LOVE IN EDUCATION,
A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MAX SCHELER

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Abstract

My two main purposes in this thesis are to clarify the essential meanings of love and to understand how central it is in educational activities aimed at the cultivation of the person. This thesis consists of three main parts and has nine chapters.

Attention in Part I is focused on the exposition of Plato's eros, Aristotle's philia, Christian agape, Confucian love, Hume's indirect passion of love, Butler's self-love and Kant's practical love. It is shown that the significance of love in human life includes the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom, the unfolding of human nature, the establishment of friendship in human relationships, and openness to transcendental objects.

In Part II, referring to the phenomenology of Max Scheler, it is pointed out that the person-as-lover is the one with his own unique ordo amoris, the order or ordering of love. Meanwhile, it is in the continuous movement of heart that the individual's ordo amoris determines whether he/she becomes a genuine lover in manifesting pre-reflective life as well as reflective life, forming second-order desires and volition as well as first-order desires, establishing subject-subject relations as well as subject-object relations with others, being an intentional self rather than an ecstatically immersed self, performing social acts as well as singularizing acts, possessing situation-intuiting capacity as well as means-end calculating capacity, all of which are highly relevant to the formation of the ethos in a given historical period.
In Part III, the central position of love in education is indicated in terms of the investigation of love and autonomy, the education of the emotions, and the pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love. It is suggested that fundamentally educational activities should be based on pedagogical love; on this basis the pedagogical relationship can prevent authority in education from becoming the pure use of power and make possible the development of *ordo amoris* in pupils.
Acknowledgments

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Again I never forget my friends and their help. Adi, Angel, Charles, Christian, Lee-kun, Linda, Michael, Mu-lung, Timothy, etc. Thank all of you. Last but not least, I would like to thank my examiners, Professor David Cooper and Dr. Paddy Walsh, for their precious recommendations. Also, my debt is to Taiwan Government and Institute of Education.
CONTENTS

Abstract
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations

Introduction

Part I: The Main Interpretations of Love in the History of Ideas

Chapter 1 Interpretations of love in ancient thought and the Christian and Confucian traditions

1-1. Plato's *eros*: the power continuously to ascend the scale of values

1-2. Aristotle's *philia*: the stable disposition to wish and do our friends good for their own sake

1-3. Christian *agape*: the love of God as the example of neighbour-love

1-4. Confucian love: the perfect or general virtue of mind and the giving of life

Chapter 2 Interpretations of love in modern western philosophy

2-1. Hume's love: the agreeable indirect passion directed to others

2-2. Butler's self-love: the pursuit of private happiness
2-3. Kant's love: the practical love as the accompanying feeling of carrying out duties

Part II: Scheler's phenomenology of love

Chapter 3 What is loved: the object which possesses value
3-1. Love in Scheler's non-formal ethics of values
3-2. What is loved
3-3. The value of love
3-4. The cognition of values and love

Chapter 4 The way love is directed to its object
4-1. Love as the movement of heart
4-2. Love as an emotional act
4-3. Love as a spiritual feeling

Chapter 5 Who is the lover: the person
5-1. The meaning and nature of the person as the lover
5-2. The community of love as the collective lover

Chapter 6 The essential meaning of love
6-1. Sympathy
6-2. The essential meaning of love
6-3. The embodiment of love
6-4. The order of love
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part III: Love in Education</th>
<th>202</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7 Autonomy and love</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-1. Three conceptions of autonomy</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-2. The status of emotions in the activities of autonomous mind</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-3. Love and autonomy</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-4. Autonomy in education</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8 The reexamination of the education of the emotions</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-1. Mind</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-2. Reason</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-3. The nature of the emotions</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-4. The education of the emotions</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 9 The pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-1. The main features of the teacher-pupil relationship in school</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-2. Authority in education</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-3. The authority of the teacher</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-4. The pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Abbreviations

Plato:
SYMP           Symposium

Aristotle:
NIC           Nicomachean Ethics

Confucius:
ANA           Analects

Mencius:
MEN           Mencius

Hume:
THN           A Treatise of Human Nature
EHU           Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and
              Concerning the Principles of Morals

Butler:
FIF           Fifteen Sermons

Kant:
CPR           Critical of Practical Reason
TMM           The Metaphysics of Morals
GMM           Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
TEA           The End of All Things
OBS           Observations on The Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime

Scheler:
FORM          Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A
              New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical
              Personalism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REST</td>
<td>Ressentiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIM</td>
<td>On the Eternal in Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYM</td>
<td>The Nature of Sympathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSK</td>
<td>Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPE</td>
<td>Selected Philosophical Essays</td>
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<td>PER</td>
<td>Philosophical Perspective</td>
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<td>PSV</td>
<td>Person and Self-Value</td>
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<td>MPN</td>
<td>Man's Place in Nature</td>
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<td>TMS</td>
<td>The Meaning of Suffering</td>
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<td>LAK</td>
<td>Love and Knowledge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

My fundamental belief in the necessity of this study is that education should take the educated as a whole, viz. the affective, cognitive and volitional aspects of human nature, into account. My lived experiences seem to suggest that, although the autonomous position of emotions and their origin and variation are vague and invisible, their existence and influences on both individuals and society are undeniable facts. If emotions have distinctive features, which can be either conducive or harmful to the cultivation of an ideal person, then the unfolding of human affective life should not become the victim of the one-sided development of other facets of human nature. Otherwise, apart from the education of the emotions, that of cognition, skills, etc., will deteriorate as the result of this ignorant neglect. What is not less important is that only the person who can know himself can educate himself and others appropriately and well. Namely, the understanding of human emotion is necessary for becoming a genuine teacher, as well as for the establishment of educational theories.

Among emotions, the feeling of love seems to attract the attention of various thinkers everywhere and at all times. Etymologically, the term 'philosophy' consists of love (philia) and wisdom (sophia). Beneath the continuous wisdom-pursuing activities is the underpinning and motivating power of love, without which both philosophizing and the establishment of philosophy seem to be not likely. Even in some of the religious practices and thinking, God is experienced or interpreted as love, the loss
of which might be understood as the basic reason for exclusiveness found in different religions or even within a religion. Then one puzzle arising in my mind is whether the sort of love apparent in philosophy, religion, etc., is the archetypal emotion in educational activities, if there is one. Is the teacher who undertakes his job with the same passion as the philosopher's pursuit of wisdom or as parents' sacrifice for their children the ideal teacher? Without further investigating the essential meaning of love and its proper manifestation in educational contexts, the above question is hard to answer clearly. As a corollary, understanding love in education becomes the main concern in my investigation.

The special reference to Max Scheler's phenomenology of love is not accidental. In contrast to the external casual explanation of emotional phenomena, the phenomenological attitude suggested by him, by means of the noetic-noematic relationship of emotional intentionality, allows the human subjective meaning to be involved in emotional experiences and, on the other hand, human emotional experiences to reveal their essential features rather than being confined into a presupposed inflexible framework. In particular, in Scheler's thought as a whole, the feeling of love is closely related to the person-as-lover and to values and their carriers as the beloved. These insights concerning emotions, the person and values can provide a fruitful pointer to the essential meaning of love. More important, his discussion of ordo amoris, the order or ordering of love, takes the developmental and dynamic aspects of the cultivation of heart as the locus of human affective life into consideration. In the light of this uniqueness, the exploration of values, emotions and the person is summarized in the discussion of the order of love in Part II.
Prior to making any reference to Max Scheler's phenomenology, some of the interpretations of love in the history of ideas are dealt with as a preparation for further examination. The main purpose is gradually to make the essential meaning and significance of love and its essential relationship with values and the person more visible. On the one hand, if there is an essential meaning of love, it must be explicitly or implicitly implied in human experiences and interpretations of love. On the other hand, because human consciousness is located in a given historical, cultural and social situation, the reference to various but relevant understandings of the same topic makes a hermeneutical dialogue possible, instead of the understanding being restricted to the spirit of any particular time. What is discussed in Part I includes Plato's *eros*, Aristotle's *philia*, Christian *agape*, Confucian *jen* and love, Hume's indirect passion of love, Butler's self-love and Kant's practical love.

How central the feeling of love should be to the educational profession is another of my concerns. After clarifying the essential meaning of love, I consider what the relationship is between the person-as-lover and the autonomous person as in the commonly-advocated educational ideal, whether the recognition of the position of love in the stratification of human emotions can shed any light on the education of the emotions, and how the essential meaning of love is embodied in educational activities in connection with the teacher-pupil relationship and the authority of the teacher. Therefore, the main concern in Part III is to show how central pedagogical love should be to the educational profession, in terms of the philosophical investigation of three significant themes, viz. love and autonomy (the etymological elements of which are 'auto', self, and
'nomos', norms or principles), the reexamination of the education of the emotions, and the pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love.
Part I: The Main Interpretations of Love in the History of Ideas

Chapter 1 Interpretations of love in ancient thought and the Christian and Confucian traditions

1-1. Plato's *eros*: the power continuously to ascend the scale of values

1-2. Aristotle's *philia*: the stable disposition to wish and do our friends good for their own sake

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1-4. Confucian love: the perfect or general virtue of mind and the giving of life

Chapter 2 Interpretations of love in modern western philosophy

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2-2. Butler's self-love: the pursuit of private happiness

2-3. Kant's love: the practical love as the accompanying feeling of carrying out duties
Part I: The main interpretations of love in the history of ideas

Due to the fact that human beings are sentient creatures, the existence of human emotions, including love, can undoubtedly be traced back to the beginning of human history. In Homer's epic, Aphrodite is described as an Olympian goddess of love, while Hesiod confers on her a unique nature and birth, i.e. the creation of Uranus' castrated organ (Dover, 1980, 1; Bergmann, 1987, 3–4, 20 & 33). Eros, a strong desire in Homer's epic, is armed by Euripides with bow and arrows and becomes another Greek god of love. Then, love also attracts philosophers' attention and plays a crucial role in philosophical thought. Plato's eros in the Symposium and Aristotle's philia in the Nicomachean Ethics separately depict different characteristics of love. With the coming of the Christian era, agape and caritas manifest the new aspect of love. Apart from western literators and philosophers, ancient Chinese thinkers do not ignore the significance of love either. For instance, in Confucian thought, love mainly is the fulfillment of jen, the foundation of other virtues, in human relations. This point will be illuminated in what follows. Even from the above rough description of love, it is easy to find why, as Outka suggests, a single English term 'love' is insufficient and imprecise to cover such profound phenomena (1992, 742). On the other hand, it can be said that the English word 'love' at least contains three different Greek and Latin words for love, i.e. 'eros, amor, erotic or sexual love', 'philia, delictio, friendly love' and 'agape, caritas, divine love or the love of God and of one's self and others as creatures of God' (Adler & Doren, 1977,
At the beginning of this investigation, Santas' very simplistic chart, which indicates roughly only the denotations or semantic fields of the English 'love', philia, eros and agape, not their connotations or meanings, is helpful in understanding the possible relations among the four terms. In the following chart, it can be found that philia in ancient Greek is used to signify two kinds of love: familial love and the love of friendship (1988, 8~9 & 12).

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<th>LOVE</th>
<th>Philia</th>
<th>Eros</th>
<th>Agape</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Familial Love</td>
<td>Sexual Love</td>
<td>Christian Love</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Friendship</td>
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<td>God–Man</td>
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<td>Parental</td>
<td>Male–Female</td>
<td>Male–Male</td>
<td>Man–God</td>
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<tr>
<td>Filial</td>
<td>Male–Male</td>
<td>Female–Female</td>
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<td>Sibling</td>
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In the light of the aforementioned understanding, what will be dealt with in this part is not only modern western thought about love, but also the ancient western and Chinese ones. However, admittedly due to the limit of capacity and space, the exclusion of other great thinkers and thoughts on love does not mean that they are not important. Therefore, in order to grasp the inherent features of love, I will in order illumine the eros and philia of the ancient Greeks, the agape of Christianity, and jen of Chinese philosophy in Chapter 1; and modern western philosophical thought about love in Chapter 2, in which Hume, Butler and Kant are representatives.
In this chapter, four interpretations of love in western and eastern thought are going to be discussed. Behind their various distinctive characteristics, some common concerns can be found in the following discussion, which are capable of bringing out the significance of love. They include the role of love in our individual and social life, the objects of love and the pursuit of what is valuable, human nature and its unfolding, etc., all of which are based on the intrinsic features of love.

1-1. Plato's eros

Plato, in his great works about eros, discusses in detail how human beings, as one kind of mortal creature, eagerly pursue immortality and wisdom, the love of which is the etymological meaning of philosophy. In his Symposium, Plato brilliantly describes how the power of eros enables human beings to become philosophers, the lovers of wisdom, rather than sophists, the possessors of wisdom. Moreover, in the process of striving for wisdom, human desires can be diverted into different channels, in which eros plays a pivotal role. Owing to the fact that without the aid of eros there is no likelihood of becoming a philosopher, Plato's doctrine of eros, mostly suggested in the Symposium, can be regarded as the education of desire, which, as well as the education of the purely intellectual, is also necessary for a philosopher-king (Cornford, 1978, 121).
In contrast to the atmosphere of Plato's Phaedo, in which death and its significance for the perfect man are articulated at twilight, in the Symposium the praise of love happens in the brilliant light of Agathon's banquet (Cornford, op. cit., 119). The whole story which occurred in Glaucon's childhood is recollected and stated by him in accordance with Plato's epistemology of 'recall'. After reaching agreement to eulogize love (SYMP, 117a6–8), everyone in turn delivers his eulogy. Phaedrus suggests that the god of love is the oldest one and without parents (SYMP, 178c2, 179a1–a2). He also emphasizes the visible and effective aspects of love. Pausanias distinguishes Heavenly Aphrodite from Common Aphrodite and claims the former is better than the latter (SYMP, 180d9–e1, 181b1–d1 & 184d1–d5). Eryximachus, from the standpoint of medicine, describes the phenomenon of love as the harmony of opposition in all affairs (SYMP, 186d7–188b7). Aristophanes, using the legend of the 'circle-man' of three genders, points out that love is the healer of human wounds by restoring us to our former state (SYMP, 189d8–193d4). Then, after having pointed out the only right way of composing any panegyric, Agathon advocates that love is beauty, good, and wisdom (SYMP, 194e4–197b10). These Greek traditional viewpoints of love might stand for the different Athenian opinions of love at that time and form the background to Plato's theory of eros (Bergmann, 1987, 43; Santas, 1988, 15).

What is the object of eros in Plato's Symposium? Before praising love, Socrates interrogates Agathon and points out his weakness (SYMP, 190c10–201c9). At the same time, the objects of Plato's eros can be discovered in this process of dialogue. The first consensus in this dialogue is that love exists only in relation to some object and that that
object must be something which is at present lacking (SYMP, 200e9~10). However, if Agathon suggests that love is beauty, good and wisdom, then gods do not need love because they are self-sufficient and do not lack anything. Additionally, Diotima from whom Socrates claims to hear the art of love says '---but according to my view of the matter, my friend, love is not desire either of the half or the whole, unless that half or whole happens to be good.' (SYMP, 205e1) Obviously, Plato disagrees with Aristophanes and suggests that what we love is objects with some sort of positive significance for us, rather than the external things without any meaning of value.

From another point of view, the objects of Plato's *eros* are our true selves. In Lysis, Socrates points out that, if A loves B, he does so because of some benefit he needs from B and for the sake of just that benefit. For instance, the sick love their doctor for the sake of health, the poor love the affluent and the weak the strong for the sake of aid. But what is the final object for the sake of which we love all else? Socrates' answer is 'the good' (Vlastos, 1972, 8~11). However, in Plato's mind, 'the good' is something which belongs naturally to ourselves, but from which we have been separated (Kosman, 1976, 60~61). Therefore, Plato's passionate erotic love, mainly discussed in the Symposium and Phaedrus, can be regarded as self-love, that is to say, a human being eagerly searches for his true self with the aid of *eros* and tries to return to the noumenal world where his self and Ideas are united.

A further question closely relevant to the objects of Plato's *eros* is the status *eros* plays in human nature. By means of the legend of Contrivance and Poverty, Plato hints at the abundant and deficient aspects of human
nature (SYMP, 203b1–203d6). Additionally, the fact that what we love is something which we lack and must be something good does not mean human beings are always in a state of deficiency. Otherwise, philosophers, the pursuers of wisdom, are those who always lack wisdom. In fact, *eros* is an intermediate demon who is half-way between mortal and immortal (SYMP, 202a7–203a8). Diotima initiates Socrates to understand that there is something existing between knowledge and ignorance, and between beauty and ugliness. Therefore, that love is neither good nor beautiful does not imply love is evil or ugly. Put in a different way, when *eros* helps us to be aware of our ignorance, it also empowers us to strive for wisdom. In this way *eros* becomes the power to transcend ourselves and pursue goodness and happiness.

The rhythm of life impelled by *eros*, as Plato describes, is not a temporary phenomenon, but is the passion for immortality and the desire for the perpetual possession of the good (SYMP, 206a10, 207a2–3). For instance, mortal creatures seek to perpetuate themselves and become immortal by procreation, physically as well as in other ways. In the Symposium, Plato gives us three concrete ways of partaking in immortality, these are physical procreation, the search for a glorious reputation and the begetting of wisdom and virtue (SYMP, 206b8–209b1). Actually, beneath the pursuits of health, wealth, reputation, knowledge, wisdom etc., it is *eros* which decides the priority of various desires. For instance, a miser gives priority to having money and hates spending it. A philosopher, without neglecting other desires, regards knowledge and wisdom as more important than other things. Consequently, without *eros* a human being is incapable of forming a harmonious system of desires and knowing which desire deserves to be
pursued. In this case, he will be in a state of ambivalence and be uncertain about how to respond to the conflict in his desires, except that he will feel badly - unhappy - about any outcome which is harmful for his well-being (Campbell, 1979, 170–181).

The reason why Plato's *eros* has the ability to decide the harmony and priority of human desires lies in the fact that its feature of movement can help us to ascend in the ladder of values. This particular nature is expressed in Plato's presentation of the scale of love which cannot be credited to the historical Socrates (Cornford, op. cit., 129; Vlastos, 1972, 21). In the Symposium, Diotima further tries to initiate Socrates into the following love-mysteries (SYMP, 210a9–211a4).

1) He will first fall in love with one particular beautiful person and beget noble sentiments in partnership with him;

2) Later he will observe that physical beauty in one person is closely akin to physical beauty in any person.---He will become the lover of all physical beauty;

3) He will reckon beauty of soul more valuable than beauty of body;

4) He will be compelled to contemplate beauty as it exists in activities and institutions;

5) From morals he must be directed to the sciences and contemplate their beauty;

6) At last, he catches sight of one unique science whose object is beauty. The beauty is eternal, absolute, existing along with itself and unique.

One point deserving special attention here is that this sort of movement of value-promoting can appear in both individual and social aspects. Firstly
it provides those who love their true selves with the energy to transcend the present self and reach the ideal self. For example, in the process of human development, we will love and make the effort to get what is worthwhile in our system of value, such as to be a teacher, to keep a promise, not to violate the law and so on. Hence in this case the movement of love underlies the direction of individual life. On the other hand, from the standpoint of society and culture, the movement of love is the latent factor deciding the development of every society and culture. Suppose we are brought up in a society with the slave trade or in a culture in which women bind their feet for a so-called aesthetic purpose. If our horizon of values can be widened, then human beings will reflect on their customs and ethos. Perhaps when the intrinsic value of human life or health is taken into consideration, slavery and feet-binding might be abolished. As the result of the movement inherent in love, the societies which consist of a value-promoting ethos can continuously reflect on their institutions. This significance of love for our individual and social life will be explored more in Part II.

In every stage of Plato's scale of love, beauty is one necessary condition of value-promoting. As Moravcsik suggests, this labour yielded by the collaboration between *nous* and *eros* contains three types of steps, in which emotion-steps, distinguished from reason-steps and creation-steps, could initiate a series of steps and bring about creations (1972, 285–289). It can be said that in the movement of love we come to recognize the vision of higher value in the beloved. Nevertheless, Diotima emphasizes, it is only in beauty that the procreation in bodies or in souls happens. In addition to physical procreation, the search for a glorious reputation, which would live for ever in men's memory, and the begetting of wisdom
and virtue are also the ways to partake in immortality (SYMP, 206b8–209b1). In pouring new life into the traditional meaning of eros, Plato's eros lends to Psyche the wings that will carry her from the phenomenal world to the world of Ideas (Kosman, 1976, 57–58). As a result, love becomes a necessary component of human cognition, the goal of which is to widen and deepen our horizons of knowledge. On the other hand, it is true to say that Plato's eros is selective in its objects of partnership.

The impression Plato's Symposium gives us seems to be that the lover only considers his own immortality and the beauty instantiated in the beloved is regarded as just a springboard for the grasping of the highest beauty and good. That is the reason why Vlastos accuses Plato's theory of love of ranking personal affection so low and not providing for love of whole persons, but only for love of an abstract version of persons (1972, 30–31). However, in the ascending of the scale of love, Plato reminds us of procreating virtue in the beloved, that is, calling the other to be his true self (Kosman, 1976, 64–65). Plato also points out that, by sharing their children and the upbringing of them, the lover and the beloved can establish a stronger and far closer partnership than ordinary parents (SYMP, 209e). Moreover Nussbaum claims that, in the speech of Alcibiades in the Symposium and in Phaedrus, Plato describes more personal features of passionate love (1986, 165–228; 1990, 314–335; Price, 1981, 33–34). In loving Socrates, Alcibiades feels that the light of Socrates appears all at once. Then Socrates' virtues are mentioned in the process of describing the wholeness of a unique personality. Due to the openness and madness of the lover, he begins to have access to insights that are not available within the dry life of the non-lover.
Plato's *eros* tells us some characteristics of human love. What we love is something with values, including our true selves, rather than the external things which make no sense to our systems of value. In other words, our selves are beings with value and could be the objects of love. Although human beings possess both qualities of deficiency and abundance, furthermore, love is the power which propels us to go beyond our present selves. Meanwhile, the movement of love decides the harmony of our desires and the level of value-promotion. Whereas the emergence of this movement, in Plato's mind, relies on the awareness of the beauty of the beloved.

1-2. Aristotle's *philia*

Aristotle, mostly in his Ethics, discusses the psychological manifestation and moral value of friendship, as one kind of human interrelationship. He points out that man is a social animal, and the need for company is in his blood. From the individual viewpoint, friends are our second-self from whom we can obtain self-knowledge which is conducive to our flourishing life. The different kinds of friendship, moreover, also decide different forms of political constitution. Doubtless both the active friendship of a close and intimate kind and the 'civic friendship' are essential human goods. For this reason, Cooper suggests that Aristotle's discussion of friendship contains a very significant amplification of the theory of moral virtue and the investigation of friendship can help us to completely understand his theory of virtue (1980, 303).
Before pointing out the objects of *philia*, Aristotle distinguishes friendship from liking and goodwill in terms of examining the conditions of friendship. To be friends men must have reciprocal goodwill, wishing each other well, and knowledge of the existence of this feeling (NIC, 1155b–1156a). First, liking has the character of an emotion, friendship that of a confirmed disposition (NIC, 1157b). Hence, such senseless objects as stones, books, etc., can become the objects of our liking. But only mutual liking originating in deliberate choice can be called friendship. Additionally, we can have goodwill towards strangers or anyone who is not aware of our feeling. Due to the absence of reciprocity, goodwill can only be inactive or potential friendship (NIC, 1167a).

Thus far two differences can be found between Plato's *eros* and Aristotle's *philia*. When Alcibiades falls in love with Socrates, reciprocal goodwill is not required as a necessary condition. Plato's *eros* represents a one-way relationship in which human beings fall in love with what is beautiful and good. On the other hand, Aristotle's *philia* is a mutual act in which both partners recognize each other's goodwill. In addition to this, what can be loved in Plato's *eros* is wider than what can be our friends. The former is what can embody beauty, including bodies, souls, activities, institutions and Plato's Ideas. In contrast, it is only among human beings, who can show and acknowledge goodwill mutually, that friendship can emerge. For Plato's *eros*, only by sharing their children and the upbringing of them can the lover and the beloved establish their partnership.
After pointing out the differences between friendship, liking and goodwill, Aristotle tries to divide friendship into three species in accordance with its three objects. According to the intentions toward and their conceptions of one another, Aristotle finds three varieties of friendship, i.e. virtue-friendship, pleasure-friendship and usefulness-friendship (NIC, 156a~1157a; Cooper, 1980, 301~317). In virtue-friendship, what we love is each other's character. Whenever human beings mutually recognize the virtue of their partners in a way, not necessarily in all ways, after a period of living together, they are likely to be conscious of reciprocal goodwill and then a full-fledged friendship will exist. If the bond is based upon pleasure or usefulness of partners, then it will be pleasure-friendship or usefulness-friendship.

Aristotle follows ordinary language and resists the temptation to hold that pleasure-friendship and usefulness-friendship are not friendships at all (Fortenbaugh, 1975, 53; Walker, 1979, 187~188; Cooper, op. cit., 301~317). However, the basic difference lies in the fact that virtue-friendship is without qualification but the other two friendships are with qualification. The reason for this restriction is that, in Aristotle's mind, good qualities of character are deep-seated moral characteristics and are, once fully acquired, permanent or nearly so, but pleasantness and advantageousness, just due to their incidental properties, are subject to change. Though we wish and act for the good of our friends for the sake of them, not ourselves, virtue-friendship is relatively more stable than the other lesser friendships. According to the same reason, virtue-friendship, the best and perfect friendship suggested by Aristotle, is not easily to be found and is a slow-ripening fruit (NIC, 1156b). In contrast to virtue-friendship, if our intentions toward friends are based on pleasure or
uselessness, this kind of friendship is not only more likely to change, but is also easily mixed with self-seeking interest.

From the viewpoint of the objects of love, both Plato's eros and Aristotle's philia presume the different height of values and levels of love. In Plato's scale of values, eros ascends from relative, particular and individual values to absolute, universal and eternal ones. The stagnation of ascending motion stands for a break in value-promotion. The assumption of the height of value, implied in the objects of love, is similar to that in Plato's divided line of knowledge, according to which Ideas are different from hallucination, opinions and mathematical knowledge. With regard to Aristotle's philia, although he does not mention the scale and the movement of love, the distinction between virtue-friendship, pleasure-friendship and usefulness-friendship does assume the difference in height of the values we grasp in virtue, pleasure and usefulness. Depending on the division of the human soul into the vegetative element, the appetite and in general the desiring element and the intellectual element, the friendship based on virtues, intellectual or moral, is regarded as the most perfect and most valuable.

In Aristotle's virtue-friendship, we wish and act for the good of our friends for the sake of them, not ourselves. One implication we can find in this statement, I think, is that Aristotle recognizes the possibility of altruistic behaviour originating in human love. This point is more clearly found in his discussion of self-love. Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics ix. 4 discusses the nature and importance of self-love. He says 'Friendly relations with one's neighbour, and the marks by which friends are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself.' (NIC,
1165) and '---he is related to his friend as to himself--for his friend is another self.' Obviously, although friendship can not be reduced to self-love, the understanding of the latter can be extended to and is conducive to that of the former. Furthermore, whether one can love others or have the best and perfect friendship, i.e. virtue-friendship, which is based on the loving of mutual character, but not on pleasure or usefulness, depends on his relationship to himself.

What is self-love in the Nicomachean Ethics? Aristotle suggests that self-love is to love the intellectual element of the human being, which is regarded as one's true self (1166a). When Aristotle describes five marks by which people define friendship, he also thinks that '---each of these is true of the good man's relation to himself.' (NIC, 1166a). Hence, in order to make the meaning of self-love clear, it is worth quoting the passage at length. A friend is one who '(1) wishes and does what is good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend, or (2) wishes his friend to exist and live, for his sake;---(3) others define him as one who lives with and (4) has the same tastes as another, or (5) grieves and rejoices with his friend;--'

From these five marks, we find some requirements for a lover of self. In the first place, owing to ignorance, human beings often desire what is harmful to our selves. To obtain correct self-knowledge about our desires could help us to reduce ignorance. Next, to see ourselves as having an independent and equal intrinsic worth vis-a-vis every other self (Campbell, 1979, 265~272). With respect for ourselves, we regard the real desires of ourselves as worthy of gratification. Then, as living together is one of the conditions of friendship, we should spend time on living with and reflecting on our self. Fourthly, the true lover of self
should have the same ideals and choices as his or her self. That means to avoid any conflict in the priority of desires or weakness of will in the resolution. Finally, we should share the perception of our self. Otherwise, the divided and unembodied self will lose contact with any reality and then wither.

The good man is a lover of others as well as a self-lover, because he is related to his friend as to his self. As Aristotle says, 'Therefore the good man should be a lover of self, for he will both profit himself by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows.' (NIC, 1169a) Nevertheless, it is often doubted whether the good man in doing noble behaviour is acting just for his own interest. If he aims only at satisfying his desire to help others, can he be properly considered as altruistic, rather than egoistic? Similarly, if Plato's lover merely pursues the contemplation of Ideas, does he love the beloved for his partner's sake? Suppose we are faced with a disastrous situation in which someone or something is burning in a fire, both Aristotle's philia and Plato's eros are possible reasons why we rush to rescue the objects of our love.

In the above situation, if the person in danger is my friend, out of virtue-friendship I regard him or her as another self and naturally regard his or her disaster as mine. When loving the beloved or our friends for their own sake, even in pleasure-friendship and usefulness-friendship human beings also can love their friends without considering their own interest, let alone the choice of heroism (Cooper, 1980; Annas, 1988, 9). If what is in danger, for instance a painting or a forest, becomes the beloved of Plato's eros, then we, the lovers, in view of the vision of beauty or good grasped in it, try to deliver it from extinction. In this case, we actualize
the meaning of a higher value as well as benefiting other people or things. Though the need for friends implies the deficiencies inherent in human nature and their mode of living suggested by Cooper (1980, 317-331), without the abundance of wishing for the good of friends for their own sake or pursuing the values of a higher level, one is less likely to find Aristotle's philia and Plato's eros. Even though Plato's eros strives for the universal good and happiness and Aristotle's philia loves the virtue of a particular person, both of them as the motivations of human moral behaviour are beyond the frame of egoism-altruism, in which moral behaviour is exclusively classified into either the former or the latter.

Both eros and philia have the nature of selection. Eros is closely bound up with the vision of beauty, which can be regarded as the door towards Ideas. Similarly philia is based upon the awareness of the quality of a person, such as virtue, pleasure or usefulness. Only in finding these qualities can we yield the dialogue of beauty or friendship. As a result, from the experience of actual life, Aristotle contends that the number of friends should be limited and great friendship can only be felt towards a few people (NIC, 1171a). In everyday life, a human being may fall in love with the good or the beautiful and make the effort to be unified with them. It is also common to make friends with someone with the same character and find the support necessary for the development of character. However, is it possible to love anyone valueless or without character in common? This issue brings us to the discussion of Christian agape.
Apart from Plato's *eros* and Aristotle's *philia*, with the advent of the Christian era, *agape*, love of God, becomes one kind of love in western history. Originally, the term *agape* is used by Greek eroticism as the relationship between erastes and eromens. As Kristeva points out (1987, 59), Paul is the first person who gives *agape* Christian value and makes it similar to the love in the Old Testament. Deuteronomy says 'Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength.' (6:5). Leviticus also says '---love your neighbour as yourself.' (19:18). Upon the essential spirit formed from these two commandments hangs the whole thought of Christian ethics. Even to the extent that, according to Christian situation ethics, all laws and rules and principles and ideals and norms are only contingent, only valid if they happen to serve love in any situation (Fletcher, 1985, 139). Although theologians and ethicists interrogate the all-inclusiveness of *agape*, its importance and influence are undeniable facts.

Christian love in the Bible is the love of God, but not human love for God. In fact, God is the identity of love. 1 John (4:16) says 'God is Love. Whoever lives in love lives in God, and God in him.' Therefore, due to the self-sufficiency and infinity of God, the love originating in God is disinterested and uncaused. That means, without our desire for His love, God loves us first and generously, and, without striving for human repayment, the love of God is spontaneous and not conditioned by human beings. In contrast, human loves, including Plato's *eros*, Aristotle's *philia*, romantic love etc., are interested and caused by deficiency and abundance.
in human nature. The reason why only agape unilaterally gives favour without demanding any mutual goodwill or benefit is also the self-sufficiency of God.

In addition to disinterestedness and spontaneity, the love of God manifests the features of equality and creativity. The objects of Christian love include the worthless as well as the worthy, the virtuous and the vicious. This universality is clearly portrayed in Mark 2:17, 'I have not come to call the righteous, but sinners.' and Matthew 5:45, 'He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous.' In other words, any quality found in human beings is not an obstacle to the giving of God's love. However, there is no likelihood of finding this universality in human love. For instance, only in recognizing beauty in Plato's eros or the qualities of partners in Aristotle's philia, can we bring about Plato's love or human friendship. In human loves, the selection of values is inherent in the giving of love. In opposition to this sequence, the love of God loves the beloved first, and then creates values in them.

In view of the preferential relationship involved in friendship and erotic love, Kierkegaard suggests that this relationship has intrinsic clashes (Outku, 1972, 17). The anxiety emerging from self-suspicion could lead mankind to jealousy and despair. Even with regard to the true friendship discussed by Aristotle, which is based on virtue, the degeneration of the friend's character can result in the deterioration of the previous relationship of love. The love of God, nevertheless, possesses the characteristics of permanence and stability, which are succinctly depicted in 1 Corinthian 13, 'Love is patient, love is kind.---It always protects,
always trusts, always hopes, always preserves.---And now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love.' As one concrete embodiment of the permanent stability of God's love, the father in Luke 15 does not stop his love for his lost son. Although the qualities of human beings change, the love of God remains the same for ever.

Christians believe that the love of God is revealed to human beings in the commune between God and His creatures. Moreover, the self-sacrifice of the Christ on a cross expresses the nature of the self-giving of God's love. Corresponding to the act of God in commune and revelation, human beings imitate God's love and have love for God and for neighbours, which form the two commandments in the New Testament (Matthew 22:37; 22:39). Additionally, the importance of loving brothers is also described in 1 John 5:21, 'If anyone says, "I love God," yet hates his brothers, he is a liar.---Whoever loves God must also love his brother.' Owing to the nature of imitation in human love for God and for neighbours, love of fellow creatures also has the characteristics of God's love. On the other hand, it can be said that, when imitating God's love in their love for God or for neighbours, human beings can endeavor to fulfill the abundance of nature to the maximum.

Our neighbour-love is not one sort of natural instinct, but one imitation of the perfect love of God. Ordinary human love is inspired by gratitude for past service or fired by lovable qualities, physical, mental or spiritual. The objects of our neighbour-love, in contrast, are those who are made in the image of God and the objects of God's love (Mortimer, 1947, 139). In this kind of love each individual is regarded as a person with bestowed dignity which, as one kind of value, is based on the love of God for all
people and is different from appraised dignity that can only be found in certain qualities (Charles, 1982, 46-47). Due to the fact that what is loved is a person rather than a role or a function, we can find a principle of equal regard in the love of a neighbour, which can prevent friendship from changing into a state of aristocratic isolation, from changing into elitism (Outku, 1972, 282-283).

In imitating God's love, neighbour-love possesses the features of unselfishness, equality, creativity, and permanent stability, and is capable of developing a different type of human relationship from those based on Plato's *eros* and Aristotle's *philia*. When we love someone and care about actively promoting their well-being, apart from people with the quality of beauty or good and our friends, those who are ugly and even our enemies are able to become the objects of neighbour-love. Put in another way, neighbour-love enables us to break through the barrier of selection which appears in *eros* and *philia*. Out of neighbour-love, even the members of an aristocracy or elite will willingly concern themselves about people of different class, race, age, gender, culture, etc.

In everyday life we can find some obstacles to treating everyone as a person with bestowed dignity. First, self-division and indifference make people unsympathetic to others' rights and needs. Because of self-centredness, human beings usually give such high priority to their own interests that there is no possibility of their having respect for others' bestowed dignity, or of giving themselves, as is required in love of one's neighbour. Therefore, others are regarded only as means to meet their own desires. Moreover, pride also brings human beings the enjoyment of superiority, which makes pity different from compassion. If we expand
these observations about individuals to the scope of social classes and nations, it can easily be found that indifference, self-centredness and pride are the main fundamental causes for national conflicts and the opposition of classes, the removal of which should be based on the cultivation of love.

Thus far, the characteristics and importance of God's love and neighbour-love have been articulated, but the question, 'Is love enough?', is often raised by theologians and ethicists. For the sake of answering this question, we can consider the parable of the workers in the vineyard (Matthew 20). In this parable, despite the difference in working-time of the workers, the owner of the vineyard pays the same wage to all his workers. Faced with the grumbles of the workers who are hired first, the owner replies, 'Don't I have the right to do what I want with my own money? Or are you envious because I am generous?' From the standpoint of equal pay for equal work, the owner denies the workers justice. Whereas the main intention of the owner might be the forgiving, acceptance and reformation of the other workers. Similarly, I think, teachers should accept their pupils first in spite of pupils' wrong-doings, and then try to discipline them'. On the other hand, resistance from the pupil will be the biggest hindrance to further teaching. The pivotal point in this situation lies in whether or not love can awaken a real response or repentance—a matter in which laws and principles might play an important role as well. Although in view of its fundamental significance love would be enough, it also needs some laws to actualize its intention.

In this process of the creation of values in the beloved, in which the goal of Christian love lies, Christian situation ethics suggests that principles or
maxims or general rules are only illuminators, but not directors. In situation ethics, love is for people, not for principles; i.e., it is personal—and therefore when the impersonal universal conflicts with the personal particular, the latter prevails (Fletcher, 1985, 139). The extreme form of situational ethics is pure act-agapism, so-called by Frankena (1976, 81), according to which there are no rules or principles other than the 'law of love' itself and the confrontation of one's loving will with the facts about that particular situation is the sole source of one's right and duty. However, when reflecting on our everyday experience, we find some established laws which also can assist us in carrying out the creation of values in the beloved. In the meantime, it is possible to find rules, principles or precepts of which the source is the moral agent's competence to make moral judgements (Ramsey, 1985, 144–152). As a result, love in Christian ethics is closely related to the fulfillment of laws.

The concrete embodiment of the principle of equality inherent in God's love is social justice in a society, which pursues the equality of rights and duties of its members to one another. Therefore, in a society filled with various kinds of discrimination, justice becomes an indispensable means to the welfare of a race or other group. Whereas, as Thomas points out (1955, 255–256), the justice actualized in history is only the compromise of different interests. In other words, there is a gap between legal justice and moral or biblical justice, between actual justice and the ideal justice demanded by love. Moreover, the willingness to affirm the welfare and serve the needs of others, which originates in love, can consider individual particular needs, which are neglected by the principle of justice, the focus of which is mainly on collective aspects of a society. In view of this feature, love becomes the force to transcend justice.
In both Plato's *eros* and Aristotle's *philia*, self-love plays a positive and necessary role, namely to reunify the self and good or to love the true self. Nevertheless, in the context of *agape*, it is doubted whether self-love makes any sense or whether there is any friendship between human beings and God, the self-sufficient being. Aristotle clearly points out that gods surpass us most decisively in all good things, and so it seems impossible for human beings and gods to become friends (1159a). Though human perfect happiness consists in the activities that conform to the highest virtue, i.e. the best and most divine things in us, human beings are not gods (1177a). Nevertheless, Aquinas answers this question positively: human beings can have friendship with God.

Though we can find friendship with God, Thomas indicates, the fall and the resultant sin make us turn away from God and toward ourselves, and then lose grace and the other gifts of God's friendship. The way to restore this friendly relationship is through the imitation of Christ, the atonement of Christ and Christ's continuing presence in the sacraments. On the other hand, in this imitation, human beings are capable of participating in the happiness called God. As a result of this acknowledgment, the goal of the Christian moral life is to make our way back to God who is our happiness (Jones, 1987, 381~390).

Thomas suggests that God communicates His happiness to us, upon which some kind of friendship must be based (Aquinas, 172). The love based on this mutual communication is charity, the friendship between God and human beings. Moreover, because we can love all belonging to God whom we love, He is loved for His own sake and we love our selves,
neighbours and enemies for the sake of God and in God. Due to the fact
that a man is also the creature of God and loved by God, a man ought to
love himself out of charity. In his discussion of charity, Thomas is
obviously under the influence of Aristotle. He regards 'the love with
which a man loves himself as the form and root of friendship.' Whereas,
what one likes in loving oneself is one's spiritual nature, but not corporeal
nature (Aquinas, 1991, 178~179 & 182). Through the mediation of God,
both the friendship between God and human beings and self-love become
possible.

Although agreeing that it is possible for the divine and the human to meet,
both Augustine and Pascal contend that it is in the heart rather than in
reason that this commune takes place, which is of paramount importance
to the understanding of Scheler's phenomenology of love explored in Part
II. Three points seem to deserve our attention here. To begin with, in
Augustine's interpretation of the love of God, Christian love has the
connotation of both the affective and the conative. In emphasizing the
efficacy of will, love sometimes is equated by Augustine with will as the
determining principle of all affective movements of the soul (Burnaby,
1991, 87, 92~99, 141 & 153~156). Secondly, what is dominant in
Augustine's conception of Christian love is desiderium—the unsatisfied
longing of the homesick heart, that is, the unending quest for the
changeless life or the continual hunger for God, the immutable Good, and
the happy life. Thirdly, in the search for union with God or in the
immediate experience of the reality of God, love precedes and merits
knowledge. It is in Augustine's loving memory, but not in the reasoning
soul, that our will to the search for recollection and our divine likeness are
inspired by the revelation of divine love. On the other hand, what
determines whether 'adhering to the Truth' or other things are loved properly is the 'constant will' or 'the perverse will' rather than the discursive reason.

Pascal further stresses the unique significance of heart in the responding of the human will to the will of God. Especially, the discovery of the order of heart (ordre du coeur) enables Pascal to open a new way of associating the heart with reason in the perception both of first principles and of divine truths (Levi, 1959, 93 & 100~101). First of all, 'heart' in Pascal's pensées, like the usage in the Bible, refers to the seat of the faculties of the soul, whether discursive, volitional, affective, or intellectual (Miel, 1969, 158 & 165~166; Daridson, 1983, 85; Norman, 1988, 40~41 & 56). On the other hand, the heart is a capacity, in the operation of which the knowledge of first principles such as space, time, motion, number, etc., and divine truths such as the perception of God, are obtained as the basis of more formal reasoning processes (Pascal, 1966, 110 & 298; Broome, 1965, 157; Miel, 1969, 159; Goodhue, 1969, 27; Norman, 1988, 20, 40~41 & 57). Actually, as Norman suggests, the distinction between the powers of forming principles (coeur) and of reason (raison), and between the operation within those powers (sentiment and raisonnement), can be found in Pascal's discussion of heart. Thirdly, in all of Pascal's three orders, viz. corps, esprits and charité, the heart is involved. In other words, the heart, the seat of earthly pleasures, of knowledge and of passion, and of divine revelation, can operate in all the realms of the senses, the body, human knowledge and God.
1-4. Love in Confucianism

In Confucianism the relationship between the feeling of love and *jen* (pronounced *ren*) is so important and inseparable as to make it almost impossible to discuss one without mentioning the other. In answering Fan Ch’ih’s question about *jen*, Confucius says, 'It is to love all men.' (ANA, 12:22). Even in contemporary Chinese philosophy, Fung Yu-lan interprets *jen* as extending our sympathy to include Heaven, Earth and all things, i.e. 'forming one body with all things' (Chan, 1963, 762). In other words, love and *jen* are closely related together in the development of Confucianism. No wonder that, in the evolution of the Confucian concept of *jen*, love is integrated into several connotations of *jen*, such as affection, love, consciousness, impartiality, unity with the universe, etc. (Chan, 1969, 35–36). Therefore, the first task in understanding Confucian love is to investigate the relationship between love and *jen*, in which the main characteristics of Confucian love, viz. life-giving, originality, sociality, transcendence and graduation, will be revealed.

Among the various English renderings of *jen*, 'benevolence', 'love', 'altruism', 'kindness', 'charity' and 'compassion' make us jump to a conclusion that *jen* is the synonym for love (Chan, 1969, 1; Tu, 1981, 50). The fundamental reason for identifying these two concepts is that most Confucianists before the Han dynasty (206 B. C.–A. D. 220) used to expound *jen* in terms of love. For instance, in addition to Confucius, Mencius also suggests, 'The *jen*-man loves others,---', 'The *jen*-people embrace all in their love,---' (MEN, 4b, 28; 7a, 46). In the minds of these two thinkers, the evidence according to which human beings are described as *jen*-men or superior men is that they love others. Tung
Chung-shue (179–104 B.C.), who made Confucianism the state doctrine, also claims, 'The man of jen loves people with a sense of commiseration.' In other words, jen-man without love is a contradiction between his name and substance and is inconceivable. If the final goal of human development is to become a jen-man, the most important task is to cultivate love and learn how to love people.

With the emergence of Neo-Confucianism in the late T'ang (618–906) and Sung (907–1279) dynasties, the suggestion that jen is love is open to challenge. Due to the fact that Neo-Confucians try to find the metaphysical level of Chinese philosophy, they make the effort to separate jen from love. First of all, Chang Tsai (1020–1077) proposes the theory of li-i fen-shu, that is to say, the principle is one but its manifestations are many, which becomes the basis of Neo-Confucian ethics (Chan, 1963, 498–499). Moreover, deriving from Mencius' idea, 'Jen is the distinguishing characteristic of man.'--, jen is identified with human nature, while love is human feeling, in the thought of Ch'eng I (1033–1107). He says '[But] love is feeling whereas jen is the nature.' With regard to the difference between jen and mind, his answer is 'The mind is comparable to seeds of grain. The nature of growth is jen.' (Chan, 1963, 559–560). Thus far, jen is the growing nature of 'seed' and the manifestation of jen is love. It can be said that, when a human being is born, jen, planted in his or her mind, naturally grows up to love others. The qualities of life-giving and generative force are implied in jen and love.

Regarding the relationship between mind, nature and jen, Chu Hsi (1130–1200) synthesizes previous doctrines and rejects talk of jen as
clearly distinct from love. He regards *jen* as the principle of love and as the feeling of love before it stirs, love as the *jen*-principle after it has been stirred. Although the spheres of man's nature and feelings are different, he contends, their mutual penetration is like the blood system in which each part has its own relationship (Bruce, 1922, 373–374 & 376; Chan, 1963, 595). *Jen*, as the virtue of mind, determines the manifestation of feelings, including love. Similarly, Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) also points out that *jen* is love before it is stirred, love is *jen* after it is stirred. Nature is the 'substance' of mind, from which our emotions, thought and consciousness proceed, feelings are its 'function' (Ching, 1972, 11 & 90). It is evident that the locus of love is mind, but not intellect. Only from the embodiment of love can we understand the functionalization of mind and the development of *jen*.

Even from this rough description of the relationship between *jen* and love, the feature of life-giving can be easily recognized. In other words, love, as the exercise of mind and the spreading out of *jen*, enables us to unfold our lives. Following this feature of love, to love others means to help them to flourish in their lives. 'When loving him, wish him to live; when hating, wish him to die.' conclusively exemplifies this spirit (ANA, 12:10). In observing young chickens, Chu Hsi suggests, we can discover *jen*. It illustrates the first manifestation of the Vital Impulse which is more difficult to observe in the full-grown birds (Bruce, 1922, 338–339). However, if the unfolding of life-force meets no hindrance, then where there is life, there is the joy of life. That is the reason why Wang Yang-ming reminds us of observing the hawks flying, the fish leaping, the birds singing, the animals dancing, and the plants flourishing (Ching, 1972, 89).
Beneath the rhythm of life, love underpins it and makes its actualization possible.

The life-giving and creation in love last and expand unceasingly, rather than temporarily. That we can easily observe the first movement of Vital Impulse in newborn life and in spring does not imply that it stops and vanishes midway through our life or in the other three seasons. In contrast, the Vital Impulse runs through all four seasons and penetrates our whole life (Bruce, 1922, 316-318). Moreover, the life unfolded in love is not confined only to physical life, but also includes spiritual life, which is regarded as an unique human substance. Therefore, under the propelling force of love, we open our minds to and absorb spiritual food, such as knowledge and wisdom, as well as taking nourishment for physical development. In terms of life-giving, Confucian love is similar to Plato's *eros* in helping human beings to unfold their spiritual natures without cessation.

In the light of the permanence of love, *jen*, as the virtue of mind, becomes the foundation of other virtues, love the foundation of other feelings. In order to interpret this point more clearly, it is necessary and worthwhile to quote the passage in Mencius at length (MEN, 6a:6).

If you let people follow their feeling (original nature), they will be able to do good.—The feeling of commiseration is found in all men; the feeling of shame and dislike is found in all men; the feeling of respect and reverence is found in all men; the feeling of right and wrong is found in all men. The feeling of commiseration is what we called *jen*; the feeling of shame and dislike is what we called...
righteousness; the feeling of respect and reverence is what we called propriety (li); and the feeling of right and wrong is what we called wisdom. Jen, righteousness, propriety, wisdom are not drilled into us from outside. We originally have them with us.

Suppose one was born without jen, sometimes translated as general virtue or perfect virtue, then the tendency to grow up will stop, let alone the pursuit of other virtues. Hence, when cultivating or performing righteousness, propriety or wisdom, jen is the invisible foundation. In other words, from the perspective of emotions, the feeling of love penetrates and underlies other emotions, such as the feeling of commiseration, shame and dislike, respect and reverence, the sense of morally right and wrong. This is the reason why jen and love are more fundamental than other virtues and emotions. Similarly, if Plato's eros stops its movement, then the source of the value-promotion and virtue-cultivation will be completely eradicated.

Although eros, philia and agape have their own distinctive features, they all presuppose a value scale. Plato's eros climbs a ladder of value toward Ideas. Aristotle's philia regards virtue-friendship as more valuable than pleasure-friendship and usefulness-friendship. In Christian agape, love of God is the highest form of love and the imitating-object of human love. Does Confucian love require any kind of value scale? In the Confucian Analects, love is not blind but displays the implication of value-selection. For instance, Confucius says 'The superior man seeks to perfect the admirable qualities of men, and does not seek to perfect their bad qualities. The mean man does the opposite of this.' (ANA, 12:16). 'Can there be love which does not lead to strictness with its object?---'(ANA,
14:8). When Mencius can not keep life and righteousness together, he will let life go and choose righteousness (MEN, 6a:10). In those cases, the decisions they make do presuppose the existence of a value scale, wherein admirable qualities or righteousness are preferred to bad ones or to life. Consequently, it can be said that, although there are a multitude of ways to embody jen and to love others, the fulfillment of virtues and the expression of love necessitates the scale of values, upon which the human mind moves. Meanwhile, according to the direction and the height to which human beings progress, we differentiate correct from incorrect love. It is only the correct love that could be regarded as the true manifestation of jen (Ching, 1972, 90).

In Confucian thought, because jen is the distinguishing characteristic of man, only practising jen can we become true men and be distinguishable from other creatures. Whereas the word jen is composed of the character meaning 'man' (jen ), combined with the character for 'two' (erh ). Thus jen, sometimes rendered as co-humanity, becomes meaningless unless it is involved in actual human relationships (Fung, 1952, 69; Chan, 1969, 23; Ching, 1977, 138). In order to seek jen, which fundamentally is regarded as the most important and ultimate aim of learning by Neo-Confucianists, the way of loving people must be followed and actualized in mundane and intersubjective society. By the same token, Confucian love is different from cosmic pessimism and the negation of man's social responsibility. To love people is actualized in every human relationship, rather than in the pure contemplation of theoretical objects and the pursuit of otherworldliness.
How to actualize *jen* and love others? In the opinion of most Confucianists, 'To master oneself and return to propriety (*li*), regarded as *jen* by Confucius, comes to be the most direct answer (ANA, 12:1). 'To master oneself' means to eliminate selfish desires which becloud the embodiment of *jen* and are an impediment to loving others. It is after the eradication of our own selfishness that we can pay equal attention to others' desires and love them for their sake. Moreover, the propriety (*li*), as an externalization of *jen* in a specific social context, becomes the path to express our care for others (Tu, 1967-1968, 34-37; 1972, 193). On the one hand, *jen* and love enable us to follow and revise any conventional and established proprieties. On the other hand, in following and revising proprieties human beings humanize themselves without stopping.

The elimination of selfish desires and care for others imply opening one's mind to others and regarding their desires as our own. In Confucian thought, conscientiousness (*chung*) and altruism (*shu*) can be interpreted as this sort of self-transformation and concern for others (ANA, 4:15). Conscientiousness means the full development of one's (originally good) mind and altruism means the extension of that mind to others (Chan, 1963, 27). Because of what I do not desire, I know what others do not desire, and therefore 'what I do not desire for myself I do not apply to others.' (ANA, 15:23; Fung, 1947, 17). With regard to what we desire, apart from wishing to establish our own character, we also wish to establish the character of others; and apart from wishing to succeed ourselves, we also wish others to succeed (ANA, 6:28; Lin, 1949, 259). It is obvious that Confucian love also takes notice of the positive aspect of human desires and is put into practice in concrete life. In fulfilling *jen*, self-love is not in conflict with loving others, but is the basis of the latter.
Thus far we understand that Confucian love is mainly the realization of *jen* in human relationship. However, some questions can still be raised: for instance, what is the position of ourselves in loving others? to what extent can Confucian love extend? According to Confucianism, the great virtue of Heaven and Earth is the giving of life, which is also the source of a myriad of things, including human beings. It can be said that out of love every creature comes to life. Furthermore, it is in the human mind that we meet the life-producing mind of Heaven and Earth. As soon as a human being completely cultivates his or her mind, as a sage does, he gives birth to myriad things and is in union with Heaven and Earth (Ching, 1977, 80). In this way, human beings imitate the creation of Heaven and Earth, like the imitation of *agape*, and actively take part in Nature's nourishing. On the other hand, the final goal of self-cultivation in Confucianism is to form a body with all things. Especially in the later development, partly because of the influence of Buddhism, the objects of love in Neo-Confucianism are not limited to human beings, but include lifeless things. This issue is connected with the graduated feature in Confucian love.

Confucian love requires us to serve our parents before we love all men comprehensively (ANA, 1:2 & 1:6). Thus it is a common impression that love in Confucianism involves graduation or distinction. Mencius also points out 'The man of *jen* embraces all in his love, but what he considers of the great importance is to cultivate an affection for the worthy to be the most urgent.' (MEN, 7a:46). Therefore, Mo Tzu attacks Confucian doctrines, including the feature of graduation, and advocates universal love without distinction.
The reason why Mo Tzu advocates the doctrine of universal love lies in trying to remove various conflicts and harms from society (Chan, 1963, 213–217). During the dynasty of Warring States (403–222 B. C.), various groups and individuals consider only their own interests and then love just their own states, families, relatives and selves. Because of want of mutual love, people severely and continuously attack each other. The good medicine to cure the malady of the age is, Mo Tzu suggests, to make mutual love universal, namely universal love. In contrast, graduated love, in his mind, is not only incapable of promoting harmony and peace in the world, but also makes social discrimination worse.

It is worth noticing that the ideal goal pursued in Confucian love, the unfolding of *jen* on both individual and social aspects, is not different from Mo Tzu's. Nevertheless, the main difference, apart from the utilitarian approach used by Mo Tzu to praise the positive effect of love, is the graduation in Confucian love, of which Mo Tzu strongly disapproves. From the viewpoint of human development, I side with the idea of graduation in love. That means we should love our parents first, then extend our love to other people. As Wang Yang-ming points out, there is an order in the operation and growth of *jen*, which ensures its continuous production (Chan, 1963, 675–676). Taking a tree as an example, it should grow up from the shoot, then there will be the trunk, branches, leaves, etc. Parental affection, filial piety and brotherly respect, like the shoot of the tree, are the starting point of the unfolding of the human mind and the root of *jen*. As a result, without the earliest love-relation in the family, the attempt to bear the fruit of universal love is deemed to fail. Certainly, good family relations can be regarded as a
necessary rather than sufficient condition for the success of universal love.

Prior to discussing the interpretations of love in modern western philosophy, it is worth reiterating the fact that love and its cultivation are fundamentally important for both individual and social life, which is commonly emphasized in Plato's *eros*, Aristotle's *philia*, Christian *agape* and Confucian love. On the one hand, human love in the various interpretations above is the power to continuously determine and pursue what is good for our life, the disposition to wish and do our friends good for their own sake, neighbour-love as the imitation of the love of God, or the lasting unfolding of the nature of growth inherent in mind, without which, in other words, human beings will be indifferent to the search for the meaning of a desirable life, be autistc egotists incapable of entering into the mind of fellow creatures, be corporeal self-lovers rather than spiritual self-lovers, be paralytics without any sense of life, physical and spiritual, at all. On the other hand, a true self-lover can actualize himself/herself in some sort of social life, where the partner will be called to be his true self, friends can be treated as other selves, the intrinsic bestowed dignity of people of different class, race, gender, etc. can be realized, equal attention will be paid to each other's desires. In Chapter 2, it will be considered whether the significance of love is still recognized in some of its modern understandings or not.
NOTES


2. Cf. Chapter 4 section 1.

3. Cf. The distinction between emotional acts, functions and states, and the distinction between the person and the ego in Chapter 4 section 2 and Chapter 5 section 1.
Chapter 2 Interpretations of love in modern western philosophy

Among modern interpretations of love, Hume, Butler and Kant have their own distinctive views on love and its position in human nature. Adopting the associationist theory, Hume points up the internal relationship between sympathy and love, namely that sympathy is required for the emergence of love, the agreeable indirect passion directed to others. In his four constitutive principles of human nature, Butler reminds us of the compatibility of self-love and benevolence. Opposing the idea that moral principle could be based on any blind and slavish feeling, Kant recognizes the significance of practical love, the feeling which accompanies the carrying out of the duties of love to others, rather than a pathological feeling. These three distinct interpretations of love will be marshalled and discussed in this chapter.

2-1. Hume on Love

In Hume's mind, love, like pride, humility and hatred, is one sort of indirect passion, the production of which demands the help of a double relation, viz. of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the passion itself (THN, 333). Moreover, only through the principle of sympathy can we enter into the sentiments of others, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness. In other words, without sympathy, the soul or animating principle of passions, others can hardly become the objects of our love (THN, 362-363). We need to understand this double relation to clearly grasp the meaning of Hume's love.
Pointing out that to sympathize with others and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments is the most remarkable quality of human nature, both in itself and in its consequences, Hume seems to pay more attention to sympathy than to love (THN, 316). In the communication of opinions and feelings, he observes, whatever we reflect on or converse about unavoidably excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness. Due to the function of mirroring the mental conditions of others, sympathy in Hume's ethics enables us to understand human motivation beneath their behaviour. Hume believes that without taking sympathy into consideration, any ethics is incapable of correctly comprehending the chief source of moral distinctions (THN, 618). From the standpoint of society, sympathy, as a natural tendency to care about the happiness and misery of others, is highly relevant to the uniformity of temper in men of the same nation and to the esteem we pay to the artificial virtues, such as justice (THN, 317, 577; EHU, 220). In view of the importance above-mentioned, sympathy is naturally the starting point for the discussion of love.

Hume, in Book II of the Treatise, once describes sympathy as 'nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination.' (THN, 427). Therefore, I will first devote myself to the understanding of impressions, ideas, passions and sympathy. After that, the focus will be on the description of the relationship between sympathy and morality. Finally, I am going into the questions of Hume's doctrine of love.

Hume regards sympathy as 'nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression.' (THN, 385~386). Before trying to explain the process of conversion, the connotations of ideas and impressions should be
understood. Hume suggests that 'As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and ideas, so the impressions admit of another division into original and secondary.---into impressions of sensation and reflexion.' (THN, 7~8 & 275). According to Hume's doctrine, the impressions of sensation arise in the soul originally, from unknown causes, but those of reflection are derived in a great measure from our ideas. After the first impression and perception such as heat, cold etc., the copy of it becomes an idea in our minds, from which in turn a new impression can be derived. Of the first kind of impressions are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them.

Although all human perceptions of the mind are divided into two categories, the main difference between them lies only in the degree of force and vivacity. That means, Hume reminds us, the component parts of ideas and impressions are precisely the same (THN, 319). So far it can be said that, once the difference is removed, an idea of a sentiment or passion may become the sentiment or passion itself. Then Hume's sympathy can be roughly presented as follows: to find an idea in others and to convert it into a lively idea and an impression. For instance, sympathizing with the pain of others means to grasp the idea of pain in others and to transform it into the impression of pain. Furthermore our imagination can help us to form every lively idea. Hume considers this as the nature and cause of sympathy.

Taking account of the fact that what we sympathize with in others is their passions, 'How many sorts of passions do humans have?' naturally becomes one question we are eager to answer. According to the first
classification Hume provides, the reflective impressions can be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent. In the vulgar and specious division, the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humanity are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, that is, the sense of beauty and deformity. The other classification divides passions into the direct and the indirect. The former refers to the passions arising immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure, such as desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security. The latter to those proceeding from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities, such as pride, humanity, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependents (THN, 276–277). As Mercer points out, the calm/violent classification refers to the intensity, but the direct/indirect one to the origins of the passions (1972, 22–23). It is worth noting that the intensity or violence of a passion is different from its strength which is its motivating factor. Sometimes calm passions are capable of controlling the violent ones (THN, 437–438).

In Hume's Treatise the origins of indirect passions have some connection with sympathy so that a necessary process for the arousal of indirect passions, viz. a double relation, is sometimes confused with the process of sympathizing with others. Suppose I reflect on the quality of my work, as the cause of my indirect passion. Hume contends that I can find two properties of the cause, viz. the quality producing a separate pain or pleasure, and the subject, on which the quality is placed, relating to self. In accordance with the original quality of the mind, I am always conscious of both my self or other persons and some peculiar emotions as the object of my indirect passion. If I associate my self with my work, the pleasant
emotion will arouse the feeling of pride, but the painful emotion the feeling of humility. If I associate others with my work, the agreeable sensation will stir up the feeling of love, but the uneasy sensation the feeling of hatred (THN, 286, 337-338). In this process, a double relation can be found, one between ideas and one between impressions.

Although sympathy has a crucial impact on the production of indirect passions, it is different from the double relation. When sympathizing with the passions and sentiments of another, Hume claims, 'these movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and are conceiv'd to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact.' (THN, 319). In the first place, by a particular manner of presentation or an external sign in the countenance and conversation, as the effect of some passions, we are able to immediately pass from the effect to the cause, and form the idea in the mind of others. Then, with the assistance of imagination, the idea is converted into an impression and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an emotion equal to any original affection (THN, 317, 576). Hence, Brand divides the process of sympathizing into two stages, a cognitive and an affective stage. The former explains how we acquire the idea of another's passional state. The latter involves the conversion of this idea into an impression, so that we come to feel the emotion we believe another is having (1992, 72).

It is obvious that a necessary procedure for sympathy is to enliven the idea we grasp in the minds of others, otherwise we are incapable of sharing in another's passions. Hume gives an account of this mechanism of conversion by appealing to his doctrine of self. In Book II of the
Treatise, he suggests that this conversion arises from the relation of an object to our selves and our selves are always intimately present to us. That means, our consciousness gives us a lively conception of our own person and the ideas of our selves convey a sensible degree of vivacity to the ideas of any other objects, to which we are related (THN, 317, 320 & 354). Thus far it is reasonable to say that, despite the interchangeability between ideas and impressions, the relationship between the ideas of our selves and the ideas of others influences in a great measure the occurrence of sympathy. For instance, Hume observes that the resemblance between similar characters is conducive to converting the idea into an impression 'by presenting such materials as take fire from the least spark.' (THN, 354).

What is the role sympathy plays in indirect passions? Through the operation of sympathy, the beholder can share the pleasure a rich man receives from his possessions. In turn, the rich can sympathize with the beholder's love and esteem caused by a double relation. Consequently, apart from the original pleasure, the rich can have a secondary pleasure in riches from this love or esteem (THN, 362 & 365). Because this sort of interaction can carry on without cessation, Hume at one point compares human minds to mirrors to one another, which can reflect each others' emotions and decay by insensible degrees. In this case it can be easily found that sympathy not only helps the occurrence of indirect passions but also enlarges the effects of them. Additionally, sympathy, as an elaborate mechanism but not a passion, involves the ideas and secondary impressions rather than a corresponding pure sensation we feel in a double relation (Wand, 1955, 276; Mercer, 1972, 21; Altmann, 1980, 47
135). In the same way, sympathy makes us capable of partaking in social life and evaluating the moral behaviour of others.

Before describing how sympathy is involved in moral evaluations, Hume must explain what is the relationship between passions and morality. With regard to this issue, he asserts that it is the mind or heart, the faculty of emotions or passions, not reason, the inquiring or intellectual faculty, that directly has an effect on our moral behaviour and moral decisions (THN, 413-415 & 458-459; EHU, 290 & 294). Relying on his division between ideas and impressions, he asserts that the main function of speculative reason is operating with ideas and finding the relationship between them. Reason is incapable of giving rise to any new idea and is incapable of guaranteeing the continued existence of external objects. Besides, reason is not the source of our idea of causation, it alone can never be a motive to any action of the will and can never oppose the direction of the will (Rorty, 1993, 171). There is no doubt that passions and reason in Hume's ethics belong to two different faculties and the substance of morality is located in the human heart, rather than in reason.

Given that the arbiter of moral issues is passions or emotions, then we need to explain what is virtue and vice and how to distinguish them. Because Hume suggests that morality is more properly felt than judged of, the moral experience in feelings and sentiments becomes the source of moral evaluations. Firstly, the very essence of virtue is to produce pleasure, and that of vice to give pain. Therefore, whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation is virtue; and vice the contrary. Then, appealing to the moral sense, human beings can make moral distinctions. That means they can separate the
agreeable impression arising from virtue from the uneasy one proceeding from vice (THN, 296, 470-471; EHU, 170, 289). In everyday life, the way to have the sense of virtue is to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. By an immediate feeling and finer internal sense, we praise outer actions, but the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motives that produced them, viz. the durable principle of the mind, which extends over the whole conduct and enters into the personal character (THN, 477 & 575). In fact, this sort of appraisal demands the mechanism of sympathy to share the feelings of others. Otherwise there is no way to feel the pleasing or uneasy sentiment and make a moral judgement.

Sympathy allows us to grasp the idea in the minds of others and to convert it into a lively impression. In the case of the production of moral sentiments, the role sympathy plays is similar to the role in the arising of indirect passions. For example, by the double relation and sympathy, the pleasure of the rich causes the beholder's indirect passion of love or esteem for him, which is also his moral sentiment of approbation. The difference between them lies in the fact that the object of sympathy is others' feelings, but that of moral sentiment is others' motives (Wand, 1955, 278-279). In contrast, when seeing that someone takes pleasure in violating the rule of justice, we might feel uneasy, rather than feeling pleasure. The reason for this situation is, Hume suggests, that sympathy enables us to be aware of the tendency the qualities could bring about (THN, 589). With the help of imagination, we can also infer effects from causes, and then sympathize with the possible pleasure or suffering of others, such as the violator and those injured by him in the above case. It can be obviously found that the moral sentiments arising from reflective
sympathy are different from those proceeding from immediate sympathy. Under the influences of resemblance, contiguity, relation etc., immediate sympathy is unable to make us become an impartial spectator. Hume contends that reflective sympathy is able to let us go beyond limited generosity and concern about public interest. But this achievement needs calm passions or strength of mind (THN, 418 & 437-438).

In the description of sympathy and morality, Hume recognizes love as a violent and indirect passion. Like other indirect passions, it is only by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, that love can be produced (THN, 333, 347 & 351). For instance, in the above case of reflecting on the quality of my work, if the sensation induced by the cause-sensation is agreeable (i.e. the sensation is pleasure rather than pain) and the object associated with it by the cause-subject is others (rather than self), then the affection of love will arise. It can be said that the double relation helps us to associate the cause-sensation with an agreeable affection and the cause-subject with the idea of ourselves. If the affection is uneasy, then the resultant passion will be hatred. Providing that the idea of the object is ourselves rather than others, the passion will be pride or humility.

In addition to the double relation, in discussing the causes of esteem and contempt, considered as species of love and hatred, Hume suggests that sympathy is the principal cause, to which we ought to ascribe esteem. The reason is that sympathy makes us enter into the sentiments of the rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness (THN, 357-360 & 362). For instance, with the services of sympathy and a double relation, the sharing of pleasure might lead the beholder to love a rich man.
However, Hume also observes that a sympathy with pain may produce love. In this case, what we are concerned with is the fortunes of others and what determines the character of any passion is the general bent or tendency of pain or pleasure, but not the present sensation of momentary pain or pleasure (THN, 381–385). It is true that, in everyday life, sympathy with the uneasiness of the poor can bring about love or tenderness instead of hatred.

So far the impression Hume gives us is that he confines love to the associationist theory and tries to elucidate love in terms of the double relation and sympathy. However, in comparison to other senses of love such as Plato's *eros*, Aristotle's *philia*, Christian *agape* and Confucian love, I think, Hume's love is too narrow. Firstly, in the process of the arising of passions, the virtue of human mind or character is always presupposed. In other words, the individual's system of value affects his reflection of painful or pleasurable sensation. If this is plausible, the feeling of love has decided the possible directions of passions before their occurrence. By the same token, the source of the strength of mind, on which the transition from immediate sympathy to reflective sympathy relies, as Hume contends, is closely relevant to the exercise of mind induced by love discussed in Chapter 1. Under the influence of the force of life-giving found in Confucian love, sympathy with the suffering of the poor could lead to Hume's passion of love.

The second question pertaining to the above point lies in the object of Hume's love. Owing to the double relation and sympathy, the passion of love is always directed to some sensible being external to us or a thinking conscious being (THN, 329, 331 & 362). If the object is an ordinary
stone, belonging to neither of us, Hume thinks, none of the four passions will appear (THN, 333–334). Considering Plato's eros and Confucian love, I think, the objects we love are not restricted to sensible beings. The reason for Hume's limitation is that what we sympathize with is others' passions, which do not arise in, for instance, a landscape itself. However, understanding love as the motion of value-promotion or the force of life-giving, it is reasonable to love this landscape without associating it with ourselves or others. We may grasp the beauty instantiated in it or extend our identity to include it and protect it from destruction. If we go beyond Hume's associationist doctrine, the objects of love include lifeless things.

If the object of love is always another person, then the term 'self-love' becomes questionable, even contradictory. In a double relation, if the object is ourselves, the passion will be pride rather than love. Hume not only doubts the adequacy of self-love but gives it an unfavourable interpretation, that is, pleasing oneself and satisfying one's own appetites (TNH, 329–330 & 361; EHU, 272). It is understandable that self-love in the framework of associationist theory loses the connotation of reunifying the self and the good, loving the true self or loving the self in loving others. Whereas, in fact, love is not only the association of idea and impression. Before the stirring up of passions, love constitutes the virtue of mind or the core of our disposition. In other words, love determines the fundamental way to treat ourselves, others and other objects. If this account is plausible, then the term 'self-love' not only makes sense but also implies the compatibility of self-love and love of others, as in Aristotle's philia or Confucian love. Hume helps us to understand the
operation of the human passion of love, but he fails to notice its deeper and holistic meaning.

2-2. Butler on Self-love

Dealing with ethics in terms of the actual constitution of human nature, Butler, in his Fifteen Sermons, points out that human nature consists of four principles, viz. particular passions, self-love, benevolence and conscience. However, these four principles are not on the same level and have different degrees of superiority. Self-love and benevolence are on the same level and have the power to regulate particular passions. Conscience, moreover, as a supreme principle, has authority over other principles.

According to Butler's observations, our appetites, passions and affections are the instruments of actualizing public good as well as private (FIF, 36-38). The objects of them are external and particular (FIF, 167). Whereas the principle of self-love aims at the pursuit of private happiness and its object is internal enjoyment. Self-love leads us to satisfy our appetites, passions and affections, upon which we find happiness and enjoyment. This is the reason why Butler regards the enjoyment of particular passions as the presupposition of happiness or interest (FIF, 22). From this difference between particular passions and self-love, it is worth noticing that love, including self-love and benevolence, determines the enjoyment of our desires. Similarly, it can be said that the gratification of desires does not necessarily lead to happiness. For instance, in the usual situation, when eating, we can obtain both the
gratification of an appetite and private happiness, the aim of self-love. However, once we find that the food we are eating is stolen, the above happiness might disappear or be overridden by the feeling of shame or guilt. Self-love, I think, is closely relevant to an individual's system of values, which can decide the priority of our desires and the occurrence of happiness.

Benevolence, the love of another or good-will, as one principle in human nature, is directed to the interests of others or the good of our fellow-creatures (FIF, 172). Benevolence and self-love are not to be opposed, but only to be distinguished from each other (FIF, 23). The reason is, Butler suggests, that in endeavouring to promote the good of others, considered as a virtuous pursuit, the benevolent man is gratified by his own consciousness (FIF, 174 & 178-180). In practice, the conflicts of benevolence and self-love only occur in the materials or means of enjoyment. Additionally the occasional conflicts between particular passions and self-love are greater than those between benevolence and self-love.

The way Butler uses to reconcile the seeming competition between benevolence and private interest is the distinction between the materials or means of enjoyment and enjoyment itself. Beneath this differentiation, I think, two different sorts and levels of values can be found, the embodiment of which is also different. The fulfilment of the first one is to possess something, but that of the second is to give it to or share it with others. If the agent in the above case does not develop the second level of value, there is no way for him to grasp the enjoyment in his consciousness. Therefore, giving money away is compatible with the
enjoyment of this virtuous action. Only if the second and higher value takes priority in the agent's system of values, can we obtain Butler's happiness in the altruistic and apparently self-injuring deed, as in the pursuit of virtues in Aristotle's *philia*. In other words, the agent's correct preference-hierarchy, if it exists, guarantees the compatibility of self-love and benevolence understood in Butler's sense.

Apart from particular passions, self-love and benevolence, conscience in Butler's ethics, as a principle of reflection in the inward frame of man, regulates self-love and benevolence and enables us to actualize the goal of life, i.e. to promote the happiness of society and to take care of our own life, health and private good (FIF, 33 & 40). Butler finds that the happiness we can get is not proportionate to the degree in which self-love engrosses us and leaves no room for other principles. The result of immoderate self-love will be pain and misery rather than happiness and internal enjoyment (FIF, 170~171). On the other hand, in order to attain the greatest public good, reason and reflection is required to guide and direct benevolence. Only by the regulation of conscience can self-love become reasonable and benevolence just (FIF, 24 & 197~199). Moreover, due to the theological basis, Butler regards human beings as God's creatures and conscience, in the movement of mind and heart, becomes God's commandment (FIF, 27 & 31).

In reflecting on Butler's account of self-love and benevolence, the focus is on the differentiation of self and others, that is, the love of private interests versus that of others' interests. Even though they are compatible, conscience, the supreme principle, is still required to direct them. In contrast, if the focus is on love itself, then it empowers us to love others
in loving our true self, as Plato's *eros*, Aristotle's *philia* or Confucian love. Like Hume, I think, Butler does not consider love as the virtue of our mind or the core of our disposition. On the other hand, the separation of self-love from loving others only emerges in the lower level of values, for instance, in the possession of money as in Butler's example above. Once we, by the aid of Plato's *eros*, climb to the higher level of values, self-love and benevolence can work together without opposition. The vital point is the promotion of the order of values rather than the distinction between self and others.

Relating to the foregoing reflection, if love finally elevates us toward the highest level of value, the contemplation of Ideas, the pursuit of virtues or the unfolding of *jen*, then the supremacy of conscience, as the faculty regulating Butler's self-love and benevolence, is in doubt. Two reasons can be held to support this suspicion. Firstly, without human love, the willingness and ability to reflect on what we have done will be, I think, limited. Even in Christian *agape*, for instance, the human endeavour to cultivate sensibility of mind, apart from God's grace, also affects the revelation of God's commandment. Secondly, from a dynamic or developmental viewpoint, as Matthews points out in the introduction to the Fifteen Sermons as well, conscience itself should continuously be reflected on (xxv). In other words, once love helps us to fulfil the promotion of value, the call of conscience should be different. As a result, in considering the status of conscience in human nature, the feeling of love is of at least the same importance.
What is the role human emotions, especially love, play in Kantian ethics? On the one hand, Kant suggests that inclination, be it good-natured or otherwise, is blind and slavish, and thereby disagrees with basing moral principle on any feeling whatsoever, upon which all inclination and every sensuous impulse is based (CPR, 73, 75 & 118; TMM, 376). On the other hand, in Kant's doctrine of virtue, to cultivate and strengthen moral feeling is an obligation for every man (TMM, 399). If emotions are unable to be the foundation of moral principle, why does Kant ask us to foster our moral feeling? One of the possible reasons is that moral feeling is unique to the extent that it can not be included in the category of human emotions. In order to find the answer to this seeming paradox and Kant's views about love, the first focus will be on the status of emotions in the development of Kantian ethics. After that, the connotation and nature of moral feeling will be presented. Finally, I will discuss practical love in his ethics and some questions about it.

Although Kant doubts the likelihood of developing moral principle from feelings, he indeed finds their significance in morality in his early works, such as An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. In the former, Kant contends that the faculty of representing the true is cognition, while the faculty of experiencing the good is feeling. Just as there are unanalysable concepts of the true, there is an unanalysable feeling of the good, the judgement of which will be an immediate effect of the consciousness of the feeling of pleasure combined
with the representation of the object. Using the principle 'love him who loves you', he points out that it is subsumed immediately under the universal rule of good action (Walford, 1992, 273~274). Obviously, without neglecting the importance of the universal rule, Kant admits that feeling is the power which enables us to recognize what is good. Additionally, in regard to this point, he mentions that 'Hutcheson and others have, under the name of moral feeling, provided us with a starting point from which to develop some excellent observations.' (Walford, op. cit., 274).

Similarly, in his observations on the beautiful and sublime, Kant also contends that the perception of the value, the beauty of what moves, or what charms people is different from the understanding of it. Without a strong feeling for the truly noble or beautiful, these talents of intellectual understanding would be in vain (OBS, 31). Moreover, in considering the weakness of compassion and complaisance, he claims that 'true virtue can be grafted upon principles, and the more general they are, the nobler and more sublime does it become. These principles are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling.' (OBS, 18). In Kant's later works, the emphasis on the generality of principles can still be also found, while the feature of recognition of feelings is thrown away. In this period Kant hopes, through education, to 'exalt by time the moral feeling in the breast of every young citizen of the world to an active sentiment.'; this task later becomes the aforementioned obligation (OBS, 78).

The reason why Kant does not trust human emotions is highly relevant to his doctrine of human constitution. That is, he regards human beings as rational natural beings belonging to both the sensuous world and the pure
intelligible world (CPR, 42–43; TMM, 379). The sensuous nature of human beings is their existence under empirically conditioned laws. However, pure reason shows itself actually to be practical, viz. it can determine the will independently of everything empirical. Establishing this bifurcation of human status, Kant says 'The supersensuous nature of the same beings is their existence according to laws which are independent of all empirical conditions and which therefore belong to the autonomy of pure reason.' (CPR, 43). In other words, the final goal human beings pursue is to elevate themselves from belonging to the world of sense to belonging to the intelligible world (CPR, 86). The reflection of this sort of dichotomy in Kantian ethics can be found in his discussion of freedom and necessity. In the world of sense, human beings are conditioned by the mechanism of nature and all laws of nature only give us heteronomy. In contrast to this, we, as members of the intelligible world, can realize a priori moral principle and become the legislators of moral principle. In obeying the moral law made by our will, a rational being with the autonomy of the will is free and independent of determination by causes in the sensible world (GMM, 451–452 & 457–458).

In this frame of double worlds, Kant, furthermore, points out that feeling, whatever may arouse it, always belongs to the order of nature (TMM, 377). On the one hand, only through reason can we recognize a priori moral law. The true function of reason is to produce a will and the cultivation of reason even reduces happiness to less than zero without nature proceeding contrary to its purpose (GMM, 396). On the other hand, the moral worth of an action lies in duty, namely that the moral law should directly determine the will. Then, if duty is based on feelings,
impulses, and inclination, the relative ends, as the possible effects of this sort of action, can be the ground only of hypothetical imperatives, but not of categorical imperatives. In other words, the choice (Willkür) of actions will be effected by our faculty of desire and then may be induced to break the moral law (GMM, 427–428; CPR, 72; TMM, 379). Consequently, human feelings lose the prominent position they had in Kant's early works. As MacBeath correctly points out, Kant earlier belonged to the moral sense school, but now he sees it as committing the error of attempting to ground moral laws upon empirical principles (1973, 283).

Although Kant denies the significance of emotions in his ethics, even in obeying the moral maxims we can have the experience of feelings. He suggests that an 'intellectual feeling' is self-contradictory, whereas we can feel intellectual contentment and intellectual pleasure (CPR, 118; TMM, 212). According to his understanding of human nature, only under the guidance of reason can we obtain true contentment and pleasure. However, if his view of emotions is true, we may wonder why he asks us to cultivate moral feeling and what is the part love can play in his ethics.

In Kant's work of 1794, *Anthropology, Considered from a Pragmatic Viewpoint*, he still claims that emotions make one (more or less) blind (Cartwright, 1987, 291). Unless he regards moral feeling as a special kind of emotion, it will be very perplexing to regard its cultivation and establishment as a duty (CPR, 38). Kant even suggests that 'if someone were completely lacking in susceptibility to it he would be morally dead.' (MOM, 400). If moral feeling is different from inclination or fear, as
Kant says, it should manifest different functions (GMM, 401n). In what follows, those aspects of moral feelings will be clarified.

When Kant uses the term 'moral feeling', more than one meaning can be found in different contexts (Lee, 1990, 22-30). First of all, moral feeling seems to signify respect for duty. Kant considers it as 'the sole genuine moral feeling', 'the boundless esteem for the pure moral law' (CPR, 80 & 85). In the same passage, moral feeling indicates 'the capacity of taking an interest in the law or of behaving out of respect for the moral law itself.' (CPR, 80). Sometimes, the subjective pleasure or pain caused by the observation or transgression of a duty is also regarded as moral feeling (CPR, 38; TMM, 221 & 399). Among these connotations the common quality we can find is the existence of the moral law or duty. Then it can be understood why Kant suggests that the respect for the law of which a person gives us an example is the essential part of respect for that person (GMM, 401n; CPR, 81n).

The existence of the moral law also underpins the distinction between moral feeling and other kinds of feelings. In Kant's terminology, moral feeling is 'self-produced by a rational concept, but not a feeling received through outside influence.' (GMM, 401n). In other words, moral feeling 'is the subjective effect exercised on our will by the law and has its objective ground in reason alone.' (GMM, 460). Because human beings belong to the intelligible world and the sensuous world, in choosing the objective moral principle to be their subjective maxim, they will have the feeling of pleasure or pain. Although the effects are the same, the sources are different (CPR, 117). One is out of reason, the other is from the faculty of desire. Considering the same state of feeling, the feeling which
follows upon the representation of the law is moral, while the feeling which precedes it is sensibly dependent, or sensuous and pathological (TMM, 399; CPR, 116–117). The uniqueness of moral feeling, i.e. its foundation in reason, makes Kant allow it to remain and to play some role in his ethics.

The fact that will (Wille), as a legislator, can make the law does not guarantee that the law will necessarily be chosen as the subjective maxim. It is in this process of choice (Willkür) that moral feeling has some function to perform. Kant regards moral feeling as the explanation of why human beings take an interest, in virtue of which reason becomes practical, in the moral law (GMM, 401n & 460). When reason recognizes a priori the moral law, then the consciousness of a moral law will give rise to the consciousness of moral feeling. By virtue of moral feeling, humans can be put under obligation, which makes us aware of the constraint present in the thought of duty (TMM, 399). The feeling of respect is capable of producing an interest in obedience to the law, which is called moral interest and which consists solely in respect for the law (GMM, 401n; CPR, 80). There is no doubt that moral feeling is conducive to human freedom to follow the law.

From the standpoint of moral practice, moral feeling in Kant's ethics seems to provide assistance in the observation of a duty. According to his description, 'every determination of choice proceeds from the representation of a possible action to the deed through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, taking an interest in the action or its effect.' (TMM, 399). The influence of moral feeling spreads through the whole process of an action. In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone,
Kant points out that the capacity for simple respect for the moral law, as moral feeling, can be the motivating force of choice (Triebfeder der Willkür) and can be incorporated by free will into its maxim (McCarty, 1993, 424). When the law checks self-love and strikes down self-conceit, the feeling of respect weakens the hindering influence of the inclinations (CPR, 75, 80 & 85).

It is evident that Kant is against locating the foundation of moral principles in human emotions. In his frame of double worlds, human emotions, including love, belong to the sensuous world and possess sensuous nature. The empirical principles of emotions vary with the special constitution of human nature or with accidental circumstances (GMM, 442). Hence they are never fitted to serve as a ground for moral laws. On the other hand, the consideration of pleasure and pain can produce principles of heteronomy, not those of autonomy, and can only prescribe a hypothetical imperative rather than a categorical one. By the same token, Kant regards love as being out of inclination and a matter of feeling, not of willing, so that it can not be commanded (GMM, 399; TMM, 401). Love understood in this way has no real moral worth.

Paradoxically, Kant in some passages seems to praise the importance of love. In the discussion of observing duty, love, recognized as the free integration of the will of another into one's maxims, becomes an indispensable addition to human nature's imperfection (TEA, 338-339). It is common sometimes to feel very unwilling in carrying out a duty. However, the love accompanying duty's command can supplement the deficiency of duty's incentive. In another passage, love of man is required if the world is to appear as a beautiful moral whole in its full perfection.
Although Kant notices the uniqueness of love, rehearsing the necessity of respect for love, as only a great moral adornment in his mind, he says 'without respect there is no true love.' In this case, love, as well as respect, becomes the feeling that accompanies the carrying out of the duties of love to other men, rather than a pure feeling from inclination (TMM, 448).

In this new context, love is not to be understood as feeling, that is, as pleasure in the perfection of other men or as delight in them. In contrast, it must rather be thought of as practical love, the maxim of benevolence, which can be subject to a law of duty (TMM, 401~402 & 449). Putting this statement in the terms of Kantian ethics, it means that our will (Wille) can make the law, for instance, to do good to other men insofar as we can, and then moral feeling, respect, assists us in taking an interest in the law and in the choice (Willkür) of it as our subjective maxim. Through this process, practical love, instead of pathological love, can be an object of command and has its moral worth. This also explains why Kant emphasizes the close relationship between respect and practical love.

Connecting to the above point, in interpreting the Christian commandment of love, Kant offers us an interesting way to cultivate love. He suggests that the saying 'you ought to love your neighbour as yourself' means that first you must do good to your fellow man, and afterwards your beneficence will produce the love of man in you (TMM, 402; CPR, 82~83). Additionally, in obeying the duty of gratitude, to honour a person who has rendered us a benefit is also an opportunity of combining the cordiality of a benevolent disposition with sensitivity to benevolence. In other words, it can lead us to unite the virtue of gratitude with the love of
man and to cultivate the love of man (TMM, 454 & 456). In these ways, people are commanded to observe duties and then develop the love of man.

Human emotions are incorporated by Kant into the sensuous world and can not be the basis of moral principles. Correspondingly, love is understood only as feeling and can not be commanded. However, do human emotions only belong to Kant's sensuous world and only disrupt the making of moral law? The answer, I think, is negative. When discussing human emotion, its scope can not be confined to sensation, which may on occasion disturb our thinking. Apart from sensation, emotions can exist in a higher level of life, as do Butler's self-love and benevolence, which are capable of regulating our sensation. Furthermore, human emotions dwell more deeply in the virtues of our mind or at the core of our disposition, which will affect our modes of perceiving others, that is, whether we conceive of others as subjects or as objects (Strasser, 1970, 291~307). It is evident that love is not just a sensation, since its functionalization enables us to be aware of the higher level of values, to perceive true selves. That Kant situates love in his sensuous world and bases morality on the principle of volition prevents him from fully recognizing the significance of human emotions, especially love, in morality.

When discussing respect for the law, Kant says 'Respect is properly awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love.' (GMM, 401n). Namely, the key reason why moral principle constrains us and becomes our subjective maxim is the value we are conscious of. However, if the agent does not develop some sort of sensibility to values or a preference-
hierarchy, it is doubtful whether he can realize the value inherent in moral principle and whether the feeling of respect can arise. Without love, human beings actually lose the main thrust toward developing and transforming an individual system of values. If this argument is reasonable, because of his neglect of love, I think Kant will be in difficulties in maintaining his ethics without any revision. Interestingly, suggesting that in our value-feeling (Wertfühlen) we can vividly grasp values which are the foundation of any ought, Scheler opens an alternative way to grasp the possible implication of human emotions in morality (FORM, 194–203 & 206). This will be my topic in Part II.

From the viewpoint of interpersonal perception, Kant fails to treat human emotions properly, viz. he can not appreciate the contribution emotions can make in human interaction (Cartwright, 1987, 291–304). For instance, if the consideration of what is duty does not serve as a determining ground, sympathy in Kant's view is a burden for humans (CPR, 118). It is obedience out of duty, not action from sympathy, which is the only criterion for the moral worth of helping others (GMM, 398). However, the question is how we know that others are in need of help. The volitional capacity to follow duties does not imply the capacity to sympathize with other's pain or pleasure. If we can not perceive others' pain, how can we help others properly? Actually the awareness of others' mental states in interpersonal perception is the real content of our judgement or inference. Consequently, moral perception, in which human emotions play a vital part, is an essential prerequisite of moral judgement (Vetlesen, 1994, 162).
From the sketchy survey in this Part, it can be found that, even though love enters differently into different ethical doctrines, it constantly and strongly attracts our attention. However, looking at the above interpretations of love in ancient and modern ideas, some alterations in this transition can be found and are worth mentioning.

To begin with, the perception obtained in the feeling of love seems to be underestimated in the above modern interpretations. That is to say, in the above ancient understandings of love, some sort of vision can be perceived in the exercise of love, say, the insight of what is better or more beautiful, the awareness of the desires in our self or our friends, the perception of first principles or divine revelation, and the sensibility to the movement of Vital Impulse. Nevertheless, in both Hume's and Kant's mind, the function of perception in human nature is mainly attributed to sympathy rather than love.

Secondly, two different pictures of love seem to emerge from the above rough review. On the one hand, the feeling of human love is the unceasing movement towards what is more good or beautiful, the stable disposition to do good to our friends, the imitation of divine love with permanence and stability, and the invisible foundation of other virtues and emotions. On the other hand, love becomes some sort of transient sensation such as the violent, indirect passion in Hume's sense, and the pathological inclination or the accompanying feeling of carrying out duties in Kant's sense.

Finally, the role of self-love in human nature undergoes change as well. Once the insightful vision is continuously grasped, the person who loves
himself should be the lover of his true self, the intellectual element in his soul, his spiritual nature, and his admirable qualities or righteousness. While, once self-love is regarded as the satisfaction of one's own appetite, as in Hume, or the blind inclination which we should demolish, as in Kant, the position of self-love in the unfolding of humanity is depreciated. Although self-love is not necessarily incompatible with benevolence in Butler's sense, their compatibility requires the regulation of conscience as a higher authority.

Actually, behind these variations exist some problems which are in need of more inquiry. They are as follows:

1) Is there any essential intrinsic connection of love to the beloved other than the contingent casual connection, which is germane to what is really loved? If there is, do the objects of love form a structure with different levels?

2) Is the feeling of love either a stable disposition or an episodic sensation? Or can it be both? Meanwhile, how is love connected to the beloved?

3) Does the self-lover really actualize himself in loving others? If he does, what are his essential features? How does this sort of self-lover participate in human interaction and in social life?

Plainly, the answers to these problems rely on whether any essential meanings of love can be recognized and what they are. In order to make them out, Max Scheler's phenomenology will be referred to in Part II.
NOTES


2. Guyer's interpretation of Kant's view on our natural inclination to sympathy as 'a pair of moral eyes', as 'an instrument for the discovery of what actions need to be taken in order to realize our general policy of benevolence' is discussed in Chapter 3 section 4.
Part II: Scheler's phenomenology of love

Chapter 3 What is loved: the object which possesses value
3-1. Love in Scheler's non-formal ethics of values
3-2. What is loved
3-3. The value of love
3-4. The cognition of values and love

Chapter 4 The way love is directed to its object
4-1. Love as the movement of heart
4-2. Love as an emotional act
4-3. Love as a spiritual feeling

Chapter 5 Who is the lover: the person
5-1. The meaning and nature of the person as the lover
5-2. The community of love as the collective lover

Chapter 6 The essential meaning of love
6-1. Sympathy
6-2. The essential meaning of love
6-3. The embodiment of love
6-4. The order of love
Part II: Scheler's phenomenology of love

It was pointed out in the discussion in the previous part that an intrinsic inseparable relation between love and values seems to appear in the lived experiences and interpretation of love. Then one question to be raised here is: are values the objects of love? Apart from the object of love, what is not less important is who is the lover and what is it that qualifies some sort of act as love? In fact, the act of love, the lover and the loved form the noetic-noematic relationship of emotional intentionality. This structural relationship is also manifested in our oral expression. That is, when the act of love is performed or mentioned, what is logically entailed includes the agent, the object referred to by this act of love and the essential way of carrying out this act. On the other hand, in Scheler's system of thought, the feeling of love, values, emotions and the person are closely connected with each other and establish an inseparable and organic relationship and structure. For instance, the apprehension of values relies on the intentional function of human emotions, among which love is not just a spiritual feeling, but also decides the understanding of a person's value-essence (FORM, 343–344 & 488). Furthermore, the person is a being of value, to whose values all possible values belong (FORM, XXIII). In view of the close connection among them, there is no likelihood of understanding Scheler's insight into love without expounding his views on values, human emotions and the person.

The first focus of this part will be on Scheler's non-formal value-ethics and on the role love plays in the grasp of values, where what is loved is
going to be discussed. By presenting the theory of the stratification of human emotional life, then, the position of love in this stratification and the way love is directed to its objects will be examined in Chapter 4. After that, I will concentrate my attention on the nature of the person as the lover and on the intrinsic link between the collective lover and social life. Finally, the aim of Chapter 6 is to describe the essential meaning of love and the order of love.

NOTE

1. This note is printed as Note 1 to Chapter 3; see p. 107.
Chapter 3 What is loved: the object which possesses value

Although the feeling of love is a concrete lived experience, the objects of love seem to be many and various from person to person. For instance, they might be various kinds of beauty from physical beauty to beauty itself in Plato's *eros*, or virtue, pleasure and usefulness in Aristotelian *philia*, etc. Another difference concerning what is loved is whether lifeless things, beside sensible ones, could become the objects of love, as in the difference we find between Hume's love and Plato's *eros* and Confucian love. In the discussion of Kantian love, furthermore, it has been mentioned that Scheler's suggestion of value-feeling seems to open an alternative way to understand the relationship between human emotions and morality and the essence of love. This chapter will commence, thus, with the exposition of Scheler's non-formal ethics of values, after which what is loved, the value of love itself and the connection of love with value-cognition will gradually be revealed. It is going to be revealed that, taking the significance of emotions in the apprehension of values into account, actually love is the fundamental and determinative factor in the variations of ethical-estimations.

3-1. Love in Scheler's non-formal ethics of values

Regarding human beings as rational beings belonging to both the sensuous world and the pure intelligible world, human feelings in Kantian ethics belong to the order of nature and are incapable of recognizing *a priori* the moral law. In other words, although moral feeling, the respect for the law, is conducive to human beings taking an interest in the law and
following it in putting themselves under an obligation, moral principles should fundamentally not be based at all on any feeling, which is the basis of all inclination and every sensuous impulse. By the same token, two sorts of love are understood in this ethical system, that is, pathological love and practical love. Love out of inclinations or desires is pathological, whereas love from respect for the law of duty is practical. However, in emphasizing the value-ception (Wertnehmung) of intentional feelings discussed in section 4, human emotions in Schelerian non-formal ethics of values can become the foundation of moral judgements or actions, not only an assistance to carrying out a duty. More important, because of its unique feature of moving toward higher values of the beloved object, the spiritual act of love in fact determines the horizon of values and the structure of preferring of both individuals and societies. In his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, Scheler puts forward the above insights into values, persons and emotions, especially love, in his discussion of Kantian ethics.

Is it possible to find this value-ception of emotional intentionality and establish this kind of non-formal ethics? Scheler commences answering this question by examining the eight presuppositions he found in Kant's ethics, which he takes to be the most perfect one in the area of philosophical ethics (FORM, XVIII, XXIX & 5–6). According to Scheler, although correctly insisting that ethical propositions must be a priori, Kant is incapable of understanding a 'phenomenological experience', which exhibits as a fact of intuitive content (Anschauung) what is already contained in natural and scientific experience. As a result of failing to distinguish the facts upon which a priori ethics must be based from the facts obtained in observation and induction, Kant can not help
but appeal to a purely constructive explanation of the a priori contents of objects of experience', that is to say, to derive the multiple variety of moral phenomena from one uniform principle (FORM, 46–47, 65–66 & 68; Deeken, 1974, 19–20). Presuming that what is 'given' is a 'disordered chaos', every 'synthesis' in appearances must of necessity be produced by understanding (or by practical reason). To the contrary, finding that what is given in the intentional functions and acts of emotions, such as loving and hating, is the a priori content of values and their order, Scheler denies the above Kantian presumptions.

Moreover, Scheler also points out that Kant's fundamental error lies in identifying 'the a priori with the formal, the non-formal with the sensible content, the a priori with what is thought or what has been an addition to such sensible content by way of reason' (FORM, 53–54). In fact, adopting the phenomenological approach, Scheler discovers that the a priori consists of the ideal meaningful units and propositions, which are self-given in immediate contents of intuition, and the 'phenomena' presented in essential intuition without any previous positing have nothing to do with illusion or appearance. Without being based on any media of symbols and abstraction, this kind of immanent experience can not be categorized into universals or particulars and is independent from observation, description, induction of experiences and cause-effect explanation. In other words, what is given in the intentional intuition of human emotion is not a chaos, but the a priori content of values, their essence and interrelation. In this way, the opposition of 'a priori' to 'non-formal' is resolved and there is the likelihood of the existence of non-formal value-ethics'.

75
Scheler's view on the intentional function of emotions can be traced back to Brentano's intentionality of psychological phenomena and Husserl's phenomenology. Brentano suggests that intentionality is the crucial difference between physical phenomena and psychological ones. In his descriptive psychology, 'reference to something as its object' characterizes a psychological phenomenon. Unless something is heard, there is no hearing; unless something is believed, there is no believing. However, two objects appear in our psychological phenomena. For example, in seeing something, apart from that I can see things with colours, I am aware that I am seeing. In these two different relationships, the former is the relation to the primary object, the latter to the secondary object (Brentano, 1967, 15~18 & 139~141; Spiegelberg, 1981, 14~15). In particular, among Brentano's three sorts of psychological acts, it is emotional acts, rather than presentations or judgements, which adopt emotional positions toward objects. Applying these insights into the investigation of human emotions, emotional acts, as one kind of consciousness-acts, possess the feature of intentionality, and values become their objects in Scheler's non-formal value-ethics. At the same time, the distinction between primary object and secondary object also affects Scheler's differentiation between sensations and emotional function, which will be discussed in what follows.

Additionally, from Husserl Scheler not only inherits the insights of intentionality, phenomenological intuition and reduction, but also revises and absorbs them into his thinking about love, values, human emotions and the person. Husserl is concerned with the investigation of the phenomena of acts, the characteristic of which is intentionality, i.e. being directed to objects. He believes that, when focusing our attention on the
objects of investigation, the intuition of the individual token object enables us to grasp universal essences. However, before the comprehension of essence, Husserl asks us to carry out the act of 'epoche' or 'reduction', i.e. to bracket or suspend all beliefs about objects and go back to things themselves (Spiegelberg, 1981, 66~69; 1982, 104~105, 118~119 & 682~697; Schmitt, 1967, 58~68; Levinas, 1967, 83~105). Scheler extends the scope of intentionality to include human emotions. For instance, the intuition of love enables us to see the higher value in objects. Adopting the attitude of 'epoche' and eidetic reduction, any positing concerning love, the person, values, etc., could be suspended in order to go back to the essences of them.

In fact, with regard to the priority of emotions in the examination of ethics, in his 1897 doctoral thesis 'Contributions to the ascertainment of the relation between the logical and ethical principles', Scheler's suggestion that truth and goodness are not only separately studied in different disciplines, but also grasped by different human faculties, has already emerged. Inheriting Pascal's point that heart and reason have their own distinguishable order, Scheler emphasizes the independence of the phenomenology of values and the phenomenology of emotional life from logic, constituting an autonomous area of objects and research. Logic and ethics, in his mind, are two equal and strictly autonomous disciplines in the sense that the axioms of values are wholly independent of logical axioms and are not mere 'applications' of the latter to values (FORM, 64). As a result, using the phenomenological viewpoint to investigate values, as Frings points out, this sort of non-formal ethics of values locates 'the moral good (and evil) in the direction of our loves and hates and feelings, i.e., in man's heart', rather than 'through the light of man's reason' or 'in the
direction of man's will' (1987, XIV). The fundamental recognition of heart as the starting point of all moral volition and judgements makes Schelerian ethics different from Kantian and thereby the feeling of love is allowed to reveal its essential meaning rather than being merely the feeling which accompanies the carrying out of duties.

In view of the basic concern of Schelerian ethics, namely, the basis of value which is presupposed in social value-judgements regarding good and evil rather than those judgements themselves (FORM, XVII, 45), the feeling of love occupies an unshakeable key position. The reason, which will be expounded in what follows, is that values can only be grasped in the function of emotional intuition, and love is a movement, passing from a lower value to a higher one (SYM, 148 & 152). In other words, it is evident that, without love, the apprehension of the whole range of values with different ranks, which is the goal of Scheler's non-formal value-ethics, and the understanding of the value basis of value-judgements, are doomed to fail.

3-2. What is loved

Given that what non-formal value-ethics is concerned about is what good and evil are, rather than what is considered good and evil according to 'social validity', and that love is a value-enlarging movement, what is the essence of value and what is loved naturally become key issues needing to be dealt with. In displaying the a priori hierarchical order as their own quality, upon which love can progress from a low level toward a high level, values (Werte) are distinguished from goods (Güter), 'thing-value' and 'value-complex' in Schelerian ethics. So far, the exposition could give
us the impression that what is loved is values themselves. However, the
aforesaid distinction can help us understand that what is really loved is the
object which possesses values rather than values.

By means of a phenomenological approach, Scheler points out that 'all
values (including the values 'good' and 'evil') are non-formal qualities of
contents', in which a determinate order of higher-lower ranks can be
found (FORM, 17). The values themselves can only be presented in
consciousness by intuition and the authentic and true qualities of them
constitute a special domain of objectivities. Moreover, value-qualities are
independent from the movement and changes of goods or things in
history. Their qualities of order are neither an abstraction from goods nor
the consequence of goods, in which values appear, but dominate existing
goods (FORM, 13, 15 & 18–19). Scheler gives us the statement 'It is not
true that the colour blue becomes red when a blue sphere becomes red.'
Keeping this distinction in mind, it can be understood that the sphere is
the place the colour of red appears and different from red itself.
Similarly, when my friend turns out to be a false friend and betrays me,
the value of friendship is not affected. That means, the alteration in the
carriers of values can not influence the independence of values and the
objectivity of their qualities.

Then, what are the differences between values and goods? Goods refer to
value-things or things of value (Wertdinge) or things considered as
bearers of values, namely, the things in which values are realized or to
which our names of values refer. For instance, they could be cultural
goods, or material goods etc., such as a work of art, or a special dish.
Again, in the taste-sensation of a sweet fruit or the atmosphere of a party,
the value quality 'agreeable' or 'comfortable' might be represented or be
realized. Such goods, of course, are thoroughly permeated values and
every good or value-thing represents a small 'hierarchy' of values, where
the value-qualities are differentiated in their 'feelable whatness'. That is to
say, the unity of a good is founded in an order of values, but not in natural
things (FORM, 12 & 20-23). That is why alterations in parties or fruits
do not entail alterations in the objectivity of values and their natures.

Values in Schelerian ethics, given through intentional acts, are, as Moosa
reminds us, the Sosein rather than the Dasein. The former refers to the
nature of an object (be it contingent or essential nature), which can be
immanent to and truly inherent in knowledge and consciousness, while the
latter, its existence, is transcendent and alien to them (FORM, 21; SPE,
289-290 & 315; Moosa, 1991, 38). It is significant that values as ideal
objects can only be grasped in the operation of reduction and ideation
regarded as one special spiritual act, which can only be achieved by a
human being with spirit, one of the five essential forms of human, rather
than animal, life discussed in the next chapter. That is to say, it is in
spiritually saying 'No' to our vital drives that the existence or the sense of
reality derived from the experience of resistance inherent in our vital
drives is suspended and the Sosein of values, emotions, person, etc., is
comprehended' (MPN, 49-53; Pivcévic, 1970, 97-100; Dunlop, 1991,
61-62 & 75). Furthermore, values are not existing things, nor do they
exist by themselves in a Platonic realm. Put in different terms, values,
like colours, require some kind of substrate in order for them to exist
(Frings, 1987, XXVII; 1992, 101-102). In their carriers such as animate
or inanimate things, human states of affairs or historical events, persons
etc., values enter into functional relationships with them and can be grasped.

Apart from goods, thing-values in Scheler's non-formal value-ethics are not the equivalents of values themselves. The former refer to the values things 'have' and which 'belong' to things. In our perception, a natural thing can be a bearer of certain values and in this sense a valuable thing (FORM, 20). Therefore, changes in thing-values can not be regarded as changes in values. In the above case, the value attached to friends may change, as in the increase of the value carried in the Berlin wall, whereas values and their qualities are a priori with regard to thing-values. In the natural view of the world, a house may be viewed as a 'complex' (Sachen) (FORM, 22), i.e. a thing insofar as it is of value. While, by a volitional faculty, the act starts of moving toward pure things in deliberately setting aside all values or toward pure goods in deliberately setting aside all thingness.

The foregoing classification is of vital significance for us to understand Scheler's phenomenology of love. The object we love is never values, but always something that possesses values (SYM, 148). For instance, in loving the person as its object, we can intuitively grasp the value-essence of the person, as a bearer of values. It has been pointed out in the discussion of Plato's eros that 'love is not desire either of the half or the whole, unless that half or whole happens to be good' (205e1). In the pursuit of life, sometimes some part of our body should be cut off. In fact, our true selves or 'the good' as the objects of love are the objects with values. By the same token, the Aristotelian virtue of our friend, Mencius' distinction between righteousness and life, Butler's pursuit of
private happiness and the good of our fellow-creatures, etc., are the carriers of values rather than pure natural things or values themselves.

When reflecting on our lived experiences of loving a person, a book, a flower, etc., the beloved objects should be the meanings of value, say, kindness, loveliness, usefulness, comfortableness, etc., rather than their thingness of width, length, solidity, etc. It is common to find in everyday life that the alteration of thingness does not necessarily arouse our love, unless our meanings of value grasped in objects have changed. On the other hand, insofar as we make a favourable evaluation of a knife scar across a given face, the former feeling of indifference or disgust could be replaced by that of appreciation or love without any change of the person's thingness at all. In other words, what is loved is the objects with values, but not pure natural things.

However, is the distinction between 'objects with values' and 'pure natural things' to be interpreted as the distinction between two kinds of things, those which can be carriers of values and those that can't, or between two ways of 'relating to' the same things? Concerning the first interpretation, appreciating the world solely from the viewpoint of things, pure or valuable, four points can be raised. Firstly, the boundary line between the so-called two kinds of things seems to be in doubt. At least, in the process of human history, nothing is absolutely valueless so that it can not be a carrier of values. Secondly, the same thing can both be and not be a carrier of values. For instance, 'The Creation of Eve' by William Blake can be investigated just in terms of qualities such as length, width, colour, lightness, etc. Nevertheless, its usefulness or beauty can be perceived as well. Thirdly, even if the first distinction is conceded, there still exists the
realm of values, which can be carried in the things. Therefore, a change in things does not necessarily guarantee a change in evaluation. Once the individual system of values alters, the resulting evaluation of the same thing will be different. Fourthly, the qualities of things are different from those of values, namely the realm of values has its own essential lawfulness which is independent of that of things.

Consider the second distinction, between two ways of 'relating to' the same things. This view suggests that the reason why 'pure natural things' are appreciated as 'objects with values' lies in some special relationship that arises out of circumstances linking the valued object with the valuing subject. As a matter of fact, the nature of the relationship at issue is highly germane to the existence and qualities of values. If the relation consists solely of the satisfaction of desires of the subject's will or the subject's feeling of pleasure as his reaction to the stimulation of the environment, as Windelband claims, the removal of will and feeling makes it clear that there is no such thing as value (Rescher, 1969, 55). Similarly, recent 'projectivism' explains the process of evaluation as the projection of the evaluator's needs, desires, sentiment, etc., onto the world where there are no objective values at all. However, it seems to me that in the perception of values there should be another relationship than the individual's projection. Namely, the kind of 'self-regarding' or involvement of self required in the process of value-ception can be a self-forgetting openness to what is already real and there rather than just the satisfaction of the individual's desires or wishes. In distinguishing intentional feelings and sensations, Reiner points out that the former as a faculty of the world-openness of man can discover entirely new values, which scarcely function to fulfil human needs (Reiner, 1983, 159). The
intentional qualities inherent in human emotions, including love, will be explored more in Chapters 4 and 6.

Concerning the second part of the above question, is it possible to love just values without their carriers? In the daily usage of language, people would say 'I love truth, goodness, beauty, etc.' Nevertheless, the crucial issue behind these expressions is whether values could exist or be grasped without entering into functional relationships with concrete things. Because values are Sosein rather than Dasein, as was elucidated above, they require some sort of substrate in order to exist. As a result of this feature of values, the values we love, truth, goodness, beauty, etc., should actually be carried by the beloved objects. This is also the reason why the objects of love can extend to our selves, others, transcendental being, institutions, even lifeless things, because all of them can become the carriers of various values.

Given that values and their qualities constitute a special sphere of objectivities, is Scheler's ethics of value one sort of realism? On the other hand, does the analogy between values and colours suggest the idea that values are secondary qualities? The vital debate between axiological or moral realism and anti-realism is whether or not values exist, to which ordinary axiological or moral terms refer. Therefore, Scheler's ethics belong to 'realism' in the sense that, as discussed above, values exist as ideal objects grasped in the intentionality of human emotions rather than as empirical entities. Nevertheless, Scheler might be called an 'idealist' in the sense that values are intuitable essences, but not conceptual representations (like Platonic ideas) (Blosser, 1995, 80~81 & 95~96). It is interesting that recently, in arguing that a realist position has more
strength in relation to the axiological portion of ethics than in relation to morality, Kupperman is also aware of the significant role emotions can play in the cognition of values (1996, 185 & 200–201). This seems to imply that probably from the investigation of the relationship between human emotions and values a resolution can be found of the lengthening debate between realism and anti-realism.

With regard to the cognitive aspect of emotional intentionality, are what is perceived, say, values, secondary qualities? The distinction between primary and secondary qualities can be traced back to Galileo, who points out that the only things which are required in physical bodies are sizes, shapes, numbers, and slow or fast movements, while tastes, odours, colours, and so forth have their habitation only in the sensorium. In other words, insofar as animate and sensitive bodies were to be removed, these secondary qualities would be removed and annihilated and hence become 'mere names' (Funk, 1974, 46–49). Given that Galileo's distinction is acceptable, taking the following three reasons into consideration, I am reluctant to equate values with secondary qualities.

Firstly, the explanation of both primary and secondary is given in terms of sensory experience, in which the subject is in a passive state and just depends on the powers of objects to produce various sensations. However, apart from passive emotional sensation, emotional functions and acts such as sympathy and love have some sort of spontaneity which enables human beings to spontaneously perceive the world*. Secondly, due to the spontaneous involvement of self, emotional perception of values shows some qualities which could not be found in that of secondary qualities. For instance, in specifying the disanalogy between
values and secondary qualities, a virtue is seen by McDowell to be not merely such as to elicit the appropriate 'attitude' as a colour does, but rather such as to merit it (1985, 118). Certainly, it is possible that the colour of redness may merit pursuing or avoiding. In such a case, apart from being passively caused to do so, the involvement of the agent in the apprehension of the value or disvalue of redness should be the main reason which implies more room for individual or cultural variations in the realization of values than in that of secondary qualities. It is also on the basis of this close connection between emotions like shame and the life of the subject of experience that Taylor (1985, 47-56) separates subject-referring qualities from secondary qualities. Thirdly, owing to the agent's participation in value-ception, axiological or moral phenomena should not be solely explained causally or from just an external standpoint (McDowell, 1985, 118-123), which might be applied to secondary qualities properly.

3-3. The value of love

In the previous sections, it has been reiterated that love is a movement, passing from 'a lower value to a higher one' upon 'the ranks of values as their own quality'. Then, the scale of values which reveals itself as a hierarchy of higher and lower levels seems to be implied in this statement. In fact, the height of a value or the fact that one value is higher than another can be comprehended in the cognitive act of preferring (FORM, 87). Therefore, the criteria of the height of values and value-modalities will be presented here as the starting point of the value of love.
Five different characters of values can be found to decide their heights and all of them may be traced back to one factor. They are the criteria of *endurance, divisibility, fundamentality, depth of contentment* and the *level of relativity or absoluteness* (FORM, 90~100). What is implicitly suggested in these criteria, in fact, are different cores of the unity of human life, as will become clearer in the discussion in the next chapter regarding the stratification of human emotions. These centres are a given part of our organic body, lived vital life and the person, all of which could become the bearers of values at different levels and give rise to qualitatively different feelings in taking part in the activities of human life. Compare the act of drinking water with appreciating an opera performance. Suppose what is experienced is agreeable or vital values in the former while it is the value of beauty in the latter. Then, the accompanying depth of 'contentment' will vary with the different values felt and the cores of human life participating in these activities. Certainly, for different people and in different situations, water might be the carrier of spiritual values, whereas attendance at opera might be boring. The origin in the deepest core of the person explains the *endurance* of bliss, despair, spiritual love in absolute time.

Value-modalities are used by Scheler to refer to the most important and most fundamental *a priori* relations, an order of ranks, among the systems of qualities of non-formal values. In the intuition of values and the intuition of preferences, they constitute the non-formal *a priori* proper (FORM, 104~105). These value-modalities are independent from all factual goods and the special organizations of living beings that feel values. The *a priori* rankings of four value-modalities are pointed out: the
modalities of agreeable value, vital value, spiritual value and holy value (FORM, 104~110).

1) A sharply delineated value-modality is formed by the values ranging from the agreeable to the disagreeable. Other conditions being equal, the agreeable is preferable to the disagreeable. This modality is correlative to the function of sensible feeling.

2) The values correlated to vital feeling, for example, the feelings of 'quickening' and 'declining' life, health and illness, ageing and oncoming death, etc., constitute another modality. Its thing-values, insofar as they are self-values, which retain their value-character independent of all other values, are such qualities as those encompassed by the 'noble' and the 'vulgar'. Life is a genuine essence and not an empirical generic concept. Vital values can not be reduced to the values of the agreeable and the useful, nor to spiritual values.

3) The realm of spiritual values is an original modal unity and separate from that of vital values. There are three main types of spiritual values: (i) the aesthetic values of beauty and ugliness; (ii) the values of right and wrong as the ultimate basis for all legislation; (iii) the values of the pure cognition of truth, whose realization is sought in philosophy. Spiritual values are apprehended in the function of spiritual feeling and acts of spiritual preferring, loving, and hating.

4) The unity of value-quality of holy and unholy value-modality are not subject to further definition. These values appear only in objects that are given in intention as 'absolute objects.'

Two points deserve notice here: the characteristic of the phenomenological typology and the harmonious balance of values on
different levels. Regarding phenomenology as 'an attitude of spiritual seeing in which one can see (er-schauen) or experience (erleben) something which otherwise remains hidden', what is suggested by Scheler is to come into a 'most intensely vital and most immediate contact with the world itself', where 'the contents of the world reveal themselves' (SPE, 137~138). Thus it can be understood in what follows that Schelerian modalities concerning, apart from values, human emotions, the person, and the forms of love are a sort of phenomenological typology, as Strasser points out (1977, 317–325). Instead of abstract deduction of concepts or general induction from empirical investigation, upon which deductive and inductive typologies are based, phenomenological typology is founded on the intuition of essence, which can reveal itself to us in its givenness and our attitude of openness, and on the discovery of its possible expressive types. In this case, the phenomenological attitude makes a relationship of dialogue between the knower and what is known possible. That means that the knower with the attitude of openness continuously participates in the intersubjective field of meanings, where the known discloses himself in response to the knower. Hence, phenomenological investigation, by which phenomenological typology is established, requires some sort of ascetic effort, otherwise it could lead to such dangers as subjectivism, impressionism (Strasser, 1980, 295–302) or projectivism or anti-realism discussed above.

With regard to these modalities of values, phenomenological investigation does not ensure the exhaustiveness of the expressive types of what is examined. It is likely to recognize not yet known types and even essences of values, love, etc., in our lived experiences and their dialogue with established knowledge. On the other hand, in entering into functional
relationships with concrete animate or inanimate things, human states of affairs or historical events, persons etc., these *a priori* essential interconnections are compatible with the pluralism of various cultures. Without neglecting the possibility of perversions in the human actualization of values, a multiplicity of cultural systems exemplifies the carriers of a plurality of values. In showing the main difference between ethical qualities and secondary qualities, i.e. the former are dependent on us and our motivation, Williams also reminds us that ethical variation should be understood more in terms of cultural and psychological factors (1995, 177-179). It is true, for example, that in the main cultural systems the different concrete ways to embody the values of different levels and their hierarchical relationship can be found. In the light of the characters of different values, if the values of lower levels are dominating in the human heart or a given ethos, then the passion for possession and the resultant fighting will be unavoidable. This also explains why the values of higher levels, and their functionalizations such as justice, love, etc., which regulate human desires and behaviour, are necessary for us to live in peace.

Apart from value-modalities, Scheler also describes a relatively 'formal' order, in which values are ranked at different heights according to their essential bearers11. Among them, the *a priori* relations between values of acts, values of functions, and values of reactions have something to do with the understanding of love. In accordance to *a priori* relations, the values of spontaneous acts are higher than those of functional ones and reactive ones. Love is a spontaneous spiritual act whereas sympathy is a functional reaction. Hence the value of love is higher than that of sympathy. By the same *a priori* relations, the values of acts and
functional reactions, such as love and sympathy, are higher than that of emotional states (FORM, 101; SYM, 41–42 & 141–142). Emotional acts, functions, and reactions—the differentiation among which will be the focus of Chapters 4 and 6—are all carriers of values and possess various heights in the rank-order of values.

Thus far, it seems to make sense and be clear to describe love as 'a movement, passing from a lower value to a higher one' upon 'the ranks of values as their own quality'. By the same token, it is on the basis of this a priori relationship of values that the phenomena of perversion, stagnation or infatuation can be distinguished, as discussed in Chapter 6. Then, what is the value carried in the genuine act of love? Surely the evaluation of love could vary with different systems of cultures or with the different focus on its intention, process or consequence. However, here the act of love is evaluated in accordance with the low-high criteria of values, their modalities and their essential bearers.

Although being not values themselves, human emotions, including love, can carry values and become experiences of values rather than values of experiences. Then, what is the value borne in the act of love? In the execution or co-execution of love, the criteria of low-high values, viz. endurance, divisibility, fundamentality, depth of contentment and the level of relativity or absoluteness, are of importance for examining the height of the value of love. In the description of the features of values, the act of love is used to expound the characteristic of endurance. When we love a person on the grounds of his personal value, the phenomenon of endurance is implicit in both the value to which we are directed and the
experienced value of the act of love. There is also an implicit 'unceasing endurance' of these values and this act. However, in daily life expressions like 'I love you now' or 'for a certain time' contradict the above essential interconnection. In such a case we may wrongly regard the thing-bearer as the value itself or the common interests as the act of love (FORM, 91~92). The values carried in this experience of unceasing endurance, as is experienced in love, are higher than those carried in the feelings of, say, sensible pleasure, vigor or health, the experiences of which do not endure so long. Due to its source in the spiritual person, rather than in the lived vital body or any part of our organic body$^{12}$, the act of love, in comparison to emotional states or functions$^{13}$, is less able to be divided in participation and perception. Meanwhile, a deeper contentment and a greater independence from the nature of sensibility and of life could be experienced in love.

In view of the criterion of **fundamentality**, it seems to me, the givenness of the act of love and its directed value is the condition of shame and the values carried by it. Take one example from Scheler's cases: as soon as a mother running to the rescue of her child who is burning in a fire has rescued him, she has a feeling of her own self and is ashamed of nudity. In the feeling of shame, actually a tension between two levels of consciousness is experienced, where the indecision is produced by the opposition between the selective function of higher value and the lower drive, conation and strong attractions. For example, bodily shame is the index of the measure of the tension between the value-selecting functions of vital love and the impulsive drive. The former is concentrated in sexual love, the latter toward sensible feelings of the agreeable and pleasant (PSV, 15~16 & 27). On the other side, psychic shame, or the spiritual
feeling of shame, stands for the index of the measure of the tension between the value-selecting functions of spiritual or psychic love and the vital basic drive of enhancing life in general. Without the love of higher value as part of her identity, the mother concerned will not experience the feeling of shame in this situation. In other words, love is the presupposition and foundation of the emergence of shame and the impulsive drive is the genetic and ontic condition.

3-4. The cognition of values and love

One fundamental reason which differentiates Schelerian from Kantian ethics is the recognition of value-ception of emotional intentionality. That means, in terms of the intentionality inherent in emotions such as preferring, love, hatred, etc., what is perceived or given as the intentional object is, instead of a disordered chaos, the essential nature of values and their interrelation. In other words, by means of value-feeling, in which values themselves are immediately given, we can vividly and properly feel them. Certainly, in what follows it will be understood that the above intentionality and value-ception do not appear in every kind of human emotions. It is worth noting that value-feeling is not only presented in our perception of the outer world and others, but also in that of the inner world and our own ego (FORM, 68, 87 & 197–200). That implies that our inner world and our own ego can be the objects of our emotional intentionality, in which values are immediately given. The emotional comportment of value-ception in Schelerian ethics is our primordial comportment toward the world, which is prior to all representational ones.
Among the value-cognizing acts of emotions, it is the feeling of preferring or disfavouring that enables us to recognize the rank-order of values or the *a priori* relations of value-qualities. Regarding the heights of values, that one value is higher than another is felt in the act of preferring or ranking down, as a special act of value-cognition, where values and their order flash before us. In interpreting human emotions as an affective awareness of situation or an access to the entire domain of what matters to us *qua* subject, Taylor's notion of strong evaluation seems to imply this sort of value-ception inherent in emotional intentionality (1985, 59–68). That is to say, strong evaluation or 'second-order' evaluation involves qualitatively discriminating our desires or motivations, not only actions or ways of life, as higher or lower, or intrinsically good or bad, which discrimination is anchored in feelings, emotions and aspirations and requires the drawing of a moral map of ourselves. Once the value-cognizing or strong evaluation is recognized, Reiner's distinction between primary strivings and secondary strivings become comprehensible (1983, 159). The main difference between these two kinds of strivings lies in their origins: the former stems from need such as a state of deficiency like the sensation of hunger, while the latter stems from and is the consequence of the discovery of new values.

However, it is reasonable to ask whether the value-ception intrinsic in love is different from that found in other intentional feelings or emotions such as preference or sympathy. As a matter of fact, it will be pointed out that the value-ception disclosed in the act of love is highly relevant to its feature of movement, namely, the continuous emergence of ever-higher value in the object (SYM, 157). Similarly, in identifying man as a self-interpreting being, Taylor points out that the attempt to further elucidate
the articulation of our situation incorporated in our interpreted feeling is potentially a life-long process, where we either seek the truth or take refuge in illusion (1985, 63-65). On the other hand, the unique cognition of values in love also elucidates why this act functions in a determinative role in the variations of ethical value-estimation.

Although inheriting Brentano's view of intentionality, Scheler does not entirely agree on his suggestion about love. In acknowledging the significance of insight in descriptive psychology, Brentano classifies emotional acts, as well as representation and judgement, as one kind of psychological phenomena. Moreover both love and hatred are not just a matter of individual taste, but can be distinguished as correct or incorrect. Namely, due to perversion, what is loved may not be what is worthy of love. In correctly loving, the insight that the objects loved are good can be immediately obtained. Likewise, in correctly preferring, what is immediately perceived is that the objects preferred are better (Brentano, 1967, 15-22, 26-28, 140-148 & 157; SYM, 148). However, apart from the aforesaid essential difference between them, Scheler contends, love is more fundamental than preference in the comprehension of values. The act of love plays the pivotal role in grasping values.

The emotional act of preferring is not the same as the conative act of choosing. Among many options, at least two, the one with higher value will be chosen as our purpose. A choice must be made on the basis of the cognition of a higher value. However, preferring occurs in the absence of all conation, choosing and willing (FORM, 87-89). Preferring, as an act of the emotional realm, in Scheler's view, occurs before the operation of conation and will. In preferring one deed to others, we do not need to
think of these other deeds. In such a case, what is presented is the consciousness of 'being able to prefer something else.' Rather than our labouring to reach a higher value, in preferring this value draws us toward it.

Hitherto, two significant points implied in Scheler's description of value-ception and preference should be kept in mind. Firstly, relying on the reciprocal correlation of noetic and noematic, or the intentional act and its intended object, three classes of acts with their corresponding correlates are distinguished from each other by Scheler: acts of thought are correlated to concepts, acts of will to projects and emotional acts to values⁴ (Emad, 1974, 78). Therefore, the emotional value-ception is different from, and even prior to, conceptual representation. Consider one example provided by Funk of the givenness of values in our intentional emotions, even before the objects which bear them (1974, 49).

when one attempts to recall, say, a short vacation of several years past, the quality of it, e.g., that it was 'dreary', can be given before any specifics, such as the days on which it rained. Indeed, the quality may be given apart from any specific recollections, so that one must search for the specific events which might bear the given quality.

It is true that, in everyday life, without considering whether the perception is correct or not, value-ception could emerge beforehand to be conceptualized. Secondly, the discussion about intentional emotions and their value-cognition is undertaken in the context of human emotional life, which possesses its own nature different from that of pure volition or cognition.
In the traditional theories of emotions, they are normally regarded as feelings, physiological disturbance or emotional behaviour (Solomon, 1977, 42-45; Calhoun & Solomon, 1984, 8-22). Unlike them, Scheler's views on value-feelings can be classified with the evaluative theory and the cognitive theory of emotions. That means, in perceiving our situation, this sort of feeling provides us with evaluative information. It can also be said that in preferring or disfavouring the meaning of value concerning the situation or objects is informed in an intuitive way. Ergo, apart from the causal analysis used in traditional theories, the phenomenological explanation, which takes the intentionality and subjectivity, one's own viewpoint and what one experiences, into consideration, becomes an alternative way to understand emotions (Solomon, 1977, 44).

Among the cognitive theorists of emotions, I think, Calhoun's suggestion is plausible and helpful in expounding Scheler's value-ception. In trying to solve the problem of emotion-belief conflict, she points out that 'our cognitive life involves more than clear, fully conceptualized, articulated beliefs.' Because the 'evidently' held beliefs could be different from and even in conflict with the 'intellectually' held ones, we can experience emotions without holding the emotion-relevant belief in an 'intellectual' way (Calhoun, 1984, 335 & 342). Similarly, Taylor also suggests that what we know is also grounded in a certain feeling, as an affective, intuitive awareness of a situation, from which some insight emerges as the basis for reasoning (Taylor, 1985, 61 & 65). By the same token, Scheler's value-feelings can be understood as a mode of cognition and an access into the domain of values.
What is implicit in the above account is relevant to Scheler’s distinction between the intentional act of preferring and choosing. The way by which our emotions reveal cognitive meaning concerning their objects to us is pre-reflective and prior to volitional experience. Sometimes, the cognitive relation inherent in emotions is not appreciated by and is inaccessible to the agents. That is why Solomon, in recognizing emotions as normative and often moral judgements, contends that such judgements are essentially non-deliberate choices (Solomon, 1980, 274–275; 1984, 323–325; Calhoun, 1984, 338). On the level of volition, we may make an effort to choose a higher value deliberately, whereas, in emotional preferring, our attention is drawn to it.

Because the *a priori* relations of values can only be comprehended in preferring and disfavouring them, the feeling of values has its foundation in these feelings of value-cognition. Then it can be said that only in preferring and ranking down can the value-range be widened. Our own rule of preferring determines what kind of values will be given and be felt in value-feeling. Hence, Scheler says ‘The structure of preferring and disfavouring circumscribes the value-qualities that we feel’ (FORM, 88–89). On the other side, the fact that values and their qualities are objective does not guarantee that what is preferred by human beings necessarily is in accordance with their *a priori* hierarchy, as in the modalities of values presented in the previous section. This phenomenon is described by Scheler as the deception of preferring, which affects the formation of goods and enspirits a given epoch (FORM, 22–23).

Although, in grasping values, value-feeling, preferring and subordinating play an important role, the act of love precedes them as a pioneer and a
guide (FORM, 261; SYM, 148-149 & 156). In love, as the movement from lower values toward higher ones, it is not necessary for both values to be given in the process. The movement of love, passing toward the potentially higher value of the beloved object, has nothing to do with whether this higher value is already in existence or whether it does not yet exist and merely 'ought' to do so. In contrast to that, in love and hate even a single value can be given, whereas preferring always presupposes a plurality of felt values in intention. In fact, preferring and disfavouring belong to the apprehension of grades of value, whereas love, as well as hatred, represents a unique attitude towards objects of values, in which ever new and higher values flash out, and serves as a basis for the apprehension of value. In this way, love governs our standard for the apprehension of value-attributes.

Due to the objective order of value-ranks and the human capacity of value-cognition in preferring, Scheler suggests, the moral value 'good' or 'evil' appears in the realization of a certain non-formal value. For the same reason, the morally good appears in, or on the back of, the value-realizing act such as forgiving, commanding, willing, promising etc., which agrees with the value that is preferred and disagrees with the value disfavoured. Evil is carried in the act which disagrees with the preferred value and agrees with the one that is subordinated (FORM, 25~30). What is good and evil is necessarily connected with acts of realization which take place with respect to acts of preferring of the person, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. Therefore, without cognizing the basis of value, merely obeying the moral law is not truly good, but only the action of a pharisee. On the other hand, when one acts morally, the subject of the
moral act is the person, who is the bearer of non-formal values of good and evil and exists solely in the pursuance of his acts.

Here, three points seem to merit noticing. Firstly, because the value-ception of preferring, on which the realization of non-formal values in the sphere of willing is based, is guided by the act of love, moral 'good' and 'evil' in Scheler's ethics are located in the emotive life of the person's moral tenor, in particular, in the direction of love and hatred. Secondly, because the person is a dynamic, act-being, the moral good can be regarded as his achievements through continuous moral effort. That is to say, through the acts of the person, including those of willing, the value preferred is fulfilled and the value disfavoured is renounced. Thirdly, moral 'good' and 'evil', occurring in the executions of acts of the person, can be carried only in the person, not in things. In contrast, the values in the aforementioned five modalities, i.e. agreeable values, useful values, vital values, spiritual values and holy values, can be borne by other entities (Frings, 1984, 106). Plainly, other non-formal values are different from moral values in the sense that the latter come into existence only in the realizing act of the former and thus are carried by the person.

In examining Scheler's terminological and conceptual conventions as to moral and nonmoral values, Blosser suggests that Scheler's theory of moral values is too 'formal' or too 'empty' (1987, 139~143; 1995, 84~86). It seems to me that the fundamental difference, from which Blosser starts his examination, lies in the different categorization of values and the understanding of moral values. In Blosser's discussion, values are classified into fifteen irreducible strata, among which moral value such as 'fidelity', 'faithfulness', 'remorse', 'forgiveness' and 'honesty' is only one
strata. Therefore, it is not the realization of all values, say, economic values or logical values, but only that of moral values, that can result in moral good. In such a case, against Scheler, moral values can constitute a distinct sphere of non-formal values and even can be a content of willing, not just on the back of the realizing act of non-formal values in the sphere of willing discussed in the above.

It seems to me that at least two points should be considered as to the status of moral value in our ethical life. First of all, take the cases in Blosser's examination: positive linguistic values 'ought' to be realized in human speech or positive logical values 'ought' to be realized in philosophical arguments. In Blosser's understanding, what appears in the above acts of realizing linguistic or logical values is linguistic or logical good, rather than moral good. However, it can be found in Schelerian ethics that what linguistic or logical good refers to is the things in which linguistic or logical values are realized, such as eloquent and correct expressions or clear-cut and distinct reasoning, but not the person or his qualities. More important, even in Blosser's notions of values and their realizations, moral values or good seem to possess a special feature. That is to say, moral values in Blosser's sense seem to be presupposed in the realization of other kinds of values. What is required in the realization of linguistic or logical values, for instance, is not just linguistic or logical capacities of the person, but his moral qualities. The fourteen other values distinguished by Dooyeweerd (Blosser, 1987, 142~142, note 7; 1995, 84) viz. religious, juridical, aesthetic, economic, linguistic, social, historical, psychical, logical, biotic, physical, kinematic, spatial, and numerical values might be crucially vital for the person to distinguish what is better in the experiences concerned. Nevertheless, it is moral
value or good and in particular the person's moral tenor that determine whether the value preferred is fulfilled and the value ranked down is renounced. Hence, from the dynamic process of moral experiences, instead of the static classification of values, the person seems to fulfil moral values in the realization of other values.

In contemporary discussion about our ethical life, Williams's and Taylor's criticisms of morality in the narrow sense seem relevant here and inspire the following further consideration. To begin with, as a result of the restriction of our value-horizon to a certain narrow scope, other kinds of values and goods, even if they are of most significance on a given occasion, will be underestimated or neglected (Williams, 1985, 6-7, 16-17 & 179; Taylor, 1989a, 14, 19; 1995, 149). This sort of reductivist enterprise, among which Kantian ethics of obligatory action and utilitarianism are two notorious representatives, i.e. to make all ethical considerations into one type, is also criticized by Williams and Taylor6. Plainly human ethical life should consider the whole range of values and their various carriers, goods, among which moral values are one kind. Secondly, the system of morality based on the diversities of values and goods, in which certain goods such as respect for persons, justice, etc. and their actualization are cherished, is not, I think, incompatible with the particularity of individual situations. That is to say, the concrete evaluation of 'good' or 'evil' should take various value-related factors into account, including William's practical necessity17 (1985, 188). Thirdly, what should be emphasized in the cultivation of the person includes what is valuable in itself or what we should admire or love as well as what we ought to do (Taylor, 1995, 145). Actually, how we express ourselves in action, responding, feeling, etc., has its origin in Scheler's value-ception
or Taylor's pre-articulately qualitative discrimination, an orienting sense of what is important, valuable or commanding (Taylor, 1989a, 22; 1995, 134–135, 140). In replying to Taylor's friendly criticism, Williams also alludes to the importance of the inquiry into values involved in various activities and states (Williams, 1995, 205). It seems to me Scheler's non-formal ethics of values and the phenomenology of emotions, in particular love, are conducive to the understanding of the source of human moral vision.

Obviously, Scheler's view on the contributions of human emotions, especially love, to moral life is qualitatively different from Kant's. In defending the Kantian position on the cultivation of moral sentiments out of the motive of duty itself, Guyer interprets our natural inclination to sympathy as 'a pair of moral eyes', as 'an instrument for the discovery of what actions need to be taken in order to realize our general policy of benevolence' (1993, 337 & 388–389). Although being recognized to play a role 'in alerting us to moral salience' in our concrete situation, as Sherman points out (1995, 376), this function is not the whole equivalent of value-ception in Schelerian ethics. Perhaps, human emotions are mainly subsumed under the sensuous world so that the phenomenological distinction between emotional states, functions and acts, the details of which will be explored in Chapter 4, can not be found in Kantian ethics. As a result, the value-ception of preference or love, that is, the widening of value-range or passing toward the potentially higher value of the beloved object, is not acknowledged and becomes the foundation of moral principle.
If the realm of values and their qualities is categorically different from the world of primary or secondary qualities, as implied in the aforementioned discussion, then why does the relativity of the comprehension of values emerge in human history or how is the cultural variation in ethical life to be explained (Williams, 1995, 177–180)? In order to resolve the problem of variations of ethical value-estimation, Scheler reminds us that these changes could happen in five different levels, namely (i) ethos, (ii) ethics in the broadest sense, (iii) types of unity of institutions, goods and actions, (iv) practical morality, and (v) mores and customs, rather than values themselves (FORM, 295–307). Applying these five levels of variations to the examination of ethical relativism, it can be found that what is generally regarded by relativists as relativistic is not values themselves, but the various value-estimations. Scheler's value-perspectivism reminds us of the fact that ethical relativism takes values to be mere symbols of its own culturally dominant value-estimations of certain goods and actions. In other words, value-relativism absolutizes the value-estimations which depend on the idiosyncrasies and culture of the observer concerned (FORM, 301–304). In fact, what we should take notice of is not just the changing ideas such as love and justice, but also the immediate value-consciousness and its governing rules of preferring by which values themselves are preferred or subordinated.

Love in these variations of value-estimation is closely related to the change of historical ethos as the special structures of loving and hating, of preferring and disfavouring of values, of a given area or epoch. In the movement of love and its power, with regard to existing values, 'higher' ones are discovered and disclosed and therefore the renewal and growth of the ethos occurs (FORM, 305). As Taylor and Smith suggest as well,
human nature is not a community nature, identifying itself completely with a social group or a 'group mind,' that is to say, our feelings could lead us to go beyond what is regarded as good or bad by giving what is important or valuable. (Smith, 1977, 118; Taylor, 1985, 60) First this happens within the limits of holy value-modalities, then within those of the others. That is why Scheler says 'It is to the moral-religious genius that the realm of values opens up.' In the change of ethos, the whole old realm of values will be relativized and the virtues of the old ethos now become 'glittering vices.' By means of love, 'higher' values will be found and the existing realm of values will be 'elevated.' However, this change could be estimated as morally inferior and the individual tragedy could become 'tragic guilt' (FORM, 496). Whether the values are really 'higher' or it is a real 'elevation' has something to do with ordo amoris, the order of love, the coming topic of Chapter 6.

Before entering the further discussion of how love is directed to its objects, it is better not to let Scheler's treatment of the feeling of ressentiment pass without considering its resultant distortion of value-ception. Behind various expressions of ressentiment, regarded by Scheler as a self-poisoning of the mind, one common formal structure can be found: A is affirmed, valued, and praised not for its intrinsic quality, but with the unverbalized intention of denying, devaluing, and denigrating B. A is 'played off' against B (REST, 68). For instance, as a result of ressentiment, human inherent qualities such as spiritual personality or 'divine' nature are offset by the animal aspects of human nature, viz. the qualities which 'all' men clearly have in common (SYM, 94, 99–100; REST, 114, 122–125). In this way, ressentiment affects human rules of preferring and therefore results in the falsification and
overthrowing of values, as also manifested in modern morality. Apart from the above 'love of mankind', the consequent delusions and corresponding value judgements include the reduction of moral values to what the individual has acquired by his own strength and labour, the subjectivization of values as the projections of our desires and feelings and the subordination of vital values to utility values (REST, 138~174). On the other hand, it is plain how emotional deception in ethos rather than aberrations in applied ethics or errors in scientific ethics prevents us from grasping the \textit{a priori} relations of values.

So far it is evident that love is of vital significance in Scheler's non-formal value-ethics. Only through the act of love can it be realized and achieve its goal, to return to the basis of values. Values present their essences and \textit{a priori} relations in the contents of emotional intuition. Moreover, in the movement of love, what is loved is not values themselves, but something possessing values, and higher values will be found. Thus, love not only displays the feature of endurance, but also determines the grasp of the highest value. The value of love, as an act, is higher than the value of emotional functions or states. In preferring, the hierarchy of values is grasped, whereas love is ahead of it and the foundation of value-cognition. That is the reason why the order or disorder of love affects the variation of ethos.
NOTES

1. The noesis-noema relationship is described by Husserl as a parallelism between the *cogitare* and the *cogitatum*, namely, the intentional relationship between the structures of the subjective act and of its objective correlate. Due to the intentionality of consciousness, insofar as acts are carried out, certain contents are referred to as their intentional objects. In the first section of this chapter, the intentional relationship between acts and contents will be traced backed to Brentano and Husserl. Especially, this insight is incorporated by Scheler into his treatment of human emotions. For instance, he points out that feeling originally intends its own kind of objects, namely, 'values' (FORM, 258). This point is going to be explored more in Chapter 4. Cf. Schutz (1967, 102–106) and Spiegelberg (1982, 92–93).

2. The eight presuppositions, which underlie Kant's ethics, recognized and examined by Scheler are:

i) Every non-formal ethics must be of necessity be an ethics of goods and purposes.

ii) Every non-formal ethics is necessarily of only empirical-inductive and *a posteriori* validity.

iii) Every non-formal ethics is of necessity an ethics of success. Only formal ethics can treat the basic moral tenor (*Gesinnung*) or willing based upon it as the original bearer of the values of good and evil.

iv) Every non-formal ethics is of necessity a hedonism and so falls back on the existence of sensible states of pleasure, that is, pleasure taken in objects. Only formal ethics is in a position to avoid all reference to sensible pleasure-states through the exhibition of moral values and the
proof of moral norms resting on such values.
v) Every non-formal ethics is of necessity heteronomous. Only formal ethics can found and establish the autonomy of the person.
vi) Every non-formal ethics leads to a mere legalism with respect to actions. Only formal ethics can found the morality of willing.
vii) Every non-formal ethics makes the person a servant to his own states or to alien goods. Only formal ethics is in a position to demonstrate and found the dignity of the person.
viii) Every non-formal ethics must of necessity place the ground of all ethical value-estimation in the instinctive egoism of man's natural organization. Only formal ethics can lay the foundation for a moral law, valid in general for all rational beings, which is independent of all egoism and every special natural organization of man.

3. Friedrich Bollnow suggests that what Scheler attacks includes not only the formalism of Kant's ethics but also the 'constructivism' (Konstruktivismus) prevailing in most forms of modern ethics. It means 'the tendency to derive the multiple variety of moral phenomena from one uniform principle,' for instance, the good of society, the 'will to power' (Nietzsche), compassion (Schopenhauer), or duty (Kant). One common trait among them is to reduce the rich totality of moral phenomena to one common origin and principle. In Deeken (1974, 19–20).

4. Scheler's 'non-formal' is used in contrast to Kant's 'form' and rendered from the German adjective 'material' which is suitable for English 'content' rather than 'material.' That means, the value-grasping of intentional feelings possesses a priori content, in which the essences of
values and their relationships are given. In Frings (1965a, 106; 1965b, 87), Stark (1954, pxv), Ranly (1966, 5~6) & Lauer (1961, 283).

5. Cf. Chapter 1 section 3.


7. The five essential forms of psychic life and their own features will be dealt with in Chapter 4. Cf. note 5 of Chapter 4.

8. The distinction between emotional states, functions and acts will be explored in Chapter 4 section 2.

9. These five criteria are:

1) Without considering the existence of their thing-bearers, values have the characteristic of **endurance**, as a phenomenon absolutely different from 'succession' (or change). The lowest values are essentially the 'most transient' ones; the highest values 'eternal' ones. This difference of endurance could be experienced in the various feelings of different levels, the discussion of which will be undertaken in the next chapter. For instance, sensible feelings of, say, bodily pain, are actual and essentially punctual, without duration or continuity of sense, while what is experienced in the spiritual feelings of bliss, despair or spiritual love are as old as heaven and earth (FORM, 330~338 & 343~344). The fundamental reason behind this phenomenon is that the values referred to in spiritual feelings are 'eternal' ones.

2) **Divisibility** is the second criterion of the height of values. Values
are 'higher', such as the values of the 'holy', of 'cognition,' and of the 'beautiful,' the less they are divisible, that is, the less they must be divided in being participated and perceived. This quality explains the false conflicts between Butler's benevolence and self-love, that is to say, the conflicts only appear in the materials or means of enjoyment rather than in the giving or sharing, which is allowed in higher values. For instance, consider the painting masterpieces of John Constable, Claude Monet, Vincent van Gogh, etc. Insofar as they are divided, the value of beauty is certainly destroyed. However, in view of the value of usefulness, they are able to be divided for possession or warmth-giving.

3) If a value A can only be given on the condition of the givenness of a value B, then the value B is the 'foundation' of the value A. The more fundamental one value is the higher it is. **Fundamentality** becomes another criterion, by which five ranks of values are recognized. The value of what is 'useful' is 'founded' in the value of what is 'agreeable,' without which there would not be the 'useful'. Then the agreeable, as a value, is 'founded' in a vital value, upon the value of which, for instance, the value of the feeling of vitality and strength, the value of the agreeable is based. Again, the 'foundation' of the vital value is spiritual values such as values of cognition, beauty, etc. Only through spiritual acts can the rank-order of vital values be comprehended and differentiated from other levels of values. Moreover, all possible values are 'founded' in the value of an infinitely personified spirit and its correlative 'world of values.'

Although the condition of the givenness of values is finally founded in the value of an infinitely personified spirit and its correlative 'world of
values', from the view of genetic development, the actualization of higher values requires lower values and their carriers as a necessary supportive structure. From human childhood the ideal possibility of spiritual values is inherent in an organic body, which could be the bearer of useful values or agreeable ones. It is only through the formation of the order of love discussed in Chapter 6 that the values of higher levels such as vital values and spiritual values can be functionalized and come to fruition. Otherwise, without organic body or lived vital life, there will be the difficulty in actualizing vital values or spiritual values. On the other side, it is plausible that the fulfilment of higher values could regulate those of lower values. This essential feature is also embodied in the diverting of desires in Plato's *eros* and the authority over lower principles in Butler's self-love.

4) When an intention toward a value is fulfilled through the appearance of this value, we will experience the feeling of 'contentment.' *The depth of contentment* accompanies the feeling of a value-height, and a 'higher value' yields a 'deeper contentment.'

5) The above four criteria of value-heights can be traced back to the level of the 'relativity of values,' or their relationship to 'absolute values.' The values of the agreeable and disagreeable are 'relative' to a 'sensibly feeling being' and vital values to 'living being' in general. However, absolute values exist in 'pure' feeling, preferring and loving, which is independent of the nature of sensibility and of life as such. Hence, the values are higher the less the feeling of them is relative to the positing of a specific bearer of 'feeling' and 'preferring.' The values given in immediate intuition 'as higher' are those that are, in feeling and preferring, given as nearer to absolute values.
10. Maria Scheler points out that a special 'modality' for the useful is established by Scheler in his discussion of the person (FORM, 502, note 138). It can be found that, in Scheler's treatment of *ressentiment* and the criterion of *fundamentality* for the height of values, utilitarian values are still recognized as consecutive values of pleasure-values (FORM, 94; REST, 152-154). However, in his essay 'Exemplars of person and leaders', utility-values seem to become a separate modality (PSV, 194-198). Using Scheler's five pure person-types as the supporting case, Frings (1972b, 44) and Deeken (1974, 205) contend that there are five value modalities in Schelerian ethics. Cf. Dunlop (1991, 20).

11. The eight *a priori* relations include (FORM, 100-104):
   
i) Values of the person and values of things.

ii) Values of oneself and values of the other.

iii) Values of acts, values of functions, and values of reactions.

vi) Values of the Basic Moral Tenor (*Gesinnungswerte*), values of deeds, and values of success.

v) Values of intention and values of feeling-states.

vi) Values of terms of relations, values of forms of relations, and values of relations.

vii) Individual values and collective values.

viii) Self-values and consecutive values.

12. Cf. Chapter 4 section 3 where why love is a spiritual feeling will be discussed.
13. The distinction between emotional acts, functions and states is explored in Chapter 4 section 2.


15. The features of the person will be discussed in Chapter 5 section 1.

16. Cf. note 3: Scheler's attacks on 'constructivism'.

17. Apart from value-height from Scheler and value-strength from Hartmann, another nine principles of value-preference are put forward by Reiner to determine what a person ought to do here and now in a concrete situation. They consist of temporal urgency, quantity of value-realization, the greater chance of success, the greater or more pressing need, the negative demand of not violating already existing values, the scarcity of people capable of doing the job equally well, special abilities and the possession of particular means for performing certain tasks, the special calling out of the gifted capacity suitable for one task and 'the principle of the daimonion' as the voice of conscience (Deeken, 1974, 57~60).

18. These five different levels separately refer to (FORM, 295~307):
   i) Ethos: the variations in feeling (i.e. 'cognizing') values themselves, as well as in the structure of preferring values and loving and hating (FORM, 299).
   ii) Ethics: the variations occurring in the sphere of judgement and the sphere of rules for the assessment of values and value-ranks.
   iii) Types of unity of institutions, goods and actions: the variations taking
place in the quintessence of institutions, goods, and actions, the unities of which are built into moral value-complexes such as marriage, monogamy, murder, theft, lying, etc., or in existing morals.

iv) Practical morality: the variations relating to the value of the factual comportment of human beings, who live in a certain age and have their own structure of preferring. Being dominated by an ethos, human beings recognize the relations of value-ranks and form behavioural norms, on whose basis the value of the factual comportment is determined.

v) Mores and customs: The variations in the forms of action and expressions, the root of whose validity and practice is in (genuine) traditions and a deviation from which presupposes an act of willing.


20. In his discussion of the exemplary person, five models presented by Scheler are a saint, a genius, a hero, a leading spirit of civilization and an artist of enjoyment. However, due to the essential limitation of human beings, nobody can become an equally perfect example of all five models. It forms what Scheler calls the 'essential tragedy of being a finite person and the essential moral imperfection of being a man' (FORM, 590). M. S. Frings suggests that Seinsschuld (guilt resulting from being) is appropriate to express what Scheler has in mind, namely the 'incompleteness and the necessarily finite exemplarity of the individual person as compared to the ideal persons typified by the models.' Facing the moral judges of his time, the moral Prometheus must necessarily appear guilty when, in fact, he is guiltless. It is what Scheler calls schuldlose Schuld (guiltless guilt). In Deeken (1974,
Interestingly, Kohlberg in his stage theory as a rational reconstruction of
the ontogenesis of justice reasoning postulates a soft hypothetical
seventh stage of ethical and religious orientation, used to chart
development which occurs after the development and stabilization of
postconventional justice reasoning. The sense constructed in this stage
of identity with and participation in being, life, God, and a cosmic order
enables human beings to face such questions as injustice, suffering,
death, etc. The essential limitation of human beings and the
unavoidable tragedy in the value-realizing process seem to be inherent
in this postulation (Kohlberg, et al., 1983, 41–42).
Chapter 4  The way love is directed to its object

Given that what is loved is somebody or something possessing values, then what is the way love is directed to its objects? Suppose human feelings of vigour, fatigue, sadness, etc., and thinking or judgement possess intentionality as well and are directed to their objects. Then, is there any difference between the intention inherent in love and those in the aforementioned feelings or acts? This issue, I think, is clearly relevant to both the distinction between human emotions and intellect, or heart and head, and the essence of emotions themselves. If all human emotions are homogeneous or are not essentially different from intellectual acts, then the answer to the question at issue should be negative. In this chapter, the investigation of the intentionality of love will be undertaken from three angles: the movement of heart, emotional acts and the stratification of human emotions.

4-1. Love as the movement of heart

Thus far, it is understood that 'love is that movement of intention whereby, from a given value A in an object, its higher value is visualized' (SYM, 153). Then one question which could be raised here and is bound up with the nature of love's intentionality is where this movement of intention arises from. In Plato's scale of love, it is Psyche who obtains the wings and ascends from the phenomenal world to the world of Ideas in the collaboration between nous and eros. What is required in the imitation of Christian agape is with all heart, as well as with all soul and all strength. Moreover, in the Confucian interpretation of the relationship
between mind, nature and \textit{jen}, it is from nature, the 'substance' of mind, that our emotions, thought and consciousness proceed. If the essence of love reveals itself in the above descriptions, then what is the relationship between love and heart in Scheler's phenomenology of emotions? In fact, it has been pointed out that, in his 1897 doctoral thesis during his neo-Kantian or pre-phenomenological phase, the idea that truth and goodness are not only separately studied in different disciplines, but also grasped by different human faculties, has already emerged. In other words, it is through our heart rather than intellect that goodness and its basis of values are comprehended. This point could further be traced back to Augustine's idea of heart (\textit{cor}) and Pascal's order of heart (\textit{ordre du coeur}) or logic of heart (\textit{logique du coeur}), from which Scheler develops a non-formal \textit{a priori} emotive ethics.

For Augustine, heart plays a crucial role in human cognitive processes (Deeken, 1974, 34-35; Strasser, 1977, 17-18). The \textit{cor inquietum} with its \textit{pondus amoris}, the core of his thought, expresses the dynamic movement of heart in the search for love of God and the highest moral goodness. On the other side, he also discovers that it is only in the \textit{cor rectum}, the straightforward, orderly and pure heart, that the objective order of things is mirrored. Similarly, in recognizing the uniqueness and importance of heart in human life, Pascal suggests that both heart and reason have their own separate order and are responsible for different areas. In the cognition of truth, we use our heart as well as our reason. What is cognized by heart is first principles, with which reason has nothing to do. Actually, like intellect, heart has its own logic, i.e. the logic of heart (Pascal, 1966, 110, 298 & 424). It should be kept in mind that, as Guardini reminds us, what Pascal wants to suggest is the unique
cognitive grasp of values in heart rather than the strict antithesis between heart and intellect (Deeken, op. cit., 36–38; Strasser, op. cit., 19–20). In other words, the objects given in the act of heart are accessible to intellectual and rational penetration, while it is heart that is the first faculty for grasping those objects.

In manifesting the possible connotations of heart implied in ordinary language usages, Wood points out, it could be very closely bound up with the physiological blood pump, vitality, courage, moods, sympathy, memory, will, thought, one's heart of hearts and the 'heart and core' of any given matter (1975, 5–22). In fact, apart from the physical aspect, some significant features of heart are given in the above connections: the intentionality toward self, others or transcendental objects, the openness and receptivity to its directed objects, the source of will and thought, etc. In other words, the term 'heartless' could be used to describe the sort of person who loses the above intentionality, openness and receptivity, or the source of life, physical or spiritual. The person in this condition could be inert, despairing, narcissistic, unsympathetic, callous, inauthentic, etc., a type of person not infrequently found in an extremely intellect-worshipping civilization. Thus, a trained specialist of calculating reason could simultaneously be a narcissus who is so infatuated with his own reflection that he finally jumps into the water and drowns himself. By the same token, it seems to me that Midgley also reminds us about the crucial element of heart within the unity of human feelings, thoughts and actions (1981, 1–4). In everyday concrete events, heart and intellect interpenetrate each other and form an inseparable unity, while it is an experienced fact that heart has its own different nature from that of intellect.
Augustine's and Pascal's ideas reinforce Scheler's suggestion that love is a movement of heart. In his discussion of *ordo amoris*, i.e. the counter-image of the objective hierarchy of values as a reflection in the human heart, heart is no chaos of blind feeling-states, but a microcosmos of the world of values (SPE, 116). However, instead of a mechanical process of reflection, it is only in the unceasing movement of love and through its inherent intentionality that the objective order of values is grasped. Certainly, Augustine's aberration of heart and its resultant direction of movement toward the city of Man, rather than to that of God, are also described by Scheler as the phenomena of perversion and infatuation, the general form of the destruction and confusion of *ordo amoris* (SPE, 114~115). Especially, Augustine's doctrine of the primacy of love over knowledge is obviously enhanced by Scheler in that the phenomenological attitude becomes that of the knower's openness and participation in 'self-revealing' of the known (LAK, 161~164). Basically, this attitude of love underlies his philosophical treatment of values, emotions, person, etc.

Inheriting Pascal's idea of *ordre du coeur* or *logique du coeur*, on the other hand, the order of heart, like that of pure logic, in Scheler's mind, means the existence of an absolute and eternal lawfulness of feeling, loving, and hating, which is not reducible to intellectual lawfulness (FORM, 254). In the following discussion, it will become clearer that the whole spiritual life possesses 'pure' acts and the laws of acts which are independent of human organization. The emotive elements of spirit such as feeling, preferring, loving, hating, and willing, also have original *a priori* contents which are not borrowed from 'thinking' (FORM, 63). In
other words, the contents of spirit include feelings, apart from intellect and will. However, the irreducibility and independence of emotional life can not be recognized in an age of the confusion of hearts, the *desordre du coeur.* The result of this neglect is that everything emotional is degraded to states (FORM, 262–264). Strictly speaking, as will be shown in Scheler's stratifications of emotional life, what can be regarded as emotional states is only sensible feelings, whereas vital feelings, pure psychic and spiritual feelings always exhibit an intentional character. That is to say, the pure external casual explanation is improper for the investigation of the whole of human emotions without considering the involvement of the feeling subject.

Another reason why the importance of human emotions is neglected in human life is, Scheler points out, the false opposition of sensibility to reason. Since its introduction by the Greeks, the term reason, or ratio, has always designated only the logical side of spirit, not the non-logical *a priori* side (FORM, 63–65). Similarly, in his comparison of the Chinese Tao and the Greek Logos, Yang maintains that logical discrimination is given more emphasis and regarded as what is common to all men in western thought, rather than sympathetic feeling and aesthetic-orientation as found in Chinese thought (1989, 7 & 17). This groundless dualism leads us to overlook and misinterpret the peculiar properties of whole classes of acts. Actually, feeling, preferring and disfavouring, loving and hating belong to the totality of spirit and possess their own *a priori* contents independent of inductive experience and pure laws of thought. In feeling, but not in feeling-states, there is original emotive intentionality and the function of cognition. What is implied in the resolution of this false opposition is that our sensibility could be compatible with, even
conducive to, reason. Taking the aforementioned vital features of heart into account, it is plainer that the emotional aspects of spirit such as intentionality, openness and receptivity, or the source of life, are actually required in abstract reasoning and thinking.

The identification of the logic of the heart clearly indicates that the human spirit possesses emotional elements, including the feeling of love, which can not be reduced to intellect. Moreover, with regard to the apprehension of values and their order of ranks, reason is as blind to these objects as ears and hearing are blind to colours⁴ (FORM, 255~256). Hence, the cultivation of heart is distinguished from that of understanding, the former has its own autonomy. In other words, the whole unfolding of human reason or spirit contains the development of emotional acts as well as that of intellectual acts. The movement of heart, additionally, is not the product of the operation of intellect. The establishment of the position of emotions in human spiritual life makes possible the further understanding of love.

4-2. Love as an emotional act

In discussing the a priori relations between the height of values and their essential bearers, it has been pointed out that the value of acts such as the spiritual act of love is higher than those of functions and states or reactions. Nevertheless, due to the improper division between reason and sensibility, all things about emotions are degraded into emotional states. Since whatever is not rational is attributed to sensibility, the whole emotional life is assigned to 'sensibility,' so that emotional functions and acts are not properly recognized (FORM, 253). Obviously, in comparison
to Hume's double relation and to Kantian practical love, it can be found that the Schelerian recognition of emotional acts is unique and offers human emotions an irreplaceable position.

Whether intentionality, received from Brentano and Husserl, exists or not is utilized by Scheler to distinguish emotional states and functions, i.e. to distinguish the intentional 'feeling of something' and mere feeling-states. When both a feeling and feeling it happen simultaneously, the latter feeling is directed to the former one and the phenomenon of intentionality is apparent. Take Scheler's treatment of pain and suffering. With regard to suffering, Williams seems wrongly to accuse Scheler of not explicitly differentiating the structure of two levels in suffering (Williams, 1940, 379). In encountering suffering, I think, Scheler does find the different attitudes toward suffering. For instance, dulling of suffering, heroic struggle against suffering and suppression of suffering form not only various attitudes toward life, but also different cultural orientations. He also mentions that when Luther's daughter Magdalene died, Luther could feel both merry in the spirit and sad in the flesh (FORM, 331; TMS, 155 & 161). In fact, these different ways to face pain, such as to suffer, to endure, to tolerate or to enjoy, are based on the levels of emotions as well as on the distinction between emotional states and functions.

In the above cases, what varies lies in the functional quality of feeling pain, which as a state remains the same in different functions. That is to say, the diverse receiving functions of lessening, enduring, heroically structuring, etc., can be directed to the same state of pain. The latter belongs to the functions of reception; the former, to contents and appearances. Moreover, the ways emotional states and intentional feeling
connect with their objects are also different. The 'association' between states and objects must be through the contents of sensing, representing, or perceiving. It is possible that they are 'objectless.' In contrast, the connection between intentional feeling and objects has an original relatedness, a directedness of feeling toward something objective, viz. values. Perhaps, it is also in this directedness that different cores of the unity of human life such as a given part of our organic body, lived vital life and the person, participate. Therefore, intentional feeling is a goal-determined movement and a meaningful occurrence that is capable of 'fulfillment' and 'non-fulfillment' (FORM, 257~259), which is relevant to the criteria of value-height such as contentment, endurance, etc.

Hitherto, it could be understandable that, if love as the movement of heart is a pure feeling-state without intentionality, it should be incapable of diverting or regulating our desires as in the case of Plato's eros or Butler's self-love and benevolence. On the other hand, it is due to the involvement of individual subjectivity that the pure external and casual association of stimulus-response is improper for the interpretation of love. However, here there is still one crucial question: what is the difference between emotional acts and functions in that love is classified as the former? Prior to describing their differences, it seems to me that Scheler's insight into the structure of human existence should be mentioned as the preparatory understanding of spiritual acts, the person and the stratification of human emotions.

Being deeply concerned with the questions 'What is man?' and 'What is man's place in the nature of things?', Scheler tries to answer them by examining the overall structure of the biological-psychological world. In
the stages of psychic life, the five essential forms with their unique features are pointed out, namely, the vital feeling, drive or impulse, 'instinctive' behaviours, associative behaviour or memory, practical intelligence and spirit. Here, the term 'spirit' is used to connote, apart from the concept of reason, 'the intuition of essences and a class of voluntary and emotional acts such as kindness, love, remorse, reverence, wonder, bliss, despair and free decision' as well as conceptual thought. The essential characteristic of this crucial principle, which characterizes human distinctive metaphysical or ontological status, is (MPN, 3 & 8–36)

its existential liberation from the organic world--its freedom and detachability from the bondage and pressure of life, from its dependence upon all that belongs to life, including its own drive-motivated intelligence (MPN, 37).

In other words, the exercises of the vital feeling, instinct, associative behaviour or memory, practical intelligence and choice, the psychic and vital functions and capacities, are not the unique substance of human beings (MPN, 36). It is only in the functionalization of spirit that human beings are qualitatively different from other creatures. Then, what are the features of spirit in Scheler's philosophical anthropology, the understanding of which is required for the consequent differentiation of the spiritual person and the psychological ego, the differentiation of emotional acts from functions? By virtue of the spirit, three essential characteristics of man emerge, that is to say, that he is open to the world, that he is self-conscious and that he is the only being incapable of becoming an object (MPN, 37–48). In contrast to the environment in which the animal is 'ecstatically immersed,' in the peculiar act of
detachment and distance, an 'environment' is transformed into the 'world' and the centres of resistance determined by drives and affects into 'objects'. Furthermore, instead of being confined to the bounds of organic drives and practical needs, the human spiritual centre of action can have the consciousness of itself and objectify 'his own physiological and psychological states, every psychic experience and every vital function'. More important, although psychic acts can be objectified, the spiritual acts and their centre presupposed by the acts of objectifying can not be objectified and thus become objects. The only way to 'know them' is by participating in, or entering into, their free acts in an attitude of empathetic love. In what follows the essential nature of the spiritual acts and person will be discussed further.

Now the distinction between emotional functions and acts can be dealt with properly. It is clear that persons are the centres of spiritual acts, including those objectifying psychological acts, while egos are the centres of the psychological states or psychic experiences. Thus, all functions are ego-functions and never belong to the field of persons. Functions are psychic and performed by themselves whereas acts, whose essential content is 'intentionality' or 'consciousness-of' and whose mode of being is 'performance', are non-psychic and performed by persons. Functions, further, require a lived body and an environment to which the 'appearances' of functions belong. However, to the person there corresponds a world rather than an environment. Acts spring from the person into time but functions are facts in phenomenal time. Functions can be the objects of acts, but not vice versa (FORM, 388; SPE, 27~28). Being the subject who can objectify time, space, lived body, psychic experiences, etc., in the execution of the spiritual acts, the person is trans-
temporal and trans-spatial. However, ego-function can be objectified and measured in the realm of objective time.

In pinpointing Scheler's insight into both the nature of acts and the person, Spader's illustration probably is helpful in understanding the distinction between acts and functions, in particular about their differences in the manifestation of time. Take Spader's example (1985, 204-205):

As a particular act of friendship I take someone to the store. Such an act involves all sorts of physical events: getting into my car and driving to my friend's house to pick him up, driving to the store, shopping, carrying groceries, etc.

The series of physical events, all of which take time, are penetrated and connected with each other by the meaning 'act of friendship of taking someone to the store'. In such a case, all of the physical events do occur in time and are durational, while the unity of meaning is non-durational and penetrates phenomenal duration. Certainly, these physical events can occur without any unity of meaning or occur as part of a different unity. However, without some unity (MacIntyre's agent's intention), primary or secondary, longer-term or shorter-term, they are unintelligible occurrences and not even human acts (MacIntyre, 1981, 190-199).

Actually, the above case is used by Spader to illuminate Scheler's statement: 'There is no phenomenal time-duration in an act; it in this sense is something that cuts through all phenomenal time-duration and never spreads itself over a duration of time' (SPE, 27). Then, it can be understood that love as an emotional act of the person cuts across and
unifies emotional functions and other physical events occurring within time. Furthermore, the acts of meanings, in the execution of which the person lives, are carried out in absolute time, where contents and phases are inseparable, rather than in the objective, measurable time or clock-time (Frings, 1987, XXIII–XXV). This also explains the distinction between the phenomenon of endurance and that of 'succession' (or change) discussed in Chapter 3 concerning the criteria of value-height, where love originating in the deepest core of the person shows the characteristic of endurance in absolute time.

In the above threefold classification, preferring, loving and hating belong to emotional acts, rather than intentional functions of feeling (FORM, 260). That means, they are performed by a person and directed to the world. Meanwhile, it seems to me that in emotional functions and acts our subjectivity or inwardness, namely, lived vital life, psychological ego and person, are directly or indirectly involved. On the other side, because what directly participate in human activities are the essentially various centres of the unity of human life, our emotional life can be revealed as a structure of stratification, and love as a spiritual feeling in our attitude of openness.

4-3. Love as a spiritual feeling

Besides the difference between emotional acts, functions and states, human emotions also display a structure of stratification with various intensity and depth, which can be found in a finely differentiated language. The examples Scheler offers are bliss, blissfulness (Glückseligkeit), being happy, serenity, cheerfulness, the feelings of
comfort, pleasure, agreeableness as well as their opposites, despair, misery, calamity, sadness, suffering, unhappiness, disagreeableness. What these terms signify is not just the dissimilarity in intensity, but also the differentiations among positive and negative feelings. Moreover, while suffering from bodily pain, a true martyr can be blissful. A human being in a state of deep despair in his soul can experience some sensuous pleasure and enjoy it in a state of ego-concentratedness. The fact beneath these phenomena is that feelings are not only of different qualities but also of different levels of depth (FORM, 330-331). Emotional acts, functions and states together participate in these depths. The former two spring from a deeper source in the ego into experience and the fulfillment of the intentions can yield deeper contentment. Feeling-states are attached to a deeper level of the ego and simultaneously fulfill the centre of the ego in a richer way.

Corresponding to the structure of human existence, four levels of feelings and their distinctive features are distinguished. They are sensible feelings or feelings of sensation; feelings of the lived body and feelings of life; pure psychic feelings; and spiritual feelings (FORM, 332-344). It will be found that their differences lie in how they are embodied in space and time, what their relationships to ego or person are, whether intentionality appears in them, and whether they can be controlled by willing, etc.

1) A sensible feeling is given as extended and localized in specific parts of the lived body. It can not be separated from the contents of sensation by attention. Essentially this kind of feeling is given as a state, never as a function or an act. Thus purely sensible feelings lack the most primitive form of intentionality, 'having a mind to.'
Whereas they can be the objects of enjoying and suffering. Only in a
doubly indirect manner is a sensible feeling related to the ego, but not
to the person. Being not attached to the body-ego, it is given only as
a state of a part of the lived body. Because sensible feelings are
actual, we can not find refeeling, postfeeling, prefeeling and fellow
feeling in them. Furthermore, they are essentially punctual, without
duration or continuity of sense, that is, there are no interconnections
of fulfillment among them. In comparison to other feelings, the
sensible feeling is the one least disturbed by attention given to it.
With regard to the influence of our will, the more feelings approach
the level of sensible feeling-states, the more having or not having the
feelings is subject to willing and not willing. Applying adequate
stimuli, Scheler finds, every sensible pleasure can be produced, while
feelings spontaneously issuing forth from the depth of our person,
such as the bliss and despair of the person himself, are beyond any
volitional control.

2) Unlike sensible feelings, the vital feelings such as health, illness,
fatigue and vigor extend, are located and participate in the whole lived
body. The 'myself' in this kind of feeling is a lived-body-ego, a
unitary consciousness of my lived body. The amalgamation of
sensible feelings can not constitute vital feelings. The increase of
vitality can be experienced, for instance, during a long and painful
illness resulting from a mere injury. That is to say, vital feelings can
not be reduced to sensible feelings and possess their peculiarity and
autonomy. In contrast to the deadness of sensible feelings, the
feelings of life display a functional and intentional character. In them
our life itself, its growth, its decline, its illness, its health and its future
are given to us. This also holds for the vital feeling which is directed
toward the outer world and other living beings. In the intentionality, the vital meaning of the value of events and processes within and outside my body is given.

3) In vital feelings, a lived-body ego, a unitary consciousness, of my lived body is given. However, a psychic feeling such as sadness, woe, does not become a state or function of the ego, but is an ego-quality.

4) In the experiences of bliss and despair, or even in the cases of serenity and peace of mind, all ego-states seem to be extinguished. Scheler points out that spiritual feelings can never be states. Streaming forth from the very source of spiritual acts, spiritual feelings bathe everything given in the inner and the outer world in these acts. They are not relative to extrapersonal value-complexes or their motivating powers, but are absolute feelings. In fact, these feelings take root in the value-nature of the person himself and his being and value-being. Therefore, either they are not experienced at all, or they take possession of the whole of our being. We can only 'be' blissful or in despair whereas we can not 'feel' bliss or despair, nor can we even feel 'ourselves' to be blissful or in despair. In despair or bliss, there lies at the core of our personal existence and world an emotional 'No' or 'Yes.' In these feelings, we do not adopt an attitude of reflection and our 'person' does not become a mere object of reflection. They originate in the person himself as the subject of spiritual acts.

Four points merit noticing here. Firstly, it is obvious that, from sensible feelings to spiritual feelings, the subjectivity or inwardness of human beings plays a more and more significant role in the emergence of various
feelings. Instead of the pure mechanical connection of external stimulus-response, our lived-body ego, psychological ego and person could actually become the core of the emergence of vital feelings, psychic feelings and spiritual feelings. Secondly, in connection with the criteria of value-height, spiritual feelings bathe the whole of our being and are not relative to the positing of our lived-body ego, psychological ego. Ergo the values given in spiritual feelings are nearer to absolute values than others. Thirdly, spiritual feelings come out from the involvement of our whole being rather than from adopting a reflective attitude of objectifying, which could accompany an act but is incapable of objectifying it (FORM, 374). On the contrary, it is only in the participation of love that our spiritual feelings originate and others' are coexecuted. Last but not least, due to the various depth of emotional stratification and the intentionality inherent in emotional acts and functions, the feelings of lower levels are compatible with and could become the intended objects of spiritual feelings. The fundamental reason is that, in contrast to the feelings of other levels, spiritual feelings stem from the deepest core of the person rather than from peripheral parts of our life.

In comparison to other theories of emotions, Scheler's insight into human emotions, as Smith points out, lies in the discovery of the levels of depth of emotional life. Apart from discussing some ambiguities contained in Scheler's vital feelings, Smith categorizes the above criteria into essential criteria and nonessential criteria. In terms of whether the criterion pertains to all four levels of emotional stratification, essential criteria include: (1) the manner of relatedness of the feeling to the ego or person; (2) the extent to which the feeling is subject to practical control; and (3) the length of the feeling's duration. The other five nonessential criteria,
which do not differ with every level of feeling, are (1) the manner in which the feeling relates to the extension of the body; (2) the feeling's susceptibility to representation; (3) the feeling's continuity of sense or lack of such; (4) the extent to which the feeling is altered when it is attended to; (5) whether the feeling is a mere state or is intended (Smith, 1977, 103-105 & 123). Due to the fact that these four levels essentially differ from each other, in the interpretation of emotions themselves or their cultivation and expressions their different criteria, especially essential ones, should be taken into account.

So far some debatable issues about emotions can be put forward, the clarification of which could help us understand the feeling of love. Several theorists recognize the fact that the term 'emotion' does not connote 'feeling.' When someone reports his 'feeling' of a twinge, it is proper to ask whether it was a twinge of remorse or of rheumatism (Ryle, 1984, 254-255; Bedford 1984, 269 & 274; Taylor, 1985, 49; Thalberg, 1984, 294). Plainly emotions themselves or their objects are not homogeneous phenomena. When people report that they are experiencing some sort of feelings, it is better to understand these feelings' concretization in space and time, relatednesses to ego or person, intentionality, etc. Appropriating Scheler's stratification of human emotions, for instance, due to the lack of intentionality, only sensible feelings or bodily sensation can be causally explained without reference to subjective meaning. In contrast, vital feelings, psychic feeling and spiritual feelings are intentional feelings and entail inner meanings. The feeling of fatigue informs us the state of our life and warns us to take a rest (Heller, 1979, 34). The feeling of shame means that the agent worries about his falling down from a high level of value to a low one. As
is said above, in these feelings, especially spiritual ones, subjectivity plays a crucial role in their appearance.

Whether emotions are voluntary and can be chosen is another concern. Solomon states 'I am responsible for my emotions as I am for the judgements I make' (1984, 312). However, Rorty (1980, 120), de Sousa (1980, 140–141) and Solomon (1980, 276) himself in his later revision consider to what extent it is in our power to want to feel this or that. I think we should tackle the issue from two different ways. From the viewpoint of the inner nature of feelings, the higher the feeling is, the less probably can it be subject to volitional or practical control. It is plainer when we consider that emotions arise in the pre-conative level and possess their own lawfulness. In other words, the volitional intervention can only indirectly affect and even probably destroy intentional feelings. From another, genetic, viewpoint, because intentional feelings have a close inner relation with the person, psychological ego or lived body-ego, then if we can obtain sufficient self-knowledge, the cultivation of the ideal person can become the goal of our education or design of culture. These two approaches, I think, are not incompatible with and should supplement each other.

In accordance with the distinction between the prereflective level and the reflective level, two essentially different ways of changing emotions can be found. It is commonly believed that emotions logically or causally entail some sort of belief or judgement. If the belief or judgement changes, then the emotion will be different. For instance, once finding that we are not wronged by others, then our feeling of anger will disappear or become shame. This way of changing beliefs or judgements
mainly happens in the volitional, reflective level of our consciousness. On the other hand, in some cases the change of beliefs does not guarantee the corresponding alteration of emotions. The avowed belief that the spider is not dangerous does not change the feeling of fear. In order to hold the above belief 'evidently' in Calhoun's sense, we should feel the experience that the spider is not dangerous (1984, 341~342). In this case, what we emphasize is to offer a situation or de Sousa's paradigm scenarios in which the emotions we want to cultivate can be experienced (de Sousa, 1980, 142~143). Especially for young children who have not developed formal, conceptual thinking, the second will be the preferable way to change emotions.

In the unity of human life, love belongs to spiritual feelings and possesses the characteristics of this sort of feelings. In fact, this world-opening movement of heart fundamentally determines whether a human being can completely unfold his unique substance of spirit or is ecstatically immersed in the environment. Moreover, love as a spiritual feeling is beyond our volitional control. Insofar as the autonomy of the emotive life is recognized, Kantian practical love as an object of command is suspect (FORM, 222~226; LAK, 160). However, from a heuristic perspective, it is possible to develop love of mankind in carrying out the maxim of benevolence. The spiritual feeling of love can not be controlled by our will and the intervention of our intention will destroy its nature. If love is induced and discussed in the field of human will or desires, its intrinsic nature can not be correctly understood. It can be said that the feeling of love can cause some sort of will or desires, but they are not love itself.
The reason why the feeling of love is the value-promoting movement lies in the fact that it is an emotional act of heart with intentionality and originating in the very source of spiritual acts. Then, in the noetic-noematic relationship of emotional intentionality, it is reasonable to ask the question about the essential qualities of the subject of the act of love, viz., what sort of mankind could be qualified as the genuine lover? In terms of the origin of spiritual feelings, the exploration of the spiritual person becomes inevitable for the understanding of love. On the other hand, the concept of the person is referred to many times in the previous discussion on values and human emotions. For example, the participation of the person as one core of human unity makes intelligible the criteria of value-height such as the level of the 'relativity of values,' or their relationship to 'absolute values,' endurance and contentment etc. The main distinction between emotional acts and function is that the former, including love, come from the person. It will be understood in the next chapter that some capacities are required to entitle the human being to be the person, the genuine lover.
NOTES

1. The division of Scheler's intellectual life into three phases, namely, the 'neo-Kantian' or 'pre-phenomenological', the 'phenomenological' and the 'metaphysical', can be found in Frings (1965a, 27), Kelly (1977, 16), Spiegelberg (1982, 273) and Koestenbaum (1967, 302).

2. Cf. Chapter 1 section 3.


4. The primacy of heart or mind, the faculty of emotions or passions over reason, the inquiring or intellectual faculty in morality is also recognized by Hume as well. Cf. Chapter 2 section 1.

5. The first four essential forms of psychic life and their own features:
   i) the vital feeling, drive or impulse: without consciousness, sensation and representation, a general drive toward growth and reproduction, an essential orientation toward the outside rather than reporting organic states back to a centre, lack of any centralization, especially a nervous system, its presence in all animals and also in man.
   ii) 'instinctive' behaviours: the purposefulness of serving its own life or that of another organism, a definite unchanging rhythm, the response to only typically recurring situations which are significant for the life of the species and not for the particular experience of the individual, the innateness and heredity with respect to specific modes of behaviour, a form of behaviour which is independent of the number of attempts that an animal makes in order to deal with a situation.
iii) associative behaviour or memory: the slow and continual modification on the basis of earlier behaviour with respect to a purposive and useful end, the involvement of the entire prehistory of the organism rather than a product merely of the immediately preceding state, only the description of statistical regularities in terms of laws of association, its operating in all animals as the consequence of the emergence of the reflex arc, the separation of the sensory from the motor system, the more and more individual emergence from bondage to the species and from the nonadaptive rigidity of instinct.

iv) practical intelligence: the capacity to choose in action, among goods and among members of the same species in the reproductive process, its aiming at some action by means of which the organism obtains or misses a goal set by its drives, the insight into a state of affairs on the basis of a structure of relations whose basic elements are partly given in experience, partly completed in anticipatory representation (MPN, 8~34).

6. Cf. Ch.5 section 1. In Scheler's anthropology of philosophy, spirit as one of the five essential forms of human psychic life enables human beings to open to the world and to be aware of self-consciousness. In contrast, without spirit the animal can only be 'ecstatically immersed' in the environment. Other writhers reserve 'ecstasis' for a more spiritual interpretation of being 'outside oneself'.

7. Cf Chapter 5 section 1.

8. Cf Chapter 3 section 3 and note 9. The perception of time can be either directly felt in our lived experiences or be measured and put into an
Chapter 5 Who is the lover: the person

Who is capable of spiritually seeing the ever new and higher values of the beloved object out of his intentional movement of heart? In the lived experiences of various thinkers, lovers seem to embody different qualities. Plato's lover is Psyche who, with the wings lent by *eros*, ascends in the scale of values toward the reunion of the self and the Idea of goodness. Thanks to the dispositional feeling of friendship, the Aristotelian lover is the one who could wish and do what is good for his friend for the sake of the latter, regarded as another self. In the tradition of Christian *agape*, the human lover should imitate God's love in loving his neighbours as himself. With regard to Confucian love, *jen*-people embrace all in their love as the manifestation of their growing nature. Suspending the differences in love-concretizing contexts, the genuine lover seems to be the person who could actualize himself both in continuously pursuing what is true and good and in helping others actualize themselves as well.

Who is the lover in Schelerian ethics? Plainly, it is from the spiritual centre, namely, the person rather than the psychological ego or lived-body ego, that the emotional act of love issues. In other words, it can be said that love is one of the essential capacities a spiritual person should display. That is to say, although the whole connotation of spirit is more than the affective aspect of human nature, a fully realized person should be the lover capable of participating in others' persons and in an objective order of values. Actually, the recognition of human emotional life makes Scheler's insight into the person-as-lover different from other versions of the person, which give more weight to human intellectual capacities,
strategic actions or outer behaviour. Especially, Scheler reminds us of the existence of various collective persons, in which love is the basis of the essential social unit of collective person-community. It seems to me that, because the main way of human association or understanding each other, individually and collectively, is based on love, this sort of collective person could be described as a collective lover and has something to do with the contemporary Liberal-Communitarian debate about the nature of common goods and the bond of solidarity. Therefore, in this chapter, the meaning and features of the Schelerian person will be explored first and be briefly compared with both Frankfurt's and Taylor's conceptions of the person. After that, the collective lover and its importance for social life are going to be elucidated.

5-1. The meaning and nature of the person-as-lover

Regarding the meaning of the person, one essential definition is enunciated by Scheler: the person is the essential, concrete unity-in-being of a wide range of acts with different essences (thinking, willing, loving etc.), a unity-in-being which precedes all such act-differences. Therefore, the being of the person is the 'foundation' of all essentially different acts, including the act of love. That is to say, the whole person as a concrete being is contained in every fully concrete act and permeates every act with his peculiar character. In other words, from the manifestation of every act the moral tenor or Taylor's personal style can be recognized (FORM, 383~386; Taylor, 1985, 68). For instance, it is in the execution of various acts such as thinking, willing, loving, hating and so on, that the person and his intentional qualitative direction tinged by his moral tenor are present. Plainly, the above meaning of the person is germane to the
distinction between acts and functions dealt with in Chapter 4 section 2, where it was said that persons are the centres of spiritual acts, while egos are the centres of psychic acts. Three special points implied in Scheler's understanding of the person can be found: the person is the human being in a spiritual rather than biological or psychological sense, is a dynamic and lived unity rather than a static point, is an 'act-unity' rather than a logical subject of rational acts.

Spirit in Schelerian philosophical anthropology is one of the five essential forms of psychic life, the functionalization of which qualitatively differentiates human beings from other creatures'. Hence, being referred to the unique spiritual facet of human life, the person should be understood in the spiritual sense, not in the biological or psychological sense. In other words, the display of spiritual capacities such as openness to the world, the awareness of self-consciousness, etc., is more crucial than the vital feeling, drive or impulse, 'instinctive' behaviours, associative behaviour or memory, practical intelligence etc., for human beings to be qualified as persons. On the other hand, the significance of spiritual development for the person lies in the fact that the unfolding of biological or psychological functions such as hearing, seeing, etc., is insufficient for the cultivation of the person. It is true that the development of the person necessarily commences in a given cultural context, in which some concepts of the person are taken for granted. However, the completion of an ideal person necessitates the exercise of the essential feature of spirit, that is, pointing beyond itself to something other than itself (Emad, 1974, 60), which enables human beings to continuously deepen and widen their experiences of life in critical examination of given views or in searching for new perspectives.
Because spirit actualizes only in and through the execution of its acts, the person as its centre is a continuously self-executing ordered structure of acts or the immediately coexperienced unity of experiencing, rather than a merely thought thing behind and outside what is immediately experienced (FORM, 371–372; MPN, 47). When returning back to our own lived experiences of intentional attitude, the person as a dynamic and lived unity rather than a static point can be recognized easier. For instance, we may make a judgement about something or regret a decision. Then what is judged or regretted is the intentional object of our present act, judging or regretting. Hence, Scheler's person, the executor of these acts, is and experiences itself only as act-consummating being, rather than a static point. Existing in the continuous execution of acts, the person is an essentially dynamic and lived unity in human practice, but not in the realm of philosophical abstraction (Frings 1972a, 69–70; Perrin, 1991, 89–90). It goes without saying that the perceptual recognition of the dynamic and lived unity is able to be crystallized into some static concept. However, the person can not be reduced to a rigid definition without losing his dynamic life.

The above description of the person as a dynamic and lived unity, the executor of these acts or act-consummating being, could give us various impressions that the person is either a substance or actuality. On the one hand, although the person is the performer of spiritual acts, he exists and lives solely in the execution of intentional acts. That is to say, the person is not something standing 'behind' or 'above' the execution and processes of acts, which always leads to a substantialization of the person (FORM, 385 & 390). On the other hand, the person is not a 'mere connection or---interweaving of acts' or 'the intentional connection of the meaning' of
those acts (Hartmann, 1968, 254). Instead of some sort of substance with relative or absolute permanence and unchangeableness, the person is a dynamic and creative 'act-unity' with individual unique *ordo amoris* which determines his moral tenor and the qualitative direction of his acts.

Keeping the aforementioned points in mind, it becomes easier to realize why the person should not be defined as an abstract logical subject of rational acts in Schelerian ethics. If the person is the X of following ideal laws, then the moral person is the X of volitional activity conforming to the moral law. However, the person in our real perception is the dynamic centre of various acts, where the spiritual acts originate, rather than a static and unchangeable substance. Moreover, X's deepest source of following ideal laws lies in the value-ception of spiritual feelings, not just in the volitional level. Based on the same point, the person is never a thing or a substance with faculties and powers, say, the faculty or power of reason. Losing the status of a centre of acts brings about the phenomenon of depersonalization.

Coming back to Spader's case (1985, 204-205) of 'the act of friendship' mentioned in the previous chapter seems helpful to make Scheler's view on the person clearer. Firstly, the true performer of the act of friendship, as well as other spiritual acts, should be the person with his spiritual sense. In other words, if the motivation for 'the act of friendship' is only to meet some social expectations or physical desires without grasping their possible meanings of values, then the executor at issue is not the spiritual person who gives unity to acts. Secondly, the person of 'the act of friendship' is continuously open to the realm of values and in the process of realizing the values grasped. As a result of the dynamic
becoming, the person is, as Frings suggests (1984, 114), at every moment, 'on the way' to moral goodness as loving being, i.e., as 'not yet' existence. Thirdly, the person exists and lives, but can not be wholly exhausted, in the execution of the act of friendship. The qualitative direction of the person's intentional acts is decided by his *ordo amoris*.

Given the person exists and lives solely in the execution of intentional acts, then how can our person or other persons be understood properly? Meanwhile, what is the objectifying attitude which makes the person immediately transcendent (FORM, 387 & 390)? In dealing with human transactions with each other, perhaps Strawson's separation of the objective attitude and the attitude of involvement or participation can be appropriated for the understanding of Scheler's objectifying attitude. What is meant by the attitude of involvement or participation, in Strawson's mind, is essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of others towards us in ordinary life. In this case, others are seen as morally responsible agents. On the other hand, in the objective attitude, others become the objects of social policy, intellectual understanding, management and control (1974, 9~13, 17 & 21). Instead of the post-execution, co-execution and pre-execution of acts, others in the latter attitude are perceived through the selective mechanism of the agent's interests and as objects, being what is treated, cured, controlled or managed. Similarly, Frings points out that, when meeting other persons in our natural attitude, 'their personal being is immediately co-experienced, i.e. not in a conscious or volitional fashion.' Once we intend to objectively analyse others, their persons may disappear into their background (1972a, 72~73). Moreover, what can be perceived in the
objectifying attitude is the psychological ego or lived-body ego, but not the person.

Here two points concerning the conception of the lover seem to merit a further discussion. First of all, the person can only be understood in the non-objectifying intentionality of emotional life rather than in the abstract operation of intellectual life. Even the volitional intervention could probably worsen this intentional relationship of emotional acts. Secondly, within human emotional life, it is only in the emotional act of love, not in emotional functions or states, that the person's uniqueness can be perceived. For instance, although the attitudes based on sympathy, emotional infection, emotional identification, etc., are not objectifying ones, they are still incapable of establishing subject-subject relationships where spiritual persons are open to and participate in each other. This point will be followed up in Chapter 6.

Apart from the essential definition, some features pointed out by Scheler of the meaning-intention of the term 'person' are worthy of further discussion if the idea of the lover is to be understood (FORM, 476-486):

1) The word 'person' can only be applied to a specific level of human existence and its nature can be found only in a certain kind of man, rather than in man in general. One of the first conditions is to possess a wholly sound mind, which means, in understanding the expressions of a man, out of the spiritual center of the other, we experience the acts of the person and the environment as intentionally directed toward something and we re-execute such acts, rather than seek to explain them causally.
Obviously, the person in human existence is not merely a human being in the biological, psychological or sociological sense. It is not impossible that some sorts of biological properties, psychological functions or sociological definitions have been regarded as the conditions for being a person. For instance, reaching a certain age, performing a certain psychological function or a certain social role, etc. However, insofar as spirit is recognized as the distinctive form of human life and the person as its centre, the manifestation of spiritual acts should be the genuine requirement for the person. Certainly, the aforementioned conditions are essentially insufficient to specify the person properly. Furthermore, among various spiritual acts, what is of the utmost importance for a wholly sound mind of the person is the capacity to emotionally participate in and understand others' external expressions of spiritual life. As a matter of fact, it will be acknowledged in the next chapter that this capacity is only actualized in the understanding of a love-relationship.

2) The concept of the person is ascribed only to a certain level of development in man. The manifestation of the egoness, the possession of a soul and consciousness of self do not make a child a person. The determinative is the ability to experience insight into the difference between one's own and someone else's acts, willing, feeling, thinking. This insight should be given in the immediate experiencing of any experience itself. Once the givenness of the insight must refer to whether it was another lived body or one's own through which the act-experience was externally made known, the man does not have the maturity to be a person.
Further considering the features of what Frings calls ethical existence (1972a, 75-76), it is obvious that, in the process of human development, only some but not all human beings reach the level of the person. The reason is that a human being, before attaining the level of the person, is incapable of experiencing his self-value, which is distinguished from those values deliberately attached to him by way of societal legislation, religious doctrines or philosophical ideas of man. Thus he can just will what parents, educators or anybody else want him to do without recognizing the will of someone else or a person different from himself (FORM, 478). Empirically, it is true to say that prior to the emergence of the consciousness of one's own person, the period of primitive 'we-feeling', where one is not differentiated from others, is undergone. The individual has not built up his spiritual person until his own acts are experienced differently from others'. In pointing out how education should aim at shortening the difference between infants, young children and the fully realized person, the capacity of reciprocal self-awareness or seeing oneself and others as distinctively separate persons is also recognized by Langford and Pring as one of the qualities the person should cultivate (Langford, 1985, 173, 175 & 189-191; Pring, 1984, 13-18; 1996, 114). The main characteristics of the person as a lover will be summarized at the end of this part after the discussion of the essential meaning of love and ordo amoris in Chapter 6.

3) Apart from 'the genuine being-able-to-understand', 'the being-able-to-do', the immediate consciousness of the power of willing, is also required to be a person. In other words, soundness in mind and matureness are not sufficient conditions for being a person. A person is the one who dominates over his lived body and lives
immediately as a master of the lived body.

It has been pointed out in Chapter 4 that, within the unity of human life, various cores of human existence are involved in the stratification of human emotions. Within the relatedness of these centres, the person could directly or indirectly influence psychological ego or lived body-ego and become their master, whose power of willing is required to be the person. Then, given the power of willing of the person over his lived body, what is the relationship between 'the genuine being-able-to-understand' and 'the being-able-to-do'? Consider the value-ception of emotional intentionality, say, preference, which provides the value-directions for the intended goals. It becomes comprehensible that the spontaneous welling up of feeling from heart could become the root of the choice of will-act, which then is capable of ruling the lived body in actualizing its project. Especially, it is through the openness of love and the project of will that the spiritual person could direct and guide our vital drives and at the same time be vitalized (MPN, 62 & 68). On the other hand, it becomes much plainer that, although the connotation of the person or spirit is wider than that of the lover or love, the spiritual person should be a lover in the sense that the person without love is actually contradictory.

4) The idea of the person is different from the concept of soul-substance and the so-called character. The real and thinglike object of the soul-substance is composed of hypothetically attributed properties, forces, faculties, dispositions, etc. However, the person is the concrete subject of all acts of the essence of inner intuition, rather than an object or a real thing. Additionally, character is just a
hypothetical, more or less constant X posited to explain single observed actions of a person. Hence the hypothetical 'picture of his character' must be altered in correspondence with change in his actions. While the action of a person is not a straightforward consequence of the sum of his dispositions and his changing external life-situations. The freedom of the person can not be reduced to the mere causality of character.

What is implied in this feature is that the person is a dynamic, concrete, act-executing subject rather than a static, hypothetical, objectified thing or thinglike object. With regard to the observed actions of a person, some hypothetical, inductively or deductively obtained features could be constructed to causally explain them. However, being the subject pointing beyond itself to something other than itself, the spiritual person can only be concretely understood in the coexecution of his spiritual acts. Instead of using some pre-established and hypothetical framework to explain why the subject behaves in this way, the effort to understand the person or the lover is to let the known continuously and willingly reveal what the behaviour and its invisible meanings are.

In contemporary philosophy, the issue as to what the person is is raised repeatedly and has attracted a lot of attention. Here, a slight comparison between Scheler's person and Frankfurt's and Taylor's is able to illuminate this issue of the person. At first glance some similarities between them might emerge. For instance, it is a commonly-recognized fact that the animal, a child or even a human being without certain kinds of capacities or qualities can not be equated with the person (Frankfurt, 1971, 5–7; Frings, 1972a, 76; Taylor, 1985, 97; Ibana, 1989, 43). Apart from
decision-making or strategic power, moreover, what is of more significance for being a person is to care about our will or what we care about or the matters of significance for human beings (Frankfurt, 1988, 84, 91 & 163; Taylor, 1985, 101-104). Among the conditions qualifying a human being as a person, especially, volitional strength or commitment or sensitivity to certain standards is regarded as more fundamental than reason (Frankfurt, 1971, 11; Taylor, 1985, 102 & 105). However, taking a close look seems to reveal some differences between them, which probably indicate that Scheler's view is more insightful.

What is the deepest core on which the life of the person should be based? In Frankfurt's mind, what distinguishes the person from other creatures is to be found in the structure of his will or 'second-order volition' which enables a human being to identify himself with one of his conflicting first-order desires and thus to have an effective desire that will or would move him all the way to action (1971, 6-8, 12-13; 1988, 163). As well as the hierarchy of desires, the immanent reflexivity of our consciousness is required for the formation of the volitional commitment (1988, 162 & 166). Although he does not neglect the significance of human emotions (1988, 85 & 188-190), it seems to me that Frankfurt gives more weight to the volitional aspects than to other aspects of human life. Taking the above three features of Scheler's person into account, Frankfurt's emphasis seems to be placed on 'the being-able-to-do' more than on 'the genuine being-able-to-understand'. That is to say, the intentionality inherent in human emotions and their value-ception is recognized and highlighted more in Scheler's understanding of the person.
On the other hand, the distinctive feature of Taylor's person is the consciousness of being open to qualitatively different concerns or the significance of things for us as agents instead of consciousness as the power to frame representations of things (1985, 102-105). Moreover, the sensitivity to certain standards involved in peculiarly human goals, of which the unique human consciousness consists, is made possible in human affective awareness. The relevance of emotions to being a person is lighted up more when Taylor states 'Our emotions make it possible for us to have a sense of what the good life is for a subject' (op. cit., 65). Actually, the experiences of certain standard feelings involve both the sense of situation, viz. characterizing our situation in certain ways, and the inclination to do something as a response (op. cit., 63-64 & 107-108). Without overlooking the authority of willing to action, what is more stressed by Taylor seems to be Scheler's 'the genuine being-able-to-understand'. That is, the person should have the capacity to be open or sensitive to the domain of what is significant.

However, taking Scheler's stratification of emotional life into consideration, some points concerning the person, which seem not to be found in Taylor's discussion, deserve more attention. Firstly, in the unity of human life, the person is the centre of spiritual acts, while the ego is the centre of psychic acts, and the lived-body-ego the centre of vital acts. As a consequence of this differentiation, what is intentionally perceived in affective awareness or in qualitatively diverse feelings can be categorized into three domains of what is important for us as agents. For instance, what is grasped in fatigue, vigor, sadness, happiness, bliss or despair are separately and directly important to our lived-body-ego, psychic ego or spiritual person. Secondly, what is of greatest significance for the
unfolding of the person or human spiritual life is our *ordo amoris* which determines the formation of moral tenor and hence the qualitative direction of spiritual acts. It is in this emotional act of love, the dynamic movement of heart, that human beings are able to participate, vertically and horizontally, in the field of values. Therefore, it can be said that among emotional awareness the value-ception inherent in the openness of love provides human beings with the vision of what is more valuable as the foundation of the formation of Frankfurt's volitional commitment and of Taylor's life-long process of strong evaluation.

5-2. The community of love as the collective lover

In the fourth section of Chapter 3 on the cognition of values, it has been pointed out that love is bound up with the renewal and growth of the ethos, in which the emotional deception caused in *ressentiment* prevents us from grasping the *a priori* relationships of values. Then it seems to be plausible to imagine a certain sort of collective unit which consists of genuine lovers or is based on the ethos of love. In other words, the relationship of love can also be embodied in the relations between individuals and groups, or between various groups, not only between individual persons. This probable connection of love with collective units is referred to by Scheler in his investigation into various essential social units. It seems to me that this sort of community based on the spiritual feeling of love could be regarded as a collective lover who as an essential social unit, in comparison to other essential social units, manifests the uniqueness of the spiritual person and personalistical solidarity.
Based on the lived experiences of social acts such as promising, cofeeling, etc., and the consciousness of community, the individual person can experience the existence of collective persons. That is to say, the individual person in every execution of a social act is given to himself in self-experience as a member of a community of persons which encompasses him (FORM, 519). Scheler finds that even an imaginary Robinson Crusoe would coexperience his being a member of a social unit in his experiencing the lack of fulfillment of acts of act-types constituting a person in general. For instance, he could feel the consciousness of emptiness or absence in the authentic types of love for other people (FORM, 520–521; SYM, 234–237). In social acts as those of the true kinds of love, which find their fulfillment only in a possible community, the intentionality toward a possible community is cogiven by essential necessity with the nature of these acts themselves. In the endless totality of living with one another, the various centres of co-experiencing within social living, insofar as these centres fully correspond to the definition of the person mentioned in the above section, are 'collective persons' or a personal community. It can be said, therefore, that the consciousness of community is evidently inherent in the essence of the person and has a necessary connection with the principle of solidarity.

Apart from some legendary or exceptional cases, human beings were born in and encircled by various social units such as family, clans, school, race, nation, church, state, culture, and so on. Despite historical or geographical differences, these social groups are not just the aggregate summations of their individual members. As a matter of fact, diverse social organizations do display their own intentional consciousness, which permeates the consciousness of their individual members. Like the
individual person, the independent, concrete, spiritual act-centres of various collective experiences exist and live solely in the execution of intentional social acts. Here three points as to the essential qualities of the social units deserve further notice (Ibana, 1989, 46–47; Vacek, 1991, 167–169). First of all, the unique essence of every group is only understood by participating in the social acts of social organizations. Put in a different way, on the grounds of the nature of the person, the ethos, i.e. the special structures of loving and hating, of preferring and disfavouring of values, of every group is experienced in the co-execution of social acts as to be realized. Secondly, the social group is 'immanent' in its members, but 'transcendent' to any given member. Although the group needs members to exist, the group-spirit or group-psyche is not tantamount to but independent of its particular members. Thirdly, besides the belonging of the individual persons to communities, communities in the solidaristic relationship can also be members of other communities. It is only in this solidaristic connection that Scheler's self-responsibility and co-responsibility in the moral universe can be made comprehensible and discussed in what follows.

According to the nature of the person, namely that not all human beings reach the level of the spiritual person, not all kinds of real social unit can be regarded as a collective person. In order to understand factual social units such as marriage, family, people, nation, etc., it is necessary, Scheler points out, to develop a theory of all possible essential social units. From the standpoint of factual experiences, these essential social units and their interconnections are never purely and fully actualized, but they delineate the objective possible condition for these factual experiences (FORM, 525–526). Among these four essential social units, viz. herd and mass,
life-community, society, and person-community (FORM, 526–529), it will be found that person-community is closely bound up with the spiritual act of love so that it can be described as a collective lover. Moreover, behind these four essential social units, various ways people associate with or understand each other, and various kinds of solidarity exist, among which, as Vacek reminds us as well (1991, 165), Scheler’s distinction between prepersonal and personal communities is not like the highly undifferentiated notion of community employed by those who argue for community over against individualism.

The herd in animals or the mass in men is constituted in so-called contagion and involuntary imitation (SYM, 41–42). Life-community is constituted in coexperiencing or reliving, for instance, cofeeling, costriving, cothinking, cojudging, etc. Conversely, the basic social unit of the society (Gesellschaft) is an artificial unit of individuals, in which there is the division between the experience of self and that of the other, having no original 'living-with-one-another' as occurs in life-community. Thus, each member can experience specific conscious acts as coming from his individual ego and directed to someone else as 'another,' which establish all relations among individuals. Last, but not least, person-community or collective person (Gesamtperson), the highest essential type of social unity in Scheler’s thought about the person, is the unity of independent, spiritual and individual single persons 'in' an independent, spiritual collective person. That is to say, any finite person on this level is an individual person and simultaneously a member of a collective person. Obviously, in person-community the way its members connect with each other involves the emotional awareness of the difference between one's own and someone else's acts, willing, feeling, thinking, etc., including

154
collective ones. However, this sort of connection is through the participation of love rather than any objectifying act which, as pointed out in the above section, makes the person as the lover immediately transcendent.

This kind of infection appearing in the herd or the mass is only the transference of emotional states and therefore lacks understanding (SYM, 41-42). However, what makes life-community different from the mass is some understanding of the members of life-community, which is revealed in this coexecution and occurs in this coexperiencing itself. Therefore, in this immediate experience and understanding, no member coexperiences his individual egoness and none of others is being objectified, as found in society. Then, presupposing a distinction between bodily gestures of expression and the experience in the other, not given in the life-community, the understanding of others in the essential social unit of society should make an analogical inference from the self-experienced to the experienced of the other.

It is manifest that the main difference between these four essential social units is located in the way the members connect with each other and the various forms of solidarity. Because of 'involuntary imitations devoid of understanding,' strictly speaking, there is no solidarity in the herd of animals or the mass in men. Then, the chief bond that unites life-community such as family, tribes, brotherhoods, fraternities etc., is vital feelings. Living in the shared traditions, mores, myths, customs, and costumes that convey their history, the egos of the members of life-community with shared feelings have not emerged (Ibana, 1989, 45 & 50; 1991, 463 & 468-469; Perrin, 1991, 102-103). In contrast to 'solidarity
by contagion' and 'representable or organic solidarity', 'solidarity by interests' is found in society. After the conscious articulation of vital feelings, individual members begin to possess their own consciousness of ego and are not 'living-with-each-other'. In making the effort to achieve their own rationally calculated goals, the way of understanding one another is shifted from immediate experiences to self-conscious inference. However, the highest ideal of solidarity is 'unrepresentable or personalistic solidarity' which appears in person-community, where every person is recognized and treated as an irreducible value. It is only in this level that the person is not only a functional ego, but a spiritual one who can not be objectified by any established measure. Thus, we can find, the change in the principle of solidarity, as an eternal component and a fundamental article of the cosmos of finite moral persons, determines the rise and fall of the total moral world.

Interestingly, Scheler's views on co-experience and 'unrepresentable or personalistic solidarity' seem to be recognized by Taylor as the sense of a shared immediate common good as well, which is required for a citizen to identify with the republic (1989b, 169–171 & 176–178). Firstly, this sort of we-identities, instead of merely convergent I-identities, involves emotional awareness of certain values on which a particular historical community is founded. Secondly, the patriotic identification in the civic humanist tradition establishes emotional bonding and republican solidarity, which can become the motivation for citizen's self-imposed discipline and liberty, i.e. active participation in public affairs. In view of the above features, Taylor's republican patriotism can be regarded as the actual realization of the person-community and its ethos of love. However, Scheler's phenomenology of community reminds us of two
further relevant questions about Taylor's sense of a shared immediate common good. It seems reasonable to ask what the values which citizens are aware of and identify with are. When Taylor contends that 'To that degree, the bond resembles that of friendship, as Aristotle saw' (1989b, 169), moreover, another question emerges, that is, to what extent can the citizen friendship be extended and what is the proper attitude to those who do not share the same values or are not citizens? These issues are more urgent when the earth becomes a global village.

Because of the absence of true solidarity, all responsibility for others in society is based on unilateral self-responsibility, that is, only derivatively for those with whom they have made agreements (Vacek, 1991, 171). The boundless trust in one another as the basic attitude in life-community is replaced by the basic attitude of distrust in society. Unless this essential social unit is assisted by other ones, it can only impose supposed social will on its members by fiction, like the so-called majority principle, or by force. On the other hand, every individual person and collective person in person-community is self-responsible. More important, the coresponsibility between the individual person and the collective person is mutual. In other words, every individual is coresponsible for the collective person, just as the collective person is coresponsible for each of its members. There is neither an ultimate responsibility of the individual to the collective persons, as is the case in life-community, nor an ultimate responsibility of the collective person to the individual, as in the majority principle in society.

In the organic structure of personalistic solidarity, the essential reciprocity and reciprocal responsibility of all morally relevant comportment in
Scheler's ethical personalism becomes intelligible. That is to say, what is affected by every performance of moral acts is not confined to the actor himself, but also goes beyond the immediate social context and extends to the moral universe as a whole. On the one hand, every individual person's realization of a value improves the 'whole value' of the community. On the other hand, the 'whole value' of the community enhances the individual person's realization of values as well. In other words, what is inherent in the principle of solidarity and its web of responsibility includes the responsibility of the individual person for himself or herself, his coreponsibility for the other members of that collective person and for the collective person itself, the responsibility of the collective person for itself, for each of its members, and for the other collective persons to which it is related (Vacek, 1991, 172~173; FORM, 496~497). As a result, the compatibility between the individually valid good-in-itself and the universally valid good-in-itself implies that there is collective good and evil, guilt and merit, in addition to and independent of the individual good and evil, guilt and merit (FORM, 526~527 & 533~535).

In terms of what can the essential social unit of the collective person-community be regarded as a collective lover? It goes without saying that the spiritual feeling of love constitutes the main way the members of person-community associate with and understand each other. Insofar as a given social unit is based on the ethos of love, the individual person is able to be understood in the attitude of involvement or participation rather than in the objective attitude where he is fitted into fixed categories such as the objects of social policy, intellectual understanding, management and control, etc. At the same time, it is only in this essential unit that the 'tragic guilt' in the process of elevating the existing realm of values can
be properly or to some extent avoided. That is to say, the genuine comprehension of 'higher' values or the expansion of the realms of values will not be regarded as morally inferior or guilty. Scheler's insight into person-community signifies the significance of love for social life, as well as the ideal of social ethos.

Based on the fact that these essential social units and their interconnections are never purely and fully actualized, the person-community could be considered as the ideal at which human effort should aim. From the viewpoint of phenomenological typology, it is plausible to say that emotional contagion or involuntary imitation in the mass, coexperiencing or reliving in life-community or the conscious analogical inference in society are not the essential foundation of person-community. However, it does not rule out the existence of other social units in the real actualization of person-community. What is implied in the highest ideal of person-community is that other ways of association or understanding such as the mass demonstration, the experiencing-with-one-another in family, contracts, majority principle, etc., which are required in our social life, should be subjected to and regulated by the ethos of love.

If these thoughts are plausible, the understanding of the essential meaning of love and of ordo amoris, which will be deeply explored in Chapter 6, is of vital significance for both the unfolding of individual spirituality and the formation of the social ethos of love.
NOTES


2. Scheler’s compromise between the substance theory and the actuality theory is discussed by Hartmann (1968).

3. The issue of *ordo amoris*, the order or ordering of love, will be explored more in Chapter 6 section 4.

4. Cf. Chapter 3 section 4 on the cognition of values and Chapter 4 section 3 on spiritual feelings.


7. Cf. Chapter 4 sections 2 & 3.


Chapter 6 The essential meaning of love

After understanding the structural relationship between the act of love, the lover and what is loved, it seems appropriate to describe the essential meaning of the act of love itself. Here, one question could be raised, that is, are there any other emotions which could take the place of love in human life? Sympathy seems to be the likely candidate, through which Hume's love, the agreeable indirect passion directed to others, comes into existence. Similarly, it has been pointed out in the first part that Fung Yulan interprets *jen* as extending our sympathy to include Heaven, Earth and all things. However, the essential features of love found in the previous three chapters, such as the grasp of ever-higher values in objects and the intentional movement originating in the spiritual person, make us hesitate to answer the above question positively. In the light of this recognition, the phenomenon of sympathy should be addressed in order to further understand the essential meaning of love.

The first section, instead of immediately defining what love is, will clarify some emotions commonly misunderstood as love—such as emotional infection, the reproduction of previous emotions, the phenomenon of comparison, sympathy, etc.,—which are examined by Scheler mainly in SYM. The second section will explore the difference between love and sympathy, benevolence, the desire to better the object and so on, in order to describe the essential meaning of love. Thirdly, in terms of the basic spheres of values, to which the act of love is directed, the typical embodiment of love will be discussed, where such essential features of
love as the continuous openness of the lover to what is loved, the acknowledgment of the uniqueness of the beloved, the direction and guidance of vital drives etc., are revealed clearly. Last but not least, the fourth focus is on the significance of the order of love, *ordo amoris*, including its dynamic development in both the individual moral life and the whole culture. In particular, the phenomenon of infatuation is differentiated from the genuine act of love.

6-1. Sympathy

It is undeniable that, in the history of ethics, sometimes more attention is paid to sympathy than to love. For instance, due to its function of mirroring the mental conditions of others, sympathy in Hume's ethics is understood as the mechanism which enables us to understand the motivation beneath human behaviour. In other words, without taking sympathy into consideration, Hume believes, any ethics is incapable of correctly comprehending the chief source of moral distinctions (THN, 618). Our natural inclination to sympathy in Kantian ethics, as Guyer interprets it, is regarded as 'a pair of moral eyes', as 'an instrument for the discovery of what actions need to be taken in order to realize our general policy of benevolence' (1993, 337 & 388~389). Similarly, in emphasizing the importance of moral perception in our moral life, especially empathy as a prerequisite for the mature development of emotional attitudes, it is sympathy rather than love that is cherished more by Vetlesen (1994, 148, 204 & 207). Are the attitudes of rejoicing-with and commiserating, or those of love and hate more fundamental in moral life? Obviously, the answer is closely bound up with the differences and relationships between
these two types of emotional phenomena. In other words, only when their essential meanings are investigated can this issue be tackled properly.

It seems to me that one crucial point implied in the issue is how others are perceived in real human interaction, including to what extent others are perceived and what is the status of others in the perception: whether they are perceived as subjects with their own desires, interests and so on or as objects without these mental attributes. Actually, in daily interaction, what we perceive contains a subject with his psychological life as well as a material object. The bodies of others form a field of perception in which we use what we acquire to interpret and understand others and their expressions of life. In terms of the process of 'copresence' described by Husserl, the mind of the other ego, together with his body, is apprehended as a gestalt (Schutz, 1967, 314; Strasser, 1970, 292–293). A similar observation seems to be found in Scheler's phenomenology of emotions, when he points out that it is in the blush that we perceive shame, in the laughter joy. In the sight of clasped hands, the 'pleasure' is given exactly as the physical object is. In these cases, the body becomes the field of expression of experiences, through which we can have insight into others, directly and primarily rather than by inference (SYM, 9–10). Although this process of perception seems to be very natural, the participant might fail to maintain his own or others' status as a subject or fail to participate in the unique core of the other person discussed in Chapter 5, which requires some sort of moral effort.

It has been seen in Chapter 3 that, in comparison with the spontaneous spiritual act of love, sympathy is a functional reaction rather than an emotional state. Apart from this, Scheler reminds us that sympathy is the
direct understanding of others without the reproduction of the previously possessed experience. This feeling, furthermore, also presupposes the separate existence of the other self, rather than the fusing together of the two selves to become one unity. Concerning the origin of sympathy, it is neither the comparison of others with myself nor the release of one's own distress, let alone the self-deceit of total attachment to others (SYM, 13~14, 23, 39, 42~44 & 45~49). Insofar as sympathy is viewed as either the emotional reproduction of others' experiences, emotional identification, emotional infection, mutual comparison, or the release of distress or self-deceit, how it functions in interpersonal perception will not really be realized. Therefore, before clarifying the dissimilarity between sympathy and love, these emotional phenomena commonly misconceived as love should be examined.

The first emotional phenomenon considered by Scheler as different from sympathy is the immediate community of feeling. Take, for instance, the parents standing beside the dead body of a beloved child; they feel in common the 'same' sorrow, the 'same' anguish. It is not the case that A feels this sorrow and B feels it also, and moreover that they both know that they are feeling it. In this community of feeling, the 'sorrow', as value-content, and the grief, as characterizing the functional relation, are one and identical (SYM, 12~14). By the same token, it seems to me, the immediate community of feeling, along with emotional infection and emotional identification discussed in the following, is classified by Mercer as non-cognitive fellowing-feeling (1972, 12 & 16~17), because it does not involve the awareness of each other's existence as feeling subjects. However, sympathy is comprised of two phenomenologically different facts, namely to vicariously feel the feelings of others and then to
participate in this feeling, both of which are closely interwoven and can not be distinguished from each other in community of feeling.

Moreover, emotional infection is a quite involuntary and unconscious transference of the state of feeling. Similar emotions, efforts and purposes could be produced by a common making of expressive gestures among the people or animals concerned. It is not uncommonly found that the cheerful atmosphere in a pub or at a party may infect the newcomers, or the mass emotion at political demonstrations, mass rallies or football matches may blur the boundaries of individuality and diminish the notion of personal responsibility (SYM, 12; Mercer, 1972, 13~14). The characteristic of emotional infection is the complete lack of mutual understanding, for instance, of any sort of knowledge of the joy or pain which others feel, despite the realization of another person's existence as the cause, but not the intentional object, of the present feeling. Likewise, the natural landscape, the weather or the decoration of a room can infect us (SYM, 14~18, 41~42 & 37). Because the emotion caused by infection can again reproduce itself by means of expression and imitation, the result of mutual infection often goes beyond what is expected. In contrast, sympathy is a reaction to the feelings of others which contains the element of understanding, rather than the transference of emotional states.

Thirdly emotional identification as found between, say, the crowd and its leader or the hypnotist and his patient, as a heightened form of infection, is germane to the problem of self, that is, one will be involuntarily identified with the selves of others and lose his own self. According to the different forms of self-identification, Scheler points out, there are two opposite kinds of emotional identification: idiopathic identification and
heteropathic identification (SYM, 18-19, 23, 31-32 & 39; Mercer, op. cit., 14-16). In the former, if I am the leader and others are the crowd, their selves might be completely eclipsed and absorbed by my self. In contrast, in the latter, if my partner is the hypnotist and I am his patient, the formal status 'I' as a subject might be usurped by the other 'I', all with their characteristic aspects. As a corollary, the patient or the crowd might not think of their feelings as 'really belonging to' the hypnotist or the leader. In the process of emotional identification, the selves of both partners fuse together so that one of them wholly loses his self. Without the recognition of the other as an independent feeling agent, the 'understanding' or 'helping' of others in a full sense becomes problematic.

So far, the description of the above three emotional phenomena is helpful in showing an implicit question in Van Hooft's discussion of Scheler's sharing emotions. Van Hooft is right in the thesis that the sharing of an emotion and its inherent meaning in a given situation should fundamentally be based on the participants' pre-reflexive mental disposition of caring (1994, 18, 20-21, 23 & 25). However, taking the qualitatively different status of the interactors into account, I doubt that the quality of emotional solidarity and shared understanding of a shared context are all the same in Van Hooft's four sharing emotions mentioned, namely, the immediate community of feeling, fellow-feeling 'about something', emotional infection and emotional identification. Strictly speaking, it is only in Van Hooft's second sharing emotion, viz. fellow-feeling 'about something', which plainly distinguishes the functions of vicariously visualized feeling from the participation in feeling, that true emotional solidarity and shared understanding make sense. Further speaking, although in the characterization of caring as the way 'in which
persons transcend their preoccupation with themselves so as to engage with the world and with people around them, the separation of feeler from what is felt is implied, this implication is undermined by Van Hooft's alleged sharing of emotion via emotional identification, the immediate community of feeling or emotional infection. For instance, one clear case in his paper is that, due to emotional identification in the context of a funeral, B, a close friend of A's, shares grief with A, the loving son of the deceased. In this case, what is formed is 'representable or organic solidarity' found in the essential social unit of life-community where either one of the interactors is involuntarily identified with the selves of the other or both of them are immersed in the prevailing atmosphere of the situation.

Does the occurrence of sympathy require some sort of previous experiences as its necessary condition? The theory of reproduction suggests that the perception of joy or sorrow in others or the tendency to imitate the symptoms so perceived, has the effect of immediately evoking the reproduction of a similar joy or sorrow previously experienced in us (SYM, 45). However, we can vividly and immediately participate in the joy or sorrow of others and share their comprehension of values, even if we have not previously experienced ourselves what they are experiencing. For example, one who is without the experience of death can feel the horribleness of death. Allport also observes that infants can show an appropriate type of response to expressions of which they have had no conceivable experience (1971, 528). With regard to mental feelings and especially spiritual feelings, the understanding and sharing, such as the sharing of Jesus' despair in Gethsemane or Buddha's sympathy for the
pain and misery of the world, are independent of the contingent personal backgrounds of individuals.

Without appealing to previous experience or any analogy, we can even enter into their pity for a third person. Otherwise, our understanding of and sympathy for historical knowledge would be necessarily limited and our knowledge of the psychic world could not be extended far beyond our own experiences (SYM, 48–50; SPE, 88–90). It goes without saying that our experiences can be expanded by means of the mechanism of sympathy, instead of being confined to the reproduction of the old experiences. However, from the genetic viewpoint, not all persons are able to enter into and sense the meanings of values of, say, Jesus' despair in Gethsemane. The old experiences of being exposed to similar situations and appreciating similar meanings might be conducive, although not necessary, to the emergence of sympathy.

The phenomenon of compassion is also different from sympathy (SYM, 39–40). The former is a heightened commiseration bestowed from above, i.e. from a standpoint of superior power and dignity; that is to say, the 'comparison' inherent in compassion is relevant to consideration for the condition of its object. A similar nuance can be found in Mercer's distinction between sympathy and pity in that the one who expresses pity implies that his position is better than that of the pitied (1972, 18–19). However, sympathy directly refers to the other person, as such, or the individual uniqueness of his sorrow or joy. With regard to the release of distress, it is only directed to one's own subsequent reaction, rather than to the situations of others. Nevertheless, the genuine sympathizer refers intentionally to the feeling of joy or sorrow of others, in which no
previous judgement or intimation such as 'the other person is in trouble' is required. In vicarious feeling the sympathizer is capable of visualizing the value and state of the other's feelings. He actually partakes in it and reacts to what is visualized. That is why sympathy is a reactional function.

It follows from the above clarification that the mere outward behaviour of helping is not a sufficient condition for genuine moral behaviour out of sympathy. What is crucial in sympathy is that the sympathizer should realize the existence of another centre of sentient consciousness. When someone verbally claims that he sympathizes with others, what should be examined is whether he is infected by the prevailing emotions, involuntarily identifies himself with others, shows his condescension or just releases his own worry. Insofar as the agent lives in the above states of mind, what he experiences is not sympathy, still less the emotional act of love.

6-2. The essential meaning of love

The openness and participation in the phenomenological attitude enable the knower to spiritually come into a most intensely vital and most immediate contact with the world itself (SPE, 137~138). Adopting the phenomenological attitude toward love and hate, Scheler points out that their essences are inherent in acts themselves and can be exhibited rather than being defined. Therefore, the main concern of his phenomenology of love is to describe the essences of love and hate and their essential relationships given in the phenomenological attitude, which, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, requires some sort of ascetic effort to suspend the
agent's vital drives so as to open to the world by virtue of spirit (PSE, 136~138, 202 & 241~242). In SYM, love is described as:

the movement wherein every concrete individual object that possesses value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its nature. (161)

It seems to me that the feature of movement inherent in this description merits special notice, as discussed in Chapter 4 section 1. By means of the intentionality, openness and receptivity of heart, human beings are able continuously to perceive and pursue what is more valuable with the collaboration of will, thinking etc. In contrast to passive states or reactive functions, love is a continuous going forth towards the object (Ortega y Gasset, 1967, 15). Plausibly it is the features of openness and movement that inspire the understanding of love as self-expansion, self-awareness and self-realization, unpossessiveness and unselfishness, in opposition to narcissism, cynicism, selfishness (Murdoch, 1970, 88; Solomon, 1988, 28~29). However, the intentional development of a person presupposes some sort of direction, that is, the expanding or shrinking of the horizon of values, and its stagnation as the phenomenon of infatuation explored in section 4. That is also implied in another definition of love given by Scheler: as an edifying and uplifting action in and over the world and a movement toward the enhancement of values, from one height to an even greater height (SPE, 109, 112 & 114).

The feature of the movement manifested in Plato's eros is also recognized by Scheler and Murdoch. That is to say, in the objective hierarchy of
values, love is the dynamic movement passing from a lower value to a higher one, in which the higher value of the object or person suddenly flashes upon us and forms a more real moral vision (SYM, 152; Murdoch, 1970, 94–95). Due to this trait, it can be said that love enables us to discover a higher value in what is loved, including ourselves, which cannot be found in everyday interaction otherwise. As a corollary, what love involves is not only the probability of ruling out a lower value, but also that of building and maintaining a higher value. For instance, if the teacher-pupil relationship, which will be examined in detail in Chapter 9, is based on the intentional act of love, then the teacher will participate in the pupil's value fulfillment and his transformation of personality via the process of evoking love in love.

If the vision of ever-higher value in the object can be continuously seen in the intentionality of love's movement, then what could be the meaning of the proverb that love is blind? Can this proverb be interpreted in this way: that the ever-higher value-ception in love leads to ignorance of the defects in the beloved or affects the perception of negative values? So far, the spiritual act of love described by Scheler is nearer to a deep-seated dispositional tendency of mind than to occurrent feelings. One of the differences between these two sorts of mental phenomena is that the former can predispose us to interpret its objects in a certain way, while the latter comes into existence as the result of the dispositional interpretation. Hence, once the emotional act of love is situated in the core of our heart, then the defects, apart from merits, of the beloved can be perceived in a brighter light rather than being overlooked. That is to say, the lover will encourage the beloved to change his or her faults in terms of the attitude of acceptance and tolerance, instead of indifference.
or complacency. On the other hand, what is usually regarded as being blind seems to be the occurrent sensual impulses which could accompany love, rather than constituting love itself, and which necessarily demand some sort of regulation, for example, the proper disposition to express it in proper ways. In this case, a teacher should be alert to the ignorance of defects and the overestimation of merits of their pupils brought out by this sort of superficial impulse.

From the perspective of the categorisation of human emotion, love is an act of the person, not an emotional state or function’. Firstly love is not a reactive emotional function, like sympathy. Emotional functions are only directed at what is felt and are relative to an ego, while love is a spontaneous act executed by the person and belongs to the non-psychological field of the person. Furthermore, neither is love an emotional state without intentionality. On the other hand, the alteration of love and hate is independent of the vicissitudes of the state of feeling (SYM, 147~148). By contrast, the carrying out of love and hate itself is the deepest of all sources of joy and sorrow, bliss and despair. These two issues, viz. the differences between love and sympathy and love as the foundation of other emotions, are going to be dealt with again in what follows.

In the genuine relationship of love, a lover respects the other as what he is, but does not take and treat the beloved as if the latter were identical with himself, so that the reality of the beloved as another pole of the relationship disappears. Regarding the nature of the object, the vision obtained in love calls explicitly for respect for the real, namely a whole-hearted and warm acceptance of his existence as what he is (SYM,
70–71; Murdoch, 1970, 91). Hence, in contrast to a relationship of subordination, suggestion and hypnosis, the lover clearly perceives the other as another subject with otherness. It is precisely in this whole-hearted and warm respect and acceptance that the marginal awareness of absolute personal privacy is first quickened and made clear. It is exactly in this process of evoking love in love that the individual's openness to being known and his uniqueness involving the unknown privacy emerge together. That is why love, in comparison to sympathy, possesses more capacity for understanding up to and beyond the limits of absolute privacy (SYM, 68).

In accordance with various connotations of respect, the relationship between respect and love may be understood in at least three different ways. If respect is understood as finding some meritorious or tasteful features in the beloved, then the object concerned can be loved without respect (Hamlyn, 1978, 13; Newton-Smith, 1973, 119). Secondly, we may 'love' others because of respect for the demands of moral principles, rather than because of respect for persons as persons (Kellenberger, 1995, 112–114). The third meaning of respect, for persons as persons, is based on the realization of the intrinsic worth of any concrete person, including, say, infants or a permanently unconscious individual, as well as the fully realized person discussed in Chapter 5. Obviously, the respect inherent in the above description of love, regarded as the backbone of love by Midgley (1981, 95–96), should be the third one, the foundation of which is the discovery of the value of bestowed dignity, but not appraised dignity. Surely, rather than complacency, this giving and receiving of freedom, independence and individuality in love constitutes a warm
acceptance of the beloved as they are and an invitation to them to become better (SYM, 70-71; Kellenberger, 1995, 90). For instance, in accepting his lost son with warmth, the loving father in Luke 15, discussed in Chapter 2, inspires, but does not force, the beloved to change.

Even with regard to the third sense of respect based on the inherent worth or dignity of the respected, it is possible to respect the object without love. The fundamental reason is that, apart from the realization of intrinsic worth, what is spiritually seen is the 'higher value' in the inexhaustible richness of the beloved. The respect of bestowed dignity prevents love from becoming emotional identification or subordination, while what transforms a human being from the potential state with various possibilities of value development to the fully realized person is the features of movement and inspiration of love. However, the emotional act of love should not be confused with benevolence, sympathy, the desire to improve the object and the creation of values in the object.

Love is to love the objects as they are and the values they possess. That is to say, the main concern in love is to 'Become what thou art', rather than expecting love in terms of the attitude of 'Thou shalt' (SYM, 157-159). Thereby, willing and trying to secure the betterment of its objects or wishing their betterment could be the result of love, but not love itself. In fact, the interpretation of love as the 'creation' of higher values in the other could be the projection of our own values into the object. Owing to the inherent inability to free oneself from partiality to one's own ideas, feelings and interests, the above-mentioned phenomena usually are misunderstood as love and then obstruct us from knowing the essential meaning of love. The pedagogical relationship and pedagogical
love explored in Chapter 9, which enable us to invite pupils to actualize their more valuable potentialities, are different from and can actually become the basis of a certain sort of 'pedagogic' attitude, viz. this will to improve the object.

The main attention in the act of love is paid to the positive value of the beloved, while this concern could, but does not necessarily, lead to looking for the benefit of the object. Wishing others well as a consequence of loving them is also different from benevolence. Apart from remoteness and superiority, the element of 'condescension' inherent in benevolence may rule out the possibility of loving (SYM, 140–141). Furthermore benevolence involves the making of an effort towards the well-being of the other, an impulsive tendency to self-exertion, which can not be found in love, the movement towards positive value. Love has nothing to do with whether the positive value has already existed or not, while all effort has a content to be realized. All kinds of effort, desires or longing for the beloved object could be brought about in love, but they are no part of it. More important, because the law of love is a contrast to that of effort, the former either remains the same or increases its activity whereas the latter exhausts itself and comes to rest once it is satisfied.

What is implied in Scheler's distinguishing of love from benevolence, wishing others well, and striving for others' well-being, it seems to me, is the essential difference between human affective, volitional and cognitive life, and the fundamental position of love in human life. As presented in the stratification of human emotions, the cognitive content of value grasping in love, which is sometimes aggravated by volitional intervention, precedes volitional effort and projects and is able to direct
our desires. Insofar as benevolence is understood as a will to better others, it should be differentiated from and be based on the act of love. It is commonly found that, when loving, a good will will be shown to the beloved (Midgley, 1981, 95; Brown, 1987, 29). However, benevolence should not be understood and regarded as a necessary constituent element in the emotional act of love.

So far it seems appropriate to answer the question of what is the difference between love and sympathy usually construed as the foundation from which the facts of love and hate are derived. First of all, sympathy as a passive or receptive function refers to the feelings of others, while love as an intentional movement of the spiritual person refers to the value of the beloved. Hence, love can be directed to our selves with values and forms some sort of self-awareness and self-love\(^4\), which is distinguishable from egoism, while genuine sympathy for oneself does not exist at all (SYM, 141–143). By the same token, love can be directed to insensible but valuable objects while sympathy is confined to sentient creatures. Besides, sympathy should be based on love, which makes pity bearable, otherwise without love sympathy will create a sense of 'injured pride', shame and humiliation, and the expression of pity, even by a morally sensitive pitier, will be felt to be an act of brutality. Although not basing sympathy on love, Mercer seems to be aware of the humiliating experience of being treated as an object of charity (1972, 124 ). In other words, it is possible, as is observed in everyday life, to have fellow-feeling for someone we do not love. However, due to the fact that, in the relation of love, both partners give and accept the individuality of each other, the act of love circumscribes the level and degree of penetration into its object that fellow-feeling is able to reach. In view of these
differences, it seems to me, Fung Yu-lan's interpretation of *jen* as the extension of sympathy, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, is incapable of capturing the whole connotation of *jen*.

Going a step further, it is plausible to say that genuine sympathy enables us to feel vicariously the feelings of others and then to participate in this feeling; doing this can inform us of the cognitive content of value about this situation and become the motivation for moral behaviour. Hence, sympathy is viewed by Mercer, as well as by Hume (see Chapter 2), as a necessary precondition of morality, upon which Maclagan bases both the principle of respect and *agape* (Maclagan, 1960, 211–212; Mercer, 1972, 118 & 126). Similarly, in his inquiry into the preconditions of moral performance, Vetlesen contends that sympathy, instead of love, is capable of extending our capacity for empathy toward a wider setting, including the person we do not love (1994, 204). Nevertheless, once the level and degree of penetration are taken into account, the deepest core of the spiritual person can be understood only in the participation and co-execution of love. When Maclagan suggests that, by fusion with 'our general consciousness of obligation', active sympathy is moralized or transformed into *agape* (Maclagan, 1960, 215–217; Mercer, 1972, 127–128), what is implied, it seems to me, is that *agape*, one form of love, breaks down the barrier to the deepest understanding. In fact, the limit inherent in sympathy can only be removed in the various embodiments of genuine love.
6-3. The embodiment of love

Because the consciousness of love can be directed towards any objects which carry values, the objects of this spiritual, intentional act are not confined to other persons, but include the world and the transcendental being. Among the typical manifestations of love referred to by Scheler are the love of the world, sexual love, the spiritual love of the person and the love of God, in which the features of love can be more clearly recognized as well. For instance, St. Francis of Assissi's love of the world embodies the openness to and belief in the world. Sexual love, unlike pure sexual desire, involves the value-selecting nature. The love of the person expresses the spontaneity and penetration of understanding. With regard to the love of God, it forms the final foundation of all loves.

In expanding the Christian emotion of love to include all the lower orders of Nature and uplifting Nature into the light and glory of the supernatural, St. Francis of Assissi's panentheistic love of the world allows natural objects and processes to assume an expressive significance of their own and to possess the intrinsic value of their own (SYM, 87-89 & 92-93). In this emotional relationship, Nature becomes a living whole and God is also felt as the loving Father, not only the Lord and Creator, of all Nature's creatures. The crucial implication of Assissi's panentheistic identification with Nature as a unique confluence of *Eros* and *Agape* is the realization of the inherent value of Nature, which restores the brotherly connection between men and Nature. Similarly, as mentioned in Chapter 1, partly due to the influence of Buddhism, the objects of love in Neo-Confucianism are not limited to human beings, but include lifeless things. Scheler reminds us that modern technical civilization which is
only concerned about what can be practically handled has led to the
deterioration of the relationship between human beings and Nature (PSV,
188; EIM, 390). The hostility towards the world, and hate and mistrust as
substitutes for love and trust, prevent human beings from understanding
the holistic picture of the world.

Once love is directed to our vital life, the main manifestations of this
emotional act are sexual love and the historical sentiment of romantic love.
Sexual love possesses the features of love and can not be regarded as a mere
blind sexual instinct or impulse (SYM, 114, 125~127 & 205; Solomon,
1988, 30). Because the higher value-ception in love can guide the direction
of our drive, sexual love is not just for maintaining races, but can offer the
likeliest chance for the qualitative betterment of mankind. In anticipating
the best and the most beautiful model, this manifestation of love becomes an
emotional project for bringing forth a better creature than has existed before.
The natural end of sexual love is to promote qualities and produce a 'nobler
race' rather than to reproduce, which is the end of sexual instinct and
procreative instinct. Furthermore, it is also based on the features of love
that, Scheler suggests, rational eugenic arrangements are incapable of
replacing the value-selecting function of sexual love, which could even be
destroyed by the intervention of will and volition.

In comparison to other forms of love, Solomon points out three distinctive
characteristics of erotic (romantic) love, that is, the centrality of sexual
desire, the prerequisite of equality between lovers and being unprescribed
and often spontaneous (Solomon, 1988, 14~15). However, Solomon seems
to imply, if I am right, that other forms of love can come into existence
without the precondition of equality. Consider Plato's *eros*, Aristotle's


philia, Christian agape or Confucian love. Without the realization of the other as another subject with equal status to ours in the openness and participation of love, I doubt that others can become genuinely beloved. This point seems also to be recognized by Wilson in his interpretation of love between equals in that the various points of view, preferences, feelings, desires, rights etc., of the people concerned should be weighed and cherished equally (1995, 65). Actually, regarding the relationship between love and desires, the capacity of directing desires in terms of the awareness of value in love can be functionalized in various forms of true love (Ortega y Gasset, 1967, 10–11), not only in erotic (romantic) love. What is unique in this form of love is that it is embodied in vital life and is able to regulate sexual desires. Furthermore, to say the genetic process of cultivating love, say, Aristotle’s friendship or pedagogical love, involves deliberate consideration such as some conscious valuation of the other or seeing oneself as in the role of teacher, is one thing, while to say the stirring of true love is spontaneous rather than reactive is quite another. Because the object with which romantic love is compared by Solomon is family love, he can say that the former is unprescribed and often spontaneous. Doubtlessly, romantic love is not the only kind of love which is unprescribed and spontaneous.

Of the crucial features of love, the openness of the person clearly reveals itself in Scheler’s spiritual love of the person. As a Christian conception of spiritual love, this sort of love is to love the individual as a person rather than just as a member of the human species. Apart from the spontaneous act of the lover in accepting the existence of the other person, this love of the person relies on the openness of the beloved person as well. In other words, unless the person spontaneously discloses
himself, without being intuitively understood, the person is capable of silence and concealment. Hence the fundamental condition of self-disclosure depends on a pure mutual love, rather than on sympathy, between the parties, which can awaken a similar love and therefore is bound up with the development of individual personality, as discussed in the previous chapter (SYM, 122-123, 128; SPE, 103-107; FORM, 490-491). Only in this process of mutual disclosure to each other does it make sense to say that the participants are subject to injury through personal reactive attitudes, or that the self of the lover is able to expand to include another and to form a shared identity (Brook, 1973, 68; Solomon, 1988, 22 & 28-29). It is an experienced fact that, unless we suspend our own desires, interests, prejudices, etc., we perceive our individual projections, and do not at all grasp and move toward the higher values in the beloved.

Another significant feature disclosed in the love of the person is the uniqueness and irreplaceability of the beloved. The question is commonly raised whether the beloved can be replaced by other objects carrying the same values or with the same characters or qualities (Kraut, 1986, 425-426; Brown, 1987, 43, 96 & 102-108). However, it has been pointed out in Chapter 5 that the spiritual person is a hierarchical structure of acts which permeates every act with his peculiar character or moral tenor (MPN, 64; FORM, 383-386). It is only through the openness and participation of love that this unique essence of this concrete individual can be truly grasped. In the relationship of genuine love, one fact experienced by the participants is that, the more deeply we understand the other in love, the more unique and irreplaceable the other is. On the other hand, insofar as others are perceived as only social functional roles or the
instantiation of some general qualities, it can not be said that actually they are loved.

In Scheler's system of thought, due to the feature of unlimitedness of love in the dynamic movement of heart, the loves for limited objects necessarily connect to and are based on the love of God, the change of whose direction determines those of all kinds of loves (SYM, 102 & 128; FORM, 498). Additionally, it is believed in Confucianism that, as soon as a human being completely cultivates his mind, as a sage does, he is able to give birth to myriad things and to be in union with Heaven and Earth, the great virtue of which is the giving of life (Ching, 1977, 80). What is implied in this sort of insight seems to be that human heart in its unceasing search necessarily leads to the pursuit of the origin of the myriad things as an ultimate concern of life, the grasp of which answer determines our structure of preferring values and loving and hating. For instance, the primal intention of the unfathomable creator such as God, Heaven, etc., is realized as the act of loving; it is able to invite us to participate in this great project of creation, where probably self-love and neighbour-love, benevolence or loving others merge with each other.

Because the understanding of the person is only through the co-execution of acts, the love of the person also exists in the loving participation of acts. For the same reason, the highest form of the love of God is to participate in His love for the world (amare mundum in Deo) and for Himself (amare Deum in Deo), rather than to have love 'for' God, a mere concept. In identifying Him as Infinite Love, the peculiar nuances of value-qualities of the divine are given, which guide the formation of ideas of God and concepts of God (FORM, 294; SYM, 164 & 168).
important, it is only through God's love, a co-loving of all finite persons with the love of God as the person of persons, that self-sanctification and love of one's neighbour are inseparably and organically united as stated in the above. That means, in sanctifying the loving person, all love for others can be regarded as pure and genuine and, on the other hand, self-sanctification should be confirmed in acts of loving one's neighbour (FORM, 498). In this way, human beings imitate the creation of Heaven and Earth, like the imitation of agape, and actively take part in Nature's nourishing, including the amelioration of human society, as in the fundamental goal of self-cultivation in Confucianism.¹⁰

It seems to me that, in the embodiment of agape or the life-giving of Heaven and Earth, the profound significance of the emotional act of love can be appreciated. Given that what is loved should be something which possesses some sort of value, then how can the handicapped, the person in a state of coma or permanent unconsciousness, or ugly and undisciplined children, abused animals or the destroyed environment, etc., become the objects of love and concern? Although they surely cannot be the beloved of Plato's eros or the friends of Aristotle's philia, they can be loved in terms of human agape, the human imitation of the love of God, and Confucian love. In other words, against Vetlesen (1994, 204), through the intentional movement of love our identity can be extended to embrace objects from the other side of the world in warm acceptance and see higher values in them.

What is no less significant is that the relationship of love implies equality between lovers, but not necessarily a give-and-take relationship, as Taylor suggests (Newton-Smith, 1973, 126–127; Taylor, 1976, 153 & 160;
Two points deserve more explanation here. Firstly, what is meant by the precondition of equality is the recognition of the equal status of the partner, that is, his or her desires, wishes, interests, rights, opinions etc., are as important as mine. Whether one-way love or mutual love, when A loves B, B's equal status in the above sense must be perceived in A's act of love. Otherwise, the relationship between A and B might be based on emotional identification, sympathy, etc., rather than love. Next, what is referred to by 'giving without taking' is the unselfish devotion, which seems usually found in such processes of evoking love in loving as maternal love and unrequited love, rather than the sharing or giving and taking of opinions, feelings, etc., in the process of negotiation and communication. There are some manifestations of love which do not involve taking. Therefore, if A loves B genuinely, A's perception of B as another self and of what is more valuable for B is compatible with A's unselfish devotion.

Can we have 'sensual love', in which we adopt a purely 'sensual' attitude towards the objects? In terms of the nature of love, namely an enhancement of value, Scheler denies that the word 'sensual' can denote a particular kind of love. The objects treated in the sensual attitude are regarded as having no other value in themselves, viz. the intrinsic value, than that of being pleasant. Instead of loving another for his own sake, if a person is treated as a sensual object or just a body, then he is subordinate to our own sensual feelings, needs and enjoyment and there is no concern for his positive value in this absolutely cold and loveless attitude, let alone any recognition and respect for his individuality, wishes, interests, etc. (SYM, 169-170; Brook, 1973, 72-73; Newton-Smith, 1973,
122–123). If taking this attitude towards oneself, it will be a debasement of body and spiritual personality rather than self-love.

6-4. The order of love

It is explicitly or implicitly anticipated that ordo amoris, the order or ordering of love, should be the core of Scheler's phenomenology of love (Deeken, 1974, 177–178). The fundamental reason is that ordo amoris is so closely bound up with our structure of preferring values and loving and hating that it determines the unfolding of spirit and the hierarchical structure of spiritual acts, which is directly responsible for the direction and guidance of vital drives (MPN, 64; SPE, 110–111). It is also comprehensible that, if the activity of education is distinctively human, namely, it cannot be executed in the kingdom of other animals, it should be concerned about the unfolding of the spiritual person as the centre of the distinctive essential form of human life. In view of this significant position in the development of the spiritual person and in the variations of ethical value-estimation, it seems not to be an exaggeration to say that the correct ordo amoris is highly bound up with educational theory and the critical evaluation of culture, and how to restore the order belongs to the province of pedagogy and to therapeutic techniques for human salvation (SPE, 103; SYM, 1). What is going to be addressed in this section includes the importance and meaning of ordo amoris, the priority of love in human cognition, the relation between affects, passions and love and finally the correct order of love and its aberration.

The essential significance of ordo amoris lies in the fact that it affects the human view of the world, and human deeds and activities, and becomes
the fundamental root of historical ethos13, the structure of preferring values as well as loving and hating (SPE, 98–99; FORM, 299). The central reason is that our emotional comportment of value-ception precedes all of what we perceive, think, will, choose, etc., all of which fundamentally depend on the play of this movement of our heart. Moreover, the individual's order of love and hate is capable of determining the basic direction of his heart and then the scope and strength of his value-ception. In other words, **ordo amoris** forms the selective mechanism, the rules of preference and rejection, in accordance with which what attracts or repulses us is determined (SPE, 101–102). In our moral life, behind the emergence of a value-signal, which governs and circumscribes the experiences of moral reality and then moral activities, exists individual **ordo amoris**. Rather than sympathy, regarded by Hume as being highly relevant to the uniformity of temper in men of the same nation and to the esteem we pay to the artificial virtues, such as justice (THN, 317, 577; ECH, 220)14, here it is love and individual **ordo amoris** that determine the ethos of a given area or epoch, which in turn plays a vital, although not the only, role in the formation of **ordo amoris** in the coming generation15.

The concept of **ordo amoris** has two meanings, one normative and the other purely factual and descriptive (SPE, 99, 103 & 116). The former refers to the correct and true order of love. Being no chaos of blind feeling-states as discussed in Chapter 4, the human heart after proper cultivation is able to become a structured counter-image of the cosmos of all possible things worthy of love. **Ordo amoris** precisely means the counter-image of the objective hierarchy of values as a reflection in the human heart, where the subjective intentionality of emotional acts is involved and, instead of a mechanical reflection, some sort of moral
discipline is required. Once the correct ordo amoris is formed, the acts and capacities of love are in accordance with the graduated construction of what is worthy of love. On the other hand, the latter is relevant to a sum of norms and could be laid down only by some will. It can be said that, when being seen as connected to the will of man and as commanded to him by a will, the objectively correct ordo amoris becomes a norm. Therefore, the ideal which the moral life should aim at is to foster the acts and capacities of love in accordance with the graduated construction of what is worthy of love and then forming correct individual ordo amoris and historical ethos.

In the statement 'Man, before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volens, is an ens amans,' the core of Scheler's philosophy of man (Frings, 1965a, 67~68), the importance of ordo amoris is more clearly elucidated. From the ontogenetic perspective, before developing the objectifying and reflecting mode, human beings in their childhood necessarily undergo an original feeling and emotional mode of awareness, which is not based on objectifying knowledge and discriminatory volition. Even when there is the ability to use languages and names to objectify objects and to obtain a more realistic view of the world, emotional awareness still exists as one access to the world (Strasser, 1970, 296~297 & 303~306; Zajonc, 1980, 152 & 169~170). On the other side, because love and hatred are bound up with expansion and limitation in the grasp of values, the fullness, gradations, differentiations and power of love thereby circumscribe the fullness, the functional specificity and the power of our possible spirit. The nature and modalities of values grasped by human beings determine the part of what is worthy of love which is available for them (SPE, 110~111). That is to say, the rule of value-preference and value-
depreciation defines their possible attitudes towards the world as well as themselves and the content and structure of knowledge, all of which ultimately rely on the movement of their heart.

Here it seems proper to come back again to the issue of the position of love in the perception of otherness or the discovery of the intrinsic worth of others. In section 2, it was pointed out that in Maclagan's thought (1960, 208–210) a sense of obligation, which makes possible the difference between 'I ought' and 'I want', is required to moralize natural sympathy into agape. However, considering the source of this sense of obligation, it seems to me that neither Maclagan nor Mercer explains clearly how the general intrinsic worth of persons is grasped and is combined with natural sympathy (Maclagan, 1960, 215–216; Mercer, 1972, 126–130). Kellenberger, furthermore, in his reflection on Maclagan's view, considers agape, sympathy, respect or concern for persons, etc., as the affective side, an affective response or affective experience, in our realization of the intrinsic worth of persons. He implicitly suggests that it is the recognition of the worth of persons that leads to agape as a positive attitude or some other attitude in the respect/love range (1995, 49, 55, 93, 95 & 103). Now what I wonder about is the place of agape in Maclagan's moral principle of respect for persons, Mercer's ethics of sympathy and Kellenberger's relationship morality.

Given the plausibility of what has been said about the essential meanings and importance of love, including agape, and about ordo amoris, agape should be the crucial factor determining whether and to what extent another centre of consciousness or the intrinsic worth of persons can be
perceived rather than only an affective response. Certainly, Kellenberger also pays attention to the avoidance of the selfish illusion, which is able to blind us to the discovery of the personhood of all persons (1995, 50 & 58–59). However, I would like to say that the prevention of selfishness is fully actualized in the emotional act of love as the necessary condition of attaining this sort of moral insight. This task is exactly like what is meant by 'to master oneself' in Confucian love, to eliminate selfish desires which becloud the embodiment of jen and are an impediment to loving others\(^7\). Furthermore, what is seen is not just the inherent worth of others, but also the vision of what is more valuable for the beloved. Hitherto it seems plausible to say that the ordo amoris of the lover determines the moralization of sympathy and the realization of others' personhood.

Regarding the priority of love in cognition implied in the above discussion of ordo amoris, love is grasped by Scheler as the mother of spirit and reason itself, which awakens both knowledge and volition (SPE, 110). 'Knowing' in this context is understood as an ontological relation; knowledge is the cognition of something as something\(^8\) (SPE, 110 & 290). Furthermore, in the act of cognition, it is presupposed that the 'knowing' subject abandons and transcends his self and his conditions, his own 'contents of consciousness,' in order to come into experiential contact with the world as far as possible. In terms of its features of openness and acceptance, love is exactly the act by which we transcend ourselves, rather than giving up ourselves and becoming one part of the other, and by which we participate in another being as an ens intentionale. Therefore, the 'knowing' subject without love, the movement of going beyond oneself and taking part in others, is a being without cognition. In other words, it is only in love that human spirit and reason gradually unfold and human
beings are capable of knowing the essences of objects as they are (Wolfgang Blanken Burg, 1972, 23~26). Without the openness and participation inherent in love and the unfolding of spirit and reason, human beings will be 'ecstatically immersed' in the environment like animals. 

Here it seems to me that one important question clearly comes into view, that is, should the emotion of love be based on the particular belief that something is good? Is it plausible to say that, before loving the painting masterpieces of John Constable or Claude Monet, I should believe that they are marvelous and admirable? Taylor, Kraut and Brown remind us of the possibility of loving someone or something without believing the beloved to be lovable, without the mediation of judgement or belief (Taylor, 1976, 152~153; Kraut, 1986, 418 & 423~424; Brown, 1987, 15~16). Probably some ineffable beliefs are located in the prereflective level rather than in the volitional, reflective level of our consciousness. However, another possibility is that, as is implied in Hamlyn's non-epistemic perception (1978, 9, 12~15 & 20), in the genuine openness of love, an ever newer perspective on objects can be apprehended without a belief as to the perceived perspective. This does not amount to saying that the lover or hater does not need any belief at all. Presumably, someone does have some opinions about how to appreciate a painting, say the arrangement of the scene, the use of various colours, the quality of light, etc. When standing in front of some unknown paintings, what is perceived by him is that the works are worthy of love, although he is unable to articulate the fundamental reasons in terms of his beliefs. It seems to me that our complete openness in love is actually one access to the world and is able to provide us with a different source of beliefs,
which becomes the object of our reflection as well. If this is plausible, then it is deemed that a person with a closed mind is incapable of coming into contact with the world.

Because of the openness to and the grasping of ever higher values inherent in the intentional movement of love, individual *ordo amoris* is the fundamental basis of other sorts of emotions and desires in determining their formation and emergence. For instance, it is in the selective function of higher value inherent in the emotional act of love that a tension between two levels of consciousness is experienced as the necessary condition of the feeling of shame (PSV, 15–16 & 27). Moreover, it is the openness of love to the past, the re-appraisal of what we have done in our past life and the discovery of its new meanings and values, that makes the feeling of repentance possible (PSV, 96–97). On the other hand, the establishment of correct *ordo amoris* implies the continuous expansion of the individual horizon of values and our transcending and participating in another being, which actually are required in the emergence of other emotions and desires such as liking, sorrow, etc. Obviously, the emergence of the aforementioned emotions demands the receptivity, instead of indifference, of the agent to the objects concerned, which is implied in Hamlyn's characterization of love and hate as the primary forms of 'feeling towards' rather than passive states (1978, 5–6 & 13–14). Apart from this, the agent's preference-hierarchy determines whether the objects concerned are valued or not.

Thus far, the intentional act of love understood as the act or the tendency seeking to lead everything in the direction of the perfection of value proper to it seems to be the omnipotent and crowning emotion in human
life (SPE, 109-110). However, is it possible that love goes wrong? In this context, the distinction between true love and false love is quite often to be used to depict this possibility. However, it seems to me the phrase 'false love' is capable of describing at least two not-infrequently-found fragilities of the spiritual act of love. The first possible referent is the confusion between love and the immediate community of feeling, emotional infection, emotional identification, etc., discussed in section 1. In such a case, without genuine understanding based on the separate existence of the knower and what is known, it becomes impossible to grasp the real value carried in the object, let alone the higher values.

The second likelihood of false love arising from the process of forming correct _ordo amoris_ in the individual is closely bound up with the _a priori_ hierarchy of values discussed in Chapter 3. Being based on the objective rank order of values, therefore, the idea of a correct and true _ordo amoris_ for Scheler is 'the idea of a strictly objective realm independent of man, the objective order of what is worthy of love in all things' (SPE, 103). However, because one's actual inclinations and acts of love can accord with or be against the rank-ordering of what is worthy of love, loving can be rendered as correct or false. If we love what is more valuable more than what is less valuable, say, we love the value of life more than that of sensual pleasure, then our love is correct. Otherwise, it will be a false love. Therefore, an act of love, which should not be confused with the concrete moral decision\(^\text{21}\), apprehended in a given social ethos as true might be incorrect in terms of the _a priori_ hierarchy of values. A further look at this issue suggests that the phenomenon of false love has something to do with that of infatuation.
The openness to and participation in the world of our spiritual person in the movement of love should be continuous. However, in every transitional stage of this journey the phenomena of slumber or self-infatuation happen quite often and make this movement stop (SPE, 109). It is comprehensible that, as the result of the stagnation of the spiritual-ethical development, the individual is incapable of unceasingly broadening, horizontally and vertically, his awareness of the realm of values, still less the movement towards the Creator, God or Heaven. Concerning the most general form of the destruction and confusion of ordo amoris, infatuation is used to signify both one's being carried away and enraptured by some finite good without regard to his guiding centre of personhood and the delusive character of his behaviour, which is not suitable to indicate the factual restriction brought about by the essential capacities for love (SPE, 114–115). If the value of a finite good or type of good occupies the absolute position in one's actual consciousness of value, it is called absolute infatuation in which the good is absolutized through delusion as an idol and the object with relative value is falsely deified. On the other hand, if the objective rank-ordering of what is worthy of love is broken, it is relative infatuation which happens in accordance with one's actual structure of love and rule of preference, whereby an object of lesser value is preferred over another object of greater value (SPE, 115 & 124). In either case the love is not adequate to the object.

Obviously, the value grasped in the passion of infatuation is over-evaluated so that the objective rank-ordering of what is worthy of love is destroyed or some finite good is absolutized. In her clarification of the relationship between love and infatuation, three possibilities of the latter
are pointed out by Taylor (1976, 155-157). That is, when someone simply desires A,

he may not evaluate A at all; or he may think that no value or even that a dis-value attaches to doing or having A; finally he may think it worth while to do or have A, but because he thinks it worth while to satisfy his desires, either on this occasion or as a general policy.

Strictly speaking, desires of all these kinds might be the deterioration of love, but not the emotional act of love itself or the desires arising out of it. Here, Brown's view seems to be more plausible in saying that what is common to various phenomena of infatuation is 'the agent's inability to scrutinize his or her desire critically' rather than 'the absence of favourable evaluation' (1987, 38-39). In other words, the grasp of some sort of value in the development of individual ordo amoris might invite the whole involvement of the person concerned so that he is incapable of spiritually seeing other sorts of values continuously. Especially, the failure inherent in the infatuation with a given social ethos or with some ideology ultimately lies in the stagnation of the movement, but not only in weakness of will, for which the cultivation of heart is directly responsible.

Before exploring the probable relationship between the educational profession and the spiritual emotion of love in the next part, I would like to summarize the main characteristics of the person discussed in the preceding parts as follows, in which love plays a pivotal role. That is, the person as a genuine lover should manifest pre-reflective life as well as reflective life, form second-order desires and volition as well as first-order desires, establish subject-subject relations as well as subject-object
relations with others, be an intentional self rather than an ecstatically immersed self, perform social acts as well as singularizing acts, possess situation-intuiting capacity as well as means-end calculating capacity, behind all of which is his or her correct *ordo amoris* regarded as the consummation of the development of the person.

Firstly, the pre-reflective life mainly refers to the field of our affections or emotions, including feelings and desires, while the reflective life refers to that of our volition or will. It is through presentation or articulation that the contents of the former become those of the latter. As a matter of fact, both pre-reflective life and reflective life are included in the whole life of the person. It is worth noting that, in the process of our volitional reflection on what has happened in pre-reflective life, the openness of love circumscribes the possible extent our reflective power can examine.

Then, in addition to the gratification of immediate desires, the person is capable of forming second-order desires in an intentional self-evaluation of first-order desires. In view of the intentionality inherent in emotional functions and acts, I think that when love is directed to first-order desires, second-order desires can be brought out and become second-order volition. Surely, the formation of second-order volition presupposes the existence of preference-hierarchy and immanent reflexivity, which enable an agent to reflect on and identify him/herself with one of the possible conflicting desires.

Thirdly, in the process of development, a human being is able to examine himself and acquire self-consciousness. With the increase of self-consciousness, man not only goes beyond the primitive 'we-feeling', in
which self-consciousness is identified with and submerged below the consciousness of the cosmos or the community, but also has the ability to view others as subjects or objects. In this case, the person is required to establish I-Thou relationships with others, but not I-It relations. Moreover, this awareness of differentiation is obtained through emotional intentionality rather than intellectual inference or external casual explanation. Actually, in recognizing the existence of the other person and his individuality, the act of love enables us to see others as subjects with dignity and the status of ends in themselves, rather than as inanimate or commercial objects or the instruments for other aims.

Fourthly, the person localizes himself in a given society or culture and adopts his positions toward knowledge, Nature, etc. Being acculturated in a tradition, before he can critically examine the contents of his consciousness, his views on values, knowledge, the world, etc., have been formed and been taken for granted like the sediments in rivers. On the one hand, the inherited legacies make the meanings inherent in his intentional relationship with the intended objects intelligible. On the other hand, they become the objects of our intentionality. Therefore, the person is not only an ecstatically immersed self encumbered by the established social customs and ethos, but also an intentional self who can intentionally participate in and even step back in examining the presuppositions behind these legacies. In the becoming process of self-realization, the meanings of values grasped in love can lead us to commit ourselves to or to renounce the status quo.

Fifthly, according to the intentional essence of the person's acts, the directions of these acts could be toward a possible community, toward an
individual self or indifferent (FORM, 521). In the singularizing acts such as self-love, scrutinizing one's conscience, etc., the intentional object is the individual self. While the social acts like promising only find their fulfillment in a possible community. It can be said that, because the intentional directions of love are toward both the individual self and the social unit, the person possesses both the individual consciousness and the collective consciousness.

Last, but not least, in the two different levels of the person's life are two different cognitive capacities. By means of the intentional function of emotions, the person can intuitively and immediately perceive the meaning of values in the pre-reflective level. By contrast, the main cognitive model used by him in volitional reflection is discursive choice, judgement, inference, etc. What a person should possess includes situation-intuiting capacity as well as means-end calculating capacity. However, the perception of values engaged in love can become the basis and motivation for the consequent means-end deliberation.

Therefore, *ordo amoris* in the person refers to at least three interrelated qualities of the human heart, as part of the whole connotation of spirit. First of all, an individual's *ordo amoris* means his/her preference-hierarchy, which can be grasped in the stirring of intentional acts and becomes one of the important foundations of value judgements. Secondly, *ordo amoris* implies our openness or receptivity to the world, which provides human beings with the emotional awareness of what is significant for human life. Finally, the non-objectifying reflexivity is immanent in *ordo amoris*, which makes possible continuous reflection on our desires and the attitude of participation. In other words, the
cultivation of correct *ordo amoris* requires human beings to possess all of the above qualities, at which education should aim as well.
NOTES

2. The distinction between the deep-seated state of mind and superficial states of emotions will be explored further in Chapter 8 section 1.

3. Cf. Chapter 4 section 2 and Chapter 5 section 1.

4. Cf. Chapter 2 section 3. The main difference between bestowed dignity and appraised dignity lies in their various bases of values recognized. That is to say, the foundation of the former is the recognition of the intrinsic value, which is understood in Chapter 2 as being based on the love of God and bestowed on all people, while the basis of the latter lies in the appraisal of certain qualities found in certain people.

5. Cf. Chapter 2 section 2 and Chapter 1.


7. Cf. Chapter 4 section 1.

8. Cf. Chapter 1 sections 3 & 4 and Chapter 2 section 2.


11. Cf. Chapter 4 note 5 and Chapter 5.


15. The typical case of how an individual's *ordo amoris* affects his or her moral tenor or view of the world can be found in Scheler's description of the exemplary person such as *the saint, the genius, the hero, the leading spirit* and *the bon vivant*, which separately correspond to the ranks of the holy or religious values, mental or cultural values, nobleness or vital values, the useful and what is agreeable (FORM, 585; PSV, 141). On the other hand, the functionalization of social ethos in different cultures can be found in Scheler's discussion of some examples of actual ethos such as Prussian ethos, Franciscan ethos, the ethos of modern industrialism and so on (REST, 138~149; SYM, 87~89).


18. Cf. The distinction between the *Sosein* and the *Dasein* in Chapter 3
section 3. Namely, what is known is ideal objects such as values and their interrelationships rather than empirical entities.

19. Cf. Chapter 4 section 2 and note 6 and Chapter 5 section 1.


22. It is commonly suggested that in the discussion of the relationship of love, instead of the development of individuality of the lover or the beloved, the loss of self is involved. If the self concerned disappears, we can further enquire whether this is a matter of handing over oneself and being emotionally identified with the other or a matter of transcending oneself in order to participate in the other. Although the former is often understood as love, it might better be recognized as emotional identification or infatuation discussed in sections 2 and 4.
Part III: Love in Education

Chapter 7 Autonomy and love
7-1. Three conceptions of autonomy
7-2. The status of emotions in the activities of autonomous mind
7-3. Love and autonomy
7-4. Autonomy in education

Chapter 8 The reexamination of the education of the emotions
8-1. Mind
8-2. Reason
8-3. The nature of the emotions
8-4. The education of the emotions

Chapter 9 The pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love
9-1. The main features of the teacher-pupil relationship in school
9-2. Authority in education
9-3. The authority of the teacher
9-4. The pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love
Part III: Love in education

Hitherto it is understood that the feeling of love is the emotional act of the heart arising from the spiritual person. Moreover, individual *ordo amoris*, as a selective mechanism of value-quality, rules the occurrences of passions and affects in determining a person's rule of preference and what will be loved. In view of this feature, love recognized as an emotional act rather than a function¹ is similar to dispositional feelings rather than to occurrent feelings, in terms of contemporary discussion about human emotions². In other words, insofar as this intentional disposition is continuously functionalized in human nature, our spiritual eyes are capable of seeing the ever-higher values in objects, namely, constantly perceiving and interpreting objects in the light of higher values. Due to this edifying and uplifting action, human beings are able to unfold their nature and be receptive to their own self, to others, Nature, knowledge, transcendent objects, etc. On the other hand, although the potentiality of the unfolding of spirit is inherent in human nature, it is only in the relation of love that the person can gradually develop the disposition to love and to be continuously open to the various fields of values, and here I believe education plays a central role.

From the previous discussion about the essential meaning of love, a different relation of affection to cognition and volition emerges. For instance, in emotional intentionality the ideal objects of value and their essential relationships are comprehended. The intervention of volition can only indirectly influence the autonomy of emotional life, or may even
impair spiritual feelings. Through the relationship of love the deepest understanding and growth of the person is fulfilled. Thus, considering the significance of love in unifying the person-as-lover and values, one way to show the centrality of love to the educational profession will be to examine in Chapter 7 the connection of love and autonomy (the etymological elements of which are 'auto', self, and 'nomos', norms or principles), regarded as one educational aim or ideal. After that, the education of the emotions is going to be reexamined in Chapter 8 as the result of the recognition of the position of love in the stratification of human emotions. Finally, in Chapter 9, a genuine educational relationship and pedagogical love will be differentiated from other interpretations of love discussed in Part I, as the foundation of the actualization of ordo amoris.

NOTES

1. This note is printed as Note 1 to Chapter 7; see p. 237.
2. This note is printed as Note 2 to Chapter 7; see p. 237.
Chapter 7  Autonomy and love

The core meaning of the spiritual person is to be open to and participate in the world in love. The etymological connotation of autonomy, on the other hand, contains 'auto', self, and 'nomos', norms or principles. I wonder whether the commonly debated ideal of the autonomous person is the same as the person-as-lover? In reviewing the debates on autonomy in an educational context, it seems to me that some main issues are raised, around which the key points of different accounts appear. They are, for instance, what the conception of autonomy connotes and whether emotions are conducive to the realization of truth and morality in the activities of the autonomous mind. In order to understand the significance of love in the cultivation of an autonomous person, four topics will be dealt with in this chapter in turn: three conceptions of autonomy; the status of emotions in the activities of the autonomous mind; love and autonomy; and autonomy in education.

7-1. Three conceptions of autonomy

In recent years, autonomy regarded as one educational aim or ideal is still a popular and debatable issue which has caught the attention of many writers. One of the two main reasons for this lasting debate is closely relevant to the western social situation (Dearden, 1972, 449; 1975, 16; Aviram, 1995, 62). Another more important reason, I think, has something to do with the obscurity and uncertainty of this concept.
In his argument about the compatibility between autonomy and commitment, Aviram tries to categorize autonomy into three conceptions, i.e., the rationalistic model, voluntarist model and rationalist-voluntarist model. Here I am going to discuss three different but related conceptions of autonomy, that is, reflective autonomy, pre-reflective autonomy and Aviram's rationalist-voluntarist model of autonomy. In what follows the inappropriateness of Aviram's subsuming Callan's pre-reflective autonomy under his rationalist-voluntarist model of autonomy will be pointed out.

1) Reflective autonomy
Appealing to the capacities of self-direction and choice, Dearden's conception of autonomy is typical of reflective ones. Without depending on others, an autonomous agent must be independent-minded and is in a condition of 'self-determination', 'self-government' (1972, 452 & 459). By the same token, it is said that, without reference to 'his own activities of mind,' what the autonomous person thinks and does can not be explained (1972, 453). The most important of the activities mentioned by Dearden are choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, judgements, plannings or reasonings. Obviously, this sort of autonomy happens in our volitional field.

In contrast to autonomy, at least two possible sorts of heteromony are recognized by Dearden (1972, 454; 1975, 8). When being, 'consciously or unconsciously, passive or submissive toward compulsion, conditioning, indoctrination, expectations or an authority unfounded on his own recognition of its entitlement,' he is governed by others and becomes the first kind of heteronomous person. Secondly, if being governed by factors which seem to be in himself, but which are actually external to his activity
of mind, then he is heteronomous. These factors include 'the various forms of psychosis and perhaps also neurosis, together with physiologically based addictions and derangement.'

Three points should be noted in Dearden's discussion of reflective autonomy (1972, 453–454, 457; 1975, 8–9). Firstly, a necessary condition of autonomous thought and action is origination, but not originality. What is essential in autonomy is 'motivational independence,' rather than whether to follow conventions and authorities or to co-operate with others. Secondly, what the autonomous person thinks and does is in the important areas of his life. Finally, the criteria for choices, judgements, etc., are subject to second-order deliberation and revision.

Emphasizing the volitional power of 'self' in thinking and action, Dearden's reflective autonomy is questioned from the following sides. Wilson, for example, doubts whether Dearden's autonomous individual can make all reasonable decisions for himself. He points out that people could 'do things for themselves' when they are bloody-minded or stiff-necked or just stupid (1977, 101). With regard to all matters in our life, sometimes we should submit to others' advice. In view of the cases where 'it is silly to do things for oneself and it is sensible to obey orders,' Wilson reminds us to give equal weight to thinking for ourselves and being obedient and properly submissive (1977, 108 & 110). I think proper obedience and blind obedience should be distinguished from each other. On the other hand, once morality and truth are taken into account (as discussed in the following sections), various virtues, among which autonomy is only one, should balance each other in education.
In observing how an autonomous person thinks and acts, it can be immediately found that some other activities such as wants and desires can not be cut off from choices, judgements, etc. Dividing an entire autonomous action into discovery, forming of opinions and wants, and overt action, Telfer points out that choice, which plays the crucial role in Dearden's reflective autonomy, does not appear in all these three activities (1975, 19~20). In fact, deliberation does not necessarily give rise to desires, while autonomous wants and desires are formed but not chosen (1975, 22 & 25). Although Telfer takes the activities of our pre-reflective life into consideration, as Stone also notices (1990, 275), the positive contribution our emotions, feelings and wants could make to autonomy is still ignored.

From the viewpoint of the motivational aspect of human choice, Bonnett criticizes reflective autonomy for being yoked to critical rationality and leaving out too much that men should concern themselves with (1978, 56~57; 1994, 124~127). In terms of care as the propelling momentum of understanding, human beings are concerned to establish a personally meaningful relationship with the world. However, the ways we show our concern are not only through reflection and conscious choice or the giving and criticizing of reasons, but also in our perception, interests, aspirations etc. By the same token, Bonnett proposes that the discussion of autonomy should include our pre-reflective life, which is closely relevant to how we come by our meanings, beliefs and values. Additionally, both inauthentic life and non-authentic life have a harmful impact on autonomy.

Either Dearden's 'motivational independence' or Bonnett's 'motivational aspect of human choice' alludes to the significance of human emotions,
feelings or desires. In examining the incompleteness of Dearden's autonomy, Stone states 'feelings, emotions and the like must therefore play some positive role---they cannot function merely as possible impediments to autonomy' (1990, 273). Nevertheless, Stone's 'positive role' means the necessity of referring to feelings, emotions and the like in explaining autonomous thinking and action (1990, 282). In fact, it can be imagined that, in order to bring out the positive role of emotions, feelings, etc., firstly the concept of autonomy might be expanded to cover our pre-reflective life. Apart from that, the motivational function and cognitive feature of emotions should be clearly recognized. In Callan's pre-reflective autonomy, these two revisions seem to be found.

2) Pre-reflective autonomy

It is interesting to notice that, in showing unreflective goodwill toward the persecuted, Callan's spontaneous rescuers of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe just feel they have to help without deciding among alternatives (Callan, 1994, 36-37). In this case, what constitutes the autonomous self is the altruistic moral concern which employs reflective powers for its distinctive ends.

The reason why autonomy on Callan's conception 'entails a disposition to frame the will in the light of the truth about who we are and the circumstances in which we must live, as well as a developed ability to discern the relevant truth' is the cognitive role played by emotions (1994, 41). In other words, emotions could promote depth of moral understanding and commitment to felt demands in concrete situations, for instance, the good of the persecuted. In the light of a determined fidelity to the truth or the good, emotional awareness can foster our moral
reflection as well. This understanding and commitment can, moreover, lead us to moral behaviour. That is to say, besides their cognitive role, emotions play a motivational role in autonomous thinking and action.

In comparison to pre-reflective autonomy, reflective autonomy pays too much attention to our reflective consciousness. As a result of this one-sided picture of human nature, the 'self' of the autonomous person is disconnected from the source of his life and alienated from himself and community (Dunlop, 1986, 154~157). For example, Heydrich in Weil's *Mendelssohn is on the roof* is so intoxicated with the sense of mastery and control that he completely loses his open-mindness to and imaginative appreciation of others' good (Callan, 1994, 49).

However, one possible danger one may find in pre-reflective autonomy is how to avoid being imprisoned in the gratification of immediate impulsiveness or being subject to Stone's inconsistent desires and 'self-destructive desires' (White, 1982, 50, 56~57; Stone, 1990, 276). Unlike immediate impulsiveness or desires, Callan's commitment, both revocable and irrevocable, allows room for and is subject to possible critical challenge and reflection (Callan, 1994, 41~42).

3) Rationalist-voluntarist model of autonomy

In order to defend the compatibility of autonomy and commitment, Aviram subsumes both Callan's view and Mill's view under his voluntarist-rationalist model. With regard to the connotation of this autonomy, he says
the desires or commitments of the self are conceived of as preceding reflection and as constitutive of the self's identity; at the same time they are conceived of as subject to alteration by rational reflection for the sake of the maximal well-being of the individual in given circumstances.---commitment, reflecting one's pre-reflective and (in Sandel's terms) encumbered identity and desires, is not only allowed but actually required by autonomy (1995, 64).

The first inappropriateness of categorizing Callan's autonomy into this model, I think, lies in the different meanings of 'commitment.' For Aviram, commitment is mainly identified with 'a natural consequence of a human desire,' or the object to be evaluated and rationally reflected on (1995, 67~68 & 72, n5); whereas Callan's commitment implies 'fidelity to the truth' or 'fidelity to the good.' For instance, in Aviram's discussion of the compatibility of institutional autonomy and psychological autonomy, one's desires or commitments of, say, marriage, become the objects of reflection and rational evaluation. However, in Callan's version of autonomy without alienation, commitment involves a spirit of fidelity to the truth or the good, in view of which a will can be formed without deliberately meditated choice (1994, 41~42). In other words, the recognition of the cognitive capacity of human emotions in our pre-reflective life constitutes their fundamental dissimilarity.

The second inappropriateness seems to be relevant to the status and the possible influence of control in autonomy. Aviram's view on the differences between 'permanent control', 'overall control' and 'control in principle' is based on 'what to control,' 'how long to control' and 'when to control.' In the case of 'permanent control', for instance, the individual is
'always' in control of 'all his/her major activities' with 'pre facto' rational premeditation and 'post facto' rational reconsideration.' Therefore, his rationalistic model presupposes 'overall control,' which is distinct from 'permanent control' in that, instead of 'always being in post facto control,' the 'eventual' re-evaluation necessitated by 'prima facie' good reasons' for doing so is required. And the rationalist-voluntarist model presupposes 'control in principle,' which requires only that 'the individual intends to submit any of his/her major actions to rational criticism if prima facie good reasons for this occur, and adhere to the implications of this criticism' (Aviram, 1995, 65).

On the other hand, the point Callan has in mind about control is the structure of autonomy, that is, what the volitional control in pre-reflective autonomy is. Especially, when we wholeheartedly stick to 'self-control' as part and parcel of reflective autonomy, it is doubtful whether we can maintain our receptiveness and acquire understanding or insight out of emotional awareness'. Although Aviram also alludes to desires, interests or commitments as 'a given' and to the question of the origin of the individual's will, it seems to me, his discussion of control in autonomy is different from Callan's.

7-2. The status of emotions in the activities of autonomous mind

Behind these three different conceptions of autonomy are some common concerns. What kinds of 'his own activities of mind' should be referred to in explaining a person's autonomous thinking and action? Concerning this question, in accordance with the location of self in autonomy, i.e. pre-reflective life or reflective life, there will be different answers. From the
viewpoint of the whole person, human emotions should have something to
do with personal autonomy. But positive or negative? Before exploring
the connection of love with autonomy, these prior concerns are going to
be dealt with.

1) The activities of mind
What sorts of activities of mind are involved in autonomous thinking and
action? The first impression we may have is 'choices, deliberations,
decisions, reflections, judgements, plannings or reasonings' as advocated
by Dearden in his reflective model. For instance, if Socrates' action of
accepting the death sentence, instead of escaping, is described as
autonomous, then the explanation of his autonomous thinking and action
could be made clear in terms of the above activities. Suppose Socrates
has two options, namely to accept or to escape, what are the possible
processes of mind in making his choice? He may deliberate about the
different consequences of these two options, reflect on the different bases
of legitimacy implied in these two options, reason that to accept the
sentence is better than to get away from it and make a decision to choose
it.

What is important and implicit in these activities is the full involvement of
our own mind. In other words, what is significant is 'how it came about
that the views, wants, choices or opinions came to be his,' (Dearden,
1975, 8) rather than the contents of autonomous thinking and action.
Another noteworthy aspect of 'the full involvement' is the state of mind
when the autonomous person chooses, deliberates, decides, reflects,
judges, plans or reasons. At least, he should not be governed by others as
people are in the cases of conditioning, indoctrination etc., and should not
be 'compulsively determined by dissociated elements within himself' (Dearden, 1975, 8). However, it seems to me that what is more germane to this issue is the awareness of the self-value of the person or the capacity of reciprocal self-awareness discussed in Chapter 5.

The kernel of reflective autonomy implicit in the aforementioned activities is 'self-origination' or 'motivational independence.' However, once our pre-reflective life is recognized as at least equally as important as reflective life, the activities of mind happening in the former should not be overlooked. On the other hand, unless engaging in purely theoretical thinking, the objects the above activities are directed to have something to do with our wishes, desires, wants, feelings, emotions etc. The activities of mind concerning 'self-origination' or 'motivational independence' should extend to our desires, feelings, emotions etc., which are more relevant to heart than discursive reason as Pascal points out. Moreover, in Socrates' case, the durational phenomena of his deliberation, reflection, reasoning and decision-making should be penetrated and unified by some unity of meaning of the spiritual acts determined by his ordo amoris.

The fact that human beings are born with natural desires and wants is indisputable. More importantly, there is no likelihood of satisfying all of them at the same time in a given situation. Thus a reflective self-evaluation of the first-order desires and simultaneously an effective desire that will or would move a person all the way to action are required for living well. Nevertheless, the reflection on first-order desires and the formation of second-order desires should be based on the person's ordo amoris which entails at least the preference-hierarchy, the openness or receptivity to the world and the non-objectifying reflexivity summarized at
the end of Chapter 6. Put in an other way, so far as pre-reflective life is taken into account, the autonomous person's activities of mind should take root in his correct *ordo amoris*, not only in Frankfurt's volitional commitment or Taylor's strong evaluation.'

Here one question can be raised: that is to say, can our will be formed only via choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, judgements, plannings or reasonings? Obviously, the answer is negative. In our emotional awareness, our understanding can be deepened and our will can be made according to the felt demands in concrete situations, for instance, the good of the persecuted in the case of Callan's spontaneous rescuer. In the state of fidelity to the truth or the good, our will becomes obedience to reality and could be formed without any choice. On the other hand, without the moral vision as the result of moral imagination and moral effort, the choice could become outward movement and the true person be identified with empty choosing will (Murdoch, 1970, 35-37 & 40). In other words, once the formation of will is subsumed under the activities of mind of the autonomous person, emotional activities such as faithful perception, receptiveness, etc., should be paid close attention.

In the above discussion, actually, the distinction between evaluation or perception and choice or judgement is implied. That is to say, what is perceived or evaluated via the cognitive function of emotions 'gives' judgement or choice its objects (Vetlesen, 1994, 87-88 & 164; Callan, 1994, 42). Meanwhile, our emotional comportment of value-ception in pre-reflective life, which is fundamentally contingent on individual *ordo amoris*, precedes and influences the direction of judgement and choice. This nuance can also be made out from the operation of emotion-steps in

215
Plato’s value-promoting labor, viz. the collaboration between *nous* and *eros*, in Pascal’s observation of heart as the seat of the faculties of the soul, whether discursive, volitional, affective, or intellectual, or in Confucius’s *jen*, general virtue or perfect virtue, as the invisible foundation of other virtues.

For example, life might be chosen or judged as more valuable than the pursuit of sensual pleasures at the volitional level, while what sort of persons or objects will be perceived as those with the values of life or sensual pleasure in everyday life relies on our capacity of perception or our sensibility to what is worthy. As Vetlesen points out, the failure of moral behaviour does not necessarily occur in the level of thinking or judgement, but in that of emotional perception, which determines a certain way we see the situations of others. For instance, Eichmann, the SS officer, not only kept calm face to face with survivors in the courtroom, but also, according to the report (Vetlesen, op. cit.), perceived the victims and the survivors as ‘an abstract category, a category consisting not of persons but of cases’ or ‘figures, statistics, administrative tasks,’ rather than as fellow beings. Obviously, the attitude adopted by the SS officer is the objective one, which makes person-person or I-Thou relationships impossible, rather than the attitude of involvement or participation. In comparison to Callan’s spontaneous rescuers, it is clear that how to evaluate or perceive is different from, even more important than, how to choose or judge in autonomous thinking and action.

So far, I think, ‘What sorts of activities of mind are involved in autonomous thinking and action?’ can be answered. Take Socrates as an example once more. Supposing his action of accepting the death sentence
is autonomous, then the reference only to 'choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, judgements, plannings or reasonings' is obviously insufficient for its explanation. Firstly, his mind should be fully involved in these activities in the above sense. More deeply and fundamentally, in connecting his action with his desires, feelings and emotions, the formation of his autonomous will should be at least based on his preference-hierarchy, his openness or receptivity to the world and the non-objectifying reflexivity implied in his ordo amoris, due to all of which Socrates could evaluate or perceive the action of accepting as more valuable or better than that of escaping. In other words, 'his own activities of mind' referred to in explaining autonomous thinking and action should cover what happens both in our pre-reflective life and in our reflective life.

2) The status of emotions in the activities of autonomous mind
Given that autonomous thinking and action involve our desires, feelings, emotions etc., then what are their status and their criteria for autonomy? Thus far, it is clear that the above three conceptions of autonomy contain different accounts of the role of emotion. Paying little attention to pre-reflective life, Dearden's model of autonomy only paints a negative picture of emotions, namely the reactional or passively produced emotions. With regard to this sort of description, Stone already pinpoints its failure to give an adequate account of the possible contributions emotions, feelings and wants could make (1990, 271 & 273). On the other hand, Callan's pre-reflective autonomy recognizes the role emotions could play in the revelation of the truth. Nonetheless, I think, the likely impediments to autonomy caused by emotions as well should not be overlooked. Here, Scheler's view on emotional states, emotional
functions and emotional acts, discussed in the previous part, will be referred to for the sake of understanding the status of emotions in autonomy.

The two possible sorts of heteronomy mentioned by Dearden give us the impression that emotions are hindrances to reaching autonomy. The conditions of being heteronomous such as 'compulsion, conditioning, indoctrination, unfounded expectations' or 'psychosis and neurosis,' for instance, have heavy overtones of emotions (1972, 454; 1975, 8). Moreover, consider some of Dearden's phrases concerning human emotions: 'all were absorbed in immediate reaction and were carried along by passively produced emotions' or 'preferring to be carried along by the mood of the group or a crowd' (1972, 455 & 463; 1975, 14). In Dearden's opinion, these above emotions distract us from autonomous activities of mind and confine us to heteronomy.

The first immediately perceived issue is whether Dearden's account of the nature of emotions could be appropriate to all kinds of emotion. Put otherwise, we can think about whether all human emotions are reactional or passively produced emotions. It seems to me that what is presented by Dearden is emotional states without intentionality. Consider the behaviour of helping others. We can imagine that it could arise out of emotional infection, emotional identification or sympathy. As is the case under hypnosis, others' states of feeling can be transferred to us. In this case, no intrinsic meaning is understood by the helper except the outer behaviour of helping. Even in the case of emotional identification discussed more in Chapter 6, due to the eclipse and loss of the individual's own self, his behaviour is without any self-perceived meaning. By
contrast, emotional functions imply, to a certain extent, the existence of the agent's self and his receptiveness to others. Therefore, it can be said that not all sorts of emotions are impediments to being autonomous.

Regarding the status of emotions in autonomy, we should clarify whether what is referred to is emotional states, emotional functions or emotional acts. Plainly, emotional states such as Dearden's passively produced emotions, which could lead us to behave mechanically, should be examined and then rejected as obstacles to autonomy. When being faced with others' opinions, gossips, fashions, etc., it is easy to lose ourselves in the emotional states transferred from others or in our total identification with others. In such an instance, the contents of one's thought or action have nothing to do with 'the full involvement of our own mind' required as the condition of autonomy. Moreover, the corollary of submerging ourselves in emotional states is the inauthentic expression of self. Being confronted with the issues of values, the inauthentic individual may blindly oppose or comfortably accept common norms or opinions (Bonnett, 1978, 58; Cooper, 1991, 19). Similarly, in interpreting Scheler's view on the person, Frings points out the 'mode of anonymity' of the person in which the individuality of the person disappears in the psychic contagion of a mass (1972a, 76~77).

However, with regard to emotional functions and emotional acts, what is the status of emotions in autonomy? Thus far, what the self in autonomy 'owns' is not only reflective activities of mind like choice, judgement, etc., but also pre-reflective ones such as desires, feelings, emotions etc. Additionally, the self should be aware of the meanings inherent in those activities. From this viewpoint, emotional function and especially
emotional acts are of crucial importance for autonomous thought and action. The reason is that, apart from the involvement of self, they can offer us access to others' weal and woe. The altruistic moral concern of Callan's spontaneous rescuers or Eichmann's total indifference to Jews relies on the flourishing or atrophy of emotional functions and emotional acts. Even though the abilities of judgement and reasoning are equal, emotional functions and emotional acts could determine whether a person respects the value of life and saves the persecuted, or sees the Jews as subhuman and massacres them. Emotional functions and emotional acts, then, are located in the core of autonomy.

In advocating the necessity for some restrictions on desires, feelings, emotions etc., Stone mentions self-destructive desires, whose problem is that 'one person's self-destruction may be another person's path to enlightenment' (1990, 276~277). However, here what interests me is the concept of 'self-destruction.' It is in accordance with human nature, I believe, that the human self unfolds itself toward various realities including oneself, others, the world, knowledge, etc. and thus forms meaningful relationships with them. Then self-destructive desires mean desires to isolate a human being from the objects to which his consciousness is directed. The aforementioned atrophy of emotional functions and emotional acts is, I think, one sort of self-destruction. For instance, due to the failure of participation in vicarious feeling, the cruel person takes pleasure in the enlargement of others' pain. Furthermore, apathy could be regarded as the entire numbness and death of life, let alone the unfolding of self and establishing of meaningful relationships with realities. In these cases, the agent dehumanizes both himself and
others. As a result, 'self-destructive' desires or feelings are by no means possible bases of autonomous thought and action.

What, then, is the status of emotions in autonomy? Now it is obvious that the answer varies depending on the kind of emotion investigated. If what is at issue is emotional states, by which we could be carried away, then sensible feelings, namely bodily sensation without intentionality, should become the object of emotional functions and acts or the object of reflection. On the other hand, emotional functions and emotional acts lie at the root of autonomy. The reason is that they can provide us with access to various realities and ergo the resultant emotional awareness can promote reflective power. Moreover, with regard to relating possible criteria employed by the autonomous person to the field of desires, feelings, emotions, etc. (Stone, 1990, 276), two points, I think, can be considered: to what extent the self is involved in these activities and to what extent these activities reveal the truth or the good to us. In view of these two points, sensible feelings and 'self-destructive' feelings can not constitute the foundation of autonomy.

It is understandable that, due to the undue attention paid to the reflective level, the decision made in reflective autonomy lacks emotional receptiveness to the truth or the good. Nevertheless, even on the pre-reflective level, emotional awareness and determined fidelity do not always guarantee that what is perceived is the truth or the good in itself. The ground for this gap lies in the fact that autonomy and the truth or the good belong to different categories. Autonomy refers to the condition under which our mind operates, while the truth or the good refers to the objects or the achievements of our cognition or our practices. Therefore,
what the autonomous person thinks and does is not necessarily morally
good or true.

Once our emotional life is given at least equal weight, two fundamentally
different attitudes toward the good and the true can be found separately in
reflective autonomy and pre-reflective autonomy. Through the
intentionality of emotional functions and emotional acts, we can
immediately perceive the meanings of value concerning our situation or
objects, as in Scheler's value-ception and the feeling of preferring or
disfavouring. By the same token, Callan's spontaneous rescuers perceive
the value inherent in the life of the persecuted and prefer to maintain it.
While, in coming to the same action, reflective rescuers may go through
the choice of criteria for judgement, reasoning from different evidences to
possible consequences, the comparison of alternative plans etc. It is not
in dispute that neither what is perceived nor what is judged is necessarily
the true or the good *per se*. Nevertheless, reflection is, as Callan
correctly points out, 'a way of gaining or perhaps retrieving something she
might already have without reflection' (1994, 37). Although reflecting on
and following principles, standards etc., may retrieve or evoke the lost
perception, they are not emotional receptiveness.

If autonomous thought or action is not the truth or the good in itself, then
how to improve on its limitations? Three suggestions can be put forward
here, I think. First of all, the self who perceives, feels, thinks, judges,
chooses etc., should continuously grow up and develop better qualities;
that is to say, what is perceived or judged should become closer to the
good or the truth. This task has something to do with the quality of our
consciousness and the structure of our preference-hierarchy implied in
individual *ordo amoris*. The second important thing is to form a comprehensive concept of autonomy, which could include both reflective life and pre-reflective life. Finally, autonomy as a complex virtue and other virtues, with which autonomy has a close connection, should balance each other. For instance, once our ignorance of special areas of life is recognized, obedience to founded authority is a desirable way to the truth or the good. These suggestions have something to do with the relationship of autonomy to love and its education discussed in the following two sections.

7-3. Love and autonomy

After clarifying the connotation of autonomy, we can proceed to discuss the possible relationship between love and autonomy. So far it is plain that 'the full involvement of mind' in autonomy requires the self, the etymological meaning of 'auto', to maintain his 'ownership' in thinking and action, namely the self should not be in a state of division, confusion, numbness etc. Moreover, the autonomous self should display his emotional awareness and reflective power. With regard to 'nomos', the other etymological element of autonomy, it should be originated in or legislated by the self, even in following conventions and authorities or in co-operating with others. Actually, from the investigation of autonomy and love, the nature of love as general virtue or the foundation of other virtues is more manifest, which is indeed implied already in the expansion of reflective autonomy to pre-reflective autonomy\textsuperscript{12}. 

223
1) Autos

In discussing the status of emotions in autonomy, it was pointed out that, unlike emotional states, emotional functions and emotional acts are located in the core of autonomy. Moreover, thinking or acting out of, for instance, sympathy, love etc., is autonomous in the sense of pre-reflective life. Especially, love is a spiritual feeling of the person and takes possession of the whole of our being. Because the feeling of love originates in the person himself as the subject of spiritual acts, it can be co-executed but can not be objectified. In other words, whenever we love something our selves are wholly involved in this act. In what we love, similarly, our person entirely and authentically manifests its nature and preference-hierarchy. In contrast to the loss of the self in emotional states such as emotional contagion, emotional identification etc., the person in love maintains his unique individuality and autonomy.

Although being able to maintain his self in thinking and action, it is likely that the agent falls into the state of self-division suggested by Laing and Muller. In the development of self, due to the ontological insecurity and nonautonomy, the emotionally dependent man will uncouple his self from his body and yield to feelings of helplessness. On the one hand, he is eager to be seen by others, so as to prove his existence. On the other hand, the sight of others is a threat of engulfment or implosion of his self in any reality. Hence he develops a false self between his body and his 'inner' self. Without the true awareness of self and others, the dialogic and person-to-person relationship is only a mirage. Meanwhile, losing contact with any reality leads to the death and emptiness of this self, namely the divided and unembodied self (Laing, 1969; Muller, 1987,
In this case, what the divided person perceives and judges is by no means authentic and autonomous.

In contrast to the withdrawal, closure and numbness of self, love implies the unfolding of human nature and the transcendence of self toward realities. In the movement of love, our spiritual eyes are open to continuously perceive ever-higher values in the object. It is plain that the false self in self-division is incompatible with and even precisely opposite to the receptiveness of love. Apart from hate, as the final result of self-division, another failure of love is indifference to the objects, including ourselves, at which our consciousness is directed. Whether our desires, feelings, etc. can be correctly perceived plays a vital role in obtaining self-knowledge and becoming a lover of self. In increasing our ignorance, self-division is a hindrance to autonomy. However, in pursuing the integration of self, love could provide us with the accurate perception of self required as the foundation of autonomy.

Self-division leads us to the incorrectness and emptiness of emotional awareness, self-confusion to the disorder of perception. The cause of confusion mainly lies in the chaos or loss of ordo amoris. If a person lacks preference-hierarchy, openness or receptivity to the world, or non-objectifying reflexivity, then when he is faced with conflicting desires, he is incapable of reflecting on, or mindlessly indifferent to evaluating, his own desires and motives. Like the status of Butler’s self-love and benevolence, as the principle of regulating our particular appetites, passions and affections, individual ordo amoris, by means of giving priority to certain kinds of desires, can aid us in resolving conflicting desires and ergo in determining the enjoyment of particular passions. As
a result of his incapability of perceiving and evaluating his own desires, wants, situations, etc., the person at issue will be in a state of ambivalence and uncertainty, which is harmful for his well-being (Campbell, 1979, 170~181), let alone the full involvement of mind and autonomous judgement.

However, the more serious self-confusion, I think, originates in the chaos of *ordo amoris*. Actually, the formation of *ordo amoris* requires at least the emergence of self-consciousness, the awareness of various sorts of values and the continuous prioritization of them. In the relationship of love\(^6\), the individual is encouraged to develop his individuality and self-consciousness. Meanwhile, in the movement of love, he is capable of continuously expanding and perceiving a full richness and abundance of values of different heights and width, which is able to make our autonomous thinking and action more appropriate. Nevertheless, once this movement stagnates as a result of infatuation, the finite good will be regarded as an absolutely final fulfillment and satisfaction. Suppose one's value-horizon is only limited to utilitarian values and agreeable values, he is incapable of perceiving other sorts of values such as vital values, spiritual values etc. On the other hand, the destruction and confusion of *ordo amoris* could bring about *ressentiment* and the resultant value-deception\(^7\). In this case, an object of lesser value, say, pleasure-taking, will be preferred over another object of greater value such as life. Therefore, if individual *ordo amoris* is the precise basis of autonomy, incorrect individual *ordo amoris* is at the bottom of the gap between what is autonomously thought or acted and the truth and the good.
With regard to the self in autonomy, the more positive contribution love can make is to expand the self and then establish subject-subject or person-person relations with others. Whenever others are truly loved, they are regarded as subjects with dignity and the status of an end in itself. In contrast, in a manipulative attitude, they become inanimate or commercial objects or the instruments for other aims. Furthermore, only in this full receptiveness and trust can their mental state and knowledge be revealed to us. Without losing our own individuality, love enables us to participate in the growth of the beloved and assist him in actualizing the ever-higher values visualized in our spiritual eyes by means of inviting him to reach the ideal value-essence that is proper to him (Vacek, 1982, 167–169). We can image what an conception of autonomy without sympathy or especially love will be. Intellectually knowing that we should respect others as an end in itself is compatible with being a solipsist. Again, in order to fulfill an I-Thou relationship, autonomy should be based on love.

In addition to the expansion of self, the self in love ultimately goes beyond itself and unites with the beloved. In the concrete experience of love, we can unite ourselves with the good via beauty, love our friends for their own sake, or wholeheartedly imitate and participate in the love of God or the life-giving of Heaven. In all of these various manifestations of love, the self is open and receptive to the values revealed in the beloved and lives in the fullness of the values of situations such as knowledge, human beings, the world, etc. By contrast, what is first perceived by the egoistic self is his relationship with the object, according to which he selects possible values of situations (FORM, 243–244). It can be said that self-reference is not the same as egocentricity. For example, 'fidelity
to the good or truth' in spontaneous rescuers implies receptiveness and participation, rather than egocentricity. Once again, whether the self can transcend himself and unite with the beloved to some extent relies on whether his *ordo amoris* is correct or not. That is to say, for the sake of transcending himself and participating in others, the autonomous self should cultivate his *ordo amoris* and become the person-as-lover discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

From the perspective of self, love is the foundation of autonomy. Only in love can the potential of self be completely actualized. With the movement of heart and the establishment of individual *ordo amoris*, the self breaks through the barriers of 'false' self and obtains its real perception, which is required as the necessary condition of autonomous thinking and action. Once self-consciousness appears as the result of the call of love, the widening of the value-horizon and the promotion of the height of values in the movement of love enable us to form individual *ordo amoris*, in terms of which first-order desires are evaluated and self-confusion, an obstacle to reaching autonomy, is overcome. Furthermore, the beloved, in the attitude of love, is perceived as a subject with individuality and is willing to reveal his deepest privacy to the lover. Thus, in contrast to the attitude of manipulation or objectification, this attitude of love can be regarded as the fullest involvement and as most autonomous. Most important, whenever participating in and uniting with the truth or the good, autonomous thinking or action is most thoroughly carried out. Obviously, the expansion of self and its transcendence have a close relationship with 'nomos,' another element of autonomy.
2) Nomos

It has been emphasised that what is of vital importance in autonomy is origination rather than originality. Put differently, following conventions and authorities or co-operating with others is compatible with autonomy. However, such kinds of thinking or action should be the result of 'the full involvement of mind' without the aforementioned self-division, self-confusion etc. Presumably, there exist some more universal and stable or *a priori* facts or principles such as Scheler's hierarchy of values discussed in previous parts. To observe them autonomously, by the same token, should be preceded by emotional awareness or self-judgement of the spiritual person. Here my main concern is the role love could play in the process of self-legislation, but not whether there are eternal and universal principles, rules etc. Plainly, the attribution of an individual sense of value or the participation of the agent's will is the main difference between heteronomy and autonomy in following the same convention. Thus this concern is bound up with the origin of will or an individual sense of value as well.

In everyday life, living up to or actualizing the ideal self grasped in preference or in judgement is a laborious and painful task. Being confronted with the problems of values, therefore, it is not unusual for human beings to escape them. For example, two attitudes of evasion mentioned by Cooper (1991, 6-7 & 18) are flippancy and fanaticism, namely 'pre-emptive dismissal of questions of belief and value and wholesale immersion in a viewpoint which does not allow such questions to arise.' Similarly, Bonnett describes one possible inauthentic mode of being when 'one can somehow be determined by external factors, or by losing oneself in the "crowd"' (Bonnett 1978, 58). In such cases, the self
is not necessarily in the state of division, confusion, etc. However, the attitude of evasion or inauthenticity could bring us into entire indifference or apathy. Instead of evasion of and distraction from the questions of principles, rules, etc., the attitude of love is to be open to and to take part in them. With the development of individual *ordo amoris*, the understanding of 'nomos' will be widened and deepened without cessation.

From the process of obtaining and implementing principles, norms, standards, etc., what is the function love could perform in assisting us in progressing from a heteronomous state to autonomy? It is unquestionable that we are born into a human world where there are some given rules of preferring, rules of assessment, morals, norms, mores and customs, etc. Before the emergence of self-consciousness or the attribution of individual meaning into these given social facts, what is taken into consideration is only the possible consequences of obeying or violating these facts, the expectations of significant persons such as parents, teachers, etc. or the whole society. Once our individuality is gradually developed in the atmosphere of love, some parts of these facts will become the intentional objects of our emotional awareness or reflective power. In other words, behind the same behaviours of obeying or violating, the agent could intuitively appreciate, not only causally explain, their intrinsic significances, where his/her self is spontaneously involved. The more one becomes the mature person discussed in previous parts, whose consciousness should be more sensitive to certain matters of significance, the more he becomes autonomous.
Obviously, corresponding to the gradual formation of the person, the
individual attitude toward 'nomos' is continuous participation, instead of
evasion and distraction. In the beginning, with regard to these traditional
facts, the individual is only a parasite, who lives in the will of parents,
educators or anybody else, without his own independent will, still less
Frings' ethical existence or the reciprocal self-awareness of Langford and
Pring. Then the act of love opens us towards individual memory or
traditional culture and history, which has been taken for granted.
Therefore, the full meaning of internalization of 'nomos' does not mean to
externally obey norms, but to integrate them into individual *ordo amoris.*
Apart from emotional receptiveness, for instance, another important
feature implied in this integration is respect for the intrinsic logic of
knowledge. However, this respect is founded not only on empathetic
understanding or sympathetic agreement, but, more importantly, on the
subject-subject attitude of love reiterated in the previous chapters. So far,
it can be said that, besides understanding, in the relation of love, human
beings feel the demand for widening, deepening, respecting the 'nomos,'
including rules of preferring and criteria for judgement. It is also in this
movement of heart in love that human beings gradually come closer to
what is the true, the good and the beautiful, which can prevent an
autonomous person from being a great criminal.

By means of retrieving lost perception and promoting reflective power,
emotional awareness can result in the formation of will or volitional
commitment, the most important condition for autonomy. However, could
love described as the mother of spirit and reason itself offer any different
awareness from general emotional awareness? In previous parts
concerning the essence of love, it was pointed out that 'love enables us to
discover a higher value of objects' or 'in love ever-higher value in the object continuously emerges.' Take Callan's spontaneous rescuer as an example. If his moral tenor consists of indifference or hate, instead of love, then he will not be concerned about the lives of Jews at all or will have the tendency to destroy them as the result of the awareness of lower values in the objects hated. Towards the opposite direction, people with a dispositional emotion of love or altruistic moral concern could perceive a higher value in Jews, namely, the value of their lives, and then make the effort to rescue them. Similarly, out of love the 'nomos' such as principles, rules, norms, etc., will be rectified and improved as in the dynamic relationship between Confucian *jen* and *li*\textsuperscript{21}. In such a case, the notion of will is nearer to obedience to realities than to resolution to do something (Murdoch, 1970, 40). With the aid of love, which awakens both knowledge and volition, the gap between autonomy and impersonal standards is gradually bridged.

To sum up: without love, the full involvement of mind as part and parcel of autonomy is logically impossible. 'The full involvement of mind' presupposes at least two things: individuality of the agent, namely, his own *ordo amoris*, and full participation in or the attribution of individual meanings to the 'nomos.' However, only in the subject-subject relationship of love can individual *ordo amoris* be called forth and matters of 'nomos' be acknowledged with authenticity. Moreover, the attention directed by love, in contrast to indifference or hate, is toward the widening and deepening of the 'nomos.' That is the reason why love, the spiritual continuous act, shortens the distance between autonomy and the truth or the good.
7-4. Autonomy in education

Can autonomy still be one of the educational ideals? If the answer is affirmative, then what sort of autonomy is appropriate and should be proposed in an educational context? In order to see the proper position of autonomy in education, it seems to me, the following points should be taken into consideration: both the pre-reflective level of life and the reflective level of life; the balance of various virtues; the aspects of the true and the good; the education of the emotions; the idea of the educated person and of the person, whose main characteristics are summarised at the end of Part II.

For a whole person, but not a divided one, his activities of mind are not just to make plans, to choose, etc., but also, more importantly, to desire, to feel, to want, etc. Especially, with regard to the full involvement of self in autonomous thinking and action, our pre-reflective life determines whether our self is in a state of division, confusion, evasion, distraction, integration, receptiveness, etc. Plainly, a comprehensive concept of autonomy should include these two levels of life. In other words, initiating pupils into different forms of knowledge or widening the scope of their cognition is insufficient for the successful education of autonomy. Another fundamental aspect of cultivating the autonomous person is the depth of cognition or authentic understanding, in which desires, feelings, emotions, etc., play a vital role. Similarly, apart from the encouragement of reflection on wants, desires, etc., (White, 1982, 57) or the giving or seeking of reasons, the expression of spontaneous concern or the formation of commitments should be given at least equal weight. The ideal autonomous person, therefore, is the one who is capable of basing
his judgements, choices, reasonings, etc., on and even reflecting on what he authentically feels, desires, or wants.

Another important question concerning the education of autonomy is the balance of various virtues. On the one hand, it is obvious that autonomous thinking or action actually presupposes other virtues, without which autonomy itself becomes impossible. These virtues or various qualities of character include honesty with oneself, courage to face unpleasant truths, patience, thoroughness, receptiveness, etc. (Telfer, 1975, 24-25; Callan, 1994, 43). It seems to me that the kernel of autonomy is 'the involvement of self in the formation of will,' or 'the attribution of individual meanings in the legislation of "nomos".' However, autonomy can not exist as an end in itself, that means, there is an intrinsic interdependence between autonomy and other virtues and the ultimate end of all virtues is the unfolding and flourishing of the whole person. On the other hand, if all attention is paid to autonomy and other virtues are ignored, the ideal of autonomy is doomed to fail. For instance, without the cultivation of honesty with oneself or authenticity, it is doubtful whether the self could be fully involved in its thinking or action. Although self-judgement, self-choice, self-government, etc., seem to be more significant in modern society, the education of autonomy or of any virtue should balance and benefit from that of other virtues, and should fundamentally be based on the cultivation of ordo amoris.

It is a fact in our growing up that, before entering the palace of autonomy, we should go through the passage of heteronomy. Nevertheless, there can be cases where it is silly to do things autonomously for oneself and sensible to obey others heteronomously (Wilson, 1977, 101). It goes
without saying that the education of autonomy can not overlook the issue of impersonal standards and the disposition of respect for them. The possible way to fill the gap between what seems to be and what is really the truth or the good is to refine the quality of our consciousness and then to be aware of what is the good and the truth. Actually, as has been discussed in earlier passages, the attention of love can provide us with awareness, which is the pivotal point determining whether we obey or transcend the given 'nomos.' Meanwhile, the attitude of love entails the relationship of person-person, the attitude of respect, to the given or impersonal 'nomos.' In order to foster proper obedience and reduce blind obedience, upon which the formation of our will should be founded, the education of autonomy should take root in the development of individual ordo amoris which is going to be dealt with more in the following two chapters.

The activities of mind involved in autonomous thinking and action contain desires, wants, feelings, emotions, etc. Then one question can be raised: should emotions be considered in the education of autonomy? Emotional awareness could provide us with evaluative information or the meaning of value concerning the situation or objects and then foster reflective power. More importantly, in openness and transcendence of love, our whole person could participate in and unite itself with what is the good or the truth. By contrast, emotional infection or emotional identification prevents our selves from being fully involved in thinking or action and becoming autonomous persons. Destructive emotions such as cruelty, hate, etc., additionally, lead us to dehumanize both ourselves and others by taking pleasure in the expansion of others' pain or destroying others. It can be said that, once pre-reflective life as the root of autonomy is taken
into account, it is plain that how to educate an autonomous person has something to do with the education of emotions, the focus of the next chapter.

The last point which is of vital importance for the ideal of autonomy in education, I think, is whether the autonomous person is the ideal person we would like to cultivate, namely the educated person. If the concept of autonomy is confined to reflective life, then it is similar to Telfer's intellectual autonomy, which is 'concerned with the formation of one's own judgements and the criticism of those of others' (1975, 28). In comparison to the unfolding and flourishing of the whole person, obviously intellectual autonomy is just a small part of educatedness. By the same token, in insisting on the integration of head, hand and heart, Martin (1981, 101~104) suggests that an educated person, according to the ideal, should care about others' welfare as well as having knowledge about them, or should be sensitive to and concerned for both other human beings and the standards immanent in activities. How about extending the concept of autonomy to pre-reflective life? The fundamental difference between the autonomous man and the educated man, Telfer thinks, lies in their basic motivation. The motivation of the former is more self-referring or devoted to personhood in himself or whatever, while that of the latter involves a sense of duty or devotion to truth and beauty as such (1975, 33~34). If the education of autonomy could take root in the development of individual *ordo amoris*, I think, then the above worry could lessen. The person as the final consummation of this development, described at the end of Part II, actually is the ideal of the educated person or the autonomous person.
NOTES


2. The characteristics of both the deep-seated emotional disposition and the episodic feelings will be explored more in Chapter 8 section 1.

3. Most recently, Morgan also tries to sort out the proper place of autonomy in education in terms of the account of being a person (1996, 239~252). Although Morgan's starting point is the traits of a person's identity and his emphasis is on rationality, which is essentially required for coherence in one's identity, his conclusion can be found at the end of this chapter as well. That is to say, if the person is the educated person we hope to cultivate, then being autonomous is only part of being educated. However, given that the 'higher-order' disposition can render all our experiences, including our experiences of our own conscious behaviour, rationally intelligible, the problem is how the more diverse visions are perceived rather than how the events or experiences are organized and made rationally intelligible (Piper, 1985, 184~186 & 197, note 30 & 31). In other words, as well as the disposition to rationality, I think, the movement of heart mentioned in the previous chapters is needed for the integration and expansion of self. This point is going to be discussed in section 3.

4. Cf. Chapter 4 section 3 on the relationship between the volitional intervention and the resultant destruction of intentional feelings.

5. Cf. Chapter 1 section 3.
6. Cf. Chapter 4 section 2, Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 6 section 4.


8. Cf. Chapter 6 section 4 and Chapter 3 sections 1 and 4.

9. Cf. Chapter 1 sections 1, 3 and 4.

10. Cf. Chapter 6 sections 2 and 4, Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 4 section 3.


13. Cf. Chapter 4 section 2 and Chapter 5 section 1.


16. This issue will be explored more in Chapter 9.


19. Three various connotations of respect and their relationships with love
are discussed in Chapter 6 section 2.


Chapter 8 The reexamination of the education of the emotions

From the previous discussion about the essential meaning of love, it is evident that the emotion of love is of the utmost importance for education, including the education of the emotions. If education is understood as the process of expanding and opening the human mind toward realities, then only in the relationship of love can we go beyond ourselves and take part in these realities. As a matter of human development, the acceptance of individuality and independence enables our spirit and reason to unfold gradually. Even where our volition or desirable behaviour is concerned, seeing the ever-higher values in concrete situations can lead to looking for benefits or the actualization of appropriate virtues. Meanwhile, because of the involvement of the whole person and the promotion and expansion of *ordo amoris*, the movement of love determines what sort of emotions can arise in everyday life. If the value of pleasure takes priority over that of life, for instance, the abuse of animals will not cause a sense of cruelty or shame. What my attention will be focused on in this section, then, is to derive the possible implications from the above description of love for the education of the emotions.

The education of the emotions changes its connotation in accordance with our understanding of education and emotions. Whether education is concerned with the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake or also includes the formation of desirable behaviour decides the role emotions could play in education or the tasks of the education of the emotions. On the other hand, whether emotions can be educated or there are ways of educating them depends on the nature of emotions, i.e. whether emotions are only
passive physiological states or also modes of awareness in which subjective effort is involved. More fundamentally, the connotation of the education of the emotions is inseparable from the nature of our mind and reason. In order to examine the education of the emotions, the nature of mind, in which they originate, and their place in mind, should be carefully examined first. Furthermore, because the cultivation of the reasonable person is frequently regarded as one of the goals of education, the education of human emotions necessarily involves the issue of reason. For example, whether the capacities a reasonable person should display are only how to think rather than how to feel, or whether emotions are helpful or harmful for intellectual work. Therefore, mind, reason, the nature of the emotions and the education of the emotions will be dealt with in turn.

8-1. Mind

In the previous chapter it was pointed out that the whole life of the person includes pre-reflective life and reflective life, the field of our affections or emotions, including feelings and desires, and that of our volition or will. One of the vital distinctions between these two levels of life, which is implied in Pascal's distinction between the intuition of heart and discursive reason and has something to do with the education of the emotions\(^1\), lies in the different modes of cognition. By means of the intentionality of our emotions in pre-reflective life, the way to grasp the meanings of situations is to live through or experience them immediately and intuitively. In contrast, in reflective life inference and means-end thinking are what give common access to the province of meanings. For example, with regard to the blush or laughter in the other's face, it could
be understood as shame or joy in the intuitive or in the inferential way. Apart from this, in the pre-reflective mode of awareness, in which the subject-subject or non-objective attitude is adopted, I and You as separate unities with individual identity are able to form a union in an I-Thou relationship. I (You) open my (your) inwardness, not just bodily existence, to you (me), and you (I) correspond and reciprocate. Through the You of the Other, each I becomes complete (Muller, 1987, 168-169). Conversely, in the inferential mode of awareness, the way of understanding others is to make an analogical inference from the self-experienced to the experienced of the other as discussed in Ch. 5 section 2.

After pointing out these two levels of life in the mind, the fundamental importance of emotions for our whole life can be more clearly discussed. Several writers in common notice the essential position, negative or positive, which moods or 'life-feelings' occupy in our life. This affectivity reveals itself as 'a frame of mind' which predisposes us to interpret situations in a certain way or thus 'a tendency to have a certain feeling, a readiness to experience emotions of a more episodic kind' (Peters, 1972, 221 & 475; Vandenberg, 1975, 37-40; Warnock, 1986, 182-183; Dunlop, 1984-a, 47-48 & 1984-b, 250). Three crucial features can be found behind the general state-of-mind. It is deep-seated and lies at the most fundamental level of human existence. Moreover, under the influence of this underlying affectivity, everyday situations will be perceived in a certain light and consequently some sorts of emotions or feelings will arise. Even in the appreciation of works of art, as Hepburn
points out, aesthetic responsiveness depends on a pre-existing joy as well as on art or natural beauty (1972, 498). Thirdly, together with the world itself, our mood co-determines the way and the extent to which the world opens to us. Consider the person whose mood is predominantly resentful (Warnock, 1986, 183). When being dominated by this mood, 'whatever the cause of their mood, everything tends to be taken as a case of injustice; as an object of envy or as a slight'. In other words, this kind of deep-seated and pre-existing resentment 'colours' the whole of our experience. Even though the abilities of reflection and reasoning are in good condition, our mood influences how the world is disclosed to us and the basic direction of our reflection and reasoning.

Considering the fundamental position of moods or 'life-feelings' in our life, the importance of the education of the emotions can be recognized without doubt. Whether children can develop some positive moods or general state-of-mind such as trust, hope, love etc., which are the basis of other superficial and current states of emotions, affects their attitudes toward life and the world. Imagine a person with excellent intellectual capacities of choice, deliberation, decision, reflection, judgement, planning and reasoning, but without any concern or expectation, or even with disgust and resentment, about his life. Obviously, his intellectual capacities may not be used at all or be used to harm his own life. On the other hand, due to the fact that pre-reflective life is essentially different from reflective life, emotion has its own logic, as Scheler claims, and therefore its own way of being educated. In order to cultivate positive moods in people, for instance, the atmosphere of the institutions and the pattern of everyday interaction etc., are obviously more important than merely verbal preaching, judgement or reasoning concerning these moods.
Apart from the dissimilarity in the modes of cognition, the nature of emotional awareness in pre-reflective life is different from that of conceptual thinking. Appealing to experiential facts, it is easy to realize that feelings have a closeness and warmth (Knights, 1983, 13–14). The basic reason for displaying this feature, I think, is the direct or indirect involvement of our ego or person. In the discussion of Scheler's stratification of human emotions, the manners of relatedness of the feelings to the ego or person in each level were pointed out. For example, a sensible feeling is related to the ego in a doubly indirect manner. In correspondence to vital feelings, psychic feeling and spiritual feelings, lived-body-ego, psychic ego and the person itself are separately related to. It is also in our emotional life that others' egos or persons can be directly perceived and the sense of feeling-with or with-ness occurs. In contrast, the feature manifested in intellectual thinking is detachment, coolness and 'impersonal' anonymity. This difference in characteristics explains why emotional life is likely more directly to lead to impulses and to determine the integrity of the whole person than conceptual thinking.

Within these two levels of mind, the types of knowledge we get are dissimilar to each other. Through the intentionality of human emotions, we are able to make direct contact with realities such as objects, persons, values and so on and acquire first-hand, pre-conceptual knowledge. For the sake of expression and communication, this primitive and unverbalised sort of knowledge is articulated in the various symbolic forms of languages, gestures, rituals, works of art etc., and is transformed into conceptual and prepositional knowledge. It is worthy of note that the truth or falsity of knowledge is not dependent on the level of life where it
is obtained. In other words, the refinement of the capacities of feelings and perception does not essentially depend on the improvement of intellectual thinking. Moreover, what is implied in the distinction between 'knowledge of' and 'knowledge about' is that the latter is based on the former, which could provide the contents for the construction of propositional knowledge. By the same token, the education of the emotions could build a sound basis for that of the intellectual. The entire expansion of mind should take both of these two kinds of knowledge, two levels of life, into consideration.

What is the position of love in the human mind? In fact, love and hate are the movements of mind and the order of the former, *ordo amoris*, can determine the basic direction of the human mind. Being located in pre-reflective life, love can be understood as a deep-seated and pre-existing dispositional emotion which influences us to interpret situations in such a way that ever-higher values are grasped. In the movement of ever-higher value-ception, as found in Plato's *eros* and Confucian love, love enables a human being to unfold both his physical nature and spiritual nature. In contrast, once this movement of mind stops or even reverses, the attitude of indifference or hate toward life or any intentional objects is thus formed. The consequence may be the atrophy of vitality or apathy in the attitude of indifference or the destructive attitude in hate, with no possibility of the betterment of life or the positive unfolding of spirituality. Plainly, it is only in the unlimitedness inherent in the movement of love that human nature can be manifested fully and the human mind fully expanded. That means to go beyond oneself and take part in others, to transform selfishness and regard others as another self.
Another important issue concerning the education of the emotions is the relationship between love and the occurrence of other emotions. Two points should be considered here. Firstly, as a spontaneous act, love opens our spiritual eyes to see the ever-higher values in the object loved. In comparison to emotional states and functions, the emotions arising from the relation of love, being based on the whole involvement and openness of the person, are more authentic than those arising from emotional states and functions. Secondly, because of the formation of the selective mechanism, the rules of preference and rejection, individual *ordo amoris* in fact determines what attracts or repulses us and what kind of emotions will arise in everyday situations. For instance, with the formation of the individual's *ordo amoris*, his value-blind affects will be gradually transformed into value-laden passions in which one predominantly looks at the world. Once one loves the philosophy of education, as White points out as well, he will feel pleased, depressed and anxious or indignant about its prosperity, uncertainty or unjust malignment (1984, 237). As a consequence, the promotion of the deep-seated, dispositional emotion of love is of the utmost importance for the expansion of mind and the education of the emotions.

8-2. Reason

The proper use of reason is quite often regarded as one of the aims of education. However, does this goal have anything to do with the education of the emotions? Plainly it depends on the connotation and features of reason, namely, whether emotions are oppositional to or subsumed under reason. Moreover, before reaching the palace of reason, the courtyard of unreasonableness must be passed through. Then, it is
also interesting to consider what is the role of emotions in the process of rationality and what sort of emotional change is implied in it. Finally, could the education of the emotions, especially love, make any contribution to the development of a rational person?

In clarifying what is reasonable or unreasonable, rational or irrational, Peters points out that 'these words suggest the ability to reason in the sense of explicitly employing generalizations and rules in the forming of beliefs and in the planning of action', 'they both presuppose a background of reasoning that the person either actually performed or could have performed' (1972, 209, 215 & 225; 1973, 96). In the background of reasoning, mainly in accordance with which three forms of life are distinguished by Peters from each other, the main characteristic of the life of irrationality is that some beliefs are held or something is done in the face of conclusive evidence, as through some primitive wish or aversion. On the other hand, once reasoning is involved in the agent's belief or actions, he/she is able to live the life of unreasonableness or reasonableness. The main difference between reasonable and unreasonable life lies in whether the basic grounds are sound, proper weight is given to other alternatives, due attention is paid to others' views, etc. Here, there is one significant dissimilarity between being 'unreasonable' and being 'irrational' in that the former is much more a social concept than the latter.

Interestingly, instead of the perspective of levels of life, Rawls makes the distinction between the Reasonable and the Rational in terms of participation in public life. Mainly, Rawls in 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory' contrasts the rational autonomy of the parties in the model-
conception of the original position with the full autonomy of citizens in society (1980, 520-522 & 528-533). It is in the ideal selection of principles of justice and their public affirmation by citizens, viewed as moral persons, of a well-ordered society in every-day life that rationally autonomous agents of construction become fully autonomous. In this partaking in social life, agents, apart from the pursuit of their individual rational advantage, the Rational, must undergo Rawls' *fair terms of cooperation*, namely, the reciprocity and mutuality in benefiting, sharing, etc., the Reasonable (op. cit., 528-533). In this way, the Reasonable forms the framework of constraint within which the rational deliberation of parties takes place. Actually, the subordination of the Rational stands for a feature of the unity of practical reason. On the other hand, the Reasonable presupposes the Rational. That is to say, without the conception of the good and the search for it, there is no sense in social cooperation or in notions of right and justice.

What is the role of human emotions in the unfolding of reason? In order to suggest that the use of reason is a passionate business, three stages of the development of reason are distinguished by Peters, in which both different capacities for reasoning and different types and levels of passion are involved. Firstly, in the life of irrationality, individual judgement is warped or clouded by wishes and aversions linked with primitive, paleological classification and thinking, which lack 'the sense of reality and of causal connexion in relation to the means necessary to obtain what is wished for' (1972, 219-223). With regard to outward behaviour on this level, the involuntary emotional reaction is recognized as 'lacking the co-ordination involved in deliberate action'. In contrast to the transcendence of the here and now regarded by Peters as one of the cardinal features of
reasoning, the life of this level is overwhelmed by the present. Then, the life of unreasonableness, the second level of development of reason, lacks respect for others and is extremely partial and arbitrary so that others' viewpoints are not seriously considered. Being dominated by the urgency or concreteness of the present particular, the unreasonable person frequently suffers from conflicts of desires and is unable to keep to his well-meaning plan. For the reasonable man of the third level, finally, the passions needed are love of system, classification and order, the love of clarity and hatred of confusion, humility towards his own fallibility and towards impersonal standards (Peters, 1973, 75~76 & 91).

Although a special sort of emotions, i.e. rational passions, is mentioned by Peters as the necessary condition of rational thinking, it seems to me that more emphasis is put on intellectual life rather than emotional life. Then the picture of a reasonable person is that of one who has a good ability to choose, deliberate, make decisions, reflect, judge, plan or reason. In such a conception of rationality, the more active role of desires or emotions is not taken into consideration properly. Namely, emotions are considered as either the cause of confusion in judgements or merely the sentiments which are auxiliary to rational thinking. However, once the cognitive or evaluative aspect of emotional acts or functions is recognized, then Peters' view on reason should be examined and extended to the positive contribution of pre-reflective life.

One of the basic presuppositions implied in Peters' conception of rationality, I think, is a Kantian dualism of reason and nature, in which feelings, impulses, desires and inclination are included. Thus, as White also points out, for Peters, 'acting rationally is not to be understood in
terms of satisfying one's wants' which incorporate within them the idea of having reasons for acting (1984, 243). Nevertheless, it is clearly elucidated in the previous discussion that in emotional awareness the inner meanings grasped in situations can become the reason for rational thinking or actions. For instance, there is no reason to regard Callan's spontaneous rescuers of Jews as irrational or wholly unreasonable. In fact, apart from sensible feelings, vital feelings, psychic feelings and spiritual feelings are the modes of awareness in which our inwardness is involved and through which we gain access to reality. More important, deep-seated dispositional emotions can influence how the world is disclosed to us and the basic direction of our reflection and reasoning. The education of the reasonable person, evidently, should take the education of the emotions into account.

Even in Rawls' account of rational and full autonomy, the significance of emotions, especially love, is implied. To begin with, his moral persons are 'characterized by two moral powers and by two corresponding highest-order interests in realizing and exercising these powers' (1980, 525). Actually, either 'the capacity for an effective sense of justice' or 'the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good' is inseparable from our capacity of emotional awareness and its ensuing motivation discussed in section 3. In other words, there is still some distance between the cool cognition of discursive reasoning and the applying and acting from the principles of justice or the seeking of the good. Meanwhile, in order to have 'highest-order' interests as a supremely effective and regulative power, the interests of Rawls' moral persons must form some sort of preference-hierarchy, which makes the highest-order desires different from natural inclination. Nevertheless, the establishment
of preference-hierarchy should be fundamentally based on individual \textit{ordo amoris}'. Thirdly, it has been pointed out that the sense of a shared immediate common good is required for a citizen to identify with the republic. Moreover, this co-experience or we-identity involves emotional awareness of certain values. If Rawls' principles of justice or the pursuit of the primary goods are to become shared political culture, they require emotional solidarity'. Last but not least, Rawls himself concedes that the two important matters of justice between societies, and of our relations to the order of nature and to other living things, are left aside, at least in his 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory' (op. cit., 524). However, these issues are partly discussed in Chapter 6, in which individual \textit{ordo amoris} and social ethos occupy a central place. Evidently, the last two points are germane to the agent's participation in social life as referred to in Peters' conception of reasonableness and Rawls' conception of the Reasonable.

If pre-reflective life could be given at least equal importance, then at least three issues concerning this conception of rationality could be put forward. From the viewpoint of the origin of knowledge, it is through the mode of emotional awareness that reality is directly touched and first-hand knowledge is gained. In other words, the materials to which our reasoning, judgements, reflection, etc., are directed lie deep in our desires, impulses, and feelings. Secondly, once our \textit{ordo amoris} is gradually formed, our desires, feelings and emotions are value-laden rather than value-blind. Even our vital feelings such as health, illness, fatigue and vigor can offer some sort of vital meaning as the direction of our reasoning'. Last but not least, apart from emotional states, the intentionality inherent in emotional functions and acts can provide us with values or meanings concerning situations, without the foundation of which
the manifestation of reason would become instrumental rationality, which signifies a preoccupation with 'How to do it?' rather than 'Why do it?' Actually, the one-sided emphasis of instrumental rationality embodies 'the dissociation of reason from feeling, the celebration of mastery, prediction and control over nature and over others' (Gibson, 1983, 54; Dunlop, 1984-a, 23 & 71). The integrated picture of a reasonable man should be one of both a feeler and a thinker.

Furthermore, given that love is 'the mother of spirit and reason itself, who awakens both knowledge and volition' (SPE, 110)\(^{10}\), the cultivation of love actually is the foundation of the unfolding of reason. From two perspectives this point can be understood. In the process of the development of self, as has been elucidated above, the relation of love makes the emergence and transcendence of self possible. Meanwhile, in terms of openness and participation of self, emotional functions and acts such as sympathy and love etc., enable human beings to perceive the meanings of situations, which can become the end or motivation of our reflective reasoning. On the other hand, love as the spiritual act of the person also determines individual rules of preference and rejection, i.e. the formation of an individual's preference-hierarchy, his openness to the world, non-objectifying reflexivity, etc. Similarly, with the expansion of value-ception in love, the scope and direction of values grasped by the individual can decide the purpose of his reasoning. For instance, if the values of the pleasant are preferred to vital values, then our reasoning unconsciously or consciously will be carried on in the direction of the former more than in that of the latter. As a corollary, individual ordo amoris can be regarded as the basis of the development of reason.
Examining Peters' description of the development of reason, the relationship of love to reason can be understood as well. In the stage of irrationality, what warps or clouds our judgement and dissociates us from the sense of reality is emotional states such as anger, fear, jealousy, envy and lust. Nevertheless, apart from influencing the occurrence of these above states, the movement of love is able to overcome two of the main problems the unreasonable person suffers, viz. conflicts of desires and disrespect for others. The reason is that, in this movement, the other is regarded as a subject and simultaneously the individual preference-hierarchy is continuously reorganized and expanded. Even for the reasonable life, the unceasing openness and participation of the self in love can enlarge the provinces of meanings grasped in emotional awareness which are required in Peters' notion of reason as reasoning, judgement, calculation, plan-making, etc.

Another vital point about the significance of emotions in the unfolding of reason has to do with respect for the status of a subject. In principle, it is undisputed that a rational person should regard others as subjects rather than objects of any sort. Nevertheless, I doubt whether 'the ability to reason in the sense of explicitly employing generalizations and rules in the forming of beliefs and in the planning of action' (Peters, 1972, 209) is the equivalent of the ability to perceive others as subjects. Once emotions are regarded as merely passive states, the evaluative or cognitive aspects of which are neglected, it is highly possible to disregard the latter ability in favour of the former states. This is similar to Hepburn's point that 'a too-exclusive stressing of principle can thwart emotional understanding' (1972, 490–491). As a consequence of the one-sided stress on reflective life, the power of feeling our way into the situation of others will be
damaged. In contrast to the phenomenon of depersonalization or the objective attitude in Strawson's sense, in the person-person relationship of love freedom, independence and individuality are given and received.

8-3. The nature of the emotions

As is elucidated above, the expansion of mind and the bringing up of a rational person relate to the education of the emotions. Nevertheless, one common doubt about emotions is whether they can be educated. Before discussing how to carry out the education of the emotions, the fundamental question should be answered first. Plainly, the answer depends on whether emotions are the sort of things we suffer or we choose. Supposing they can be educated, then how to teach them? Does the fact that emotional life and intellectual life are located in two different levels of mind imply different ways to teach emotions? All of these issues pivot on the nature of the emotions, which also partly influences the tasks of the education of the emotions.

Is there any active quality inherent in emotions, which could be determined by the effort of human subjects rather than be passively aroused by external factors? If human emotions are only something like physical reflexes, then they can be conditioned in accordance with physical laws without the involvement of subjective meanings. However, I think, Scheler's view on the stratification of human emotions is helpful in clarifying that this is not the case. Firstly, human emotions are heterogeneous mental phenomena so that one linguistic term is insufficient to connote one particular kind of emotion happening in different levels of human existence. For instance, when the feeling of pain or suffering is at
issue, it could be sensible pain, pain of the lived body, pure psychic pain or spiritual pain. Then, once emotions are described as entirely passive, obviously they refer to sensible feelings. On the other hand, given the distinction between emotional states, functions and acts, what is passive is only emotional states. Therefore, in pointing out that the term emotion 'is typically used in ordinary language to pick out our passivity', what Peters mostly has in mind, in fact, is emotional states or sensible feelings, but not the whole range of human emotions (1972, 469-470). Being overwhelmed by upheavals or outbursts, our judgements in Peters' level of life of irrationality can be warped, clouded or distorted by emotional states.

Where is the spontaneity of emotions located? Consider the feelings of the lived body, pure psychic feelings and spiritual feelings. Although the ways the person, psychic self and lived-body ego relate to the feelings concerned are different, to some extent these feelings manifest the involvement of human subjects, i.e. subjectivity. Once the structure of the person, psychic self or lived-body ego is altered, for example, the preference-hierarchy or the perceptivity of vitality, the occasions for the occurrence of the feelings at issue such as fatigue, vigor, sadness, bliss and despair etc. will be different. As regards emotional functions and acts, to a certain extent they entail the openness and participation of self, without which there is no likelihood for, say, love and sympathy to happen. More important, I think, the intentional relationship inherent in emotional functions and acts, like the regulating relationship between different principles in Butler's view of human nature, can be directed to emotional states as their objects. That means, in terms of the cultivation
of emotional functions and acts, we are able to adjust emotional states in a different way from the purely intellectual change of beliefs.

The fact that there is spontaneity in our emotions implies that emotions are not only things we suffer, but also things we choose. That is to say, it is also in this active aspect of emotions that the education of the emotions becomes possible. Whereas, because the location of the emotions is in the heart rather than in the head, in pre-reflective rather than reflective life, the term 'choice', commonly understood as one of the reflective and volitional activities, requires further clarification. Suppose someone says 'I choose to love or to sympathize with someone'. The first impression we get from these expressions is that our volitional ability or will is used to control our love or sympathy. Is this the case? It is likely that will could indirectly awaken love or sympathy, as Kant maintained. Nevertheless, the crucial point is the openness and participation of the self in pre-reflective life rather than the will to love or sympathy. Moreover, I think, it is only in the absence of love or sympathy that we will use volitional ability or will to command them. Sometimes, as was pointed out in Chapter 4, the intervention of volitional or practical control will damage the autonomous life of human emotions. Sticking rigidly to a target or principle, I think, the agent will not be able to open himself and accept others. In pointing out this phenomenon of self-defeatingness, de Sousa's description is worthy of quoting:

It does me no good to tell myself how foolish I am to miss her: for the thought is an enemy agent as it were, calculated to fix my thoughts on just what I should forget. I should forget her smile, her eyes, her perfect breasts---The best course is to fall in love with someone else: 'it'll take
my mind off her.' Or failing that, to hate her: directing my attention onto her betrayal, her levity, her heartlessness— (1980, 141)

Obviously, the more the self is involved in the emergence of feelings or the more deeply and spontaneously feelings issue forth from the depth of the person, the less they are subject to volitional control or choice.

If we can not volitionally 'control' ourselves to have some sorts of emotions such as love, sympathy, etc., then it may be doubted whether we are able to cultivate them or whether the education of the emotions is possible. From a genetic point of view, I think, the statement 'I choose to love or to sympathize with someone' makes sense. After understanding the nature of love or sympathy, some situations could be designed to help us and then to awaken them. For instance, in the relation of love the self could open itself and participate in others; or through the appreciation of art the peculiar meanings inherent in various situations could be grasped and sympathized with. In other words, with regard to the occurrence of the feelings of the lived body, pure psychic feelings and spiritual feelings, emotional life displays its autonomy so that the intervention of volition might aggravate this pre-reflective life. Nevertheless, due to the involvement of self, genetically the individual or the education he receives is able to and should aim at and be responsible for some desirable sorts of subjectivity including the quality of consciousness, preference-hierarchy, the ability of perception etc., which is involved in these emotions.

Apart from the close relationship between emotions and cognition, the possible connection of emotions to behaviour is another vital concern in the education of the emotions. The reason is that, on the one hand, the
immediate experience of emotions as an amalgam of awareness, impulse and affective tone is not just cognitive, but also conative and affective (Dunlop, 1983, 5). The impulses toward outer behaviour could originate in emotional states, functions or acts. As the consequence of the involvement of self, the closeness, immediacy and warmth brought out in feelings more easily motivate outward behaviour than the coolness in purely intellectual thinking. Naturally, even in etymology, the term 'emotion' is easily associated with motives or the alteration of conduct (Bantock, 1967, 65-66). On the other hand, the ideal person our education should aim at is one who is not only able to feel or think but also able to put what is thought or felt into practice. For instance, apart from intellectually thinking that helping others is noble behaviour or feeling the demand for obeying regulations in concrete situations, an educated person should carry out these desirable activities in the appropriate ways. It is true that our behaviour should be based on the cognition of knowledge, including values. Nevertheless, cognition is the beginning rather than the completion of the whole of human action. Therefore, the education of the emotions should be concerned with the possible connection between emotions and behaviour.

Emotions are an aspect of but not the equivalent of our action. A whole action involves at least the awareness of meanings, the formation of will, the choice of the appropriate means and the outward bodily behaviour, all of which could be under the influence of emotions. However, some self-transcending emotions and passions such as wonder, concern for truth etc., do not necessarily issue in outward behaviour but could tend towards quiescence, tranquillity and catharsis (Peters, 1972, 471; 1973, 85). In the very strong affection of terror or delight, we could be put in a state of
rigidity and unable to behave or think. On the other hand, the ways in which outward behaviour is associated with our emotions will be different in different situations. Take love as an example. In different situations, encouragement, counseling, reproach etc., could be viewed as appropriate ways to show our love for pupils; while outward behaviour such as reproach could come from different emotions such as love, malice, jealousy etc. That is why emotions, will and outward behaviour belong to different categories and have different characteristics.

Then, what is the relevance emotions have to our action? Between the emergence of desires and the action, as said above, the agent may at least undergo the determination of conflicts of desires, the choice of the real and appropriate means, the carrying out of what is chosen. In this briefly sketched process, I think, two crucial matters are affected by emotions. First of all emotions can provide our actions with the foundation of meanings, which is the main criterion for the distinction between meaningful actions and outward behaviour. Regarding the same outward behaviour, say, helping others, it could issue from emotional infection, emotional identification, sympathy or love. It is plain that, without the appropriation of meanings or subjective intention in this outward behaviour, the former two cases can not be called 'helping others' in the full and strict sense. Only through the involvement of self, especially the participation of the person in spiritual feelings, can this conduct be authentic and be human action in the full sense.

Secondly, in contrast to purely intellectual thinking, emotional awareness of meanings and the involvement of self mean that emotions empower the agent more intensely, sometimes even beyond what is commonly
expected and accepted, to actualize what is felt or thought. For instance, once one grasps the good or beauty in objects or the greatness of the Creator or Heaven in life-giving, the motive for reunion or imitation is so powerful that human potentiality could be fully brought into play even at the cost of one's life. In other words, although emotions and actions belong to different categories, the former is closely bound up with the meanings and manifestations of actions.

In criticising Peters' dichotomy between the category of passivity and that of activity, i.e. the dichotomy between emotions and motives, White insists that 'the concept of emotion connotes activities as well as passivity---' and thus emotions are 'the building blocks of character', the formation of which should be stressed in education (1984, 238 & 242). His main reason is that character is comprised of virtues and attachments and 'emotions enter into virtues sometimes passively and sometimes as motives' (236). A courageous person, for example, should both learn to manage the fears which affect him in a passive way and be motivated by fear occasionally. Similarly, a sympathetic person should both check his partiality and act out of sympathy on many occasions. In fact, what White suggests is not contrary to the above statement 'emotions are an aspect of but not the equivalent of our action'. Nevertheless, I think, the activities referred to by the concept of emotion should include emotional awareness as well as motivated activities towards outer actions. The judgement needed to determine whether to check some sort of emotion or be motivated by it, or the practical wisdom required for the adjustment of different kinds of dispositions, is fundamentally and partially based on the emotional awareness of pre-reflective life. In everyday activities emotions are actually not only the objects our virtues attempt to control
and direct, but also the source of information from which we can decide which virtue to exercise or what kinds of response would be adequate.

Apart from behavioural dispositions, that is the tendency to behave in certain ways in certain situations, what is also of vital importance and should be shaped is the dispositional emotions discussed in section 1. In contrast to the episodic occurrence of feelings, these deep-seated dispositional emotions can predispose us to perceive situations in a certain way so that certain kinds of feelings will arise. Although it is true that in everyday life our occurrent feelings and experience influence our thinking and behaviour, this underlying affectivity circumscribes how the world is disclosed to us and the basic direction of our reflection and reasoning, as was shown in the discussion of the general state-of-mind at the most fundamental level of human existence. Additionally, due to the nature of deep-seatedness and pre-existence, the cultivation of dispositional emotions can not be completed within a short time; at least, one or two classes of any subject is insufficient for pupils to develop them. As a matter of fact, what is essential is the pattern of everyday teacher-pupil interaction, the ethos of the whole school, the style of communication in the family, etc., in which one can gradually be imbued with some sense of meanings and get belief 'evidently' in Calhoun's sense, the gradual accumulation of which could form the individual ordo amoris (1984, 341~342).

What is the role the feeling of love could play in the emergence of actions from desires? It has been shown in the previous section that the emotional act of love is similar to the deep-seated and pre-existing dispositional emotion which influences us to interpret situations in such a
way that ever-higher values are grasped. Therefore, with regard to the possible contribution love can make to human behaviour at least three points can be made. First of all, with the continuous expansion and integration of an individual's preference-hierarchy in the movement of love, the individual's ordo amoris can determine the occurrence of his desires or feelings, which are the starting point of human actions. Due to the correct or incorrect formation of ordo amoris, for instance, in concrete situations vital values could be preferred to or subordinated to the values of the pleasant and the resultant desire could be to stop or to continue cruel conduct. In other words, in such a case what sort of will will be formed is also based on the individual's ordo amoris. Secondly, in the whole involvement of the person, love gives actions our own authentic meaning. When we say 'we love someone or something', the act of opening ourselves and participating in the beloved objects emerges from the depth of our person, rather than the ego which could be objectified. The whole involvement of the person could not be obtained in emotional states, functions and impersonal thinking. Last but not least, an act out of love can actualize ourselves and help others at the same time. That is to say, in transcending himself and participating in the beloved or in friends, or in imitating the love of God or the life-giving of Heaven, a true self-lover simultaneously actualizes his ideal and helps others to grow up.

Is it possible that the desire or action out of love can be selfish? According to the essential meaning of love, i.e. the openness of self and the recognition of others' individuality, selfish desire or action is by no means to be called love. However, can the exclusiveness inherent in Plato's eros, Aristotle's philia, Confucian graduated love or Butler's self-
love be regarded as selfishness? If the term 'selfishness' means one kind of mentality the characteristic of which is that what is of concern is only personal interests, so that others' desires, interests, etc. can not be treated equally or even are overlooked, then plainly the lovers at issue are not selfish at all'. One of their common features is receptiveness to others, viz. to the qualities of beauty, good or desires, which is the very opposite to selfishness understood in the above sense. On the other hand, it is true that, from the number of persons or groups we love, very few of us could reach the complete selflessness of God or Heaven. Owing to the fundamental condition of human being, I think, we will always be in progress toward this ideal. That is also why only in the everlasting movement of love can the unlimitedness of love assist us in expanding the human mind toward the mind of Heaven and Earth, and human nature toward Goodness, which to some extent could break down the exclusiveness.

Before starting the discussion of the education of the emotions, the nature of stratification within emotional life must be considered, as it is relevant to the cultivation and alteration of emotions. The fact of different levels of depth in our emotional life can be observed in everyday events. For instance, while suffering from bodily pain, a true martyr can be blissful. A human being in a state of deep despair in his soul can experience some sensuous pleasure and enjoy it in a state of ego-concentratedness. Behind this fact, what is more important is that these emotions at different levels originate in different sources and levels of our life. That means some emotions such as love, bliss, despair, etc., originate in the deepest core of our person, and others such as bodily pain, sensuous pleasure, etc., in particular parts of the lived body. Imagine the person suffering from
bodily pain. Being bathed in love or bliss, the person is able to endure pain and even to embrace it with joy. Thus, when we want to substitute one emotion for another, what should be considered is the levels and quality of emotions as well as their strength.

8-4. The education of the emotions

After the clarification of mind, reason and the nature of the emotions, we can proceed to discuss the education of the emotions. It will be found in what follows that the main focus is on our pre-reflective life and its nature, in which our emotions display their own lawfulness. In other words, I intend to elucidate the education of the emotions in terms of the nature of the emotions themselves. Taking the feeling of love, the topic of my study, into account, the argument of this section will refer to it as an example of emotions. Rather than putting forward a detailed and technical procedure, some fundamental principles for teaching the emotions will be suggested. The understanding of mind, reason and emotions also provides the foundation of my opinions concerning the educability of emotions.

Can human emotions be educated? Instead of directly answering this question, perhaps we can consider whether some emotional defects in life, including those manifested in education, can be improved. These undesirable qualities include apathy, self-centeredness, inauthenticity, sentimentality, emotional volatility and over-excitability, emotional disorder and 'crudity', coldness and tenseness, etc (Dunlop, 1984b, 247; Hepburn, 1972, 487~488; Warnock, 1986, 184~185). The person with the above emotional imperfections may be incapable of caring about

264
anything, may close himself off so completely that he cares for nothing except himself, may indulge in some sort of feeling so that he becomes unperceptive of and insensitive to other aspects of situations concerned, may only feel something which is not his own, namely, something emerging from peripheral parts of self or borrowing from social fashion or others, or may be incapable of or unwilling to concern himself steadily and constantly with anything, and so on. Can these human imperfections be improved through education, that is, the development of knowledge and understanding in Peters' sense (Peters, 1972, 466)?

Taking a further look at these flaws, some aspects of the ways in which improvement might come about directly or indirectly via the process of education are the openness of self, the expansion of commonly-shared meanings, the formation of certain dispositions to perceive or to behave, etc. Considering the positive aspect of human development, can we help our pupils to have certain kinds of emotions? Here, I think, we should note at least four aspects of the occurrence and alteration of emotions which could be directly or indirectly subject to the process of education. Firstly, the emergence of the emotions, say, shame or love, requires receptiveness to and participation in our inward world and outer world, without which the intentionality of the emotions could not exist and could not be directed at their objects. Murdoch reminds us that in the appreciation of beauty instantiated in good art, but not fantasy art, and in nature, our selfish consciousness could be refined into an unselfish one, which makes possible self-forgetful pleasure and unpossessive contemplation. Consider the case she gives us (1970, 84–85, 90):

I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of
mind, oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important.

As well as art and nature, intellectual discipline is able to stretch our imagination, enlarge the vision and strengthen the judgement, namely, to forget self, to be realistic, to perceive justly. Plainly, the openness and transcendence of self is not merely a fictitious construction, but also an experienced fact in everyday life.

Next, apart from sensible feeling, the occurrence of emotions is inseparable from the subjective interpretation of meanings, which can happen on the level of pre-reflective life. Obviously, beside the perceptivity of the self, a person's quality of lived-body experience or preference-hierarchy can determine whether a certain sort of emotion will arise or not. For different people, the reason why the same situation will awaken different emotions, say, pride or shame, vigour or fatigue, partially lies in the difference in the quality of lived-body experience or *ordo amoris*. Moreover, due to the aspect of inwardness or import-ascription in their existence, human beings in the full sense, whom Taylor calls self-interpreting animals18 (1985), could and should perceive the import in their interaction with themselves or the world, in which their subjectivity is involved or subjective meaning appropriated. It can be said that the subjective horizon of values is also continuously reorganized and reconstructed not in a vacuum but in this interactional process, wherein the inter-subjectivity or the educability of meaning is located. For instance, without examining in detail the different meanings of stealing in different situations, at least it can be taught that 'taking without permission
is called stealing and it is shameful behaviour' within a given community. Once it is accepted as part of a person's pre-reflective beliefs, the authentic perception of stealing can arouse the feeling of shame. Surely, without ruling out the possibility of going beyond the established and commonly-shared meanings or the sedimentation of traditional prejudices, what is emphasized here is their inter-subjectivity and educability.

Thirdly, what kind of meanings will be felt or what will be done partly depends on the nature of a person's dispositions to make sense or to behave. When one is dominated by the mood of deep-seated and pre-existing resentment, for instance, everything tends to be perceived as a case of injustice. With regard to the formation of dispositions, being thoroughly and lengthily imbued with a certain sort of atmosphere, or practising to perform some pattern of behaviour in or out of some sorts of feelings, could probably be conducive to interpreting situations or to behaving in a certain way.

Finally, given the lawfulness of emotions, human emotions themselves can become the objects of their intentionality and therefore be changed. It is true that the feeling of hunger is uncomfortable so that normally nobody will be willing to experience it. Nevertheless, insofar as the values are perceived as higher in action which induces hunger, such as a hunger strike or the mother's sacrifice of food for her children etc., the pain of hunger could be accepted and embraced with joyful feeling.

The influence of education on the emotions will often be indirect. The main reason is that most of the process of the education of the emotions should be put in the context of pre-reflective life, where the subjectivity of
the educated should be considered and his system of beliefs can not
directly be imposed by the educator. Additionally, consider the question:
can spiritual feelings, including love, be educated? From the viewpoint of
the inner nature of feelings, the higher the feeling is or the deeper it
originates in its source, the spiritual person, the less probably can it be
subject to volitional or practical control\textsuperscript{19}. It is much plainer when we
consider that emotions arise in the pre-conative level and possess their
own lawfulness. In other words, volitional intervention can only
indirectly affect and will even probably worsen intentional feelings. From
another, genetic, viewpoint, because the subjectivity of the feeler is
involved in intentional feelings, provided we can obtain sufficient self-
knowledge, then the cultivation of the ideal person can become the goal of
our education or design of culture. These two approaches, I think, are not
incompatible with and should supplement each other.

Can human beings be 'educated' to open themselves and participate in
reality, to continuously expand their horizon of meanings and preference-
hierarchy, to be disposed to interpret situations in such a way that ever-
higher values are grasped? Before answering this, we should recognize
that the autonomy of spiritual feelings, including love, could be damaged
by the intervention of volitional or practical control. What we are able to
do is to establish a relationship of love or an environment of beauty, in
which the individuality of the educated is respected and thus called forth
or the feeling of love inspired. If attention is paid only to the endeavour
to 'raise' the value of the object, willing and trying to secure its betterment
or wishing its betterment, namely, only to the level of reflective life, then
spiritually seeing the higher values in the beloved and the willingness of
the latter to open himself will become difficult. The proper and best way
to cultivate emotions, especially love, is through emotions themselves and in pre-reflective life, not through the intellect in reflective life.

Before considering how to carry on the education of the emotions, it might be asked what kinds of emotions should be cultivated. 'Positive emotions' rather than 'negative emotions' could be the immediate and simple answer, although further clarification is required. In the aforementioned issue of the status of emotions in autonomy, it was pointed out that 'self-destructive' desires or feelings are by no means the basis of autonomy. Here, the much wider context allows us to examine in detail the modified notion of 'negative' or 'self-destructive'. Within the lawfulness of emotions themselves, the unfolding of emotional life should manifest some characteristics in the appropriate situations. They include, I think, receptiveness to rather than withdrawal from reality, the expansion of preference-hierarchy rather than its stagnation or atrophy, sensitivity to rather than lack of discrimination towards the features of situations, authenticity and integrity rather than shallowness and duplicity in feelings, involvement and dispositional constancy rather than loss and volatility of self in feelings and their expression, and so on. Once the development of emotional life is impeded, the above human imperfections will appear and thus interfere with the pursuit of personal well-being as well as the development of reflective life. By the same token, these characteristics could also be useful in assessing the processes and consequences of education, including the education of the emotions.

After the above discussion of the essential meaning of love and emotions' educability, I would like to put forward four interrelated suggestions about the education of the emotions, without going into technical details,
which will depend on individual and cultural variations. First, considerable weight should be given to pre-existing and deep-seated emotional disposition. The main reason is that, apart from influencing how people perceive the meanings of the realities happening at school, the underlying disposition will determine what kinds of emotions will arise.

At the level of school, the term 'atmosphere' is used by Vandenberg to refer to an intangible, transient flow of experienced quality, which depends on 'the objective conditions and one's own underlying mood, that is, upon one's general state-of-mind' (1975, 37~38). Apart from the objective conditions such as architecture, the design of the syllabus etc., the aggregate of underlying moods brought by teachers and pupils to the classroom or the aggregate created by the mode of their being together could decide the formation of the pedagogic atmosphere in which they are able to open to each other. In other words, the crucial condition for the successful education of the emotions is the emotionally educated teacher with positive dispositional emotions such as hope, trust, patience, etc., which are conducive to the unfolding of the pupil's emotional life. Only in love and trust perceived in the pedagogic atmosphere flowing from the person of the teacher can the pupil willingly open himself and be led into the world and the future in authentic learning.

Secondly, for the whole and harmonious life, it is undeniable that both pre-reflective life and reflective life are needed and should be paid equal attention. In the pursuit of well-being, similarly, putting what is desired into action requires the awareness of meanings or ends as well as the calculation of means for achieving goals. However, if what is emphasized in education is only the propositional or quantitative aspect of knowledge, efficiency and control, then the development of reflective life could be
pursued at the expense of the atrophy of pre-reflective life, which in turn makes problematic our direct encounter with reality. In the wider context of contemporary life, it is pointed out that the adopting of an objective, scientific attitude, the worship of technique or a technological attitude etc., make it easy for human beings to lose emotional vitality and become machines (Hepburn, 1972, 490; Dunlop, 1984-a, 82 & 1984-b, 254). The crucial implication of this phenomenon is that the pre-reflective life, namely the feeling and involvement of the subjective meanings of pupils, should be incorporated into everyday learning. Literature and art have a more important role to play in awakening some sorts of images or a sense of situations, which is of vital significance for the appreciation of meanings, than subjects only based on abstract principles. For instance, in the production of poems or paintings the shift of tone and rhythm, the usage of metaphors and the order of words or the alteration of lines and colours, the layout of topics etc., mainly focus on creating certain sorts of images, which could be imaginatively shared with appreciators and awaken their resonance. Additionally, the most important manifestation of respect for pre-reflective life is the maintenance of the relationship of subject-subject, whereby pupils are treated as persons with their subjectivity, rather than the objective attitude in which the persons become only the objects of social policy, intellectual understanding, management and control (Strawson, 1974, 9–13, 17 & 21).

Thirdly, the education of the emotions should put weight on the expansion of value-horizons. The main way to encounter directly the infinite provinces of meanings is to enliven our perceptivity, which can enable us to enrich our system of beliefs and at the same time perceive the various particularity of human situations. In contrast, the worship of instrumental
reason mentioned above actually indicates the narrowness of the grasp of meanings, i.e., the means-end mode of thinking becomes the only access to meanings. Even within pre-reflective life itself, once the movement of love stagnates, the horizontal and/or vertical expansion of meanings stops. That is to say, without the dispositional openness of emotions to the light of ever-higher value, it is doubtful whether Plato's eros is able to ascend the ladder of values, Confucian love to unfold human Vital Impulse, neighbour-love to imitate the love of God or Aristotle's pleasure-friendship or usefulness-friendship to be transformed into virtue-friendship.

Of the commonly-found emotional defects, sentimentality is closely related to narrowness of meanings. The sentimental person indulges in some sort of feeling so that he becomes unperceptive of and insensitive to other aspects of situations. When we are exposed to a certain sort of work of art or any media for a long time, our perception is likely to become stereotyped and restricted to the extent that only some narrow aspects of reality can be experienced by us, say, the values concerning consumption and possession (McLuhan, 1964, 14~15, 41~47 & 56~57; Hepburn, 1972, 485~494; White, 1984, 244). Being confronted with this crisis of culture, in order to enliven pupils' perceptivity, educators should design appropriate environments, which provide the opportunity of, for example, directly and widely experiencing the art-works of different epochs and regions or experiencing reality in a total and inclusive way rather than in a particular and fragmentary way. Moreover, when strong passions for some activities have occurred, people may display the similar characteristic of being obsessed with a particular sort of images or activities. At school our pupils, probably like infatuated persons, may
have a strong interest in stamp-collecting, gardening, football etc., so that other kinds of valuable activities are overlooked. In such a case, they should be directed to experience a wider range of interesting and valuable activities and expand their perceptivity to a wider horizon of values. Among these activities, participation in rituals or other common activities may be a good way to break through the passionate fascination or sentimental indulgence.

The fourth suggestion concerning the education of the emotions is about whether emotions should be taught by arguments or emotions. Consider the two methods of emotional education put forward by Warnock (1986, 180~181). In order to master the emotion of rage when losing a game, the first method, i.e. the rational method, is to tell the loser that to play is more important than to win and how a good loser should behave, whatever his feelings. It is undeniable that sometimes this method does enable a pupil to enjoy the game without considering its consequence. In contrast, the other method is to teach people how to behave. For instance, in the above case, the point is for the loser to congratulate the rival on his success. Appropriating Aristotle's opinion that the disposition of virtue is acquired by imitating virtuous behaviour, Warnock believes that 'The habit of concealment may finish certain feelings; the habit of expressing feelings, at times not truly felt, may bring them into being'. However, one condition presupposed by the second method is the existence of the virtuous person and his behaviour. In imitating such virtuous behaviour, I think, it is the awareness of meanings involved, such as the awareness of the value-content of the exemplary person, rather than outward behaviour, that determines the occurrence of the authentic feelings.
Here two fundamental characteristics of emotions should be taken into account, that is, the 'evident' belief in pre-reflective life and the involvement of self in emotions. It has been pointed out that change in avowed beliefs does not guarantee the corresponding alteration of emotions, because the beliefs, say, that to play is more important than to win and that congratulating the rival on his success is noble and valuable behaviour, are not experienced and held 'evidently'. Moreover, I think, the emotions we want to cultivate should involve the participation of self rather than one's absorption and loss in emotional identification or infection. If the outward virtuous behaviour is imitated, it should be considered whether subjective meanings are ascribed to this imitation, making it authentic. On the other hand, the reason why pretending to have some sorts of feelings and acting them out is more likely to awaken authentic feelings than the pure telling of reasons lies in the fact that the former is more conducive to the emergence of the sense of situations, which is of vital importance for holding beliefs 'evidently'.

Plainly, the true meaning of educating emotions by means of emotions is to imbue our pupils with the emotions we want to cultivate, through which emotional awareness and the involvement of self are made possible. In educating sympathy, for instance, the crucial point is the demonstration of sympathizing with others through persons, works of literature or art, etc. Apart from the possibility of imitating sympathetic behaviour, the pupils will be directed to perceive the meanings inherent in this behaviour and act out their feelings. If taught only in arguments or reasons, it is doubtful whether pupils can truly sympathize with others and behave sympathetically. In particular, when what is perceived by pupils is the
contradiction between a teacher's words and his deeds, then the resultant resistance will bring about the complete failure of the education of the emotions. In interaction at school, in fact, the emotions manifested in teachers inevitably make much impact, positive or negative, on the cultivation of pupils' emotions. Additionally, the suggestion about using emotions to teach emotions can also be applied to other aspects of activities inside or outside school. In other words, what should be taken into account in the teaching of languages, the performance of rituals, the design of a school's architecture, the form and content of media, the pattern of relationships in the family, the influence of the whole society's ethos, etc., should include the emotional images and meanings perceived by our pupils as well as the conceptual and propositional knowledge implied in these activities.
NOTES

2. Cf. Chapter 6 sections 2 and 4 and Chapter 9 section 4.

3. Cf. Chapter 4 section 3.


16. Cf. Chapter 4 sections 2 and 3 and chapter 5 section 1.


Chapter 9 The pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love

As a result of exploring love in the context of pedagogy, the role love can play in everyday educational activities necessarily becomes another fundamental concern of my investigation. Apart from the fact reiterated in the previous two chapters that love understood as the intentional movement of heart is capable of predisposing us to perceive the wider and higher aspects of impersonal realities, in interpersonal interaction it makes possible the understanding of the deepest core of the other person and thus can lead to the conversion of one's own faith or altruistic behaviour. For instance, it is in the relationship of love that Socrates' virtues, manifested in the wholeness of his unique personality, are revealed to and followed by Alcibiades; that our friend is regarded as our second self and good is done for his or her own sake; that the unselfishness of Christian agape or the life-giving of Confucian love will be imitated and implemented in social practices. As a corollary, despite the fact that the school is different from the above-mentioned situations where various embodiments of love are found, I wonder whether there is any sense in examining this feeling in teacher-pupil interaction, by means of which educational aims are gradually actualized. If the answer is affirmative, then what are the possible features of pedagogical love, which make it different from other kinds of love such as parental love, Plato's eros, etc.?

The term 'relationship' used here could refer to two different but compatible senses, that is, as Downie et al. suggest (1974, 134~138), the occasion or situation sense and the attitude sense. That is to say, various
relationships in the attitude sense, such as attitudes of respect, fear, pride, etc., could exist in various relationships in the occasion or situation sense such as the teacher-pupil relationship, doctor-patient relationship, etc. Furthermore, as well as the first point that 'attitudes must be to something', the second important point is that 'attitudes must be of something, where "something" stands for a disposition to feel and act in characteristic ways towards the object of the attitude.' (Downie et al., 1974, 135) Therefore, it is true to say that, in the teacher-pupil relationship (situation sense), several kinds of dispositions such as resentment, indifference, trust, etc., can actually appear as the main attitudes (attitude sense) of teachers and pupils. Nevertheless, in what follows I am going to argue that the ideal teacher-pupil relationship should be based on the deep-seated and pre-existing feeling of love, which is capable of preventing the authority of the teacher from becoming the use of pure power.

Furthermore, because, with the nationalization and bureaucratization of education, most, but not all, educational activities are carried out in school, the main characteristics of teacher-pupil activities will be pointed out in relation to the nature of this organization first. It will be found in the first section that, as well as the features of pseudo-dialogical situation and authoritative structure, the modes of organic association and mechanical association co-exist in teacher-pupil interaction. Next, in the light of the hierarchical relationship, the conditions for the existence of authority, especially authority in education, and its distinction from the use of power or force will be addressed with relation to the features of love. Thirdly, before the discussion of the pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love in the last section, my focus will be put on the proper authority teachers should have and its characteristics.
9-1. The main features of the teacher-pupil relationship in school

It is undisputed that human behaviour and the nature of interpersonal interaction are to some extent under the influence of the nature of the organization in which they exist. For instance, behind the various sort of social situation such as family, school, church or army there exist not only the different role-sets of parent-child, teacher-pupil, father-believer or officer-soldier but also the different ways of association, which actually prescribe how people should treat each other. In order to understand these possible forms of being together, I think, Scheler's treatment of essential social units could be appropriated here. Imagine the above factual social units of family, school, church or army, etc., only as the concretization of the mass, life-community, society or person-community. Then joint social action can originate in different kinds of meaning-grasping acts or may just be the following of outer behaviour. Consider the behaviour of up-bringing or helping others in these essential social units. It may issue from emotional infection, coexperiencing, analogical inference or the understanding implied in love. In other words, the cause or reason for the joint action may be as follows: involuntary imitation without understanding; coexperiencing and coexecution without the awareness of egoness or otherness; contractual agreement without the sense of 'living-with-one-another'; or the grasping of individuality and ever-higher values in the object loved. Although empirically any one or the amalgam of the four essential social units and their ways of association can appear in the everyday life of school, not all of these above manifestations should be regarded as the ideal or desirable school in our mind.
So long as the expansion of mind is regarded as the main aim of education, at which school also should aim, obviously the everyday teacher-pupil interaction should not be based on involuntary imitation without understanding. Without the involvement of subjective meaning, the mimicry of superficial behaviour is helpless to enlarge our depth and width of understanding and can not be called true learning. On the other hand, corresponding to the different levels of the human mind, viz. pre-reflective life and reflective life, as Dunlop also points out, no institution can be totally a matter of society (Gesellschaft), but must also contain elements of community (Gemeinschaft) (1979, 49). Teachers and pupils as the main members of school, therefore, by no means interact with each other only in terms of either the coexecution of joint action or the implementation of contractual rights and duties. More important, once the ability of emotional awareness in concrete situations, including the capacity of reciprocal self-awareness or seeing oneself and others as distinctively separate persons² (FORM, 476–486; Langford, 1985, 173, 175 & 189–191; Pring, 1984, 13–18; 1996, 114) is recognized as one crucial condition for being a person, our pre-reflective life on the level of life-community, apart from reflective life on the level of society, should be given due attention. Needless to say, the understanding of teacher-pupil relationships should take both organic association and mechanical association into account.

Does the essential social unit of person-community based on the mutual understanding of love have anything to do with the nature of school? Although not being the main focus and examined in Dunlop’s aforementioned article, the point is, I think, closely bound up with the
second feature of the teacher-pupil relationship in school, that is, pseudodialogical relationship. The individual person in the pure manifestation of person-community is an independent, spiritual and individual single person 'in' an independent, spiritual collective person. In other words, the members of the pure person-community are single persons with the features discussed in Chapter 5 such as 'being-able-to-understand' and 'being-able-to-do', etc., which can only be reached at a certain level of human development. Then logically and even factually school is not the manifestation of person-community. Additionally, the teacher-pupil relationship as the main combination in school entails that a comparatively mature person teaches another comparatively immature or developing one and initiates him/her into the level of a mature person. As a result of the implied meaning in the teacher-pupil relationship, it follows logically that school is not the purely factual embodiment of person-community. In everyday reality, both teachers and pupils could be the persons in question, for instance, in university or the organization of adult education. However, the historical variety of the teacher-pupil relationship does not invalidate its logical structure. Furthermore, the way teachers and pupils interact with each other should not be through emotional infection, whereas it could be an amalgam of coexecution, contractual adjustment and the understanding of love. Although school is not the pure manifestation of person-community, it is the way towards the highest ideal of a human social unit.

Here one question that can be raised is how, if school is not the pure embodiment of person-community, it can help the pupils to become persons with correct individual ordo amoris, as summarized at the end of Part II, and to form a person-community of love? Because the fully
dialogical relationship of subject-subject can appear only in the interaction between mature persons, this question can be restated as 'how can the dialogical relationship emerge from the non-dialogical one?' The phenomena of 'one-way affairs' or pseudo-dialogues pointed out by Spiecker in his attempt to expound the pedagogical relationship as a relationship *sui generis* could be, I think, the answer to this question. Although, in the early mother-child interaction, the infant or baby is still very young so that he can not develop his self-consciousness and appropriate its subjective meanings in every interactive response, mother constantly 'replies' to it *as if* these responses have communicative significance', *as if* her child were an active communicative being' (1984, 205~207). It is only in this dialogue-like situation, where the infant is treated *as if* he were already a person, in a spiritual sense, with a hierarchical structure of acts regulating his wishes, needs, etc., that he can be initiated into 'a pattern of joint action within a field of meaning' and becomes a developing person. In schools, especially kindergartens and primary schools, this sort of pseudo-dialogue is the basic pattern of teacher-pupil interaction. What is more, I think, empathetic understanding and pedagogical love presupposed by pseudo-dialogue in school could be the pivotal factor drawing out the beloved's personality and leading to the formation of *person-community*. This point will be examined in detail in the fourth section concerning the pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love.

Another important and pseudo-dialogical situation-relative feature of the teacher-pupil relationship in school is its intrinsic hierarchical or authoritative structure. The triadic relationship between teacher, learner and what is to be learnt can probably make this characteristic more
intelligible. Consider the status of learner first. In comparison to other species, it is an empirical fact that a human being has a longer period of infancy and plasticity. That is to say, human infants are in more need of care and guidance to survive and develop their whole potentiality. Despite recognizing both the constructive and destructive forms of the longing for authority, Carroll points out that the universal craving for it, especially in children and adolescents, is endemic and necessary for developing into relatively sane adults (1979, 134). Certainly, not all of the pupils in educational institutions are children. However, most of their members are of immature years (Peters, 1959, 45 & 47). Insofar as people are involved in the relationship of teacher-pupil as learners, then by definition they are in a state of comparative ignorance.

From the standpoint of what is to be learnt, that is, the established knowledge, the accumulation of human experiences or the various modes of social life, etc., children are relatively uninformed. More important, the inevitable gap or distinction between knowledge itself and its construction, between the truth or goodness itself and human experiences about them, does not rule out the normative structure inherent in knowledge, truth or goodness itself (Bantock, 1952, 191~192 & 202). Therefore, before accepting or even revising these established conceptions, norms, etc., some kind of authority is required to initiate the new generation into them. From the viewpoint of the evolution of human education, school is this kind of institution and the teacher this kind of person. However, this does not mean that every actual school or teacher is appropriate for this aim.
Thirdly, within the triadic structure, as well as the selected subject matter, there is the teacher in the position of authority. Due to their relative immaturity and ignorance, children are generally incapable of learning what they should learn by themselves. In a comparatively primitive society, perhaps parents or all adults bring the young generation into what is worthwhile. With the accumulation of knowledge and the division of labour, teaching becomes a professional activity. The fact that only some adults are qualified to be teachers in school also means that, to some extent, teachers have knowledge and experience which is more correct or more worth learning than that of the unqualified. In such a case, a teacher is not a pure individual any more, but a representative of valuable cultural goods. Whenever young people become learners and learn something from teachers, or adults become teachers and teach something to pupils, the authoritative structure comes into existence in the hierarchical teacher-pupil relationship. In comparison to pupils, teachers should know at least what should be learnt and how pupils learn and then become authorities on teaching.

9-2. Authority in education

Because of the intrinsic hierarchical or authoritative structure in the teacher-pupil relationship, the nature of authority should be investigated in order to find out the kind of authority appropriate to teachers. Although the teacher should influence the behaviour of his pupil in the process of teaching, the way of controlling behaviour should be different from that happening in prison, industry, army or supermarket (Peters, 1966, 237 & 262). The fundamental reason for this difference lies, I think, in the unique educational goal, the expansion of the comparatively immature
person's mind, which necessitates the aforementioned pseudo-dialogical relationship and its presupposition of empathetic understanding and love. Thus the meaning of authority should firstly be clarified and differentiated from power. Then it will be understood that authority in fact requires the spiritual feeling of love to underpin it. Otherwise, authority in school will descend into the use of pure power or force.

The notion of authority is usually referred to to make the distinction between natural wholes, a multitude of men, and human societies. In the various social institutions, among which school is one, someone with some sort of authority could mean either the person who is qualified to lead or one who actually leads others to complete the joint goal. The former sense of authority is a *de jure* concept, the latter a *de facto* one; the former a right of doing certain actions, the latter the ability of a man to get his proposals accepted (Peters, 1967, 83–84; 1959, 13–15). Consider social institutions such as army, school, hospital or bank again. The officers, teachers, doctors or bankers have different sorts of authority to regulate the behaviours of soldiers, pupils, patients or clients. Behind their joint actions are some joint goals of guarding territory, expanding the mind, curing illnesses or investing money. Obviously, without authority the operation of social institutions and even the existence of the whole society will become problematic. A multitude of men without the regulation of various sorts of authority, that is, of persons who are able to orient or summon uncertain wills, could form only a chaotic mass rather than an ordered society with its different functional systems.

Behind the causal relationship of authority, namely the influence of will or the regulation of behaviour, is its internal relationship, as Winch points
out (1967, 98–99), that is, the nature or structure of authority itself. In fact, the notion of authority is inseparably related to the rule-following nature of human social activities or to the existence of correct or incorrect established ways of doing things. When one is born, what he is faced with is some commonly-shared systems of meanings such as language, economics, politics, etc., which involve the rules governing human behaviour. Furthermore, there are some established, perhaps tentative, correct or incorrect ways of reaching the shared goals implicit in the above social activities such as mutual understanding, the pursuit of utility or the accumulation of power. Then, whoever is capable of helping others to guard territory, to expand the mind, to cure illnesses or to invest money in the right way will be qualified to be or actually become an officer, teacher, doctor or banker. It is true that the way to identify authorities might vary in accordance with the differences between areas or epochs. However, if there were not the rule-following nature of human social activities or the correct or incorrect, at least comparatively, established ways of doing things, the notion of authority would make no sense and would not appear in everyday social activities.

In the discussion of the regulation of human behaviour, it is commonly suggested that authority is different from power (Peters, 1967, 93–94; 1959, 18–19; 1966, 239). It is said that obedience brought about by the use of force or the threat of force not only breaches liberty but also demonstrates the failure of authority (Winch, 1967, 102). If the above internal relationship of authority is investigated in detail, some of its presuppositions can be pointed out, the lack of which transforms the authoritative regulation of behaviour into the use of power. Actually, authority in the full sense, I think, contains at least mutual understanding.
and trustful obedience or acceptance. Take the relation between a solicitor and his client as an example. If it is based on mutual understanding and agreement, then the way the solicitor influences his client is through authority rather than power. Although probably the client is incapable of understanding what the authority legally advises, he is able to have an understanding of the solicitor and his firm from evidence such as legal licenses, past records, etc., and freely to decide whether to trust him or not. On the other hand, the solicitor's concern is the understanding of the situation of his client and the right way to deal with the case. Insofar as the mutual understanding and trustful obedience, or the shared concern about the right way to handle the matter at issue, is lacking, the authoritative relationship between them breaks down.

Looking into the behaviour-regulating ways of power, the distinction between authority and power becomes much clearer. For instance, physical or psychological coercion, the use of less dire forms of sanction and rewards or the personal influences of hypnotism, sexual attraction, etc., are usually used to control others' will (Peters, 1966, 239). Instead of mutual understanding, the shared concern about the right way to handle the matter in question or trustful obedience, what is behind the above means is the direct subjection of others' will to one's own will. In contrast to authority, the use of power induces people to be in certain sorts of emotional state such as fear or fascination which are incompatible with mutual understanding in the strictest sense based on the emotional act of love. Despite the commander's understanding of the situation of others, furthermore, he could take anything but the joint goal, the right way of doing things, as his first priority. Without the distinct awareness of the difference between one's own and others' willing, it is so hard to
recognize distraction from the joint goal that the other's willing could be regarded as one's own and falsely accepted as an authority. Then the result could be blind commanding or trust and slavish comportment rather than the insightful and trustful obedience which appears in genuine obeying and authority (Scheler, FORM, 499-500). Although the goals of guarding territory, expanding the mind, curing illnesses or investing money with profit could be fulfilled in terms of power as well as authority, mutual understanding, the concern about the right way to reach the goals or trustful obedience do not appear in both cases. In other words, as the result of false love or infatuation, the officers, teachers, doctors or bankers are more likely to become authoritarians, the direct users of power, than genuine authorities.

So far it becomes easier to understand the statement that school is an authoritative institution or teachers are persons with authority. It could mean that the school or teachers have the right to educate pupils and expand their mind or have the ability to influence others, including pupils, parents, etc., to accept its or their proposals concerning the education of pupils. In the context of teacher-pupil interaction, the teacher with actual authority is the person who is concerned about the right way to expand the mind of pupils and who makes the effort to form a trustful relationship involving genuine obedience, which is destroyed by the use of power. Here, one question could be put forward, namely, apart from the hierarchical or authoritative quality itself, do another two main features of the teacher-pupil relationship in school influence the nature of the authority in education? If the coexistence of community and society in school and the pseudo-dialogical relationship between teachers and pupils are taken into account, inevitably authority should be discussed in relation
to the emotional awareness of others' status, especially in empathy and
love, which is presupposed in the pseudo-dialogical relationship. In fact,
none of the mutual understanding, the concern about the correct way of
doing things and the insightful and trustful obedience inherent in genuine
authority is independent of human emotional awareness.

One of the necessary conditions for the existence of authority is that there
are correct or incorrect ways of doing things in various social activities.
However, if the human heart or the whole ethos of society is filled with
hate and indifference, which are incompatible with love or the passionate
concern about pursuing or improving these impersonal standards, nobody
can become a person with any sort of authority or have the willingness to
accept the guidance of authority. More important, with regard to the
practice of everyday interaction, genuine, as opposed to blind,
commanding and obeying are based on mutual understanding and trustful
submission as pointed out in the foregoing discussion. Furthermore, the
understanding of the other person's uniqueness can only be reached by
virtue of the relationship of love in pre-reflective life, which predisposes
us to open our spiritual eyes, to go beyond ourselves and participate in
others'. In terms of this relationship, the person with authority can
understand what is better for the one who obeys and can be willing to
help him. On the other hand, despite the content of the proposals from
the authority, his intention and ability, viz. to achieve the joint goal in a
right way, is revealed to and can be understood by the one who obeys in
this person-person relationship. Take the solicitor-client case as an
example once more. The former can either initiate the latter in a
respectful way into what he suggests as a correct way to solve the matter
at issue or directly impose his will on the latter. Underneath these two
ways of regulating behaviour are two different attitudes towards others: the respect of love and the domination of power.

The ability to do things in a right way is in fact different from that of reaching mutual understanding in a respectful way. From the point of view of the development of the whole culture or whole person, whoever develops better in any field of the realization of values such as politics, economics or religion could influence the comparatively undeveloped person. Nevertheless, the attitude the former adopts towards the latter, rather than the superior value content of the relatively developed and powerful subject, is the pivotal point in determining whether authority breaks down and becomes the use of power. In investigating the forms of association of the members’ consciousness, two interwoven mental acts, viz. sympathy or love and power, are distinguished by Spranger as the deepest foundation upon which any society is founded (Spranger, 1928, 57~60, 172~173 & 188~189). In the attitude of sympathy or love, people confront each other on an equal basis and direct their attention to the essential value or the mentally dominant value direction of each other. By contrast, in the attitude of power, people are ranked and the superiors intend to imprint their own wills with some sort of values upon the inner world and the external behaviours of the inferiors. Thus, superiority in some social activities such as actual knowledge, technical means (hence derives the relation of property), capacity to express oneself aesthetically and thus influence people strongly (power of oratory for instance) or religious conviction (enthusiasm i.e. charismatic power) does not guarantee that authority will not become the pure use of power. Plainly, apart from the concern about the correct way of doing things, what an authority needs is the deep-seated dispositional tendency of sympathy or
love and its resultant insightful obligation to help others for their own sake rather than the sense of superiority in imposing one's will upon others' and the occurrent feelings, which can lead to the teacher's blindness to defects or overestimation of the merits of their pupils.

For authority in education, in comparison to other activities, love is of even more importance. The reason is closely bound up with the pseudo-dialogical relationship in educational activities. Most, although not all, of those taught in educational institutions are relatively immature, so that they are incapable of distinguishing what kinds of authorities to trust and choose. Because pupils' ability to reach mutual understanding or to recognize whether educators are concerned about the right way to expand the mind is not wholly developed yet, the authority in educational institutions needs more effort to cultivate the attitude of love or sympathy. Another significant reason is that, in an atmosphere of love or sympathy, the attitude of love or sympathy on the part of the pupils, and their concern about the right way of doing things, can properly develop as the foundation of various sorts of authority. In the following two sections, the paradox of educational authority or the pedagogical relationship will be picked up again.

If educational activities are carried on in terms of power, rather than love or sympathy, then the taught are treated with an impersonal attitude, in which 'the efficient operator who manipulates a given object for one purpose or another---sees nothing personal in any reactions of his object' (Downie, et al., 1974, 139–140). In other words, in such an attitude of directly subjecting others to one's own will or framework of thinking, the pupil becomes the object only of causal explanation, but not of purposive
explanation which would involve his subjective meaning. For instance, one form of adopting this objective or impersonal attitude is to wholly pigeonhole the pupil as 'nothing but a teenager, or lazy, or delinquent, or intelligent, or whatever' without considering any purpose of his own or his individuality (Downie, et al., 1974, 151-152). As a corollary, authority in education is inseparable from the attitude of love or sympathy, without which authority will become the use of pure power or even the violence, rather than enlightenment, of knowledge.

9-3. The authority of the teacher

Whether the notion of authority, including the authority of the teacher, is used in its *de jure* or *de facto* sense, it necessarily presupposes concern about the correct or incorrect way of doing things, mutual understanding, and trustful obedience. It goes without saying that, insofar as the above features are absent from the teacher-pupil interaction, the teacher loses his status as a genuine authority, as a result of the misuse of authority. Furthermore, I think, these internal qualities of authority can be used to examine three commonly-mentioned forms of authority, namely traditional authority, legal-rational authority and charismatic authority. In this process of examining authority, the nature of the teacher-pupil relationship and the authority of the teacher will become clearer. Some characteristics of the teacher's authority will be pointed out which, if put into practice, will prevent its degeneration into the use of pure power.

In Peters' discussion of the nature of authority, Max Weber's three different types of authority are mentioned to explain its different grounds of legitimacy (Peters, 1959, 15-16 & 20; 1967, 86-89; 1966, 242-247).
The legitimacy of legal-rational authority rests on 'a belief in the "legality" of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rule to issue commands' whereas the legitimacy of traditional authority rests on 'an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them'. Take the authority of the teacher, the leader of teaching activities, as an example. If the belief that parents, retired soldiers, the captives in a war, etc., are the proper candidates for the bringing up of children is accepted by the members of a given community and becomes a custom, then plainly the foundation of this sort of legitimacy lies in the sanctity of tradition. It is not difficult to find such cases in the history of education. However, with the spread of enlightenment and the rise of bureaucracy, the cult of reason requires various sorts of authorities to have some rational justification. Who can become a teacher and how to be qualified as a teacher are written down in the legal system with some sort of rational justification, which also clearly records the rights a teacher could have in teaching his pupils. For instance, at least some courses concerning pedagogy should be taken for the qualification, or a teacher has at least the right to mark students' essays. Apart from these two sorts of legitimacy, that of charismatic authority rests on 'devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him'. Insofar as someone's character, behaviour, achievements and so on are recognized as valuable and worthy of devotion, then, although he is not accepted as an authority on the grounds of traditional or legal-rational legitimacy, he actually influences and regulates others' will or behaviours in an authoritative way.
What sort of legitimacy is the authority of the teacher based on? From the standpoint of the evolution of history, before the rise of legal-rational authority there was traditional authority, which could partly explain why the social expectations of a teacher vary in accordance with different cultures. On the other hand, the traditional authority of today could have been legal-rational or charismatic in the past. Thus, although the legal-rational system of legitimacy becomes the dominant basis of authority, without the authority of tradition it is unlikely to emerge or to be intelligible. For a similar reason, Winch insists on the necessity of traditional authority for the existence and understanding of the other two sorts of authority as well (1967, 107-108). Now consider the importance of charismatic authority for the authority of the teacher. Although, with the accumulation of various sorts of knowledge and the improvement of legal systems, a certain kind of knowledge and education can be recognized and designed as the necessary condition for becoming a teacher, and a certain kind of duty and obligation can be prescribed as the normative content of the authority of the teacher, the inexhaustibility of knowledge and the complicatedness of human beings, etc., mean that charismatic authority continues to appear. Inevitably, legal-rational authority is not the sole kind of authority for the teacher: any of the three sorts of authority could become the ground of the legitimacy of the teacher's authority.

Concerning the internal features of authority, viz. concern about the right way of doing things, mutual understanding and trustful obedience, it can be asked what type of authority is more suitable for displaying the above features and reaching the ideal of authority. If appealing to traditional authority, what the teacher pays attention to or how the process of
teaching proceeds is the reflection of the ethos or custom of a certain area or moment. In such a circumstance, what the teacher is concerned about might be the expansion of the pupil's mind or his own survival; and the process of teaching might be the initiation into what is worthwhile or the domination of others' will. In other words, what is identified as true or as the order of Nature could be some sort of superstition, prejudice, etc., or could be truth itself; and what is regarded as the ideal teacher-pupil relationship could be the use of pure power or the concern of love or sympathy. With regard to legal-rational authority, it is true that, by means of rational reflection on what is taken for granted, including the aim of education, the authority of the teacher, etc., the procedure to cultivate and select proper teachers can be legally enacted and practically carried out. However, authority in the *de jure* sense is not necessarily authority in the *de facto* sense, that is to say, there is a gap between them to be bridged. In particular, when the curriculum of teacher education has a built-in bias, it is not easy to expect our qualified teachers to adopt the attitude of love or sympathy towards their pupils. For example: giving too much weight to our reflective life but too little to our pre-reflective life, paying too much attention to the learning of skills but too little to the cultivation of character, to mention only some easily-found phenomena in educational theories and practices. Heydrich in Weil's *Mendelssohn is on the roof* and Eichmann, the SS officer, in the Holocaust, discussed in the previous chapter concerning autonomy, are clear cases of this sort. In contrast to legal-rational authority, the way charismatic authority regulates others' will or behaviour is a *de facto* influence rather than a *de jure* right. Consider Peters' concrete case:
Suppose there is an explosion in a street or a fire in a cinema. Someone comes forward who is not a policeman or a fireman or manager of the cinema and who is quite unknown to all present—i.e. he is not regarded as 'an authority' in virtue of his personal history or known competence in an emergency. Suppose he starts issuing orders and making announcements. And suppose that he is unquestioningly obeyed and believed.---(1967, 91)

Peters' attempt to expound the reason why the person commanding is trusted is that '---his orders were obeyed simply because they were his', '---there is something about him which people recognize in virtue of which they do what he says simply because he says it'. Here, it is reasonable to assume that behind the same behaviour of obedience lie various mental states which could motivate people to accept orders. For instance, being open to and accepting of the value-content embodied in the announcement, being infected by the atmosphere of the crowd, being fascinated with the power of the person, intellectually following moral principles without emotional awareness and so forth. Therefore, I think, Winch is right in suggesting that the acceptance of authority, including the charismatic kind, logically involves the giving and grasping of sense (1967, 108–109). Nevertheless, it is only in the openness and participation of love that mutual understanding and trustful obedience are reached and the authoritative leaders become exemplary persons" (Scheler, PSV, 135). In other kinds of obedience mentioned above, in which the mental states of the people concerned are incompatible with genuinely mutual understanding, the person issuing orders might be an authoritarian rather than a charismatic authority.
It is worth considering that, insofar as the mutual understanding based on love between an authority and his followers disappears in an educational situation, the use of pure power makes teaching degenerate into indoctrination and pupils perpetually depend on the false authority of the teacher. In fact, what Peters worries about is, I think, the misuse of authority or the abuse of power, which already disqualifies authority itself, rather than genuine charismatic authority (1959, 55; 1966, 260~261). Being faced with this danger of simply viewing the pupils 'as conversion fodder' or using 'his subject-matter as a vehicle for his own private views', Downie et al. suggest three kinds of awareness as antidotes to it (1974, 125~126). These are: to see the pupil or student as a person who can appropriate his own meaning in his action and form his own view of life; to respect the objective structure of the subject-matter or knowledge which should not be distorted by individual political position, social class, gender, etc.; and finally to examine oneself whether, by his own effort, the above ideal awareness is continuously improved or retrogressed. In fact, it seems to me that the cultivation of these three kinds of awareness is implied in the cultivation of the emotional act of love, which, in a whole-hearted and warm acceptance of the beloved, predisposes us to perceive the ever-higher values in the object loved. As a corollary, the teacher with correct ordo amoris, apart from respecting the subjectivity of the pupils or the objectivity of knowledge, will continuously grasp and even actualize what is better for them or enrich the content of human knowledge in the process of the union of self and goodness or truth.

So far, three characteristics of the authority of the teacher can be pointed out to guide the conduct of teacher-pupil activities. To begin with, the
authority of the teacher or the teacher-pupil relationship should be based on the spiritual act of love, rather than on the use of pure power. It is only in this emotional act of love but not in sympathy, that the deepest privacy and moral tenor of the teacher reveals itself to the pupil and the latter can understand and trustfully obey the former. In the process of teaching, therefore, the teacher should constantly remind himself of whether the pupil is allowed to form his own perspective rather than only to accept others' perspectives passively, of whether reality is allowed to reveal itself rather than to be distorted or coloured by various sorts of bias. Secondly, the authority of the teacher in the teacher-pupil relationship is provisional rather than permanent. The reason can be seen in the triadic structure of teacher, learner and what is to be learnt. Insofar as the learner grows up so that he knows how to pursue knowledge critically or lead his own life; or so that what is found by the learner is better than what is taught by the teacher, the teacher is happy to relinquish the status of authority. Put differently, it can be said that the teacher with a genuine authority is the person who can evoke the individuality of the pupil in terms of pseudo-orders, pseudo-commandments, etc., and encourage the pupil to transcend what is passed on by the teacher. This is also the reason why the authority of the teacher is described as paradoxical (Peters, 1959, 48; 1966, 261).

Lastly, the authority of the teacher displays the characteristic of growth. If the teacher's authority is to be grounded in a concern for the right way of expanding the mind, together with the mutual understanding between teacher and pupil which results in the pupil's trusting obedience, then it is important that the teacher's character, knowledge and skill should improve in accordance with the development of professional knowledge regarding
education and the mind of the pupil. Otherwise, the teacher's authority in the *de facto* sense will be more separate from that in the *de jure* sense and the teacher in question will become an inadequate teacher. When pointing out the morally appropriate attitude towards persons, including pupils, as rule-following as well as self-determining agents, Downie et al. remind us that, even in attempting to convince the pupil, whose thinking or behaviour is regarded as immoral, in terms of argument rather than ridicule, bribery or threats, the teachers and fellow pupils run the risk of changing their minds (op. cit., 144–145). In the pursuit of truth or the cultivation of character, I think, the emergence of the above situation sometimes indicates the maturity of the pupil, but is not always a risk. As a result of these characteristics, the authority of the teacher or the ideal teacher-pupil relationship should be the kind marked by love, provisionality and improvement, instead of hate, indifference, the use of pure power, permanence and stagnation.

9-4. The pedagogical relationship and pedagogical love

Consider the fact that the emotion of love or sympathy is required to prevent authority from being the use of pure power. Then the ideal teacher-pupil relationship should be carried out through the spiritual act of love or the emotional function of sympathy rather than the attitude of domination and power. In such a case, the teacher actually becomes a lover and the pupil a beloved. However, in the triadic relationship between teacher, learner and what is to be learnt, what the teacher should love is not only his pupils but also knowledge, including the right way of expanding the mind. Suppose a person only loves his pupils or only loves knowledge, is he a genuine educational authority or teacher, and is his
relationship to his pupils ideal? Meanwhile, in the context of education, can the different interpretations of love mentioned in Part I, say, Plato's *eros*, Aristotle's *philia*, Christian *agape* or Confucian love, become the proper supporting affections for the carrying out of educational activities? Before answering this question, the aforementioned pedagogical relationship and its unique features should be examined in detail, after which pedagogical love is going to be explored.

So far it is plain that an ideal teacher-pupil relationship should be one sort of relationship of love, in which the relatively immature person will expand his mind and become a mature person by virtue of initiation by the relatively mature person. In fact, this sort of relationship based on the intentional act of love is the foundation of the pedagogical relationship as well. The reason is that the pivotal point in creating the pedagogical relationship lies in the general state-of-mind of the teachers and the pupils rather than in the physical proximity of their bodies (Vandenberg, 1975, 38). Here, we can imagine the various aggregates of the teachers and the pupils with different affective conditions, resulting in different atmospheres. Suppose a school or a classroom is full of the atmosphere of indifference, resentment, disappointment, etc. It is hard to believe that in these situations the receptivity towards others and the world could come into existence as the affective condition of any learning. In everyday teacher-pupil interaction, in the absence of pupils' openness and acceptance genuine learning and teaching, which could be reached only in the pedagogical relationship, become problematic, to say nothing of the expansion of the mind and the development of the person. In contrast, the teachers and pupils who have a deep-seated and pre-existing affectivity of love can truly open to each other and to what is taught and learnt, which
can form the pedagogical atmosphere and make the pedagogical relationship possible.

Although the ideal teacher-pupil relationship or the pedagogical relationship is based on the spiritual feeling of love, genetically it begins with the attitude of one-way love rather than mutual love. In expounding how the child becomes a developing person and establishes the I-Thou or subject-subject relationship with others, Buber and others point out that the mother or the educator should play or actually plays the unique role of 'double agent', that is to say, the mother or the educator 'stands at both ends of the shared situation, the child at only one' or 'acts both on behalf of herself and of her child' (Buber, 1954, 99–101; Spiecker, 1984, 204–207). In fact, what is necessary for the role of 'double agent' is the moral tenor of helping a human being become a person as a moral being, and the emotional openness and awareness implied in individual *ordo amoris*\(^{13}\), which includes empathetic or sympathetic understanding of others' mental states. Without empathetic or sympathetic understanding, the mother or the educator will have difficulty in emotionally perceiving a child's wishes, needs, etc. This is also required in the process of 'giving without taking' as in unselfish devotion or in the prerequisite of equality between lovers\(^{14}\). More important, without the deep-seated feeling of love, the mother or the educator could be indifferent to the expansion of the child's mind or will not have the intention to help the child for his own sake. It is only through the relationship of 'one-way affairs' or pseudo-dialogues, that the child or the pupil can develop his personality and establish the symmetrical relationship of parity, regarded by Brook (1973, 76–77) as a most important principle of person-person relationship, with others.
Here one question concerning the distinction between love and sympathy may be raised. It is true that, when showing sympathy for others, what is implied includes *practical concern* for them, 'active sympathy', as well as simply *feeling with* others, 'passive sympathy' or 'empathy' (Maclagan, 1960, 210–212; Downie et al., 1974, 144–146 & 152). Thus, can sympathy replace the role of love in the pedagogical relationship? Before answering this question, two points deserve to be taken into account. Firstly, as is discussed in Chapter 6, sympathy is the passive or receptive function comprised of two different functions: vicariously visualized feeling and participation in this feeling. Take the discussion of Downie et al. as an example.

Suppose that a teacher is aware of the difficult home circumstances of a certain pupil and has been showing sympathy towards the pupil. But suppose that in the course of this the teacher becomes aware that the pupil is involved in some criminal activities. However much concern the teacher might have for the pupil he would be acting wrongly if he were to pretend that the criminal activities did not matter or if he were to tell lies about the activities on the pupil's behalf (op. cit., 144–145).

'Active sympathy', regarded by Downie et al. as one morally appropriate attitude of respect for others as ends, is the attitude of seeing the pupil as a self-determining agent, which enables us to recognize the existence of 'the pupil in trouble' or 'the pupil in need'. However, what matters is that love as a spontaneous movement of the heart can open our eyes to what has not come into existence yet but is more valuable to the pupil or the situation. For instance, in this case, once the moral tenor of the teacher
consists of the intentional act of love, instead of resentment, then the way for the teacher to help the pupil for his own sake could be to inspire the pupil to perceive the undesirable aspect of his criminal activities, to request the help of social workers to improve the pupil's home circumstance, to reflect on the legitimacy of the criminal activities concerned etc. Secondly, because it is possible to have fellow-feeling for someone we do not love, the teacher could have fellow-feeling for the pupil without loving the pupil at all. Even in the above practical concern of 'active sympathy', it is doubtful whether the sympathizer could wholeheartedly and warmly accept the pupil's individuality and independence. In the genuine pedagogical atmosphere based on pedagogical love, the teacher can transcend himself and participate in the pupil's life, in which the level and degree of the practical concern, including that out of 'active sympathy', is circumscribed. As a corollary, what is required in the pedagogical relationship, where the pupil is able to expand his mind and become a mature person, is not merely sympathy but the spiritual act of love, which predisposes the teacher to perceive the ever-higher value in the pupil.

When investigating love in the context of educational activities, one question should naturally be explored: what is the relationship between pedagogical love and the different interpretations of love mentioned in Part I? It is true that some sort of teaching and learning could take place in the relationship of Plato's eros, Aristotelian philia, Christian agape or Confucian love. However, are these relationships of love appropriate to be the ideal pedagogical relationship based on pedagogical love? In other words, it can be asked whether these different kinds of love are suitable for guiding concrete educational activities and should be cultivated in
teacher education. Should an educator form the same relationship with the educated as that which appeared between Socrates and Alcibiades, between the friends within Aristotle's virtue-friendship, between the father and his lost son or between *jen*-man and what is loved? What is common in these relationships of love includes the lover's self-transcendence and acceptance of the beloved, the awareness of what is ever-valuable for and the participation in the life of the latter. Apart from manifesting the aforementioned qualities, I think, pedagogical love can be distinguished from other kinds of love when its origin, the mental state of the lover and what is loved are taken into account (Spranger, 1928 & 1971; Buber, 1954).

First of all, pedagogical love does not originate in pure instincts or a completely biological drive. In comparison to parental care, the love required for educational activities should be based on the spiritual relationship of a conscious mind rather than on the pure blood relationship and tradition. Parental love might be the archetype of all upbringing and education, but it is insufficient to become and should not be the equivalent of pedagogic love. It is only through the grasp of the value of developing the child's mind and the cultivation of the sense of duty to educate the new generation that this unique educational affection and the genuine educator can come into existence. Secondly, in the process of the movement of the human mind towards unlimitedness, the human being can perceive his own ignorance and pursue what is good and true. Pedagogic love can be regarded, I think, as the manifestation of the abundant aspect of human nature in the imitation of the life-giving of Heaven or the self-giving of *agape*, but without the presupposition of original sin. Meanwhile, anyone with the potentiality to develop as a
spiritual person can become the object of pedagogical love, without any sort of appraisal of valuable quality, as is the precondition of Plato's *eros* or Aristotelian *philia*. Therefore, a genuine educator is the person who could enjoy his selfless giving out of the abundance of his character, knowledge, skills, etc., which is only possible on condition that he possesses correct *ordo amoris* and is able to continuously enrich himself. Thirdly, what is loved in pedagogical love? What the genuine teacher loves is the potentiality of the unfolding of the pupil's mind towards various fields of values, say, holiness, beauty, truth, etc. Although the pupil is ugly, wrong, poor, mean, or impious, the teacher believes that the *status quo* could become better and the pupil could actualize his potentiality of values.

Plainly, although being interwoven with other forms of love, pedagogic love should not be identified as Plato's *eros*, Aristotelian *philia*, Christian *agape* or Confucian love. When teaching the pupil, the teacher should frequently ask himself whether the process of teacher-pupil interaction is being carried out with an undertone of sexual enjoyment or aristocratical onesidedness, as is criticized by Spranger (1971, 538–540) and Buber (1954, 94). Moreover, insofar as pedagogical love is replaced by Christian *agape* or *caritas*, education will be aimed at giving relief or alleviating suffering and individuality may be ignored so that the pupil can be initiated into a certain sort of religious belief. Although *jen*-man could love all men, including the educated, and help them to unfold life-force, Confucian love should go beyond the earliest love-relation in the family and is thereby qualified to become pedagogical love. In other words, in an educational situation the teacher-pupil relationship is based on Buber's one-sided experience of inclusion rather than the mutual experience of
inclusion between mature persons, which could be the fruit of the successful pedagogical relationship (op. cit., 99-101). In fact, with the development of culture and the accumulation of knowledge, the qualities of pedagogical love, a unique kind of personal love, become much clearer and more distinct from other forms of love.

Thus far, the genuine educator should be the lover of both the educated and of what is learnt. In interpreting the significance of Plato's *eros* for the activity of teaching, Socrates is described by Alston as the lover of both Alcibiades and philosophy (1991, 390). More important, it is only in the love-relationship between them that Alcibiades can participate in the joint pursuit of wisdom and truth and establish friendship with Socrates. As a matter of fact, both the love of wisdom and the love of the educated are compatible and necessary for a genuine educator. With the aid of wisdom or knowledge, the teacher can love his pupils in a correct and adequate way. However, without pedagogical love, it will be hard to initiate the young generation into the world of history and culture, let alone the unfolding of mind or the cultivation of correct *ordo amoris*. In particular, when the teacher becomes a lover rather than an observer, the pupil's dormant value possibilities may be awakened and the deepest learning may happen in the pupil's response of love (Spranger, op. cit., 175; Elliott, 1974, 145). That is to say, the pupil can realize what he has already known or theoretically understood and convert his system of faith into a much deeper level of life. For instance, a cruel pupil can change his *ordo amoris* and prefer the value of life to that of pleasure when the value-core of the person he loves is open to and perceived by him. In such a case, the teacher is not only an authority, but an exemplary person, in terms of whose authentic demonstration the pupil is invited to become a
more valuable person. It can be said that, in the triangle of teacher-pupil interaction, through pedagogical love and the pedagogical relationship the pupil learns to love others, the world, knowledge, etc., and is finally weaned to become a mature person, who possesses a correct *ordo amoris* and continuously unfolds his value possibilities.
NOTES

2. Cf. Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 6 section 2.


4. Cf. Chapter 4 section 3, Chapter 5 section 1 and Chapter 6 section 2.


8. In understanding the contrast between authority and power, love and sympathy may be treated together; but for a full understanding of the pedagogical relationship, it is important to distinguish love from sympathy. See Chapter 6, and p. 303 below.


15. Cf. Chapter 6 sections 1 & 2 concerning the distinction between love and sympathy.


18. In Chapter 6 section 3, it has been pointed out that romantic love is not the only kind of love which is unprescribed and spontaneous. At least, pedagogical love and Aristotle's friendship possess these features as well. In this context, from the point of view of human emotions, we can make two senses of the spontaneity of love. First, the intentional act of love is spontaneous in the sense that it originates in the spiritual person and refers to the not-yet-existing values of the beloved, while sympathy is a receptive function referring to the feelings of others (cf. Chapter 6, section 2). Secondly, the display of a full-fledged love is spontaneous, while deliberate consideration is involved, or perhaps necessary, in the process of the cultivation of love (cf. Chapter 4 sections 2 & 3 and Chapter 2 section 3). As well as Aristotle's virtue-friendship, pedagogical love is a slow-ripening fruit (cf. Chapter 1 section 2).
Conclusion

My two main purposes in this thesis are to clarify the essential meanings of love and to understand how central it is in educational activities aimed at the cultivation of the person. In this conclusion I will try to sum up its essential meanings in terms of love itself, what is loved and the person-as-lover and its centrality in education in terms of pedagogical love, the education of emotions and the relationship between love and autonomy. Apart from that, some limitations and suggestions of this investigation will be put forward.

Love understood as an intentional act of the spiritual person rather than a sporadic sensation is able to predispose human beings to constantly perceive and interpret the beloved in the light of higher values. However, once the feeling of love is recognized just as passions, sensations, etc., its crucial feature of movement in value-ception will be neglected. Actually, before the arising of passions and sensations, individuals' ordo amoris determines their main and possible directions. In other words, the scope of the realm of values we perceive, the embodiment of our original Vital Impulse, both physical and spiritual, or the extent of openness of our heart is able to regulate our desires and sensations or what kinds of passions may come out. In the same way, love manifests its spontaneity instead of passive reaction. As a result, if love is merely regarded and discussed as passions and sensations or if love is wholly situated in the discourse of discursive reason, the result of this effort is plainly one-sided and insufficient.
With the assistance of love, human beings can establish the deepest, most intimate relationship with our interacting objects, including self, others, transcendental being, values, knowledge and lifeless things. In the process of cognition, tentative theories can continuously be falsified and the horizon of values widened and promoted. When reflecting on ourselves or interacting with others in a non-objectifying attitude, we see what is reflected on or interacted with as having an independent and equal intrinsic worth. In this continuous movement, the objects of love can extend to transcendental being and lifeless things. Therefore, it can be said that without love human development will stagnate and then interpersonal interaction is getting superficial, even becomes the domination of one's will over another's.

There is an intrinsic inseparable relationship between love and the beloved, the object which possesses value. The vision perceived in love draws us to a higher level of values, for example, from possession-value to sharing-value in Butler's case, and sets the possible level of moral development. On the other hand, what is loved is someone or something with some sort of values, not just pure things. The life-giving feature of love enables us to grasp a higher level of value in objects than can be found otherwise and then to make an effort to actualize this value. Once love disappears, the person with pleasure-disposition or usefulness-disposition will lose the opportunity to cultivate virtue-disposition and will be unable to form virtue-friendship. By the same token, the vision of value apprehended in love can lead the lover to embrace or go beyond a given system of morality or a given ethos.
The person-as-lover is the person with his individual unique *ordo amoris*, which implies his preference-hierarchy, his openness or receptivity to the world, and his non-objectifying reflexivity. Meanwhile, the person-as-lover can participate in communities and form a solidaristic relationship in the execution of intentional social acts. In other words, the feeling of love calls human beings to take part in social life via the formation of a shared sense of common goods. In particular, the more the common goods are based on spiritual values with the characteristic of non-*divisibility*, viz. the less they must be divided in being participated in and perceived, the more the person-as-self-lover can actualize himself in loving others or in participation in social life.

Moreover, the feeling of love is of fundamental significance in education. Three main reasons substantiate this statement. Firstly, in the I-Thou relationship based on the intentional feeling of love, what is more valuable for the pupils can be visualized by the teacher. This awareness and acceptance of the not-yet-developed desirable potentiality in pupils, which can not be obtained in an I-It relationship, makes possible the pupils' response of love and the development of personality. Secondly, the teacher's individual *ordo amoris* and the atmosphere of openness based on love and trust in school mainly determine the pupils' growth in receptiveness to reality, expansion of preference-hierarchy, sensitivity to the features of situations, authenticity and integrity in feelings, and the deep-seated disposition to perceive intentional objects, all of which require more attention in the education of the emotions. Finally, because the full involvement of mind and the attribution of an individual's meaning to the 'nomos' are realized in the subject-subject relationship of love, the
education of autonomy as a valuable ideal should take root in the cultivation of love.

However, in comparison to Plato's *eros*, Aristotelian *philia*, Christian *agape*, Confucian love or parental love, pedagogical love as a unique kind of personal love possesses its distinctive features. That is to say, pedagogical love on the part of the teachers or educators originates in the spiritual relationship of a conscious mind. Furthermore, pedagogic love is the manifestation of the abundant aspect of human nature. Thirdly, the person-as-pedagogical-lover can love anyone with the potentiality of the development of the spiritual person without discrimination. Last but not least, the genuine teacher is concerned about the developing potentiality of various values in the pupil's mind and their unfolding. As a result, it is through pedagogical love that human beings can be invited to love what is beautiful or good, to develop good qualities of character, or to imitate divine love or Heaven's life-giving heart.

Clearly, the comprehension of the essential meanings of love is not tantamount to the practice or the bringing out of love. Apart from the clarification of the essential meanings, the investigation of the genetic conditions for the emergence or maintenance of love or pedagogical love is not less important. In this case, multi-disciplinary cooperation is necessary for a holistic understanding or cultivation of love. Secondly, it was found in the process of this study that human emotions are full of subtle nuances. Therefore, the investigation of language and concepts in accordance with human experiences of emotions is required as well. Finally, apart from love, reason and its relationship with love appear to be crucial for the unfolding of personality, though these are partly addressed.
in Chapters 6 and 8. This will be another really worthwhile task to undertake.
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