SCHOOLING IDENTITIES:

An ethnography of the constitution of pupil identities

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the constitution of pupil identities within the school context. My central goal is to offer an enhanced understanding of the processes through which inequities within the context of secondary education come to pivot around biographical, cultural and learner identities.

The thesis examines existing school ethnography concerned with pupil identities and maps key theoretical movements within the social sciences and humanities concerned with the subject and identity. I suggest that school ethnography has only recently begun to explore fully the interactions of multiple identity categories and the implications of these interactions. I also suggest that the utility of recent theorisations of power and the subject for understanding school-level practices remains under-developed.

My analyses of empirical data generated through an ethnography in one London Secondary School offers a response to these limitations. Drawing on the theoretical contributions of Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida and Robert Connell, my analyses show how the citational linguistic, bodily, and textual practices of pupils and teachers contribute to the performative constitution of intelligible selves and others. I suggest that while performatively constituted subjects have discursive agency, the intelligibility of performative constitutions is constrained by the historicity of discourse. I demonstrate the significance of the discursive intersections and interactions of identity categories and suggest that identities can best be understood as and in constellations. These constellations open up and close down the possibilities for identities to both become traps and be reinscribed again differently. These analyses add depth to existing understandings of the ways in which identities are constituted, the significance of constellations of identity categories, and the processes whereby educational inequities are sustained.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract 2
Acknowledgements 5
Key to transcripts and textual conventions 6
List of episodes and figures 8

1. **Schooling Identities** 9
   - Introduction
   - Pupil identities and school ethnographies
   - Another school ethnography
   - Structure of the thesis

2. **Understanding Identities** 42
   - Introduction
   - Notions of power
   - Notions of the subject
   - Conclusion

3. **Researching Schooled Identities** 88
   - Introduction
   - The school context
   - Ethnography
   - Schooling Identities: a school ethnography?
   - Conclusion

4. **Naming Identities** 123
   - Introduction
   - Representing naming practices
   - Policing race identities
   - The Same or the Other? Constitutions of marginality
   - The authenticity of race
   - Masculinities and femininities within the heterosexual matrix
   - Given names: abbreviated names; nick names; new names; taken names
   - Conclusion
5. **Practicing Identities**
   Introduction
   Representing bodily practices
   Practicing bodies
   Desiring bodies: constituting legitimate relationships
   Conclusion

6. **Identity Traps**
   Introduction
   The incommensurability of Indianness/Asianness and desirable femininity
   The price of man
   The chains of desirable femininity and hyper-masculinity
   Black sub-cultural identities: (mythical) challenge or discursive entrapment?
   Conclusion

7. **Resisting Identities**
   Introduction
   Resisting marginality, reinscribing raced masculinity
   Resisting femininity, reinscribing ‘Geeza-girl’
   Performative performances:
     Leaving Day and National Record of Achievement Day
   Resisting the Black challenge to White Hegemony, reinscribing Blackness
   Resisting subjugated homosexuality, reinscribing gay masculinity
   Conclusion

8. **Schooled Identities**
   Introduction
   Contributions
   Reflections
   Conclusion

**Bibliography**
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Key to transcripts and textual conventions

Transcripts
Data generated through my fieldwork in Taylor Comprehensive are presented here as ‘episodes’ which combine the conventions of sociological transcriptions and theatrical scripts. This approach is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The following conventions have been adopted:

Outside quoted speech
- Background or contextual information appears in italicised text.
- Biographical information about individuals appears as italicised text within (round) parentheses.

Within quoted speech
- Background or contextual information appears in [square] parentheses.
- Detail of the ways in which quoted speech is delivered, non-linguistic utterances and bodily postures, movements and gestures are indicated through italicised text within (round) parentheses.
- Emphases and raised voices are indicated by italicised text.
- A pause is indicated by ...
- That material has been edited out is indicated by […]

Sources -- audio recordings, fieldnotes and photographs
- Where episodes offer detailed representations of extended discussions these draw on audio recordings supplemented by fieldnotes (written during and/or shortly after the event).
- Where episodes offer detailed descriptions of students’ attire and/or appearance these frequently draw on photographs as well as fieldnotes.

Textual Conventions
I have sought to minimise my use of ‘single inverted commas’ in order to indicate the problematisation of a term or concept. However, it seems neither desirable nor possible to completely jettison this convention. When such problematisation seems necessary, single inverted commas are used only on the first occasion that a given term or concept appears within a section. Single inverted commas are also used to indicate the citation of published works.
Due to this dual use of single inverted commas, “double inverted commas” are used where pupils’ or teachers’ talk appears within the body of the text. Where I adopt terms and concepts drawn from pupils’ and teachers’ talk within the text, these are enclosed in “double inverted commas” only on the first occasion that they appear within a section.
# List of episodes and figures

## Episodes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Episode</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Episode 1</td>
<td>Phenotypes; nations; exotic others</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 2</td>
<td>Dir’y ‘ippies/Shazas and Bazas</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 3</td>
<td>Popadom; Black; Coolie; Indian; White</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 4</td>
<td>Heterosexual masculinities/heterosexual femininities (Part 1)</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heterosexual masculinities/heterosexual femininities (Part 2)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 5</td>
<td>Postures, gestures, movements, contacts</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 6</td>
<td>Raced heterosexual desire</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 7</td>
<td>Samosa, munchers and White princesses</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 8</td>
<td>Excessive masculinity?</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 9</td>
<td>Masculine rights, feminine obligations</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 10</td>
<td>Black bodies walking</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 11</td>
<td>Quoc Trinh’s Doll</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 12</td>
<td>Geeza-girl</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 13</td>
<td>Bitches and Bibles</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode 14</td>
<td>Bent as a ballet dancer?</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>‘V-ing out’</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Schema of raced hetero-sex</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Schooling Identities

Introduction

A concern with equity, and the constancy with which inequity appears to be marked by an array of identities, underpins this study. A key goal of the thesis is to offer an enhanced understanding of the processes through which inequity, subjugation, marginalisation and disavowal come to pivot around identity categories. Or, indeed, how identity categories function to enable and sustain inequity.

Focusing on one secondary school context, the thesis considers a (potentially inexhaustible) array of identities. These can be characterised as biographical, cultural and learner identities. In making this assertion I have begun a classificatory process which inevitably pervades this thesis. This process is extended further by making explicit some of the identity categories which are inferred by the above umbrella terms and which I scrutinise within this text: sex, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, culture, social class, ability, intelligence. These too can be sub-divided -- for instance the biographical and/or sub-cultural category ‘sexuality’ can be (is incessantly) broken down into (now telling) classifications such as heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, queer, etcetera. Exploring and understanding the intersection and interaction of such identity categories, and their implications for pupils¹ (another identity category) inside schools, is a key feature of the study.

This study is concerned to establish bridges between three fields of study: the Sociology of Education, in particular school ethnography; theorisations of identity and/or the subject; and Foucauldian understandings of discourse and disciplinary power. Each
aspect of this triad has been paired with another. Foucault has informed both school ethnographies and theorisations of identity and/or the subject. School ethnography has been concerned frequently (and always implicitly?) with identities and theorisations of these. Yet it seems that within the Sociology of Education the usefulness and implications of these combinations has only begun to be explored and the triad has not been integrated and interrogated.

The articulation I aim to establish between these fields of study is multi-directional. I want to extend the critical insight gained through school ethnography by employing particular theoretical underpinnings and analytical frameworks (outlined in Chapter 2). At the same time, I want to interrogate the capacity of these theorisations (which tend to be developed with reference to historical, philosophical, psychoanalytical, and literary sources) to make sense of that empirical data generated through school ethnography. As such, my study takes the identities, the subjecthood, of young people in the context of the school as its substantive area, framed by broader concerns with the theorisation of identities and the methodologies underpinning school ethnography.

The term ‘identity’, or in its constructionist/post-structural/post-modern guises ‘identities’, has been used in a variety of ways. Indeed, the meanings of the term are multiple and shift across time, disciplines and epistemological frameworks (see Connell (no date) for a useful discussion). Throughout this thesis the terms ‘identity’ and ‘identities’ are used in particular ways. Identities categories are understood as namings which differentiate in order to designate membership of particular groups and particular types of ‘subjects’. In this sense, identity categories pertain to individuals but do so through reference to sameness with, and difference from, others. Identity and the subject are not taken to be interchangeable terms here. Rather, the subject is understood as the
appearance of a coherent and enduring self -- a self which is made possible/intelligible through identity categorisations. In examining the identities of the fifteen and sixteen year old subjects whose words and practices are represented and analysed within this thesis I am engaged with subjects in process. My concern is neither where and/or how these subject began nor where and/or how they will conclude. My questions are unconcerned, if not incompatible, with such beginnings and endings. I am interested in understanding and illuminating the ongoing processes through which identities circulate and the subject comes to appear coherent and abiding. These theoretical issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

**Pupil identities and school ethnographies**

Many ethnographic accounts have come out of anthropological and sociological scholarship. These encompass a wide range of social and cultural institutions and forms and have been pursued in diverse settings and locales. A significant body of these are school ethnographies which include concerns with pupil identities. Yet school ethnographies that take pupil identities as their central focus are relatively scarce and studies which set out to examine multiple identities have only recently begun to be seen.

My focus in this chapter is on a relatively small selection of studies that have immediate relevance to my substantive and theoretical concerns. I examine a selection of school ethnographies produced in the UK over the last three decades that address issues of pupil identities, focusing in particular on those which engage with multiple identity categories. In doing this I aim to ensure that my study is integrated with existing work and develops those insights offered by it (Delamont & Atkinson 1995). It would prove fruitful to look beyond ethnography in the UK, school ethnographies and ethnography concerned with identities (Delamont & Atkinson 1995). Yet charting even a 'representative' sample of
this large body of work would be an enormous task and is beyond both the scope and needs of this chapter.

In approaching this literature I have three key questions: what do these studies tell us about pupil identities?; what are these studies unable to tell us about pupil identities?; and how can these studies inform my own work?. My examination of this literature combines a thematic analysis, in terms of pupil identities and debates concerning education policy and practice, with a chronological analysis of the ‘development’ of school ethnography in the UK. These are not discreet organising principles; the identities which are of concern at a given moment reflect the broader debates concerning education policy and practices as well as dominant theoretical perspectives and analytical frameworks of the period.

In examining these studies I highlight methodological and substantive continuities over time and across studies as well as shifting concerns and theoretical underpinnings. I suggest that these school ethnographies have made significant and enduring contributions to understandings of education sociology, policy and practice. However, I also argue that two key limitations can be identified within these school ethnographies. First, detailing and making sense of the plurality and interaction between identities continues to present a challenge to ethnography. Second, a sovereign subject often continues to lurk beneath the surface of ethnographic accounts.

There is no clear, defining moment of ‘school ethnography’ in UK. Indeed, the shift in the genre has been such that those texts produced as the result of school ethnographies in the early 1970’s are not always easily recognisable as ‘ethnographies’ today.
Nevertheless, the studies by Hargreaves (1967) and Lacey (1970) retain both conceptual utility and canonical status and, therefore, provide one possible starting point.

(White) working class (boys)

The work of Hargreaves (1967), Lacey (1970) and, with a different theoretical underpinning, Willis (1977) is centrally concerned with the relatively low educational outcomes of working class boys.

The studies by Hargreaves (1967) and Lacey (1970) form part of a broader study and, as such, share a common concern with the ways in which school values and norms impact on pupil cultures and, ultimately, educational outcomes. Taking a symbolic interactionist approach, both see these norms and values as embedded in the school’s organisational practices of streaming and reflected in the minutiae of teachers’ perceptions of and interactions with pupils. Both of these studies examine pupils as members of groups or cliques within the school. Drawing on both quantitative as well as qualitative data and utilising sociometric mapping of pupil friendships, they suggest that school practices of differentiation contribute to the polarisation of the pupil population and the formation of pupil sub-cultures, with their own norms and values, which are characterised as ‘pro-school’ and ‘anti-school’.

Lacey (1970) defines differentiation as:

‘the separation and ranking of students according to a multiple set of criteria which makes up the normative, academically orientated, value system of the grammar school. Differentiation is defined here as being largely carried out by teachers in the course of the their normal duties’ (Lacey 1970:57).
He goes on to say that polarisation:

‘takes place within the student body, partly as a result of differentiation, but influenced by external factors and with an autonomy of its own. It is a process of sub-cultural formation in which the school-dominated, normative culture is opposed by an alternative culture’ (Lacey 1970:57).

Utilising a similar understanding of differentiation and polarisation, Hargreaves (1967) discusses the ways in which the formal and overt consequences of differentiation -- streaming -- impact in more subtle and less visible ways. He suggests that streaming positions influence teachers’ perceptions of and interactions with pupils which in turn contribute to processes of polarisation:

‘These inferences which the teacher draws in such a highly selective way from students’ behaviour, and the ‘categorisation process’ to which it leads, act as a definition of the situation in which teachers and students find themselves . . . . Because the inferences are selected from limited aspects of the child’s behaviour and are interpreted in terms of the teacher’s role expectations, there is a constant danger of misinterpretation’ (Hargreaves 1967:105).

Hargreaves’ suggestion that behaviours might be ‘misinterpreted’ implies a ‘true’ interpretation which does not sit comfortably with post-structural notions of the subject. Yet his discussion of teacher’s selective inferences and categorisations offers a useful point of contact for reworking through Foucauldian notions of discourse and technologies of disciplinary power (Foucault 1991).

Concepts such as ‘delinquency’ and the bifurcation of pro- and anti-school sub-cultures now seem both dated and over simplified. Yet the insights offered by differentiation and polarisation into the roles of the school organisation, teachers and pupils in the
formation of pupil sub-cultures (or *identities*) remain pertinent. Furthermore, reconfiguring these processes as being produced through a network of discursive practices may allow a more detailed understanding of the complex operations of power in the school.

The concern with the relatively low educational outcomes of working class pupils persisted after the move to comprehensive education. Over a decade later, Ball (1981) took up the notions of differentiation and polarisation in a co-educational setting during a period in which mixed-ability teaching was replacing banding, a move indicated by the work of Hargreaves and Lacey. Like Hargreaves and Lacey, Ball focuses on pupils as *groups* and utilises sociometric mapping to examine these. Again, his concern is with the roles of organisational and teacher practices in the processes of differentiation and polarisation. Ball suggests that pupils adopt a range of ‘lines of adaptation’ (Ball 1981:53) which cannot be fully understood in terms of pro- and anti-school sub-cultures. He takes up a refined understanding of pro- and anti-school positions offered by Lambert (1976) which suggests that pro-school groups might be either ‘supportive’ or ‘manipulative’ of school values and norms and anti-school groups might be either ‘passive’ or ‘rejecting’ of these norms and values (Ball 1981:121). Furthermore, he suggests that these adaptations and positions are ‘flexible’ (Ball 1981:121 my emphasis). While Ball argues that the mixed ability organisational context inhibits the ‘emergence of a coherent anti-school culture’, he asserts that variant pockets remain (Ball, 1981:254). A key factor in this is the persistence of differentiation through teachers’ perceptions of and interactions with pupils which are ‘filtered’ through teachers’ preconceived notions of pupils’ behaviour and ability (Ball 1981:39).
Understanding the gendered nature of pupils' lines of adaptation is not a central concern of Ball’s study. Ball’s observation of the increased currency of out-of-school youth cultures and fashions inside the *co-educational* school, however, offers an indication of the school’s role in the production of normative (hetero)sexualities. This is an area that is currently receiving particular attention within the Sociology of Education and will be discussed fully below.

Willis (1977) is also concerned with the educational outcomes and employment trajectories of working class boys. The chronology of these ethnographies is broken here to allow the extent to which Ball’s study developed the work of Hargreaves and Lacey to be reflected and the distinct nature of Willis’ theoretical perspective and conceptual framework to be made clear.

Unlike Hargreaves, Lacey and Ball, Willis’ analysis is informed by an explicit neo-marxist theoretical framework which bounds the inferences and analyses made. While the study is also concerned with pupils as members of a *group*, the study differs in that it focuses almost exclusively on a single group of pupils -- White, working class boys known as ‘the lads’. The study makes no use of quantitative data or sociometric mapping and the material is presented (uniquely but inconsistently?) in two sections; ‘data’ and ‘analysis’.

While Willis is centrally concerned with differentiation and the processes of sub-cultural formation, his understanding of differentiation differs markedly from that of the studies already discussed. He suggests that differentiation is: ‘the process whereby the typical exchanges expected in the formal institutional paradigm are reinterpreted, separated and discriminated with respect to working class interests, feelings and meanings’ (Willis
As such it is ‘the intrusion of the informal into the formal’ (Willis 1977:63). Working with this definition, it seems that Willis leaps over the organisational and teacher practices that concerned Hargreaves and Lacey. However, it enables Willis to focus in on the meanings and practices of the pupils themselves. For Willis, it is the agency of the pupils, in particular their resistance to the norms and values of the school, which is of interest. Yet within his neo-marxist framework, this group of pupils is seen to gain only limited insights into the operations of the organisation they resist -- what Willis refers to as ‘partial penetration’ (Willis 1977:119). Willis maintains that ‘there are deep disjunctions and desperate tensions within social and cultural reproduction’ (Willis: 1977:175) which create possibilities for alternative outcomes. Yet ultimately, Willis argues, the structural inequalities of capitalist production are reproduced through the pupils’ specific practices of cultural reproduction, that is, through their practices of identity.

A further area of interest in relation to Willis’ study is his discussion of the White working class boys’ perspectives of and interactions with (White?) girls and Caribbean and Asian boys. While Willis’ analysis displays implicit racisms and sexisms, these groups are at least present within his text. Furthermore, this implicit racism and sexism should be understood as (at least in part) the product of the period during which he wrote and the theoretical perspective which drove his analysis. By interrogating the raced and gendered discourses within Willis’ work, we begin to see the percolation of such discursive practices over the course of two decades. For instance, Willis’ juxtapositioning of the working class employment trajectories of ‘the lads’ with the potential future ‘wagelessness’ (Willis 1971:154) of Caribbean young men, illustrates the ways in which discourse of the present (in this case Willis’ ‘present’) are implicated
in producing those ‘futures’ that we claim to be simply speculating on or concerned for (Hart 1998).

The studies discussed so far legitimised scholarly concerns with the cultures of pupils themselves and established the concepts of differentiation and polarisation within the Sociology of Education. These concepts, however, have been called into question.

Hammersley and Turner (1984) challenge the dichotomies of pro- and anti-school and conformity and deviancy intrinsic to the notions of differentiation and polarisation. They suggest that research has tended to focus on anti-school pupils and assert that pro-school pupils are not a homogeneous group which uniformly conforms to all school values and norms. More importantly, perhaps, they challenge the coherence and consistency of the school values and norms posited by the theory of differentiation and polarisation and assert that pupils engagements with these will be multiple:

‘The assumption that ‘official’ values/goals are the primary feature of the school environment for pupils. This assumption seems rather implausible. Pupils have various latent identities and cultures which they bring with them to school...Furthermore, these different latent cultures may be interrelated in various ways producing multiple sub-cultures. ...We can even playfully speculate that conformity to ‘official’ goals might sometimes be the product of failure to succeed in other sub-cultures.’ (Hammersley and Turner 1984:165 emphasis in original as sub-title).

This assertion is useful in drawing notions of differentiation, polarisation, and sub-cultural formation into a post-structural theoretical and analytical framework. Hammersley and Turner’s position does not sit comfortably alongside such a framework, for instance, their assertion of ‘latent cultures’ implies an ‘authenticity’ or ‘essence’ of identities which has been widely challenged by post-structuralism. Yet their
indication of the multiplicity of pupil cultures and suggestion that school may be secondary or even incidental to pupils works to disrupt the linearity of those models offered by both Hargreaves and Lacey. Furthermore, their suggestion that schools might accommodate and, therefore, divert pupils' adaptations articulates with post-structural understandings of shifting and provisional meanings and Foucauldian notions of discursive resistance and recuperation.

(White) girls
Lambert's (1976) study of social relations in a girls' grammar school formed part of the broader study of which Hargreaves (1967) and Lacey's (1970) work (discussed above) is best known. Lambert's study was not published as a single volume and, as a result, has enjoyed far less comment than the work of her male peers. Delamont also undertook an ethnography in a girls school during the same period, this time an elite public school. Again this was not published in a single volume. It may be conjectured that this reflects the gender of the researchers and the pupils under study. Discussing the insights into women's roles in cultural reproduction offered by this study, Delamont (1989) refines Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital by differentiating, once again, between sub-cultures or groups of pupils and the uses they make of acquired knowledge.

The 1980's saw a number of studies concerned with the education of girls. These studies were, for the most part, generated by 'liberal', 'socialist' and 'radical' feminist scholars, whose work encompassed various theorisations of patriarchy. This body of work reflects those understandings of gender inequalities within education and society, and the reproduction of gender roles (or identities) which were seen to underpin these, that were dominant during the period. In this chapter I want to focus on more recent ethnographies concerned with gender and for this reason these studies will not be discussed in detail.
here. See for example, however, Davies (1984); Griffin (1985); Mahony (1985); Weiner (1985); Lees (1986); Askew and Ross (1988); Holly (1989); and Stanley (1989). Worth noting from this body of work are two key points concerning the role of the school and the responses of girls to schooling. First, it has been suggested that schools not only reinforce dominant societal sex roles but also ‘enforc[e] a set of sex and gender roles which are more rigid than those current in the wider society.’ (Delamont 1990:5).

Second, girls’ responses to school cannot be understood in terms of pro- or anti-school sub-cultural formation. Rather, girls’ gender development in the context of the school is seen as an ‘active response to social contradictions’ through ‘a simultaneous process of accommodation and resistance’ (Anyon 1983: 19).

It is useful to consider Wolpe’s (1988) study in some detail. This study is significant in that it moves away from the various feminist theoretical positions and begins to engage with the Foucauldian notion of power/knowledge. While Wolpe remains concerned with the processes by which gendered identities are constructed, she sees patriarchal analysis as ‘failing to differentiate between the various forms of power’ (Wolpe 1988:14). She aims to ‘re-insert multi-dimensional factors into feminist accounts of girls education’ (Wolpe 1988:7), engaging with the intersection of gender with race and social class, and integrating micro- and macro- level analyses. Wolpe’s study examines discipline, sexuality and the official and hidden curriculum which she sees as pervading all aspects of schooling. Wolpe’s engagement with the Foucauldian notion of power/knowledge throughout her analysis, and her utilisation of Foucault’s understanding of technologies of disciplinary power, represented a new approach to school ethnography. Yet in speaking of schools’ disciplinary practices and procedures as ‘a form of rigid social control’ (Wolpe 1988:15) it seems that she fails adequately to integrate a Foucauldian understanding of the distinction between sovereign and disciplinary power. With the
benefit of the substantial body of Foucauldian work now available, it seems that Wolpe
did not fully grasp the distinctiveness of Foucault’s understanding of power and,
therefore, did not fully realise the opportunity offered by engaging his work.

**Black girls**

Relatively few school ethnographies have focused on the identities of African-
Caribbean girls. Writing in 1984, Fuller suggested that African-Caribbean girls had not
been addressed in studies of schooling. Rather, she argued, they had been absorbed in
studies focusing on their male peers and, as such, the differences between African-
Caribbean boys and girls had gone unnoted and unexplained.

Fuller’s school ethnography is underpinned by an understanding of the ‘double
subordination’, along lines of gender and ethnicity, of African-Caribbean girls. Fuller
suggests that such a model might lead to the hypothesis that African-Caribbean girls
would fare worse in schools that their male peers. The relatively high academic
attainment of African-Caribbean girls does not lead Fuller to reject this model. Rather,
she is concerned to understand African-Caribbean girls’ educational success within this
framework. In doing this, Fuller does not assume that one identity category will have a
greater impact on schooling than another, rather she asserts that ‘given an additive
model of subordination ... there are no *a priori* reasons for assuming a greater
importance for either sex or race’ (Fuller 1984:77). In examining these girls adaptations
to schooling, Fuller argues that they are simultaneously (and consciously) pro-education
and anti-school, a position that she sees as being ‘intimately connected with their
positive identity as black and female’ (Fuller 1984:84). Reflecting on previous studies of
pupils’ adaptations to schooling, and theorisations of differentiation and polarisation in
particular, Fuller echoes Hammersley and Turner (1984) asserting that the position of
African-Caribbean girls within school ‘calls into question the necessary equation of academic striving and success with conformity’ (Fuller 1984:85).

Subsequent school ethnographies have engaged in varying degrees with African-Caribbean girls’ experiences of schooling. Mac an Ghaill’s (1988) study, also examined below, explores African-Caribbean and Asian girls’ and boys’ school adaptations and offers an understanding of their gendered differences. Mac an Ghaill is concerned to move away from culturalist approaches which frequently (implicitly or explicitly) locate the routes of inequity in Black communities. He endeavours to combine an analysis of economic structure and social/cultural factors and also address institutional racism. Mac an Ghaill offers a specific understanding of institutional racism:

‘racism operates both through the existing institutional framework that discriminates against all working class youth and through ‘race’-specific mechanisms, such as the system of racist stereotyping, which are also gender-specific. There may be no conscious attempt to treat black youth in a different way to white youth, but the unintended teacher effects result in differential responses, which work against black youth’ (Mac an Ghaill 1998:34).

In the context of this theoretical framework, Mac an Ghaill suggests that, like the girls in Anyon’s (1983) study, the ‘strategies of institutional survival’ (Mac an Ghaill 1988:11) of African-Caribbean and Asian girls can be understood as ‘resistance within accommodation’ (Mac an Ghaill 1988:9). Like Fuller (1984) Mac an Ghaill understands these girls as being ‘anti-school but pro-education’ (Mac an Ghaill 1988: 11). While Mac an Ghaill retains an additive notion of ‘triple subordination’ along axis of race, class and gender, he suggest that the educational attainment of these girls demonstrates that this is ‘only partially successful’ (Mac an Ghaill 1988:19). He suggests that ‘[t]heir insightful distinction between education and schooling enables them to acquire high-
status qualifications, while, at the same time, perceptively offering an explicit critique of present day schooling' (Mac an Ghaill 1998:153).

Mirza’s (1992) school ethnography, focusing exclusively on African-Caribbean girls, draws some insight from Mac an Ghaill’s (1988) study and also attempts to combine a structural and cultural analysis of race and gender. Like Mac an Ghaill, Mirza argues that a cultural analysis alone draws us back into concerns with the African-Caribbean family and is, therefore, implicated in the perpetuation of prevailing (pathologising) myths of Blackness. Mirza also criticises ‘additive’ models of subordination, such as those utilised by Fuller and Mac an Ghaill, arguing that these frequently conflate ideological and economic factors and tend to assume that identity categories are independent and constant.

Like Fuller, Mirza asserts that the educational attainment of African-Caribbean girls has been overlooked as these girls have been subsumed by research concerned with African-Caribbean boys. This collapsing of African-Caribbean boys and girls has, argues Mirza, resulted in the prevailing notion of African-Caribbean girls’ resistance. In contradiction to this (and failing to connect with Anyon’s (1983) or Mac an Ghaill’s (1988) assertion of accommodation within resistance), Mirza indicates African-Caribbean girls’ ‘positive educational orientation in the context of persistent labour-market inequalities’ (Mirza 1992:2) which, she argues, notions of anti-school sub-cultures are ill-equipped to make sense of.

**Black boys**

The work of Gillborn (1990) and Mac an Ghaill (1988) are key examples of ethnography concerned with the inequality of educational experiences and outcomes of (some) Black
pupils. Specifically, these studies share a concern with *institutional racism* (defined above). Both studies are concerned with African-Caribbean and Asian boys, and to varying degrees, girls. In this section I will focus on their discussions of boys.

Mac an Ghaill (1988) focuses his discussion of African-Caribbean boys on a group of pupils referred to as the ‘rasta heads’ (he also identifies the ‘soul heads’ and the ‘funk heads’). Stressing the wider community and social contexts in which these boys are located, Mac an Ghaill suggests that this group constitutes an ‘anti-school male students’ sub-culture[s]’ (Mac an Ghaill 1988:9) which rejects ‘Englishness’ and foregrounds African-Caribbean identities. Mac an Ghaill argues that these boys are engaged in processes of ‘consciously creating [their] own culture’ (Mac an Ghaill 1988:110) which offers ‘collective protection and survival’ (Mac an Ghaill 1988:102) and resists ‘institutional incorporation’ (Mac an Ghaill 1988:110) in the context of institutional racism. More recently, Sewell (1998) has offered a typology of *groups* of African-Caribbean boys in schools – conformists, innovators, retreatists and rebels – derived from the structural-functionalist work of Robert Merton (1957).

Gillborn (1990) discusses African-Caribbean boys’ adaptations in the context of teachers’ formal and informal constructions of an “‘ideal client’” (Gillborn 1990:26 after Becker 1970) which incorporate classed, gendered and raced notions of what constitutes ‘appropriate pupil behaviour’ (Gillborn 1990: 25). Through an examination of teachers interpretations of and responses to the culturally specific dress, speech and gait of African-Caribbean boys, Gillborn suggests that teachers sustain a ‘*myth of an Afro-Caribbean challenge to authority*’ (Gillborn 1990:19 emphasis in original as title). He argues that this is reinforced by teachers’ particular responses to African-Caribbean boys’ engagement in behaviours which are general to pupils across ethnic groups. As such, Gillborn asserts that:
'in the day-to-day life of the school almost any display of Afro-Caribbean ethnicity was deemed inappropriate and was controlled, either officially (in the case of non-uniform dress) or informally (in the case of speech or the style of walking noted above)' (Gillborn 1990:29).

Gillborn argues that African-Caribbean pupils adopt a range of complex adaptations to such an experience of schooling. He suggests that these have variable and shifting meanings and functions and include a multitude of resistances and accommodations. As such, he refrains from offering a typology of pupils and his treatment of their adaptations moves further from the differentiation-polarisation model. Gillborn argues that 'it is not an either/or question of “resist” or “accommodate”. ... The essential point is that pupil adaptations are complex and negotiated.' (Gillborn 1990: 71). In addition, he suggest that the nature and ‘success’ of these adaptations is not determined by either ethnicity or gender but that ethnicity and gender are both salient in shaping these.

It is useful to turn here to Gillborn’s (1990) examination of existing attempts to refine the pro/anti school model. He suggests that this be replaced with a notion of a continuum that ‘allows for the variety and complexity of pupil adaptations’ (Gillborn 1990:99). He argues that:

‘each attempt remains at the level of an ideal type and seems artificially static in its conceptualisation of a pupil’s potential to move in any direction (as regards harmony or conflict with the official value system) on any issue and in any action throughout the school day’ (Gillborn 1990:97).

This understanding of researchers’ constructions of pro- and anti-school pupils might be taken to suggest that researchers’ constructions embody the very school and teacher
practices which are seen to be so detrimental to the schooling of pupils deemed to be ‘anti-school’.

Turning to Asian boys inside school, Mac an Ghaill suggests that Asian boys experience relative invisibility (to teachers) inside school in comparison to African-Caribbean boys. He stresses the importance of social class in shaping Asian boys adaptations and highlight the rejection of stereotypes of passivity in the part of a group of working class Asian boys. Nevertheless, he suggests that teachers interpret this resistance as individualized, thereby retaining the overarching notions of Asianness being resisted. Gillborn’s (1990) study confirms Mac an Ghaill’s assertion of the nature and impact of teacher’s stereotypes. Gillborn’s focus on the racial harassment and violence experienced by Asian pupils, however, makes clear that the ‘invisibility’ of Asian pupils asserted by Mac an Ghaill does not extend to White pupils.

Interlude

Early school ethnography’s concern with the processes and practices of schooling and their implications for pupils’ educational experience and outcomes has persisted in varying forms throughout the studies discussed so far. I have shown significant shifts in the particular groups of pupils of interest to school ethnographers, with the initial focus on social class (predominantly white, working class boys) being superseded by an emphasis on gender (girls) and race (African-Caribbean pupils). I have also highlighted a number of studies which aim to work across the categories of class, gender, and race. Yet while these studies have aimed to access the detail and complexity of these identity categories, they have not attempted to problematise these categorisations.
Furthermore, not only have the processes of categorisation remained unchallenged, they have been utilised and, therefore, unavoidably embellished.

The school ethnographies which I turn to below represent something of a shift in focus and approach. Moving from an overarching concern with differential and/or inequitable experience and outcome across categories of pupils (be it ‘social class’, ‘gender’ or ‘race’), these studies take the categories themselves as their central focus. This emphasis on the identities of pupils is informed/driven/enabled by the now familiar ‘post-modern turn’ in which the individual is understood to be an inherently problematic discursive construct and the identities which mark ‘it’ (him/her) are taken to be multiple, fluid and contested.

*From girls to femininities*

The work of Valerie Walkerdine, including a number of qualitative and ethnographic studies, has drawn heavily on post-structural and Foucauldian understandings of power, discourse and subjectivity and developed a sophisticated insight into the gendered operations of schooling. Walkerdine (1990a) offers a Foucauldian genealogy of schooling (see also Hunter 1996) and discusses disciplinary practices and procedures in schools in terms of disciplinary power. Unlike Wolpe’s assertion of school discipline as control, Walkerdine’s suggestion that the role of the school and the teacher is one of ‘covert watching’ (Walkerdine 1990a:22) goes further in utilising Foucault’s notion of surveillance in understanding school practices.

Understanding identities is at the core of Walkerdine’s work. She suggests that central to the contemporary school is the ‘production of self-regulating, rational individuals’
Drawing, like Wolpe, on Foucault's technologies of disciplinary power, she suggest that the normalisation of the (illusory) rational individual who is the subject of schooling 'hinges on the detection of the pathology [of the irrational Other]' (Walkerdine 1990b:29). In assessing the implications of this rational subject for women in schools, Walkerdine suggests that girls and women teachers are positioned through a constellation of discourses, including discourses of femininity, passivity and irrationality. At the same time, however, such an understanding of power offers possibilities for movement, rupture and resistance:

'both female teachers and girls are not unitary subjects uniquely positioned, but are produced as a nexus of subjectivities, in relations of power which are constantly shifting, rendering them at one moment powerful and at another powerless' (Walkerdine 1990c:3).

Hey's (1997) study of the friendships, and conflicts, between girls in school challenges understandings of girls' relationships based on notions of naturalness or phased development. Hey suggests that 'girls' same-sex relationships have been variously overlooked, overromanticised, overpoliticised and oversimplified' (Hey 1997:6). Drawing on Foucault's notion of power/knowledge, Hey offers an alternative understanding. Placing social and cultural power and the marginality of girls friendships at the centre of her analysis she asserts that girls' relationships with each other are 'invested in the production of certain forms of power and subjectivity' (Hey 1997:23). This theoretical framework enables Hey to draw out the intricacies of the differences between girls and the intersections of the dominant discursive frames through which their relationships are mediated. While she successfully encompasses the classed dimensions of these friendships, her study is predominantly, but not exclusively, concerned with White girls. In addition, Hey asserts the absent-presence of boys in girls’
friendships, yet, as a study of girls’ friendships, boys only appear as part of girls’ (heterosexual) constructions.

In analysing the differential power positions of girls in school, Hey utilises the notion of positionality which she defines as:

‘not only a concept of place and power, it is also a conceptualisation of a discursive economy in which different groups of subjects can and do try to position and out-position each other through their access to differential resources of social, economic and cultural power’ (Hey 1997:28).

This is a useful conceptual framework for understanding identities which penetrates constructions of girls as passive and their friendships as inherently cohesive. At the same time, however, it is illustrative of the residual ambiguity concerning notions of ‘agency’, ‘rationality’ and ‘self’ which is evident in much empirical work underpinned by post-structural challenges to the Cartesian subject.

From boys to masculinities

Haywood and Mac an Ghaill (1996) draw upon Connell’s (1995) notion of hegemonic masculinity in their analysis of masculinities in school. Understanding masculinities as differentially related to power through the multiple social relations with which they are imbued, Haywood and Mac an Ghaill suggest that ‘schools exist as sites where styles of masculinities are produced and used’ (Haywood & Mac an Ghaill 1996:52). Echoing Connell, hegemonic masculinity is not seen as the singular mode of masculinity. Rather, its production and reproduction through practices of Othering means that ‘[a]s schools create the conditions for a hegemonic masculinity, differing meanings of masculinity will compete for ascendancy’ (Haywood & Mac an Ghaill 1996:55). Understanding
masculinities in this way avoids a (social/cultural) determinism: ‘schools do not produce masculinities in a direct, overly deterministic way ... the construction of students’ identities is a process of negotiation, rejection, acceptance and ambivalence’ (Haywood & Mac an Ghaill 1996:59).

Nayak and Kehily (1996) take a similar approach in their examination of the mobilisation of homophobias in pupils’ constitution of hegemonic masculinities. While recognising the abuse of gay and lesbian pupils in schools, Nayak and Kehily’s concern with pupils’ expressions of homophobia centres on their function in the assertion of hegemonic (heterosexual) masculinities and the identification of Self in opposition to the homosexual Other.

*To sexualities*

Mac an Ghaill (1994) examines practices of female heterosexualities and male heterosexual and homo-sexualities in school. This study will be discussed in the next section. Here I turn to Epstein and Johnson’s (1998) study which focuses on sexualities in school.

Epstein and Johnson suggest that there is an apparent contradiction inherent to discussions of schooling and sexuality. They argue this is due to the dominant positioning of the child and, therefore, the pupil as sexually innocent which renders sexuality beyond the realm of the school. Yet they reject this construction of the child arguing that, within the school, sexuality is ‘both everywhere and nowhere ... at once forbidden and a major currency and resource’ (Epstein & Johnson 1998:108). In this context, they see schools as:
'sites where sexual and other identities are developed, practiced and actively produced. ... Sexual and other social identities, as possible ways of living, are produced in relation to the cultural repertoires and institutional conditions of schooling' (Epstein & Johnson 1998:2).

Understanding the school, the teacher and the child as formally desexualised, Epstein and Johnson map a range of teacher and pupil sexual, desexual and/or asexual identities. In doing this they stress the relational nature of identities, their inherent contradictions and implicit reliance on the Other and practices of individual and collective Othering. They also examine sexualities in terms of power and resistance arguing that both teachers and pupils deploy sexualities within their practices of schooling: ‘within the repertoires of resistance open to students, playing up sexuality forms a significant part’ (Epstein & Johnson 1998:118). In addition they explore the ways in which pupils adopt strategies of asexuality.

While Epstein and Johnson discuss particular modes of heterosexuality, their focus is on lesbian and gay identities. This is based in their assertion that gay and lesbian pupils and teachers are ‘under particular pressure’ (Epstein & Johnson, 1998:7) and that understanding these identities will ‘help us to understand sexualities more generally’ (Epstein & Johnson, 1998:7). Very few studies exist that address gay and lesbian identities in schools, and this study begins to fill a major gap in the research literature. Epstein and Johnson do not make clear, however, how a focus on homosexualities informs our understanding of sexualities in schools more generally and do not to fully develop this assertion through their analysis.

It is useful to consider in some detail the theoretical framework employed by Epstein and Johnson as it intersects strongly with the theoretical framework which I utilise
within this study (see Chapter 2). They cite Rich's notion of compulsory heterosexuality and, in particular, Butler's notion of performativity as guiding their understanding and analysis. Epstein and Johnson describe performativity as the:

'idea that gender is performed and that it is inescapably linked to what [Butler] has called the 'heterosexual matrix', that is, the idea that gender is culturally understood through the notion of heterosexual attraction to those of the opposite gender/sex' (Epstein & Johnson 1998:4).

This understanding appears to conflate performance with performative. The performative is not interchangeable with performance. As Lynda Hart has argued, '[t]he linguistic “performative” becomes conflated with performance, which is then sometimes used interchangeably with “theater”' (Hart 1998:64). Butler herself uses the terms performance and performativity interchangeably. Yet, in the context of her broader exposition of performativity, Butler's use of the term performance should not be taken to infer a self-conscious playing out of a chosen role or identity.

This leads to a further problematic area in Epstein and Johnson's utilisation of Butler. Epstein and Johnson discuss the 'active processes' of identity production in which 'identity solidifies through action in the world in collaboration or tension with others and established social rituals' (Epstein & Johnson 1998:116). They go on to suggest, although not citing Butler, that gender and sexual identities are neither fully chosen nor constrained:

'In making themselves in conditions not of their choosing, students become invested in certain ways of being in relation to the dominant discourses which are always already in place. For most students, social recognition, a key element in identity formation, is generally obtainable only within terms of dominant discourses. ... The processes of 'Learning Sexualities' take place through the
telling, to self and others, of ‘sexual stories’ about oneself” (Epstein and Johnson, 1998:170).

This emphasis on discursive constraints and, perhaps echoing Althusser (1971) and/or Austin (1962), social ritual seems to reflect Butler’s understanding of the historicity and citationality of the performative. Yet Epstein and Johnson’s suggestion that pupils ‘make themselves’ through ‘action in the world’, ‘active processes’ and the ‘telling of stories’ appears vulnerable to slipping back into an inference of a sovereign subject, albeit one whose agency is discursively constrained. As I show in Chapter 2, performatively constituted identities are not simply the enunciations/practices of volitional subjects. In Excitable Speech (1997) Butler develops in detail a notion of discursive agency which allows for the intent of a discursively constituted subject. This notion is not explicitly utilised by Epstein and Johnson. The relatively recent publication of Excitable Speech at the time of Epstein and Johnson’s writing may have made it difficult to incorporate this development in their theorisation and analysis. Indeed, the ‘threat’ of a sovereign subject in Epstein and Johnson’s work might be taken as illustrative of the limitations of Butler’s earlier texts.

Ultimately, Epstein and Johnson’s distinction between identity as a ‘choice’ (which they reject) and something that is “‘performed’” (which they assert) (Epstein & Johnson 1998:116) is both unclear and insufficient to advance any reconciliation between agency and performatively constituted subjects. Butler’s simultaneous erasure of the a priori sovereign subject and assertion of discursive agency is not drawn on. This is unfortunate as Epstein and Johnson provide a wealth of those mundane and routine practices that Butler argues constitute the minutiae of performative identities but that are absent in her own work.
To identities

Finally, I turn to Mac an Ghaill’s (1994) school ethnography. While concerned primarily with masculinities within the school context, this study is particularly successful in incorporating and addressing the multiplicitous nature of identities. This is facilitated by the utilisation of a Foucauldian understanding of discourse and power and post-structural notions of identities as multiple, fluid and constructed.

Mac an Ghaill’s analysis examines school identities at the micro level of the school while also working through the implications for these of current education policy. Mac an Ghaill engages with multiple identity categories (such as gender, social class, ethnicity, sexuality, ability/attainment) and draws out the various ways in which these intersect and interact. In addition, while his study focuses on masculinities he includes an examination of girls’ and women teachers’ experiences of masculinities in schools and the ways in which these position femininities in particular ways.

In what is now clearly a tradition of school ethnography, Mac an Ghaill is concerned with the identities of groups of masculinites in schools and he offers typologies of both teachers and pupils. His typology of teachers identifies the Professionals, Old Collectivists and New Entrepreneurs as key teacher masculinities. In relation to pupils, he moves from the pro-/anti- school dichotomy and identifies four modes of pupil masculinity; the Macho Lads, Academic Achievers, New Entrepreneurs and Real Englishmen. These are categorisations which illustrate or, indeed, are implicated in, the circulation of disciplinary power. However, this does not negate the value of Mac an Ghaill’s work. Rather, it underscores the centrality of categorisations (or names) to the intelligibility of identities.
Within the study a degree of tension remains between the post-structural problematisation of the individual and the actors of empirical school ethnography (see Youdell & Gillborn 1996). Nevertheless, through an empirical and theoretical suturing, Mac an Ghaill begins to demonstrates the applicability of Foucauldian notions of discourse and power and post-structural notions of identities to data generated through a school ethnography. Furthermore, his analysis begins to show the value of these theoretical tools for accessing the intersections of various identities and advancing the insights into identities offered by the empirical study of life inside school.

**Reflections on school identity ethnographies**

It is clear that, post- Wolpe, the divisions between studies and ‘where’ they might be placed within an analysis of this sort becomes more arbitrary. Many of these later studies could be placed across sections and this is itself indicative of the limits of identity categories as organising and conceptual tools. My placement of these studies has been based on either the author’s explicit identification of leading issues or the prominence of these within the analysis. Yet, in drawing these lines around studies it is possible that, in some instances, I am doing a disservice to studies which try to work across identity categories.

My organisation of studies within this chapter exposes an (almost chronological) progression through a ‘list’ of identity categories, which have come to prominence at particular moments and in particular contexts, to a concern with the multiplicity of *identities* which refuse singular categorisation. Simultaneously, it highlights a shift from structural understandings of identities, where these are real, fixed and relatively unproblematic (if complex), to post-structural understanding of identities where these are fluid, contested, and constructed. This theoretical shift is itself almost chronological
-- relating back to the political and policy contexts in which particular identities came to the fore and the search for theoretical tools which can (begin to) adequately explain these.

Another school ethnography

Among the general criticisms of school ethnography made by Delamont and Atkinson (1995) there are two that seem to be of particular relevance to this study and the field in which it is situated. They suggest that, first, 'theoretical underpinnings are not always explicitly acknowledged' (Delamont & Atkinson 1995:21) and, second, there is a 'lack of integration between one study and another' (Delamont & Atkinson, 1995:7). These are significant difficulties which relate to the particular concerns I have for those school ethnographies which draw on and/or are underpinned by post-structural theory.

While Delamont and Atkinson highlight a lack of integration between studies, I would highlight a lack of integration between theory and data within studies. In a field driven by the possibilities for new understandings offered by emerging theorisations, school ethnographies often cite theory which does not then go on to interrogate data. The post-structural/post-modern underpinnings of these studies, whether or not they are acknowledged in the opening chapters or paragraphs, frequently slip from view as they begin to rub up uncomfortably against the 'actions' of the 'actors' that the data represents. In other instances, school ethnographies draw eclectically upon a range of theories. Such an approach may intend to alleviate the uncomfortable tensions between post-structural theory and data concerned with 'real' lives. This eclecticism, however, risks writing theoretical incoherence, inconsistencies and slippages into ethnographic accounts of life inside schools. Furthermore, in the context of this uncomfortable tension, ethnographic data are only infrequently utilised in the interrogation of theory.
Rather than attempting to elide, conceal, or over-ride the tensions which might exist between post-structural theorisations and empirical ethnographic data, this study is concerned to explore this uncomfortable rubbing up. A key feature of the theoretical framework which I outline in Chapter 2 is the questioning of the notion of a sovereign subject. Yet it is difficult to escape the agency of the subject in empirical education research. Common sense and experience send the unrelenting message that schools are populated by numerous subjects who have agency -- the spectre of the sovereign subject is difficult to escape. A turn away from the sovereign subject, however, is not necessarily a turn away from agency. The understanding of linguistic or discursive agency, which I detail in Chapter 2, may allow a revised notion of agency to be retained within a coherent theorisation of discourse. This promises (but does not guarantee) to engage with and move beyond the tensions between theory and data discussed above.

One concern of this study, then, is to interrogate how far such theorisations of the subject, and its discursive agency, can account for the actions and intentions of 'real' individuals and groups inside school. At the same time, it intends to explore the implications of the actions and intentions of these 'real' individuals and groups for theorisations of discursive agency. These questions will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

This study does not represent an attempt to map exhaustively pupils' identities. Previous studies have undoubtedly overlooked, excluded, or erased particular pupil identities and the precise nature of these and other pupil identities are of interest to this study. My theoretical framework suggests, however, that an exhaustive mapping is impossible. Furthermore, it suggests that even if an exhaustive mapping were possible, such an
exercise would be of limited value. My principal question is not 'what or which identities are constituted within the context of the school?', rather, it is 'through what processes are these identities constituted?'.

This study aims to understand the processes through which a range of pupil identities are constituted in the school context. As I indicated above, these identities can be taken to include biographical, learner and sub-cultural identities. Biographical identities might be understood to include identities constituted along axes of gender, race, sexuality and social class. Learner identities might be understood to include identities constituted along axes of ability and educational and/or school orientation. Sub-cultural identities might be understood to be constituted along axes of fashions, musical genres, and recreational activities and interests. These are by no means intended to be understood as either exhaustive or exclusive. Indeed, the study is specifically concerned to explore and understand the intersection, interaction and interdependency of multiple identities. My examination of these processes will be guided by the following questions:

- How are pupils' biographical, learner and sub-cultural identities constituted within the school?
- How are these various identities inter-related or inter-dependent?
- What meanings are inscribed by and through these identities and how might these be contested, disrupted, reinscribed?
- What are the implications of particular biographical, learner and sub-cultural identities?
- What are the benefits and limitations of recourse to such identity categories?
- What is the significance of and relationship between the individual and (multiple) audiences?
• In what ways do pupils’ identities and social networks interact and what is the significance of this?
• What is the significance of the school organisation and context for the constitution and mediation of these identities?

Structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 explores in detail key theoretical movements within the social sciences and humanities concerned with the subject and identity. A theoretical framework for understanding identities is offered. Central to this framework are Foucauldian notions of discourse, disciplinary power and resistance and Judith Butler’s notion of performative habitus, resulting from her engagement with Bourdieu, as well as her understanding of discursive agency and the performative constitution and resignification of identities. It is argued that the utility of these theorisations, often developed in the absence of empirical data, remains unclear and a series of theoretical research questions are offered.

In Chapter 3 I outline my understanding of the school context and the significance of this for identities. Methodological discussions focus on the distinction between ethnography and qualitative research as well as conceptualisations of those subjects involved in ethnography -- the researcher and the researched. The school in which the research was undertaken is described; the approach which I have taken to school ethnography is detailed; and my methods of data collection and analysis are outlined and reflected upon.

Chapters 4 to 7 address my research questions through detailed analyses of ethnographic data generated through an ethnography undertaken in a co-educational secondary school located in London. These empirical data are subjected to close scrutiny in order to
expose the ways in which those practices represented constitute pupil identities in particular ways. Chapter 4 focuses on naming practices and Chapter 5 focuses on bodily practices. The analysis with these chapters shows how the linguistic, bodily and textual practices of pupils and teachers (whether intentional, tacit, or unintentional) contribute to the performative constitution of intelligible and legitimate selves and others. It also shows how these citational constituting practices, and the historicity of those discourses cited, act to constrain intelligibility. Chapter 6 examines the processes through which these intelligible identities come to act as discursive traps. Chapter 7 explores the potential for identities to be resisted, recuperated and resignified. Finally, Chapter 8 offers a summary discussion of key analyses detailed in the preceding chapters, limitations of the study are explored and key concerns for further research are highlighted. It is concluded that the analysis offered within this thesis adds depth to existing understandings of the ways in which identities are constituted and offers further insight into the processes through which enduring educational inequities are sustained.
Notes to Chapter 1. Schooling Identities

1 Throughout this text I have elected to use the term pupil, rather than the term student. Within my research school and, arguably, across compulsory schooling in the UK, this is the term commonly used by both pupils and teachers. Furthermore, the term pupil conveys and is implicated in the continued hierarchical organisation of teacher/pupil relations inside the school context.

2 It should be noted that Aggleton (1987) undertook an ethnographic study focusing on middle class boys in schools.

3 The often forgotten third study in the Hargreaves, Lacey, Lambert trilogy.

4 In this vein, Burgess (1983) suggests three stages of teachers’ classification of pupils. These are speculation, elaboration and stabilisation (Burgess, 1983:177).

5 The terms used to name different ethnic groups change frequently. Within this chapter, I echo the terms used the authors whose work is being discussed. Where I am not referring directly to a published work, I use the term ‘African-Caribbean’; one of the term most commonly accepted by the people so named in contemporary English ‘race’ relations. When I move on to data analysis, I echo the terms by which pupils identified themselves.

6 Again, this study was not published as a single volume.

7 Key elements of Mac an Ghaill’s discussion concerning girls have been discussed. For reasons of sample size and the various data generated boys dominate Gillborn’s study.
2. Understanding Identities

Introduction

This study aims to understand the processes through which identities are embroiled in inequities, subjugations, marginalisations and disavowals. In order to adequately make sense of these inequities, a satisfactory understanding of power, identities and the relationship between these is required. This chapter will begin by exploring some of the ways in which power has been theorised. It will then move on to examine a number of theorisations of identity and the subject. In doing this a provisional theoretical framework will be outlined and a series of theoretical research questions, which will be explored through my data analysis, will be identified.

Notions of power

It seems to me that understandings of power have not been fully interrogated, an observation also made by Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1993:121). While power tends to be present in social theories and sociological studies, this presence frequently takes the form of an explanatory or contextual factor in relation to some other substantive field of inquiry. Power is much less often itself taken as the substantive area of concern. As such, prevailing understandings of power are frequently underdeveloped.

Power has tended to be conceptualised as something that is possessed and exerted. Whether possessed by a Sovereign, State, group or individual and whether exerted through consensus or coercion, the prevailing and ‘common sense’ understanding of power is that it is held by one individual or group over another individual or group(s). This has been characterised as a ‘zero-sum’ conception of power (Parsons 1960 cited by
Zero-sum suggests that power is an unevenly distributed finite resource. While attempts have been made to shift this notion of zero-sum power, for instance Parsons’ assertion that power can both ‘inflate’ and ‘deflate’ (Parsons 1963 cited by Giddens, 1993:241-217), this has not altered the underlying assumption that power is a property that is (or is not) possessed.

This is not to suggest that power is generally understood to be held exclusively by a single individual or group within a given society. Emancipatory politics have detailed multiple axes of power through which inequalities are produced and reproduced. This has led to an ‘additive’ model of subordination (and, implicitly preceding this, an additive model of power) in which individuals or groups are seen to be ‘doubly’ or ‘triply’ subordinated along intersecting axes of, most commonly but only for instance, gender, race and social class. (See for example Fuller 1984 and Mac an Ghaill 1988).

Within Giddens’ theory of structuration, power has been more fully elaborated. Giddens asserts that power should be understood as ‘the transformative capacity of human action’ (Giddens 1993:109 original emphasis) that is neither necessarily consensual nor necessarily conflictual. While such power might be played out through skill, authority or force, it is the capacity to communicate meanings which is foregrounded in Giddens’ analysis:

‘the creation of frames of meaning occurs as the mediation of practical activities, and in terms of differentials of power which actors bring to bear. The significance of this is crucial in social theory, which must find as one of its chief tasks the mutual accommodation of power and norms in social interaction. The reflexive elaboration of frames of meaning is characteristically imbalanced in relation to the possession of power, whether this be the result of the superior linguistic or dialectical skills of one person in conversation with another; the
possession of relevant types of ‘technical knowledge’; the mobilization of authority or ‘force’ etc’ (Giddens 1993:111-112, original emphasis, my bold).

Despite Giddens’ rejection of a binary conception of power as either consensual or conflictual and his emphasis on the relation of power to social meaning, power remains something possessed and exercised in this analysis. Bourdieu (1990 & 1991) has also offered a more nuanced account of the ways in which inequitous relations of power are produced and reproduced. Dominated by a concern with social class, Bourdieu’s formulation suggests that power relations are reproduced through differential relations of social, cultural economic and linguistic ‘capital’. While this again retains a notion of power as something possessed, it offers further insight into the mechanisms through which such power might be understood to be transmitted and retained.

The notion of power as something that resides in and/or is held by ‘the powerful’, whether the powerful is a monarch, government, institution, social group, or individual, has been characterised as ‘sovereign power’ (Foucault 1990a & 1991). More recently, however, such understandings of power have been challenged. In particular, the work of Foucault has offered a reformulation of power which entails a simultaneous reformulation of the way in which the subject, and identities, are understood. I will discuss this second point later in this chapter. Here I want to outline Foucault’s understanding of power and the implications of adopting this particular conceptualisation of power.

Foucault effects a shift from the notion of sovereign power which is held, possessed and exercised to the notion of ‘disciplinary power’ which is productive and formative (Foucault 1990a & 1991). The notion of disciplinary power is itself predicated on a prior
shift from structural analyses of society to a concern with discourse and discursive practices. Foucault says of discourse:

‘we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. ... we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies’ (Foucault 1990a:100).

Theorising in terms of discourse and discursive practices is not simply a concern with language, that is, text or speech. Text and speech are practices of discourse in that they inscribe wider systems of meaning and, in so doing, contribute to the ongoing constitution of what is intelligible/unintelligible. Representations that are not immediately linguistic but are rendered accessible through language, such as images or gestures, also inscribe wider systems of meaning and constitute what is and is not knowable. In this sense, discourse refers to those wider systems of meaning (knowledges) rather than to individual utterances or representations. Utterances and representations, that is, discursive practices, do not simply constitute discourse, they are themselves rendered meaningful and productive through discourse. As such, discourse comes to appear somewhat circular; discursive practices constitute discourse at the same time as being constituted by discourse.

In this schema, meaning is historically located; it is the historicity of meaning that guides, but does not determine, the way in which discursive practices constitute and are constituted in discourse. This is a guiding, rather than determining because meaning is understood to be equivocal (open to varying interpretations) and contingent (non-necessary) and, therefore, open to contestation and change. One discourse is not
intrinsically imbued with more or less power than another. Yet the historicity of particular discursive practices (deployed in the light of particular demands) means that some discourses do come to dominate and bound legitimate knowledge and, indeed, what is knowable. So while some meanings do appear to be more or less equivocal and contingent than others, this impossibility of fixing meaning once and for all means that even the most enduring discourses are not ‘master’ (Cixous & Clement 1986a) discourses.

This understanding of discourse owes much to the work of Jacques Derrida. Derrida (1988) suggests that meanings are always historically and contextually located; they are equivocal and contingent, not fixed or singular. As such, the signified is understood to escape the signifier resulting in the constant deferral of meaning. By extension, Derrida is also concerned with the way language is suffused by oppositional binaries, such as: mind/body; man/woman; masculine/feminine; reason/nature; white/black; heterosexual/homosexual; capitalism/socialism. These are not straightforward couples or opposites, rather they are inherently imbalanced and, therefore, intrinsic to the inscription of power relations: ‘an opposition of metaphysical concepts ...[is] a hierarchy and the order of subordination’ (Derrida 1988:21). These binaries demarcate presence and absence, domination and subordination, intelligibility and unintelligibility -- the Same and the Other. Furthermore, the terms of these binaries are bound in an inextricable dependency. This is because the dominant presence is always defined against the absent Other, that is, in terms of what it is not: the Same depends on the Other, even as it disavows it. These binary concepts are frequently entangled in webs of associations, for instance, mind-reason-man-masculine opposed to, and disavowing, body-nature-woman-feminine. This entanglement is often so deeply set that concepts from one or other side of the binary become almost synonymous, for example, man-
masculine/woman-feminine. Through this analysis the Other is exposed as being always already in the Same, and the Same is exposed as being always already dependent on the Other. Given this intrinsic inter-dependence of the Same and the Other, the assertion of the dominant concept implicitly inscribes the Other, even as it subjugates it. In reverse, the Other’s opposition of the Same is implicated in its inscription. Derrida suggests that, rather than seeking to redress the domination of the Same over the Other through opposition, a strategy of deconstruction should be adopted.

'Deconstruction cannot be restricted or immediately pass to a neutralization: it must, through a double gesture, a double science, a double writing--put into practice a reversal of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is on that condition alone that deconstruction will provide the means of intervening in the field of oppositions it criticizes ... deconstruction does not consist in moving from one concept to another, but in reversing and displacing a conceptual order' (Derrida 1988:21, original emphasis).

Discourses of the Same should not be opposed from the position of/by the Other, rather they should be interrogated in order to expose both their intrinsic reliance on the Other and their internal tensions and contradictions. Practices of deconstruction, then, supplant oppositional modes of resistance.

This understanding and practice of deconstruction can be seen in Foucault’s ‘archaeological’ and ‘genealogical’ approach to understanding both the effects of power in discourse and power as an effect of discourse. As already indicated, Foucault perceives power as being intrinsic to discourse, circulating through the minutiae of discursive practices. Foucault writes:

‘Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere ... Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from
innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations’ (Foucault 1990a:93-94).

Power is not a repressive force which is wielded or enacted by a rational individual and/or State -- it is deployed improvisationally through the micro-circuits of discursive practices in historically contingent circumstances. This is not to suggest, however, that power is simply either random or incidental. In his discussions of the genealogy of institutional forms (most notably the prison but also the school, hospital, sanatorium and military) and the discourse of sexuality, Foucault offers the concept of ‘disciplinary power’ (Foucault 1990a & 1991) along with a series of regulatory ‘technologies’ through which it operates. Disciplinary power is describe by Foucault as follows:

‘it implies an uninterrupted coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather that its result and it is exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement. These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called the ‘disciplines’. (Foucault 1991:137).

Foucault identifies a series of ‘disciplines’ or ‘technologies’ of disciplinary power: ‘spatial distributions’ are concerned with enclosure and partitioning, the establishment of functional sites, and the ranking or classification of bodies; ‘the control of activity’ is concerned with time-tabling, the elaboration of the act, body and gesture, and exhaustive use of time; ‘normalizing judgment’ compares, differentiates, categorises, homogenises, corrects and excludes; the ‘examination’ documents individuals into cases; ‘hierarchical observation’ or ‘surveillance’ underpins theses technologies and in turn, and perhaps most significantly, gives rise to the ‘self-surveillance’ of the observed, examined and judged ‘individual’ whose activity is controlled and who is distributed across functional sites (Foucault 1991).
These technologies are seen as drawing from, circulating within and sustaining those established and emergent discursive frames available in particular historical circumstances in order to meet the particular exigencies faced. The theorisation of these technologies of power in the context of emergent institutions, or ‘disciplinary institutions’ (Foucault 1991) does not imply that disciplinary power is seen either to be the privilege of those who plan, develop and manage these institutions or as located exclusively within these institutions. Indeed, these technologies are understood to constitute and circulate through those discourses and discursive practices which constitute social life. As such, the school which forms the central site of my study, can be understood as a ‘disciplinary institution’ (Foucault 1991) in which the discursive practices that constitute life in the school are permeated by the localised effects of disciplinary power. I will return to this understanding of the school when I detail my research methodology in Chapter 3.

This reformulation of discursive and disciplinary power suggests that power and knowledge are intertwined. Knowledge does not enable power to be accessed, nor does power give access to knowledge. Discursive technologies of power constitute, disavow, and resist particular knowledges. At the same time power is an effect of knowledge and the discursive deployment of its ‘truths’. As such, Foucault refers to ‘power/knowledge’: ‘what is said [...] must not be analyzed simply as the surface of projection of these power mechanisms. Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together’ (Foucault 1990:100).

Foucault’s technologies of disciplinary power indicate a particular constitution of the subject. This is elaborated in his work concerning sexuality. In the next section I will
return to Foucault when I argue that the discursive practices through which disciplinary power circulates are also fundamentally implicated in the constitution of subjects and their identities.

**Notions of the subject**

A concern with the 'subject' -- who and what the subject is, how the subject comes into being, how the subject is sustained -- has formed a central focus of philosophical and theological writing. The subject of Western philosophy and Christian theology has been configured in a variety of ways. Since Aristotle's metaphysics of form and matter, however, the distinction between the mind and body has been an enduring feature of dominant understandings of the subject.

As already discussed in relation to the work of Derrida, an implicit hierarchy and opposition underpins understandings of the relationship between the mind and the body. This can be seen in philosophy and theology concerned with the struggle of the mind to abate and bound the excesses of the body. Furthermore, this dichotomy has been gendered, with the concepts of mind and body corresponding to the male and the female respectively. Indeed, it has been argued that the opposition of man/woman underpins and makes possible all binary concepts (Cixous & Clement 1986b). For instance, St Augustine's work was centrally concerned with the authority of the mind/will (and man) over the body (and woman) (see Oates 1948 & Sheed 1978). And much Mediaeval theology reiterated this concern with the 'victory' of (man's) mind over the (feminine) body (see, for instance the anonymous *Cloud of Unknowing* (Hodgson 1944) and Richard Rolle's *The Fire of Love* (Allen 1931)). This mind/body binary, and the various discourses through which it has been inscribed, underscores more recent philosophical understanding of the subject. Perhaps the most significant of these is Descartes' notion
of ‘rational man’. This metaphysical subject is, in turn, evident in contemporary discourses (religious, political, academic, everyday) concerned with the subject.

However, these oppositions are by no means stable or guaranteed. For instance, in the early modern period the ‘Cult of the Virgin’ extricated (partially and provisionally) at least one woman (the Virgin) from the ‘wrong’ side of this opposition (see Warner 1976). Similarly, Mediaeval texts which highlighted the passions of Christ’s (feminine) body (see for instance Julian of Norwich’s A Revelation of Divine Love (Glasscoe 1976)) and Renaissance texts which challenged the location of original sin in the body of Eve (and by extension all women) (see, for instance, Aemilia Lanyer’s Salve Deus, Rex Judeorom (Rowse 1976)) acted to destabilise, even if only partially, momentarily and/or retrospectively, the hierarchical oppositions of mind/body and man/woman.

I am not aiming here to undertake a genealogy of the subject of Christian theology and/or Western philosophy. Rather, I am concerned to highlight the simultaneous endurance and fragility of the oppositional concepts on which the subject rests. These discourses, and the notable continuities across them, do not function to explain or describe the a priori ‘state’ of the subject. Rather, they demarcate the limits within which it is possible to conceive of and think about the subject. Indeed, they are implicated in our continued concern and preoccupation with the subject.

Identity and the social sciences

The nature of the subject has not formed a central focus of the social sciences where, until recently, there has tended to be an acceptance (at least implicitly) of the rational, knowing subject inherited from Enlightenment thought. Theorisations of agency and social action, which simultaneously theorise or assume a particular kind of subject, have
been a key feature of social science. Giddens' (1993) theory of structuration offers a notable recent example of such work. This understands social life as being produced and reproduced through the practices of social actors. This production and reproduction is understood to be bounded by social 'rules and resources' which are historically contextual and 'recursively implicated in practice' (Giddens 1993:118). The agent who engages in these processes has intent and is engaged in 'reflexive monitoring' (Giddens 1993:92) of his/her actions. The contextual nature of social practices means that consequences cannot be fully predicted or controlled and actions are understood as having both intended an unintended consequences: 'the consequences of activities chronically escape their intentions' (Giddens 1993:165). This theorisation moves beyond a notion of direct correspondence between intent and outcome, while retaining an actor who is not simply the victim of social structures and highlighting the complexities of social life. The nature of the agent who 'acts', however, is not fully explained and a rational prior subject, albeit one whose will is circumscribed, appears to be retained.

In terms of scholarship which directly addresses the subject, the social sciences have tended to focus upon identity or identities. The social sciences have largely moved away from notions of natural, or essential identities, based in the materiality of the body.

Such understandings have been the basis for substantial debate amongst feminist scholars. An acceptance of the commonality of the category 'woman', and woman's difference from man, formed the bedrock of feminist politics and scholarship. The theoretical and political utility of this foundation, however, has been increasingly called into question. The differences between women, in particular their differential power positions, has led to a questioning of a universal concept of 'woman' or 'women'. Similarly, the shared (while potentially still distinct) subordination of particular groups
of men and women has been highlighted and, in turn, challenged the proposition of
universal patriarchy which has underpinned much feminist theory and politics.
Furthermore, concerns have been raised that the insistence on a common category of
'woman' or 'women' implicitly rests upon those assertions of 'natural' or 'essential'
difference which feminism sought to challenge. Endeavours to counter this have seen a
distinction drawn between the categories of biological 'sex' -- male/female -- and the
socially and historically constructed and inequitous categories of 'gender' --
man/woman. While this distinction has offered feminism certain political opportunities,
it too has been challenged. Feminist scholars utilising Derridian deconstruction and
Foucauldian notions of discourse have problematised the distinction between 'sex' and
'gender'. It has been argued that the assertion of oppositional categories of sex
inadvertently inscribes, or is at least open to recuperation by, dominant discourses which
assert a natural and essential difference between man and woman. That is, the very
discursive practices through which women's subordination has been effected. Indeed, it
has been suggested that any reliance on the subordinate term of a binary hierarchy
intrinsically inscribes the dominant term which is being opposed. As such, an increasing
number of feminist scholars have been concerned with the possibility of identifying a
'third term' which exceeds and is irreducible to the binary (see, for instance, Cixous and
Clement's discussion of 'bisexual' (Cixous & Clement 1986a) and Wittig's discussion
of 'lesbian' (Wittig 1981)). For further discussion of these issues see, for instance, Arnot
1990).

These debates have been mirrored in relation to theorisations of race and the politics of
anti-racism. The assertion of biologically distinct racial groups has been widely
discredited (see, for instance, Lang 1997) and the strategy of deconstruction has been deployed in order to expose the dependence of the (unspoken) category of ‘Whiteness’ on disavowed ‘Black’ and ‘Other’ racial categories (see Lamont 1999 and Jacobson 1998). The challenge to agendas for equity and social justice mounted by continued recourse to theorisations of ‘essential’ races, and the ‘natural’ differences between them, has been illustrated by a number of recent studies. Most notable amongst these has been *The Bell Curve* (Herrnstein & Murry 1994). This claims to demonstrate natural and irrevocable differences in ‘intelligence’ between races, differences also marked by gender and social class. It concludes that African American people as a ‘race’ are of significantly lower intelligence than other racial groups in the United States. That this academic text became a best seller in the US illustrates the endurance of those discourses of the enlightenment, colonialism and eugenics whose deployment has inscribed the subordination of African Americans. A recent study from Canada (Rushton 1995) is of particular interest and concern in that it restates a particular and ‘natural’ relationship between race and sexuality. The study asserts biologically based correlations between race, intelligence and sexual practice, thereby inscribing those discourses of Black hyper-sexuality (and implicitly White sexual continence and purity) historically deployed in the control and subordination of colonised and enslaved Black peoples.

Understandings of identities as socially/culturally constructed have, with significant exceptions such as those indicated above, largely supplanted essentialist models of identities within the social sciences. These have been established to counter the apparent determinism of biological explanations and open up space in which possibilities for change could be conceptualised: ‘[i]dentify is not a destiny ... identities are not expressions of secret essences’ (Weeks, 1991:83). Such theorisations suggest that
identities are shaped through social and cultural institutions located within particular historical contexts and constraints. The usefulness of this understanding has been called into question for two apparently contrasting reasons. On the one hand, opposition to essentialist theorisations have led it to reject determinism to the extent that identities have come to be configured as a matter of choice: ‘the point that needs underlining is that identity is a choice’ (Weeks 1991:80 original emphasis). In so doing, they appear to side step the historical contextualisation they call for and simultaneously retain, either implicitly or explicitly, a notion of the metaphysical rational subject. On the other hand, while constructionist understandings have sought to overcome the determinism of biological explanations of identities, the social/cultural institutions through which identities are said to be constructed have been positioned (and in some senses demonstrated) to be so powerful and far reaching that biological ‘determinism’ has been replaced by a ‘social/cultural determinism’.

It is worth noting that a particular understanding of the nature and exercise of power appears to be implicated in this apparent social/cultural determinism. Constructionist theorisations tend to understand power as residing within social institutions and, whether driven by macro theories of neo-marxism or patriarchy, understand these social institutions as being central in the reproduction of existing power relations. As a result, challenges tend to take the form of radical or liberal opposition. Accepting such a rational subject in conjunction with a sovereign model of power raises the question of why, given concerted efforts for change at the level of both oppositional groups and the legislature, inequities appear to remain so engrained?

The appropriateness of positioning ‘essence’ and ‘construct’ as oppositional and, indeed, the utility of pursuing this debate has been called into question. Fuss (1990) queries both
the logic and the utility of establishing a good/bad dichotomy between constructionism and essentialism. Fuss argues that, while set up as oppositional, essentialism and constructionism are deeply entwined. Essentialism, she argues, is not inherently materialist or reactionary. And constructionism, while concerned with refuting essentialism, is itself deeply essentialist, relying heavily upon essentialist notions while simultaneously renouncing essence. Fuss illustrates the essentialism upon which constructionism is set with recourse to the categories man and woman: while constructionist arguments foreground the discursive production of these categories, the categories themselves are sustained. Hence she argues that ‘[s]ome minimal point of commonality and continuity necessitates at least the linguistic retention of these particular terms’ (Fuss 1990:4). Fuss does not accept the constructionist pluralisation of terms as an adequate negotiation of this contradiction; plurality within a category retains the category itself: ‘[t]he essentialism at stake is not countered so much as displaced’ (Fuss 1990:4 original emphasis). Similarly, the constructionist assertion of the body as ‘always already’ culturally mapped’ does not obliterate the possibility of an essence beneath the surfaces of this cultural mapping, rather, and as in the case of pluralising categories, it ‘defer[s] the encounter with essence, displacing it, in this case, onto the concept of sociality’ (Fuss 1990:6). Fuss states that:

‘Historicism is not always an effective counter to essentialism if it succeeds only in fragmenting the subject into multiple identities, each with its own self-contained, self-referential essence. The constructionist impulse to specify, rather than definitively counteracting essentialism, often simply redeploy its through the very strategy of historicization, rerouting and dispersing it through a number of micropolitical units or sub-categorical classifications, each presupposing its own unique interior composition or metaphysical core’ (Fuss 1990:20).
Fuss is not alone in identifying these implicit reliances upon essence within a constructionism which has the express intention of undermining all recourse to essence. Elizabeth Grosz highlights the internal contradiction within constructionism when she queries how constructionism might account for the ‘raw materials’ from which it constructs -- if not through a recourse to essences:

‘In my understanding, a mistaken bifurcation or division is created between so-called essentialist and constructionists insofar as constructionism is inherently bound up with notions of essence. Constructionism, in order to be consistent, must explain what the “raw materials” of the construction consist in; these raw materials must, by definition, be essential insofar as they precondition and make possible the process of social construction’ (Grosz 1995:245 footnote 1).

Constructionism’s implicit dependence upon essentialism creates, therefore, an impasse within its own terms. As such, alternative ways of understanding identities have been sought.

*Psychoanalysis and the subject*

The turn to psychoanalysis has not been embraced across either political movements or academic disciplines, with some of its most strenuous criticisms coming from a range of feminisms (see Grosz 1990 & 1995; Ransom 1993). Nevertheless, it has offered a detailed and significant theorisation of the subject. In particular, the Lacanian understanding of the Symbolic has offered a point of exchange between psychoanalytic and other theorisations that suggest the centrality of discourse and/or language.

Reworking Freudian psychoanalysis through a concern with language and ideology, Lacanian psychoanalysis substitutes a subject status that is acquired through biological
imperatives with one that is derived from social exchange through language. This is a
staged model, although not one which is understood to be linear, complete or without
significant tensions. This is a particular and detailed schema and it is not within the
scope of this chapter to offer a full elaboration of this. However, I will offer a brief
outline of this.

Lacanian psychoanalysis suggests that subjecthood is attained through entry into the
Symbolic. Within this model, the infant, understood as a ‘(proto)-subject’ (Grosz
1990:31) or ‘subject (-to-be)’ (Grosz 90:33), is initially located within the Real. The
Real is marked by fragmentation, boundlessness, and fulfilment -- the lack of Lack.
However, through the mirror phase -- the recognition of Self and Other -- and the
concomitant acquisition of the language of demand, the Real is lost and the now ‘proto­
social’ (Grosz 1990:65) infant passes into the Imaginary. The Imaginary is disrupted
through the child’s recognition and acceptance of the signifier – or ‘the-name-of-the­
father’ – and entry into the linguistic exchange relations of the Symbolic. It is only
through this entry into the linguistic exchange relations of the Symbolic that the child
becomes a subject: ‘[b]y submitting to the laws of the signifier, the subject takes up a
place in language and is thus, unknown to itself, submitted to social law (the Symbolic)’

Lacanian psychoanalysis offers a radically altered notion of the subject. By aligning the
subject with the Symbolic, speaking and subjecthood become inseparable: the subject
who speaks is only a subject because he/she speaks. As such, Lacanian psychoanalysis
supplants the metaphysical subject with a subject who is belatedly constituted in the
exchange relations of language:
'Lacan claims that the subject, instead of being self-given and self-transparent, a subject radically incapable of not knowing itself, as Descartes assumed, is the end-result, a product, of processes that constitute it as an ego or unified subject (the Imaginary) and a social and speaking subject (the Symbolic). The subject is constructed through its necessary relations to others and the Other’ (Grosz in Wright (ed.)1992:414).

Lacanian psychoanalysis has been subjected to extensive criticism, particularly by feminist scholars who highlight its retention of a founding and irresistible sexual difference. It has been argued that such criticisms serve to highlight psychoanalysis’ necessary dependence on and inscription of patriarchy. (See Gallop 1982 and Irigaray 1985a & 1985b). It is not necessary here to attempt to offer an exhaustive account of either feminisms’ continued criticisms of and concerns with psychoanalysis or post-Lacanian theorists’ responses to them. What I want to highlight is that the contribution of psychoanalysis remains contested.

Of particular significance for me in Lacanian and post-Lacanian psychoanalysis is the move away from an a priori subject and the central positioning of language in the constitution of the subject. Despite the difficulty of fully separating the Symbolic from (discursively constituted) patriarchal relations, the assertion that the ‘name-of-the-father’ resides in the Symbolic, that is, language, offers the possibility of problematising a notion of power as a sovereign possession. Furthermore, understanding the subject as being formed through entry into language (in Lacanian terms the Symbolic) and, by extension, the discursive field, suggests that a coherent ‘being’ is only possible through particular (discursive) epistemic frameworks (‘the-name-of-the-father’ in this case).

Lacan’s triad of the Real, Imaginary and Symbolic suggests that while an infant/child ‘exists’ prior to entry into the Symbolic, it is only in the Symbolic that it is rendered a subject5. This concern with the role of language in the constitution of the subject within
Lacanian psychoanalysis resonates with a number of contemporary theorisation of the subject.

**The Foucauldian subject**

My earlier discussion of discourse and power touched upon a Foucauldian understanding of the subject. For Foucault, the subject is constituted through the productive power of discursive practices. Discourse imputes the meanings through which the 'world' and the 'self' are made knowable and known (Foucault 1990a & 1991). Psychoanalysis, discussed above, represents one (or more) such discourse and its schema (consider the Real, Imaginary, Symbolic) and application (consider the analyst's surveillance and the analysand's self surveillance) exemplify such discursive practices and technologies of power (Foucault 1990a).

The Foucauldian understanding of the subject has been criticised on the basis that it overstates the extent to which bodies (subjects) should be seen as 'docile'. This 'docility' is seen as positioning the individual (or group) as the victim of those discourses through which he/she is constituted, thereby denying him/her the possibility of agency or intentional action, in particular resistance (see, for example, Giddens 1993; Ramazanoglu 1993). It is indeed the case that 'agency' and 'resistance' are discursively constrained, as Foucault himself points out (Foucault 1980). Yet these criticisms seem to place undue emphasis on the metaphor of the 'docile body' while simultaneously understating, or even overlooking, Foucault's insistence that innumerable possibilities for resistance are an integral facet of discursive and productive power (Foucault 1980, 1990a & 1991).
Foucault unmoors the subject from the haven of rationality and free will. Yet this unmooring does not deny the subject the capacity to act and act with intent. Rather, Foucault’s reformulation of power suggests, like Derrida’s deconstruction, that power cannot be wrested from one (individual or group) through the opposition of another (individual or group) and that to attempt to do so is based in, and inscribes, a mistaken conception of power itself. This is based on the understanding that the subject, produced in and through discourse, is necessarily already (multiply) positioned in matrices of discursive power relations. As such, the subject’s agency does not reside in either his/her own sovereignty or his/her (present or potential future) hold on power. Agency and power are simultaneously inscribed and contested through the strategic deployment of discursive practices. Discourse, discursive practices, power, and (discursive) agency are inseparable.

**Performative Subjects**

Judith Butler (1990, 1991, 1997a, 1997b) attempts to suture a Foucauldian understanding of discourse and disciplinary power with Lacan’s theorisation of the Symbolic. Butler’s work draws heavily on philosophical and psychoanalytical sources and is often, therefore, both theoretically dense and not easily applicable to empirical data. Nevertheless, it appears to furnish us with some new and potentially useful ways of making sense of identities. Butler’s theorisation of the subject plays a central role in this study. I will outline her theorisation in some detail here.

Butler takes up Foucault’s assertion that understanding power as ‘sovereign’ neither adequately explains the nature and circulation of power nor furnishes us with viable means through which power can be resisted. Adopting Foucault’s notion of ‘disciplinary’ power, Butler understands power as productive (of subjects) and sees
resistance located within contextual and situational circuits of discursive power. She also engages with Lacan’s understanding of the subject realised through entry into the Symbolic.

Butler’s earlier texts (1990 & 1993) are concerned centrally with gender identity. Butler begins by challenging the feminist distinction between sex and gender (discussed above). She rejects the distinction between socially/culturally produced (binary) genders and biologically given (binary) sexes, arguing that sex and gender are indistinguishable. This is not in order to argue the natural correspondence of gender to its preceding sex, as has been the case in multiple, enduring discourses. Rather, it is to disrupt this correspondence. Butler argues that biological sexes are themselves discursively constituted and dependent on gender: ‘[b]odies cannot be said to have a signifiable existence prior to the mark of their gender’ (Butler 1990:8). This ‘mark’ of gender is understood to be constituted through discursive performativity. Butler defines the performative as being ‘that discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names’ (Butler 1993:13) and suggests that:

‘Discursive performativity appears to produce that which it names, to enact its own referent, to name and to do, to name and to make. ... [g]enerally speaking, a performative functions to produce that which it declares’ (Butler 1993:107).

In terms of gender then, those discursive practices which appear to describe (pre-existing) genders are not, in fact, simply descriptive. Rather they are productive. Discursive performatives not only act to constitute gender, they simultaneously position these genders as existing prior to their description. This performative constitution of gender is not understood to be an originary, singular, or definitive enactment. Working with a Foucauldian notion of discourse, the performative constitution of gender is
understood to be productive only in so far as it is 'derivative' (Butler 1993:107). Butler suggests that gender performatives are 'compulsive' and 'compulsory' (Butler 1990) -- the condition upon which the 'subject' is effected. She also suggests that gender performatives demand 'repetition' (Butler 1990) and 'citation' (Butler 1993) -- the ongoing deployment of intelligible discursive practices. I will return to these aspects of performativity later in this chapter.

The performative constitution of gender is understood, therefore, to be the prerequisite for any notion of the subject. Furthermore, performative gender creates the illusion of a preceding subject. While it appears that the subject expresses its 'proper' or 'self-identical' gender, this is, in fact, an illusion created by performative gender itself. Yet Butler asserts that to argue that performative gender effects the illusion of an *a priori* subject does not deny the subject, rather it calls into question accepted notions of a prediscursive metaphysical subject.

While Butler’s focus in these texts is on gender performativity, she stresses the discursive intersections of multiple identities. Asserting that identity categories are illimitable, she discusses the intersections of gender and sexuality and the racialisation of these. Butler adapts Rich’s (1980) notion of compulsory heterosexuality in order to argue that binary genders are dependent on the discursive production of a causal relationship between sex, gender and desire within the 'heterosexual matrix' (Butler 1990:35). As such, sexuality and coherent and oppositional genders cannot be disentangled. Similarly, she suggests that regulatory discourses of gender and sexuality are intertwined with discourses of race (Butler 1990 & 1993). Nevertheless, Butler does appear to position gender in a principal relationship to the subject. She argues that the subject is impossible without an intelligible, that is, oppositional man/woman, gender.
This understanding of the constitution of gender, and, indeed, the subject, through discursive performativity is not intended to suggest a discursive determinism. Performative genders are understood to be constrained by the regulatory practices of discourse and the bounds of intelligibility. Nevertheless, the repetition and citation upon which these performative genders depends also identifies the impossibility of either fixing or finalising gender: '[t]o the extent that gender is an assignment, it is an assignment which is never quite carried out according to expectation, whose addressee never quite inhabits the ideal s/he is compelled to approximate' (Butler 1993:231). It is in this nexus of compulsion and citation that Butler positions the possibility for resistance.

Throughout these texts Butler appears to use the terms ‘performative’ and ‘performance’ interchangeably and this raises a number of concerns. I have already detailed the particular way in which ‘performative’ is understood within these texts. While ‘performance’ does have a particular usage (distinct from performative) in linguistics, Butler does not define it in these terms. As such, it seems that its common meaning(s) is indicated by its usage. The terms ‘perform and ‘performance’ imply a volitional subject, even a self-conscious, choosing performer, behind the ‘act’ which is performed. This is at odds with Butler’s understanding of the compulsive and compelling discursive practices of the performatively constituted subject. The notion of discursive agency insists that the subject is not simply a victim of discourse and performative resistances might well be understood to be the ‘self’-conscious performances of discursively constituted subjects. Yet, in her slippage between terms, Butler seems to obscure her own very particular understanding of the constitution of identities, paving the way for this to be interpreted, once again, as the self-conscious act of a metaphysical subject?.
In a similar vein, Butler’s movement between notions of ‘construction’ and ‘constitution’ raises some difficulties. Butler specifies the constitution of the subject in terms of the discursive constraints of intelligibility: ‘when the subject is said to be constituted, that means simply that the subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that govern the intelligible invocation of identity’ (Butler 1990:145). This is distinct from the social/cultural constructionist understanding of identity discussed earlier. Given the distinct understanding of constitution in Butler’s own work, and her critique of constructionist theories of identity (Butler 1990), Butler’s use of the term within her own theorisation seems incongruous. In an attempt to minimise the potential for conceptual slippage, I will rely on the terms ‘performative’ and ‘constitution’ unless I explicitly intend to convey an alternative meaning.

More recently, Butler’s *Excitable Speech* (1997a) has offered a rigorous re-examination of the performative. While this demands a detailed engagement with linguistic theories, this does not amount to a shift away from discourse. Rather, it is an interrogation of language situated in the broader contexts of discourse. In as much as this work focuses closely on the action of the performative, it can be read as adding a further layer of detail to her earlier theorisations of gender performativity. Furthermore, this work departs from the particular concern with gender and examines the performative constitution of the subject more broadly. As such, it supplements, and to some extent supplants, aspects of that theorisation already discussed.

An adaptation of Althusser’s understanding of interpellation (Althusser 1971) is a key feature of Butler’s revised understanding of performatively constituted subjects. Althusser suggests that interpellation, or the hail, is a crucial component of subject formation. As such, Butler suggests that ‘[b]eing called a name is ... one of the
conditions by which a subject is constituted in language’ (Butler 1997a:2). Butler is not arguing here that a pre-existing subject is given a name, rather that this naming is a prerequisite for being ‘recognizable’ (Butler 1997a:5, original emphasis) as a subject. As such, ‘[o]ne comes to “exist” by virtue of this fundamental dependency on the address of the Other’ (Butler 1997a:5). This does not infer that the address conveys a ‘truth’ about the one addressed. Such interpellations are not understood as being descriptive; rather they are understood as being ‘inaugurative’: ‘[i]t seeks to introduce a reality rather than reporting an existing one’ (Butler 1997a:33). Furthermore, Butler suggests that the one addressed need not recognise, concur with or respond (as in the case of Althusser’s example of the Policeman) to this hail; that the call itself need not be issued by a speaking voice; and that the absence of an address can also act to interpellate a subject (Butler 1997a).

In illustrating the constitutive power of the address Butler considers what she describes as ‘an impossible scene’: a ‘body’ that, having not been named, is without ‘social definition’ and is, therefore, not accessible to us. It is only through being interpellated, she argues, that this ‘body’ acquires the social definition that makes it accessible. Butler understands this interpellation not as a discovery but as a ‘fundamental constitution’ (Butler 1997a:5). Butler is not suggesting here that the named body appears on naming, that it is some sort of apparition which is conjured through naming. Rather, I take this to mean that naming gives the body within Butler’s ‘impossible scene’ meaning, or a host of possible meanings, through which we make sense of and engage with it. In a number of works which discuss the constitution of the subject, and in particular the imperative to gender the subject, Butler offers as an example the scene of birth in which the medic makes a pronouncement of ‘sex’: ‘it is a girl’ or ‘it is a boy’ (Butler 1990; 1993; & 1997a). Such interpellating addresses can, perhaps, be traced further back to, for
instance, the scenes of the pre-natal examinations in which the medic pronounces the
health of ‘baby’ or the mother-to-be’s pre-natal provisional naming and address of
‘baby’. We might understand these instances as (preliminary) interpellations: namings
which subjectify the foetus, making it accessible within the realm of meaning, and give
the pregnant woman’s altered body (new) meaning through which it can be understood. I
want to avoid being diverted here into a discussion of ‘pro-life’ and ‘women’s right to
choose’ debates concerning the ‘status’ of the foetus. What I want to highlight is the
impossibility of offering these examples without naming ‘medics’, ‘pregnant women’,
‘mothers-to-be’, ‘babies’ and ‘foetus’: a series of interpellative addresses without the
which ‘bodies’ under discussion would be inaccessible.

Returning to Butler’s particular utilisation of Althusser’s notion of interpellation, a shift
from a structural and ideological power to name to a discursive and productive power to
name is evident. In effecting this shift Butler’s revised understanding of the performative
is crucial. The return to the nature of the performative refines significantly Butler’s
earlier understanding of the constitution of subjects. Butler examines the distinction
between illocutionary and perlocutionary performative speech as defined in Austin’s
How to Do Things With Words (1962). Illocutionary speech acts are understood to ‘do
what they say and do it in the moment of that saying’, whereas perlocutionary speech
acts are understood to ‘produce certain effects as their consequence; by saying
something a certain effect follows’ (Butler 1997a:3).

In Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990) and Bodies that Matter (1993) it is difficult to
decipher whether the performative is understood as illocutionary or perlocutionary.
These distinct modalities of the performative are not discussed, however, her assertion
‘to name and to do, to name and to make’ implies an illocutionary understanding of the
performative. In *Excitable Speech* (1997a), however, Butler takes a specific, and apparently altered, position in relation to illocutionary and perlocutionary performative. It is acknowledged that some utterances, such as judicial pronouncements of sentencing (‘I sentence you’) or ecclesiastical pronouncements of marriage (‘I now pronounce you man and wife’) or baptism (‘I baptise you’), do appear to effect the acts of which they speak in the moment of speaking. Nevertheless, the extent to which a performative can be said to be illocutionary, and the utility of understanding performatives as such, is challenged.

In doing this Butler draws on Derrida’s discussion of the contextual and citational nature of the performative and his insistence that those ‘infelicities’ identified by Austin are, in fact, contextual ‘breaks’ intrinsic to performatives (Derrida 1998). She also highlights Austin’s assertion of the ‘ceremonial’ nature of illocutionary speech and Althusser’s assertion of the ‘ritual’ nature of interpellation, suggesting that such ceremony and ritual implies that the performative ‘is an inherited set of voices, an echo of others who speak as the “I”’ (Butler 1997a:25). In this way, Butler suggests that performatives are always ‘citational’ 11. That is, they are contextual, spoken within a chain of signification, and embued with prior and future uses in which their meaning are open to change and dispute. As such, Butler suggests that ‘speech is always in some ways out of control’ (Butler 1997a:15) and a performative ‘produces a set of non-necessary effects’ (Butler 1997a:39). This rejection of the illocutionary performative appears to serve three interrelated functions. First, it untethers the performative from fixed or necessary meanings or effects; it ensures that ‘utterances bear equivocal meanings’ (Butler 1997a:87). Second, it opens up the performative to the possibility of infelicity or misfire12. Third it establishes the conditions for a ‘performative politics’ (Butler 1997a) which I will discuss in detail later in this section.
This understanding of the performative is essential to Butler’s revised theorisation of the constitution of subject. In formulating a post-sovereign subject Butler sutures this understanding of performative interpellation with Foucault’s understanding of productive power and Lacan’s formulation of the linguistic entry into the Symbolic. The subject is understood to be constituted, therefore, by their initiation into the Symbolic through the performative interpellations of others. The Symbolic, and these interpellations, are governed, but not determined, by discursive practices in the context of productive power. The discursive nature of this subjectification renders any notion of a pre-discursive or extra-discursive subject an impossibility -- even while the performative nature of this interpellation creates the illusion that the subject who is formed is a prior sovereign subject. The notion of a sovereign subject is recast as a post-sovereign, discursive subject. Butler writes:

‘If we concede that the one who speaks powerfully, who makes happen what she or her says, is enabled in his/her speech by first having been addressed and, hence, initiated into linguistic competence through the address, then it follows that the power of the speaking subject will always, to some degree, be derivative, that it will not have its source in the speaking subject’ (Butler 1997a:32-33, my emphasis).

As is the case in Butler’s earlier theorisations of performativity, this is not understood to be a singular or absolute constitution. Rather, the constitution of the subject is effected through continuous performative addresses, of the self and the Other, which are understood to permeate discursive practices:

‘The rules that constrain the intelligibility of the subject continue to structure the subject throughout his or her life. And this structuring is never fully complete. Acting one’s place in language continues the subject’s viability’ (Butler 1997a:136).
While performative interpellation is a necessary pre-requisite for the intelligibility and accessibility of the post-sovereign subject, this does not render the subject devoid of agency. The agency of the post-sovereign, linguistic subject is, however, a reconfigured agency. Performative interpellations constitute speaking subjects. Being constituted as an intelligible subject, this subject is able to constitute further subjects through such interpellations:

‘the one who names, who works within language to find a name for another, is presumed to be already named, positioned within language as one who is already subject to the founding or inaugurating address. This suggests that such a subject in language is positioned as both addressed and addressing, and that the very possibility of naming another requires that one first be named. The subject of speech who is named becomes, potentially, one who might well name another in time’ (Butler 1997a:29).

As such, the possibility for a specific understanding of intent and agency remain. The subject who is interpellated can, in turn, interpellate others, that is, the performatively constituted subject has ‘linguistic agency’ (Butler 1997a:15). This is not the agency of a sovereign subject who exerts its will. Rather, this agency is derivative, an effect of discursive power:

‘Because the agency of the subject is not a property of the subject, an inherent will or freedom, but an effect of power, it is constrained but not determined in advance. ... As the agency of a postsovereign subject, its discursive operation is delimited in advance but also open to a further unexpected delimitation’ (Butler 1997a:139-140, my emphasis).

The linguistic agency of this performatively interpellated subject is, therefore, simultaneously enabled and constrained through discourse. This subject retains intention and can seek to realise this intent through the deployment of discursive practices. The
efficacy of this deployment, however, is never guaranteed due to the citationality and historicity of discursive practices.

**The subject and the corporeal body**

This postsovereign subject, like the gender performativity of Butler’s previous work, poses the question of the materiality of the subject. That is, if the subject is constituted in language through the performative hail, how is that subject’s body to be understood?

Foucault suggests that ‘[i]t is through sex...that each individual has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility..., to the whole of his body..., to his identity’ (Foucault 1990a:156). The body, then, is central to Foucault’s understanding of the subject and subjection. In his discussion of disciplinary power, Foucault identifies the centrality of the relationship between ‘productive’ (Foucault 1990b:118) power and the body. He suggests that this relationship is marked by two key deployments of discursive power. First, the ‘anatomo-politics of the human body’ in which disciplinary technologies address the optimisation, exhortation and utility of the body (Foucault 1990a:139). Second, the ‘bio-politics of the population’ in which ‘regulatory controls’ address the biological processes (such as, health, reproduction and mortality) of the population as a whole. (Foucault 1990a:139). For Foucault, the proliferation of discourses of sexuality, and the concomitant proliferation of sexualities, has been a central locus of this activity (Foucault 1980, 1990a, 1990b). By encompassing the body both of the individual and the population, sex becomes a central locus and concern of disciplinary power: it is ‘a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species’ (Foucault, 1990a:149). The biological sex and sexual practice of the body are not seen as preceding or precipitating these discourses of sexuality. Rather, these
discourses are understood to have produced as an effect the sex which comes to be seen as a prior, biological fact:

‘We must not make the mistake of thinking that sex is an autonomous agency which secondarily produces manifold effects of sexuality over the entire surface of its contact with power. On the contrary, sex is the most speculative, most ideal, and most internal element of a deployment of sexuality organised by power in its grip on bodies and their materiality, their forces, sensations and pleasures. ‘ (Foucault 1990a:155).

In Bodies that Matter, Butler takes up Foucault’s understanding of the centrality of the body to both the formation of subjects and the operations of disciplinary power. She challenges the notion that the material body is irreducible. This challenge aims to open up possibilities for the body to be understood in non-normative ways. Butler considers the relationship between the body and its signification and suggests that the body is ‘bound up with signification from the start’ (Butler 1993:30). This is not to argue that there is no body prior to signification, but to underline the way in which the material requires signification in order to be accessible and intelligible. Butler writes:

‘The body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or signified as prior. This signification produces as an effect of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless simultaneously claims to discover as that which precedes its own action’ (Butler 1993:30 original emphasis).

That is, the body understood as beneath or before its representation in discourse, comes to inhabit this beneath or before through this discourse. Butler gives further consideration to this grammatical and epistemological limit when she considers Althusser’s subject who, responding to the policeman’s hail, is subjugated through the turn. Emphasising that, implicitly, the subject must already be a subject in order to turn and thereby be subjugated, Butler endeavours to illustrate the impossibility of accessing
the body outside either language or the subjecthood which the performativ address
effects. Butler offers the figure of the ‘girl’ as an example of this insistent relationship
between the body and representation and the way in which the meanings of corporeal
bodies are discursively constituted:

‘To the extent that the naming of the “girl” ... initiates the process by which a
certain “girling” is compelled, the term or, rather, its symbolic power, governs
the formation of a corporeally enacted femininity that never fully approximates
the norm. This is a “girl”, however, who is compelled to “cite” the norm in order
to qualify and remain a viable subjects’ (Butler 1993:232).

This ideal cannot be fully approximated because, even suspending grammatical
limitations and accepting the impossible scene of the pre-discursive body, the pre-
discursive body of the impossible scene cannot already be girl precisely because it is
pre-discursive. The body of the girl is a body without original -- the original body of the
girl is an illusion of the performative. This does not render the body of the girl a matter
of choice or something that can be easily discarded. The girl must ‘cite’ or do girl in
linguistic and bodily practice in order to retain a bodily identity which is intelligible and
accessible -- an intelligibility and accessibility that is necessarily discursive. The
demand for an intelligible and accessible body, in the case of this example the sexed
body, is predicated on it being at once a condition and effect of subjecthood.

If we accept this inseparability of the material body and its discursive representation,
then a discussion of the body is inescapably also a discussion of the historicity of the
signification. Furthermore, any attempt to identify the pre-discursive body becomes
doomed to failure, as it is only through discursive frames that the body becomes
intelligible. The question of whether there is a pre-discursive body must then be
supplanted with the question of what sorts of bodies are made intelligible through signification and what possibilities for other bodies there might be.

Bourdieu’s notion of habitus makes a significant contribution to understanding the body. This is concerned with the ways in which bodily practices are normalised and naturalised and, in turn, contribute to the reproduction of class relations. Bourdieu focuses on those bodily practices which make up ‘the most apparently insignificant aspects of the things, situations and practices of everyday life’ (Bourdieu 1991:51). He refers to ways of standing, walking, feeling, eating, drinking, laughing and speaking. As Thompson (1991) suggests in his introduction to Bourdieu’s *Language and Symbolic Power*, habitus is concerned with ways of being and doing. These ways of being and doing are not understood as being natural, arbitrary, chosen or consciously learnt. Rather, they are seen as being inculcated and ‘internalized as a second nature’ (Bourdieu 1990:56) without the awareness or conscious effort of the subject. The practices, or dispositions, inculcated through the habitus are sedimented in what Bourdieu calls the ‘bodily hexis’; ‘a life-style made flesh’ (Bourdieu 1991:86). Cultural, symbolic and linguistic capital is understood to be derived from this habitus, as is the practical sense of the relative values of these capitals within and across contexts or, to use Bourdieu’s term, markets.

Familial and cultural contexts are seen as being central to the inculcation of habitus. While this inculcation is ongoing, it is the inculcation of habitus within young children to which Bourdieu give particular emphasis. This is not understood as the imitation of a model (the child imitating the parent, sibling, etc. who sets him/herself up as an example to be emulated), rather, it is seen as a ‘practical mimesis ... which implies an overall relation of identification’ (Bourdieu 1990:73 original emphasis). The family as the
primary site of inculcation means that the habitus' of subjects within particular context or milieu is reproduced. Having been inculcated without the awareness of the subject and sedimented as a second nature, these bodily practices take on a natural appearance which is so enduring and mundane as to be barely noteworthy within everyday life. In this way, bodily practices are seen to 'naturalise the decisive breaks that constitute an arbitrary cultural limit' (Bourdieu 1991:123). The habitus then, imbues the body with a 'sense of limits' (Bourdieu 1991:123); a constellation of truths and ways of being which the subject tacitly believes in and owns yet is unaware of in either inculcation or practice. The naturalisation of these dispositions means that the subject is unlikely to have a sense of subjugation through them -- the habitus obviates any sense of being or doing otherwise.

To offer a simple example, the man's grip on his fork as he eats is a bodily disposition inculcated through proximity to his father, brother, uncle, etcetera, and which reproduces the habitus' of these and other men. These men neither choose to hold their fork in this way nor wish to hold it otherwise. While mundane and everyday, folk holding is not neutral. Across various markets, subtle and unspoken norms govern modes of folk holding; sanctioning some and censuring others. Furthermore, particular modes of folk holding infer a plethora of additional, and particular, bodily dispositions inculcated in the same way and subject to similar tacit sanctions and censures.

It may seem an uncomfortable narrative break to return to a structural notion of reproduction after considering Foucault's and Butler's understandings which make significant contributions to post-structural theorisations of the body. Yet Bourdieus emphasis on normalisation, naturalisation and the mimesis which accounts for the inculcation of the habitus articulates with the idea that the body is inseparable from
either the mind or discourse. Butler takes up this point of articulation and revises Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. I will turn to this in a moment. First, I will consider Connell’s criticism of habitus and his concept of body-reflexive practice.

Connell (1986), while critical of the apparently cohesive nature of habitus and the lack of specificity in Bourdieu’s account, suggests that the notion of habitus offers a useful ‘conceptual space’ (Connell 1986:151). This is a conceptual space which Connell appears to utilise in developing the concept of ‘body-reflexive practice’ (Connell 1995:61). He rejects the body as biologically determined, culturally mapped or some combination of the two. Instead he offers a body of sensations, capacities and responses: which is often recalcitrant; ‘will do certain things and not others’ (Connell 1995:58); but is simultaneously bound to the social. Connell’s notion of the recalcitrant body which will do some things and not others seems to resonate with our common sense understandings and experiences of the body. The physiological limits to bodily capacities are recognisable; bodies will swim but they will not fly, they will open doors but they will not walk through them. The body’s recalcitrance, its unmanageability, can be seen -- is experienced -- in, for example, panic attacks, phobias, insomnia, impotence. The relationship between the body and the social is encoded in the principles of traditional Chinese medicine, homeopathy, and understandings of psychosomatic or stress-related illness.

Connell suggests that, through body-reflexive practices, diverse and changing bodies are seen to intersect with, intercede into and refuse the social while simultaneously being addressed by it. This body is seen to have an ‘effectiveness’ (Connell 1995:60) -- it is both formed by and formative of social meanings and practices. Connell develops this notion through detailed analysis of empirical data. A useful illustration from this
analysis is the case of a man who, while having sex with a woman, enjoys the sensation of anal penetration and decides to have sex with a man. Connell suggests that the bodily sensation of anal pleasure, which is ungendered at the level of the body, is mediated through (particular) social meanings of anal sexual practices and, through this mediation, is transformed into a bodily pleasure which marks and is marked by the social meanings of homosexuality. Connell’s concept of body-reflexive practice -- bodies which are formed by and formative of social meanings and practices -- resonates with Bourdieu’s notion of habitus.

Butler takes up Bourdieu’s notion of habitus stressing that, as a ‘bodily understanding’ (Butler 1997a:134), habitus is not reducible to the following of rules or norms in a self-conscious way, but is a ‘tacit normativity’ (Butler 1997a:154). Butler suggest that habitus should be taken to be a tacitly crafted and cultivated ‘cultural style of gesture and bearing’ (Butler 1997a:142) which goes to constitute the ‘obviousness’ of a given culture (Butler 1997a:153). Butler notes, however, that while Bourdieu engages with debates concerning the performative in the context of language, he does not extend the notion of the performative to his discussion of habitus. For Butler, it is in the intersection of understandings of performative constitutions and bodily habitus that a particular possibility for theorising the body is located.

Butler suggests that performative interpellation is both embodied and embodying, constituting the subject both socially and discursively. She stresses that psychic and physical injury are implicated in one another and argues that discursive and social constitution are ‘inextricably bound’ (1997a:154). As such, Butler suggests that ‘the theoretical distinction between the social and the linguistic is difficult, if not impossible to maintain’ (1997a:153). Butler suggests that the body does not simply obey bodily
rules or reflect bodily norms, rather, she asserts that the body is these rules and norms and can be understood as ‘a kind of incorporated memory’ (Butler 1997a:154). Over time, then, ritual and convention forms the body. Simultaneously, and in an extension of Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and resonating with Connell’s body-reflexive practice, Butler suggests that bodily activity is formative of this ritual and convention. She suggest that ‘it is in this sense that the bodily habitus constitutes a tacit form of performativity, a citational chain lived and believed at the level of the body’ (Butler 1997a:155 original emphasis). Butler explains the formative power of the tacit performative:

‘The “constructive” power of the tacit performative is precisely its ability to establish a practical sense for the body, not only a sense of what the body is but how it can and cannot negotiate space, its “location” in terms of prevailing cultural coordinates ... In this sense the social performative is a crucial part not only of subject formation, but of the ongoing political contestation and reformulation of the subject as well. The performative is not only a ritual practice: it is one of the influential rituals by which subjects are formed and reformulated’ (Butler 1997a: 159-60).

Foucault’s understanding of the body’s discursive intelligibility and subjectivation; Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and the bodily hexis; Connell’s concept of body-reflexive practice; and Butler’s notion of performative habitus all insist on the inseparability of the body and the subject. The material body elbows its way into or casts a shadow over any discussion of the speaking, discursively constituted subject. At the same time, this speaking subject shouts over or whispers asides to any discussion of the material body. The material body -- the speaking mouth, the writing hand -- is literally necessary in order for a discussion of the speaking subject to take place. And the speaking subject -- intelligible and accessible through discourse -- is literally necessary in order for a
discussion of the material body to take place. The subject is inseparable from his/her embodiment.

A politics of performativity

The (perlocutionary) performative interpellation, imbued with historicity and citationality in the discursive circuits of productive power, is the foundation for Butler’s understanding of political possibility. Using this reformulation of the performative constitution of the subject, Butler suggests that a Foucauldian resistance might be practiced within discourse through a politics of performative resignification (Butler 1997a). The simultaneity of linguistic agency and the performative’s openness to failure at once makes this possible and means that such resistances may or may not be effective. Butler writes:

‘The possibility of decontextualizing and recontextualizing ... terms through radical acts of public misappropriation constitutes the basis of an ironic hopefulness that the conventional relation between [interpellation and meaning] might become tenuous and even broken over time’ (Butler 1997a:100).

Butler variously describes this performative politics as operating through appropriations, misappropriations, reappropriations and expropriations of authorised performative interpellations. These terms convey the strategic deployment of discursive practices in the resistance or alteration of authorised, normative or conventional meanings. I am concerned, however, that these terms are all embedded in a notion of property. The Oxford English Dictionary defines these words as follows: Appropriate: ‘3. To take possession of for one’s own, to take to oneself’. Reappropriate: ‘b. to take back to oneself’. Misappropriate: ‘To appropriate to wrong uses; chiefly, to apply dishonestly to one’s own use (money belonging to another)’. Expropriate: ‘1. To dispossess (a person) of ownership; to deprive of property’; ‘2. b. To take out of the owner’s hands’.
While the different actions conveyed by each of the prefixes is interesting and potentially useful for understanding the specificites of resistant practices, the prior ownership inferred by each of these terms raises difficulties. First it might implicitly restate ‘ownership’ by the authorised or enduring discourses from which the interpellation is being extracted and, by extension, an unequivocal meaning that can be fixed and be ‘owned’. Second, it might infer a subject or group of subjects who ‘own’ the term or discourse and, by extension, some form of sovereignty. Butler also refers to practices of inscription and reinscription as discussed by Derrida. While these terms are often taken to refer specifically to writing, they avoid the inference of ‘ownership’ of terms or discourses. For this reason, I will provisionally use the Derridian terms. The Oxford English dictionary suggests that, in English, the prefix ‘re-’ ‘is almost exclusively employed in the sense of ‘again’’. It also suggests, however, that it can be used to ‘reverse a previous action or process’. Given that the notion of citationality takes all inscription to be a repetition, a saying or doing ‘again’, I will restrict my use of the term reinscription to instances where the suggestion of a saying or doing again differently, if not necessarily a reversal, is inferred.

The provisional success of this performative politics has been illustrated by the reinscription of the term ‘queer’ and, more contentiously, the term ‘nigga’. This is not to suggest, however, that such a performative politics is simply a matter of asserting a new or altered meaning. The regulatory operations of authorised discourses and the historicity of terms render normative meanings resistant to resignification. Yet while normative meanings may be resistant to resignification, they are never immune from it. The possibility of resignification is intrinsic to the perlocutionary performative interpellation. Butler writes:
contexts inhere in certain speech acts in ways that are very difficult to shake. ... [but] contexts are never fully determined in advance ... the possibility for the speech act to take on a non-ordinary meaning, to function in contexts where it has not belonged, is precisely the political promise of the performative, one that positions the performative at the center of a politics of hegemony, one that offers an unanticipated political future for deconstructive thinking’ (Butler 1997:161).

Butler does not indicate whether she takes performative politics to be the practice of an individual or that of a group. My understanding is that it is at both the level of the individual and group (whose organisation, coherence and longevity may well vary) that such practices are, and might be, deployed. It may be an individual linguistic subject who engages in practices of resignification, and whose performatives may, or may not, achieve (be received by another linguistic subject as having) a ‘non-ordinary’ meaning. In such an instance the positionalities of these linguistic subjects will have a significant bearing. The resignifications of a single linguistic subject, however, cannot transform normative meanings. Such a transformation requires the non-ordinary meaning of the performative to be efficacious to the point the this non-ordinary meaning alters the interpellation. Such an alteration can only be effected through repetition and re-citation. This re-citation might imbue the performative interpellation with an altered historicity, a re-historicity that then acts to govern its normative meaning. As such, the proposition of a politics of performative resignification is not a renunciation of organised and/or collective resistance. Rather, reflecting Butler’s utilisation of deconstruction and understanding of productive power, it indicates a recognition of the necessary limits of State focused and oppositional politics.

I will offer a simplified example. If I say ‘I am queer’ to ‘you’, thereby positioning ‘you’ as the ‘learned reader’, it is likely that my performative interpellation of us both will be efficacious. As my reader you are unlikely to respond by interpellating me as
‘pervert’. If you were tempted to do so, my interpellation of you as ‘learned reader’ is likely to have acted to diminish your temptation -- you act your place in discourse, your place being the place I have positioned you. However, I run a risk by interpellating us both. You may object to my positioning of you or you may have found this text on a train and decided to read it to find out ‘what the queers are up to now’. Either way, you may act a different place in discourse to the one I offered (intended for you). In which case, I am (provisionally) the ‘pervert’ which my performative interpellation intended to resignify. The ways in which the gestures and intonations of the body exceed the language that it speaks/writes adds a further layer of equivocacy to this scene. If you simply ‘receive’ my interpellation of myself you have (possibly) understood this as an indication both of my politics of resignification and sexual identity. However, if you respond by interpellating me as ‘pervert’ you have not necessarily recuperated my intended resignification. Rather, you may have understood this as I intended and extended my resignification. We are then involved in a collective discursive practice in which we are resignifying: the terms ‘queer’ and ‘pervert’; the association of these two terms within authorised discourse; and the broader discourses through which these terms have been deployed in their normative meaning. If I then engage in a fantasy of unparalleled book sales and vigilant, learned and resignifying readers, we have a community of linguistic subjects who cite the resignification (the current signification in a queer-gay/lesbian bar?). Taking the example into an imagined future, this citation of the non-ordinary meaning masses to recast the historicity and normative meaning of the interpellations. Resignifying efforts are needed in order to extricate ‘queer’ and ‘pervert’ from their now normative affirmative meanings (when it is shouted into the bar from the street and the patrons are confused). This is familiar because I am citing a resignification whose non-ordinary meaning has, arguably, been transformed into its ordinary meaning within some discursive frames. This is not a definitive resignification, nor could it ever
Irrespective of how normative a non-ordinary meaning becomes (in some discourses) it remains equivocal and, therefore, open to further resignification.

**Conclusion**

My discussion throughout this chapter has focused primarily on the 'subject'. Particular 'identities', such as those of gender, race and sexuality, have been shown to constitute, rather than describe or represent, subjects.

Taking up this understanding suggests that identity 'categories', or 'names', are central to the performative interpellation of the subject. The subject, like the body in Butler's 'impossible scene', is unimaginable without these. To be called, for example, 'boy', 'Black', 'dyke', 'slag', is to be simultaneously interpellated as subject and as a particular type of subject. Yet understanding identity categories as constitutive exposes the problematic nature of their use. To speak of an identity is not simply to describe a pre-existing identity, it is to join the citational chain of its constitution. Returning to Derrida's understanding of binary hierarchies, identity categories not only act to constitute the identity that they *are*, they also act to simultaneously constitute and exclude the identity that they are *not*. The identity 'White' is so because it is not the identity 'Black', the identity 'woman' is so because it is not the identity 'man'. As such, identity categories inevitably inscribe hierarchical binary relations. Furthermore, the deployment of one such identity inevitably fails to account for, or even acts to erase, the way in which it makes possible and intersects with an inexhaustible array of further identity categories.

Accepting that the use of identity categories is problematic does not imply, however, that these categories should be, or even could be, abandoned. It is these identities,
performatively interpellated, that constitute the subject. And it is their equivocacy which
opens up the possibility for the subject’s discursive agency. Understanding these
performative names as bearing equivocal meanings offers both possibilities and
limitations. It means that they are open to strategic resignification, they can take on non-
ordinary meanings. At the same time, however, it means that they are always also open
to recuperation within authorised discourses. These identity categories cite and
reinscribe authorised discourses and initiate the subject into hierarchical discursive
relations. Simultaneously, however, they inaugurate the subject and, therefore, create the
conditions of possibility in which this speaking subject might resignify that very identity
otherwise.

Foucault’s understanding of the productive power of discourse and Butler’s revised
understanding of the constitutive power of performative interpellations offer nuanced
insights into the processes through which identities are constituted as well as the
intersections, interactions and interdependencies between these, while retaining a
reconfigured intentionality and agency. This means that only limited reference to
(usually secondary) empirical data is made and an articulation with that range of data
common to the Sociology of Education is not readily established. While Foucault and
Butler have been taken up across a range of disciplines, the possibilities offered by their
work for the generation and analysis of empirical data have not been fully developed.
Ethnography offers particular opportunities to explore the usefulness of these
theorisations for data generation and analysis. In Chapter 1 I examined a number of
recent ethnographies within the Sociology of Education which have drawn upon these.
However, these studies have not situated the theorisations themselves as central aspect
of inquiry.
These theorisations will both inform and become the objects of my study. Their resonance in relation to my empirical data will be interrogated through a series of specific questions:

- Are pupils’ identities performatively constituted?
- Are these identities multiple, contingent, interacting, contradictory?
- Are techniques of disciplinary power deployed and resisted by not-so-docile bodies?
- To what extent is dissonant potential evident within these performative constitutions?
- How far might a politics of performative reinscription be possible?
- Does the notion of discursive agency account for the intent and actions of subjects?
Notes to Chapter 2. Understanding Identities

1 Historicity has usefully been described as: 'what might be understood as the history which has become internal to a name, has come to constitute the contemporary meaning of a name: the sedimentation of its usages as they have become part of the very name, a sedimentation, a repetition that congeals, that gives the name its force' (Butler 1997a:36).

2 In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* Foucault describes this method as trying 'to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are revealed in discourses, but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules' (Foucault 1972).

3 This approach is taken up in *Discipline and Punish* and the *History of Sexuality Volume 1*. It is understood as: 'a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc. without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history. (Foucault 1980:117).

4 This is primarily, but not exclusively, understood in terms of sovereign and additive models of power.

5 This is relevant for rethinking the oppositional pair ontology/epistemology. While psychoanalysis does not radically disrupt the binary itself, it reveal the intrinsic reliance of each term on the other. The suggestion that the unbounded Real is lost through the infant coming to know it's body, infers an intrinsic interdependence of the concepts of mind and body. The infant's body is made known through recognising it, as such it is a knowing that itself depends on the body being seen. To know the body and knowing in this way, however, depends on a prior episteme, that is, psychoanalysis itself.

6 Butler describes productive power as: ‘formative of subjects and the legitimate boundaries of speech. This notion of a productive or formative power is not reducible to the tutelary function of the state, that is, the moral instruction of its citizens, but operates to make certain kinds of citizens possible and others impossible’ (Butler 1997a:132).

7 As seen in Epstein and Johnson’s (1998) use of performativity discussed in Chapter 1.

8 Butler remarks on her use of Althusser’s term that '[a]lthough Althusser’s own account of interpellation does not suffice to account for the discursive constitution of the subject, it sets the scene for the misappropriation of interpellating performatives that is central to any project of the subversive territorialization and resignification of dominant social orders’ (Butler 1997a:153-154).

9 This sits somewhat uncomfortably with Lacan’s understanding of the subject’s formation within the Symbolic. This is because it suggests that the newly born, or even unborn, infant is subjectified in discourse (at least provisionally) prior to that subject’s own linguistic capacity to understand or respond to the interpellation.

10 Illocution is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘an act such as ordering, warning, undertaking, performed in saying something.’. Perlocution is defined as ‘a speech act, such as persuading or convincing, that may or may not be successfully achieved by an illocutionary act such as entreating or arguing.’. (Both of these definitions cite Austin 1962).

11 Butler details the citational nature of the performative as follows: ‘If a performative provisionally succeeds ... [it is because] that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices. It is not simply that the speech act takes place within a practice, but that the act itself is a ritualised practice. What this means, then, is that a
performativ" works" to the extent that it draws on and covers over the constitutive conventions by which it is mobilized. In this sense, no term or statement can function performatively without the accumulating and dissimulating historicity of force" (Butler 1997a:51 original emphasis).

Austin identifies the infelicities of the performative but takes these to be a problematic aspect of the performative. On the other hand, Derrida (1988) and Feldman (1983) see misfire or infelicity as the enabling condition of the performative (Butler 1997a:175 endnote 12). It is in this latter vein that Butler approaches infelicity and misfire.

A tension remains in this suturing. As already discussed, Butler identifies as subjectifying those performativ interpellations which preceded the infant's entry into the Symbolic. Yet for Lacan, the infant who is interpellated by, for instance, 'it's a girl/boy' is not subjectified through it. In seeking some sort of resolution to this theoretical tension it is perhaps useful to turn to Grosz's notion of the 'subject-to-be'. By understanding the pre-Symbolic infant as a 'subject-to-be', the interpellation might be understood as preparatory or precursory. This also raises issues of the positionalities of the addresser, addressed and audience in the interpellating scene. The infant that is interpellated is positioned as a subject by the addresser, and any audience concurs with this. Yet the infant cannot be understood as a subject because it is, as yet, literally unable to take up the position of speaking subject. The infant subject is inaugurated through and into discourse prior to own ability to take up its place in discourse. Nevertheless, the infant is given a place in and through discourse by the addresser and the concurrence of the audience.

Subjection is understood here as both forming and regulating of subjects, see Althusser 1971, Butler 1997b and Foucault 1990a.

I suspect that the differential assessments of these resignifications might reflect the status of 'queer' as academic-intellectual-political counter-discourse, while the reinscription of 'nigga' (note also the respelling here) has emanated from pop/sub culture(al counter-discourse). As such, the role of the academic/intellectual in resignifying 'nigga' has predominantly been one of response and/or commentary (see Rose (1994) for a useful discussion of these issues).

Butler's earlier work has been criticised for focusing too heavily on the individual and failing to offer an adequate account of audience. This is addressed in part by Butler's discussion of the relation between the addresser and the addressed in Excitable Speech (1997a).

In order to focus in on the resignificatory aspects on the interpellation I am setting aside the particular implications of this 'exchange' being one between a 'present' writer and an 'absent' reader or an 'absent' writer and 'present' reader. See Derrida's Signature Event Context (1988) for a discussion.

Butler challenges attempts to account for 'all' the identity categories which might apply to an individual or group arguing such a list 'invariably close[s] with an embarrassed "etc."' (Butler 1990:143). Butler sees this inability to achieve closure or completeness as productive, indicative of 'the illimitable process of signification itself' (Butler 1990:143).
3. Researching schooled identities

Introduction

In Chapter 1 I outlined the key concerns which underpin this study; discussed the particular way in which the notion of identity is utilised here; and examined examples of school ethnographies which have been concerned in a variety of ways with pupils' identities. In doing this I mapped the substantive and theoretical continuities and shifts across existing studies; highlighted some of the limitations of these; and identified a series of substantive research questions for this study. In Chapter 2 I explored a range of existing theorisations of the subject and identity in order to develop a theoretical framework to be drawn on within my fieldwork and analysis and identify a series of theoretical research questions to be addressed through this study.

In this chapter I will turn to a range of methodological issues relating to school ethnography in general and my study of schooled identities in particular. I begin by detailing the significance of locating this study within the specific context of the school. In doing this, I outline the particular way in which the school context is to be understood. This is followed by a discussion of a range of understandings of and approaches to ethnography. This discussion illuminates the specific approach to ethnography taken in this study and, indeed, why this is particularly appropriate in addressing the research questions identified. Finally, I outline how this study aims to contribute to the methodology of school ethnography; understandings of pupils' identities; and theorisations of identities more broadly.
The school context

Schooling provides a ‘formal’ educational context and an ‘informal’ social context that, in principle, all children are obliged to enter and spend a substantial part of their early lives in. It is now widely agreed, however, that schools are not simply neutral institutions whose processes are universally beneficial. Whitty and Menter (1989) have suggested that ‘education is a key route to the thoughts and values of people within nations (Whitty & Menter 1989:60). Education might similarly be understood as a key route to the identities of people within nations.

In understanding the nature of school contexts it is useful to begin by looking briefly at earlier debates within the Sociology of Education. An increasing focus on in-school socialisation processes rejected the idea that education is intrinsically ‘good’ and that educational ‘failure’ can be explained in terms of pupil ‘deficit’. Rather, it was proposed that educational processes should themselves be problematised and subjected to critical scrutiny. This saw the ways in which social and cultural relations are implicated in, and reproduced through, the designation of appropriate knowledges within the school curriculum become a central focus of study (see Whitty 1985). Understandings of the role of the school in the reproduction of cultural and social relations was extended by Bowles and Gintis’ (1976) work concerning the ‘official’ and ‘hidden’ curriculum. Concerns over schooling’s reproduction of inequitous social relations led to the development of critical pedagogies and these have formed a key feature of progressivist educational efforts. More recently, however, the limitations of critical pedagogies’ endeavours to develop strategies for emancipatory schooling have been highlighted (Luke & Gore 1992).
As some of the more recent ethnographies examined in chapter 1 demonstrate, developing theorisations have offered the Sociology of Education further tools with which to make sense of schooling. Perhaps most notable amongst these theorisations is Foucault’s work on discourse and disciplinary power. It has been suggested that the work of Foucault offers two key opportunities; first, to examine the school’s possible role in shaping the subject, and second, to explore the relationship between educational theory and education itself (Hunter 1996). Foucauldian theory has been drawn upon within education sociology and policy analysis to develop new understandings of the school and school processes, the differential educational experiences of outcomes of pupils, and the identities of both pupils and teachers inside schools. See, for instance, Ball (1990); Brine (1999); Epstein & Johnson (1998); Gewirtz et al (1995); Gillborn & Youdell (2000); Gore (1995); Hey (1997); Luke & Gore (1992), Mac an Ghaill (1993); Walkerdine (1987) and (1997); and Wolpe (1988).

Reflecting this broader move within the Sociology of Education, this study is underpinned by Foucault’s understanding of the school as a disciplinary institution, constituted through and permeated by discursive practices of productive power (Foucault 1991). This understanding of the school as a disciplinary institution has been challenged. For instance, drawing on his study of urban schools in the USA, John Devine (1996) suggests that the pedagogic and the behavioural/pastoral have undergone a radical separation which exposes disciplinary power in crisis. He suggests that the regulatory technologies of power outlined by Foucault, in particular surveillance and self-surveillance, have broken down and been replaced by ‘antipanopticism, the lack of disciplinary enforcement, and constant fear’ (Devine 1996:10). Consequently, Devine questions the usefulness of Foucault’s understanding of power as an analytical tool and
asks whether, in comparison, ‘the older humanist social order ... did not have something to recommend it’ (Devine 1996:10).

Key aspects of Foucault’s theorisations were discussed in Chapter 2 and the significance of these for understanding the school was indicated. It is useful, however, to consider in detail Hunter’s (1996) Foucauldian genealogy of the school. For Hunter, both liberal and Marxist educationalists begin from a ‘conception of the person as a self-developing subject, who “learns” through freedom, and for whom the school is thus only an instrument of the person’s own self-realization’ (Hunter 1996:145-146). Hunter argues that liberal and Marxist theorisations and criticisms of schooling which understand schooling in this way, and assess its ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ in these terms, proceed from a fundamentally flawed conception of schooling. Furthermore, he suggests that the work of such theorists is based upon a ‘principled’ and unrealisable ‘ideal’ of and for education, which leads to a ‘hypercritical and prophetic intellectual fundamentalism’ (Hunter 1996:146).

Adopting a genealogical approach, Hunter suggests that mass public schooling was established to serve neither a democratising nor repressive project. Rather, schooling is seen as being shaped by the ongoing deployment of available discursive strategies. After Foucault, these deployments are seen as attempts to meet the demands of particular circumstances, and their effects are understood as the effects of power/knowledges. As such, schooling inevitably fails to realise either the progressive or repressive goals that it is frequently perceived to have been established to achieve. Hunter writes:

‘[T]he modern school system is not the historical creation of democratic politics or of popular political struggle. Neither, on the other hand, can it be understood as the instrument through which the aspirations of rational individuals or self-
realizing classes have been defeated, through the cold calculations of the State acting on behalf of an inhuman economic system. ... the school system can be neither as good as its critics wish it were, nor as bad as they think it is’ (Hunter 1996:147).

In suggesting that the realisation of individual and societal potentials was not the originating principle of mass public education, Hunter is not denying the centrality of this to contemporary schooling. He suggests, however, that this is an effect of those discursive practices mobilised in the establishment of schooling; most notably discourses of the pastoral church. While the intention of schooling was not the continued betterment of individuals, the deployment and adaptation of pastoral discourses has produced this as an unintended effect and embedded these practices within the school institution: ‘one of the most distinctive characteristics of the modern “popular” school ... is that, in adapting the milieu of pastoral guidance to its own uses, State schooling made self-realization into a central disciplinary objective’ (Hunter, 1996:149). Such an understanding moves away from a concern with schooling as the good or bad design and/or intervention of the powerful State. It considers instead the discourses through which schooling has been established in particular contexts and in the light of particular demands:

‘The school system, I suggest, is not bureaucratic and disciplinary by default, having betrayed its mission of human self-realization to a repressive State or a rapacious economy. It is positively and irrevocably bureaucratic and disciplinary, emerging as it does from the exigencies of social governance and from the pastoral disciplines with which the administrative State attempted to meet these exigencies’ (Hunter 1996:149).

Taking a Foucauldian approach, then, the school is seen as a disciplinary institution in which particular power/knowledges are inscribed and contested. These are not only related to those knowledges identified as being legitimate components of the school.
curriculum, but entail the multiple power/knowledges which are deployed throughout the school day by staff and pupils.

The school must also be recognised as a material location. Setting aside the increasing interest in virtual classrooms offered by information technologies, the school’s buildings and grounds are comprised of a series of locations -- classrooms, halls, canteens, kitchens, corridors, toilets -- with a variety of possibly mobile official and unofficial purposes and uses. Beyond the Sociology of Education, the significance of location, in terms of material spaces and their imagined meanings, is increasingly being recognised and explored (see Keith & Pile 1993; Squires 1993; and Woodhead 1995). This work suggests that, along with mobile purposes and uses, the meanings of these spaces may well be multiple, contested and shifting. This is across time and across those individuals or groups who occupy, pass through, avoid, boycott or are barred from these spaces. Furthermore, the identities of these individuals or groups are simultaneously mediated by the meanings of these spaces.

Exploring the significance of particular school spaces, Devine (1996) suggests that the Sociology of Education has been dominated by a concern with the classroom and curriculum. In response to this he focuses his study on ‘that most contested of spaces, the high school corridor’ (Devine 1996:2). Devine suggests that, unlike the ‘privatized universe of the classroom’ the corridor is ‘emblemic of the whole public dimension of the institution’ and ‘implies infinitely deferred presence, multiplicity, a dispersion of temporality, constant distraction, and the random occurrence of events’ (Devine 1996:2).

Hunter has asserted that a Foucauldian analysis suggests that ‘it is not educational principles that are central to the role of educational systems but school premises’
While the architecture of the panopticon might be absent, the technologies of disciplinary power are evident. Yet this does not automatically infer that pupils (and teachers) are successfully or permanently rendered docile bodies. If the school is constituted through a multiplicity of material locations, locations in and through which power/knowledges are both constituted and contested, then resistances, dissonances and ambiguities (however momentary, quickly recuperated, mundane) may also found. It is not within the scope of this study to engage fully with the spatial meanings of school locations as they interact with pupil identities. Nevertheless, the study does remain mindful of the possible significances of the materiality of the school and the multiple and shifting meanings of its spaces.

The school context, then, is not a neutral one. Nor is it simply an arbitrarily selected environment which could simply be exchanged with, for example, the hospital, shopping mall, unemployment office, or restaurant. While these and other contexts would no doubt be informative sites in which to study the constitution of identities, the school is a specific context understood is specific ways and promising specific insights.

Ethnography

Despite a plethora of 'how to' manuals for ethnographic and qualitative research, there is no simple definition of ethnography -- across time, theoretical persuasion and methodological debate its meaning and promises are shifting. As such, Atkinson and Delamont (1995) offer that 'it is not at all clear that there is a coherent 'qualitative' paradigm' (1995: 204). Consider, for instance, the following encyclopaedia definitions of 'ethnography':

'The direct observation of the activities of members of a particular social group, and the description and evaluation of such activity, constitute

'[T]he modern field researcher [...] must first describe events and customs from within, in order to search for patterns and to explore the cognitive maps of his subjects. This is ethnography' (The Social Science Encyclopaedia, Kuper, A. & Kuper, J. (eds.), 1985).

Here ethnography, derived from a preceding tradition, is a straightforward set of activities which progress in linear fashion from data collection, to analysis and, ultimately, understanding -- ethnography is a method.

Contrast this with the following statement made by a prominent scholar of education sociology and policy:

'fn]he choice of ethnography carries with it implications about theory, epistemology and ontology'. (Ball 1993:32).

Here ethnography might be a method, but if it is a method it is one suffused with both theory and the broader philosophical questions of knowing and being.

In this section I will suggest that, despite its variety, ethnography exists as a distinct research tradition that is distinguishable from qualitative research. Within this, I will argue that a false dichotomy has developed between 'descriptive' and 'theoretical' studies and go on to suggest that all ethnography is intrinsically theoretical. I will also draw attention to a growing body of ethnographic work which questions the extent to which reflexivity fulfils the promises made on its behalf. In addition, I will problematise the subjects who inhabit much ethnographic work and, drawing on the provisional
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2, offer an alternative conceptualisation of the researcher and the researched.

**Ethnography and qualitative research**

Ethnography is often presented as synonymous with, or an example of, qualitative research methods. To some extent this is a fair and useful starting point for examining ethnography -- the use of certain research methods is an enduring feature of such studies.

‘Unstructured’ and/or ‘semi-structured’ interviews along with various modes of observation are commonly found within accounts of both how to *do* ethnographic research and ethnographic studies themselves. Case studies and, to a lesser extent, life histories are also regularly present. The place of documentary evidence and statistical data in ethnographic research is debated more frequently. However, these methods were utilised by the Chicago School of the early twentieth century which is widely credited as the founding school of ethnographic research (Hammersley 1989). Furthermore, early research within the New Sociology of Education drew on quantitative methods as part of broader ethnographic studies (see, for instance, Ball 1981, Hargreaves 1967 and Lacey 1970). More recently, surveys and their subsequent statistical analyses have been the terrain on which an epistemological battle between qualitative and quantitative research has been fought. These methods retain a place in ethnography (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983) and continue to be drawn upon -- albeit for sometimes radically transformed reasons (see Prior 1997; Watson 1997).

It may well be legitimate to offer a preliminary definition of ethnography based upon the cluster of methods employed. In this way, research might be said to be ethnographic/qualitative when interviews, observations, case studies and life histories. in
combination or alone, are taken as the central research tools. However, questions remain over whether there is some distinction between ethnography and qualitative research and whether ethnography is 'more' than a data collection kit.

There is no clear line between 'ethnographic' and 'qualitative' research. Indeed, a number of notable, and in other instances divergent, writers in the field introduce their texts with the assertion that they take ethnography and qualitative research to be one and the same (see, for instance, Hammersley & Atkinson 1983 and 1995; Hammersley 1992; Silverman 1997). It would be difficult to argue against this position in terms of methods. Yet I retain a desire to set ethnography apart from qualitative research. This setting apart seems to rest on a number of closely related features: time, the nature of those data generated and purpose.

While the question of time is far less tangible than that of methods, the issue of time spent in the field seems to lurk implicitly within assessments (including my own) of whether research is 'ethnographic'. There is no dictum that states that a researcher must spend a set number of hours, days, weeks, months, years in the field in order for their study to be granted the title 'ethnography' (such quantification may well be seen as counter-ethnographic in any case). And yet, there remains the sense that an ethnography must take time, it must demand the time and, by extension, dedication and sacrifice of the researcher. Ethnography becomes a rite of passage, the key to the inner circle of sociological research. Time spent in the field is not a measure of the researcher's endurance (or any other qualities). Ethnography takes time, in a way that qualitative studies which employ the same or similar methods do not, because of the nature of those data sought. Ethnographic data are in-depth, they are rich. The time consuming generation of data that are rich and in-depth is necessary to fulfil the purpose, or more
accurately purposes, of ethnographic study. These purposes cannot be met through hurried interviews, collected to tight deadlines and within strict budgets, that will be cut and pasted together (the insult of all qualitative insults) as limited time rapidly runs out. As such, a useful distinction between ethnography and qualitative research is a distinction based upon purpose.

A range of purposes for ethnographic studies have been posited. This can be seen in relation to the early ethnographies of the Chicago School as well as contemporary studies. In his discussion of the work of the Chicago School, Hammersley (1989) suggests that this founding ethnographic work sought to: understand behaviour; explore creativity and innovation; document subjective experience; and capture interpretive processes. The influence of these early aims can be seen in much more recent ethnographies. In the second edition of their widely cited text Ethnography: Principles in Practice (1995), Hammersley and Atkinson suggest that ethnography may be concerned with generating descriptions, explanation or theories. They assert, however, that ‘the primary goal of research is, and must remain, the production of knowledge’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:17). As such, the connections of contemporary ethnography with that of the Chicago School remain evident.

The purposes of ethnography identified above, along with the data and time necessary to achieve these, underline the central feature of ethnography. Ethnography is concerned with the study of social life in context(s). Along with generating rich, in-depth data within specific contexts, ethnography is also concerned to understand the significance and possible mediating effects of these contexts. Through the process of generating data in context, then, the ethnographer also strives to develop a detailed insight into this context. Intermittent observations within a context might allow the researcher to begin to
develop an understanding of its specific nature and significance. Similarly, a small number of interviews, undertaken either inside or outside the context, can explore participants' perceptions and reports of this context. Such a qualitative approach, however, cannot furnish the researcher with the detailed, context-specific data and understanding that can be achieved through ethnography. I would suggest, therefore, that it is the contextual nature and focus of ethnography which distinguishes it from qualitative research more broadly.

Descriptive or theoretical ethnography?

In the first edition of Ethnography: Principles in Practice Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) suggested that ‘the development and testing of theory is the distinctive function of social theory’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983:19). Accepting that this would not be achieved through the scientific mode of falsification, they turned to theorisation through interpretation. Hammersley and Atkinson argued that this approach offered ‘confidence’ rather than ‘proof’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983:25) and suggested that such theorisation should aim to understand the ‘mechanisms or processes’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983:20) that underpin the relationships to which it refers.

Hammersley subsequently revised his position in relation to interpretive theorisation. Hammersley (1990) draws a distinction and hierarchy between ethnography which is theoretical and ethnography which is descriptive or interpretive. Here Hammersley criticises much contemporary ethnography, particularly that generated through Symbolic Interactionism, Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology, on the basis that it descriptive - - depicting diversity without attempting to explain the patterns that it observes. He argues that interpretive ethnography has failed to test theory or contribute to theoretical knowledge and is, as such, ‘condemned to rely upon theoretical ideas which are vague
and untested' (Hammersley 1990:102). Hammersley maintains that too little ethnographic work has contributed to social theory and calls for a "reassessment and reconstruction of ethnographic practice" to allow for the "cumulative development of theory" (Hammersley 1990:136).

More recently, the revised second edition of Hammersley and Atkinson's *Ethnography: Principles in Practice* (1995) suggests a valid role for both descriptive ethnography and that concerned with the "refinement and testing of theories" (1995: 236-7). Furthermore, in this later text it is asserted that descriptive ethnography is concerned with selection and interpretation and is, therefore, implicitly concerned with theory.

Miller (1997) has suggested that ethnographic work should take up its "distinctive opportunities to develop analytic perspectives that speak directly to the practical circumstances of everyday life" (Miller 1997: 24). The theoretical opportunities offered by ethnography are considered to be distinctive precisely because ethnographic data is generated in and concerned with context(s). Miller suggests, therefore, that theoretical developments derived from ethnographic study are able to "speak to issues of everyday life and practice" (Miller 1997:24).

Drawing on a Foucauldian notion of discourse (Foucault 1991), I would suggest that a distinction between descriptive and theoretical ethnography is both false and unhelpful. The notion of a purely descriptive ethnography is itself underpinned by particular theoretical frames -- descriptive ethnography does not stand outside discourse, it is engaged in the citation and inscription of theory. Like Hammersley and Atkinson (1995), the distinction for me, therefore, lies in the extent to which any given theoretical
framework is made explicit and worked through research questions, data generation, analysis and writing.

In illustrating this, it is useful to highlight the existence of a multiplicity of ethnographic ‘schools’ which have contributed to debates concerning theorisation through ethnographic study. Atkinson, Delamont, and Hammersley (1993) identify a range of schools associated with ethnography including: Symbolic Interactionism; Anthropology; Sociolinguistics; Ethnomethodology; Neo-Marxist Ethnography; and Feminist Ethnography. My purpose here is not to offer an exhaustive list or to draw out the distinctions between these schools. Rather, it is to highlight the intersection of ethnography with varied theoretical and analytical frames. This intersection challenges the distinction between descriptive and theoretical ethnography. All of these ‘schools’ are concerned with social study in context. These contextually situated data, however, are inseparable from the ethnographer’s underpinning theoretical framework. Theoretical and analytical frames shape ethnography in distinctive ways, introducing particular boundaries and possibilities. This study of schooled identities, predicated on an understanding of multiple and shifting identities constituted performatively through discourse, will produce an ethnographic text (in terms of data, analysis and style) that is markedly different from a study of similar issues predicated on Marxist-feminist understandings of social class and gender. It is difficult, therefore, to conceive of the product of ethnography as an unproblematic description.

**The turn to reflexivity and its limits**

The broadly accepted response to the recognition of the theory-ladenness of all research has been the turn to reflexivity. Almost any of the many ethnographic methods texts and ethnographic accounts espouse the reflexive ethnographer/ethnography. Such reflexivity
is called for at the level of the individual researcher in the field and at the level of the questions asked and answers offered by any given study.

Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) state that ‘social researchers are part of the social world they study’ (1995:16): the researcher’s assumptions (personal, theoretical, epistemological) have an unavoidable impact upon her/his study. It has been argued, therefore, that the researcher shapes the contexts in which data are gathered (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995); the theories tested, generated in or brought to the field (Ball 1993; Hammersley 1990); and the ethnographic text produced (Atkinson 1990; Atkinson & Delamont 1995; Hammersley & Atkinson 1995; Miller 1997).

This does not result in either a futile attempt to erase these effects or a simple acceptance of them. In the first edition of Ethnography: Principles in Practice (1983) it was suggested that reflexive research practices enable the ethnographer to interrogate her/his effects. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) asserted that:

‘[w]hile there are often practical limits to reflexivity, and while reflection on a problem by no means always produces a solution, reflexivity is, in our view, the key to the development of both theory and methodology in social science in general and in ethnographic work in particular.’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983:236).

This position shifts within the second edition of the text. Here the implications of the knowledges brought to the research by the ethnographer are more fully expounded; the opportunities offered to research by the ‘researcher as active participant’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:19) are explored; and the requirement and utility of making explicit and interrogating interpretations is discussed. Hammersley and Atkinson state:
‘[T]his reflexivity provides the basis for a reconstructed logic of inquiry that shares much with positivism and naturalism but goes beyond them in important respects. By including our own role within the research focus, and perhaps even systematically exploiting our participation in the settings under study as researchers, we can produce accounts of the social world and justify them without placing reliance on futile appeals to empiricism, of either positivist or naturalist varieties’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:21-22).

The call to reflexivity within ethnography raises an issue which reaches beyond method and theory into epistemology and ontology. Reflexivity begs the question of the ‘subject’. The notion of the reflexive researcher infers an *a priori*, knowing subject. A subject who can assess rationally the actions, words, thoughts, meanings, of both her/himself and the researched. And if the researcher is such a subject, then so is the researched. Many sociologists/social scientists have battled vigorously against Enlightenment modes of ‘truth-through-science’. Yet another artefact of the Enlightenment -- the rational, knowing subject -- has received only limited mention and interrogation. This rational subject appears to be implicit within much ethnography (and other empirical social research), although explicit cognitive, psychological, psychoanalytical or philosophical models for such a subject are rarely offered. While reflexivity elides the subjectivity/objectivity dichotomy, it by no means represents a third term (Cixous 1993). As Silverman (1997b) notes ‘perhaps the reflexivity card is now being played too regularly in the social sciences’ (Silverman 1997b:239).

**The researcher and researched -- ethnography’s subjects**

The absence of an adequate interrogation of just what sort of ‘subject’ is engaging in reflexive practices is reflected in the treatment of the roles of both the researcher and the researched in much of the methods literature. The agency and rationality of both the researcher and the researched is frequently implicit in discussions of relations within the
field. This is a viable position, however, it is only one of a number of viable positions, all underpinned by particular theoretical assumptions. As such, any understanding of the subjects who inhabit research should be interrogated rather than assumed.

Discussions of the role of the researcher frequently cover the need for ‘impression management’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:83), through dress, speech and demeanour, as well as the presentation of ‘different ‘selves’’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:87) appropriate to different research contexts. This clearly embraces a notion of an active, rational researcher managing her/his identity/ies within the field. The notion of ‘ascribed characteristics’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:92) closes down the possibilities for impression management. Here, the researched makes assumptions and mobilises stereotypes on the basis of ascribed characteristics -- such as gender, race and age -- that the researcher cannot ‘manage’ or present ‘differently’. At a practical level this is reasonable. Common sense tells us that, short of drag, passing or cosmetic surgery, these identities will be evident to the researched. This position belies, however, the notion of the subject by which it is implicitly underpinned. If characteristics are ascribed then they are, to some degree, determined (whether socially or biologically).

Similarly, Baszanger and Dodier (1997) note the engagement of the researched in interpretation of the researcher. They suggest that the researcher must be ‘attentive to the expectations and role projections of the people being observed’ (Baszanger & Dodier 1997:13). Here the researcher remains a rational, knowing subject, however, in this understanding the possibility that identities are fluid enough to be manipulated, counter-manipulated and misunderstood appears to be retained.
Irrespective of the possibility for varying interpretations, the researcher in these accounts appears to be imbued with essence(s) (Fuss 1990). As such, the significance of interrogating the ways in which these identities are constituted is overlooked.

Turning to the roles of the researched, a similar ‘subject’ is in evidence. It has been suggested that ‘[i]t is a distinctive feature of social research that the ‘objects’ it studies are in fact ‘subjects’, and themselves produce accounts of their world’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:120). These accounts are seen as being influenced by the biographical and cultural identities of the researched and are relevant to their perspectives, understandings and interpretations. Likewise, Giddens (1984) argues that the researched are ‘knowable agents’ within the context of their specific local and structural conditions. Within such understandings, both the researcher and the researched are positioned as knowing subjects who are engaged in an ongoing reading of identities -- some malleable, others fixed.

Feminist research and research methodology have played a significant role in promoting discussion of a problematised researcher and researched. At the risk of labouring a point, it is important to point out the extent of diversity and debate amongst ‘feminist’ scholars and researchers, not least in relation to the question of whether a feminist methodology exists (Clegg 1985). Nevertheless, specific and recognisable contributions have been made to understandings of the researcher and the researched which have been led by feminist writers/the feminist movement. Notably, feminism has demanded that attention be paid to the power relations implicit in the researcher-researched relationship (as well as within the academy itself) (Oakley 1974 & 1980; Skeggs 1994) and the possibility for empowerment/emancipation through particular modes of and agendas for research (Lather 1991). As such, feminist research methodologies are characterised by their
underpinning political commitments and histories -- political commitments and histories that tend to imply particular notions of women (and men) as subjects.

It is possible to draw a distinction between feminist research which understands gender identities in terms of material relations and feminist research which understands gender identities in terms of discursive relations. Across this distinction, however, feminist research methodologies foreground the significance of the identities of both the researcher and the researched. Among materialist/structuralist feminists this is most strongly illustrated by ‘feminist standpoint’/‘feminist ontology’ (Skeggs 1994; Stanley & Wise 1990) and ‘feminist epistemology’ (Stanley & Wise 1993). While there are differences within and between these strands of feminist research, they all position ontology as prior to, and in a deterministic relationship with, epistemology -- what we are determines what/how we will/can know. This premises an *a priori* subject, a subject whose being, or ontology, is ‘authentic’ and ‘essential’ even where this authenticity and essence is understood to be socially constructed (Fuss 1990).

This intersects strongly with, and arguably has stimulated, much discussion concerning the social locations of the researcher and researched found outside ‘feminist’ research. What most strongly distinguishes standpoint epistemology is its insistence on making standpoint visible and interrogating its impact on both the research process and findings. To some extent, then, this is akin to reflexivity. Calls to reflexivity, and ‘reciprocal reflexivity’ (Lather 1991:59) are common within feminist research and it has been argued that feminist interrogations of these issues have prompted the widespread adoption of reflexive research practices more broadly (Stanley & Wise 1990).
Post-structural research subjects?

More recently, feminist researchers have engaged with post-structural/post-modern notions of the subject and the tensions and contradictions between the ontological basis of feminism and the contingent and constructed subject of post-structuralism has been acknowledged and debated (Bordo 1992; Stanley & Wise 1990 and 1993). This contradiction has been responded to by repositioning gendered identities as discursively produced, thereby refocusing the research agenda from a concern with disadvantage to a concern with multiple and shifting (while constrained) discursively produced power relations (Jones 1993; Middleton 1993). In attempting to retain the central categorisation of ‘women’ in this context, Jones (1993) suggests that ‘[o]ne option is simultaneously to use and reject it’ (Jones 1993). As such, preceding notions of feminist standpoint, ontology and epistemology have been reworked through ‘feminist postmodernist’ epistemology’ (Stanley & Wise 1990:27) and ‘feminist standpoints’ (Stanley & Wise 1990:47). Nevertheless, the overriding ontological basis of feminism has not been reconciled fully with the constituted and contingent subjectivities of post-structuralism.

Ethnographic studies which are informed by the discourse theory of Michel Foucault express the researched in a different way. Here discourse provides the ‘conditions of possibility’ (Miller 1997:33) within which ‘setting members’ (Miller 1997:38) make (limited and constrained) use of particular ‘discursive practices’ and ‘interpretive frameworks’ (Miller 1997:32). For Holstein and Gubrium (1997), the researched as ‘subject’ is a passive vessel (to be tapped for facts and experiences by the researcher) and needs to be re-situated as ‘active maker of meaning’ (Holstein & Gubrium 1997:117). Baker (1997) goes further and suggests that it is the activation and deployment of ‘membership categorization devices’ (Baker 1997:143) that are at the centre, and the key concern, of ethnographic study. The shift from the usually
unproblematic reference to research 'subjects'/'participants' to 'setting members' or 'maker of meaning' belies the tension inherent to empirical research framed by theory which is uncomfortable with, or even rejects, the notion of the rational subject. Yet this self-conscious shift in language is not sufficient to erase the underlying sovereign subject.

Serious attention is increasingly being paid to the problematic relationship between the 'knowing' subjects implicit to empirical research and the 'troubled' subjects (Butler 1990) of post-structuralist writing. Yet there is no easy 'solution' here. It is possible that replacing sovereign agency with the notion of discursive agency (Butler 1997a; Foucault 1991) will go some way to illuminate and relieve this tension. Discursive agency may facilitate an ethnography which retains a sense of the agency and intent of the subject without implicitly casting this subject a sovereign. This is a possibility that will be explored in subsequent chapters.

**Schooling Identities: a school ethnography?**

Locating my study in what might be broadly understood as a post-structural theoretical framework demands that a similar approach be taken to methodology, methods and data. Similarly, my overarching concern with the discursive/performative constitution of the subject has implications for my research methodology.

As I have shown above, there is now a strong current within ethnographic and methodological writing which suggests that ethnography is intrinsically bound to the theoretical positionings, epistemic frameworks and ontological understandings of ethnographers; 'the choice of ethnography carries with it implications about theory, epistemology and ontology' (Ball 1993:32). In this vein, Silverman (1997) asserts 'the
centrality of the relationship between analytic perspectives and methodological issues’
and, as such, refutes what he calls a ‘‘cookbook’ version of research methods’
(Silverman 1997:1). Nevertheless, this does not automatically place theory above
empirical research. Reflecting earlier calls for the testing of theory through ethnography,
Miller (1997) argues that ‘serious questions should be raised about sociological
perspectives that purport to speak with authority about social life, but which cannot
minimally inform research on how that life is lived’ (Miller 1997:24).

In finding a satisfactory starting point for ethnography that is theoretically driven, the
comments of Atkinson and Delamont (1995) are useful. Their call for ‘eclecticism and
pragmatism’ (Atkinson & Delamont 1995:iv) may involve a degree of vulnerability to
theoretical and epistemological incoherence and, as such, might be treated with a degree
of caution. However, a sense of freedom and scope for creativity is offered by their
suggestion that:

‘[R]esearchers should not treat methods, or disciplines, or schools of thought as
if they were sectarian doctrines with iron barriers between them that scholars
cross at their peril. Rather, ethnographers should be promiscuous bricoleurs,
selecting whatever techniques, theories or insights can be best deployed in any
particular project’ (Atkinson & Delamont 1995: vi).

In this chapter and in Chapter 1 I have identified the growing body of ethnographic
research that endeavours to utilise and explore Foucauldian notions of power and
discourse. Prior (1997) argues that social research should move beyond a focus on the
individual to an examination of discursive practices. Similarly, Silverman (1997) asserts
‘the need to broaden our conception of qualitative research beyond issues of subjective
meaning and towards issues of language, representation and social organisation’
(1997:1). As such, ethnographic study becomes the exploration of the ways in which the
researched create their local realities through those discourses available to them (Miller 1997) and data is understood and utilised as a 'venue' (Miller 1997:39) for exploring discourse. Such an analysis is not positioned as interpretive but as the interrogation of discourse as 'monument' (Prior 1997:77).

In drawing on such approaches to ethnographic work (while always attempting to retain a critical distance from them in order to continually allow for alternative views and understandings), I am attempting to suture together established features of school ethnography and with more recent understandings of the nature of discourse and power/knowledge (Foucault 1980, 1990a, & 1991). In this way, my selection of particular methods is not predicated on an assessment of their relative abilities to access 'truth' or even 'experience'. Rather, selection is based on considerations of how best to access the discursive practices through which multiple 'identities' are constituted, sustained, contested and reinscribed. As such, I utilise those key methods of ethnographic data generation -- interviews and observations alongside relevant documentary data -- but do so with a somewhat transformed understanding of their nature:

>'no method of research can stand outside the cultural and material world ... this involvement of methodologies in the world suggests that we should be a little cautious about the claims we make about our preferred research techniques. The appeal to 'authenticity' and of the direct contact with human 'experience' are, I believe, part of the messages of the world we live in. As such, they are to be explained rather than to be relied upon' (Silverman 1997b: 249).

The interview

A concern with the ways in which knowledges are constituted frames my approach to interviews (Holstein & Gubrium 1997). Considerations of the most appropriate mode of
interviewing -- 'structured' or 'unstructured', 'directive' or 'non-directive' (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:151-2) -- is secondary. Rather, interviews are informed by an understanding of the interview as a collaborative product (albeit an unequal one) which is implicitly structured and directed on an ongoing basis (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:152). Approaches to interviews that attempt to reconcile empirical study with a refutation of the a priori subject are favoured:

'The imagined subject behind the respondent emerges as part of the project, not beforehand. Within the interview itself, the subject is fleshed out -- rationally, emotionally, in combination, or otherwise -- in relation to the give-and-take of the interview process and the interview's broader research purposes. The interview and its participants are constantly developing' (Holstein & Gubrium 1997:121).

Informed by such an understanding of the researched, the notion of accounts that provide insight into participants' knowledge of phenomena and participants' perspectives (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995) is replaced with an understanding of the interview as a 'site of, and occasion for, producing reportable knowledge itself' (Holstein & Gubrium 1997:114). In this way, my approach to the interview is characterised by an emphasis that is 'as much on the assembly process as on what is assembled' (Holstein & Gubrium 1997:127).

The observation

The classification of observational roles as ranging from complete participant to complete observer (Junker 1960 cited by Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:104) has been criticised on the grounds that observation can be neither fully participant nor non-participant (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995). This criticism foregrounds the inescapability of observer-effect. However, more significantly, it begins to suggest the
impossibility of observing (and thereby accessing) an external reality which can be either fully known or devoid of interpretation. Miller (1997) argues that 'social realities are always under construction' (Miller 1997:27) and suggests that observation is crucial to ethnography that is concerned with discursive practices. It is useful to consider observation as a route to discerning the discursive constitution of social realities, however, this must be coupled with a recognition of the ways in which observation itself simultaneously constitutes and is constituted by both social realities and the multiple meanings and significances of particular spatial locations. As such, the observation -- as contained within the text of the researcher’s fieldnotes -- is not a neutral account of a seen, heard, felt exteriority; it is a representation.

**The text**

Prior (1997) suggests that '[t]extually ordered knowledge packages and stabilises the order of things as they appear within a wider realm of discourse' (Prior 1997:67). As such, documentary data can be understood as 'a representation of what is assumed to exist' (Prior 1997:69). Subsequently, analysis of documentary data is concerned with 'the origins, nature and structure of the discursive themes by means of which the text has been produced' (Prior 1997:66). Such an understanding has implications for the ultimate product of ethnographic study -- the ethnographic text. This text is not a 'true' representation of 'true' identities, rather, it is a reconstruction created within (or, perhaps, against) the bounds of the ethnographic genre (Atkinson 1990). It is a discourse on a multiplicity of discourses. The text is, as Prior (1997) suggests, 'a simulacrum rather than a reflection' (Prior 1997:69).
The promise of the turn to discourse

The central value of a shift from structural or cultural analyses to Foucauldian discourse analysis is the reconfiguration of power and subjectivity which it entails. Foucauldian discourse analysis of school practices might share the findings of (earlier) studies underpinned by (typically, but only for example) neo-marxist, feminist or symbolic interactionist theorisations. For example: girls still apply lipstick during maths lessons, boys are still aggressive and sexist; the precise items of clothing, shoes and accessories necessary to demarcate membership may have changed but sub-cultures are still in evidence; the expectations of teachers remain reflected in the educational experiences and outcomes of individuals and groups; hierarchies in which race, class, and gender are pivotal indicators of position continue to prevail.

It is at the levels of data generation and analysis where the difference, something new, a set of further insights, a proposition of new possibilities and limitations becomes evident. By taking a different approach to what constitutes data and its ‘proper’ collection (generation), a Foucauldian school ethnography might (or might not) ‘see’ something different, the stories on the tape recorder and the notes scribbled in the fieldbook might (or might not) change. What will change, is the status ascribed to those stories and notes and the sense made of them. It is at the level of analysis, of meaning making -- in the moment in the field, while scribbling in a fieldbook, rambling into a tape recorder on the drive home, in day dreams and later in formal analysis and writing -- that these theorisations ‘change’ school ethnography.
Aside -- a fragment of data

A girl gets out of her seat, walks to the front of the classroom, takes a sheet of paper from the teacher's desk, turns, begins walking back to her seat, meets the eyes of a boy and, still walking, smiles at him, reaches her desk and sits down.

What is in the fragment and what is omitted from it speaks of my substantive area of concern, theoretical underpinnings and analytical frame. So what might this fragment tell the reader?

Perhaps the reader sees participation in designated classroom activity and implicit understanding/playing out of classroom norms established between the teacher and student(s) -- suggesting the girl is 'pro-school' or 'pro-education'.

But I have not provided the contextual background to allow any certainty of this. I have not indicated what task the class has been given and omitted (until now) the teacher's earlier announcement that paper was available on her desk for any students needing it. Taking paper from the teachers desk and moving around the classroom making social contacts with a (male) student might just have easily been evidence of the girls 'deviant' behaviour and 'anti-school' or 'anti-education' position. Alternatively, the reader may see gender, (hetero)sexuality, desire, desirability which might be understood in terms of (for instance) patriarchal gender relations or the shared meanings and contextual practices of social actors.

But what interested me was the way the girl walked, the way she held the paper, the way she smiled. The untroubled, steadily paced sashay (did she get that from
the Clothes Show?), the paper held at the edge by relaxed thumb and forefinger, other fingers fanned, elbow bent and hand rocking as it hangs from the wrist, the affirmation in the smile (the star acknowledging the attention of her audience?) ... For me, a constellation of gendered and sexualised discourses coalesced to produce a (necessarily embodied?) performative moment. One that I captured, or was captured by. Was it compulsion that activated this collection of citations? What identity or identities does it assert, avow, allow? Was it a considered performance? Was it all for her audience? What meaning would these performative practices have without audience? Does her entry into the Symbolic insist that she always already has an audience? Would her body have been the same in an empty classroom? Would she still smile? Has she practiced this in private in front of her bedroom mirror?

**In the field**

Within my study, then, interviews, across a spectrum of occasions of/for discourse, were pursued on the basis of theory and opportunity. Despite being persuaded theoretically that the assembly process is as insightful as the assembled, I retained implicit hopes for interviews. Specifically, that question and answer sessions would be outnumbered by scenarios in which pupils' offered detailed narratives (Polkinghorne 1995). The selection of observational sites and ‘moments’ within my study was driven by theory, hunches, opportunism, pupils’ suggestions and entreaties as well as the demands, and perhaps more significantly limitations, of field relationships. In addition, I aimed to be constantly mindful of the potential significance of spatial meanings (Keith and Pile 1993) when undertaking observations and during my habitual and mundane use of and movement through the school. A multiplicity of textual sources circulate within the school, from the public and publicity orientated prospectus to notes passed between pupils in classrooms.
The contexts and processes of the production of these texts was varied and reflected their content, status and formal availability. Furthermore, the meanings of these texts were by no means singular or waiting to be lifted from the page. Once again, my use of texts generated within the school has been guided by both theory and opportunity.

As anticipated, tensions emerged when my theoretical framework and understanding of methods met pupils’ accounts of ‘real’ events; assertions of ‘truth’; and lived actions and experiences. Furthermore, I often found myself ‘hanging out’ with pupils, more concerned about whether I was ‘hanging’ acceptably than with making sense of the discursive practices through which the boundaries of acceptable ‘hanging’ were inscribed and policed. At times I also found myself ‘hanging out’ with teachers, although ‘pseudo-teacher’ was never quite as alluring as ‘pseudo-pupil’. During classroom observation I found myself being (almost) ‘shh-ed’ by teachers as (almost) part of a group of pupils; being asked for and giving answers (as a pseudo-teacher when asked by teachers, as a pseudo-pupil-friend-something when asked by pupils); and taking part in pupils’ learning activities. Spending time with pupils in classrooms, corridors and elsewhere I found myself being hit on by (particular) boys; answering the questions that I was trying to find ways to ask; being given ‘good quotes for your book’; invited to gigs; comparing tattoos; and being drawn, by association, into pupils’ conflicts. Ethnography is messy. As a researcher I did become embroiled in and part of the lives of the researched. I would suggest, however, that some time spent as not-quite-native(s) is both inevitable and essential to developing the insight into the research context which ethnography seeks.

Over the course of the following chapters I attempt to step-back from the data generated through this range of processes. I will not suggest that I am retrospectively ‘outside’
these data. Rather, I have available theoretical tools which enable me to access and understand these data in ways that were impossible for me in the moments of their generation.

The school and the pupils

The fieldwork for this study was undertaken in a co-educational outer London secondary school, ‘Taylor Comprehensive’, during the 1997/8 academic year. During the 1995/6 and 1996/7 academic years Taylor Comprehensive participated in an ethnographic study concerned with the impact of reform on equity and attainment in the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) (hereafter known as the ‘GCSE research’) (see Gillborn & Youdell 2000). I was the principal fieldworker for the GCSE research.

The decision to undertake this study of Schooling Identities in Taylor Comprehensive was fuelled by three key considerations. First, the fieldwork period of the GCSE research coincided with the early stages of deliberation and design of this study and issues arising out of interviews and observations undertaken as part of the GCSE research linked into my developing ideas in relation to this study. As such, data generated through the GCSE research influenced the shape of this study, for instance, the identification of specific notions of ‘ability’ as crucial pupil identities. By extension, it became evident that data generated for the purpose of examining education reform and inequality was simultaneously or tangentially concerned with schooling identities.

Second, I developed a detailed understanding of the school organisation and ethos during the course of the GCSE research. I also developed relationships with many teachers and pupils within the school, enjoyed freedom of access to and movement around the school and gained the sponsorship of the senior management team and a
number of pastoral and departmental managers. As such, the GCSE research furnished me with a number of key informants amongst staff and pupils as well as a wealth of pertinent documentary, interview and observational data. Furthermore, the senior management team made significant efforts to facilitate the GCSE research and offered their commitment to continue to do so for the ‘schooling identities’ study.

This combination of a substantial pool of pertinent data and the pre-existing field relationships made the opportunity to undertake this study in Taylor Comprehensive particularly attractive. Finally, the characteristics of the school itself added weight to this decision. Given the theoretical framework of the study and its concern with the mundane and routine practices through which identities are constituted, it is arguable that (while recognising shifting contextual specificities) any school would provide an appropriate venue for study. Nevertheless, the exploration of the multiplicitous nature of identities is a key aspect of the research. I sought, therefore, to undertake the study in a school whose pupils might be located by a diverse range of ‘biographical’ ‘learner’ and ‘sub-cultural’ identities. Being a multi-ethnic, co-educational ‘comprehensive’ (‘boasting’ a wide and balanced ability range on intake), Taylor had a pupil population of the diversity sought. Examining the constitution of multiple identities demanded a detailed focus on a small yet diverse sample. A substantial part of the GCSE research data was generated through interviews and observations focused around one Year 9 (age 13-14) tutor group during the 1995/6 academic year. These pupils were in Year 11 (age 15-16) during the 1997-8 academic year when the ‘Schooling Identities’ fieldwork was undertaken. Returning to this tutor group allowed existing field relations to be built upon, with further pupils being incorporated through the social networks of tutor group members. It also offered the opportunity to integrate those data generated through the GCSE research into this
study. In addition, these year 11 pupils were in a position in their educational careers and of an age which seemed to offer particular research opportunities.

While the constitution of identities is understood as an ongoing process, this does not infer that pupils will experience identities in this way. I anticipated that, approaching the GCSE examinations which mark the end of compulsory schooling, pupils' learner identities were likely to have crystallised. Along with preparations for GCSE examinations, this stage of pupils' educational careers is marked by decision making processes concerning post-16 destinations. I anticipated that these decision making processes would intersect and interact with pupils' identities. I also anticipated that pupils' social networks and sub-cultural allegiances, and the identities which inform and are informed by these, were likely to be embedded. Where these had shifted over the duration of pupils' schooling, I anticipated that pupils would be able to construct retrospective accounts of these changes. Finally, I believed that, by the ages of 15 and 16, pupils would have a range of experience both inside and outside the school that were likely to be pertinent to the constitution of identities. I also anticipated that a number of pupils would be engaged in sexual or pseudo-sexual relationships; a possibility which was likely to enhance the ability of the study to explore pupils' sexual identities.

Returning to Taylor Comprehensive and to a research cohort from an earlier study also presented a series of potential hazards. Perhaps most significant was the potential for lack of clarity over, or slippage of, the research focus. Issues pertinent to the GCSE research inevitably crossed over into the 'schooling identities' study. I was aware, however, that the researched and/or I might inadvertently revert back to issues that were familiar but no longer at stake. Likewise, while the utilisation of existing field relations was a key factor in selecting the school and cohort, the nature and longevity of these field relations could by no means be assured -- whatever the previous relations had been,
these could shift, dissipate or become embedded during the break in fieldwork. Finally, selecting a cohort entering Year 11 -- their final year of compulsory schooling -- meant that this was the final opportunity to study this cohort within this context and that fieldwork must be intensive.

The ‘informed consent’ of pupils was sought and, given that school is a context in which pupils are rarely offered ‘real’ choices, it is unsurprising that consent was received. The reach of this ‘consent’ became evident through its granting, resisting or withdrawal within the day to day practices of the research. Overall, girls in the tutor group were willing, indeed eager, to participate in the research. The greatest difficulty encountered in relation to girls’ participation was that they persistently offered and asked to be interviewed (in order to miss lessons?) or have their lessons observed (in order to liven-up lessons or create a diversion from school work?). This meant that I constantly appeared to be declining some offers/requests while accepting others. The participation of boys in the tutor group was less straight forward. Some boys were happy to engage with me informally in the classroom and corridor as well as in arranged interviews. There was a small cluster of boys, however, who avoided interviews until well into the school year and who regularly appeared embarrassed when they saw me enter a lesson and took some time to stop ‘checking’ if I was ‘looking’ at them during classroom observations.

All of these mode of engagement in the research demanded that care was taken in managing field relations in order to ensure that no pupil felt either neglected or intruded upon. I do not, however, understand these varying levels and modes of engagement as indicative of a flaw in my research design (although I accept that they may well have been related to various ascribed characteristics). Rather, I analyse these in terms of the
ongoing constitution of identities and the various constituting force(s) of these participations and/or avoidances. That is, I understand pupils’ multiple modes of participation in the research as *identity practices*.

**Conclusion**

Over the course of this chapter I have attempted to map the relationship between ethnographic methodologies and my own study. I have suggested that ethnography can be understood as the in-depth study of social life in specific contexts. In addition, I have argued that the distinction between descriptive and theoretical ethnography is unhelpful, suggesting instead that all ethnography is intrinsically theoretical. I have also argued that to date too little attention has been paid to the nature of the subjects with whom ethnography is concerned. I have posed the possibility of better reconciling the ‘real’ people of empirical study with the de-centred subject of post-structural theory by drawing on the notion of discursive agency. Such discursive agency retains intent and action but reconfigures agency as being constituted in discourse. In the light of this critical appraisal, I have outlined my own approach to ethnography and ethnographic methods and offered some reflection on my research process.

I have also posited that the school might best be understood as a disciplinary institution, continually shaped by the discourses which circulate within and constitute its practices, and suggested that the school’s interacting educational and social contexts are likely to mediate the biographical, learner, and sub-cultural identities of pupils. Finally, I have offered an account of my research school and cohort, along with the reasoning which underpinned their selection.
This ethnography aims, therefore, to contribute to the ongoing reassessment and development of school ethnography; enhance understandings of pupil identities and the relationship of these to schools and schooling; and advance existing theories of identities more broadly. In the chapters that follow I will turn to these pupil identities. Drawing on a range of my ethnographic data generated, I will examine the processes by which pupil identities are constituted, resisted and reinscribed within the school context.
4. Naming Identities

“every day you hear something new about yourself”
(Juliet, year 11 pupil, girl, Mixed-raced).

‘to be called a name is one of the first forms of injury that one learns’

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with names, that is, what groups and individuals inside the school call themselves and others. I begin with names not with the intention of creating a set of groups or categories which will then serve as an heuristic typology throughout the rest of my analysis. Rather, I am concerned with the names that circulate within the school and the implications of these. As such, I intend to identify and analyse, rather than create and use, identity typologies.

My focus here immediately raises the questions of, first, what is to be understood as a name and, second, how a name is to be understood. The first question is more readily answered than the second. The Oxford English Dictionary devotes over four pages to the definition of ‘name’. I will not attempt to offer an exhaustive definition. Rather, I will highlight a number of meanings which are particularly pertinent:

‘I. 1. a. To give a name or names to (persons, places, things, etc.); to call by some name.’ ‘c. with the name as complement’ ‘2. a. To call by some title or epithet.’ b. To have a (good or bad) name, to be well or ill spoken of. *obs. rare.*’
‘c. To give (one) the name (of being something); to allege or declare (a person or thing) to be something. *obs.*’ ‘3. To call (a person or thing) by the right name.’
‘II. 4. a. To nominate, designate, assign, or appoint (a person) to some office,
duty or position.' 5. a. To mention, speak of, or specify (a person, or persons, etc.) by name.' 6. a. To mention, speak of or specify (a thing) by its name or usual designation.' 8. To mention or specify something desired, suggested, or decided upon; to appoint or fix (a sum, time, etc.) to name the day.'

These definitions include both proper names and additional terms applied to people, groups, places and things. They also highlight the capacity of names to be given and/or taken and entail reward and/or punishment. These understandings are familiar. In addition to identifying what might ‘count’ as a name, however, they also begin to identify how a name might be understood. Particularly noteworthy is the suggestion that a name can both be a usual designation (6.a.) and an act of designation (II.4.a) -- it can describe and bestow qualities. Also of note is the suggestion that a name can allege or declare (2.c.). While the Oxford English Dictionary identifies this usage as obsolete, this constituting quality of the name intersects with the notion of performative names and asserts that the name does more than simply describe.

In this chapter I will adopt a particular understanding of naming. Rather than understanding the name as simply descriptive, it will be understood as potentially constitutive. Specifically, I will utilise and Butler’s theorisation of performative interpellation (detailed in Chapter 2) in order to examine the significance of names and naming for the constitution of particular subject positions.

After Butler, I suggest that names, and discursive practices of naming, are performative interpellations which (potentially) act to constitute particular types of subjects. These performative interpellations of self and other are inherently citational -- they iterate and, in so doing, inscribe the discourses on which they draw. As such, their constitutions are neither originating nor concluding. Rather, they are embedded in multiple, interlinking
and unending discursive chains. The meanings of such names are also imbued with historicity and their citation contributes to this historicity. This citationality and historicity means, first, that names must be intelligible within discourse in order to be provisionally successful and, second, that their efficacy is always provisional and at risk.

The discourses deployed through such naming may be both intentional and unintentional: discourses intentionally deployed may escape or exceed the intent of the speaker and/or a speaker may unwittingly deploy discourses whose historicities and/or intersections assert unanticipated meanings. Indeed, namings may entail the deployment of complex combinations of intentional and unintentional discourses and their discursive effects. Taking up the notion of discursive agency, this analysis assumes multiple degrees of both intent and ‘penetration’ (Willis 1977) amongst speakers in terms of the embedded meanings and effects of discourses. On the one hand, it suggests that speakers do not necessarily regurgitate discourse unwittingly. On the other hand, however, it suggests that discourses are not necessarily cited knowingly and that they are not necessarily known explicitly to the speaker and/or audience. As such, a speaker and audience need not be self-consciously alert to the discourses deployed in order for their familiar and embedded meanings to be inscribed. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that discourses do not need to be cited in order to be deployed. Rather, multiple discourses are references through the meanings and associations embedded in the historicity of apparently simple and benign utterances.

Representing naming practices

Over the course of the chapter I will examine in detail a number of examples of potentially performative namings. My focus here is on pupil identities and I will be
primarily concerned with intra-pupil naming. I will, however, also make use of some instances of teachers’ naming practices.

Pupils’ talk and interaction is suffused by constituting names. The examples offered are inevitably a partial representation of an inexhaustible field of both identities and constitutions. Examples have been selected on the basis of their reflection of recurrent and enduring discursive practices. Furthermore, presenting and analysing naming practices is itself a process of performative constitution. These factors do not place discourses of identities beyond the realm of appropriate inquiry and/or utterance. Rather, it illustrates the importance of exposing such naming practices to vigorous scrutiny (Butler 1997a).

The majority of the presented examples draw on pupils’ speech, which took place in contexts of small, self-selected group discussions or informal ‘interviews’. Listening to audio cassettes made of these discussions and reading my accompanying fieldnotes has underlined that there is much more to speech than the words spoken. The text of speech, that is, the transcribed verbatim, does not in itself ‘contain’ or ‘convey’ meanings. Particularly striking are the ways in which the intonations, sounds, bodily movements, and gestures that accompany/stand in for speech open up, close down, and add layers of possible meanings. It is impossible, both theoretically and practically, to present to the reader ‘everything’ that has contributed to the moments offered as examples. Nevertheless, I endeavour to present detail in excess of the utterances themselves. Furthermore, such speech and gestures are contextually situated, with meanings being mediated by these contexts. I attempt to offer extended extracts of data that enable assessments of the mediating effects of context to be made. I recognise, however, the
impossibility of either presenting data in its ‘entirety’ or determining ‘how much’ context is ‘enough’.

The identities with which these data and analyses are concerned are not discrete, nor do they progress from one to another in a linear fashion. Rather, the identities constituted are multiple and entwined and the performative interpellation of one identity is often implicitly implicated in the simultaneous constitution and disavowal of other identities. For this reason examples are ordered to highlight the relationships between those discourses mobilised. This approach means that the chapter moves back and forth between particular identity categories. In doing this, however, it facilitates an analytical movement across authorised and alternative discourses and reflects the complexity of the discursive practices through which identities are constituted.

In presenting data within this and subsequent chapters, I attempt to combine sociological transcription conventions with the conventions of a theatrical script. This borrowing from theatrical conventions does not infer that I understand these data as accounts of pupils (and myself) putting on an act, as a series self-conscious performances. (Although at times this is clearly the case; I endeavour to indicate these performances within my presentation.) These examples are presented as a series of ‘episodes’. In some instances these ‘episodes’ are made up of a number of ‘scenes’. The allusion to ‘soap-opera’ is intentional. I adopt this presentational style for a number of reasons. First, to underline and expose the complex, contextual, interactive and ongoing nature of discursive practices. Second, to facilitate detailed analysis of the deployment of multiple discourses, as well as their intersections and contradictions. Third, to demonstrate the analytical approach being taken. Forth, to explore the possibilities and limits of the ethnographic genre. Finally, to leave the data open, as far as possible, to facilitate
further, alternative analysis. It is my intention that the reader examine each Episode before moving on to its respective analysis and discussion.

Policing race identities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Episode 1: Phenotypes; nations; exotic others</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DY (the researcher, mid/late twenties, woman, White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISS BAXTER (group tutor, late thirties/early forties, woman, White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEVE (year 11 pupil, boy, White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCELLA (year 11 pupil, girl, African)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRIDULA (year 11 pupil, girl, Indian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE REST OF THE TUTOR GROUP (year 11 pupils, boys and girls, predominantly White)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The exchange takes place during a PSE lesson. On previous occasions several pupils, most notably MARCELLA, have discussed racism inside the school with DY. The pupils are completing questionnaires for the Careers Service that have been distributed by MISS BAXTER. DY is observing.

STEVE: (calls out) Miss, I still want to know why there isn't a White British here if there's a Black British.
MARCELLA: (rolling her eyes, slightly annoyed/weary) OK Steve, just fill it in.
MISS BAXTER: (to STEVE) Why? you want something more exotic?
MARCELLA: (flashes MISS BAXTER an intense stare, then looks at DY)
STEVE: Yeah, I'll be White Pakistani.
MRIDULA: (turns around in her seat to look at STEVE)
MISS BAXTER: (to STEVE) Just close your eyes and put a cross in it.
STEVE: (makes a dramatic display of following MISS BAXTER's suggestion) [It is not known how STEVE eventually identified his race on the questionnaire.]

Later in the lesson, DY tells the pupils that all names will be changed when writing about the research and invites pupils to offer their own pseudonyms. MISS BAXTER responds to DY's invitation:

MISS BAXTER: There you are Steve, you can think of something really exotic.
STEVE: (does not respond/responds by appearing to ignore this comment)
MARCELLA: (flashes MISS BAXTER another intense stare, then looks at DY)

Episode 1 illustrates how, within apparently mundane discursive practices, names draw on multiple discourses which are complexly entwined. It also demonstrates the endurance of a discourse of natural and distinct races inside the school.
Steve’s questioning of the absence of a particular ethnic/national categorisation might simply be understood as an example of a counter-school discursive practice (see Ball 1981, Hargreaves 1967, Lacey 1970 and Willis 1977). Such an analysis takes the questionnaire being completed as an instance of official school processes. In turn, Steve’s question is taken as a mundane and momentary challenge to these processes, a challenge which contributes to his negatively educationally orientated learner identity. In this analysis the reference to ethnic/national identities might be seen as incidental.

However, the question/comment cites familiar racialised discursive practices. Steve’s assertion of a “White British” identity draws on and inscribes a discourse of (authentic and superior) ‘Whiteness’ which is entangled with discourses of colonialism and nationalism. These discourses have frequently been mobilised within far-right nationalist and racist discourses, simultaneously constituting and challenging the excesses of equity and anti-racist discourses. Ethnic monitoring practices are one site at which these discursive battles have been fought. As such, the question/comment might be taken as indicative of, at least, an implicit racism on the part of the speaker. Furthermore, ethnic monitoring is positioned within equity and anti-racist discourses as a tool against discrimination. As such, Steve’s question/comment, taken as a challenge to ethnic monitoring, can simultaneously be taken as a challenge to anti-racist practices and, therefore, as implicitly racist. That equity and anti-racist discourses are, at a policy level at least, part of the school organisational ethos might be taken to identify the question/comment as both racist and a counter-school challenge.

Yet this assertion of a White British identity has other, quite different discursive effects. Steve attempts to performatively constitute himself as White British through his question/comment. The ‘British’ implicit in the ‘White’ of UK ethnic monitoring
categories, however, interrupts this naming. White is White British and as such the latter specification is superfluous. Indeed, it is comedic; of course White means White British. Yet the responses to Steve’s question/comment seem to illustrate that it is also unsettling. The question/comment exposes the implicit ‘Britishness’ of White and, in so doing, exposes the ‘not-quite-Britishness’ of racial categories that are not White, where the Britishness must be specified. White is already British. Other race identities may well not be. As such, Steve’s question/comment might simultaneously be taken to indicate that he has at least an implicit insight into the silence through which hegemonic Whiteness operates.

Understood in this way, the school and ethnic monitoring practices are exposed as being implicated in the inscription of White hegemony through the citation of categorisations that constitute non-White pupils as Other. In this sense, it is the school/career service’s discourse which is imbued with very particular racial constitutions -- racial constitutions which are exposed by Steve’s apparently counter-school/racist challenge. This apparent racism might be understood as a discursive by-product of the exposure of the non-neutral categorisations used within ethnic monitoring and the constituting force of these categorisations. Ultimately, however, the anti-racist discourse of ethnic monitoring is not destabilised: the exposure is recuperated by being positioned as racist. The anti-racism of ethnic monitoring and its embedded discursive practices are sustained through the elision of its own racialised, and implicitly racist, performatives. Also of interest here is Miss Baxter’s invitation to Steve to “Just close your eyes and put a cross in it”. This invitation might itself be understood as a negation of the importance and validity of ethnic monitoring. Given the teacher’s relative institutional power, such a negation is likely to be far more effective than the possible challenge/exposure offered by Steve.
The teacher’s response introduces a further racialised and implicitly racist discourse into
the discursive frame; that is, the discourse of the exotic Other. Steve does not suggest
that non-White identities are exotic, or that he wishes to identify himself as something
other than that which he considers himself to be. He questions why the
nationality/national affiliation of White remains unspecified while the
nationality/national affiliation of other ‘races’ is specified. The teacher does not respond
to this. Rather, she effects a discursive shift away from discourses of
nationality/nationalism, White hegemony, equity and anti-racism. These discourses are
replaced with the discourse of the exotic Other, itself entangled with discourses of the
pastoral colonial and the colonised savage; a savage who is hyper-sexual, untamed and
ungodly (and certainly not British).

Steve attempts to recuperate and mobilise this discursive shift by asserting himself as
“White Pakistani”. Whether understood as a performative interpellation or a description
of a pre-existing race this name is unintelligible: a key discursive marker of Pakistani is
its not-Whiteness. White Pakistani is, therefore, outside the bounds of possibility. Once
again, the name is comedic; of course Steve is not White and Pakistani. And, once
again, the performative fails. This assertion might also refer back to the previous
questioning of the presence of “Black British” in the (textual but not discursive) absence
of White British. The intimation may be that if Black can be British then, following the
same formulation, White can be Pakistani. And as White Pakistani is clearly
unintelligible, then, by extension, all non-White Britishness is simultaneously
disavowed.

Marcella’s and Mridula’s differing contributions to the episode are informative.
Marcella’s early attempt to silence Steve may indicate that she is aware that his
question/comment raises a number of troubling challenges to the enduring understanding of ‘real’ and distinct races and nationalities. Yet, while Steve’s question/comment might be troubling, it is Miss Baxter’s “exotic” that prompts Marcella’s stare. Having spoken to me about institutional racism and the difficulty of specifying its mundane and everyday appearances, Marcella looks at me to confirm that I understand the casual deployment of the discourse of the exotic Other as an example of this. She may or may not consider Steve’s question/comment to be racist, she does understand Miss Baxter’s “exotic” as such. Conversely, while Mridula does not appear to respond to Miss Baxter’s citation of the exotic Other, her look attempts to censure Steve’s White Pakistani. Mridula is undoubtedly alert to the historicity of ‘Paki’; the abbreviation of Pakistani which is so frequently deployed as a generic injurious name against all South Asian people. Indeed, this meaning may be so congealed that the injurious name itself need not be uttered in order for it to be interpellated; in this context it may be already ‘present’ in the (not-so-neutral) term Pakistani. Steve’s unintelligible coupling of Pakistani with White, while not the injury, cites the injury and Pakistani is implicitly denigrated and rendered injurious by the coupling. Indeed, the very unintelligibility of this coupling may well contribute to its denigrating/injurious force. That it is a Black pupil who attempts to silence Steve’s White British/Black British, and an Indian (not Pakistani) pupil who censures his White Pakistani, is also of note. In the discursive frame of real races that dominates this scene, it is pupils who identify themselves as/with these races who defend them against possible challenge, even as this challenge exposes the constituted and constituting nature of the essence of race.

The teacher’s later shift from exotic races to exotic given names might be understood as an intentional discursive movement designed to dissociate the exotic from the racial Other. Yet, the historicity of the discourse of the exotic Other means that is not
vulnerable to such easy reinscription. Rather than effecting a dissociation, the exotic name is colonised by, and confirms, the racial Otherness of the exotic. The Other is, then, potentially constituted as such through each utterance of the given name, not simply in those moments when a racial identity is uttered. Indeed, the exotic given name comes to stand in for the name of the racial group in these performative constitutions. The teacher’s implicit assertion that non-White races, whether designated by group or individual given name, are exotic, is not addressed directly at the non-White pupils in the class. Nevertheless, in this moment it constitutes these pupils as such. The teacher does not recognise and describe already exotic pupils, rather, she constitutes them as Other through her discursive practice. This is not to suggest that this is an originating or concluding constitution. Indeed, it is the familiar and repetitious nature of the call, the pupils’ recognition of the historicity with which it is imbued, which informs Marcella’s differentiation between Steve’s and Miss Baxter’s utterances.

This context is dominated by a discourse of natural and distinct races. From the race identities assumed and constituted by/through the questionnaire, through to pupils identifying (constituting) themselves in these terms, and the exchange that surrounds Steve’s question/comment, races are understood as real essences that precede their social designation. These categories are understood to describe pre-existing racial groups, groups which are themselves not open to question. Steve’s namings of himself ultimately fail: his Whiteness means that he is already British and he cannot be both White and Pakistani. His implicit challenge to natural races has destabilising potential, yet the responses of his peers and teachers ensure that this is, at best, momentary. Despite the inefficacy of Steve’s performatives, the racist discourses that he implicitly cites, and the defence of natural race inscribed by Marcella, Mridula and Miss Baxter, the essence of race is momentarily troubled within this episode.
Episode 2: Dir'y 'ippies / Shazas and Bazas

DY (the researcher, mid/late twenties, woman, White)
VICI (year 11 pupil, girl, White)
PIPA (year 11 pupil, girl, White)
SUZI (year 11 pupil, girl, White)
TOM (year 11 pupil, boy, White)

Sitting in a group around a table in the Year Base, an infrequently used classroom that is designated as the social space of the year group. The discussion/interview takes place while the rest of the tutor group are in a PSE lesson. The group begin to talk about how they believe they are perceived in the school.

VICI: We are seen as very very uncool because we are seen as (laughing and imitating an east London accent) dirty hippies.

[...]

DY: Dirty hippies, who thinks you're dirty hippies?

(simultaneously) TOM: Everyone.

(simultaneously) PIPA: It's actually (changing pronunciation to imitate east London accent) dirty hippies.

SUZI: (imitating east London accent) Dirty hippies.

ALL: (laugh)

DY: (trying to repeat and write as pronounced) Dir'y 'ippies?

SUZI: Have you heard of them?

VICI: No they don't, cos they just sit here and go (whining) 'Ner ner' No, they don't know that they're referred to as Shazas and Bazas but we know that we're referred to as Dir'y 'ippies cos we are, (with slight laugh in voice) on the ball.

the group engages in an extended discussion of the different styles of clothing, hair, jewellery, shoes, bags that distinguish between Dir'y 'ippies and Shazas and Bazas.

SUZI: Another thing is speech. You see, we all speak quite clearly so you can understand what we're saying.

PIPA: (squeals)

DY: Is there a social class thing about being a Dir'y 'ippie or a Shaza or Baza?

PIPA: Erm...

VICI: If we're honest, sort of, not strictly but it does tend to be.

(simultaneously) SUZI: A trend.

VICI: It's not a definite decision but a trend. Probably anyway.

PIPA: Sort of.

(simultaneously) SUZI: If you take a case study in Taylor, that is.

TOM: And the people who are more inclined to work in school. The people that are more inclined to work and come from slightly more middle class backgrounds tend to be, don't you think?

SUZI: Erm, not exactly. I'm not sure that I'd quite agree with that. I wouldn't say Dir'y 'ippies tend to work.

DY: If you think about somebody in your tutor group, say, Mridula...

SUZI: (laughing, feigning suspicion) Why do you say Mridula?!

(simultaneously) VICI: She's...

DY: I say Mridula 'cos it seems she's not a Shaz and Baz

SUZI: (in mock earnest) Why do you say that?
DY: It seems she's not a Dir'y 'ippie and she's not a Shaz, but she works hard and does her work...

VICI: Some people don't fall into any category, some people prefer to be...

DY: So what other spaces are there?

VICI: I wouldn't say there are actually any more defined groups.

TOM: It's two ends of a spectrum rather than two groups.

VICI: Yeah, we're right at the Dir'y 'ippie end, and then the Shazas and the Bazas at the other end and everybody else is on the scale but, neither one or the other.

DY: So if you're in the middle you'd probably be undefined?

VICI: Yeah.

SUZI: Yeah.

VICI: For example, Mridula is more of a Shaza than she is a Dir'y 'ippie, but she's not a true Shaza, (laughing) her hair is not solid and she doesn't wear quite enough gold jewellery either!

(simultaneously) PIPA: (laughing) yeah!

(simultaneously) SUZI: (singing, as in the Ashford and Simpsom mid 80s pop song 'Solid as a Rock') Solid!

PIPA: Music that's another big thing.

TOM: Yeah, music taste.

VICI: Shaza things are all about love, every song is like, 'Oh yeah...'

SUZI: (interrupting) 'You've left me and I'm on my own and I'm a sad cow because I like to sit at home and go (imitating east London accent with high pitch, whining delivery) 'Ahh, I can really relate to this'.

(simultaneously) ALL: (laugh)

VICI: I would say, as far as I know, the 'ippies tend to be probably more open minded about things.

SUZI: Oh definitely.

TOM: Certainly.

SUZI: I agree with that completely.

VICI: Personally, I don't want to make any judgements cos I don't know them...

SUZI: (interrupting) I was sitting in my art class and listening to them talking, and you hear them talking about people they don't even know and make such sweeping judgements about people and you think, 'God, I'm sure I don't do it that badly'!

VICI: We do it too, but we don't sort of mean it.

TOM: We realise that we're doing it don't we?

SUZI: They do it in that way, so politically incorrect kind of thing, whereas we're doing it in a joking sort of way, as a joking insult to people we know.

VICI: A Baza insult is to say something like 'Urg gay', and we just don't do that.

VICI: You could almost write out a set of definitive rules for Shazas and Bazas and Dir'y 'ippies.

TOM: The point is, Shazas and Bazas keep to those rules.

Episode 2 details the performative constitution of two opposing categories of pupils' sub-cultural identity: "Dir'y 'ippies" and "Shazas and Bazas". These categories are of particular interest for a number of reasons. First, while offered by a single group of pupils, they are used to differentiate between and constitute the identities of all pupils. Second, the hierarchical relationship between the pair is contested, rendering Same/Other positions mobile. Third, these oppositional identities are constituted through the coalescence of a multiplicity of other identities, both overt and implicit. Fourth,
while apparently a resistant discourse, the categories deployed remain embedded in authorised discourses which inscribe hierarchical social relations.

At a superficial level this piece might simply be seen as a group of pupils who, having been called an injurious name (Dir’y ‘ippie), retaliate by first, insisting that the name is not, after all, injurious and second, by retorting with another injurious name (Shazas and Bazas). Yet the names at stake here, themselves imbued with a multiplicity of further names and understood as potentially performative interpellations, provisionally constitute the pupil population in very particular ways.

It is important to note that it is by no means clear that a “Shaza” or a “Baza” has actually ever addressed one of these pupils as “Dir’y ‘ippie”; the group is unable to recount an originating moment for the term. And these pupils have certainly never addressed a “Shaza” or “Baza” as such; they make clear at a number of moments in the discussion that they would expect a Shaza or Baza to respond to the address with physical violence. This imagined response is significant and will be returned to later. Also significant is the way in which pupils who might be recognised as Shazas and Bazas actually name Dir’y ‘ippies. These pupils are most notable in the talk of Shazas and Bazas by their absence. Where they do appear, (usually at my instigation), they are named as “Bods” or “Boffins” and quickly disregarded. Again, this will be returned to. It is also noteworthy that Dir’y ‘ippies believe that Shazas and Bazas intentionally ignore them; that they are “social outcasts”. Whereas, pupils defined here as Shazas and Bazas believe that “Boffins” and/or “Bods” (Dir’y ‘ippies) intentionally ignore them, considering them “too dumb” or “not good enough”. As such, only limited exchange takes place between these groups of pupils.
While the pupils in Episode 2 are unable to specify a moment at which the injurious name Dir'y 'ippie originated, an original address does not need to be identified in order for this performative to be felicitous (Butler 1997). In the context of the (absent) relations between these groups of pupils; the names ("Bod", "Boffin") which these pupils are called; and the recognisable quality of the names under discussion, it is plausible and even likely that such an address did not take place. Rather, it seems that these pupils are citing names that circulate in discourses reaching far beyond the specific context of this school, and whose historicity lends them their performative force.

Nevertheless, that Dir'y 'ippie was a prior injury appears significant in positioning it’s subsequent adoption as a recuperation and reinscription and legitimating the name Shaza and Baza as a response. The assertion of Dir'y 'ippie as a prior injury also insists that the Shazas and Bazas have recognised and, therefore, constituted the Dir'y ippies as speaking subject through this (imagined) address. As discussed in chapter 2, Butler suggests that the subject can be constituted through silence and that the lack of an address can act to constitute the subject's place as no place (Butler 1997a). By asserting Dir'y 'ippie as a prior address, these pupils avoid (at least provisionally) this threat of no place. In addition, they simultaneously constitute themselves as particular types of subjects (Dir'y 'ippies); other pupils (the speaker(s) of this imagined prior address) as particular types of Other subjects (Shazas and Bazas); and an (imagined) exchange between the Same and the Other. I will return to the binary nature of these names and question of the hierarchical relationship between the Same and the Other below.

Also of significance is how recognisable the identities apparently described but actually constituted by these names are. On the surface these names might appear to reference nothing more than a nebulous array of ‘teenage’ ‘choices’ concerning clothing, hair

137
styles, musical genres, effort in school work, modes of speech and so on. I have chosen not to examine in detail these pupils' talk concerning dress, hair styles and music. This is due to the fact that these apparent choices at once mask and indicate an array of discourses which constitute subjects along intersecting lines of social class, gender, race, sexuality, and intelligence/ability. Indeed, these 'choices' are the very discursive practices which cite and inscribe these discourses and the identities which are constituted through them. In the analysis that follows I suggest that Dir'y 'ippie is constituted as implicitly middle-class, intelligent and liberal (radical?), simultaneously inscribing these constituting discourses. Shaza and Baza, in contrast, is constituted as implicitly working class, unintelligent and conservative (reactionary/traditional?), simultaneously inscribing these constituting discourses. Furthermore, I suggest that these categories implicitly constitute pupils along axes of race, with pupils identified as being of particular ethnicities doubly excluded; as the Other-Other. In addition, I argue that these implicit constitutions are masked by the apparently sub-cultural nature of the categories. Finally, I suggest that the discourses through which both categories are constituted ensure that they remain firmly embedded in, and inscribe, enduring discourses of hierarchically organised identities.

Interweaving discourses of social class, intelligence and educational orientation are deployed within the Episode. The specific pronunciation of Dir'y 'ippie is central to both Dir'y 'ippie and Shaza and Baza. Dir'y 'ippie as an injurious name is pronounced with an (imagined) 'real' east London accent. As a recuperated and reinscribed self-identity it is pronounced with a self-conscious parody of this 'real' east London accent ("Spelt: D, I, R, apostrophe, Y ..."). The pronunciation of Shaza and Baza repeats this parody. Distinct modes of speech are also positioned as crucial markers of difference. Dir'y 'ippies "speak quite clearly so you can understand". Implicit in this assertion, and
the response it receives, is the suggestion that the reverse is true for Shazas and Bazas. These assertions of differential modes of speech can be understood as discursive practices which expose how the categorisations are infused by, and inscribe, a discourse of distinct and hierarchically organised social classes. Bourdieu’s theorisations of habitus (Bourdieu 1990) and linguistic capital (Bourdieu 1991) are useful here: in these terms, the habitus of Dir’y ‘ippies grants them particular linguistic capital; linguistic capital not generated through the habitus of the Shazas and Bazas. The Dir’y ‘ippies discussion of these categories (and, indeed, much of their speech) is infused with wit, irony and sarcasm. This may also be understood in Bourdieu’s terms as further evidence of linguistic capital and a practical sense of market value (Bourdieu 1991).

As such, it becomes evident that the opposition Dir’y ‘ippie/Shaza and Baza might well be synonymous with the opposition middle class/working class. Furthermore, discourses of social class, innate intelligence and educational orientation come to be entwined through these discursive practice. This is illustrated by the implicit assertion of distinct levels of intelligence -- Dir’y ‘ippies “know” how they are referred to, while the (imagined) “ner ner” of the Shazas and Bazas at once masks and indicates their ‘failure’ to know how they are referred to. The (imagined) physical violence of the Shazas and Bazas similarly draws on and inscribes discourses of low intelligence and/or social class. The assertion of distinct educational orientations, albeit one that is internally disputed, also draws on and inscribes discourses of social class. The disputation of this educational orientation infers that the Dir’y ‘ippies may be well aware that, as highlighted earlier, they are in fact performatively named “Bods” and “Boffins”9. The intertwining of these multiple discourses is such that these discursive markers of difference are exposed as being commensurate: ‘middle class-intelligent-positive educational orientation (but not pro-school)’ (Dir’y ‘ippies) becomes opposed to
'working class-unintelligent-negative educational orientation (and possibly anti-school)' (Shazas and Bazas). Indeed, the group hesitantly confirms the social class distinctions between the categories when asked explicitly.

The Dir’y ‘ippies’ internal contestation of their positive educational orientation and their hesitation to confirm explicitly the classed nature of the opposition they describe offers insights into the intentions of this constitution. These pupils believe that they are (and constitute themselves as) excluded (“outcast”) from the mainstream of the pupil population on the basis that they are “uncool” Dir’y ‘ippies. In this sub-cultural discursive frame it is the Dir’y ‘ippies who are constituted (constitute themselves) as Other. They ‘respond’ to this Othering by constituting this marginalisation as a radical alternative and thereby recuperate it through an ironic/parodic/radical reinscription of the injurious name through which their marginality has been (fictively) constituted. As such, the marginal Other is constituted as a radical and, therefore, desirable identity. This identity contrasts with the alternative identity apparently available to these pupils: “Bod” or “Boffin”. Acknowledging a positive educational orientation (which might also be pro-school) and confirming middle class status threatens to undermine this radical Other identity and recast it as the sub-cultural minority and the privileged Same (middle class, high attaining). That is, it might be exposed as being Bod or Boffin. If this discursive shift occurs, then the conservative Same (sub-cultural majority) appears as the marginalised (working class) Other, particularly within those discursive frames that exceed the limits of the school’s pupil sub-cultures.

Dir’y ‘ippie/Shaza and Baza is also marked by, and in turn inscribes, race. The discursive practices of the group are not explicitly raced. While this might be taken to infer that racial identities traverse this binary, the dominance of unspoken White
hegemony suggests that this silence implicitly races both sides of the opposition as White. Furthermore, that the opposition is synonymous with middle class/working class infers that it is already raced: the disproportionate poverty of the non-White population in Britain implies that the middle class Dir’y ‘ippies are predominantly, but not exclusively, White. The racialised nature of the opposition only becomes explicit through discussion of the positioning of named individuals. Named Dir’y ‘ippies are all White pupils. Named Shazas are White and Mixed-race. Named Bazas are White, Mixed-race and Black. The most notable absences here are Black girls and Asian pupils. I will discuss the constitution of these raced identities in detail in later episodes. Here I will focus on the group’s response to my insertion of an Indian girl, Mridula, into the discussion.

It is interesting that Suzi challenges me on my use of this particular pupil as a example for clarification. First, it is possible that this challenge indicates a level of awareness of the raced exclusions that operate across the binary. Second, while the group presents the binary as “ends of a scale”, they discuss (provisionally constitute) these identities in oppositional terms. It is only when the name of an Indian girl is offered that the group posits a “spectrum”. Nevertheless, in discussing (constituting) this spectrum, this oppositional binary persist: Mridula is more of a Shaza than a Dir’y ‘ippie; there “aren’t any other defined groups”. As such, the apparently Same/Other binary of Dir’y ‘ippie/Shaza and Baza is exposed as functioning as a totality of the Same. That is, both have been designated intelligible sub-cultural identities with markets and market values, while those pupils who fit neither category are constituted as the disavowed Other-Other.
Dir’y ‘ippie/Shaza and Baza is also constituted through, and inscribes, particular modes of intelligible masculinity, femininity and sexuality. Of immediate note is that Dir’y ‘ippie incorporates both female and male pupils, whereas, the female and male parts of Shaza and Baza are distinct. The groups discussion of Shazas’ and Bazas’ preferred musical genre, their responses to this and their (heterosexual) relationships with each other cite and inscribe discourses of compulsory heterosexuality and traditional modes of passive femininity and active masculinity, thereby provisionally constituting Shazas and Bazas in these terms. Dir’y ‘ippies attempt to constitute themselves in opposition to this, citing liberal discourses of gender and sexuality equality/alternaeity. Indeed, a key feature of Dir’y ‘ippie is its embracing of non-heterosexual identities and the additional cultural capital (Bourdieu 1990) of these identities within the Dir’y ‘ippie discourse and milieu.

Of the pupils in the year group who were ‘out’ as ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘bisexual’ or ‘queer’, all but one was identified to me as such by Tom and all were identified by this group as Dir’y ‘ippies. Once again, Bazas, if not Shazas, are constituted in opposition to this and, therefore, as homophobic: “a Baza insult is to say something like ‘urg gay’, and we just don’t do that”. As such, a Dir’y ‘ippie identity is constituted as liberal, if not radical, while a Shaza and Baza identity is constituted as conservative, if not reactionary. Yet this is achieved through the citation, and therefore inscription, of dominant discourses of binary genders and sexualities. And by positioning Dir’y ‘ippie as an oppositional discourse, those discourses opposed are inadvertently inscribed (Derrida 1988).

Furthermore, while homosexuality reinforces the Dir’y ‘ippie discourse of/as the marginal Other, it might also be understood as an indicator of their privilege. As middle class, liberal, positively educationally orientated and White, the ‘Dir’y ippies are already at once outside the mainstream pupil sub-culture but inside broader social hierarchies.
These combined outsider-insider positions may be what enables Dir’y ‘ippies to be ‘out’ in ways not open to Shazas and Bazas.

The Dir’y ‘ippies’ intent, then, is to constitute a sub-cultural identity of radical marginality, not one of privileged hierarchy. However, an acknowledgement of the Dir’y ‘ippies biographical and learner identities threatened this radical marginality. Of course, in the classroom, the GCSE examination, the further and higher education market places and, ultimately, in the employment market, it is the Dir’y ‘ippies -- the White, middle class, high attaining pupils -- who score highly for Bourdieu’s cultural, symbolic and linguistic capital (Bourdieu 1990 & 1991).

In later episodes I will turn to Shazas’ and Bazas’ own performative constitutions of themselves. Here I will suggest that the Dir’y ‘ippies constitution of the Shazas and Bazas is likely to have broader provisional success than their attempted radical constitution of themselves. Through citational discursive practices the Dir’y ‘ippies say that they are Dir’y ‘ippies and so, within their own sub-cultural milieu, they are Dir’y ‘ippies. Likewise the Shazas and Bazas. Yet it appears likely that, beyond this particular milieu, the efficacy of the pupils discursive practices will be less straightforward. At the level of the broader pupil sub-cultures, it is unlikely that Shaza and Baza will be felicitous. First, the name will not be uttered beyond a specific and highly restricted community of speakers. Second, even if the name were to be uttered in wider school contexts, the uncoolness of the Dir’y ‘ippies suggests that they do not have the necessary authority for the performative to succeed. Bod or Boffin is likely to be a more enduring performative name, citing as it does the enduring discourse of the synonymy of social class and positive educational orientation and the wider pupil sub-cultural discourse of pro-school ‘uncoolness’. Moving from the pupil population to the school staff and
institution, it is likely that, while rejecting the name Bod or Boffin, the broader discourse on which its efficacy rests will contribute to the inscription of the privilege conveyed through its intersecting biographical and learner identities. On the other hand, while the name Shaza and Baza may or may not be familiar in this broader context, it is likely that the discourses which underpin the biographical and learner identities with which it is infused will resonate. It is pupils’ identities within these broader, official school contexts that are likely to have the most bearing on pupils’ educational experiences and outcomes.

At a superficial level, then, these oppositional identities are readily recognisable and the distinctions between the two groups draw on established social ‘truths’. Yet while reporting and offering a commentary on these ‘truths’, and at time offering a critical resistance to them, these oppositions are simultaneously constituting. These pupils attempt implicitly to performatively interpellate themselves and others as particular subjects and, in so doing, they inscribe those discourses of embedded, distinct and hierarchically organised identities on which the efficacy of these performatives depend.

The authenticity of race

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**Episode 3: Popadom; Black; Coolie; Indian; White**

DY (the researcher, mid/late twenties, woman, White)
MARCELLA (year 11 pupil, girl, African)
MOLLY (year 11 pupil, girl, White)
JULIET (year 11 pupil, girl, Mixed-race)
JASMINE (year 11 pupil, girl, Mixed-race)

Sitting in group around a table in the year base. The discussion/interview takes place while the rest of the tutor group are in a PSE lesson. The group is in the process of recounting a conflict with RACHEL, another girl in year 11, that resulted in MARCELLA being excluded from school for a fixed term.

MARCELLA: I went to maths and I confronted her and I got excluded for it. She's just something!
MOLLY: You called her 'Popadom'.
ALL: (laugh)
MARCELLA: I didn't mean to insult her for where she comes from, I really didn't, but I was so angry, (imitating calm) so I just let all the anger out.
DY: So basically you shouted at her and punched her?
MARCELLA: I hit her a bit, buffed her out a bit, so she learned sense!
(terminally) JULIET: Duffed her up a bit.
(simultaneously) MOLLY: Called her a few names.
MARCELLA: And when I used to see her I pushed her a bit and called her abusive names ...
(dy) JULIET: The way she acts.
MARCELLA: And you know coolie right, she's Indian, a proper Indian right, I have Indian next door neighbours so I know what they look like, right.
(terminally) ONE: (laughs)
(terminally) ONE: (a sharp intake of breath)
MARCELLA: She, right, you know when a Black person and an Indian person makes a baby they call the baby Coolie because its got half Black and half Indian, she goes round saying that that's what she is because she's ashamed of what, where she comes from.
DY: So where is she from?
JULIET: She's Indian, yeah.
MARCELLA: Indian...
DY: So what sort of parents does she have, does this have any relevance?
MARCELLA: No, no, She's adopted.
(simultaneously) MOLLY: Yeah.
DY: Is she adopted by an Indian family?
(simultaneously) JASMINE: (trailing off) But that might be why the way she's acting...
MARCELLA: No, no, white people, but they're nice.
(simultaneously) MOLLY: (aside to JASMINE) That's what I'm saying, it might be the way she's been brought up.
DY: So what are you saying? that she acts like she thinks she's Black?
MARCELLA: Blacker than me, I know this sounds funny but she does, she uses words that I'm not even ready for yet!
DY: What sort of words?
MARCELLA: I forgot what.
MOLLY: like 'gwarnin' or something like that, in'it.
ALL: (laugh)
Episode 3 illustrates how raced identities are performatively constituted and contested through their naming and designation. Furthermore, it shows the discursive practices through which races are constituted as discreet, authentic (essential) and hierarchical.

The Episode also offers some insight into the nature of girls’ relationships with one another inside the school. In attempting to make sense of this episode it is possible to focus on what it tells us about these relationships. Rachel is clearly the object of significant derision. Not only is she castigated by the group in her absence, she has also been verbally and physically abused by at least one member of the group. This can be seen as illustrative of the conflict and violence which suffuses girls’ relationships with one another inside schools. Indeed, it might be seen as an example of ‘bullying’ and, at another point in this discussion, Marcella relates how this is precisely how it has been interpreted by senior school staff. The conflictual nature of girls’ relationships, and they ways in which this has been both manifest and understood, has been examined in detail elsewhere (see Hay 1997). While the conflict conveyed within the piece is of interest, it is the underlying notions of race which appear to be of particular significance.

In the following discussion I will analyse the group’s understanding of race, the way this informs the group’s dislike of Rachel, and the specific nature of their responses to her.
Through this analysis I will suggest that the group understands race as authentic and essential; that their dislike of Rachel stems from her perceived transgression of the boundaries of authentic race and expropriation of 'Blackness'; and that their response attempts to recuperate this perceived transgression and expropriation by performatively interpellating Rachel as "Indian" or "Popadom" -- the place they consider to be her 'proper' race.

The group draws on a number of names that might be understood as race identities. Some of these are familiar -- Black, Indian, White. Others are perhaps more recognisable as terms of abuse -- "Coolie", "Popadom". Each of these names has the potential to performatively interpellate particular types of racialised subjects. All of these names are permeated by an understanding of race as a discreet and authentic marker of identity.

**Black**

Marcella strenuously and repeatedly asserts the existence of a particular way of being that is quintessentially Black and the rest of the group recognise and concur with this assertion. Indeed, Molly suggests that I too am aware of this Black way of being. Through her own exaggerated mode of speech, Marcella indicates a specifically Black way of speaking. Such modes of speech have been discussed elsewhere (Gillborn 1990, Mac an Ghaill 1988, Sewell 1998). The group refers to "the way she acts", which may indicate particular bodily gestures, such as the way of walking discussed by Gillborn (1990). In these cases it is not clear whether such Black ways of being are understood to be innate or learned. When particular vocabulary is discussed, however, Marcella talks about "words that I’m not even ready for yet". And when the group refers to particular Black hairstyles, this does not appear to be a reference to hair itself, but rather to
culturally influenced ways of wearing hair. These markers might be taken to infer that the Black being asserted is understood to be progressively learnt, or even earned, over time.

The group does not pin down the exact nature of the Black way of being that they are asserting. This does not suggest, however, that the group’s assertion is spurious. Rather, it may well be the very impossibility of specifying the minutiae of the composite ‘parts’ of Blackness that give the claim its force. When Molly asserts that I share this understanding, at a certain level it is true. I do share the group’s tacit knowledge of Black, despite also being aware that an attempt to define this risks crude generalisation, essentialism, racism and, ultimately, failure. When Marcella first makes her assertion she precedes it with a disclaimer: “I know there’s not a certain way for a Black person to present...”. Marcella is at least implicitly aware that such assertions have been and continue to be used to denigrate Black people and legitimate their subjugation. Yet, in the context of this disclaimer, she asserts that “there is” and the rest of the group concur. It may be possible to understand the Black that the group is referring to in terms of bodily habitus (Bourdieu 1990 & 1991). By adopting Butler’s suturing of Bourdieu’s theory of habitus with Foucault’s notion of discourse, it is possible to understand the Black asserted by the group as a constellation of discursively constituted dispositions, imbued with particular discursive capitals, that are deeply inscribed and exceed conscious choice or sovereign agency (Butler 1997).

In naming and asserting this specific Black race identity, the group is not simply reporting fact or offering a description. They are citing an enduring discourse of race and simultaneously inscribing this discourse and performatively interpellating Black, including Marcella’s own Black race identity.
**Indian, White**

The group also refers to Indian and White race identities. These race identities are simply stated and accepted without question or hesitation by the group. When Marcella claims to “know what they [Indians] look like”, however, responses within the group (laughter, an intake of breath) might infer that some members of the group are uncomfortable with this.

The group as a whole recognises the notion that race is self-evident simply by ‘looking’; Marcella is citing an enduring, if crude and often racist, discourse of race phenotypes or physiognomies. Yet the responses to Marcella’s claim that she knows “what they look like” suggest that this notion is not accepted in a straight forward way. These responses might indicate that the group is aware (including from personal experience) of the racist history of this discourse, the role it continues to play in racism, and its increasing unacceptability within particular milieu. This does not necessarily suggest that this discourse is not subscribed to, however, rather it may suggest that these members of the group are surprised, amused, shocked, or disconcerted by Marcella’s explicit citation of it. It appears, then, that at least some members of the group accept Indian and White as natural and phenotypically/physiognomically distinguishable races. Once again, this is not simply a case of stating facts about race -- it is a citation of race discourses which simultaneously inscribe and performatively interpellate race identities.

**Coolie**

The members of the group appear to have a common understanding of “Coolie”. It seems, however, that I am not expected to share this tacit knowledge in the same way as is the case for Black, Indian or White. Marcella explains to me that Coolie is the race identity of a person with both Black and Indian parentage. This infers that each race is
understood to be discreet, but that it is possible to combine these in an additive way in order to produce a third, discreet race. Within this understanding, then, Black plus Indian does not equal ‘Black and Indian’, rather, it equals Coolie. This clearly echoes designations such as ‘Mixed-race’ and ‘Half Caste’ used to indicate (performatively interpellate) a person with both Black and White parentage within authorised discourses of race.

The use of the term Coolie to designate (and performatively interpellate) this particular race identity is of interest. The Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition of ‘Coolie’ or ‘Cooly’: ‘2. a. The name given by Europeans in India and China to a native hired labourer or burden carrier; also used in other countries where these men are employed as cheap labourers.’ ‘2. b. S. Afr. [Afrikaans. Koelie (also used)] An Asian or Indian, esp. one of the lower classes. also attributively.’ At the time that the group raised the name Coolie, I was reminded of the image of the colonised Indian ‘happily’ serving the colonial master. When the group went on to explain their meaning of Coolie to me, I recalled that some years earlier I had heard Coolie used in London as a race identity for a person of Black and south east Asian (not Indian) parentage.

This contemporary use of Coolie to signify a particular race identity might be seen as a radical reinscription of a term steeped in the historicity of colonialism. Nevertheless, as evidence by my initial understanding, such historicity is not easily disrupted. Furthermore, while the term might have been put to a radically altered use, the enduring discourse of natural and distinct races continued to be cited and inscribed through the group’s naming of this race identity.
As a performative interpellation, “Popadom” is not imbued with the citationality or historicity for it to be efficacious as an enduring race identity. Nevertheless, it is intrinsically linked to race and constitutes (and denigrated) a particular race identity. In this context Popadom can be understood as an injurious performative. This name is citational and its power to injure is derived from its historicity. Its injury is located in its derogatory reference to (constitution of) a specific race or, indeed, in its reference to (constitution of) a specific race as intrinsically derogatory. It is possible to suggest, therefore, that it is a racist address. By calling Rachel “Popadom”, Marcella is not inaugurating the racist injury, rather, she is citing it, echoing a community of prior speakers and prior injuries (Butler 1997). Yet Marcella is a particularly outspoken critic of racism in the school (see Gillborn & Youdell 2000). My discussions with Marcella concerning racism have been concerned with the impact of institutional racism on African-Caribbean pupils, whereas the injurious name in question here is directed against an Indian pupil. It is possible to suggest that while displaying a sophisticated awareness of racism as it acts against her, Marcella’s own racism persists. This may be the case, yet Marcella apologises for using a racialised name to injure. It seems that while Marcella is vocally anti-racist, she is also acutely aware of the injurious power of names pertaining to race and is prepared to deploy such a name in this instance. In this context, then, Popadom simultaneously effects multiple injuries: it disavows Rachel’s (alleged) performative interpellation of herself as Coolie; without naming her as such, it performatively interpellates Rachel as Indian; and it denigrating Indian by substituting the proper name with the abusive name Popadom.

Underpinning all of these race identities is a discourse of discreet, real races. While there seems to be some oscillation between a discourse of essential races and a discourse of
culturally constructed races, race remains self-evident and unproblematic. At the core of the group’s understanding there appears to be an implicit assertion of racial authenticity; individuals are *a* race -- whether Black, Coolie, Indian or White -- which is determined by the race of parents, is enduring, and can be identified. This recourse to authenticity carries with it at least a residual acceptance of race as natural and based in essences -- race identity remains a biological fact.

*The Hierarchy within the Other*

The group does not explicitly state that hierarchical relations exist between races, yet such a hierarchy does seem to be implicit in their discussion. This hierarchy appears to be concerned with ‘non-White’ races or ‘people of colour’. Such terms have not gained currency in popular or intellectual discourse inside the UK. Nevertheless, such notions seem to underlie the discursive practices through which the group constitutes a Hierarchy within the Other. The relationship between this hierarchy and White is unclear: White might be understood as tangential or irrelevant; its position at the ultimate pinnacle of any race hierarchy might be implicitly conceded; or the Hierarchy within the Other might be an inversion of this dominant White privilege. This is clearly significant and will be returned to. In the first instance, however, I will examine how the Hierarchy within the Other is constituted by the group.

In terms of those non-White races named by the group, this Hierarchy within the Other appears to position Black at the top, followed by Coolie and then Indian, with Popadom positioned at the bottom. This hierarchy is evidenced in a number of ways within the episode.
Rachel’s (imagined) desire to be Coolie, or even Black, infers a common, tacit understanding that these race identities are more desirable than the ‘real’ Indian race identity that is designated to her (which she is performatively interpellated as being). That Popadom simultaneously acts to constitute and denigrate an Indian race identity suggests that the former is of a lower status than the latter. Rachel’s (alleged) ‘thinking’ she is Black appears to cause greater outrage than her (perceived) ‘false’ claim to be Coolie. This may be taken to infer that the former carries particularly high status. The notion that Black boys are particularly desirable as boyfriends is further indication of the high relative status of Black. The inference that Rachel’s claim to a Coolie race identity enables her to establish relationships with Black boys, and the related inference that these boys would not go out with Rachel if they ‘knew’ that she is ‘really’ Indian, conveys the implicit hierarchy of Black > Coolie > Indian. Taken together, then, the discursive practices within the group constitute an underlying race Hierarchy within the Other of Black > Coolie > Indian > Popadom. This hierarchy cites and inscribes the relative status or ‘coolness’ of particular race identities within broader discourses of youth/street culture -- discourses which performatively constitute non-White race identities in particular ways.

While this Hierarchy within the Other might be an inversion of the dominant race hierarchy, it simultaneously underlines and inscribes the ultimate privilege of White within hegemonic discourse where these non-White races are imbued with less and different relative status. In considering the relation of White to this hierarchy, it is interesting to turn to the race identity of the Rachel’s adoptive parents. Rachel has been adopted by White parents and Marcella is effusive in her positive comments about them. It seems that the Whiteness of Rachel’s adoptive parents produces an undercurrent within the Episode. Is it possible that the group’s dislike of Rachel is influenced by a
perceived access to Whiteness, an imagined potential for proxy Whiteness and/or an assessed excess proximity to Whiteness? Whatever the reason or reasons, it seems that the unease that the group feels in relation to Rachel’s race, and their efforts to performatively interpellate her as Indian, are in part informed by the fact that her adoptive parents are White. This reinforces my assessment that the hierarchy described above is situated within the Other of a White/non-White binary.

**Racial transgressions and expropriations**

These understandings of race identities and the hierarchical arrangement of distinct non-White race identities underlie the group’s dislike of Rachel. It appears that for Marcella, and to varying degrees the rest of the group, Rachel has committed a number of ‘crimes’ against ‘proper’ race.

First, Rachel has ‘denied’ what is considered to be her ‘proper’ race -- Indian. The denial of this ‘proper’ race is taken to indicate that she is “ashamed” to be Indian. This denial is itself a transgression of the group’s mode of race identity and anti-racism in which race is a matter of individual and community pride. Second, Rachel has made what is considered to be a false claim to an alternative race identity -- Coolie. This assertion of an alternative race, is not simply the substitution of one race identity with another. If this were a simple case of substitution it is unlikely that it would provoke such a hostile response or such efforts at recuperation. Rather, Rachel is ‘denying’ a race identity -- Indian -- which is accorded low status within the pupils’ Hierarchy within the Other and expropriating a race identity -- Coolie -- which is accorded higher status within this hierarchy. Furthermore, by asserting a Coolie race identity Rachel might be seen as staking at least a partial claim to Blackness; the race identity at the pinnacle of the group’s race hierarchy. This assertion is also seen to have enabled her to gain access to
Black boyfriends -- access which might be seen to lend her some Black status by association. Rachel's most reviled transgression of race boundaries concerns the groups' belief that she has behaved in ways that are the preserve of a Black race identity. This expropriation is confirmed to the group by the evidence that supports the accusation that Rachel "thinks she's Black" -- her mode of speech, vocabulary, actions and hairstyles. It is this expropriation which inspires the greatest wrath and ridicule on the part of the group.

In a discursive frame dominated by race phenotypes/physiognomies, however, Rachel simply cannot be Black. A notion of bodily habitus appears to underlie the group's notion of Black. For the group, the authenticity of a raced way of being (bodily habitus) is absolutely dependent on 'being' that race phenotypically or physiognomically. That Rachel is 'not' Black in this schema offers the group 'proof' that her Black habitus is inauthentic; that it is a masquerade. Such a race masquerade is considered by the group to be a serious transgression of race boundaries and is censured. This reflects research by Solomos and Back (1996) which suggests that while inter-racial friendships are common among young people, evidence that non-Black young people might want to 'be' Black leads to considerable censure on the part of Black young people.

Through the claim to a Coolie race identity and Black behaviour Rachel is seen as trying to effect a transition inside the Hierarchy within the Other from one of the most low status race identities -- Indian -- to the highest status race identity -- Black. This can be understood as an Indian girl attempting to performatively interpellating herself as Coolie and performatively constitute herself as Black. As noted in Chapter 2, performatives always run the risk of infelicity (Derrida 1988) and interpellations depend on the authority of both the speaker and ritual or convention for their success (Althusser 1971,
Austin 1965). As Butler (1997a) points out, a speaker can deploy any performative at all, but if it is not meaningful in discourse it will fail.

Marcella, and to some extent the rest of the group, is determined to prove the Rachel’s performatives infelicitous and ensure that her own constitutions -- Indian, Popadom -- are efficacious. That Black is at the pinnacle of the Hierarchy within the Other heightens the demand to prove the performative infelicitous -- Rachel has not just told a ‘lie’, she has attempted to expropriate the most highly prized race identity. Furthermore, this is a race identity which Marcella ‘is’ and one which the Mixed-race pupils in the group may consider, in part, to be their domain. There is, therefore, also an element of protectionism within the discursive practices of the group. Indeed, Marcella cites one of the girl’s offences as acting (being?) “Blacker than me”. In addition, these pupils have a personal investment in this hierarchy and in policing the racial boundaries within it; the Same is at stake when the Other refuses to act its place (Butler 1997).

The preservation of the Hierarchy within the Other requires that the boundaries of all races be policed. As such, while no member of the group is Coolie, the group retains an investment in ensuring that Rachel is ‘not’ Coolie. Furthermore, as indicated above, a Coolie race identity might afford Rachel some legitimate access to Black. As such, Rachel’s perceived transgression of race boundaries is punished by denying her Coolie and performatively interpellating her as Indian or, in further denigration, Popadom. These constitutions also serve to relocate Rachel at the bottom of the Hierarchy within the Other.

Rendering infelicitous Rachel’s Coolie is not as straightforward as is the case for Black. In a discursive frame dominated by race phenotypes/physiognomies, Rachel’s Coolie
retains a residual plausibility. In addition, the fact that she is adopted means that her biological parents can neither be examined for phenotypic/physiognomic evidence of race, nor can they be asked to state their (and, therefore, her) race(s). As such, it is impossible for a definitive statement of Rachel’s ‘real’ race to be made -- Coolie can neither be proved nor disproved. It is perhaps this very impossibility that fuels the particularly heated contestation of Rachel’s Coolie claim. The ‘aside’ exchange between Molly and Jasmine indicates that they have some awareness of the possible significance of Rachel being adopted. Indeed, they seem to suggest that this may in some way explain her behaviour and they offer this in a partial and muted defence. This does not mean, however, that Molly and Jasmine are ready to concede that Rachel may be Coolie, but they are less punishing in response to her claim than Marcella and Juliet.

Ultimately, the contestation surrounding Rachel’s race identity comes down to the performative force of competing names: Coolie / Indian or Popadom. Rachel’s Coolie has been provisionally successful: she does have Black boyfriends who believe that she is Coolie -- she ‘is’, therefore, Coolie. Marcella’s only available resistance to this appears to be to deploy counter performative interpellations -- Indian and Popadom. These have also been provisionally successful: Marcella and the group believe that Rachel is Indian -- she ‘is’, therefore, Indian. This suggests that Rachel is at once both Coolie and Indian -- a situation that is clearly at odds with the discourse of discreet and authentic races which frames this context. The ‘truth’ of her race identity becomes a continual site of struggle and Rachel is forced to move between these identities as she names herself and is variously named by others.

The group’s discursive practices are suffused with evidence of Foucault’s disciplinary power. Rachel is the subject of the group’s surveillance, hierarchical observation,
normalising judgement, and classification. And the group implicitly subjects itself to these techniques of disciplinary power. The limits of this modality of power is also evident; while Rachel is not able to oppose these techniques, she is able to resist them and this resistance is seen to have at least provisional success within certain contexts. Nevertheless, both the group and Rachel cite and inscribe the discourse of discreet, authentic and essential races. And it is this discourse which ensnares them and renders them all perpetually vulnerable to performative interpellations of race.

**Masculinities and femininities within the heterosexual matrix**

Episode 4 illustrates the ways in which multiple heterosexual masculinities and femininities can be understood in terms of a series of dominant binary oppositions within what Butler has referred to as the ‘heterosexual matrix’ (Butler, 1990:5).

Episode 4 draws on girls’ constitutions of heterosexual masculinities and femininities. In the following chapters I will turn to boys’ own constitutions of gender. This initial focus on girls’ constitutions is due to the fact that girls offered gender narratives in a way that boys did not. Indeed, the very practice of narrating gender identities appears as an integral part of heterosexual femininities. Boys, in the main, did not engage in this sort of talk. When I move on to examine boys’ constitutions of gender and sexual identities I will draw primarily on my observations of boys’ performative practices inside the school.

The girls’ discursive practices constitute heterosexual masculinities in terms of a man/boy dichotomy, in which the man is masculine and adult and the boy is feminine and infantile (Connell 1995). Heterosexual femininities, on the other hand, are constituted in terms of a virgin/whore dichotomy (Butler 1990 and Warner 1976). These
dichotomies are themselves underpinned by the oppositions man/woman, masculine/feminine\textsuperscript{15}. All of these are constituting discourses which cite and inscribe the enduring authorised discourse of normative heterosexuality (Butler 1990 & 1993; Grosz 1995). Taken together, the Scenes of Episode 4 offer insight into the inseparability of (hetero-) sexuality and gender, the inseparability of masculinity and femininity, and the interactions of these with social class and race identities.

Episode 2 examined middle class pupils’ naming of themselves as Dir’y ‘ippies. In doing this, these pupils self-consciously attempt to constitute themselves outside the heterosexual matrix. This attempt is made through a positive emphasis on gay, lesbian, bisexual and queer identities (whether or not these are self-identities) and a refutation of the sexual and gender identities through which the Shazas and Bazas are constituted. At a superficial level, such resistance to the compulsory and compulsive repetition of heterosexual masculinities and femininities (Butler 1990 & 1993) is absent amongst the majority of pupils included in the study. As indicated in my analysis of Episode 2, this contributes to the Dir’y ‘ippies’ naming of the (working class) pupil majority as Shazas and Bazas. This is not to suggest that resistances to hegemonic masculinities and femininities are not found amongst these pupils. Unlike the resistances of the Dir’y ‘ippies, however, the resistances of these pupils tend to be seen within the discursive frame of the heterosexual matrix. The scenes contained in Episode 4 are taken from discussions with pupils who can be understood to form part of this working class pupil majority.
Performative interpellations of heterosexual masculinities

Episode 4: Heterosexual masculinities/heterosexual femininities (Part 1)

All scenes take place sitting in a group around a table in the year base while the rest of the tutor group are in a PSE lesson.

Scene 1: known boys – decent geezas and rude boys/unknown boys – immature little boys and ugly boys

DY (the researcher, mid/late twenties, woman, White)
MARCELLA (year 11 pupil, girl, African)
MOLLY (year 11 pupil, girl, White)
JULIET (year 11 pupil, girl, Mixed-race)
JASMINE (year 11 pupil, girl, Mixed-race)

DY: All the people we’ve been talking about are girls. What about boys in the school?
ALL: (laughing exclamation) ahhgh!
MOLLY: They’re filthy.
MARCELLA: Half are little boys who...
JULIET: They’re little, aren’t they, the boys in this year [...] Immature little boys.
MARCELLA: Most of them are immature.
JULIET: Some of them are alright, you can talk to some of them.
[...]
[...]
MARCELLA: (calling to him) Hi Josh!...yeah, fine!
JULIET He’s real funny, he cracks me up.
DY: So you like him?
ALL: Yeah.
JULIET: Yeah Joshua, he’s a decent geeza.
[...]
DY: What about Tony and Daniel? [two boys who have been mentioned earlier]
MARCELLA: (laughing, imitating coyness) ahh, they’re my friends!
MOLLY: They’re right little trouble makers though.
JASMINE: And they’re rude.
MOLLY: Yeah, they are.
MARCELLA: Yeah, they’re rude to me, (laughing, throwing head back, patting heart, high tone) but I still love ‘em! [...] Tony is lovely though, so is Daniel.
JASMINE: They’re rude!
JULIET: Tony is rude, Tony is so rude, so is Daniel.
MARCELLA: They are rude, but they’re lovely still.
DY: (to MARCELLA) Do you like them because they’re rude?
MARCELLA: No, no, no.
MOLLY: They’re big softies at heart.
MARCELLA: [...] Why do I like them Jasmine? I don’t know, I don’t know... There’s a real special bond I have with them, they try to be horrible to me but I know deep inside...!
ALL: (laugh)
[...]
DY: Do you three like them? do you think they’re this special?
JULIET: No.
JASMINE: I prefer Tony to Daniel cos Daniel does give you a lot of abuse.
DY: What sort of abuse?
MOLLY: I just walk into a classroom and they...
  (simultaneously) JASMINE: (laughing) They start...
  (simultaneously) JULIET: You can’t, you just walk in and they start ‘urg’...
JASMINE: And you laugh and they go ‘Oh shut up!’ [...] They tell you to ‘Shut up’, ‘Go away’.
MOLLY: Yeah.
JULIET: It’s like, as soon as you walk into the room they’re like ‘Oh you fat bitch’.
ALL: (laugh)
MARCELLA: They don’t do that to me though, do they Jasmine? They don’t abuse me as soon as I walk in the room, I have to do something.
JASMINE: He messed up my hair, he told me ‘It’s not a fashion show’.
MOLLY: Yeah!
MARCELLA: But one time it really touched me, cos he told me that he liked my hairstyle, but at times I really wanna.
MOLLY: (interrupting) Hit him!
MARCELLA: I want to hit him more!
JULIET: Tony is cute though.
MARCELLA: Cos one time I kicked Daniel and he came and said sorry to me afterwards, cos I showed him who is the boss!

The group goes on to talk about the boys in their tutor group.

JULIET: We’ve got the worst boys in the year.
MARCELLA: We have.
DY: In what way are they worst?
MARCELLA: They’ve go no social...
JASMINE: (interrupting) They so boring and unattractive.
JULIET: They’re so ugly, they’re the worst boys in the year, they’re so unpopular.
MARCELLA: Yeah, no one knows them, like all the other classes...
(Jointly) JULIET: Like all the other classes, you know all of them.
MARCELLA: Yeah, they’re known.

Scene 2: Virgin boys

DY (the researcher, mid/late twenties, woman, White)
MOLLY, NICOLA, DIANE, ANNIE, MILLI (year 11 pupils, girls, White)

MOLLY has given DY her school diary to look at. Each pupil is provided with a diary by the school. In the back of the school diary there are pages with printed boxes [approximately 3 cm by 5 cm] in which teachers can write positive comments or ‘Commendations’. Tutors check the diaries for homework records and subject teachers’ comments on a weekly basis but do not use the Commendations section. Unused and apparently unchecked by tutors, pupils write Commendations for each other.

DY: (reading from MOLLY’s Commendations, trying to read indentation of text under correction fluid) ‘For having ...
MOLLY: Louder.
DY: ‘For having ...’ Oh, did that used to say something like breasts?!
ALL: (laugh)
DY: ‘For having big breasts and being good at football’.
MOLLY: He’s a disgusting little prat, and the thing is, I bet he’s a virgin.
NICOLA: No, he ain’t.
MOLLY: No?
NICOLA: Well, thinking people he’s been out with and that.
MOLLY: The way boys go on right, the way most boys go on is as if they’ve had sex.
NICOLA: Daniel’s ... Daniel’s a virgin.
MOLLY: And he goes around doing all this.
NICOLA: (almost whispering, others leaning in to listen) Daniel’s a virgin right, cos when I walked home with him the other day I goes to him ‘Are you a virgin?’, cos you know how he acts, and he goes ‘That’s for me to know and you to find out’. Now a boy who is a virgin will say that, but a boy who ain’t a virgin will go ‘I’ve shagged about 8 girls so far’, cos they don’t really want to lie but they don’t want to tell the truth either.
MOLLY: Cos the way he comes across he goes around doing all that stuff to girls.
NICOLA: He’s probably done everything else apart from shag a girl.
Within the Episode masculinities are defined not only in relation to Other masculinities but also in relation to femininities. This sequence of interconnecting binary relationships means that a focus on masculinities inevitably raises the issue of femininities. To facilitate discussed I have separated masculinities and femininities, yet this separation is artificial and remains incomplete.

In the open moments of Scene 1 the girls performatively interpellate “half” or even “most” of the boys in the year as “immature little boys”. In constituting these boys as such, those boys not included in this half/most are implicitly constituted as mature big boys or even men. Immediately, then, the underlying man/boy dichotomy becomes evident. That these immature little boys are simultaneously constituted and disregarded is indicative of the hierarchical arrangement of this binary. Furthermore, in naming at least half of the boys in the year group immature little boys the girls implicitly constitute themselves as being substantially more mature than the boys they are denigrating. Indeed, they might be seen to be extending the man/boy binary to those of woman/girl and man/woman, thereby implicitly constituting themselves as woman. These discursive practices cite and inscribe the discourse of popular psychology which asserts (constitutes) the relative maturity of ‘adolescent’ girls in comparison to boys of the same age.

At the end of Scene 1 these “immature little boys” come back into view. When the girls constitute the boys in their own tutor group as “boring”, “ugly”, “unpopular” they seem
to be extending (but not exhausting) their designation of these “immature little boys”. In addition, a further oppositional relationship is explicitly established between masculinities: known/unknown. The rest of the boys in the year are “known”. The boys in the tutor group are, therefore, unknown. In constituting unknown boys as boring, ugly, unpopular, known boys are implicitly constituted as interesting, attractive, popular. As such, it appears that man is intrinsically linked to being “known”, a masculinity that incorporates being interesting, physically attractive and popular.

Once again, the girls implicitly constitute themselves in terms of a particular femininity. If they ‘know’ the “known” boys (pseudo-men) then they are themselves known and, by extension, interesting, physically attractive and popular. Yet a sense of the girls having been short-changed seems to underlie their constitution of the unknown boys in their tutor group. The girls’ social access and proximity to known boys has been restricted by the school’s organisational processes of allocating pupils to tutor groups. This might be taken to infer a tacit understanding of the binary constitution of man/woman and, by extension, particular masculinities and femininities. The girls’ known identity becomes tenuous in the absence of known boys against and by whom these identities are defined and designated.

The girls focus on known boys during the majority of the Scene 1. One such known boy, Josh, is called a “decent geeza”. This status as a decent geeza interacts with being “real funny”: Juliet’s approval of Josh is initially based on the grounds that “he cracks me up”. The historicity of geeza embeds this name in and cites a discourse of heterosexual, working class, adult masculinity -- a geeza is a man. In this case it appears that this status as man might be achieved through particular uses of humour. Such a constitution simultaneously implicitly constitutes a passive heterosexual femininity (the entertained)
in (complementary) opposition to an active heterosexual masculinity (the entertainer). The naming of Josh as decent geeza also gives further illustration to the man/boy binary through which the girls constitute their male peers: this geeza is constituted in opposition to the immature little boys simultaneously constituted and disregarded in the opening of Scene 1.

The way in which known boys Tony and Daniel are constituted through Scene 1 is more complex. Tony and Daniel are simultaneously constituted as “trouble makers” or “rude” and “lovely”. Marcella does not contest the other girls’ performative naming of these boys as rude. Rather, she constitutes them as at once rude and lovely. The other girls do not contest this simultaneous constitution. At a common sense level this may seem to be contradictory. Yet the compatibility of rude and lovely draws on, cites and inscribes the popular discourse of the loveable rogue (for contemporary soap-opera examples think Grant Mitchell in Eastenders, Barry Grant in Brookside, Steve MacDonald or Mike Baldwin in Coronation Street...) -- anti-authoritarian, sexually powerful, heterosexual, masculine. There seems to be within the group an implicit acknowledgement of Marcella’s romantic and/or sexual interest in these boys: a romantic/sexual interest which is both legitimated by and sustains the discourse of the loveable rouge and the heterosexual masculinities which this cites and constitutes.

It seems that trouble maker or rude -- that is, aggressive -- is by no means an indicator of immaturity within the girls’ discursive practices. Indeed, aggression appears as a further constituting discourse of working class, heterosexual, masculinity -- of man -- resonating with the protest masculinity discussed by Connell (1995). In addition, Daniel’s Black race identity and Tony’s Mixed-race race identity might serve to further constitute that aggressive heterosexual masculinity through the implicit citation and inscription of a
discourse of Black hyper-masculinity-sexuality. Furthermore, it appears that rude and funny do not co-exist in the girls’ constituting discourse. Rather, these are alternative known masculinities, both of which act to constitute man in hierarchical opposition to (immature little) boy.

Once again a passive heterosexual femininity is implicitly constituted in opposition to an active heterosexual masculinity. The girls catalogue the ways in which these boys are rude to them: telling them to “go away”, “shut up”; calling them “fat bitch”; telling them school is “not a fashion show”. They do not appear to be upset or outraged by this behaviour. On the contrary, the girls laugh while recounting these instances and appear to enjoy retelling the boys’ rudeness to them. It is possible that to be abused by these boys is taken by these girls as a sign of approval. Once again this appears to be a passive femininity in which the girls receive the attention (albeit superficially derogatory and abusive) of the boys. That is, it constitutes the girls within the bounds of desirable and, therefore, acceptable passive heterosexual femininity. Marcella’s affectations (head back, patting heart) indicate that the girls are well aware of the particular femininity constituted in (complementary) opposition to this masculinity. Marcella’s affectations parody this femininity, thereby exposing it. Yet this exposing parody does not threaten to challenge or subvert.

Through the incidents being narrated and the narration itself the girls are constituted as passive-heterosexual-feminine. This does not imply, however, that the girls simply accept this constitution. Both Molly and Marcella state that they would like to “hit” these boys and Marcella recounts an instance when she “kicked” Daniel. Within the confines of a passive-heterosexual-femininity, such an aggressive (and, therefore, masculine) response might be expected to provoke considerable censure. Yet Daniel is
reported to have subsequently apologised to Marcella for the abuse which promoted her to kick him. This suggests multiple heterosexual femininities -- passivity is not always a pre-requisite of acceptable heterosexual femininity.

It is possible that the incident, and indeed femininities more broadly, are mediated by race identities. Both Daniel and Marcella are Black; the race at the pinnacle of the Hierarchy within the Other. Perhaps a Black race identity affords Marcella a degree of activity within heterosexual femininity which is not available to the other girls in the group. Perhaps Daniel understands Black femininities to be bounded in different ways to the passive heterosexual femininity I have postulated. Perhaps Daniel’s and Marcella’s shared race identity enables passive femininity to be suspended, at least temporarily, in relation to this incident. Whatever the reasons for Daniel’s ‘unexpected’ response to being kicked by Marcella, this indicates both the possibilities within and constraints upon viable femininities and masculinities. It also indicates the ways in which the femininities available to individual girls might be mediated by other identities, in this case race. If by virtue of her race identity Marcella does enjoy a less strictly bounded heterosexual femininity, it seems almost inevitable that this will bring with it associated costs. I will turn to these costs in subsequent chapters.

It appears that the boys being discussed in Scene 2 are those known boys (pseudo-men), whether funny or rude, who were distinguished from the immature little boys through Scene 1. In Scene 2 the girls are discussing whether or not particular boys are “virgins”. The immature little boys disregarded in Scene 1 are implicitly constituted as virgin: sexual inexperience is an integral feature of immature little boy. As such, it is the known boys or geez as of Scene 1 whose sexual activity is of interest to the girls. While these
girls did not use the term man to refer to boys in the year group, the boy/man dichotomy is evident in their constituting discourse of not-virgin/virgin.

The graffiti in Molly’s school diary, which has been partially erased with correction fluid, appears to have been written by one of these rude boys (pseudo-men). Despite the group’s laughter and Molly’s encouraging me to decipher the partially erased text, Molly responds to the reference to her breasts (performatively constituting her as female, woman, sexually available) by naming the writer “disgusting little prat”. Molly’s use of little is of note: it cites the unknown little boys of Scene 1 and thereby threatens to performatively interpellate this boy as boy within the man/boy binary. This name is at least provisionally successful in this context -- it is not contested by the group although it is likely that the boy in question would do so. Molly transforms/exposes the bodily reference to her breasts into/as a sexual reference when she sets up an opposition between the boy’s text and her naming him “virgin”. This claim to his virginity also acts to further constitute him as boy within a man-not-virgin/boy-virgin binary.

To call a boy virgin, if the performative is successful, has important consequences. Whether or not boys are virgins is of great significance to their masculine identities and, therefore, their status within the school. As already indicated, not-virgin/virgin mirrors, and is intrinsically linked to, man/boy. This is the case in the pupils’ discursive practices and in the broader discourses of heterosexual masculinity which these draw upon. In an adaptation and citation of medical discourse, the pupils’ not-virgin demands penile-vaginal penetration. For both boys and girls not-virgin is synonymous with coitus: a bodily practice/experience which is defined precisely and imbued with particular (but not fixed) social meanings. Furthermore, this definition renders masculinity and femininity always already heterosexual -- whether virginal or not.
Within the man/boy dichotomy, then, adult heterosexual masculinities -- man -- is constituted through a discourse of coitus. Indeed, the coupling of man-not-virgin acts as a prerequisite for masculinity itself in a series of oppositional hierarchies which equates virgin with boy, and boy with feminine. These connections renders virgin implicitly feminine, with the concomitant threat of homosexuality which this feminine implies (Connell 1995). In such a discursive frame, it is imperative that boys performatively constitute themselves as experienced in coitus, that is, as not-virgin, in order to constitute themselves as man and protect against being constituted as virgin-boy-feminine and potentially homosexual19.

Nicola, however, has ‘evidence’ of the “disgusting little prat’s” not-virgin (man) status. She deduces this from the girls that he has been out with: she ‘knows’ that these girls are not virgins and, as he has been out with them, it follows that he is not a virgin either. Molly appears to concede the specific case but generalises that: “the way most boys go on is as if they’ve had sex”. Molly’s “as if” is significant: according to Molly, boys attempt to constitute themselves as men (not-virgin) when they are, in ‘fact’, boys (virgin). This ‘going on’ is not comprised of subtle allusions to sex, rather, it is comprised of explicit sexual propositioning. As in Scene 1, this is an active, aggressive, heterosexual masculinity. This might also be understood as a particularly working class heterosexual masculinity. While middle class heterosexual masculinity might also require sexual activity, it is likely that this would demand a more refined propositioning than “Come on round my house, I’ll shag you senseless”.

Nicola has also ‘decoded’ the discursive practices that boys deploy in relation to their sexual activity and is able to determine where these boys are ‘truly’ positioned in the man/boy binary. As a result she has important and sensitive information on this issue.
Her information is important because adult heterosexual masculinities are crucial to the status of boys. Her information is sensitive because it relates to Daniel; one of the rude boys discussed in Scene 1. Daniel has particularly high status in the school and his aggressive, heterosexual masculinity, including his experience of coitus, is a key to this status. By performatively interpellating Daniel as virgin, then, Nicola is contesting his constitution of himself and threatening his masculinity. Given the apparent efficacy of Daniel’s constitution of himself, Nicola also risks the failure of her own performative interpellation.

Nicola has asked Daniel whether or not he is a virgin and claims that his response -- a guarded non-response that also serves as a (half-hearted) sexual proposition (itself constitutive of aggressive heterosexual masculinity) -- exposes the fact that he is a virgin. That is, that he is a boy and, by extension, feminine. Nicola does not expect any boy to admit to being a virgin but she ‘knows’ that a boy who is ‘truly’ not-virgin will state this explicitly. Nicola concedes, however, that Daniel has “probably done everything else apart from shag a girl”. This concession serves to shore-up, at least provisionally, the man that her deduction undermines. Nevertheless, Daniel is still virgin and the threat of boy remains.

Within the girls’ discourses of masculinities, the discursive practices through which the boys are seen to constitute themselves as man appear to be positioned as being at odds with intelligence. I suggested above that heterosexual masculinities in the school might be mediated by social class. It is noteworthy that, in Episode 2, intelligence is positioned as intrinsically middle class. It seems that Intelligent (middle class?) boys do not, or ‘should’ not, engage in the practices through which other boys constitute themselves as heterosexual-masculine. William’s case is interesting because his discursive practices
infer that he has experienced coitus. At the same time he has "admitted" (inferring that this is potential source of shame), and is indeed "proud", to be virgin. This illustrates the complexity and multiplicity of heterosexual masculinities in the school. In this instance active heterosexual masculinity combined with intelligence (middle class identity?) allows man to be sustained in conjunction with the 'lack' of coitus. Yet it appears that this particular heterosexual masculinity is not widely available to the known boys. Indeed, virginity, middle class status, and/or intelligence are not often compatible with known masculinity.

Particular femininities are also constituted through these discourses of masculinity. These are implicitly heterosexual, knowing, but ultimately deferential. Nicola does not challenge Daniel directly in relation to his virginity. Rather she shares her deduction with her feminine co-conspirators in hushed tones. This can be seen as citing and inscribing a broader popular discourse of wily and untrustworthy femininity.

Molly can be taken as a possible exception to the heterosexual femininities inscribed and constituted through Scenes 1 and 2. Molly does not appear to be either amused or flattered by Tony and Daniel’s rudeness. While Marcella kicked Daniel, this was in the context of what seems to be a relatively intimate relationship. Molly, on the other hand, simply wants to “hit” Tony and Daniel. Although it is Molly who concedes that Tony and Daniel are “big softies”, this might be seen as a counter-discourse to the aggressive heterosexual masculinity cited, inscribed and constituted through Scenes 1 and 2. Similarly, when Molly’s constitution of the “disgusting little prat” as “virgin” is recuperated by Nicola’s assertion that this boys is, in ‘fact’, not -virgin, Molly broadens this constitution to incorporate boys across the year group. Furthermore, Molly’s opening naming of boys as “filth” is a generalised denouncement and potential
constitution. This does not appear to fit the man/boy binary deployed by the other girls.
Indeed, there is a sense that, for Molly, the boys on both sides of this binary may well be
"filth".

The heterosexual masculinities provisionally constituted by the girls through Scenes 1
and 2 cite and inscribe a series of interwoven hierarchical binaries: masculine/feminine,
man/boy, not-virgin/virgin, heterosexual/homosexual. As in popular and authorised
discourses, within the discursive practices of the pupils the privileged terms from each
of these binaries combine to constitute sought after masculine identities. While the most
sought after man is not a singular heterosexual masculinity, it is constrained and the
boundaries of these viable heterosexual masculinities are closely monitored and policed.
It appears that the availability of these masculinities is mediated, at least in part, by other
identities, such as race and social class. These identities themselves confer particular
discursive capitals (Bourdieu 1991) and provide (or deny) access to and legitimate (or
disavow) the deployment of particular constituting discursive practices.

**Performative interpellations of heterosexual femininities**

**Episode 4: Heterosexual masculinities/heterosexual femininities (Part 2)**

*All scenes take place sitting in a group around a table in the year base while the rest of the tutor group are
in a PSE lesson*

**Scene 3: slag girls**

DY, MARCELLA, MOLLY, JULIET, JASMINE (as Scene 1)

The group are discussing SU LIN, a Chinese girl in the tutor group.

MARCELLA: I mean, what is she, she's fifteen, the problems that she's had...
(simultaneously) MOLLY: She's got a lot of problems.
(simultaneously) JULIET: She's like thirty isn't she?
MARCELLA: Yeah.
DY: What sort of problems?
MOLLY: (gravely) pregnancy.
JULIET: She's got herself into so much trouble and then she comes to us to sort it out for her, she wants us to sort it out for her, and that's the problem.
MARCELLA: She's got to be careful. Like, when you've got a boyfriend you don't come and tell everyone, it gets twisted and then...
JULIET: She's lost so many friends over it, she's got hardly any friends left now, it's only us lot now that talk to her.
ALL: Yeah.
DY: What's made this happen, because she has so many boyfriends or she talks about it?
MARCELLA: Yeah, she sleeps around.
JULIET: (slight laugh in voice) She's my friend and everything but I've told you she's a slag.
MARCELLA: She goes with so many different boys. She's got to be careful. Like, when you've got a boyfriend you don't come and tell everyone, it gets twisted and then...
JULIET: She's lost so many friends over it, she's got hardly any friends left now, it's only us lot now that talk to her.
ALL: Yeah.
DY: What's made this happen, because she has so many boyfriends or she talks about it?
MARCELLA: She's got to be careful. Like, when you've got a boyfriend you don't come and tell everyone, it gets twisted and then...
JULIET: She's like up Chinatown all the time, so like, (laughing) I wouldn't feel welcome up there and that.
DY: Is it the number or turnover of boyfriends that concerns you or is it that...
MARCELLA: At her age she shouldn't be sleeping with so much people.
JULIET: Leave it to, like, later.
DY: So it's the number of people she's sleeping with?
MARCELLA: She shouldn't be sleeping with anyone at all if you really think about it, but I mean whether she chooses to do it, that's her business.
JULIET: But then she shouldn't be telling everyone about it, that's how she loses friends.

Scene 4: virgin girls, slapper girls and other girls

DY, MOLLY, NICOLA, DIANE, ANNIE, MILLI (as Scene 2)

DY: How do you know if people are virgins or not?
MOLLY: I dunno, because people don't give a shit.
DIANE: (indicating NICOLA) she ain't.
NICOLA: (shouting, high pitch) I am Diane!
MOLLY: (laughing) she ain't.
DY: How do you know?
MOLLY: It's just the way she goes round.
DY: What about...
MOLLY: (interrupting) Puts herself across to boys.
DY: What does she do?
MOLLY: She goes running up to them and cuddling them and (impersonating NICOLA) 'Oooh'.
NICOLA: (screeching) No I don't!
DY: She flirts a little bit?
MOLLY: Yes, and she goes, 'Ah, I'll have sex with you later if you open the door'.
NICOLA: (laughing) I do not say things like that!
DY: And [boy] goes 'Ok come on then, lets go' and she actually walks up to him and goes 'Come on'.
NICOLA: (more serious, agitated) But I'm still joking around, I'm just having a laugh Molly!
MOLLY: Yeah but people like [boy] and [boy], they'll take it differently and think 'Ah, she's a right little slapper' and that. Think about what happened to [girl].
NICOLA: Sorry, I ain't gonna spend the night shagging someone if I don't love 'em and trust 'em, I ain't gonna shag anyone that I ain't going out with.
Within the pupils' discursive practices, the not-virgin/virgin binary does not function in the same ways for masculinities and femininities. Rather than conferring the status of adult woman, a sexually active girl (whether or not this has involved coitus) runs the risk of the performative interpellations "slapper" or "slag". This cites and inscribes the double standards embedded in dominant discourses of heterosexual masculinity and femininity. The historicity of the virgin/whore dichotomy, where the virgin shifts to the privileged side of the binary, is embedded in the heterosexual femininities of working class girls in the school.

Scene 3 offers evidence of this virgin/whore dichotomy and illustrates both its boundaries and the ways in which girls inscribe and police this. Within the Scene the status of Su Lin as not-virgin is quickly inferred when her "problems" are identified as "preg-nan-cy". The group indicates that telling people, including girls who are friends, about sexual activity with boyfriends is a justified and common reason to lose these friends. It seems that it is the combination of being sexually active with a succession of boys and talking about this that leads to the naming "slag".

The discursive practices of the group suggest that the discourse of feminine sexual morality (and immorality) underpinning the pupils' constitutions of heterosexual femininities is based on something of a sliding moral scale. In the terms of this moral scale, a girl should be a virgin: she should "leave it to later", "she shouldn't be sleeping with anyone at all". If she is not-virgin, she should only have coitus with boys with whom she has an (implicitly monogamous) relationship (boyfriends). The number of these relationships should be limited. Sex outside a relationship -- "sleeping around" -- is unacceptable. A girl should not discuss her sexual activity with anyone, including
friends who are girls. The greater the number of boys a girl has had sex with (coitus or not), the greater the imperative for silence.

The moral discourse of heterosexual femininities deployed by the group cites and inscribes both paternal discourses of heterosexual femininity and the religious discourses in which these are rooted. Within what has become a secularised discourse, the girls are citing and inscribing a discourse of prized feminine virginity which must be ‘saved’ in order to be gifted to, or taken by, the ‘right’ man. These overlapping religious and secular discourses of feminine (im-)morality also entail the necessity for this (im-)morality to be policed. A policing that is discursively positioned as being in the interest of girls and women both as individuals and as a group.

The girls’ moral discourse does not wholly subscribe to the stark virgin/whore binary which it cites. Rather, some possibility for sexual activity is retained, although this is tightly bounded and the risk of “slag” is ever present. In the girls’ constitution of heterosexual femininities, sexual activity is only protected from the performative interpellation slag if a girl does not talk about this sexual activity. That is, feminine sexual desire must be silenced. Sexual activity outside a relationship states boldly this feminine sexual desire. This is the apex of active (and, therefore, immoral) heterosexual femininity -- the slag or whore of the virgin/whore dichotomy -- and is censured most strongly. The implications of this moral discourse for the availability of viable heterosexual femininities, as well as intimate friendships between girls, peer support and peer sexual health education, are significant.

In naming Su Lin “slag” -- or whore -- the group members implicitly constitute their own heterosexual femininities in hierarchical opposition to this: virgin. The reference to
"Chinatown" is also interesting. Juliet is distancing herself from her one-time friend by implicitly constituting her as the racial Other. This also implicitly entwines Sue Lin’s heterosexual femininity -- slag -- with her Chineseness. Juliet is citing and inscribing the discourse of the sexually promiscuous and exotic Other; an exotic Other seen in a different guise in Episode 1. That this is a discourse which has also been deployed to denigrate Black and Mixed-race heterosexual femininities seems to be overlooked in the group’s own deployment of it.

This moral discourse and the constraints within which heterosexual femininities are constituted are elaborated through Scene 4. In Scene 4 Diane and Molly assert that Nicola is not-virgin, and, by extension, at risk of being slag or whore. Nicola begins by contesting vigorously this constitution. Diane and Molly do not suggest that Nicola has told them of her sexual activity. In the light of the imperative for silence detailed in Scene 3, it is unclear whether Nicola will have divulged this information directly and she is not offering me this information. Scene 3 also showed how a girls’ virginity can be crucial to the constitution of a particular heterosexual femininity. Given the risk of slag, the silencing of feminine desire and the centrality of virgin to the constitution of heterosexual femininities, it is unsurprising that Nicola denies the charge laid by the other girls.

Scene 4 illustrates that it is not simply the ‘fact’ of virgin/not-virgin (whore) that is at stake. The “way” Nicola “goes around” and “puts herself across to boys” is also significant. Molly describes Nicola’s interactions with boys as being tactile, having sexually explicit verbal content, and involving the making of sexual promises. Nicola appears initially to be amused by these reports. As Molly’s description proceeds, however, Nicola disputes the account with increasing vigour and appears to become
quite upset. Eventually Nicola concedes that she does behave in the reported ways and attempts to defend herself by asserting that she is “joking around” and “just having a laugh”.

This concession and justification leads to Molly’s ‘warning’. Nicola may well be “just having a laugh” but she is not sovereign in this context. What ‘counts’ is how boys will “take it”. Certain boys, whose performative interpellations appear to be understood as having particular authority, will constitute Nicola as a “right little slapper”. The intimation seems to be that if these boys constitute Nicola as slapper this is likely to be felicitous and Nicola will be slapper. Through these discursive practices Molly presents the virgin/whore dichotomy as being established by boys. Yet her ‘warning’ exposes the role that girls play in policing the boundaries of this dichotomy. It also implicates girls in the citation, inscription and constitution of themselves and other girls within the terms of this dichotomy.

The threat of slapper implicit in Molly’s ‘warning’ leads Nicola to concede ultimately that she is not a virgin. This ‘admission’ is not an acceptance of the constitution slapper. Rather it an attempt to differentiate herself from slapper and pre-empt this naming. Nicola asserts that she only has sex with boys if “I love ‘em and trust ‘em”, that is, if she is in a relationship. In making this assertion she attempts to constitute her own heterosexual femininity as being in the upper regions of the moral scale deployed through Scene 3. Furthermore, Nicola’s refusal to volunteer this information until it is necessary demonstrates her compliance with the requirement for silence contained in the moral scale.
In the opening moments of Scene 4, Molly asserts that “people don’t give a shit” whether or not other pupils are “virgins”. My discussion of Episode 4 might be taken to indicate simply that Molly’s assertion is false. I would suggest, however, that Molly’s comment offers particular insight into the constituting role of virgin. It is not the ‘fact’ of being or not being a virgin which is crucial. Rather it is the constituting force of discourses of virginity, and the ways in which the deployment of these open up and constrain the possibilities for intelligible heterosexual femininities and masculinities, which are significant within the pupils’ discursive practices.

The discursive practices deployed by Nicola, in particular her citation and inscription of the moral scale, can be understood as attempt to constitute herself within a third heterosexual femininity. Such a femininity would allow sexual activity while avoiding and/or rendering infelicitous the performative interpellations slapper or slag, that is, whore. This constitution is provisionally successful, a success which appears to be derived from its acquiescence to and citation of the moral scale. While the citation and inscription of the virgin/whore discourse remains evident, in some moments the girls appear to be involved collectively in attempts to constitute a sexually active heterosexual femininity which is not whore. Nevertheless, the historicity of the virgin/whore dichotomy, and the intrinsic dependence of the moral scale on this dichotomy, renders such a constitution fragile and the risk of whore remains.

My examination of Episode 4 suggests that discourses of virginity are integral to the constitution of varying heterosexual masculinities and femininities. The virgin/whore dichotomy is clearly at odds with the deployment of virgin in the constitution of heterosexual masculinities. Virgin constitutes a boy as boy; the subjugated Other in a man/boy hierarchy. Yet, as Scenes 3 and 4 have illustrated, virgin is the valorised and
dominant term within the virgin/whore binary through which heterosexual femininities are constituted. There is not, it seems, a masculine equivalent of whore through which a sexually active and subjugated masculinity is interpellated. Indeed, the coupling of whore and man is outside meaningful discourse: a performative interpellation of man as whore would almost certainly fail. The sexually active feminine whore and the sexually active masculine man appears to expose a paradox within the constituting discourse of heterosexuality: with whom do these men have sex? The moral scale from Scene 3 and Nicola’s struggle for a third space in Scene 4 offer a possible resolution to this paradox. The man has sex with the girl who protects herself against the ever present risk of whore through adherence to the moral scale and, ultimately, her own silence.

Multiple heterosexual masculinities are cited, inscribed and constituted through the discursive practices of both boys and girls. Similarly, the hierarchical opposition of virgin/whore is not simply imposed on girls by boys. Girls’ own discursive practices play a significant role in inscribing this binary, even as they attempt to constitute an alternative positioning. Girls are also deeply involved in policing the discursive boundaries of heterosexual femininities and masculinities and performatively interpellating themselves and others within the terms of this heterosexual matrix.

**Given names; abbreviated names; nick names; new names; taken names**

This chapter has focused upon the names used to refer to groups of pupils and/or pupils as members of groups. Before moving away from names I will consider briefly the significance of names used to distinguish individuals.

It might be argued that the given name of the individual is not a performative interpellation in the sense that this term has been used within this chapter. This would
suggest that, in English at least, the given name is a word which, despite being ‘shared’ with many other known and unknown individuals, has no meaning or function other than to differentiate one individual from another. While a number of given names are shared with or taken from objects or things, this is not a literal correspondence. For instance, the given name Rose does not infer that the bearer of the name is a rose (although the giver of such a name might intend to suggest that the bearer is like a rose). In this sense, when I am called Deborah the given name is simply a devise which allows a speaker to differentiate me from a group and address me specifically.

However, when I am called Deborah, on the occasion of my first naming and subsequent addresses, the historicity of the given name also immediately constitutes me as female (and potentially Judaeo-Christian). While, in English at least, a minority of given names are used for both girls and boys, in general subjectification through the given name is implicitly gendered. It is also arguable that given names potentially constitute subjects along axes of social class (think Penelope and Rupert in contrast to the Shazas and Bazas of Episode 2) and race (contrast the preceding examples with Jermaine, Lin-ming, Rahel and Satsu).

Alternatively, it might be suggested that the given name of the individual is an illocutionary performative interpellation which is inaugurating and enduring. This would suggest that the very act of naming the infant (at a christening perhaps, or at the office of the Registrar General) inaugurates the infant subject as the given name and that the subject will remain this name indefinitely.

However, given names can be changed legally, habitually or in relation to specific contexts. Furthermore, the nature of such changes to the given name might have the
potential to constitute the individual named in altered ways. Amongst the year 11 pupils in Taylor Comprehensive a range of changes to given names were evident; changes with a variety of constituting potentials.

**Abbreviated names**

The abbreviation of given names is common amongst those girls (but not boys) who identify themselves as Dir’y ‘ippies. These names are self-selected and specific spellings of these are asserted. As I argued in my analysis of Episode 2, these middle class, positively educationally orientated and high attaining pupils are engaged in efforts to constituted themselves as radical, marginal and non-conformist. It is possible that these girls have a tacit sense that their given names might have the potential to constitute (conservative) middle class identities in ways that their abbreviated names do not. Calling themselves and each other by these abbreviated names, then, can be seen as a further discursive practice by which the girls attempt to constitute themselves as Dir’y ‘ippies. It is interesting, however, that the choice of possible abbreviations and the specific spellings of these are such that they underline that these names are, in fact, abbreviations. As such, the given name (and it’s particular constituting possibilities) is cited through the abbreviation. The abbreviation, then, is simultaneously distanced from and retains the constituting possibilities of the given name.

In contrast, the working class girls in the tutor group rarely abbreviated one anothers’ given names. Indeed, their almost exclusive use of full (often multi-syllabic) given names is notable. It is possible that these girls have a tactic sense of the market value of full given names which the middle class girls are attempting to eschew. That is, calling by the full given name might be an attempt to performatively interpellate one another as middle class and/or adult. An exception here is Juliet’s frequent abbreviation of
Mridula’s name to “Mrid”. It is interesting to note that this abbreviated call is often used in contexts where Juliet is seeking a service from Mridula: homework or classwork to copy; practical equipment to be set up, monitored, put away; a piece of chewing gum. Mridula invariably responds positively to this call and the requests it accompanies. It appears that Mridula is keen to be friends with Juliet but is lacking the various capitals that might lead Juliet to choose her as an intimate friend. I would suggest that Juliet is aware of this and uses the abbreviated name to create an illusion of familiarity and intimacy.

Working class boys’ given names seem to be abbreviated more frequently. In some instances this abbreviation appears to act to constitute relationships as familiar and informal (for instance Marcella’s “Hi Josh” in Episode 4). It may also contribute to the constitution of those working class masculinities explored in Episodes 2 and 4. Indeed, the Dir’y ‘ippies’ interpellation of working class boys and girls -- Shazas and Bazas -- derives some of its potential performative force from the citation of the abbreviation of particular ‘working class’ names, even when the actual girls being constituted in this way appear to actively avoid such abbreviations in their own discursive practices.

**Nick names**

A number of pupils have nick names. Some of these names are given and embraced, some are given and disputed. Some of these names appear to have been given by peers in primary school, some by other pupils in the year group at Taylor, and one by a teacher.

For instance, “Elana Banana”, a nick name based on a simple rhyme, appears to have been actively carried into secondary school by the bearer of this name. When Elana is
asked about this name by another pupil she explains “Ah, it was my name in primary school, some people still call me that”. This name might be understood as citing discourses of childhood (femininity?) and exotic fruit (race? active sexuality?), while also conveying the intimacy and longevity of particular friendships.

Molly’s nick name -- “Geeza girl” -- was originally used by boys as an abusive name when the year group was in year 7, although it appears that the name is recuperated within some contexts. This name brings together two terms which are incommensurable within the discourse of natural binary genders which is cited and inscribed by it. In doing this, the name has the potential to constitute Molly as inappropriately or even unintelligibly gendered. However, the name also has the potential to trouble this discourse. I discuss Geeza girl in detail when I examine performative resistances in Chapter 7.

“Little Lucy”, Molly’s non-identical twin, appears to have been given this nick name by one of her female teachers. Lucy is also called this by some girls. In addition, I have heard Lucy called this name by a boy who was embracing her during a lesson. This name contributes to the constitution of a particular relationship between Lucy and the teacher; one of intimacy and nurture, or even mother and child. Reflecting this, the wider use of this name appears to have the potential to constitute Lucy as a child and the caller as an adult. Simultaneously, calling a diminutive young woman in this way also cites discourses of desirable, adult, heterosexual femininity.

**New names**

Another alteration is the anglicising of ‘non-English’ given names. In particular, a large number (but not all) of the south east Asian pupils in the year group call themselves, and
are called by teachers and other pupils, traditional English names. These names contrast with the pupils’ actual given names, logged in official school records, which have the potential to constitute (not-White/British) race identities.

I do not interpret this re-naming practice as a rejection or denial of race. Indeed, in a discursive frame dominated by race phenotypes such an attempt is likely to be futile. Nor does it seem to be interpreted by the pupil population as an indication that these pupils are ‘ashamed’ of their race, as was asserted in relation to Rachel, discussed in Episode 3. This re-naming practice might be understood as an attempt on the part of these pupils to distance themselves from a traditional race identity and reinscribe this race identity in ways that are more acceptable and/or desirable within the dominant pupil sub-culture and popular culture more broadly. Indeed, it might be evidence of the provisional success, for example, of Chinese-British or Vietnamese-British race/national identities that were contested implicitly within Episode 1.

Such anglicisation of given names is not found amongst other pupils in the year group whose given names might have the potential to constitute (not-White/British) race identities. Indeed, this practice appears to be absent amongst South Asian pupils in the year group. It is possible that this re-naming practice, its general acceptance within the school, and its contrast with South Asian pupils’ retention of their given names, can shed further light on the Hierarchy within the Other. South east Asian pupils’ successful distancing from traditional race identity and South Asian pupils’ retention of a key marker of traditional race identity may be indicative of these pupils’ differential penetration of the terms of the Hierarchy within the Other and, therefore, their relative success within its terms. As such, it might be possible to insert south east Asian above Indian (south Asian?) in the Hierarchy within the Other.
An exception to this successful Anglicisation is Su Lin -- the slag discussed in Scene 3 of Episode 4. Miss Baxter alerted me (albeit with a note of condescension) to the fact that Su Lin had re-named herself “Chloe”. I also observed other teachers call Su Lin by this new name and ‘check’ with her whether this remained her preferred name. Pupils in the year group, however, continued to call Su Lin by her given name. The group of girls in Scene 3 of Episode 4 disparaged Su Lin on the basis of this re-naming. This disparagement was based on two things. First, the allegation that Su Lin had re-named herself a succession of times. Second, that such re-naming was disrespectful to Su Lin’s mother (an explanation that might indicate that, in some instances, re-naming is taken as evidence of racial ‘shame’). That these pupils did not adopting the new name may be explained by Su Lin’s timing of the re-naming (well into her secondary school career) and/or by her oscillation between names. The pupils’ disapproval of Su Lin’s sexual activity may also have been pertinent here: the refusal to adopt the new name may have been a ‘punishment’ for transgressing the moral scale (Episode 4). It may also indicate that Su Lin’s reinscription of her race identity was not recognised -- Su Lin’s given name retains the potential to inscribe a traditional (not-British) Chinese race identity (see Episode 1).

**Taken names**

The significance of the given name to pupils, and the possibility that they tacitly recognise its constituting potential, is evidenced by pupils’ textual practice of “V-ing out”. “V-ing out” is a practice common amongst what appears to be a number of pupils. As illustrated by Figure 1. below, V-ing out involves a pupil writing a large letter V over the top of another persons name when it appears written in an informal context, such as graffiti in/on another pupil’s school diary.
To V out another person’s name is considered to be a serious challenge to the person concerned. The genesis of this practice appears to be unclear; I was told that it came “from time”. The implications, however, are well understood; one pupil explained that V-ing out is a “major insult”. As such, V-ing out makes a significant contribution to sustaining and escalating conflicts between pupils in the physical absence of one party to the conflict.

For example, Rachel, the girl discussed in Episode 3, used V-ing out to retaliate against Marcella and a number of her friends. In their absence, Rachel V-ed out their names each time she found that they had written them in Steve’s school diary. During a lesson observation, Naomi (one of Marcella’s friends) discovered that their names had been V-ed out. Naomi counter-attacked by V-ing out each instance of Rachel’s name in Steve’s school diary. Rachel watched this from across the room, unable or unwilling to intervene in person.

It appears that writing given names in/on school diaries (and other items) belonging to friends is a textual practice of identity; citing graffiti ‘tags’ as well as the wider practices
of providing signatures and collecting autographs. In turn, V-ing out is a textual challenge to this identity -- it is a defacement that seems to 'take' the name and, in doing so, dispute the status and even subjecthood of the person who bears the name. Furthermore, pupils’ school diaries (in this case Steve’s) become sites for these ongoing textual struggles over the name, status and subjecthood.

As the year group approached the end of their compulsory schooling, they took up the long standing pupil tradition of writing and drawing on their school sweatshirts. In an apparent extension of the textual identity practices discussed above, pupils’ sweatshirts were covered in tags and signatures. Pupils did not V out names appearing on these sweatshirts. It is likely that such a defacement would be unacceptable to the wearer and be so public as to implicate the wearer and demand harsh retaliation from the bearer of the name. However, several pupils V-ed out the school logo printed on the front of their sweatshirts. This textual practice provoked a great deal of laughter and congratulation amongst pupils. School staff appeared unaware or the significance of V-ing out within the pupil sub-culture and, therefore, did not recognise this “major insult”. Yet within the discursive frame of the pupil sub-culture the severity of the injury was not diminished by this lack of recognition. Indeed, that the school organisation was oblivious to the injury it had sustained through the defacement or ‘taking’ of its name appeared only to make it funnier.

The given name, then, can be understood as a performative interpellation. By implicitly citing and inscribing a multiplicity of discourses the given name has the potential to constitute the self and the other, becoming a site of both linguistic and textual struggles over particular identities and even subjecthood itself.
Conclusion

This chapter has been concerned with the constituting potential of names, that is, it has focused upon names as performative interpellations. My primary purpose here has been to explore how names might come to provisionally constitute pupils. As such, my dominant concern has been with the processes of constitution, rather than the products of these constitutions. At the same time, however, the particular discursive practices through which these names are interpellated have been shown to constitute pupils' identities in particular ways.

Through my analysis of the episodes in this chapter, I have explored whether, why, and how individuals or groups are constituted by performative interpellations. I have shown how successful namings have varying degrees of efficacy. Some appear to be efficacious only in the moment of utterance or within the context of the Episode. Others appear to be potentially enduring beyond the moment and/or context of utterance. In some instances this enduring efficacy seems to be restricted to the individual speaker/group of speakers or the pupil population. In other instances this enduring efficacy seems to be across the school institution; sub-culture(s); broader hegemonic culture; or even pan-cultural. Whether an interpellation has the performative force to endure beyond the moment or the milieu of the speaker(s) and continue to constitute a subject or subjects over time, contexts, or even geographical boundaries depends on its repetition. That is, its ongoing citation and intelligibility within discourses which are cited by further speakers and which frame further contexts.

This analysis has also illustrated that some performative interpellations fail. The infelicity of a naming is not arbitrary or incidental; it is infelicitous for a reason. Such failure is the effect of particular constellations of discursive formations, historicities and
contextual locations which coalesce to render the name unintelligible. However, this very unintelligibility, this being outside meaningful discourse, implicitly cites and inscribe what is intelligible, what is inside meaningful discourse. The infelicitous naming has, therefore, the potential to misfire. It can implicitly constitute alternative subjects, even though this constitution may well be unintentional and the names of these subjects may well have gone unspoken and unacknowledged in the constituting moment.

Over the course of this chapter, I have begun to detail a number of pupil identities. This has not been an attempt to map exhaustively those pupil identities evident within this school context. Nevertheless, particular identities -- constituted along axes of biographical, learner and sub-cultural identities -- appear to be dominant within and across specific school contexts. While these identities are multiple and constituted through the citation of multiple discourses, pupils’ discursive practices of naming cite familiar discourses and, therefore, frequently cite familiar identities. As such, the identities detailed seem to share a degree of predictability and adherence to authorised discourses of race, gender, sexuality, social class, learners, and youth/street sub-cultures.

Where these identities appear less familiar, closer analysis has shown them to implicitly cite dominant discourse and be implicated in the inscription of other, familiar and often dominant identities. For instance, in Episode 3, the apparent resistance or inversion of the White/Black binary through the Hierarchy within the Other was seen to inscribe dominant discourses of authentic races and even the binary itself. In Episode 2, the Dir’y ‘ippies’ attempt to recuperate the injurious name and constitute themselves as the marginal Other was seen to be underpinned by privileged biographical and learner identities. As such, the Dir’y ‘ippie discourse was shown to cite and inscribe the subjugation of the working class pupils against whom it was defined and disavow the
identities of Asian pupils who disrupted the binary and, therefore, were constituted as the Other-Other. Finally, in Episode 1, Steve’s performative interpellation of White Pakistani was seen to fail. This failure was shown to be due to the unintelligibility of the name. Yet this unintelligibility simultaneously acted to constitute (again) Steve inside meaningful discourse (here a discourse of discreet, essential and hierarchically organised races) as White and Mridula (and other Asian pupils in the room, in the school, the UK, globally?) as not-White/British and Asian.

My analysis has also suggested that the identities cited and provisionally constituted are imbued with (discursive) cultural and linguistic capitals whose values shift across markets (discursively framed contexts). For instance, discursive capitals of positive value in a context framed by a discourse of youth/street culture may well be the very capitals which yield negative equity in a (arguably more significant) context framed by hegemonic discourse.

The location of names and naming within broader discursive practices means that an exploration of naming inevitably incorporates discursive practices and performative constitutions beyond naming itself. In particular, the bodily dimensions of masculinities and femininities, sexualities and race phenotypes/physiognomies have emerged over the course of this chapter. I have begun to explore the usefulness a notion of a bodily habitus which is discursively constituted through ongoing practices of identities. This analysis will be developed in the following chapter.

Performative interpellations, then, irrespective of their success or intent, contribute to the inscription of the discourses which they cite. They are discursive moments in the sedimentation of the historicities of discourses. It is these enduring discourses which
constrain the possibilities and intelligibility of identities and, therefore, the possibilities for legitimate and recognisable subjects.
Notes to Chapter 4. Naming Identities

1 For examples of such typologies see early school ethnographies such as those by Hargreaves (1967), Lacey (1970), and Willis (1977). For a critical discussion of this approach see Aggleton (1987). For more recent examples of the nuanced and critical use of typologies see Connell (1995), Mac an Ghaill (1988 & 1993), and Sewell (1998).

2 Following those theoretical moves outlined in chapter 2, I would suggest that the 'meanings' of speech are impossible to contain (see Butler 1997 and Derrida 1988). Yet while it is impossible to pin down, or fix these meanings, this does not negate the possibility of examining their potential or likely meanings. While I assert that the data has particular meanings and functions, I do not suggest that these are in anyway, exhaustive, final or fixed.

3 Butler (1997a) examines this in relation to the demise of affirmative action legislation in California, USA.

4 I would suggest that the teacher interprets the question/comment as no more than a counter-school challenge--and the conflict which escalated between this pupil and the teacher/school over the course of the year reinforces this assessment. This can also be understood as a moment through which Steve's learner identity is discursively constituted as disruptive, anti-school and, therefore, undesirable.

5 Having said this, it is note worthy that White-Pakistani can be found among the 78 ethnic categorisations used by the school in its own ethnic monitoring. This classification system is discussed in Gillborn and Youdell 2000.

6 For the purpose of this discussion, I will provisionally adopt these 'names' here.

7 During this discussion I recalled with discomfort (and with embarrassment now repeat) the names used by myself and my friends to identify (and constitute) Other pupils and ourselves in our East Midlands secondary school during the early 1980s. Our Shazas and Buzas were “Sharons and Traceys” whose male equivalents were “Casuals” or “Garys”. (It is interesting that Sharon is still around). We believed that we were referred to (constituted ourselves) as “Grebs” and “Trampy Punks”. Greb was mostly considered inaccurate (injurious?), Trampy Punk was embraced. In Taylor at least, Punk appears to have been superseded by Hippie (‘ippie). The dirt/tramp factor persists.

8 As differentiating devices these ‘choices’ or ‘preferences’ are extremely slippery. Each time the pupils attempt to designate particular modes of dress, hair style or music choice to a single side of the binary their attempts fail -- an exception is found amongst pupils identified (constituted) as Dir’y ‘ippies: someone wears a Shaza and Baza jacket; someone else uses hair gel as if she/he was a Shaza and Baza; someone else listens to Shaza and Baza music; someone else has a Shaza and Baza bag. In making sense of this slippage it is useful to turn to Bourdieu’s understanding of the market values of cultural capitals (Bourdieu 1990 & 1991). In these terms this slippage does not undermine the notion of difference expressed here through the Dir’y ‘ippies/Shazas and Bazas binary. Rather, I suggest that these ‘choices’ or ‘preferences’ can be taken as deployments of cultural capitals within varying market. These deployments entail different meanings and are valued in differing ways within different markets. Pupils, it seems, have at least a tacit understanding -- a practical sense (Bourdieu 1990) -- of at least some of these market values. On the surface, then, the binary is concerned with what pupils wear, what music they listen to, the way in which they use a hair product, whether they wear gold or silver jewellery. My analysis suggests, however, that it is the relative values of the wearer/user/listener's capitals in varying markets that is at stake. This practical sense of the relative values of capitals across markets reinforces my analysis that the opposition of ‘teenage’ sub-cultures is simultaneously, and perhaps more significantly, one of biographical and learner identities.

191
9 In another context Suzi confirmed explicitly that the group are aware of and dispute this designation.

10 These terms are used interchangeably elsewhere by members of this group.

11 The Complete Oxford English Dictionary suggests that the word is derived from a combination of the Indian vernacular ‘hire’ or ‘hire person’ and the similar sounding name of a west Indian people.

12 During further fieldwork another group of pupils explained that Coolie applied to people of Black and Indian parentage as well as people of Black and Chinese parentage.

13 Of course this could also be explained in terms of the greater plausibility of the latter claim within a model of race phenotypes or physiognomies.

14 I am not suggesting that the group’s account conveys the ‘truth’ of the nature of inter-racial relationships. Pupils’ discursive practices concerning inter-racial relationships will be returned to in Chapter 5.

15 I acknowledge my own citation and, therefore, inscription and constitution of this oppositional discourse of binary gender though my own opening question to Scene 1 of Episode 4.

16 As I will demonstrate when I turn to focus on femininities, however, the ‘known’ girl is not constituted in the same way as the ‘known’ boy.

17 The nature of this entry will be explored in Chapter 7

18 As discussed in Chapter 2, Connell (1995) calls this interaction between bodily practice and discursive meaning body-reflexivity and suggest that this allows an account of the body which does not revert to essentialist or biologically determined notions of the subject. This opportunities offered by the notion of body-reflexivity will be examined further in Chapter 5.

19 It is interesting to note that known boys often interrupt themselves when they see that I am observing their social interactions with girls. Do they think that I might see though their efforts to constitute themselves as man and give the game away?
5. Practicing Identities

‘there need not be a “doer behind the deed,” ... the “doer” is variably constructed in and through the deed’
(Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, 1990: 142).

‘In gait and countenance surely like a father’
(William Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, Act 4 Scene 2).

Introduction

In the previous chapter I showed that discursive practices of naming and the deployment of names have the potential to constitute subjects. My examination of the performative power of naming also began to highlight the significance of embodiment. The body was evident in the interactions between pupils’ bodily and linguistic practices. The body was also central to the identities constituted -- pupils deployed phenotypic or physiognomic races, natural and distinct sexes and bodies engaged in sexual practices in their performative interpellations of identities. In this chapter I will focus on bodily practices and the relationship of these to the discursive in an attempt to understand the implications of the body for and in the constitution of identities.

Representing bodily practices

The inseparability of the body and the subject is evident in my dilemmas and wrangling over which bodily data to represent, how to represent them and where these representations should appear within this text.

It may seem counter-intuitive for bodily practices to appear after linguistic practices of naming. This sense of my ordering being counter-intuitive is indicative of the resilience
of the hierarchical binary of the biological/social in which the biological is taken to precede (and inform or even determine) the social. My analysis will demonstrate that such a causal and oppositional conception is spurious: without the discursive, the bodily is inaccessible and, therefore, without meaning. Bodily practices, in the moment of practice, may be outside language (the spoken and written), but they remain inside discourse. This renders the question of whether the biological precedes the social obsolete -- if the biological cannot be accessed without the social, then to ask after it is social.

In deciding how to represent pupils' bodily practices I began by looking for modes of representation that were non-linguistic. I considered using photographs, drawings and storyboards. These possibilities raised technical difficulties as well as concerns over the anonymity of pupils and the school. The separation also seemed to be an artificial one. In chapter 5 pupils' bodily practices were seen to contribute to the meanings made and identities potentially constituted through their linguistic naming practices: Steve closes his eyes as he theatrically selects by chance a race identity; Marcella throws back her head and pats her heart as she talks about her like of particular boys; Nicola's friends lean in to hear potentially dangerous, whispered information. Likewise, pupils' bodily practices are frequently coupled with linguistic practices and certain bodily practices, most notably pupils' sexual practices, are only accessible through linguistic representations of them.

More importantly, it seemed to me that attempting to represent pupils' bodily practice non-linguistically acted to inscribe the body/mind, biological/social dichotomies which I hope to problematise. In Chapter 2 it was suggested that it is through discourse (and often language) that bodies become intelligible and accessible. Bodies are meaningful
and have the potential to inscribe meaning only within discourse. In this theoretical framework, the discursive is already present when attempting to detail the body, indeed, representing the body is impossible without discourse. Even if I were to represent pupils’ bodily practice in non-linguistic ways, these representations would be steeped in discursive historicity and I would have to turn to language in order to make sense of these representations within this text. The body and the discursive are inseparable. While concerned with bodily practices here, it is impossible to remain exclusively at the level of the body and the return to language within this chapter is inevitable.

The school is populated by embodied pupils and staff. Each moment in a classroom, corridor or assembly hall offers a plethora of apparently mundane and self-evident bodily stylisations, adornments, postures, gestures, movements and deeds. Understanding bodily practices was a key question for this research during my fieldwork. Yet when I returned to those data I had generated these bodily practices were difficult to ‘see’. While my data were full of bodily practices, the primacy of language coupled with the taken for grantedness of bodily practices meant that I had to force myself to silence the ‘talk’ of the data in order to attend to the apparently mundane and self-evident body. In selecting data to represent I have resisted the temptation to offer a typology of bodily practices, as a typology of pupils’ names and naming practices was resisted in Chapter 4. Rather, I have attempted to offer examples which include both a range of bodily practices and a range of identities whose constitution these practices might be seen to contribute to. Continuing my strategy of representing data, these data are presented as Episodes and Scenes. However, in this chapter Episodes move away from detailed representations of pupils’ talk and towards short accounts or vignettes of bodily and/or linguistic practices.
Practicing bodies

Episode 5: postures, gestures, movements, contacts

Scenes are drawn from observations made in a number of contexts and locations around the school.

Scene 1: Sitting

Year 11 Assembly. Each tutor group in the year forms a single line seated on the wooden floor. Teachers are seated on chairs/benches or stand leaning against the wall. A degree of body contact is unavoidable. Girls sit cross-legged, with upper bodies drooping over the legs. They hold their hands in their laps, those wearing skirts hold the fabric and/or their hands to conceal groins. Girls also sit with touching knees bent up close to the chest, feet flat on the floor and chin resting on knees. They wrap their arms around their bent legs, either over the shin or between the calf and the thigh. Again, girls wearing skirts hold the fabric and/or their hands to conceal groins. Where space will allow, girls sit with legs close together and outstretched, leaning the upper body either forward over the legs or backward resting on a straight arm with hand flat to the floor. Boys also sit with legs crossed, bent up or outstretched. Bent knees are rarely touching, pulled up close to the chest, or hugged. Outstretched legs lie apart. Boys also sit with one leg bent up and one lying on the floor, outstretched if space will allow. Bent knees are used to rest forearms or elbows. Boys often lean backwards and prop themselves up with braced arms. Boys at the back of the hall recline further, leaning on one forearm flat to the floor with outstretched legs crossed.

Scene 2: Slouching

Year 11 Maths lesson. The lowest of the GSCE foundation tier teaching groups, it is a relatively small class. A number of pupils are absent. The majority of pupils are boys. One group of boys (Black, Mixed-race and White) is seated spread out around a large desk. They have lots of space, with empty seats separating some of the boys. These boys sit low in their chairs, bums at the front of the seats. They lean back with legs either outstretched resting on heels or bent at the knees with legs wide apart and feet flat on the floor. Some sit with their chair at a right angle to the desk, rest one elbow on the table and raise the forearm and hand on which the head then rests. Alternatively, they rock back on the rear legs of the chair, bracing themselves by knees on the underside of the table top or feet caught around the far legs of the table. The two girls who are present are seated next to each other at a table in the corner of the room. Their chairs are pulled in close to the table, the bum pushed back into seat and the upper body leant forward and down over the table. One leg is crossed over the other or the tips of feet push calves together and knees up to meet.

Scene 3: Grooming

Miss Baxter’s Year 11 tutor group morning registration period. Nicola (girl, White) is seated talking to other girls while brushing her newly cut hair. The arm holding the brush reaches up and back to brush the hair while the free hand reached up to follow the brush over hair in a smoothing, stroking action. Miss Baxter looks over at her and says in a clipped but friendly tone: “Nicola, it looks lovely, you can stop brushing it now!”. Nicola grins and continues to brush saying: “Just a couple more Miss”. Miss Baxter replies: “Really, it looks lovely”. Nicola stops brushing her hair shortly after this exchange but, apparently, in her own time.

Scene 4: Moving

Year 11 Maths lesson. A GCSE intermediate tier teaching group. Steve (White) walks into the room. The teacher asks “Are you on referral?” [sent out of his usual class]. Steve replies: “Yes Sir.” The teacher holds out his hand to Steve and says: “Your report”. Steve replies: “I haven’t got it Sir.” The teacher appears relatively unconcerned and continues with the lesson. Steve sits down near a group of boys who nod to him. Later in the lesson, another teacher opens the classroom door and looks in. The teacher sees Steve and beckons him. Steve gives an exclamation: “Ahh”. Steve pushes his chair back from the table through the combined force of feet pushing back against the floor and hands pushing back against the table. A space is opened up as the chair scrapes back along the floor and the table moves slightly forwards. Steve stands. Holding the chair back in his hand behind him, he lifts the chair and moves it back creating further space. He strides casually through the aisle with his hands hanging at his side. Other boys grin and make eye contact with Steve and/or call out a mimicking “Ahh!”. Steve grins at them. Steve smiles at me as he passes. As he walks out of the classroom and into the corridor he pulls the door behind him by the handle but does not shut it fully.
Scene 5: Touching
A school corridor during morning break. Marcella, Naomi and Marcia (Year 11 girls, Black) walk slowly around a corner. Marcella is in the middle flanked by the other girls. She has an arm around the back of the neck of each of the other girls, her lower arm and hands hanging over the front of each girl’s shoulder. Both Naomi and Marcia have their near side arm around Marcella’s lower back, their hands lightly clasping her at the side of the waisthip. All of the girls are around the same height. Marcella’s arms, therefore, are pushed upwards from the armpit in order to reach the other girls’ necks and the other girls are leaning/pulled inwards and down slightly to facilitate Marcella’s reach. Movement is facilitated by the girls walking slowly and in time with one another. Marcella makes eye contact with me, smiles and calls “Hi Miss, I want you to meet my friends!”.

Scene 6: Trusting
A Year 11 trampolineing lesson in a sports hall. A group of girls and boys are taking turns on two trampolines. While waiting for their turn, pupils stand around the trampolines chatting and watching. Pipa (girl, White) and William (boy, White) are standing a few metres from the trampoline they have been using. William stands a metre or so behind Pipa and encourages her to let herself fall backwards into his arms. Laughing, she consents. They do this several times. Each time William allows her to fall slightly further than the previous time, crouching to catch her in time. Pipa laughs and exclaims “William!” as he catches her later and later in the fall. William chuckles in response. On the final fall, William catches Pipa and in a quick fluid motion turns her and lies her face down on the floor. Pipa makes herself comfortable on the floor, resting her head on her crossed arms. William puts one foot on Pipa’s back and rocks his foot, and Pipa, from side to side. Pipa makes a gurgling sound. William chuckles, takes his foot away and helps Pipa up, holding her around the upper torso with both arms when she is upright. Pipa laughs and halfheartedly attempts to elbow William in the ribs.

Scene 7: Holding, hounding, hitting
Year 11 Food Technology lesson. Pupils are engaged in both practical and written work and there is a degree of free movement around the room. Lucy (girl, White) is watching Mridula and Avtar (girls, Indian) cook. Owen (boy, White) stands behind Lucy and wraps his arms around her head. The front of his body is pressed up against her back. Lucy exclaims: “Owen!” as she wriggles. He removes his arms. As they continue to watch Owen continually touches Lucy, he pulls her by the arms and shoulders and moves her from one standing position to another. Lucy wriggles and giggles as Owen does this. At another moment in the lesson Lucy watches Manny (boy, White) cook. Stuart (boy, Black) approaches her and hold her by the arm, he tugs at her, exerting enough force to pull her towards him. As he moves her around he tries to punch her upper arm. Lucy pulls against Stuart and dodges to stay out of reach of his punching arm. Eventually one of Stuart’s punches makes contact with Lucy’s upper arm. Lucy exclaims in pain “Arrgh, Stuart!”. Stuart releases his hold on Lucy, chuckles and wanders away.

Scene 8: Refusing and consenting
Year 11 Science Lesson. Mixed GCSE tier teaching group. Matt (boy, south east Asian) walks over to the table where Juliet (girl, Mixed-race), Jolene (girl, White), Mridula (girl, Indian) and I (woman, White) are sitting. Matt hold out a splint and says: “Can I get a light?” and nods towards the Bunsen burner. In unison, Juliet and Mridula say: “No!”. Matt lights the splint saying: “Too late!”. Juliet and Mridula simultaneously blow out the splint, look at each other, then look at Matt and laugh. Matt smiles and shakes his head as he walks away. Juliet chuckles and says: “Mrid!”. Mridula laughs and protests: “It was you!”. Later in the lesson Nat (boy, White) calls across to Juliet asking to borrow her rubber. Juliet doesn’t look up at him, with her eyes still on her work she picks up Jolene’s rubber and throws it to Nat. Nat uses it. A few moments later the rubber lands back on the table by Juliet’s arm. She looks at the rubber and glances disdainfully at Nat. Around five minutes later, without any verbal or non-verbal prompt apparent and again without looking up from her work, Juliet pick’s up the rubber and throws it to Nat. Nat uses it. The rubber lands back on the table. Mridula watches this silent exchange and lets out a small laugh. Juliet does not acknowledge Mridula’s laugh.

The scenes in Episode 5 represent a selection of apparently mundane and insignificant instances of bodily postures, gestures, movement and contacts. The Scenes are mundane
in as much as the bodily practices which they represent are unexceptional and everyday within this school context. This does not mean that they are insignificant. In analysing these practices I will draw on the theoretical understanding of the body detailed in Chapter 2 in order to argue that it is the ordinariness of these practices which lends the discursive habitus its performative force. The necessarily discursive intelligibility and accessibility of these bodies becomes evident within my analysis. These postures, gestures, movements and deeds are unintelligible, in either the moment of their practice or within this text, without recourse to the discursive frames in which they are located and which they cite and inscribe. These intelligible, animate bodies are both constituted by and constitutive of discourse. Heterosexual masculinities and femininities are evident throughout the Scenes and the overt or tacit sexual content of these bodily practices is striking. At the level of pupils' intent, the sexualities cited and inscribed through these practices appear to be a key motivational force for these practices. At the level of the performative habitus, these embodied sexualities are a key feature of the bodily hexes (Bourdieu 1990) which are unintentionally cited and constituted through these bodily practices.

_Sitting_

Scene 1 illustrates the way in which the most mundane bodily practice -- sitting -- is constitutive of multiple identities. That teachers stand or sit in chairs while pupils sit on the floor in rows is a ritualised practice of bodily differentiation through which the hierarchical teacher/pupil, adult/child binaries are cited and inscribed. It is an occasion for the observation, classification and judgement of bodies. While there is some overlap between the ways in which boys and girls sit in this Scene, it nevertheless demonstrates how this simple bodily activity cites and inscribes multiple discourses of the sexed body.
Overall, the girls sit in ways which minimise the space taken up by their bodies. Their postures cite and inscribe a discursively constituted heterosexual femininity in which the feminine body is small, tidy, restrained, and deferential. A common feature of the girls’ varied ways of sitting is the concealment of genitals. This is both a literal and a symbolic concealment: while girls wearing short skirts need to hold the fabric and carefully position their hands in order to obscure a view of the underwear covering their genitals, the bodies of girls wearing long skirts and trousers assume similar positions. Yet these acts of concealment, by signalling the need for concealment, also involve a symbolic display of the genitals. This genital concealment/display highlights a contradiction within the discursive constitution of heterosexual femininity. That is, it cites and inscribes the requirement for the feminine body to deny its sexuality, to take responsibility for the control and constraint of the body in general and sex in particular. Simultaneously, however, it cites and inscribes the requirement for the feminine body to display its sexuality, to be the repository of the body and sex. This is a double bind which is underscored by, cites and inscribes the virgin/whore binary discussed in Chapter 4. This genital concealment also highlights a contradiction between heterosexual femininity and pupil identity. The literal challenge is to be a pupil, that is, sit in a row on the floor, and be a woman/girl, that is, maintain an appropriately feminine bodily posture, including concealing the genitals whether wearing a short skirt or not. The girls’ ways of sitting illustrate their bodily responses to this challenge. The cost of failure here is high -- a blase approach to feminine posture, and the genital concealment intrinsic to it, would be potentially constitutive of the whore, or even unintelligibility. Simply by sitting in particular ways, then, these girls’ bodies cite and inscribe particular discourses of heterosexual femininity and simultaneously constitute themselves as embodied subjects within these terms.
Boys' bodies are not compacted like those of the girls, knees are not pressed together or hugged to the chest. Boys' bodies can take up space. Unlike the feminine body, the masculine body does not need to be reigned in or controlled -- it is in control. Its genitals regions do not have to be literally or symbolically concealed. There seems to be something of continuum of sitting masculine bodies. Many of these bodies appear to cite and inscribe a heterosexual masculinity which is comfortable and entitled but which abides by its location in the teacher/pupil binary. Other masculine bodies, however, appear to cite a hyper-masculinity. These bodies seem to occupy as much space as possible, they are large and imposing. Individual body parts become instruments for maximising the comfort of the body as a whole; knees, elbows and hands support the weight of the body and thereby maximise its comfort and relaxation. The genitals areas of these bodies are not simply neutral zones; through wide spread legs they are accentuated and displayed. This hyper-masculine body is intrinsically counter to official school norms and requirements for the deportment of pupils' bodies. These bodies are surveilled, judged and reprimanded by teachers. As in the case of the girls, simply by sitting in particular ways boys' bodies cite and inscribe particular discourses of heterosexual masculinity and simultaneously constitute themselves as embodied subjects within these terms.

These bodily activities cite and constitute the habitus and are both formed by and formative of discourses of bodily femininity and masculinity. These practices are understood to be both intentional and tacit. A girl's clutching at her skirt hem or a boy's occupation of space may or may not be self-aware activities in this moment. A girl may be thinking “I hope my knickers aren’t showing”, a boy may be thinking "get out of my way". But these bodies are not simply the neutral instruments of self-conscious subjects. They are bound up with signification and the continued viability of the subject. A girl
cannot clutch her hem one day, secure her femininity, and then give it up for the greater comfort of relaxed, spread legs. These bodily practices are necessarily repetitious and citational -- this is evident simply by looking around the assembly hall and recognising the embodied subjects who sit. These bodies exceed the intent of the subject and constitute the body's possibilities and limits.

_Slouching_

The postures of the boys in Scene 2 resonate with the hyper-masculine bodies of Scene 1. These postures are counter to the school's known expectations for deportment inside the classroom. The 'ideal' (Gillborn 1990 after Becker 1970) pupil, even the tolerable pupil, does not slouch, rest his head as if asleep, or rock on the back legs of his chair. In terms of the official school discourse these postures cite and constitute the boys' negative school orientation. The school also constitutes these pupils' identities in terms of their educational 'ability'. Pupils in this teaching group will take foundation tier GCSE examinations in which the maximum grade they can attain is an E. Pupils in this group are constituted as having low educational ability and have no way of attaining the benchmark grades of the 'A-to-C economy' (Gillborn & Youdell 2000).

Some of the boys in this group have been named as known boys by the girls in Chapter 4. A disproportionate number of the boys in this group are Black and Mixed-race and it is possible that these masculine bodily practices cite and inscribe bodies raced in particular ways. In terms of the pupil sub-culture, the boys' bodies cite those hyper-masculine bodies discussed in the previous Scene, irreverence for the school and high sub-cultural status, all of which are intimately linked.
In seeming contradiction to these bodily practices, not only do these boys continue to attend this lesson, they participate -- they ask and answer questions and express concern over the forthcoming GCSE examinations. It appears that the boys’ bodily practices provisionally offset the humiliation and lack of status associated with their location in the lowest group. The sub-cultural status and cool of these masculine bodies counteracts the (marginally) pro-school identities inferred through continued attendance at and participation in this lesson. It seems, however, that the boys have a tacit awareness that this contradiction risks the felicity of their bodily performatives. This risk is provisionally recuperated by the boys’ immediate engagement in a discussion about “scoring green” (buying cannabis) when the teacher momentarily leaves the room -- their sub-cultural status, their cool, is cited and inscribed. As such, it appears that there is a tacit agreement amongst these boys -- if the hyper-masculinity of sub-cultural cool and irreverence to school norms is maintained bodily, then the concomitant negative school orientation can be temporarily suspended and continued attendance and participation can be legitimised. In saying that this is a tacit agreement I am suggesting that it is a necessarily collective practice but one which is unlikely to have been discussed or verbally agreed on. Rather, the boys have a practical sense of the value of their bodily dispositions in this context and deploy these as second nature in ways which sustain both their masculine identities and their legitimate participation in education.

The boys’ postures go unacknowledged and unchallenged by the teacher. It seems that the teacher understands (at least tacitly) the contradiction between the boys’ sub-cultural and learner identities. That is, she is aware that these boys might well have opted not to ‘risk’ their sub-cultural identities and stopped attending this lesson. She may also anticipate (again, at least tacitly) that the masculine bodies which the school censures may be acceptable, or even valued, in the likely (assumed) post-school destinations of
these boys. The boys' desire for accreditation in Maths and the school league table requirements will both be met if the boys sit and pass the examination that they have been entered for (see Gillborn & Youdell 2000). The teacher is willing, then, to forego the school's usual expectations of deportment. In another teaching context (perhaps a higher tier lesson) such bodily practices would be designated so anti-school that they would immediately constitute the pupils as undesirable. Indeed, this may have contributed to these boys' trajectories into the lowest Foundation tier teaching group.

**Grooming**

Scene 3 illustrates one of numerous occasions inside classrooms when girls applied lipstick, checked their faces in compacts, adjusted their clothing and groomed their own or another girl's hair. Like the holding of skirt hems in assembly, this checking of the body's appearance seems to be sometimes automatic and sometimes self-conscious. Whether automatic or self-conscious, these activities can be seen as bodily performatives which are constituted through and are constitutive of discourses of femininity. The Scene detailed here took place on the first day of term. During the holiday Nicola's hair had been cut from mid-back length into a bob at the nape of her neck.

Nicola's grooming of her hair in the classroom may well have the intention (tacit or self-conscious) of announcing and displaying her new hair style. It may also be indicative of a self-consciousness of her newly remodelled body. The way in which she brushes her hair, however, seems less likely to be consciously modelled. Rather this combination of movements might be seen as the bodily dispositions of the performative habitus. This does not negate their potentially performative force. The fact of Nicola brushing her hair and the way that she brushes it are citational and constitutive of bodily femininity. Her
bodily practices also cite the centrality of a concern with and achievement of physical beauty to the constitution of desirable femininity. Miss Baxter's request for Nicola to stop can be seen as a moment of the institutional control of bodies in a Foucauldian sense. Yet she is also complicit with these bodily performatives. She sanctions and praises the femininity which is cited and constituted through Nicola's bodily practice. By postponing her compliance with Miss Baxter's request, Nicola asserts the superior relative value of femininity in relation to school norms and the teacher's authority, and this is an assertion which Miss Baxter does not challenge. Through the bodily practice of brushing her hair, then, Nicola cites and inscribes a particular discourse of femininity, a discourse of femininity which is simultaneously constitutive of Nicola's body.

Moving

In scene 4 we see a bodily negotiation between the pupil identities required by the school and the masculine bodily dispositions valued within the pupil sub-culture. Steve's bodily activity is tacitly self-surveillant while also being surveilled by an audience of teachers, pupils and myself. This is a bodily scene of compliance without acquiescence or humiliation. Steve complies with the teacher's instructions, there is no overt refusal, argument or challenge. Yet his exacerbation with and contempt for the school's unquestionable authority is expressed bodily. His movement of furniture, his slow, striding exit from the room, his pulling the door to without shutting it, are all bodily practices which technically obey the teacher without deferring to him. These bodily activities simultaneously cite the bodily dispositions of entitled, confident, anti-authoritarian, adult masculinity -- man -- which are citations and inscriptions of Steve's sub-cultural status within the pupil milieu. In so doing, they have the potential to present a tacit challenge to the authoritative, adult masculinity of the teacher. In this sense, these are not the bodies of a pupil and a teacher, they are the bodies of men. Such a scene is
not new, Steve has experienced this many times. As such, a tacit ritual is being enacted through which Steve's learner and sub-cultural identities are cited and inscribed but not inscribed anew. Steve's identity within the school has congealed over a multitude of such mundane constituting incidents. Through the bodily practices which comprise rising from a desk and leaving a classroom, a tolerable (but not desirable) learner identity and a confident, anti-authoritarian, adult masculinity are cited and constituted. Once again, I am not suggesting that Steve thinks "I'll get up like this", what I am suggesting is that he has a tacit, practical sense of the relative values of his bodily performatives across the multiple markets (teachers, pupils, me) in which he is bodily located.

**Touching**

The bodily contact and synchronised movement of Scene 5 is a moment in the bodily constitution of gender, sexual, sub-cultural, race and learner identities. While the bodily chain in this Scene seems to be relatively uncommon in the school, many girls link arms as they walk around the corridors. This is a practice which is unseen among boys and which boys criticised and asked for explanations of during discussions with me. It is also a practice which is censured by the school. While there is no official rule which prohibits such consensual bodily contact, I regularly saw teachers ask girls to stop linking arms in corridors. Girls explained to me that teachers saw linking arms as a cause of congestion and a potentially hazardous obstacle. In considering the performative possibilities of this chain of bodies, it seems that avoiding congestion may be only one reason why such bodies are censured by the school. This resonates with Devine’s (1996) assertion that the corridor is the most contested space within the school.
The bodies in the Scene are not engaged in a neutral activity. It is one which cites and inscribes the bodily intimacy of girls' friendships and implicitly cites and contributes to the prohibition of such bodily intimacy amongst boys. Moving around in a chain of bodies is difficult and uncomfortable. That these girls move rhythmically and in time is constitutive of a femininity positioned as natural and sexually desirable, it is also potentially constitutive of their raced femininity. The chain also displays the inaccessible heterosexual feminine body to a heterosexual masculine audience. At the same time, these bodies cite and inscribe the relative sub-cultural status internal to this group of girls as well as their status within the broader pupil sub-culture. Marcella’s positioning in the middle of this chain of bodies and Naomi’s and Marcia’s fashioning of their bodies into this chain are indicative and formative both of Marcella’s particularly high status within the group and the value and unity of the group as a whole. This chain of bodies does create an obstacle which other pupils must navigate. In this way it is indicative and formative of the group’s location at the pinnacle of the Hierarchy within the Other, a hierarchy which is itself formative of status within the pupil sub-culture constituted as incommensurate with official school norms. That such a bodily chain is likely to be censured if seen by a teacher cites and inscribes the girls’ irreverence for school norms. Yet it seems that this is not intended as a bodily challenge to school norms. Rather, it appears that at the level of intent it is the unity of the group, its status and its norms which are foregrounded. These girls’ bodies are acting their place in discourse.

**Trust**

While Scene 5 considered bodily contact between feminine bodies, Scene 6 considers bodily contact between a masculine and a feminine body. These practices cite and inscribe a discourse of particular heterosexual masculinities and femininities: the
masculine body is capable, controlled and active; the feminine body is trusting, compliant and receptive. These bodily practices are sexually loaded. This is reinforced by the fact that Pipa and William has a casual sexual encounter at a recent party. The Scene, then, implicitly refers to what Pipa has done with William in the past and what she might do with him in the future. It is noteworthy that in Episode 2 Pipa identified herself as a Dir’y ‘ippie while in Episode 4, Scene 2 William was identified as a “known” boy. In terms of the ‘rules’ which govern the factions within the pupil sub-culture these pupils are not a legitimate match. It seems that Pipa’s heterosexual femininity outweighs the “uncool” of being a Dir’y ‘ippie. Furthermore, Episode 4 showed that while William might be “known”, he is also “intelligent” and “proud” to be a “virgin”. As such, it seems that William is able to bridge the gap that separates the Dir’y ‘ippies or “boffins” from the mainstream pupil sub-culture. It is significant that this bodily activity is a trust game which requires Pipa’s consent and active participation. Although William appears to abuse the trust within the game and ultimately break its tacit rule, Pipa’s response to this suggests that a further set of tacit rules govern the encounter. That is, breaking the rules of the game is, in fact, within its terms. Pipa’s response to being laid on the floor and stepped on is also noteworthy. While her lack of resistance might be seen as passivity, her response might also be seen as a counter-move which actually neutralises William’s bodily domination of her. If William expected/intended Pipa to squeal and beg for mercy, her making herself comfortable might be a partial rejection of the requirement for the feminine body to defer to the greater strength and authority of the masculine body. In moving on the examine Scene 7, it is pertinent to retain a sense of the extent to which Pipa’s bodily activity in this Scene is consenting and active.
Holding, hounding, hitting

Scene 7 is also one of contact between masculine and feminine bodies which is sexually loaded and in which particular heterosexual masculinities and femininities can be seen to be cited and inscribed. Yet this Scene differs markedly from Scene 6. The 'games' played here are barely recognisable as games, Lucy's consent to participate is not sought and her permission to be touched is neither asked for nor given. In this Scene there is a sense that femininity is unavoidably passive and the masculinities cited and inscribed are entitled and authoritative and, in the case of Stuart, aggressive, as well as being active and capable. Particular heterosexual masculinities and femininities and the relative authority of these are simultaneously constituted.

Owen moves Lucy around through his bodily force. Yet his bodily practices of masculinity include a degree of gentleness and seduction along with their authority and entitlement. When Lucy’s body encounters Owen’s body she wriggles and giggles; her resistance appears to be part of a bodily script of femininity rather than a genuine attempt to extract her body from Owen’s. When Lucy exclaims ‘Owen!’ as he presses his body into her back and covers her eyes, this is a light-hearted objection. It is also unclear whether it is the front (potentially genital) to back bodily contact, the covering of her eyes or both which prompts the exclamation. Notably, while Owen assumes the right to access Lucy’s body, when she objects he responds immediately and releases her.

Stuart’s bodily practices, in contrast, are aggressive as well as authoritative. While the bodily contact between Stuart and Lucy may also be sexually charged, it does not include the seduction implicit in her encounter with Owen. When Stuart restrains and handles Lucy, he does not seek consent or respond to her bodily attempts to extricate herself. The masculine entitlement to access and take the feminine body is cited and
inscribed. When he ‘plays’ at punching Lucy, it is his success and her exclamation of
pain which leads to him to end the ‘game’. It seems here that Lucy may well not be
consenting to this bodily encounter, that is, it may well be an assault. Lucy’s response to
Stuart is informative. She does not call the teacher or make any other serious attempt to
interrupt Stuart’s hold on her body. This may be indicative of her tacit awareness that
any interruption here will simply be a deferral of Stuart’s ‘game’ and that neither she nor
the (woman) teacher has the authority within a gender-dominated discursive field to
prevent subsequent re-enactments of this encounter. Furthermore, Lucy may well be in a
double bind here. Her encounter with Stuart testifies to and is a further moment in the
constitution of her heterosexual femininity -- along with a bruised upper arm, Lucy
 provisionally ‘gains’ desirable heterosexual femininity through this bodily encounter.
This is a moment in Lucy’s ongoing constitution as a viable subject. While the encounter
cites and constitutes the constraints of heterosexual feminine subjection, to attempt to
interrupt Stuart might be to risk this femininity.

Servicing
Scene 8 also demonstrates the constitution of particular heterosexual masculinities and
femininities. The practices in the Scene cite the feminine provision of services to the
masculine which consumes these feminine services.

Matt’s tacit refusal to light his splint from the teacher’s Bunsen burner and his desire to
light it from Juliet’s and Mridula’s Bunsen burner can be understood as a demonstration
of his indifferent or negative orientation to the teacher/school norms. It also provides an
opportunity to engage with the girls -- put simply, Matt is flirting. Nat’s lack of a rubber
(his failure to be properly equipped for school) and his need to borrow a rubber from
Juliet can be understood in similar ways. These practices cite and constitute a particular
sub-cultural masculinity -- the known boy -- which is irreverent or indifferent to school norms and prioritises (implicitly sexual) engagement with (particular) girls. That the girls are educationally orientated enough to have already lit their Bunsen burner and have a rubber to lend does not make them boffins. Indeed, by enabling them to service the needs of these boys, this apparent (marginally) pro-school orientation cites and inscribes their desirable heterosexual femininity. Yet this constitution of the feminine provider of services is not straightforward.

Within the Bunsen burner incident, Juliet and Mridula tell Matt he cannot light his splint and blow it out when he does light it. Yet it is difficult to see their practices as resistances to the citation and constitution of the feminine service provider. It seems unlikely that the girls expect or intend their “NO!” to be efficacious, or that their blowing out of the splint is a display of indignation at their refusal being ignored. Their refusals, then, do not appear to contest this femininity. Rather, they seem to reinforce desirable femininity and indicate the sexual dimension to the bodily exchanges within the Scene. As in the cases of Matt and Nat, Juliet and Mridula are flirting. When the girls playfully chastise and blame each other it seems that this is for refusing to service Matt and for flirting with him, both of which are simultaneously constituted as being highly inappropriate and appropriate to desirable femininity. Mridula’s and Juliet’s refusal does not actually prevent Matt from lighting his splint. While feminine consent is sought, the refusal can be ignored or taken as having been given -- For Matt, their “NO!” means ‘yes’ and, if the girls did not intend their “NO!” to be efficacious, then in this context Matt may be right. The simultaneity of the girls’ “NO!” and blowing out of Matt’s splint, their laughter and Matt’s smiling and shaking his head (the paternal, adult man allowing the girls to have their fun?) suggest that this is a well practised, perhaps even ritualised, bodily and linguistic sequence. These pupils may well go through this
every science lesson. Nevertheless, there is a minor struggle, albeit a light-hearted one, within this Scene. It cites and constitutes the legitimate boundaries of particular heterosexual femininities and masculinities and the relationship between them.

The race identities of the two girls also appear significant. As I discussed in Chapter 4, Juliet (Mixed-race) has significant feminine sub-cultural status in terms of the Hierarchy within the Other. Mridula (Indian), on the other hand, has limited sub-cultural status and she seeks proximity to Juliet (and her desirable feminine). I would suggest that Juliet and Mridula engage in this Scene differently. For Juliet it is a citation and inscription of her desirable femininity. For Mridula it is citation and inscription of her appreciation of Juliet's femininity, and by extension an implicit citation and inscription of the lesser value of her own. As such, I would question whether Mridula would engage in these practices without the legitimacy given to them by Juliet’s involvement. That is, without Juliet’s tacit approval such practices would be outside Mridula’s place in discourse. The well practiced, ritualised nature of the sequence also seems to minimise the risk that Mridula takes by her participation. This analysis, and the femininities with which it is concerned, are reinforced by the girls’ respective practices in the rubber incident.

Within the rubber incident, the minutiae of the apparently mundane practices through which Juliet’s ultra-desirable femininity is constituted become evident. On the surface Juliet’s bodily practices infer that Nat’s request is an unwanted and inconvenient interruption to her school work. Yet school work seems to be a low priority for Juliet; she has avoided working throughout the lesson and is copying the results of the lesson’s experiment out of Mridula’s book when Nat makes his request. As such, the way in which Juliet responds to Nat seems to have little to do with a desire to work
uninterrupted. In understanding Juliet’s practices here it is useful to consider the way in which she lends the rubber.

On the first occasion she picks up the rubber and throws it without looking up from her book. That Juliet’s throws the rubber ‘blind’ is significant. At once it suggests that Nat and his needs are of no importance to her, that attending to them is beneath her, but that she is able meet these needs effortlessly. However, the accuracy of the blind throw suggests a degree of effort -- in this moment and possibly numerous previous moments - to ensure that the throw hits its target. The blind throw, citing and constituting Juliet’s effortless fulfilment of Nat’s need and, therefore, her ultra-desirable femininity, would be worthless or even damaging if it missed. Nat, his needs and her ability to meet them are important to Juliet. When Nat returns the rubber in the same way that it was given, Juliet glances at him disdainfully. Nat’s blind throw, and the absence of thanks, might be an attempt to expose how important his needs are to Juliet and recuperate the apparent indifference with which she has fulfilled them. Her glance might be a contestation of this exposure and an attempt to recuperate Nat’s recuperation.

On the second occasion Juliet throws the rubber without any apparent cue that Nat needs it. Nat uses it and returns it in the same way as before. Despite the apparent inconvenience which Nat’s needs represent, Juliet appears closely attuned to them. Juliet may have been monitoring the activity on the boys’ table and overheard a reference to the need for a rubber. Throwing it over offers a further illustration of her ultra-desirable femininity -- it suggests that she has an intuitive knowledge of Nat’s needs and is able effortlessly to fulfil them without being asked. Juliet may also know, from a multitude of prior instances, that Nat will inevitably need the rubber again and throws it with this knowledge -- she is both fulfilling his needs and teasing him for them. Throwing the
rubber here also cites the earlier exchange and this citation might further recuperate Nat's previous return of the rubber. It also seeks and gets the attention of the boys in a way that simultaneously denies that this attention is being sought -- the unsolicited blind throw is far more effective than hovering at the boys' table.

Throwing the rubber, at the right time and in the right way is not the natural, effortless and insignificant act which Juliet's body suggests it to be. These practices appear as natural and effortless indicators of Juliet's ultra-desirable femininity, and Juliet does not miss a beat. But rather than simply narrating this femininity, these practices cite and inscribe it. Constituted as natural and effortless, this femininity must elide the effort entailed in its performative constitution -- it must appear natural, effortless and integral in order to be ultra-desirable, to be 'truly' feminine. Mridula and I are enthralled by this encounter and I would suggest that this is Juliet's intent. While her bodily exchange is with Nat, we and the other boys at Nat's table are also her intended audience. Juliet does not acknowledge Mridula's appreciative laugh. She cannot -- the appearance that nothing noteworthy has taken place is intrinsic to the ultra-desirable femininity which is cited and constituted through her practices.

Desiring bodies: constituting legitimate relationships

Episode 3 showed that, within the discourses of this pupil (youth/street) culture, an alternative race hierarchy was constituted. I suggested that this hierarchy appeared unable to disrupt the broader, dominant hierarchy White/Black. Nevertheless, the pupil discourse cited and inscribed a Hierarchy within the Other which could be expressed as Black > Coolie > Indian > Popadom. Episode 4 suggested that discourses of heterosexual masculinities and femininities might interact with discourses of race identities, with these interactions acting to mediate, place limits on, and open up
possibilities for these identities. Episode 5 suggested that apparently mundane bodily practices are potentially constituting of particular heterosexual masculinities and femininities. The bodily practices discussed in Episode 5 are implicitly heterosexual and the constitution of desirable (hetero)sexualities is central to these pupils' bodily practices. Furthermore, and reinforcing the analysis of Epstein and Johnson (1998), many of the scenes seem to be sexually loaded.

Pupils’ actual sexual practices are not available for representation and study. Such practices as represented within my research data are necessarily mediated through pupils’ representations of these. Within Episode 6 the pupils are discussing raced heterosexual relationships. They are not concerned with sexual encounters which take place outside relationships and it seems likely that the permutations of legitimate relationships will differ from and be more tightly bounded and policed than those which apply to ‘getting off’.

Episode 6: raced heterosexual desire

DY: (the researcher, mid/tate twenties, woman, White)
NAOMI: (year 11 pupil, girl, Black)
SARAH: (year 11 pupil, girl, South East Asian)
STEVE: (year 11 pupil, boy, White)

The Episode takes place during a Science lesson. DY is sitting at a table with this group of pupils. SARAH listens to the conversation but also regularly looks up at the teacher who is giving instructions for the lesson. NAOMI is looking through STEVE’s school diary and hands it to DY to read.

DY: (reading from commendations page in STEVE’s school diary) ‘For having a massive dick. Angel’. ‘For being the best fuck. Moan Baby’.
NAOMI and SARAH: (laugh)
STEVE: (resigned protest) Arrg...
DY: Who wrote that?
STEVE: My girlfriend.
NAOMI: (laughing) Steve’s loved out!
[...]
STEVE: I've got a thing for Mixed-race girls.
DY: 'Yeah'?
NAOMI: His last two girlfriends have been.
Discourses of race and heterosexual masculinities and femininities interact within the Episode -- race is central to the pupils’ discussion of appropriate heterosexual objects and relationships. This offers insights into the discursive constraints within which these raced heterosexual sexual objects and relationships are constituted and the sedimented historicity of these discourses. In addition, further nuances are added to the Hierarchy within the Other. In analysing the Episode it is not my intention to undertake a psychoanalytic reading of pupils’ sexual objects. I am interested in how bodily sensations, feelings and pleasures might be made accessible, intelligible and legitimate or illegitimate. I will suggest that the pupils’ discourse simultaneously polices race; heterosexuality; raced heterosexual masculinities and femininities; and heterosexual objects and relationships.

In Episode 6 Naomi and Steve outline the likely race identities of boys and girls who enter into heterosexual relationships with one another. They suggest a number of possible permutations which these raced heterosexual objects and relationships might take. In some instances the desire indicated by the pupils is reciprocal, for instance, “White girls like Black boys and Black boys like White girls”. In other instances this is unidirectional, for instance, “I wouldn’t go out with a White boy”. The pupils do not suggest that other permutations are impossible, but they do indicate that these may be
unlikely: “you don’t often see a White boy and a Black girl together”. The pupils’ discourse does not describe or report the ‘facts’ of inter-racial sexual objects/relationships. Rather, particular permutations are legitimated or disavowed through these citational discursive practices. A number of race identities go unmentioned in the Episode. The pupils’ silences concerning the raced sexual objects/relationships of some groups of pupils may be more than a simple omission. These silences may act to constitute in particular ways these raced heterosexual masculinities and femininities.

Schema of raced hetero-sex

Figure 2, Schema of raced hetero-sex (below), attempts to map the various permutations of raced heterosexual objects/relationships which are explicitly stated and implicitly inferred through the pupils’ discursive practices within Episodes 3, 4, 5 and 6. As an artefact of the pupils’ discursive practices this Schema is, unsurprisingly, incomplete. In an attempt to extend the mapping provided by this Schema, I have extrapolated from these episodes to incorporate those race/gender identities not discussed by the pupils. I have also added what might be considered normative intra-race sexual objects/relationships. This condensation of the pupils’ discourse shows particular permutations of legitimate raced heterosexual desire, both reciprocal and unidirectional, as well as varying degrees of desirability. This adds further detail to the Hierarchy within the Other, exposes the way in which this hierarchy is gendered, gives added insight into the relationship between this hierarchy and White, and illustrates the interaction of constituting discourses of race and heterosexuality.
**Figure 2. Schema of raced hetero-sex**

[Diagram showing relationships between different racial groups, including Black Girls, Black Boys, White Boys, White Girls, Mixed Race Girls, Mixed Race Boys, Coolie Girls, Coolie Boys, South East Asian Girls, South East Asian Boys, Indian Girls, and Indian Boys.]

**KEY:**
- **↔** Reciprocal desire indicated
- **→** Unidirectional desire indicated
- **—** Reciprocal or unidirectional desire inferred or extrapolated

*Note: Race identities in bold indicate those explicitly discussed by pupils through Episodes 3, 4, and 5.*

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**Black girls**

In Episode 6 Black boys are indicated as Black girls’ only sexual object. It is not stated that this is reciprocal. While, Steve obliquely infers that he may want to go out with Black girls, he simultaneously acknowledges that is not reciprocal and may transgress the boundaries of appropriate inter-racial sexual objects and relationships. No boys of other races are identified as wanting to go out with Black girls. This appears to leave Black girls with only one legitimate raced relationship ‘choice’ -- Black boys. In the
context of the Hierarchy within the Other this might appear counter-intuitive -- a correspondence between high status and high desirability might be expected. And this is the case for Black boys (see below). The exclusively intra-race nature of Black girls' appropriate relationships exposes the highly gendered nature of the Hierarchy within the Other and Black girls' position at the pinnacle of this. Black girls' position is protected and inscribed by their only going out with boys also at this pinnacle -- Black boys. Going out with less well placed boys might threaten Black girls' own status.

Furthermore, understood as potentially reproductive relationships, these exclusively intra-race relationships can be seen as constituting Black girls as the guardians of Blackness -- a constitution that cites and inscribes discourses of authentic races, racial integrity and female reproductive responsibility coupled with paternal ownership. The disavowal of Black girls' inter-racial relationships, therefore, protects and inscribes Black status and the integrity of Black.

**Black boys**

In contrast, it appears that Black boys' status is inscribed through their almost universal desirability. In Episode 6 it is stated that Black boys and White girls share reciprocal desire. The same is inferred for Black girls but is not explicitly stated. Episode 3 suggest that Black boys and Coolie girls share a reciprocal desire. As Coolie appears to act as a particular specification of 'Mixed-race', it seems reasonable to extrapolate that the same will be true in relation to Mixed-race girls. Conversely, Episode 3 shows the disavowal of inter-racial relationship between Black boys and Indian girls.

Black boys are, then, the most legitimately desired and desiring of all boys. They share reciprocal positions as sexual objects with White girls as well as girls of all races towards the top of the Hierarchy within the Other. It seems that Black boys' status is not
compromised by inter-racial relationships in the way seen for Black girls. This appears to interact with the incommensurable man-not-virgin/boy-virgin and virgin/whore binaries of Episode 4. Indeed, it is possible that inter-racial relationships with girls from particular race backgrounds contribute to this status.

However, this legitimated desire and desirability is not without cost. The (imagined) overwhelming desire for Black boys cites and inscribes discourses of Black hyper-masculinity, thereby constituting Black boys in these terms. The status of Black boys at the pinnacle of the pupils’ and popular cultures’ race hierarchy is preserved through these discourses. Simultaneously, however, discourses of Black hyper-masculinity, and the Black man’s ‘threat’ to White men’s masculinities, White femininity and the ‘purity’ of Whiteness are sustained.

White girls
Paralleling Black boys, White girls are the most desired and legitimately desiring of all girls. The Episodes suggest that White girls share reciprocal desire with White boys as well as boys of all races towards the top of the Hierarchy within the Other. The overwhelming desire for White girls cites dominant discourses, from eugenics to the fashion industry, of the synonymy of Whiteness and feminine beauty which inscribe the ultimate privilege of White in a White/Black dichotomy. At the same time, however, the desired and desiring White girl risks being constituted slag. Such a constitution simultaneously risks the privilege of White. These interacting identities and risks cite and inscribe multiple discourses. The desire for White women is embedded in a discourse of White hegemony and the privilege of White heterosexual femininities. The discourse of inter-racial relationships’ ‘threat’ to Whiteness, citing discourses and prior prohibitions of miscegenation (Jacobson 1998), is implicitly cited by non-White desire.
for White women. This ‘threat’ is underlined by the potential reciprocity of the sexual object. This ‘threat’ is recuperated, however, through the ever present discourse of the virgin/whore: the White woman who reciprocates non-White desire is whore and, by extension, sacrifices the privilege bestowed through a discourse of virginal White femininity.

White boys

In apparent contrast to White boys’ privilege in terms of the dominant White/Black binary, within the pupils’ and wider sub-cultural discourse, desire for White boys is more limited than desire for Black boys. Episode 6 states that White boys share reciprocal desire with Mixed-race girls. Through my extension of Mixed-race desire to Coolie, I have inferred possible reciprocal desire between White boys and Coolie girls. Steve obliquely infers his desire for Black girls while simultaneously acknowledging the illegitimacy of this. White and Black boys, then, share access to legitimate relationships with girls of a number of races. Yet while Black boys have exclusive legitimate access to Black girls, White boys share access to White girls with Black boys and have no legitimate access to Black girls.

This might appear to suggest that Black boys have superseded White boys at the pinnacle of raced heterosexual masculinities within discourses of youth/street culture. This does not infer, however, that a similar shift has been effected within broader enduring discourses. In these terms, the legitimacy of relationships between Black boys and White girls within discourses of youth/street poses a ‘threat’ to White heterosexual femininities (virginity), the integrity (purity) of Whiteness, and White hegemonic masculinity. Yet White hegemony is not so easily disrupted. These intertwined ‘threats’
are recuperated through the deployment of the very discourses which constitute them as ‘threats’, in particular, the discourses of Black hyper-sexuality/masculinity.

The interactions between discourses of miscegenation, phenotypic or physiognomic races; the exotic Other; and the Hierarchy within the Other offer insights into the way in which race becomes central to the constitution of White boys’ legitimate and illegitimate sexual objects.

The illegitimacy of relationships between White boys and Black girls and Black girls’ apparent rejection of White boys might be seen as indicative of the relative low status of White masculinities within discourses of youth/street culture. Black girls are positioned at the (gendered) pinnacle of the Hierarchy within the Other -- a position in part constituted by and constitutive of their guardianship of Blackness and concomitant exclusive desire for Black boys. Yet Black girls are rendered an illegitimate sexual object for White boys through the combined force of this sub-cultural status and discourses of prohibited miscegenation and the exotic Other. Within sub-cultural discourse, Black girls’ status is too high for Steve. Within broader hegemonic discourses Black girls are too exotic; phenotypically or physiognomically too Black.

On the other hand, while discourses of the exotic Other are also potentially constitutive of Mixed-raced girls, they are a legitimate sexual object for White boys. These girls have lesser status in the Hierarchy within the Other than Black girls. Furthermore, already constituted as Mixed-race, a phenotypic or physiognomic racial purity is not at stake for these girls -- the legitimacy of their sexual objects is not informed by a duty of racial guardianship. While this might explain the legitimacy of Mixed-race girls’ desire for White boys, it does not explain the legitimacy of White boys’ desire for Mixed-race
It is possible that it is the racial ‘impurity’ already signified through their constitution as Mixed-race which render these girls a legitimate sexual object for White boys. That is, the legitimacy of inter-race sexual objects/relationships for White boys is mediated through a discourse of phenotypic or physiognomic races which cites and inscribes degrees of Blackness -- Mixed-race girls are not White, but they are less black than Black girls. This legitimacy may also be imbued with and cite the historicity of colonial discourses of assimilation which, in uncomfortable co-existence with prohibitions of miscegenation, offer an imperative to protect the integrity of Whiteness through the ‘breeding-out’ of Blackness (albeit an imperative whose failure is evidenced by constitutions such as ‘mixed-blood’, ‘half-caste’, quadroon’, ‘octoroon’). As the sexual object of a White boy, then, Mixed race girls are the exotic Other and a ‘trophy’ within the terms of the Hierarchy within the Other while simultaneously remaining within the bounds of legitimate inter-race relationships.

Mixed-race boys and Coolie boys

Episode 6 suggests that Mixed-race boys share a reciprocal desire with both White girls and Mixed-race girls. On the basis that Coolie appears to function as a specific type of Mixed-race, I have extended the Schema for Mixed-race to Coolie. As such, the permutations of appropriate raced relationships for these boys mirror those for White boys. Again, race phenotypes or physiognomies which render these boys at once ‘Black enough’ and ‘not Black enough’ seem to pervade pupil discourse.

Mixed race girls and Coolie Girls

Episodes 3 and 6 suggest that, in addition to mirroring the reciprocal desires of their male racial counterparts, these girls also share a reciprocal desire with Black boys. That is, while it is not legitimate for Mixed-race and Coolie boys to have relationships with
Black girls, it is legitimate for Mixed-race and Coolie girls to have relationships with Black boys. As already discussed above, it seems that these girls are positioned as having relatively high status and, therefore, desirability within the terms of the Hierarchy within the Other. At the same time, they are constituted as already racially ‘impure’ and, therefore, without a pure race for which to be the guardians as in the case of Black girls.

**South East Asian boys and girls**

South East Asian pupils are not included in the pupils’ constitution of raced desires through Episode 6. Sarah, a South East Asian pupil, is present during Episode 6 and engages in the discussion as audience. She neither confirms nor challenges the model suggested by Steve and Naomi and she does not extend this to incorporate South East Asian pupils. It seems possible to understand the discussion within Episode 6 as being concerned with pupils who are privileged in terms of either the Hierarchy within the Other or the White/Black binary. In this sense the group’s silence surrounding (O)ther races confirms and inscribes the relative low status of these within this discursive market.

My analysis of earlier episodes offers some insight into the ways in which South East Asian pupils might be constituted as sexual objects and subjects within pupil discourses. Within Scene 3 of Episode 4 Su Lin, a South East Asian girl, was constituted “slag”. This designation was supported by her spending time in “Chinatown”, with its implicit inference that she has sex with Chinese men and ‘evidence’ of her ‘exotic-Otherness’. My discussion of new names in Chapter 4 showed how South East Asian pupils are often, but not always, able to successfully anglicise their names and, by extension, themselves. In addition, within Scene 8 of Episode 5 Juliet’s ultra-desirable femininity
did not preclude/was not risked through her constituting exchange with Matt, a South East Asian boy.

Broader Western constitutions of the exotic eroticism of South East Asian femininity can be seen in discourses of the Geisha, the decadence of pre-communist Shanghai and the region's contemporary position as a key destination for Western sex tourism and/or source of 'mail-order brides'. Could the silence surrounding South East Asian sexual desire and desirability within Episode 6 be indicative of a tension between this ultra-exotic feminine Other and a denial of this? Such a denial appears necessary for the continued constitution of relative feminine status in terms of the Hierarchy within the Other and the expression of this within the pupils' constitutions of legitimate sexual objects and relationships. Might the group’s silence be simultaneously constitutive of this ultra-exotic femininity? That is, might it constitute South East Asian femininity as so exotic, so sexualised, that, reflecting the moral scale of Episode 4, it cannot be spoken? Could Sarah’s literal silence suggest that she has opted to retain ‘no place’ in this sexual Schema rather than assert the apparent alternative of ultra-exotic feminine Other (which is, nonetheless, constituted through this very silence)?

Such tensions also seem evident in relation to pupils' constitutions of South East Asian boys as (hetero-) sexual subjects. Contradictory popular discourses cite and inscribe the femininity of South East Asian (un-)masculinity while simultaneously citing and inscribing the ultra-masculine South East Asian warrior as exemplified by the Samurai; the traditionally rendered tattoo; the ‘triad’ crime gang; and the martial arts master (think Bruce Lee and Jackie Chan). While this ultra-masculinity is implicated in the inscription of the gendered Otherness of South East Asianness, might it simultaneously pose a potential threat to the Hierarchy within the Other? Might this potential threat be
negotiated through silence? Might such a silence carry with it the potential to constitute such ultra-masculinity as exemplary\textsuperscript{9}, thereby continuing to inscribe the generalised femininity of South East Asian (un-)masculinity? (These issues will be returned to in the following chapter.)

While this evidence is clearly only partial, it seems that enduring discourses of South East Asian ultra-exotic femininity and ultra-masculinity might constitute a partial disruption to the pupil discourse of the Hierarchy within the Other which privileges Blackness (African-Caribbean) -- a disruption which might be recuperated through silence.

\textit{South Asian boys and girls}

As in the case of South East Asian pupils, within Episode 6 legitimate (hetero-) sexual objects and relationships are not identified for South Asian pupils.

The absurdity of "White-Pakistani" in Episode 1; the constitution of South Asian pupils as Other-Other in Episode 2; the denigration of "Indian" and "popadom" in Episode 3; the absence/refusal of anglicised ‘new names’ discussed in Chapter 4; and Mridula’s apparent quest for proximity to \textit{but not approximation of} Juliet’s ultra-desirable femininity in Scene 8 of Episode 5 all suggest particular constitutions of South Asianness with pupil discourses. That is, the lack of status, undesirability and Otherness of South Asian race identities are variously cited and inscribed through this array of pupil practices.

The pupils’ silence concerning the legitimate (hetero-) sexual objects and relationships of South Asian pupils might be framed by broader enduring discourses of the sexually
continent, racial-religious Other. This is a racial-religious Other whose religious and cultural practices of sexual abstinence and subsequent arranged *intra-racial* marriages (whether real or imagined) set them ‘outside’ such a Schema of raced hetero-sex. In such a discursive frame, intra-race relationships would be legitimated while simultaneously contributing to the constitution of these pupils as without desire or desirability in the terms of hegemonic discourses of romantic love and sexual attraction. As such, the (impossible) desire of South Asian pupils becomes significant only if boundaries of authentic race and legitimate inter-racial sexual objects/relationships are transgressed and require recuperation (as in the case of Rachel discussed in Episode 3). South Asian femininities will be explored in detail in the next chapter. Heterosexual desire, if not activity, appears as a pre-requisite to subjecthood within the pupils’ discursive practices. Such activity or desire is denied Asian pupils who are constituted as if this was not a denial but a *prior* fact. This offers further insight into the processes through which south Asian pupils are constituted at the nadir of the Hierarchy within the Other.

**Conclusion**

The Schema of raced hetero-sex suggests that, within the terms of the pupils’ discourse, demand for Black boys and White girls must exceed supply. With both in such demand, it is perhaps unsurprising that it seems they might often be one another’s first choice. Furthermore, Mixed-race, Coolie and White boys seems to ‘share’ the same pool of potential girlfriends -- Mixed-race, Coolie and White girls. While this desire is reciprocated, these girls can also legitimately desire Black boys. This means that, in the terms of the Schema, there is an imbalance between demand for and supply of appropriately raced potential partners. If the pupils’ discursive Schema was adhered to in practice, it seems that many pupils would be left without access to a partner of the race identity/ties proscribed.
Those pupils whom the Dir’y ‘ippies (Bods/Boffins) sought to constitute as/through the injurious name Shaza and Baza are, in terms of this Schema and the Hierarchy within the Other, the very pupils who are privileged -- cool -- in the discourses of the pupil sub-culture. Yet beyond the reach and influence of the discourses of youth/street culture, this privilege or cool may have limited value. In terms of Bourdieu’s cultural capital, in the context of the pupil culture, these pupils have capital of high market value. In the contexts of the school’s institutional culture, and hegemonic culture more broadly, the value of such capital shifts. The implications of this will be mediated by the particular discursive capitals which permeate particular markets. It is likely, however, that pupils’ youth/street culture privilege will be inversely related to their privilege in these context. Indeed, For Black boys, the dispositions and capitals that secure them the pinnacle of the Hierarchy within the Other, may not only be devalued but, extending Bourdieu’s economic metaphor, may be the very practices which constitute their negative equity in discursive markets dominated by hegemonic culture.

The Schema of raced hetero-sex appears to report common (and not-so-common) sense ‘facts’ about the nature of inter-racial heterosexual objects and relationships. Yet it does more than this. It has the potential to constitute legitimate and illegitimate sexual objects and relationships. It demarcates which inter-racial relationships are acceptable, and which are not. In doing this, notions of miscegenation and the exotic other, themselves predicated on understandings of phenotypic or physiognomic races, are sedimented within the historicity of these discourses of sexuality. This historicity is so deeply imbued that discourses of sexuality can be seen as intrinsically raced. Jacobson (1998) suggests that ‘[t]he policing of sexual boundaries -- the defence against hybridity -- is precisely what keeps a racial group a racial group’ (Jacobson 1998:3). This policing is evident within the Schema of raced hetero-sex. It cites and inscribes multiple,
contradictory and competing discourses of race and heterosexual masculinities and femininities. As such, it is also implicated in performatively constituting these identities.

The Schema brings to the fore the interaction between bodily sensation and the discourses through which this becomes accessible; an interaction which might be understood through notions of performative habitus and body-reflexive practices. Steve’s “thing” for Mixed-race girls and his inference that he (illegitimately) desires Black girls is a particularly useful illustration of this. I am not suggesting that Steve necessarily has a conscious awareness of the ways in which the discursive constraints surrounding legitimate sexual objects are cited and inscribed, although he is undoubtedly consciously aware of these constraints. It is possible to suggest that his knowledge of these constraints is formed and formative at the level of bodily understanding; the habitus. If bodily sexual arousal -- sensations, feelings and pleasures -- is understood to become meaningful and accessible through those mediating discourses of raced sexuality, then we begin to have an insight into the relationship between the body and raced relationship practices. The identification of Mixed-race girls as Steve’s preferred sexual object as well as his acquiescence to the prohibition of Black girls as a sexual object could be seen here as body-reflexive practices or as tacit bodily performatives. His body knows desire for the exotic Other, yet his body also knows that some exotic Others are too exotic to be a legitimate sexual object. This knowledge is both formed and formative -- if it has been formed through the citation of the bodies around him, then it also contributes to the ongoing formation of this and other bodies. It is potentially performative.

Within the Scenes of Episode 5 there is a complex interaction between intentional, tacit and unintentional bodily practices. Beginning to understand the complex interaction
between these forms of bodily practices promises further insight into the ways in which they contribute to the constitution of discursive subjects. A better understanding of the discursive (including bodily) agency of the post-sovereign subject is also offered.

In some moments pupils may knowingly cite their own and others’ prior bodies. Pupils may have a practical sense, a tacit awareness, of the potentially performative force of their bodily practices, but this tacit awareness is not the same as a conscious strategy or game plan for the constitution of the identities of themselves or others. In addition bodily performatives, like many of the linguistic performatives discussed in chapter 4, may be unintentional, cited and inscribe implicitly. Furthermore, whether bodily practices are deployed intentionally, with a tacit awareness or unintentionally, their efficacy is not guaranteed. Bodily performatives, like linguistic performatives, always run the risk of misfire.

These potentially performative bodily activities are an integral part of the discursive constitution of identities. They do not supplement the discursive -- accessible and meaningful only through discourse, they are already discursive. This underlines the importance of retaining the sense of the distinction between the linguistic and the discursive. The linguistic and the discursive are not one and the same. The discursive field is constituted by and constitutive of representations whether these are linguistic, visual, bodily or otherwise. These bodily practices are not somehow inherently masculine/feminine, heterosexual, pro-/anti- school, imbued with particular degrees of sub-cultural status. Rather, these bodies are designated within these terms through discourse -- their meanings are cited and inscribed. Just as the historicity of discourse is sedimented through its citation within linguistic practices, so it is sedimented through its citation within bodily practices be these intentional, tacit or unintentional.

229
Endnotes to Chapter 5. Practicing Identities

1 Black and Mixed-race pupils, in particular boys, are over-represented in the foundation tier. See Gillborn & Youdell (2000) for a full discussion.

2 I will explore this double bind further in Chapter 6.

3 Juliet’s ultra-desirable femininity is so within the context of the pupil sub-culture and, perhaps, working class femininities more broadly. However, this does not reinscribe the hegemony of White, middle class femininity.

4 While common sense might suggest that sexual practice is perhaps the most bodily of sensations, feelings, pleasures, my analysis suggests that sexual practice, like the multitude of other practices which might be designated as bodily, is discursively constituted. Understood as an effect of discourse, sexual practice is likely to be as discursively constrained and imbued with as sedimented a historicity as any other discursive practice (be it linguistic, bodily or otherwise).

5 The virgin/whore binary seen in Episode 4 suggests that such ‘getting off’ will be disavowed, at least publicly, by Naomi and Sarah, while, reflecting the ‘man’ of Episode 4, this might not be disavowed by Steve in another context.

6 While I do not intend to undertake a psychoanalytic reading here, the term ‘sexual object’ is borrowed from the lexicon of psychoanalysis and the term ‘desire’ has particular meanings within psychoanalysis. For Freud, ‘sexual objects’ and ‘sexual aims’ (Freud 1991: 46 original emphasis) are functions of the libido. The unconscious libido is represented mentally through the ‘ego-libido’ (Freud 1991: 139) but is only available for analysis through the ‘object-libido’ (Freud 1991: 139). While the libido cannot be fully or finally satisfied, the (mental, not actual) sexual object consciously wished for by the subject allows the libido to achieve ‘partial and temporary extinction’ (Freud 1991: 139). Within Lacanian psychoanalysis the Real, Imaginary and Symbolic (discussed in Chapter 2) incorporate need, demand and desire respectively. Desire here is understood as lack of the Other. This desire is unconscious and, therefore, not tethered by the social constraints and limits integral to the speaking subject. With its emphasis on discursively legitimate objects and relationships, it seems that Episode 6 is not concerned with desire in Lacanian terms. Yet Lacan draws a distinction between the unattainable ‘objet a’ (Grosz 1990: 75) or Other which is the cause both of desire and its insatiability, and the object or other through which the (non-instinctual) drives seek desire’s impossible satisfaction. It is this latter sexual object which the Episode might be considered to be concerned with and I am using the term desire loosely in connection with the pursuit of this sexual object and not the objet a.

7 Irrespective of the gender of each partner, Coolie contradicts this disavowal. The existence of Coolie evidences Black-Indian and/or Black-South East Asian relationships. The relative positions of Black and Indian in terms of the Hierarchy within the Other suggests that, within the terms of this discourse, the relatively high status of Coolie is derived from its Black and not its Indian component.

8 Research in the UK suggests that ‘four in ten Black Caribbean men (aged 16 to 34) were living with a white female partner in 1991’. Half as many Black women in the same age group were living with White men. (Office for National Statistics 1996:23).

9 Connell (1995) uses the term ‘exemplary masculinity’ in his discussion of black masculinities, particularly in the US context, where the individual is taken as an exemplar of hegemonic masculinity without this undermining the Whiteness intrinsic to this hegemony.
6. Identity Traps

**Trap.** 'any device or plan for tricking a person or thing into being caught unawares'; 'anything resembling a trap or prison'; 'an obstacle or hazard'

**Traps.** 'belongings, luggage'

(Complete Oxford English Dictionary).

**Introduction**

In the previous chapters I have outlined the ways in which both linguistic and bodily practices are potentially constituting of identities. I have suggested that the bodily and the linguistic cannot be separated out or understood as distinct realms. Rather, I have suggested that the bodily and the linguistic are intimately linked in and through discourse. The social world cannot be separated out from what people say (or do not say) or what their bodies do (or do not do). And as linguistic and bodily practices are formed by and formative of discursive frames, the social cannot be partitioned off from discourse.

In exploring the discursive practices represented through the Episodes in Chapters 4 and 5, I have stressed the *potentiality* of performatives and the *provisionality* of their constitutions. Within the school there are a range of shifting official and sub-cultural contexts and milieu. These contexts and milieu are constituted by and constituting of a multitude of discourses. These discourses do not have intrinsic relative values or performative forces. While the historicity of some discourses gives the appearance of particular and abiding meanings and performative force, the different ways in which discourses intersect and interact across contexts insists that meaning and performative force is mobile and subject to change.
Located (constituted) in these constrained but not determined discursive frames, the post-sovereign subject has been shown to retain a significant degree of agency. This subject has intent, but this is an intent which is constrained by the discursive frames through which he/she is constituted and within which his/her discursive practices are potentially constituting. Performatives are also deployed tacitly and unintentionally through pupils’ discursive practices. The potential for discursive performatives to fail, misfire or even backfire is as inescapable as their potentially constituting force. The shifting nature of discursive frames, an effect of the citationality of discourse, means that whether performatives are deployed unintentionally, constitute identities as intended, or misfire or backfire to constitute identities in unanticipated ways, their constitutions are always provisional. In addition, discourses which are potentially constituting of identities which are particularly desirable in specific contexts or milieu may implicitly interact with and cite other discourses which threatened to recuperate these desired identities or even constitute these identities as undesirable. There is no once and for all constituting moment which brings an identity to finality or closure.

In this Chapter I will focus on the risks to and cost of performatively constituted identities. If we accept Althusser’s understanding of subjection (Althusser 1971), the position of subject always entails cost -- subjection is simultaneously formative and regulative. In this sense the subject who is constituted as a subject by turning to the hail is necessarily ‘self-incarcerating’ (Butler 1997b: 32). The notion of the self-incarcerating subject, paralleled by Foucault’s notion of the body imprisoned by and through the soul (Foucault 1990a), is useful here. Building on the theoretical framework deployed and developed in the preceding chapters, I will consider the ways in which those identities constituted through the discursive practice of surveillent and self-surveillent subjects might be seen as discursive traps.
Through my analysis of a series of further Episodes, I will argue that there are likely to be implications for the surveillent and self-surveillent subject who provisionally constitutes him/herself and others within the terms of/as a particular identity or constellation of identities. I will suggest that constitutions of identities frequently bring with them particular limits as well as further constitutions which are unforeseen, undesirable or even counter to those identities which the subject intentionally or tacitly sought. That is, situated within, citing and inscribing a discursive frame which is mobile and often unknown to the subject, discursive practices which constitute identities are often also traps. Having already begun to consider and highlight the risks and costs of identities in previous chapters, this Chapter hopes neither to contain every moment in which pupils identities appear as traps nor exhaust every identity or constellation of identities which might be subject to such discursive traps. The Chapter endeavours to indicate the ways in which a range of identities entrap subjects and outline some of the implications of this for subjects constituted by and through particular discourses.

The incommensurability of Indianness/Asianness and desirable femininity

Within the Schema of raced hetero-sex, South Asianness appeared to be variously constituted as without legitimate desire and desirability. Episode 5 suggested that within the pupil sub-culture (ultra-)desirable femininity is constituted as intrinsically unavailable to South Asian girls who can seek proximity to but not approximation of this femininity. In Chapter 5 the Hierarchy within the Other suggested that South Asian was the least valued race identity within the pupil sub-culture. Episode 3 suggested that “Popodom” was deployed as an injurious name which, while perhaps not enduring, provisionally constituted South Asianness as subordinate and undesirable. Episode 2 suggested that South Asian pupils might be constituted as the other-Other within pupils’
sub-cultural discourses and Episode 1 highlighted the enduring historicity and reach of the injurious name “Paki”.

The preceding chapters, then, offered a number of insights into the ways in which South Asian race identities are constituted as subordinate, undesirable and even disavowed within the pupil sub-culture. Episode 7 give further demonstration of these processes and begins to identify how Indian girls might become entrapped by their own and others’ constitutions of Indian/Asian race identities and Indianness/Asianness.

Episode 7: Samosa, munchers, and white princesses

A Food Technology Lesson. MRIDULA and AVTAR (both year 11, Indian, girls) are making samosa and have invited DY to observe. This practical session contributes to their GCSE coursework which they have opted to work on together. This work is set in the context of a fictional ‘Multicultural Wedding’. A boy at a similar stage in his coursework is also cooking during this lesson. The rest of the group are expected to work independently on ongoing written work.

Mridula and Avtar are making pastry. Avtar holds up the bag of flour for me to look at. It has several lumps of pastry stuck to it. Avtar pulls her mouth down and says “Urrrg!”. The pastry is sticky and the girls grimace as they knead it. While kneading, they pause regularly to pick lumps of pastry off their hands. Once the pastry is rolled, it is stuffed with a filling which Mridula has made at home with the help of her mother.

Avtar is taking photographs for their coursework folders. She asks me to hold the food and utensils for the photographs. I point out that my finger nails are a bit chewed. She counters that her own are much worse. Mridula and Avtar laugh as I roll up my sleeves and remove my watch and ring. Lucy, who has come to watch, reminds Avtar: “make sure you can’t see she’s not in uniform!”. Avtar takes photographs of my hands holding cooking utensils and pinching an uncooked samosa closed.

Intermittently various pupils come to the cooking area. The (White) girls look to see what Avtar and Mridula are doing and ask: “Are you cooking those thingies again?” and “You’re making what’s it called?”. They do not wait for an answer before moving away. Only Lucy and Briget (White), who stop to chat and contribute cooking advice, refer to the samosa by name. The (Black, Mixed-race and White) boys demand: “When will it be ready?”, “What am I getting to munch?”, “Isn’t it ready yet?”, “I better get a munch”. Mridula ignores the boys. Avtar becomes annoyed, her face is unsmiling and set. On one occasion Avtar shouts: “Miss!” and the teacher calls the boys back to their seats. Mridula asks Avtar: “Why are you getting stressed?”, Avtar replies: “I’m not, I dunno...”. After a moments pause she looks at me and says: “All they want is a munch.” Turning to Mridula she says: “Mrid, I’m going to save 2 each for us and Debbie and they can have the rest. We’ll cut them up”. She looks back to me and tells me: “Last time we let them have them all. The boys won’t do the survey, they just want a munch”.

Mridula crosses the path of Stuart, one of the boys who has been hassling for a munch, as she walks into the kitchen area. As Mridula passes, Stuart throws his weight into a headbut and shouts “Urrgh”. He pulls the headbut a few centimetres before it makes contact with Mridula’s face. Mridula ignores him. When she reaches Avtar and me she says: “That boy’s a nutcase”.

A girl approaches the kitchen area. Avtar nods towards the girl and says to me: “Watch this”. The girl is White and noticeably overweight. The girl stands close by and watches. Avtar and Mridula ignore her. She
walks away. I ask: “What was I watching?”. Avtar chuckles as she replies: “Her coming to see if it was ready yet”.

[...]

Avtar and Mridula fry the samosa they have made along with a packet bought from a shop. We try the samosa as they are cooked. Mridula finds the samosa “too hot” and says that she cannot eat a whole one. She laughs as she tells us that she is known within her family for being unable to eat hot foods. Avtar and me laugh as we eat a number of samosa during the cooking process and agree that shop-bought variety are far inferior to the ones which she and Mridula have made.

[...]

When all the samosa are cooked, Avtar and Mridula put the shop-bought samosa on a plate together. Six of their own samosa are set aside for us to eat and the rest are cut into smaller pieces and put on a plate with a survey sheet next to it. The boys who have been demanding a munch throughout the lesson come over saying: “Where’s mine?”. Avtar indicates the plate of cut up samosa. One boy responds: “I don’t want that, I want a whole one”. Avtar says: “No, those are the ones for tasting”. The boys hassle Avtar for a whole samosa. Avtar says: “They’re for us”. The boys indicate the shop-bought samosa and say: “What about those?”. Initially Avtar refuses but, with persistent hassling, she tells the boys that they can each have a whole shop-bought samosa. The boys walk away grumbling about the quality and quantity of what they have been given. They do not offer any thanks. Once the boys have left the area, a number of girls come to taste the samosa for the survey. These girls do not complain about the size of the portions. As they eat, several girls say that the samosa are “Hot!”. One girl takes a bite, puts her hand over her mouth, reels, and says “I’ve got to get a drink of water!”. The girls’ responses on the survey sheet are uniform: the colour is “golden”; the appearance “nice”; the smell “spicy”; and the flavour “HOT!”.

Within Episode 7 Avtar and Mridula are engaged in a tacit, if not intentional, affirmation of Indianness and themselves as Indian. Simultaneously, they attempt to constitute themselves within the terms of desirable femininity. That it, they seem to be seeking, at least tacitly, to constitute Indianness as valuable, valued and legitimate and commensurate with desirable heterosexual femininity.

The girls’ decision to make samosa is significant. It seems that making samosa acts as an assertion and affirmation of their race identity; the specificities of this race identity; its cultural difference from the White majority; and also its legitimacy within the school context. It is notable that ‘Indian’ food is common-place within UK popular culture -- the image of the drunken White (and possibly racist) young men stopping for a curry on the way home from the pub is extremely familiar. It would be reasonable to suggest that every pupil in the school lives within a walk of an Indian restaurant and that most will have eaten this food. In this context, making samosa neither introduces a unfamiliar cultural artefact into the school nor acts as an assertion of race which is likely to disrupt
hegemonic notions of Asianness. At the same time, the linguistic and bodily performatives deployed by Mridula and Avtar as they make pastry cite and inscribe a desirable heterosexual (and middle-class) femininity which is clean, sensitive and unused to domestic and/or menial tasks. Their distaste for the pastry sticking to their hands cites and inscribes a femininity of and for beauty and ornamentation, not domestic work. At the same time, however, they are competent cooks and this cites and inscribes the ‘natural’ capacities of the feminine service provider seen in Scene 8 of Episode 5.

While Mridula and Avtar may have a tacit intent to constitute themselves as simultaneously Indian and desirably feminine, my analysis of the Episode will suggest that such a constitution is likely to fail on several counts. First, despite the likely familiarity of samosa to the other pupils in the class, Mridula’s and Avtar’s assertion and affirmation of Indianness is strongly resisted. Second, their practices of desirable femininity seem to be subsumed by the other pupils’ constitutions of them as Asian, that is, as Other, and, therefore, beyond the bounds of desirable femininity. Finally, the girls’ own tacit knowledge of the incommensurability of Indianness and desirable femininity appears at various moments within the Episode.

It is possible to suggest that it not the assertion of Indianness itself which is contested by other pupils in the group. Rather, it seems that it is the simultaneous affirmation of this and the attempt to constitute it as commensurable with desirable femininity which is resisted. The refusal of the majority of the other pupils to name the samosa seems to recuperate Mridula’s and Avtar’s assertion of it as a legitimate food. By not ‘knowing’ the name of the food they reassert its Otherness -- the food (and by extension the girls making it) are provisionally constituted as the exotic/racial Other.
The White girls' bodily and linguistic practices concerning the spiciness and hotness (flavour not temperature) of the food are potentially performative practices. These practices cite and inscribe their own desirable White femininity (which is too sensitive and delicate to eat Asian food) and, therefore, the Otherness of Asian girls who lack this desirable femininity. The boys practices also constitute Mridula and Avtar as Other to desirable femininity. The boys' desire to eat the girls' food is reminiscent of the masculine consumer/feminine service provider seen in Scene 8 of Episode 5. Yet I would suggest that Scene 8's exchange of constitutions of desirable masculinity and femininity is absent here. The boys do not request feminine services, thereby citing and inscribing this femininity. Rather, they demand and their demands do not allow for any legitimate refusal. These practices are potentially constitutive of the boys' aggressive masculinity and of the girls' racial Otherness. Within the discursive frame mobilised by the boys, Mridula's and Avtar's services are citations and inscriptions not of their femininity but of their subordinate Asianness and lack of desirable femininity. The historicity of discourses of colonialism is evident here.

This constitution of Otherness and lack of desirable femininity is also apparent in the headbut sequence. Stuart's pulled headbut might be reminiscent of the way he punched Lucy in Scene 7 of Episode 8. Yet here Stuart does not attempt to engage Mridula, to extract her (feminine) submission. Rather, his shout and headbut appear as particularly aggressive and intimidatory performative practice. These practices are potentially constitutive of Stuart's aggressive hyper-masculinity. They are also potentially constitutive of Mridula. Stuart's practices do not simply overlook Mridula's femininity, they deny it, that is, they cite and inscribe the subordination of Asianness and its intrinsic lack of desirable femininity. Yet Stuart's constituting practices do offer Mridula a position as speaking subject from which she can resist this constitution. To me and
Avtar she calls Stuart a "nutcase". This is a performative interpellation which might be seen to be at least partially and provisionally successful within the restricted context of our corner of the kitchen.

Whether intentionally or through a tacit knowledge of the potentially performative force of their practices, these pupils recuperate Mridula’s and Avtar’s affirmation of Indianness and neutralise, if not subjugate, this race identity. That is, they cite and inscribe its place in discourse -- that place being very low indeed within the terms of the Hierarchy within the Other which permeates this pupil sub-culture. At the same time, the pupils’ practices deny any possibility of desirable femininity. They cite and inscribe the incommensurability of Asianness and desirable femininity².

Mridula’s and Avtar’s awareness of the Otherness of Asian and the incommensurability of Asianness and desirable femininity within authorised discourse can be seen within the photographing sequence. While asking me to hold the utensils and samosa in my (White) hands could simply be indicative of Mridula’s and Avtar’s like for me and desire to include me in their activities, it might also be understood as an attempt to ratify samosa as a genuine and legitimate food within White hegemonic culture. That is, White hands making samosa might suggest that samosa are more than the exotic food of an exotic/racial Other -- if a White woman makes them they are staples of contemporary British cuisine. At the same time, this might indicate Mridula’s and Avtar’s acquiescence to the intrinsic Whiteness of desirable femininity. They are captured by discourses of hegemonic femininity in which the hands of a White woman (irrespective of how chewed the fingernails) are intrinsically more desirably feminine than the hands of an Asian woman. In such an analysis it appears that Mridula and Avtar are at least tacitly aware of the likely infelicity of their attempted simultaneous constitution of
Indianness and desirable femininity. Their constitution of affirmed Indianness traps them within a discursive chain which excludes the possibility of desirable femininity.

This can also be seen in Mridula’s assertion that the samosa are too spicy and hot for her to eat. This is despite having chosen to cook samosa (and thereby affirm her Indianness) and the filling having been made by her and her mother (suggesting she may well have eaten it in the past). Furthermore, Mridula attempts to give this potential constitution some endurance and broader legitimacy (performative force) by asserting that she is known for her inability to eat hot and spicy food (feminine delicacy and sensitivity) within her family. These practices cite those of the White girls. In doing so, they cite and inscribe the Whiteness of desirable femininity and its incommensurability with Asianness. In this discursive frame it appears that Mridula acquiesces to, cites and inscribes the incommensurability of Indianness and desirable femininity and is prepared to jettison the former in favour of the latter. Such a trade, however, seems unlikely to be effective. Preceding episodes have underlined the endurance, significance and force of phenotypes and/or physiognomy in the pupils’ constitutions of natural, authentic and distinct races. In addition, the performative practices of the pupils within this Episode demonstrate the force of constitutions of Indian/South Asian Otherness and its incommensurability with desirable femininity. Mridula is trapped by and through these discursive constraints. She cannot simply jettison her Indianness in favour of desirable femininity. Her inability to eat the samosa might risk the affirmation of her Indianness, but in this moment it cannot undo either her Indianness or her lack of desirable femininity.

Avtar seems to navigate the constraints of this discursive frame in different ways. Avtar’s “Watch this” constitutes the watching White girl as fat and greedy. Avtar’s
‘fattening’ and ‘greedying’ of this White girl can be seen as an attempt to claim a degree of desirable femininity -- she is more desirably feminine than this girl because she is neither fat nor greedy. This might also be understood as a momentary retaliation against the White girls’ recuperation and inscription as Other of Avtar’s attempted constitution of affirmed Indianness. If these girls recuperate her Indianness in order to inscribe it as Other, then she will cite and inscribe another Otherness -- (un)feminine fatness and greediness. Through these practices, Avtar appears to claim a degree of desirable femininity within our corner of the kitchen without this being at the expense of her affirmed Indianness.

Avtar’s controlling of the munching boys, however, seems to suggest that she may have given up (at least momentarily) on desirable femininity within the terms of the mainstream pupil sub-culture. Having given up on this (inaccessible) desirable femininity, it cannot be risked by refusing to provide services to the boys or by calling for the intervention of the teacher. In this sense, she contributes to the constitution of her lack of desirable femininity but at the same time offers herself possibilities for practice which appeared unavailable to Lucy in Scene 7 of Episode 5. Put simply, Avtar’s practices suggest that if she is debarred from desirable femininity anyway then she will withdraw the feminine submission and services which this femininity cites and requires. While Avtar is also trapped by her own and others’ discursive constitutions of Indianness/Asianness and desirable femininity, her practices offer momentary resistances to this, albeit resistances which might ultimately contribute to these discursive traps.
Chapter 4 showed how masculinities within the school are constituted through discursive chains which deploy oppositions of not-virgin-masculine-man/virgin-feminine-boy. The chapter emphasised the intersections of social class and learner identities in pupils’ constitutions of Bazas and Dir’y ‘ippies or Boffins. It also illustrated how these constitutions interact with race identities through the sub-cultural discourse of the Hierarchy within the Other. The interactions of race, heterosexuality and masculinity were demonstrated in Chapter 5 through the Schema of raced hetero-sex. Chapter 5 also detailed masculine practices which cite and inscribe oppositional and hierarchical relations to femininities. In addition, it showed how practices of masculinities constituted through sub-cultural discourses are often incongruous, if not incompatible, with official school values. Scenes 2 and 3 of Episode 5 detailed ways in which this incongruity is negotiated by some boys. This included an examination of a mundane moment in which Steve’s bodily practices endeavour tacitly to retain his masculine identity while minimising the performative force of the school’s constitution of his undesirable pupil identity. My analysis of Episode 8 explores the discursive limits of Steve’s masculinity. I suggest that while particular masculinities are desirable within the mainstream pupil sub-culture, within the discursive frame of official school values -- values cited and inscribed by both teachers and other pupils -- these masculinities become traps of excess.

**Episode 8: Excessive Masculinity?**

**Scene 1: Man / Boy**

*Discussion/Interview with STEVE, LUKE and MARCUS (all year 11, boys, White)*

DY: Are there any teachers you don’t like?
LUKE: Mr Mills, he picks on people.
DY: Who does he pick on?
LUKE: Steve, and other people.
STEVE: (interrupting) And he talks about your sexuality, your sex life, like the other week, he saw me out with my girlfriend and then brought it up in class.

LUKE: Yeah.

STEVE: He goes “What were you doing with her, it wasn't looking too good” and I just had to sit and take it. After the lesson I went and said to him, really politely, “Please don’t speak about my girlfriend in class” and I got shouted at again. You can’t win.

Scene 2: Little Wanker

_In the staffroom during a teaching period._ Mr Mills (teacher, man, White), who I see regularly around the school and exchange friendly “hellos” with, approaches me. We talk and it transpires that some content of my discussions with pupils has got back to him through a pupil in his tutor group. Mr Mills believes that he has been “slagged off” and, while I try to assure him that this is not the case, he conjectures on who it might be. He says: “I bet it was Steve. I hate that kid, he’s a little wanker, one of those really arrogant kids who thinks he doesn’t have to do any work. I bet it was him whose been slagging me off”. I deny this (of course), reiterating that he has not been “slagged off”.

Scene 3: Wanker

_Discussion/interview_ with RICHARD, ROB, JAMES, SIMON, CHRISTOPHER, DECLAN (all year 11, boys, White)

CHRISTOPHER: Steve tries to act bigger than he is.

ALL: Laugh.

DY: What?

RICHARD: (laughing) if you were, if Steve saw that!

(simultaneously) JAMES: (earnest) I won’t tell.

(simultaneously) SIMON: (laughing) Git!

DY: He’s What?

ROB: He’s a bit of a (hand-mimes the act of masturbation -- hand encircled to meet fingers and thumb with hand moved back and forth).

(simultaneously) ALL: (Laugh)

DY: I’ve put in my notes ‘wank sign’, OK?

RICHARD: (laughing) Put Declan next to it!

ALL: Laugh.

DY: We didn’t say that either so!

DY: I saw somebody else do it, do you disagree?

SIMON: (laughing) I don’t want my name right next to it.

(simultaneously) JAMES: (laughing) Don’t worry about it.

(simultaneously) ROB: It won’t get out.

CHRISTOPHER: He won’t touch us.

DY: This is strange cos, I don’t know what I thought, but you don’t get on with him, you don’t like him?

CHRISTOPHER: Often he appears without invitation and we just sort of ignore him or we don’t really mind but, he gets angry without any reason, or start being mean to us.

SIMON: He’s got a bad attitude.

CHRISTOPHER: Yeah, he’s got a big temper as well.

RICHARD: He cries a lot.

ROB: Yeah.

DY: Does he? Does he cry when people wind him up?

RICHARD: (laughing) No, not like crying with tears, he whines, kicks things.

The teacher’s comments⁴ reported to me in Scene 1 of Episode 8 can be seen as a challenge and threat to Steve’s masculinity as well as his girlfriend’s desirable femininity. Such comments are more than slurs, they have the potentially to
performatively constitute Steve and/or his girlfriend in particular ways. The teacher’s question suggests that there is something wrong with the girl and/or Steve’s bodily practices of masculinity. That is, the question potentially constitutes the girl as (for instance and citing an enduring injurious name) dog and Steve as sexually inept and, therefore, boy. In the teacher’s subsequent statement the “it” is significant. The “it” might refer to the girlfriend, potentially constituting her as lacking the desirable femininity to merit the designation ‘she’ -- again she is potentially constituted ‘dog’. If the “it” is taken to refer to Steve and his girlfriend’s practices more generally then it is, once again, a challenge to Steve’s masculine sexuality and potentially constitutive of ‘boy’. The obliqueness of the teacher’s “it” might expose his wariness of mounting a more direct challenge to Steve. Yet the “it” also broadens the potential reach of the teacher’s constituting linguistic practices. Furthermore, that the teacher’s comments are made in front of the whole class renders this a public humiliation and potentially constituting moment. The potentially performative force of the teacher’s comments is felt by Steve and recognised by Luke.

Steve’s immediate response (sitting and taking it) and his later private, polite request provisionally recuperate the teacher’s constitution. At the level of conscious awareness and intent it is likely that Steve felt injured/humiliated; knew (given the teacher/pupil hierarchy which frames the context) that an immediate, aggressive response would only lead him to be disciplined and hoped that a polite, private request might make him feel better (recuperate the teacher’s constitution of him/his girlfriend) and possibly guard against similar comments in the future. Steve’s response did both more and less than this. His response did not save him from being disciplined -- he was “shouted at again”. It did not make him feel better -- he felt “you can’t win”. I would suggest, however, that Steve’s private, polite request had substantial, if only provisional, performative force.
Steve’s private polite request cites and inscribes the quiet word, the man-to-man talk -- it is a particularly adult, masculine response. Through these practices Steve recuperates the teacher’s implicit ‘boy’ and constitutes himself as man. In turn, this constitution destabilises the teacher-adult-man/pupil-child-boy hierarchy which framed the teacher’s comments. Indeed, Steve’s man-to-man talk with the teacher might even momentarily transpose their locations within this hierarchy -- it is the teacher who has behaved inappropriately, or even childishly, and Steve who offers a gentle but clear correction. Steve’s tacit performative practices of man have not only been felicitous, they have exceeded and even threatened the teacher’s own. Steve has acted out of his place in discourse and in doing so he has risked the teacher’s place.

While Steve’s tacit performatives have some force, they do not enhance his standing in the teacher’s eyes. Rather, it is the provisional force of these performatives (which are undoubtedly tacitly deployed in a multitude of Steve’s apparently mundane practices) which make it imperative for the teacher (-adult-man) to recuperate these. One such recuperating moment is illustrated in Scene 2. It is the very force of Steve’s performatives which provoke the teacher’s potentially constituting tirade seen here. If Steve has acted out of his place in discourse (again) and in doing so risked the teacher’s place in discourse, then he must be constituted (again) in his proper place and thereby restore the teacher to his. The teacher’s comments to me are not simply vilifications of Steve. They are tacit attempts to recuperate Steve’s constitution of himself as man and the threat which this poses to the teacher-adult-man/pupil-child-boy hierarchy. By calling Steve “little wanker” and “arrogant” and suggesting that he “thinks he doesn’t have to do any work” the teacher provisionally constitutes Steve in particular ways.
As an injurious name which is both gendered and sexualised, “little wanker” might constitute Steve as a child-boy (feminine), as sexually incompetent and, by extension, as not-man. While the potentially performative force of “little” is relatively straightforward, the embedded meanings of the potential constitution “wanker” is more complex. Wanker cites and inscribes a discourse of masculinity in which the social and the sexual are closely entwined and constitutive of each other. While wanking is literally the act of masturbation, to call a man wanker can be seen as a tacit contestation of his masculinity as well as a suggestion of a (vilified) masturbatory act. In chapter 5 I discussed in detail the way in which sexual experience and activity -- not-virgin -- is crucial to the constitution of adult heterosexual masculinity -- man. In this discursive frame the true man does not (need to) masturbate because he has plentiful opportunities for coitus with (desirably feminine) women. The wanker, on the other hand, is socially and sexually inept, incapable of gaining sex with (intrinsically available) desirably feminine women and is forced to wank. I am not suggesting here that a given man engages in coitus or masturbation to the exclusion of the other. I am suggesting, however, that deployed as a injurious name in this discursive frame, coitus and masturbation are implicitly positioned as mutually exclusive. The potentially performative name wanker, then, simultaneously contests not-virgin, masculinity and man. The wanker lacks masculinity, indeed, he may well not be man at all.

In Scene 3 of the Episode the teacher’s “wanker” is echoed by a group of boys who are in the same tutor group as Steve. The boys’ practices within the Scene are potentially constituting of Steve. The boys’ practices also potentially constitute their own masculinity in opposition to Steve’s masculinity as well as femininity. These boys might be included in the category of unknown boys alluded to and discarded by the girls in Episode 4. They do not seem to fit the definitions of Dir’y ‘ippie, Baza or Boffin
discussed in Episode 2. These boys are neither strongly positively nor negatively educationally orientated. Rather, in Christopher's words, they endeavour to "stay out of trouble" with both teachers and peers. They are not notable for either high or low attainment. Their mundane bodily practices (postures, gestures) cite and inscribe discourses of masculine physical ableness and entitlement but do not reflect the aggressiveness of the hyper-masculinities discussed earlier. Their group identity seems to reflect traditional working class/lower middle class notions of masculine paternalism, group consensus and loyalty. These are ordinary boy-pupils.

The boys do not call Steve wanker verbally, rather they interpellate him wanker through a familiar hand-mime. That they do not say the word neither renders the interpellation ambiguous nor negates the potentially performative force of their naming. The bodily rather than linguistic interpellation might itself be seen as a practice of masculinity. To call names, to "bitch" or "gossip", has been denigrated by these boys as a girls' pass-time. To hand-mime wanker, itself a masculine doing (not saying), protects against the risk of (feminine) bitching/gossiping. A number of the boys express concern over the possibility of Steve discovering that they have called him wanker. While they assure one another of confidentiality, they also jokingly suggest that the comment should be attributed to a particular member of the group. Despite such joking, this is a group interpellation -- all the boys concur through repetitions of the hand mime, nods, laughter and assurances of safety. Nevertheless, the explicitness of this concurrence seems to vary according, perhaps, to each boy's degree of confidence in me and the rest of the group.

The boys also attempt to challenge Steve's masculinity by suggesting that he cries. An accusation of crying is intrinsically feminising within a discursive frame in which
women/girls cry and men/boys do not. Yet this feminisation is retracted when I query their meaning -- while my momentary belief in Steve's crying provides some pleasure to the boys (seen in their amusement), the boys' clarification of this (whining and kicking things) might act to reinforce Steve's hyper-masculinity.

The Scene is punctuated by moments of hilarity during which it is difficult to make out the boys’ verbal contributions to the discussion. This underlines the excitement which suffuses the Scene. The boys have taken a risk. As unknown boys they have transgressed the boundaries and order of the hierarchical pupil sub-culture by calling Steve wanker -- they have acted outside their place in discourse. Popular wisdom within the pupil sub-culture has it that Steve is a high status man who demands and deserves respect. This group of boys have taken the risk, which in their (constituting) understanding of Steve’s hyper-masculinity might include a real physical risk, of contesting this position and potentially constituting Steve as wanker.

Steve’s adult heterosexual masculinity is, in part, constituted through his refusal to defer to the authority of the school and his contestation of the givenness of the teacher/pupil hierarchy which school authority is constitutive of and constituted by. These boys have witnessed Steve’s constituting practices (such as those detailed in Scene 3 of Episode 5) a multitude of times. Unlike Steve, the boys in this group do defer to school authority, including the teacher/pupil hierarchy. This deference seems to be motivated by a practical desire for an easy life rather than an active approval of and belief in the school’s authority. Steve’s refusal exposes the boys’ own acquiescence and the lack of adult masculinity which this implies. The boys’ interpellation of Steve might expose a tacit recognition of the inferior status of their own masculinity within the pupil sub-culture and a concomitant envy of Steve’s masculinity and the status it cites and
inscribes. In calling Steve "wanker" it seems that these boys are differentiating between their own and Steve’s mode of masculinity. This is a differentiation which implicitly suggests that, contra to the discourse of the mainstream pupil sub-culture, their own masculinity is not that of the unknown boy but that of the mature, rational man. That is, it is more desirable than Steve’s.

Steve’s particular masculinity is successful in pupil sub-cultural and street/youth cultural discourses of desirable heterosexuality (man). Furthermore, this masculinity may well also prove to be an asset as Steve moves out of compulsory schooling and into educational, training or work contexts in which adult masculinity is not only valued but demanded. It appears possible, however, for such a masculinity to be too successful within the school context. It appears that both the teacher’s and the boys’ potentially performative interpellations of Steve are provoked by his excess of adult masculinity in the terms of the school’s institutional discourses, particularly the teacher-adult-man/pupil-child-boy hierarchical opposition. In the context of official school values Steve’s masculinity is a threat or challenge which must be recuperated -- Steve is entrapped by the very success of his adult, heterosexual masculinity.

The chains of ultra-desirable femininity and hyper-masculinity
In chapter 4 I examined the practices through which desirable working class heterosexual femininity is constituted in terms of a virgin/whore binary and working class heterosexual masculinity is constituted through a man/boy binary. The Hierarchy within the Other (Chapter 4) and the Schema of raced hetero-sex (Chapter 5) showed how these intersects with gendered discourse of race. Preceding Chapters also showed how pupils’ ongoing discursive practices act to constitute an exemplary femininity and a hyper-masculinity within the discourse of the pupil sub-culture. These discourses, and
the exemplary femininity and hyper-masculinity constituted through them, draw on, resonate with and inscribe broader discourses of youth/street culture. The risks and costs of these femininities and masculinities have been highlighted throughout these discussions. In addition, Avtar’s fatting and greedying of the White girl in the Episode 7 and the ‘excess’ of masculinity seen in Episode 8 suggest that desirable femininity and hyper-masculinity entail their own discursive traps.

Episode 9 highlights a powerful and enduring trap intrinsic to discursive constitutions of desirable femininity -- the necessary submission to heterosexual masculinity. That is, success within sub-cultural and broader discourses of desirable femininity entraps girls in a compulsory acquiescence to particular (if not all) masculinities. The implications of this trap for men is also evidenced in the Episode. Constituted through the man/woman hierarchy as necessarily having authority over the desirably feminine, masculinities -- and aggressive hyper-masculinity in particular-- are risked if this authority is not asserted and realised through potentially performative practices.

**Episode 9: Masculine rights, Feminine obligations**

JULIET (year 11, Mixed-race, girl) and SU LIN (year 11, Chinese, girl) are on Work Experience at a hairdressing salon in a small, upmarket parade of shops. DY has come to visit JULIET and SU LIN and they have told the owner of the salon that we will talk outside. They may have inferred that DY is their teacher. We sit on a bench in the pedestrian zone in front of the parade. On the opposite side of the parade a large office block is being renovated/decorated and a number of tradesmen are working on the outside of the building. While we are sitting talking one of these tradesmen (Black, approx. 18 years old), looks in our direction and makes a beckoning gesture. JULIET looks at the man and then looks away without acknowledging him. Later the man comes over stands in front of JULIET.

MAN: (with a strong Caribbean-South London accent) Come over here he wants to talk to you.
JULIET: (clipped) I'm busy at the moment.
MAN: (demanding, disbelieving) You're busy and you're sitting down?
JULIET: (clipped) Yeah, I'm talking to my friends.
MAN: Well come and talk to him.
JULIET: I'll come and talk to him tomorrow.
MAN: (dissatisfied, incredulous) Tomorrow?
JULIET: Yeah.
MAN: Who says he'll be here tomorrow?
JULIET: (more friendly) I'll come and speak to him later then.
MAN: When will you speak to him later?
Throughout this Episode, Juliet’s tone and language is reasonably dismissive of the man’s demands. She does not simply do as he asks or make firm promises that she will do at a given future moment. This dismissiveness is potentially constituting of Juliet’s desirable, or even ultra-desirable femininity. She is so desirable that, in her words, she is “playing hard to get” (a playing which also protects against the risk of “slag”). It seems, however, that Juliet is doing more than simply playing hard to get. She does not want to talk to this man or go and talk to his friend. Yet in the constituting discourse of femininity which frames this street/youth cultural milieu, a direct refusal would exceed the bounds of desirable femininity, be unintelligible and carry significant risk for Juliet’s identity. This is also seen in Su Lin’s “go away”, a refusal which is necessarily an aside.
On the one occasion that Juliet does literally refuse, this is a laughing refusal which seems unlikely to be either intended or expected to succeed.

Rather than refuse directly and risk her ultra-desirable femininity, Juliet deploys discursive practices of evasion and deferral. While this does not allow her to refuse, it does postpone her submission to the man’s demands while continuing to constitute her ultra-desirable femininity. Juliet’s evasion and deferral does not, however, extricate her from the man’s demand. Rather, her practices lead only to the repeated iteration of his demand. This is not a simple case of masculine force or coercion -- Juliet is entrapped by her own ultra-desirable femininity which is constituted as intrinsically available to the masculine. The implicit prohibition of her ‘no’ is cited and inscribed by her own practices of desirable femininity -- a femininity which is intrinsically submissive and accommodating, which has always already said ‘yes’.

Just as Juliet’s practices are constitutive of her ultra-desirable femininity, the man’s practices are constitutive of his hyper-masculinity. His discursive practices cite and inscribe active, entitled and aggressive masculinity. His phenotypic or physiognomic race as well as his mode of speech also contribute to his constitution at the pinnacle of the sub-cultural Hierarchy within the Other and Schema of raced hetero-sex. Just as Juliet’s ultra-desirable feminine identity prohibits a direct ‘no’, the man’s hyper-masculine identity prohibits him accepting, or even acknowledging, her inferred ‘no’. As access to and authority over the desirable feminine is a constitutive of his masculinity, to be refused is to risk the continued felicity of this constitution. The man is trapped by hyper-masculinity.
The discursive practices of Juliet and the man do not only contribute to the performative constitution of their own identities. They each contribute to the constitution of the Other’s respective masculinity or femininity as they cite and inscribe their own. The man’s demands are constitutive of Juliet’s ultra-desirable femininity. While she may not want to talk to him or his friend, to refuse directly is to interrupt a potentially constituting moment and give up the performative force of the men’s desire. The men desire her and her ultra-desirable femininity desires (requires) their desire. Furthermore, to refuse directly would also be to threaten the man’s hyper-masculinity, a masculinity which this desirable femininity needs for its continued constitution and intelligibility. To risk the identity of the Other is also to risk the identity of the self. To say or to hear ‘no’ is beyond the bounds of, and therefore risks, their respective identities. Neither Juliet nor the man can practice in ways other than those represented in the Episode if their respective femininity and masculinity is to be safeguarded. They are both trapped.

Ultimately Juliet calls on me to take responsibility for her unspoken refusal. When the man first comes over Juliet does not differentiate me from Su Lin, we are all “friends”. When the trap of her ultra-desirable femininity becomes evident through the man’s absolute persistence, however, I am redesignated. Juliet is no longer talking to her friends, she is “being interviewed”. Through Juliet’s nod and simple statement and Su Lin’s concurrence and identification of evidence, I am transformed from the barely noticed White girl lacking many of the adornments of desirable femininity into the professional (middle class) White woman. Juliet effects a shift from the discursive frame of the youth/street sub-culture to that of the broader hegemony as she deploys the dominance of Whiteness, middle class professionalism and adultness. In doing this she constitutes me as imbued with the necessary authority and status to refuse on her behalf and even against her wishes. That is, Juliet’s ultra-desirable femininity cannot refuse the
man so she trumps his hyper-masculinity by citing and inscribing my race, social class, professional status and age. This performative transformation is extremely effective, just as Juliet anticipated. Its efficacy can be seen in the man’s ‘Whitening’ of his accent and language to deliver his immediate, effusive apology as well as his rapid departure. I do not even need to politely ask him to go away. In my acceptance of the man’s apology I accept and contribute to Juliet’s citation and inscription.

In this way Juliet extricates herself from the trap of her ultra-desirable femininity without risking it -- she is able to deflect the refusal onto me. While this deflection underlines the limits of and thereby risks the man’s hyper-masculinity, it is not Juliet’s femininity which threatens it but my Whiteness, middle classness, professionalism and adultness. This is an exceptional extrication. My presence -- the availability of a repository for the refusal -- is out of the ordinary. On future occasions I or my equivalent will not be on hand to take responsibility for the refusal and protect Juliet’s continued constitution of ultra-desirable femininity. The submission to hyper-masculinity which Juliet is trapped into by her ultra-desirable femininity is only deferred.

**Black sub-cultural identities: (mythical) challenge or discursive entrapment?**

Throughout my preceding analysis pupils’ discourses of race have been shown to draw heavily on phenotypic and physiognomic ‘racial’ differences and to cite and inscribe notions of race identities as natural, distinct and essential. Within this discursive frame, pupils’ sub-cultural and broader youth/street cultural practices constitute an implicit Hierarchy within the Other and Schema of raced hetero-sex. In an inversion of White hegemony which simultaneously subjugates Asian race identities, these discursive practices position Black masculinities and femininities (differently) at the pinnacle of both the Hierarchy and Schema.
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that, within the pupils’ sub-cultural milieu of the school, Black pupils’ identities are constituted as synonymous with considerable status and prestige -- in this market these pupils have substantial discursive capital. This status and prestige, however, comes at considerable cost. Through my analysis of Episode 10 I will show how the apparently mundane bodily practice of leaving a room contributes to the constitution of Black pupils as intrinsically at odds with and a challenge to school authority. Furthermore, I will suggest that it is the very success of these pupils’ Black youth/street-cultural identities which entraps them within institutional and broader discourses of the Black challenge to authority (Gillborn 1990).

Over the course of this and an earlier study in Taylor (see Gillborn & Youdell 2000) a number of (predominantly but not exclusively) Black pupils within the year group complained of racism in relation to disciplinary matters. These pupils consider only a very small number of teachers to be explicitly racist. Nevertheless, they cite numerous examples of inter-pupil conflicts which have resulted in markedly harsher disciplinary outcomes for Black pupils than for pupils of other races. They also suggest that at a day-to-day level, Black pupils are consistently reprimanded for minor infringements of school rules (such as lateness, alleged rudeness, inappropriate behaviour), while such infringements by non-Black pupils go unnoticed and/or uncommented. That is, they see the school’s routine processes as racist. The pupils’ complaints might be understood, therefore, as assertions of institutional racism.

The notion of institutional racism offers important insights into how Black pupils can attend schools which appear to have developed and be implementing equal opportunities policies and still be significantly more likely to be excluded and less likely to attain benchmark GCSE grades than their counter-parts from other racial groups. Research
suggest that ‘teachers play an active (although usually unintentional) role in the processes that structure the educational opportunities of minority students.’ (Gillborn 1995:42). In the context of schooling, Gillborn suggests that institutional racism is ‘a dynamic and complex facet of school life ... in which routine institutional procedures and teachers’ expectations may be deeply implicated.’ (Gillborn 1995:36)\(^{12}\). In order to further understand the relationship between the school and Black pupils I build on Gillborn’s (1995) assertion that (predominantly White) teachers’ interactions with individual Black pupils are informed by generalised beliefs about Black pupils as a group. I also develop Gillborn’s (1990) argument that these teachers interpret the sub-cultural modes of Black pupils as a challenge to authority. I suggest that, in the terms of the ‘ideal client’ (Gillborn 1990, after Becker 1970) of contemporary schooling, Black pupils are far from ‘ideal’.

Pupils’ sub-cultural constitutions of Blackness and organisational constitutions of Blackness are deeply entwined. These constitutions appear somewhat circular, implicitly feeding into and contributing to each other. In the moment of practice in which the Black pupil constitutes him/herself within the terms of the pupil sub-culture, she/he simultaneously contributes to the organisational constitution of him/her as a challenge to authority. Likewise, in the moment of practice in which the school organisation constitutes the Black pupil as a challenge to authority it simultaneously contributes to the constitution of that pupils’ sub-cultural identity and the sub-culture as a whole. Given this circularity, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate out the organisational and sub-cultural discourses in play here. For clarity, however, I will begin by outlining my understanding of the performative potential of the organisational discourse of the Black challenge to authority before moving on to consider the performative practices of the pupils in Episode 10.
Episode 10: Black bodies walking

Year 11 Assembly.
The majority of the year group (predominantly White), group tutors (All White, predominantly women), and DY are present. The Head of Year (man, White) is addressing the year group.

The Head of Year pauses and looks out to the back of the assembled pupils. A few minutes later, looking in the same part of the audience, he calls out a short string of boys names and instructs them to pay attention. A minute or so later he stops mid-sentence and calls: “OK Daniel, outside my office please”. There is a pause. Daniel (boy, Black) slowly gets to his feet, shaking his head as he does so. He takes his time as he leaves the hall, there is a sway and spring to his gait. The Head of Year continues his address. Through the rest of the address the Head of Year send a further two Black boys from the same group to wait outside his office. Each boy exits in a similar manner to Daniel. As the final boy walks towards the door, the head of year continues to chastise him. The boy makes a short tutting sound, which is audible to those towards the front of the hall, as he walks out of the door.

The school’s discursive relationship with and constitution of Blackness

Blackness is censured within and through the discursive practices of the school organisation. This is not an overt or explicit censure, nor is it a censure of some innate or intrinsic Blackness. Rather it is an implicit censure of particular youth/street sub-cultural constitutions of Black identity. That is, at the level of the institution, discursive practices of Black youth/street culture are tacitly mediated through discourses which constitute these practices as inherently challenging to the school’s (or individual teacher’s) authority and, by extension, the broader White hegemony. This is not simply a rejection of the sub-cultural meanings of discursive practices of Blackness. It is a mediation which in rejecting these sub-cultural meanings constitutes particular (and denigrated) Black learner identities. The school’s constituting interpretations of Black sub-cultural identities as intrinsically anti-school and a challenge to authority are tacit. Furthermore, it is unlikely that any racialised or racist intent underpins the school’s constitutions of these pupils. Rather, the racialised and racist nature of these constitutions can be understood in terms of common-sense, everyday and institutional racism. Such racism operates through the historicity of unrecognised and unacknowledged organisational and common-sense discourses which cite and inscribe the biological and/or cultural
deficiency, hyper-sexuality, and aggressiveness of Blackness -- the Black challenge to White hegemony.

At the level of the body, the discourse of phenotypic or physiognomic races contributes to the ongoing constitution of Black pupils' learner identities. As an assemblage of pupils is subjected to the surveillent gaze of the teacher, the teacher's body-reflexive practices (Connell 1995) -- the mediation which renders gut reaction intelligible -- designate the Black pupil as 'trouble', a challenge to authority, and insist that he/she must be kept under closer surveillance in order to be subjected to greater control.

Black pupils' practices are mediated in similar ways. In the moment in which Black pupils' discursive practices cite and inscribe their Black sub-cultural identities and, therefore, their status and prestige within the pupil milieu, these practices are mediated through organisational and common-sense discourses of race. The sub-cultural and race identities of Black pupils are designated as inherently counter to the school organisation and culture. They are at once censured by the school organisation as undesirable and simultaneously deployed as 'proof' of this undesirability. In this way, it is the very cultural capital within the pupil milieu of Black sub-cultural identities which renders these identities undesirable at the level of the institution. Furthermore, in the moment of institutional censure and deployment, the school organisation also contributes to the ongoing constitution of these sub-cultural identities and the incommensurability of these with desirable learner identities. That is, Black pupils' sub-cultural identities interact with and contribute to the school's constituting discourses of learner identities. As pupils deploy discursive practices of sub-cultural identities and the school deploys discursive practices of learner identities, these interact to establish particular bounds of
intelligibility -- bounds in which Black sub-cultural identities are incommensurable with the desirable pupil.

The school's constituting mediations of Black learner identities can be seen in Episode 10. I am not aware that this group of Black boys is being more disruptive/less attentive than other pupils. The Head of Year stands looking out over an assembly of pupils seated on the hall floor. His position optimises the capacity of his surveillent gaze, this is a moment in the deployment of the technologies of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1991). These Black boys may or may not be being more disruptive/less attentive than other pupils, but any disturbance is minimal -- it is not apparent to me. Out of a largely White pupil population it is a group of Black boys who are subjected to particular and continued surveillance and, ultimately, ejected from the hall. This is not because the Head of Year is deliberately discriminating against Black boys. It is because those sedimented discourses through which the Head of Year classifies the pupil population ensure that these boys are identified as being a challenge to authority and, therefore, in need of greater surveillance and control.

This might seem to suggest that if Black pupils were able or prepared to jettison practices of Black sub-cultural identities then they would not be subjected to the surveillance and control of this tacit racism. Yet my preceding discussion of body-reflexive practices highlights the enduring performative force of discourses of phenotypes or physiognomies. In this discursive frame, these pupils will be recognised (constituted) as Black irrespective of their practices and this recognition will continue to mediated Black learner identities in the ways I have suggested. In addition, my analysis of Episode 7 suggested that, in relation to Asianness, such discourses make it all but impossible to jettison such race identities. Furthermore, a suggestion that it might be
Black pupils who should modify themselves in order to be constituted as desirable learners seems to return to the notion of cultural difference and *deficit* which the school’s constituting practices cite and inscribe.

**Black Pupils’ constitutions of self and relationships with the school**

The moment represented in Episode 10, like any other moment in the school, is not racially neutral. The school context is racialised. Pupils know, at least tacitly, that their Blackness renders them undesirable pupils. These Black pupils cannot have both a pro-school, positively oriented learner identity and a high status Black sub-cultural identity. This is not simply because these Black pupils refuse such duel identities. Rather it is because these identities are constituted, in part, through their incommensurability and opposition. In this context, the Black identities at stake are self-consciously racialised and politicised. Irrespective of the fact that these identities trap pupils in discourses of authentic races and the incommensurability of Blackness and desirable learners, these identities are (at least partially and tacitly) a response to and resistance of White hegemony. There is also a sense here that Black pupils’ sub-cultural identities, and the cost of these within the school context, play a significant role in the maintenance of their self-esteem or even their sense of self. These Black pupils cannot be ‘pro’ the very institution which they understand themselves to be subjugated by, and experience themselves to be discriminated against within, without substantial cost. While this does not mean they must be *anti*-school, the historicity embedded in the discourses through which these identities are constituted forecloses the viability of the simultaneity of Black-‘cool’ and pro-school. The ‘Uncle Tom’ which might be the key alternative identity available to these pupils does not promise a markedly better relationship with the school and insists on a markedly worse relationship with the self.
This analysis suggests that the school organisation and Black pupils are engaged in a complex series of performative constitutions of identities which present something of a double bind to Black pupils. Namely, if these pupils want the protection (Mac an Ghaill 1988) afforded by the status of a Black sub-cultural identity (and it is unsurprising that they do as the alternatives available appear extremely limited), then the cost of this is the concomitant constitution of an inherently challenging learner identity that must be at once censured and deployed by the school organisation.

This is illustrated by my analysis of the practices of the boys as they leave the hall in Episode 10. The way that the boys walk is much like the Black boys’ walk discussed by Gillbom (1990). Gillbom suggests that the walk is a cultural practice which is interpreted by the school as a challenge to authority which must be disciplined. As such, it becomes a racialised site for institutional disciplinary practices and Black boys’ contestation of this. The boys in Episode 10 are not disciplined for walking in this way, rather, they walk in this way after having been disciplined. Gillbom suggests that to walk in this way might allow Black pupils to ‘salvage some dignity’ (1990:28) in such disciplinary moments. Building on Gillbom’s analysis, I suggest that the meaning(s) of this walk, and the non-verbal utterance of the final boy, are constituted by and constitutive of both Black sub-cultural and learner identities. These bodily practices are not intrinsic markers of either Blackness or a Black challenge to school authority. It is the congealed institutional meanings designated, but not once and for all fixed, to these bodily practices which constitutes these practices as a challenge to school authority. These meanings are not inaugurate within the Episode, they are citational. They are imbued with an embedded historicity which the Head of Year and these Black boys as well as other staff and pupils are well aware of (at least tacitly). The performative force
leant to these bodily practices by this historicity as well as the institutional authority of the school constrains tightly the possibilities of alternative meanings within this context.

This is not to suggest that, at the level of the boys’ intent, they are simply leaving the room with some neutral gait which at once cites and forms their bodily habitus. While the boys’ gait may well be understood as a disposition of bodily habitus, in this context it is unlikely that it exceeds the boys’ conscious choice. It is important to consider the boys’ status within the pupil sub-culture as well as their audience in understanding the implications of the way they leave the room. These are “known” boys. They are positioned at the pinnacle of the Hierarchy within the Other and the Schema of raced hetero-sex. These sub-cultural identities are publicly threatened by their ejection from the hall -- high status masculinity is denied as these boys are provisionally constituted as pupil-child and forced to submit to the authority of the teacher-adult. The boys’ walk, and the final boy’s non-verbal utterance (constituted here as irreverently ‘kissed teeth’ but equally plausibly an expression of frustration at being ejected from the hall (again)?) might be understood as attempts to recuperate this provisional constitution. Their bodily practices cite and inscribe their sub-cultural identities, reasserting and confirming their status despite its denial by the school. As such, it is a further moment in the ongoing constitution of these identities. Yet as I have already shown, within the school’s institutional discourse these bodily citations and inscriptions of sub-cultural identity and status, and their recuperation of the ‘pupil-child’ which being ejected from the hall entails, simultaneously cite and inscribe a Black challenge to authority.

These boys are trapped in a double bind which is the effect of two realms of constituting discourses, that of the pupil and street/youth culture and that of the school organisation. I suggest that the boys know that such an exit from the hall will be understood by the
Head of Year, other staff and pupils as a challenge to the authority of the Head of Year and the school more generally. To walk out of the room in this manner, within the discursive frame which permeates and constrains this context, is a clearly recognised assertion of a Black sub-cultural identity which is constituted as oppositional to the school. That is, it is constitutive of a intolerable learner identity. Yet by walking out of the room in this way, and kissing teeth on exit in the case of the final boy, the boys are able to acquiesce to the Head of Year’s discipline while simultaneously displaying contempt for it and reasserting a high status sub-cultural identity. It seems likely that these boys are well aware of this double bind and actively choose to prioritise a Black sub-cultural identity. To do otherwise in this discursive frame would be to (hopelessly) attempt to constitute themselves as desirable learners. Such an attempted constitution would be hopeless because this is a learner identity which these boys are barred from through the school’s organisational discourses as well as their own discursive practices through which they challenge this constituting bar.

**Conclusion**

This analysis suggests that identities may well be constrained within mobile discursive chains which act to trap particular identities in ways which are counter to or at odds with the intent or desire of the individual subject. Constellations of identities are connected in and constituted through discursive chains which render some identities accessible and some identities inaccessible or even unintelligible. For example, the incommensurability of Indianness/Asianness and desirable femininity or Blackness and desirable learner. Identities are also linked within discursive chains of identification, discursive chains which are often embedded in hierarchical oppositions. These discursive chains act to trap subjects not only into one side of these oppositions but also into the hierarchical
opposition itself. For example sub-cultural hyper-masculinity/ultra-desirable femininity and teacher-adult-man/pupil-child-boy.

Of particular significance are the ways in which discursively embedded relationships between biographical or sub-cultural identities and learner identities trap pupils within particular learner identities which seem almost impossible to escape. For example, (particular) adult masculinities and Black sub-cultural identities appear to foreclose the possibility of desirable learner identities within institutional discourse. This offers further insight into the processes through which institutional racism impacts on the educational experiences and outcomes of Black pupils. It is particularly pertinent, therefore, for educators and policy makers attempting to enhance the educational participation and attainment of groups of pupils identified along biographical or sub-cultural lines.
Endnotes to Chapter 6. Identity Traps

1 The girls at the centre of this Episode, Mridula and Avtar, are Indian, as are the majority of South Asian pupils in the school. However, it is unclear whether, within the discourse of the pupil mainstream, distinctions between South Asian race identities are made or made consistently. Within the specific context of the Episode it may be that while Mridula and Avtar constitute themselves ‘Indian’, the other pupils constitute them in terms of a generic Asianness. This creates a tension over my use of terms for discussing the constituting practices within the Episode. In an attempt to navigate this tension I use both terms. This is not to assert a general interchangeability between Indian and Asian, but to try and reflect the discursive frames which seem to underpin the practices of Mridula and Avtar as well as the other pupils who appear in the Episode.

2 This is not to suggest that the feminine and Asian are mutually exclusive constituting discourse. The feminisation of Asian boys and, by extension, their lack of masculine and the impossibility of man within such a discursive frame has been documented (see Mac an Ghaill 1988, Gillborn 1990).

3 My repetition of this demonstrates the success of this unspoken performative and illustrates the potential performative force of silences.

4 It must be stressed that the teacher may or may not have spoken to Steve as reported. The ‘truth’ of the teacher’s words and intent, however, are less significant here than the way in which they are received. It is the meaning ascribed to the teachers words, Steve’s response to them and their location in a chain of signification that I am concerned with here.

5 Steve told me that he and his girlfriend were sitting on a park bench kissing when the teacher saw them.

6 The interview context may also be influential here. The boys have consented to have the discussion tape-recorded. While they trust me enough to practice the hand-mime, they may not trust me (or each other) enough to call Steve wanker in a way which can be captured by the tape-recorder.

7 In the moment in the field I thought she was smart, but having my race and class deployed -- and self-consciously watching their force -- offered an extremely painful theoretical insight.

8 The notion of a Black challenge to authority which I draw on throughout this analysis is borrowed from Gillborn’s (1990) school ethnography which was discussed in Chapter 3.

9 Analysis of exclusions from schools shows that Black pupils are significantly more likely to be excluded from school than pupils from other racial groups (Gillborn & Gipps 1996). This research has received substantial publicity and it is possible that these pupils are aware of this trend.

10 Mac an Ghaill’s (1988) definition of institutional racism was given in Chapter 1. Mac an Ghaill does not offer this as a definitive definition. Indeed, institutional racism has been defined in a number of ways. These definitions tend to share a concern with the effects of actions rather than their intent. Perhaps the most influential definition in the UK at present is that accepted by the UK Government and Metropolitan Police as a result of the Lawrence Inquiry (see Blair et al 1999).

11 See Gillborn & Gipps 1996 and Gillborn & Mirza (forthcoming) for a thorough analysis of Black pupils’ differential experiences and outcomes in UK schools.

This has been detailed elsewhere. For instance, Gillborn (1990) shows how Black pupils who distance themselves from the sorts of bodily practices discussed here do not avoid this exaggerated teacher surveillance and discipline.

It is perhaps useful to understand this in terms of Althusser’s subjection through the turn to the Law. If the school organisation is positioned as the Law which hails these pupils, the pupils turn through their desire for subjectivity (albeit also subjection) and through their tacit ‘guilt’ that they do, indeed, contest the subjugating authority of the Law. That the pupils turn at this hail is further explained by the fact that the subjectivity which proves their guilt in the school context is also the subjectivity which proves their value in other (sub-cultural) contexts. It may also be helpful to examine this in terms of Hegel’s discussion of lordship and bondage. Here the ‘self enslavement’ (Butler 1997b:31) of the servant is an effect of his/her recognition of his/her own ‘formative capacities’ and ‘passage from bondage to unhappy consciousness’ (Butler 1997b:42).
7. Resisting Identities

‘The word that wounds becomes an instrument of resistance in the redeployment that destroys the prior territory of its operation’ (Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 1997a:163).

Introduction

In the preceding chapters I have considered the potential performative force of pupils’ discursive practices. I have highlighted the ways in which multiple discourses interact within particular contexts or discursive markets to: confer varying degrees of status and prestige to identities; render some identities intelligible and others unintelligible; and trap subjects within the terms of particular identities.

Yet as I discussed in chapter 2, identities bounded by such discursive chains are not fully determined. The historicity of discourse and the citationality of performative constitutions means that some discourses and the identities constituted through them appear to be imbued with particular dominance and endurance. This dominance and endurance, however, is a discursive effect and it is this very citationality which insists that performatively constituted identities are provisional; risk infelicity; and might be resisted and resignified. A given identity is not *either* trapped *or* capable of resistance. Rather, the possibility of both entrapment and resistance is intrinsic to performative constitutions. Indeed, a discursive moment of entrapment may simultaneously open up particular possibilities for resistance. Such resistances have been evident throughout my analysis and will form the focus of this Chapter. I will examine the discursive practices which pupils deploy in order to resist performatively constituted identities and (potentially) reconstitute themselves *again differently*. I will seek to identify how particular constellations of biographical, sub-cultural and learner identities might act to
open up possibilities for such resistances. In doing this I will explore the possibilities and limits for a politics of performative resignification (Butler 1997a) within the practices of pupils.

Resisting marginality, reinscribing raced masculinity

Episode 11. Quoc Trinh's Doll

Science lesson, mixed ability. Vici (girl, White), Suzi (girl, White) and I are sitting together at a table which seats four. Vici points to the other side of the room where Quoc Trinh (boy, Vietnamese) is sitting on a stool next to a radiator. A small doll, approximately 6 centimetres tall, is lying on top of the radiator. Quoc Trinh appears to be drying the doll's hair. While the doll lies on the radiator, Quoc Trinh brushes its hair with miniature, pink plastic hairbrush. Vici calls to Quoc Trinh. Quoc Trinh looks over, smiles, picks up the doll and comes over to our table. Vici introduces me to Quoc Trinh saying "This is our friend Deb, she wanted to see your doll". Quoc Trinh smiles and hands the doll to me. The doll is made of moulded plastic and is the standard orange-pink of caucasian dolls. The doll has silver-white hair which is longer than the doll is tall. Pink and purple streaks have been drawn on the dolls hair with felt-tip pen. The doll has large blue eyes and a plump but narrow pink mouth formed in a pouting smile. The doll is wearing a short pink dress with a cheerleader style skirt. I hold the doll and inspect it saying "she's gorgeous". Quoc Trinh smiles and nods. Suzi laughingly suggests to Quoc Trinh that "you should give her plaits!". Again, Quoc Trinh smiles and nods and, putting the miniature hair brush down on the table, goes back to his seat on the other side of the room. Vici, Suzi and I laugh as we experiment with the doll's hair. We plait it and then coil the plait into a cone around the doll's head. Vici laughs and shakes her head as she points out that glitter make-up has been put on the doll's face. We stand the doll on the desk.

[...]

The teacher comes over to our table to check on progress and offer assistance. She notices the doll and says "Can you put her away?" before moving on to the next table.

[...]

Hieu (boy, Vietnamese), who has been sitting with Quoc Trinh comes over to our table. As he approaches he announces that "I've come for a visit!". He asks me "What year are you in?". Vici and Suzi laugh and, before I can respond, Vici introduces me. Quoc Trinh and Greg (boy, White) follow Hieu over to our table. Quoc Trinh picks up the doll and admires the hairstyle we have given her. He smiles and tells me "her name is Chelsea Page". The teacher approaches and the boys go back to their desk leaving Chelsea Page behind. Vici takes Chelsea Page and her hairbrush over to Quoc Trinh and speaks briefly with him. Vici returns and, in mock earnestness, assures Suzi and I that Quoc Trinh is very pleased with the hairstyle we have given to Chelsea Page.

[...]

Quoc Trinh picks up Chelsea page. Holding her horizontally above his head he moves her around in a flying motion and makes a "Chhhh" rocket/aeroplane sound. Vici and Suzi observe this and exchange glances, chuckling and shaking their heads.

Episode 11 represents the moment in which I was introduced to Quoc Trinh's constant companion -- the miniature doll Chelsea Page. Within authorised discourses of
masculinity, it is inappropriate, if not unintelligible, for a 16 year old boy to own a doll, keep it constantly with him, and regularly display and even celebrate this inside school. Yet this is exactly what Quoc Trinh does. In this discursive frame, the ‘abnormalness’, the ‘madness’, of Quoc Trinh’s practices are striking. Yet Quoc Trinh is not simply ‘abnormal’ or ‘mad’, rather, his practices act to simultaneously trouble the gendered and raced discourses which frame the pupil milieu and potentially reconstitute his identity.

Within the discourse of discrete and natural races which frames the pupil sub-culture, a Vietnamese race identity potentially constitutes, and is constituted through, Quoc Trinh’s lack of status within the Hierarchy within the Other as well as his lack of desirability within the Schema of raced hetero-sex. Similarly, the implicit exclusion of Asian pupils from both sides of the Dir’y ‘ippie / Shaza and Baza binary suggests that Quoc Trinh might be constituted as Other-Other within this minority pupil discourse of alternative marginality. Yet Quoc Trinh’s discursive practices appear to effect some degree of recuperation of these multiple marginalisations. Indeed, it seems that his practices may effect at least a partial and provisional reinscription of these marginalisations and, therefore, reconstitute him again differently.

Quoc Trinh’s practices seem to parody discursive constitutions both of the feminine and the feminised Asian man. His practices simultaneously transgress the bounds of appropriate and intelligible masculinity, itself constituted through the discursive opposition of masculine/feminine. Such parody and transgression might appear to pose significant (identity and physical) risk to Quoc Trinh. Yet if the masculinity of hegemonic discourse is understood to be denied Quoc Trinh through a discourse of the feminised Asian man, then transgressing the bounds of this does not risk Quoc Trinh’s masculinity -- it is a masculinity from which he is debarred. Furthermore, his parody of
the feminised Asian man can be seen to expose the performatively constituted nature of this raced (un)masculinity and, therefore, masculinities more broadly. Understood in this way, it seems that through his practices in relation to Chelsea Page, Quoc Trinh revels (at least tacitly) in breaching the taboos and exposing the constitutedness of a masculinity which was never available to him. In this sense, Quoc Trinh might be understood to mimic the marginalised race and gender identity ascribed to him by and through authorised pupil discourses and simultaneously redeploy these in order to reinscribe himself otherwise.

It is noteworthy that Quoc Trinh is one of the few non-White pupils in the year group who appears to align himself with the marginal group of pupils who name themselves Dir’y ‘ippies. While Chapter 4 showed that a Dir’y ‘ippie identity was synonymous with and masked a White middle class identity, it seems that the emphasis placed on alternaeity, particularly in respect to gender/sexuality, by these pupils renders Quoc Trinh’s practices potentially constitutive of a Dir’y ‘ippie identity. While Quoc Trinh is most closely aligned with Dir’y ‘ippies, he is also popular with many known girls. On subsequent occasions I saw a number of girls ask to play with Chelsea Page and, while Quoc Trinh did not always consent, the doll was frequently passed between groups of girls during lessons. In this way Quoc Trinh’s practices can be seen to offer him a degree of social access to girls which might not usually be open to him.

This does not mean, however, that his practices somehow create a fissure within the Schema of raced hetero-sex. While Quoc Trinh’s practices seems to facilitate his friendships with girls, they do not appear to constitute him as a legitimate sexual object. Indeed, it is possible to suggest that while his parody of the feminised Asian (not-)man is troubling, it is also open to a recuperation which would insist that Quoc Trinh (and
Chelsea Page) is confirmation of the femininity with which Asian (un)masculinity is inscribed within discourses of White hegemony. That is, in this discursive frame Quoc Trinh practices -- playing with a doll -- are explained by and constitutive of his lack of masculinity, a lack which is constituted as a prior and natural fact of Asianness and which positions Quoc Trinh as a legitimate friend but an impossible sexual object.

While Quoc Trinh’s practices transgress gender, sexual and racial boundaries and clearly trouble heterosexual masculinity and femininity, he does not appear to be explicitly censured for this. In exploring possible reasons for this apparent absence of censure it is useful to consider the ways in which Quoc Trinh’s practices might be recuperated through the authorised discourses of the mainstream pupil sub-culture.

Quoc Trinh is not (could not be) a known boy. Nor is he like the White unknown boys who called Steve ‘wanker’ in Episode 8 and, in doing so, asserted the superior value of their own masculinity. While Quoc Trinh appears to be almost universally popular amongst girls, this is not the case with boys. It seems that a small number of boys -- Vietnamese and Dir’y ‘ippie -- are friends with Quoc Trinh and, as seen in the Episode, ride on the wave of his access to girls. These boys’ practices in the Episode seem to deploy a strategy of proximity to, approval of and difference from Quoc Trinh. As such, these boys benefit from Quoc Trinh’s practices without risking their own identities.

Given the destabilising potential of Quoc Trinh’s practices, it might be reasonable to expect those boys with the greatest investment in masculinity -- the known boys -- to explicitly censure Quoc Trinh. Yet known boys simply ignore Quoc Trinh. While such silence can, as argued in earlier chapters, act to performatively interpellate the subject in
particular ways, the question of why Quoc Trinh is not explicitly censured for this behaviour seems to press on this analysis.

Within popular discourse, dolls are for children and, therefore, playing with dolls is childish. As such, Quoc Trinh potentially and inadvertently constitutes himself as infantile and, simultaneously, runs the risk of his potential reinscription being recuperated through discourses which cite and inscribe the adult-masculine/child-feminine binary. If Quoc Trinh’s practices are recuperable through discourses which cite the feminine child, the intrinsic adultness of man and, therefore, the man/boy binary, it may be possible that his practices are not explicitly challenged, censured or punished because he is constituted within this discursive frame as so feminine as to pose no threat to masculinity. It may be possible that by being ‘proof’ that Quoc Trinh is a child (boy), his practices are simultaneously ‘proof’ that the known boys are adult (man). Such an infantilising and feminising recuperation may also insist that the known boys’ masculinities would be risked if they were to censure, through verbal or physical violence, Quoc Trinh’s practices. That is, the recuperation of Quoc Trinh’s practices involves an implicit citation and inscription of a discourse of paternal masculinity in which the ‘real’ man is risked if he hits the woman, child or ‘sissy’. This would suggest that the known boys do not explicitly censure Quoc Trinh’s practices in a tacit effort to protect against the potential threat to masculinity. Furthermore, it may be that Quoc Trinh’s practices are so unintelligible within the discursive frames which bound identity constitutions within this context that Quoc Trinh is inaccessible to the known boys. That is, Quoc Trinh may constitute his place in this discourse as no place. He may refuse to respond to/be subjected by the constituting hail of masculinity and, in so doing, sacrifice his subjecthood within this discursive frame.
It is interesting to compare Quoc Trinh’s practices with those of Manny, another boy in the year group. While cooking alone during a Food Technology lesson, Manny wandered/danced around his kitchen area singing “I’m a Barbie girl, in a Barbie world...” -- the chorus to the Aqua pop song which was in the charts during 1998. As he sang he imitated the accent, pitch and intonation of the woman singer in the group. Manny’s practices, like Quoc Trinh’s, breach the boundaries of the masculine/feminine binary and might be expected to be met with ridicule and censure. Yet while known boys firmly ignore Quoc Trinh, they laughingly encourage Manny’s song and dance.

This reception might be explained in part through Manny’s formal educational classification of special educational needs (SEN) or emotional and behavioural difficulties (EBD). Manny often behaves ‘unusually’, he appears to have particular difficulties with social interaction and, while not actively excluded by pupils, he is socially isolated within the year group. It seems that as the disciplinary technologies of the school formally categorise Manny as SEN/EBD and the pupils designate him the ‘fool’, the potentially disruptive performative force of his practices is minimised. If Manny is constituted as having no practical sense of appropriate bodily dispositions within the masculine/feminine binary then his practices can be disregarded -- Manny ‘doesn’t know any better’. In this discursive frame Manny cites and inscribes his own SEN/EBD or ‘fool’ designation and in doing so his practices are rendered so unintelligible that they pose no threat and have no broader implications.

Despite the various possible recuperations of Quoc Trinh’s practices, these retain the potential to trouble mainstream discourses of race, gender and sexuality and reconstitute Quoc Trinh’s marginalised identity. Indeed, these practices may well be simultaneously recuperable and reconstituting. Quoc Trinh undoubtedly has a practical sense of the
implications and potential impact of his practices. Conversely, Manny seems to sing because he wants to and anticipates that he will be encouraged to do so. Nevertheless, Manny’s song is an eruption within masculinity. While his SEN/EBD or ‘fool’ designation means that this masculinity is unavailable to him and constrains the performative reach of his practices, this does not completely negate the effect of this performative eruption. A shadow of these practices’ gender troubling remains.

Resisting femininity, reinscribing ‘Geeza-girl’

In a number of the preceding Episodes, Molly has been involved in performatively constituting practices. She was involved in the policing of ‘Coolie’ (Episode 3); the designation of hierarchically organised masculinities (Episode 4); and the ongoing constitution of the virgin/whore binary of heterosexual femininity (Episode 4). At a number of points in these Episodes Molly appeared to deviate from the authorised discourses of the pupil milieu. She sought to explain Rachel’s desire for a Coolie race identity; she was reluctant to concur with the other girls’ approval of the “rude” boys, suggesting instead that all boys are “filth”; and sought to ‘warn’ Nicola of the hazards inherent in attempting to constitute an acceptable not-virgin femininity. It seems from these Episodes that Molly may not accept, cite and inscribe in a straight forward way the discourses of the mainstream pupil sub-culture.

Episode 12: Geeza-girl

Scene 1: Geeza, Sylvester Stallone, Brick Shit House

During a discussion/interview with RICHARD, ROB, JAMES, SIMON, CHRISTOPHER, DECLAN (year 11 boys, White).

JAMES: Molly is like a ...
RICHARD: (interrupting) Geeza!
ALL: (laugh).
DY: Molly’s what?
JAMES: (laughing) A geeza!
SIMON: (laughing and curving his hands out over the front of his chest) she's built like a brick shit house!
ALL: (laugh hysterically).
RICHARD: (laughing) She's built like Sylvester Stallone!
ALL: (laugh).
DY: When you said “she's built like a brick shit house”, the actions were like you were talking about breasts.
ALL: (laugh).
JAMES: (laughing) She has got so much breast.
(simultaneously) CHRISTOPHER: I would never argue with her, if she want something done I'd do it.
(simultaneously) ALL: (laughing uncontrollably).
DY: Sorry, was I not suppose to point that out?
SIMON: (laughing) No, I mean she's like, big like (juts elbows out to the side, clenches fists in classic 'muscle-man' pose).
ALL: (interrupting, laugh hysterically).
DY: You said she's built like a brick shit house and went...
SIMON: (Interrupting and laughing so hard that he can barely speak) No, I meant, I meant to go like...
(repeats 'muscle-man' pose).
ROB: She's a footballer, her legs are just like... (laughing so hard that he can barely speak) ginormous, they make us look puny!
CHRISTOPHER: She plays football a lot, and when she takes a shoot everyone just like jumps out of the way, dives for cover!
DY: Does she play football with you lot?
JAMES: Used to.
RICHARD: She used to.
CHRISTOPHER: When she does, she was such a great player.
DY: Why doesn't she play football with you anymore?
CHRISTOPHER: She's hanging around with the girls more.
SIMON: She's realised she's not a boy.
RICHARD: She's turned more feminine.
[...]
CHRISTOPHER: As long as your not in goal when she shoots.
ALL: (laugh).
CHRISTOPHER: (laughing) Feel sorry for whoever is.
RICHARD: She is a bit dangerous.
ROB: Yeah I know, I used to get...
RICHARD: (interrupted) Jump out the way.
CHRISTOPHER: Just kick the ball for your life.
ROB: Yeah Molly, oh dear, 'cos I got booted by the ball in the groin area once, it really hurt.
DY: Off Molly's shot?
ROB: Molly's shot.

Scene 2: Geeza Girl

During a discussion/interview with MOLLY and NICOLA (Year 11 girls, White), MOLLY takes her school diary out of her bag and offers it to DY to look at. DY flicks through to the ‘Commendations’ section at the back.

DY: (reading aloud from MOLLY’S school diary) Commendations: “For being very masculine and for being a dedicated geeza, well done”.
MOLLY: (indicating NICOLA) That was her. She calls me that all the time, look: (indicating several other instances in her school diary and reading aloud) “geeza”.
(simultaneously) Nicola: (laughs)
DY: How do you feel about that?
MOLLY: (still reading) “for being a school bod and for being the biggest and best geeza-girl”.
DY: How do you feel about being called that?
MOLLY: It doesn’t really bother me, it doesn’t really bother me.
DY: Do they think you should be more girly?
MOLLY: But then I wouldn’t be me would I? They do say stuff about wearing girls clothes, I do out of school, but not in school.
NICOLA: (shrieking) I’ve seen her wearing her bridesmaid’s dress!
MOLLY: See, it's a big thing.

(simultaneously) NICOLA: (laughs)

NICOLA: It depends on if she likes the attention or not. Even what Molly wears, she don't care what anyone else says.

MOLLY: Just cos I play football and, OK, I'm kinda big, but I don't get it, they've been doing it for years now, 5 years now, all the boys used to do it really bad.

NICOLA: (laughing) But you shut em up!

MOLLY: No, but they just don't give a toss anymore. But I don't care. She still calls me it.

Scene 3: Restraining, embracing

Standing in a ragged line in the corridor outside the tutor room before a PHSE lesson. Molly walks up behind Nicola and wraps her arms around her upper torso restraining her arms. Without looking around to see the face of her assailant, Nicola giggles and exclaims: "Molly!". Molly laughs and loosens her hold, allowing Nicola to almost wriggle free. Nicola turns so that she is sideways on to Molly and tries to take hold of Molly's wrists. Nicola giggles, squeals and exclaims: "Molly!" and Molly chuckles. They continue to grapple in this way until Molly again takes hold of Nicola from behind and laughs. Nicola lets her arms drop to her sides. They stand in this restraining embrace for a few moments. As Molly lets go they both smile and laugh.

The Scenes within Episode 12 represent three moments in the constitution of Molly's own identity. My analysis suggests that there is considerable ambiguity amongst pupils over the viability and legitimacy of Molly's (un)femininity and that this identity is subject to ongoing inscription, contestation, and reinscription. Within the Episode, it seems that Molly's constituting practices of her own identity trouble authorised and enduring constitutions of masculinity and femininity as well as their complementary opposition and natural discreteness. Through these practices it appears that Molly is able to reinscribe the subjugated identity which is (tentatively and potentially) assigned to her by the unknown boys. In so doing, her practices appear to render legitimate (at least partially and provisionally) a gender identity which is implicitly proscribed against within the authorised pupil discourse.

In Scene 1 the boys deploy a series names which are potentially constitutive of Molly. The boys name Molly "Geeza" and "Sylvester Stallone", she is "built like a brick shit house", her legs are "ginormous" and make these boys "look puny". These are not
neutral namings. Within authorised discourse, biological sex -- male/female -- is constituted as a natural opposition which exists in a linear and causal relationship with gender -- masculinity/femininity. In the discursive frame of sex-gender¹, masculinity is active and physically powerful while femininity is passive and physically delicate. The boys’ linguistic and bodily practices appear to constitute Molly’s physical masculinity. Yet within the discursive frame of sex-gender Molly -- a girl -- cannot be masculine. These namings of Molly are impossible constitutions.

Reflecting the commendation seen in Episode 4, the boys also assert Molly’s physical sex -- her breasts, her realisation that she “isn’t a boy” -- a sex which forecloses her masculinity and demands her femininity. The boys hilarity throughout the Scene suggests that they have a practical sense of the impossibility of Molly’s masculinity. Rather than being constitutive of Molly’s masculinity, the boys practices appear as injurious namings which potentially constitute Molly’s lack of, unacceptable, or illegitimate femininity. Molly cannot be man or boy, but she is not appropriately girl or woman either and she is subject to censure for this.

Yet there is a degree of ambiguity within the boys’ constituting censure of Molly. She is introduced into the discussion through being identified as a girl with whom the boys have a preferred friendship. Furthermore, and citing the discourse of the tomboy, the boys are respectful of Molly’s footballing skills. Yet these concessions are not straightforward. Molly is identified as a friend but is accused of inconsistency within this friendship. While her football skills are praised, it seems that she is denigrated for being too good -- a denigration which seems unlikely to be applied to a boy. Her football skills deserve respect but are simultaneously deployed in the ongoing constitution of her unacceptable femininity. Molly’s masculinity is also a potential threat to the boys’ own -
on the football field and in thigh circumferences Molly’s masculinity exceeds the boys own. This is a threat which appears to be protected against by simultaneously asserting Molly’s masculinity, the impossibility of this and, therefore, transforming this into an unacceptable lack of femininity. In short, Molly has acted outside her place in discourse and implicitly threatened the boys’ place. The boys’ discursive practices tacitly attempt to recuperate this and return Molly to her ‘proper’ place.

However, the recuperating effect of the boys’ discursive practices are by no means guaranteed. Indeed, it seems that the boys are in something of a quandary concerning Molly. Within the boys’ discourse Molly is potentially constituted as at once masculine and feminine -- an identity which the authorised discourse suggests is an impossibility and which the boys’ tacitly attempt to disavow. Is it possible that Molly’s discursive practices effect an intelligible identity which is somewhere between, straddling or outside the man-masculine/woman-feminine binary? I will consider this possibility as I examine Scenes 2 and 3 of Episode 12.

In Scene 2 the ‘commendations’ that pupils have written in Molly’s school diary-- their textual performative interpellations -- are repeated and discussed. Molly has been called -- “masculine”, “geeza”, “school bod”, “geeza-girl”. The boys’ namings in Scene 1, then, are not isolated potential constitutions. Rather, Molly’s (un)femininity-/masculinity is constituted through citational chains which suffuse the pupil milieu and which are reported to have endured throughout her time in the school. Within the Scene it appears that these are names which have injured Molly in the past and, despite her assertion that she is “not bothered”, continue to at least confuse her. Yet Molly is not interpellated in these ways by pupils with whom she has conflictual relationships. The boys identify
Molly as a friend and Nicola, who is the author of many of the 'commendations' being discussed in Scene 2, has a close friendship with Molly.

In Scene 1 the boys offer Molly’s body -- her stature, strength and physical skill -- as ‘evidence’ of her (un)femininity-/masculinity. In Scene 2 it appears that Molly is well aware that playing football and being “kinda big”\(^3\) are deployed by other pupils as ‘evidence’ of her (un)femininity-/masculinity. Within popular discourse football is constituted as a pursuit of boys and men. This is a constitution which cites and inscribes discourses of physical strength and mastery and is, in turn, constitutive of masculinity.

In this discursive frame physical size is also sexed and gendered. Constituted by and constitutive of the man/woman binary, man is physically big (and strong) while woman is physically small (and delicate).

In Scene 2 the way that Molly dresses is added to the bodily ‘evidence’ of her (un)femininity-/masculinity. Molly suggests that other pupils think she should wear “girls’ clothes”, a suggestion which cites and inscribes clothing as intrinsically differentiated by gender and which infers that, in the context of this intrinsic differentiation, Molly wears ‘boys’ clothes\(^4\). Molly seems to be in a double bind here. Her usual clothes are deployed as (constituting) evidence of her (un)femininity-/masculinity. Yet when these clothes are contrasted with that most feminine of garments -- the bridesmaid dress -- this is worthy of comment and a source of hilarity for Nicola. Molly’s assertion that she “wouldn’t be me” if she dressed otherwise infers that she and other pupils have a practical sense of the potential performative force of such bodily practices. Even as Molly is pressurised to wear “girls’ clothes”, then, the comment and hilarity when she does so highlights the endurance of Molly’s bodily performatives and the unintelligibility of doing/being otherwise. In turn, this suggests that girls’ clothes
might not be appropriate attire for Molly -- femininity might not be her ‘proper’ place after all. Indeed, the contradiction and ambiguity around how Molly ‘should’ dress might suggest that her identity is constituted through and constitutive of a possible fissure within the discourse of the sex-gender binary.

Molly does not concede these potentially performative constitutions of her (un)femininity-/masculinity, asserting “I don’t get it”. Throughout my analysis in this and preceding chapters I have demonstrated the sedimentation and endurance of sex-gender discourses within the pupil milieu. While Molly might not adhere to these discursive imperatives, it is almost certain that she is well aware of them. Indeed, the discussion represented in Scene 2 is itself illustrative of Molly’s awareness. It is possible, however, that Molly does not “get” quite how she transgresses these imperatives. I have noted that her body and mode or dress are not markedly different from those of many other girls. Indeed, apart from her exceptional footballing skill, Molly’s ‘difference’ seems almost intangible. Perhaps it is subtle and almost inscrutable ‘differences’ in the dispositions of her discursively formed and formative bodily habitus, in her body-reflexive practices, which underpin this (un)femininity-/masculinity but which are made accessible and intelligible by being attributed to her footballing, her stature and her clothes.

When Nicola claims that Molly “don’t care” what she is called by the boys and asserts that Molly has “shut them up” (inferring actual or threatened physical violence) she (gleefully) contributes to the ongoing constitution of Molly’s (un)femininity-/masculinity. Nicola implicitly cites and inscribes authorised discourses of binary sex-gender in which the absence of emotional sensitivity to name calling and the capacity for physical violence are positioned as masculine. But as I discussed earlier, the discourse of
sex-gender proscribes the possibility of Molly being masculine. Nevertheless, Nicola is identified here as the author (but not the originator) of the name “Geeza-girl” -- a name which appears to have some enduring performative force. Geeza-girl is only one of a number of names deployed to interpellate Molly. I will consider this name in some detail here as it seems to offer particular insight into the potential reconstitution of Molly.

Geeza-girl is potentially constitutive of Molly’s (un)femininity-/masculinity. At the same time, however, geeza and girl are incommensurable within the authorised discourse which positions geeza of one side of the sex-gender binary and girl on the other side. Yet geeza does not supersede girl here. Rather Nicola hyphenates these terms and deploys this sutured geeza and girl to interpellate a single identity (rather than duel, oppositional identities). This suggests that these terms might not be as mutually exclusive as they appear within authorised discourse. Through the interpellation of Molly as “Geeza-girl” a fissure within the sex-gender binary becomes evident. If Molly can be (is) Geeza-girl, then perhaps the relationship between sex and gender is not quite as linear and causal as it appears, and perhaps female sex and masculine gender are not as incommensurable as authorised discourse constitutes them as being. Furthermore, if Molly can be (is) Geeza-Girl then perhaps the identities of other pupils, and subjects more broadly, can transgress the sex-gender binary too.

In Scene 2, as in Scene 1, Molly is performatively interpellated in ways which are injurious and constitute her as (un)feminine-/masculine. But in doing so these performative names simultaneously problematise the givenness of the binary oppositions which Molly’s identity is constituted as having transgressed, exceeded or troubled. Geeza-girl is constituted through and constitutive of a fissure in the authorised discourse of binary sex-gender.
Scene 3 represents a sequence of bodily practices which contribute to the constitution of Molly as Geeza-girl. These practices also trouble the sex-gender binary while simultaneously contributing to the constitution of masculinity and femininity as discreet, oppositional and complementary. My analysis of Episode 5, Scene 5 suggested that physical contact between girls is commonplace within the pupil sub-culture. Yet the physical contact between Molly and Nicola represented in Scene 3 seems to diverge from the everyday bodily practices of girls within the school. Physical contact between girls tends to cite and inscribe discourses of the cohesive and consensual nature of girls’ friendships as well as feminine bodily practices of caring, comforting and nurturing. Molly and Nicola’s bodily practices in Scene 3, however, are reminiscent of the bodily practices of William and Pipa in Episode 5, Scene 6 and Owen and Lucy in Episode 5, Scene 7. In Chapter 6 I suggested that these bodily practices are suffused with (hetero-)sexual content and constitutive of (heterosexual) masculinity and femininity.

The bodily practices of Molly and Nicola in Scene 3 can be understood in similar ways. It seems that Molly’s bodily practices cite and inscribe her physical strength and mastery -- her masculinity. On the other hand, Nicola’s bodily practices cite and inscribe her physical weakness and passivity as well as her (half-hearted/feigned) resistance to this masculine strength and mastery -- her desirable (virgin) femininity. As such, Molly and Nicola’s bodily practices cite and inscribe heterosexual masculinity and femininity and the oppositional relationship between these at the same time as they trouble the givenness of masculinity and femininity and their correspondence to male and female.

My analysis of Episode 12 suggests that Molly is constituted in a way which authorised discourse suggests ‘should’ be unintelligible but which, nevertheless, appears viable within this context. Through censure and attempted recuperations, pupils attempt tacitly
to return Molly to her ‘proper’ place in discourse -- femininity. Yet, these practices often seem to misfire and contribute to, rather than disavow, the ongoing constitution of Molly as intelligibly (un)feminine-/masculine. Indeed, in this specific context and in relation to this specific pupil, this (un)femininity-/masculinity appears to have such enduring performative force that it appears to have become Molly’s ‘proper’ place. Molly’s identity exceeds authorised femininity, so much so that it seems that it is within these terms that Molly might be rendered an unintelligible subject. The discursive practices represented within the Episode appear to expropriate masculinity and constitute an intelligible unfemininity. In doing this, the constitutedness of masculinity and femininity; binary sex; binary gender; and the linear and causal relationships between sex and gender are exposed. In the discursive frame of the pupil milieu Molly causes sex-gender trouble.

Performativé performances: Leaving Day and National Record of Achievement Day

A number of practices which might be understood as resistant, or even moments in a politics of performatif resignification/reinscription, were found within the contexts of two events which mark the end of compulsory schooling for year 11 pupils in Taylor Comprehensive. These events are ‘Leaving Day’ and ‘National Record of Achievement Day’ (NRA Day). It is perhaps unsurprising that events (rituals) which mark formally the end of compulsory schooling become contexts in which schooled identities are resisted. Indeed, it might seem that by their very nature these events will mark a rupture with or end to schooled identities. Yet it must not be assumed that pupils moving out of compulsory schooling will have either the desire or discursive capital to jettison schooled identities. While in some instances these events seem to be taken up as arena in which (particular) hegemonic identities can be resisted and reinscribed, in other
instances they appeared as moments of further citation and elaboration of (particular) schooled identities. As I have argued in the preceding chapters, identities, and the discourses through which they are inscribed, cannot be simply discarded and/or reinscribed. Rather, there are likely to be significant continuities between the many identities constituted within the school and those constituted across broader contexts and beyond compulsory schooling.

Episode 13 and Scene 2 of Episode 14 draw on pupils’ practices in the context of Leaving Day and NRA Day. In order to make sense of these identity practices it is necessary to understand the contexts in which they were situated. For this reason I will sketch an outline of the nature, purposes and activities involved in Leaving Day and NRA Day.

*Leaving Day*

Leaving Day is the day on which year 11 pupils attend their final timetabled lessons of compulsory schooling prior to the ‘study break’ which precedes the return of most pupils to sit at least some GCSE examinations. That is, it is their final day as fully fledged pupils.

On the morning of ‘Leaving Day’ pupils are expected to attend lessons as usual. During the period which would usually cover the lunch break and part of the afternoon teaching session, pupils, form tutors and the head of year gather for a series of activities. First, there is a show in the Drama Studio where a number of pupils and staff entertain the assembled group with songs, dances, poems, and skits. The group then moves to a sports field. A photograph of the year group is taken and then the tutor groups have a mini inter-tutor group sports contest. The mood is informal and celebratory, pupils gather in
groups hugging, crying, joking, taking photos, and writing on school t-shirts and sweatshirts (as mentioned in Chapter 5). There is a sense of this being the pupils' time, of the event being captured by/surrendered to the pupils. It also seems that the teacher/pupil hierarchy is blurred -- while not equalised, the distance between the status of teacher and (almost) ex-pupil seems to be narrowed.

**NRA Day**

NRA Day is the formal ceremony at which pupils are presented with their ‘National Record of Achievement’. Over the course of Years 10 and 11 pupils in Taylor, and their peers in schools across the UK, spent time preparing an individual National Record of Achievement (NRA). These comprise a personal statement from the pupil, examples of work from each subject area; statements from subject teachers; certificates of commendation for effort, behaviour and attainment; details of extra curricular activities and attainments; and a formal statement of the pupil’s predicted GCSE grades (see Gillborn and Youdell 2000 for a discussion of the implications of such predictions). Taylor Comprehensive provides each pupil with a presentation folder, the front of which carries the school crest embossed in gold, in which their NRA is displayed⁶.

The NRA Day ceremony takes place late in the Summer Term, shortly after the final GCSE examinations have been taken but prior to the publication of GCSE results. Parents, teachers and year 11 (ex-)pupils assemble in the school’s main hall. Speeches are made, prizes in each subject are announced, each pupil is presented with their NRA folder and some teachers and pupils provide musical entertainment⁷. After the event pupils are invited to join their form teacher for a glass of ‘champagne’ (reduced alcohol sparkling wine). A cold buffet is also provided for all those who attend. The event begins late in the morning and runs through to mid afternoon.
Resisting the Black challenge to White Hegemony, reinscribing Blackness

In chapters 4 and 5 I detailed the ways in which pupils’ discursive practices contribute to the ongoing constitution of raced identities. I showed how a Hierarchy within the Other and Schema of raced hetero-sex, with Black pupils at the pinnacle of both, are implicitly cited and inscribed through these practices. In Chapter 6 I demonstrated the interaction between constitutions of Black sub-cultural identities and institutional constitutions of a Black challenge to White hegemony. I suggested that the interaction between these discursive frames constitutes Black pupils in particular ways. Specifically, the Black sub-cultural identities which imbue Black pupils with particular status and prestige within the pupil milieu are the very identities which are deployed within institutional discourse as ‘evidence’ of the Black challenge to authority. In this discursive frame Black sub-cultural identities are constituted as incommensurable with the ideal, or even tolerable, client of schooling.

This does not mean, however, that all Black pupils are inevitably banished to an educational wasteland. As I have stressed throughout my analysis, the risk of failure and misfire as well as the possibility of recuperation or reinscription are intrinsic to such constitutions. My analysis of Episode 13 examines these possibilities. Drawing on the notion of resistance within accommodation (Mac an Ghaill 1988) I suggest that through their practices within Leaving Day and NRA day a group of Black girls can be seen to assert the legitimacy of Black sub-cultural identities; resist the constitution of these identities as synonymous with a challenge to authority; and (potentially and provisionally) reinscribe a Black identity which simultaneously incorporates sub-cultural and school values.
Episode 13: Bitches and Bibles

Scene 1: Bitches

| Venue:     | Drama Studio, Leaving Day |
| Performers:| MARCELLA (year 11 pupil, girl, Black) |
|           | JASMINE (year 11 pupil, girl, Mixed-race) |
|           | NAOMI (year 11 pupil, girl, Black) |
|           | MARCIA (year 11 pupil, girl, Black) |
|           | NATASHA (year 11 pupil, girl, Mixed-race) |
| Audience:  | Year 11 pupils, form tutors, members of the SMT, DY. |

The auditorium has tiered seating on three sides arranged around a large empty floor space. The forth side of this floor space is flanked by a low-level stage. The seating capacity of the Drama Studio is barely adequate to accommodate the entire year group. FORM TUTORS, members of the SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM and PUPILS are squashed together in their seats, with an over-spill of PUPILS seated on the floor at the edges of the central floor space. The HEAD OF YEAR, who is hosting the event, is on the stage. He also provides some musical interludes along with the school MUSIC TEACHER and a FORM TUTOR. The room is illuminated only by stage lighting on the stage and, when in use for performances, the central floor space.

The head of year announces that the next entertainment will be a dance performed by MARCELLA, JASMINE, NAOMI, MARCIA, and NATASHA. The girls enter the auditorium and assemble in the large performance space in the centre of the room.

The girls are wearing tight fitting micro or circular cheerleader skirts or cycling shorts. These are paired with cropped vests and bra-tops; some sports style, others beach style with fabric ends dangling from where they have been knotted between uplifted breasts. Skirts and shorts are in shinning, lycra-mix synthetics, tops are in cotton-lycra mix. These outfits combine black and white with bright blues, reds and greens. All the girls have bare legs and wear trainers with well known brand labels. Hair is perfect. The Mixed-race girls have long hair worn slicked back from the face into a tall bun. This bun is worn high on the top of the head and given added elevation by fabric accessories bound up from the base. The Black girls have shorter hair worn in straightened jaw length graduated bobs, with slicked side-parted fringes and kiss-curls. The outfits not matching but their shared sub-cultural source is evident.

The performers receive an uproarious welcome as they enter the room. There is loud applause; cheering; wolf whistling; bent elbows circling clenched fists above heads and in front of bodies accompanied by “boo boo boo”; some boys call out to the girls by name and make sexual propositions. The girls are smiling to one another and to friends they see or hear in the audience, including some of the propositioning boys. They look to one another: “ready?” “ready”. They stand in two staggered lines of 3 and 2, feet apart, arms held out diagonally, heads turned to one side. Naomi, on the front row, bends, hits the play button on a tape recorder and gets back into position. A moment of silence then the music starts.

The watching pupils repeat their welcoming noises and gestures when the music starts — a well known song that has recently been successful in the mainstream music charts. While it’s hip-hop roots are clear, it has a R ’n’ B feel which undoubtedly contributes to its mainstream success. The lyrics are overtly sexual but the extremely explicit lyrics of some hip-hop is absent. The girls begin to dance. They perform a synchronised dance routine of the sort commonly seen in promotional videos for music of this genre. Its execution is proficient but is not outstanding. Included in the dance routine are moves where the girls bend over forwards, rocking their upper torsos from side to side accentuating the display of plunging cleavages. It also includes moves which involve the girls thrusting their hips back and forth while standing with feet apart and knees bent. At times they do this while straddling one another’s thighs. These moves are greeted by more appreciative noises and gestures from pupils in the audience.

When the music ends the pupil audience gives a similar display to that which welcomed the girls. The girls laugh and smile and take repeated bow before leaving the auditorium. Once they have gone, it takes the head of year some time to quiet the pupil audience ready for the next act.
Scene 2: Bibles

**Venue:** The main hall, National Record of Achievement (NRA) Day

**Participants:** Year 11 pupils, form tutors, head of year, headteacher.

**Audience:** Parents/carers, family members, guests (including DY)

A low level platform is against the centre of one wall. Above it hangs a painted banner which read “All the Best for the Future, Class of 98”. The HEADTEACHER, who is the keynote speaker, is seated on the platform behind a cloth draped table. The MUSIC TEACHER is seated at a piano. The HEAD OF YEAR, who is hosting, sits on a stool in the middle of the platform. At his side are JASMINEx and NATASHA who are assisting the HEAD OF YEAR in hosting the event. Flanking each side of the platform and facing in towards it, each TUTOR GROUP is seated together with their FORM TUTOR. The AUDIENCE of parents/carers, family members and other guests are seated facing the platform and rows of pupils.

The main event is the presentation of NRA folders. Each form tutor goes up on the platform in turn to present the folders to their tutor group members. The head of year calls out the name of each individual pupil. As their names are called, pupils rise from their seats and walk up onto the platform. They shake hands with their form tutor and are handed their NRA folders. Some pupils plant a hesitant kiss on the cheek of their tutor. Women teachers are kissed by both girls and boys. Men are kissed only by girls. Having been handed their NRA folder, pupils return to their seats. In sum, pupils are required to sit, walk, shake, accept, walk, sit. This process is repeated for almost every member of the year group which includes more than 200 pupils. There is persistent polite applause throughout this process.

**Outfits:**

1. Bridget, Pipa, Suzi, Vici (White, middle-class, Dir’y ippies/Boffins)
   - Evening dresses. To the floor (occasionally mid-knee) contour skimming but not skin tight. Bootlace shoulder straps and cleavage. Metallics, negligee synthetics and lace, velour. Black, inkly blue, silver. Tyre-soled or high heeled platform sandals. Chokers, leather corded pendants, and a feather boa. Expensive and high quality fabric and manufacture -- top end of the high street or small label designer/boutique.

2. Annie, Diane, Molly, Mridula, Lucy, Su Lin (White, Indian, Chinese, working-class, known and unknown girls/Shazas)
   - Mix and match separates. Fitted jacket over skinny rib vest worn with bootleg pants or mid thigh straight, or kick pleat skirt. Variations on high heeled strappy sandals (except Molly in boots). Gold hoop earrings, fine or chunky twist/link gold chains, gold pendants especially initials and names in script, gold rings often sovereigns. White, grey and pastel blue, pink, lemon. Inexpensive and low quality fabric and manufacture -- bottom end of the high street or mass produced for the market.

3. Juliet, Nicola, Sarah (Mixed-race, White, working-class, known girls/Shazas)
   - Mix and match separates and one pieces. Tight fitting mini dresses or skirts. Stretch and/or see-through fabric. Skinny rib tops or uppers with cleavage. Black, white and brights. Variations on high heeled strappy sandals. Gold hoop earrings, fine or chunky twist/link gold chains, gold pendants especially initials and names in script, gold rings often sovereigns. Inexpensive and low quality fabric and manufacture -- bottom end of the high street or mass produced for the market.

4. Marcella, Naomi, Marcia (Black, working-class, known girls)
   - Two and three piece tailored suits. Long line jackets with skirt to top of knee. Mid chest square or diagonal neckline. Ivory or cream. Alternatively, tailored separates long line jacket and trousers. Brights. Flat heeled black leather fashion court shoes. Quality heavy cotton/linen/silk. Department store, bridal, hand tailored.

The group whose practices are represented in Scene 1 of the Episode includes both Black and Mixed-race girls. The three Black girls -- Marcella, Naomi and Marcia -- have had ongoing disciplinary problems with the school organisation throughout their school
careers. Marcella was originally in the same tutor group as Naomi but was moved during year 9. Marcella suggested to me that the school perceived her and Naomi as “trouble makers” and removed her from this tutor group in an effort to “separate” them. Inside her new tutor group Marcella had ongoing conflicts, of varying degrees of severity, with the Tutor. Both Marcella and Naomi were centrally involved in the conflict over the contested ‘Coolie’ identity discussed in Episode 3. Marcella received a fixed-term exclusion in relation to this conflict only weeks before Leaving Day -- her sixth fixed-term exclusion from the school. Naomi and Marcia both reported having received multiple “threats” of exclusion and being warned that they were on their “last chance”. Unlike Marcella, Naomi and Marcia, Jasmine (Mixed-race)\(^8\) does not have a history of disciplinary conflict with the school. Indeed, she appears to be immensely popular with teachers despite her close alliance with Marcella, Naomi and Marcia. On a day-to-day basis it seems that Jasmine sustains a desirable learner identity and a (moderately) high status sub-cultural identity\(^9\).

This group of girls is highly critical of the school organisation and made significant contributions to the discussions of institutional racism which were outlined in my analysis of Episode 10. However, all of these girls recognise the ‘A-to-C Economy’ (Gillborn & Youdell 2000) which frames GCSEs and seek to attain the benchmark of at least 5 higher grade passes. Within subjects which are set by ability and/or tiered the girls are positioned towards the middle of the set/tier hierarchy. Such placements are not always satisfactory to the girls. The girls, most notably Marcella and Naomi, suggest that within certain subjects their set/tier placement is too low and see this as a result of having an unjustified “bad reputation” amongst staff. This co-existing criticism of the school organisation and regard for educational qualifications suggests that the girls are
anti-school and pro-education, a relationship to schooling detailed by Fuller (1984), Mac an Ghaill (1988) Mirza (1992)\textsuperscript{10}.

My analysis here and my earlier analysis of Episode 10 suggests that the girls' relationships with education, the school and individual teachers are entwined with and underscored by their identities as Black girls. A provisional identification of the girls as pro-education and anti-school suggests that their identity practices might involve intentional and/or tacit resistance within accommodation. At the same time, however, the school organisation disavows Black sub-cultural identities and simultaneously deploys these in the constitution of a Black challenge to authority -- discursive manoeuvres which render Black sub-cultural identities and desirable learner identities incommensurable. These institutional practices are likely to interact with the girls' resistances and constrain the felicity of their accommodations. In this context it is interesting to examine both the fact and mode of the girls' participation in the Leaving Day show and NRA Day ceremony.

\textit{Bitches}

Scene 1 is a moment in the citation, inscription and reinscription of the girls sub-cultural and learner identities. My analysis suggests that while it may appear on the surface to be an acquiescence to school values, it is also a moment of resistance to school values and particular schooled identities -- a moment of resistance which citing a multitude of minor skirmishes throughout the girls' educational histories. At the same time, it has the potential to provisionally reinsert these schooled identities and reconstitute them \textit{again differently}. Furthermore, in my outline of Leaving Day I noted that the event appears to have been captured by the pupils and/or surrendered by the school. The girls performance might be seen as moment which contributes to this capture/surrender.
In the discursive frame of the mainstream pupil milieu, it is the girls who are constituted within the terms of a coveted Black sub-cultural identity who are the key figures in this group. While Jasmine and Natasha’s race identity is less prestigious (but still substantial) in these terms, they have both studied GCSE drama and are (relatively) experienced performers. It is possible to conjecture, therefore, that Marcella, Naomi and Marcia might not put on such a public performance without the performance skills of Jasmine and Natasha. Conversely, it is possible to conjecture that Jasmine and Natasha’s sub-cultural status might not be high enough to put on such a performance without the other girls. Furthermore, given the specificities of the race identities cited and inscribed through the Hierarchy within the Other, it seems unlikely that these Mixed-race girls would put on this performance without the sanctioning participation of the Black girls. That is, the dance is racialised -- it cites and inscribes (gendered) Black sub-cultural identities. In the discursive frame of discreet and authentic races which frames the mainstream pupil milieu, such a performance by Mixed-race girls alone might be received as an expropriation of Blackness. As was seen in relation to ‘Coolie’ in Episode 3, expropriations of race bring considerable censure.

The Black girls’ sub-cultural identities seem to assure a positive reception from peers. Yet this very identity is constituted, in part, through its oppositional relationship with the school organisation. This suggests that these girls might be unlikely to (ask or be allowed to) participate in such an event and that to do so would undermine the very identity that secures peer support, that is, it could be construed as pro-school. It may be that Jasmine’s apparent (almost/partial/sometimes) pro-school identity deflects the risk posed to the Black girls’ sub-cultural identity by their participation. I would suggest, therefore, that the performance itself is made possible through a particular constellation of multiple biographical, sub-cultural and learner identities.
The dance can be understood as being performed for two overarching audiences -- teachers and pupils. As the preceding chapters have shown, the pupil audience is by no means homogeneous. Rather, it is self-consciously categorised along biographical and sub-cultural lines. Likewise, the teacher audience will also be differentiated, for instance, along biographical, cultural and professional axes.

The girls have discursive agency -- their citational bodily practices have the potential to performatively constitute, whether intentionally or otherwise, themselves and others in particular ways. Their multiple audiences, however, also have discursive agency -- the meanings made and identities potentially and provisionally constituted through the girls' dance are mediated through the discourses which frame the (multiple) audiences' reception of it. Understanding these audiences as discursive markets suggests that the cultural capitals citationally displayed and inscribed through the girls' bodily practices are likely be imbued with values which vary across these markets. The meanings cited and inscribed through the girls dance, therefore, are multiple, multi-directional and always at risk.

In terms of the (multiple) pupil audiences the girls' discursive practices -- their dress, bodily movements and the music to which they dance -- cite and inscribe a Black hypersexual heterosexual femininity. This is a femininity which contrasts with Marcella and Jasmine's sexual conservatism and policing of the moral scale seen in chapter 5. The girls' practices also display a version of the Black heterosexual femininity which the Schema of raced hetero-sex suggests is legitimately available only to Black boys. Simultaneously, these practices lay claim to, demonstrate and constitute the girls' location at the pinnacle of the Hierarchy within the Other. As such, the dance is a dramatic flaunting and inscription of the (almost indisputably) high value of the girls'
cultural capital within the discursive market of the mainstream pupil sub-culture. It also alludes to the existing (or potential) value of this within youth/street cultural markets which exceeds the bounds of the school. The value of this cultural capital has been accrued and constituted over time through the ongoing citation of the status of Black heterosexual femininities within the Hierarchy within the Other; the Schema of raced hetero-sex; the known/unknown binary; and youth/street culture more broadly. The dance (silently and provisionally) ‘says’ to the pupil audience ‘this is how cool, high-status and desirable we are, and how cool, high-status and desirable you (through multiple, varied but intersecting identities) are also/nearly/not’.

In terms of the teacher audience(s) the girls’ practices also constitute a Black sub-cultural identity which cites and inscribes particular genres of music, dance, bodily gestures and adornments as well as particular urban experiences, lifestyles and relationships to the State. In the person of Black R ‘n’ B and hip-hop artists within the music industry, these sub-cultural identities have had notable professional and financial success. They have also had a significant influence on mainstream youth cultures globally. By citing these Black identities the dance ‘says’ to the school ‘this is what you have refused to allow me to be and punished me for being. This is what you have forced me to deny/compensate for/retain at high cost. Now we are leaving school and you can no longer make any intervention. And there are places where this/I am sought after and valued -- you know that just from listening to the radio, watching TV and looking around at what everyone wears (including your own trainers)’.

However, as Connell (1995) has noted in relation to Black sports men, these R ‘n’ B and hip-hop artists are exemplars -- their success in the entertainment industry does not elevate the social status of Black identities in general. These exemplary Black identities
are restricted to this sub-cultural milieu without being generalised to other discursive markets. That is, just because some Black artists are professionally successful, have massive global record sales and are emulated by young people from across diverse biographical backgrounds, this does not mean that these girls (Black young people in general) become more desirable as pupils, potential employees, citizens. Indeed, the success of the girls’ emulation of these exemplary figures may well contribute to their undesirability beyond this specific sub-cultural milieu. The teachers undoubtedly recognise this citation and the exemplary status of successful Black R ‘n’ B and hip-hop artists. Furthermore, the sub-culturally status-laden and exemplary Black identities the girls are flaunting, citing, and constituting are the very identities which the school has simultaneously disavowed as being intrinsically beyond the bounds of the tolerable (let alone ideal) client and deployed in constituting these identities as anti-school and a challenge to authority.

The citations and inscriptions of the girls’ dance, then, can be understood as a moment in which the Black sub-cultural identity which is institutionally disavowed is provisionally reinscribed as the most desirable and prestigious identity through the citation of popular sub-cultural discourses. In this sense it might be understood as a moment of a politics of performative resignification. Yet in doing this, the dance also confirms (cites) the school’s discourse of the Black challenge to authority and this confirmation (citation) means that the resignification is highly tenuous and open to rapid recuperation.

**Bibles**

Scene 2 is also a moment in the citation, inscription and reinscription of sub-cultural and learner identities. Like their participation in the Leaving Day show in Scene 1, the dress of Marcella, Naomi and Marcia in Scene 2 might suggest that they have finally
acquiesced to the school values and are attempting to constitute themselves, at this last moment, as the ideal client of schooling. While this might be the case, it is also a moment of resistance to the constitution the Black challenge to authority in general and the girls’ undesirable learner identities in particular. As such, it is moment in which these schooled learner identities are reinscribed again differently.

On NRA Day parents and families are added to the multiple pupil and teacher audiences of Leaving Day. As I noted in my outline of NRA Day, this is a formal occasion which cites the Speech Day of the prestigious grammar school. As such, it is an event dominated by the school organisation which is not open to capture by/surrender to the pupils. Nevertheless, NRA Day does take on an unofficial, secondary functions for many (if not all) girls. Through clothing and adornments (which have been much discussed in the preceding weeks and even months) the event becomes a fashion gala. The outfits represented in Scene 2 indicate both the differences between and continuities across girls’ bodily practices of femininities.

When exploring clothing as potentially performative bodily practices, it is important to bear in mind a number of practicalities which may have some influence on them. For instance, when shopping for an NRA Day outfit girls are likely to have been constrained (to varying degrees) by the cost, durability and transferability of a particular outfit or garment. Parental consent/permission for particular clothing to be bought and/or worn for the event may also have been an issue for some girls. In addition, girls’ personal ‘taste’ and ‘style’, as well as that of their friends/family, is undoubtedly a key influence on these outfits. While this may seem a banal point, understanding such ‘taste’ and ‘style’ as citational and constitutive of dispositions of a performative bodily habitus suggests that these NRA Day outfits are potentially constitutive of identities.
My representations of girls’ NRA Day outfits within Scene 2 and the analysis which follows runs the risk of appearing judgmental; citing and deploying caricatures and stereotypes; and inscribing these girls’ identities through its own performative force. Yet these are judgements, citations, deployments and inscriptions which are made, often unintentionally and tacitly, on an ongoing basis. Without them the subject is inaccessible (not a subject). These practices contribute to ‘who’ and ‘what’ the subject is and are an integral part of the discursive practices through which identities are constituted.

Clothes, are not neutral surfaces which are imbued with meaning only when they enclose the body of a wearer (Barthes 1967). The observer sees the cut and quality of the cloth, the style of the garment, the material and design of the jewellery. In a glance gender, class, race, sexuality is ‘known’. This is the mundane, routine, everyday practice of the ongoing constitution of identities. The subject who clothes his/her body has at least a tacit, practical sense of the potential performative force of the observer’s mediations. The girls in Scene 2 know that their clothes and bodily adornments are seen and are potentially constitutive of their identities. Yet these constitutions are not simply imposed. The performative bodily habitus and body-reflexive practices of the wearer also mediate and bring meaning to clothes. In addition, the wearer has intent, albeit discursively constrained, and can seek to constitute him/herself in particular ways through his/her bodily adornments. My representation and analysis here, then, attempts to access and convey a layer of identity practices that is often taken to be so obvious or impolite that it goes unexamined.

The outfits of the first group of girls can be understood as costumes; an ironic masquerade of the ultra-feminine prom queen. As such these costumes are a moment in the constitution of Dir’y ‘ippie as an alternative, marginal and anti-school identity and
exposure of the constitutedness of femininity\textsuperscript{11}. As in Episode 2, however, the relative privilege of the girls’ social class is also evident. The cultural capital and practical sense of the discursive markets of NRA Day which enables this masquerade; the obvious high quality and cost of the outfits; and the confident and entitled chasse’ with which these girls mount the stage to collect their “best in subject” awards as well as their NRA folders, are made possible by, cite and inscribe these girls’ middle class status and concomitant positively orientated learner identities. While the masquerade constitutes Dir’y ‘ippie and troubles the naturalness of femininity, it simultaneously exposes these girls as the “bods” and “boffins” which the Shazas and Bazas always said they were.

The outfits of the second and third group of girls cite and inscribe the heterosexual femininities constituted through the discourse of the virgin/whore binary discussed in Episode 4. The attire of the second group cites the office job interview, the registry office wedding, the family function. These clothed bodies (potentially and provisionally) performatively constitute a conservative, passive, subdued, oblique heterosexual femininity -- the virgin, and even the unknown girl\textsuperscript{12}. The attire of the third group cites the pub, the nightclub, the rave, the party. These clothed bodies (potentially and provisionally) performatively constitute an overtly (hetero-)sexualised desirable femininity -- the known girl, and even the whore. It seems that the Group 3 girls might want to constitute themselves as the prom queen which the Dir’y ‘ippines masquerade so effortlessly. Yet if these girls were given the money that the middle class girls spent on their NRA Day costumes, it is unlikely that they would come up with the same outfits. These girls lack the bodily dispositions and discursive capitals to choose them. If they were handed Bridget, Pipa, Suzi and Vici’s dresses to wear it is unlikely that they would wear them in the same way. These girls lack the bodily dispositions and discursive capitals to sashay onto the stage in this formal, school dominated and public context.
The obvious (relatively) low quality and cost of the clothes worn by the girls in the second and third groups exposes their working class status, or even poverty. This contrasts with the ample and often copious amounts of gold jewellery which these girls wear every day -- a persistent assertion (infelicitous (?) performative constitution) of their (relative) affluence within this working class milieu. While these outfits potentially constitute these girls as women, they also expose them as the Shazas that the Dir’y ‘ippies always said they were.

The outfits of the fourth group of girls -- Marcella, Naomi and Marcia -- might be expected to explicitly reflect their identity practices seen on Leaving Day. That this is not the case underlines the contextual specificity of identity practices. It also underlines the ongoing nature of identity constitutions; the multiplicity of the subject’s bodily dispositions; and the subject’s deployment of his/her practical sense of multiple markets and the relative values of capitals within them. On NRA Day the girls are not the ‘bitches’ they were on Leaving Day, and this being otherwise exposes the constitutedness of these identities and identities in general.

In contrast with Scene 1, these girls’ bodily practices in Scene 2 seem to assert their overt respect for the event (a respect perhaps not shown by the first and third groups of girls) and their willingness to go to considerable expense and effort for it. The styling and obvious high quality and cost of their attire cites and inscribes conservatism and affluence. It might also be understood as a citation of well dressed Black women gathered for Protestant worship and, therefore, an inscription of Black Christianity and concomitant respectability. In this way the girls’ clothing seems to be imbued with the history of colonialism and slavery, the historicity of colonial discourses of Blackness and Black communities’ responses to and resistances of these. The girls’ attire, then, is
potentially performative of Black affluence, conservatism, religiosity and resistance. That is, it might be understood as a final attempt (whether tacit or conscious) to simultaneously resist the school’s constitution of the Black challenge to authority (to convince the school that it has misjudged them) and to potentially reconstitute themselves again differently as Black and the ideal client. At the same time, the girls bodily practice here might be understood as a display of the group’s solidarity and a celebration of their collective and individual literal survival of the school institution and its embedded racism.

Discourses of phenotypic or physiognomic races and the Black challenge to White hegemony endure across contexts within the school and beyond. In this discursive frame, Marcella’s, Naomi’s and Marcia’s ‘bitches’ of Leaving Day and ‘ideal clients’ of NRA Day are incommensurable. Despite this incommensurability, the girls’ practices in Scene 2 resist institutional constitutions of the Black challenge to White hegemony and reinscribe their learner identities in terms of the ideal client of schooling. Yet the necessity of jettisoning the Black sub-cultural identity of Scene 1 in order to enhance the likely performative force of the reinscription of Scene 2 displays the costs of this reinscription. Furthermore, the enduring historicity of the authorised and institutional discourses which frame this context mean that, at the level of body-reflexive practices at least, the felicity of such a performative reinscription cannot be guaranteed and is likely to be fleeting.

**Resisting subjugated homosexuality, reinscribing gay masculinity**

Throughout the preceding chapters I have shown how particular modes of heterosexual masculinity and femininity are constituted as intelligible identities within the mainstream pupil milieu. Masculinities and femininities constituted through the
heterosexual matrix; discourses of compulsory heterosexuality; and the concomitant (explicit and/or implicit) disavowal and subjugation of homosexualities pervade the mainstream pupil milieu. My analysis of Episode 2 suggested that the Dir’y ‘ippie pupil sub-culture sought to (potentially and provisionally) recuperate its marginalisation. This was seen in particular through the rejection of compulsory heterosexuality and the valorisation of non-heterosexual identities. I suggested, however, that these pupils’ attempts to reinscribe both Dir’y ‘ippie and non-heterosexual sexualities were unlikely to be felicitous in discursive markets dominated by the mainstream pupil sub-culture. This does not mean, however, that these discourses cannot be resisted. The Scenes within Episode 14 represent moments of resistance to compulsory heterosexuality and the disavowal and/or subjugation of homosexuality as well as the (potential and provisional) reinscription of intelligible gay masculinity. That is, the Scenes can be understood as moments in the politics of performative resignification.

Episode 14: Bent as a ballet dancer

**Scene 1.**

*Science Lesson, mixed ability.* DY is sitting at a table with VICI and SUZI (girls, White). At the next table, SCOTT (boy, White) is sitting with three girls (all white). The class is noisy and inattentive and the teacher seems unable to counter this. There is a relatively high level of movement around the room.

Scott comes and stands next to the table where Vici, Suzi and I are sitting. He leans down over the table, bending at the waist, and rests his elbows on the table top. He takes Vici’s hands and enthusiastically tells her about a dance performance that he took part in the previous weekend. Daniel (boy, Black) walks past the table and, while passing, says in a derisory tone but to no one in particular: “He’s getting ready”...

Scott and Vici exchange a momentary look but do not acknowledge Daniel’s comment verbally. Scott continues to recount his story and a minute or so later he returns to his seat at the next table.

*Later in the lesson.* Scott is in conversation with the girls sitting at his table. He takes a pair of pink ballet shoes, with hard toes, out of his bag. He holds the shoes in his hands and examines them while listening and contributing to conversation. Vici, Suzi and I notice Scott examining his ballet shoes.

Vici: *(calls out)* Scott, are they your en pointe shoes?
Scott: *(looks over with a (feigned) surprised smile)* No, they’re for footwork.
Vici: They’re beautiful.
Suzi: *(chuckling)* Your feet must be so scummy!
Scott: *(nods and laughs)* They are. *(replying to VICI)* These are my practice ones, you should see my good ones, they’re satin!
Vici smiles at Scott and the conversation ends. Scott returns to his previous conversation and, while chatting, puts his ballet shoes on. He stands up and runs through a short sequence of classical ballet positions, before raising himself up onto the points of his toes, his arms outstretched to the front and side. The girls sitting at the table with Scott watch and smile. Vici calls: “Beautiful, Scott” and begins a round of brief, delicate applause which Suzi and I join. Scott smiles and bows before sitting back down. He rejoins the conversation at his table. After a few minutes he takes off his ballet shoes off and puts them on table in front of him. A while later he returns his ballet shoes to his bag.

Scene 2.

Drama Studio, the Leaving Day show. The head of year announces that the next entertainment will be a dance by SCOTT. He introduces Scott as an “incredibly talented young man”, reporting that Scott has recently been accepted into one of the UK’s most prestigious dance schools. The head of year says that Scott was reluctant to perform in the Leaving Day show, concerned over how his dance — which he performed for his successful audition — would be received.

The lights in the Drama Studio go out. A spotlight goes on and follows Scott as he enters and stands stationary in the middle of the central floor space. He is wearing a pair of white cotton-jersey track suit trousers. The trousers sit just below his waist, the hems are turned up exposing his ankles. This is the only garment that Scott wears. He is bare foot. His torso and arms are lean and well toned. His muscular and skeletal structure are extremely well defined. He has a small, black Egyptian-style tattoo on one shoulder-blade. The audience is momentarily silent, then gives light applause.

The spotlight goes out and contemporary classical music begins. Low level lighting illuminates the central floor space and Scott begins to perform. The dance is extremely well choreographed and professionally executed; Scott’s skill is indisputable. The fast-paced dance and music convey a sense of peril, pursuit and conflict. Scott’s bodily movements are arresting. He sweeps around the entirety of the central performance space, sometimes lowering himself to the floor, sometimes leaping high into the air, sometimes lunging forwards and imposing into the space of those seated in the front rows. The first time that Scott lunges in this way there is an audible gasp from the audience. As the dance ends Scott is spotlighted in a frozen pose on the ground. There is a moments silence before the applause begins. The applause is loud but does not include the cheering, “boo boo boo”s or whistling of Episode 13, Scene 1. Scott rises and exits the Drama Studio. The applause dies and there is silence punctuated by whispered conversation.

Scene 1 represents a collection of discursive practices within the everyday context of a classroom. Leaning over a desk and resting elbows/forearms on the tabletop while talking to someone seated there is by no means exceptional. Indeed, this is a bodily practice which pupils and teachers engage in all the time. Yet when Scott engages in this bodily practice it seems to contribute to the ongoing constitution of his gayness and precipitate a series of further practices through which intelligible sexualities are constituted and contested.
Scott is ‘out’ within the school. As discussed in relation to Episode 2, a number of pupils in the year group identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual and/or queer. Of these pupils, however, Scott is the only one who appears to attempt actively to ensure that his non-heterosexual identity is known across the school. Scott, it seems, is engaged in ongoing intentional constitutions of himself as gay. For instance, his school diary is decorated by images which cite and inscribe this gay identity and a gay aesthetic: a large rainbow flag sticker; red ribbon and World Aids Day stickers; magazine clippings of monochrome images of semi-clothed young men and dramatic landscapes. Inside the school Scott is never seen in the company of other boys and he is dismissive of Tom, the other boy in the year group known to identify as gay. However, he has a number of close friendships with Dir’y ippie and known girls. These friendships are tactile, affectionate and include much verbal mutual admiration -- citing and inscribing the gay man and straight woman (injuriously ‘fag-hag’) relationship of popular and gay discourse. As indicated by Episode 14, Scott is a highly accomplished ballet dancer. This is an activity which he is well known for within the year group. Ballet dancing is itself intimately linked with Scott’s gayness both through his own practices and popular discourse which cites and inscribes the synonymy of homosexuality and ballet dancing -- the male ballet dancer is homosexual.

In a context dominated by compulsory heterosexuality but in which Scott is ‘out’, when he leans over the table, takes Vici’s hands and effusively recounts his recent ballet performance it seems that his bodily and linguistic practices cite and inscribe his identity as the gay ballet dancer. This raises the two related questions. First, are Scott’s practices here any different to the multitude of leanings over tables and chattings that go on across the school every day? And second, how does Scott come to practice in the ways that he does? In answer to my first question it seems that Scott’s practices differ in small but
significant ways from those of the boys around him. Chatting about a ballet performance and holding the hands of the girl being spoken to (without this contact being sexually charged) are practices which are unintelligible within the terms of those masculinities which dominate this context. The precise way in which Scott leans over the table -- the placement of his feet, the bend of his knee, the angle of his back -- is more difficult to differentiate from the ways in which other boys might lean, yet it does seem that he does this with a (gay-ballet dancer’s?) grace and elegance not seem amongst the other boys.

This begins to indicate a possible answer to my second question. Scott’s bodily practices here might be understood, in part, as the dispositions of a particular bodily habitus13. In positing this, I am not suggesting that these are the dispositions of a habitus inculcated primarily within the home during early childhood as Bourdieu’s (1990 & 1991) work might suggest. Rather, I am suggesting that the dispositions of this performative habitus are constituted and constituting on an ongoing basis (Butler 1997a). Such dispositions might be unknowingly inculcated through images and representations of gay icons and a gay aesthetic; the gay scene; and the ballet school. The constituting and constitutive dispositions of such a performative habitus might be unintentionally cited and intentionally mimicked. Scott’s bodily practices here, then, can be understood at once as the disposition of a particular performative habitus and the intentional mimicry of a particular modality of gayness.

As Scott leans over and talks to Vici, his practices cite and inscribe his gay identity -- he displays publicly an identity which is disavowed by the discourse of compulsory heterosexuality. By being ‘out’ and displaying this ‘outness’, Scott potentially reinscribes homosexuality as intelligible and legitimate. In turn, this potential reinscription of the disavowed Other exposes the inextricable link between the Same and
the Other of the heterosexual/homosexual hierarchical binary. It also exposes the constitutedness of the binary; the terms within it; and its concomitant masculinities and femininities (Butler 1991). It is this reinscription of the disavowed homosexual Other and the exposures which it effects that inspires, or even compels, Daniel’s censure and attempted recuperation.

When Daniel announces “He’s getting ready” he does not address Scott directly, nor does his comment make any explicit reference to homosexuality. Indeed the comment does not make explicit what Scott might be getting ready for.

The comment can be understood as a (verbally incomplete) citation of the homophobic insult which insists that if a man or boy who is known or even suspected to be homosexual bends over, then he is preparing for/inviting anal penetration -- “He’s getting ready” ‘to take it up the arse’. This understanding is reinforced by the derisory tone in which the comment is delivered. The oblique/incomplete nature of the comment does not negate its potential to performatively constitute Scott in particular ways. Indeed, that it is unnecessary to utter the entire assertion highlights the enduring historicity of authorised (hetero-normative/homophobic) discourses of homosexuality. This comment cites the obsession within authorised discourse with the homosexual man who receives anal penetration and inscribes receptive anal penetration as synonymous with male homosexuality (the mystery of who might penetrate remains unresolved with this discourse). In this way, Daniel’s comment also cites and inscribes the heterosexual constitution of homosexuality as a poor imitation of the (illusory) heterosexual original (Butler 1991).
In an apparently more benign reading of the comment “He’s getting ready”, Daniel might be taken to have observed Scott’s interaction with the girls and anticipated the ballet performance to come. Scott might, therefore, be “getting ready” ‘to perform ballet’. Understanding Daniel’s comment as an anticipation of Scott’s later dance might seem to lessen its homophobic force/intent. Yet, that the male ballet dancer is synonymous with the male homosexual in authorised discourse suggests that, understood in this way, Daniel’s comment remains at least implicitly homophobic and threatens to constitute Scott’s homosexuality in particular ways. Furthermore, the comment might simultaneously suggest the (imagined) sexual practice and the ballet performance. Within the hetero-normative discursive frame which Daniel cites these are both key markers of the subjugated homosexual whose lack of masculinity is exposed through the constellation of his bodily practices, whether these practices are sexual or otherwise. Daniel’s comment then is a potential and provisional performative constitution of Scott as (a particular) homosexual.

Daniel is not potentially interpellating the denigrated homosexuality of a boy whose bodily dispositions have somehow unwittingly failed to cite heterosexual masculinity. Scott himself performatively constitutes himself as (a particular) homosexual, but this is by no means the same identity which Daniel’s comment cites and inscribes. Scott’s bodily practices cite, inscribe and celebrate the sexual identity which he seeks to constitute. Scott may not have sought Daniel’s comment, but this comment confirms Scott’s self-constitution. This is not to suggest that Daniel’s comment is welcome. It is an injurious interpellation which potentially constitutes Scott as the disavowed and subjugated homosexual. In this sense, the mundane moment of leaning over a desk and a comment being passed can be seen as skirmish over the limits of intelligible masculinity, homosexuality and gay identity.
Later in the Scene Scott takes out and examines his ballet shoes; engages (across the space between two tables) in a (mildly) camp discussion of his good satin ballet shoes and the state of his feet; and offers the girls an unbidden impromptu performance.

Scott’s practices here can be understood as a hyperbolic masquerade (Butler 1990) of the subjugated homosexual which Daniel (provisionally) constituted him as and an intentional potentially constituting mimicry of a particular gay identity. As such, these practices expose the constitutedness of this subjugated homosexuality; have the potential to recuperate Daniel’s constitution; and reinscribe gay. The participation of the girls is significant. Vici and Suzi’s questions, and the appreciative audience which they and the other girls form, guarantee Scott a positive reception which contributes to his reinscription of the legitimacy, intelligibility and desirability of his gay identity.

Daniel does not appear to acknowledge or respond to Scott’s performative performance. The homophobia of Daniel’s comment which I have outlined might lead to the expectation that Daniel will retaliate, perhaps aggressively or even with physical violence, to Scott’s ballet performance. I suggest however, that a number of factors mitigate against any such retaliation.

First, the specific context of the classroom in which the dance takes place appears significant. This is a classroom in which the teacher consistently lacks control and the pupils appear to have a tacit agreement to regularly challenge the teacher’s authority and disrupt the lesson. In this specific context it may be that Scott’s performance gains acceptability, and even kudos, by contributing to this ongoing challenge and disruption.

Second, Scott has many friends and allies amongst the known girls and a number of these make up Scott’s audience within this classroom. The Schema of raced hetero-sex
suggests that these are the very girls with whom Daniel and other known boys pursue relationships. The continued approval of these girls is highly important. By drawing attention to and denigrating Scott’s homosexuality Daniel asserts his own heterosexual masculinity. In this sense the comment may have served its purpose in the moment of its utterance. Indeed, Scott’s subsequent performance is performative in its constitution of Scott’s gay identity and Daniel’s heterosexual masculinity. In these terms, Daniel need take no further action and to do so may well be counterproductive. This resonates with my analysis of the boys’ responses to Quoc Trinh and Manny in Episode 11.

Third, despite his homosexuality, Scott has significant capital within the institutional discourse of the school -- he is White, middle-class, high attaining, even “talented”. Daniel, on the other hand, is Black and has a history of disciplinary conflict with the school. Like the Black girls discussed in the previous Episode, Daniel may well be on his “last chance”. In such a context, even if Daniel wanted to censure Scott more strongly (which I suggest is not the case anyway) to do so would be to guarantee the full weight of institutional retaliation.

Fourth, the ‘wisdoms’ of pop-psychology/sexology (themselves appropriated within gay discourse) -- which suggest that those individuals who are most ardent in their criticisms of homosexuality are, in fact, the ‘closet’ homosexuals -- may well have percolated through into the discourses of the mainstream pupil sub-culture. If this is the case, it may render it possible to protest against homosexuality, but not too much.

Finally, the broader pop-cultural context may debar Daniel from denigrating Scott’s homosexuality through any more explicit practices than his partially expressed comment. In recent years gay culture has attained a new degree of exemplary ‘chic’
within pop-culture. This can be seen through discourses of the ‘pink pound’ and ‘lesbian chic’; exemplary gay and transsexual celebrities (think the Pet Shop Boys and Lilly Savage); the endorsement by heterosexual icons of ultra-fashionable gay exemplars (think Madonna and Jean Paul Gaultier); and the prominent role of gay culture in popularising the dance and rave scene (think ultra-camp singer turned ultra-cool Ministry of Sound DJ Boy George). It is arguable that within this broader pop-cultural context, Year 11 students attending a large, London comprehensive school in the late 1990s may well have recognised, at least partially and tacitly, the ‘cache of queer’. the ‘cosmopolitan’ requirement to be unfazed by and accepting of difference. In this discursive frame gay bashers are uncool and may well be hiding their own homosexuality. The ‘cool man’ must constitute himself as absolutely heterosexual and dismissive of but unthreatened by the homosexual man.

If Daniel had not made his potentially constituting comment, Scott may or may not have engaged in these practices. The elapsed time between the comment and the exchange which leads up to the impromptu performance obscures any explicit intent to retaliate/recuperate which Scott might have. This elapsed time also protects Scott from becoming involved in a direct confrontation with Daniel. Irrespective of intent, these practices potentially recuperate the denigrated homosexual which Daniel’s comment cited and inscribed as well as provisionally reinscribing gay again differently.

Scene 2 represents an exceptional moment in this performatively reinscribing mimicry of gayness. Scott’s foremost intention in performing in the Leaving Day show may well be the display of his dancing accomplishment. As my analysis of Scene 1 demonstrates, however, Scott’s identity as ballet dancer and gay interact both within the popular discourses which dominate this context and his own practices.
In understanding this Scene it is useful to consider how Scott comes to be dancing in the show. Scott is a White, middle class, high attaining pupil. His interacting biographical and learner identities are potentially constitutive of the marginalised Dir’y ‘ippie or boffin. These identities combine with his disavowed and subjugated sexual identify to constitute him outside the mainstream pupil sub-culture. In my analysis of Episode 13 I discussed the multiple audiences of the Leaving Day show. These are the audiences for whom Scott dances. Yet the implications of the mediations of these various audiences differ markedly here.

Although the reasons for Scott’s reluctance to perform are not specified, it seems reasonable to conjecture that this is due to his awareness of the explicit and implicit homophobia within the mainstream pupil sub-culture. Scott is guaranteed a positive reception by the Dir’y ‘ippie pupil minority as well as those known girls with whom he is close friends. The teachers’ professional identities demand their support. Furthermore, that the head of year has persuaded Scott to participate suggests that there is genuine support for him amongst the staff. In addition, if pupil attainment is understood to be a central concern, then any implicit homophobia amongst staff is likely to be outweighed or neutralised by Scott’s exceptional success. This is not to suggest that the acceptability of Scott’s gayness amongst teachers is necessarily generalisable. Indeed, as a White, middle class, high attaining pupil, Scott’s gayness might simply be overlooked and/or understood (constituted) as exemplary (Connell 1995).

Yet by dancing in this public arena which has, at least in part, been captured by/surrendered to the pupils, Scott risks the possibility of vigorous and aggressive censure by the pupil majority. It seems, however, that it is the potential constitutions of this audience which Scott may be concerned, tacitly or intentionally, to recuperate and
reinscribe. The majority of these pupils have never been and never will be his friends or allies. He is already exiled. It seems that Scott may have little or nothing to lose by performing. Furthermore, in the formal market of the Leaving Day show and broader hegemonic markets, the high value of the cultural capital cited and inscribed through Scott's biographical and leaner identities is likely to mitigate any enduring performative force which the constitutions of the pupil majority might have. That is, it may be Scott's interacting Whiteness, middle classness and ableness which allow him to constitute as intelligible and legitimate the 'out' gay ballet dancer.

Within authorised discourses of compulsory heterosexuality and oppositional man-masculine/woman-feminine, the homosexual man is (although impossibly within this discourse) not man. In this discursive frame, the homosexual man is constituted as (un)masculine-/feminine, physically (and psychologically) weak, a poor imitation of the (illusory) heterosexual man whom he (fails) to imitate (Butler 1991). Scott's bodily practices and his body itself within his Leaving Day performance resist these constitutions of the homosexual man. Scott's body is strong, muscular, controlled -- he is indisputably masculine. Yet his dance is also that of a classically trained ballet dancer and the dominant discourse which frames this context insists that the male ballet dancer is homosexual. As such, the dance recuperates the incomensurability of masculinity and male homosexuality and reinscribes again differently a gay identity which is at once masculine and homosexual.

The dance is a moment of defiant, triumphant and celebratory homosexual masculinity. It insists that this is legitimate and, arguably, superior to the hegemonic masculinities which it is accused of failing to approximate and by which it has been disavowed and subjugated. Scott's resistances and reinscriptions may well be at once intentional and
tacit. The dance does not reinscribe once and for all those authorised discourses which constitute the homosexual man as (un)masculine-/feminine; the male ballet dancer as homosexual; and the homosexual as disavowed and subjugated. But his dance does trouble these constituting discourses. The audience’s silence as he enters; audible gasp during moments of the dance; silence as he finishes; loud but polite and formal applause: silence and whispered conversation after his exit, all infer this trouble. Scott’s performance is at once intelligible and unintelligible. It at once confirms what the audience ‘knows’ about the gay ballet dancer and unsettles this ‘knowledge’.

These discursive practices might be understood as moments in a politics of performative resignification. They have the potential to reinscribe disavowed and subjugated non-heterosexual identities, even if these reinscriptions are provisional and open to recuperation.

Conclusion

The episodes explored within this chapter demonstrate the ways in which identities can be resisted and reinscribed. That is, the episodes evidence the performative resignification posited by Butler (1997a). Yet my analysis here also highlights the fragility of such reinscriptions. Reinscribing identities that are constituted through the citation of enduring discourses, themselves steeped in historicity, is not straight forward. With multiple discourses in play within single moments of practice, the possibility for such reinscriptions to be recuperated, or rendered unintelligible is ever present. Performative resignification offers strategies through which identities can be constituted again differently. However, the limits of these strategies as a ‘politics’ appear to be tightly circumscribed, particularly within the context of schooling. I will discuss these issues in detail in the following chapter.
Notes to Chapter 7. Resisting Identities

1 I concur with Butler's (1991) argument in which she outlines the problems involved in retaining the notion of sex as distinct from gender. However, in this section I am concerned to explore the discursive relationship between sex and gender within authorised discourse. For this reason I will use the hyphenated term sex-gender to refer specifically to this discursive relationship.

2 It is noteworthy that it is a group of unknown boys who censure Molly's (un)femininity while many known boys appear to have a respectful friendship with her. It is possible that while Molly's masculinity exceeds the traditional masculinity of these unknown boys, it does not threaten the masculinity of the known boys.

3 At one level Molly's refusal seems reasonable -- her footballing skills are exceptional but her physique is unremarkable in comparison to the other girls in the year group.

4 As in the case of Molly's body, her school clothes are unremarkable in comparison to those worn by other girls. Indeed, her usual attire of school sweatshirt; black boot-leg trousers; Reebok classics; several gold rings, including one ornamented with the word 'sister'; several gold chains; and gold hoop earrings fits the definition of Shaza offered by the pupils in Episode 2. The key difference in Molly's appearance seems to be that she invariably wears trousers, does not wear make-up and wears her shoulder length hair in a pony tail without sculpting hair products or ornamenting accessories.

5 It would be possible to read this Scene as a moment of homo-erotic bodily practice. Yet as my analysis has shown, discourses of compulsory heterosexuality frame the mainstream pupil sub-culture to such an extent that the possibility of any alternative is silenced. I am concerned here with pupils' constentions of identities and not with the (impossible) task of rooting out some (illusory) truth of pupils' identities. For this reason I have chosen not to deploy the very disciplinary technologies which I aim to expose.

6 NRAs are as variable as the predicted GCSE grades they contain. NRAs are identified as being in the interest of and, therefore, the responsibility of each individual pupil. Their content, however, is a product of the combined efforts of individual pupils and teachers. In terms of pupils' personal statements and examples of work, the content of each NRA varies according to, among other things, the time a pupil has dedicated to its production. Statements from teachers, awards and commendations and predicted GCSE grades are arguably the central feature of NRAs. In relation to these aspects, the content of each NRA varies according to a pupil's prior attainment and organisational assessments of their abilities and educational orientation. Given this, the NRA can also be understood as textual monument which records prior constitutions of pupils' identities as learners and continues to cite and inscribe these constitutions.

7 The event itself is citational, appearing to reference the British grammar school Speech Day and the high school Graduation of the US. Yet NRA Day appears somewhat incongruous alongside such events. Taylor Comprehensive, while a 'succeeding' comprehensive school is not, and has never been, a selective grammar school with significant social status or inherited public school traditions. Likewise, situated in a demographically mixed Outer London borough, Taylor is not participating in a practice that commonly marks pupils' passage through compulsory schooling as is the case in the US. That such an event is usual within the state comprehensive system does not negate the functions served by NRA Day; its implicit inference, and potential appropriation of, the status associated with the old grammar school not being the least of these.

8 I had only limited contact with Natasha (Mixed-race) during the research. For this reason it is not possible to comment specifically on her disciplinary record, relationship with the school or learner identity.
Jasmine is not Black, she is Mixed-race. In mainstream and pupil discourses these race identities are not the same. Rather, while located together in terms of a White/Black binary, the Hierarchy within the Other and the popular discourses of race which it draws upon differentiate between racial sub-categories within the subordinated Black Other. It is arguable that at the level of body-reflexive practice, teachers and pupils quite literally do not see Jasmine as they see Marcella, Naomi and Marcia. Phenotypically and physiognomically, Jasmine is not as Black as her friends. This is not to suggest that phenotypes and physiognomies convey some inherent racial truth. Rather, it illustrates the sedimentation of these discourses which are tacitly relied upon and deployed within ongoing constituting practices. The constituting discourses of the pupil milieu imbue Jasmine with less status and prestige than her Black friends. Simultaneously, this inaccessibility of a Black sub-cultural identity constitutes her as a more desirable learner within the school’s institutional discourse -- her race identity is not inherently commensurate with a challenge to authority as that of her Black friends. As such, it seems that there may be inverse relationship between pupils’ status in terms of the Hierarchy within the Other and their status in terms of institutional learner identities.

I would suggest that the rapid rise of marketisation in education and the associated emphasis on higher grade passes since the 1988 Education Reform Act means that only pupils with their heads firmly in the sand are able to dispute the significance of higher grade passes. The adherence to the overriding goal of benchmark grades is not isolated to this group of pupils but can be seen across diverse studies and groups of pupils (see, for instance, Gillborn & Youdell 2000 and Gillborn et al 1997). As such, a pro-education and anti-school stance is arguably extremely common. Indeed, I would suggest that very few pupils inside contemporary schools in the UK could be understood as anti-education.

This masquerade which exposes femininity as a discursive effect reflects that of drag discussed by Butler (1991).

It is noteworthy that this includes the attire of Su Lin, interpellated “slag” in Episode 4. Perhaps Su Lin is attempting to resist slag and reinscribe her femininity here.

I have some discomfort in suggesting a gay bodily habitus -- it might be taken to infer a ‘gay body’ which, while perhaps not natural or innate, could precede the designation, the ‘coming out’, of this body as gay. Furthermore, it seems to risk a citation and inscription of the much denigrated homosexual ‘camp’, thereby inscribing the intrinsic (un)masculinity-/femininity of the gay man within authorised discourse.
8. Beyond Identities?

‘Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me’
(Children’s rhyme).

Introduction

I began this thesis by asserting an underpinning concern with equity and the constancy with which inequity appears to be marked by an array of identities. I suggested that my over-riding aim was to understand the processes through which inequity, subjugation, marginalisation and disavowal come to pivot around identity categories. Viewing this dilemma from an alternative vantagepoint, I suggested that I aimed to understand how identity categories function to enable and sustain inequity.

In attempting to address these somewhat ambitious concerns, I have sought to offer a nuanced understanding of the processes through which identities are constituted within the school context. My introductory discussion of school ethnographies highlighted the significant contribution to understandings of schooling, educational inequalities, and pupil identities made by existing studies. However, this discussion also showed how the interactions and possible interdependencies of identity categories have only recently begun to be fully explored. In endeavouring to extend this exploration, I have placed the coalescence of pupils’ (various) biographical, sub-cultural and learner identities at the centre of my school ethnography.

Contributions

Throughout this thesis I have explored the utility of particular theorisations of the subject for making sense of ethnographic data concerned with identities. Specifically, I
have foregrounded Foucault’s notions of discourse and formative power (Foucault 1990, 1991, plus); Bourdieu’s understanding of capitals, markets, and habitus (Bourdieu 1990 & 1991); and Connell’s postulation of body-reflexive practices (1995). These have been drawn together through the utilisation of Butler’s understanding of performative interpellation, performative habitus, and a politics of performative resignification (Butler 1997a). Within this thesis I have offered interpretations of these theorisations and demonstrated the usefulness of these analytical tools for understanding the processes through which pupil identities are constituted.

**Discursive constitutions**

Within my analysis I have at once adopted and demonstrated the utility of a particular understanding of discourse. This suggests that a discourse is not cited and inscribed in isolation from a broader discursive field. Rather discourses intersect and interact. Furthermore, multiple discourses are cited and inscribed through discursive practices. These practices might be linguistic, textual, bodily, and/or otherwise. These citations and inscriptions might be intentional, tacit, and/or unintentional. What is meaningful and, indeed, meaningless within particular discursive frames is variously limited and constrained by their sedimented historicity.

Multiple discursive markets suffuse the school context and the locations, settings and moments within it. The school is not simply dominated by an authorised or hegemonic discourse. Rather, it is a site for authorised discourses as well as discourses which might be characterised as alternative, marginal, counter or oppositional. These discourses combine, coalesce, intersect and interact in various ways. In so doing, possibilities for identities are opened up, identity limits are demarcated and possibilities for identities are closed down. Nevertheless, particular discourses do seem to endure within the school.
context and traverse its locations, settings and moments. While these may be nuanced
and appear to include adaptation and surprises, a degree of predictability remains.

**Performative pupils**

By using the notion of performative interpellation I have shown how names constitute
particular types of subjects through the citation and inscription of enduring discourses. A
name is not guaranteed performative force and, where these performative interpellations
are successful, this success remains provisional: their endurance is never guaranteed.
The efficacy of performative names is mediated. Crucial to the provisional success of
the performative name is its intelligibility; the historicity of the discourses cited through
and inscribed by the name; and the specificity of the context in which the name is
uttered. Yet my analysis has also shown how these performative practices cannot be
understood as being simply linguistic or textual -- the embroilment of the body in
naming is evident.

By applying the notion of a performative habitus I have shown how enduring discourses
which are constitutive of particular types of subjects are cited and inscribed through
bodily practices. I have demonstrated how the subject and the body cannot be
understood as distinct, dichotomous or oppositional (as in mind/body, reason/nature),
but must both be understood as being constituted in and constitutive of discourse. That
is, my analysis has shown how the body is discursively constituted (as a prior, neutral
fact) and cannot be said to precede or predict the subject. This analysis insists that
discourse cannot be understood as synonymous with language (with the bodily, the
social or the cultural residing someplace 'outside' or 'beyond' discourse). Rather, this
analysis insists that discourse be understood as being constituted by and constitutive of
linguistic, textual, representation *and* bodily practices. By utilising these analytical tools
I have been able to demonstrate the nuances and minutiae of a multitude of mundane discursive practices through which identities are constituted.

My analyses have suggested that the performative practices of teachers and students cite and inscribe enduring discourses which are themselves underpinned by and constitutive of enduring hierarchical binary oppositions. I have also shown that each term of these binaries is not singular and demonstrated the complexities and further hierarchies within individual terms. I have detailed the citation and inscription of discourses of discreet, natural races based in phenotypes or physiognomies; dichotomous, biological sex; discreet, oppositional yet complementary genders; sex as causative of gender; and normative heterosexual masculinities and femininities. My analyses have suggested that, in citing such enduring discourses, these performative practices tend to constitute pupil identities within the terms of enduring and predictable categorisations.

My analysis has demonstrated the enduring privilege of biological discourse. This is underlined by the almost inescapable sense within these data that the categories of sex(-gender) and race are absolute in ways that (possibly) sexuality and (certainly) social class are not. I have shown how authorised discourses constitute race and sex as in/on the body; sexuality as of the body; and social class as social, impacting on, but not intrinsic to the body. My analysis has also shown that these are not sealed or unproblematic constitutions – they are fraught by contradiction and contestation. However, the ‘common sense’ of this characterisation is illustrative of the endurance of those discourses through which biological categorisations are performatively constituted as prior facts.
In my exploration of the practices of the pupils and teachers within this school context I have offered a series of specific observations which represent key aspects of my analysis. I have suggested that marginality is particularly significant to understanding the processes through which pupils constitute themselves and others. Marginality is deployed against others, that is, to Other, yet it is also deployed in the resistance and reinscription of such Othering. The Same/Other opposition is not stable, rather, it is struggled over and shifts across discursive fields.

I have shown how particular masculinities and femininities are constituted through an array of inter-linked binary oppositions within a matrix of normative heterosexuality. I have illustrated some of the ways in which heterosexual masculinities and femininities are constrained, for instance, through the man/boy and virgin/whore dichotomies. I have also highlighted possible resistance to, or resistances within accommodations of, these constraints, such as the moral scale. I have shown how masculinities and femininities which are imbued with particular status within particular contexts, such as hyper masculinity and ultra-desirable femininity, can trap pupils in other discursive fields.

In attempting to move beyond a notion of a White/Black dichotomy and understand the ways in which multiple not-White race identities are constituted and interact I have posited the Hierarchy within the Other. In seeking to understand the complexities with which race, gender and sexuality intersect and interact I have posited the Schema of raced hetero-sex. I have also shown how prestige within these discursive fields is recuperated and deployed within authorised discourse to evidence (constitute) the Black challenge to White hegemony.
I have shown how identity categories which are privileged in particular discursive fields can be deployed to mask identity categories which are undesirable with the same discursive field. This can be seen even when the category which is masked appears crucial to the constitution of the category which is deployed. I have also shown how a particular identity category can act to allow and/or disallow coexistence with certain other identity categories. Despite a multitude of moments of (variously efficacious) resistance, biographical identities which operate along intersecting axes of race, gender, sexuality and social class persist. These axes are open (in varying contexts) to multiple (but not illimitable) provisional constitutions and are pivotal to an array of overlapping and variously constituted sub-cultural and learner identities. Through this analysis the centrality of biographical identity categories has become evident. Sub-cultural and learner identities often seem to be constituted through discursive practices which simultaneously and implicitly cite and inscribe discourses which are constitutive of race, sex, gender, sexuality, social class.

My analysis has shown how enduring discourses constrain both the intelligibility and commensurability of identities. Furthermore, I have shown how particular constellations of identity categories become traps. These traps might be understood as the costs of efficacious constitutions of the self and Other. These constitutions inadvertently act to pin down, corner, demand, foreclose particular further identities. Perhaps this need not be seen as misfire or infelicity as the respective analyses of Derrida and Austin might suggest. Rather, this may be understood as the unforeseen or even acceptable cost of felicitous constitutions.

My analysis has also shown how identities can be resisted. I have explored the possibilities offered by a politics of performative resignification. My analyses of pupils'
performative practices have illustrated moments of this politics – I have shown pupils reinscribing and reinscribed again differently. I have also shown the limits, risks and provisionality of such reinscription. The endurance of authorised discourses means that such reinscriptions remain open to recuperation. The citationality and historicity of discourse means that such reinscriptions may misfire. The almost inevitable implicit citation of further discourses can contribute further to such misfire and/or recuperation.

Across multiple discursive fields, some identities are rendered intelligible, legitimate and desirable while others are rendered undesirable, illegitimate and even unintelligible. In this way, within the contexts of specific discursive fields, disavowed identities can be imbued with prestige (if only fleetingly) and coveted identities can be stripped of their status (albeit momentarily). Nevertheless, those identities which have traditionally been constituted as privileged within and through hegemonic discourses abide and continue to be constituted as such. There is no great throwing off or overthrowing of identities promised here.

**Identity constellations**

My analyses have shown how multiple identity categories can be constituted through single performatives. The identity category (or categories) to which a performative refers explicitly, frequently is not the only category (or categories) constituted through it. Rather, further categories are often cited and inscribed implicitly, even though these citations may be unintentional and/or unacknowledged. Furthermore, identity categories interconnect and interact in particular ways to inform the felicity or otherwise of performatives. These are chains of discursive constitutions, chains which are perpetually incomplete and at risk.
This suggests that it is unhelpful, if not impossible, to conceive of single identity categories in isolation. Rather, identities should be conceived of and interrogated as shifting, non-necessary constellations of categorisations, constellations which are themselves shifting and non-necessary. This is not to suggest that each category which is embroiled in such a constellation is discreet, sealed or has performative force outside the constellation. In many instances it seems that the constellation may be a pre-requisite for each category – the constitutive force of ongoing performative citations lends categories the appearance of singularity, independence, of being ‘outside’ the constellation.

I do not intend to suggest a hybridity, a bricolage, a construction which infers prior raw materials, essence, purity. The constellation of stars is meaningless until we join the dots, until we draw in the sky and impose meaning. If a point goes unconnected, the constellation fails – we cannot see the Bear and the constellation remains meaningless. Yet we join the dots in particular, abiding but non-necessary ways. We join the dots to make the Bear as we have done for centuries, but we need not join them in these ways. There are surely other pictures which could be drawn in the sky. Yet in this analogy the dot is not illusory – the star remains with or without the constellation. And I am returned to raw materials. Perhaps inevitably, I am left searching for language, for meaning. Perhaps what I illustrate is the enduring performative force of authorised discourse.

**Reflections**

Early in my analysis I stated that I did not intend to develop typologies of pupil identities. Nevertheless, I am left with a sense that to some extent such typologies are embedded implicitly within my analysis. I do not intend the constellations of pupil identities which I have detailed within this thesis to be understood as either exhaustive or universal. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the identities discussed here are
recognisable and are likely to be seen in other contexts, even though they may well be manifest in differing ways. The analytic approach I have developed is intended to have a degree of utility and applicability in relation to data generated in other settings.

At points in this thesis the simultaneous analysis of multiple identity categories has presented a significant challenge. At these points I have wondered whether I should have taken an established approach and organised my analysis around particular identity categories. This might have offered a chapter concerned with race, a chapter concerned with social class, a chapter concerned with gender and a chapter concerned with sexuality. I have resisted this approach, however, in order to facilitate my aim of detailing the particular ways in which identity categories interact within specific discursive markets. Nevertheless, my analysis has been concerned with identity categories. Within sections within chapters, particular identity categories do become prominent while others seem to be subsumed. On the other hand, particular identity categories appear repeatedly throughout the thesis. Rather than evidencing a return to singular categorisations, I hope that this illustrates the ways in which particular discursive markets foreground certain identities and disavow or silence others. Yet I remain aware that even if this thesis had focused exclusively upon a single Episode, a definitive and final reading of the identities constituted through it would not have been possible. Butler’s exhausted etcetera, discussed in Chapter 2, would have remained.

In my discussion of school ethnographies which opened this thesis, I noted that concern has been expressed over the apparent exaggeration of gender identities inside schools. It is not my intention to interrogate this assertion here. Rather, I want to explore the anxiety which seems to underpin it, an anxiety which I recognise. I sigh a disappointed “Oh no” as I see another generation of young people practicing variations on an array of
the same old identities. This “Oh no” leaves me with a sense of disquiet, a disquiet which is aggravated by its selectivity. I feel disappointed at the girls’ relentless pursuit of desirable femininity. I filter this body-reflexive through my abiding feminism which hoped (wished) ‘we’ (feminists?) had ‘saved’ today’s girls from this. Meanwhile I try hard not to notice the classed judgement implicit to this imagined salvation. On the other hand, when I feel concerned at the Black boys’ sub-cultural performatives, I am troubled by this body-reflexive. I filter this through the knowledge that these practices will almost certainly be deployed to the boys’ detriment, to racist outcome. Yet I am unnerved by the possibility that I am already participating in this deployment. I am left asking myself why I am (reasonably) comfortable with a project of ‘saving’ girls from hetero-femininity but would not dream of suggesting a similar salvation from/of Black masculinities.

This leads me to my concerns over the possibility that my analysis will be captured, recuperated, deployed in reactionary inscriptions. Or, indeed, that I have already inadvertently inscribed it so. Detailing the ways in which identities are constituted and deployed has required me to cite explicitly those discourses which are being inscribed implicitly. I have found myself discussing, describing, detailing a plethora of discourses through which racism, sexism, homophobia, class privilege are inscribed. I have asked myself whether I am sure that the reader will see that I am not positing these constitutions, that I am only exposing their operations. I have asked myself whether I am exposing my own implicit racism, sexism, homophobia, class privilege simply by recognising these discourses and their historicities, whether I want to ‘admit’ that I share the tacit knowledges on which these performatives rely. I have asked myself whether my attempts to deconstruct these discourses and expose the processes through which they make particular meaning outweighs the potentially constitutive force of my inevitable
citations. I have tried to minimise these various risks, yet I cannot be certain that I have succeeded. I retain a sense of disquiet – a disquiet which seems to be integral to this terrain.

Further Research

At various moments in this thesis I have shown how learner identities are constituted through the performative practices of pupils and teachers. I have shown how the discursive practices through which privileged sub-cultural and/or biographical identities are constituted can be recuperated and deployed within organisational discourse to constitute undesirable learner identities. In this way I have shown how biographical and sub-cultural identities interact with learner identities in particular ways, creating possibilities and setting constraints for various intelligible identities.

The discursive practices of the school organisation seem to suggest a hierarchy of learner identities which is marked by and interacts with pupils' biographical and sub-cultural identities. Organisational discourses are, in a variety of ways, underpinned by a notion of innate intelligence or ability. In such discursive frames notions of intelligence or ability inform fundamentally the type of learner a pupil can be (see Gillborn & Youdell 2000). Yet learner identities are not constituted solely through discourses of intelligence or ability. Learner identities are also closely linked with notions of school orientation. Within organisational discourses, the sociological distinction between school and educational orientation seems to be elided. School orientation seems to subsume and/or deny educational orientation. In turn, this school orientation becomes synonymous with levels of effort. Furthermore, organisational discourses of school orientation also appear to interact with discourses of behaviour and discipline. Indeed, it
seems that effort is often inseparable from compliance with school rules and values. As such school orientation becomes synonymous with acceptance of the school hegemony.

As this multiplicity of discourses interact, it seems that learners are constituted along axes of ability, effort, conduct – axes which themselves appear to interact with biographical identities through discourses of race, gender, social class. Within these constitutions there seems to be an inverse relationship between status in the mainstream pupil sub-culture and the organisational discourse of ideal, tolerable and undesirable learners. Indeed, practices which constitute high status in one of these discursive fields appear to be the very practices which constitute low status in the other. I have shown how Black sub-cultural identities are deployed within organisational discourse as evidence of (to constitute) undesirable learners. It seems reasonable to conjecture that pupils who are constituted as White, middle class, heterosexual are simultaneously constituted as ‘possessing’ high levels of ability and/or ‘exerting’ high levels of effort (“Boffins”). Furthermore, gender discourses may also act to differentiate between ability and effort – ability may be constituted as masculine, effort as feminine.

These connections are not new. The analytic tools offered here, however, are likely to enhance significantly understandings of the relationships between learner, biographical and sub-cultural identities. Research focusing specifically on the performative constitution of learner identities and their interactions within constellations of identity categories promises to further existing insights into how educational inequities are sustained and, indeed, how these might be shifted.

Throughout the preceding chapters I have explored the relative status of particular identity categories and the processes through which these are imbued with (or denied)
such status. In doing this I have discussed the significance of identity constellations and the discursive fields or markets within which these constellations are constituted and deployed. In my discussion of Butler’s engagement with Bourdieu (Chapter 2) I outlined the possibilities offered by understanding Bourdieu’s notions of capital and markets as discursive. While I have drawn on these ideas within this thesis, I have not explored fully either the specificities of how this might differ from or augment a notion of discursive fields, or the inevitably mobile relationships between performatively constituted identities and discursive capitals and markets. Further theoretical and empirical consideration of these issues promises to contribute a nuanced and focused account of the enduring relationships between identity categories and inequities.

Conclusion

My opening to this thesis posed the question of how inequities come to pivot around identity categories. This thesis has offered some tentative answers to this question. A series of specific understandings of identities are asserted by my analyses. Despite the abiding mind/body dichotomy, the body can be understood as accessible only through discourse – attempts to understand the body as preceding, distinct from, or extra to the discursively constituted subject are unhelpful, if not fallacious. Identity categories are not discreet, unitary or independent, but are best understood as constellations which are performatively constituted within discursive matrices. These potentially constituting discursive matrices bound those constellations of identity categories which are meaningful – which render a subject – and those which are unintelligible. These constellations can trap subjects within unforeseen or undesired constituting chains. Yet identity categories are intrinsic to meaningful subjecthood and cannot simply be jettisoned. Nevertheless, in the constitution of identities subjects act with discursively constrained intent, that is, subjecthood brings with it discursive agency. The potential
remains for identities to be resisted – the notion of a politics of performative resignification offers possibilities for disrupting normative meanings, shifting historicities, and inscribing identities again differently. A politics of performative resignification does not offer boundless possibilities. Rather, resignification is constrained by the endurance of the normative meanings and historicities of discourses. My analysis gives further insight, therefore, into the ways in which performatively constituted identities are entangled with, indeed, become the conditions for, enduring inequities.

This analysis does not offer any simple or straightforward solutions to education policy makers and practitioners concerned with educational inequities. Yet this does not mean that we cannot make interventions into these constituting processes. Indeed my analysis has shown that we are engaged constantly in performative practices. While we cannot close down the meaning or guarantee the felicity of our constitutions, we can be alert to their potentialities. Furthermore, as individual and groups of educationists, we can engage in a politics of performative resignification. It is essential that education policy makers and practitioners understand the processes through which identities are constituted within schools. The efficacy of any interventions for equity will be constrained massively if these do not address the minutiae of everyday life in school where the practices of teachers and pupils, and the discourses which pervade and their milieu, have enormous performative force.

It has been widely argued that marketisation and individualisation are integral to the disappearance of biographical identities within education policy discourse (see Arnot 2000). In such a discursive frame educational inequity, which was previously understood in terms of race, gender and/or social class disadvantage, becomes individualised.
Nevertheless, educational inequities continue to be marked by biographical identities. This is clearly seen in analyses of educational outcomes (see Gillborn & Gipps 1996; Gillborn & Youdell 2000). In an increasingly individualised policy context which refuses analyses concerned with groups based on biographical identities, this thesis underlines the importance of continuing to examine inequity in terms of race, gender and social class. This thesis makes a significant contribution to the methodological, theoretical and analytical tools through which the processes whereby these educational inequities are constituted can be understood.

Identity categories are inescapable, they are intrinsic to subjecthood. They render the subject by making it accessible and meaningful. Butler’s impossible scene, discussed in Chapter 2, suggests that there is no subject without these constituting categorisations. This suggests, then, that any political project cannot have as its aim the jettisoning of these categorisations. We cannot move beyond identities. Rather, the project might be to continually interrogate the performative practices through which these identity categories are constituted. We might aim to shift the meanings of these categorisations, to fracture their normative meanings, to reinscribe these meanings again differently.
Bibliography


333


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