THE INTERNATIONAL AID APPROACH
TO EDUCATIONAL PLANNING:

A CASE STUDY OF THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
OF SECONDARY EDUCATION IN SWAZILAND

BY
RAYMOND PETER JONES

SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PhD,
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

NOVEMBER 1987
ABSTRACT

What happened in the planning and development of secondary education in Swaziland can be seen as representing a common African experience, and exemplifying a general paradox which characterised the aid process. What donors regarded as persistent weaknesses in planning and management in recipient countries was, in varying degrees, a way of protecting an African view of education against donor intervention. The development of secondary education was shaped by an African approach and the variety of societal institutions across African countries, rather than by the acceptance or imposition of international models and the responsible interventionism of donor agencies.

The exceptionally well protected nature of the Swazi case stems from a distinctively Swazi paradox. Extreme dependence on South Africa provided a form of security within which the Swazi monarchy was enabled to give full expression to a remarkably homogeneous traditional system, a system which had broken down elsewhere in Africa. The functioning of a powerful traditional monarchy and the persistence of traditional institutions and processes gave Swaziland a rare degree of autonomy in protecting the Swazi model of education against external pressures brought to bear by a substantial array of donor agencies.

The Swazi experience provides support for the view that education, far from being a powerful instrument for economic and social change, has only a limited role to play in the development process. The particularity of the Swazi experience, and the reason it was an extremely heightened case of a more general phenomenon, arises out of the features that imposed fundamental restrictions on alterations in existing societal structures. These features were those that form the two sides of the Swazi paradox, the functioning of a powerful traditional monarchy and extreme dependence on South Africa.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks to John Cameron for support and encouragement which continued after his retirement from the EDC Department; to Trevor Coombe, my supervisor, for substantial advice and assistance and insights into educational planning in African countries, particularly in the southern African region; and to John Anderson for sharpening an awareness of the 'age of practicality' and the exceptional nature of the Swazi case. My thanks to numerous Swazi and international colleagues, notably Bella Katamzi, Maria Mbelu, Mats Eklund, and Colin Sentongo, for a variety of formal and informal contracts in educational planning in Swaziland. In Mauritius my thanks to Liette Laval for typing a working draft, and to Evelyne Lam for transforming a final working draft into a finished typescript.

Cap Malheureux

MAURITIUS

November 1987
# CONTENTS

**Introduction**

8

**Chapter 1: Education for Development**

- The theory of human capital 13
- Educational planning 17
- The manpower approach 19
- Aid for education 23

**Chapter 2: Education for Rural Development**

- Education for rural development 33
- Non-formal and basic education 37
- Educational planning 42
- Aid for education 46

**Chapter 3: Donor Intervention**

- Responsible interventionism 63
- The impact of donor intervention 72
- Aid for education and dependency 80

**Chapter 4: An African Approach to Educational Planning**

- An African approach 90
- Economic and social change 105
- The international aid approach 107

**Chapter 5: Swaziland**

- Size and population 116
- The political system 117
- Tradition and conservatism 120
- The economy 122

**Chapter 6: The Education and Training System**

- The formal education and training system 138
- Non-formal education and training 144
- Aid for education 146
Chapter 7: The Swazi Approach to Secondary Education

. The Swazi model of education
. The financing of secondary education
. The administration of secondary education

Chapter 8: Donor Intervention in the Planning and Development of Secondary Education in Swaziland

. Aid for educational planning
. The education plan
. Donor projects
. The impact of aid for education

Chapter 9: The Impact of Donor Intervention in the Planning and Development of Secondary Education in Swaziland

. The education plan
. Educational planning
. Project implementation

Chapter 10: The Implementation of Swaziland's Third Education Plan

. The development of secondary education
. Economic and social change
. The demand for secondary education

Conclusion

Charts and Tables

Bibliography
CHARTS AND TABLES

Charts
1. Structure of the formal education system. 261
2. Ministry of Education organisational structure. 262

Tables
2. Primary schools, enrolments, number of teachers, and pupil teacher ratios by district, 1978 and 1982. 263
3. Primary school enrolments by grade and sex, 1978 and 1982. 264
4. Primary teaching force by qualification and citizenship, 1978 and 1982. 264
5. Primary Certificate Examination results, 1975 to 1981. 265
6. Grade 7 enrolments, Primary Certificate Examination passes, and Form 1 entry, 1978 to 1982. 265
8. Secondary schools, enrolments, number of teachers, and pupil teacher ratios by district, 1978 and 1982. 267
10. Secondary teaching force by qualification and citizenship, 1978 and 1982. 268
13. Planned and actual enrolments in junior secondary classes, 1976 to 1982. 269
14. Planned and actual enrolments in senior secondary classes, 1976 to 1982. 270
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Junior Certificate Examination results, 1973 to 1982.</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Form 3 enrolments, Junior Certificate Examination passes, and Form 4 entry, 1978 to 1982.</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Junior Certificate Examination class 3 passes entering Form 4, 1979 to 1982.</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Cambridge Overseas School Certificate examination results, 1968 to 1982.</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Cambridge Overseas School Certificate examination results in selected high schools, 1982.</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>University of Swaziland enrolments, 1978/79 to 1982/83.</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>University of Swaziland output of Swazi degree, diploma, and certificate holders, 1978/79 to 1981/82.</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Planned and actual supply of primary school teachers, 1978 to 1982.</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Planned and actual supply of secondary school teachers, 1978 to 1982.</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Total Government expenditure on education and training, estimates 1978/79 (E '000).</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Total Government expenditure on education and training, estimates 1982/83 (E '000).</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Ministry of Education recurrent estimates and expenditure, total and secondary education, 1978 to 1982 (E '000).</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Capital costs (E '000) education and training as estimated in the Third National Development Plan 1978/79 to 1982/83.</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ministry of Education capital estimates (E '000) by activities, 1978/79 to 1982/83.</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Discussion of the international aid approach to educational planning is focused on donor assistance in developing countries in English speaking Africa. It provides a frame of reference for the Swazi case study of the planning and development of secondary education, with particular reference to Swaziland's Third National Development Plan 1978/79-1982/83.

The international aid approach to educational planning

Aid to education is shaped to a large extent by the separate traditions and corporate styles of the various donor agencies, and there is considerable diversity of forms and styles of assistance within the donor community. At the same time, there is a sense in which the various bilateral and multilateral agencies see themselves, and are seen by others, as an international aid community. Strong similarities in policy and common concerns for the most effective use of the aid they provide have shaped an international aid approach to educational planning.

The international aid approach is based on two closely linked assumptions. The first is that education, as an investment in human resource development, is a central element in economic growth and national development. The second is that educational planning can direct and control the development of education, and gear it to the promotion of economic growth and national development. Chapter 1 describes the main features of this approach in the 1960s, with reference to the manpower approach. Chapter 2 describes the main features in the 1970s, with reference to the education for rural development strategy.

Chapter 3 describes the common concerns and similarities in approach which characterised the responsible interventionism of donor agencies, and indicates that aid to education was designed to have an influence in the planning and development of education in African countries, whether or not this intention was made explicit. It examines the restrictions imposed on donor intervention by inadequacies in planning and management on the donor as well as the recipient side, and by critical limitations in the international aid approach to educational planning.
Chapter 4 describes an African approach to educational planning which was at variance with the international aid approach, and which imposed fundamental restrictions on the influence donor intervention was intended to exert. It refers to critiques which suggested that educational development depended upon rather than brought about economic and social change, and it suggests that the planning and development of education in African countries was shaped by an African approach and the variety of societal institutions across African countries, rather than by international models and the responsible interventionism of donor agencies.

A final section in chapter 4 refers to the persistence of the main assumptions that underpinned the international aid approach. In spite of the general air of scepticism that surrounded most commentaries on educational planning and aid to education in the late 1970s and 1980s, donor rationale for aid to education remained virtually unchanged.

The planning and development of secondary education in Swaziland

There are broad similarities between conditions in Swaziland and in other African countries. While chapter 5 recognises these similarities, the account of Swazi political, social, and economic structures draws attention to the combination of features which gives Swaziland its distinctive character: the homogeneity of the Swazi people, the unchallenged authority of the traditional monarchy, the persistence of traditional institutions and customs, the monarchy's participation in the modern economy, and Swaziland's over-all dependence on South Africa.

Chapter 6 describes the Swazi education and training system, the array of donors that provided aid to education, and the various forms of aid they provided. The Swazi model of education, described in chapter 7, was based on the principle of education as an inalienable right and Government preparedness to respond to popular pressures by making education available to all who wanted it. The Swazi model was linked with a largely non-interventionist approach to educational planning, as evidenced in the financing and administration of secondary education.
Chapter 8 examines donor intervention in the planning and development of secondary education in Swaziland, with particular reference to aid for educational planning, the part played by donor assistance in the preparation of the third education plan, and the projects various agencies were prepared to provide in support of a donor view of 'what was best' for Swaziland. Donor intervention was designed to have an influence, and appeared to exert considerable influence in the planning and development of secondary education, but its impact was restricted by limitations in planning and co-ordination on the donor as well as the Swazi side.

The influence aid to education was intended to exert was restricted more critically by lack of Swazi commitment to donor policies and lack of support for donor projects, the persistence of the Swazi approach, and the pragmatic nature of the Swazi response to donor intervention. Chapter 9 describes the dominant influence of the Swazi model of education in the preparation of the education plan, and the ways in which the operation of educational planning and the implementation of donor projects were neutralised.

The account of plan implementation in chapter 10 indicates that the development of secondary education was shaped by the Swazi model of education, not by donor policies incorporated into the plan. Had donor policies been implemented, there was little if any chance that implementation would have brought about the kind of economic and social change envisaged in the international aid approach. Existing economic and social structures were shaped by the vested interests of a powerful monarchy and Swaziland's over-all dependence on South Africa, and the secondary education and training system played little part in this process.

A final section in chapter 10 describes the persistence of popular pressures for the expansion of secondary education, continuing conflict between the Swazi and international approaches to secondary education, and the persistent dominance of the Swazi model of education.

What happened in the planning and development of secondary education in Swaziland can be generalised in varying degrees across other African countries. But, as indicated at various points in the main text and in the conclusion, the persistence of the Swazi
approach, the strong pragmatism of the Swazi response to donor intervention, and the marked degree of protection afforded the Swazi model of education were ultimately shaped by the combination of distinctively Swazi characteristics referred to in chapter 5.

Documentation

Description of the international aid and African approaches to educational planning makes use of donor agency documentation. This includes policy statements, reports of international conferences and seminars, and studies commissioned or supported by various donor agencies. It draws on critiques of the international aid approach and commentaries on aid for education written by expatriate observers. Where possible, this material is supported by reference to accounts of educational planning and aid for education from the recipient side.

Description of the Swazi background and the planning and development of secondary education in Swaziland makes use of official Swazi documentation and commentaries by Swazi and expatriate observers. It draws on project documentation, sector reviews, and reports of analytical surveys prepared by donor 'experts' and visiting missions. Where donor agency documentation is restricted or classified, it cannot be referred to directly. Documentation which is unclassified or no longer restricted has been cited. In some instances, Swazi documentation was prepared with donor assistance and reflected donor views, in others reports and reviews prepared by 'experts' and visiting missions were 'ventriloquised' as Swazi documentation. The status of the various kinds of Swazi documentation is referred to in the main text.

Supporting 'collateral' evidence is provided in the form of reference to analysis of the international aid and African approaches to educational planning, particularly in chapters 3 and 4. In addition, the Swazi case study is informed by what has been described as 'anecdotal' evidence based on "private knowledge" and available through the formal and informal contacts of the trade (1), and the "unavoidable reference to daily, ordinary, occupational workings" (2). In this case, it is grounded in the writer's participation in educational planning in Swaziland as adviser to the Ministry of Education for four years from 1980 to 1984.
Footnotes follow immediately after the chapter to which they refer. Charts and tables are collected together and placed after the conclusion. The bibliography is placed at the end of the thesis.

Footnotes

1 Taylor W  The Contribution of Research to the Study and Practice of Educational Administration, 1975, p 211.

The international aid approach to educational planning is based on two assumptions, which are closely interlinked. The first is that education is a central element in economic and social progress. The second is that educational planning is capable of directing and controlling the development of education, and gearing it to the demands of economic and social development.

This chapter examines the main features of this approach in the 1960s. It describes the influence of the theory of human capital and modernisation theories of economic development, the emergence of what was regarded as a new 'science' of educational planning, the widespread application of the manpower approach in African countries, and donor rationale for aid for education. It concludes with reference to the disillusion with the consequences of the international aid approach when it had become clear by the end of the 1960s that initial expectations had not been realised.

The theory of human capital

The international aid approach was firmly based on the notion of education as human resource development. It was shaped and directed by what Coombs referred to as "a new recognition of the critical role which education and human resources had to play in the process of economic growth and over-all national development" (2). This recognition stemmed from the remarkable interest in the early 1960s in the economics of education (3) and the rediscovery of the importance of education to the development process (4), and in particular from what Bowman described as "a core concept that has come as something of a revolution in economic thought, that of investment in human beings" (5).

Schultz, who was largely responsible for the formulation of this concept, argued that education constituted an investment (private and societal) in human beings and that an increased investment in human capital "predominantly accounts for the productive superiority of the technically advanced countries". As long as assistance to underdeveloped countries to help them achieve economic growth concentrated on (non human) capital aid and neglected the need to invest in human beings, their rate of growth would be seriously
limited. It simply was not possible "to have the fruits of modern agriculture and the abundance of modern industry without making large investments in human beings" (6).

In a background paper delivered at the ECA/UNESCO Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa held at Addis Ababa in 1961, Singer pointed out that there had been a fundamental shift in thinking about the problem of economic growth and development. The basic problem was no longer considered to be the creation of wealth but rather the creation of the capacity to create wealth. The capacity to create wealth "resided in the people of a country" and, once a society had acquired this capacity, the creation of wealth itself became almost incidental. Progress in underdeveloped countries was based on "human investment" and, although it could be "nursed, assisted and stimulated from abroad", it would and "must always be a domestic product" (7).

Once it was accepted that progress depended on 'human investment', it was a short step to the idea that money spent on education, as a direct investment in human resource development, was a precondition for economic growth and modernisation in underdeveloped countries. The background papers at the Addis Ababa conference, written by UNESCO staff and influential Western academics, left African member states in no doubt that the development of education, and in particular secondary and post-secondary education, was an essential element in any plan for economic and national development. The conference resolutions and recommendations emphasised that education was "a gainful economic investment" and that economic and social progress was "indissolubly linked" with the development of education. Education "should be given its due weight as a productive investment and as a basic factor in economic and social development" and the planning of education should be integrated with over-all economic planning (8).

There was a sense in which the widely held notion that underdeveloped countries were caught up in a vicious circle of poverty and stagnation, summed up bluntly by Nurkse in the proposition that "a country is poor because it is poor" (9), seemed to have been turned upside down. Now it could be argued that no country need be poor if it could make a large investment in the development of its educational system.
For example, Curle (10) followed Myrdal's argument (11) that circular causation, given an initial push to start a cumulative process of development, could move in an upward as well as a downward spiral. A crash programme of investment in education, supported by external aid, would provide a launching pad for "a leap forward from the past", enabling underdeveloped countries to break out of the vicious circle of poverty and stagnation into a progressive circle of change and modernisation.

The international aid approach to educational planning was shaped by borrowings from the modernisation theories of economic development, current in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which maintained that underdeveloped countries were at an early stage of the same trajectory of economic growth as more advanced countries. Underdeveloped countries were, in fact, 'developing' countries. Rostow's theory of economic growth (12) assumed the existence of an economic growth path which all countries must follow. It identified five stages of economic growth and, although a country could not miss out a stage, it could emulate and catch up with more advanced countries by accelerating the transition from one stage to the next. What was needed was a massive injection of capital aid and technical assistance for the modern sector of the economy to support "a take-off into sustained growth".

Harbison and Myers (13), basing their theory on what appeared to be a positive correlation between a country's level of economic development and enrolment rates at different levels of schooling, argued that there were four stages of educational growth (roughly comparable to Rostow's stages of economic growth) through which all countries had to pass as their economies grew, and suggested that underdeveloped countries could accelerate their economic growth by accelerating the transition from one stage of educational growth to the next. An underdeveloped country that wanted to emulate and catch up with more advanced countries would need to give "absolute priority" to the expansion and improvement of second-level education, which would provide the high-level manpower indispensable for the development of the modern sector of the economy through the secondary school system itself or by providing an avenue of access to vocational training programmes or professional training at the university. The limited availability of second-level education was the greatest 'bottleneck' in the modernisation of underdeveloped economies and
"an initial heavy investment in human resource development is necessary to get a country started on the road to self sustaining growth".

The priority given to the expansion of secondary and post-secondary education and the provision of high-level manpower for the development of the modern sector of the economy was rationalised in terms of the 'trickle down' theory of economic development, in which Lewis suggested that the effects of modernisation would spread downward throughout the economy, bringing employment opportunities and social benefits to the whole population (14). Coombs, in a survey of educational planning in the 1960s, argued that:

"it made sense to give initial priority to educating the most needed types of manpower for economic growth, for without such growth the desired long run expansion of education and other major social objectives would simply not be possible" (15).

In a lecture on ways to improve United States foreign educational aid, Coombs described education as "a direct and essential investment in development", and argued the need for a strong commitment in aid programmes to the idea that "educational investment was a basic prerequisite to economic growth and over-all development" on the grounds that:

"only by massive educational effort can the developing nations develop their human resources, and only by developing their human resources can they achieve economic growth and social advancement.... It is clear that industrialisation and the whole modernisation process cannot proceed far without the development of human resources, and for this a major investment in education is required" (16).

It was also clear that this major investment would depend, to a considerable extent, on the availability of foreign aid. In a discussion of problems and prospects for United States aid in African countries, Bigelow pointed out they had "limited - very limited - financial and skilled human resources" and, however valiant their own efforts might be, they could not hope
"out of their own resources, to pay for anything like the educational system that is required if they are to advance at anything like the rate to which they aspire".

Given these conditions, "their only hope lies in outside assistance and the immediate investment must be massive if the hoped-for consequences are to ensue" (17).

The idea that a substantial investment in secondary and post-secondary education was a prerequisite for economic growth and over-all national development became "almost a slogan", one that had gained "universal acceptance", and which was rarely, if ever questioned (18). The human capital theory had provided what was seen as a plausible, almost axiomatic, justification for allocating substantial assistance for education in developing countries. But the manpower for economic growth slogan overlooked the fact that, though it might be true that economic growth required prior investment in education, it did not follow that investment in education would bring about economic growth (19).

Educational planning

Coombs argued that the need to harness education to economic growth called for a new kind of educational planning to replace old ideas and practices that would no longer suffice. What was needed was a much more complicated and extensive kind of educational planning than that which had been acceptable in dealing with what were described as the relatively simple problems of the past. According to Coombs, there was, in the early 1960s, a general agreement among leading educationalists and economists that this new kind of educational planning must be comprehensive in order to embrace and co-ordinate all the main components of the education system, it must be effectively linked with the requirements for economic growth and social progress, it must take account of a much longer time perspective, and it must be an integral part of education management (20).

Although not always stated explicitly in the literature, the notion that the development of education was 'plannable' leaned heavily on the assumption that there was a general 'science' of educational planning. Coombs suggested the existence of a body of generalised knowledge (admittedly still imperfect and in need of further
development) and a set of methods and techniques (already often highly sophisticated though still capable of further refinement) that could be applied in a 'rational' and 'systematic' way by appropriately trained 'experts' to the process of educational development. The basic logic, concepts, and principles of the new 'science' of educational planning were seen as universally applicable and its methodologies and techniques as sufficiently flexible and adaptable to be applied in a variety of diverse settings and different conditions (21).

What Coombs described as the 'young science' of educational planning encompassed planning, policy making, and implementation within the same framework. In theory, they were seen as inseparable elements of a single determining and controlling process capable of systematically shaping and directing future developments in education. What was supposed to happen was that the 'scientific' application of new methods and techniques would lead to the formulation of 'rational' policy decisions, which would be incorporated into an educational development plan, and systematically implemented within a given time span. Education, it was assumed, would respond to and be controlled by the plan and develop according to its declared intentions and objectives (22). Educational planning as described in a 1968 UNESCO report, was "the application of a rational and scientific approach" which was "vital to the orderly and efficient development of education". (23).

Once it had been accepted that economic and social progress was "indissolubly linked" with the development of education and that the planning of education, at least in theory, was an integral part of national development planning, it was a short step to the notion that educational planning was capable of determining and controlling not only educational development but economic and social development as well. Seen in these terms, educational planning was a form of social engineering directed towards solving the most pressing economic and social problems in underdeveloped countries. Although this was not always stated explicitly in the literature, much of it was couched in terminology which appeared to suggest that the prevailing international model of educational planning, by determining and controlling the development of education, was expected to exercise substantial control over economic and social development as well (24).
The manpower approach

The manpower approach to educational planning was an attempt to link the development of education to the high-level manpower requirements of the economy and to integrate the planning of education with over-all economic planning. As described by Parnes (25), it was "essentially economic in its orientation". It started from the proposition that educational planning must give priority to economic development. The production of manpower was the most important function of the education system, and the development of education could, and should, be determined by a quantitative forecast (matching levels and types of schooling to broad occupational categories) for the requirements of educated manpower necessary to support the pace of economic development. The long lead time needed to produce manpower through the education system meant that forecasts of future manpower requirements should be long-term forecasts, covering a span of ten to twenty years.

Parnes argued that manpower forecasts, derived from targets for economic growth,

"do not, or at least should not, purport to be pure unconditional forecasts. That is, they are not so much predictions of what will happen in the manpower field as indications of what must happen if certain targets for economic growth are to be realised"

and, in this sense, they were "technologically determined" (26). Forecasts of future manpower requirements would determine the rate of educational expansion, providing the basis for calculating the enrolments in each level and branch of the education system necessary to achieve the required annual outputs of educated manpower. The required expansion in enrolments in the various components of the education system would then be used to estimate the requirements for additional facilities and teachers, which, in turn, would provide the basis for estimating the costs of the required expansion (27).

The conventional rationale for the use of the manpower approach in developing countries was straightforward. The development of human resources through the education system was a prerequisite for economic growth and over-all national development. The 'whole
process of modernisation' was being held back by 'conspicuous shortages of all kinds of specialised manpower'. The education system, therefore, should be geared to the production of manpower for development. Forecasts of manpower requirements would provide the basis for a 'rational' programme of investment in education and ensure the 'efficient' and 'productive' use of scarce resources. Seen in these terms, it seemed 'logical' to give 'absolute priority' to the development of secondary and post-secondary education and to the production of the high-level manpower that was regarded as indispensable for the development of the modern sector of the economy (28).

There was no universally accepted method of estimating manpower requirements. An early attempt in Tanzania consisted of asking employers to estimate their requirements for two to five years ahead (29). This was superseded by the adoption of the method used in the OECD Mediterranean Project (30), in which forecasts of manpower requirements were related to the patterns of growth estimated in the different sectors of the economy and laid down in a national economic plan (31). Manpower forecasting in Kenya, based on the Harbison rule of thumb (32), and in Uganda, based on what Rado and Jolly described as the "cautious" use of the Tinbergen equation (33), were also derived from, and aimed at, target rates for economic growth laid down in a national economic plan.

The over-riding assumption was that the development of secondary and post-secondary education could be geared to the achievement of a required rate of economic development. The Harbison rule of thumb, which was also used in manpower forecasts in Nigeria (34), East Africa (35), and South East Asia (36) in the early 1960s, was based on the assumption that a target rate for economic growth of $x$ per cent a year could be 'achieved' by increasing the stock of 'top-level' manpower (university graduates) by $2x$, 'second-level' (School Certificate plus two or three years training) by $3x$, and total employment by $\frac{3}{2}x$ per cent a year. Tinbergen argued that "the desired acceleration of economic growth requires a corresponding acceleration of the education system" (37). The setting of target rates for economic growth, from which manpower forecasts were derived, appears to have been an arbitrary process (38). In a critique of the manpower approach in African countries, Foster pointed out that the bases on which high-level manpower estimates were made were
"sometimes not clear" and some of the assumptions about the rate of growth in the economy "seem to be questionable" (39).

The practitioners of the manpower approach acknowledged the difficulties in estimating future manpower requirements and the limitations of the methods that were used, particularly in developing countries where there was little reliable information about manpower and employment (40). Rado and Jolly, describing the preparation of manpower forecasts in Uganda, referred to the speculative nature of the assumptions they had made, the crudity of the procedures they had employed, and the possibility of considerable margins of error at almost every stage of the forecasting process (41). The case for manpower forecasting rested largely on the assumption that all decisions relating to investment in education, if they purported to be 'rational', involved manpower forecasts of one kind or another, and that a 'systematic' attempt to forecast future manpower requirements (however broadly based and liable to error) was better than guesswork or no attempt at all (42). Rado pointed to serious weaknesses in the theory and methodology of the manpower approach but concluded that developing countries like those in East Africa in which "the supply of educated manpower is sure to be one of the principal constraints in economic growth" had "no option but to attempt manpower planning. This would appear to be the only basis for framing a rational programme of investment in education" (43).

Critiques of the manpower planning approach (44) argued that it rested on shaky empirical foundations, that its procedures were "hazardous" and characterised by "large doses of sheer guesswork", and that it would not produce the results expected of it - instead of maximising, it was more than likely to slow down the rate of economic development. The production of large numbers of educated people would not at the same time create employment opportunities for them and the application of the manpower approach in developing countries was likely to lead to a large-scale misallocation of resources, over investment in secondary and post-secondary education and training, and a growing army of unemployed and disaffected secondary school leavers.

The manpower approach was confined to high-level manpower and the production of skills for the modern sector of the economy through
the planned expansion of the formal system of secondary education, post-secondary technical and vocational education, and professional training at the university. It paid no attention to primary education, which accounted for half the total expenditure on education, suggesting by implication the curbing of its expansion until the production of high-level manpower had created the wealth necessary for its future development. It paid no attention to the part that non-formal education and training could play in the supply of critical skills and the generation of employment and self-employment opportunities. It ignored the educational and manpower requirements of the traditional rural economy, where over 90 per cent of the population lived and worked, and which would have to be taken into account in any plan for economic growth and over-all national development (45). In addition, it seldom considered the contribution of training provided in the work place and on the job. 'Manpower requirements' were equated to the numbers achieving educational or training qualifications, with little or no consideration being given to the quality of the 'manpower' concerned or their experience on the job, or lack of it.

In a number of instances, critiques of the manpower approach centred on arguments for the use of cost-benefit (or rate-of-return) analysis in educational planning. These critiques argued that the "essential single-mindedness" and the "technologically determined rigidities and inflexibilities" of the manpower approach left no room for the "realistic appraisal" of alternative forms of investment, an appraisal which was central to any investment decision theory. The manpower approach gave no indication that there might be limits to what could be considered 'worthwhile' investment in education as compared to other sectors of the economy, or that there might be limits to what could be considered 'worthwhile' investment in one level or one kind of education and training as compared to other levels and other kinds of education and training. It conveniently overlooked the obvious fact that "what is spent on education is not spent on something else, and that what is spent on one educational sector is not spent on the others" (46).

Smyth and Bennet pointed out (47) that it was a short step from the assumption that an increase in the stock of educated manpower
was necessary to 'achieve' a 'desired acceleration' in the rate of economic growth to the idea that the faster the stock of educated manpower grew, no matter what its rate of growth, the faster the economy would grow. The proposition was no longer stated in terms of a shortage of educated manpower as a constraint on economic growth so much as in terms of the production of educated manpower as a source of economic growth - the idea that the expansion of secondary and post-secondary education and training, no matter what its rate, would, of itself, guarantee economic development. In a paper presented at the 1972-74 Bellagio conferences, Blaug argued that the manpower approach "constituted an open-ended invitation to expand secondary and higher education without limits" and that, by necessarily committing the bulk of educational expenditures to the expansion of secondary and higher education, "it leaves the educational planner with virtually no choices to make" (48).

Cost-benefit analysis made little or no impact on the international aid approach to educational planning. It served mainly as an intellectual focus for scepticism about the manpower approach (49). The manpower approach to educational planning "spread around the world" during the 1960s and "certain enthusiasts saw in it the answer to all educational planning problems" (50). One of the main reasons for its widespread application in developing countries was its advocacy by donor agencies and their concern for an education plan based on manpower forecasts as a basis for negotiations for aid for education.

Aid for education

The rationale for aid for education rested squarely on the theory of human capital and the promotion of economic growth. While there might be the occasional token reference to education as "a fundamental human right" or as "a desirable social service" (51), donors tended to regard education almost exclusively in terms of human resource development, and they were concerned primarily with strategies for maximising education's contribution to economic growth.

British Government policy for the assistance of development in overseas countries subscribed to the view that education was "an indispensable condition of development" (52). United States aid programmes committed increasing proportions of total aid budgets to educational
development on the grounds that:

"education is not something which is a luxury which can be afforded after development has occurred; it is an integral part, an inescapable and essential part of the development process itself" (53).

Presidents of the World Bank justified the Bank's decision to involve itself in aid for education on the grounds that nothing was more vital than education to economic progress in underdeveloped countries (54), and that education was of central importance in the whole development process (55).

In an explanation of Bank lending policy in a paper presented at a UNESCO seminar in 1964, Tobias argued that:

"we have come to the point where the benefits of education for economic development are universally recognised. The propriety of long-term financing of education growth is accepted. The availability of external aid for such financing increases" (56).

In a paper on the international financing of educational investment Ripman (57) made it clear that such aid was available to countries that had accorded a high priority to education and training, and that the Bank was prepared to consider requests for aid for education designed to meet the needs implied by economic and social development and, in particular, requests for projects which could be shown to have "a rapid effect on economic growth".

Donors advocated the use of the manpower approach as a 'rational' basis for the planning of educational development and for negotiations for aid for education (58). The Ford Foundation representative for East and Central Africa indicated that donors looked for situations in which their aid would be effective and in which it could be seen to be effective. As long as there were manifest deficiencies in the supply of high-level manpower and the scale of the need appeared to be within reach, the policy for aid to education appeared straightforward and the manpower approach was a "natural first for foreign aid" (59). The World Bank's lending policy was based on the manpower approach, and the Bank gave priority to education projects geared "to produce trained manpower for economic development" (60). Donors attached
the highest priority to secondary education, followed by post-secondary technical and vocational training and university level professional training (61). Between 1963 and 1971, 72 per cent of Bank financing for education was spent on secondary education and 23 per cent on post-secondary training and universities (62).

As described more fully in chapter 3, donors provided substantial assistance in educational planning and in the preparation of manpower plans. National education plans in African countries drawn up with advice and assistance from international 'experts' and reports of education commissions made up almost entirely of expatriate 'authorities' were based on the manpower approach and presented in terms of the development model of educational planning advocated by donor agencies.

In 1960, the commission on post-school certificate and higher education in Nigeria, under the chairmanship of Sir Eric Ashby, presented its report with the title Investment in Education. Its recommendations were based solely on estimates of high-level manpower requirements, prepared by Harbison especially for the commission, on the grounds that "economic advance depends on skilled manpower, and the manpower must come first". The report took little account of estimates of what Nigeria could afford to spend. It argued that investment in Nigerian education was an investment in its economic future and the commission deliberately rejected "cautious, modest and reasonable ways in which the educational system might be improved within the limits of our budget" in the expectation of substantial amounts of foreign aid (63).

The 1967 Uganda manpower plan was drawn up by international 'experts' and based on the estimates of high-level manpower requirements prepared for the Uganda Government by two British economists at Makerere University. It was based on the idea of manpower for economic growth and the 'trickle down' theory. It attached the highest priority to the rapid expansion of secondary education "to provide the trained manpower necessary for rapid economic development" in the expectation that this would "provide more resources for future development" and that:
"from the increased wealth more and more education will be provided so that the whole population will have the chance to participate in the modern society, and lead more productive and fulfilling lives" (64).

It appeared that the international aid approach to educational planning fitted with and supported the aspirations in newly independent African countries for economic growth and modernisation (65). Convinced that the brake on development applied by colonialism in the past had been released (66), directed by an overwhelming sense of urgency (67), and encouraged and supported by the prevailing model of educational planning and the availability of substantial external aid, they embarked on what Foster later described as "ambitious programmes of educational expansion in the hope that the provision of more schools would in itself constitute the 'royal road' to economic development " (68).

By the end of the 1960s, it had become increasingly clear that the international aid approach to educational planning had not been able to exert the kind of leverage which had been confidently expected of it in attempts to gear the development of education in African countries to economic growth and modernisation. In spite of attempts to integrate the planning of education into comprehensive national development plans, and in spite of large allocations from domestic budgets and massive injections of foreign aid, educational planning had fallen short, in some instances disastrously short, of initial expectations.

In an IIEP conference document published in 1968 Coombs argued that educational planning and the support provided by foreign aid had not been able to relate educational expansion to developmental needs, and that developing countries, without exception, were in the throes of a deepening educational crisis (69). The Pearson report described a situation in which the expansion of secondary education in developing countries had been accompanied by continuing shortages of trained manpower and, at the same time, growing numbers of unemployed school leavers, and in which education systems were ill adapted to the economic and social requirements they were supposed to fulfill (70). The expansion of education systems had not opened up the 'royal road' to economic growth and national prosperity, and the high hopes
and widespread expectations that had characterised the early 1960s
had been replaced by an uneasy feeling of disillusion with the conse-
quences of educational planning and the provision of aid for education.

Towards the end of the 1960s donors initiated a critical reappraisal
of their policies and programmes. UNESCO organised conferences
and seminars in which 'authorities' and 'experts' analysed the inade-
quacies of educational planning and the limitations of its concepts
and methodologies (71). The UN system, the World Bank, and USAID
set up commissions to review aid programmes, identify problem areas,
and recommend changes (72). In the early 1970s the Bellagio confe-
rences (73), under the auspices of the Ford and Rockefeller Founda-
tions, involved all the major Western donors in a critical review
of their aid policies and programmes. Arguments that suggested
that the international aid approach to educational planning was
based on assumptions that were over simplified and suspect and that
it encouraged expectations that were exaggerated and over optimistic
gained wider currency. In the introduction to the Bellagio Conference
Papers recognition of these arguments (and of limitations in the
provision and use of aid for education) led Ward to describe the
first stage in the international aid approach as 'the age of innocence'
(74).

One result of the review of donor policies was the rediscovery by
international 'authorities' and donor agencies of the notion of
education for rural development, and the formulation of an alternative
development strategy for educational planning. The next chapter
examines the main features of this shift of emphasis in the interna-
tional aid approach to educational planning.

Footnotes

1 The idea of an emergent 'science' of educational planning,
linked with the need for "a massive research effort" to develop
new concepts and methodologies and for the training of a cadre
of educational planning 'experts', permeated the literature.
See, for example, Coombs, P H What Do We Still Need to Know
about Educational Planning?, 1967, pp 57-58, 61-66; UNESCO
Educational Planning, 1968, pp 10, 147-157, 189-197; Curle
A The Professional Identity of the Educational Planner, 1969,

2 Coombs P H What Do We Still Need to Know about Educational Planning?, 1967, pp 59-60.


19 See, for example, Cash W C A Critique of Manpower Planning in Africa, 1965, p 104.

20 Coombs P H What Do We Still Need to Know about Educational Planning?, 1967, pp 59-60; Coombs P H What is Educational Planning?, 1970, pp 33-34.


23 UNESCO Educational Planning, 1968, pp 7, 10.


26 Parnes H S Manpower Analysis in Educational Planning, 1964, p 266; Parnes H S The OECD Mediterranean Regional Project in Retrospect, 1967, pp 157-159.


Rado E R and Jolly A R The Demand for Manpower, 1965, p 88.

Harbison F H High-Level Manpower for Nigeria's Future, 1960, pp 60-64.


Rado E R and Jolly A R The Demand for Manpower, 1965, pp 77-78.

Rado E R and Jolly A R The Demand for Manpower, 1965, p 96.

Parnes H S Manpower Analysis in Educational Planning, 1964, pp 265-266.


Anderson C A and Bowman M J Theoretical Considerations in Educational Planning, 1967, pp 21-29; Smyth J A and Bennett


54 Black E R Statement to IBRD and IDA Board of Governors, 1962, p 411.


61 (Addis Ababa Conference) Report, p 10; Cerych L Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries, 1965, pp 41, 49.


64 (Uganda High-Level Manpower Survey and Analysis of Requirements 1967-1981), pp i-ii.


69 Coombs P H The World Educational Crisis, 1968.


During the 1970s, the international aid approach to educational planning adopted a broader view of the development process and proposed a more broadly based educational strategy. The education for rural development strategy stemmed from a growing disillusion with the consequences of educational planning, and it over-lapped with and cut across the approach which had dominated the 1960s. It was firmly based on the assumption that education, as an investment in human resource development, was a central element in economic growth and over-all national development, and in its main essentials it was an extension of the international aid approach of the 1960s.

This chapter examines the main features of the international aid approach in the 1970s. It describes the rediscovery of education for rural development, the importance attached to non-formal/basic education, the attempts to develop new approaches to educational planning, and the shift of emphasis in donor policies and priorities. It concludes with reference to the scepticism which permeated educational planning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and which ran alongside the ambitious scenarios of the education for rural development strategy during the 1970s.

Education for rural development

The education for rural development strategy stemmed from arguments and recommendations that had a long history in the development of education in English speaking Africa. A stream of memoranda and reports dating from as far back as 1847 (1) had questioned the relevance of existing systems of education to the developmental needs of African countries and stressed the part that education could, and should, play in the development of rural areas. The theme of education for rural development ran as a constant thread through major policy documents on education in Africa issued by the British Government from the 1920s to the 1970s (2). There had been numerous attempts by colonial governments and voluntary agencies to put theory into practice but most of these attempts had ended in failure and disappointment (3). As donor agencies and their academic advisers began to have misgivings about the consequences of educational planning in the 1960s, the rediscovery of this theme, tempered by
an awareness of a long history of previous failure, provided the international aid approach with an alternative development strategy for educational planning.

In 1966, a conference of international 'authorities' and donor agency representatives held in Kericho drew attention to the related problems of education, employment, and rural development in Kenya. The conference report, edited by Sheffield (4), proposed a broadly based educational strategy geared to the needs of rural development, and argued for a shift in emphasis in donor policies to provide foreign aid "on the basis of a comprehensive approach to rural transformation". A year later, Nyerere's Education for Self-Reliance (5) stressed the importance of primary education in rural development, and challenged the notion of priority to secondary and post-secondary education (without disturbing the rationale for manpower-led development in these areas). As Dodd pointed out (6), shorn of its political rhetoric, Education for Self-Reliance was largely a restatement of earlier colonial policies for development related and community based primary education, and its proposals for gearing education to rural development were based on attempts made by the British administration in Tanganyika in the 1950s. While it cannot be argued that Education for Self-Reliance was a product of the international aid community, it was taken up enthusiastically by donors and their academic advisers as a bold home-grown challenge to the 1960s trends in the international aid approach.

Harbison and Hunter, who had presented papers at the Kericho conference, took part in a 1968 IIEP symposium on the manpower aspects of educational planning. The symposium report suggested that there had been "a significant realignment" in the international approach to the development of human resources and drew attention to the role of education in rural development, which was "perhaps the number one problem for many developing countries, deserving of higher priority than it has been getting" (7). In 1970, the report of the Commonwealth Conference on Education in Rural Areas, largely dominated by donor agency representatives and British academics, formulated what it described as "an alternative strategy" for "broad planning in education and rural development for the benefit of the majority of the community, the rural masses" (8).
In the early 1970s, donors commissioned or supported studies on education and rural development, notably the ICED studies on basic education for UNICEF (9) and non-formal education for the World Bank (10). Reports of international conferences and studies commissioned or supported by donors picked up the thread that had run through most colonial assessments of education in African countries. In their turn, they were critical of existing systems of education and questioned their relevance to the 'real' developmental needs in developing countries. They pointed to the pressing economic and social problems of rural poverty and unemployment, and they stressed the need for education to be geared to the demands of rural change and modernisation.

The broad logic of the education for rural development strategy was straightforward. It started from the proposition that economic growth and over-all national development depended on change and modernisation in rural areas, and that education and training, in the widest sense, was an essential condition in this process. It proposed a 'bottom up' as opposed to a 'trickle down' theory of economic development. The transformation of the traditional rural economy was "necessary to foster growth in other sectors" and to generate the wealth on which "can be built in due course the social services of health and education which are so needed and demanded" (11). It adopted a broader view of "the social and economic changes which make up the development process", in which economic growth and social equity were linked as complementary goals (12).

Although international conferences and donor studies emphasised that the development process was more complex, and the part that education could play in this process more conditional, than had been supposed (13), in its main essentials the education for rural development strategy was an extension and a broadening of the approach that had dominated the 1960s. It was still firmly based on the assumption that education, as an investment in human resource development, was an essential condition for economic growth and over-all national development (14). In the keynote address at the 1970 Commonwealth conference (15), the Executive Secretary for the UN Economic Commission for Africa argued that the modernisation
of the traditional rural economy depended on investment in education and training for the development of a wide range of human resources, and that education and training could be "deliberately designed as an instrument of economic and social growth" and directed towards 'satisfying' the most pressing economic and social needs in developing countries.

The education for rural development strategy was based on the idea that education, formal and non-formal, could be geared to the production of manpower for development, and on the assumption that the production of large numbers of skilled people would, at the same time, create employment and self employment opportunities for them. The planning of education for rural development was seen largely in terms of a broader, more eclectic, version of the 1960s manpower approach to educational planning. Harbison argued that "the assessment of human resource requirements for rural modernisation offers a new frontier for manpower planners", along which various kinds of formal and non-formal education and training "should be regarded as elements of a single effort to develop and utilise the nation's manpower for rural transformation" (16). The ICED/World Bank study saw the establishment of a rural learning system, incorporating formal and non-formal education and training, in terms of "a radical new approach" to human resource development directed towards the production of the various kinds of manpower to provide the wide-ranging craft, technical, and professional skills without which the whole process of rural transformation could not take place (17).

In some instances arguments for education for rural development, and in particular for the part that non-formal education was confidently expected to play in this process, cautioned against the danger of assuming that it was a panacea for the problems of national development (18). As Courtney and Kutsch (19) pointed out, this caution was not always reflected in submissions about education for rural development. The tenor of these submissions, as well as their underlying assumptions, often bore a striking resemblance to the over simplified approach and over optimistic expectations which had characterised the international aid approach to educational planning in the 1960s.
The education for rural development strategy was, if anything, even more optimistic in the expectations it encouraged. Education, in its widest sense, would bring about the transformation of the traditional rural economy. This transformation was seen not only in terms of increased productivity and economic growth but also in terms of an attack on poverty, ignorance, and disease, the eradication of economic and social inequality and injustice, the provision of satisfying life and rewarding work for people in rural areas, and the improvement of the living standards, the status, and the self respect of rural communities (20). The international aid approach was still rooted in 'the age of innocence' and education was posited as the means to achieve economic growth and national prosperity, as a way of solving the most urgent economic and social problems in developing countries, and as a way to "restore education's flagging reputation as a good investment in development" (21).

Non-formal and basic education

Most arguments for education for rural development, as exemplified in papers by a senior FAO representative at the 1970 Commonwealth conference (22) and in the 1974 World Year Book of Education (23), started from the proposition that existing systems of education and training were counter-productive and that, if education was to be a 'key' element in rural and national development, it would need "to undergo major changes both in content and application". Formal education and training had a part to play, and the Commonwealth conference report argued that it could be used "as a positive and constructive force in rural development" (24). But the main emphasis in the education for rural development strategy was on finding new approaches to education and training for rural people and rural development. Two of these new approaches, non-formal and basic education, along with the idea of life-long education, achieved an almost ritual significance during the 1970s.

(a) Non-formal education

As Fordham (25) and Evans (26) pointed out, the idea of non-formal education - as distinct from its practice - was a new phenomenon. In practice, non-formal education, described by a wide variety of terms (agricultural extension, farmer training, health education, adult literacy, community development, and so on) had existed for
many years. A whole range of out-of-school educative services, promoted by separate ministries and voluntary agencies, had grown up, often in response to specific needs - better husbandry, better hygiene, better family planning, for example. These services had been manned by government officers and voluntary agency staff who for decades had worked to improve the farming methods, the health, the economic livelihood, and the education of people in rural areas. Earlier policy documents had recognised the part that these out-of-school educative services could play in the development of rural areas (27). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the rediscovery of the notion of education for rural development gave non-formal education, as a whole, a vastly increased importance in educational planning.

The Kericho conference had outlined an educational strategy for rural transformation in which the formal education system would be a part, but not the most important part, of a broad, flexible approach. The conference report argued that:

"a more significant contribution to rural development can be made by a much strengthened, more clearly thought-out and effectively co-ordinated educational service to adults, than by alterations in or expansion of the existing system of primary and secondary schools. In future, greater emphasis should be given to out-of-school education relative to formal education than has been true before" (28).

Two years later, the phrase 'non-formal education' was coined and Coombs (basing his argument on the inescapable resource limits in developing countries and the inability of formal systems of education to satisfy an ever increasing popular demand) was calling for greater investment from developing countries and donor agencies in non-formal education (29).

The 1970 Commonwealth conference proposed a wider, more comprehensive programme of education and training for rural adults, supported by 'a well-designed system' of education and training for young people - for school leavers and drop outs, and for those who had never been to school. Mass campaigns for the promotion of adult
literacy had met with only limited success during the previous two decades. They had lost their initial impetus, political and popular support had dwindled, and they had often failed to maintain the gains achieved in the earlier stages of their operation. What was now proposed was that adult literacy programmes, along the lines of the selective and intensive work-oriented approach recently adopted by UNESCO in its Experimental World Literacy Programme, should be "built into comprehensive programmes for the education and training of rural communities". Programmes for the promotion of functional literacy, built into vocational training courses and work-oriented schemes, would be part of an over-all system of non-formal education and training geared to the needs of rural development (30).

In the early 1970s, there was a remarkable surge of interest in the idea of non-formal education (31), fuelled to a considerable extent by donor interest and support (32) for the part that non-formal education and training could be expected to play in the process of rural transformation and over-all national development. The theme of the 1971 IIEP seminar for UNESCO staff in its regional training and research centres and UNESCO educational planning 'experts' in member states, planning out-of-school education for development, reflected

"an increased awareness of the educational and training functions performed outside the traditional school structure and a resultant need to broaden the purview of educational planning to encompass these activities" (33).

The publication of the ICED studies in 1973 and 1974 gave wider currency to the phrase 'non-formal education' and to the idea of non-formal education and training for rural development.

The 1974 ICED/World Bank study argued that non-formal education was "an indispensable and potent instrument of rural development", and stressed "the urgency of doing more through non-formal means to meet the educational needs of rural people and rural development". It described non-formal education as more flexible and adaptable than formal systems of education, and suggested that even the poorest countries would be able to mobilise the resources necessary for
"a considerable expansion of non-formal education in rural areas". This mobilisation was seen largely in terms of a large-scale, nation-wide programme, embracing all the diverse kinds of non-formal education and training, and using a wide variety of approaches within a 'comprehensive and coherent' strategy for the planning of non-formal education for rural development (34).

The international aid approach regarded non-formal education largely in terms of human resource development. Most arguments for non-formal education started from the proposition that the human resources of the rural areas were a developing country's greatest potential asset, and that economic growth and national prosperity depended on the development and mobilisation of these resources (35). In a paper presented at the Bellagio conferences (36) Miller argued that the whole idea of non-formal education was still "essentially economic", a human resource approach to national development directed towards training a greater variety of workers in more diversified programmes and stimulating employment in sectors that had been neglected. In a study of education and self-employment in Kenya (37) King pointed out that most arguments for non-formal education were essentially work-oriented. According to the education for rural development strategy non-formal education and training programmes were intended to provide rural adults and young people with the necessary skills (the 'intermediate' or 'appropriate' technology) for wage earning or productive self-employment. What was not made clear was how these employment and self-employment opportunities were to be generated, and the whole idea of self-employment remained extremely vague.

(b) Basic education

In the early 1970s, the Faure report (38), which had been commissioned by UNESCO, gave wide currency to the idea of universal basic education. The provision of basic education for all children was seen as part of a wider process of the universalisation and democratisation of education at all levels. Basic education was to be "many sided, designed not only for children and adolescents but also for adults, who at any age, may have need of it", part of an all-encompassing process of life-long education which would be available to all on demand. The report described existing
education systems as incapable of providing for universal basic education, and it echoed the de-schooling arguments of Illich, Reimer, and Freire in its proposals that education should be de-formalised and de-institutionalised. It argued that the "outmoded barrier" between formal and non-formal education must be abolished, and it envisaged "a learning society" in which all methods of learning would be inter-changeable and recognised as equally valid.

The 1973 ICED/UNICEF study, in its search for 'new paths to learning for rural children and youth', incorporated the idea of universal basic education into the education for rural development strategy. It argued that the inescapable resource limits constraining further expansion of formal systems of education in developing countries and the incompatibility between what schools were teaching and what rural children and adolescents needed to learn made it inevitable that non-formal education would play an increasingly important part in the provision of basic education in rural areas. It proposed the adoption of a wide variety of approaches, formal and non-formal, to meet "the minimum essential learning needs" of young people in rural areas within "the broad conceptual framework of a life-long learning system". It argued that every developing country, even the poorest, already had the beginnings of such a system. Even so, "the building of a multipurpose rural learning system" would require "a massive educational effort", which would "succeed only if educational resources now geared to a narrowly conceived elitist educational establishment are redirected to a democratically conceived mass learning system designed to provide far greater equality of opportunity and achievement to all rural young people" (39).

Arguments for rural learning systems were often characterised by ambiguity and contradiction in the use of the term 'basic education'. It was seen, often at one and the same time, as primary education or minimum learning needs, formal or non-formal education, first level or adult education, elementary education or a development strategy for the fullest possible utilisation of human resources in rural areas, or as any combination of these (40). Nor was it always made clear whether non-formal basic education was intended
to complement or to provide an alternative to the existing system of formal education (41). In spite of ambiguities and contradictions, there was what Sheffield described as a generally accepted view of 'basic education for the rural masses' (42), for adults as well as young people, which according to the ICED studies would "help accelerate social and economic development in rural areas" (43).

Advocacy on behalf of basic education for rural development was as generalised and over optimistic as that for non-formal education (44). Basic education was expected to provide the rural masses with functional literacy and numeracy, basic knowledge for community development and civic participation, and basic skills to enable adults and young people to find employment and self-employment in rural areas. It was expected to increase productivity and promote economic growth in rural areas, and to cater for the individual needs and aspirations of the rural masses. All this was to be achieved through a nation-wide programme of low cost mass education. A UNICEF conference held in Nairobi in 1974 argued that basic education would provide people in rural areas with 'individual fulfillment' and make them 'useful citizens and producers' (45). The report of a meeting of UNESCO 'experts' in the same year outlined an educational strategy in which:

"First of all, everyone, child or adult, should receive a minimum of education - and in many cases this minimum is also, for the time being, the maximum that governments can afford - which will prepare him for life, and enable him to be a productive citizen and to fulfill his individual potentialities" (46).

Educational planning

Coombs argued (47) that the central importance accorded rural change and modernisation in national economic and social development, and the greater emphasis given to non-formal education in the development process, called for a radically new kind of educational planning to replace ideas and practices which were no longer adequate. This argument, and the terminology in which it was presented, bore a striking resemblance to that made for a new kind of educational planning in the 1960s and, in the same way, Coombs stressed the need for a more comprehensive and better integrated
approach to educational planning.

Educational planning must be more comprehensive in order to see the wide variety of non-formal education and training activities as a whole, and in order to encompass and co-ordinate all a country's educational activities, formal and non-formal, within a single perspective. It must be better integrated in the sense that various kinds of education and training must be brought together within a coherent national strategy of educational planning, and also in the sense that educational planning must be more closely linked with national economic and social development planning as part of an over-all strategy for rural change and progress. This new kind of educational planning must provide a 'rational' and 'systematic' approach to ensure the 'orderly' and 'efficient' development of a broader more comprehensive system of education and training than in the past (48).

There seemed to be general agreement about the need for "a massive educational effort" to develop "a comprehensive and coherent rural learning system", in which various kinds of education and training, formal and non-formal, would be linked together within national procedures for educational planning, 'inter-acting' with and 'mutually complementing and reinforcing' each other in a variety of ways (49). There also appeared to be general agreement that, although education was an essential condition for rural change and modernisation, it could not by itself "precipitate a dynamic process of rural development" (50). It would make its most effective contribution as "an instrument of change and progress" when it was dovetailed into an over-all pattern of integrated development" as part of a 'team' or 'package' approach (51).

The 1970 Commonwealth conference argued that the need for educational planning to operate as an integral part of a comprehensive rural development strategy required that:

"any plan for education and training in rural areas should be as well integrated as possible, with the maximum of operational co-ordination among the various agencies involved" (52).
At national level, educational planning, closely linked with economic planning, should be an integral part of a comprehensive strategy, which would include the work of other ministries and other agencies directly involved in rural development. At the community level, education, as "a key element in the whole process of rural change and development", should be a part of a 'team' approach, which would co-ordinate the work of teachers, agricultural extension officers, public health personnel, co-operative workers, and others "engaged in the education and training of rural people" (53).

Coombs argued forcefully for a 'coherent and consistent' national strategy for rural development, in which educational planning would be an integral part. At the same time, the planning of non-formal education in rural areas, "by its very nature, must be de-centralised and brought as close as possible to the scene of action". The "previous piecemeal approach" to the planning of education and other development programmes in rural areas must be abandoned

"in favour of a systematically planned and integrated approach, in which educational elements become closely interwoven with all related development factors and programs in each area".

What was needed was "a far more flexible, broad gauged and creative kind of planning" to allow "broad participation" in decision making at the local level, to harness local support, and to ensure that education and training programmes were adapted to local needs and conditions (54).

Proposals for planning education for rural development tended to be strong in rhetoric, but weak in suggestions for translating this rhetoric into practical terms. Non-formal education was not a single, easily categorised activity. Coombs (55) referred to the phrase as "a convenient label" for "a bewildering assortment" of "many different things". Grandstaff (56) considered it to be "too broad to exempt it from ambiguity and contradiction". This ambiguity and contradiction was reflected in arguments for linking formal and non-formal education and training within a comprehensive rural learning system, and in proposals for the planning of an
education for rural development. The ICED/UNICEF study argued for a multi-purpose, lifelong rural learning system but did little more than suggest "a few general guides and criteria" and list some "pitfalls to avoid" (57).

Arguments for a rural learning system and an integrated 'team' approach to rural development tended to minimise the formidable organisational and political, as well as educational, problems involved in these proposals. Apart from references to existing mechanisms for national economic planning (58), the community school idea (59), and rural training centres along the lines of the Kenya multi-purpose training and development centres (60), there was little, if any, indication of organisational and institutional structures designed to link formal and non-formal education and training programmes or to integrate the efforts of different government ministries and other agencies, some of which might be outside the direct jurisdiction of government.

There was little indication except in the most general terms, of ways and means in which inter-ministerial co-operation and maximum operational co-ordination among all agencies involved in the rural development effort might be achieved at either central or local level. The organisational problems and political tensions which might be expected in attempts to develop a flexible, de-centralised form of planning at the local level alongside a comprehensive, integrated rural development strategy at the central level were rarely, if ever, taken into account in proposals characterised more by their generality and enthusiasm than by consideration of the practical problems of planning and implementation. Analysis of the problems associated with the planning of non-formal/basic education led Evans to emphasise the need for a "minimal planning approach, which might be characterised as a philosophy of 'less is better'" (61).

Most proposals for planning education for rural development tended to overlook the cogency of two closely linked arguments which had been made by earlier commentators. (These arguments are referred to again in chapters 3 and 4). In spite of a long history of previous failure and disappointment in even the most determined and well organised attempts to gear education to rural
development (62), there was still a strong tendency to regard educational planning as capable of bringing about the transformation of the traditional rural economy. The main reason for the failure of previous attempts, as the 1963 report of the Uganda Education Commission pointed out (63), was that the problem of the transformation of the traditional rural economy was not primarily educational and there was, therefore, little to be gained in seeking an educational solution. Without radical changes in existing social, economic, and political structures there was little that either formal or non-formal education (even when linked with complementary measures) could do that would, of itself, bring about rural change and modernisation.

The second of these arguments concerned the response that could be expected from the people for whom the rural education package was intended. Foster had argued (64) that in the past rural populations had resisted attempts to provide rurally biased or vocational education. They had regarded such attempts as no more than a second best alternative to the path of high status and high rewards, and they had recognised that acceptance of an alternative education for rural areas was likely to sustain existing inequalities and disadvantage them even further. While ever rural areas remained unproductive, unreformed, and unattractive, rural parents and children would continue to reject rurally biased education programmes and to opt for and insist on the more vocational bias of formal academic education. There was nothing to indicate that proposals for non-formal/basic education and comprehensive rural learning strategies would be any more acceptable to rural populations, or that such proposals would meet the legitimate aspirations of rural parents and children, or in some way tie them to the land (65).

Aid for education

During the 1960s, the bulk of aid to education had gone to secondary and post-secondary education and training for the production of high-level manpower for the modern sector of the economy. Donor support for education for rural development and for non-formal education and training had been limited, and was generally offered through the agriculture, community development,
or health sectors, rather than the education sector. British colonial administrations had a well established tradition of support for community development programmes and for rural trade and farm schools which had been continued through British aid into the 1960s. FAO had provided assistance for non-formal and basic education for farming communities, ILO for non-formal training in rural skills, and WHO for non-formal health education programmes in rural areas. UNICEF had provided assistance for non-formal basic education for rural communities. UNESCO had supported programmes for 'fundamental education' in the 1950s and initiated work oriented literacy programmes in the 1960s. In the 1970s, many major multilateral and bilateral donors attempted to link such efforts to the education systems of developing countries under new schemes of 'education for rural development' or 'basic education'.

(a) Education for rural development

In the early 1970s, donors declared a commitment, in one form or another, to the idea of non-formal/basic education for rural development and expressed a willingness to allocate a greater proportion of their budgets for this purpose. UNESCO expressed a growing concern for universal basic education provided through a flexible system of formal and non-formal education (66). The World Bank expressed its preparedness to allocate 27 per cent of its education budget to basic and non-formal education and training (67). UNICEF gave priority to non-formal education and the provision of a package of basic essential learning needs for rural communities, and USAID made strenuous efforts to redirect its aid for education away from post-secondary education and training towards the reform and expansion of formal and non-formal education in rural areas (68).

In 1970, the British Government issued a White Paper on Aid to Education in Developing Countries which stressed the "importance of patterns of education and training which will foster rural development". These patterns included the revision of primary school curricula, increased support for rural schools and for non-formal vocational training programmes, and "an increase in efforts devoted to adult education, linked with rural development..."
schemes" (69). A further White Paper in 1975 contained a formal commitment to focusing aid on the world's poorest, and it placed special emphasis on the need for integrated rural development programmes aimed at increased productivity in rural areas and a more equitable distribution of wealth (70). During the 1970s, most donors declared a commitment to directing aid for education to helping the rural masses, attacking poverty, and reducing social and economic inequality through integrated rural development programmes (71).

Declarations of commitment to programmes of integrated rural development were reflected in donor attempts to broaden the perspective of their aid programmes and to regard aid for education as an integral part of a comprehensive strategy for aid for over-all national development (72). The idea of the country programme, which governed the provision of aid through the UN system from the early 1970s, reflected an attempt to integrate aid for development across sectors. Country programming was an attempt to programme aid at the country level rather than at the headquarters of the various UN agencies and, in this way, to ensure that the needs of the different sectors could be considered and assessed in an integrated manner so that aid for one sector would support, and be supported by, aid for other sectors of the economy. It was also an attempt to ensure that the needs of individual countries could be considered in relation to the needs of other countries, and that special consideration was given to the least developed countries (73).

The ILO World Employment Programme's basic needs approach was an attempt to examine the entire development strategy of a country from the point of view of its effect on employment and income distribution. ILO studies using this approach (74) emphasised the significance of the informal economic sector in over-all national development. They proposed greater investment in those sectors which would involve more people in productive employment and lead towards a more equitable distribution of income, and they stressed the need for the development of 'intermediate' or 'appropriate' technology to improve the productivity of the rural and traditional sectors. They argued for an integrated approach to development in which education and training would be geared to
rural development and the needs of rural communities.

The education for rural development strategy appeared to offer African countries an alternative path to economic growth and national prosperity, and a way of solving, or at least containing, their most pressing economic and social problems. King argued (75) that proposals for education for rural development were being urged more by external agencies and external observers than by local people in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but that "within a very few years local decision makers, commissions of inquiry and politicians had begun to stress similar themes very forcefully". When Nyerere published Education for Self-Reliance in 1967, he was virtually alone among LDC leaders and governments in attempting to promote a coherent approach to rural education. A decade later, there was widespread interest in the education for rural development strategy as evidenced in national policy documents (drawn up with the advice and assistance of international 'experts') and a wide variety of experimental approaches (largely supported by donor efforts) which included the vocationalisation and diversification of curricula, attempts to make schools self-reliant production units, village polytechnics, 'vocational centres', 'continuation schools', 'production brigades', and the use of schools as rural education and training centres.

Although there were shifts in emphasis in priorities for aid to education, donors still regarded education, whether formal or non-formal, primarily in terms of human resource development. Donors still saw the diversification of secondary education and the development of vocational and technical schools as having a critical part to play in the production of manpower for development. The UK 1970 White Paper gave priority "to a selective and diversified system of secondary education with much more emphasis on the vocational and technical streams" closely linked with the manpower needs of the urban and rural sectors, and to non-formal vocational training programmes to complement the work of rural trade and farm schools in providing the necessary manpower for the traditional rural sector (76). Psacharopoulos described educational planning as still dominated by the manpower approach (77), and Hurst described the "conventional rationale" for the provision of aid for education as still resting squarely on the
human capital theory and the promotion of economic growth (78).

(b) The World Bank Education Sector Working Paper 1974

The 1974 World Bank Education Sector Working Paper is discussed in some detail for two reasons. The first is that it summarises the shift in emphasis in donor policies and priorities, and the persistence of the main features of the international aid approach in the 1960s. The second is that the main features of the working paper were incorporated into Swaziland's third education plan, which is discussed in detail in the Swazi case study.

The Bank had been one of the most enthusiastic and influential exponents of the policy of maximising education's contribution to economic growth through the expansion of secondary and post-secondary education to produce the high-level manpower for the development of the modern sector of the economy. The 1974 working paper described this policy as having been largely irrelevant to the real needs of developing countries. It endorsed the alternative development strategy of education for rural transformation, and it adopted a broader view of development which took social as well as economic considerations into account and which was directed towards the alleviation of poverty and the equalisation of social and economic opportunity as well as the promotion of economic growth (79).

At the same time, as Williams argued in a critical analysis of the 1974 working paper's policies and proposals, there was

"throughout a tendency to regard education primarily as an instrument to provide skills needed by the economy.... The principle enunciated at the beginning of the working paper, that the social dimensions of development are as important as the economic, is in fact given little practical expression in the discussion of the content and style of education" (80).

The working paper declared a commitment to basic and non-formal education as instruments for the transformation of the traditional rural economy. The Bank was prepared to support the provision of universal basic education, as soon as the course of development required, through the expansion of the formal system of primary
education or through a combination of primary education and a variety of non-formal schemes which would supplement rather than rival the formal system. Basic education was seen as instrumental in "increasing the productivity as well as improving the opportunities of underprivileged groups", and as "a means by which the minimum learning needs of the masses will be met so as to ensure effective participation in the development process by all" (81).

Education was still regarded primarily as a basic factor in economic growth. Meeting the demand for critical skills for economic development was still a major objective, and the Bank would continue to finance secondary education and training to the extent that it met the needs for vocational and professional skills in both the urban and rural sectors of the economy. Past policies had led to an over expansion of secondary education and the problem of unemployed school leavers. At the same time, developing countries had critical shortages of educated manpower in specific categories. Secondary education must be more closely linked with job requirements by giving greater emphasis to vocational and technical schools and through the vocationalisation of the curriculum in secondary schools (82).

The Bank's lending policy would take account of the "terminal nature of the lower levels of education for the majority of the participants" and of the need for further education and training beyond the basic level to be "selectively and carefully planned" to improve the knowledge and skills necessary for the "performance of economic, social, and other developmental roles". Secondary and higher education would have to be rationed through the establishment of controls to limit access to certain kinds and levels of education. Access to secondary education, for example, could be based on assessment of ability. Bank policy would take account of the "tendency to generate surpluses of educated manpower" and "point out the need for explicit government policies on rationing and pricing secondary education" (83).

The working paper continued to place major emphasis on the manpower approach to educational planning. The scope and perspective of
manpower analysis would be broadened to ensure a fuller use of available human resources by including the lower level skills necessary to promote and sustain economic growth in rural areas. The Bank was prepared to support the development of skills for rural areas through the ruralisation and vocationalisation of formal education as part of a broader strategy which would include the development of non-formal schemes as parallel or alternative programmes. These non-formal programmes would have to be functional, part of a total delivery system, and integrated with other rural development activities at national and local level (84).

The Bank declared a basic commitment to the idea of 'education and equity' (85). Throughout the working paper there was a tendency to regard the goals of economic growth and social equity as consistent and complementary. The Bank's strategy was based on the assumption that the "development of human resources not only helps to alleviate poverty but also contributes significantly to growth in national productivity and income", and its lending policy was to be directed towards the fullest possible equalisation of educational opportunities "in the interests of both increased productivity and social equity" (86).

The Bank acknowledged that it had little idea how many developing countries would be willing or able to "undertake the radical changes" proposed in the working paper and "which many external observers consider necessary" (87), and it gave little indication of how its proposals were to be implemented. Williams pointed out that the Bank's idea of a comprehensive educational package for rural development meeting all the needs of an area or group of individuals implied "an omniscience and an organisational sophistication" that would be difficult to achieve (88).

(c) Scepticism

The editors of the 1974 World Year Book of Education described an "air of scepticism" which permeated educational planning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and which coincided with the rediscovery of the notion of education for rural development (89). As indicated at various points throughout this chapter, this sceptical trend persisted throughout the 1970s.
The education for rural development strategy was accompanied by arguments that it presented an over simplified model of development, its underlying assumptions rested on shaky empirical foundations, its ambitious scenarios were either impracticable or would not produce the results expected of them, and the twin foundations of economic development and social equity on which it was based were competing rather than complementary strategies (90). Linked with these arguments was the notion that education served to reproduce rather than change existing social and economic structures. Critiques of the education for rural development strategy argued that proposals for rural learning systems and basic/non-formal education would lead to two separate but unequal education systems, reflecting and sustaining rather than reducing economic and social inequality (91).

Arguments that the problems of economic and social change were not primarily educational and that education, far from being the most important element in the development process, had only a limited role to play (92) gained wider currency. Colclough and Hallak suggested that educational reform depended on rather than brought about economic and social change (93). Court and King referred to a "widespread recognition of the extent to which education - both formal and non-formal - is shaped and the possibility of reform circumscribed by the political and economic institutions in a country" (94). Bacchus reiterated the conclusions of the Uganda Education Commission in arguing that any attempt at rural transformation "must start with radical changes in the existing social and economic system" (95).

Before the end of the 1970s, it was clear that most attempts to gear education, formal and non-formal, to rural development had ended, as in the past, in failure and disappointment. Evans described the international aid approach as having "been highlighted by persistent failures to make any appreciable progress in either economic development or educational advances for the majority of the world's peoples trapped in rural poverty" (96).

Todaro argued that claims that education
"would accelerate economic growth; that it would raise levels of living, especially for the poor; that it would generate widespread and equal employment opportunities for all ... have been shown to be greatly exaggerated and, in many instances, simply false" (97).

In a later review of problems associated with vocational education in developing countries, Lillis and Hogan concluded that attempts to diversify education systems to meet the needs of rural development using formal and non-formal approaches had "over-all a very poor track record of success" (98). The report of the 1982 Harare conference described a situation in African countries in which the linear expansion of existing systems of secondary education had been accompanied by continuing shortages of trained and qualified manpower, particularly middle level technicians and skilled workers, while at the same time there were growing numbers of jobless school leavers (99).

Recognition of "a conspicuous and alarming history of failures" in educational planning, and reference to critiques of its concepts and methodologies, led Weiler to describe educational planning at the end of the 1970s as moving away from an 'age of innocence' towards an 'an age of scepticism' (100). In the preface to the report of a seminar on educational planning and social change held in 1978, the Director of the IIEP suggested that, after some twenty years during which educational planning had "been looked upon with general favour throughout the world", it had "now become the fashion to be sceptical of any attempt to rationalise the operation and development of educational systems". The main reason for this shift in thinking about educational planning stemmed from the over expectations which were placed on educational planning and the over simplified vision of the relationship between education and economic and social change (101).

The next chapter examines some characteristic features of donor intervention through the provision of aid for education in African countries. Consideration of the relationship between educational planning and economic and social change is taken up again in chapter 3, and more fully in chapter 4.
Footnotes


7 UNESCO Manpower Aspects of Educational Planning, 1968, pp 6-7.


10 Coombs P H with Ahmed M Attacking Rural Poverty, 1974.


Coombs P H The World Educational Crisis, 1968, pp 138-139, 142-144.


38 Faure E Learning to Be, 1972, pp 181-190.


42 Sheffield J R The Rediscovery of Poverty, 1976, p 49.


48 Coombs P H with Ahmed M Attacking Rural Poverty, 1974, pp 208-210, 211-212.


60 Coombs P H with Ahmed M Attacking Rural Poverty, 1974, pp 221-222.


62 See, for example, Dodd W A "Education for Self-Reliance" in Tanzania, 1969, pp 5-18 and Ker A D R The Uganda Experience with Farm Schools, 1971, pp 5-18.

63 Education in Uganda, 1963, pp 33-34, 39.

64 Foster P J The Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning, 1965, pp 145-147, 150-151.


71 Sheffield J R The Rediscovery of Poverty, 1976, p 48; Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, pp 4-22.

72 OECD Development and Co-operation, 1972, pp 141-143.

73 Phillips H M Educational Co-operation between Developed and Developing Countries, 1976, p 45.


78 Hurst P Aid to Educational Development, 1981, p 120.


80 Williams P Education in Developing Countries, 1976, p 33.


88 Williams P Education in Developing Countries, 1976, p 34.
There was considerable diversity of forms and styles of assistance within the donor community. Aid for education was shaped to a large extent by the separate traditions and corporate styles of the various donor agencies and their preferences for working in particular countries and for providing particular kinds of assistance. There were considerable differences in the nature and the scale of recipient needs arising out of differences in the pattern and development of their education systems and in the state of their financial and human resources. Patterns of aid provision, conditioned by donor policies, recipient needs, and the amount of aid available for education, varied from country to country, and changed over the years in response to shifts in donor policies and changes in recipient needs and the availability of aid.

At the same time, there was a sense in which the various donor agencies saw themselves, and were seen by others, as an international aid community, linked by strong similarities in policy and common concerns for the most effective use of the aid they provided. There was a strong donor tendency to search for generalisable solutions to educational and developmental problems in recipient countries, and to design projects which could be replicated across the variety of settings and the diverse conditions in African countries. The specific array of donors and their 'experts' brought to bear on national education systems varied from country to country and over time, but at any given time similar projects funded by a single donor or by different agencies could be found in many African countries. During the 1960s and 1970s, for example, most donors supported projects and programmes for the diversification and vocationalisation of secondary curricula, and the World Bank funded an array of secondary curriculum diversification projects, which were markedly similar, in many African countries.

The account that follows recognises the diversity of forms and styles of assistance, but it deals mainly with the common concerns and the generalised approach which characterised donor intervention in African countries. It describes the main features of what
King (1) referred to as the responsible interventionism of donor agencies, and notes the influence it was expected to exert. It examines the restrictions imposed on donor intervention by inadequacies in the planning and management of aid on the donor as well as the recipient side, and by critical limitations in the international aid approach to educational planning. A final section refers to the issue of aid and dependency. As indicated in the references cited in the text, the broad issues raised in this account have been persistent features of donor intervention in African countries.

Responsible interventionism

The first part of this section describes the common concerns that shaped the donor approach to aid negotiations, and some of the problems faced by recipient countries in responding to this approach. The second describes the importance donors attached to aid for educational planning.

(a) The aid dialogue

The context of the aid dialogue required that it should appear to be between equal 'partners in development', with full recognition of the sovereign rights of recipient countries, and with donors responding to requests for assistance in the achievement of nationally formulated goals and objectives (2). But the various donors had their own policies and procedures which determined the kind of assistance they were prepared to offer, and the ways in which they were prepared to provide it. They entered aid negotiations with their own views on educational needs and priorities, and they specified, in various degrees of detail, projects and activities they were prepared to support (3). As Phillips (4) has pointed out, developing countries, by the very fact that they were recipient countries, were not in a position to control completely the nature and the conditions attached to aid for education, and the provision and administration of aid was largely controlled by donor priorities and donor procedures.

The nature and the persistence of the fundamental tension which characterised the international aid approach is neatly illustrated in donor agency documentation. A 1972 SIDA policy document on
Aid and Education (5) contained a basic commitment to the idea of responding to national goals and priorities and, at the same time, made it clear what educational policies and priorities SIDA was prepared to support. The World Bank 1971 and 1974 education sector working papers (6) stressed the need for more continuous dialogue and closer co-operation to ensure that projects were agreed between the Bank and its member countries, but the account of Bank lending policy left member countries in no doubt as to what policies and priorities the Bank would support. The 1984 ODA document on British aid (7) emphasised that "Aid is based on discussions and negotiations with partner governments so that the assistance offered represents an agreed view of needs and priorities". At the same time, it listed the needs and priorities ODA was prepared to support and made it clear what kind of assistance ODA was prepared to provide.

Donor commitment to the theory of responsiveness was tempered by their own views on 'what was best' for education in developing countries, an understandable interest in ensuring that the aid they provided was used as effectively as possible, and a concern for what were seen as persistent weaknesses in educational planning and management in developing countries. The kind of aid donors were prepared to offer was conditioned by their own policies and procedures and their own analysis of a recipient country's educational needs and priorities. They required assurances that the aid they provided would be used to support policies of which they approved and that, when provided, it would be properly administered and accounted for (8). Hurst referred to

"a conflict between seeing that aid is spent efficiently on approved purposes, on the one hand, and encroaching on the sovereign rights of a nation to self determination on the other" (9).

King pointed out that "In crude terms, in the trade-off between sovereignty and accountability, it frequently transpires that the donor knows best" and, as aid negotiations were ultimately loaded in favour of the aid giver, the aid dialogue was largely controlled by the various donor agencies (10).
Donor concern for accountability was linked with an equally strong concern that the aid they provided should have the maximum possible impact, and be seen to have the maximum possible impact (11). Donors searched for situations in which their aid would have what was referred to as a 'multiplier effect'. They looked for institution building projects, for pilot schemes and experimental models which could be replicated across the system, for the placement of 'experts' and 'advisers' in what ODA described as key parts of the education system, concentrating on "finding important pressure points" within the education system (12). They designed comprehensive package projects in which as many critical factors as possible were covered, and which relied increasingly on the availability of 'experts' and the appointment of a senior 'experts' with over-all responsibility for project implementation. They insisted on project identification and appraisal missions; detailed definition of project objectives, activities, inputs and outputs spelled out in joint agreements; regular reporting procedures; the drawing up of work plans and the setting of deadlines; careful attention to accounting procedures and the disbursement of project funds; and regular monitoring and evaluation missions (13).

Donors sought to improve the effectiveness of their aid programmes through collaboration between the various agencies and the co-ordination of their efforts. The 1970 White Paper on British aid (14) outlined a strategy for closer collaboration among donors and more co-ordination between their aid programmes. OECD reports on development and co-operation (15) called for a more flexible approach to the provision of aid and for closer co-ordination among donors to avoid competition and duplication of effort. These themes, examined in detail in a paper by Phillips (16), ran as a constant thread through the report of the 1972-74 Bellagio conferences. There was a tendency for donors to see themselves, and to be seen by others, as a 'development community' (17), a 'donor fraternity' (18). Meetings of the Bellagio (later IWGE) group and the DAC committee of the OECD were designed to provide regular channels for international co-operation and to develop an integrated approach to the problems of development in recipient countries. There were also occasional inter-agency review seminars.
held by the IIEP, specialist sector reviews, and one-off events ranging from the Ditchley conference in 1964 to the 1984 Windsor conference.

UNDP country programming was an attempt to co-ordinate the efforts of the various UN agencies across sectors, and to involve recipient countries more closely in project identification and appraisal. The ILO studies of a country's entire development strategy (19) provided donors with a basis for collaboration and co-ordination of their efforts. Other moves towards co-operation included joint programmes and co-operative agreements such as those between UNESCO and UNICEF and UNESCO and the World Bank, and the generation of joint projects such as those financed by SIDA and executed by various UN agencies. Whatever the intention, the danger with such an approach was that it could be regarded as further strengthening donor control of the aid dialogue, encouraging donors in attempts to influence domestic policies, and, as the World Bank pointed out (20), usurping a recipient country's responsibility for the planning and co-ordination of aid.

Donor attitudes and procedures were shaped by what they regarded as serious inadequacies in educational planning and management in recipient countries. The World Bank's conclusion that the most pervasive weakness in education in developing countries was in its planning and management, and its preoccupation with the need to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their education and training systems (21), reflected widely held views which were expressed, with various degrees of emphasis, in donor agency documents and commentaries on aid for education (22). There was a general acceptance among donors of the need to strengthen educational planning and management in developing countries to enable them to "sharpen their participation" in the aid dialogue, develop their capacity for project identification and implementation, and improve the planning and co-ordination of aid on the recipient side (23).

In a lead paper at the 1984 Windsor conference, organised jointly by ODA and the University of London Institute of Education, King argued that the interest in accountability was "further evidence of donors feeling that education somehow has got out of control",
and referred to "a widespread feeling that education is being mismanaged" and "very strong agency concerns" for what was seen as a "decay in professionalism" and a lack of commitment in ministries of education and in education systems in developing countries. One result was an intensified donor search for projects which would be administration proof and system proof and for more rigorous procedures which would ensure the successful operation and implementation of the projects they funded (24).

Donors required copious and detailed information to support requests for aid. Each agency had its own style, its own procedures, and its own format, and requirements varied from donor to donor and from project to project. The need to comply with donor procedures, often characterised by 'cumbersome complexity and unwieldiness', and with the different criteria and agenda insisted upon by the various agencies placed an immense strain on what were already inadequate systems of planning and management. Developing countries were not equipped to provide the various donors with the information and the documentation they required, and the preparation of project documentation was taken over, more often than not, by short-term technical missions sent out by the various agencies to advise and assist in the identification and appraisal of priority projects and, in some instances, by longer-term 'experts' provided to advise and assist in educational planning. A great deal of agency time was taken up in identifying suitable projects, in some cases ready made projects, and in 'ventriloquising' requests for them (25).

The diversity of forms and styles of assistance appeared to offer recipient countries opportunities for selecting from the different kinds of assistance those projects and approaches which best served their needs and interests. It also appeared to suggest that it might be possible for a recipient country to play one donor off against another, and so assume some measure of control over the aid dialogue. But the different kinds of assistance offered by the various donors created problems for recipient countries. As Clifton-Everest pointed out in a background paper at the 1984 Windsor conference (26), the different procedures required by a variety of donors could all too readily appear as "an impenetrable
bureaucracy", and the names used by the various agencies to describe the kinds of assistance they were prepared to offer were "notoriously confusing". The variety of approaches and procedures often made it difficult for recipient countries to understand exactly what kinds of assistance were available, how they could be most profitably used, and what conditions were attached to their provision.

Sectoral agreements intended to ensure a more effective use of aid and to involve recipient countries more closely in project identification and appraisal (27) appeared to offer a solution, but the position of the recipient country might be much more compromised with sectoral agreements than with aid negotiated on a project by project basis. With sectoral agreements

"the recipient is sometimes in danger of becoming so constrained that he no longer has any freedom of choice about the course of development at all. The effect of most sectoral aid agreements is to package the donor's offer of aid and thereby strengthen his negotiating position. Aid is offered on an all or none basis. The recipient either accepts all the donor's terms or he receives nothing" (28).

Clifton-Everest suggested that there were two kinds of conditions attached to the provision of aid. On the one hand, there were "the conditions of use defined by the activities or policies that a donor considers worthy of support", and which have been referred to in earlier paragraphs. On the other, there were the broader conditions "which might entail an undertaking to follow certain policies or to implement certain administrative changes". It was clear that donors

"have wanted to vet recipients' development programmes, and to limit their support to those projects and activities which, in their view, could be justified as part of a sound strategy for the sector. Some donors have wanted to go even further than this, and to negotiate changes in the recipient's development plan beyond those areas in which they were willing to give support" (29).
The Zambian Ministry of Education report of a World Bank project carried out in the mid-1960s and early 1970s described the problems arising out of the conditions attached to the provision of aid, and the need to comply with Bank requirements and procedures which proved to be beyond the capacities and experience of local people to handle. It referred to the "policy changes demanded by representatives of the Bank as a condition of loan assistance", described how "at a political level there was considerable resentment at what was interpreted as the Bank's unwarranted attempts to influence domestic policies", and concluded that "the influence of outside agencies in policy making has been rather substantial" (30). In a case study of a similar project in Sierra Leone, Wright noted that local officials felt that the Bank had imposed unacceptable constraints and attempted to influence government policy, and concluded that diversification of the secondary school curriculum "was not so much a policy formulated by the government as one thrust upon it" in connection with an external project (31).

(b) Aid for educational planning

As already indicated, donors had their own criteria which governed their provision of aid for education. In the mid-1960s a senior World Bank official made it clear that consideration of requests for aid depended upon the preparation of "a comprehensive, well balanced, practical education plan". The Bank needed to be satisfied that steps had been taken to make the education and training system "effective and efficient", and it would "expect to find arrangements made for exercising a continuous planning function" and for the "efficient co-ordination of aid received from various sources". Project identification and appraisal would be characterised by a "hard-boiled insistence on sound project priorities and adequate project planning and implementation" (32). Approaches by other agencies might have been less hard-boiled, but donors shared (33), and still share (34), a strong concern for evidence of a sound framework of educational planning to support requests for aid and to ensure the most effective use of the aid that was provided.

There was a general tendency on the part of donors to assume that
an understanding of the basic concepts of educational planning
and a mastery of its often sophisticated methods and techniques
demanded a particular kind of expertise and a high degree of
technical competence (35). Developing countries were not equipped
to undertake the kind of educational planning and manpower analysis
donors required to support proposals for aid. Nor had they
developed the capacity for effective planning and management of
the education system, or for efficient administration and co-
ordination of aid. The introduction and operation of educational
planning in developing countries has depended on external assistance
in the form of short-term missions and longer-term 'experts'
provided by UNESCO and other agencies (36). There was an acute
shortage of 'expert' personnel in the initial stages of aid for
educational planning and, as Curle (37) pointed out, many of the
'experts' sent out to advise and assist developing countries
in the early 1960s lacked the necessary experience and expertise.

Coombs has described the determined attempt, made during the
1960s, to remedy this situation. International agencies gave
educational planning a top priority, training programmes were
established, research was undertaken, and a growing body of
professional literature emerged. UNESCO was the main catalyst
in this movement, particularly as it related to educational
planning in developing countries. Between 1960 and 1963, it
established a network of regional training and research centres
in Latin America, Asia, the Arab States, and Africa. In 1963
(with the co-operation of the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, and
the French Government) it founded the International Institute for
Educational Planning (IIEP) in Paris (38).

Since its foundation the IIEP has had a significant impact on the
theory and practice of educational planning in developing countries.
It promoted basic research, developed and disseminated the concepts
and methodologies of educational planning, trained educational
planning 'experts' for international service, and provided training
programmes to help recipient countries develop their own capacity
for educational planning. It became a meeting ground and exchange
centre for officials and academics from universities and other
organisations that were developing their own research and training
programmes. It provided a centre for international conferences
and seminars, and it produced a stream of reports, case studies, occasional papers, and major publications on various aspects of educational planning. It was largely instrumental in establishing what was described as "an international community of educational planners" (39), and in encouraging the notion of an international aid approach to educational planning.

During the 1960s UNESCO, on its own and in co-operation with the World Bank, sent out short-term missions to advise developing countries on administrative requirements for educational development, including the establishment of educational planning units in ministries of education; to "assist in the selection of priority areas" in their education plans; and to advise and assist in the identification and appraisal of priority projects for donor financing. During the same period UNESCO provided longer-term resident 'experts' to advise and assist developing countries in target setting, the planning and financing of education, and the preparation of education plans (40). Other organisations, notably the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation, sent out 'experts' to assist in the preparation of manpower plans and in the establishment of educational priorities (41). During the 1970s and into the 1980s the operation of educational planning in developing countries continued to depend, to a considerable extent, on the availability of 'experts' provided by UNESCO and other agencies to advise and assist in the planning and management of the education system, the drawing up of national education plans, and the planning and co-ordination of aid, supported by 'experts' in manpower analysis and short-term missions and consultants sent out to undertake specific planning tasks (42).

The importance donors attached to aid for educational planning was shaped, and still is shaped, by their concern for the most effective use of the aid they provided, and by an equally strong and persistent concern for the weaknesses in educational planning and management in developing countries. What was described as a decline in already inadequate systems of planning and management (43) sharpened the issue of aid for educational planning. The report of the 1984 Windsor conference noted that the importance of aid for educational planning was a common feature of all donor
agency reports, and so obvious as to need little elaboration. It stressed the need for substantial, and better directed, donor assistance to develop the capacity in African countries for the planning and management of the education system, and for the planning and management of aid (44).

The impact of donor intervention

Aid for education was, by its very nature, designed to have an influence in the planning and development of education in African countries, whether or not this intention was made explicit (45), and however hard-boiled or diplomatic the donor approach might be. African and expatriate observers, cited below, have described donor intervention as exerting a considerable influence, in some instances a decisive influence, in educational planning and development in African countries. The Zambian Ministry of Education report and the Sierra Leone case study, already referred to, described how the World Bank insisted on its own procedures for project identification, appraisal, and implementation, demanded changes in existing administrative arrangements, and exerted substantial influence in the formulation of educational policy (46).

The Director of Educational Planning in Upper Volta described how external aid was channelled almost entirely through projects identified and drawn up by visiting missions, implemented through technical assistance, and controlled and monitored by agency procedures over which the Ministry of Education had little or no control. The preparation of the education plan was conditioned, to a large extent, by the availability of external aid and the inclusion of projects that donors were prepared to support, and the role of national educational planners was restricted to providing data and servicing the needs of visiting missions and consultants, and assisting in the preparation of project dossiers. Attempts at planning on the recipient side became "meaningless", and the funds obtained through aid for education bore "no relationship to what is lost in terms of independence and coherent national policy" (47).

In an assessment of the impact of international assistance organisations on the development of education Spaulding maintained that "no one can dispute the fact that assistance organisations
have been and are influencing" the planning and development of education in developing countries.

"both in terms of the kind of educational programmes receiving priority and in terms of how these programmes are implemented and adopted. This is done through the various policies adopted by the various assistance organisations ... and through the way such agencies manage technical assistance activities, capital loans and other grants, once they agree to assist a government".

In some instances, donor agencies appeared to exercise a decisive influence in over-all educational policy formulation, planning, programming, and implementation; in others influence was brought to bear through a "more project centred impact". Whatever kind of influence was brought to bear, donor policies had an impact on the planning and development of education in developing countries far out of proportion to the amount of actual aid provided (48).

In the report of a 1977 IIEP seminar on educational planning and social change and in articles on education and development Weiler argued that the planning of education in developing countries was largely determined by their dependence on external aid, and the imposition by donor agencies of international models of educational planning. Dependence on external funding imposed severe limitations on a recipient country's ability to act independently in shaping the future of its education system. The availability of resources for education, and the establishment of priorities for the allocation of these resources, was largely determined by donor policies and procedures and their preference for projects in particular sectors of the education system. The formulation of a coherent national education policy was impossible where external donors brought their own perspectives to bear on the policy making process in developing countries (49).

Donor policies were not always translated into practice, donor projects and programmes were not always fully implemented, and aid for education did not always have the determining influence ascribed to it in the commentaries referred to above. The impact of donor funded projects and programmes was restricted by inadequacies in the planning and administration of aid on the
donor as well as the recipient side. The responsible interventionism and operational persistence of donor agencies rested on the assumption that donors knew 'what was best' for recipient countries, and that they could provide the expertise, as well as the financing, to ensure that 'what was best' would be effectively and efficiently implemented. As Hurst (50) has pointed out, the idea of technical assistance presupposed that 'donors knew how to do it and recipient countries didn't'. The limited documentation that is available suggests that this was not always the case.

Reviews of aid for education in the 1960s noted that developing countries were not equipped to control the aid dialogue or to make selective and systematic use of available external aid. At the same time, donor capacity to provide constructive assistance was underdeveloped. Donor agencies had limited and not always relevant experience and expertise on which to draw and their administration and management of external aid was often less than adequate (51). There was no positive attempt, on either the donor or recipient side, to plan the co-ordination of external aid. Donor agencies competed with each other for projects, they funded projects which transferred foreign models which were inappropriate and expensive, and they established projects that advocated rival educational philosophies and different educational standards. They provided, and developing countries accepted, aid that generated additional recurrent costs and which involved interest and repayment on loans which recipient countries could ill afford. Projects were often poorly designed and badly implemented. There were long delays between the initial design and the eventual implementation of donor projects, reservations about recruiting procedures which produced 'experts' of variable calibre, problems in the supply of 'experts' and other forms of assistance, and problems in the training of 'counterparts' and the provision of scholarships (52).

Inadequacies in the planning and administration of aid for education on the donor and the recipient side persisted through the 1970s and into the 1980s (53). The move towards donor collaboration and co-ordination was often more apparent in declarations of intent at international conferences and in donor publications than in the generation and operation of projects at country level.
Phillips referred to competition between donors, the lack of exchange of information on policies and procedures, and differences between official agency policy and the generation of projects at country level (54). Spaulding noted a general lack of collaboration, and described the operation of aid for education at country level as "a patchwork of programmes and projects, a bevy of expert teams under a variety of auspices" concerned with their own interests rather than the possibilities for co-operation and co-ordination (55).

The considerable diversity of forms and styles of assistance within the donor community appeared to offer the various agencies a remarkable wealth of possibilities to respond to the many different needs of African countries, and to arrange their aid programmes so that they complemented one another. But, as King (56) and Clifton-Everest (57) pointed out, there was "negligible understanding of the culture and organisation of other agencies", in spite of recognised channels for donor collaboration. There were tensions between the aid priorities of individual donors and the demands of international co-operation, and the persistence of the separate traditions of donors, their preference for working in particular kinds of countries, and their sense of what they did best tended "to make it difficult to arrange much in the way of very coherent co-ordination at the level of the individual country". The variety of approaches and procedures tended to result in unco-ordinated inputs, conflicting pressures from different donors, and what were often irreconcilable conditions insisted upon by the various agencies.

The various donor agencies designed self contained 'package' projects, relied increasingly upon the provision of 'experts', and insisted upon agency procedures for close supervision of project implementation. But there was no guarantee that an aid project which was successfully implemented from a donor perspective would have any appreciable impact on the planning and development of education in the recipient country. In discussion of the influence that aid for education was expected to exert King referred to aid projects "insulated from the ordinary rough and tumble of life" in the recipient country's education system, and concluded that the very factors which ensured their success as aid projects ensured their failure when agency funds were removed.
On paper the generalisation or replication of projects across the education system was assured. In reality, the education system "gradually returned to normality" (58). In some instances, when an aid project came to an end, it meant the end, for all practical purposes, of the programme or activity for which it had assumed responsibility.

As already indicated, donors attached great importance to aid for educational planning. In the late 1960s and through the 1970s what were referred to as the administrative aspects of educational planning became a major preoccupation within the IIEP. A stream of discussion papers and seminar reports contained recommendations for the renovation of inadequate management structures and procedures, and proposals for the training of new cadres of educational planners and administrators (59). Reference in earlier paragraphs to continuing, and increasing, donor concern for weaknesses in recipient countries in the planning and management of the education system and the planning and administration of aid suggests that donor assistance in these areas had not exerted the kind of influence expected of it. The Windsor conference report referred to a "decline in administrative performance" and "the pervasive lack of management capacity throughout the education system" in African countries (60).

Donor assistance exerted considerably more influence in the preparation of education plans, but national education plans, drawn up with advice and assistance from 'experts' provided for the purpose, were rarely, if ever, implemented. As early as 1967 Coombs (61) referred to the lack of implementation of education plans as "the number one problem of educational planning". In 1968 a UNESCO conference (62) described the divorce between planning and the implementation of plans as a "major and frequently recurring problem". The report of an IIEP seminar published in 1980 (63) referred to the "alarming frequency" with which plans in education encountered implementation problems, and considered "the question of implementation as one of the most problematic and preoccupying aspects of the entire issue of educational planning".

Critiques of the international aid approach suggested that lack of implementation could be traced to the application of a kind of
educational planning which was restricted in scope, overly concerned with technical factors, and dominated by economic criteria. Beeby argued (64) that educational planners were primarily concerned with the design of education plans and had little or nothing to do with the problems of implementation, and that "the artificial separation between planning and administration" was the "most serious weakness of the modern movement in educational planning". Educational planners had little experience of how the education system worked, or of the adjustment and compromise involved in the preparation, adoption, and implementation of an education plan. More often than not the plan drawn up by the 'expert' planner turned out to be impractical, and the educational administrator was left to carry it out as best he could by making adjustments, dealing with unexpected problems and unforeseen contingencies, and seeking new policy decisions.

Educational planners paid little attention to educational criteria, to the needs of the children in the system, or to the variety of factors which had a bearing on the teaching/learning process in the classroom. The administrator needed to become "an educational watchdog", prepared to defend "the values that seem to him proper to education". Nor did educational planners give special consideration to the education system's capacity for growth, and the educational and administrative limits imposed on this capacity. These included existing patterns of provision, established organisational structures, the level of education and training of the teaching force and the wide range of ability and adaptability among teachers, the time lag that was part of any attempt at educational reform, and the innate conservatism throughout the system. One result was that educational planning, dominated by the ideas and techniques of economists, did what it knew best, concentrated on the quantitative aspects of educational development, at the expense of quality (65).

Following Beeby, and with a case study of his experience in Papua New Guinea for support, McKinnon argued (66) for a more realistic approach to educational planning. Lack of practical experience and concentration on technical factors resulted in "narrowness and neglect of other important issues", in particular the practical issues and organisational features which were "the facts of life for an administrator", and which played a crucial part in the
design and implementation of an education plan. Far too often education plans were not implemented because the planners who designed them failed to take into account the limitations imposed by the legal and regulatory features of the education system, the existing organisational framework of the education system and its relationship with the more general pattern of government, and established patterns of financing and administration.

The international aid approach paid little attention to the broader political and social settings in which education plans were prepared, and in which they were expected to work. Beeby (67) and McKinnon (68) drew attention to the influence exerted by political realities and social values in the planning and development of education. Educational planners failed to recognise the need to balance "the complex of competing forces", the pressure groups and vested interests, from which an education plan finally emerged, and which continued to shape its implementation. Nor did they take into account the interests and expectations of the various groups who managed, worked in, or made use of the education system. Anderson (69) and Foster (70) questioned the effectiveness of a kind of educational planning which ignored social and political constraints, and which seemed unaware that the planning and development of education was often shaped by political, rather than economic, criteria.

The 1963 Uganda Education Commission report (71), and later commentaries (72), pointed to the limits imposed on educational planning by social, economic, and political forces, and suggested that the development of education depended upon, rather than brought about, economic and social change. Foster argued (73) that the development of education was shaped by a variety of historical, sociological, economic, and political factors over which a ministry of education had little or no control, and which were "almost totally ignored" in international models of educational planning. In addition, educational planning adopted a global approach in which it was assumed that international models could be generalised across the variety of settings and diverse conditions in African countries. As a result it underestimated the differences between African countries, and failed to come to terms with the historical, social, economic, and political realities in particular African countries.
In a paper presented at the 1972-1974 Bellagio conferences Jolly questioned the assumption that the development of education was directed by the policies adopted by a ministry of education, and argued that it was in fact largely directed by a ministry of education's often partial and inadequate reaction to a combination of local pressures (74), pressures which, as Colclough and Hallak pointed out (75), often ran counter to the declared aims and objectives of educational planners and administrators. Levin argued that the 'academic' models of educational planning were not a crucial determinant in the direction of educational development, and that the development of education systems was shaped and directed by a combination of economic, political, and social forces rather than by the concepts and methodologies of educational planning or the stated intentions and objectives in national education plans (76).

Foster drew attention to the fact that the attitudes of local populations and their demand for education played a far greater part in the development of education systems than was often supposed, and the success or failure of new education and training programmes depended to a large extent on the response from local communities, whether they were urban elites or part of the rural masses (77). McKinnon pointed out that community expectations frequently cut across well meaning plans to improve education or to introduce new programmes (78). Windham suggested that the development of education was shaped to a large extent first by the short-term political interests of those in power, and second by what people wanted from education and their perception of the rewards that education offered. Educational planning that was not grounded in an understanding of this demand and of the social and economic forces that conditioned it was "doomed to either futility or counter productivity" (79).

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s commentaries such as those by Castle, Beeby, and Foster stressed the need for a more practical, commonsense approach to educational planning. Their arguments represented an 'age of practicality' which ran alongside the 'age of innocence' as a critical commentary on its over simplified assumptions and over optimistic expectations, and which provided a background for the idea of an 'age of scepticism'. The issues raised by the 'age of practicality' are referred to in the critiques
of educational planning cited above, and at various points in chapters
1 and 2. They are referred to again in chapter 4 in an analysis
of the ways in which African countries responded to donor
intervention.

Aid for education and dependency

In the 1960s Bauer had argued forcefully that external aid, even
though well intentioned, retarded rather than accelerated progress
in developing countries. The obstacles to development in these
countries were domestic rather than external and the determinants
of progress were the capacities, attitudes, and social institutions
of the society concerned. Aid tended to retard development because
it encouraged passivity and dependence on others, undermined self
reliance, and bred resentment (80).

In the second half of 1970s the idea of aid and dependency was
given a different emphasis in arguments which derived from the
dependency theory of international economic relations, as exemplified
in the work of Leys (81), and linked with the development of
education in developing countries by Carnoy (82). According
to the dependency theory, developing countries were still under-
developed because they were tied to and dependent upon an interna-
tional network of economic wealth and political power, over which
they had no control, and which worked to perpetuate their under
development and their dependence on advanced Western countries.
International governmental and corporate agencies, aided and
abetted by local elites in furtherance of their own capitalist
interests, retarded or distorted development in developing
countries, using the modern sector for their own purposes and
leaving the traditional rural economy to stagnate.

Although aid was directed ostensibly towards change and modernisation,
it was part of an international conspiracy to perpetuate under
development and increase dependency. It served as a smokescreen
to conceal the real exploitation taking place, and as a sop or
palliative to divert attention away from the fundamental economic
and political inequalities between developed and developing
countries. Aid for education ensured the supply of the small
amount of educated manpower required for the capitalist owned
modern sector, and provided the trained agents and intermediaries for the process of capital exploitation. At the same time, it inculcated the political and social values of metropolitan countries as a way of moulding the consciousness of the exploited into acceptance of their own exploitation (83).

The idea of aid as part of an international conspiracy derived from a prior interpretation of social reality, which mistook consequence for intention, and which was beyond proof or disproof through argument or research. It provided a framework within which all other explanations could be accommodated and interpreted in terms of a single perspective. There was a strong suggestion that things were not as they seemed, and it needed the dialectic of the dependency theory to explain them as they really were. So, for example, the over supply of educated manpower resulting from a government's response to social and political pressures for the expansion of secondary education was seen in terms of a capitalist strategy to depress wages and increase profits (84). In the same way, donor proposals for basic/non-formal education concealed a strategy for limiting aspirations, perpetuating economic and social inequality, and legitimising a status quo of under development and exploitation (85).

Developing countries were dependent in varying degrees upon aid for education. As the Permanent Secretary for education in Ethiopia pointed out, it was "a fact of life that most forms of development action in developing countries could not take place without some element of aid" (86). The funding power of donor agencies placed them in a strong position in aid negotiations, particularly in the poorest countries with the greatest needs, and frequently with the greatest array of aid donors and consequently the greatest problems in aid absorption and aid accountability. As indicated in earlier paragraphs, donor assistance was designed to have an influence in the planning and development of education in recipient countries. Donors attached conditions to the provision and use of aid, they brought their own perspectives to bear on the policy making process, and in some instances they insisted upon changes in domestic policies. But there was nothing to indicate that the various donor agencies were, knowingly or unknowingly, part of an international conspiracy. Hurst (87) pointed out, there
was no hard evidence to support the idea of such a conspiracy, and Eckstein and Noah saw the dependency theory applied to education as beset by "formidable logical and empirical weaknesses" (88).

The issue of aid and dependency was sharpened in the second half of the 1970s by changes in the world economic situation. A world economic recession, rises in oil prices, high rates of inflation, and rising levels of unemployment affected developed and developing countries, but the massive negative changes in terms of trade for primary exporters and oil importers struck hard at the economies of most developing countries in the second half of the 1970s and into the 1980s. Rates of economic growth stalled or reversed, food and agricultural production continued to decline. External borrowing negotiated in previous years caused acute debt servicing problems, and most African countries were "on a treadmill of arrears, re-scheduled debts and additional borrowing to finance debt servicing" (89).

At the same time, the effects of the recession in richer industrialised countries limited their ability to provide aid on the same scale as in the past, at a time when developing countries were most in need of external assistance. As donor agency funds shrank and aid budgets were cut back, there were two main consequences for aid for education. The first was an increasing need to support arguments for aid for education against the competing demands from agriculture, energy, water, and health, sectors which might hold out more promise of a substantial early pay off. The second was an intensified donor search for situations in which the aid they were prepared to offer would have the maximum possible impact (90).

The next chapter describes, in broad outline, the main features of an approach to educational planning in African countries which was at variance with the international aid approach. It suggests that this approach shaped the planning and development of education in African countries, and limited the influence donor assistance was expected to exert.

Footnotes
1 King K Aid Response to Education Priorities, 1984, p 4.
2 (Ditchley Conference) Aid to Education, 1965, pp 17-18; Cerych
L Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries, 1965,
p 203; Phillips H M Educational Co-operation between Developed
and Developing Countries, 1976, pp 19-20, 23-24; King K Aid
Responses to Education Priorities, 1984.
3 Ripman H B International Financing of Educational Investment,
1966, pp 593-594; Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in
4 Phillips H M Educational Co-operation between Developed and
5 SIDA Aid and Education, 1972, p 3.
7 ODA British Aid to Education in Developing Countries, 1984,
pp 1, 3.
8 Cerych L Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries,
1965, p 203; Chesswas J D Educational Planning and
Development in Uganda, 1969, pp 56-57; Phillips H M
Educational Co-operation between Developed and Developing
Countries, 1976, p 23.
9 Hurst P Key Issues in the External Financing of Education,
10 King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984, p 4.
11 Coombs P H Ways to Improve United States Educational Aid,
1965, p 14; Cerych L The Integration of External Assistance
with Educational Planning in Nigeria, 1967, p 52; King K
12 King K Aid Responses to Educational Priorities, 1984, p 3;
ODA British Aid to Education in Developing Countries, 1984,
pp 1, 3.
13 Phillips H M Educational Co-operation between Developed and
Developing Countries, 1976; King K Aid Responses to
14 Ministry of Overseas Development Education in Developing
18 Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, p 1.
22 See, for example, Cerych L Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries, 1965; Ripman H B International Financing of Educational Investment, 1966; UNESCO International Conference on Educational Planning, 1968; UNESCO Administrative Aspects of Educational Planning, 1970; Phillips H M Educational Co-operation between Developed and Developing Countries, 1976; UNESCO Seminar for Field Experts in Educational Planning and their Counterparts, 1977; King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984.
24 King K Aid Responses to Educational Priorities, 1984, p 4.

26 Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, pp 1, 2, 38-40, 66.


28 Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, pp 72-73.

29 Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, pp 67, 72.


34 King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984; (Windsor Conference) Education Priorities and Aid Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986, pp 64-66.


36 Coombs P H What is Educational Planning?, pp 26, 47-48; Phillips H M Educational Co-operation between Developed and Developing Countries, 1976, pp 24, 156-158, 160.


44 (Windsor Conference) Education Priorities and Aid Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986, p 64.
45 King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984, p 3.
47 Damiba A Educational Planning in Theory and Practice, 1980, p 73.
52 Cerych L Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries, 1965, pp 150-154; (Ditchley Conference) Aid to Education, 1965, p 18; Williams P Aid in Uganda, 1966, pp 107-109, 120; Cerych L The Integration of External Assistance with Educational Planning in Nigeria, 1967, p 70.
53 Phillips H M Educational Co-operation between Developed and Developing Countries, 1976, pp 24, 156-158, 160; King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984, pp 18-19; Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, pp 71-73.

54 Phillips H M Educational Co-operation between Developed and Developing Countries, 1976, pp 27, 166-167.


56 King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984, pp 18-19.

57 Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, pp 1, 24-25.

58 King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984, pp 12-14.


60 (Windsor Conference) Education Priorities and Aid Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986, p 49.

61 Coombs P H What Do We Still Need to Know about Educational Planning?, 1967, pp 71-72.


65 Beeby C E The Quality of Education in Developing Countries, 1966, pp 4-5; Beeby C E Planning and the Educational Administrator, 1967, pp 13, 23-26, 36.


71 Education in Uganda, 1963, pp 33-34, 39.


74 Jolly A R The Judo Trick, 1974, pp 62-63.


76 Levin H M Educational Planning and Teacher-Learning Strategies, 1977, pp 3-5.


80 Bauer P T Foreign Aid, 1966; See also Bauer P T Dissent on Development (1971), 1976, pp 96-132.


86 (Windsor Conference) Education Priorities and Aid Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986, p 34.


African countries vary considerably in size and population, in natural and human resources, in economic wealth and political systems and ideologies, in their cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity. They have different historical legacies, and they vary in the nature of their response to colonial and post-colonial experiences. With such diversity in setting and conditions approaches to the planning of education were almost certain to vary from country to country. At the same time, as noted in the Lagos conference report (1), there were broad similarities in approach across African countries. This chapter recognises variations across African countries, but it suggests that there was a sense in which there was an African approach to educational planning, as distinct from and at variance with the international aid approach.

The first section in this chapter describes in broad outline an African approach to educational planning, and the ways in which it restricted the influence donor intervention was intended to exert. The second suggests that educational development depended upon rather than brought about economic and social change. Together, the first two sections suggest that the planning and development of education in African countries was shaped by an African approach to educational planning and the variety of societal institutions across African countries, rather than by the acceptance or imposition of international models and the responsible interventionism of donor agencies. A final section refers to the persistence into the 1980s of the main assumptions that underpinned the international aid approach to educational planning.

An African approach

This section describes broad similarities in approach to educational planning across African countries, under the headings of policies, politics, popular pressures, planning, and pragmatism. Reference to the influence of political considerations in educational planning runs throughout the section.
(a) Policies

The report of the 1976 Lagos conference of ministers of education of African countries (2) noted "a remarkable consensus" in educational policies in African countries, and commented:

"It is clear that educational strategies are being designed which, through different ways and means, reflect a variety of situations, political choices, and availability of resources. These are all aimed at achieving the same purposes; giving access to education to all; eliminating or reducing disparities between the various parts of the country, between social groups, between men and women; relating education to the world of work, to manpower requirements, to the environment, to the culture and values of the community".

These strategies were based on two principles. The first was that "education is an inalienable right which all should be able to exercise". The second was that "education is a determining factor in economic, social and cultural development". For this reason and, as it "has a role to play on the political scene", the "systems and structures whereby it is provided should express the national political will".

The Lagos conference and the 1982 Harare conference were organised by UNESCO in co-operation with OAU and ECA. Conference reports were dominated by views from African countries, rather than those of donor agencies and their academic advisers. There was a sense in which African countries saw the rhetoric of conference reports and declarations as representing an African, as distinct from an expatriate, approach to education and the part it could be expected to play in national development. As indicated in the above quotation, the idea of manpower for economic development which dominated the international aid approach was one aspect, but not the most important aspect, of a wide ranging and ambitious set of educational aspirations in African countries (3). The Harare conference (4) noted that "the principle of the right to education for all had been adopted by all the African states", and that they had made, and continued to make, strenuous efforts to ensure "the effective exercise" of this right. The expansion of education
at all levels, seen in terms of 'democratisation' and 'generalised access' (5), was a major policy concern, and many African countries were already grappling in various ways with problems stemming from the adoption of an 'open access' approach to lower secondary education (6).

Differences between the approach to education in African countries and the international aid approach led to conflicts in policy priorities, and donors and recipients often seemed to operate at cross purposes in the design and implementation of externally funded projects. This was particularly the case in projects for the diversification of secondary curricula, where donor concern for selective development geared to manpower needs was at variance with the tendency towards an 'open access' approach in many African countries. The tension between donor and recipient approaches is illustrated in the case study of a World Bank diversification project in Sierra Leone.

The Bank project was designed and implemented against a background of a national education policy entangled in a complex web of ambitious educational aspirations such as expansion of the system at all levels, democratisation of educational opportunity, universal primary education in the shortest possible time, qualitative improvements in the education system, improved linkages between education and national development through the production of manpower for development. Diversification had always been an important educational concern, but along with other changes always regarded as necessary adjuncts to a major programme of educational expansion. Although Sierra Leone was prepared to go along with the Bank in regarding diversification as an important aspect of its educational development strategy, it was not prepared to sacrifice or even curtail the pursuit of other educational goals in the interest of diversification. Indeed some of these other educational goals were regarded as more important than diversification, and there was resentment over what were seen as attempts by the Bank "to influence Government policy in a highly sensitive area where social pressures cannot be ignored" (7).

(b) Politics
Educational development policies in African countries were shaped as much by political considerations as by the notion of manpower for economic growth. In the 1960s the manpower approach fitted with and supported the aspirations in newly independent African countries for economic growth and modernisation, but the expansion of secondary and post-secondary education and training was not geared exclusively to assumed requirements for economic growth. It was shaped to a large extent by the "political imperative" of localisation (8), and by a political awareness of the strong and insistent pressures exerted by an increased and increasing popular demand for education (referred to in the following section).

Strategies for educational development were conditioned by the need to respond to the demands of localisation, "an over-riding concern for the replacement of expatriates in both the public and the private sectors" (9), which would be an assertion and a justification of a recently acquired independence. The development plans of the three East African countries were based on estimates of high-level manpower carried out by donor 'experts'. But, as Rado pointed out (10), each East African development plan set as its first long-term aim the localisation of the public service and the modern sector of the economy. The demands for localisation and economic growth were, more often than not, competing rather than complementary. Thomas (11) indicated that the reason manpower targets seemed impossibly high in Uganda was

"not related to any prospects for large-scale economic development. It arises from the fact the government and the economy of the country have hitherto been operated and managed by foreigners".

Rado and Jolly (12) argued that the implementation of a policy geared primarily to the replacement of expatriates would slow down economic development, and the problem in Uganda "resolves itself to one of political choice of priorities" between economic growth and localisation.

The widespread application of the manpower approach in African countries could be explained in terms of donor advocacy, and national aspirations for rapid economic growth and modernisation (13). From a political point of view, much of its appeal stemmed from
what Thias and Carnoy (14) referred to as its "innate expansionist quality". It seemed a relatively simple matter to justify a bold educational growth policy, and requests for aid to support it, on the grounds that the production of high-level manpower would lead to economic growth and the "blessings of modernity" (15) from which all would eventually benefit. At the same time, proposals for the expansion of secondary and post-secondary education and training could be rationalised in terms of a vigorous localisation policy, and as a response to social and political pressures for the increased provision and more equitable distribution of educational opportunity.

The broader version of the manpower approach proposed in the education for rural development strategy appeared to offer a solution to the deep rooted problems of rural poverty and unemployment, and to point towards an alternative path to economic growth and modernisation. In addition, the idea of vocationalising education had been an enduring feature of educational policy in many African countries, before and after independence (16). The persistence of critical manpower shortages, particularly at craft and technician levels, when there were increasing numbers of young people who could not find employment on completion of their schooling, lent additional weight to long standing arguments that education was too academic and not geared to the real development needs in African countries. Non-formal education and training programmes had the added advantage, in theory if not always in practice, that they offered a way of responding to pressures for educational expansion without a massive investment of national resources, and they were expected to generate employment and self employment opportunities.

The report of the 1982 Harare conference for ministers of education and those responsible for economic planning in African countries noted that

"delegates voiced their concern to bring education into better alignment with the need for trained manpower, not only in the modern sector but also in the traditional rural sector and the informal urban sector",

and stressed the need for a manpower approach to educational planning
But educational policy continued to be shaped as much by short-term political interests as by projections of manpower needs in the surveys carried out by donor 'experts'. Bacchus (18) suggested that in many African countries the decision to establish vocational programmes was a political response to the problems of increasing numbers of unemployed school leavers and the continuing demand for educational expansion, rather than an attempt to develop a comprehensive and coherent national strategy to meet the wide ranging manpower needs in African countries. Lauglo (19) indicated that in Kenya the attempt at diversification of the secondary curriculum had not been so much an attempt to meet certain projected manpower needs as an essentially political response to a situation in which the products from the regular academic programmes were experiencing increasing difficulties in finding employment.

Local elites, faced with the social and political problems of disappointed and disaffected school leavers, rural-urban drift, and the widening gap between rural and urban sectors, argued that something had to be done to diversify the education and employment opportunities of the rural masses. As King pointed out, "even from motives of enlightened self interest" it was possible to see that the very few jobs available in the modern sector "could not possibly accommodate the massive aspirations of thousands to similar positions". Formal and non-formal education and training programmes were designed to lower these aspirations and bring them more into line with employment and self employment opportunities in the rural and urban sectors (20). Bacchus (21) argued that there was no doubt that these attempts "had at their roots a strong political motivation", before and after independence. They represented an important part of the effort "to use the instructional programmes of the schools as a mechanism of social control - a means of trying to 'cool off' or lower the occupational aspirations of the youngsters in these societies to a more 'realistic' level".

(c) Popular pressures

The planning and development of education in African countries
was shaped to a large extent by a political awareness of the strength and persistence of popular pressures for the expansion of education. Coombs noted (22) that there could have been little doubt in the minds of the leaders of African countries in the 1960s that a popular demand for education existed, and that it exerted considerable pressure for the rapid expansion of education at all levels. The demand for education seems to have been released in the 1950s, and then enlarged by a continuing population explosion. The growth of primary education in developing countries in the 1950s had generated a demand for secondary education and the increasing popular pressure for, and the consequent expansion of, secondary education in African countries were a natural extension of past trends. This pressure had been added to by national and international declarations that education was a fundamental human right to which all were entitled, by the setting of ambitious enrolment targets and the making of large promises at international conferences, by the influence of populist political ideologies in ex colonial countries. It was a pressure that was impossible to ignore and difficult to resist, and it made increasing demands on available resources.

What Phillips described as a "revolution of rising expectations" (23) continued into the 1970s and the 1980s. The Windsor conference report (24) described the dilemma in African countries of maintaining participation rates in the face of rising populations, and of seeking to provide further educational opportunities demanded by an increasing number of jobless school leavers. Added to the difficulty of maintaining quantitative growth was the more intractable problem of ensuring or restoring acceptable levels of educational quality. As Williams (25) pointed out, it had

"often seemed in the past as if maintaining the quality of education had been regarded as bringing less political reward than numbers of schools and teachers and particularly enrolments".

The strength and persistence of popular pressures for the expansion of education, and in particular for the expansion of secondary and post-secondary education, and the preparedness in African countries to respond to these pressures, was reflected in the
The report took note of the outstanding progress made in the past twenty years with regard to the quantitative expansion and renovation of education in Africa: in no other region of the world has there been such a rate of growth in overall enrolments.

Between 1960 and 1980, enrolments at the first level of schooling in sub-Saharan African countries had almost doubled, they had increased more than fourfold in secondary education, and enrolments in higher education had increased eightfold over the same period.

The international aid approach acknowledged the existence of popular pressures for the expansion of education in references to the social demand approach to educational planning. The problem, using this approach, was to estimate the demand for different levels of education and to provide the necessary schools and teachers to cater for it within the resources limits of the economy. The social demand approach, described by Phillips as "no approach at all" (27), was seen as contradicting and competing with the need for the controlled development of secondary and post-secondary education geared to economic needs as determined by the manpower approach (28). Coombs (29) listed the three main criticisms made of the social demand approach. It ignored the larger problem of national resource allocation. It ran counter to "the character and pattern of manpower needed by the economy". It tended to over stimulate popular demand, to under estimate costs, and to spread available resources so thinly that the quality and effectiveness of education would be reduced to the point where education became a dubious investment.

Social and political pressures for the expansion of existing systems of formal secondary education were conditioned by a shrewd awareness of the rewards of education as a private investment. As Lewis pointed out,

"the idea of education as an investment was recognised and pursued by Africans long before the economists made it a feature in the theory of education for development" (30).
For many education was an escape route from the drudgery and backwardness of the traditional rural economy, and secondary and higher education provided access to employment in the modern sector and the exorbitant advantages of the elite (31). As already indicated in chapter 2, Foster argued that rural populations had resisted, and would continue to resist, attempts to provide rurally biased or vocational education as no more than a second best alternative, and they would continue to insist on the more vocational bias of formal academic education.

Later commentaries (32) described problems in developing formal and non-formal vocational education and training programmes in similar terms. Wright (33) noted

"a fundamental contradiction between the aspirations of pupils (and their parents) who regard education as a means of upward mobility to 'high status' occupations, and the popular perception of vocationalisation as a preparation for 'low status' occupations".

In a 1986 review of vocationalisation in developing countries Bacchus (34) commented on its lack of appeal to pupils and parents, and the higher rewards and "increased attractiveness of the modern sector with its greater demand for individuals with an academic education".

Attempts to lower pupil and parental aspirations and make them more 'realistic' were hardly likely to have the required effect. Attempts to generate employment opportunities in rural areas through the Swaneng Hill brigades in Botswana foundered because trainees did not accept this as their future. They wanted a certificate that would lead to a salaried job in the modern sector. As van Rensburg pointed out,

"As far as students and parents are concerned, secondary education serves its purpose well. People do not want to change it, they want more of the same" (35).

Bock (36) and King (37) argued that non-formal vocational programmes were not designed to lead to modern sector employment, and were unpopular for this reason. Formal technical and vocational programmes were accorded low status except in the few instances when they could
be seen to lead directly to employment in the public service or a foreign owned enterprise. Both were seen, more often than not, as a pathway to further education and a return to the formal academic education system.

The increase in the number of unemployed school leavers far from leading to a decline in the demand for formal education led to even further expansion in this demand. Edwards and Todaro (38) argued that educational development was shaped by the private demand for education in the face of rising unemployment. Carnoy (39) suggested an inflationary model of educational development in which growing numbers of jobless school leavers increased the demand for more education at higher levels. The Windsor conference report (40) noted "a built in momentum in African populations which guarantees massive over-all numerical growth into the next century", the broadening of the age pyramid and the increase in an already high dependency ratio, and concluded that "the sheer pressure of demand for schooling is likely to continue as long as anyone can foresee". Williams (41) argued that although logic, supported by research findings, might suggest a shift of emphasis towards primary education strong parental demand was directed towards the expansion of secondary and post-secondary education:

"the message that reaches parents is not that schooling has lost its point as a result of the 'diploma disease'; rather the lesson many of them learn is that their children need more education if they are to get a job".

(d) Planning

The African and international aid approaches to educational planning operated according to different sets of assumptions and were directed towards the achievement of different objectives. As indicated in chapter 1, this was not always readily apparent in the early 1960s when African and donor interests appeared to coincide in a groundswell of enthusiasm for ambitious programmes of educational expansion which it was assumed would constitute the royal road to economic growth and over-all national development. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was becoming increasingly evident from critiques of the international aid approach (already referred to) that there was a fundamental difference between the two approaches
in the planning and management of the education system as well as in broader policy issues.

The difference between the approach to planning and management of education in African countries and the international aid approach, with particular reference to the years after 1974, was summarised in a lead paper presented by Williams (42) at the Windsor conference. It suggested three educational strategies as ways of overcoming what were described as the constraints and challenges that were besieging education in African countries. These were described in terms of "passive reaction, radical re-structuring and planned improvement", and categorised as the 'sit-out', 'break-out', and 'work-out' options. Williams suggested that the 'sit-out' option, which was described as "reacting by responsive adjustment rather than premeditated intervention to successive pressures afflicting the system", was "in fact the main strategy that African governments have pursued".

The main symptoms of the 'sit-out' option were a depressed teaching force, inadequate management structures, a lack of professionalism and commitment throughout the system, and a qualitative erosion of educational standards. The rapid expansion of education systems had outstripped the capacity in ministries of education for effective management and control. A major problem was over-staffing in schools, resulting from poor organisation and supervision. Education systems were characterised by heavy teacher turn over and wastage, high rates of teacher absenteeism and 'moonlighting', and a high number and proportion of unqualified teachers, a problem added to by an unwillingness to enter teaching on the part of better qualified graduates and, in some instances, by a deliberate decision on the part of governments to recruit less highly qualified and lower paid teachers than had been the case in previous years.

The main features of the 'sit-out' option reflected long standing donor concern for weaknesses in planning and management in African countries. From a donor perspective inadequate organisational structures, ineffective operational procedures, and a lack of professionalism and commitment were linked with a lack of control over what happened in the education system, failure in plan
implementation, and ad hoc expansion of the education system. King (43) described planning and management in African countries in terms of a break down in the briefly inherited traditions of Western style administration and its replacement by a less formal, more ad hoc way of doing things, which relied increasingly on oral tradition for the taking and communication of decisions. Ministries of education were overstaffed while, at the same time, there was a shortage of relevant skills and experience, and the politicisation of appointments had led to a lack of commitment and a paralysis of initiative among professional career officers (44).

King (45) noted "a predictable collapse of civil service morale" in the technical wings of the service as it had become clear progressively that technical knowledge was not particularly important to policy formulation and implementation. The nature of many educational decisions was highly political, shaped by the short-term interests of those in power, and conditioned by reference to a deeply rooted set of obligations based on tribe, clan, and kinship (46). The political instinct to respond to popular pressures for educational expansion often ran counter to the professional instinct to consolidate quantitative gains by qualitative reinforcement (47), as well as donor proposals for a more selective development of the education system geared to the production of the 'requisite skills for economic growth and national development'.

The 'work-out' option and its emphasis on the need for planned and purposeful educational renewal reiterated the recommendations for improved professional leadership and management, proper advisory and supervision services, more control over what was happening in the education system, and more efficient use of available resources which had been recurring features of donor agency documentation, and which had been the main preoccupation within the IIEP in the late 1960s and through the 1970s. Williams concluded that while the education professional had an important role to play in attempts to counter balance the tendencies of the 'sit-out' option, the task was "primarily one for the national political leadership" (48).

The approach to educational planning and management in African
countries was characterised by a process of responsive adjustment and adaptation to political and social pressures rather than by donor notions of planned intervention and control. While donor agencies might see this approach as evidence of persistent weaknesses in planning and management in recipient countries, there was a sense in which it was a way of protecting a view of education and development which was at variance with donor policies and priorities. The largely non-interventionist approach adopted by African countries meant that there was little likelihood that donor policies and donor projects would be fully implemented in the way envisaged in the international aid approach. This may not have been the intention but, more often than not, the consequence was that, in varying degrees across African countries, the influence donor assistance was expected to exert was restricted, and national aspirations for education were protected against the responsible interventionism and operational persistence of donor agencies.

(e) Pragmatism

Linked with the assumption that donors knew 'what was best' was a strong tendency for them to regard African countries as willing, and more or less passive, recipients of donor assistance and donor expertise. Generalisation about donor intervention and the response in African countries to this intervention is limited by the various conditions referred to at the beginning of this chapter, and by the variety of patterns of aid provision referred to in chapter 3. The response in any particular country was conditioned by the specific array of donors and their 'experts' brought to bear upon the national education system, and the pattern of interaction between government and the various donor agencies developed over the years. Response to donor intervention could vary not only from country to country but also from donor to donor and from project to project within a particular country. In addition, the aid process had evolved over the years. There had been shifts of emphasis in donor policies, and some donor agencies had made changes in their operational procedures and in the tenor of their approach to aid negotiations (49). The following account recognises the existence of a broad spectrum of
responses across African countries, but it suggests that in general terms the response to donor intervention in African countries tended towards the pragmatic rather than the passive.

African countries could hardly fail to appreciate the significance of the connection between the availability of external aid and donor concern for the establishment of a sound framework of educational planning. While they accepted, in principle, that assistance in educational planning was a form of aid that had the highest priority and ostensibly welcomed donor provision of specialist services (50), their acceptance was not completely disinterested. Acceptance of the need for educational planning was conditioned, to a large extent, by donor insistence on an education plan and on arrangements for sustained and systematic planning as conditions for aid.

Coombs (51) noted that, in some countries, acceptance of the need for educational planning was in direct response to donor agency requirements and the prodding of donor agencies. Weiler argued (52) that, in some instances, the adoption of some form of systematic educational planning in developing countries had been prompted by "the genuine intention to enhance the level of rationality of the educational decision-making process" while, in others, it had been "the more or less mechanical reaction to an external demand that some form of planning would be a prerequisite for receiving foreign assistance for educational development". Over the last twenty years, most developing countries had adopted one form or another of institutionalised educational planning. Most had done so under pressure from donor agencies and these agencies had been largely responsible for introducing "both the notion and the specific models of educational planning into developing countries - often by insisting, in no uncertain terms, on the demonstration of sustained planning efforts as a prerequisite for financial assistance in key educational areas".

African countries might be prepared to accept assistance in educational planning as a condition for the provision of external aid, but their commitment to donor models of educational planning was often less than wholehearted. The donor approach ran counter
to that adopted in African countries, and the operation of educational planning was marginalised in a variety of ways. There was a tendency to regard educational planning, whether carried out by 'experts' or national staff, as an imported, expatriate activity, separate from the process of policy formation. There was a reluctance to consider the implementation of educational strategies proposed by educational planners, and educational decisions were rarely based on technical information and critical analysis. Educational planning was often reduced to the apparent neutrality of its minimum function of gathering data on the education system and making it available for potential users (53).

The endorsement of donor policies and priorities in African countries was conditioned, to a considerable extent, by the availability, and expectation, of external aid and the need to comply with donor requirements. The incorporation of donor priorities into national education plans did not necessarily imply any serious commitment on the part of recipient countries, and a fundamental reason for the lack of implementation of education plans stemmed from the conflict between national aspirations for education and the declared intentions and objectives in plans drawn up with the advice and assistance of donor 'experts' provided for the purpose.

In some instances, as noted by Coombs (54), education plans were drawn up "merely to please the donor" and "national priorities simply reflected what were thought to be agency priorities". In others, acceptance of donor priorities was tempered by a reluctance to curtail other national priorities, which were regarded as more important (55). Foster (56) argued that manpower forecasts and the general idea of manpower for economic growth were used to buttress policy decisions that would have been made in any case for reasons other than those of manpower for economic growth. Smyth (57) suggested that the adoption of donor policies in developing countries was conditioned, almost entirely, by the availability of substantial external aid for education and what developing countries saw as the need to formulate appropriate assurances to make sure they obtained their share of this aid.
There was a tendency in African countries to be critical of the donor approach to aid for education, and to resent what was seen as disregard for national preferences and national aspirations. From a recipient perspective, it often appeared that aid for education was provided "as part of a preconceived package by the external donor", and aid projects were imposed, or at the very least unduly influenced, by donor agency priorities and procedures (58). Such conflict and its resulting ambivalence had significant implications for project, and policy, implementation. Wright described (59) how implementation of an aid project was distorted by government insistence on injecting national priorities into the project, and by channelling project investments into schools selected on elitist and political grounds. In other instances, project implementation was distorted or neutralised by lack of administrative support, delays in providing national staff, the non-utilisation of project related training, and the use of aid, and donor 'experts', for purposes other than those for which they were intended (60).

Lack of support for donor projects could be explained in terms of shortages of suitably qualified and experienced manpower and weaknesses in planning and management in recipient countries but, as noted by a senior World Bank official (61), projects often failed because from the very beginning they lacked serious commitment on the part of recipient countries. For whatever reason, and whatever the intention, lack of support for donor projects was another way in which the influence donor assistance was intended to exert was restricted, and national aspirations for education were protected against donor intervention.

Economic and social change

The persistence of an African approach to educational planning precluded any real possibility that donor policies would be fully implemented in the way intended by the various agencies. But, had it been possible to implement these policies, it is unlikely that implementation would have brought about the kind of economic and social change envisaged in the international aid approach. As indicated in chapters 2 and 3, critiques derived from experience and observation of attempts to gear education to rural development in African countries (62) had argued that the problems of economic
and social change were not primarily educational and there was, therefore, little to be gained in seeking an educational solution. They suggested that education, far from being the most important element in the development process, had only a limited role to play, and that educational development depended upon rather than brought about economic and social change.

The report of the Uganda Education Commission pointed out that the problems of rural change and modernisation were intimately bound up with economic, technical, and social problems, which included systems of land tenure, methods of land use, finance and marketing, and tradition and tribal custom. Any attempt at rural change and modernisation would, therefore, need to start with radical changes in existing economic and social structures, which would involve "embarrassing political and legislative complications" (63), and which were unlikely to be sanctioned by local elites whose power and position might be threatened by such changes.

Later critiques (64) indicated that concerted efforts to use the education system to promote economic development, alleviate poverty, or reduce social inequalities had shown little evidence of success. The development of education had not led to economic development, and not only had education failed to achieve greater equity in the distribution of income and social status, it seemed in many ways to have contributed to reproducing and further consolidating economic and social inequalities. Carnoy and Levin (65) argued that the reason for education's inability to exercise the sort of leverage expected of it was that, although it was generally regarded as a powerful device for achieving economic and social change, the social dilemmas which arose out of the basic functioning of the economic, political, and social structures in a society were not amenable to solution through educational planning and reform. Levin (66) described educational planning as "necessarily an exercise in optimism". The implicit assumptions underlying the educational planning exercise were "in conflict with the actual social reality that we face", and educational planning directed towards alterations in existing societal structures would fail to achieve its stated objectives.
Carnoy and Levin (67) gave the argument an additional emphasis. The reason education reproduced and consolidated existing inequalities was that the development of education was controlled and manipulated by the dominant group or groups in society to maintain and further their own interests. Their dominance depended upon the reproduction of prevailing patterns of economic wealth, political power, and social status, and education was used as a means of reproducing and consolidating these patterns through the exploitation and socialisation of the masses. On the one hand, education was seen as a weak and powerless instrument for economic and social change, while on the other it was regarded as a powerful device for the reproduction of economic and social structures. But, as Foster had pointed out in earlier commentaries (68), viewed in historical perspective education was a remarkably clumsy instrument for large-scale economic and social change, and it had also "been a failure as an agency of conformity and repression".

The critiques referred to in discussion of the 'age of practicality' argued that what evidence there was suggested that educational development was shaped by the economic, political, and social institutions of a country, and educational reform depended upon prior economic and social change, rather than the other way around. As indicated in chapter 2, this view gained wider currency in the late 1970s and into the 1980s. The conclusion reached by Bacchus (69) in a recent review of vocationalisation brings discussion in this chapter full circle to consideration of the political context of educational planning:

"our continuing concerns with issues like the vocationalisation of the curriculum only draws away our attention from the more important and burning issue of producing effective development and supporting educational strategies aimed seriously at grappling with these crucial social and economic problems in the LDCs .... But this needs the kind of development strategy and political will and determination to implement which most political leaders in the LDCs have not been prepared to demonstrate, at least up to this point of time".

The international aid approach
The general air of scepticism that characterised most commentaries on educational planning and aid for education in the late 1970s (70) was a far cry from the confident assertions of the manpower approach and the ambitious scenarios of the education for rural development strategy. By the 1980s, most commentators on international aid for education (71) tended to give the impression of a vast process at work, a process that often appeared to be misguided in its intention and misdirected in its application. In spite of continued disillusion with the consequence of educational planning (referred to in chapters 1 and 2) and repeated criticisms of the international aid approach, donor rationale for aid for education remained virtually unchanged. Donor reappraisals recognised that the principles and methods of educational planning were "neither as certain nor as effective as had been thought" (72), but they rarely, if ever, seriously questioned the basic assumptions of the international aid approach (73).

The World Bank 1980 Education Sector Policy Paper (74) reaffirmed a positive view of education linked to economic growth, as "a central element in development". Education was not just a sector of development, it was a basic factor in development efforts in other sectors, sustaining and accelerating over-all development. The 1982 edition of ODA's British Aid to Education in Developing Countries (75) emphasised "the developmental role of education in relation to manpower needs and both social and economic growth". The 1984 edition (76) stressed the developmental role of education in the production of trained manpower, and as "a strand that runs through all economic and social development". As Hurst (77) and Clifton-Everest (78) noted, donor rationale for aid for education still rested squarely on the theory of human capital and the promotion of economic growth.

Williams (79) argued that the Bank's 1980 sector paper adopted a "mechanistic approach" in which education was regarded primarily as an instrument for promoting development and for solving economic and social problems in developing countries. In a more general discussion of aid for education, Hurst (80) maintained that donors tended to take "an instrumentalist view of education, dominated by economic criteria". They did not especially value
it as an end in itself or, apart from token utterances, as a human right. Nor did they profess much interest in education as "an ideological or moral instrument". Donor agency representatives (81) might make token references to education's "broader socio-cultural dimension", but they left little doubt that the provision of aid was based on "the need for education as a central element in growth".

The international aid approach still leaned heavily on the assumption that educational planning was capable of directing and controlling the development of education, and gearing it to the demands of economic and social progress. Proposals for a new kind of educational planning in the late 1970s, and the terminology in which they were made, bore a striking resemblance to earlier proposals in the 1960s and early 1970s (82). They presented similar arguments for a more comprehensive and better integrated approach to educational planning, more closely linked to the needs of economic and social change. As in the past, there was a strong tendency to see the limits to educational planning, and their solution, in terms of the need for further research, the formulation of new concepts and methodologies, the renovation of organisational structures and administrative techniques, and the training of new cadres of educational planners (83).

Aid for education was still shaped by the responsible interventionism and operational persistence of the various donor agencies. Clifton-Everest (84) noted that

"If the last two decades have been sombered by repeated criticisms of methods used to promote development within the education sector, and by a sense of disappointment that so little headway has been made, this does not seem to have dampened the ardour of donors in their quest for more effective methods of assisting education".

Commentaries on aid for education referred to in this chapter and in chapter 3 indicate that donor intervention was still shaped by common donor concerns for the most effective use of the aid they provided, and characterised by continuing tension between donor and recipient approaches and priorities.

Footnotes

6 Williams P African Education under Siege, 1986, pp 94-95.
16 Foster P J The Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning, 1965, Appendix pp 162-166; Lewis L J The School


35 Van Rensburg P Report from Swaneng Hill, 1974, p 64.
38 Edwards E O and Todaro M P Education and Employment in Developing Countries, 1974, pp 4-5, 11-12.
39 Carnoy M The Political Consequences of Manpower Formation, 1975, pp 122-123; See also Harbison F H The Generation of Employment in Newly Developing Countries, 1967, pp 176-177.
43 King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984.
44 King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984.
45 King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984.
50 See, for example, (Ditchley Conference) Aid to Education, 1965, p 19 and (Harare Conference) Final Report, 1982, pp 34, 36.
51 Coombs P H Ways to Improve United States Educational Assistance,
1965, pp 14, 23; See also Cerych L Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries, 1965, p 203.

52 Weiler H N The Uses of Educational Planning, 1981, p 151.


56 Foster P J Secondary Education, 1969, p 76.

57 Smyth J A Equity Criteria in Educational Planning, 1974, p 117.


60 See, for example, Cerych L Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries, 1965; Cerych L The Integration of External Assistance with Educational Planning in Nigeria, 1967; Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984; King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984.


63 Education in Uganda, 1963, pp 33-34, 39.


67 Carnoy M and Levin H M The Limits of Educational Reform, 1976,


72 Debeauvais M The Contribution of the Economics of Education to Aid Policies, 1974, p 33.

73 See, for example, Debeauvais M The Contribution of the Economics of Education to Aid Policies; Weiler H N (ed) Educational Planning and Social Change, 1980, p 156; and Weiler H N New Tasks in Planning the Development and Reform of Education, 1980.


75 ODA British Aid to Education in Developing Countries, 1982.

76 ODA British Aid to Education in Developing Countries, 1984, pp 1, 4.

77 Hurst P Aid to Educational Development, 1981, p 120.
78 Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, p 54.
79 Williams P Education in Developing Countries, 1981, p 149.
84 Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, p 54.
Description of the Swazi background refers to several characteristics noted in the Windsor conference report (1) that Swaziland shares with other African countries. In common with all but two of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa Swaziland has a colonial past. It has political and economic links with other African countries through its membership of organisations such as the OAU and SADCC. It is styled a 'less developed country'. It is largely agrarian, there are inequalities in the development of the traditional and modern sectors of the economy. It has a rapid population growth rate with a broadening base of the age pyramid. It has problems of jobless school leavers and rural-urban migration. It is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in international commodity markets and natural setbacks through drought or plant disease.

These are broad generalisations which conceal the variety of settings and diverse conditions across African countries. The following account of Swaziland's political, social, and economic structures draws attention to a distinctive combination of Swazi characteristics: the remarkable homogeneity of the Swazi people, the virtually unchallenged authority of the traditional monarchy, the strength and persistence of traditional institutions and customs, the monarchy's increasing participation in the modern economy, and Swaziland's over-all dependence on South Africa.

Size and population

African countries vary considerably in size and population. The kingdom of Swaziland is one of the smallest countries in Africa in terms of both its size and its population. It is a landlocked country with an area of 17,364 square kilometres, slightly smaller than the size of Wales. It is situated in southeastern Africa, roughly between the 25th and 27th parallels, between the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique, and almost completely surrounded by South African territory. It is largely dependent on its neighbours for communication with the rest of the world. The nearest seaport is Maputo in Mozambique, 225 kilometres from Swaziland's capital Mbabane. Johannesburg, the industrial and commercial centre of South Africa, is 390 kilometres away.
The boundaries of African countries were fixed by the colonial powers and were often arbitrarily drawn. One result is that almost all African countries contain disparate varieties of people, and political leaders face the critical task of welding them together as a nation. In contrast to nearly all other African countries Swaziland's boundaries enclose a single group of people who share a common language and a common tradition. This group constitutes the Swazi Nation, ruled over by a traditional monarchy, and largely regulated by traditional Swazi law and custom. The 1976 population census showed that only about 2.4 per cent of the population was of non-Swazi origin. The census showed a population of 519,959 of which 494,534 were permanently resident and 25,425 were temporarily absent, many of them employed as migrant workers in South Africa.

The census indicated a resident African population of about 482,000. Over the decade since 1966, the resident population had been increasing at a recorded rate of 2.8 per cent a year. As a result, a large number of Swazis were young; approximately half were less than 15 years old. Consequently, the proportion of the population of notional school going age was high, while the proportion of adults of working age was low (2). In 1982, it was estimated that the rate of population growth was running at an average not of 2.8 but of 3.5 per cent a year, an increase which would make this dependency ratio higher.

The political system

The coming of independence did not enfeeble or herald the demise of the traditional monarchy as it did in many other African countries. Swaziland has a dual system of government in which a system of modern government and a traditional political system exist side by side and overlap. The modern system of government has all the trappings of a central government - Prime Minister, permanent secretaries, civil servants and bureaucratic procedures - but the real power in the conduct of affairs in Swaziland was exercised by the king, and the modern system of government was an extension of and subordinate to his traditional powers as king of the Swazi Nation.

The modern system of government was a legacy of the British administration in Swaziland. Before the granting of independence
in September 1968, the British administration had established a Westminster style constitution with national elections, a House of Assembly, and a Senate. This constitution did not provide a platform or open up the way to power for the leaders of the political parties that sprang up in the 1960s. The traditional political system had been left virtually intact during the British administration and it was Sobhuza's use of traditional structures and techniques that enabled him to gain control of the modern system of government and, by so doing, to maintain and expand his political power (3).

(a) The traditional political system

The traditional Swazi political system is that of a powerful, centralised dual monarchy consisting of the ngwenyama (king) and the ndlovukazi (queen mother). Political power resides in and radiates from the king and membership of the nation and the political system is contingent on direct allegiance to the king. The king consults senior princes on important issues and is advised by an inner council (liqoqo), a small, aristocratic, and highly prestigious group; and by the Swazi National Council (libandla laka Ngawane), a general meeting of chiefs, headmen, and councillors. The liqoqo meets irregularly, called to advise the king on any matter of state importance; the Swazi National Council meets when summoned to the royal cattle byre at the traditional capital of Lobamba.

The king is head of an extensive bureaucracy staffed by princes of the realm and tindyuna (councillors) appointed by the king who can be of either noble or common birth. Councillors are strategically placed throughout the kingdom and, apart from their political and administrative duties, they act as the eyes and ears of the king. The king controls all Swazi Nation Land 'in trust for the nation'. Swazi Nation Land is divided into districts, each headed by a chief (sikhulu) who has control over local membership of the community and the power of land allocation. Chiefs are most often princes or headmen of important clans. Districts, which can be as big as 52 square kilometres and include several thousand people, are commonly divided into wards, each with an induna (official) with authority delegated by the chief (4).
The 1960s in Swaziland saw the formation, break up, and regrouping of a number of political parties and political alliances (5). In 1964, the king formally entered the modern political arena by forming his own political party, the Imbokodvo National Movement, and announcing that the Swazis would contest the common roll elections as a nation. The Imbokodvo National Movement had all the trappings of a modern political party but it was, in effect, an updated version of the Swazi traditional political system. All decisions were made by the king and his closest advisers. Mass participation in the electoral system and support for Imbokodvo were mobilised through traditional loyalty to the king, an existing bureaucracy, and an in-place administrative system headed by chiefs loyal to the king (6).

The Imbokodvo National Movement swept to power in the first Westminster style elections held in 1967, demonstrating the king's virtually unchallenged political authority. His political party held all the elected seats in the House of Assembly, his personal appointees filled the Senate, and his hand picked choice - Prince Makhosini, leader of the Imbokodvo - was Prime Minister. By 1968, Sobhuza, who had been recognised only as a paramount chief by the British administration in the 1950s, was not only king of the Swazi nation but also king of the newly independent sovereign state of Swaziland (7).

In 1973, the king suspended the constitution, banned all political parties and public meetings, and announced that he would rule by decree until such time as a new and more appropriate constitution had been framed. A new constitution was not approved by the king until 1978. Elections under the new constitution were held in the same year. Selection of members for the new Parliament was indirect, with the traditional tinkhundla (regional grouping of chiefs) forwarding candidates to the king for his approval. The king could reject candidates and appoint others. Political parties and public meetings were, and still are, banned. Voting in the tinkhundla areas, presided over by the king's representatives, was by public, not secret, ballot. Voters chose an electoral college, which, in turn, elected 24 MPs and 6 Senators from within its own ranks. The king appointed 10 additional MPs and another
10 Senators, the Prime Minister and cabinet, and, through them, senior government officials.

The centre of political power was not the modern Parliament but the royal kraal at Lobamba. All decisions were taken by the king. The Prime Minister and other ministers were summoned to Lobamba to report and receive instructions and they needed, and sought, the king's approval before acting on any matter. Parliament's role was limited to debating the issues of modern government, advising the king when requested, and carrying out his policies. The people who wielded power in the modern system of government were those who had been appointed by the king and held his trust and, as the mass cabinet dismissals of 1979 demonstrated, they held office entirely at the king's pleasure. A demonstration of unquestioning loyalty and service was the way to advancement not ambition, skill, or drive (8) and signs of critical inquiry were regarded as disloyal and disruptive and very quickly nipped in the bud.

After the king's death in October 1982, the traditional liqoqo, not the modern Parliament, emerged as the supreme power. The liqoqo, by that time, consisted of an inner council of fourteen of the 'old guard' appointed by the king shortly before his death. By 1983, the liqoqo had assumed extraordinary power and had made it abundantly clear that traditionalism, referred to in terms of 'Swazi law and custom', was the dominant force in Swazi politics and that it would use and, where necessary, change the modern political and judicial system to serve its own ends.

Tradition and conservatism

The remarkable homogeneity of the Swazi people, the undisputed authority of the traditional Swazi monarchy, and the strength and persistence of Swazi tradition are closely interlinked. In spite of, and partly in response to, the strains and stresses resulting from social and economic changes, Swazi society places great emphasis on traditionalism and conservative values and Swazi traditional institutions and customs play "extremely powerful roles in the regulation and conduct of daily life" (9). The homestead still remains the principal locus of domestic life
for most Swazis, including professionals, civil servants, teachers and workers in the modern sector. Cattle are still a store of wealth and a symbol of prestige and the homestead's cattle byre still has great ritual as well as practical significance. Blood relationships, the kinship system, and a rough hierarchy of clans and lineages (headed by the royal Dlamini clan) are still very important. The king's regiments, based on a system of age cohorts, still exist and take important roles in national ritual, serve as labour battalions for the king and nobility, and serve as a principal vehicle for the reproduction and imparting of traditional values.

The traditional religion of the Swazi people revolves round the ancestral cult. Christian missions, since the mid nineteenth century, have challenged traditional spiritualism and contributed to evangelism and also to education and health care. Since the 1930s, however, growing numbers of Swazi converts have been drawn towards separatist sects, often of Zionist persuasion, which are characterised by exclusively black pastorates and services that combine Christian dogma and liturgy with traditional customs. In spite of missionary efforts, the propitiation and the presentation of offerings to ancestral spirits has persisted and medicine men (tinyanga) and diviners (tangoma), whose powers are said to be derived from and sanctioned by ancestral spirits, are habitually consulted. There is, also, still a widespread belief in the powers of muti (a form of witchcraft and sorcery) and, since 1973, the incidence of ritual muti murders has reached epidemic proportions and given rise to great concern in the national press.

Traditional rituals and ceremonies have retained their symbolic and practical importance. The most important of these, until the king's death, was the Incwala ceremony. The Incwala lasts for roughly three weeks every year. It reinforces the legitimacy of the monarchy and renews the strength and virility of the king, and consequently, the Swazi nation. The ceremony is lengthy and complex in its symbolism, embracing every significant element of Swazi society, and re-affirms the power of the king and the allegiance owed to him by the nation. The king is central to every facet of the ceremony; when there is no king, there is no
The economy

The most striking feature of Swaziland's economy is that it is a peripheral economy, closely inter-linked with and heavily dependent on the Republic of South Africa. Internally, it is a dual economy in so far as a prosperous, advanced modern sector exists alongside and overlaps with an unproductive, backward traditional sector. The modern sector has been and is still largely dominated by foreign capital and foreign expertise, much of it South African. While the traditional sector has stagnated, the rapid growth of the modern sector has given Swaziland an enviable record of economic growth.

(a) Agriculture

Agriculture in Swaziland is characterised by the co-existence of a modern industrial and commercial sector based on individual title deeds on freehold land and almost wholly controlled by non Swazi interests, on the one hand, and a stagnant traditional sector based on traditional forms of land ownership and production on the other. The modern agricultural sector operates on freehold land, which accounts for about 40 per cent of all agricultural land. On freehold land there is an individual tenure system where ownership is clearly and unambiguously defined and land can be sold or used as security. The traditional sector operates on the remaining 60 per cent of agricultural land, which is Swazi Nation Land "held in trust by the king for the benefit of the Swazi people" and on which "there is no private ownership" (13). The king bestows on his chiefs the right to allocate land among their subjects on a right-to-use basis. Although individuals are seldom deprived of their land, they have no real security of tenure and they cannot sell the land or use it as security for credit.

At independence, individual tenure farms (ITFs) on freehold land had been almost exclusively owned by foreign companies and individuals. By 1980, less than half the freehold land in
Swaziland was owned by foreign interests (14). Much of the foreign owned freehold land was not productively used - in many cases owners of ITFs were absent in South Africa - and contributed "little or nothing to agriculture" (15). The ITFs that were productive and that had supported the establishment and growth of the modern sector were the foreign owned large agricultural estates and commercial forests that were capital-intensive, technologically advanced, and well managed. Some ITFs were run by government bodies such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Prisons Department, and the Defence Force. Others were owned and operated by Tibiyo Taka Ngwane, a parastatal development and investment corporation controlled by the king. The Department of Economic Planning estimated that the modern agricultural sector had "experienced an average growth rate of 12.9 per cent" between 1978 and 1981 (16).

It has been estimated that 70 per cent of the population live on Swazi Nation Land and about half depend entirely on traditional agriculture for their livelihood (17). There are about 50,000 Swazi Nation Farms (SNFs) with an average size of about 3 hectares (18). These farms are run largely on traditional lines, employing family labour and draught animals and producing mainly for subsistence. Swazi Nation Land is not husbanded and improved as is individual tenure land. The threat that land usage rights can be withdrawn, however rarely exercised, contributes to a sense of insecurity that inhibits both development and productivity of the land. Conspicuous improvement of the land or innovation in its use is often frowned upon by the more conservative chiefs, many of whom have the reputation of regarding improvements to the land as threats to their traditional authority (19). A combination of factors - the land tenure system, traditional methods, extremely limited credit and marketing facilities - have all contributed to the low productivity of SNFs and a stagnant traditional agricultural sector.

The traditional view that a man's status and wealth can be judged by the number of cattle he owns still holds good; cattle are a universally recognised store of wealth and symbol of status. The traditional land tenure system allows for free grazing of unlimited numbers of cattle. Over 80 per cent of Swazi Nation land is used as grazing land (20) and Swaziland has one of the
highest densities of livestock in Africa (21). As a result, attempts to improve and develop traditional agriculture have been thwarted by overstocking, indiscriminate grazing and the associated problems of soil erosion and poor quality livestock.

Farmers on SNFs produce mainly for subsistence but they do not grow enough food to feed themselves and their families. A survey of rural homesteads estimated that, on average, cash income accounted for more than half of total homestead income in 1982 and that about three quarters of this cash income was generated from wage employment in Swaziland and remittances from migrant workers in South Africa (22). The rural homestead had been progressively integrated into the modern economy and it made more sense to earn a wage to buy the balance of food requirements (imported from South Africa), to pay school fees, and to provide other requirements such as fuel, clothing, household goods, transport, and so on (imported from South Africa). The survey also indicated that there were "extreme" disparities between homesteads with one in ten being relatively wealthy and one in five "impoverished" (23).

(b) Rural Development Areas

The Rural Development Areas (RDAs) scheme was initiated by the British administration prior to independence in 1966. The idea was that large tracts of Swazi Nation Land would be designated RDAs and form the nucleus around which all development programmes would be planned and implemented. The RDAs project was an ambitious scheme of rural social engineering directed towards improving the quality of rural life through land development, intensive farming, and the creation of improved communications, marketing, and social services backed up by a network of extensive rural extension services. It was supported initially by British aid and later by capital funding and technical assistance from the British Government, USAID, and other donors. It was planned that, by the 1980s, there would be fourteen RDAs covering between 50 and 60 per cent of Swazi Nation Land. By 1981, the RDA programme covered approximately 50 per cent of Swazi Nation Land and 47 per cent of the estimated total rural population (24).

The RDAs scheme was not a success. It "consistently fell short
of achievement, sometimes seriously" (25). Maize production declined, the incidence of cash cropping did not show any substantial improvement and "may have provided lower average return to labour than even the traditional cropping pattern", the degradation of natural pastures continued through overstocking which had "reached a point where animal nutrition" was "being severely affected" (26). A number of factors contributed to the failure of the RDAs scheme - traditional land tenure, adherence to customary methods, the continuation of overstocking and indiscriminate grazing, the lack of trained and skilled manpower, inadequate organisation and management, and the lack of effective planning and implementation by Government (27). Productivity on Swazi Nation Land declined by minus 1.7 per cent during 1978 to 1981; the rate of rural-urban migration rose (28).

(c) The modern sector

The modern sector of the Swazi economy depends very largely on commercial and industrial agriculture. The largest agriculturally based industries are sugar refining and woodpulp processing; other important industries are fruit canning, meat packing, and cotton ginning. These industries have been largely responsible for Swaziland's enviable record of economic growth. The sugar industry is the country's largest employer and an important source of government tax revenue through a special sugar levy. It has grown impressively since its beginnings in the late 1950s. In 1972, it contributed 20 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings; by 1981, its contribution was 40 per cent. In 1981, the modern agricultural sector, as a whole, accounted for 65 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and 42 per cent of private sector paid employment (29).

Swaziland's natural resource based industries were started, and are still dominated and largely controlled, by British and South African capital. Although efforts have been made in recent years to reduce the country's dependence on a few foreign owned large agricultural estates and commercial timber plantations (30), Swaziland is still largely dependent on a few foreign owned and foreign run establishments for most of its industrial and commercial agricultural production. The woodpulp industry, for
example, consists of Peak Timbers (a subsidiary of the South African conglomerate Anglo American) and Usutu Pulp (owned by Courtaulds and the Commonwealth Development Corporation and in the process of being sold to Anglo American). The sugar industry, based on three large estates at Mhlume, Big Bend and Simunye, is still largely controlled by the CDC, Tate and Lyle, and Lonhro. The sugar and woodpulp industries are, in turn, dependent on international markets and world prices over which Swaziland has little or no control. As Swaziland's third development plan pointed out, a drop in world market prices for sugar or woodpulp "will have a grave impact on the whole of Swaziland's economy and will seriously affect Government's revenue" (31), which is what happened in the early 1980s (32).

Swaziland's mining industry has also been dominated by British and South African capital. A British company still owns 60 per cent of Havelock Asbestos Mines; Anglo American was the main developer of iron ore deposits at Ngwenya and, through a local subsidiary, operates the coal mine at Mpaka. The iron ore deposits at Ngwenya were exhausted in 1981; and the importance of the mining sector in the national economy declined rapidly in the late 1970s/early 1980s - between 1977 and 1981, the asbestos and coal mines' share of paid employment fell from 5 to 0.3 per cent and the value of their exports fell from 17 to 6 per cent (33).

Early hopes for tourism as a major industry have not been fully realised. Swaziland's tourist industry depends on South African visitors to the four Holiday Inns and gambling casinos operated by South African and American capital. These establishments enjoyed an initial surge of popularity in the early 1970s but the establishment of similar facilities in South African homelands closer to the large cities of South Africa - most notably Bophuthatswana's lavish Sun City, only a two and a half hour drive from Johannesburg - has meant that Swaziland's anticipated growth in tourism has not met initial expectations.

Other efforts to diversify Swaziland's economy have centred on attempts to develop a light industrial base through two parastatal organisations - the National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland (NIDCS) and its subsidiary, the Small Enterprises
Development Company (SEDCO). NIDCS seeks to attract foreign investment and create employment by offering generous incentives to potential investors. SEDCO aims to develop locally owned enterprises. Their efforts have been limited by inadequate management, similar, and in some cases more attractive, incentives offered by South African homelands, the small size of the Swazi market, and the intractable problem of competing with South African industries; but they have resulted in the establishment of a number of small businesses at the country's main industrial site at Matsapha and also in Mbabane, though these are heavily subsidised by central Government (34).

The modern sector of Swaziland's economy has been developed, and is still dominated and largely controlled, by foreign capital and the availability of foreign professional and technical manpower. Foreign influence permeates the whole of the modern sector. Most of Swaziland's import and export trade is controlled by South African interests. British (Barclays Bank) and South African (Standard Bank) capital dominates Swaziland's banking network. Swaziland's beer industry is effectively controlled by South African Breweries through a local subsidiary. Some idea of the way in which South African interests have moved in to dominate and control much of Swaziland's economy can be illustrated by the activities of South African industrialist, Nathan Kirsh. Through his various enterprises, principally the holding company Swaki, Kirsh dominates Swaziland's maize importation and milling businesses; owns the lucrative Datsun and Mercedes Benz car franchises; controls the two largest trade, hardware, and agricultural wholesale houses (Metro and Swaziland Wholesale); owns a timber estate and plastics and medical drugs factories; and is the developer of the country's two largest and most modern shopping complexes (35).

Foreign capital and foreign skills had created a rapidly growing and prosperous modern sector but, as a 1977 ILO study pointed out, the benefits of economic growth had not reached the overwhelming majority of the Swazi population and, "despite apparent prosperity, poverty affects a large proportion of the population" in both rural and urban areas. The report pointed to wide disparities in the incomes of Swazis and non Swazis, in the incomes of urban and
rural Swazis, and in the incomes of Swazis within urban and rural areas. It also pointed to the large numbers of the 'working poor' in both rural and urban, mainly in rural, areas; and warned of the growing problems of unemployment, particularly among primary and junior secondary school leavers, and rural-urban migration (36). During the third plan period, Swazi commentaries described rising levels of unemployment, increasing numbers of jobless school leavers, widening disparities between and within urban and rural sectors, and growing problems of rural-urban migration (37).

(d) Tibiyo Taka Ngwane

As already indicated, the Swazi monarchy controls the traditional economy through a system of land tenure on Swazi Nation Land ('held in trust for the nation'), operated through the traditional system of appointed chiefs and their delegated officials. Since independence, the monarchy, through Tibiyo Taka Ngwane and its alliance with foreign capital, has progressively established itself within the modern sector of Swaziland's economy. Tibiyo Taka Ngwane, which means 'the wealth of the Swazi Nation', is a parastatal development and investment corporation controlled by the king. The independence constitution had vested control over Swaziland's mineral wealth in the king 'in trust for the nation' and, in 1968, Sobhuza established the Tibiyo Fund into which all revenues derived from mineral royalties were to be deposited. Tibiyo, as it is generally referred to, acquired interests in foreign owned asbestos, iron ore, and coal and used these proceeds to expand its interests into agribusiness, industry and tourism by acquiring shareholdings in a large number of foreign owned companies. It participates in joint ventures with foreign investors - for example, the Royal Swazi Airlines, the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation, a bank, and the insurance monopoly, Tibiyo Insurance brokers (38). It also owns its own newspaper, the Swazi Observer, which began publication in 1981.

No one knows how successful these ventures have been since there is no public accountability of Tibiyo's balance sheet and it is immune from taxation. The airline reportedly loses E3 to E4 million a year; a new clothing factory at Nhlangano stands idle,
a monument to inadequate market research; the Swazi Observer is a poor second to the longer established and more professional Times of Swaziland; and an ocean shipping line was a spectacular fiasco. But Tibiyo has accumulated enough capital to establish a second fund, Tisuka Taka Ngwane, in 1975, to manage the original mineral royalties with Tibiyo becoming self financing through its other holdings and ventures (39).

Tibiyo claims to have brought great benefits to the people of Swaziland by acting as "a stimulus and catalyst of progress and development" and by "striving vigorously towards self sufficiency in food production". It has bought back 40,000 hectares of land from foreign control for Swazi use, mainly for "major development projects" - owned wholly or in part by Tibiyo - but also for "Swazi traditional occupation" - in some cases it would seem for resettlement schemes necessitated by the siting of Tibiyo projects on Swazi Nation Land (40). It also claims that it is the Swazi Nation that has the real ownership of Tibiyo - like Swazi Nation Land, it is held by the king 'in trust for the nation' - and that all Swazis have the right to know about Tibiyo activities - how it works and what it does. As in all national matters, all Swazis have the right to appeal to the king with any query about the activities of Tibiyo" (41).

In fact, few Swazis know the details of Tibiyo's operations. It operates independently of central government and appears, in many ways, "to have taken on a sort of statehood of its own" (42). The third national development plan, for example, does not once mention Tibiyo by name; nor does the Department of Economic Planning's Economic Review 1978-1982. Tibiyo is referred to as the Swazi Nation in the third plan (43) and as the Trust Fund in the economic review (44). Tibiyo's resources were, until his death, entirely under the control of the king and its board of trustees, which he appointed and which served at his pleasure. Its accounts are not subject to parliamentary or public scrutiny; it is immune from any form of taxation; and its revenues accrue, not to the Ministry of Finance in Mbabane, but to Tibiyo House at Lozithehlezi, the king's palace at Lobamba.
Tibiyo's accumulation of wealth, and the power that goes with it, has been achieved, not through an alliance with the modern system of central government, but through alliances with foreign capital and foreign interests. Until the king's death, great power was held by a small circle of men who directed or advised Tibiyo - Sishayi Nxumalo (a former cabinet minister, the king's roving ambassador, and secretary to the Tibiyo Board) and three foreigners, Robert D Friedlander (Tibiyo's legal adviser), Goshe Szokolay (manager of the Simunye sugar complex), and industrialist Nathan Kirsh. This close circle was said to have "amassed between them enormous influence over major decision making in Swaziland" (45), and decisions taken in the name of Tibiyo or to further its interests could not only run counter to, but could also over-ride, those taken by central government and incorporated into national development plans and central government estimates.

Central Government funds were used to make substantial 'loans' to Tibiyo to support the operation of the Royal Swazi Airline (46), and capital loans negotiated by Government were used for 'on-lending' to the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation (47). An estimated E60 million investment in a single ITF (the Simunye sugar complex) had exceeded E140 million by 1981, and was expected to make further demands on public funds. Over the same period, the second and third national plan goals for agricultural development in rural areas were underspent by 60 per cent. Like other Tibiyo enterprises, Simunye opted for high mechanisation as against intensive wage employment when official Government policy stressed the need for small scale, labour intensive agricultural enterprises (48). Tibiyo conducted its own negotiations with foreign companies and at times with donor agencies without reference to the Department of Economic Planning, which was in theory responsible for all aid negotiations. There were instances, for example, a proposed hydro electric scheme, when Tibiyo appeared to be in direct competition with central Government (49).

(e) Dependence on South Africa

The Swazi economy, through Swaziland's membership of the Rand Monetary Area and the South African Customs Union, is closely
interlinked with, heavily dependent on, and largely controlled by the economy of the Republic of South Africa. Swaziland's incorporation into the Rand Monetary Area pegs the Swazi lilangeni (plural emalengeni) to the rand. As a result, Swaziland has been unable to influence monetary policies that affect its economy; it has had little room for manoeuvre in attempts to counteract the devaluation of the rand and the spill over effects of rapid inflation in South Africa; and it has been unable to control the outflow of capital to South Africa (50).

The Customs Union pool provides more than half of Swaziland's total revenue. As the third national development plan makes clear, payments from the Customs Union are made according to a complex formula and, as a result, the revenue bears no direct relation to the current level of economic activity in Swaziland and the rate of revenue is "outside the control" of the Government of Swaziland (51). Government revenue depended, almost entirely, on payments from the South African Customs Union and on trade and income taxes levied on the private sector of the modern economy, which was still largely dominated and controlled by foreign capital and foreign expertise, much of it South African. During the third plan period, Customs Union payments accounted for 66 per cent, and the sugar export levy, company taxes, and personal income taxes for over 30 per cent of total Government revenue (52).

Under the customs agreement, trade consists almost entirely of the export of raw materials from Swaziland to South Africa and the import of manufactured goods from South Africa to Swaziland - goods that are much more profitable and duty free under the agreement. Swaziland imports 95 per cent of its goods from South Africa (53) and has built up a huge trade deficit. South Africa retains the right to determine customs, excise, and sales duty tariffs and does so in its own interests; and, in spite of the agreement's provisions for the free interchange of goods, South Africa, has a virtual monopoly of import and export traffic. South Africa can prevent the establishment of industries in Swaziland that it fears will provide unwanted competition simply by announcing that it is not prepared to buy their products (54).
Swaziland depends on South Africa for its staple diet. In recent decades, the increase in Swaziland's grain dependency on South Africa has been dramatic. Swazi imports, which averaged 3,000 metric tons a year during the 1950s, rose to an annual average of 28,000 metric tons a year during the 1970s when more than E1,000,000 was spent each year on maize imports (55). Recent studies have shown that at least half of all Swazi homesteads are deficit producers of maize (56). Efforts to boost maize production have had consistently disappointing results and dependency on South Africa has increased.

Swaziland also depends on South Africa for employment for a substantial portion of its labour force - estimated at roughly a third of total paid employment. Swaziland has been incorporated into South Africa's migrant labour catchment area for the better part of a century and the migration of Swazi workers on six to nine month contracts in search of higher wages and better conditions of service in the mines of South Africa has been an established and well recognised feature of the economy. Most Swazi workers in South Africa are employed in the mines; others work for individual firms, on farms, and in domestic service. In a sense, "Swaziland may have been able to export its unemployment and underemployment with advantage" but any fall in the demand for Swazi labour in the mines of South Africa would, quite clearly, have serious consequences for the Swazi economy (57).

In 1979, Swaziland was one of the founder members of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), formed by nine states in the region increasingly apprehensive about their dependence on South Africa and hoping to lessen this dependence through the co-ordination of economic programmes for regional development - programmes which would depend on the availability of international aid. SADCC has not, so far, made any impression on South Africa's overwhelming economic power in the region and Swaziland's membership has not affected what has been described as "its growing economic clientage to South Africa" (58). Nor has Swaziland's membership of the OAU weakened its close and co-operative political ties with South Africa.

Lesotho shares a number of features with Swaziland. It is one
of the smallest countries in Africa in size and population, and its boundaries enclose a single group of people. It is landlocked, and completely surrounded by South Africa. It is a member of the Customs Union Pool and the Rand Monetary Area, and its economy is closely interlinked with and heavily dependent upon that of South Africa. But the Lesotho monarchy has little if any authority, and it plays little part in the conduct of political and economic affairs. A closer parallel, for all its differences, could well be Malawi with what amounts to a secular monarchy and a Tibiyo-like Presidential holding company cum state monopoly. As indicated throughout this chapter, what gives Swaziland its distinctive character is the combination of the undisputed authority of a traditional monarchy, supported by the power and persistence of Swazi law and custom and the homogeneity of the Swazi Nation; the monarchy's increasing participation in the modern economy through Tibiyo and its alliances with foreign interests, and in particular South African interests; and Swaziland's over-all dependence upon, and close political links with, South Africa.

Chapter 6 describes the Swazi education and training system, and the array of donors providing aid for education in Swaziland. Along with this chapter, it provides a background for examination of the planning and development of secondary education in later chapters.

Footnotes

2 Third National Development Plan, pp 4, 51.
3 Potholm C P Swaziland, 1972, pp 20-21, 105-108.
5 Potholm C P Swaziland, 1972, Chapters 3, 4, 5.
6 Potholm C P Swaziland, 1972, pp 105-108.
7 Potholm C P Swaziland, 1972, pp 126-130.


11 Booth A R Swaziland, 1983, pp 75-76.


15 Third National Development Plan, pp 6, 73-74.


17 Third National Development Plan, p 65.


19 Booth A R Swaziland, 1983, pp 54, 84.


39 Tibiyo Taka Ngwane A Nation in Progress, 1978; Swazi Observer

39 Third National Development Plan, p 101; Swazi Observer

40 Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Advertisement in Times of Swaziland, 10 January 1976.


42 Third National Development Plan, p 101.


44 Booth A R Swaziland, 1983, p 77.


50 Third National Development Plan, p 41.


6 THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEM

This chapter describes the education and training system in Swaziland with particular reference to the period covered by the Third National Development Plan 1978/79 - 1982/83. The first section describes the formal education and training system, the second covers non-formal education and training programmes. A third section lists the areas in which a variety of donor agencies provided aid for education, and refers to the different kinds of assistance provided for secondary education.

The first two sections are based on two comprehensive and detailed sector reviews. The first, prepared by a visiting UNESCO/World Bank mission, was published by UNESCO in 1979 (1). The second, prepared by a team of 'experts' provided by a consortium of donor agencies, was published by the Government of Swaziland in 1981 (2). This documentation is supported by statistical analysis prepared by the UNESCO educational planning project in the Ministry of Education, and referred to in the text. Information on aid for education is drawn from papers prepared by the UNESCO planning project in 1978 (3) and 1982 (4), and is supported by reference to the education and training chapter in Swaziland's second national development plan 1973-1977 (5). There are no detailed references to aid for education in the third national development plan.

The formal education and training system

The following account of the Swazi education and training system indicates that the educational legacies of the British colonial administration can be seen in structures, patterns of assessment, curricula, and the use of English as the language of instruction. The structure of the formal education and training system, shown in Chart 1, was a carry over from the British administration, and had remained virtually unchanged since independence. During this time, the education system had expanded rapidly. Table 1 indicates that enrolments had doubled at primary level, more than tripled at junior secondary level, and increased almost elevenfold at senior secondary level.

(a) Pre-school education
The responsibility for pre-school education was transferred from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of Education in 1980. Although the Ministry of Education had over-all responsibility, it did not build, equip, maintain, staff, or operate pre-schools. Nor did it control their programmes and activities. The onus of responding to public demand for pre-school education rested with local communities and private initiative. It was estimated that, by 1981, there were 64 pre-schools, which catered for between eight and nine per cent of children in the three to five year age group.

(b) Primary education

Primary education was a seven year cycle (Grades 1 to 7) and was intended, in theory, for the 6 to 12 year age group. Except in a very few 'English medium' schools, Siswati was the language of instruction for the first three years, after which English was the language of instruction throughout the school system. At the end of Grade 7, pupils took a locally set and administered Primary Certificate Examination (PCE). Table 5 indicates that, during the third plan period, over 70 per cent passed the PCE each year and thus were eligible for entry to junior secondary school.

The Report of the National Education Commission, 1975 (recalling the recommendation made at the 1961 Addis Ababa conference) recommended 1980 as the target date for the achievement of universal primary education (6). This was changed to 1985 in the third national development plan (7). It was claimed that UPE had been 'achieved' by 1980, when it was estimated that, for the first time, there were more than enough places in primary schools for all the children in the 6 to 12 year age group.

However, places were not the same thing as enrolment. Although there had been a progressive increase in the number and the proportion of 6 to 12 year olds enrolled in primary schools, less than 80 per cent were receiving primary education. The out of age problem persisted and accounted for about 22 per cent of total enrolment in 1980. One reason why out of age pupils remained such a significant fraction of primary school enrolments was the pattern of entry into Grade 1, the age distribution of new entrants ranging from 5 to 17. Another was the high level of repetition
and drop out throughout the primary system (Table 7).

Statistical information on primary schools, enrolments, pupil teacher ratios, and the composition of the teaching force is given in Tables 2 to 5.

(c) Secondary education

The seven year primary cycle was followed by five years of secondary education, which was divided into junior secondary (three years) and senior secondary (two years). There were two kinds of secondary school in Swaziland, junior secondary schools and high schools. Junior secondary schools had only junior secondary classes (Forms 1 to 3); high schools had both junior secondary (Forms 1 to 3) and senior secondary classes (Forms 4 and 5). Apart from two schools which offered Cambridge Overseas HSC courses, secondary education ended at Form 5.

At the end of Form 3, pupils took the Junior Certificate Examination (JCE), which was set and administered by a regional examination council for Lesotho and Swaziland, though still broadly patterned on British examinations. Further education and training opportunities which were available after junior secondary school included entry to high school, craft training at the Swaziland College of Technology (SCOT), primary teacher training, and health training programmes. Over the third plan period, the proportion of junior secondary graduates entering high school increased from around 50 per cent to over 60 per cent (Table 17).

At the end of high school, pupils sat the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate (COSC) examination. Further education and training opportunities after Form 5, based on results in the COSC examination, included entry to degree and diploma courses at the university, technician training at SCOT, secondary teacher training, and training programmes at the Institute of Health Science and the College of Nursing.

Though it had started from a small base, secondary education had expanded rapidly since independence. It was estimated that, in 1980, 46 per cent of the junior secondary age group and 20 per cent of the senior secondary age group was enrolled in secondary
school. This expansion had been particularly marked in high schools, where enrolments had increased from around 520 in 1968 to 5,417 in 1982, reflecting a strong and insistent popular demand for the rapid and continued expansion of senior secondary education and Government's preparedness to cater for this demand. Tables 15 and 18 indicate that the expansion of secondary education had been accompanied by a decline in the results in the JCE and, more specifically, in the COSC examination.

Statistical information on secondary schools, on junior and senior secondary enrolments, pupil teacher ratios, and the composition of the secondary school teaching force is given in Tables 8 to 12.

(d) Further and higher education and training

Apart from a number of teacher training programmes (described below), the Ministry of Education was not responsible for further education and training. The Department of Establishments and Training administered the system of grants for students in post secondary education and controlled the disbursement of overseas scholarships. The Ministry of Health had over-all responsibility for the training of nurses and health assistants. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister was responsible for the financing and administration of SCOT and for the operation of the National Employment Service, which provided careers guidance for secondary school pupils.

SCOT was founded in 1946 as a trade school. It was later upgraded to become the Swaziland Industrial Training Institute and, when technician courses were introduced in 1974, it was upgraded again and its name changed to the Swaziland College of Technology. It was mainly concerned with the training of middle level technicians and skilled craftsmen, and with secretarial and commercial training, tested and certificated by the British City and Guilds and Pitman examining boards. In addition, it provided two year secondary teacher training courses in technical subjects (Woodwork, Metalwork, and Technical Drawing) and Commerce.

From 1964 to 1975, the University College of Swaziland (UCS) formed part of the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. After Lesotho's withdrawal and the break up of UBLS in 1975, the
University of Botswana and Swaziland was established with two constituent colleges of equal status providing complementary programmes. In 1982, the University of Swaziland (UNISWA) became a university in its own right. UNISWA was an autonomous body with its own University Council responsible for the government, control, and administration of the university. It was responsible for the preparation and control of its own budget and for the preparation of its own development plans. It was housed on two separate campuses, one at Kwaluseni (Humanities, Science, Social Science, and Education), and one at Luyengo (Agriculture and Home Economics). Enrollments of Swazi students in degree and diploma courses over the third plan period are shown in Table 20.

(e) Teacher training

The Ministry of Education had over-all responsibility for primary teacher training at William Pitcher College, a government college which also trained secondary school teachers, and at Nazarene Teacher Training College, which had been founded, and was still administered, by the Nazarene Mission. A third primary teacher training college, Ngwane Teachers' College was opened in 1982. The minimum entry requirement for primary teacher training was a pass in JCE. On the successful completion of a two year course, graduates were awarded a Primary Teachers' Certificate. The university moderated examinations and awarded certification.

An in-service training programme to upgrade 600 partially qualified primary school teachers was started at William Pitcher in 1973. The three year course was a combination of training in the college, correspondence assignments, and on-the-job tuition. Later, the programme was modified from three to two years and provided in-service initial training for nearly 1,000 unqualified teachers in the primary school system. Teachers who qualified through the in-service programme were awarded certificates by the Ministry of Education. With the opening of Ngwane, the in-service programme was phased out in 1982 (8). Outputs from all primary teacher training programmes over the third plan period are shown in Table 22.

Secondary school teachers were trained at two levels, a two year post School Certificate course leading to a Diploma in Education,
and a four year university course leading to a first degree with a Concurrent Diploma in Education (CDE). Although there were no official guidelines, it was generally accepted, in principle if not in practice, that teachers with a two year diploma were qualified to teach at junior secondary level and that university graduates, with or without a CDE, were qualified to teach at senior secondary level.

Secondary teacher training was spread across a variety of institutions administered by different agencies. The Ministry of Education was responsible for a two year diploma course in general subjects at William Pitcher. The Luyengo campus of the university was responsible for a two year diploma course for teachers of Agriculture and Home Economics, and SCOT provided two year training courses for teachers of technical subjects and Commerce. Teachers who trained at William Pitcher and Luyengo were awarded diplomas by the university, those who trained at SCOT were awarded teaching certificates by the Ministry of Education. The entry requirement for two year secondary teacher training programmes was, in theory, a COSC with at least four credits though, in practice, this requirement was not enforced. The Kwaluseni campus of the university was responsible for graduate teacher training programmes, through the award of a CDE, in the humanities and the sciences, and it also offered a four year BEd degree course. Outputs from all secondary teacher training programmes over the third plan period are shown in Table 23.

(f) Curriculum development

The curriculum in both primary and secondary schools had remained virtually unchanged since independence, in spite of regular pronouncements that it was 'unduly academic' and proposals to make it more 'relevant' and more 'practical'. Curriculum development efforts were spread across a primary curriculum unit established in 1973, a secondary curriculum unit set up in 1978, various subject panels, and the Ministry of Education inspectorate. Progress in developing primary and secondary curricula was slow and fragmentary and little had been accomplished by the end of the third plan period (9).
Non-Formal education and training

There were a number of non-formal education and training programmes for adults and young people organised by different ministries and other agencies. The operation and over-all effectiveness of these programmes was limited by inadequate staffing, ineffective management, minimal co-ordination both at field level and at headquarters in individual ministries, and Government's inability to effect any real inter-ministerial co-operation (10).

(a) The Ministry of Agriculture

The Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for crop, livestock, and forestry extension services and for the implementation of the Rural Development Areas (RDAs) programme. It was also responsible for four Farmer Training Centres, a national Home Economics programme, and a vocational 'women in development' scheme. Ministry extension staff and supporting specialists constituted the largest body of people engaged in non-formal education and training in Swaziland.

(b) The Ministry of Commerce

The Ministry of Commerce was responsible for the development of the co-operative movement. It operated a co-operative development training centre, and organised savings and credit unions and farmers' co-operatives. It was also responsible for the development of rural handicraft centres and the administration of a handicrafts training centre.

(c) The Deputy Prime Minister's Office

The Deputy Prime Minister's Office was responsible for the Swaziland Broadcasting Service (SBS), which, at the beginning of the third plan period, broadcast 17 hours of educational programmes each week. Plans to develop radio education during the third plan period and for it to be "closely integrated with curriculum reform, teacher training, and correspondence studies" (11) were not carried through and there was no mention of SBS or radio education in the Ministry of Education's review of the implementation of the third development plan.
(d) The university

The university's Division of Extra Mural Studies (DEMS) started in 1974. It provided five different types of part time courses: 'bridging' courses to prepare for the COSC examination, 'self help' courses for personal improvement, secretarial courses, a diploma course in adult education, and a course in business studies. By far the most popular were the 'bridging' courses to prepare for the COSC examination.

(e) The Ministry of Education

During the third plan period, the Ministry of Education assumed responsibility for second chance general education, vocational, and adult literacy programmes that had been developed outside the ministry.

The Swaziland International Education Centre (SIEC) was established by DANIDA in 1972 to develop JCE correspondence courses. In 1977, it began to develop correspondence courses in a number of subjects for the COSC examination. The centre was also responsible for a vocational training programme, run largely along self help lines, which trained a small number of secondary school leavers and drop outs in furniture making techniques. The Ministry of Education assumed responsibility for SIEC in 1978 and, in 1981, its name was changed to the Emlalatini Development Centre.

The Sebenta National Institute (SEBENTA) started in 1961 as a voluntary organisation with the aim of eradicating illiteracy and promoting community development. Since 1972, SEBENTA had been governed by a Board of Directors and had concentrated on the promotion of an adult literacy campaign. It was responsible for literacy work throughout Swaziland, mainly in the rural areas, for the training of staff, the production of materials, and the administration and supervision of classes. In 1980, Government support for SEBENTA was transferred from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of Education.

The Ministry of Education was, however, responsible for the initial establishment of the seven rural education centres (RECs) which started operating in 1978. RECs were attached to junior
secondary schools in rural areas and were expected to use school facilities and equipment to provide non-formal education and training programmes for adults and young people outside regular school hours. These programmes would be based on community needs, with special emphasis on vocational skills. It was intended that RECs would become community resource centres and act as a focus for all the non-formal education and training programmes organised by different ministries and other agencies within the areas in which they were situated.

(f) Voluntary agencies

The Ministry of Education also provided limited support for two small vocational training programmes for secondary school leavers and drop outs, run along self help lines. These were organised by voluntary agencies and attached to secondary schools, the School of Appropriate Farm Technology (SAFT) attached to St Mary's Secondary School at Lobamba, and the Salesian Industrial Training Centre (SITC) attached to the Salesian High School in Manzini.

Aid for education

As indicated in chapter 3, the various donor agencies had their own policies and procedures which determined the countries in which they preferred to work, the activities they were prepared to support, and the particular forms of assistance they were prepared to provide. Aid for education in Swaziland was provided by a variety of multilateral and bilateral donor agencies in the form of capital funding and technical assistance. It covered all levels of the education system from pre-primary to the university, and it included formal and non-formal education and training programmes. The following paragraphs describe the activities supported by an array of donors, and the kinds of assistance they provided.

The capital investment programme for education in Swaziland depended, to a large extent, on the availability of external aid. The second national development plan noted that most of the "considerable capital expenditure" needed to implement planned developments in education would "have to be sought from aid donors"
and, although the third national development plan made no mention of capital aid for education, 59 per cent of the Ministry of Education total capital budget over the plan period was expected to be financed from external sources (Table 26).

The expansion of primary education was supported by capital funding from SIDA and, after 1980, by a World Bank loan. The expansion and development of secondary education, which had depended in previous years on capital aid from Britain, was supported by loans from the World Bank. The Bank also provided loans for the expansion of William Pitcher and Nazarene teacher training colleges, the establishment of a curriculum development and education materials production centre, the extension and development of SCOT, and other capital projects in the education sector. The establishment of the new primary teacher training college was funded by capital grants from EDF under Lome 1 and 2. The development of the university depended on capital aid from a variety of donors, including Britain, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, the United States, EDF, FAO, and the World Bank.

The primary teaching force had been virtually completed localised by the beginning of the third plan period (Table 4). In other sectors, the development of education was supported, to a greater or lesser extent, by the availability of expatriate personnel provided by a variety of donors or directly employed by the Government on 'local expatriate' contract. Primary teacher training was still supported, to some extent, by expatriate personnel and the in-service programme which had been initially established with support from UNESCO, UNICEF, and ODA, was still supported by ODA and the Dutch government.

Although the number and proportion of expatriate teachers in secondary schools fell over the plan period (Tables 10 and 11), they continued to fill key posts in the teaching of Mathematics, Science, and technical subjects. Secondary teacher training programmes at William Pitcher and the Kwaluseni campus of the university were supported by technical assistance provided by ODA and other donors. A SIDA/FAO project was responsible for the training of teachers of Agriculture and Home Economics at Luyengo, and ODA technical assistance was responsible for teacher training
programmes in technical subjects at SCOT. Other programmes at SCOT depended on the provision of technical assistance from ODA and ILO. The development of the university was supported by expatriate personnel provided by ODA, UNESCO, and other donors.

Curriculum development depended, almost entirely, on external assistance. USAID was responsible for the establishment and operation of the primary curriculum unit (PCU) and SIDA/UNESCO for the establishment and operation of the secondary curriculum unit (SCU). It was intended that the SCU would develop curricula for junior secondary schools in Science, Development Studies, Elementary Technology, Commercial Studies, and Home Economics. ODA personnel in key posts in the Ministry of Education inspectorate and at William Pitcher were responsible for the development of a secondary school curriculum for Mathematics, and the ODA Schools Agriculture Project (SAP) for the development of primary and secondary curricula in Agriculture.

Donors provided assistance for non-formal education and training programmes. The RDAs scheme depended on capital funding and technical assistance from the British Government, USAID, and other donors. Agricultural extension services, the Home Economics programme, and the 'women in development' scheme were supported by FAO. The development of co-operatives was supported by FAO and ILO. The establishment and operation of the handicrafts training centre was supported by capital funding and technical assistance from the Republic of China. Plans for the development of radio education were based on the expectation of external aid following the visit of a UNESCO/SIDA mission in 1977.

The development of pre-school education was supported by capital funding and technical assistance provided by UNICEF. DEMS was supported by USAID, and SEBENTA by UNESCO. SIEC was established by DANIDA, and Danish technical assistance was responsible for the administration and operation of correspondence courses and the vocational training programme until 1978. The World Bank proposed the idea of the RECs and provided a loan for their establishment. During the third plan period, the development of the RECs depended almost entirely on Peace Corps volunteers.
Educational administration had been almost completely localised by the beginning of the third plan period but the Ministry of Education still relied on donor assistance to staff a number of key posts. During the plan period, ODA provided inspectors of schools for Mathematics and technical subjects. The second of these posts was taken over by SIDA/UNESCO during the second half of the plan period. SAP was responsible for the development of the teaching of Agriculture in primary and secondary schools. CIDA provided 'experts' in educational administration and adult education for the first half of the plan period. UNESCO established an educational planning project in the Ministry of Education, and provided technical assistance for the SIDA Primary School Building Unit (PSBU) and the World Bank Swaziland Project for Educational Development (SPED).

Aid for education, in the form of capital funding and technical assistance, was a fact of life in Swaziland. In a number of crucial areas (for example, curriculum development, schools agriculture, the training of teachers of practical subjects, educational planning and school building) donor projects and programmes appeared to have virtually assumed responsibility for the planning and development of education, and in particular for the planning and development of secondary education.

Aid for secondary education was conditioned not only by the amount of aid the various donor agencies were prepared to make available for secondary education in Swaziland, but also by the different kinds of assistance they were prepared to provide. In general (13), World Bank support for education in developing countries was provided in the form of loans for capital investment. UNESCO acted as an executing agency, providing 'experts' as advisers in projects funded through UNDP country programmes, co-operative agreements with the World Bank, and in some instances joint agreements with other agencies such as SIDA. The greater part of ODA support was provided in the form of technical assistance. SIDA provided most of its support in the form of capital grants, though at times it provided funding for technical assistance projects executed by one or other of the UN agencies. The American Peace Corps Service provided technical assistance in the form of volunteers, usually in teaching posts in secondary schools.
In Swaziland, aid for capital investment in secondary education was provided almost entirely by the World Bank in the form of three overlapping loans through SPED in 1975, 1977, and 1980 (14). SIDA provided capital grants for the construction of primary, but not secondary, schools though it was prepared to provide funding to support technical assistance projects in secondary curriculum development (through UNESCO) and secondary teacher training (through FAO). UNESCO provided 'experts' as advisers in self-contained projects identified with particular programmes and activities: educational planning (UNDP), SPED (World Bank), and curriculum development (SIDA). FAO provided 'experts' as advisers in the SIDA funded Agriculture/Home Economics teacher training project. ODA had provided capital grants for secondary education in previous years, but the main thrust of its aid programme was the provision of technical assistance in operational rather than advisory positions. ODA personnel worked in a variety of situations: in self-contained projects such as SAP and the teacher training project at SCOT, in key positions in the Ministry of Education and at William Pitcher, as teachers of technical subjects in secondary schools, and as lecturers at SCOT. Most Peace Corps volunteers worked as teachers in secondary schools. Some worked as co-ordinators of RECs and in other non-formal education and training programmes, and at various times Peace Corps provided a volunteer to work in the UNESCO educational planning project.

The next chapter describes three aspects of the Swazi approach to secondary education. Later chapters examine in more detail donor intervention in the planning and development of secondary education, and analyse the conflict between this intervention and the Swazi approach to secondary education.

Footnotes


7 Third National Development Plan, p 181.


13 See also Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, pp 38-50.

THE SWAZI APPROACH TO SECONDARY EDUCATION

The three sections in this chapter describe three aspects of the Swazi approach to secondary education. Reference to chapter 4 and to the account which follows indicates a number of broad similarities between these aspects of the Swazi approach and the approaches to secondary education in other African countries.

The Swazi model of education described in section 1 was similar in broad outline to those in other African countries, in its adoption of the principle of education as an inalienable right, and its preparedness to respond to popular pressures. Section 2 describes a lack of co-ordination and control over the financing of secondary education which could be generalised, in varying degrees, across other African countries. It examines the part played by private costs in the financing of secondary education, and the consequent shifts in responsibility for decision making and widening in inequalities between schools, which were emerging features in many African countries (1). The account of a largely non-interventionist approach to the administration of secondary education in section 3, and of the operation of a school fees system in section 2, describe the main symptoms of the 'sit-out' option in a Swazi setting.

There were broad similarities in approach to secondary education in African countries. There were also important differences arising out of the diverse conditions and variety of settings across African countries, illustrated by the different patterns of secondary education development in, for example, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. The particular nature of the Swazi approach was shaped by distinctively Swazi characteristics. At various points in the account which follows reference is made to the part played in this process by the traditional monarchy's unchallenged authority over virtually every aspect of life in Swaziland, the prevailing Swazi view of the particularity and autonomy of the Swazi Nation, and the importance of Swazi traditional structures and processes. The strength and persistence of the Swazi approach were deeply rooted in and nurtured by the strength and persistence of Swazi traditional institutions.
The Swazi model of education

The main features of the Swazi model of education were outlined in two Swazi documents: the Imbokodvo Manifesto, 1972 and the Report of the National Education Commission, 1975. Both were sanctioned by royal authority and their influence was powerful and far reaching. The Manifesto was the official policy document of the Imbokodvo National Movement. It was written by Prince Makhosini, chosen by the king to lead the Movement and to be Swaziland's first Prime Minister. It was in effect a royal proclamation. The National Education Commission was established by the king through Cabinet, and the NEC report made it clear that its work and its recommendations were guided by and based on the policies contained in the Manifesto (2).

The two documents had the status of being Swazi statements of Swazi policy. Official Government publications and national development plans prepared with donor assistance were not accorded the same status and were rarely, if ever, referred to by politicians and senior civil servants. In a speech in 1981 on educational planning and policy in Swaziland the Permanent Secretary for Education (3) described Swazi educational policy as firmly based on the Manifesto and the NEC report. The NEC was described as "composed of Swazis" and its recommendations "determined the type of education that was relevant to the realities of the economy and society of the kingdom of Swaziland". There was no mention of any other Government publication or any reference to a national development plan.

As represented in the Manifesto (4), the Swazi approach to education was based on the fundamental principle that "education is an inalienable right for every child and every citizen to receive to the limit of his/her capabilities". This principle was linked with a view of education that took little or no account of the idea of education as a basic factor in economic development and which was in many ways a throwback to an earlier, more 'humanistic' ideology. According to the Manifesto (5), "the major objective (of education) is the improvement of the individual". The NEC report (6) asserted that "human development is the great aim of education", but it saw this development in
terms of catering for "the spiritual, intellectual and physical needs of the nation's citizens" not in terms of human resource development for economic growth.

Acceptance of the principle embodied in the Manifesto that everyone had a right to an education geared to his own needs was tantamount to a commitment to an educational development policy of expansion at all levels, limited only by the nature and extent of popular demand for education and by Government's ability to make education available. The need to respond to popular pressures was an inbuilt feature of the Swazi model, advocating what Mosteller described (7) as an 'open banquet' approach to educational development. The NEC report (8) made it clear that Government's main task was "to cater for the ever increasing demand for secondary school places", and much of the report was taken up with detailed recommendations for expansion of the existing system of secondary education.

There were strong and insistent popular pressures for the rapid expansion of secondary, and in particular senior secondary education, shaped to a large extent by existing links between secondary education and employment opportunities in the modern sector and by the enormous private rewards associated with the higher levels of education (9). The demand for secondary education had been added to by pressures emanating from the expansion of the lower levels of the system, by the rapid expansion of secondary education in previous years, and by proposals for increased expansion in the NEC report.

A second main principle in the Manifesto (10) was that education "must be work oriented from the primary to the highest levels", and the academic bias inherited from a colonial past "must be uprooted". The Manifesto and the NEC report (11) proposed the diversification of the secondary curriculum through the inclusion of practical subjects and the addition of "vocational training of different kinds" in secondary schools and training institutions. These proposals echoed exhortations in colonial reports and in donor agency proposals for education for rural development. But it was significant that the development of vocational education and training programmes was seen largely in terms of the expansion of
the existing system of senior secondary education through the addition of technical and vocational streams, according to pupils' interests and abilities.

It would have been a foolhardy politician or civil servant who chose to question the policies enshrined in the Manifesto and reiterated in the NEC report, even when they might appear to run counter to considerations based on manpower requirements, efficiency criteria, or professional concerns for quality. Two major policy statements by the Minister for Education in 1980 (12) and 1983 (13), like every other policy statement from the Ministry, referred to the Manifesto and the NEC report and made detailed mention of education as an inalienable right, the major objective of education as improving the individual, and the need for education to cater for the spiritual, intellectual and physical needs of the nation's citizens. They reaffirmed the need for education to be work oriented, and rationalised proposals for the expansion of senior secondary education in terms of catering for individual interests and abilities through the addition of vocational and technical streams.

The over-riding principle on which the Swazi model of education was based was summed up in statements by the Permanent Secretary for Education in 1981 (14) and 1982 (15). Education was an inalienable right; it should cater to the needs and development of the individual; Government's task was to make education available to all who wanted it, according to their needs. This was the view that found expression in the 1981 Education Act, which charged the Minister for Education with responsibility for "providing a comprehensive education service" and for taking "such steps as may be necessary to contribute to the spiritual, moral, mental and physical development of the people by ensuring that ... educational facilities are available to all to meet their needs" (16).

The financing of secondary education

There were two systems of resource acquisition and allocation for secondary education. The first consisted of central
Government budgetary procedures for the planning and allocation of resources, in which the Ministry of Education participated only peripherally. The second depended on parental contributions in the form of fees paid directly to secondary schools, and it operated independently from and outside the control of the Ministry of Education.

(a) The Ministry of Education: budget preparation

Within the modern system of government, control of the national budget was exercised by the three central agencies in the Prime Minister's Office: the Ministry of Finance, the Department of Economic Planning, and the Department of Establishments and Training. Decisions on budgetary allocations between and within individual ministries were taken by a Budget Committee, which consisted of the Permanent Secretaries of the three central agencies. This committee was advised by working parties drawn from the central agencies, and worked within broad outlines set by Cabinet. Its decisions were communicated to the various line ministries by the Department of Economic Planning.

The Ministry of Education capital and recurrent budget requests were prepared by separate sections of the ministry in consultation with and under the general direction of the Permanent Secretary for Education. Estimates of capital requirements were prepared by the educational planning section and submitted to the Department of Economic Planning. Recurrent estimates were prepared by the accounts section and submitted to the Department of Establishments and Training. This split was linked with two different systems of resource acquisition. The capital budget was related, to a large extent, to Economic Planning's ability to find donor funds. The recurrent budget was determined primarily by the level of Government revenue, which (as indicated earlier) depended on Customs Union payments and trade and income taxes.

All decisions relating to the allocation of resources for education were taken by Economic Planning and Establishments and Training. The Ministry of Education might be consulted from time to time during the preparation of the budget but there was little evidence that such consultation was perceived by the ministry as influential in the decision making process, and the ministry was "in the
unfortunate position of having to be responsible for a budget for which it has minimal responsibility in setting" (17). The Ministry of Education’s main role in the preparation of its capital budget was restricted to ensuring that the appropriate forms, sent to the ministry by the Department of Economic Planning, were filled in accurately and submitted on time (18). Within the ministry, the educational planning section complained that District Education Officers and inspectors of schools did not complete these forms correctly or return them on time. DEOs and inspectors complained, with some justification, that the forms were unnecessarily complicated and time consuming, and that their submissions, even when filled in correctly, appeared to have little effect on decisions made in the Department of Economic Planning (19).

Priorities were established by the Department of Economic Planning without reference to the Ministry’s stated priorities. A Ministry of Education report, prepared by the educational planning section, pointed out that every year there was "a considerable change of priorities of which the Ministry of Education knows nothing about"; that it was not clear what criteria were used "in determining sectoral and project allocations in the Ministry of Education capital budget"; that the ministry was not provided with "a ceiling, indicating what resources are available to it"; and that the ministry received no "clear guidelines" from the Department of Economic Planning on the criteria to be used in establishing priorities (20).

Preparation of recurrent estimates was restricted almost entirely to salary costs (see Table 27). The basis for the ministry’s annual budget was the Establishment Register prepared each year by the Department of Establishments and Training. The 1981 sector review described a situation in which "unfortunately, there is little relationship between the basis used for recurrent budget by the Ministry of Education, the Establishment Register and what is actually happening in the school system".

There was, for example, no increase in the number of teaching posts in the Establishment Register between 1980 and 1981 in spite of
the opening of new schools and an increase in the number of teachers employed (21). It was not clear whether this was primarily a result of the ministry's failure to request additional posts or reluctance on the part of Establishments and Training to establish them.

A fundamental weakness in the preparation of the Ministry of Education annual budget was the lack of co-ordination between the preparation and submission of capital and recurrent requests, and this split was "critical in the failure to relate the implications of capital and recurrent budget" (22). This lack of co-ordination was a reflection of the way in which the central agencies operated. It was not uncommon to find that, while Economic Planning had approved the construction of educational facilities, no provision had been made by Establishments and Training to establish the posts needed to staff them (23). Nor was it uncommon for a donor agency to sign a joint agreement with Economic Planning which included the establishment of 'counterpart' posts to find later that no provision had been made, or was likely to be made, for these posts by Establishments and Training (24).

These two central agencies appeared to exercise virtually absolute authority over decisions relating to the planning and allocation of resources for education. A report by a CIDA consultant (25) noted that it was relatively futile for the Ministry of Education to attempt to establish priorities for educational development when its participation in the planning and allocation of resources to support the implementation of these priorities was no more than peripheral. But, in spite of their bureaucratic procedures and apparent authority, the central agencies did not have the administrative capacity to follow through on the decisions made in the annual budget or to control what was happening in individual ministries. The Ministry of Education regularly employed more teachers than indicated in the Establishment Register and regularly overspent its recurrent budget (26), and at headquarters the ministry operated with a 'shadow' establishment, where either more or fewer people were doing the jobs provided for in the official establishment (27). In addition, there was another system of resource acquisition and allocation within the secondary school
system, which is described at (b) below, and which operated independently from and largely outside the control of the ministry and the central agencies.

The authority of the central agencies was restricted by the fact that the national budget, like every other aspect of modern government, was subject to the king's wishes and required his approval. The preparation and implementation of the budget was curtailed by the monarchy's demands on available resources either directly (28) or through Tibiyo. The king's own views, the needs of Tibiyo, the counsel of his closest advisers, and appeals and grievances expressed through traditional channels carried more weight and took precedence over the workings of central Government. Funds already allocated could be withdrawn by royal command, as they were early in the third plan period to bail the Royal Swazi Airline out of financial difficulties. Decisions taken by central Government could be reversed, as they were when unqualified teachers extra to requirements in secondary schools taken off the payroll in December 1982 were reinstated in January 1983 after representations to the king at the royal kraal.

(b) The secondary school system: school fees

Government's share of the total cost of secondary education was limited to the payment of teachers' salaries and boarding subsidies in seven secondary schools, and an increasing part of the cost of secondary education had been shifted to the private sector in the form of school fees (29). In 1978/79, teachers' salaries accounted for 86 per cent of approved estimates for recurrent expenditure for secondary education and for 91 per cent of actual expenditure, and for 96 per cent of approved estimates and for 94 per cent of actual expenditure in 1982/83 (Table 27). The financing of other recurrent expenditures depended on school fees paid by parents, and collected, spent, and accounted for by headmasters.

The amount of fees charged varied widely from school to school. The schools themselves determined what fees they would charge, what they would be used for, and when and by how much they would be increased without reference to the Ministry of Education. The "heavy reliance on private costs" meant that "the wealthy
schools can provide better opportunities for children". The school fee system led to "great inequalities" and,

despite the availability of classrooms and teachers the resources necessary for teaching and learning are unequitably distributed and in all cases these resources depend upon parental contributions and local wealth" (30).

There were wide variations in the way school fees were charged and collected. Some schools charged a composite fee to cover all recurrent expenditures. Others charged a school fee plus additional fees which could be intended for a wide variety of purposes - text books, equipment, school uniform, medical treatment, a mid day meal, sports, entertainment, and so on - though there was little evidence that such fees "bear any relationship to expenditures for these functions". In most schools the increased costs associated with the teaching of practical subjects were shifted on to parents by charging separate fees, a Woodwork fee, a Home Economics fee, or an Agriculture fee (31).

Diversification of the secondary curriculum depended upon a number of factors, not the least of which was parental ability and willingness to support the teaching of practical subjects through the payment of fees. Reports on school visits by secondary inspectors commented on a widespread reluctance to pay practical subject fees and the consequent restrictions on diversification. The 1981 sector review described a situation in which the diversification of secondary education was restricted, and the curriculum continued to reflect public demand for the more vocational bias of the formal academic system of secondary education (32). Attempts at diversification and vocationalisation of secondary curricula have often been unsuccessfully implemented, ineffective in meeting stated objectives, or treated with indifference or hostility by pupils and parents. In Swaziland, the operation of a school fee system enabled parents and local communities to bring direct influence to bear in curtailing such attempts.

Secondary schools charged a building fee as a condition of attendance, and in some instances these fees were supplemented
by community funds, controlled and administered by local chiefs. The wealthier schools and communities generated substantial building funds, which were outside the control of the Ministry of Education. In theory, Ministry of Education approval was necessary for the construction of any educational facility but additions to existing schools were often built without either the knowledge or approval of the District Education Office or ministry headquarters, although approval was often obtained for large projects such as the construction of a new school. Consequently, although there was a substantial private sector building programme, funded through school building fees, it was difficult to know exactly how much private construction was taking place, and where it was taking place, at any given time. From the Ministry of Education point of view, a considerable portion of the total school building programme was essentially unplanned. All private construction was invariably followed by a demand for teachers, a demand which the ministry found difficult to refuse, and which placed additional strains on its recurrent budget. The CIDA report on educational finance in Swaziland referred to a situation in which "richer areas build classrooms and demand and usually get teachers while in poorer areas pupil teacher ratios increase and educational support dwindles" (33).

The generation of school and community building funds enabled schools and communities to circumvent World Bank insistence on more efficient use of plant and equipment incorporated into specifications for new junior secondary schools. On completion of a SPED school, the local community's first step was to build an additional classroom, following accepted practice in other secondary schools and obviating the need for changes in school organisation. The next step was often the generation of additional building funds, the building of extra classrooms, and a demand for upgrading to a high school. These demands were made through Swazi traditional channels, through local chiefs or by direct community representation to the king at Lobamba.

The Ministry of Education exercised no control over school fees. There was no limit to the purposes for which fees could be charged, no limit to the amount that could be charged, no check on how
fees were collected, what happened to them after they were collected, or how they were spent. In the schools the administration and control of school fees was "considerably less than optimal", and methods of classifying and accounting for expenditure were described as "arbitrary and sometimes whimsical". Record keeping was "chaotic". Schools were rarely, if ever, audited. Except in the largest well established schools there were no written statements of required fees and no financial statements. Headmasters were often vague as to what fees were charged, for what purposes, and how much they amounted to. In some schools it was impossible to find out what fees had been collected, for what purposes, and what they had been spent on (34).

There was a great deal of inefficiency and waste in the collection and expenditure of school fees. Headmasters claimed, with some justification, that they were not trained to keep accounts. The CIDA report alleged that direct access to school funds and lack of financial accountability resulted in misappropriation as well as mismanagement and,

"while many heads recognise that the monies they deal with are those of the school and the community, there appears to be far too many who view these funds with a proprietary interest" (35).

There were procedures for disciplinary action and penalties for the misappropriation of school funds (36). These procedures were rarely, if ever, initiated and penalties were not imposed, even in serious cases of misappropriation (37).

The administration of secondary education

The following account examines the administration of secondary education in two parts. The first describes the Ministry of Education's organisational structures and operational procedures. The second describes the staffing and organisation in secondary schools.

(a) The Ministry of Education

The organisational structure of the Ministry of Education was a legacy of the British administration in Swaziland. Chart 2
indicates that the ministry had over-all responsibility for primary and secondary education and some teacher training programmes, and that its staff were based at headquarters and in the four district education offices. Apart from the addition of donor projects in curriculum development, educational planning, and school building, this structure had remained virtually unchanged since independence.

The ministry had been directly responsible for the management of primary education through the district education offices. A small secondary school system had been administered largely by voluntary agencies, and the role of the ministry, working through a small secondary schools inspectorate, had been supportive rather than supervisory. Expatriate headmasters had enjoyed a large measure of autonomy in staffing, curricular organisation, admissions, and the collection and spending of school fees. In the years after independence, the ministry experienced increasing difficulty in responding to demands arising out of the rapid expansion of secondary education and the need to assume responsibility for a national system of primary and secondary education. By the beginning of the third plan period, it was clear that the ministry's capacity for effective management and supervision of a rapidly expanding secondary education system was still largely undeveloped (38).

In theory, over-all responsibility for the administration and professional supervision of secondary education was vested in a Chief Inspector Secondary. His responsibilities (39) included the staffing of secondary schools, the maintenance of staff and pupil discipline, the proper and correct use of school funds, and the provision of equipment and furniture, as well as the inspection of schools and the organisation of in-service courses for teachers. He was also responsible for the development of relevant curricula and the proper organisation of the SCU, though the ministry's organisational chart showed the SCU reporting directly to the Director of Education. In practice, the ministry exercised little control over what happened in secondary schools, and provided little in the way of professional support and guidance.
As in the past, District Education Officers were responsible for the administration and inspection of primary schools, and they reported to a Chief Inspector Primary. In addition, they were expected to be responsible for "the over-all educational administration of the district", reporting to the CIS on "all matters relating to secondary education" (40). DEOs were products of the primary system, and they had no experience of the organisation and administration of secondary education. The grading of their posts did not reflect their additional responsibilities or their status as leaders of a district team; and the qualifications required for the post of DEO were lower than those needed by a secondary school teacher. They were reluctant to 'interfere' in secondary schools, the more so as they were finding it difficult enough trying to cope with the demands of an expanding primary school system, a task not made any easier by unfilled primary inspector posts and frequent changes of staff (41). Their annual reports (42) made it clear that most of their time was taken up with routine administrative matters concerning primary schools, meetings with local communities, and arrangements for tours of the district by politicians and senior civil servants. They had no contact with secondary schools and their reports made no mention of secondary education.

Senior Inspectors of Schools worked out of headquarters and, in theory, reported to the CIS. Ministry of Education annual reports (43) made it clear that Senior Inspectors saw themselves as subject specialists, and they had little wish to take over responsibility for the general administration of secondary education. The number of Senior Inspectors had increased considerably since independence. Their effectiveness as inspectors of secondary schools was limited by a shortage of suitably experienced and competent staff, by the lack of clearly defined responsibilities, by their reluctant entanglement in routine administrative matters, and by their involvement, as and when the need arose, in a variety of tasks that had little or nothing to do with the professional supervision of secondary schools (44). They were also expected to have wide ranging responsibilities for the teaching, development of curricula, and examinations not only in secondary but in primary education and teacher training as well (45).
There was little attempt to direct and co-ordinate the work of Senior Inspectors, to plan itineraries and to ensure that secondary schools were regularly visited and reported on. Inspectors, left largely to their own devices, went their separate ways, pursued their own interests (curricular and extra-curricular), and grappled with their own problems. Ministry of Education annual reports (46) indicated that, with a few notable exceptions, inspectors' visits and reports on schools tended to be infrequent and irregular, and in-service courses were few and far between. As analysis of the ministry's management and supervisory procedures, carried out by the educational planning section in 1981 (47), found that there were secondary schools that had not seen an inspector for five years, and that there were teachers with a number of years experience who had never had an inspection visit and who were still technically on probation.

Organisational structures inherited from the British administration were still in place, and schedules of duties and lines of responsibility and reporting were updated during the third plan period. But, in practice, they played little part in the way the Ministry of Education operated, and they had been replaced by a less formal Swazi way of doing things. Schedules of duties and formal reporting procedures had given way to personal instruction on an ad hoc basis and an increasing reliance on an oral tradition for the taking and communication of decisions. Ministry officials were reluctant to commit anything to paper, and there was a strong tendency to wait for instruction even in routine matters, to avoid taking decisions, and to refer even minor matters to a higher level (48).

This approach was linked with the nature of the political process. Decisions on educational matters, like everything else in Swaziland, were either taken by the king or were subject to his approval. The king could be involved in decision making at all levels, for example, the posting of teachers, the location of new schools, admissions to Form I, or proposed changes in school uniform. These decisions, or approval for them, could be influenced by a variety of factors, including the king's own wishes, the counsel of his closest advisers, and representations
by chiefs and communities through traditional channels. Within the Swazi context unquestioning loyalty and service were the way to promotion and preference, not initiative and drive. It was more politic for ministry officials to wait for and carry out instructions as and when they were communicated, rather than initiate action which might possibly be seen as running counter to popular expectations or conflicting with the interests of those with influence in the traditional hierarchy.

(b) The secondary schools

In theory, the Chief Inspector Secondary was responsible for the staffing of secondary schools and for the appointment, posting, and transfer of all secondary school teachers. In practice, teachers were appointed, posted, and transferred in a variety of ways involving senior ministry officials, the accounts section, the schools themselves, pressures from local communities, and representations from individual teachers, often without reference to the CIS. No particular official or section within the ministry exercised over-all control over the staffing of secondary schools (49). One result was that secondary education was heavily overstaffed. The third plan target of a ratio of pupil to qualified teacher of 25 to 1 had been achieved by the beginning of the plan period (Table 12) and, using this ratio as a yardstick, there were 94 more qualified teachers (9 per cent) than needed in 1981 and 72 (7 per cent) than were needed in 1982. The application of an over-all pupil teacher ratio of 25 to 1 (including qualified and unqualified teachers) indicated that secondary education was overstaffed by more than 40 per cent in 1981 and 1982 (50).

There was a substantial increase over the plan period in the number and proportion of qualified Swazi teachers and a corresponding drop in the number and proportion of non-Swazi teachers in secondary schools (Table 11). In many cases, experienced expatriate teachers had been replaced by newly qualified, inadequately trained Swazi teachers, the majority of whom had not fulfilled the minimum entry requirement of at least four COSC credits for the training courses they had completed (51), and by Peace Corps volunteers, and about a quarter were teachers from South Africa, other African countries, Sri Lanka, and Western
Europe employed on 'local expatriate' contracts.

It was not only experienced expatriate teachers who were leaving the secondary teaching force. Sgwane, in a 'critical appraisal of secondary education policies in Swaziland', drew attention to the low morale and the high turn-over of Swazi staff in secondary schools (52). In spite of salary increases in 1977 and 1981, salaries and conditions of service still lagged behind those in the public service and were nowhere near as good as those found in the private sector. There was a strong tendency for the better qualified and more ambitious to leave teaching, when the opportunity presented itself, for higher salaries and better conditions of service and fringe benefits in the public and private sectors (53). At the same time, the best qualified senior secondary school graduates did not enter teacher training. Sgwane described teacher training in Swaziland as "the dumping ground where rejects from the education system find temporary refuge" (54), and a combination of a low level of intake and inadequate courses resulted in an 'unsatisfactory' output from teacher training programmes (55).

Reports prepared by the educational planning section (56) drew attention to the number of unqualified teachers in secondary schools, wide variations in the distribution of teachers, the under utilisation of qualified teachers, and the lack of organisational structures in many schools. In spite of the increase in the number and proportion of qualified Swazi teachers, and the fact that there were more qualified teachers in secondary schools than could be reasonably justified, the number of unqualified teachers increased over the plan period from 289 in 1978 to 374 in 1982, an increase of almost 30 per cent. However, in view of the expansion of enrolment during this period, the proportion of unqualified teachers in the secondary teaching force remained fairly constant over the plan period at around 25 per cent (Table 10). All junior secondary schools employed unqualified teachers, and in two thirds over a third of the staff was unqualified. In one school nine out of a staff of 12 were unqualified, in another 14 out of 18. A quarter of all high schools had no unqualified teachers. The rest employed at least one unqualified teacher, and in a quarter of all high schools a third or more of the staff
was unqualified. In one high school 18 out of 41 teachers were unqualified, in another 12 out of 33, and in a third 11 out of 27.

In 1982 the over-all pupil teacher ratio in all secondary schools was 18 to 1 (Table 12) but in individual schools it ranged from 13 to 1 at one end of the scale to 33 to 1 at the other. There were often shortages, even in schools with a surplus of qualified staff, of teachers of particular subjects. In many cases schools had too many teachers of some subjects and not enough, or none at all, of others. In 1981 the average teaching load for all teachers was 22 lessons out of a notional timetable of 45 lessons a week, but in individual schools average teaching loads ranged from 15 to 30 lessons a week. In theory, the adoption of a recommended average teaching load of 30 lessons a week would have dispensed with the need for unqualified teachers.

In many schools curricular organisation and timetabling were governed not so much by educational considerations as by the availability or otherwise of subject teachers, by what particular teachers were prepared or not prepared to teach, and by the headmaster's lack of administrative know how and his inability to direct and organise the work of his staff. There were schools where unqualified teachers were responsible for the teaching of core subjects such as English and Mathematics, and where unqualified teachers taught more lessons a week than qualified staff. Sgwane (57) described a secondary education system characterised by inexperienced teachers, shortages of teachers in particular subject areas, and the poor quality of instruction. Secondary schools taught an incomplete curriculum, basic formal skills were not effectively transmitted, and there were wide differences in the status and quality of secondary schools.

In Swaziland the quality of education was measured in terms of examination results, in particular the results of the COSC examination. The popular view, as expressed by the Times of Swaziland (58), that "it is now an accepted fact that the standard of education in Swaziland has fallen drastically in the past few years", centred on a series of disappointing COSC examination results. The COSC was a "vitally important examination" and every year an increasing number of candidates was "bitterly
disappointed. The introduction of a fourth class pass did nothing to lessen the disappointment. It was regarded as a fail, and success in the COSC examination was still measured in terms of a class 1, 2, or 3 pass (59). The increase in the number of entries, from 240 at independence to over 2,000 by the end of the plan period, had been accompanied by a significant decline in the proportion of candidates who passed the examination, from 75 per cent in 1968 to 30 per cent in 1982 (Table 18). Wide variations between schools and the successful performance of a small number of schools every year was a characteristic feature of the COSC examination results over the plan period (see Table 19).

Wastage through repetition and drop out was an endemic feature of education in Swaziland. A theoretical model, constructed by the educational planning section and based on 1979 rates of repetition and drop out, suggested that a Grade 1 cohort of 1,000 pupils would produce 60 entrants for the COSC examination, of which no more than 20 could be expected to obtain a class 1, 2, or 3 pass (60). Donor analysis in 1981 and 1982 (61) indicated that the internal efficiency of secondary education had declined over the last decade. It was estimated that in 1981 it took nearly 17 pupil years at junior secondary level to produce a class 1 or 2 pass in the JCE, more than two and a half times longer than it had taken in 1970; and nearly 9 pupil years at high school level to produce a class 1, 2, or 3 pass in the COSC examination, more than two and a half times as long as in 1970. Within the Swazi context everyone had a right to an education geared to his own needs, and it would be unfair to deny pupils the chance to learn at their own speed (62). Popular pressures demanded, and expected, that failures in the PCE and JCE would be given a second chance (and a third and fourth if necessary) within the existing education system (63).

In a paper on the need to establish criteria for the staffing of secondary schools (64), the educational planning section pointed out that the majority of secondary school headmasters were "no longer as mature and experienced as they would have been in the past", when they would have had "the opportunity to work for a number of years as head of department and deputy headmaster before being appointed as secondary school headmasters". Although
secondary education had expanded rapidly and the number of schools had increased, for most teachers the opportunity to work as head of department or deputy headmaster was severely limited. There had been no attempt to establish appropriate organisational structures in recently established or upgraded schools. In 1982 two thirds of all secondary schools had no established post for a deputy headmaster. The older, well established schools had posts for heads of department. One school had eight out of a staff of 32, another had five out of 26. The majority of schools had none at all. In many cases headmasters with limited experience had been appointed to schools with no deputy headmaster, no supporting organisational structure, and little or no hope of advice and assistance from qualified and experienced staff. The ministry provided little in the way of professional support and guidance and exercised little control over what happened in secondary schools, and inexperienced headmasters were left to cope as best they could.

In a speech to mark the inauguration of the Swaziland Teaching Service Commission in 1983, the Minister for Education (65) emphasised that the Commission had been established to "provide effective control of the teaching service establishment", to "reduce the possibilities of favouritism and nepotism in matters concerning promotion and appointments", and to make recommendations "on how efficiently we should run our schools". He issued what the Times of Swaziland described as "a stern warning - threatening to punish lazy teachers", described "widespread laxity among members of the teaching profession, including headmasters", referred to "absenteeism, drunkenness during school hours, abscondment and all forms of immorality", and drew attention to the need for "firm control on school heads" or school administration would "continue to be in a shambles as it is today".

There was no indication in the Minister's speech that the Ministry of Education could be held responsible for the administrative shambles or the widespread incidence of unprofessional conduct. Nor was there any suggestion that the ministry had a responsibility to provide what Beeby described as the authoritative support (66) needed in a rapidly expanding system of secondary education.
largely staffed by teachers and headmasters who lacked the experience and professionalism to make effective use of the autonomy that was still allowed to secondary schools. It was not so much that the ministry had somehow lost control of secondary education, but rather that it had never made any determined effort to assume control. Given the nature of the Swazi approach to educational administration, it was unlikely that the Teaching Service Commission would display any greater determination.

Footnotes

5 Imbokodvo Manifesto, 1972, p 23.
7 Mosteller C F Quoted in Williams P Objectives for Planning: Equality, Yellow Paper No 4.
10 Imbokodvo Manifesto, 1972, pp 24, 27.
Nsibande M J The Friday Interview, 1982.
UNESCO Swaziland: Education and Training Sector Review, 1979, p 58.
Third National Development Plan, pp 261-264.
47 Ministry of Education Administrative Reform for Educational


52 Sgwane B S P Education and Reform, 1983, p 126.


58 Times of Swaziland The Friday Interview, 20 August 1982, p 4.


65 Dlamini S Speech by the Honourable Minister for Education at the Inauguration of the Swaziland Teaching Service Commission, 1983.

66 Beeby C E The Quality of Education in Developing Countries, 1966, pp 128-129.
This chapter describes donor intervention in the planning and development of secondary education and training with particular reference to aid for educational planning, the preparation of the education chapter of Swaziland's *Third National Development Plan 1978/79 - 1982/83*, and the projects provided by various donor agencies during the third plan.

The first section indicates the importance donors attached to aid for educational planning, and describes donor assistance in the establishment and operation of national economic planning, manpower analysis, and educational planning. It refers to donor concern for what were regarded as persistent weaknesses in Swazi planning and management of education, and planning and co-ordination of aid to education.

The second examines the part played by donor assistance in the formulation of an education policy geared to the production of manpower for development, and in particular to the needs of rural change and modernisation. It describes how donor policies for secondary education and training described in chapter 2, and projects donors were prepared to support, were incorporated into the education plan. Together, the first two sections indicate that donor assistance provided the sound framework of educational planning, the arrangements for project preparation and planning and co-ordination of aid, and the comprehensive education plan that donors, themselves, insisted on as requirements for aid to education.

The third section describes donor preferences for particular kinds of assistance, and the projects various donor agencies were prepared to provide for the development of secondary education and training during the third plan period. It examines the ways in which aid to education was shaped by donor views on 'what was best' for education in Swaziland, the operation of donor agency policies and procedures, their concern for the most effective use of the aid they provided, and a tendency for donors to regard
Swaziland as a willing, and more or less passive, recipient of donor funding and donor expertise. A final section refers to the restrictions imposed on the impact of aid to education by limitations in planning and co-ordination on the donor side.

While the following account describes the specific array of donors and their 'experts' brought to bear upon the planning and development of secondary education and training in Swaziland during the third plan period, general analysis in chapter 3 indicates a number of broad similarities in the responsible interventionism of donor agencies in Swaziland and in other African countries. Patterns of aid provision varied from country to country, but donor intervention in Swaziland and in other African countries was shaped, to a considerable extent, by a number of common donor concerns and broad similarities in donor agency policies and procedures, and there was a strong tendency for donors to provide similar kinds of assistance in support of a view of 'what was best' for education that was generalised across African countries.

Aid for educational planning

Before independence, development plans drawn up by the British administration had been closely tied to the disbursement of aid from Britain (1). With the coming of independence, and the expectation of substantial aid not only from Britain but also from a variety of other donors, the outgoing British administration drew up Swaziland's first Post Independence Development Plan to identify and support proposals for international aid (2). It also set up a central planning agency with over-all responsibility for national development planning and the planning and co-ordination of external assistance (3). The establishment and operation of the Department of Economic Planning depended almost entirely on the availability of technical assistance, provided at first by ODA and later by a variety of donors. At one time and another the post of Chief Economic Planner and other senior technical posts were filled by 'experts' provided by ODA, UNDP, CFTC, EEC, and GTZ.

The manpower surveys produced by Economic Planning in 1969 (4) and 1974 (5) were limited in coverage and methodology (6). Examination
of the relevant documentation (7) indicates that they were not drawn up in time for the preparation of the first or second national development plans, and that neither was considered to be of much assistance in the preparation of the 1976 University of Botswana and Swaziland Development Plan. The report of an ILO mission which visited Swaziland in 1976 (8) noted the absence of any proper and up to date manpower survey, and stressed that "the urgent need for a detailed and continuous manpower assessment and planning exercise cannot be overestimated". The report's findings and recommendations reflected donor insistence on careful manpower analysis as a basis for educational planning, and donor conviction that the only way to provide this was through technical assistance. Towards the end of 1976, two manpower planning specialists, provided by ODA and attached to Economic Planning, started work on a comprehensive survey of the supply and demand for skilled manpower in Swaziland. Their findings and recommendations, and the way they were incorporated into the third national development plan, are discussed in the next section.

The UNESCO educational planning project, set up in late 1975, was located in the Ministry of Education. It is clear from joint agreements (9) and project reviews (10) that it was designed to fulfill donor criteria for the provision of aid for education. Its main objectives were the preparation of a comprehensive education plan, and the development of appropriate systems for monitoring and implementation; the planning and co-ordination of aid for education, and the preparation of related documentation; and the development of a national capacity for systematic education planning through the appointment and training of 'counterparts', and the establishment of an educational planning section in the ministry.

The establishment and continued operation of educational planning depended upon the availability of donor assistance and, when the UNESCO project was operational, it was for all practical purposes the Ministry of Education planning section (11). The importance donors attached to educational planning was indicated by their preparedness to support the UNESCO project (12). At first, the project was funded completely through the UNDP country programme in Swaziland. During the UNDP financial crisis of 1977, one
'expert' post was taken over and funded by USAID. At a later date, when there were further cutbacks in the UNDP country programme for Swaziland, the three UNESCO 'expert' posts were funded at one time and another by UNDP, the World Bank (through SPED), and SIDA. At various times, the American Peace Corps Volunteer Service provided assistance in the form of a volunteer attached to the project.

The activities and outputs of the educational planning project were described in Ministry of Education annual reports (13) and project reviews (14). The project established a detailed and comprehensive information base through periodic collection, analysis, and reporting on educational and financial data. It acted as a resource centre, providing the Ministry of Education with regular and systematic information on the education and training system. It prepared, submitted, and monitored the ministry's annual capital budget, and its building programme. It was actively involved in the preparation of education and training sector reviews. It carried out school mapping exercises, analytical surveys, and research studies and its reports on these activities provided information, identified constraints, highlighted problem areas, and suggested alternative strategies. It prepared the education chapter for the third development plan (discussed more fully in the next section), monitored and evaluated plan implementation, and drew up the education chapter for the fourth development plan.

The project was actively involved in establishing educational needs and priorities, identifying suitable projects, and preparing and submitting proposals for external assistance - laying the groundwork for the establishment of major projects in the education sector. It serviced the needs of visiting missions and consultants, as well as those of donor agency representatives in Swaziland. It arranged meetings, worked out itineraries, and provided information and documentation tailored to the needs of different donors. It was involved in project identification and appraisal, and monitoring and evaluation missions; it assisted in the preparation of project documentation; and it participated fully in aid negotiations. At times, the aid dialogue in Swaziland appeared to be a one-sided affair with donor perspectives heavily represented on both sides of the negotiations.
Donor intervention, and in particular aid for educational planning, was shaped by strong donor concern for what were regarded as persistent weaknesses in Swazi planning and management of education, and planning and co-ordination of aid for education. Documentation drawn up by donor agencies (15) and prepared with donor assistance (16) drew attention to the Ministry of Education's inadequate organisational structures and ineffective operational procedures. From a donor perspective, the ministry's capacity for effective management and control of the education system and for providing teachers with regular and well informed professional guidance and supervision had not kept pace with the demands generated by an expanding and developing education and training system. The planning and management of education was severely limited by an ad hoc approach, a lack of co-ordination, and a decline in professionalism and commitment. The various commentaries described a weak and stagnating educational administration, on the point of collapse, and badly in need of strengthening and re-organisation.

Reports drawn up by the educational planning project, other 'experts' working in the ministry, and visiting missions and consultants reiterated long standing donor concerns for improved planning and management, proper advisory and supervision services, and more efficient use of available resources, categorised by Williams as the work-out option for educational planning. These reports made detailed and comprehensive recommendations for the strengthening and re-organisation of the Ministry of Education (17); for co-ordination in budget preparation and increased ministry involvement in the planning and allocation of resources for education (18); for a systematic approach to the planning and co-ordination of the various 'curriculum development and teacher training programmes (19); and for the formal establishment of an educational planning section within the ministry, with its own structures and its own clearly defined and delimited functions and responsibilities (20).

A Guide to School Regulations and Procedures prepared by the CIDA 'expert' in educational administration, and published by the Ministry of Education in 1979 (21), included sections on school organisation, staff and pupil discipline, and the administration
and control of school funds. Later documentation prepared by the educational planning project and visiting consultants drew attention to inefficiency and inequalities in the provision of secondary education, weaknesses in school management and the administration and control of school fees, and the ministry's lack of control over what was happening in secondary schools. They made detailed recommendations for the setting, collection, expenditure, and accounting of school fees (22); for the establishment of clear guidelines for curricular organisation, staffing criteria, and teacher utilisation (23); for the rationalisation of organisational structures in secondary schools (24); and for greater effectiveness in Ministry of Education management and inspection procedures (25). Most of the recommendations in the reports referred to above were incorporated into the 1981 education and training sector review.

The education plan

This section describes the part played by donor 'experts' in formulating policy for the development of secondary education and training, and the incorporation into the Swazi education plan of donor policies advocated in documentation prepared by 'experts' and with donor assistance. As indicated in the Ministry of Education 1977 annual report (26), the UNESCO educational planning project was responsible for drawing up the education chapter of the third national development plan, in consultation with the Department of Economic Planning.

(a) Policy formulation

The third development plan noted (27) that the Ministry of Education development strategy over the plan period was based on two planning documents published by the ministry, and that strategies for the development of technical and vocational training were based on the projections in the ODA manpower survey. Current Trends in Educational Policy, published in 1976, was produced by a working group within the ministry, with substantial advice and assistance from the UNESCO educational planning project. A Financial and Statistical Analysis of Swaziland's Educational System with Projections to 1985, published in 1977, was the work of the UNESCO 'expert' in the economics of education. A report of the ODA
manpower survey prepared by Colclough and Digby, the two manpower planning 'experts' provided by ODA, with the title Skills for the Future: Education and Manpower Perspectives in Swaziland was published by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in 1978.

Current Trends proposed (28) a "comprehensive and homogeneous approach" to the development of secondary education and training which would "provide for the different levels and kinds of manpower needs, from self-employment to modern sector high level skill". Junior secondary education, seen in terms of the last three years of a ten year course of basic education, would be terminal for the great majority of children. The curriculum would be vocationalised, by the inclusion of practical subjects, to prepare this majority for self-employment in rural areas. The vocationalisation of junior secondary education would be reinforced by further vocational training programmes in district vocational training centres, "aiming at the specific needs of the district".

The development of senior secondary education would be selectively and carefully planned according to manpower requirements, an assessment of pupil ability, and financial constraints. Enrolments would be strictly limited according to manpower requirements, and high schools would provide technical and vocational as well as academic programmes. Access to senior secondary education would be rationed, and entry would be "determined according to the results of a very selective examination". Since senior secondary education was expensive, every effort must be made to improve the internal efficiency of education at this level. The development of technical training would be governed by similar considerations, and entry to technical courses at SCOT would be "on a very selective basis and according to manpower requirements".

The formal system of secondary education and training would be complemented by non-formal education and training programmes in rural education centres. Each centre would be attached to a junior secondary school, share the school's facilities and equipment, and integrate its work with that of the school. RECs would be "geared to the economic development of rural areas" and would provide vocational training programmes for adults and
school leavers,

"concentrating on self-employment skills or small commercial enterprises or training suitable to the employment opportunities available in the area served by the Centre" (29).

The Financial and Statistical Analysis set enrolment targets (Tables 13 and 14), specified teacher requirements (Tables 22 and 23), and estimated costs (30) for the policy recommendations in Current Trends. It was estimated that the Ministry of Education recurrent budget would need to grow at the rate of 11 per cent to support proposals for the development of primary, secondary, and higher education as outlined in Current Trends. This estimate was based on the expectation of a gradual increase in junior secondary enrolments, and an anticipated cut back in entry to senior secondary education. Enrolment projections for senior secondary education were based on estimates of what manpower requirements were likely to be, and the assumption that entry to high schools would be limited to those pupils with a class 1 or 2 pass in the JCE (31).

Skills for the Future reiterated and supported the strategy for the development of secondary education and training as outlined in Current Trends. Colclough and Digby emphasised the need for the vocationalisation of junior secondary education adapted to the needs of a subsistence economy and the development of rural areas. They warned of the growing problem of surpluses of educated manpower, endorsed the idea of junior secondary education as terminal for the majority, and advocated the strict rationing of places in high schools (32). They recommended the expansion of further education and training institutions, and stressed the need "to plan their capacity in line with the country's need for vocational skills". This would entail the establishment of the proposed district vocational training centres, considerable expansion of craft training at SCOT, and a doubling of SCOT's planned capacity for secretarial and commercial courses (33).

The recommendations in Skills for the Future were shaped by two main considerations (34). The first was that the growing
problem of unemployed secondary school leavers, already noted in the ILO report (35), would become "dramatically worse over the next few years". The second was the need for a rapid improvement in the efficiency of the education and training system to gear it to the production of the right kinds of manpower, and so rectify the situation, described in the ILO report, in which "by and large the present educational and training system is producing students who are either unemployable or for whom there is very little demand" (36).

The majority of pupils who completed the junior secondary course would not be able to find jobs in the formal sector. There was, therefore, a need to vocationalise junior secondary education and gear it to development efforts in rural areas for the "greater benefit" of this majority "whose destinies lie in rural rather than urban work". The recent growth of senior secondary education could not be justified "on the basis of either employment needs or equity considerations" and, though it might be

"thought to be easier, in the short term, to yield to the pressures to continue the expansion, the longer term costs - political, economic and social - will be much greater than the benefits of so doing".

Senior secondary education was expensive and should not be expanded faster than was really necessary, particularly in circumstances where Swaziland's limited resources could be more profitably used. What was needed was an educational development policy directed towards a major effort to improve social and economic opportunities for the rural masses, the great majority of the population who would "remain untouched by formal sector growth" (37).

Reference to chapter 2 indicates that the strategy for the development of secondary education and training outlined above incorporated the main features of the education for rural development strategy, and in particular the main features of the World Bank lending policy as contained in the 1974 Education Sector Working Paper. The one variation was that, while the Bank tended to see basic education in terms of primary schooling, in Swaziland it was
seen in terms of a ten year course of basic education encompassing primary and lower secondary schooling. This issue is referred to again in the next chapter in discussion of the part played by the Swazi model of education in the preparation of the education plan.

(b) The plan

As indicated in the references cited in the following paragraphs, the proposals for the development of secondary education and training in *Current Trends and Skills for the Future* which are outlined above were incorporated directly into the education plan. From this perspective, the planned development of secondary education and training could be seen as part of a broadly based manpower strategy, outlined in Chapter 5 of the national development plan (38), which would "entail efforts to shape education and training for maximum employability and productivity". Over the plan period education would be "re-structured in order to fit the manpower needs of the country". The two main components of this re-structuring would be "the re-orientation of education towards practical rather than academic pursuits", and the expansion of "the capacity of post-junior secondary training institutions to meet manpower requirements".

What was needed, according to the education plan set out in Chapter 15, was "training in practical skills with immediate applicability to the problems of a subsistence economy and a rural environment". The junior secondary curriculum would be

"revised through the inclusion of practical subjects with a bias towards preparing the majority of those who complete the course for employment and self-employment opportunities".

The development of junior secondary education as "three years of post-primary training with a strong practical orientation" would prepare school leavers "for actual conditions of life and work" and provide them with the basic skills to support Government programmes for the development of the rural economy (39).

Entry to senior secondary education would be restricted according
to manpower requirements. The intended diversification of secondary education would include senior secondary education, and the "orientation towards practical and technical pursuits" would gear it to the production of the critical skills needed for economic development. It was "vital, economically and socially, to ensure that the output from senior secondary schools is closely geared to employment opportunities" to avoid the problems associated with surpluses of educated manpower and unemployed high school leavers. Entry to high school would be restricted to manpower requirements, and limited to those pupils who obtained a first or second class pass in the JCE (40).

Junior secondary education would provide "practical courses to prepare students for rural occupations". At the same time, it would also prepare them for further vocational training. Vocational training programmes would develop "a reservoir of urgently required skills responding to the needs of industrial and agricultural developments in various parts of the country" (41). Government planned to establish "the first two of a series of vocational training centres in the districts". These centres would "serve the development needs of rural areas with skilled and semi-skilled manpower, thus providing secondary school leavers with training and employment" (42). The facilities at SCOT would be expanded to enable the college "to meet its greatly increased responsibilities to produce the qualified manpower needed for Swaziland's development" (43).

It was "expected that some post-primary and post-secondary training" could be "accomplished through non-formal education programmes provided by education centres situated in rural areas", but the plan tended to see RECs more in terms of a social experiment in adult education. They would "provide courses according to the expressed needs of the communities which they serve"; they would "make their facilities available to the various extension services of Government"; and the Ministry of Education would co-ordinate and integrate the development of the RECs "with other adult training programmes organised by various ministries and agencies" (44).

Plan proposals for the development of secondary education and training depended on, and were arranged to accommodate, donor-
agency projects and programmes. Proposals for the establishment of the RECs had been included in the 1975 World Bank loan and the centres were expected to start operating in the first year of the third plan period. The vocationalisation of secondary education depended on the extension of existing projects and programmes such as ODA's schools agriculture project and its technical education programme; the facilities and equipment to be provided under the Bank's 1975 and 1977 loans; and the establishment of proposed projects in curriculum development (SIDA/UNESCO) and teacher training (SIDA/FAO), which were incorporated into joint agreements with the Bank, and for which the educational planning project had laid the groundwork. The inclusion of proposals for the establishment of district vocational training centres was based on the expectation of external assistance following a project identification report funded by the Bank and prepared by the World ORT Union (45).

Donor projects

The theory that donors responded to official requests for aid from Government was spelled out in a paper prepared by the UNESCO educational planning project for the Ministry of Education. As a sovereign independent state, Swaziland was expected to formulate its own educational development policy, establish its own priorities, and make its own assessment of where external assistance was needed and how it could be most profitably used to support the implementation of national goals and objectives (46). Donor agencies and Government subscribed officially to the theory of donors acting at the request of Government. But, as indicated in the account that follows, in practice donor commitment to the theory of responsiveness was tempered by their own views on aid for education, as indicated in the opening paragraphs of this chapter and in general analysis in chapter 3.

The various donor agencies had their own policies and procedures which determined the kind of assistance they were prepared to offer, and the ways in which they were prepared to provide it. Project documentation (47) indicated that they entered aid negotiations with their own definite views on Swazi educational needs and priorities, and they specified, often in considerable detail, the projects they were prepared to provide and the conditions attached
to their provision. As already indicated, donor views on 'what was best' for education in Swaziland rested on the idea of education as human resource development, and as an instrument for economic and social change. Donor projects provided aid for the diversification of the junior secondary curriculum and related teacher training programmes, the extension of craft and commercial training, and the development of non-formal education and training programmes.

Government was ill equipped to provide the clearly defined priorities, the extensive statistical information, and the detailed project documentation insisted upon in a variety of styles and formats by the various donor agencies (48), and referred to in general discussion of the aid dialogue in chapter 3. In the absence of clearly defined educational priorities and detailed requests from Government, donor agencies identified what they regarded as suitable projects and ventriloquised requests and supporting documentation for their proposals. Project documentation was prepared by 'experts' in the UNESCO planning project, by visiting missions, and in some instances by consultants provided by donors expressly for the purpose (49). The education and training sector reviews prepared by donor agencies, and referred to in chapter 6, were used to identify and support proposals for aid for education. They specified major problem areas, established educational priorities, and made detailed recommendations for areas for external assistance. The first was published by UNESCO as an agency document and presented to Government. The second, drawn up by a team of consultants provided by EEC, USAID, ODA, and CIDA, and supported by the UNESCO educational planning project, was ventriloquised as a Government document.

The design of donor projects was shaped by strong agency concerns for the most effective use of the aid they provided. The search for situations in which aid could be expected to have the maximum possible impact through the application of a 'multiplier effect' was indicated in their preferences for particular kinds of assistance. Donors looked for institution building projects in areas such as planning and administration, curriculum development and teacher training; for the placement of 'experts' in positions
where it was expected they would be able to exert influence in the planning and development of key parts of the education system; and for experimental projects, such as REC's, which were intended to be replicated and generalised across the education system.

The various donor agencies funded self contained projects identified with and responsible for particular programmes and activities. UNESCO was responsible for the establishment and operation of the Ministry of Education planning section and the secondary curriculum unit, FAO for the training programme for Agriculture/Home Economics teachers, ODA for the schools agriculture programme and the teacher training programme in technical subjects at SCOT. The various kinds of technical assistance provided by ODA were packaged so as to support key parts of the education system. The SCOT project, the placement of 'experts' in key positions in the ministry and at William Pitcher, and the provision of specialist teachers were identified with and responsible for the development of technical subjects and Mathematics in secondary schools. The placement of 'experts' with responsibility for educational administration and adult and non-formal education was designed to bring pressure to bear on what CIDA regarded as key parts of the education system.

The various ways in which donors sought to exercise control over the operation of the projects they funded, and ensure their effective implementation, have been referred to in general discussion of the aid dialogue in chapter 3. Joint agreements and reports of project implementation (50) indicated that donor projects were designed as comprehensive packages intended to cover as many critical factors as possible. They included provision for 'expert' staff and a senior 'expert' as project manager, 'counterparts' and project related training, administrative and support staff, transport, and equipment. Project implementation was tied to agency procedures for the disbursement, expenditure, and accounting of project funds. Donors insisted on the setting of deadlines for the production of project outputs and the achievement of project objectives, and on the systematic checking of project implementation through frequent progress reports, regular monitoring and evaluation missions, and periodic reviews of progress and problems.
In some instances, donors insisted on analytical surveys, research studies, and reviews of educational development funded by project funds or through country aid programmes. Reports funded through SPED, for example, included proposals for technical and vocational education (51), school leaver tracer studies (52), a wastage analysis in primary schools (53), an evaluation of RECs (54), and a study of the utilisation of teachers in secondary schools (55). Most of these reports, written by 'experts' in the UNESCO educational planning section and by visiting missions and consultants were ventriloquised as Government documents.

A characteristic feature of donor intervention was a continual stream of visiting missions and consultants seeking information, and drawing up reports. More often than not, these reports were written outside Swaziland and were not available to Government until some considerable time after the mission or consultant had left the country. Some reports, such as the CIDA report referred to in chapter 7, were based on field research. Others consisted of little more than information provided by the UNESCO planning project and re-working of information in earlier reports, accompanied by recommendations for further missions and consultancies (56).

Reliance on a single donor for capital aid for secondary education placed Government at a disadvantage in the aid dialogue, the more so as World Bank assistance through SPED was packaged in the form of a sectoral agreement. The result was that Government was made an offer it could hardly refuse, and the Bank appeared to exert considerable influence in the formulation of educational policies. Joint agreements referred to in Ministry of Education annual reports (57) indicated that Bank assistance for the construction of secondary schools was conditional on Government adoption of policies for diversification of the junior secondary curriculum, the establishment of RECs, and the development of non-formal education and training programmes.

The Bank was not prepared to fund the total cost of capital development projects. As a condition of Swaziland's credit effectiveness, substantial local funding, over 40 per cent of total construction costs, had to be committed to SPED projects (58), tying Government resources to the implementation of Bank projects and Bank policies.
The need to match the Bank contribution over the plan period was reflected in a larger allocation for the development of secondary education that envisaged in the education plan (Tables 28 and 29). In addition, Government was responsible for long term salary costs generated by the project and, however generous its terms might be, it had eventually to meet the interest on and repay the loan for the total SPED package (including technical assistance, procurement costs, missions and consultants), not merely the total construction costs.

The Bank's sectoral approach and Swaziland's reliance on a single donor for capital investment in the secondary sector limited Government's room for manoeuvre in negotiations about conditions attached to the provision of aid. The Bank brought pressure to bear for a number of changes in existing administrative and organisational arrangements which, as indicated in Ministry of Education annual reports (59), were agreed to reluctantly by Government, and never fully accepted. The Bank insisted on the establishment of a project implementation unit, and on its placement in the Ministry of Education rather than the Ministry of Works, which was responsible for all Government building programmes. SPED was tied to Bank specifications for the design of school buildings and for materials, furniture and equipment, and to Bank procedures for tendering, construction, and procurement. Junior secondary schools built by SPED were designed to promote a more efficient use of plant and equipment through a reduction in the number of classrooms, changes in school organisation, and their use as RECs.

Joint agreements made it clear (60) that the Bank's continued support for education in Swaziland was conditional on Government agreement to establish programmes, provided through external assistance, for the diversification of the junior secondary curriculum and the training of teachers of practical subjects. UNESCO provided assistance for the development of a junior secondary curriculum, FAO for the training of Agriculture and Home Economics teachers, and ODA extended its assistance for the training of teachers of technical subjects and the schools agriculture project. The parcelling out of areas of assistance and the provision of projects designed to complement and support
each other were indications of donor attempts to increase the effectiveness of their aid through collaboration and co-ordination of their efforts. SPED operated under a UNESCO/World Bank co-operative agreement, SIDA funded joint projects executed by UNESCO and FAO, a consortium of donors initiated and produced the 1981 education and training sector review. Donor collaboration appeared to strengthen their control over the aid dialogue, encourage attempts to influence Swazi educational policies and priorities, and give them a large measure of responsibility for the planning and co-ordination of aid.

The impact of aid for education

Aid for education was designed to have an influence, and it appeared to exert considerable influence, in the planning and development of secondary education. Donors had virtually assumed responsibility for educational planning, the planning and co-ordination of aid, and the preparation and drawing up of the Swazi education plan. The plan incorporated donor policies and priorities for secondary education and training, and plan preparation was conditioned by the availability of aid and the inclusion of projects that donors were prepared to support. Crucial areas in the development of secondary education had been virtually taken over by donor projects drawn up by visiting missions, implemented through technical assistance, and controlled and monitored by agency procedures.

But the influence aid for education was intended to exert was restricted by limitations in planning and administration on the donor side, as indicated in general analysis of the impact of donor intervention in chapter 3. There were weaknesses in project design, delays in project implementation, and problems in the provision of 'experts' and other forms of assistance. In some instances, plant, furniture, and equipment provided according to agency specifications proved to be inappropriate for Swazi conditions and for the purposes for which it was intended. Expensive metalwork and woodwork equipment provided through SPED turned out to be too sophisticated not only for junior secondary school pupils but also for locally trained technical subjects teachers (61), and far too sophisticated for the non-formal rural training programmes for which it was also intended.
In spite of donor attempts at the project design stage, there was little in the way of collaboration and co-ordination at the stage of project implementation. Project documentation and documentation prepared with donor assistance commented on the lack of co-ordination between the curriculum development and teacher training projects which were in theory working together towards the diversification of the junior secondary curriculum. There was no professional contact between the USAID and SIDA/UNESCO curriculum development projects, though they worked in the same building, and in theory were collaborating in the development of a ten year basic education curriculum. Ministry of Education annual reports made it clear that SPED and PSBU, though both were staffed by UNESCO 'experts' working in the same ministry, operated separately from each other according to different policies and procedures.

Aid to education was very largely a collection of self contained package projects, working separately from each other, and depending on technical assistance and agency procedures for their implementation. But, as indicated in general analysis of the impact of donor intervention in chapter 3, the ways in which the various donor agencies sought to ensure the implementation of their projects limited the influence they brought to bear in the development of secondary education. When an aid project came to an end, it meant the end for all practical purposes of the programme or activity it had established or for which it had taken over responsibility. The end of the SIDA/UNESCO curriculum development project in 1982 meant the end for all practical purposes of the secondary curriculum unit; and the end of the SIDA/FAO project at Luyengo and the ODA project at SCOT in 1983 meant in effect the end of training programmes for teachers of practical subjects for junior secondary schools.

Project implementation and the influence aid to education was intended to exert was restricted more critically by the Swazi approach to secondary education and the Swazi response to the responsible interventionism of donor agencies. The next chapter examines the ways in which the Swazi response restricted the influence donor intervention was intended to exert in the preparation of the education plan, educational planning, and
project implementation.

Footnotes

1 Post Independence Development Plan, 1969, pp 1, 3.
12 UNESCO Swaziland: Educational Planning Specialists, 1984, p 5.


36 Colclough C and Digby P W Skills for the Future, p 40.


38 Third National Development Plan, pp 56-57; See also Ministry of Education Current Trends in Educational Policy, 1976,


44 Third National Development Plan, pp 194, 196; See also Ministry of Education Current Trends in Educational Policy, 1976, pp 4-5, 29-35.


48 Swaziland/UNESCO/UNDP Joint Tripartite Evaluation Exercise,


56 See also Damiba A Educational Planning in Theory and Practice, 1980, p 70.


59 Ministry of Education Annual Report 1980, p 118; Ministry


The impact of donor intervention in the planning and development of secondary education was more apparent than real. The account that follows examines the ways in which the influence aid for education was intended to exert was critically restricted by the persistence of the Swazi approach and the pragmatic nature of the Swazi response to donor intervention. Section 1 describes the preparation of the education plan from a Swazi rather than a donor perspective, and Sections 2 and 3 describe the operation of educational planning and the implementation of donor projects during the plan period.

Throughout the three sections there are references to the conflict between Swazi and international aid approaches to secondary education, lack of Swazi commitment to donor policies, and lack of Swazi support for aid projects designed to implement these policies. Lack of commitment was linked with an underlying resentment at what was seen as disregard on the donor side for Swazi preferences and aspirations, and attempts by donor agencies to bring undue influence to bear in the formulation and implementation of Swazi policies. From a donor perspective, lack of support for aid projects could be rationalised in terms of persistent weaknesses in Swazi planning and management, but there was a strong sense in which what was regarded as Swazi weakness in planning and management was a way of protecting the Swazi model from the responsible interventionism of donor agencies. In the initial stages this form of protection might have been largely instinctive, but analysis suggests that lack of Swazi support for donor policies and projects was not always unintentional.

Reference to chapter 4 and to the account which follows indicates a number of broad similarities between Swaziland and other African countries in the ways in which their approach to secondary education and their response to donor intervention limited the influence aid for education was expected to exert, and in the conditions that shaped this process. But the persistence of the Swazi approach, the strong pragmatism of the Swazi response to donor intervention, and the marked degree of protection afforded the
Swazi model of education were shaped by distinctively Swazi characteristics. At various points in the account which follows reference is made to the part played in this process by an all pervasive political authority, rooted in the homogeneity of the Swazi Nation and the strength and continuity of Swazi traditional institutions and processes. The chapter ends with brief reference to the way in which Swaziland's over-all dependence on South Africa provided a form of security within which the traditional monarchy was enabled to exercise its authority.

The education plan

Chapter 8 described the impact of donor intervention in the preparation and presentation of Swaziland's education plan. The account that follows describes the part played by the Swazi model of education in the formulation of policy for secondary education and training, and the incorporation into the education plan of Swazi policies and priorities. This approach, that of telling the same story in a different way, entails a certain amount of repetition, but it illustrates the interplay of donor and Swazi approaches in the formulation of educational policy, the essentially diatomic nature of the education plan, and the dominant influence of the Swazi model of education.

(a) Policy formulation

As already indicated, Current Trends was drawn up by a working group in the Ministry of Education with advice and assistance from the UNESCO educational planning project, and its strategy for secondary education and training was shaped by donor policies and priorities. At the same time, this strategy was shaped by the need for the working group, and the Ministry of Education, to demonstrate an allegiance to a royally sanctioned Swazi model of education by reaffirming the policies enshrined in the Manifesto and the NEC report. Current Trends incorporated donor policies and priorities, but it was drawn up within limits set by a Swazi approach to education legitimated by an all pervasive and virtually unchallenged political authority.

Proposals for the development of junior secondary education followed the NEC report in paying "great attention to social demand", and acknowledging that
"the pressures for expanding the capacity of junior secondary schools (are) already very strong, and cannot realistically be reversed. Moreover, Government has accepted this expansion and is committed to it" (1).

The inclusion of junior secondary education as part of a proposed ten year course of universal basic education was a convenient rationalisation for continued expansion at this level. Reference to basic education, manpower for rural development, and social equity accommodated the NEC report's proposal to cater for the ever increasing demand for secondary school places within the framework of the education for rural development strategy. Proposals for the vocationalisation of junior secondary education as part of this strategy were supported in Swazi terms by direct reference to the notion of work oriented education in the Manifesto (2).

The need to restrict the development of senior secondary education according to manpower requirements was set alongside proposals for the diversification of the senior secondary curriculum, supported by direct reference to the principle in the Manifesto that education must be work oriented from primary to the highest levels. As in the Manifesto and the NEC report, these proposals were seen largely in terms of catering for individual preferences and aptitudes, and of the expansion of senior secondary education through the addition of 'vocational and technical streams' in high schools and the development of 'parallel senior secondary courses' in district vocational training centres. It was expected that this expansion would provide places, and COSC examination passes, for non academic pupils (3).

As Skills for the Future made clear (4), planned outputs from secondary schools and training institutions had been set by Government before work started on the ODA survey. The supply side of the equation had been determined without reference to, and before any attempt had been made to assess, the likely demand for skilled manpower. The report of the 1976 ILO mission had recommended the restriction of junior secondary education "in the light of the manpower needs of the nation" and to avoid the "economic and social repercussions" which would be caused by
"high unemployment among educated persons" (5). The ODA survey was carried out within limits set by an already established Swazi policy for continued expansion at this level. The warning in Skills for the Future that the majority of junior secondary school leavers would be unemployed, and its recommendations for vocationalisation adapted to the needs of a subsistence economy and the development of rural areas were made within these limits.

Proposals in Current Trends and Skills for the Future for the development of senior secondary education to be limited according to manpower requirements and financial constraints ran counter to strong and persistent political and social pressures for rapid and continued expansion at this level. Preparedness to respond to these pressures was an inbuilt feature of the Swazi approach and it was hardly likely that Government would ever be seriously committed to a policy of restricted entry to high schools. There had been no attempt to implement earlier proposals for a cut back in the expansion of senior secondary education. Enrolment targets for 1976 and 1977 included in Current Trends and the Financial and Statistical Analysis, and which appeared to have been accepted by Government, had not been achieved, and planned entry into Form 4 had been exceeded by over 50 per cent in 1976 and 1977 (Table 14). The ODA survey had based its manpower supply estimates on these planned enrolments, and warned that the problem of unemployed secondary school leavers would become dramatically worse over the next few years. Skills for the Future pointed out (6) that annual Form 5 enrolments were currently some 600 higher than planned and that, if the trend continued, the surplus of educated manpower from senior secondary schools, and the number of unemployed Form 5 leavers, would be twice as high as estimated.

(b) The plan

The main features of the Swazi model of education were incorporated into the education plan along with the donor policies and priorities referred to in the previous chapter. A characteristic feature of the Swazi education plan was a lack of coherence and consistency, which stemmed very largely from the attempt to include within it two contrasting approaches to education. At times, the two approaches appeared to be accommodated one within the other. At
others, they existed separately, side by side, as competing and contradictory policies.

The opening sentence of the preamble to the education plan was a restatement and reaffirmation of the basic principle in the Manifesto: "It is the right of every child to have access to education and to receive an education geared to his own needs". At the same time, "in a developing country such as Swaziland", the nation's limited resources "must be applied for the realisation of national goals" (7). The Manifesto's second principle, that education must be work oriented, and its emphasis on the need to break with the colonial past, were also incorporated into the preamble. The "traditional scholastic model" had for some time been "inappropriate for Swaziland", and what was needed was the re-orientation of the education system "towards practical rather than academic pursuits". This proposal was linked with the education for rural development strategy through reference to the need to relate training in practical skills to the demands of a subsistence economy and a rural environment (8).

The education plan followed the NEC report in that its major development objective was "to cope with the strong and diversified demand for education" (9), which was strongest and most insistent at the senior secondary level. At the same time, as proposed in Current Trends and Skills for the Future, it was necessary to restrict the development of senior secondary education according to manpower requirements and financial constraints. The plan gave no indication what these manpower requirements and financial constraints were likely to be, though these were available in Skills for the Future and the Financial and Statistical Analysis. The implications of a policy of restricted entry to high schools were not spelled out in terms of Form 4 and 5 places available over the plan period, and separate enrolment targets for junior and senior secondary education were not included in the plan, though these had been provided in Current Trends and the Financial and Statistical Analysis (Tables 13 and 14) and used in the ODA manpower survey.

Government was never seriously committed to the idea that the development of senior secondary education should be determined by
financial constraints and according to manpower requirements. The education plan accommodated donor insistence on limiting development at this level by invoking the Manifesto's criteria of "merit and aptitude" for entry to secondary education (10). It proposed "to restrict entry to senior secondary schools to holders of first and second class passes in the Junior Certificate Examination, subject to a decision by the Council of Ministers" (11). This meant in effect that the matter would be referred to the king at Lobamba, and decided according to the principles in the Manifesto and the recommendations in the NEC report.

Swaziland's over-all development objectives, outlined in Chapter 3 of the national development plan (12), were economic growth, self-reliance, and social justice and stability. While these objectives could be seen from a donor perspective as fitting with the education for rural development strategy, they were shaped by Swazi rather than donor considerations. Education, as a social service, had a part to play in social justice and stability through increased and more widely spread provision. It would contribute to self-reliance through the production of educated manpower to support "a vigorous localisation policy in the private and public sectors". It was in this sense, as Chapter 3 made clear, that education and training programmes would be "tailored to the manpower needs of the nation" (13), and it was in this sense that the plan followed the policy in the Manifesto for transferring economic as well as political power "to the rightful owners - the Swazis" (14).

Neither education nor manpower requirements were referred to in the context of economic growth, which was seen exclusively in terms of increased agricultural and industrial production in the modern sector. There was no reference to the part that education might be expected to play in the transformation of the traditional rural economy. Rural development was seen in terms of the commercialisation of traditional farming in the RDAs, and the wider spreading of social services financed by modern sector economic growth. The plan's manpower strategy, outlined in Chapter 5, was based on the report of the ODA survey. It proposed a re-structuring of the education system to meet the manpower requirements of the country, but it made no reference to
recommendations in the ODA report, or to proposals in the education chapter of the plan, for education and training to be geared to the needs of a subsistence economy and the development of rural areas.

(c) Aid for education

There were in effect two education plans, drawn up according to different assumptions, and shaped by conflicting approaches to education. The first, as indicated in the previous chapter, was conditioned by the availability of aid for education and the inclusion of donor policies and priorities. The second was shaped by the Swazi model of education and the need, for obvious political reasons, to reaffirm the policies and priorities set out in the Manifesto and the NEC report.

Government was well aware that the provision of aid was linked with the preparation of a national development plan. Development plans before independence had been closely tied to the disbursement of aid from Britain (15). The 1969 Post Independence Development Plan had been drawn up in the expectation of aid from Britain and a variety of other donors. The Prime Minister had acknowledged in the 1969 plan that "to successfully carry out the country's investment and development programme Government needs external aid" (16), and had made it clear in the second development plan that "we do expect and hope that our friends will continue to help us" (17). In the same way, the University Council acknowledged the support of donor agencies in the past "with both capital and technical assistance". It was "of concern" that "the commitment of donors in the past to support higher level education should continue", and the 1976 university development plan had "been written with this aim in mind" (18).

From a Swazi perspective the preparation of the education plan was largely conditioned by and geared to the production of an official document that would fit donor requirements, and which could be used by the various donor agencies to support proposals for projects in the education sector. The incorporation of donor policies and priorities into the education plan did not necessarily imply a Swazi commitment, or indicate that Government had any
serious intention of trying to implement them. The education plan was not accorded the same status as a policy document as the Manifesto and the NEC report. It was regarded as an expatriate rather than a Swazi document, and there was a sense in which it was 'written by expatriates for expatriates'.

Government might be prepared to provide a token demonstration of commitment to donor policies and priorities, but it was not prepared to compromise the Swazi model of education. It insisted on the incorporation into the education plan of Swazi policies and priorities and, on one of the very rare occasions on which the plan was referred to, it was described as a continuation and confirmation of the Swazi policies in the Manifesto and the NEC report (19). Whatever the plan's declared intentions and objectives might appear to be from a donor perspective, from a Swazi perspective national policy for the development of secondary education rested squarely on the principle of education as an inalienable right and acceptance of Government's responsibility to make education available to all who wanted it, according to their needs.

Educational planning

Government might be prepared to accept assistance in educational planning to comply with requirements for aid and under pressure from donors, but it was never fully committed to the donor approach or the need to develop a national capacity for educational planning. Documentation prepared by donor agencies (20) and with donor assistance (21) made it clear that, in spite of persistent donor pressures, there was no attempt to establish an educational planning section in the Ministry of Education with its own structures and clearly defined functions and responsibilities. The establishment and operation of educational planning depended on donor assistance, and the UNESCO project was, for all practical purposes, the ministry educational planning section. When the project ceased to be operational in 1978 and 1979, educational planning virtually disappeared (22). When the project was operational, there were delays in establishing and filling 'counterpart' posts, changes in personnel, and a marked reluctance on the part of the ministry to arrange that national staff attached to the project were engaged in planning activities (23).
The ministry regarded educational planning, whether carried out by donor 'experts' or national staff, as an imported, expatriate activity, a technical enterprise concerned almost exclusively with the collection of information on the education system and the preparation of statistical tables and enrolment projections (24). The Swazi view of educational planning and the donor tendency for self contained package projects combined to create the impression that expatriate staff constituted, almost by definition, a small technocratic elite, distanced by their status as 'advisers' and the nature of their work from other activities in the ministry, and insulated against the ordinary rough and tumble of what was happening in the education system (25).

At the same time, there was a tendency to regard 'advisers' as operational within the ministry (26), and subject to its administrative procedures. Project documentation (27) indicated that 'experts' carried out routine administrative and management tasks, and they were expected, as and when the need arose, to involve themselves in activities in addition to, and in some instances instead of, those generally accepted as educational planning activities. Awareness of inadequacies in Swazi administration linked with professional concern that things were not being done and needed to be done made these pressures difficult to resist. Project efforts to provide educational planning with over-all management and direction, and to identify and implement operational priorities, were restricted by the ministry's lack of commitment to what it regarded as an expatriate activity, the absorptive capacity of its ad hoc structures and procedures, and a tendency to expect 'experts' and national staff to take on a variety of extraneous tasks which directed time and effort away from fundamental planning activities (28).

Swazi acceptance of the need for educational planning was a more or less mechanical reaction to donor requirements and donor pressures, and the application of international models of educational planning played little part in policy formulation and plan preparation. As already indicated, Government made little use of the manpower analysis prepared by ODA 'experts'. There was no attempt to supplement the ODA survey by "smaller, more selective studies" as recommended in Skills for the Future (29), or to seek further assistance in preparation for the fourth
development plan. Technical information made available by UNESCO 'experts' in Current Trends and the Financial and Statistical Analysis played little part in the preparation of the education plan, and Government avoided the problems of resource allocation and ranking of priorities raised by analysis of the plan's financial implications.

The incorporation of donor proposals for improved planning and management into official Government publications was little more than a token demonstration, and did not indicate any serious intention of trying to implement them. A Guide to School Regulations and Procedures was published by the Ministry of Education and distributed to schools. These regulations and procedures were rarely, if ever, referred to, the ministry made no attempt to enforce them, and they were regularly ignored by schools. Nor was there any attempt to implement detailed and comprehensive recommendations, made in donor reports and reiterated in the 1981 sector review, for the rationalisation of the budget process and the more effective administration and control of school fees. The UNESCO report on educational financing (30) noted that "both Government and local communities seem to be willing to maintain as much as possible the principles of free decisions by the schools". The only attempt by the ministry to intervene in the school fees system was a proposal for the standardisation of school uniform (31), and this was quickly shelved following representations from local communities to the king at Lobamba.

There was little room in the Swazi approach for donor notions of intervention and control. As indicated in chapter 7, the ministry's inability to provide effective management and supervision of secondary education was linked with its reluctance to intervene directly or to assume responsibility for what happened in secondary schools. Donor proposals which were critical of existing Swazi practice, which conflicted with the Swazi way of doing things, and which might have political and social repercussions stood little chance of being implemented, however rational they might appear from a donor perspective, and however much pressure was brought to bear by the various donor agencies. In spite of donor pressures and exhortation, there was no attempt to implement the donor proposals for more effective management and supervision,
and increased ministry control of secondary education, which are referred to in chapter 8 and which appeared to be endorsed by incorporation into official documentation.

On the one occasion donor influence resulted in direct intervention in secondary education the effect was shortlived. Donor pressure for a more rational and efficient approach to educational expenditure, brought to bear through 'experts' in the three central agencies and supported by analytical surveys prepared by the UNESCO planning project, led to unqualified teachers employed on temporary terms and extra to requirements being taken off the Ministry of Education salary roll in December 1982. After representations to the king at the royal kraal, they were reinstated in January 1983. Almost immediately, without any supporting evidence or argument, the ministry proposed, and the central agencies accepted, further increases in the number of teachers required in the secondary school system (32).

As indicated in chapter 7, the ministry's non-interventionist approach was linked with the nature of the traditional political process. Within the Swazi context there was no room for the idea, as expressed by Eide (33), that educational planning "must primarily be conceived as a function of informative criticism, continuously involved in a critical analysis of current practices, procedures and policies". The function of educational planning was to support and justify existing Swazi policy and practice, not to draw attention to problem areas and make proposals for change. The ways in which the ministry sought to make use of donor expertise in educational planning were conditioned by donor requirements and donor pressures on the one hand, and on the other by Swazi expectations and Swazi pressures. 'Experts' found themselves being pushed towards a situation in which their main function, as far as the ministry was concerned, appeared to be that of providing senior officials with appropriate information, selective analysis and supporting argument to explain and legitimate existing policy and practice, and to justify ready made decisions taken without reference to the technical information and critical analysis made available by the planning project.

Documentation drawn up with advice and assistance from the UNESCO
planning project was expected to support and legitimate Swazi policy in donor terms. Policies for the continued expansion of secondary education were presented in terms of 'universal basic education' (34), and as an 'alternative strategy' for consolidation and re-orientation (35). A school mapping exercise (36) was intended to provide technical corroboration for policy decisions that had already been taken in response to political and social pressures for more secondary school places. The planning project was also expected to justify existing Swazi practices and procedures in the light of donor pressures for the more systematic and efficient management of secondary education. At various times, documentation prepared with project advice and assistance (37) attempted to explain the continuing employment of unqualified teachers on the grounds of subject shortages and reduced costs, and to justify over staffing and ministry over expenditure in terms of the demand for secondary education, the lack of alternative educational opportunities, and the need to update the Establishment Register.

At the same time, the ministry tended to regard the planning project as a sort of public relations office which could provide, as and when the need arose, the necessary justification and supporting argument to vindicate existing policy and practice in terms of Swazi pressures and Swazi expectations. Donor 'experts' assisted in drafting speeches and press releases (38) in which senior ministry officials outlined the progress made since independence in making secondary education more widely available; explained, and where necessary adjusted, policy and practice on entry to secondary schools, repeating, school uniform, and so on; and attempted to justify existing policy and practice in the face of disappointment and concern over issues such as COSC examination results, teachers' conditions of service, and school discipline.

Statistical information and analytical surveys prepared by the UNESCO planning project and other donor 'experts' were rarely, if ever, used as a basis for decisions relating to the formulation and implementation of educational policy. As indicated in chapter 7, the briefly inherited traditions of a Western style administration had largely broken down and been replaced by a more traditional Swazi way of doing things. Technical knowledge played little part
in the Swazi approach, which relied on a common oral tradition for the taking and communication of decisions, and which left ample room for Swazi manoeuvre and adjustment.

The nature of the decision making process was shaped by the strength of traditional political authority and the persistence of Swazi law and custom, and conditioned by reference to a deeply rooted set of obligations based on kinship, clan, and lineage. A common tradition shaped a Swazi network of power and patronage and allegiance and obligation, not readily accessible to donors and their 'experts', and which severely limited their room for manoeuvre in attempts to bring pressure to bear in educational decision making, and precluded the possibility of playing off one part of the Swazi system against another.

It was not just that the colonial legacy of a Western style administration had largely broken down. It had never worked in the way it was intended. The real political power in Swaziland was vested in the king, and the modern system of government was an extension of and subordinate to his traditional powers as king of the Swazi Nation. Decisions on educational matters, as on everything else, were taken by the king, or with reference to his wishes and subject to his approval. On rare occasions when decisions taken in the name of central government conflicted with Swazi interests and expectations, they were quickly reversed after representations to the king through traditional channels.

Educational planning operated within the modern system of government, but what happened in the planning and development of education in Swaziland was largely shaped by traditional forms of decision making that existed separately and worked independently from those ostensibly adopted by Government and recognised by donors and their 'experts'. The operation of Swazi traditional institutions and processes provided a single, all encompassing frame of reference, from which donors and their 'experts' were excluded.

The persistence of the Swazi way of doing things placed donors at a disadvantage in aid negotiations, and Swazi resistance to donor pressures strengthened over the plan period. Delays in aid negotiations on the Swazi side became more protracted, assurances
of support to monitoring and evaluation missions more perfunctory with little relationship to what was happening or what was likely to happen, and what appeared to be official acceptance of the 1981 sector review was followed by serious reservations about its findings and recommendations when they were used to support proposals for new aid projects. Government preparedness for the UNESCO planning project to be largely involved in aid negotiations (39) was a way of distancing Swazi priorities from the donor view of 'what was best' for Swaziland, and proposals arising out of these negotiations were rarely if ever seriously taken up on the Swazi side. Lack of Swazi commitment and support for existing projects became more noticeable, which (as already noted) led some agencies to withdraw funding from aid projects.

Project implementation

Chapter 8 has described how the implementation of aid projects was restricted by limitations in planning and administration on the donor side. The account that follows examines the ways in which implementation was restricted and the influence aid for education was intended to exert was largely neutralised by the Swazi approach to secondary education, the Swazi response to donor intervention, and the nature of Swazi popular expectations for secondary education. It focuses on three areas: diversification of the junior secondary curriculum, non-formal education and training programmes, and vocational training at SCOT. It concludes with a brief reference to the distinctive combination of Swazi characteristics that strengthened Swazi resistance to donor intervention.

(a) Diversification

Government's major policy concern was to cater for popular pressures for the continued expansion of the existing system of secondary education. While it was prepared to accept World Bank assistance for new schools to support the expansion of secondary education, it was never fully committed to the policy of curriculum diversification and vocationalisation that was part of the SPED package. Aid projects for the diversification of the junior secondary curriculum were accepted under pressure from the Bank and other donor agencies, and as conditions attached by the Bank to the
provision of physical facilities necessary for continued expansion. Attempts at diversification depended almost entirely on donor initiative and donor effort. In spite of official rhetoric in support of the principle in the Manifesto that education should be work oriented, Government provided little in the way of administrative or professional support, adequate funding, or national staff for aid projects designed to develop the teaching of practical subjects.

There was no section in the Ministry of Education with over-all responsibility for curriculum development and/or teacher training. Project documentation (40) and documentation prepared with donor assistance (41) commented on the virtually complete lack of co-ordination between the various curriculum development and teacher training programmes, and made it clear that the ministry provided little in the way of administrative and professional support for aid projects, or for Swazi programmes, in these areas. Donor proposals for the establishment of appropriate structures and procedures for improved planning and management of curriculum development and teacher training were largely disregarded, and attempts by the UNESCO planning project to provide some form of co-ordination were not encouraged.

Curriculum development depended almost entirely on donor effort and donor support. In spite of pressures from the various agencies, the ministry made little attempt to provide the support envisaged in joint agreements, or to co-ordinate the activities parcellled out between the SCU, the schools agriculture project, and 'experts' in the ministry and at William Pitcher though these activities were ostensibly directed towards the development of a junior secondary curriculum. Little was achieved during the plan period in the development of a practically oriented junior secondary curriculum. A member of the Swazi Parliament, who had retired as a Senior Inspector of Schools, regarded the ministry's lack of support for curriculum development projects and its lack of any attempt to co-ordinate their efforts as "evidence beyond a vestige of a doubt that curriculum development work is not taken seriously yet" (42).

As noted in chapter 6, secondary teacher training was spread across
a variety of institutions administered by different Swazi agencies. The ministry provided limited support for the training of general subjects teachers at William Pitcher. Aid projects for the training of teachers of Agriculture and Home Economics at Luyengo and of technical and commercial subjects at SCOT were outside its immediate jurisdiction, and contact between these projects and the ministry was virtually non-existent. These projects received little support from the university on one hand or the Deputy Prime Minister's Office on the other, and the Faculty of Agriculture and SCOT were more concerned with the administration of their own courses than with providing support for donor projects which were largely separate from their main concerns.

Project documentation (43) and Ministry of Education annual reports (44) indicated that, in spite of joint agreements and persistent donor pressures, there were continuing problems in the provision of 'counterparts' and the utilisation of project-related training. There were lengthy delays in establishing 'counterpart' posts, further delays in making appointments to the few posts that were established, unexplained changes in personnel, and temporary makeshift arrangements in preparation for monitoring and evaluation missions sent out by the various donor agencies. There were delays in identifying suitable candidates for overseas training, and in making them available. In a number of instances, when candidates had been selected and had received overseas training, they were appointed to duties unrelated to the training they had undergone and outside the projects donors expected them to work in. In some instances, they left the ministry for more attractive posts elsewhere. When 'counterparts' were attached to donor projects, the ministry expected them to carry out a variety of tasks which had little if anything to do with project activities and project outputs.

As a result, the implementation of aid projects depended upon the continued availability of 'experts' and their preparedness to take on operational tasks rather than the advisory roles specified in most joint agreements. Projects lost the local character they were intended to have, as well as the institution building aims they set out to achieve (45). The Swazi approach kept aid projects
apart from each other and from other activities in the ministry and the education system as a whole, neutralising any real possibility of effective donor collaboration and co-ordination. Project activities were regarded very largely as expatriate activities, carried out by foreign 'experts' in a variety of self contained projects funded by and identified with different donor agencies. Within the Swazi context, diversification was an imported activity, largely separate from Swazi aspirations for secondary education. Government provided little support during project implementation and, when donor funding and expatriate personnel were withdrawn, it made no effort to take over responsibility for what were regarded as donor programmes.

The key post of Senior Inspector of Schools (Technical) was established as a result of donor pressure, and filled by donor 'experts' provided in the first instance by ODA, and, after a gap of over a year with no one in post, by SIDA/UNESCO. When there was an 'expert' in post, efforts to develop technical subjects in secondary schools were frustrated by lack of support and the absorptive capacity of the ministry's ad hoc structures and procedures. The SIS (Technical) was expected to be responsible for both technical and commercial subjects in secondary schools, for some aspects of non-formal training (though these were never clearly specified), and for art and craft in primary schools, as well as undertaking routine administrative duties and various extraneous tasks, as when the need arose (46). There was no regular contact between the ministry and the SCU, and (as already noted) contact with the ODA teacher training programmes at SCOT was virtually non existent. Any attempt at co-operation between the SIS (Technical) and other programmes and activities in the same area tended to be informal and spasmodic.

Reports and surveys (47) referred to the funding of technical and commercial subjects as unplanned and unrealistic, and to the way in which lack of administrative and professional support precluded any real possibility of effective management and supervision. SPED continued to provide plant and equipment but shortages of trained teachers, and the inefficient utilisation of available staff, meant that in a number of schools workshops remained unopened and equipment unused, while in other schools trained teachers coped as best they could with inadequate plant and equipment. Teacher
training programmes were described as inadequate, and curricula for secondary schools and teacher training programmes as in need of a complete overhaul. A final report prepared by the SIDA/UNESCO 'expert' working as SIS (Technical) noted that ministry reluctance to provide adequate support raised doubts as to the seriousness of its commitment to the development of technical and commercial subjects, and curriculum diversification in general (48).

What was achieved in attempts at diversification was largely the work of the ODA schools agriculture project, supported during the plan period by the SIDA/FAO teacher training project. SAP started in 1973, and project documentation (49) indicated that ten years later it still relied almost entirely on expatriates in fully operational roles to staff its 15 professional, administrative, and support posts. It had established its own organisational structure within the ministry and operated very largely, in Damiba's phrase (50), as "a state within the state". By 1978 it had developed a junior secondary curriculum for agriculture, and by 1982 a new COSC Agriculture syllabus in conjunction with the Cambridge Examinations Syndicate. By the end of the plan period the necessary facilities, staff, and administrative and professional support had been provided for the teaching of Agriculture in nearly two thirds of Swaziland's secondary schools (51). The results achieved by SAP derived from its long term involvement in the development of the teaching of Agriculture in Swaziland, its operational rather than advisory approach, and its operation as a self contained, administration proof project.

However effectively implemented in donor terms, and however well insulated against the Swazi approach donor projects might appear to be, attempts at diversification through SAP and other aid projects were largely neutralised by popular expectations for secondary education and the ministry's reluctance to intervene in what happened in secondary schools. Strong and insistent popular pressures were directed towards rapid linear expansion of the existing system of secondary education. As noted in chapter 7, the operation of a school fee system, and the independence it afforded to secondary schools, enabled parents and communities to bring direct pressure to bear in resisting attempts at diversification
and, in spite of donor efforts, the junior secondary curriculum continued to reflect popular demand for the formal academic system of secondary education. The ministry was not prepared to insist on curricular guidelines for secondary schools and, in spite of determined and sustained efforts by SAP, development of the teaching of Agriculture, along with other practical subjects, was not taken seriously in most secondary schools (52). More often than not, very small numbers of pupils were ineffectively taught for a minimal amount of time (53).

In the early years of the plan period, donors tended to regard lack of Swazi support for aid projects largely in terms of weaknesses in Swazi planning and management and shortages of suitably qualified Swazi manpower (54), and this was reflected in their preference for self contained package projects and their reliance on expatriate personnel. The basic weakness in this approach, as indicated in chapter 8, was that the conditions intended to ensure effective project implementation also tended to ensure that the activity for which the project was responsible would come to an end when donor support was withdrawn. As already noted, a basic lack of Swazi commitment to donor policies meant lack of support for projects designed to implement them and, when a donor project came to an end, the programme it had established and for which it had assumed responsibility came to an end.

Towards the end of the plan period, some donors, disillusioned by lack of Government commitment to project objectives and lack of support for project implementation, withdrew their support. The SIDA/UNESCO secondary curriculum project came to an end in 1982; the SIDA/FAO teacher training project at Luyengo and the ODA teacher training project at SCOT came to an end in 1983. The end of these projects meant the end, for all practical purposes, of the secondary curriculum unit and of training programmes for teachers of practical subjects for junior secondary schools. There was every indication that the eventual withdrawal of ODA support for the schools agriculture project would mean the end of any sustained effort to develop the teaching of Agriculture in secondary schools, and with the withdrawal of donor support.
for diversification the secondary education system would quickly return to normality.

(b) Non-formal education and training

The Ministry of Education had no previous experience of non-formal education and training, and there was no section in the ministry with over-all responsibility for non-formal education and training programmes. The post of SIS (Adult Education), established in the first place through donor pressure to accommodate a CIDA 'expert', was an ad hoc arrangement with the SIS working out of headquarters and in theory reporting to the Chief Inspector Secondary. Responsibility for various aspects of non-formal education and training was ostensibly shared out between the SIS (Adult Education), the SIS (Technical), and the schools agriculture project. These areas of responsibility were never clearly defined, and there was considerable overlap and confusion.

It was never quite clear exactly where responsibility for the development of rural education centres was supposed to lie. Reports on the RECs (55) made it clear that their operation was severely limited by inadequate funding, a lack of administrative and supervisory support, and the fact that there was no official establishment for staffing them. Throughout the plan period, the task of initiating and organising community support and participation, and of developing and teaching REC courses, was undertaken almost entirely by Peace Corps volunteers on two year contracts. Their task was made more difficult by a lack of support from the junior secondary schools to which RECs were attached. Headmasters regarded RECs as separate programmes for which they had little or no responsibility. They were unwilling to arrange school timetables to accommodate REC classes or to allow RECs to make use of school facilities and equipment (56).

As noted in chapter 8, the REC project was thrust upon Government as part of an offer it could hardly refuse. Discussions with senior officials left little doubt that from the Swazi side acceptance of the project had been regarded as the price to be paid for World Bank assistance in the building of new secondary schools, and that from the beginning Government had no serious intention of using junior secondary schools as RECs, of developing
non-formal education and training programmes, or of providing support for donor efforts in this area. The fact that the REC project never got off the ground can be traced to a basic lack of commitment on the part of Government, and lack of support from those for whom the RECs were intended.

The expected local community support for RECs did not materialise. Ministry of Education annual reports (57) and a report prepared for the World Bank (58) made it clear that Form 3 leavers and drop outs from junior secondary schools showed no interest in RECs and made no use of them. Nor did RECs attract many adult learners. It had been anticipated in the joint agreement drawn up by the World Bank that each REC would cater for around 1,000 adult learners a year. It was estimated that "in 1979 and 1980 there were only 688 participants in all RECs together". Roughly three quarters of these were women, nearly all enrolled in sewing, knitting, and cookery courses. By 1981 one REC was no longer operating, there were no enrolment figures available from a second, a third had 20 adult learners, and a fourth had 32. The RECs were not used by other ministries and other agencies and they had not become community resource centres as envisaged in the Bank's joint agreement. In negotiations for the fourth phase of SPED the fact that the RECs were not working strengthened Swazi resistance to a proposed extension of the REC project. In 1983 the Bank agreed to temporarily shelve plans for the establishment of additional RECs pending the findings of a further evaluation report.

Other attempts to provide non-formal education and training programmes owed little to Ministry of Education initiative or support. The Emlalatini Development Centre (established and supported until 1978 by DANIDA) was inadequately funded and inadequately staffed (59) and relied heavily on a small nucleus of staff on local expatriate contracts. The EDC vocational training programme (established by DANIDA) was taken over by a single Peace Corps volunteer, and had to be "virtually self supporting" (60). The establishment and continued operation of non-formal training programmes at the School of Appropriate Farm Technology and the Salesian Industrial Training Centre depended almost entirely on voluntary agency initiative and the
availability of mission, local expatriate, and volunteer staff (61).

(c) Vocational training at SCOT

Similar conflict between Swazi and donor policy priorities, and a similar lack of Swazi commitment and a preparedness to make use of aid for purposes other than those for which it was intended, characterised the development of vocational training at SCOT. The development of SCOT ran counter to proposals for a cut back in technician training, the expansion of craft and commercial training, and the more efficient use of resources made in Skills for the Future (and incorporated into Chapter 5 of the development plan). SCOT expanded its technician courses and cut back its craft and commercial courses to about half the level they had been in 1976 (62), which had been the baseline for these proposals. Documentation prepared by donor agencies (63) and with donor assistance (64) commented on the under utilisation of facilities and teaching staff, and pointed out that facilities provided through SPED and intended for craft training were being used to expand technician training. Proposals for the more efficient use of resources and for the need to expand craft and commercial training were largely disregarded.

Donor proposals for the expansion of craft and commercial training at SCOT had been seen as part of a broader strategy which included the establishment of district vocational training centres geared to local needs. Although donors demonstrated a continuing interest in providing support for vocational training, no VTCs were established during the plan period. Aid negotiations were hampered by conflicting donor and Swazi views on the type of institutions that were needed. Donors were not prepared to support Government proposals for the establishment of a large "institute of crafts and technology, similar to SCOT", which Government claimed would "ease the burden on the present Swaziland College of Technology" (65). Government, in turn, showed little interest in donor proposals for one year training programmes in small centres geared to the production of skilled craftsmen and clerical workers (66), and even less in proposals for low cost vocational centres, run along self help lines, which would provide
craft training geared to the needs of rural areas (67).

(d) Swazi resistance

Like everything else in Swaziland, the strength of Swazi resistance to donor intervention, and the marked degree of protection this afforded the Swazi model of education, was conditioned by the functioning of a powerful traditional monarchy, the persistence of Swazi traditional forms, and the prevailing Swazi view of the particularity and autonomy of the Swazi Nation. What sets Swaziland apart from other African countries is the combination of distinctive Swazi characteristics that made for the conservation and consolidation of Swazi traditional structures and processes, and which enabled it to safeguard a remarkably homogeneous traditional system which had broken down elsewhere in Africa. Chapter 5 has referred to the historical and geographical factors which played a part in shaping this process, including a colonial administration that left Swazi traditional structures virtually intact and fixed Swaziland's boundaries to enclose a single group of people with a common language and a common tradition. The power and influence of South African interests in the region also played a part in the fixing of Swaziland's boundaries.

Chapter 5 has described the ways in which the Swazi economy is closely interlinked with and heavily dependent upon the economy of South Africa, and the part played by South African capital and South African interests in the development of the modern sector of the Swazi economy. Economic dependence and close political ties with South Africa (along with its geographical position and the remarkable homogeneity of its people) insulated Swaziland from the variety of post colonial influences that shaped events in many other African countries. Swaziland was provided with a form of security within which Swazi traditional institutions and customs retained their symbolic and practical significance, and a traditional monarchy was enabled to maintain and expand its political power and establish itself within the modern economy through alliances with South African capital and South African interests. Over-all dependence on South Africa protected the Swazi traditional system, and gave it a marked degree of autonomy in dealing with pressures brought to bear by the various donor agencies.
The issue of dependence on South Africa is taken up in the next chapter in relation to the limited part played by secondary education and training in the process of economic and social change during the implementation of Swaziland's third education plan. The account of plan implementation starts with description of Government's preparedness to respond to popular pressures for the expansion of secondary education.

Footnotes


7 Third National Development Plan, p 181.

8 Third National Development Plan, p 181.

9 Third National Development Plan, p 193.

10 Imbokodvo Manifesto, 1972, p 27.

11 Third National Development Plan, p 197.

12 Third National Development Plan, pp 33-35.

13 Third National Development Plan, p 34.

14 Imbokodvo Manifesto, 1972, p 15.

15 Post Independence Development Plan, 1969, pp 1, 3.


18 University of Botswana and Swaziland Development Plan 1976/7-1986/7, p 5.


25 See also King K Aid Responses to Education Priorities, 1984, pp 12-13.

26 See also Clifton-Everest I Aid to Education in Africa, 1984, p 60.


31 Dlamini S Ministry of Education Policy Statement by the Hon.


38 See, for example, Swazi Observer Universal Primary Education Achievement, 1981 and Nsibande M J The Friday Interview, 1982.


42 Mokgokong S The Friday Interview, 1982.


53 See Ministry of Education The Expansion of Secondary Education,


58 Townsend-Coles E K Report on the Rural Education Centres of Swaziland, pp 4, 7, 15, Appendix 3 Table 1.


65 Deputy Prime Minister's Office Times of Swaziland, 18 June 1982, p 3.


This chapter describes the implementation of Swaziland's third education plan in terms of the development of secondary education, and the limited role that this development played in the process of economic and social change. Reference to chapter 4 and to this chapter indicates a number of broad similarities between conditions in Swaziland and in other African countries, but the account which follows focuses on the particularity of the Swazi context and the distinctive combination of Swazi characteristics referred to in chapter 5.

The development of secondary education, described in section 1, was shaped by the Swazi model of education, not by donor views of 'what was best' for Swaziland. The persistence of the Swazi approach and the pragmatic nature of the Swazi response to donor intervention precluded any possibility that donor policies incorporated into the education plan would be implemented in the way intended by the various donor agencies involved in the planning and development of secondary education in Swaziland.

Had it been possible to implement donor policies, there was little if any chance that the development of secondary education would have brought about the kind of economic and social change envisaged in the international aid approach. Section 2 indicates that Swazi economic and social structures were shaped by the vested interests of the Swazi monarchy, the operation of the mainly South African, foreign companies that dominated and largely controlled the modern sector of the Swazi economy, and Swaziland's over-all dependence on the economy of South Africa. The development of secondary education and training played little part in this process.

There was no slackening in the private demand for secondary education, in spite of growing numbers of jobless secondary school leavers. Section 3 describes the persistence of popular pressures for the expansion of secondary education, the conflict between Swazi and international approaches to secondary education, and the continuing dominance of the Swazi model of education.
The Permanent Secretary for Education made it clear in a speech in 1981 that the development of education was guided by the fundamental principle enshrined in the Manifesto:

"We believe that education is an inalienable right of every child, and every citizen of Swaziland should receive education up to the limit of his and her capabilities. We have, therefore, expanded our education facilities to meet this demand" (1).

As already indicated, this demand was strongest and most insistent for expansion of the existing system of formal secondary education, and in particular senior secondary education.

The development of secondary education during the plan period was an ad hoc affair, shaped by popular pressures for rapid and continued expansion and Government's preparedness to respond to these pressures in attempts to 'make education available to all who wanted it'. Swaziland had adopted what was virtually an open access approach not only for junior secondary (as in a number of other African countries) but also for senior secondary education, and had made more progress towards open access secondary education, and maintained this progress for longer, than in many African countries. As already noted, diversification and the development of non-formal education and training programmes were not major policy concerns, and what limited progress was made in these areas depended on donor and voluntary agency initiative and support.

Every year, around 75 per cent of those pupils who entered for the Primary Certificate Examination obtained a first, second, or third class pass (Table 5) and expected to continue into junior secondary school. Every effort was made to provide sufficient places, when necessary by last minute, makeshift arrangements. In 1980, for example, the Ministry of Education, in response to popular pressures, provided 560 additional Form I places by announcing, well after the start of the school year, that 14 junior secondary schools would take in an extra stream (2).

For the few who passed the PCE and for one reason and another did not find places in Form I, and for a considerable number of those who failed, there was always the chance to repeat the last year
of primary school and try again. Repetition was an inbuilt feature of the Swazi approach, supported and encouraged by verbal directives from politicians and senior ministry officials. In a press interview the Deputy Minister for Education insisted that "children who had failed should be given a second chance to study and sit for examinations at the very schools they had attended last year" (3). The continuation rate from primary to junior secondary was over 70 per cent a year, and it was estimated that education was being made available to over 85 per cent of those who completed the last year of primary school either by entry to Form I or through repetition of Grade 7 (Table 6).

Junior secondary education was not regarded as terminal for the vast majority of its participants, as recommended in donor proposals. Government made no attempt to restrict entry to high schools in line with manpower requirements or according to financial constraints. Nor was there any attempt to ration access to senior secondary education based on assessment of ability as indicated by a class 1 or 2 pass in the Junior Certificate Examination. The only limits to the development of senior secondary education were the extent of social and political pressures for expansion and Government's ability to make education available.

Every year demand and expectation were reflected and added to by verbal directives from the Ministry of Education urging headmasters to find places in Form 4 for as many class 3 passes as possible. Every year direct pressure was brought to bear on headmasters by parents and local communities, politicians, Government officials, local chiefs and others with influence in the traditional hierarchy. As Dlamini pointed out in a study of 'shortages and surpluses of educated manpower' in Swaziland (4), these pressures were extremely difficult for headmasters to resist. The 1979 sector review (5) described a situation in which, in the absence of "fair and clear criteria for selection", entry to senior secondary education had become "a continuing battleground from one year to the next".

It was as a battle that was being won by those with class 3 passes in the JCE. Over the plan period the continuation rate from junior secondary to high school increased from 52 to 63 per cent,
and the proportion of class 3 passes gaining entry to high schools rose from 65 to 100 per cent. Of those who entered for the JCE in 1981, 22 per cent obtained a class 1 or 2 pass; 63 per cent of those who had entered found places in Form 4 in 1982. All those who had entered for the JCE in 1981 and obtained a class 3 pass found places in Form 4 in 1982 and they accounted for 64 per cent of the total new entry (Tables 16 and 17). Throughout the plan period, enrolment in senior secondary schools exceeded the targets set in the Financial and Statistical Analysis by more than 60 per cent (Table 14).

Every year Government found ways of providing additional high school places. In 1980, for example, the Ministry of Education in response to what it described as "the insistent demand for more senior secondary school places" provided an additional 360 Form 4 places (6). These places (like those in junior secondary schools) were made available by a ministry announcement, well after the start of the school year, that some high schools would admit an extra stream and a number of junior secondary schools would be upgraded. The ministry announced the provision of additional places, but it did not furnish schools with the facilities and equipment necessary to support this provision. In spite of World Bank effort through SPED and building programmes funded by local community effort, the development of secondary education, in junior secondary and high schools, was characterised by a shortage of school buildings and equipment, overcrowded classrooms, and a continuing and increasing shortage of teachers' houses (7). Numerically there was no shortage of teachers to meet this expansion, by (as indicated in chapter 7) a growing proportion were inadequately trained and inexperienced, the number of unqualified teachers increased over the plan period, and there were wide variations in the distribution of teachers and the quality of instruction across secondary schools.

The expansion of secondary education could be seen as contributing to the achievement of the third plan objective of social justice. Secondary education had been made available for more people in more parts of the country. It was more widely spread and more equitably spread. It continued to cater, in equal measure, for boys and girls. But inequalities between schools had persisted
and widened. Sgwane described a secondary school system characterised by glaring inequalities in the distribution of resources, significant variations in the quality of instruction, and wide differences in status and the market value of their qualifications between 'theoretically equal' schools.

From a donor perspective, the decline in educational standards noted in chapter 7 was associated with the rapid and uncontrolled expansion of secondary education, and the Ministry of Education's inadequate management structures and procedures. The ministry response to widespread Swazi concern over results in the COSC examination, as expressed by the Permanent Secretary and Minister for Education, was that performance in COSC was bound to decline in Swaziland and in other African countries which were trying to replace a pre-independence system of restricted education with a system of mass education. In a review of the education plan, the ministry claimed that an increase in the number of secondary school teachers, a reduction in the over-all pupil teacher ratio, and in particular an increase in the number and proportion of qualified Swazi teachers in secondary schools "should indicate a significant improvement in the quality of secondary education systematically throughout the plan period".

Disentangling the elements which had a bearing on the quality of education, even when measured simply in terms of examination results, was a more complex process than suggested in donor analysis and ministry assertion. Conditions associated with the qualitative erosion of secondary education were linked with rapid expansion and the ministry's lack of control over what happened in secondary schools. But the problem was not so much that the expansion of secondary education had outstripped the ministry's capacity for effective management and supervision, as suggested in donor analysis, as that the ministry had never assumed full responsibility for secondary education and was unlikely to make any determined effort to do so. As in the past, responsibility for what happened in secondary schools had to be taken on by the schools themselves. One result of expansion, as noted in chapter 7, was that most secondary schools were ill equipped to take on this responsibility.
The account of the Swazi approach to secondary education in chapter 7 provides no support for ministry expectations of significant improvement in the quality of secondary education. Analysis of COSC examination results and secondary school staffing carried out by the UNESCO planning project provided no hard evidence to support arguments that qualified Swazi teachers, unqualified teachers, or pupil teacher ratios were in themselves decisive factors in school performance in the COSC examination. What did emerge was that the half dozen or so schools that regularly achieved good results were the older, well established high schools with an experienced and competent headmaster, clearly defined organisational structures, a nucleus of experienced staff, adequate facilities, and the support of local communities.

Economic and social change

At (a) and (b) this section describes the development of the secondary education and training system in relation to donor policies to gear it to the production of manpower for the modern economy and for rural change and modernisation. At (c) it describes the limited progress made in implementing Swazi policy for localisation of the private sector.

(a) Manpower for development

The basic assumption made in Skills for the Future was that the demand for skilled manpower over the plan period would increase at the same rate as economic growth. Basing its economic forecast on 'likely developments and past trends', Government assumed that the rate of economic growth would continue, as it had done for the previous five years, at the comparatively rapid rate of an average of seven per cent a year (13). Skills for the Future warned that, even if this rate of economic growth was achieved, if the expansion of senior secondary education was cut back as envisaged in the Financial and Statistical Analysis, and if the private sector was completely localised, there would still be surpluses of educated Swazi manpower and a growing problem of unemployed secondary school leavers (14).

In 1982, the Department of Economic Planning estimated that the average growth rate in the economy over the first four years of
the plan period was just over 2 per cent a year (15). As noted in chapter 5, the Swazi economy was vulnerable to fluctuations in international commodity markets and natural setbacks. It was also vulnerable in so far as it was closely interlinked with and heavily dependent upon the economy of South Africa. The slowing down in economic development was largely caused by a fall in world prices for sugar, woodpulp, and citrus fruit on which the Swazi economy depended (for example, the Tibiyo run Simunye sugar complex made a net loss of over E15 million in its first 16 months of operation), and by the spill over effects of recession and inflation in South Africa (16). It was added to by a drought, which threatened the production of sugar and cotton crops, and a cholera epidemic, which had an adverse effect on an already declining tourist industry (17). By the end of the plan period, Swaziland was in the middle of an economic recession and the Deputy Minister for Finance warned that the country's "very serious economic and financial situation" was "likely to remain for a considerable period" (18).

The Department of Economic Planning estimated the creation of new jobs over the plan period at 2,400, as compared to the 4,000 anticipated in Skills for the Future and the third development plan. The creation of new jobs in industry fell well below expectations. Plantation agriculture, run by foreign companies and by Tibiyo, continued to opt for high mechanisation as against intensive wage employment at a time when 'experts' in the Department of Economic Planning were stressing the need for more labour intensive production as the "over-riding objective of all development programmes" (19).

The efforts made by NIDCS and its subsidiary SEDCO to attract foreign investment and to develop locally owned enterprises were limited by lack of planning and inadequate management, by the small size of the Swazi market and the more attractive incentives offered to investors in the South African homelands, by the intractable problem of having to compete with South African based industries, and by South African protectionist measures (20). In addition, NIDCS investment policy was heavily influenced by the vested interests of the king's foreign advisers, and it ran counter
to and took precedence over that officially endorsed by central government. Two thirds of total investment in new enterprises over the plan period was spent on buildings, most of it on the construction of three warehouses for a South African owned wholesale group (a Nathan Kirsh company), while plans for Swazi based tanning, vegetable processing, and textile industries were not implemented (21).

Matsebula, head of the Economics Department at UCS, argued that the slowing down in economic development coupled with an increase in the rate of population growth had led to a fall in living standards and a rise in urban unemployment (22). At the end of the plan period the Minister for Works, Power and Communications described "a continuing loss of jobs" through redundancies and lay offs, and warned that Swaziland was facing "a very bleak period of unemployment" as foreign owned companies retrenched, transferred their investment to the South African homelands, or went out of business (23). Changes in South Africa's migrant labour policy meant that the problem could no longer be exported as conveniently as in the past. As the Department of Economic Planning pointed out,

"the steady decline in the number of citizens working in the South African mines has further aggravated the problems of under-employment and unemployment in the economy" (24).

As already noted, there had been no attempt to cut back the expansion of senior secondary education. While the economy had not grown as fast as anticipated by Government, secondary education and in particular senior secondary education had expanded faster than envisaged in the Financial and Statistical Analysis and Skills for the Future. Although there had been some growth in employment opportunities during the plan period, there was a distinct and widening gap between the supply and demand for skilled manpower. It was estimated that the plateau of 'settled unemployment' of Form 3 leavers three years after leaving school had moved upwards from 12 per cent in 1976 to 23 per cent in 1978 (25); and that, in 1982, 59 per cent of Form 3 leavers and 65 per cent of Form 5 leavers were still unemployed five years after
leaving school (26). In 1983 the Prime Minister warned that unemployment was "rising so rapidly" that the problem was "reaching crisis proportions". The unemployment problem was "particularly critical among school leavers", and the indications were that it was "getting worse" (27).

At the same time, there was "still a substantial shortage of skilled manpower in the country, especially at the professional, semi-professional and artisan levels" (28). Reports prepared by donor agencies (29) and with donor assistance (30) described the development of vocational training in Swaziland as an ad hoc development, limited by weaknesses in management and organisation, and arising from "a vague response to assumed needs" rather than from a soundly based and well defined development plan geared to the production of the critical skills needed by the economy. The cut back in craft and commercial training at SCOT had left a gap that had not been filled, and SCOT itself appeared to be trying to achieve a level and standards unrelated to the country's needs. Planned output from SCOT ran counter to the manpower requirements in Skills for the Future, and the content and organisation of its courses did not fit with the needs of employers.

As indicated in (c) below, little progress was made in localising the private sector. The development of the modern sector of the Swazi economy had depended, and continued to depend, on foreign capital and the availability of expatriate professional and technical skills. The production of Swazi manpower from the secondary school system and from SCOT had played little part in this development. Employers were reluctant to localise, and their reluctance could be rationalised in terms of economic recession and by reference to an education and training system which had produced and continued to produce people who were, by and large, 'either unemployable or for whom there was very little demand'. In 1982, von Wissel, who was then a member of Parliament and also President of the Federation of Swazi Employers, argued that the education and training system's failure to produce the 'required skills' needed by the economy was largely responsible for a decline in foreign investment and a continuing and increasing
dependence on expatriate skills and foreign imports (31).

(b) Education for rural development

Government was never committed to the education for rural development strategy insisted upon by donors and incorporated into the education plan. But, as noted below, the problems of rural change and modernisation were not primarily educational. There was nothing that formal or non-formal education and training programmes could have done that would, of itself, have brought about any significant change, even if Government had been prepared to make determined efforts to gear education to the needs of rural development.

There was no suggestion in reports of rural development programmes (32) and school leaver tracer studies that secondary school leavers had found either employment or self employment opportunities in rural areas. Nor was there any suggestion that those who had been taught Agriculture and other practical subjects had improved their chances of further training and employment in the modern sector. Sullivan (33) concluded that there was "no systematic association" between the teaching of Agriculture and agricultural training and employment after school. Eklund (34) suggested that taking practical subjects might well have reduced school leavers' chances of further training and employment. The most practical subjects were still those regarded as academic, and which led, hopefully, to one of the available white collar jobs with a foreign owned company or Government department.

The problem was not in the Ministry of Education's lack of support for donor attempts to gear secondary education to the needs of rural development, but in the stagnation of the traditional economy and the poverty and unemployment in rural areas. As long as rural areas remained unproductive, unreformed, and unattractive, there was no real possibility that secondary school leavers would find, or for that matter would want to find, employment or self employment in the backwardness of the traditional rural economy. Local communities would continue to resist attempts to vocationalise secondary education, and to insist on the more vocational bias of the existing system of formal academic secondary education.

The main vehicle for rural development was the RDAs scheme
initiated by the British administration in 1966 and supported after independence by aid from the UK and various other donors. As indicated in chapter 5, the RDAs scheme was not a success. Maize production declined, the incidence of cash cropping did not show any substantial improvement, and destocking targets were never approached. The dependence of rural homesteads on cash income from the modern sector increased, and a decline in rural incomes and production was accompanied by an exodus from the rural areas as the educated and semi educated moved to the towns in search of employment, and the uneducated looked for work in the cane fields, the canneries, and the saw mills (35).

Magagula, head of the Faculty of Agriculture at Luyengo, described (36) the "vast masses of unemployed in rural areas" as a problem of "alarming proportions", and unemployment and under employment as Swaziland's "most pressing economic and social problems". The widening economic and social disparities between rural and urban areas had led to an "unprecedented" and "accelerating" rural-urban migration, "expanding the pool of poverty and unemployment in the urban areas". Rapid increases in population were "continually adding to the reserve army of Swaziland's unemployed and underprivileged". Other Swazi commentaries (37) described rising levels of unemployment, increasing numbers of jobless school leavers, and widening disparities between and within urban and rural sectors.

A combination of factors contributed to the failure of the RDAs scheme and the continuing backwardness of the traditional rural economy. Donor attempts to improve agricultural productivity were thwarted by the traditional system of land tenure, adherence to customary methods of production, and the power and conservatism of the king's appointed chiefs. The traditional view of cattle as symbols of wealth and status led to overstocking of poor quality beasts, indiscriminate grazing, and degradation of natural pastures. In addition, the operation of the RDAs scheme was restricted by shortage of trained and skilled manpower, lack of credit and marketing facilities, and inadequate organisation and management in the field; and any chance donor efforts might have had of bringing about change in rural areas was largely neutralised by massive Government underspending on RDAs and lack of effective
planning and implementation. As noted by Magagula (38), Government might pay lip service to the RDAs scheme, but it was not committed to donor policies for rural change and modernisation. Lack of Government commitment was conditioned by the power and vested interests of the Swazi monarchy. Any attempt at rural change and modernisation would need to start from radical changes in existing political, economic, and social structures. Booth pointed out (39) that changes in the structure of traditional agriculture, in particular changes in the traditional system of land tenure, "would involve a fundamental alteration in the underlying political system". There was never any likelihood that a strong centralised monarchy would sanction political, economic, or social changes that appeared to threaten the traditional structures on which its power was based. After the king's death, there was even less likelihood that the ligogo would countenance any changes that ran counter to Swazi law and custom, and which might threaten its power and influence.

Nor was there ever any likelihood that the monarchy would sanction changes that appeared to threaten the interests of Tibiyo. Tibiyo's annexation of Government funds for large scale agriculture while the RDAs scheme was massively underspent, its proprietary interest in the most fertile tracts of Swazi Nation Land, and the resettlement schemes necessitated by the siting of its major development projects played a large part in the failure of rural development programmes and the continuing backwardness of the traditional economy. Tibiyo's accumulation of wealth, and the power that went with it, had been achieved through alliances with foreign, largely South African, capital. Through its increasing involvement in agribusiness, Tibiyo's interests were linked with those of the handful of foreign companies that dominated and still largely controlled the modern agricultural sector. It had a similar vested interest in the development of the modern sector, and in maintaining the conditions within which large scale agriculture operated so profitably. Proposals for changes in these conditions would meet with strong resistance from an alliance of powerful economic interests, those of the traditional monarchy as well as those of foreign capital.
Donor strategies for rural development were frustrated by South African domination of the modern sector of the Swazi economy and Swaziland's heavy dependence on the economy of South Africa. Rural homesteads depended increasingly on cash income from wage employment in South African owned businesses and remittances from migrant workers in South Africa. Increasing numbers left the rural areas in search of paid employment, rural productivity and rural incomes declined. Efforts to boost maize production and to promote cash cropping were hardly likely to succeed in depressed rural areas deprived of the more ambitious and the more able bodied. They were even less likely to succeed when South African maize, imported and distributed by a South African owned company, was readily available, and when cash income could buy the balance of food requirements, pay school fees, and provide other requirements made available by South African owned companies and through the free flow of goods from South Africa.

The operation of the customs agreement, South African control over Swaziland's import and export traffic, and the free flow of goods from South Africa virtually destroyed any chance there might have been of establishing a network of small industries and commercial businesses intended to generate employment and self employment opportunities in the rural areas and to provide support for other rural development programmes. South African interests would resist any proposals for change that appeared to challenge their domination and control of the modern sector of the Swazi economy, and there was no suggestion that South Africa would accept any changes that might reduce Swaziland's economic clientage or weaken its own overwhelming economic power in the region.

(c) Localisation

By the beginning of the third plan period, the modern sector of the Swazi economy already had an enviable record of growth and development. As already noted, the production of Swazi manpower from the secondary education system and from SCOT had played little part in this development. Progress in the modern sector had been promoted and sustained by the operation of foreign capital and the application of foreign skills, and more recently
by Tibiyo's alliance with foreign capital and foreign interests. The problem in Swazi terms was not one of promoting economic development, as envisaged in the international aid approach, but of gaining control of an established and expanding modern economy.

The public service had been virtually completely localised, apart from a number of professional and technical posts, before the start of the third plan. Progress in the private sector had been disappointingly slow (40), and Government was in a dilemma over its declared policy of rapid and vigorous localisation. In effect, the problem resolved itself into a political choice between the competing, rather than complementary, demands of economic growth and localisation. On the one hand Government needed to maintain an attractive investment climate for the foreign capital on which the development of the economy continued to depend, and for the expatriate management and the expatriate skills that went with it. On the other, as Booth (41) pointed out, it needed to respond to mounting pressures from an educated, affluent, and ambitious elite which had permeated all levels of Government bureaucracy, but had not succeeded in passing beyond the mid level in the management of foreign owned companies, and which was becoming increasingly impatient at its exclusion from the upper levels in the private sector.

Attempts to localise the upper levels of management in the private sector through the operation of a work permit system (as recommended in Skills for the Future) met with resistance from foreign owned companies, and the system was never consistently applied. In some instances, these attempts produced threats of closure, which were followed by Government's granting of the required permits, as in the case of Metro Wholesale, Tracar, and Swazi Oil Seedmills (42), all of which were Nathan Kirsh enterprises. In at least two instances, and probably more, problems in obtaining work permits for skilled expatriates had played a major part in companies transferring their investment to South African homelands (43). Progress in localising the private sector continued to be disappointingly slow as far as the Swazi educated elite was concerned. At the end of the plan period the modern sector of the Swazi economy was still dominated and largely controlled by foreign capital and foreign expertise. The large agricultural
estates and timber plantations were "still mainly owned and managed by foreign companies" and Swaziland's banking system, tourist industry, trade, and commerce were still largely owned and operated by foreign companies and expatriate personnel (44).

The declared policy in the Manifesto was for the transfer of economic as well as political power "to the rightful owners - the Swazis", and reference to this policy had supported proposals in the third development plan for vigorous localisation. Analysis in chapter 5 of Swaziland's political, economic, and social structures indicates that in this context the monarchy regarded Tibiyo as representing the economic interests of the Swazi Nation. Tibiyo's increasing participation in the modern sector and its alliances with foreign interests did little to restrain the impatience of the Swazi educated elite. Enterprises owned wholly or in part by Tibiyo operated in the same way as foreign owned companies, and depended largely upon expatriate upper level management and expatriate professional and technical skills. Tibiyo's major objective was the accumulation of wealth and economic power for the monarchy, and it opted for procedures intended to achieve this objective rather than for localisation.

The continuing expansion of secondary education did little to bring about localisation in the private sector at technician and craft levels. The 1981 sector review described a situation in which most of the secondary school leavers who had found jobs were engaged in clerical occupations and teaching. There was "a chronic shortage of Swazis in jobs requiring a high degree of competence in technical or scientific fields" and "a prevailing shortage of middle level technicians and craft workers". Many building firms, garages, and other enterprises were not only owned and operated by foreign companies and expatriate personnel, they were "manned by foreign craftsmen and artisans" (45). Government was faced with the problems of growing unemployment among secondary school leavers, the continuing presence of expatriate technicians and craftsmen, and a reluctance to localise on the part of foreign owned enterprises supported by reference to an education and training system which continued to turn out people who were either unemployable or for whom there was very little demand.
The demand for secondary education

For an increasing number of young people secondary education offered inadequate facilities, poor teaching, disappointing COSC results, and virtually no hope of further education and training or employment. At the same time, more and more of the cost of secondary education was being shifted on to parents and local communities, involving greater sacrifices as incomes declined and the cost of living, fuelled by the spill over effects of inflation in South Africa, continued to rise. But, in spite of persistently disappointing COSC results, growing numbers of jobless secondary school leavers, and increases in school fees, there was no sign of any slackening in the demand for the continued expansion of secondary and in particular senior secondary education. Popular pressures were still fed by expectations of the enormous rewards associated with the higher levels of education, and the increase in the number of unemployed secondary school leavers far from leading to a decline in the demand for secondary education led to even further expansion in this demand. The odds might have lengthened but the chance, however slim, was still there and to miss out on secondary education was to miss that chance.

There was no indication of any modification in the Swazi approach to secondary education. In a speech at the opening of a new secondary school in 1982, the Prime Minister made it clear that Government expected the demand for more secondary education to continue, and that it would make every effort to cater for this demand (46). In 1983 the Ministry of Education proposed the establishment of seven new junior secondary and seven new high schools in response to what was described as the "tremendous" and "increasing demand" for secondary education, as a first step in a comprehensive exercise which would cover all areas of the country (47).

The sections on education in Swaziland's Fourth National Development Plan 1983/84 - 1987/88 were finalised by 'experts' in the Department of Economic Planning with advice and assistance from the UNESCO education planning project. The tension between conflicting Swazi and international approaches to secondary
education was summarised in the plan's review of secondary education and training:

"The basic dilemma facing the country concerns the question of whether to continue the practice as developed in the period of the Third Plan to provide education according to social demand, or restrict access and advancement according to the ability of the pupil, financial resources of the country and employment prospects in the job market" (48).

The donor policies which had been incorporated into the third plan dominated the fourth plan, to the exclusion of the Swazi approach to secondary education. The development of secondary education was to be geared to manpower requirements and the needs of economic development (49). The Ministry of Education was committed to limiting entry to senior secondary education and controlling the development of secondary education according to the availability of financial and physical resources and the employment prospects of the country (50).

Government resentment at what it regarded as unwarranted attempts to influence Swazi policy, in other sectors of the economy as well as in education, led to delays in finalisation and publication. The plan was not finalised until 1984. Government acceptance was no more than a token demonstration of commitment and the plan had still not been published by mid 1985, more than two years after the beginning of the plan period. By that time the Swazi approach to education had been reaffirmed through the publication by the Ministry of Education in mid 1985 of Reform through Dialogue: Report of the National Education Review Commission. The Commission, set up by Cabinet (appointed and controlled by the liqogo), included Government officials, representatives from the university, members of Parliament, and members of the Swazi National Council. Its report was drawn up with assistance from a reconstituted UNESCO planning project.

The report's main objective was the reaffirmation and protection of the Swazi model of education. It made it abundantly clear that its proposals followed on from and were legitimated in terms of the Manifesto, the NEC report, and the advice given to the
Swazi Nation at various times by the late King Sobhuza (51). Education was an inalienable right, what was expected of education in Swaziland was the encouragement and development of the individual, and Government's main task was to make education available to all who wanted it according to their needs (52). At the same time, the report provided donors with a token demonstration of commitment to donor policies and priorities, which could be used to support proposals for aid to education. As in Current Trends and the third plan, references to manpower for development, vocationalisation, and formal and non-formal training programmes were rationalised in terms of the expansion of the existing system of secondary and in particular senior secondary education (53).

The long term recommendations in Reform through Dialogue proposed the democratisation of education at all levels up to and including senior secondary education. Pre-school education was to be universal and free. Universal primary education was to be extended from a seven to an eight year course, covering the 6-14 age group. The first four years of primary schooling would be free. Universal primary education was to be followed by a four year course of secondary education, which would combine junior secondary and senior secondary schooling and cater for the 15-18 age group. As in the past, admission to secondary education would be "based on merit", available to all who qualified (54). In the immediate future, and in the long term, the development of secondary education would continue to be shaped by pressures generated by social demand and by Government's preparedness to respond to these pressures by making education available to all who wanted it.

Footnotes

3 Magongo M Times of Swaziland, 3 February 1983, p 16.
4 Dlamini E M Shortages and Surpluses of Educated Manpower,
1983, p 86.


8 Sgwane B S P Education and Reform, 1983, pp 61, 126.


16 Times of Swaziland Simunye Loses E15m, 3 June 1982, p 1; Times of Swaziland Even Tougher Times Ahead, 4 June 1982, p 1; Times of Swaziland Economic Reality, 2 July 1982, p 1.


23 Leibrandt V Times of Swaziland, 10 February 1983, p 10.


27 Prince Bhekimpi Times of Swaziland, 17 October 1983, p 1.


32 See, for example, Magagula G T Population Issues and


38 Magagula G T Lip Service Won't Help RDA, 1982.


41 Booth A R Swaziland, 1983, p 60.


43 Leibrandt V Times of Swaziland, 10 February 1983, p 8.


46 Prince Mabandla Speech by the Right Honourable Prime Minister at the Opening of Etimphisini Secondary School, 1982.


CONCLUSION

The three sections in this chapter focus on three issues arising out of the Swazi case study and analysis of the international aid approach to educational planning. The first looks at what happened in Swaziland in broad terms as representative of a common African experience, pointing to the paradox that what donors regarded as serious weaknesses in educational planning in recipient countries was, in varying degrees, a way of protecting an African view of education from donor intervention.

The next two sections examine the most important aspects of the Swazi experience, the exceptionally well protected nature of the Swazi case and the distinctive combination of Swazi characteristics that shaped it. Section 2 describes a Swazi paradox in which extreme dependence on South Africa provided a form of security within which the Swazi monarchy was enabled to give full expression to a Swazi traditional system. The functioning of a powerful traditional monarchy and the persistence of homogeneous traditional forms gave Swaziland a rare degree of autonomy in protecting the Swazi model of education from external pressures brought to bear through donor intervention in the planning and development of secondary education.

The third section draws attention to the critical limitation in an international aid approach that regarded education primarily as a powerful instrument for economic and social change. It focuses more particularly on the exceptional nature of the Swazi experience, and on the fundamental restrictions imposed on economic and social change by the forces that shaped the Swazi paradox, the functioning of a powerful traditional monarchy and Swaziland's extreme dependence on South Africa. It concludes with further reference to the Swazi paradox of autonomy in dependency.

The African experience

The Swazi case exemplifies a general situation, in so far as what happened in the planning and development of secondary education in Swaziland can be seen as representative of a common experience, generalised in varying degrees across other African...
Donor intervention in Swaziland and in other African countries was shaped, to a considerable extent, by strong similarities in donor policies and procedures and common donor concerns for the most effective use of the aid they provided. There was a strong tendency for donor agencies to provide similar kinds of assistance across African countries in support of a generalised view of 'what was best' for education and over-all development, to regard African countries as willing, and more or less passive, recipients of donor funding and donor expertise, and to expect that aid to education would exert a significant influence in the planning and development of secondary education and in the wider process of economic and social change.

The Swazi model of education was similar in broad outline to those in other African countries, in its adoption of the principle of education as an inalienable right and its preparedness to respond to popular pressures for the expansion of secondary education. The main features of the non-interventionist Swazi approach to educational planning and management can be generalised in varying degrees across other African countries. The response to donor intervention in African countries was conditioned, to a large extent, by the availability and expectation of external aid, and tended towards the pragmatic rather than the passive. Swaziland was by no means the only African country in which there was a lack of commitment to donor policies and a lack of support for projects designed to implement them.

There were broad similarities between Swaziland and other African countries in the ways in which their approach to secondary education and their response to donor intervention restricted the influence aid to education was intended to exert, and in the conditions that shaped this process. These similarities point to the paradox that characterised aid to education in African countries. While donor agencies regarded the African approach as evidence of persistent weaknesses in planning and management in recipient countries, there was a sense in which it was a way of protecting a view of education which was at variance with the donor view of 'what was best'.

countries.
This might not always have been the intention, but the consequence was that, in varying degrees across African countries, the influence donor assistance was expected to exert was restricted, and national aspirations for secondary education were protected against donor intervention. The planning and development of secondary education was shaped by an African approach to educational planning and the variety of societal institutions across African countries, rather than by the acceptance or imposition of international models and the responsible interventionism of donor agencies.

These are broad generalisations which conceal significant differences between African countries. There were similarities in approaches to secondary education. There were also important differences in these approaches and in patterns of secondary education development, arising out of the variety of settings and diverse conditions across African countries. There was a generalised international aid approach to educational planning, but there was considerable diversity of forms and styles of assistance within the donor community and differences in the nature of the scale of recipient needs, and patterns of aid provision varied from country to country. In general, the African response to donor intervention tended towards the pragmatic, but the response in any particular country was conditioned by a variety of specific factors, on the donor as well as the recipient side, and there was a broad spectrum of responses across African countries.

Against this background, the search for common approaches and common experiences can encourage the tendency, noted by Eckstein and Noah (1), "to find what one is looking for, to stop when one has found it, and to gloss over counterfactual evidence", making for an oversimplified view of educational development in African countries. In the context of this study, it tends to divert attention away from the exceptional nature of the Swazi case, which stems from a second, distinctively Swazi, paradox described in the next section.

The Swazi paradox
The strength of Swazi resistance to donor intervention and the marked degree of protection this afforded the Swazi model of education placed Swaziland at the extreme end of the spectrum of responses to donor intervention across recipient African countries.

The particular nature and the extent of the persistence of the Swazi approach and the strong pragmatism of the Swazi response to donor intervention were shaped by the functioning of a powerful traditional monarchy, the continuity of Swazi traditional institutions and processes, and the prevailing Swazi view of the particularity and autonomy of the Swazi nation. What set Swaziland apart from other African countries was the strength and persistence of a remarkably homogeneous traditional system headed by a powerful centralised monarchy, a system which had broken down elsewhere in Africa.

A number of factors contributed to the exceptionally well protected nature of the Swazi traditional system. As in other African territories administered by the British, traditional political structures had been left virtually intact during the colonial administration. What was different from nearly all other African countries that had undergone a colonial experience was the fixing of Swaziland's boundaries to enclose a single group of people who shared a common language and a common tradition. This group constituted the Swazi Nation, ruled over by a traditional monarchy, and regulated by Swazi traditional law and custom. The power and influence of South African interests played a significant part in the fixing of Swaziland's boundaries and, consequently, in the preservation of the territorial, ethnic, and political autonomy of the Swazi Nation.

It was Sobhuza's use of traditional loyalties and his application of traditional structures and techniques that enabled him to gain control of the modern system of government (bequeathed as a legacy of colonialism) and, by so doing, maintain and expand the political power of the monarchy. The real political power in Swaziland was vested in the king, and the modern system of government was an extension of and subordinate to his traditional powers as king of the Swazi Nation. The monarchy's undisputed authority over virtually every aspect of life in Swaziland was
exercised through the operation of traditional institutions and processes, within a common network of power and patronage and allegiance and obligation that radiated from the king, regulated by Swazi law and custom and conditioned by reference to kinship, clan, and lineage.

Swaziland's over-all dependence on South Africa played a crucial part in the protection of the autonomy of the Swazi monarchy and the Swazi traditional system. Swaziland is a small landlocked country, almost entirely surrounded by South African territory and dependent on South Africa for communication with the rest of the world. The Swazi economy is a peripheral economy, closely interlinked with, heavily dependent upon, and largely controlled by the economy of South Africa. In spite of its membership of organisations such as the OAU and SADCC, Swaziland is linked with South Africa through close and co-operative political ties conditioned by Swazi dependence and powerful South African interests.

The Swazi paradox was that of autonomy in dependency. Extreme dependence on South Africa insulated Swaziland from the variety of post colonial influences that shaped events in many other African countries. Swaziland was provided with a form of security within which the Swazi monarchy was enabled to give full expression to a Swazi traditional system and to safeguard Swazi traditional institutions and processes. Extreme dependence on South Africa protected the Swazi traditional system, and gave Swaziland a marked degree of autonomy in dealing with external pressures brought to bear on the planning and development of secondary education by a substantial array of donor agencies.

The planning and development of secondary education, like everything else in Swaziland, was shaped by the all pervasive political authority of a traditional monarchy, and this had the effect of strengthening the persistence of the Swazi approach to secondary education and the pragmatic nature of the Swazi response to donor intervention. Swazi adoption of the principle of education as an inalienable right and preparedness to respond to popular pressures for the rapid expansion of the existing system of secondary education had the undisputed authority of a royal
proclamation. The persistence of a largely non-interventionist approach to educational planning, and the characteristic lack of control over what happened in secondary schools, derived from the fact that it was an expression of a Swazi way of doing things, deeply rooted in and nurtured by the nature of the traditional political process.

The international aid approach to educational planning operated within the modern system of government, but what happened in the planning and development of secondary education was largely shaped by the operation of traditional institutions and processes and by traditional forms of decision making that existed separately and worked independently from those ostensibly adopted by government and recognised by donors and their 'experts'. The operation of Swazi traditional structures and processes constituted a single all encompassing frame of reference from which donors and their 'experts' were excluded, and which severely limited their room for manoeuvre in attempts to bring pressure to bear on the planning and development of secondary education. The strength and persistence of the Swazi traditional system provided a rare degree of autonomy in dealing with these pressures, and heightened the Swazi capacity for neutralising the influence aid to education was intended to exert and for protecting Swazi aspirations for secondary education from the responsible interventionism of donor agencies.

**Economic and social change**

The Swazi experience provides further support for the 'age of practicality' view that the problems of economic and social change were not primarily educational and there was, therefore, little to be gained in seeking solutions through educational planning and reform. Education, far from being the most important element in the development process, had only a limited role to play.

The part played by lack of commitment and support from Government and from local communities in restricting donor attempts to gear secondary education and training to the production of critical skills for economic development, and in particular rural change and modernisation, was more marked in Swaziland than in many other
African countries, and the chances of implementation considerably less. But there was little that education could do that would, of itself, bring about rural change and modernisation. As in other African countries, any attempt at rural transformation would need to start with radical changes in existing social, economic, and political structures, and such changes were unlikely if they were in conflict with the interests of those in power in African societies.

The particularity of the Swazi experience, and the reason why it was an extremely heightened case of a more general phenomenon, arises out of the distinctively Swazi features that imposed fundamental restrictions on alterations in existing societal structures. These features were those that form the two sides of the Swazi paradox, the functioning of a powerful traditional monarchy and Swaziland's extreme dependence on South Africa.

The king controlled the traditional rural economy through a system of land tenure on Swazi Nation Land (held in trust for the nation), operated through the traditional system of appointed chiefs and their delegated officials. Changes in the structure of traditional agriculture, in particular changes in the land tenure system, would involve fundamental alterations in the underlying political system. There was never any possibility that a powerful centralised monarchy, with unchallenged authority over virtually every aspect of life in Swaziland, would sanction political, economic, or social changes that might appear to threaten the traditional structures on which its power was based.

The modern sector of the Swazi economy, dominated and largely controlled by South African interests, had an enviable record of growth and development. The production of Swazi manpower from the education and training system played little part in economic development, and donor attempts to gear it to the production of 'critical skills' were hardly likely to bring about any change in this situation. Progress in the modern sector had been, and still was, promoted and sustained by the operation of foreign capital and the application of expatriate skills. The problem, in Swazi terms, was not one of promoting economic development but of gaining control of an established
and prosperous modern economy. The dominance of South African interests limited Swazi participation in modern sector activity, and frustrated Swazi aspirations for rapid localisation at all levels in the private sector.

The monarchy's participation in modern sector activity and its identification of national economic interests with those of Tibiyo illustrate the nature of the Swazi paradox. Dependence on South Africa provided a form of security within which the traditional monarchy was enabled to maintain and expand its political power, and to progressively establish itself within the modern sector of the economy. The monarchy's accumulation of wealth, and the power that went with it, was closely linked on the one hand with the nature and extent of its political authority, and on the other with the availability of South African capital and the collaboration of South African interests.

The establishment and operation of Tibiyo, through mineral rights 'held in trust for the nation', the appointment of advisers, and the king's control over its resources and every aspect of its operation, was shaped to a large extent by the application of traditional structures and techniques. Its proprietary interest in the most fertile tracts of Swazi Nation Land, and the resettlement schemes necessitated by the siting of its major development projects, was contingent upon the monarchy's control of the traditional rural economy. Its annexation of government funds, its immunity from taxation and public scrutiny, and its entire operation as a state within the state depended upon the king's control of the modern system of government. There was never any likelihood that the monarchy would sanction changes that conflicted with Tibiyo's economic interests, or which appeared to challenge the political authority on which its operation was based.

Tibiyo's alliances with South African capital, its increasing involvement in agribusiness, its operational procedures, and its reliance on expatriate skills linked the monarchy's economic interests with those of the handful of foreign, mainly South African based enterprises that dominated and still largely controlled the modern agricultural sector. It had a similar vested interest in the development of highly mechanised commercial
and industrial agriculture, and in maintaining the conditions that made for its profitable and continued operation. An alliance of powerful interests, those of the traditional monarchy as well as those of modern South African business enterprise, was opposed to any attempt to bring about radical change in existing social, economic, and political structures. It discouraged unauthorised Swazi participation in modern sector activity, retarded localisation in the private sector, and frustrated donor attempts at rural change and modernisation.

Any possibility of radical change in existing societal structures was ultimately curtailed by Swaziland's extreme dependence on South Africa. What happened in the Swazi economy was largely controlled by South African interests and South African policies. South African interests resisted any proposals for change that appeared to challenge their domination and control of the modern sector of the Swazi economy, and there was no suggestion that South Africa would countenance any change that might reduce Swaziland's economic clientage or weaken its own overwhelming economic power and influence in the region. There was a strong sense in which South Africa, by protecting its own interests and perpetuating Swazi dependence, was protecting the interests of the Swazi traditional monarchy and assisting in safeguarding the conditions on which its political and economic power were based.

There is little indication of any significant change in the Swazi situation. Traditionalism is still the dominant force in Swazi social, economic, and political life. The power struggles following the death of Sobhuza involved the liqoqo, princes of the realm, and other members of the ruling Dlamini clan within the traditional political system. The extraordinary power wielded by the liqoqo was justified in terms of Swazi law and custom. Mswati's accession to the throne and recent events following his succession (2) indicate the homogeneity of the Swazi Nation, and the strength and persistence of Swazi traditional forms. Political power still resides in and radiates from the king, and the modern government is subordinate to his traditional powers as king of the Swazi Nation. The Swazi economy is still
heavily dependent upon and largely controlled by the economy of South Africa, and political ties are as close and co-operative as ever.

Nor is there any indication of significant change in the aid process. In some instances, donor agencies have adopted a more accommodating approach and their field representatives and 'experts' have developed an awareness of the political dimension of the Swazi approach to planning and management. But donor rationale for aid to education and concern for the most effective use of the aid they provide remain virtually unchanged (3). There has been no indication of any modification in the Swazi approach to secondary education, or in Swazi capacity for protecting the Swazi model from external pressures brought to bear through donor intervention (4). It is in the nature of the Swazi paradox that any weakening in the Swazi traditional system, and in its marked degree of autonomy in dealing with donor pressures, is more likely to be brought about through reduction in South Africa's overwhelming economic power and influence in the region than by changes from within Swaziland.

Footnotes

3 See Chapter 4: The international aid approach, pp 107-110.
4 See Chapter 10: The demand for secondary education, pp 244-246.
Chart 1: Structure of the formal education system

Primary

AGE 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Grades

Secondary

12 13 17

Junior

Forms

Senior

Primary teacher training

W.P.C. N.T.T.C.

Vocational training

Scot

College of nursing

Notes:

O - Primary Certificate Exam (PCE)

- Junior Certificate Exam (JC)

△ - Cambridge Overseas Certificate Exam ("O" level)

1) - W.P.C. - William Pitcher College

2) - N.T.T.C. - Nazarene Teacher Training College

3) - SCOT - Swaziland College of Technology

UBE - To Universities of Botswana and Edinburgh

Source: Compiled from official documents

University degrees

Sociology, arts, agriculture, economics, education, commerce

Science, law

University diplomas/certificates

Agriculture, business studies, education, home economics

Junior Secondary teacher training

WPC, University

Vocational training

Technician training

Health services training

College of Nursing

Institute of Health Sciences
Chart 2: Ministry of Education organisational chart

MINISTER

PERMANENT SECRETARY

(ADMINISTRATION)

UNIVERSITY

UNDER SECRETARY

SENIOR INSPECTOR-PERSONNEL

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

SENIOR EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
PERSONAL SECRETARIES
TRANSPORT OFFICER
SENIOR CLERICAL OFFICERS
JUNIOR CLERICAL OFFICERS
TYPOGS
DRIVERS
MESSENGERS

ACCOUNTING SECTION

PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTANT
SENIOR ACCOUNTANT
ASSISTANT ACCOUNTANTS
ACCOUNTS OFFICER

CHIEF EDUCATION PLANNER
EDUCATION UNIT
ECONOMIC AND STATISTICS UNIT
BUILDING MANAGEMENT UNIT

SECONDARY CURRICULUM UNIT
PRIMARY CURRICULUM UNIT

DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION

CHIEF INSPECTOR PRIMARY
CHIEF INSPECTOR SECONDARY
EXAMINATION INSPECTOR

WILLIAM PITCHER COLLEGE

D.E.O.
HHOHHO
D.E.O.
LUBOMBO
D.E.O.
MANZINI
D.E.O.
SHISELWENI

ASSISTANT D.E.O.
PIGGS PEAK
ASSISTANT D.E.O.
ANKAYANE
ASSISTANT D.E.O.
HLATIKULU

INSPECTORS OF SCHOOLS

Source: Ministry of Education
Table 1: Schools, enrolments, and teachers 1968, 1973, 1978 and 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRIMARY</th>
<th></th>
<th>SECONDARY</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Enrolments</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>62,100</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>81,694</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>100,700</td>
<td>2,853</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>125,323</td>
<td>3,769</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2: Primary schools, enrolments, number of teachers, and pupil teacher ratios by district, 1978 and 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Enrolments</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Pupil teacher ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hhohho</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>26,072</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubombo</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16,335</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>31,803</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiselweni</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>26,430</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>100,700</td>
<td>2,853</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hhohho</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>32,177</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubombo</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>22,704</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>38,688</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiselweni</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>31,754</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>125,323</td>
<td>3,769</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Primary school enrolments by grade and sex, 1978 and 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>1978 Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>1982 Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,324</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>20,374</td>
<td>13,157</td>
<td>12,313</td>
<td>25,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8,942</td>
<td>8,576</td>
<td>17,518</td>
<td>11,213</td>
<td>10,594</td>
<td>21,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8,263</td>
<td>7,763</td>
<td>16,026</td>
<td>10,590</td>
<td>9,934</td>
<td>20,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7,016</td>
<td>6,970</td>
<td>13,986</td>
<td>8,519</td>
<td>8,757</td>
<td>17,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,969</td>
<td>6,235</td>
<td>12,204</td>
<td>7,369</td>
<td>7,760</td>
<td>15,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5,303</td>
<td>5,407</td>
<td>10,710</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>13,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,788</td>
<td>5,094</td>
<td>9,882</td>
<td>5,730</td>
<td>6,167</td>
<td>11,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>50,605</td>
<td>50,095</td>
<td>100,700</td>
<td>62,978</td>
<td>62,325</td>
<td>125,303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4: Primary teaching force by qualification and citizenship, 1978 and 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Graduate trained</th>
<th>Secondary trained</th>
<th>Primary trained</th>
<th>Total qualified</th>
<th>Unqualified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Swazi</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>2,194 (77%)</td>
<td>659 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,196</td>
<td>3,227</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Swazi</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3,216</td>
<td>3,305 (88%)</td>
<td>464 (12%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5: Primary Certificate Examination results, 1975 to 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>First class</th>
<th>Second class</th>
<th>Third class</th>
<th>Fail</th>
<th>Total entries</th>
<th>% pass</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>2,382</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>2,544</td>
<td>8,762</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>3,613</td>
<td>2,383</td>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>9,006</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>2,474</td>
<td>2,273</td>
<td>9,087</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>3,343</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>2,404</td>
<td>9,284</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>3,781</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>2,495</td>
<td>9,441</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>3,893</td>
<td>2,578</td>
<td>2,547</td>
<td>10,054</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>4,166</td>
<td>2,571</td>
<td>2,777</td>
<td>10,666</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 6: Grade 7 enrolments, Primary Certificate Examination passes, and Form 1 entry, 1978 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grade 7 enrolment</th>
<th>Grade 7 repeaters</th>
<th>PCE entry</th>
<th>PCE passes</th>
<th>Form 1 new entrants</th>
<th>Form 1 as % PCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>9,882</td>
<td>1,576 (16%)</td>
<td>9,284</td>
<td>6,880</td>
<td>6,716</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>10,018</td>
<td>1,682 (17%)</td>
<td>9,441</td>
<td>6,946</td>
<td>6,802</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>10,459</td>
<td>1,654 (16%)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>7,453</td>
<td>6,802</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>11,197</td>
<td>1,801 (16%)</td>
<td>10,666</td>
<td>7,889</td>
<td>7,234</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,562</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Primary school enrolments, repeaters, promoted, and drop-outs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,864</td>
<td>12,856</td>
<td>12,369</td>
<td>11,142</td>
<td>9,436</td>
<td>7,745</td>
<td>6,911</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,079</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,612</td>
<td>11,495</td>
<td>10,205</td>
<td>8,861</td>
<td>7,328</td>
<td>6,154</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,496</td>
<td>14,375</td>
<td>13,787</td>
<td>12,306</td>
<td>10,882</td>
<td>9,187</td>
<td>9,077</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>1,231</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>1,695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,792</td>
<td>13,032</td>
<td>11,394</td>
<td>10,038</td>
<td>8,698</td>
<td>7,320</td>
<td>6,039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18,357</td>
<td>15,631</td>
<td>14,435</td>
<td>13,046</td>
<td>11,454</td>
<td>10,162</td>
<td>9,636</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>1,348</td>
<td>1,317</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,195</td>
<td>13,766</td>
<td>11,820</td>
<td>10,712</td>
<td>9,180</td>
<td>8,122</td>
<td>6,815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,374</td>
<td>17,518</td>
<td>16,026</td>
<td>13,986</td>
<td>12,204</td>
<td>10,710</td>
<td>9,882</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,261</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>1,524</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,654</td>
<td>15,449</td>
<td>12,854</td>
<td>11,462</td>
<td>9,769</td>
<td>8,442</td>
<td>6,880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23,342</td>
<td>19,630</td>
<td>18,069</td>
<td>15,521</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>11,598</td>
<td>10,459</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,186</td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>1,877</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18,953</td>
<td>17,076</td>
<td>14,508</td>
<td>12,769</td>
<td>10,932</td>
<td>9,543</td>
<td>7,453</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8: Secondary schools, enrolments, number of teachers, and pupil teacher ratios by district, 1978 and 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Enrolments</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Pupil teacher ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hhohho</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5,807</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubombo</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,716</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6,857</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiselweni</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5,204</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>20,584</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hhohho</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8,408</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubombo</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3,934</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7,748</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiselweni</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6,379</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>26,469</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 9: Secondary school enrolments by form and sex, 1978 and 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,158</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>6,483</td>
<td>3,979</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>7,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,869</td>
<td>2,754</td>
<td>5,623</td>
<td>3,449</td>
<td>3,741</td>
<td>7,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,323</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>4,513</td>
<td>2,932</td>
<td>2,862</td>
<td>5,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8,350</td>
<td>8,269</td>
<td>16,619</td>
<td>10,360</td>
<td>10,608</td>
<td>20,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,248</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>2,188</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>3,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>2,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>3,876</td>
<td>3,013</td>
<td>2,404</td>
<td>5,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,620</td>
<td>9,875</td>
<td>20,495</td>
<td>13,373</td>
<td>13,012</td>
<td>26,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%age</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 10: Secondary teaching force by qualification and citizenship, 1978 and 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Graduate</th>
<th>Diploma</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trained</td>
<td>Untrained</td>
<td>Qualified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Swazi</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Swazi</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 11: Secondary teaching force: Swazi and non-Swazi, qualified and unqualified, 1978 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qualified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Swazi</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Unqualified |      |      |      |      |      |
| Swazi       | 281  | 271  | 310  | 338  | 361  |
| Non-Swazi   | 8    | 11   | 12   | 11   | 13   |
| Total       | 289  | 282  | 322  | 349  | 374  |

Total Swazi 703 810 966 1,117 1,224 Total teaching force 1,073 1,158 1,292 1,433 1,501

% Swazi 66% 70% 75% 78% 82%
% Qualified Swazi 39% 47% 51% 54% 57%

### Table 12: Pupil teacher ratios in secondary schools, 1978 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pupil teacher</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupil qualified teacher</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupil Swazi teacher</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupil qualified Swazi teacher</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Calculations and pupil teacher ratios include headmasters.

### Table 13: Planned and actual enrolments in junior secondary classes, 1976 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th></th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Form 1</td>
<td>Form 2</td>
<td>Form 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>6,403</td>
<td>5,236</td>
<td>3,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>6,793</td>
<td>5,857</td>
<td>4,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>7,086</td>
<td>6,236</td>
<td>4,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>7,349</td>
<td>6,514</td>
<td>5,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7,587</td>
<td>6,759</td>
<td>5,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>7,796</td>
<td>6,980</td>
<td>5,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>8,149</td>
<td>7,176</td>
<td>5,703</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 14: Planned and actual enrolments in senior secondary classes, 1976 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Planned Form 4</th>
<th>Form 5</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Actual Form 4</th>
<th>Form 5</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>2,507</td>
<td>1,731</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>2,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>2,173</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>1,471</td>
<td>3,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,451</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>2,462</td>
<td>2,188</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>3,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>2,820</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>4,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,742</td>
<td>1,338</td>
<td>3,081</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>1,923</td>
<td>4,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,823</td>
<td>1,433</td>
<td>3,256</td>
<td>2,878</td>
<td>2,152</td>
<td>5,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,893</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>3,394</td>
<td>3,090</td>
<td>2,327</td>
<td>5,417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 15: Junior Certificate Examination results, 1973 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>First Class</th>
<th>Second Class</th>
<th>% First &amp; Second Class</th>
<th>Third Class</th>
<th>Fail</th>
<th>Total Entries</th>
<th>% First, Second &amp; Third Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>2,914</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>3,019</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>3,218</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>3,950</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>4,226</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,903</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>4,716</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,069</td>
<td>1,994</td>
<td>5,130</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,982</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>4,835</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>5,210</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 16: Form 3 enrolments, Junior Certificate Examination passes, and Form 4 entry, 1978 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Form 3 enrolments</th>
<th>repeaters</th>
<th>entry</th>
<th>class 1</th>
<th>class 2</th>
<th>class 3</th>
<th>Form 4 new entrants</th>
<th>class 3 passes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4,771</td>
<td>280 (6%)</td>
<td>4,266</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>2,222</td>
<td>1,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>5,089</td>
<td>263 (5%)</td>
<td>4,716</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>1,903</td>
<td>2,547</td>
<td>1,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5,320</td>
<td>339 (6%)</td>
<td>5,130</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>2,069</td>
<td>2,749</td>
<td>1,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>5,522</td>
<td>440 (8%)</td>
<td>4,835</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>1,982</td>
<td>3,090</td>
<td>1,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: Junior Certificate Examination class 3 passes entering Form 4, 1979 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% age total JCE entry entering Form 4</th>
<th>% age class 3 passes entering Form 4</th>
<th>class 3 passes as % age total new entrants to Form 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>100(+)%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From Table 16.

Table 18: Cambridge Overseas School Certificate examination results, 1968 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>First Class</th>
<th>Second Class</th>
<th>Third Class</th>
<th>% First, Second &amp; Third Class</th>
<th>Fourth Class</th>
<th>Fail</th>
<th>Total Entries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>1,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>2,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>(1575)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: Cambridge Overseas School Certificate examination results in selected high schools, 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centre No.</th>
<th>Entries</th>
<th>First Class</th>
<th>Second Class</th>
<th>Third Class</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% First, Second &amp; Third Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>402</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>428</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>429</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>434</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>437</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>438</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Education Examination Section
Table 20: University of Swaziland enrolments, 1978/79 to 1982/83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Comm.</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A. (Soc. Sc.)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL.B.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A. + CDE</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc. &amp; B.Sc. + CDE</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc. (Agric.)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Ed.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Degrees</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diploma/Certificate Programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accounting &amp; Bus. Stud.</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Agric.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric. Educ.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anim. Prod.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Economics</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cert. in Agric.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Dip./Cert.</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>1063</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: University of Swaziland output of Swazi degree, diploma, and certificate holders 1978/79 to 1981/82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Comm.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A. (Soc. Sc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL.B.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A. + CDE</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc. &amp; B.Sc.+CDE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc. (Agric.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Ed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Degrees</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diploma/Certificate Programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accounting &amp; Bus. Studies</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Agric.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric. Educ.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anim. Prod. &amp; Health</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Economics</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cert. in Agriculture</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Diploma/Certificate</strong></td>
<td>115</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>138</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22: Planned and actual supply of primary school teachers, 1978 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WPC Nazarene Ngwane In-service Total</td>
<td>WPC Nazarene Ngwane In-service Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>59 50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>64 45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>59 50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>85 49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>90 50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>67 50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>90 50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>90 50</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>388 250</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>390 244</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>1,571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 23: Planned and actual supply of secondary school teachers, 1978 to 1982**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>WPC Tech.</th>
<th>SCOT Comm.</th>
<th>UCS Diploma</th>
<th>UCS H.Ec.</th>
<th>UCS Degree/CDE</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>WPC Tech.</th>
<th>SCOT Comm.</th>
<th>UCS Diploma</th>
<th>UCS H.Ec.</th>
<th>UCS Degree/CDE</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Ministry of Education, A Financial and Statistical Analysis of Swaziland's Educational System with Projections to 1985, 1977, pp72 and 74; Deputy Principal William Pitcher College; Head Services Department SCOT; FAO/SIDA Project Manager Luyengo; Assistant Registrar for Planning, University College of Swaziland.
Table 24: Total Government expenditure on education and training, estimates 1978/79 (E '000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry and activity</th>
<th>Recurrent</th>
<th>Capital Local</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOT</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>1,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police College</td>
<td>407</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishments and Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMPA</td>
<td>281</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Services</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post secondary grants</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>1,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Economics</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and extension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative training</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Home Affairs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult education (SEBENTA)</td>
<td>174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special education</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (A)</td>
<td>3,727</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>5,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Ministry</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>3,778</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>4,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>3,423</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>3,374</td>
<td>8,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult education</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post secondary (University)</td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>4,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher training</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (B)</td>
<td>10,248</td>
<td>3,114</td>
<td>7,387</td>
<td>20,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (A &amp; B) education &amp; training</td>
<td>13,975</td>
<td>3,439</td>
<td>8,553</td>
<td>25,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) as % Total (A &amp; B)</td>
<td>73.33%</td>
<td>90.55%</td>
<td>86.37%</td>
<td>79.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Government expenditure</td>
<td>61,367</td>
<td>84,513</td>
<td>40,975</td>
<td>186,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total education &amp; training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as % of Government</td>
<td>22.77%</td>
<td>4.07%</td>
<td>20.87%</td>
<td>13.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as % of Government</td>
<td>16.70%</td>
<td>3.68%</td>
<td>18.03%</td>
<td>11.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 25: Total Government expenditure on education and training, estimates 1982/83 (E '000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry and activity</th>
<th>Recurrent</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Commissioner</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishments and Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMPA</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Services</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post secondary grants</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Health Sciences</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Economics</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and extension</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative training</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (A)</td>
<td>5,433</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and Ministry</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>8,987</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>11,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>6,874</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>9,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult education</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post secondary (University)</td>
<td>2,533</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>3,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher training</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>3,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special education</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school education</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (B)</td>
<td>21,062</td>
<td>4,616</td>
<td>3,764</td>
<td>29,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (A &amp; B) education &amp; training</td>
<td>26,495</td>
<td>4,711</td>
<td>3,764</td>
<td>34,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) as % of Total (A &amp; B)</td>
<td>79.49%</td>
<td>97.98%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>84.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Government expenditure</td>
<td>135,460</td>
<td>54,540</td>
<td>35,187</td>
<td>225,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total education &amp; training as % of Government</td>
<td>19.56%</td>
<td>8.64%</td>
<td>10.70%</td>
<td>15.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education as % of Government</td>
<td>15.55%</td>
<td>8.46%</td>
<td>10.70%</td>
<td>13.07%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 26: Ministry of Education capital estimates, Government and donor contributions, 1978/79 to 1982/83 (E '000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>3,343</td>
<td>11,114</td>
<td>13,170</td>
<td>14,895</td>
<td>15,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>5,199</td>
<td>4,968</td>
<td>5,479</td>
<td>5,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donor</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>7,771</td>
<td>10,545</td>
<td>8,825</td>
<td>6,033</td>
<td>4,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>3,374</td>
<td>3,496</td>
<td>2,989</td>
<td>1,935</td>
<td>1,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Donor</strong></td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Education</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>25,802</td>
<td>36,938</td>
<td>24,084</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27: Ministry of Education recurrent estimates and expenditure, total and secondary education, 1978 to 1982 (E '000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>10,248</td>
<td>12,691</td>
<td>12,261</td>
<td>16,339</td>
<td>19,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+962</td>
<td>+240</td>
<td>+2%</td>
<td>+3256</td>
<td>+20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>3,423</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>4,066</td>
<td>5,312</td>
<td>6,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+637</td>
<td>+276</td>
<td>+7%</td>
<td>+969</td>
<td>+18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary as %</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of MoE</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>115%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>9,262</td>
<td>10,201</td>
<td>9,712</td>
<td>12,541</td>
<td>15,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+939</td>
<td>+185</td>
<td>+7%</td>
<td>+3333</td>
<td>+27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>2,942</td>
<td>3,692</td>
<td>3,572</td>
<td>4,659</td>
<td>5,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+750</td>
<td>+276</td>
<td>+8%</td>
<td>+1088</td>
<td>+23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary as %</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of MoE</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>149%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personnel only</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>only as % of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recurrent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Ministry of Education Report on the Review of the Third National Development Plan 1983, Tables 1 to 4
Table 28: Capital costs (E '000) education and training as estimated in the Third National Development Plan 1978/79 to 1982/83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>5,554</td>
<td>5,668</td>
<td>5,908</td>
<td>5,960</td>
<td>24,295</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>5,086</td>
<td>2,164</td>
<td>2,446</td>
<td>2,442</td>
<td>2,525</td>
<td>14,663</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum Centre</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>812</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Programme</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Technology</td>
<td></td>
<td>224</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>560</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2,913</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td>228</td>
<td></td>
<td>428</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence Education</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland College of Technology</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Training Centres</td>
<td></td>
<td>206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>206</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Education Centres</td>
<td>719</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>719</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Education Centres</td>
<td></td>
<td>87</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gcina</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Education</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>2,229</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>7,051</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,298</td>
<td>12,169</td>
<td>10,906</td>
<td>10,709</td>
<td>9,803</td>
<td>53,885</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 29: Ministry of Education capital estimates (E '000) by activities, 1978/79 to 1982/83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry Administration</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>3,164</td>
<td>4,549</td>
<td>4,845</td>
<td>2,833</td>
<td>16,571</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>5,199</td>
<td>4,968</td>
<td>5,479</td>
<td>5,941</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>24,081</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum Development</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Education</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>2,463</td>
<td>3,109</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>1,535</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>9,869</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>1,484</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>2,198</td>
<td>6,731</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Education</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>349</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Training and Testing</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>604</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-School Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,114</td>
<td>13,170</td>
<td>14,895</td>
<td>15,178</td>
<td>8,380</td>
<td>62,737</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ministry of Education to total Government</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography is a list of documents referred to in the text, arranged in alphabetical order. Documents published by the various Government Ministries and Departments in Swaziland are listed under the heading Swaziland, Kingdom of.


Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British Tropical African Dependencies Education Policy in British Tropical Africa. London: HMSO, 1925.


Bacchus K The Success of Vocationalisation Depends on the Political Context. Paper presented at the conference on Vocationalising Education organised by the Department of International and Comparative Education (DICE) at the University of London Institute of Education, 7-9 May 1986.


Blaug M Economics of Education: A Selected Annotated Bibliography.


Cerych L  Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries. New York: Praeger, 1965.


Commonwealth Secretariat  Report of the Planning Meeting on Training of Personnel in Educational Administration and Supervision,


Deputy Prime Minister's Office Times of Swaziland, 18 June 1982, p 3.


Dlamini S Speech by the Honourable Minister for Education at the
Inauguration of the Swaziland Teaching Service Commission. Times of Swaziland. 14 June 1983.


Evans D R Responsive Educational Planning: Myth or Reality.


Grandstaff M. Non-Formal Education: Some Indications for Use.


Hurst P  Educational Aid and Dependency. Paper delivered at the Seminar on Foreign Aid for Education, Oslo, 15-17 September 1983, Nordic Association for the Study of Education in Developing Countries.


Ker A D R  The Uganda Experience with Farm Schools. Education in Eastern Africa 2.2 (1971) pp 3-21.


King K  Aid Responses to Education Priorities. Paper delivered


Leibrandt V Times of Swaziland, 10 February 1983, p 8.


Magagula G T Lip Service Won't Help RDA. Times of Swaziland, 31 March 1982, p 3.


Magongo M Times of Swaziland, 3 February 1983, p 16.


Mokgokong S The Friday Interview. Times of Swaziland, 18 June 1982, p 12.


ODA  British Aid to Education in Developing Countries. London: HMSO, 1982.

ODA  British Aid to Education in Developing Countries. London: HMSO, 1984.


Parnes H S  The OECD Mediterranean Regional Project in Retrospect. Chapter 9 in Bereday G Z F, Lauwerys J A, and Blaug M (eds)


Prince Bhekimp i  Times of Swaziland, 17 October 1983, p 1.


Rosch G and Welter R  Vocational and Commercial Training Institute


SIDA Aid and Education: Policy and Programme. 1972.


Swazi Observer Tibiyo's Record of Achievement. 4 September 1981, p 3.


Swaziland, Kingdom of


Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Advertisement in Times of Swaziland, 10 January 1976.

Times of Swaziland After the Disappointment. 25 February 1981, pp 4-5.

Times of Swaziland Cholera Menace Looms. 31 December 1982, p 16.

Times of Swaziland Cotton Cash Drops by Half. 2 July 1982, p 1.


Times of Swaziland Drought Hit Areas to get UN Food. 9 August 1982, p 1.


Times of Swaziland Even Tougher Times Ahead. 4 June 1982, p 1.


Times of Swaziland Simunye Loses El5m. 3 June 1982, p 1.

Times of Swaziland So Much for Failures. 18 March 1982, p 7.


Todaro M P  
Economic Development in the Third World. 

Townsend-Coles E K  
Report on the Rural Education Centres of Swaziland: In the Over-All Context of the Responsibilities of the Ministry of Education for Non-Formal Education. 

(Uganda High-Level Manpower Survey 1967 and Analysis of Requirements 1967-1981) 
Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. Manpower Planning Division. 
Entebbe: Government Printer.

UNESCO Administrative Aspects of Educational Planning: Contributions to a Seminar held at the IIEP 23 June - 4 July 1969. 


UNESCO Manpower Aspects of Educational Planning: Problems for the Future. 


de Vletter F The Rural Homestead as an Economic Unit. UN Women in Development Project/University College of Swaziland, 1978.

de Vletter F A Socio-Economic Profile of Swazi Rural Homesteads: A Summary of the Main Findings arising from the Swaziland Homestead Survey. Kwaluseni Social Science Research Unit University of Swaziland, 1982.

de Vletter F The Swazi Rural Homestead. Kwaluseni Social Science Research Unit University of Swaziland, 1983.


Williams P Education in Developing Countries: Halfway to the Styx. Comparative Education 17.2 (1981) pp 149-156.


Wilson F Education for Rural Development. Chapter 1 in Foster


Wright C A H Curriculum Diversification Re-Examined: A Case Study of Sierra Leone. Paper presented at the conference on Vocationalising Education organised by the Department of International and Comparative Education (DICE) at the University of London Institute of Education, 7-9 May 1986.