which teachers cannot know, and if they are not concerned to fake achievement in order to give the impression that they have learned, they will be able to ask frankly for help. Although Holt may be right 131 in his suggestion that pupils may not always know if they don't understand, a pupil who thinks he does not understand is likely to be right.

However, a pupil coming to ask the teacher for help provides an assessment of learning difficulties rather than rendering one unnecessary. Furthermore, as Wittgenstein has shown 132, there is a distinction between thinking one has understood and understanding, for to understand something one must have got it right. A pupil may think he has understood and be mistaken, so that even if the classroom climate is such that pupils are willing to ask for help, the teacher cannot assume that pupils who do not ask have no problems. But because there are degrees of understanding, there are teaching advantages in assessing pupils' learning by seeing how they use what they have learned in new learning. For in this way, that learning is integrated with the new learning, so that the teacher who uses his teaching for assessment or his assessment for teaching can create a deeper understanding. In the earlier example
given of learning about viscosity in order to design a boat hull, the successful designing of the hull is sufficient to indicate to the teacher whether or not the work on viscosity has been understood. Discussions with the pupil on what she was doing would also be useful for both teaching and assessing.

On my view, the most positive contribution to making judgments about assessment comes from considering the child-centred theorist's question "What reason has the child for doing these things?" In schools as they are, what is assessed is produced by the child for assessment. He knows that this is, in most cases, the reason why he is asked to do it. It is not a part of his learning activities, but rather the evidence to be produced that he has learned. If its purpose is seen only being to satisfy the teacher, then its production is necessarily, for the child, instrumental only to this. That is, such work can have no intrinsic value. So we see our students "learning things up" for examinations and promptly forgetting them. We have done the same thing ourselves. If the pupil sees no intrinsic point in the learning and the teacher can be satisfied by rote-learned work or inert learning, he has no reason for learning in any other way. For this reason, it is suggested that, if possible, the child should engage in the performance which is being assessed for reasons other than for assessment.

However, a different perspective can be taken on this. Is assessing in this kind of way justifiable at all, for might it still not lead pupils to produce work which they know will be acceptable regardless of whether or not they themselves accept it? Would discussions in which any questions asked are 'genuine' as opposed to 'exam' questions be more likely to encourage pupils to formulate their own beliefs and views? On the view of this thesis, such a change in teaching practice would have to be made clear to pupils, for simply rephrasing questions to ask for pupils' own views would not be adequate, for it might not be seen by them as a significant change. And this is not to suggest that all views or arguments might be equally valid, nor to accept a crude epistemological relativism. It is rather to look at the way in which an insistence on 'right' or 'acceptable' answers may cause learning to be inert.
It does not follow, as Holt sometimes seems to imply, that there is always something wrong with wanting to know 'the right answer'. Such a desire can be related not to wanting to please the teacher but to a concern for truth. Sociologists who see the classroom as a market place where performances in school work are exchanged for grades and approval may, in many instances, not be far wrong from the pupils' point of view. But if they are right, some change in practice is required to ensure that pupils' concern is more with understanding than with getting grades. This is why this thesis has stressed the importance of interest.

Nor is it necessary, as Holt sometimes seems to imply, to accept that because there are not always single right answers that there never are, nor that some answers might be known to be wrong even though we do not know what answers (if any) might be right. Furthermore, if a concern with 'right answers' is sometimes destructive of learning, it does not follow that it always is. Holt himself plays games like Twenty Questions (where there is always a right answer) with his pupils in order to teach them to understand certain skills and strategies; and it has already been pointed out that to value the skills of finding out presupposes that some knowledge—that has value.

One teaching goal, at a high level of generality, that all teachers might have is that their pupils learn to be self-evaluative, something which is stressed by Rogers. For this, however, a person must have some criteria, and the teacher would be surely involved in an epistemological fallacy if he led the children to believe that any set of criteria was as valid as any other. Even the youngest children come to school already able to some extent to evaluate the success of some of their projects, and to teach them to be more self-evaluative requires their involvement in evaluations with their teachers, not the withdrawal of the teacher from evaluation altogether. Indeed, for some practical projects, the criteria almost force themselves on you. For theoretical projects (those concerned with finding out what is true) criteria are intersubjective in a different way, and in some areas pupils have criteria which they apply outside of school (e.g. they are not usually undiscriminating in their choice of 'pop' music or films). Criteria in different areas of learning must be made explicit, discussed and debated. Talk of 'imposing' or 'rejecting' teachers'
criteria is meaningless without this, for the teachers' criteria must be taught to the pupils before they can reject them. This is to argue that there can be worthwhile things to be learned in respect of the criteria themselves.

As Oakeshott suggests, judgment in the application of criteria is often taught by imparting. Disagreement in judgment between teacher and pupils often arises because of the employment of multiple criteria, and an understanding of this is necessary not only for the pupil but also for the teacher if he is to join with his pupils in continually applying and modifying criteria both as a part of teaching and of finding out what is being learned. To paraphrase Aristotle, we learn to judge by judging.

It is nonsense to talk about 'imposing' judgments in the sense of getting children genuinely to agree with them, in the same way as it is nonsense to talk about 'imposing' interests, for children cannot be made to judge in a given way. This is self-contradictory. Teachers must think seriously about whether they can responsibly 'opt out' of making judgments (e.g. refusing to differentiate between valid and invalid arguments) because of difficulties in this area. Perhaps there is simply too much concern about disagreements in judgment between teachers and pupils, which may be related to teachers' concern about their authority position (see chapter 8), for it is not necessarily the case that the teacher's judgment will be the right one.

This applies, too, to the necessity for the teacher to make judgments about what learning is worthwhile. It is sometimes asked how it could be argued that the teacher's evaluation of the children's learning as worthwhile or otherwise can be the most valid (this is not being claimed here). The various proponents claim that the teacher ought to promote the learning he believes is most worthwhile, or that the learning that should be promoted is what the children think is worthwhile, or that the learning promoted should be what the community as a whole thinks is worthwhile. The latest contender is the educationalist, the curriculum planner, whilst much actual control has come from the Universities through examination syllabuses. There is space for only a few comments here.
The position taken in this thesis has been that values are neither entirely subjective nor entirely relative, and that what an individual values, or what a group values or even what a whole community values may not be worth valuing (examples of the latter being illustrated by Nazi Germany). There is, I suggest, no reason to assume that any group is more likely than any other to have better judgment, including teachers and curriculum planners, and the suggestion that teachers must evaluate their pupils' learning along a value dimension is not made on the grounds that they are most likely to be right about what learning is of value.

An alternative way in which the problem is sometimes viewed is to ask who should have the right to decide what is learned, but this question, too, has difficulties, as discussed earlier in relation to the work of Mugrove and Taylor. For on what ought these rights to be based?

It is clear that giving content to what specific learning might be worthwhile for our society is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the comments made indicate a perspective which avoids the difficulties both over whose views are most valid, and over rights, for it is not formulated in these terms. To be substantively helpful, it requires agreement to some extent on the normative concept of a person, an individual living a responsible human life in society. I suggest that there is a larger measure of agreement on this value issue than is sometimes implied by discussions of differences between "traditionalist" and "progressive" educators, or between individualist and communitarian political perspectives, for they all share the rejection of cultural, social and political apathy and passivity.

The claim that the justification for institutions such as schools and the teacher's role within them is that they teach their pupils something worth learning entails that teachers must make day-to-day judgments about this - that what they teach must, at the least, be what is non-immoral, non-harmful, non-trivial, and non-inert. For, it has been argued, a responsible role-filler must try to evaluate whether or not he is fulfilling his role, and teacher cannot do this without evaluating the children's learning on a value dimension. To have a view, then, about whether he is fulfilling his role or
wasting the children's time, a teacher must have beliefs about the
dvalue of what he is teaching as well as about what it is, unless a
dvalue relativism so extreme as to be cynical is being adopted.

It is concluded, therefore, that assessment of what children
are being taught and some evaluation of it is not merely a contingent
aspect of the teacher's role (4) but a necessary part. Any claims
that it would be possible to responsibly reject this part of the role
(re-define the teacher's role without this aspect) must be
unacceptable. For it is through these evaluations that the teacher
must choose to modify his own actions (as is necessary for filling
a role responsibly). This is very different, however, from a set of
evaluations obtained for the purpose of putting children in some kind
of hierarchical order of merit, and this thesis has not been concerned
at all with the kind of assessment involved in examinations for other
purposes (e.g. admissions to institutions of Higher Education).
And it is worth speculating that the continual evaluation by pupils
and teachers together of the worth of what is being learned may make
teachers themselves more aware, and is for that reason also to be
preferred to a situation where teachers have little autonomy (as in
many secondary schools at present) and never evaluate the worth of
what they are trying to teach, either taking it for granted or being
indifferent to it.

In chapter 10 I discuss the implications of this conclusion for
the conditions which must be provided for schooling to be justifiable.
The discussions of this part of this chapter suggest that they must be
conditions in which teachers will be able to assess what they are
doing through assessment of their pupils' learning in ways which do
not militate against their pupils' chances of learning what is
worthwhile. If present forms of assessment are destructive, they
must be replaced by less destructive ones, but assessment and the
application of criteria for judging learning and teaching cannot
be abandoned in schools if they are to be justifiable institutions
staffed by responsible teachers.

Assessment, innovation and change

I have suggested that a responsible teacher must try to satisfy
himself that he is teaching his pupils something which, at the minimum, satisfies the criteria of worthwhileness of non-inertness and non-triviality. In particular, I have suggested that much investigation may be needed about how to assess without encouraging purely verbal and thus inert learning. Should a teacher decide that he is teaching his pupils nothing of value to them, if he is genuinely concerned that he should fulfil his role, he would be rationally required to change what he is doing. On the view offered here, he should be more concerned with the person-dependent question "What can I teach these children that will be valuable to them?" than the person-independent question "What learning is of most worth?"

A teacher's role must therefore include responsibility for innovation and change, wherever it can be shown that such change is likely to ensure that pupils' learning is more "alive" than what is being brought about at the time, or where it is shown that current learning is trivial. This has practical implications in respect of competing curriculum projects, in a way which can be seen to bear some resemblance to what Lakatos has said about competing scientific theories. There are triadic considerations in both. The adequacy of a scientific theory is assessed not simply by looking at the theory and at the world, nor simply by looking at the two competing theories. All three must be considered. The same is true for curriculum projects. They must be chosen not by purely abstract consideration of the 'merits' of the content and the method which is suggested, but also in respect of the particular group of pupils who, it is suggested, are to use them.

Now it might be argued that this has always been acknowledged by teachers and, indeed, is implied by the activity analysis of teaching which has stressed the logical appropriateness which is necessary for a teacher's acts in respect of pupils' conceptual states. This is not the point being made here, for this has already been accepted, and, indeed, is incorporated also within the perfection analysis of teaching. The distinction made here is concerned with the manner in which the Xs are learned psychologically. The suggestion, therefore, is that teachers of a school, individually and collectively, have a responsibility for ensuring not merely the learning of theoretically justifiable Xs but that this learning is psychologically non-inert.
This requires that the teacher have the right to promote change and be flexible in the classroom, and (insofar as the whole organization of the school and the kinds of role relationships within it promote values) in the organization of the school. I have mentioned choosing between curriculum projects, and earlier suggested that some teachers might fulfil their roles more effectively if they worked without tightly structured curricula and deliberately kept their aims "fuzzy", indicating that the way in which roles would need to be substantively instantiated would depend on empirical factors relating to individual teachers, groups of teachers and groups of children. Similarly, if it is the case that non-inert learning is promoted by wide opportunity for pupil choice, a matter which again requires empirical investigation, the role of a teacher in a school which offered its pupils no such choice would involve promoting it (and vice versa). This indicates why, at this stage of our empirical knowledge, claims about the teacher's role (4) must be made at a high level of generality. Its instantiation in the future will depend also on philosophical work (epistemology, ethics and social philosophy, and theory of value) but will always relate to the personal characteristics of particular pupils and teachers.

In respect of this aspect, therefore, it must be concluded that the teacher's role is neither necessarily conservative nor necessarily radical (in the sense of promoting change). It cannot be a teacher's role (4) obligation to promote change per se, for not all change is for the better. The claim is rather that, as was claimed for both the teaching of values and for assessment, the teacher cannot responsibly "opt out". This implies having views about new ideas and the possibility of change, and the evaluation of the likely consequences of various possible changes as compared with the consequences of retaining the status quo. For as I have already suggested, a failure to do the latter is partly what is meant by being irresponsible, and the relationship between responsibility and role (4) is a necessary one. There are implications here in respect of in-service training.

The conclusion of this chapter is therefore that the teaching of values, assessing what one is teaching and being open to change are not merely contingently associated with the teacher's role.
CHAPTER 8: (a) Authority and the Teacher's Role
(b) Pupil-Teacher Relationships

PART (a): Authority and the Teacher's Role

Introduction

It had originally been my intention to carry out a wide-ranging enquiry into the possible authority aspects of the teacher's role, both in relation to knowledge and understanding, and in relation to social control and decision-making in schools. However, the limitations of space render this impossible now, and the work on authority presented here is restricted to epistemic considerations, and to the teaching of rule-governed activities, including the teaching of those aspects of them which are not themselves rule-governed, such as judgment in the application of criteria. In particular, I shall raise some objections to something which shows signs of becoming a new orthodoxy - that there is something wrong with the acceptance of authority, that the authority of the teacher in some way inhibits the development of autonomy by pupils and involves risks of indoctrination, and thus that the authority aspect of the teacher's role is fundamentally objectionable.

Being an Authority

Peters has suggested that what is meant by saying that a person is an authority in the sphere of knowledge is that he has a special right to pronounce or to be heard on those matters concerning which he is an authority. Though he agrees with Winch that talk of authority presupposes that there is a right and a wrong way of doing things, he points out that the pronouncements of any person who is an authority can always be challenged by appeals to evidence or grounds. (In a school context, this would mean that it was always a possibility that a pupil might have an insight that over-turned beliefs that were well established.) I suggest, however, that it remains to be shown that there is any conceptual relationship between being an authority and having a right. Peters may be extrapolating from institutionalized situations within which those who are considered to be authorities have additionally been given special rights to
be heard, for there seem to be no reasons for accepting that such rights are generally associated with being an authority. However, since one cannot become infallible by becoming an authority, Peters is clearly correct in his claim that nothing in the sphere of knowledge is ever made right (i.e., true) because authorities say so. I suggest, nonetheless, that the meaning of 'an authority' is related to 'right' in the sense of 'correct' or 'true' rather than with having a 'right' in the sense of 'entitlement' as Peters suggests, and agree with Downie\(^{138}\) that to say someone is an authority is to suggest that what he has to say on the subject matter on which he is an authority is likely to be 'right' in this sense.

Obviously, if this is so, it would be a rational course of action for a person who wanted to know something to listen to those who are authorities in that sphere. However, it does not seem to be part of the meaning of authority, and the demand that one listens to those who are authorities cannot be a demand of conceptual necessity. The point that authorities can make mistakes is, on my view, better made by suggesting that the statements made by authorities should only be taken as provisionally true (that is, that it is sometimes right to be sceptical about the pronouncements made by authorities), rather than by saying, as does Peters, that all authorities should only be treated as provisional. However, this does not mean that no individual who claims authority should be treated as provisional, for there can be spurious 'authorities', and we cannot always know if an individual is an authority or not.

Talk of authority in the sphere of knowledge and understanding requires spelling out in two spheres. Firstly, there is a content area. A person may be an authority on the Incas, on the history of Greece, on the migration of birds, on the breeding of dogs or on the strategies of playing chess. But there must also be a context of persons in relation to whom one is an authority. A person may be an authority on X within group A, where others know a great deal less than he about X, but not in group B, where most people know a great deal more. If so, authority is a relational concept, and it is an error to suggest that a person must either be an authority on X, or not be one, unless by the former is implied 'in any context'.
If it is accepted that what is true is, in some sense, independent of people's beliefs, decisions and choices, in the sphere of knowledge authority must, in the same sense, be independent of people's decisions, beliefs and choices. If I am an authority on Malaysian postage stamps in relation to members of the Malaysian Postage Stamp Society, this is the case even if I do not hold a position of authority in the society; even if all the members of the society refuse to acknowledge me as an authority or admit me as a member; and even if I find myself stranded on a desert island without any Malaysian postage stamps. In particular cases, a person's authority is independent of other people's knowledge of it. What is required for epistemological authority is for there simply to be others with whose knowledge the knowledge of that authority can be compared. Neither their presence nor their recognition is needed.

This concept of an authority presupposes a non-individualist epistemology and a view that knowledge is essentially social in character, and an acceptance of Winch's statement that it is not possible for knowledge to be "a property of the individual mind"\textsuperscript{139}, by which I assume he means 'not all knowledge can be a property of individual minds alone' since clearly something might be known to only one individual at any time. Though epistemological authority is necessarily personal and not positional, authority is derived from a community. This is not, however, to deny the distinction between 'being an authority' and 'being recognized as an authority' in relation to a given group. Recognition is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of being an authority.

This distinction is clearly part of our current concept of an authority, for we may say intelligibly to someone, "I wasn't aware you were such an authority on X." A student could be more of an authority on Y than his professor was, and we speak of discovering that someone we had believed to be an authority was spurious. The concept of a spurious authority is, of course, parasitic on the concept of a genuine authority in the same way as the concept of counterfeit
money is parasitic on the concept of genuine money.

I have rejected Peters' suggestion that it is part of the meaning of authority that we are obliged to listen to what those who are authorities in this sense have to say. Is there nothing further to be said than that listening to authorities is a rational course of action? I turn now to an alternative suggestion as to why we must accept authority, the one made by Winch - that very often we have not the choice as to whether to accept or reject authority. We are, claims Winch, compelled to accept it for we have no choice as to whether or not to participate in some rule-governed activities.

Rule-Governed Activities and Authority

The relation between rule-governed activities and authority, Winch claims, is not merely a contingent one. There is a conceptual connection (an internal relation) between the two which constitutes the difference between an exercise of authority and an exercise of power. He says, "To participate in such an activity is to accept that there is a right and wrong way of doing things" (for the determination of which the rules function as criteria) "and the decision as to what is right and wrong in a given case can never depend on one's own caprice." It follows in such cases, argues Winch that "when it comes to following rules, I must (as a matter of logic) accept what certain other people say or do as authoritative."

He suggests that "a relation of authority, as opposed to one of power, is an indirect relationship between X and Y, involving as an intermediary the established way of performing the activity on which X and Y are engaged." This is to say that whereas instances of power relations involve one party's actions having a direct effect on the other, where authority is concerned, both parties are obliged to recognize authority by virtue of the rules which both accept and share. The rules, therefore, mediate between the parties to establish authority in the context of the activity concerned. However, Winch has, by this explanation, moved from the acceptance of the authority of persons to the acceptance of the authority of rules.
There is surely a gap between accepting that the rules are authoritative, and even that certain persons may be more authoritative than oneself, and accepting that certain individual persons must be more authoritative than oneself, or even as authoritative as oneself once one knows the rules. Though Winch may have established that where there are rule-governed practices, there must be authorities, he has failed to show how we are to know who they are. A paradox therefore arises in relation to the epistemological questions "How, in general, can we come to know the rules of a rule-governed activity?" and "How do we know who the authorities are?"

The answer to the first question leads to the second, for it is that we must, in the last resort, learn the rules from those who know them, that is, from those who are the authorities on the rules. That is, we must take them on authority. The reason that Winch's discussion is so relevant to this thesis is that what he has illustrated is not so much the importance of the internal relation between rule-governed activities and authorities (which, though it may be correct, is trivial as stated because unless we have some way of learning who these authorities are, it could have no possible substantive implications), but the relation between learning the rules of an activity and accepting the authority of particular persons.

Winch's example is of a person's being taught to play chess. "Here," he writes, "the pronouncements are authoritative for me because of my recognition of the fact that he is telling me the correct way to move the pieces.... And I can only learn to play by accepting the pronouncements or examples of some mentor or mentors as authoritative." But he has not yet explained why we cannot simply accept the authority of the rules themselves. Why must we additionally accept the authority of particular persons?

We cannot clearly accept the idea that there might be rules which are authoritative for us without any reference to the authority of persons, for this would imply some kind of Platonic understanding of rules and their existence independent of any human activities. So Winch's suggestion - that rule-governed activities logically imply the authority of persons - is more acceptable in that it gives due account
to the social nature of rules and the fact that they cannot exist independently of any persons at all. But since rules can, and do, exist independently of any particular persons, understanding that there is a relation between rules, a right and wrong way of doing things, and authority, does not help us to decide which particular persons are, in the context, genuinely authorities on the rules, from whom we can learn both them and judgment in following them correctly. For it is not the case, as Winch seems to imply, that my belief that my teacher is telling me the correct way to proceed entails that he is doing so.

The paradox is that until we know the rules, and thus already have some idea of, as Winch puts it 146 "the right course to pursue in the context of that activity", we have also to accept that any particular individual is an authority on the rules on authority. This is so even in cases (like chess) where, according to Winch 147 there is "no dispute about what moves are legitimate." It is not merely a contingent matter that for theoretical activities the beginner is not in a position to assess whether he is being taught the correct way to proceed or not, and this is true for any activities which do not carry obvious criteria of success and failure with them.

This indicates that there may be some unexplored difficulties involved in some of the current discussions about authority and its relation to "publicly accessible rules", for the public accessibility of the rules is subject to our already having accepted authority on authority to enable us to learn to understand them. Quinton puts it that 148 "we can weigh the purported pound of sugar only on the scales the grocer himself provides." But we have to accept not only his scales but his instructions on how to use them.

The person who does not yet understand what the rules of the activity in question are cannot first evaluate for himself who "knows the right way to proceed" and thus rationally choose an authority as his teacher, but has to accept the authority of particular persons even to get into such a position. In relation to activities where there are disagreements over the current nature of and interpretation of the rules themselves, through which the changes in the rules and thus the nature of the activity historically come about, accepting
authority of this particular person rather than that may lead to quite different understandings of the activity in question. The view one gains of X depends largely on the views of the person who has taught it to you, though this is not to suggest that this view cannot later be abandoned. This point is very relevant for schools, where pupils tend to have a succession of different teachers.

Winch suggests that when it is not clear who knows the right way to proceed in a particular activity (which, I suggested, was the case for anyone who has not yet started to engage in the activity in question), we can only evaluate candidates for authority on the basis of whether or not they seem to know. He claims that a further necessary condition will be that the individual to be considered sincerely believes that he knows "the right way" and "cares about what is right and what is wrong." Now, even if it were acceptable to recognize the authority of the person who most seemed to know what he was doing (which does not seem to be the case because of the obvious distinction between seeming to know and knowing), it would not be possible to fulfill the necessary condition of finding out whether or not a person was sincere in his belief that he knew what he was doing. Winch accepts the former, for he agrees that confident demeanor cannot be a criterion of authority. But not only is sincerity no criterion of correctness either, but it is notoriously difficult for observers to determine. It may be possible to seem more sincere when actually insincere and trying to give the impression of sincerity than when one actually is sincere.

As a method for a would-be learner to choose his teachers, then, this solution of Winch's is totally unacceptable (and being based on a phenomenally comprehensive access to other minds, raises more problems than it solves in relation to authority generally). But this argument is interesting, for it calls into question some of the suggestions of deschoolers, who write of children being left free to choose anyone as a teacher. It follows from it that, for many activities, the children could have no way of knowing whether or not those they choose know enough to teach them what they want to learn. (Would children tend to gravitate to "quack" teachers, who really had nothing to teach, but who had the appearance of knowing?)
Telling objections can be raised, also, to Winch's other suggestion that we can look to tradition for direction, for, he claims, even charismatic authority is unintelligible apart from an understanding of the tradition within which it arose. Winch is quite obviously mistaken in his main example of Christianity, where he claims that what Jesus said was completely unintelligible apart from an understanding of the Jewish religious tradition. Can he really be suggesting that the religion that Jesus Christ introduced was completely unintelligible to Africans, upon whom, Winch would presumably have to say, the effort expended by missionaries was necessarily in vain, and to Romans who, if Winch were right, were prepared to be eaten by lions for that which they could not understand?

Now it may be that all Winch is saying is that Christianity was not understood in precisely the same way by the early Christians in Rome as it was by the first Jewish converts, but what further understanding is gained from this? The point is that if it is Christianity which is understood in each case, it is rather that the understanding of the Romans was not quite the same as that of the early Jewish converts than that no understanding was possible for the Romans. Even if there must be, as Winch suggests, a tradition within which any new rule-governed activity arises (which may involve a vicious regress), it does not follow that the practices and pronouncements of those who have knowledge of that tradition must necessarily be superior. So the existence of a tradition is of no assistance in our problem of locating those who are the authorities on particular rule-governed activities in our group. They need not be those with the greatest understanding of the tradition from which the currently practised activity arose and its history.

At first sight it looked as if he had the choice of either accepting the authority of some particular persons without question or ourselves becoming authorities in order to make an informed choice of whose authority to accept in the sphere of knowledge. But, it was then suggested, these are not distinct options. If we become authorities, our own authority is based ultimately on the acceptance of the authority of others. We learn from other people (those whose authority we are trying to assess) the language, the logic and the methodology by virtue of which we assess their statements, their
evidence, arguments and grounds, and thus their claims to know. We cannot reject all we have learned on authority, for this would leave us without language to intelligibly question parts of it.

But this surely cannot constitute an objection to accepting authority in the sphere of knowledge, for it is impossible to raise objections to that which is necessary. The important issues would rather be to attempt to show that it was necessity, to discuss what kind of necessity was involved, and to show that the regress which has been indicated - the appeal to authority in order to decide who the authorities are - is not a vicious one.

Winch's argument seems to show nothing about the acceptance of the authority of particular persons except in the case of learning new rule-governed activities, which I have argued in more detail above. If this is so, it cannot be (as Winch suggests) a matter of logic that anyone must accept authority, for it is not a matter of logic that anyone learns anything, and this has no relationship with choosing. Learning is not an intentional activity, though one can learn intentionally.

But that children must accept authority is not an arbitrary or wholly contingent matter either. It is a contingent matter that human beings need to learn, for they might have been made otherwise, but given that it is part of our concept of a human being that he needs to learn how to engage in human activities and to come to understand, either explicitly or implicitly, what the rules are, then he must accept the authority of particular persons. It is a condition of his admission into the various forms of social life, including speaking his native language. In teaching him, for example, to speak, his parents and others exercise authority in the sense that the child willingly accepts what they say as right. In trying to communicate with them, he has no choice; and though this is therefore quite different from choosing to learn to play chess, his acceptance of what other people say and do as authoritative is similar.

The claim which is being made here is that accepting the authority of particular persons is a necessary condition of learning how to engage in activities which are roughly rule-governed, and where (as in many important areas of life) there are no formal rule books, (and
where such rule books do exist, for knowing that one has properly understood the rules. For if one goes directly to the rules one may misunderstand, so that completely independent knowledge of one's own understanding is not possible.) But accepting the authority of particular persons is not sufficient to ensure that what is learned is the established way of engaging in the activity in question. It is not a sufficient condition because those who claim epistemological authority may not be the possessors of it.

The necessity of the acceptance of authority is derived from the necessity of human learning. It might be called a conceptual necessity. Very young children cannot opt out of accepting authority because learning, and thus accepting the authority of particular persons, is a condition of their admission to their society. The persons whose authority they must accept are simply those who are there. They have no choice. Accepting authority is argued here to be a pre-condition of choosing, rather than, as sometimes suggested, choice being a precondition of accepting authority.

What, then, of the regress, which appears to be involved in the suggestion that one's teacher must be accepted as an authority on authority, or without question, because the learner is not in a position to judge whether he is an authority or not. Here an argument may be employed similar to the one used by Wittgenstein in considering the problem "how do I know that I know?" Although for the majority of assertions we can cite reasons and evidence for their truth or falsity, there comes a point at which reason-giving must end, because this just is the way we think. As he writes, "What stands fast is held fast by what lies around it."

We have to accept authority in the sphere of knowledge on authority because that is the way things are. No other possibility is open to us. If accepting authority is a precondition of knowing anything, then the regress, if that is what we wish to call it, is an acceptable one. Wittgenstein writes, "The child learns by believing the adult. I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human authority, and then found some things confirmed or disconfirmed by my own experience."
Thus there is a sense in which, as Peters suggested, our acceptance of authorities is provisional. For we do not permanently accept what we originally learn, including the ways of doing things and the rules of activities, as we originally learned it. We also learn to criticize, to look at the ways of doing things which others who claim to be authoritative employ, at their evidence, and at their conclusions. And the rules themselves are changed. Thus the possibility of seriously asking questions about whether we were right or not to accept our first teacher as authoritative is opened up to us. It is not until we ourselves are relatively authoritative about X that we are in a position to make judgments about who the authorities on X in our group are, at least in respect of some Xs.

Authority and the Teacher

Waller and Geer, writing in 1932 and 1968 respectively, show the long-term prevalence in sociological writing of the view that teaching is a form of dominance and submission institutionalized through the notion of authority. It is becoming a new orthodoxy that the teacher should give up any claim to be regarded as an authority in the classroom, particularly in the sphere of values. Followers of Rogers suggest that the teacher and pupils should simply be regarded as peers, all concerned with the same end, learning. It is true that teachers can often learn from their pupils, and that, as Rogers suggests, there can be a blurring of the roles, in one sense, if pupils teach and their teachers learn. But, in another sense, teachers and pupils cannot be regarded as peers, for in that sense their roles are not interchangeable. Schools, I have suggested, are institutions developed primarily to promote the learning of those who go to them as pupils, and the presence of the teachers is in furtherance of this aim. By definition they are not peers with their pupils in the role sense, because schools are not institutions to which pupils come in order to further the learning of teachers. A teacher who comes to school only to learn has inappropriate aims, whereas if he thinks his pupils can teach him nothing, he is arrogant, not mistaken about his role.

Those who write of the necessity for abandoning teacher authority see the acceptance of authority as in some way an infringement of
freedom. I am not here concerned with whether or not this is ever the case, but simply with how far this might be the case in respect of teaching/learning transactions. The previous section will have indicated that I am in agreement with Winch that, in a transaction in which someone is being taught how to engage in a rule-governed activity, the acceptance by the pupil of the pronouncements or examples of the teacher as authoritative at some stages of his learning are necessary (but not sufficient) for him to learn how to engage in that activity according to the rules (however flexible and liable to alteration they may be). As Winch says 157, "If I make a wrong move and he corrects me, this is not in any intelligible sense an encroachment on my freedom of action. Until I know how to .... the question of my being free or not to .... cannot arise." That is, the kind of teaching and learning discussed in Chapter 6 - of that which enlarges a person's capacity for action - involves the acceptance of authority instrumentally in the way Winch suggests, where its acceptance is necessary to teaching. The child who accepts authority in this sense sees the teacher as someone who knows how to do things. If he himself wants to learn how to do these things, he needs to see the point of the school's having teachers as being instrumental to helping him learn and his teacher's understanding of "the right way to proceed" in the activity in question as necessary for his learning success there (though, of course, this is not to say he could not learn elsewhere). The suggestion that it would be better if children did not see their teachers as authorities seems to me misguided and confusing. For if they took their teachers to be as ignorant as themselves about the ways in which activities were conducted, they could not see their teachers as being in a position to teach them at all. Sometimes, of course, they may be wrong, and their teachers may not understand the activity in question, in which case they need to learn it along with their pupils, both in order to help them learn and to see what they are learning.

I have argued that teachers must know something their pupils do not in order to teach them that which they could not learn alone, and it seems to me that this is something which pupils also must accept. To suggest that pupils should give up seeing their teachers as authorities in relation to themselves is to suggest that pupils give up seeing their teachers as persons who can teach them. Furthermore,
if the pupils view the teacher's authority as being for their benefit, then there seems no reason why such authority should be resented. This parallels the point made about constructive criticism. But, of course, this argument on both scores requires that the pupil should want to learn.

Where the activities in question are academic disciplines, or broader or more general perspectives based on themes, topics or problems, or traditions in the expressive arts, what the learner is required to accept the teacher as authoritative on are general rules for the engagement in the activity in question, rules that guide his attempts and help them work, which enable him to engage in disciplined thinking or skill learning, to structure the subject matter for himself, to see problems and engage in disciplined attempts to solve them. The teacher is not required to structure the pupils' thinking but to enable the pupil to structure his own thinking. It is to exercise epistemological authority, the authority of knowledge or experience, in a different way, not to abandon it. This does not suggest giving up the flexibility of approach which I argued for earlier, for it is usually the case that there are many appropriate things to be done to engage in the activity in question. Nor is it to suggest that there cannot be ways of doing things that the student could invent for himself that are better than the established ways, known to the teacher, of engaging in that activity. But these must bear some relationship to the established ways for it to be the same activity.

But perhaps this is not what those who suggest that the teacher should give up his claim to be an authority have in mind. Perhaps they are more concerned that pupils should not accept on authority particular statements by the teacher which embody content of a different kind, not that associated with the right ways to engage in the activity but with what has been claimed to be true by previous practitioners of the activity in question. For it may be that seeing the teacher as the authority on this may lead pupils to regard the important part of school as the remembering of extracts of subject matter that the teacher knows, rather than as learning to engage in an activity according to the somewhat flexible rules for participation which are current at the time. That is, they learn in this way not so much about the world as about what others have said about the world.
This is, perhaps, understandable since these are the learnings which are easily examinable.

Since, in schools, it is through the teachers that various ways of understanding the world are made accessible to the pupils (and there would be no point in their coming to school to learn these things if they were readily accessible or more easily accessible elsewhere, as the deschoolers rightly point out), it is important to note that if the pupil is to accept no authority in school, he rejects the opportunity of being taught. For these are areas in which there are no rule books. It is important, I suggest, for genuine intellectual authority to be accepted by pupils where appropriate. This doesn't imply that teachers must know everything, for indeed they could not, nor that their pupils may not sometimes be able to teach them.

The primary difficulties lie in the paradox that at the start learners cannot be in a position to decide whether their teachers are authorities or not. Being assigned a status as an authority does not, I have argued, make one an authority in the context, for there is a distinction between being seen as an authority and being one. The responsibility of ensuring that children do not accept as authorities those who are ignorant lies with the people who appoint teachers, but the responsibility of ensuring that the children do not equate authority with infallibility lies with the teachers themselves.

I have further argued that distinctions must be drawn between that which it makes sense for learners to refuse to accept on authority (e.g. particular propositions) and that which it makes no sense for them to refuse to accept on authority as, at least, provisionally true if they are to learn. These are things related to the constitutive rules of human activities, in the learning of which the child learns how assertions are made in the context, how they are tested, improved, discussed and used to solve problems, how and which skills are relevant, and how to formulate problems in such ways that answers may be sought. At the same time is learned the point and interest of the activity itself, for, as already suggested, these cannot be learned in isolation. What can
be given up is the idea that teacher's answers are authoritative in the sense that they should be accepted without question and memorized, the idea that teachers have once-and-for-all answers. I suggest that it is only in this sense that the claim that pupils ought not to regard their teachers as authorities, that teachers should relinquish their authority, can be seen to make sense.

In what way, then, is being an authority and being seen as an authority argued to be part of the teacher's role (4) and justifiably institutionalized? Certainly it is argued that it is part of the teacher's role that they be authorities relative to their pupils on the ways of understanding the world which are current in their society, or on some specified selection of these for which they have a special responsibility. This is to say that, in relation to this, they ought to know more than their pupils. But we cannot at the same time argue that it is a part of their role (4) that they have the right to be accepted as authorities by their pupils, for their pupils ought to accept them as authorities only if they are so. A person cannot be entitled to be regarded as an authority simply because he has taken a job as a teacher, regardless of what he actually knows.

I have argued that at the start pupils do have to accept their teachers as authorities on trust. This cannot be institutionalized as part of a role, for talk of obligation is out of place. Thus teachers will have to establish relationships with their pupils through which they show that they can be trusted to help them learn "the right way to proceed." The authority of the teacher in the sphere of knowledge need not be viewed as a dominance/submission relationship, but rather, as Winch suggests, as the necessary basis from which a pupil must start. The dominance/submission view is necessary only where the pupils have no wish to learn, no wish to engage in activities suggested, and are coerced into doing so. Thus it ceases to be associated with epistemological authority.

Though the acceptance of authority may, in some cases, lead to over-dependence and in the end to the inhibition of autonomy, nothing has been said to suggest that this must be the case. Scudder, who argues strongly that authority is necessary, writes, "The teacher's primary responsibility is .... to his students, not to offer them a
cafeteria of ideas from which to select, nor to subtly guide their personality growth, nor to impersonally initiate them into the prescribed principles of a discipline or ethical system. He openly, honestly and personally shares his relationship with his discipline and the meaning he has found from this in such a way as to evoke response and decision." Similarly, Herbst questions whether we are entitled to try to "fashion the young in the image of their elders," and perhaps the same thought has led Wilson to ask if schools might not "sometimes be more educative places if we thought of them as providing opportunities occasionally for children to become less, not more, like us?"

On these views, the child's acceptance of authority must not violate his own integrity and must not be used by teachers for the manipulation of their pupils. Provided that these conditions are fulfilled, they argue, the acceptance of authority need not violate autonomy, for there is no reason to accept that autonomy involves the rejection of all authority but one's own or to worry that later stages of teaching must fail to promote and encourage autonomy if pupils are asked to accept certain things on authority.

Quinton's arguments have been further developed by Coady who argues convincingly that they cast doubt on the view developed by Telfer and implicit in some of Dearden's writings that autonomy must decrease if appeal to authorities increases. Indeed, it is more plausible to suggest that autonomy lies in judging for oneself when appeals to authority are appropriate, what one can rationally accept on authority and what must be questioned. (The autonomous chemist takes it on authority that his reagent bottles contain what the labels say, at a mundane level, and at a less mundane level, accepts on trust the reports of large numbers of experiments performed by other people.) If this were not so, the autonomous man would be required to reject not just the route-plan but also the map. Sometimes an autonomous person may rationally ask somebody who knows, for authority and autonomy are complementary.
PART (b): Teacher-Pupil Relationships

I conclude this investigation into some aspects of the teacher's role by briefly discussing what is demanded of the teacher in his relationships with his pupils. It is sometimes suggested that there is a sense in which the teacher-pupil relationship is necessarily and fundamentally impersonal - firstly because it is a role relationship and secondly because it is mediated by authority. I suggest, however, that neither of these aspects necessitates impersonality in any sense - that is, that there is no sense in which a teacher is required to view his pupils impersonally. This is not, of course, to deny that a teacher should treat his pupils fairly (and impartiality is an impersonal virtue) but the practice of impartiality in school requires taking individual pupils' interests, goals, difficulties and understandings of the situation into account. The commitment to impartiality within a face-to-face social group like the classroom is not like the commitment of an administrator within a legal system. It requires the teacher to know the pupils as individuals as far as he can, for how else could he be fair?

Downie suggests 165 that impersonality is required because the relationship is a role relationship, because it has aspects which are independent of persons in that they are required of anybody who undertakes the role. This position seems to make the invalid assumption that a person can only fulfil a role by doing what the role obligations require him to do because it is an obligation of the role. This can be illustrated to be invalid by considering that though it may be a role obligation for a parent to provide food for his children, parents feeding their children generally do not do it because it is their duty, i.e. as an impersonal fulfilment of a role obligation. There is no reason why some reciprocal roles cannot be seen as entirely personal by those who fulfil them, and they do not thereby fail to fulfil the obligations of the role. Winch 166 offers the example of the father who plays with his children merely from a sense of duty. If he plays with his children for the sake of playing with his children, he does not thereby fail to fulfil any role obligation there might be for fathers to play with their children. All this relates to earlier comments 167 on role enactment.
Furthermore, it does not follow that because a person is doing that which is an impersonal obligation of his role (e.g. as a husband) the corresponding role-filler (i.e. his wife) ought to view him impersonally. To argue this would involve the Naturalistic Fallacy. The impersonal aspects of role (obligations independent of persons) implies nothing for the relationship between role incumbents. It is therefore a mistake to claim that the fulfilment of role obligations must have an impersonal aspect, and that there is a sense in which all role-fillers must view each other impersonally.

Downie claims that the teacher-pupil relationship 'ought' to be seen as a role relationship because if it is not, the question of whether teacher and pupil like each other would become important. He suggests that if they did not like each other (or liked each other too much) then the teaching relationship would be disrupted. As I understand it, it seems to imply that there is something wrong with the teacher and pupils seeing each other as involved in a personal (as opposed to a role) teaching relationship, though I am not sure about this as I do not know what sort of 'ought' is intended here. I assume, however, in the light of Downie's general account of roles that it is intended as an 'ought' of obligation. If this is so, I argue that he has failed to substantiate his case. There seem to be no reasons why a teacher could not fulfil his role properly without seeing his pupils impersonally as role fillers. Rather than being mandatory, such a way of viewing his pupils might be something which a teacher can be required to do if personal factors are inhibiting the teaching relationship. One might, indeed, even argue this for parents - it could, at the most, be something which might be required if things were going wrong. But this is a long way from the claim that it is an obligation of the role.

The necessity for authority relationships to be impersonal seems to involve the same fallacy, for to accept someone as an authority need not involve one in viewing him impersonally. That some authority relationships might do so does not entail that all must be, as cases of charismatic authority clearly show. A distinction can be drawn between impersonal authority (illustrated by a judge within a country's formal legal system) and personal authority (as illustrated by the relationships between some parents and their children). No
valid reasons have been given for suggesting that the authority of the teacher which is involved in learning must be viewed as of the first rather than of the second type. I have already argued that it is the authority of particular persons which must be accepted in learning. Though authorities may be viewed impersonally, it does not follow that they must be.

The appeal to rules (on which, it is argued, the teacher must have understanding) cannot take the possibility of uniqueness out of each teaching situation, nor can it render it necessarily impersonal. I thus conclude that though impersonality of relationships in this sense is part of the teacher's role (2) and (3), it is not conceptually demanded (necessary to) the role. That is to say, unlike the aspects of value teaching and assessment, it could be given up, and the onus of justification would fall on those who suggest that teachers ought to view their pupils primarily as role-fillers to show why this is so. One argument which might be used would be the suggestion that such a relationship in some way increased the chances of pupils learning that which is worthwhile. For this, however, evidence would be needed. The fact that young children cannot learn easily in this kind of relationship has already modified many people's current view of the infant teacher's role (3). It may be that empirical evidence will show that this is true of the majority of school-age children.

I am not suggesting here that the majority of our pupils cannot learn anything from a person with whom they have a relationship which is impersonal in this sense, but, in the absence of other justification, the grounds for institutionalizing the demand that teachers view their pupils impersonally in this sense would have to rest on the claim that their pupils learned more and more valuable things from them than they would have done in a relationship in which they were essentially viewed as persons rather than as role-fillers. There is no reason to believe that in general, teachers and pupils who do not view each other primarily as role fillers would be unable to have a relationship in which the one taught the others something worthwhile. Thus I argue that there is no necessity for teachers to view their pupils impersonally in this sense suggested by Downie.

Downie points out that there is another sense in which all
role relationships must be seen as personal, in a sense which he calls\textsuperscript{171} "the basic sense". He speaks of this sense as involving pupils and teacher in "seeing each other as persons" (i.e., rather than as objects) "acting in ways to which a purposive explanation is appropriate." That is, as Downie puts it\textsuperscript{172}, "We take seriously what he says and does as proceeding from rational policies and responsible decisions, and see in his behaviour the significance which he himself attaches to it." Downie claims\textsuperscript{173} that this is "pedagogically and morally appropriate", and also that it may be logically appropriate in that persons are not, logically, explicable in causal terms.

However, there seems to be a certain tension between these claims which most writers would accept and many of the other things they say. For example, it is often argued that children are not yet fully persons - Peters, for example, writes of them as 'potential\textsuperscript{174} persons' and speaks of them as 'embryonic persons',\textsuperscript{175} whilst Langford implies this by his claim that education is "learning to be a person".\textsuperscript{176} Alternatively, it might be argued that other principles, such as the consideration of the child's own interest, justify teachers in overriding children's wishes to pursue their own learning purposes and insist that they learn what they are told to, at least to a limited extent. This seems to return us to viewing pupils primarily as learners rather than as persons. Downie et al. take this view when they argue that some measure of coercion or paternalism is justifiable in schools. White, also, argues that it is not to be up to the pupil e.g., whether or not he should reach a certain standard in science.\textsuperscript{178} Peters, also, seems to be reminding teachers not to view pupils only as learners when he suggests that they are not "just pupils but additionally are moral agents."\textsuperscript{179} It is, I suggest, this kind of position which Wilson was attacking in the section of his work quoted earlier\textsuperscript{180} and which is objected to by advocates of 'free' or 'open' schools, all of whom urge the pupil's right to learn nothing if there is nothing he values learning.

It is difficult to see why age makes any difference when it comes to seeing in someone's behaviour "the significance he himself attaches to it", and I suggest that no reservations need be placed upon Downie's claim that the teacher-pupil relationship is personal in this basic
sense. It would follow from this that the role (4) of the teacher involves the obligation to regard the pupils as persons. This is not to be identified with the claim that teachers ought to act morally, for, on some moral views, a teacher might argue that the right way to act in a school did not involve treating his pupils as persons. The important point I wish to make here, however, is that this does not conflict with the claim that the teacher-pupil relationship is a role relationship but is rather derived from it.

To speak of the role of the pupil is to make the claim that there are rights and obligations associated with being a pupil. This presupposes that pupils are appropriately regarded as persons, for only persons (or artificial persons such as companies) can be said to have obligations. To claim that a pupil, however young, has any obligations (and this claim is usually made even of infant school pupils) is to commit oneself to the view that pupils are persons (in the sense used by Downie) at that time, not that they will become 'fully' persons at some time in the future. It is to accept that they already have goals, purposes and values, some ideas of right and wrong, and the ability to follow a rule. Some support for this position can be found in the empirical work of Piaget and Kohlberg, and that the assumptions are made is indicated by the fact that claims are made by teachers (e.g. that pupils ought to be responsible for their own learning, that children ought to help tidy up the classroom) about what even very young children ought to do. Neill writes of the responsible way in which six year olds participate in the Summerhill parliament, and Holt and other deschoolers continually urge us to accept how responsibly young children can act if they are trusted to do so. People who could be responsible must, I suggest, logically be treated as persons in a role relationship.

It is surely wrong to suggest that pupils can be regarded first as learners and then additionally as moral agents. The regarding of pupils as moral agents is implicit in any suggestions that there are proper ways for them to act (of which engaging in activities through which they are taught is considered to be one). Similarly, teachers
are not both enacting the role of the teacher and also acting as moral agents. In attempting to fulfil a role (4) they must be acting as moral agents. It is unjustifiable to promote a distinction between a role-filler and a moral agent, and therefore any conception of a teacher's role which denied that pupils should be viewed as primarily persons would fail to imply that the pupil had a role in any normative sense. If pupils are role-fillers, they are at the same time individual moral agents, and in treating them as such, the teacher must be concerned with their view of both his and their roles, and thus with their concerns and interests. The teacher's role must therefore include trying to get to know his pupils as persons.

Here perhaps it is worth reminding the reader that this discussion is on a justifiable role for teachers. There is no suggestion that if a teacher fails to treat his pupils as persons in the above sense, he cannot teach them anything, for this is clearly empirically false. What is the case, however, is that the majority of children in our schools form different kinds of relationships with different teachers. Some of these are of the kind which inhibits their learning. I do not believe that one can generalise here, for though Holt has suggested that children have difficulty learning anything of value when they are frightened of the teacher, this is an empirical matter and may be true for some people and false for others. Some people claim to have been taught more by teachers of whom they have been frightened than when relationships have been more friendly, for they have then tried harder to learn. But if this is not the case for most pupils, then it can be argued that it is part of the teacher's role (4) to try to establish friendly relationships with all his pupils. This is not to suggest that it is his obligation to like them all, for liking is not a matter of choice, nor is it to suggest that, in some schools, it is easily achieved.

Downie seems to me to be mistaken in his view that the pupil sees the teacher only by reflection from subject matter. It is rather through the teacher and his actions that the pupil views the subject matter, and where he engages with subject matters directly and without
any mediation by the teacher, then there is no teaching. Herbst\textsuperscript{186}, writing of teaching as he ideally conceives of it (i.e. his conception of the teacher's role (4)) says, "For teachers all of this insists on one commandment: Be honest, genuine and real." He adds\textsuperscript{187}, "A teacher teaches as he is, that is to say, he teaches by his personal example." Though this is not Herbst's concern, it is worth noting that since learning in school will involve some teaching in the area of interpersonal understanding, the relationship between a teacher and his pupils is itself a means of teaching. Thus if a person dislikes children, cannot get to know them (when the circumstances are reasonable) and cannot act towards them with good will, perhaps he is incapable of fulfilling the role (4) of the teacher, the role of a teacher as we ought to conceive of it.

Earlier I suggested that schools ought not to be coercive institutions, and that it would not be justifiable to institutionalize the manipulation or coercion of children in respect of learning as part of the teacher's role (4)\textsuperscript{188}. Thus I accepted Wilson's view that, if schools are to be moral places, the children themselves must have reasons for engaging in the activities which their teachers suggest, and in particular, activities through which teachers may try to teach the children new interests. Some pupils may be willing to engage in the suggested activities because the learning is instrumental in some way to other goals which they already have. But this will not be true of all of them.

Aside from a small minority of children who may need to be taught to be curious (for some children come to school appearing, at least, to be no longer curious about anything), the answer to this may lie in a combination of the child's curiosity and his relationship with his teachers. It is the children's own past experiences which can provide them with the best reasons for engaging in the activities their teachers suggest - that they have learned from these experiences that the activities their teachers suggest are often interesting and/or pleasurable, and that their teachers can teach them that which they themselves think (or come to think) worth learning. Conversely, their past experiences can provide them with the best reasons for not wishing to try these new activities - that they have learned from these experiences that school activities are neither interesting nor pleasurable.
If they have had the right early experiences, they will be willing to trust their teachers to show them the interest of at least some of the activities proposed. This is why it is so important that primary school children should not simply be required to acquire skills etc. If they see no value in what they are doing, or have no interest in what they are learning, this experience will count as a reason for expecting nothing of value in the future.

If pupils did trust their teachers, this would imply that they would have no reason to deceive them in the many ways already mentioned - pretending an interest or an achievement that they do not have, or concealing those they do have. This is, indeed, a part of what we mean by trusting someone. The relationship of acceptance and trust may be of a purely intellectual kind at University level, and even, perhaps, for some children in school. But for most children, and certainly in the primary school, there is an affective component, which means that for trust, the pupil must view his teacher as a person. One cannot have an affective relationship with a role-filler whom one sees purely impersonally.

This argument suggests that each teacher's ability to form satisfactory relationships has a greater importance than for his own teaching relationship with that child alone; for unsatisfactory relationships with some of his teachers may lead him to be unwilling to enter relationships appropriate for learning with others. It is surely a mistake to think that there are no consequences extending beyond the relationship itself, for the child's judgments of his new teachers can only be based on a form of inductive reasoning, an extrapolation of his past experiences with teachers, together with what he is taught by other children about what his future teacher is thought to be like. Each teacher, therefore, has, for better or for worse, the consequences of the children's relationships with their previous teachers and his own relationships with his former pupils as the basis of his own future relationships with his pupils.

These are, of course, empirical points. But I suggest that in the past, in our concern with what pupils are learning at a given time, we have paid insufficient attention to the personal aspects of the teacher's role. Now many teachers go into schools and encounter only hostility from their pupils. Sometimes their pupils simply ignore
them. Often many of them aren't even there. Sometimes this may be because pupils have seen teachers as authoritarian and schools as hostile places in which they have been kept busy at activities which have seemed to have no point or purpose. At other times, it may be the result of a vacuous 'progressivism' which has lost sight of the learning goals of school. If simply left to their own devices, with no help and guidance from a teacher, pupils may not experience the satisfaction of developing their interest in something in a disciplined way, and have come to regard their teachers as little more than benign child-minders. They, too, as they get older, can see no point or purpose to school. It may be that child-centred theorists, in their concern to emphasize the importance of the child's view of what he is doing and that he should value what is to be learned, have seriously under-estimated the importance of the child's view of his teachers. The traditionalists, on the other hand, in their concern with the 'intellectual' relationship between teachers and pupils, may have neglected other aspects of the relationship.

I believe that it is important that teachers be seen not as "transmitters of knowledge" (as on the so-called 'traditional' view), nor simply as "friend and guide" (the friendly psychological manipulator of so many so-called "progressive" views) but rather as a person, with an understanding of and an interest in various important human activities and problems, which he is willing and able to share, concerned to know his pupils and their interests, able to engage in discussions with his pupils about the various activities which all are engaging in, and to help them to see what it is about them which makes it worthwhile for them all to spend their time on them.

It would follow that if the pupils were to be right to view their teachers in this way, this is what their teachers would have to be. These are the attributes associated with the role (4) of the teacher. It would surely be too pessimistic to suggest that this is a role which not many people would be willing or able to fill.

Notes and References for Section IV

Introduction

2. Ibid., p. 74.

3. Ibid., pp. 79, 83, 86.

4. This way of putting the claim clearly indicates the importance of differentiating role (4) from role (3), for it is not necessarily the case that, as an empirical matter, teachers all have such intentions, or even that it is part of the teacher's role (3) in our society. For it might be that most people who hold expectations of teachers and what they ought to do in fact have no such normative expectation (for they may not have any well-thought-out expectations concerning teachers' intentions at all). Even teachers themselves may not have such intentions, for they may view their roles as teaching e.g. Chemistry or Latin without any consideration of its value, or see it simply in terms of pedagogy to be performed on instruction from their Head of Department, or consider their primary role to be to get children through examinations, or even have given up the idea that the primary aim of the school should be learning in favour of, for example, the children's happiness or their own quiet lives. At any rate, whether having such intentions is a part of the teacher's role (3) is, on the analysis presented in the previous chapter, a matter for empirical investigation. The claim being made here is non-empirical, that the role (4) of the teacher involves an intention to teach something worth learning.

The claim that such intentions are a justifiable part of a role in the sense that they are necessary to it implies, on the argument of Chapter 1, that teachers (logically) ought to have such intentions, because having such intentions is part of the obligations of the role, and a person who chooses to accept a role (4) must accept this obligation if he is to be a responsible role-filler.

Chapter 6.


10. Downie R.S., Loudfoot E.H. & Telfer E., *Education and Personal Relationships*, Methuen, 1974. Though this book raises some of the issues discussed in this section, it was published too late for a detailed consideration of its views to be included. This does not seem a matter of great importance, however, because (a) the views expressed are substantially the same as those put forward by the authors in separate articles which are discussed, and by Downie in the book *Roles and Values*, op. cit. (b) they are discussing a view of the teacher's role derived from a highly specific concept of education, whilst I am discussing a view derived from an analysis of teaching in its most general sense. There is a sense, therefore, in which its arguments will not 'mesh' with those of this thesis.


13. If one asks "Why ought we to value persons?" a paradox is involved, for they can only be valued non-instrumentally for what is involved in being one, i.e. for what they are. Thus if the concept of a person was taken as non-normative, one would be involved in the Naturalistic Fallacy, since nothing could follow from the fact that a person has characteristics X, Y and Z etc. that indicates that persons are worth valuing. That is why the concept of a person must be taken as normative. Persons are the sources of values and reasons. This evaluative assumption is required if one is to attempt to draw evaluative conclusions, as I do here,
that some learning requires no special justification as worthwhile.


18. For example, a man who saves his dog rather than his child from a burning house clearly values his dog more than his child. However, few would dissent from the judgment that (objectively) he ought to have valued his child more.


24. Ibid. p. 36.


27. Ibid., p. 106.


30. He must know something of what Ryle (in The Concept of Education, op. cit., p. 114) called "the modus operandi".

31. See this thesis pp. 129-130.


38. as mentioned e.g. by Wilson, Interest and Discipline in Education, op. cit., p. 56.

39. For further discussions on this, see Chapter 7.


41. See Freeman, "Interests and Educational Value", op. cit. for a fuller discussion of this.

42. Sartre J.-P., Being and Nothingness, Methuen, 1957.


47. See discussions in Wilson, Interest and Discipline in Education, op. cit., chapter 2.

48. Ibid., pp. 42-49.

49. Ibid., p. 52.

Chapter 7


64. Counts G., "Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order" in The Teacher and the Taught, op. cit., pp. 178-194.


71. Durkheim, Education and Sociology, op. cit.


74. Hare in *New Essays in the Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., p. 155
76. Hare in *New Essays in the Philosophy of Education*, op. cit., p. 155
78. Ibid., p. 84.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., p. 83.
81. Merson M.W. & Campbell, "Community Education: Instruction for Inequality" in *Education for Teaching*, No. 93, 1974. pp. 43-49. See the references to this article for earlier contributions to the debate.
82. See note 18, p. 284 this thesis and relevant discussion in the text.
85. Barrow, *Plato, Utilitarianism and Education*, op. cit., p. 179
87. Stenhouse L, The Schools Council Humanities Curriculum Project
88. Wilson J. et al., The Farmington Trust Moral Education Project
89. McPhail et al., The Schools Council Moral Education Project
90. See Hare in *New Essays in the Philosophy of Education*, op. cit.


98. Wilson, 'Interests and Educational Values,' op. cit.

99. Ibid., p. 184.

100. Ibid., p. 186.

101. See Barrow, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, op. cit., p. 84, p. 171. Barrow seems to make no distinctions between different kinds of pro-attitudes.

102. Wilson in "Interests and Educational Values", op. cit.

103. Ibid., p. 193.

104. In Freeman H, "Interests and Educational Value", op. cit., I suggest that there are difficulties with Wilson's arguments because he has failed to notice the ambiguity in his use of the term 'instrumental'.


106. Wilson, Interest and Discipline in Education, op. cit., p. 43.


109. As, for example, Steerpike in Peake M., the Titus trilogy, Penguin, 1969.

110. e.g. Young M.F.D. (ed), Knowledge and Control, Collier-Macmillan, 1971. Also in Open University Coursework books for Education Courses.


112. Kretch D., Crutchfield R.S. & Ballachey E.L., Individual in Society, McGraw-Hill, 1962, p. 27, cite an experiment by Zillig M., "Einstellung und Aussage" in Z. Psychol., 106, 1928, pp. 58-106. When two groups of children, selected as widely liked and generally disliked, performed exercises before the remainder of the class, the observers reported "seeing" the children they disliked performing badly and the children they liked performing well, even though the 'liked' group had been trained to perform deliberately poorly.

Henry J., "In Suburban Classrooms" in Gross R. & Gross B. (eds),
Radical School Reform, Penguin, 1969, pp. 86-87 gives an account of a classroom in which pupils were attempting to assess each others' work. For self- and peer- assessment to be given any chance of success, it would seem (a) that the competitiveness would have to be removed from the situation and (b) that the children would have to have a much clearer idea of what they were doing, and see a rather different point in it all from the ones in Henry's classroom.


119. See, for example, Evans L.M., "Towards Field-Centred Teacher Education: Trends in the U.S.A." and Elliott J. & Mabbot B., "Teaching, Research and Teacher Education: Some Comments on Competency-based Teacher Education", both in Education for Teaching, No. 96, 1975. I am also indebted to a paper by Prof. I. Steinberg, given to a Ph.D. Seminar Group at London University Institute of Education, March 5th, 1975.

120. See this thesis, pp. 56-57.


126. Holt, How Children Fail, p. 108


Holt, The Underachieving School, op. cit., pp. 121–122. The notable thing about nearly every example of classroom talk given here is that it is both initiated and ended by a comment from the teacher. The contributions by the pupils are all their responses to what they clearly see as questions, asked by a teacher who already knows the answers.

131. e.g. Holt in How Children Fail, op. cit., p. 23.

Chapter 8

140. Ibid., pp. 103–104.
141. Ibid., p. 98.
142. Ibid., p. 99.
143. Ibid., p. 100.
144. Ibid., p. 101.
145. Ibid., pp. 102–103.
146. Ibid.
180. Wilson, *Interest and Discipline in Education*, op. cit., p. 36.

Kohlberg in *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, op. cit.
184. Of course it does not follow from this that every action of such a person is rational or responsible, or that on some occasions a causal explanation might also be appropriate.
187. Ibid., p. 276.
188. This thesis, p. 209, p. 213.
189. One new technique which might have a part to play here is the use of simulation and gaming. Most of their proponents see their use primarily as a means of teaching skills, though there is still considerable controversy about their desirability for this purpose. (See, for example, Walford R., "Operational Games and Geography Teaching" in *Geography*, No. 242, Vol. 54, Part I, 1969. pp. 191-205, and a reply setting out the case against them by Scarfe N.V., "Games, Models and Reality in the Teaching of Geography in School" in *Geography*, Vol. 56, Part 3, 1971. pp. 191-205.) Some concern might also be due in respect of the values which the simulations themselves embody and which are taught to children through the playing of these games. For a fuller discussion, see Taylor J.H. & Walford R., *Simulation in the Classroom*, Penguin, 1972. My point here is a different one - that children enjoy games and thus have a reason for playing them. They may therefore have an important role to play as a means of interesting them in subject matter. If the interest is aroused, this, according to my arguments, will itself be a reason for choosing to learn in that area. Further gaming for the purpose of teaching skills is then only one method among many. As an initial interest arrouser, it may have special value because of the interest most children have in games.

I am particularly indebted to Suzanne Castel for discussions on the topic of authority and rules, which we have had over a period of about a year.
147. Ibid.
150. Ibid., p. 106.
151. Ibid., p. 107.
153. Ibid., para. 144.
154. Ibid., para. 161.
157. Winch in Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. 103.
160. Wilson, Interest and Discipline in Education, op. cit., p. 120.
161. Quinton in "Authority and Autonomy in Knowledge", op. cit.
167. This thesis, pages 202-205.
169. See, for example, some of the comments by Hirst and Peters in *The Logic of Education*, op. cit., p. 136, on related aspects.

170. That the personal characteristics are important in charismatic authority, or the more mundane version which Peters calls 'de facto authority', can be seen by considering Winch's example of the illustrious William Webb Ellis, who "picked up the ball and ran", thus introducing the game of rugby football. We can ask whether Winch is right in explaining that he acquired authority simply by virtue of the tradition of the game in which he was playing. Looking at the rules of soccer alone, and seeing that what Ellis did could be viewed as a new sense of "the right way to proceed" within the traditions of the game will not suffice to explain what happened. Social psychologists will confirm that it is quite possible that earlier in the day Fred Bloggs picked up the ball and ran, and got kicked off the pitch for it. An appeal to personal qualities is needed to explain why something done by person A is accepted as authoritative sometimes when the same act performed by person B (in the same situation) is ignored. Accepting the authority of persons is not quite the same as accepting the authority of role-fillers.


172. Ibid.

173. Ibid., p. 137.


175. Peters in seminar discussion


179. Quotation taken from his writings, source uncertain.
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO SOME ASPECTS OF THE TEACHER'S ROLE

Helen Stephanie Freeman
SECTION V

Conclusions and Further Questions for Research
CHAPTER 9: Conclusions, Prescriptions and Further Questions

Introduction

This thesis has explored a number of related questions concerned with philosophy of education, teaching and the role of the teacher, each section being concerned not only with clarification but also with justification. In this chapter, I draw together the conclusions reached in the body of the thesis, and point to ways in which they open up some directions for future research.

(1) Philosophy of Education

In Section I, I presented a view of philosophy of education which is, in one way, distinctively different from the commonly accepted view. I have suggested that justifications must be taken as implying prescriptions, and that particular works in the philosophy of education which draw conclusions about the justifiability of certain practices must be taken as presenting the analysis or the social practice which has been justified as being one which, ceteris paribus, ought to be adopted.

This principle is one which, unlike some, can satisfactorily be applied to itself. My claim, therefore, that I have justified a conception of philosophy of education as itself an activity without bias and value neutral but within which particular enterprises can issue in justificatory claims with direct prescriptive, and therefore value, implications, if correct, implies that this view of philosophy of education ought to be adopted.

(2) Concepts of Teaching

I first became interested in the analyses of teaching when I discovered that it was impossible to use the standard analysis to
explore the role of the teacher with an open mind because it embodied certain assumptions about the teacher's role which had not been supported with argument and which could, indeed, be questioned. In offering this new analysis of teaching, therefore, I have reversed the orthodox approach which limits its conclusions about what we must say about teaching by views about what we ought to say about teachers, and offered an analysis which, I believe, embodies no assumptions about teachers in schools. I made, instead, the reverse point that, if valid, the analysis presented must have appropriate application to schools, on the grounds that it was presupposed by the existence of such institutions.

A major part of Section II was devoted to justifying the claims of this analysis as against those of the more orthodox analysis, and the belief that the 'outcome' sense of teaching has logical priority over other senses. I have therefore argued not only that this is the way in which we do understand teaching, but additionally that this is the way we ought to understand teaching in the future. The distinction between descriptive and prescriptive analysis does not prevent any analysis being offered and accepted as both descriptive and prescriptive. The concept of teaching as analysed here is offered as a conceptually normative one, and I suggest that persons with certain ontological assumptions should prefer this analysis to the standard orthodox analysis as it does not embody some of the internal inconsistencies of the latter.

(3) The Concept of a Perficienary Transaction

In order to have a framework for the alternative analysis I was trying to develop, I suggested the concept of a perficienary transaction, and of a class of verbs which can fill in for X in claims such as "A is X-ing B" where B is a person. This work is philosophically important, I suggest, in more than one way.

Perficience verbs, as I have distinguished them, are Janus-concepts which draw attention at the same time to actions by an agent A and to outcomes in another person, B, to which those acts are instrumental.
I believe that this concept should have a wider application than simply to the consideration of teaching for which it was developed, in that it may be helpful for further understanding of inter-personal relationships and be useful within the area of philosophy of action in general.

If this is so, it again implies a revision of certain views of philosophy of education which suggest that a distinctive feature of work in this area is that it simply draws on relevant work from other branches of philosophy, the implication being that philosophy of education itself has nothing to contribute to these other areas. If the concept of a perficienary transaction, which was developed as a conceptual tool from a concern with a problem in the philosophy of education, has this wider application, then this indicates that work with potential for use in other areas of philosophical enquiry can be anticipated from philosophy of education - i.e. that it can contribute to "pure" philosophy rather than being simply parasitic upon it.

(4) The Concept of Role

In seeking to examine the question of a justifiable role for a teacher, I found it necessary to develop a more sophisticated analysis of role than that of Downie, which I have criticized in Section III. This analysis is, I suggest, of importance to anyone who holds an essentially non-relativist position in ethics, a position which accepts that obligations associated with a role in a given community can be examined in the light of fundamental principles to see whether they are justifiable. The concept of role (4) is necessary as a contrast with role (3) in order to be able to entertain the view that some social roles, as instantiated, might be pernicious.

Once again, this analysis may be of wider application by being useful for anyone who wishes to examine other social roles from the philosophical perspective.
(5) **The Role of the Teacher**

This thesis is, I believe, the first systematic study of the teacher's role investigating whether various aspects are necessarily or contingently associated with it, given certain assumptions. Such work has implications outside the philosophy of education.

For example, if certain sociologists imply that there are no limits to the ways in which roles may be re-defined, then my claims, if correct, that there are necessary elements to the teacher's role cast doubt on these sociological views, which could therefore not be correct. I suggest that there is the implied prescription here that such sociologists should re-consider their claims in the light of these arguments. The aspects of the teacher's role claimed to be necessary are not simply judged to be so a priori, but derive from assumptions which would be valid for any society - namely, the relationship which must hold for anyone between an attempt and its goal, and the necessity for human beings to learn through teaching (intentional or non-intentional) in order to become social agents. These aspects are necessary, but the claim is not simply analytic.

(a) **Bringing about capacity-enlarging learning**

I have argued that for learning to be worthwhile in the sense of enlarging a person's capacity for experience and responsible social action, it must be non-inert. This implies that we need seriously to reconsider some of the justifications which are offered for certain aspects of the school curriculum. For example, the justification for attempting to teach children to read that stresses its instrumentality to "reading poetry with sensitivity and expression or to reading George Eliot's novels" is no justification at all if children are taught at the same time to dislike reading and leave school determined never to read anything they don't have to again. If children's capacities are to be enlarged in any practical, as opposed to merely theoretical, sense, it follows that we ought to pay a great deal more attention than we do to the ways in which pupils regard their learning, and what they are disposed to do with it.

Secondly, I have claimed that the following of tightly structured
curricula was, at the most, contingently demanded of the teacher, and suggested that some teachers might fulfil their roles better by leaving their aims at a high level of generality, or by keeping them "fuzzy". I refer later to the implications of this for empirical research. At this stage, I point only to the prescriptive implications of this claim for policy-makers, particularly in view of some American trends which are lurking on our door-step.

As long as it has been considered to be demanded by the nature of teaching that a teacher have aims as tightly specified as the nature of the content permits, claims that teachers should have behavioural objectives have been rejected on the grounds that certain objectives cannot be spelled out behaviourally. The work of this thesis provides an alternative ground for rejecting the claim. Behavioural objectives are, by definition, a low-level specification or break-down of higher level aims. I have suggested here that no low-level spelling out of aims for particular enterprises is demanded by the nature of teaching itself, and that some people might fulfil their roles better by deliberately keeping their aims "fuzzy". If this is correct, then, a fortiori, the specification of behavioural objectives cannot be demanded by the nature of teaching. Unless alternative justification can be offered for the demand for pre-specified behavioural objectives, there is the implied prescription from the work of this thesis that administrators cannot justifiably demand this of teachers.

(b) The teaching of values

In this thesis I have argued that teachers cannot opt out of value teaching, and that schools and teachers are thereby committed to justifying the values which they do in fact teach, and to changing their practices if it is the case that they cannot justify them. This implies the prescription that teachers examine more carefully the practices they employ in their attempts to teach knowledge and skills in respect of the values taught at the same time (for it is impossible to separate the teaching of knowledge and skills from the teaching of values) and also the social
organization and practices of the classrooms and the school.

Particular attention was paid to the claim that schools 'impose values' (in particular 'middle-class' values) on children. A careful examination was carried out of the teaching of interest (in the psychological sense) and it has been shown that teaching children to be interested in various kinds of activities cannot be correctly regarded as the imposition of values. Furthermore, it was argued that where children are learning about that which they are interested in, or are interested in that which they are learning, they must (by virtue of what is meant by being interested) come to appreciate what can be described as 'intellectual virtues' - such as clarity in thinking, imagination, consistency, the structuring of concepts and beliefs into a coherent system, self-discipline, a willingness to entertain new ideas, etc. These can clearly not correctly be described as 'middle class' values for they transcend social class in that they would be of value to anyone in pursuing any interest (since all interests are necessarily cognitive to some extent). It was also argued that if these values are taught through children's interests, the learners come to value them because they enable them to pursue their interests more successfully. It is therefore inappropriate here, as well, to speak of values being 'imposed', for the pupils have come to value them rationally.

These are, I believe, important claims, and suggest openings for further philosophical research to discover other instances of the teaching of values in ways such that the charge that they have been 'imposed' can be firmly rejected. Further work in the philosophy of value is also relevant here, to establish claims that there are other values which it would be justifiable to teach (not 'impose' on) any child, insofar as they transcend social class.

(c) Assessment

It has been argued that a teacher must assess what his pupils are learning from him in order to fill his role responsibly, for if he does not do so, there is a clear sense in which he does not know
what he is doing. This is to claim that assessment, involving discussions with pupils in which the criteria for assessment are themselves evaluated as well as the value of what is learned, is a necessary part of the teacher's role.

The claim that assessment cannot be responsibly eliminated from the teacher's role again implies that any sociologist or psychologist who suggests that this is the case should re-consider his position. In particular, this has implications for those who suggest that teachers should 'suspend their categories' in the classroom. I have argued that in order to fulfil his role responsibly, a teacher must perform actions. The performance of actions presupposes that the agent has beliefs about his role, about his pupils and about the world. For this reason, it seems clear that teachers cannot 'suspend their categories' in the classroom, for such beliefs require categories. Without categories a teacher could not act, and thus could not teach anyone anything. The rejection of this claim therefore raises further urgent questions regarding the justifications for using certain categories for assessment rather than others. These are philosophical questions.

(d) Authority

The conclusions drawn from the discussion of learning and authority are that it is necessary for pupils to see their teachers as authorities in relation to much of their learning for epistemic reasons, and that suggestions that teachers should try to avoid being seen as authorities by their pupils are therefore mistaken.

However, the sense in which it is claimed here that pupils should accept their teachers as authorities is a limited one. It has not been claimed that it is a sense which gives the teachers a special right to be heard (which would entail the obligation of the pupils to listen) nor that what they say must be right. It is rather argued that insofar as someone wants or needs to learn or to do something for which learning is a pre-requisite, there are areas in which he must accept what others say as authoritative, at least temporarily.
If I am correct, and it is justifiable that learners accept authority in this sense, there is the implied prescription that schools should ensure that both teachers and children understand the relationship required in this kind of way, rather than, as sometimes occurs, equating 'being an authority' with 'being infallible'. It is necessary to emphasize that the relationship between being an authority and being right on any particular occasion is not a necessary one, in order to reject the view that the claim that teachers should be authorities relative to their pupils, and should be seen by their pupils to be so, implies either a kind of arrogance on the part of the teacher, or that what is required of pupils is that they be submissive. In particular, it should be remembered that the authority in question is personal. Casting people in roles (i.e., as teacher and pupil) cannot, of itself, render the one an authority and the other relatively ignorant.

There is a further implication here for those who appoint teachers, that what they should seek is not so much (or only) those who know a great deal more than pupils in the way of propositional knowledge, but rather those who understand the ways in which many important human activities can be effectively pursued and what can be found interesting about them, and who can communicate this understanding to their pupils.

Finally, since I was unable here to consider whether the various 'in authority' aspects of the teacher's role are necessarily or only contingently associated with it, there remains this further important area for philosophical investigation in respect of the teacher's role.

(e) Pupil-teacher relationships

The section on pupil-teacher relationships in this thesis was curtailed through lack of space, and is an area in which I hope to do further work. In this thesis I have suggested that the claim that there is a proper role for pupils commits us to the view that it is part of the teacher's role to treat his pupils as persons, rather than as 'embryonic' or 'potential' persons. This claim was made in conjunction with an earlier one that no justification exists for the
suggestion that it should be a standard obligation of the teacher's role to manipulate or coerce his pupils. At the same time, I criticized the view that there was any sense in which it could be claimed as necessary for a teacher to see his pupils impersonally, by showing that the arguments presented for this in terms of role were invalid. If this is so, it follows that teachers are not under an obligation to view their pupils impersonally, and that pupils are entitled to be viewed as persons by their teachers. This latter claim implies that many teachers ought to re-consider their views of their pupils.

(6) Implications for Empirical Research

It is an interesting feature of philosophical research of this kind that it has direct implications for empirical research, both in terms of suggesting new research, and new foci of attention for on-going research. Since suggestions in this area could be but speculative, I do not discuss them in detail, but illustrate this point briefly by example.

Although I have argued that it is not demanded by the nature of teaching that a teacher has a well-structured curriculum to which to work, it does not follow from this that all teachers would be equally able to fulfil their roles without a structured curriculum. There are important individual differences between teachers as well as between pupils to be taken into account, and each teacher may need to develop a range of teaching styles for which his own particular personality characteristics, knowledge and skills fit him, and learn to exercise judgment in respect of which ones to employ in different contexts and with different groups of learners.

Research is clearly needed to find out how, in what contexts and with what people the adoption of tightly structured curricula is more helpful or less helpful than the abandonment of such curricula. As a pedagogical method, the latter may make much greater demands on teachers' imaginations, knowledge and understanding, which not all teachers may be able to meet, though the possibility that groups of
teachers with complementary strengths working together may overcome this should not be ignored.

The main claim, however, is that this is not decidable a priori but is essentially a matter for empirical investigation.

In arguing that much can be discovered about teaching by the investigation of cases of non-intentional teaching, I suggest that this may be of particular importance when it comes to value teaching, for we do not yet have a clear understanding of how people are taught their values. In respect of the teaching of knowledge, understanding and skills, there is the claim that investigations should be extended to groups outside of schools where the primary intention is 'doing' rather than 'learning' and which have been excluded from investigations by the orthodox analysis of teaching. In respect of teaching interest, it is clear that we need a great deal of research into the kinds of activities children find most interesting (and their reasons for finding them so) and how far other factors, such as the teacher's personality, the social climate of the classroom, structured or unstructured curricula, rigid or flexible timetabling, a high or low level of pupil choice, etc., either contribute to or militate against the teaching of interest.

Since 'ought' implies 'can', clearly the claim that one of the main tasks of the teacher is to help children learn through or with interest those things which can be justified on grounds other than interest alone has important implications for those who provide the conditions under which teachers and pupils work. If they accept the importance of interest as a means of ensuring that schools justify themselves by teaching children only that which is non-inert, they are committed to a policy of providing the conditions (as discovered by the kinds of research suggested above) which enable the teachers to fulfil their roles.

There was serious consideration in the body of this thesis of the claims of writers such as Holt and Barnes that current school practices used by teachers at least in part as a means of assessing what their pupils are learning militate, in many cases, against their learning.
anything of value. However, if I am correct in suggesting that assessment of pupils' learning is a necessary part of the teacher's role, this problem cannot be overcome by giving up assessment altogether. There is the implication here, therefore, that research on assessment should broaden its terms of reference to include consideration of whether the assessment itself militates against teaching anything worthwhile.

In this thesis as a whole, great stress has been placed on the importance of the pupils' view or interpretation of the teacher's actions. The empirical research required thus must include not only observations in the classroom of what the teacher does, interpreted non-behaviourally in terms of meanings, but investigations of both how the teacher himself and how the pupils, individually and collectively, view them, to see how far interpretations are shared. It suggests that an important way for some teachers to become more successful in fulfilling their roles might be to engage in this kind of research with their pupils for themselves. It is often surprising to teachers to discover how very differently their actions have been interpreted from the way they were intended.

These suggestions indicate the kinds of implication for empirical research which this thesis offers.

Final Conclusions

In claiming that there is a role (4) for teachers and schools, I have suggested an essentially reformist view of schooling, though this is not to imply that the reforms required might not be fairly radical. The grounds for the claim that schools need to be reformed have been that it is the case that so many pupils, particularly in secondary schools, learn only to pass examinations, see no value in much of their learning on its own account, and forget most of what they have learned there as soon as they have left school. Thus schooling as it is fails to fulfil the criterion of teaching many pupils that which it is worthwhile for them to learn - a condition which, on the arguments of this thesis, is necessary for schooling
to be a justifiable institution.

On this score, the deschoolers have stirred our consciences by pointing out how the schools fail so many of their pupils - even, I would suggest, many who have strings of O-level and A-level successes to their names, for these have often been acquired and valued only as a 'ticket' to something else. But deschooling cannot be the answer. We must rather find out what needs to be changed about schools to make them justifiable institutions, for there is nothing in their primary purpose that makes this impossible.

A person who takes a job as a teacher may be prepared to regard himself merely as an instrument, accepting (that is, insofar as he can ignore the conflicts within it) society's role (3) for the teacher. But there are grounds for concern about this, for any teacher who fulfils his role is responsible for changing his pupils. A case can therefore be made that he ought, as a moral agent, to work out what must be the role (4) rather than to look at what is the role (3) in his society. Expectations arise in many different ways, and a teacher can argue that other people's possibly arbitrary expectations are an inadequate basis for deciding one's own responsible actions. All these considerations suggest that the role (4) of the teacher is a responsible and difficult one.

The conclusions presented in this thesis for the teacher's role (4) in a school are based upon a set of assumptions about teaching, about what justifies schooling, and about what it is to fulfil a role responsibly. There is thus the implied prescription that, if my arguments are correct, those who share my assumptions ought to have this conception of the teacher's role. The relationship between concepts and action is such that spelling out the role implied by a set of assumptions in more detail may change a person's view of his role and thereby may change what a teacher feels he can rightly do in school. Thus, as I argued in Chapter 1, one of the main justifications for philosophizing about the teacher's role lies in the prescriptive implications which it has for school practices.

In that first chapter, I presented arguments to substantiate the claim that philosophical work could have direct prescriptive implications,
and added that the main body of the thesis represented an instantiation of this which was offered as additional grounds for accepting the claim and revising our conception of philosophy of education to include it. I believe that this chapter, which has collected together the many and wide-ranging prescriptive implications of this thesis itself, indicates clearly the validity of the original claim about the nature and value of philosophy of education - that its importance lies in its being not simply an academic discipline issuing in theoretical judgments but also an activity closely related to the world of action and issuing in practical judgments as well.

Notes and references for Section V

1. Of course it is possible for people to hold beliefs which conflict with one another. My claim is that, on reflective consideration, it can be seen that, insofar as we hold consistent beliefs about teaching, this is how we do understand it.

2. Downie R.S., Loudfoot L.H. & Telfer E., Education and Personal Relationships, Methuen, 1974 use this term on p. 173 to speak of the way in which they recommend the use of the term 'education' and the view of the end-state of educatedness which they employ. I use it here in the same sense.

3. It must be pointed out that this kind of claim is not legislative about the use of language in a wider sense, for I have discussed in this thesis many other concepts of teaching, such as Scheffler's (which could become normative) and the institutionalized uses of the term which have developed as a result of the establishment of schools. There is no suggestion that these uses should be abandoned, nor is there any claim that new uses may or should not develop. I only suggest that they must all respect this logical relationship between a person's goals (what he wants to do), and the attempts he makes to do these things. That is, all senses are, I suggest, necessarily based on an 'outcome' sense.

4. As suggested by Ryle (personal communication)

5. On certain relativist positions, of course, role (4) may collapse into role (3).

7. i.e. because of the conceptual relationship between 'being an authority' and 'knowing' on the one hand, and between 'knowing' and 'being infallibly right' on the other.

8. There are certain things on which the children are necessarily authorities in relation to the teacher, and in a position to teach him and each other. In individual cases, as well, a pupil may be more of an authority than his teacher on something, and again be in a better position to teach in relation to it than his teacher is. Neither of these possibilities is excluded by the formulation and arguments of this thesis. Indeed, great care has been taken to ensure that this is not the case.

9. This might suggest the possibility of making attempts to match teachers and pupils in some way, in order to maximize non-inert learning, rather than, as happens at present in most schools, arbitrarily assigning them to each other. The aspects of a subject area or problem which interest one person may be boring to another, who is interested in different aspects. It is unrealistic to expect everyone to be interested in everything.

10. As already discussed, this does not imply that there will be no disagreements at more substantive levels, since there may be disagreement about what non-inert learning is worthwhile. It is worth noting that it is logically possible that the view of pupils may in some cases be more valid than the views of their parents or teachers who are not exempt from the possibility of being irrationally prejudiced in favour of or against particular kinds of learning.
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ADDENDA

ON THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND ITS PRACTICE

IN COLLEGES AND DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION

OR

"DOES PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION LEAVE EVERYTHING AS IT IS?"

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APPENDIX 1 (A Philosophical Enquiry into some Aspects of the Teacher's Role: Helen Stephanie Freeman) Paper forthcoming in Education for Teaching, November 1975.)
ON THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND ITS PRACTICE IN COLLEGES AND DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION - OR "DOES PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION LEAVE EVERYTHING AS IT IS?"

Philosophy used to be thought of as providing a comprehensive understanding of the universe, and philosophers as constructing metaphysical and ethical systems, and thus prescribing the Good Life for Man. Now philosophy is more modest, and as has been explained to us in this very journal (Barrow 1973), it is no longer understood in this way. Philosophy, it is usually said, prescribes nothing.

Wittgenstein (1953) said, of philosophy as he conceived of it, that it left everything as it was (although the changes in his own thinking and of people's conception of philosophy which resulted from his philosophizing might be adduced as evidence for rejecting the claim). But if what he said is true of philosophy now, and if philosophy of education is being properly philosophical, it, too, must leave everything as it is.

Now this is not necessarily regarded as an objection to philosophy by those who believe it is true of philosophy as it is conceived of now. A.J. Ayer, when asked about this by Brian Magee in a radio interview (Magee 1973), said that he didn't regard it as an objection to philosophy, because, as he put it in his incisive way "That's where things are." But many would clearly regard it as an objection to philosophy, for this way of understanding philosophy (including philosophy of education) makes it essentially and necessarily conservative. And this is important to those who teach philosophy of education to intending teachers, for it may mean that such students are unwilling to give this activity their serious attention. To those
who feel that philosophy - seen as Ayer put it (Magee 1973) as having
as its point clarification, eludication and justification - is
important, there are grounds for concern if students are unwilling to
consider it seriously.

But I believe that Ayer is wrong is agreeing with Wittgenstein
that philosophy, conceived of as above, leaves everything as it is.
I must make it clear that I do not treat this as a merely empirical
point. Rather it is a claim to do with the nature of philosophy (and,
a fortiori, philosophy of education). In this paper I shall be
concerned to deny that philosophy of education necessarily leaves
everything as it is (and thus to claim that it is not necessarily
conservative), to claim that much work in philosophy of education has
prescriptive implications for practice (though not all of the same
kind) and to claim that this, rather than constituting an objection
to philosophy of education, is the main justification for including
philosophizing about education and school practices as part of the
professional training of teachers.

The question of the relationship between philosophy of education
and educational practice has been raised again recently by Barrow
(1974), who suggests that philosophical work can issue directly in
prescriptions for educational practice. My own view is that Barrow
has only skimmed the tip of the iceberg, and that far more work in
philosophy of education has prescriptive implications than he has
suggested. This paper shows what some of them are.

Conceptual analysis and its relationships with practice

Adelstein (1971) has attacked the method of conceptual analysis
as being necessarily conservative. He writes, "It defends only the
status quo because it takes the status quo as its starting point."
Though he uses Gellner's (1968) book "Words and Things" in support, he does not appear to know of Gellner's own (1958) speculation that the society of Moroccan Berbers could be undermined by subjecting one of its concepts, *baraka*, to the kind of analysis performed by Ryle and Austin.

The main point I wish to make here is that if an activity were necessarily conservative, there is a sense in which its enquiries would be spurious. I am not, therefore, concerned here to discuss whether or not conceptual analysis could undermine our educational system, but only to indicate the ways in which it need not leave everything as it is, even though it takes the status quo as its starting point.

I start off this discussion by using as an example the work of P.S. Wilson (1971, 1974). Wilson makes it clear that what he is doing is conducting a serious investigation into the meanings of educational language. In a footnote to his paper "Interests and Educational Values" (1974), he explicitly disclaims any intention of engaging in educational evaluation, adding "let alone a proselytizing or missionary venture on behalf of any particular brand of educational activity."

There is no suggestion in this paper that he, or any other writer, intends to prescribe for others what they should do (though of course some writers may, in fact, have such intentions).

However, in my view, the reader of "Interest and Discipline in Education" (Wilson 1971) may be forgiven if he finishes reading it with the feeling that he has been given prescriptions for what is worth doing. What the teacher ought to do is help children learn through interest, for education is the development of interest and children ought to be educated and not merely 'schooled'. So the question I am pushed to ask is whether Wilson, in claiming that a child-centred view
of what education is is justified (i.e. because of its usefulness in picking out a distinction with 'schooling' which is of importance), is implicitly prescribing what ought to be done, whether he intends this or not. Though there is clearly a difference between justifying and prescribing - one can prescribe without justifying - to justify something is implicitly to prescribe it, all other things being equal. If this is the case, then questions can be raised about the suggestion that philosophy leaves everything as it is, for it is accepted that justifying (or showing that there is no justification for) something is a philosophical activity.

Now it may be true that all Wilson is saying is that if a teacher is not helping children to learn what they value for reasons which are intrinsically instrumental to their own learning goals, then it is not appropriate to describe him as educating them. So it might be suggested, I am quite mistaken to regard this as in any way a prescription, a claim that this is what a teacher or educator ought to do. It is rather that it is what he must (logically) do if he is to be educating in the sense in which child-centred theorists use the term. So (according to this argument) what is being justified is the analysis. If the reader himself accepts that educating in this sense is what he ought to do, then he is prescribing for himself. It is not Wilson who is being prescriptive. Or, at least, if his analysis is not reportative, at the most he is prescribing language use, not prescribing what ought to be done in school.

But I find this a most problematic position. Here is the teacher, or would-be teacher, already accepting the view that educating, in some sense, is what he ought to be doing. So he may see the argument in the following way, as a sort of practical syllogism:-

(1) I ought to educate children

(2) This is what educating is
Therefore (3) This is what I ought to do.

I will return to this syllogism in a moment. The point I want to make here is that this kind of account picks out a central problem in the argument about the relationship between philosophy of education and educational practice, as already discussed, in different contexts, by Pring (1970) and Hirst (1971). They point to the relationship between a person's concepts and his actions. Given that a person accepts that e.g. he ought to be teaching, or educating, or that he ought not to be indoctrinating, if you convince him that this, rather than that, is what teaching, or educating, or indoctrinating is, then you may affect his practice. And since philosophers of education, writing for College of Education students, know that the student has (in many, if not most, cases) beliefs that it is educating and teaching, and not indoctrinating that he ought to be doing in school, then there is a sense in which, in that context, there are prescriptive implications in an analysis. For the writer knows that students who accept the analysis, and who believe that they ought to teach and educate, or ought not to indoctrinate, will argue along the syllogistic lines already suggested, that this is what they ought to do.

If there are, so to speak, competing concepts of, for example, education, Wilson or Peters (e.g. 1966, 1970), by convincing people of the validity of their analysis ("this is what we really mean when we use the term 'education'") may change a student's view of what it is to educate so that, as Hirst (1971) put it in relation to teaching, "his actions in its name" are different from what they otherwise would have been. It seems to me that this implies an acceptance of the view that the analysis of key educational terms may not leave everything as it is.

It might be argued that this is some kind of sociological claim, and has nothing to do with the nature of philosophy. For clearly it
it is not necessarily the case that any change in practice will take place as a result of conceptual analysis. For, as Hirst and Peters (1970) have pointed out in respect of their own analysis of education, it could always be argued that if this is what education is, then it ought not to get very high priority in schools. But my claim is that within the 'form of life' that is our institutionalized school (or 'education') system, there is the assumption that education is what the schools are for. In this context, given the relationship between a person's concepts and his actions, it is the nature of conceptual analysis that produces the prescriptive implications. They arise both from the nature of analysis and the assumptions about e.g. teaching, educating and indoctrinating which prevail in the context within which the analysing is done.

The prescriptive implications here cannot be logical implications, for there is nothing that follows necessarily from the analysis. That is why it seems appropriate here to speak of contextual implication. Or it could be said that the implications may follow from persuasive definitions in the context. A good example of this seems to be Scheffler's (1960) analysis of teaching. Convincing people that teaching involves displaying the underlying rationale of the subject matter might make a very great difference to what actually did go on in schools though Cooper (1966) has convincingly shown that the analysis is not descriptive. People convinced that this is what teaching is will argue that this is what they ought to do on the syllogistic lines already set out. The definition or analysis that is prescriptive today may be descriptive in a few years, if language usage changes.

And this seems to me to pick out the dangers of conceptual analysis (and to talk of dangers presupposes that conceptual analysis does not
necessarily leave everything as it is). It is not the case that we can show that something ought or ought not to go on in schools by means of conceptual analysis. A different kind of justification is required. Displaying the underlying rationale of something is justifiably demanded or not independently of whether it is called 'teaching' or anything else. The use of the syllogistic argument given (valid though it is as a form of argument) is not the way in which one should decide what one ought to do. Except for a person who takes an extreme position on the fact/value issue, on any analysis of an activity X or a social practice Y, it is always appropriate to ask "But ought it to be done?" and look at the reasons for engaging or refusing to engage in it.

This is not, however, to suggest that conceptual analysis is unimportant. It is important to recognize, for example, that when Wilson writes of the distinction between educational and non-educational learning, he is not talking about the same thing as Peters when he uses the same terms. So a very clear understanding of the use of language within the context of any writer's work is important. And, of course, any particular analysis may be open to criticism because, for example, it embodies contradictions within it in respect of concepts which do not seem to be incoherent. Or, as Gellner (1958) pointed out, analysis may show that the concept embodies some inherent contradictions. What conceptual analysis cannot do is justify people's actions, and I suggest that students should be made explicitly aware of the fact that to analyse a concept is not to offer a justification for the social practice which it denotes.

**Justifying social practices**

I have suggested above that conceptual analysis and the justification of social practices are different philosophical activities. But of course
there are relationships between them, for, on this view, the former delineates what it is that is being justified. Many philosophers of education, though not all, go on to attempt to justify the social practices they have delineated. Wilson (1971) and Peters (1973) offer what they believe to be adequate justifications for the practice of educating in the (different) senses they have delineated. And this is clearly very important, for I have already pointed to the difference between what people (logically) must do e.g. educator, and what they ought to do. To argue that certain acts or kinds of acts are what a person ought (morally) to do because he has taken a job as a teacher is analogous to arguing that causing pain to people is what a person ought (morally) to do because he has taken a job as a torturer. Rather we might wish to argue that torturer is an unjustifiable social role. Any assumption that we can get from analysis justifications about what a person ought to do trades on the presupposition that teacher/educator is a justifiable social role. It should be clear that I believe that a justification of the social role would be required, and that again would be a philosophical task.

I suggest that the claim that an adequate justification has been offered for a social practice (clearly delineated by analysis) or a social role, implies the claim that, all other things being equal, these practices should be engaged in. For there would be a contradiction involved in claiming that a practice had been adequately justified as being worth engaging in, but that no-one ought to do it. Similarly, a claim that no adequate justification can be offered for a practice clearly seems to imply that it should not be engaged in. There would be a contradiction involved in claiming to have shown (as for example Dearden (1972) has in respect of competition in school work, and Bailey (1975) has in respect of compelling children to participate in competitive games) that the practice is unjustifiable, but that it is permissible to
continue promoting it.

Here, however, the prescriptive implications are of a different logical order, or status, from the prescriptive implications of analysis in a context closely tied to practice. These are instances of logical implication. If students consider the discussions, accept the premises or assumptions, and accept the arguments, here, if they are rational, they must accept the conclusions, including the prescriptive implications.

This argument must not be taken as suggesting that all work involving consideration of the justification of social practices necessarily has prescriptive implications, for a writer may simply lay out the arguments on both sides and draw no conclusions whatsoever. The prescriptive implications derive from the formulation of judgments and conclusions. As long as it is considered to be part of philosophy to draw conclusions of this type (and it might be argued that to fail to draw a conclusion at all is to fail to complete one's philosophical investigation) then, on my argument, such philosophical work is necessarily prescriptive, in a particular sense which does not imply that it was the intention of the philosopher to prescribe. It is not to suggest that the study was carried out by the philosopher concerned in order to tell people what they ought or ought not to do, but rather to say that it is part of the nature of the philosophical activity of investigating the justifications for social practices that it has prescriptive implications. It is not the case that to say of a philosopher that he is being prescriptive in this sense is somehow to have a complaint against him, as some people seem to suppose. And, of course, it is not to suggest that only "professional" philosophers can or should do this. It is rather to claim that when a person engages in an attempt to justify a social practice (in general) he is engaged in a philosophical activity.
At this stage it is worth making explicit the reasons why it can clearly be seen that philosophy is not necessarily conservative in this area either. For philosophical work may justify, and thus, on my account, implicitly prescribe, either the maintenance of the status quo (by claiming that social practices which are widely engaged in are justifiable) or change (by claiming that social practices which are widely engaged in are not justifiable, or that social practices which are not widely engaged in are more justifiable than the practices which are engaged in). So philosophy of education, as philosophy, is neither essentially and necessarily conservative, nor essentially and necessarily radical, nor essentially and necessarily liberal, nor anything else. It is, however, neutral only in the sense that, as an activity, it has no bias. Any particular piece of work in philosophy which draws a conclusion about the justifiability of social practices is not neutral.

Other ways in which philosophy of education implies prescriptions

Barrow, in the article (1974) already referred to, re-interprets some examples earlier discussed by Thompson (1970). Thompson discusses the place in educational theory of showing that concept A is logically prior to concept B, suggesting that this is a claim which is "materially relevant" to educational practice. Barrow suggests that Thompson's example should rather be interpreted prescriptively. If one accepts the claim that concept A is logically prior to concept B, then, on Barrow's account, this implies the prescription for anyone trying to teach concept B: "Do not try to teach concept B without reference to concept A." I accept Barrow's interpretation, and call this kind of relationship between philosophical work and prescription conditional implication, since the prescriptive implication here is conditional upon an agent's attempting to do something. It can, I think, be contrasted usefully with the two previous examples of contextual implication and logical
implication.

But this is not the only alternative way of interpreting Thompson's example. We could argue that if a person claimed to be trying to teach concept B but made no reference in the course of his activities to concept A, he could not seriously be trying to teach concept B. On Barrow's view the philosophical work involves us in offering him prescriptions for acting in certain ways, given that he has certain goals. On this alternative account, we make claims about what can be said of his doings - for example, we could ask "Can his trying be evaluated as serious (given that he understands concept B)?" Or "Is it concept B that he is trying to teach?"

On the first account, work which shows the relationship between certain concepts, or to take another of Thompson's examples, certain logical independencies such as those between religion and morality, implicitly prescribes courses of action for those concerned, ceteribus paribus, to do certain things (teach those concepts, or what is believed to be true). On the second it is merely to give criteria by which acts or activities may be appraised.

These accounts seem to me to involve very different conceptions of the relationship of philosophy of education to educational theory and educational practice. Both the Thompson account and the Barrow account fit the view of philosophy as part of educational theory seen, as Hirst (1973) suggests, as a guide to educational practice. But it is the second account that fits the Wittgensteinian view that philosophy leaves everything as it is, for it simply lays down criteria by virtue of which what is done can be assessed - as, for example, Peters (1966) says of his own analysis of education. This makes the philosopher an observer, sitting on the side-lines, helping us to assess e.g. what can be counted as "educational" theory and "educational" practice.
But, neglecting this latter view of philosophy and educational theory, there remain two different views of the relationship of philosophical and empirical work in educational theory and practice. On Thompson's view (if I interpret him correctly) the relationship is always the same. Philosophical, psychological and sociological work are equally "materially relevant" to the drawing of educational conclusions.

I do not wish to deny that this interpretation is appropriate in many cases. However, in other instances such a description seems to me to be positively misleading. An example suggested is of a course in American schools which has as its stated aims the achievement of such goals as "learning respect for evidence, the superiority of the American way of life, the making of unbiased rational judgments, the evils of Communism etc." Now it seems to be a pre-eminently philosophical enterprise to show that this collection of aims embodies some radical contradictions, and, on my view, this has the implication for any teacher who seriously wants to achieve the goals he sets himself that he ought to reconsider his aims. To say the philosophical conclusion is "materially relevant" is to make too weak a claim for it.

Similarly, when justifications for a social practice are being discussed, philosophical work comes in at the beginning, to delineate clearly the practice for which justifications are being considered. Empirical evidence is clearly often relevant (sometimes the justification offered stands or falls on whether the empirical claims are correct or not). But if the drawing of conclusions about the justifiability of a social practice is considered to be a philosophical activity (and it is usually seen as an engagement in social philosophy) then it seems to me that a clearer and preferable alternative is to say that here it is the empirical evidence that is materially relevant to the drawing of philosophical conclusions. In arguing that there are subtle and important differences in the different kinds of contributions made by
philosophical work in respect of practice, I suggest that philosophy does not always stand in the same relation to empirical work within educational theory. Since the relationship of philosophy of education to educational theory and practice is necessarily part of our conception of it, the difference between Thompson's view and the one outlined here is an important one.

I hope to have shown that much philosophical work in relation to education has direct practical implication, and if this is accepted, it might be wondered whether this involves a shift in our conception of philosophy of education. For philosophy has usually been conceived of as seeking knowledge and understanding, and I am here suggesting that it issues in practical judgments, prescriptions about what to do. It is still a matter of controversy, after all, as to whether or not we can rightly speak of truth or falsity, rightness or wrongness, in relation to prescriptions, so this may seem, at first sight, a strange conception of philosophy of education. But I am not suggesting that philosophy of education be conceived of as a search for prescriptions. I still consider it most appropriately conceived of as a search for knowledge and understanding in relation to education.

It can surely be pursued by those who have a serious concern for truth, or who are interested in philosophical problems which arise in relation to educational discourse, even if they are not particularly interested in educational practice, or by those who would not presume to prescribe for others. I do suggest, however, that such philosophers should be aware of the prescriptive implications which some of their work may have, particularly if they publish it in the context of teacher education and training (that is, as textbooks, or in educational journals rather than journals of pure philosophy). Philosophy of education is not, on this view, defined as a search for prescriptions. It is merely that, given the nature of the enterprise and the issues
with which it concerns itself, prescriptive implications are, in some cases, unavoidable. And my suggestion is that we should acknowledge this. In the world of educational institutions, philosophy of education is applied philosophy.

The justification of philosophy of education in teacher education and training

A philosopher reading this paper may conceive of it so far as an analysis of the concept of philosophy of education, for its relationship with practice is surely part of our conception of it. If this is appropriate, then on my own account I must offer a justification for the social practice of philosophizing about education in Colleges and Departments of Education.

The first kind of justification which can be - and has been - offered is that philosophizing about education (or other important issues) is worthwhile for its interest and/or its educational value. Reflective consideration - philosophy itself as a search for understanding - can be worth doing for its own sake. But I do not think that this would be adequate for suggesting that philosophy, and especially philosophy of education, should have any special status or even be a compulsory part of the curriculum in Colleges of Education. For, given that there may be many kinds of intellectual enquiry which provide interest and educational value, why should philosophy of education be put forward as having any special claim? Courses of philosophy of education, on this account, should surely be available as options, but no account like this can justify the inclusion of philosophy of education in any compulsory part of a course, such as a "foundation core", or anywhere else.

The traditional answer to this might be that it is not right that anyone should go into the schools to work without having seriously
and critically reflected on the professional activities in which he is going to be engaged. This reflection, it is argued, is necessary for any teacher or intending teacher (though, of course, this is not to say anything about what it might be called, and I do not wish to be taken as saying anything at all about that). But when we ask "Why?" the only answer that can have any force is that it is because of its practical implications; for if there were no practical implications for what a person was going to do as a teacher in school, what would be the virtue of his having seriously reflected? If his reflections could make no difference to what he was going to do, why would the fact that he was going into the schools to work constitute a reason for doing or not doing any philosophizing? This is why any student who believes that philosophy must leave everything as it is can see no point in doing it, and why it seems to me that the prescriptive implications of it must be made clear. For professional training is essentially practical.

So the conclusion to which I have come is that student teachers and teachers ought to engage in philosophizing about education because of its prescriptive implications for practice. Now it is to be imagined that it will immediately be objected "But who are these philosophers, that they should set themselves up as being in some special position to tell us what to do!" And there will be a rash of objections about reactionary philosophers 'imposing' reactionary views, or liberal philosophers 'imposing' liberal views, and perhaps even of radical philosophers 'imposing' radical views (though the last is perhaps not so likely as this role seems to have been given to the sociologists). But of course nothing has said about anyone 'imposing' anything.

Philosophers looking at the kinds of questions I have discussed must put forward their own views and the conclusions they have come to with intellectual honesty, for how could we ask them to do otherwise. Students
must look at the arguments and judge them for themselves - that is, they cannot be asked, and should not be asked, to accept any prescriptions on authority. Indeed, given that it is possible for one writer to claim that social practice X is justifiable, and another that it is not, there is no choice but that they decide for themselves whether or not they think that they ought to engage in it by evaluating the arguments and producing their own. My point is that, in stressing the prescriptive implications of much philosophical work, we show students why it is important for them to philosophize for themselves; for it is only in this way that they can decide which prescriptions to accept and try to act on in the classroom situation.

It may be suggested that I am flogging a dead horse here. Haven't philosophy lecturers always argued that students should philosophize for themselves? Didn't Barrow (1973) explicitly point out that 'liberal philosophers of education' would be pleased if they found students disagreeing with their views (e.g. on the value of autonomy) as put forward in their articles and textbooks, because it would mean that more students were doing philosophy? But if this is to be more than empire building, it must be admitted that the value of philosophy of education as part of a professional training cannot lie in our future teachers becoming clearer about how key educational words are used, or about whether the 'liberal philosophers' who do so are right to value autonomy. The value must lie in its relationship with the students' own values and actions, in what they come to believe that it is justifiable for them to do as teachers. Its value lies, too, in the discussion of their own ideas and reflections on practice. (And, of course, I am not suggesting that only philosophy is relevant, for I am in strong agreement with Elliott and Adelman (1973) about the importance of teachers and pupils engaging in classroom research, and of teachers learning to recognize the consequences, intended and unintended, of their actions.)
I finish by returning to my original point. Many students, and, indeed, lecturers in other subjects, who know little about philosophy, think that it is merely talk about talk (and I stress the merely). So they reject it on this account. Others believe that if philosophy is neutral in the sense that it leaves everything as it is, then it is not neutral but conservative. So they reject it on that account.

My own view, which I hope to have substantiated here, is that philosophy is not merely talk about talk, for much philosophizing has direct and important prescriptive implications; that it is neither necessarily conservative, nor necessarily radical, nor necessarily liberal, etc; and that, on this understanding of it, the answer to Barrow's (1974) question is: "There's nothing wrong with the philosophy of education."

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