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A Philosophical Discussion of Social Cohesion as a Goal of Educational Policy-making

By
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Mary E Healy

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Abstract

This thesis examines what it means to take social cohesion seriously in relation to school educational policy. Much of the literature on such policy in English speaking countries has an explicit directive to promote 'civic bonds' in schools. This thesis is a philosophical account of how we characterize these civic bonds and a consideration of the educational implications for how we best encourage and develop them.

The discussion identifies the necessary facets of civic relationships within a modern democratic society. It criticises theories of social cohesion as lacking an analysis of the model of belonging used. To address this deficiency, three metaphors for the civic relationship are considered: friendship, family and market. A version of the family metaphor, democratic fraternity, it is argued, best provides the desired ideal civic bond.

The research offers insight into the educational implications of civic relationships, social cohesion and school choice. It enquires into how metaphors, models and social imaginaries give a framework for considering our interrelatedness. It suggests we should extend our understanding of the interplay between, on the one hand, the models and metaphors we adopt for civic relationships, and, on the other, the institutions we choose to teach and nurture the relevant attitudes, virtues and values.

As the models we adopt can have deep effects on the organisations we create, the thesis then explores, through consideration of current practices, implications for school educational policy in relation to the promotion of civic relationships.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In 2008, a French court denied citizenship to a Muslim woman from Morocco on the basis that her practice of 'radical Islam' was incompatible with French values. Her initial application for citizenship in 2005 was turned down on the basis she was 'insufficiently assimilated' into French society. The woman, married to a French national and with three French-born children, wore a burqa, lived as a virtual recluse, disconnected from French society and was considered to act in a submissive way to her male relatives. This was judged to be incompatible with the principle of equality of the sexes and the concept of laïcité (religious neutrality). The court said that the woman could reapply for citizenship when she had assimilated the values of French society. ¹

The challenge of ethnic and social diversity, and the implications that this has in turn for social cohesion, is one of the most pressing political concerns facing Western liberal democratic societies. Our global society has seen many changes in recent years with the spread of democracy to areas of the planet where previously it had not taken root: the Soviet Union has split into parts; the Berlin wall has been torn down; apartheid rule has ended in South Africa; Fukuyama even predicted the end of history with the prevalent spread of liberal free-market democracies.

Global factors have caused millions of people to migrate to the West, many of whom may belong to traditions other than those previously associated with Western Europe and the USA (Feinberg, 2006, p234). Most countries, with the

¹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7503757.stm [last accessed 19.11.09]
opening of previously closed borders and with wider social mobility, have seen a rapidly changing and diverse populace created, which in turn has created tensions and difficulties both with the existing population and between competing groups. This move towards a more globalized economy plus the transitory nature of some immigration patterns highlights the need for public policy makers to consider how such societies can hold together and function as one with the coexistence of potentially conflicting ideas and commitments.

Social cohesion, in many ways, is a new term applied to the desire for a stable society. Arguably, liberal political theory has always dealt with this issue (Reich, 2002). Indeed, the existence of different ways of life and how to ensure groupings coexist peacefully has occupied theorists from Locke to Rawls. Yet the question of balancing the 'associational bonds' that enable citizens to live together whilst, at the same time, respecting the flourishing of the bonds that tie communities of tradition and culture together still remains of critical importance.

What is new in this debate, however, is that much of the recent literature highlights the role of education in achieving or undermining the cohesive society (Cheshire, 2007; Rogers and Muir, 2007; Stevens, 2001). Furthermore, empirical research seems to confirm that certain features of school choice systems have the unintended consequence of increasing social segregation and fraying social cohesion (Ball, 2003; Cheshire, 2007). Much of this literature demonstrates that school choice policies result in an increase in social sorting into differing subpopulations (Galston, 2004, p322), with parents seeking out schools with high standards of achievement and lower concentrations of pupils they see as different or undesirable (Ball, 2003; Cheshire, 2007; Green, Preston and Gemen Janmaat,
However, there is a notable ambiguity in the use of the term 'cohesion', in which all too frequently it is thinly conceived and seen as unproblematic. Rarely does the literature contain a coherent conceptualisation of what a socially cohesive society should look like.

It is therefore surprising, given the current unease as to whether or not unrestricted school choice policies affect our parallel desires for social cohesion and social well-being, that empirical research has only recently sought to explore exactly how particular education policies affect social cohesion (Green, Preston and Germen Janmaat, 2006). Evidence of the consequences of school choice from a number of different countries demonstrates that this is not particular to just the UK situation, but a widespread phenomenon. Whilst the perceived interplay between civic relationships, social cohesion and school choice is an exceedingly complex one and, as such, is frequently the subject of much disagreement, there seems to be little doubt amongst academics that the consequences of school choice policies are implicated in the development of civic bonds.

If my analysis were to remain merely at the level of the effects of school choice upon social cohesion, it would offer little different to the already numerous school choice critiques. Behind the issues of equity and social justice frequently associated with this discourse, lies a more complex and relatively unwritten element of the debate about the model of belonging that underpins our beliefs and commitments to the socially cohesive society. Much existing theorizing in this

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2 Prior to 2005, there was little evidence about how schools were segregated on lines of race or religion in the UK. A study by Burgess, Wilson and Lupton in 'Urban Studies' indicated high levels of segregation for different groups, albeit with high levels of variation in England (Burgess, Wilson and Lupton, 2005). Their study indicated higher levels of segregation within schools than by neighbourhood alone and that this increased with population density. Previously, most research concentrated on economic segregation and on whether the market based choice system increased or decreased such segregation.
area lacks an explicit analysis of the relationships needed between citizens to support a democratic life. Subsequently, there can be a lack of consideration of the models of bond that best encapsulate the relationship that allows us to speak of the collective as a 'we' within the civic realm.

The lack of clarity found in the many uses of the term 'social cohesion' through policy, educational documents and curriculum frameworks demonstrates a need for significant theoretical attention. Within this area, a certain 'slippage' in the language often moves from instances of 'community cohesion' to that of 'societal cohesion', assuming that one may lead to the other without explicitly drawing out how this may be done (Green, Preston and Germen Janmaat, 2006). Consider the following quotation from the guidance given by the Department for Children, Schools and Families on the duty of schools to promote community cohesion:

> By community cohesion, we mean working towards a society in which there is a common vision and sense of belonging by all communities; a society in which the diversity of people's backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and valued; a society in which similar life opportunities are available to all; and a society in which strong and positive relationships exist and continue to be developed in the workplace, in schools and in the wider community (DCSF, 2007, p3)³


This conceptual mingling of the concepts of community and social cohesion can then result in confused policy recommendations.

This thesis is a philosophical contribution towards a rich account of how we characterize these civic bonds and, leading from this, a consideration of the educational implications for how we best encourage and develop the models used to examine these bonds. In an attempt to bridge educational theory and practice, my research examines what it would mean to promote civic relationships in
relation to school educational policy. I start from a stance that the term 'civic relationship' has become troubling in policy decision making in two ways: firstly, it has the potential to be an empty, meaningless term used merely rhetorically. Similarly and perhaps more importantly, when people start to clarify what they mean by the civic relationship that of which they speak tends to dissipate and prove problematic in analysis (as will be illustrated in chapters 3, 4 and 5).

With this in mind, this thesis seeks to answer three fundamental questions. Firstly, what would it mean to take social cohesion seriously? Can we ascertain what the bond, the civic relationship, between citizens in a society deemed socially cohesive would look like? If we care about social cohesion, do we not also need to care about what is required to sustain and perpetuate it over generations? Do different models through which we envision these human relationships carry different implications for how we educate for and structure the bonds that support a civic relationship?

Leaving to one side the confusion within the concept of community itself (Gereluk, 2006a), I wish to develop the point that for societal cohesion within a framework of democracy, citizens need to have concern for the public way of relating to each other and that this in turn requires a particular model of civic relationships. Much evidence from anthropology suggests that most cultures and societies use two particular relationships, those of friendship and family, to model civic relationships. To these two, I have added a modern alternative, that of market, which has gradually moved from economic parlance into aspects of public
life. These three concepts offer differing metaphors for connectedness in the civic sphere. 

Any society seeking congruity between its guiding principles of democracy and liberalism, and equally desiring social cohesion at societal level, should aim to shape educational policy in appropriate ways, hence my second question becomes: what sort of school structures would meet this model? How should we organize education when we aim at encouraging and nurturing these relationships? Are there particular structures that can increase social cohesion or be more 'friendly' to the factors that nourish it? Likewise, do any particular arrangements or structures impede this aim?

Thirdly, what pedagogy would we need to achieve the goal of social cohesion? Are there implications for the way we teach or what we teach in our public schools? How should the next generation of citizens be formed and with what type of values? Is the best way to tolerate and cope with differences in others by casual acquaintance and contact with others?

To answer these questions, five perspectives run throughout this thesis, drawing on arguments across many different traditions in both philosophy and social research. The first perspective falls within the philosophical tradition: a consideration of some of the unclear notions within this area, necessitating an exploration of the notion of 'we'. Such debates about how we relate to others in the world are all too frequently underpinned by unclear notions of who we are, the commitments we are bound by, and the values we share. How do different

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4 I have deliberately restricted my choice of relationships within the parameters of this thesis, not only for reasons of range and depth of study, but for what these particular metaphors can offer by way of analysis. For this reason, I have chosen not to consider the concept of solidarity. As Brunkhorst indicates, solidarity is based upon the Roman legal concept of an obligation for the whole or a joint liability. Everyone takes responsibility for anyone who cannot pay his debt and vice versa. It binds unfamiliar persons within the demands of the law. (Brunkhorst, H. (2005), Solidarity (J. Flynn, Trans.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.).
groupings in society, through relating to each other, enable society to act and function as one? What are social bonds and how do they affect the way we organise social life?

The second significant perspective is an enquiry into how metaphors, models and social imaginaries give a framework for considering our interrelatedness. I draw on the contribution that can be offered by the study of metaphor as the method we use to conceptualise our world, to govern our ways of perceiving and acting, and thus shape educational practice. Do metaphors reveal unconscious beliefs that, in turn, influence our behaviours and actions? Can the way we conceive of the civic relationship directly affect the normative values and beliefs to be transmitted to future generations? If we value ourselves as being connected in particular ways, do we then create organisations and structures that reflect and nurture those ways of being connected? Equally, when we fail to value civic connectedness, do we create organisations and structures that disconnect or only pay lip-service to this feature of social life?

The field of relationships between metaphors and policy, whether in education or elsewhere, is decidedly under-theorised at present. This thesis is a first step towards this goal, considering not only some of the prevalent metaphors for the civic relationship, but also studying how these particular metaphors shape practice with regard to school organisation. Although writers in the field constantly emphasise that the language and concepts that we choose can arguably define how we structure our thoughts about subjects (Batstone, 2001) this has not, as yet, been applied within the field of school systems nor considered systematically for possible contribution within the arena of civic discourse in general.
As a way of leading into both the second and third questions, the third perspective draws on parallel arguments in empirical studies into social relationships as a way of understanding social networks as an account of what it is to be civically connected (see Chapter 5). The importance and definitions of these social relationships and their relationships to policy decisions have been explored through empirical studies with growing interest particularly through the notion of social capital. Using the insights of theorists such as Granovetter and Putnam (Granovetter, 1983; Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2001; Putnam, 2007), I explore the underlying theories behind much of current thinking in this area.

The fourth perspective involves a close examination of the concept of fraternity and a revision of the concept as a root metaphor in an understanding of democracy. Whilst little has been heard specifically of fraternity per se in recent political literature, I shall argue that fraternity has to some extent become an unspoken value within the literature. It has been 'smuggled' back into modern social science discourse through newly emerging arguments of social capital (networks of trust, obligation and cooperation). Fraternity has a long history in political life as a relationship between those bound together in 'family' groupings, bound by similarities and common heritage. Nevertheless, I shall highlight a rather different aspect of the concept which I shall argue can help articulate how we can relate to others outside our immediate arena of concern by building on the work of Veronique Munoz-Darde, arguing that any relationship of citizens must be firmly grounded within the notion of democracy itself (Munoz-Darde, 1999). I shall not be considering a complete revision of the concept, taking it away from its existing meanings, but will be attempting to show how the history of the concept itself requires the move I will be suggesting here.
The fifth perspective considers how this revised conception of fraternity can contribute to the discussion of school choice arguments through considering how schools can best be organised to promote, nurture and support this element of the civic relationship. I shall claim that when we consider what kind of a society the concept of democratic fraternity would embody, and the types of educational structures needed for its survival over generations, we may be led to reconsider our current method of organisation of these structures. This alternative perspective provides a philosophical account that may have direct policy implications. With these perspectives in mind, the main structure of my argument is as follows:

Chapter 2 introduces the first of the metaphors for our social connectedness, that of personal friendship and outlines some necessary features of the concept. An outline of, and justification for, the general Aristotelian approach which underlies much of this literature is offered, together with a consideration of more recent challenges to this area. Friendship is then related to the Aristotelian notion of 'the shared life' as a prequel to considering it as a candidate for the civic bond.

Chapter 3 extrapolates these features of friendship into the wider civic relationship. From this, I indicate many difficulties in expanding the concept of friendship into the civic arena, even metaphorically. I situate this concept in its original historical context and subsequently explore its relevance in a modern liberal democracy.

Chapter 4 explores one particular strand of the market metaphor and begins with an exploration of the nature of loyalty. Using both theories of brand loyalty and Albert Hirschman's distinction between exit and voice, I offer an
account of how human loyalties may be formed in general before contrasting both civic loyalty and market loyalty in the field of education. I explore the implications for civic loyalty when the metaphor of market loyalty is in ascendance in educational parlance. I argue that civic loyalty is an essential component for social cohesion and as such, can be undermined by features of marketisation.

Chapter 5 considers the bond of the family metaphor through that of fraternity. I explore some of the conceptual and practical difficulties it has as a simple metaphor in encapsulating civic relationships. From this, I argue that it may be redeemed by grounding it in the concept of democracy itself as a metaphoric 'sibling' relationship. I identify two contrasting spheres of fraternity and argue that democratic fraternity constitutes an alternative way to consider our civic engagement beyond the boundaries of family and friends.

Chapter 6 develops the argument that all description of the civic relationship is necessarily metaphorical. I argue that the metaphors we choose carry over images and values from one area to another enabling the discussion of basic political principle. If this is holds, it is essential that the debate concerning social cohesive ties is based upon a coherent view of the civic relationship based upon the best models available.

In Chapter 7 I consider the implications for a democratic society which wants an appropriate education system that will nourish social cohesion. I consider what sort of structures and pedagogy would best enable us to meet these ends. In addition to this, I consider how theory moves to policy.

Finally, in the Conclusion, I draw together the different strands of my argument and consider both the originality and importance of this thesis. I argue that acknowledging the necessary rooting of the discourse within the domain of
metaphor may shed new light on the dilemmas and issues affecting policy makers within the field of school choice.
Chapter 2

A Concept of Friendship

In 2005, President George Bush nominated his old friend and personal lawyer, Harriet Miers, for Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court. The nomination met with stiff opposition from all sides of the political spectrum. As a former corporate lawyer, she had no experience as a judge and was felt to be unqualified for the role and chosen simply on account of her friendship with the president. It was felt the appointment of a close political ally to such a key post was inappropriate.  

Introduction

The concept of friendship, after a lull, has had a great deal of attention within recent years from philosophers. Whilst the majority of the attention has centred around the Aristotelian conception of friendship and related areas (Pangle, 2003; Sherman, 1987), there have been moves to reinterpret the concept in the light of sociological and psychological interpretations and evidence (Gilbert, 1991; Pahl, 2000). Others have sought to use friendship as a heuristic device for discussing the political relationship between peoples (Cocking and Kennett, 2002; Hansot, 2000; Jenkins, 1999). Still others have concentrated on friendship as a model for morality (Blum, 1993; Cocking and Kennett, 2000; White, 1999a).

There is much empirical evidence that those with many friends and/or deep friendship bonds lead happier, healthier lives, thus linking the concept closely to conceptual frameworks of our personal well-being (Pahl, 2000; Pahl and Spencer,

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5 See report online for details: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4382370.stm [last accessed 19.11.2009]
1997). This link with our personal well-being appears to be reinforced by empirical evidence, according to research by Gallop entitled Vital Friends: The People You Can't Afford to Live Without⁶, an illustration of the importance of personal friendship in social mechanisms in such areas as health, poverty and social relationships. Friendship can thus be claimed to have a constitutive role in our happiness and personal identity (Badhwar Kapur, 1991).

When discussing how humans relate to each other in society to elucidate the model of belonging, it is customary to go back to the simplest forms of relationship, that of family and friends. It is presumed that by studying these intimate relationships, one can learn and extrapolate from these to consider wider, looser forms of human interconnectedness (Macmurray, 1961). As such, could the study of friendship throw light upon the bond needed to support the socially cohesive society?

Studies of friendship tend to start with the work of Aristotle wherein one finds one of the richest treatments of the concept. All standard treatments of Aristotle, according to Cooper, point out that the Greek word 'philia' has a far wider range of meaning than our word 'friendship', covering intimate relationships, family relationships and what is commonly termed 'civic friendship' (Cooper, 1977a; Cooper, 1977b; Cooper, 1999; MacIntyre, 1985). It is important to remember that this term is not reserved for voluntary relationships in Greek thought. This, in itself, makes it difficult to be sure exactly what it is that is being compared (King and Devere, 2000).

Whilst friendship has come to be seen as a private affair, a matter of personal choice, this has not always been the case. Friendship has been seen to

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be part of the common morality that applies to everyone, regardless of other personal values. The Aristotelian model of friendship draws a direct connection between the personal and the civic. Not only does Aristotle hold that intimate relationships are a necessary part of the flourishing life, but that 'civic friendship' is an essential human good. Not only does one need to have personal friendships that have common, shared activities at the heart of the relationship, but fellow citizens should be predisposed to wish and do each other well (Aristotle, 1156a5).

Tying together the two forms of friendship has a long line in political philosophy, from Aristotle to Maclntyre (Aristotle; Maclntyre, 1985; Schall, 1996; Schollmeier, 1994; Schwarzenbach, 1996; Schwarzenbach, 2005). It can be a useful analogy to make in that it allows us to consider what draws people together, to look at issues of sameness or difference, to examine whether bonds of friendship between people can rest on matters other than shared values, goals and similar personalities. It is in this respect that friendship, as a metaphor, may approximate the desire for social cohesion.

In this chapter, I seek to ground the concept of personal friendship through illustrating particular features and understandings prior to examining the concept as a metaphor for the civic relationship in the next chapter. Section 1 thus begins with an examination of the nature of friendship, looking at the features identified within the concept. Section 2 then considers the contribution to this area of Aristotle on the importance of friendship in the flourishing life of the individual and the forms of friendship. Section 3 explores the view that friendship is concerned with the concept of self as a moral being. Section 4 continues by further considering a conception of virtue friendship, concentrating on the features of Partiality, Trust, Equality, a Shared History and Reciprocity/Mutual Aid. In Section
5, I draw together the features of friendship and suggest why this topic may be receiving current attention as a possible model for relationships within the civic sphere.

Section 1: The Nature of Friendship

Friendship is a curious relationship, important to us all, yet strangely neglected in our public life. We do not have ceremonies to mark the start of friendships nor their demise (as we do with relationships such as marriage). Although we do not have public celebrations of our friendships, we value them above many things. We see something valuable in another person that makes us want to be with them, to commit to them, and they to us in some unspecified fashion. Friendship introduces a moral element into our behaviour with non-kin. Indeed, Pahl refers to friendship as “a metaphor for morality” (Pahl, 2000, p86).

One cannot be a friend in isolation: as a concept it requires the existence of another person: “Friendship requires two consenting parties” (Goering, 2003, p402). Although it can be noted that friendships do exist between more than two, it should also be born in mind that they are not the same friendship. For example, Tom may be friends with Louis who may be friends with Robert, who may in turn be friends with Tony, but the friendship between each pair is unique to that pair. Friendship excludes a one-sided relationship. It has to be mutual, to be reciprocal. It differs from relationships with, say, colleagues and other interpersonal relationships, being a deeper, more intimate relationship (Helm, 2005).

Friendship is both an emotional attachment to another and a statement about the status of that relationship. Central to this, is that the emotional attachment has to be one of affection. For some philosophers, it is a form of love.
(Thomas, 1987; Thomas, 1993). It would be curious to call someone a friend and not care for them or have any feelings towards them in some way. It would be equally curious to call someone a friend and it to make absolutely no difference in the way one treated or regarded the person (this partiality is one of the reasons the area has attracted such attention in recent years as will be explored later).

Friendship is by nature preferential: we prefer some to others. Because of this, it must exclude some from the relationship. When we say ‘this is my friend’ we are saying something to set this particular relationship apart from others: it is a relationship of positional importance. When we call someone 'a friend', we are saying something about the status of the relationship. We are giving it a value and indicating in some way that we see the other as having value to us. That we see our friends as having value to us does not mean that they are in themselves more valuable than other people; other people may have different friends.

Friendships are not the kind of things that can be forced on someone by a third party. They are essentially voluntary relationships, entered into by the persons concerned without written agreements or agendas. Demands by parents of young children that their child become friends with a particular child rarely have the desired outcome. For a relationship to be termed a friendship, it has to be voluntary:

A relationship that is forced or assigned is not a friendship. Familial connections do not constitute friendship for this reason. We are born into families, and then we may choose to act in ways that acknowledge or ignore the unchosen relationships. Family members may become our friends, but they are not friends simply in virtue of their familial relation. (Goering, 2003, p402)

This emphasis on the voluntary nature of friendship becomes a crucial factor in metaphorizing outwards to the civic community (see Chapter 4).
We may choose our friends for many reasons: on the basis of shared interests, similarities, mutual pleasures. Most of us have little idea how we made our friends. But the chances are, we did not wake up one morning and decide to suddenly make one. Maybe they are people we met at work, or at school, or through mutual friends. Most literature on the psychology of friendship suggests several different reasons for choice: proximity (they are people we come into contact with), a form of reciprocal liking (both parties like each other), similarity (parties have something in common), physical attractiveness (we like the initial look of them) or strategic friendships (they can do or have something we want) (Furnham, 1989; Goering, 2003; Helm, 2005; Schutte and Light, 1978).

From this we can elucidate that friendship is a mutually, reciprocal relationship of concern. It is a voluntary, emotional attachment to another person. It seems important, at this point, to return to, and examine in depth, the model of friendship identified by Aristotle, which forms the grounding for many of these conceptualisations.

Section 2: Aristotle and Friendship

The ancient philosophers took it for granted that friendship was a virtuous, moral activity. It was revered as one of the highest of virtues and was seen as a way of building character. Aristotle, for example, gives more space to an account of friendship than to any other personal virtue. Aristotle suggests that being with others is not only desirable but also a fundamental condition of what it is to lead a flourishing life (Aristotle, 1155a5-20). Friendship ties in closely with all accounts of our personal well-being and what it is to live a good life. This suggests that being
with others is in some sense a fundamental condition of what it is to be fully human and is intimately connected to our sense of who we are.

It is generally accepted that the person without friends is less well off than the person with friends. Without friends, says Aristotle, no one would choose to live even if he had all other goods (Aristotle, 1155a5). Within the Aristotelian model, friendship is defined as recognised, reciprocal goodwill (Aristotle, 1155a30-35). But ‘friendship’ itself may not be a simple concept: it may not indicate or point to one particular thing that can be identified. Richard White refers to it as “an inherently complex and multiple phenomenon” (White, 1999b, p21).

Central to this Aristotelian model is the division of the concept into three categories of friendship, which Aristotle terms utility friendships, pleasure friendships and virtue friendship. The first two categories are friendships based on the self (pleasure or utility); the third category is based on the other person as an end in themselves. Taking each of these sub-divisions in turn, I now want to highlight and focus in on a deeper understanding of this model which has proven central to much of subsequent thinking on the concept.

**Friendships of Utility.**

If one were to summarize utility friendships, three points would arise. Firstly, in utility friendships, each only loves the other incidentally, for the good they can get from each other. Secondly, because these friendships are based on personal interest, they are the most easily dissolved of all friendships. Take for example two colleagues, Ricky and Nikki, who work together at the same school. Suppose it fits their purpose to share a car to get to work. This car sharing forms

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7 This is sometimes referred to as perfect or character friendship. However, for the purpose of this chapter, I shall use the term ‘virtue’ to cover this third category.
the reason they have come together. They get on agreeably and try to fit in with each other’s timetables to enable their travel plans to coincide. Suppose one of them moves job to another school where it is no longer possible for the pair to share their travel arrangements. Now that the purpose that defined their ‘friendship’ no longer exists, the chances are that the two will no longer be the same sort of friends and will gradually drift apart. The friendship existed only for the purpose of utility — it was useful to both parties.

This, in turn, gives rise to the third point: because what is considered utility can change over time and because one cannot count on someone remaining ‘useful’, such friendships are prone to disappointment and dissolving. Such friendships are quickly activated … and just as quickly fall apart. Such friendships of utility are frequently found amongst those who are opposites. For example the colleague with a car, and the one who needs a lift; the friend who can cook and the one who likes to eat; the friend who is learned and the one who is ignorant.

But is this view of friendships of utility sufficient or even satisfactory? Maybe the two colleagues sharing a car earlier will keep in touch. Maybe the utility served as a means to a deeper form of friendship. Or maybe it’s OK to have useful friends. If friends weren’t useful in times of need, questions Badhwar, in what sense are they still friends (Badhwar Kapur, 1987)? Just because the utility ceases, it does not always mean the end of the friendship. The friendship may not take the same form any more, as in the two colleagues now separated by jobs. Perhaps they will find a different reason to keep in touch.

For it to be a friendship of any description surely there had to be some form of feeling between them however loosely defined or mild, a form of affection that goes beyond deriving benefit from the other? Even a friendship of utility has to
have affection within the relationship. The usefulness or exchange of services may have been the initial reason for people coming together but that does not mean it has to remain the sole purpose.

Returning to our two colleagues working in the same school. Suppose Vicki also lives nearby – what reason could Ricky have for choosing to travel with Nikki as opposed to Vicki? Suppose that Nikki is a quiet, placid character, similar to Ricky, whereas Vicki is a loud, gossipy character. Is it not likely that Ricky would prefer to travel with Nikki simply because she likes her better? No matter how useful someone can be, there comes a point where sometimes the price you have to pay for his or her usefulness is greater than the benefit received.

Whilst Aristotle argues that in friendships of utility, the affection is motivated by the friends’ own good, I would argue that even here, the character of the person is relevant. Even young children will on occasions prefer to be on their own rather than to play with just anyone. We prefer to be with people we like and are drawn to when we call them ‘friends’. We prefer to be helped by those we like when a choice is possible. And so to the second category of the Aristotelian model.

Pleasure Friendships

Friendships of pleasure are motivated by the pleasure experienced or shared between the friends. As long as the pleasure continues, so does the friendship. Whilst they last, they are deeply felt, the friends cherishing each other’s company. But should one of the two change in some way, and the initial pleasure experienced as a result of the relationship wane, so may the friendship. As Aristotle points out, these friendships give cause for problems; they are prone
to change with changes in the object of their pleasure; they have a tendency to be transient. He argues that this is because such pleasure friendships are based on emotions and emotional responses, for example, people falling in and out of love (Aristotle, 1156b).

Take, for example, a group of young people who go out every night together. Now suppose they take great pleasure in this joint entertainment, forming a major part of their friendship, for example the preparing to go out, the shared venture, the chat about it later. Then suppose that one of them becomes pregnant and has a child and thus is unable to join the others in their joint revelries. That person is now excluded from the main source of their friendship, and in many cases, the friendship ceases. The previous friends are unable to find anything now in common with their previous partner and can no longer share common events and experiences.

If we did not take pleasure in the company of our friends, why would we remain with them? Surely it must be part of what we look for in a friend that we should find their company pleasurable? Only martyrs and masochists would think otherwise! But we don’t take pleasure in everyone’s or just anyone’s company. We take pleasure in the company of people we like, and we like them for reasons of who they are. Even friendships of pleasure are to some extent reliant on the character of the friend. Sharing time, company and pleasures are important to friendship as acknowledged by Aristotle. All of these are demanding of time and energy, leading one to assume that the number of people one could count on as being ‘pleasure friends’ would ultimately be limited. And finally to the third category in this model.
Virtue Friendship

If we take utility friendships to be based on material advantage, and pleasure friendships to be based on emotional attachments, how do we understand virtue friendship? Aristotle sees the perfect form of friendship in those who love their friends for their own sake, not merely because they are useful (which they may be) nor because their company is pleasurable and they are fun to be with (which they might be) but because of who and what they are, the virtuous person (Aristotle, 1156b5-10). Virtue here represents the highest level of moral goodness and the virtuous person, the epitome of such goodness. The characters of the virtuous draw such friends to each other, not because of any benefit each may incur. Virtue friendship could never involve using another person as a means to one's own happiness, but because such complete friendship would be based on mutual recognition and association in virtue (Blum, 1993; Cooper, 1977b; Pakaluk, 1991).

Virtue friends are integral to each other's lives and thus the flourishing of one is intimately connected with the flourishing of the other. But what is it to say someone is virtuous? At a basic level, it is to make a judgement or evaluation about the character of the individual. It is to identify admirable traits that are central to one's character (Millgram, 1987):

...the virtues are essential properties of humankind: a person realizes more or less fully his human nature according as he possesses more or less fully those properties of character which count as moral excellences. (Cooper, 1977a, p635)

If virtues are a central part of whom the person is, we could reasonably expect them to be stable character traits. However, Aristotle further claims that even virtue friendships will last only as long as the persons involved are 'good' (and as goodness within his definition lasts, so would these friendships) (Aristotle,
He admits that even the virtuous may be corrupted from virtue, but that would mean that the person was no longer the same sort of person and hence could not be the friend they had been.

Friendships of virtue, in this view, would come only to the virtuous, which leaves rather a lot of us without! Most of us do our best in our friendships. Sometimes it is good enough; sometimes it is not. There are very few who do not at some point exhibit the odd vice or two, or who fail to be totally virtuous or who find moral goodness just a little bit too difficult twenty-four hours a day. That there are very few such paragons of virtue around capable of such friendship leads one to ask if all our friendships are merely pleasure centred or utility centred? Are we incapable of anything other than self-centred ‘friendships’?

Cooper appears to find a way around this conundrum (Cooper, 1999). He puts forward an interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of perfect virtue as being part of a wide variation of virtue friendships. One could, in this scenario, be attracted to someone for his or her generosity to the less fortunate, or for his or her kindness whilst still acknowledging that they have a foul temper first thing in the morning and do not suffer fools gladly! They do not have to exhibit virtue of every kind but just have some morally good qualities and it is those qualities that attract their friend. Such a friendship could still be part of the category of virtue friendships even though neither person has a perfectly virtuous character. Cooper must be, in this instant, correct in his view, if we are to allow the possibility of people having character friendships, and common experience teaches us that they do indeed exist. Perfect friendship of the perfectly virtuous would thus be an extreme example of this friendship of character. Ordinary mortals are capable of
character friendships through showing an unselfish interest in others. But what of the opposite? Could there be instances of 'vice' friendships?

Joseph and Danny are best friends at school. They see each other all the time outside of school, always play together, look out for each other, share everything together, and bully the other children together. In fact, bullying plays a major role in their friendship. They both enjoy making other children cry, smashing their toys and creating general mayhem. Could their relationship not be seen as a 'friendship'? It exhibits many of the identified features: loyalty, sharing, spending time together.

Within an Aristotelian conception of virtue friendship, friendship pervades all aspects of one's life. With Danny and Joseph, what brings them together, is their bullying behaviour and the pleasure they get from it. It has to be acknowledged that not all relationships bring out 'the best' in those concerned. There are cases where friends can bring out 'the worst' in each other, where a particular pairing can incite each other forward to situations or events that neither would arrive at on their own. For example, in the film 'Heavenly Creatures', two girls in 1950's New Zealand became inseparable, obsessive friends to the extent that they created an alternative reality from which others were barred and which ended in murder.

Whilst Aristotle's account of friendship is attractive in its simplicity, it holds many problems. I would argue that the separation of the three types of friendship is not as clear-cut in practical terms as supposed. Character traits matter in questions of friendship. They have to, or we would never have a reason to choose one person over another as a friend. Friends can doubtlessly be useful, but they
are still friends and the emotional attachment inherent in the term is necessary to the concept. We enjoy and take pleasure in doing things with our friends; spending time with our friends is part of the friendship: it is how we build the 'common history' and get to know our friends better.

We all have differing 'circles' of relatedness and dependency. There are those we have never met and may never meet, those we meet in their roles with whom we exchange goods and services. We don't see them as individuals, we don't know them, we don't even particularly want to know them. There are those whom we term acquaintances: we see them fairly regularly and are friendly towards them, but we stop short of being friends with them (colleagues perhaps). There are those whom we have an emotional attachment to and we term friends (a small number again) and there are a few that are within our inner circles of intimate friendship. But even to talk in terms of circles of friendship, requires the use of metaphors. The 'useful friends', 'pleasure friends' and 'virtuous friends' may again be metaphors for how we categorise our relationships with others, but if we start to categorise all our friendships, they would hardly survive the process.

How does this help us to understand the nature of friendship itself? The reasons we have for starting a friendship may be different from those for sustaining it. We may well start with utility or pleasure, which, with time, then becomes friendship based on elements of character. If we return to Ricky and Nikki – the utility of sharing a journey gave them the opportunity and space to discover each other's character, to find out if they liked each other enough to keep the friendship going for its own sake. If their relationship does not survive the utility, perhaps they discovered they really didn't like each other that much to begin with!
It is to be remembered that Aristotle's theory of friendship takes place within the context of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in which he seeks to explore the connection with morality: that friendship helps us to become good. As Richard White describes it:

... true friendship offers us an apprenticeship in virtue and an everyday training in the moral life. (White, 1999a, p79)

Friendship is thus an 'introduction to the moral life': it teaches us to see others as ends in themselves and not as a means to an end. Whilst Aristotle's discourse on friendship is useful in the many insights it offers into friendship, there are alternative views. In my next section I shall be considering the work of more recent philosophers to elucidate further the usefulness of the concept of friendship in modelling public life.

**Section 3: Friendship and the Self**

To talk about friendship is to talk about how we relate to others. Friendship plays a considerable role in our self-knowledge and perspectives on the world and is frequently the means by which we learn the affective dimensions of social life and respect for others outside of the family. It can thus be argued that a form of moral development and/or character education takes place within its remit. According to Cocking and Kennett, a view of the self is vital to an understanding of the nature of friendship (Cocking and Kennett, 1998). They discern that a mark of friendship is the extent to which the *self* is disclosed to the other in the relationship. This disclosure, in turn, serves to create intimacy and to further cement bonds of trust between the individuals.

The model, developed by Cocking and Kennett, presents two alternative interpretations of 'companion friends'. Firstly, individuals disclose themselves to
their friends through a 'secrets' model of friendship: we share those things closest and most important to us with those whom we trust the most. Alternatively, we see ourselves as reflected in our friends (a 'mirror' model of friendship): the idea is that the friend is a mirror for the self; we see ourselves reflected back because my friend is like me. Both models depend on disclosure in the relationship: either the disclosure of the self to the other or the self is disclosed in the other.

According to the mirror view of friendship, people can be friends only in so far as they happen to be alike. In several places, Aristotle states that a friend is "another self" (Aristotle, 1166a30), a statement that has been held to support various interpretations (Cartledge, 1993; Cocking and Kennett, 1998; Franck, 1999; Millgram, 1987). A friend is someone who shares many of the same values, goals and priorities as I do. However, Cocking and Kennett dispute this:

...the mirror view misrepresents the depth and nature of the engagement which friends have with each other and the impact which each has on the other. For you do not passively reflect my own characteristics; what you give back to me is not a reflection, but an interpretation of me, and for this you do not need to be like me ...I do not see myself in you as the mirror view suggests, I see myself through you. We are thus, to some significant extent, each other's creators.

(Cocking and Kennett, 1998, p509)

It could be assumed that the more alike two people are the more likely they are to be friends, yet experience teaches us this is not always the case. It is possible to have very similar characters and to have absolutely no interest in being friends at all. Similarly, people can share similar interests and yet be very dissimilar characters: having similar interests or similar characters to another is no guarantee of friendship.

There is the obvious interpretation taken by many, as pointed out by Annas, that logically a friend cannot regard another's thoughts, wishes etc as they would their own as they are separate beings (Annas, 1977). Yet as Annas
continues, there is a sense in which this phrase says something profound about the nature of deep friendship. There is a sense in which I can come to regard my friend as a second self in that I regard their wishes, desires and the fulfilment of them etc as having as much importance as do my own and will therefore seek to bring them about. And insofar as the other views me as a friend, they reflect back to me “an approval and endorsement of whom I am” (White, 1999a, p86).

The moral self that we are is thus not developed in isolation, but particularly with those who know us best. As White continues:

... our commitment to friendship is an objective expression of our commitment to the moral life. Indeed, at a more basic level than the reflective choice of moral principles and explicit values, my friends give me recognition and make me immediately aware of myself as a moral being.

(White, 1999a, p86)

If this is so, when a friend leaves or is taken away, we can feel a deep sense of loss: the loss of part of our 'self'.

Friendship is thus an 'introduction to the moral life': it teaches us to see others as ends in themselves and not as a means to an end. If friendship can be seen as a way of pursuing a shared moral life, then it assumes great importance for moral development: it forms an arena in which we learn to practise our moral reasoning. The dispositions of friendship (a complex mixture of attitudes and emotions) predispose us to consider the needs and wants of others as being of importance and thus to draw back from being prepared to always sacrifice the goods of others to our own.

It thus appears that 'friendship' itself may not be such a simple concept after all (one that indicates or points to one particular thing that can be identified). In the next section, I consider friendship as a 'shared life' contributing to our moral development over time.
Section 4: Friendship and the Shared Life.

Sherman points out that there may be specific shared ways of virtue peculiar to friendship, but the actual acquisition of the virtuous state of character must pre-date the virtue friendship (Sherman, 1987). The friends must choose each other based on character and, through the friendship, such commitments of character may deepen and develop. It is thus in the exercise of the virtues of friendship that we learn to become more virtuous in character. This seems to be asking a lot of friendship: how do we get to know each other’s character except through the occasions of friendship?

If we reflect on our own experience of friendships, those whom we are closest to, those we feel comfortable sharing the intimate details of our lives and selves with, those that have endured over many years are few, there are precious few of us with life-long friends. At different periods of our lives we seek different character traits in our friendships; some friendships last for many years, some do not. Those that last, tend to ‘deepen’ as the friends learn more of each other’s character and build a common history of experiences, sharing secrets, letting the other break through our social pretences.

Coming to know another person is a complex business. Crucially, we often begin interacting with someone before we can ascertain his or her character. We may initially believe we have much in common and then come to find commonalities were superficial at best. Yet in the interactions, we may come to regard the person as a friend, developing concern and care before we get to know the character of the person. Friendship, in these terms, becomes a long-term relationship that is built up and develops over a period of time. This creates a shared history between the friends – which grounds mutual references and
experiences. To come to know another person, to be aware of what their well-being consists in, requires time, energy and patience amongst other virtues. The time spent together in learning of each other’s character really is ‘time well spent’ – this grounds the friendship.

There is a sense in which we learn to share in the same activities as our friends and to share similar tastes. My friend may be a sports enthusiast and because this is an area that is important to her, it may become an area important to me. I may never develop an independent liking for the topic but through the friendship I may come to understand and appreciate what it is that appeals to my friend in sports. We want to please our friends; it is only in learning who they are, what their aims are, that we are able to do so. Deep friends will frequently sacrifice or subjugate some of their own wants and aims to seek out that which will most please their friend.

Friends trade secrets and keep confidences for each other; friendships require some form of mutual disclosure. The things I may tell my friend about myself will be different to the things I may tell others in the more public domain. The extent in which someone is willing to reveal himself or herself to us is a measure of how much they trust us and vice-versa.

Just as it is not possible to decide to be friends and then suddenly to be so, so it takes time to build a friendship. The time spent together exploring each other’s character, tastes, likes, dislikes, opinions etc builds a bond between the two. This on-going sharing in each other’s life is unique to each pair of friends and creates a ‘shared history’. The past spent together creates the present relationship, an emotional and historical shorthand that enables other virtues to take place and be developed.
Part of what is required in friendship is spending time together in a “jointly pursued life” (Sherman, 1987, p596) as suggested by Aristotle (Aristotle, 1171b30-1172a10); it is not the ‘what is shared’ that is important so much as the willingness to share and coordinate activities over a period of time. It would be an unusual friendship if the people concerned did not spend any time together. Could you count as a friend someone who would not ever go for a drink with you, neither would they go to the cinema with you, the theatre, the shops, nor spend time chatting with you nor eating with you?

But in addition to this is the fact that friendship does not have a 'sell-by date'. To suggest a time limit seems to demean the relationship to one of utility and few people would be willing to put in the emotional work of getting to know another person for it to be held so lightly and valued so little. If it is subject to a time frame, it appears to miss a fundamental aspect of the relationship: the shared life has to be open to the possibility of future development and growth together. In the next section I shall explore further five distinct features of friendship identified by Aristotle and frequently used as a basis for metaphorizing to a civic relationship: partiality, trust, equality, shared history and reciprocity (or mutual aid).

Section 5: Virtues of Friendship

Friendship usually marks the boundary of where the private world meets the public and enlarges the number of persons we have regard to be partial to. Indeed, Goering suggests that morality may require us to give preferential treatment to our friends (Goering, 2003). To have a personal relationship is to see someone else as special. To treat a friend with the detachment of an impartial
observer seems, somehow, wrong. There is a sense in which friendship requires us to go over and beyond our duties/obligations to others; we are partial to our friends in a way we are not with strangers. If we did not show particular pleasure in their achievements (over and above that to others), if we did not in some way show them special treatment, what would mark them out for the title of 'friend'?

The ship that you are sailing on sinks and you have found the only lifeboat (incidentally it only holds two), do you take in a stranger or your best friend? Most people would not have a problem. They would take their best friend over and above someone else. We would think them slightly odd if they did not and would probably make sure we never travelled with them if they would not show partiality to their friend! But if the choice was between one best friend and another, and we liked them both equally, it may be more difficult to choose and other factors come into play.

In lots of situations we see nothing strange in giving preference to a friend, in choosing them first or giving them a better deal. When choosing to share an intimate secret, one would naturally choose a friend. When choosing to share some goods with another, it is natural to do so with friends. Personal teaching observation: when choosing a partner, young children choose their friends first. When given a choice as to whom to sit with, they will choose a friend. They play with ..., their friends. Should we as teachers condemn such partiality? I would argue that such individual partiality is helpful in building the friendship itself. When young children are giving out some good in the classroom (e.g. milk) they normally give it out to their friends first (in most classes the children tend to distribute goods on a rota) and as such, each person will have different friends to
choose first. Only when there is a shortage of the good being distributed could there be a problem with equitability.

Yet partiality can clash with the demands of justice. Take for example the case of a politician who appoints a close friend to a prominent position in government, despite there being other more qualified candidates (the case involving George Bush and Harriet Miers that we started the chapter with, perhaps). Would we see such partiality to the friend as praiseworthy or are there areas where we think partiality should bow out? If the impetus towards moral impartiality is to reduce the possibility of bias towards those within our immediate circle, when is it permissible to give advantage to our family and friends? If we treat all people the same in all situations, then we are leaving nothing special for our friends… and friendship makes the other person special.

The second feature essential to virtue friendship is that of mutual trust. Deep friendships require trust of the other. Not just in terms of trusting each other with privileged information and being certain that the other will treat confidences appropriately, but being able to depend on and be sure of another. The more confident we are of each other’s moral character, the more intimately we trust. Where there is a marked disparity in the ability to share privileged information, there can be an indication of lack of trust or regard. Self-disclosure can be one of the predominant ways in which deep friendships contribute to the flourishing life of the other.

Trust between individuals tends to be something that is created over time as they get to know each other. The personally created history that is unique to each friendship builds the trust. When two friends have lost trust in each other’s character and capacity for virtuous behaviour, how do they repair the damage? As
common experience teaches us, it takes time: talking to each other, explaining points of view, admitting and forgiving faults. Sometimes the trust cannot be repaired and the relationship ends.

This brings me to the third feature, that of equality between friends. Aristotle put forward the view that it would not be possible for those with a wide gap between the parties, (whether of virtue or of affluence) to remain friends and that they do not expect to (Aristotle, 1158a25-1159a10). There are two differing ways in which this can be interpreted: the first that it would be unlikely for those at opposite ends of the economic sphere to have occasions to meet to develop a friendship. Neither the ultra-rich nor the merely wealthy tend to 'hang out' at the same places as the moderately financed or even the socially deprived. The rich man and Lazarus of the Gospels may never have had occasion to meet in order to become friends. The other interpretation, which is more interesting, is should they have met, could they have become friends without the richer feeling in some way obliged to help the poorer?

Joe is a multi-millionaire who works in the city. Jerry is a homeless man who lives on the doorstep of Joe’s company. Could they ever be friends? Would not the very nature of friendship itself have made the rich man automatically help the poorer and somehow equalise their positions one to the other? He has to care about his friend, he has to seek his good, and he is in a position to help Jerry. If they are friends, would he not have to do so? Joe could say hello each morning as he steps over Jerry. But that is not being his friend. Friendship has to go beyond being friendly. There has to be an active commitment to seek the flourishing of the other. If Joe genuinely cared about Jerry, would he not want to see him decently housed etc?
But why is equality so important to friendship? Goering, in discussing the work of Thomas states:

If we look at Thomas's work, his main emphasis is that neither party in the friendship can be in a position of complete authority over the other (although the two parties need not be equal in all respects).

(Goering, 2003, p403)

If there is not a form of equality of trust, respect, self-disclosure, the relationship becomes more of a therapist than that of a friend (Goering). Nevertheless, I do want to suggest there may be something valuable in danger of being missed here, that the deeper the friendship goes, the more the most advantaged of the pair would feel *impelled* for the sake of the friendship to help the less advantaged. The commitment to aid the flourishing of the other in a relationship would motivate such action.

The fourth feature I wish to consider is that of a 'shared history'. Aristotle emphasises developing friendships through time and a shared history of activities leading to some notion of a shared common good. Friends spend time together; they do things together. This in turn creates the 'shared history'. They have a unique 'language' of events that they can refer to as part of their friendship, whether of the "do you remember that holiday we took" variety, the personal events they have shared (mutual good luck, new jobs, family events, births and deaths etc). These are among the things that bind friends together.

Joint ventures, shared projects, an active participation in seeking each other’s good: these are all points drawn out by Aristotle as part of friendship as an ongoing, shared life (Aristotle). The fact that people share different events with different people contributes to the uniqueness of each friendship.

The fifth, and final, attribute of virtue friendship to be discussed here is that of reciprocal goodwill. Friends help each other automatically. As previously stated,
friendship is a recognised reciprocated goodwill to another. Suppose one had a friend, a good friend of many years standing, a kind, and generous person, good to little old ladies and small furry animals, who turns to a life of drugs. He is extremely happy in his lifestyle; he enjoys taking the drugs; his view of his well-being is centred on getting more and more drugs. We remonstrate with him, tell him all the dangers, and explain that the drugged state is different to reality for example, but he is still convinced that this is his proper end. Would we be bound to help him in his quest? Most of us would say he was mistaken in his view of what his well-being consisted in and that we were not required by reasons of the friendship to seek his good in this way. But how do we judge? How can we know what is good for our friends?

Two children are at school studying maths, one who finds it really easy and one who struggles even to spell the word. The nature of friendship will frequently make the more able help their less able friend where possible and common experience shows us many examples where the more 'superior' may aid the 'inferior' in the name of friendship. Friends automatically help each other. It is part of what is meant by friendship. One does not stand by and see a friend suffer if one is in a position to help. But what if it was an exam? Should the friend take the exam for their less academic friend? Are there areas outside the bounds of friends helping each other?

What if friends were not in a position to offer help? Return to Joe and Jerry. Joe is in a position to help Jerry, but what realistically can Jerry ever do to help Joe? Anything Jerry does may not be of the same kind. Reciprocity implies that I will do something for you if you will do something for me: it is centred on an advantage as the focus. We take part in common endeavours because we both
benefit. Friendship carries with it the implication that we help each other for each other's sake, because of the relationship between the persons.

Section 6: Conclusion

In this chapter, I have considered the concept of friendship in the private sphere of intimate relationships using both the Aristotelian framework and some modern insights. From this, certain conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the concept of virtue is tied in strongly with any concept of friendship in the Aristotelian framework: friendship is firmly tied with his idea of the good life. No one would choose to live without friends (Aristotle, 1151a5). Virtue friends are such not because they need each other, but because of each other. As Den Uyl comments, such friendships require "an extraordinary level of self-perfection" (Den Uyl, 1997, p107) One would need to develop dispositions to view any benefit gained as secondary to the relationship itself. One would need a secure sense of self to be able to relate to the other solely on the basis of the other's qualities.

Secondly, the categories may not be as distinct as Aristotle would have us believe. Friends are useful, pleasant people by virtue of their being friends. What makes someone a friend is that we like them, and we like them for who they are. Even at a basic level, there is a need for character to come into play.

Thirdly, friendship represents the point at which we meet unknown others for the first time outside the bonds of family. Friendship, at a basic level, binds us to another person. It is this binding together that becomes philosophically interesting as perhaps a model enlightening us in the civic realm and thus providing a model for the cohesive society. Thus Aristotle's connection of friendship, in this instance, with the desire to live together, creates a metaphorical
model for the civic community, which can then be interpreted as the bridge between family kinships and society. As Cooper comments:

Civic friendship, then, as the special form of friendship characteristic of this kind of community, is founded on the experience and continued expectation, on the part of each citizen, of profit and advantage to himself, in common with the others, from membership in the civic association. This is to say that civic friendship is a kind of advantage-friendship.

(Cooper, 1999, p333)

From this stance, it would seem reasonable that it might then leap into the civic sphere. It is this belief that has perhaps made the concept of friendship suddenly becomes 'topical', reigniting interest in both personal friendship as a virtue, and also as a model for the civic bond itself. In the next chapter, I shall further explore a more metaphoric version of friendship to see if the concept of 'civic friendship' can be made meaningful and thus function as a model for the civic relationship.
Chapter 3

'Civic Friendship'

Friendship also seems to be the bond that holds communities together, and lawgivers seem to attach more importance to it than to justice...

Between friends, there is no need for justice. (Aristotle, 1155a20-30)

Between countries, there are no friends, only interests. 8

Introduction

The tragic events in London on July 7th and 21st, 2005, have made many people question urgently how disparate groupings in society can relate to each other in order that society can interact and function as one. Can we extrapolate from personal relationships to consider wider, looser forms of human interconnectedness that could model the civic relationship? 9 Tying together the two forms of friendship, (personal and civic) has a long line in political philosophy (Aristotle; MacIntyre, 1985; MacIntyre, 1999; Macmurray, 1961; Schwarzenbach, 2005). Nevertheless, there are, as I shall indicate, problems in this move of characterising citizenship as a form of friendship.

By using metaphors for particular relationships, it is believed we can move from the personal to the civic domain, allowing the insights engendered from one

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8 (Senegalese President Abodoulaye Wade, paraphrasing Lord Palmerston, in a 2005 letter to Pres. Chen Shui-bian, announcing Senegal's de-recognition of Taiwan and establishment of diplomatic relations with China). Chang Yun-ping and Ko Shu-ling, “Taiwan Foreign Minister Offers to Quit Over Senegal’s Severance of Ties,” Taipei Times, 27 Oct. 2005. Queen Victoria criticized her Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston for expressing sympathy for Poles seeking independence from Britain’s ally Russia. He replied, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 97, col. 122 (1 Mar. 1848) as quoted in: http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/working_papers/WorkingPaper12.pdf [last accessed 19.11.2009]

9 To achieve this unity, some commentators have suggested integration into the common life, whilst others have suggested assimilation. Others still, have suggested identifying a core of common shared values that should form the basis of 'British-ness'.

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area to give us fresh insights into another, hence this chapter seeks to explore the philosophical possibility of the concept of 'Civic Friendship', as a model for the nature of ‘belonging’ that underpins societal cohesion. The success of this particular metaphor will ultimately hinge, in strong measure, on whether it can plausibly be understood as a form of friendship. Can the social matrix of friendship offer a framework for understanding citizenship? In response to this, I shall consider both of the standard arguments for civic friendship: that it can be understood as either a form of utility friendship or as a form of virtue friendship. The exposition of these arguments then lays the foundation upon which to consider the metaphorical argument, whether or not the concept is likely to do the work expected of it in characterising the civic relationship as a form of friendship.

In Section 1, I start by considering ‘what is civic friendship’. This entails a return to the Aristotelian understanding of the relationship between the personal and the civic, with the following two sections examining the link in greater detail. In Section 2, I consider whether civic friendship can be viewed as a form of utility relationship (Aristotle’s first category). In Section 3, I turn to Aristotle’s third category of friendship to consider the civic relationship as a form of virtue friendship through looking at Partiality, Trust, Equality, a Shared History and Reciprocity/Mutual Aid. From here, in Section 4, I consider the linkage with citizenship. In Section 5, The Ancient Greeks and Civic Friendship, I examine the context within which the concept arose in Ancient Greece and query how this may, in turn, map onto the modern context. In the Conclusion, I return to consider the possibly inappropriate categorisation of the civic relationship as a form of friendship and to claim that if this is the case, then it may be an inapplicable metaphor for the civic sphere in a modern liberal democracy.
Section 1: What is Civic Friendship?

Before considering the place of civic friendship in a well-ordered society, it must be distinguished from other sorts of friendship. However civic friendship is understood, it must characterize the way that people relate to each other in the public sphere. By definition, it must be both *civic* and a type of *friendship* if the concept is to carry meaning. The civic element means it must relate to the civic realm, how we relate as citizens. It is not synonymous with being a citizen, but it should offer some illumination as to how, at a civic level, citizens relate. Here I concur with Spragens, who claims the adjective 'civic' is used to denote the politically relevant forms of friendship to distinguish between the private (individual) and public (political) realms (Spragens, 1999). The friendship element puts it clearly within the definition of friendship. It must carry enough of the characteristics of friendship as to be clearly 'of the same type'. If friendship is defined as a relationship denoting certain virtues, of mutual affection, of goodwill, of a propensity to seek each other's company, of joint endeavours and shared history, of mutual trust and help when needed, then we need to consider how this would extrapolate into the public domain.\(^\text{10}\)

The Aristotelian typology of friendship, explored in the previous chapter, draws out a direct connection between the personal and the civic. Cooper makes the point that Aristotle holds that intimate relationships are a necessary part of the flourishing life (Aristotle, 1155a5) and that this leads to 'civic friendship' being considered as an essential human good (Cooper, 1977a, p622). For example, when citizens view each other as civic friends, they come together in a broad

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\(^{10}\) These are among the virtues and features drawn out by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics in his description of the third type of friendship – virtue friendship – that only those who are good can really be friends in this sense: (see 'Aristotle on Social Friendships' by Theodore L Fortier)
consensus on matters of public policy, of things that are advantageous to the community (Aristotle, 1167b1-5).

What is particularly of interest here, is that Aristotle holds the connection between the personal and the civic to be so close that he states that lawmakers care more for friendship than for justice: when men are friends they have no need of justice (Aristotle, 1155a25-30). Lawmakers seek agreement (concord) and the elimination of division (faction). Friendship, he argues, is similar. This seems, at first, a most curious statement to make: what has friendship to do with justice? Rawls, for example, states that justice is the first virtue of social institutions (Rawls, 1971, p3). In what way can friendship trump that? As Schwarzenbach points out, friendship is rarely cited as one of the constituent factors holding the modern state together (Schwarzenbach, 1996).

To consider this question, a brief return to the examination of the Aristotelian model of personal friendship becomes necessary. Which particular model of friendship best provides this move from the personal to the civic? In the next section I consider the claims of utility friendship as a direct model for the civic domain.

Section 2: Civic Friendship as Utility Friendship

Aristotle, in the *Ethics* does not state explicitly the relationship between civic friendship and the three personal forms, yet it is argued to be a special case of utility (or advantage) friendship: the civic community is formed because of the common advantage that its members derive from it (Cooper, 1977a; Cooper, 1991; Cooper, 1999). Central to this is that it is advantageous to be interested in the character (or virtues) of fellow citizens with whom one comes in contact (for
example, they should be trustworthy, honest), whether in economic or civic terms, because of the utility involved. It thus seems reasonable to assume that citizens care about the moral characters of their fellow citizens because the other is a fellow citizen. The prosperity and well-being of each is interlinked. (Cooper, 1977a; Cooper, 1991; Cooper, 1999):

Civic friendship, then, as the special form of friendship characteristic of this kind of community, is founded on the experience and continued expectation, on the part of each citizen, of profit and advantage to himself, in common with the others, from membership in the civic association. This is to say that civic friendship is a kind of advantage-friendship.

(Cooper, 1999, p333)

In such a community, as Cooper states, the citizens assume that all others, including those unknown or barely known, are supporters of the common institutions and contributors to these institutions from which all benefit. Significantly, this civic friendship would exist where citizens like each other, wish well to each other and are willing to confer benefits on others, recognising that they in turn also benefit regularly from the actions of others. Cooper further claims:

..the advantage friend wishes his friend well for his friend's own sake, in consequence of recognising him as someone who regularly benefits him and has done so in the past. (Cooper, 1977a, p633)

The concern with character, however, is only in areas from which advantage can be drawn and only for that reason.

As we identified in the last chapter, both utility friendship and pleasure friendship are essentially self-centred friendships. They are concerned with the self and satisfaction of the self's needs. With personal utility friendships, the friendship lasts as long as does the utility; they are the most fragile and easily dissolved of friendships: when the advantage ends, so does the friendship. With this in mind, is this then the most appropriate model for the civic community?
We cannot be certain when and with whom we will experience utility friendships in the future. We cannot in advance tell when or where we are going to need help. I may not require a state pension, meals on wheels and a home help at present, but I cannot anticipate that I never will, so it is to my utility to band together with fellow citizens to provide such assistance so that such help is there should I need it. Perhaps this can best be understood as a form of utility, or mutual support relationship, between citizens; but need this utility relationship be friendship?

I contend it is possible to have a utility relationship without it being a friendship at all. An example, a plumber comes to put in a shower: it is an exchange of services for mutual interest. He puts in the shower, I pay him. Yet I would not describe him as a friend. I have some concern as to his character; it is to my advantage that he is honest, knows what he is doing etc. When the shower is in, the relationship ends; I do not expect him to come around and visit the shower, check it is doing well, bring me little gifts on the anniversary of it being put in! As the example indicates, it is a form of utility relationship, not utility ‘friendship’.

It seems reasonable to assume that Aristotle wants utility friends to like and feel affection for each other. As both Schwarzenbach and Cooper indicate, Aristotle sees both of the lesser forms of friendship as real friendships (Cooper, 1977b; Schwarzenbach, 1996) hence the emphasis on the affective dimension involved. However, it is one thing to seek mutual assistance from fellow citizens or to band together through the payment of taxes for common projects, but it is quite another to be required to like them as well. In the case of the plumber, I am not connecting with him in terms of the person he is, but in terms of his function
I am only interested in his character in terms of how it affects the job he fulfils. Liking and feeling affection for him does not enter the equation; I do not need to be friends with him for the relationship to work. I can be friendly without being friends. Civic friendliness is a very different concept to civic friendship.

I purport that this model of personal friendship leads to confusion in the civic arena and is thus particularly ill suited as a model for the civic relationship. When dealing with unknown, or barely known, others, friendship need not be a consideration at all: I can achieve utility in cooperative working with others without it. We are thus left with a conundrum: if the affective dimension of friendship is not needed for cooperative working, how do we then characterise the bond between citizens? Without the deep affective dimension, can it be friendship? In the next section, I consider the second path - virtue friendship as a model for civic friendship.

**Section 3: Virtue Friendship**

It would appear, on the surface, reasonable to assume that the features identified in the previous chapter as necessary attributes of virtue friendship could be applied within the civic domain. However, the confusion noted within the previous section spreads when we try to use virtue friendship in this role. In this section, I shall take each of the features from the previous chapter (partiality, trust, equality, a shared history and reciprocity/special mutual concern) and draw out how they may, or may not, apply within the public sphere at a macro level to see if virtue friendship provides a more effective model for the civic relationships underpinning conceptions of social cohesion.
Firstly, I shall consider the place of partiality. Friendship requires a certain partiality to our friends. In the private sphere, it seems obvious that I would do more for my friend than for strangers; I would benefit them above others, simply because they are my friend. This partiality, as we previously noted, is engendered by seeing these people as being, in some sense, special. In personal relationships, we expect people to be partial to their friends: that is what being and having friends is all about, always having someone on your side, someone who is going to put you first. But it may not easily translate from the private sphere into the public. The partiality of friendship demands that some are excluded from the relationship; there is a numerical limit to the number of people one can share this type of friendship with. If I attempted to include everyone within the boundary, then who would count as being within the realm of my special attention?

There is a sense that in the public sphere impartiality is more appropriate (Baron, 1991; Cocking and Kennett, 2000; Jeske, 1997). An example: a politician is in a position to give someone a job as Chair of a major corporation. The job carries a massive salary, chauffeur-driven car, lots of travel etc. Should they give it to their best friend who needs a job? Or to their daughter, to keep the 'treats' in the family? If they exercised some form of partiality, no doubt they would do so, and be pilloried for so doing in the press. It would violate our sense of justice. We feel automatically that impartiality should have driven the hiring to such a position.\textsuperscript{11} Recall the hue and outcry in the UK in 2009 at Derek Conway, a Conservative politician, who hired both of his sons as 'researchers' at public expense.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} Many politicians were highly criticised precisely for this reason during the expenses scandal of 2009.
\textsuperscript{12} \url{http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/jan/29/derek-conway-fined} [last accessed 19.11.2009]
Close friendships may lead to one friend covering for another – perhaps telling a lie. For example, a friend might lie about whether or not a particular new outfit suited another friend, not wishing to upset them. We might even see it as commendable in certain circumstances, for example, acting as a good friend, positively reinforcing their self-image. Nevertheless, when this translates to the wider public sphere, it is seen as something to be condemned. Those involved in the Enron scandal in America could hardly have given as their defence that they were just covering for their friends.13 A higher standard of behaviour is usually required in public life.

Turning to the concept of trust. All friendships involve some form of trust. Trust is a way of saving oneself the time and trouble of finding things out; it is entangled between convenience and morality and has a close connection with forms of loyalty (O'Hara, 2004). When we trust someone, we have certain beliefs about how they will act/react, enabling us to make plans. It is only to be expected that we are willing to do things for people we trust that we might be reluctant to do for strangers (e.g. to lend them our own car).

Trust undoubtedly transcends the personal relationship, and as such looks on the surface as the most likely candidate to transpose neatly from the personal virtue to the public. Just as we need to be able to trust our friends, so we need to be able to trust beyond individuals. When ill, I need to trust the medical establishment is truly trying to make me better, (for example, has appropriate expertise, is recommending the appropriate medication without payment from drug companies) without continually asking to see their qualifications and chasing

13 http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/ethicalperspectives/enronlessons.html [last accessed 19.11.2009]. Enron Corporation was made bankrupt after a series of irregular accounting procedures made the company look more profitable than it was, driving stock up whilst profits were falling. The fall out from the scandal led to a wave of other companies being prosecuted for fraud, high-level corruption and insider trading.
up references. When a parent sends their child to school, they trust that the child will receive what is regarded as an appropriate education rather than training in theft, drug dealing and arson.

Trust is necessary between civic individuals for civic life to take place. Where 'public trust' is strong, citizens are willing to try new ways of working, organising etc. However, public trust (going beyond particular individuals and groupings to encompass societal agencies) can be lost overnight, with disastrous repercussions for those involved. An example of the breakdown of public trust would be the supposed MMR link with autism (an injection given to vaccinate against measles, mumps and rubella). A report in the UK that the vaccine may be associated with autism provoked a dramatic reaction on the part of parents who then refused to have their children vaccinated in this fashion. Despite further reports and targeted studies not being able to find a link between the two, a link was formed in the public mind with serious potential side effects.\textsuperscript{14} A further example. The parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009 previously alluded to, is alleged to have had a direct bearing on the fragmentation of public trust to the extent that local council elections and European Parliamentary elections following the original outcry had disastrous turnouts of the electorate, enabling fringe parties such as UKIP and the BNP to gain seats.\textsuperscript{15}

The existence of trust cannot be assumed between a populace and its elected government. Politics in the USA has been dominated by money for many years (slush funds etc.). Both the President of France, Jacques Chirac and the Prime Minister of Italy have been reportedly using their offices to impede criminal

\textsuperscript{14} http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article5683671.ece [last accessed 19.11.2009]
\textsuperscript{15} http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-pays-the-price-of-expenses-scandal-1694507.html [last accessed 19.11.09]
investigations. In Germany, Helmut Kohl was supposedly discovered channelling funds to pet causes. In the UK, Jeffrey Archer and Jonathan Aitken (senior Conservative politicians at the time) were discovered lying under oath and served prison terms. Again in the UK, many of the sources accredited with the justification for the invasion of Iraq, turned out to have been falsified or based on incomplete evidence. Even the suspicion that Tony Blair 'lied' about the WMD held by Iraq was enough to taint his role as Prime Minister beyond repair.\(^{16}\)

Just as a lack or betrayal of trust between friends can destroy the relationship, so the breakdown of public trust can fracture the civic relationship. But is personal trust the same thing as public trust? Public trust is a much thinner concept and needs to be supported by a variety of laws and regulations giving justification for the trust. As recent events in the global 'credit crunch' have shown us, once trust between institutions is lost, rebuilding it comes at huge costs and frequently demands for further legislation to prevent 'civic misdeeds'. Yet the need for coercion (legal or otherwise) is problematic and can itself be claimed to be the antithesis of 'friendship'.

Next, we turn to the notion of equality between friends. Here I raise three different interpretations of how this may be perceived in the civic domain, as resource equality, as equality before the law or as considering another's needs as being of equal worth. I questioned in the previous chapter whether a virtuous rich person might not, by virtue of their friendship, feel compelled to aid a poorer friend. This can prompt us to ask broad questions about the connection between this form of friendship and equality: should the civic relationship entail a

\(^{16}\)http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article1364671.ece [last accessed 19.11.2009]
redistribution of resources within a society, to create the relevant conditions in order that 'civic friendship' should prosper? Could part of the nature of civic friendship require some desire for equality between sections of the civic body? To what extent should the ultra rich feel obliged to help those at the other end of the spectrum, and to do it willingly as 'friends' would17. That the rich already contribute financially through progressive taxations systems is praiseworthy, but it is legally required; law has been needed to ensure this happens. As recent events have illustrated, the mega-rich would all too frequently manage to avoid paying any taxes if left to their own devices18. Once the force of law is involved, friendship seems to fade away.

Yet virtuous individuals who seek to ameliorate the ravages of poverty on a voluntary basis, or going beyond what is legally required, do exist. History is strewn with cases of philanthropy: Carnegie, Vanderbilt, Peabody, Rockefeller, Guggenheim. Today we have such people as Bill Gates, even Andre Agassi (tennis star) has given away more than $20m. In the UK, we have had the Rowntrees, John Lewis, William Lever, Bourneville, Cadbury, all people of 'good will' towards others, seeking to improve life in some way for those less fortunate. Whilst all of this is undoubtedly laudable, we have to ask, is it wise to rely on the virtuous characters of individuals to sustain this element of the civic relationship? Is benevolence and/or altruism sufficient or do we need a framework of rights and obligations?

Here, again, I concur with Spragens who directs us to seek an answer within the domain of democracy. In democracy, citizens are political equals, they

17 "We don't pay taxes. Only the little people pay taxes" Leona Helmsley, U.S. businesswoman. Quoted in New York Times (July 12, 1989).[last accessed 19.11.2009]
18 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/17/barclays-guardian-injunction-tax: articles examining how numerous banks, the ultra-rich and multinational organisations avoided paying taxes.[last accessed 19.11.2009]
rule and are ruled in turn (Spragens, 1999). This gives civic friendship a weakened form of equality: a political equality not resource equality. Whilst not wishing to dismiss this important line of enquiry it does raise equally troubling issues: what does it mean to be a political equal? Does it in its weakest sense merely refer to an equality before the law? Yet is the poor man really equal before the law with the rich man in practice?

This may well be so, to a point, yet I feel there is something valuable in danger of being lost within the complexities of this argument. Central to the ideal of virtue friendship, as we elucidated in the previous chapter, friends regard the well-being of their friends as they do their own: they seek each other’s good. Hence, when people look on each other as friends, this empathic bond allows them to step back from demanding the satisfaction of their own needs at all times and to consider the needs and the cost of decisions to others as being of equal worth. Sometimes the fact of friendship serves to put others first. However, in friendship, this tends to be motivated by the deep love between friends and, again, it is hard to see how this would realistically expand into the civic community. Whilst equality may be an essential ingredient needed by any civic relationship within a pluralistic society, the concept of friendship is unlikely to ground it.

And so to the concept of a 'shared history'. To some extent it seems reasonable that a society might have a 'shared history' in that they may experience certain world events together, for instance the death of a public figure (e.g. Diana, Princess of Wales), public tragedies (the events of 9/11). But this in turn begs other questions. Do we experience these things in the same way, with the same responses in the public arena?
The events that form the shared history between friends are experienced and lived by those particular individuals. Furthermore, it is quite possible in the civic arena for some members to be completely unaware of what is happening to their civic others. The plight of the Chinese cockle pickers, for example, brought the existence of an almost sub-culture of work-gangs and gang-masters to the attention of the British public; it had been assumed that such practices only happened in 'other places'.\(^{19}\) Certainly, some events are so widely publicised it is not possible to avoid knowing about them, but the knowledge tends to be gained through the mass media and not personally experienced, thus it is frequently superficial at best. It is the difference between being a participant in the events and an observer to the events.

Similarly, the question arises at what point does one 'share' in a society's history? How long does one have to have lived in a country before one can claim to share in its history? Crucially, there are many minorities whose experience of the public sphere is one of exclusion; others may choose not to be a part of certain elements (Mason, interestingly, draws a distinction between citizens and long-term residents (Mason, 1997)). All that being said, it must be admitted that in many current liberal societies, the creation or understanding of a shared history is perceived as a difficulty, yet it need not be so. It can be claimed as a strength of democratic societies that they do allow for variation in the kinds of dispositions and attitudes permitted by citizens. Interestingly, the question then becomes, where should they draw the line between what is permissible and what should not be permitted? The civic relationship needs to be strong enough to permit

\(^{19}\) On the 5\(^{th}\) February, 2004, 21 Chinese cockle pickers, all illegal immigrants, were cut off by the tide and drowned at Morecambe Bay, UK because of the negligence of their gang master. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/lancashire/4259226.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/lancashire/4259226.stm) [last accessed 19.11.2009]
elements of inclusion for those who wish to be included, yet weak enough not to require the 'cricket test'\(^{20}\).

Turning now to the final feature, reciprocity. Friends spontaneously help each other in times of trouble out of concern for each other’s welfare. What interests me here is the possibility of this concern converting into the civic sphere as a concern to provide all citizens with a minimum level of support. Superficially this extrapolation seems to have a logic about it. Yet the underlying rationale behind the provision of social welfare/civic aid works to restrict access to certain groupings. Most societies require a certain level of commitment, or reasonable anticipation of commitment, on the part of the beneficiary to the civic forum before allowing access to the aid (a certain length of residence, taxpaying etc); not just anyone can be a civic ‘other’. Consider the recent argument concerning the extension of the EU to include many countries in Eastern Europe with a lower level of ‘living’ than the UK, leading to hasty, political moves to limit who may benefit and under which circumstances.

This in turn results in two obvious outcomes: either firstly a seeking the good of another for no reason other than that one can or alternatively, a form of contributionist stance (that one should only aid those who can also in turn aid us). Taking the first pathway to begin with, altruistic actions do take place. Passers-by, seeing drowning children in rivers, do sometimes jump in at the risk of their own lives; people do donate to charities without knowing the recipient or without gaining anything in return; people do help their friends without thought of utility. Some people do have character traits fine-tuned to virtuous behaviour, and others do not. However, relying on people to develop virtuous characters may not be the

\(^{20}\) Norman Tebbit, a British politician, once claimed that citizens could be identified by which team they supported in a game of cricket
most advisable method of organising the way a society interacts or how they distribute social resources.

The second pathway, as an extreme contributionist view of distributive justice, is rightly criticised by Buchanan (the idea that an individual has a right to a share of social resources if that individual contributes or can contribute to the community surplus) (Buchanan, 1990). This, as he points out, clashes with the sense we may have that even those who cannot contribute deserve to be treated justly. To say that only those who can contribute have a right to social resources would have profound, unpleasant implications for the treatment of the disabled and goes against many of our common instincts. We do have instincts that those, who from birth, are profoundly disabled in ways which prevent them from contributing in any way, should still deserve support from social resources, and that any theory of justice as fairness should allow and enable this. A strict form of reciprocity would rule out such views and would seem to destroy any notion of 'civic friendship'.

Whilst there may be a form of reciprocity and mutual aid common in both personal and civic sphere, the underlying motive is different. In the personal sphere, the motive is the relationship with the other as a person; in the public sphere, the character or person of the other is not always relevant: the motive is more of an utility relationship, which may not be mutual for all who benefit. Having rejected both forms of friendship as a model for the civic relationship, in the next section I consider further the close connection, and, on occasions conflation, between the concepts of friendship and citizenship.
Section 4: Friendship and Citizenship

Scorza identifies two important structural similarities between friendship and citizenship (Scorza, 2004). Firstly, just as relationships between individuals evolve over time and develop with effort, so might those between citizens. He gives the example of how incensed we might be if a slight acquaintance presumed a level of intimacy in the relationship that may not exist, and relates it to that of citizens having claims made upon them by complete strangers and how this, too, may feel excessive. Just as a person might be displeased at a slight acquaintance expecting to move into their spare room when they have been made homeless, so might a community feel annoyed over newly arrived ‘legal aliens’ jumping the housing list over others within the settled community. This comparison, however, may merely mean there are layers to both, layers of friendships and layers of citizenship, interesting, but ultimately not necessarily enlightening.

Secondly, he claims that citizens in modern liberal democracies may disagree and fight with each other as much as friends. In answer to this, I purport that when friends disagree, they try to govern those disagreements in such a way as to preserve the friendship bond, without stifling disagreement or terminating the bond completely. Neither do they risk an escalation to violence and snapping the bond. It may not be just a matter of differing opinions, as it might be with friends, but matters of substance that risk ‘snapping the bond’.

I can think of no better way of illustrating this point than to recall the banning of wearing the hijab headscarf within schools in France in 2004.\(^{21}\) The disagreement over the interpretation of the separation of religion and state within

the French Constitution and the practical effects that had for certain sectors of the school community, (whether Muslim, Sikh, Christian or Jewish), had already escalated. Many commentators argued that such a ban could result in the retreat of certain religious sections of the community away from the civic public sphere, that more students would leave the state-provided education system and seek out the religiously founded sectors that would allow these religious symbols/clothing (Gereluk, 2006a; Gereluk, 2006b; Levinson and Levinson, 2003). What makes this issue so complex is that this, in turn, would have the unintended outcome of possibly cutting those same people off from the civic forum whereby citizens can attempt to reach some form of shared public reason. In addition, it abandons attempts to create a shared history.

Whilst the French authorities acknowledged that this might place a more onerous burden on certain sectors of the community for whom it may be a religious requirement, they equally claimed that this should not negate the duties as citizens that such communities of tradition hold. The argument was that there should be some place in the public domain whereby people can come together as citizens, not as members of such and such a community, and if this argument can be made, then surely in schools, wherein students are learning the duties, rights and responsibilities of becoming citizens, it assumes even more importance. A further argument pointed out that the wearing of some symbolic clothing directly contradicted many of the values and commitments held by the secular state (the burqa and niqab were seen as contrary to the equal status of women within the political sphere).

22 Of course, the added worry is also of the pressure on some Muslims to wear the hijab, who might not otherwise do so, or even, as a recent court case in the UK identified, the pressure to go even further and wear the jilbab - and whether pupils should be protected from such pressures.
Such a view assumes, however, that one can divorce one's community affiliations from one's civic affiliations and it is unclear whether or not in practice this can be done. When one enters the public sphere, it is not a question of either/or in one's affiliations, but often both at the same time. Members of communities are rarely, if ever, members of just one community. Frequently they, of necessity, are members of several, overlapping communities, for instance a religious, a political, a social, a familial. They may, in a 'pick and mix' fashion, choose from a variety of mores and values interweaving many contradictory points of view. That we allow our beliefs to influence our actions is not that remarkable, but it is another thing entirely to claim that we cannot stand back from those beliefs and consider other viewpoints within, for example, the civic sphere. (If this were not so, then no one would be able to question their belief systems or to exit their communities, and common experience tells us that this happens.) John Kerry is reported to have said that when he votes as a politician he is a representative of more voices than just his own, and has to stand back from his personal belief commitments.23

Here I concur with Wellman, who argues convincingly that relationships between fellow citizens are not like those of personal friends and that the comparison is particularly ill-suited for three reasons (Wellman, 2001). We should examine his arguments in full as answers to the points made by Scorza. Firstly, he shows that personal friendships are chosen and consented to in a way that citizenship is not. Whilst there is a sense in which one can give up one's citizenship and take on another, citizenship as such, is not initially chosen nor consented to. Secondly, Wellman points out that the strong emotional attachment

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23 Democratic Candidate in the USA for president (in response to threats by Catholic Bishops that Catholic politicians who vote in favour of abortion etc should be denied Communion).
felt between two personal friends is lacking in the public sphere to the same
degree. Personal friendship requires a form of caring, of intimacy, of having
feelings towards someone, for it to be even termed a friendship. It would seem
strange to expect someone to have an emotional attachment to complete
strangers and to have the sort of caring feelings for people who may be very
different from yourself, with whom you have very little in common, and whom you
might never meet. There may, however, be a way out of this difficulty; if instead of
expecting friendship within the civic sphere to echo that in the personal sphere
(an unreasonable expectation, considering the amount of time and energy
required to get to know people, for no one's life is long enough to allow for
friendship with more than a minute percentage of a population), one changed the
emphasis. In the civic sphere one should act as if one had caring attachments:
being 'friendly' without being 'friends'.

Lastly, Wellman indicates that whereas friendship might be argued to have
intrinsic value, citizenship can only ever have extrinsic value. This last point,
however, is debatable. Mason, for instance, challenges this viewpoint and claims
that citizenship can also have intrinsic value (Mason, 1997), that citizens can have
special obligations to each other based on the intrinsic moral worth of citizenship.
He argues that nations are partially constituted by their traditions, that these
traditions are themselves intrinsically valuable, and that as such one might have
an obligation to sustain such traditions. Furthermore, by being a citizen, one is
part of a collective body in which one enjoys equal status and recognition with
other members. This collective body, the state, enjoys considerable power and
influence over the members above that exercised by individuals. As such, they
can contribute to the collective life, including forming laws and policies. Part of
being a citizen, in these terms, is having special obligations and responsibilities to fellow citizens (Mason, 1997).

Yet to regard fellow citizens as in some way equating to 'a second self' in the Aristotelian framework is to suggest an unrealistic mode of engagement in the whole life of the other, as a form of caring for the whole of each person that would be unsustainable in a modern liberal democracy. Similarly, and perhaps, more importantly, the public sphere has to encompass all people, regardless of how we feel about them, and it has to do so as political equals, in a way that friendship does not. It is possible to be friendly towards relative strangers and yet not have a friendship with them; friendliness is not itself friendship.

Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the affective element of friendship. If friendship is a type of love (Thomas, 1993), if it requires an emotional attachment to another (Cooper, 1999; Long, 2003), it is difficult to see how this can be replicated in the civic sphere. diZerega agrees that all too often liberal writers have shied way from the “affective dimension of social life” (diZerega, 2003, p23) and rightly concludes that the civic relationship:

... applies to all human beings equally....Friendship is selective, excluding as well as including. (diZerega, 2003, p.24)

Friendship has a certain exclusivity. It must exclude others in some way from sharing in the relationship. Each friendship is unique and irreplaceable: the features or virtues of A if found in B cannot be seen as an instance of a universal and thus lead to a replaceable friendship. There is a sense in which the civic membership has to be inclusive to a far greater extent than with personal friends: it has to include those we may not like.

Within the Aristotelian framework, friendship requires a common commitment to the good. Within the civic domain, this would seem to entail an
official conception of virtue (Spragens, 1999). This is not to undermine nor negate the importance of friendship itself, merely to indicate that this may not be possible within the wider context of a liberal society committed to individual liberty in pursuit of plural conceptions of human flourishing. Perhaps friendliness, or goodwill, is all we can ask for in the civic sphere but neither virtue equates with friendship.

It seems obvious that the concept of civic friendship cannot possibly be a literal form of friendship, yet I question whether indeed, it can even act at a metaphorical level. To be an appropriate metaphor requires the use of one part of experience to throw light upon another (Pepper, 1982); metaphors work by crossing categories of concepts and a similarity or contrast may be created. To consider this further, I now turn to the original context and purpose of civic friendship, questioning whether it can still perform its historic task.

Section 5: The Ancient Greeks and Civic Friendship

The desire to extend the virtues of friendship to the civic sphere is perhaps grounded in trying to pinpoint a particular moral dimension within the political field. As Brunkhorst indicates, within the historical tradition of civic friendship lay a desire to import the obligations of friendships into the communal bond (Brunkhorst, 2005). This idea of networked civic friendship was itself an attempt to deal with the problems of social integration, how a civic community could hold together without recourse or dependency upon the bonds of tribal relationships to create a socially cohesive society.

As previous sections have argued, Aristotle clearly believes that individual friendship could be seen as a model for the public realm through being a
Aristotle sees friendship between citizens as:

...a necessary condition for the justice of any political regime. In the worst regime such as tyranny, he writes in the Nicomachean Ethics, there is the least amount of friendship.

(Schwarzenbach, 2005, p234)

Nevertheless, in what follows, I will argue that it would be a serious error to try to align the Greek concept with that of our own modern situation.

To summarise in three points. Firstly, the arena within which Aristotle was writing was very different. He was writing for a small city-state (small by our standards) of about 15-20,000 citizens. The Athenian society was lived 'face-to-face', in a culturally homogenous community. This in turn was upheld by vast quantities of slaves, creating the leisure conditions necessary for their deliberations. The size of the citizenry, as well as its composition (it omitted slaves, women, children and foreigners) meant that individuals could exercise real political power in a way not available within larger modern communities (Cartledge, 1993; Constant, 1806). Even here, the size of the citizenry would not have allowed for fellow citizens to have direct friendship with each other, neither did Aristotle expect it to.

Secondly, the idea of friendship as a voluntary bond (as opposed to ties of blood) became an analogy for politics, separating the household from the polis. According to Benjamin Constant, (Constant, 1806) amongst the ancient Greeks, the individual was sovereign in public affairs having direct influence on law-making and issues of war and peace. Because of this, the commitments to family versus the demands of the polis created a constant threat to public stability.

Thirdly, an ancient Greek practice amongst aristocratic families was to form alliances with leading families of other cities called 'guest-friendships' (xenoi).
These 'xenoi', for example, would provide a refuge in exile should one offend or no longer be able to live in one's own state. They were not built on friendship but on obligation that could override other obligations (Herman, 1987). The host was obliged to provide food and shelter; the 'xenoi' in return was obliged not to raise arms against the host. These bonds of xenia outlasted the lives of individuals and were inherited by their descendents, could lapse for many years and then be reactivated, binding not just individuals but families together. As ritual friendships became over time transformed into political friendships, the kinship ties of individuals created a tension with civic demands (Deneen, 2000; Herman, 1987; Konstan, 1997).

Aristotle's concept of civic friendship should thus be seen in this context, as an answer to the problem faced by the ancient city in which friendships of kin and guest- friendships endangered political stability within a particular political framework. Does this mean that the notion of civic friendship can no longer contribute to our understanding of how we relate in large culturally diverse communities? The modern state contains many millions of others who may not share a common view, or trust each other, certainly not necessarily have a shared history, and probably not harbour mutual affection for each other (features of personal friendship). How could they possibly know each other's character as friends would do? Is what we commonly call 'civic friendship' a form of friendship at all? It is unclear within The Ethics as to whether Aristotle, himself, is classifying civic friendship as a type of utility friendship or of virtue friendship. I think that this is critical and perhaps deliberate. In my concluding section, I shall elaborate why.
Section 6: Conclusion

In this chapter, I have considered whether the personal form of friendship can be extrapolated to the civic domain as a model for the bond needed for the socially cohesive society. My argument is that trying to identify which form of personal friendship civic friendship is best modelled on, may be to miss the point entirely. There are too many differences between the two to make the metaphor work effectively by carrying necessary attributes from one area of experience to a new one. By attempting to translate the features and structures from personal friendship into the public realm, we run into insurmountable problems.

Firstly, virtue friendship would be impossible with large numbers and inappropriate without a winnowing of the content of the virtues. These same virtues and dispositions of personal friendship may be present to a greater or lesser degree in 'civic friendship', but not uniquely so: they are also present in many other concepts, such as democracy, solidarity for example. What of utility friendship? If it is possible to expand the concept of 'utility' to cover those beyond the immediate beneficiaries, this concept may be useful. We are all of us 'attached' to someone who may be of no economic use to others or who may become of no economic use to others. It can make sense to include these people within a system of mutual aid and advantage because of others’ attachment to them and our inability to see into the future as to when, where or how we in turn may need support and help.

Nevertheless, one can have utility relationships without having friendship. It seems obvious that not all personal relationships are ones of friendship; why would we expect civic relationships to be a form of friendship? It is quite possible to behave in a 'friend-like' way to complete strangers and not be friends. I may
support the payment of child benefit to complete strangers through general taxation and not expect the recipients to come up and thank me. My motive is not that of liking the recipient, but a question of social justice: I can be 'friendly' towards my civic others without being their friend. Arguing over which Aristotelian form of friendship the civic relationship emanates from may not ultimately be helpful.

Secondly, personal friendship has both an affective as well as a behavioural aspect. One of the overriding features of personal friendship is that of an affective, emotional attachment to another person, as a form of love (Fortier, 1971; Thomas, 1987; Thomas, 1993). However, the civic relationship cannot contain the emotional attachments that are a defining feature of friendship on a large scale. We cannot care for everyone that we come across in the way we care for our special friends. At most, we can act in a way as if we care but care itself cannot be drummed up at will. We cannot come to care for our civic others as persons for we cannot get to know them as persons. No one’s life is long enough. Can we legitimately base questions of justice on personal feelings towards others?

Thirdly, the value of the concept of civic friendship may be in viewing it metaphorically. Somehow, when we consider our civic others, we should in some way, regard them as 'friends'. Metaphors abound in political philosophy and serve the purpose of enabling us to see the familiar in new ways, in explaining or clarifying, in providing insight to a problem. They give us a vocabulary to grasp complex unfamiliar domains. Take, for example, a model such as Benedict Anderson’s 'Imagined Communities', wherein he posits the idea of the nation as an 'imagined community':
...because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.  

(Anderson, 1991, p.6)

The argument is not whether metaphors are useful in understanding the world, but that we need to carefully consider which particular metaphors we choose and how we subsequently use them (Lunt, 2005). We need to bear in mind how the chosen metaphor functions in directing policy by subconsciously encapsulating our deepest commitments and values, as shall be expanded on in Chapter 6. In the case of civic friendship, to indicate a likeness, to comment on similar features, to indicate a 'family resemblance' is one thing; to suggest that it goes deeper than this and indicates a closer relationship, that the civic relationship is a type of friendship, is entirely another. Friendship depicts relationships to particular others, our 'imaginary community' is not of that category. With the change in usage of terminology and changes in the nature of society, 'civic friendship' as a metaphor no longer fulfils its original function.

Fourthly, the very concept 'civic friendship' seems to spiral downwards eventually into a partialism/impartialism argument. Friendship requires a form of partiality to a particular other that can be inappropriate in the civic arena; justice requires a form of impartiality. Schwarzenbach's argument for an impartial civic friendship based in part on individual rights and a re-emphasis on relationships between citizens (Schwarzenbach, 1996; Schwarzenbach, 2005) fails to acknowledge it would not qualify as a form of friendship. Once we introduce the vocabulary of rights, we start to leave the realm of friendship. We have to be partial to our friends, yet the civic relationship has to exclude this type of partiality.
Fifthly, any concept of political friendship today would have to acknowledge
the fact of pluralism in society; citizens cannot be expected to hold thick values in
common (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p114). This does not mean we hold no values in
common or have no regard for the character of our civic others. Schwarzenbach
concedes that even for Aristotle, civic friendship does not imply that all citizens of
a city know and personally like each other (Schwarzenbach, 1996), yet the city-
state cannot equate to largely urban modern liberal democracies that encompass
many millions of citizens with frequently competing visions of the good. The
cohesion that may have been experienced within the Greek city-state may not
translate into current political realities.

Finally, Hansot directs us to consider that for Aristotle, civic friendship is
grounded:

...in part, in friendships between persons developed in the civic arenas.
And of course the reverse is true: civic friendship in turn grounds the
cognate practice of friendship between persons. Common to both is the
notion of a settled disposition, the result of education reinforced by
habituation in the individual and by custom in the polity.

(Hansot, 2000, p178)

Friendship is thus seen as not just practice, but also disposition. Practice and
disposition can become customary behaviour and then develop as part of the
background environment within which other practices can develop and flourish
(Hansot, 2000, p180). These are among the predispositions that form the
essential environmental ethos within which civic life should take place. We are
back in the realm of civic virtue ... minus the friendship. Any attempt to situate the
civic bond within the prevailing conceptualisation of civic friendship is doomed to
failure.

The journey, however, is not without value. Whilst Vernon indicates an
impoverishment of popular discourse which has virtually privatised the concept of
friendship in modern life (Vernon, 2005), we cannot ignore the complex interplay between past and present conceptions in this area. Aristotle’s expansion of friendship into the civic arena in The Ethics directs us to consider the importance or otherwise of 'the shared life' in enabling public discourse in the civic space, and a concern for the wellbeing of each other and shared desire for the good life. Part of the appeal of civic friendship lies in an attempt to expand an understanding of the 'binding togetherness' of friendship into civic life. However, the concept of 'civic friendship' promises more than it can deliver. Friendliness is not the same thing as friendship. We are left finally facing the crucial question: it may be civic... but is it friendship?

In the next chapter, I turn to the metaphor of market in which I will consider different strains of loyalty, and question how conceptions of civic relationships are formed.
Chapter 4

Loyalty

Introduction

A Church school was approaching an Ofsted inspection. A new head teacher had been appointed the year before under unusual circumstances (the only person interviewed, close friend of some of the governors, etc.). The new head came with a reputation of poor management style from her previous school, and soon the new school staff discovered why. In short, she was a bully. She not only bullied the staff, but also the pupils. It was common place for her to shout at staff and undermine their authority in front of each other and in front of the children and to humiliate the children as well. Staff meetings were dreaded as each member of staff was targeted in turn for ridicule until eventually they either left for other jobs, or went on extended sick leave. Within a year, half the staff had left and been replaced. New arrivals soon started looking for a way out.

The staff were caught. Should they stay and try to protect the children from the worst of the bullying, or should they think first and foremost of themselves and their careers and get out? Finally, remaining staff decided that they had to let the inspection team know what was really happening in the school and five of them told the Ofsted inspectors the truth. The inspectors were horrified at the reports ... and accused said staff members of being disloyal.

24 Ofsted (The Office for Standards in Education) is the body responsible for inspection of schools in England.
The seeming view of the inspectors was that the teachers owed a duty of loyalty to the school and to the head that should have prevented them from any action that put either in a bad light. They assumed that the overriding loyalty should be to protect the school’s reputation, and the head teacher in her role as head teacher. The staff, whilst acknowledging their emotional ties and loyalties in this direction, felt competing claims for their loyalty from their resolve as professionals to protect the children. To be loyal to one area entailed a necessary disloyalty in another area.

Loyalty is a confusing area of study. We take for granted that it is praiseworthy to be a loyal person. Indeed, Royce refers to loyalty as: “the heart of all virtues, the central duty amongst all duties” (Royce, 1908, p xxiv). Yet dig a little deeper and a myriad of problems emerge. Whilst loyalty is a devotion of a person to a cause (Royce, 1908), there is no guarantee it will be a good cause: it is quite possible to be loyal to a bad cause - history has shown us many examples of this. If this is the case, how can loyalty be a civic virtue?

Recently, philosophers have attempted to create an alternative picture of how this might be envisioned as a model for civic behaviour. Oldenquist, for example, situates loyalty squarely in the domain of the normative:

...in terms of the logic of the reasons they provide, loyalties are a third category of the normative, distinct from both self-interest and impersonal morality.

(Oldenquist, 1982, p176)

Can loyalty, as a study of the moral relationships between people, offer a model for the normative relationship between citizens allowing us to sidestep the cul-de-sac of friendship and its partner civic friendship? Can it enlighten us as to how
citizens should relate to each other and how these attitudes could then be taught to future citizens within a cohesive society?

The UK, in common with many other countries, has gradually been importing the language and practices of the market place into educational language and practice. The privatisation of education as yet another commodity and/or parental choice has been written about many times (Boyd, 1987; Brighouse, 2000; Edwards and Whitty, 1997; Fitz, Halpin and Power, 1997; Halpin, Power and Fitz, 1991; Tooley, 1995; Tooley, 1996). Furthermore, the social process that I am looking at within this chapter has been considered recently from the point of view of parents and their responses to the increasing effects of marketisation of education systems, to gain advantages and maximise chances through intensified positional competition (Ball, 2003). That there are elements of education and school structures that can be susceptible to real markets and can be bought or sold is outside the parameters of this thesis. I do not propose to cover this ground but accept that this description of the invasion of both genuine markets and market values, with the resulting effects of parental choice and specialisation of schools in education is accurate. Where I depart from commentaries and empirical research on this, is to apply a philosophical perspective by examining it through the lens of different strains of loyalty: that the commodification of education leads to undermining and might, under certain conditions, erase the very structures of loyalty and ties between people that are not only essential for the civic arena, but also necessary for schools to function in their civic task of educating the future citizenry.

This chapter seeks to explore the possibility of loyalty as a model for civic connectedness and to lay out the implications such a model would have in the
realm of education. The task of discerning how the bond of loyalty ties in with issues of the market metaphor is both complex and intricate. The market metaphor relies on the cross-over of theories, language and values prevalent in the field of economics and business studies. Hence to examine this metaphor requires untangling these elements in their original fields. As a result of this, I use both theories of brand loyalty and Hirschman's distinction between Exit and Voice, to examine how human loyalties may be formed in general and then I apply these insights within the field of education. I indicate the implications this has for how these attitudes can then be taught to and developed between future citizens. I argue that the use of an inappropriate model of loyalty is forming our discourse in the world of education, and that this has serious repercussions for developing civic loyalty: that the form of loyalty encouraged and fostered within school systems and organisations is more akin to the vertical loyalty of the ruler and ruled (brand loyalty) than the horizontal loyalty needed of the equal citizens in a democratic society.

In this chapter, I initially look at personal loyalty as a personal and civic virtue before considering the loyalty of the marketplace. In section 1, I look at loyalty as a relationship to particular others. Then in section 2, I consider the role that loyalties have in creating our identities. After that, in section 3, I consider what makes us loyal and turn to empirical work on loyalty within the marketplace, laying out briefly two types of brand loyalty to be used later in my argument, inertial brand loyalty and cost brand loyalty, reinforcing this with Hirschman's contribution in this area on Exit and Voice. In Section 4, I consider how schools and educational systems help create identity-loyalties. Following from this, in Section 5, I apply the metaphor of the market place loyalties within the
educational domain. In section 6, I contrast personal loyalty with civic loyalty, including patriotism, and argue that civic loyalty needs to go beyond this. In section 7, the conclusion, I argue that the use of marketplace language and suppositions that schooling systems can be equated with business practices are based on the misuse of a metaphor, which has the capacity to undermine civic cohesion.

Section 1: What is Loyalty?

A striking feature of this initial debate is that loyalty is now seen as more of a matter of personal choice against the historical reality of being imposed upon people by virtue of who they were and where they lived (Franck, 1999, p62). But what is loyalty itself and what is it to be loyal? Loyalty does not arise in the abstract: it arises as a result of a relationship to a particular other. Crucially, loyalty has to have some object. One has to be loyal to something or someone. Hence, to be loyal is more than merely having an attachment to something or someone: it requires a particular attitude. It is no wonder, perhaps, that it is difficult to find a person with no loyalties at all. Sometimes, as in the example at the start of this essay, there are competing loyalties. Loyalty requires an attitude of affection enabling one to put the needs or wants of another above one’s own. Loyalty requires that, when the chips are down, we choose to help and support our friend, relative or colleague over a stranger. The key point to note here is that it grounds our behaviour and gives us motives for action.

We do not just adopt projects, causes and persons to be loyal to at random; we are loyal for reasons. Critically, we are usually loyal when by doing so we in some way benefit or we deem the cause to be valuable. For this reason,
loyalty denotes how we stand to one another within an intricate web of relationships. Historically, our loyalty to tribe and clan members has been based on some expectation of a mutual benefit: the expectation of them being loyal to us, an expectation of food, shelter, and comfort: all the things necessary for survival. Our loyalty was the price we paid.

One obvious way in which this can have a bearing on wider, civic connections is that loyalty can interfere with our deepest convictions in deciding on and judging moral behaviour; it can cloud our ability to be impartial where questions of our ties to others come into play. When we love someone, when we have an attachment that demands particular forms of loyalty, impartial moral judgement is on occasion blurred and sometimes inappropriate. Choosing to rescue our partners, our children, or our closest friends from drowning before unknown strangers are actions demanded by those ties, frequently without questioning the moral justification. We just do it. Indeed, the very act of questioning really would be 'one thought too many'. All too often there is unease that those who have to hesitate and weigh up what they should do before acting at all in such circumstances are somehow reproachable and are, themselves, failing to fully understand what is demanded by those ties. Underlying this is the assumption that ties by their very nature, demand actions, actions of particular kinds.

On the surface, it seems obvious that loyalty crosses from the personal to the civic arena. Nevertheless, one does not suddenly choose to be loyal and then become loyal any more than one wakes up one morning and decides to be someone’s friend (as indicated in a previous chapter). Suffice it to say, loyalty takes time to develop and also requires some form of shared history: I cannot
suddenly decide to be loyal to Canada and all its values, ways of life for example. I can, however, change my allegiance to that of Canada by finding out about the values, ways of life and, finding them to my liking, decide to adopt them after a time. Here, the time element is crucial: the emotional ties or attitudes take time to form and bind one properly from one set of values to another. Indeed, a comparison can be drawn with the development of a shared history within the concept of friendship as denoted in the previous chapters. As the new ones form, the old wither away, and exit from the previous attachments becomes possible.

Connected with this is that when I have a loyalty towards something or someone, I regard it as in some way being 'mine'. Its value to me is derived from that emotional attachment: my friend, my family, my school. It is undoubtedly true that when that which belongs to me prospers, then I feel pride; when it is hurt or suffers, I suffer or feel the pain as well. In other words, we care about the objects of our loyalties and this can move us to action.

If loyalty requires a propensity to put the needs of another first, sometimes even at the expense of one's own well-being, surely it can lead to some anomalies? By the same token, whilst we expect a parent to be willing to sacrifice for their own child, because they are their children, we do not expect them to be willing to sacrifice for someone else's child under normal circumstances. But how much do we expect them to sacrifice? Can their loyalty to their particular child warrant them over-riding the well-being of others?

A true story. A girl wanted to be a cheerleader in the USA. Her mother, in order to bring about the dream of her daughter, murdered the nearest rival to the position, in order to improve her daughter's chances (the case of Wanda Holloway in Texas, USA, 1991). Can the parent's attachment to their particular child warrant
such things? There is a distinct difference between self-sacrifice (parents frequently go without things to ensure their children are provided for) and sacrifice of others. We would typically accept that such loyalty ties are limited in what they can justify.

It is perhaps to be expected that who we are as people is affected by the values and attachments we form and the beliefs, attitudes and actions surrounding us. Our commitment to uphold these values and attachments reinforces those attachments within a moral community. Lu argues that a commitment to these values requires a commitment to their public display and expression and a commitment to seeing those loyalties prosper: “Public loyalty is an important consequence of moral maturity in the life of a shared moral community” (Lu, 2005, p224). But to see it as a circular pattern is to abandon our responsibility for those loyalties and our capacity to reflect critically as to their worth.

In summary, being loyal, having ties and commitments, is fundamental to what it is to be human. Who we are and how we view ourselves impinges on our relationships to others. Loyalty requires an attitude of a particular kind; it denotes a particular tie or bond; the bond requires particular actions to reinforce the bond. It helps us separate those we need to be partial to from those deserving of impartiality (Oldenquist, 1982). But the act of loyalty cannot be a substitute for moral discernment. Loyalty is our attachment to the cause after deeming it worthwhile. The problem is in discerning what is worth our loyalty, and how much. To explore this further requires that we explore the connection between loyalty and self-identity.
Section 2: Loyalty and Identity

As the preceding discussion has suggested, when we speak of our personal identity, we usually mean those attributes that make us unique as individuals and different from others (Olson, 1965). Fletcher, for example, refers to this as the 'historical self': our history and our personal biographies make up who we are (Fletcher, 1993, p16). It seems evident that we do not choose to be born into a particular culture, neither do we choose our initial mother-tongue, childhood religious or political ideals. These commitments are made on our behalf by others - parents, family or leaders.

For instance, it is to be expected that a child brought up in a closed community such as the Amish, will eventually choose to stay Amish. It should be noted that the Amish claim to operate a 90% retention rate (Walker, 2002). They have been brought up to believe certain beliefs about how they should live their lives, which will affect how they live their lives. Central to this is that their earlier experiences will have formed their inclination to make that choice.

People identify with each other on the grounds of similarities: indeed, aspects of our self-identity are tied up with this. To take just one example, Anderson's idea of the 'imagined community' points to a certain psychological component of nationhood, that we need a group identity, a community we think of as 'us' (Anderson, 1991) and that as such, nationhood is intimately connected to our sense of who we are. It would be possible for someone to identify with different groupings for different purposes, for example groupings of teachers, ethnic origins, philosophers, vegetarians, stamp collectors, religious affiliations. Some groupings may clash in their aims and objectives; others sit side by side. In
the civic arena, it springs from the need to identify those who are to be governed together, and those outside the scope of such governance (Gilbert, 1998, p26).

Whilst our personal identities are linked in with our group memberships and loyalties, there is also, as Glover points out, an identity that we create for ourselves branching out from these 'givens' that gives a sense of authority over our own lives (Glover, 1999). This self-creation is a long process. Glover likens it to a narrative:

The story we tell ourselves, partly by what we do and partly by how we edit the account of our past, is central to our sense of our own identity.

(Glover, 1999, p145)

Our lives are bound up with those of other people, who in turn play a role in our stories. This makes them important to us, drawing heavily on shared stories, a shared frame of reference to these events, a common history in which our lives can flourish. In addition to this, our group identities frame what we value and how much. To have a coherent identity consequently leads us to behave in certain ways to protect that identity: we are loyal to the sources that give meaning to that identity.

Section 3: What makes us Loyal?

Turning back momentarily to a previous claim: we can be loyal to differing things, many at the same time, for example to professional associations, to family units, to sports teams. The loyalty is strongest when it is to particular others: this particular football team, this particular family, this particular group of workers. Loyalty has benefits to others as well as to ourselves: it keeps us bound to like-minded others when there are alternative choices.
As a way into this discussion, I need to introduce two further ideas using theories and empirical evidence prevalent in the study of economics to look at the psychology behind loyalty: brand loyalty (to discuss what keeps us loyal) and Hirschman’s concepts of Exit and Voice (Hirschman, 1970).

**Brand Loyalty**

The majority of empirical studies of what it is to be loyal centre on the usefulness of loyalty in economic terms studying how firms can, through advertising and their public ‘face’, reinforce ‘brand loyalty’. Whilst this theory of brand loyalty comes from marketing and economic theories, it can be a helpful lens to examine how human loyalties can be formed and from there, applied in the field of education.

Within the parameters of this discourse, a customer is defined as brand loyal: “if his purchasing pattern depends positively on the last brand purchased” (Wernerfelt, 1991, p231). Brand loyalty, as Wernerfelt points out, is a fundamental concept in strategic marketing (Wernerfelt, 1991). Consumer behaviour theory is thus greatly concerned with loyalty as an attribute, and the sources and mechanisms through which it is created.

Wernerfelt identifies two types of brand loyalty. The first *(inertial brand loyalty)* is characterised by a lack of awareness of the virtues or values of alternative brands: people are loyal out of habit: the consumer who stays with the local electricity board/gas company and never seeks to compare prices or to switch companies to get the 'best deal'; the voter who always votes for the same party because that’s what they have always done; the parent who sends their
child to the local school because it is their local school (or the one they themselves went to) without any thought or investigation of alternatives.

In contrast, the second (cost-based loyalty) is characterised by consideration of the costs of switching. The consumer arms themselves with the information, comparing prices for instance, but chooses not to switch for now. Maybe there are costs to switching or inconvenience or the last brand had some advantage: the voter who reads all the manifestos and votes according to the policies that they most agree with/benefits them; the parent who collects all the available information about all alternatives, reads Ofsted reports, visits and then makes their 'informed' choice but is open to revision should circumstances change.

The concept of brand loyalty is important in marketing because of its role in ensuring customers return again and again to the same item. Central to this is the claim that brand loyalty is a means by which companies may prevent consumers looking elsewhere. Specifically, it can ensure higher equilibrium prices as loyal consumers are less likely to look for alternatives. As a result of this, companies breaking into existing markets are forced to try to find ways to shift existing loyalties by working out the switching costs to loyal consumers of other companies or to build up loyalties in those not currently engaged in the market, perhaps by lower prices to new customers, special offers.

Significantly, brand loyalties tend to be negative by nature. People are loyal, not for value of the item in question (there is not an attitude of affection consistent with the map of loyalty drawn up previously); they see things as 'mine... for now'. All that being said, it must be admitted that occasionally companies will try to create a horizontal relationship between consumers, making
them identify with the company products through their ownership: this grouping says something about the type of person they are or wish to be seen as (clubs for purchasers of a particular brand of car perhaps). In so far as these customers are identifying each other as members of a group, there is a feeling of affection as fellow members of the group, but there is no willingness to sacrifice one's own well-being for the others or mutuality of sacrifice normally associated with the virtue of loyalty. It is too small a part of their identity. 

Brand loyalty tends to be created by a variety of measures: easily identifiable logos or mottos, clear public marketing to identifiable audiences, 'free' marketing via corporate sponsorships, company identities (which can include uniforms, company design in and of premises) etc. My contention is that brand loyalty is essentially a form of vertical loyalty: it exists between the supplier and the consumer. Hence if the consumer is not satisfied, they can exit and seek another supplier.

Exit and Voice

A major contribution to this argument, by Hirschman, distinguishes between exit (leaving) and voice (staying and fighting) as further development of the cost-based loyalty game. When members or customers become dissatisfied, the choices of action are exit (reaction in which customers leave for another product) or voice (in which customers choose to stay and provoke change by directly influencing the organisation) (Fletcher, 1993). Exit, and prevention of exit, has a major role to play in marketing strategies. Returning to a previous point, companies want to prevent exit from their particular brand: they want to keep people loyal to their brand. Yet in contrast to this, conventional free market theory
decrees that exit is to be encouraged in that it creates competition, drives down prices and benefits the consumer (Fletcher, 1993, p3). One solution to avoiding this flight, is that companies need to give consumers reasons to stay, hence the development of loyalty schemes. One argument in defence of this (Baron and Lock, 1995) concerns a chain of supermarkets in Missouri, US and describes how in-store marketing environments can have an impact on brand loyalty, price sensitivity and introduction of new brands, with information gleaned from scanner data (Baron and Lock, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1991).

Voice, on the other hand, can range from making a complaint, attending stockholder meetings, negotiating, banding together with others etc. Arguably, many companies have had to change policies because of voice, for example Nestlé and the baby milk scandal of the 1970s, Barclays Bank in South Africa amongst others. However, voice demands a greater commitment than exit. One example is that given by Fletcher quoting the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late eighties:

> Within a few months of the Berlin Wall’s crumbling in November 1989, a million East Germans, 6 per cent of the population, left for the West. Not only was the federal Republic’s “product” similar in history and language to life in the East, but the costs of exit were minimal. Only loyalty to the socialist way of life could have saved the German Democratic republic as a separate state, and it was clear from the outset that economic welfare was more important than the state’s preservation. (Fletcher, 1993, p5)

Interestingly, the cost of exit is a major factor in determining voice or exit, with neither being the exclusive response to any one problem (Labaree, 2000).

Hirschman points out that exit is particularly suited to the economic sector. It is impersonal, neat, (one exits or one doesn’t), indirect and confrontation is avoided (Hirschman, 1970). Voice, on the other hand, is personal. One has to articulate one’s criticisms whether by grumbles or protest. Hirschmann describes
it as “political action par excellence” (Hirschman, 1970, p16). Exit is easier than voice: the latter requires spending time, effort, energy to persuade others to change or adapt their point of view. So far we have explored these factors from the position of economic theory, yet they have become increasingly powerful elements in the organisation of social life, hence in the next section, I turn to the field of education.

Section 4: Loyalty in Education

In recent years, numerous articles in the press reported how a previous UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, wished to import practices of independent and public schools into the state school sector. Interestingly, the very practices referred to were all concerned with the production of loyalty: school houses, earning points or credits, having and wearing school uniforms, internal competition between pupils and groups of pupils, competitive sports. These elements are all part of the loyalty-forming process; they enable schools to form a brand and corporate identity based on that brand.

Schools are inevitably in the loyalty business. Our schools create bonds of identity-loyalty between pupils and also within their schools. At the same time, they aim at both horizontal loyalty (between each pupil as a member of the school) and vertical loyalty (from each pupil to the school). The sheer fact of referring to a class as Year 2 gives them a grouping to identify with, to belong to. By wearing a school uniform, they are encouraged to look the same in some respect and to be able to identify themselves as being alike in some way, and others who wear a different uniform as different. Coupled with this, most schools these days have mottos expressing some shared ideal, again, another identity-
forming device. This, then, is found on items used to identify members as part of a group (school uniforms, bags, scarves). Although there may be much to be said in favour of such practices in creating a 'community', the subconscious externalities of all this function to declare to others: this is who we are. We belong; those that are different do not belong to us.

Many schools not only try to create a school identity and loyalties, but also identities and loyalties at the micro level. It is common practice amongst many primary schools to have 'table points' awarded for good behaviour and subtracted for poor. By giving the points to those seated at the same table, each pupil is then responsible for the behaviour of the next. When one succeeds, they all succeed: there is 'something in it for them'. All this leads to the children seeing themselves as part of a team: the formation of an 'us'.

There is a downside to this: those who are not in the group are then rejected. Loyalty identifies those that belong together: and equally identifies those who are rejected as being 'other', serving to exclude as well as include. Those who for one reason or another cannot keep the school or group identity are singled out and made to feel different. School uniforms, however basic, cost money; not everyone can afford the right colours, shop providers for example. The more schools actively encourage children to come to school in the correct uniform, the more they make those who cannot do so, feel different and 'outsiders'. Ultimately, an overemphasis on such things can lead to low-level bullying or rejection by peers.

There are times when education is involved in attempts to exclude personal loyalties in order to create joint 'civic loyalties'. The recent 'hijab' ruling in France, as explored in the previous chapter, banning the wearing of ostentatious
religious symbols, is at one level concerned with creating the conditions in
schools for an equal citizenry outside of personal or religious commitments, and
the complete separation of church and state, but at another level is concerned
with identity-loyalty symbols. Who we identify with is as important as how our
identities are formed. An alternative interpretation of the ruling in France can be
taken as an attempt to ensure that pupils think of themselves as French citizens
first and foremost. It serves to introduce a new element into the argument: who
we want to be (personal autonomy in choice over our future ends) over who we
are (the sum of our allegiances, traditions and loyalties). Whilst schools can
provide a place to expose children to various ways of life and commitments, trying
to prevent children from public displays of religious allegiance may end up making
such displays more attractive by virtue of being forbidden!

Most schools in the UK have got around such problems with identity-
forming symbols by allowing religious dress, as long as it is in school colours. This
allows for the principle sought of being the same (a group loyalty) and providing a
common symbol (as in the same colours) yet allowing for other identity forming
symbols (those of religious commitment). When the way we dress becomes an
indicator of who we are and who we identify with, and thus indicates our deepest
loyalties, it can and will continue to make others feel uncomfortable and excluded.
School identity does not need to depend on all pupils looking the same to create
bonds of loyalty. This raises, however, several troubling issues: which strands of
identity-forming loyalties should schools have control over? And how much control
is reasonable?
Section 5: Brand Loyalty in Education.

So far we have explored the nature of loyalty and how schools can be closely involved with loyalty development. I now turn, in this section, to a parallel argument, applying the lens of brand loyalty within the education system itself. State schools have, since the 1980s, set up in direct and open competition with each other to attract pupils. Indisputably, the devolution of budgets to single school level have made schools function on one hand as quasi-businesses whilst on the other hand continue to function as a service to society at large. For schools to be able to plan financially, they need to know how much money is coming in, which in turn, depends on the number of pupils. As pupil funding now follows the pupil to any new school, there is the financial incentive for schools to encourage exit from other schools. So pervasive has this become, that schools with falling numbers and/or questions about their financial viability frequently find a small, but increasingly difficult, mobile pupil populace. As schools view themselves, even subconsciously, as businesses, so they adopt particular business practices.

Where schools once worked together within particular clusters, the concept of competition now makes cooperation unlikely or difficult to achieve. Schools are unlikely to share ideas or work on shared projects if it could have an effect on their 'brand position' in the local market. Each school looks for something unique as a selling point to parents. In the UK, for example, secondary schools have long been encouraged to identify a specialism: sports academies, ICT academies, schools of the performing arts etc. This impetus is now being devolved downward to primary schools (brain-gym schools, brain-centred learning schools, Philosophy for Children schools etc.). However, the loyalty required towards one’s particular 'brand' or school that requires teachers to put their own school first above other
schools can have the unwanted side effect of discouraging the cooperative behaviour and the sharing of 'good practice' equally desired by other government policies.

To take just one example. The government policy in the UK in the 1980-90s encouraged schools to opt-out of local education control by offering such schools the promise of greater financial resources. Schools were encouraged to leave cooperative ways of mutual support and financial interdependence for greater individual independence. Such schools that chose to leave LEA control received additional financial resources to those remaining within the Local Authority influence, thus setting them up as a more 'attractive' option for parents who saw them as better resourced and in some way 'exclusive'. Indeed, in some cases schools received as much as £300,000 more than if they had stayed with the LEA counterparts (Fitz, Halpin and Power, 1997, p. 20)

Much of economic theory, as previously pointed out, is concerned with choice (Akerlof, 1983). By developing a range of different types of schooling systems/organisations, each offering a particular 'brand', it appears a choice is being created. A huge volume of research appears to indicate such choice is superficial at best and that schools' ability to themselves 'choose' their pupils is becoming apparent (Edwards and Whitty, 1997; Fitz, Halpin and Power, 1997). Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, parents eager to maximise their child’s economic welfare would thus be inclined to value choice between types of schools where it can be shown that one type would prove more advantageous for their child. Choice can reduce loyalty.

Many school choice activists have noted that parents have been exercising this 'exit' indirectly for many years. Parents who are financially able to do so, exit
their children from state schools that do not meet their standards (whether educational or social) by moving house into the catchment area of a school that does (Anton, 2000; Cuban and Shipps, 2000; Swift, 2003). Some have been known to buy second homes in such areas, others stay in their homes and buy a different school system (private education), discover religious commitments where faith schools have a 'better reputation/standards', and others, still, choose to home-school (less so in this country than in the USA, but growing numbers are opting out altogether).

Exit is possible, but expensive. Those who move to a more affluent area or pay thousands of pounds every year in private school fees are a minority. However, with funding following the pupil as they transfer between state schools, the cost of exit is then born by the school as they lose and gain pupils. Parents that choose one of these routes are “treating education as a private good” (Labaree, 2000, p115); they are treating education as another consumer good by exiting one system for another. The aim is not to improve the system or school left behind, but to attain the best goods for themselves. Applying the insights of the market, this vertical loyalty between consumer and supplier snaps as the consumer seeks another, ‘better’ product. Exit over voice.

Labaree claims it is to be expected that state education should be experiencing the exit option as the preferred solution to educational problems.

Reform initiatives for choice, charters, and vouchers offer educational consumers a variety of ways to leave schools they do not like and move to schools they do like. All of these reforms work by removing governmental barriers to the exercise of the exit option and increasing the responsiveness of schools to their exiting customers. The result, we are told, will be an increase in the quality of education.

(Labaree, 2000, p115)
Yet 'Voice' is something schools are particularly open to: parent-teacher organisations, complaining directly to the teacher and head teacher, using professional and other organisations, appealing to the governors or LEA, becoming parent-governors for example. A television programme on school choice issues in the UK reported on a middle-class group of parents who consciously made the decision not to send their children to private schools, but to support their local state school. They each believed that state education would only improve if parents such as themselves (articulate, committed etc) would support their local school. Whilst each was reluctant to do it alone, they argued that collectively they could achieve an effectiveness that could not be achieved separately (See Reay et al, 2007). Voice over exit.

Within this argument, there are three distinct parties, each with their own reasons for loyalty: parents, children and schools. Schools, as I have previously stated are concerned to develop both vertical and horizontal loyalties. Pupils, similarly, are required to develop and exercise both forms also. Parents, on the other hand, work with a sense of vertical loyalties prevalent in the economic model; their loyalty is to their particular child. Whilst they may have concern that the school in general prospers, the motivation is the sake of their child. Few schools embed a sense of horizontal loyalties with their parents to keep them loyal, to give them a sense of ownership, of belonging to that community, and where they do, the loyalties may be to that limited grouping and not capable of expanding to a wider community of people dissimilar to themselves.

25 Channel 4 “The Best For My Child” by Fiona Millar broadcast 5th March, 2004
26 This phenomenon was the subject of a study by ESRC, as reported on by Reay et al: see web link for details: http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2005/mar/15/schools.uk [last accessed 19.11.2009]
I contend that the use of a metaphor from one field to another can lead to serious problems. The application of the metaphor of market surreptitiously imports the values associated with the metaphor, and as a result of this, can lead to the slow erasure of the horizontal loyalty demanded by a commitment to the civic sphere. For example, in one town in the shire counties in the 1990s, Roman Catholic parents were torn between their competing loyalties when the local Catholic secondary schools all became Grant Maintained and thus exited LEA control. For some parents, the decision to keep their children within the religious sector meant they had to choose that identity over their civic identity. Whilst the individual schools benefited by large amounts of money by going Grant-Maintained, doing so frayed their relationships to other state schools.

By overstressing the breaking of the ties that unite us and bind us together, and focussing on the self-centred individual parts of the whole, we lose sight of what loyalty provides in the civic sphere: competition does not necessarily lead to cooperative learning or living. Instead of schools constantly playing a version of 'Robbing the beanbag', more might be achieved by reintroducing notions of collegiality and working together. In the next section I briefly consider the specific virtue of civic loyalty.

Section 6: Loyalty in the Civic Sphere

Loyalty, as a virtue, forms a crucial plank in our civic obligations to others in the liberal state in its horizontal form by enabling us to identify with certain groupings: to see ourselves as being of the same sort and thus have reasons to

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27 A common game for four children in primary schools. Four hoops are set out at right-angles with a few metres space in between. Each hoop starts with the same number of beanbags. The aim is for the winner to end up with the most beanbags by 'robbing' the other hoops. However, as each person is equally robbing each others hoops, the overall number of beanbags in any one hoop stays more or less the same. A lot of energy and time is expended for very little progress.
consider their well-being. In addition to this claim, it is frequently the 'glue' that binds us together, to see ourselves as 'belonging' and to allow us to see the relationship as a joint venture. Civic loyalty demands that in some way, within the sphere of civic engagements, all actors are somehow equal and interdependent. At this point, it is appropriate to step back a little and consider further the difference between the vertical and horizontal forms of loyalty within the civic sphere.

Historically, humans have defined themselves in terms of loyalty to a person (whether to emperors, princes or popes) or to an institution (empire, state, nation church etc) (Franck, 1999). As late as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the individual's loyalty to the sovereign was personal and real, but with little sense of community between ruler and ruled. The loyalty was:

...law-based and religiously enforced, a duty, not a blossoming of common culture or affinity. (Franck, 1999, p53)

The loyalty was demanded as birthright from those ruled to their social superiors (a vertical loyalty).

The move from subject to that of citizen, following the revolutions of the late eighteenth century in America and France in the West, substituted a theory of horizontal loyalty (between citizens) for the previous vertical one (from ruled to ruler). Loyalty thus became understood as owed by the people to each other. This form of loyalty grounds understandings of nationhood, of a people joined together, as claimed by Franck, based on shared ideals, not on the grounds of race, shared history and culture. The "common bond of mutual loyalty" (Franck, 1999, p54) was expressed in the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. It is little wonder, perhaps, that envisionings of loyalty have become one of the invisible ties that bind us together.
One argument within this domain contends that social life itself depends on the development of group loyalties, where an object of loyalty can be shared with others. This move, Oldenquist refers to as the move from egoism (mine) to group egoism or social values (ours) (Oldenquist, 1982). A loyalty, as Oldenquist states:

..defines a moral community in terms of a conception of a common good and a special commitment to the members of the group who share this good... Those who share this common good comprise my tribe; the common good is its flourishing. (Oldenquist, 1982, p177)

Thus understood, a loyalty goes beyond an individual to collective others.

The argument so far suggests civic loyalty can reasonably be explored at the macro level. Within this domain, considerations of a loyalty or partiality of special concern to particular people, traditions or groupings can usually be found. Frequently referred to as 'patriotism', it is usually thought of as a special kind of loyalty and devotion to a cause, usually a country. This loyalty is founded upon a particular relationship between the subject and the object of the patriotism. In the light of this, various definitions are offered in the copious literature on the subject. For example, Archard refers to it as:

...love of one’s country or nation, and this love is, in terms of the ideal, prescribed as a virtuous disposition to act in certain, often self-denying and self-sacrificial, ways on behalf of one’s country. (Archard, 1999, p159)

Amongst the key facets of the concept, as identified by MacIntyre, are that it is not merely an attitude or emotional disposition, but an “action-generated regard” (MacIntyre, 2003, p287).

I do not pretend to offer a full exploration of the concept of patriotism; such would be impossible within the confines of this thesis. It is important to acknowledge the existence of this as one possible form of civic loyalty. Yet there are weaknesses and difficulties within this move. MacIntyre, for example, wishes to use patriotism exclusively for those instances of loyalty to one’s own nation that
are based on the characteristics, merits and achievements of that nation. Nations, he continues are not interchangeable. One wouldn't switch allegiance for another nation exhibiting the same characteristics: "the particularity of the relationship is essential and ineliminable" (MacIntyre, 2003, p288).

Patriotism would appear to require me to be devoted in a particular manner to my country as it does Joe Bloggs to be devoted to his. Yet in spite of this requirement, it is no easy matter to define oneself in terms of one's group loyalty. Mass migration and globalisation frequently create ties outside of the 'my-ness' of our own original grouping. Globalisation of trade has created new ties: a recent article in the Guardian argued that no two nations that had McDonalds had ever gone to war. Under the joke rhetoric was the point that trade agreements meant that nations were now bound together in a mesh of intertwined financial dependencies which, by their very nature, now meant that they had more to lose in combat.

Civic loyalties may be ties that bind us together, either as individuals or as societies, but that does not necessitate that the actions leading from the tie will be good or virtuous. Needless to say, the challenge for the modern liberal state goes over and beyond the shifting loyalties of vertical bonding. It needs to encourage the loyalties necessary for civic life to exist without abandoning the individualist principles of personal choice and to develop the horizontal forms of loyalty necessary for citizens to be able to identify with each other and thus be willing to sacrifice some of their well-being for the sake of others – whether through being willing to pay taxes to benefit others, to the ultimate sacrifice demanded in warfare. This requires treading a fine line between the selfish individualism of too little loyalty and the horrifying spectre of too much. The history of the twentieth
century is one case history after another of how tribal loyalties have broken down respect for people of other tribes leading to a denial of their humanity, for example Nazi Germany, Rwanda, Bosnia.

Section 7: Conclusion: Which type of Loyalty should Schools aim at?

So far, I have tried to distinguish between loyalty as a personal value between individuals (horizontal) and loyalty within the economic arena (vertical). I have indicated that personal loyalty is always towards something or someone, the 'my-ness' effect, and that within the business/market world loyalty has a different meaning, usage and purpose. Now I wish to take the argument a step further and suggest that the understanding of loyalty from the latter world is now influencing the development of loyalty in the education world to the erosion of an understanding of civic loyalty, that some solutions sought and implemented may even be making matters worse: they may be aiming at the wrong type of loyalty.

Firstly, as we saw at the start of this chapter, loyalty has an affective dimension: we care about our attachments and derive satisfaction from their flourishing. It is not enough to identify with those attachments: we have to care about them too. However, if we mistakenly confine 'identifying with' to those who are the same, those we are closest to or to those we care about, we run the risk that our loyalties will not extend to those outside our affections to the wider community and to those who are not like us. This then has implications for the model of cohesion being used and illustrates the difficulty of presuming community or local instances of cohesion will extend outwards to societal levels, as shall be further explored Chapter 5.
Secondly, we need to consider the function of loyalty: that it is useful for what it achieves or aims at; it aims at allegiances. Our loyalties hold our allegiances; it states those we are bound to, whom we can count on and who can in turn count on our help. Just as loyalty can draw us to those who are most like us, it also identifies those who fall outside of this remit, and makes them ‘other’. But are those we are closest to, the only ones who should come within our sphere of moral concern? If we only identify and bond with those most like us based on one element of our identity, how would we relate across differing bondings into the civic arena? We do not live (and arguably probably never have lived) in homogenous groupings: real life is far messier and mixed up than that. An argument could be made that we need a variety of loyalties and it is only by encouraging such that we can create a civic sphere to begin with. If so, perhaps school systems should be formed to create and disperse our allegiances and loyalties as widely as possible.

Thirdly, there is a marked difference between identifying with and being identical to. That we may share some values or practices with others does not itself make us identical to them. Not all middle-class parents are going to share all their values/histories etc (that would make them identical); there will be just as much that divides them as unites them. Identities exclude as well as include; they show ‘who are the same as us’ and ‘who counts as among us’: equally they point out those who differ. But to pick on one aspect of our identities and create school systems around it can be to ignore all other aspects, and the ties and obligations thereof.

Parents who seek a particular type of school are, in effect, seeking a school that can reinforce and nurture the same self identity-reinforcing loyalties
that they have or aspire to have. The horizontal loyalties, attitudes and dispositions that may be found within groups are not necessarily the same as the horizontal loyalties, attitudes and dispositions demanded of equal citizens between groups. These bonds of loyalty, mutual recognition and identity that tie group members together may prove to be more circular than horizontal; they may not expand out of the particular grouping to other groups in the wider community.

Fourthly, it could be argued that the development of different types of schooling is an effort to apply 'brand loyalty' in the realm of education. However, both inertial brand loyalty and cost brand loyalty are based on trying to prevent customer exit and this may not be an appropriate model for educational systems. Such schools then become exclusive schools, not in the sense of being 'elite' or 'high-class', but as being selective, that by their nature, exclude or restrict access (whether by fee, religion or geography). Brand loyalty is ultimately a vertical loyalty and may not be the best model for creating or encouraging civic virtues. For that we need a horizontal loyalty, where citizens develop a 'mutual loyalty' going beyond self-interest.

Fifthly, neither of the market loyalties identified early in the chapter has the good of the customer at heart, but is aimed at maximising profits: a loyal customer will not leave even if the price rises slightly or they have slightly less favourable conditions. The trick for the market is to identify and understand the exact circumstances that would make loyal customers weaken their loyalty and avoid those circumstances: this is not the best model for the civic arena. Schools are caught in the middle, trying to balance the loyalty of the marketplace (with the emphasis on the brand, the individual and competition) against the loyalty of the
civic arena (with the emphasis on the civic behaviour, the whole group, and cooperation). The two sometimes clash and can be mutually exclusive.

This illustrates the clash of vertical loyalty over horizontal loyalties. Parents are encouraged to see schools as a brand and ‘brand loyalty’ comes into play. This is cost-based loyalty in the extreme. However, it is the parent’s loyalty that is targeted in issues of school choice, not the child’s. If we reverse the problem and see it not as a problem of exit, but one of positive choice, what then are the problems? Why shouldn’t parents be free to choose one school over another?

Let’s start from where we are: should Catholics only go to school with fellow Catholics, Buddhists, with fellow Buddhists? But where would such a model lead? Wicca worshippers, with fellow Wicca worshippers? Should rich parents be able to choose a school based, say, on wealth? Should middle-class parents be enabled to choose schools with only middle-class children? Should white skinhead parents be allowed to choose schools that best reflect their belief systems? What about drug-addicts? Could we have schools specially designed to bring children up to identify and be loyal to particular drugs? What counts as relevant criteria upon which to base choice? There is nothing intrinsically wrong in schools developing their own ‘corporate’ identities and encouraging a sense of ‘ownership’ amongst pupils etc. Identity-forming symbols and rituals can be useful tools in doing this. These identities, on their own, however, may be too insular to fulfil their civic purpose.

To assume that education has only instrumental value, and is a product that can be bought and sold, is to ignore the value it has as a ‘social good’ and the value it may have in the life of the person being educated. I am not arguing that it has no instrumental value. One could hardly claim a flourishing life if one
was left unemployable and/or unable to participate in the economic life of the collective. The idea of markets and choice work best when used to discuss the repeat trading of simple goods, where there is easy entry and exit. This, however, is at odds with the highly complex nature of education systems and schools and neglects the public good that society expects from schools (the promotion of particular values, creating citizens etc).

But to speak of an educational marketplace at all is simply the misuse of a metaphor. The problem arises when we forget marketplace language is just a useful metaphor for looking at systems and become convinced that this is the reality of it all. By misusing the metaphor of the marketplace in educational parlance, there is the danger that such practices necessary for the development of civic virtues may be neglected. By schools concentrating overly on creating loyalty to their particular brand and school systems ‘selling’ themselves as a ‘product’ in the search for ‘customers’, the development and encouragement of personal loyalty (horizontal) and civic loyalty are downplayed. Fraternity is eroded and fraternal behaviour is undermined.

Wherein lies the role of the schools? Schools are still more or less a common experience and as such, they are one of the few vehicles available for the character development and reinforcement of these necessary features of our civic life. Civic loyalty may not be effectively provided by market-driven school choice mechanisms. If civic behaviour and dispositions form the background within which civic life takes place, then their development and reinforcement within the education system is a crucial challenge. In the next chapter, I explore this point further through turning to the third of the metaphors for civic
relationships, that of family, and consider the possibility of fraternity acting as a normative political concept, situated within a conception of democracy.
Chapter 5

Fraternity

The idea of fraternity goes to the heart of what being human means -
what it means to be social. (Rutherford, 2008, p105)

Introduction

On the 7th July, 2005, four 'home-grown' young men took part in a suicide
attack in London. News reports were full of shock that the terrorists were British
citizens killing their own fellow citizens. It had always been assumed that terrorists
would be 'others', terrorists coming from outside the country.

In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans (and other
coastal states) killing 1500 people and scattering the majority of the 450,000 pre-
hurricane population. When an official evacuation of the city was called for on
August 28th, over 10,000 citizens were unable to leave and crammed into the
Superdome to wait for help to come. It didn’t. It was nearly a week before a
complete evacuation was achieved, in the richest nation on the planet. Those who
had the means to leave when the levees broke did so: those who could not, were
without personal transport and/or had nowhere else to go; nine out of ten were
poor and black.

Political and press preoccupation with the 'veil' issue, as raised by Jack
Straw in 200628, reiterated growing concerns with the fraying nature of our civic
relationship and how certain features of our lives serve to separate us from each
other. It had suddenly been 'discovered' that there are parallel communities living

28 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article662160.ece [last accessed 19.11.2009]
separate lives amongst us. This fact of pluralism has led national soul-searching with regard to our commitment to multiculturalism as opposed to other solutions to problems of integration sought by other countries.

In addition, the Conservative Party in the UK, in 2006, claimed the notion of fraternity as a political principle and, as such, commensurate with their own particular values. A special adviser to David Cameron, Danny Kruger, in an article in October 2006 in Prospect magazine made this claim:

...our agonized debates about community cohesion, about the integration of immigrant groups and national identity, are debates about fraternity. How do we accommodate some, a cohesive and exclusive social grouping, if that grouping both suppresses one (the individual) and admits little allegiance to all (the nation, represented in the state)? But fraternity is also the ghost in the machine of the debates about health and education, about housing and the environment, and about crime and its causes. In each of these areas the vital issue is how communities themselves, not the individual or the state, can address the challenges that face them.

(Kruger, 2006, p2)

Could the family metaphor, to which fraternity belongs, provide a more suitable model for civic belonging?

Whilst much has been written in political philosophy about liberty and equality in democratic theory, the concept of fraternity has occupied a lesser place. Of the three values espoused by the French revolution, liberty, equality, fraternity, it is the one that has been most ignored or neglected. Indeed, in much writing it is either ignored as a political concept in its own right or thought to be a subset of one of the other two values. Where it has been written about, philosophers have conceptualised it in many differing ways: as an ideal, as a value, as a civic virtue, as an attitude/disposition or as a relationship between people. Few have, however, applied the concept to the field of education and schooling.
With a general lack of prior attention to fraternity, and to enable us to proceed with clarity of vision in our identification of applications within education, the conceptual underpinnings and commitments that support our understandings of fraternity need untangling prior to situating it within the realm of education. On the surface, fraternity is a contested concept whose nature is open to endless dispute. That may be so to a point, yet it can be derived from an original exemplar, that of the move from vertical to horizontal loyalties, that sustains a plausible claim for its development over time. Yet the lack of current literature in this area somewhat indicates both a conceptual laxity within the discourse (as shown by its adoption by political groupings), and a failure of existing advocates to take account of the philosophical difficulties found within this area.

Fraternity forms part of a group of 'family' relationships (including paternalism, brotherhood, fatherland, nation etc) that have been metaphorized in different ways. These metaphors stress interdependence, affection and belonging. Thus models of idealized family structures are argued to lie at the heart of political imaginings as a way of modelling how moral obligations to help each other can be expanded into civic understandings and frame discussions of political issues (Lakoff, 1995). Perhaps the most commonly encountered family metaphor is that of nationalism, whereby a people are imagined as connected by 'bloodline', as shall be further explored in this chapter. Family metaphors are common because of their usefulness as specific images representing interactions in terms of the interactions of family members.

In this chapter, I indicate two different senses of the concept: the first I call the strong version of fraternity, which is related to an obligation, connected with dependence, responsibility and morality. This, I contend, is rooted in a strict
interpretation of the family metaphor. The second, I call democratic fraternity: an ideal metaphoric relationship between citizens within a conception of democracy between different people who may not belong to the same community and do not have the same ties. This distinction plays a crucial role in considerations of models of cohesion.

I purport that strong fraternity cannot provide a model for the civic relationship, nor is it likely to expand from particular groupings to the civic domain. Furthermore, this type of bond may ultimately prove more circular between people of 'interest groups' rather than the horizontal loyalty relationship between citizens. In other words, strong fraternity, being more in line with community cohesion, does not expand without difficulty into the societal cohesion of weak fraternity. With this in mind, I explore democratic fraternity as a concept, having both historical and metaphorical import, which may provide such a link. In Section 1, I précis the historical significance of fraternity. Following this, in Section 2, I examine the claims for strong fraternity and consider the strong affective bonds that tie those of both tight-knit communities and communities of interest together. I acknowledge the positive elements of this, but also indicate some of the problems with this when extrapolated into the civic community in the form of nationalism. In Section 3, I offer an alternative concept, grounded within the historical exemplar, based on the ideal relationships between citizens as required by an understanding of democracy. Central to this, I indicate a need for the horizontal loyalties of citizens and the implications this has for the restriction of socio-economic inequality. Finally, in Section 4, I indicate that it is not an either/or choice between the two concepts of fraternity, but that both are needed for different purposes.
Section 1: A Brief History of Fraternity

In 2004, Theo Van Gogh was murdered by a 26 year old man of joint Dutch and Moroccan nationality two months after his film "Submission" (which criticised the treatment of women under Islam) was shown on Dutch TV. The Dutch press was full of surprise and horror that their liberal democracy had given rise to such a thing. Where had they gone wrong in their willingness to adopt live and let live attitudes? The estrangement from each other felt by 'native Dutch' and the largely Muslim immigrant section of the population was widely reported and commented on.

The history of the metaphor of fraternity can be claimed to be almost a shorthand history of politics. Yet the phenomenon of group loyalties and the sharing of resources existed long before political terms for it were coined (Stjernø, 2005). Ties of kinship and familial bonds formed the basis for the duties and moral obligations required by living in groups in many early societies (Stjernø, 2005). Brunkhorst draws out a fascinating and convincing history of human relationships along historical lines. He argues persuasively that the weakening of kinship ties and familial bonds as the basis for social arrangements led to the development of a concept of civic friendship as the ideal form of civic relationship amongst the Ancient Greeks (see Chapter 3).

According to Brunkhorst, the concept of fraternity (the concept mirrored the religious imagery of the time, hence has often been viewed as having strong Christian overtones: that of brotherhood before God as a loving parent) took over as a concept from that of civic friendship held by Aristotle amongst others (Brunkhorst, 2005). Just as the growing Christian empire replaced that of the Ancients, so concepts associated with particular virtues valued by the prevailing orthodoxies also replaced each other. Whilst brotherliness was originally familial,
Brunkhorst claims it became detached from kinship relationships by the growth of Christianity to include the 'brotherhood' of all human beings (Brunkhorst, 2005). It used the metaphor of family relationships to illustrate the relationship between creator (father) and created (brothers/children). The paternalistic and vertical relationship of ruler and ruled mimicked this Christian model.

Stjernø points out that the Christian understanding of fraternity was originally based on communities of friars and that by the Middles Ages the term had come to be used to indicate relationships of people of the same profession (Stjernø, 2005). Alongside this religious connection, developed a more secular understanding of the concept. The online etymology site, Etymonline, traces the word 'Fraternity' back to c1330 as meaning 'a body of men associated by common interest' from the Old French, 'fraternité' which in turn can be drawn back to the Latin 'frater' meaning 'brother'.

Family imagery was a recurrent feature of medieval life (Phillips, 1984). Craft masters saw themselves as 'fathers'; kings played the same card. Patriarchy was the underlying model for how a society should function. Trades and professions organised themselves along similar lines. These fraternities and/or brotherhoods pre-figured later trade unionism. They brought together strangers who shared a common concern, who became united or joined together by this common purpose to put pressure on masters who tried to cut wages or conditions of work.

Fraternity achieved, perhaps, notoriety as the slogan of the Jacobin Revolution, together with freedom and equality in 1793: liberté, égalité, fraternité

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(Stevens, 2001). Whilst, undoubtedly, as Stevens draws out, the ideal of fraternity may have been influenced by working men's associations prevalent in France at the time, the older meaning from the Latin is perhaps the more interesting. Consider the following:

It evokes a metaphor of family relations: relations among brothers. The revolutionary idea of fraternité was meant to be extended to all humans so as to view humanity as an extended family: the family of man. Relations among brothers are basically horizontal relations: relations among equals. The revolutionary fraternity is in competition with another political family metaphor: paternalism, which is the government of a father over his children, a thoroughly vertical relation. It is a relation of authority and hierarchy. Paternalism is a relatively new term coined in the second half of the nineteenth century, but viewing the king as father and his subjects as children has been with us from time immemorial. Paternalism is based on the idea that the ruler, the metaphorical father, knows best what is good for his subjects, his metaphorical children, than they themselves do. Fraternity differs from paternalism and in a way is a rejection of paternalism. We the metaphorical brothers will help you as long as you are loyal to the family.

(Margalit)³⁰

In what sense could one speak of people as being brothers outside of close kinship relationships?

The usage was obviously metaphorical in nature, used as it was to draw out a particular relationship: not one of particular siblinghood, but to demarcate that in some sense people should relate as brothers. It was to step away from the vertical loyalty relationship (as discussed in the previous chapter) associated with aristocratic ruling, particularly that of kings, to indicate a more horizontal relationship, that of brothers, of equals in some respect. This horizontal relationship was public; they were no longer subjects, but citizens. Fraternity was thus the ideal relationship of citizens, representing the emancipation from other ruling powers.

³⁰ This article can be found online at http://www.vn.nl/Standaar-media-pagina/Fraternity.htm [last accessed 19.11.2009]
Brunkhorst continues in his historical analysis that the revolutions of the 18th Century took it further still:

On the streets of Paris in the 1790s, the old Christian slogan of brotherly love of neighbour turned into the political longing for a kind of fraternité that would disband all the clerical brotherhoods of premodern Europe and overturn the altars... The third concept in the new association of citizens, was then no longer regarded as the fulfilment of the divine command to love, but was understood in socially immanent terms as the realization of the political freedom of all citizens.

(Brunkhorst, 2005, p59)

The concept of fraternity thus became detached from the history of Christian idealism and attached to freedom and equality in democratic literature in the sense of a secularised 'love' of neighbour. Johnston, quoting from Furet & Ozouf, points out that as a concept, fraternity was not as central to revolutionary predecessors (Furet and Ozouf, 1989): they were more concerned with the 'rights of man' and equality of entitlement to these rights (Johnston, 1991, p492). Yet fraternity was said to consist of a moral obligation upon citizens. Furet and Ozouf point out it was the Second Republic of 1848 that adopted the Republican credo of liberté, égalité, fraternité which became part of the new constitution of that year (Furet and Ozouf, 1989). Ozouf writes convincingly of the failure of literal fraternity being achieved after the French Revolution, but concludes the search, or hope, for fraternity among the sans-culottes was not without value:

... fraternity did not challenge the principle of democracy. On the contrary, it realised that principle, since it refused to imprison the individual in the concrete conditions in which he lived. It postulated the idea of humanity within the idea of individuality, added social rights to individual rights...

(Ozouf, 1989, p703)

Contrary to this analysis, Hobsbawm, claims that the slogan liberté, égalité, fraternité derives from the Freemasons (Hobsbawm, 1975) and that a relationship of mutual aid and dependence associated with the concept indicated a type of social cooperation outside of brotherhood (whether real or artificial). Interestingly,
whilst Hobsbawm acknowledges that fraternity may initially have had some strong emotional content akin to the sentiments of friendship and kinship (Hobsbawm, 1975, p472), he also indicates that fraternity can imply two things:

.....an ideal of society as a whole and an ideal relationship between people for particular purposes: a 'programme' and a technique.

(Hobsbawm, 1975, p472)

In a similar vein, more recent theorists draw a parallel argument with the rise of understandings of nationalism (Fletcher, 2001; Gilbert, 1998; Miscevic, 2005). To take just one example, Fletcher considers the move from peoplehood to nationhood using the example of the American constitution in 1787, where the preamble begins with "we the people"; he elucidates that the people are coming together (or at least as imagined by their representatives), with the emphasis being on voluntary association, to create their union. A ‘people’ is here seen as a collection of individuals who have come together for a common purpose at a particular (perhaps metaphorical) point, a voluntary association. To be able to go from the here and now, from those immediately around us, from the particular to the general is not a straightforward task. Even Fletcher accepts that, in imagining the nation, a certain leap of faith is necessary from what one sees to what one does not (Fletcher, 2001).

The history of fraternity thus captures and symbolises the change from vertical loyalties to horizontal ones, the linkage of the concept with democracy itself and with the concept of what it is to be a citizen. It points to the ideal of free and equal citizenship within civic association:

.....it gives fraternity a democratic form and extends it to the nation.

(Leydet, 2006b, p800)

It discards individual differences and inequalities as irrelevant to the practice of citizenship.
...what the ideas of 1789 give us is a concept of fraternity/solidarity, which is both radically inclusive and political. It is radically inclusive in the sense that it now covers all of our co-nationals... It is political in the sense that it is essentially linked to democracy itself.  

(Leydet, 2006b, p800)

This linkage with citizenship, with notions of equality, of nation, and especially with democracy itself, shall be further spelled out as this chapter progresses. In the next section, I shall draw a distinction between the fraternity of the closed group and that of the wider civic community, and indicate the inadequacy of this conception of strong fraternity for this latter grouping, thus illustrating the need for further conceptualisation in this area.

Section 2: The Inadequacy of Strong Fraternity

In 1994, 800,000 Rwandans were killed in the space of ten days. Most of the dead were Tutsis; most of the killers were Hutus. The two ethnic groups spoke the same language, lived in the same area and had the same traditions. Neighbours killed neighbours, encouraged by radio propaganda, the military, the police and other authorities. 31

Prior to further analysis, it should be acknowledged that fraternity as a relationship or bond going beyond the family has frequently been examined from the point of an affective element in the civic relationship (Caputo, 1999; Eshete, 1981; Kahane, 1999; Stephens, 1874). Because of this, there has been a tendency for it to be subsumed into discourses on community. Whilst the idea of 'community' has been debated at length over the past few years, there appears to be little agreement as to what precisely is entailed by the concept.

The communitarian argument that we are essentially social beings, that our moral characteristics are constituted socially and historically through our roles can

31 See [http://www.un.org/events/rwanda/resources.shtml](http://www.un.org/events/rwanda/resources.shtml) for further information on the genocide [last accessed 15.08.2009]
be argued to draw on a particular model of a traditional pre-modern community. The claims are that moral norms are always the norms of some society or other and thus belonging is central to the acquisition of these norms. Within this, the individual's identity is inseparable from their place in a rigid social structure and system of values; one is always a member of this family, this tribe, this city. These serve to anchor one's identity to a particular way of life by viewing people as being united by shared norms, traditions and identities (Strike, 2000). The shared values within this framework help continually to experience and create a shared identity through engaging and contributing to the practices of the community.

There is usually a strong commonality between members of particular communities, which forms a major part of the identities of members through participating in the group. These internal ties I call the strong version of fraternity, characterised as a relationship between people of the same kind, connected by a joint endeavour or with ties to a community. It is affective: there is some emotional tie to the group, which is particularistic - these particular people, this particular project. This attitude of affection promotes a sense of belonging and loyalty commitments from one to the other as members of the group, hence a strong sense of partiality to fellow members.

Many of these 'groupings of interest' are held together by a distinct body of ideas as to the best way to lead individual and collective lives. The private commitments of some of the groups and individuals, however, can be grounded in a zero toleration of opposing points of view, even to the extent of cutting their community links with others who live differently. A well known example of this would be that of the Amish, a group with a particular system of beliefs cutting themselves off from the society around them in all aspects. The Amish take
seriously the biblical injunction to keep themselves separate from unbelievers: they do not vote, accept public welfare, are not in general connected to public utilities, or public education systems. The triad of family, faith and community forms the background ethos to such dealings. It would appear on the surface that they are a self-sufficient people living a particular life-style, wearing a particular form of dress, living by a particular set of rules and regulations.

Lest we think such groupings belong only in certain parts of the USA, we have the example of the Exclusive Plymouth Brethren (referred to here as EPB) in the UK. The EPB refuse to take part in community clubs or events, they do not vote, they ban TV, radio, the internet and theatre. They are quiet, conservative in view and fundamentalist in religious outlook. They are not unfriendly with outsiders; they choose not to socialise or eat with them. Their children attend publicly funded schools for the main part, but do not partake of extra-curricular activities. There are 43 private schools for 11-17 year olds (teaching app1400 children) in the UK operated by the Plymouth Brethren. The children do not go to university; they do not have friends outside the group; they only work in Brethren owned businesses. They do not use mobiles, computers or newspapers.

The stronger, the thicker the fraternal bond and bonds of loyalty, the more exclusive the group becomes. Strong fraternity, as the previous examples have demonstrated, can create communities that are closed to those who are different, whether in belief, practice or simply physically different. It is undoubtedly true that this form of 'belonging' can be examined at a broader level outside of religious groupings. One solution has been to consider the concept of nationalism (the creation of a bounded people committed to the fate of one another), which also depends on these strong bonds.
Nationalism

As indicated previously, nationalism relies heavily on a strict family metaphor, frequently based on bloodline; members believe they share something in common, be it language, history or symbols, that there is some shared interest binding them together and that this is 'inherited' in some way over generations. Although such a community may be diverse and comprise of some different traditions, through the attachment of 'nation' they become one.

The concept of 'nation' conjures up different images that may at times interlink and/or overlap and remains hotly contested. As Gilbert points out, the very term 'nation' is not without complications. There are few who will agree on a precise definition of the term (Gilbert, 1998). It can be taken to indicate the population of a territory, a cultural community, an ethnic group, voluntary associations, a sovereign people amongst other definitions. People believe that they, as part of the group, have a shared identity based on this conceptualisation of nation:

Historically, it is the nation that has allowed large numbers of individuals to feel a sense of commonality, setting them apart from others and making solidarity among strangers possible.

(Leydet, 2006a)32

There is, arguably, a certain psychological component of what it is to be connected in this way, that we need a group identity, a community we think of as 'us' (Anderson, 1991). Some groupings may clash in their aims and objectives; others sit side by side. In the civic arena, it springs from the need to identify those who are to be governed together, and those outside the scope of such governance (Gilbert, 1998, p26). Yet, even within the metaphor of 'nation' sit

32 Online resource: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/ [last accessed 19.11.2009]
other metaphors, each seeing human connections through particular insights, resulting in different policy decisions.

An example. Until the 1980s, it was customary to speak of the American experience of creating the nation as a *melting pot*: that all different peoples became Americans by blending together into one whole as in a cooking pot. This encouraged newcomers to assimilate into the existing culture. Consider the original exemplar: in a melting pot, all the ingredients lose some of their own identity in mixing together, in the blending and mixing, they become a new reality. Thus one could understand the process of becoming an American as integration and assimilation into the larger group. Previous identity-loyalties fade as the new ones are adopted.

Since then, a further metaphor has evolved: America as 'the salad bowl', whereby each keeps their individual identity but forms part of a 'salad'. All the ingredients of a salad contribute towards the end product. They can all be seen for what they are: the tomato, the lettuce, the onion, but all form part of the same salad. Transpose this metaphor to the political scene and we get the hyphenated American: for instance, Irish-American, Italian-American amongst others. With this metaphor, the newcomers retain their own previous 'national characteristics' while integrating into a new society. The point to note here is that both the newcomers and the society itself are changed. Two contrasting images, *melting pot* and *salad bowl*, representing two contrasting kinds of loyalty. The melting pot only allows the vertical loyalty to the new state and the abandonment of previous ones; the salad bowl encourages both the vertical to the new state, but also allows horizontal ties to previous commitments.
Is Strong Fraternity Sufficient?

On the surface, strong fraternity would appear to be a possible contender for modelling the civic bond needed by a society which aspires to be cohesive. But there are problems. Firstly, many moral philosophers accept that our lives may begin embedded in such thickly formed attachments but that this alone is inadequate as a response to the problem of social justice. Family, nation or people no longer determine inescapable identities. The modern society may lack these shared frameworks and belief systems (MacIntyre, 1985). Modern liberal societies tend to have weaker identities, celebrating their achievement of pluralism and/or multiculturalism.

Secondly, when citizens of the same state are also citizens of the same nation, the loyalty and obligations of one to another is straightforward. However, when more than one nation shares the same state, the lines become blurred. Citizens have particular obligations to fellow citizens of the same state, but that may not mean having prior obligations to fellow members of the same community simply on the grounds that they are members of the same community. If we allow, or encourage, community commitments over state or civic commitments, the notion of justice becomes meaningless.

Thirdly, the problem of nationalism is that it is almost exclusively defined along historical bloodlines: for a people to become a nation, Fletcher claims, takes time and shared experiences (in some ways, parallels can be drawn with the move from acquaintanceship to friendship).

Choice marks the people. History breeds the nation. (Fletcher, 2001, p2) Fletcher further points out that to be understood as a nation is to include the dead, the living and the unborn and hence no single generation can undo the
work of the past or hold back on the promise to the future; a nation is extended out over history.

If this view of what it is to be a nation is correct, that it is both an historical fact and based on shared experiences, there may be no easy way of adapting the concept within a pluralist society that is both rapidly growing and changing. Under pluralism, nationalism may not serve as a focus for identity and allegiance if some are excluded from the nation itself, particularly where one national group is given preferential treatment (i.e. the Malays in Malaysia have preferential quotas in particular services, a practice resented by both Chinese and Indian Malaysians (Abdullah, 2007b; Fang and Norman, 2006)).

A society based on nationalism may unwittingly create oppression of minority cultures within and an imperialistic attitude to others outside the group.

Whilst strong fraternity may have many 'goods' about it (i.e. creating a sense of belonging, creating close tight knit communities) it also contains many 'bads'. Such networks create a sense of inclusion, but in so doing, produce the externality of a sense of exclusion, creating outsiders and sometimes even unrealistic hurdles for those who wish to join the group. The deaths of the Chinese cockle-pickers on the beach in Lancashire in 2004 (referred to in the last chapter) shocked the British public in more ways than one. It had never occurred to many people until then, the perilous conditions that illegal immigrants might be forced into, that they may be owned in a form of modern day slavery, hidden in the shadows. For those who do not belong, who are forever on the

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33 Until April 2009, it was official government policy for any business starting in Malaysia to be 30% owned by ethnic Malay shareholders. Malays have easier access to public sector employment; racial quotas are enforced for university admissions etc.

34 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/lancashire/3464203.stm [last accessed 19.11.2009]
outside, life can be unimaginably harsh. Yet even for those who successfully migrate legally, many can be made to feel second class, 'not quite one of us'.

We cannot assume that all tight-knit communities are bound together with a vision of the good: it could equally well be a vision of 'the bad', for example, a death squad or an armed and murderous militia. Simply positing the creation of a sense of belonging, sharing a tradition or belief says nothing about the value or the worth of the joint enterprise. It does not rule out a severe form of inequality through a caste system, or the exploitation of members. Even the Jonestown suicide sect had a sense of belonging, a shared purpose and belief system.35

As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the horizontal loyalties, attitudes and dispositions that may be found within groups are not necessarily the same as the horizontal loyalties, attitudes and dispositions demanded of equal citizens between groups. The bonds of loyalty, mutual recognition and identity that tie group members together may prove to be more circular than horizontal; they may not expand out of the particular grouping to other groups: herein lies the problem. On its own, this conception of fraternity is insufficient to support the civic bond.

Phillips points out that 'identity recognition' based on family metaphors may in fact lead us into a divisive cul-de-sac (Phillips, 1984). The problem with family relationships is that it indicates the differences between your family and mine:

We may be willing to co-operate with those we see as alien, but we will reserve affection for those of our own kind. Unity premised on family likeness can be a recipe for disaster. It tends to exclude those from a different family background, and subjects those it embraces to the familiar tensions of family life. In contemporary Europe, where

heterogeneity is so much a feature of our lives, it is bound to lead us astray. (Phillips, 1984, p239)

Instead of being a model for the ideal civic relationship, the consequences of this particular metaphor are often deleterious, degenerating into an excuse for nationalism and the atrocities associated with this bond (e.g. Rwanda, Bosnia, Sudan, amongst others). It would seem that the metaphor of family falls down in a similar fashion to that of friendship in previous chapters.

However, I wish to argue that this need not be so. Our experiences of what counts as family and how one joins a family have greatly expanded from that of pure bloodline; most liberal western societies are accustomed to reconstituted families, step-families, adopted family members, the break down and reformation of marriages leading to second or more families. In addition, there tends to be a bond of affection between family members, yet it is by no means compulsory: yet the bond of connection still holds. Whilst you choose your friends, it is very rare that one gets to choose one's family members. Can this then expand into the civic arena in a more productive manner? Using the insights of Munoz-Dardé on fraternity as a 'sibling' relationship, (based on our changing understandings of 'family') I seek, in the next section, to re-imagine the family metaphor to avoid these pitfalls, rooting it instead within an understanding of democracy.

Section 3: Democratic Fraternity

In the autumn of 2005, riots occurred in Clichy-sous-bois, (a ghetto-suburb of Paris, marked by both economic and social isolation from the richer residential areas), leading to political commentators discussing the failure of the French model of full citizenship integration. Those who lived in the impoverished, segregated communities tended to be second and third generation immigrants from France’s former colonies, who suffered greater unemployment, discrimination and poorer housing than those in
equivalent suburbs. The riots lasted eight nights and spread to other
cities. 36

So far we have explored the strong version of fraternity, and, finding it both
unsatisfying and ultimately unpersuasive, have concluded that it cannot ground
the relationship needed between citizens; for this, we need a different style of
thinking and conceptualisation of fraternity. Prior to further analysis, it is useful to
summarise the argument from previous chapters to focus in on necessary
features desired in a civic relationship.

Whatever the civic relationship is, or however it is defined, it must include
certain elements: it must be impartial by nature (the partiality of friendship would
be inappropriate in the public sphere); it may include but cannot require emotional
attachments (whilst it is good to care about our civic others, we cannot base a
system of justice on people's ability to care), and it must encompass strangers,
those we do not yet know or may never know, yet indicate 'those who count as
one of us' and those who do not. It requires a certain element of equality between
persons: within the civic domain 'each counts for one and none for more than
one'.

This weaker conception of fraternity is marked by being non-particularistic
in its reach, by enabling us to reach out to others outside our immediate realm, by
an attitude and preparedness to share resources, by including unknown civic
others, by reciprocity and mutual assistance. It should be noted that this form of
fraternity is not synonymous with fraternal feelings towards others (though this
may come to be the case) but denotes a way of behaving/attitude to fellow
citizens.

36 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4413964.stm for further details on the
riots. [last accessed 19.11.2009]
The relationship I call 'democratic fraternity' is both descriptive and normative in its reach between different people who may not belong to the same community and do not have the same ties as in strong fraternity. It is democratic in that the concept of democracy has an assumption of a particular vision of the relationship between an equal citizenry. It requires a - what can only be described as 'metaphoric' - relationship of mutual recognition in a form of equality between citizens, that each is of equal value or worth in some way, that there is a principle of equal standing from one to another as citizens: it is more than the space in between citizens. It is the invisible link itself. It is fraternity in that the historical link with the original conception provides the metaphoric power associated with the move from vertical to horizontal loyalties. Together, it provides an 'over-arching umbrella' enabling disparate peoples to come together for a shared purpose: that of being governed together. In what follows, I shall begin to unpack this alternative understanding of fraternity.

Historically, fraternity formed a break from the existing political order. It symbolised that very shift to a civic notion of 'citizen' and how each is bound to each other; it distanced the citizen from the paternalism of the reign of monarchs. It renewed a conception of what it was to be a citizen. The more secular understanding of the term indicates the belief that when strangers come together for the common purpose of government they are somehow standing one to another as 'brothers', as family members. It encompasses not just the present generation, but generations past and present, forging a civil society. Fraternity, through its historical importance in the transition from autocracy to democracy, from vertical to horizontal loyalties, provides the metaphor.
Democracy begins with the simple view that 'people' are the source of political authority. As such, it rests on an assumption that such authorities can be changed at regular intervals through the actions of the citizens. This in turn requires a citizenry capable of choosing; to exercise rule, such choices have to be based upon knowledge of alternatives:

...the term 'democracy,' ... refers very generally to a method of group decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the collective decision making. (Christiano, 2006)\(^{37}\)

But the ability to make choices is not sufficient in itself; the citizenry needs a form of moral commitment to the collective values needed to sustain democracy itself. This voices two distinct problems to be explored in this section: firstly, what kind of bond is required amongst such participants to enable both collective decision making and the moral commitment needed to sustain the process, and secondly, what kind of equality is required amongst said participants.

**Associational Bonds**

As I have suggested elsewhere (Healy, 2008), there has been a failure on the part of many theorists to acknowledge the quintessentially metaphoric nature of how we envision associational bonds within conceptions of social cohesion. Nonetheless it should be noted that for us to survive and flourish in society we need to somehow see ourselves as bonded together to thus generate reasons for cooperative behaviour. Indeed, empirical studies appear to validate this claim. This claim is particularly pertinent to the study of social cohesion in which theories start from the assumption that society can be examined through studying patterns of the interconnections, ties or bonds between people that hold groups together. It is

\(^{37}\) Available online at: [http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/democracy/](http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/democracy/) [last accessed 19.11.2009]
these factors that have made social cohesion (and its polar opposite social fragmentation) a major feature in work on equality issues, integration, social capital and social policy.\textsuperscript{38}

Many of the studies on the 'social fabric' that makes a society argue that interactions and relationships of trust require a certain level of shared values and purposes. The notion of social capital has been bandied around across subject boundaries for many years. It is viewed as a useful way of entering into dialogue for modelling civic society. The central thesis is that relationships (and networks of relationships) matter: that the social fabric is created by interactions and relationships of trust. It is taken very seriously in governmental circles as witnessed by a recent European Commission on the subject (Aldridge, 2002) and World Bank studies as being an important indicator of economic performance, as impacting on health, education and crime. Yet even theorists within the field acknowledge that all too often there is a lack of clarity and blurring of boundaries between the ways in which associations and organizations within the society prove vital to the production of social capital and the upholding of democracy (Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2001; Putnam, 2002; Putnam, 2007).

The analysis of social relationships within this area suggests three distinct forms of association: bonding, bridging and linking. Bonding social capital holds people together in groups and is characterised by strong ties usually within a homogenous community which shares a common identity usually within families or ethnic groups. It also refers to those close relationships to people like yourself: friends, work colleagues, people we turn to for help in a crisis in our personal life.

\textsuperscript{38} It is interesting to note that the term can be traced back to at least the work of Durkheim on the interdependence between members of society.
These are the personal ties we need to lead a happy, flourishing life. A certain level of bonding social capital is need for bridging to emerge. Bridging allows us to connect across diversity, is believed to create reciprocity of generalised trust and to enable economic transactions to take place between strangers and tends to be characterised by weaker links, loosely shared values within more heterogeneous relationships across social and ethnic groups, people who are not like you in some sense; they may be names in your email or address system you rarely contact but who are essential for your professional life. Linking occurs when such relationships cross social classes and/or power structures. A person's ability to get things done, to seek advantage relies on these ties to these elites. (van Staveren and Knorringa, 2006). These categorisations of associational bonds are potentially useful ways of understanding the utility of cooperative social networking relationships.

According to the work of Granovetter, in one of the most influential of social networks papers, one of the characteristics of close primary relationships is their interdependence (Granovetter, 1983). Our social networks of primary relationships tend to be with mutual others. We usually know the friends of our friends, or they are similar sociologically, of similar ethnic origin, religion, social standing. Secondary relationships, on the other hand, being weaker ties, do not have so much overlap. We may not know the friends or the networks of these distant others. The strength of these ties is usually decided on by taking into account the amount of time characterised by the tie, the intimacy encouraged, the reciprocity and emotional intensity found within the relationship. The stronger the tie between two people, the greater percentage of people to whom they are both tied ('the friends of my friends').
Significantly, strong ties draw us together with similar others and to some extent, exclude distant others. However, the weaker ties are argued to be those that open us to others in the wider community. Labaree, in discussing Granovetter, claims:

Weak ties are what hold societies together in a complex web of connections and interactions, which make up in number and richness what they lack in intensity and duration... A rich network of weak ties is therefore the essential basis upon which citizens can construct a sense of public education as a public good.

(Labaree, 2000, p128)

The ability to develop these important secondary relationships (or weaker ties) becomes diminished if we choose to only associate with similar others. These weak ties to a larger, wider society give us good reason to view education and state schooling as having a crucial role to play in both developing and nourishing opportunities to bring about these ties. It gives us the opportunity to meet, mingle and meld with those who may be different. This becomes more pertinent when it refers to schools of a particular kind, ones that are open to the public without restriction based on faith, finance or ability.

Recent studies in neuroscience seem to indicate that our brains have evolved to cope with group living; in other words we may have a biological precondition to trust each other within cooperative living (Grimes, 2003). Following from this, is that social bonding and other trust relationships appear to depend upon the production of a chemical in the brain, oxytocin (Broad, Curley and Keverne, 2006) and neuroactive hormones. The most notable contribution of this approach is that such chemicals act as 'social glue', enabling individuals to engage in trust-bond relationships and thus live in social groups (Broad, Curley...

39 Granovetter's doctoral research in 1970 for Harvard University focussed on examining how social networks can be used to obtain new jobs. He found that most people found their jobs, not through close friends as might be initially supposed, but through 'weak ties' which, he argued, play an important role in occupational mobility.
and Keverne, 2006; Zak and Fakhar, 2006). Whilst this empirical research (neuroeconomics) is obviously in its infancy and requires further development, at present it is still limited in both its outreach and analysis, yet holds the possibility of supporting a normative appraisal.

However we define these bonds, whatever names we give them, they are an important part of our psyche and our social lives. The first observation from this would be that to feel bonded with others requires an affective disposition of a particular kind. It also carries with it an inclination to action based on the bond, a practice of working with others in pursuit of common interests. Some interests are short lived and require directed, cooperative working of a particular kind, for example, the collective action of workers at Visteon, who in answer to losing their jobs at the firm, undertook a rooftop occupation. Or the workers in Woippy, France who 'boss-napped' five managers of FM Logistic in protest at plant closure. It is unlikely that these individuals would share all interests in common, but the shared nature of their common problem motivated common response. When the common interest no longer exists, the bond is unlikely to continue (in a similar fashion to that of utility friendship).

The second observation would be that when the bond is a civic bond, it denotes the group of people to whom we are bound within a complex mesh of obligations and responsibilities. It seems reasonable to assume that it marks out that grouping as being of special concern: I am obliged to regard them in some way differently from those to whom I am not bound and this may ground the extent of the help that I am willing to give them. One positive suggestion arising from this discussion of the nature of the bonds that bind us together is not just the

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40 The Observer:26.4.09: Business and Media Section, p6-7, Kathryn Hopkins
recognition of the complexity of the issues involved, but also interlinking this with ethical considerations. With this in mind, in the next sub-section, I shall explore further the horizontal relationship referred to previously.

The Horizontal Bond of Equality

When we consider the bond between those drawn together because of a common interest/connection (in the sense of strong fraternity: our most usual understanding of the concept), a literal understanding of equality does not seem to be a necessary element of the bond. If we take the literal family itself: not all family members stand one to another as equals. Frequently the parents are seen as the leaders of the family, followed by the children. Even amongst the children there may be different levels of ‘seniority’. However, the civic relationship requires a particular form of commitment to equality between citizens which, I argue, is lacking in strong fraternity and which the concept of democratic fraternity can offer.

It is undoubtedly true that one can care about human equality in many ways and for many differing reasons, which I do not propose to go into. Equality (and there are numerous different forms of it), is rarely sought for its own sake, but for what it leads/contributes to, the flourishing life of the individual (Marmor)41 or as part of a wider vision of what society should be (Miller, 1982). Many philosophers give credence to the idea that the concepts of fraternity and equality are somehow linked and can only be understood in relation to each other (Arthur, 1986; Fielding, 1988; Lee, 1986; Lyons, 1986). For some, fraternity is either a by-

41 http://wwwl.idc.ac.il/marmor/work/equality.htm [last accessed 24.03.2007]
product of equality or a subset of equality. White identifies the fraternal attitude as being:

... feeling a bond between oneself and others as equals, as moral beings with the same basic needs and an interest in leading a life of one's own, is the necessary emotional attitude between citizens who hold that one of the basic principles of their society is that power must be exercised, or controlled, equally by all moral agents who form the citizen body.

(White, 1983, p72)

The maintenance of some impetus towards equality across a group of people may foster and encourage feelings of fraternity and community among them which in turn can motivate the maintenance of structures in societies that encourage equality.

Inequality, on the other hand, can undermine social cohesion and fragment fraternal feelings. Where there is vast inequality in societies, the affluent tend to dominate the decision making processes, create lower levels of social trust, the residential segregations of different groupings and the erosion of a shared public realm (Jackson and Segal, 2004). It is generally believed that a society structured to create or allow a high level of inequality would be politically unstable (giving rise to the threat of high levels of crime, social unrest, violence, a divided society).

The belief holds that political instability would be caused by the have-nots envying the holdings of the haves and that such envy would be socially destructive. The problem of envy has frequently been seen as a weapon against egalitarians; the charge is that envy forms the psychological basis for the concern with equality and egalitarian conceptions of justice (those seeking to limit inequality would thus be concerned that if they could not have something, no one should). To hold, egalitarians would have to be motivated by opposing only inequalities that were unfavourable to themselves (it would not make sense for them to be envious if it were to their advantage). Whilst there may be some
egalitarians who might be envious of others' holdings, it does not hold that all are. Some may be concerned by the effects of inequality. Neither is it certain that all egalitarians are concerned only with inequalities unfavourable to themselves: there may be some concerned with inequalities in which they would benefit from the status quo. Maybe their concern is, as Cohen points out, because inequalities alienate people from each other (Cohen, 2001). It destroys fraternity.42

It can thus be seen that the nurturing of fraternity is adversely affected by high levels of inequality. The desirability of some form of equality arises from the ability to connect with others, the desirability of civic cohesion, not for the sake of equality itself, but for the social effects of political stability. Interestingly, this ties in with the neuroeconomic research referred to earlier by Broad, Curley and

42 Envy is described by Norman as a socially destructive feeling - that social life would go better the less envy generated (Norman, 2002). When people start to envy other's holdings, it affects their sense of well-being and personal satisfaction with their lot, creates dissatisfaction and unhappiness. La Caze, however, sees this kind of envy as useful in a society (La Caze, 2001; La Caze, 2002). She builds an argument that this social envy is what motivates people to improve their situation or standing. When we see that someone can do something we cannot, it can motivate us to seek the same through practise of a skill, learning a new way of doing things etc. She further argues that the point of envy can be to alert us to injustice – by noticing how we differ from others, comparing and justifying differences can itself lead to a "righteous envy". In this non-vicious envy, the judgements we make of the situation are correct ones and the object of our envy really is unworthy of their good fortune. The "envy" becomes a prompt to action.

What is frequently missed in the argument is that the envy being spoken of by political philosophers and economists is not the emotion known as 'envy'. The confusion arises from the use of the same word to signify two different things. The first, an emotion which can make life unpleasant for the sufferer (malign envy); the second usage (as used by Rawls, Nozick and game theorists) is as a term or a symbol allowing discussion of inequality of distribution within a society; it functions as a formula, almost as a metaphor. Indeed, Dworkin defines equality as an 'envy-free' distribution of resources (Dworkin, 1981).

The adoption of a second metaphorical sense of envy avoids the overtones evoked by the emotional form of envy, that of the sense of inferiority and welfare loss as: "The form of envy it uses is comparatively benign insofar as it takes a disinterested viewpoint towards the object of envy. According to that interpretation a person envies not because the envied are in a better position than they are, but because they want what the envied has for their own benefit. His envy is motivated by personal want-satisfaction, rather than wishing to be better than the envied, or wishing them to be less than him, or wishing to emulate them." (Wigley, 2000, p3)

No-envy or envy-free allocations are based on two agents having the same preferences who should be treated equally in considering the fair allocation of goods in economies. A scheme for distribution of goods is thus considered envy-free (in terms of game theory) if each recipient is convinced that no other recipient has received more than they have (according to their measure). The issue is that no recipient would wish to swap their share. The idea of no-envy or envy-free allocations is attractive to economists because it is claimed to be impartial between conceptions of the good as agents are responsible for their choice of their allocation of resources.
Keverne, that indicates that levels of oxytocin are affected by such external circumstances as trust relationships (and their lack), air pollution, equality (and conversely inequality) and socio-political stability (Broad, Curley and Keverne, 2006; Grimes, 2003).

Empirical studies on social capital\textsuperscript{43} have also drawn links between inequality and conceptions of connectedness, arguing that periods of greatest economic equality tend to coincide with high levels of social and civic connectedness (Putnam, 2000). The current vast, growing gap between rich and poor in UK society gives cause for concern. Consider the following:

... it would be perverse to neglect the fact that large economic inequalities are important causal drivers of social exclusion: both of the poor, and of the rich. When the rich are very rich, and the poor are very poor, it is much harder for them to meet as equal citizens. Indeed, it is hard for them to meet at all. Large inequalities lead to radically divergent consumption patterns and lifestyles, and to mutual incomprehension and lack of sympathy between individuals who are nominally members of the same civic community.

(Jackson and Segal, 2004, p40-41)

The US is said to be more socially divided now by the gap between the richest and the poorest than thirty years ago. Each year, the gap grows. Hutton reported in 2002 that the richest 20% of Americans earned nine times more than the poorest 20%:

The US has more of its population living in poverty – 19.1% - than any other Western industrialised country (quoting Mishel et al – State of Working America); worse, the bottom 10% of Americans, even though they live in a richer society, are poorer than their counterparts in Europe, Canada and Japan (quoting Freeman – National Bureau for Economic Research June 2000 – working paper 7757)

(Hutton, 2002, p149)

In the UK, a recent Performance and Innovation Unit paper on Social Mobility informed ministers that over the past 20-30 years, income inequalities widened significantly (Aldridge, 2001). Between 1979 and 1998/9, the income of the

\textsuperscript{43} Definitions of social capital categories can be found on p125-6
bottom decile of population rose by 6% in real terms, whilst that of the top, rose by 82% (Aldridge, 2002).

The idea of civic engagement and the effects this has in other areas has received much attention in empirical studies over the past decade. Robert Putnam has been examining the gradual disappearance of these joint ventures in civic and social life where citizens came together whether through social activities or civic engagement in the USA for many years. In 2000, he published the largest, most comprehensive study of the phenomenon of civic erosion, *Bowling Alone* (Putnam, 2000). Using the example of bowling, he pointed out that whilst as many Americans were going bowling as in the 1950s, they were no longer joining bowling clubs. They were figuratively 'bowling alone'. People were less deeply connected in the lives of their communities than post war, less civically engaged and less likely to vote.

The 'bowling alone' phenomenon, showing the erosion of this particular element of civic life, over generations, is not limited to the USA. In 2002, a study by the Performance and Innovation Unit in the UK indicated a link could be shown between civic engagement and economic and business performance (Aldridge, 2002). Interestingly, Putnam did a follow up study (less widely reported) in 2002 after the effects of 9/11 (Putnam, 2002) where in he found that some elements of civic engagement were 'repairing' themselves as a crisis brought the nation together (e.g. trust of government). Civic engagement would thus appear to affect not only individual wellbeing and life chances, but the capacity to *be* a public.

Much work has been done in recent years on the development of an underclass in society (Hills, 2002), the growing numbers of people who cannot for one reason or another fully take part in the life of the society (usually measured in
financial terms). When inequality widens, life chances are curtailed for some. If a grouping within a society can cut themselves off from cradle to grave by avoiding those things held in common, by always using private medicine, schooling, gated communities, private transport, accessing different media for instance, in what sense are they actually functioning as members of the same society with those who cannot so afford? Where is the meeting place, what 'language' is shared by those with nothing in common? In what sense is it a society at all?

Collective goods, I argue, are amongst the things that bind a society together and create a sense of belonging. The idea of shared public goods de-commodifies certain goods essential to the wellbeing of the citizen. They form a space in which all members of the community can metaphorically 'meet' enjoying a basic equality as citizens regardless of their differing social backgrounds. With high levels of economic inequality, those with wealth can buy their way out of this. Once the wealthy do so, they are less likely to be willing to pay taxes for the upkeep of this public space and less supportive of efforts to improve them.

Suissa, in discussing the work of White, points out that:

... the conceptual connection between fraternity and equality can work both ways: not only does a relatively high degree of socio-economic equality foster and support fraternal attitudes, but the institutional maintenance of such equality may depend on a degree of fraternal feeling.

(Suissa, 2006, p68)

The tendency for fraternal bonds to cause people to act co-operatively, to identify together and feel part of a 'team' can affect the impetus towards equality.

Is there an alternative interpretation of family metaphors? Munoz-Dardé offers a vision of fraternity as an abstract concept based within a Rawlsian theory of justice. Using the metaphor of siblings, Munoz-Dardé points out that brothers and siblings tend not to share things between each other on the basis of altruism.
nor on a shared vision of the good life: what concerns them is ‘fairness’ (Munoz-
Dardé, 1999). They are more concerned with the fairness of the distribution of
goods by parents. The metaphor of siblings, she suggests, leads us to:

... an interrogation of each of the brothers and sisters concerning the
rules and principles applied to them, which suggests the analogy with the
scrutiny of principles of political legitimacy and distributive justice. A
further aspect of the metaphor is also visible at this stage: unlike
solidarity or community, with which fraternity is often associated, the
accent is put not only on the group, but also on each of the brothers and
sisters that belong to it.

(Munoz-Dardé, 1999, p89)

The power of the sibling relationship is not the emotional tie with each other, but
the way in which they stand to each other in the distribution of goods.

The concept works as a metaphor for the relationship between citizens
through the suggestion of a political family (one in which we happen to find
ourselves not through choice or voluntary association). The metaphor carries both
similarities and disparities: it is not a simple comparison (Munoz-Dardé, 1999).
We do not relate to fellow citizens as if they were siblings, (the criticisms of the
concept of civic friendship would no doubt apply here too) but serves to tie us to
impersonal others through the need to consider each other as someone having
rights to resources that we share. All that being said, it must be admitted that the
ability to stand back from one’s own situation and consider how one’s actions and
choices affect civic others may require a high level of abstract moral development
(in seeing oneself as connected to abstract others) and as such, needs far greater
exploration than can be achieved within the parameters of this thesis.

Section 4: Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to explore the nature of fraternity as a model
for the civic relationship through identifying and drawing out two differing
conceptions: one, I have termed strong fraternity and indicated how this may be inadequate at the civic level; the second, I have termed democratic fraternity. As the previous discussion has intimated, there are several remaining puzzles left to address.

Firstly, the horizontal loyalties demanded between groups differ in kind from the loyalties between members within groups. Many of the groups may have differing conceptions of the good; some will have opposing conceptions. A pluralistic society means accepting we have a multiplicity of identities and attachments, but that in the public realm, our personal loyalties to those most like us (whether in terms of culture, religion and/or interests) may be inappropriate.

Secondly, the dispositions and attitudes needed to sustain citizens in such situations require careful nurturing and development within education systems. They require ‘reasonable toleration’ (akin to Rawls’ theory of reasonable doctrines), the willingness to enter into dialogue with fellow citizens (Abdullah, 2007a), respect for those who come within the remit of ‘being governed together’, ‘knowing’ our fellow citizens, interacting with them, to develop these particular dispositions.

Thirdly, why has the concept of fraternity received so little attention in political philosophy? Why has there not been the same development and analysis of the concept as have been received by liberty and equality? One of the foremost explanations must be the normative significance of the concept: it expresses a form of attachment that tells us how we ought to relate to others. It contains within it an implication that this is both desirable and valuable, which sits uneasily with other commitments within the modern liberal state. Following from this, the relational aspect appears to be in tension with individual rights expressed by
commitments to liberty and equality. Fraternity, at the expense of liberty and equality, would certainly fall foul of this argument, however in conjunction with the other two, and firmly rooted in a conception of democracy itself, the idea of balance may avoid this.

Fourthly, linked to the above, is the idea that fraternity requires some form of sacrifice, for want of a better term, of some in favour of others. It can evoke memories of the outcomes of particular totalitarian regimes promoting radical collectivism, such as Soviet Russia, coupled with emphasising the needs of the many over the individual, which would appear to make such a society appear illiberal. It seems to involve some form of commitment on the part of some to forego certain of their rights in response to the needs of others. This links to the argument in the previous section, that fraternity is adversely affected by vast socio-economic inequalities within a society. Democratic fraternity is not necessarily concerned with 'neighbourhood inequalities' (between individual people or between certain groupings); it is more concerned with the gap between top and bottom – the spread of inequalities. Just as in friendship, it is hard for the very rich to befriend the very poor (see Chapter 2), so the civic relationship is harder to sustain when the gap between top and bottom becomes too great.

Lest it be thought I am dismissing strong fraternity in favour of democratic fraternity, I am not; both may be important in a society. The former gives us a sense of belonging, allowing us to join with like-minded people in ventures that give meaning and pleasure: whether they be philatelists, philosophers or Philadelphians. The latter enables us to be a society. Strong fraternity alone will not allow us to create the strong bonds across disparate groupings and thus support collective action nor collective sacrifice: yet no society could exist over
time without requiring citizens to make sacrifices on behalf of other citizens (Wellman, 2000). It would not enable a modern pluralistic western society to rise above individual differences and conceptions of the good to enable social life.

If we accept Anderson's argument, democratic fraternity would have metaphoric significance as an imagined relationship within an imagined community – but not less real for the fact of being imagined (Anderson, 1991). To describe fraternity as an imagined relationship is not to comment on the falsity/veracity of the claim but to indicate the style in which it is experienced. The people are real, the way in which they are connected or feel to be connected is best described as a social imaginary. It is a necessary way of feeling/being attached to others for social life to continue.

The concept of democratic fraternity is metaphoric and does not point to a particular relationship. We seem to lack an appropriate 'vocabulary' in which to address these issues and hence lapse into metaphorical imagery. The physical and social isolation from each other of the poorest sections of the community has serious consequences for democratic politics. But the horizontal relationship of fraternity goes beyond this resource inequality. It seeks something more.
Chapter 6

Metaphors, Imaginaries and Schools

Introduction

The previous chapters have considered three different metaphors we use to consider civic relationships in the search to identify an appropriate theory of belonging to correspond with our desires for social cohesion. This chapter turns to the second and third of my original questions to consider the possible implications of the three metaphors and how they might affect both school structures and pedagogy when social cohesion is taken seriously. By considering the commitments held within the models, examining their capacity to bind disparate people together through an appropriate exemplar, we may gain clarity as regards the potential ramifications for how we organize education to nurture and encourage these relationships.

Political concepts influence our lives and are constantly being re-examined and redefined by politicians or theorists in the course of everyday life. The way in which we describe the world, the metaphors we use, marks out and highlights what we think as being of importance. Coupled with this is the view that such metaphorical models form a crucial link between the world around us and our knowledge of the world (Willson-Quayle, 1991, p8). It is undoubtedly true that we cannot know our civic others in the same way that we know our friends and families, and given that we cannot relate to them or feel for them in the same way, we have to find a way of discussing these complex situations. All such discourse necessarily depends, to some extent, on metaphorical models, and given that the
models we choose can have such extraordinary effects on the policies we choose, it is of utmost importance that we are aware of how our policy choices may be formed by these underlying commitments. In other words, every effort should be made to critically examine our metaphors to ensure the implicit values are the ones we want to inform our policies.

There are many different strands to the argument surrounding the issue of the use of metaphor, echoing many of the complexities surrounding how we organise our social lives, some of which we have explored in previous chapters. As the preceding discussions have indicated, the models through which we discuss the civic relationship are themselves fiercely disputed, and open to interpretation and analysis. I now wish to examine how different metaphors affect our understanding and organisation of schools and to demonstrate the importance of appropriate models. In this chapter, I will outline two distinctive arguments concerning the use of metaphor in this area. Firstly, I shall argue that metaphor is used where ordinary language fails: in new situations, we need a new ‘vocabulary’. Metaphor enables us to create this new vocabulary. Metaphor, in this view, enables us to encapsulate potentially complex arguments and phenomena in a way that can be understood by the populace or can be used to further scholarly discourse and understanding of the subject matter. In the second argument, I wish to suggest that metaphor not only translates what is there but also in turn has the power to affect that reality.

Whilst most political philosophy is built upon the tacit understandings and interlinked assumptions of two contrasting metaphors for the civic relationship (that of friendship or family - both of which I have shown to have problems), in the last chapter I proposed an alternative to these: that of democratic fraternity. In the
course of addressing these issues, I suggested that by rooting of fraternity in a concept of democracy, we might throw new light and gain fresh insights into the nature of the civic relationship. As I indicated in my first chapter, understanding and analysing the associational bond is only one element of my thesis. As discourse in this area can be seen to be unavoidably metaphorical by nature, the methodology of this thesis needs necessarily to turn to consider this facet to achieve the former.

The use of metaphor as a focus in itself for academic study has emerged over the past two decades from the field of Cognitive Linguistics into a field of study known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory. This has been built around the work of George Lakoff, based on empirical studies as well as the application of metaphor, in contrast to the literal understanding of the world around us. Whilst metaphor has long been the subject of study of linguistics and literature, less attention has been paid to it as a feature of our neurological systems, informing the way we conceptualise systems and interpret the world around us (Lakoff, 2002). Metaphor, following the work of Lakoff and Johnson, is a fundamental mechanism of the mind that allows us to use what we know about one area to affect our understanding of others. They become 'metaphors we live by' and are frequently used to interpret or explain novel phenomena. The use of particular metaphors helps create and frame discourse in shifting political ideas. They are about meaning and the persuasive consequences of interpretations (Beer and De Landtsheer, 2004, p7).

Metaphors abound as soon as we start to consider complex ideas. To take just one example, all talk of a public sphere is metaphorical by nature and demands an acceptance of a social imaginary for the discourse to take place. The
state is invisible and has to be symbolised, it has to be imagined before it can be conceived (Anderson, 1991). Metaphor becomes a distinct way of allowing us to consider particular areas of life by carrying over images, values and associations from one area of life to another; it allows us to enter the realm of political theory and thus can affect policy. It is in this respect, I suggest, it can interplay with the way we structure school systems.

Democracy requires citizens: it requires citizens of a certain type, yet such citizens are not born, they are made (Callan, 1997). Education is a cornerstone of democracy. Making citizens, turning children into citizens can be claimed to be one of the basic functions of education. Education and schools, more than any other institutions, shape normative values and beliefs and transmit these to successive generations. The models we choose to use for shaping these values thus assume great practical importance. In so far as schools form a central role in the primary socialisation of children, then how we conceive of this civic role and the relationship between citizens assumes importance for how we structure the transmission of this view and the institutions we choose to do this in. Given this close association, it is important that the structure of the institution that transmits the policy should not itself undermine the values being transmitted.

Simply posited, schools in societies that purport to be democracies are obliged to develop citizens, part of which is developing the necessary relationship between such citizens (Parker, 2005). Whilst citizenship education has come to be seen as a means of addressing the social cohesion needed by the state and the diverse range of cultures formed within the polis, some models of organisation can restrict the achievement of this aim. Discerning how a system of schooling might aim to prepare children for their future lives as citizens, how it might be
structured and how it might affect their capacity to restrict or develop the
relationships and behavioural traits necessary to democratic character, forms the
subject-matter be explored in this chapter.

To explore how the metaphorical models for the civic relationship interplay
with how we structure our educational institutions, in Section 1 I explore how we
understand our collective life through an expository section on the academic
literature surrounding the social imaginary. In Section 2, I examine how an
understanding of 'root metaphor' illuminates many of the features of this area. In
Section 3, Metaphors and School Organisation, I look at how the metaphors of
friendship, the marketplace and family give normative authority to how school
systems are structured and to how the relationships between schools, teachers
and pupils would thus be organised. Finally, in Section 4, the conclusion, I return
to my alternative metaphor using a modification of the family metaphor as
siblinghood within a concept of democracy.

Section 1: The Social Imaginary

It is not part of my focussed intentions to offer a complete exposition of the
study of social imaginaries, yet having alluded to the work of Benedict Anderson
and the insights gained through his work on the 'imagined community' as a way of
thinking about nationalism and how we consider our collective life, it appears
imperative to explore how this complex topic relates to my field of study and the
conceptualisation of what it is to be a 'we'.

The term 'social imaginary' was first coined in 1975 by Castoriadis in his
book "The Imaginary Institution of Society" in which he examined how a
multiplicity of socio-historical realities could be possible through an ontological
approach. In other words, that society is a self-creating enterprise whose form cannot be deduced from previous conditions. Each society derives its unity through its collective myths, legends, symbols and shared significants. The creation of new language, for example through metaphors, serves as a heuristic model for understanding the social imaginary (Gaonkar, 2002). It is the formation of this element of often unarticulated background understandings that has formed the background to this thesis. I purport that a rapidly changing pluralist society within a modern liberal democracy requires the creation of a new language for how we stand to one another, and that this conceptualisation, in turn, relies upon the use of metaphor.

This 'grand narrative' has in turn been taken up and interpreted through a rapidly growing mountain of literature. Take for example, Charles Taylor's book, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, which looks at the way people imagine their social existence and the “deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor, 2004, p23). He adopts the idea of an 'imaginary' to focus on how ordinary people *imagine* their social surroundings through images, stories and legends (p23). The overall picture that emerges from this is that an imaginary is a way of 'imagining' our social existence, how we relate to others, how social life can be ordered. It goes beyond the background understandings necessary to make sense of these practices to encompass:

> How we stand to each other, how we got to where we are, how we relate to other groups, and so on. (Taylor, 2004, p25)

This idea of social embeddedness then becomes part of a theory of personal identity. And again, an imaginary is taken to refer to how a given people imagine their collective social life:
...the thinking shared within a society by ordinary people, the common understanding that makes common practices possible and legitimizes them. The social imaginary is implicit and normative; it derives from the usual, the quotidian, from everyday attitudes, behaviours and opinion making... the social imaginary provides the background that makes sense of any given act in daily life.

(Arthurs, 2003, p580)

These quotations taken together suggest that the imaginary has to be shared by a large group of people, if not the whole society, yet allows for change and development; it does not remain static and unchanging.

I will try to approach the main issue here by first sketching how the idea of social imaginaries encompasses three areas that are crucial to the modern imaginary in the Anglo-American world in Taylor's original piece: the public sphere, the citizen-state and the economy (Taylor, 2004). Consider the following:

I want to speak of social imaginary here, rather than social theory, because there are important – and multiple – differences between the two. I speak of imaginary because I'm talking about the way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms; it is carried in images, stories and legends. But it is also the case that theory is usually the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society.

(Taylor, 2004, p106)

On the present interpretation, modern social imaginaries are dependent on relationships between strangers made possible through the existence of mass media, for example (Anderson, 1991). It is dependent on a notion of 'we' – a collective metaphorical coming together.

Since its publication, the book *Imagined Communities* (Anderson, 1991), has been a point of reference for many writers in the area of political philosophy as well as those of anthropology and sociology. Whilst it was initially conceived as a contribution to the discussion of nationalisms, it has found its way into discussions of contemporary social analysis as a way of analysing how society is formed and interacts. Indeed, it has become almost impossible to discuss
nationalism without reference to this seminal work. The first point to consider from this text is that Anderson defines the nation as:

..an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. (Anderson, 1991, p6)

He argues that it must be *imagined* because members of the nation cannot possibly know, meet or hear of all of their fellow citizens in the face-to-face way that can exist within a small village. Yet, despite this, each citizen holds an image of their community. It must be *limited* in that there has to be an ‘us' and ‘others'. Even the largest nation has to have boundaries beyond which there are other nations. No nation, he argues, sees itself as encompassing all of humankind. It must be *sovereign* because of its historical origins, from the Age of Enlightenment and revolution destroying the divinely-ordained and/or dynastic realms. It is imagined as a *community* because

...regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal relationship. (Anderson, 1991, p7)

Whilst there appears on the surface to be some ambiguity within the concept, it is important to understand that for Anderson ‘imagining’ does not imply falsity or imaginary. He contends that all communities larger than the face-to-face-ness of a small village have to be imagined.

What is the metaphor of the ‘imagined community’ illuminating? What is it pointing to? Ultimately, it is pointing out a psychological fact, that the nation cannot be known in the same way as close, personal relationships, neither can it create the same attachments. Yet the metaphor goes beyond this, in a poetic way, to indicate the *type* of relationship. The nation is *like* a community; it puts the nation in with the family of concepts that includes ‘communities'.
There are, however, several unspoken suppositions underlying much of this material. There is the implied sense of a certain psychological element to how we experience our social life. When political life is imagined a certain way, a particular set of insights is then available. More interestingly, beyond this, lies the ethical or normative claims forming much of the background understandings: the myths, legends, stories that carry the imaginary speak of what we see as important, the values and commitments that underlie social life. The social imaginary is then conceived as "a set of symbols with which people give imaginative definition to their yearning for supportive, reciprocal and intimate social relationships" (Farrar, 1999, p13). These provide the background understandings for the organisation of social life.

Whilst much of the discourse on social imaginaries is decidedly vague in character and full of unclear interpretations (perhaps due to being a relatively new area of study), some elements of it have been accepted into mainstream social and political theory. It is generally accepted that we orientate ourselves in the political world by the symbols and referents used. The challenge for countries facing high levels of immigration would thus lie in adapting or reinterpreting our existing symbols and referents that speak of this element of political life. This in turn requires an ever-adapting language through which to conceive of our social existence. Given that Anderson is correct in his analysis of 'the nation' as a social imaginary, that it is a necessary way of conceiving of ourselves as a collective agency, and given that much of political discourse depends on the use of metaphor, it seems reasonable to assume that how we conceive of our social bonds will also be conceptual. In the next section, I shall briefly step back a little
to consider how the use of metaphor relates to that of the imaginary, by outlining one particular understanding of the role of 'root metaphors'.

Section 2: Root Metaphors

Much of our social and political reasoning makes use of interlocking systems of concepts (Lakoff, 1995). This assertion seems both reasonable and self evident. Yet I wish to consider the usage of particular metaphors that can be unpacked to reveal subconscious commitments to particular values and goals, and when acted upon, can have important consequences. Whilst the three metaphors forming the basis of this thesis are interesting in their own right, I wish now to argue that one of them in particular when rooted in a conception of democracy provides the most appropriate interplay with the modern liberal state.

The concept of root metaphors has been gaining attention and importance since the 1970s; it is generally accepted in the literature that root metaphors seek to explore the 'logic' of the metaphor. The contribution of Lakoff et al that I find of potentially most interest in this area is that the root metaphor differs from other metaphors in not being an explicit language device, but more an unconscious, yet fundamental assumption necessitated by the argument.

Taking this further, there are two distinct applications of this point. Firstly, it can be understood as an underlying world view that shapes an individual's understanding of a situation. A key feature of this claim is that these tend to be so embedded within the language, that one can be unaware of their existence as metaphor. One has to go:

...beneath the surface of expression where metaphors exist as figures of speech and seeking that level of thought where they serve, formatively, to bring into being a world we are to experience as concrete and literal. (Kunze, 1983, p153)
Secondly, root metaphors can be understood as the concept from which other metaphors spring, for example, *winning an argument* (argument as war, battle, for instance). I wish to make use of both of these facets: firstly, that when we unpick the underlying and implicit commitments and values within democratic fraternity, we will recognise that these most fully correspond with our liberal traditions, but secondly, that democratic fraternity has a unique relationship to that of democracy, that democracy implies a relationship of fraternity.

Metaphors of family and friends are amongst the strongest we have for models of the public space and as such, are common in many different cultures. These metaphors are not only universal as models, but also incredibly powerful; kinship and models of kinship, for example, have impacted on every part of social life throughout history. Both anthropology and sociology, through the work of theorists such as Mary Douglas and Emmanuel Todd in their studies on natural symbols in cultures, have given support to this claim. Indeed, Todd, in particular, looked at how family structures and relationships constitute models of socio-political relationships in societies (Todd, 1985). In addition to these two metaphors, there has been a growing tendency to use market-place metaphors to describe civic relationships as 'transactions' between strangers. In what follows, I shall consider the particular values and commitments entailed by these three metaphors.

Turning back momentarily to Lakoff: different uses of family-metaphor (with different visions of 'parents': strict parent versus nurturing parent) are claimed to underpin much of US politics and indicate how beliefs are frequently supported by the metaphors in which the ideas are framed (Lakoff, 1995). Our identity is socially embedded as a member of the family. By so characterising the topic, the
relationship to the state is dependent to some extent on our relationship to other people. For example, the 'Nation-as-family' metaphor carries with it a strong notion of belonging together in some sense, whether by birth or adoption. Consider just a few of the common metaphors in this area: 'Uncle Sam,' 'founding fathers,' 'sending sons into war' 'family of man', 'brothers-in arms' and other such examples. These surreptitiously serve to call to mind the warmth and support of kin relationships (Kaplan, 2007). It can, however, carry over other, more negative images: government-as-parent and citizens-as-children and invoke paternalism (Lakoff, 1995).

Similarly, I would argue, the metaphor of 'Nation-as-friends' carries with it a particular notion: that of having been a 'chosen' relationship, of being bound together in a joint venture: 'Britain will stand by her friends' 'living side-by-side' 'citizen-friends' 'civic friendship' 'friendship of peoples' 'our fellow Americans'. Here, the effect created is of a society of equals, of mutual benefit, of people 'drawn' together. But the equation of friendship with citizenship has problems (Healy, 2006). Ties of friendship require a voluntary nature and affection between participants; ties of citizenship are more contractual, driven by obligation and duty (Wellman, 2001).

In contrast, the metaphor of 'nation-as-marketplace' carries with it 'government as contract' and citizens as 'buyers and sellers', an exchange of services, society as 'consumption or production': 'social contract' 'we need to be more competitive as a nation' 'the consumer society' 'corporate citizenship' 'a nation of shopkeepers'. The relationship between people becomes that of utility, not affection. For a society to achieve civic cohesion, however understood, it would need to go beyond a relationship based on exchange of services to
achieve inclusion of those weaker members of society outside of the boundary of
the market. Citizens need to be motivated towards doing what is good for the
sake of others: they need a sense of concern for the well-being of each other
(Kaplan, 2007).

These metaphors undoubtedly have 'audience appeal' in that they can
activate conscious and subconscious emotional responses (Beer and De
Landtsheer, 2004, p27), even suggesting that often complex political issues have
a simplicity to them, thus giving the audience a sense of confidence. There are,
however, negative aspects to this: they are capable of carrying stereotypes, of
oversimplifying complex issues, even of lulling the audience into being
manipulated by their emotional responses. The more literally a metaphor is taken,
the less likely it is to be subject to examination and critique. No metaphor can
wholly eliminate these problems, yet as intimated in the first chapter, it is highly
important that the metaphors that shape our lives should be as germane as
possible.

To consider democratic fraternity as a metaphor. Each component of the
metaphor highlights an important aspect of the concept. The metaphor of family
evokes a specific community of people who belong; it implies a home, an
emotional bond and a common purpose binding people together. But what it does
goes beyond this: democratic fraternity secularizes the notions of family and
expands those within its remit, removing lingering historical religious connotations.
Democratic fraternity, I argue is unique as a political metaphor in that it is rooted
in a particular understanding of the relationship between citizens in an
understanding of democracy. The linkage with democracy serves to point to a
normative dimension and gives a guideline for future action. It shifts the core of
investigation to both the linkage with equality and the realm of the political. The idea of the nation-as-family is referred to by Lakoff as a deeper metaphor in the way to it underlies many liberal values (Lakoff, 1995), can avoid many of the problems associated with family metaphors (paternalism for instance) by confining the image to that of siblings. It is this particular characteristic of this particular metaphor that is lacking in the other two.

Could democratic fraternity be understood as a literal relationship, a straightforward description of a state-of-affairs? It seems a trivial point to make, but citizens of western liberal democracies are not brothers or family members in a literal sense of the term (with the possible exception of possible tribal communities). As elucidated in the previous chapter, when fraternity is used metaphorically on its own, it results in 'strong fraternity' and the problems that arose from this (see Chapter 5). To expand into possible wider understandings of belonging, beyond the narrowness of birth relationships, fraternity is indispensable to democracy. Fraternity, when rooted in a conception of democracy, achieves something the other two metaphors fail to do: it forms a framework through which to consider democracy as a way of living in society.

Munoz-Darde points to how fraternity itself works as a heuristic device because of being a metaphor:

...it suggests the idea of a generation of siblings asking: ‘what would things be like if, instead of obeying the rules and principles that are applied to us, we were to choose them?’... But fraternity also invites us to enquire: "What kind of principles would I want to apply to my fellow citizens if I had a concrete understanding of their needs and then of the kind of person each of them is such as the understanding I would have if they were my brothers and sisters?" In the first sense, fraternity works as a heuristic device for the discovery of normative binding elements between each of the brothers and sisters and among all of them. In the second case, fraternity provides a conceptual link between concrete personal care and impersonal benevolence.

(Munoz-Darde, 1999, p90)
Thus the use of metaphor allows us to enter the realm of political theory, allowing us to move from the metaphor to insights into the relationship between citizens. These deep metaphors serve a further purpose. They provide a standard to steer by, yet hold the possibility of being realizable (Taylor, 2004). To develop this further, I now turn to how these different metaphors influence/interact with the field of schooling and school structures to examine the normative significance of each of the metaphors considered here and suggest how they might be realized.

Section 3: Metaphors and School Organisation

Whilst undoubtedly there are those who view metaphors as merely decorative or stylistic additions to arguments, the study of how metaphor frames the domain language and interacts with policy is starting to attract academic attention (for example Beer and De Landtsheer, 2004). Metaphors clearly play a role in how we think and talk about the realm of the political; the rhetorical persuasiveness of these can form a framework within which to then reason about our commitments. However, it must be acknowledged that whilst we may speak of the 'power of metaphor' and the 'interplay between metaphor and policy', demonstrating this in practice may not itself prove entirely achievable in all situations. New phrases, new metaphors, new vocabulary come in to usage all the time, some pass into common usage, others wither and fade. Some affect the ways in which we organise or run aspects of our shared lives, for example 'the stakeholder society', 'the third way' amongst many others.

If we remained at the level of metaphor as mere decorative language, it would be of interest, but not of great importance. However, as intimated in the previous chapter, it is the possibility of metaphor usage to go beyond this at an
unseen level, to import the hidden, sometimes subconscious, values and commitments from one area to another that epitomizes this aspect of metaphor that I wish to focus on in this section. Herein lies the role of philosophy, mapping out metaphoric concepts and enabling us to understand better the metaphorical nature of what we take for granted in conventional language.

Hence, to look at the normative implications of this, I shall consider the metaphors of friendship, family and market (economic metaphor) already encountered in this thesis. I then consider what kinds of schools and school systems would emerge when interplaying with practice. So pervasive has the market metaphor become in both the structure and running of schools (particularly in the UK), that many elements will be instantly recognisable, hence this forms the best starting point.

*Market (economic metaphor)*

Even for advocates of the marketisation of schools, there have been rumblings of disquiet over some of the externalities associated with this as a practice, and as such, the impact of markets on schooling remains hotly contested in many quarters. Yet to look at it as a metaphor, interplaying with practice and carrying over the associated values is an area less often explored. For example, this metaphor emphasises the vertical forms of loyalty over the horizontal forms needed by citizens; exit becomes the preferred way of dealing with problems or dissatisfaction; brand loyalty emphasises the corporate-identity forming process; the concept of competition reduces the likelihood of cooperation; 'choice' is the predominant feature (Healy, 2008).

44 Externalities in economic terms are the consequences or factors of production that are not taken into account in establishing the market price.
I will approach the salient issues by first sketching out some of the concepts associated with the metaphor of market: price, value for money, customers, clients, sponsorship, standards, competition, delivery, appraisal, assessment, business, economy, corporate identity, contracts, demand, enterprise, market and sales. Using this metaphor, what would the school system look like? There would need to be a variety of types of school to choose from (choice requires more than one to choose between), each offering something different (brand loyalty to the extreme). Whilst parents would be looking for 'best value' for their particular child, schools would also be choosing: they would be looking for pupils that could meet their academic requirements. Funding would be by vouchers and/or top-up fees or completely fee-paying. Between schools would be intense competition both for pupils (frequently referred to as customers or pupil units) and position, with a declining or low level role for LEA involvement. Schools would have to consider their market position in admittance procedures, for example, pupils who might lower their position in league tables and/or academic achievements would not be viewed as 'valuable' to the school and may even be discouraged. Schools would be judged on their position in league tables, ranked in order: those with declining pupil rolls would be deemed unprofitable and allowed to close. Those schools looking to increase their advantage over other schools, and market position, would look to how best to achieve academic achievement including size of school. Whilst there may be schools that could be tempted to increase the number of pupils and hence have greater financial gain (each pupil being worth X number of pounds), others may well concentrate on 'small schools'.
On the present interpretation, such schools would be stratified organisations with a strong emphasis on uniforms and vertical loyalty symbols. Teachers and schools would be pitted against each other in competition. Staff relationships would be affected by emphasis on individual personal achievements, lack of co-operation and non-sharing of good practice (for fear of others’ advancement). There would be an overemphasis on achievement measured by constant assessment, targets and testing, league tables and competition. Personalised learning would be sought for individual benefit, gain and achievement. Placement by test scores and league tables would feature highly.

This model contrasts and clashes with many important values within a liberal democratic society. With the use of the metaphor of markets, excellence for some would mean the failure of others. There would be little regard for the civic virtues of mutual respect or toleration, no equality of worth of citizens: it would negate any idea of ‘education for its own sake’. Again, it would neglect the secondary relationships needed by the civic relationship, but it may even go further. It could damage or fray the primary relationships too: the work colleagues, friends and people we turn to in a crisis, with whom we may also be in competition. The consequences of a purely market-metaphor based education or school system would damage an important element of the flourishing life: personal relationships.

Family

The family is a primary domain in how we organise social life and as such, it provides a powerful metaphor for how the civic relationship can be modelled. As a model of organisation and relationships, this subsequently affects how we view
and interpret systems of cooperation. With its suggestion of the domestic sphere, the model can be seen to underpin some conceptions of civic interaction. This model can be understood as a metaphoric model for schools wherein the pupils are tied together through something substantial shared in common: a strong attachment linked to a sense of identity, inseparable from their place in a particular structure; shared values and traditions; strong, thick bonds of loyalty; an emotional tie to the group; a distinct body of ideas as to how best to live a life.

Many church/religious schools work within this imaginary seeing each person involved in the school (pupil, staff, governors, parents) as being related as family, through the attachment to the religion, priding themselves as being part of a greater whole, united as the 'family of God'. They would conceive of them as being part of a 'whole life'; the same people involved in the public life of the school would be the same people involved in the elements we associate with the more private world of religion/tribe and home. This gives an extraordinary closeness to the communities and sense of belonging.

Now consider the concepts evoked by the metaphor of family: clan, group identities, related by origin, common lineage, group, related, kinsfolk, private, kindred, community, tribe, intimates, a house and a sense of belonging (usually by birth). In so characterizing the metaphor, it should be noted that such an educational system would be evidenced by schools based on group identities, (frequently religious, ethnic or tribal) and these would have very strong internal structures and tight bonds of loyalty. They would be groupings bound together on the basis of a common origin or lineage. Such schools would bond tightly with other schools sharing the same identity but to some extent, stand at a distance
from those who did not. Some schools may deliberately limit their size to enable
the close relationships and allegiances: the family-school.

Within the school, the metaphor of family would determine the organisation
and ethos: they would see themselves based on 'family principles'. There would
be clear leadership roles with centralised control. There would be the use of
strong identity symbols: uniforms, mottos, group activities to bind individuals to
the group. The tight vertical and horizontal loyalties would be evidenced in the
responsibility each felt for the other. Schools would be organised to anchor the
personal identities of pupils to a particular way of life, nourished by contributing
and engaging in the practices of the community. The loyalties and dispositions
would be between members of the same group. There would be a sense of
shared tradition and belonging through a shared belief system or framework.
Obligations would be felt towards those who share the same characteristics; a
sense of communion can be felt with those attending other schools bearing the
same characteristics.

Again, there would be problems transposing these values to the civic
sphere where there would be a variety of other groupings bound tightly together.
Those not related by origin (whether birth, cultural for example) would be viewed
as outsiders and a lesser sense of responsibility would be in order: they would be
outside the clan. The allegiances of 'family' may even clash with their civic
allegiances. This metaphor would create and sustain very strong primary
relationships, in a similar way to friendship metaphors, yet fail to encourage the
secondary ones needed by the general civic community. Again, in the same way,
it may be successful at creating and nourishing bonding social capital, but less successful at bridging and linking social capital.\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{Friendship}

Friendship is not as easily mapped onto school structures or types of schools as the other two metaphors yet can be understood on several levels with regard to personal relationships within schools. Firstly, it can be understood as a metaphoric model using a 'mirror' understanding of friendship. This encompasses features of friendship: first and foremost, that of emotional attachment, voluntary nature, partiality, a shared history, issues of equality, an attitude of equal worth; reciprocity and mutual aid. But also there is the point that we tend to choose our friends from those who are like ourselves.

Consider the surrounding concepts evoked by \textit{friendship} as a metaphor: closeness, strong affective bonds, affection, goodwill, intimacy, kind-heartedness, sympathy, openness, sociability, empathy, generosity, understanding and love. Transpose these attitudes and dispositions into schools and we can construct a second more literal understanding of schools using the features of friendship. In school terms, this would appear to be an appropriate metaphor for prescribing an idealised relationship which could then be reflected in the organisation and ethos of the \textit{functioning} of the school. Between schools would be a spirit of cooperative ventures, an emphasis on staff and pupils meeting and working together. Such schools would not be competing against each other but would have a sense of mutual belonging and a common goal, evidenced by federations or clusters of schools working together. However, this would only extend to those schools that

\textsuperscript{45} These concepts were outlined on p125-6 in Chapter 5.
'knew' each other, that were somehow connected whether geographically or by some shared system of values; it would not extend to all schools.

Between adults, the emphasis would be on team teaching, supportive learning environments, working together. There would be the supportive relationships of 'critical friends': teachers working alongside each other, talking through problems, observations of each other teaching, solving each other's difficulties. The emphasis would be on personal feelings and relationships between adults and other adults, adults and children, and children to children.

However, such a metaphor also carries some of the negativities of personal friendship: the possibility of partiality and favouritism. Such partiality can exclude as well as include. It is one thing to be friendly towards others, another entirely to be friends. This metaphor creates very strong primary relationships, but may also fail to adequately encourage the secondary ones needed by the general civic community. It may be successful at bonding social capital, but less successful at bridging and linking social capital.

Friendship tends to be more common between those who share a particular bond; where schools consist of children of the same kind (whether class, race or geographical similarities) the chances are high that the loyalty bonds will be stronger. Ball draws a very convincing picture of how 'choice politics and education markets' aid the reproduction of class advantage (Ball, 2003). This, combined with the ability to cherry-pick (whether by post-code or ability) the peers their children are schooled with, means parents 'inadvertently' create schools of 'similars': similar types of children will attend. Unlike the family metaphor that seeks to bind together those who share a particular vision of the
good (including), this seeks to exclude those who are different or do not fit the profile, in turn creating intolerance towards the 'out-group'.

**Democratic Fraternity**

The concept of democratic fraternity is itself metaphoric and thus does not point to a *particular* relationship. This combined metaphor can throw new light and insights through grounding the symbols and referents used. It may require a common system of schooling; it would certainly reject segregation of any type as being incompatible with the democratic ideal of citizenship. Schools would have a wide range of persons attending; physical and social integration would be highly prized in creating a space where future citizens come together. Schools would see themselves as having common goals, working together, again, possibly in federations, perhaps emphasising the amelioration of disadvantage.

There would be mutual support in school processes with schools working together for best practices. Schooling would focus on future citizens’ abilities to choose between alternatives and to exercise ‘rule’. Schools would be concerned to develop both vertical and horizontal loyalties. The relationship between adults and pupils would be one of sharing common goals and a lessened sense of competition with other pupils and other schools. There would be an equal emphasis on the ‘weak ties’, or ‘bridging’ that connects us to others as well as on the bonding/strong ties. There would be a sense of trust and affection for fellow citizens; partiality would be balanced with the demands of justice.

Pupils would see each other as standing one to another as moral equals. Personal virtues such as co-operation and fairness would be highly valued personal attributes. Pupils may well work in a variety of different ways: team,
group and individual. Celebrations of achievement would encompass both group and individual achievements (both vertical and horizontal relationships). Pupils would feel a sense of ownership within the school but a lessened sense of competition between others.

It is notable that the contrast between 'schools-as-they-are' and these metaphoric models emphasises that no actual school fits neatly into just one category; most schools are an amalgamation of more than one metaphor, though some will inevitably emphasise one more than another. However, it does illustrate how these different metaphors for the civic relationship are themselves reflected in the values and attitudes that influence school, forming the 'background noise' affecting development of civic relationships.

Section 4: Conclusion

In this chapter, I have indicated that the metaphors we use for the civic relationship can interact with and reflect how we organise educational institutions and, unconsciously, the values we then transmit. I have thus outlined how the three metaphors explored in this thesis can be realised in school organisations. However, a major problem with this sort of move is to justify whether we need metaphor at all. Is it possible to step outside of metaphor? It is to this that I now direct my argument within the framework of democratic fraternity.

Firstly, it is palpably correct that all talk of a public sphere is metaphorical by nature. Political life would be unintelligible without being ordered and given meaning by language; metaphor is how we order these important constructs. The world of the political is too big and complex to be directly experienced hence we need metaphors from direct experience to help us engage with the subject. In
other words, we are limited in our ability to process information from such large entities as the civic sphere; we need a way to limit or draw out important features in a manageable manner:

Metaphors allow the general public to grasp the meanings of political events and feel a part of the process. They are also effective because of their ability to resonate with latent symbolic representations residing at the unconscious level. (Mio, 1997, p130)

This requires us to filter out unnecessary features allowing us to discuss and predict possible connections, which of necessity limits and structures the information available. It is hardly surprising that 'social cohesion' is rarely seen as being, itself, a metaphor. If subjected to the same examination as the three deep metaphors forming the core of this thesis, it can be seen to contain the unspoken subtext of *accord, harmony, union, wholeness*, as referring in some way to a 'social glue'.\footnote{I am indebted to Graham Haydon for this insight.} It creates a model for how we speak about 'belonging' at a macro level and illustrates both the seeming impossibility of political study without recourse to metaphor and that some of our most widely used metaphors become so embedded within the language that we forget their metaphorical character.

However, whilst it is possible to speak of the civic relationship metaphorically, these deep metaphors do more than this. As previously intimated, they give us guidance in discerning how to live the civic relationship in reality. Democratic fraternity, I purport, encapsulates a particular vision of how we might consider our collective life.

This brings me to my second point: philosophical explanation needs metaphor because, on occasions, no literal language yet exists to discuss new areas or to communicate new insights. In these cases, metaphors have a creative role to play in filling in the gaps as we attempt to create such a vocabulary and as
such, they aim at 'global coherence' (Peres, 2006). Unlike literary metaphors, philosophical ones are tied up with explanation: they serve a function that cannot be served in another way, allowing us to create and model theories, to test hypotheses, to consider that which is hard to articulate in another way; they create the background conditions in which we work and think.

It can be argued that the study of political life has always depended on the use of metaphors, but these metaphors can change over time in response to socio-historical contexts (as so interestingly drawn out by Brunkhorst\(^{47}\)). Yet changing metaphors can also indicate changes of mind and reclassification of ideas or concepts. (One can recall from the previous chapter that the concept of fraternity itself replaced that of civic friendship in response to such contexts). The challenge for ethnic and social diversity, with its subsequent implications for social cohesion (as set out in my first chapter) requires such a new vocabulary, hence I argue for a place for democratic fraternity as a contribution to this vocabulary. Newly crafted metaphors take time to pass into common parlance, yet when adopted can drastically alter particular parts of social life ('the public sphere', 'community', 'the social contract' amongst others). The 'stakeholder society', for example, which started as a way of understanding the relationship of the citizen to the state, had enormous influence for a short time in the late 1990s on issues such as an enabling welfare state, issues of dispersion of wealth and opportunity.

Thirdly, the normative value of metaphorical models in political philosophical discourse (and I include educational discourse in this category) lies in their ability to carry over particular un-stated, (and possibly un-stateable) values and commitments. Consider the following:

\(^{47}\) Brunkhorst: 'Solidarity': extensively referred to in Chapters 3 & 5, tracing the history and usage of the bonds of civic friendship and fraternity.
I have argued that perhaps the most important part of any real moral system is the system of metaphors for morality and the priorities given to particular metaphors. If I am correct, then vital political reasoning is done using those metaphors — and usually done unconsciously. This means that the empirical study of metaphorical thought must be given its appropriate place in ethics and moral theory.  

(Lakoff, 1995, p20)

As I suggested in the first chapter, there is an ethical dimension to the models used. With this in mind, I contend that fraternity encompasses many values needed within a notion of democracy that are not explicitly contained within the concepts of liberty and equality: fairness, cooperation, trust, inclusion and responsibility for example.

The difference between liberty and equality, on the one hand, and fraternity on the other, is that the former values promote the free association of individuals, whereas the latter promotes the cooperation of individuals in the community. Cooperation is inspired by the commonality of interests and gives rise to the pooling of resources in pursuit of a common goal. Association per se connotes a simple fact: people are connected with one another. Cooperation connotes something more: people who are connected can work together to advance common interests.  

(Gonthier, 2000, p.574)

And again:

The goal of fraternity is to work together to achieve the highest quality of individual existence.  

(Gonthier, 2000, p.570)

Such metaphors can have enormous social consequences in shaping our understandings of our world, often subconsciously. It must be remembered: political theory is meant to be persuasive, aiming at new attitudes, changing minds and thus discovering new meanings (Shklar, 1969, p225).

The use of metaphor as a methodology allows us to create and model theories, to test hypotheses, to consider that which is hard to articulate in another way. But more than this, they not only provide the language in which to express these commitments, but by tapping into our memories and associations as a tool for understanding, can subconsciously direct public policy. These factors direct
the methodology used in this thesis to zone in on the use of metaphor as a viable subject of study. Nevertheless, one must be careful to remember metaphorical insights are not literal truths and cannot be subjected to the same verification processes as such. Although not verifiable by empirical testing, they can be subject to similar standards of authentication: their 'truth-value' is in their usefulness as models.

Democracy has a unique interest in the formation of all citizens and future citizens. If we determine that one of the most crucial responsibilities of public education is the formation of a public, then it is incumbent on us to work within an appropriate model that will reinforce that aim. This entails that we are working with an appropriate, useful model of the civic relationship, have some conception of how public education nourishes this and can show why this is the best policy to fulfil this responsibility. Where models clash, the aims of both are undermined. In the next chapter, I turn to how best to translate the metaphor of democratic fraternity into action.
Realizing Democratic Fraternity: From Theory to Policy

For democracies to thrive, citizens have to be taught how to be democrats.

(Enslin, Pendlebury and Tjiattas, 2001, p115)

Introduction

In the previous chapter I argued that the use of metaphor helps us to model possible relationships, and as such, can aid the move from theory to practice. I suggested that the implications of this analysis may lead us to rearticulate not only how we organise our schools to further develop these bonds of association, but also could impact on what happens within the classroom. I now wish to look at these claims a little more closely.

The focal point of any vision of what a socially cohesive, democratic society should be, must be how its citizens relate to each other and the bonds and loyalties required of them. It is through these associations with others that we learn to practise and develop the civic skills and attitudes needed to uphold the civic bond. The wider the range of contacts, the wider the scope for secondary relationships, thus bringing students together to associate with one another is an important part in learning to be free equal citizens (Gutmann, 2003, p130). Where associations are restricted amongst particular sectors of a populace, the development of the civic virtues of toleration, respect, for example, may themselves also be restricted. Merely seeking to expose pupils to a smattering of differences and diversity through teaching about other commitments/ways of life is arguably not sufficient. Learning about someone’s way of life is very different from
knowing someone who practices that way of life and thus appreciating the importance that this holds for them as part of who they are.

Education is unavoidably about the next generation (Reich, 2002). Schools are probably one of the first sustained, public experiences children have (Parker, 2003). These two factors make schools particularly well-situated to supporting future citizens with common sets of values, attitudes and knowledge to enable social life to continue. These attributes enable us to develop the secondary relationships necessary to make possible our breaking out from family, tribe and friendship. Schooling is our most deliberative form of human instruction (Gutmann, 1987) where our private and public selves come together in a necessary tension. I use the word 'necessary' deliberately. The constant tension between the two causes us to continually evaluate and create dialogue between all parties concerned. Democracy needs the tensions: the tensions prevent complacency and limit power of one party over another.

The purpose of this penultimate chapter is twofold. Firstly, I start from the query: what are the implications for a democratic society that wants an appropriate educational system capable of the development of appropriate levels of social cohesion. I then seek to consider the practical implications through considering possible policy solutions to the problem. Rather than delve into all possible pedagogical or structural issues connected with democratic fraternity, I have chosen to treat several possible scenarios with brevity to help illustrate the use of metaphor as a methodology for moving into policy. Using an 'ideal model' may allow us to consider that which cannot be transposed directly into a current situation.
A second function of this chapter is to raise questions as to the nature of the relationship between ideal theory and policy. Leaning on the insights of others in the field (Forester, 1993; Reich, 2002), I suggest that ideal models serve to delineate possible policies that accord with our ultimate ends and to completely exclude others that are contrary to the values we seek. I argue that it is a far from simple matter to totally separate arguments about school structures from those of pedagogy, and suggest instead that the two are intimately connected: that certain structures both encourage and nourish particular ways of working. Similarly, other structures may inhibit or completely rule out particular desirable pedagogical practices.

In Section 1, I explore the relationship between school structures and human relationships at an ideal level. With this in mind, I query whether democratic fraternity demands a particular form of school structure and whether this conforms to other endorsements of school organisations such as the common school movement. In Section 2, I consider current policy research in school organisation such as school federations, networks and schools-within-schools movements as the means to ameliorate concerns with fraying social cohesion at school level through expanding the possibilities for increasing the range of societal relationships. In Section 3, I consider the last of my three initial questions, given that we have decided to take social cohesion seriously within a democratic society, and equally given that we realize these commitments in the way in which we structure our school systems, what are the implications for pedagogy within these structures? To this end, I consider the contribution claimed by the Philosophy for Children movement, that coherence between conceptions of teaching about democracy and teaching democratically is required to support
democratic citizenship. I consider the possibility that what happens within schools may be as important as the structures and organisation of schools: that the debate about school choice policies (and their impact on social cohesion) fails to adequately explore the equal need to account for the civic attitudes necessary to uphold civic relationships. Finally, I question to what extent the ends we desire indicate particular means and consider the purpose of philosophical research in relation to policy.

Section 1: From Philosophy to Policy

One of the historical functions of education has always been to enable the citizens to form a civic body. Because they are public civic places (as opposed to private places), schools are uniquely placed as ideal sites in which this should take place. With this in mind, questions about school choice subconsciously affect how we see ourselves as related as citizens. Consequently, when the development of social cohesion is seen as a key aspect of publicly funded education, the consideration of how best to value and develop appropriate bonds of association acquires political pertinence. This forms the background motivation to the second and third of my original questions: what sort of structures would best support social cohesion when we choose to take it seriously, and what are the implications for pedagogy within these structures?

When democratic fraternity is understood as an ideal relationship between citizens, one that encompasses such things as impartiality, an element of equality, mutual support for example, and is equally viewed as the capacity to develop secondary relationships, encompassing both bonding and bridging social capital that are argued to lead to social cohesion, the question arises as to how can we
best educate for this? Does it imply a particular form of organisation of schools to nourish and develop this ideal? If part of the identified problem is the wide variety of possible forms of schooling with the resulting segregation of different social/ethnic/religious groups, plus the lack of attention to the development of human relationships, would a different form of school organisation support such ties better?

It is to this focal point where principles and theoretical models meet and generate policy that I now direct my attention. The exact linkage between these two strands is decidedly unclear. Indeed many political philosophers are decidedly silent on the subject of expanding models and principles into prescribing particular educational policies and pedagogies at school level. Yet practical experience teaches us that theories can and do push policy makers into specific forms of action by serving as 'road-maps'. In other words, ideas provide us with a frame within which to act. However, our ideal models are not always easily articulated and realized of at the level of policy and pedagogy.

Policy makers frequently look for clear cut simple solutions to problems, yet normative stances rarely contain a coherent and consistent set of positions that are translatable into policy decisions without difficulty. This is not to argue that the role of philosophy is redundant but that it occupies a particular role as regards policy. Philosophy offers a unique methodology in discussing possible scenarios through the use of models. It creates a space to consider alternative practices that may be accepted within the desired model. In addition to ruling in particular policies, it also serves to rule out other scenarios (this was demonstrated in previous chapters: a civic relationship based on friendship, a strict understanding

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48 I am indebted to Rob Reich for this insight given at the Roehampton /PESGB Summer School, 2009.
of the family metaphor and all those dependent on a thick usage of the market metaphor cannot be contenders). This provides a framework for the analysis of policy, serving to indicate and thus restrict the group of policy ideas found in accord with the desired aims.

In order for policies to be adopted effectively, they must cohere with the underlying norms in society. All possible solutions must themselves accord with other deeply held values and commitments in society. The policy consequences of uncovering the hidden assumptions and values implicit within the models we make use of, often rely on the examination of both metaphor and models. This has the practical outcome of setting limits on the possible structures of schools and provides guidelines for what schools within these boundaries may look and operate like. In what follows, I purport that I cannot point to one particular structure or pedagogical practice and state unreservedly that this is how democratic fraternity will play out in practice. What I can do, however, is to show which particular policy decisions can be ruled out completely (as being outside the boundaries) and which in turn may be fruitful areas for policy makers to consider or perhaps to adapt.

To start with, I consider whether our ideal relationship of citizens can best be guaranteed within an ideal system to which all have access without exception: a common school.

*The Common School*

There is, needless to say, a rapidly growing literature considering the common school which I cannot begin to address comprehensively in this thesis. Nevertheless, it would be impossible to address the practical outcomes and
implications of my work without reference to this body of work. Although the understanding of the concept of 'common school' is itself open to some ambiguity, it is usually understood in one of two ways; firstly, as a belief that all children are entitled to an education at state expense, funded commonly, but the second, and perhaps more controversial of the two, is that all children should be educated together regardless of class, race or social distinctions (as proposed by Horace Mann in the USA in the 1830s). Consider the following:

Bringing together children from different backgrounds, and caring about their education as free and equal citizens, is a crucial feature of democratic education that will fade from public view if the market metaphor comes to dominate the theory and practice of publicly subsidized schooling in American democracy. (Gutmann, 2003, p.147)

Historically, the common or public school movement in the USA evolved precisely for this purpose: the social good that ensued through bringing children of differing persuasions together into a single setting during a period of mass migration. The belief was that such school organisations enabled children from differing traditions to come together, learn from one another and exercise mutual respect within a safe, public environment. These schools were thus seen as an essential building block in creating one nation from a multitude of immigrants in the American experience and with ensuring that civic virtues and national identity, through a shared set of values, were reflected in the school structure. Non-public schools, it was felt, could not reliably represent public educational values such as equal freedom and civic relationships: the task of creating the nation.

One of the historic functions of public education in democracies has always been to connect people, build common values and drive the engines of democracy. The idea that if children were educated together, attending the same schools, then race relations would improve underpinned many of the examples
we have of bussing in the USA. Contact theory is alluring - that by being with those who are 'different', people will trust each other more and increase social capital. Yet the theory clashes with its polar opposite: 'conflict theory' - that the more diverse a populace is, the more we 'stick to our own' and create out-groups, reducing social capital.

Social psychologists and sociologists have taught us that people find it easier to trust one another and cooperate when the social distance between them is less…. Social distance depends in turn on social identity: our sense of who we are. Identity itself is socially constructed and can be socially de-constructed and re-constructed. Indeed, this sort of social change happens all the time in any dynamic and evolving society. For example, religious evangelism, social mobilization and political campaigning all involve the intentional transformation of identities.

(Putnam, 2007, p159)

Putnam claims many resolve this dilemma by relating the theories to the different types of social capital: that contact theory is based on bonding social capital and conflict theory is concerned with bridging social capital (as defined in Chapter 5).

If the production of citizens capable of standing back from their own attachments to debate and participate in shaping their society is required by democracy, a third definition of 'common schools' can thus be created: public, or common schools, are not only schools funded by the public or open to the public, but can hence be defined as the means by which we become a public:

Public schools are not merely schools for the public, but schools of publicness: institutions where we learn what it means to be a public and start down the road toward common national and civic identity. They are the forges of our citizenship and the bedrock of our democracy.

(Barber, 1997, p22)

Public education thus becomes the vehicle by which all citizens, regardless of their birth, wealth or family background can take part in society with shared purpose, a society that can talk and make decisions together through access to a 'social dialogue'.

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Given that public or state schooling fulfils this role within a democracy, does this in turn require a particular organisation of schools? The answer to this is not entirely clear. This, I wish to suggest, is as should be expected. Whilst the ideal model might indicate that a particular system of common schools should, in theory, enable this intermingling better than other systems, we have very little empirical evidence that allows us to come to this conclusion. Schools have multiple purposes, some of which conflict with each other: not all of these purposes serve democratic aims equally well. Our desire for social cohesion, for creating a shared identity conflicts with our equal desire to allow parents to educate their children in line with their deepest attachments. Liberal neutrality requires that states should be neutral with respect to competing controversial conceptions of the good; public policy should not be based on one particular vision: citizens have the right to live according to their particular reasonable conception. Yet equally, liberalism, and its commitment to democratic practices, requires that future citizens acquire particular attitudes and values to support and maintain these practices.

Something of this conundrum has puzzled many who contemplate this area: that school choice systems undermine our common future when the polarised positions of market values are allowed to dictate how our institutions are organised and entrusted with perpetuating the political system. Whilst I might conclude that the ideal of the common school may indeed be the ideal venue in which to explore where our democratic and private sentiments come together, I also acknowledge the fact that no democratic state would forbid parental choice, private education or home schooling. It would be undemocratic to do so, which leaves the democratic state supporting the ability of parents to school
undemocratically if they so choose and have the finances to do so. In other words, whilst the state may value and actively seek social cohesion, it cannot forbid practices that may undermine this aim because of other equally important commitments; it has to temper one commitment with another.

If the recreation and reinvention of the common school is doubtful given our other democratic principles respecting the rights of parents and communities to reproduce in each generation the beliefs, traditions and visions of the good, and the freedom to choose educational options that best express and support their preferences and goals (the demand for school choice), is there a way to develop democratic fraternity and overcome the problems created by the fragmented educational system we currently have with policies that may be consonant with the goal of democratic fraternity? With this in mind, I wish to suggest that the idea of the common school as a way of securing a single 'imagined community' may need revising (Feinberg, 2007).

This brief analysis indicates the difficulty in directly drawing out complete policy implications in every respect from conceptual models. Whilst the common school accords with the values and commitments contained within democratic fraternity, its feasibility may not translate into direct policy without revision. In the next section, I explore several current policy proposals, federations, networked schools and schools-within-schools considered as possible adapted variations attempting to realize this commitment to the cohesive society. Whilst many of these are seen as being possible starting points for working towards a system of schooling with the potential to expand and develop the associational bonds between future citizens needed in a liberal democracy, I will indicate that some
contain values that should exclude them from the set of ideas from which policy ought to be drawn.

Section 2: School Organisation and Associational Bonds

In the chapter on loyalty, I raised a concern about the direction of UK schools in eroding the cooperative practices needed through the use of marketisation and extreme competition practices which in turn affected the capacity to develop the horizontal loyalties of the civic sphere. I suggested that school systems should, perhaps, be formed or created to disperse our allegiances and loyalties as widely as possible. This dilemma, created by the over emphasis on market values and competition and the resultant effects on our collective flourishing, preoccupies both politicians and educationalists. Indeed, at least four government initiatives have been aimed at encouraging schools to find new ways to recapture this working together: Excellence in Cities (1999), Networked Learning Communities (2002), School Federations (2002) and the Leadership Incentive Grant (2003). These documents have been serious efforts to re-examine and enable school collaboration through encouragement, incentives, or even external pressure. In this section, I shall briefly consider examples of possible contributions made towards reinvigorating our civic connectedness: the federation and the networked learning communities and suggest a relatively new contender for consideration, that of the schools-within-schools.

Federations

The idea of federations of schools comes from attempts to reintroduce ways of schools working together and to thus avoid some of the effects of the
market metaphor when applied to public schooling, that of schools working in competition to the neglect of the cooperative development and sharing of 'best practice'. The Standards Site defines federations as:

For our purposes here, federations can be defined in two ways:

- The definition as invoked in the 2002 Education Act which allows for the creation of a single governing body or a joint governing body committee across two or more schools from September 2003 onwards.
- A group of schools with a formal (i.e. written) agreement to work together to raise standards, promote inclusion, find new ways of approaching teaching and learning and build capacity between schools in a coherent manner. ⁴⁹

There is an increasing interest in the model, particularly at secondary level, in line with the demands of 'Every Child Matters' requirements. At present, hard federations (those with shared governance) are only available within the maintained sector.

As a possible practical solution to the problem of re-imagining the public aspect of education, it would be quite feasible, in theory, to set up federations to include private, fee-paying schools (perhaps making their active participation a requirement for keeping their charitable status), faith schools, special schools, further education bodies, academies and all other Heinz varieties of schools. Where it is sought, the federation seems very much to be an instrumental aim: as a support/solution to 'weak' or 'failing' schools, and not as a good in itself. However, further investigation of the empirical evidence for school federations that really do work in a hub supporting each other is vital. As Ainscow et al (Ainscow, Muijs and West, 2006) point out, there is very little research to show when and how such ventures are successful. Where research does look at

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⁴⁹ [http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/federations/] (last accessed 19.11.2009)
success criteria, it tends to be seen solely in terms of school management and pupil standards, with little regard for citizenship.

Similar to the idea of a federation, is the practice of schools working in a virtual network thus allowing schools which may be geographically separated to work together. Acknowledging the impact of competition and league tables, the hope is that working collaboratively with other schools may improve teaching, learning and attainment over and beyond what individual schools may achieve alone. With the growth of ICT systems in schools, it is considered possible to link schools, not only in community-based formats (still allowing for those shared orchestras, for example) but also for more fundamental joint activities, in subjects (particularly citizenship) thus widening the curriculum to some and extending the possibility of interaction to others. This is seen as a "radical answer to raising standards of teaching and learning in every school"\textsuperscript{50}.

Whilst on the surface, the school federation or network may seem an acceptable substitute for the common school ideal, I contend such arrangements do not go far enough, and frequently go in the wrong direction for three reasons. Firstly, such initiatives are time-consuming for those involved, and socially complex to achieve (Ainscow, Muijs and West, 2006). Secondly, research conducted by the National College of School Leadership appears to suggest the idea that the major attribute of networks leading to success was to be found within the character of people in them and their relationships (Bell, Cordingley and Mitchell, 2006). Thirdly, collaboration may even look different in different social contexts (Ainscow, Muijs and West, 2006). But underlying these empirical

\textsuperscript{50} http://www.innovation-unit.co.uk/content/view/82/596/ [last accessed 19.11.2009]
difficulties lies a deeper problem, that of trying to work within two competing metaphor structures at one time.

My contention is that the very idea of federations or networks may be faulty if expected to take the weight of encouraging the cross loyalties currently found wanting in the system: the mixed metaphors generated by ideals of cooperation and market competition simply undermine each other. It is unrealistic for schools to be able to do both at once; ‘successful schools’ which wish to hold their place in the marketplace would be foolish to give up their advantage in this manner. To illustrate further: school improvement, as currently defined, is driven by competition. The educational market, with its over-emphasis on the raising of standards, severely constrains genuine collaborative practice between schools. In the light of this, it can be argued that not enough attention is given to the competitive nature of the school market (Taylor, Fitz and Gorard, 2005). Cooperation and networking between schools may be an approach to raise standards overall, but, as Taylor et al point out,

...naively ignores the presence of school choice and competition that is now firmly established in the education system.

(Taylor, Fitz and Gorard, 2005, p66)

Whilst there may be recognition of the importance of collaboration amongst schools, it fails to recognise sufficiently the way in which competition and markets undermine this.

The current system of organising schools into federations or networks is to tamper with a system that is already problematic in terms of equality and social justice. This is not to argue that federations or networking are not worth pursuing. These may be worthwhile activities for other reasons: they are just not the answer to promoting a genuinely democratic civic relationship. For there to be real
possibility for developing both primary and secondary relationships across the board, the solution has to go much further. A more creative view is arguably needed to fulfil the requirements of allowing for the growth of both primary and secondary relationships.

School-within-schools

The problems of the above organisational structures superimposed on existing school management has led some to champion the development of the small school movement, in the belief that this will encourage a greater community spirit and more personal connections between staff and students as well as between each other (related to the call by some politicians for the return of the 'house system'\textsuperscript{51}). This way of structuring schools is being re-examined in a new way: as schools-within-schools.

What should be noticed first is that units within school settings have been features of schools for many years (SpLD Bases, Nurture Groups, Behaviour Units, Dyslexia and other such units in the UK, and Gifted programmes in the USA). The schools-within-schools approach claims to go one stage further than this: to provide a way for the personalized learning of some, with the capacity to interact with a larger school population in ways that are mutually enriching. Where these exist, they tend to be schools that have 'down-sized' from large schools into smaller, autonomous units. Each has their own learning community, staff, and facilities but with a use of shared space and/or some use of facilities with the larger 'school'. The attraction of such schools stems from the more personalized relationships between staff and pupils with smaller numbers of

\textsuperscript{51} The Guardian: Tues, Sept. 20, 2005
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2005/sep/20/schools.uk3 [last accessed 19.11.2009]
pupils (units can range from 30 to about 500), thus combining the best of the features of large schools with the advantages of smaller schools.

Some experiments with this approach are already in existence in the UK: a school for the deaf being situated within a secondary school in Bristol; the school-within-schools approach with Year 7s at Kingswood High School, Kingston upon Hull; Countesthorpe College, Leicestershire; Stantonbury Campus, Milton Keynes; Bishops Park College, Clacton (the latter being the subject of a research project for the Department For Education and Skills Innovation Unit (Fielding, 2006))52. The principles behind the projects tend to be on relationships and creating a feeling of belonging, of team-work and commitment to the whole community.

As yet, there have been no exemplars adapting the constituent parts to include faith communities. Where there has been experience of shared faith schools, the success has been mixed: from the proposed shared-campus schools in Glasgow in 2002 (where neighbouring Catholic and non-denominational schools would share dining rooms, assembly halls and playgrounds – rejected by the Catholic Church in Scotland), the proposed shared campuses in North Lanarkshire in 2004 (again turned down) to the more successful inter-church schools in Liverpool and Lagan College in Northern Ireland (today there are 58 integrated schools in Northern Ireland). Restructuring school systems is understandably both politically and practically time-consuming and may not, on its own, provide the development of democratic fraternity as desired without loosening the intense ties to personal commitments.

52 Further ‘Human Scale Schools’ can be found at http://www.hse.org.uk/ssp/Casestudiesofschools.html [last accessed 19.11.2009]
As the above have shown, certain elements of policy would automatically be shown to be contrary to the desired ends. Neither federations nor networked schools could be exemplars contributing to social cohesion (this is not to argue they could not be adopted for other purposes). Notice that the school-within-schools model however, would fall within the set of ideas from which policy could be drawn. This however, is only half the story. Current public policy suggestions to tackle difficulties of social cohesion, as outlined above, rest on suppositions that may turn out to be founded on false premises. Just as we cannot suppose that the virtues of particular relationships such as friendship, family or market can be extrapolated unchanged into the macro level of society, neither can we assume that what counts or contributes towards social cohesion on a small scale community level will also hold for societal cohesion. If we judge that an aim of education within school systems is to become a public, we must naturally question the organisations within which this occurs, yet we must also be open to the possibility that other factors may need to be taken into consideration.

One route out of the impasse created by the previously identified difficulties in restructuring school systems, is to attend to what happens within the school: that school practices need to be as democratic as the civic ideals they preach (Barber, 1997). Whilst human associations are undoubtedly affected by the structures that enable them to take place, they are also deeply affected by the motives and attitudes of the people who attend or use them. If this holds, then the importance of actively teaching and practicing the virtues and attitudes necessary for the upkeep of democracy in a democratic manner has important practical implications.
In the following section, I finally turn to consider the issue of pedagogy. What would be the implications for pedagogical practices if we are to take social cohesion seriously? To answer this, I shall consider just one particular approach that may be worth further investigation for the claims it makes in developing the skills and attitudes necessary for democracy to flourish, going some way towards situating democratic fraternity within the classroom itself. Instead of arguments for a particular organisation of education systems, I consider the ethical environment within which it is translated and thus resituate the argument within a practical conception of democracy. The overall picture that emerges is that the nurturing of democratic fraternity itself may require teaching in a democratic fashion. The development of the character of those within schools and that of future citizens directs a consideration of one particular exemplar that claims to achieve this: Philosophy for Children.

Section 3: Philosophy for Children

If we are serious about democracy, then philosophy has to be taken seriously as well. Doing philosophy and developing democratic attitudes and dispositions are intertwined, and both require practice or doing.

(Portelli and Church, 1995, p80)

Much has been written about the role of education in supporting/ensuring the durability of democracy (Callan, 1997; Gutmann, 1987; Levinson, 1999; McPike, 2003). In addition, many democratic states have expressed concerns about levels of political engagement amongst the population as a whole, particularly the young. Citizenship education and/or democratic education has come to be seen as a means of addressing the social cohesion needed by the state and the diverse range of cultures formed within the polis. In terms of the
curriculum, it has been customary to suggest the teaching of PSHE $^{53}$ and/or Citizenship as part of the solution within schools. These effective pedagogical approaches, however, may not be sufficient. In attempting to answer what sort of pedagogical approach is required when we take social cohesion within a modern liberal democracy seriously, I shall examine and articulate a vision of what it could be like to teach democratically. In what follows, I shall argue that citizens of a democracy need to be more than active, involved and informed: they also need particular attitudes from one to another to uphold the democratic process.

Philosophy for Children, as a governmental initiative, has mostly been identified with the thinking skills movement. $^{54}$ A common objection to this classification by proponents of the methodology is to distinguish Philosophy for Children from other critical thinking programmes by the dialogue that develops amidst a 'community of enquiry'. This, it is claimed, differs from mere conversation by its emphasis on constructing ideas, working together towards a common goal as well as questioning the ideas themselves. In other words, the emphasis is on learning together: collaborative learning:

...the program is worried about behaviours and habits such as; developing the ability of self-correction, learning how to listen to other people, paying attention and trying hard in order to understand, asking for and giving reasons, among others.... these habits and behaviours are crucial for the existence of a democratic society.

(Accorinti, 2000)

Crucially, the goal of the programme is not to turn children into philosophers, but to develop particular skills and attitudes. Whether or not this is 'philosophy' is an argument for elsewhere; I wish to concentrate on more recent claims that it can

$^{53}$ In 2008, the UK government announced it was to make Personal, Social and Health Education statutory in both primary and secondary schools. In November 2009, it was announced that this would commence from 2011.

affect and reinforce 'citizenship education' and aid social cohesion. It makes many ambitious claims for its significance for democracy and democratic education. But do they hold up?

Philosophy for Children (P4C) was started in the 1960s and 70s by the US philosopher Matthew Lipman and is now used in over fifty countries from all continents. Claiming to be rooted in the work of Vygotsky and Dewey amongst other theoreticians, it has usually been seen as having the primary goal of teaching children to think critically (Daniel et al, 1999):

Philosophy for Children incorporates the Deweyian and Vygotskyian notion that in order to think for oneself, one must be a member of a community. However, Dewey's ideal of community is not the homogenous community, criticized by Iris Marion Young. Rather, it is a democratic community of inquiry, which is inclusive of difference and interacts with other communities. (Bleazby, 2006, p30)

The aim of Philosophy for Children for Matthew Lipman, however, has always been developing democracy in social character and reasonableness (as in 'be ready to reason') in personal character. It is these claims that lead to it being considered as a contribution to citizenship education: the promotion of autonomy, reasonable citizenry, participation, dialogue, critical thinking amongst other attributes. Take for example, the curriculum review Diversity and Citizenship (Ajegbo, Kiwan and Sharma, 2007) which named Philosophy for Children (P4C) as a possible tool to encourage diversity in the curriculum, thus reinforcing the findings of a previous paper on the assessment of citizenship education for assessing enquiry and communication skills (Briefing Paper for Teacher Mentors Of Citizenship Education):

P4C strategies help to develop pupils’ powers of logic, advocacy, discussion and debate. It is a powerful tool to help young people deal rationally with difference and conflict. (Brett, 2004, p21)
The Deweyian insight of creating a democratic culture within schools (Dewey's Laboratory School, at the University of Chicago, distributed decision-making and responsibility to even the youngest children by allowing all to exercise and practise their skills appropriate to their level of development) is further developed to enable pupils to practise the skills necessary for the participation in a democratic community.

Similarly, and perhaps most importantly, the idea of democracy is claimed to be central to the community of inquiry. Indeed, it has been described as an expression of democratic values (Fisher, 2000). The rationale behind the practice is to encourage children to cultivate the social skills necessary for both good moral conduct and to enable them to take their place in a pluralist society: to develop listening skills, and reasonableness of character, taking into account the views and feelings of others, to develop the capacity to be reasoned with and to change their own mind or beliefs upon good reasons, to be reflective learners. Arguably, the habits and behaviours practised and developed within Philosophy for Children are the same as required by the practice of democracy itself. The emphasis is not so much on democracy as a system of government but, in a Deweyian sense, as a way of life (Dewey, 1997). Given the close connection between the two views, transforming a class into a community of inquiry assumes fundamental import: the process is the worth as opposed to the product (Accorinti, 2000). Every child has the same rights in the community of enquiry to express their opinion and to be listened to: the connection with equality. This is not to argue that every opinion is accepted as equally valid (hence the role of the facilitator) but to create a climate enabling the acceptance of difference.
with this, students are encouraged to exchange ideas in an open and respectful manner.

The format of Philosophy for Children can arguably help in this situation as it defuses the tension between the hierarchical role of the teacher against that of the pupil (Vansiegleghem, 2005). Although pupils lead the discussion, (the topics are chosen after democratically voting on a variety of open-ended questions raised by a stimulus) the teacher (or facilitator) is expected to challenge and deepen the argument. Children are taught not to be afraid of conflict or disagreement but how to understand and make sense of the need to find a solution, emphasising consistency of argument, and reflection on value judgements. It values the development of particular social behaviours: supporting one another in building arguments, taking one another's ideas seriously, collaborating and co-operating, encouraging each other, a willingness to be open-minded to change, the courage to change their minds in response to good reasons. Sharp describes it as "reflective communal action" (Sharp, 1991, p35): a commitment to open debate, pluralism and practical judgement.

Does Philosophy for Children teach and give the space for practise of the very attitudes we wish future citizens to have? Is this just another form of character-building? If Philosophy for Children remained at the level of enquiry one would be led to believe that its influence was directed towards a form of PSHE or even moral education. However, the very proponents extolling its virtues seem to want more from it than this: that it should spur young adults to action, to participate in the democratic life. The Deweyian idea that participating in a democracy was the most effective way to create and maintain democratic virtues
pushes the methodology into combining in some way the 'improvement' of thinking and positively influencing behaviour.

Whilst such an approach may well prove to be useful as an experience of democratic education, and may well have positive effects on teaching particular attitudes and dispositions necessary for the sustaining of the democratic ethos, it does not, on its own, answer the problem of how to inculcate social cohesion. This is just an unrealistic task even if the practice of teaching democratically expanded beyond the one weekly session recommended, to embrace a wider usage both in the curriculum and school ethos. Whilst Philosophy for Children may have much to recommend it as a particular teaching method and may contribute as deliberative democracy in action, on its own, it will be insufficient, as it does not embrace the whole 'public'. It does little, on its own, to tackle the segregating features of schools.

Whilst Philosophy for Children may well be a useful tool for teaching some democratic virtues and attitudes (for example, the emphasis on each person's contribution leading from the previous "I agree/I disagree with...." ensures that pupils listen carefully to each other; the emphasis on interacting with the argument and not the person saying it can explicitly teach children to treat each other respectfully), this on its own may not contribute towards democratic fraternity. Whilst for cohesion of argument, the method of teaching should not undermine the content (if we are to teach democratic values, we should ideally teach them in a democratic manner), democratic fraternity requires more. Again, this is an approach that would come within the domain of possible areas for policy to explore.
Schools in societies that purport to be democracies are obliged to develop public citizens: part of which is developing the necessary relationship between such citizens (Parker, 2005). There has been, as yet, no empirical study to explore, consider and examine these aspects of Philosophy for Children; much 'evidence' is anecdotal at best. I argue that this may be worth further empirical examination as to its possibilities for developing particular attitudes and virtues of citizenship. To date, the relevant literature on Philosophy for Children has mostly been driven by thinking skills proponents, seeking measurable, utilitarian raising of academic standards with little interest in exploring the possible relationship with the civic attitudes and virtues of practical citizenship. Philosophy for Children raises questions as to whether a pedagogic methodology of teaching democratically is itself a requirement of democratic fraternity. The question of how to encourage the practice of particular attitudes and dispositions needed between citizens to support a democratic framework is an area which is decidedly under-theorised at present and requires empirical research to further these claims.

Section 4: Conclusion

This chapter has sought to focus on some of the difficulties in moving from a particular theory into recommendations for policy. It is undoubtedly true that school systems are a cornerstone of democracy and play a significant role in forming 'the public'. Armed with these assumptions, public life can be argued to require a constant reconsideration of what it is to be a 'public'. As education is primarily engaged in enabling society to re-imagine itself over the generations, it would appear reasonable to assume that philosophical analysis can contribute towards core aspects of educational policy and schooling arrangements. This in
turn raises fascinating questions about the nature and relationship between theory, policy and pedagogy.

Firstly, whilst the ideal model of society may initially seem to imply a common schooling solution, the constraints of our equal commitment to individual freedoms and rights to choose lives of value cause us to question the feasibility of this as policy. The liberal democratic society is constantly negotiating two incompatible demands. The first, that public schooling should be provided for all children and that the state has a justified interest in the content and form of that education in view of its capacity to create future citizens. The second, that individuals should be permitted to choose educational options that best express and support their preferences and goals (the problem from school choice).

Our liberal commitments accept that individuals within a western liberal society may hold differing conceptions of the good life over which the state must remain neutral. This includes allowing "parental discretion over the education of their children" (Reich, 2002, p10). Whilst no acceptable theory coming from these commitments would outlaw the practice of parental choice including faith schools, what can be done is to delineate the parameters within which these can operate. Policy can be created to encourage such schools into partnerships (such as the schools-within-schools) allowing for greater development of relationships upon which conceptions of social cohesion can be built. Should schools of faith or the privately funded choose to remain outside any such reorganised structures, there is no moral requirement that we ensure their survival, thus the removal of all state funding becomes a viable option (whether 'charitable status' or otherwise). The practical outcome of just this stance could significantly affect the topography of
school organisation and our capacity to achieve schools open to the creation of a socially cohesive society.

Secondly, the focus of education must concern itself with fostering the attitudes and virtues needed to sustain the political framework and hold a critical attitude to current practices that claim to uphold this vision. Being overly concerned with enabling the possibilities and opportunities for widening primary relationships (by restructuring school organizations) without, at the same time, an equal concern with the development of the civic attitudes and virtues underpinning these relationships, may serve to undermine or weaken each resolution. My contention is that both may be required. A greater attention to particular pedagogical methodologies and how they interact with schooling arrangements is required.

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it is important to reiterate that no particular theory can provide a complete blueprint for either school structures or the pedagogy required to support said structures. Theory does not easily translate into policy, neither does policy automatically map onto classroom practice (Reich, 2002). It cannot be assumed that theory can automatically provide answers to problems, yet without theory our chances are diminished of alighting on appropriate policy. What theory can do is to provide a framework within which we can consider the relevant issues and then rule out particular practices as either contrary to our ultimate aims and commitments. All planning and policy decisions are necessarily value-laden, educational planning perhaps more conspicuously so than other areas. To claim that all theories have normative dimensions is hardly radical, yet it does suggest our work as philosophers of education should be firmly involved in policy issues.
The task for the philosopher is to get a clearer view of the commonplace assumptions we use in our everyday thinking about the world and to assess the coherence of this way of thinking (Gilbert, 1991). Yet it has to be acknowledged that big ideas and sweeping narratives do not always neatly fit reality. Whilst philosophy, at the level of models and principles, cannot indicate one particular design of schooling nor the pedagogy practiced within, it can rule out possibilities that would undermine or be contrary to the end result desired. It can delineate the borders within which the discussion takes place by eliminating particular structures or pedagogies.

In the next and final chapter, I reflect on this thesis as a whole and draw together its contributions and significance for philosophy of education and policy.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

The plans which are formed, the principles which man projects as guides of reconstructive action, are not dogmas. They are hypotheses... to be rejected, corrected and expanded as they fail or succeed in giving our present experience the guidance it requires.  

(Dewey, 1948, p96)

I think there is a world market for maybe five computers.  

(Thomas Watson: Chairman of IBM, 1943)

The focus of this thesis has been a philosophical consideration of the educational implications for social cohesion given the internal diversity of the modern western liberal state, and the effect of globalisation on a previously territorial conception of the nation-state. The preceding chapters have clearly demonstrated that any theory of social cohesion is incomplete without a corresponding consideration of the model of belonging used. It should be noted that in a stable and self-perpetuating society, the models we adopt are informed by our commitments, values and aspirations for how we ought to live. As such, they can have deep effects on the way we organise our social lives and the organisations we create to fulfil this image. Given that education plays such a large role in enforcing and upholding the collective commitment to particular ways of life, the quintessentially metaphoric nature of how we envision these associational bonds and the ways in which we model those commitments can become urgent issues for educational policies.

http://www.enterpriseirregulars.com/1881/i-think-there-is-a-world-market-for-maybe-five-clouds/ [last accessed 19.11.2009]
It is currently a requirement in the UK that community cohesion must be a consideration within school settings. The lack of conceptual clarity in much of the discourse, including policy papers, combined with often confusing and contradictory strands of thought, has often made the drawing of practical implications difficult to achieve. Fresh insight into this perennial problem can be achieved by raising critical questions as to what it would mean in educational terms if we should take social cohesion seriously and explore its implications through the methodology of metaphor.

To recap the argument. The bulk of this thesis has been an attempt to piece together a systematic account of some of the major political metaphors for social relationships and to assess and evaluate their contribution to understanding the tension between cohesion and diversity. I started by raising three main questions which formed the framework for this study: firstly, what would it mean to take social cohesion seriously? What sort of structures would best meet the desire for social cohesion and finally what pedagogical implications would this then have?

In Chapter 2, I explored the first of the models for civic engagement, that of friendship. What sort of a society could be based on friendship as the binding attachment? I drew upon the Aristotelian origins of the concept to elucidate that personal friendship requires personal contact and time spent to create the deep affection between friends. As such, a literal understanding of friendship could not be a model for civic engagement.

This then led into Chapter 3 in which I considered whether friendship could act at a metaphorical level to offer insight into civic relationships. However, even

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56 The Education and Inspections Act, 2006 actively promoted cohesion and OFSTED has been directed to consider and report on these duties since September 2008.
as a metaphor, it became clear that the virtues and attitudes of personal relationships offered little fresh insight not already found in other metaphors, and could sometimes be misleading. How personal friendships and attachments serve to bind small groupings together and the civic value of so doing, was not, however, an aim of this thesis. Despite growing attention to the topic, there is still much to unravel in the domain of friendship, both empirically and philosophically on how the role of on-line communities ties in with civic relationships.

In Chapter 4, I considered the second of the major metaphors, that of market, and demonstrated that market relies on a different type of loyalty to that of the civic sphere, and thus had the potential to undermine our attachments in other areas. By reducing the relationship to one of utility, the metaphor of 'marketplace' was argued to be particularly ill-suited to dealing adequately with matters of citizenship and the public domain.

In Chapter 5, I established the concept of fraternity as both distinct and philosophically interesting in its own right as an imaginative way to embody some of our most revered values. The exploration of two different conceptions of fraternity signalled that only a conception of fraternity rooted within democracy had the capacity to offer fresh insights into the problem of the civic relationship. The model of connectedness that I have advanced in this thesis emphasised the role of centring the civic relationship within a framework of democracy itself. Although throughout this thesis I have often used the phrase 'civic others', this phrase can itself be problematic. The very language used (others) serves to distance us from each other: it suggests that the default position is that some are not part of 'us'. Any theory dealing with the creation of a 'we' is automatically creating a 'they'; inclusion always carries with it the shadow of exclusion. Whilst a
small point, it illustrates how the language we use to model our attachments can position us prior to engaging with arguments about the models used. Yet it goes beyond this. Rooting our imaginings of our belonging within the *family* metaphor, serves to change the default position to include 'others' as part of 'us'.

Part of my project in this thesis has been to argue that we need to pay proper attention to the vocabulary and models used for our civic attachments. Hence, in Chapter 6, I turned to the second and third of my three original questions, through a deeper examination of the use of the three models and metaphors for civic engagement examined in this thesis, and an indication of the commitments they unconsciously align us with. Without a consideration of the implicit attachments found within exemplars, no model can faithfully represent the values and commitments they need to carry. Yet any metaphor adopted for civic relationships within a liberal democratic framework must, itself, cohere with the demands of democracy.

This led, in Chapter 7, to a fuller examination of the background connections and commitments of democratic fraternity and a consideration of how this might be realised in policy and practice. The contention that developing civic virtues and attitudes *within* schools whilst at the same time examining how best to reorder current school structures to encourage and nourish cooperative behaviours *between* schools strove to align our theories with our practices. The chapter concluded by cautioning that considerations of what can be achieved, all too often mediates the degree to which our most cherished beliefs are realized in practice. Despite this, it seems reasonable to suggest that both the schools-within-schools as structures and Philosophy for Children as a pedagogy for
democratic values would both benefit from further empirical research and exploration with regard to the possible benefits for social cohesion.

The focus of this thesis has been the location of civic relationships within a wider framework of accounts of belonging which draws on parallel arguments from the social sciences. Whilst it is undoubtedly chronological in format, with one chapter leading necessarily to another, an alternative reading suggests that it can also be viewed more holistically as five interwoven perspectives (as laid out in the first chapter). The first perspective examines three models for civic relationships within a democratic framework. This is then interwoven with a consideration of the use of metaphor in which questions are raised about its usage as methodology and as a subject for analysis. A third perspective is offered by a consideration of empirical work on social relationships within this area and a fourth by a reappraisal of fraternity within democracy as a model for civic connectedness. Finally, the fifth perspective highlights the practical implications for policy and pedagogy with respect to issues of social cohesion and school choice.

The ideas espoused within this thesis, through their originality of content and method, contribute to and extend the boundaries of current knowledge in four distinct ways. Firstly, the thesis makes a contribution towards untangling some of the conceptual confusion underlying the models we have for civic connections. I have referred extensively to other disciplines, which inform major trends in education, from situating concepts historically, to considering the contributions of theories of social relationships, social capital, metaphors and imaginaries. I do not claim to have offered a comprehensive account of these traditions and concepts, but have used their insights to position the concept of democratic
fraternity as a modified metaphor within the wider academic framework of family metaphors, to demonstrate where it fits in the 'grand narrative'.

Secondly, this project is significantly distinct from other approaches in that it suggests we should extend our understanding of the interplay between the models and metaphors we adopt for civic relationships, and the institutions we choose to teach and nurture the relevant attitudes, virtues and values. One thing to be noted is that metaphors are a vital resource for political reasoning. Whilst we may abandon particular models in the pursuit of a coherent integration between our values and social arrangements, we cannot abandon all. Until our policies take metaphors seriously and accommodate to their demands, they may be offering inappropriate guidance, sometimes even undermined by conflicting commitments. My research has clearly pointed to the importance of an understanding of metaphor in the ongoing debate on school policies about social cohesion given the light it throws on the unspoken assumptions embedded in particular models. It offers a new way to conceptualise the educational aspects of social cohesion by establishing the hidden assumptions and commitments inherent within such approaches and demonstrating how we are bound by such metaphors within a social and political context.

Thirdly, the account of democratic fraternity that I have developed is both transformational and emancipatory in its ability to voice what it is to be connected to others within a modern liberal democracy. Democratic fraternity, by providing a framework to encompass seeming strangers as connected civically, proves itself to be theoretically equipped to deal with the contemporary problems of a modern society. Furthermore, the repositioning of the concept within its metaphoric origins
has clearly shown that the values and aspirations underpinning such a concept lie within liberal traditions.

Fourthly, the significance of my thesis for social cohesion and school choice arguments is to cause us to consider the everyday metaphors, models and imaginaries we use in a new light, as having the capacity to radically challenge our current practices, and the potential to significantly affect how we structure our educational organisations and school systems. It differs in important respects from existing work in social sciences on social cohesion in adding a philosophical analysis to examine and challenge aspects of what we take for granted in our existing frameworks of reference. I believe this conceptualisation is an important contribution to the ongoing debate on how school organisation and the issues of civic relationships needed for social cohesion may feed into each other. It suggests a possible normative dimension to the models we choose. It seems incoherent to claim attachment to particular values and then not be willing to express these in any way in policy decisions. It seems equally incoherent to have particular policies in practice and then deny attachment to the values contained within them.

I have used the term cohesion within its usual domain but I wish to suggest the concept may not denote any one particular condition that must be met, but may work more as an appraisal of a state of affairs. Critically, to say a society has social cohesion is evaluative rather than descriptive of particular practices. To some extent, this accounts for the slippery usage of the term within much of the literature, but it adds a secondary feature that is, for me, more interesting. It serves to place it within the concern of philosophy. If this proves correct, perhaps the study of social cohesion may belong in an 'ethics of social life'.
This thesis has by no means resolved the theoretical and practical tensions involved in balancing the commitments of individuals and those of society at large. Neither, I argue, should it. The tension is necessary: it is the conflicts between the two competing demands that 'keep us honest'. Theoretical stresses notwithstanding, I suggest our ideals of the good society, the metaphors used, are normatively important to motivate us and guide our policy making.
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