SCHOOLING AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

IN CAMEROON

By

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DEDICATED to my mother Anna Abamut Elad
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moral and financial support has been
responsible for the completion of this
STUDY.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the effects of the level of schooling on National integration in English-speaking Cameroon. National integration is con- ceptualised as the creation of an individual's sense of identification and loyalty to the nation and his willingness to accept and integrate voluntarily with one's fellow citizens irrespective of their cultural or ethnic differences.

The main hypothesis adopted for the investigation (there will be a significant increase in positive attitudes towards National integration from primary to secondary and from secondary to post-secondary education) was confirmed. However, a Step-wise Multiple Regression Analysis of all the variables indicated that urbanization and not levels of educational attainment is a better predictor of National integration as far as this study is concerned.

Four scales, the Nationalism scale, the Friendship Choice scale, the Language Choice scale and the Language Use scale. A questionnaire was used to obtain data from 491 randomly selected subjects from primary, secondary and post-secondary students and also from the adult population. In addition to the demographic facts, the questionnaire used was composed of four scales, three behavioural and an attitude scale of the Likert type. These scales were modified in the field after the pilot study. The data obtained from these instruments were analysed by Gutman scale analysis, Pearson-product Moment Correlations, one way analysis of variance, factor analysis, multivariate analysis of variance and a step- wise multiple regression analysis. Comparisons were made between groups of students categorised by various demographic and educational factors

(e.g. age, levels of education, urbanization etc.) in order to demonstrate the schools foster a positive attitude towards integration and to discover the most effective variable that influences national integration.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM

a) THE OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

The present study attempts to examine by empirical field research the impact of levels of educational attainment on national integration in the two English-speaking provinces of the United Republic of Cameroon. Specifically, the study attempts to develop and design a research instrument, a questionnaire to assess the degree of ethnocentric feelings (as a measure of national integration) among primary school children, secondary student and post-secondary students in the country. A further objective is to improve understanding of the source of different attitudes by relating attitude variations to a series of independent and dependent variables which are identified later in the study. In broad terms, it is predicted that two measures of national integration: namely, the level of national identification and diminishing ethnocentrism, would correlate positively with increasing levels of educational attainment and with the quality and type of education received.

b) THE PROBLEM

The European colonialisation of Africa and the consequent partition of the continent in the nineteenth century created political units from an agglomeration of people possessing distinctive languages, religions and cultures; at the same time, once homogeneous groups within well-defined geographical, linguistic, and cultural entities were arbitrarily distributed into larger administrative entities, irrespective of traditional ethno-linguistic boundaries. As a result, most independent countries in Africa have emerged with plural societies characterised by the co-existence within the new political milieu of diverse ethnic groups with different languages, religions and cultures.

The United Republic of Cameroon is one of the countries that has in this way,

"inherited from history the greatest diversity. It has Bantus and Fans, Sudano-Bantus and Peuls, Arabs and pygmies etc. Its tribes and languages are innumerable. Situated at the Cross-roads (see Appendix 1) of the migrations, it is a veritable Africa in miniature. To complicate the picture, the majority of the North is Moslem, the South (Christians of various denominations),Animist, and the country has been colonised successively or simultaneously, by the Germans, the French and the British, all of whom have left often contradictory imprints on the ways in which Cameroonians think and Act."[1]

Accordingly, President Ahmadou Ahidjo has described Cameroon as "an original puzzle of living diversities"[2]. This puzzle includes not just the diversities of ethnic groups, cultures, language, religion, political institutions, history, but also geography, ecology and habitat.

As a political unit Cameroon faces internal stresses caused by diverse races, diverse and contradictory cultures, diverse languages and diverse religions. Recent tabulations (Rubin Neville 1971) have listed over 135 such diverse ethnic groups. Geographically and historically the country has little to unite it. Differing colonial experiences combine to exacerbate differences.Cameroon became independent

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1. See The Political Philosophy of Ahmadou Ahidjo, Political Bureau of the Cameroon National Union, Paul Bory Publishers, 1968, p. 26.
2. Ahmadou Ahidjo 'As told by Ahmadou Ahidjo' Political Bureau of the Cameroon National Union, 1968, p. 40.

after a total period of 77 years[1] of successive or simultaneous colonial rule under Germany, France and Britain and these three imperial powers differ considerably, not only in their colonial policies and administrative tactics, but equally so in their cultures which have exerted varying influences on Cameroonian behaviour and attitudes[2], will be amplified later as this thesis develops.

An appreciation of this variety and of the factors inviting diversity and disruption of Cameroon is essential to the understanding of the political context and consequently of the place of education as a unifying factor. The process of political integration has involved major changes which have included the abandonment in fact, if not in name, of the so-called "Westminster Pattern" of parliamentary democracy and some curtailment of freedom of expression both of the individual and of the press. The resultant political structure has involved the establishment of a powerful and unchallenged central political power, and year by year further measures are taken to achieve this end. Most of these have repercussions, more or less direct, on the way schools are organised and curricula developed.

1. German rule from 12th July 1884 to 1st January 1920 when the Treaty of Versailles came into force, French rule (in East Cameroon) from 1920 to 1960; British rule (in British Cameroon) from 1920 to 1961. See Mveng, 1970, Histoire du Cameroun.
2. For a subjective description of difference in perception, mentality, outlook, and tastes between English-speaking and French-speaking Cameroonians, see Le Monde Diplomatique issue of 17th July 1971. According to the writer of the article, German trained Cameroonians, French trained Cameroonians and British trained Cameroonians tend to think and act differently, having acquired cultural or sub-cultural frames of reference that approximates to the national characteristics of their colonial perceptors. It should be borne in mind that this article lacks empirical evidence.

Since independence then, efforts of Government have been directed
firstly towards consolidating her nation-hood and secondly to achieving
economic as well as political independence. This is shown by actions of
Government which have been illustrated above and by very powerful and
unequivocal statements by the President of the Republic, on the need for
national unity. For example, in the first congress of the Union
Cameroonaise in 1961, he said emphatically

"we are determined to purge our policy of every consideration,
every factor likely, directly or indirectly, to cement and
foster ethnic differences. National unity means that in the
work-yard of national construction there is neither Ewondo
nor Douala, Bamilike nor Boulou, Foulbe nor Bassa; we are,
one and all, simply Cameroonians"[1]

In a second address to the Legislative Assembly, President Ahidjo said
"Every nation is composed of a mosaic of families, tendencies
and interests. But a nation is not great, nor even viable,
until these various elements complement each other and combine
together in a constructive manner. This result can only be
obtained by freely made sacrifices; this means for some, the
desire to adhere to the social order, and for others the
concern for justice and progress"[2].

One could go on for pages quoting statements by Ahmadou Ahidjo and other
government officials on the adverse implications that a re-assertion of

1. Congress of the Union Camerounaise, Ebolowa, 4th to 8th July 1962.
2. Ahmadou Ahidjo, address to the Legislative Assembly, 6th May 1962.

ethnic aspirations could have for nation building. There is no speech that the President has made to the nation, the National Assembly or to a small gathering of Cameroonians with different tribal or ethnic backgrounds, in which he has not stressed the importance of people regarding themselves "first simply as Cameroonians".

"Nevertheless", President Ahidjo writes "Cameroon tribes are realities, but they are realities into which the leaders of the party and the state should search very diligently for those characteristics most calculated to help in grafting the tribes, one into the other, in merging them together, in order to hasten national unity".

In this ethnic puzzle, education is seen in Cameroon as elsewhere in Africa as the primary instrument of national integration.

"The schools.... play the same role of disintegration by undermining traditional concepts, introducing new values and spreading the idea of a more efficient body of know-ledge. Furthermore, the schools require the study of a foreign language which, after becoming a vernacular language, facilitates communications between people of different ethnic origins and thus enables them to feel no longer as strangers to each other."[1]

The integrative role of education, says Coleman (1965) is "more or less self-evident" but in the transitional period education may be dis-

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1. See, The Political Philosophy of Ahmadou Ahidjo, Political Bureau of the Cameroon National Union, Paul Bory Publishers, 1968, pp.27-28.

functional to political integration and mal-integrative in two respects.
It may "perpetuate the elite-mass gap", and it may

"perpetuate and even intensity divisions among different
ethnic regional and parochial groups out of which nation
builders partly through education, must forge a larger
sense of national identity".[1]

It must also be added that in plural societies like Cameroon, different
groups, even when socialised under the same educational system (in this
case they are not) may internalise different terminal as well as
instrumental values, and may vary in their respective allegiences to
the political centre. In the long run, however, (and where there is a
policy of giving priority to the achievement of equity of educational
provision to encourage acceptance of national norms and ideologies
which creates a division between a small education group and the mass
of the population),[2] and where school curricula are sufficiently adapted
to reflect national values and ideologies, formal education amongst the
masses is designed to lessen many inter-cultural differences and helps
to replace particularistic and local values by attitudes more consonant
with the needs of the whole nation.

In a recent general policy report, President Ahmadou Ahidjo indicated
that his government had given priority both to the achievement of equity
of educational provision and the reform and harmonisation of the
curricula as a way of ensuring and consolidating national unity. He said,

1. See Coleman, James S., _Education and Political Development_ 1965,
   p. 30.
2. McLean Martin, The political context of educational development, A
   commentary on the theories of development underlying the 1979 World
   Bank Education Sector Policy _Comparative Education_, 1980, p. 8.

inter alia,

> "that general secondary education establishments have been
> set up in various administrative units following the targets
> of the plan which provide for the opening of a high school in
> the chief-town of every division and a general education
> college in each sub-division in accordance with the policy
> which aims at bringing the school to the family."[1]

On the reform and harmonisation of the curricula, he told the delegates
that government has been reforming the educational system

> "by adapting it to the requirements of national development
> and to the respect of our values so as to base it at all
> levels, not only on the instruction but on experience within
> the meaning of being faithful to our values, knowing how to
> live with others. In the same line of thought, we are pur-
> suing our endeavour to harmonise education syllabuses and
> examinations now obtaining in the English-speaking and
> French-speaking provinces".

Although, it is true that the government has established at least one
grammar school and a number of secondary modern schools in each
administrative region, there exists great ethnic disparities in enrolment
rates and these disparities are not likely to decline over time. Remi
Clignet (1975) has also shown that ethnic inequalities are likely to be
associated with other forms of inequities which might threaten co-
existence between ethnic groups. Clignet is, therefore, forced to the

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1. Ahmadou Ahidjo, General Policy Report presented by the National
   President of the Cameroon National Union, President of the United
   Republic of Cameroon Bafoussam, 13th February 1980 pp. 35-36.

conclusion that

> "the contribution of Cameroonian schools to national integration
> remains fragile. Individuals who share similar educational
> experiences but do not have the same ethnic background often
> do not enjoy the same occupational status nor the same level
> of occupational attainment".[1]

While it may be true to say that people with the same educational
qualification from the same school do not necessarily enjoy the same
occupational status, it is difficult to know whether or not they have
received the same experiences as this would depend, as it was indicated
earlier, on the personality of the individuals, their abilities and upon
the resilience or the fragility of their ethnic and cultural backgrounds.
Nor would the fact that they do not enjoy the same occupational status
tell us anything about their feelings towards society and towards others.
Clignet's pessimistic evaluation stems from his approach which is con-
cerned with equity in educational provision as a measure of national
integration. This study takes as its point of departure the hypotheses
that national integration is the creation of a sense of national
identification and the willingness to accept other ethnic groups as
fellow citizens. The first step in this direction consists of assessing
the degree to which educated people choose friends outside their ethnic
group and secondly, how far they see themselves as Cameroonians, thereby
recognising wider loyalties beyond those of the clan and/or village.

1. Clignet Remi, The Search for National Integration in Africa, Smock,
D. R. and Bentsi-Enchill, The Free Press, 1975 , pp. 155-156.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1   BACKGROUND TO THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

1.2   HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

1.3   ENGLISH-SPEAKING CAMEROON

1.3.1 ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING
       CAMEROON

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY: GEOGRAPHY

Cameroon - "An Original Puzzle of Living Diversities"

The United Republic of Cameroon is situated on the edge of the Gulf of Guinea. It lies between 4° and $12^{\circ}30'$ N of the equator and $8^{\circ}30'$ and $14^{\circ}50'$ E of Greenwich. The whole territory is thus located within the humid tropical region of Africa. It has frontiers with Nigeria to the West, Chad to the North, the Central African Republic to the East and the Congo Republic (Brazzaville), Gabon and Rio-Muni to the South. This coastline stretches from Rio-del-Rey down to Rio-Muni. It is strategically located so as to occupy the area between the coastal states of West Africa and the Western coastline of the equatorial states to its South.

As Rubin points out, the wedge shape inherited from colonial partition is symbolic in significance as well.[1] By accident of history, Cameroon finds itself conveniently situated at the junction of two distinct geographic areas in Africa, stretching northwards from the Bight of Biafra to Lake Chad and the fringes of the great Sahara Desert.

As one of the smaller and less known countries outside Africa, Cameroon covers a surface area of 183,000 square miles, which is 16% of the total area of the continent of Africa and ranks twentieth among the non-insular states, far smaller than Suden, Nigeria, Algeria, Zaire, Liberia or Chad. It is also interesting to note that because of its configurations and its geographic situation, Cameroon enjoys a wide variety of climates and varying rainfalls. Its highly diversified topography ranging from

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1. Rubin, Neville, Cameroon: An African Federation, Pall Mall Press, 1971, p. 4.

less than one foot above sea level at Kribi and Victoria to over 13,350 feet at the top of Mount Cameroon and stretching to over 770 miles into the interior, gives rise to a wide range of physical and human environments.

As already indicated, Cameroon is a land of diversity and variety. This variety is amplified by a gamut of peoples, religions and culture as well as different European influences, so that Cameroon may claim with some justification to synthesize (in the sense of its colonial heritage) much of tropical Africa.

The pattern of population distribution in Cameroon has been influenced by rainfall, relief and soil fertility[1] with great differences of latitudes and altitudes, Cameroon enjoys several climates. Corresponding to these climatic zones is the mantle of vegetation ranges.On purely geographic criteria, that is, as far as topography, climate and vegetation are concerned, it is possible to divide Cameroon into five natural regions.[2] But as the study is concerned with people, we propose four main subdivisions based on relief, vegetation, climate and human type (broad divisions).

The first is the coastal plain bordering on the Atlantic Ocean. This relatively low-lying region, interrupted only by the Cameroon Mountain (13,370 feet) is traversed by many swiftly flowing rivers. It stretches from Rio-del-Rey through Victoria, Tiko, Duala, and Kribi downto Rio-

1. Other factors historical and human, have played their role such as the ravages of tribal wars and slavery.
2. Le Vine, Victor The Cameroon from Mandate to Indpendence, University of California Press, 1964, p.3 Ngwa, J. N., An Outline of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, divides Cameroon into four major regions, using basically a relief criteria, 1967, p. 13. So does Clarke, J. I, Cameroon Focus, American Geographical Society Vol. XVI No. 7, March 1916, p. 13.

Muni. The area is largely covered by dense forest, marshes and mangrove swamps. The climate is hot, averaging 80°F and humid. Average rainfall, for example, varies from 150 to 200 inches along the coast. Debundscha, near the foot of the Cameroon Mountain, with 400 inches of rainfall annually, is the second wettest place known in the world. In this region, a civilisation developed whose artistic, economic and political aspects is of great interest. At the foot of the Mbo (Manenguba and Kupe) and Fako Chains and in the rich valleys sloping down towards the coast live the Mbo, Bakaka, Bakweri, Ndian and Bakosi cultural groups. Most people in this coastal area speak Douala as a first or second language.

Above the coastal plain, with an abrupt change of altitude, is the southern region, extending from the Sanaga River to the edge of the Middle Congo Basin. It is a region of plateau averaging 2,100 feet with a sparse equatorial forest. The greater part of this plateau is in the Francophone region of Cameroon. It extends from the south to Garoua in the north. The climate is also hot and humid and rainfall averages between 60-80 inches a year. This zone is dominated by people of Bantu origin. A small number of pygmies from the Great Congo Basin are also to be found in this region. The most prominent tribes are the Douala, Bassa or Ewondo, Bamum and the Tikar of the Anglophone region.

North of the Sanaga River, begins the Adamawa or Central plateau. This range of plateau begins from south of the Lake Chad lowlands, is broken by the River Benue, and stretches south-west, almost along the Nigerian border, reaching the Atlantic Ocean near the lofty Cameroon mountain. This is an area of transition between the forested south and the northern Savannah. The altitude ranges between 2,600 to 5,000 feet above sea level and rainfall decreases as one moves northwards from 60 to about 20

inches along the south of the Chad Basin.

The Adamawa forms a watershed for many rivers and, consequently, as a divider of population. Running in an oblique line from south-west to east, the enormous plateau divides Cameroon into two distinct regions. It also forms a human divide between the Bantu of the South and the Sudanese and Arabs of the North. The dominant cultural groups are the Fulani and the Tikar and some of the groups are quite large. Living in the midst of these large groups, who constitute political societies with organised economies, and political and administrative structures are the Bororo, who are perpetually on the move with their cattle.

The last of our subdivisions is the Chad Basin. The region begins North of the Benue Valley and slopes gradually northwards to Lake Chad. This is an inland drainage area from which water has no outlet to the sea. It is hot and temperatures are always more than ninety degrees centigrade. The region is a point of confluence of a mixture of peoples and also a big centre of civilisation. It is here that the great Sao and Sori tribal groups meet.

Geologically, then, the Republic of Cameroon lies on a fault zone with volcanoes and mountains which render the land rugged and inaccessible in places. The broken terrain and the dense forests have undoubtedly led to tribal isolation arising from linguistic and cultural differences. The fact that the inward looking nature of these diverse groups of people presents a political source of disunity, accounts for the emphasis in national unity since independence towards increasing centralization.

1.2   HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this brief historical introduction is to show the
particular circumstance underlying the birth and the development of
Cameroon, and to highlight the urgent and difficult task of promoting
a sense of national unity and identity among Cameroonians. This is
because of the variety of colonial experiences acquired by the differing
populations of the country and of their distinctive ethno-cultural out-
look.

Prior to the European political administration in Cameroon, there were
such potentates as King Bell, King Akwa, Chief Manga William and Njoya,
the Sultan of Fumban, exercising political power over large tribal
groups and clusters of inward-looking villages, but the emergence of
Cameroon as a single political entity was the result of European
activities[1], and the delimitation of frontiers often involved consideration
of European interests, not only in Cameroon, but even interests outside
Cameroon[2], and this has given Cameroon the characteristic feature of
being a country where for years both populations, shape and size[3] were

1. See File Co 649/9 in P.R.O. in a series of Minutes marked very pressing
   and confidential for the external considerations for which Britain
   handed Douala Port to France contrary to yearnings of natives and
   British commercial interest in general and the specific interest of
   the British companies who made representations through George A.
   Giggs (M.P. for Bristol West) to Sir Edward Grey. Paragraph 2 of the
   Minutes of 23rd February 1916 reads "Monsier Picot then said that
   this soreness might be overcome and all agitation for participation
   in East Africa suppressed if H.M.'s Government would meet French
   aspirations in Cameroon ..... On being pressed to define these
   desiderata M. Picot said that the Port of Douala was essential and
   on this point there could be no compromise".
2. Dumont, Rene, L'Afrique Noire est mal Partie, Paris,1962, Passim,
   for a universalization.
3. See Map 1, see Appendix I.

variables until 1961 when the present size and shape were finally fixed, after Northern Cameroon had opted to join the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the former Southern Cameroons opting to join the French Cameroon rather than Nigeria.

Cameroon embraces several of the cultural groups of Africa. Thus, the peoples inhabiting the Southern coast of Cameroon include units variously termed those of the Guinea Coast, Western Atlantic or Negritic groups; as well as peoples more closely allied to those of the Bantu or Bantoid languages. In the North, ethnic groups are said to relate to Chadic, Western Sudan or Hamitic blocks.[1]

In the centre of the country are Bantu, Bantoid or Semi-Bantu groups as well as pygmies. All these groups of people are thought to have come to Cameroon from other parts of Africa. These groups migrated to Cameroon at various times before the thirteenth century.[2] What is important for this study is that in the South (including Anglophone Cameroon) these ethnic groups clustered themselves into ethnic communities who were ruled by powerful chiefs and in the north, where as a result of Islamic

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1. Rubin, Neville, Cameroon: An African Federation, London, Pall Mall Press, 1971, p. 9.
2. This classification has no immediate relevance for the present study for two reasons, firstly, the introduction here is very general and does not specifically refer to Anglophone Cameroon where this study is based, and secondly, there are very wide disagreements about those classifications - see Victor T. Levine, Cameroon from Mandate to Indpendence op. cit. He also distinguishes the following groups, a) Semite (the Arabic, Chadic or Fulani), b) other northern groups known collectively as the Kirdi, c) two groups of Bantus - the equatorial Bantu and the northwest Bantu and d) the pygmies. In this he follows Murdock, Africa: its peoples and their culture, op. cit. who in turn based his categories on J. H. Greenberg's Studies in African Linguistic Classification. But see the doubts expressed by E. Ardener, loc cit., p. 40.

influence, genuine states had been established with political and military organisations, by Sultans who were dependent on the Emir of Yola, he himself a protege of the Emperor of Sokoto. Nowhere, was anyone aware of belonging to a single and selfsame community of interests known as the Cameroons. The only solid social frames were provided by ethnic and clan groupings. Ethnic groups possessed their own means of communication in the modern sense of the term and no chief was powerful enough to impose his authority on the country as a whole. As Albert Owona pointed out in his paper, each of these communities lived in seclusion and led a life of its own.[1]

The advent of settlers from Europe were soon to undermine the authority of the traditional chiefs. The first European to reach Cameroon was a Portuguese sailor and explorer, Fernando Poo at the end of the fifteenth century. The name Cameroon is based on the large quantities of prawns which he found at the estuary of River Wouri at the bend of the West African Coastline, which he named Rio Das Camaroos or River of Prawns. Two centuries later, European traders established trading posts and by the end of the eighteenth century, the British influence was predominant and established a settlement on the estuary. Soon after, the French and Germans began to show interest. After much jockeying for position, Germany seized its opportunity in 1884 by establishing treaties with native kings. From 1884 to 1918 when a combined force of British and French soldiers defeated the Germans in Cameroon, Germany had extended its dominion to more than twice the present area of Cameroon and initiated economic development.

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1. Owona, A., Cameroon Nationalism in the Making: Its Origins and Foundations. A paper read at the Round Table organised in Paris in May 1962. Original French translation sh/PRF/70/2178.
2. Clarke, J. I., Cameroon Focus, op. cit., p. 18.

German rule in Cameroon had severe contradictions as Clignet points out, even though Bismarck was particularly anxious to assert a uniform German influence and hence to establish a highly centralised form of colonial control; his policies in this regard were thwarted by a number of factors.[1] Firstly, the first German traders, missionaries and administrators could not, without jeopardizing their long-term interests, depart too markedly from the empirically orientated policies adopted by the English explorers. Secondly, many powerful metropolitan interest groups deemed the German presence in Africa to be more costly than promising, and such groups were successful in limiting the financial and human resources assigned to the Cameroon experiment.[2]

German colonial practices were relatively decentralised, notably in the educational field where most significant initiatives were taken by religious missions.[3] But the study of the German language was introduced in all schools by government decree of 1910.[4] Commercial traders were instructed to use German in all official communications; the German language became compulsory in schools. The decree also authorised the teaching of a local language, but not outside of their ethnic areas.

1. Clignet, Remi, 'The role of school in the rise of Cameroon Nationalism' in Education and Urban Society, Vol. 2, 1978, p. 179.
2. Levine, Victor, The Federal Republic of Cameroon, New York, Cornell University Press, 1971.
3. Van Der Phoeg, A., Education in Colonial Africa. The German experience 1885-1900, Comparative Education Centre, University of Chicago .
4. Reppel Education, Die landes gesetggeburyfur das schutggebiet Kamerun (The Territorial Law for the Cameroon Protectorate), Berlin, E. S. Mittler, 1912, pp. 1142-1145.

The opposite side of the coin, so to speak, of this policy was to en-
courage and entrench ethnic feelings among those ethnic groups whose
mother tongues were not being taught. Opposition to the introduction of
a local language was fierce and it carried tribal or ethnic overtones:
Keller (1969) described these grievances when the people petitioned to
the government in these words

> "we your humble petitioners beg respectfully to forward to
> your Grace our complaint respecting the sort of education
> given to our children in the Duala language. It is quite
> against reason that our children should be educated in a
> barbarous tongue instead of a civilised one either German
> or English. (my underlining) We have reasons for protesting
> against this and two of our principal reasons are that
> children could not obtain employment under the German
> government or under any civilized person or persons
> when they are grown up because they could never understand
> what to do. Also the Duala language is not our native
> tongue"[1] (my underlining).

The opposition to education in Douala was based on two objections.
Firstly, for many Cameroonians, it was not their mother tongue. There
was also a realization that if the local language was used in school,
the native speakers of that language would have an in-built advantage.
The second objective was that the purpose of sending a child to school
was in order that he should obtain a job within the colonial administration

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1. Keller, W., The history of the Presbyterian Church in West Cameroon,
   Pressbook Victoria, 1969, p. 37.

or economy. However, the high-handedness of the Germans minimised any large scale opposition to the policy. It is, however, pertinent to note that even today the Government of Cameroon has no indigenous language policy.

At the end of the First World War, and with the defeat of the Germans in 1916, mandates were issued by the League of Nations to France and Britain, the French portion being more than nine-tenths of the whole, while the small British portion was divided into two regions, Southern Cameroon and Northern Cameroon. After the Second World War, the mandates were replaced by United Nations trusteeships, but administered by the same powers, which held quite different concepts of their functions. This particular arrangement had a number of economic, educational and political implications. As far as this study is concerned, the determined policy of the French to 'assimilate' had impact much deeper than that of the British, who administered their trusteeship as part of the then Eastern Nigeria.[1]

The policies of assimilation adopted by the French and that of indirect rule adopted by the British had wider implications. In the French Cameroon, the territory was divided into traditional divisions and these in turn into subdivisions. A political bureau and an economic bureau were created and a number of official decrees and ordinances (arretes and ordinances) were issued to provide some direction in social and economic matters. They also introduced a well-organised selective

1. Mortimer, E., France and the Africans 1944-1960, Faber and Faber, London, 1969, pp. 34-35.

educational system, using French as the official language. Language teaching for the French was very important for they felt through language the French culture would be brought to Cameroonian people. Froelich[1] expressed this view when he wrote "C'est la porte ouverte vers la culture, vers l'avenir, vers le progress". (It, (language) is the open door towards culture, towards future, towards progress.) To implement this policy, recourse to local languages as a medium for communication in the administration, commerce or even daily life was discouraged, apart from in purely local or domestic situations. The curriculum and syllabus were all written in French. It was essential for instructions in every other subject and often began on the first day in school. The government made financial aid to Mission Schools that followed the recommended curriculum.

Many schools were opened at all levels and government scholarships enabled Cameroonians to study in France at secondary, technical and university level. The French actually saw language as a cultural and unifying force. As a result, when the Supreme Allied Council of the League of Nations asked why French rather than a local language was the language of the school, the French representative replied "What other language might be employed? Could the language be one of the local languages, one of which was not used widely enough to make it a lingua franca and many of which for historic reasons were anathema to other indigenous groups? Why not French, with its lack of inter-tribal association, its unifying influence and its worldwide usefulness?"[2]

1. Froelich, Jean Claude, Cameroon, Togo, Territories son Tutelle Paris, Editors Berger-Levrault, 1957, p. 83.
   Also Vernon Jackson, Language Schools and Government in Cameroon, Teacher College Press, Teacher College Columbia University, New York, 1967, p. 14.
2. cited by Vernon Jackson, op. cit., p. 15.

It is probably the same calculations that have influenced the use of French and English (and not local languages) as official languages of Cameroon.

The administration, designed to show the pace of political growth and the wholesome suppression of traditional authority through direct administration methods, called forth increasingly active opposition from both traditional leaders and the newly educated elite. This, of course, was one of the paradoxes of the period, a paradox not uncommon elsewhere in colonial Africa, that the French undermined their administrative policies by the very education they took pains to encourage.[1] However, all these do not minimise the important part played by the Missions, especially through their schools,in which although they offered the official prescribed courses, inculcated ideas such as freedom, liberty and independence whose effect was to encourage challenge to the regime.

1. Le Vine, Victor, op. cit., p. 118.

1.3   ENGLISH-SPEAKING CAMEROON

The Anglophone region, where this study is based, is wedged between the
Republic of Nigeria and the Francophone zone of the United Republic of
Cameroon, in an area where West Africa and Equatorial Africa merge (see
Appendix I). Its surface area of nearly 17,000 square miles constitutes
less than one-tenth of the total area of the Republic.

In this region, as indeed in the rest of Cameroon, there are various
ethnic groups, corresponding to the relief, certain elements of which
have contributed to the settling of peoples in their natural sites. They
have moulded the spirit and allegiance of these peoples and endowed them,
as Bahoken and Atangana point out, with particular character traits.[1]

The configuration of the land in Anglophone Cameroon gives the region
great variety. As regards relief, there is from North to South a chain
of mountains varying in height. Ngwa[2] divides the state into five main
geographic regions, from North to South, but as far as this study is
concerned, and as a matter of introduction, two broad zones have been
proposed: the forest and the grassland zones which correspond to two
broad cultural groups. The main criterion of ethnic classification of
the people of this region is linguistic.

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1. Bahoken, J. C. and Atangana, E., Cultural Policy of the URC, The
   UNESCO Press, Paris, 1976, p. 9.
2. Ngwa, J. A., An outline geography of the Federal Republic of
   Cameroon, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning.
   The Population of West Cameroon Main findings of the 1964 demographic
   sample survey, 1967, p. 31.

There is, however, an important cultural distinctiveness between the grasslands and the forest peoples, irrespective of the broad linguistic division. Within both regions, a further cultural distinction will be made in a later Chapter. For example, within what is usually called Forest Culture, there is a distinction between those focussed on the Cross River (Manyu and parts of Meme Division) and those focussed on the Coast (the rest of Meme and all of Fako Division) (see Appendix II.)

The forest region includes the administrative divisions of Fako, Ndian, Meme and Manyu. As the name implies, the region is forested and the land rises precipitously from the coastal basins of Rio-del-Rey and Tiko to an altitude of 13,350 feet on Mount Cameroon. The volcanic lava from the active Mount Cameroon has weathered into rich black soils. There is heavy rainfall in the region. Human settlement and areas of activity are determined by the topography of the region. In Fako and Meme Divisions, all the people (with the exception of the Kurop and Efik of the Western borders of Meme Division and the Fish towns of Rio-del-Rey), speak Bantu languages of the North-Western groups. In Manyu, Mezam and most of the grasslands the people speak various languages classified as Bantoid.

The second geographic zone includes the divisions of Momo, Mezam, Bui, Donga and Mantung, and Mentchum. A plateau of granitic origin, covers most of Donga and Mantung and Mentchum divisions. It is a continuation of the low plateau which covers most of the Francophone provinces of the West and Centre-South. The plateau is of broken aspect and descends towards the West and the North. The vegetation is savannah grasslands. The central part of Mezam division is also covered by a mountain chain of volcanic origin. This chain of mountains stretches from the Kumbo Mountains (2,590 metres) along the inter-states borders southwards to the Forest zones.

There are numerous linguistic groups identifiable in the grassland zone, but superimposed upon these linguistic divisions is the broad cultural group, among which the most remarkable is a general cultural uniformity to be found in all the five northern divisions and which is related to the neighbouring cultures of the Bamileke and Bamum in Francophone Cameroon.

1.3.1 ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING CAMEROON

The British sector consisted of two unequal wedges of territories
adjacent to the Nigerian borders.[1] The British ruled British Cameroon
by indirect methods through the representation of the traditional
nobility. The territory was divided into two sectors: Northern Cameroon,
mostly Moslem, administered as part of Northern Nigeria and Southern
Cameroon administered as part of the Eastern Region of Southern Nigeria.[2]

In the Southern Sector, the British found many tribal groups, clans,
chiefdoms, and other traditional political arrangements. In the extreme
South, around Victoria, Tiko and Buea, the Germans had already created a
number of local chieftaincies to rule the local tribes. Further North,
in the Bamenda section, the large grassland and highland areas were
under the rule of traditional chiefs (Fons), the natural and often auto-
cratic rulers of a number of Tikar, Bali and Widikum tribal groups. By
1936, the British government had created a wide variety of native
authorities, most of them based upon fairly accurate evaluation of the
nature of the local socio-political structures.

In the Bamenda province, the Fons of Bali, Kom, Banso, and the Fon of
Bangwa in Mamfe Division became the native authorities complete with
courts and councils. This process was carried out throughout the
territory. In the Northern sections, there was a well-established highly
developed political tradition, associated with divine Kingship which

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1. See Appendix *I and II*
2. The Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated that 'C' mandates
   "can be administered under thelaws of the mandatory as integral
   portions of its territory" (Act 22, Section). See Quincy Wright,
   Mandates under the League of Nations, Chicago, University of Chicago
   Press, 1930, pp. 414-415.

remained typical of the Islamic Kingdoms and empires.

In administering the territory, while the French had a systematic and uniform language teaching policy, the British were more laissez-faire in their language policy. In Northern Cameroon which was dominated by Fulani Moslems, had only Koranic schools. With this background, the British government included these schools as part of the educational system of the Northern province of Nigeria. These schools reflected British colonial policies which encouraged the use of the local language in the primary schools, to be followed inthe higher forms by instruction in English. For further training at secondary, teacher-training and technical education, students went to Nigeria where English was the official language.

In the Southern province, the schools were included with those of the Eastern region of Nigeria. English and 'Pidgin' were the language of interaction and inter-ethnic communication. During the early years, the territory experienced a severe economic depression and the virtual stagnation of all development including education which was restricted entirely to the primary level.[1] Thus, the disparity in development resulted in an intensification of the differential experience of colonialism between the North and the South of the territory which was increased as the provision of education resulted in the incorporation of individuals in the Southern region into the structure of colonialism earlier than in the North.

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1. Vernon Jackson, op. cit., p. 17

Cameroon became independent after a total of 77 years[1] of successive or
simultaneous colonial rule under German, French and British and these
three great powers being considerably contradictory, not only in the
colonial policies and administrative tactics, but equally so in their
educational philosophies.[2] The philosophical bases of the educational
policy and practices of each power would appear to be the extent to which
each colonial power was prepared to recognise firstly racial equality,
or whether they regarded natives as instruments for labour and production.
Secondly, how far each power recognised the rights of the individual vis-
a-vis those of the society, and thirdly, whether they were consciously
promoting the mission of a superior culture working to 'civilise back-
ward people'.

As Clignet (1978) reminds his readers, the two parts of Cameroon have not
only experienced different forms of colonialism, but have also been in-
hibited by ethnic groups with distinctive cultural orientations. In spite
of the common Bantu origin, controls in the migratory patterns of
peoples living in the coastal and Northern areas of the two parts of
Cameroon, are associated with paralelled differences in economic,
political and social organisations. The combined influence of low density
and of modes of subsistence has induced the dispersion of peoples among
a variety of small villages occupied by segments of lineage which controls
the economic, political and social activities of members.[3] It is in this
environment that the school is expected to enhance the sense of national
identity among their pupils.

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1. German rule from 12th July 1884 to 1st January 1920 when the Treaty
   of Versailles came into force; French rule from 1920-1960; British
   rule from 1920-1961. See Nveng: Histoire du Cameroon, Passim.
2. See H. Bohner's Die Ergihung des Kamerun - Negus Zur Kultur (The
   Education of the Mamerun Negro into culture), 1920, pp. 8-23.
3. Clignet, Remi, op. cit., p. 80.

CHAPTER TWO

TRIBE, ETHNIC GROUP, AND ETHNICITY — AN OVERVIEW

2.1   INTRODUCTION

A great deal of work in social sciences and social psychology devoted to national integration and in particular to ethnic relations in Africa seems contradictory and confusing. The confusion begins with the application of two terms - 'ethnic/ethnicity' and 'tribe/tribalism'. This section will look critically at the different application of the two concepts in recent writings.

2.2   TRIBE OR ETHNICITY? AN OVERVIEW

In an introduction to the study of multi-tribalism in Africa, Philip Mayer (1962) divides the concept of tribe into two broad emphases. He writes

"when using the first emphasis, one sees the problem as

the fact that certain behaviour patterns, attitudes, or

norms indigenous to the tribal cultures of Africa, are

'non-western' in quality and seem out of place in the

contemporary setting. In its second usage, the problem

of tribalism emphasises something rather different. It

refers specifically to the pressure of social and

political cleavages - oppositions between one tribe and

another".[1]

In its more etymological usage, 'tribe' merely refers to a group of people, that is, to some sort of social unit. But implicit in the use

1. Mayer, Philip, Introduction - 'The study of multi-tribalism' in the Proceedings of the Sixteenth Conference of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute held at the Oppenheimer College for Social Science, A. A. Dub, Lusaka, 1962.

of the term is the idea that the social unit also represents a cultural
unit. Such a social unit need not be in perpetual opposition to another
group as Mayer's second definition implies.

In a paper presented at the same conference as Mayer, P. C. Lloyd (1962)
identified three allied concepts of tribalism. He saw tribalism,

> "firstly as the continual observance of traditional norms,
>
> secondly as the paramount loyalty to one's own family,
>
> village or Kingdom, and thirdly as the development of
>
> pride in one's own traditional culture."[1]

The first two concepts correspond to Mayer's categorisation. But loyalty
to one's family, loyalty to the tribal community and loyalty to the
tribal government or chief, does not necessarily mean adherence to
traditional norms. Indeed, Wallerstein (1960), writing of the Ivory
Coast, differentiates between loyalty to one's family or tribal govern-
ment or chief, and loyalty to an ethnic group. He sees loyalty to a
tribal community or loyalty to a tribal government as a rural phenomenon,
and loyalty to an ethnic group as an urban phenomenon. He writes,

> "we shall see that quite often the group from which the
>
> individual is 'detribalised' (that is, the tribe to which
>
> chief he no longer pays the same fealty) is not necessarily
>
> the same ethnic group into which he is 'super-tribalised' —
>
> that is, the ethnic group to which he feels strong bonds
>
> of attachments in the urban context."[2]

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1. Lloyd, P. C., 'Tribalism in Nigeria', op. cit., 1962, pp. 134-135.
2. Wallerstein, I., 'Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa',
   Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, No. 3, 1960, p. 131.

According to him, the term 'tribe' should only be used for the groups in
rural areas. By restricting the term to rural groups, he implicitly
equates tribe with 'traditionalism', perhaps in opposition to greater
susceptibility to modernising influences.

In what seems a rather derogatory and out-of-date definition, Morton
Fried (1966) describes tribalism as

> "an atavistic sentiment found among primitive peoples who
> have always preferred to live in kin-organised groups
> and who resist incorporation into larger socio-cultural
> entities."[1]

Fried completely ignores the dynamism of socio-cultural ties of a tribe
which are based on tradition and kinship. It is to a certain extent in-
evitable that primary loyalties should remain at clan or village level –
especially in the rural areas. For as Wallerstein points out, in urban
areas, there are new sources of power, new affiliation and loyalties.
But 'resistance' to socio-economic change (in the sense of refusing to
acknowledge wider affiliations beyond that of the village or tribe)
can no longer be said to characterise most part of Africa with the
influence and determination of Central Governments to reach all, but
the remotest of areas with the radio school and other social amenities.

Tribalism for many writers appears to be at the root of the present
upheavals and the basis of tension in most of African nation-states.
For example, Herskovits (1962) explained the Zairian (Congo) Katanga

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1. Morton, Fried, 'On the Concept of Tribe and Tribal Society,' Transaction
   of the New York Academy of Science, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1966, pp. 527-540.

crises in terms of inter-tribal loyalties. He wrote:

> "Tribal loyalties and ancient hostilities generated fears
>
> that erupted as colonial controls were relaxed, so that
>
> actual warfare, often with weapons that outdated the
>
> introduction of firearms, broke out between the Baluba and
>
> Benelulua in the Kasai even before independence."[1]

As with Morton's (1966), there is in Herskovits' definition a juxta-
position of 'tribal loyalties', 'ancient hostilities' and 'tribal
warfare' with antique weapons thereby lamenting a return to primordial
sentiment of kinship as contrasted with worldwide allegiance. In other
words, the so-called tribalist is regarded as a conservative promoter
of traditional values and aspirations, which can generate deep-rooted
inter-ethnic hostilities and rivalry.

Similarly, unrest in Nigeria culminating in the Civil War has been
attributed by foreign correspondents to a renewal of the 'primitive'
tribal sentiments. A reporter in an American weekly magazine wrote:

> "Nigeria was only a collection of tribes for centuries.
>
> Britain took over for 100 years..... A new breed of Nigerians
>
> (appeared and) took over a new nation in 1962..... But the
>
> veneer was thin. Tribal rivalries broke through in bloody
>
> change in January."[2,3]

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1. Herskovits, M. J., The human factor in changing Africa, New York,
   Alfred Kuopf, 1962, p. 346.
2. cf. Morton, Fried, Essays on the Problem of Tribe: Proceedings of the
   1967 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Athnological Society, p. 54.
3. 'US News and World Report',1966, p. 54.

The assumption here is that the primordial ties and suspicions endemic among the ethnic groups in Nigeria had re-emerged, and that the Nigerians turned back to their old tribal ties, irrespective of the undermining effect on national unity.

To see the Nigeria-Biafra War or any other conflict in Africa solely in terms of ethnic antagonism is to offer a very simplistic explanation. Several problems arise when conflicts in contemporary African societies are attributed to atavistic tribalism. First, the belief supports the distorted view that pre-colonial Africa was inhabited primarily by antagonistic tribal groups. Secondly, it belittles the many significant changes that occurred in Africa during the colonial era. And thirdly, it masks and over-simplifies the nature of the struggles now taking place in Africa, minimises the role of the emergent elite class, and plays down on the economic and social upheavals of modernisation which have taken place in recent years.[1]

However, John Mitchell (1967) departs from the explanation of associating 'tribalism' with 'primitivity' and 'traditionalism' and sees the term as a significant factor in human relations. He writes

"tribalism only arises in situations where people from
widely different backgrounds were thrown together in social
interaction, for example, in industrial areas and other
labour centres such as in schools, in farms etc. It is

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1. See Elliott Skinner 'Group dynamics in the politics of changing societies: The Problem of Tribal Politics in Africa' in Essays on the problem of tribe: Proceedings of the 1967 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society, pp. 170-193.

then that differences in language, beliefs, values – in

short culture – is observed."[1]

This view has since been developed by British anthropologists influenced
by Malinowski's[2] view on the subject. His own field work has led him to
develop a particular concept of culture. One of the fundamental
assumptions in this approach was that those institutions that can be
said to constitute culture formed a coherent whole. Relying heavily on
behaviouristic psychology, Malinowski saw culture as a set of customs,
practices and beliefs which the individual during maturation incorporated
into his habitual behaviour.

Mitchell's definition is an attempt to relate the customs and practices
of an ethnic group to the social situations in which they appear. The
virtue of this approach has been to recognise the importance of
'situational selection' in interaction, that is individuals are able to
discriminate among the beliefs, values and social practices in terms of
the situations in which they find themselves. This view contradicts
Malinowski's view of culture as behaviour patterns which individuals
acquire through a complex process of conditioned reflex learning. The
implication of Malinowski's view was that social change is centred on
the individual almost autonomously outside the social situation being
observed.

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1. Mitchell, J. C., op. cit., Essays on the problem of tribe , p. 2.
2. Malinowski, B., 'Methods of Study of Culture Contact' in
   International Institute of African Languages and Cultures, Memo XV,
   1938.

Concerning the usage of the concept of tribe, Paul Mercier (1965)[1] has isolated a number of criteria found in social science literature on Africa among which one can enumerate the following. Firstly, common territory of origin; secondly, a linguistic category; thirdly, a way of life (subsuming the major dimensions of socio-cultural existence such as the economy, religion and the like); fourthly, a political federation or alliance of smaller related ethnic collectivities and fifthly, self-definition by the members (particularly presumed blood or kinship ties). Following these criteria, the task of isolating the ethnic units in the two English speaking provinces does not seem to present serious difficulties.

However, the discrimination power of the criteria seems to rest largely on the simplicity of the situation, rather than on the sensitivity of the criteria per se. In other words, such criteria do not indicate the degree to which a person participates in the traditional and socio-cultural milieu, nor do they indicate the degree to which he pays loyalty to his ethnic group. It should also be noted that the greater the complexity of a multi-ethnic society, the greater the need to employ multiple criteria in delineating tribal groups as social entities.

However, in considering different interpretations of the concept of tribe, it is unfortunate as Elliott Skinner points out, that tribalism (with all its prejorative connotations of primitivity and traditionalism) has been used to explain the causes of tension in Africa by somewhat

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1. Mercier, Paul, 'On the meaning of tribalism in Black Africa' in Pierre van den Berghe, *Africa: Social Problems and Change and Conflict*, San Francisco, Chandler, 1965, pp. 483-501.

greedy and ambitious groups competing for power and prestige in con-
temporary Africa.[1] The competition for power and prestige is generally
seen among the elites.It is the elites who manipulate tribal or cultural
pluralism for their own pursuit of political power and scarce economic
benefits. As Van den Berghe has noted, most ethnic or tribal conflicts
in Africa stem in good part from competition for power and wealth. He
writes:

> "In the scramble for salaried positions in the Civil Service,
> the Army, the school and the universities, the state cor-
> porations, and the private bureaucracy, the easiest way to
> eliminate the majority of one's competitors is by making a
> tribal claim to the job and by mobilising political support,
> on an ethnic basis."[2]

This is not only true of Nigeria, but the rest of the African continent.
Kirk-Greene (1970) reminds us that in Nigeria

> "the political class up to 1966 held on tightly to the
> positions that assured them of control over three vital
> elitist desiderata: power, prosperity and posterity.
> Nowhere was the politics of patronage more conspicuously
> played than among the political and to a lesser extent
> the professional elite."[3]

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1. Skinner, ELLIOT , op. cit., 1967, pp. 182-183
2. Van den Berghe, P. L., 'Ethnicity: The African Experience'
   International Social Science Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, 1971, p. 67.
3. Kirk-Greene, The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War, 1970, p. 16.

It is hard to believe that people like the U.S. News reporter are un-
aware of the influence of external factors on the conflicts and tension
in Africa. Since the cold war period, Africa has emerged as a focal
point of major world power struggles, as evidenced first in Zaire and
more recently in Angola. Any balanced explanation of the tension and
conflicts in Africa must also take into consideration the role of
external actions in activating conflicts among the dominant elites.

On the issue of external involvement in Africa, Karl W. Deutsch has
distinguished between 'authentic war' and 'wars by proxy' depending on
the degree of domestic and foreign participation.[1] It could be argued
that the war over the Katanga secession in Zaire in the 1960s was a war
'by proxy' - in that it was instigated by Western and principally the
United States and Belgian commercial interests. In 1965, another war 'by
proxy' broke out in Zaire. A Simba rebel group supported by the Eastern
Block and China, challenged the Central Government in Kinshasa headed
by Moise Tshombe.[2] The Kinshasa Government was supported by the West and
it was only the help from Belgian and American paratroops which ensured
Moise Tshombe's defeat. This crisis has been described in some detail
here inorder to show the inadequacy of the concept of tribalism as the
sole reason for unrest and tension in developing African nations when a
host of other factors including elite instability and crises of leadership,

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1. Deutsch, Karl, W., 'External involvement in internal wars' in Internal
   War, Harry Eckstein, London, The Free Press , 1963, p. 102.
2. See Dunston, Wai, M., 'Sources of Communal Conflicts and Secessionist
   Politics in Africa' in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. I, No. 3,
   RKP, London, July, 1978, pp. 229 -300.

ideology and external actions,[1] disparities in wealth, economics, marginalisation, regional underdevelopment and inequalities need to be taken into consideration.

The modern and sociological alternative to the derogatory ridden term 'tribe' is 'ethnic group', with its corollaries ethnic and 'ethnicity'. Unfortunately, as Glazer (1975) points out, this usage seems to be largely confined to intellectuals who refuse to use the out-of-date and pejorative term 'tribe'. However, this usage of a newer seemingly scientific term wrongly suggests that the whole complex problem of tribe and tribalism with its dysfunctional aspects will somehow disappear. Glazer and Moyinham write "

"Any such categorization taken up and given currency by social scientists suffers from a certain presumption of disutility. Does it mean anything new, or is it simply a new way of saying something old? Does it make for greater precision in describing the world or does it merely compound the confusion, fuzz further the fuzziness?"[2]

1. Dunston, Wai, M., _ibid._, 1978, p. 287. Lists among the salient conditions that lead to communal conflicts and subsequent attempts at secession in independent African states a) cultural pluralism and value incompatibilities; b) historical hostilities and mutual distrust; c) psychological factors; d) right of self-determination; e) relative social and economic deprivation; f) elite instability and crises of leadership; g) ideology and external actions; and h) government ineptitude and closed channels for dissent. The first four preconditions – circumstances which make it possible for the precipitants (e-h) to bring about political violence. Also see Eckstein Henry, "On the causes of internal wars" in _Politic and Society_, Eric Nordlinger, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1970, p. 291.
2. Glazer and Moyinham, B., in _Ethnic and Racial Studies_, Vol. I, No. 3, July 1978.

One is tempted to agree with the view expressed by Glazer and Moyinham as most of the definitions offered for ethnic group and ethnicity are just as vague as those of tribe. For example, according to Schermerhorn (1974),

> "ethnicity is a synthetic term which refers to the fusion
> of many traits or components that belong to the nature of
> any ethnic group, thus ethnicity is a composite of shared
> values, beliefs, norms, tastes, consciousness of kind
> within the group, shared in group memories and loyalties,
> certain structural relationships within the group and a
> trend towards continuity by preferential endogamy".[1]

Although there is nothing pejorative about this definition, it raises more questions than it purports to answer. For example, what is the nature of any ethnic group? Are they enumerated 'composite' attributes peculiar only to ethnic groups? Or do they encompass other social units (such as religious groups) not subsumed under the term 'ethnic'?

Most of the literature on the concepts of 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic groups' not only seems to raise these recurrent questions, but is full of assumptions which are largely based on psychological factors which are themselves often not established.For example, Novak (1971) asked the right questions about what constitutes an ethnic group, but gives an elusive answer,

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1. Schermerhorn, R. A., 'Ethnicity in the Perspectives of Sociology of Knowledge', Ethnicity, No. 1, 1974, pp. 1-14.

"What is an ethnic group? It is a group with historical

memory, real or imaginary..... ethnic memory is not a

set of events remembered, but rather a set of instincts,

feelings, intimacies, expectations, patterns of emotions

and behaviour....."[1]

Similarly, Schermerhorn, like Gordon (1966) and Berry (1958) has posited

a very comprehensive definition of ethnic group which is at once an

illustration of the ambiguity of this concept. An 'ethnic group' he

writes

"is defined here as a collectivity within a larger society

having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a

shared historical past and a cultural focus on one or more

symbolic elements. Examples of such elements are kinship,

physical continuity..... religious affiliations, language or

dialect forms, tribal affiliations, nationality, phenotypical

features, or any combination of these."[2]

The problem with this definition is while implying that an ethnic group

is something distinct from the rest of a society, the listed criteria

are so broad as to encompass all other component units of the larger

society.

This review of literature relating to 'tribe' and 'ethnicity' has been

made in order to draw attention to some of the implications of the

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1. Novak, Michael, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics, New York, 1971,
   p. 49.
2. Schermerhorn, R. A., Comparative Ethnic Relations, New York, 1970,
   p. 27.

conceptual tools that will be used in this study. We have shown how the term 'tribe' has been given derogatory connotations by various writers, and how because of this, social scientists have turned more and more to using 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic group' in place of tribalism and tribe. We have also tried to show how differentiated conceptualisation of ethnicity leads in turn to unjustified assumptions about what constitutes an ethnic group. In spite of this, most Africans recognise the term 'tribe' as indicative of a normative relationship based upon common ancestry and a common myth of origin, which continues to generate group consciousness and related behaviour. It is in this sense that 'tribe' will be used through this study.

The term ethnic group will be used inter-changeably with tribe in order to avoid some of these conceptual difficulties encountered in attempting to generalise the concept of tribalism or ethnicity in cross-cultural methodology. Wallerstein[1] suggests that tribe should be applied in case of loyalty to tribal government in rural setting, and ethnicity in the case of loyalty to a tribal community in an urban setting... "By ethnicity we mean the feeling of loyalty to this new ethnic group of the towns". But as Wallerstein himself observes, this distinction can be quite arbitrary since individuals in West Africa move back and forth between towns and rural areas."[2] What seems to be crucial here is the distinction between belonging to a tribe as an active participant in its socio-cultural milieu, and belonging or aspiring to belong to a tribe in

1. Wallerstein, I., 'Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa', in Harry Eckstein and David Apter, Comparative Politics, New York, Free Press, 1963, pp. 665-670.
2. ibid., p. 667.

the sense of psychological identification with one's ethnic origins,
without the requisite participation in its socio-cultural milieu. For
example, the younger generation of Cameroonians, or indeed of any
African Nation-states born in this decade into an elite class in urban-
ised centres, still identify with their parents' ethnic origin. But most
of them have lost all the norms and values of their ethnic group of
origin. Some have never gone to their fathers' villages and few can
speak their ethnic mother tongue fluently. They identify with an ethnic
group, but are not involved in that group's aspirations or activities.

This leads to the distinction made in reference group theory between a
membership group and a reference group, to which one aspires to relate
(or dissociate) oneself, whether one is in fact a participating member
or not.[1] Reference group theory has direct implications for the concept
of situational ethnicity, a phenomenon frequently encountered by the
social researchers of the African urban scene.[2] Situational ethnicity may
be said to operate whenever an individual or a group of individuals
shift their ethnic designation to suit the exigencies of the circumstance
in which they find themselves. The shift in ethnic designation may be
self-imposed or imposed by influential people participating in the same
social milieu.

In the light of the foregoing remarks, the isolation of ethnic units and
the treatment of ethnicity as a dynamic variable in inter-group relations,

1. Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure, (enlarged
   edition), New York, Free Press, 1968, ch. 10, pp.279-334.
2. Epstein, A., Politics in Urban African Community, Manchester, Manchester
   University Press, 1958, pp. 234-6.

should take into account the following variables: first, within group
variations in objective indices presumed to be measures of traditionalism
or detribalisation as, for example, type of occupation, education and
income, place of residence and type of house, participation in tribally
homogeneous subenvironment, and the like. Second, within group variations
in subjective identification with respect to a perceived tribal entity,
and the implications this identification has as a norm-generating
behavioural cue for the individual. Within the matrix of social change,
the issue invoked here is the old question of assessing the relative
importance of psychological variables, as opposed to structural variables,
in isolating the casual antecedents of social change.

However, the polarisation referred to here is of significance to this
study only in so far as it relates to inter-ethnic attitudes of children
of the twelve largest ethnic groups who account for 63.5% of the entire
secondary school population in the two English-speaking provinces of
Cameroon (see Table 2.1, p. 54).

We have, in the course of the discussion in this section, identified some
pseudo-scientific characteristics of an ethnic group. What we have not
discussed so far is the writer's personal contact and knowledge of the
various ethnic groups in this region. As a product of the school system
(primary, secondary and teacher-training, and as a teacher in various
parts of the region), the writer is familiar with the major ethnic groups
of this area. Besides, as far as the two English-speaking provinces of
Cameroon are concerned, one's tribe can also be identified by such tribal
practices of facial tattooing in the case of the Assumbo tribe in Akwaya
Sub-division. However, such facial markings or tatoos may have been made

in childhood, and therefore the adult who has moved away from his
original socio-cultural milieu may not necessarily subscribe to the same
symbolic values or belief system. Linguistic impediments also reflect a
particular place of origin in which habits formed in learning the ethnic
mother tongue of the area interfere with subsequent language acquisition.
For example, the Mbo in Meme Division have no 'r': road is pronounced
'load' and 'lolly' stands for lorry.[1] The degree to which a person has
consciously tried to overcome such pronunciation impediments, peculiar
to his ethnic group, can also be taken as an index of 'detribalisation'
reflecting process of urbanisation and consequent shifts in affiliation
from the values, customs and aspirations of the ethnic group of origin
(Wallerstein, 1963).

The difficulty with this definition in particular, and the concept of
detribalisation in general, is that it does not indicate the degree to
which an individual has been detribalised or no longer subscribes to the
norms of behaviour and values of his ethnic group of origin. In other
words, it does not show us the position of the individual on the tribal/
detribalised continuum. This is important because as we have already
indicated, it is the elites (possibly the most detribalised group in the
urban sector), who manipulate tribalism or ethnicity for their own
pursuits of political power and economic benefits. As far as this study
is concerned, the important thing, therefore, is not just whether an
individual no longer believes in witchcraft, superstition, and idols, or
has developed new affiliations, which can be taken as an index of

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1. Incidentally, these linguistic peculiarities have found their way into
   popular national stereotypes used on the radio or in local plays or
   entertainment.

education and modernisation: but whether such an individual has shifted his loyalties, acquired new beliefs and values to a degree that he is no longer susceptible to ethnic or tribal parochialisms. National integration or national unity depends very much on individuals being above inter-ethnic stereotypes and prejudices.

2.3   ETHNIC GROUPS IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING CAMEROON

The population of the two English-speaking provinces of Cameroon is small,
1,600,000 in 1976 and unevenly distributed, with about 70% of the people
in 30% of the area. The highest concentration of the population are in the
divisional and provincial headquarters, particularly in Bamenda and in
most of the Fako division. In these two divisions, population density
reaches 80 people per square kilometre. This leads to severe land
shortage, severe pressure on the school system and on public amenities.
On balance, these are also the areas where there is a high degree of
ethnic integration, because of the daily contact and co-existence between
the various ethnic groups.

The 1.6 million people are divided among the 50 ethnic groups.[1] Attempts
to classify the different ethnic groups in Cameroon as we have already
indicated rested mainly on linguistic criteria (Ardener, 1964). It will,
however, be shown that in the two English-speaking provinces of
Cameroon, environment and social organisation play just as an important
part in differentiating one group of people from the other, as do
linguistic differences. On the other hand, if we were to use environment
and social organisation criteria as the distinguishing factor among the
peoples of this region, we are likely to come up with just two main
divisions – the Forest and Grassland cultural groups. Although there
are broad similarities among the various ethnic groups in each of these
two regions, there are some important differences between them. It has,
therefore, been decided to use both distinguishing factors.

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1. The number is disputed – Levine, Victor, ibid., talks of 70, while
   others mention 50. See Courade, C. and G., Education in Anglophone
   Cameroon 1915-1975, 1977, p. 70.

The main ethnic groups in the Forest Zone include in Manyu Division:
Bayang, Keaka, Anyang, Bangwa, Mbo and the Assumbo groups; in Meme
Division, Bakosi , Bakossi, Bakundu, Bafaw and Balung; in Ndian: Korup,
Ngolo, Bima and various Efik groups from Nigeria, and in Fako Division:
Bakweri, Wovea, Bomboko and Isuwu (see Appendix #). Few tribes are now
confined into single divisions. There are many inter-divisional and inter-
provincial overlaps. The main tribal groups in the Grassland Zone or the
North-West province are the Tikar, comprising the Bafut, Ndop, Nsaw, Kom
Bum and the Fungum; the Widikum group — Mbembe, Aghem, and the Chamba
group — Bali; and a large group of Hausa and Bororo (formally Fulani).
With the exception of the Hausa and Bororo, the peoples of the grassfields
have very close cultural similarities than the peoples of the forest zone
or South-West Province. As in most West African coastal states, the
political division and distinctiveness is always made between the Northern
Moslem and the Southern Christian.

2.3.1   Political Organisations of Ethnic Groups

The second task is to consider some of the major ethnic groups that have
been mentioned, highlighting their political, social and cultural
values and how these values may be a source of friction or in antithesis
to the larger political values of Cameroon. The basic political unit in
the grassland zone is in the chiefdom. Chieftaincy is almost universally
important in the grassland zone and the chiefdoms range from a few
hundred to tens of thousands of subjects. The political structure of the
grasslands chiefdom of Bafut and Bali in Mezam Division, Nsaw in Bui
Division and Kom in Menchum Division are basically similar in the strong
central authority of the chief.

The Nsaw chiefdom in Bui Division provides a good example of a centralised strong political organisation. In Nsaw as in most of the grassland chiefdoms, there is almost a secret kingship, a cult of dead kings, a marked distinction between royals and commoners – certain titles reserved to Princes and Princesses, State Councillors which are hereditary and a military organisation based on village lodges. Although there has been very subtle pressure from the government for some liberalisation in the organisation of the chiefdom,[1] the structure of the Nsaw and other chiefdoms in the grasslands has remained intact.

The Nsaw chiefdom includes a number of villages of alien origin, conquered in the last century. These villages became tributary to the Fon of Nsaw, but in many ways retained their independence in the management of their own affairs. Succession to the office of these sub-tribes was contingent on the ratification by the Fon of Nsaw. The whole chiefdom is built on a hierarchical structure as shown in the diagram below. Power and authority emanated from the top. (See Figure 2.1)

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1. The pressure has taken two forms, first, the importance of the chiefdom has been played down by the abolition of the House of Chiefs which gave chiefs a strong political voice in the government in the days of the West Cameroon House of Assembly. Second, chiefs now receive an allowance from the government and this has resulted in them exacting fewer services and money from their subjects.

The Hierarchical Structure of Nsaw Chiefdom

```
                              Fon
                               │
                               ▼
                              Fon Mbiame (Sub-Chief)
                               │
                               ▼
                              Fon Nkar and Fon Ndzerem
                               │
                               ▼
Afon      Afon      Afon      Afon                    Chiefs of the
           /                    \                      conquered
          ▼                      ▼                     villages
1. Councillors            Councillors

2. Court Official         Court Official
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
The Fon's palace comprises an inner courtyard, dwelling houses, kitchens, stores and a courtyard where the Fon hear cases. These houses are surrounded by the houses of his wives and the quarterheads of the palace secret society, members of which are called 'Alefafsi'. These act as personal attendants to the Fon. The 'Atanto' ('Father of the Palace') looks after the palace and the wives. He also arranges marriages for the Fon's daughters and grand-daughters. The high priest 'Tawon' and high priestess 'Yewon' and the Queen Mother 'Ya' assist in the government of the Court and chiefdom. It is important to note that this is an area of contrast between the ethnic groups of the grasslands and those of the forest zone who regard such autocratic organisation as despotic.

This strong central organisation such as the one of the Chiefdom of Nsaw, Bali, and Bafut is inherent not only in the chiefdoms of the forest zone, but also in some of the tribes within the grassland zone, such as the Widikum, Nbembe, Mogamo, Njie, Meta and Esimbo who have never recognised a central political authority. In most of these tribes lineage organisation provides the framework of the political structure. Clans are localised in villages, and as a rule most of the lineages in villages are segments

of the Patri-clan of the village head. Unlike the mixed villages of Nsaw
or Bafut, the villages of some of these smaller ethnic groups are
essentially comprised of members of the same family.[1] The village head
performs sacrifices and he usually has a right of the game hunted by his
subjects, but lacks the vast wealth of a Tikar chief or fon.

In the grassland zone, there are two main ways of succession — Patri-
lineal and Matri-lineal. In all the Tikar tribes except the Kom and five
Fungom villages, kinship is patri-lineal; in Nsaw, character and not age
is the criterion for eligibility to any position of authority, although
usually a married man gets preference.As already indicated, the Nsaw tribes
believe in having title positions in terms of relationships rather than
respect of ages. This also applies to the royal clan, for example, those
related to the Fon first by agnatic descent and secondly by cognatic
descent down to the sixth generation are referred to as 'wini-e-fon' and
may be regarded as a limited kinship group. In other villages, succession
passes collaterally in order of age to all brothers and half-brothers
until the generation is extinct, then to the first-born of the next
generation.[2]

In the Matri-lineal ethnic groups of Kom and other villages of Fungom and
Aghem, residence in ethnic groups does not appear to follow closely
either patri-local or matri-local lines. A man may decide after marriage
to live either with father, mother, affine or friend. As Kaberry points out,

1. Kaberry, P. Women of the grassfield, Colonial Research Publication No. 14,
   1952, p. 10.
2. Kaberry, P.;   ibid., 1952, p. 12

"The strength of the tie between a man and his father,
the considerable economic independence of a man after
marriage, and his right to receive the major part of
the marriage payment for his daughters - all these
factors militate against the emergence of the matri-
lineage as a localised unit."[1]

Such considerations have been discussed in some detail because of their continuing influence on the attitudes of Cameroonian youth. For example, people from matri-lineal ethnic groups would obviously find it difficult to marry out of their tribes except where there are conscious efforts made to play down such differences in inheritance and succession. Until recently, it has been difficult therefore even among the educated to marry outside their tribes because of these differences.

These political organisations of the grassland tribal groups contrast sharply with the loose political structures of the forest and coastal zone groups. Although the village is still the smallest political unit in the forest zone, as it is in the grassland zone, the powers of the village chief in the forest zone are limited. His influence is limited by his personal charisma and influence. The Bayangs in Manyu Division, for example, have chiefs with no authority. The structure of the chief's authority is based upon the principle of collective action of the

1. McCulloch, M., 'Peoples of the Central Cameroon', in Ethnographic Survey of Africa, Daryll Forde, International African Institute, Western Africa, Part IX, p. 33.

elders and it is also conditioned by it. The Bayang idea of political community is diffused - that is a community where the centres of political power and authority are dispersed and not concentrated on one person. Each village has a village council which by virtue of the fact that the Councillors represent the groups, have the powers to make authoritative decisions concerning every action in the village. However, there are also a number of politically powerful associations such as the 'Ngbe', which in conjunction with the kinship groups jointly exercise authority. It is this combination between 'City Hall' and the 'Lodges' that defines Banyang political authority systems making them different from the Kpe's or Bakwerian for example, whose associations have no political significance.

This set-up has implications in terms of power and authority structures. It is evidence that the Bayang system permits overlapping membership which makes it possible for a village head to hold membership simultaneously in one or more Councils, for example, residential community council, village level council and also in the Ngbe Society. An Nsaw village chief does not automatically qualify for position in the 'Alefafsi' since his elevation to that body depends on factors other than the fact that he is a village chief. The Bayang system of overlapping membership allows leaders to assume different authority powers; for example, as a village leader his powers are circumscribed by the functions he is allowed to perform, but in his capacity as a high Ngbe official this same individual assumes wider powers because his functions have expanded to correspond with the new status. In the grassland set-up, it is only the Fon who can behave or assume responsibility in this manner and this is because it is he who delegates authority to his subordinates. It is the inter-play in the

authority domain between kinship groups, secret associations and the Fon
that distinguishes Nsaw political community from the Bayangs. Most of the
major ethnic groups of the forest zone that have been mentioned have
Councils.

To conclude the political structure, one sees a sharp contrast between
the egalitarian feature of the South and the authoritarianism of the
North. Where in the egalitarian system the leader's role is traditionally
defined, in the centralised Banso system his role is vested with a wide
range of decision-making authority and extensive command of power. In
this system, authority derives from the Fon and is exercised on his
behalf. The reverse is true of the South — where authority derives from
the people and is exercised on their behalf by leaders appointed by them.
Succession to leadership roles in the South is determined partly by
heredity, by age, wealth and personal qualities of the candidate. The
Bayang believe leadership role is achieved through the demonstrated
ability of an individual to influence the inner-chamber of the decision-
making councillor bodies in his community. Among the Kpe, for instance,
a village head gets respect not because he is considered to be divine,
but by virtue of his position as 'father of the village', a position he
holds first, because he is an elder (the fact of age), second, because he
is a direct descendant of the founder of the village (heredity), and
third, because of his personal qualities. Thus succession to the chief-
taincy is not necessarily hereditary. It usually passes from one family
to another.

In the North birth plays a decisive role in matters of succession, and only people with 'Royal blood' are eligible for the Fonship. Although not all leadership roles are ascribed, the dichotomy between nobles and commoners creates a highly stratified society with pronounced status distinction. Thus a pronounced dominance-submission relationship emerges.

The hierarchy of statuses so created is sustained through a web of values that stress obedience, loyalty and reverence to superiors. All these make for an authoritarian system in contrast to the egalitarianism of the South where heredity and superior-subordinate distinctions are played down. Most of the value systems of the ethnic groups of the South have been greatly influenced by Western values. However, status distinction does exist but it is not subservient or so institutionalised in the socio-political structure as it is among the Northern groups.

It has been found necessary to base ethnic analysis on a regional level between North and South, because as has already been indicated the differences in social and political organisation of the various ethnic groups are more pronounced between North and South than within each region. This state of affairs has historical roots. The South having had the first contact with Europeans is more modernised in political and social institutions and tends to look upon the North as backward.

The term 'Grafi', a corruption of the English term grassfield tends to be used derogatively by Southerners to imply that the Northerners are backward.

This is not to say that there is no ethnic solidarity between the ethnic groups of the South and those of the North; where this occurs, it is as a result of linguistic differences among them as separate groups rather than because of broad cultural differences between them. The cultures of the major ethnic groups of the grassland are broadly similar, as are those of the forest zone groups.

Inheritance and succession are patri-lineal among most tribes in the South. The Bakweri (Kpe) have an explicit double descent system in which the core of the linealised group is the patri-lineage, and succession is also matri-lineal but it is sometimes from mother's brother to sister's son, in a case where the brother has no son. Matri-lineage is of great ritual importance among the Kpe. The eldest member of the clan usually succeeds. In Kumba division, the tribes related to the Kpe – Balue, Balong, Balondo – have double descent system. In all other tribes in the forest zone, patri-lineal inheritance is practised. Among the Bayang the nephews succeed on the father's side. This is in sharp contrast to some of the matri-lineal groups in the North, such as the Kom and the five villages of Fungum.

Attempts have been made to identify some of the major values and characteristics of the major ethnic groups in the two English-speaking provinces f Cameroon. In a region where there are over 50 ethnic groups, it would be impossible to study the attitudes of all of these groups. In the first phase,none of the schools that will be used in this study could have among their enrolment representatives from all of these groups.

An attempt has been made (Appendix 3) to reduce the 50 ethnic groups in the English-speaking provinces of Cameroon to 24 strata on the basis of four criteria: first, Location - common geographic situation; second - Biological - common ancestral origin; third - Cultural - common customs, beliefs, values, common dialect or closely related dialect; and fourth, Psychological - common historical experience and common sentiments. From the point of view of ethnic mix of secondary school students, two-thirds of all students belong to twelve of the fifty ethnic groups shown in Appendix 3. In the forest zone, there are Bakossi, Bakweri, Bangwa, Banyang, Ejagham; and in the grassland zone there are Bafut, Meta, Moghamo, Ngemba, Nsaw, Wimbum and Bamileke. The proportion of each of the twelve ethnic groups in secondary school is shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Anglophone Cameroon: Ethnic Origin of Students from the various types of Secondary Education 1969/70.

Ethnic Group	Secondary Schools	Teacher Training Colleges	Technical College (OMBE)	Adult Population
Bakossi	8.5	11.0	4.0	2.7
Bakweri	8.9	4.5	1.0	1.8
Bangwa	2.8	9.6	6.0	2.9
Banyang	9.2	7.3	7.0	2.8
Ejagham	4.3	6.9	9.0	2.1
TOTAL S.W.	33.7	39.3	27.0	12.3
Bafut	4.8	6.3	11.0	4.7
Metta	4.4	2.9	12.0	2.5
Moghamo	2.2	2.9	6.0	3.8
Ngemba	5.0	3.6	9.0	5.0
Wimbum (inc. Nsaw)	2.2	6.1	2.0	5.0
TOTAL N.W.	18.6	21.8	40.0	21.0
Nigerians	4.3	4.2	-	4.7
Bamileke	8.7	4.6	2.0	2.7
TOTAL FOR N.W. & S.W.	65.3	69.9	69.0	40.0

Source: ONAREST , Education in Anglophone Cameroon 1915-1975 compiled for ONAREST by C. and G. Courade, 1977, p. 53

Apart from their numerical strength as indicated in Table 2.1, the choice of the ten ethnic groups (excluding Nigerians and Bamileke of Francophone Cameroon who are mainly in Bilingual Grammar Schools in Anglophone Cameroon) was dictated by the relative importance in national politics. For example, the four Cabinet (senior) Ministers in Ahidjo's Government (1980) from the two English-speaking provinces are from the major tribes: Banyang, Bakossi/Bakundu, Moghamo and Ngemba; their distribution within the urban centres of the region, and finally methodological considerations that will become apparent later.

It should be noted that the inclusion of only twelve ethnic groups in the sample is a simplification that has been adopted for expedience. However, the explicit reference will be made to other tribes in analysis whenever the need arises, as surely it will. The twelve ethnic groups as illustrated in Table 2.1 only constitute 65.3% of the total secondary school population and only 40% of the adult population.

CHAPTER THREE

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

3.1   INTRODUCTION

3.2   DEFINITIONS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

3.3   EDUCATION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION − REVIEW

**3.4   EDUCATION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION− RESEARCH
        EVIDENCE**

3.1 Introduction

In Chapters One and Two of this thesis, an attempt was made to isolate
and describe the variations in cultures and cultural patterns between
various ethnic groups in Cameroon, their different political and historical
experiences and how geographic and geological factors have helped to
exacerbate these differences, inviting for disunity rather than unity.
Kofele-Kale[1] has pointed out that since Cameroon became a bilingual
Federal Republic in 1961, there has been an urgent need to re-unify the
former German Kamerun which was partitioned into French and British
territories at the end of the European war of 1914-18. For it is recog-
nised that such local allegiances impede development since national
leaders, aspiring to expand the functions of the political system need
the undivided loyalty of the whole nation. Secondly, Clignet (1975)[2]
rightly suggests that there is a need to foster unity because the values,
aspirations and expectations of citizens of the state reflect widespread
structural and cultural differences in the traditional, social and
political systems into which they have been socialized, so that the
common social and political orientations on which a wider community
could be founded have yet to be achieved. It is therefore one of the
challenges to national political leaders to bring about the process whereby
people transfer their commitment and loyalty from small villages or
ethnic groups and regions to the larger central political system.

1. Kofele-Kale, Ndive, An African experiment in Nation building: the bi-
   lingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification, Westview Press, Boulder,
   Colorado, 1980, p. xxvii.
2. Clignet, Remi 'The impact of educational structures and processes on
   National Integration in Cameroon' in Smock and Betsi-Enchill The
   Search for National Integration in Africa, The Free Press, 1975, p. 139.

All these factors show that national integration is a complex process
that involves several related problems. This chapter will explore these
problems in some depth, and will attempt to define the concept of
'National Integration' in order to clarify several issues involved in a
term that has for recent years (and within the context of the politics
of African independence and nation-building) been used to cover an extra-
ordinary range of political phenomena. Once the source and dimensions of
national integration are established, the theoretical analysis can be
directed towards the possible impact of education on integration processes.
The political functions of education that may increase or decrease national
integration will be discussed in relation to the political socialization
function of education and educational opportunity - its role as an
equalising instrument.

3.2   Definition of National Integration.

Myron Weiner (1965) distinguishes five uses for national integration.
First, as the process of bringing culturally and socially discrete groups
into a single territorial unit, and the establishment of national
identity in the context of some sort of plural society or the prior
existence of distinct independent political units. Second, he suggests
that the concept of 'integration' has been used to refer to the process
of establishing a national central authority over subordinate political
units or regions. The assumption (first definition) that there is an
ethnically plural society and that each group within the territorial
boundaries has defining characteristics of language, culture, etc. that
sets it apart from the others is the situation that exists in Cameroon.
In this sense, national integration involves creating a common political

identification that either incorporates or eliminates the narrower parochial loyalties of the groups. This first aspect is more concerned with the subjective attitudes than with the objective fact of central government control within the national boundaries. The latter is territorial integration and it must precede subjective national integration.[1]

Third, he sees national integration as a process of linking government with the governed, with special stress in closing the elite-mass gap. Insofar as this involves establishing patterns of authority and consent, it is more difficult to achieve if either national or territorial integration is not well established. While it is agreed that an elite-mass gap exists in all cultures, it is generally held to be wider in those situations where a modernizing elite confronts a traditionally-orientated population.[2] Fourth, he suggests that integration refers to the minimal value consensus which is assumed to be required for the maintenance of a system; and appliable to any process or product leading to the formation of a whole from many parts and the last one dealing specifically with consensus of intellectual responses within a small group; and fifthly, as the process of integration between members of a group which results in reciprocal accommodation with increased sense of identification with the group. As such, these definitions are mutually inclusive and can be seen as simply redefining the same concept in greater detail. It is therefore reasonable to argue that these

1. Coleman, James S. 'The Problem of Political Integration in Emergent Africa', Western Political Quarterly, No. VIII, March 1956, pp. 44-57.
2. Pye, Lucian, and Verba Sidney, Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 15.

definitions present different facets of the same concept.

Weiner's categorisation attempts to provide a meaningful distinction between integration at the level of subjective identification of individuals with the whole and objectively-imposed labelling by some central authority for the first and second definitions respectively. But these two categories cannot be separated completely from the problems of consensus and common purpose. The concepts of national consensus, and common purpose are all closely related to the degree of harmony or conflict prevailing between culturally or ethnically discrete groups. It seems reasonable to suggest that linking the elite with the mass requires a minimum consensus. This is so because the elite and the mass must be conceived as belonging to the same larger group. It seems then that the value of Weiner's contribution is more in the initial distinction of the subjective versus objective integration than in the analysis of the latter three categories. It is this subjective and objective aspect of integration which is of concern to this thesis; that is, the creation of a sense of national identity entailing loyalties to a wider socio-political grouping than that of the immediate neighbourhood. Hence, the creation of a common political culture is both implied and fostered by this initial process of integration.

In addition, this definition refers to separate units or elements, and this can be individuals, groups of individuals or countries which are brought into interaction with one another by some characteristic mechanism, as for example sharing the same colonial experience. This definition sees national integration as a measure of cohesion, cultural homogeneity, harmony of conflicting groups, reciprocal accommodation and

consensus which results from interaction between the units or groups. National integration may therefore be measured by the social distance (that is, the degree of co-operative behaviour that may be expected in a particular social situation) between groups.

Emile Durkheim(1926) argued that integration can only be based on common belief or value consensus. Following Durkheim, Smith (1963) also argued that consensus is basic to integration. He writes,

> "Integration rests on common values and common motivations
> at the individual level and on functional relations of
> common institutions at the societal level."

This notion of value consensus is not very useful when applied to understanding the African situation because it distorts the ethnic reality of Africa, where cultural diversity automatically imposes the structural necessity for domination by an interest group (arising from ethno-cultural background, religious affiliation, socio-economic status, educational background, professional or commercial ties, etc.). Indeed, the differences between groups within a nation are so great and fundamental that the possibility of consensus or structural balance between the different sections is difficult to achieve, but draws attention to the fact that the alternative approach of seeking functional integration, in which groups are held together by common interest and agreement, has been seen as likely to enhance integration.

On this theme, Van den Berghe has pointed out that where value consenses cannot form the basis for integration, a combination of political coercion, economic interdependence and compliance or regulation can form

the basis for integration. Concerning the importance of economic

participation, Van den Berghe claims that

> "clearly participation of disparate ethnic groups in common
>
> system of production is a crucial integrative factor in all
>
> African countries and is one of the major factors which has
>
> held together such conflict-ridden society as South Africa
>
> for so long."[1]

Since Cameroon, like many countries in Africa, has a very different

history and political orientation from South Africa, one cannot identify

economic interest transcending politics based on national unity. In most

of Black Africa, what is more important is policies aimed at achieving

balanced economic development throughout different parts of the country

and between different ethnic groups.

Other writers, Bogardus (1958), Coleman (1965), Amber (1967) and Devine

(1972) for example, identify two types of integration - vertical and

horizontal dimensions. Coleman writes

> "The concept of national integration has a variety of
>
> meanings. Integration is regarded as a broad subsuming
>
> process whose two major dimensions are political inte-
>
> gration, which refers to the progressive plane in the
>
> course of development and integrated political process and
>
> a participating political community and also to
>
> territorial integration which refers to progressive

---

1. Van den Berghe, P., 'Towards a Sociology of Africa', <u>Africa: Social
   Problems of Change and Conflict</u>, in P. L. Van den Berghe, San Francisco,
   Chandler Pub., 1965, p. 82.

reduction of cultural and regional tensions in the process
of creating a homogeneous territorial political
community."[1]

Coleman's definition refers mainly to the horizontal dimension of inte-
gration; that is, it refers mainly to the creation of a sense of
national identification and the willingness to accept other groups as
fellow citizens. In addition, Van den Berghe[2] suggests that the horizontal
dimension of integration can be effective where lines of cleavage are
shifting with a variety of circumstances. This prevents polarization,
since it is evident in the political arena that an opponent in one
circumstance may be an ally on a different issue. However, he concludes
that the more important aspects of horizontal integration arises when
members are able to transcend internal conflicts, while providing
political channels for discussions.

Bogardus (1958)[3] on the other hand, distinguishes between 'horizontal'
integration which involves groups of similar status and 'vertical'
integration which involves groups of unequal status. Devine (1972)[4] makes
the same distinction. He sees horizontal integration as a member to
member interaction and vertical integration as a member to political
system relationship.

1. Coleman, James S., Rosberg, J. and Carl, G., Political Parties and
   National Integration in Tropical Africa, 1965, p. 30.
2. Van den Berghe, Power and Privilege in an African University, Routledge
   and Kegan Paul, 1973, p. 262.
3. Bogardus, E. S., 'Integration as a Current Concept', Sociology and
   Social Research, No. 42, Jan-Feb., 1958, p. 217.
4. Devine, C., 'The Political Culture of the U.S.', The Influence of
   Member Values and Regime Maintenance, Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
   1972, p. 72.

By treating the ethnic dimension (or ethnic relationships) in terms of horizontal integration, these writers assume that there is no significant variance (that is due to the horizontal ranking) of ethnic groups on the level of modernization such as economic development. But in Cameroon and most African States, this assumption is itself problematic since there are important disparities with respect to level of modernization between ethnic groups. Indeed, as Paul Amber (1972)[1] has warned, educational and economic development may directly lead to the reinforcement of ethnic identity rather than to its deterioration, by reviving or creating particularistic cultural attachments to the ethnic group that is in the process of achieving modern goals. Paul Amber supports his arguments through citing the Ibos in Nigeria and the antagonism they experience from other Nigerian ethnic groups because of their relative economic and educational advantages.

The position of the Ibo in Nigeria, cited by Paul Amber above, is paralleled by that of the Bamileke and Grassland groups in Cameroon in terms of commercial and educational development. This leads to the same methodological problems of separating tribal loyalties that have continued to evolve concomitant to economic development, and those that have been accentuated by the very nature and context of modernization itself.

A third approach to defining the basis of social integration was provided by Landecker (1951) when he wrote:

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1. Amber, P., 'Modernization and Political Integration: Nigeria and the Ibos', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, Sept. 1967, p.168.

"A typology of integration can be developed on the premise
that for sociological purposes the smallest units of
community life are cultural standards on the one hand
and persons and their behaviour on the other."[1]

Using this criterion of types of integration, Landecker further suggests
three varieties: first, cultural integration, being the degree to which
cultural standards are mutually consistent; second, normative integration,
the degree to which behaviour conforms to cultural standards; and third,
communicative integration being the degree to which members of a group
are linked together by the exchange of meaning.

As it has become apparent, these three varieties have at least two
elements in common. First, they all suggest contact between distinct
cultural groups occupying a similar social plane which can be generalised
by common functional interest and second, they also suggest that inte-
gration can be brought about as a result of deliberate efforts of
cultural group members to rise above narrow parochial identities in
order to participate together in the wider context of the nation.

Landecker's last two types of integration, which suggest functional
integration and behavioural change respectively, are complementary; that
is, the presence of one does not exclude the presence of the other.
Rather than viewing the two as different levels in an ordered hierarchy,
they can best be understood as points of a continuum. The product

1. Landecker, W. S., "Types of integration and their measurement", American
   Journal of Sociology, Jan. 1951, LVI, pp. 332-340.

(functional integration) begins where the process (behavioural change)
ends.

Considering the definitions so far discussed, one perceives interdependence
between the different aspects. The definitions seem to be arranged in
ascending order of levels of integration;for example, Weiner's Territorial
(objective) and National (subjective) views of integration, value consensus,
and Landecker's types of integration, which could be viewed as common
purpose. The levels of the integration pyramid can be seen as Territorial -
National - value consensus - common purpose. The last one (common purpose)
is not merely the highest level of integration, but presupposes and
encompasses all the others. This is so because problems involved in fostering
the other forms must be resolved before positive co-operative national
action can take place. However, it should be pointed out that the smaller
units creating integration problems such as tribes, linguistic groups,
are not necessarily hindering integrative behaviour. The tribe may well
rank significantly higher as a co-operative societal group than the
population of the whole nation, as examples in Nigeria have shown, where
local allegiance stimulates development on a competitive basis.[1] The
point is rather that the boundaries for this integrative behaviour are
limited and mutually exclusive as between component groups in the nation.

While this analysis is primarily concerned with the 'national' problem
(merging of the different tribes into one nation), this cannot be
separated completely from the problems of value and common purpose

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1. See Blakemore and Cooksey, op. cit., p. 30.

behaviour. The three problems are all closely related to the degree of harmony or conflict prevailing between the groups. This is in a sense the horizontal dimension of integration in all its complexity of the national integration process. It is a fundamental aspect of this dimension which is central to this thesis. That is the creation of a sense of national identification and the willingness to accept other groups as fellow citizens. This definition does not take into account the nature of the elite-mass gap.[1]

To create an integrated polity, the political system should be supported by other systems (social, cultural, economic, etc.) on a national scale and serve as a focus of orientation. This implies constant interactions with the other systems — a change in one will bring about a change in the other, or any disturbance in one part of the system may have an effect on the other parts. Thus the link between polity and society is a subtle and shifting relationship but a necessary part of the interaction between polity and society. Given the central role of the polity in developing countries, the capacity to carry out desired social processes such as economic modernization is increased if the society supports the political system. Essential to this support is some degree of consensus on common goals including tacit agreement to identify first and foremost with the nation.

An attempt has been made thus far to show how the concept of national integration like other concepts in the social sciences, has problems

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1. Evidence suggests that the elite-mass gap is less of an immediate problem than that of horizontal integration in the African context as experiences in Uganda, Nigeria, Burundi, Congo and Sudan have shown.

arising from its variegated nature. However, what has become evident
as this analysis has progressed, is that the key word for national inte-
gration, (a group concept) is 'interaction'. If we consider interaction
as being intrinsic to national integration, then for this thesis national
integration will be defined firstly, in terms of the social distance
existing between cultural or ethnic groups; and, secondly, as the
manifestation of an individual's sense of identification and loyalty to
the nation. In other words, national integration will be seen as the
willingness to interact positively with members of other ethnic groups
and the creation of a sense of national identity.

Insofar as national integration necessitates the creation of wider
national loyalties that will supersede parochial loyalties to tribal or
ethnic groups, it has posed particular problems of persuasion and re-
conciliation in Africa. This is so because within a more heterogeneous
field of interaction people representing specific ethnic categories
bring with them characteristic social distance norms which they have
learnt in their respective ethnic groups. This situation is borne out by
evidence in most African states when one considers the difficulties
which have been evident from attempts since Independence at establishing
national unity across ethno-cultural boundaries. To complicate the
picture further, African nationalism was not a wider grass-roots
movement in reaction to the subjugation of the colonial government, but
rather the conscious creation of intellectuals who had had the opportunity
of participating in the larger colonial administration. Since, in most
cases, the nationalist movement did not have a country-wide basis in its
struggle for Independence, consciousness of loyalty and affiliation to
the 'nation' has had to be fostered among peoples whose primary loyalties

have traditionally been to their clan, ethnic group or village. The development of such wider loyalties involves greater social interaction and hence new relationships and contact with other ethnic groups characterised by different values and affiliations at local level. The outcome of the plebeite held in British Cameroons in 1961, with people in Adamawa choosing to become part of Nigeria and the others choosing to identify with East Cameroon, shows that the inhabitants of the area under study were conscious of the need to develop wider loyalties to the Cameroon nation.

The process of fostering loyalties to a wider entity beyond that of ethnic group and village is considered by politicians to be essential to the smooth government of their territories. The process of national integration becomes even more crucial and difficult to foster where national boundaries cut across ethno-cultural units with their particular local affiliations. Thus, implicit in this process if the political strategy of shifting allegiances from the immediate community and ethnic group towards the wider, more remote entity of the nation. Implicit in the concept of national identity is the development of loyalties to the government, within the boundaries inherited on independence. Hence, the close inter-relationship between the concepts of national integration, unity and identity that the educational system is supposed to promote.

As far as developing a national identity in the two provinces of West Cameroon is concerned, the process is complicated for two reasons. On the one hand, its population of only 1.6 million is characterised by extreme ethno-cultural heterogeneity, having over fifty major ethnic groups. On the other hand, the Confederation linking West Cameroon to East Cameroon on Independence necessitated identification with a centre

of government in Yaounde, arising from a different colonial and administrative tradition. Besides experiencing different forms of colonial government, the administrative tradition adopted for the nation has been more French influenced by the French system. Because of this, the French-speaking Civil Servants find it easier to adapt to the administrative system than the English-speaking Cameroonians whose British Colonial tradition has had less influence on the administrative styles and methods of government.

3.3 Education and National Integration - An Overview.

In section 3.2 above, it was noted that national integration of diverse cultural groups can be achieved through the deliberate effects of the cultural group members to rise above narrow parochial identities. One of the ways by which national governments, particularly those in developing countries, have attempted to achieve national integration is through their school system. The objectives were to reconcile conflicting sub-systems, bridge discontinuities between one level of education and another, reorientate the curricula and rewrite text books and materials in which learning outcomes would be more closely linked to national goals. These changes where aimed in part at changing individual and group identities so as to replace primordial group loyalties with an over-riding national identity.

In recent years, however, empirical studies conducted both inside and outside Africa on the role of education in national integration, have suggested that education per se may not be as potent an integrative agent as earlier literature had claimed. But, as the short review in this

paragraph will indicate, some of these studies have produced conflicting results. As one major difficulty in reconciling these conflicting interpretations concerns the conception of education used by these authors, an attempt is made below to define education briefly. It is hoped that such a definition will not only help us to understand some of these studies, but it may also help us to identify a better conceptual framework for this study.

Education can be said to consist of two major activities. The first, the teaching of skills designed to enable its clientele to follow an occupation or range of occupations and second inculcation in the clientele of the value systems of a given society. These two activities are usually, but not necessarily, congruent. It is also generally agreed that because these two activities dominate all educational systems, there is always a close relationship between the provision of educational facilities and both the occupational demands of the economy and the maintenance of the 'national value system'. In particular cases, notably Japan and Germany, the expansion of the educational system corresponds roughly with their economic and socio-political demands.[1]

The schools in these countries are organised in levels or phases and transfers from one level to another are either by examination or on

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1. See Koppel, P., Modern Germany: Its history and civilization, Macmillan, New York, 1966, pp. 252-3; and Hameron, T. S., The Social Foundation of German Unification 1858-1871, Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 280-283. For France, see Fraser, W., Reforms and Restraints in Modern French Education, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1971, p. 21.

teachers' recommendation or both. Besides, there are different curricula

at each level which, on the one hand, take into account the national

heritage and on the other hand, the demands of a modern state. However,

it would be simplistic to assume that these two demands always coincide.

In many countries, it is the conflict between these two demands which is

central to an understanding of the actual working of the educational

system. For example, one of the major problems in Cameroon, as in most

African countries, is how to strike a balance between programmes which

would give children scientific and technological skills necessary for the

modernization process and which would also incorporate traditional

customs and belief systems. Dongmo, (1974) identifies the dilemma when

he writes that:

> "We want to master seriously science and technology and
>
> gain access to the world of the developed countries. But
>
> can we do this and at the same time retain our customs,
>
> our beliefs, our traditions, our mentality?"[1]

The funding of research projects and units in Cameroon,

for example,   are carried out by government research bodies such

as IPAR and ONAREST. The work done by IPAR concerns the ruralization of

primary education, that is making the primary curricula relevant to the

experiences and environment of the child. ONAREST follows the same

principle, but their research covers a wider range of academic subjects;

particularly, the sciences and agriculture at all levels of the

educational system. In Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the mounting of National

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1. Dongmo, Andre, 'Les Origines du sen Commercial des Bamileke,' Yaoundé,
   Cameroon, 1974, p. 66.

Seminars have been on in recent years[1], reflect the same concern as that implicit in Dongmo's pertinent question.

Because of the immensity of the problem, it seems reasonable to conjecture that no one institution in society can by itself bring about national integration. It is now more generally accepted that no part of the formal educational system can independently achieve national integration. Education is seen as a potent contributing factor to the process. Apart from those philosophers who argue that education as no ends outside of itself, that is, that education has no extrinsic values[2], most people would readily agree that it can be put to several uses and also that it fulfils diverse functions, its function as an integrative agent being just one of many, but the one that we are concerned with in this thesis.

It must be pointed out that education is not the only integrative agent known to social and political scientists. Much has been written about possible political solutions to the problems of integration. The strategy adopted in fostering unity in most African countries is one of persuasion and reconciliation. This includes the use of the mobilization party, propaganda, provision of material benefits, participation in the international stage and the expansion of the educational system. Although the use of force against secessionists (for example, the Biafrans during the Nigerian Civil War of 1966), is sometimes used as a measure of last resort when the security of the state is threatened, this can only be a

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1. See Hawes, H. W. R., *An African Primary Survey: Innovation*, News Letter of the I.E.R.S., UNESCO, No. 10, Geneva, 1976, p. 7.
2. See, for example, Peters, R. S., *Ethics and Education*, especially Chapter II ("Education as Initiation"), pp. 46-63.

stop-gap measure. While force serves to promote loyalty, it is recognised that it does not diminish cultural pluralism although it may restrain overt manifestation of it.

Balanced economic development in different parts of the country has been suggested as the tie that will bind diverse ethnic groups together. But as this objective is difficult to achieve in the short-term in most parts of Black Africa, (due to the sheer physical difficulties and the lack of adequate human and financial resources to develop all areas simultaneously), economic development can itself be a source of dis-integration. In addition, it is not economic development per se, but the interdependence of commercial links that are important for integration. As examples in Nigeria and other parts of Africa have shown, an awareness of interdependent commercial links among the various cultural groups does not necessarily lessen inter-communal tensions.

National integration can be fostered through a variety of channels such as the mass media, nonformal education, youth clubs, etc. But like the economic aspects, in some circumstances it may be integrative, while in others it can be a divisive rather than a harmonising agent. For example, the legacy of foreign language(s) as official language(s), can be used to overcome some of the problems associated with cultural diversity. This is so because in some multilingual countries, the major ethnic groups resist to accept as a national language the mother tongue of another group fearing that such a policy would give the others an undue advantage (see Chapter Four).

In some African countries, religious homogeneity may be a unifying
factor (e.g. Muslims in North Africa) but in others, particularly those
with the legacy of a Christian South and a Muslim North, it may contribute
to widespread instability or Civil War (e.g. Chad). Hence, the role of
different channels for promoting national integration varies according
to the complex inter-relationship between historical, geographical,
cultural, social and economic factors.

3.4 The influence of Education on national integration - Research Evidence.

From the analysis of previous operational definition of education, one is
forced to conclude that there is a strong need for a clearer conceptual-
ization with more empirically related methods of operationalizing this
concept. This will enable the researcher to know what is meant when
education is proclaimed to be a determinant of any social or attitudinal
behaviour. It is therefore the intention of this study to move closer
to a tenable conceptualization of the problem and a more objective way
of measuring education and its influence.

If we focus on the political functions of education, the distinction
Coleman (1965) makes between (i), (ii) and (iii) below, provides a model
for identifying these different approaches to the problem.

Coleman outlines the functions of education as (i) socialization of
youth into the political culture; (ii) selection, recruitment and
training of political leaders; and (iii) the political integration of a
community. Coleman describes socialization as the process by which
individuals acquire attitudes and feelings towards the political system

and their role in it.[1] Almond (1960) refers to these processes as the process of induction into the political culture[2]. In fostering this attitude, one of the ways by which national governments, particularly those in developing countries, have attempted to achieve national integration is through their school system. Many different views have been put forward concerning ways the school fosters national integration. One sees the school as a means of providing opportunity for prolonged contact with various ethnic groups in a public institution of learning (Haupt, 1968). Another advocates the use of the school curriculum as a means of changing attitudes. Such studies (Makulu, 1971) pronounce on the importance of a particular curriculum content as the factor influencing integration to the exclusion of all other school related factors. A third concerns the quality of staff and teaching techniques. In the latter case, it is maintained that schools, with proper teaching techniques and appropriate qualified staff, would foster a positive attitude to national integration. The view favoured by the economists is that the amount of money devoted to education as a proportion of the total national budget would help national integration. This concerns equitable distribution of wealth and educational facilities among the different ethnic groups. Research concerning these views will be discussed in the next section.

However, some empirical studies tend to support the widely held contention that schools are integrative agents. This conviction is common in the United States where several studies give credulence to the integrative

1. Coleman, J. S., Education and Political Development, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 18.
2. Almond, G. A., and Coleman, J. S., The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 27.

role of the school. Thus Stember's research (1961) in the United States carefully documented the impact of school on ethnic attitudes and notes that in most respects the better educated are less likely to be pre-judiced. Yet they are also more likely to avoid intimate contacts with other groups, to hold highly effective derogatory stereotypes and to favour discrimination in some areas of behaviour on an informal basis. These conclusions and findings have been challenged consistently by most investigators who have conducted studies or reviewed research recently. For example, with regards to an overall impact of the school, Niemi's (1973) conclusion is that

> "the effects of the school are highly variable - depending
> at least on the quality of the teacher, the class material,
> the social and political composition of the school and
> classroom, particular circumstance of time and place,
> and even interactive effects such as the correspondence
> between what is taught in the classroom and what is in-
> formally taught outside the school."[1]

The empirical studies coming out of Africa also show some conflicting results, Peil (1976)[2] found in her Nigerian Survey that

> "the well-educated ..... tend to emphasise the nation
> as opposed to the locality ..... the uneducated.....
> remain more tied to local interests."

But Beckett and O'Connell (1977)[3] found a rather low level of national identity among students from Amadu Bello University, Nsukka and Ibadan. universities.

1. Niemi, R., 'Political Socialization' in Handbook of Political Psychology Jeanne N. Knutson, San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass, 1973, p. 131.
2. Peil, M., 'Nigerian Politics', The People's View, London, Cassell, 1976, p. 88.
3. Beckett, P. and O'Connell, J., Education and Power in Nigeria, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1977, p. 67.

Students were asked to compare different levels of personal identity as an index of their relative sense of belonging to one community or another. Table 3.1 illustrates the results.

Table 3.1: Relative strength of different levels of identity among Nigerian students (percentages)

		ABU	IBADAN	NSUKKA
Nigerian identity stronger than state identity	Yes	48	59	36
	No	52	41	64
	Total	100	100	100
Nigerian identity stronger than ethnic identity	Yes	48	55	37
	No	52	45	61
	Total	100	100	100
Nigerian identity stronger than home community	Yes	43	36	35
	No	57	64	65
	Total	100	100	100

Source: Beckett, P. and O'Connell, J., Education and Power in Nigeria, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1977, p. 67.

Comparing the relative strength of home state as opposed to national identity, only the Ibadan students indicated the latter to be more powerful than the former. Nsukka students were the least nationally inclined. As regards ethnic as opposed to national identity, a similar pattern emerges, and all three groups of students expressed a higher level of attachment to home community than to the nation. This data demonstrates the important fact that national identity in Nigeria is not automatically associated with higher education, but rather reflects the Nigerian political context and recent times.

These studies take into account the nature of educational experiences.
They see the school as a more 'neutral'environment than the rural or
village, non-literate home background of most students which represents
a different view of the world. This situation is particularly true after
primary school when students take national common entrance examination
to secondary schools outside their geographic and ethno-linguistic areas
of origin. Since most of the students live in boarding houses, this
provides for a long-term physical isolation from the traditional influences
of family and village[1]. It also brings into close contact various
children of differing ethnic backgrounds. This kind of proximity, it has
been suggested, contributes to attitudinal consensus and reduces levels
of ethnocentrism[2]. The sense of national identity then created is
further nurtured by the "old-boy" network which Abernethy (1969) des-
cribes in the case of Nigeria:

> "Through its recruitment policies it (the school) can bring
>
> together members of different groups, and the school can
>
> become a miniature nation by instilling co-operative habits
>
> among a diverse student body."

Co-operative attitudes can be developed in schools where new activities
such as lessons, sports, work, games, tours and residential life provides
new centres of interest. New roles, motivations, aspirations and oppor-
tunities are also derived from these new activities. These may lead to
the development of a new sense of identity among the students and

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1. Abernethy, David, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An
   African Case, Palo Alto, Cal., Stanford University Press,1969, p. 257.
2. Secondary school involves from five to seven years away from home, and
   higher education adds at least three more.

formation of new groups. Abernethy (1969) continues by saying that

"if leaders of competing groups have in common an 'old

school tie' and memories of eccentric teachers..... that

binds old boys everywhere together, it is more likely

that their political differences can be mediated than

if their educational experiences are quite dissimilar."

Although Abernethy's hypothesis was not submitted to statistical test,
Clignet's research (1967)[1] on the same lines, reinforces this point
clearly. He summarised his research on secondary schools in the Ivory
Coast by warning that "ethnic differential in attitudes do seem to be
deeply eroded by education" but that:

"the homogenizing influence of an educational environment

is effective only when the functions performed by the

school are reinforced by other Agencies and by the mass

communication system".

Unfortunately, however, the integrative function of the school resulting
from recruitment policies and from prolonged proximity is now seriously
threatened in places like Cameroon by the creation of regionally-based
post-primary institutions. It is now possible for the majority of Anglo-
phone Cameroonians to obtain all formal education (apart from the
University education) without leaving their areas of origin, and con-
sequently without interacting very much with students of different ethnic
backgrounds. In each of the nine administrative regions (which, as was
indicated in Chapter One, approximate roughly to the major ethnic
boundaries), there is a grammar school, at least two secondary modern

1. Clignet, Remi, 'Ethnicity, Social differential and Secondary Schools
   in West Africa', Calviers d'Etudes Africaines, VII, Summer 1967, p. 378.

schools, and various private technical and commercial secondary schools
of low standards (in terms of the facilities provided and the academic
achievement of the students). The students recruited in these technical
and commercial schools are usually those who fail the common entrance
examination to grammar and secondary modern schools. While the govern-
ment's aim is to make secondary education for most children completing
primary education in each division, this inadvertently leads to ethnic
isolation and less prolonged contact between the groups. In other words,
this policy takes account of the quantitative rather than the qualitative
aspects of contact, which this thesis is concerned about.

From the above, one sees that the role of education as an integrative
agent remains controversial. But it seems clear that education will
increase awareness of the political system but does not necessarily
determine the effective content of this perception. In other words,
through the educational system students acquire a wide range of ideas
and values and have a better opportunity than most of the population of
being well informed about politics. But this does not necessarily imply
a positive change in political attitudes towards integration. If
education is to become a potential influence on the process of national
integration, there must first be many other changes in the social
structure such as increased democracy, social equality and economic
development.

It is not only by applying uniform recruitment or distributional policies,
however, that schools and other educational institutions can overcome the
divisive effects of ethnicity, but also by developing curricula which
are sensitive to the cultural or ethnic difference in society. The

curriculum ought to be so designed as to prepare the youth not only for greater versatility in an increasing technologicaland complex world, but also for better cultural empathy with other ethnic groups.

On the basis of this, Cameroon, like most other African nations, has been making innovations in both fields. For example, major efforts have gone into making all curricula, particularly at the primary school level, more Cameroonian in flavour and less pedantic in practice. Among the most noteworthy reforms have been substantial injections of Cameroon history, geography, music and traditions into schools once saturated with either British – or French – orientated subject matter. The point of making these remarks is that Abernethy's hypothesis should be extended to take account of the quality (content of the curricula) that is being given, because, where academic programmes and pedagogy incorporate knowledge of the values of other ethnic groups, a potentially integrative situation may exist.

On the other hand, there is a danger in Cameroon that planners and policy-makers have assumed too readily that the current weaknesses and apparent failings of the school system may be corrected by making school curricula and methodology more relevant to the students' needs. This assumption is questionable since Clignet (1976) has pointed out that the functions performed by the curriculum and the teaching techniques of the Cameroonian schools with regards to national integration are perhaps less significant than one would like them to be. He concluded that it is difficult to identify the factors in the school system that influence integration because of the many intervening variables present in the system. For example, he wonders whether the impact of educational

structures can be attributed to the content of the courses taught or does it rather reflect the formal and informal processes of interaction between teacher and student or between student and student? He suggests that much more research is needed to assess the intensity and the quality of the influence that education institutions exert on loyalty to the nation.[1] Since Clignet's research was done in the littoral and central provinces of French-speaking Cameroon, the situation in the English-speaking part (South-West and North-West provinces), where the present study has been done, is rather different particularly as the educational system remains influenced by the British model in its structure and organisation.

Apart from history and geography, the civics programme is the one subject area which is meant to promote positive feelings towards national identity in an explicit way through teaching pupils about their res-ponsibilities as citizens of the United Republic of Cameroon. The teaching of civics poses problems in analysing which three factors will be considered — (i) the nature of change to be implemented; (ii) the characteristics of the educational system; and (iii) the social system within which the educational system operates.

Havelock and Huberman (1977)[2] analysing the barriers of educational change, concluded that educational planners produced inadequate programmes which failed to take into account the nature of the social system into

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1. Clignet, Remi, The Search for National Integration in Africa, op. cit., p. 154.
2. Havelock, R. G., and Huberman, A. M., 'Solving educational problems, the theory and reality of innovations in developing countries', a study prepared for the International Bureau of Education, Paris, UNESCO, 1977, p. 15.

which the change is being introduced. They argued that schools have
tended to lag behind social change largely because of the difficulty of
reconciling divergent demands and because these demands have often been
inappropriate to the nature of schooling. Besides, because education may
be the largest administrative enterprise in many developing countries,
the more difficult it becomes to make substantial changes even though a
large amount of resources may have been allocated for running the
educational system. For example, the introduction of universal primary
education places a strain on existing resources, finance and expertise,
thereby leaving a very small amount for reorientating the system. Under
such circumstances, it is evident that the main concern of administrators
has tended to be in maintaining the standards of the past rather than
with improving the structure of the system.

In addition, the problem is exacerbated where there are no trained
teachers in this new integrative philosophy. Teachers should be supplied
with adequate books and other teaching materials relating to what the
Government identifies as 'national identity'. But in Cameroon, as in
other African states, these conditions are frequently lacking. Since
few teachers have any formal training in civics teaching, there is a
danger that they may exhibit the kind of particularistic attitudes
which the civic courses are intended to counter. In some cases, Blakemore
and Cooksey (1981) stress that the teachers may not even see the use of
citizenship training in schools nor accept that schools are the right
place for such training.[1] Thus, an examination of the social relations
within the school (for example the contacts between teachers and pupils)

1. See Blakemore, K. and Cooksey, B., A Sociology of Education for Africa,
   George Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp. 237-238.

or the types of student activities which are regarded as important, may
tell us more about the political values being passed on by the school
than the content of formal instruction.

Clearly, the introduction of changes of this nature is by no means
simple, and demands considerable administrative planning. Coombs (1962)[1]
emphasises this view strongly and has suggested that if a revolution in
education is needed, it is with educational management that we need to
begin. Existing arrangements, he suggests, are archaic and anachronistic,
reflecting historical factors and past circumstances rather than any
coherent interpretation of the contemporary situation.

This situation is reflected in the Cameroon educational system, where
power and responsibility is in the hands of the central government. The
Cameroon educational system has a typically bureaucratic administration
and authoritarian methods of teaching. This curtails the influence of
other bodies (such as churches, religious organisations, private
individuals and organisations) in having a say in the educational system.
The hierarchical system, with its model from the colonial period, has
been designed essentially to facilitate downward communication of
information and institutions. Indeed, they sometimes give prior place to
considerations of administrative convenience as opposed to educational
desirability. This inhibits an upward flow of ideas and suggestions. It
is worthwhile to note that though it is suggested that centralization of
authority can, in theory, be a powerful instrument for bringing about

1. Coombs, P., The World Educational Crises, A System Analysis, New York,
   Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 120-121.

change, in practice a top-down communication system has very definite limitations which are likely to inhibit desirable changes from below. For example, democratic political processes such as consultation, representation and checks on the abuse of power have been at risk in such an authoritarian context. Surveys show that students are often hostile to one-party authoritarianism, but they are less enthusiastic about democratic alternatives in which everyone's opinion is held to be important. This is supported by Beckett and O'Connell's[1] study in Nigeria, where they asked students' opinions about the following statement: 'The masses in African countries are not yet capable of making rational choices in elections for national political offices'. From their various samples, between 73% and 82% of respondents agreed with the statement. The reason for this way of thinking is that the school has long emphasised values such as obedience, thriftiness, diligence and honesty at the expense of values such as leadership, initiative and the ability to be critical. It is known that the spread of such values would have been disfunctional to the maintenance of the colonial regime. On the other hand, because of the structural obstacle of change within the system after Independence, the old values are still inherent in the educational system which, in a sense, undermines and often contradicts current educational philosophies or societal practices.

In addition, because of the hierarchical nature of the educational system, the schools in most African countries promote individualism through competition to succeed, especially in examinations. These have severely undermined attempts to diversify primary curriculum and give practical

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1. Beckett, P. and O'Connell, J., Education and Power in Nigeria, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1977, p. 154.

and vocational-orientated studies the status they need. The highly
competitive nature of African education forces the individual to be
competitive and self-orientated rather than community-orientated. This
constitutes considerable problems in societies like Tanzania, where
co-operation and equality are highly valued in the political ideology of
the Government and party.

Similarly , the teaching style in Cameroonian schools in the North-West
and South-West provinces of Cameroon remains essentially authoritarian
in that teachers tend to cram the student with facts, rather than teaching
them to think for themselves. The nature of the concepts in the civic
programme, such as national identity, loyalty, unity, etc. requires
teachers who are well-informed in current affairs, but, because these
types of teachers are usually lacking, rote teaching tends to be the
norm. This situation is worse in schools in Cameroon where civics is not
an important component of the school examination system. Even in schools
where civics is an examinable subject, there is no guarantee that the
students understand the programmes. They are usually treated like other
subjects, where students merely memorise and produce material in
examinations.

Other studies, as distinct from the use of civics programmes however,
show that what the student learns from his environment is even more
important than political programmes in instilling political ideas. Where
there is congruence between the socializing elements in the student's
environment and the political programmes, a positive attitude is likely
to develop towards the political regime; but, where there is oncon-
gruence or a disparity between the polity and programmes, there is a

likelihood that an adverse attitude will develop towards the political system.[1]

The later description is characteristic of most African countries where there is incongruence between the values of the schools, and the parochial values of such political socializing agent as tribal elders, parents and even some teachers. From this, it is clear that most students acquire a diffuse allegiance to their nation which is important when one notices that the majority of adults have little sense of belonging to the nation themselves. For example, when political leaders and civil servants are seen to be particularistic, tribalistic and corrupt, rather than universalistic, nationalistic and honest, it is unlikely that any innovations in the curricula will have much impact as regards forming positive attitudes towards the polity. Abernethy shows how attitudes are affected by exposures to politics in Southern Nigeria.

Table 3.2: Southern Nigeria Students' attitude towards Politicians (percentages)

ATTITUDE	PRIMARY	SECONDARY MODERN	SECONDARY GRAMMAR	SIXTH FORM
Positive	15	13	14.4	17
Neutral	26	46	50.6	47
Negative	5	9	25.2	35
Don't know/no answer	54	32	9.6	1
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Source: Abernethy, D., The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1969, p. 217.

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1. Prewitt, K., Education and Political Values, 1968, p. 31.

The data shows a sevenfold increase in negative responses between primary and sixth-form students. This is a substantial index of the effects of exposure to politics on political attitudes. Barkan (1975) also found that students in Tanzania, Ghana and Uganda rated MPs and Ministers as basically opportunists, wasteful and proud.

In connection with the above, various other studies seem to indicate that the national political context strongly conditions attitudes and values. Court and Prewitt (1971), for example, found that the attitude of Kenyan secondary students towards the central government varied between privileged and under-privileged regions in terms of education and economic development. The results showed that a third of the subjects from the privileged groups supported government's economic and social policies, while only 14% from the under-privileged group supported it. This suggests that awareness of regional inequalities has a stronger socializing effect than a common educational experience.

Other studies dealing with equitable distribution of national resources from Africa, however, suggest caution towards the integrative role of the school. They have concluded that schools may indeed be, in certain conditions, a source of tension between ethnic groups, and hence dis-integrative agents. These conditions may be largely dependent on structural aspects of education such as the expansion of educational activities which involves distributing available resources to various groups and regions. Thus, selection and recruitment, says Coleman (1960) "depends on social stratification system of a society". He concludes on the basis of contemporary stratification theories that (i) the life chances of an individual for achieving political elite status are enormously enhanced if he belongs to, or can rise into, the upper level

of the stratification system; (ii) that in modern achievement-orientated societies, education tends to become the most important determinant of social mobility, because it alone leads to higher occupational achievement and consequently to higher income upper social status and higher prestige positions; and (iii) that education, therefore, is the main, if not the sole key to socio-political mobility into elite status.[1]

In the light of Coleman's comments about the role of education in relation to social mobility, it is hardly surprising that since Independence, many leaders have seen the need to expand the educational system on the assumption that this would lead to greater equality of opportunity among children of school-going age. Thus, in Cameroon, for example, the school population grew from 460,000 in 1960/61 to 1,200,000 in 1974/75.[2] At other levels of education, the expansion was even more phenomenal. The immediate consequence of the rapid growth of the school population was that schools at all levels turned out more graduates than the number of available 'white collar' jobs in government service, industry or commerce. Those first bitten by the scarcity of 'white collar' jobs were the primary school leavers as against 15,000 secondary and high school graduates.[3] In search of non-existent jobs, the school leavers drift into towns where they are faced with a life of squalid urban subsistence. The problem has become more serious in recent years with the shortening of the basic primary school course to six years and the growing tendency for children to go to school at six (in townships earlier, at five years), a situation where large numbers of children are completing

1. Coleman, op. cit., 1965, p. 18
2. Cameroon Ministry of Educational Statistics, 1974/75.
3. Ibid.

primary school at the age of twelve, and some at eleven. For these, prospects are particularly gloomy. They are too young to enter wage employment, too young also to be given land, responsibility or any degree of independence at home. This situation shows that the growth of primary schooling per se is unlikely to help many of the disadvantaged children, despite its role of incorporating them, at least temporarily, within the education system.

But equally important is the fact that existing educational institutions tend to be part of a pattern involving urbanization and economic development. Thus, the local resources to maintain and expand education are usually used up in areas that have advantage over other areas in terms of school provision. Educationally backward areas, on the other hand, tend to be less developed in economic and social terms. Such situations could have an adverse effect on integration because some families and localities will continue to have better opportunities in both the economic and educational systems, unless national policy and resources are deliberately directed towards overcoming regional imbalances and disparities.

Foster (1962) expressed similar views based on his informative study in Ghana when he said

> "in the long run, the extension of formal education among
>   the masses tends to lessen many inter-cultural differences
>   and helps to replace particularistic and local values by
>   attitudes more consonant with the needs of the nation .....
>   but ..... in the short run (and the short run can be a very
>   long time) regional inequality in the distribution of

schooling can exacerbate ethnic conflicts."[1]

Foster's conclusions that enrolment inequalities may decrease with time can be questioned in two ways. First, the national resources for providing schools may not coincide with the increase in population, and secondly this may not be adequate to provide the type and levels of schools that meet parents' aspirations. On this theme, Coleman (1965) concluded that

> "a premature and excessive effect to impose or to realize
> equality may so disperse meagre resources that system
> capacity is gravely weakened, if not destroyed."[2]

In Cameroon, some progress has been made in equalizing education opportunity between regions, but the Northern part of the country (outside the scope of this study) still remains at a disadvantage.

In summary, we can conclude on the one hand that the contribution of education to national integration remains unclear faced with conflicting results of studies relating to the influence of education on creating wider loyalties to the nation. In some cases, this may be due to the smallness of the sample used in the study and in other cases, the difficulties of isolating the school from other factors that influence values the students adopt. Insofar as political socialization is concerned, it seems that out-of-school factors are more important in changing values and orientating students' loyalties and affiliations to those of the wider community, than civics programmes. This may be so because, despite some minor changes in curricula content, no systematic attempt has been

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1. Foster, Philip, 'Ethnicity and the School in Ghana', op. cit., 1962, p.28.
2. Ibid., p. 31.

to reform the two educational systems inherited from the two colonial
powers; so that one national harmonized system, reflecting Cameroonian
national values and aspirations, can emerge. On the other hand, the
multiplication of schools since Independence may lead to school leaver
unemployment and social instability, to the localization of the students'
experiences and the development of cliques, elites originating within
the schools. In this respect, the school system would appear to be a
divisive instrument. It is, therefore, apparent that the process of
integration and the role of formal education in it are more complicated,
uncertain and variable than is often assumed.

CHAPTER FOUR

EDUCATION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN CAMEROON

4.1   INTRODUCTION

4.2   STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION IN CAMEROON

4.3   EDUCATION, LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

4.1   <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

In spite of the equivocal conclusions reached by social and political
scientists referred to in the preceding chapter, most African leaders
still assume education to be one of the most powerful instruments for
achieving political integration.[1] As far as Cameroon is concerned, the
extent to which education has been used in fostering national integration
can be measured by (i) the level of the degree of institutionalised
harmonisation of the two systems of education at the national level;
(ii) the curriculum and pedagogical methods and techniques adapted to
the diversity of local cultures; and (iii) the presence or absence of
recruitment of students from the variety of ethnic groups present in
the country. So the problems raised by ethnic factors in the field of
education relate to the functions the schools are expected to perform.
They also relate to the location of resources and the harmonization of
programmes of study. Before looking at each of these factors in detail,
a brief summary of the political and educational development of Cameroon
will be given to refresh our minds.

As noted in chapter one, having been colonised by the Germans, Cameroon
was divided after the Treaty of Versailles (1920) into two parts, East
and West. The eastern part was subjugated to French authority for nearly
forty years, while the western part was placed under British tutelage[2]

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1. Curle, Adam, <u>op. cit.</u>, 1969, P. 34.
2. A brief history of this period is given in chapter one of this study
   but fuller discussions on the development of colonisation in Cameroon
   are given in Le Vine, 1966, <u>op. cit.</u>, Willard Johnson 1970, <u>The
   Cameroon Federation</u> (Princeton University Press); and as far as
   educational development is concerned in Vernon, Jackson H.,
   <u>Language, Schools and Government in Cameroon</u>, New York, Teachers
   College, 1967.

for the same period. The two powers had different educational ideologies and organisational patterns. These contrasts in turn affected the potential influence of traditional ethnic factors on formal schooling, producing at the National level differing effects which, whether they now be active or dormant or even extinct, attract the historians' interest and in turn offer explanations for the educational development and educational ideologies that have been followed since Independence (1960) and Reunification (1961).

There is no doubt that during the negotiations for the Federation of French and British territories, Ahidjo (as Prime Minister of East Cameroon and leader of the East Cameroon delegation[1]) was aware of the integrative potentials of education, when he insisted (during the complex negotiations of the Federation of the two parts) that all education above the primary level be controlled by the Federal Government. Foncha, the Prime Minister and leader of the West Cameroon delegation (which Johnson (1970) identified as "the classic tradition of spokesmen for minority and regional interests"), demanded that all education save perhaps a federal university, should fall within the separate jurisdiction of the states.

In the end, Ahidjo's views prevailed and secondary level education became a Federal responsibility in 1963 - the year when the Federal,

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1. In 1960 while the negotiations for the unification of the French and British territories were going on, Ahidjo (President of Cameroon today)was the Prime Minister of East Cameroon and leader of the East Cameroon delegation; Foncha was the Prime Minister and leader of the West Cameroon delegation to these talks.
2. Willard, J.R., op.cit., 1965, p. 21.

and not the regional, budget assumed the burden of the secondary and technical education. In the same year, the French and English languages became compulsory subjects in each state and a Federal official (the cultural delegate) was appointed the following year to supervise secondary and technical schools in West Cameroon.[1] Again in 1963 Eteki-Mboumoua, the Federal Minister of Education gave a hint of the Government's intention to harmonise education when opening the new Cameroon College of Arts and Science in Kumba. He said,

> "Cameroon must become the crucible where, fed by the fire
>
> of our faith, the eminent physical, intellectual and moral
>
> values of our faces, nourished on the Anglo-Saxon and
>
> French cultures will dissolve and merge."[2]

4.2   STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION IN CAMEROON

Before analysing the implications of the policies so far discussed, a brief description of the structure of education in Cameroon is necessary in order to assess the impact of the policies affected in each level of the educational system. Unlike educational systems in other African

1. The official being also the Director of Education in the Ministry of Education in West Cameroon, held two posts so that this appointment had the effect of giving the number two man in the State Ministry more responsibility than the State Minister of Education.
2. Eteki-Mboumoua, Minister of National Education, address at the official opening ceremony of the Cameroon College of Arts and Science, Kumba, Yaoundé, Ministry of National Education, 1963, p.10

states where there are many "cut off points", Cameroon operates a
relatively straight-forward educational system as figure I suggests.
The main ladder of formal education is six years of primary school with
an entry age of six years. At the end of the primary course, the govern-
ment sets a 'First School Leaving Examination'. The pupils also sit for
a Common Entrance examination in the last year of primary schooling
which determines selection to secondary school. Many attempts have been
made since independence and reunification to revise the primary curriculum
in order to prepare the child to meet the challenge of the changing
social and political environment.

The second level of education (secondary school) consists of a five-year
course terminating in the Ministry of Education General Certificate of
Education (GCE) at ordinary level and a further two year course leading
to the GCE Advanced Level examination. The second level of the educational
system prepares its clientele for middle level opportunities in the
economy. After completing the second cycle of secondary education, those
with good academic records can either further their education in Yaoundé
University or the Ecole Normale Superieure where secondary school teachers
are trained. The curriculum of the first cycle of secondary school (the
first three classes) are designed to meet the needs of Cameroon by
offering students a wide range of subjects. At the secondary level,
emphasis has been placed on the quality of education. The third and
final level of the educational system culminates with the University of
Yaounde in its various faculties and departments. The university produces
men and women who fill the top level posts in Cameroon. All students'
activities and organisations function under the umbrella of the only
political party in the country, the Cameroon National Union Party (CNU).

FIGURE I: STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING CAMEROON 1980

The sum of the preceding material is not only a description of the scene in which this study has been carried out, but is designed to show the background to the attempts made to harmonise the structures of education at each level. At the primary level, haphazard attempts have been made to harmonise the structures of education, but as we shall show, very little has been done beyond this level. In 1964, the primary school course was shortened from eight to seven years and the Anglophone school year, which hitherto had begun with the civil year in January was transferred to September and the terms in the year were synchronised with those in operation in Francophone Cameroon. The syllabuses for all subjects taught at the primary level and teacher training colleges were revised to take account of the local environment and needs[1] but these policies directed towards integration remain largely unrealised since the policies were not fully implemented. So, as far as the primary schools curricula are concerned, we see that in the post-unification period there has been little conscious effort to promote national unity through the schools. The desire for national unity (a theme Ahidjo has repeatedly come back to in many public speeches), is not reflected either in school textbooks or in teacher training or ministerial directives.[2]

One of the major differences between the educational system which operated in Francophone Cameroon and one which operated in Anglophone Cameroon at the secondary level before Federation (1961) concerned the curriculum. Each state followed a secondary school curriculum peculiar

1. See Ministry of Education, Policy Education, Buea, Government Printing Press (1963).
2. In a Cameroon sample of 120 secondary school teachers, Abangma (1977) reported that 'National Unity' as an educational aim was ranked 15th out of 20 popular Educational Aims. See Abangma, M. A., 'Developing a Curriculum Strategy for Secondary Schools in West Cameroon', Un-published M.Ed thesis, University of Bath, School of Education, 1977.

to the territory under the jurisdiction of the administering power. On the eve of independence (1960), West Cameroon students prepared for the General Certificate of Education (GCE) set and marked in London.[1] East Cameroon students prepared for the brevet and baccalaureat. This continues to be the pattern, and may remain so for some time.[2] There are at least three reasons for this: first, it must be remembered that in the years immediately preceding Independence, the major political issue had been regionalism versus centralization as the parties (East Cameroon delegation and West Cameroon delegation) agreed for a constitution that would allow them to retain their localized bases of support. Thus, at this stage, the leaders were obviously more concerned in fostering unity through politics and the economy than with education. Second, the language problem seems to be equally important. The harmonising of syllabuses and examinations at the secondary level poses problems. For example, producing textbooks with similar content suitable for both groups and more important, the supply of these books to the teacher and student in the language he or she is most proficient in. Third, the metropolitan universities – French and English continue to attract a large part of the students graduating from the high schools.For this reason, any changes from the metropole-based curriculum could be seen as limiting the opportunities of young Cameroonians for upward mobility through the

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1. Cameroon GCE is now being set and marked by Cameroonians but with the strict supervision from the University of London Examination Council. Also see footnote 30.
2. In 1974, the Federal Ministry of Education took over the organisation, setting and the marking of GCE from London. The GCE has a different office and a sub-director under the Director of Examination in the Ministry and London still sends advisers every year to help with the organisation.

additional qualification of having studied abroad.[1] Besides, obtaining

a qualification from the metropolitan university has a wider currency

and is more prestigious.

Also, not much has been done at introducing Cameroonian languages in

both primary and secondary schools, despite the great intellectual

debate on the subject[2] and despite initiatives taken by teachers in

certain schools.For example, just after independence, UNESCO formed a

subcommittee to look at language usage in Cameroon between 1967-1970.

The reports adopted by the UNESCO Commission are used in the University

of Yaounde and by ONAREST mainly for research purposes and the training

of personnel. Since 1968, the Societe Internationale Linguistique

(S.I.L.) has also been working in Cameroon on the development of

languages for literary purposes, the production of pedagogic material

and the training of teachers. Despite all these efforts, the teaching of

Cameroonian languages is limited to two experimental schools: Lycee de

Nkongsamba, where Bamileke is taught in the first cycle, and Libermann

College in Douala where four Cameroonian languages are taught as

subjects - Douala, Bamileke, Bassa and Ewondo.

As far as the school curricula are concerned, it is difficult to identify

a specific policy formulated to expose Cameroonians of various ethnic

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1. In 1976, for example, when the Ministry of National Education took
   over the setting and marking of GCE in Anglophone Cameroon, there was
   fear among parents (who did not know the arrangements between London
   and Cameroon) that the Cameroonian GCE would not be recognised in the
   U.K. and many people saw it as an attempt by Francophone Cameroonians
   who controlled the Ministry of National Education to prevent Anglophone
   Cameroonians from studying in the U.K. Since that decision, an increasing
   numberof children from the Anglophone sector with wealthy parents have
   come to do Advanced Level in the U.K.
2. See for example: Abangma, M.A., "A Study of Primary Teachers' Attitudes
   towards the ruralisation of school curriculum in English-speaking
   Cameroon", an unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1981.

groups to norms, values, and techniques to a degree that transcends
ethnic parochialism. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that
the school curriculum has a definite impact on the political socialisation
of students. This is particularly true of the secondary schools where
curricula have not been fully adapted to Cameroonian realities. At the
primary school level, however, I.P.A.R. is working to ruralize the
curriculum based on the social realities of Cameroon. Much has been done
to try to adapt the curriculum, but this has not been implemented fully.

In most secondary schools in English-speaking Cameroon, for example,
African history does not have high priority, the explanation being
either that the teachers themselves have never done it before or that
there are no available textbooks. The emphasis in schools is usually
more on International History so the child completes secondary education
with some knowledge of British and European history, but hardly knows
the history of his ethnic group, let alone that of the region or
continent of Africa. Also, there is hardly any Cameroonian literature
prescribed in the curriculum despite the fact that Cameroon novelists
like Mongo Beti and Ferdinand Oyono have attained international recog-
nition. There is no set curricula for secondary schools in English-
speaking Cameroon, with the result that school principals work within
the confines of the GCE examination rather than for any national unified
policy.* On these lines, Walter Haupt concluded from his own study in
Cameroon that although formal education appeared to reduce ethno-centric
feelings, the most important factor was not programmes, but inter-ethnic
proximity, prolonged contact and the resultant interaction.[1]

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* see footnote I page 99
1. Haupt, Walter N., 'The Secondary School and Cross-tribal Integration
   in Cameroon', unpublished Ph.D thesis, 1969, Michigan State University.

The contribution of secondary schooling to national integration should
also depend upon the ability of the schools to attract proportional
numbers of students from the various ethnic groups either in the same
or different schools.[1] This has not been the case of Cameroon. As in
most African countries, the coastal zones and coastal peoples have more
schools and higher enrolments than the interior and grassland areas.
From this, one would expect to find more enrolment in the English-
speaking group which occupies a greater proportion of the coastal area.
But in Cameroon, the French-speaking group has a higher enrolment than
the English-speaking group.[2] The difference between these two groups
has existed for some time. It is possible to observe the trend between
1964/65 to 1970/71 as depicted in figure II below.

Cameroon: Changes in Educational Enrolment in East and West
Cameroon between 1964-1970:

A Profile of Enrolment Trend

Source: Adapted from Clignet, Remi, 1978, 'The role of the School in
the rise of Cameroonian Nationalism', Education and Urban
Society, Vol. X, No. 2, p. 186.

1. See Clignet, Remi 'The role of the schools in the rise of Cameroonian
Nationalism', Education and Urban Society, Vol. X, No. 2, 1978, pp.
177-208.
2. See Ministry de l'Education Nationale Bureau des Statistiques, Liste
des establissements du second degre pour les annees scolaires 1972/73,
Yaoundé.

At both primary and secondary level, there is a widening of the gap
between Anglophone and Francophone enrolment. The gap is greater at the
primary level than at the post secondary level. But it nevertheless gives
no evidence of a clear policy of educational integration. If equal
educational facilities between the groups was evident, one would expect
a closing of the gap rather than a widening.

In Anglophone Cameroon, the enrolments are higher in the larger cities
than in the rural hinterland. On the whole, ethnic contrasts are more
marked in urban than in rural areas. This might be so because of
accentuated differences in the occupational status of adults, which in
turn increases differences in the resources they can devote to the
education of children. Table 4.1 shows these differences in enrolments
and Table 4.2 shows the differences in occupational status of students'
parents.

TABLE 4.1 DIFFERENCES IN ENROLMENTS BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS (1965-66)

Some Ethnic Groups	Rural %	Towns %	Cities %	Total %
Coastal (Bakweri)	54.2	100.0	87.9	56.2
Meme Division: Balundu Mbo	53.8	73.0	78.8	58.2
Manyu – Forest Bantoids	44.7	75.0	87.8	56.1
Savannah (Bantoids of the plateau)	44.1	48.7	72.5	46.2
Others	50.1	100.0	66.3	66.2
East Cameroonians	55.1	85.3	77.6	71.5
Nigerians	22.8	48.9	69.3	42.6
Bamileke	56.6	100.0	84.8	60.1

Source: La population de l'Ouest Cameroun Paris, INSEE Service de
Co-operation, 1968 , p. 106.

TABLE 4.2 ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON: OCCUPATIONAL ORIGIN OF STUDENTS FROM THE VARIOUS TYPES OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN THE SOUTH-WEST PROVINCE ONLY (1969-70)

Socio-professional stratum	Secondary schools %	Teacher-training colleges %	OMBE Technical College %	Adult popu-lation %
Senior staff	17.4	5.5	4.0	1.4
Missionaries and teachers	11.3	6.1	3.0	1.8
The Armed Forces - Police	3.1	0.8	3.0	0.4
Clerks	6.5	1.8	3.0	1.8
Traders	7.3	5.0	2.0	4.5
Salaried manual workers	2.5	1.4	2.0	2.3
Modern farmers	37.3	64.6	68.0	38.6
Drivers	1.1	0.6	-	1.2
Independent manual workers	2.0	1.1	2.0	4.7
Plantation labourers	1.2	0.8	1.0	3.6
Pensioners	1.4	1.1	-	4.4
Subsistence farmers	6.3	10.0	3.0	0.9
Services	1.3	0.5	1.0	0.9
Other labourers	1.3	0.6	-	4.2

Source: Courade, C. and G.,   Education in Anglophone Cameroon
1915-1975, 1977, p. 51.

These differences are not likely to decline over time. In the 1960s and early 1970s, most of the schools were mainly mission schools whose aim was to spread Christianity. Besides, these schools were not evenly spread, most being in the coastal areas where the missionaries first landed. The distribution of the corresponding denominations tends to vary along ethnic lines; for example, most of the Bakweri are Baptists and Presbyterians. This is reflected in the enrolment of the Baptist

Secondary School for Girls in Victoria and the former Training College
for Teachers at Soppo-Buea. Also, most people in Donga and Mantung
Division are Baptists and there is a Baptist Secondary School in that
area. In Meme Division, there are Roman Catholic teacher training colleges
and a Presbyterian Secondary School. Most of the Bafaw, Balundo-Mbo,
Bakossi are Presbyterians. In Manyu Division, there are both Catholic
and Presbyterian secondary schools. There is a strong Catholic presence
in the grassland areas of Bamenda and Nsaw where there are many Catholic
organisations. This distribution has two implications: first, it makes it
difficult for the government to erode progressively the ethnic in-
equalities stated above since it does not control the schools. Second,
the link between ethnicity and Christianity lowers the impact that
educational processes may have on national integration, although these
Christian denominations have a fraternal brotherly basis irrespective of
ethnic or racial background.

To combat the inequality in school enrolment, the government is now
establishing Government Grammar Schools in every division in order to
give every ethnic group a fair opportunity, but as it was pointed out
earlier, this can lead to regional isolation. And as Clignet[1] points
out, this strategy raises two difficulties. First, it is not certain that
the schools so created will recruit their students from the local
population. In English-speaking Cameroon, for example, the schools
opened in the North, such as Nbengwi Grammar School and one in Fontem
(Bangwa), tend to attract students from the forest areas with a relatively

1. Clignet, Remi, op. cit., The Search for National Integration in Africa,
   p. 148.

low quality of academic performance, usually those who pass the common entrance examination in List 'B' or who fail the common entrance examination but pass the first school leaving certificate examination. Second, such schools are not necessarily able to get the most qualified teachers. In such circumstances, most teachers of different ethnic groups would not want to teach in schools of other ethnic groups, particularly if the schools are in the rural areas. In this situation, the government can help by creating incentive systems to encourage teachers to work in rural areas. However, it is not very easy for the government to change the situation completely. Even if the government prescribes a common curricula content, differentials which result from economic and social forces do not easily come under political control.

4.3   EDUCATION, LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN CAMEROON

Although it has been argued in this thesis that schools in Cameroon have not tended to be utilised explicitly as instruments for national integration, language policy can be cited as the one area in which Government seeks to promote a wider sense of identity and unity. We will look closely at the way policies for bilingualism in English and French have been implemented in the United Republic of Cameroon. As a result, the section is both historical and analytical. It is historical in the sense that attempts will be made to look at the evolution of language policy as an instrument for national integration; and analytical in the sense that attempts will be made to consider how this policy is related or unrelated to other policies directed at national integration.

For communication of thought, feeling, will and action to be possible, there must be contact between members of the national community. That is why a common language is such an effective instrument in forging national unity. As Jacobs (1966) observes, "not to have a language in common with one's compatriots is to have a stranger for a countryman".[1] Although many language experts and many of us living in multi-lingual societies would cite this as an example of an extreme observation, the advantages gained by having a common language are enormous. African states not fortunate to be in this position have devised various means of fostering unity, the main one being the use of a foreign language to overcome this handicap.

The use of foreign languages in Africa has certain advantages. First, it is practical because of its 'supra-ethnic' and 'supra-local' connotations in the multi-lingual African contexts.[2] From the point of view of the education system, the foreign languages have a rich literary resource and formalised reference grammar. Second, the foreign languages have the advantage of wide international usage. So for expediency at least, most African states have had to retain the various metropolitan languages which were once a symbol of political, economic and cultural domination.

In Cameroon, as elsewhere in Tropical Africa where national unity cannot be fostered easily through a common local or African language, it became imperative that national unity would have to be achieved through a non-African language. Having previously been under the tutelage of two colonial powers, France and Britain, Cameroon chose at independence to

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1. Jacobs, R., 'English language teaching in Nigeria' Lagos, Ford
   Foundation , 1966, p. 39.
2. See Fishman, J. A., 'Nationality-Nationalism and Nation-Nationism',
   in Fishman, Forguson and DasGupta, Language Problems of Developing
   Nations, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1968, pp. 39-51.

become constitutionally a bilingual state with English and French as
its two official languages. After Federation (1961) it was soon realised
that if national integration was to be achieved, bilingualism in the two
languages inherited from their respective colonial governments could form
a fundamental objective of educational policy. An experiment in bi-
lingualism was soon begun in Buea with the building of Buea Bilingual
College,[1] with an equal number of students from the two second language
groups who were taught all subjects of the secondary school curriculum
by Francophone and Anglophone expatriates.

At first, the West Cameroon Government did not seem enthusiastic about
learning French, as they thought that this would cause West Cameroonians to
lose their cultural difference arising from their colonial experience. In
1963, the West Cameroon Government defined its language policy in a
rather curious way:

> "In the opinion of government, French should not be taught
> to persons who have not acquired a solid foundation of
> English... In secondary and teacher training colleges,
> government feels that French should continue to be a com-
> pulsory subject and should be supplemented by audio-visual
> teaching and exchange visits."[2]

Educationally, it makes sense to concentrate on teaching a new foreign
language at primary level, leaving the second until later on in the
cycle - hence avoiding the confusion of having to learn two foreign
languages at the same time. Besides, politicians and educational

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1. Housed provisionally at Man O'War Bay Victoria, it moved to its present
   site in Buea in 1970.
2. See Ministry of Education, Buea 'West Cameroon Educational Policy:
   Investment in Education', West Cameroon Gazette, February 1963.

authorities were fighting secretly to preserve the Anglo-Saxon heritage.
As long as the Federation lasted (1972), the West Cameroon Government
used its constitutional right to refuse the introduction of French
course into the primary school system which was under regional manage-
ment. However, neither state introduced the second official language at
primary level. As West Cameroonians continued to express anxiety about
the dominant position of French, the Federal President continued to
allay their fears. In 1965 on a tour of West Cameroon he said:

> "Nous avons eu l'occasion d'exprimer notre conviction en
>
> cette orientation qui n'est pas destinee a assurer la
>
> domination d'un groupe linguistique sur l'autre, mais
>
> qui entend proceder peu a peu a la creation d'une
>
> civilisation originale qui conservera tout ce qu'il
>
> y a de valable dans les apports exterieurs, en leur
>
> adjoutant ce qui appartient a notre genie."[1]

A year later on another tour of West Cameroon, President Ahidjo who has
continued to be an ardent advocate and defender of Cameroon official
bilingualism, said:

> "We have got to forge out unity, we have inherited bi-
>
> lingualism and we want to preserve it because it is in
>
> our own interest ... Some African countries whether they
>
> be Anglophone or Francophone, do French and English as
>
> compulsory subjects ... We must maintain our bilingualism.
>
> I am personally committed to bilingualism that I am firmly

---

1. An extract of a speech by President Ahidjo to the National Assembly,
   May 1965.

decided to create a special allowance for all those civil
servants who will make special efforts to be bilingual."[1]

The most hotly debated aspect of the language policy in Cameroon relates
to the respective roles to be accorded each of these two official
languages and how to promote both languages. This is uniquely a
Cameroonian problem (with Somalia having chosen to replace English and
Italian with Somali)[2,3]. In other African countries, Nigeria and Ghana
for instance, where there is only one European language, the problem
debated upon is whether English should continue to hold a prominent
position as the official language rather than a major Nigerian or
Ghanaian language of wider communication.

As far as Cameroon is concerned, there has never been a policy to
encourage or pay attention to the role of a Cameroonian language at
national level; whatever efforts have been made have been limited to
the work of intellectuals. Even the intelligentsia is not unanimous
about the need for a local language as official language; attempts have
rather been made on how to make bilingualism in English and French work.
For example, two university lecturers, Dr. Bernard Fonlon (1964) and
Dr. F. Mbassi-Manga (1964) have both put forward a thesis for early
'bilingualism' of the child. In other words, they see the solution not
in terms of promoting a Cameroonian language in the place of French and
English, but rather in the teaching of both languages at an early state

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1. An extract of a speech by President Ahidjo in Buea on November 1st
   1966, translated by the Ministry of Information, Buea 1967.
2. Ewondo was proposed as a national language but mainly by intellectuals
   from the Ewondo ethnic group. See Njijoh, P. 'Necessite d'un langue
   Nationale', Abbia, No. 7, October 1964, pp. 83-98.
3. *Although the promotion of English, French and common local languages
   will become a problem in the recently formed Confederation of Senegal
   and the Gambia.

at the primary school level. A novel idea as far as Cameroon is concerned

has been the proposal by Kisob (1964) that pidgin English be adopted as

a national language.[1] At least two criticisms can be made against pidgin

English. First, pidgin English has not been fully developed as a written

language and as a result, the country would experience the same problems

as it would in trying to introduce an indigenous language. Second, since

most people do consider pidgin English to be an inferior language, no

government would like to be seen as the first to adopt it as a national

language.

Before 1972, although there was much enthusiasm for bilingualism at the

highest political level, the onus remained on the individual students

or civil servants to make themselves proficient in the two languages,

> "d'abord le plus grand nombre possible de personnel
>
> enseignant representant les deux langues, ensuite la
>
> volonte, la conscience des etudiants de devenir bilingues."

At institutional level, the government introduced courses in both English

and French at the Centre Linguistique in Yaounde which civil servants

could attend during working hours, but President Ahidjo did not follow

up this statement on introducing a financial incentive for civil servants

who achieve proficiency in a second official language. Besides, the

government put more emphasis on making Anglophones fluent in French than

vice versa. For example, there were government schemes through which

Anglophone Cameroonian civil servants could go to improve their French

in France during the long vacation. There was no similar project to send

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1. See Kisob, J. A., 'A live language: Pidgin English', _Abbia_, No. 1,
   Feb., 1963, pp. 25-31 (Anglais), pp. 32-7 (Francais; Fonlon, B.,
   'Will we make a war?', 'Construire ou detruire', _Abbia_, No. 5, 1964
   pp. 9-33 (Anglais), pp. 35-56 (Francais); and Mbassi-Manga, F.,
   'Cameroon: A marriage of three cultures', _Abbia_, No. 5, 1964

French-speaking Cameroonians to England to follow English language
courses although provision for English classes for top civil servants
was made in the capital.

Thus, the printed news is mainly in French, notices are in French,
official communications with the central authorities are in French, films
are in French (even in the West), police speak French, bulletins such
as the bulletin in the Ministry of Education are entirely in French
including articles on English teaching, except for a bilingual title
page and even magazines, such as Abbia, with the avowed aim to promote
bilingualism, tends to have articles mainly in French, sometimes with
summaries in English. And, as Constable (1974)[1] rightly points out, it is
impossible to function in administration without French while it is
perfectly possible to do so without English.

Apart from the bilingual grammar schools, one in Buea, the other in
Yaounde, the other bilingual institution of significance is the
University. The language situation in the University reflects the strong
French teaching staff and the overwhelming student body of Francophone
origin (see Table 4.3). Apart from the English Department which makes a
policy of using English as much as possible,

> "notices are in French, rarely if ever with translation
> and never in English alone, meetings are conducted solely
> in French (with speeches in English by Anglophones often
> greeted by sighs of exasperation), dealing with the
> administration are in French."[2]

1. Constable, D., 'Bilingualism in the United Republic of Cameroon:
   Proficiency and Distribution' in Comparative Education, Vol. 10,
   No. 3, 1974, p. 235.
2. Constable, D.,   , ibid. 1974, p.236.

TABLE 4.3: CAMEROON: ANGLOPHONE AND FRANCOPHONE ACADEMIC STAFF AND STUDENTS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF YAOUNDÉ 1973/74[1].

| Faculty | LECTURERS | | | | STUDENTS | |
| | ANGLOPHONES | | FRANCOPHONES | | | |
	Cameroon-ians	Foreign-ers	Cameroon-ians	Foreign-ers	Anglo-phones	Franco-phones
Law	5	1	11	20	54	1,251
Arts	11	5	26	22	249	983
Science	6	1	28	37	64	1,184
Education	8	3	22	26	64	499
Agriculture	–	5	13	19	–	56
Medicine	8	–	15	27	41	218
Journalism	–	–	2	5	10	77
Polytechnic	1	–	2	16	3	77
Diplomacy	1	2	–	1	3	27

Source: Statistics Handbook compiled by the University of Yaoundé, 1974.

In practice, however, lecturers have the right to lecture in the language they choose (English or French) and students have the choice of writing essays in English or French, but generally take into account the language preferred by the lecturer.

Since May (1972) French and English have been officially introduced into the primary schools where the other language is the medium. Thus, the use of each metropolitan language as the unifying political medium at

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1. The university was established with technical assistance from France. In the early days, most of the lecturers were Frenchmen. The situation is now better than this table suggests, taking into consideration the 'parrainage' arrangement between the University of Leeds and the English Department and the recruitment of many more qualified Anglophone Cameroonians.

the national level has inevitably entailed the parallel teaching of both
English and French. But, as has been indicated, the policy of using two
international languages of wider communication each with a 'neutral'
role in 'Nationist' politics can be undermined by underlying colonial
connotations when both are used round the same staff meeting.[1] With the
introduction of both languages into primary school, the whole educational
system now uses both French and English, even if only in theory. In
practice, the sheer weight of numbers of Francophones in all walks of
life – the university, as shown in Table 4.3, and the Ministries – make
French the dominant language.

However, outside the official circles and the university there are
principal work domains in which occasional contact and inter-state co-
operation has taken place; for example, religion, commerce and trade, and
road transport. In situations as these, where most Francophones and
Anglophones are neither bilingual nor able to speak English and French,
communication is mainly in Pidgin English.

On May 7, 1972, President Ahidjo announced to the National Assembly and
to the nation the change-over from a Federal Republic (which Cameroon
had been since 1961) to a United Republic. The following extract on bi-
lingualism is from this important policy statement:

"It is really at the Federal level, namely the central
authority governing the nation as a whole, that bi-
lingualism and particularism have been promoted. At
the level of federal states no special effort has been

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1. See Constable, D., ibid., 1974, p. 237.

made to introduce them either in public life or in primary

education. I do not pretend that there are no questions to

be asked about the eventual place of bilingualism and

particularism within the state. But, I solemnly declare

that both must be maintained and developed — because they

are now integral facts of our historical heritage and

constitute the original traits of our national personality.[1]

As the President himself admits, not much has been done at the state, nor

provincial level, to foster bilingualism in English and French. The

question which now arises is how bilingualism even at the national level

might contribute to a sense of national integration among the rest of

the population. Very little; but perhaps hopes are placed on the fact

that bilingualism in English and French would help to make the

intellectual nationalistic and the intellectual, might in turn help to

lead the thinking masses in the same direction.[2]

The next question that arises is how is the policy to concentrate efforts

towards national unity at the national level and among the intellectuals

trickling to the provinces? In answering this question, attention should

be directed to finding out levels of political and national awareness,

degrees of inter-ethnic neighbourliness, degrees of inter-ethnic friend-

liness and attitudes towards inter-ethnic marriages among secondary

school pupils and adult population in the two provinces of Anglophone

Cameroon.

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1. An extract of speech to the National Assembly on May 7, 1972. Trans-
   lation by the Ministry of Information, Yaoundé.
2. For this sort of belief, see Ali A. Mazrui, 1967, 'The English Language
   and Political Consciousness', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.
   4, No. 3, pp. 295-311. He compares the role of English in the develop-
   ment of political consciousness in East Africa where Swahili already
   existed as lingua franca during the fight for independence and West
   Africa where no such language existed. Also, see Whiteley, W.,
   'Language and politics in East Africa', in *Tanganyika Notes and Records*,
   Dar es Salaam, Nos. 47 and 48, June and September, 1951.

In the light of the importance attached to the problem of nation integration and 'bilingualism' as an instrument for national integration, one would have expected to see both languages in National Development Plans and other policy documents,[1] and a conscious attempt to make institutions more bilingual both at the National and State levels. It is easier for schools, for instance, to provide books in both languages than for an individual to buy them. The absence of activities or efforts outside the school system must cast doubts about government determination to sustain 'bilingualism'. There is, however, a feeling that the English language should not be abolished as one of the two national languages. There are at least three reasons for this: first, it is guaranteed in the constitution; second, the proximity of Nigeria, an African colossus, rich and using English as its official language; and third, the importance of both languages for international communication. For example, a relatively short history of the OAU, Cameroon has provided two Secretary-Generals, both bilingual; this can only be explained by

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1. See, for example, "The first of the needed changes (in education) is to enrich the programme by putting emphasis in the humanities, languages and social sciences on the greater principles of our culture in order to develop individual character, righteous living, dignity among our youth, as to strengthen and purify the base of patriotism founded on the historic role of their nation in the marching life of mankind." Government of Pakistan (1956), The First Five Year Plan (1955-60) Education and Training (Karachi), p. 31. Also, "we recommend that in every school, history should be taught by a qualified, preferably Nigerian teacher. Both in this subject and in geography, emphasis should be placed on the detailed study of the history and geography of Nigeria before anything else... Civics also should be given a prominent place on the timetable and conscious effort made by secondary school teachers to instil in our youth the right attitude to and respect for our culture, our eminent men and women and our National Anthem and Flag." Eastern Ministry of Education, Report of the Conference on the Review of the Educational System in Eastern Nigeria, Enugu, 1964, pp. 16 and 21.

the fact that Cameroon bridges the gulf between Francophone and Anglo-
phone Africa. President Ahidjo is aware of this position when he says:

"I am very proud to be at the head of a State where French
and English are spoken and I think many African states would
like to be in our position. We must keep this privileged
position."[1]

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1. Quoted by Mbassi Manga in Higher Education and Social Change, African
   Case Studies, 1975, p. 31.

CHAPTER FIVE

OBJECTIVES OF EMPIRICAL SECTION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.2 HYPOTHESIS: Development of Hypothesis

5.3 OPERATIONALISATION OF CONCEPTS AND THEIR
     INDICATORS.

5.1   INTRODUCTION

The objective of this section of the study is primarily to investigate the contribution of education in the promotion of national integration in the two English-speaking provinces of Cameroon. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to develop hypotheses which will guide the investigation and the next chapter will deal with a detailed examination of the methodology and the instrumentation for the investigation.

That education is seen as one of the most important instruments of change is manifested by the support it receives from various quarters within society. Some economists recommend it as the most effective way of producing the labour force for manpower requirements.[1] With varying degrees of enthusiasm, economists have come to recognise the importance of investments in education as investment in human resources or human capital.

Politicians frequently claim that it is the natural or moral right of every citizen (a good vote-winning platform); social scientists and politicians recommend it as the most effective way of developing new

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1. This newly-emergent branch of economic theory dates from the presidential address of Theodore Schultz to the annual meeting of the American Economic Association in 1960. Since that date, Human Capital Formation, or the Economics of Education, to cite just two of the labels, has enjoyed considerable limelight. There has been an acceleration of research in the field. See, for example, Schultz, Theodore, 1963 , The Economic Value of Education, New York: Columbia University Press, Anderson, C. A. et al. 1965 , Education and Economic Development, Chicago, Aldine Publishers, Hanson, J. W. et al., 1966 , Education and the Development of Nations, New York Holt, Rinehart and Winston for a systematic exposition of the subject, see M. Blaug   , Economics of Education, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books , Vol. I, 1968 and Vol. II, 1969, W. Lee Hausew,   . Education, Income and Human Capital, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970, which selects and criticises seven important survey articles which purport to show economic returns on education.

values and attitudes towards national government and governments expect
it to assist in integrating populations fragmented by religious,
political,linguistic or ethnic differences.

As it was described in Chapters I and II, Cameroon has an unusually high
number of ethnic groups and the resulting divisive effects of ethnicity
have been exacerbated by the divisive effects of the differing colonial
experiences to which the country was subjected. It is this divisiveness
of ethnic and colonial factors which schools must overcome if education
is to be seen to contribute to national integration in the country.

Several differing strategies might be chosen in attempting to investigate
the role of education in National Integration. The most popular
strategies in studies of this type have been either a) through a
statistical assessment of the degree of ethnocentric feelings among the
varying levels of educated people; or b) a description of the integrative
functions of education. The first approach presupposes the existence of
reliable and valid measures of the variables involved. This study adopts
the former strategy while using evidence where possible from the latter
to support or challenge the formulated hypothesis. The study attempts
then to answer the following questions: first, is there a relationship
between education and people's attitudes towards national integration? and,
Second, does the quality rather than the quantity of education received
determine people's attitudes towards national integration;and finally
what is the relationship between the level of national integration and
the respondent's biographical (sex, age) environmental (urban, rural)
and occupational characteristics? From these analyses, certain
implications for research and action are inferred in Chapter Eight.

5.2 HYPOTHESIS

According to Kerlinger, F. N. (1965) "A hypothesis is a statement asserting a presumed relationship among natural phenomena."[1] It demands a conclusive statement in which one set of phenomena is expressed as a function of another. In this study, the two phenomena are levels of educational attainment and National integration. Levels of educational attainment will be regarded as the independent variable and National integration as the dependent one; that is, the one which is affected by education. As Kerlinger also points out, the presumed relationship may be linear, (proportional) or non-linear (non-proportional).

On the importance of stating hypotheses before any scientific or semi-scientific investigation, Cohen, M. (1956) has stated quite unequivocally that

"There is no genuine progress in scientific insight through the Baconian method of accumulating empirical facts without hypotheses or anticipation of nature. Without some guiding idea we do not know what is relevant and what is irrelevant."[2]

It should, however, be pointed out that a hypothesis formulated on this basis does not necessarily denote a causual relationship, but only a functional statement referring to a covariation between the two variables. However, for purposes of clarity, the hypothesis for this study are stated in research form although the statistical analysis employ the

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1. Kerlinger, F. N., Foundations of Behavioural Research, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, p. 13.
2. Cohen, M., A Preface to Logic, New York: Meridan, 1956, p. 148. Also cited in Kerlinger, F. N. 1965 , op. cit., p. 16.

usual null form. Thus, the main, and indeed the first order hypothesis of this study[1] could be stated as:

Hypothesis I

Level of National integration is a function of level of formal education.

This is an unconfirmed supposition, predicting a relationship between the amount of formal schooling and national integration. From the background literature quoted in the previous chapters, it seems reasonable to postulate the relationship expressed in the hypothesis. The underlying assumptions of many of the political, sociological and economic assertions reviewed so far support a relationship between education and national integration. It is less clear, however, which direction the function will take. Is national integration a positive or a negative function of educational levels? Is the function, if it exists, a linear or a curvilinear one? In order to make the prediction more precise, it is necessary to review such sociological and psychological literature which seems relevant to the issue.

Most studies done have limited relevance however. Studies done in other countries have so far produced inclusive results. Alport (1945)[2] and Williams (1964)[3] working in the USA reported a negative correlation between ethnic prejudice and the amount of formal education received. This finding was substantiated and put on a firm basis by the work of Bettelkeim and Janowitz[4] in 1964. They collected the data from 25 national

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1. First order and second order hypothesis refer to general and specific assumptions.
2. Alport, G. W., The Nature of Prejudice, Cambridge Mass.: Addison-Westley, 1954.
3. Williams, R. M., Strangers Next Door, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
4. Bettelkeim, B. and Janowitz, M. Social Change and Prejudice including Dynamics of Prejudice, New York: Free Press, 1964.

surveys and concluded that the effects of formal schooling on levels of prejudice was indeed a real one. They further separated the influence of education from that of sociological origins, thus strengthening the conclusion. A third stance on this debate has been provided by Stember (1961) who argues that although in most respects the better-educated are less likely to be prejudiced, yet they are also more likely to avoid intimate contact with other groups.[1]

As is apparent, these studies though related are of limited relevance. Firstly, they deal only with prejudice between individuals in a society and do not tell us much about a "sense of identification and loyalty to the nation". Secondly, the data comes from a highly modernised and westernised culture. So far the best hint for a directional hypothesis is that educational level would be a positive function of national integration.

Empirical studies specifically dealing with the relationship or supposed relationship between formal education and national integration are few and far between. Still fewer are those conducted in Africa. Such that exists produce conflicting results as indicated in section 3.3. For example, the studies by Abernethy (1969) and Musgrove(1952) show somewhat equivocally that formal schooling plays a positive role in enhancing national integration. On the other hand, studies by Philip Foster (1962), Remi Clignet (1967) and Coleman (1964) have shown that the school may indeed be a source of tension between ethnic groups, and hence prove to be a disintegrative influence.

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1. Stember, C. H., _Education and Attitude Change: The Effect of Schooling on Prejudice against Minority Groups_, New York: Institute of Human Relations Press, 1961.

Such apparent contradictions arise from a failure to identify several factors involved in the question. To say that schooling plays a positive or negative role does not distinguish between the many operational definitions of the concept 'schooling'. Abernethy and Musgrove conceived of schooling as the formal teaching in a public institution. Foster and Clignet see schooling as a scarce public 'resource' to be divided between different competing groups. They make no specific reference to what goes on in the school themselves. There is no doubt that the uneven provision of schools, among various ethnic groups within a society may cause tension between the groups, but this does not refute the fact that programmes within a school can help to bridge the gap between ethnic groups. The argument that the location of a school in 'A' and not in 'B' may cause tension between 'A' and 'B) 'is on a different level from whether schools' programmes in 'A' and 'B' are such as would reduce levels of ethnocentrism.

This is only one example of the many conflicts which arise when researchers fail to analyse the problem into its component parts and to establish appropriate operational definition of education.   . At this point, it seems necessary to assess the effects of these definitions as for example to look at the vociferous debate on whether the functions performed by the school curriculum and teaching techniques are less important than the prolonged contact among various ethnic groups which school encourage. There seems also to be a need to re-open this debate, particularly as far as Cameroon is concerned, for two other reasons. First, as has been indicated in this thesis, studies by Clignet (1975) Norman Haupt (1968) have already cast doubts on the role of the Cameroonian schools in fostering national integration. But as we argued in Chapter One, Clignet's approach to the study of education and national

integration in Cameroon was deficient as it did not include an assessment of ethnocentric feelings among the various ethnic groups in Cameroon. As he himself rightly points out

"much research is (still) needed to assess the intensity

of the quality of the influence that educational

institutions do exert in this regard. A first step in

this direction would consist for example of assessing

the degree to which students choose friends outside of

their ethnic group and in determining whether the

tendency varies with (a) the proprietorship status of

the school that they attend; (b) their status in the

school, that is whether they are boarders or day

students; and (c) their academic standing."

The present study should go somewhat towards closing the loop-holes in Clignet's study. To the main issue of predicting the direction of the relationship between education and national integration, this type of study does suggest a negative relation even if the methodology is a suspect.

Second, although in his study Norman Haupt (1968) included an assessment of ethnocentric feelings and friendship choices, the study like most undertaken elsewhere in Africa and discussed in this thesis, was restricted only to secondary schools in the region. But the present study attempts to study all three levels of the educational system in Cameroon. Besides, other factors have now made this study more viable than when Haupt's study was undertaken. First, what was true or false of Cameroonian students yesterday is frequently not applicable today and can certainly not confidently even be projected into the immediate future. In this

particular case, "yesterday" was nearly twelve years ago. Since then, two changes have taken place as far as the educational system is concerned. First, attempts have been made to harmonize curricula and teaching techniques in both the French and English speaking sectors of the country. Second, attempts have also been made to adapt school curricula and teaching methods to the Cameroonian environment. This is particularly true of the primary schools. Even at the secondary level, attempts have been made to go for quality of education rather than for quantity. Cameroon now sets its own GCE 'O' and 'A' levels instead of the London GCE. These changes have now encouraged the introduction of Cameroonian based subjects. Third, the ages of the children throughout the school system have been much reduced since 1968, and finally, factors outside of the schools (the degree of modernization, the increase in urbanization, the general prosperity of the people and the increase in contacts between the various ethnic groups) are indicators which may now have a bearing on the present study. These indicators have been discussed more fully in section 5.3.

A review of such studies   have some relevance, however slight, is not conclusive on the direction of the education-national integration function. On the whole, however, taking the methodological issues into account, one would hypothesise a positive relationship. A second and most important issue has come to light; that is the need for proper operational definition of the concepts used in the study.

5.3 OPERATIONALISATION OF CONCEPT AND THEIR INDICATORS

The operationalisation of a concept is the process of identifying certain measurable indicators; that is, those indicators which will show the relationship between the level of educational attainment and the level of National integration. For example, although the main hypothesis provides a blanket cover and is based on political theory which attempts to relate education to national integration, further refinements of this hypothesis to relate a particular kind of education, sex of respondents, their ages, and the degree of urbanization in which the school is suited to national integration.

There are many ways in which the school system can be used to promote national integration and political stability in 'fragmented' countries like Cameroon. But the most popular strategy has been to adapt the school curriculum to local environment. This is of particular importance in such school subjects as civics, geography, history and literature. Since 1963, various attempts have been made at the primary level to adapt all the subjects on the school timetable to local conditions. Although the subjects have, for the most part, retained traditional subject divisions, considerable efforts have been made to draw up a Cameroonian oriented curriculum. At the secondary school level, the picture does not seem to be 'national'. For example, in most 'commercial' and independent secondary schools, the children still appear to complete their courses with a better knowledge of British, French or European history than the history of Cameroon. Although subject panels were set up in the early 1970s to harmonize and reform the curricula in West and East Cameroon, from my observation of history teaching in schools

visited in the course of this study too much emphasis still seems to be placed on memorising dynasties and dates.

In literature, the novels and works in secondary schools are usually by French or British authors. It is difficult to see how authors like Jane Austen, Dickens, the Brontes, Kipling, Orwell, Shakespeare, Chaucer, D. H. Lawrence, will evoke in Cameroon students the type of emotional enjoyment and understanding that is intended. British literature backed without relevant cultural background becomes a dry academic study with little enjoyment and hardly any emotional feelings for characters and their situations. In civics, the teaching is limited to a memorisation of the names of Ministers and politicians. The end result is 'naming of parts'. The child can recall historical dates, facts and battles, but cannot think or discuss historically. But in government-controlled Grammar schools, the curricula has been revised several times and each time more Cameroon oriented topics have been included in the curriculum. We can, therefore, hypothesise that pupils attending grammar schools will score higher on the national integration scales than their counterparts in private or commercial secondary schools.

But Walter Haupt's (1968) research, which was restricted to secondary school children in Cameroon, reported that although formal education appeared to reduce ethnocentric feelings, the most important factor was not the school curriculum but inter-ethnic proximity, prolonged contact and resultant interaction.[1] This is not surprising. Kenneth Little's (1965) concept of the process of national integration emphasises the

1. Haupt, Walter Norman (1968), op. cit.

importance of the urban centre as the area in which integration is most likely to take place. It seems reasonable to extend this idea beyond the urban centre and say any centre in which various ethnic groups meet for long enough to make new associations is likely to foster national integration. Such 'integrative environment' would include the church, the market place and the schools. In the schools, new activities such as lessons, sports, work, games, tours, clubs, residential life – if it is a boarding school – provide new centres of interests and activities, capacities and skills are developed and broadened. At school also, children from different ethnic groups are given new roles, they have new motivations and aspirations and opportunities which can lead them to new loyalties and identities. The formation of new groupings within the school environment, such as classes, forms, houses, clubs or dormitories, is likely also to lead to new friendships and loyalties which may influence identity thereby leading to greater awareness of the need for national unity. From this, one can hypothesise that prolonged school contact can lead to national integration.

Educational systems are universal phenomena in societies, but their contents and characters vary tremendously between cultures, environments and societies. In Cameroon, although the schools' curricula are developed centrally, there is no doubt that their contents, in terms of extra-curricula activities, and character vary between environments and localities. The different environmental and local variables impinge upon not only the quantitative aspects of the schools, but also on the qualitative inputs and outputs of the schools. Some of these variables include the location of the school, the staffing, and the staff-pupil ratio. We can hypothesise that:

Hypothesis II

Is there a relationship between school location (in terms
of the regions) and the respondents level of attitudes
towards national integration.

Although the main hypothesis is based on the theory relating education
to national integration and political stability, it focuses only on one
aspect of that theory. It considers only two variables, whereas there
may be many other variables affecting integration, for example, pace of
social change, the level of modernization,the .level of urbanization,
the state of the economy, cultural heritage, government policies not
directly related to education and political consciousness derived from
political participation in decision-making processes. At this point, we
only want to draw the reader's attention to the fact that there are
many other ways of looking at national integration and how a study such
as this can never cover all the possible operational definitions.

Despite these limitations, there are practical advantages for relating
education to national integration. The very quality of measurability of
inputs and outputs of the formal education system makes its operational-
isation possible. For example, where statistics are available, the out-
puts of the school system in terms of percentages of literacy and the
proportion of graduates in the total population and the inputs of
education in terms of enrolment ratios, expenditure on education could
be obtained and analysed. But in order to appreciate the full impact
of education on national integration,an attempt will be made to isolate
and highlight those variables not directly derived from education.

The first of these non-educational variables which has an impact on national integration in developing countries is the development of urbanisation. Gutkind writes, "the urban areas of Africa, both old and new are the originator of change and the focus of a new social order."[1] Kenneth Little's concept of the process of national integration also emphasises the importance of the urban town as the area in which integration is most likely to take place as

"new roles are created whose fulfilment necessitates the

interaction of individuals on the basis of common interest

in such things as wages, education, religion, and politics

rather than genealogical origin and descent."[2]

As a result, urbanisation creates broken social groups preventing the establishment of enduring cohesive societies, but the ability of urban centres to develop strong feelings of national identity among its multi-ethnic groups depends on how well national institutions within the urban centres open up opportunities for social mobility and interaction.

Since the rural areas, on the other hand, are almost always ethnically homogeneous, they do not provide the same opportunities as ethnically heterogeneous urban centres for close inter-ethnic contact which ultimately leads to the building of strong inter-personal and inter-ethnic friendship networks – the very foundation for any long and lasting sense of national integration in multi-ethnic societies. Within the Cameroon context, the effect of inter-ethnic contact over a long period, especially in the coastal towns, has had a considerable impact on

1. Gutkind, C. W., 'Network analysis and urbanisation in Africa: The Use of micro- and macro-analysis', The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 1965, p. 128.
2. Little, Kenneth, West AfricanUrbanisation, Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 1.

traditional values and institutions. The multi-ethnic character of these centres leads one to hypothesise that:

Hypothesis III

Is there a relationship between degrees of urbanization (as indicated by years spent in an urban area) and attitudes towards national integration?

In the end, urban-based dwellers ought to manifest a stronger sense of national identity than rural residents, irrespective of whether the urban dweller has been to school or not.

The major centres of change and the centres where the level of national integration is likely to be highest are the towns, the factories and the plantations and the school environment, but as Southall pointed out nearly two decades ago "changes do not stop at town boundaries."[1]

Few villages, if any, have escaped untouched and undisturbed not only the effects of inter-ethnic contact, government drives for modernisation through extension agents and the mass media (radio in particular), but of Western values of change. Writing about traditional Banyang society, Ruel (1960) argued that the high incidence of Banyang migrating to the coastal urban centres and plantations has resulted in the introduction of new ideas, aims, and values by the "coastal been-tos', new lifestyles, not all of which, to be sure, are necessarily consonant with traditional

1. Southall, A., Social Change in Modern Africa, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 1.

Banyang values. "It will be impossible", Ruel argues,

"to remain long in a Banyang village, however isolated,

without very quickly becoming aware of the influence

of the south (or coastal areas)"[1]

As Ndive Kofele (1973) points out after two decades of this being written, it is now time for 'south' to be read 'cumulative experience of the Cameroon people with foreign western values and customs', and also for 'south' to be read 'the sources of modernity and change'. Easier means of travel within the country and the exchange of ideas this generates, coupled with the impact of the radio have eroded the hitherto clear distinction in modernisation and the degree of acquisition of western values between the 'southern' or coastal regions and the hinterland of Cameroon. The Banyang experience can be replicated for the rest of Cameroon. We can, therefore, no longer see the rural villages in terms of Redfield's characterisation that

"such a society is small, non literate, and homogeneous

with a strong sense of group solidarity... Behaviour is

traditional, spontaneous, uncritical, and personal, there

is no legislation or habit of experiment and reflections

for intellectual ends. Kinships, its relationships and

institutions are the type categories of experience and

the familial group is the unit of action. The sacred

1. Ruel, M. J., 1960 , 'Migration in two Southern Cameroons Tribes (2) The Banyang of Mamfe Division', in Plantation and Village in the Cameroons, Ardener, E. 1960 et al., London, Oxford University Press. The Asian experience is also a case in point where urban areas have always acted as catalysts of socio-economic change through which Western influences filter down into the countryside. For the discussion of the Asian experience, see Robert I. Crane, 'Urbanisation in India', American Journal of Sociology 60, 1955 , pp. 463-70, and Norton Ginsberg, 'The Great City in South East Asia', American Journal of Sociology 60, 1955 , pp. 455-62.

prevails over the secular; the economy is one of status

rather than of market."[1]

But, because the ethnic mixture in urban areas is still far greater than

that in rural areas, we would still expect that the level of national

integration as measured by ethnocentric feelings among the various ethnic

groups in urban centres will still differ significantly from those in rural

areas.

The growing concern with the role of education in national integration

and national development is of very recent origin. The early post-war years[2]

which saw the political and social reconstruction of Europe, the future

development of its nations' economies, and an accentuation of the inter-

national trends of industrialisation and urbanisation suggests a model

in developing societies in which not education, but the economy which holds

the key to national integration. In the context of Cameroon, we will

expect ethnic groups in the more prosperous areas of the country to

favour national integration rather than those from the less prosperous

areas. Having said this, one immediately has to say that the more pros-

perous areas have high rates of literacy, whereas low rates of literacy

are the rule in less developed areas. For example, the southern region[3]

of Cameroon have the most prosperous areas and higher rates of literacy

than the Northern and the poorer regions.[4] We would therefore expect a difference

1. Redfield, Robert, 'The Folk Society', American Journal of Sociology 52,
   1947, p. 293. For a critique of Redfield's position see Horace Miner,
   1950, The Folk Urban Continuum, New York. To be fair to Redfield, he
   was concerned with the 'ideal type' and a mental construction and in
   any case he was writing thirty-three years ago.
2. Refers to the Second World War.
3. These include the S.W., the Littoral, the Central and the Western
   provinces of Cameroon.
4. See 'Cameroon 1960-1980 Economic and Educational Development', Ministry
   of National Economic Planning.

in ethnocentric feelings between respondents in the North and poorer
areas and those in the South, more prosperous and usually more urbanised
areas. This hypothesis can even be extended to take account of the social
status and occupations of the respondents. We can expect that those who
benefit from the system in terms of acquiring higher positions,
occupations[1] and a better way of life would express more loyalty to the
nation. People's attitudes may also be influenced by situational charac-
teristics of their occupational position such as scholastic achievement
level at the school at which they are, or were, taught.

The major hypothesis (the higher the degree of formal education attained,
the higher the level of national integration) as outlined above is pre-
dicted on a number of assumptions, propositions and corroborative
evidence to be found in the literature on intergroup relations. We have
attempted to indicate above some variables which are likely to contaminate
(be in agreement or at variance) with the predicted relationship. But,
one of the most contaminating variables in social and psychological
investigation not yet discussed, is age. General attitude studies find
age as an important determinant of an individual's attitude system.[2] As
we indicated earlier in this section, there is very little research done

1. By the criteria above the following social groupings are used:
   (1) Higher professional (Ministers of religion, lawyers, principals
       of secondary schools, lecturers, MPs, permanent secretaries,
       divisional officers, etc.).
   (2) Lower professionals (Teachers, policemen, soldiers, etc.).
   (3) Higher commercial (owners or managers of substantial concerns).
   (4) Lower commercials (small shop owners, shop assistants).
   (5) Clerical and allied.
   (6) Artisans and other manual.
   (7) Farmers (subsistence) and fishermen.
   (8) Students (for purposes of computational identification only).
2. See a review of such research in Charters, W. W., 'The Social
   Background of Teaching' in Handbook of Research on Teaching, Gage,
   N. L., Chicago, Rand and Co, 1963.

in Africa on the relationship between education and national integration. The studies we have so far reviewed did not clearly identify age as a factor in their findings as these studies were generally restricted to only one level of the educational system, usually the secondary level.

If we assume that the older generation of Cameroonians are more closer to their ethnic roots, we would expect an older person to be influenced by such norms to a greater degree as compared to a younger person. If the norms favour greater interaction towards other ethnic groups, age would be directly related to inter-ethnic contact, while the reverse would be true if the norms favoured less interaction towards other ethnic groups. On the other hand, to the degree that a younger person is susceptible to influence by his elders, peer group, and the school, we may also expect age to be either inversely related to national integration or adversely to it depending upon the influence that is making greater impact on the younger person. We can therefore hypothesise that:

Hypothesis IV

> The younger the respondent, the more he is likely to have
> favourable attitudes towards national integration in
> Cameroon.

Sex, family size (the number of children and wife or wives) are other context variables which will be analysed in relation to respondents' attitudes to national integration. In all these expectations, other variables have to be held statistically constant in order to extract the possible effects of any one particular variable.

The remainder of this will be a presentation of the empirical investigation designed primarily to explore the hypotheses developed above. As we have

indicated so far, these hypotheses combine several different types of explanatory variables.. Combing these different types of explanatory approaches reflects our belief that national integration is a complex issue requiring the analysis of several factors. In the end, we do not intend to construct an integrated theory of how education affects national integration; rather we intend only to subject hypotheses (which have been suggested by the earlier literature) to empirical testing in the context of the two English-speaking provinces.

The three main factors hypothesised to affect attitudes towards integration in this chapter are (1) Level of educational attainment;

(2) Urbanisation; and

(3) Age.

The subsidiary factors are: (1) Regional variations;

(2) Sex;

(3) Occupational groupings;

(4) Family size; and

(5) Religion.

The hypothesis formulated for the study is discussed in relation to the independent variables (above) and the dependent variable (measuring instruments) in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

RESEARCH DESIGN

<u>RESEARCH DESIGN</u>

6.1 <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

The number and nature of the variables to be investigated in the present study suggested using either interview schedules or questionnaires, as the main instrument for collecting data. The independent and dependent variables used for this investigation are shown in Table 6.1.

The independent variables were quantified as nominal measurements. These included sex, ethnic group, education and age. The dependent variables, i.e. language and friendship choices were rank-ordered and the Nationalism Scale was in interval measurements. Each dimension was measured, starting from one to nine for friendship choices, one to twenty for language usage and one to a hundred and five for the Nationalism Scale.

The design of the research was a composite one which included psychometrics, sampling techniques and data collection under controlled conditions. However, the design does not provide a means of finding whether the independent variables cause the dependent variables. The concern of the design is to indicate associations or correlates between or among the variables. Questions concerning cause and effects cannot be determined at this level.

TABLE 6.1 GRAPHIC SUMMARY OF DESIGN FOR THE STUDY

Independent variables

1. Age

2. Sex

3. Marital status

4. Tribal Affiliations (a) Regional Affiliation
                        (b) Birthplace

5. Location
   Rural – Urban
   Village – Town

6. Occupation

7. Education
   – Length of schooling

Dependent variables

Integration as indicated by

1. Friendship Pattern
   – Best friend
   – Others

2. Language
   – Language used
   – Number of languages spoken
   – Choice of a national language

3. Nationalism – loyalty/affiliation

6.2 THE TESTS

As the analysis in the next two chapters is based on data collected by a
questionnaire, it seems pertinent to examine some of the issues which
arose in deciding to use it, rather than interview schedules. First, it
was decided that in a study of this nature we should be able to generalise
from the finding to the total educated population of the two English-
speaking provinces of Cameroon within the limitation of random sampling
error. This called for a country-wide sample which would be representative
of this population. Interviewing a country-wide sample given the size,
the extent and sparseness of the region would be time-consuming and
expensive. Second, in a region reckoned to have over 100 languages among
its 1.6 million people[1], it would have been difficult to get interpreters
and interviewers of sufficient calibre and quantity to assist with the
research. Therefore, a mailed, self-administered questionnaire seems the
best method of collecting data in Cameroon on a country-wide basis.

The second crucial issue concerns the validity and reliability of self-
completion questionnaires as a method of information-gathering for
empirical investigation. Critical tests in which the interview and the
questionnaire methods are administered to the same subjects are rare, but
in an extensive review of literature on the two methods, Scott (1961) con-
cluded:

"On the existing published evidence, the mail survey does not
appear to be necessarily any less efficient than interview

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1. See Le Vine, V. T., 1963 , op. cit.; also see Appendix 2.

as a measure of collecting information and opinions from the
public, unless the questions on their inter-relation are
complex... evidence on the reliability and validity of mail
survey response is meagre in quantity and poor in quality.
On the whole it does not appear that mail survey responses
are generally any less accurate than those given by inter-
view, and there is some slight evidence that socially less
acceptable responses are more readily elicited by question-
naire... Attitude questions inviting criticism seem to
elicit more critical response in a mail survey."[1]

A more recent study by Bill (1973) has not only provided firm support for
Scott's hypothesis above, but has gone a step further,

> "The general conclusion which may be drawn from the above
> analyses", he writes, "is that even with young adolescents,
> some of whom were of low intellectual ability the question-
> naire is as effective a method of gathering personal
> information... as the interview."[2]

However, once it has been realised that all methods of information gathering
have biases and that some are more suited in particular situations than
others, it is difficult to reject the self-completion survey as an
adequate method of information-gathering, especially in a study as
sensitive as this one.

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1. Scott, C. 1961 , Research on Mail Survey, quoted in Abangma (1981),
   A Study of Primary Teachers' Attitudes towards the Ruralisation of
   School Curriculum in English-Speaking Cameroon'. Unpublished Ph.D
   Thesis, University of London, 1981.
2. Bill, J. M., 'A Methodological Study of the Interview and Questionnaire
   Approaches to Information-Gathering', Research in Education, 9, 1973,
   pp. 25-42.

The questionnaire developed was in four parts. The first consisted of questions on demographic facts concerning the respondents. The second part included three questions of friendship patterns, to detect the spread of friendship choices and the third part was on language and language usage. The fourth part comprised a Likert Scale of 21 statements to detect an individual's sense of identification and loyalty to the Nation.

The demographic questions were in two versions, one for the students and the other for adults. Most of the statements in the two versions were almost the same. For example, questions concerning marriage and occupation were not included in the questionnaire for students (see Appendix 4 for Questionnaire).

In the first part, the demographic data was basically factual and objective. Information on these were based on family, or household composition, such as marital status, age, sex, social environment and occupation. These consisted of 15 statements and 17 statements for adults and students respectively. The variables were quantified as follows: Independent variables: Age is grouped in 9 levels, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20-21, 22-29, 30-40, over 40. Sex - men and women. Education: grouped in three levels: Primary, Secondary and post-secondary. Location: two levels rural and urban. Regional affiliation: two levels - Forest ethnic groups and grassland ethnic groups. Family status: marital (a) single or married; (b) Family size.

The second part deals with friendship pattern. Friendship pattern or social integration is a concept that has been introduced in educational

psychological measurement as a fairly reliable indicator of some of the social and political behaviour patterns of peoples from different cultural backgrounds in the same country. It is recognised that people spend a great deal of their time in the company of others, though according to the analysis of Brietkreng, (1967) people are not equally attracted to all human beings. From early childhood, the individual selects groups or partners for all forms of interaction. According to Darwyn, (1973) the choice may be based on one or more of the following factors: i.e. propinquity, similarity of values and beliefs, similarity of personality traits, complementality of need systems, high ability, pleasant or agreeable characteristics or behaviour, etc.[1] It was from this type of reasoning that Brietkreng[2] stressed that these relationships based on affection may produce integration, when he said

"In all human systems, people like and dislike, accept and
reject each other in varying degrees. These similarities and
differences of persons and groups give rise to attraction
or repulsion which form social network."

This is true in all societies, but in plural societies, the acceptance or rejection of individuals or groups is more pronounced. This idea is borne out clearly in Summer's (1970) definition of ethnocentrism when he wrote:

"People view things in a way that one's own group is the
centre of everything, and all others are scaled, rated with

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1. Darwyn, E. Linda, 'Some Antecedents of Interpersonal Attraction' in
   Psychological Dimensions of Social Interaction: Readings and Perspective,
   ed., Darwyn Linda, Arizona State University, Addison-Wesley, Dub. Coun.,
   1973, p. 32.
2. Brietkreng, Elmar A., 'An Analysis of Social Influence and Subgroup
   Structure', unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Alberta,
   Edmonton, 1967, p. 18

reference to it... Each group nourishes its own pride and
vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities
and looks with contempt on outsiders."

This is understandable, because there is a tendency for one to like that
which is known and understood and dislike that which is not. But more
importantly Rosenblatt (1964)[1] proposes that people use the group in
terms of the function it may perform for the individual qua member of
his ethnic group. For example, he says

1. Survival of ingroup is facilitated by ethnocentrism towards outgroups.
   If ingroup membership is associated with rewards (material, economic,
   or administrative efficiency) the dispositional of the individual to
   identify with the group is heightened.

2. Ethnocentrism makes for more stable, less rapidly changing culture
   thereby promoting individual security.

3. It increases group homogeneity which may facilitate communication
   and cohesiveness, common language, customs and belief.

4. Group goals can be pursued more effectively if it increases cohesiveness,
   motivation and persistence. Efficiency of competiton with outgroup
   is increased and intra-group social disorganisation is decreased.

5. Group leaders find increased ethnocentrism functional to improving
   their tenure, suppressing dissidents and providing objects to blame
   for non-success.

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1. Rosenblatt, P. C., 'Origins and Effects of Group Ethnocentrism and
   Nationalism', Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII: 2 June, 1964,
   pp. 131-146.

6. For the individual ingroup member, it provides for the satisfaction
    of needs to affiliate with a relatively unique group as well as with
    a familiar group; to share in a common cause or goal, to simplify
    his cognitive world, to provide acceptable objects of aggression,
    to reduce boredom and to increase self-esteem.

It is clear from the discussions that individuals may like or dislike
others simply because they belong to some other ascriptively defined
group. It was therefore reasoned that integration can be measured
according to the willingness to make friends with people from other
ethnic groups.

To measure integration in terms of friendship choices, questions were
designed to elicit responses related to the choice of friends in terms
of 'in-group' and 'out-group'. The questions elicited information about
the respondent's best friend and his ethnic group. Also, the same
information about two other friends was asked for.

A decision had to be made about the type of scale to be used for these
three items. On friendship patterns, various methods have been used in
the past. The most important is the social distance scale developed by
Bogardus. The social distance scale is a way of asking the respondents
whether they would agree to associating with different ethnic groups in
the following situations: would marry; would have as regular friend;
would work in an office; would have in my neighbourhood; would have
live outside my country. Based on this, Mitchell (1956) also compiled a
comprehensive monograph on tribal categories in Zambia.

Using the social distance scale, many studies in Africa reveal that friendship is usually given to persons of the same ethnic group, such as Southall's[1] study in Kampala and in an unpublished survey of male student opinion in Lusaka, Zambia, Longton found out that out of 329 question- naires on the importance of tribalism, 40 per cent considered tribalism important among Africans, 53 per cent thought tribal identity should not affect the behaviour of Africans to each other and 7 per cent were un- decided.[2] With these results, it was therefore assumed that the existence of making friends out of the 'ingroup' was an indicator of integrative tendencies in an individual's social behaviour.

However, looking at the social distance techniques as a means of measuring friendship patterns proved unsuitable for use in this study. First, the large number of ethnic groups (about 60) made this approach too extensive: it was necessary to multiply the seven items in Bogardus's scale by the total number of tribes with whom association was possible. Second, com- putation of results would involve comparing social distance between tribal groups making the results confusing and difficult to get a clear- cut pattern.

For the study, a questionnaire containing three sociometric type questions were designed to detect the pattern of friendship choices. The questions were more concerned with ethnic groups rather than with individuals. These are the questions:

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1. Southall, A., 'Kinship, Friendship and the Network of Relationships in Kisengi, Kampala', Social Change in Modern Africa,   London University Press, 1963, p. 219.
2. Longton, J., 'Tribal Distance in a Secondary School', Ninth Conference of Research Officers, Institute for Social Research, Lusaka, Zambia, 1964.

Who is your best friend and what ethnic group is he or she from?
Name two other friends and their ethnic groups.

In presenting the data, neither a sociogram nor a sociometrix was used
for two reasons. First, sociograms are difficult to construct without
the assistance of two or more other researchers, whereas one researcher
can compute scores to questions as indicated. Second, Northway (1936)
pointed out that when the group size exceeds twenty, there are com-
plexities in choice relationships thereby making interpretation of
results difficult. Instead, the data was presented in terms of 'in-group'
friends, 'near in-group' and 'out-group' friends for statistical analysis.

6.2.1
Scoring

Those who endorse friends from 'in-group' score one; 'near in-group'
score two; and 'out-group' score three points. A high score indicates a
positive attitude towards integration and a low score a negative
attitude towards integration. The scores range between one and nine for
the two items.

6.2.2 LANGUAGE AS A MEASURE OF INTEGRATION

Language is, as was indicated earlier in Chapter Four, an essential
building block for any pluralistic society in search of order and the
basis for human knowledge and comprehension.[1]

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1. Haya Kawa, H., Symbol, Status and Personality, New York, Harcourt,
   Brace and World, 1953, pp. 107-134.

Nesbit[1] makes a seemingly obvious, but an important point when he says
that language functions as one of the most fundamental symbols which
makes the world comprehensible. Viewing language as a rallying symbol
around which group pride and solidarity converge, one can suggest that where
the latter attributes are highly manifested, language communication will
be equally high.

In Cameroon, as elsewhere in Africa, where there are diverse local
languages, the official languages (although alien to the majority of
the population) have become the instrument for national unity and some-
times for power in the country. The official languages, French and English
in the case of Cameroon, also provide one of the main national cultural
links which unite various ethnic groups under the leadership. Gumperz
(1968)[2] sees this as "language loyalty", a situation where an official
language(s) unite local groups and social classes whose members may
continue to speak their own local languages within the family circle.

But in Cameroon, and in most of Black Africa we regard 'language loyalty'
as the retention by the educated elite (some who were born and educated
in urban centres) of their ethnic language for family or ethnic commun-
ication even where all other ethnic and cultural symbols have been lost
or abandoned in the face of on-going process of modernisation. Although
in her study Treffgarne (1978)[3] refers to language loyalty as the

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1. Nesbit, E., Language Meaning and Reality, New York Exposition Press,
   1955, p. 165.
2. Gumpertz, J. Language in Social Groups, Stanford University Press,
   1968), reprinted 1971, p. 123.
3. Treffgarne, C. B. W., Language Usage and Language Policies in Senegambia:
   Local Responses to the Anglophone Division of a Multilingual Region.
   unpublished Ph.D thesis, London University, 1978.

"migrants recognition of the official language of his

country of origin and as a symbol of his 'Nationist'

affiliation",

she defined it principally as the retention of the ethnic mother tongue

of the migrant worker in the new speech community. People who take pride

in something tend to make efforts to preserve it. When members who share

the same cultural space select their language over existing languages as

a medium through which feelings and ideas will be communicated within

the group, then such members show concern about the preservation not only

of their language but the overall cultural individuality of that group.

Therefore, it was reasoned that in a heterogeneous cultural setting like

Cameroon, where there are many indigenous languages and two official

languages, proficiency in one's own ethnic group language and the rate in

communicating with it will be used as an index of the level of group

contact and cohesion. Here, cohesion simply means the degree to which an

ethnic group's distinctive identity and individuality is maintained by

its members.

Language has been chosen as an index of cohesion as it is apparent that

language cannot exist divorced from the human community which it serves

as a functional and symbolic tool, nor can a society endure over time

without a medium of communication. In this sense, a people's cultural

heritage rests primarily on the symbols and artifacts that distinguishes

those who belong from those who do not. It would follow that where

communication within the group was heavy, there will be a correspondingly

high level of group contact and solidarity. Thus, ethnic groups that are

highly cohesive are likely to show a negative attitude towards other

groups at local, regional and national levels of society.

Two separate measures were used. The first dealt with language usage and
the second with the choice of a national language. There were five items
on the language usage as follows:

What language do you use when you are with

    a) your children/parents?

    b) your wife/husband?

    c) your best friend?

    d) your work/class mates?

    e) people from your tribe?

On factor analysing the five items,   three factors
emerged; items a) and b) were high on factor I, items c) and d) on
factor II and item e) on factor III. Interpreting the underlying con-
cept for each of the three factors, it seems to suggest that factor I
is a measure of language used within the ambit of the family. Factor
II concerns language usage with friends and acquaintances outside the
home. Factor III specifically relates to language usage with strangers
of the same tribe.

The fact that the analysis separates these three different aspects of
the scale as separate dimensions is worthy of note. On the basis of these
results, therefore, the three factors were scored separately.

The second scale of language was based on the choice of a national
language. They were asked:

Which of these languages would you like the government to adopt as a
national language?

    a) Douala

    b) Fola

    c) Ewondo

d) Others (specify)

e) no local language.

6.2.3

Scoring:

Both measures were scored in descending order of ego-centre preference

for one's own language and a willingness to adapt to a more commonly used

language.

	Score
1. Own local language.	1
2. Other local language (if different from yours)	2
3. Pidgin (widely used across ethnic groups)	3
4. English/French	4

The rationale behind the scoring is to award points according to degree

of willingness to accommodate one's language usage to a more widely used

or more locally appropriate one. In the case of someone living in a

district where the local language is not his, he would obtain more marks

for his willingness to accommodate to the local requirement at home or

with his personal friends rather than stick rigidly to his own language.

A high score indicates a favourable attitude towards integration. The

scores range between 1-8 points for factor I and II and 1-4 points for

factor III and on choice of a national language.

6.3   THE NATIONALISM SCALE

This scale based on nationalism measured the degree to which the res-

pondents identify themselves as Cameroonians. In modern society every

individual is simultaneously a member of several groups, such as the
family, ethnic group, the church, class and the nation. Multiple group
membership is a phenomenon of which social psychologists and sociologists
are keenly aware. Of these various groups of which an individual is a
member some may be regarded by him as his reference groups. The
individual feels or aspires to feel himself a part of these groups and
tries to follow their norms. However, acceptance by an individual of a
reference group does not necessarily prevent him from simultaneously
accepting other reference groups. If at any time the norm of two
reference groups clashes, the individual will experience conflict. He
would follow the norm of the group to which he is most strongly attached.

For this study, the sub-sections of the test were based on first, 'in-
group' versus 'out-group' loyalties; second, the identification of one-
self as a Cameroonian and third, viewing Cameroon as a nation in terms
of other nations. The diagram below illustrates this.

> World
>
> Nation
>
> Ethnic
> group

The investigator made up the scale. Some of the items were taken from
Shaw and Wright's (1967) scale on international issues. Most of these
were modified to suit the present research. All seven items in the first
group were constructed by the investigator. The detailed description of
the test is given below.*

---

* Also see Appendix 6

The final version has 21 statements in the scale. The initial pilot version had 50 items. Each group has 7 items but these are mixed up in the whole test. It is a factorial inventory based on three factors: loyalty vs non-loyalty, tolerance vs non tolerance and patriotism vs non patriotism. The first part of the test deals with loyalty to the nation in contrast to loyalty towards the locality or region, family or larger kinship group. These consisted of seven items as follows:

1. No duties are more important than duties towards Cameroon.

2. We should be ready to die for Cameroon whether it is right or wrong.

3. I don't know much about other countries, but I am satisfied with Cameroon.

4. There are good reasons why some tribes should be given better treatment than others.

5. We should not allow foreigners to preach their beliefs in Cameroon because they might succeed in destroying our culture and customs.

6. Loyalty to Cameroon is more important than what one feels is right.

7. No other Cameroonian language is more important that one's tribal language.

The second part deals with the rather generalized feelings about the utility and desirability of association with members of other groups in the nation. These include seven items as follows:

1. If one is loyal to Cameroon its policies should never be criticised.

2. I think it is better to marry someone from one's ethnic group or tribe.

3. We should show greater loyalty towards our tribal or ethnic group than towards other Cameroonians.

4. People from the same tribal group should be encouraged to go to the same school.

5. It is much better if one has one's tribal person in a high place.

6. One's ethnic or tribal group is more superior to all other tribal groups in such important aspects as family life and government.

7. It is better not to discuss our political affairs with foreigners.

The third part deals with the international level. These include seven items:

1. All Cameroonians are equally important.

2. We in Cameroon should use our natural resources for developing and maintaining our strength so that we may not have to rely on other nations.

3. I do not feel any special pride in being identified as a Cameroonian.

4. The Government's first goal is that of promoting national unity.

5. If I had a choice, Cameroon will be the last place I will choose to live in for life.

6. Cameroonians should never read anything bad about Cameroon, even if it is true, for unpleasant truths about Cameroon might make us love it less.

7. Although I have not travelled a lot, I think that Cameroonians are generally more friendly than most people in Africa.

These items were processed for discriminability, reliability and validity and latter factor analysis, for a better understanding of the underlying dimensions of judgement.

The scoring is based on a five-point, Likert-type scale: strongly agree, agree, uncertain, disagree, and strongly disagree.

6.3.1   Scoring

The scoring system is the same as any Likert-type questionnaire where each item's response is scored from 1-5 (or as the case may be) with a favourable response being given the higher score as follows:

5 - strongly agree

4 - agree

3 - uncertain

2 - disagree

1 - strongly disagree.

In this study, items 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 39, 42, 44, 47, 48 fall under this category. In cases of negative items, the order is reversed thus:

1 - strongly agree

2 - agree

3 - uncertain

4 - disagree

5 - strongly disagree

These include items 29, 33, 35,37, 38, 41, 43, 45, 46, 49. The scores for the whole test range from 21-105, where a high score indicates a positive attitude towards integration.

6.4 THE SAMPLE

It is customary in survey research to use sampling techniques based on probability models. But in Cameroon, as elsewhere in Africa, where accurate and up-to-date documentations to form a sampling frame are sparse, to select population samples which are of the necessary rep-

resentative character is not always possible. The second difficulty in carrying out survey research of this nature in Cameroon concerns the un-usually high number of some ethnic groups (see section 2.2.0) with different political organisation, authority patterns and value systems which a priori have implication for the way each ethnic group reacts to the political, social and national issues. This gives reason to suspect a difference in reaction to the data collection instruments and techniques.

In the introduction, it was pointed out that the literate class required for such a study in Cameroon is highly mobile. Even in urban centres, where people tend to congregate, there are frequent changes of domicile. This makes a sampling frame, if one exists, quickly out of date. Researchers in this field have bemoaned this particular difficulty. In an environment continually in transformation with a population that is mobile, there can be no controllable independent variables (for example, place of domicile). The word control is itself in some ways the anti-thesis of change and in this particular research is detrimental to national integration which connotes 'moving together'.

It is therefore necessary, if this type of survey research in this sort of environment is to preserve some empirical status, to take steps which will compensate in part for these inadequacies. This can be partly achieved through the use of comparative designs and by testing the hypothesis with more than one population. The first decision was to determine the total population to be sampled. This decision had to be made in the light of the main objective of the research. As it was intended to identify the main influences on the growth of national unity, the unit of enquiry had to be a large one. It could really be a

country. If this was so, one would study a number of countries in turn, isolating the main factors influencing national integration in one country and testing the findings in another. The more countries studied, the greater generality would apply to the findings.

A small unit of enquiry would, of course, be feasible. One could examine the correlates of national integration in a subsection of a country and test it in a second, third or fourth subsection. One advantage of the latter technique is the opportunity to monitor regional variations. The use of this approach, however, depends on the availability of identifiable discrete subunits in the country each with sufficient cohesiveness to form a unit; each with sufficient distinctiveness to render it different from other units within the total country. The administrative and geographical circumstance in Cameroon allows a meaningful subdivision of the country into English and French speaking regions. It was, therefore, decided to study the English-speaking section to begin with. Any finding arising from this investigation will be open to a retest on the French-speaking sample to establish its generalizability.

Having identified the total population for study, it was necessary to select a sample. The two basic problems in choosing the sample for this study concern representativeness and accessibility. Other practical issues relating to size and language of communication will also be discussed.

To ensure representativeness and thus obtain generalizability, geographic regions were used as the basis of sampling. There are nine ethno-geographical strata in the English-speaking Cameroon. These coincide with the administrative subdivisions. They are Fako, Meme, Ndian and Manyu in

South West province and Momo, Megan, Bui, Menchum and Donga in the North
West province. Subsamples were drawn from each.

The sample size was determined by the nature of the question being asked.
A study which sets out to answer questions about the difference in levels
of National Integration between the nine regions would require a fairly
large number of respondents or subjects in each area. On the contrary, a
study devoted mainly in reflecting the status of the country as a whole
needs to ensure that each region is proportionately represented in the
sample though the size of the sample from each region is not crucial to
the issue. The unit of measurement is the sum total of 9 regions not any
single region. The limitation imposed would be that no conclusion be drawn
about regional differences. Also the total sample on which the character-
istics of the country is based must be adequate.

The sample was five schools chosen   from each region making a
total of 45 schools for nine regions. The total distribution of schools
were as follows:

      Mako - 5 Schools

      Meme -   "

      Ndian   "

      Manyu   "

      Momo   "

      Megam   "

      Bui   "

      Menchum   "

      Dongo   "

In selecting the schools, three criteria were taken into consideration: first, the ethno-geographical environment in both regions as well as urban and rural areas. Five schools of each level were selected from the grassland region and four from the forest region. Second, the type of school was considered in terms of its orientation - secondary grammar, secondary modern, or commercial, and whether it was a boys' school, girls' school, or mixed school. Third, the administering authority of the school was also considered - the schools run by Catholic Mission, Presbyterian, Government and private individuals. The 45 schools can be broken down as one grammar school, one commercial, one technical, one church and one primary school from each division.

The sample for the adult followed the same ethno-geographical strata, but unlike the school sample, the adult sample was stratified into three subsamples. The first subsample was drawn from semi-urban centres based on the size of the population (over 2,000 inhabitants). The second sub-sampling was in plantations. The third subsampling was in the townships. These strat correspond to the nine administrative divisions in the school sample. The breakdown of this subsample was

Fako -	23
Meme -	14
Ndian -	14
Manyu -	28
Momo -	21
Me2uM -	21
Bui -	21
M nchum -	20
Donga -	22

Selection of pupils was done on a class basis and then randomly from within each class chosen. Classes selected were last years of primary, third, fifth and upper sixth of secondary students. Hence, the schools were also selected on a stratified basis . Then the appropriate ⎯ classes were chosen. Next, the pupils were randomly selected from each class chosen. The final sample is given in Table 6.2 below.

Table 6.2 The Composition of the Sample for the Study.

	URBAN		RURAL		TOTAL
	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	
PRIMARY	20	20	20	20	80
SECONDARY	65	45	60	50	220
ADULTS	35	35 '	60	41	191
TOTAL	140	100	140	111	491

Since the selection process was,wherever possible, based on randomization procedure the cell sizes tend to reflect the differences existing in the target population. There were more male than females, for example, since there are more boys than girls in schools. There were more subjects between ages 20-35 as this is the largest age group amongst the adult population.

6.5 PILOT SURVEY

The aims of the pilot study were to assume clarity and ease of communication; to ensure that such concept receives comparable interpretation across ethnic groups and across educational levels since the population tested was heterogeneous. Most specifically, it was intended to minimize

ambiguity, poor construction and language difficulties. On the technical
level, procedural steps had to be taken to obtain adequate objectivity,
validity and reliability of the test instruments used.

A small sample of 40 respondents chosen to be similar as possible to the
intended sample participated in the pilot study. Each respondent in the
pilot sample completed a questionnaire containing two sections. The first
was a demographic section dealing with factual information about subject's
name, date of birth, place of birth, etc. The second section consisted of
three separate tests on choice of friends, language use, choice of a
national language and a scale on nationalism which contained 27 items.

6.5.1   DEMOGRAPHIC SECTION OF THE SCALE

Since most of the questions in this section are factual, to reduce
sensitivity and promote good quality of response, a number of items were
modified and repetitive internal checks put in. These checks were meant
to discover how consistent the respondents were on factual matters. An
example of reduction of sensitivity is 'what is your father's language?'
could have been worded 'What is your father's ethnic group?' One could
see that the second version is very direct and it is possible that
respondents from less developed ethnic groups would refrain from en-
dorsing the right response. Besides, to make respondents feel confident
in answering the questions, they were not required to write their names.
Very little modification was required, as seen from the results of the
pilot (see Appendix 4).

6.5.2   THE CONSTRUCTION AND TRIAL OF THE SCALE ON NATIONALISM

The test was composed of three parts. The scores on these were obtained
separately for each variable and the coefficient of reproducibility of
each group of items was calculated by Guttman's scaling procedures. The
purpose was to see how far the respondent's response to the statement
deviated from the ideal Guttman's scale pattern. Originally, each
group had nine items, making 27 items in all. In the final scale,
only 21 items were selected on the bases of the test scores (see
Appendix 4 and 5).

In the final scale, only 21 items were selected using item analysis (see
Appendix 6). The items were analysed by obtaining the facility value and
the index of discrimination of each item. The facility value gives the
ease of the item and is obtained by employing this formula:

$$\frac{R}{N} \times \frac{100}{1}$$

where R = the number of pupils who got a particular item correct

   N = the number of pupils who took the test.

The index of discrimination of each item expresses the strength of the
item in picking out people with a positive attitude from amongst those
who have a negative attitude. To obtain this, two groups of respondents
one of which is known to have strong positive views and the other with
strong negative views or very low views, are identified. These are called
criterion groups. They are given the test items and those items on which
they both score equally well are regarded as very low in discriminability
and are eliminated from the test. On the other hand, items on which one
group does particularly well and the other does particularly badly have

good discrimination value. Items that are not understood, either because they are ambiguous or unintelligible, will tend to have low discriminability and will also be eliminated. A particular statistical technique has been formulated to measure the index of discrimination. This involves getting the total score of each subject, arranging the scores in rank order and extracting the 13 highest and 13 lowest scores. It is then found by using this formula:

$$\left(\frac{RU}{NU} - \frac{RL}{NL}\right) x \frac{100}{1}$$

where RU = no. of respondents who got items correct in the upper group

NU = total number of respondents in the upper group

RL = no. of respondents in the low criterion group who got items

correct

NL = no. of respondents in the low criterion group

On the basis of the above item analysis, items with a facility value of between 20-80% and an index of discrimination of 25% or more were chosen (see Appendix 6).

All items which no-one scored were dropped such as item nos. 7 and 14. This was probably because the subjects had not attempted such items before, or that the questions were vague. Items no. 8 and 11 were modified to make them simpler. Item no. 6 was rejected, although the facility value and the index of discrimination were within range, the middle third group did worse than the lower group. The selected items were renumbered.

The Reproducibility Coefficient of each subgroup was calculated. This is based on the idea that items can be arranged in an order such that an

individual who responds positively to any particular itemalso responds positively to all other items having a lower rank. If items are arranged in this way, they are said to be scalable. The relative non-occurance of deviant patterns allows the computation of the reproducibility coefficient thus:

No. of subjects 40   Rep = 1 − $\dfrac{\text{No. of errors}}{\text{No. of responses}}$

The results obtained were as follows:

ITEMS	COEFFICIENT OF R.
Ingroup vs outgroup	.814
Viewing Cameroon as one	.798
Cameroon in relation to other nations	.835

These are acceptable levels of coefficient.

6.5.3   RELIABILITY OF THE SCALE

It indicates how consistent the scale is when repeated on the same respondents. The reliability coefficient was calculated using the Guttman split half formula (1945).

$$rxx = 2\sqrt{\dfrac{1 - 6^2x^E + 6^2x^0}{6^2x}}$$

where rx = the reliability of test

6^2x^E = the variance of the scores obtained on the even number

items of test

6^2x^0 = variance of the scores on the odd number items

6^2x = variance of scores obtained on the entire test.

The reliability coefficient obtained was .84, which is quite high.

6.5.4   <u>VALIDITY OF THE SCALE</u>

It refers to the extent to which a scale or an apparatus measures what
it claims to measure.

In attitude questionnaires, it is difficult to obtain independent criteria
against which to determine whether the scale is really measuring what it
sets one to measure. On IQ testing children's performance or teachers
ratings are not available. Some authors accept a watered down version of
validity by approving the use of an internal scale of consistency,
similar to the Kuder Richardson scale previously reported. McNemar
(1964) for example, supported the internal criterion and reported that

> "a scale of attitude towards an issue is said to be valid
>
> because the items in the scale make it so."

In this study, recourse was made to the concept of construct validity.
This implies that the scores obtained from the use of this test should
logically relate to certain other scores e.g. there should be a positive
correlation between measuring of nationalism and someone's language
choice. It stands to reason that the people who would choose a language
which would unite the country even if it is not his language should
score more on a nationalism scale than someone who would prepare to keep
his language even if it meant destroying national unity. This relation-
ship would lead to a positive correlation between scores from language
choice and nationalism scale. Statistical analysis was carried out to
check the correlation between the nationalism scales, friendship scores,
language choice scores and language uses scores. Table 6.3 gives the
results.

Table 6.3 showing Pearson Product-Moment Correlations between the
'Nationalism', Friendship, Language choice and Language use
Scales for the entire sample.

SOURCE

	1	2	3	4	5	6
NATIONALISM	1.0000					
	S=.001					
FRIEND	.412	1.0000				
	S=.001	S=.001				
LANGUAGE CHOICE	.53	.283	1.0000			
	S=.001	S=.001	S=.001			
LANGUAGE USE I	.002	.165	.131	1.0000		
	S=.485	S=.001	S=.002	S=.001		
LANGUAGE USE II	.174	.154	.285	.194	1.0000	
	S=.001	S=.001	S=.001	S=.001	S=.001	
LANGUAGE USE III	.007	.111	.077	.168	.031	
	S=.440	S=.008	S=.04	S=.001	S=.253	

6.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SCALES

The Nationalism Scale

The 'Nationalism' scale, it will be recalled, consisted of 21 items. The
respondents were asked to indicate how 'strongly' they 'agree' or 'dis-
agree' with each of the 21 items. Five categories of responses as des-
cribed by Likert (1932) were allowed. These responses were coded for
computational purposes as 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 and reversed for statements
expressing negative attitudes. All the items were factor analysed, using
principal component with orothogonal rotation. Rotation is performed

according to Kaiser's algorithm which emphasizes the simplification of factors (columns) rather than variables (rows). The maximum number of factors to rotate was placed at three, in line with our theoretical formulation based on three sub-scales: ethnic group, nation, world (see .PAGE 151 FOR detail). The results of the analysis are given in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4 Showing Principal Component Analysis of twenty-one items.

		I	II	III
PER CENT OF VARIANCE		41.5	32.8	25.9
EIGEN VALUES		2.11	1.87	1.56

		FACTOR LOADINGS		
NO.	ITEMS	I	II	III
1	A1	− .066	.049	.470
2	C1	.533	.073	− .222
3	A2	.053	.109	.631
4	B1	.102	.483	.170
5	A3	.85	.086	.573
6	C2	.634	.015	.107
7	A4	.485	− .025	.486
8	C3	.452	.349	− .143
9	B2	.080	.547	.115
10	C4	.363	.455	.097
11	B3	.187	.495	.056
12	B4	− .077	.535	.196
13	C5	.566	.199	.089
14	A5	.033	.198	.446
15	B5	.102	.470	.215
16	A6	.002	.196	.483
17	C6	.662	.082	.041
18	B6	.224	.475	− .179
19	A7	.010	.061	.487
20	B7	− .232	.550	.196
21	C7	.636	.038	.014

* For item code name description, see OVER LEAF.

The interpretation of these factors is given in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5 INTERPRETATION OF THREE ROTATED FACTORS.

FACTOR I   LOYALTY vs NON-LOYALTY

NO.	ITEMS	LOADINGS
I	No duties are more important than duties towards Cameroon (A1)	.470
II	We should be ready to die for Cameroon whether it is right or wrong (A2)	.630
III	I don't know much about other countries, but I am satisfied with Cameroon (A3)	.573
IV	There are good reasons why some tribes should be given better treatment than others (A4)	.484
V	We should not allow foreigners to preach their beliefs in Cameroon because they might succeed in destroying our culture and customs (A5)	.415
VI	Loyalty to Cameroon is more important than what one feels is right (A6)	.483
VII	No other Cameroonian language is more important than one's tribal language (A7)	.487

FACTOR II   TOLERANCE vs NON-TOLERANCE

NO.	ITEMS	LOADINGS
I	If one is loyal to Cameroon, its policies should never be criticised (B1)	.533
II	I think it is better to marry someone from one's ethnic group or tribe (B2)	.634
III	We should show greater loyalty towards our tribal or ethnic group than towards other Cameroonians (B3)	.452
IV	People from the same tribal group should be encouraged to go to the same school (B4)	.454
V	It is much better if one has one's tribal person in a high place (B5)	.566
VI	One's ethnic or tribal group is more superior to all other tribal groups in such important aspects (B6)	.662
VII	It is better not to discuss our political affairs with foreigners (B7)	.636

FACTOR III   PATRIOTISM vs NON-PATRIOTISM

NO.	ITEMS	LOADINGS
I	ALL CAMEROONIANS are equally important (C1)	.483
II	We in Cameroon should use our natural resources for developing and maintaining our strength so that we may not have to rely on other nations (C2)	.546
III	I do not feel any special pride in being identified as a Cameroonian (C3)	.494
IV	The government's first goal is that of promoting National Unity (C4)	.534
V	If I had a choice, Cameroon will be the last place I will choose to live in for life (C5)	.470
VI	Cameroonians should never read anything bad about Cameroon even if it is true, for unpleasant truths about Cameroon might make us love it less (C6)	.474
VII	Although I have not travelled a lot, I think that Cameroonians are generally more friendly than most people in Africa (C7)	.550

The interpretations of the results show that the first factor accounts for 41.5 per cent of the variance while factors (ii) and (iii) account for 32.8 and 25.9 per cent of the variance respectively. The eigen values of 2.11 for the first factor, 1.87 and 1.56 for the second and third factors respectively, also substantiates a three factor structure among the items.

6.6.1
Summary

At this stage, it seems reasonable to say that a national integration scale can be constructed including the nationalism scale and the language scales. This was done and met the first main objective of this research

which was to develop an objective, reliable and valid instrument for quantifying Cameroonians' attitudes towards National Integration. The next step of this inquiry was to apply this instrument in order to answer the following research questions:

1. Is there a relationship between educational level and attitudes towards national integration?

2. Is there a relationship between the degree of urbanization and attitudes towards national integration?

3. Is there a relationship between 'age' and attitudes towards national integration?

4. What is the relationship between national integration and major ethnic regions.

5. Is there a relationship between 'sex' and attitudes towards national integration?

6. What is the relative importance of each of these variables?

CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

7.0   ADMINISTRATION OF THE TEST

7.1   STUDENT SAMPLE

7.2   ADULT SAMPLE

7.3   DESCRIPTIVE PARAMETERS OF SAMPLES USED

7.4   THE FIRST SCALE: NATIONALISM SCALE

7.5   THE SECOND SCALE: FRIENDSHIP CHOICE

7.6   THE THIRD SCALE: LANGUAGE CHOICE

7.7   THE FOURTH SCALE: LANGUAGE USE

7.8   SUMMARY

7.9   FURTHER ANALYSIS USING ALL SUBSCALES
       AS A WHOLE (I)

7.9.1 FURTHER ANALYSIS (II)

Chapter 7

MAIN STUDY

7.0 Administration of test

In this chapter, the administration of test and results will be discussed.

7.1 Student Sample

The questionnaire was administered to 287 students in 45 Secondary

schools and 80 primary school pupils in 9 secondary schools. In each

school, the respondents were all assembled in the school assembly hall,

where each had a separate seat to avoid copying, talking, or discussing

the questions. The investigator then distributed the questionnaire to the

respondents. The investigator assured the students that the questionnaire

was purely for research purposes and had nothing to do with their parents,

teachers or the school. To re-assure them, they were only to write their

initials and not their full names. No member of staff was present when

the students were filling in the questionnaire.

The students were advised to read the instructions carefully before

filling in the questionnaire. Individual help was given where needed, but

in a non-directive way. Finished questionnaires were checked for complete-

ness. The finishing time was between 30-35 minutes for the primary school

pupils and 20-30 minutes for the secondary school pupils.

7.2 Adult Sample

The questionnaire was administered to over 220 respondents randomly selected in the nine divisions of Anglophone Cameroon of which only 195 filled in the questionnaire. The investigator explained the purpose of the inquiry and then the respondents were left alone to complete the questionnaire. The completed questionnaire was collected by the investigator.

7.3 Descriptive Parameters of Samples Used

The data on all the dependent variables (Nationalism, friendship choice, language choice and language usage) were analysed to get the general parameters. Further detailed analysis was carried out to obtain specific answers to the following research questions:

(i) Does educational level significantly affect attitudes towards National Integration?

(ii) Does age significantly affect attitudes towards National Integration?

(iii) Does urbanization play a significant part in determining attitude towards National Integration?

(iv) Does Region determine attitudes towards National Integration?

(v) Does sex significantly affect attitudes towards National Integration?

In an attempt to answer the questions posed above, it is necessary to analyse the data on the variables statistically. The first analysis uses the total scale score of the Nationalism scale as criterion measure.

7.4 The First Scale: Nationalism Scale

(i) Educational level

Table 7.1 shows the nationalism scores for different educational levels.
The overall mean scores for entire sample (N = 434) on the scale was
72.39 (SD = 10.17) while the overall means for primary level respondents
(n = 119) was 70.16 (SD = 9.79) that of secondary level (n = 205) on the
scale was 70.27 (SD = 9.54) and for the post secondary level (n = 116)
was 78.7 (SD = 9.05). All scores are well above the theoretical middle
point of the scale i.e. 53. It implies therefore that the majority of the
sample tested showed a significant positive attitude towards integration.

Table 7.1 showing means, SD and sample sizes for educational level. The
maximum score obtainable is 105.

Level of Education	No.	Mean	SD
All Sample	434	72.39	16.17
Primary Sample	119	70.16	9.79
Secondary Sample	205	70.27	9.54
Post/Secondary Sample	110	78.7	9.05

In order to test whether the scores on nationalism varied with each
educational level, the ANOVA was used to compare the means.

Table 7.2 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between Primary,
Secondary and Post Secondary respondents on Nationalism scale.

Source of Variation	Sum of squares	df	Means square	F. Nation
Educational Level	5974.64	2	2987.32	33.14
Error	38849.20	431	90.13	Sig. beyond the .001 per cent level of sign.
Total	44823.84	433		

(P < .001; df - 2,431)

An examination of table 6.2 shows that the differences between the sub-groups were statistically significant. The mean scores of post-secondary respondents on the attitude or Nationalism scale are higher than either those of the secondary or primary respondents. The difference in mean scores between post-secondary and secondary level is 8.43 scale points, and the difference between post-secondary and primary level is 8.54 scale points. Further analysis using the method of individual comparison reveals that the post-secondary level of education shows a significantly higher attitude to National Integration than either the other two levels. There is no significant difference between the primary and secondary levels of education. It should not therefore be unreasonable to conclude that the level of academic or educational attainment is positively related to people's attitudes to national integration. Indeed, the data reported in Table 6.3 supports such a view. An analysis of variance yields an F-ratio of 33.14, which with degrees of freedom (2) and (431), is significant beyond the .001% level of confidence.

It is necessary to proceed however with caution in interpreting the data. Since people with post-secondary qualifications are likely to be exposed to other factors and influences than those who do not enjoy the same level of education, the difference in attitude may be due to other than simple educational attainment. It is possible, for example, that post-secondary subjects are predominantly working in urban areas, have travelled more, earn more, are more open to the mass media – television, radio, newspapers etc. Thus while education might have placed them in a better position to have a more favourable attitude towards national inte-gration, it may not in itself have been responsible for the influence. As such, education would simply be a predisposing factor rather than an influential factor.

Because of the potential effects of other moderation variables it would therefore be erroneous to conclude at this stage that the level of educational attainment correlates positively with attitudes towards national integration. Further analysis is needed to isolate these other likely influences.

(ii) <u>Age</u>

Table 7.3 showing means, SD, for the sample by age in years on Nationalism scale.

AGE	NO.	MEAN	SD	RANGE
All sample	434	72.39	10.17	
11	59	68.78	9.58	
13	61	68.73	8.05	
15	55	69.92	12.22	11 yrs
17	44	70.72	9.33	to 56
19	42	76.00	6.51	
21	42	71.85	10.28	
30	51	72.39	8.58	
40	52	77.17	10.13	
Above 40	28	81.96**	9.48	

ETA SQ = .416

Table 7.4 showing results of one-way Analysis of Variance between the age groups.

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F-RATIO
BETWEEN	6346.33	8	793.29	8.76 sig. beyond the .01% level of confidence.
WITHIN	38477.50	425	90.54	
TOTAL	44823.83	433		

(P $<$ .01, df = 8,425)

The data was further re-analysed to reveal the attitudes at different age levels. An examination of Table 6.4 shows that there exist differences between the mean scores at each age level. The trend is pronounced with the degree of National Integration rising with an increase in age. The result is statistically significant at the .01 level of confidence. These results are surprising since it is generally believed that older people turn out to be less favourable to integration than younger people. This preliminary analysis will need to be subjected to further detailed re-analysis later in the test.

(iii) Length of stay in urban centre

Table 7.5 showing Means, SD, sample size for the sample on length of stay in urban centres.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
Sall sample	434	72.39	10.17
0 = never lived in town	27	67.14	7.53
1 = under five years	136	66.50	8.79
2 = 6-10 years	72	70.04	8.43
3 = 11-20 years	142	74.84	8.04
4 = over 20 years	57	85.82	5.54

ETA SQ = .379

Table 7.6 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between the groups.

Source of Variance	SUM OF SQ	DF	MEAN SQ	F-RATIO
Urban centre	17000.714	4	4250.18	65.53
Error	27823.12	429	64.86	Sig. below .01% level
TOTAL	44823.83	433		

$(P < .001, df = 4,429)$

The F-ratio indicates a highly significant difference between the groups. There is not much difference between the first group (those who have not lived in a town) and the second group (those who have lived in a town for up to five years). On the other hand, respondents who have lived in towns or urban centres for over six years, seem from the results to have more favourable attitudes towards National Integration. This is a very major finding which complicates the recent attempts in Cameroon and other African countries, to stem off the flow of rural migration. It has been

in recent years that not only has this phenomenon had a profound dis-
locative impact on the traditional African values and institutions, but
also that it has created serious social and economic pressures. This data
suggests very strongly that urbanization may not be altogether a bad
phenomenon. In revealing this significance, the data on urbanisation
under-scores its inherent functional role in nation building. The results
also suggest that urbanisation can actually help in minimising or defusing
inter-ethnic conflict.

(iv) Region

Table 7.7 showing Means, SD of Nationalism scores for the sample by regions.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD	
ALL SAMPLE	434	72.39	10.17	
FOREST	233	73.09	10.82	
GRASSLAND	201	71.58	9.31	

ETA SQ = .006.

Table 7.8 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between the two
regions.

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO
Region	248.209	1	248.209	F = 2.405 sig. = .121
Error	44575.63	432	102.184	not sig.
TOTAL	44823.83	433		

$(P < .121,\ df = 1,432)$

Table 7.8 shows the means and standard deviations for the sample by
cultural regions. One-way analysis of variance between the sub-groups
yields an F-ratio of 2.40, which is not significant at the 5% level of
confidence. On the basis of this data, it does not seem unreasonable to
suggest that the respondents from the grasslands (or North West Province)
were not substantially different from the respondents from the South
West Province (or coastal areas). But of greater significance for this
investigation is the extent to which there seems to be no significant
difference between the broad cultural groups discussed in some detail in
chapter two. The data suggests perhaps that the desire to build a united
Cameroon transcends the wide variations in sub-cultural and ethnic patterns
so obvious in the country.

(v) <u>Sex</u>

Table 7.9 showing means, and SD on sex, using total scores of the Nationalism
Scale.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
ALL SAMPLE	434	72.39	10.17
MALE	239	72.91	10.03
FEMALE	195	71.75	10.33

Table 7.10 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between the
sexes.

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO
Sex	143.835	1	143.83	F=1.39 sig.=.238
Error	46679.99	432	103.425	
TOTAL	44823.83	433		

(P = < .238, df = 1,432)

Table 7.10 shows the breakdown by sex of the respondents in the sample and
a one-way analysis of variance with an F-ratio of 2.34 between the groups
indicates that no significant difference exists between them. On the first
five variables presented so far, only three of them (level of academic
attainment, age and length of stay in a town or urban centre) are shown
to have significantly different means as assessed by the one-way analysis
of variance. However, it is still likely that these three variables have
been contaminated by each other; for example, 'educational attainment'
and 'length of stay in a town'. It will be necessary, therefore, in the
next section to attempt to eliminate the potential effect of certain
moderating variables. These moderating variables may also have differential
effects on the relationship between the 'Nationalism' scale and attitude
towards National integration as a function of particular sub-groups of
the overall sample. For example, age and attitudes towards National inte-
gration may be related, but may be related differently as a function of
the length of stay in a town or urban area. In testing our hypotheses, it
is necessary to be aware of and attempt to eliminate the possible effects
of those moderating variables.

7.5   The Second Scale: Friendship Choice.

The modified friendship scale, it will be recalled, consisted of three
questions. They were:

1. Who is your best friend? What is his ethnic group?

2. Name a friend who you would play with and his ethnic group?

3. Name a friend you would take to your home and his ethnic group.

For each question, the scoring was based on how near or distant one's
friends were in relation to his ethnic group. If the respondents
endorsed a friend from his own ethnic group, he/she scores one, nearer
own ethnic group scores two and further away scores three. The total
scores for the three questions added up nine.

    (i) Educational level

Table 7.11 shows some preliminary data on educational attainment using
Friendship choice total scores. The overall means for the entire sample
(n = 4.69) on the scale was 6.89 (SD 1.83), while the overall means for
Primary school respondents (n = 141) was 6.58 (SD = 2.14), Secondary
level respondents (n = 217) was 6.67 (SD 1.66) and for the post
Secondary level respondents (n = 111) overall means 7.52 (SD = 1.57).

Table 7.11 showing means, SD, on Educational level using scores on Friendship choice.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
ALL SAMPLE	469	6.84	1.83
PRIMARY	141	6.58	2.14
SECONDARY	217	6.67	1.14
POST SECONDARY	111	7.52	1.57

Table 7.12 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between the different educational levels.

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	Df	MEAN SQ	F-RATIO
Educational level	67.171	2	33.585	10.33
Error	1513.775	466	3.248	sign. beyond the .01%
Total	1580.946	468		level

$$(p < 10.33, df = 2,466)$$

Table 7.12 shows that there is a significant difference in the pattern of friendship choices among the groups. The mean scores, however, show that there are no significant differences between the primary level respondents and those of the secondary level group. The mean of the post secondary respondents are much higher than the two lower groups. Further analysis using the one-way analysis of variance shows that . level of Education affects people's attitude to choosing friends. The data reported on Table 7.12 confirms this view.

These results are consistent with the results obtained on the Nationalism Scale (see Table 7.1) where the post-secondary group is significantly different from the two lower groups. As mentioned earlier, these results should be interpreted with caution, since people with post-secondary qualification are likely to enjoy certain privileges not open to the other two groups. The differences in the choice of friends may be due to other reasons other than educational attainment. It is possible, for example, that post/secondary students may have access to becoming members of clubs, societies and organisations which admit members by virtue of status and/or amount of money earned or paid as dues. This automatically places them in a position of meeting many more people of different ethnic groups, interests, tastes, profession, etc. to choose friends from. In these circumstances, education would be seen as a predisposing factor rather than an influential factor.

(ii) Age

Table 7.13 showing means, SD on Age using scores on Friendship choices.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
ALL SAMPLE	469	6.84	1.83
11	70	6.90	2.04
13	68	6.91	1.68
15	55	6.96	1.56
17	50	6.92	1.36
19	42	7.64	1.32
21	47	6.72	1.98
30	58	6.12	2.00
40	51	6.76	2.07
over 40	28	7.46	1,91

ETA SQ = .044

Table 7.14 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between different age groups.

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQs	F-RATIO
AGE	72.475	8	9.05	2.76
Error	1508.47	460	3.279	sign. at .005 level
Total	1580.946	468		

$$(P < 2.76, \text{ df} = 8,460)$$

Table 7.14 shows that there exist differences among the mean scores at each age level. The trend in selecting friends is pronounced with the degree of National Integration decreasing with age. It is interesting to note the increase in the lower age group (11-19) and the drop in mean scores of the (21-40) age groups. The results are statistically significant at the .005 level of confidence.These results, contrary to those on the nationalism scale, confirm the supposition that older people are less open to integration than the younger generation.

(iii) Length of stay in an urban centre

Table 7.15 showing means and SD for the sample on length of stay in an urban centre.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
ALL SAMPLE	469	6.84	1.83
0 = never lived in a town	32	6.18	1.82
1 = under 5 years	180	6.36	1.79
2 = between 6-10 yrs	77	6.32	2.03
3 = 11-20 years	153	7.14	1.67
4 = over 20 years	57	8.40	6.79

Table 7.16 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between the groups.

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	Df	MEAN SQUARE	F-RATIO
Urban Centre	222.072	4	55.518	18.157
Error	1358.87	464	2.928	sig. beyond the .001 level
Total		468		

$$(p < 18.16, \text{ df} = 4,464)$$

The F-ratio shows a highly significant difference between the groups. The trend is pronounced with the degree of National Integration rising with an increase in the number of years spent in an urban area. This result yet again suggests that urbanization is likely to affect people's attitude towards National Integration than ruralization.

It is generally agreed that people who have lived long in a town are likely to be exposed to other factors and influences than those who have spent much of their lives in villages. It is possible, for example, that in towns new roles are created which permits interaction of individuals on the basis of common interest in such things as work, education, religion and politics. This helps to create broken social groups which present enduring cohesive societies. As such urbanisation would be regarded as an influential factor to National Integration. However, further analysis is needed to judge the effectiveness of urbanization to National Integration.

(iv) Regions

Table 7.17 showing the means, SD for the sample on Cultural groups using scores of friendship choices.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
ALL SAMPLE	469	6.84	1.83
Forest zone	259	7.08	1.93
Grassland zone	210	6.65	1.69

Table 7.18 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between those from the grassland and those from the forest regions.

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO
Region	20.905	1		F = 6.258
Error	1560.040	467		sig. at the .01% level
Total	1580.946	468		

$$(p < 6.26, \text{ df} = 1,467)$$

An examination of Table 6.18 shows that there exists a difference between the groups. The mean scores of those from the Forest zone are higher than the mean scores of the grassland zone respondents. The one-way analysis of variance reveals that the forest zone subjects have a significantly higher tendency to express their National Integration in their friendship choice. In the light of this, one can conclude that cultural background affects people's choice of friends. The date reported in Table 6.19 supports this view. An analysis of variance yields an F-ratio of 6.26, which with degrees of freedom (1) and (467) is significant beyond the .01% level of confidence.

It should be noted that there was no difference between regions on the
Nationalism scale, but there is a difference between the regions on
Friendship scale. Thus, it is possible to conclude from these results
that the feeling towards National Integration is equally present in the
two regions while the willingness to mix with others varies between the
regions.

This results are not surprising, simply because of the district cultural
heritage of the groups. With the more egalitarian features of the forest
zone, where the unit of political power is dispersed and not concentrated
on one man, one would expect those from the forest zone to be more out-
going and more open to change than those from the grassland whose system
is highly centralized with the 'Fon' (Chief) as head. At this stage, one
could see region as a factor influencing Integration in terms of friend-
ship choices, though further analysis is needed to discover the full
impact of the variable.

(v) <u>Sex</u>

Table 7.19 showing the means, SD for the sample on cultural groups using
scores of friendship choices.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
All Sample	491	6.51	1.19
Male		6.1	1.23
Female		6.4	1.15

Table 7.20 shows result of one-way analysis of variance between male and female.

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F-ratio
Sex	.153	1	.123	F = .066
Error	698.30	489	1.42	sig. level
Total	698.43	490		.75 not sig.

$$(p < .066, \text{ df} = 1,489)$$

Table 7.20 shows that there is no significant difference between male and female in their friendship choices. The results show that both groups have a positive attitude towards making friends from other ethnic groups. As other analysis has shown (Table 7.10), sex does not seem to be an influential variable in attitudes towards national integration.

7.6 The Third Scale: Language Choice

The language choice scale is described in some detail in chapter five. In summary, the respondents were asked to select a national language. The scoring was based on those who choose their

1. own language scored 1.

2. other local language scored 2.

3. Pidgin English scored 3.

4. English or French scored 4.

A high score indicates a favourable attitude towards National Integration. The scores range from one to four.

(i) Educational level

Table 7.21 showing means and SD for sample on educational level using total scores of Language Choice.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
ALL SAMPLE	491	2.51	1,19
PRIMARY	152	2.53	1.17
SECONDARY	227	2.17	1,13
POST SECONDARY	112	3.22	1.01

Table 7.22 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between the sub-groups.

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Squares	F-Ratio
Between Groups	82.225	2	41.11	32.56
Within Groups	616.206	488	1.262	sig. beyond the .01%
Total	698.43	490		level

$(p < 32.56, \text{ df} = 2,488)$

Table 7.22 shows that there exist differences between the groups. The mean scores of the Post Secondary level respondents are much higher than those of the Secondary and Primary respondents. The difference in mean scores between the Post Secondary level respondents is 1.5 scale points and the difference between Post Secondary and Primary level is 0.69 scale points. On the basis of the analysis of variance result, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the level of academic attainment affects attitudes to choosing a national language. The results with an F-ratio of 32.56 with degrees of freedom (2) and (488) is significant beyond the .01% level of significance. As before, the results must be interpreted with caution.

(ii) <u>Age</u>

Table 7.23 showing means, SD on Age using the total scores of Language
Choice.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
ALL SAMPLE	491	2.52	1.19
11 year olds	79	2.26	1.11
13	69	1.97	1.11
15	68	2.06	1.18
17	52	2.00	0.99
19	43	2.90	1.08
21	50	3.04	1.12
30	59	2.83	1.13
40	53	3.11	1.06
Over 40	28	3.28	1.04

ETA SQ. = .16

Table 7.24 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between the age groups.

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO
Age	112.45	8	14.6	11.56
Error	588.97	482	1.21	sig. beyond the .01%
Total	698.43	490		

$$(p < 11.56, \text{ df} = 8,482)$$

Table 7.24 shows that there are differences in the mean scores at each age level. The general trend shows attitude towards Integration in terms of language choice rising with an increase in age. The results are statistically significant at the .01% level of confidence. This shows that age is an important variable in determining language choice.

(iii) Length of stay in an Urban Centre

Table 7.25 showing means and SD on Length of Stay in the town using Language Choice total scores.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
ALL SAMPLE	491	2.52	1.19
0 = never lived in a town	36	1.66	0.82
1 = 0-5 years	160	1.74	0.79
2 = 6-10 years	83	2.44	1.08
3 = 11-20 years	155	3.07	1.10
4 = over 20 years	157	3.84	0.45

ETA SQ. = .397

Table 7.26 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between the
groups.

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO
Urban Centre	277.84	4	69.45	80.26
Error	420.58	486	.865	sig. beyond the .01%
Total	698.43	490		level

$$(p < 80.26, df = 4,486)$$

Table 7.26 shows the differences in mean scores between the groups. The

differences progress from 1.66 (for those who have never lived in a town)

to 3.84 (those who have lived in a town for over twenty years). With an

F-ratio of 80.26 (Table 7.25), urbanization seems to have a strong effect

on the respondents. This again confirms the view that the longer a

person stays in a town, the weaker will be the social bonds binding

him to his ethnic group members. From this data, it is not unreasonable to

conclude that urbanization is a contributory factor that influences language

choice. The data further suggests that the influence is gradual and

cumulative, building up from the first year in the city and getting

increasingly stronger.

(iv) Region

Table 7.27 showing means, SD for the sample on Regions using Language
Choice total scores.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEANS	SD
All Sample	491	2.52	1.19
Forest	266	2.59	1.19
Grassland	225	2.44	1.19

Table 7.28 showing results of one-way analysis of variance between the forest and grassland regions.

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean squares	F-ratio
Regions	272	1	2.725	1.91
Error	695.70	489	1.42	not sig.
Total	698.43	490		

$$(p < 1.91, \text{df} = 1,489)$$

Table 7.28 shows the mean scores between the groups. There is no marked difference between the forest zone with a mean score of (2.52) and the grassland zone with a mean score of (2.44). This shows that region is not an important variable in determining integration in terms of language choice. The data in Table 2.26 confirms this. An F-ratio of 1.91 and 489 degrees of freedom shows that the results are not statistically significant at either the .01 or .05 per cent level of significance.

(v) Sex

Table 7.29 shows the means, SD for the sample on sex using the total scores of Language choice.

Sample	No.	Mean	SD
All Sample	491	2.52	1.19
Male	270	2.51	1.16
Female	221	2.54	1.22

Table 7.30 shows result of one-way analysis of variance between the two groups.

Source of variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F-ratio
Sex	.123	1	.123	F =.086
Error	698.30	489	1.42	sig. level
Total	698.43	490		.76 not sig.

$(p < .086, df = 1,489)$

There is no significant difference in the mean scores of male and female as Table 7.30 illustrates. An F-ratio of .086 shows that there is no significant difference in Language choice between the groups. It is worth taking note that in all the analysis done so far, Sex has not been seen as a significant factor in any of the dependable variables. At this stage, one can conclude that sex is not important in determining integration.

7.7   The Fourth Test: Language Use

Five separate statements were used to detect the languages the subjects used in various situations. The first two statements denote intimacy — what language to you use most when you are with

your best friend?

your class/work mate?

The next two statements relate to the family. What language do you use most when you are

at home with your parents/wife/husband?

at home with your brothers/sisters/children?

The fifth statement relates to one's ethnic group. What language do you use most when you are with people from your own ethnic group.

The scoring system is the same as for choice of a national language. For computational purposes, the first set of language use with be designated Language Use I, the next set Language Use II and the third one Language Use III.

(i) Educational level

Table 7.31 showing means, SD on educational level using the total scores of Language Use I, II and III.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
LANGUAGE USE I			
ALL SAMPLE	460	6.55	2.15
PRIMARY	143	5.65	1.65
SECONDARY	209	6.97	1.83
POST SECONDARY	168	6.97	1.55

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
	LANGUAGE USE II		
ALL SAMPLE	481	5.35	2.24
PRIMARY	111	5.31	2.28
SECONDARY	221	4.93	2.20
POST SECONDARY	111	6.23	2.02
	LANGUAGE USE III		
ALL SAMPLE	487	1.45	0.95
PRIMARY	150	1.48	0.04
SECONDARY	225	1.37	0.87
POST SECONDARY	112	1.57	0.95

Table 7.32 showing the results of one-way analysis of variance for the groups.

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO
	LANGUAGE USE I			
Educational level	165.56	2	82.78	19.28
Error	1960.28	457	4.28	sig. beyond
Total	2125.85	459		.05% level
	LANGUAGE USE II			
Educational level	124.71	2	62.36	13.02
Error	2289.197	478	4.79	sig. beyond
Total	2413.92	480		.01% level
	LANGUAGE USE III			
Educational level	2.95	2	1.48	1.64
Error	435.76	484	.900	not sign. at
Total	438.71	486		.05% level

Language Use I (Language use at work or school)

The mean scores for each group is different with 5.65 for the primary group, 6.97 for the secondary group and 6.97 for the post-secondary group.

The trend shows the degree of Integration (Language Use) rising with an increase in academic qualification. This data shows no significant difference between that of Secondary and Post-Secondary groups, but there is a significant difference between the primary respondents and the two higher levels. Table 7.30 shows an F-ratio of 19.28 which is significant beyond the .05% of confidence. This confirms that the groups are significantly different.

Language Use II (Language use at home)

The overall mean scores for the entire sample (n = 481) on the scale was 5.35 (SD = 2.28) while the overall means for primary level respondents (n = 111) was 5.31 (SD = 2.28), that of secondary level (n = 221) on the scale was 4.93 (SD = 2.20) and for the post-secondary level (n = 111) was 5.23 (SD = 2.02). The mean scores for each level is different. The post-secondary subjects have the highest means of 6.23, followed by primary respondents with 5.31 and then the secondary level with 4.93. Each group is significantly different from the other. The results of the analysis of variance confirm this. With an F-ratio of 13.02, it is significant beyond the .01% level of significance.

Language Use III (Language use in the ethnic group)

Table 7.32 shows the mean scores of the groups. The mean scores for the primary level is 1.48, secondary group 1.37 and post-secondary group 1.57. There is no significant difference in mean scores for the groups. An F-ratio of 1.64 is not significant at the .05% level. This shows that there is no significant difference in language use with members of their ethnic groups. These results were expected. It is obvious that when members of the same ethnic group meet, they tend to speak their common first language.

(ii) <u>Age</u>

Table 7.33 showing means, and SD for the sample on Age using the Language Use scales I, II and III.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEANS	SD
LANGUAGE USE I			
ALL SAMPLE	460	6.55	2.15
11	77	7.84	.46
13	66	7.62	.77
15	56	7.50	.78
17	52	7.69	.82
19	43	7.53	.93
21	43	3.97	2.26
30	46	4.63	2.43
40	50	4.70	2.49
Over 40	27	5.27	2.36
LANGUAGE USE II			
ALL SAMPLE	481	5.35	2.24
11	78	4.58	2.20
13	68	4.97	2.17
15	54	4.62	2.13
17	52	3.86	2.09
19	43	4.79	2.19
21	48	6.31	1.96
30	59	6.40	1.72
40	51	6.78	1.72
Over 40	28	6.96	1.34

LANGUAGE USE III

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
ALL SAMPLE	487	1.45	.950
11	78	1.83	1.28
13	69	1.57	1.10
15	58	1.32	.845
17	52	1.36	.840
19	43	1.44	.93
21	47	1.08	.35
30	59	1.33	.70
40	53	1.47	.89
Over 40	28	1.35	.82

Table 7.34 showing results of one-way analysis of variance on Age.

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO
LANGUAGE USE I				
Age	1032.59	8	129.07	53.25
Error	1093.26	451	2.42	sig. beyond the .01% level
Total	2125.85	459		
LANGUAGE USE II				
Age	499.195	8	62.399	15.38
Error	1914.72	472	4.06	sig. beyond the .01% level
Total	2413.916	480		
LANGUAGE USE III				
Age	21.111	8	2.64	3.02
Error	417.59	478	.873	sig. beyond the .01% level
Total	438.71	486		

Table 7.33 shows the mean scores of the respondents. The scores are different for each age group. The trend shows the degree of using either English or French rising with a decrease in age. The younger age group scores range between 7.50 to 7.84 while the older age groups (21 - over 40s) range between 3.97 to 5.29. This shows a remarkable difference between the groups. The F-ratio of 53.23 is significant beyond the .01% level of confidence. This result confirms that the groups are significantly different from each other. These findings also confirm the general view that younger people tend to be more flexible in choice of language spoken than older people.

However, it seems likely that there are other influences and factors that affect language use I. It is possible that the younger age groups are likely to be exposed to other factors other than simply age. It is possible, for example, that because the younger age groups are living predominantly in boarding houses, they are isolated for nine months of the year from the traditional influences of family and village. It also brings various children from differing ethnic groups into contact. Thus, while age may have placed them in a more adaptive environment, it may not be entirely responsible for their choice of language, but simply a pre-disposing factor.

Language use II (Language used at home)
Table 7.33 shows the mean scores of the groups. The scores show the degree of using language in the home rising with an increase in age. The mean scores for the 11-19 year olds ranges between 3.86 and 4.97, while those of the over 21s and over 40s ranges between 6.31 and 6.96. There are big differences between the groups. An F-ratio of 15.38 was

significant beyond the .01% level of significance. This confirms that the groups are different.

From these results, it is interesting to note the difference in mean scores between the groups in Language Use I (languages used at work/scholl) and Language Use II (language used at home). The scores of the younger groups are far higher in language use I than the older groups, while the reverse is true of Language Use II. From these contrasting results, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that there are other factors influencing the use of language other than age for the groups. It is possible, for example, that in the home, where older people are usually in control, they may decide to use a more formal language in order to make their influence felt. Commands or instructions may be given in a 'neutral' language (English or French) rather than the ethnic group language as a means of exerting authority. Besides, older people may make it a point of duty to use either English or French as language of communication in the home, so that their children learn to speak the languages better.

On the other hand, the younger age group may see home as a less formal environment than the boarding houses in schools. In this situation, they may relax and speak either pidgin or their ethnic group language.

Language Use III (language used in the ethnic groups)

Table 7.33 shows that the mean scores of the groups are not significantly different. However, the trend is pronounced with the degree of language used rising with a decrease in age. The mean scores of the younger groups (11-19) ranges between 1.32 - 1.83, while those of the older groups (21 - over 40s) ranges between 1.08 - 1.49. The results are not significant

at the .05% level of significance.

(iii) Length of stay in an urban centre

Table 7.35 showing means, SD for the sample on length of stay in an urban centre using the total scores of Languages Use I, II and III.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEANS	SD
LANGUAGE USE I			
ALL SAMPLE	460	6.40	2.34
0 = never lived in a town	35	7.82	0.70
1 = under 5 years	153	6.90	1.98
2 = 6-10 years	76	6.50	2.23
3 = 11-20 years	144	6.19	2.29
4 = over 20 years	52	5.71	2.22
LANGUAGE USE II			
ALL SAMPLE	481	5.35	2.24
0 = never lived in a town	36	3.61	2.06
1 = under 5 years	156	4.66	2.19
2 = 6-10 years	81	5.86	1.99
3 = 11-20 years	153	5.80	2.11
4 = over 20 years	55	6.52	1.99
LANGUAGE USE III			
ALL SAMPLE	487	1.45	0.95
0 = never lived in a town	35	1.22	0.68
1 = under 5 years	160	1.45	0.99
2 = 6-10 years	83	1.46	0.941
3 = 11-20 years	153	1.50	0.98
4 = over 20 years	56	1.42	0.89

Table 7.36 showing results of one-way analysis of variance on length of stay in an urban centre using Language Use I, II and III total scores.

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO
LANGUAGE USE I				
Urban centre	121.12	4	32.78	7.48
Error	1994.73	455	4.38	sig. beyond .01% level
Total	2125.85	459		
LANGUAGE USE II				
Urban centre	306.028	4	76.50	17.28
Error	2107.89	476	4.43	sig. beyond .01% level
Total	2413.92	480		
LANGUAGE USE III				
Urban centre	2.315	4	.579	0.639
Error	436.395	482	.905	not sig.
Total	438.710	486		

Language Use I (Language used at work/school)

Table 7.35 shows the basic data for the sample on length of stay in a town's total scores. On examining this table, one finds there exist great differences between the sub-groups mean scores which ranges between 5.71 and 7.82. The trend shows that the degree of using English or French of stay in town. Those who have never lived in a town have the highest mean scores of 7.82, next those who have lived under five years with 6.90, those who have lived between 6-10 years with 6.50, followed by those who have lived between 11-20 years with 6.19, and those who have lived in an urban centre for over 20 years with the lowest mean score of 5.71. The middle groups, that is the under 5 and 11-20s, seem to have no significant

difference between them. On the whole, with an F-ratio of 7.48, confirms
that the groups are significantly different beyond the .01% level of
significance.

At a first glance, one would see these results as surprising. One would
have expected those who have lived longest in a town to have the highest
mean scores, rather than those who have never lived in a town. However,
on closer examination, one may conclude that the reason for the trend could
be both psychological and social. It is possible, for example, that those
who have lived in a town for long are more confident of themselves and
more relaxed because they know what is expected of them. In formal places,
therefore, they may vary the language used, according to what seems to be
expedient. The reverse is true for those who have not lived in a town or
who have lived for a short while. In formal situations, they are more
tense and sometimes confused, because they are not sure of what is
expected of them in terms of language behaviour. They therefore behave
in the most formal way possible, probably fearing to make mistakes. This
however is speculative and calls for further investigation to get at the
root causes.

Language Use II (Language use in the home)
Table 7.34 also shows the mean scores of the groups. The mean scores
range between 3.61 and 6.52, showing the groups are different. Those who
have never lived in a town have the lowest score of 3.61; next, those
who have lived for 5 years with 4.66, then, those who have lived between
6-10 years with 5.80, followed by those who have lived between 11-20
years with 5.80 and those who have lived in a town for over 20 years with
the highest mean score of 6.52. The trend shows that there is a

correlation between the use of the English or French language in the home and the length of stay in town. An F-ratio of 17.28 shows that the groups are significantly different beyond the .01% level of confidence.

These results are interesting. Taking a look at language used at work or school (Language Use I), those who have not lived in a town have the highest mean scores. But with language spoken in the home, this same group have the lowest mean scores. The reverse situation applies to those who have lived longest in town. From these results, therefore, it will not be unreasonable to conclude that there may be other factors other than town life influencing language use in the home. It is possible, for example, that whilst the newcomer is trying to adjust to town life, he may find out that his home is most secure and familiar environment. As a result, he will be more relaxed, and tend to adopt a less formal attitude. On the other hand, those who have lived longest in town, may be influenced by different factors. For example, they may want to improve on their wife's or children's educational attainment, hence they may develop a more formal attitude to language use at home in order to foster this aim.

Language Use III (language use in the ethnic groups)

Table 7.34 on Language Use III shows the means of the groups. The mean scores for the groups are between 1.22 - 1.42. These show that there may not be any significant differences between the groups.

(iv) <u>Region</u>

Table 7.37 showing means, SD for the sample on Region using Language Use I, II and III total scores.

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
LANGUAGE USE I			
ALL SAMPLE	460	6.55	2.15
Forest	252	6.81	1.97
Grassland	208	6.32	2.27
LANGUAGE USE II			
ALL SAMPLE	481	5.35	2.24
Forest	264	5.45	2.27
Grassland	217	5.23	2.20
LANGUAGE USE III			
ALL SAMPLE	487	1.45	0.95
Forest	265	1.44	0.96
Grassland	222	1.45	0.93

Table 7.38 showing results of analysis of variance on Region

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO
Between Groups	27.123	1	27.123	5.92
Within Groups	2098.72	458	4.582	sig. at
Total	2125.85	459		.01% level
LANGUAGE USE II				
Between Groups	5.98	1	5.98	1.190
Within Groups	2407.93	479	5.03	n.s.
Total	2413.92	480		
LANGUAGE USE III				
Between Groups	.013	485	.013	.014
Within Groups	438.69	486	.904	n.s.
Total	938.711			

The mean scores for Language Use I show a small difference, while those for Language Use II and III show no significant difference. The results of the one-way analysis of variance between these subgroups yields an F-ratio of 5.92 for Language Use I which is significant beyond the .05 level of confidence. These results suggest that there is a marked difference in the language spoken at home between the Forest zone respondents and the Grassland respondents. It seems those from the forest areas are more willing to use other languages in communicating at home rather than their own ethnic group language. The reverse seems to be true of those from the grassland areas. For language use II and III, there are no significant differences between the groups.

(v) <u>Sex</u>

Table 7.39 showing means and SD for the sample on Sex

SAMPLE	NO.	MEAN	SD
LANGUAGE USE I			
ALL SAMPLE	460	6.55	2.15
Male	258	6.43	2.19
Female	202	6.69	2.09
LANGUAGE USE II			
ALL SAMPLE	481	5.35	2.24
Male	264	5.45	2.25
Female	217	5.22	2.25
LANGUAGE USE III			
ALL SAMPLE	487	1.45	0.95
Male	268	1.35	0.84
Female	219	1.57	1.05

Table 7.40 showing results of one-way analysis of variance on Sex

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARES	F-RATIO
LANGUAGE USE I				
Between Groups	7.372	1	7.37	1.59
Within Groups	2118.47	488	4.62	n.s.
Total	2125.85	489		
LANGUAGE USE II				
Between Groups	6.43	1	6.43	1.28
Within Groups	2407.477	479	5.02	n.s.
Total	2413.916	480		
LANGUAGE USE III				
Between Groups	5.44	1	5.44	1.69
Within Groups	433.264	485	.899	n.s.
Total	438.710	486		

The mean scores for Language Use I, II and III show no significant differences between the groups. The results of the analysis of variance also suggests that no differences exist between the groups for all three measures. These results have been consistent throughout. The results suggests that sex is not an important variable either as a reflection of attitudes towards National Integration or of a willingness to accept other Cameroonians from different ethnic groups as fellow citizens.

7.8 <u>Summary</u>

At this stage, it seems appropriate to summarize the results of the
investigation so far.

The general parameters show an overall positive attitude towards national
integration whether it is measured by the nationalism scale, friendship
choice, language choice or language usage. The respondents as a whole
were favourably disposed towards national unity and the breaking down
of national barriers. This is seen from the fact that the mean scores on
each measure is above the theoretical midpoint of the scale.

The detailed analysis offers certain insights into the factors which
make for greater degree of integration. The analyses so far have treated
each of the four indicators of national unity separately. In a sense,
they are separate and possibly different expressions of the same under-
lying desire for national integration. Treating them separately can, to
some extent, be justified. It is meaningful, for example, to examine the
strength of feeling for nationalism at different levels of education,
regions, urbanization and sex. It is equally meaningful on the one hand
to examine the choice of friendship or language at diverse levels of
education, etc. The results will vary slightly with the different
indicators used. Inasmuch as they are all indices of the same underlying
desire for integration, they can be later combined into a single measure.

Summarizing the results of the separate analysis so far, we have the
following points.

(i) All subjects reveal a positive inclination for national integration when measured by the nationalism scale.

(ii) Educational level is a significant influence on inclination towards national integration as measured by the nationalism scale, but only at the post-secondary level. Prior to that level, the inclination is positive but fairly low.

(iii)a) There is also a significant positive correlation between age and National Integration, but like the effects of educational level the relationship is a complex one.

b) The over-40s expressed a higher degree of will towards National Integration when their desire is measured by the Nationalism scale. This is indeed not the expected trend as previously discussed. It possibly indicates that the level of an individual's desire for National integration depends on the way in which it is measured. The measure or scale in question is an oral expression of one's intention and could result in a different conclusion from say a behavioural measure. It also emphasizes the multi-dimensional nature of the socio-psychological variable called National integration and endorses the research technique which uses at least four ways of measuring it.

(iv) Again using the Nationalism scale as the index of National integration, the results show that length of stay in urban centres has a positive influence on the individual's desire for National integration. Here the trend seems cumulative, with a constant increase in attitude towards National integration the longer one stays in an urban centre.

(v) The effect of region on this measure on National Integration is
not significant. People in the grassland and forest regions were
equally positive about national integration.

(vi) Similarly, the males and females in the sample were equally
positive towards national integration.

Summarizing the results, when the friendship choice is used as a measure
of National Integration, we find that

(i) Educational level shows the same trend as with the previous
measure. The post-secondary group were more disposed to seeking
social interactions and relationships outside a narrow ego-
centric area. This is a more behavioural indicator of national
integration as compared with the nationalism scale.

(ii) The age trend also confirms the previous findings. The 19 year
olds and the over 40s show a greater tendency towards national
integration through greater inter-ethnic interaction in their
friendship choices.

(iii) The length of stay in an urban centre again cumulatively
influences the attitudes towards National Integration as
measured by friendship choices.

(iv) There is a departure from previous findings in relation to the
influence of regions on attitudes towards national integration.
Where there was no difference in the oral expression and
feelings towards the ideals of national integration there is a
difference in the tendency to express this ideal in their
friendship choices with the forest region showing greater
tendency towards this expression of national integration.

When language choice is used as a measure of National Integration, the
results show that on

(i) Educational level, the post-secondary subjects claimed to
prefer a more indigenous language as a medium of communication
as a national language. This result shows the same trend as
those of the national scale and friendship choice. The
consistency of the three measures show that the differences
between the levels are real rather than chance.

(ii) Age seems to have a significant influence on tendencies towards
National Integration. The patterns of the attitudes of older
and younger people are different as a medium of communication
in the situation and social relationships   the survey
investigated, but the degree of their nationalistic feelings
is very similar. Older people, for example, gave a stronger
expression of positive attitudes towards National Integration
but a weaker degree of willingness to form friendships across
tribal boundaries, and a greater readiness to use other ethnic
languages as the national language.

(iii) Like the national and friendship choice scales, the choice of
a national language shows the same trend depending on length
of stay in town, there being more positive attitudes towards
National Integration the longer one lives in an urban centre.

(iv) Again there was no significant difference between males and
females on the question of choice of a national language.
Both sexes were equally positive towards national integration.

(v) In choosing a national language, people from the forest and
grassland regions were equally positive.

Concerning Language Use I (language use at work/school):

(i) Level of education is a significant influence on language of communication as a measure of national integration. The secondary and post-secondary subjects expressed a greater willingness to communicate in other ethnic languages than the primary level subjects. This is perhaps so because after primary education, other factors appear to be of greater importance of shaping people's attitude towards integration. This, of course, is not surprising because at secondary and post-secondary level most students live in communities, away from home and ethnic group loyalties, whereas primary school subjects hardly leave their areas of origin. In these communal situations, communications are usually carried out in a more nationwide language or lingua franca, so that people from different ethno-linguistic backgrounds can understand each other. This attitude is perhaps transferred to the place of work and/or school.

(ii) The trend shows the choice of a language used at school/work depends on age. The younger age groups are likely to have a more positive attitude towards different patterns of language use than the older ones.

(iii) Life in an urban centre affects choice of a language, but this result shows a departure from previous findings where length of stay in a town increased attitude towards integration progressively. Here, the reverse is true where those who have spent a short time in town or urban centre express more willingness to use a language other than his own.

(iv) Region and Sex show no effect on this measure. They are both equally positive towards National Integration.

In concluding the results when Language Use II (language used at work/ school) is used as a measure of national integration, the results show

(i) that the post-secondary subjects expressed a more positive attitude towards communicating with other ethnic languages, English or French than either the primary or secondary subjects.

(ii) Similarly, the effect of age shows the same trend as educational level. The post-secondary subjects were more inclined to use other languages than either the primary or secondary subjects.

(iii) The results show that the effects or urbanization has a positive influence in language use at work/school. The longer one has lived in an urban centre, the more likely one is willing to use other ethnic group languages, English or French as a medium of communication at work.

(iv) There is no difference in language use at work between those from the Grassland areas and those from the Forest areas.

(v) Again, there is no significant difference between male and female on language used at work.

With Language Use III (language used in the ethnic groups) all the results are not significant. It is understandable that when members of the same ethnic group meet, they tend to speak their common first language.

7.9 Further Analysis using all subscales as a whole.

In this section, an attempt is made to analyse the data combining
the four sub-scales into a single complex measure of National Inte-
gration. To do this, the multivariate statistical technique will be
used. Amongst the advantages of combining the scales into a single
one is the opportunity to observe the relative effectiveness of each
of these factors on National Integration. One would need to know, for
example, whether education has a more effective   influence on National
Integration than age or urbanization. One would also need to know the
way these factors relate to one another. For instance, do they interact
in such a way that once education has been improved, urbanization is
no longer as effective or vice versa? As a result of questions like
these, it was considered particularly useful to recompute the data
with the main research question in mind.

Two of the variables under study were rearranged. Age, for instance,
was originally in nine categories but in the analysis age has been
categorised into two levels - 11-20 year olds and 21-over 40 year olds.
This has been done because previous basic analysis shows that there are
no significant differences in the mean scores within the 11-20 years
and within the 21-over 40s, but there are significant differences
between the two groups.

The other variable affected was urbanization. In order to construct an
index of urbanization, a frequency ratio was computed using age and the
length of stay in a town.
From this, three levels of urbanization emerged as shown in Table 7.4/

Table 7.41 showing levels of urbanization and frequency distribution.

URBANIZATION LEVEL	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY	CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY
Urban 1	185	37.7	37.7	37.7
Urban 2	130	26.5	26.5	64.2
Urban 3	176	35.8	35.8	
TOTAL	491	100.0	100.0	100.0

Similarly, by doing cross-tabulation of urban by age, the following table
emerged.

Table 7.42 showing a cross-tabulation of age by urbanization.

	1	2	ROW TOTAL	
Urban I	n=129 69.7 42.9 26.3	n=56 30.3 27.3 11.4	185 37.7	NUMBER ROW Pct. COLUMN Pct. TOTAL
Urban II	n=65 50.0 21.6 13.2	n=65 50.0 34.2 13.2	130 26.5	
Urban III	n=107 60.5 35.5 21.8	n=69 39.2 36.4 14.1	176 35.8	
COLUMN Total	301 61.3	190 38.7	491 100.0	

These three measures of urbanization were used in the analysis.

As was indicated earlier (Table 7.6) through the analysis of variance (F = 10.33 SL = .00001), academic qualification affects attitudes towards national integration. The results suggested that higher academic qualification beyond secondary level, the more likely a respondent is to have favourable attitudes towards National Integration. But further analysis is needed to discover the nature of relationships between the variables. Table 7.43 shows the result of multivariate analysis using all the subscale as one.

Table 7.43 showing results of multivariate analysis of all the scales combined.

EFFECTS	SIG. OF F. SCORES	MULTIVARIATE LEVEL OF SIG.
Educational level	.00001	Sig.
Age	.0001	Sig.
Urbanization	.00001	Sig.
Educational level and age	.01	Sig.
Educational level and urban.	.27	N.Sig.
Age and urbanization	.01	Sig.
Educational level, age and urban.	.07	N.Sig.

The results of the multivariate analysis confirm the influence of education, age and urbanization as major factors influencing attitude towards national integration. As previously discussed, the value of the multivariate approach rests in the fact that it combines all the sub-scales into one global measure of attitude towards National Integration. This is similar in concept to taking an individual's performance on English, Maths, Geography and History and making a combine score entitled Academic Ability. These sub-scales, of course, cannot be

crudely added together but are accumulated so that the elements in common are not repeatedly accumulated. If, for example, English and History were sharing the same academic ability, then they would not be added twice. Having done this, we are in the position to support the influence of these three major variables as determinants of national integration.

The more interesting question is whether the influence of one factor depends on the fact that it comes before or after another factor. Or again, whether the influence of say education is the same for the people in different areas. For example, it could be the case that educating someone in the urban area could lead to a greater feeling of national integration where in educating someone in the rural area could lead to the opposite effect. Statistically, this type of result is described as an interaction. When such interactions are real and not due to a chance occurance, they are seen in the statistical analysis as significant.

Turning to the results in Table 7.42, therefore, we can ask: is the influence of education exactly the same for the 11-19 year olds as for the 21-40+ year olds? The answer from the results are clearly so, since the statistical results reach the one per cent level of significance.

Educational level and urbanization.

A similar analysis on the interaction between educational level and urbanization shows no significant results, since the statistical analysis shows a probability of .27. This means that the relationship between educational level exerts on individual tendency towards national integration is the same in the rural and urban area, which is a different finding for that observed for education and age.

Age and urbanization.

The influence of age is different in the town from the country. Younger people in the town feel differently about integration than their counterparts in the country areas.

With the inclusion of region and sex variables in the analysis, the results will be presented in the same format.

Table 7.44 showing the multivariate analysis results of all the scales combined.

EFFECTS	SIG. or F-SCORES	MULTIVARIATE LEVEL OF SIG.
Region	.0001	sig.
Sex	.01	sig.
Sex by education	.49	n.s.
Sex by urban.	.83	n.s.
Sex by age	.011	sig.
Region by education	.001	sig.
Region by urban.	.08	n.s.
Region by age	.92	n.s.
Region, sex, urban.	.78	n.s.
Region, age, education	.47	n.s.
Region, age, urban.	.59	n.s.
Sex, urban., education	.39	n.s.
Age, sex, education	.21	n.s.
Region, urban, education	.14	n.s.
Region, sex, education	.25	n.s.
Region, age, sex, urban.	.45	n.s.
Region, age, sex, education	.54	n.s.
Region, age, urban., education	.55	n.s.
Region, sex, urban., education	.57	n.s.
Age, sex, urban., education	.44	n.s.
Age, region, sex, education, urban.	.45	n.s.

With all sub-scales combined, the results show that the effects of
region and sex are significant beyond the .01 per cent level of
confidence. These results show that region and sex positively influences
national integration. With the interaction effects only *two* are sig-
nificant - sex by age, region by education,

Sex by age

The influence of educational level is different for male and female.
Younger males feel differently about integration than their female
counterparts.

Region and education.

A similar analysis on the interaction between education level and region
shows a significant result at .001% level of confidence. This means that
the influence of educational level in the grassland region is different
from those in the forest region.

In summary, therefore, one may deduce that age, educational *level* and place of
residence exert a significant influence on the way a person feels about
national integration. This finding is unaltered whether national inte-
gration is measured using all sub-scales combined into one. Moreover,
the influence of education will vary with age. For example, the post/
secondary individual of between 21-40 years old feels more positively
orientated towards integration than post/secondary individual of 20. The
tendency, therefore, is for the older educated person to be more tolerant
to the concept of national integration than a younger one. Lastly, the
relationship between educational level and national integration is the
same in the country or rural areas as in the city areas.

7.9.1 Further analysis II

The data presented in the last two sections suggests very strongly that
there is a relationship between the level of academic qualification and
attitudes towards national integration. Descriptively, this correlation
indicates that the more educated or the higher the level of educational
qualification an individual possesses, the more likely that individual
is to score high on attitudes to national integration. However, the data
also indicates the relationship between the attitude total scores and
other potentially moderating variables. Clearly to attempt at this point
to claim any practical significance from the data would be premature. One
would need to probe the inter-relationship between the many factors which
seem to influence national integration and which of these identified so
far is the most effective. In a country of limited financial resources,
it would be interesting to find out which of these factors should be
financed and promoted to achieve the best returns for national integration.

To answer this question, a step-wise multiple regression equation was
calculated. This calculation arranges the many factors in order of their
effectiveness as individual predictors of the variable under consideration
i.e. national integration. Table 7.44 shows the result of a step-wise
multiple regression analysis using the entire sample's attitude total
score as the independent variable. Such an analysis performed using SPSS
600 statistical package for the social sciences ranks independent variables
entered into a multiple regression equation by the percentage of the variance
each accounts for in predicting the dependent variable, in this case the
attitude scale.

Table 7.45 showing step-wise multiple regression using attitude total
score as the dependent variable for the entire sample.

STEP NO.	VARIABLE ENTERED	MULTIPLE R	R^2	INCREASE IN R^2	F-RATIO
1	Urban	.479	.229	.229	114.966
2	Academic qualification	.562	.316	.086	88.703
3	Age	.580	.336	.020	64.776
4	Sex	.587	.344	.008	50.240
5	Religion	.589	.347	.002	40.524
6	Occupation	.589	.347	.0001	33.701
7	Religion	.592	.350	.003	29.217

For the entire sample, the analysis indicates that the best single pre-
dictor of an individual's attitude towards national integration is
urbanization. The analysis indicates that 22.9 percent of the variance is
accounted for solely by urbanization. The relationship is positive,
indicating that town and urban residents have a proportionately higher
level of national identification than rural residents. But more
importantly, the data indicates that urbanization is a more effective
instrument for nation-building in Cameroon than educational attainment of
individuals. With the addition of the variable "academic qualification",
some 31.6 percent of the variance is accounted for. An analysis of the
third step in the equation indicates that the addition of the variable
'age', adds only 2 percent giving a total variance accounted for as 33.6
percent. The next four variables, 'sex, 'region', 'occupation' and
'religion' account for less than one percent of the variance. The
maximum significant(at the .01% level of significance) number of variables
which the equation predicts is seven. Other additional variables did not
have high enough 'F' ratio values to be significant. Thus, maximally the
seven variables listed account for 35% of the variance of the dependent
variable.

The presentation of the results concerning the relationship between 'Friendship Choice', 'Language Choice', 'Languaged Used' (i-iii) scales and the listed variables will follow closely the form used previously in the presentation of the attitude scale data.

Table 7.46 showing stepwise Multiple Regression using the 'Friendship Choice' total scores as the dependent variable for the entire sample.

STEP NO.	VARIABLE ENTERED	MULTIPLE R	R^2	INCREASE IN R^2	F-RATIO
1	Urban	.380	.144	.144	65.226
2	Academic qualification	.415	.172	.027	40.084
3	Age	.430	.185	.012	28.996
4	Sex	.430	.185	.0006	21.781
5	Region	.435	.189	.0003	17.789
6	Occupation	.448	.200	.011	15.921
7	Religion	.449	.202	.001	13.705

Table 7.47 showing stepwise Multiple Regression using the 'Language Choice' total score as the dependent variable for the entire sample.

STEP NO.	VARIABLE ENTERED	MULTIPLE R	R^2	INCREASE IN R^2	F-RATIO
1	Urban	.448	.200	.200	100.661
2	Age	.586	.343	.306	84.392
3	Academic qualification	.630	.397	.054	82.636
4	Religion	.631	.398	.0009	63.376
5	Sex	.631	.399	.0005	50.673
6	Occupation	.632	.399	.0002	42.154
7	Region	.632	.399	.00003	36.041

Table 7.46 shows the Stepwise Multiple Regressions for the entire sample. The analysis shows urbanization as the most effective variable influencing the choice of friends from a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds. However, only 14 percent of the variance is accounted for by urbanization. This suggests that there may be other important variables not included in the analysis which may be more important that urbanization. Nevertheless, these results confirm the view that a town or urban resident is more likely to mix with other ethnic group members. With the inclusion of the variable 'academic qualification', some 17 percent of the variance is accounted for. This shows an increase of 3 percent. Age accounts for only 1 per cent, while sex, region, occupation and religion accounts for 2 per cent between them. All the variables account for 20 per cent of the variables.

Table 7.47 shows the step-wise multiple regression for the entire sample, where urbanization is the best single predictor of an individual's choice of a national language. The analysis indicates that 20 per cent of the variance is accounted for solely by urbanization. The relationship is positive, assuming that a town or urban dweller is likely to choose a neutral language as national language for Cameroon. For this analysis, other variables are less effective. With the inclusion of age, some 34.3 per cent of the variance is accounted for, an increase of 14.3 per cent. Age is the second best predictor, while educational level comes third, with just 5.3 per cent increase, bringing the variance of the three variables to 39.7 per cent. The maximum significant number of variables which the equation predicts is seven. Thus maximally the seven variables listed accounted for 39.9 per cent of the variance of the dependable variable.

Table 7.48 showing Step-wise Multiple Regression using Language Use I
Scale total score as the dependent variables for the entire
sample.

STEP NO.	VARIABLES ENTERED	MULTIPLE		INCREASE	F-RATIO
		R	R^2	IN R^2	
1	Age	655	429	429	289.29
2	Academic qualification	728	530	101	217.300
3	Sex	731	535	004	147.310
4	Occupation	735	540	005	112.450
5	Region	738	545	004	91.363
6	Urbanization	738	545	0006	76.124
7	Religion	738	545	00003	65.085

The analysis indicates that age is the best single predictor of an
individual's choice of Language Use with one's family. This accounts for
42.9 percent of the variance. The relationship is positive. One would
have expected academic qualifications to be more effective than age, but
the reverse is true with the younger age group more willing to use other
languages than their own in the home. With the addition of the educational
qualification variable, some 53 percent of the variable is accounted for,
and an increase of 10.1 percent on the age variable. Sex comes third with
an increase of .004 percent on age and academic qualification. For this
equation, urbanization is not effective. It adds only .0006 percent. The
seven variables accounted for 54.5 percent of the variance of the dependable
variable – Language Use I.

Table 7.49 showing Step-wise Regression using Language II total score
as the dependent variable for the entire sample.

STEP NO.	VARIABLES ENTERED	MULTIPLE R	R^2	INCREASE IN R^2	F-RATIO
1	Age	413	171	171	79.55
2	Urbanization	434	188	017	44.59
3	Academic qualification	449	218	013	32.28
4	Occupation	466	218	016	26.62
5	Religion	467	218	001	21.36
6	Sex	468	219	0004	17.80
7	Region	470	221	001	15.36

Again, age is the most effective variable in an individual's choice of
language used at work or school. The older age group show a greater
willingness than the younger age group in communicating in other languages
than their own in work or school situations. The variance accounted for
solely by age is 17.1 percent, while urbanization is next with just an
increase of .17 percent. All the other variables are less effective.
For all seven variables, the variance accounted for 22.1 percent.

Table 7.50 showing Step-wise Regression using Language Choice III total score as the dependent variable for the entire sample.

STEP NO.	VARIABLES ENTERED	MULTIPLE R	R^2	INCREASE IN R^2	F-RATIO
1	Age	44.1	195	195	107.08
2	Academic qualification	447	200	.005	55.25
3	Occupation	457	209	.008	38.78
4	Sex	459	211	.002	23.49
5	Religion	496	246	.035	23.86
6	Urbanization	498	248	.001	20.61
7	Region	501	251	.003	18.30

The data indicates that age is the best single predictor of one's choice of language use with members of one's ethnic group. Previous results show all variables were equally positive in choosing a language for use within an ethnic group area. The results on Language Use (I, II and III) show age as the most effective variable.

In conclusion, on the one hand the results show that using the nationalism total scores, Friendship total scores and the choice of a national language scores as the criterion variables, the most effective independent variable is urbanization. These areas are concerned with one's loyalty and affiliation to the whole country. It is therefore not surprising that these should correlate highly with urbanization. On the other hand, age is seen to be the most effective variable when the total scores of language use I, II and III are used. These measures relate to use of language in specific situations.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This study examined the many influences upon Cameroonians' attitudes towards National Integration with particular reference to levels of educational qualifications. Within the context of Cameroon, the issue of National Integration is seen as a very important one. The political history and tribal and cultural diversities within the country make progress conditional upon a sense of national identity.

This investigation begins by analysing the geographic, historic and socio-economic realities of Cameroon, comparing these with similar situations within other African countries, and it was concluded that the major influences on national integration were likely to arise from educational practices, educational levels, urbanization, tribalism (as identified by geographic regions) and such personal characteristics as sex and age.

The study is accordingly best understood in two parts. The first dealing with the conceptual analysis of the antecedents and consequences in historic and cultural terms of the current situation in Cameroon. The meanings of such contradictory connotation as tribe, ethnic group, diversities had first to be conceptually explored. The political and traditional organisations associated with each major group had to be objectively described and their possible influences on national integration explored.

The second stage dealt with the empirical verification of the major conclusions derived from the conceptualanalysis. This stage is, in itself, sub-divided into two parts. The first deals with the construction

of an appropriate scale to quantify Cameroonians' feelings and attitudes to national integration. This is followed by tests of a number of conceptually derived hypotheses. The hope is that the national integration scale would provide a tool whose usefulness goes beyond the scope of the present research. If the objective of constructing a valid and reliable scale has been achieved, then it should be of use to future researchers.

The major hypothesis examined dealt with level of education, urbanization, region, age and sex as determinants of national integration. Of particular importance to the objective of nation building is the finding that urbanization is the single most influential factor in attitudes to national integration. The data suggests that urbanization and hence the drift in urban centres which many social scientists and politicians have usually criticised may not, after all, be such a bad thing for a developing and heterogeneous society like Cameroon. The drift to urban centres and the growth of urban centres in Africa has been criticised on two grounds. First, that it has a profound dislocative impact on traditional African values and institutions and second, that it puts undue pressure on scarce resources, leading to unemployment, congestion, crimes and poor sanitation.[1] While there is no doubt that this is often the case, these results in revealing the positive sode of urbanization underscore its inherent functional role in national integration and nation building. What these results show is that urbanization can actually help in minimizing or defusing inter-ethnic conflict.

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1. Little, K., Urbanization as a Social Process, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974, pp. 40-54.

A second finding of special interest is that dealing with the effect of age on attitude towards national integration. In spite of the commonly held view that older people move towards greater conservatism and by deduction would be less inclined to national integration, the results were rather complex. The older respondents showed less predisposition to national integration when national integration was measured by one's willingness to form friendship outside of one's ethnic group and to use a foreign language at home. However, this same older group were more disposed towards national integration when it (national integration) was assessed by one's declaration of goodwill and support for the ideal of national integration. The data argue against the accusation that these individuals are making false declarations since the scales show high reliability and validity. A more likely explanation for the con-flicting results would be that older people demonstrate their attitudes in a different way from the younger ones. Where the older group would be unwilling to change their life styles by/new friendships
^{initiating} and new modes of communication at home, they could nevertheless still feel positively inclined towards a national goal of integration.

On a theoretical level, the data imply a distinction between conservatism and attitude to national integration. Conservatism shows itself in a reluctance to change one's style of life and it is more apparent in the older group. Attitudes towards national integration for such a group is best measured by an expression of support for the concept. In the younger group, however, there is a high correlation between the willingness to modify their behaviour and the attitudes towards national integration; a point well worth the attention of future researchers.

At three important points over the last two decades (Independence (1960), Reunification (1961), and the declaration of a United Republic (1972)), the Cameroon government has shown its political determination to create unity and stability for its diverse population. Its promotion of national unity is closely linked to the need to create a national identity reflecting wider awareness of being above all a 'Cameroonian', rather than an 'Anglophone' or a 'Francophone', a 'Bulu' or an 'Ewondo' or inhabitant of Bamenda or Sangmelima. The use of education to promote a national culture reflecting this political identity has been neglected. In countries like Cameroon, which is extremely heterogeneous in terms of language, ethnic groups, religion, ecology, habitat (see Chapter 1), the promotion of a national cultural awareness or the over-riding power and authority of the nation is an essential part of nation building. It is one of the conclusions of this thesis, that the government's concern for unity and stability has been promoted at the expense of its traditional cultural heritage. Such cultural pluralism could be a positive part of Cameroon's national identity if more attention were to be paid to making the curriculum more relevant in local as well as national terms.

Because the government in Cameroon has paid insufficient attention to the development of a pattern of political norms which can be internalized, the Cameroonian community has not yet evolved a way of identifying with issues at national level. Thus the identity crisis in Cameroon specifically relates to the fact that one does not know the politically appropriate stance to take on common problems. One is therefore able to conclude that an integral part of nation building task will be the shape and substance of the political culture. It may

facilitate or impede co-operation, lead to increasing unity or greater fragmentation. But with the present policies in Cameroon, where for example the political leaders make no attempt to involve the society in its programmes that is linking the school with the community, the future of a shared common culture is still in its infancy.

To foster a coherent national identity there is general concern among politicians that if the curricula is relevant to the child's environmental cultural settings, the child would understand himself better, his social and cultural past, and the life of the society of which he is a member. Thus the Addis Ababa Conference of Independent African States sponsored by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)[1] expressed with unequivocal clarity that curriculum reforms, particularly at the primary school level should be undertaken as a matter of urgency to reflect the local cultural environment. But the next Conference of African Ministers of Education held in 1964 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast[2] showed from the reports submitted by participating States that educational development was still lagging behind since the Addis Ababa Conference, both in quality and quantity. At Independence, most leaders were concerned about the quantitative expansion of education so it was not until the second half of the 1960s that many African governments began to consider ways of reforming the content of their educational systems to reflect their traditional cultural heritage[3].

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1. UNESCO, Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa: Final Report, Addis Ababa, Paris, 1961.
2. UNESCO, Conference of African Ministers of Education, Abidjan, Ivory Coast, 17-24 March, Final Report, Paris, 1964.
3. See Hawes, H. W. R., 'An African Primary Curriculum Survey', Innovation, No. 10, UNESCO, Newsletters of the International Educational Report of Services, pp. 6-8.

Subsequent UNESCO Conferences on education have consistently drawn
attention to the need for integrating the traditional cultural heritage
into the curriculum. For example, the Lagos Conference (1976) draws
attention to "the assertion of the national character of education"
within which "authenticity and modernity in education" are seen as "an
effective combination for rejecting, at the level of institutions and
at the level of content, imported patterns and ready-made formulae".
In this instance, the concept of authenticity refers to the strengthening
of cultural identity, which appears in this study to be an integral part
of the promotion of a national cultural identity, reflecting the diverse
backgrounds of the Cameroonian people. Similarly, the UNESCO African
Regional Conference (Zimbabwe 1982) reiterated the need for

> "the restoration to their rightful status·of the African
>
> cultural heritage and the traditional social and human
>
> values that hold potential for the future."

-for

It there/ seems that while African governments may recognise the need to
reform their curriculum, so that it is more relevant to national needs
and more authentic in local terms, progress in this area has been slow.

In Cameroon, the use of the curriculum to stress national consciousness
was explored by the Seminar for Administrative and Political Cadres on
the Reform of Primary Education 1973. It identified both history and
geography as subjects in which the emphasis could be made with the
concern for nation building in a Cameroonian context. Since then,
systematic and rigorous research has been undertaken as preliminary to
primary school reform and curriculum development.[1] On this, an excellent

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1. See Abangma, M. A., op. cit., 1981, especially Chapters I and V.

piece of work by IPAR — Buea proposed the integration of several
previously distinct subject disciplines into broader areas of study.
They point out that this will not lead to 'fewer' subjects on the time-
table, but rather that language and mathematical skills and concepts
are taught in such a way that they genuinely relate to the study of the
environment and the acquisition of craft and agricultural skills. They
observe,

> "We believe, however, that all the subjects listed on the
> present timetables have a right to their place in the
> curriculum. We are, therefore, determined that the
> experience, principles and concepts which each subject
> represents should form part of our proposed integrated
> units."

This proposal makes considerable progress towards greater individualisation
in the learning process and seeks to move away from the traditional
emphasis on acquiring unrelated facts and ideas towards an emphasis on
such skills as, for example, the ability to observe, the ability to
collect information, data, etc.

The report further suggested that these broad topics must be related to
the environment. On this, the report says,

> "In infant and junior section, environmental studies are
> seen as a method that can be applied in several, if not
> in all subjects treated in the school. The environment
> provides the stimulus and examples for the different
> topics of the different subjects. It serves as a source
> of information and observation, help the school to relate
> learning with real life situations."

The point of saying all this is to show the faith political leaders have in relating content to the environment hoping that this may provide stability, strength and confidence which may be derived from feeling with the past and from strong belonging identity. This, in turn, they hope would foster cultural homogeneity leading to national unity — that is the ability to put the claims of nation state above those of the kin-group or tribe when there is a real or apparent conflict of interest. This represents a value orientation for the individual.

Despite this proposal by IPAR — Buea, the school subjects still retain traditional divisions and only occasionally does one come across school implementing a more interdisciplinary approach and relating subjects to the environment. Moreover, it may well be argued that appeals to tradition viewed as a means of mobilising the people behind coherent and planned projects, have not yet proved dynamic because of the strong socializing impact to modernization and non-traditional possibilities which their education and changing world have introduced to them.

At the secondary level, because of the pressures exerted by examination requirements, very little has been done to reform school subjects to reflect Cameroonian cultures. Although subjects like civics and history in the first classes of the secondary school attempts to inform the youths of the struggle for independence, national heroes and policies of government, it must be said that national integration demands more than just an informed electorate. The society needs educated youth who can assume civic responsibility and leadership rôles. This means that all academic problems should incorporate knowledge of the values of the major ethnic groups.

There should also be a programme of general education based on an intensive study of national cultural subject matter both at the primary and secondary levels. Such a programme of general education should be organised around cultural themes such as 'Cameroonian belief system'. These themes should be studied on comparative and interdisciplinary manner. In language courses, the study of Cameroonian literature in translation and in the original should form a major component of the course. As part of the general education programme, students should be required to take at least one subject from Cameroon Art, Music, Dance, or Drama. It is reasonable, I think, to suggest that the ability to enjoy and appreciate another ethnic group's art, music, dance or drama should be considered as an index of inter-ethnic identification and interaction, which may foster national unity.

It is understandable that such suggestions would only work if the Government is prepared to review its examination policies. Current examination at the primary and secondary school levels do more harm than good. They do not function adequately in selection processes and they do not influence teaching positively towards cultural integration. Nor would improvement in their setting remedy the situation, because it is extremely difficult to devise adequate means of measuring the degree of loyalty to the nation of an individual child.

Accordingly, alternatives should be considered; one which will cost nothing extra to the government is for children to present written work for continuous assessment which is marked and graded by their teachers and moderated if necessary by the headteacher or a regional panel.

This leads to two further suggestions. First, the staff must be able to produce teachers who are highly motivated, well informed in current affairs at both the primary and secondary school levels. If this type of teacher worked closely with the students, it is hoped that an atmosphere of civic responsibility could be created throughout the schools which will not only make the students aware of their obligations to the nation and other ethnic groups in society, but prepare them for leadership roles.

But such duties must be followed by reform in teacher education. In other words, teacher education must be seen as an essential part of citizenship education. This task requires teachers who are equipped and who must accept the challenge of introducing to their students patterns of good citizenship. As of present, the initial training course is still dominated by specialists in education (psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, etc.) and other academic subjects in the primary and secondary school curricula such as Mathematics, English, French, History and Sciences. A programme of general education based on an intensive study of national cultural subject matter should also form an essential part of the teacher education course. The results obtained of the research confirm the implementation of the above suggestion in that although the multivariate tests of analysis show that the Forest and Grassland regions portray an equal positive attitude towards integration, the univariate tests using the Friendship Choice total score as the dependent variable, show that those from the Forest region have a more positive attitude in making friends with other than those from their own ethnic groups than those from the Grassland region. This sort of situation could be changed by introducing a study of national cultural subject matter that reflects the diversity of Cameroon's cultural heritage.

In Chapter Five of this study, attempts were made to show that language is an important vehicle of national integration in Cameroon. Cameroon has a language policy based on the use of foreign languages (English and French) as languages of wider communication. The rationale for this is the view that the use of these languages serve the need of nationism, thereby fostering integration. Although there has officially been no national debate about developing an indigenous language as a national language, such a policy would present a specific African vehicle for national co-ordination and unification. The empirical research carried out in Cameroon for this study confirms the viability of this suggestion. While the older age group (20-40) were more positive in using English or French as a national language, the younger age group (11-19) were more keen for an indigenous language as a national language. This could be taken as a favourable indication for a possible change in policy in the future.

Our analysis of political integration and education did not suggest that we are ready to discard all the previous framework but the standard variables must be supplemented or modified if we are to arrive at a useful model of political socialization in Cameroon. A re-evaluation of the role of education was undertaken in Chapter 3. The visible and utilitarian functions of education in providing access to high status occupations in the modern sector was a major rationale for elevating it to a role of importance within the socialization process.

The success of such a strategy clearly depends upon the availability of equal educational opportunities,and upon the extent to which economic development appears to offer people some real hope of satisfying their aspirations. The first concern of educational planners, therefore, is

to be able to expand educational facilities, abolish fees and provide qualified teachers for all schools. But merely to admit all children to school does not guarantee that all children will possess the same ability to succeed and to make use of the education they receive. Children are very different in their range of talents, motivation and experience they carry along to school and it may therefore be argued that schools need to provide a greater diversity of forms and kinds of experience to cater equally for all children. This is not the case in most African schools. Equality of opportunity is usually interpreted as meaning that all children should receive the same treatment, a common education through the same procedures, the same syllabuses and subject to the same means of assessment. However, the ideology of individualised provision to meet the unique needs and talents of different children in accordance with their aspirations appears likely to demand resources beyond the capacity of most developing nations. Thus, the outcome will inevitably be a compromise providing only limited equality of opportunity in real terms. Although political purposes may lead to provide mass education, political stability may well be undermined where the extension of education is not matched with the provision of jobs. In this respect, schools have played a disintegrative role in that increasing patterns of social stratification tend to reproduce educational inequalities. For example, even though the educational systems have expanded rapidly in recent years, the selection function of education ensures that the majority of children are eliminated from the school system at its lower level (usually after primary level).

Since Independence, politicians and educational leaders have tried to expand the educational system and facilities to satisfy the growing

demand of the people of Cameroon for more education. But because of obvious economic and manpower shortages, the expansion has not been affected evenly through the whole country. There is today a great imbalance in the number of schools provided between the coastal ethnic groups and some ethnic groups in the Northern regions. There is also a great disparity in the provision of schools between urban and rural areas. The schools in rural areas of the two provinces are not only few in number but the geographical isolation of some of these schools from one another and their relatively few ethnic composition encapsulate the children who attend them, hence preventing wider cross-cultural interaction. If allowed to continue, such a situation could lead to social tension, to a perpetuation and even an intensification of divisions among different ethnic and regional groups.

Where does all this lead us? It leads us to a development of a policy that ensures more equitable distribution of schools and facilities. To foster this aim, it may be necessary to abolish fees in the primary school and partially allocating educational spending on a regional basis, to counter regional variations in political influence and high levels of inequality in income and land ownership.

As aspirations and expectations rise with the expansion of secondary education, group frustrations and hostility are likely to increase. To check against such a possibility the relative strength of some groups should lead to the adoption of a policy of positive discrimination in favour of the disadvantaged groups for access to higher education and employment opportunities. Already the central government is attempting to equalise opportunities by preferential sponsorship of the disadvantaged groups, for example the Northerners. But, there is an

inherent weakness in the present policy as the disadvantaged groups are
by definition disadvantaged because few of them go to school and fewer
still complete either primary or secondary schooling. The government has
tried to increase educational opportunity through various means such as
lowering entry qualification to universities but the effect of this
strategy has not been very satisfactory. It seems reasonable to suggest
that the policy of preferential sponsorship should start at the secondary
school level. Children coming from so called "Regions sous-scholarisees"
(under-scholarised areas) should either be admitted to secondary schools
at the government's expense or be encouraged to apply to government
schools which are fee-free.

In addition, educational institutions above the primary level should be
ethnically integrated. This can be done in one of two ways. First, all
children who pass the common entrance examination organised by the
Ministry of National Education into secondary schools should be assigned
to schools throughout the country. This should pose no problems since
all secondary schools in the country have boarding facilities. Second,
failing this, the location of post-primary institutions should be in
areas which could, because of their centrality, attract more than two
ethnic groups, that is secondary schools should not be built in remote
and isolated areas nor should they be built in areas which would attract
only one ethno-cultural group. In other words, secondary schools should
be situated on ethnic border areas and in urban centres.

This fact is substantiated by the results obtained from this research.
The results of the step-wise nationalism scale total scores, friendship
choice total scores and language choice total scores as dependent
variables, indicate that urbanization is the best single predictor of a

respondent's attitude towards national integration, willingness to make friends outside his own ethnic group and the willingness to communicate with fellow citizens in other languages rather than his own ethnic group language respectively. Similarly, both the one-way analysis of variance of the individual scales total scores and the multivariate analysis of variance indicate that the longer one stays in an urban centre, the more positive attitude he has towards identifying with the nation and also more willing to accept people outside of his own ethnic group as fellow citizens.

Finally, most of the suggestions in this section would only work if the government is prepared to place both primary and secondary schools under government supervision so that they may control both quality and quantity. Already the government has taken over most of the primary schools formerly under mission bodies. It must be the policy of government that at some future date all schools, both primary and secondary, should become state and secular schools. Alternatively, the government could make it a condition that all mission schools should include a programme of general education in all their school programmes.

FINAL NOTE:

In this thesis, national integration has been conceptualised as consisting of two related elements, the level of national identification and the willingness to accept other ethnic groups as fellow nationals. It was assumed from the outset that these two elements were inexorably related though analytically separable. The major hypothesis that the level of academic qualification correlates positvely with national integration as measured by the dependent variables - Nationalism scale,

Friendship Choice scale, Language Choice and Language Use scale was
supported.

However, when efforts were made to discover the nature of this relation-
ship, it emerged that the model was not as simple as earlier analysis
had indicated. The data from the second and more sophisticated com-
putation indicated that age and 'location' (whether the respondent is
an urban or rural resident) variables play an equally important part in
one's attitude towards national integration. It also emerged from the
computation that according to the percentage variance of the variables
using the stepwise multiple regression analysis, that there are other
important but missing variables. The question that poses itself is
what new variables are needed? Perhaps further research building on the
present study will attempt to discover such missing variables.

But since our analysis of the educational system of Cameroon had seemed
to indicate that the central government has not used education
explicitly as an instrument for national integration, the results obtained
are encouraging but to improve this relationship, there are other
factors that need to be looked upon if education can serve effectively
as an integrative agent.

One such factor deals with the congruence between the theory of citizen-
ship and everyday practice of the society. As earlier stated, it must be
realised that one of the most effective socializers is the society
itself, and that societal values and practices have far greater effects
on political thoughts and values of the students than the civics pro-
gramme taught in schools. In Cameroon, as in most other African states,
the relationship between what is taught in school and the values of the

society are incongruent. This is highlighted by the fact that the
processes for orderly transfer of political power have not been
institutionalized (that is individual politicians are operating
without the constraints of an informed and political conscious electorate
in a context which offers personal rewards for pursuits of personal or
sectarian interest) leadership has become authoritarian, personalistic,
tribalistic and corrupt. There is no wonder then that, in some
African countries (such as Ghana and Nigeria) where politicians and
civil servants are seen to be particularistic, there has been wide-
spread loss of confidence in the capacity of democratic processes to
remedy the situation. As a result, people use military action to gain
control, hence creating political instability. From this analysis, we
can conclude that if the school is to perform its role effectively as
an integrative agent, then national leaders must create a politically
aware electorate with a genuine capacity to participate in political
processes by practising the values it aims to inculcate in the young.

This leads us to the next factor, that of educational reform, which
has been seen as manipulating the form and content of the curricula to
create attitudes consonant to that of the nation among the younger
generation. Based on this, there has been a tendency to ask the schools
to provide overt political socialization of a more rigorous and
directive kind. The question that poses itself is how should the school
be used to inculcate prescribed political values and beliefs, and to
what extent can the school hope to succeed in the task?

It is however difficult to teach political values, because there is
usually a tendency of indoctrinating the children rather than teaching
them to understand and think for themselves. In many African countries,

it is this conflict between these two demands which is central to the understanding of how the teaching of political values is carried out. Mazrui identifies the dilemma when he writes,

> "There should be transmission of political values to
>
> children at the primary level, provided the values
>
> are broad and rudimentary and basic to the task of
>
> living in society is in my opinion an education
>
> imperative..... At secondary school level, the trans-
>
> mission of values should become more sophisticated
>
> with a high degree of critical flexibility and
>
> individual choice permitted within the system.....[1]

He argues that at the primary level, children need some guidance as they evolve a capacity for making choices, and the political world can seem confusing without some explanation. Even then, he advocates for explanations in particular parameters rather than indoctrination.

In Cameroon, for example, the syllabus on political education is basically to build up support for the one party system and the current leadership. The Cameroon National Union (C.N.U.) being the only mass movement in the country, is supported by the Cameroonian people. It is not clear whether this support is backed by political education on a wide scale or people support the party out of fear of sanctions (such as not getting a desired job) if the latter reason than this support can easily fade away.

In most developing countries, indoctrination is usually carried out in all levels of the educational system, particularly where the political system is a one party state. This is so because it may be in the nature of the one party state that the political status quo is not to be

questioned. Clearly this implies a desire to form the minds and outlook of the young who are likely to assume positions of leadership in the society. From the above analysis, it can be argued that the proper role of the school should not be only of inculcating values but also to equip individuals with the skills they will need if they are to understand, adapt to, and exert influence upon the changing world in which they live. Because the nature of change is not clear-cut and factors which will bring about future change are not easily anticipated, it is difficult to view education as a process which simply reproduces the social components for the economic and political system. Therefore, if education is to equip people to adapt to current conditions, it seems clear that schools should not limit the range of things students are interested in, or keep them selectively ignorant by inculcating in them passive and conformist attitudes. Such a policy would not produce the kind of people needed to foster national unity. If education, however, seeks to raise the capability of men to adapt to change and to respond to new pressures and old constraints, it must seek to develop in the young the ability to inquire, to challenge, to question and to weigh evidence before arriving at conclusions. This suggests the need for well trained teachers in this type of philosophy.

The above show some suggestions for the effective use of education as an instrument for national integration. These are not easy solutions to implement, but rather we hope we have indicated that the problem is so many facetted that any attempt to seek easy solutions in the shape, for instance, merely of rewriting text-books to include a few national heroes will not get very far. Education for national integration must mean that the structures of education, curricula and teachers, must be consciously geared towards achieving national unity.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I : ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON

Source: IPAR-Buea.

APPENDIX II . ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON. ETHNIC MAP

APPENDIX II . ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON. ETHNIC MAP

MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS OF ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON

APPENDIX III

SOUTH-WEST PROVINCE

Division	Stratum	Combination	Groups	Number (1976 Census)
I FAKO	1	Costal Bantu	Bakweri, Bakolle, Bamboko	80.025
	2	Western Creek	Bakolle, Orou, Balundu, Badiko	31.109
II NDIAN	3	Ndian	Ibibio, Isangelle	60.303
	4	Inland Group	Bima, Ngolo, Balue, Korup	70.761
III MEME	5	Central	Bafaw, Balong, Bakundu	33.184
	6	Bakossi	Bakossi, Elung, Ninong, Bassossi, Mbo, Banyu	24.124
IV MANYU	7	Akwaya	Ekot, Mgba, Anyang, Boki, Manta	28.610
	8	Cross River	Banyang and Ejagham	60.925
	9	Bamileke Group	Bangwa and Mundani	65.214
*	10	N.E. Group	Menka, Widikum, Befang, Bibiku	20.596

NORTH-WEST PROVINCE

Division	Stratum	Combination	Groups	Number (1976 Census)
V MOMO	11	Moghamo	Menemo and Moghamo	25.00
	12	Ngie	Ngie and Ngwaw	69.719
VI MEZAM	13	Ngemba	Ngemba	51.429
	14	Bali	Bali	38.170
	15	Bafut	Bafut	60.896
	16	Ndop	Ndop	90.784
VII BUI	17	Nsaw	Nsaw	130.744
VIII MENCHUM	18	Western	Aghem, Esimbi, Biba, Befang	32.400
	19	Northern	Fungom and Bum	80.000
	20	Kom	Kom	80.387
IX DONGA and MENTUNG	21	Wimbu	Tang, War, Wiya	63.839
	22	Eastern	Mfumte, Mbem, Mbaw	56.103
	23	Mbembe	Mbembe, Misaji	49.119
	24	Others	Nigerians, Fulani	N.A.

* This group although placed under Manyu is now administratively part of Momo Division. However, the ethnic groups under this group are nearer the Akwaya group in Manyu than the Moghamo group in Momo Division.

Source: Compiled from:

1. Southern Cameroon Demographic Census: Ministry of Economic Planning and Statistics, Buea (1964).

2. Cameroon Demographic Census (1976), Ministere de l'Economie et Plan. Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilite Nationale.

3. I.P.A.R. Buea (1977), Report on the Reform of Primary Education.

4. C. Courade and G. Courade (1977), Education in Anglophone Cameroon (1915-1975), ONAREST, Yaounde.

APPENDIX   <u>QUESTIONNAIRE</u>   ADULTS Section

Please answer the following questions as required. In some cases, you
will have a choice among several possible answers. We request that you
tick (✓) the letter corresponding to your answers. There will be some
in which the alternative provided does not precisely correspond to your
opinion. In such cases, tick the response closest to your opinion. There
are no <u>right</u> or <u>wrong</u> answers. The only right answers are those which
best express your personal feelings.

1. How old are you? (a) Under 25 ..... (b) 26 to 30 .....

                (c) 31-40   ..... (d) 41-50   .....

                (e) above 51 .....

2. What is your Sex? (a) Male   ..... (b) Female   .....

3. What is your marital status?   (a) Married .....

                                   (b) Single   .....

4. If you are married, are you from the same tribe with your partner?

   (a) Yes .....   (b) No......

5. Which of the following best describes your marriage?

   (a) Polygamous ..... (b) Monogamous .....

6. If your answer in No. 5 is (a), how many children are there in the

   family?

   (a) under 3 ..... (b) 4-7 ..... (c) 8-10 ..... (d) above 11 .....

7. If your answer in No. 5 is (b), how many children have you?

   (a) Only 1 ..... (b) 2-3 ..... (c) 4-6 ..... (d) above? .....

8. What is your ethnic or tribal language? .....

9. Where were you born ....(Place) ....

   in .... (Division) ....

10.Have you ever lived in a village? (a) Yes ..... No .....

11.How long have you lived there? (a) Under 5 years .....

   (b) 6-10 years ..... (c) 15-20 years..... (d) All my life .....

12.Have you ever lived in a large town? (a) Yes..... (b) No .....

13.How long have you ever lived there (a) Under f years .....

   (b) 6-10 years ..... (c) 15-20 years..... (d) All my life .....

14. What is your occupation? ....

15. What is your religion? (a) Catholic ..... (b) Presbyterian .....

     (c) Baptist ..... (d) Muslem (Islam) ..... (e) Other .....

     (Please Specify) ....

16. What is your highest academic qualification? (a) First School Leaving

     Certificate ..... (b) Secondary School Leaving Certificate

     (G.C.E.) ..... (c) University Education (degree) ..... (d) Other

     (Please Specify) ....

17. Who is your best friend, and from what tribe is he or she?

     ....name (initials only) from ....

     (Place) in .... (Division).

18. Name two other friends and their tribal group.

     (a) .... name (initials only) from ....

     (Place) in .... (Division).

     (b) .... name (initials only) from ....

     (Place) in .... (Division).

19. What language do you use when you are with

     (a) Your children ....

     (b) Your Wife/Husband ....

     (c) Your best friend ....

     (d) Your workmates ....

     (e) People from your tribe ....

20. How many Cameroonian languages do you speak?

     (a) One only ....

     (b) Two ....

     (c) Three ....

     (d) More than four ....

21. Which of these languages would you like the Government to adopt as a national language?

    (a) Douala .....

    (b) Fola   .....

    (c) Ewondo .....

    (d) Other (Please specify) ....

    (e) No local language .....

APPENDIX IV   STUDENTS Section

Please answer the following questions as required. In some cases, you
will have a choice among several possible answers. We request that you
tick (✓) the letter corresponding to your answer. There will be some
in which the alternative provide does not precisely correspond to your
opinion. In such cases, tick the response closest to your opinion. There
are no right or wrong answers. The only right answers are those which
best express your personal feelings.

1. What is your name? ....

2. How old are you? ....

3. What is your sex? Male ..... or Female .....

4. Where were you born? .... in .... Division.

5. What is your Father's language? ....

6. When you are not in school, where do you usually stay?

                    .... in .... Division

7. What is your religion?

                    ..... Catholic

                    ..... Presbyterian

                    ..... Baptist

                    ..... Muslem

                    ..... Other (please specify)

8. What is your Father's occupation? ....

9. What is your Mother's occupation? ....

10.At what point did your father leave school?

    (a) Primary .....   (b) Secondary .....

    (c) University ..... (d) Other (specify) ....

11. At what point did your mother leave school?

    (a) Primary .....   (b) Secondary .....

    (c) University ..... (d) Other (specify) ....

12. How many wives has your father? ....

13. Are the wives from the same ethnic group as your father? ....

14. How many brothers have you? ....

15. How many sisters have you? ....

16. Have you ever lived in a big town like Victoria, Kumba, Bamenda, etc.
   ....

17. How long did you live there? ....

18. What was your position in class at the last report?....................

Out of ....

19. What is the name of your school? ....

20. Is it (a) boys' school? .....

(b) girls' school? .....

or (c) mixed school? .....

21. Do you learn anything about Cameroonian ethnic groups or tribes in

college? .....

22. In what subjects do you learn about Cameroon?

(1) .... (2) .... (3) ....

23. Who are your friends and what are their ethnic groups?

<u>NAME</u>   <u>TRIBE</u>   <u>TOWN OR COUNTRY</u>

Best friend (1) ....from .... in .... Division

(2) .... "   .... "   ....   "

(3) .... "   .... "   ....   "

24. What is your form? ....

25. What language do you use most when you are with

(a) Your best friend? ....

(b) Class mates?   ....

(c) At home with your parents? ....

(d) At home with your brothers and sisters? ....

(e) With people from your own ethnic group? ....

26. How many Cameroonian languages can you speak?

(1) .... (2) .... (3) ....

27. Which one of these languages would you like to be made a national language, i.e. language of government?

(a) Douala .....   (d) Bali .....

(b) Fula   .....   (e) Other (specify) ....

(c) Ewondo .....

PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE COLUMN	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNCERTAIN	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
28. No duties are more important than duties toward Cameroon.					
29. If one is loyal to Cameroon, its policies should never be criticised.					
30. We should be ready to die for Cameroon whether it is right or wrong.					
31. All Cameroonians are equally important.					
32. I don't know much about other countries, but I am satisfied with Cameroon.					
33. I think it is better to marry someone from one's ethnic group or tribe.					
34. There are good reasons why some tribes should be given better treatment than others.					
35. We should show greater loyalty towards our tribal or ethnic group than towards other Cameroonians.					
36. We in Cameroon should use our natural resources for developing and maintaining our strength so that we may not have to rely on other countries.					
37. People from the same tribal group should be encouraged to go to the same school.					
38. I do not feel any special pride in being identified as Cameroonian.					
39. The Government's first goal is that of promoting national unity.					
40. Because some Cameroonians are tribally inclined, we should have nothing to do with them.					
41. It is much better if one has one's tribal person in a high place.					
42. We should not allow foreigners to preach their beliefs in Cameroon because they might succeed in destroying our culture and customs					

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNCERTAIN	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
43. If I had a choice, Cameroon will be the last place I will choose to live in for life.					
44. Loyalty to Cameroon is more important than what one feels is right.					
45. One's ethnic or tribal group is more superior to all other tribal groups, in such important aspects as family life and Government.					
46. Cameroonians should never read anything about Cameroon even if it is true, for unpleasant truths about Cameroon might make us love it less.					
47. No other Cameroonian language is more important than one's tribal language.					
48. Although I have not travelled a lot, I think that Cameroonians are generally more friendly than most people in Africa.					
49. It is better not to discuss our political affairs with foreigners.					

APPENDIX V

PILOT STUDY: THE NATIONALISM SCALE

In the next set of questions, tick the column which best expresses your personal feelings and experiences.

PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE COLUMN	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNCERTAIN	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
1. Loyalty to Cameroon is more important than what one feels is right.					
2. No other Cameroonian language is more important than one's tribal language.					
3. Because some Cameroonians are tribally inclined, we should have nothing to do with them. (*)					
4. I think it is better to marry someone from one's ethnic group.					
5. We in Cameroon should use our natural resources for developing and maintaining our strength so that we may not have to rely on other countries.					
6. Since I live in this country, I want to be part of it.					
7. The unitary government of Cameroon is more representative of the people than the state government. (*)					
8. All jobs done by Cameroonians are equally important.					
9. Tribal festivals and rites should actively be discouraged in Cameroon. (*)					
10. I prefer to be a citizen of the world rather than of my country. (*)					
11. One feels more comfortable, if one has one's tribal person in a place.					
12. Although I have not travelled a lot, I think that Cameroonians are generally more friendly than most people in Africa.					

PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE COLUMN	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNCERTAIN	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
13. It is better not to discuss our political affairs with foreigners.					
14. Whatever best serves the interest of the government is generally right.					
15. If I had a choice, Cameroon will be the last place I will choose to live in for life.					
16. One's ethnic or tribal group is more superior to all other tribal groups, in such important aspects as family life and government.					
17. All Cameroonians are equally important.					
18. We should show greater loyalty towards our ethnic group than towards other Cameroonians.					
19. People from the same tribal group should be encouraged to go to the same school.					
20. Our schools should teach the history of the * whole world rather than of our own country.					
21. I do not feel any special pride in being identified as a Cameroonian.					
22. I do not know much about other countries, but I am satisfied with Cameroon.					
23. There are good reasons why some tribes should be given better treatment than others.					
24. If one is loyal to Cameroon, its policies should never be criticised.					
25. We should be ready to die for Cameroon, whether it is right or wrong.					
26. We should not allow foreigners to preach their beliefs in Cameroon because they might succeed in destroying our culture and customs.					

PLEASE TICK CNLY ONE COLUMN	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	UNCERTAIN	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
27. Cameroonians should never read anything about Cameroon even if it is true, for unpleasant truths about Cameroon might make us love it less.					

* Items not selected.

APPENDIX VI: FACILITY VALUE AND THE INDEX OF DISCRIMINATION OF EACH ITEM.

ITEMS	PROPORTION WHO GOT EACH ITEM CORRECT	UPPER GROUP	MIDDLE GROUP	LOWER GROUP	FACILITY VALUE	DISCRIMINATION VALUE (U-L)
1	15/40	9	6	0	38%	69%
2	18/40	11	6	2	45%	69%
* 3	5/40	2	1	2	12.5%	0%
4	28/40	13	12	3	70%	76%
5	22/40	10	9	3	55%	54%
* 6	23/40	9	0	2	58%	54%
* 7	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	33/40	13	13	7	83%	46%
* 9	5/40	2	2	1	12.5%	8%
*10	21/40	9	7	5	53%	31%
11	30/40	12	12	6	75%	46%
12	12/40	10	0	2	30%	62%
13	11/40	8	2	1	28%	54%
*14	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	14/40	9	5	0	35%	69%
16	30/40	13	13	4	75%	69%
17	15/40	13	1	1	37%	92%
18	11/40	9	1	1	28%	61%
19	26/40	10	3	1	65%	70%
*20	30/40	12	10	8	75%	30%
21	20/40	12	4	4	50%	62%
22	20/40	10	8	2	50%	61%
23	28/40	12	10	6	70%	46%
24	29/40	13	10	6	72%	54%
25	21/40	10	5	6	53%	30%
26	11/40	8	2	1	28%	54%
27	15/40	9	6	0	38%	67%

* Items not selected.