An analysis of the significance for curriculum theory of the work of Michel Foucault:
with particular reference to the concept of power/knowledge

By

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I hereby declare that except where explicit attribution is made, the work presented in this thesis is entirely my own.

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to draw on the work of Michel Foucault to focus on the field of curriculum theory - with particular reference to his theme of power/knowledge. Several curriculum theorists are indebted to Foucault’s thought in developing their own work. The ways in which they use Foucault’s work, however, do not accurately reflect his central project. Rather than critiquing curriculum theories themselves or developing my own, alternative theories from a Foucauldian perspective, however, my purpose here is to diagnose how curriculum is studied and how the field of curriculum theory governs itself, in the name of Foucault. To achieve this purpose, I develop three lines of inquiry. First, I review Foucault’s reception in curriculum theory and educational policy analysis. I focus specifically on the perspectives of Cleo Cherryholmes, Henry A. Giroux, Thomas S. Popkewitz and Stephen J. Ball. Second, I seek a preliminary understanding of the notion of power/knowledge by directly referring to Foucault’s work. Third, I attempt to refine my account of power/knowledge through reference to secondary literature on Foucault. Through exploration of power/knowledge along these three lines, I develop a critique, in light of both Foucault’s own account and these secondary interpretations, of the way that Foucault’s concept has been used in curriculum theory. This enables an examination of the limitations of their application of Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge, seemingly constrained by a dominant understanding of curriculum as the medium through which to understand the oppressive social structure. Instead I seek to outline an idea of curriculum as a practice for inspiring self-transformation. At the end of this thesis, I raise two new issues, to illustrate the ways in which Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge can be applied elsewhere in the study of curriculum.
Acknowledgements

Studying for a PhD abroad has been a significant adventure in my life. The journey has been full of challenge, especially because of the elusive nature of philosophy, involving difficult reading and writing, and adaptation to a different culture. This has also, however, been a turning point for me in terms of self-transformation and self-realization: it has enabled me to break through barriers in both my research and myself. I am now delighted that this process has been completed.

This thesis has been made possible thanks to help from many people. First of all, I am grateful to my supervisor—Professor Paul Standish. His kind support has always pushed me to move from where I am. Many of our inspiring discussions have prompted me to think otherwise, and these are very much a part of the scene I shall be missing. Second, I would like to thank Professor Jan Masschelein for his guidance during the period I stayed at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, in Belgium. Furthermore, I am indebted to the many good questions and suggestions raised by my examiners, Professor Nigel Tubbs and Dr Gerard Lum. Thanks also to Dr Jan Derry, who gave me useful suggestions for elaborating my thesis before its submission. In addition, I am grateful to Naomi Hodgson and John Colbeck, for their help in reworking my English, especially in relation to my attempts to write about such challenging texts as those of Foucault. I also wish to thank all my colleagues and fellow students who shared their time with me, in both Sheffield and London. Their company indeed enriched my life in the UK. In the end, I am delighted to be able to share this achievement with my family. The work could not have been completed successfully without their encouragement all the way.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to understand Foucault's notion of power/knowledge and to inquire into the ways this notion has been adopted in curriculum theory. The thesis is driven by the belief that there are problems with this take-up of Foucault's thought, regarding both the substance of interpretation and the ways in which such interpretations then settle into the role of received ideas. While my main purpose is to provide a criticism of certain ways in which the notion has been taken up, I also hope to show the potency of Foucault's ideas in this respect in relation to curriculum theory.

Seven chapters are included in this thesis. Chapter One provides an outline of my topic and an indication of the way in which I shall approach it. Chapter Two is a brief survey of a number of leading curriculum theorists who have drawn on Foucault's concept of power/knowledge. In particular I consider the work of Cleo Cherryholmes, Henry A. Giroux, Stephen Ball and Thomas S. Popkewitz. This survey is undertaken in order to explore how these theorists adopt power/knowledge in their theories. After this, I turn, in Chapter Three, directly to Foucault in order to examine the main sources of this idea in his writing, specifically in Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality, Vol.1, and in some of his remarkable essays and interviews. These materials offer a clear account of Foucault's position regarding the concept of power/knowledge. In order to gain a deepened understanding of the different interpretations of power/knowledge that have emerged in the mainstream philosophical literature, I examine, in Chapter Four, several secondary sources on Foucault. Chapter Five is the culmination of this thesis, and here I use the
understanding developed in Chapters Three and Four to criticize and evaluate the applications of the notion of power/knowledge that have been examined in Chapter Two. My critique is not directed towards the curriculum theories themselves, but towards the very limited way that Foucault’s concept has been employed. This critique, which draws on a Foucauldian understanding of critical practices, is made in aid of a reoriented adoption of power/knowledge in thinking about curriculum. In Chapter Six, a Foucauldian account is offered in relation to two examples within curriculum theory in such a way as to demonstrate the relevance of a more robust and coherent interpretation of Foucault’s thought. In the final chapter, Chapter Seven, I shall offer some concluding remarks about the thesis as a whole. These will serve as a kind of reflection on the study as a whole and an acknowledgement of its limitations.

The present chapter includes two main sections. The first section starts with an introduction to the field of inquiry of this study, curriculum theory, through the discussion of poststructuralism. The increasing interest in poststructuralism affects the development of curriculum theory in this postmodern era. Within this context, I illustrate briefly the influence of Foucault’s thought on curriculum theory, focusing especially on his idea of power/knowledge. In addition, I give an account of my personal encounter with Foucault’s work to show the reason why I am pursuing this inquiry. The second section restates and expands on the aim of my study, explaining more fully the structure of each chapter, and the way the topic is pursued in this thesis.

1.1 Field of inquiry
In *Understanding Curriculum: An Introduction to the Study of Historical and Contemporary Curriculum Discourses* (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman, 1995) William Pinar *et al.* claim that: "The era of curriculum development is past...that field is no longer preoccupied with development. As we shall see, the field is preoccupied with understanding" (pp. 5-6). Practical aspects of curriculum development—such as the establishment of curriculum objectives, the exercise of curriculum design, curriculum implementation and curriculum evaluation—are no longer, in their view, the main concepts of the day. Teachers and curriculum theorists are no longer seen as educational technicians. Rather than focusing on technical *development* in relation to the curriculum or the organization of the curriculum, the trend in the study of curriculum since the 1980s has been towards a preoccupation with *understanding*.

What do the authors mean by "understanding"? They explain that they are concerned with the ways that learners come to relate to the world as a result of the curriculum they are given. For Pinar *et al.*, compared to several decades ago, our world has become more complicated and this has an impact on the conception of curriculum. Many new conceptions have added to the ideas of what it means to study the curriculum, and to work for curriculum change. Pinar *et al.* claim that instead of something needing to be accomplished, curriculum is better understood in terms of forms of discourses, texts, words and ideas. Discourse, in their view, refers to particular discursive practices, or forms of articulation that follow certain rules. In this sense, then, to study the curriculum is to study "the language of the field" (p. 7), which is comprised of the language that reflects and determines what we mean by a school. Regarding the idea of curriculum theory, they claim that "theory exists to provoke thinking" (p. 8). This thinking has nothing to do with "how to", but with
"why". So, curriculum theory in their view is a matter that pushes us to think about questions concerned with "why" in the educational context, such as: why history, politics, gender, race have come together in a particular way to create the complex and problematic contexts found in schools. For Pinar et al., the conventional approach, that of curriculum development, fails to answer this kind of question. On the contrary, an understanding of curriculum theory can help us to reflect more profoundly on these specific issues arising from dramatic changes in our society. Following this idea, the aim of curriculum theory has nothing to do with being an instrument for the practice in our current schooling, but it changes our way of looking at curriculum through different perspectives of understanding.

In one chapter of their book, Pinar et al. draw on poststructuralism as a perspective through which to understand what curriculum is. This chapter is entitled "Understanding curriculum as poststructuralist, deconstructed, postmodern text". They list several examples of curriculum study that use the approach of poststructuralism or deconstructivism and show how this philosophical movement has been one of the most prominent approaches in understanding curriculum. These examples serve to illustrate their idea of curriculum as a form of language or discourses to be understood.

Patrick Slattery has also addressed the impact and prevalence of the poststructural movement on the development of curriculum theory in his book *Curriculum development in the postmodern era:*

Two of the philosophies that are most challenging to understand, but also widely influential in curriculum studies, are poststructuralism and deconstructionism.
Understanding curriculum theory from the poststructural and deconstructed perspective involves enlarging our modes of cognition, engaging in methods of critique and analysis, and analyzing contemporary culture and history in order to challenge and subvert the central values, organizing metaphors, and discursive strategies of modernism. (Slattery, 1995, pp. 155-156)

As both Pinar et al. (1995) and Slattery (1995) argue then, the philosophical perspective of poststructuralism plays a significant role in contemporary curriculum theory discourses. This perspective is helpful in exploring the multiple natures of curriculum theory and to challenge existing values in postmodern times. In the last few decades, more and more curriculum theorists have drawn on poststructuralist perspectives to consider curriculum issues and to extend the scope of curriculum study. This trend is evident in such areas as innovation of methodology, analysis of curriculum history, and critique of educational policy. Poststructuralism relates to the so-called linguistic turn of 20th century philosophy and pays close attention to the relation of language to thought (Standish, 2004, p. 490). Poststructuralism should not be thought of as a single approach, however, because it includes many different but related strands. As in the view of Michael Peters and Nicholas Burbules (2004), we cannot reduce it to a set of shared assumptions, a method, a theory, or even a school. It is best referred to as a movement of thought—a complex skein of thought embodying different forms of critical practice (Peters and Burbules, 2004, p. 18).

Foucault, the philosopher I study in this thesis, is normally referred to as a poststructuralist. His work ranges widely across history, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and linguistics, and it emphasises the constitution of subjects and subjective experience through discursive practices. But more than other poststructuralists, he is

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1 Though Foucault is usually seen as a poststructuralist, he himself resisted this categorization.
concerned to go beyond the role of language into an explicit consideration of the nature of power/knowledge, and the constitution of the modern subject. For Usher and Edwards, this is possibly one of the reasons why his work has had a more remarkable impact on educational writing than other poststructuralist work (Usher & Edwards, 1996, p. 83). Foucault’s thought generates fruitful discussions on educational issues, but in many interpretations in the field of education, Foucault’s idea of power and knowledge are not elaborated very well. The reception of power/knowledge as such is usually governed by certain orthodox ways of thinking, and by the specific power/knowledge complex of the field of study itself. As stated at the outset, I believe that these adoptions of Foucault in curriculum theory, and in educational studies more widely, require a more profound understanding of Foucault’s idea, in ways that I hope will become clear as my thesis progresses. If, as Pinar et al. and Slattery claim, Foucault’s—as a poststructuralist—account can facilitate a different approach to understanding curriculum, I question whether understanding is the only reason to employ Foucault’s conception. Or whether, beyond gaining specific knowledge from Foucault, his ideas may offer us another approach to thinking about the curriculum, which is different from the imposition of an “understanding”. In contrast to current applications of Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge, I would regard curriculum theory informed by Foucault as offering “a box of tools” for the action of practices, which I will elaborate in Chapter Five.

More detailed discussion of the relationship between power and knowledge will be discussed in Chapters Three and Four. For purposes of clarity, however, I provide a brief introductory summary here.
Power/knowledge, the unifying theme of this thesis, is a term developed by Foucault. He puts power and knowledge together because, in his view, they are combined with each other and cannot be separated. Foucault refers to this indivisible relation between power and knowledge in one of his interviews: "knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power" (Foucault, 1980a, p. 52). Foucault was concerned with understanding the dynamics of power and knowledge. He intends to criticize dominant reason by diagnosing the power/knowledge relations and their manifestations in institutions and throughout modern society. This interrelationship highlights the profoundly political nature of educational debate. These ideas enhance the possibility for us to consider the operation of power/knowledge in the production of truth in the content of the curriculum. According to Foucauldian perspectives of power/knowledge, for curriculum, the question that we pose is no longer "Whose knowledge is of most worth?", in Michael W. Apple's claim (1990, p. vii). Instead, the question that we may ask could be concerned with how the regime of truth is formed and why truth is taken to be true within the particular power/knowledge conditions of a particular context.

My previous study is one of my motivations for engaging in a study of Foucault's notion of power/knowledge. My Master’s dissertation (Wang, 2001) was based on an action research project, which related to curriculum implementation in the primary school I worked in, within the context of new curriculum reform in Taiwan. This experience inspired my interest in investigating not only curriculum practices, but also theoretical perspectives associated with these practices. After this, in my first
doctoral thesis, I chose to examine the new curriculum guidelines in Taiwan via the perspectives of critical pedagogy. My first encounter with Foucault and power/knowledge came during this period of study. By way of the interpretation of the theorists of critical pedagogy, I developed a very rough understanding of this notion. This study provided a good opportunity for me to further my inquiry into this Foucauldian concept. In this thesis, however, I shall explore it not only through the ideas of curriculum theorists but also by means of Foucault’s own account and also some of the secondary literature related to his work, in order to reconsider its significance for curriculum theory.

In brief, for this study, I shall provide an examination of curriculum theory that reveals the impact of Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge. I shall then explore the meaning of this concept, and different interpretations of it, in order to critically diagnose both how the power/knowledge is used, and the truth that informs its use in contemporary curriculum theories. Because of the limits of time, it is not possible for me to deal with every prominent concept of Foucault’s and to consider all his works. My inquiry and critique focus specifically only on the single concept of power/knowledge and on curriculum theories related to it.

1.2 The aims of this study

There are three lines of theoretical inquiry developed in this thesis. First, I shall try to review Foucault’s reception in curriculum theory. The content that I will expound

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2 This curriculum guideline was put into practice since 2003 while I was a primary school teacher. It applies to students from year 1 to year 9.

3 This verb diagnose has a specific meaning in Foucault’s account. I provide an elaboration of the way this is interpreted by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1986) in Chapter Four.
derives from several curriculum theorists whose work predominantly uses Foucault’s thought in curriculum theory or curriculum policy analysis, specifically the concept of power/knowledge. The theorists on whom I shall draw in Chapter 2 are Cleo Cherryholmes, Henry A. Giroux, Thomas S. Popkewitz and Stephen J. Ball.

The first author, Cherryholmes was, to the best of my knowledge, the first to adopt poststructural perspectives, and more specifically Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge, in order to create a new approach to curriculum theory. My investigation of his ideas is intended not only to understand how he uses Foucault, but also to reconsider the issues of curriculum that he raises in the light of Foucault’s thought. Second, Giroux’s approach is based in an American tradition of “Critical Pedagogy”. He is indebted to Foucauldian power/knowledge for the development of his conception of the educational ideal of democratic schooling. I am interested in how he uses power/knowledge to develop his Utopia of education. Third, Popkewitz draws on Foucault’s idea to develop his own thinking about the history of curriculum. This is a new approach in curriculum study, which motivates me to explore how he employs Foucauldian notions such as knowledge, power, governance and the subject in his analysis of what he calls “cultural history”. Finally, Ball is another well-known theorist who uses the concept of discourse and power in the field of curriculum policy analysis. He undertakes an analysis of the UK’s 1988 policies of curriculum reform in the light of Foucault’s thinking. I will illustrate the perspective from which he analyses curriculum policy and discuss the specific examples that he provides.

The second line of inquiry in this thesis which I will develop in Chapter Three, seeks a preliminary understanding of the theme of power/knowledge by directly referring to Foucault’s work. My interest here is in seeing how Foucault addresses the
significance of power/knowledge in the context of the history of the prison and the
history of sexuality by focussing on two of Foucault’s works, Discipline and Punish: 
and Punish: The birth of the prison is a work that has direct relevance to educational
theory and practice, and, in particular, it shows the complex relations between power,
knowledge and “docile bodies”. As Peters and Burbules put it:

The relevance to education and schooling of Foucault’s genealogical studies is clearly
illustrated in Discipline and Punish, including, for example, a long analysis of how the
division of the school day into periods with clear schedules and transitions serves not
only curricular and organizational purposes, but also teaches submission to a particular
order that defines for the subject what can be done, where, and when. (Peters and
Burbules, 2004, p. 63)

The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (1990) is another book in which the notion of
power/knowledge is developed. In this work, Foucault moves his thinking from the
modern individual as object to the modern individual as subject. His purpose is to
define the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human
sexuality in the Western world, and to bring out the “will to knowledge” that serves
as both their support and their instrument (Foucault, 1990, pp. 11-12). Because of the
limitations of my language, the editions of these two works that I refer to are English
translations rather than the original French publications.

In many respects, Foucault is the best commentator on himself. I consider that his
interview, lectures and essays are another important resource for this research, and
these also contribute to Chapter 3. Foucault refers to issues relating to
power/knowledge in a number of interviews and lectures published in English. For
example, Power/knowledge (Gordon ed., 1980) is closely linked to this theme and
argument. Several anthologies edited by Paul Rabinow and James D. Faubion also address discussion about power/knowledge, such as *The Foucault reader: An introduction to Foucault’s thought* (Rabinow ed., 1984), *Michel Foucault: Ethics, subjectivity and truth* (Rabinow ed., 1997a), *Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method and epistemology* (Faubion ed., 1998), *Michel Foucault: Power* (Faubion ed., 2002), and *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics* (Dreyfus and Rabinow eds., 1983). In addition, *Language, counter-memory, practice* (Bouchard ed., 1977), *The politics of truth* (Sylvere ed., 2007), and *The Foucault effect* (Burchell, Gordon and Miller eds., 1991) also include selected essays and interviews, which offer valuable reading for understanding the theme of power/knowledge. Owing to the limits of time, I cannot discuss every essay in these books, so I choose only those essays most closely linked to this notion.

For the third line of enquiry, developed in Chapter Four, the secondary literature on Foucault is an important source for obtaining an explicit understanding of the concept of power/knowledge. I shall select some representative works, outlined below, and then make comparisons over several key points. I first outline the interpretation by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow whose book *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics* (1983) is well-known in the English-speaking world. Their exegesis of Foucault is easy to read for novices and for an introductory study of Foucault. The second section connects with the elucidation of Foucault’s concept by Barry Smart. Smart’s writing sets off from a sociological point of view. He makes a comparison of the notion of power between Foucault and other thinkers, such as Marx or Weber. Several curriculum theorists employ Foucault’s thought from a sociological perspective, however, Smart’s work may contribute different ideas to this area. Third, Colin Gordon’s interpretation will be discussed. Gordon provides a
global contextualisation and exegesis relating to Foucault’s work. He writes in great
detail about several main themes of Foucault’s ideas and about the development of
his thinking. This helps to provide a better understanding of Foucault in the light of
his own historical and cultural context. Fourth, the interpretation of Jan Masschelein
will be considered. Masschelein’s work specifically refers to the implications of
Foucault for educational theory and practice. He explores a different approach to
Foucault from any other educationists, and through this I hope to gain different
perspectives through which to consider education in terms of Foucault’s ideas. Judith
Butler’s response to one of Foucault’s lectures, “What is critique?”, is the fifth
position I will address. Her interpretation of “critique” highlights the main task of
power/knowledge and makes manifest the link between power/knowledge and
subjectivity. Sixth, Thomas. R. Flynn stresses the perspective of history in
Foucauldian thought. Foucault’s conception of history is an aspect that curriculum
theorists often adopt. We can also see this in the examples of Cherryholmes and
Popkewitz. I shall underline Flynn’s interpretation of Foucault’s idea of history and
see how it can contribute to a different approach to curriculum theory. The last
interpretation that I will elaborate is the unique reading of Foucault by Gilles
Deleuze. His interpretation is far beyond the scope of exegesis, and it moves towards
Deleuze’s own thought. It is no longer Foucault’s Foucault, but belongs to Deleuze’s
Foucault. For readers, understanding Deleuze’s Foucault is more challenging and
demanding, but his work offers more space for us to imagine what power/knowledge
is.

Chapter Five presents the convergence of the previous three lines of inquiry. It
includes my evaluations of each of the curriculum theorists addressed in Chapter Two.
The ideas of my arguments derive from the sources in Chapter Three and Chapter
Four. Some curriculum theorists indeed offer insightful thinking in terms of Foucault's ideas. Nevertheless, it is also not unusual to find improper applications of his notion of power/knowledge. Certain philosophical debts in the sphere of education or curriculum are claimed by Foucault's notion. Underneath the surface, however, certain "pre-designed" thinking regarding power/knowledge is embedded in their employment of the concept and this has nothing to do with Foucault. When Dan W. Butin reviewed three educational books that engage the writings of Foucault (Butin, 2006), he found that Foucault has been narrowly adopted in the dominant mode, in which it is seen to either liberate us from or entrap us within social structures and oppressive schooling practices. Foucault has been reworked for each author's purposes in ways that show little meaningful linkage between Foucault and education. Butin argues that Foucault "never wanted to free us or help us cope" (p. 380). Such a binary of liberation/entrapment misses the ironic point that Foucault highlights and this binary is exactly what Foucault intended to work against. Unfortunately, it is not only in three books that Butin examines, but also in the work of several educational researchers who engage with Foucauldian thought, that we see attempts at revealing different accounts of power/knowledge within Foucault.

I do not intend to act as the guardian of authentic Foucauldian thought and thereby to maintain an unchangeable orthodoxy. As a matter of fact universal truth and value are concepts that he campaigns against, and it is his campaign in this respect that informs my interest in curriculum theory. Though, on the one hand, my starting point is to evaluate the use of Foucault (and specifically his concept of power/knowledge) in curriculum theories, on the other hand, I also attempt to understand this same

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4 Foucault's notion of "the history of the present" shows an ironic stance towards our current situation. See the related interpretation of Dreyfus and Rabinow in Chapter Four.
mobilization of the idea of power/knowledge itself in terms of power/knowledge. My 
suspicion then is that the curriculum theorists in question have taken up the notion of 
power/knowledge as yet another tool in their theoretical armoury, and that in the 
process they understand it in terms of sovereign power; my belief is that this involves 
a misunderstanding of what Foucault intends in his use of the term, and that this may 
frustrate the shift in philosophical practice that he intends to bring about. I attempt to 
realize that shift in theoretical practice in two ways, and these constitute a move 
towards a kind of critical practice⁵: first, through my examination of the curriculum 
theorists in question (and their use of power/knowledge), which constitutes the major 
part of this thesis; second, through the consideration of two concrete examples, in 
ways that are explained below. I believe this achieves a movement beyond 
understanding of philosophy found in the work of such curriculum theorists as 
William Pinar, which takes philosophical concepts as something to be applied to the 
curriculum, a means for better access to the understanding of curriculum practice; and 
I believe that, in consequence, I work with Foucault’s thought in a more robust way. 
What we can valuably do in adopting Foucault is to provide more possibilities in 
thinking about education, rather than, as in Cris Mayo’s critique of the use of 
Foucault by educational theorists, supporting the “claustrophic accounts of power” 
(Mayo, 2000, p. 103) in the name of Foucault. Hence, at the end of Chapter Five I 
borrow the notion of the tree and the rhizome from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
(2004/1987) to argue that power/knowledge should be considered in the rhizomatic 
way rather than the tree-like way that dominates in curriculum theory. Following this, 
in place of curriculum theory’s dedication to free from the oppression of an unequal 
social structure, curriculum can be seen as a practice of self-transformation.

⁵ This echoes the idea of Peters and Burbules (2004) regarding the thought of poststructuralism that I 
have shown earlier.
I am fully aware that part of my critique in Chapter Five is in tension with Foucault's idea of critique\(^6\). Therefore, in Chapter Six, in a more Foucauldian critical way, I try to offer my suggestions for relevant issues in curriculum theory in terms of the notion of power/knowledge. I then focus on two concrete examples: the first is globalization and the import of critical pedagogy, and the second is the question of what is "critical" in critical ethnography.

This chapter has then briefly explained my purpose and approach in this thesis. As this should have made clear, I intend to build up my argument in stages. In Chapters Two, Three and Four, my main preoccupation will be descriptive rather than critical. I wish to provide a fair account of the views of the curriculum theorists in question, and thereafter to elaborate Foucault's position regarding power/knowledge, through his own writings and through the secondary philosophical literature. Inevitably, in these chapters, lines of criticism will emerge through the juxtaposition of contrasting points of view, but I reserve the main thrust of my own critique until Chapter Five, where the positions of the curriculum theorists are subjected to critical scrutiny in the light of my more direct examination of Foucault. The descriptive groundwork is necessary, I believe, if my critique is to gain the purchase that it needs.

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\(^6\) For Foucault, critique is an attitude of how not to be governed according to certain dominant truths, an approach I turn to in Chapter Six. The reason why my critique in Chapter Five is in tension with Foucault's account of this notion is that, somehow, I regard Foucault's work as a sovereign truth in order to judge the application of these curriculum theories.
Chapter 2 Foucault and power/knowledge in curriculum theory and policy analysis

There have been several educational theorists employing the Foucauldian notion of power/knowledge in their analysis of curriculum theory or policy. Pinar et al. claimed that, apart from Cherryholmes’ discursive analysis of traditional curriculum discourses, “as yet there has been little effort to map contemporary curriculum discourses employing a Foucauldian analysis” (1995, p. 514). Now, however, around ten years after the publication of their book, Foucault’s thought has gained more influence on educational theory and it has generated fruitful discussions in this field. In this chapter, I shall address these discussions and show some examples of them. My purpose here is only to show the way that these curriculum theorists use Foucault’s idea. My own response to and critique of them will be presented in Chapter Five.

I have been partly motivated to write this thesis because of my belief that Foucault is commonly misinterpreted in educational research. His ideas about power/knowledge tend to be grafted onto prevailing ideas about the operation of power, along more or less neo-Marxist lines. It would be easy for me to take as my target some of the more extreme examples of such misappropriation or misinterpretation of his work. What will be more valuable, however, will be if I can identify weakness or problems of a similar kind in the work of leading curriculum theorists who have drawn on Foucault’s work and who are themselves enormously influential. Hence, this is what I have tried to do. One consequence of this is that the criticisms I shall make are more moderate than they might have been against those more extreme examples, but I
believe this more subtle, moderate line of approach in the end provides the basis for a more robust and rigorous enquiry.

2.1 Power/knowledge in educational discourse – Cleo Cherryholmes

Cherryholmes is a pioneer in the field of curriculum theory, who is strongly indebted to Foucault. In *Power and criticism: poststructural investigations in education* (1988), he sets out a new, poststructural approach to educational research and practice by criticizing prominent structuralist conceptualisations of education and curriculum. For this purpose, he employs the ideas of Foucault, Derrida, and other poststructuralists.

In order to understand the interrelationship of knowledge and power in education, Cherryholmes tries to gain insight into discursive practices of education. He regards education as a discursive practice in which power and knowledge interpenetrate. For Cherryholmes, educational discourses are not composed by randomly choosing words and statements, but constituted by certain rules and language use. These rules shape a discursive practice, and they are relative to time and place, as Foucault suggests. Cherryholmes highlights that: “Practices do not exist without rules, nor rules without practices” (p. 4). As with educational discourses, for him, educational practices are also constituted by sets of rules that constitute their coherence. For instance, educational progress is assessed by criterion-referenced testing or norm-referenced testing. This standardized norm of testing is one kind of rule. There is knowledge about the exercise of these rules. Hence, “knowing rules means knowing how to proceed” (ibid). In Cherryholmes’ view, the constitution of rules results from choices – for example, the standardized exam is a way of distinguishing between the
cognitive ability of each student, and this distinction affects their future choices of schools. However, Cherryholmes suggests that ideology is the main origin of the control of these choices. He says: “choices cannot be made without reference to a value, set of values, criteria, or interests” (ibid). These values and interests can be thought of as ideology in his view. He shows the way that ideology informs testing:

…the ideology of educational testing organizes and rationalizes beliefs and interpretations about testing—its purpose, process, and outcomes—which justify activities and rules that count as testing and evaluation. An ideological orientation about testing includes beliefs behind production of tests and their consumption by teachers, administrators, students, parents, and social institutions other than schools. (pp. 4-5)

By drawing on Foucault’s notion of discursive practices, Cherryholmes emphasizes the influence and the importance of ideology. Ideology structures educational discourses and the taken-for-granted lived experience of everyday classroom life. Because of ideology, we have shared ideas about what is true or what is false. And, hence, because of it, educationalists choose activities that are coincident with normative commitments. Cherryholmes claims, therefore, that “ideology and power arrangements infiltrate our thinking and actions, they shape our subjectivities, that is, how and what we think about ourselves and so act” (p. 6). This is the fundamental point in Cherryholmes’ employment of Foucault. Next, I shall focus on some of his analyses of examples of educational research, textbooks, teacher education, and social studies education, used by Cherryholmes to illustrate the effects of power and ideology.

2.1.1 Educational research
Concerning the issue of educational research, Cherryholmes draws on the Foucaudian method of "interpretive analytics" to criticize the idea of "construct validity", a term commonly used to describe the process of deciding whether research data can be taken as truth. Cherryholmes describes interpretive analytics as a viewpoint emphasizing the role of history and power in the production of the present, which can be used to ask why researchers use specific words or utterances when they make statements. He draws attention to the way that, in interpretive analytics, "Foucault uses power in a productive sense as well as in a negative, coercive, and restrictive way" (p. 116). On the one hand, Foucault argues that power is often thought to operate as censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression. On the other hand, Cherryholmes explains, power produces effects at the level of desire and also at the level of knowledge. Power produces knowledge rather than preventing it. In this sense, for Cherryholmes, researchers desire to be productive theorists. They are keen to write proposals and submit their research for publication, following research norms such as "construct validity". Therefore, knowledge is produced by the norm—the procedure of legitimation. Research, then, becomes a form of social reproduction. In his analysis of interpretive analytics, Cherryholmes comments: "construct validity is situated in a power-knowledge nexus over which speakers have limited control" (ibid). In his view, researchers have no autonomy because truth is decided in terms of measurement and norms. This truth is linguistic and relates to language use (words, concepts, statements, discourses) at a given time and place. Within this language use, truth is controlled by ideology, interests and power. Cherryholmes claims:
...ideology, interests, and power arrangements at a given time and place are implicated in the production of what counts as “true”. “Truths” of a time and place are politically produced, and constructs and their measurement are tools of production. (ibid)

Following Foucault's idea, Cherryholmes considers that not everything is bad, but everything is dangerous, such as construct validity. The danger of construct validity is that its judgement is technical and each choice is based on expertise, rationality and authoritative knowledge. For Cherryholmes, positivism is underlying construct validity. Rather than being located in a specific time and space, positivism reinforces acontextual and ahistorical scientific narratives of construct validation, hypothesis testing and program evaluation. This systematic research methodology is separated from historical elements and from a history of the present. I shall now illustrate what Cherryholmes means by the history of the present in terms of Foucault’s notion.

2.1.2 On educational history

Regarding the Foucauldian perspective on history, Cherryholmes argues that Foucault’s writing of history is not the writing of narratives. Rather, it is the history of the present. Its methodology focuses on “relations between discourse and power and how effects of power produce texts and discourses-practices?” (P. 161). Cherryholmes argues that there is a need to see educational history in a Foucauldian frame in order to “uncover how power operates in, through, and on discourses, institutions, and social practices” (p.162). He criticizes two examples of educational history in terms of a Foucauldian history of the present. The first is the analysis of the

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7 For Cherryholmes, no stable distinction can be drawn between discourse and practice, because what is done is with what is said. He therefore uses the term—discourse-practice or discourses-practices to emphasize interpenetration between the two. See Cherryholmes (1988), pp8-9.
political economy of textbooks by Michael W. Apple. The second is Thomas S. Popkewitz’s analysis of teacher education reform proposals.

For Apple, textbooks are products of political economy. The publication of textbooks always follows the consideration of commercial benefits. State and school textbook adoption committees place their judgement and constraints on the content of textbooks. They decide what kind of materials should be included and excluded in textbooks. Besides this, statewide assessment tests and standardized achievement tests also influence the content of textbooks. Apple describes this phenomenon as “the homogenization of textbooks” (ibid). Cherryholmes counters Apple’s view, however, by arguing that we can see this as the anonymity of textbook discourse practices according to a Foucauldian account. He goes on to explain that, “from a Foucauldian perspective, none of the participants (authors, editors, publishers, state adoption committees, school adoption committees, teachers, students, parents) have many degrees of freedom in which to act” (ibid). For him, the political economy of textbooks is driven by the discourse-practice, which results in “bland” textbooks because no individual opinion can be made obvious through the mechanism of collective decision. That is to say, discourse practice is constituted by collective practice rather than individual decision. This is how Cherryholmes explains discourse practice as “anonymity”, within which the individual has no freedom.

In addition, Cherryholmes draws on another Foucauldian perspective to see textbooks as discourses which relate to political production. He points out that “Foucault shows textbooks to be political, material products that represent a privileged way of seeing things, privileged by means of power, position, tradition, and so forth” (p.61). For Cherryholmes, this political production or power hides commitments to the effects of
efficiency, control, manipulation, instrumentalism, and utilitarianism. And these effects derive from ideological bias. He adds “textbooks are products of human culture that present partial, local organizations of meanings. It seems their fate never escapes partiality and ideological bias” (p.72). If teachers reinforce dominant structures, and repeat the structured assertions of textbooks, the dialogue would become repetitive and non-instructive in the classroom. If they have a critical attitude with which to question the structural and positivist standards in textbooks, then they can enact a critical teaching. Unfortunately, for Cherryholmes, critical teaching can seldom occur in school structure, because this structure constrains what can and cannot be said. It therefore has a tendency to reinforce the authority behind textbooks.

In an analysis of American teaching reform and teacher education reform proposals during the 1980s, Popkewitz suggests that educators held the ideal of choosing programs freely and rationally to advance in their role as reformers. However, this was mocked by some as “the liberal illusion of social autonomy” (ibid). Cherryholmes considers that this unexpected consequence of the liberal illusion was the conjunction of several separate discourses-practices. For example, at the federal level, statistical measurement and research capability expanded fast in service of establishing equal opportunity of access to education by way of an emphasis on measurement and test performance. At the state level, the Ministry of Education imposed greater surveillance on teacher education programs in order to train the competent teachers who can achieve educational aims under new policy. Systematic and quantitative measurement was also emphasized for this purpose. Power, in the practices of this educational reform, operated through different aspects of discourses-practices, which reinforced each other. Within the exercise of power, teachers and students became visible in order to be able to be operated on through
scientific measurements. This management relates to the knowledge produced in education according to Cherryholmes’ account. By contrast, the power that controls these measures became invisible in its enhancement of social reproduction. For Cherryholmes, Popkewitz fails to subtly analyze this power effect, because Popkewitz’s history of the present “highlights the uncritical social determinism and reproduction that such reforms promote” (p.163).

In the discourses-practices of teacher education, Cherryholmes considers, students in teacher education institutions or universities are situated within a mechanism through which power shapes how they think of themselves and how they act in terms of expectations and desires. Becoming good teachers means they must master “appropriate discourses-practices of teaching” (p. 35), such as developing skills of controlling a classroom, of teaching specific subjects and of evaluating students’ learning and achievement. Student teachers have to obey many invisible rules in order to be good teachers. Teacher education is therefore linked to the processes of socialization. Cherryholmes intends to show how power constitutes the belief and subjectivity of these prospective teachers. In this example, power is operated effectively by desire. This desire of being a good teacher makes the invisible power possible. Cherryholmes draws on a question from Foucault: “How can people gain control of their discourses and practices instead of being controlled by them (p. 36)? Following this, he would like educationists to think: “How can students be subjects rather than objects within the processes of teacher education?” and “How does power shape the subjectivities of prospective teachers?” From Foucault’s perspective, Cherryholmes claims that subjectivity is an important issue in thinking about teacher education.
2.1.3 Social studies education

In an essay “Knowledge, power and discourse in social studies education” (1983), Cherryholmes offers his critique on social studies education. Again, he regards social studies education as a discursive practice in the vein of Foucault’s account, and seeks to explore knowledge and power relations in this discursive practice. For him, “what counts as knowledge in social studies education is constrained by power relations that are internal as well as external to the discipline and profession” (p. 349). That is to say, disciplinary power is a force to control and to confine knowledge in social studies education.

Cherryholmes criticizes current inquiries into social studies education in the light of Foucault’s concept of power. He draws on Foucault’s view that power relations shape a discursive practice and determine what can and cannot be said. He argues, however, that these factors have been largely excluded from the discussions of social studies education. In his view, “much has been said about how things are and should be. Little has been said about how the way things are determine what is said and can be said” (p.346). He explains this further: “if it is never considered how our utterances are products of social processes and power relations, then we cannot claim to be deeply reflective about or in control of what we do” (ibid). To expose what he sees as the decisive elements in educational discourses, Cherryholmes analyzes three traditions in the curriculum of social studies education: citizenship transmission, the social science disciplines, and reflective inquiry, which in turn inform inquiry into social studies education.
Through the first of these, *citizenship transmission*, students are indoctrinated into a certain body of knowledge relating to citizenship. Geographical or historical knowledge, drawn upon to this end, contains specific ideology. In this sense, knowledge, assumptions, and beliefs are treated as self-evident truths. For maintaining social harmony, controversy is substituted by the idea of cooperation and consensus in curriculum. Behind this discourse, for Cherryholmes, there are ideological commitments that serve to support or contest power relations. Rather than the will of textbook authors, the consideration of marketization is the main power (or ideology) that supports this discursive practice. The second tradition, the *social science disciplines approach*, is grounded in the content and methods of social sciences. It presumes that rationality is the most important element in constituting a society; and that, as an ideal citizen, one should have the ability to solve problems in society. This discourse is supported by social science methodologies in which our world is seen systematically and everything is assumed to be value-free. In this discourse, the fact of socio-economic inequality and injustice are excluded. Social scientists are authorities who determine what counts as knowledge; what can be talked about and what is left unsaid. Normally, power relations that support this discursive practice are influenced by the positivist view that there is absolute truth or falsity of statements.

The third tradition in social studies education that Cherryholmes refers to is *reflective inquiry*. In this approach, citizenship is defined as decision-making in the socio-political context. The issues that textbooks highlight are relevant to individual or social problems and to the solution of these problems. This approach does not exclude the importance of personal value in problem-solving. Comparing this with the previous two approaches, Cherryholmes comments: "The power relationships that
support this view of social studies education—reflective inquiry—are weak” (p.353); because it “poses questions that run counter to the powerful interests that support citizenship transmission and the lesser interests behind social science education” (ibid). In this respect, Cherryholmes considers that the intensity of power relations depends on the degree of the influence of certain interests or ideology, which shows also how dominant discourses are constructed.

At the end of this essay, Cherryholmes claims: “part of Foucault’s project and a goal of this essay, quite simply, is to help people get control over the constraints and power relations of their discursive practices” (p.356). Hence, his analysis of social studies attempts to make explicit the political structure and to constitute a new politics of truth in order to substitute the dominant regime of truths. Otherwise, under the exercise of power, political commitments informing discursive practices will remain invisible and beyond our control.

In this section, Cherryholmes considers that power enhances the procedure of normalization, which functions to make a distinction between what is included and what is excluded, and also between what is said and what is unsaid in educational discourses. This distinction derives from certain dominant ideologies or interests. We may see that, for Cherryholmes, power refers to operations at the macro-level of social structure and that his analysis attempts to expose the manipulation of economic decisions or social reproduction, as evidenced by his various examples of discourses. Knowledge (in the form of educational research or textbooks in his case) in curriculum is therefore produced (this is the way that he see knowledge is productive) by the ideology of scientific methodology or economic benefits. In Cherryholmes’ view, we should be aware of this “dangerous” impact and try to control it.
2.2 Power/knowledge in critical pedagogy—Henry A. Giroux

According to Peter McLaren (1998), critical pedagogy is a contemporary educational discourse that is "fundamentally concerned with understanding the relationship between power and knowledge" (p. 183). In this section, I will focus on Foucault's reception in Giroux's theory of critical pedagogy with reference to the concept of power/knowledge, and show the way that he use the notions of power and knowledge to develop his curriculum theory.

2.2.1 A critique of the constitution of academic discipline

In Teachers as intellectuals: Toward a critical pedagogy of learning (1988), Giroux reflects on the issue of academic discipline. For him, an academic discipline is not a natural subject matter, but "a field which is itself constituted by the practice of the discipline" (p. 145). The field of academic disciplines is arbitrary because it is contingent on historical circumstance, and reflects cultural, social and institutional demands, especially in fields outside the natural sciences. Giroux draws on Foucault's analysis of "discipline" to consider the constitution of academic disciplines here. He puts it like this:

Though Foucault is not directly concerned with academic disciplines, much of his analysis applies to these enterprises. What is characteristic of disciplinary technologies is their capacity simultaneously to normalize and hierarchize, to homogenize and differentiate. This paradox is explained by the control which discipline asserts over

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8 The "discipline" in "academic discipline" means academic subject. But this "discipline" in Giroux's account has different meaning from the former. I consider that it is the discipline in Foucault's idea of disciplinary power.
difference. Because norms are carefully established and maintained, deviation can be measured on a scale. The goal of the professional in a discipline is to move up this scale by differing only in the appropriate ways. (p. 146)

Giroux's purpose is not to show that discourse is limited by disciplinary technologies. Rather, his position is that Foucault's work is helpful for us to understand how this discipline, in the sense of power, is enforced by institutions through hierarchical ranking or normalization, which is related to the tactics of various rewards or punishments. For Giroux, the ultimate effect is exclusion or marginalization. Statement outside discipline is always excluded. Giroux offers the example of a Ph.D. student that has to follow the dominant academic discourse in his study area; otherwise, he will be excluded and not get the admission into this academy. Discipline in this sense is to build up the norm and to whittle down the difference.

2.2.2 The language of possibility

In Education still under siege (1993), Aronowitz and Giroux employ Foucault's notion of power/knowledge to develop a language of possibility in their curriculum theory. A starting point in their account is the denial that power is treated as a negative force that works in the interests of domination. They consider, in the classical Marxist view, that power relates to knowledge primarily through the ways in which it serves to distort or mystify the truth. The economic and social conditions of knowledge are examined through ideological critique. Knowledge is always analyzed for its distortions and mystifications. Thus, school knowledge and culture are reduced to serving the interests of privileged groups. The question of how power works in schools is almost limited to recording "how it reproduces relations of domination and subordinacy through various school practices" (p. 150). They argue that the notion of
power must be rescued from its current usage if schools are to be seen as active sites where possibilities exist. They point out:

We believe that power is both a negative and positive force. Its character is dialectical, and its mode of operation is always more than simply repressive. In actuality, power is at the root of all forms of behaviour in which people say no, struggle, resist, use oppositional modes of discourse, and fight for a different vision of the future. (ibid)

They highlight Foucault's analysis of power that views power as not solely negative and as a force to say no, but also as producing things and inducing pleasure. Power, for Foucault, is seen more as a productive network than as a repressive mechanism. Hence, Aronowitz and Giroux claim, the nature of social control and its relationship with schooling needs to be redefined. Power is positive and productive in a way that produces particular forms of life. We need a positive notion of social control to establish the theoretical basis for critical learning and practice, in which social control is seen not merely as an instance of domination but also as a form of emancipatory practice. They go on to claim that: “the notion of power that underscores this positive view of social control takes as its starting point the empowerment of teachers and students and the confirmation of their histories and possibilities” (ibid). They consider social control as a form of cultural politics to serve the interests of freedom. Within this perspective, schools are regarded as sites to struggle for a qualitatively better life for all. Curriculum, as an emancipatory form, plays an important role in giving students an active and critical voice, the ability to express themselves on the basis of their daily experience.

They raise further questions here: how can teachers and others produce curricula based around forms of culture and forms of school knowledge in a way that
empowers students who traditionally have been excluded from the benefits of education? If curriculum is regarded as a form of cultural politics, what kinds of knowledge have to be produced? First, in their opinion, teachers will need to develop forms of knowledge and classroom social practices that validate the experience that students bring to their own schools. This means giving students who come from subordinate social categories an active voice in order to change their disadvantaged situations. Second, a critical interrogation of the experiences that students bring to schools is needed. It helps students to understand what they need to learn in order to reflect on their own experience, and in order to break the chains of domination and subordination; namely, to “provide students with the skills and courage in order to transform the world according to their own vision” (p. 152). Third, for them, it is imperative to “analyze state and nonstate agencies as important sites involved in the production of dominant culture and ideologies” (p. 154). As a critical educator, a teacher has to know how corporate influences bear down on the shaping of school policy and curriculum development. They think, for example, of the growing business-school partnerships being promoted by neo-conservative ideologues in the United States. Finally, they assert a cultural politics that seeks to rethink the nature and the role of being a teacher. For Aronowitz and Giroux, the ideal role of teachers is one of transformative intellectual who engages in the struggle for equality and democracy on the basis of the moral and intellectual leadership necessary. This concept of the transformative intellectual not only suggests a political function but also offers the theoretical ground for the examination of the teachers’ own histories, those connections to the past that define who they are and how they mediate and function in the world.

2.2.3 Border pedagogy
Border pedagogy is a concept developed by Giroux, influenced by postmodernism, which incorporates ideas of counter-text, the politics of difference, and counter-memory. Democracy and difference are essential components in border pedagogy. Aronowitz and Giroux (1991) argue that the discourses of democracy and difference can be taken up as pedagogical practices through what Foucault calls counter-memory. As they put it, counter-memory in Foucault’s account is a practice that transforms history from a judgment on the past in the name of present truth. By placing the present in a new relation to the past, this practice combats our current modes of truth, and helps us change our present situation. Following Foucault’s terms, they claim:

Counter-memory represents a critical reading of how the past informs the present and how the present reads the past. Counter-memory provides a theoretical tool to restore the connection between the language of public life and the discourse of difference. It presents an attempt to rewrite the language of resistance in terms that connect human beings within forms of remembrance that dignify public life, while at the same time allowing people to speak from their particular histories and voices. (p. 124)

For them, counter-memory is an attempt to develop the language of resistance so as to substitute the subjugated history. On the basis of this notion, democracy cannot be treated as merely inherited knowledge. It also needs to be linked to the notions of public life that afford empowering investments. Pedagogical practice, therefore, is the rewriting of history through the power of student voice. Democracy becomes a referent for understanding how differences are organized by public life, and for clarifying how “schools, teachers, and students define themselves as political subjects, as citizens who operate within particular configurations of power” (p. 125).
As a transformative intellectual, Giroux considers, the teacher’s task should begin with a recognition of those manifestations of suffering that constitute historical memory and the conditions of oppression. He attempts to define educators as bearers of dangerous memory, which he describes thus:

Dangerous memory has two dimensions: that of hope and that of suffering…it recounts the history of the marginal, the vanquished, and the oppressed, and in doing so posits the need for a new kind of subjectivity and community in which the conditions that create such suffering can be eliminated. (Giroux, 1997, p. 105)

In Giroux’s opinion, some forms of historical and popular knowledge have been suppressed and ignored, but it is possible to reveal the effects of conflict and struggle through the form of these knowledges. Underlying the view of dangerous memory and subjugated knowledge, transformative intellectuals can advance both the language of critique and the language of possibility.

2.2.4 Emancipatory authority

Developing a critical pedagogy consistent with the principles of emancipatory authority is of significant interest for Giroux. To achieve this, in his view, radical educators need to reconstruct the relations between knowledge, power, and desire, in order to bring together two often separate struggles within schools: the changing of circumstances and the changing of subjectivities. To begin with, educators have to identify the kinds of material and ideological preconditions that need to exist for schools to become effective. For example, the concerns of active parent involvement in the schools, of adequate health care for students, of high student morale, and of adequate financial resources: “All of these factors represent resources through which
power is exercised and made manifest” (Giroux, 1997, p. 107). Power refers to the means of getting things done in this sense. As Foucault says: power “consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome to govern, in this sense, to structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault, quoted in Giroux, 1997, p. 107).

Giroux argues that, for teachers, the relationship between authority and power is manifested not only in the legitimate exercise of control over students, but also in influencing the conditions under which they work. In this way, teachers can teach collectively, produce alternative curricula, and engage in a form of emancipatory politics. The main issue that Giroux focuses on is teachers’ ability to empower their students through what they teach, how they teach, as well as through the formation of school knowledge. They are all relevant to the link of power to knowledge. This kind of knowledge that educators provide for their students might empower them not merely to engage the world around them but also to act so as to change the wider social reality. That is, for the purpose of real democracy. Furthermore, Giroux suggests that there is a requirement for radical educators to reconstitute the very nature of the power/knowledge relation. This requires engaging in a consideration of the idea that “power relations exist in correlation with forms of school knowledge that both distort the truth and produce it” (p. 108). A curriculum for democratic empowerment must examine not merely how knowledge distorts reality, but also how knowledge can produce particular forms of life. The latter accords with Foucault’s emphasis: on the productive and positive function in power/knowledge, which centres on “generating knowledge that presents concrete possibilities for empowering people” (ibid).
According to Giroux’s vision, knowledge in the curriculum should include not only the basic skills students will need to work and live in the wider society, but also “the social forms through which human beings live, become conscious, and sustain themselves” (ibid). To put it more specifically, this is the knowledge about power and about how it works, as well as the analyses of those practices such as racism, sexism, and class exploitation that structure and mediate our daily lives. The point here is to “expose and deconstruct the processes through which these dominant ideological representations are produced, legitimated, and circulated in society” (ibid). Thus, curriculum should be built on knowledge and provide students with a language through which they can analyze their own lived relations.

Giroux assumes that resistance provides an important focus for analyzing the relationship between school and the wider society. However, a clarification of what resistance actually is and of what it is not is imperative. In this sense, he attempts to establish a more rigorous notion of resistance by drawing on Foucault’s concept of power and resistance. For Foucault, power works in order to be exercised on and by people within different contexts where dominance and autonomy interact. Giroux highlights this idea:

...power is never uni-dimensional; it is exercised not only as a mode of domination, but also as an act of resistance or even as an expression of a creative mode of cultural and social production outside the immediate force of domination. (Giroux, 1983, p. 108)

Thus, in his view, the behaviour expressed by subordinate groups could be incorporated into cultural and creative acts of resistance in which fleeting images of freedom are to be found. It also can form a strategy which connects with students’ own lived experience against structures of domination and constraint.
To sum up, we know that the notion of power/knowledge Giroux employs is for the purpose of social transformation. Knowledge, in his perspective, is not simply the content of curriculum or particular skills that schools provide for students, but also needs to be thought about critically in relation to the nexus of power, and in historical, ideological and political context. In particular, the daily life and experience of students cannot be excluded from the curriculum. In Giroux’s idea of cultural politics and border pedagogy, the boundary between centre and margin are no longer as firm as usually assumed. Knowledge and cultural borders are giving way to shifting configurations of power. Power is not merely a form of constraint and control. Following Foucault’s emphasis on the positive and productive side of power, Giroux criticizes the traditional Marxist view of power, that power is always oppressive and negative. He indicates the possibility of empowerment and transformation in curricula based on illuminating the productive effects of power. As transformative intellectuals, teachers’ task is not only to engage in the excavation of historical consciousness and repressed knowledge, but also to connect curriculum with students’ voice based on counter-history. They strive for empowering students and themselves. The final destination is to construct a more democratic society.

2.3 Power/knowledge in cultural history—Thomas S. Popkewitz

Popkewitz draws on Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge in his study of the history of curriculum, using an approach that he terms “cultural history”. In this section, I begin by outlining Popkewitz’s interpretation of Foucault’s notions of power and knowledge, in which he focuses on the productive effect of power; rethinks the meaning of knowledge in curriculum theories; and develops the idea of
the decentering of the subject. I shall then describe Popkewitz’s account of social epistemology. It bears on his new idea of cultural history and challenges the presuppositions of the historicist tradition. After that, I will show Popkewitz’s critique of hidden curriculum traditions by Foucauldian perspective. And finally, express his claim: “curriculum as a governing practice”, informed by Foucault’s work in the thinking of curriculum.

2.3.1 Laying stress on the productive effect of power

In an essay “Restructuring of Social and Political Theory in Education: Foucault and a Social Epistemology of School Practices”, Popkewitz and Brennan (1998) elaborate two interpretations of power: first, power as sovereignty; the second, power as deployment. They explain these two approaches as follows:

The view of power as sovereignty focuses on larger historical structures, which determine that in our daily life we cannot avoid the affect of sovereign power. Popkewitz and Brennan consider that we may find this concept of power evident in much of the sociology of school knowledge. This concept is normally employed to interpret the origin of domination and subjugation in schools, and to explain how gender, racial, and class distinctions are re-produced in our society. They suggest, structural uniformity is assumed in this perspective. It also premises that society is constituted by groups, social interests and the force of coercion; and that dominant groups always repress and subjugate less powerful groups.

For Popkewitz and Brennan, the idea of “power as sovereignty” comes from the philosophy of consciousness. The purpose of studying power in this context is to
identify the origin of power, which lies in understanding the actors who control, and who benefit from such arrangements. For example, the question “in whose interest the curriculum is selected or achievement assessed” (p. 16) arises from this approach. It is concerned with identifying which groups are favored in decision-making and how these decisions produce values that effect domination and subordination.

In the view of Popkewitz and Brennan, however, this notion of sovereign power is limited on a number of counts. They argue, first, that power is treated as immanent to the specific setting rather than asking questions about “how it is possible to exist in this form or what the conditions of its production are” (p. 17). Second, this concept homogenizes and essentializes categories of analysis. The historical contingencies and multiple boundaries, in reality, are relational fields that are fluid and multidimensional, rather than being of a single origin or a universal characteristic. Not only does such an understanding of power create a dichotomous world, such as through the dualism of oppressor/oppressed, they argue. It also loses sight of the subtleties through which power is exercised in multiple arenas and in social practices. Because of the deficient consideration in the first approach of power, they favour the second approach of the analysis of power, power as deployment, which derives from Foucauldian thinking.

This second interpretation considers the concrete practices through which power produces and circulates by multiple strategies. The establishment of subjects based on resistance is also made possible by way of the exercise of power. In Popkewitz and Brennan’s view, Foucault’s notion is concerned with productive effects of power, which circulate through institutional practices and discourses of daily life. They highlight Foucault’s argument that, “power is embedded in the governing systems of
order, appropriation, and exclusion by which subjectivities are constructed and social life is formed" (ibid). This concept of productive power focuses on how the subject is disciplined through the rules of knowledge. It links to the governing principles that organize individual action and participation, and it enables us to see the ways that individuals construct both boundaries and possibilities. For Popkewitz and Brennan, Foucault’s work extends the ideas of the Frankfurt School with a specific historical focus. The theorists of the early Frankfurt School were concerned with the expanding rationalization and instrumental reasoning that underlie modernity. In Popkewitz and Brennan’s view, however, Foucault’s insight “enables us to understand that such reasoning has multiple trajectories and to explore the various strategies through which individuality is constructed as both disciplining and productive of power” (p. 19). With regard to teaching and teacher education, for example, Popkewitz and Brennan consider that the notion of productive power can be used to re-conceptualize the issue of socialization. The term child or teacher as “subject” should not be assumed to be stable categories. Through processes of socialization, discursive practices constitute what it means to be a teacher or to be a child.

2.3.2 The redefinition of “knowledge”

For Popkewitz, knowledge in Foucault’s account is “something that is used in social practices to affect some outcome” (Popkewitz, Pereyra and Franklin, 2001, p. 12). This notion of knowledge relates to the way in which a collective or individual uses ideas to achieve their purpose effectively in social action. The purpose of Popkewitz’s analysis is to examine the particular expressions that link reason to the problem-solving rationalities of science, and in turn link that issue to the actor who is identified as the agent of change. This attention “is directed to the systems of reason
through which the objects of schooling are classified and ordered over time, providing a way to think about change” (ibid). Popkewitz views curriculum as “a practice of regulation and governance through the reason generated for organizing action (and actors) and establishing purposes (structurally or individually)” (p. 29).

Popkewitz et al. disagree with the central premise of those prior studies of schooling in which “knowledge is an epiphenomenon to other forces, structures, or groups that exercise control over the ideas and organizational arrangements of schooling” (ibid). They give an example: when people draw on the idea of Gramsci to analyze schooling, knowledge is an essential element for the establishment of hegemony. For Popkewitz, it is better to see knowledge as “a technology of power” (Popkewitz, 1991, p. 37). In modern society, knowledge, as a technology of power, is organized and supervised by a professionalization of social affairs, in which psychology, for instance is a central discipline for defining new patterns of supervising individuality.

Popkewitz is critical of the notion of knowledge assumed in British philosopher—Herbert Spencer’s question: “what knowledge is of most worth”. In Popkewitz’s view, this question “assumes a certain philosophical, ahistorical a priori” (Popkewitz, Pereyra and Franklin, 2001, p. 28), in which a foundational knowledge can be identified and can lead to the essential purpose or normative function of the school. Moreover, this question “inserts theories of action that inscribe the agent who is to bring progress through that absolute knowledge” (ibid). This means that there is a performative reiteration of an absolute ideal that stands as a pragmatic position to measure the progress of schooling. Thus, knowledge becomes an instrument that is used to achieve certain purposes. Popkewitz argues, however, that this Spencerian question can be reconsidered in the thinking of how people tell the truth about society, themselves and their routes of salvation. Instead of asking what knowledge is
of most worth, we may ask: "how that worth is produced as a cultural field of practices" (ibid). Following this, what counts as knowledge is embodied in the conflicts over who can speak, and in the criteria of truth. As a governing practice, curriculum is concerned with the administration of the child through forms of knowledge that order the sensibilities and feelings of the individual. For Popkewitz, it is the way that knowledges fabricate worlds and individuality that goes unnoticed.

2.3.3 The decentering of the subject

In contrast to dominant thinking in Western philosophy concerned with the centering of the subject, Popkewitz explores the idea of knowledge as a "decentering of the subject" (Popkewitz and Brennan, 1998, p. 10), which aims is to understand how the subject is constituted within a field understood in terms of power/knowledge. Popkewitz explains what he means by "decentering of the subject":

It is not to eliminate subjects seeking to change their worlds but to give historical specificity to the systems of ideas that enclose and intern the "reason" and the "reasonable person" as alternatives are sought. (p. 11)

Popkewitz attempts to work against the systematic thinking that constrains subjects by the dominant reason of the current curriculum practices. Through examining how an autonomous self is possible, Popkewitz would like to problematize our relation to present modes of reasoning in terms of the practice of the decentering of the subject. A subject-decentered approach focuses on systems of ideas as historical practices through which the objects of the world and the systems of action are constructed. Taking the study of the notion of difference in educational studies as an example, Popkewitz argues that difference might be seen as that of studying blackness instead
of blacks, femininity instead of women, homosexuality instead of homosexuals, and
colorado instead of children. That is, there is a need to understand the specific
historical context behind the fact of difference. We can then see how a concept has
been constituted and how it has imposed upon subjects and their self-identity. In this
way the decentering of the subject is made possible.

2.3.4 Social epistemology

Popkewitz develops his idea of social epistemology as offering a different perspective
from the historicist tradition. Social epistemology links to Foucault’s notion of
genealogy, in which points he argues that the human subject is constituted within a
historical framework. As such, unlike the philosophical tradition that treats
epistemology as a search for the essential rules of knowledge, Popkewitz claims that
his use of epistemology is related to Foucault’s notion of “regimes of truth”
(Popkewitz, 2001, p. 178) according to which social practices are oriented. Take the
notion of “child” for example. Many systems of ideas place “child” into calculable
epistemological spaces through which competence, achievement, and salvation are
acted upon. A child in traditional epistemology might be regarded as a learner, a
citizen in the future, or the shoot of a plant. Popkewitz claims that his idea of social
epistemology enables us to consider the notion of “child” not as standing alone, but as
embodying a range of historically constructed values, priorities, and dispositions,
which affect how one sees and acts towards, the world.

The reason, that is the dominant rationality, through which the rules of truth are
produced is central to Popkewitz’s social epistemology. By investigating a “system of
reason”, for Popkewitz, it is possible to enquire into questions concerning how
different discourses about the child, teaching, learning, school administration, and sociopolitical discourses overlap to become the common-sense of schooling and its practices. Such an investigation emphasizes the significance of the relation of the social (the organization, the operational systems of rules, and relations among actors and actions) to the cultural in which knowledge, as Popkewitz understands it, is the main point of inquiry. According to a Foucauldian perspective, in Popkewitz’s view, historical change in the curriculum “is viewed as one of the breaks in the structuring of knowledge rather than as an evolutionary process of universal progress” (p. 164). In other words, we can think of historical change as rupture, in which there is no a priori philosophical formulation in knowledge systems, but a change of the subject that is brought into history.

2.3.5 Cultural History

In the book *Cultural history and education: Critical essays on knowledge and schooling*, Popkewitz, Franklin and Pereyra (2001) regard history as an understanding of the present and of collective memory. They develop their notion of “cultural history” as follows (pp. 32-33):

First, the concern with knowledge is a central object of the study of cultural history. Language can be considered not only as giving information or getting information, but also as disciplining, ordering, and dividing a field of cultural practices. The inquiry of knowledge involves different trajectories of integrating social and political theory; involves different views of historiography; and also involves different ways of thinking about the culture of human beings. Second, a cultural history is a history of the present. It is an ironic undertaking to suspend history itself through an
understanding of the past in the present. In this perspective, history is not a programmatic moral role to identify the absolute, transcendent values in schooling, but an attempt to "grasp the conditions concerning what is possible to say as 'true,' and to consider the present configuration and organization of knowledge through excavating the shifting formations of knowledge over time" (p. 32). Third, cultural history entails systematic and continuous interdisciplinary interaction. The normal disciplinary boundaries are dissolved in it. Fourth, a notion of change is built on the politics of knowledge. Knowledge, on the one hand, is a strategy that intern and encloses consciousness. On the other hand, it can also be a strategy to open up different possibilities and alternatives. Fifth, cultural history dissolves the divides of knowledge and practice, and of the dichotomy between what people say and what people actually do. Cultural history is relevant to the academic movement of the "linguistic turn" that is not only related with text or discourse, but also with the relation of knowledge and society. Its methodological approaches aim at dissolving the boundaries between discourse and reality, text and the world.

This cultural history, Popkewitz et al. claim, offers a different approach from the notions of regulation and control that we may see in most social histories. These social histories of control embody a sovereign concept of power as something that someone holds, and that such actors, as owners of sovereign power, use to develop a collective authority according to their own interests. Popkewitz et al. argue against this dominant thinking:

...power and historical narratives can be ordered differently, namely without a search for the origins of sovereignty and without the ahistorical a priori subject inscribed in actor-centered social histories. Regulation and governance can be thought about historically as the imposition of order through knowledge. Through this sense of
knowledge as regulation and governance we can approach a cultural history of schools without an epistemology of a constantly unfolding progression and a subservient relation to philosophy. (Popkewitz, Pereyra and Franklin, 2001, p. 19)

Following this, they draw on Foucault's understanding of power to consider regulation and governance as a productive, rather than a repressive, force. They claim that although knowledge can also be understood as constructing the world and individuality by enclosing possibilities, by focusing on knowledge and reason their study dislodges the ordering practices that enclose the boundaries that are established for thought as action (p. 20). History, for Foucault, means a rejection of a historicism that looks for origins. In their view, Foucault's refusal of traditional historicist knowledge is not a rebuff to history itself, but is a different way of thinking about the primacy of its contents, its uses and its practices. For Popkewitz et al., Foucault's meticulous historical construction of the genesis of social practices and discourses aims, eventually, to create multiple forms of subjectivity.

2.3.6 A critique of “Hidden Curriculum” traditions

Certain perspectives in the writing of social histories and historical sociology refer to social regulation that connects with regulatory functions and therefore effects of social control in the knowledge of schooling. In Popkewitz’s view, the “hidden curriculum” argument in curriculum study is one of these approaches (Popkewitz, Franklin and Pereyra, 2001, p. 10). In the idea of hidden curriculum, knowledge is considered not as a productive practice in the operation of power itself, as Popkewitz would have it, but as a means of articulating the interests of dominant

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9 Historicism is related to the idea of “philosophy of consciousness” that Popkewitz mentions earlier.
10 This is central concept of Popkewitz’s cultural history.
social groups. For example, some so-called revisionist historians of education in the United States placed the issue of social regulation and social control at the heart of their work. They saw the American public school as an agency of social control. Popkewitz claims, however, that this account has been challenged since the 1980s, as it is too simplistic to assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the administrative practices in schools and citizenship requirements of society. It is also naïve to assume that schools simply serve to reproduce existing culture. The notion of regulation that was employed by these educational historians was related to a repressive notion of power. They study issues such as how curriculum differentiates children in conformity with certain a priori structures. For Popkewitz, curriculum is not merely part of explanatory frameworks of social regulation. Likewise, knowledge in curriculum can not only serve as a framework to understand social interests that are brought into schooling to produce inequities and injustices; it can also serve as “a field of cultural practice and cultural production” (p. 15) in the study of curriculum or schooling.

2.3.7 Curriculum as a governing practice

Popkewitz offers an account of the nature of curriculum in terms of the thinking of power/knowledge. He argues that what students learn in school is not only concerned with what to do and what to know. Learning science, mathematics, history or geography is also concerned with learning dispositions, awareness, and sensibilities towards the world. Popkewitz’s aim in relation to the study of curriculum is “to make the problem of knowledge and reasoning in schools—the forms by which we ‘tell the truth’ about ourselves and others—an issue of governing” (Popkewitz, 2001, p. 159). Furthermore, he intends to offer a history of curriculum that focuses on knowledge as
a governing practice. This idea of "knowledge as governing" denies that rationality is a unified and universal system by which we can judge what is true or false. Popkewitz's aim, then, is to explore how particular doctrines of reason become effects of power, and how particular systems of thinking and rules of reasoning are embedded in the practice of schooling. For this purpose, he considers the possibility of conducting a historical inquiry into curriculum that makes problematic the assumptions of positivism and the philosophy of consciousness. He also suggests the possibility of engaging in a self-reflective stance towards the relation of intellectual work to social movements (ibid).

Curriculum, for Popkewitz, can be viewed as an invention of modernity, as a particular organization of knowledge by which individuals regulate and discipline themselves as members of a society. Curriculum, then, "involves forms of knowledge whose functions are to regulate and discipline the individual" (ibid). Embedded within the curriculum are certain rules related to the way students reason about themselves and discipline the actions they take. Its procedure does not work through violent force, but through symbolic systems that organizes the way individuals behave. School, in this sense, has become an institutional form that is located in the changing patterns of governing. Here, Popkewitz employs Foucault's notion of *governmentality*\(^{11}\) in order to explain new principles of governing embodied in pedagogy. After the 19th century, governmentality was made possible through such

\(^{11}\) *Governmentality* is a new term coined by Foucault, which associates "government" with "mentality". It means the way that our mentality is governed by the practices of government. Foucault refers it to the development of the modern State that is a specific governmental apparatus. For improving economic and social development in the modern State, through the exercise of power/knowledge, individuals govern themselves by certain kinds of rationality. This governance is not as the sovereign power in order to control people, but as the bio-power (I shall elaborate this notion later) to ensure security, welfare, prosperity and the subsistence of population in one country. For example, statistics had become a new governmental technology following scientific rationality to deal with the emergence of the problem of population in the eighteenth century (see Foucault, 1991b).
devices as the establishment of the concept of “childhood” (pp. 160-162). For Popkewitz, new ideas of childhood were always associated with the occurrence of new ideas of learning and schooling. The dominant discourse of science enabled the operation of governmentality through its role in the creation of knowledge concerning “childhood”. At this time, social sciences were developing, which described, explained, and gave direction for solving social problems. Systems of ideas in the social sciences were brought to bear not only on the interpretation of social life, but also onto social practices themselves. In Popkewitz’s view, emerging pedagogical theories and sciences of education were unavoidably formulated in terms of governing practices based on the techniques of science and social science. Statistics were central to the construction of knowledge. State reforms and the policing of health and wealth were constructed by reference to statistical aggregates of populations. This rationality divided people into specific units that could be calculated and organized through the administration of the state, for example as in the control of epidemics and crime. It also produced new cultural forms for constructing individuality. For example, the child study movement of the time was informed by the knowledge produced by statistics. Thus, the growth and development of a child was supervised and monitored according to this rationality. The concept of childhood was also a focus of this governing practice, which had a great influence on family education and schooling. Popkewitz explains that pedagogy was, therefore, a central strategy related to political rationalities concerned with individual consciousness in the social administration of the child. When we approach curriculum history as a perspective of governing, the issue of child development not only links to what knowledge is to be taught, but also associates with diverse trajectories of social and cultural forms that emerge in new sets of relations and institutions.
In traditional thinking, schooling is seen to define the boundaries of what is to be taught and what is to be known. This relates again to the Spencerian question: “What knowledge is of most worth?” that Popkewitz cites. The process of selection of valuable knowledge in this sense is enacted through the classifications that are sanctioned. Popkewitz, however, considers curriculum, or the history of curriculum, differently. The selection of knowledge is decided by power relations based on discipline or a dominant rationality. Through this governing practice, individuals organize their view of “self”. Schooling thus informs this view of self through the production of a set of strategies that direct students’ reason and their view of their self in the world. Rather than highlighting the notion of repressive power, as in hidden curriculum traditions, Popkewitz’s focus on the decentering of the subject, social epistemology and cultural history attempts to draw on knowledge as a strategy through which to examine regimes of truth and the way the subject is constructed through schooling. He aims then to challenge the limits of transcendent values, and to open up different possibilities for curriculum.

2.4 Power/knowledge in education policy analysis—Stephen J. Ball

Stephen J. Ball is the most prominent scholar in using Foucauldian ideas in the field of education policy analysis. He treats education policies as texts and discourses and examines them in terms of Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge. He focuses particularly on issues relating to UK education reform, such as the 1988 Education Reform Act, the National Curriculum, the political trajectory of neo-conservativism, neo-liberalism and the New Right. In this section, I shall explore Ball’s account of discourses in education, focussing particularly on the advent of discourses of
management and school effectiveness in educational policy that accompanied the 1988 Education Reform Act.

2.4.1 Dividing practices in educational discourses

Ball draws on Foucault's idea of "dividing practices" to look at educational discourses. He considers that such practices currently operate in the organizational processes of education in the UK (Ball, 1990a, p. 4). In his view, dividing practices have become prevalent in the UK educational context, exemplified in the use of testing, examining, and profiling. Through such processes, different types of intelligence, ability, and scholastic identity in schooling are ordered according to different criteria. Individual identity and subjectivity are constituted and normalized through certain techniques that exist in forms of organization, teacher-student relationships, curricula and pedagogies. Ball sees that within many arenas of the educational sciences, such as: educational psychology, pedagogy, and the sociology of education, "truth games" are played out according to these dividing practices. He offers an example to explain this: in the 1960s and 1970s, the development of the sociology of education was guided overwhelmingly by the issues arising from the problem of working-class underachievement. Working-class family life was constructed in terms of deficiency and cultural deprivation, that is, as abnormal. Their misfortune was regarded as the result of cultural determination, which it was impossible to change. As a result, individual students were objectified in terms of various fixed social class or other social indicators. From this perspective, Ball argues, we may see that knowledge and practices in educational discourse provide modes of

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12 Dividing practices, for Foucault, is the objectivizing of the subject. We can see it in the examples of the distinction between the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, and the criminals and the "good boys" (Foucault, 1983, p. 208).
classification, control, and containment; often, paradoxically he notes, couched within a humanitarian rhetoric of reform and progress.

From a Foucauldian perspective, Ball suggests that “the student is compiled and constructed both in the passive processes of objectification, and in an active, self-forming subjectification” (ibid) through the processes of schooling. The latter, in Ball’s view, involves a process of self-understanding informed by an external authority figure – such as a teacher: the way teachers look at the achievement of students influences how students think about themselves. For Ball, this process is related to Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge. He interprets that the effects of power are not only negative, but also positive: “education works not only to render its students as subjects of power, it also constitutes them, or some of them, as powerful subjects” (p. 5).

2.4.2 The discourses of management and school effectiveness

In an essay “Management as moral technology: A Luddite analysis” (1990b), Ball critiques the UK’s 1988 Education Reform Act. For him, the very nature of the school had been transformed by this policy because it shifted the governance of schools from a professional/collegial style to a managerial/bureaucratic one. Teachers became subject to systems of administrative rationality. Through the techniques of management, control was exerted over teachers’ work. Schooling, in this mode of governance, became clearly embedded into the logics of industrial production and market competition. Ball expressed his concern regarding this change:
Our point here is that concepts like efficiency are treated as though they were neutral and technical matters, rather than being tied to particular interests. The question of “efficiency for whom?” is rarely asked. Efficiency itself is taken as self-evidently a good thing. The costs involved for workers in achieving greater efficiency (intensification, loss of autonomy, closer monitoring and appraisal, non-participation in decision-making, lack of personal development through work) are rarely considered. (p. 154)

In other words, his concern about the discourse of school effectiveness relates to the question of whose interest is fulfilled, and teachers’ loss of autonomy—their role in decision-making. The 1988 Educational Reform Act, for Ball, is an example of industrial management. He explains: management is a “moral technology” or a technology of power in Foucault’s account. As Foucault suggests, “it is a modern, all-purpose equivalent of Bentham’s panopticon, a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men” (p. 156).

Ball provides a characterization of this form of management through his reading of the Educational Reform Act. First, management is a professional and professionalizing discourse within which exclusive claims are made by its speakers and by its incumbents to certain expertise such as organizational leadership and decision-making. In this sense, management is a set of procedures that cast subordinates as objects. In educational settings, the professional claims of management are set against the autonomy of teachers and of institutions. Second, “management is a theoretical and practical technology of rationality geared to efficiency, practicality, and control” (p. 157). It embodies a rationalist epistemology. Organizational control and individual action are incorporated into a technical perspective. Organization presents itself as an objective, technically neutral
mechanism, dedicated only to maximum efficiency. Third, Ball claims: “management
is also an imperialistic discourse” (ibid). In the presumption of management theory,
the social world is locked into irrational chaos which needs to be brought into its
redeeming rationalist order. By way of a set of potent discursive oppositions,
management theory constructs its superiority. For instance, order is set over and
against chaos, rationality against irrationality, sanity against madness, efficiency
against inefficiency, and meritocracy against personal influence. Fourth, “the
language of management deploys rationality and efficiency to promote control; it is a
regime of ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘veridiction’” (ibid), Ball describes using Foucault’s
terms. As a system of possibility for knowledge, the language of management
eschews or marginalizes the problems, concerns, difficulties, and fears of “the
subject” (the managed) who is the objectified product of organization, authority, and
responsibility. Limits, meaning and possibilities of action are determined by position
and expertise. Through the lens of Foucault, Ball considers, management constitutes
“subjected and practised bodies”; and “increases the forces of the body in economic
terms of utility and diminishes these forces in political terms of obedience” (p. 158).
The managed is supposed to be fragile, prone to irrationality, and surfeits of emotion.
Control and change are therefore employed to resolve these problems. At the same
time, the discourses of psychoanalytic or psychological analysis are mobilized in
response to individual resistance because dissension or conflict is regarded as being
aberrant and pathological. From the perspectives of dominant groups, oppositional
activities within the organization are defined as inherently irrational. The
subject—the individual worker or practitioner—is constructed in terms of the ideal of
sameness and of “normalized normality”. Rather than as part of the system and the
result of collective interests, all problems are taken to be “in” the person. The resistor
is treated as a social deviant, and is normalized via coercive or therapeutic
procedures. Thus, “management is both a totalizing and individualizing system” (ibid).

Moreover, in Ball’s view, the personal file and the personnel manager are key mechanisms in the moral technology of management. For instance, the techniques and research findings of psychology provide norms and models through which individuals can be compared and monitored. He refers to Foucault’s ideas of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgments, and examination etc. in this respect. And in particular, these forms of managerial knowledge are embedded within the development of techniques of teacher appraisal. Ball considers how, since the 1980s, “appraisal has become one of the prime features of the political reconstruction and disciplining of teachers as ethical subjects” (p. 159), which has extended the logics of quality control and performance indicators into teaching. Appraisal made teachers calculable, describable, and comparable. Individual teachers were, therefore, drawn into an evaluating eye and its disciplinary power. Ball employs Foucault’s understanding of examination to explain the effects of appraisal (pp. 159-160). For Foucault, he suggests, examination transforms the economy of visibility into the exercise of power. It is a space of domination, a process of inspection and of review without favour or prejudice. It is a compulsory objectification. Through the mechanism of examination, individuality is drawn into the field of documentation, into a meticulous archive which can be observed. This personal information is the basis for the decision of promotion, reward, competency and dismissal. Each performance is measured and categorized in order to be compared. Furthermore, the examination makes each individual a “case”. This involves a process of what Foucault calls “subjectification”. Ball argues:
The techniques of appraisal have been developed and legitimated to the extent that they co-opt individuals, and established notions of professionalism, into their operation. The teacher is encouraged to view the procedures of appraisal as a part of the process of self-understanding and self-betterment—professional development—which Foucault calls “subjectification.” (pp. 160-161)

In Ball’s view, “subjectification” refers to an active engagement of the subject in self-formation. Its procedure refers back to people’s own bodies, to their own souls, and to their own conduct. In the appraisal interview, for instance, where confession and techniques of psychoanalysis are encountered together, appraisees are encouraged to display their shortcomings, to identify appropriate therapeutic procedures, and to judge themselves. By way of this technology of self and the dynamics of self-revelation, appraisees are thus completed.

For Ball, school-effectiveness research represents another approach through which the school is reconceptualized within the management discourse for several reasons (pp. 162-163). First, effectiveness studies and school-difference studies define the achievement of schools in pupil performance in ways that are calculable and visible. These studies provide a technology for the possibility of blaming and judging schools as “delinquent” or “failing”. Second, by “neutral” performance measures, effectiveness studies have developed a technology of power that enables monitoring and control of schools. Schools have been reworked not only as forms of but also as subject to surveillance. The “poor” school and the “failing” school have to cure and improve themselves under this surveillance. Through schemes of self-appraisal, school improvement, and institutional development, teachers are also involved into taking responsibility for their own discipline. They are urged to believe that their commitment to the engagement in such processes will enable them to become more
professional. By way of these techniques, Foucault’s so-called “normalizing judgments” are turned upon a whole school. Each school is inscribed into a field of knowledge for the exercise of comparison. The order and the norm are constituted on the basis of opposing values—good and evil, good school and bad school, effective practice and ineffective practice. If schools fail in self-examination and self-improvement, the expert, the authority and the moral disciplinarian are at hand to intervene. Ball criticizes the studies of school effectiveness thus:

In a dramatic sense the language, concepts, and field of concern of effectiveness research imposes stringent limits to the possible ways of thinking and speaking about and studying schooling. Effectiveness reconstructs the school and the teacher as its subject, to be evaluated, monitored, and managed. (p. 164)

In Ball’s argument, effectiveness and management was linked to the political discourse of Thatcherism in the UK. Its central concerns are the control of teachers and the achievement of consensus. As a new mode of discipline, management is a form of organization based on the strength of a specific rationality. Ball believes that although it is couched in an ideology of neutrality, it is a “political technology” in reality and is inevitably involved in “dividing practices”. As a “regime of truth”, Ball argues, the discourse of management “empowers the manager and objectifies and subjects the managed” (p. 165). Through this, subjugation is achieved by the interrelation between power, knowledge, and the body.

2.4.3 Discourse in educational policy

At the beginning of his Politics and policy making in education: explorations in policy sociology (1990c), Ball posits: “Policy is clearly a matter of the ‘authoritative
allocation of values” (p. 3). This authoritative allocation of values refers to power and control and can not float free of the social context. In Ball’s view then, “we need to ask whose values are validated in policy, and whose are not?” (ibid) Rather than simply reflecting the interests of one social class, however, education policy is a complex and heterogenous configuration of elements. Ball therefore tends to focus on multiple aspects in his policy analysis, such as the relationship between education and ideology, or between education and economy. In particular, he is concerned with the way that policy changes in education can be traced to ideological shifts and changing patterns of influence within the ruling political party. He focuses on issues of conflict and incoherence within the state, and its constitutive institutional elements. These conflicts cause disputes over the meaning of education, and thus cause the struggles for control within it.

For Ball, discourse is the crucial concept in Foucault’s account which is of the relationship and inter-relationship between power and knowledge. In Ball’s view, discourse is an object where power is invested. Conversely, discursive practices produce and maintain power relations. He argues:

...knowledge is that of which one can speak in a discursive practice. Meanings thus arise not from language but from institutional practices, from power relations, from social position. Words and concepts change their meaning and their effects as they are deployed within different discourses. (pp. 17-18).

Ball uses the concept of power/knowledge to explain the fact that discourses are constructed in certain possible ways. They are constituted by exclusions and inclusions, by what cannot and what can be said. They also “stand in antagonistic relationship to other discourses, other possibilities of meaning, other claims, rights
and position" (p. 18). For Ball, this is Foucault's "principle of discontinuity". This discontinuity, in his view, derives from the opposing strategy and the struggle. In discourses, not only specific words and meanings (such as, in education, progressivism or comprehensivism) are debunked, but also the speakers (such as experts, specialists and professionals) of these words are replaced. As such, a new discursive regime has been established, which accompanies a new form of authority.

For Ball, in the light of Foucault's concept of "discontinuity", discourses of education are now very different. It is to be produced in more disciplined ways (greater state intervention and monitoring and more centralised control) and more efficiently (reallocation of funds and cuts in expenditure) (p. 19). Ball considers that discourse provides a particular and pertinent way of understanding policy formation. Policies privilege certain visions and interests and they legitimate practices. For Ball, "they are power/knowledge configurations par excellence" (p. 22). As Foucault shows in the arenas of sexuality and politics, the procedures of exclusion and control over discourses are strict in our society. Ball quotes Foucault's idea to echo this: "We know very well that we are not free to say anything, that we cannot speak of anything when and where we like, and that just anyone, in short, cannot speak of just anything" (ibid). Ball would like to draw attention in particular to the way in which these emergent discourses were constructed to "set limits to the possibilities of education policy" (p. 23).

In sum, we can see that Ball draws on Foucault's notion of dividing practices and disciplinary power (such as the techniques of examination, normalization or hierarchical observation) to expose the problems of the UK's 1988 curriculum reform. For him, the interests, ideology, or specific values of dominant groups lead to
subjugated technicians, teachers who lose autonomy in the process of schooling. Ball not only shows the limits of education policy, he also seeks to extend the thinking about education policy beyond a state control perspective by drawing on Foucault’s idea that there is an “economy of power”, a set of technologies and practices which are realized and struggled over in local settings (Ball, 1994, p. 10). For Ball, policy has its multiple aspects. It is a sophisticated, contingent, complex and unstable practice, created within the effects of dominance, resistance, chaos and freedom. But control and dominance, he argues, cannot totally contain all power relations. In power relations, however, “subjugated knowledges” cannot be totally excluded from arenas of policy implementation. In Ball’s view, discourse can be seen not only as an instrument, an effect of power, but also as a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. He would like to recognize and analyze “dominant” discourses, regimes of truth, and erudite knowledges (like neo-liberalism and management theory) within social policy. By this exploration, resistance in the discourse of policy and the positive aspect of power is made possible. For Ball, this is an example of what Foucault calls “the real political task” in our society (Ball, 2005, p. 52).

In this chapter, four curriculum theorists—Cherryholms, Giroux, Popkewitz and Ball—whose ideas represent different thinking on curriculum theories and on curriculum policies are introduced. In the next chapter, the original conception that influenced each of these curriculum theories—Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge—will be elaborated.
Chapter 3 Foucault's concept of power / knowledge

Foucault’s idea of power/knowledge is the main theme that I would like to explore in relation to the study of curriculum, and of education more broadly, in this thesis. Foucault develops his concept of power/knowledge mainly in two books: one is Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison (1991a) and The History of Sexuality, vol. I (1990). In this chapter, I shall focus first on how the idea of power/knowledge is developed in these two works. I will illustrate the concept using examples and also refer to some of Foucault’s own interpretations found in interviews he gave, which are relevant to this theme. The issue of the subject is also important in understanding Foucault’s articulation of power/knowledge. I therefore pay particular attention to Foucault’s essay “The subject and power” (1983), through which Foucault’s reason for studying power, and the development of his notion of power/knowledge in relation to different aspects of historical concern, can be clearly understood.

It is fairly common among interpreters of Foucault to draw clear distinctions between the different phases of his writing, and it would be possible to do this in relation to the theme of power/knowledge. My own view, however, is that the distinctions between these phases are less clear that these commentators sometimes make out, and that the lines of his thought intertwine through the different phases of his writing. Hence, in what follows I have chosen not to draw such distinctions in any systematic way.

3.1 A brief introduction to Discipline and Punish
This book, subtitled *The Birth of the Prison* is Foucault’s study of the establishment of the prison in the French modern penal system. In the opening chapter, Foucault depicts the cruel public execution of a criminal for regicide in 1757. The body of the condemned person, as many eyewitnesses saw, was “drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 3). By the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, punitive objectives had changed. Punishment was no longer treated as a spectacle, and the body was no longer the major target of penal repression. Physical punishment had been replaced by the loss of wealth or rights that imposed on the heart, the thoughts and the inclinations. The new juridical mechanisms judged the “soul” of the criminal rather than crimes.

The birth of the prison, therefore, symbolized a historical shift regarding penal mechanisms in Europe. From the nineteenth century onward, imprisonment had become the essential form of punishment and covered the whole middle ground of punishment, between death and light penalties. Punishment was replaced by the uniform machinery of the prisons, which, in Foucault’s view, violate the corresponding relationship between offences and penalties. For him, this phenomenon looks like “a physician who has the same remedy for all ills” (p. 117). As detention was denounced by reformers as an inappropriate punishment before the 19th century, Foucault’s inquiry concentrates on why and how it can became the most general form of legal punishment in such a short time. In his interpretation, prison was not only the place that deprives convicts of liberty, but also that rendered individuals docile and useful. It showed an unceasing discipline and an apparatus for transforming individuals.
Besides imprisonment, several other new measures were invented at this time, based on constraints, prohibitions or obligations, which marched distinct shifts in the operation of power. First, there was the scale of the control: it didn't treat body as "wholesale", but as "retail" (p. 137), by which the body was a dissociable unity—movements, gestures and attitudes are involved in the power mechanisms. Second, there was the aim of the control. It was dictated by the economy, the efficiency of movements, and the internal organization. Finally, there was the modality of control. It implied a constant coercion, a supervision of the processes of the activity, and an exercise according to codification. Foucault terms these forces of subjection that impose upon bodies "disciplines". For Foucault, discipline has four types of character: it is cellular (by the play of spatial distribution), it is organic (by the coding of activities), it is genetic (by the accumulation of time), and it is combinatory (by the composition of forces) (p. 167). In these features, it uses four great techniques: it draws up tables; it prescribes movements; it imposes exercises; lastly, in order to obtain the combination of forces, it arranges "tactics" in disciplinary practice. Through the method of time-tables, collective training, exercises, total and detailed surveillance, for Foucault, a disciplinary society has been formed. The feature of this disciplinary power is exercised at the lowest possible cost. It brings the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity, and links the economic growth of power with the output of the apparatuses within which it is exercised. As a result, the object of discipline in modern society is no longer the body of the guilty man, but the disciplined individual. The process of the constitution of this disciplined individual is a central concern in Foucault's work.

Foucault claims that this work is "a genealogy of the present scientifical-legal complex" (p. 23). Rather than the history of the past or the history of the past in terms
of present, genealogy, in Foucault's account, is the history of the present. This means that he has less concern about how the events happened in the past or how they could be employed to provide the solution for our present problems, but pays more attention to how our modern society and individual subject is formed through historical events. He argues:

I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political investments of the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present. (p. 31)

In fact, this “present” refers to our current situation and how the milieu in which we exist constitutes our own subjectivity. The history of the “micro-physics” of punitive power described in Discipline and Punish, then, is a genealogy, or an element in a genealogy, of the modern “soul”. In this work, Foucault not only discusses the consequences of legislation or the indicators of the development of penal system, he also aims to write the history of the modern soul and of a new kind of power exercised in punitive mechanisms. He regards punishment as a complex social function and as a political tactic. Rather than the negative effect, the productive effect of power in punitive systems is his focus. For Foucault, punitive measures are not simply ‘negative’ mechanisms which repress, prevent and eliminate people. On the contrary, they are linked to a series of productive and useful effects. The technology of power in these measures includes the principles both of the humanization of the penal system and of the knowledge of human beings. Next, I shall give an account of the notion of power/knowledge as it emerges in Discipline and Punish.

3.2 Power/Knowledge in Discipline and Punish
In this section, I shall concentrate on a number of points pertaining to Foucault's idea of power/knowledge in *Discipline and Punish*. First, I will show the meaning of discipline and its connection with power. Next, I will describe modes of disciplinary power in pedagogical practice, which I am particularly concerned with. After that, I will discuss a mechanism of the operation of power identified by Foucault, which draws on the idea of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon. Finally, the correlations between power and knowledge, and the nature of power will be clarified with reference to Foucault's thinking.

### 3.2.1 Discipline and power

"Discipline" is an important concept in *Discipline and Punish*. Foucault explains its meaning thus:

"Discipline" may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a "physics" or an "anatomy" of power, a technology. (p. 215)

Discipline, then, is a technique, a form of power. Through the embodiment of specific techniques of power, discipline in this sense enable the rearrangement of individuals' bodily action, in response to particular social and political needs. This force of discipline operates in two ways. First, it organizes a positive economy for maximum speed and efficiency by distribution. The target of this distribution could be space, rank or time. In this distribution, the body of an individual is not located in a fixed position, but circulated in a network of relations. Second, this operation treats
individuals both as objects and as instruments of the exercise of power, and also constitutes a network of coercions that dominates bodies. The manipulation of power is effected, for example, by means of the tactics of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and examination that Foucault illustrates. The effect of discipline is to produce “docile bodies”. For instance, in the prison, criminals have to obey a strict time-table within which very detailed regulations are prescribed. A lot of routine physical work must be completed in different areas every day according to this timetable. This is a concrete example of rearranging the action of bodies by the organisation of space and time. In this way, the body is used for producing positive economy by becoming obedient, and by becoming more useful and functional. Eventually, all mechanisms become habit or aptitude immanent in the body of prisoners, and this process of subjection is effected by the habitual obedience. As Foucault explains:

...discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 'aptitude', a 'capacity', which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection. (p. 138)

Foucault is actually not predominantly concerned with what happens in the prison. His concern is with the social development of the disciplinary power of the prison being expanded outside it, namely, to the whole society. The focus of disciplinary technology moves from prisoners to individuals and from imprisoned periods to our daily lives. For Foucault, Western society is a disciplinary society where disciplinary control prevails. As a “new micro-physics of power” (p. 139), this disciplinary control connects with the techniques for arranging the force of human bodies.
Foucault's main concern, then, is not the essence of power, but how it operates through its investment and its effects on the human body and the subject.

3.2.2 Disciplinary power in pedagogical practice

Though Foucault's doesn't refer to the issue of education directly, he offers several examples of disciplinary power regarding pedagogical practice in *Discipline and Punish*. These examples of disciplinary tactics are both a technique of power and a tactic of knowledge. In Foucault's view, discipline is an art of distributions, an art of rank, and a technique for arrangements in education. Some examples from the text and from my own experience illustrate different techniques of discipline.

In the example of Jesuit Colleges in the eighteenth century that Foucault gives (pp. 146), two or three hundred pupils in one "class"—a basic unit in these colleges—were subdivided into groups of ten. These groups competed against each other. Each pupil was assigned a functional place as a combatant within a unitary group through the confrontation with rivals. This distribution is one means of utilizing human resources effectively by assigning individuals a suitable place in order to win victory for the whole group.

After 1762, Foucault suggests, "rank" began to define the distribution of individuals in the educational order. Rank was attributed to each pupil at the end of each task and each examination. Pupils occupied one rank or were placed according to their performance, their age, and their behaviour. In elementary education, this made it possible to supervise each student and to stimulate his work. This may also be seen in the arrangement of tables in the classroom according to the level of learning.
achievement. Such distribution functions to provide a whole series of distinctions based on students' progress. Consequently, the educational space was operated not only as a learning surrounding, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchizing and rewarding (p. 147).

The timetable is another technology of the control of daily activity through which the actions of students are governed in detail by its ordering. Time is the meticulous control of power that guides the action of bodies. In primary schools in Taiwan, for example, every student in the same class has the same time-table. Detailed information in this timetable shows how time is divided in the school and the time and duration of each academic subject. The sound of the school bell is a signal that reminds students to go to a lesson or that the class is dismissed. The sound of a bell is a tactic of disciplinary power that controls students' school activities and their bodies. It assigns an individual pupil to the right place at the proper time in order to prevent disorder.

Gesture is another manipulation of power over the body. The control of gesture has been applied to army barracks for a long time. It is now also seen in schools. When I taught children in a primary school in Taiwan, I found the use of gestures to be an effective strategy for teaching small children. This discipline of gesture could be effected through a game. For example, when I said "little eyes", all the pupils in the class had to respond with "look at teacher". At the same time, they should all move to look at me. By associating this word game with this gesture, I could easily and

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13 Although Foucault's work is explicitly focussed on Europe and develops his ideas of power/knowledge in this context, I consider that his concept can apply elsewhere that includes my country.
immediately gain the attention of the pupils. This “look at teacher” is an utterance or a code that functions to discipline children’s body.

Examination, for Foucault, is also another important disciplinary power in educational practices, which originated as a new type of power/knowledge relation for the government of populations during the eighteenth century (Foucault, 1997a, p. 20). In the examination itself, human beings become numbers and codes. Schools use examinations, which by virtue of embodying students as codes, numbers and documents, enable them to be compared, measured, judged and classified. But examination also refers to broader disciplinary practices than the examination as test. As Foucault points out:

...the school became a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted examination that duplicated along its entire length the operation of teaching. It became less and less a question of jousts in which pupils pitched their forces against one another and increasingly a perpetual comparison of each and all that made it possible both to measure and to judge. (Foucault, 1991a, p. 186)

On the one hand, examination is exercised through its invisibility; on the other, “it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility” (p. 187). This visibility assures the force of power exercised over individuals who are arranged in a mechanism of objectification, such as writing. Writing is a concrete, visible matter and it can be transcribed and accumulated. For example, the university joint entrance exam in Taiwan is held annually. After the exam, each student is given a score for each subject and in total. This score is a form of writing that determines which university and department this student can study in. In this case, students are the embodiment of codes that become easy to arrange in the procedure of distribution.
They are fixed under the gaze. In this sense, for Foucault, “examination is at the centre of the procedures that constitute the individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge” (p. 192).

Hierarchical observation is one application of examination that Foucault identifies. It might be found in the military camp, housing estates, hospitals, asylums, prisons and even schools. This disciplinary gaze specifies the surveillance and aims to increase the productive function in a particular place. Foucault gives the example of the organization of elementary teaching (pp. 175-176). In 1669, following the development of the parish school, the number of pupils increased and disorder occurred in the classrooms simultaneously. A system of supervision was, therefore, needed, so, in order to help teachers to teach. Batencour selected a whole series of “officers” from among the best pupils. Their roles, as intendants, observers, monitors, and tutors, involved two main functions. The first involved material tasks such as distributing ink and paper, giving alms to the poor or reading spiritual texts on feast days. The second involved surveillance, recording who left his bench, who was talking, who committed an impure act among the pupils, for example. Such surveillance is a specific technique in the disciplinary power that functions for maintaining order and for improving efficiency in the school.

According to these disciplinary techniques, also tactics of knowledge, disciplinary power in education is organized to enhance “normalization”, which serves to standardize the behaviour of individuals. It functions to reduce gaps, to impose homogeneity and to fix specialities. In schools, we may see that the behaviour and performance of students are judged by the binary standard—good or bad. This is an example of normalizing judgement. Students know which category they belong to,
and, therefore, what kind of award or punishment they deserve. By way of the tactic of normalization, they know how to follow regulations and to be a “satisfied” good student. As Foucault comments:

...it exercised over them a constant pressure to conform to the same model, so that they might all be subjected to subordination, docility, attention in studies and exercises, and to the correct practice of duties and all the parts of discipline. So that they might all be like one another. (p. 182)

Normalization, therefore, affects how people (or students) look at themselves or behave in relation to others. This effect homogenizes individuals by excluding and blurring differences. By means of distribution, examination and normalization, then, the body is the object to be arranged, and to be transformed according to specific educational intentions. These intentions, however, should not be understood as full of ideology or as means of domination by dominant groups. They are drawn by the demands of enhancing the efficiency of learning, teaching, and economic utility within and of education. In this respect, Foucault argues that this feature of power/knowledge is not only negative, in an oppressive sense, but also productive. This is an important aspect of Foucault’s conception of power that I shall elaborate further later.

3.2.3 Power of surveillance—Panopticism

Surveillance, which is central to achieving economic efficiency, is a perfect mechanism of disciplinary power. As Foucault claims: “It was more efficient and profitable in terms of the economy of power to place people under surveillance than to subject them to some exemplary penalty” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 38). Surveillance is
a new mode of the exercise of power that developed during the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. It makes the "disciplinary gaze" possible, and thereby enhances
productive effects through internal, articulated and detailed control.

Jeremy Bentham's panopticon is an ideal type of building for effecting unceasing
all-round surveillance. According to Foucault, it is made to strengthen the productive
forces, "to increase production, to develop the economy, spread education, raise the
level of public morality; to increase and multiply" (Foucault, 1991a, p. 208). The
architecture of the panopticon characterised by is its axial visibility and lateral
invisibility. Every cell is located opposite the central tower. No-one can escape the
gaze of guardians from the central tower; yet prisoners never know when they are
being inspected, only that they always may be. Individual prisoners are isolated and
cannot talk with each other. For Foucault, this was a marvellous metaphor for the
mechanism of disciplinary power because no matter who exercises power, by virtue
of the guardians' invisibility in the central tower and the permanent visibility of
prisoners, he or she produces the same effect of power. The operation of power is also
economical because only a single person is required in the central tower for this
mechanism to operate. Through the central tower, the panopticon ensures the
automatic functioning of power.

In schools, we may see many examples that are similar to this technique of power. In
a classroom, normally, the teacher's desk is located in a "proper" place from which he
or she can monitor the movement of each student by surveillance. The function of this
position is similar to that of the central tower of the panopticon. Children do not
necessarily know when they are being inspected, but they fully understand that they
are always visible. This knowing pushes them to engage in their work without playing and chatting with each other, as their bad behaviour will be noticed.

In modern society, disciplinary power akin to the panoptic model is expanding. First, inspection is imposed not merely by warders, but also by society as a whole. For instance, educational practices in schools might be inspected by the public. Any educational activity happening in the classroom cannot not be hidden from the gaze of parents and public. Second, a panopticon is not only a metaphor of architecture, but also a symbol of disciplinary mechanisms that have been extended everywhere without concrete buildings and without the limitation of space and time. As Foucault puts it:

...Bentham dreamt of transforming into a network of mechanisms that would be everywhere and always alert, running through society without interruption in space or in time. The panoptic arrangement provides the formula for this generalization. It programmes, at the level of an elementary and easily transferable mechanism, the basic functioning of a society penetrated through and through with disciplinary mechanisms. (p. 209)

Definitely, instead of the architecture at a fixed place far away, the panopticon has already penetrated through the whole body of society, as, for example, where CCTV has been used everywhere for the purpose of surveillance in the society. It is one kind of disciplinary power exercised through a more detailed, subtle way to monitor our mind, our thought, and our lives.

3.2.4 The relation between power and knowledge
In *Discipline and Punish*, the “knowledge” that Foucault refers to is the knowledge of the human sciences. This is the knowledge that is referred to as a tactic of the management of human beings. For instance, demography is one kind of knowledge concerned with the phenomena of population in modern society. As mentioned above, confession, timetable, gesture and panopticon also belong to the corpus of knowledge of the human sciences, which shapes docile bodies in the punitive system. They are all correlative to the exercise of power. Foucault coins a new term, then, in “power/knowledge” as power and knowledge cannot be separated from each other. As discipline is both the exercise of power and the employment of knowledge in the form of tactics that individuals are subject to. Foucault claims:

...power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations....the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge. (pp. 27-28)

“Symbiosis” perhaps captures the mutual relation between power and knowledge as Foucault understood it. We cannot understand power without considering the function of knowledge, and can not comprehend knowledge without observing the operation of power. Foucault concentrates more on the way power/knowledge is exercised and the effect it has than on the meaning of power/knowledge. In *Discipline and Punish*, his main purpose is to investigate these power/knowledge relations and their transformative effects in the history of punishment.
In an interview with Paul Rabinow, Foucault explains power/knowledge further:

...power and knowledge are not bound to each other solely through the action of interests and ideologies; so the problem is not just to determine how power subordinates knowledge and makes it serve its ends or how it superimposes itself on it, imposing ideological contents and limitations. No knowledge is formed without a system of communication, registration, accumulation, and displacement that is in itself a form of power, linked in its existence and its functioning to other forms of power. No power, on the other hand, is exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution, or restraint of a knowledge. At this level there is not knowledge on one side and society on the other, or science and the state, but the basic forms of “power-knowledge”. (Foucault, 1997a, p. 17)

In Foucault’s view, then, the basic element that combines power with knowledge is not merely the interest and ideology of rulers that Marxists identify. This does not mean Foucault denies the dominant aspect in power and knowledge. Certainly, hegemony or ruling ideology is also a result of the manipulation of power. Power/knowledge for Foucault, however, ought to be examined in a broader scope, which is different from the traditional Marxist account, in which power and knowledge is thought of in terms of dominance and oppression. The social processes and cultural practices within the exercise of power/knowledge are more significant than the consideration of the political and ideological oppression. In Foucauldian thinking, the specific manipulation of power (the policy to render bodies docile and useful) requires the involvement of knowledge (the technique of facilitating subjection and production). Moreover, power defines what can be constituted as knowledge, and in what manner knowledge is accumulated, transmitted and contributes to judgement. Each society has its own mode of operation of power/knowledge. New configurations of power/knowledge constitute new forms of society.
3.2.5 The nature of power

*Power is camouflaged inside tactics*

Power, from a Foucauldian perspective, is always an enigmatic issue. It is never easy to understand because it completes things silently and unconsciously rather than ostentatiously and obviously. There is no definite, clear idea about what it is, how it is exercised and where it is imposed. Foucault claims that power is not a matter that someone can really own:

> Everywhere that power exists, it is being exercised. No one, strictly speaking, has an official right to power; and yet it is always exerted in a particular direction, with some people on one side and some on the other. It is often difficult to say who holds power in a precise sense, but it is easy to see who lacks power. (Foucault, 1977, p. 213)

Unlike during the classical age in which power was owned by the sovereign, in modern society power exists everywhere. It penetrates into each place. Power is always anonymous in Foucault’s account, and does not belong to anybody. Foucault would like to draw our attention to the strategy of power, the exercise of power, rather than the ownership of power as in characteristics. Rather than dominant ideology or interests, power assures its control and guarantees its use for dominating individuals through effective tactics.

*Power is productive*

Foucault criticises the concept of power put forward by Marxists. According to a Marxist account, power is regarded as an instrument of class domination in Western
capitalism. Foucault argues, however, that “the mechanics of power in themselves were never analysed” (Foucault, 1980d, p. 116). In Foucault’s view, on the one hand, power has its multiple aspects. It is not as univocal as that in a Marxist account. It would be wrong to say that power is only an instrument to affect human consciousness and to reproduce repressive ideology. It is also insufficient to say that power is manipulated only for domination. On the other hand, power has its productive aspect that cannot be adequately covered only by the notion of repression. Foucault argues:

If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (p. 119)

In Foucault’s view, power does not simply prevent knowledge; instead, no matter whether in barracks or schools, power produces a physiological and organic knowledge, which constitutes docile bodies within its disciplinary mechanism. As Foucault puts it:

If, on the contrary, power is strong this is because, as we are beginning to realise, it produces effects at the level of desire—and also at the level of knowledge. Far from preventing knowledge, power produces it. If it has been possible to constitute a knowledge of the body, this has been by way of an ensemble of military and educational disciplines. It was on the basis of power over the body that a physiological, organic knowledge of it became possible. (Foucault, 1980b, p. 59)
In Foucault’s view, the effect of power should not be put in negative terms once and for all. On the contrary, “power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 194). From the historical context of the formation of the disciplinary society that Foucault sets out in *Discipline and Punish*, the tactics of power can be seen to be tied with economic principles. Namely, power is exercised at the lowest cost to reach the maximum outcome. Its effect is both more efficient and less wasteful. Power links with the output of apparatuses, it exists within the mechanism that is employed to meet the demands of production for commercial, industrial or political need. This leads Foucault to engage in thinking about such questions as: What is the truth behind the process of this production which follows the principle of economy and efficiency? What is power/knowledge in this truth? And how are individuals governed in this regime of truth?

Though Foucault sheds light on the productive nature of power, we have to bear in mind that the meaning of “production” in Foucauldian account is placed in a broader sense. This “production” could be useful or harmful. It could be a matter of the ‘production’ of construction; in contrast, it also could be used for the ‘production’ of destruction, as with the army (Foucault, 1980d, p. 161).

3.3 A brief introduction to *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*

At the beginning of this book, Foucault argues that we must abandon the hypothesis that modern Western society developed in an age of increased sexual repression. On the contrary, there was a steady multiplication of discourses concerned with sex. As a topic of discussion, sex had never disappeared. Instead, “things were said in a
different way; it was different people who said them, from different points of view, and in order to obtain different results” (Foucault, 1990, p. 27). The same applies to the proliferation of the discourse of confession (the confession of the flesh in which the desire of human beings was incorporated into discourse) in Western society. Confession was an obligation for committed Christians from the seventeenth century and had gradually become a part of Western culture. In Foucault’s view, after the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the utterance of sex was embedded in the internal discourses of institutions, such as schools and hospitals, as the scope of such discourses expanded. These institutions could be schools or hospitals. The discussion of sex in terms of perversion is another example that Foucault offers to indicate the increasing discourses relating to sex. In reality, sex was talked about and was recorded continuously within the discourses of medicine, psychiatry, prostitution and pornography in modern society, each in turn, he notes, relating to various economic interests.

The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 is an introduction to Foucault’s series of three studies concerning the historical relationships of power and the discourse of sex. The sexual attitude of people is not the main focus of Foucault’s account. Instead, he aims to explore the language that is spoken about sex; the person who does the speaking; and the positions from which they speak; as well as the institutions that prompt people to speak about it and that store and distribute the utterances that are said. In brief, these indicate what Foucault termed “discursive fact”—through the way in which sex is considered in relation to pleasure and desire, it becomes part of the discourses of daily lives. Foucault explains his purpose like this:
...my main concern will be to locate the forms of power, the channels it takes, and the discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of behavior, the paths that give it access to the rare or scarcely perceivable form of desire, how it penetrates and controls everyday pleasure. (p. 11)

This power reveals not only refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also incitement and intensification. What Foucault was interested in were "the polymorphous techniques of power" (p. 11) and the "will to knowledge" (p. 12) which serve as both support and instrument of the truth of sex. He intends to write a history about the transformation of discourses, about the production of power, and about the propagation of knowledge.

Foucault attempts to elucidate the objective, the method, the domain to be covered, and the periodizations used in his study of the history of sexuality. First, the aim of his inquiry is not a "theory" of power, but an "analytics" of power. He attempts to "analyze a certain form of knowledge regarding sex, not in terms of repression or law, but in terms of power" (p. 92). Here, sexuality is seen in the context of the entire technical machinery, and power/knowledge is examined particularly through the discourse of sexuality. Rather than the repression of sex, power/knowledge is involved in a productive mechanism of the discourse of sexuality. Second, Foucault criticises the traditional viewpoint of power which represents law, absolute monarchic power, sovereignty and prohibition. He tries to explore a new method of analysing power, which is defined by technique, by normalization, and by a different kind of control. This method can apply to all levels of analysis and goes beyond the state and its apparatus. Third, with regard to the domain of this study, Foucault distinguishes four strategic unities deployed in the nineteenth century, which formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and of power regarding sex. These four strategic unities
are: a hysterization of women's bodies, a pedagogization of children's sex, a socialization of procreative behaviour, and a psychiatrization of perverse pleasure (pp. 104-105). All of these strategies are practised by means of a focus on the unit of the family for controlling the population and maintaining health in a country's population. In this context, the human body plays an important role in producing and consuming. Lastly, concerning periodization, two ruptures are generally supposed in the history of sexuality: first, the strict treatment of sex in the seventeenth century and second, the loosening of the grip of prohibitions in the twentieth century. But Foucault disagrees with this distinction because it is based on assumptions of the mechanism of repression. In his view, there was no age of sexual restriction; there was no unitary sexual politics. The deployment of sexuality was not established as a principle of limitation by "ruling classes". On the contrary, we might see many rigorous techniques were applied first to the politically dominant class, because the bourgeoisie were concerned with their health, hygiene, and the heredity of their "class" body. Sexuality therefore became an essential issue.

In the last part of this book, Foucault also inquires into the transformation of power mechanisms in Western society. He refers to the concept of "bio-power", which he saw as an indispensable element in the process of the development of capitalism. History shows us, Foucault argues, that "it was life more than the law that became the issue of political struggles (p. 145).

3.4 Power/Knowledge in *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*

In *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*, Foucault tries to examine how power is exercised over the discourse of sexuality through the economic and political spheres. In this
section, with Foucault’s analysis of discourses of sexuality I will begin by outlining why he denies that there was a repression of sexuality during the Victorian era. I shall then expound the relations between power/knowledge and truth in this discourse of sexuality. Foucault’s critique of a traditional vision of power using the concept of the “juridico-discursive” is significant for the clarification of power/knowledge and I outline this here. In the final part of this section, several propositions of power, some research methods for the analysis of power, and the specific concept of “bio-power” in Foucault’s account will be shown.

3.4.1 The hypothesis that there is a Victorian repression of sexuality is wrong

In Foucault’s view, power in the discourse of sexuality is not as repressive as it appears on the surface. He supports this claim by identifying that, far from people stopping talking about sex after the seventeenth century, people had never stopped talking about it. The issue of sexuality appeared across various modalities of discourse. I shall, in this section, describe Foucault’s perspective regarding this by offering several examples of the nature of the developing internal discourse of institutions and the idea of perversion. I will also expound the way that power/knowledge operates in these discourses of sexuality in Foucault’s view.

_The increasing internal discourse of the institution_

We might imagine that inside the secondary schools of the eighteenth century, for example, sex was scarcely spoken about. Foucault illustrates, however, that the architectural layout, the rules of discipline, and their internal organization meant that sex was a constant preoccupation for educators. The distribution of space of
classrooms, the arrangement of desks, the plan of courses, and the distribution of accommodation, which Foucault calls "the internal discourse of the institution" (pp. 27-28) all refer to the sexuality of children. According to this analysis, it would be wrong to say that pedagogical institutions keep silent on the issues of the sexuality of children and adolescents. On the contrary, the discourses of sex have multiplied in many ways. For Foucault, it "has established various points of implantation for sex; it has coded contents and qualified speakers" (p. 29). Educators, physicians, administrators and parents, or even children themselves, are induced to speak of it. Take another example offered by Foucault concerning the discourse of sex in families (Foucault, 1980d, p. 120): The books for parents related to pedagogy and child medicine published in the eighteenth century speak constantly and in every possible context of children's sexuality. The discourses found in these books seemed to be intended to prevent children from having any problems concerning sexuality. The effect, however, was to remind parents that the sexuality of their children was a fundamental problem by referring to their educational responsibilities as parents. These books also reminded children that their own body or their own sexuality was a fundamental problem. Consequently, the discourses of these books forced the sexuality and the body of the child under constant parental gaze. Foucault sees this as "an intensification of the interventions of power to a multiplication of discourse" (Foucault, 1990, p. 30).

Discourses of sexuality were produced by a whole series of mechanisms operating in different places, such as the institutions of medicine and psychiatry, as well as the school and the family. They all emerged from a cluster of power relations through which various discourses were created to arouse people's awareness of the hidden danger of sex. In this way, more discourses of sexuality were generated. For Foucault,
from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, the discourse of sexuality expanded from the confession of the sins of the flesh to the practices of demography, biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology and pedagogy. It operated in the "wide dispersion of devices" (p. 34) in which continuous speaking, listening, recording, transcribing and redistributing are invited. People regard sex as a private matter, yet simultaneously and ironically discourses with regard to it proliferated.

The implantation of perversion

The perversion of sex is another example, given by Foucault, of the proliferation of sexual discourses. Perversions are commonly regarded as harmful to the ethics of society and are therefore always the target for eradication. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, activities defined as perversions rapidly expanded. As Foucault argues, the bourgeois society "was a society of blatant and fragmented perversion" (p. 47). The discourse of the perversion of sex had never been repressed. Foucault endeavors to analyze the exercise of power behind this expanding discourse. In his view, the discursive explosion of sex started around the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which underwent two modifications: a centrifugal movement with respect to heterosexual monogamy; and increased scrutiny of the sexuality of children, mad men, women and criminals. Different kinds of peripheral sexualities that were ignored in the past had acquired more attention within this trend. Under the mechanisms of control and surveillance, sexuality was put into operation by the field of pedagogy or therapeutics. Rather than merely prohibition, power exerted its influence on this mechanism using particular tactics. For example, educators, parents or doctors treated children's onanism like an epidemic and engaged in eradicating it. They searched for every element that might cause the occurrence of onanism; and
scrutinized every trap that children fell into. Their presupposition was that all children were guilty, and they were going to face danger. This extraordinary effort from adults meant that the discourse of sexuality was in constant use, constantly spoken and thought about, through which power multiplied its relays and its effects. The discourse of onanism, therefore, strengthened itself through the strategies of power.

The discourse of homosexuality was produced in a similar way. Generally speaking, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts and was nothing more than a juridical subject. This did not change until the nineteenth century, when the past, case history, childhood and the type of life that a homosexual led had become the popular target of analysis. The psychological, psychiatric and medical study of homosexuality intensified as homosexuality came to be regarded less as a habitual sin than as a part of one’s nature. For Foucault, the machinery of power that focused on this issue did not aim to suppress it, “but rather to give it an analytical, visible, and permanent reality” (p. 44). Through the techniques of psychology, psychiatry and medicine, as well as the strategy of dissemination (such as many erotic books on the basis of commercial profits), power proceeded by means of examination and observation. We might suppose that the medical examination, the psychiatric investigation, and pedagogical report, and the family controls would say “No” to all this peripheral, unproductive sexuality. In reality, however, power promoted discourses of perversion by means of the pleasure of its process. Foucault explains it like this:

The pleasure that comes of exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies, searches out, palpates, brings to light; and on the other hand, the pleasure that kindles at having to evade this power, flee from it, fool it, or travesty it. The power that lets itself be invaded by the pleasure it is pursuing; and opposite it, power asserting itself in the pleasure of showing off, scandalizing, or resisting. (p. 45)
In the above example, on the one hand, educators and parents enjoyed the pleasure of checking on any possibility of a child’s onanism. They were satisfied with fulfilling their obligation by doing so. On the other hand, children might feel much pleasure if they succeeded in using tactics to evade detection from adults. Since the nineteenth century, parents and children, adults and adolescents, educators and students, doctors and patients, chased each other for pleasure in what Foucault terms “perpetual spirals of power and pleasure” (ibid). This is a dynamic procedure in which the discourse of sexuality is produced and renewed and through this, therefore, the “devices of sexual saturation” (ibid) were constituted. This is a complicated network in which power and pleasure are linked together, and reinforced each other in a reflexive relationship. Sexuality became part of a mechanism less of inhibition than of incitation and multiplication. Sexuality, within the exercise of power, was not excluded and seen as outside our life, but influenced our behaviour and thinking. For this reason, Foucault denies that power is operated by prohibition and repression as in Marxist account. Power, in fact, reveals its influence by increasingly clever tactics.

3.4.2 Power/knowledge and truth

There is an indivisible relation between power/knowledge and truth in Foucault’s account. He claims that: “We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (Foucault, 1980c, p. 93). In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault mentions the concept of “truth” again and again. For him, the production of truth is present in the power/knowledge of the discourses of sexuality and is concerned with how the truth of sexuality was formed by the exercise of power. Hence, Foucault claims that the
discourse of sexuality is the “interplay of truth and sex” (Foucault, 1990, p. 57). Truth has a broader meaning here. Even though the discourses apparently present the prevention of utterance, as in the discourses of sexuality, they still show one kind of truth.

With reference to the production of truth in the discourses of sexuality, Foucault considers that there is a form of power/knowledge, confession, which exists in Western society. In his view, confession has been established as one of the main rituals for truth-telling in Western societies since the Middle Ages. From the religious penance to interrogation in the juridical procedure, confession plays a central role. It has permeated deep into every aspect of daily life, in the field of justice, medicine, education, family relationships, and sexual relations. People confess their crimes, their sins, their thoughts, their desires, and their troubles everywhere and anytime. Western society has become a confessing society, or as Foucault comments: “Western man has become a confessing animal” (p. 59). This is exemplified in the TV program “Big Brother”, which began in the Netherlands and is now franchised in many countries including the UK. Housemates frequently perform confession in the Big Brother House. For Foucault, through confession, the production of truth links with relations of power. People become used to exposing themselves, their thoughts and feelings, by endless confession through the exercise of power. Sex is always an essential issue in confession. Far from being something hidden, however, in Foucault’s view people continuously talk about issues relating to sex by way of confession. In Foucault’s analysis truth and sex are interconnected. For instance, a Catholic believes their sin would be pardoned after confessing their guilt of sex to the priest. This belief is the truth that is established by the manipulation of power/knowledge.
In capitalist society, the discourse of science has a great influence on the production of confession and hence Foucault uses the term the "confessional science" (p. 64). An example of how this "confessional science" is constructed is founding the process of clinical codification, which has the function of examination and production of confession. The data of clinical codification comes from the knowledge elicited through interrogation, by means of exacting questionnaire or hypnosis. This knowledge is placed under the gaze of scientific observations and therapeutic operations by the exercise of power. Sex, then, derives its meaning (or "truth") from these medical interventions. In modern society, many institutions such as hospitals, schools, and the mass media generate this kind of truth about sex. In these contexts, people engage in talking about sex for therapeutic or for educational purposes. Through the incitement to confession, the discourses of sexuality, therefore proliferate.

3.4.3 Foucault's Critique of the Juridico-Discursive

Rather than a "theory" of power, Foucault aims to construct an "analytics" of power (p. 82) in the series of *The History of Sexuality*. This means that a definition of the specific domain that is constituted by the relations of power is needed in order to make an analysis of power possible. For this purpose, Foucault endeavours to free the analytics of power from an inappropriate perspective, which he terms the "juridico-discursive" (ibid). Both the hypothesis of repression and the theory of law are affected by this perspective of power. According to Foucault, this causes the limited interpretation of power and leads to two contrary results: "either to the promise of a 'liberation', if power is seen as having only an external hold on desire,
or, if it is constitutive of desire itself, to the affirmation: you are always — already trapped” (p. 83). Following these limited interpretations, the notion of power is either to be regarded as being for the purpose of liberating or empowering people; or, on the contrary, to be considered as something that entraps us within the network of power and whose repression we cannot escape. Although these two considerations are employed frequently, not only in the analysis of the discourse of sexuality, but also in the political analysis of power, in Foucault’s view, the way in which power operates goes far beyond them.

In order to raise his critique, Foucault indicates several principal features of the discourses of sexuality in terms of the “juridico-discursive” (pp. 83-85). The first is: “the negative relation”. This means that the relation between power and sex is absolutely negative. In other words, power can do nothing but say “No” to sex. The second is “the insistence of the rule”. In this feature, the discourses of sexuality are placed in a binary system—such as licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden—by the exercise of power. Furthermore, power is seen in terms of its relation to the law. That is to say, power is employed as an instrument to control the discourses of sexuality through creating a rule of law. The third is “the cycle of prohibition”. This means that power prompts nothing more than a law of prohibition; it restrains the discourses of sexuality. The fourth feature is “the logic of censorship”. There are three forms of interdiction in this logic: affirming that such a thing is not permitted, preventing it from being said, and denying that it exists. The final feature is “the uniformity of the apparatus”. This “uniformity” means that power acts in a uniform manner in the reproductive mechanisms of law, taboo, and censorship. In sum, power is the law that shows its effect by creating obedient subjectivity. Foucault criticises this narrow and partial perspective of power like this:

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...this power is poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed always to repeat itself. Further, it is a power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a power to say no; in no condition to produce, capable only of posting limits, it is basically anti-energy. This is the paradox of its effectiveness: it is incapable of doing anything either, except for what this power allows it to do. And finally, it is a power whose model is essentially juridical, centered on nothing more than the statement of the law and the operation of taboos. All the modes of domination, submission, and subjugation are ultimately reduced to an effect of obedience. (p. 85)

Power, in Foucault's view, is not a matter that stands only on a negative side to say no, or on a violent side, to oppress people. It is not simply operated by law or taboos. If power only operates like that, it would reduce its force, and could not complete things effectively and productively. As discussed earlier in this chapter, disciplinary power is not exercised in order to say no to human beings. Instead, it drives bodies for the purpose of production. Moreover, the discourses of sexuality are not monotonous discourses constructed in terms of law or prohibition. In both scientific discourse and confessional discourse, people talk about the issues of sex rather than being prevented from discussing about them. Power multiplies discourses by various strategies rather than being limited by juridical rules. Although the issue of sex is still regarded as a taboo in Western society, beneath the surface, however, multiple discourses are produced by desire, curiosity or pleasure, as the examples above have shown. Prohibition, in a Foucauldian perspective, is merely one tactics of power. Though it is obvious and easily seen, it is not the whole thing of power.

Foucault tries to answer a question: "Why are the deployments of power reduced simply to the procedure of the law of interdiction?" (p. 86) Foucault argues that "power is tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its
success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms” (ibid). Indeed, if the tactics of power are clearly exposed, it is impossible for people to yield to its indication. The strategy of concealment is a good policy to reduce the resistance to power and get more control. Foucault also argues that, since the Middle Ages, law has been the acceptable mode of the manifestation of power in monarchical systems. It is easy to see that the exercise of power was formulated in terms of law, and that monarchy was always connected with dominant power in juridico-political discourse. In modern society, however, the configuration of power has become more complex. This leads Foucault to claim that we need to “cut off the head of the king” (p. 89). This is because the new operation of power “is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus” (ibid). That is to say, the repressive, juridical vision of power that is conceived in terms of law, prohibition, liberty, and sovereignty should be replaced by another perspective of power, which is strategically multiple and effectively productive. Instead of liberating us or trapping us, power is placed within a more complicated operation. Foucault would, therefore, like to construct an analytics of power of sexuality not from the perspective of law and sovereignty. The aim of this analysis is to explore the technical machinery of power, rather than the repressive aspect of power.

3.4.4 Several propositions of power

In Foucault’s view, power should be understood as the multiplicity of force relations and as existing in complex strategies. Through the ceaseless process of struggles, confrontations and transformations, these force relations form a chain in our society. for Foucault, power is everywhere, because “it comes from everywhere” (p. 93),
unlimited by time and space. Several propositions relating to this view of power are elaborated by Foucault as follows (pp. 94-96):

First, power is not something that can be acquired, seized, or shared. It is not a substance that can be caught, but the mobilization of force. Foucault explains this further in one of his lectures (Foucault, 1980c) by criticising two other conceptions of power. According to the juridical conception of political power, power is a right which as a commodity can be transferred or alienated. In this sense, power is a concrete matter that an individual holds and as such this mode of power is seen as a contractual exchange. According to the general Marxist concept of power, concerned with “an economic functionality of power” (p. 88), power is conceived in terms of the role it plays to maintain relations of production and class domination. Its principle action is located in the function of the “economy”. Foucault argues, however, that “power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and that it only exists in action” (p. 89). For him, power is not a property or a matter of simply maintaining and reproducing economic relations; it is a relation of force. There is no absolute and stable power. Power is exercised at innumerable points, in a dynamic network in which force is spread. Foucault’s analysis is not predominantly concerned, then, with who owns power or who lacks power.

Second, the relations of power are immanent rather than external to other types of relationships, such as economic processes, knowledge relationships and sexual relations. Power relations show the immediate effects of the division, inequality, and disequilibrium that occur in each social relation. In addition, power relations are also the internal conditions of these differentiations. For example, the distinction between teachers and students is formed by power relations. There are also power relations
within this distinction in the educational system, determining the self-identity of
teachers and students. On the one hand, no social relation can ever be independent of
power. Power is always there. As Foucault claims, "power is co-extensive with the
social body" and "relations of power are interwoven with other kinds of relations"
(Foucault, 1980e, p. 142). On the other hand, power cannot exist alone and without
other relations. Through unstable, imbalanced and disunited social relations, power
gains space to exercise.

Third, power comes from below. In Foucault's account, the exercise of power is
similar to the physical phenomenon of "capillarity", a term that refers to the upward
movement of a liquid through an absorbent substance. This means that the analysis of
power he offers is bottom-up (starting from the local, or individual) rather than
top-down (from the global, or the state). If this premise is right, monarchical power is
not the root of power relations because it comes from above, and exercises power
from the top-down. For Foucault, the relationships of power are generated from the
basic structure of a social body, for instance in families, limited groups and
institutions. By means of redistributing, realigning, rearranging and converging loose
forces within these social units, the effect of power is achieved.

Fourth, power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective. It is "intentional"
because, for Foucault, "there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims
and objectives" (Foucault, 1990, p. 95). Power achieves specific purposes, but this
does not mean that power is decided by an individual subject. There are no groups or
headquarters that really control directly the entire network of power in a society.
Though the logic of tactics in the mechanism of power is decipherable, there is no
way to prove who invokes these tactics. Hence, power relations are nonsubjective in Foucault's view.

Finally, "where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (p. 95). According to this point, resistance exists within the relations of power. But it is a misunderstanding to say that because people exist in the entrapment of power, they need the action of resistance to break out of this dominant situation. It would also be wrong to say that resistance always stands in the passive position, without success. For Foucault, resistance is not the matter that is destined for failure. It is the "irreducible opposite" (ibid) in relations of power. The distribution of the force of resistance, as power, is constituted in an irregular, dispersive way. The knots of resistance appear at different times, exist across different spaces, and with varied densities. They may appear at certain moments in life, arouse certain types of behaviour, or even mobilize certain groups. Resistance is a part of the relations of power. It exists everywhere in the network of power, and plays the role of adversary, target, support or handle. In Foucault's view, there is no single great point of revolt or rebellion. The resistance is rooted in multiple points and shows its character of plurality. Though these points are mobile and transitory, they could make a tremendous revolution possible.

3.4.5 Four principles of Foucault's analysis of power

Foucault claims that we should analyze the mechanisms of power in the sphere of force relations. In this way political thought with respect to power can be liberated from the dominant thinking of "Law-and-Sovereign" as outlined above. I shall
discuss here Foucault's suggestions of four possible rules to analyze power in terms of force relations (pp. 98-102). These rules are laid out in relation to sexuality and its discourses.

**Rule of Immanence**

Foucault considers that sexuality is not a matter that should be considered to be free from power or knowledge. Instead, power/knowledge is immanent in and cannot be separated from the discourses of sexuality. Sexuality is historically involved in the techniques of knowledge and the production of discourse. Foucault states that: “between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority” (p. 98), meaning that no discourse can be separated from the power/knowledge network. Power/knowledge is everywhere and is already there. All social relations, in Foucault's view, are incorporated into the power/knowledge network. Foucault suggests that the study of sexuality can start from the “local centres” of power/knowledge. A local centre can be seen as a discursive centre or a centre of practice. For example, the child was an obvious local centre of focused attention. Since the eighteenth century, his cradle, his bed, or his room were watched continuously by parents, nurses, servants, educators and doctors. This way of focusing on local centres shows a different approach from looking at power in the global social structure, as in Marxist thinking.

**Rules of Continual Variations**

Rather than assuming an inactive condition in local centres, Foucault concentrates on the development and transformation therein. In Foucault's view, relations of
power/knowledge are not static forms of distribution; instead, they are “matrices of transformations” (p. 99). He is interested in exploring the dynamic transformation within power/knowledge matrices and its continuous evolvement. This dynamic transformation, in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, is the historical development, the constant modification and the continual shift of the discourses of sexuality. During the developmental process, in each epoch, contingent events occur and change people’s perspectives on sexuality. These contingent events that Foucault seeks to examine are breaking points that show the variations in discourses, and launch another new historical stage of thinking about sexuality.

Rule of Double Conditioning

For Foucault, in the local centre, the pattern of transformation cannot function without entering into an over-all strategy. And conversely, the strategy cannot achieve comprehensive effects without tenuous relations serving as its anchor point in local centres. The “double conditioning” Foucault refers to implies an inseparable relation between strategies and local centres. By means of this double conditioning, power/knowledge can be exercised. In other words, relations in local centres cannot be seen as subordinated relations. Rather, these relations are constituted by multiple strategies or tactics in power mechanisms. In the organization of the family, for example, that Foucault discusses, the father is not the “representative” of the sovereign or the state; and the latter is also not the projection of the father. The family does not duplicate society, but it provides it with its own power relations to support the “maneuvers” employed for the Malthusian control of the birthrate, for the adjustment of population and for the medicalization and psychiatrization of sex (p. 100).
Rule of the Tactical Polyvalence of Discourses

Power/knowledge and discourse are not separable from each other. For Foucault, the relations of power cannot be established, consolidated or implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse (Foucault, 1980c, p. 93). Discourse is the place where power and knowledge link. In Foucault’s account, discourse is regarded as “a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable” (Foucault, 1990, p. 100). That is to say, multiplicity is the nature of discourses. Each discourse has its own tactics to be exercised and these tactics are adaptive according to historical situation. The distributions between different discourses and their effects are what Foucault concentrates on. He writes:

It is this distribution that we must reconstruct, with the things said and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden, that it comprises; with the variants and different effects—according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated—that it implies; and with the shifts and reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary objectives that it also includes. (ibid)

To be more precise, for the discourse of sexuality, we may inquire what kind of words relating to sex are said, and what remains unsaid; what kind of sexual practice is permitted, and what is prohibited? We also need to examine different effects of varied ways of talking about sex, varied positions of power, and varied institutional contexts in which discourses about sex are located. The central concern of these inquiries is not historical facts, but the way that historical facts are established by different strategies of power in discourses. In addition, Foucault’s concern is not how discourses of sex are subservient to power or how they work against it. There is a
more complicated process at work in discourses of sex determining how the discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, and also how it is formed as resistance to an opposing strategy. For Foucault, the relationship between discourse and power is that “discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.” (p. 101) For instance, silence is a discourse that enables different strategies. It could be a strategy for anchoring and reinforcing the prohibitions of power; but on the contrary, it could also be a strategy for loosening the control of power. It becomes clear, then, that discourse has multiple compositions and might incorporate various strategies.

Foucault also discusses some methodological precautions regarding the analysis of power in one of his lectures (Foucault, 1980c, 96-102). First, the analysis should not concern itself with the regulated and legitimate forms of power. By contrast, it should be concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary. This means that we need to examine how power invests in its more regional and local institutions, as “local centers”, as discussed above. Second, the analysis should not concern itself with power at the level of conscious intention or decision only. That is to say, do not ask the questions such as “Who has power and what has he in mind?” or “What is the aim of someone who possesses power?”, but ask instead “how things work at the level of ongoing subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours” (p. 97). This question is essential for preventing oneself from the subjugation of one’s subject. Third, power is not to be taken as the domination of one individual over others, or of one group or class over others. Power must be analyzed as something that circulates in a social chain. It is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. Individuals are
the vehicles of the chain of power. An individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, he or she is the element of the articulation of power. In other words, individuals should not be observed as a fixed point, but as active within the dynamic procedures of power. Their interaction with power is significant. Fourth, methodological precaution is that one must conduct “an ascending analysis of power” (p. 99), which departs from its infinitesimal mechanisms, and sees how power has been invested, utilized, transformed, displaced and extended in these mechanisms. With regard to the repression and interdiction of sexuality, for example, it is necessary to identify the agents involved (parents, the wider family, doctors, etc.) and to see how these mechanisms of power become economically advantageous and politically useful. We then can see how these mechanisms come to be effectively incorporated into the social whole.

In the fifth methodological precaution, Foucault offers he does not deny that it is possible to connect the mechanism of power with ideological production. However, he claims:

I do not believe that what has taken place can be said to be ideological. It is both much more and much less than ideology. It is the production of effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge—methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control. All this means that power, when it is exercised through these subtle mechanisms, cannot but evolve, organise and put into circulation a knowledge, or rather apparatuses of knowledge, which are not ideological constructs. (Foucault, 1980c, p. 99)

Ideology, for Foucault, could be one element of the mechanism of power, but it is not a necessary imperative in this mechanism. Instead, the apparatuses of “knowledge” should be seen as the foundation of the exercise of power. Regarding education,
Foucault would disagree with the idea that all educational practices are constituted by ideology, or that nothing regarding education is ideologically free. We may consider this by an example. When a teacher thinks about the question of how to organize a useful timetable for students, or how to arrange space in a classroom, this is related to what Foucault calls "knowledge". Rather than ideology, this is the knowledge that enables the exercise of power; it enables effective teaching and effective learning. It would be arbitrary to analyze all educational discourses in terms of ideological vision.

3.4.6 Bio-power

"Bio-power" is a notion that Foucault introduces during the examination of the historical development of Western society. A long time ago, the sovereign power of the king gave the monarch the right to decide between the life and death of subjects. Power in this circumstance was a right of seizure; it seized the life in order to suppress it. Since the classical age, however, the mechanisms of power have undergone a transformation. Rather than hindrance, destruction and submission, power has become a force for organization, control, incitement, monitoring and growth. The right of the sovereign was manifested as the reverse of the right of social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Power, in this respect, "is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population" (Foucault, 1990, p. 137). For instance, wars were no longer fought in the name of defending the sovereign. Instead, they came to be seen in the context of the subsistence of a race or a country. Slaughter or massacre was carried out in their name.
In the seventeenth century, this power over life evolved in two basic forms. The first focused on the body as a machine, in which human bodies were integrated into the systems of economic control. It was “ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the human body” (p. 139). In Discipline and Punish Foucault elaborates this kind of disciplinary power. The second form was established later. It focused on the species body, on the body imbued with the mechanics of life on the basis of the biological processes, such as propagation, health, life expectancy and longevity. Political and social supervision, in this sense, worked through “an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population” (p. 139). It is this idea of power that Foucault develops in The History of Sexuality. These two forms were constituted by disciplines of the body and by regulations of the population. Their purpose was no longer to kill, but to invest life.

During the classical period, diverse techniques were developed rapidly in social institutions such as schools or barracks, for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations. An era of “bio-power” was thus beginning. The life of the human species became inscribed into the order of knowledge and power, and into the sphere of political techniques. Historically, bio-power was an indispensable element in the development of capitalism due to the need to insert human bodies into the machinery of production and the importance of the examination of populations for economic processes. The accumulation of human resources and therefore of capital, the expansion of productive force, and the differential allocation of profit, became possible through the exercise of bio-power. Bio-power differs from the traditional concept of power in the judicial mechanism; which serves and promotes effects of oppression, domination, exclusion and rejection. Bio-power is a positive, productive
power to ensure the continuing existence of a race, of each citizen, or of human life more generally.

Following this elucidation of the notion of power/knowledge as found in Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*. I now turn to one of Foucault’s remarkable essays regarding power/knowledge “The subject and power” (Foucault, 1983). Here, Foucault explains why he intends to study the concept of power and power relations. He shows us the way that power is exercised, and the way he analyzes power relations

### 3.5 The subject and power

Foucault claims that the goal of his work has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. Instead, his objective has been “to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (p. 208). In other words, rather than the theory or the methodology of power, he is concerned with the development of human subjectivity in the particular historical context. The issue that he concentrates on is not power, but the self, or the way that subjects have been governed.

#### 3.5.1 Why study power?

Since Foucault’s purpose is to explore the way that subjectivity is constituted, why does he attempt to explore the idea of power? He claims that the reason is that, so far, the tools for the study of power relations are still insufficient. First, though, it is necessary to clarify the dimensions of this definition of power Foucault uses in
studying the objectivizing of the subject. Foucault does not mean that we need a theory of power, but that we need an ongoing conceptualization, a constant checking of power. This relates to the need for an examination of the historical conditions that motivate our conceptualization. That is, “a historical awareness of our present circumstance” (p. 209) is needed. Second, it is also important to grasp the type of reality with which we are dealing. For example, fascism and Stalinism are two pathological forms of the reality of power, which indeed changed the ideas and the devices of our political rationality.

Foucault claims that “what we need is a new economy of power relations” (p. 210). This is “economy” in both a theoretical and practical sense. To make this new economy of power relations clear, Foucault intends to explore the links between rationalization and power. He does not take the rationalization of society or of culture as a whole, however, instead, focussing on it as a process in specific fields. Each of these refers to a fundamental experience, such as crime, illness, madness or sexuality. For Foucault, it is better to analyze specific rationalities rather than to invoke the process of rationalization in general. In addition, Foucault also suggests another way to proceed towards a new economy of power relations: “It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point” (p. 211). This is a way of “analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies” (ibid), rather than in terms of its internal rationality. Foucault offers an example of this. If we want to find out what our society means by sanity, the issues around insanity should also be investigated. In the same way, power relations can be examined by a series of oppositions such as: the power of men over women, of parents over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, or of administration over the ways people live (ibid).
These oppositions, or power relations, for Foucault, have several features in common (pp. 211-212). First, they are "transversal" struggles. Namely, they are not limited to one country or confined within a particular political or economic form of government. Second, the aims of these struggles are power effects as such. For instance, the medical profession is criticized not because its concern is profit-making, but because it exercises an unlimited power over people's bodies, health and death. Third, they are "immediate" struggles. People do not fight against the chief enemy, but fight against the immediate enemy. Instead of struggling against specific social class or government, this is an anarchistic struggle. Fourth, these struggles involve questioning the status of the individual. In Foucault's view, however, these struggles are not exactly directed towards individuals or against them, but are against the "government of individualization". Fifth, they are an opposition to effects of power, which are linked with privileges of knowledge. What is questioned is the ways in which knowledge circulates and functions, and the relations of these ways to power. Foucault calls it "the régime du savoir" (p. 212). Sixth and finally, all of these struggles arouse a significant question: "Who are we?". These struggles accompany a refusal of economic and ideological state violence, which ignore who we are, and also a refusal of a scientific or administrative inquisition, which determines who one is. In sum, the main target of these struggles, for Foucault, is not a group, a class, or an institution of power, but a technique, a form of power. This is a form of power that "makes individuals subjects" (ibid). "Subject" carries two meanings here: one refers to being subject to someone else by control and dependence; the other refers to the relation to one's own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both of them associate with a form of power, which subjugates and makes subject to.
Foucault adds that, generally speaking, there are three types of struggle (ibid): against forms of domination (ethic, social, and religious); against forms of exploitation, which separate individuals from what they produce; and against the individuals having no right to decide what they themselves are (such as struggles against the forms of subjection or submission). These three modes of struggles could operate together or in isolation. Nowadays, in Foucault’s view, the struggle against forms of subjection (against the submission of subjectivity) is becoming more and more important. It is because a new political structure, a new form of power, namely state power, has been continuously developed. This power of the state is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power. Its political structure includes both individualization techniques and totalization procedures through which our subjectivity might be subjugated. Pastoral power plays an important role in the process of the development of the modern state. It is a role of dominant power, which Foucault stresses. I shall show this below.

3.5.2 Pastoral power

In the modern Western state, not only a new political perspective had been shaped, but also an old power technique had been operated in it on the basis of Christian institutions. This old power technique is what Foucault terms “pastoral power”. Foucault explains this traditional pastoral power like this (p. 214) First, its ultimate aim is to assure individual salvation in the next world. Second, not only exercising a form of power for command; the pastors also prepare to sacrifice individual life itself for the life and salvation of the flock. Third, not only is the whole community concerned with pastoral power, but also each individual in particular for the duration of his life. Finally, pastoral power implies a knowledge of an individual’s conscience.
and an ability to direct it. It cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, and without being able to elicit their innermost secrets. To sum up, this form of power is oriented toward salvation and is therefore different from general political power and sovereignty. For Foucault, it also connects with the production of truth, that of the individual himself.

Foucault considers that, as a modern matrix of individualization, the exercise of the state can be regarded as a new form of pastoral power. He describes this new form of power as follows (p. 215). First, there is a change in its objective. Foucault argues that “it was no longer a question of leading people to their salvation in the next world, but rather ensuring it in this world” (ibid). The meaning of “salvation” had also been changed to become more “worldly” (ibid). Salvation functioned to ensure the health, well-being and security of people in this current world. Second, the number of officials (or agents) of pastoral power had been increased. Pastoral power began to be exercised by a state apparatus, or by public institutions such as the police, the hospitals, or schools. It was not only exercised in public institutions, its agents had also been expanded to private institutions such as private organisations, welfare societies, benefactors, or philanthropists. Even the family had been mobilized to take on pastoral functions. Lastly, a new knowledge of human beings had been developed in this context. That knowledge played two roles in its own development: on the one hand, it was concerned with population and was globalizing, normalizing and quantitative; on the other hand, it was concerned with the individual and was analytical and differentiating. This new form of “pastoral power” is, I believe, consistent with the idea of “bio-power” that Foucault refers to in *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*. Power, in the modern state, was no longer operated only for oppression, but also for the investment of life and existence.
In relation to his analysis of the development of pastoral power, Foucault reconsiders Kant’s concern with Enlightenment and repeats his questions: “What are we?” Rather than the Cartesian question “Who am I?” within which the “I” is a universal and unhistorical subject, “What are we?” in Foucault’s inquiry refers to both ourselves and our present. Foucault elaborates the question like this:

…the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state’s institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which as been imposed on us for several centuries. (p. 216)

Here, Foucault highlights his point that “the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are” (ibid). To be more precise, he regards the exploration of “what we are” as the way to find out how historical events affect the formation of modern rationality (such as the application of normalization, examination, surveillance, and the new form of pastoral power), and how modern rationality constitutes what we are and shapes our subjectivity at present in the process of state development. Through the analysis of both ourselves and our present, he endeavours to contribute to new forms of subjectivity in which human beings can liberate themselves not only from the manipulation of state apparatus, but also from the individualizing process within this manipulation. In other words, through the refusal of the kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries, a new form of subjectivity becomes possible.

3.5.3 How is power exercised?
In Foucault's question: “How is power exercised?”, this “how” includes both “By what means is it exercised” and “What happens when individuals exert power over others?” (p.217). In the study of power, Foucault claims, it is better to ask the question “What happens?” than to ask the questions “What is power?” or “Where does power come from?”. This “What happens?” means to attempt a critical investigation into the theme of power. For Foucault, to best comprehend the disciplining of societies in Europe since the eighteen century is not to conclude that individuals had become more obedient in this system, or that they it functioned through the construction of barracks, schools, or prisons. It should, instead, be considered that “an increasingly better invigilated process of adjustment has been sought after—more and more rational and economic—between productive activities, resources of communication, and the play of power relations” (p. 219). By analysing “How?” in relation to the theme of power in this context critically shifts a fundamental supposition about power. The object of this analysis is not power itself, but power relations, which Foucault attempts to grasp in terms of the diversity of their logical sequence, their abilities, and their interrelationships.

For understanding power relations, Foucault generalizes three elements that constitute the specific nature of power, action, conduct and freedom. I describe these below (p. 219-222):

**Action**

Not merely a relationship between individual and collective, the exercise of power is a way in which “certain actions modify others” (p. 219). For Foucault, “power exists
only when it is put into action” (ibid). The nature of power is not a renunciation of freedom, nor is it a transference of rights. A relationship of power is a mode of action that does not act immediately and directly on others. Rather, it is an action upon an action, of a set of actions upon other actions, in existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future (p. 220). The exercise of power occurs in a structure of actions that produces other possible actions. It incites, induces, seduces them; makes them become easier or more difficult. Consensus and violence in Foucault’s view do not constitute the principle or the basic nature of power. They are merely the instruments or the results of power.

**Conduct**

Foucault uses the term “conduct” to specify power relations. It is at the same time both to “lead” others and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities (pp. 220-221). Basically, the exercise of power guides the possibility of conduct and puts the possible outcome in order. This relates also to Foucault’s inquiry into government. Foucault defines the meaning of “government” like this: “Government did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather it designated all the ways in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed” (p. 221). In other words, it is not only political or economic subjection, but also the modes of action of individuals or groups, that are considered and calculated in order to act upon the possibilities of action or of other people. To govern, in this sense, means to structure the possible field of action of others.

**Freedom**
Freedom, in Foucault’s consideration, is an important element in the exercise of power. We might think that power is exercised only over the subjugated subject. Foucault, however, claims that “power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (ibid). He denies that slavery is a power relationship. In his view, power is exercised in the places where individual or collective subjects are presented with a field of possibilities for their behaviour and reactions. Rather than being mutually exclusive, power and freedom constitutes a more complicated interplay. For instance, freedom is the foundation of the occurrence of resistance. For Foucault, the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom are central to and coexist within the power relationship. According to this, “agonism” is an appropriate term to express power relations. Agonism, in Foucault’s definition, means “a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle” (p. 222). Rather than a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides, permanent provocation is the real situation of agonism.

3.5.4 The way to analyze power relationships

Foucault suggests that we should analyze institutions from the standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa, and that the fundamental point of anchorage of these relationships must to be found outside the institution. Foucault understands a specific institution through power relations and through the circumstances encompassing these power relations. The specific institution is one of Foucault’s so-called “local centres” discussed earlier. Power relations, in Foucault’s view, are diffused in social networks, rather than being “reconstituted ‘above’ society as a supplementary structure whose radical effacement one could perhaps dream of” (ibid). Power is everywhere; there cannot be a society without power relations. What Foucault does
not intend to say that the establishment of power relations is necessary, nor that power constitutes a fatality at the heart of societies that cannot be undermined. Instead, he would like to implement a political task that through analysis and elaboration, brings into question “power relations and the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom” (p. 223). The political task is to explore the possibility of freedom in subjectivity by way of agonism between power relations. Following this idea, he presents several areas of concern in establishing these analyses of power relations (p. 223):

The first relates to the system of differentiations that permits one to act upon the actions of others. The relationship of power is exercised in the system of differentiations which are its conditions and its results. This differentiation could be determined by the law or by traditional privilege, such as, linguistic or cultural differences. The second concerns the types of objectives pursued by those who act upon the actions of others, for instance, the maintenance of privileges, and the accumulation of profits. The third is the means of bringing power relations into being. Specifically, the threat of arms and economic disparities are examples of these means. The fourth is forms of institutionalization. These forms may link to traditional predispositions, legal structures, custom, or fashion. They have their own regulations, hierarchical structures, and specific loci. They also have complex systems within multiple apparatuses, such as in the case of states. The last one concerns the degree of rationalization. This may be the possibility in relation to the effectiveness of the instruments and the certainty of the results. Or it could be in proportion to the possible cost, based on economic consideration. In each case, the operation of power is elaborated, transformed and organized, and it is related to the adjustable processes. In the contemporary Western societies, in Foucault’s view, the state becomes an
important apparatus where power is exercised. Not because power relations derive from the state, but because that they have come increasingly under state control. That is, power relations are elaborated, rationalized and centralized in the form of state institutions.

In this chapter, I have revealed the central tenets of power/knowledge in Foucault's account through his own work. Next, in Chapter Four, I will draw on some of Foucault's secondary literature in terms of this concept in order to gain further interpretation of it.
Chapter 4 Secondary literature relating to Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge

Power/knowledge is a long-term project in Foucault’s work. According to Olssen (2006, p. 23), the source of the idea of power/knowledge can be seen in The Order of Things, in which the production of knowledge in social structure is related to technologies of power. Foucault examines the way that different human sciences interact with social structure, within which power and knowledge are produced. This theoretical interest informs a critique of the contemporary human sciences. This account then became the source for what developed in Foucault’s genealogical inquiry. For Olssen, Foucault’s concern starts from the constitution of discourses in terms of legitimate science; this then turns to connect to the micro-physics of power. Foucault seldom refers to the idea of power in his earlier work. Later, however, he focuses on “how human populations became objects of positive knowledge and to explore the bio-medical roots of modern knowledge” (ibid). Bio-power is a power in this respect that is identified as the increasing ordering and regulation of all realms of society under the requirement of improving welfare of individuals and population. Knowledge, under these circumstances, is the technique that regulates populations by discipline. The link between discipline and power, in Olssen’s view, is offered to build on his idea of the relations of power and truth (p. 24). Truth, which is produced in power/knowledge strategies in a given society, is political in nature. This epistemological issue, in Foucault’s view, affects the ontology of the self within the power/knowledge nexus. Self, therefore, is an important target in the operation of power/knowledge because it is constituted institutionally by its mechanisms. This is a
rough outline of how Foucault's concept of power/knowledge developed, and is the context of the interpretations of this idea that I shall elaborate later.

This chapter is concerned with secondary literature concerning Foucault that refers to the idea of power/knowledge. I shall choose several notable interpretations of power/knowledge, and shed light on their individual viewpoints in preparation for next chapter, which offers a critique of curriculum theorists' use of Foucault. These interpretations are provided by Dreyfus and Rabinow, Smart, Gordon, Masschelein, Butler, Flynn and Deleuze, which highlight different aspects of Foucault's concept of power/knowledge. After reading these interpretations, the concept of power/knowledge in my account has been changed, I shall describe this change at the end of this chapter.

4.1 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow

In this section, I shall focus on the interpretation of Foucault offered by Dreyfus and Rabinow. First, for Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault successfully develops a new method, which entails a type of archaeological analysis influenced by structuralism, and an interpretive dimension that is related to hermeneutic perspectives in terms of its concern for cultural practices. They term this method "interpretive analytics". Second, Dreyfus and Rabinow claim that the issue of power is central to Foucault's diagnosis of our current situation. The concept of power, in their view, remains elusive but is important in Foucault's account. I will give a more explicit description of their ideas concerning this below. The third point concerns Foucault's response, following Kant to the question "What is Enlightenment?". I shall, then, sketch out
Dreyfus and Rabinow's interpretation of the concept of maturity that is investigated within Foucault's idea of Enlightenment.

4.1.1 Foucault's method

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault states that he is interested in writing "the history of the present" rather than writing "a history of the past in terms of the present". Dreyfus and Rabinow explain what Foucault means by "the history of the present". There are two fallacies in historical analysis (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 118), they claim. One is "presentism" in which present interests, institutions, and politics are read back into history for the discovery of their current significance. In this sense, the historian takes a model from the present and tries to explore its parallel meaning in the past. That is the writing of the history of the past in terms of the present. One such example is the writing of the history of Medieval Christianity in terms of individual psychology with which history offers an instruction to current individual psychology. The other fallacy is "finalism". This history finds the core of the present based on the remote past, and shows the finalized necessity of the development from the past to the present. Everything happened in this march forward and is situated by the final goal of a history that suggests the final destination of human beings. For Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault's approach to "writing the history of the present", however, starts from a diagnosis of the current situation. It is located in the acute manifestations of a "meticulous ritual of power" or "political technology of the body" (p. 119) to see where it arose and how it took place. The target that Foucault tries to explore is neither a simple unity of meaning nor a changeless significance. Instead, he intends to "construct a mode of analysis of those cultural practices in our culture which have been instrumental in forming the modern individual as both object and
subject” (p. 120). Taking the example of confession for example, Foucault never tries to give us the true history of confession in different epochs. Rather, he isolates the central components of political technology nowadays by tracing them back in time, to show that confession is a vital component of modern power. He therefore provides “a history of the present”. Dreyfus and Rabinow find that the topics that Foucault chooses are all peripheral and relatively minor in history. This is because they are enmeshed within forms of power/knowledge in cultural practices to some degree.

Dreyfus and Rabinow call the method that Foucault applies “interpretive analytics” (p. 122). They explain, this “analytic” as drawing on both Kant’s transcendental analytics in the problematization of Enlightenment and Heidegger’s pursuance of a transcendental ground in knowing the subject by exploring the ahistorical and cross-cultural existential preconditions of human self-understanding. Both of them intend to provide a universal theory and to explain the sources of the concepts. In the view of Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault accepts their project but rejects the aims of finding a universal foundation. They consider that analytics today “must find a way of taking seriously the problems and conceptual tools of the past, but not the solutions and conclusions based on them” (p. 122). Furthermore, their use of “interpretation” follows both Nietzsche’s concept of genealogy and the thinking of Heideggerian hermeneutics. Nietzsche’s genealogy shows that we are nothing but our history in the making. In Heidegger’s argument, we must read our history in terms of our current practices; otherwise, genealogy is only an arbitrary interpretation. For Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault’s interpretation, however, is based not in seeking the true and deepest meaning underneath people’s surface behaviour, as it is in hermeneutics. Instead, the deeper meaning that Foucault intends to investigate is something that can lead the individual to see deeper meanings masked by everyday behaviour (p. 124). In
other words, Foucault’s concern with the deeper meaning is not what truth is, but how truth is constituted by human everyday behaviour. This, in Dreyfus and Rabinow’s view, is the place where Foucault turns to what they refer to as interpretation, and also creates more possibility for the actor to resist the current practices of dominance. Rather than searching for the everyday meanings shared by actors, or revealing the intrinsic meaning of practices, Foucault’s interpretive understanding, for Dreyfus and Rabinow, can be obtained by someone who not only shares the actor’s involvement, but also “distances himself from it” (ibid). This keeping distance is undertaken through an analysis of the history of current cultural practices. Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that this is the reason why Foucault’s method is not hermeneutic. For them, Foucault’s interpretive analytic is neither a strict research method nor a general theory, but a way of looking at our current situation. They expound Foucault’s method further:

It is Foucault’s unique combination of genealogy and archaeology that enables him to go beyond theory and hermeneutics and yet to take problems seriously. The practitioner of interpretive analytics realizes that he himself is produced by what he is studying; consequently he can never stand outside it. The genealogist sees that cultural practices are more basic than discursive formations (or any theory) and that the seriousness of these discourses can only be understood as part of a society’s ongoing history. The archaeological steer back that Foucault takes in order to see the strangeness of our society’s practices no longer considers these practices meaningless. (pp. 124-125)

In Dreyfus and Rabinow’s interpretation, interpretive analytics reveals that the human subject is constituted within the network of history and cultural practices. Foucault’s objective is to examine how these practices make us what we are, in order to achieve distance from that constitution of our subjectivity.
4.1.2 The nature of power

Dreyfus and Rabinow discuss several of Foucault’s propositions regarding power in their work (pp. 185-187). The first is that power relations are “nongalitarian and mobile”. For them, political technologies throughout the social body set up nongalitarian, asymmetrical power relations. The “mobile” in Foucault’s account implies an analytics of power, rather than a theory of power. Because power relations are mobile, the task for the analysis of power is to identify how it operates. In Dreyfus and Rabinow’s view, Foucault’s aim is to escape from the representation of power as law (that is, in the juridical sense as discussed in the previous chapter) by drawing attention to the mobilization of power. In this sense, the understanding of power is taken “to the level of the micropractices” (p. 185), in its materiality, and in its day to day operation. The second aspect Dreyfus and Rabinow draw attention to is that power is productive. In their interpretation, Foucault highlights this idea in order to argue that power cannot be restricted to political institutions. This productive power is multidirectional, “operating from the top down and also from the bottom up” (ibid). Rather than being identified with particular institutions, the technologies of power only find a localization within specific institutions. The disciplinary technology is effective while it establishes to links between institutional settings. Power is productive in this respect. Dreyfus and Rabinow argue, however, that power and institutions are not identical, neither is their relationships merely a pasted-on, superstructural detail (ibid). For example, the school, therefore, cannot be reduced to its disciplinary function.

Dreyfus and Rabinow’s third point concerns the relationships of power to domination. Althought Foucault is saying that we are all enmeshed in power, “he is not suggesting
that there is no domination" (ibid). For Dreyfus and Rabinow, power does not control in any simple sense, only applied by those at the top to those at the bottom. The characteristic of power is in fact more multiple than that and is operated with actual material functioning. In Dreyfus and Rabinow’s view, “power is exercised upon the dominant as well as on the dominated; there is a process of self-formation or autocolonization involved” (p. 186). This self-formation or self-constitution is an important aspect in power relations, but it cannot be considered in terms of a simplistic understanding of power relations, such as class domination.

The fourth proposition that they draw attention to is that power is “intentional and non-subjective”. This raises the difficulty of how to talk about intentionality without a subject, a strategy without a strategist? For Dreyfus and Rabinow, the answer can be found in the practices themselves. In practices, there is a push for achieving a strategic objective, but no one is pushing. This is because, at the level of the practices, there is no inherent logic of stability, but “there is a directionality produced from petty calculations, clashes of wills, meshing of minor interests” (p. 188). This directionality, in Dreyfus and Rabinow’s view, is not shaped by individual aims, but by the political technologies of power.

4.1.3 What is maturity?

Dreyfus and Rabinow elaborate Foucault’s concept of maturity in an essay entitled “What is maturity? Habermas and Foucault on ‘What is enlightenment?’” (1986). For them, Foucault’s study responds to what is intolerable in the current situation in order to frame a general problem and to embody a style of action that enables us to see which ways of functioning as human beings are worth opposing or strengthening.
Rather than deconstructing texts, in their view, Foucault uses texts for the aims of social practices. As with the pre-Platonic rhetoricians, they consider that the language that Foucault uses serves "to articulate an understanding of our situation which moves us to action" (p. 114). In later works, they comment, Foucault turns his attention to the productive dimension of power relations and formulates the repressive hypothesis as part of the problem. He draws on genealogy to reinterpret the discourses of sexuality not merely regarding them as an epistemic structure, but also as a stage showing how a Western individual is constituted as both the subject and the object.

Concerning truth, in Dreyfus and Rabinow's view, Foucault disagrees with the claim that truth serves to function against power, or that it and power are external to each other. The role of intellectuals, for Foucault, is someone who identifies "the specific forms and specific interrelationships which truth and power have taken in our history" (p. 116), namely, to see the way truth is established by the operation of power, and the way the subject is constituted by this operation. Dreyfus and Rabinow consider that Foucault's main purpose "has never been to denounce power *per se* nor to propound truth but to use his analysis to shed light on the specific dangers that each specific type of power/knowledge produces" (ibid).

Dreyfus and Rabinow draw attention to Foucault's view on how the coherent form of life that we call modernity has been formed. In the analysis of modern society, Foucault offers the concept of "bio-power" as the form of power/knowledge specific to modernity. It can be defined as a complex of practices to ensure health, security and productivity for Western people. Through seeing the operation of bio-power, we gain a clear understanding of what we are today. For Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault has never claimed that bio-power is the only thing to shape our life nowadays.
Instead, it should be seen as an interpretation, rather than a normative claim. In
*Discipline and Punish*, Dreyfus and Rabinow consider, Foucault singles out and
describes the practices that produce modern subjects as objects. *The History of
Sexuality* plays an import role in tracing the development of those practices of
confession and self-mastery that have made Western people into self-interpreting,
autonomous, meaning-giving subjects. These disciplinary and confessional practices
shape who we are in modern society.

The original question of the meaning of “maturity” in Foucault’s account follows
Kant’s questioning in terms of the spirit of Enlightenment? In Dreyfus and Rabinow’s
view, maturity does not only entail having the lucid and heroic ability to face up to
the collapse of the old order, but also to having an ironic stance toward one’s present
situation. For them, understanding the use of the term “ironic” is helpful to
differentiate Foucault’s view of maturity from those of other contemporary
philosophers. Dreyfus and Rabinow put its meaning like this:

> It is an abandonment of traditional seriousness while preserving active engagement in
the concerns of the present. It seeks to avoid preserving some special status for truth
which grounds serious involvement, and also to avoid the frivolity which arises when
one abandons all seriousness to dance on the grave of god, or *logos*, or phallo-centrism,
etc. (p. 117)

Briefly, the ironic stance of Foucault is not simply an attitude of destroying the old
system and deriding out-of-date tradition. It is an action of concerning ourselves with
our present world and of seeking the practices that provide a different way to live at
present. Dreyfus and Rabinow explain this further. Like Heidegger, Foucault attempts
to change our world, but he never laments the default assumption of the existence of
God nor does he himself try to look for a new one. In fact, his main task is not really to offer alternative possibilities for acting. He intends only to diagnose the contemporary danger and, in his last work, to provide the constitutive elements of modern ethics. He suggests that a philosopher will bring his own philosophy to bear on his present situation, and seek a way “to reconcile human dignity with the current social arrangements” (p. 118). This reconciliation does not urge human beings to follow the rules of the current social arrangement, but to consider how to maintain their dignity within the mechanisms of that social arrangement. The central argument of Dreyfus and Rabinow’s paper is that Foucault’s maturity would “consist in at least being willing to face the possibility that action cannot be grounded in universal, ahistorical theories of the individual subject and of writing, nor in the conditions of community and speaking” (ibid). In this respect, Foucault denies that there is a common form of morality that is acceptable by everyone, and that everyone has to submit to. For Dreyfus and Rabinow, this perspective is different from Habermas’ idea that one must reach agreement on valid claims on the basis of reason and communicative practice.

Dreyfus and Rabinow offer a clear explanation of several issues arising in Foucault’s account, such as the meaning of “the history of the present”, and the characteristics of power. They claim that Foucault’s method of interpretive analytics or his interrogation into Enlightenment is an approach that enables action towards reaching a diagnosis of our current situation. For Dreyfus and Rabinow, “the history of the present” never refers to finding a solution or a conclusion, especially not a universal, global one. In the next section, I shall discuss Barry Smart’s interpretation of Foucault to see his different elucidation of aspects of power/knowledge.
4.2 Barry Smart

Barry Smart is a sociologist who invokes Foucault’s analysis in a rethinking of the traditional Marxist analytical framework of the development of the Western society. Since the twentieth century, the emergence of “non-class”-based political subject groups have replaced the differentiation of class levels in social structure. Complex relations and technologies of power gradually increase their significance in modern society. For Smart, new conceptual frameworks, therefore, need to be articulated, which are different from or extend the scope of historical materialism. Foucault’s theory could overcome the limitations of Marxist analysis in understanding our present. It is in this context that Smart locates his commentary on the work of Foucault. In this section, I shall start by referring to two controversial issues relating to the misunderstanding of Foucault that Smart attempts to clarify. These relate to what he calls “the modern state and relations of power” and “resistance and power” (Smart, 2002, p. 122). I shall then describe his interpretation of the concept of power/knowledge and of Foucault’s methodological rules.

4.2.1 Power and the state

Smart is critical of the theory of power in the social sciences in which the exercise of power is seen in terms either of the actions of individual or institutional agents, or of the effects of structures or systems. Power has been defined as the capacities of agents to realize their will or interest against the will or interest of others: “power has been conceptualized as a property or an effect of structures and systems” (ibid). Smart offers several examples from sociological theory. For example, Weber considers that power relations are articulated in systems of domination. Parsons suggests that,
instead of a property held by groups or individuals, power is conceptualized as a
generalized resource flowing through the political system. For Marx, power is rooted
in the economic structure of society. Foucault’s account of power in Smart’s view is,
however, of a qualitatively different order. Similarly to Dreyfus and Rabinow, Smart
argues that power is neither a matter that is controlled by certain agents or
individuals, nor a matter of the aim of domination. It is neither a resource operated in
the political system, nor is it merely rooted in economic structure. Rather than
something that can be seized, shared or acquired, power is relational; it is exercised
from a variety of points in the social body. Relations of power are not considered to
be secondary to other relationships, such as economic processes, knowledge
relationships or sexual relations, but are immanent in them all. Smart explains these
aspects of power further:

…power is not conceived to be imposed from the apex of a social hierarchy, nor
derived from a foundational binary opposition between a ruling and ruled class,
rather it operates in a capillary fashion from below. (ibid)

Smart uses Foucault’s term “capillary” to draw attention to the way that power comes
from below and expands everywhere in the social body. Confrontations in the form of
binary divisions, for Smart, are merely temporary and exceptional states of
accumulation of the multiplicity of cleavages and resistances within power relations.
They are one type within the plurality of power relations.

Again similarly to Dreyfus and Rabinow, Smart highlights how in Foucault’s
conception of “power is presented as intentional yet non-subjective” (p. 123). He
claims that state apparatus should not be a labelled as representative of power because
this would direct our focus specifically towards sovereignty or law, which connects
with other apparatus like the army and police and consequently contributes to understanding everything as repressive. In Smart’s view, Foucault does not intend to construct an approach that analyses power in terms of the state, sovereignty and the law. The State and its apparatuses are not pivotal in Foucault’s exploration of the exercise of power. Smart argues, however, that “the importance of the modern state as the political form of centralised and centralising power is both acknowledged and addressed” (p. 126). As such, power relations are seen as localized in and imposed upon the constitution of the State and modern society. “Pastoral power” is one of these power relations, which comes from Christian thought, and is operated in order to ensure, sustain and improve the lives of individuals. This is associated with techniques of power developed to govern the human subject in a subtle way. Hence, Smart comments that the heart of Foucault’s work is “a shift from the predominance of sovereignty-law-repression to the development and diffusion of more subtle and economical forms of power exercised over life—over individuals and populations” (p. 127).

4.2.2 Power and resistance

Smart contests critics of Foucault’s work who argue that his idea of resistance lacks a foundation or any unique and unified agency of social change. He argues that Foucault’s work reflects the rejection of the common conception of power relations in terms of a binary division along class lines. In Foucault’s statement “where there is power, there is resistance,” Foucault means, in Smart’s view, that “resistance is present everywhere power is exercised, that the network of power relations is paralleled by a multiplicity of forms of resistance” (p. 133). As in power relations, resistance is also characterised by multiplicity, and thus cannot be generalized as
being from a limited source. Moreover, resistance is not always and already colonized by power and thereby is doomed to defeat. Smart argues: power and resistance constitute an “irreducible opposite” (ibid) in Foucault’s term within power relations; and their respective forms may change in this opposition. In Foucault’s account, the exercise of power should not be conceived simply in terms of a relationship between individual or collective agents, or as a relationship of violence or consent. Actually, power induces, incites and seduces. It is a way of acting upon an acting subject. Opposition or resistance to power is conceptualized in terms of freedom, because power is exercised only over free subjects (individual or collective). The conduct or action of subjects exists within a field of possibilities. In this way, the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom are provoked constantly in power relations. The “irreducible opposite” that Smart highlights is the struggle derived from this will or freedom against power. For Foucault, this is the process of permanent provocation. Because this provocation is ongoing and the opposing two sides are necessary, the opposition between power and resistance is irreducible. Though, for Foucault, the use of violence and the achievement of consent are not excluded from the field of power relations, they are not the basis and the imperative constitutive element in power relations. In Smart’s interpretation, power relations “cease to exist where insubordination or the means of escape or possible flight are absent” (p. 133). The attitude of insubordination, as the opposite side of power—resistance, is exactly the imperative element in power relations. Therefore, for Smart, every relationship of power implies a potential “strategy of struggle” in Foucault’s account. In Smart’s view, Foucault’s concept of resistance, opposition, and struggle still remain as enigmatic: in Discipline and Punish, forms of resistance and revolt were not addressed. In the first volume on The History of Sexuality, though the concept of resistance is offered through the analysis of power and a counter-attack against the
various mechanisms of sexuality, it provides little clarification. Forms of resistance to
power in Foucault’s work, however, constitute the basis of further studies. Through
analysis of resistance and struggle, relations of power might be understood explicitly.

Smart believes that Foucault’s notion of power is a “non-class”-based analysis. For
Foucault, the development of modern Western societies cannot be ascribed only to
class struggle—consider other power relations such as in the concern of men over
women, of parents over children and of psychiatry over the mentally ill. Instead, these
forms of “non-class” struggle manifest several common characteristics. Smart
summarizes them as follows (p. 135). First, they are “transversal”, which means that
they are not limited to a particular nation or political or economic formation. Second,
they have as their target the effects of power per se over people’s bodies and lives.
Third, they are “immediate”. Individuals direct their opposition to local exercises of
power, and power exercised over individuals. Rather than a global solution set in a
distant future (e.g. liberation, revolution, and the end of class struggle), the
consequence of power is direct and immediate. Fourth, they are opposed to a
government of individualization. Fifth, they contest in the “régime du savoir”, that is
the effects of power which are linked with knowledge, competence and qualification,
and they oppose secrecy, deformation and mystifying representations imposed on
individuals. Finally, they are each concerned with the question “Who are we?” In
summary, such struggles stand opposed to a particular technique of power that
categorizes individuals, marks their individuality and attaches them to their identity.

As the interpretation of Dreyfus and Rabinow also suggested, Foucault attempts to
diagnose our current situation, and diagnose the danger in modernity. Smart’s account
is similar to this, focusing on individual identity and the present. For him, then, it is
wrong to merely reduce Foucault's thinking to "that of the determination of forms of subjection and subjectivity through class and/or ideological structures" (p. 136).

4.2.3 Foucault's account of domination

For Smart, Foucault's idea of a non-economic analysis of power is important to an unprejudiced understanding of the interconnection between politics and the economy. Power is exercised and is a relation of force rather than being given or exchanged in this analysis. In the non-economic analysis, power relations are not relations of sovereignty, but of domination in Foucault's view. This notion of domination is different from sociologist's thinking of domination in general. Smart explains it further:

The sense of domination invoked here is not that of one individual, institution, or class over the people or the nation, but the multiplicity of forms of domination exercised within the fabric of society. (Smart, 1983, p. 82)

That is to say, Foucault's concept of domination does not come from specific dominant individual or groups. Rather, it has multiple origins and is embedded into the whole society. If, as Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest, Foucault's analysis of power sheds light on the specific dangers that each specific type of power/knowledge produces, Smart's account of "domination" appears to represent the "danger" that Dreyfus and Rabinow refer to. Power is not always coercive and repressive. Instead, it is one kind of domination that fixes our way of doing things and our thinking of ourselves.
In Smart's view, Foucault's notion of domination is easily misunderstood as referring to the domination by class or superiority. He argues, "the analysis of power should be ascending rather than descending" (ibid). He says:

It is a matter of examining how the techniques and procedures of power operating routinely at the level of everyday life have been appropriated or engaged by "more general powers or economic interests" rather than the converse, namely of conceptualising power as a property located at the summit of the social order employed in a descending direction over and throughout the entire social domain. (ibid)

A descending analysis of power is a global form that focuses on macro operation of power. Power, in this sense, is a property located at the summit of the social order employed in a descending direction throughout the entire social domain. On the contrary, Foucault's analysis of power is ascending: it starts from local centres, from the level of everyday life. It is a kind of micro-physics of power. Smart argues that Foucault disagrees with the idea that "anything can be deduced from the general phenomenon of the domination of the bourgeois class" (Foucault, cited by Smart, p. 84). Rather, the procedures of power reveal a political and economic utility for the bourgeoisie, which have been incorporated into the social whole. For Smart, Foucauldian analysis allows an unprejudiced exploration on which "specific mechanisms, techniques and procedures of power may achieve a degree of economic and political utility for dominant state apparatuses, oligarchies or ruling classes" (ibid). There is no general, global theory of the connection between power and economic relations, however; the relations between power and economy are decided by individuals.
In Smart’s interpretation, Foucault’s purpose is not to discover a global rationality of the modern state, or to revolt against sovereign power. Nor does he intend to work out a solution for the problems in the development of modern society. Instead he is concerned with how power has affected our present daily lives, how this influence has occurred in the formation of state, and how the human being has become a political and economic utility through disciplinary power. Rather than social status, the objects that are governed are our bodies, gestures and behaviour. In this sense, Smart shares a common view with Dreyfus and Rabinow. Perhaps because of his sociological concerns, Smart offers many explications related to the concept of resistance and clarifies the different meanings of domination in Foucault’s account and in the Marxist framework. Smart’s analysis leaves open several questions about how resistance may work against domination and what forms this may take. In the next section, I shall sketch out Colin Gordon’s exegesis of Foucault to see if any different ideas emerge.

4.3 Colin Gordon

Gordon has edited a number of anthologies of Foucault’s work. He is very familiar with Foucault’s thought as well as its historic, cultural, and philosophical scope. Several of his papers make an incisive exegesis of Foucault’s work. There are three main aspects developed in this section. First, I shall illustrate Gordon’s elaboration of the notion of power/knowledge, which includes the source of this thought and several methodological issues regarding this idea. This first part mainly comes from the “Afterword” of his edited book: *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. Second, I shall focus on ethical and political issues arising in Gordon’s interpretation of Foucault’s notion of governmentality. This concept relates
to power/knowledge and the discussion here derives from an introductory essay in another jointly edited book: *The Foucault Effect—studies in Governmentality* (1991). He expounds in detail the political and economic aspects concerning governmental rationality. Finally, I will sketch out Gordon’s perspective on Foucault’s essay: “What is Enlightenment?” This shows a profound connection with genealogical thinking, and the way Foucault considered the implications of the notion of critique.

### 4.3.1 On Power/knowledge

In Gordon’s view, the development both of Foucault’s study of power/knowledge and of new technologies for the governance of people links to a new philosophical conception: “‘Man’ as a simultaneous subject and object of knowledge” (Gordon, 1980, p. 234). Gordon argues that Foucault’s works, from *Madness and Civilization* to *The History of Sexuality* are not histories of madness or sexuality at all. Rather, through the problems he addresses, madness and peripheral subjects have been constituted as both an object and a subject of certain forms of knowledge and as targets of certain institutional practices. Gordon considers that Foucault’s conceptualisation of power/knowledge indicates an obvious methodological shift, which leads to a reflection on power in terms beyond good and evil. In Gordon’s view, Foucault’s analysis of power is constructed by two methodological principles: the principles of neutrality and scepticism, which are based neither on a moral philosophy nor on a social ontology. For neutrality, power is not an institution, a structure or a certain force that are endowed by certain agent, but is “given to a complex strategic relation in a given society” (p. 236). This has nothing to do with good and evil, but is involved into a mobile process for establishing social orders and socialized individuals. Gordon explains it like this:
So, as with Kant, the task is not that of fixing an ontologically primitive, definitively "real" stratum of historical reality, but in tracing the mobile systems of relationships and syntheses which provide the conditions of possibility for the formation of certain orders and levels of objects and of forms of knowledge of such objects. (ibid)

Foucault's study of history, therefore, attempts to make the analysis of objects, and of relations encompassing these objects, available in order to catch the mobile trajectory of power. The notion of power/knowledge belongs within a Nietzschean project of genealogy that relies on the principle of ethical and ontological skepticism. To clarify, Gordon suggests that the purpose of power/knowledge is not a critique of ideology, in the manner influenced by the Frankfurt School. He goes on to explain that knowledge of "Man" is able to serve a technological function in the domination of people and that this need not be a matter of the ideological mystification, in which ideology has the ability to define a certain field of truth. Rather than functioning as a ruse or a fraud, the history of Man is compatible with "their authentic espousal of the humanist values of self-emancipation, self-improvement and self-realization" (p. 237). This position leads Gordon to see Foucault as less of an anti-humanist than Nietzsche, which opens up more potential for the existence of human beings. In Gordon's interpretation, it is this feature of genealogy that makes Foucault's characteristics of modern apparatuses of power positive and productive. Gordon's argument goes beyond the interpretation of Dreyfus and Rabinow, or that of Smart, in which the productive power is seen only as serving economic utility. Productive power, in Gordon's view, presumes the possibility of human self-making. He emphasises Foucault's point that the object "is not to arrive at a priori moral or intellectual judgment on the features of our society produced by such forms of power, but to
render possible an analysis of the process of production itself” (ibid). This process of production implies the potency of human development.

For Gordon, the historical matrix of conditions for modern human sciences must be understood in terms of a whole range of techniques and practices for the discipline, surveillance, administration and formation of populations of human individuals in Foucault’s account. These forms of knowledge and these apparatuses of power are constituted interdependently. Here, Gordon claims that two complementary shifts of philosophical perspective are necessary to make a genealogy of this relationship possible (p. 239). First, the ethical polarization of the subject-object needs to be discarded. This discarding makes possible a conception of domination that can take the form both of a subjectification and an objectification, and enables subjectivity to be seen as a form of moral autonomy. Second, on the one hand, the assumption that domination (the class domination in Marxist terms or the domination of instrumental rationality in the idea of critical theory) falsifies the essence of human subjectivity has to be rejected. On the other hand, an assertion needs to be addressed, which is that power promotes and utilizes a “true” knowledge of subjects and constitutes the very field of that truth. This “true” knowledge of subjects seems to me to equate to the knowledge of the self, or the care of the self, in Foucault’s terms. The truth in this knowledge is not related to judgement or to theoretical construction, but is an ongoing pursuit of self-transformation. The “subject”, in Gordon’s view, must be thought of as a fictive or constructed entity, but this is different from saying that subject is false or imaginary. For Foucault, it is an ironic usage employed in order to struggle against the way that subjects are constituted or governed by a certain sovereign truth. In sum, for Gordon, Foucault’s position in his methodological skepticism includes both the ontological claims and the ethical values that humanist
systems of thought invest in the notion of subjectivity. He does not intend to judge or to subvert these ethical values, only to investigate how they become possible.

With regard to Foucault's concept of the "history of the present", Gordon considers that the object of Foucault's critique is the status of the present. The Foucaudian method of genealogy utilizes George Canguilhem's analysis and critique in which the present is a standpoint of scientific thought and a standpoint of the history of that thought. This is a history of the present as "modernity". In this respect, Gordon explains, it is "the present as the form of a particular kind of domain of rationality, constituted by its place on a diachronic gradient" (p. 242). Foucault's philosophical challenge to history is, therefore, not to inquire into the reality of "the past" but to interrogate the rationality of "present" that is constituted in his history. To "interrogate" here is what Dreyfus and Rabinow refer to as "diagnose", a diagnosis of modernity and our present. It is also an ironic stance towards modern rationality, and towards our being at this moment.

Concerning the concept of power, Gordon supposes that Foucault uses it in a relational rather than a substantialising mode. He suggests that power in Foucault's view "is not an omnipotent causal principle or shaping spirit but a perspective concept" (p. 245). This "perspective concept" has the same sense as the term—"directionality" that Dreyfus and Rabinow use. Power relations have direction and movement, but they are not something visible and accessible for people to own. Moreover, Gordon explains the reason why power is nonsubjective in terms of techniques. Technique possesses an intrinsic rationality of its own. But we cannot reduce the history of this rationality to that of its individual or institutional users, or to the ulterior purpose of its applications. Gordon comments that Foucault does compile
a random collage of scattered and heterogeneous elements in *Discipline and Punish*. These relatively autonomous technologies, for Gordon, contribute to produce the multiplication, adaptation and reorganization of effects. According to this interpretation, a technology of normalization "always admits of a certain free play with respect to any specific programmatic norm" (p. 253). That is, this play makes a whole range of strategies possible. It is also possible for a technological apparatus to adapt itself continuously to a strategic role opposite to that of its initial programme. In the case of the prison, Gordon explains, it is not seen as being for the elimination of criminality, but for its exploitation, in Foucault’s account. Beneath the multiplicity of technology, it is possible to identify a basic structural bipolarity that characterizes modern projects of human governance. Gordon explains this structural bipolarity as consisting of two modalities of the technology of power, "microscopic" and "macroscopic" (p. 254). The former effects an orthopaedic training of the body, the soul and the individual. The latter secures and enhances life and well-being of a population or a social body. Every social practice needs to be evaluated simultaneously on both levels. Modern forms of governance are thus conceptualized by means of this “double-entry system of calculation” (ibid). In this sense, power integrates the dual imperatives of good government—the individual and the society.

Unlike Smart who concentrates only on Foucault’s micro-physics of power, Gordon argues that the technology of power is both microscopic and macroscopic. He supplies, however, two clarifications (pp. 254-255). First, the "macroscopic" focus on the population is not equivalent to Foucault’s notion of strategic effects in the real. Foucault does not assert an inexorable globalization of effects of power. That is the reason why he distinguishes our disciplinary society from a disciplined society by docile, obedient, normalized subjects. Second, Foucault also does not claim that the
governance of collectivities is merely a resultant or a projection of a discipline in closed institutions such as the prison. As a matter of fact, there are different forms of the exercise of power in our society. A social government is constituted by minute capillary relations. Gordon explains the meaning of “capillary”: it is not equated with individual. It may properly be regarded as “sub-individual or trans-individual” (p. 255). Additionally, the notion of State that Foucault refers to so often in his later works “is neither the definitive form assumed by government nor its subject, but rather one of its effects or instruments” (ibid). As Smart puts it: power is immanent in rather than exterior to the State.

4.3.2 On Governmentality

For Gordon, the issue of “government” is pivotal in Foucault’s political analysis of the “microphysics of power”. The constitution of the modern state, of modern societies can be understood by way of Foucault’s analysis of government. Gordon explains the meaning of “government” in Foucault’s account: government is “the conduct of conduct,” that is “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon, 1991, p. 2). In Gordon’s view, the practices of government occur within the network between self and self, and between human beings and social institutions. The target of governmental rationality is the self and others. In turn, Foucault’s conception of govermentality raises the question of how to govern, in Gordon’s view. This “how” relates to the immanent conditions and constraints of practices. It cannot be explained by the theory of the legitimated foundations of political sovereignty. For Gordon, “how to govern” relates to the interdependence between the “government of men” and the “manifestation of truth”
(p. 8). That is, this manifestation of truth and the government of human beings according to it, is the art of government.

Unlike Machiavellian political thinking which is concerned mainly with retaining the prince's sovereignty, Gordon explains, how Foucault's account identifies a shift of political rationality from prince to state characterised by a form of "secular perpetuity" (p. 9). State rationality is established through government concerned with the state's strength. Gordon elaborates that ideas of prosperity and happiness become the principles which identified the state with each and all subjects. The role of ruler is thus as a shepherd, and the population, the governed, is as a herd. After the prosperity of individual lives is ensured, this in turn enhances the strength of the state. This is the basic outline Gordon provides of the function of government in Foucault's account.

Gordon emphasizes one aspect of Foucault's account in particular: "nothing is an evil in itself, but everything is dangerous" (p. 47). As in Dreyfus and Rabinow's interpretation, Gordon identifies the shedding of light on these dangers as Foucault's central concern. Gordon, however, goes further to think of this point more positively. For Gordon, things are liable to go wrong, but there is also a possibility of doing something to prevent this. This can be applied to modern Western forms of government. Gordon identifies the need for action in Foucault's account. Gordon points out that Foucault disagrees with "the project (neo-liberal or socialist) of a guaranteed freedom or a definitive Enlightenment" (ibid). The liberty of men in Foucault's account is never assured by the institutions and laws. The exercise of freedom cannot be guaranteed inherently in the social structure. For Foucault, the only guarantee of freedom is freedom. Gordon therefore considers power as positive,
following Foucault’s claim that power is infinite rather than being ill (or repressive) (ibid). In this view, unbreakable laws and unrestricted rights never exist. So, on the one hand, in order to be operable, to be credible to both the governed and the governing, governmental rationality is conditional. Although, on the other hand, our existing conceptions of ourselves may be more contingent and modifiable than we think. Because government is the “conduct of conduct,” the relation between subjects and government is like a “moral judo” in Gordon’s terms (p. 48) (or the “agonism” in Foucault’s terms). Gordon draws attention to Foucault’s view that it is important to keep in mind that the possibility of change never disappears in governmental process. As Foucault says: “one can simultaneously work and be restive” (Foucault, cited in Gordon, ibid) in working with a government. Resistance could occur in any power relationship.

4.3.3 On Foucault’s response to the question: “What is Enlightenment?”

Gordon comments that Foucault’s response to Kant’s reflections on Enlightenment is neither to concern the present possibilities of Enlightenment, nor to achieve liberation from this idea. Rather, it is a critical interrogation on the limits of Kant’s thinking of it and on the abuses of power it has lead to. Enlightenment reason can be seen, in Foucault’s view as despotically spread in history. For Gordon, the experience that Foucault refers to as Enlightenment is not that of doctrinal conversions and deconversions, but rather “a mutation in the problem of political identity as such” (Gordon, 1993, p. 21). The pressing question of political identity is no longer

14 “What is Enlightenment?” is a question that Immanuel Kant raised in a short essay in a Berlin newspaper in 1784, a few years before the Revolution in France. Two centuries later, Foucault refers back to this text in a series of lectures, interviews, and prefaces. He found in it that Enlightenment would be taken up in a new way—a “historico-philosophical critique” that is based on the examination of modern political rationality. See John Rajchman (2007, p. 9).
“how can we exist?,” but “who are we?” Rather than “engagement in”, this is “experiment with” in Foucault’s terms. For Gordon, the moral issue that Foucault raises here is not that of whether things should be changed or remain unchanged, but that of “How is it possible for us to hold on to liberty and truth in our ways of changing and not changing?” (ibid). This is a way that of being engaged in dominant truth, but of experimenting with the experience of it otherwise. Gordon connects this idea to Foucault’s interpretation of Kant’s concept of revolution. Following the revolutionary movement in France in 1968, Foucault reflects on what a desirable revolution could be like and how it might be possible. By drawing on the idea of revolution from Kant, Foucault considers that some revolutions have not been worth repeating, but repetition is a sense of the contradictory nature of the will to a revolution. Foucault argues, therefore, that the important matter regarding revolution is something other than revolution itself. It is the “wishful participation bordering closely on enthusiasm of its audience” (p. 21). May 1968 was a revolution consisting in nothing beyond or other than enthusiasm for revolution. For Foucault, Kant sees enthusiasm as a political object, through which life was taken at its face value and turned back against the system bent on controlling it. Gordon points out that Foucault raises a further question in his discussion: Since revolutions had fallen back into their former rut: “Can they still provide the basis of a consistent political rationality which is distinct from—even, in a sense, the opposite of—the traditional ethos of revolution?” (p. 22). In Gordon’s view, for Foucault, the rationality of revolution was always trapped into the effects of despotism in which hope itself was lost. Kant’s notion of revolution gives Foucault inflection towards the answer of what the Enlightenment is. Gordon expounds:
Kant distinguishes between revolutions as events and the enthusiasm for revolution which is the true and sure sign of progress. Foucault distinguishes between an Enlightenment of sure identity, conviction and destiny, and an Enlightenment which is question and questioning, which is commitment to uncertainty. (ibid)

In Gordon’s perspective, Kant’s questions for Enlightenment and revolution inspire Foucault’s thinking of Enlightenment as a permanent possibility of questioning. Foucault, however, discards Kant’s philosophical meaning as the decisive valorizing judgment in the history of humanity, and as “man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage” (p. 23) in the context of the present moment. Foucault recognizes “a reflexivity of the contingent and the inessential in the time and in ourselves” (ibid). Foucault’s treatment of Kant’s thought is not merely a polemical refusal, but produces different thought from it. This can be seen in Foucault’s notion of critique, outlined by Gordon:

The point, in brief, is to transform critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression...criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the pursuit of formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and recognize ourselves as subjects of what we do, think and say. (pp. 23-24)

This is the “ironic stance” in Foucault’s account that Dreyfus and Rabinow draw attention to. This is also what Foucault calls the attitude of “maturity”, which is related to his genealogical inquiry into the constitution of what we are. In this way, we get new impetus for the undefined work of freedom. As Gordon highlights, the point perhaps is no longer to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are, as

15 Kant gives the meaning of Enlightenment like this: “Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage” (Kant, 2007, p. 29). Tutelage, in Kant’s term, means that men make use of their understanding by the direction from another. The cause of self-incurred in this tutelage is not because men lack of reason, but because men lack of resolution and courage to use their own reason without direction from another.
Foucault claim's in the essay “The subject and power”. Gordon explains that an ethic of “refusing what we are” does not mean a leap into the void, or an immoralism of the gratuitous act. First, such a form of freedom needs a form of knowledge obtainable only by means of exacting historical and political investigation. The questioning of “what we are” follows a principle of permanent contingency that demands a vigorous appetite for facts. Second, the question of “what we are” has a mutual implication in Foucault's question of the present and the “history of the present”, the investigation of what we are by recourse to a history of the present. The relationship between the practice of genealogy and the question of Enlightenment is identified by Gordon as polemic. Gordon comments: “the genealogical attitude is almost synonymous with mistrust of Enlightenment; genealogical narration is an inverse, a post-mortem, a satire of the Enlightenment’s prospectuses of progress” (p. 25).

According to Gordon’s interpretation of Foucault, “knowledge” not only has a relation of mutual production with power, as in Dreyfus and Rabinow’s understanding, but is also a matter that we need to inquiry into in order to obtain freedom of our subjectivity. That is because he regards power/knowledge as a mechanism that functions more to disencumber the domination of rationality than to evoke this domination. In his account, while Foucault announces that power is the combination of heterogeneous elements, and strategy is a multiple exertion, power is no longer the force to enhance unitary domination. Therefore, it is quite a narrow view to presume power serves only to eliminate; on the contrary, “exploitation” is the real thing it does. For Gordon, the nature of power is productive in Foucault's account; this opens up various possibilities for the constitution of the subjects of human beings. On the one hand, our subjects could be confined by the effects of power/knowledge and governmental rationality; but, on the other hand, this
confinement is not really so indissoluble, and power may be the positive force that can help people towards pursuing self-emancipation, self-improvement and self-realization. Likewise, the subject of the human being is not static or immobile. Rather than being as a unitary value and universal standard, it is itself as full of plasticity and full of possibility, as the characteristics of power/knowledge. This is Foucault’s opposition to Kant’s view of Enlightenment and rationality. In Gordon’s account, Foucault’s genealogical inquiry is not only an exploration of what we are, but, most importantly, also a rejection of what we are. According to this, Gordon provides a more positive account of power/knowledge than Dreyfus and Rabinow or Smart. For Gordon, the history of present does not aim to support people engaging in their current life, but to encourage people to keep distance from the process of certain kind of blind normalization and govermentality, which manifest the freedom in power/knowledge. This freedom, an ethical choice, is based on the possibility of conduct. In the next section, I shall show Jan Masschelein’s elucidation of Foucault, and see how he considers educational research and educational theory by adopting Foucault’s notions of power/knowledge and governmentality.

4.4 Jan Masschelein

Compared with other interpreters of Foucault discussed in this chapter, Masschelein’s writing is more directly concerned with educational issues. He takes up Foucault’s ideas, particularly relating to the notion of governmentality, in thinking about our present educational theory and practice. The correlative concepts such as limit-experience, e-ducative, de-subjectivation and de-govermentalisation that he employs are negative aspects in Foucault’s account. But these concepts have nothing to do with negative effects in education; on the contrary, these negative ideas are
likely to evoke certain inspiration for further positive transformation. Masschelein’s account of Foucault that I will address here includes three parts. First, I shall focus on his interpretation of limit-experience and educative, which derive from Foucault’s question of how to read and write an experience book, and of what effect this experience book would have on the subject. Second, I shall introduce his critique of contemporary critical educational theory which, in his opinion, is governed by the power of certain standard rationality, such as emancipation, autonomy and liberation. He tries to expose this form of governmentality and to show a “real” form of self government that we need in educational theory. Last, I shall describe Masschelein and Simons’ reinterpretation of Foucault’s “ontology of present” in our educational present. They redefine a meaning of truth that is different from traditional notions of knowledge production. In their argument, the mission of a truth-teller (or an educational researcher) is to arouse the critical act of an ethics of de-governmentalization.

4.4.1 Educative practice

In “Experience and the Limits of Governmentality” (2006) Masschelein first addresses Foucault’s notion of critique. He highlights Foucault’s idea that critique is “the art not to be governed in this way” (p. 561), and is a “project of desubjectivation” (ibid). This means that critique is not an act of judging the legitimacy of knowledge, or to subjugate the demands of reason. Rather, Masschelein cites Butler’s interpretation of critique as “a practical refusal of a particular form of subjectivity, a kind of virtue” (ibid). It is an act of freeing ourselves from current conceptions about ourselves and our conduct, and an experiment to go beyond what we are; that is, to establish a new relationship with ourselves as subjects. As Gordon
also emphasised, Foucault’s concern is not so much to discover what we are, but more importantly, to refuse what we are. For this purpose, Masschelein underlines Foucault’s notion—“e-ducative”. He elucidates the meaning of “e-ducative”: “an e-ducative practice is a practice in which in a certain sense the subject is ruined or dies, a practice that involves acceptance of life up to death, up to annihilation” (p. 563). Masschelein considers that this e-ducative implies a negative and critical practice that equates to Foucault’s concern with “desubjectivation”. By drawing on one of Foucault’s interviews that relates to the writing of experience books, Masschelein then expounds the way that subjectivity can be refused.

Masschelein explains that for Foucault, an experience book is not a book on or about experiences. Rather, the writing and reading of a book is itself an experience. In this sense, Foucault suggests that his books are more an experience for himself and readers than an establishment of a historical truth. Foucault thus calls himself not a theorist but an experimenter. This idea echoes with the point that Gordon highlights mentioned earlier, that Foucault’s central concern is to “experiment with”, rather than “engagement in”. Masschelein considers that in Foucault’s perspective “an experience is something that one comes out of transformed” (ibid). The purpose of Foucault’s writing is a practice to change himself in order not to think the same thing as before. Masschelein identified Foucault’s idea of experience as being influenced by the thinking of Nietzsche, Bataille and Blanchot, for whom “experience is trying to reach a certain point in life that is as close as possible to the “inlivable”, that which can’t be lived through (p. 564). For Masschelein, this “inlivable” is a project of desubjectivation and suggests the idea of a limit-experience. Such an experience serves to wrench the subject from itself, and achieves a transformation of the relationship we have with our own knowledge. Furthermore, Masschelein clarifies
that telling the truth in Foucault's experience books is not to establish truth that belongs to epistemological questions, but is an ethical issue that relates to the relationship with ourselves and with the world. Through experience, Foucault aims to construct himself, and to invite others to share an experience of what we are that allows a transformation of self. In this sense, for Masschelein, an experience book is not used by Foucault to teach anything. Instead, it is more like an invitation or public gesture.

Masschelein also draws on Foucault's notion of fiction. Experience, for Foucault, is neither true nor false; it is a fiction that shows how one fabricates oneself. In Masschelein's view, this "fiction" can be regarded as "the articulation of the failure (or destruction) of the actual government through exposing its games of truth and power" (ibid). This articulation constitutes a truth beyond truth and a truth in the future, in which truth is seen as a continuous diagnosis of the way that regime of truth is constituted, as an examination of what we are. Masschelein clarifies that Foucault avoids using experience as a concept. Foucault resists the question: "what is experience?" because in it a concept is merely an act of defining or confining. For Foucault, Masschelein says, experience "delivers no substance and no foundation" (p. 566), that is it does not refer to the soul, desire or consciousness, as something that we have. Masschelein then considers how these ideas of experience can be thought about in critical educational theory in the context of the learning society. Then he clarifies some ideas following Foucault as follows:

First of all, an experience book is different from a truth book or a demonstration book within which the relationship between writers and readers are put into a pastoral-pedagogical regime. Foucault rejects the idea of teaching his readers
something or conveying lessons in his books. Hence, he claims that his books are all personal experiences and do not have that particular value. An experience book is written out from an attitude of “ex-position” (p. 568) which enables readers to liberate their gaze and thoughts and enables writers to see and think differently and then transform themselves. Masschelein quotes Foucault’s description: it is a way of “writing-one/the –self, of self writing” (ibid). For Masschelein, this is a philosophical exercise in which the limits of subjectivity (and objectivity) are at stake. Writing is an activity “to expose oneself in order to allow for the possibility for ‘seeing further’, ‘thinking further’ or ‘thinking otherwise’ to occur” (ibid). In addition, in this way, one puts oneself in confrontation with a knowledge that is foreign. Masschelein explains the meaning of “at stake”. What is at stake is not to express what one thought before, but is “to lose one’s face”, that is, in a certain sense, one’s subjectivity” (ibid). When Foucault pursues the theme of “having no face”, it does not mean the subject of writing is less important. On the contrary, Masschelein explains, it is the demand to “withdraw subjectivity from the individualising action of the regime of power and truth” (ibid). Therefore, on the one hand, the writing of losing one’s face refers to a desubjectivating writing, in which “one both undergoes and goes under, is dying” (ibid), in which readers and writers are exposed and are confronting each other as equals. On the other hand, this writing “does not offer us a liberating or emancipating gaze, but liberates our gaze” (p. 569). It inspires us to have a different gaze on the world, a gaze without being captured by a certain, fixed regime of truth.

Hence, writing an experience book is an educative practice that opens up the possibility to liberate our gaze. But Masschelein insists that two points need to be added here. Firstly, the direction to which one exposes oneself is not a universal
structure, but a possibility. Secondly, certain work is necessary to be performed. This work is to encounter an experience that cares for the world. For Masschelein, this procedure is “active to become passive” (p. 570). De-subjectivation and subjectivation (or we may say: “resubjectivation”) take place at the same time. This e-ducative practice “is itself ex-posed and leads us outside” (ibid). We cannot find any entrance to get into because there is no map. It demands a state of care for the self to be reached. However, in Masschelein’s view, it is too narrow to focus on one’s singular self. Instead, this is an inquiry that relates not only to oneself, but also to others in a particular way, in a broader world. Masschelein claims that if one is attentive in such a way, one can tell truths. To sum up, for Masschelein, this writing and reading is a limit-experience, a negative experience. This experience is negative, he explains: because it “transforms in an irreversible way” (p. 571). But we should bear in mind Foucault’s warning that we should not dramatize this limit-experience. Masschelein expounds further on this limit-experience. It is an attempt “to hand over oneself with one’s own hands, to make oneself into a question” (ibid) in the “non-pastoral” or “non-Christian” context. Experience, in this sense, “is not something that simply happens, but always something which happens to ‘us’” (ibid). A limit-experience is an experience “that transforms us, which makes something in us die” (ibid). It cuts every bond with our past; does something irreversible to ourselves. This experience has no substance, no external criteria such as reason; it shows mainly the possibility to transgress oneself, “to detach oneself from being-governed” (p. 572). This can chime with Foucault’s understanding of “maturity” that Dreyfus and Rabinow address: our action and thinking cannot be grounded in universal theories of the individual subject. In Masschelein’s perspective, care of the self “is not a care for one’s identity, but related to what Foucault meant by ‘losing one’s face’” (ibid).
4.4.2 How to conceive of critical educational theory?

Masschelein employs Foucault’s concepts of power and government to rethink critical educational theory in an essay “How to conceive of critical educational theory today?” (2004). In his perspective, the classical figure of critical educational theory in Germany proposes itself as the critical principle of Bildung which, following Levinas, posits the capacity to say “I”; and following Critical Theory, encourages the practice of self-reflection in dialogue. It is based on the principle of cultivating one to be able to determine oneself and to be rationally autonomous in a reflexive way. Actual social and educational reality is therefore regarded as a site of coercion, distortion, alienation and oppression. Masschelein argues that this critical educational theory has become the main creed in almost all educational thinking and practice, which subjugates the self to the claims of communicative reason. Emancipation and liberation, as the aim of critique, ensure the truth of education. In this respect, autonomy and critique are not only brought to bear against the existing social order, but also “have become parts of that order and power” (p. 355).

Foucault’s notion of power, for Masschelein, can offer a different view of this predominant critical theory and critical educational thought. Following Foucault, Masschelein disagrees that power is either the ability to enforce one’s own will in a social relation, or the repressive force of determination of the will from others. On the contrary, he argues, power needs to be regarded as a productive technique and mechanism. He goes on to describe Foucault’s concept of power. For Foucault, power is not a substance. Rather, it is only a certain type of relation between individuals. It relates to actions upon actions, upon the possibilities of actions. The idea of power relations, Masschelein explains, “implies free subjects for whom there opens up a
field of possibilities of responses and ways of behaving” (p. 358). Foucault describes power as “government” that is “conduct of conduct”. To govern means to “structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault cited in Masschelein, ibid). Governmentality, bring together the terms “government” and “mentality”, according to which people conducting both themselves and others, is for Masschelein, an important aspect of understanding power relations. This process operates through every social institution including the state and schools. In Masschelein’s view, power produces truth games which determine not only what the individual is and what his/her knowledge means, but also “how the individual relates to him/her self and to others” (ibid). Individuality, in this respect, is one of the effects of a specific modern power apparatus. Foucault calls this “the government of individualization” (p. 359). Through scientific and administrative procedures, government determines who one is.

Masschelein attempts to draw on Foucault’s ideas above to rethink the thought of critical education. More precisely, he would like to investigate critical theories as different forms of governmentality. In his view, the critical, self-reflective subject is “an effect and instrument of a Christian-spiritual discipline and a pastoral power relation” (p. 360). He argues, therefore, that autonomy, self-reflection and self-determination in critical educational theory “are not the realization of an idea of humanity, but just a particular form of self-government” (p. 362). We therefore need a “new” critical educational theory that describes the interrelationship between processes of power and processes of education. Foucault’s ontology of the present, for Masschelein, can inspire a new critical educational theory that continues the imperatives of the Enlightenment. This Foucauldian critical theory details how concepts (such as autonomy, emancipation and freedom) are connected to the birth of the modern subject and are related to the government of individuals. It also reveals
contingent facts in history about how people govern others and themselves following particular truth games. Masschelein holds that a new critical educational theory could produce “a genealogical problematisation of the self-reflective, self-realising and self-determining critical subject” (p. 363), which is different from producing the ideology of autonomy. That is to say, we need a different critical self-reflection and autonomous behaviour to constitute a “‘real’ form of self government, a real ‘ethos’ as relation of the self to the self” (ibid). Power, in this sense, does not affect our individuality by the operation of repression or negation, but is a force to stimulate us to problematise ourselves. This is, not only in a practical sense, but also in an ethical sense.

4.4.3 De-governmentalisation of education

In “De-governmentalisation of education and the meaning of the public” Masschelein and Simons (2007) pose a question: “How do pedagogy and educational research contribute to the Enlightenment of power in educational processes?” (p. 1). In their view, Foucault’s ontology of the present is one kind of educational research. The term “educational” has two meanings here: first, it is the object of research; second, it refers to a characteristic of research itself. In the latter sense, the educational meaning of research is not only for research, but also has an influence on the researcher herself. They specifically focus on the educational meaning of research for the researcher herself in this paper, as they see this as crucial for the “ontology of the educational present” (p. 2). Based on this concern, they raise another question: “How can people become truth-tellers on educational issues?” (p. 3) To answer this question, drawing on Foucault, two traditions are distinguished. First is the idea that knowledge is the claim of the truth. Namely, people endeavor to get the “true”
knowledge. Second is the tradition they term "existential-ethical-ascetic" (p. 3), which means that it requires a particular transformation of the self to access the truth. Masschelein and Simons argue that Foucault's ontology of the present manifests the second consideration, through which educational researchers become truth-tellers in a more critical way. For them, that is nothing to do with the production of true knowledge, but only with the transformation of the self. The relation that is focused on is no longer between knowledge and truth, but between ethics and truth. Ethics, they explain, "refers to the relation of the self to the self and how this relation is modified or transformed by the self in order to become an ethical subject, a subject of action" (p. 4). This is Foucault's "care of the self" in their view. Researchers obtain access to the truth in a relation of "care", rather than a relation of "knowing". Masschelein and Simons offer the concept of a "critical ontology of the educational present" (p. 5); in which, the form of reflexivity of the researcher does not refer to a judgemental attitude based on criteria of validity. Rather, it supposes an "attentive attitude" (ibid) to the educational present connected with the researcher herself, and to our current understanding of what we are. Curiosity, for Masschelein and Simons, is the proper attitude of this care of the self. It gazes on what is happening today in education and implies "a willingness to become a stranger in the familiar present" (p. 6).

They refer to Foucault's description of two attitudes to reflexivity. They are "limit-attitude" and "experimental attitude". The former is necessary to explore a possible transgression of the current limits. This limit-attitude needs to be combined with an experimental attitude so as to transform or modify one's mode of being. The critical ontology of the educational present, thus "involves an experimental relation of the self to the self" (p. 7). It is an attempt to disengage oneself from oneself.
Masschelein and Simons explain that Foucault refers to the critical ontology of the present as a kind of “essay” because it is a “transforming test of oneself in the play of truth” and “an exercise of the self through thinking” (p. 8). The care of the self can be part of an “ethics of de-governamentalization” (ibid). This ethics, they explain, does not aim at withdrawing subjects from the world of education. Rather, in Foucault’s words, it aims to “live the present otherwise” (ibid). Knowledge is required in this situation. But this knowledge has a particular function. For Masschelein and Simons, rather than as scientific theories of the subject or the present, this knowledge needs to be considered as a “reflexive ethical instrument” (ibid), as an experimental knowledge of the self. As in Foucault’s claim, they emphasize, “knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting” (p. 9). The critical ontology of the present refers to a kind of truth-telling that cuts how we live the present. In Masschelein and Simons’ view, it leads us outside, and out of position. Therefore, educational research is an “e-ducational research” for the researcher herself.

Masschelein and Simons are concerned with the question of how the meaning of the public can be thought about in terms of Foucault’s ontology of the present. For Foucault, Kant’s text “What is Enlightenment?” is an ambiguous text. Masschelein and Simons note that it opens up a philosophical questioning of the present to ontology, but also immediately closes down what it opened up. They argue that to serve Enlightenment “is not to tell others what they should know, but to leave the others the freedom to make use of their own reason” (p. 10). Furthermore, to serve Enlightenment is also to take care of oneself, to take care that “one is present in what one says and writes, in speaking and writing truth” (ibid). As Walser points out: “what one is doing as a writer and a speaker is making the present public” (ibid). This is an attempt to expose oneself, to put oneself as being part of the present in public.
Actually, it is an action to put our present at stake. The other does not need to accept what I say, but she is invited to take part in the risk in order to take care of herself. While one speaks for others, simultaneously, one also speaks simultaneously with oneself. This speaking creates a public space—a space both for everyone and for no-one. Though generally, to speak publicly is to speak in one’s own name, this is a speaking without name, without a universal position, and is a speaking out of position.

For Masschelein, the aim of education is the transformation of the self. This is self-government without being governed. This concept seems analogous to Foucault’s assertion of critique or maturity that Dreyfus and Rabinow address. There are two procedures in this process. On the one hand, one needs to realize the effect of power/knowledge in social and cultural contexts. On the other hand, one has to take action to distance oneself from certain intolerant and dominant rationality. Dreyfus and Rabinow’s “diagnosis of our current situation” sheds light on the former; while Masschelein’s “de-governmentalization” and “de-subjectivation” is close to the latter. But we should not make a clear distinction between these two tasks as they actually refer to the same aspect of Foucault’s account. In Masschelein’s view, the way towards maturity in not by accumulation, but by “paring away.” Hence, the meaning of knowledge that he highlights is not only the science of governing people, but serves the function of cutting. This way shows the deconstructive sense in Foucault’s thought. Power, for Masschelein, stands in a more positive position, which is less subjugation than production for problematising the self, and for self-transformation. This perspective is similar to that of Gordon discussed above. The departure from power/knowledge starts with the self. However, in Masschelein’s view, the ethical relation within power/knowledge is not only between self and self, but also between
self and other, and between self and the world. Thus, the care of self should also include these three aspects.

4.5 Judith Butler

Foucault gave a lecture in 1978 entitled “What is Critique?” In this section, I offer a consideration of Butler’s response to this text. From Butler’s perspective, Foucault’s notion of critique encompasses his main tenet of virtue, which relates to the act of self-formation and to the attitude of the subject in the face of the effects of power/knowledge in the politics of truth. Following “what is Enlightenment?”, “What is Critique?” is another important question concerning the limits and also conversely, the possibility of power/knowledge. I set out Butler’s interpretation of the essay below.

Generally speaking, critique is regarded as a judgment in relation to, or often in terms of knowledge claims. For Butler, however, “critique” in Foucault’s account is an ethical issue, a practice that goes beyond judgement. Foucault undertakes to question what is central to the activity of critique itself. In the article “What is critique? An essay on Foucault’s virtue,” Butler argues that critique is no longer a normative matter, a normative judgment, as Habermas put this. In Foucault’s view, the notion of critique is not merely to be understood in these terms; his idea of self-making is central to the politics of desubjugation that he proposes. Desubjugation and self-making are not two separate procedures; on the contrary, they take place always at the same time.
The general notion of critique is defined by the various objects, that is, critique is dependent upon these objects. Butler claims that in Foucault’s view, the primary task of critique is not a matter of the evaluation of whether such objects are good or not, but “to bring into relief the very framework of evaluation itself” (Butler, p. 4). This means that the purpose of critique is to examine how the relation of knowledge to power forecloses alternative possibilities of ordering, and to be conscious of how this power/knowledge confines the possibility of thinking otherwise. For Butler, the reason that Foucault illuminates the issue of critique again is to show the limits or “impasse” (p. 5) of these ways of knowing and to rethink the kind of practice that critique can be. Significantly, Foucault transfers the notion of critique from the limits of the epistemological field into the possibility of the ethical field. In this sense, the practice of virtue is counter to order or regulation. As a stylization of morality, radically, virtue is “a critical relation to those norms” (p. 6) in Butler’s interpretation. She argues that it is “a non-prescriptive form of moral inquiry,” namely, a moral experience (or a moral practice) without prescription, without rules and without juridical law. This moral experience is an experiment of self-transformation by virtue of a form of knowledge that is different from dominant knowledge. Our self or subject, in Foucault’s view, is crafted within a certain kind of norm in the exercise of its power. We therefore need a knowledge that guides us to create a different kind of thinking, beyond the limits of these norms. In fact, Butler does not explain the implications of such knowledge. We may consider it by employing Gordon’s account however: such knowledge can be obtained by exacting historical and political investigation, by asking the question of “what we are,” which appeals to a “history of the present”. Or if we consider this in terms of Masschelein and Simons’s interpretation, this knowledge is a “reflexive ethical instrument,” and rather than for understanding, it is made for “cutting”.
Butler explains the term “critical” is to be taken to imply a rejection of the assumption that one must “comply with a given category” (p. 7), and to constitute an interrogatory relation to this category. She highlights that this point does not aim to put practice into a pre-given epistemological context, “but to establish critique as the very practice that exposes the limits of that epistemological horizon itself” (p. 7-8). This practice turns out, then, to the effect of self-transformation. Butler expounds further about how self-transformation links to “critique” and links to Foucault’s notion of virtue. Virtue, for Foucault, is not an uncritical obedience to authority; rather, it is a resistance to authority. We may see this point in his treatment of Enlightenment. In Butler’s thinking, Foucault’s reading of Enlightenment serves not only to establish his continuity with its aims, but also to read “his own dilemmas back into the history of the Enlightenment itself” (p. 8). That is to say, even though Enlightenment itself is an emancipatory concept subjugated to knowledge of that time, it itself is also inevitably one part of this kind of knowledge. Foucault’s rereading of Enlightenment is indeed a critical history, and it is a practice of critique itself. Rather than pinning down only a Kantian interrogation, as in Gordon’s interpretation, Foucault’s thinking of Enlightenment is as a permanent possibility of questioning—to question history and ourselves. In Butler’s view, Foucauldian critique starts from “questioning the demand for absolute obedience and subjecting every governmental obligation imposed on subjects to a rational and reflective evaluation” (p. 9). His interest is in how a subject becomes involved in those reasons and in how one comes to form and reform them. This notion connects with a critical practice of self-transformation. Butler asks a question related to this: how can people transform themselves in the course of producing those reasons? She suggests that this is based on the ethical demand for one to accept or to refuse a rule. This ethical
demand comes from desire. Foucault's question "how not to be governed?" is therefore worked up by desire, which is the central impetus of critique.

Butler's interpretation of Foucault's use of resistance differs from that of Smart. Not only seeing it as an "irreducible opposition", Butler also considers that resistance needs to be replaced by "virtue". Resistance is perhaps the demonstration of virtue, or an imperative act of virtue. In addition, this virtue is by the same token an "art". For Butler, as a practice of freedom, Foucault's "critique" cannot reduce to consent or voluntarism. A critical practice is not only an opposition to the governmental demand, but also an inquiry into how such a demand becomes legible and possible. Critique, however, may sometimes itself be based on governmental demands, as, for example, in the universal rationality of Kant in the thinking of Enlightenment, or, as Masschelein points out, in critical theorists' critique of educational theory. In Butler's view, therefore, it is essential for Foucault to frustrate the aspiration to certainty that orientates these more conventional forms of critique. Butler explains why this virtue is an "art?" If this interrogation of the order of truth is a right, this is because the subject gives himself that right. In Foucault's terms, this is the art of "voluntary insubordination" and of "reflected intractability". As Butler puts it, this art, or critique, cannot be determined in advance; actually, it must happen contingently. But something is at stake here, which is "the relation between the limits of ontology and epistemology", and this involves "the link between the limits of what I might become and the limits of what I might risk knowing" (p. 13). At the limits of what I can know, and at the moment that the desubjugation of the subject occurs, liberty then can takes place. For Butler, Foucault identifies the "rationalization" of the Frankfurt School as the governmentalizing effect on ontology. This form of rationalization unfolds the exercise of bio-power. Power, in Butler's view, dwells in "a domain of suspended
ontology" (p. 14). On the one hand, it sets the limits of what a subject can “be” and constrains the subject through the force of coercion. On the other hand, it goes beyond in that a subject no longer “is,” and offers the possibility of resistance to coercion through the stylization of the self. In this sense, the ontology of the self is unstable, changeable, and is never fixed in one way. This is an “ontological suspension” (p. 17), in Butler’s terms.

For Butler, there are double tasks of critique (p. 14). The first is to show how knowledge and power constitute the system of ordering the world. The second is to find out the breaking points of the emergence of this system. This means not only to identify the field of intelligibility constituted by the nexus of power and knowledge, but also to track the place where the field meets its breaking point, to examine the contingent moments of its discontinuities, and to find out the sites where it fails to constitute the intelligibility. In other words, the task is to explore not only the field that is constituted, but also the limits of those conditions. Or, in Butler’s opinion, another way to describe this is that “rationalization meets its limits in desubjugation” (p. 15). That is to say, desubjugation marks “the fragility and transformability of the epistemics of power” (ibid). Within this circumstance, critique, as “fiction” in Foucault’s term, serves the function of resisting the totalization of the subject. What does Foucault means by “fiction”? Butler sees this as a substitution for what Foucault understands as “a historical-philosophical practice”, or, in terms of genealogy, as the following of lines of connection between power/knowledge and its fragility, between rationalization and desubjugation. This is a practice that posits a critical distance on established authority, and also a practice that risks the subject at the limits of its order. The subject “is both crafted and crafting” (p. 19) under these circumstances. Butler draws upon the term “modes of subjection or subjectivation” from Foucault,
which means that a subject is both formed and self-forming. This self-forming, however, Butler reminds us, cannot take place without the politics of norms, or without subjectivation. That is, “there is no self-forming outside of the norms that orchestrate the possible formation of the subject” (p. 19). To put it more precisely, the self forms himself within forms. The virtue, in Foucault’s account, therefore, means one forms oneself in disobedience and in desubjugation.

Butler’s essay reveals Masschelein’s focus on the desubjugation and degovernmentality of educational practice and theory to be a philosophical practice of Foucault’s concept of “critique”. Butler shows that the second task of critique is to uncover the breaking point and the contingent moments of the discontinuities in the system of power/knowledge. From this, we may deduce that the system of power/knowledge is not self-contained or closed; instead, it has cracks, which show its limits and simultaneously provide the possibility for desubjugation. I consider, therefore, that desubjugation may start from this discontinuity where there is an outlet through which power/knowledge can leak. Desubjugation refers to an experiment of going outside through this crack. Outside its boundary, power/knowledge does not remain the same, just as the subject is no longer the same. It is no longer the original one that functions to constitute the intelligibility of truth, or the order of norm. Rather, power/knowledge becomes the motive force that makes self-transformation beyond normalization possible, or as Gordon puts this, makes transgression or refusing what we are possible. Critique, therefore, is the practice that seeks to find the crack and then to move from inside to outside. However, this crack is not a single, unidirectional exit. The pulling force that originates from power/knowledge may draw the subject back inside, inside the norm. Self-forming is thus a dynamic, an unstable process within which subject shifts between inside and outside, by virtue of
both thrust and traction. This shows the status of “agonism” that Foucault refers to, within which the ontology of self is then suspended, as Butler points out. But, why is agonism an essential condition in power relations? I suggest, first, that if there is no limit to power/knowledge, self-making (or desubjugation, degovernmentality) will be lost in a void. That is, the limit inspires the individual to do otherwise, to find another outlet for their subject. This is why Butler says: “there is no self-forming outside of the norms that orchestrate the possible formation of the subject” (ibid). We cannot have self-transformation, therefore, without looking at the limits of governmentalization. Self in this context is moving inside and between being formed and forming, that is, in the status of agonism. Second, like agonism, the power/knowledge relation is a continuous process. After breaking through the limits of power/knowledge, another new form of normalization will be constituted. Desubjugation is then needed again. Power/knowledge circulates in this way and is never static.

Further questions arise here. If, as Butler claims, desire (this is the desire of not being governed) forms the central impetus of critique, is the origin of this desire is inherent or is aroused, that is, acquired in the social and political context? And further, how can we inspire this desire? At the end of her essay, Butler refers to Foucault’s response to question from a member of the lecture audience about whether to resist governmentalization is “originary freedom”. Foucault’s response is very vague. He does not admit that resistance comes from originary freedom; though he does not exclude the possibility. If, as Butler emphasizes, there is no self-forming outside of the norm, then this desire will be elicited within the norm. The norm, as with discourse or power/knowledge, is established in the social network, in the political operation. I suggest, therefore, that the desire to reject being governed is not a
primary desire, or innate desire. If this is the case then one cannot have this desire (the desire to put oneself at stake, I deem that it is identical with resistance) without the limits of govermentalization, and the domination of power/knowledge.

4.6 Thomas R. Flynn

Flynn is interested in making a comparison between Sartre’s and Foucault’s perspectives on history. He claims that rather than the approach of historiography, Foucauldian history is historical nominalism, which underscores the contingency of events in history. He also suggests that Foucault is a philosophical historian instead of a traditional historian. In this section, I shall concentrate on Foucault’s three approaches to history identified by Flynn, and on Foucauldian notions of “experience” and “freedom” in Flynn’s interpretation.

4.6.1 Foucault’s three approaches to history

Flynn identifies three correlative approaches to history in Foucault’s work: history as archaeology, as genealogies of the present and as problematizations. For Flynn, Foucault’s earlier works are “archaeologies” of madness, clinical medicine, and the human sciences, which serve to examine the “archive” (Flynn, 2006, p. 30). The archive in Flynn’s explanation not only sets discourses, but also sets the conditions for “what counts as knowledge in a particular period” (ibid). In Flynn’s view, the word “archive”, therefore, refers to discursive practices. He suggests that the archive is not relevant to the language of discourse, but to “discourse itself as practice” (ibid). As a method, archaeology reveals both discursive and nondiscursive practices. A practice forms actions by its twofold character: “judicative” and “veridicative” (p.
31). This means that practices, on the one hand, establish norms, exclude and control. On the other hand, they render true/false discourses possible. Power/knowledge, for Flynn, is merely the elaboration of these judicative and veridicative dimensions of practice. Flynn considers that Foucault's early studies of archaeologies, inspired by George Cangiulhem, "tread the borderline of the scientific" (p. 32). He explains that these histories of science show epistemic breaks that display a change of discipline from the old pattern to the new one. For Flynn, "archaeology is both counter-history and social critique" (p. 33). It is counter-history because it assumes a contrapuntal relationship to traditional history. Rather than a negation, its conclusions are opened for more alternative accounts. In addition, archaeology is social critique: that is because it radicalizes facts of the contingency of people's biases. By way of this critique, a space for change is opened up.

With regard to genealogies of the present, Flynn considers that genealogy concerns the descent of practices as a series of events. It stresses the jolts and surprises of history in order to maintain events in their proper dispersion. The problems that genealogy poses begin from the imposition of power upon bodies. Foucault's work on the practice of punishment and of sexuality is distinguished by this character. In Flynn's view "power relations underwrite all Foucault's genealogies" (p. 35). History is thus translated toward a "micro-physics of power". For Flynn, Foucault's genealogy shifts the model of historical understanding from Marxist science and ideology or from hermeneutical interpretation, to power-strategy and tactics (ibid). However, Foucault offers no definition of power, and describes it only as "action on the action of others". Flynn argues that Foucault is a historical nominalist who states that power does not exist concretely and, therefore, there are only individual relations of domination and control. Moreover, rather than in a pejorative sense, power should
be taken as a positive concept. Similar to Gorden’s view of genealogy, Flynn notes that every exercise of power is accompanied by resistance which “opens a space for possibility and freedom in any context” (p. 36). For Flynn, the terms “transformation” and “displacement” are crucial junctures throughout Foucault’s history. As Flynn explains, displacement is not a temporal, but a spatial term. In *Discipline and Punish*, for example, Foucault shows that before the 19th century, the body of the criminal is paid close attention to, as the public forms of punishment shown at the beginning of this book. Later, though, the body is confined in the name of discipline. This change is a “displacement”. Rather than being subject to the vengeance of the sovereign, the individual’s body is rendered a docile tool of economic productivity. This is the reformed technique of punishment. Bentham’s Panopticon is the architectural emblem for this displacement of punishment. Power within it renders the prisoner perpetually visible, to the effect that “inmates became their own guards” (p. 38); namely, it effects governmentality.

Flynn discusses Foucault’s claim that his later work is a “problematization”, in which the “truth game” is its central notion. This relates, for instance, to how a person regards himself as insane or sick. Not simply as discourse or as discursive practice, problematization is described as dimensions of “experience”. For Flynn, the purpose of Foucault’s investigation is to analyze “the cognitive and the normative relations of experience in modern Western society” (p. 38). This experience describes how an individual constitutes and recognizes himself as subject, that is, “subjectivation” in Foucault’s term. To this end, for example, in Foucault’s later work, he asks why sexual conduct became an object of moral solicitude, why this “problematization” occurred and how an individual constitutes a moral self in the discourses of truth games. Problematization means that we need to write a history of a “problem” rather
than of a “period” (p. 43). In sum, for Flynn, there is no whole picture in Foucauldian history, but “a multiplication of events” that Foucault terms a “polyhedron of intelligibility” in his spatial metaphors (p. 39). The task of history is to expose discursive and non-discursive practices in their plurality and contingency so as to complete an intelligibility that involves an otherwise heterogeneous collection of events. Flynn points out that Foucault’s intention in writing histories is the articulation of the series of practices that reflect our current practices. It assigns indeed “the relevant transformations and displacements or charting the practice along an axis of power, knowledge, or “subjectivation” (p. 40).

4.6.2 Freedom

As discussed above, Dreyfus and Rabinow view Foucault’s “history of the present” as a diagnosis of our current situation. In Flynn’s view, this diagnosis concerns the nature of the present by following lines of fragility in the present, which opens up what Foucault calls “a space of concrete freedom” or of possible transformation (Flynn, 2005, pp. 103-104). This possible transformation is based on uses of freedom, which for Foucault had a particular meaning. Flynn cites an interview with Foucault: “I am simply saying: as soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility of resistance. We are never trapped by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy” (p. 104). In other words, resistance unfolds the will of freedom, and it shows that the individual has possible ways to react against power within various strategies. This resistance could be both individual and collective. In this sense, freedom implies a “plurality of options” (p. 162) and thereby reduces the constraints that come from relations of power. Furthermore, Flynn interprets freedom as the capacity for “reflective withdrawal” (p.
161), or this can be seen as a kind of “reflective freedom” (ibid). This is what Foucault calls “the ontological condition of ethics”. Flynn considers this to be “practices of freedom” (p. 162). For Foucault, it is an act for an individual to turn her gaze upon herself. In the political use of freedom, for Flynn, this political use of freedom is another form of “governance” of self and it withdraws oneself from the domination. This opens up the possibility of self-transformation.

4.6.3 Experience

As shown, Flynn emphasizes that experience is an important term in Foucault’s approach of problematization. Rather than discourse or discursive practice, experience is pivotal in Foucault’s later work. But Flynn warns that Foucauldian experience should not be taken in a universal and univocal sense. Instead of constructing a system, Foucault attempts to construct a personal experience, especially with reference to “limit-experience” as discussed in Masschelein’s work above. Flynn remarks, then, that experience assumes a critical and a political hue. Foucault wishes his “experience book” to change readers’ relation to their world, namely, a self-transformation. History in a Foucauldian experience book, for Flynn, is no longer a “factual” history, but an invitation to share an experience of what we are, and enable a self-transformation (p. 228).

In sum, in Flynn’s view, the exploration of the practices of “judicative” and “veridicative” is necessary for understanding power/knowledge. That is, how norms are established and how the binary distinction is produced in discourses are attentive points in historical studies. In addition, “transformation” in time and “displacement” in the deployment of space are important perspectives from which to observe
historical events (or “experience”). According to Flynn’s interpretation, a Foucauldian thinking of history is not as the factual history in a specific period, but as a counter-history, a social critique, and also an experience story. Rather than a universal truth, history shows the potency of the possible modification of our present. I consider experience in Foucault’s later work to have two senses: one is the experience of subjectivation; the other is limit-experience. Both of them relate to the experience of self, or the experience of subject. Foucault’s practice of problematization exposes how things get wrong in the experience of subjectivation, and then through a diagnosis of our current situation, makes limit-experience possible. At this point, an experience book (or we may say a historical book) functions to arouse an individual’s freedom. This is the freedom of practice, of resistance against power/knowledge, of selfconstitution, and of self not being the same. In a historical book, thus, the leading characters, and the verified events are no longer as important as that in traditional historical books. Rather than experience in the past, experience in the present is central to this kind of book, which directs to the future, and engages in inspiring a reflective freedom in order to encourage self-transformation.

4.7 Gilles Deleuze

In his book *Foucault* (2006), Deleuze develops his unique interpretation of Foucault’s thinking and endows Foucault’s notion of power, knowledge and subjectivity with new meanings. In this section, I will describe Deleuze’s critique of several improper postulates related to Foucauldian concept of power. He argues that Foucault’s thinking is not the philosophy of confinement. By virtue of the concept of “outside”, Deleuze counters this wrong presupposition of confinement, and thereby opens up an
unlimited space of Foucault's thought. This "outside" is not only Foucault's outside, but also Deleuze's own outside, where the thinking of resistance and the movement of transformation exist. After this, I shall expound Deleuze's interpretation in terms of Foucault's notion of history and the relations between subject and power. These perspectives derive from Deleuze's interviews in Negotiations (1995).

4.7.1 A critique of several postulates of power

To clarify the meaning of power in Foucault's account, Deleuze addresses several inappropriate postulates of power and attempts to overturn these misunderstandings (Deleuze, 2006, pp.22-27). The first is the postulate of property, which is that power is a "property" won by class. Foucault's concept of power for Deleuze is less a property than a strategy; and thus is exercised rather than possessed. Power is the overall effect of its strategic positions. Smart believes that Foucault's concept of power is a "non-class" analysis. Deleuze adds that this Foucauldian new functionalism and functional analysis does not deny the existence of class and class-struggle, but merely illustrates it in a different way. Concretely, "power is not homogeneous but can be defined only by the particular points through which it passes" (p. 23). Rather than analogy, homology, or univocality—as found in the thinking that power belongs to a specific social class—power is a kind of possible continuity. The matters that exist within power are innumerable and unstable points of confrontation, each of which presents the risks of conflict, of struggles, and of a temporary inversion of power relations.

The second point is the postulate of localization. This states that power is the power of the State and is located in the machinery of state. But, as Deleuze puts it,
Foucault’s idea is not like that. For Deleuze, Foucault’s perspective is that “the State itself appears as the overall effect or result of a series of interacting wheels or structures which are located at a completely different level, and which constitute a ‘microphysics of power’” (ibid). State is the concrete configuration which is constituted by the operation of power. For instance, as an institution, police forces are organized in the form of a state apparatus and its mechanisms. Their operation is specifically implicated in the exercise of power and discipline. Foucault defines modern societies as “disciplinarian” societies in *Discipline and Punish*. Deleuze explains that this discipline is a type of power, a technology that traverses every kind of apparatus or institution and enables power and technology to function in a new way. We cannot identify this power with any one institution or apparatus precisely. Likewise, the birth of the prison does not lie in the juridico-political structure of a society, nor does it link to the evolution of law. In its role in the administration of punishment, prison also possesses autonomy itself and it reveals a disciplinary supplement that goes beyond the machinery of State. Deleuze argues that “Foucault’s functionalism throws up a new topology which no longer locates the origin of power in a privileged place, and can no longer accept a limited localization” (p. 24). “Local,” in Deleuze’s interpretation, has two very different meanings: on the one hand, power is never global so it is local; on the other hand, power is not local or localized because it is diffuse.

The third postulate is of subordination, which suggests that power embodied in the machinery of State would be subordinate both to a mode of production and to an infrastructure. As we have seen, the disciplinary mechanisms cannot be separated from the demographic upsurge in the eighteenth century, or the growth in economic production extracting useful force from the body. But, in Deleuze’s view, power
cannot only be seen in terms of economic determination. For Foucault, relations of power are not outside other types of relationships, and are not in superstructural positions. They have a directly productive role. Deleuze argues that, in this respect, Foucault’s functional microanalysis replaces the Marxist concept with a strict immanence where power and disciplinary techniques form multiple segments, and where human body and soul traverse. Foucauldian power, again, is a social space in Deleuze’s view. It “is characterized by immanence of field without transcendent unification, continuity of line without global centralization, and contiguity of parts without distinct totalization” (ibid). That is to say, power is not the limited space or category which can be fixed, centralized and totalized. Far from being static, the space of power is opened, dispersed and dynamic.

In the fourth postulate power is seen to have an essence or is an attribute. Deleuze argues, however, that power is simply operational in Foucault’s account. Power has no essence. It is not an attribute but a relation. The power relation is the set of possible relations between forces, which passes through both the dominated forces and the dominating forces. Power invests the dominated, passes through them and with the help of them. Once the dominated struggle against power, they still need to commence with action by means of power. Rather than operating in a general sphere, a power-relation establishes itself wherever conflict or confrontation is to be found. It could be such as boundary disputes, quarrels between parents and children, domestic tiffs, and public squabbles. All of these, for Deleuze, are relations between forces.

The fifth is the postulate of modality. By reprimanding, by tricking or persuading, by acting as police or as propaganda, power is exercised through the use of violence or ideology. But, Deleuze points out, even when power concerns the soul, it does not
come about through ideology; even when power weighs on the body, it does not necessarily separate through violence and repression. Violence does not express the power relation—the relations between force and force, an action upon an action. The relation between forces is a function of the type such as to incite, to provoke, to combine, to allocate, to classify, to compose, to normalize and so on. As Deleuze puts it: "power produces reality before it represses" (p. 25). Equally, "it produces truth before it ideologizes, abstracts or masks" (ibid). Foucault does not ignore repression and ideology. But, as Nietzsche had seen, Deleuze says, far from constituting the struggle between forces, they are "only the dust thrown up by such a contest" (p. 26).

Legality is the sixth postulate, in which State power expresses itself in law. At this point, revolutionaries can only demand a different legality, which comes from winning power, and then installing a new machinery of State. Deleuze argues, however, that Foucault's insight makes use of the subtle correlation made between illegalisms and laws to replace the crude opposition of law and illegality. Law, in any case, is not contrasted worldwide with illegality. For Deleuze, power is not the property of the dominant class, but the strategy of that class in action. This point of Foucauldian power therefore breaks with Marxist assumptions, and breaks with complicity about the State. Local tactics and overall strategies in the battles in society are advanced not by totalizing but by relaying, connecting, converging and prolonging.

4.7.2 Foucault is not a thinker of confinement

Deleuze argues that it is wrong to regard Foucault as a thinker of confinement. Hospital and prison in Foucault's work also cannot be interpreted as this way. On the
contrary, they are open space or "highways" (p. 37) where speed or acceleration run unlimitedly. As a hard segmentarity and a free area, prison is the place where a whole network interweaves. It has flexible and mobile functions. Deleuze draws on Maurice Blanchot's interpretation of Foucault. In Blanchot's view, "confinement refers to an outside, and what is confined is precisely the outside" (ibid). For Deleuze, whether discursive or non-discursive, they neither enclose nor interiorize anything. Instead, "they are forms of exteriority through which either statements or visible things are dispersed" (ibid). Here, Deleuze points out there are three (or more) correlative agencies (ibid). First of all, there is the "outside" which exists as an unformed element of forces. Forces come from outside, and conversely, outside stirs up relations between forces and draws out their diagrams16. Second, there is the "exterior"17—the area of concrete assemblages where relations between forces are realized. Lastly, there are "the forms of exteriority"18 (ibid) which is the split or disjunction between two different forms that are exterior to each another and yet share the same assemblage. Confinement in Deleuze's account is only a transitory figure on the surface of the forms of exteriority. In any case, Deleuze stresses that "nothing in Foucault is really closed off" (p. 37). The evolution of forces and the diagram expand the history of forms. The force exists within a relation network from one point to another. The diagram from the outside includes the points that are relatively free or unbound. Creativity, resistance, struggle and change start from these

16 Deleuze defines the meaning of diagram as follows: "it is the presentation of the relations between forces unique to a particular formation; it is the distribution of the power to affect and the power to be affected; it is the mixing of non-formalized pure functions unformed pure matter" (Deleuze, 2006, p. 61).

17 Deleuze considers that there is a need to differentiate the meaning between outside and exteriority. In his account, the exteriority is a form, such as two forms in knowledge—light (visibility) and language (statement) are exterior to one another. The outside, however, is not a form; it concerns force. Forces refer to an irreducible outside, and are interactive with each other at outside. The outside "is made up of distances that cannot be broken down through which one force acts upon another or is acted upon by another" (Deleuze, 2006, p. 72)

18 "Prison" is one of the examples of "the forms of exteriority". It shares the same assemblage between two forms: the visibility of crime and the expression of penal law. These two forms are exterior to each other. This assemblage evolves "disciplinary" and the statements of "delinquency".
points. We may understand the whole picture, the succession of diagrams through these dynamic points that go beyond the discontinuities. To sum up, in Deleuze’s view, Foucault is a cartographer. His writing is to struggle and resist, to become and to draw a map.

Here, I would like to expound more about what Deleuze means by “outside” and about its relation with Foucauldian power. Outside, in Deleuze’s sense, does not mean a real place that is occupied by forces. On the contrary, it is a provisional and unstable “non-place” (p. 71). Non-place is not a fixed place that is visible. In this “non-place”, forces are not a formed substance, but are in a perpetual state of evolution. The diagram mentioned earlier is a “non-place” rather than a physical place. It is a place only of mutation. In this way, things are changing continuously; they are no longer perceived or articulated in the same way. The distance towards outside is too far to be measurable; however, the influence that comes from outside is so far-reaching (in this respect, it is also too near to be calculable). For Deleuze, the thinking of Foucault’s works addresses itself to an outside that has no form, “which is swallowed up by the interstice between seeing and speaking” (p. 72). This thinking of outside is in a mixed-up state of agitation, modification and mutation. The force of self-constitution and self-transformation also comes from outside. Transformation effects outside and then come back to subject. As Deleuze puts it: “the outside is always an opening on to a future: nothing ends, since nothing has begun, but everything is transformed” (p. 74). In Deleuze’s account, “a social field offers more resistance than strategies, and the thought of the outside is a thought of resistance” (ibid). The force operated outside is the force of resistance. That is, resistance effects change. Resistance, for Deleuze, is more like an affirmative power of life (this is “virtue” for Foucault). Once power takes life as its aim or object like this, resistance
to power has to put itself on the side of life, and turns life against power. Drawing on Nietzsche’s idea, Deleuze points out that Foucauldian resistance “is the force of a life that is larger, more active, more affirmative and richer in possibilities” (p. 77).

Deleuze elucidates the idea of outside in one of his interviews. He claims that “in Foucault we find the outside, the folding of the line Outside, and human reality as the being of the Outside” (Deleuze, 1995c, p. 112). In Deleuze’s interpretation, knowledge and power for Foucault are not something extrinsic, they are always already in place. They produce the forces to break through the confinement of the subject and to reach the line Outside. Crossing over the line Outside, the dominant power/knowledge vanish, and the positive power of life appears. For Deleuze, Foucault brings out the relation between power/knowledge and outside in terms of the problem of living. Once crossing through the line Outside, ways of living become different. Power and knowledge are not limited any more. Deleuze raises further questions regarding this: “How far can we unfold the line without falling into a breathless void, into death, and how can we fold it, but without losing touch with it, to produce an inside copresent with the outside, corresponding to the outside?” (p. 113) That is, when we reach the line Outside, how we can make sure that outside is a real outside, rather than another duplicated inside. The question is, whether we can have a pure outside without subjugation, without dominant governance. For Deleuze, rather than a substantial utopia, the outside is constituted (or is folded) by an ongoing practice. Or we may say, as mentioned earlier, outside is a “highway” where acceleration runs without hindrance. In Foucault’s account, I consider that outside is the place where that attitude of “critique” is aroused unceasingly. Only this continuous interrogation of the self, of what we are can foster human as the being of the outside.
4.7.3 Foucauldian thinking of history

In the Deleuzian view, although history is a method that Foucault uses, Foucault is not a historian at all. He invents a completely different relation to history. Traditional history, according to Foucault, is the matter that circumscribes us and sets limits. Deleuze explains the Foucauldian notion of history further: “it doesn’t determine what we are, but what we’re in the process of differing from; it doesn’t fix our identity, but disperses it into our essential otherness” (Deleuze, 1995b, p. 95). That is to say, what we are and our identity is never to be fixed and is changeable in different contexts. This also presumes that subjectivity has various possible components. Foucault deals with historical series from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and from the Greeks and Christians in his last books. For Deleuze, this is not to find the way for ourselves to be Greeks or Christians, but to become something else. History is “what separates us from ourselves and what we have to go through and beyond in order to think what we are” (ibid). Namely, history could be the impetus to shape what we are, which helps us to go beyond our original self. For Deleuze, “Foucault’s key historical principle is that any historical formation says all it can say and sees all it can see” (p. 96). In his discussion of madness, for example, he talks about it in what light of what can be seen, and in what utterances can be talked of. And then this allows us to ask ourselves today: what are we able to say today, and what are we able to see (ibid)? In Deleuze’s view, we have to find visibilities in history by ourselves, and to break things open and to break words open in order to find what is uttered in them. This act that is articulated in history, as in Flynn’s interpretation, is to reflect on our current practices.
4.7.4 Subject and power

Apart from power and knowledge, for Deleuze, the subject is the third dimension of Foucault’s thought. Foucault’s concepts of power and knowledge indeed relate to the “subject”. Why does Foucault need this third dimension? Deleuze explains that it is because the play of forces has become a line that Foucault attempts to cross and to go beyond. The subject is another way to unlock the impasse of the notion of power. It also invokes foci of resistance. The subject, Deleuze explains, does not mean a person or a form of identity in Foucault’s account. Instead, it refers to “subjectification” as process and “Self” as a relation (a relation to oneself) (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 92) Thus, what Foucault talks about is a relation of force to itself (and to other forces), and a “fold” of force. The establishment of different ways of existing depends on how one folds the line of forces. It refers to the question of “doubling” the play of forces of a self-relation (Deleuze, 1995b, p. 98), namely, a reflexive force playing on the self. Power and knowledge, on the one hand, determine form, and constrain rules; but, on the other hand, they make existence a work of art to life. By way of this work of art, power can be resisted and knowledge can be evaded and then a new possibility of life is invented. This is what Nietzsche explored as the will to power. On the constitution of subject, Deleuze’s thinking differs from the other secondary literature on Foucault that I have considered. He argues that “subjectification has little to do with any subject” (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 93) Instead, subjectification is an electric or magnetic field, which is the site of “an individuation taking place through intensities” (ibid). In other words, intensity is the effect which issues from the process of subjectification in order to transform an individual. Deleuze considers that intensity is synonymous with what Foucault calls “passion” (ibid)—a passion to our individual life. Together with power and knowledge, they constitute a way of living, and a way of modern
philosophies. Deleuze claims then that “there is no subject, but a production of subjectivity” (Deleuze, 1995c, p. 113). This means that subjectivity is not something that is “ready-made”. On the contrary, it is always in the making (or becoming) and it has to be produced while working with knowledge and power. This process of production forces us to frame new questions that have not been framed before. In Deleuze’s point, subjectification is the process of folding the line outside. In this respect, it is “an artistic activity distinct from, and lying outside, knowledge and power” (p. 114).

When Deleuze shows that power is not localizable, and it is located in a heterogeneous and open social space, I consider, that this refers to his idea that power exists within a “non-place” and refers to “outside”. It seems then that outside, as a space for mutation and continual evolution, is a territory that extends infinitely and has no boundary. It is not in opposition to inside, but goes beyond the dichotomy between inside and outside. Though Blanchot says: “what is confined is precisely the outside,” this does not mean outside is the place deemed to be confined, but that there is an irreducible relation between power and outside. Butler claims that the second task of critique is to uncover the breaking points and the contingent moments of the discontinuities in the system of power/knowledge. I suggest that the space beyond these breaking points and contingent moments is the Deleuzian “outside”. An outside is the place in which power/knowledge is changed from domination to activation and constitutes a confrontation to an assumed inert life. My question here is: since the relations of power come from and are stirred up at outside, are the forces of power generated by the will of subject or does it take place by the interplay between subject and the relations with other contingent events (such as by seeing and by speaking)? Perhaps, the latter would be possible if there is, as Deleuze mentioned previously, a
"doubling" play of forces. This "doubling" indicates a reflexive process that goes back and forth between subject and historical events. This doubling play of forces is exercised not only by the subject, but also by the convergence between subject and power/knowledge. I consider that Flynn's point of "reflective withdrawal" or "reflective freedom" is the display of doubling play. It is also "the ontological condition of ethics" in Foucault's thinking.

As in the interpretations of Gordon, Masschelein or Butler, power/knowledge is double-sided. On the one hand, it causes the confinement of subject; but, on the other hand, it is also the solution for the former situation. It seems to me, Foucault tries the act of keeping distance—"de-subjectification" (it is also the "ironic" gesture in the interpretation of Dreyfus and Rabinow)—to solve the problem that power/knowledge causes, or to resist the effect of power. Deleuze, however, shows his own way to consider this question. While he says: "there is no subject, but a production of subjectivity" (Deleuze, 1995c, p. 113), it refers to two aspects. First, this "production" has two possibilities: on the one hand, the subject could be produced docilely; on the other hand, there is a "self-production" inspired by resistance. I think Deleuze does concentrate on the latter. Second, subjects cannot be fixed and located; namely the production of subjectivity is an ongoing process. Our being is therefore a "becoming". Deleuze in fact chooses the movement of a continual mutation or incessant evolution to constitute a "grown-up" subject (or I should say a "growing-up" subject; the formation of subject is progressive tense in this sense). This movement is both "de-subjectification" and "re-subjectification" that breaks through the confinement of power/knowledge, and is a "fold" of force to serve the purpose of resistance. It takes place at outside, and thereby maps "intensity" by forces (or even by power). Within outside, the constraint caused by power/knowledge
dissolves by means of ceaseless movement. And resistance, in this respect, is an act to reject the idea of remaining the same self.

4.8 The change of my thinking of power/knowledge

In the process of reading from Foucault’s two main works on power/knowledge, as well as interviews, essays and secondary literature, my thinking about power/knowledge has been changed. This change has two main aspects: first, my focus has moved from power/knowledge itself to the issue of the subject. Through the interpretations of the secondary literature, I realize that the concept of power/knowledge cannot be separated from human subjects. That is, the three notions, power, knowledge and subject should be seen as interactive; as Deleuze suggests, power, knowledge and human subject are three dimensions of Foucault’s thought. Second, my concentration has been moved from the negative effects of power/knowledge (the tactics that govern human subjects by such as normalization or examination) to the positive functions of it (such as critique or resistance in Foucault’s term). As suggested, the effect of power/knowledge has its double sides. On the one hand, it causes the domination of modern rationality by disciplinary power or pastoral power, which is manifested in *Discipline and Punish*. On the other hand, an act of critique, of de-subjectivation, of de-governmentization or of limit-experience can also be aroused by a new form of power/knowledge, which is underscored especially in Foucault’s later work. After reading the secondary literature, I consider that it is better to shed further light on the latter than the former. Then, an attitude of resistance can be adopted in order to face the problem that arose from power/knowledge. I shall address these ideas below.
Indeed, power/knowledge is an important theme in Foucault’s thought and penetrates all of his work. His primary concern, however, is not the essence of power/knowledge or the method of analyzing power/knowledge. Power/knowledge is merely an perspective to see how a subject fits into a certain games of truth. As Foucault claims: power and knowledge “are only an analytical grid” (Foucault, 2007, p. 60) Or in Masschelein’s interpretation, knowledge is a “reflexive ethical instrument” (Masschelein and Simons, 2007, p. 8), which is an experimental knowledge for the self. Instead of power/knowledge, the subject and the self are the focuses in Foucault’s thought to which power/knowledge is the route. We could say, therefore, that a relation with power/knowledge is also a relation with self, with a subject (or we can think of it more broadly: with collective subjects). Foucault’s purpose with reference to power/knowledge is to explore how human beings are made subjects in history and in Western culture. Though the main concept in my thesis is power/knowledge, it would be wrong for me to inquire only into the meaning of this notion. The subject that power is exercised over and its interaction with power/knowledge are also significant for in this topic.

Furthermore, even though disciplinary power or bio-power controls our behaviour and the way of thinking, Foucault does not assert that people are compelled unavoidably to be obedient subjects. Rather, the issue which permeates his thought is the possibility of how human beings can be transformative subjects. Power, in his view, is not only a coercive structure, but also “matrices of transformations” (Foucault, 1990, p. 99), through which one’s subject could have various formations (not merely a singular pattern) and various possibilities. In this sense, rather than being decided by norms or universal reason, one should take responsibility to decide what she is by herself. This responsibility is the threshold of the act of critique and
self-transformation. If power, as Foucault claims, is productive, I would say, the effect that it produces is not only political and economic utility, but also a new subject—a subject who need not submit to the process of normalization, governmentalization and subjectivation; and a subject who dares to engage in the process of self-making. Deleuze shows that the process of the latter means an individual subject is a “becoming”. The constitution of the subject is unceasing and never has its ending. This is also what Foucault calls “a possible crossing-over” (Foucault, 1997, p. 315)—crossing over dominant thinking, and crossing over an unchangeable subject. Here, Foucault has never mentioned what kind of subject one should be. That is because his task is only to remind his readers of making power/knowledge problematic. As to the issue of how to constitute as an individual subject, he hands this task over to his readers. That is to say, everyone has to take care of himself/herself; no one can take up this imperative mission except oneself.

In Foucault’s account, resistance is an essential concept in considering power/knowledge. The existence of resistance implies the possibility that an individual can achieve freedom in the process of self-formation; and it also shows that it is possible to refuse what we are and to accomplish the aim of “how not to be governed” (Foucault, 2007, p.44). This freedom is Flynn’s so called “reflective freedom” and also “reflective withdrawal”, which is not an inherent freedom to be endowed with, but only can be obtained only by practice. This practice is “critique”, “limit-experience” and “de-subjectivation” in Foucault’s terms. Rather than liberating subjects from repressive power, this practice is to liberate the subject by way of the positive effect of power and knowledge. This is the form of power/knowledge that we need, in order to transgress the limits which we impose on ourselves.
Chapter 5 Critiques of curriculum theories

This chapter turns again to the curriculum theorists examined in Chapter 2 and reconsiders their mobilization of the Foucauldian idea of power/knowledge. In Chapters 3 and 4 I have sought to examine Foucault’s elaboration of this idea and the secondary literature that this has generated, with a view to becoming clearer about the meaning of the term and its range of applicability. It is with this more robust understanding of power/knowledge that I now reconsider those curriculum theorists. Following this I shall then consider the curriculum theorists, examining one by one the ways in which their readings of power/knowledge come closer to Foucault’s intent. In certain respects I believe that the readings of power/knowledge offered by these theorists are tainted by neo-marxism or critical theory. This is apparent not only in Cherryholmes’ work, but also in that of Giroux and Ball, reflecting the more dominant way of thinking about critical educational research. For me, the work of Popkewitz’s use of Foucault contributes to a more profound thinking about curriculum. I will therefore only point to how this is so, rather than offer a critique of his idea. After general evaluation of these four curriculum theorists, I draw on
Deleuze’s metaphors of the tree and the rhizome to develop another critique of their theories. I shall argue that their reception of Foucault contributes to a tree-like perspective of looking at the concept of power/knowledge, which, in my view, narrows the scope for considering this theme in education. Instead of an arborescent mode of thought, it is better to see power/knowledge in a rhizomatic way. I seek to develop this approach to the interpretation of power/knowledge and to offer my own perspective on Foucault’s concept.

5.1 An evaluation of the adoption of power/knowledge in curriculum theories

5.1.1 Cherryholmes

In this section, I will concentrate on two aspects of Cherryholmes’ reception of the idea of power/knowledge. First, I will show how Cherryholmes’ standpoint diverges from Foucault’s in his analysis of discourse practice in the curriculum, in which power is dominated by the elements of authority, ideology and instrumental reason. Second, I shall argue that Cherryholmes’ analysis fails to responds to Foucault’s idea of a history of the present. Both of these are due to the implication of power/knowledge being seen in a dominant way by Cherryholmes.

*Power/knowledge as a feature of dominant social structure*

Cherryholmes has offered several examples in his analysis in order to claim that education can be seen as a discursive practice. His idea of power/knowledge, however,
can be put into the category of “juridico-discursive”\textsuperscript{19} that Foucault opposes. In his critique of “construct validity”, though, on the one hand, Cherryholmes underscores Foucault’s assertion that power is productive; on the other hand, he addresses the point that researchers produce knowledge via the process of legitimization. In his view, research serves the function of political domination and social reproduction. Power produces both the speech of construct validity and its silence. He thereby draws the conclusion that speakers have limited control in this power/knowledge nexus. The “truth”, he presupposes, is that educational research is constituted by certain ideologies, interests and powers embedded in and transmitted by language. Rather than productive power, in fact, truth is formed by a dominant power for that narrows of the meaning of discourse in this respect. Take the adoption of textbooks for example: he considers that power achieves the effect of efficiency, control, instrumentalism and utilitarianism in these texts, and ideological bias is unavoidable in them. Knowledge, for Cherryholmes, is an instrument to legitimize or contest existing power relations (Cherryholmes, 1983, p. 343). He presumes a dominant structure in our society that expands into educational arenas. Educational researches, teacher education, the aim of education and the adoption of textbooks are all affected under and by this structure. According to this he supposes that Foucault’s notion of power is generated from a “macro-level” social structure, when actually this is not the case.\textsuperscript{20} I consider that Cherryholmes interprets Foucault’s idea according to his own political goals in line with critical theory. He therefore assumes that instrumental rationality is the vehicle of domination in the adoption and production of textbooks. He also assumes that educational research methods accompany the development of

\textsuperscript{19} I have addressed this Foucauldian notion in Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{20} On the contrary, Foucault claims that his concept of power is a “micro-physics of power” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 139).
science or positivism, which makes possible a technological mastery over our thinking about educating.

In Smart's view, rather than critical theory, Foucault's critique of modern rationality and his rejection of global and systematizing forms of theory derive from Nietzsche's idea of genealogy (Smart, 1983, p. 135). Smart argues that the critique in the work of the critical theorists is a "critique of ideology" generated from the Enlightenment, which signifies "a process of reflection on humanly produced illusions, distortions, and systems of constraint" (ibid). However, Foucault's genealogical analysis for Smart shows a different approach of critique. Foucault attempts to open up a different route to diagnose the constitution of "regimes of truth" in Western society, and to disrupt those forms of power/knowledge that serve a dominant rationality. His analysis is actually beyond good and evil, in Nietzsche's phrase, and beyond oppression and exploitation. Smart explains this idea further:

The objective of Foucault's analysis is not the construction or preservation of a particular "truth" within theory, or a formulation of the process by which theory might be realized in practice, or an elevation of theory as the final refuge of resistance. Rather, the object has been an analysis of the interrelationship between the formation of domains and objects and their articulation within discourse itself subject to rules and procedures of verification and falsification, and the effects of this complex relationship "in the real". (p. 136)

For Smart, Foucault's concern is how truth is seen as the truth in discourses, how power governs ourselves and our relationships with others by means of the production of truth, and how productive technologies of power make up a particular rationality. This intention is clearly seen in Foucault's essay "The subject and power". He would like to uncover how human beings are made subjects through the
effects of power/knowledge and through specific reasons which power/knowledge generates. Cherryholmes’ analysis of power and knowledge is different from this, as education is regarded as a discursive practice that imposes the dominant ideology or specific interests of ruling groups.

Foucault sees discourse itself as practice. This is the point that Cherryholmes adopts from Foucault’s earlier work. Cherryholmes’ idea of discourse, however, is far from developed along Foucauldian lines. According to Flynn’s interpretation, in Foucault’s approach of archaeology, power/knowledge is the elaboration of “judicative” and “veridicative” dimensions of practice (Flynn, 2006, p. 31). This means power/knowledge reveals the way that norms are established and are applied, and the way that true/false distinction is judged and that its discourse is made possible. The historic examination of this approach cannot be simplified by using ideology to answer all questions. Rather than opening on to alternative accounts of discourses, Cherryholmes’ work merely imposes negation on every educational practice. His analysis fails to explore how people’s biases have been constituted in history contingently, and then to show the epistemic limits in our educational practices in order to open up alternative ways of seeing things. Actually, his perspective of looking at power/knowledge is itself caught into an epistemic limit.

*The history of the present*

As Gordon argues, Foucault’s philosophical challenge to history is not to survey the reality of the past, but to interrogate the rationality of the “present” (Gordon, 1980, p. 242). For Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault’s “the history of the present” starts from a “diagnosis” of the current situation through an examination of a meticulous ritual of
power or a political technology of the body. This diagnosis is an ironic attitude to our current situation (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 119). Nevertheless, I cannot get any hint of this point from Cherryholmes' analysis. In Cherryholmes' critique of Popkewitz's example, he claims that teacher education is controlled by the "knowledge" of scientific measurements. The method of scientific measurements follows certain scientific or political rationality associated with governmental technologies. It is an alliance with the recognized scientific views concerning the individual. I consider that following Foucault, the target that the diagnosis of "the history of the present" struggles against is not the dominant economic structure, but the dominant rationality—the governance of pedagogy, the governance of politics, and the governance of economics behind that structure. This dominant rationality, again, cannot be reduced merely to the composition of ideology, as Cherryholmes suggests. Mark Olssen (2003) argues: "A political rationality is not simply an ideology but a worked-out discourse containing theories and ideas that emerge in response to concrete problems within a determinate historical period"21 (p. 196). The concrete problem here is not the dominance of ideology (though it could be part of dominant rationality), but the governance of a certain inertia or rationality which not only functions to solve social problems in terms of technologies of power, but also dominates thinking and behaviour of individuals in modern society and in our current schooling. This governance is not always bad, but is dangerous in Foucault's view.

Another misleading aspect of Cherryholmes' analysis of educational history in the light of power/knowledge is the way he considers power: he claims that it is a repressive force to confine the production of knowledge, as in the example of

21 This idea echoes with Flynn's interpretation of Foucault's idea of history in his later work, in which history is seen as the practice of "problematization" (Flynn, 2006, p. 38).
textbook adoption. As I have elaborated above, power relations in Foucault’s account are a set of actions acts upon other actions, which can bring about many possible actions. The characteristic of power is more multiple, and cannot be narrowly seen as merely serving domination or oppression. In Flynn’s analysis, power is also more optimistic than pessimistic. He claims that the diagnosis in “the history of the present” concerns the nature of the present by following lines of fragility in the present, which opens up what Foucault calls “a space of concrete freedom” or of possible transformation (Flynn, 2005, pp. 103-104). Our present in this sense has never been confined or fixed. It is, instead, waiting for a turning point to challenge what it is and what it was. Writing history, therefore, is not a task to inform readers to fit themselves into presumptive roles in this history. On the contrary, history should be a fable to inspire its readers to think about the possibility of changing themselves in a positive way. Rather than setting limits, history should open up a field of possibility.

Cherryholmes raises a good example to consider the historical development of social studies education. He attempts to explore how the utterances of three traditions of social studies curriculum are produced by power relations. His analysis, however, concentrates merely on ideological commitments, and on the consequence of inclusion and exclusion. Foucault’s concept can, I suggest, be used to think about this issue in another way. The emergence of these three approaches has to be seen in their historical and political context. In the tradition of “citizenship transmission”, the United States had a need to gain national cohesion in that era (in the 1940s, after World War Two). The social studies curriculum thus became a route to confer

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22 These three traditions were addressed by Robert. D. Barr, James L. Barth, and S. Samuel Shermis (1977) in their essay entitled “Defining the social studies”.
national value and identity onto all prospective citizens. The purpose behind this curriculum was to constitute a common consensus so as to enhance national development in politics and the economy. The regime of truth in education, or we may say, the truth of education was that it is the way of providing students with the "proper" notion of citizenship.

Concerning the second tradition, "the social science disciplines", social studies were taught in terms of the methods of social sciences. This tradition was linked to the trend of the New Social Studies in the 1960s in America. This curriculum focused on cultivating each student as a social scientist. Its historical background was related to the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, which brought to light a lot of educational problems and thus informed mood of educational reform in America. The military and scientific competition between United States and Soviet Russia led to the result that the production of the knowledge of science and social science were suddenly given far more priority in education. Accordingly, scientific and systematic methods were introduced in each subject in which social studies was included. The United States yearned to catch up with Soviet Russia in the national level competition by means of training students as scientists or social scientists through the school curriculum. The aim of learning the knowledge and the method of social science hence became the "truth" in social studies education.

The third tradition began in the 1970s, when skill development and values clarification were at the heart of the aim of curricula. During the 1970s, the American government endeavoured to promote the value of equality and to narrow the gap between different ethnic groups and between different cultures. Students' ability for self-decision and self-development had become more important to serve this purpose.
Social studies education became a way of responding to this concern to make students into active social participants. Social skills like communication skills and critical thinking had become central to educational training in the classroom. According to this genealogical analysis, we may see that social studies education was regarded as an avenue to deal with social and political problems. It is also the nexus through which power/knowledge is manipulated so as to respond to these problems. "Bio-power", in Foucault's terms, was evidenced in the development of these three approaches. The three traditions display three kinds of historical formation in each era. Knowledge in social studies is the combination of visible and articulable elements that are embedded in each historical formulation. I wonder to what extent these three traditions refer to our present; and whether we have a new way of seeing and a new way of saying after them. In other words, apart from law-abiding citizens, social scientists and social problem solvers, what else can students be?

Flynn asserts that Foucault seeks to write a history of a "problem" rather than of a "period" (2006, p. 43). "Problematization" is therefore an important task in writing a Foucauldian history. At the heart of "problematization" is an investigation of "truth games", which are encompassed by power/knowledge. This is an attempt to explore dimensions of experience in discursive practices—an experience about how an individual constitutes and recognizes himself as both object and subject in modern Western society. In Flynn's view, Foucault shifts his genealogical critique for historical understanding from Marxist science and ideology or from hermeneutical text and interpretation, to power-strategy and tactics (p. 35). Then, the question becomes "How to make the history of the development of social studies problematic in this respect?" Its philosophical practice is not like Cherryholmes' criticism of the domination of ideology, but a diagnosis towards modern rationality in education.
With regard to a social studies curriculum, there is, first, a need to survey how “truth games” were played in each tradition. After that, the task is not that we have to envisage another, fourth tradition and then engage ourselves in the consideration of a better approach—an approach without repression and hegemony. The key point of “the history of the present” in Foucault’s later work is a task of distancing ourselves from a certain dominant rationality. Rather than those three established educational purposes and three arranged subjectivities for children, I suggest the following questions: Can we have alternative ideas of the aim of study? Can students have freedom to decide what they would like to be in the future? Can social studies go beyond immobile purposes, which stood behind those three traditions? Foucault’s genealogical inquiry, in my view, does not seek the answer of what the social studies curriculum should be. Instead, it is an interrogation towards the possibility of thinking what social studies should not be. This thinking refers to the question that Cherryholmes himself raises: “How can people gain control of their discourses and practices instead of being controlled by them?” (1988, p. 36). It associates with Foucault’s endeavour of seeking to reject what we are. This is also a practice of resistance for gaining more freedom in education.

5.1.2 Giroux

In this part, I shall critique Giroux’s misemployment of power/knowledge by focussing on two points. First, Giroux’s idea of power is as a kind of dual-dimensional and unidirectional power. On the contrary, however, Foucault’s notion of power is dynamic, dispersive and polymorphous, and cannot be “fixed” in Giroux’s way. Second, Giroux has a different way of seeing the “value-of-reason” from Foucault. He offers a singular thinking of universal truth in his emancipatory
practice of education. Foucault, however, is a pluralist with regard to reason and truth.

*Dual-dimensional, unidirectional power vs. Dynamic, polymorphous power*

Giroux provides a critique of the unidimensional power (that is, power is exercised only for repression) of Marxism, in which knowledge is analyzed for its distortions. He extends the idea of power to be dual-dimensional whose purpose is both reproduction and transformation. In Giroux's view, on one hand, curriculum is dominated by cultural reproduction or neo-conservative ideology, which is the negative dimension of power. On the other hand, power needs to be used in service of the ideals of justice and democracy, towards a more positive function, the positive dimension of power to which Giroux pays special attention. Power, in this perspective, is distinguished by its two poles. One is for repression; the other is for emancipation. Its direction of movement is from the repressive side to the emancipatory. This unidirectional procedure might be called empowerment. Here, I try to generalize Giroux's viewpoint on power as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>negative dimension</th>
<th>positive dimension</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>domination</td>
<td>resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>repression</td>
<td>emancipation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reproduction</td>
<td>transformation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Though Giroux does not take the view that power is merely employed for repression in education, his assumptions are still that teachers and students lack power and that they are oppressed by power. Otherwise, why do they need to be empowered? There is a causal relation behind his supposition. Because power is oppressing, we need liberation as a solution. He thus argues that, rather than a dominant instrument,
curriculum needs to be seen as a form of cultural politics that gives students an active voice in order to change their subordinated situation, which lacks cultural capital. This is the positive perspective of power that he derives from Foucault’s concept. However, the purpose of Foucault’s study of power is different from this. Foucault never intended to liberate prisoners or emancipate sexuality through *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality*. I have shown this very clearly in Chapter 3. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) point out:

...it is important to realize that he (Foucault) does not see sexual identity or sexual liberation as inherently free from or necessarily opposed to domination within our society. He has frequently been misunderstood on this point... (p. 169)

It is inappropriate to fix Foucauldian power/knowledge in a particular function or to portray it with a specific purpose. The notion of power can better be seen in terms of a relationship rather than as a matter of substance. For Foucault, power is inherent within social networks rather than being constituted somehow above society as a supplementary structure. In Giroux’s concept, this supplementary structure is a binary structure. There is a distinction between repression and emancipation, and they are irreconcilable. Foucault’s view of power, as Gordon claims, “is not an omnipotent causal principle or shaping spirit but a perspective concept” (Gordon, 1980, p. 245). Power is everywhere; it is always already there. One can never be outside power, but this does not mean one is trapped or condemned to defeat. In contrast to Giroux’s account of dual-dimensional and unidirectional power, my argument is that power for Foucault is dynamic and polymorphous.

First of all, Foucault asserts that “power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and that it only exists in action” (Foucault, 1980c, p. 198).
89). In this way, power is neither a property nor a means of maintaining and reproducing economic relations; it is above all a relation of force. Power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations. There is no absolute and stable power. This means that we cannot say who owns power or who lacks power. Power is operated in a complicated and dynamic network in which many dispersive points are spread. These dispersive points could converge together on an immense force for a new transformation. For Giroux, curriculum should be designed for empowering the subject who lacks power. Power is something that can be given to the oppressed. A disadvantaged minority can be given more freedom and more autonomy. But Foucault regards power as machinery that no one owns. For instance, in the mechanism of the Panopticon, no matter who stands inside the central tower, power still can be exercised and maintained with the same effect. The key point is not the ownership of power, but the effective tactic that is used in this building and its effect on subjects. Second, rather than monotonous power, what Foucault is interested in are “the polymorphous techniques of power.” (Foucault, 1990, p. 11) Power is exercised through various strategies and tactics. It is revealed in not only refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also incitement, intensification and resistance. For example, instead of prohibition, pleasure plays an important role in the production of truth in confession in Foucault’s view. Giroux’s idea of power oversimplifies the way that power is exercised and the effect that power causes in the real situation. It is inadequate for capturing the productive aspect of power. Because Giroux takes a different standpoint on power from Foucault, the way he looks at the concepts of reason and of truth are also foreign to the Foucaudian approach. I shall discuss this next.

Foucault is a pluralist
In the Marxist tradition, and also in the work of critical theorists, there is a claim of a paramount rationality—a liberating reason. Giroux’s curriculum theory basically follows this step in his praxis of education. As Nigel Blake and Jan Masschelein (2003) identify, Giroux takes up the notions of the early Frankfurt School in his work, such as the analyses of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. Giroux’s notion of “the language of possibility” more or less reflects the idea of liberating reason, in which the purpose of education is to emancipate marginalized groups. This possibility in his terms, however, is only one possibility in the view of Blake and Masschelein. Rather than opening the way of possibility, in fact, it closes off the plural possibilities of education. In other words, apart from liberation, there is nothing else for curriculum to aim at. The truth in education that he presumes is also a universal claim. Giroux’s claim indeed maintains a set of modernist values and commitments, though his work is generally put into a postmodern category. Obviously, his assertion is monistic in attitude. But Foucault is a pluralist\(^\text{23}\) through and through.

In one of Foucault’s lectures, he explains the main task of his genealogical project like this:

> What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects. (Foucault, 1980c, p. 83)

\(^{23}\) Foucault claims himself as a pluralist in an interview entitled “Politics and the study of discourse” (Foucault, 1991c). This role highlights that his idea is foreign to a sovereign, unique and constraining form.
This project is associated with his idea of “an insurrection of subjugated knowledges” (p. 81). Foucault would like to struggle against any theory that makes claims for itself as universal truth. For instance, the historical contents have been buried and disguised in global theories such as scientific discourse or Marxist discourse. For Foucault, these systematic discourses are dangerous because they present a dominant power that closes different possibilities and then becomes a ruling rationality. I consider that Giroux’s curriculum theory belongs to one of these “totalitarian” theories from which Foucault attempts to keep his distance. As Smart puts it:

...in Foucault’s work there is no absolute “value-of-reason”. The thrust of Foucault’s work is not to subvert one notion of rationality, as capitalistic, instrumental, and technical, with another, “higher” form which is socialist, intrinsically emancipatory, and enlightening, but to analyse rationalities, in particular how relations of power are rationalized. (Smart, 1983, p. 137)

Foucault intends to diagnose the danger of rationalization in our current situation, but this does not mean that he attempts to provide a universal prescription or solution for our present. His pluralism is not the way to uphold a banner of truth in order to subvert other truths, as Giroux or Cherryholmes does. Rather, its plurality shows alternative ways of thinking, of living by examining the constitution of human beings’ subjectivity, and by exposing the governance of specific rationalities to our subjects. This presents another route of emancipation, to which Giroux’s theory is alien. Rather than striving for social equality and empowerment, Foucault endeavours to break away from the limits that are imposed on the development of subjectivity. This is not a resistance to the emancipation of subjugated others, as in Giroux’s claim, but to inspire a self-emancipation, self-realization and self-transformation24. Hence,

24 See Gordon, Masschelein and Butler’s interpretation of Foucault that I addressed in chapter 4.
with reference to the role of intellectuals, we can also see a different perspective between Foucault and Giroux. Giroux ideally regards teachers as transformative intellectuals who carry a responsibility for social transformation. Foucault, however, disagrees with the idea that intellectuals are agents for serving in a particular theory or truth. In an interview with Deleuze, he sees the role of intellectuals like this:

The intellectual's role is no longer to place himself "somewhat ahead and to the side" in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of "knowledge," "truth," "consciousness," and "discourse". (Foucault, 1977, pp. 207-208)

Instead of claiming a liberating truth or an emancipatory discourse, in Foucault's view, an intellectual should struggle against the instrumental purpose of all totalizing truths. Theory in this sense does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice; it is practice itself (p. 208). This practice is not to "awaken consciousness" in Marxist terms, but to struggle to uncover and undermine dominant power in knowledge.

5.1.3 Ball

Ball's work takes up more of Foucault's earlier thought than of his later work, in his analysis of educational policy. In addition, he situates the ideas of neo-Marxism as in line with Foucault. This more or less follows on the heels of the emergence of the British "new sociology" in 1970s. At first, I shall argue that the analysis regarding power/knowledge should be liberated from the perspective of sovereignty. Second, instead of regarding discourse as a hindrance as in Ball's account, I consider that the character of discourse in Foucault's account is dispersive and transformative.
The head of the king has still not been cut off

Drawing on Foucault’s concept, Ball manifests the multiple features of power/knowledge and its effect on subjects in his work. The conclusions he draws, however, are always incorporated into the category of control, oppression and domination. It is the analytics of power within juridical law, in which power is either spoken of in terms of the promise of liberation or anchored in the understanding that we are trapped in its prohibition. This kind of perspective is very similar to that of Cherryholmes and Giroux. For instance, for Ball, educational policy is associated with the “authoritative allocation of values” that reveals power and control. Therefore, “we need to ask whose values are validated in policy, and whose are not?” (Ball, 1990c, p. 3). Ideological shifts and economic structure are elements that have great influence on the discourse of educational policy. Foucault, however, distances himself from the notion of power in Marxist accounts and seeks to construct an analysis of power without the vision of juridical law or sovereignty. As in the emphasis of Olssen, Foucault’s criticisms of the Marxist concept of power relate to its determined presupposition of “totalism” (Olssen, 2006, p. 67), in which power is exercised according to a singular rule through the whole social body. In Olssen’s view, Marxist historical materialism is based on a structuralist project that explains the whole by exploring the interrelations between its component parts. Foucault’s historical materialism, however, is opposed to this Marxist approach. History for him is determined in terms of the event. This event is not predictable and fixed, but “was characterized by incompleteness, indeterminacy, complexity, and chance” (p. 68).

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25 This title derives from Foucault’s description. See Foucault (1990, p. 89).
I see that Ball tries to expose the regimes of truth in the discourse of dividing practices, of management and school effectiveness and of educational policy. He gives many examples of disciplinary power in his analysis of management and effectiveness. He also shows how they limit the possible ways of thinking and speaking, and how educationists are subjected to them, as seen in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, he himself is limited by the structuralist thinking and speaking of sovereign power and the sovereignty of this concept. The critique he offers does not show the spirit of anti-discipline, but rather represents exactly an academic discipline as we can usually see it in the analysis of the sociology of education. In one lecture, Foucault says:

If one wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to struggle against disciplines and disciplinary power, it is not towards the ancient right of sovereignty that one should turn, but towards the possibility of a new form of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from the principle of sovereignty. It is at this point that we once more come up against the notion of repression”. (Foucault, 1980c, p. 108)

That is to say, the principle of sovereignty itself is also the discipline against which we need to struggle if we intend to break the confinement of the notion of domination and repression in education. Ball’s analysis of curriculum reform and educational policy, however, is limited to the dominant effect of power/knowledge of which he himself is unaware. This analysis ignores the complexity of those educational events and sees the domination in educational policies in a narrow way. Ball does raise a good point in line with Foucault’s thinking. He points out: “education works not only to render its students as subjects of power, it also constitutes them, or some of them, as powerful subjects” (p. 5). Following this, however, his analysis uncovers only the fact that educational discourses are full of control, cause loss of autonomy and lack of
personal development. Ball emphasizes that: "We do not speak the discourse. The discourse speaks us" (1990c, p. 18). The idea that "the discourse speaks us", however, does not mean that people are controlled by discourses in education, as Ball’s interpretation in the examples of educational policies suggests. How can we consider the concept of discourse and refer it to a "powerful subject"? I shall elaborate this in the next part.

Discourse is dispersive and transformative

Unlike Ball’s analysis of educational discourses, I consider that discourse in Foucault’s view cannot be regarded as being only repressive, or being totalizing in a singular way. In his critique of the Victorian repression of sexuality, Foucault denies the hypothesis that the discourse of sexuality is prohibited after the seventeenth century. Rather, these discourses are proliferating and increasing. They show their multiplicity in different aspects, by different ways in the Western society, such as its embodiment in the internal discourse of the institution and in the implantation of perversion. For Foucault, a discursive field does not display a single trajectory, or a totalizing frontier. It is a space for opening, a space of dispersion and of transformation. Foucault says: “Each discourse undergoes constant change as new utterances are added to it” (1991c, p. 54). New languages continuously plunge us into their inception. There is the existence of a set of rules of formation for all its scattered objects, for all its unconnected operations, for all its incompatible concepts and for all its theoretical options that are mutually exclusive. In Foucault’s view, it is “an individualized discursive formation” (ibid) to define such a set of rules. Each discursive formation is neither decided in advance, nor does it appear after examination. Its formation depends on relations among other types of discourse and
in the non-discursive context in which it functions, such as institutions, social relations and economic and political conjuncture. As the episteme of a period, for Foucault, it "is not a general developmental stage of reason, it is a complex relationship of successive displacements" (p. 55). Because of its successive displacements, a juridical principle or a constraining form does not correspond to Foucault's understanding of discourse. Domination or empowerment cannot be a particular structure of history. The history of a discourse, however, reveals the transformation in its specificity—a constituted change, a "becoming" (p. 56). There are discontinuities between each displacement. Following this discontinuity, a mutation appears and shows another stage of discourse and transformation. Each one is different from the next, and from the last. On the basis of this, relations of power/knowledge are therefore seen as "matrices of transformations"; which show rules of continual variations in Foucault's account. The task that he undertakes is to detect "the changes which affect its objects, operations, concepts, theoretical options" (ibid) within a given discursive formation. Foucault wonders how these changes decide the boundaries defining the field of possible objects, the new mode of functioning of language with reference to objects, and the new form of localization and circulation of discourse within society. For Foucault, discourse deploys a free and unrestricted domain in which speech and writing may vary the functioning of a system by an opposite and different position. So the status of resistance or "agonism" consequently arises. The analysis of history is thus "a descriptive analysis of the different transformations effectuated" (p. 58).

Regarding discourse, Foucault's notion does not show that there are inert discourses on the one hand, and an "all-powerful subject" (ibid) which manipulates them,

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26 See Foucault (1990, p. 99). This idea I have shown in chapter 3.
overturns them and renews them on the other hand, as Ball suggests. Rather, he would like to reveal the conditions that discoursing subjects create in their discursive field. They have their possibilities of displacements and their possibilities of functional mutation with discourse. So although, as Ball points out, we do not speak discourse, the discourse speaks us; this does not mean that subjects are dominated by discourse. Nor does it mean that discourse is a place into which subjectivity irrupts. Rather, discourse is a field in which there exist “differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions” (ibid). Subjectivity in discourse, as Butler claims, “is both crafted and crafting”\textsuperscript{27}. Subjectivity is both object and subject in the discursive field. While Foucault claims that discourse is a place of transformation and mutation; it also supposes the possibility that this transformation can both impose on and also be originated by subjects themselves. Subjects might be elements to upset the system or to cause another discontinuity, and its effect can come back to motivate a possible self-formation of subjects or to have a potential influence on others. That is the reason why Foucault assumes that subjects are free in the exercise of power\textsuperscript{28}. If they are not free, the system of discourse cannot be dynamic. The emergence of self-creation is also impossible in this situation. While the linguistic system is changing, at the same time, the identity of the subjects is also changing. In the interpretation of Foucault’s concept of critique, Butler shows two main tasks of critique: one is the examination of the constitution of the system of order; the other is the exploration of the contingent moment of its discontinuities. I consider that these two tasks are ways that enable “powerful subjects”, in Ball’s term. Powerful subjects do not gain power from the movement of social empowerment, as Marxists suggest. Instead, they inject the force of power into their life by searching each discontinuity in the order and

\textsuperscript{27} This idea I have addressed in chapter 4. See Butler (2002).

\textsuperscript{28} See Foucault (1983, pp. 221-222) in chapter 3. Freedom is an important element in the exercise of power.
functioning of discourse (or we may say it is an action of breaking the current order) in order to have another transformation at a different stage.

Foucault’s idea of political practice is similar to the two tasks that Butler addresses. On the one hand, he undertakes to expose and to establish the limits in the history of thought; on the other hand, he seeks to reveal another turning point for transformation—another new role of the speaking subjects in discourse. Establishing limits is a practice of disclosing the limited practical domains, the limited rules of formation, and the limited conditions of existence in discourse so as to release their blockage derived from and imposed on subjectivity. In addition, it is also a practice “to challenge the idea of a sovereign subject” (p. 61) which constitutes dominant meanings and then transcribes them in discourse.

With reference to the example of discourse in educational policy that Ball is concerned with, I consider that new educational policy transforms the previous mode of educational discourse, and shows a new system of the administrative and political discipline of teachers and students. Drawing on Foucault’s notion, a political practice of education is to question its mode of existence and its functioning as a science in the name of curriculum reform and educational improvement. This discourse is not isolated, but part of a system of correlations with other practices. Conceiving of another universal operation to substitute it cannot be the solution for the problems of this discourse. Instead, a new transformation will occur only when the rules of a system can be changed. It is a change of thinking by virtue of the continual modification of subjects. In doing so, a discursive field is not a place full of oppressed

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29 This idea can be seen in Foucault’s concept such as “limit-attitude” or “limit-experience”. To establish the limits is not to set up confinement, but has an opposite sense.
utterance. It itself should be regarded as a critical practice, an open domain in which subjects strive for their own rules of formation on the basis of their freedom. Subjectivity is thus not only the status of being static or passively moved; but is also a process of becoming—a self-creation.

5.1.4 Popkewitz

In my reading of Popkewitz’s work, his adoption of power/knowledge shows a different approach from the thinking of Cherryholmes, Giroux and Ball. I do not intend to provide a critique of his account here because I consider that his employment of power/knowledge shows a useful model for curriculum theories. I shall give several examples in support of this and then extend his thinking of curriculum in terms of my understanding of Foucault’s concept at the end of this chapter.

Popkewitz claims two perspectives for analyzing power: one is “power as sovereignty”; the other is “power as deployment”\(^{30}\). I consider that the analysis of Cherryholmes, Giroux and Ball are closer to the former; and the thought of Foucault and Popkewitz belong to the latter, in which power is productive, fluid and multidimensional. Subjects in this sense are no longer put into stable categories. Popkewitz calls it “the decentering of the subject”—a decentering towards a multiplicity of subjects. This idea is very similar to Masschelein and Simons’ assertion, “e-ducation” (Masschelein and Simons, 2007) which I have discussed in chapter 4. It associates with Foucault’s claim that “knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting” (Foucault, cited in Masschelein and Simons, \(^{30}\) See Chapter 2.

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2007). In other words, we need a knowledge of self to cut how we live the present in order to prevent ourselves from living in the same way (or we may say “a rejection of what we are” in Foucault’s terms). Finally, as Popkewitz suggests, our thinking of power should turn from the limitation of the constitution of subjects to the positive production of multiple forms of subjectivity. Popkewitz’s idea of social epistemology, in my view, is not an “epistemology” that explores what is truth and what is knowledge in our society, but exposes “regimes of truth” in curriculum or education. It is relevant to how truths are formed and how they govern our thinking of what we are. This idea is not only an epistemology; it is also a critical ontology of the present, and of educational subjects.

Popkewitz provides an in-depth critique of traditional curriculum theories in terms of Foucauldian thought. He sees curriculum as an issue of governing, as seen in his reinterpretation of Spencer’s question: “What knowledge is of most worth?”. Normally, curriculum theorists would follow this question by asking: “What knowledge is of most worth in our present?” But in terms of Foucault’s idea, as Popkewitz suggests, this kind of question uncovers problem-solving rationalities of science. It shows that our normative thinking of educational purpose is governed by the rationality of maintaining subsistence by virtue of curriculum implementation. This rationality is connected with Foucault’s notion of “bio-power”31 in which power is exercised for investing in life and in national existence. The maintenance of national existence becomes the first value-premise and universal truth in education. However, it is dangerous because it displays the only way on which education can proceed.

31 I have discussed this notion in chapter 3.
Popkewitz's critique of a hidden curriculum tradition is actually a critique of a neo-Marxist perspective on curriculum prevalent in curriculum theories. His critique breaks the cycle of prohibition, the logic of censorship and the uniformity of the apparatus in Foucault's terms. I consider that if curriculum is not "hidden" with the effect of furtively destroying equality by way of reproduction and oppression, that is, if curriculum is not only part of explanatory frameworks of social regulation, as Popkewitz criticizes, how can we conceive of what curriculum theory is through the notion of power/knowledge? To answer this question, I shall draw on Deleuze's thinking in his tree and rhizome metaphors. This is for the purpose, not only of providing another way of criticizing the use of Foucault found in Cherryholmes, Giroux or Ball, but also of considering power/knowledge in a rhizomatic way and then developing another approach to curriculum theory following Popkewitz.

5.2 The tree and the rhizome

In the "Introduction" of A thousand plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (2004) suggest that there are three kinds of writing: root-book, radicle-system (fascicular root) and the rhizome. In the root-book, a tree is the image of the world. This book imitates and reflects our real world. Hence, one (the world) then becomes two (the real world and its representation). One is the subject, the other is the object. This world is the subject, and the root-book is the object that represents the world. There is a "binary logic" (p. 5) that exists in the spiritual reality of the root-tree. Chomsky and his grammatical trees is one of these examples, for Deleuze and Guattari, which assumes a principal unity and fails to reach an understanding of multiplicity. This principal unity presents the pivotal taproot of the tree. A taproot can support the second, third or fourth roots, but these roots attach themselves to the same centre, to the same order. The second
figure of the book that Deleuze and Guattari use is a “radicle-system” or “fascicular root” (p. 6). Its root type is not one but multiple. Comparing with the first figure, it is more like a comprehensive secret unity or an extensive totality. The direction of its expansion is linear, or it may display a circular or cyclic dimension. In the view of Deleuze and Guattari, this fascicular system does not break with the dualism between a subject and an object, a natural reality and a spiritual reality (pp. 6-7). Though it becomes more multiple, this kind of book still retains the same image of the world, but only changes it from “root-cosmos” to “radicle-chaosmos” (p. 7). The third system of the book is the rhizome. The rhizome is a subterranean stem. Deleuze and Guattari give several examples; for instance, bulbs and tubers are rhizomes among plants; rats and burrows represent rhizomes among animals. For them, rhizomatic roots differ from tree roots and radicles. They characterise the rhizome as follows.

The first and the second principles of the rhizome are: connection and heterogeneity. The rhizome is organic but not fixed in an order or pattern. It is an open system in which the node of the rhizome connects to anything other. Regarding heterogeneity, take language for example. The rhizome metaphor symbolizes a heterogeneous reality of language. There are no linguistic universals in it, only a throng of dialects, patois, slang, and specialized languages (p. 8). As a rhizome, language has never closed itself up; it produces a power within political multiplicity without domination. For Deleuze and Guattari, the rhizome can be a form of power, an abstract machine associated with various fields such as art, sciences, political struggles... and so on. The second feature of the rhizome is its multiplicity. Deleuze and Guattari explain that a multiplicity does not mean tree-like pseudo-multiplicities. Instead, it is rhizomatic; it is unlimitedly changing in nature. Rather than points or positions, as those found in a structure, there are only lines in the rhizome serving towards proliferation.
Multiplicities, in the view of Deleuze and Guattari, always connect with other multiplicities, and with accelerations and transformations. Multiplicities are always relative to outside by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization. Because of deterritorialization, multiplicities accompany reterritorialization and gain more territory for their exercise. Therefore, a book of the rhizome is a "war machine-book" (p. 10), which is asignifying and asubjective, and fights against the "State apparatus-book"—determinatizes the hegemonic idea of State apparatus. The fourth principle of the rhizome is that of asignifying rupture. The rhizome can be broken at a given node, and it will start up again by following an old line or creating a new line. Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity so it can be organized, stratified, and territorialized. The rhizome also contains lines of deterritorialization down which it can run away. There is no constant dichotomy or dualism in the rhizome, because everything is always changing. Deleuze and Guattari argue that in the rhizome, dichotomy is "only the products of an active and temporary selection, which must be renewed" (p. 10). A rhizomatic book is not an image of the world like a tree-book; rather, it has an aParallel evolution with the world. I consider that human subjects are the media to advance this aParallel evolution between a book and this world. According to Deleuze and Guattari, there is a procedure of becoming or relay between a book and a world in the rhizome—the book deterritorializes the world; the world reterritorializes the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world (p. 12). In this process, a book is a becoming-book, and a world is a

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32 Deleuze and Guattari offer an example about the interaction of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The wasp transports the pollen of the orchid. The orchid deterritorializes by the movements of the wasp. And the wasp reterritorializes the orchid as a reproductive apparatus to improve its proliferation. These two heterogeneous elements therefore form a rhizome by both deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

33 AParallel evolution means two matters of evolution are not models or copies of each other, but form a rhizome together with and through other procedures or other media. Take the baboon and the cat for example, they do not have a direct relationship with each other, but they form a rhizome together through the infection with viruses. See Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p. 11).
becoming-world. They do not revert to any former procedure. The fifth and sixth principles of the rhizome are: cartography and decalcomania. The rhizome does not correspond to a reproducible principle of tracing. Deleuze and Guattari explain the idea of tracing. In their view, tree logic is the logic of tracing and reproduction. The way of tracing is laid out along a genetic axis within a structure. Its aim is the description of de facto states; is also the exposition of hidden memory and language which are ignored. To use the metaphor of the rhizome, however, is to make a map. The map is an experimentation in contact with the real. It constructs the unconscious and removes the blockages. Deleuze and Guattari explain that “the map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification” (p. 13). It can be dismantled, recombined and reversed by an individual, group, or social formation. A map has multiple entryways, but tracing always comes back to the same, to the same root. Behind the presupposition of tracing, a standard model is created. Tracing stabilizes, structuralizes the rhizome and assumes that the rhizome reproduces something else. Tracing, however, reproduces itself only. The continuous repeat of tracing finally falls into an impasse, a blockage within the same taproot. But the rhizome is moved and produced by desire without hindrances. For Deleuze and Guattari, the tree and the rhizome are not two opposed models. It is possible for root division or tree branch to burgeon into the rhizome, which occurs not by a universal consequence in theoretical analyses, but “by a pragmatics composing multiplicities or aggregates of intensities” (p. 16). In this way, the tree or the root can extricate themselves from tracing, from a dominant power, and then in turn form the rhizome.

A tree operates as a transcendent model and tracing; a rhizome operates as an immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map (p. 22). For Deleuze
and Guattari, the mode of the rhizome is a construction of collapsing, “a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again” (ibid). Their critique of dualism does not serve the aim of creating another dualism by the rhizome. Instead, they would like to challenge all transcendent models in order to undo the domination of dualism. The feature of the rhizome is that it connects any point to any other point. It therefore brings into play different “regimes of signs” (p. 23), or even goes into a non-sign state. The specific meaning of sign is no longer important in the rhizome. The rhizome is composed of dimensions—dimensions in motion. This motion has neither beginning nor end, has neither starting nor finishing, but “always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills” (ibid). This “middle” is the starting point of being mobile, dynamic and dispersive. Through the “middle”, dimensions are always being changed, and in this way it undergoes metamorphoses.

A rhizome-book, for Deleuze and Guattari, is written in the name of an outside. Normally, a tree-book or a fascicular-book presents three kinds of field: a field of reality (the world), a field of representation (the book), and a field of subjectivity (the author). However, there is no image, no signification, and no subjectivity at the outside. Deleuze and Guattari employ the term “flow” to express the movement of the rhizome outside. For them, it is not at all important whether the flows are “One or multiple”; rather, they are the points that we pass. There is an assemblage of desire, of enunciation, through which “one inside the other and both plugged into an immense outside that is a multiplicity in any case” (p. 26). This outside is not another transcendent “model” that refers to the God, but an open field without boundary, an assemblage without limitation where speed or acceleration run.

5.2.1 Tree-like or rhizomatic notion of power/knowledge?

34 This “outside” is the same with the outside of Deleuze that I have elaborated in Chapter 4.
I draw on the idea of the tree and the rhizome from Deleuze and Guattari here because I consider that there are also tree modes and rhizomatic modes in the employment of power/knowledge. In my view, the use of Foucault in the work of Cherryholmes, Giroux and Ball are typical examples of the former, and that of Popkewitz closer to the latter. I shall argue that, rather than a root-tree model, a rhizomatic notion of power/knowledge is necessary in the thinking of curriculum theory.

Cherryholmes, Giroux and Ball all seem to have a pre-established supposition of the concept of power/knowledge. This means that the concept is used to reveal a hegemonic mechanism to control subjugated groups and to reproduce the inequality of the status quo. There is a dualism in their presupposition. For them, the reality is that this world (also education or curriculum) is controlled by sovereign domination. Their theories of power/knowledge are, therefore, the representation or reflection of this reality. I consider that these curriculum theorists have been greatly influenced by neo-Marxist or critical theory tree-like modes of thinking. They graft an attached branch of these trees on to the field of curriculum in order to show the unique truth that power is oppressive, and further, that power should also be used for the purpose of dismantling this oppression. In this respect, we can also think that the idea of that “curriculum is oppressive” belongs to one of the fascicular roots that extend from the same taproot—the root of sovereign power. In other words, the idea of sovereign power is reproduced in various academic subjects, one of which is curriculum theory. I also think that the way that those curriculum theorists construct their notion of power and knowledge is one kind of “tracing” in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari. Cherryholmes makes a tracing of hegemonic power and dominant knowledge in
educational research, in the adoption of textbooks, and also in the social studies curriculum. Giroux makes a tracing of the critical theory root in American curriculum implementation and schooling. Ball traces a neo-Marxist root in educational policies in the UK. These tracings delineate a common and constant outline of the thinking of power/knowledge. The educational objects that are the focus of their tracing might be different, but the consequences remain the same. They attempt to expose the underside (or shadow) of education by appealing to persistent tracing. These tracings in fact change nothing in curricula. They finally come back to the same root, and narrow the idea of power/knowledge into the same perspective. Since nothing has been changed, their undertaking of reproducing the identical notion of power/knowledge is only a futile effort, like the repetitive work that Sisyphus does in Greek mythology.

To break the unyielding, dominant idea of power, the sovereign power, Foucault claims that we should “cut off the head of the king” (1990, p. 89). Likewise, concerning these arbitrary interpretations of power/knowledge, I suppose, we may cut off the trunk of the tree (the Marxist tree or critical theory tree) through our research practices. It is possible to consider power/knowledge in another way—a more rhizomatic way without tracing, without the reproduction of a central order in order to break through the impasse of thinking in this notion. In the adoption of Foucault by Cherryholmes, Giroux and Ball, power/knowledge is a concept as root or as the ramification of root. Each outlet of power/knowledge has been blocked by a ready-made tracing. Far from this monotone perspective, however, the character of Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge is more proliferating than limited, more rhizomatic than tree-like or radicle type. It is misleading to change rhizomatic power/knowledge into the mode of roots or radicles. The idea of power/knowledge is
not a totality; it also cannot be understood as totalization. Foucault does not intend to show us a pre-established form of knowledge and a dominant concept of power. If, as Deleuze claims, Foucault is not a thinker of confinement\(^{35}\), his idea should not be considered in a confined way.

For Deleuze, there is a process of mutation in the rhizome. I suppose that it is similar to the process of the constitution of subjects in Foucault’s view. In the effect of power/knowledge, subjects are not destined to be confined. Though there is a process of both objectivation and subjectivation, we can still seek for the possibility of “de-subjectivation” and then towards a motion of “resubjectivation”. This means that we can either follow the original movement or turn to form a new shoot in the rhizome. Self and subject are always renewing by virtue of this process, which is not only a way of collapsing but also a way of constructing—a construction through collapse, a resubjectivation through desubjectivation. Thus, at Deleuze’s outside, the question of “Who am I?” is no longer important because there is no concept of transcendent self in the rhizome, but a process of the production of subjectivity\(^{36}\). Power/knowledge makes a transformative self possible in the flow. Subjects are changing and growing without a universal definition. This is the reason why Deleuze argues that Foucault’s idea of power cannot be localized. For Foucault, power is exercised in a complicated and dynamic network in which many dispersive points are spread. Rather than being localized, these dispersive points could converge together on an immense force for a new transformation, in which there is a new bifurcation of rhizome growths. Concerning the idea of history, Foucault shows its feature of discontinuity instead of continuity. Popkewitz interprets this as: “historical change is

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\(^{35}\) See Deleuze (2006), p. 36.

viewed as one of the breaks in the structuring of knowledge rather than as an evolutionary process of universal progress” (2001, p. 164). I consider that we may regard this “discontinuity” or “break” as the node of the rhizome, through which a new force of life germinates, and a new formation of history starts. Rather than tree-roots, power/knowledge develops and grows in a rhizomatic “pattern”, to constitute a new history and a new subject. Power/knowledge can not be embedded into a closure. Rather, it is exercised within an “open system” that is full of multiplicity and new potentialities of life.

5.3 What is curriculum theory?

Since it is inappropriate to regard power/knowledge as a tree-like mode, I ask: “How can we conceive of curriculum theory in terms of rhizomatic power/knowledge?” Following the tradition of critical theory and Marxism (or Neo-Marxism), many contemporary curriculum theories invest the project of unmasking social control and dominant ideology in curricula, and attempt to solve these problems. In this way, certain questions are raised such as Apple’s “Whose knowledge is of most worth?” and Ball’s “Whose values are validated in policy, and whose are not?” (Ball, 1990c, p. 3). Owing to the intervention of dominant groups, curriculum is seen as a political instrument for oppression and destruction, which is seen as being hidden. The idea of a hidden curriculum in Popkewitz’s critique is one of these examples. Though Popkewitz claims that against hidden curriculum traditions, we need to consider curriculum as the channel of cultural practice and of cultural production; he does not

37 In my view, the “breaking points” or “contingent moments” that Butler (2002) refers to can also be seen as nodes of a rhizome.
38 In an interview, Deleuze claims that what he and Guattari call a rhizome is precisely one example of an “open system” (Deleuze, 1995d, p. 32).
39 The question is put in the preface of Apple’s book Ideology and Curriculum (1990), which I have referred to in chapter 1.
develop this idea very much. To supplement this idea, therefore, I shall first explore the reason why curriculum is not hidden and is not for serving certain *a priori* social structures. This argument mainly draws on Deleuze's interpretation of Foucault in his book *Foucault* with reference to the notion of statement and visibility. Second I shall suggest that curriculum theory should be considered as practice (both cultural and political) in terms of power/knowledge.

In Deleuze's interpretation, statements in Foucault's view are never hidden (2006, p. 46). He argues:

> One might think sometimes that statements are often hidden, because they are disguised, withheld or even repressed. But beyond the fact that this implies a false conception of Power, it holds only if we stick to words, phrases and propositions. (ibid)

The opinion that statements are not hidden is seen in Foucault's disagreement with the hypothesis that there is a repression of sexuality in the Victorian age. For Deleuze, this hypothesis refers to a false conception of power and knowledge. Its falsehood derives from the obstinacy of people sticking to specific usage of language, as in the proposition shown above that the discourse of sexuality was repressed. Inertia in language is massive in this situation. Deleuze considers that the insistence on these texts and propositions derives from the problem that our sense remains on the level of an empirical exercise, so that it is difficult to articulate something beyond that in invisible areas of our motivation and thought. However, following Foucault, Deleuze highlights that the historical formation at that age teems with statements of sexuality in various occasions and by different interlocutors. Sexual discourses in fact proliferate. They are not consigned to a shadow existence, but rather refer to an
infinite field. In Deleuze’s view, Foucault’s historical principle is that “everything is always said in every age” (p. 47). Discourse displays itself nakedly without concealment. Nothing is hidden behind the curtain. Nothing is either behind or beneath these statements. But rather than being fixed, they vary depending on the systems or conditions in different historical strata. Not only statements, for Deleuze, but also visibilities are never hidden though they are not immediately seen. Statements and visibilities are always there to be said and to be seen if we can reach their conditions. The problem is, how to reach these conditions in order to say what we can say, to see what we can see?

I consider that statements—words, texts, phrases, propositions, and visibilities—material substances, physical surroundings to which people adhere the presupposition of what they are, are so-called “truth”. We try to expose more texts and more physical environments to come into view, into our perception, so that we can know what exists in this world, which is comprehensively thought of as being true. However, no matter how we exhaust our energy and our time to do this, statements and visibilities in this sense are unavoidably limited. Our perspective is always narrow, blinkered. There is always something hidden on which light cannot be shed. The matter that we regard as truth is biased and limited. For Deleuze, Foucault uses a different way to consider his idea of statements and visibilities. In Foucault’s view, “visibilities are neither the acts of a seeing subject nor the data of a visual meaning” (p. 50). For instance, if we see prison as merely a physical building, its function would be merely reduced to a symbol of confinement. The discourse or the function of a prison is far, however, more than that, or even goes beyond that. Deleuze argues that Foucault’s visibilities are not defined by physical sight, and statements are not defined by texts and propositions. Instead, they are “complexes of
actions and passions, actions and reaction, multisensorial complexes, which emerge into the light of day" (ibid). In Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault, the way of seeing and of saying is not really to see and to say empirically. On the contrary, they are by virtue of being blind and of being mute. To be blind is not that we give up our perception to see, or close our eyes to this world, but that we should not persist in something we have seen, and then regard that as the whole of this world. Likewise, to be mute is not that we reject speaking, but that it is arrogant to suppose that speaking can cover infinite language because utterance in words is always limited to, and by, words. For Deleuze, as well as for Foucault, we are not able to see the “real” truth with our eyes and speak the “real” truth with our mouths. Rather than sight and articulation, only actions or passions can reach the condition of visibilities and statements and open them up. Actions or passions are both blind and mute, but they can make the visibility visible, and make the statement articulable. In this respect, everything is neither hidden nor secret. Its splendour is achieved by a different concept of statements and visibilities. It is a function of transgression to betray those secrets. It makes statements blossom and proliferate, and also makes visibilities highlight everything. Nevertheless, what does Deleuze mean by actions or passions in this sense? How can we initiate this function of transgression to make us able to see, and to make us able to say?

For Deleuze, the way of knowing how to articulate and of knowing how to see is Foucault’s so-called “knowledge”. Power is the impetus to inspire us to leap into a different dimension of forms of statements and visibilities, namely, a different dimension of knowledge. Instead of exploring the truth, knowledge is rather

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40 Deleuze in fact uses this phrase only explains what are visibilities. I consider that statements can be regarded as this same way.
employed to unmask “games of truth” or “regimes of truth” so as to transgress the
sovereign truth that we take for granted, and to transgress the dominant way of seeing
and speaking. This does not mean that Foucault endeavours to struggle against every
truth; or that he asserts that there is no truth in the world, as in the account of
relativism. But he would like to expose the danger of obeying certain sovereign
truths, which is another truth he intends to highlight. Not only having an influence on
our perspective, this sovereign truth and dominant way of knowing also constitutes a
dominated subject. A transformative being must draw support from the force of
power/knowledge that derives from passion—a passion to create different meanings
of life. This passion is synonymous with intensity in Deleuze’s terms and with desire
in Butler’s terms\(^4\). As the positive effect of power/knowledge, this passion motivates
us “to break things open and to break words open” (Deleuze, 1995a, p. 83). It creates
a “social space\(^2\)” to allow us to think otherwise, to be ourselves otherwise. It is also
an action to question ourselves what we are able to see and what we are able to say in
order to see something further beyond our sight and to say something further beyond
our usual ways of using words. In this sense, curriculum is not hidden any more. On
the contrary, by way of the practice of power/knowledge that derives from the
passion (or desire) of subjects, curriculum should be regarded as being more positive
and productive. I suppose that the cultural practice and cultural production in
Popkewitz’s account can be thought of in such a way. Yet, this practice or production
is not only cultural, but also political and ethical. It is a political and ethical practice
to rebel against the sovereign “truth” that imposes on curriculum theories, and also on
our thinking of them.

\(^{41}\) See Chapter 4 regarding Butler. Deleuze and Guattari also mention “desire” in their discussion of
the rhizome.

\(^{42}\) Deleuze says: “The thing called power is characterized by immanence of field without transcendent
unification, continuity of line without global centralization, and contiguity of parts without distinct
totalization: it is a social space” (2006, p. 24).
To end this chapter, I shall elaborate an important issue: “What is curriculum theory based on power/knowledge?” If curriculum theory is not for the sake of exposing something hidden, what is it for? For Deleuze, a theory is like “a box of tools” (Deleuze in Foucault, 1977, p. 208) that has nothing to do with the signifier, but being useful and functional. A box of tools does not function as bricks to construct a fort of theory. It is like a pair of glasses, in Deleuze’s metaphor, directed to the outside in order to see the broader view outside. A theory, therefore, is “an instrument for multiplication, and it also multiplies itself” (ibid). In other words, a theory functions to revolt against the oppression of a single and global form so as to make possible multiple perspectives of our visibility and statement. A theory also reaches its multiplicity, reaches its richness in this way. I consider that Foucault’s views concerning theory chime with this idea. As mentioned earlier, instead of serving to apply practice, Foucault regards theory itself as a practice. We may think that of it as the practice of making use of “a box of tools” in Deleuze’s terms, and a practice to “liberate our gaze”, as Masschelein suggests. In the same way, we may also see curriculum theory as a practice. In this practice, power/knowledge is productive, can be rhizomatic in connection with a continuous process of production for self-emancipation, self-improvement and self-realization. This practice opens a field of possibility. On the one hand, individuals are an effect of power/knowledge; on the other hand, individuals are also the agents of power/knowledge. While Foucault claims that “agonism” is a permanent political task (1983, p. 222), it means that rather than only being constituted, individuals have freedom to struggle against the form of

43 In the translator’s foreword of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Brian Massumi refers to this idea of “brick”.
44 I have mentioned about this idea in Chapter 4.
this constitution. There is a continuous process and an evolving practice in this struggle.

In the implementation of curriculum, though teachers or students are under surveillance; they consciously or unconsciously follow certain disciplinary orders, certain ways of governance in schools, such as a timetable or syllabus. A curriculum theory should also function to open up another practice based on freedom, based on the spirit of resistance, of being unwilling to be governed. A curriculum theory is not applied to construct a universal operation for transformation, but creates experience in order to develop a knowledge of self, an attitude of problematization to break the confinement of dominant power/knowledge, and “to challenge the idea of a sovereign subject” (Foucault, 1991c, p. 61)—a transcendental subject. For Foucault, this is the best way to cross over and to go beyond the limits of power/knowledge. The concept of “emancipation”, “transformation” or “empowerment” in curriculum theory can be reconsidered in this sense. The practice of emancipation ought to be undertaken from our own subject, rather than from subjugated groups or something else. However, we need to bear in mind that this practice of transgression cannot guarantee a good result. Following regular rules, being normalized is dangerous in Foucault’s view. But, the attempt to transgress these rules is also dangerous. We are not able to have a clear idea of the destination when we are in this revolutionary, destructive and reconstructive mode. This journey could be fruitful or injurious. It is the same with Foucault’s caution that productive power can produce a harmful outcome. The way that cancer cells grow is also by way of a rhizomatic mode. Nevertheless, even if breaking normalization is to take a risk, in any case, power, desire or passion is needed to constitute a transformative being, to “perfect” an energetic life—a full commitment, a wholehearted engagement of ourselves. Here, I would like to refer to a
poem in order to respond to this idea. It was written by Chu His (1130-1200AD): a Chinese Neo-Confucian philosopher. This poem speaks about:

The half-acre pond is as clear as an opened mirror.
The reflection of sun and cloud shimmers on its surface.
Why is this pond so clear without being turbid?
Because there is always a fresh input from its source.

In Chu His's account, the reason why the pond is clear is because it is an open field into which fresh water continuously pours. If its entry and outlet are blocked, and the flow is stagnant, this pond would become a surrounded pond—a designated area that is closed up. It would then collect sediment from the exteriority and gain contaminants. By contrast, under the water of the pond, as Chu His illustrates, everything is clearly seen. Chu His writes this poem to imply that study is an ongoing process through which ourselves or our mind become as clear as a pond. Following this idea, our subjectivity should not be like a static pond, but a continuously refreshed pond. The subject as a static pond is a pre-given entity, which is seized on by the exercise of power/knowledge, and is enclosed by the dominant rationality. The subject as a refreshed pond, however, is always renewed by the desire, the passion derived from power/knowledge in order to reach the multiplicity of life. As an educational practice and also as a political practice, a curriculum theory might be employed to break all inert rationality that confines ways of thinking and ways of behaving in education. This is a practice for removing the blockages of a closed pond in order to become an opened pond into which the force of

45 This idea of clear pond can refer to Deleuze’s idea of “statements” and “visibility”. In Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault’s idea of language, because of a continuous supply of passion of life, both statements and visibilities are not hidden, as I mentioned earlier. This is the same idea with that flowing water make a pond limpid and visible. Therefore, nothing remains hidden under the water of the pond, also behind discourses.
power/knowledge is flowing. In this way, our subjectivity is as clear as the pond without being tainted by any dominant rationality or other totalitarian truth.

I return to the question that I asked in Chapter One: Should curriculum theory be preoccupied with “understanding”, as Pinar et al. suggest? My answer is “no”. If we employ Foucault’s ideas to think about curriculum, it does not mean that we need merely to understand his concepts such as discourse, power/knowledge, genealogy or governmentality, and then trace their meanings in the context of curriculum. By drawing on Foucault, I suggest that curriculum theory is not something to be understood; instead, it is itself a practice—both a political and an ethical practice. Or we may say that curriculum theory is “a box of tools” in Deleuze’s terms. Curriculum theory has nothing to do with understanding, or with accomplishing certain expected curriculum aims, but it functions as the practice of self to break through the limits in our education. In this sense, the meaning of curriculum theory is not given; it is created by individuals, and always in the making.

Following the above evaluation of these curriculum theorists, I shall in the next chapter raise two issues with regard to curriculum theory: the first is globalization and the import of critical pedagogy; and second, I raise the question of what is ‘critical’ in critical ethnography. My aim is to think about these issues differently in terms of Foucault’s thought, and see them in a more practical sense, as discussed above. I am conscious in what follows that some aspects of my criticisms in this chapter go beyond or perhaps against Foucault’s idea of critique. In other words, sometimes I simply pass judgement on the theorists in question in terms of the accuracy or cogency of their interpretations. In Chapter 6, I want also to acknowledge the form that a more Foucauldian critique would take, and so I shall endeavour to add
comments along these lines too. These remarks will lay the way for a fuller elaboration of a Foucauldian stance.

Chapter 6 Towards a more robust use of Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge in curriculum theory: Two examples

After offering critiques of the curriculum theories I addressed in Chapter 2, I now give two examples that aim to show a more robust approach towards employing Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge in curriculum theory (also in general educational theory). The first example that I shall discuss is globalization and the import of critical pedagogy. Within this discussion, I try to extend my critique of Giroux given in Chapter 5 and to expose the regime of truth that informs the import of his critical pedagogy. Foucault’s notion of “limit attitude” is drawn on in relation to this issue. The second example is related to a question: “What is ‘critical’ in critical ethnography?”. My question is inspired by my reading of Ball’s work with regard to the concept of critical ethnography. Unlike Ball’s adoption of Foucault in this topic, I shall borrow the concept of “critique” from Foucault in order to question the mainstream understanding of critical ethnography and to reconsider the meaning of “critical” in this methodology.

6.1 Globalization and the import of critical pedagogy
Critical pedagogy is a prevalent educational theory that emerged in the 1980s in America. It is based on a combination of ideas from the Frankfurt School, Antonio Gramsci and Paulo Freire (Lather, 2001b, p.184). Many educationists whose work is orientated towards social justice are indebted to this perspective. Critical pedagogy has been discussed not only in American domestic circles, but also in non-Western countries. I consider globalization to be the driving force in this spreading. In the form of academic commodities, several countries accept it by means of international publications, in books and journals, and through international students who are studying or have studied in the United States. My approach does not focus mainly on critical pedagogy as such, but undertakes to make this intellectual exportation problematic. This spread of ideas raises several questions: What kinds of rationalities does this academic “import” follow? What kinds of consequences result? Is this imported theory of great “import” for those importing countries? Is it efficacious to utilize a ready-made foreign educational theory so as to improve local educational practices? Without doubt, America—the exporter—is dominant over those importing countries in this circumstance. Its intellectual influence expands across the world. Anglo-American ideas have their particular merit. However, it is dangerous for any country to adopt an uncritical, unreflective acceptance of any external theory.

Being a citizen of one of these importing countries, Taiwan, I have seen the tendency for critical pedagogy to become an orthodox norm when people refer to critical education or critical teaching. In the light of this, I aim to take a diagnostic position, an ironic stance, towards this event. In an interview entitled “Questions of method”, Foucault claims that the main purpose of his investigations is to "see how men govern
(themselves and others) by the production of truth" (Foucault, 1991d, p. 79). This production of truth does not equate with the production of true utterances; rather, it is the establishment of domains through which truth is constituted, and in which the practices of truth and falsity establish their self-reinforcing categories. Following Foucault’s idea, I shall examine the production of truth in the importing of critical pedagogy into my country and investigate how Taiwanese educational thinking comes to be governed by this version of truth. There are two aspects to my exploration regarding truth. First, what is truth in critical pedagogy? Second, how is truth established in the importation of critical pedagogy? Both of them are interconnected. On the basis of this diagnosis, I will argue that instead of absolute acceptance, Foucault’s assertion of a “limit attitude” is another idea that we can take up in order to address this kind of intellectual governance; in other words, we need a practice of critique in order to struggle against the particular forms of disciplinary power that globalization enables. This must be a mature attitude both of examining what we are and of rejecting what we are.

6.1.2 Critical pedagogy as a prominent discourse

Over the past decade, the discourse of critical pedagogy has been taken up by many Taiwanese educationists. If one keys in the words “critical” with “education” in an academic search engine, the titles of papers one finds are very consistent. Most of them refer to the thought of American critical pedagogy, including the theories of Henry A. Giroux or Paulo Freire. If we ask what the definition is of educational praxis, we find in these papers the answer: to empower marginalized groups in the educational arena, or to liberate disadvantaged students in the classroom. Regarding the question of the role of teachers, the consistent answer is: an educator should be a
transformative intellectual. Critical educational discourse is therefore treated as if there is only one route to be taken in education. As a rhetorical style, critical pedagogy has become the norm in talking about the issue of social justice in education and in developing an educational movement of empowerment. It normalizes educational forms and standardizes critical educational discourse in Taiwan. It has become a popular commodity, which is heavily consumed by many lecturers in departments of education. The ideal of critical pedagogy seems very attractive to any educationists who attempt to change unfair situations in education. It presents optimism that gives us confidence that we can cope with problems of our present schooling. Oddly, however, this foreign educational theory permeates a territory that is far removed from its historical development, and it does this by virtue of the exercise of power and the production of truths. I shall analyze this later. But before this, I will show both internal and external problems in the import of critical pedagogy.

6.1.3 The problems in the importation of critical pedagogy

I shall address the problems in the importation of critical pedagogy in terms of two points. One is internal to the theory itself; the other is external, which derives from the inappropriate transplantation of this theory.

Internal problems

Though critical pedagogy is a widespread educational discourse, it is never a "perfect" theory. This theory itself harbours several internal problems, which cannot be solved. It is dangerous to discuss it and use it without noticing its problems.
Critical pedagogy had already triggered much debate in America over the past two decades, which even spread to countries outside the U.S.A. These debates all point towards defects in the theory. For instance, it tends to be paternalistic. Elizabeth Ellsworth (1989) and Patti Lather (2001b) show that exponents of critical pedagogy see the world from a position of white, middle-class males, and thus the theory is marked by a masculine prescriptive attitude. Furthermore, this discourse advocates emancipatory education in an abstract, universalistic language, and it asserts an instrumental concept of educational praxis. The problem here is that it seeks to perfect a future human order and overemphasizes the importance of an ideology of effectiveness. As the critiques of Blake and Masschelein show, American critical pedagogy has never interrogated the very concept of educational praxis itself, but merely invested it with an instrumental purpose, which operates along an axis from repression to liberation. Education thus becomes the realization and execution of this ideal. This means that advocates of critical pedagogy themselves get trapped in an instrumental logic that is similar to that of the very system that it deplores: the capitalist system (Blake and Masschelein, 2003, p. 50).

Ilan Gur-Ze’ev (1998) also addresses several key paradoxes in the theory of critical pedagogy. In his view, Freire seeks a dialogue that can challenge the silencing hegemonic aspects of education, through which there will be equal, open, and critical intersubjectivity between students and teachers, and between students and their world. The aim of Freire’s critical pedagogy is to enable marginalized groups to recognize, identify and name things in the world. However, this could be interpreted,

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46 Patti Lather calls critical pedagogy as a “boy thing” (Lather, 2001b, p. 184). This “boy thing” has another implication, that critical pedagogy produces truth through an abstract and universal rhetoric. This rhetoric is contrary to the deconstructive pedagogy based on poststructuralism, which she calls a “girl thing”.

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in his liberatory thinking, as violence in the form of a normalizing of human beings and making them more productive in the realm of self-evidence. For Gur-Ze'ev, the danger in Freire's project is that its self-evident knowledge of the oppressed over that of the oppressors is noncritical and automatic. Regarding Giroux, though he distances himself from the concept of emancipation in the projects of Enlightenment and critical theory, and turns to underscore instead the concept of "the other" and "difference", as Gur-Ze'ev puts it, he is accurate in exposing some of the harmful characteristics of the Enlightenment, such as: "its positive utopianism, its hasty optimism, and its arrogance as to the possibility of liberating the repressed and constituting a better world within current reality" (p. 474). On the one hand, Giroux takes up postmodern thinking on plurality and inconsistency. On the other hand, contradictorily, he still insists on a form of universal reason—the possibility of emancipation. For Gur-Ze'ev, Giroux's notion of "the language of possibility" is itself a naïve optimism and a positive utopianism. The route of this positive utopianism is, however, at odds with his epistemic assumptions. Moreover, Giroux fails to find a solution to cope with the conflict between the authority of "self-evident" knowledge and the interests of individual students in repressed collectives (ibid). Violent potentialities may arise in the dialogue between teachers and students, as Ellsworth's critique of her teaching experience in a university shows (Ellsworth, 1989). In brief, the task that theorists of critical pedagogy need to engage in is perhaps to reconsider the solution to the question of how to move away from an optimistic utopianism—an opiate thinking of education—and to come back to the reality of schooling. Or as Blake and Masschelein suggest, it is to develop "a noninstrumental concept of action", to conceive of "a critical pedagogy without foundation" (Blake and Masschelein, 2003, p. 54).
External problems

Foreign educational theory could be a helpful resource in that it enables people to draw on the experience of other countries in order to consider domestic issues. Nevertheless, it is always risky to employ such ideas uncritically. American critical pedagogy is specifically conceived of as dealing with educational problems in America or Brazil. For instance, Michael Apple, Henry A. Giroux or Peter McLaren engages in exposing the unjust and undemocratic mechanisms in America and their association with educational systems. In Brazil, Paulo Freire endeavors to awaken the consciousness of oppressed people in order to help them to empower themselves. The issues with which this theory is concerned are current crises of racial, gender or class inequality in their territory. Taiwan, however, has a different historical and social context from those countries. Though racial, gender and class inequality exist in Taiwanese society, social problems show themselves in a local character that is different from America or Brazil. For example, it is evident in the nature of poverty gap that has arisen from unbalanced economic development between cities and rural areas. Furthermore, the issue of national identity occupies a crucial role in political debates, which is unusual in other countries.

In my previous empirical study (Wang, 2006), I found that Taiwanese teachers have rarely thought about the issues of inequality in education. Even more, very few educators would see pedagogy as a political or social movement or see themselves as committed to subverting the situation of domination and oppression in schooling. Most of them prefer being faithful to their duties. They make an effort everyday to teach their students well in the classroom and to help them to increase their achievement in order that they may occupy a good socio-economic position in the
future. This is their normal way of treating (or empowering) disadvantaged students, namely, aiming to change their social status through education. We may take a view that the liberatory consciousness of Taiwanese teachers simply has not been raised. Conversely, we can also explain that liberation is less important in their conception of educational practice; or they have another self-definition of liberation. Social equality may be an important dream for America. However, this does not mean that it is also the dream of the Taiwanese. In this sense, it may not be feasible to realize “the language of possibility”, as Giroux put this, because it has never been considered as the hope of educators in Taiwanese context. Another example is that most educational theorists agree with the findings that textbooks are not ideology-free and that the hidden curriculum has the potential effect of oppression. But, I do not think that they are the primary and urgent issues facing education in Taiwan. They are really not the root of disorder in the Taiwanese educational system. For these reasons, we should be suspicious of leaping into this American “positive utopianism”.

6.1.4 The “truth” in the importation of critical pedagogy

In order to examine what “truth” is in the importation of critical pedagogy, I draw on Foucault’s account of “truth”. In Foucault’s view, truth is established by means of multiple forms of constraint, and it also induces successive effects of power. He explains the composition of truth as follows:

Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is

47 For instance, aboriginal students or the student whose mother comes from a foreign country (who is termed an “immigrant bride”).
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault, 1980d, p. 131)

In each social body, truth is circulated by apparatuses of education and is subject to “constant economic and political incitement” (ibid). Truth, for Foucault, has nothing to do with empirical truth or with judgements of right and wrong. Nor does he attempt to pursue a universal epistemological truth or to destroy existing truth. Rather, he seeks to diagnose how an individual fits into a truth game and how people are governed under the regime of truth in which distinctions between what is true and what is false are drawn. It refers to the exploration of “what we are”. As Dreyfus and Rabinow claim, Foucault has never intended “to denounce power per se nor to propound truth but to use his analysis to shed light on the specific dangers that each specific type of power/knowledge produces” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986, p. 116).

Before clarifying what “truth” informs the phenomenon of academic importation and its operation within a particular power/knowledge complex, let me address first the question of truth in critical pedagogy itself in order to make the regime of truth that I shall expose clearer. In critical pedagogy, “truth” refers to the imperative to empower marginalized groups, and it entails that we succeed in liberating individuals and collectives by virtue of emancipatory movements. This main tenet is indeed a unitary truth by which other aims of education are excluded, because outside emancipation there is no educational purpose. There is an implicit knowledge that the society is progressive when teachers and students become liberatory agents. So it comes to be claimed that education ought to be organized in the light of this goal. Power is manipulated in order to promote emancipatory praxis so as to empower minorities. Both “dialogue” in Freire’s account and the “voice” in Giroux’s belong to this praxis.
Truth in this sense serves to solve social and political problems in America. Critical pedagogy thus becomes a new kind of "governmentality" (Blake and Masschelein, 2003, p. 54).

In an essay entitled "How to conceive of critical educational theory today" (Masschelein, 2004), Masschelein shows that classical concept in the critical principle of Bildung promotes the individual as a self-reflective, self-determining and rationally autonomous subject. Educational reality in this perspective is regarded as a site of coercion, alienation, oppression, negation or distortion. The task of education is, therefore, to create opportunities to live a critical, emancipatory and autonomous life. For instance, in the thinking of Habermas, critical educational theory is offered by the model of emancipatory practices as "self-reflection in dialogue" (p. 354). The truth in such educational practices therefore is that children need to be equipped with communicative competence in order to participate in dialogue. For Masschelein, this is a way of subjugating oneself to the claims of communicative reason and of recognizing oneself to be part of a universal humanity. Masschelein claims that rather than revolting against the existing social order and power, ironically, the notion of autonomy and critique have become parts of that order or power. Drawing on Foucault's analysis of power relations, he explains, first of all, that the notion of an autonomous, critical life is shaped historically. It constitutes a particular relation to oneself and a specific work of the self on the self. Second, this autonomous, self-determining subject refers to a nexus of power relations through which the form of subjectivity becomes both an effect and an instrument. It is "an effect and instrument of a Christian-spiritual discipline and a pastoral power relation" (p. 360). Thus, self-determination and self-reflection are not the realization of humanist ideals, but merely a form of self-government. In this respect, power is exercised through the
intensification of self-reflexivity, rather than through the negation or oppression of individuality. The point I attempt to highlight here is that critical pedagogy is part of the critical educational theory that Masschelein criticises. It is not only an attempt to rescue educational practices through emancipation; it is also a way of governing our thinking and attitudes in pedagogy.

With the importation of critical pedagogy into Taiwan, another similar truth is formed. This truth becomes: “By way of the importation of critical pedagogy, we can succeed in emancipating subjugated teachers and students, and in helping them to become self-autonomous and self-determining subjects.” Teaching then plays the role of transforming our society towards a more democratic and egalitarian utopia. The truth here is constituted and enabled by the trend of globalization, through which American local theories become international and then affect Taiwanese educational discourses. In this regime of truth, power tends to exclude other possibilities of critical teaching or critical education. Power also excludes other possibilities of what a teacher or a student might be or become. Take Giroux’s idea, for example. He asserts that we need not only a “language of critique”, but also a “language of possibility” in education. That is to say, it is not enough to expose only the current situation of domination in schools by a language of critique; we need but also liberatory practices to empower both teachers and students for social reconstruction (Giroux, 1992). This “language of possibility”, however, has only one possibility—that is, to end up as the only alternative possibility of thought in our local educational discourse. I do not disagree with the positive ideal and the humanist concern of critical pedagogy. However, the danger is that in the name of liberation it ends up governing our thinking; and we accept this unitary discourse as the whole of education.
6.1.5 Sustaining a “limit attitude” to critical pedagogy

Since it is hazardous to adopt the concept of critical pedagogy unproblematically, how can we question it? What kind of attitude could we adopt in facing this discourse? To answer these questions, I shall refer to Foucault’s critique of Kant’s notion of Enlightenment. In one of Foucault’s essays “What is Enlightenment?” (Foucault, 1997b), he considers that Kant regards Enlightenment as a process in which human beings traverse from “immaturity” to “maturity”. This process is both personal and collective. Foucault explains, for Kant, that “immaturity” means the situation that we “accept someone else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for” (p. 305). For instance, a book takes the place of our own thinking, and a doctor’s prescription decides what our diet is to be. In Kant’s account, men can reach the aim of maturity by making use of reason, and without following authority. This is the reason for the sake of reason itself. The Enlightenment in Kant’s thought, for Foucault, needs to be seen as a reflection not only on history, but also on modernity, and on our present. Even more, we need a form of relationship that is established not only with modernity, but also with ourselves. In Foucault’s view, however, Kant’s assertion—one should constitute oneself as an autonomous subject by following reason—is historically determined by the Enlightenment. It is unavoidably limited by its necessary and certain reasons of that historical time. As Masschelein and Simons put it, Kant’s idea of Enlightenment opens up a philosophical questioning of the present to ontology—an ontology of the self—but also immediately closes down what it opened up (Masschelein and Simons, 2007). Kant’s claim about Enlightenment, rather than emancipating subjects, becomes a restriction, a means of confining our use of reason and constraining what human
beings can be. Its consequence is far apart from Kant's ideal of maturity and from the idea of the individual as an autonomous subject.

On the basis of this deficiency, Foucault claims that we need a philosophical ethos that connects with a critique of our utterances, thinking and behavior through "a historical ontology of ourselves" (315). This philosophical ethos may be characterized as a limit-attitude (ibid). In the first place, this limit-attitude is not a gesture of rejection, but a move beyond the outside-inside alternative, or a shift to be at the frontiers. In Foucault's point, it is "to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over" (ibid). In his analysis of Kant's notion, he attempts to reflect upon its limit as such. This limit exposes the constraining of knowledge—connaissance—that is, scientific reason and State reason in Kant's epoch limit his concept of Enlightenment. For Foucault, we need a practical critique to break through the narrow limitation of looking at things by a single, universal, and obligatory perspective. This critique is not like Kant's critique, which is based on arbitrary, transcendental values, but is a historical, genealogical investigation into the contingent events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects. It reaches towards the undefined work of our freedom—the freedom to decide what we are, and to be ourselves. Second, this limit attitude must be experimental. On the one hand, it opens up a realm of historical inquiry; on the other, it opens up the space in which change of the self becomes possible. The historical ontology of ourselves hence turns away

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48 Connaissance is a French word meaning "knowledge" in English. It is the knowledge to multiply the knowable objects, to manifest their intelligibility, and to understand their rationality. An inquiring subject remains fixed while he is in the process of it. Another French term, savoir, upon which Foucault mainly concentrates, is different from the meaning of connaissance, though both of their English translations are "knowledge". For Foucault, savoir is a process through which one engages both in constructing the object and in modifying the subject. The knowing of the object relates to the knowing of our own subject. See Foucault (2002), p. 256.
from all global projects. This critical attitude helps us to go beyond limits, which is an action to be “carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (p. 316). Third, because of the abandonment of complete and definitive knowledge, the theoretical and practical experience we have is always limited. Rather than limiting possibility, on the contrary, the limit in this limit attitude enables us to keep a distance from our historical constraints and conditioning, from the effects of power/knowledge that bear on our bodies, through which self-transformation or a new birth of self is possible. Consequently, as Foucault puts it: “we are always in the position of beginning again” (p. 317). In doing this, Foucault claims an attitude of problematization, which is to be understood as “the way to analyze questions of general import in their historically unique form” (p. 318). This is also an inquiry into the way that power is exercised in establishing truth in relation to ourselves, and into how our experience is constituted by determinate and contingent historical figures. Problematization is relevant to the dimensions of experience in the interpretation of Thomas R. Flynn. For him, Foucault’s investigation of problematization analyzes “the cognitive and the normative relations of experience in modern Western society” (Flynn, 2006, p. 38). This experience describes how an individual constitutes and recognizes himself as a subject—namely, the process of subjectivation, in Foucault’s terms. For example, in Foucault’s later work, he asks why sexual conduct became an object of moral solicitude. This problematization enables us to see how an individual constitutes a moral self in the discourses of truth games.

In sum, following Kant’s reflection on the Enlightenment, Foucault claims that we should engage in a critical interrogation of the present and of ourselves. However, this critical ontology of ourselves cannot be considered as a theory or doctrine, in the way that Kant saw it. Rather, Foucault suggests:
...it must be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. (p. 319)

How can an individual be an autonomous subject after all? In Foucault's account, it is not possible to achieve this purpose by following along behind Kant's affirmation of reason, nor can it be accomplished by pursuing the universal value of critical theory or the positive utopianism of critical pedagogy. Rather, one needs a critical practice, a "limit attitude" that enables us to struggle against our current limits and to seek in a different way to live in the present. Rather than requiring a theory or a doctrine, an autonomous subject has her own freedom to reject what they are (Foucault, 1983, p. 216) or to decide what they will be by themselves. In the case of the import of critical pedagogy, as in the case of the Enlightenment, there are relations between power, truth and subjects. Power is productive in this importation. Critical pedagogy has become a norm. We subjectify ourselves in a process of normalization in terms of both intellectual imitation and a Western liberating ideal. In fact, this functions as a kind of "immunity" that reinforces the power that is imposed on us. It is also immature to wait for a guru or a messiah to guide us towards a utopia through education. There is rationality behind this immature expectation. For a long time, especially after World War Two, Taiwan relied on Western scientific technologies and economic, social and political institutions to enhance its internal development. This imitation has become a symbol of advance, which is in reality less difficult than conducting an innovation of our own. This conduct indeed helps Taiwan free itself from poverty and become prosperous in many respects. The movement of globalization enhances the ease with which, not only commodities flow, but also thought and ideas are fast exchanged among different countries. The importation of
academic discourses is informed by the need to improve the current educational situation. However, the dominant knowledge here is the belief that Western "advanced" educational theories are omnipotent. This powerful thinking then denies the opportunity to examine foreign ideas critically and to elaborate a mature attitude of adopting them. Following Foucault's critique of Kant's idea of Enlightenment, I suggest that we can hold a "limit-attitude" or a problematizing attitude in order to explore how truth is constituted in our use of critical pedagogy. We can distance ourselves from dependence on an uncritical adoption, and disconnect ourselves from the intensification of these academic power relations. Then we may be able to reconsider local educational discourses and to resolve domestic educational problems otherwise, by which a "crossing-over" of both educational innovation and our thinking of it is made possible. This critical practice is not only personal. It could also be a group or collective practice, or it could be that of a country as a whole. The subject that Foucault is concerned with can be both an individual subject and collective subjects.

6.1.6 The "import" of critical pedagogy

As I mentioned above, the uncritical implantation of theory has come to govern our thinking. While we are indebted to critical pedagogy, a mature attitude would be to distance ourselves from the dominant way of using it. Then, we may ask a further question: What is the import or significance of critical pedagogy? How can we look at this theory with the benefit of a limit attitude? Adopting a limit attitude does not mean that we should repudiate or reject this theory. Critical pedagogy has its contribution to make in terms of a self-examination of the educational status quo in America. However, this does not imply that we should have the same expectations of
it in our own educational present. A limit attitude warns us of the risks we run if we adopt this theory as a prescription to treat our educational maladies without being self-critical and ready to problematize what we do; and it inspires our practices to interrogate the truth-dogma that is constituted by power relations. While we believe that the thought of critical pedagogy can liberate us, ironically, we are dominated by the truth it asserts and are governed by both the totalitarian thinking of this intellectual trend and the universal mode of applying it as seen in the Taiwanese context. It is not problematic to refer to academic resources from all over the world. Our stance should be open-minded in order to be able to accept multiple ways of thinking. However, a question can be considered: “How can we use those theories rather than being used by them?” It is helpful to draw on Foucault’s notion of “critique” here. He defines “critique” as: “the art of not being governed like that and at that cost” (Foucault, 2007, p. 45). A limit attitude is a critical practice that shows how not to be governed in this way, by these means. Through this, more space will be spared in order to accommodate multiple pedagogical discourses and educational ideals. Therefore, our dream with reference to the role of teachers may not be that they become “transformative intellectuals”, as Giroux advocates. It could be that what is needed is another kind of “transformative intellectual”, defined differently from those in Giroux’s account. Or, dismantling this frame, we may be able to envisage a role for teachers in another way, which can help to trigger a new self-transformation of our society. Therefore, the importance of critical pedagogy does not lie in our dependence on this theory, but is decided by a mature and critical attitude towards the adoption of it.

6.1.7 Conclusion
The importation of critical pedagogy is not merely an issue of making use of foreign theories, but an issue that has to do with relationships between power, truth and subjects. Educational practices should not be regarded as normalizing practices. Though we are fascinated by the emancipating ideal of critical pedagogy, it is unwise to embrace it without critical reflection. The employment of foreign theories should have the effect of emancipating our thinking, rather than of limiting it. Also, the action of this employment itself cannot be conducted in a limited way, as in a comprehensive acceptance. As Masschelein claims, instead of appealing to a liberating or emancipating gaze, what is essential is to “liberate our gaze” (Masschelein, 2006, p. 569). Foucault’s conception may help us to hold a limit attitude in facing theories that are imported through the process of globalization. On the one hand, a limit attitude is a practice for us to challenge limits in the thinking of critical pedagogy and to distance ourselves from the governance of power in globalization. On the other hand, this problematic attitude offers possibilities for us to reconsider what we are and what our education should be. It transforms how we think about education and how we practice pedagogy.

6.2 What is "critical" in critical ethnography?

6.2.1 Introduction

What is “critical” in critical ethnography? How does this “critical" element or this "critique" help us to enrich our thinking about critical ethnography? These questions have fascinated me since I read Stephen J. Ball’s Education reform: A critical and post-structural approach (1994). Ball integrates the methods of critical policy analysis, post-structuralism and critical ethnography into his research on educational
policy and curriculum reform in the UK. He employs an ethnographical methodology in order to generate critical perspectives on the impact of policy in local settings. For Ball, ethnography “provides access to ‘situated’ discourses and ‘specific tactics’ and ‘precise and tenuous’ power relations operating in local settings” (p. 2). On the one hand, it counters the trend of rational scientism or psycho-humanism; on the other hand, it opens up the possibility of considering diverse participating voices of currently marginalized or oppressed social groups. Ball explains that a tradition of critical ethnography was central to the US Chicago School. In the UK, it has become prominent as a result of Paul Willis’ 1976 work *Learning to Labour*, in which educational ethnography is oriented towards the exploration of “resistance” and the interplay of domination and resistance. Ball sees a valuable connection between ethnography and Foucault’s genealogy. He points out:

I see a possible role for ethnography (as sets of cultural texts) in relation to theorization, similar to the role played by historical texts in Foucault’s genealogical method. In other words, there is a methodological affinity between ethnography and genealogy.49 There are also important parallels between critical policy research and Foucauldian sociology. (p. 3)

Ball considers that Foucault’s genealogical approach “interrupts the taken-for-granted and isolates the contingent power relations which make it possible for particular assertions to operate as absolute truths” (ibid). In this sense, genealogy enables an “insurrection of subjugated knowledges” (ibid). For Ball, this means that through genealogy, it is possible to provide a conduit for submerged voices that are obscured

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49 Tamboukou and Ball (2003) develop these theoretical affinities more in their later work. They generalize them into 7 points: 1. Interrogate the validity and universal authority of scientific knowledge; 2. Adopt a context-bound critical perspective; 3. Transgress closed theoretical and methodological systems; 4. Point to the limits of dominant power/knowledge regimes; 5. Recover excluded subjects and silenced voices; 6. Highlight the centrality of the body in sociohistorical analyses; 7. Restore the political dimension of research.
and marginalized by specific power/knowledge arrangements. Likewise, in Ball's view, ethnography is also a way of engaging in critical interpretations that are realized via local memories and marginalized voices. It is connected with the play of power/knowledge relations in local and specific settings, as are found, for example, in curriculum, management, leadership, choice and competition.

I agree with Ball's assertion that it is possible to undertake genealogical research within critical ethnography; and vice versa, we can also conduct ethnographical research by means of a genealogical perspective. However, it is essential to clarify several concepts here. First, does the "critical" in critical ethnography equate with the notion of "critique" in Foucault's account? Second, both genealogy and critical ethnography show their opposition to the systematic, universal knowledge of science. Nevertheless, my question is: Does the "insurrection of subjugated knowledge" in these two approaches have the same meaning? What kind of "knowledge" is subjugated after all? Is this only to be realized in local and marginalized voices, as in Ball's thinking, or could it have another significance? Third, Ball refers to the concept of "resistance" in critical ethnography, which involves a confrontation with the dominant order in order to change the inequitable situation of oppressed groups. I also question whether this is the only meaning that "resistance" can take. All of these questions derive from my reading of Foucault. I shall argue that we cannot draw on Foucault's thinking in critical ethnography without reconsidering these basic concepts. Otherwise, we will lose the opportunity of transforming our stable presuppositions within critical ethnography, and so of thinking through this methodology in a fresh way. To achieve this purpose I shall, first, delineate the conventional notion of critical ethnography. My discussion of this includes several aspects. For instance: what is critical ethnography for? Against what kinds of
domination is it struggling? What kinds of resistance does it attempt to arouse? And what kinds of subjugated knowledge is it concerned with? Through the examination of these questions, I find that recent trends in critical ethnography have been governed in particular ways. This itself could be a target of critique in Foucault’s account. Second, I shall analyse Foucault’s concept of “critique” in order to think about critical ethnography in a different way. This will involve a different approach to the word “critical” from the way that conventional critical ethnographers typically understand this term. My concern is not only with critique, but also with the related concepts of “domination” and “resistance”. Following the discussion of these, I shall consider a story of critical ethnography that can be regarded as a “fiction” in Foucault’s terms. Instead of an illusionary story or piece of research intended to persuade its readers by truth, this “fiction” is a historical-philosophical practice, a movement between rationalization and desubjugation. Through writing and reading fiction, the purpose of critical ethnography is no longer an emancipating praxis for confronting existing mechanisms of oppression, but rather an ethical practice dedicated towards a “critical ethnography of the self”. I suggest that the self could also be an ethnographic field to be explored critically, with a view to achieving a new relation in our knowledge of ourselves and in order to transform our ways of thinking about ourselves.

6.2.2 Conventional notions of critical ethnography

Critical ethnography is in fact a hybrid idea in methodological terms, and it cannot be traced back to a singular origin. In the view of Patti Lather (2001a), critical ethnography is rooted in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, the sociolinguistics of Basil Bernstein and British Cultural Studies of the Birmingham School, which focus
on local knowledge and on the illumination of the operation of power in culturally specific contexts linked to socially reproductive processes. Focusing on the perspectives of feminisms, post-colonialisms and critical race theories, Lather considers that critical ethnography reworks the Marxist project that aims at exposing the construction of consent and the naturalization of inequalities. By breaking with the limits of the conventional methodologies of symbolic interactionism and phenomenology, critical ethnography turns its interest, in Lather’s view, towards and aligns itself with oppressed groups. Joe L. Kincheloe and Peter McLaren (2000) suggest what “critical” means in critical research. For them, critical research is embedded in the context of empowering individuals. This sense of “critical” is then combined with the struggle against injustice in a particular society. Critical research shows its “transformative endeavor unembarrassed by the label political and unafraid to consummate a relationship with emancipatory consciousness” (p. 291). Drawing on Marxist traditions, they claim that, beyond questions of method, ethnography needs to be understood in terms of the critical assessment of reading and writing practices. This practice is “a transformative praxis that leads to the alleviation of suffering and the overcoming of oppression” (p. 303). Kincheloe and McLaren claim that an insurgent research of this kind can ask questions such as: “Whose interests are served through institutional arrangements?” and “Where do our frames of reference come from?” The “subjugated knowledge” in critical research is therefore, they claim, a knowledge imposed on minority groups by the interests of their oppressors and a knowledge made for controlling people by certain dominant ideologies. Since the 1970s, critical ethnography has been greatly influenced by neo-Marxism, Frankfurt School Critical Theory and feminist social theory. As Phil Francis Carspecken (1996, p. 7) puts it, the purposes of doing critical ethnography are always related to political
struggles against inequality and injustice, for the exposure of the oppression of disadvantaged groups, and for cultural and social criticism.

Next, I shall discuss Foucault’s notion of “critique” and then see whether it stands in line with this “orthodox” critical ethnography.

6.2.3 What is “critique” (or what is it to be critical)?

In a lecture entitled “What is Critique”, Foucault (2007) elaborates what he means by “critique”. He considers that critique is an attitude, a means and a “virtue” that is directed towards the truth. To develop this idea, Foucault uncovers a triple relationship to the “truth” in the salvation-oriented operations of Christian pastoral thinking. First, truth is understood as dogma; second, it implies a special and individualizing knowledge of individuals; and finally, it deploys a technique comprising general rules—for example, particular forms of knowledge, methods of examination, and practices of confessions. I think that the idea of “subjugated knowledge” in Foucault’s account derives from these kinds of dogma, of knowledge of individuals and of techniques of governance. Truth may be governed in certain fixed ways by virtue of these kinds of knowledge, and this is the constraint that Foucault would like to break. He holds the opinion that the “art of governing men” started in the 15th century, before the Reformation. The process of governmentalization expanded not only to different objects—children, families, armies—and to different fields—pedagogy, politics and economics—but also deep into the individual’s own body and mind. Nevertheless, the question that interests

50 “Governmentalization” is related to another of Foucault’s terms, “governmentality”. It refers to a process in which human beings govern their own mentality through the exercise of power/knowledge.
Foucault is not merely the process of governmentalization itself, but "how not to be governed?" (p. 44). For him, the critical attitude, which is a virtue as well, starts by asking an important question: "How not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them" (ibid). This attitude is not a complete rejection of governmentalization. Rather, he explains, it is an attitude that one is "both partner and adversary to the arts of governing" (ibid). On the one hand, in Foucault's view, governance is an essential tactic that works in the process of the constitution of modern state, which serves to enhance economic prosperity and social welfare. On the other hand, governance is harmful in the way that it unifies the development of human subjects, and it closes off alternative perspectives of looking at the nature of human beings. For the negative effect of the latter, we therefore need an act of limiting these arts of governing and of transforming them. Foucault's definition of critique, following this, can be underlined with the words: "the art of not being governed like that and at that cost" (ibid).

Foucault then examines three historical anchoring points of critique. The first anchoring point is related to religion. In this, critique, or the question of how not to be governed, involved seeking out what was authentic in Scripture and questioning what sort of truth it was that the Scriptures represented. In the second anchoring point, the question of how not to be governed involves a not wanting to accept unjust laws or illegitimate sovereignty. This is basically a legal issue. I consider that most concepts of critique in conventional critical ethnography fit this understanding of the term. The third anchoring point is that critique is a confrontation with the authority that controls our subjectivity. This is the critique that Foucault would like to underscore—the freedom to want not to be governed. He claims that "critique is the movement by
which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth" (p. 47). Foucault continues:

...critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability. Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth (ibid).

Critique, for Foucault, is the politics of truth, or we may say that it is a political investigation into regimes of truth. It is an act that dares to challenge and transform the limits of subjugation of the subject.

6.2.4 A critique “of” critical ethnography and “within” critical ethnography

Foucault’s idea of critique prompts me to reconsider what is “critical” in critical ethnography; and it also leads me to rethink the nature of the alliance between critical ethnography and Foucault’s philosophy. In the first place, critical ethnography itself could be a target of critique. According to those central points of this methodology that I have addressed above, it is obvious that critical ethnography is governed in particular ways and by a dominant truth, which is validated in certain coherent systems of knowledge. Its critical gesture is made with the intention of confronting inequality and oppression. The purpose of consciousness-raising and transformative praxis has become the norm in the discourse of this methodology. Several terms such as “empowerment”, “liberation” or “autonomy” have then been incorporated into its normative language. These emancipatory concepts are still part of the subjugated knowledge and governmental rationality, and they constrain researchers from thinking outside these terms. In the name of emancipation, ironically, the invariable assumption has been that there is a specific route to be taken, a taken-for-granted
order that cannot be liberated. If, as Ball puts it, the critical aspect of critical ethnography is the “insurrection of subjugated knowledge”, then the normative thinking of critical ethnography itself is a subjugated knowledge. It is this too that stands in need of insurrection.

Since critical ethnography is governed by its own regime of truth, I suggest that Foucault’s notion of critique can be applied in order to rethink ethnography in another wider “critical” way. This is the second aspect of the implication of this concept that I attempt to demonstrate. Olssen (2006) explains that Foucault’s conception of critique is different from that of Marxism or the Frankfurt School. Rather than realizing a rational society or dreaming of a future utopia, Foucault’s critique is designed more pragmatically to reveal “the contemporary limits of the necessary” (p. 130). Following Foucault, I consider that what is “critical” in critical ethnography can be regarded in terms of a practice of breaking through the contemporary limits of the necessary, of an attitude of “how not to be governed like that and at that cost”. It can be seen as a virtue—a desire\(^{51}\) of “voluntary insubordination” or of “reflected intractability”. Research then becomes the ethical possibility of transforming the limits of subjugation; it becomes an investment in the desubjugation of the subject. As Butler’s interpretation of Foucault’s notion of critique suggests, this practice offers a way of transferring the confinement of the epistemological field into the possibility of the ethical field (Butler, 2002). Critique, therefore, is an ethical practice committed to raising a critical attitude to those norms, to the established order, or to the limits of the epistemological horizon. Namely, it is an examination related to how knowledge forecloses the possibility of any alternative ordering and how power/knowledge confines the possibility of thinking otherwise. Domination, for

\(^{51}\) From the viewpoint of Butler, an ethical practice of critique comes from desire.
conventional critical ethnography, comes mainly from the unjust operation of
sovereign power and from ideological oppression, as in Neo-Marxist terms; or
perhaps it is seen, as critical theorists suggest, as nothing other than the workings of
instrumental rationality. In Foucault’s view, however, domination refers to the limits
of knowledge—the knowledge that is confined through certain dominant forms of
rationality and that is constituted through the manipulation of power/knowledge.
Hence, a practice of resistance cannot be a matter of an unyielding attitude dedicated
to breaking the advantages of privileged groups; it must instead be a revolt against
governmental demands in order to release knowledge within a concrete strategic field,
and in order to liberate subjects from their unwitting subjugation. On the one hand,
our thinking and behaviour are governed by normalizing knowledge—the dominant
knowledge of individuals; on the other, we need another kind of knowledge to
support resistance against this. This is the knowledge of “what we are”, and it is to be
achieved by means of an investigation of a history and politics of the present. As
Masschelein and Simons suggest, knowledge can be seen as a “reflexive ethical
instrument” (Masschelein and Simons, 2007) that is made not for understanding, but
for “cutting”. This “cutting” is a rejection of the obedience of governmental
obligation and also a rejection of “the inertia of power which was maintaining itself
indefinitely” (Foucault, 2007, p. 54). Through the construction of this knowledge of
cutting, we can see the limits of our history and then cut through the seemingly
inevitable ways that we have come to look at ourselves. It is this that makes the
transformation of the self possible.

In the next part, I shall try to conceive of the way that this kind of knowledge might
emerge in critical ethnography and shall suggest ways of drawing on Foucauldian
critique in the reading and writing of ethnographic research.
6.2.5 Writing and reading critical ethnography as a "fiction"

With the purposes of critique in mind, I suggest that critical ethnography can be written and read as "fiction", in the sense that the term is used by Foucault. For an example of this notion, I shall once again refer to Foucault's critical viewpoint regarding the Enlightenment. In Kant's view, Enlightenment requires that one has the courage to recognize and to break the limits of knowledge. Foucault argues, however, that Kant's formulation of this thought has never been far from obedience to the sovereignty of knowledge. The sovereignty of knowledge in this sense is to be understood in terms of state-type power or scientific reason as this was manifest in Kant's age. Kant was enmeshed in the great process of society's governmentalization, in ways of which he was himself unaware. Positing a different approach from Kant, Foucault envisages that the concept of Enlightenment can be seen as a historical-philosophical practice. In this practice, one can fabricate one's own history through "fiction" (p. 56). This fiction is not the same as untruth or fantasy; rather, it aims to show the structure of rationality and the mechanisms of subjugation. The truth that Foucault suggests in this fiction displaces what historians are concerned with. It is not the truth constituted by a universal principle. This truth is based on desubjectification, through attention to its history, and on the liberation of historical contents, by examining the effect of power. Hence, we can see Enlightenment as a matrix in which a network involving power, truth and the subject inspire a certain possibility of self-transformation, a network in which a confrontation exists between the art of being governed and that of not being governed. Foucault elucidates further how this historical-philosophical practice is to be conducted. It is more a philosophical ethos, a thinking, an attitude, than a feasible way of behaving. In
Foucault’s view, Kant’s critique of Enlightenment, as the understanding of the 18th century philosopher, is raised in terms of knowledge [*connaissance*], which starts with “what was the historical destiny of knowledge at the time of the constitution of modern science” (p. 58). This Kantian investigation links to the legitimacy and domination of historical modes of knowing in terms of scientific knowledge. Foucault, however, claims that Enlightenment must be related “not to the problem of knowledge, but to that of power” (p. 59). Foucault calls this as “an examination of ‘eventualization’” (ibid). The event of Enlightenment creates an opportunity for us to consider the contents of knowledge in terms of their diversity and heterogeneity, and to view them in the context of effects of power that are interwoven with a system of knowledge. Instead of finding out what is true or false, scientific or ideological, legitimate or abusive, as the study of conventional critical ethnography attempts, what we can do is to examine the interplay between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge [*savoir*]. And then there is the possibility of a breakthrough in the limits of our own *savoir*, which can take us beyond the frame of our current thinking.

Foucault’s conception of the Enlightenment is an example of his so-called “fiction”. It is not only the Enlightenment but also any event in our own history or in our current situation in the ethnographic field could be the material of a fiction. Writing and reading a fiction is an eventualization, through which a nexus of power, truth and subject is uncovered. Butler attempts to explain the meaning of this fiction. For her, in terms of genealogy, fiction is constituted between power/knowledge and its fragility, between rationalization and desubjugation. There are double tasks here in Butler’s view: the first is to show how current knowledge and power constitute the system of ordering this world. The second is to detect the breaking points, the contingent moments of this system. Therefore, through both the writing and reading
of fiction, researchers and readers may gain a critical distance on established authority and also instigate a practice that risks the subject at the limits of its order. These limits may be limits of both epistemology and ontology. In this process, according to Butler, the subject "is both crafted and crafting" (Butler, 2002, p. 19). In her view, the ontology of the self is unstable in the reading and writing of fiction. She calls this an "ontological suspension" (p. 17) in which human beings are always in the process of self-transformation. In the interpretation of Masschelein, fiction in Foucault's terms can be regarded as "the articulation of the failure (or destruction) of the actual government through exposing its games of truth and power" (Masschelein, 2006, p. 564). For him, truth in this fiction is not a truth in reality. Instead, it is a truth outside a regime of truth, so it is merely a fiction. I consider this fiction is also an ironic fiction because its ironic gesture mocks at the collapse of governance and of dominant power/knowledge. In Masschelein's view, reading and writing a fiction is a limit-experience in Foucault's terms. It is an experience that shows the possibility of transgressing oneself, of detaching oneself from being-governed (p. 572).

6.2.6 A critical ethnography of the self

I try to address the question: "How can an ethnographer write a 'fiction' in her study?" It seems to me that there are no instructions to guide us as to how to do this step by step. What we are concerned with is less a concrete research method than a philosophical ethos, an attitude or a historical-philosophical practice, as Foucault claims. However, several ideas may contribute to the methodology of critical ethnography here. First, the aim of an ethnographer is not to engage in the direct

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52 This "fiction" refers to the notion of fiction as Foucault uses it, not to the idea common in qualitative research of writing fiction.
pursuit of truth but, on the contrary, to consider the way of detaching oneself from that truth (or authority). The truth shown in her research is a different kind of truth, and this is not based on a specific rationality: its purpose is rather to delineate the order of this world through the observation of each event that happens in the field. On the strength of this the researcher can go further with a view to gaining a “critical distance” from that order, as Butler suggests. Second, while an ethnographer constitutes her field work as a research object, she herself is a subject who knows that both the field and her relation to it are so constructed. Namely, she constitutes herself as a subject through this exploration. Her subject is not fixed in the process, but rather, as Butler claims, is both crafted and crafting. We might say that doing critical ethnography creates the occasion for the ethnographer to change herself. This will involve a transformation of the relationship she has with her own knowledge—a knowledge of herself, a knowledge of others, and a knowledge of this world. This self-transformation makes possible a critique, a desubjectivation and an ethics of “de-governmentalization” (Masschelein and Simons, 2007). It is possible, I think, to relate a familiar attitude of anthropologists to this idea. This is that the anthropologist should bring curiosity with her into the field in such a way as to make familiar matters unfamiliar. The idea of the “familiar” suggests our fixed habits and ways of thinking. It can be seen as the limits of our own knowledge and, hence, as crucially to our way of governing ourselves. The action of making what is familiar unfamiliar might be seen as a practice of critique, a practice to prevent ourselves from being the same. Through this defamiliarization, a critical distance is made possible. Everything becomes new for ethnographers—with a new beginning and a new self-making. Third, I would like to suggest that it is not only the field of study as constructed in anthropological terms but also our selves and our knowledge that should be the concern of critical ethnography. This means that there are actually two fields in a
critical ethnographical study. A critical attitude concentrates both on the events and on the self. If we think of critical ethnography broadly, it can be a form of philosophical practice: “a critical ethnography of the self”\(^{53}\). In this research, everyone could be an ethnographer. Critical ethnography becomes a research of the self, a way of exploring oneself, through which one diagnoses the daily life of inertia, and defamiliarizes oneself with one’s surroundings in order to distance oneself from the dominant rationality. Truth, in this exploration, is not related to noting everyday experience at all, as the way a real ethnographer does. Rather, for a researcher of the self, truth is shown in “a willingness to become a stranger in the familiar present” (Masschelein and Simons, 2007). A stranger, as a critical subject, attempts to apply an alternative vision to look at his familiar present (the “field” in “a critical ethnography of the self”) by means of an attitude of insubordination, of disobedience. An experiment with a new way of living is then made possible in the present, and also in the future.

This critical ethnography of the self could also extend to the readers of this fiction. Reading is another action of research. Critique thus becomes a collective practice. For Foucault, not being governed can be both an individual and a collective attitude (Foucault, 2007, p. 67). In this critical ethnography of the self, this “self” may be a singular self or a collective self. In one of Foucault’s interviews, he claims that his books do not have particular value in themselves. He sees them rather as invitations or public gestures (Foucault, 2002, p. 245). Likewise, we may think, the purpose of writing a fiction is not to convince readers, but rather to offer them the opportunity to reflect on themselves through this story. This reflection is related to their experience

\(^{53}\) I am indebted to Maarten Simons for this idea.
of both objectivation and subjectivation. Though this fiction might be a local and personal story, it can welcome the participation of others; it can become public.

6.2.7 Conclusion

Instead of confronting those forms of oppression that arise from hegemony and ideology, Foucault’s idea of critique contributes an alternative approach to critical ethnography. Without presupposing truth or rationality, we may see that critical ethnography might offer, to borrow Butler’s words, “a non-prescriptive form of moral inquiry” (Butler, 2002, p. 6) that engenders a moral practice without prescription, without rules and without juridical law. Rather than liberating oppressed social groups and individuals, critique is an ethical practice aimed at emancipating ourselves from the dominant forms of power imposed on our own knowledge. This knowledge does not refer to the intention of knowing something or of arousing specific consciousness, but is what Foucault terms “the care of the self”. Writing and reading an ethnographic story, according to this idea, becomes the writing and reading of a “fiction”, in such a way as to display the tension between governmentalization and desubjugation, and to reveal the possibility of transgressing one’s limits and of transforming oneself. Not only a local site, but also the “self” can be an ethnographical field to be explored critically within critical ethnography.

In this chapter, two examples have been offered as illustrations in order to bring Foucault’s thought to bear on my own thought in relation to curriculum issues. I shall, in the next chapter, offer some brief concluding remarks regarding on the thesis as a whole. These will serve as a retrospective on what I have been doing in this thesis, and it will acknowledge those limitations of my study that I am aware of.
Chapter 7 Concluding remarks

In this thesis I have attempted to examine the use of the idea of power/knowledge in the work of four leading curriculum theorists. My purpose has been two-fold: first, to consider critically their adoption of this Foucauldian idea; second, to attempt to realize in my own work a kind of critical practice consonant with that idea. I have tried to show the extent to which each of these theorists is in or out of tune with that idea, and finally to offer two examples of my own to work in relation to problems in curriculum theory.

I am well aware that this project is vulnerable to certain dangers. In the first place, I have tried to avoid presenting myself as an exponent of Foucauldian orthodoxy: the very idea of an orthodoxy grates with the deconstructive nature of Foucault’s thought and practice. Nevertheless, it remains the case that nothing much can be said about Foucault or done with his work unless we have certain notions of what constitutes richer or poorer adoptions of his thought. Clearly I believe that my own interpretation is borne out by a close reading of his text and of the leading secondary literature on his work; in this respect I follow conventional academic good practice. But this is not to imply a canonical reading, something that the very nature of power/knowledge (as capillary rather than as sovereign) is intended to undermine. It is considered instead to be a way of going beyond the sovereign mode of the adoption of Foucault in curriculum theories, and of doing this in the light of the groundwork of Foucault’s
thought. In the field of curriculum studies, most work has been dominated by the prominence of Marxism or neo-Marxism. Even though a Foucauldian perspective is drawn on in this field, the conception of knowledge within the idea of power/knowledge is typically characterized by what I think of as a kind of (neo-)Marxism or critical theory. This is a conception that I have set out to break through in terms of power/knowledge.

In the second, I have not set out entirely to reject the work of the theorists in question, which in various respects I find valuable—that of Popkewitz, in particular. My purpose has been more specific: to consider the distortions effected in the adoption of Foucault’s idea. Popkewitz’s work, in my view, has touched the core of Foucault’s thought, and it offers a new approach to thinking of curriculum issues, compared with other curriculum theorists in my critique. What we need is the new explorations like this enabled by employing philosophical perspectives, rather than merely using philosophy as an instrument to prove presupposed ideas.

In the third, it should be clear that the project involves a subtle line of argument. Such is the nature of power/knowledge, and such is the nature of the misinterpretation, that the problem does not lead us to knock-down arguments. The very point of Foucault’s work, as is the case with that of other poststructuralists, is altogether more subtle. It is to reveal the operations of language at a level that is less easily disclosed than the logical stages of clear-cut premises and tidy conclusions.

I am aware of limitations in this study in certain respects. First, the idea of power/knowledge recurs in the various stages of Foucault’s work, and it is modified in the process. Yet this modification is sometimes overstated, and it is often theorized
in an overly systematic way. My own view, as stated at the start of Chapter 3, is that these changes should not be exaggerated and that it is more fruitful to explore the intertwining of different threads in Foucault’s thought. In any case, because of the constraints of word-length, it has not been possible for me to argue this here, and so in some sense it has been beyond the scope of this study to do justice to these changes. The route I adopt in this thesis is to follow the main account in Foucault’s primary work with regard to this concept. My belief is that my own understanding of this term perhaps more closely approaches Foucault’s later viewpoint than his earlier one.

Second, my reading of the curriculum theorists in question is highly selective. My purpose was to examine the specific question of their take-up of the idea of power/knowledge. I do not attempt any more global assessment of their respective considerable contributions to curriculum theory, for this also would have been beyond the scope of the thesis. Hence, I am aware that I may be thought not to be doing them sufficient justice. But I would also like to reinforce the stronger point made in the introduction to Chapter 2. This is that the motivation for writing this thesis comes in part from my sense of the ways that Foucault has commonly been misappropriated in educational research, particularly through his being read in neo-Marxist terms, with power/knowledge understood in terms of sovereign power. It would have been easy for me to identify serious misreadings of this kind, for these are prevalent enough. Instead, and in order to test out my ideas more rigorously, I have chosen to concentrate on leading curriculum theorists who write in a particularly Foucauldian vein. If I have been able to make case in relation to the most sophisticated exponents of such views, it has been all the more valuable and academically robust.
Third, there is the pervasive problem of language. I am a native Chinese speaker writing in English about a philosopher who wrote in French! Inevitably, some meanings are lost in this process. Is there a chance that something is gained too? My hope is that my different cultural background, and the linguistic resources this has, can in its own way feed into this study to beneficial effect.

Finally, I would like to say that this thesis has been a development from my earlier work in a way that has been a kind of experiment for me and, at the same time, an important experience. It has built on my earlier work in a particularly pertinent way. In 2005, I completed a PhD at National Kaohsiung Normal University on the topic “The implementation of ‘Grade 1-9 Curriculum’ in a primary school—Perspectives of Critical Pedagogy”. This was a qualitative empirical study of an ethnographic kind into new curriculum reform in Taiwan, carried out in a primary school. During the time that I was working on this I was committed to certain theoretical assumptions, but gradually I became less confident of these. It was the way that I was coming to question these that led me to seek the opportunity to pursue study of a more philosophical kind into the theories in question. Through this philosophical exploration, I became aware that my own understanding of the ideas of power and knowledge in curriculum had also been dominated by neo-Marxist assumptions.

The thinking behind the two examples that I have raised in Chapter Six constitutes in fact my own limit attitude: in Foucault’s terms. I have attempted to expose my philosophical attitude and stance through making these available to the reader. This very process has taken me beyond any previous understanding of them that I may have had. That is, through reading Foucault, my limit-experience has been induced in
facing the issues of looking at the import of critical pedagogy in my country and of doing curriculum studies by way of an ethnographical approach. This *limit-experience*, drawn by this study, offers me an opportunity to transgress the limits of my previous work, and also to wrench myself from the sovereign concept that has been imposed upon curriculum studies.
Bibliography


