A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE MODERNIZATION
OF MUSLIM EDUCATION IN EGYPT, PAKISTAN AND TURKEY
SINCE THEIR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

BY

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THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
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1974.
DEDICATION

This work is humbly dedicated to the undying memory of Dr. Allama Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal, the post-philosopher of Islam who, of all modernist Muslims, attempted to discover the dynamics for the reconstruction of Islamic thought in the modern age.

*****
A TRADITION

Muslims!

SEEK knowledge from cradle to grave, and search for it even if you are bound to go to China.

Prophet Muhammad.
(Peace be upon him)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to record my deep sense of gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Brian Holmes, B.Sc., Ph.D., Reader in Comparative Education at the University of London Institute of Education, whose insight into the field of Comparative Education in general and a critical guidance of my work in particular, have helped me a great deal in my search for the crucial questions involved in a comparative study of this nature. If a tribute is not out of place, I would like to add that whether in a tutorial meeting with him or during his seminars, Dr. Holmes unmistakably inculcates in his students a lasting interest in Comparative Education as a discipline and a critical approach to their own work.

My thanks are also due to Mrs. Ann Williamson, M.A. now Vice-Principal, Keswick Hall C.E. College of Education, Norwich who first undertook to supervise my work but who had to leave the Institute for Norwich. Mrs. Williamson’s guidance and help in the initial stages of the study were highly valuable.

The staffs of the libraries of the University of London Institute of Education, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London Library and the British Museum, where I found most of the materials, deserve a special word of thanks. Mrs. Thelma Bristow, incharge Comparative Education Library and her team of assistants especially Mr. Robert Williams, Mr. Neil McLeod and Miss Eva Tremaine were particularly helpful, and I am highly appreciative of their co-operation. I would also like to thank the University of Chicago for preparing and sending over for my use, a microfilm of Dr. Richard Maynard’s thesis titled, “The Lise and its Curriculum in the Turkish Educational System”, and also the Princeton University, Department of Economics Industrial Relations Section for permitting me to reproduce some data from their publication titled, “Quantitative Analysis of Modernization and Development”. I am grateful to Mrs. Valerie Pollock who helped to polish the idiom and style of the manuscript.

In 1968, when I was employed by the Ministry of Education of Saudi Arabia and worked in the Holy city of Makka, I had the honour of interviewing Maulana Sayyid Abu’l Ala Maududi, Amir (President) Jamaat-i-Islam of Pakistan. Excerpts from the interview are included in the study as Appendix B. Maulana’s views on the various points raised by me regarding modernization and the Muslim Education speak for themselves. For my own part, however, I will always cherish the affection with which the Maulana received me and the sincerity with which he answered my questions. I am grateful to the Maulana for his readily affording me time of his extremely busy schedule in Makka and for his hospitality.

Last, but not least, I shall not miss to thank my wife and children who have given me great moral support, often sacrificing their prior demands on my time during the period of this study.

M.S.Agha.
This study takes Cyril E Black’s definition of modernization to denote "the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man’s knowledge, permitting control over his environment that accompanied the scientific revolution", and, is an attempt at gauging such an adaptation and the problems involved in it in the educational sphere of three typical Muslim countries. It follows Brian Holmes’s "Problem Approach" by identifying a 'problem' and studying 'solutions' to it in comparative perspective. The study is divided into four parts.

Part I is devoted to the 'intellectualization of the problem' in its 'ideal-typical' dimension. A rational construct of the normative order of modernity, defining the nature of modern man, modern society and modern knowledge, has been drawn in Chapter 2. A similar construct for the normative order of Islam has been simulated in Chapter 3, and a comparison between the two drawn.

Part II assesses the development of the gaps that developed between the normative and the institutional aspects of Muslim societies as a result of their introduction of modern institutions, and examines 'solutions' to eradicate them. Chapter 4 draws three parallel models of nationalisms that developed in these countries as ideological bases for modernization, that is: Turkish secular nationalism; Egyptian Arab nationalism and Pakistani Islamic nationalism. Chapter 5 traces their respective implications and commitments to the modernization of Muslim education.

Part III attempts to assess the actual development of modernization in context along the lines of the 'proposed' policies. This has been done in three case studies, one on each country, in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in a systems approach as input-output functions of the educational system.

Part IV is devoted to the comparative analysis and conclusions. In Chapter 9 a comparative quantitative analysis of the performance of the three countries under study on the indexes of overall modernization, and then educational modernization, has been made to corroborate findings in the case studies. Chapter 10 draws broader conclusions for the prospects and obstacles involved in the modernization of Muslim societies and the role of education in the process.

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INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM

In cultural encounters, asserts Professor Toynbee,
"One thing leads to another ... 
If a splinter is flaked off from one culture and is introduced into a foreign body social, this isolated splinter will tend to draw in after it, into the foreign body in which it has lodged, the other component elements of the social system in which this splinter is at home and from which it has been forcibly and unnaturally detached. The broken pattern tends to reconstitute itself in a foreign environment into which one of its components has once found its way."  

In line with Toynbee's thesis, by the turn of the present century, nationalism emerged in the various then colonised societies, as the ideological strand promising the subjugated peoples their liberation and reformation. Modernist-nationalist leaders sought legitimacy for their modernization programmes both from the colonial overlords and from their backward compatriots. They took upon themselves the dual task of achieving national independence and then of building up a modern, viable society. Since then, most of the colonised countries all over the world have become independent national states. Invariably they subscribe to modern norms which have been included in their National Constitutions.

In the world of Islam, the first modern nation state to emerge on these lines was the Republic of Turkey under the forceful leadership of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk departed from the Muslim tradition by dislodging the historic ruling Muslim institutions of Khilafah (caliphate), Shariah (the Islamic law), and the Ulama (guardians of the Faith). With

these went traditional Muslim educational institutions; the Madrassahs and the Mektabs; and the content, as well as media of instruction, i.e. Arabic and Persian, the hitherto accepted vehicles of Islamic culture.

In their place, he promised to give his people a modern democratic polity, a modern 'self-regulating' economy, and modern systems of law and education, which would make the Turkish nation to learn to be free, progressive and rationalist in outlook.

Next, in 1947, an independent 'Islamic' State of Pakistan, was created which confirmed Toynbee's view, and was motivated by the same modernising ideals, albeit logically antithetical to Ataturk's. It was the next historic event in the World of Islam. Other Muslim nations then appeared on the world map, one after the other, interposing their rationale for modernity in between these two ends of the spectrum, yet all committed to the ideals of modernization. Whatever varying ideological postures they have adopted to legitimise their proposed modes of modernization, the common denominator among them has been that they all rejected the traditional interpretations of Islam, particularly its traditional institutional arrangement, as vestiges of medievalism. They all agreed on the need for urgent and basic changes in the institutional set-up to ensure the progress of their societies; indeed, they have accepted modern and alien institutions as instruments of reform in their own societies. With this acceptance there had also to follow a gradual change in their system of values. The important thing is that change as such has now come to be regarded as desirable and beneficial.

But the urge to transform and modernize was not simply a desideratum that gripped the Muslim leaders suddenly in the present

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2. The makers of Pakistan seemed to reject, at least apparently, the holism of cultural borrowing stressed by Ataturk.
century. In fact it marks the tip of an iceberg. Beneath it lay the colossal problem of the great socio-cultural lag that has beset Muslim societies ever since the eighteenth century when alien modern technology as well as institutions were introduced, either by the Muslim potentates on their own or by the colonial powers. Holding fast to their own system of values Muslims of course did not become ready converts to the new order. With the passage of time and driven by necessity, however, they latterly did begin to participate in it, and participation led to a degree of normative change. Yet the underlying inconsistency between their traditional values and modern norms remained unresolved. This study views the problem in terms of the historical inconsistency that has been forthcoming in the Muslim societies in modern history.

The questions examined in this study are (1) Assuming that modernization of Muslim Societies is proving tedious, are the causes to be found in the inconsistency between the traditional value-systems of the Muslims and the norms of modernity? (2) And if so, are they to be traced back to the ideological rationale that were devised by Muslim societies to justify modernization? (3) To what extent were modern norms incorporated into the national normative framework of constitutions, statutes, charters or programmes? And (4) how was Muslim education involved in the modernization programmes?

A comparative analysis is useful because a comparison of similar features in a diagnosis of common problems would provide broad scope for generalizations. Various approaches to the comparative study of education have been suggested in the growing literature on comparative education. Holmes' 'Problem Approach' is considered most suitable for this study for he urges on the comparativist the need to search for inconsistencies that may inhibit change in educational systems of societies.3 Looking critically

at the role education may play in a changing social system, he then
suggests that the researcher should analyse a selected problem by referring
to 'critical dualism' whereby both the normative and the institutional
patterns in the educational systems may be examined; to look for the 'fit'
or 'misfit'. Holmes' approach requires the comparativist, having once
identified the universal, vaguely perceived problem, to intellectualise
or analyse it in general terms and then to reveal its specific features in
selected context". 4 It would then be necessary to trace policy proposals
and to identify factors relevant to the enquiry. 5

Intellectualization of the Problem

Since the term "modernization" itself is still ambiguous and can be
interpreted variously, it is necessary first to define "modernization";
and secondly, to show how education has been employed as instrumental in
the modernization of the features of society to be compared.

Modernization: the concept

The term "modernization" seems to have come in vogue, after a process
of some refinements, only after World War II. Basically, it denotes
processes by which social and cultural lags are removed in certain societies,
though scholars have tended to interpret it in different ways. A synoptic
view of the term, according to Professor Henry Bernstein, would suggest
two major assumptions: (1) "that modernization is a total social process
associated with (or subsuming) economic development in terms of the
preconditions, concomitants, and consequences of the latter, (2) that this
process constitutes a universal pattern". 6 But many scholars have wanted

4. ibid. p.35.
5. ibid.
6. Henry Bernstein, "Modernization Theory and the Sociological Study of
   Development", in the Journal of Development Studies, Vol 7,
to divest modernization of its economic determinism, and focus on the very
dynamic of change per se that has been recognised as desirable by
individuals and societies for their betterment. Following from an accept-
ance of change, and contrary to the suspicion and fear of it as found in
traditional thinking, it is the generic nature of change and its concomitant attributes, 'rationality and positivism'\textsuperscript{7} and not the economic development alone, that have come to be acknowledged as the potent motive force for producing social, economic and political changes for the emancipation of mankind. Stressing the idea of change in modernization, Weiner remarks:

"Because the term is so loosely used, it is tempting to drop it entirely and to speak more precisely of changes occurring in individual attitudes, in social behaviour, in economics, and in politics. But scholars persist in using the term not only because it is a part of popular speech, but also because they recognize that these many changes are related to one another - that many countries in the developing world are today experiencing a comprehensive process of change which Europe and America once experienced and which is more than the sum of many small changes."\textsuperscript{8}

Historical Sequence

The historical emergence of these basic norms of modernization: i.e. change, rationality and positivism, has been traced back to the twelfth century 'Renaissance' when throughout the world Greek learning returned to Europe via the Muslims of Spain, and a new spirit of critical thinking emerged.\textsuperscript{9} Hitherto, throughout the recorded history, all over


\textsuperscript{9} Highlighting this diffusion of the Greek and Islamic learning remarks Haskin, "When, in the twelfth century, the Latin world began to absorb this oriental lore, the pioneers of the new learning turned chiefly to Spain where one after another sought the key to knowledge in mathematics and astronomy, astrology and medicine and philosophy which were there stored up; and throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Spain remained the land of mystery, of the unknown, yet knowable, for enquiring minds beyond the Pyrenees. The great adventure of the European Scholar lay in the Peninsula." Charles H. Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, Meriam Books, Cleveland N.Y. 1970, pp.285-286.
the world, change per se had been held in suspicion. Then the most prized norm was that stability and the 'trodden path' ought to be preserved. Innovators were persecuted. As La Pierre has asserted "secular and sacred thought of the Western as well as the Islamic Society throughout the Middle Ages, was hardly more than a rationalization of the status quo ... Not until Locke (1632-1704) did there appear a social philosopher who directly and consistently sanctioned change ... as a desirable and justifiable process."\(^{10}\) To be sure, the process was slow, and it was not until the close of the eighteenth century that the crystallizations of a 'modernizing society' were discernible in England, France and Holland.\(^{11}\) Until the nineteenth century, the process of modernization unfolded exclusively in the 'crucible' of Western Europe, precipitated in the events of the Age of Exploration, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Counter Reformation, the French political Revolution and the English Industrial Revolution. Each of these upheavals marked a step forward towards the transformation of traditional, medieval lifestyles to modernity. From this series of events, Europe emerged with a new vigour, a new dynamic of change, which the Europeans have in turn, within the last two or so centuries, introduced into the rest of the world.\(^{12}\)

With this historical background, it was natural that the term "modernization" was preceded by such terms as "Europeanization" and "Westernization" which were indeed considered synonymous with it, but which seem now to have lost their appeal mainly because of their ethnocentric connotations. Modernization which apparently discounts ethnocentrism appears to be gaining global recognition in its import, though objectors still question its complete neutrality. A rather more refined

and somewhat seemingly universalistic definition of modernization devised by Eisenstadt, for instance, runs like this:

"Historically, modernization is the process of change towards those types of social, economic, and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian and African continents." 13

Bernstein has criticised this mainly American style of defining modernization, because of, among other things, its ethnocentrism. Yet his own suggested mode of classification, which he suggests must be viewed from the colonial perspective, is not far removed from ethnocentrism. 14 Scholars looking at the process of change from the point of view of the developing societies themselves, seem to want to eschew ethnocentric theories of modernization completely. They appear to suggest that in the long view of the history of human development, the European-colonial impact, though the most powerful so far, should still be regarded as a transitory phase: it should not, as Tipps protests, "be patterned after a rather Utopian image of 'western society'." 15

Now that the whole range of societies, with variant cultural backgrounds, have decisively and voluntarily ventured to march on to the road to modernization, and alternative paths and shortcuts are being explored, the process has become


14. H.Bernstein, op.cit. "This conceptualization, the colonial situation as a historical and total social phenomenon asserts Prof. Bernstein, both substantively and as reflecting a different tradition of sociological analysis, stands in direct contrast to that derived from modernization theory which is precluded from identifying the dynamics and contradictions of the colonial situation as sui generis by a concomitant to analysis in terms of 'traditional' and 'modern' elements which can only yield a dynamic in the concept of transition or movement along a traditional-modernity continuum". pp.153-54.

more universal and on-going. They therefore, want to see modernization
defined as an open-end concept.

Alberto G-Ramos, for instance, suggests a clear distinction to
be kept in mind between Theory N (Necessity) and Theory P (Possibility),
as each is implied within the understanding of modernization. "The
main assumption of Theory N; as far as modernization is concerned"
asserts Ramos:

"is that there is a law of historical necessity that
impels every society to try to attain the stage
occupied by the so-called developed or modernized
societies. These societies reveal to the so-called
developing societies the image of their future ..."

"In contrast, Theory P has two main characteristics,
in relation to modernization: (1) it supposes that
modernity is not located in any specific part of the
world; that the process of modernization is not to
be oriented to any Platonic archetype; and (2) it
holds that any nation, whatever it contemporary
configuration, always has its own possibilities of
modernization, the implementation of which can be
disturbed by the simple imposition of a frozen,
normative model, extrinsic to those possibilities." 16

Ethnocentrism manifests itself most keenly when modernity and
tradition are posed as polarities. As Tipps has pointed out,

"This dichotomisation of modern-traditional suggests
that traditional societies are essentially static ...
that from the perspective of tradition-modernity
contrast, history begins with the transition from
traditional to modern society. Since this transition
is generally assumed to have begun in non-western areas
as a result of contact with European Societies, this
amounts to an implicit denial of the relevance of the
pre-contact experience of those areas to their
subsequent development t" 17

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in Beling, and Totten (eds) Developing Nations: Quest for a

even goes further and stresses that
"a proper understanding of the cause of under-development
and the problem arising out of this under-development can
be arrived at only if it is fully understood in the context
of growth of the world-wide capitalist system from its
mercantilist, industrial, to its latest imperialist phase
of development where a few countries around the Atlantic
developed as the exploiting countries and the rest of the
colonial and semi-colonial countries as the under-developed
periphery ... According to scholars leaning towards the
Marxist approach, the entire rhetoric of development, aid
and modernization is evolved by the scholars of the
But observations and fieldwork studies of the so-called 'traditional' societies in the process of modernization show that, far from being obstacles, certain traditions of such societies may even facilitate change by providing the central integrative anchorage. To quote Tippa again:

"As knowledge of pre-contact history has increased, however, such a static image of traditional societies has proven untenable. In fact, traditional societies appeared changeless because they were once defined in a manner that allowed no difference between traditions and recognised no significant change save that in the direction of Western experience."

So, with such searching insight into the nature of modernization, a continual refinement of the concept has become a major concern of scholars. But whatever academic connotations may be associated with the concept, the reality of the unprecedented and fantastic tempo of change that characterises life today is not to be denied. This affects all aspects of life today. It affects the beliefs, norms and values as well as the institutions and organisations. All are in a rapid process of all-round change, and this change is being welcomed and planned. As an all-embracing and multi-dimensional process, modernization is increasingly attracting the indulgence and scrutiny of various social-science scholars who try to pinpoint the most important aspect of it and to define the order of priorities in the process. Each considers it from his own point of view.

An economist sees it primarily as the increase in growth per head of a nation's income enabling its citizens to enjoy a better standard of

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17. 'Western societies', is in reality the cloak to hide the fact (contd.) of a new form of exploitation and as a subtle defence of the policies which are not intended to overcome their backwardness ... They assert that the capitalist class and the colonial exploitation is the historic course and the contemporary cause of under-development and must be eliminated first to permit such development.

living. According to Rostow, for example, modernization is a watershed which marks the 'take-off' into the 'self sustained growth' of traditional economies which had up to then remained 'episodic, spasmodic and localised'. The 'take-off' is then followed by a push towards industrial maturity, leading towards an era of high mass-consumption made possible by high average income and the resilience of the perfected industrial processes. Similarly, Levy, though he seems to reject the economic determinism of Rostow, implicitly reinforces the production to this aspect of modernization by stressing industrialisation and technology. He measures the degree of modernization in terms of the "uses of inanimate source of power and/or the use of tools to multiply the effects of their efforts" and draws a distinction on these lines between relatively modernized and relatively non-modernized societies.

A political scientist equates modernization with the *processes of differentiation of political structure and secularization of political culture which enhances the capability --- the effectiveness and efficiency of performance --- of a society's political system." Within this broad definition, certain features of change in the polity receive greater importance. Shils for instance, emphasizes the 'progressive sharing' by the generality of the public in the polity as the most outstanding feature of political modernization. But he accepts variant types of deviant political systems, such as 'tutelary democracy', 'modernizing oligarchy,' 'totalitarian oligarchy', and 'traditional oligarchy' which emerge and struggle for their survival before their final evolution into a viable system of 'progressive sharing.' According to Apter, modernization is a process

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20. See Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol 10, s.v.'Modernization' pp.395-6
'of increasing complexity in human affairs within which the polity must act'. 22 Coleman stresses the element of competition in the polity as the essential theme in political modernization. 23 Parsons, Smelser and Eisenstadt stress the evolution of institutional differentiation as the focal 'evolutionary universal' in the process of modernization. 24

Psychologist McClelland explains the 'rise and fall of civilizations' (he mentions the Greek city-states, the Romans, modern western civilization and also Japan) in terms of a kind of 'mental virus' called 'n-ach' (short for 'need for Achievement'), "that is to say, a certain way of thinking that was relatively rare but which, when it occurred in an individual, tended to make him behave in a particularly energetic way." 25 This 'n-ach' impulse among individuals, he argues, inspires and causes economic growth and modernization. Similarly, Lerner has coined a psycho-dynamic concept of 'empathy' which, though not causal to modernization, accelerates it by helping individuals to adjust to change. 26

To a sociologist, modernization is the kind of social change in which, largely because of economic and political mobilization, individuals and groups reshape values, norms and institutions to adapt to an ever-changing environment. Sociologists stress the processes of differentiation, social control and integration as well as "massification of power, respect,


24. ibid.


rectitude, affection, well-being, skill, enlightenment" emerging during and as a result of modernization. 27

Corresponding to these conflicting viewpoints on the causal factors of modernization, scholars also put different emphases on causal sequences in modernization. Some argue that a dynamic change in the outlook and behaviour of the individual is a prerequisite to modernization, particularly if it is to become a self-sustaining process. Others contend that strategic structural changes introduced in the institutional framework of a society, in turn, generate new values, outlooks and behaviour.

Faced with these difficulties involved in an attempt to conceptualise a consistent and universally acceptable theory of modernization, a student is left with the only alternative of making a subjective choice from among the various definitions. This study, therefore, accepts Cyril E. Black's definition as a starting point, mainly because of its universality, dynamic nature and also because it recognises the importance of historical evolution. Black considers modernization, in general terms, as

the dynamic form that the age-old process of innovation has assumed as a result of the explosive proliferation of knowledge in recent centuries. It owes its special significance to its dynamic character and to the universality of its impact on human affairs. It stems initially from an attitude that society can and should be transformed: that change is desirable. 28

To put it more succinctly, Black defines modernization as:

the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution. 29

27. Although 'Social Change' and 'modernization' have been commonly used in literature as synonyms, Bendix has differentiated between the two by emphasizing the 'extrinsic origin' and the intensity of speed of modernization contrasted with the 'intrinsic origin' and slowness of social change. See Reinhard Bendix, "What is Modernization" in Beling and Totten, (Eds) Developing Societies, op.cit. Chapter 1, pp.3-20.


29. ibid.
Apart from its explicit cultural neutrality, this definition presents modernization as a multi-dimensional, rather than a reductive process.\textsuperscript{30} It, furthermore, lays stress on the transformation rather than the transference of institutions, thereby allowing flexibility and room for possible and diverse developments to take shape as various societies and cultures set out to modernize themselves. Another important feature of this definition is its overt rejection of any reductionism. Again it does not pose modernity and tradition as antithetical. "Modernization," asserts Black, must be thought of not as a simple transition from tradition to modernity, but as part of an infinite continuum from the earliest times to the indefinite future.\textsuperscript{31} Its special significance for the students of education lies in the fact that it views modernization basically as a 'sociology of knowledge' which in turn offers an impulse for change and readjustment to all other aspects of life. Hence its implications for the cognitive aspect:

**How Modernization takes place**

Black regards the following four phases as watersheds that mark, though not abruptly, 'certain critical problems that all modernising societies must face':

1. **The Challenge of Modernity** - the initial confrontation of a society, within its traditional framework of knowledge, with modern ideas and institutions, and the emergence of advocates of modernity;

**30. The multi-dimensional development of all aspects of social life seem to be central to the concept modernization. Edita Vojas looking at the concept from the viewpoint of under-developed countries, observes,**

"I consider modernization as a process of manifold interrelated changes in the economic, social, political and cultural fields through which less developed societies acquire the characteristics of more developed societies".

**Edita Vojas, "Problems connected with Modernization of Under-developed societies" in A.R.Desai, Essays in Modernization of Under-developed Societies. op. cit. pp.493-504**

31. ibid. p.54.
2. The Consolidation of Modernising Leadership - the transfer of power from traditional to modernizing leaders in the course of a normally bitter revolutionary struggle often lasting several generations.

3. Economic and Social Transformation - the development of economic growth and social change to a point where a society is transformed from a predominantly rural and agrarian way of life to one predominantly urban and industrial; and,

4. the Integration of Society - the phase in which economic and social transformation produces a fundamental re-organization of the social structure throughout the society." (32)

He then describes the current types of innovations associated with the concept 'modernization' as is understood in the present times in their historical perspective. Taking the year 1789, the year of the French Revolution, as the generally agreed 'milestone' in the development of modernization, he ranks the 170 contemporary 'politically organised societies' by seven distinguishable patterns measured chronologically from the date when 'the consolidation of modernising leadership' started to take place in them. 33

Thus, pattern one applies to England (1649-1832) and France (1789-1848), the earliest societies to modernize. 34 In pattern two falls the 'New World' i.e. the offshoot countries of Britain and France, the U.S.A., Canada, Australia and New Zealand where consolidation of modernising leadership took place between 1776-1907.

32. ibid. pp. 67-89. "The logic of these four successive phases" suggests Black, "must be seen in the context of wide divergences of levels of development, and the modernization of each society must be understood in terms of its own traditional heritage, resources and leadership. A comparison of many societies in terms of these phases is useful as a means of visualising modernization as a worldwide process, but this does not mean that any given society can gauge its course by the experience of those that have preceded it except in general terms." pp. 88-89.

33. ibid. 89-128.

34. In regarding the year 1789 as the 'base year', although the English Revolution preceded it, Prof. Black argues that, "the subsequent restoration was so prolonged in England that it is often lost to sight as a germinal stage of political modernization ... French Revolution, on the other hand, contributed both ideology and institutions that were widely imitated. Throughout Northern, Central and Southern Europe, French ideas and institutions were introduced directly by the armies of Napoleon. French republicanism was the model for modernizing leaders in much of the Muslim world as well as Latin America." pp.107-108
Pattern three applies to the rest of the European societies where consolidation of modernizing leadership began indirectly, induced by the French Revolution.

In pattern four are included the offshoots of these European societies in the New World, i.e. the 22 Latin American countries. "These societies differ from those in the second pattern also populated predominantly by immigrants from the Old World, apart from differences in their bases of resources and skills" - asserts Black - "in that modernization came later, was to a much greater degree under foreign influence, and was influenced in particular by those societies of the third pattern that were inclined to place the least emphasis on modernization".35

In the fifth pattern are listed societies that 'modernised without direct outside intervention but under indirect influence of pattern one societies e.g. Russia, Japan, China, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Thailand.'

Finally, in patterns six and seven are included the rest of the 'Third World' countries.

The thirty-four newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, and twenty-nine dependent countries with a sufficiently developed traditional culture, are placed in the sixth pattern; while about thirty-one independent and 20 dependent societies which "did not have religion, or language or political institutions sufficiently developed at the time they faced the challenge of modernity, to be readily adaptable to modern conditions,"36 are placed in the seventh pattern.

According to this historical classification, the three countries studied are placed proximately, though Turkey, mainly because modernization there was inspired by the French Revolution directly and not through colonial rule, has gained priority over the other two. But they all lived

35. ibid. pp.106-128.
36. ibid.
through the first phase, 'the challenge of modernity', almost simultaneously as will be seen later. Having gone through the first two stages, all the three since their national independence, (Turkey 1924, Pakistan 1947 and Egypt 1952) are now engaged in the processes of the third phase, i.e. the phase of 'economic and social transformation'.

It would, therefore, be appropriate and revealing to trace the kind of changes experienced in this phase in the hope that this would help, in a general way, to construct a strategy for the modernization of the societies under study.

It appears that, although with the creation of a nation-state, consolidation of modernising leadership, by and large, is assured, yet the struggle, in some situations, may still continue. However, the 'transformation' phase "represents the period between the accession of political power of modernising leaders and the development of a society to the point at which it is predominantly urban and the focus of mobilization of the great majority of population is toward the society as a whole rather than toward local communities and specialised groups." 37

Other focal changes that distinguish this phase can be summarised as under:

1. 'The changes in values and way of life of the average person' as gauged from the experience of the advanced countries, during this phase is greater than the previous ones.

2. A concomitant of this normative transformation has been the dramatic growth of science and technology.

3. "The concentration of effort required by economic and social transformation is focused primarily at the level of the politically organised society, the national state or polity, rather than at the local or the international level." National integration and solidarity are important.

37. ibid. p.37.
4. "As a result of economic mobilization, a large-scale transfer of work-force of a society from agriculture to manufacturing, transport, commerce and services takes effect."

5. "There is also a considerable broadening of the base of the ruling group as the sources of recruitment change from landownership to business, commerce, and areas of activity requiring university-trained specialists. The executive, managerial and service strata may come to embrace as much as one-half the population of a society."

How these changes are in fact introduced and achieved depends largely on the policies of the leadership and the circumstances of each country. The process can be slow, prolonged and liberal, as in the case of the West-European countries; or it can be radical and controlled, as in the communist countries. Black, for example, regards the 'liberal' and the 'controlled' strategies as alternative choices, each with its own priorities and consequences. "The tightly centralised direction of the Soviet State", he emphasizes, "resulted in a rapid economic and social transformation, but only at a high cost in human suffering". The choice, in the long run, has to be made by each society in the context of its own ideology, socio-cultural priorities and the nature of its modernizing leadership. Whatever method is employed, modernizing societies, in this phase, must face certain common problems. In general, in such societies, concludes Black,

"Value systems always seem to lag somewhat behind economic and social developments (e.g. social mobilization, urbanization, extension of universal literacy and equalization of opportunity, etc.) and the assumptions and outlook of leaders in this phase remain under the strong influence of the traditional agrarian and rural frame of reference. Indeed, the work force itself, as it moves from the countryside to the cities, retains many of its rural modes of thought and life. Village traditions are carried over into the cities, and the deference of peasant to landlord is transmuted into"

38. ibid. pp.76-80
the respect of the poorly educated for the technically trained. Similarly minority groups retain many of their disabilities throughout this phase despite the actual changes in their status and the cosmopolitan goals of the society. A kind of agrarian cushion protects the bulk of the population from the hardships of urban life, but at the same time delays the fulfilment of their expectations." (39)

In the light of these changes and problems, a possible valid strategy for the modernization of such societies would be somewhat like this:

1. Directed changes in the normative and value systems by means of ideological orientations committed to modernization and spelled out in the national constitution.

2. Institutionalization of the processes of innovation in the context of national needs, problems and ideology, to make modernization an on-going and self-sustaining process.

3. Planned expansion and differentiation of the institutional structure of the society matched with the construction of the necessary infrastructure to accommodate a greater use of technology.

Modernization and Education

There seem to be two ways in which education and modernization are mutually involved. In the first place, education is seen as a variable of modernization, and in the second, it becomes an object of modernization. Both the implications are significant, when the modernization of a traditional system such as the Muslim education is to be studied.40

39. ibid. p.80.

40. The distinction between the concepts of 'Islamic' and 'Muslim' institutions, though both terms are used indiscriminately by many authors, has been drawn clearly in the Muslim world. An 'Islamic' state, for example, is regarded as the State which commits itself by definition, to continuing and developing the historical process of law as developed by classical jurists; while a 'Muslim' state can be a secular or secularised state, "the majority of whose citizens are Muslims of varying degrees of observance or non-observance, but attached to Islamic culture and history, to the ethics of the Quran and the many considerable achievements in all fields of human endeavour." See AZIZ AHMAD, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, (1857-1964), O.U.P. London/Bombay/Karachi, 1967, p.267. A similar distinction can be drawn between the Islamic and the Muslim Education. The former would mean the classical-traditional system inherited from the past or the Islamic Studies as introduced within the present-day Higher Education system. Muslim Education is taken in this study to mean the total formally organised educational effort of a Muslim society, for the Muslims, preparing them as members of the Muslim community and citizens of a modern Muslim country.
Since modernization, as defined above, is a multi-dimensional, complex process, education is an integral subsystem of this complex. As Shipman has suggested, "education can only be meaningfully studied as a part of many social institutions ... and, in the light of the functions that it serves during modernization." 41

Basically, education in a modern, or modernizing society, serves to provide the best possible link between the modernizing personality and his surrounding socio-cultural environment. Here, education is consciously employed by modern societies as an instrument of change in the political and economic and social systems. For this reason, the priority assigned to education in the programme of modernization is not out of place. In fact, some scholars have gone as far as to assert that "Education is the key that unlocks the door to modernization." 42 Others, however, are less sanguine in considering education as the 'chief variable' of modernization. Professor C.A. Anderson, for example, looking back at the earlier phases of modernization of the pioneer modern societies, England and France and others, points out that "in spite of the apparent economic superiority of the best-education nations of the world, there is little direct evidence of the contribution that education has made to their modernization." 43

Similarly, with regard to the developing countries, particularly the African, Professor P.J. Foster stresses that "schools are remarkable clumsy instruments for inducing prompt large scale change in under-developed countries." 44


43. C. Anderson. op.cit. p. 72.

Without going into the question of the consumer versus producer values of formal education, or the debates on the economics of education, concerning which a sizeable literature seems to be developing, it can safely be assumed that there is a vital interaction between a social system and its educational subsystem during the modernization programme. The precise significance of education in the modernization of a particular society depends very much upon its peculiar circumstances and the stage of its development. Much also depends on how well education is organised and harnessed to foster socio-political integration, and to promote norms of modernity. Ineptly handled, it can become regressive and dysfunctional to the socio-political integration, or indeed a tool in the hands of ideologues to perpetuate traditionalism in their own interests. As Anderson has aptly concluded,

"The best assurance for a stimulating and constructive educational system is to surround it with a society that has vigorous impulses towards change and initiative. Schools alone are weak instruments of modernization; but when well-supported, they are powerful". (45)

The functions of education in a modern society have been subsumed under three headings, described by Shipman as socialization, schooling and education. As a socialising agency, education is the vehicle for the integration of the young into the dominant national or group values. Schooling prepares them for their social placement and equips them with occupational and professional qualifications enabling them to perform their 'secondary roles' in the society. Education, in a broader sense, is regarded as an agency for social and political control. In this last respect, it is responsible for the creation of an elite force, the Modernizing Leadership which spearheads innovations and sustains modernization. These functions can equally be classified as economic, political, social and cultural.

45. C.A. Anderson, op.cit. p.80.
46. M.D. Shipman, op.cit. pp 33-35.
In order to perform these various functions, the educational system itself must undergo structural, administrative and content transformations.

All the functional and intrasystem changes that education undergoes during modernization can, as Adams and Coombs have suggested, be usefully studied by using the 'systems approach' whose relevance in the social science disciplines has been widely recognised by numerous social scientists and research scholars. According to Coombs, the indicators of different studies vary, but the strategy can remain constant. Don Adams uses the systems approach particularly in the study of education and modernization in a comparative context. The following set of variables appear relevant to this study:

**Societal Features as Inputs into the Educational System**

1. **Ideological-Normative:** Ideological orientations as expressed in the national norms that put a demand on the education system to broaden 'mental horizon'.

2. **Political mobilization:** Demand placed on the education system for the creation of modernizing leadership - the innovators.

3. **Economic mobilization:** Demand placed on the educational system for the creation of trained manpower as the 'problem-solving' force.

4. **Social mobilization:** Demand placed on the educational system for social and national integration as well as social mobility. Education is also an item of social welfare.

5. **Cultural mobilization:** Demand placed on the education system for cultural change and for stability.

**Within Educational System Transformation**

1. **Administrative modernization:** Differentiation of the educational system to accommodate the various community, technical and managerial interest in the formulation, adoption and implementation of educational policy at the national, regional and local levels.

2. **Structural Differentiation:** The division and diversification of the educational institutions according the functions they are required to serve.

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<td>INNOVATIVE CULTURE</td>
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<td>INTEGRATIVE CULTURE</td>
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3. Expansion of the Capacity: Expansion of the educational system to provide education for the maximum numbers according to the targets set by the various input demands.

Educational Outputs as Inputs into the Society

1. Value-System Change: By enlarging the 'cognitive map' of those exposed to it, education inculcates values alternative to those of the traditional value-system. It inspires the impulse for 'n achievement' and mobility. This change is incorporated in the new aims of education and measured by the various indices of modernization.

2. Political outputs: Modernizing Leadership is directly produced by the educational system and can be measured by the strength of the civil-military bureaucracy, intellectuals and other cadres of political administration, as recruited from the University outputs.

3. Economic Outputs: The educational outputs to the economy can be measured by the trained manpower either of white-collar and/or blue-shirt workers.

4. Social Outputs: Social integration and mobility is created by the educational system into society as a whole by the provision of widespread or universal literacy.

5. Cultural Outputs: Education output into culture is manifested by the quest of the innovative-rational and scientific culture as well as the integrative role of religious and language education.

These input and output functions as well as the intra system changes are shown in the diagram opposite.

Assumptions and Hypothesis:

This study assumes that modernization in the Muslim Societies is now an accepted fact. Even the traditionalist elements in Muslim societies welcome modernization programmes. The success or failure of modernization does not necessarily depend on traditionalism alone. A variety of factors can contribute to the success or failure of modernization in the developing societies.

Keeping in mind the degree of backwardness inherited by the developing countries, the time-scale in which they have to eradicate socio-cultural and economic lags, the diversities of their 'primordial groupings' that need integration, the sheer dearth of resources and lack of expertise.
necessary for the development of modernization programmes and hosts of other constraints, it is obvious that 'breakdowns' can occur in more than one, if not all aspects, at the same time, and cause setbacks in the modernization of education. It is, therefore, too early to pinpoint any conclusive and leading causes of the failures of educational, or indeed of socio-economic and political modernization of the developing countries. Any hypothesis in such a situation has to be a tentative one.

This study therefore, dwells upon the assumption that the success of educational modernization in Muslim countries is relative to the success of modernization of their overall economic, political and social institutions. On its own, education cannot be the 'chief variable' of modernization.

Bases of Comparison

Black staunchly advocates the use of comparative method in the study of Modernization. Stressing the significance of a comparative approach to knowledge in general, he asserts:

"It is interesting to note in this connection that recent studies of the machinery of the brain have demonstrated that the process by which we store, organise and recall information in our computers is based on a system of association and inter-connection that is essentially comparative in character. In one form or another, comparison is the most widely used method for organising the great diversity of data presented by man and nature ... Whether or not they realise it, even those most dedicated to the unique would find it difficult to write a sentence that is applicable to and based on the observation of more than one case." (49)

48. From the worldwide review of the overall problems involved in Modernization, Joseph Spenglar has deduced three leading lessons for the prospect of modernization in the developing Societies: "First, until a country attains the capability for self-sustaining modernization and development its progress is quite susceptible of interruption, resulting in stagnation, and even decline. Second, even having attained such capability, a country remains susceptible to decorative influences, if only because any and every potential source of progress is subject to exhaustion. Third, a country still in process of attaining this capability will fail if it ceases to emphasize the objective of growth or if it slackens unduly in its efforts to supply the means." See Joseph J. Spenglar, "Breakdown in Modernization" in Myron Weiner (Ed) Modernization, op.cit. pp. 321-333, also see S.N.Eisenstadt.

49. C.E.Black. Modernization. op.cit.p.35.
In another context, he emphasizes the importance of both the 'diachronic' and 'synchronic' dimensions of comparison in modernization.50 A comparative study of the Muslim societies must, presumably, call for a two dimensional comparison: In the first place, a diachronic comparison aimed at an appraisal of the respective orientations of Islam as a normative and social system vis à vis modernity, must be posed in order to gauge compatibility or incompatibility between the two. Secondly, a synchronic comparison between some selected entities within Islam, such as the nation states of Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan as in the present study, with particular reference to an aspect of modernization e.g. education, should demonstrate some leading directions of change and some of the problems involved in it.

The three countries selected for this study have not been picked haphazardly from the pool of some thirty-five contemporary Muslim societies which are engaged in a process of modernization. The choice is based on some very appropriate grounds.

In the first place, these three regions constitute the mainstay of the Sunni Muslims who have a basic conformity of views and values with regard to the verities of orthodox Islam, and the traditional Muslim institutions of Khilafah, Shariah and Ummah. Secondly, these countries are the inheritors of the two great Muslim Empires, the Ottoman in the West and the Mughal in the East, whose ascendency has only faded with the 'challenge of modernity.' Thus they provide ample evidence for the study of the traditionalism which Muslim countries have been beset by. Thirdly, each of these countries has outlined a distinctly typical ideological model, a basis of its nationalism: the Turkish nation-state secular nationalism; the Egyptian ethnic-linguistic-regional, Arab socialist-nationalism; and, the Pakistani ideological-Islamic nationalism.

These approaches between them constitute almost all the choices available at present to the whole range of Muslim countries on their march towards modernization. They also provide a diversity of orientations and hence a broader scope for arriving at generalizations about their common problem; the problem of modernization of Muslim societies.
"Men must form ideas about the material universe and must embrace definite convictions on the subject. No part of the human race has ever been known to exist without a system of such convictions, and it is clear that their absence would mean intellectual annihilation. The public must choose, therefore, either to believe in science or else in some rival explanation of nature, such as that offered by Aristotle, the Bible, Astrology or Magic.

Of all such alternatives, the public of our times has in its majority chosen science."

Michael Polanyi
The Logic of Liberty
CHAPTER II

2. MODERNITY AND MODERNIZATION

2.1 Ideal-typical Modern Norms

Social scientists and scholars engaged in macro-social comparisons either 'diachronic or synchronic', have deduced or used some ideal-typical indexes for the purpose of analysing comparative behaviour. Typical examples of such indexes are the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft types of Toennies; the rational and traditional types of Max Weber (who also seems to have given popularity to ideal-types methodology); the local and cosmopolitan distinction drawn by Merton; the mechanical and organic types of Durkheim; the sacred and secular types of Becker; the familistic and contractual types of Sorokin; the empathetic and apathetic types of Daniel Lerner; and others.

In all these typologies 'ideal-types' are seen as 'the virtual tendencies of a system', and not as the empirically existing realities. They are constructed, as Rogers has observed, by 'abstracting to a logical extreme the characteristics of the behaviour under analysis' and serve mainly as an instrument for detecting discrepancies of similarities between differing systems.

Viewed in the light of this theoretical significance, the ideal-type norms of modernity can directly be constructed from Parsons' famous 'pattern-variables' which in turn seem to have been inspired by Weber, Toennies, Main and Durkheim. According to Parsons the following

2. See the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Free Press and Collier Macmillan, N.Y. s.v."Typologies", pp.179-180
3. E.M.Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, Free Press, N.Y. 1969, p.60
dichotomies show the contrasting variable tendencies of ideal modern and traditional systems:

<table>
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<th>Modern</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
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<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Particularism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Ascription</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity</td>
<td>Diffuseness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affectivity-neutrality</td>
<td>Affectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivity-orientation</td>
<td>Self-orientation</td>
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Social system and their sub-systems, according to these variables would be amenable to modernity if their goals significantly reflect general standards and criteria rather than particular cases; if they judge and reward actors on the basis of their performance rather than for their particular kinship, caste, class, sex or locality; if they operate on rationally defined, differentiated and changeable laws instead of diffuse, immutable and traditionally handed down canons; if they function to gratify long-term rather than immediate objectives, and finally if they are committed, in the last analysis, to the collective interest rather than to self-interest.5 Parsons furthermore, seems to believe that these normative orientations, and the institutions and roles that they give rise to, all interact in such a way as to produce a social system based on integration, equilibrium and consensus.

As a supplement to 'pattern variables', Parsons further goes on to trace and postulate certain 'evolutionary universals' that emerge and must form the watershed between primitive-traditional conditions and modernity. In his view, just as the use of hand, vision and brain as organic universals distinguished the human development, in the same manner, transition towards modernity has been marked by the development of a

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well-marked system of social stratification, a system of specialised
and explicit cultural legitimation; and, their inherent system of
differentiation.6 Defining these Universals as the 'generalised adaptive
capacity' of social systems, Parsons advances the thesis that in the
ideal-typical systems of modernity, the normative framework based on the
'pattern variables', and the structural changes ensuing from the
'evolutionary universals' function to provide the ideal 'isomorphism'
between the personality, the cultural, and the social systems, affording
ultimatum and necessary opportunities for 'need disposition' within a social
system based on equilibrium and integration.7

Applied to the various sub-systems of a social system, the norms
of modernity can further be deduced in relation to the nature of modern
man, the nature of modern knowledge and the nature of modern society.

2-1.1
The Norms of Man in Modernity

The 'pattern variables' clearly identify the rationale of modern man
by norms reflecting a combination of universalistic, achievement, affectivity-neutral, collectivity and specificity orientations. The character traits
of modern man, ideally speaking, according to these variables, should stand
antithetical to those of the traditional man. Ideally, modern man ought
to be an open book, a mobile and empathetic individual. He would subscribe
to rational, changeable and universally acknowledged views of reality. His
'rationalist and positivist' belief-system would require him to give reasons
for doing certain things in scientifically defensible terms, as opposed to
saying, "we have always done it that way" or "it is the right way because
it was so done by our elders". Achievement versus ascription index of norms
would require him to believe in accomplishment and qualification as the
essential criteria for recruitment into the social roles and positions

6. See Talcott PARSONS, "Evolutionary Universals", in the American
7. ibid.
obtaining in the society, rather than in belonging to a family, caste, class, community or religion. As a corollary, achievement-accomplishment and rationalist-positivist criteria would make him fundamentally a man of this-world; ingenious, sophisticated and skill-oriented. Affectivity-neutrality and specificity norms would make him to be less dogmatic, rather sceptical, and committed, as Shipman has argued "not only to a new working and social discipline, but to a less certain, less immutable view of his world - dynamic not static perspective."

As a derivative from these normative orientations, some scholars have described an 'ideal-type' man by a list of qualities. Inkles, for example, distinguishes between the external and internal attributes of modern man. Externally, he points out modern man is identifiable with such indicators of modernity as urbanisation, education, politicisation, industrialisation and widespread communications. Modern man is an agent as well as the by-product of these modern indicators. For his internal attributes, Inkles lists the following nine:

1. openness to innovations and new experiences;
2. capability to form and hold opinions over a large number of problems and issues arising in his immediate environment and outside it; and as a corollary, a willingness to accept the right of others to their opinions;
3. orientation to the present and the future rather than the past;
4. reliance on planning and organization in individual and communal life;
5. efficacy;
6. belief in calculability rather than fate;
7. awareness of own and other's dignity;
8. faith in science and technology;
9. belief in distributive justice, i.e. merit rather than ascription as a criterion for reward. (9)

Gunnar Myrdal has drawn up a similar inventory of character-traits of modern man. Psychologist McClelland defines modernity in terms of the capacity for 'need-achievement' - a 'mental virus' as he calls it, which modern man comes to possess as he moves towards modernity. A similar psycho-dynamic model of modern personality has been advanced by Lerner in the concept of 'empathy' which he defines as 'the inner-mechanism that enables a modern man to move out of traditional settings and to operate efficiently in a changing environment. Modern personality, according to Lerner, has a 'mobile sensibility' so adaptable to change that re-arrangement of the self-system is its distinctive mode. Lerner goes on to advance the thesis that high empathetic capacity is the predominant personal style, only under modernity.

Thus modernity, in terms of the nature of man, according to Lerner, is "primarily a state of mind, expectation of progress, propensity to growth, and, readiness to adapt oneself to change". Its basic challenge is the inculcation of a rationalist and positivist spirit which manifests itself in the making of an empathetic personality.

A consensus of all these opinions and postulations on the nature of modern personality has been summarised by Eisenstadt as below:

"This modern cultural outlook has been manifest in the development of some new personality orientations, traits, and characteristics - greater ability to adjust to the broadening societal horizons; some ego-flexibility; widening spheres of interest; growing potential empathy with other people and situations; a growing evaluation of self-advancement and mobility; and a growing emphasis on the present as the meaningful temporal dimension of human existence." (15)

13. ibid.
14. ibid.
2. 1.2.
The Norms of Knowledge in Modernity

In the realm of knowledge, Parsons in 'Pattern Variables' and 'Evolutionary Universals' necessarily implies the rise of rationality, empiricism and science as the bases of knowledge; and the differentiation of the secular and religious culture. The emergence of these norms has been traced from the twelfth century Renaissance, which gave rise to a critical spirit that stood to question the authority of traditionally inherited metaphysics; and has culminated in the supremacy, in the modern times, of scientific outlooks, and the resultant power of science and technology. Modern man now regards science instead of metaphysics as his ideological choice.

The essential demarcation between science and metaphysics, as Popper has pointed out, lies in the fact that "the generalizations of science are, because of their very form, unverifiable, but they are falsifiable, whereas the propositions of metaphysics are not." From this assumption, Popper has developed the now popular 'hypothetico-deductive' methodology of knowledge which currently forms the guiding principle of study in all science and social science disciplines. Popper asserts:

"The aim of science is to put forward bold hypotheses, the deductive consequences of which must be subjected to rigorous testing and criticism ... This is the way in which science progresses ..." (19)

The progress of science as an ideology in modernity has brought colossal changes in the role of thought and ideas in the formation of modern man, and the importance of knowledge in modern society. Three schools of thought have been identified with the evaluation of the modern sociology of knowledge:

18. See the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, VolIII.S.V. 'Epistemology' pp.5.38
19. ibid.
(1) The Materialist School. This school puts no premium on thought per se. One of its proponents, Vilfredo Pareto argues that "Men act first and think of reasons for their actions only afterwards."\(^{20}\) Pareto gives central importance to the "residues" or "quasi instincts" which determine human conduct and thought. Reasons, he points out, are "derivations" from the "residues".\(^{21}\)

(2) The Idealist School. This school relates the formation of the cultural mentality directly to the way in which individuals and societies envision their 'Absolute'. Pitirim Sorokin, the propounder of this school pinpoints three basic metaphysics that signify the prevalent cultural systems. He asserts that if the Absolute is seen to encompass the realm beyond space and time, (as in Ancient India) an "ideational" mentality will transpire. If both here and hereinafter are posited as the Absolute (as in the Middle Ages), an "idealistic" mentality will crystallise, and finally, if the Absolute is viewed within the limits of space and time (as in modernity) a "Sensate" mentality will emerge. Evidently modern mentality is inclined more and more towards the sensate, this-worldly and empirical values than either the "ideational" or "idealistic" ones.\(^{22}\)

(3) The Sociological School led by Karl Marx, Mannheim and W.G.Sumner. This school views knowledge essentially as a question of human conditioning which occurs through two dialectic factors: a primary or "conditioning" factor and a secondary or "conditioned" factor, though views differ as to what element in Society constitutes the former and what the latter. One section considers "the social constitution as a whole as the substructure of knowledge, thought and culture."\(^{23}\) According to Karl Marx it is the relations and institution of production and property that constitute the conditioning

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20. See the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. VII. S.V. "Sociology of Knowledge", pp.475-77
21. ibid.
22. ibid.
23. ibid.
factor. W. G. Sumner regards the established habits of social action as primary conditioners of habits of mind or 'a generalised ethos that permeates the mental life of the society concerned.'24 "A Society is a society", he maintains, "because, and insofar as, it is attuned to certain selected and hierarchical ordered values. These values determine what lines of endeavour will be pursued both in practice and in theory."25

The upshot of all these modern epistemologies is that modern knowledge is regarded not in a superimposed or sacred, but a problem-solving and practical perspective, related closely to the society that perceives and applies it. According to John Dewey, who pioneers this instrumentalist-pragmatic view, knowledge is "an activity, constantly involved in the crucible of the experimental practices of testing hypotheses and adjusting and revising goals in the light of experience. It is seen as a particular evolutionary adaptation of intelligent organs in the context of interaction with a changing and precarious environment."26

To sum up, modern knowledge relies upon a scientific, rational and empirical understanding of reality with a view to gaining greater control of the forces of nature for the betterment of life in this world. It lays stress on investigation, planning, calculation and prediction as guides to social action. It remains mutable and subject to continuous changes as a result of constant research and discovery of new factors. It is open-ended.

2.1.3.
The Norms of Society in Modernity

The 'rationalist and positivist' spirit that symbolises modernity would in turn give rise to a new kind of society subscribing to norms and values that run counter to traditionalism. The 'ideal-type' modern society ought to put more positive emphasis on the normative syndrome of

24. ibid.
25. ibid.

universalism, achievement, specificity, affective-neutrality and collectivity-orientation. It has been argued that the modern society ought to contribute to these normative patterns not simply for their ethical values but also because they are most supportive of the desired equilibrium and growth.\textsuperscript{27}

The application of these modern norms of society takes shape in the form of three major 'evolutionary universals' that have been regarded as fundamental to the rise of modern society viz: 'social mobilization,' 'social differentiation' and 'social integration.'\textsuperscript{28} Social mobilization denotes the socio-demographic aspects of changes that distinguish modern societies from the traditional ones. It has been defined as 'the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken, and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour.'\textsuperscript{29}

Social differentiation refers to the continuing process of the separation of tradition-bound roles from their ascriptive moorings, and the proliferation of the social organizations necessary to house them in order to enable modernizing societies to adapt to the changes affecting their environments.\textsuperscript{30} Elaborating the underlying principles of differentiation, Eisenstadt has specified two important aspects in which a modernizing society is significantly affected by differentiation: (1) the occupational sphere "where possession of a particular role does not automatically entitle the holder to the incumbency of others such as in the political and cultural spheres; and (2) the institutional sphere where "within each institutional sphere e.g. (in the economy, polity and social organisation etc.) there develop distinctive units organised around the goals specific to each sphere, and not fused with other groups

\textsuperscript{27} Levy. ibid. p.53, also Eisenstadt. op.cit. p.3.
\textsuperscript{28} See S.N.Eisenstadt, Modernization, Protest and Change, op.cit, pp.2-3 also Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, op.cit. pp.395-6
\textsuperscript{29} Levy. ibid. pp.187-219
\textsuperscript{30} Eisenstadt. ibid. p.2. also T.Parsons, Structure and Process in
in a network based on family, kinship and territorial bases." 31

Social integration relates to the process whereby autonomous, self-sufficient and closed units of social action, such as kinship, tribe, trade guilds and other organizations having been duly differentiated, are then brought closer to form a part of a larger aggregate. 32

Considering the term "integrated society" as the most satisfactory of all the names given to the modern society, e.g. the 'achieving society', the 'advanced society', the 'great society', the 'mass society', the 'new society', the 'organic society', the 'learning society', the 'civilized society' and so on, Black describes social integration to imply the phenomenon in which

"the individual's ties with local, regional, and other intermediate structure are reduced at the same time that his ties with the larger and more diffuse urban and industrial network are strengthened." This shift in relationships", he stresses, gives "the individual the advantages of greater opportunities in a more flexible society and a larger share in the distribution of resources in terms of education, consumer goods, and a variety of services..." (33)

The need for social integration seems particularly urgent in newly independent societies, as Abernethy has rightly pointed out, because of the vast 'vertical' gap that exists between their 'small, usually Western-education leadership and the mass of the population', in addition

30. Modern Societies, Free Press of Glencoe, N.Y. 1959. Robert Marsh (contd) has drawn a crucial distinction between differentiation and segmentation. In segmentation, two or more structurally distinct roles and collectivities essentially perform the same function. So defined, segmentation was obviously prevalent in some pre-modern societies as well. But differentiation is characterised by the element of progressiveness which involves the establishment of a unit having primary functions of a higher order, seen in terms of the system in which it operates, than was the function of the unit from which it differentiates." See Robert Marsh, Comparative Sociology, Harcourt, Brace and World Inc. N.Y. 1967, p. 31

31. ibid. p. 2.

32. Marsh. ibid.

to the various traditional 'horizontal' gaps defined in ethnic, racial, religious or linguistic terms. In his view, the expansion of education relates directly to integrative efforts on both the vertical and horizontal planes.

To sum up then, the following have been listed as the essential features that uphold and sustain the normative orientations of a modern society:

1. A high degree of urbanization;
2. widespread literacy;
3. comparatively high per capita income;
4. extensive geographical and social mobility;
5. a relatively high degree of commercialisation and industrialisation of the economy;
6. an extensive and penetrative network of mass-communication media, and, in general
7. widespread participation and involvement by members of the society in modern social and economic process;
8. a relatively highly organised bureaucratic form of government with widespread involvement by members of the society; and,
9. an increasingly rational and secular orientation of the individual to his environment based on the growth of scientific knowledge." (36)

35. ibid. p.9.
36. See G.A. ALMOND and J.S. COLEMAN, (ed), The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1960 p.532. At the Hakone Conference in 1964, where various definitions of 'modernization' came to be scrutinised, the Japanese scholars particularly Ouchi seems to have questioned terms such as 'urbanization', 'commercialisation' or the phrase 'high per capita income' which he objected were "heavily coloured by capitalistic connotations". The Hakone Conference, therefore, modified these terms in rather more general terms eschewing some terms used originally by Almond and Coleman. See Marius B. Jansen, Changing Japanese Attitudes towards Modernization, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J. 1965, p.18.
Institutional Changes in Modernization

Institutional transformation is essential to the modernization process. But the sociological view of institutions puts greater emphasis on the study of the functions that institutions arise to perform in order to understand the nature of the institutional complex. The functional approach has, as Black points out, "an inherent bias in favour of equilibrium while societies are never in equilibrium." Functionalism, therefore, does not give due importance to change per se. Black insists that "the ultimate source of change in societies is the growth of knowledge, the immediate impact of which bears on the functions that institutions perform." He goes on to argue that "Functional change depends on the few, and may often be rapid and easy. Structural change depends on the many, and is slow and painful. ... For this reason, the process of modernization may within the foreseeable future lead to a convergence and perhaps a universalization of functions, but not of institutions, as long as the 175 societies in the world retain their relative discreetness as system. So long as one appreciates these limitations of the functional approach, Black is prepared to go along with it and sees no harm in the study of institutional modernization in the context of systemic organism.

The most significant characteristic of modernization affecting the institutional structure of modernizing societies has been considered as the continuous structural differentiation that manifests in each institutional sphere such as the economy, polity and social organization.

38. Black, ibid. pp.46-9
39. ibid.
40. ibid.
2. 2.1

The Political Aspect

The modern polity has been defined as "an independent nation-state, composed of citizens who are equal before the law and at least nominally able to participate in the selection of a ruling elite; its government is relatively centralised, accepts some responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, and efficiently deploys its human and material resources in the solution of pressing policy problems." (42)

The major objectives of the modern society have been regarded as the enhancement of 'capacity', 'equality' and 'participation' of its citizens within the social system. In order to meet these objectives, the modern polity demands a highly differentiated institutional set up. Its multi-functional system has been described by Almond and Coleman in the following input-output schema:44

**Input Functions (Political)**
1. Political socialization and recruitment,
2. Interest articulation,
3. Interest aggregation,
4. Political communication.

**Output Functions (Governmental)**
5. Rule-making,
6. Rule-application,
7. Rule adjudication.

These input-output demands of the modern polity clearly necessitate the expansion of the institutional structure of the modern political system to include not only the classical institutions of authority, law and civil and military bureaucracy, but also various other types of political organizations ranging from parliamentary cliques, and pressure groups to 'fully organised political parties.' 45

43. ibid. In the relevant literature, 'participation' has been denoted by 'differentiation'.
44. Almond and Coleman. op.cit.p
The State

The significance of the modern nation-state as a repository of supreme sovereignty and power and the centralization of its authority has grown only in modern conditions. In the pre-modern societies political authority was shared by various segmented units and intermediary bodies such as the family, the village, the landlord and the church. The authority of the modern state is now consolidated into a central national government and then extended on a 'functional basis' to various regional and local level units or functional sub-divisions. The basis of allocation of authority in a modern state is rationalized and enshrined in the national constitution which ranks supreme as the most sovereign instrument and a source of legitimation of authority. The functions of policy making, policy implementation and policy adjudication in a modern society are directly differentiated into the institutions of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.

The Administration

A highly centralised and organised civil and military bureaucracy is the bulwark of administration in a modern polity. Modern administration has further been differentiated into the professional, technical and managerial cadres and requires a highly qualified and trained elite class to man these various cadres. Professionalised and dedicated elites are the great modernizing force within all modern or modernizing societies, though their relative importance has varied from society to society. The creation of such a high-level manpower is the prime necessity of modern and modernising societies and their educational systems.

Modern Law

Equally important, perhaps pre-eminent in the order of priorities, is the emergence of the 'rule of law' and a universalistic national legal system. Modern law, ideally speaking, has been regarded as

47. EISENSTADT. ibid. p.10
rationalist, positivist, enacted, transactional and specific. Its institutional arrangement is marked by the hierarchy of courts differentiated into courts of application and appeal, and integrated into a network operating at local, regional and national levels. The modern legal system is run bureaucratically, i.e. by professionals who engage in it on the basis of 'mundane qualifications' and the mastery of the technique of the legal system itself rather than the possession of some special talents or charisma.  

48 Modern law is furthermore considered to be political rather than sacramental, inasmuch as the state enjoys a monopoly over disputes within its cognizance.  

49 Above all, the separation of the legislative and the judicial agencies is an essential hallmark of the modern law.

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49. ibid.
2. 2.2.
THE ECONOMIC ASPECT

A modern and mobilized economy is regarded as showing the following salient characteristics:-

1. "increasing application of technology, and of inanimate energy, to enlarge and diversify the production of goods and services per capita;

2. a growing specialization of labour and subdivision of productive processes within and among firms, industries, occupations, and territories, and an increasing inter-dependence and mobility of individuals and groups within a network of widening impersonal markets;

3. a concomitant improvement in human skills and economic efficiency, especially at the higher technical and managerial levels;

4. an accumulation of capital goods in more productive forms and in growing amounts per worker, financed by a complex of financial institutions that characteristically divorce the savings from the investment process in order to pool liquid resources for the growing stream of investment;

5. production, transport, marketing and finance organised on an increasingly large-scale, with concomitant tendencies to the concentration of decisions over economic life;

6. as the dynamic force behind the above processes, a society increasingly oriented to the pursuit of innovation and growth, infused (especially within the elite) by a spirit of innovation and growth, and increasingly rational in its choice of techniques and allocations of resources to achieve its economic goals;

7. as a result of these processes - and despite a characteristic increase in population - a rise in the level of material well-being, usually a widening of the range of personal choice, and sooner or later, a reduction in the range of economic and social inequalities;

8. as incomes rise, a shift in the balance of employment and production from the extractive industries to manufacturing and the services, within a concomitant urbanization of the labour force;

9. the spread of wage labour as the chief form of gainful employment, and commonly the separation of ownership and management; and,
10. the replacement of natural hazards (e.g., weather) as the main source of insecurity by technological change, the uncertainties of the market, and the bargaining disadvantages of the individual in relation to his employer and the state" (59)

Pre-mobilized and subsistence level economies of the Traditional societies as they set out to achieve modernity, must go through phases of structural differentiation in their institutional patterns. Their economic institutions of production, consumption, capital, exchange and labour force which had hitherto remained embedded in the self-sufficient and limited units of family, tribe, community, village or the guild, are separated from these settings into autonomous and self-regulating organizations.

In agriculture, for example, the main source of production of such societies - cash crops give rise to the separation of the units of production and consumption. Wage labour replaces family, caste or forced labour. In the same manner, the traditional 'household' or cottage industry that originally provided for the needs of the family or the community, develop into factory organization where division of labour calls for specialization and occupational differentiation. Pre-industrial exchange systems operating on 'reciprocal basis' die out in the face of exchange markets. Exchange of goods and services is done more by money than by payment in kind.51

With the introduction of science and technology for rapid modernization, the process of mobilization of the economy and the differentiation of its various organizations is accelerated. The continually increasing stock of scientific and technological knowledge


and the research into the technique of production and marketing give rise to a still further complexity of economic organizations and market structures. New categories or occupations arise as the economic development proceeds from one stage to the next. The initial classifications of manpower, such as skilled and unskilled manual occupations, middle-class occupations such as trade and manufacture as well as professions such as army, law, medicine, etc. become sub-divided into sub-categories. New groups and service organizations emerge as contingent occupations.  

Many scholars of modernization have challenged the popularly held belief in the economic determinism of modernization. According to Black, for example, "economic development depends to a great extent on the intellectual and political aspects of the process - the growth in knowledge and the ability of political leaders to mobilize resources.  

Harbison and Myers who attach great importance to the 'human resources development' distinguish modern economy essentially for its capability of making major scientific, technological and organizational discoveries and innovations."  

"This" they argue

"is because it has a relatively large stock of high-level manpower, particularly scientists, engineers and managerial and administrative personnel. It has made heavy commitment to education especially to higher education and to human resources development generally." (55)

Modernization of the economy, therefore, entails seminal implications for the educational system. Economic mobilization and the institutional, as well as occupational differentiation within the economy, demand in the first place, a 'rationalist and positivist' spirit to motivate individuals as well as societies. Schools, more than any

52. See EISENSTADT, Modernization: Protest and Change, op.cit. pp.5-7  
53. C.E.Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, op.cit. pp.18-20  
55. ibid.
other social institution, operate systematically to inculcate the norms of modernity, and innovations; and, to raise innovators inspired by a desire to break away from, and not to perpetuate, the inherited systems of production, labour and commerce. Again the complexity of occupational structure and the increasing enhancement of technological skills demand greater professionalization and higher educational qualifications. Schools, Universities, technical and vocational centres, and the like, are also the major institutions that raise the necessary expertise and manpower quickly and efficiently. 56

2. 2. 3.

THE SOCIAL ASPECT

Modernization does not only introduce scientific knowledge and technology and a network of complex industrial and commercial corporations, legislative assemblies, law courts, and bureaucratic administrative offices etc. into societies, it also brings unprecedented changes to their self-sufficient social order. Social mobilization manifests itself in geographical mobility, from villages to towns, and from farms to factories; occupational mobility from local-level reciprocal labour to specialised, wage-labour; psychic mobility in the shape of a growing empathic capacity as a result of greater exposure to the means of communications; economic mobility with the increase of earned income and the concomitant spending capacity on consumer goods; political mobility with increased participation into the polity, and cultural mobility with the participation in the written culture by means of literacy.

Social differentiation brings separation of ascribed, basic roles and the achieved, 'free-floating' roles outside the primary institutions. It also brings transformation of the primary social institutions such as family, caste and clan, village, community and religious organization. As a result the new social order becomes immensely different from the

56. See EISENSTADT, op.cit. pp.5-7
traditional one and necessitates changes of attitudes, habitats and disciplines among people.\textsuperscript{57}

The Family:

The modern family, for example, tends to be a nuclear, conjugal unit stressing freedom in the choice of the partner; there is reluctance to accept parental control in everyday affairs; a separate household is created upon marriage, independently of, and away from the family; there is economic independence of the family, and consequently, an earlier separation of the young from the parents.\textsuperscript{58} The increasing economic freedom of women brought about by the extension of education and equalization of occupational opportunities for both sexes, their engagement outside the household, in skilled, professional or unskilled occupations has led to new problems, ones to which even the advanced societies have only partially and recently given appropriate institutional forms.\textsuperscript{59}

The Urban Community

The Urban community is a haphazard, heterogenous and impersonal configuration. Movement from village into urban settings demands adjustment with the 'scale and tempo of life and work' by the migrants in the new environment. "Traditional expectations, traditional beliefs and traditional symbols handicap newcomers and create instability".\textsuperscript{60} "Urban life" continues Shipman, "is symbolised by the clock, the traffic light, the hooter, the time-table, the shift-system and the warning notice. There is a precision, an urgency about urban life that demands a personal and collective discipline ... In early phases of urbanization this discipline


\textsuperscript{59} BLACK, op. cit. p.22.

\textsuperscript{60} M.D.SRIPMAN, Modernization and Education, op.cit.p.20
is missing and has to be learned. Until people know how to use available public services, use leisure time wisely, spend money efficiently, learn the new concepts of time and space and to relate cause and effect in a rational way, disorganization persists." (61)

Religion and Modernization:

Like all other social institutions, religions also become subject to changes and readjustment under modernization. The most crucial aspect of this readjustment appears in the differentiation of socio-economic and political roles from religion. As a result religion tends to become a sub-system within a wider culture and the total social system instead of remaining the ruling institution. Whether modern man is or will ever be, absolutely without religious beliefs and systems; or whether religion has or has not a vital role to play in modern life or indeed in the modernization process remain open questions. What seems certain, as seen from the example of those religions that appear to have become modernized such as Christianity, Judaism and, to some extent Buddhism, is that the traditional crystallizations and medieval systems of all religions must undergo definite institutional modifications in order to remain forceful. Religion itself, however, may not be considered as an obstacle to modernization. As Myrdal has pointed out,

"No religions on the higher level need be in conflict with the modernization ideals. But as religion is part and parcel of the whole complex of people's beliefs and valuations, their modes of living and working, and their institutions, it needs to be reformed in order to break down inhibitions and obstacles to development." (62)

61. ibid. p.21
2. 2.4.  

**IDEOLOGY IN MODERNIZATION**

From a purely pragmatic and neutral term, used originally by Destuit de Tracy in his 'les elements d'ideologie' to denote rational application of principles derived from scientific observations in the fields of anthropology and psychology, to the cultural sciences, i.e. ethics, epistemology and pedagogy, ideology later came to be associated with idiosyncratic deception and travesty. Karl Marx in particular popularised the term 'ideology' in a derogatory sense to imply distortion practised by the ruling classes in their arguments in defence of the existing social system.  

Despite any such connotations of distortion the importance of ideology for social cohesion during modernisation cannot be denied. Ideology helps a changing social system to achieve greater integrative and adaptive capacity. With this vital integrative function, ideology is usefully employed by politicians and modernising leadership as an instrument for obtaining greater social harmony during modernisation. Modernisation because of its attack on old loyalties and habits, causes certain disillusion with old beliefs. Here ideology by providing the link between beliefs and the intended action, as Apter has pointed out, helps "to make more explicit the moral basis of action during the upheaval of modernisation."

Apter has highlighted four ideological tendencies that apply to the modernisation of all societies whether advanced or developing, viz: science, nationalism, socialism and national socialism. Following what he regards as the 'Polanyi choice', he has put forward the hypothesis that the

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65. ibid. p.317
advanced, industrial societies have chosen science with its norms of rationality, planning, research and professionalism as their ideology. Here the role of the scientist is paramount. By contrast, modernist leaders of the developing countries, have of necessity, to go through an ideological phase of nationalism or (national) socialism, before their eventual acceptance of science as an ideology. Both Nationalism and National Socialism basically provide the same ideological foundations for modernization, with only a slight difference of emphasis on identity and solidarity; the former appealing more to the specific elements of national tradition and its historical culture; the latter to the more universalistic elements of social justice and equality within the national framework. In societies with a lively traditional past, nationalism seems to have appeared more satisfying. The role of both is summed up by Apter, as follows:

"Nationalism and socialism are ideologies that, better than most, provided the coherence necessary for retraditionalization during the process of change. Nationalism, for example, helps to centre authority on certain aspects of tradition, asserts the continuity of society, and links the present with the past, and, by so doing, asserts the immortality of the society, its on-going and life-giving characteristics. The definition of membership in the society, the sanctity of the past, and the symbolism of political forms are made explicit, reinforced and stipulated as part of a modernizing culture. (67)

2.2.5

HAZARDS OF MODERNIZATION

The foregoing syndrome of ideal-types tends to weave a matrix of modernization entirely/rationality, scientism, secularism, technology and material progress: that is to say, a view of life with externality

66. POLANYI maintains that of all the alternative beliefs, e.g. religion, magic, philosophy etc. modern man has chosen science to explain the nature of universe. Michael POLANYI, The Logic of Liberty, University of Chicago Press Chicago 1958, pp.57-8. quoted in Apter, op.cit.p.316

67. ibid. p.340
as its dominant motif, and with little or no room for the non-rational, spiritual/religious inclinations or needs of man, individually or collectively. This idolization of scientism and technology, as archetypal wizards with miraculous powers of solving all problems of mankind, is however not accepted without misgivings and protests. There are many warnings that scientism and technology with their thing-centered, gadget-ridden and competitive-materialistic culture, which J.B.Priestly has described by the term 'Admass', taken as ends, may doom the very mankind that craves to employ them for its progress. Already, a modern man's sense of bewilderment and spiritual isolation, the breakdown of his primary ties, the compartmentalization and atomization of corporate life as well as ecological pollution, and socio-political violence are proving to be the high cost of modernization.

Historian of the cyclical school like Wells, Spenglar, and others, with their 'rise and fall' theory of civilizations have, in their time, sounded their pessimistic notes about the fate of the scientism and technology-oriented industrial (Western) civilization. With these caveats and protests in mind, perhaps, social thinkers like Sorokin and Toynbee, with a look ahead in to the distant future, have envisioned that the salvation of the Western civilization lies in a return to an ideational religious idealism rather than relying on materialism.

68. See J.B. PRIESTLY, The English, Heineman, London, 1973, pp. 241-42. Pronouncing Admass the so-called "Good Life" as a threat to the true 'Englishness' of the English Priestley protests that "while things are important, states of mind are even more important" ... He goes on to warn: "Now Englishness with its relation to the unconscious, its dependence upon instinct and intuition, cannot break its links with the past; it has deep long roots. Being itself a state of mind, it cannot ignore other states of mind and cannot help feeling that Admass, with its ruthless competitiveness, its idea of man simply as a producer and consumer, its dependence upon dissatisfaction, greed and envy must be responsible for bad and not good state of mind..." pp. 242.


The question however arises; is it possible, at the present stage of human development or under-development, for any one to sit back and shun modernization? Can there be modernization without the hazardous and radical surgical operations that follow in its train?

It would appear that as things stand, it would be impossible for any individual or society to remain in or to revert to, the stage of development before the changes associated with modernization came into operation, or indeed, to choose to stay aloof from the rewards of the scientific and technological progress. There is not a single socio-political unit of society in the world today which remains unaffected by the impact of modernization. Modernization, therefore, with all its advantages and disadvantages, has come to stay.
CHAPTER III

MODERNITY AND ISLAM

GOD changeth not what is in a people, until they change what is in themselves.

(Quran: II:164.)

Reason and logic are the roots of my faith.

Caliph ALI

The teachings of the Quran that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems.

Dr. Allama Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal.
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.
CHAPTER III

3. MODERNITY AND ISLAM

3.1 IDEAL AND ACTUAL VARIATIONS

An examination of the current literature dealing with the question of compatibility between modernity and Islam, and the prospects of the latter to lend itself to modernization without losing identity, reveals a marked divergence of emphasis which scholars place according to their viewpoints on the dynamic and the historical manifestations of Islam. The Muslim scholar, even of the modernist bent, is wont to differentiate between the universal and the traditional aspects of Islam. His desire to draw such distinctions seem to form a conviction that the former are viable and universally beneficial, and ought to be adaptable to all conditions, if skilfully and consistently expurgated from the crusts of historical traditionalism. The purely secularist, reductive-functionalist, non-Muslim scholar, on the other hand, does not see much point in such a distinction, and is prepared readily to write the whole 'package' off as traditionalism and incompatible with modernity.71

71. The latter type it appears, although presumably concerned with the contemporary phenomenology of cultures, is not free from the historically handed down predispositions, reading Islam, as he does, from the Western literature. Highlighting his limitations and exhorting such a scholar to take up the study of Islam with an open mind, Prof. Montgomery-Watt, has pointed out,

"The difficulty is that we are heirs of a deep-seated prejudice which goes back to the 'war propaganda' of the medieval times...From about the eighth century A.D. Christian Europe began to be conscious of Islam as her great enemy, threatening her in both military and the spiritual spheres...The image created in the twelfth and the thirteen centuries continued to dominate European thinking about Islam and even the second half of the
According to Lerner, for example, "Islam is absolutely defenceless against modernization."\(^{73}\) Halpern asserts that the Islamic system that 'connected man, God and Society together, is falling apart in the teeth of modernization which is tearing off its repetitive pattern of balanced tensions.'\(^{74}\) Similarly, Parsons advances the following as the causes to explain why Islam failed to develop itself into a modern system:

1. "the failure of the Ummah to become institutionalised as a fully corporate societal community comprising essentially the whole populations of the society;
2. the failure of Islam completely to Muslimize much of the populations under its political control as Christianity had done;
3. its inability to accept the rationalizing Greek culture;
4. certain features of the religious traditions itself for example the Islamic monotheism became a major factor for its evolutionary limitation;
5. its unsystematized Koranic law;
6. its lack of philosophical grounding for theology and law;
7. its inability to draw very clearly the line between this-worldly and other-worldly spheres, and so,
8. its cultural tradition and societal normative order did not undergo the crucial process of differentiation, inclusion and upgrading that could have transformed the Ummah into a total society permeated by universalistic norms." \(^{(75)}\)

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71 twentieth century has some vestigial influence. According to this image, Islam was a perversion of Christian truth, even an idolatorous religion, it was a religion of violence, spread by sword; it was a religion without ascetism, gaining adherents by pandering to their sexual appetites both in this world and in the world to come. Muhammed was a deliberate propagator of false doctrine, thinking only of increasing his own power...." \(^{(72)}\)


75. TalcottPARSONS, Societies. op.cit. pp.84-86.
On closer examination, it seems that even the purely secularist agrees with the Muslim scholar, that of all the great religions of the world, Islam emerged with the most rationalist, dynamic and comprehensive outlook.\(^{76}\) It is also appreciated that Islam showed a remarkable capacity and strength to cope with changes in time and space, and assimilated diverse systems of thought and culture without abandoning its axiological concepts. As Halpern has asserted;

"Traditional Islam survived for more than a millennium in a harsh and uncertain environment because it was capable of converting constant tensions and conflict into a force for constant political renewal and social survival. This extraordinary political and social system of action - mobile in all its parts yet static as a whole - is rare in human annals for its endurance. This resilient system has been one of traditional Islam's greatest, yet least appreciated, achievements." \(^{77}\)

What is not fully understood is the nature of conceptual constraints which prevented the medieval Muslims from making compromises with the 'sensate', dichotomous imprints of the contemporary thought of the Greek, Hindu or Buddhist cultures. It is true that the aslaf (forefathers) in Islam, after a certain crystallization of orthodoxy had emerged, branded all innovation as heretical and harmful. But, whether the normative Quranic Islam itself stands opposed to the 'rationalist-positivist' and scientific spirit, or indeed to the norms of universalism, achievement, collectivity and affectivity neutrality is not much discussed. The Muslim scholar of today, therefore, in his attempt to recapture the dynamism that Islam showed in the first two centuries of its growth, when it was faced with the impulse to meet outside challenges and successfully discovered formulae for keeping its normative order intact while incorporating potential strands of diverse systems within its own institutions, is keen to rediscover similar formulae.


Typifying this approach, Professor Al-Faruqi, for example, asserts that -

"There are two Islams in the world today. The first is the Islam of the Quran and the example of the Prophet in so far as it can be ascertained. The second is the Islam of the masses of Muslims, their common beliefs and customs.

Of the two Islams, the first is scriptural, and normative; the second is descriptive and empirical. The first is the Divine pattern God has revealed and into the likeness of which the Muslim is to knead and mould creation. It is the ideal ought to be. The Quran is its repository and final authority.

The second is the human, fallible, and often mistaken pattern by which the Muslim attempts to live up to the divine ideal. This Islam has no single or final authority because while basing itself on the thinking and deeds of ancestors specially selected from the age of Muslim decline, it must depend on living interpreters of contemporary society." (78)

Ideal Islam invoked rationality and castigated taqlid (traditionalism).

The Quran repeatedly exhorts its adherents to observe, to reflect, to think, to ponder, to reason and to learn from the natural phenomena that are patterned to change and alternate.

"The creation of heaven and earth, of night and day, the vessels that cross the seas for the use of men, the fall of rain which brings life to be a dead earth; the animation of the creatures, the orientation of the winds and subjection of the clouds between heaven and earth - all are signs for those who reason." (79)

The clearest exhortation to man to keep pace with the change comes in the verse:

"God changes not what is in a people, until they change what is in themselves." (80)

In a similar manner, the Quran while, underlining the nature of conflict between his fellow Makkans and Prophet Muhammad, states:

"The Makkans said, 'We found our fathers following a certain course and we shall follow in their footsteps.'

'What', said the Prophet, 'Will you still persist even if I bring you a clearer guidance than your fathers had left for you?' "So," affirms the Quran, "We punished them". (81)


79. The Quran, Chapter II, verse 164

80. ibid. 13:11

81. op.cit. p.14
Similar exhortative, even admonishing statements for not developing critical faculties and for not questioning traditionalism, abound in the Quran. To quote Al Faruqi again,

"To say of anyone that he is a blind follower of tradition, that he does not weigh his spiritual inheritance against new knowledge and newly discovered truth— in short, to impute to him stupidity and folly— is the strongest spiritual rebuke. 'They do not reason,' 'they do not consider', 'they do not think' and the like, which can be found on every page of the Quran, express this castigation of taqlid." 82.

3.1.1. REVELATION VERSUS REASON

It is evident that revelation remains the kernel of Islamic norms. But Muslim thinkers have not regarded revelation and reason essentially to oppose or supersede each other. On the contrary, they see them both as striving towards the same objectives: the understanding of Reality. Since Islam strictly holds the unity of Reality, reason and revelation are both aspects of Reality, or 'two eyes of the soul by which it knows.'

The central concept in Islam is Tawheed (monotheism) which rejects any anthropomorphic association, or any dichotomization of Reality. It was basically for their concern for Tawheed— the unity of Reality, that the early Muslim savants rejected the dualistic nature of Greek thought while still accepting the elements of their rationalism. 83

In its sociological import the concept of Tawheed is seen by the Muslims as the highest of all universalistic values by which human conduct and the conduct of nations would be judged. Islam superordinates the 'Universal Ego' as the highest common goal, and then addresses all human beings individually and collectively to strive for the universal good. Ideal Islam equates personal and social good with Divine good. Salvation, as Islam sees it, comes from 'maarifa' (knowledge) and piety; and piety includes prayer as well as knowledge. The most pious Muslims have been

82. op.cit. p.14
the most knowledgeable. So the quest of the Reality via piety and/or knowledge; revelation or science, remains the highest bliss for a Muslim. Thus ideally, a Muslim regards 'science as integral to Islam' and equivalent to piety. In summarising Islam's position with regard to rationality, Prof. Arberry observes, "Revelation in Islam is above any reasoning but not above reason. Neither is reason above revelation." A Muslim scientist, remarks Al Faruqi, does not conceive of the work of scientists as an amoral, non-religious quest of a reality independent of God... He can neither be dictated to by nature or be dominated by his inventions. Above nature stands God; and above the machine stands the Muslim's God-granted privilege of usufruct of the forces of nature. This connection with divinity, with God's will or values, spiritualizes his quest and animates it. It even promises him greater achievement in the fields of science and technology than has so far been achieved.

3.1.2.
THE NORMS OF MAN IN ISLAM

According to the foregoing perception of Reality, as revealed in the Quran, the following doctrines about the nature of the Universe, have been established:

1. The Universe is a manifestation of God's Volition. It is not standing in opposition to Him as an independent reality. Space, time and matter are interpretations which thought puts on the free creative energy of God. They are not independent realities existing per se but only intellectual modes of apprehending the life of God.

2. The Universe is designed to obey a certain order and a purpose; nothing in the universe is meant to be in jest.

84. Al-FARUQI. op.cit. p.26
86. ibid. pp.26-7
"We have not created the Heavens and the earth and whatever is between them in sport. We have not created them but for a serious end, but the greater part of them understand it not". (89)

"Surely, in the creation of the heavens and of the earth and in the alternation of night and day, there are signs for men of understanding who, standing and sitting and redlining, bear God in mind and reflect on the creation of the Heavens and of the earth; and say, Oh, our Lord, Thou has not created this in vain." (90)

The position of man in this designed Creation, according to the Quran, is highly significant - first as an embryo and then the Ego. The Ego takes significance only when soul is infused into it; until then it is only matter - a germ cell. Man has a twofold creation; the physical and the spiritual, both in one. As the Quran puts it:

"Now, of fine clay have We created man. There We placed him, a moist germ, in a safe above; then made We the moist germ a clot of blood; then made We the piece of flesh into bones; and We clothed bones with flesh; and then (finally) We brought man yet another creation ... (92)

From these verses and others, the nature of man in the 'Ideal' Islam has been summarised by Iqbal in the following points:

1. "That man is the chosen of God."
2. "That man, with all his faults, is meant to be the representative of God on earth:
   "And it is He who made you His representatives on the Earth, and has raised some of you in rank above others, that He may try you by (the test of) that which He has given you..." (93)
3. That man is the trustee of Divine trust - a free personality and individuality, with all the perils involved.
   "Verily, We offered to the heavens and to the Earth, and to the mountains to receive the 'trust', but they refused the burden and they feared to receive it. Man undertook to bear it, But hath proved aggressive and ignorant." (94)

89. The Quran. 44:38
90. ibid. 3:188
91. The Quranic description of the Fall of Man differs from the Biblical account. "It has nothing to do with the first appearance of man on this planet. Its purpose is rather to indicate man's rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of free-self, capable of doubt and disobedience. The Fall does not mean any moral depravity. it is man's transition from simple consciousness
93. ibid. 6: 165.
94. ibid. 33 : 72.
4. That with the acceptance of Divine Trust, man received from God the knowledge of things and was fitted for his sojourn on the earth.95

5. That man's sublimation to spiritual proximity with God comes from his carrying out of the responsibilities of the Divine Trust, by way of knowledge and piety - all in submission, in the last analysis, to the Divine Will (Islam).

Thus by the very onus of his free-choice and individuality, the human being is constantly in search of the Reality that he is a part of and from which he has been alienated. 'Maarfa' (quest for knowledge) and 'ibada' (prayer) are the responses of his 'fitrah' (nature) to the challenge of his tenure on earth. "Prayer," asserts Iqbal, is an expression of man's inner yearning for a response in the awful silence of the universe." 96

3. 1.3.
THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAM

Knowledge has been highly esteemed in Islam. In fact, the whole purpose of Divine revelation and 'sending down' prophets has been explained in the Quran as the communication of knowledge.

"The prophet recites unto people God's revelation; causes them to grow and imparts them knowledge and wisdom." (97)

Various other verses of the Quran and sayings of the Prophet highly emphasize learning and diffusion of knowledge, e.g.

"God bears witness that...men embued with knowledge maintain His creation in justice..."(98)

"God will raise in rank those of you who believe as well as those who are given knowledge." (99)

"Say, shall those who know be deemed equal with those who do not!" (100)

95. Quran. 2: 31, 37.

The Prophet has said

"To seek knowledge is the duty of every Muslim (man) and Muslimah (woman)." (101)

"Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave, and acquire it even though it be in China." (102)

"He dies not who seeks knowledge. Whosoever reveres the learned, reveres me." (103)

"He who leaveth his home in search of knowledge, walketh in the path of God." (104)

"Acquire knowledge: it enables the possessor to distinguish right from wrong; it lighteth up the path to Heaven. It is your friend in the desert, your society in solitude, and your companion when friendless. It guideth you to happiness; it sustaineth you in adversity. It is an ornament among friends, and an armour against enemies." (105)

Again there are a large number of verses of the Quran bidding man to observe the phenomena of nature, the alternation of day and night, the mysteries of birth and death, growth and decay, the rise and fall of nations and to discover from them the nature of things and their causes. 106 The prophet also said, 'An hour's contemplation and study of God's creation is better than a year of adoration.' 107

Knowledge is represented in the term 'ilm' in Islam although numerous other words such as 'maarfa' and 'Sha'ur' etc. are also used for the concept. But, the other terms are narrower in meaning.

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97. The Quran, 3:164
98. ibid. 3:18
99. ibid. 58:2
100. ibid. 2.269
101-105. Traditions of the Prophet quoted in Al Ghazali, Kitab al IIm op. cit. pp.10-19, also in M.M. Pickthall, "The Islamic Culture" in Islamic Culture, I (1927) pp.151-163
107. Kitab al IIm. p.19. The Prophet has also said, "Knowledge is like sealed treasure houses, the keys of which are inquiry. Inquire, therefore, for therein lies reward for four: the inquirer, the learned, the auditor, and their admirer." p.18.
denoting for example the activities of reflection and perception and the like, whereas the term 'ilm' is more comprehensive.\(^{108}\) The English equivalent, 'knowledge' observes Rosenthal:

"falls short of expressing all the factual and emotional contents of 'ilm'. For 'ilm' is one of those concepts that have dominated Islam and given Muslim civilization its distinctive shape and complexion. In fact, there is no other concept that has been operative as a determinant of Muslim civilization in all its aspects to the same extent as 'ilm' (109)"

To elaborate all the various dimensions of cognition, gnosis, investigation, believing, acting and other shades of meanings in which the word 'ilm' has been used by Muslim epistemologists, Rosenthal has enlisted over a thousand definitions of 'ilm' and categorised them into a dozen typologies.\(^{110}\) These connotations became crystallised as the Muslim culture and civilization progressed. But the basic division has been ascribed to a saying of the Prophet who is recorded to have said, "Knowledge is two-fold: knowledge of religions and knowledge of bodies." This dictum has been interpreted to imply the knowledge of the abstract and the concrete, or the religious and the secular knowledge.\(^{111}\)

The most comprehensive syncretisation of the nature of knowledge in Islam was deduced by the celebrated scholastic Al Ghazali. In his renowned 'Book of Knowledge' (Ihya al Ulum al Din)\(^{112}\) which has been regarded as the Islamic Sociology of Knowledge and has formed the blueprint of Muslim education all through the pre-modern times, he has propounded all the norms and connotations of knowledge in Islam and how best it is acquired.

The fundamental thesis of All-Ghazali's sociology of knowledge' is the unity of knowledge which corroborates the concept of monotheism (Tawheed) in Islam. Al Ghazali postulated that in Islam the individual as a whole is the concern of knowledge as he is accountable to God for all aspects of his life. "Watan as a knower", asserts Al Ghazali,

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108. Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. pp.469-70. For a detailed study in English of the concept of 'ilm' see F.Rosenthal's, Knowledge Triumphant, The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, Brill, Leiden, 1970

109. ROSENTHAL. Knowledge Triumphant, pp. 1-2
"is at the same time man as a being; and both aspects are an indissoluble whole. At any stage in his development, the individual's depth of insight and the degree to which he understands correspond to a state of being within his total personality. What are known as 'instruments of knowledge' including the mind, are not independent of the whole personality, and cannot be detached from other constituents of the personality as the 'faculties of knowledge' or the only things that count in establishing contact with reality. Every aspect of the personality besides these 'faculties' of knowledge, i.e. the habits, desires, emotions, personality traits, personal goals and interests, etc. are all involved in the process of knowledge." (113)

Al Ghazali discovered that human beings have a natural disposition (fitrah) to know and seek knowledge of Reality. The ultimate goal of those who seek knowledge is to have a contact with Reality as absolute certainty of Reality is possible only at this level. Contact with Reality, which Al Ghazali has called 'immediate disclosure' (mukashafah) is the highest stage of knowledge. Mukashafah is uncommunicable; words do not convey its real nature for words express conventionally known concepts. Again Mukashafah can not be learnt; it is experienced. The Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet form the result of the mukashafah of Prophet Muhammad as these have been expressed by God Himself for all levels of understanding. (114)

Next to mukashafah are the stages of revelation (wahy) and inspiration (ilham) in which Reality conveys knowledge of Itself and Its dimensions in the former to the Prophets and the latter to seekers of Truth. All these higher levels of knowledge are a part of the Divine knowledge (ilm ladduniya) and unless man achieves this knowledge, he is not wise. According to the Quran, 'wahy' or the linguistic

110. ibid. pp.46-69
111. R.LEVY, The Sociology of Islam, Vol.II, Cambridge University Press, 1931, p.343. Levy, however, ascribes to it the apparent literal meanings, i.e. the knowledge of theology and medicine.
113. OTHMAN, op.cit. p.47.
expression of Reality by God directly, was sealed with Prophet Muhammad's demise, but 'ilham' or the exposure of truth through inspiration remains open; and Godly men in every age are inspired by it.

Communicable knowledge defined as the 'practical knowledge' (muamlah) is that knowledge which human beings can impart and receive from other human beings or the systematised knowledge which again, in its highest form, must conform to the verities of mukashafah. Muamlah is divided into knowledge of the visible (zahir) and that of the invisible (batif); or the religious and the intellectual sciences. Religious sciences have been divided into fundamental principles and practices; intellectual sciences are either native principles (matbuh) or acquired disciplines (masmuh).

Ilm has also been divided into theoretical (ilm nazari) and practical (ilm amli) and great emphasis has been placed on the practical application of knowledge. A saying of the Prophet goes:

"Your knowledge is not complete until you have acted upon it. He who acquires knowledge and acts upon it has two acts of piety to his credit; if he knows and does not act upon it he has obeyed God once and disobeyed once; and he who neither knows nor acts has transgressed twice." (116)

Al Ghazali's typology of knowledge had implicit within it the notion that the essential knowledge that leads to the bliss (saadah) is all there in the Quran and the Sunnah. It was only to the understanding and acquisition of that knowledge that human effort was to be directed. In other words, knowledge and Reality are permanent, and the changeable aspects are only their understanding and re-statement. It was natural, therefore, that the main importance was given to the religious sciences as these were considered to be the short-cut to saadah and intellectual sciences.

114. OTHEMAN, op. cit. p.36
115. A graphic abstraction of the Scheme of knowledge can be seen on the opposite page.
116. See the Encyclopaedia of Islam. s.v. 'Ilm' pp. 469-70
THE NATURE OF REVELATION AND THE PROCESS OF ITS ACQUISITION

IN ISLAM

(Al-Ghazali's Scheme)
sciences remained only as an appendage to the former. Again, whether the great teacher himself had designed it to be so or not, the fact remains that Islamic learning became mostly repetitive and stereotyped. With its deterministic bent it was inherently inclined towards conservation and corroboration of the known rather than experimentation and innovation. The inspiration and desire to innovate stems from a dissatisfaction from the prevalent and doubt of its efficacy. Muslim scholarship though exorted doubt yet paradoxically doubt into the tradition had become a taboo whose violation was an exception, not a norm.

3. 1.4.
THE NORMS OF SOCIETY IN ISLAM

In adherence to its central concept, the unity of Reality (Tawheed) Islam upholds the basic unity of mankind as one community united in the essential common bond of its humanity and spirituality. "Men were created but one community; then they differed," declares the Quran.

Having affirmed this common denominator of universalism, it also recognizes the diversity of various cultural systems. The various ethnic and national divisions among the peoples, according to the Quran, are mere geographic arrangements, designed by God, for recognizing and distinguishing one from the other. The only distinction that God draws between one man and another, affirms the Quran, is in the belief and the right conduct.

"O mankind, Lo! We have created you male and female; and have made you nations and tribes that you may know one another. Surely, the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah is the best in conduct. Lo! Allah is all knowing; all-Aware." (119)

The ideals of Islam, as gleaned from the above Quranic verses and numerous traditions of the Prophet undoubtedly uphold a criteria of

118. The Quran. 10:20
119. ibid. 49:13
universalism and achievement, though belief in the Unity of God as defined in Islam is imperative for Islamic society.

The Islamic concept of society is 'Ummah' which does not connote a racial, geographical or kinship unit; Ummah is an ideological community 'a brotherhood in the faith'. Belief in One God, therefore, forms the essential core and the axiological basis for the Islamic society.

The ideal Islamic society was founded by the Prophet in Medina after his migration (Hijra) from Makka where he left his kin, his home and his traditional environment. In Medina, he established the first Islamic society which comprised the believers consisting of his immigrant followers and the Muslims of Medina, as well as those non-believers who crusaded with the former and owed allegiance to them. They were accepted as the 'protected people'. (zimma)

The Constitution that the Prophet drew up for his Islamic society declared:

"...the believers: Muslims of Quresh (Makka) and Yathrib (Medina) and those who follow them, and those that are attached to them; and those who crusade along with them, all constitute a single community, distinct from other communities." (120)

So important was the founding of the Islamic Society; that to symbolise it, the Islamic Era itself starts from the inauguration of the Ummah in Medina and not with the birth of the Prophet, nor indeed, with the initiation of the Quran at Makka.

The Prophet's model of the Islamic society was later conceptionalised by Muslim philosophers and sociologists, and institutionalised by the succeeding generations. The first four pious Caliphs (Khulafa-i-Rashidun') so called for their personal piety and their just conduct of the affairs of the Ummah, their adherence to the rule of law and their striving for the upkeep of the norms of Islam,

120. See William MONTGOMERY-WATT, Muhammad at Medina, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956, p.21. All the 47 clauses of the Constitution of Medina have been reproduced by Professor Watt.
have been regarded as the closest upholders of the ideals of the Islamic society. Whether the later generations of Caliphs, Sultans and potentates in different parts of the Islamic world have striven for the ideals of the Prophet and the Khulafa-i-Rashidun remain a matter for history to judge, but as an ideal, the model Islamic society as established by them has never been lost sight of whenever the succeeding generations aspired to reconstruct an Islamic society.

Ideally, the main objective of the Islamic society has always remained the implementation of the norms of Islam as codified in the Shariah for the welfare of the Ummah. Shariah is the collective code of the laws of Islam as derived from the Quran, the Prophetic Traditions and the consensus of the Ummah and vouchsafed by the learned Ulama; the scholars and custodians of the faith. The Shariah forms the main societal norm of Islam and encompasses laws concerning all the political, social, economic, socio-economic, cultural and religio-moral aspects of the Ummah. Differentiation of the secular and the religious laws was not possible or held desirable in Islam as the Shariah constituted the single axiological core of norms for the Islamic society. It was this all-pervasive, axiological nature of the Shariah that made Muslim philosophers like Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Al-Farabi, Al-Mawardi and others to diverge from the Hellenic dichotomous ideals of society when the latter were studied by the Muslims. These philosophers came out with a common assertion that Islamic society was what has been regarded as an 'idealistic' type of society because in this system, the mind and body, the material and supramaterial are united into one.

Refuting the claim held by certain orientalists that Islamic sociological philosophy merely developed out of the Hellenic thought asserts All, "Platonism is a philosophy based on sensation or the negation of the suprasensate realities and hence it is absurd to claim that either Platonism or Aristotelianism gave form or character to Muslim culture which is a psychological force to the Muslim philosophy. No doubt the Muslims in their contact with the Grecian philosophy, systems of knowledge and culture, got an opportunity to study them with deep insight, critical vision and
Ibn Khaldun, the great Muslim historian and sociologist, for example divides societies into those which only care for the material needs of their subjects and those which also care for their happiness in the future world. He was sanguine that an ideal society (for him the Islamic society) is superior to the secular society as the former has man's welfare, both in this world and the next, at heart whilst the latter cares only for his material well-being in this world.\(^{122}\)

Al-Farabi also stresses that the ideal society must have a theological and metaphysical superstructure. Similarly, Al-Ghazali, deducing the purposes of society from the Quran and the Shariah, has maintained,

"The human society arises inevitably as a result of the individual's inability to live alone. That its coming into existence is necessary reveals God's wisdom, both in creating such needs in human being on the one hand, and in making individuals incapable of satisfying them alone on the other. God has, in order to make the existence of society inevitable, also created in each individual an inescapable desire for human companionship. In other words, in fashioning human nature in the manner He did, God has made human society a necessity.". (123)

This innate socialising trait of the human nature, asserts Al-Ghazali, dictates the creation of social organization. Without social organizations, man would not fulfil God's desire to settle the world with human beings as His representatives on earth. This is how civilization (Tamaddan) starts. Man needs 'tamaddan' in order to live, to improve his destiny in this world and to perfect his soul for the next.

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121. comparison with the idealistically integrated thought and cultural contd. patterns of Islam. But they never borrowed anything that could clash with their own mentality."


123. A.I.OTEMAN, The Concept of Man in Islam in the Writings of Al Ghazali, Dar al Maaraf, Cairo, 1960. p.168
According to Ibn Sina (Avicenna) the core of social organizations is political. The same point has been stressed by Ibn Khaldun in his famous edict that 'Man is political by nature'. But an Islamic polity as indeed the entire Islamic social system, they argue, must be based upon social co-operation, and governed by the rule of law (Shariah). Social competition and conflict would inspire a tendency among individuals and groups to accumulate all the benefits for themselves, and this greed would lead to exploitation, strife and grief in the society.  

The sole purpose of the Islamic society and its organizations is to create conditions helpful for man, individually and collectively, towards ego-perfection and the attainment of the bliss (saadah) of journey towards the "Ultimate Ego'. This bliss (Saadah) is attained through knowledge and moral perfection and these, according to the Muslim philosophers, are possible only in a society which is ruled by the Divine law, and guided by the example of the Prophet.

As man is 'on trial' in this life, which he took upon himself as a trust with the endowed gifts in turn of free will and creativity, in order to invoke universal justice, to enjoin common good and forbid evil; so are societies and civilizations. The Quran repeatedly stresses the fact that the rise and fall of civilizations has been due to their success or failure in carrying out this Divine trust of doing justice, promoting good and warding off evil.

"Already before your time, have precedents been made. Traverse the earth then and see what hath been the end of those who falsify the signs of God." (125)

It is in this sense too that the Quran exhorts the Islamic society to be the most righteous society:

"You are the most righteous society that has been created for mankind. You (ought to) enjoin right (maaruf); and forbid evil (munkar); and You believe in God." (126)

125. Quran 3: 131
126. Quran 3:110
Authority in an ideal Islamic society ought to be exercised as an act of worship in the interest of the universal good, and to further both the material and spiritual welfare of the subject. Obedience to authority has, therefore, been enjoined in the Quran as an act of duty upon the Muslims: an act of co-operation and not acquiescence. The ideal leader of such an Islamic society ought to be the person elected/selected as the most suitable representative of the Prophet, i.e. his Khalifah (Caliph), as the first four pious Caliphs were. He must regulate the society in such a way that it promotes the common interest (musharikat), the sanctity of family life (manakihat) and safeguards life and property. Muslims have been enjoined by the Quran, whenever they associate together, to co-operate and take part only in righteousness and not in sedition and criminality.

"And co-operate with one another in righteousness and piety; Do not associate with one another unto sin and transgression. Keep your duty to Allah..." (127)

To sum, the norms of an ideal Islamic society can be stated as below:

1. That the Islamic society ought to be an 'idealistic' society, a unity in the Faith and a 'universal brotherhood' whose prime objective is to function to fulfil God's will and purpose, and to uphold righteousness, justice and welfare for all mankind.

2. Divine will and purpose has been revealed in the Divine Law which is universalistic and immutable. Man's role as law maker is restricted within the limits (Hadud) set by the Divine Law. He is the interpreter, adjuster, implementer and adjudicator of the Law but not the law-maker.

3. Social integration and co-operation between all sections of the society are the best means of achieving the Divine purpose. 128.

126. Quran. 3:110.
127. Basharat Ali. op.cit. p.104
Islamic society allows for no elitism and stratification on the bases of kinship, class or caste. The leader and the led are all answerable equally to the (Shariah) Divine Law. The only criteria for excellence and social primacy are piety and right conduct.

4. Since belief and piety are the only criteria for excellence, knowledge has to be strong determinant of social equilibrium in the Islamic society. "Insistence upon knowledge," asserts Rosenthal, "has no doubt made medieval Muslim civilization one of the great scholarly and scientific productivity." 129

5. Since Islam remains a unitarian belief system par excellence, unification of all aspects of social life has been stressed as against their differentiation. In this sense, then the Islamic society would be regarded as a segmented and not a differentiated society.

3. 1.5.

ENTRENCHMENT OF TRADITIONALISM (TAQLID) IN ISLAM

The 'ideal-normative' Islam, with its universalistic achievement and collectivity orientated 'vision' started to live itself out in an environment, both at home and abroad, deeply entrenched in ascriptive, particularistic values. It is only in the living that a vision is faced with the classical lag that develops between the ideal and the actual. Visionaries then essay to eradicate this lag by a continuous process of assessment, reassessment and reinterpretation of the vision. Once however they see the vision finalised and 'close the door' for change, it starts getting fixated to a particular time and a particular shape. As time passes the vision itself gets crusted under layers of traditionalism. Any change that then comes into it, is generally extraneous.


130. William Montgomery WATT, What is Islam, op.cit. The idea of Islamic vision is taken from Prof. Watt who writes, "Since a vision is a way of both looking at the world and of dealing with it, it also follows that a vision is always something that has to be lived out. This means that it has to be embodied in the life both of individuals and of society as a whole, since man is a social animal" p.11.
Just as the Christian vision centred round the person of Jesus as the unquestionable divine Logos, Islam emerged as a civilization of the Book, Al-Quran, which formed the tabula-rasa of the divine Logos. The 'Book' formed the source of belief, knowledge and the 'rule of Law'. The Prophet was the living example of it in person, and the Islamic community is its embodiment. Together, these three components became the axiological bases of the Islamic vision. But these were only the rock bottom bases; they still had to develop structures and systems.

Crucial events and diverse traditions throw up challenges for ideologies and visions where legitimate conceptual guidelines have to be provided. Fallible human beings, with all their frailities and predilections do not always readily achieve a consensus. So appear splits, factions and controversies. And, if these become violent, instability follows. In the face of instability and undcertainty, people and societies naturally tend to find anchorage in their traditions. Medieval Muslim traditionalism was more a result of fear of anarchy than a lack of idealism.

The first split that emerged in Islam was over the question of succession to the Prophet in his functions both as the spiritual guide and the leader of the community. A section of the community which later came to be known as the Shi'ites, held that the 'leader of the faithful' cannot be chosen 'on the basis of men's capricious will and temptation' but it should invariably be a divine appointment in the Apostolic line, that is to say, an infallible descendant of the Prophet through his daughter, Fatimah, and her husband Ali, (the Prophet's cousin) who became the fourth Caliph. Those who insisted upon the


electoral basis of the Caliphate, came to be known as the Sunnites, the followers of the Prophet's Sunnah (precept). The focal point of variance between the factions lay in the importance given by the former to the ideal leader as the source of authority as well as law; and by the latter, to the consensus of the community as the basis of authority and the implementation of the Shariah (law). Thus, the Shi'ites, as Professor Watt points out, believed in salvation through a 'charismatic' leader: the Sunnites through a 'charismatic society'.

The Shi'ites did not accept the election of the first three Caliphs as lawful and regarded Ali as the rightful successor to the Prophet, among other things for his lineage with the Prophet. After Ali, they held, the leadership of the Muslims remained de jure vested in his posterity until Imam Hasan al Askari, the 11th Imam who died in 874.

Upon his death, the Imamate devolved upon his son Muhammad al Mahdi, who disappeared into a cavern and never returned. All religious and political authority after Imam Muhammad (the hidden) has to be held in his name by proxy.

The Sunnites regarded the election of all the four Caliphs, including Caliph Ali, perfectly in order, and in line with the requirements of the Book and the 'rule of law'. But, then came the tragic killing of Othman, the third Caliph who was alleged to have assigned public offices to his clansmen from Makka and thus given rise to ascription and nepotism in the Islamic polity. So intense was the reaction to the introduction of ascriptive criteria into body politics of Islam, that it was considered as the gravest sin, which sparked off

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133. W. Montgomery-Watt, Islam and the Integration of Society, op.cit. also W.M.Watt, "The Conception of the Charismatic Community in Islam", in NUMEN, vii (1960), pp.77-90. On the question of the charismatic leadership of the Islamic Ummah having Quranic support, Prof. Watt remarks, that though the Prophet was in fact a charismatic leader, marked out by the receiving of supernatural communications, the conception of the charismatic leader had little impact in the Quranic system of ideas.

134. Imamate is the Shi'ite concept of leadership of the Muslims as against the Sunni concept of Khilafah (Caliphate). Imamate stresses the idea of 'leadership' while the Khilafah of 'succession'.
continual doctrinal controversy and violent socio-political conflicts.

On the doctrinal side, a group of thinkers known as the Kharijites (secessionists) who idealised the Islamic community as sinless, on the sole criterion of its unadulterated following of the 'Book' and judged all the events of the time as deviations from it. A Muslim, they argued, who committed a grave sin, as Caliph Othman in their view had, strictly speaking forfeited his membership of the Islamic community and was liable to be killed. This very extreme view had within it the seeds of an uncontrolled violence, for anybody branded sinful was liable to lose his life. A serious objection to this position was that legal jurisdiction could only go as far as a man's external actions, and not to his beliefs. The moderates known as Murji'ites advocated that the question of sin and punishment should be left to God's will until the Day of Judgement. Their line of argument helped the Omayyid dynasty which, taking advantage of the lack of a solid institutional structure of the elective 'Khilifah' had established themselves as an autocratic monarchy. Being de facto in power, they demanded obedience of the Ummah on the grounds that the Quran enjoined upon believers to 'obey Allah, the Prophet and those in authority.'

Thus, the idealistic elective Khilafah, before it could institutionalise itself was misappropriated into a hereditary dynastic rule by the powerful Omayyids and has, ever since, remained only as an ideal. The Omayyid dynasty (660-750 A.D.) was followed by a more despotic, Abbasid Caliphate which relied more firmly on an elaborate machinery of state imperialism, on the model of the Persian and Byzantinean rule, though it also encouraged diversity of thought and beliefs, and systematised Islamic law and patronised scholarship.

135. W.M.WATT, What is Islam, op.cit. pp.116-17
136. This stringent approach to the visualisation of human society remarks Prof. Watt, was essentially a characteristic of the pre-Islamic callous tribal way of looking at human affairs. ibid. p.155
It was in the Abbasid academies that the Greek philosophy came under the study of the Muslim savants. Being a priori concerned with uncompromising purity of monotheism, the Muslims remained highly selective in borrowing from the Greek thought. Whatever the amount and nature of their borrowing, however, the dialectic contact itself was culturally, fruitful. The Abbasid Caliphate has rightly been credited with the honour and esteem of being the most liberal and rationalist period of Islamic history. Hellenic culture strengthened the philosophic and scientific thought in Islam. A direct product of this contact were the Mu'tazilites - the Muslim rationalists - who rose to interpret the Quranic norms in the light of reason.

The most heatedly debated question of the time was the metaphysical position of the 'Book', the divine Logos, that is to say, whether the Quran was an uncreated word of God, eternal and coeval with God Himself, or creation in time. The Mu'tazalites held that it was a creation in time on the premise that an uncreated, eternal and coeval-with-God position of the Quran would have meant in the last analysis, the association with God of another Divine entity, a position standing contrary to Tawheed. Another off-shoot of the rationalist school, the Asharites, a splinter group of the Mu'tazilites, drew a distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric speech, a distinction which according to Affifi was a direct influence of the Stoics who spoke of the potential and actual or internal and external logoi.

One likely consequence of the controversy was seen by Caliph-Al-Mamun that the Khilafa would be able to enact legislation on a 'rationalist and positivist' basis as distinct from its sole source, the Quran and Sunnah. Al-Mumun, therefore instituted an inquisition (mihna) requiring

137. MORGAN, Islam and the Straight Path, op.cit. p.64
139. ibid.
all the Qâdis, Muftîs, saints and the Ulûma of the realm to testify to the doctrine of the Quran's creation. This raised a storm of fury and there were some executions. The overwhelming consensus of the learned held the uncreatedness view of the Quran, a position which has remained intact as a basic norm in the Sunni Islam. In 847, Caliph al-Mutawakkal abolished the inquisition (mîhna) and restored the orthodox viewpoint.

On the philosophical side, the Muslim thinkers, in their attempt to reconcile the Greek and the Islamic thoughts, were confronted with four main theories of the Absolute: (1) the Aristotelian theory of a Prime Mover who set the whole world in motion and then left it to its own course; (2) the Platonic theory of God as the Supreme idea; (3) the Stoic theory of pantheism, and (4) the Neoplatonic theory of emanation. Stoical pantheism never appealed to the Muslim philosophers although a distinctly Muslim theory of pantheism was developed by Ibn al Arabî. Of the other three, the Neoplatonic school absorbed the geniuses of philosophers like Ibn Sîna (Avicenna), Al-Farab, Al-Kindî and Ibn Rushd (Averroes).

By the middle of the tenth century, four distinct approaches to knowledge were discernible among the Muslims. In the first place, the Mutakallîmun (the scholastic theologians) who held that all knowledge is from God without any intermediary. They stressed the unquestioned following of the letter of the revealed Logos as interpreted by the previous generations. They developed into a class of scholars adept in the methods of argumentation, debating and defensive polemics. Then there were the Batîniyâh (the esoterists) who claimed that the charismatic leader was the only source of all knowledge. A third group comprised the rationalist philosophers with their leaning towards logisîci... and emanence, and finally there were the Sufis (mystics) to whom knowledge meant the possession of reality through a mystical experience which comes during the quest for a glimpse of Reality itself.
These different approaches gave rise to unending debates on the conflict between the rival theories and viewpoints. Each group traced its authority from the Scriptures and the Prophet's sunnah. Not only had there developed gross artificial disharmony between the learned classes but excessive doctrinal wranglings threatened to disrupt society and to misdirect activity. Socio-political stability was in danger; Islam was considered to be in danger. It was at this stage that Al-Ghazali (1111) intervened and produced a synthesis which became the crystallization of the orthodox Sunni thought in Islam. In this synthesis, observes Professor Arberry, "the three currents: theological, philosophical and mystical, made confluence to attempt an all embracing harmony, an end to dispute Orthodox Islam, though suspicious of the mystics ready to excommunicate even to execute the extremists, finally accepted the Sufis as allies against the far more dangerous enemies, the free-thinking rationalist philosophers; Al-Ghazali routed them from the field." 140

This was a turning point for the evolution of thought in Islam. Although the great Iman Al-Ghazali, himself a critic of Taqlid (traditionalism), did not intend his synthesis to become hardened as the final word, yet the fact remains that the idea of finality did get entrenched in the vision of Islam. From now on it was the 'completed tradition', the consensus of the 3rd/9th century legalist-theologians that came to be regarded as the 'right path'. Any deviation from that crystallised synthesis, was labelled as 'heresy'. "Every Muslim child", maintains Professor Al-Faruqi, "is exhorted to honour not only the faith of the fathers but their definitions of that faith as well, and to avoid every deviation from tradition." 141

Innovation is stigmatised as

anti-Islamic, and traditionalists support their faithful devotion to the 'completed tradition' by referring to corroborating verses from the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet. The most often quoted tradition of the Prophet negating change is the report of the Prophet's companion Jabir, who quotes the Prophet saying, "The best words of God and the best guidance is that which Mahum mad brought. The worst of all things are the new;every innovation is an error and a misguidance." 142

Some of the Quranic verses quoted against change are:-

"Some people acknowledge God but understand Him in a peculiar way. Their faith is strong as long as their fortune is good; but once they are put on trial they give up their faith for something else, thereby losing both this world and the next." (143)

and "It is He who revealed to you the Book some verses of which are precise and their meaning unmistakable, and others of which are equivocal. Those whose faith is faulty follow the latter with a view to innovate and to interpret as they wish." (144)

Howsoever these verses are interpreted, the crux of the matter is that traditionalists do not give any significance to the overwhelming number of verses that encourage rationalism, thought and change.

The great merit of Al-Ghazali's dissertation to syncretistic Islamic thought was that it provided the politically unstable and socially Muslim disillusioned societies of the time with a coherent, and powerful formula for a harmonious compromise with the heterogeneous traditions that had merged into the body social of Islam, and the de facto authoritarian kind of polity that had settled for good, never to allow the ideal Khilafah to take effect. But the transitory formula turned into a frozen norm which became, after centuries of 'wear and tear' unmalleable and uncreative. From the 9th/10th to 13/19th centuries, Islamdom then remained a changless and rigid world whose inertia was only shaken by the Western impact.

142. ibid P.13.
143. The Quran. 22:11
144. ibid. 3:7
Traditional (Folk) Muslim Value Systems

The fossilization of thought in Islam had a naturally degenerating effect on the intellectual vitality of the Ummah. The traditionalist Muslim values were gradually becoming akin to the folk culture as distinct from the elite culture. Folk Islam had become an instrument in the hands of the autocratic medieval and post-medieval rulers who feared change and employed traditionalist ulama and sufis to preach obedience as the most pious route to salvation. A common traditionalist Muslim received his values either from the rigid, ascriptive-diffuse pattern of environment in which he was born or from the guides, pirs, and maulvis, either at the tombs of saints or at the mosques.

According to this view of the Universe, God, man and society, "the world is composed of natural elements, which obey certain laws, and of supernatural dependences, which often strike into the world of nature and bring about change designed to satisfy unknown ends. Besides God, at whose command everything in nature moves, there are angels and jinn who can act efficiently in nature for a good or bad cause. Divines, pirs and saints have been 'endowed with the supernatural power to over-rule at will the workings of nature and perform karamat, or 'little miracles'. Finally, the common Muslim believes that there are instruments and mechanics (such as the talismans-Arabic talism), by means of which any proper administrator can effect breaches in the laws of nature to suit his purpose." 145

Continuing with the nature of man in the traditionalist-folk version of Islam, Al-Faruqi remarks, "we find that, in the view of taqlid, the supernatural powers which interfere in nature - and interfere equally in human life - are by definition beyond impediment or frustration. What they decree will necessarily happen and, in fact, all that happens does so because it is predetermined by them. The only attitude consonant

145. ibid. p.19
with this is passive acquiescence and surrender to the flow of events.
Graver still, such flow is neither knowable nor predictable, for its
necessity is merely the invincibility of an arbitrary agency. Kismet,
or the silent acquiescence to the fait accompli, is only the ethical side
of the gnoseological principle... Forgetting that Islam attributes
transcendental knowledge to God exclusively, the Muslim implores, listens
to, believes without question; and in the process is milked of his land,
his wheat, his little wealth, his wife's jewellery - indeed even of his
freedom and future earnings - by the charlatan magician, esoteric
Sufi Shaikh or pir, who has arrogated to himself the job of spiritual
mentor." 146

Traditional Muslim society was a loosely knit, segmented pattern
with its division into town and village, tribe and guild. Each unit
tended to be self-contained, closed and self-governing; communication
with other groups was restricted and personal. However, a degree of
social mobility did exist since rigid caste and class systems did not
prevail in Islamdom. People did move out of their hereditary moorings
and achieved better status, but this was exception rather than a rule.

Depicting the structure of the pre-modernization eastern
including Muslim societies, an early observer writes:

"Eastern society appears to us as earthbound, living with
the Rhythms of nature, and mainly consists of territorial
and geneological communities. These communities are
rooted in thousands of more or less isolated centres,
mostly villages, which are autonomous units, almost self-
sufficient in their religious, social, political and
economic life. In many parts of the East great religions ..
Islam, have super-imposed a common veneer of general
religious culture upon these isolated little communities,
without, however, causing them to lose their peculiar
shade of mystical, magical feeling of their own particular
life. Within this circle human identity and human
consciousness feel merged into the community and group
instinct. Tradition, status and the interests of the group
determine the place and the functions of the individual,
and as a rule, heredity transfer them. Aptitude or
inclinations are not consulted, so that talent is rarely
given the chance of unfolding itself." (147)

146. ibid. pp.21-2
147. A.D.A.De Kat ANGELINO, Colonial Policy, Trans.G.J.Renier,
3. ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL ISLAM

3. 2.1 Political Aspect

As has been seen above, an elective Caliphate was held as the ruling political institution in the Sunni Islam but 'asabiyya' later turned this into a succession of autocratic Sultanates, some keeping Shariah as their guideline; others guided only by self-interest. The institution of Khilafah incorporated both religious and secular functions under one authority; but it has never been a theocracy: the Khalifah has never been drawn from the class of the ecclesiastics. Ideally, the Khilafah was elective. The Khalifah (Caliph) is required by Islam to rule and decide policy matters after consultation with the 'Shura' (consultative council), the body of the chosen representatives of the people. The Prophet is recorded as having equated the state to a shepherd responsible for its flock, in its protection, provision of its needs and the integration of its formation and the direction of its activities. Examples of selfless, God-fearing, just and vigorous leadership have been set by the Khulafa—Rashdun, and others who followed in their footsteps. On the other side, it has also been laid down for the people as a duty to obey and co-operate with those in (legitimate) authority, and those who exercise their authority for the welfare of the community.

The essential duties of the Khalifah were to protect the Ummah from outside aggression and internal strife, and to uphold the Shariah which was binding on all Muslims without distinction. Various offices and institutions within the Muslim polity functioned as delegates of the Khalifah such as Imamah (leadership of Prayer), Qadha (justice), the Chief Mufti (Jurisconsulate), the Amil (Revenue collector), the Amir al Jaish (Commander of the Army) and others. The most influential

148. The Quran. 3:160
149. M.Zafrullah Khan, Islam, op. cit. p.158
150. The Quran. 4:60
office was that responsible for the overall upkeep of the rule of law (Shariah) and the welfare of the Ummah was that of Shaikh al Islam whose authority and fetwa (ruling), at times, even superseded that of the Ruler.\textsuperscript{151} The office of the Shaikh al Islam held a pivotal position in the Ottoman Caliphate. In the Mughal Empire, the title was known as the Sadr al Sadur although the functions were the same. The Shaikh al Islam or the Sadr al Sadur was also responsible for the administration of educational institutions, pious foundations (awkaf) and grants to students as well as financial support of the scholars.

Judiciary in Islam is regarded strictly independent of the executive and in Shariah even the Khalifah is answerable to a court of law.\textsuperscript{152} Among others, Muslim courts also comprised a Court of Justice against the Executive (Diwan i Muzalam). The Khalifah is also required to appoint an authority (Muhtasib) to supervise public morality. The Muhtasib is authorised to exhort, invite and even chastise those who deliberately infringes the moral and social order of the society.

The Islamic Law

The Islamic law includes the entire system of moral and institutional laws ranging from the religious observances, the family law, the law of inheritance, property, contracts and obligations, criminal procedure, constitutional law as well as the law of the State administration and conduct of war. The onus of obedience to the law

\textsuperscript{151} See Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. Shaikh al Islam, pp.275-279. As late as 1807, the Ottoman Shaikh al Islam issued a fetwa that Sultan Selim III by introducing foreign institutions into the Ottoman society and by undermining the Islamic institutions was not fit to remain as a Muslim ruler so he was deposed.

\textsuperscript{152} It is recorded that the second Caliph Umar was once summoned to court to answer a civil charge brought up against him. As he entered the court, the Qadhi (judge) stood up to show respect; but the Caliph objected that by so doing the Court had failed to show impartiality since the Caliph had appeared there only as an ordinary citizen and not as the Head of the State. See N.Zafrullah Khan. Islam. op.cit. p.170
is placed, in the first place, on the individual conscience. Divine Will is the ultimate sanction that operates through individual conscience, and the enforcement of legal commands by the State agencies is only a secondary sanction created by the society.  

Though ideally, Islam allows two 'positivistic' sources namely the consensus (of the learned ijma) and analogical deduction (qiyas) to augment its primary sources of law viz the Quran and the Sunnah, the traditionalists strictly restrict these two functions to the 3rd/9th century crystallizations of the Islamic law whereby four orthodox schools of jurisprudence completed the entire code of the Islamic law. A consensus emerged in the 4th/10th century among the Ummah to the effect that all future activity with regard to legislation would have to be confined to the explanation, interpretation and application of the doctrines enunciated by these four schools, thus closing the doors of positivism for all times to come. Until then, Islamic jurisprudence had remained adaptable, growing and progressive; then it became a closed book. The result of this rigid position, writes Sobhi, was that "Islamic thought met a dead-end, and imitation (taqlid) and stagnation in jurisprudence as in other Islamic learning eventually became predominant." It also led to a de facto differentiation of the secular and the Islamic law although the jurists would not consider such a differentiation as legitimate. The Sultans could always issue rescripts which, in non-religious matters, had been accepted by the jurists as de facto binding. So although in theory, the law of the Shariah prevailed, in practice, the secular rulers had a way out to administer their own secular laws. The rule of law was often flouted in favour of particularistic inclinations.

The political system of the Mughal and the Ottoman Empires was far from the ideal Islamic polity as envisaged in the Shariah.

Autocrat Sultans with the nobility, bureaucrats, feudal lords (mansabdars and ayans) and the religious learned class of ulama formed the top oligarchic ruling classes. Power and authority were not differentiated into institutional systems but segmented into various sections of the society each constituting, more or less, a self-sufficient unit.

The ulama, whose true role in a Muslim society was to guide the ruler in the affairs of the state and society in accordance with the rule of law of the Shariah, had in fact acquiesced in accepting the virtual mighty authority of the Sultans provided the barest minimum conditions, i.e. the respect of the Shariah in principle, and the protection of the Ummah vis-à-vis their own social status in the various offices of the state remained intact. This was a kind of equilibrium which had been forthcoming in the traditional Islamic polity ever since the Sultan or the Sultan-Caliph usurped authority of the ideal Khalifah. In this system (sultante) the Ulama held the offices of the Shaikh al Islam, the Chief Mufti and the Chief Qadi, but an unjust or self-willed ruler (Sultan) could depose any of the holders of these high offices at will rather than the other way round. The Ulama had only a de jure authority, i.e. the power of persuasion against the unjust ruler, but no de facto military power to resort to as an ultimate sanction. As a result, the ulama for centuries had become reconciled, as Nikki Keddie points out, "to the acceptance of almost any nominally Muslim authority as preferable alternative to discord or revolt." Muslim education was equally geared towards maintaining this equilibrium and traditional status quo.

154. 44 (1954, pp.186-201. also cf. T.Parsons, 'Islamic Law remained contd. legalistic in the sense true of the Jewish law especially in its Talmudic pharse'. Societies, op.cit. p.85

So entrenched had this status quo become and been accepted as 'the' Muslim socio-political order that when in 1923, the office of the Caliph-Sultan was abolished by Kemal Ataturk, the whole world Muslim community felt bitterly about his action. The Caliph-Sultan still remained a symbol of the ideal Islamic Khilafah for the Muslims, and the attachment to this vestige of the ideal even though it had become degenerated into a despotic rule, carried great traditional weight with the Muslims.

To sum up then, as a result of the entrenchment of traditionalism in Islam, the whole set of dominant Muslim value-systems was clearly pulling in the opposite direction to the norms associated with modernity or indeed to the ideal norms of Islam. The world of Islam in its pre-modernization outlook, as Watt concludes, was beset by three rigid tendencies:

1. The "isolationary attitudes" which made its contacts with the other religious and social systems only superficial.

2. The "inflationary attitudes" which made Muslims to impute exaggerated claims of traditional Islam's conclusiveness.

3. The "fixational attitudes" which compelled Muslims to look "doggedly backwards to the old formulations for guidance in the present age." 156.

The nature of traditionalism has been summarised by Professor Bernard Lewis as follows:

"In the self-view of traditional society there is no progress and no development; there can, however, be change, and change is usually for the worse. The ideal model is usually situated in the past, in terms of a mythology, a revelation or a master philosophy, or a semi-historical golden age. Given this original perfection, all change is deterioration - a falling away from the sanctified past. Virtue, in society, means the acceptance and observance of tradition; departure from it is the major social offence. The true path is the doctrine and practice of the ancestors, as preserved and recorded by tradition - in a word, the Sunna. Departure from it is bid'a - innovation, which is assumed to be bad unless specifically accepted as good or permissible." 157.

3.2.2.

Economic Aspect

Economic pursuit and progress has not been considered a taboo in Islam; on the contrary, within the limits of certain moral principles, Islam encourages it. As Lewis points out:

"The charge that the Islamic religion is innately hostile to economic development is difficult to sustain; the social and cultural causes of economic backwardness in Muslim countries must be sought in a complex of factors, of which historic (traditional) Islam is a part and, to some extent an expression." 158
The guiding principles of economic activity and pursuits in Islam can be summarised as below:

1. The absolute ownership of everything in the Universe belongs to God. As God's viceregent on earth man holds the right to ownership only in trust. God has subjected the entire wealth of the universe to man's service, as a trustee of God, to enable him to do God's will and justice.

2. The economic wealth and all bounties of the universe must be spent in promoting good of humanity.

3. That human beings have been created unequal in their innate abilities including those of making fortune which is only a test of man's gratitude to the Giver, and a means towards an end; that is to say, the fulfilment of God's trust in creating social justice and harmony. As an end in itself, wealth has been regarded as the Hell-fire.

4. That in spite of the inherent inequalities, the entire society, including the inarticulate animals, have a right to share in the total wealth of the society.

With these basic principles, Islam has aimed at an economic system which places highest stress on the circulation and not the hoarding of wealth. Wealth and capital are not allowed to become the controlling force in the society. Therefore, monopolies, finance-houses, insurance companies and gambling are strictly prohibited. Islam also forbids loans on interest (Riba), for Riba 'tends to draw wealth into the hands of a small circle and to restrict the exercise of beneficence toward one's fellow beings'. Instead Islam exhorts interest-free loans; it even urges the lender to remit the loan altogether if the debtor is unable to repay.

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160. The Quran, 2:281

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158. Ibid. p.291.
Although Islam places no restriction on the lawful acquisition of wealth, it makes it obligatory for the wealthy to set aside a small proportion, two and a half per cent of all capital and income, as the share of the poor, the distressed and the needy of the society. This poor-tax, called Zakat, has been utilized to raise a welfare society in public health, public works, social, educational and medical service. The first Khilafah, the Islamic State, was considered to be a welfare state in which Zakat was paid into the Bait-al-Mal (public treasury) from which regular allowances were given to the destitute, the aged and the poor of the society.

To ensure equity and justice to all the rightful parties, the Islamic system of inheritance allows a person to dispose of his inheritance by testamentary means only to the extent of a third of his total legacy. The rest of the inheritance must be divided among the rightful heirs in specified shares which are prescribed in the Quran. The purpose of the system is to make the wealth circulate among more people rather than restricting it in the hands of a few.

Islam urges spending for charitable and beneficent purposes and condemns miserliness and niggardliness. It equally condemns extravagance and wasteful spending. The theory behind the encouragement of spending "in the cause of Allah: in the service of humanity", seems to be that by so doing prosperity and wealth increases.

Economic theorists who propound saving and investment as the two essential functions that led to modern economic development would question these Islamic economic ideals. They would regard the above defined principles of the Islamic economic system as characterising a

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161. The institution of Zakat is not a commendable act of charity, the Prophet described it as "a levy imposed upon the well-to-day which is returned to the poorer sections of the people," it is obligatory and its place is not taken by charity which is equally strongly urged in Islam. M.Z. Khan, Islam, op.cit.pp.150-7

162. ibid. p.161

a pre-modern economy which could hardly have resulted in a 'self-regulating' economic system. The prohibition of interest (Riba) in Islam did restrict Muslims in the past from saving capital for investment as well as from participation in foreign trade. This was perhaps one of the reasons why in all Muslim societies in the pre-modernization times non-Muslim communities such as Christian and Jews, Hindus, Parsis and others controlled most of the foreign trade. Again the overall effect of Islamic economic constraints on the Muslim's attitudes towards economic activities whether trade, industry or agriculture, as Hans Kohn has pointed out, was that of lethargy and indifference. Describing the economic attitudes of the typical Mediterranean man (including the Muslim) living still in the pre-capitalistic world, Kohn has remarked:

"Timelessness is a part of the pre-capitalist attitude towards trade and industry. Life still proceeds amid a natural harmony, in which there is yet no dominance of the impulse to push business at the cost of everybody else, of the lust for the acquisition of material possessions. Men still have a dignified indifference to the chances of business success, they feel it as important to satisfy the need for an easy-going and care-free existence and for a simple and direct joy in life as to earn money. Poverty is no disgrace, and in business life, irrational considerations play an important part... Most of the shop-keepers sit silently amid the treasures of their stock in silence and scarcely betray any interest in doing business. (166)

Modern Muslim scholars nevertheless insist that Islamic economic ideals are not inhibitory to economic development. Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan for example asserts that Islam does not oppose joint-stock companies, co-operatives or other commercial institutions that promote trade and legitimate financial dealings. 167

166. ibid. p.71.
167. M. Zafrullah Khan, op.cit. p.153
It is equally significant to remember as Demonbynes has maintained that in spite of the limitations imposed by the prohibition of interest (Riba) in Islam the "banking institutions and commercial customs which were to become those of Europe, developed in Muslim societies during the ninth and the tenth centuries. But the impact, for a modern 'self-regulating' economy with its supportive network of institutions to emerge in Muslim societies, was undeniably extraneous.

3. 23.
THE SOCIAL ASPECT

As has been noted above, the fundamental basis of community in Islam is belief. Traditional Muslim societies were therefore basically divided on the lines of Muslims and non-Muslims. Next to the Muslims were regarded the 'people of the Book', i.e. the Christians and the Jews, and then the various other communities. All these religious groups functioned autonomously under the overall protection of the Sultan, and were responsible for the administration of their own legal and socio-cultural systems. The Ottoman Empire had given this social segmentation a highly institutionalised form by creating and allowing the various millet (communal) systems autonomy to organise their own cultural as well as educational systems. The Mughal Empire in India allowed similar autonomy to the Hindu, Buddhist, Parsi and other communities although not in an institutionised way.

Within the Muslim community itself various factional divisions such as the Shiah and Sunni, the four schools of thought within the Sunni section, i.e. the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafee and Hanbali also formed vertical groupings. Again Muslim society was also segmented into occupational groups and guilds. The only horizontal division was on

168. ibid. pp.190-91
the basis of education, learning and piety. Institutionalised stratification consisted of the ruling classes of the royalty, nobility, landed aristocracy and the learned Ulama. But the lines of demarcation were not very rigid. One group that transcended the entire society was that of the learned ulama who not only manned all the professional, administrative, legal, judicial and educational institutions but also co-ordinated and integrated all other strata of society. Ulama could emerge from any stratum of society and their only qualification to belong to the learned group was a thorough education in the Islamic law and other religious sciences. Thus a Muslim society allowed sufficient fluidity for the educated and the qualified to rise to higher social status. Education therefore formed a passport for social mobility.

THE FAMILY IN ISLAM

The family in Islam is basically a socio-economic unit. In general Muslim family, like traditional family structures elsewhere in medieval societies, was an extended and patriarchal institution in which the head of the family united in his household his wife (or wives), his children and their children. The Head of the family enjoyed absolute authority, although the relationship between him and the members of his family was based on mutual affection and respect. Parental respect is highly commended in the Quran. 169

As an economic unit, the family is a pool of joint property which remained intact during the life of the father; sons contributed their labour and services into the pool and partook of its benefits. "Large families", remarks Goode, "are able to amass the capital for an important

169. The Quran XVII:23,4; XXXI:14; XLVI:15
economic enterprise whether it is obtaining enough cattle for a marriage, buying land or a governmental office, or paying for the education of a young man of promise. As long as those who receive the benefit of the investment also continue to feel obliged to share that benefit with their kinsmen, the group as a whole can function as a kind of savings bank." (170)

The weaknesses of the joint family structure, however, outweighed the benefits, which never existed in the first place in poor families. The entire social structure of Muslim societies, submerged as they had been in a top-heavy feudal system of government and autocratic rule, worked to grind the masses to a life of poverty, inertia and subservience while the aristocracy drained all the advantages, monopolizing the lands and wealth as well as political and military appointments. Lacking the dynamic of individual action and change, family members hardly could afford to live independently. The sons more often than not learned the trade of the father and never moved away from his abode.

Another feature of the joint family system was endogamy which took several forms such as the 'hamula' (clan) endogamy to include patrilateral, parallel and cross cousin marriages; social-class endogamy; and, in the case of Indo-Pakistan Muslims, also the caste (zat) endogamy. Designed perhaps to foster kinship, sympathy and group solidarity, the barriers created by endogamy between the groups; castes and classes became too rigid to cross.

Islam strongly enjoins marriage upon every Muslim and condemns celibacy even for saints. But marriage is a civil contract not requiring any religious ceremonial for validity. Marriage may be repudiated by divorce (talaq) which, although allowed, is not commended.


171. Cf. G.BAER, Population and Society in the Arab East, trans. Hanna Szoke, Routledge & K.Paul, 1964, London, pp.64-9. Baer has traced the following social causes that justify patrilateral marriages among old societies: (1) The young couple do not face the problem and expenditure of creating a new household unit; (2) the dilemma of split loyalties does not arise; (3) parents contd.
Before Talaq becomes irrevocable, both parties, with the help of their elders, influential and learned men, are required to try for a possible reconciliation.

The Quran legitimises polygamy by allowing Muslims to marry up to four wives, a practice which has aroused heated debate both within and without the Muslim world for centuries. Modern Muslim jurists have tried to prove that Muslims were not the only societies in which polygamy has been practised; other eastern, as well as western, societies have resorted to it. Furthermore, they maintain that polygamy was permitted mainly to combat the evil of promiscuity and to save man from abnormality.\textsuperscript{173}

The Quran, they claim, by restricting polygamy to a definite number and by subjecting it to a strict condition - that is, of doing full justice among all wives ("if you fear you are unable to do justice then only one")\textsuperscript{174} - brought about a great improvement over the pre-Islamic conditions.\textsuperscript{175} The argument has, however, failed to convince the critics of the justification for plurality of wives. Turning to the actualities, it would be true to say that polygamy was a luxury only the rich and the leisurely classes have been able to indulge in, and that, in general, polygamy has fairly helped in keeping Muslim societies relatively pure of promiscuity. Standards of morality have not deteriorated because of it, although harmony in family life has remained a dream in a polygamous household.

\textsuperscript{171} are sure of couple's social and familial background and standing; contd. (4) the marriage costs such as the dower are lower; (5) loyalty of the couple toward their common kinship is inculcated to the children, and (6) daughters' inheritance remains within the family. p.66.

\textsuperscript{172} P.
HUGHES, Dictionary of Islam, s.v. Marriage, pp.313-327


\textsuperscript{174} The Quran, IV:22

\textsuperscript{175} V.E.
Functionally, and in terms of social roles, man has been regarded as superior and dominant over women whose societal role has primarily been considered as the betterment of family life. The field of her role, so defined, Islam then gives woman equal rights with men. There is ample evidence to suggest that the respect for women as such has been unquestionably high in Islam7.

Another controversial feature of the Muslim society and the relationship between the sexes, is the strict seclusion or purdah found in Muslim societies. Strictly speaking the Quran does not enjoin purdah in its commonly known form; it only requires women "to down upon them their over garment" so that "they may be known and not given trouble". The rigid veiling existing generally among Muslims, asserts Sayid Ameer Ali,

"did not come into vogue until the reign of the Omayyid Walid II. Borrowed originally from the Persians and the Byzantines, its practice became common owing to the character and habit of the sovereigns. It is an historical fact that the custom of excluding women prevailed among most nations of antiquity. The Athenians, certainly, observed it in all its strictness. In later times, it found its way among the Byzantines who claimed to be inheritors of the Athenian culture. From them it descended on to the Russians among whom it was maintained with ludicrous rigour until Peter I abolished it by his usual drastic methods."

In spite of these refutations it is hard to deny that the orthodox took over purdah as a strict rule and have thereby tended to restrict the freedom and even education of Muslim women.

176. "Let us not assume," writes Djebar, "that this conception of Muslim family is necessarily a sign of ascendency of man over women. Does it not spring rather from the wish to safeguard the security of women, to shelter her from too great responsibilities? I feel, there is nothing offensive - quite the contrary, her position is more precious." Assia DJEVAR, Women of Islam, trs. J.MacGibbon, Andre Deutsch, London, 1986. p.31

177. The Quran, XXXIII:59. (Moulvi Muhammed Ali in his translation of the Quran states that in the early days of Islam, Muslim women were insulted by non-Muslims, hence this verse.

3. 4. MUSLIM EDUCATION

The history of Muslim education goes back to the Prophet himself, who taught his companions the Quran and its meanings as well as the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence. Even before he inaugurated his community and the Islamic State at Medina, he enjoined the literate among the prisoners of war captured at the battle of Badr to teach the children of Medina to read and write. At Medina, his own mosque became a centre of Muslim learning and religio-social activities, and the Prophet therein established a circle of learned men to study and teach the Quran. Later, mosques were opened in every locality and have remained ever since the primary centres of educational activities among the Muslims. The Prophet also sent missions of preachers to various parts of the country and abroad to teach and preach Islam. The main concern, in this age, and for some time to come, writes Ahmad, was simply to learn the Quran

"by heart or to preserve its verses by writing them on palm leaves, bones or stones. The so-called sciences of the Quran were not existent in those days." (183)

The Prophet's example as an educator and teacher inevitably became the most pious act for his followers, and his Khalifahs and rulers after them regarded it their sacred duty to build mosques and schools in their domain, to open pious trusts (awkaf) for the maintenance of teachers and scholars, and to associate themselves with the learned and teachers. In the course of time, the simple model of the Prophet's school was developed into a stratified and co-ordinated system of education well integrated with the social and economic pattern of life.

179. See Munir-ud-din Ahmad, Muslim Education and the Scholars' Status, Verlag, Zurich, 1968, p.30. "The Prophet used to teach his companions as children are taught in primary schools."


181. ibid.

182. Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. Mosque

183. Ahmad, op.cit. p.30.

3. 4.1. **THE STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF MUSLIM EDUCATION**

Muslim educational institutions could be divided into a three-tier system according to the functional outputs of socialization, schooling and education.

1. **Socialization**

Socialization of the child started at home where fundamentals of the faith were taught even before the child started his formal education. Parents were naturally keen to see a toddler start accompanying his/her father to the mosque and perform the ritual. The first school for all Muslim children, even today, remains the mosque, where he learns to read and memorise portions of the Quran and the tenets of the creed. In some Muslim countries when a child is four years, four months and four days old, the family celebrates the ceremony of 'Bismillah Khawani' an occasion marked with jubilation and blessings for the child at entry into the mosque school (Kuttab or Maktab), or in the care of a tutor for formal education.

2. **Elementary Education**

The widespread schools for elementary education were known as the Kuttabs or Maktabs (Mektab, as in Turkish) which have come down to the present times as primary schools. The idea of the Kuttab as an institution for reading and writing, and the teaching of the Quran started with the second Caliph Umar, who appointed teachers in all major cities of the Caliphate, e.g. Medina, Kufa, Basra and Damascus. Caliph Umar is also quoted as having proclaimed that apart from the reading of the Quran and writing, children should be taught swimming, horsemanship, good proverbs and poetry. To this list of subjects, arithmetic was later added to finalise the curriculum of the Kuttab.

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185. In some Muslim countries, the ability to read the Quran is still accepted as a qualification for literacy.

No uniform age for entry or leaving the Kuttabs seems to be on record; pupils entered sporadically from four years onwards to ten years. What seems clear is the fact that not only were the Kuttabs centres of basic education but they also formed the preparatory stage for higher studies. So widespread were the Kuttabs all over the Muslim world that Ibn Khaldun has furnished an enlightening comparative analysis of the methods employed and the emphases on the curriculum as applied in various countries of the time. The gist of his findings was that although the Quran was the common factor, in the Maghreb and other North African countries, no other subject was introduced until the pupil had full mastery of the Quran. In the Spanish schools, as well as in the East, poetry, grammar and calligraphy were given equal importance with the Quran.

"The fact that the people of Afriqya and the Maghreb restrict themselves to the Quran" remarks Khaldun, makes them altogether incapable of mastering the linguistic habits... As for the Spaniards, their varied curriculum with its great amount of instruction in poetry, composition, and the Arabic philology gave them, from the early years on, a habit providing for a better acquaintance with the Arabic language... They had a literary education either excellent or deficient depending on the secondary education they received after their childhood education." (187)

It is recorded that girls were admitted into the Kuttabs, probably until they reached the age of puberty when they were segregated and taught at home.  

Kuttab education was free and teachers called 'Mu'allim' were held in great esteem, although modestly remunerated. Describing the Kuttabs of the Ottoman Empire, Kazamias has pointed out that they were free but not compulsory. "The Maktabs constituted one of the most important avenues through which the values of the Ottoman Islamic society were transmitted to the young."  

The nobility and the wealthy classes engaged private tutors called (Mu'addib) for their children. The term Mu'addib, implying both moral and intellectual coaching, a Mu'addib was naturally held higher in esteem and rewarded more befittingly than a Mu'allim. 190

3. Schooling and Higher Education

Higher learning progressed gradually as Muslim society became more complex and established. The earliest institution again was, of course, the mosque, where various groups or circles of students (halqa) assembled around a scholar and learnt the Quran, the Sunnah and the Fikh, subjects which later became the religious sciences. When a scholar gained excellence in his subject and established his reputation as an authority, he held his halqa either at the mosque or at his house. With the further spread of knowledge bookshops also emerged as centres of educational activity. The rulers and nobility and the rich built special chambers where scholars and students and the learned among the people would gather and hold meetings (majalis) for lectures, debates and literary discussions. These were the informal, privately-sponsored places of higher learning as founded in the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad before Caliph al Mamun founded his celebrated academy, the House of Wisdom (Bait al Hikman) in 815. Supported by the State Treasury, this Academy was founded by the Caliph specifically for the study and translation of the Greek philosophy and sciences. An observatory called (al-Shamsiyya) and a library were also constructed along with the academy, which became the alma mater for scholars,

191. Nasr, op. cit. pp.69-70
philosophers, scientists as well as translators and commentators; and eventually gave rise to the so called rationalist school of thought in Islam.  

All these institutions, however, still did not constitute a system until in 1055 the Saljuq Vizier Nizam-ul-Mulk inaugurated his archetypal Nizamiyya Madrasah in Baghdad and other similar cities such as Nishapur, Harat, Isphan, Basrah, Balkh, Merw, Amul and Mawsil. Religious as well as secular studies formed the curriculum of the Madrasah. The celebrated Al-Ghazali taught in the Nizamiyyah. Madrasah thus became the prototype institution of higher Muslim learning which then spread across all Muslim countries: some of them flourished with a continued tradition of eminence for centuries.

Madrasahs were founded by the rulers, the nobility, the wealthy classes and the community. In Egypt, under the Ayubide Rule alone, seven Madrasahs were opened by the Sultans, twelve by people of high rank and thirteen by the community. Some Madrasahs were monumental in architecture, in the number of faculties they housed, the size of the libraries attached to them and the distinction of their scholars and the specialization of subjects. Prominent among them were the Nuriyyah-al-Kubra of Damascus, the Nizamiyyah and the Mustansiriyya of Baghdad.

192. SHALABY, History of Muslim Education, op. cit. p.58.
195. Contemporary historians have given the following description of the Mustansiriyyah: "In outward appearance, in stateliness or ornament and sumptuousness of furniture, in spaciousness and the wealth of its pious foundations, the Mustansiriyyah surpassed everything that had previously been seen in Islam. It contained four separate law schools, one for each of the orthodox sects of the Sunnis with a Professor at the head of each, who had seventy-five students (fakih) in his charge,
The Mughal Emperors of India and their preceding Sultans of Delhi and other dynasties built numerous colleges in various cities of the sub-continent. One such built in Delhi by Sultan Firoze Tughlaq in the fourteenth century was as magnificent as the Mustansirriyyah, if not more so. In the Ottoman Empire, the role of the Madrassah was even more significant since the Ottomans had a rather more organised hierarchy of social classes based on meritocracy than other Muslim countries. The Medrese (Turkish spelling) write Kazamias,

"Occupied a pivotal position in Ottoman society. It trained the teachers including those in the palace schools and all the Ulema of the Ottoman society. In so far as the Ulema performed functions other than purely religious ones in the judiciary, public administration, diplomacy and politics, the role of the Medrese was at least as important as that of the Enderun in the Ottoman body politics." (197)

195. contd.

to whom he gave tuition gratis. The four professors each received a monthly salary and to each of the three hundred students one gold dinar a month was assigned. The great kitchen of the college further provided daily rations of bread and meat. There was a library (dar al Kuttab), with rare books treating of the various sciences, so arranged that students could easily copy from the manuscripts; pens and paper being supplied by the establishment... Inside the College, a bathroom (hamam) was erected for the special use of the students and a hospital (Bimaristan), to which a physician was appointed."

Quoted in Nasr. op. cit. pp.50-51

196. The Madrassah was originally built in 1220 by Sultan Altamush of Delhi. Contemporary historian Barni wrote that: "the Madrassah was a very commodious building, embellished with lofty domes and situated in an extensive garden adorned with alleys and avenues, and all that human art combined with nature could contribute to make the place fit for meditation. An adjacent tank mirrored in its shiny and placid breast the high and massive house of study standing on its brink. What a charming sight it was when the Madrassah hummed with hundreds of busy students walking on its clean and smooth floors, diverting themselves on the side of the tank or listening in attentive masses to the learned lectures of the professors from their respective seats. See S.M.Ikram, Aab-i-Kauser, (Urdu Text) Ferozesons Lahore, 1936, pp.494-5, also Y.H.Khan, 'The Educational System in Medieval India' in the Islamic Culture, 30 (1956) pp.106-125. A brilliant history of the Muslim Educational System in India is given in N.N. Law, Promotion of Learning in India by Muhammadans, Calcutta, 1916

197. KAZAMIAS, Education and the Quest for Modernity, op.cit. p.33
Besides the Madrassah where teaching was more theoretical there were a number of observatories and hospitals, some functioning independently as institutions of scientific learning and experimentation, others appended to the Colleges. Caliph Mamun's famous Shamsiyyah observatory was copied in many other cities. In Muslim India, the Mughal Emperor Humayun seems to have been a regular visitor to his observatory, for it was there that he slipped and met his death.\textsuperscript{198}

At the apex of the Muslim education system stood the University (Jami or Dar el Ulum): the most famous is the Al-Azhar of Cairo, which has recently completed its first millennium, while that of Qaraawiyin in Morocco, built in 859 is the oldest university in Islam.\textsuperscript{199} Originally built by the Shiite Fatmi Caliphs in 972, the Dar al Ulum al Azhar later came under the Sunni influence which it has promoted, being the leading and the highest institution of Islamic studies, until its modernization in the last decade when various modern faculties were incorporated into it and some administrative changes were introduced.

**Contents of the Traditional Muslim Education**

Although local variations existed, depending on the availability of specialised professors, in general, the curriculum for the higher Muslim learning was divided, following Al-Ghazali's scheme of learning, into the Religious sciences and the Worldly sciences. The chief subjects of study comprised the Qur'an, Hadith, Fikh (Islamic Jurisprudence), scholasticism, philosophy, Arabic etymology, syntax, rhetoric, literature, logic, mathematics and chemistry.\textsuperscript{200} In Egypt, according to James, subjects like astronomy, medicine, mathematics and

\textsuperscript{198} See N.N.LAW, The Promotion of Learning during Muslim India, Longmans, 1936.

For a concerted study of the growth and importance of the observatory in Islam see Aydin Sayili, The Observatory in Islam and its place in the General History of the Observatory. Publication of the Turkish Historical Societies, Series II, No.30, Ankara, 1960. Aydin in fact has established that "it was first in Islam that the observatory came into existence."
metaphysics gradually passed out of the curriculum and instruction in these subjects was obtained only through a private teacher. In the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, Persian occupied an equally important position with Arabic, although the basic scheme of knowledge remained the same. In the Ottoman Empire, Madrassahs attached to the Sulemaniyah Foundation were devoted to special studies: the Dar al Hadith for the study of the Prophetic Traditions, the Dar al Tibb for the study of medicine; while those attached to the mosque of Bayezid were devoted exclusively to the study of jurisprudence.

Scholarship standards and techniques were quite advanced. Research, specialization, experimentation and observation were known methods of learning although there seems to have been a great emphasis on an encyclopaedic approach to knowledge.

FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OF THE TRADITIONAL MUSLIM EDUCATION

1. Muslim education was clearly the most developed, articulated and differentiated system of its time.

2. Education was free and relatively well spread. Education was valued both for its religious significance as well as for its socio-economic demand. All classes of society, royalty,

199. See Mualammad el-Bahay, "Al-Qarawiyin University, how far it has participated in the characteristics of Past Culture of Islam", in the Majillat al Azher (Journal of the Azhar University, III. 1 (1961) pp.7-16.

200. For a detailed description of the Muslim Curriculum, see J. Heyworth-Dunne, op. cit. pp 41-95. Scientific studies are best dealt with by Nasr, op. cit. pp 92-304. For the Muslim India see G.M.D. Sufi, Al-Minhaj, being the Evolution of Curricula in the Muslim Educational Institutions of India, Ashraf, Lahore, 1941, also M.A. Mund Khan "Muslim Theories of Education during the Middle Ages, Islamic Culture, 18 (1944) pp.418-433

201. William James, Education in Egypt before the British Control, 1939, p.49


business men and the community at large were involved in the promotion of learning. An important supplementary to the academic learning was travel, and students were given assistance to make journeys to various countries in order to complete their education.  

3. Educational institutions occupied key societal positions. They furnished the society with its elite, intellectual leaders and bureaucrats as well as socio-political thinkers. They reflected the aims of society in their curricula and were thus closely integrated with the society of which they were an integral and dynamic subsystem.

4. Education and teachers were held in high esteem. Academic freedom was the rule and those engaged in education were held next to prophets. "Except insofar as custom and convention imposed some limits", remark Gibb and Bowen, "there seems to have been a good deal of freedom in colleges... During the lessons, the auditors were at liberty to question or argue with the teachers; it was, in fact, very largely by their success in such sessions of questions and arguments that prospective teachers made their reputation.

5. Libraries and other ancillary services formed an important complement of the educational system and free service and facilities were provided.

6. The most vital societal role of the Muslim education was the creation of an elite corps of a 'broad and affluent middle-class' the ulama, who were well-versed in the verities of Islam and acted, on many occasions and in many ways, as the guardians of the rights of the

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206. Ibid. p.158
207. Nekosteen, pp.65-74. Shalaby, pp.73-111
208. S. D. Goite, Studies in Islamic History and Institutions, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1968, p.64, 217
community. "They could", asserts Waardenberg, "counterbalance an arbitrary exercise of power and defend, to a certain extent, the masses against unlimited despotism by making known certain norms of Islam to any Muslim ruler."

7. Defined as it has been as the 'Intermediate Civilization', Islam, by means of its Madrassahs and universities, very successfully preserved the ancient Greek and Eastern learning and transmitted it to the Latin West. On the basis of this process, certain Muslim scholars have tended to claim that the Muslim institutions of higher learning were "the forerunners of the Modern European universities, having established hundreds of colleges in advance of Europe."

Such claims have, however, been denied by Western historians and educationists.

3. 43. TRADITIONALISM OF THE MUSLIM EDUCATION

Although rising on a fairly universalistic normative framework, the Muslim educational system and its underlying ideology had, in the course of time, crystallized itself into a dogmatic and rigid structure. Oriented exclusively towards the religiously constructed norms, it mainly catered for the other-worldly interests of the individual. Inevitably, therefore, Muslim societies were beset by a basic dualism which education remained unable to transcend. As T. Parsons has observed:

"On the one hand, legitimized by the religious mission of Islam, was a continual drive to unify all the faithful politically; but on the other hand, was the lasting anchorage of the Islamic masses in traditional agrarian or nomadic societies, organised about kinship and


210. GOITEN. Studies, op.cit. pp.54-70, also Parsons, Societies, op.cit. pp.82-86

211. NAKOSTEEN, op.cit. p.62, also M.M. PICKTHALL, "Muslim Education" in the Islamic Culture, 1 (1927) pp.100-108

212. RASHDALL for example refutes such an influence although he too accepts contacts with Islamic learning and its influence on philosophy and medicine. The origin of the Universities of Europe are traced by him exclusively from the European Schools. See H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages vol. I. p.xxxix and 70. Oxford University Press, 1936
particularistic local solidarities which were never thoroughly structured to match the religious universalism - or even that attained, at times, by the highest political authorities and the law, indeed, the particularism often penetrated the higher echelons. Religiously, this basic duality was especially clear. On the one hand, orthodox Islam adhered to a theological rigourism which could not legitimise any mediation with the diversity of human interests and motives. On the other hand, these human elements gave rise to the widespread and popular sufist movements which fostered an extreme emotionalism, mysticism and magic that undermined the institutionalization of any distinctly Islamic pattern in large-scale societies." (213)

In this diffuse cultural milieu, the scholastic elites - the ulema, consolidated themselves into a ruling caste with self-perpetuating tendencies that lay hidden behind their veneer of a sacred view of knowledge and education, instead of promoting a 'self-generating' concept of culture. Faced with any real or supposed threat by way of rationality, critical analysis or comparative philosophical scrutiny, the only safe course they deemed fit for the Ummah in safeguarding its solidarity was in a recourse to orthodoxy or orthopraxy and traditionality which, inter alia, guaranteed their own primacy.

As if a dead-end had been reached, for centuries there does not seem to have appeared any significant change in the contents, methods and functions of Muslim education. The Nizamiyyah curriculum devised in the eleventh century was followed, preserved and faithfully passed on to the next generations. Education, therefore, had become an exercise in pedantry. The best method of learning had been reduced in the main, to memorization of the texts at the expense of intellectualization; and there was more emphasis on transmission rather than creativity. As Gibbs and Bowen have pointed out,

"Education had ceased to set before itself even the hope of moulding society in the direction of its ideals, and had sunk to the level of merely holding society together by the inculcation of tradition." (214)

214. GIBB and BOWEN, op.cit. p.160.
The traditionalism of Muslim education has further been described by Lewis who asserts:

"The literary and authoritarian character of traditional pedagogy, as well as the attitudes of traditional society, made it very difficult to assimilate either the physical and natural sciences, or the practical and technical skills associated with them. Society despised manual skills, and rejected as inferior those who taught, acquired or exercised them. A good illustration of this is the low rating and limited attention given to artists in traditional Islamic society, as contrasted with the high respect accorded to poets and scholars-artists of the word, not the hand. The only exception was the architect who, as an officer concerned with bridges and fortifications, and as a director of building operations rather than a mere builder, qualified as a gentleman.

The position of the scientist was somewhat higher than that of the artist, but in post-classical times, with little justification. The once great Muslim tradition of scientific research and experiment had long since withered and died, leaving a society strongly resistant to the scientific spirit. (215)

To sum up, a comparative map of the normative and institutional orientations of modernity and Islam is posited in Chart 'C' overleaf.

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215. BERNARD LEWIS, op.cit. p.187. One might argue that the lower status given to the artist was not perhaps so much because of the despising of manual labour but because of the taboo against pictorial representation of the human face.
### CHART 'C'

**SYNOPTIC COMPARISON OF MODERNITY AND TRADITIONAL MUSLIM SYSTEMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEATURE</th>
<th>MODERN</th>
<th>TRADITIONAL MUSLIM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Overall View</td>
<td>rationalist-positivistic</td>
<td>authoritative-traditionalist ideational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sensate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>change per se desired</td>
<td>change per se suspected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social conflict</td>
<td>social conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accepted as a part of</td>
<td>considered as a threat to harmony and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>development and progress</td>
<td>peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>individual happiness</td>
<td>individual happiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>seen through need-creation</td>
<td>seen through contentment, piety and need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and need-satisfaction</td>
<td>elimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Norms</td>
<td>innovative</td>
<td>conformist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Man</td>
<td>empathetic</td>
<td>apathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>self-determining</td>
<td>deterministic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>calculative-sceptical</td>
<td>speculative-assured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>this-worldly in orientation</td>
<td>other-worldly in orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>relies on the power</td>
<td>relies on super-natural power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of science and technology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Society</td>
<td>differentiated</td>
<td>segmented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>massified</td>
<td>hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>literate</td>
<td>semi-literate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>industrialised</td>
<td>pastoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>urbanised</td>
<td>sparse and villaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>secular</td>
<td>religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Knowledge</td>
<td>'Absolute' changing</td>
<td>'Absolute' known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>empirical</td>
<td>revealed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hypothetical-deductive</td>
<td>logistic-repetitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>active-positivistic</td>
<td>passive-receptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEATURES</td>
<td>MODERN</td>
<td>TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>secular</td>
<td>theocratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sovereignty belongs to the nation</td>
<td>sovereignty belongs to God</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism basis of state</td>
<td>supra-national 'khilafah' basis of state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic</td>
<td>oligarchic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participative</td>
<td>meritocratic participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>self-regulating</td>
<td>constrained by religious norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radical-competitive</td>
<td>conventional-non competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capital accumulation essential</td>
<td>capital accumulation restricted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>nuclear</td>
<td>patriarchal (extended)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equality of sexes in social responsibility</td>
<td>Man held dominant in social responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independent status of child after adolescence</td>
<td>independent status of child after marriage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>a sub-system in a secular system</td>
<td>religion permeates the total social system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>aims at the development of individuality</td>
<td>aims at socialisation into Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>curricula changing with time</td>
<td>curricula unchanged since medieval configurations</td>
<td>theoretical and elite forming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>practical and integrated with the manpower needs of society.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART II

CHAPTER IV

Subjected to the test of conformity with nature, the principles of Islam, when rightly understood, do stand this test and are therefore in harmony with science and progress.

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan

The Muslims have neither opposed science, nor been opposed by science except from the day they alienated themselves from their religion and opposed the study of it.

Shaikh Muhammad Abduh
CHAPTER IV

4.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

4.1 THE CHALLENGE OF MODERNITY

Modernization started in the Muslim world in the aftermath of its defeats at the hands of the expanding European powers. Military setbacks and reversals set in motion chain reactions which brought home to the hitherto self-assured Muslim rulers the immense superiority of modern European weapons, techniques of warfare, discipline and training. Defenceless and outmanoeuvred, they had no choice but to emulate the victors in their manners, styles and techniques, in order to defend their lands, peoples and culture. The early modernization of Muslim societies, because of the over-riding motive of defence, has been described as 'defensive modernization'.

Up until the eighteenth century, the Dar-al-Islam (House of Islam) was well-set in its power and repose. Consolidated into two imposing empires: the Mughal in the East and the Ottoman in the West, which shared between them the bulk of Muslim lands, Islamdom had remained invincible ever since its decisive victories in the crusades. This invincibility however, was soon to shatter. For the Ottomans, the turning point came with the lifting of their siege of Vienna in 1683, and the subsequent treaties of Carlowitz (1699) and Passorwitz (1718). This was followed by more serious repulses ending in the fateful treaty with Russia at Kutuch Quinarji in 1774, which finally set the seal on their advances towards Europe. Henceforth, theirs was the retreat and appeasement: far from being the once 'terror of Europe', the House of Uthman was now to become its 'sickman'.

Even more catastrophic in impact and iconoclastic in consequences was the well-mobilized Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 which left
no doubt whatsoever of the obsolescence of the Muslim defences, disciplines and ideas. So confounded and awe-stricken were the Egyptians by the roaring cannonry of Bonaparte that they really took it as the doomsday.¹

In a similar manner, although far removed from the Middle Eastern scene, was the baffling defeat at Plassey in 1757 of the 50,000 strong Muslim army of Nawab Siraj-ud-Dawla by Robert Clive of the English East India Company. Though here chicanery played a part, yet the symptoms of disorder, indiscipline and weakness that accompany decline were clearly visible on the Muslim side.

The purpose in talking of these disastrous events is to underline the fact that these Muslim defeats in various parts of the world were not isolated phenomenon. Like most military defeats, they marked the symptoms of decline, the collapsing of a house that had decayed from within. Although its foundations were still firm enough to withstand and to survive some more storms and provide shelter, yet the 'House of Islam' evidently could not remain intact much longer without renovation. In Turkey and Egypt, where sovereignty was not lost, the Sultans immediately started reform programmes to re-shape their defence forces by providing them with European training and discipline. Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Sultan Mahmoud II (1807-1839) in the Ottoman Empire, and Pasha Muhammad Ali (1803-1849) in Egypt, for the first time in recent Muslim history willingly embarked upon a massive programme of innovation and thus became the harbingers of modernization by introducing alien institutions into the social structure of Islam. Their 'defensive modernization', by virtue of the very dynamics of the new institutions marked the beginning of an all-round modernization in the social, economic, educational and political aspects as well as the normative

order of their societies: the dawn of a new era: 'the Nizam-i-jedid'.

The immediate objectives of the Nizam-i-jedid of Sultan Selim III were to raise a new army trained on modern lines and to establish institutions necessary for its training. It would, however, be wrong to assume, in spite of the declared utilitarian purpose of the innovations, that their sponsors were unaffected by the intellectual and socio-political changes taking place in contemporary Europe.²

In Egypt, no sooner was the victory complete, than Napoleon with the help of a hundred learned men - teachers, scientists and technicians whom he had selected to accompany the expedition - started his comprehensive reform projects comprising constitutional, legal, judicial and technological changes. His modern institutions such as the Central Administrative Council established in Cairo and its subordinate provincial administrative councils with native and French councillors; his inauguration of the Institut d'Egypte for the advancement of science and learning, and his Printing Press were not surprisingly more radical and impressive than the fragmentary and precipitous Nizam-i-Jedid of the Ottoman Sultan Selim. The French institutions and ideas unquestionably made a very deep and lasting impact on Pasha Muhammad Ali who rose as the strongman of Egypt after the French retreat, and on some of the Shaikhs of Al-Azhar whom Napoleon had tried to harness for his New Order. It was perhaps this impetus and the brilliant leadership of Muhammad Ali that had put Egypt ahead of all eastern countries by the mid-nineteenth century, far ahead of Turkey itself.³

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² In fact, the Ottoman Sultans had watched with interest the changes brought about by the French Revolution. Sultan Selim III himself initiated his reforms after Ebu Bekir Efendi whom he had appointed his special envoy to study and report on the European thought and systems, had presented him a detailed report. For a fuller treatment of the subject see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, op. cit. pp.45-72

The case of Muslim India, however, presented a sharp contrast to those of Egypt and Turkey. Here the sovereignty of the Muslims was lost to a trading company whose dominant motive at the time was no more than profiteering and sheer economic exploitation. Reform programmes were neither warranted by their interests nor vouchsafed by their charter. Nevertheless, their agricultural, commercial and economic ventures did set in motion the dynamics of mobility and modernization, particularly in commerce, agriculture and industry. In education, because of the laissez-faire policy of the Company, it was the missionaries who took the lead in introducing new institutions. Missionary societies opened the first elementary schools, installed the first Printing Press, and published the first modern newspaper in the subcontinent. Missionaries, however, because of their proselytising zeal, their crude methods, and their attacks against Islam failed to draw Muslims towards their new institutions. The opening of the Calcutta Madrassah in 1782 as a result of a Muslim petition to the Governor General, Warren Hastings, beseeching some educational provision for the Muslims, resulted more from a personal interest of Hastings than from a policy of the Company. Isolated and unco-ordinated as the Madrassah was it soon plunged into administrative and policy problems. It failed to train a sizeable number of Muslim youths for entry into the employment of the Company but it did assume pivotal importance by


5. Hastings was opposed to the idea of leaving education in the hands of missionaries alone. He is also recorded to have taken interest in Persian literature. He himself contributed Rs.58,000 towards the building cost of the Madrassah. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.II, pp.249-7 cf. E.H. Cutts, 'The Background of Macaulay's Minutes' in the American Historical Review, Vol.LVIII, 1952-3, pp.824-56. Hastings maintained that the Company's government ought to do as much or more than the pre-British Muslim governments had done to encourage the learned classes of the Hindu and Muslim society along the lines of Eastern scholarship; and that such educational efforts would result in greater efficiency and economy in British Administration and promote Indian loyalty to British Rule in India!
The introduction of these modern institutions into the Muslim societies was generally met with severe resistance. Modernization was regarded by the orthodox Muslim leaders as an encroachment upon Islamic values and the social order. In Turkey, although (and perhaps because), the Nizam-i-Jedid was very cautiously cast in the old mould and modern institutions did not, at least overtly, challenge the ruling position of the traditional ones, the influential classes, i.e. the Janissaries, the Ayans and the Ulema jointly reacted against them and secured a fetwa from the Shaikh-ul-Islam for the abolition of the Nizam-i-Jedid, and the deposition of the ambitious Sultan. Similarly, though the Egyptians were inspired and thrilled by the Printing Press and Bonaparte's demonstrations of scientific experiments at the Institut d'Egypte, and by the new factories, casinos, hospitals, water-works and other modern systems set up by the French, yet twice during the three-year period of the French occupation they furiously revoluted against the 'infidels' and inflicted serious losses. In the Indian subcontinent, reaction was even more bitter though it was internalised at the time and appeared most violently in the shape of the 1857 mutiny which both India and Pakistan have commemorated as their first War of Independence.

The importance of these initial reforms, however, must not be under-rated. They were fragmentary, isolated and unwelcome but they paved the way for a more decisive, articulated and lasting phase of modernization.

Shaw considers two main reasons why these initial Ottoman attempts at modernization met a violent resistance: (a) modern institutions failed to replace the old ones even when the latter had become obsolete, (b) no attempt was made to reform the traditional institutions. S.J. Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reformers", in The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, Ed. William Polk and P. L. Chambers, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1968, pp. 29-30 cf. also I. R. Sinai, The Challenge of Modernization, and The West's Impact on the Non-Western World, Chatto and Windus, London, 1964, pp. 69-70.
4.2. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

4.2.1. TURKEY

After Sultan Selim, Mahmud II (1808-1839) and his son Abdul Majid (1839-61), carried on the modernization movement still more undauntedly. Sultan Mahmud proceeded more systematically and ruthlessly by first striking a fatal blow at the obstructionist groups. He then inaugurated the famous series of Tanzimat reforms with his celebrated Hatt-i-Sharif (Noble Rescript) of 1839, to be followed by the Hatt-i-Humayan (Illustrious Rescript), 1856, of Sultan Abdul Majid and ending in the code of Civil Procedure of 1879. The Tanzimat cumulatively replaced almost all Ottoman traditional institutions and gave rise to a new class of Ottomans more forward-looking and amenable to change. Whatever motives historians have tended to ascribe to their designers: whether they were prompted by a genuine desire to change their state and society, or were obligated to adopt them as a 'window-dressing' to placate the European powers who had strongly pressurized them, the fact remains that the Tanzimat marked the first thoroughgoing attempt at modernization of the Ottoman society.

For the first time, 'rationalist and positivist' norms were introduced into the Ottoman society. Equality before law was conceded for all citizens of the empire irrespective of their race or religion. For the first time too, secular legal codes, based on the French legal system, and lay courts were set up to deal with matters of a non-religious nature. A measure of constitutional representation was also introduced into the Ottoman government by the institution of a High Council of Notables (Mejlis-i-Val-i-akham-i-adliya). Modern communications such as post (1834), telegraph (1855), railways (1866) and new roads were

7. For a fuller account of the Tanzimat see Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. IV, 1934, s.v. Tanzimat, also B. Lewis, Emergence, op.cit.—pp.73-125.
built, and the first public newspaper, the *Takvim-i-Vekayi* - the Turkish version of Ottoman Monitor, also appeared in 1831.(9)

In Education, the initiative taken by Selim and Mahmud II in opening secular schools, was extended further by the appointment in 1845 of a Commission to investigate the existing educational system and to propose new measures to improve it to suit the requirements of the society. The Commission recommended (a) the creation of an articulated system of primary, secondary and higher education, (b) the formation of a permanent department of Public Instruction and (c) the establishment of an Ottoman State University.

By 1847, the foundations of the University had been laid; the Department of Public Instruction had already been upgraded to the Ministry of Education; free, compulsory primary education had been accepted in principle, although a network of schools needed for the task had yet to be built: a new type of secondary school, the Rushdiya, had been created alongside the existing Madrassah system; and by 1850, six such schools with 870 pupils were already functioning in the Empire.10 All these measures marked the beginning of the state responsibility in education, a domain hitherto exclusively in the hands of the Ulama.

The Organic Act of 1869, carried the impetus of modernization in education still further by decentralizing educational administration; by increasing the number of institutions for scientific studies; by introducing modern pedagogic methods, and above all, by the opening of the first lise, (the Mekteb-i-Sulemaniya) or popularly known Galatasaray based on the model of French lycee, which has come down to the present times as the prototype secular elitist school.11 The lise as an

9. B.LEWIS. Emergence, op. cit. pp.93-4
10. ibid. pp.III-2
institution occupied a pivotal role in restratification of Ottoman society. It was in these and other similar secular institutions, such as the Translation Chamber (Terjuman Odasi), the civil service school, the law schools, the scribe schools, etc. that training was provided for the new leaders - officers, diplomats, civil servants, translators, secretaries and others. All future classes of modernists, whether they were the liberal Young Ottomans (1865-76), the radical Young Turks (1908-18) or the revolutionary Kemalists (1923), who successively transformed an autocratic, monolithic Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-state, were products of these modern institutions.

Equally significant for the modernization of Ottoman society and education were the selected Ottoman young men who were sent abroad, mainly to France, to study European languages, legal systems and other subjects. It is recorded that between 1857-74, a special Turkish School known as the Mektebi Osmani was functioning in Paris to house these Ottoman scholars. The Mekteb was established in direct pursuance of the modernizing policy of the Tanzimat which had expressly declared the intention of the Tanzimatji Sultans for cultural borrowing from Europe. A knowledge of European languages, particularly French, had become almost a sine qua non for entry into the modernist elite class.

4.2.2. EGYPT

Having courageously rescued Egypt from anarchy following the departure of the French, Pasha Muhammad Ali (1803-49) began his distinguished reign of progress in the footsteps, but, in many ways, far ahead of his Ottoman master, Sultan Mahmud II. The modernizing


policies of the Pasha were decisive, co-ordinated and resolutely executed. Not only did he raise a well-trained army and navy and open schools for their training, but he also created a viable economic system with the supporting systems of irrigation, marketing and transport. He was the first Muslim ruler to import machinery from Europe and he initiated the industrialisation of Egypt by opening cotton and sugar factories, and copper, iron and steel foundries. Though his industrial enterprises failed because of the peculiar political position of his country and the pressures exerted by the expanding European powers through the Porte, and though he could not realise his ambition of creating a modern complex economy, yet he did succeed in giving it an export-oriented economy, which was no mean an achievement. For his brilliant projects, aimed at an all-round transformation of his country into a strong, self-sustaining and progressive as well as independent nation, he has been rightly hailed as the father of Egyptian nationalism.

- He had no qualms about borrowing from Europe its sciences, skills and techniques or about employing European instructors and technicians. His various government departments such as Health, Public Works, Post and Telegraph, Printing and Publications were in the hands of Europeans. Although he kept all effective control of the country in his own hands, he nevertheless allowed a measure of constitutionalism to develop in the country by creating consultative councils that in turn became Ministries; the Interior, Justice, Commerce and Education. His renowned Printing Press established at Bulaq in 1821 not only issued a bilingual official

14. Charles ISSAWI, Egypt in Revolution, an Economic Analysis, O.U.P. London, 1963, pp.18-30, also F.J.Vatikiotis, op.cit.pp and R.Bey, op.cit. pp.41-5. So productive was Egypt under the Pasha that in 1820, the Port of Alexandria had 35 Commercial Houses; and nearly every state in Europe as well as the United States had a Consul General resident at the port. See Enc. Britt. Vol. 8. p.67.

15. Because of his superb leadership, the Pasha has been acclaimed as 'the highest administrative genius that the East had known since the days of the First Caliphs'. Bey op.cit.p.92
gazette in Turkish and Arabic, the Al-Waqas al-Misriya, but also works of learning in Arabic, Turkish and Persian.

His educational policy was primarily directed towards fitting young men for government employment. He started his educational modernization by sending student missions to Europe as early as 1809, at first to various Italian centres of learning but later exclusively to France. In these educational missions he was certainly a pace-setter for the Ottoman government which followed his example in opening the Mektebi Osmani in Paris. Between 1813 and 1949, eight missions were sent to France. So keen was the Pasha himself to digest the modern Western learning that he personally interviewed each scholar after his return from Europe and charged him to translate into Arabic and Turkish all the important works he had studied, sometimes isolating him from other activities for this purpose.16 The Pasha's objectives in cultural borrowing were scrupulously utilitarian. Egyptian students abroad had to learn sciences and were subjected to stringent discipline: they were not permitted socially to mix with their hosts lest they should (politically or ideologically) be influenced.17

Muhammad Ali Pasha's first two schools, a Cadet school (1816) and a School of Mathematics (1821), were built in the citadel. But later, as need arose and Europe-returned instructors and technicians became available, a whole range of modern military, technical, professional and vocational as well as art schools spread into the cities of Egypt.18 These tertiary level institutions in turn created a demand for the establishment of primary and secondary schools. By the mid-nineteenth century.

16. The Pasha's personal interest in these missions can be gauged from the fact that he used to study all progress reports sent to him on each student and issued instructions "exhorting them to complete studies as soon as possible and rebuking them for their slackness, carelessness and bad results." J.Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt, Luzac, London, 1935, p.165

17. The story is told of one student who, when interviewed by the Pasha explained that he had been studying 'government affairs'. "What" exclaimed the Pasha, "you are not to get mixed up
century, Egypt could boast of having one of the most differentiated and articulated system of public schools under the administration of a central department of education. Besides elementary, preparatory and technical schools, a polytechnic on the French model to teach science subjects and a school of languages were special features of modern institutions introduced in the Pasha's time. The Pasha also gave great impetus to private enterprise in education and all the various local denominations such as Jews, Greek, Catholic and Methodist Christians, as well as British, German and American missionary societies, were encouraged to open schools. These schools, as Landau has pointed out, through their diverse curricula, their European teachers and their socio-cultural milieu played a specially vital role in the modernization of education in Egypt.  

The traditional system of Mektabs and Madrassahs and the Azhar university were left alone, as the Pasha's Nizam-i-Jedid would not have been created through them. Nevertheless, the Pasha did not hesitate to recruit the scholars of Al-Azhar into the foreign missions or to employ some of its Shaikhs for guardianship of students abroad. Distinguished among these Azharite Ulama was Shaikh Rifa's Badawi Rafi al Tahawi (1801-73) who spent five years in Paris as a tutor. There he acquired mastery of French and delved into the works of Montesquieu and Rosseau and made acquaintance with orientalists like Silvatre de Sacy. On his return, he was thrilled with a desire to publicise his views about modern French life. In 1841, he was appointed Director of the newly created Bureau of Translation where he himself translated

17. Contd. in the administration of Government. It is I who govern. Go to Cairo and translate the military works". Dunne, op.cit.p.168

not less than twenty great works. But his monumental work entitled
Takhlis al Ibriz ila Takhis Pars, has remained a pioneer insight into
the modernization movement of Egypt and the impressions of an
Azharite of the West. 19

For fifteen years after Muhammad Ali Pasha's death in 1849, Egypt
was ruled by three feeble descendants of his who failed to keep the
country on the road to progress, although not all this period was
without reforms. The systems created by Muhammad Ali Pasha, dependent
as they entirely were on the army, proved ephemeral as a consequence of
the retrenchment ordered by the Porte. However, if the great Pasha was
selective in borrowing from Europe, his grandson Khedive Ismail, who
came to power in 1863, turned out to be an impatient imitator. Himself
a devout Europhile he embarked unreservedly on Europeanising the
country. 20 His obsession was to rank equal to the European monarchs and
he wanted his capital to look like a dazzling European city. His lavish
construction programmes and grandiose sprees won him the appellation of
Ismail 'the Magnificent', 21 but they also put him under enormous debt to
European Finance Houses and brought about not only his own downfall but in the
end also the loss of independence for Egypt: independence so bravely
defended by his grandfather. 22

The development projects of the Khedive, whatever their motives,
were extensive. They comprised 112 canals covering over 8,400 miles,
railways and telegraph over 1,100 miles, the governmental postal service.

19. See HOURANI, op.cit. pp.67-102
20. 'My country' declared the Khedive, 'is no longer in Africa, it is
in Europe'. P.J.Vatikiotis. History, op.cit. p.74
21. ibid. pp.129-33
22. "Even what Louis XIV had achieved for Paris could not surpass what
Ismail achieved for Cairo and Alexandria. Go wherever you like
in Cairo, you are sure to have your eyes attracted by some grand
building, garden or statue, fountain or road or a whole quarter
planned and executed by Ismail the Magnificent". ibid. pp.84-5
By creating a Consultative assembly in 1866, he also became the promotor of constitutionalism in Egypt. To crown all these there was, however, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.

His educational modernization was equally very impressive. No public works, irrigational projects and agricultural progress was possible without a sound education system. With the advice of two able educationalists, Dor (Swiss) and Rogers (English), he re-organized the educational system by creating a Ministry of Education and separating the military and navy schools from general education. He allocated £50,000 from his own private estate of El-Wadi, thereby raising the total money for education to £150,000. Student missions to Europe were revived during his reign and the number of schools rose spectacularly from 185 in 1862 to 5,820 in 1878. In 1868, he promulgated the Organic Law of Public Instruction thereby creating a graded system. For the first time, Kuttab (Maktab) schools were integrated into the state system. Regulations for school administration, teaching, discipline and medical inspection were devised. For the first time too, two girls' schools were established, in 1873 and 1874. A Teachers Training College, the Dar-al-Ulum was set up. The Khedive's regime took initiative also in attracting the Azharite students to enter State education by training at the Dar-al-Ulum. There was an unusual flow of Europeans into Egypt during Ismail's reign, i.e. from 3,000 in 1836 to 68,653 in 1878, an influx which vexed Egyptians and became one of the reasons for the national revolt. In 1862, the British finally took over the country to save it from economic collapse. The forty years of British rule made great impact especially in eradicating corruption and other

23. ibid. p.129

24. See J.HEYWORTH-DUNNE, An Introduction to the History of Education op.cit pp.362-73 for all these educational measures.

25. ibid. p.343
social maladies. Educational expansion and reform, however, remained lower down on the list of priorities under the British.

4. 2.3. MUSLIM INDIA

The modernizing reforms introduced by the East India Company were through and through secular, rationalist and, perhaps more collectivity-orientated than those of Egypt and Turkey. But the Muslim community did not readily partake of them for a long time. Their loss of political power, and deposition from the economic and social superiority which they had been enjoying for centuries kept plaguing them and they remained aloof. The problem of their participation in modern institutions was made more difficult by the fact that the policies adopted by the British Raj for the consolidation of their power, whether consciously or otherwise, were designed to hit the Muslims harder than the Hindus. The disbandment of the Muslim armies, the Permanent Settlement of 1845, the abolition of Persian as Court language in 1837, the abrogation of Shariah courts etc. all dislodged the Muslim community from lucrative and elite positions. The appropriation of rent-free awkaf lands, granted by the Muslim rulers for the learned classes and educational institutions, directly deprived the latter from all financial support.26

The modern, 'rationalist and positivist' norms of the British Raj were arguably universalistic and bound to benefit the willing (Hindu) majority more than an unwilling and sullen (Muslim) minority; so by choosing to remain aloof, the Muslims allowed to develop a serious cultural lag for themselves. It needed the crusading efforts of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan to remove these inhibitions and prejudices from among his co-religionists as well as to convince the British of the Muslims' willingness to co-operate and take advantage of the new order.

to modernise themselves. The lag was, however, too wide to bridge soon. Despite the assurances given in the post-mutiny Royal Proclamation of 1858 of complete religious neutrality and equality in matters of participation in administration and rights of protection, welfare and employment, the Muslim community still remained comparatively backward. Their participation in the education institutions and the concession offered in the Wood Despatch of 1854 or the new universities opened in 1859, was negligible. The more they disassociated themselves from the modernization impulse of the Raj, the more they were suspected of disloyalty and the more they were disengaged. Their nostalgic attachment to traditionalism might have led to their irreversible regression, subservience and eclipse had it not been to Sir Sayyd's vision.

Sir Sayyd started by breaking down the mutual barriers and inhibitions. The foremost barrier at the time was the prejudice against the Muslims. In a convincing pamphlet entitled "The Loyal Muhammadans of India" he successfully argued for a change of heart by the British towards the Muslims. At the same time he undertook laboriously to convince his community that modernization was not antithetical to Islam. By the 1870's both endeavours were bearing fruit. The Government of India had come to accept that special action was needed to improve the conditions of the Muslims. In 1871, it issued instructions to the Provincial government to take special measures to promote education among the Muslims, to earmark funds to raise modern Urdu-English schools, to encourage the appointment of Muslim teachers, and to increase the amount of teaching of Arabic and Persian in the Universities.27 In the same spirit, a special education Commission under the chairmanship of Sir William Hunter was appointed to consider the question of Muslim education. The

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27. Sir William HUNTER, Indian Musalmans, are they bound by conscience to rebel against the queen, Tübner, London, 1911.
Commission investigated all the ideological, psychological and communal aspects of the Muslims' reluctance to participate in the modern systems, and recommended some special measures to satisfy their cultural, religious and social requirements. These met, the Muslims were, albeit belatedly, ready to march ahead with modernization. By the turn of the century, nationalism had become the over-riding socio-political movement. Lord Curzon's dynamic viceroyalty had brought impetus to all aspects of Indian life. Modernization was now in full swing. Muslims participated fully in the modernization and the liberal reform programmes. A sizeable middle class of modernists was emerging as the new leaders of the community to spearhead the modernization movement in an organised manner.

4.3. NORMATIVE CHANGE - THE RISE OF LIBERALISM

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the entire Muslim world, with the exception of Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, Persia and Turkey, had been subjugated by the expansive tide of European colonialism. With political subjugation began the cultural denigration. The Muslim World have, with ample justification perhaps, seen in Europe's particularly hostile and corrosive attack on Islam, the return of the spirit of the crusades. If the missionary had hated the Muslim more for his refusal readily to become a convert, he could be excused. But pronouncements, unsupported by reason or historical evidence hurled at Islam by eminent western liberal thinkers like Renan, Sir William Muir, H.G.Wells, Histoaux, etc. aimed as they were at the mere humiliation of Islam, were bound to create bitter reaction among the Muslims. Renan and Muir essayed to prove that Islam was inferior and unsound as a religion, and that its Beduin origin made it inherently opposed to the verities of reason and civilised culture. Histoaux, with his ethnocentric appeal, contended that though Islam and Christianity converged in their semi-
origin and Hellenic cultural contacts, Islam represented more than
semetic mentality with its contempt for man and glorification of the
Deity; whereas, Christianity reflected Aryan humanism that raised man's
dignity to that of God. According to Honotaux, the Christian concept
of the Trinity gives man a more central position in life than the
Islamic concept of 'Divine Absolutism': that is to say, 'an all powerful
God and an all dependent man'.

In the same vein, Macaulay's disparagement of the entire eastern
cultures appears far-fetched and unwarranted. What Macaulay did, in
essence, was perhaps not much different from what Mahmud II and
Muhammad Ali Pasha had done in their own domains. But the iconoclasm
that the former had employed was surely irrelevant.

It was natural for the orthodox - the custodians of the Faith -
in the teeth of such attacks against Islam and the subjugation of the
Ummah, to suspect and shun the European-sponsored modernization. But
the offensive and arrogant attitudes even coloured the reformists. In
fact, so acute has remained the sensibility of the 'save Islam' outlook
that the whole range of liberal thought in Islam and the modernists
themselves, excepting (and until) Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, have remained
entrenched in a defensive attitude. So, the normative change and
liberalism that took place among the Muslim thinkers at the time, boil
down to the following four objectives:

1. the expurgation of Islam from its medieval accretions
   and from the corrupt practices that had crept into
   Islam incident to contacts with other cultures;
2. the defence of Islam against Christian attacks and the
   preparation of the Muslim communities through
   independence to modernization;

29. HONOTAUX, then a Minister in the French government, while writing
about the problem of the French relationship with the Muslim
subjects stated that two contending viewpoints on Islam existed
among the French! One view considered Islam as a disease, called
for the extermination of one-fifth of the Muslim populations and
the enslavement of the rest in labour camps; destruction of the
Ka'aba, and the exhibition of the Prophet's remains in the Louvre.
The other view regarded Islam as a higher religion, bridging a gap
between paganism and Christianity.
3. the modernization of Muslim education; and
4. the re-interpretation of Islam in the light of modern thought and social condition. (30)

All these four objectives were conspicuous in the vehemently persuasive programme of Islamic reformation launched by one leading Muslim personality, Sayyid Jamal-ud-din Al-Afghani (1839-1897). His pan-Islamism, his refutation of Renan’s thesis ‘L'Islamisme et la science’, his attack on the orthodox Ulama and Sufi mal-practices and distortions of Islam that had turned it into a fatalistic way of life; his criticism of the autocratic regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid, and his preaching for constitutionalism, were all steps in this direction. Al-Afghani's Pan-Islamic appeal, his staunch opposition to the British colonialism as the chief threat to Islam, and his overall revolutionary activities were all bound to antagonise the colonial powers, and so his dream of seeing within his lifetime, all Muslim countries free from colonialism and in unity, could not be achieved. Nevertheless, he provided an unswerving guideline for the next generation of reformists in all Muslim lands. His influence was most strongly felt in the three countries in this study, where he spent several years of his life. In Egypt he left a coterie of eminent disciples such as Shaikh Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Muhammad Rashid Rida (1849-1905) and the Al-Manar party.32 All these liberal thinkers strongly advocated religious reform in order to achieve the total social reform and modernization of Muslim societies. They stressed, in various degrees, the necessity for the Muslims of free inquiry and reasoning, that is to say, the re-opening of the gates of ijtihad (positivism), as allowed in the Sharish,

32. C.C.ADMAS, op. cit. pp.205-247. While in Paris, Sayyid Al-Afghani and Shaikh Muhammad Abduh published the first international pan-Islamic journal, the famous 'Al-Urwah wa'l Wuthqa' (The Indissoluble Bond) in 1884, 'with the object of arousing Muslim peoples to the contd
They debated the questions of the faith and science, and held that Islam has an essential capacity to adapt to modern conditions. Their concerted efforts were directed towards the search for a rationale; the formation of an ideology aimed, in the first place, at delivering the Muslim countries from foreign rule and exploitation; and in the second, at cleansing Islam of its dogmatic rigidity and leading the Muslims towards moral and material vitality. 

An account of the emergence of liberal thought in Islam, particularly in the Arab world, cannot possibly be attempted without considering the immense effort, scholarship and practical insight of Shaikh Muhammad Abduh who, more than anyone else, in the Arab world, undertook the task of defining the principles of modernization in Islam, its social systems and education, under the impact of the West. With a profound insight gained through his variegated experiences of academic activities and public offices held over the years: as a scholar and teacher at Al-Azhar, as an editor of the official gazette of the government, as a founder of a literary and a benevolent society, as a judge, as a member of the National Legislative Council and to crown all, as the Chief Mufti (juris consult) of Egypt, the Shaikh was the most qualified intellectual to speak for Islam and modernization. Although, he shared with Al-Afghani his idealism and inspiration, he eschewed his mentors activism and political militancy. The Shaikh was convinced that in the political circumstances of the time, the only way for the Muslims' regeneration was through intellectual, social and economic jihad, and not a political one.

The starting point of his jihad for modernization of Islam was the distinction he drew between the normative or 'real' Islam and the glosses

32. contd. 
need of uniting their forces against Western aggression and exploitation'. ibid. p.9.

of traditional interpretations as popularly practised. Traditional Islam, he argued, faced serious challenge by the modern, rational and scientific thought. But he did not believe that the faith of Islam in its pure and permanent core of norms clashed with science. Instead he asserted that the faith and scientific reason operate at different levels. The real Islam, he maintained,

"had a simple doctrinal structure; it consisted of certain beliefs about the greatest questions of human life, and certain general principles of human conduct. To enable us to reach these beliefs and embody them in our lives both reason and revelation are essential. They neither possess separate spheres nor conflict with each other in the same sphere..."(34)

Shaikh Abduh was thus the chief exponent of what has been termed as the 'Two-Book' school of thought which, though it basically holds the unity of God inseparable from the unity of truth, recognizes two open ways to it; the way of revelation and that of natural science.35 He contended that since God's purpose in making His revelation was to promote human welfare, a true interpretation of the Quran and the Shariah should essentially be the one which best fulfils this purpose.36 He himself took the lead in this direction. As the chief Mufti of Egypt, he issued fetwas ranging from the questions of law to those of social morality and employed the same measure of innovation and rationality in his interpretations, assessments and judgements.

The pioneer of Indian Muslim reform, Sir Sayyid, basically subscribed to the same ideas of Islamic reform as Shaikh Abduh. Both agreed to the point of the necessity to harmonise Islam with modern science and rationalism. Sir Sayyid, however, viewed revelation by the criterion of its conformity to Nature. To him, Islam was the religion

34. SHAIKH MUHAMMAD ABDUH, Risalat al Tawhid. (Lectures on Theology) p.42, quoted in A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, op. cit. p.145
36. HOURANI, Arabic Thought, p.152
most akin to Nature. Himself profoundly impressed by the nineteenth century European rationalism and natural philosophy during his stay in England from 1867-70, his was an apologetic approach, i.e. 'an attempt at integrating a given set of ideas into Islam rather than a reformulation of it. Reason and 'conformity to Nature' according to Sir Sayyid was the essence of Islam. For his overwhelming bent towards Nature and natural law, Sir Sayyid met severe criticism from the orthodox, including Sayyid Al-Afghani, who stigmatised his line of thought— the 'nechariya' as misguided and misleading.37

Sir Sayyid's approach has been regarded as the 'One-Book' school, inasmuch as it regards Islam and the Quran as the sole fountainhead of all knowledge, human or divine, scientific or religious; 'whether in his laboratory, in the sky or under the earth, the scientist with all his discoveries is only writing a footnote to the Holy Book.'38

The Turkish group of Islamic liberals, the Young Ottomans, were far more conversant with the contemporary European ideas of liberalism and socio-economic changes than their counterparts in Egypt or India. Their ideas, as Professor Bernard Lewis has pointed out, were clearly derivatives of the jurisprudence of Montesquieu, the politics of Rousseau, the economics of Smith and Ricardo.39 They had even used the European capitals as a forum for their literacy, intellectual and political movements directed against the despotic and reactionary regime at home.

They admired modern Western ideas and institutions, yet they too, like Shaikh Abduh and Sir Sayyid, 'set high value on the social morality of Islam, and tried to justify the adoption of Western institutions in

37. SAYYID AL AFGHANI wrote about Sir Sayyid's school of thought 'Nechariya is the root of corruption, the source of uncountable evils and the ruin of the community...They present themselves before the eyes of fools as the standard-bearers of science, but only give a wider range to treachery. They are deluded by catchwords, call themselves guides and leaders, when they stand in the lowest grades of ignorance and lack intelligence.'The Refutation, quoted in Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, p.58

38. AL-FARUQI, op.cit. pp.24-5

39. B.LEWIS, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, op.cit. p.169
Islamic terms, as not being the introduction of something new but a return to the true spirit of Islam.\textsuperscript{40} The chief exponent of the Young Ottoman thought, Namik Kemal (1840-88), a product of Sultan Mahmud's Nizam-i-Jedid and well-versed in Arabic and Persian as well as in French, began his career as a Civil Servant at the Translation Office at the Sublime Porte and developed into an impassioned political journalist under the influence of the famous Ibrahim Sinasi (1826-71), founder of the literary reform movement in Turkey. His criticism of the Ottoman regime resulted in his own and other liberals' - such as Ziya Pasha - exile to Europe where he spent three years staying periodically in London, Paris and Vienna. From there he launched his programme of reformation by means of his liberal views expressed in a series of articles, essays, novels, plays and poems.

According to Namik, Islam's backwardness was acquired and not inherent. Like Abdül he was of the conviction that modernise itself Islam must; but 'in doing so it should not slavishly imitate Europe and abandon its own laws, beliefs and traditions'. On the contrary, he argued,

"all that is best in European civilization derived from, or could be paralleled in, classical Islamic civilization; and the Muslim, in adopting these things, was returning to what was deepest and most authentic in his own tradition." \textsuperscript{41}

To conclude then, liberalism that became crystallised in Islam as a result of the impact of the west, was applied by its upholders, in the main, to religion. Their best efforts were spent in ascertaining and proving whether Islam and science, Islam and reason, Islam and modernization were compatible. Little effort was spent on the objective understanding of the dynamics of modernization. Where 'human hand'

\textsuperscript{40} HOURANI, op.cit. p.68, also B.Kewis, ibid. Chapter V.pp.126-70
\textsuperscript{41} B.LEWIS, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, op.cit. p.139
seemed to have been more manifest than the 'Divine hand' in modern thought or achievement, the Muslim liberals appeared to have ascribed it to the proponderance of materialism; and warned both the East and the West against its evil consequences. Liberal thought in Islam, therefore, addressed itself mostly to the 'revivalism' rather than to modernization; and can best be described as a transitional stage. It became popular only among lay Muslims with a liberal education. Largely because of it, however, there was a definite change in norms and values. The rationalist and positivist spirit slowly started manifesting itself.

In general, liberalism seemed to emphasise social uplift, a fact, which, as Professor Fazlur Rahman points out, 'gave a decisively this-worldly, positive turn to their thought: the faith in the transcendental truth of Islam is asserted with vigour but its effect is seen not so much as a betterment of the next world (which is certainly accepted but not emphasized) but of the socio-moral life in this world.'

The nature of man, society and knowledge also received revised emphases. Greater significance was attached to the numerous verses in the Quran exhorting man to think, observe, learn and improve himself and his environment: 'to be up and doing'. The doctrine of God as found in popular belief and practice with a disproportionate view of an 'all-powerful God and all-dependent man' gets a new Quranic explanation, i.e., in terms of 'a chain of causes which affirm a final First Cause, which is self-existent Necessary Being, existing from all eternity, which is the cause of all things. To quote Professor Gibb's analysis, "the Divine transcendentalism of classical Islamic belief begins to entertain the immanentist tendencies of Western thought."
Blind faith in 'qismat' as the true Islamic belief is refuted. Shaikh Abdurrahman writing on the question asserts:

"...Muslims (of all) sects believe that they have a share of free choice in their actions which they call 'acquisition' (kasb), and this is the basis of reward and punishment in the opinion of all of them.

We do not deny that in the thought of the common people in Muslim lands this article has been contaminated with traces of the belief in compulsion, and this perhaps has been the cause of some of the misfortunes that have befallen them in past generations." (46)

The nature of knowledge in Islam as conceived in the medieval times, i.e. "'given, 'known' and 'eternal' not changing, not expanding" but there to be digested", gradually gives way to induction, analysis and enquiry. Society as a whole is visualised as resting on positivistic laws; revealed law is accepted more as a religious commandment than as the civic code. Secular national laws and civil courts replace the Shariah ones. Traditional concepts and values of family, the status of women, the status of children, are reviewed in the light of modern thought. Veiling and seclusion of women, in the stringent form prevailing in Muslim societies, is looked upon as a protective measure rather than one ordained by the Quran. Female education comes to be recognised as highly desirable although the best place for an educated woman is still considered to be the home; hence an emphasis in the curriculum on subjects aimed at making a good wife and a good mother. Polygamy is held to be permissible but as an exception rather than a rule. In general, there is a demand to regularise marriage, divorce and other social and family practices by means of law instead of convention.

4.4. CONSOLIDATION OF MODERNIZING LEADERSHIP AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF NATIONALISM AS THE IDEOLOGY OF MODERNIZATION

Nationalism with its dominant norms of national particularism, specificity, rationality and secularism, has been described as 'a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state'. Modern nationalism arose in the eighteenth century Western Europe, manifesting itself in the American and the French Revolutions as the most powerful ideology of political modernization. By the nineteenth century, it had penetrated into Central Europe, the Latin American countries, and by the beginning of the twentieth, into the rest of the world including the Muslim lands. Its evolution has been ascribed to many factors; the most important being the reaction against the monolithic structure, centralised control and absolutist rule of the great empires which undermined regional or local cultures and languages. The freedom-inspired, rationalistic and secularistic ideals of the Renaissance that defined nations by rather more visible and narrow criteria such as territory, race and language, stood to challenge the hitherto religiously-determined bases of civilization. By the end of the eighteenth century, European intellectuals were inspired by the passion for nationalism, and devoted their thought to the development of the nation state, national economy, national education and national linguistic culture.

49. See the Encyclopaedia Brittanica. S.v. 'Nationalism.

50. ibid. Anthony D SMITH, however, questions this generally accepted historical view of nationalism which makes it "a product of the peculiar European experience; that it is deeply embedded and marked with that experience, and that in other areas of the world, it must be understood as a largely alien importation". He urges that instead of 'superficiality of historicism', we must employ a longer and broader perspective—the concept of the 'ethnie' to explain the rise of nationalistic movements in non-European areas. See A.D.SMITH, "Ethnocentricism, Nationalism and Social Change", in International Journal of Comparative Sociology. Vol. XIII.No.I. March, 1972, pp.1-20.
In the Muslim World, the Ottoman Empire with its over-sized multi-racial and polyglottal community - and a religiously legitimised socio-political system - was the first to face the challenge of nationalism. In other parts of the Muslim world, the Colonial rule itself hastened the demand for nationalism and national reconstruction.

Ideally, the orthodox political philosophy of Islam with its universalistic and diffuse central concepts of Khilafah and Ummah (Brotherhood in Faith) and the Shariah law, demands socio-political unity on the basis of a religious identity. The ideals of nationalism on the other hand, centre round the basic principle of separation of religion and politics. Ideal-type Islamic siyasa and nationalism therefore, stand mutually opposed. Historically, however, dynasties and Sultanates had arisen quite early in Islam, though not entirely as nation-states, but parallel to the central Khilafah; in some cases recognised and blessed by the latter, in others, without regard to this formality.

This inconsistency between the ideal and the actual, the normative and the deviational aspects of Islamic politics has occupied the thought of most Muslim thinkers. The great Muslim historian and political thinker, Ibn Khuldun, who seems to have visualised the rise of nationalism, had explained it away in the usual dyadic terms, i.e. the 'siyasa dinya' (state system founded upon the Divine Law) and 'siyasa aqliya' (state system based on human reason); the former being the Khilafah and the latter, Mulk. The decline of the Khilafah into Mulk during the Ummayad and the Abbasid caliphates, was due according to Khuldun to the 'asabiya' which he defined as "a corporate feeling; a common bond, due in the first place to the ties of blood and family tradition, creating a sense of solidarity: it inspires common action and is an indispensable driving force in the formation of states and dynasties; its aim is mulk; dominion." 51

Ibn Khuldun had however justified this transformation and the rise of mulk on the sole criterion of its obedience to the Shariah; and its intention of caring for the welfare of the Ummah. Although the mulk too, he argued, is capable of looking after the welfare of man in this world, this is achieved even more perfectly with the aid of the laws of the Shariah, since the prophetic law-giver knows best what is to man's advantage, in both mundane and religious matters. Therefore, if the mulk is Islamic, it comes second in rank to the Khilifah; and they are linked together. But the mulk is isolated if it is outside the religious community (milla)\(^52\)

This preponderence of the Divinely-guided system over the secular law and polity clearly dominated the thought of 19th century liberal Muslim thinkers of Islam as well as their more radical successors in the three countries under study, such as Zia Gokalp (Turkey), Mustafa Kamil (Egypt) and Muhammad Iqbal (Pakistan), who have directly provided the intellectual framework for the rise of their respective nationalistic movements.

The fundamental problem that confronted Muslims everywhere by the end of the 19th century was identical, i.e. how to remove backwardness from among the Muslim peoples and raise their standard of living; and also, how to reinterpret Islam and make it a viable system capable of tackling the complex problems of modernization. Highest among the priorities was the demand for national independence, for without national independence, the objectives of modernization and reconstruction could not have been achieved. Basically it was these exigencies that necessitated the resort to nationalism. "Nationalism arose among the Muslim countries", as Halpern argues, "because there is social change, 

\(^{52}\) ibid. p.21

and hence the basic problem confronting the nationalists is not nationalism but social change. 53

Contemporary world politics and the influences that weighed on the three countries in this study, forced each to adopt a distinct orientation towards its particular nationalism; the Turkish nation-state, a secular concept; the Egyptian, a regional, religious and linguistic, pan-Arabic concept; and, the Pakistani Islamic, an ideological state concept. Each type has an expressed commitment to modernization through its nationalism and the modernization of its educational system; each type has a distinct position with regard to Islamic culture and institutions. The success or failure of each, therefore, depends on the internal consistency of the concept itself as indeed upon the will of each nation to realise its stated objectives.

4. 4.1. TURKISH SECULAR NATIONALISM

The Turks have made the boldest attempt in modern times to divorce religion and politics in Islam - a unity which hitherto remained intact. A variety of socio-political problems faced the Turks as a result of their introduction of modern institutions into their society; among these was foreign pressure and the failure of their own systems to modernize themselves. This forced them to look inwards to re-examine their beliefs and values, to search for solutions: the building of a powerful modern state and a nation with a 'rationalist and positivist' culture. The Tanzimat reforms, naïve as they had been in their objectives, failed to achieve these for the simple reason that they remained too close to the traditional ruling institutions. The discrepancies created by this duality of the institutional set up had in fact, created disharmony and rift among the Turkish people instead of fostering unity and progress. 54

The Turkish, Egyptian and Pakistani Ideological Approaches to Modernization
The most hazardous problem/fostering national solidarity was created by the presence of large numbers of non-Muslim minorities: the Armenians, Greeks, Macedonian and other Christians, and the Jews. Early Ottoman potentates, in accordance with the teachings of Islam, had given their Christian and Jewish subjects - the Ahl-al-kitab (people of the Book) - special status by creating 'the millet systems', allowing them freedom in ecclesiastical and judicial matters. The Capitulations had allowed them sufficient autonomy in matters of law, taxation, security, arrest, deportation etc. in which their own courts, or the courts of the countries of their origin, had been allowed jurisdiction. But these very concessions given to the minorities in good faith, had now become an easy excuse for the surrounding European nations to interfere in and dictate to Ottoman affairs. The modernists in their desire to introduce liberal political and social norms had wanted to allow increased freedom, equality and opportunities of participation to the minorities; but the latter had their loyalties outside the Ottoman society; and so tended to undermine the Ottoman State. This was the strangest dilemma the Turks had faced by opening their house to external influences.55 It was due, among other things, to this dilemma that the constitutional movement of 1876 had foundered; and the new Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908) had embarked upon his thirty-year reactionary regime, in spite of the fact that the Sultan had favoured modernization. His pan-Islamic appeal was only a desperate effort to defend the Ottoman society against foreign incursions. A reactionary course of action is attractive when the very faith and the structure based upon that faith fear extinction.

The Young Turks' Revolution of 1868, which deposed the despotic Sultan, instituted its socio-political modernization movement by enlisting Christians and Jews into its ranks and motivated by a desire to

55. B.LEWIS, The Emergence, op.cit. pp.349-50
create national solidarity on rational and universalistic bases. The problem was formidable. It has been suggested that had the Young Turks been left to themselves to create a really democratic, national state, they would have succeeded; but foreign intrigue and intervention frustrated all such chances of harmonious modernization. The story of massive annexations by Russia and the Balkan States, Austria and Italy, of the Ottoman territories on the slightest pretexts and the concerted pressures of the Great Powers up until the First World War to break up the Ottoman Empire is too familiar to reiterate. Suffice it to say that a declining Empire had little wish, or aptitude, to reconstruct itself upon outgrown bases. For a new Turkey to emerge, the old order had first to face complete destruction so that a new ideology of modernization, i.e. modern nationalism could take shape.

The fundamental question that this realisation and the bid to modernize Turkey posed was that of identity and loyalty: that is, to which civilization should modern Turkey belong? Three contending movements, the Islamists, the Westernists and the Turkists, which arose at the time tackled the question in their own way. In spite of their outward differences, all the three agreed on the point of Islamic revivalism. None suggested that the separation of religion and politics as the basis of future action. The vital question of civilizational reorientation was squarely dealt with, first by Zia Gokaip (1875-1923) who has been considered as 'the one and perhaps the most influential spiritual founder of Turkish nationalism.  

Gokaip's central theme was the concept of 'nation' and he utilized all his socio-political and literary acumen, gained through his understanding of Islam as well as the Western thought, to cut free the

56. See B. LEWIS, ibid. pp.206-233
57. For translation of his selected works and the critical study of his ideas see Niyazi Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gokaip, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1959; also Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, the Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokaip, Luzac and Co.Ltd. and Harwell Press Ltd. 1950
nation-state from its theocratic moorings. Himself a student of Durkheim, he employed popular sociological concepts; mainly evolution, as his tool to analyse the axiological foundations of the Ottoman-Islamic civilization. Gokalp agreed with Durkheim in his theory that:

"collective ideas, and with them, ideals, are born grow, decline and perish as the result of structural changes in society affecting its size, density, homogeneity, division of labour etc. and that the key to the explanation of the ideals lies in the morphology of society." (58)

Gokalp essayed to draw a distinction between civilization and culture; the former referring to 'collectivity of traditions created by different ethnic groups', the latter, to the mores of a particular nation. "Civilizational elements", asserted Gokalp, "assume meaning and function in the life of men only when they enter into the service of culture."59 It was mainly due to the merging of these two elements that the Ottoman systems had grown defunct and dysfunctional. It was vital, therefore, according to Gokalp, to rediscover the course of these collective ideas and ideals; this would revitalize Turkish life and culture. To him that source, the elan vital, was to be found in the concept of society based on the ideals of nationalism. He defined a modern nation as an independent unit within the confines of contemporary civilization.60 "We have to be" he asserts, "the disciples of it in culture."61

On the question of the principles of modernization of Islamic systems, he affirmed that Islam had been equipped with an adequate framework to accommodate and adapt to morphological changes in time and space. The injunctions of the Quran (nass) stay eternal and unchangeable while 'urf' or the collective ideas - the esperit publique - and 'ijma' -

58. HEYD, op.cit. pp.50-51
59. BERKES, op.cit. pp.104-9
60. ibid. p.250
61. ibid.
the consensus of the scholars - allow enough room for the dogma to adapt itself to changing necessities of life. According to Gokalp, the Islamic law has a two-fold source: the traditional Shariah and the Social Shariah. The Social Shariah is continually changing in accordance with social evolution. The stagnation of the world of Islam is due to the failure of the Muslims to relate the 'nass' to the 'urf' by means of 'ijtihad'. Gokalp has no doubt that Islam is the only religion that exhorts change.

Gokalp traces his justification for the rise of nationalism in Islam by the already accepted distinction between the concepts of Ummah and Millet. The overall concept of civilization is denoted by the term Ummah. Religion is the core of an Ummah; and so there is the Christian Ummah, the Jewish Ummah and so on. Within a certain Ummah, there may be different languages, moral standards, legal and political institutions, aesthetic tastes, economic and educational institutions. The smaller units with varying internal autonomies are "the millets" or the nation states. Ummah is the collection of several "millets" or nations. Gokalp's theory of the modernization of the Islamic systems through the evaluation of 'urf', by means of Ijtihad had seminal religious importance for Turkey. As Heyd has pointed out, Gokalp's theory should have helped (a) to separate religion and state, that is, to put an end to the domination of Islam over the political and social life of the Turkish nation, and (b) to separate religion and oriental civilization and thus make the maintenance of the fundamental values of Islam side by side with European civilization and Turkish culture.

62. N. BERKES, Turkish Nationalism, op.cit. p.196

63. GOKALP believed that the rise of protestantism in Christianity was due to a movement that rose in Europe in the aftermath of the Crusades and aimed at emulating the Islamic civilization because of the failure of Catholicism. See Berkes, op.cit. pp.22-3.

64. ibid. p.224, also Heyd, op.cit. p.60
possible. Social evolution demands the differentiation of piety, morality, justice and the functions of state and religion. He found Quranic sanction for the secular authorities to assume legislative functions in Islam in the verse: 'Obey God and the Prophet', and those in authority among you'. Those 'in authority' are surely to exercise their authority in the secular-mundane sphere. For this differentiation, he demanded the transfer of the judiciary functions of the Shaikh-al-Islam to the legislature and urged that the office of the Shaikh-al-Islam should be more of a scholar, devoid of political authority. Another of his demands was the abolition of the Ministry of awkaf and a ban on the various Dervish orders who had misused the pious endowments for self-perpetuation and the propagation of their exaggerated belief in fatalism. Heyd remarks that Gokalp dared not demand the abolition of the Caliphate during the Young Turks regime; but in his 'Fundamentals of Turkism', he clearly demanded the abolition of all theocratic rule, defined as "law-making by Caliphs and Sultans who are regarded as God's shadows on earth." He wanted the Caliphate to remain only as a spiritual head of the international Ummah of Islam and the Caliph to preside over a Dar-al-Hikmah al-Islamiyya (international Islamic Academy), to which all member Muslim states (milletts) should refer matters of Islamic reinterpretation, research and scholarship. Gokalp also advocated the modernization of Muslim family life and urged the complete abandonment of purdah and the unqualified recognition of equality of the sexes.

In education, Gokalp wanted Muslim education in Turkey fully to discharge the functions of a modern, national education system. He

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65 HEYD, pp.88-92
66. Quran, IV:59
67. HEYD, pp.90-1
68. HEYD, p.92.
69. BERKES, op.cit. pp.223-33
70. ibid. pp.247-55
maintained "if we achieve this, make our education thoroughly national, if our society in structure and type, becomes a modern society, our education in the long run will acquire a modern character...."\(^7_1\)

It is conjectured that Ziya Gokalp's ideas on modernization of Islamic systems from within, had they been allowed to be tried, were likely to lead on to a harmonious evolutionary process of reforms in Islam; but Ghazi Mustaf Kemal Ataturk, by the disestablishment of all Islamic institutions from society and a thoroughgoing importation of the European systems, closed the door for any such synthesis.\(^7_2\)

National independence was won in Turkey in 1922 from the brink of total extinction threatened by the Allied Forces and Greek invasion. Ghazi Kemal emerged victorious only to face the Sultan's government as his rival at the Peace Conference at Lausanne. For Mustafa Kemal, this was the decisive point in his resolve to dislodge the traditional Ottoman vis a vis Islamic authority from all socio-political institutions. He proceeded ruthlessly in his programme of national reconstruction and modernization by separating the Sultanate and the Caliphate in 1922 - to be completely abolished in 1923 - an action which met with strong protest from all over the Muslim world.\(^7_3\) Along with the Caliphate went also the office of Shaikh-al-Islam; the rule of the Shariah, and Shariah courts, in place of which secular-national courts were established by the Grand National Assembly. The Law of Unification of Instruction of 1924, gave the Ministry of Public Instruction control over all educational institutions within the Republic, and the Ministry of Awkaf was abolished.

71. ibid. p.246
72. ROSENTHAL, op.cit.52
73. The strongest protest came from the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent whose two distinguished leaders, H.B. the Agha Khan and Sayyid Amir Ali, wrote to the Ismet Pasha government begging them to restore the Caliphate somewhat on the lines suggested by Ziya Gokalp, which was acceptable to Muslims in general. But it appears that Ataturk suspected the move of a British complicity aimed at installing the Agha Khan as a Caliph. So he wanted no room to be left for any ambiguity and manoeuvring by outside influence. Lewis, p.256
From then on, Mustafa Kemal struck, one by one, at all traditional institutions, customs and symbols which had distinguished the Turkish people as Muslims. By 1929, he had put Turkey on the road to a modern nation-state with total adoption of modern norms of secularism, rationality and positivism, constitutionalism; populism and statism.

In 1928, the Grand National Assembly acted to adopt the resolution of the People's Party of Mustafa Kemal to delete the clause that "the religion of the Turkish State is Islam". In November of the same year, it adopted the Latin alphabet as the Turkish script to replace the Arabic and Persian. Kemalism or Ataturkism was thus expressly committed to the ideals of modernization. "The aim of the revolutionary measures, we have been and are taking", declared Ataturk,

"is to bring the people of the Turkish Republic into a state of society which is entirely modern and civilised, in every sense and in every way... This is the central pillar of our Revolution and it is essential that we bring about the utter rout of mentalities incapable of accepting this fact." (75)

The Constitutions, originally restored in 1908, had already been re-enacted in 1920 by the Grand National Assembly under the leadership of Ataturk in 1920 as the Provisional Constitution of the new nation, declaring sovereignty of the nation to belong to the people; Grand National Assembly to be the sole repository of the executive, and legislative authority; and elections as the only method of democratic representation in the Grand National Assembly.

In 1925, a law was promulgated making it compulsory to wear hats instead of the fez which was declared illegal. An attack on the veiling of women was severely made, although ban was not imposed until 1935. 76

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75. G. LEWIS, Turkey, op.cit. p.91

76. LEWIS, The Emergence, pp.265-6
Next came the iconoclastic criticism of the 'brotherhoods' (tarikat) about whom Ataturk declared:

"I flatly refuse to believe that today, in the luminous presence of science, knowledge and civilization in all its aspects, there exist, in the civilized community of Turkey, men so primitive as to speak their material and moral well-being from the guidance of one or another Shaikh. Gentlemen, you and the whole nation must know, and know well, that the Republic of Turkey cannot be the land of Shaikhs, dervishes, disciples and lay brothers. The straightest, truest way (tarikat) is the way of civilization. To be a man, it is enough to do what civilization requires..."(77)

In November 1925, the Grand National Assembly enacted to ban all the Tarikats, confiscated their assets, closed their sanctuaries and prohibited their meetings. In 1937, the Tarikats were declared an 'evil legacy from the past, distracting the Turks from the true way, that of nationalism, resting on the true knowledge, that of the positive sciences. This was the way of the greatest benefit for the material and moral life of the Turks.'78

4. 4.2. EGYPTIAN-ARAB NATIONALISM

The rise of Arab nationalism has, in fact, been associated with Pasha Muhammad Ali and his son, Ibrahim Pasha. Ibrahim is recorded to have pronounced quite early the founding of an entirely Arab state as his aim in order to 'give back to the Arab race its nationality and political existence'.79 The modernization policies of Pasha Muhammad Ali and his descendants undoubtedly exalted Egypt's place in the world of Islam. His successful military campaign against the Ottomans, threatening Istanbul itself, naturally inspired Egyptian sentiments of national independence. To these must be added the socio-political changes emerging in the Ottoman society itself. With the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, Arab nationalism turned into an anti-colonial movement which achieved complete national independence only in the 1952 Revolution.

77. ibid. pp.404-5
78. ibid. pp.405-6
79. Albert HOURANI, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, op.cit.p.261
Events in Turkey had their immediate effect in the Arab lands. Turkish nationalism with its secular, pan-Turanic, ethnic and linguistic orientations tended to reduce the status of the Arabs to a secondary race in the Empire. In return, the Arabs started suspecting the Turks of disloyalty to the cause of Islam and wanted to move the centre of gravity back to Arabia. It was openly argued that the reform of Islam could not effectively be achieved unless the Caliphate was restored to the Arabs.\textsuperscript{80} Foreseeing the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers, the Arab intellectuals had hopes of re-establishing the Caliphate in the heart of the Arab Islamic world, with its seat in Makka or Medina; the holy cities. Sharif Hussain of Makka, with his claim of lineage with the Prophet and his authority over the Hijaz, apparently allowed himself to be persuaded by these aspirations when he negotiated with the British for their help in struggle for Arab independence; negotiations which led to the 1916 Arab Rebellion, and the final severing of the Arab-Ottoman links. The Arab hopes of an Arab Caliphate were not to be fulfilled; but with the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the European colonization of the Arab lands, nationalism emerged as an ideology of modernization with its secular, rationalistic and positivistic criteria.\textsuperscript{81}

On the intellectual level, the ideals of nationalism did not find much popularity in Egypt where the Azhar University had enjoyed profound intellectual and religious influence. Eminent scholars like Muhammad

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{80} Amir Abd Allah of Transjorden (later King of Jordan), stated in his memoirs, "so long as the Ottoman Sultan's accepted this (the safeguard of the rule of Shariah), Arabs were content to be ruled by them even though they were not themselves Arabs. But in the 19th century, they abandoned the principles of Islam and adopted a Western form of government, which they themselves did not understand. From that moment, the bond of Arab loyalty was loosened and Arabs began to think of an Arab government which would be more faithful to Islam." Hourani, op.cit. p.297.
\end{itemize}
Rashid Rida, Muhammad al-Ghazali and others, following Al-Afghani and Shaikh Abduh strongly opposed nationalism and secularism. Even non-Azharite scholars like Mustafa Kamil, who wanted a scientific outlook and rationalism to be employed in the reinterpretation of Islam, did not see eye to eye with nationalism and warned that nationalism with its particularistic aims was a Christian West's device to break the unity of the World of Islam. Kamil argued that Islam is for the East what Christianity is for the West, and preached 'hubb al Watan min al iman' (the love of fatherland based on the Faith). To this effect, Mustafa Kamil was even pro-Ottoman, since for him the preservation of the Caliphate, even with the Turks, was better than the European imperialism that was to follow.

The abolition of the institution of Khilifah by Ataturk stirred the world Muslim community who assembled in Cairo in 1926 to discuss all aspects of the question. Though the restoration of the Caliphate, it was concluded was not possible in the circumstances, the vitality of the institution itself was strongly upheld. The Second Islamic Congress held in Mecca in the same year ended with a resolution urging all Muslims 'not to abandon the question of the Khilifah and try to restore it whenever this should be feasible.'

During the inter-war years, the nationalist movements were geared to free the Arab lands from the influence of European imperialism were marshalled chiefly by westernised modernists - the urban bourgeoisie, the younger generation of aristocrats, bureaucrats and professionals - whose ideas were influenced by norms of modernity, that is to say: secularism, rationality and positivism. These nationalists

82. ROSENTHAL, op. cit. pp.103-124
83. ibid.p118-120
84. C.P.HARRIS, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt, op.cit. pp.134-5
employed nationalism more as 'an ideology of vitalism than
85
romanticism' unlike their 'reformist' or revivalist brethren.

It is significant to note that while modern Egyptian-Arab
nationalism in its search for identity and an ideological formulation
still upholds Islam as the strong binding force of all social values,
at the same time it tends to differentiate between values and culture
stemming from Islam proper and those that were in existence before
Islam. In this quest, some nationalists have even sought to revive
the ancient Pharoanic symbols. 86 Others, like Taha Hussain, asserted
that Egypt formed a part of a greater Mediterranean civilization. 87
Taha Hussain was certain that the only way for Egypt to modernize was
to merge itself into Western civilization whose leadership, as he saw
it, rested upon three things: humane culture, the civic virtues and
democracy. 88 The result of all these tendencies was to reduce Islam to
the position of sub-culture under a modern, secular Arabism. Thus,

General Muhammad Neguib, Chairman of the R.C. unequivocally declared:

'it is our unanimous desire to make Egypt a secular
republic ... This does not mean that my colleagues
and I have chosen to turn our backs on the Islamic
faith. On the contrary we hope to strengthen the faith
by applying its teachings judiciously rather than
blindly. The injunctions of the Quran have as much
meaning in Egypt today, as they ever did, provided they
are interpreted with due regard to the great changes that
have occurred in human society since the Prophet preached
his message.' (89)

85. BINDER, op. cit p.146.
86. ibid. p.138
87. HOURANI, op.cit.pp.324-340, also C.C.Adams, Islam and Modernism
in Egypt, op.cit. 253-259. Dr. Taha Hussain showed special interest
in the research into the pre-Islamic literature. Some of his
findings, e.g. his denial of the legend of the founding of the
Ka'aba by Abraham and Ishmael; his thesis that pre-Islamic Arabic
literature was a rich enough source from which 'support for the
doctrines of Islam or the grammatical correctness and rhetorical
elegance of the language of the Quran was drawn'. pp.255-6. He
exhorts, "When we undertake to investigation of Arabic literature
and its history, we must forget our national feelings and all their
specialising tendencies. We must forget our religious feelings
and all that is connected with them... We must follow the course
followed by modern scientists and philosophers in their treatment of
science and philosophy. I propose to apply to literature the

88. HOURANI. op. cit. pp.324-40.
Disconcerted by these purely linguistic and ancient Pharaonic accretions of Arabism, some other scholars have attached more importance to its underlying theological beliefs such as monotheism and revelation. The civilising role of Arabism, according to al Faruqi, lay in its monotheistic belief which is inherent in the three great Arab religions and their civilizations, viz. Judaism, Christianity and Islam. So viewed, Arabism is regarded as an integral part of Islam: nationalism is only a transitional phase; and ought to remain subservient to Islam.

Nasser's three-circle Arab nationalism (i.e. the Arabic, the African and the Islamic) had eventually to restrict itself to Arabism, composed of nationalism and Islam. His pan-Arabism was designed as an ideology aimed at achieving the unity of the Arab peoples and to liberate the Arab lands which had artificially been divided by the colonial powers. His socialism was another off-shoot of the same integrative-modernizing ideology. On the one hand, it reacted against the Western economic system which allowed excesses of individual economic power to be in the hands of Shaikhs and Amirs; and on the other, as a moral system drawing its egalitarian principles from Islam and modernity. Thus, Nasser built into nationalism as an ideology for modernization a further dynamic of socialism based on economic development, planning and statism. He utilized Islamic institutions as a source of inspiration for his modernizing ideology. As Karpat points out, 'without challenging

89. MUHAMMAD NASSER, Egypt's Destiny, V. Gollanze, London, 1955, pp. 150-1, also in Harris, op. cit. p. 232 on Arabism.


91. ibid, chapter 4, pp. 121, 171

the existence of the religious establishments, he tried to invest them with some modern functions on behalf of Arab nationalism which came to be synonymous with the religious definition of Arabism. 94

The remarkable point about the acceptance of the Islamic institutions and values as a support of modernization through Arabism and Socialism in Egypt is that it thereby involved all sections of the society in the process of modernization including, particularly, the Ulama and scholars of Al-Azhar. 95 Without the participation of the latter Gibb has asserted, effective and penetrating modernization of Muslim societies was not possible. 96

4. 4.3. PAKISTANI ISLAMIC-NATIONALISM

The demand for the creation of Pakistan was symptomatic of the Indian Muslims' ideology of national independence and modernization. Its roots go back to the socio-political backwardness to which they had succumbed during the British Raj. The liberal and democratically orientated norms and institutions of the Raj, even when applied most judiciously, implicitly favoured the Hindu majority. Reduced from the position of a ruling nation, to the status of a permanent minority in the subcontinent, the Muslims were beset with the fear of further encroachments on their religion, culture and languages from a hostile Hindu majority community in an Independent India. These fears were based, as Rosenthal has stressed, 'on fact, not fiction'. 97 Both Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who successively diagnosed the 'two-nation' theory, and advocated the creation of an independent Muslim state of Pakistan as the only feasible future for the Muslims, had come to this conclusion only after having/laboured for a Hindu-Muslim accord.

93. For the ideological importance of socialism in modernization, see D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, op. cit. p. 314


96. H.A.R. GIBB. Modern Trends, op. cit. p. 122
For their part, the Hindu community, which was four times larger, had through communal clashes on numerous occasions made no secret of their militant Hindu revivalism, which stood 'as a culture and religion combined, wholly inimical to everything Muslim'.

Already under the British Rule, they had monopolized the key institutions such as banking, finance, administration, education, industry, commerce and communications: and had vigilantly kept the Muslims out. In this plight the Indian Muslims, although they many times out-numbered their brethren in Egypt and Turkey put together, stood in glaring contrast to the latter and were plagued with the agony and fear of loss of their identity. Here the very Islamic values and systems were under threat, not to speak of the question of their modernization.

If the growth of the idea of an independent Muslim state and the movement for Muslim national independence should be viewed in the context of the communal situation in India, the modernization aspect of Pakistani-Islamic nationalism, as an ideology, has essentially to be related to the events and processes taking place in the Muslim world outside the subcontinent, mainly in Turkey and Egypt. The Kemalist secular approach to modernization - the abolition of the Caliphate - brought the strongest protest from the Indian Muslims. The Khilafah Movement which rose in the wake of these developments gathered such momentum that the British rule itself faced massive non-co-operation of the Muslim community.

97. E.I.J. ROSENTHAL, op.cit. p.182
98. IAN STEPHEN, Pakistan, Ernest Benn, London, 1963, p.27.
100. The secularism and democratic rule preached by the Indian National Congress was seen as the Muslims to work against their interests and culture. Ian Stephen, Pakistan, op.cit. p.27
101. See above. p.144, fn.
The architect of the ideology of Pakistani-Islamic nationalism was Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938) in whom an unrivalled spokesman for modernization of Islam and Muslim education was to be found. He was himself the rare, enlightened combination of orthodox and modernist thought and gathered the best from both. To crown his poetic and philosophical genius, Iqbal had in the first place mastered the classical Muslim education and then experienced Western education at Cambridge, Munich and Heidelberg. He was as staunch a preacher for the modernization of Islam as he was its savant. He exhorted Muslims to reinterpret rather than reject the Islamic norms. Through his persuasive poetry, which inspired and enlightened all Muslims, traditionalists as well as modernists, to a dynamic activism, he preached for the reconstruction of Islamic civilization on modern lines. His modernizing philosophy is found succinctly in a collection of his six lectures titled, 'The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam'.

Iqbal was basically opposed to nationalism based on geography, race or language. According to him ideology formed the basis of the community. He wrote:

"Let the Muslim of today...reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principles, and evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed purposes of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam" (103)

Iqbal had no doubt that the normative order of the Quran is based on a dynamic faith and social system. He invites the entire world to benefit from the universal teachings of the Quran and warns it of the dangers of modernization or progress based on non-religious,

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102. See W.C.SMITH, Modern Islam in India, V.Gollancz, 1946, also Arif Hussain, Pakistan, its Ideology and Foreign Policy, Frank Cass, London. 1965
103. See ROSENTHAL, p.206
material and purely secular ideals. He is critical of the ulama for their thesis that the door of ijtihad is closed in Islam for ever, and asserts:

"I see no reason why this attitude should be maintained any longer...The claim of the present generation of Muslim liberals to re-interpret the fundamental legal principles in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of social life, is, in my opinion, perfectly justified. The teachings of the Quran that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors should be permitted to solve its own problems." (104)

Thus, Iqbal is against taqlid. He wants to employ the basic values of Islam to inculcate the 'rationalist and positivist spirit' among the Muslims. He refutes the assertion that religion is an opiate: it could equally be called a stimulant, for without it, he maintains, man could never have carried on through thousands of years of non-achievement. Secularism, and socio-political systems based on irreligious and materialistic capitalism or socialism, are morally unsound. The Orient he preaches, must acquire the science of Europe, and a dynamic discontent; but all the rest of Westernism it must religiously shun! 105

104. ibid. p.159
105. ibid.
## Chart E

### A Comparative Syndrome of National Norms - Constitutional Ideals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>EGYPT</th>
<th>PAKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic, nationalist secular and socialist</td>
<td>Republic, democratic socialist; based on the alliance of the working powers of the people</td>
<td>Republic, democratic socialist; based on the Islamic principles of social justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOVEREIGNTY</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>EGYPT</th>
<th>PAKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vested in the nation without reservation or condition</td>
<td>Vested in the will of the people</td>
<td>Belongs to Allah; delegated authority exercisable by the people as a sacred trust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGISLATURE</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>EGYPT</th>
<th>PAKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute legislative powers vested in the Grand National Assembly. No law to be in contradiction with the Constitution</td>
<td>Legislative powers vested in the National Assembly</td>
<td>Vested in the National and Provincial Assemblies. No law to be repugnant to Islam. National Advisory Council of Islam to advise the legislature on Islamic questions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXECUTIVE</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>EGYPT</th>
<th>PAKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President and his Government</td>
<td>President and his Government</td>
<td>President, his Government, Provincial Governors and their governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JUDICIARY</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>EGYPT</th>
<th>PAKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judicial power to be exercised by independent secular courts</td>
<td>Judicial powers to be exercised by independent national courts - Shariah courts abolished in 1955</td>
<td>Judicial powers to be exercised by national courts. No Shariah courts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITIZENSHIP - LIBERTIES</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>EGYPT</th>
<th>PAKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality before law and basic human rights guaranteed irrespective of race, language, sex or political, religious or philosophical opinion</td>
<td>Equality of basic rights for all Egyptians without distinction of race, religion, language or belief.</td>
<td>All citizens equal before law without regard to their religion or belief.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TURKEY</strong></td>
<td><strong>EGYPT</strong></td>
<td><strong>PAKISTAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION</strong></td>
<td>Freedom of expression association, controversy, rebut and demonstration</td>
<td>Freedom of opinion, scientific research, press, printing, within the limits of the law</td>
<td>Freedom of expression association, unionization, assured within the limits of morality, decency and security of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATE RELIGION</strong></td>
<td>State religion Islam - freedom of faith absolute</td>
<td>State religion Islam</td>
<td>Muslims to be enabled to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental tenets of Islam. Minorities assured of complete freedom of faith, worship as well as equality to enter public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LANGUAGE</strong></td>
<td>Turkish with Latin Script</td>
<td>Arabic with Arabic Script</td>
<td>Urdu with Persian/Arabic, and Bengali with Devnagri script. English official language temporarily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECONOMY</strong></td>
<td>Etatism, private ownership and monopolies permitted</td>
<td>Socialist economy limited private ownership permitted</td>
<td>Private ownership permitted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5

Modernization with Education

5.1. Liberalism and Modernization of Muslim Education

The first phase of the impact of modernization of Islam, which appeared in the shape of liberalism, was not strictly speaking modernizing in its objectives. Normative change did take place among a tiny section of the societies but the climate in general remained coloured with scepticism and mistrust of the modernization movement as such. The liberalist reformers who acted as the catalyst agents of modernization, even if they were appreciative of, and inspired by, the modern European thought and institutions, had only partially understood their inner dynamics. They took modernization only at its face value, at best as a means to boomerang their co-religionists for their failure to keep equal place with Europe in the material aspects of their civilization; and to exhort them to equip themselves with modern methods to defeat the 'infidel' imperialists. Their appeal was neither to the norms of rationality or science as such, nor to the ideals of modernization. Their reformism, therefore, failed to lift itself off the ground remaining tied to particularistic, affectivity-ridden and defensive motives. Most of their zeal for liberalism has been regarded as apological, as Prof. Smith remarks, on the one hand to win the respect of the Westerners and the Westernisers for traditional Islamic values, and on the other, to make 'ideas of the reforms more palatable

I. Sayyid Jamal al Din Afghani is reported to have said, "The 'Oriental Question' would never have existed had the Ottomans matched the West in the field of civilization and coupled its material conquests with scientific power", KHATIRAT, Beirut, 1931, pp.223-4.

to the orthodox Muslims. In fact liberalist reformers wanted to revive Islam and not to modernize it. But they all avowedly concerned themselves with the reform of the traditional Muslim education. They criticised its contents, methods and teachers as well as the entire educational environment which slavishly inculcated conservatism and passivity.

Shaikh Muhammad Abduh and his disciples had given education the key importance in their programme of socio-religious reforms. As the editor of the Waqai, the Shaikh wrote copiously criticising the contemporary Muslim education. He attacked the duality of the educational structure which had resulted from Pasha Muhammad Ali's utilitarian modernization policies and thereby given rise to artificial divisions within the society. In his lectures and writings, he was also severely critical of the foreign missionary schools which, he argued, were designed to subvert Muslim beliefs and to win sympathies of the people towards the countries which they represented. He warned Muslim parents who sent their children to these schools in the sole hope of obtaining better jobs for them, against the dangers of incursion upon their faith and loyalties.

It appears that what Shaikh Abduh really detested was not education in Western sciences, technology or the Western languages; these he welcomed and advocated but he disliked the lopsided way in which it was imparted so that it failed to penetrate into Muslim life. He wanted Muslim education so to modernize itself as to instil into the minds of all Muslim students a burning desire to dig deep into their civilization.

4a. B. Lewis, The Middle East and the West, op. cit. p. 105 "While rejecting the excessive subservience to Western Civilization of some modernists and reformers, he was perfectly willing to accept modern science and technology, modern methods of education, and even to take account of modern thought as well as knowledge in a reformation of Islamic doctrine."
and descry its eternal dynamics. Only then, he thought, they will be able to evolve a sound synthesis of the modern and the traditional, the 'sensate' and the 'ideational'. It was in this context that he opposed purely secular education. His central thesis seems to have been that the introduction of borrowed institutions without reference to the cultural milieu of the Muslims could not produce a harmonious development among them. What was required, fundamentally was an integrated educational system.

Judging by the ideals of science and rationality, as these have come to be evolved now, it would appear that liberals like Shaikh Abduh, and others, who advocated the introduction of scientific enquiry to reinvigorate Islam, perhaps did not fully grasp the true nature of science, scientific methods or their long-range implications. The synthesis of science and Islam which they had wanted the Muslim students to bring about was perhaps desirable; but was it easy to achieve? Could societies on the ebb of decline and impaired by socio-political and economic laceration realize such high ideals?

To consider further Shaikh Abduh's modernization of Muslim education, it is significant to note that he put greater emphasis on the reform of higher education so that the new education could then filter downwards. He wanted more teachers to be trained in the new influence of modern thought so that they could then promote it among the masses. He gave equally great importance to the education of Muslim girls. His lifelong dream, however, remained to modernize Al-Azhar so that it might become 'the intellectual lighthouse (al-Manar) not only for Egypt, but for the whole Muslim world'.

Khedive Ismail appointed the Administrative Council for Al-Azhar of which he became a permanent member. This appointment gave Abdurrahman the golden opportunity of looking into the whole range of Al-Azhar affairs viz the administration, curriculum, methods of teaching, library facilities, awqaf, salaries of teachers, and the students' bursaries, their residential facilities, and the medical care, etc. The Shaikh wrote on all these aspects of Al-Azhar on his own account and with others and prepared proposals for introducing reforms into them. Although his dreams of modernizing Al-Azhar did not come true during his lifetime owing largely to the violent clash that arose over them between the Khedive and Lord Cromer, the British Consul General, the credit of pioneership in the modernization of Al-Azhar will always go to Shaikh Muhammad Abdurrahman. 6

5.2. Nationalism and Modernization of Muslim Education

Nationalism has been considered closer to modernization in its ideals than any other movement. Consolidation of the leadership of Nationalists in the developing countries has, by and large, depended on the elite class of modern intellectuals who had the ability to break out of the rigid specificity of the traditional social order and look ahead into the future. Kautsky, has defined modernist leadership as basically comprising:

"persons with advanced standing in humanities, sciences and social sciences, excluding scholars trained along traditional, usually religious lines in the old society. That is to say, only those who have such education as would qualify them in the administration of their government whether in bureaucracy or army, and also those who have studied in an industrial Western society." 7

6. ibid. pp.70-78
They rise to challenge the leadership of the traditional elite, organize themselves into national political parties with declared programs of social-economic modernization. With a clarity of purpose they are committed to the eradication of backwardness among their societies and to the building of a strong nationhood. Instead of merely thinking in terms of a synthesis between the higher and the lower valuations of the normative order of their culture, they seek to develop, educate and create a national consciousness among their peoples.

Education occupies a central place in the nationalist theory, but it is an education that helps to solve modern problems, to generate the urge for a psychic and physical mobilization in individuals as well as societies, to create empathic awareness among their people and to equip them with modern technology.

5.3. Nationalist Parties - the Vanguards of Educational Modernization

5.3.1. Turkey

The Union and Progress

Originally founded in 1889 by a group of the modern Army Medical School students as the 'Society for Union and Progress' this organization became the embodiment of modernization in all aspects of the Ottoman society. In 1889, their leaders were exiled to various European capitals such as Paris, London, Naples and Cairo; and from there they launched their campaign for nationalist-constitutionalist government through a stream of modern literature urging revolutionary methods and using forbidden slogans of 'fatherland', 'constitution' and 'nation'. In 1908, they were successful in ending the despotic rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and restored the 1876 Constitution. They then re-organized themselves as the first political party in Turkey and opened the new era of constitutional rule known as the Mesrutiyet (1908-18).

The modernizing ideals of the party were embodied in the very words 'Union and Progress'! By 'Union' was envisaged the solidarity and co-operation between all the millets, Muslims and non-Muslims, under the Ottoman protection. Each millet was to be a cultural unit and not a political entity. Union also aimed at secularization of all the millet systems. "Progress" stood for a 'social revolution, through educational and economic measures". To achieve Progress, it was necessary, as Burkes has underlined: (a) to be able to mobilize and develop the educational institutions in such a way as to produce more men who could, and would be the carriers of Ottoman national progress, and (b) to regain scope for the utilization of the existing and new economic forces as levers of social uplift.9

Ziya Gokalp, the father of Turkish nationalism, who joined the Union and Progress in 1911, was a staunch advocate of a National education for Turkey. "The aim of national education" he wrote, "is to build representative personalities, and thus to build national culture as well as the nation."10 Gokalp differentiated between education and training and defined the roles of both for national reconstruction as follows:

"Modern education, like modern culture, is a manifestation of the very life of the nation. Modern training, on the other hand, can be adopted from a civilization which, like modern technology, is international. Therefore, we have to make our education, thoroughly national. If we achieve this, if our society, in structure and type, becomes a modern society, our education in the long run will acquire a modern character. Otherwise, that is, if our society is still far from being modern, we must not expect to be able to give our children a modern education..."11

5.3.2. Egypt

Al-Hizb and Al-Wafd

Egypt had a longer familiarity with modern institutions such as constitutionalism and parliamentarianism than other contemporary Muslim countries. Khedive Ismail, in keeping with his overall image of 'an impatient Westernizer', along with his imitation and importation of European institutions, customs and mannerisms, also instituted a consultative elected Assembly of Notables somewhat on the lines of a Western parliament. In the same way, the Egyptian political parties appeared more in line, at least outwardly, with European counterparts in their composition, organization and manifestos. Landau traces three main factors to account for the rapid rise of political parties in Egypt: the spread of modern education; the knowledge that a better state of things was possible; and suspicion towards foreigners.12

The first national party, the Hizb-al-Watni, that grew up in the aftermath of the Urabi Rebellion and the British occupation, manifested these three factors in its making, but national independence and modernization remained its overriding objectives. Its founder, Mustafa Kamal, 'a typical example of the polished, highly-educated, French-oriented gentleman', had, during his studentship in France, acquainted himself with the French literary and political circles.

He was a student of law, but what inspired his mind most in France was the political life, the methods of party organization, tactics and propaganda. In his nationalist campaign to win support for the Egyptian national independence, he employed three powerful modern methods of influencing public opinion i.e. journalism, lecturing at home and

abroad, and a demand for increasing educational facilities. In 1900 he founded the nationalist newspaper Al-Liwa (the Standard) which in time became the mouthpiece of Egyptian nationalism. The aim of the paper, declared Kamal, was "to serve the Ummah and Islam in an honourble and practical way; to strengthen the relations among Egyptians as well as among Muslims, to demand improvements in education, economy and industry of the country".13

Considerable space was devoted in the columns of Al-Liwa for Kamal's articles and speeches on the subject of education, Kamal was highly critical of the British for their negligence of education in Egypt. He demanded a national system of education in Egypt with free education for all. He advocated the extension and differentiation of modern secondary schools on technical and vocational lines. He himself opened a national school in which he provided traditional as well as modern curricula. He was also the first Egyptian leader to advocate the establishment of a modern Egyptian national university.14

During the inter-war years, the overwhelming problem that occupied the energies and attention of the Egyptian leaders was total national independence. So oppressive and abhorrent had the British occupation proved to the people of Egypt that the entire population down to the school children, the fellaheen and the womenfolk joined in the movement!15 The leader of the Wafd party Saad Zaghlul had united all sections of the society, Muslims and Copts, the traditionalists and the modernists, for the cause of nationalism. Apart from the fight for national independence, educational modernization was their major concern. Saad had himself worked as the Minister of Education under Lord Cromer and in 1906, was appointed as the President of the Founding Committee of the proposed

13. LANDAU, op. cit. p.110
15. ibid. pp.149-50.
The Wafd Party had also adopted a clause in its charter committing itself to the modernization of education.

In 1923, when the Wafd won elections, terminating the British occupation, Saad formed the first democratic government committed to the 'social and individual welfare.' The 1923 Constitution declared elementary education to be free including that of the Kuttab schools. In 1925, compulsory elementary education for all became a law although the target was nowhere near achievable for years to come, due to the lack of the necessary building facilities and of teaching personnel. Consequently progress remained highly uneven. Emphasis on literacy and elementary education created an influx of pupils at secondary schools, so much so that in 1952-3, the number of secondary school pupils rose from 151,000 to 182,000, an increase of 25% in one year. In general, schools catered for literature, languages and humanities; lower levels of sciences, vocational and higher level professional studies were ignored. The rate of wastage between elementary and secondary levels, and post secondary level was high. Two parallel systems of education still prevailed in the 1920s and the 1930s. Nevertheless, the greatest credit that goes to the nationalist Wafd Party as Fisher remarks, was for creating "a national consciousness among the middle and upper classes. Education was helping to make ready the masses for the national determination and political democracy for which Wafd leaders were striving".

5.3.3. Pakistan

The Muslim League.

The Muslim community of India, though deposed after the loss of the Muslim rule and beaten into further regression and socio-
cultural depression after the 1857 mutiny, was capable, by the last quarter of the 19th century, of producing, thanks to the jihad of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, a new class of intellectual leaders. These modernist elites were the direct creation of modern education and stood for Muslim nationalism and modernization. Sir Sayyid's efforts to modernize the Muslim community found their practical expression most notably in education. Here was a courageous Muslim leader, who perceived more than anybody else among his coreligionists that the only way to lift Muslims out of their backwardness and disillusionment into a nationhood once again, was through modern education and the modernization of the Muslim education. In a statement, Sir Sayyid is recorded to have asserted:

"There are people who hold the opinion that our national cause will be promoted (in the best way) by discussing political affairs. I do not agree with that, but regard the spread of education to be the only means for the promotion of the national cause. In these days our nation should not strive for anything other than the spread of education. If in our country, education will be sufficiently spread, then we shall have sufficient means to arise from our backward position."

He was himself greatly impressed, during his stay in England, by Cambridge University and was determined to make it the model institution for higher learning for the Muslims, in which they might acquire modern English education without 'prejudice to their religion'. His Muslim and Anglo-Oriental College, opened at Aligarh in 1877, was already, by the turn of the century, fulfilling his cherished dream. It was already attracting a large number of students not only among Muslims from all over India but also from the Islamic world. In 1920 it was raised to the status of a Muslim University.

The influence of the Aligarh Muslim University went much deeper than education alone. Aligarh soon became the centre for the Muslim nationalist movement which eventually became responsible for the concept of a separate state of Pakistan.

Sir Sayyid's zeal for the modernization of Muslim education was not confined to the establishment of the Aligarh College alone. One college could not ensure modern education for the 60 million Muslims of India. He wanted a centralized national Muslim educational system to take shape in India, and for this purpose, in 1886, he inaugurated the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Educational Conference with the following main objectives:

1. to try to spread the highest Western education among Muslims;
2. to enquire into the state of religious instruction in English schools founded by Muslims, and to conduct it in the best way possible;
3. to support the instruction of Eastern learning and religious subjects which Muslim teachers were giving everywhere on their own, and make provision for it so that it could be kept going regularly; and,
4. to examine the state of instruction of the vernacular schools, which was given on the old lines [Kuttab], and to make for their restoration, if they had decayed. 24

In 1906, eight years after Sir Sayyid's death, the Muslim League was born as a political party composed of the Muslim elite classes. The annulment of the partition of Bengal forced upon Lord Curzon's government by the powerful Hindu community, compelled the Muslims to seek elsewhere for the inspiration of their nationalism. The abolition of the Caliphate by Mustafa Ataturk moved the Muslims of the subcontinent with the same frustration as their brethren in the rest of the world. By 1937, the concept of a separate Muslim nationhood had become a reality in the subcontinent with the Muslim League as the prominent political party of

24. BALJON. op. cit. p.255.
the Muslims. In 1940, at Lahore, it resolved to demand the establishment of Pakistan as the Sovereign state for the Muslims of the subcontinent a demand first crystallised in the Presidential address of Sir Muhammad Iqbal at the 1930 Muslim League Annual Conference.

Pakistani Muslim nationalism was thus the progeny of the modernists, the class of intellectuals mostly hailing from Aligarh or other modern educational institutions. Its founders were Sir Sayyid and his followers, Iqbal, Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan; all protagonists of modernization in Islam. Equally significant in Muslim nationalism was the role of the emerging modernist middle class, the officers, clerks, teachers and technicians — men who spread into government services, and had first-hand experience of the ostracism practised against them. It is no exaggeration to say that up until 1940s the Muslims' share in the Central and the Provincial Civil Services; education, commerce, industry and other public pursuits was totally insignificant. The Hindus dominated every field and ensured that they stayed that way.

The Muslim League has been criticised for its failure to define beforehand the details of the prospective ideological, social, economic and educational orientations of Pakistan. Prof. Smith, for example, writing in the stormy days of 1945, is, perhaps justifiably, over critical of the Muslim League's inadequate explicitness in these matters. It is true that the Muslim League leaders had left most of the ideological questions unexplained before Pakistan became a reality, but, it would be erroneous to conclude that Pakistani Muslim nationalism was without a socio-political and economic rationale. The lack of clarity and a

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prior commitment to prospective policies, as the Muslim League leaders have explained, was somewhat deliberate; to a larger extent, it rested on the very creation of Pakistan which itself remained until the last moment, at the whim of the British and the Hindu majority. As Callard has aptly pointed out:

"There was no period to argue about the form of the future State or the policies it would pursue. The history of the movement toward Pakistan, from 1940-47, was one of increasing momentum toward a single, fixed goal. Unity was made easier to preserve, since fear spurred from behind and a glorious vision beckoned from ahead. No other loyalty to person or principle was to be allowed to stand in the way of Pakistan." 27

The conflicts that ensued in Pakistan over the question of the Constitution, the language problem, the 1954 religious riots about the Ahmadiyya sect, all proved how difficult it was to resolve and delineate the ambiguities of diffuse ideals. Whatever vagueness the Muslim League might have shown in other aspects of its policies, one thing stands out as highly significant: that the makers of Pakistan never floundered about the objective of educational modernization. The Anglo-Oriental Educational Conference of Sir Sayyid that later became the Muslim Educational Conference, had worked in collaboration with the Muslim League to promote education among the Muslims of the subcontinent. Its objectives were to 'popularise the modern education among the Muslims and to bring the older education more in line with the needs of the community. In 1942, a Committee appointed by the Conference issued its report known as the Kamal Yar Jung Committee Report. The Report highlighted the inadequacies of the prevailing educational system for the Muslims, and assigned to

education the role of an essential vehicle for modernization, and
nation-building.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{28} See I. H. \textsc{Qureshi}, \textit{The Muslim Community of Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent}, op. cit. pp.242-3. The Committee concluded that 'the present system of education with all its value and contributions to the economic, political and social life of India has had a disintegrating influence on the culture and social order of the Muslims.' Its curricula did little justice to Islamic History or Philosophy; there was either ancient Hindu Philosophy or modern Philosophy, Islamic philosophy was completely ignored. In history, the Muslim period was taught with slight value; it was referred in the main, as 'a narration of wars and conquests, slaughter and carnage, destruction and demolition of India's past, amidst patricidal and fratricidal struggles and disputes'. The Committee found out that the literacy rate among the Muslims was only 6.4\%, the lowest, in comparison. The Report desired: "Can we have schools and colleges where men will be trained to be leaders of men, pioneers of industry and dynamic movers of thought - men trained for devoted works, unquestioned sacrifice, \textit{and} missionary zeal in the cause of Islam."
PART III

CASE STUDIES

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PAKISTAN  ...  ...  ... pp. 250--323.

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Chapter 6

THE MODERNIZATION OF MUSLIM EDUCATION IN TURKEY

A CASE STUDY

"I flatly refuse to believe that today, in the luminous presence of science, knowledge and civilization in all its aspects, there exists, in the civilized community of Turkey, men so primitive as to speak their material and moral well-being from the guidance of one or another shaikh. Gentlemen, you and the whole nation must know and know well, that the Republic of Turkey can not be the land of Shaikhs, dervishes, disciples and lay brothers. The straightest, truest way (tarikat) is the way of civilization. To be a man, it is enough to do what civilization requires..."

Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Speech in the Grand National Assembly.
Turkey

6.1. National Independence

Modern Turkey emerged as a nation-state consequent to the Treaty of Lausanne signed between the Allies and Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923. The Treaty established the boundaries of the new State with an area comprising 15 per cent of what had remained of the Ottoman Empire by the turn of the 19th century. Though reduced in size, the modern State of Turkey still kept its strategic importance of being a bridge between the East and the West.¹

Separated by the narrow straits of the Dardanelles, Bosphorus and the sea of Marmara which constitute the only waterways between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, 97 per cent of the country lies in Asia while only 3 per cent is in Europe. The smaller, European Turkey, Thrace has a fairly smooth terrain suitable enough for agriculture and settled living. The larger, Asian Turkey, the Anatolian peninsula, on the other hand, presents a mixture of sharply conflicting features, ranging from the central basin of about 1,000 meters above sea level surrounded by mountains of 3,000 meters topped by the summits of Mount Ararat of over 5,000 meters. It is mainly Asiatic Turkey that typifies the Turkish way of life, with a semi-arid terrain, an ancient village culture and an overwhelming population of peasants.² During the Ottoman rule the only two urban centres of Istanbul and Izmir formed the two seats of political power and also concentrated between them all the economic and industrial strength, dominating over the vast hinterland of some 40,000 peasant villages. It was in this latter, Asiatic Turkey in the main, that Mustafa Ataturk wanted to introduce the dynamics of modernization when in 1923, he chose Ankara as the new National Capital.

2. ibid.
The selection of Ankara symbolised the dominant passion of Ataturk determined as he was, totally to do away with the least connection with the traditional Ottoman past; and to give the new Turks a capital within their own heartland though with new orientations.3

6.1.2. Ideology and Identity

With the settlement of the international status of Turkey at Lausanne, Ataturk and his party set out to establish a modern political structure for their country. In 1924, a Constitutional Law was adopted by the National Assembly giving the new State a modicum of the Western parliamentary system of democratic rule. Though Ataturkism had from the very start, been identified by the Republican Peoples' Party led by Ataturk himself by the famous six-points viz: republicanism, secularism, populism, nationalism, statism and reformism it was not until 1930 that Turkey was proclaimed a Republic and Ataturk its elected President; while his six-points were formally incorporated into the party programme at the Party National Congress in 1931.4

6.2.1. Political Modernization

Ataturk's potential supporters for modernization policies consisted of the army and civil bureaucracy. The intelligentsia and the peasantry, in spite of their initial acclaim for the charismatic leadership of Ataturk as 'saviour' of the nation, did not fully agree with his highhanded violence to the Muslim institutions. An element which still supported the liberalism of the Young Turks organised itself into the Progressive Republican Party in opposition to the radicalism of the ruling Republican Peoples' Party. The 1925 Kurdish revolt with its

strong Islamic zeal, followed by an attempt on Ataturk's life in 1926 and the widespread anti-government demonstrations in 1929, all resulted in turning the Ataturk-Inonu regime into a single-party dictatorship which Ataturk himself justified on the grounds that "a strong authoritarian regime must be maintained for a time in order to set Turkey on the road to modernization and the removal of all the landmarks of a dead past." But the plea for authoritarianism could not overcome the basic dichotomy that became peculiar to the Turkish society, revealing itself, as Nuri Eren has pointed out, 'in a system that believed in popular justification but denied diversity of opinion....'

Ataturk's demise in 1938 and the World War II years prevented internal socio-political conflicts and saved Turkey from civil strife. Post war years, however, brought liberal changes into the national politics. Closer contacts with the West during the War years and the subsequent desire of the Ruling Turkish leadership to join the United Nations have been considered mainly responsible for the restoration of the multi-party system. In 1945, when the charter of the U.N. came up for ratification in the National Assembly, Celal Bayar and Adnan Mendres, who later headed the Democratic Party government, tabled a motion suggesting that as well as approving the Charter, the Turkish government and Constitution must in fact put in practice within Turkey some of the basic principles and liberties vouchsafed in the Charter, such as the freedom of expression and the right for organization. At the time, the Government reacted strongly to the motion forcing its sponsors to leave the party, but public opinion soon caught up with the

idea and forced the Inonu regime to abandon the single-party system. In 1946, the Democratic Party was born under the leadership of Celal Bayar and Adnan Mendres, as the main opposition party. Later, numerous other parties, including the National Party which was reconstituted in 1954 as the Republican National Party, came into existence. Turkey now was a multiparty democratic society.

The Democratic Party started from where the earlier Progressive Republican Party had left off. It represented the larger middle-class and the foreign peasants whose sentiments had been thrown overboard by the dictatorial one-party rule of Ataturk and Inonu. The new party soon became the mouthpiece of liberalism and Islamic revivalism. So strong became its popularity among the hitherto disenchanted intelligentsia and the villagers that when in 1950, they unseated the Republican Peoples Party from power as a result of their overwhelming victory at the elections, "the whole of Turkey" remarks Eren, "including the Republicans surged with pride". The Democrats won 408 seats while the RPP only managed to gain 69 seats. In the 1954 elections they won an even more resounding victory when they gained 503 out of 541 seats in the Parliament. In 1958, however, their majority was reduced to 58 per cent.

The Democratic Party achieved its popularity by its promise to restore some of the potent Muslim symbols and institutions which had been recklessly dealt with by Ataturk. Their government encouraged the building of mosques, reintroduced the call to prayer in Arabic, permitted the teaching of Islamiyayt in schools and allowed pilgrimage to Makka. All these measures were widely acclaimed by the generality of the people for they stood to re-establish the identity of the

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8. ibid. p.94.
9. ibid.
Turkish nation as a Muslim people - an identity that had been set aside since the Revolution. The breakdown of the Democratic Party government in 1960, resulting in the military take-over, was due more to the malpractices and intolerance of its leaders, who coveted a monopoly of power as Ataturk and Inonu had done before them. But the desire expressed by the Turkish populace for the recognition of their Muslim identity, shown in their support for the change of policy which permitted the revival of Islamic symbols, could not easily be dismissed as a reassertion of traditionalism.

Ideologically, Turkey is still in a state of fluidity. The basic issues that divide the nation are still the six-point ideals of modernization launched by Kemal Ataturk. About fifty years of experiment with westernization has not made the Turks a part of the Western-European civilization. As Prof. Lewis has pointed out, "the deepest Islamic roots of Turkish life and culture are still alive, and the ultimate identity of Turk and Muslim in Turkey is still unchallenged." ¹⁰

There are now about ten political parties in the country. Basically, they are all committed to the creation of a modern, constitutional, democratic and republican society. But they are divided on the question of secularism. The Republican Peoples' Party

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¹⁰ See Bernard LEWIS, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, op. cit. pp.417-18. A more detailed and deeper study of the religious life of the Turkish people has been presented by Howard A. Reed, who has categorically maintained that:

"Despite the secularization of modern Turkey, most of her citizens are quick and proud to claim that they are Muslims. The life of a Muslim Turk today is still cast in an essentially Islamic framework from conception to the Mevlid Service of Remembrance which often commemorates the fortieth day after death".

of Ataturk and its ally, the Reliance Party, are the two main parties, staunchly committed to the original idea of secularism as propounded by Ataturk although even they have come a very long way to accept certain changes in favour of religion. The Justice, the New Turkey and the Nation Parties all want the State to repress religious freedom, belief or practice. They do not want secularism to be necessarily anti-religious. Both, they argue, function as complements of one another in the human development. The Justice Party, for example in its party manifesto declares:

"A secular state does not require that citizens should cut their ties with religion. Every citizen is free to worship according to the requirements of his religion and sect." 11

In the same manner, the manifesto of the Nation Party asserts:

"The Party recognizes the share of faith, morals and tradition in the social order. These do not change often and remain beyond the influence of the state." 12

The New Turkey Party and Union Party, on the other hand, openly demand the restoration of Islamic socio-religious practices in order to generate social harmony among the nation. Turkish society on the whole is beset by serious cleavages and extreme viewpoints that mark ideological confusion. In this state of extremes, the larger Turkish community, remarks, Eren, remains "unsure, insecure and confused." 13 Confusion leads to frustration and frustration to violence.

When the National Unity Committee set up by the Army in 1960 to devise a new constitution and to restore democratic rule, handed over

11. EREN. op. cit. p.92
12. ibid. p.93
13. ibid. p.93
power to the newly elected parties that formed a coalition government under the premiership of the veteran leader, Ismet Inonu, the underlying conflicts had not been settled. In 1965, the Justice Party was returned to power chiefly on its programme which opposed extremism. But the identity crisis still loomed ominously. Extreme leftist activities and urban terrorism, including sabotage and kidnapping, as well as student agitation were inspired and carried out by the newly organised militant Turkish Peoples' Liberation Army (TPLA) whose leaders were finally arrested and sentenced to death in June 1971. Such anomie and protest only strengthened the Army's claim that parliamentary democracy itself was responsible for the disturbances. With this excuse, the Army poses itself again and again as the main upholder of the ideals of Atatürk's modernization, ever ready to intervene and suspend the democratic system.14

The source of conflict however springs from the reluctance of the urban 'enlightened' minority to diffuse popular democracy to the general electorate. The so called 'ignorant' electorate have a permanent majority in the country.15 The army and the civil bureaucracy, by playing 'primordial' politics, refuse to restore populism. It was this 'primordial' politics that led the Army to restore democratic rule in 1961 only on the basis of a compromise formula instituted in the 1961 Constitution. This called for proportional representation instead of the popular vote; set up a Constitutional Court as the ultimate interpretative authority, and removed all executive control from the judiciary, the universities and broadcasting. These measures inevitably boomeranged to disrupt authority per se and led to an all out 'authority crisis'. As Mango has recorded, "Less responsible journalists, defamed, libelled and incited their leaders to violence at will, secure in the knowledge that according to Article 11

15. Ibid.
of the Constitution, 'the law shall not infringe the essence of any right or liberty, not even when it (the law) is applied for the purpose of upholding public interest, morals and order, social justice and national security.'\textsuperscript{16} It was precisely because of this state of an authority crisis that the army once again intervened in 1971. Thus the fight between the enlightened elites and the popular electorate goes on. The strange thing is that it is being carried on in the name of modernization. It would be wrong to conclude that the popular majority rule or indeed the resurgence of Islamic revivalism in itself is tantamount to Turkey's retreat to traditionalism. Even the most conservative rightest parties who demand the re-establishment of Islamic symbols and practices, are not opposed to modernization. On the contrary, they strongly urge the modernization of the outdated religious practices and the transformation of Muslim institutions in such a way that they become viable for present day life. In their view Ataturk's secularism has been carried too far. Ataturk only wanted, as they see it, to separate the religious and the secular functions of the state which had been haphazardly mixed up during the Ottoman rule and before. The Justice Party programme for example asserts:

"We deny all political and social concepts that can pull our country back from the point of progress she has achieved. To attain the level of contemporary civilization our people must pursue their forward march without interruption".\textsuperscript{17}

"Ataturk's secularism," asserts Eren, "though increasingly stern toward public manifestations of piety, never turned anti-Islamic. It is the failure to salvage Islam from outmoded beliefs and practices and place it in a meaningful relation to the contemporary needs of the common man that keeps secularism controversial".\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} ibid. also David BARCHFORD, "Strengthening the Power of the State", in the Guardian 30th November, 1972.
\textsuperscript{17} N. EREN. op. cit. p.101.
\textsuperscript{18} ibid. p.91.
Political Institutions

The Constitution

Since national independence, Turkey has adopted two constitutions. The first constitution was promulgated soon after the declaration of Turkey as a Republic in 1924. With some amendments, this constitution remained in force until 1960. Based on the ideals of Ataturkism, viz: "nationalism, secularism, populism, statism, republicanism and reformism", the Constitution was first amended in 1928 when the clause stating that 'Islam is the State Religion' was removed. Then in 1930, the right to vote was extended to women, and in 1934, the minimum age for participation in elections was raised from 18 to 22. In 1937 a one-party system was incorporated into the Constitution and since then both it and the Government remained the handmaids of the Republican People's Party which held power until 1950.

In keeping with the will of Ataturk, who held both offices: President of the Republic and of the National Assembly, in order to concentrate all powers in his own hands, certain provisions were built into the Constitution so that Ataturk and his Party held all the powers in their tight control; the Constitution held the National Assembly as the sole executive and legislative authority. The Assembly was a unicameral institution, and in its functioning it replaced the nation as sovereign.

A major change was introduced into the constitution in 1946 when the single party system was abolished and multi-party rule was adopted. But the loopholes that had been created in the Constitution and the style in which power was first monopolised by Ataturk and his party in turn tempted their successors, the Democratic party to resort to more authoritarianism. Of course, the Democrats were more blatant in tampering with the Constitution. They undermined the independence of the judiciary, the press and the Universities by dismissing judges, imprisoning journalists and removing professors. The Army therefore ousted them in the coup of 1960 and abolished the Constitution with a Proclamation to give the nation a new and more viable one.
The 1961 Constitution

The present Turkish Constitution was promulgated by the National Unity Committee set up by the military regime in 1960. It is the handiwork mainly of the academics: the professors of the Political Science Departments of the Universities of Ankara and Istanbul. As experts in the field and representatives of the modernizing leadership, they were called upon to draw up a draft in which sufficient checks were provided to secure vital control in the hands of the 'enlightened' elite, so that no single party could assume power solely on the basis of popular vote from the 'ignorant' majority.

The new Constitution describes Turkey as a 'nationalist, democratic, secular and social' Republic. Though it omits the clause in the old constitution which made the Grand National Assembly the highest source of sovereignty instead of the nation itself, it gives vogue to a bicameral GNA consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate. Clear distinction has been drawn between the legislature and the executive, which had been left vague in the old constitution. The Constitution also strangely fortifies the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the Press and broadcasting, as well as the autonomy of the universities, making it difficult for a recurrence of the interference with the constitution made by the Democrats. Another important innovation in the Constitution has been the creation of a Constitutional Court as the supreme organ to interpret the spirit of the Constitution.
Policy Formulation Function

According to the new Constitution, national policy formulation is the responsibility of both Chambers of the GNA. Both Chambers normally meet separately, but in an emergency and for certain special matters including the budget, joint sessions are called for. Both Chambers are also represented on special ad hoc committees. Though final authority is given to the Assembly, participation of the Senate is necessary. If a proposal is rejected by the Assembly but accepted by the Senate, it goes back to the Assembly for review. But if the Assembly rejects it again, the proposal falls.

Greater involvement of the 'enlightened' elites in policy formulation functions is also apparent from the composition, strength and the qualifications for election for both Chambers. The National Assembly is composed of 450 deputies elected by direct ballot, while the Senate of the Republic is formed of 150 members elected by general ballot and 15 appointed by the President. The term of office for the Assembly is four years while the Senate functions for six years. The Educational qualification for election as an assemblyman is defined as "literacy", while a senator must have had higher education (Art 72). The minimum age for an assemblyman is 30 but for the Senator it is 40. Such measures make the enlightened, urban and secularist elites watchdogs of policy formulation functions.

Policy Adoption Function

Article 6 of the Constitution states that the executive function will be carried out by the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers within the framework of the law. A further distinction has been made between the role of the President as the chief policy adopter and head of the executive for which he chooses the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The President gives the final legitimacy to the laws which have been formulated by the G.N.A. According to
article 98, although all policy adoption is the President's prerogative, he cannot be held personally responsible.

Strictly speaking in a parliamentary system, the choice of the Prime Minister is a prerogative of the ruling party, the proportionate electoral basis of Turkey makes it virtually impossible for any single party to gain overall supremacy. This is a situation which leads to successive weak coalition governments. The President, therefore, wields unchallenged authority. Again, the Constitution stipulates that the Prime Minister must be a member of the GNA but his Ministers may not. This, it is believed is designed to make it possible for the 'enlightened' modernizing leadership to be enlisted into the government even if they fail to be elected into the Assembly. The Constitution also allows the army to exercise supervisory authority over the executive and the legislature by the creation of a National Security Council composed of the Chief of the General Staff and the Ministers, under the Chairman of the President.

Policy Adjudication Functions

Largely as a result of the Democratic Party's capricious dismissal or promotion of judges for political motives, the new constitution has laid extra stress on the independence and consolidation of the judiciary. Article 132 of the Section of Judiciary proclaims:

"No organ, office, agency or individual may give orders or instructions to courts or judges in connection with the discharge of their judicial duties, send them circulars, or make recommendations or suggestions...Legislature and executive organs and administrations are under obligation to comply with rulings of the court. Such organs and the administration shall in no manner whatsoever alter court rulings or delay their execution."19

Article 133 further reinforces their independence by establishing that "Judges may not be dismissed unless they so desire,

19. ibid. p.46.
they many not be retired before the age limit... They many not be deprived of their salaries."^20

To consolidate the professional integrity and strength of the Judicial profession, the new Constitution called for a Supreme Court of Judges which is alone empowered to deal with all internal affairs of the judiciary.

Courts

The new Constitution has given rise to more differentiated types of courts, some quite novel to the judicial system of Turkey. Courts were originally secularised and nationalised by Ataturk in 1926. The present system is as below:

1. The Court of Cassation is the highest court of review and appeal whose judges are elected by the supreme Council of Judges.

2. The Military Court of Cassation is a court of the final resort to review decisions and verdicts.

3. The Court of Jurisdictional Disputes is empowered to settle definitive disputes among civil, administrative and military courts arising from disagreement on jurisdictional matters and verdicts.

4. The Constitutional Court is the most important innovation. It is designed as the 'guardian of the basic premises of the constitution' to review the constitutionality of laws and the bylaws of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Article 152 on the subject states:

"The rulings of the Constitutional Court are final. The decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be binding on the legislature, executive and judicial organs of the state as well as the administration, real and corporal persons". 21

The Constitutional Court is further empowered as a High Council to try the President, the members of the Council of Ministers, the members of the Courts of Cassation and of the other three highest tribunals. 21A

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^20 ibid. p.52.
^21 ibid. p.54.
^21A ibid.
Local Administration

The Turkish system of local administration was already, before the Republic, a copy of the French system and allowed for a provincial administration on a centralised structure. Atatürk's reasons for retaining this system of centralised administration, have been summarised by Rivikin as below:

1. "It existed. For the revolution to attempt the creation of a radically new state and a new form of government simultaneously could prove too immense a task. Atatürk was a visionary, but also a pragmatist".

2. "The country was not unified in spirit. Tight reins were needed over what decisions were made or not made, and parts of the nation could not be allowed to 'go it alone', particularly those where reactionary religious elements were strong".

3. "Trained talent to carry out modernization was lacking. Only a few men and women were capable of producing plans and giving orders (in education, economic development as well as administration). They had to be concentrated at the centre and in easy communication with each other. Field cadres could be given only limited responsibility, reporting directly to the centre, to forestall mistakes about policy implementation". 22

According to the French model, the country is divided into 67 Vilayets (provinces), which vary greatly in size and population; the largest being fourteen times the area of the smallest, and the most populous having 28 times more inhabitants than the least populous. 23 Each vilayet is administered by a Vali (Governor) appointed by the Ministry of Interior. Each Vilayet has also an Assembly and a Municipal Council, whose members are elected by general elections for a term of four years. The Vilayets are divided into Kazas and each Kaza is divided into Nahiyas.

The system is beset by an inherent duality that leads to unco-ordinated control. The Vali of each Vilayet, himself appointed


by the Ministry of Interior, is handicapped by having virtually no authority, except a nominal one, over the officers of the various Ministries who receive their instructions direct from their own Ministers. This superiority of the central government also handicaps the Vilayet Assemblies in their function of law making.

Regional Level

The desirability of such a large number of provinces and the disparity in their sizes has been debated, and expert opinion now seems to favour the creation of some form of larger regional set-ups. In fact, the 1961 Constitution itself states (art.115) that "for certain functions authorities may be set up on a wider than provincial basis". Regionalism, however, also generates fears of separatism, particularly in the far off Eastern Kurdish provinces. Various solutions have been mooted to decentralise and to regionalise control, but the problem remains unsolved. At the moment, there is no regional system.

District Level

The Nahiya or bucak (district), which used to be an important administrative unit during the Ottoman rule, has, since modernization in the last century, equally suffered at the hand of rigid centralization. In 1949, attempts were made to revise district level administration and it was recognised by the Government that each district should have elected a district council at least for advisory purposes. But, as Dodd points out, only 190 out of the 923 districts of the Republic have, up to now, set up such councils.

24. DODD. op. cit. p.266
25. ibid. p.266.
**Village Level**

At the village level, the elected village headman performs all the functions of administration. He is the local representative of virtually all the Ministries, and local officials of all departments exercise authority over him. There is virtually no community level participation in the administration of the village. Government officials are dominant masters whom the villagers fear in the same way as they did under the Ottoman rule. Democratic participation at the grass-root level is therefore non-existent. This typifies the pyramidal system of administration in Turkey in which the larger village base which Ataturk so vehemently pledged himself to modernise by adopting Ankara as the new capital is flagrantly ignored and remains entrenched in traditionality. To remedy the situation, if only slightly, the Government has recently decided to establish a separate Ministry of Village Affairs, mainly to help 'co-ordinate as well as promote self-help in the villages'.

But as Prof. Dodd observes:

> 'There is a strong current of feeling in Turkish society that the administration often treats the peasant harshly and unsympathetically and too paternalistically. Certainly, it is difficult for the peasant to think of government as a helpmate, but as a master more inclined to place limits to his initiative than to encourage it'.
than one-half of the principal parliamentary leaders and cabinet ministers. As late as the mid-1950s, though other classes also started exercising power yet men of bureaucratic background occupied nearly twenty per cent of all ministerial posts, being second in numbers only to lawyers. 27 Civil bureaucracy still remains the largest group of modernizing leadership in Turkey.

The strength and distribution of the Civil Bureaucracy in Turkey is shown in the table below:

Table VI.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANTS IN 1961</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Central Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actually Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. State Economic Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>452,490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table VI.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS BY MAJOR MINISTRIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: C. H. DODD, Politics and Government in Turkey, p.270

Educationally, the civil servants of Turkey have been categorized as 8 per cent with no schooling, 26 per cent with only primary level schooling, 11 per cent of middle school level, 5 per cent of lise level, 33 per cent of technical and vocational level and 17 per cent with higher education. 28 A breakdown of the 47,000 civil

servants with higher education of the last group reveals that 13,000 are educationists, 7,000 lawyers, 5,000 social scientists and 4,500 medical and veterinary surgeons.

Closer study of the composition and the intergenerational mobility of the Public Service of Turkey, as Prof. Dodd and others, have pointed out, suggests 'that recruitment to the Turkish Public Service has become much less diversified during the past half century.' A generation of one-party government has inevitably entrenched bureaucracy into the rigidity which characterised the Ottoman administration. Yet there is little doubt that both Civil and Military bureaucrats remain strict adherents of Ataturk's ideals of modernization.

6.2.2. Modernization of the Economy and Industrialisation

The Ottoman economy was mainly agricultural: its industry consisted of only some 269 machinal establishments with a labour force of 17,000. There were 76 establishments for the food industry and 75 for textile, and other small scale concerns such as pottery, tanning, furniture, printing, paper and chemical products. During the War of National Independence, the Turkish economy suffered heavily. The Treaty of Lausanne, with its mass transfer of populations, assignment of the Mosul oil area to Iraq, and other requirements added to the economic rupture of the new State; but, the Treaty also opened up immense possibilities for planning and development by removing all outside controls from Turkey.

The Republic was immediately faced with the problems of the lack of capital and trained personnel necessary for economic

29. ibid. pp.283
30. ibid.
31. Industrial Census of 1913, quoted in Herschlag. op. cit. p.61
32. For the full Economic implications of the Treaty of Lausanne, see Herschlag. op. cit. Chapter 2, pp.16-30.
readjustment, and industrial growth. Political circumstances
prevented foreign capital from flowing in, while internal capital was
scanty. Modernization of the economy and the society in general were
interlinked problems. Basic changes had to be made and decisions of
great magnitude had to be taken. Atatürk's policies started with the
declaration of 'Atatüse' (statism) aimed chiefly at the development
of the heavy industry. His opening of the Iz Bank in 1927 for loans,
and the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, helped the country to
make headway. Due largely to these radical policies, the per capita
income of Turkey rose from 73 T.L in 1927 to 95 T.L in 1939. But
the economic development in Turkey, over a period of a quarter of a
century, had lacked co-ordination of the manifold factors necessary
for a modern, self-regulating industrial economy. This was brought
home to the Turkish government in 1951 by the Mission of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In its report
the Mission, for example, asserted that, eager to industrialise on
the model of the Western nations and to raise national prestige and
the standard of living, the Turkish Government 'underestimated
the important relationship of agricultural development and
industrialisation.' The Mission further spotlighted the
ambitiousness of the industrialising zeal shown by Turkey in the
introduction of various prestigious industrial projects for which there
was no real need or skill available. These, the Mission pointed out,
included the airplane engine factory, the rayon industry and the
woollen textile industry. Among other things, the Mission outlined
the following as the main problems of Turkish economy and industry:

1. The low level of real increase severely limited the amount
   of resources available for investment.

2. Industrial development has been over emphasized at the
   expense of agriculture.

33. Herschlag, op. cit. Table XXV. p.164
34. Report of a Mission Sponsored by the International Bank for
    Reconstruction and Development, entitled, The Economy of Turkey
35. Ibid. p.46.
3. Turkey has had no adequate mechanism to guide investment into the most appropriate fields.

4. Government fiscal policies have obstructed the free circulation and growth of purchasing power.

5. The development of human productivity and efficiency has not kept pace with the growing requirements of government administration and of industrial growth. 36

Though the etatism of the 1930s and 1940s did contribute a great deal to lifting the Turkish economy from the debris of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and, according to Prof. Herschlag, "laid the foundations for progress in the social and economic spheres", it was only an emergency measure. It helped the economy to develop in the initial stages by providing 'public overheads'. It also helped slightly to improve the conditions of the overwhelming peasant majority. But it also curbed entrepreneurship, thus making the State, as the Democratic Party Programme declared, 'interventionist, capitalistic, bureaucratic and monopolistic and paralysing business and productive life'. 37 It was not until the 1950s, when the Democratic Party introduced liberalism and encouraged free enterprise, that the economy began to move ahead. The policy of etatism, however, has remained the 'bone of contention' between the Democratic and the Republican parties until today.

In the second phase, Turkey has so far had two five-year development plans: the first, 1963-67, and the second 1968-72. The first plan aimed at a 7 per cent annual growth. The actual annual growth between 1963-67 was 6.8 per cent, accompanied by a population increase of 2.8 per cent. 38 The second plan also set a target of 7 per cent annual growth with an aggregate growth, for the whole period, of 24 per cent. Prof. Herschlag maintained that these targets of the second plan could only be reached if agriculture grew annually at

36. HERSHLAG, op. cit. p.46
37. ibid. p.187
4.1 per cent, industry at 12 per cent and the rest of the economy at about 6.5 per cent. In 1970, the government devalued the Turkish pound by 66.6 per cent, which has led to some strides in the economic growth. The Agricultural sector has recorded an annual growth rate of 9.5 per cent in 1971. The industrial sector, however, fluctuated by 10 per cent between 1965-69, falling to 2.5 per cent in 1970 and rising again to 8.7 per cent in 1971.40

In 1971, 66 per cent of the manpower was still engaged in agriculture, providing for 28 per cent of the national income as compared with 11 per cent in industry which accounted for 23 per cent of the national income.41 The 1963 agreement with the O.E.C.D. countries which allowed Turkey some tariff reductions on the main agricultural exports to the Common Market countries, as well as the credit facilities granted by the Consortium for Aid to Turkey (of the O.E.C.D.) has helped Turkey to set some higher targets in its Third Development Plan of 1973-77, by which it aims at reducing the agricultural share of the manpower from 66 per cent to 20 per cent, while raising the manpower in industry to 22 per cent. These ambitious targets mean, as McDermott concludes, "that Turkey will have to cover in 20 years the distance which took Western Europe 100-150 years."42

6.2.3. Social Modernization

Demographic Features (Population)

The population of Turkey, according to the 1927 Census, was 13.6 million of which 24 per cent was urban and 76 per cent rural. After that it increased at an accelerating rate of about 3 per cent per year until 1960, when it was calculated to be 27.8 million, i.e. an overall increase of 104 per cent. Excepting the War years, the

39. ibid.
41. Anthony McDermott, op. cit.
42. ibid.
annual rate of increase has always been high, while after the
war it assumed an even greater pace of increase than ever. Since
1960, however, largely due to the migration of a considerable number
of workers to Western European countries, there has been a
noticeable decrease in the population growth.

The early legislation passed in 1930, tended for some odd
reasons, to put restraints on any attempt at family planning.
Consequent to these legislative provisions, when the population
growth reached an alarming magnitude, the First Five Year Development
Plan considered population planning as highly vital for development.
It emphasized that all previous laws prohibiting the spreading of
knowledge about contraceptives, and the import and sale of
contraceptives, should be repealed, and that personnel such as doctors,
nurses, midwives, etc. employed in the Public Health Service should
be given education in population planning. It also recommended the
import of contraceptives at low prices from abroad and their free
distribution among the needy. In 1965, the Turkish government
accepted help from the United States to combat the rising pace of
population growth, which had by then reached 31 million.

A breakdown of the age group in 1965, showed that the
percentage of the 1-14 age group within the total population rose as a
consequence of the high fertility rate. In 1945, it stood at 42 per
cent as compared with about 25-30 per cent of the developed countries.
The Second Five Year Plan envisaged a fall in fertility rate and
estimated the population to grow at medium rate, from 31 million
in 1965 to 35 million in 1970, 40.5 million by 1974 and 52 million

43. First Five Year Development Plan, pp.60-61., also Richard D.
ROBINSON, High Level Manpower in Economic Development, The
44. ibid.
45. First Five Year Plan, p.65.
by 1985. The actual population, according to the 1970 census, has been calculated as 35.6 million, which is barely more than the estimate. According to the Second Plan estimates the ratio of 1-14 age group was to come down from 42 per cent to 38.7 per cent. This ratio meant that about 15-18 million children of the compulsory education age would inhabit Turkey in 1970s.

Marriage and Family Structure.

Some changes in the family structure and marriage customs had been attempted even in the Ottoman rule before the Republic. In 1920, for example, the minimum marriage age was fixed at 17 years instead of the previously existing 12 years. Similarly Nikah (the marriage contract) was required to be signed and registered at a court instead of privately. Polygamy and easy, capricious divorce practices were made difficult by the imposition of certain preconditions. But, all these innovations were rescinded by Sultan Vaheditin in 1921, because of the adjustment problems and the protests made to him.

The Civil Code adopted by the Republic in 1926, uncompromisingly prohibited polygamy and laid down equality between man and woman by law, although, the husband's permission was still considered necessary in certain matters. The Code made registration of marriages obligatory both in the Municipal records and on the identity papers of the parties. It fixed the marriage age at 18. Parity was also granted by law to both man and woman in divorce if either could prove valid grounds as described by law such as adultery, desertion,

46. An astounding feature of the population growth in Turkey has been that even Parliamentary deputies still have exceptionally larger families. Nicholas LUDINGTON records that Abdul Bakir Ozman, deputy from Mardin has 15 children, Hasan Deger, deputy from Diyarbakher has 13 and Kinyas Kartal from Van Las has 10. See Turkey, The Times, London, September 15, 1971.

47. A. APERTIRIAN, The Emancipation of Turkish Women, UNESCO 1962, pp.50-5.
insecurity, cruelty, criminal actions, offensive behaviour or incompatibility existed. Then, in 1930, the Parliament passed the Electorate Law giving Turkish women the right to vote.

At present, excepting in the remote rural areas where old practices still prevail, women in Turkey are generally emancipated, though they still have a long way to go, as Prof. Sadi Irinck has pointed out, "to achieve the necessary social and intellectual standing". This emancipation is clearly visible in matters of economic freedom for 19 per cent of all Civil Servants in Turkey are women. Of these, the young are particularly increasing their participation in the civil service and other occupations which makes it necessary for the educational system to provide opportunities for vocational training.

Ecological Features: Urbanization

Urban population in Turkey has been constantly rising since the dawn of the modern era. In 1927, the share of the urban population was estimated as 16.4 per cent rising to about 20 per cent in 1950. But during the 1950s and after, with a rapid acceleration of industrialisation, urbanization has risen sharply. According to Robinson's study, 'the annual flow may now be 3 per cent of the rural population which means that the latter has reached a plateau'. In 1960, the urban population of Turkey was 28.7 per cent while in 1965, it was found to be 30 per cent. With this rising trend of movement to the cities, the Second Five Year Plan has estimated that within the next twenty years the population of the cities would reach 25-30 million, and as much as half of the total population of 55 million would live in cities. This is an alarming rate of geographical mobility whose economic, social and educational implications are obvious.

48. ibid. pp.51-53. also Selma EKREM, Turkey, Old and New, Charles Scribner, N.Y. 1947 pp.67-82
49. A. AFETIRAN, op. cit. p.59 also N. EKREM, op. cit. p.182
50. C. H. DODD, op. cit. p.282
51. ibid.
52. R. D. ROBINSON, op. cit. pp.25-27
53. Second Five Year Plan. p.293
54. ibid.p.295
6.3.1. **Inputs into the Educational System**

**Normative Inputs**

Modern man, modern society cannot progress, cannot even defend its existence, without planned, methodical, systematic and continuous education.

(Turkish National Commission on Education)

In accordance with the objectives of his Revolution, Ataturk started his educational modernization in 1924 by abolishing, at a single stroke, the Madrassah system and incorporating the Madrassahs and the Kuttabs into the secular national system under the Ministry of Education. Along with the Islamic Madrassahs was also abolished the office of the Shaikh-ul-Islam. In this way the dichotomy between the religious and the secular education and multiplicity of control by different authorities was removed. In 1928, the religious clause stating that the religion of the State was Islam, was abolished from the Constitution. This led to the abolition in 1935 of all teaching of religion in the public schools, and in 1932, to the closure of the Imam Hatib schools originally created by the Republic for the training of the Ulama. The old Suleymaniya Madrassah which had been reconstituted as the Faculty of Divinity in the University of Istanbul was likewise abolished in 1930 on the recommendations of its own alumni, a Committee headed by Prof. Koprulu. During the nine years of its existence, the number of students at the Faculty had decreased from 284 in 1924-5 to 20 in 1930.

In 1928, Ghazi Ataturk embarked upon yet another role of educational modernizer, declaring himself as the first 'schoolmaster' of the nation by carrying the blackboard and easel from village to village and imparting lessons in the spelling of the Latin script which

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55. LEWIS, Emergence, p.407
57. LEWIS, ibid. p.409
58. ibid. also Maynard. op. cit. pp.71-3.
was adopted to replace the Arabic and Persian scripts. To make Turkish a fully modern language, the Ghazi ordered, in 1932, the formation of the Turkish Linguistic Society to evaluate the means which could "bring out the genuine beauty and richness of the Turkish language and to elaborate it to the high rank it deserves among world languages." In his six-day marathon speech 'Message to Youth' before the Grand National Assembly in 1927, Ataturk dwelt upon mainly on the reconstruction of the Turkish nation on the basis of modernity with a modern education as its most powerful vehicle.

Then ensued the series of investigations and expert advice by various educational Commissions, headed by prominent educationalists, some of international repute, who were invited to deliberate and recommend the most suitable means of creating a modern national education system.

1. The Izmir Economic Conference and Education

In 1923, the Izmir Congress was convened to devise a new economic policy for the Republic. It gave special importance to agriculture and the development of agricultural education. Among other things, the Congress recommended steps:

- to introduce practical industrial and agricultural courses in all primary and secondary schools;
- to establish in every district of the country boarding schools that would serve neighbouring villages;
- to establish a national agricultural college near Ankara;
- to provide each primary school with a plot of land, a stable with animals, flower garden, a vegetable and fruit orchard with a residential teacher.

59. Selma EKRAM, Turkey, Old and New, Charles Scribner's, N.Y. 1947, Chapter IV. "A Nation Goes to School", also LEWIS, The Emergence, pp.419-430., and U. HEYD, Language Reform in Modern Turkey.
60. LEWIS . p.427
2. The John Dewey Report

In 1924, the Turkish government invited Prof. John Dewey, the most eminent progressive educationalist of the time, to visit Turkey and to give advice on the development of a modern education system. What prompted the Turkish government to seek Prof. Dewey's advice was, over and above his progressiveness and pragmatism, the highly successful experience the Professor had had in China. Dewey presented two reports to the government after touring the country and inquiring into the educational needs of Turkey.

Paradoxically enough, Dewey sounded a note of caution about the hasty engrafting of imported ideas and systems into the Turkish society, and insisted that the country's own educational experts should undertake extensive studies of the problems and formulate realistic plans. The existing educational system, he advised, should be allowed to function in the meantime. Among the various problems that he suggested be investigated by expert Commissions were: school buildings, teacher-training, educational administration, publication of educational literature, libraries and the role of schools for agricultural development. He wanted educational planning to be based upon economic, demographic and educational surveys.

He strongly recommended that in villages, primary and secondary schools should function as centres of community development, by being a meeting place for the village people, by being health centres for the area and even by being the agencies for the compilation of economic, agricultural and demographic statistics. Professor Dewey also proposed that local government councillors should join teachers in paying visits to the neighbouring Western European countries and in participating in the educational activities of the area on the model
of Denmark's folk schools.

3. The Kuhne Report

In their quest for a viable educational system for Turkey, the Government invited another foreign expert - the famous German educationalist, Kerstensteiner to advise on the question. Kerstensteiner was indisposed at the time, and so, his assistant, Dr. Kuhne, conducted the study. He mostly concerned himself with the school curricula. In his report, Dr. Kuhne recommended the abolition of the Arabic script and the adoption of the Latin characters. He advocated that the increase of educational facilities be provided for the Turkish girls, especially in household subjects. He also recommended the expansion of vocational schools to train skilled craftsmen and women in the trades and industries existing in the area concerned so as to meet the demands of an expanding national economy. Like Dewey, Kuhne also emphasized the need to raise the teachers' social and economic status in order that they become more competent and productive. He noticed that few students were entering into tertiary education, and to offset this imbalance, he recommended a rapid increase in the number of secondary schools. Dr. Kuhne particularly stressed that Turkey should place greater reliance in the German educational system, and on the findings of educational research done in Germany.

4. The Omar Buyse Report

Dr. Buyse, the Director General of Technical and Vocational Education in Belgium, was invited in 1927 to advise on the best ways of promoting technical education. Buyse conducted a statistical survey

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of all the existing crafts and industries and the total available labour force as well as the future manpower requirements in agricultural, commercial and industrial enterprises. Dr. Buyse was critical of the persisting demand among the Turkish intellectuals for a literary education. He advocated that an elaborate system of technical education be set up in the country, supported largely by the industries. One way of doing that, he suggested, was to make foremen working in a particular industry teach their particular technology in the local technical school. He also proposed that the national Armed Forces should work for the educational development.

5. The Kemerrer Group Report

In 1933, a group of American experts headed by W. E. Kemerrer were invited to advise on the economic development of Turkey. The Group viewed education as an integral part of national economic development, and disapproved of all the previous Commission Reports for their treatment of the subject in isolation. In order for the Turkish National education to bolster the national economy, the Group recommended four main training programmes:

- the training of 1) farmers and agricultural experts;
- 2) engineers and technicians;
- 3) industrial workers; and
- 4) businessmen and traders.

The Group were severally critical of the existing three-year elementary education programme and called for its immediate extension to five years. In villages where secondary education was scanty, the Group recommended that at least bright children must be provided with secondary school education. The Group also questioned the value of sending Turkish students to study agriculture to countries like France and Germany, where agricultural problems differed from those of Turkey.

65. BASCOG and WILSON, op. cit. pp. 70-72.
The Turkish Commission on Education

In July, 1960, Prof. Fehmi Yavuz, Minister of Education, promulgated the Report of the National Commission on Education which was headed by Prof. Fahir Iz. The Commission had been composed on the recommendations of the Ford Foundation Educational Consultant Committee in January, 1957 which looked into the subject of teachers' training in Turkey, and recommended that "it was desirable to study Turkish education as a whole". The Commission spent a year in touring the country, visiting educational institutions of all types, discussing matters with teachers, Principals, Rectors of Universities, administrators as well as parents and public representatives. It also went on study tours of Japan, the U.S.A., France, England, West Germany and Italy to examine the modern educational systems of these countries. In its report, the Commission declared the aim of National Education in Turkey:

"Our aims in educational and instructional life will be defined in accordance with the historical necessity for the Turkish nation to incline to the West at all costs, but without severing itself from its Eastern roots. Relief from the crises of cultural transmission in which we find ourselves, and attaining national and social stability within the Turkish civilization of tomorrow, which will be created from the most valuable elements of the Eastern and Western Civilizations, necessitates energetic, zealous work. But for this national zeal to be successful it is essential that it is based on knowledge.... Therefore, all types of our educational institutions must above all strive to instill an attitude of industrious effort, and a sense of duty and responsibility. Furthermore, our educational institutions must create the scientific attitude so that the national energy produced by this sense of duty and responsibility may be fruitful. In this way, we shall have entered, as a nation, upon the real road to science, the true guide, and shall have marched with sure steps towards that success which we must win: the ideal of a great Turkey." 66

6.3.2. Political Inputs

True to their unswerving zeal for modernity and a conformity with their adopted model of complete Westernization as the best mode for modernization, Ataturk and his successors in the Republican Party were committed to a total metamorphosis of the social structure in the new State of Turkey. Their dominant motive seems to have been the creation of a new elite who held effective power in administration. This class was to be the product of selective institutions of the Lycees and the Universities. Since the early Republican, one-party government, itself was highly centralised and city-orientated, its upholders were also trained in the educational institutions located in cities. Of these, the Lycees and the Universities, particularly the faculties of Arts and Political Science were monopolised by the upper ruling class and the professionals. A degree in the Political Science Faculty of the Universities of Istanbul and Ankara ranked highest among the priorities of the modernist elites. According to the OECD Study, in 1962, 'half the total enrolled had fathers who were civil servants, while 19 per cent had parents with a professional background. Thus, nearly 70 per cent of those accepted for the faculty come from upper reaches of the Turkish social pyramid -- senior members of the faculty contend that this proportion has grown rather than declined in recent years.' The 'esnaf' (technicians) class accounted for only 9 per cent in 1962. Labourers' and farmers' sons accounted for only 6 per cent. Another 7 per cent of the newly enrolled students had fathers in commerce. 67

University education was therefore, the demand mainly of the modernists and its diffusion among a cross section of society did not start until after the 1950s, when liberalism was introduced into politics. Later the Democrats who came to power on the popular vote,

were determined to reverse this monopolizing of status, power and education by a self-perpetuating urbanite elite class. Their policies were devoted to the diffusion of enlightenment to the whole country and particularly in "improving the lot of those whom the Republicans had suppressed or ignored". Since the 1950s, with a rapid and more evenly spread industry and commerce, with increased pace of construction of the infra structure and enlargement of the services sector, the prestige of bureaucratic career, and with it the Academic education seem decreasing. Technologists and scientific experts are becoming more in demand at the higher level. Higher education is, therefore on the increase than before but its orientations are changing.

According to the 1960 Census of Population, the number of Class A manpower was about 199,000 or 2-6% of the total manpower. The Second Five-year plan, basing its target on the Manpower Study of 1962-67 estimated that by 1977, it would increase to 5.9 per cent, i.e. an extra 265,000 Class A personnel, comprising an increase of 34,000 engineers and architects, 18,000 doctors and dentists, 57,000 university and secondary school teachers, and 96,000 administrators and executives, would be needed by the year 1977. Considering Higher education as the standard qualification for Class A personnel, about 50 per cent of the existing stock were not qualified. To meet the additional demand of Class A personnel, it was considered that higher education must increase new enrollments from 31,400 in the period from 1963/67 to about 58,900 in the five years of the plan period. Since the total graduate output was estimated to be 272,000 by the year 1977, it was further required that, in the aggregate, the enrollments should

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68. RIVIKIN, Area Development for National Growth, The Turkish Perspective. op. cit. p.95.
69. OECD. Report. op. cit. p.40
increase from 75,000 in 1963 to 248,000 in 1977. The most acutely needed expansion was needed in the scientific, technological and educational fields.

6.3.3. Economic Inputs (Technical and Skilled Manpower)

The Manpower Study revealed that requirements for Technical, Class B personnel by 1977 would be 528,000; while skilled Class C workers will be 4,680,000. The existing capacity of the educational system was able to supply only 258,000 Class B and 1,754,000 Class C personnel. It was highly urgent therefore to raise the capacity of the educational system at junior high school and senior high school levels including technical and vocational schooling.

Considering the shortage of teachers, and the inadequacy of buildings it was realised that the capacity of schooling at these levels could not be increased as proposed. Consequently, the projected expansion had to be restricted.

6.3.4. Social Inputs

Social mobility has increased since the emergence in the 1950s of a multi-party participative nature of polity and greater economic development. The neglected villagers who clung to their traditional ways as a result of one-party city-centred modernization have come to participate in the educational system at a greater rate than ever before. The changed policy in the agricultural sector has also helped the peasants to be more mobile and economically strong. To stress the new mood, the OECD Report observes:

"As a concomitant to the rise of political parties in the 1950s, the teacher in the village lost the authority with which he had been vested before 1950 as a representative of the modernising ideology of the State. While his status dropped, that of the local party official - usually an 'ignorant' peasant rose." 71

70. OECD. Study. pp. 49-53
The study further asserts that the villager's attitude to education and mobility does not necessarily depend upon his religious affinities or his ecological situation, but on the practical difficulties that he faces e.g. the compulsion to employ children on the field and sending his children to primary school. On the whole it has been established that the villages in the Eastern Provinces are more economically backward, and so unappreciative of education than those in the Western Provinces.

With growing exposure to urbanization, however, geographical mobility has set in giving rise to an increasing demand for literacy. Kazamias study reveals that great variations still exist between the North-Western and the Southern and Eastern provinces in terms of literacy. Whereas, the Istanbul province shows a literacy rate of 73.4 per cent of the population of 6 years and over, the far-off province of Hakkari has only 11.5 per cent literacy for the same age group. Kazamias further observes, that since 1955, only sixteen provinces out of the 67 provinces have shown increase in literacy and that the increase has been 'quite insignificant'.

6.3.5. Cultural Inputs

National Integrative Culture

The Turkish concept of modernization, based on the overthrow of all religious institutions and symbols envisaged the creation of national integration on the basis of purely nationalistic ideology. The existing bonds of unity based on Islam, its linguistic media of Arabic and Persian, and life styles, were all swept away. All loyalties of the nation had from then on to be exclusively given to the Turkish nation, its language which was Romanized, and its history which

73. ibid.
eschewed its great Ottoman past.

With these abrupt reorientations, Turkish national education was required to provide socialization into a new nationalistic ideology with a greater emphasis on the national Turkish language and the Turkish history and with distorted focus on the ethnic background of the Turks. It is interesting to note that under the impress of these orientations, some extraordinary notions of the history of the Turkish race and its glories, its contributions to the world, both in the East and the West, were invented. 74

But the most crucial strand of Turkish nationalism, both as an integrative symbol and an innovative ideology, was secularism, which demanded that schools and the national educational system should inculcate values associated with rational, scientific and modern outlooks.

Innovative Culture.

The declaration of a secularisation-westernization ideology was in itself not enough. In order to keep the innovative culture an ongoing concern, the whole emphasis of the social system, particularly its culture and personality systems, had to be dedicated to 'a scientific and rational approach to life'. 75

Thus, Turkish nationalism as an ideological force for modernization demanded that its educational system should be devoted to the understanding, investigation and promotion of the scientific culture. But until 1960, little or nothing had been done towards this end. The Report of the Turkish National Commission on Education (1960) commented on this failure of the educational system as below:

"Although it was recognized that this technical skill that Turkey wished to adopt from the West was based on Western science, it can be

75. ibid. p.265.
said that, up to the present day, none of the Islamic countries have properly understood what Western science actually is. The scientific and technical form; it has been diverted onto the road of imitation and has been unable to start out on the road of creation. Atatürk's dictum 'The truest guide in life is science', although respected as a great saying, had remained a mere literary text, like a decoration on the university walls, and has not seen much enthusiasm in practice. In fact in Turkey and the other Islamic countries new measures arising out of personal experiences and abstract logic have frequently been adopted in recent times, and no need has been seen for scientific research or for waiting for its results". 76

6.4.

Within Educational System Processes
of Modernization

6.4.1. Structural and Functional Modernization

The Republic inherited from the Ottoman Republic an illiterate population and an educational system limited in size, structure and function. In 1923, 98 per cent of the villages in Turkey were without any educational facilities and 90 per cent of the population were illiterate. There were some 4,900 primary schools, 72 middle schools and 23 lycees in the country. 77 According to the Acts of 1910 and 1913, all public schools, other than the Madrassahs, were financed by the Central Government Treasury and local taxation (compulsory educational tax). 78

But the War of Independence completely shattered the local financing system and this resulted in the closure or decline of a great many schools. Between 1923 and 1926, the Revolutionary government continued to search for expert advice on the future organisation and development of the inherited system into a viable modern system, suited to the new Turkey envisaged by Atatürk's modernization ideals.

The year 1926–27 marked the start of the re-organization of the structure of the educational system by the Ministry of Education.

76. The Report of the Turkish National Commission on Education, op. cit. p.29
Re-organization Law (Maarif Teshkilatina Dair Kanun) which consolidated the Department of Training and Pedagogy (Talim ve Terbiye), the Department of School Construction, the Student Health Service and other sub-systems, into Regional Directorates of Education under the Central Ministry of Education which had been created in 1924. The Re-organization Law unified, for the first time in Turkey, a national educational system and removed the multiplicity of control by various authorities such as the Awkaf Organizations run by the Ulama and other private establishments.

Administrative Modernization

Following the general pattern of its cultural borrowing, the administrative structure of the Turkish educational system has also emulated the French model more than any other European country in spite of strong exhortation from the German educationalist, Dr. Kuhne, to rely heavily on German experts and to follow Germany's example.\textsuperscript{79}

Before the one-party rule was introduced in Turkey, democratic participation in policy making in education at the local level was allowed, and local councillors and community leaders were relied on to participate in modern educational organizations. In cities, for example, councils with local religious leaders and laymen were required, by article 27 of the Re-organization Act to participate in the local Boards of elementary education. But during the eight years that their participation was enlisted, the Government continued to be inundated with complaints of educational mismanagement. The majority of the community leaders were themselves educated in the traditional Madrassahs and were opposed to the new concepts and methods, and were not really used to providing a responsible and creative leadership in educational matters. Criticising their corrupt demeanour, the

\footnote{79. BASCOZ and WILSON. op. cit. p.68}
Minister of Education in 1927 remarked:

"How can we possibly imagine that these local notables and landlords, these men of influence who take away all that the peasant produces with the sweat of his brow and his labour without spending any effort themselves, will sincerely work toward providing education for the people. The consideration and discussion of our primary education by these persons brings nothing but grief to the nation....." 80

With the introduction of centralization of administration in general, educational administration has been also highly centralized. The National Ministry of Education controls all the educational establishments, public and private, and all policies are formulated by the Minister. Community interest is, however, represented at the national level by the Convention of National Education Called Shura which is a legal entity that advises the Minister on all matters related to education. Various private and public institutions are represented on the Shura which meets every four years and makes suggestions to the Minister.

To advise the Minister on managerial side of educational policy there is the Board of Education which is concerned with the specialised aspects of educational policy such as curricula, textbooks, examinations and the like. The Board is a permanent organization and its members are appointed by the Minister. None of these advisory bodies, neither the Convention or the Board, has any executive authority. Their recruitment, too, is entirely at the discretion of the Minister and their suggestions also require his approval before they become a policy at all. 81

In the technical aspect of national policy formulation, the Minister is assisted by the two Secretariats of the Ministry, one for the general education and the other for technical and vocational

80. ibid. p.103.
education. Both secretariats are further assisted by the various specialist departments such as higher education, elementary, secondary and adult education and private schools, health, libraries, museums, etc. 82

Local Level Administration

In 1949, a certain amount of decentralization was introduced into the educational administration when the Provincial Valis were nominally made responsible for all education within their jurisdiction. In theory, the Vali is assisted in the educational administration by an Advisory Commission and by the Regional Directorate of Education which implements policies. In practice, however, all policies are directly handed down from the central Ministry of Education and faithfully implemented by the Maarif Muduru (the Regional Director). 83

Similarly, at the Kaza level, the Kaymakam is assisted by an Education Officer (maarif memuru) who is appointed by the Minister and who is responsible both to the Regional Director and the Minister, as well as to the Kaymakam. 84 But the Kaymakam, in fact, has no real say in the administration. The O.E.C.D., concluding the report on the question of democratisation of educational administration in Turkey, affirms:

"There is thus, little, if any involvement of the public in educational matters. The only public organization may be either the parent-teacher association, or some local temporary 'school building committee'; if the people build their school voluntarily without local funds. This may be one of the reasons why the public relations aspect of most of the educational innovations is often hanging fire." 85

82. O.E.C.D. Report. op. cit. p.102
83. A. M. KAZAMIAS, Education and the Quest for Modernity. pp.120-121.
84. ibid.
85. op. cit. p.102.
Organization of the Educational System

Although a rudimentary differentiation of the educational system into elementary, secondary and higher stages had taken shape in the pre-revolutionary Turkey, it was not until 1924 that an articulated network of a modern national system developed. In the first place, the Republican government drew a clear line between primary and secondary education. The hitherto six-year primary education course was reduced to five years and the secondary course from seven to six years. Secondary education was further differentiated into two stages: the middle and the high stage. The new type of middle school, called the Ortaokul, with a three-year programme was articulated with the three-year lise to form the new six-year secondary schooling. A network of technical, vocational and agricultural schools in place of the different kinds of trade schools, was instituted under a central organization. Female education was given special priority, and co-education was legalised first at the Universities and then at other levels. The modernised structure of the system now consists of: 5-3-3-6 years.

Primary Stage

Starting at 7 and ending at 11+, the primary stage is the only compulsory stage. Attendance at primary school is compulsory by law. But compulsory attendance in the remote eastern villages is difficult to ensure. A peculiar feature of compulsory education is that the 7-11 age limit is extended to 14, or even 17, in the case of failures.

86. KAZAMIAS. op. cit. pp.121-122.
87. ibid.
88. OECD Report. 9.76.
The types of primary schools vary from multi-shift schools in the cities to single-teacher, single-classroom schools in the villages. Moreover, to enlist the children of the sparsely populated and remote areas of the country, there are the Regional boarding schools and mobile schools which reach out to the very remote settlements. Regional boarding schools are separately organised for girls and boys.

Secondary education

The Orta

Ortaokul for the 12-14 age group is, in the main, a preparatory stage for the higher stages of the lycée (Lise in Turkish) and the university. But, built into it are also vocational and technical schools, enabling school-leavers to enter the labour market as skilled labourers. Such schools include technical, agricultural, health and a variety of vocational schools. The students of these vocational and technical ortaokuls have also the choice to take admission into Higher Secondary level technical or vocational institutes. But an overwhelming majority of parents seems to prefer their sons to remain in the general ortaokuls and leave specialisation until after the orta. 89

The Lise

Lises again are differentiated into general and technical-vocational. General lises are further divided into scientific and literary depending on the faculty the students wish to enter at the university.

Industrial lises include boys' school for the building trade, motor mechanics, textiles, printing, railways, industrial training centres and some multipurpose technical institutes. Vocational lises

include the commercial institutes, schools for training for hotel work and for tourism, finance schools, school of meteorology, schools of surveying, the police schools, secretarial schools, agricultural institutes, health schools; some are co-educational, others for girls separately. The idea of comprehensive schools has often been mooted by the Shura, but little progress has been made. Turkish educationalists seem not to interfere with the supremacy of the general lise as an elitist institution.

Higher Education

The only modern Turkish institute of higher learning, opened in 1900, the Dar-al Funun (House of Sciences), remained restricted to its original three faculties of Theology, Mathematics and Literature until 1908, when schools of Law and Medicine were also incorporated into it. The Republic raised it to the standard of a modern university and gave it autonomous status.

At present there are seven universities, and numerous colleges and institutes for higher education. The universities include over 30 faculties. All the institutions of higher education are teaching institutions, while Universities and other Research Establishments also conduct research. They all cater for the 18-22 age group, although advanced studies extend to the ages of 26-28. All institutions of higher education are, as a rule, co-educational, but, as the O.E.C.D. Study points out, two-thirds of the women students enter the social science and arts faculties.

90. ibid. p.81
91. ibid. p.82
92. ibid.
93. ibid. p.82
Teacher Training

Before 1923, the majority of elementary and secondary school teachers had no professional standing. Anyone who could open a school and teach, with only a primary school certificate to his credit, became a primary school teacher. "In fact," remarks Sassani, "very few people in the country believed that teaching is an art, that it is something to be acquired, and that schoolmasters must be trained." 94

The Republic established the first modern teacher-training institute, the famous Ghazi Egitin Enstitusu, in Ankara mainly for secondary school teachers and inspectors. But the problem of teacher shortage was so acute that in 1927 it was found that the total output of all the training schools, colleges amounted to one-fifth of the demand. 95 As a solution, lycée graduates were employed to fill the vacancies. At the same time, the Education Minister, Mustafa Necati, launched a special plan aimed at raising the capacity of the small training schools to form ten larger institutes, with a target output of some 2,000 to 3,000 teachers a year. Ten per cent of the provincial education budget was specially earmarked for the project, which it was hoped would be highly effective. But, due to the financial difficulties of the 1930s, and the death of the Minister, the plan could not take effect. Subsequently, the Ministry of Education established the Higher Teachers' Training College, the Ghazi Pedagogic Institute, the Belikesir Teacher-Training School, the Necati Pedagogic Institute, the Istanbul Physical Education Teachers' School and the Hasanogla Village Teachers' Institute. Between 1944 and 1947, two more training schools were established, in Balikesir and Edirne, especially to meet the increasing demand for the Ortaokuls and the technical Ortaokul teachers. 96

95. BASGOZ and WILSON. op. cit. pp.130-31.
96. BASGOZ and WILSON. op. cit. p.184.
The contemporary organization of teachers' education includes Primary-Teacher training schools, and Higher Teacher-Training schools. Higher Teacher-Training schools are of three types: the General Higher Teacher-Training Schools, the Technical-Teacher Training Schools; and the Education Institutes.97

Private Enterprise in Education

In spite of Ataturk's policy of statism, private enterprise in education, mainly by foreign missions, was permitted to flourish, founded either by the local minority communities of Armenians, Greek and Jew, or by the foreign Missionary societies of America, Italy, France and Holland. These schools operated mainly in towns and cities; and provided instruction in foreign languages, such as English, French, German and Italian. They all charged handsome fees and eventually rose to be prestigious schools drawing their clientele from the rich or influential urban modernists. They paid attractive salaries to the local teachers, mostly women, who were happier to work in prestigious urban schools than to move around in villages.98

6.4.2. Expansion of the Capacity of the System

Pre-primary school stage

Pre-primary schooling at the mosques, mainly for the teaching of the Quran and Arabic, was prevalent in Ottoman Turkey, as in all Muslim countries. Secular infant schools, however, did not develop considerably until towards the end of the 1940s. In 1950, there were 52 Nursery, Kindergarten and Infant Schools with an enrollment of 1,760. Since then, however, pre-primary schooling seems to be

97. SASSANI. op. cit. pp.47-48
becoming more popular and a steady expansion in it can be gleaned from the table below:

Table VI.1.
Expansion in the Pre-Primary Schools 1950-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Institutions</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>3,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>4,054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks 1965-70.

Primary Stage

Two major factors, the Latinization of Turkish language and the shortage of teachers, affected the expansion of all schooling in the early years. The Republican government was very keen to raise the rate of literacy from the very low 10 per cent prevailing at the time of national independence. As educational vitality started, the number of schools increased, and more and more children were provided with schooling facilities. The new Regime put great faith in improving literacy for its utility value in building up a national consciousness and an empathetic capacity among the Turkish nation. The task was arduous, but happily Ataturk himself saw the rate of literacy doubled in his lifetime, though wide disparities still existed between the urban and rural, and the male and female population. High emphasis was placed on the expansion of primary education, and the gradual

99. The Turkish National Commission on Education (1960) strongly stressed the importance of opening pre-primary schools particularly in the industrialised areas but called for private enterprise under state support to take the initiative. pp.42-43.

100. KAZAMIAS, op. cit. p.174.
expansion since independence is shown in the table below:

Table VI.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Institutions</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>4,894</td>
<td>241,941 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>6,598</td>
<td>489,299 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>9,418</td>
<td>905,000 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>17,428</td>
<td>1,616,626 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>18,723</td>
<td>1,981,805 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>24,323</td>
<td>2,866,020 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>31,906</td>
<td>4,273,870 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>33,369</td>
<td>4,509,433 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>34,907</td>
<td>4,790,183 b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (a) BASGOZ and WILSON. (b) UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks 1965-70.

It appears, from the figures in the table above, that the effective take-off in the expansion did not start until the 1950s and then, when the fifteen years planning started to make impact, in the 1960s. The long-range planning set up a target to provide primary school education to 100 per cent of the school age population by 1972. According to this target, in 1967 the estimated enrollment at primary schools would be 87.9 per cent of the 4,736,000 children. The above table however, indicates that the actual enrollment in 1967 stood at 4,509,433, leaving a gap of about 230,000. Again, taking an estimated average annual increase of 251,000 in the enrollment, the total number of children attending primary schools in 1968 was supposed to be 4,987,000, but the actual enrollment was 4,790,000, leaving a shortfall of 197,000. The OECD Study estimated, on the basis of the Development Plan, that by 1972, all children of school age would be attending schools. 101

Secondary Education

Table 5 shows the expansion of enrollment capacity of all

101. OECD Report op. cit. p. 108
types of secondary schools from 1923-1968.

Table VI.5.
Secondary Education in Turkey 1923-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ORTA</th>
<th>LISE</th>
<th>VOCATIONAL</th>
<th>TEACHER TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>5,905</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>6,547</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>25,398</td>
<td>5,699</td>
<td>9,296</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>92,308</td>
<td>24,862</td>
<td>20,264</td>
<td>3,877 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>65,168</td>
<td>22,169</td>
<td>52,177</td>
<td>16,301 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>253,474</td>
<td>58,954</td>
<td>69,775</td>
<td>21,216 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>317,938</td>
<td>82,062</td>
<td>72,241</td>
<td>26,872 b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>755,671*</td>
<td>146,235</td>
<td>57,788 c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>849,533*</td>
<td>153,457</td>
<td>60,576 c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (a) BASGOZ and WILSON and KAZAMIAS (b) ibid. (c) UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks (*) indicates the total Second level enrollment.

Next to the task of socialisation in the modernization ideals, the new national consciousness and empathy - the Republican government and Ataturkism in general, were keen to see the new social order formed by the educational system. As an agency for social placement, secondary schooling was on the list of their priorities. Already the Lise had provided Turkey with the bulk of its modernist-secularist intelligentsia, and the new regime was naturally interested in its expansion and strengthening as an institution responsible for the creation of modernising leadership. But equally important was their desire to expand the capacity of the educational system to provide manpower demand and skills, without which the economy of the new order would not progress.

Until 1935, the increase in secondary schooling gradually increased, the Ortas growing more rapidly than the Lises. The Ministry of Education decided to open at least one Orta in every district.102 Although this was not possible until the 1950s, enrollment

102. KAZAMIAS, op. cit. p.160.
in all types of secondary schools had steadily expanded all through the 1940s. The Democratic party regime gave strong impetus to the expansion of education in general, and the number of secondary schools, particularly in the rural areas, multiplied dramatically. Between 1950-60, the number of the Ortas rose from 381 to 713, with an enrollment increase from 65,168 to 253,474; the number of Lises increased from 88 to 182, with their enrollment rising from 22,169 to 58,954, and the numbers of technical and vocational schools and enrollment exceeded those of the general Lises. The next rapid acceleration took place, though with occasional setbacks, under the impact of the various Development Plans after 1963. The total enrollment in the Ortas and Lises in 1962 stood at 400,000 and in the vocational schools at 72,241. By 1967, the end-year of the First Five-year Plan, it had increased to 755,671 and 146,235 respectively.103 The pace of expansion seems then to have been kept during the years ahead.

Another aspect of the expansion of secondary education to be gauged is the relative increase in the secondary general and technical and vocational enrollments. In 1963, the number of pupils in secondary general (Lise) formed 61.3 per cent of the over-all secondary enrollment. The long-range plans aimed to increase these numbers by 136 per cent by the year 1977, but the ratio of secondary general (Lise) enrollment decreased to 53.7 per cent. Correspondingly, the plans targeted to increase the enrollment in technical and vocational lises from 29,700 in 1963 to 1,8,600 in 1977: an increase of 266 per cent and an increase in the ratio from 38.7 per cent to 46.3 per cent.104

103. ibid. p.108
104. ibid.
Higher Education

The capacity of the Universities and institutions of higher education did not expand much until in the mid 1940s, when the students from the newly established secondary schools and lises made a greater demand for further education. University education in the early stages of the Republican regime was largely restricted to the education of the high political, administrative and aristocratic elite class. Again, the liberalisation of policy, after the single-party system ended, gave rise to greater participation by the rising generation of ambitious young men and young women to benefit from higher education. The Democratic Party's economic and development policies further helped to accelerate expansion. A gradual rise in enrollment at the higher level is shown in the table below:

Table VI.6
Enrollment at Higher Education Institutions  
1923-69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923-24</td>
<td>2,914</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>4,311</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-35</td>
<td>5,808</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>6,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-40</td>
<td>10,137</td>
<td>2,523</td>
<td>12,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-45</td>
<td>15,850</td>
<td>4,161</td>
<td>20,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>20,363</td>
<td>4,728</td>
<td>25,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>23,220</td>
<td>4,839</td>
<td>28,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>43,018</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>53,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>73,559</td>
<td>19,832</td>
<td>93,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>101,132</td>
<td>24,515</td>
<td>125,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>130,531</td>
<td>29,803</td>
<td>160,334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (a) BASGOZ and WILSON, p. Appendix  
(b) OECD Report 1965. Table 52  
(c) UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks.

A breakdown of the figures in Table VI.6 would indicate that, whereas enrollment in institutions of higher education increased about four times during the lifetime of Ghazi Ataturk, the capacity of higher education institutions expanded constantly during the next two decades, until after the First Five-year Plan in 1968. The Plan had linked the development of higher education with the manpower
demand and a far greater and diversified expansion particularly in technical, scientific and educational fields. Another significant increase has been in the enrollment of female students, which rose dramatically from 4,839 in 1955 to 10,466 in 1960 and then in the next five years to 19,832 to stand at 29,803 in 1969.

Faculty-wise increase in the expansion of higher education is shown in table [7] below:
**UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks.**

Source: *O&D Report*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Medicine and Health Sciences</th>
<th>Social Sciences</th>
<th>Humanities</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>16.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>16.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>15.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>14.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>14.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>13.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>13.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>11.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>11.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>10.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>10.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>9.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table VI.7*

Expansion of enrollment in the different faculties of higher education, 1974-1989.
The most noticeable increase in Turkish higher education seems to have been in the social sciences which as the OECD report asserts, has high prestigious value in Turkey.\textsuperscript{105} High on the list of priorities still ranks law, which seems to be particularly attractive for its traditional reputation of enabling lawyers to enter politics and bureaucracy or achieving independent professional status. Next to social sciences, the medical faculty has also registered a rapid increase, particularly since 1960. Scientific and technological studies have increased relatively more slowly than the social sciences. The slowest to grow is the agricultural faculty which, although offered at four universities: Ankara, İzmir, Erzurum and the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, does not provide enough motivation.

The pattern of growth and expansion in the higher education, therefore, does not follow the professional manpower demand.\textsuperscript{106} The influence of city-orientated, earlier policies of modernization seem still to weigh heavily with the youth whose ideal careers still remain to be the prestigious rather than the productive professions.\textsuperscript{107} The long-range planning targets, however, visualise the greatest increases in the medical and engineering faculties in the fifteen years of planning. The Five-year Plans forecast that in 1977, the number of students in medical faculties will increase to 45,000 while those in engineering will increase to 47,800. The least growth, depicted by the Plans, would be in agriculture where enrollment will increase only by 32,000. However, it was forecast that even this low rate of increase, will produce 14,000 professional agriculturalists in the fifteen years.\textsuperscript{108}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{105} ibid. 83.
\bibitem{106} ibid.
\bibitem{107} ibid.
\bibitem{108} ibid. p.118
\end{thebibliography}
6.5. **Educational Outputs - Inputs to the Society**

6.5.1. **Inputs to the Polity**

Consonant with the ideological thought of Zia Gokalp, the father of Turkish nationalism, Ataturk and his Republican Party envisaged the creation of their fleet of modernizing cities through the highly selective institutions of the Lise and the University. Gokalp advocated that the Lise should be an institution for the 'enlightened ... ruling class'.

In the Turkey of Ataturk and Ismet Inonu, therefore, all the graduate output of the Lises entered either civil or military bureaucracy, politics and, later, when the Political Science and Law faculties of the Universities of Ankara and Istanbul had grown in capacity, the majority of the modernising elites had come from them. Ataturk did not believe as Prof. Dodd has remarked, in an open, competitive polity. So, recruitment into his brand of modernising leadership had to be restrictive and closed.

The output of graduates from the Lises remained very limited and only a few Lises in the major cities of Ankara and Istanbul produced great numbers of leaders. As Kazamias points out, the famous Istanbul Erkek Lise was aptly nicknamed as the 'Ministers' School'. "It had been particularly outstanding" notes Kazamias "in the relatively large numbers not only of cabinet ministers, but also of high political personages who have received their secondary education in it".

In the same manner, the contribution of the Faculties of Political Science and Law in the formation of the top modernising leadership is evident from the following findings of a study conducted by Prof. Frey.

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111. ibid. p.214.
"In the general category of civil bureaucrats," maintains Frey,
many of whom had reached positions as deputys
and cabinet ministers during the First Turkish
Republic (1923-60), more than half had attended
the Political Science Faculty of Ankara
University, and 23 per cent, the Law Faculty.
Of the cabinet ministers during the same period,
from 50 to 75 per cent had attended these same
two faculties. It should also be noted that in
Turkey appointment to high civil service posts
(e.g. Valis and Kaymakams) presupposes attendance
at universities, especially at the aforementioned
two faculties. It is not surprising, therefore,
that 99 per cent of this branch of the civil
bureaucracy are graduates of the Political Science
and the Law Faculties of Ankara University". 112

In the 1950s, largely due to economic liberalisation and the
resultant acceleration in all-round development, a new class of
modernising leadership did emerge in the shape of entrepreneurs, economists
and bankers, who ventured into business and opened up a new avenue of
influence as against the dominating passion for career in administration. 113
The high prestige that administration enjoyed in the earlier times was no
longer there, and professional careers as well as business drew a
considerable share of the university output. The comparative share of
all the various faculties in the graduate output did improve
considerably over the decades. But the attraction of social sciences:
law, political science and education still dominated. 114 "Moreover, in a
country, such as Turkey," observe the authors of the OECD Report
where being an engineer has not - as yet - the implication of sulllying
one's hands with manual labour, but usually involves directive and
control duties, the role is seen as one of administrative rather than
physical activity. The same is true of architects, doctors and
pharmacists." 115 So even professional education is sought really for its

112. F. W. FREY, The Turkish Political Elite, Cambridge, Mass. quoted
in KAZAMIAS, Education and the Quest for Modernity, op. cit. p.214
113. OECD Report, pp.65-69
114. See Richard D. ROBINSON, High Level Manpower in EC Development -
The Turkish Case - p.60
115. OECD Report, p.69
bureaucratic prestige rather than for purely productive purposes.

The graduate output in all the faculties of the Universities and Institutions of Higher Education is shown in the table below:

Table VI.8.

The Output of Graduates with Faculties in Turkey
1923-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FACULTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arts and Fine Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>422 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>636 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>133 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (a) BASGOZ and WILSON, Appendix. (b) UNESCO Report. pp.154-159 (c) UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks.

Evidently, the largest increase in the output comes from the faculties of social sciences, which now include education and law. The 6,524 social science graduates in 1965 included 2,457 in Education and 816 in Law, and in 1968, among the 7,718 social scientists, 1,392 were educationists and 1,326 lawyers. The relatively smaller increase in the faculties of medicine and engineering indicates that the modernising leadership in Turkey still does not constitute technocrats but bureaucrats. The growing increase in the output of agriculturalists is, in view of the O.E.C.D. Report's observation above, yet another indication that the students from rural areas who had little or no chance of entering into the 'elite' faculties and social status, were also able, through the faculty of agriculture to obtain a degree and a bureaucratic position in the Ministry of Agriculture.
6.5.2. Outputs to the Economy

Manpower Supply

Judging by the graduate output of higher education and secondary schools, it is evident that the educational system has been acutely deficient in meeting the manpower demands estimated by the Fifteen-year projections. The Five-year development plans had, taking into account the present stock in 1963 and the projected expansion of the capacity of the educational system at all levels, visualised a considerable gap in the demand and supply. But judging by the figures available, it appears that, whereas new enrollment targets are being approached gradually, the graduate output by the end of the First Five-year Plan in 1967 fell much short of even the calculated supply target not to mention the actual manpower requirements. Tables VI.9 and VI.10 below, would bear out the shortfalls in the supply of graduates and school leavers in 1967.

Table VI.9.

Deficiencies in the Supply of High level Manpower
as Measured by the Graduates Output
1963-67 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Plan target</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in 1967)</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Output</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in 1967)</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (a) OECD Report, p.51 (b) UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks.

Class B and C Personnel

The First Five-year Plan had estimated that the capacity of secondary general and vocational education to supply the required number of Class B and C workers had to increase 427 per cent by the year 1977. It required the supply of 270,000 Class B and 3,330,000 Class C workers from an expanded education, over and above the supply of these categories of employment of the existing capacity. The actual supply included a degree of expansion in the capacity of secondary education by the end of
the First Plan year i.e. 1967. This can be seen from the table below:

Table VI.10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deficiencies in the Supply of Class B and C Workers as Measured by the Pupils in Secondary Schools (in thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Orta and Lise pupils in:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (a) OECD Report. (b) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1971.

Teacher Requirements

One of the main causes for educational lags and deficiencies in Turkey has been the growing shortage of teachers at all levels; a problem which has persisted ever since national independence. Two typical causes, i.e. economic and social, have been ascribed to the continuing failure of the educational system to produce and to maintain a viable teaching staff. Economically, the teachers' salary structure does not offer enough attraction for ambitious students to train themselves as teachers, and drop-out rate from the profession remains considerable. There are not enough inducements to attract teachers to work in the rural areas, since the contrasts and differences between the cities and villages in lifestyles and amenities are sharply distinguishable. Socially, a teacher's prestige is not very high, particularly in the villages where his influence as a moderniser is rather suspect. A village Hoja (religious teacher), despite his limited

116. Prof. KAZAMIAS has pointed out that "in conversation with several girls in urban lises, he was informed that, although girls liked teaching, they did not plan to enter the profession for several reasons, chief of which seemed to be that they felt they could not 'be safe' outside the big metropolitan centres; and even if they were prepared to take up an assignment away from these centres or from home, their parents would not allow them to do so. The possibility of being appointed or transferred to a remote town in Eastern Anatolia also seems to be a factor which discourages many young men from choosing teaching as a career." op. cit. p.157.
knowledge, still wields more authority in his surroundings than a government schoolteacher. Again, social prestige being the highest attraction for higher education generally, many trained teachers are prone to resigning their teaching career at the slightest chance of getting a more prestigious job. In 1962, the existing teaching force, in both the primary and secondary schools, was found to be extremely strained and over-burdened. The pupil-teacher ratio was among the highest in the world. A primary teacher had an average of 68 pupils (72 to each full-time teacher or 63 pupils, if assistant teachers were included); while a secondary teacher had 66 pupils on average.

The fifteen-year planning target was set at reducing these intolerable ratios to 40:1 in the primary school, 23:1 in the Orta, and 15:1 in the Lise. Considering this target and the expected expansion in the enrollment at these Levels, the Plan estimated that the educational system must produce 179,000 primary teachers during the fifteen year period and 49,900 secondary teachers. But the existing capacity of the educational system, taking into account the expansion envisaged, was quite inadequate to meet these targets. Considerable deficiencies in the overall supply were, therefore, inevitable. The table below shows the obvious shortfalls in the supply of teachers during these years.

117. ibid.
118. OECD Report, pp.108-123
119. ibid.
120. ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level and Year</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Supply</th>
<th>Deficiency</th>
<th>Pup:Teach.ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Teachers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>118.4</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>-50.3</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>149.8</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>-57.5</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>170.5</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>-56.1</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (Orta)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>-16.3</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>-12.7</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>-12.1</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (Lise)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education (General)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Medical/Technical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher-Training (Primary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.5.3. Outputs to Society

Enhancement of Empathy through Literacy

In spite of the constantly rising rate of literacy in Turkey since the national independence, as shown in the table below, close observers have asserted that the country as a whole still remains non-mobilized.

Table VI.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of literates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BASGOZ and WILSON, UNESCO Yearbooks.

Literacy in Turkey is calculated on the basis of the answer to a simple question "Can you read and write?" and, as Kazamiás points out, "Often a person who is able to scrawl his name is considered literate". The 49.0 per cent rate of literacy so measured sheds little light on the 'glaring disparities' that remain besetting the country in terms of urban-rural, male-female, and age-group divisions. The Kazamiás study reveals that the rate of deviation in literacy varies from 73.4 per cent in the province of Istanbul to only 11.5 per cent in the remote province of Hakkari. Again the national literacy rate according to the 1960 census showed 54.5 literate males as against 25.2 females. The same study maintains that during the five years period between 1955 and 1960,  

121. See A. M. KAZAMIAS, Education and the Quest for Modernity, pp.174-177.
122. ibid.
123. ibid.
There has been a decline in literacy from 48.7 per cent in 1955 to 43.3 per cent in 1960, in the most important age group of six to fourteen years.

These trends and failures of the Turkish educational effort towards modernization judged by the increase in literacy and by the creation among the illiterate masses of a high rate of empathy, so as to put them at par with the Western democratic nations, indicate that during the last forty or fifty years of its modernization, Turkey has remained highly deficient in attaining its set targets. Uneven progress remains evident; and it was not until the 1950s that Atatürk's modernization ideals began to affect the vast rural populations.

Rural Development through Education

The Turkish villager, in spite of the great revolutionary strides made in the city-world around him, still remains largely isolated and immobile. The dominating pattern of his culture is characterised by "exasperating vagueness instead of curiosity, superstition rather than knowledge that form the perceptive or cognitive qualities of life and surroundings that he lives in". 125

The outlook of the Turkish villager towards the education of his children is determined mostly, as the O.E.C.D. Report affirms, by the "barrier encountered in integrating the village personality with that required for success at school, as well as the absence of immediate motivation for literacy". 126 He could hardly afford to forego the petty income of his child earned either in domestic or agricultural labour. 127 Furthermore, the intangible rewards of literacy are not particularly appreciated by the traditional villager. The Kazamias study concludes that "it is not within the village pattern of behaviour to go into town

124. ibid.
125. D. LERNER, The Passing of the Traditional Society, op. cit. p.192
127. KAZAMIAS, op. cit. p.172.
for schooling. Normally, the village child graduates from a primary school in his or a neighbouring village and then reverts to the traditional pattern of village life. In village eyes, he is 'educated'. That is enough." 128

The problem of rural backwardness and ignorance among villagers deeply concerned Ataturk and his party during the formative period of their government. The famous dictum of Ataturk that 'the real owner and master of the country is the peasant' kept reverberating in all policy statements, speeches and press publications in the 1930s. 129 In 1929, the National Schools Law was passed to establish centres in villages to impart literacy in villages. These schools consisted of two courses: one for the beginners and the other for those who already knew how to read and write. In 1932, the National schools replaced the famous Turkish Hearth Clubs introduced by the Young Turks in the 1910s and 1920s as centres for the promotion of nationalistic consciousness. But the National Schools remained inadequate to fight the battle against colossal ignorance. The attendance of village children in schools remained extremely poor. The villager considered schools as irrelevant to his lifestyle and was more appreciative of the Imam, the Hoja (religious teacher) for his closer ties with the villager and his service to the community. As one observer noted,

"The teacher sent by the Ministry to the villages looks down on the villagers. He does not like children. Moreover, he wears clothes that are objectionable to the villagers. The village pupil cannot use the theoretical knowledge that the teacher gives him. The Imam of the village, on the other hand, taught the Koran, Ilmihal and Muammediye to the village children, led the villagers in prayers at the village mosque five times each day, went to weddings and funerals and visited the sick.... Since the Imam also settled disputes among the villagers, he was held in higher esteem than the teachers." 130

128. ibid. p.173
129. BASGOZ and WILSON, op. cit. 134
In 1933, the new Minister of Education, Resit Galip, showed his great concern for the immovable traditionalism that beset the villagers, by appointing a Village Affairs Commission. The Commission put high emphasis on the formation of a new type of teacher to supplant the Hoja. The ideal village teacher, they asserted should be able:

1. "To modify the beliefs of the villagers by pioneering the principles of reformism, secularism and republicanism;
2. to modify the social life of the village by ensuring the application of Republic's civil code in the villages, and its introduction into family life and individual relations, thus paving the way for the code's essential aim: the development of a more modern way of life among the peasants.
3. to modify the material and economic standards of the village by introducing advanced agricultural methods, a wider range of goods and adjusted marketing conditions;
4. to be an intellectual, that is, to serve as a well trained teacher able to keep abreast of new educational developments." 131.

By 1940, however, the situation of village education had not improved. It was recorded that 95 per cent of children from villages in the Eastern and Southeastern provinces had never attended any school. In the Hakkari and Siirt provinces, the percentage was as high as 90 per cent while in some Western provinces the percentage for the same year was found to be only 39.6. 132

The main efforts of the Republican government and Party remained, in the last years of Ataturk, concentrated on the establishment and spreading of the newly conceived People's Houses (Halkevi), modelled mainly on ideas from the Soviet experience, as the generic centres for village modernization and the inculcation of the ideals of Ataturkism. These Peoples' Houses were designed to perform a variety of educational and cultural activities such as the study of language and literature,

131. ibid. 138.
132. ibid. p.128.
theatricals, sports, social welfare, as well as reading rooms, libraries and publications. Some of these Houses had already assumed outstanding reputation in the dissemination of national culture during the lifetime of Atatürk. The one in Ankara boasted of a library with 40,000 volumes and many others in small towns encouraged young writers to contribute to the House journals on local and national matters. But, officialdom and formality turned them into superficial institutions. As BasGoz and Wilson conclude,

"The Peoples' Houses had been principally designed to fill the gap between educated elite at the top of Turkish society and the larger uneducated masses below, through an intensive education programme. Unfortunately, the Houses became and remained centres for bureaucrats and those who already had an education. From the beginning, all government officials were instructed to support the Houses... The majority of uneducated people, on the other hand, did not participate, refusing to accept the Houses as their activity centres." 134

Again, the earlier emphasis placed by the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress on the need to open agricultural schools, and to introduce practical industrial and agricultural courses in all primary and secondary schools to integrate education with village needs, did not materialise into an effective programme. A dozen secondary level agricultural schools that did come into existence as a result of the proposals were closed in 1927 when the German Committee of Experts recommended the reversal of the policy in favour of the creation of Higher Institutions for Agricultural Education. Consequently, the Yuksek Ziraat Enstitusu was opened in Ankara in 1933, to house the schools of Agriculture, Veterinary Medicine and Forestry. The Institution became successful in reviving the dying secondary level agricultural schools; but, paradoxically, the whole system of agricultural education once successfully operational was monopolized by the children of the

133. ibid. p.154
134. ibid. p.157
non-agriculturalist class of merchants, craftsmen and government officials, mainly because it provided free boarding education and a chance for a prestigious career. So, in agricultural education too, it was the bureaucratic class that reaped the benefit while the poor peasants remained deprived. By 1950, the peasant had started on the trail 'from farm to the factory' and urbanization was accelerating. Geographical mobility in turn generated among the villagers the need for an increase in empathetic capacity and they came to realise the value of formal education for their children. This change in the outlook of the villagers and their rising demand for education ushered in a new era of village uplift. Between 1950-65, the level of literacy in the country rose from 34 per cent to 48 per cent. In 1960, the Census Report confirmed that 70 per cent of the rural population was illiterate, of which 27 per cent were male and 73 per cent female. Between 1960-1966, there was a 42 per cent increase in the total number of students in primary education and of this increase 45 per cent was registered in the villages. The number of villages having schools increased by 24 per cent during this period. The Second Five-Year Plan was highly conscious of the problem of the lack of suitable educational facilities in the villages. It particularly emphasised that special efforts should be made to provide courses for girls and women in the villages to teach them subjects like Home Economics and Hygiene.

Female Education/Co-education

Female education in modern Turkey received special impetus by the promulgation in 1926 of the Turkish Civil Code which established fundamental equality between the sexes. Atatürk himself was a staunch supporter of co-education, and the official policy of his government was

135. Second Five-Year Plan. p.268
136. ibid. p.68
declared by the then Minister of Education as follows:

"The Ministry of Education does not and will not think of a separate treatment for girls and boys either in educational institutions or as youths. Our young girls and boys will be trained within the same system, and they will follow the same path". 137

Co-education started, however, with the admission of girl students into the university faculties of medicine, law, education and engineering in the session of 1923-24, and only spread later into the secondary and middle stages, as more new schools with appropriate facilities were opened. At the time of national independence, apart from the three lises in Istanbul and a few teachers training institutes in various parts of the country, there hardly existed any schools for girls in Turkey. When a legislative proposal was put up in 1927 for the introduction of co-education, it did not go without vociferous and protracted opposition. The Training and Instruction Department itself vehemently opposed the move. A compromise solution was found by allowing co-education to extend to the Orta level. The government, however, showed its determination to introduce it to all levels, and when in 1930, the Congress of Regional Directors called for an end to co-education, the opposite became a reality and the debate was closed for ever. Henceforth co-education in Turkey became the law. 138

But the acceptance of co-education in principle as a policy did not in itself result in a breakthrough for female education in Turkey; nor indeed, did it make the Turkish women into a replica of the Western woman. Glaring imbalances still remained. The Turkish National Commission on Education, for example, deliberating on the role of woman in Turkey and her education, observed:

137. ibid. p.108
138.
"There exists today in the cities of Turkey, and particularly in the great cities, a type of modern woman who differs little in dress and behaviour from her Western counterpart - at least she appears like this, whatever her intellectual level may be. Some of these, having a false conception of freedom, and disliking duty and responsibility, are too inclined to the pleasures of modern life. But besides these examples of women who have gone to the extreme in following a false modernism, there is a group of valuable and useful women who are well-educated by our standards and who play an important part in raising the level of our national culture. At the same time, in some places in the country, there is, living in the same town or the same building as this modern Turkish woman, a type of woman who, in outlook and personality, closely resembles her fifteenth century ancestors. In fact, Turkish women can be best understood as consisting of groups in varying degrees of development between these two extremes." 139

The Commission was much concerned with the disharmony and uneasiness of the Turkish woman in spite of her modern education. It impressed upon the educational system the need to inculcate among the young citizens the spirit of mutual respect and a responsible outlook.

In terms of distribution of students in the educational institutions according to sex, studies reiterate that it is the already educated upper and middle classes whose girls are increasingly taking part in the educational services and professions, whereas the girls from the poorer, workmen's homes are fewer. It is true that female enrollments since national independence have increased steadily at all levels, but the fact remains that female education, on the whole, lags behind compared with that of the male. Questioning the exaggerated claims of success of the Turkish woman in education as advanced by writers like Nuri Eren, Prof. Kazamias has remarked:

"This study casts doubt at such an encomium of progress in female education. Although today's lises include more girls than ever before, although more illiterate parents than before may send their

daughters to 'high school', the fact remains that in the lises, girls with illiterate parents represent only a 'trickle' of the total population even in the urban centres. The more educated the parents are, the better the girl's chances are for a lise education and for higher education." 140

6.5.4. Cultural Outputs

Integrative Culture (Religion and Language)

The Turkish Revolution envisaged the transformation of the total social structure of the modern Turkey by supplanting its centuries old integrative, religio-linguistic culture by secular nationalism, in which a national language, national history and modern scientific values would unite its people for an onward march. All religious instruction in schools was prohibited and the new national language with the Roman script replaced the Arabic and Persian languages of religion, letters and culture. Right through the Ataturk regime, these anti-Islamic policies were imposed with a heavy hand. But, it is significant to notice, that as soon as liberalism returned to the Turkish scene in the 1940s, widespread demands for the re-introduction of religious studies in the educational institutions followed. Howsoever this revival of religious culture has been viewed by various observer of the phenomenon, it is impossible to deny that the Turks as a people, when their cultural affinities were ascertained after all the attempts at re-orientations and indoctrination into non-Islamic values had been made, overwhelmingly reasserted their identification with Islam.

The Turks, unlike other Muslims, having actually experienced a phase of non-Islamic education and social culture, came to realise that 'the moral basis of the society was being corroded and that the youth were being brought up in a moral vacuum'.141 Like their counterparts in other modern Muslim societies, the Turkish intellectuals who pressed

140. KAZAMIAS, op. cit. p.237
141. ibid. p.188.
for the revival of Islamic culture argued, as Kazamias has surmised, "that Islam was not reactionary, that it was supportive of science and modern institutions". As a result of a heated debate in the National Assembly in 1949, Islamic studies were permitted to be introduced in the fourth and fifth grades of the elementary schools for Muslim children. Although the course was optional, it is impressive to note that within the first year, the great majority of primary school children received religious instruction.

In the same year, a Faculty of Divinity was organised at the Ankara University; and Training Schools for the training of religious teachers (Imams) were re-introduced. By 1961-62, the Kazamias study reveals, "there were nineteen middle-level religious schools enrolling 4,400 students, seventeen lise-level schools with 1,200 students and one Higher Islamic institute with 220 students." The Democratic Party government further extended religious instruction into the first and the second grades of the Orta and the 'normal schools'. They also gave the Islamic basis of the Turkish culture still greater legitimation by reinstituting the Ezan in Arabic, building more mosques and permitting pilgrimage to Makka. The recitation of the Qur'an on the national radio was permitted and 'Arabic inscriptions from the Prophet's sayings appeared in shops, cafes, and other places; several religious pamphlets and books were published; and a greater number of Muslims made the annual pilgrimage to Makka.

The two major factors that Ataturk considered of great importance in forming a strong basis for the new national culture were the Turkish language and history. The absence of a distinctly Turkish culture and a purely Turkish language created difficulties. Early in 1925, a Language Committee (Dil Komisyonu) was formed to compile a purely Turkish lexicon

142. ibid. p.189
143. ibid. p.189
by extracting Arabic, Persian or any other foreign words. In 1933, the Turkish Language Society (Turk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti) was established under the patronage of Ataturk who wanted the question of the creation of National Language to be actively taken up by all sections of the educated in Turkey. So urgent was the issue with the nation that the Cabinet, the Ministry of Education, the Peoples' Houses, teachers and students were involved in the Language Society. 146

But the question of the purification of the language from age-old usage of foreign words, some of which had even become an integral part of the language, was an uphill task. Extreme viewpoints either favoured the reintroduction of obsolete Turkish words or of selected words from other Turkish dialects to replace the commonly used Arabic and Persian words. The result was that for a long time, the new language remained a hotch-potch of ancient and modern words. Instead of becoming a source of national integration, the new Turkish language became a source of confusion. Ataturk himself seemed to have noticed this disintegrative effect of the reform programme and so, at the Second Language Congress in 1935, a simple formula was adopted with regard to replacing the Arabic and Persian words:

"The words that had found a place in the everyday language and use of the people should not be thrown out even if they have a foreign origin. When it becomes necessary to create new words, there is no need to refer to extinct rules or to the rules of Central Asian Turkish dialects unknown to the people of Anatolia. Instead, the new words should be derived by making use of the word stems, suffixes and grammatical rules of contemporary Turkish." 147

In the 1950s, however, the government seemed to have left the question of linguistic reform to the academics and discouraged the principle of language innovations at the cost of discord.

146. BASGOZ and WILSON, op. cit. pp.171-73.
147. ibid. p.173.
The Turkish History society, which was established to state the history of the Turkish people, also fell into the deep waters of extremism. Instead of giving rise to progressive research, it was dominated by novice historians who essayed only to prove that "the European, Asian, North African, Persian and Ancient Greek civilizations had all been founded by Turkish migrations from Central Asia." These false theories and myths were naturally incorporated in the school textbooks. Though these eccentricities of racist view of history disappeared, Turkish historians of the early nationalistic zeal, as Basgoz and Wilson have pointed out, were quite prone to overplay the 'national anthem'.

Innovative Culture

In spite of the over-publicised statements of Ataturk that rationality and scientific thought was the basis of modern civilization, and was by implication to be that of modern Turkey, research efforts in Turkey remained rudimentary and sporadic. The Turkish National Commission on Education, during their visits to the advanced countries, particularly of Europe and America, found a vast advancement of scientific and social science research in those countries; whereas in Turkey, they observed, "nothing of that sort was forthcoming." It was not until 1963, that the Scientific and Technical Research Organization (STRO) was established to develop, support and regulate basic and applied research in the positive sciences. In 1967, the STRO made preparations for the establishment of an Industrial Research Institute in order to conduct basic scientific research and to train scientists of high quality. "But the importance of research," confirm the authors

148. ibid. p.175
149. ibid. p.175
of the Second Five-year Plan, "is, in general, not sufficiently understood in the organizations to which research units are attached.... There are no special opportunities for training researchers with high level potential. Most of the research is not implemented and thus not utilized. The existing research equipment is not being used effectively."\(^{151}\)

Chart 'G' below shows the learned societies and institutes engaged in research activities in Turkey.

University research activities and organizations also seem to suffer from the same lack of co-ordination and interest.

In order to invigorate research activities for economic and social development, the Second Plan recommended vigorous policies to be followed during the Plan period. It envisaged the allocation of 0.6 per cent of the G.N.P. as against 0.4 per cent of the First Plan, to the promotion of research; in terms of actual expenditure this meant an amount of TL.3,215. The Plan aimed to increase the number of high-level researchers from 3,500 to 5,000 during the Plan period. \(^{152}\)

6.6. Conclusions

It transpires from the foregoing case-study that modernization in Turkey has not progressed in the direction of modern norms of universalistic, achievement, specificity, effective-neutrality and collectivity orientations. Nor indeed have the declared ideological objectives of Ataturkism, aimed at a thoroughgoing westernization, become the living faith, institutional guideline or binding force for the Turkish nation. It remains highly doubtful if, excepting nationalism, and republicanism, any of the other six-points of Ataturkism, viz: secularism, popularism, statism, even democracy as a way of life, has really become a part of the dominant value-system of 'modern Turks'.\(^{153}\)

\(^{151}\) Second Five-year Plan, op. cit. pp.218-222
\(^{152}\) ibid. pp.222-224
\(^{153}\) The westernization of Turkey as a reality can be gauged from the fact that none of the international documents such as the U.N.O. UNESCO Handbooks enlist Turkey as a Western country. If anything, they would regard the USSR, Israel and Japan, and not Turkey, as the modern-westernised countries.
Politically, even if one discounts the high-handed treatment meted to Islam and its leadership by the Ataturk revolution, events since then, e.g. the one-party dictatorship between 1927-1940, the reactionary policies of the Democratic Party government in the latter half of their tenure of ten years, the military coups, the shaky coalitions with the overhanging threat of military intervention until the present times, all bear witness to the interplay of ascriptive, particularistic and factionalistic interests in the body politic. In spite of the relative political stability that Turkey has enjoyed during past decades as compared with the rest of the Middle Eastern/Islamic countries, the record of political modernization in Turkey, judged by the norms generating equality, capacity and integration, can barely be regarded as any better than these countries. The end achievements of the Turkish polity so far seem to have failed to convince the larger Muslim World community of the iconoclasm which Ataturk thought so compelling to resort to in order to modernize Turkey.¹⁵⁴

Economically, Turkey's progress over the past five decades since the inauguration of modernization has remained haphazard, and no better than its counterparts in the region. In fact, as Halpern points out, the Turkish economy can hardly become self-regulating and prosperous without foreign credits.¹⁵⁵

Socially, the various horizontal and vertical divisions, inequalities and imbalances within the Turkish society on the urban-rural, factory worker-peasant, modernist-traditionalist, secularist-sacred, enlightened elite-ignorant mass and other polarizations have not been bridged. On secularisation, for example, Halpern concludes:

"Despite the secularization of most of the Turkish middle class, the majority of the people remain far more familiar with the habits and outlooks of traditional Islam than with those of Ataturk".

Cultural y, the Turkish model of modernization has not generated much rationalist, positivist or secularist outlook except among the very, very thin upper slice of the university professors of the Political Science faculties or the army officers.

It is apparent then that the role of the educational system in bringing about normative changes or in the output functions the economic, political, social and cultural aspects of the modernization programmes has remained proportionately inadequate, sporadic and intermittent. As Prof. Kazamias observes,

"Commenting on consensus or commitment to a democratic ideology unavoidably brings memories of the recent successful and unsuccessful military coups. The question is raised as to how successful and unsuccessful the various agencies (including the schools) responsible for establishing such consensus or commitment have been. That substantial progress has been made since the Ottoman days would certainly not be denied, but the establishment of a viable, stable and modern democratic polity in Turkey has yet to be attained." 156

156. A. M. KAZAMIAS, Education and the Quest for Modernity, op. cit. p.225.
List of Learned Societies and Research Institutes Engaged in Innovation and Research in Turkey

LEARNED SOCIETIES AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES

BRITISH INSTITUTE OF ARCHAEOLOGY AT ANKARA: f. 1948. Objects to further archaeological research by British and Commonwealth students or scholars in Turkey.

CENTRI DI STUDI ITALIANI IN TURCHIA, ANKARA:


GEOGRAFYA ENSTITUSU (GEOGRAPHICAL INSTITUTE). Istanbul. f. 1933.

DEUTSCHES ARCHAEOLOGISCHES INSTITUT: Istanbul. f. 1929 conducts research into pre-history and archaeology of Byzantium and Turkey.


INSTITUT FRANCAIS D'ARCHEOLOGIE: Istanbul. f. 1930.


ÖSTERREICHISCHES KULTURVEREIN IN ISTANBUL, Istanbul. f. 1942.

TÜRK CERRAHİ CEMİYETİ (TURKISH SURGICAL SOCIETY), Istanbul. f. 1931.


TÜRK ECZACILARI BIRLIGI (TURKISH PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION), Istanbul.

TÜRK EKONOMÍ KURUMU (TURKISH ECONOMIC SOCIETY), Ankara. f. 1939.

TÜRK HALK KURUMU (TURKISH LAW ASSOCIATION), Ankara. f. 1934.

TÜRK JINEKOLOJI CEMİYETİ (TURKISH SOCIETY OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY), Istanbul. f. 1964.

TÜRK KÜLTÜRÜNUN ARASTİRMASI ENSTITUSU (TURKISH CULTURAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE), Ankara. f. 1961. Conducts scholarly research into all aspects of Turkish culture.

TÜRK MIKROBIYOLOJI CEMİYETİ (TURKISH MICROBIOLOGICAL SOCIETY), Istanbul. f. 1932.

TÜRK NÖRO-PSİKIYATRİ CEMİYETİ (TURKISH NEURO-PsYCHIATRIC SOCIETY), Istanbul. f. 1934.

TÜRK ORTOPEDI SİRRÜRJİSİ VE TRAUMATOLOJİ CEMİYETİ (TURKISH ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY AND TRAUMATOLOGY SOCIETY), Istanbul. founded 1939.

TÜRK OTO-RİNG LARYNOLOJI CEMİYETİ (TURKISH LARYNGOGICAL SOCIETY), Istanbul.

TÜRK SAKATLAR CEMİYETİ (TURKISH DISABLED SOCIETY), Istanbul. f. 1906.

TÜRK BIYOLOJİ DERNEGİ (TURKISH BIOLOGICAL SOCIETY), Istanbul. f. 1942.
TÜRK SIRPE VE TATBIKI MATEMATİK DERNEGI (TURKISH SOCIETY OF PURE AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS), Istanbul.

TÜRK TARH KURUMU (TURKISH HISTORICAL SOCIETY).

TÜRK TIBBI ELEKTRO RADIOGRAFI CEMIYETI (TURKISH ELECTRO-RADIOLOGICAL SOCIETY), Bursa. f. 1924.

TÜRK TIBBI RADIOLOJI CEMIYETI (TURKISH MEDICAL RADIOLOGICAL SOCIETY), Istanbul.

TÜRK TIB CEMIYETI (TURKISH MEDICAL SOCIETY), Istanbul. f. 1856.

TÜRK TIB TARH KURUMU (TURKISH MEDICAL HISTORY SOCIETY) ISTANBUL.

TÜRK TUBERKIOZ CEMIYETI (TURKISH TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY), Istanbul. f. 1937.

TÜRK UROLOJI CEMIYETI (TURKISH UROLOGICAL SOCIETY), Istanbul. f. 1933.

TÜRK VETERINER HEKIMLERI DERNEGI (TURKISH VETERINARY MEDICINE ASSOCIATION), Ankara. f. 1930.

TÜRKIYE AKIL HIFZISSİHHASI CEMIYETI (TURKISH SOCIETY OF MENTAL HYGIENE), Istanbul. f. 1930.

TÜRKIYE BİLİMSEV VE TEKNIK ARASTIRMA KURUMU (SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF TURKEY), Ankara. f. 1964.

TÜRKIYE JEOLoji KURUMU (TURKISH GEOLOGICAL SOCIETY), Ankara. f. 1946.

TÜRKIYE KIMYA CEMIYETI (THE CHEMICAL SOCIETY OF TURKEY), Ankara. f. 1946.

TÜRKİYE VE ORTA DOĞU AMNE İDARESİ ENSTİTÜSÜ (INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FOR TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST), Ankara. f. 1952.

YENİ FELSEFE CEMIYETI (THE NEW TURKISH PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY), Istanbul. f. 1943.

EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, LONDON. 1972.
"The phrase 'Islamic way of life' has on many occasions been misinterpreted by some people. It has been misconstrued variously as religious intolerance, theocratic rule, return to medievalism and so on. We believe that our religion has taught us certain principles of social and economic justice, and of human values whose application in statecraft is bound to promote human welfare.

Khan Liaqat Ali Khan,
First Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Pakistan*


When the legacy of the British Raj in India eventually came to be divided between two dominions, Pakistan was treated as a 'step-child'. All odds were so pitched against it that when it did emerge, Jinnah's Pakistan was small, weak and 'moth-eaten'. "As far as Pakistan is concerned," the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten is recorded to have written, "we are putting up a tent. We can do no more." So concerned were the British Government and the Viceroy" writes Chaudhri Muhammad Ali "over the threat of the Indian Congress Party to opt out of the British Commonwealth, for the enormous value to the U.K. both in terms of world prestige and strategy, that the injustices to Pakistan weighed little with them." So when on 14th August, 1947, Pakistan did emerge as an independent Muslim country, it had to start from scratch and against many odds. Its problems were so numerous and unmanageable that observers considered its survival almost an impossibility. The most baffling problem immediately confronted by the new State was the resettlement of millions of refugees who 'choked the roads and over-crowded the trains, where they were slaughtered."4 While India inherited the compact, fully functioning administration of the Government of India, its infrastructure, industry and expertise, Pakistan had virtually nothing to start from. The initial difficulties as Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, has recorded, "arose mostly from deficiencies in staff, accommodation, records, office-equipment and communications. Hastily constructed tin sheds provided the bulk of office accommodation. It was not a rare sight to see five or six officers, including officers of very high rank, sitting in one small room. Housing difficulties were equally great and caused much inconvenience..... There

2. ibid.
* N.B. This study does not extend beyond the 1971 situation in Pakistan. East Pakistan is therefore referred to in the pre-breakup context as the eastern wing of Pakistan.
was no help for it but to requisition houses and to enlarge the supply by partitioning the houses wherever feasible. In the process, high officials as well as private citizens suffered considerable hardship.

The demand for stenographers and typists was far greater than supply. Pakistan's share of office equipment and furniture could not be obtained from the Government of India by August 15, and even what was obtained could not all be moved to Karachi because of disturbances that disrupted communications. Local purchases were made but still there were great shortages. Typewriters and telephones, and, at times, even the most ordinary supplies like pens and pins were not easily available."

The whole system of economic and political institutions had to be set up afresh and all that with no resources. Until a new constitution was evolved, the polity had to remain functioning on the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Indian Independence Act 1947, which provided for the appointment of a Governor General by the British Crown and a legislature from which a Cabinet was to be selected to carry out policies. The economy of Pakistan was extremely backward. As Papanek has observed, "The Country was among the poorest in the world and had no industries to speak of, almost no industrial raw materials, no significant industrial or commercial groups. It was difficult to see how Pakistan's economy could grow more rapidly than its population. Economic chaos and political disintegration seemed more likely."

Pakistan's progress on the road to modernization has obviously to be seen, apart from its ideological orientation, in the light of these legacies and deficiencies.

5. ibid. pp.247-48
8. ibid. p.3.
7.1.2. Ideology and Identity

The quest for the institutionalisation of the national ideology demanding the creation of a modern Islamic Society started in February 1949, when the Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, presented before the Constituent Assembly, the blue prints of the new Constitution of Pakistan. Known as the 'Objectives Resolution', it laid down that Pakistan would be an Islamic Democracy. Its other major clauses were:

'Whereas Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty - the State of Pakistan is a sacred trust,

Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed.

Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah,

Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality.'

With some minor modifications, these objectives have ever since remained the guiding principles of the polity in Pakistan.

7.2.1. Modernization of the Polity

Pakistan's bid to create for itself a viable political system soon led it to plunge into a variety of failures. For the first fifteen years, the country remained an arena of conflicts and particularistic politics. The main parties to the drama, the secularist-modernist ruling classes of high level civil and military bureaucrats, the influential


landlords and the religious leaders (Ulama) all gave priority to their own axe-grinding rather than the national interest. Group interests in turn gave rise to regional and provincial rivalries, which expressed themselves, at times, in bitter forms.

Ideological confusion clouded the most urgently soluble questions such as the enunciation of the nature of Islamic State and Sovereignty, the evolution of the Constitution and its bases of social and inter-provincial justice and relationships, and other institutional frameworks. Instead every issue became a bone of contention and added to the confusion and lack of consensus.

East Pakistan leaders, by virtue of the larger population of their Province, claimed, and insisted upon obtaining a greater representation in the Central government. They resented that their language, Bengali, must be given a secondary position. Fearing inequalities in the share of economic development, they pressed for a greater amount of autonomy.

The bulk of the ruling class in every sector happened to be from West Pakistan. Their major concern was to see a stronger Central Government as the best anchorage against the hostile neighbour of India whose interference and provocations in the East-Wing were not a fiction. They, therefore, tried to resolve the problem of inter-provincial disparities through the consolidation of the smaller Western provinces in a 'One-Unit' of West Pakistan, equal with East Pakistan. But far from solving the problem, it aggravated grievances. As Professor Rushbrook-Williams has surmised.

"Unfortunately, the new arrangement, logical as it undoubtedly was, did little to curb the self-seeking of the local political leaders..... Since the stakes were higher and the prizes larger, competition for power became fiercer than ever. Adult suffrage, which increased the influence of quasi-feudal interests because of the power of a landlord to dragoon his tenants into voting for his nominee,
soon made the new West Pakistan legislature a byword for political intrigue. Nor were things any better in East Pakistan, where in 1958 partisan fury between rival factions reached such heights that the speaker of the legislative assembly was attacked and his Deputy so badly beaten up that he afterwards died.\(^{10a}\)

It was in these conditions that the army intervened in 1958. But army rule itself then turned into a decade of political turmoil and instability which only foreshadowed greater disintegrative consequences.

**Constitutions**

**1956 Constitution**

The first Constitution of Pakistan came into force with effect from 23 March 1956, describing Pakistan as an Islamic Republic. It was based on the Objectives laid down in the Objectives Resolution. One important clause was that no law in Pakistan should be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of the Qur’an and that the existing law should be brought into conformity with such injunctions. The modern norms were safeguarded in the Constitution which proclaimed that principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, should be fully observed.

The Constitution also proclaimed full safeguards for the interests and religious heritage of non-Muslim citizens of the country. Furthermore, the Constitution established full parity between its two provinces, the East and West Pakistan.\(^{11}\)

This Constitution, however, was abrogated in 1958 by the Army which imposed martial law and the Army rule that lasted over ten years.

**1962 Constitution**

The second Pakistan Constitution proclaimed by the Army in 1962 made a major departure from the first, in that it designated the Country

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only as the Republic of Pakistan. A year later, however, under public pressure this was amended by the National Assembly and the Country was re-styled as an Islamic Republic. Besides re-affirmation of the Principles of the Objectives Resolution, the 1962 Constitution went further than its predecessor in stipulating that there should be an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology to advise the Central and the Provincial legislatures on the question as to whether a proposed law disregarded or violated or was otherwise not in accordance with the principles of Law-making as defined in the Constitution. These principles included conformity with Islam, equality of citizens and freedom of expression. 12

Basic Democracies

In 1958, when General Ayyub Khan abrogated the 1956 Constitution, he maintained that the alien parliamentary model of democracy was not workable in Pakistan, "The key to democratic government," said Ayyub Khan,

"lies in the effectiveness of institutions that represent and include the masses of the people. Such institutions did exist in Pakistan and had been there for years, but they were stagnant from neglect".

"Foremost among these were the Panchayats, the village councils whose origins were centuries old. While empires rose and fell, the villagers paid their taxes, and, in relative isolation, governed themselves through these institutions. In Pakistan, the panchayats had little opportunity to perform constructive political work. They were not integrated into the framework of the government". 13

Ayyub insisted that effective democracy in Pakistan must satisfy the following basic conditions:

1. Be simple to understand, easy to work and cheap to run.
2. Put to the voter on y such questions as the voter can understand without external prompting.

13. See Richard V. WEEKES, Pakistan, Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation, D. Van Nostrand, N.Y./London, 1964, p.113 - cont'd next page
3. Ensure the effective participation of all citizens to their full intellectual capacity, and

4. Produce reasonably strong and stable governments. 14

In the light of these objectives, he promulgated his new system of grassroot democratic institutions called the Basic Democracies. This was a five-tier council system based on the administrative units of the colonial times, i.e. the village, the tehsil, the district, the division and the Province. The primary unit was the rural or urban constituency of one thousand inhabitants who elected a Basic Democrat. These Basic Democrats then formed Union Councils in villages and Town Committees in urban centres. There were 4,000 such primary constituencies in West Pakistan and 4,200 in East Pakistan.

The next highest unit was the Tehsil or Thana Council of about 10 Union Councils. The chairman of the Union Councils was automatically to be a member of the Tehsil or Thana Councils. But the focal stage was the District Council which drew half of its membership from among the Union and Tehsil Councils; the other half comprising officers of the various departments at district level. The fourth stage, the Divisional Councils, were merely co-ordinating and advisory bodies, and finally the Provincial Council was purely to advise on development.15

The Basic Democracies formed the electoral college for the election of the Provincial and Central legislatures as well as the President. Elections, on party lines, were to be held every four years.

Functional Differentiation

Policy Formulation function

Under the 1962 Constitution each province was equally represented in the National Assembly which consisted of a single chamber of 156

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14. ibid. p.118
Democrats elected from the electoral Colleges. Three seats in each Province were reserved exclusively for women over and above their elected seats. The National Assembly then formed the policy formulation body at the national level.

At Provincial level, two Provincial Assemblies each having 155 members, five of whom at least must be women, performed policy making functions in the areas under provincial jurisdiction. Such areas had been defined by the 1962 Constitution as agriculture, water and power development, health, social welfare and education.16

Policy Adoption functions.

Under the Basic Democracies system, the President at the National level was the sole executive authority and national policy was adopted under his signature. He appointed his own cabinet of ministers who need not to be members of the National Assembly. If, however, they were, they had to resign their seats. The President obtained legislative advice from the National Assembly through appointed parliamentary secretaries. He had the power to veto laws passed by the National Assembly, to dissolve the assembly and call for new elections, in which case he himself had to seek re-election. In the case of the National Assembly being out of session, the President could issue ordinances which were valid only for six months. But if he declared a state of emergency, his ordinances were valid indefinitely. Provincial governors performed similar policy adoption functions at the provincial level.

Policy Adjudication

The Constitution provided for a Supreme Court for the nation and two High Courts for the Provinces. In tribal areas, however, traditional jirga courts still function. All judges of the national Supreme High Courts are appointed by the President. The judiciary according to the Constitution is perfectly independent of the executive.

Bureaucracy

The Central Civil Secretariat formed and administered by the 'Civil Service' of Pakistan (CSP) with its twenty or so cadres is a monolithic and complicated body which implements the national policy in various departments. Originated in the Moghal Empire and modernised by the British Raj, the bureaucratic system that Pakistan inherited had been renowned as the 'steel frame' of the Government of India, known as the Indian Civil Service. The Civil Service of Pakistan was reorganised in 1950 and constitutes the top hierarchy of about five hundred officers out of a total of about one million public service employees of the Government. According to Ralph Braibanti's study, in 1947, at the time of the creation of Pakistan, out of a total of 1,157 high ranking officers in the I.C.S. and the I.P.S. in the Government of India only 101 or 9 per cent were Muslims and of these only 95 opted for Pakistan. With 50 British officers and one Pakistani Christian, the total of the top bureaucrats that Pakistan had, numbered only 157, of whom only 136 actually joined administrative posts; the remainder were posted to the judicial and diplomatic services.17

This was a hopelessly small number of top modernising leaders for Pakistan to start its natural independence with. Prof. Braibanti asserts:

"It is doubtful if any other nation of Pakistan's size faced independence with such a shortage of talent. - This predicament explains much in Pakistan's administrative history." 18

At the provincial level, two provincial Civil Secretariats with similar Administrative Services known as the Provincial Civil Service (PCS) Cadres, function parallel to the C.S.P. In their roles, status and jurisdiction, however, the Provincial Civil Service is restricted to the Provincial level. The C.S.P. dominates the Central and the Provincial administrations.

Local Government

The classically crucial unit of administration in Pakistan, which was devised by the British administrative genius, remains the district. Under the British Raj, the District Deputy Commissioner was originally the autocratic imperial ruler, although since 1935 District Boards have been instituted with nominated members to share in the policy-making functions at the district and local levels. But the official influence was too severe for this to offset the rigidity of control.

With the Basic Democracy system it was expected that the elected District Councils which replaced District Boards would give greater opportunity for democratic participation, but the appointment of the officials and the still dominant position of the bureaucrats in general, failed to produce that result. On the contrary, the Overhead Martial Law administration reinforced authoritarianism.

7.2.2. Modernization of the Economy

Gustav Papanek, who has studied the economic development of Pakistan up until 1967, asserts that "Any analysis of Pakistan's development must begin with its initial endowment and the effect of partition.... in 1947, Pakistan had almost no natural resources, except agricultural land, practically no modern industry, or modern banking, or commercial establishments. Power production was negligible. Few technicians, professional or political leaders existed among Pakistan's 75 million people, because Muslims in the sub-continent were largely peasants, artisans and soldiers." 21

The same author goes on to assert that,

"by the middle of 1960s Pakistan's economic growth came to be regarded as the most outstanding of all the under-developed countries in the region. The rate of growth in Pakistan was more than double the rate of population growth, investment was well near 20% and savings exceeded ten per cent of domestic resources". How did this happen? 22

The initiators of modernization policies certainly were the few, but very efficient, modernising leadership of the Civil Service. But the strides that the economy made later on were not entirely their doing; various policy factors, the sheer necessities that motivated the 'n-ach' impulse, and various sections of the society contributed towards these achievements.

Economic Policies.

In the first place, it is important to remember that building up from a scratch gave added impulse to an all round, concerted effort, both of private and public sectors. Government overhead protection in the form of loans and credits was essential, but private entrepreneurship was equally encouraged. No ideological extremities were allowed to

22. ibid.
stand in the way. Pakistan's economic policies have shown a remarkable balance of ideas, forces and strategies that all together contributed to its relative progress.

Because of sheer necessity, priority had to be given to the damaged infrastructure, roads, railways, communications and civic facilities. Then Pakistan had to build itself on whatever meagre resources that it had. Agriculture for example, could not have been ignored at the cost of an industrial dream. Repeated food shortages in the early years demanded agricultural development. Industrial development had to start from the bottom, i.e. by private enterprise in smallscale, consumer-goods industries. The Pakistan government's policy regarding foreign talent and capital seems to have developed on the principle that as long as the country needed these, it must utilise and invite them. Largely perhaps because of these 'common-sense' policies, Pakistan was able to achieve an annual growth rate of little less than 3 per cent, which was slightly higher than the population increase. "The rate of increase in manufacturing", asserts Papanek, "remained among the highest in the world".24 "In agriculture, its growth exceeded the growth rate of population, a phenomenon which made Pakistan an exceptional case. Pakistani industry grew at a dramatic rate."25

23. This was explicitly stressed in the National Constitutions and the Five-Year Economic Plan which asserted: "No doctrinaire assumptions underlie the plan, and neither an exclusively capitalistic nor an exclusively socialist economy is postulated. The approach throughout is pragmatic. The fundamental problem is how under severely limited conditions, to find some way towards the liberation of the people from the crushing burden of poverty. Viewed in this context, economic growth becomes a necessity for sheer survival...." Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65). Government of Pakistan. Planning Commission. 1960. p.xiii.


25. ibid. p.56
Planning

"National Planning in Pakistan, in the early years started" as Waterston points out, with a 'project to project' approach limited to the public sector toward more comprehensive and aggregative planning encompassing the entire economy."26

In 1948, the Development Board and the Planning Advisory Board were set up to 'co-ordinate development plans, record priorities, watch progress of development projects and make periodic reports to the Cabinet on the progress of development projects.' The Board received a sudden impetus from the Colombo plan in the preparation and co-ordination of Pakistan's First Six-year Development Programme for 1951-57 which aimed at rather modest targets, giving special emphasis to agriculture. The Korean War, however, provided the country with an economic boom, and the emphases in the Six-year Development targets were modified by an intervening Two-Year Priority Programme for 1951-53. The Planning Structure was also reorganised. The Planning Advisory Board was abolished and a new Planning Commission was instituted to replace the Planning Board as well as the Planning Advisory Boards. In addition, an overhead Economic Council, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, was set up to implement the Six-year Programme.27

In 1953, however, a Planning Board was again created to prepare a comprehensive National Development Plan. Since then four Five-year Development Plans have been launched: the First Five-year Plan 1955-60, the Second Five-year Plan 1961-65, the Third Plan 1966-70 and the Fourth Plan 1971-75.

Before planning was undertaken, it was estimated that the per capita income of an average Pakistani was about $50 a year.28

year Plans aimed at raising this to $200 by 1985. To obtain this target, a cumulative growth of about 8 per cent per annum had to be achieved during the 25 years of the total planning period. The actual increase in the GNP during the First Plan period was estimated to have been 2.5 per cent, which was however offset by a parallel population growth of 2.3 per cent. But the success of the Second Plan proved spectacular. By 1965, the annual growth rate was calculated to be 6.2 per cent, whereas the population increase had been only 3.5 per cent. This rate of increase, particularly with a very large base, asserts Papanek, "was among the highest in the world". The growth in agriculture was even exemplary, in that agricultural production far exceeded population growth - a phenomenon which was unusual for underdeveloped countries. The Third Plan, however, envisaged the reduction of the contribution of the agricultural sector to the GNP from 60 per cent to 49 per cent and the increase of that of manufacturing from 6 per cent to 11 per cent.

Investment and Savings

Starting from a very low level of domestic savings, in the period between 1947-1950, comprising mainly some foreign exchange reserves, the rate of savings steadily increased to 8.5 per cent of the GNP in 1964-65. Papanek regards this rate of saving as quite surprising for a very poor country. But the pace of growth in investment was even higher: from 4.6 per cent in 1949-50 to 15.8 per cent in 1964-65. Consequently a larger proportion of the development outlay has been spread over the expansion of the economy, as well as the social infrastructure.

29. WEEKES, op. cit. p.137
30. PAPANEK, op. cit. pp.5-7
31. ibid. p.6.
32. ibid.
33. Third Five-year Plan pp.3-4
34. ibid.
Industrialisation

At the time of national independence, the total industrial establishments of Pakistan amounted to one small oil refinery near Rawalpindi, a tiny sugar factory at Gujranwala and a cement factory at Wah in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan there was no industry worth mentioning. All the jute mills of Bengal were located in Indian Bengal. Whatever industrial capacity, resources and skills British India possessed remained in India. By 1963, however, Pakistan could boast of a dramatic industrial growth, "Not only did industrial output increase by 200 per cent between 1950 to 1963, but Pakistan," remarks Weekes, "reached its Plan targets two years ahead of schedule."35 In a study on the acceleration of industrial growth of Pakistan, Chinery found out that:

(a) "The capital goods industries grew at a faster rate (relative to the consumption goods industries), than would have been predicted in a 'normal country', and

(b) the intermediate goods industries grew at about a 'normally' faster rate than the consumption goods industries." 36

Entrepreneurship

Much of the success in the industrial progress of Pakistan has been attributed to Pakistan's encouragement of private enterprise in industry. As a result, a few wealthy industrialists, most of them migrated from the Bombay and Gujrat Provinces - the Memons, the Bohras and the Khoja Community took a plunge and started to set up new industries around cities like Karachi, Lahore, Hyderabad and Lyallpur. The growth of a class of entrepreneurs in Pakistan is typically important in that most of the industrial and business private enterprise there has been pioneered and sustained by the so-called 'traditionalist'


religious communities as against the modernist section of the society.

This point has been aptly emphasised by Papenek who observes:

"Industrial entrepreneurs are assumed to be innovators, promoting change not only in the economic sphere but also in other areas. The evidence in Pakistan lends little support to these notions. Many of the industrial entrepreneurs had no significant formal education. The great majority were not innovators in non-economic fields; they were often conservative and non-Western in religion, dress and social behaviour. Interestingly, while the entrepreneurs were much more traditional than other groups, such as civil servants, professionals and intellectuals, the best educated, most westernised minority, the Parsis, played no significant role in Pakistan's industry." 37

The only inference that can be drawn from this development in Pakistan is that when the right challenge and the incentive present themselves, even traditional Muslims are amenable to change and transform themselves.

Agriculture

Nearly 85 per cent of Pakistan's population is engaged in agriculture and produces 60 per cent of the national income. In West Pakistan only 17 per cent of the total soil is under cultivation, but in East Pakistan it was 75 per cent. During the early years, Pakistani agriculture was stagnant and primitive. Two successive floods in West Pakistan further deteriorated agricultural production and caused serious food shortages. Consequently, between 1955-1966 an average of one million tons of grain (10 per cent of the domestic production) had to be imported. To solve this acute shortage, and also to safeguard the occupational structure of the peasantry scattered over the vast village hinterlands, Pakistan gave great importance to the agricultural sector.

As with industry, private ownership was allowed to remain, although by the agrarian reforms of 1959 a ceiling of land holdings was fixed at 500 acres of irrigated and 1,000 of unirrigated land. 38

37. PAPANEK, op. cit. p.48
38. WEEKES, op. cit. p.139
government, on their part, established the Agr cultural Development Corporation which provided loans, supplied improved implements and seeds, and gave guidance on innovations and experiments to enhance production. In West Pakistan, for example, where water-logging was acute, government agencies helped in installing tube-wells and pumps, distributed chemical fertilisers and provided credit facilities. In East Pakistan, the Academy for Village Development made two very successful experiments to introduce innovations and improvements in productivity (a) by training representatives of each village in a selected area in the technique of modern farming and its improvisation in the local circumstances, in particular in farm saving and investment\(^{39}\) and (b) by organising village co-operatives. These two projects were pilot programmes in the scheme to start modernization at the bottom, village level. So successful were the Village AID Projects in East Pakistan that the President ordered their introduction in seven districts of West Pakistan and six sub-districts in East Pakistan. By 1960, records Weekes, "through the Village AID Institutes nearly 5,000 workers had received training at Comilla and Peshawer. These trainees then had established 176 development areas of 100,000 people each organised 19,625 village development canals, built 300 miles of dirtroads, and introduced new farming practices in hundreds of villages".\(^{40}\)

The result of all these measures in agriculture was that by 1965, Pakistan was one of the few underdeveloped Countries whose agricultural production was higher than the rate of its population growth.

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40. ibid. p.145.
Employment and Labour

According to the First Pakistan population Census, carried out in 1951, the total labour force in Pakistan comprised 24 million, of which 76.2 per cent was employed in agriculture, 9.5 per cent in industry, 12.5 per cent in services and 1.9 per cent in other activities or unemployed. 41 The six Five-year Development Plans extending to the year 1985, projected changes in the employment pattern as in the table below:

Table I VII.I
Changes in the Employment Pattern
Percentage Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Labour Force (millions)</th>
<th>Employment of Labour Force</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Agriculture (per cent)</td>
<td>Manufacturing (per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951 Census</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 Pre-plan</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 First-Plan</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 Second-Plan</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 Third-Plan</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 Fourth-Plan</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Fifth-Plan</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 Sixth-Plan</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


41. See Mahbub-ul-Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning; A Case Study of Pakistan, O.U.P. Karachi, 1966, p.249. Taking 15 per cent unemployment off, Haq regards the gainfully employed on agriculture as 58 per cent instead of 76.5 per cent.
7.2.3. Social modernization

Demographic Features (Population)

Pakistan's population has been constantly rising during the ten year period of the censuses of 1951 and 1961, by an annual rate of growth of about 1.8 per cent in East and 2.3 per cent in West Pakistan. In 1951, the Census showed that Pakistan had a population of 75.8 million, (42.0 million in East Pakistan and 33.8 million in West Pakistan). In 1951, it was 93.8 million of which 50.8 million was in the East and 43.0 million in the West. The long range projection, taking into consideration the projected decrease in fertility rate as well as the decline in mortality rate from 29 to 15 shows a slight decrease in the rate of growth over the period of the Plans but by 1985 the population is expected to rise 1 1/2 times over the 1960 figures. See Table VII.2.

Table VII.2

Population Projections 1960-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Pakistan</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>Percentage increase</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Percentage increase</th>
<th>All Pakistan</th>
<th>Percentage increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Third Five-year Plan.
Ecological Features

Urbanisation

According to the 1951 Census only 10.4 per cent of the population lived in urban centres of over 5,000 persons. There was a clear disparity between the Eastern and the Western wings in urbanisation: 4.4 per cent in East Pakistan and 17.8 per cent in West Pakistan. By 1961, urbanisation had further risen steadily. In West Pakistan 9.6 million people, or 22.5 per cent, and in East Pakistan 2.6 million, or 5.2 per cent of the people were living in cities. Again, the 1961 Census showed that the rate of growth in the urban population was 3 times as against 2.5 per cent in rural population during the ten year period. The Planning Commission estimated that the increase of 5.6 per cent per annum was expected to rise to 8.10 per cent during the Third Plan period (1965-70) and by 1985, the share of urban population was projected to be 25 per cent in East Pakistan and 45 per cent in West Pakistan. This meant that of the total estimated population of 150 million in 1985, about 50 million or 33 per cent will consist of town dwellers, though with the rapid development of agriculture, it might increase only by 20 per cent.\(^42\)

The Pakistani flight towards the cities is concentrated into some 16 large cities of 100,000 inhabitants. These 16 cities have grown by 64 per cent compared with other smaller towns whose population grew only by 46 per cent. between the census years. Thus urbanisation in Pakistan as in other Asian countries, is fraught with problems because of the wider gulf between the city life and the traditional rural patterns, as well as by the lack of appropriate facilities in housing,

health, job opportunities and education. Migration into cities is due largely to the subsistence level structure of village life itself, where traditional forced or caste labour and joint land holdings do not offer enough incentives for the tenant peasant or the worker. Intensive planning and urban development to meet this rising 'migration drift' to cities is needed.

Family Structure

Family structure in Pakistan before independence, had been left by the British more or less untouched as a topic of the denominational law, and was based on the traditional interpretations of Islamic law. President Ayyub's Government attempted to rationalise the system by regulating some of the malpractices and misuse of the Islamic Family law, but the reaction from the Ulema was very strong. Commenting on the protest against the recommendations of the Family Law Commission writes Ayyub,

"The recommendations of the Commission did not interfere in anyway with any Islamic injunctions on the subject; they only provided a procedure for the proper and judicious implementation of the Islamic principles relating to marriage. I decided to implement the procedure recommended by the Commission because I considered it my duty as a Muslim and as Head of the State to do what was necessary to eliminate a grave social malpractice which was affecting the lives of the people. Accordingly, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance was promulgated in 1961. A section of the Ulema immediately accused me of interjecting with Islam........" 43

But the extension of education to a larger number of womenfolk, the resultant increasing mobility in their economic and social status, is helping towards the change in attitudes.

The family structure on the whole, however, still remains ruled by traditional pattern. Extended family system in which the elder command respect and influence life decisions of the young.

7.3. INPUTS INTO THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

7.3.1. Normative Inputs

From the first Educational Conference, convened soon after independence in 1947, to the latest Commission on National Education, which reported in 1959, and the subsequent policy proposals, it has been repeatedly pronounced that education in Pakistan must be based on the ideals which led to the creation of Pakistan.

Addressing the First All Pakistan Education Conference convened by him in 1947, the Minister stressed that it was a priority for Pakistan to devise a national ideology of education. He went on to assert that education in Pakistan should be inspired by the Islamic ideology, emphasising among its many characteristics those of universal brotherhood, social justice and tolerance.

It was surmised that the aims of the inherited system of education were acutely deficient in scope, depth and width. The system lacked the qualities essential for a national system and needed complete structural, curricular and organizational differentiation and expansion. Addressing the Conference, the leader of the nation, Qaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, highlighted the objectives of a modern national education for Pakistan:

"The importance of education and the right type of education, cannot be over-emphasized. Under foreign rule for over a century, sufficient attention has not been paid to the education of our people and if we are to make a real, speedy and substantial progress, we must earnestly tackle this question and bring our educational policy and programme on to the lines suited to the genius of our people, consonant with our history and culture and having regard to the modern conditions and vast developments that have taken place all over the world...... There is no doubt that the future of our state will and must depend on the type of education we give to our children and the way in which we bring them up as

the future citizens of Pakistan. Education does not merely mean academic education. There is immediate and urgent need for giving scientific and technical education to our people in order to build up our future economic life and to see that our people take to science, commerce, trade and particularly, well-planned industries. We should not forget that we have to compete with the world which is moving very fast in this direction....."

In 1951, the Education Minister convened another conference composed of all the Provincial Education Ministers, Vice-Chancellors of Universities and Directors of Public Instruction and called upon it 'to prepare a Six-year Plan for Educational Development, in order to give the country a modern, integrated and comprehensive system of education.'

The 1956 Constitution declaring the country the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, affirmed this vide article 13

.. No person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own;

.. No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any educational institution run wholly by that community or denomination;

.. No citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution maintained by public revenues on the ground of race, religion, caste or place of birth, providing that nothing in this article shall prevent any public authority for making provision for the advancement of any socially or educationally backward class of citizens.

The 1962 Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan upheld these provisions of the 1956 Constitution but, it also affirmed that illiteracy should be eliminated, and free and compulsory primary education should be provided for all, as soon as it was practicable.


Another very significant provision of the Constitution which aimed at the modernization of Muslim education, was that of Article 207 which required the President to open an Islamic Research Institute whose functions shall be to undertake Islamic research and instruction in Islam for the purpose of assisting in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis...

The National Education Commission

The National Commission on Education ordered by President Muhammad Ayub Khan in January 1959, so defined in its report the objectives of the national education for Pakistan:

.. Our educational system must play a fundamental part in the preservation of the ideals which led to the creation of Pakistan, and strengthen the concepts of it as a unified nation. The desire for a homeland for Muslims on the subcontinent arose out of their wish to be in a position to govern themselves according to their own set of values. In other words, our country arose from the striving to preserve the Islamic way of life......

.. The first consequence which follows from this historical fact is that we must strive to create a sense of unity and of nationhood among the people of Pakistan......

.. From our concept of justice and brotherhood there derives the desire to create a social welfare state. Our greatest need as a people is to improve constantly our standard of living, which at the moment is among the lowest in the world. We lay stress throughout our report on the concept of education as a public investment in economic development.

.. The concepts of spiritual and moral values of nation-building, of scientific development, of enlightened citizenship, and of public service should in our view motivate and guide our educational system.

47. Elaborating on the implications of the Islamic ideology, Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan pointed out: "Islamic way of life has on many occasions been misinterpreted by some people. It has been misconstrued variously as religious intolerance, theocratic rule, return to medievalism and so on. I wish to make it clear, that we have no theocratic state in mind. We have in mind no special privileges of citizenship for the Muslims in our country and we abhor the ideas of applying any religious or cultural coercion to our non-Muslim nationals. But we firmly believe that our religion has taught us certain principles of social and economic justice, and of human values, whose application in statecraft is bound to promote human welfare". Lia at Ali KHAN, Pakistan The Heart of Asia, Harvard University Press, 1951, address at a luncheon meeting of the National Press Club in Washington on 4th May 1951, p.11.
7.3.2. Political Inputs

Modernization of the polity in Pakistan demanded the recruitment into the elite class of a cross-section of the population. Universities and institutions of higher education were the major sources of output into the polity as modernizing leadership. There was, therefore, a demand for a rapid expansion of higher education. The Commission on National Education specifically stipulated that the institutions of higher education had to function as the main producers of leaders. "In this," asserted the Commission, "we can't be satisfied with less than the most exacting standards of achievement." But, in fact, the military and civil bureaucracies in Pakistan became a self-perpetuating class, recruitment into which was made more on ascriptive ties than on achievement alone. This was unequivically pointed out by the Pakistan Pay Commission in 1949, which concluded that the monopolization of a developing nation's talent in a self-perpetuating class was bound to cause imbalances, deprive the public sector of the economic activity of entrepreneurs and, most important of all, "Prevent the emergence of a pluralistic society of competing interests." Through the introduction of Basic Democracies could have helped grassroot democratization of the populace, and though the education system could have become a potent agency for democratization, the consolidation of the bureaucratic class as a powerful and self-seeking element in the Society made the educational system dysfunctional to the polity by disregarding achievement and merit alone as the criterion for recruitment into top leadership. The expansion of the higher education had, therefore, to proceed without planning and utility, and this led to unemployed graduates.

50. See Ralph BRAIBANTI, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op.cit.p.35
7.3.3. Economic Inputs (n w r D and)

As has been seen, by the year 1965, Pakistan had achieved considerable economic growth both in the industrial and agricultural sectors. It is important to see to what extent the education system contributed, or was required by the planners to contribute, to the economy.

Developmental planning in the early stages of Pakistan's economy was not, it appears, based on the manpower supply through the educational system. But in 1959, the Commission on National Education clearly emphasized,

"We stress throughout our report that one of our greatest national assets is our manpower but that this asset can only become the creator of national wealth when its energies have been released and enriched with the skills and training necessary in complex modern society..." 51

The Commission further stressed,

"only through vigorous action in training the people needed for this technological and agricultural progress can we escape from the situation in which our vast manpower, instead of being a source of national wealth is a constant drag on our economy." 52

The overall projections of estimated increase in the G.N.P. and employment during the plan years itself, had direct implications for the educational system in providing outputs into the economy, though the plans based their demand on the educational system for expansion and differentiation only on rough estimates on the basis of proposed physical and investment programmes. 53

Each of the Five-year Plans devoted a chapter to education - the First Plan (1955-60), relying on the interim Manpower Survey report of the I.L.O. estimated a 4 per cent increase in the Class 'A' Administrative, managerial and clerical workers, 8 per cent increase in

52. ibid. p.12.
Class 'B' high technical personnel, 19.9 per cent increase in Class 'C' skilled workers and 6.1 per cent in Class 'D' unskilled workers in the 5,000 industrial establishments.\textsuperscript{54} This manpower demand from the educational system, as expressed in the First Five-year plan, required an increase in primary school enrollment by one million and secondary school enrollment by 144,000. The Plan did not envisage any precise numerical projection on technical and vocational education. It only stipulated that it was necessary first to fill up the qualitative gaps that existed in the present system.\textsuperscript{55}

The Second Five-year Plan (1960-65) aimed at raising the proportion of the 6-11 age group from 42.3 per cent to 60 per cent by 1965. That meant an increase in the primary school enrollment of 1.2 million in West Pakistan and 1.2 million in East Pakistan, a total of 7.2 million for the whole country. In the secondary education as a result of the recommendations of the Commission on National Education, the Second Plan visualised the amalgamation of the intermediate classes, hitherto administered by the Universities, with the Secondary education system. The plan proposed an increase of the school level enrollment by 430,000, raising the top age of those attending secondary schools from 12 in 1960 to 16 by 1965.\textsuperscript{56}

The Third Plan (1965-70) committed itself strongly to the achieving of universal primary education within the prospective plan periods which aimed at an increase in the primary school enrollment of 70 per cent by the year 1970.\textsuperscript{57} The Third Plan also aimed at making the Junior High School (classes VI, VII and VIII) compulsory for all children during the plan periods.\textsuperscript{58}

Regarding secondary education in general, the Third Plan

\textsuperscript{54} I.L.O. Report to the Government of Pakistan on a Manpower Survey, Geneva, 1956, ILO/TAP/PAK/RIO
\textsuperscript{55} First Five-year Plan, pp.402-3
\textsuperscript{56} Second Five-year Plan, pp.340-345
\textsuperscript{57} Third Five-year Plan, p.189
\textsuperscript{58} ibid. p.191.
recoi:nmended that priority should be iven to the training of skills to meet the immediate and multifarious needs of a rapidly ex ending economy. "The County can ill afford", the Plan emphasised "to see secondary school leavers posing subjects of study for which there is no economic demand, and thus creating a class of educated unemployed." 59 To this end the Plan envisaged the introduction of diversified curricula, and the opening of comprehensive schools, upgrading and improving of existing secondary schools and special emphasis on the training of technical teachers.

The Third Plan put special emphasis on the development of technical/vocational skills and for this purpose it planned to expand the existing technical institutes in East Pakistan as polytechnic institutes. In West Pakistan, it aimed to complete the eight polytechnic institutes and one monotechnic institute then being built and the construction of 13 new polytechnic institutes. 60 It estimated that the annual intake capacity of the polytechnic and technical institutes would increase from 4,100 in 1965 (1,900 in East Pakistan and 2,200 in West Pakistan) to 14,000 in 1970 (7,000 in East Pakistan and 7,000 in West Pakistan). The total output of technicians during 1965-70 would be 23,000 (11,000 in East Pakistan and 12,000 in West Pakistan).

Another dimension of the relative order of priorities in raising the capacity of the educational system can be gleaned from the percentage of expenditure on various levels and types of education during the three Five-year Plan periods as shown in the table below:

59. ibid. p.191
60. ibid. p.191
TABLE V.1:3
Comparative Figures of Expenditure in Various Sub-Sectors of Education during the Three Plan Periods (Million Rupees)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Sector</th>
<th>First Plan</th>
<th>Second Plan</th>
<th>Third Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Edn.</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Edn.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Edn.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Edn.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>380</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,102</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Third Five-year Plan, p.215

As is shown by these figures the increase in the allocation of funds to technical education has been greater (6% to 23%) than any other sub-sector. The share of higher education has relatively decreased from 26 per cent to 15 per cent over the period. Secondary education and teacher-training have also received increased financial backing, but the percentage share of primary education has remained constant, although the net seven-fold increase from 74 million Rupees to 520 million Rupees over the 15 years period is significant.

7.3.4. Social Inputs

Socialisation and Literacy

At the time of national independence, 86 per cent of Pakistanis were illiterates; and of these the majority were females. The UNESCO study in 1954 asserted that:

"by far the most difficult social obstacle to be overcome in any programme of education in Pakistan"

61. Muhammad Shamsul HAQ. Compulsory Education in Pakistan, UNESCO, Paris, 1954. For the purpose of 1951 Census, literacy was defined as the ability to read a clear print in any language even without understanding. Government of Pakistan Census Bulletin 2, p.vii.
is the prevailing unsympathetic attitude towards girls' education. Curiously enough, the prejudice against girls' education is attributed to religion. Speaking by and large, the common man still believes, that it would be un-Islamic if a girl were to be seen in public. Either he is not properly aware of Islamic teaching that education is also obligatory for women, or he has no occasion for giving any serious thought to this problem of women's education" 62

By 1961, the Second Census showed that the national literacy had gone upto 19.2 per cent of which 33.0 per cent was in the urban and 16.6 per cent was in the rural areas. 63

This was a frightening state of affairs for a nation which aimed to re-state its value systems, as well as economically and socially to modernise itself. National policy has therefore, ever since independence, been committed to introduce compulsory primary education as a process of socialisation and enlargement of the empathetic capacity of citizens, by stages of five years in the beginning and then of eight years. 64

The 1959 Commission on National Education even went as far as to declare "Universal compulsory education would be a part of our national policy whatever be the difficulties and problems involved."

In 1969, the new Education Minister, Air Marshall Nur Khan, in his proposals for a New Educational Policy also stressed:

"The importance of literacy in national development is twofold. Firstly, it helps to bring about changes in social attitudes, such as contempt for manual work, submission to authority etc. which inhibit economic progress. Secondly it raises labour productivity by facilitating the acquisition of analytical and technical skills. It is clear that no real economic progress is possible in an illiterate society." 66

Regarding the Adult Literacy Programme, the Proposals recommended that immediate emphasis should be placed on imparting functional literacy to:

(a) those employed in the urban manufacturing sector,
(b) those living in the vicinity of large upcoming projects; and
(c) the drop-outs of elementary schools. 67

62. ibid. pp.96-97
63. First All Pakistan Educational Conference 1947, also First Fiveyear plan, pp.95-97
64. Report of the Commission on National Education, op. cit. p.120
65. ibid. p.173
To this end, the proposals aimed to impart literacy to 0.8 million adults by 1980. "If the programme is to succeed," diagnosed the Minister,

"it will be necessary to introduce national service for the country's educated youth on the Iranian model of National Literacy Corps. This, it is recommended should be done." 68

But in spite of these commitments in the National Plans and ministerial statements, the same Minister records that the overall literacy in the country in 1969 was no more than 20 per cent which "is among the lowest in Asia". 69

67. ibid.
68. ibid
69. ibid. p.19.
7.3.5. **Cultural Inputs**

**National Integrative Culture.**

(a) **Religion.**

Pakistan won its national independence on the basis of the religious affinity that bound its otherwise diverse and far-flung two wings. Common religion and sentiments of Islamic brotherhood inspired its people both from East and West Pakistan for a common nationhood. In all the national documents and policy statements, therefore, there has been a pronounced emphasis on cultivating national integration through religion.\(^{70}\)

The role of Islam as an integrative force has equally strongly been visualised in all educational policy statements, both at the level of socialisation and in education in its wider cultural connotations.\(^{71}\)

Both the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions have laid down that:

"All Muslims in Pakistan should be enabled individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah."\(^{72}\)

At socialisation level, these constitutional provisions implied that Islamyyat would be made a compulsory subject for all Muslims in the Primary and the Secondary schools. It also meant that the recitation of the Holy Qur'an and the discussion on Islamic injunction and the teachings of the Prophet in school assemblies, as well as, the provision of premises and time for prayers during school hours had to be provided. At a higher level, this input demand required the introduction of Islamic Studies as subjects of study both at College and University stages. Then there was the strong commitment of the

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70. M. S. Haq, UNESCO, op. cit. p.11.
71. Address of the Minister of Education delivered at the Second All-Pakistan Educational Conference, held in 1951 at Karachi, Government of Pakistan Press (Edn. Division), 1951. p.13.
modernists to cultivate Islamic Research in order to prepare the Muslim youth to see the need to transform traditional Muslim values and institutions in the light of modern norms.

(b) Linguistic culture

National integration in Pakistan was also sought through a common national language on which there seems to have been a general consensus before and after independence. As an inter-provincial common language, and particularly as a language that developed during the Muslim rule in India, already before independence, Urdu had been widely regarded as the languages of all the Muslims of India, in spite of their provincial or regional dialects. In fact, it may be recalled that Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and other Muslim leaders became aware of the strong Hindu opposition to all things Muslim, among other things, when the Hindu leadership as a whole put up a strong opposition to the continuation of Urdu as the court language. Since then, linguistically, Indo-Pakistani nationalisms had diverged apart from the religious differences, on Hindi-Urdu linguistic alignments. Communal disturbances, on the Hindi-Urdu controversy between Hindus and Muslims flared up on many occasions. With this background, at the time of partition, no Pakistani questioned that the national language of Pakistan would be Urdu.

The First All-Pakistan Educational Conference in 1947, the Second All-Pakistan Educational Conference of 1951 and the Six-year Nation Plan of Educational development all affirmed that Urdu would be the language of national integration for a Pakistan, East as well as West. In 1948, when the demand for Bengali as the national language of East Pakistan was aired by some sections of the Bengali Students, the founder of the nation reaffirmed that the language for inter-communication and national integration should be Urdu and none else.

73. See Al-BERUNI, The Makers of Pakistan, Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, p.25
74. ibid.
6.5.3. **Innovative Culture**

**Islamic Studies and Research**

Strong as the vow of the Pakistani nation was to establish a state on the Islamic principles, stronger still seems to have been their pledge to re-interpret and purify Islam from its traditionalism and medieval institutional framework. Both the All-Pakistan Educational Conferences in 1947 and 1948 repeated the need to set up institutions to carry out research aimed at "rediscovering the truth in Islam and sharing the application of this truth to the solution of our problems." Research in Islamic studies was considered imperative for its objective and subjective values.

The 1951 Conference for example recorded:

"The adoption of Islamic ideology as a basis of the educational system necessarily involves a thorough research into Islam's contribution to the various aspects of life and its bearing on modern problems in the fields of economics, social and political relations, etc. During the last four years some attempts have been made in the provinces to undertake an intensive study of a research in Islammiyat. It is proposed to establish a Central Institute of Islamic Research which, besides conducting research will be responsible for suggesting concrete educational projects on the basis of Islamic ideology and for undertaking the publication of standard literature on Islammiyat." 76

Similarly both the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions explicitly called for the setting up of an organization for Islamic Research "to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim Society on a truly Islamic basis. 77

**Scientific Research**

It was emphasized at the All-Pakistan Education Conference of 1951 that the University education that Pakistan inherited had no avenues for research in pure and applied science. The All-India Council of Scientific and Industrial Research established during the II World War

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77. *ibid.*
had barely begun functioning when the sub-continent was divided. Whatever amount of research there had been remained in India with all the laboratories of the Council. The Conference therefore, strongly recommended the establishment of a Council of Scientific and Industrial Research to develop applied research; and a similar Council of Social Science Research to give leadership in the field by assisting and keeping abreast of research needs and bringing them to the attention of the Universities and appropriate government departments.78

7.4. Within Education 1 System Processes of Modernization

7.4.1. Administrative Modernization

Policy Formulation Function:

Education in Pakistan is, in the main, under provincial jurisdiction. At the centre, however, the overall national educational policy is formed through the National Assembly according to the general national objectives and policies. In the formation of a national educational policy, the Central legislature is assisted by advisory boards, representing both community and technical interests. Draft legislation, before it is presented for formulation, is screened by the Central Ministry of Law and other expert bodies. At one time the Government planned to set up a National Council of Education as its principal advisory body, but the plan has not materialised.

At the Provincial level, Provincial Legislative Assemblies formulate policies of more particular educational questions within the range of their own provinces. Central policies are kept in view mainly as guidelines. When, however, the National Assembly or the Provincial Assemblies are not in session, policies are formulated both at the Central and the Provincial levels by the education Departments in the form of ordinances which become binding.79

Policy A option

The President of the Republic and the Provincial Governors and their cabinets give final approval to the policies enacted by the legislature. The Central and the Provincial Ministers of Education, in fact, wield unlimited authority both in policy formulation and policy adoption functions.

Policy Implementation

The Central Directorate of Education has recently assumed responsibility for the implementation of educational policies in the Federal Capital of Islamabad. Elsewhere, however, the Provincial Directorates of Education under their Directors of Education and Parliamentary Secretaries, are responsible to the Minister of Education for the implementation of educational policies.

At the regional level, Regional Directors and Divisional Inspectors are respectively responsible for the administration, implementation and supervision of the educational policy. Besides, there are ten regional Boards of Secondary Education mainly concerned with the secondary and intermediate level educations and a Board of Technical Education in each province to administer technical education in the Province. All of these Boards are responsible to the Minister of Education in their respective province. Directorates have also a Provincial Bureau of Education whose job it is to maintain close liaison with other countries and to act as a clearing house for information on all educational and other matters.80

Local Bodies in Education

Participation by local bodies in education had started during the British period in 1883 when as a result of the Hunter Commission's Report on education, and Lord Ripon's resolution on Local Self Government, the

80. ibid.
The government of India had realised the need for public participation in the development of education. Local bodies were required to contribute from their local rates to the educational budget. The District (Deputy) Commissioner was to act as the Chief Administrator of local bodies. In 1921, more concessions were given to local self rule when the District Commissioners were replaced by the elected Chairmen. The most important unit in the urban areas was the District Board, and in the cities and towns municipalities and town committees took over the responsibility of education in their jurisdiction. This system of local bodies had remained functioning through the national independence and up to the time when the Basic Democracies were introduced. Local members, however, had failed to operate the system with efficiency. Provincial Governments were shouldering most of the financial and administrative responsibility of education as a result of the default of the local bodies. There was a constant demand from the technical and managerial sides to transfer the control of primary education to the Provincial governments.81

The Basic Democracies Law however, still kept the District Councils involved in the process of educational policy - working through the District Education Committees. In 1962, however, consequent to the rising public pressure and teachers' protest over the mismanagement of education by local bodies, the provincial governments took control of all District Education Committees although to represent community interest three Basic Democrats were still kept on the Committees. Subsequently however, the Provincial Government had to take the full control of primary education into their own hands.82 Direct government management of the schools, nevertheless, was far from a satisfactory solution, and the problem of democratisation of the administration of education still remained unresolved. In 1969, the Nur. KHAN proposals strongly emphasised the decentralisation of educational administration and

82. asudul HASAN "Education and Local Bodies in Pakistan", in Pakistan Quarterly, Special Education Number, vol.XIII. No.4. 1966 pp.113-122.
proposed for the creation of autonomous District School Authorities with well represented membership of the community, managerial and technical interests derived from parents, teachers, laymen and government officials.\(^83\)

Private Enterprise in Education

Private enterprise in education had been encouraged by the British Raj by the turn of the present century when the demand for education started rising rapidly. Local religious organizations and foreign missions were given grants-in-aid to operate private schools. Early policies of the Government of Pakistan were favourable to the existence and indeed the progressive development of independent schools.\(^84\) But soon, these institutions particularly the foreign missionary schools came to be seen as vestiges of prestigious schools running counter to the national ideals of equality and as a hindrance to the national integration.

Private institutions were also cropping up in increasing numbers, mostly as commercially profiteering organizations whose major contribution to education was to help students pass examinations and get degrees and diplomas by cramming with ready made answers. Their management was often corrupt, and they failed to provide standardised buildings, equipment and furniture. As a rule they were intolerably over-crowded. Many did not even pay proper salaries to their teachers. Pressure was, therefore mounting on the Government to take over these schools and to put an end to this commercialisation and exploitation of education. The NUR Khan proposals stipulated the enactment of legislation, regulating the working of these institutions; but it seems that public demand grew for the nationalisation of private schools as the best solution.\(^85\)


85. Air Marshall Nur KHAM, op. cit. Appendix B.pp.56-65. In fact, the 'New Educational Policy' declared by President Bhutto's government in 1972, has already resolved that "private managed schools will be nationalised in a phased manner within a period of two years commencing from Oct. 1972 - without compensation". See Education for the asses-The New Policy, Gov't, of Pakistan, Dept. of Films & Publications 1972.

83. Air Marshall Nur KHAM, Proposals of a New Education Policy, op.cit.p.28
Modernization of the Administrative Structure of Universities.

The administrative structure of the Universities that Pakistan inherited took after that of the University of Calcutta which it was modelled on London University. In their governance, these older universities had devised a workable synthesis of the three representative interests viz the community interest, the managerial interest and the technical interest. Obviously, Colonial rule kept its mighty hand overhead in the form of a larger number of ex-officio and nominated members than of elected ones.

Policy Formulation

The Senate or the Court which comprised ex-officio and lay members was the main University governing body with statutory budgetary and appellate powers. Although a minimum number of 30 fellows had been laid down, there was no fixed upper limit which gave the Governor General in Council an absolute liberty to nominate as many fellows above the minimum required number of 30 as he deemed fit. Consequently, the University Senates had become unwieldy bodies with a majority of ex-officio fellows.

To modernise the University administration, after independence, the Panjab Government instituted the Panjab University Commission in 1950 which issued its report in 1952. Its recommendations were incorporated in the 1954 Act. The Commission was critical of the unnecessarily large Senate which they observed only restricted decision-making processes and precluded the Universities from exercising any measure of autonomy. According to the requirements of the 1954 Act, the re-organized Senate of the Panjab University was much reduced in size and consisted of the chancellor, the vice-chancellor, the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, The Director of Public Instruction, University Professors, Princ
of Degree Colleges and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission as ex-officio members. Technical interest was represented by three University lecturers, three professors and teachers other than University teachers, two members of the Board of Secondary education. Community interest was represented by the five members of the Panjab legislative assembly and pro-rata representatives from other regions. The Chancellor was empowered to nominate 15 more fellows from the three groups concerned. Similar changes were introduced in the Dacca and Rajshahi Universities as a result of the Dacca University Act 1953.

The Nur Khan proposals recommended further democratisation of the Senate by dividing fellowships on a 50-50 basis. It proposed even to reserve five seats to the students' representatives 'who should be allowed to attend only the meetings in which matters of their direct concern are to be discussed.' But whereas the need is still felt and proposals are made from time to time to enlist more community interest groups into the University policy-making body, the technical interest group, i.e. the academics in fact dominate the scene.

Policy Adoption

The University Syndicate is the chief executive committee of the Senate. Its members include the V.C. as an ex-officio member, the judge of the High Court, a member of the Public Service Commission, three (non-teacher) nominees of the Vice Chancellor, six elected members of the Senate, a nominee of the principals of the affiliated colleges. Deans of Faculties can only be co-opted for the meetings on matters concerning their faculties, but they have the right to vote. The Syndicate is a rely administrative body while the academic functions are managed by the Academic Council. In 1959 the Commission of National Education recommended that the Syndicate must be a compact body of competent persons.

86. The Punjab University Act, 1954, pp.9-10
perhaps nine to eleven in number, with a small representation of teaching staff on it." The reorganized Syndicate in fact consists of 17 members instead of 15 before modernization. On the Academic Council, the Commission recommended enlisting more professional and academic specialists such as Professors and Readers as well as foreign experts so as to raise the academic standards.

Policy Implementation

The actual administration of the University policy is done by the Executive Council under the chief authority of the V.C. and comprises the Registrar, Controller and Treasurer whose appointments are made by the Chancellor. Before independence the V.C. was generally a prominent personality who was appointed as a part-time supervisor of the University administration. His powers were wide extending to the control of all the technical, institutional and managerial organizations of the University. The 1950-52 Panjab University Enquiry Committee recommended that the appointment of the Chancellor should be for a longer period and his office be made more effective. But until 1959, when the Commission on National Education reported, this had not been done. The Commission was emphatic in pinpointing that "the powers of the Chancellor and the Vice Chancellor are not properly defined in the existing acts, and if they are to perform their duties effectively, it is necessary that their powers and responsibilities should be so defined..." 89

The Commission recommended that:

"The Vice-Chancellor or pointed by the Chancellor, should have a term of service long enough to allow him to develop and implement a significant policy for the University. He should be accountable to

88. The Report of the National Education Commission, p.48
89. ibid. pp.48-49
90. ibid. p.47.
the Chancellor for the just and proper performance of his functions. The Vice-Chancellor will be the chief academic and administrative officer of the institution charged with the responsibility of giving effect to the provisions of the University Act and the statutes framed thereunder. He should be vested with the necessary power to carry out these responsibilities."

Up until 1969, however, no substantial change had taken place in the University administration. The Nur Khan proposals stressed that the "administrative side of the Universities needs to be thoroughly streamlined." The proposals ran counter to the Commission on National Education in under-rating the usefulness of making the Provincial Governors chancellors of the Universities. The proposals also sought to introduce a measure of democratic procedure into the selection of the V.C. by suggesting that instead of the unqualified right given to the Chancellor to nominate the V.C., selection should be made from amongst the panel of names submitted by the Senate, by a majority vote of the Deans of Faculties and Professors of the Departments. But the administrative structure still seems deeply entrenched in the inherited positions where personal power and the political authority of the Provincial Governor still looms heavy.

Structural Differentiation

In spite of its ideological and functional limitations, the structure of the educational system inherited by Pakistan did not lack all the basic elements of a modern framework. In fact, Professor Foster, dealing mainly with Africa, even goes to stress that accepting the restricted occupational structure of the colonialist period and the narrow, academic functions of the schools, colonial education was probably the most suitable for the role it was designed to perform. 

91. ibid. p.48
93. ibid. p.37
95. At the First All-Pakistan Educational Conference in 1947, the Education Minister remarked about the inherited system, "It has no common faith or body of principles to animate it and has conspicuously failed to inculcate and maintain\(\ldots\)."
The inherited structure nevertheless, did need structural modification and reconstruction as an articulated and uniform national system.

The first defect that seems to have confronted educators in Pakistan was the lack of uniformity in the educational structures of various provinces and regions. The British seem to have allowed each province to devise its own system to suit its climatic, economic, and occupational requirements. Duration of schooling, for example, varied from one province to another. In Sind, the primary education extended over four years while in other provinces it was generally five years. There was inconsistency and overlapping between the vernacular, Anglo-vernacular middle schools and the High Schools. Some middle schools even included elementary classes. The vernacular middle school was almost a blind alley whereas the Anglo-Vernacular and High School prepared pupils for the school Leaving Certificate. Relative to the lack of uniformity among schools, teachers' training institutions also lacked articulation. There were institutions for junior vernacular, senior vernacular, Senior Anglo-Vernacular teachers on the one hand and the post-graduate teachers, mainly for English teaching, on the other. High Schools, in theory were to have all post-graduate trained teachers. The two Universities that Pakistan inherited, Panjab and Dacca, catered for large areas and diverse functions. They were also heavily preoccupied with a large part of the secondary and intermediate stages.

The Post-War Sargent Report had spotted all the lacunae of the structure and made some important suggestions for reform. The Report

95. cont'd. /the stern moral and intellectual discipline which is the hallmark of true education. Thus, its products... have gone out into the world only to discover that they are unfit for the business of living/.

96. Post War Educational Development in India, Report by the Central Advisory Board of Education, New Delhi, Bureau of Education, 1944.
stressed that the high school should cover six years and that entry into it should be at 11+ on a selective basis. The Report also sought to bring about functional differentiation in the high schools by suggesting "that they should be of two types (a) academic and (b) technical, both providing for a good all-round education combined with some preparation in the later stages for the careers which pupils will enter on leaving schools." The Report recommended that "the curriculum in all cases should be as varied as circumstances permit and should not be unduly restricted by the requirements of Universities or examining bodies." But concerted structural modernization did not take place until after the Report of the National Commission in 1959.

The present national educational structure comprises three distinct stages. The duration of primary education is now uniformly fixed as five grades beginning at age 6-plus and extending to 11-plus. Secondary education, now comprises three stages viz. middle school grades 6-8, junior secondary school grades 9-10, and higher secondary school grades 11-12. Secondary education, therefore, covers the age group 11-18. Matriculation and secondary school certificate examination at the end of grade 10 can enable students to seek a white collar clerical job or admission into a Higher Secondary School, a polytechnic institute, primary teacher-training institute, industrial or Arts and Crafts School, whose courses vary from two to three years duration. In order, however, to go on to a University, a student must pass the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination. In 1963, when, following the proposal of the Commission on National Education, the Government extended the graduation course to three years, violent students riots ensued, particularly in East Pakistan and the much needed chance was withdrawn. Consequently,

the B.A. (pass course still remains unchanged from its pre-independence two-year structure. The B.A. (honours) course lasts three years, with a masters course lasting two years for someone with a B.A. pass and one year for B.A. Honours. Graduation in specialised courses, e.g. agriculture, engineering and medicine takes from four to five years.

Degrees are awarded by the Universities while the actual teaching at undergraduate level goes on in affiliated colleges. The Universities conduct teaching only at the post graduate level, except for the Agricultural and Technological Universities which conduct teaching at all levels. Universities now conduct only graduate and post-graduate examinations while matriculation and intermediate examinations are conducted by the newly established Boards of Education.99

THE NEW EDUCATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN
(Based on the Recommendations of the Commission on National Education, 1959)
7.4.2. Expansion of the Capacity of the System

During the pre-Plan period (1947-1954), the capacity of the educational system remained very limited. The modest expansion that did take place followed a haphazard course. In the absence of the needful resources, improvisation was the guiding principle. Primary education increased by 25 per cent, while secondary education expanded relatively slowly, and technical education was the slowest to progress. At the higher level, three new universities, Karachi, Peshawar and Rajshahi, were opened.

The First Five-year Plan (1955-1960) stressed the need to "fill gaps and maladjustments". The plan was critical of the quantitative expansion while the quality remained poor. In West Pakistan more stress was placed on the expansion of higher education than of secondary; while in East Pakistan primary and technical education needed more expansion. "This remarks Adam Curle, "is the expected contrast between an aristocratic and a more egalitarian Society." Teacher shortage remained very acute during this period.

The Second Five-year Plan, had before it the comprehensive framework of proposals and policy objectives outlined by the Commission on National Education in 1959. It, therefore, tackled the problem of expansion both of quantitative and qualitative nature in a balanced manner. Planned allocation of enrollments was envisaged for the different schools. More technical and vocational schools were planned than before. Yet the expansion in higher education, on the whole, outstripped all the other levels of education.

100. First Five-year Plan, p.453
The Third Five-year Plan further stressed the need to "achieve a well-balanced and integrated development at all levels of education." It pledged encouragement for vigorous efforts to improve the quality of education at all levels. At the same time it put greater emphasis on widening the base of primary education and on checking the high rate of drop-out. At the secondary level, the plan advocated greater diversification of courses in order to relieve bottlenecks at the higher education. For this purpose, the plan aimed to improve about 950 high schools in West Pakistan and 1,000 high schools in East Pakistan, to introduce technical and vocational courses and workshops and to open 40 comprehensive schools in each province. Extension of teacher-training programmes, with particular stress on the research facilities in education, was also emphasised. At the higher-education level, the plan put greater emphasis on expansion of the faculties of science and of scientific research activities.

A more detailed analysis of the expansion at each level would shed more light on the direction of progress and magnitude of the problem.

Primary Education

Pakistan planned to introduce compulsory primary education for all children in the age group 6-11 by the year 1970, and for age group 11-14 by the year 1975. The growth of primary education, however has developed as shown in Table VII.3.

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102. Third Five-year Plan, pp.186-187
103. ibid.
104. ibid. p.194
105. ibid. p.202
### TABLE VII.3

**Expansion of Primary Education in Pakistan 1947-1966**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>E.Pak.</th>
<th>W.Pak.</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>E.Pak.</th>
<th>W.Pak.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947-46</td>
<td>29,633</td>
<td>8,413</td>
<td>38,046</td>
<td>2,021,702</td>
<td>544,360</td>
<td>2,566,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>14,162</td>
<td>40,162</td>
<td>2,604,360</td>
<td>1,604,369</td>
<td>3,878,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>26,583</td>
<td>17,901</td>
<td>44,484</td>
<td>3,180,367</td>
<td>1,547,910</td>
<td>4,728,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>27,649</td>
<td>32,589</td>
<td>60,238</td>
<td>4,044,179</td>
<td>2,532,324</td>
<td>6,516,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>27,736</td>
<td>34,313</td>
<td>62,049</td>
<td>4,236,036</td>
<td>2,763,670</td>
<td>6,999,706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1965-66.

According to the Karachi Plan it was estimated that by 1965, the total number of children of primary school age would be 11.4 million. The actual enrollment in 1965 only stood at 6.5 million - much below the target. Dealing with this huge backlog the Tokyo meeting of Education Ministers suggested that within the broad targets set by the Karachi Plan, national policies might be varied to suit their special needs and available resources. It was with this background that the Third Plan envisaged putting more emphasis on the expansion of primary education.

### Secondary Education

**TABLE VII.4.**

**Expansion of Secondary Education in Pakistan between 1947-1966**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>E.Pak.</th>
<th>W.Pak.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947-48</td>
<td>3,841</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>6,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>3,079</td>
<td>2,264</td>
<td>5,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>3,053</td>
<td>3,043</td>
<td>6,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>3,834</td>
<td>4,323</td>
<td>8,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>3,964</td>
<td>4,472</td>
<td>8,436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1965-66

Secondary School enrolment has exceeded even the targets. In the First Five-year Plan, for example, the enrolment estimate was 144,000 and the Second Plan, aimed at 430,000. But the actual enrollment figures at the end of the First Plan stood at 146,000 and at the end of the Second at 775,060 respectively.
Intensive trends in expansion show that whereas the increase
in secondary school enrollment in East Pakistan was from 526,020 to
949,486 or less than twofold; in West Pakistan it increased from 508,039
to 1,481,094 which is about three-fold. This disparity obviously shows
the relative underdevelopment of East Pakistan and a resultant greater
rate of drop-out. As Prof. Curle has pointed out,

"The great majority of East Pakistani children
get no further than Class I. For every 100 who
enter that class 40 survive to Class II and
only about 15 to Class V. This, of course,
means that only a small proportion receive the
four or five years of schooling considered
essential to impart lasting literacy." 106

He goes on to conclude that "East Pakistan's education problems are due
more to accidents of history and geography than any failure of concern
by the authorities or lack of interest among the people". 107

**Teachers' Education**

Shortage of teachers was a very serious problem faced by the young
Country at its inception, and all the Five-year Development Plans have
given due importance to the expansion of the capacity to train more and
better teachers. The growth of teacher-training institutions and
enrollment is shown in Table VII.5.

**TABLE VII.5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number and Level of Institutions</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Level 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


106. ibid. p.76-79.
107. ibid.
TABLE VII.6
Number of Teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools
1947-1.66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PRIMARY</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>SEC IDARY</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.Pak.</td>
<td>W.Pak.</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>E.Pak.</td>
<td>W.Pak.</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-48</td>
<td>75,624</td>
<td>17,820</td>
<td>93,944</td>
<td>24,362</td>
<td>18,848</td>
<td>43,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>78,462</td>
<td>44,848</td>
<td>123,310</td>
<td>23,571</td>
<td>31,355</td>
<td>54,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>95,530</td>
<td>75,690</td>
<td>170,490</td>
<td>33,670</td>
<td>49,828</td>
<td>83,498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pakistan Statistical Year book 1965-66

The First Five-year Plan stipulated that the existing 99 Normal Schools could only train 34,000 teachers by the end of the Plan period in 1960, and projected opening new normal schools with an expected capacity of 100 trained teachers per year. The total turnover of trained primary school teachers was estimated at 43,500 by that year. Similarly for the secondary school teachers, the First Plan proposed a yield of 800 graduate and 1,800 undergraduate trained teachers annually during the Plan period.

But the actual increase in the number of teachers during the First Plan period only amounted to 16,356 primary and 9,288 secondary teachers - an achievement much less than the envisaged.

The Second Plan aimed at 70,000 additional primary school teachers and 65,000 secondary school teachers. In 1965, the system had only managed to produce some 47,000 extra primary teachers and 28,572 secondary school teachers. These gross failures resulted in the high pupil-teacher ratio of 36-3 in 1954-55, 38-3 in 1959-60 and 38-6 in 1964-65 in primary schools.

Technical and Vocational Education

As Table VII.7 shows, greater progress has been achieved in the technical and vocational education.

108. First Five-year Plan, p.421
109. ibid. p.422
110. Pakistan Statistical Year Book, p.423
TABLE VII.7
Expansion of Technical and Vocational Education
1947-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Technical Education</th>
<th>Commercial Education</th>
<th>Agricultural Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Insti-
| Enroll-
| tutions | ment | tutions | Enroll- | tutions | ment |
| 1947-50  | 121 | 7,169 | 13 | 1,023 | 2 | 33 |
| 1954-55  | 119 | 9,535 | 11 | 946 | 1 | 112 |
| 1959-60  | 113 | 12,045 | 18 | 1,098 | 2 | 321 |
| 1964-66  | (114 | 7,784 * | 33 | 3,209 | 4 | 938 |
| (18 | 8,181 |

Source: Pakistan Statistical Year Book.
* Polytechnics.

Higher education

Higher level education in Pakistan has developed disproportionately to the lower levels. By 1969, there were 10 Universities as against two inherited at the time of independence and 428 colleges as against 90 in 1947. Enrollment in the Universities has multiplied by 10 times from 2,264 in 1947 to 19,753 in 1965; and college enrollment rose from 36,000 to 267,832 in the same period. The latest figures for the third-level enrollment in the year 1968 as shown in the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1971) stood at 357,675, which is an immense growth compared with that of other levels.

Faculty-wise expansion is shown in Table VII.8.

TABLE VII.8
Expansion in Higher level Enrollment in the Various Faculties
1954-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculties</th>
<th>1954-55</th>
<th>1967-68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>65,489</td>
<td>196,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td>86,181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>6,292</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Arts</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>6,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>5,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>2,279</td>
<td>6,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>3,409</td>
<td>7,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>4,462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The greater pace of expansion in enrollment in the faculties of arts, agriculture and law is indicative of the fact that higher education is not correlated with the manpower demands of the economy. Admission into medical, engineering and science faculties in general are restricted. The influx of higher level students into the faculties of arts, law and education only helps them procure jobs and perhaps prestigious status.

7.5. Outputs of the Educational System as Inputs into the Society

7.5.1. Political Outputs - (formation of the Elites)

Before independence, the British Raj, had, as prophesied by Macaulay, given rise to a social stratification based entirely on the basis of ascriptive criteria with the minimum of achievement, that is, proficiency in English. Starting in the early nineteenth century with a restricted participation by the natives as white collar workers and junior executives in the economic and administrative institutions, the Indianisation movement of services gradually gathered momentum. Avenues of greater participation opened up by the mid-nineteenth century, when a network of infra-structures: roads, railways, postal and telegraph services and irrigation projects were constructed. Employment in these services was considered prestigious and offered security of income. So Universities were opened in 1857 to create a middle-class from which political, administrative, academic and industrial elites were recruited. In 1887, though 10 per cent of the I.C.S. posts were for the natives, only England returned graduates were enlisted. As Hennessy points out "both Central and Provincial governments ceased to

accept an Indian University degree as an automatic qualification for recruitment in the Civil Service. 113

The gradual process of Indianisation in the I.C.S. can be gleaned from the table below:

| TABLE VII.9. |
| Participation of the Indians in the I.C.S. |
| 1869-1942 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>1,205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: J. Hennessy, British Education for Elite in India (1780-1947)

This was the crystallization of the pyramidal social stratification structure in which a very thin layer of potential political elite of (Sahibs) was recruited on the basis of their education in public schools in India and/or higher education in England while the bulk of the elites who graduated from local higher education institutions remained, to borrow Abernethy's term, an 'incipient class'. 114

The seeds for dual standards in recruitment status were planted in the very creation of the popular Universities whose graduates were not considered good enough for top positions. But education still being the major avenue for social, occupational and income mobility, had to rise in demand. In the absence of a comparative shortage of job opportunities or entrepreneurship, the bulk of the University graduate output was produced by the faculties of arts, commerce and law.

Since national independence, the trend has changed but very slowly and relative to the openings or developments in the socio-economic...
and industrial systems. Education is still valued for prestigious reasons and for its passport value to securing a job - any job.

Recruitment into the higher cadres of the Civil Service still remains on the ascriptive criteria of the primordial groups who have established themselves in positions of authority. Trends of elite formation as judged by the University graduate output can be noticed from the table below:

**TABLE VII.10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>1959-60 (a)</th>
<th>1960-61 (b)</th>
<th>1963-64 (c)</th>
<th>1965-70 (d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>5,810</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>22,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc.</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Com.</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc. Home Economics</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc. Agriculture</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.BBS.</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc. Engineering</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (a) Statistical Yearbook 1965-66, (b), (c) and (d) W. M. Zeki, Educational Development in Pakistan, The West Pakistan Publishing Co. 1968, p.68

Thus modernising leadership in Pakistan is not composed of technocrats or intellectuals but of civil and military bureaucrats. Intellectuals are, as a rule, the worst hit group in states where armies win power and continue to rule. Next to the civil and military bureaucrats in Pakistan are the newly emerging class of entrepreneurs, of industrialists and businessmen, whose status and power stand in inverse proportion to their educational achievement. The older generation of the twelve notoriously influential industrialist and business "Big Houses" had little or no formal education. As Hanna Papanek has pointed out:

"Only five of the major entrepreneurs (i.e. men primarily responsible for the establishment and growth of the firm after partition) in this group of twelve, were educated to matriculation or better, including one B.A. and two B.Scs. the remaining seven entrepreneurs were educated to levels below matriculation, including instances where formal education was very rudimentary indeed". 115.

The younger generations of entrepreneurs are, however, becoming familiar with modern education, though relatively slowly. Close-book, prescriptive criteria that became entrenched in the society are hard to eradicate and create a great deal of friction among the young.

7.5.2. Economic Outputs: (Education, Manpower Supply and Economy).

Up until the Third Five-year Plan was launched, precise manpower demand and projections had not been studied. The plan, highlighting this dilemma, pointed out:

"The estimation of manpower requirements present difficulties as employment data by occupations are scarce, specially in the form of staffing tables and manning tables."

The Plan, therefore, relied on data from other countries at 'comparable stages' of development. The estimated high-level manpower output of the educational system during the five-year period was calculated as below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Supply</th>
<th>Actual Supply</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>13,100</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>7,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientists</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Technologists</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University and Sec.</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Third Five-Year Plan 1965-70. p.221

A glance at the table above shows the glaring shortages in all occupational categories.

The Third Plan recommended the following measures for the qualitative improvement of trained manpower:

1. Enlarge emphasis on practical training;
2. Provision of modern scientific laboratories;
3. Frequent reorganization of curricula of training institutes, in consultation with employers;
4. Systematic in-service and on-the-job training in a practical manner;
5. Training of more and better technical teachers by way of refresher courses;
6. Expansion of programmes for foreign technical training;
7. Improvement in the terms and conditions of technical personnel.

The UNESCO Study on Access to Higher Education, however, put equal blame on the policies of unguided admission into the higher education institutions and their resultant haphazard choice of subjects for considerable under-employment that prevails in Pakistan. It, therefore, recommended, inter alia, for guided and selective admission policy 'to meet this situation and educational and vocational guidance services organised to facilitate a wise choice of academic programmes, and later, to direct trained persons into appropriate channels.'

Another reason for the misfit of the economic system with the educational output of trained manpower in Pakistan may be ascribed to the type of industrial and business entrepreneurs that have emerged in Pakistan.

As seen above, the Big Businesses are still owned and run by family firms and their owners are either illiterates or barely literate. There seems to be a tendency among them to under-rate high-ed catinal or technical qualifications.

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117. Third Five-year Plan, p.222
7.5.3. Social Outputs

Pr vi on of Literacy

In spite of the repeatedly pronounced stress placed on it in all the educational and development plans and programmes since independence, the literacy rate in Pakistan has not much improved. The census of 1961, showed that 40.6 million population of 15 years age and over, which constituted 81.2 per cent of the total population, were illiterate as against 81.1 per cent in the 1951 census. A breakdown of these figures shows that 63.3 per cent of the illiterates are urbanites and 84.2 per cent villagers, and 71.1 per cent illiterates are males while 92.6 per cent females. Thus the original pattern of greater village and female educational and social backwardness within the overall depressing problem of mass illiteracy, remains basically unchanged.

The reasons for the failure of the educational system and literacy campaigns have been ascribed to faulty teaching, scarcity of adequate and suitable type of reading materials, lack of positive motivation for participation in the literacy campaigns by the adults and above all inconsistent and sporadic action in the early years.

To combat the formidable task of removing ignorance from among the teeming millions of village masses, the Village Agricultural and Industrial Development (V.A.I.D.) took initiative in 1956, by organizing eleven thousand village literacy centres with an enrollment of 90,000 adults in various villages of West Pakistan, and a corresponding number in East Pakistan. The Lala Musa, Peshawer and Comilla V.A.I.D. academics started reducing tr imed village workers.

Although a modicum of success was achieved by these measures, there has not been any real breakthrough.

The national Study Group for Adult Literacy and Adult Education, commissioned to prepare a 'comprehensive and effective plan for literacy', came to the conclusion that "mass illiteracy puts a stranglehold on the social and economic development of Pakistan and thus presents a serious national emergency; that mass illiteracy, therefore, must be tackled with courage and prudence and without further delay". The Study Group recommended a more planned and selective piloting of projects, by taking limited areas as economic and social units designed to operate as nuclei for a nation-wide campaign. But no worthwhile result appeared.

A more concerted effort was, therefore, made in 1969, by the Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, which set out a target of imparting literacy to 68 million by 1980. It chose three sectors considered to offer better chances for enlisting motivation for literacy, viz:

1. the urban manufacturing and industrial centres employing 3.3 million whose number was expected to rise to 6.7 million by 1980;
2. the large complex projects such as the Tarbela Dam, the Rooppur Nuclear Power Project, the Fertilizer Factories complex employing large number of labour; and
3. the rural areas where primary school drop outs below the age of 20 would be incorporated. These literacy centres built around in these areas would, it was hoped, impart not only literacy but also civic education, agricultural training and improved farming techniques. To manage these centres it was estimated that 28,000 teachers would be needed by 1970 and 72,000 by 1975.

122. RAU", op. cit. pp. 69-70.
high requirements could not have been met by the existing institutions. In view of the urgency of the task and its far-reaching occupational advantages, the government proposed to conscript all young men and women of the 18-22 age group into the National Literacy Corps to be formed on the model of the Iranian Sipah-e-Danesh (Wisdom Corps). Higher Secondary Certificate for men and matriculation certificate for women were the required education and a minimum of two-year service was obligatory. The plan has as yet to be implemented. 124

7.5.4. Cultural Outputs

**Integrative Culture - Islamic Unity**

Pakistan's education system was committed by its ideology to promote national integration on the basis of Islamic identity. Therefore, every national document has stressed that the educational system must introduce Islamiyyat and Islamic studies as a source of socialisation and inspiration. "Indeed, Pakistan to be true to her soul", declared the Commission on National Education, "should take inspiration from Islam, its principles and ideology." 125

As a result of the recommendations of the Commission on National Education, Islamiyyat has been made a compulsory subject for all Muslim children for the first eight years of schooling i.e. the primary and junior high school stages. From class 9 to 12, i.e. the high school and higher secondary or intermediate levels, it becomes an optional subject. Higher education puts more emphasis on educating the young to understand Islam in a rational manner. The Commission also stressed the need to promote Islamic Research in Pakistan in order to "bring together knowledge of the fundamental Islamic values and of modern science." A glance at the aims and objectives of Islam and abus g ven below sheds light on the stress on rationalism.

123. ibid.
124. ibid.
126. ibid. p.211.
1. Give an understanding of the basic principles of Islam.

2. To inculcate faith in and reverence for God, the Qur'an and the Prophet.

3. To inculcate respect for other prophets and the revealed Books.

4. To emphasize the Islamic conception of dignity of man, equality and universal brotherhood.

5. To inspire the students to achieve a high standard of individual and social virtues and to live a good life, clean in thought and correct in action.

6. To inculcate Islamic virtues like truthfulness, justice, tolerance, forgiveness, mercy, honesty, readiness to enforce the right and resist the wrong, simplicity, self-sacrifice, social service and search for knowledge.

7. To bring out clearly the Islamic criterion of excellence as distinct from birth, wealth, etc.

8. To emphasize the importance of practical goodness in Islam in preference to dogma and superstitions.

9. To present Islam as a progressive social system and a universal code of morality which can meet the demands of all times." 127

The stipulation of rationalistic and progressive aims in religious and moral education itself is just a part of the task. Much depends on the outlook of the teachers who are responsible for the infusion of the spirit of rationality. In Muslim countries generally, rationalistically orientated and trained teachers of Islamiyat are almost impossible to find. Teachers of religion are generally taught in the traditional madrassahs, their salaries are among the lowest, their status in the profession is low and their chance of progress scanty.

The Commission on National Education felt the need for training teachers of Islamiyat on modern lines.

"Scholars and teachers of Islamiyat should develop an objective outlook and understand the spirit and methods of modern science, natural as well as social, which should be freely applied in the interpretation of Islam. It would be desirable that teachers of Islamic studies, besides having an adequate knowledge of their subject in its various aspects, should have up-to-date knowledge of at least one of the social sciences such as economics, philosophy, sociology, psychology or political science and be able to appreciate the principles underlying the spirit and methods of natural sciences." 128


But the actualisation of these high ideals required tremendous effort in the establishment of institutions in which Muslim scholars could train, the building up of incentives for intending scholars to seek admission into these institutions; and finally the creation of a mutual trust and co-operation between the political and religious leadership. But the conflict between the politically powerful elite and the religiously powerful ulama didn't allow such synthesis to emerge. The gap that divided the modernist and the traditionalist elites remained and is widening. The ulama are suspicious of the political elite when the latter speak of modernising Islam. The so-called modernists, they argue, do not really know what Islam means; how could they be trusted with its modernization?  

In 1959, when a Central Institute of Islamic Research was inaugurated by President Ayyub in Karachi for the training of modern Islamic scholars under Dr. Fazl-u-Rahman, a Harvard modernist scholar, it came under severe criticism from all sections of the orthodox ulama.

The modernist political leaders have, on their part, striven to alienate the religious leaders from all national institutions, labelling them as communists and imprisoning them even if they speak against the primordial politics and violation of national norms which the modernists indulge in. It can safely be concluded that in spite of the great strength and intensity of the sentiments of Islamic brotherhood among the nation the socio-political divisions, the imbalances created by a small influential class on the top and an ignorant, impoverished mass, fail to unite the nation on the basis of Islam. The Educational System has, therefore, not been able to fulfil the demands of the creation of a rationalist-positivist spirit among its literati.

129. See Maulana MANDUDI'S views on modernization and Modernists, Appendix B.
The Languages

If the ties of Islamic brotherhood hold the people together in spite of the governments ineptitude and the corruption of politicians both of whom, nevertheless, have failed to channel these integrative dynamics, in the case of language, the process has reversed itself. Linguistic unity in Pakistan did not come about in spite of the politicians' desire to have a uniform national language. The language issue kept disrupting the socio-political harmony in the first place between the East and West wing from 1948 to 1954. East Pakistan with its internal linguistic unity (98.3 per cent of its population speak Bengali) and with its overall numerical supremacy over West Pakistan was fearful of West Pakistan's dominance shown by the early decision which made Urdu the national language. Strong pressure was brought to bear upon the provincial and national governments by the language campaign started in 1952 in Dacca which took the inflammatory shape of mass agitation in 1954. Students clashed with the police and some deaths also occurred. A compromise formula was, therefore, found by the adoption in 1954 of both Bengali and Urdu as the two national languages for Pakistan though English held its supremacy both as an official language and a compulsory second language at secondary and higher school levels.

According to the 1961 Census in West Pakistan, linguistically the one-unit was divided as - Punjabi 66.39 per cent, Sindi 12.59 per cent, Pashto 8.47 per cent, Urdu 7.58 per cent and Baluchistani as 2.49 per cent. So the adoption of Urdu for West Pakistan was also rife with problems. The Commission on National Education, taking cognizance of the language problem, maintained:

"We are firmly convinced that for the sake of our national unity we must do everything to promote the linguistic cohesion of West Pakistan by developing the national language, Urdu, to the fullest extent.....Urdu is already the medium of instruction at the primary stage, and this arrangement should continue. Urdu in this way will eventually become the common popular language of all the people in this area." 132

But disharmony on the language issue is basically tied up with the socio-economic and political disparities as well as the elite-mass gap.

Multilingualism does not in itself pose a threat to national integration. It is only when language becomes a vehicle for the concentration and perpetuation of status in the hands of the dominant groups that it disrupts. The Bengali speaking East Pakistanis saw in Urdu, in conjunction with English, an instrument of power and status in the hands of powerful civil and military bureaucracy of West Pakistan as a whole, and so they revolted. Similarly, the Bahuchi's and Sindus entertain a fear of social and cultural dominance, and the problem is likely to remain smouldering until linguistic diversity is somehow given equal importance.

Innovative Culture

Traditionalism and Islamic Research

Pakistan educationalists envisaged diminishing religious anachronism by the cultivation of Islamic research in the Universities and specially created Research Institutes. So great was the importance attached to the need for research that the 1962 Constitution required the President to establish a Central Institute of Islamic Research, and the Commission on the National Education recommended the opening of an Institute of Islamic studies in each wing of the country, with its own up-to-date library, research scholars and arrangements for the publication of research. 133

133. ibid. p.211.
The Central Institute of Islamic Research was opened in 1960 with the following objectives:

1. "To define Islam in terms of the fundamentals in a rational and liberal manner and to emphasize among others, the basic Islamic ideals of Universal brotherhood, tolerance and social justice;

2. to interpret the teachings of Islam in such a way as to bring out its dynamic character in the context of the intellectual and scientific progress of the modern world;

3. to determine and demonstrate the contributions of Islam to thought, science and culture with a view to enabling the Muslims to recapture an eminent position in these fields." 134

The work of the Institute was divided into four departments of Research, Publications, Law and Training. The Institute intended to imbue the spirit of criticality among its researchers and to train new types of 'Islamists' who would, as the Institute declared, "be made abreast of knowledge that man had acquired so far in other fields of inquiry without which the overall implications of the Qur'an and Sunnah cannot be fully understood." 135

In its training programme, the Institute envisaged combining together the Islamic Studies of the Qur'an, the Prophetic Tradition, Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), Tasawwuff (Islamic philosophy) and Arabic; and modern studies such as modern European languages - English, French and German, modern Law including Roman Law, Principles of Economics, comparative religion, arts and architecture.

Its publication section planned to publish research matters in its four periodicals; two in English: the "Islamic Studies" and "Ummah" one in Urdu known as "Fikro-Nazir" (Thought and Insight), and one in Bengali called Saudhan. It also hoped to publish an Arabic Journal so as to create an academic liaison with the Arab world on focal issues.

135. ibid. p.19.
of Islam so as to elicit commonality of viewpoints.136

The Institute proposed to recruit its students from amongst
the output of the Universities' Islamic studies Departments as well
as the traditional madrassahs. It also envisaged enlisting its
teaching staff from both the modernist and the traditionalist sections
of the Ulama alike, as as to gather a variety of talent at the
Institute. Judging from the aims of the Institute, its programme of
studies, research, publication and training, it would have appeared
that Pakistan moved in the right direction in the creation of an
institutional setup designed to re-educate the modern scholars of Islam
in a rational and scientific manner.

Although the hoped for synthesis of the orthodox and the modernist
scholars within the Institute has failed to emerge because of mutual
mistrust, yet the Institute has continued to contribute by means of
research, to the inculcation of the spirit of rationalism in the study
and understanding of Islam. Among its major projects, the Institute
has included research into the genesis and development of Islamic Law;
preparation of a compendium of specialised and scholarly articles on
Islamic Jurisprudence; translations of outstanding works on Islam
in the various foreign languages, among these the Caetani's
Chronographia Islamica in collaboration with the Italian Institute for
the Middle East and Far East in Rome.137

Other (Private) Institutions of Islamic Research

Important privately run research establishments include the
Madrasah-i-Alia in Dacca, the Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore,
the Shah Wali-Ullah Academy, Hyderabad, the Jamia Islamia Bahawalpur
and the Islamic Academy, Dacca.

136. ibid. p.25.
137. See Abdul RAUF, Renaissance of Islamic Culture and Civilization
in Pakistan, Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1965, pp.216-218
The Modrassah-i-Alia is the new name given to the celebrated Calcutta Madrassah founded by Lord Warren Hastings in 1785, as it moved into East Pakistan on the eve of independence. The Madrassah has a well established department of research in Islamic studies with its own journal known as Minar (The Tower).  

The Institute of Islamic Culture was founded in 1900 as an autonomous body engaged in the cultural propagation of Islam. Its publications include standard works in English and Urdu, translation of Arabic and Persian Classics and a monthly Urdu journal, known as 'Seqafat' (Culture). 

It draws many Muslim and non-Muslim scholars from foreign countries who visit the Institute and attend seminars.

The Shah Wali Ullah Academy - established in 1963 by a philanthropist Muslim lady, the academy purports to carry out research into the revolutionary ideals propogated by the great Muslim reformer Shah Wali Ullah of Delhi, who launched his reform movement in Muslim India in the 18th century. The Shah holds a prominent position in the rank of those international Muslim reformers who wished to bring about social change in the world of Islam by means of a reform of the Muslims from within, by wider propagation of the Quranic principles through simple translations and expurgation of the doctrine from the malpractices that got entrenched into it over centuries of traditionalism.

The Jamia Islamia. The Jamia was established in 1963 by the Awkaf Department of the West Pakistan government, basically to train suitable teachers of Islamiyyat at schools and colleges. The Institute also promotes research in the Islamic studies.

The Islamic Academy. This academy located in Dacca is affiliated to the Central Institute of Islamic Research. Among its objectives, it includes: 'to adopt appropriate measures for the organisation and encouragement of research in Islamic history, philosophy, law, jurisprudence, etc.'
Scientific Research

Strong emphasis was placed in the First All-Pakistan Educational Conference in 1947 on the need to develop fundamental and applied research in scientific and technological subjects within the Universities and other specialised Research Institutes. To implement the recommendations of the conference a Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was established at the national level in 1953, in order to promote and foster scientific research, "having a bearing on industrial development and utilisation of national resources to the best economic advantage".142

In addition, the conference also enjoined upon the Universities to organise their own research institutes on an inter-departmental basis. It also recommended the establishment of a Council of Social Science Research "to give leadership in the field by assisting and keeping abreast of research needs and bringing them to the attention of the Universities and appropriate government departments, by conducting Seminars in research methods and otherwise increasing the number and quality and research workers, by advising on the framing of research projects; and above all, by giving encouragement and financial support to individuals who show competence or promise in the field."143

Applied research is a national responsibility and is being conducted by various autonomous bodies such as the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Food and Agricultural Council, the Medical Research Council, the Central Cotton Committee, The Central Jute Board and the Atomic Energy Commission.144 Chart 'H' shows the list of various learned societies and institutes engaged in innovation and research in Pakistan.

142. The First Five-year Plan, p.439
143. ibid. p.443
144. Commission on National Education, p.28
### List of Learned Societies and Research Institutes Engaged in Innovation and Research in Pakistan

**ACADEMY**
- **Pakistan Academy of Sciences**: Rawalpindi. f. 1953; to promote research in pure and applied sciences.

**LEARNED SOCIETIES**
- **Pakistan Association for the Advancement of Science**: Lahore. f. 1951; promotes science in all its branches, including its application to practical problems and research; organizes national and international conferences.
- **All Pakistan Educational Conference**: Karachi. f. 1947; promotes education at all levels.
- **Agricultural Economics Society of Pakistan**: Karachi. f. 1958.
- **All Pakistan Homoeopathic Society of Pakistan**: Karachi. f. 1949.
- **Anjuman Taraqqi-e-Urdu Pakistan**: Karachi. f. 1903.
- **The Arts Council of Pakistan**: Karachi. f. 1956; fosters the development of fine arts and crafts, drama, dance, music and to promote the study and appreciation thereof by sponsoring exhibitions, lectures etc.
- **Central Urdu Development Board**: Lahore. f. 1962; aims to promote Urdu as the common language of Pakistan.
- **Institute of Islamic Culture**: Lahore. f. 1909; over 100 publications on Islamic subjects in English and Urdu.
- **Iqbal Academy**: Karachi. f. 1951; publishes books and pamphlets on Iqbal and his thought.
- **Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Control Research Council**: Rawalpindi. f. 1964; aims to promote research in the fields of hydraulics, irrigation, drainage, reclamation, tubewells and flood control.
- **Jamiyatul Falah**: Karachi. f. 1960; to encourage the study of the Quran and to set up and maintain Islamic Missions.
- **Karachi Theosophical Society**: Karachi. f. 1896. Its activities include study of UN and its work, and discussions on problems of education and social welfare in Pakistan.
- **Mehran Library Association**: Hyderabad. f. 1966. Enhances the cause of the library profession through symposia, seminars etc.
- **Music Foundation of Pakistan**: Karachi. f. 1964; to serve the cause of classical Pakistani music through academic instruction, concerts and visits abroad.
- **National Book Centre of Pakistan**: Karachi. f. 1965; to promote the study, production of books through book festivals and exhibitions and advice.
- **National Science Council**: Karachi. f. 1961; Aims to co-ordinate the activities of various Research Councils in the country and advises the government on the development of scientific research.
PAKISTAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY, KARACHI. F. 1950. conducts historical studies and research particularly in the History of Islam and of the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.


PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Karachi, 1947 to study the international politics and to encourage international understanding.

PAKISTAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, Karachi: to advance the cause of library movement throughout Pakistan.

PAKISTAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Karachi.

PAKISTAN MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Karachi. 1953. to promote research in fields of medicine and public health, to disseminate and arrange for medical research and to maintain liaison with national and international organizations.

PAKISTAN MUSEUM ASSOCIATION, Peshawar. f. 1949; aims to advance and improve the work of museums in Pakistan, establish close contact with universities, educational and services institutions, open new museums in towns in Pakistan etc.

PAKISTAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS, Lahore. f. 1954. for the promotion of philosophical studies.

PUNJAB ADEBI ACADEMY, Lahore. f. 1957; for the promotion of literary, scientific works concerned with Punjab.

PUNJAB UNIVERSITY HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Lahore. for the historical research concerning the Punjab.

Punjab Bureau of Education, Lahore. f. 1958, acts as a clearing house for information on education of all aspects and levels at home and abroad. Documentation section, statistical section, publication section and research sections engaged in their respective activities.

URDU DEVELOPMENT BOARD, Lahore. 1959. promotes the development of Urdu and publishes lexicography of Urdu.

RESEARCH INSTITUTES

ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB.

CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Karachi.

DEPARTMENT OF PLANT PROTECTION, KARACHI.

FAZI-I-QOMAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Rabwah.

HISTORICAL RECORDS AND ARCHIVES COMMISSION FOR PAKISTAN, Karachi.

IRRIGATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE, LAHORE.

ISLAMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ISLAMABAD.

PAKISTAN ANIMAL HUSBANDRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, KARACHI.

PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (PINSTECH), ISLAMABAD.

ATOMIC ENERGY CENTRE, LAHORE.

ATOMIC ENERGY AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH CENTRE, TANDOJAM.

ATOMIC ENERGY MEDICAL CENTRE, KARACHI/LAHORE.

RADIOLOGICAL GENETICS INSTITUTE, LYALLPUR. SOURCE: THE WORLD OF LEARNING; EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, LONDON.
7.6. Conclusions

Pakistan's record in the evolution of an integrative network of viable political institutions over a period of 25 years has been marked with patent failures. Its inability in the first place to formulate a national constitution for 9 years; its failure then to hold general elections to win legitimacy from the populace, and finally the breakdown of its democratic-parliamentary systems in 1958 and the imposition of Martial Law and then a backdoor coup d'etat leading into 10 years of army rule, all testify to the self-seeking policies of its ruling classes.

It is not within the scope of this study to dwell at length upon the causes of the political instability that has beset Pakistan over the years. Nevertheless, the most obvious and commonly agreed ones can be summarised thus:

1. The initial lack of a clearly defined and cogent framework of socio-political institutions in the minds of the 'founding fathers' of Pakistan that led to ambiguities and contradictory viewpoints in the early years;

2. the various regional and provincial rivalries and their resultant fear of dominance that beset the different sections of the society;

3. the pronounced monopolisation of power in the hands of the landed aristocratic class who between them appropriated all civil and military bureaucratic control and corrupted the entire fabric of society.

As Gunnar Myrdal, has depicted them:

"This group had fewer inhibitions about using power in its own interests, particularly as the masses were even less activated to defend 'theirs'."

Acute incompetence and corruption of the political system was, therefore, the inevitable result of all these ascriptive, primordial -

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"This group had fewer inhibitions about using power in its own interests, particularly as the masses were even less activated to defend 'theirs'."

Acute incompetence and corruption of the political system was, therefore, the inevitable result of all these ascriptive, primordial -

group policies. To quote Professor Myrdal again:

"From the onset, politics in Pakistan was characterised by factional maneuvering, chicanery, coercion and widespread corruption, all of which were so much part of the moves as hardly to need concealing. Not alone idealism - but even public decency was at a discount. From this low level of behaviour economic as well as political chaos quickly followed.

The mass of Pakistanis or even the larger part of the educated class were not really involved in the game of politics except intermittently and haphazardly, as voters to be bribed or intimidated, or as mobs to be swayed. Political elections were farce. Prime Ministers and Cabinets at the Centre rose and fell in rapid succession. The Constituent Assembly functioned at the sufferance of the executive instead of as a check upon it. It did not make or break governments, or educate the public on national issues...... A very few people made all important political decisions at every level of Government...."

146

These mighty few played primordial, ascriptive politics to further their group interests rather than the universalistic interests of the community. Not to mention the evolution of viable concepts from Islam, they were not even willing to create a coherent, integrated society in Pakistan. Consequently, disparities, inequalities and polarities of outlook became widespread, and their by-products; the corruption, nepotism and red-tapism and various other social evils plagued the society. Therefore, right from its infancy, the new state fell prey to administrative, constitutional, economic and social setbacks.

Ideological confusions and extreme viewpoints on the nature of society militated against the evolution of a national constitution in the country for eight years. Powerful families monopolised high strategic positions in the various organizations and cared little for the national interest. Backward provinces, regions or groups were badly neglected. Basic liberties of the people at large were curbed for long intervals under martial law. Education was equally used to further these class

146. ibid.
interests and remained highly elitist.

The reaction to all these injustices was bound to take the shape of a holocaust. In 1971, Pakistan which had risen with high ideological fervour and great expectations of the Muslims of the subcontinent, collapsed due to the divisive and selfish policies and political as well as moral incompetence of its self-imposed civil and military bureaucratic leadership. The lofty ideals of Islamic modernization as conceived by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah had the most shattering setback.

The new Pakistan that emerged in 1972, had to rediscover its vision for the future. Its commitment to the Islamic modernization had to be re-stated.

The role of the educational system in the modernization programmes of Pakistan remained manifestly related to the regressive and divisive practices that characterised Pakistani Society from its genesis to its break up into Bangladesh and Pakistan.147

The injunctions of the Qur'an have as much meaning in Egypt today as they ever did provided they are interpreted with due regard to the great changes that have occurred in human society since the Prophet preached his message.

General Muhammad Naguib.
8. EGYPT

8.1. National Independence

Egypt was in reality liberated from foreign domination by the Free Officers' Revolution in 1952 which ousted the nominally independent rule of King Farouq. On paper the King ruled 'democratically' on the basis of the 1923 Constitution which provided for a representative legislature and public participation in administration. In practice he governed capriciously only to obey the foreign 'masters'.

The 1923 Constitution itself had been so designed as to give rise to anomalies and obstructions. On the one hand it gave the King a suspensory veto, on the other it also allowed for an overriding power of a two-thirds majority to the Parliament. The King, predictably violated the Constitution flagrantly on many occasions, throwing the country into decades of misrule and corruption.

Egypt before 1952 was not nationally independent in the true sense of the term. In practice its millions of people had no say in the running of the national affairs. For these poor, forgotten and disfranchised millions life revolved round their traditional environment ruled by traditional customs and dominated by the authority of the 'Pashas'.

1. Manfred HALPERN commenting on the development of constitutionalism in Egypt during the British Presidency concludes, "The constitution of 1923 opened an era that might have been more liberal --- two-thirds of the parliament could now override the King's veto --- had that constitution also marked a willingness on the part of the King and the British to accommodate themselves to major changes in Egyptian political, economic and social relationships. This was not the case and consequently a structure suited to bargaining and compromise was destroyed both by outright battles among irreconcilable forces and the means used to avoid such battles. As parties inside and outside parliament strove for fundamental alterations in the system --- at least in ending British influence and curbing the Kings ---, the King reacted by revising the liberal constitution, or ruling without constitutions, rigging elections, curbing the freedom of the Press, Assembly and speech; and with his resources as the largest landowner in the nation, bribing party factions and parliamentarians."

In their objective of achieving a true national independence, the Free Officers aimed at, what President Nasser has described as, two revolutions: the termination of the foreign domination, and the socialistic revolution. Modernization, they believed, could only begin after these revolutions had been achieved. But to carry the modernising ideals out, consolidation of leadership had still to go on. For over two years the struggle for modernising leadership continued, until all traces of traditionalism, and groups aligned with it, either actually or possibly, such as the Wafd Party, the Muslim Bretheren and President Najib himself had been removed from the position of power. Gamal Abdul Nasser then emerged as the unchallenged nation-builder, a charismatic leader in the style of Ghazi Kemal Ataturk, which Najib had apparently failed to be.²

8.1.1. Ideology and Identity

Egypt's model of Arab-nationalism, the ideological motive force behind the revolution was, explained by President Nasser, in his 'Philosophy of the Revolution', in terms of three circles: Arab, African and Islamic.³ Of these three, the Arab circle seems to have overshadowed the other two. Egyptians began seeking for socio-political and cultural unity, not only within the confines of Egypt but within a broader, regional community of the 'greater Arab nation'. This assertion of identity manifested itself not only in the mobilization of nationalistic sentiments among the youth and students of other Arab countries, but also in the various attempts at political unification with Egypt by sister Arab States; the 1958-1961 Union of Egypt and Syria.

2. "The real reason", remarks Peter MANSFIELD, "why the General (Najib) never came over to emulating the Grey Wolf of Anatolia (Kemal Ataturk) lay in his character. He had nothing to compare with Ataturk's vision, ferocious energy or ruthlessness. He was just too nice." See Peter MANSFIELD, Nasser's Egypt, Penguin Books, 1965, p.48.

into a United Arab Republic; the unsuccessful attempt in 1964 of Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan and Syria to form an Arab Common Market, and the 1971 federation between Egypt, Libya and Syria, with the Sudan expected to join.

The appeal for a wider Arab unity, judging strictly by the norms of modernity, could be construed to mean a leaning towards irrational, diffuse and affectivity-orientated tendencies. But ideology must seek, as Binder has pointed out, to satisfy both rational and irrational needs to maintain a stable polity. The failure of various projects of Arabization nevertheless does indicate a regressive trend in the otherwise highly modernization drive of the Egyptian Revolution. Political unifications apart, the ideological orientations of Egypt have clearly leaned heavily towards Arabization of the national culture, subordinating in the process the Islamic element to the position of a sub-culture. This has obvious implications for Muslim education in Egypt.

8.2.1. Modernization of the Polity

Norms: Constitutionalism, Capacity and Equality

The first national constitution, declared in January 1956, was regarded as a 'synthesis of a reformist ideas-- in the direction of a welfare state, with Islamic and nationalist concepts'. It defined the Egyptian State as:

- an independent and sovereign Arab state;
- a democratic Republic;
- an integral part of the Arab Nation;
- a Muslim state with Islam as its State Religion and Arabic its official language.


Other norms of modernity were incorporated into the constitution by guaranteeing the basic rights of equality of citizens before law, in rights and duties, irrespective of race, language, religion or belief (art. 3); the right to state financial assistance in case of old age, sickness or disability (art. 21); the right to education (art. 49); the right to work (art. 52), and the right to unionization (art. 55).

The first general elections held under this constitution in 1957 were also exemplary in that Egyptian women were allowed, for the first time, to vote and to stand for candidacy.

The 1962 National Charter

This document, designed to be the 'national covenant', was a further commitment on the part of the leadership to define and set out clearer political, economic and social guidelines for the modernization of Egypt. The ethos of capacity and equality were further embedded in the National policy by the adoption of national socialism within the framework of a democratic society. The Charter declared:

1. "Political democracy cannot be separated from social democracy. No citizen can be regarded as truly free to vote until and unless he has secured three guarantees:
   . He should be completely free from exploitation.
   . He should have an equal opportunity for a just share of the national wealth.
   *** He should be free of all anxieties that undermine the security of his future.

2. "Political democracy cannot exist under the domination of any one class. Democracy means literally, the domination and sovereignty of the people --- the whole people".

To ensure capacity of the polity for economic and social modernizaton, the Charter envisaged three dynamic principles:

(a) the accumulation of national wealth by the state to increase the national production to the maximum;

(b) increasing employment of science and technology to raise national production; and

(c) the formulation of progressive national planning to return the benefits of economic action to the masses.
The 1964 Constitution

To give the ideals of the Charter a national legitimacy, the Constitution of 1964 expressly described the United Arab Republic as a Democratic, Socialist and Co-operative society.6

Structural Differentiation

The 1956 Constitution had defined the lines of differentiation between the legislature, executive and judiciary. But at that time, the Revolutionary Command Council controlled all the institutions, and hence a strict differentiation between functions of policy making, policy adoption and policy implementation based on the Constitution was not observed. The Free Officers held key positions in almost all institutions. However, after national integration was secured, and elections held, institutional differentiation seems to have crystallised. The Presidential Council and the Executive Councils instituted under the R.C.C. were abolished and the arrangement that emerged was, to use Leonard Binder's framework, not perhaps a truly 'constitutional system' but a 'rational system', whereby the basic objectives of 'independence and modernization' of the Regime remained constant, only the modes of implementation of these objectives varying in view of the economic and foreign policy constraints.7

Policy Adoption

The President of the Republic, as head of the State and the Chief Executive, is responsible in the final analysis for the adoption and implementation of the national policy in all political, social and economic affairs. He has the powers to initiate and draft national policies and laws.

6. In his appraisal of the validity of these concepts O'Brian has pointed out that they should essentially be interpreted in the context of Egyptian society and not in their Western European connotations. See Patrick O'BRIAN, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System, from Primitive Enterprise to Socialism., 1952-65, O.U.P. 1966. p.282

Policy Formulation

All Policy drafts initiated either by the Executive or by private members must be passed by the National Assembly by a two-third majority. A draft law opposed by the President automatically becomes a law if the National Assembly passes it a second time by a two-third majority. The President can also promulgate laws by decree if the Assembly is not in session, but such laws must be referred back to the Assembly within fifteen days of its re-opening. The Assembly has the right to withdraw confidence from the Government or any of its members, in which case the Government, or the member in question, must resign. The President can dissolve the Assembly, but he must call for fresh elections within 60 days.

The most striking feature of the National Assembly in Egypt is that, according to the 1964 Constitution, 50 per cent of its members must be represented by workers and farmers. Contrasting this with the traditional system before national independence Wilber remarks:

"Thus the peasants and workers who throughout the recorded history of Egypt have been exploited, trodden on and disfranchised now receive the lion's share of representation in the Legislative Assembly". 8

Policy Adjudication

Egypt now has an articulated hierarchy of National Courts, and all the traditional Sharia courts for the Muslims and the Milliya courts for the non-Muslims that had been functioning in the country since the Ottoman Rule were abolished in 1955 by Law No. 472. The Judiciary now remains perfectly independent of the Executive. 9

Policy Implementation

Implementation of the national policy is entrusted to the Government headed by a Prime Minister and consisting of a Cabinet of

Ministers. With the centralization of many economic and political activities within the State control and because of the growing differentiation of institutions, the Cabinet now consists of some thirty Ministries, two concerned with education: the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education.

The Bureaucracy

To administer the vastly expanding functions that modernizing leadership took over for the State, especially with the nationalisation of industrial and commercial establishments, it was necessary to raise an efficient and expanding bureaucracy. Egyptian bureaucracy has a long history going back to the French occupation and the Pasha's era when it was first established. The British Rule under Lord Cromer turned it into a highly efficient and modern organization. But corruption and nepotism crept into it during the anomalous period of the 1918 and 1923 Constitutions. Recruitment to the bureaucracy was more on the bases of age, class and hereditary positions than on qualifications. Traditional bureaucrats therefore became unproductive, prestigious 'white elephants'. Their main function was to carry out the governmental duties to the letter of the law, to ensure obedience by inspiring awe among people. 10

The Revolutionary leaders found this class of bureaucracy unsuitable and unwilling to support their radical policies. They recruited comparatively younger and more forward-looking young men from among the University students for the new military and civil bureaucracy. 11

Local Administration

Before national independence, Egypt had been divided into about 25 Governates, mainly for administrative expediency. Each Governate had a Council formed of the local prominent leaders: notables and landlords


cont'd. next page.
and the high level bureaucrats appointed by the Government. But the
Councils had no say in the highly centralised authority of the Government,
and, even at local level, bureaucrats held the control in their own
hands. To change this top-heavy system, the R.C.C., vide their law No.124
of 1960 and its subsequent amendments, devised a three-level local
administration system: the Governate (al Luha faza), the town (al Madinah)
and the village (al Qaryah). Administrative Councils at these three
levels have been set up to perform the dual functions of local level
administration of the central Government and local-self government units
in municipal, health, social, educational and cultural matters. It is
not, however, clear as to what extent these councils can initiate
policies. Understandably, a decade or so of freedom to participate in
local self administration is too short to expect truly responsible and
responsive functioning of the local level Councils, but the creation of
a decentralized institutional structure is in itself a positive step.
Transformation of the institutional structure from the traditional to the
new was given five years by the 1960 Law to take shape.

11. cont'd.
Amin Asserts, "It is perhaps not surprising to find that the
outstanding administrative successes of the Suez Canal Company or
the High Dam have been due to the formation of completely new bodies
of administrators who had never been part of the traditional
bureaucracy. One of the main challenges now facing the Government
is not only to deal with the old bureaucratic tendencies and to
attack the new problems of organization, but also to discover and
make the utmost use of persons combining ability with belief in the
new system. Galal Amin, 'The Egyptian Economy and the Revolution',
in V. J. Vatikiotis (ed) Egypt Since the Revolution, op. cit.
Chapter 2, pp.40-49.
8.2.2. Modernization of the Economy

Before national independence, the Egyptian economy was guided by an inconsistent Laissez-faire arrangement. A tiny minority of landlords, Pasha's, industrialists and businessmen monopolized the vital productive resources and enjoyed major economic roles ascriptively. The Government on their part, saddled by the burden of foreign loans, intervened in the economy to the extent mainly of collecting taxes for its military and bureaucratic expenditures. So constrained, the pre-independence rulers were unable to strike a breakthrough towards a sustained economic growth. In his penetrating study of the economic modernization of Egypt, O'Brien remarks:

"Faced with growing and vociferous demands for the amelioration of poverty, and during its latter years with a serious population explosion when all the qualifications have been offered, Egypt's former rulers cannot be excused from the charge of having displayed an incapacity to act and an unrealistic faith in the virtues of laissez-faire. It probably needed a profound change in the political system to push the state farther and faster along the path towards positive and far-reaching intervention in the economic affairs of the nation." 12

It was with this background that the Revolutionary Command Council set about modernising the national economy. Consonant with the ideals of their revolution: 'Political democracy cannot be separated from social democracy', their economic policy was geared in the early years of the Revolution, towards (a) mobilization of national savings; (b) the use of modern scientific techniques to exploit these savings, and (c) the drafting of a complete Plan for production.13

From these earlier, rather modest premises, there emerged in 1957, a more coherent outlook and policy under which National Socialism was adopted as the fundamental component of the economic policy. It was at


the Third Co-operative Congress in 1957, that President Nasser highlighted Egypt's prospective society as 'Socialist, Democratic and Co-operative'. In abstract, these were high ideals for any society to adopt, particularly for one like Egypt. How the economic system was transformed structurally to enable it achieve these ideals is seen below.

In the first place, it is clear that rationalisation of the economy was aimed through the ideological motif that inspired policy statements both of the 1956 Constitution and the 1962 National Charter and pledged itself to the eradication of social inequalities reinforced by the Imperial Rule; the liquidation of the monopoly system, and nationalization of the productive organizations of the country in order to give the nation as a whole a better standard of living and social equality. To quote from the Charter:

- Socialism is the way to social freedom.

- Social freedom cannot be realized except through an equal opportunity for every citizen to obtain a fair share of the national wealth.

- This is not confined to the mere redistribution of the national wealth among the citizens but foremost and above all it requires expanding the base of this national wealth, to accede to the lawful rights of the working masses.

- This means that socialism, with its two supports, sufficiency and justice, is the way to social freedom. 14

This is not the place to argue the validity of the choice of the Socialist solution; it is sufficient to recognise that the Revolutionary leadership seriously adopted it, as they described it, as 'a historical inevitability imposed by reality......'. 15

15. ibid. p.57.
Planning

Magdi El Kammash has divided the economic development in Egypt since 1952 into two eras: the Development period from 1952-60, and the Planning period from 1960-70. The first period, characterised by some uncoordinated measures, only made a slight impact on the economic development, although Galal Amin traces a continuity of the radical steps that followed the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, the sequestration of British, French and Belgian property in the earlier nationalisation of the Abboud Sugar Mills and Misr Bank Companies and also the stricter governmental control since 1958 in private building and industrial activity. The turning point was nevertheless reached in 1956 by the nationalisation of Suez.

In 1957, the Presidential decree No. 78 instituted a National Planning Committee in order to "prepare a long-term Plan for social and economic development which would mobilize public and private effort." Then in 1960, the First Comprehensive Five-year Plan was launched to be followed in 1965 by the Second Five-year Plan of 1965-70. In actual fact, the first 'comprehensive' plan was an overall ten-year plan.

The Plan aimed at an overall target of doubling the national income in 1970, to be phased by a 40 per cent increase during the first plan period. The targets for various sectors are given in Table V.

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TABLE VIII.1

Estimated Increase in the G.N.P.  
(Base year 1959-60 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>First Plan</th>
<th>Second Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy industry</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light industry</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, Housing, Public Utilities, Security and Defence</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Industrial production was planned to rise from 6 to 19 per cent towards the end of the Plan period. Employment was estimated to rise by 1,026,000 jobs by the year 1965, i.e. an increase of 22.1 per cent. The nationalisation mentioned above brought the major productive organizations under government control, thereby curbing the role of entrepreneurship, and consequently 75 per cent of the total investment of the Plan was provided by the Public sector. The heaviest concentration of investment was to be in industry, electricity, transport, drainage and dwellings. The share of agriculture was relatively smaller.

The rate of growth in the GNP was, however, not matched by the rate of saving. As Galal Amin has pointed out, "While the average percentage of gross investment in the GNP rose from 14 per cent between 1955-56 and 1959-60 to 17.6 per cent during the plan years, the average percentage of gross domestic savings remained more or less constant. Between 1952-53 and 1960-61, it was in the range of 10-13 per cent of GNP and during the five-year plan it averaged no more than 12.7 per cent."  

Industrialisation and Agriculture

According to the National Plan, the target set for the development of heavy industries was a three-fold increase by 1964-65 and over four-fold increase by 1969-70. The production of light industries, services and commerce was estimated to rise only by less than twice, while agricultural productivity was to rise only by 1.6 times.

In spite of the decline in the contribution of agriculture to the domestic product, however, agriculture in another way remained still the leading sector of the economy. It employed 60 per cent of country's labour force. It also earned the country its major share of foreign exchange through the export of its long-staple cotton of which 40 per cent of the world crop alone is grown in Egypt. The traditional creator of Egypt's wealth, the Fellah was not to be excluded summarily from the modernization programme. To remove the poverty of the Fellahin, the Regime considered it prior to destroy feudalism and gross inequalities of land holdings. The Agrarian Reforms Programme, which imposed an upper limit of 200 feddans on individual ownership in 1952, then reduced this to 100 feddans in 1961, and finally to 50 feddans in 1969. This has gone a long way to reducing gross inequalities and improving land productivity. Among other measures envisaged for increasing efficiency in agricultural output was included the reclamation of land, rent control, the consolidation of fragmented holdings and the drive to organize co-operatives. As a result, as much as 144,000 feddans were reclaimed annually between 1960-65 and 1.2 million were aimed at between 1956-72. The Aswan High Dam, completed in 1964, has been notably responsible for these reclamations.

Employment and Labour

The number of employed workers at the time of the First Plan was about six million. The Plan envisaged to increase this to about nine millions by the end of the ten year plan period ending 1969-70. In 1964, the Prime Minister declared that over seven million people had already found employment. The per cent distribution of employment, sector-wise, during the two plans was estimated as in Table VIII.2:

Table VIII.2.

Distribution of Employment 1959-1970. (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1959-60</th>
<th>1964-65</th>
<th>1969-70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Ec</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Planning Committee, Five-Year Plan

To appraise the success of the new economic system in Egypt one can only underline the dynamic trends. Galal Amin concludes:

"It is very tempting to argue that, when, after twenty or thirty years, economists will look at the long-term growth of the Egyptian economy, the turning point will probably coincide with the conversion of Egypt to Socialism." 22

O'Brian, in his penetrating study, suggests that allocations of economic resources as a result of the Democratic, Socialist and Co-operative ideology and the nationalisation of private productive resources have definitely shown universalistic and achievement criteria. The Monopoly of 5,000 feudal lords on land ownership has been broken

22. op. cit.
down and their lands have been distributed among 372,000 families of actual cultivators. The G.N.P. has risen from 984 in 1950 to 1,363 in 1960-61, 1,739.6 in 1963-64 and to 2,193.5 in 1966-67. This increase has enabled the Government to spend more on social services which have increased from 8.1 per cent of the G.N.P. in 1950-51 to 12.5 per cent in 1962-63.  

Since 1967, Egypt's economy has been functioning under war conditions. Without the Arab-Israeli Conflict, it was expected, to quote the Europa Year Book, that "the Egyptian economy would have come very near to reaching self-sustained growth by the end of the present decade."  

8.2.3. Modernization of the Social Order

Demographic Features (Population)

Egypt's population has been steadily rising every decade since the first censuses were taken during the French occupation in 1882, when the total population was found to be 6.8 millions. Since then it has multiplied five times to become 31.7 million in 1968 with an annual rate of increase of 2.38 per cent between 1952-60 and of 2.54 between 1960-68. With an estimated rate of increase of 2.5 per cent which discounts the projected decline in fertility rate and the birth control measures, the population in 1985 will rise, as Hansen and Marzouk have forecast, to 48.5 millions. These estimates also show that children under 15 years will form around 45.3 per cent of the total population in 1985. According to the 1966 Census, the male-female ratio of population was calculated as 15.1 to 14.9 millions.  

To check this traditional trend of population increase, the Egyptian Government in 1962 started its propaganda campaign for birth control. It is recorded that even religious leaders approved of the campaign, provided scriptural evidence in its support and publicly advocated it during the Friday Mosque sermons. The National Charter categorically declared:

"Population increase constitutes the most dangerous obstacle that faces the Egyptian people in their drive towards raising the levels of income and production in an effective and efficient way... family planning deserves the most sincere efforts supported by modern scientific efforts...regardless of the efforts which may result from the experiment." 28

Consequently, in 1960 the Ministry of Social Affairs decided to open Family Planning Clinics in urban and rural areas, where advice and contraceptive devices were made available.

Marriage and Family Structure

Modernization of the family structure and marriage in Egypt has slowly but surely followed the political and economic changes. Although the extended family still remains the general pattern, occupational mobility, particularly in the urban areas, has led to a marked trend towards the appearance of the nuclear family. The National Charter unequivocally declared that "women must be regarded equal to man and must, therefore, shed the remaining shackles that impede her free movement so that she might take a constructive and profound part in shaping life. The family is the first cell in a society and it must therefore, be afforded all means of protection...." 29

Legislative changes for social reforms, such as raising the marriage age, making polygamy illegal, except in cases of necessity, equalization of occupational and educational opportunities for women,

27. BENT and MARZOUK, op. cit. p.40, also WANSFIELD, op. cit. p.114.
29. ibid. pp.84-85.
have all enhanced the status of women from which their emancipation is gradually, manifesting first in towns and then spreading into the villages. It must be stressed that, although the policies of the Revolutionary Regime in matters of social reforms such as the traditional family and marriage structures have shown a relative caution, the progress in these very areas has not been unimpressive.30

Ecological Features - Urbanization

Since the 1930's the rate of migration from rural to urban areas has been constantly increasing as shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Urban Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Urbanization has accelerated particularly with the rapid industrialization in the post-revolutionary era. The 1966 ratio of 42 per cent clearly shows, as Magdi El Kammash has pointed out, that at the present level of its development, Egypt is already 'over-urbanised' compared with other countries at the same stage.31 Two main centres, Cairo and Alexandria, between them comprise almost half of the total urban population of the country: Cairo 4.2 and Alexandria 1.9 millions, a total of 12.3 millions.32 This uneven and outpaced urbanization obviously presents great problems for the social services, particularly education. El Kammash asserts that both capital and human resources move towards these

30. Cf P. MANSFIELD, "While there has been nothing comparable to the drastic laws to emancipate women of Kemalist Turkey, it is quite probable that Egypt's more gradualist approach will achieve more permanent results", op. cit. p.115.
two cities leaving the other areas without potential growth.\textsuperscript{33} The Egyptian government seems to have taken cognizance of this uneven situation and to have already started to redistribute industries to other towns all over the country, so as to effect a harmonious urbanization conducive to the modernization ideals.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{33} ibid. p.100

\textsuperscript{34} For a critique on urbanization in Egypt and its social problems see Janet J. Abou-Laghod, "Migrants' Adjustment to City Life; The Egyptian Case," in \textit{American Journal of Sociology}, LXVII, July, 1961, pp.22-32.
8.3. Inputs into the Education System

8.3.1. Normative Inputs

Education in pre-independent Egypt had not been employed as an instrument of national integration nor indeed was it based on rational norms. National coherence was not its objective. Ever since Pasha Muhammad Ali initiated duality in education, the gap between the traditionalist and modernist classes, had successively grown wider and wider. The British occupation of the country in turn only strengthened class divisions though it did raise standards of efficiency in administration and eradicated social evils such as nepotism and corruption.

The 1952 Revolution, while declaring Egypt as an Arab-Socialist state envisaged in the first place to eradicate disparities and inequalities that had been manifest in education and then to give rise to a truly national educational system designed to integrate the nation and to inculcate modern, rationalist values.35

In order to create a 'Democratic, Socialist and Co-operative Society' in Egypt, the revolution set out the following educational objectives:

- the elimination of imperialism and its traitorous Egyptian agents;
- the eradication of feudalism;
- the destruction of monopoly and of the domination of capital over the government;
- the establishment of social justice;
- the establishment of a strong national army; and
- the establishment of a sound democracy.

The social implications of these objectives have been explained in the following guidelines:


36. Ibid.
.. the creation of a conscious, enlightened and
democratic society; free from fear, anxiety and
want;

.. a society that believes in God, and the fatherland,
with unshakable faith in itself and its people;

.. a society that follows lofty ideals in individual
and collective behaviour alike, and holds to the
principles of right and of good;

.. a society that feels itself an integral and responsive
part of the larger Arab structure;

.. a society that has the determination for joint
struggle and power for positive action supported by
science and strong character for the consolidation
of the noble Arab nation's prestige and safeguarding
its rights to liberty, security and honourable life;

.. a society that is alive to the responsibilities of its
historic mission of erecting high the structure of
civilization, and of serving humanity. 37.

The National Charter of 1962, further endorsed these objectives.
The Revolution gave education a central role in the realization of these
objectives and considered the modernization of education highly necessary
to give it a sound ideological basis in order that it should
adequately meet the country's social, intellectual and economic demand. 38
Rational normative demands of national equality and capacity for the
fullest possible personal development through the educational system
had been vouchsafed in the Constitution itself. The Constitution
vide its article 48 affirmed that:

.. Education is the right of all Egyptians to be guarded
by the State through the establishment and the gradual
expansion of all types of schools and other cultural
and educational institutions. The State further takes
special care of the physical, mental and moral
development of the youth.

Furthermore, Article 51 declared:

.. Elementary education is free and compulsory in state
schools.

The 1964 Constitution restated all these educational provisions of the
1956 Constitution.

37. Muhammad Khayri HARBY and El Sayed Muhammad El AZZAWI, Education in
Egypt (U.A.R.), in the 20th Century, U.A.R. Ministry of Education,
1960, p.53.

38. ibid. pp.54-56.
Historically, because of the patchy developments in education, there existed five different systems of schools in Egypt, i.e. The Al-Azhar and its subsidiary Laddressah and Kuttab schools; the fee charging schools teaching foreign languages; the free Arabic schools; the free compulsory state schools and the foreign schools with their own curricula.

The first task for the creation of a national system of education was to unify these various systems, and so the government started their modernization policies by enacting various acts through the National Assembly for the re-organisation of schools into a single, coherent system. These comprised:

- Act 213 of 1956 for the re-organization of primary schools;
- Act 55 of 1957 for general preparatory schools;
- Act 211 of 1953 for general secondary schools;
- Act 22 of 1956 for industrial schools;
- Act 261 of 1956 for commercial schools;
- Act 262 of 1956 for Agricultural schools;
- Act 75 of 1957 for higher institutes and colleges;
- Act 160 of 1958 for private schools;
- Act 1911 of 1959 for the Universities;
- Act 103 of 1961 for the modernization of Al-Azhar.

Of these, particularly revolutionary was the one dealing with the modernization of Al Azhar. The Act nationalised the centuries-old independent University with all its administrative, academic and financial functions as well as the institutions affiliated/or controlled by it. The main purpose of the Act was so to modernize the Jami that "it keeps its traditional status and prestige as the largest Muslim university in the world providing higher education in Islamic Studies and producing

39. Education in the UAR, Ministry of Education, Documentation Centre for Education, Cairo, 1962, pp.vii-ix, also Dr. I. HAFEZ, Education in the UAR, an Outline, Ministry of Education, Cairo, 1964.
teachers, religious leaders (ulama), judges (Qazi) and research scholars of Islam, as well as enabling it to rise up to the standards of a modern university. For this purpose secular faculties of medicine, agriculture, business administration, engineering and industries have been set up in the University along with its classical religious studies and jurisprudence.
8.3.2. Political Inputs

Modern political norms of equalization of opportunity and maximization of capacity as were structured into the National Charter and the Constitutions of 1956 and 1964 put heavy demands on the educational system to provide basic elementary education for all, vocational and technical training and skills for those wanting jobs in industries and commerce and professional education for the elites.

National independence in itself is not enough. The polity requires a class of modernizing leadership, innovating elites to sustain and carry out the impulse to modernization to the point of a self-sustaining success. In Egypt, before the national independence, this class of elites used to be recruited from among the older class of aristocrats. The modernizing revolutionary Regime planned to recruit their corp of elites from the younger generation of professionals, technocrats and specialists. This was even more necessary after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and other major industrial and economic enterprises.

A survey made in 1960 revealed that out of a total working force of high-class manpower of 701,851, the managerial and high professionals amounted to 14,912 or 2.1 per cent, and 2.3 per cent in the other economic sectors. The National Plan projected to increase this percentage gradually over a period of 25 years to about 6 per cent.

Table VIII.4.
High Level Managerial Elites Requirements between 1960-85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>205,536</td>
<td>315,416</td>
<td>436,082</td>
<td>601,572</td>
<td>840,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Manpower</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>5.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mustafa Hamdy, Manpower Requirements for the UAR (1960-85), UAR Institute of National Planning, Memo: 431. 1964.
These requirements put an unprecedented demand on the educational system for expansion at the University and Higher Institute levels in the various faculties, particularly the sciences.

Institutional differentiation of the polity under modernization demanded a similar differentiation in the educational system, both vertically and horizontally. In a participant society, the educational system is a public-interest sub-system of the society and public participation at all levels of educational policy through proper interest articulation groups becomes a public right.

8.3.3. Economic Inputs

Industrial and economic mobilization ushered in by the Revolutionary regime demanded a supporting mobilization of human resources in the shape of a catalysing, problem-solving manpower mainly through the educational system. The two Five-year plans cumulatively set up high targets of growth in employment. Calculated on the basis of the National Plan targets, the manpower requirements of technical, clerical, skilled and unskilled labour for the period between 1960-85 were estimated as shown in Table 8 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managers and High Professionals</td>
<td>205,536</td>
<td>315,416</td>
<td>436,082</td>
<td>601,572</td>
<td>840,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>380,752</td>
<td>604,402</td>
<td>872,180</td>
<td>1,228,649</td>
<td>1,790,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>235,775</td>
<td>344,486</td>
<td>490,052</td>
<td>699,716</td>
<td>926,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Labour</td>
<td>1,061,654</td>
<td>1,481,191</td>
<td>1,987,790</td>
<td>2,620,840</td>
<td>3,627,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Labour</td>
<td>6,116,113</td>
<td>6,905,477</td>
<td>7,288,917</td>
<td>7,796,223</td>
<td>8,150,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,999,830</td>
<td>9,650,990</td>
<td>11,075,020</td>
<td>12,917,000</td>
<td>15,335,810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To meet these manpower demands, the educational system had to be completely re-organized especially at the secondary stage which provides for technical, vocational and clerical skills.
8.3.4. Social Order Inputs

Modernizing social order demands the creation of empathetic personalities among a mobile population. Empathetic personalities are created, among other things such as communications, urbanization, etc., by the provision of literacy. Demand for universal literacy also satisfies modern norms of equality and capacity. Basic education is considered as a fundamental right and is, therefore, provided for in the national constitutions. Inspired by the norms of modernity: democracy, socialism and co-operation, Egypt declared and affirmed, in both the Constitution of 1956 and of 1964, the universalization of primary education for all Egyptian children between the ages of 6 and 12. A survey carried out by UNESCO in 1952 revealed that there were 3,354,000 children of school age out of which 1,750,000 were without any schooling facilities. With the estimated population increase of 2.5 per cent, the demand on the educational system for the provision of universal literacy was a stupendous task. It was also affirmed that, pressed by the choice of priorities between the conflicting demands of equality-capacity, and quality-quantity, the Revolutionary Regime in the early years clearly gave preference to the maximization of primary education. To cope with this heavy demand the Ministry of Education planned to open 400 primary schools a year, each for 600 children, for the next ten years.

Particularly important was the demand for girls' education, since in the pre-independence period it had been grossly neglected. In 1954 it was found that at the primary stage 40 per cent of the total enrollment belonged to girls; but this percentage dropped considerably going up the school ladder. Economic limitations as well as traditional

41. See Compulsory Education in the Arab States with special Reference to the Cairo Conference, 1954, UNESCO, 1956.
42. ibid. p.35.
customs of purdah, and early marriages were responsible for the high rate of withdrawal. In some cases 75 per cent of girls withdrew from schools in the latter years. Furthermore, a great number of women who had acquired literacy by attending schools for durations varying between two to six years reverted to complete illiteracy. \textsuperscript{43} Here again, it was the educational system that had to remedy these disparities and transform traditional attitudes.

Mobility from villages to cities equally placed a high demand on the educational system for the extension of schooling facilities in the urban centres. Greater exposure to the mass-media in the cities \textsuperscript{44} --- the introduction of the television in 1960 facilitated the enlargement of empathy among urban children. The use of the radio and television for educational purposes and the establishment of ETV systems was among the other demands on the educational system.

8.3.5. Cultural Inputs

**Integrative Role:** Egypt chose to give more importance to its 'Arab Circle', as against the 'Islamic' and the 'African' originally proclaimed by the Revolutionary leaders. The National Charter has been vociferous in declaring that Egypt is a part of the 'Arab Nation', committed to the strengthening and consolidating of the unity of the 'Arab Nation' and to the promotion of its cultural heritage. \textsuperscript{45} The 'Islamic Circle' seems to have been taken as a corollary of the 'Arab Nation' concept, a subculture whose reform was necessary to contribute to the modernization impulse.

**Innovative Role:**

1. On the modernization of traditional value systems, the Charter asserts:

\textsuperscript{43} ibid. p.68.
\textsuperscript{44} The total broadcasting hours increased from 32 in 1952 to 394 in 1964. See P. MANSFIELD, op. cit. p.124.
\textsuperscript{45} The National Charter, pp.105-110.
"The welfare society is able to formulate new moral values, not subject to the influence of the remaining pressures left from our ailments, from which our society has suffered so long.

In their turn these new values must be reflected in a free national culture which awakens the sense of beauty in the life of free individual ... The freedom of religious belief must be regarded as sacred in our new life.

The eternal spiritual values derived from religions are capable of guiding man, of lighting the candle of faith in his life and of bestowing on him unlimited capacities for serving truth, good and love......

The essence of religious messages does not conflict with the facts of our life, the conflict arises only in certain situations as a result of attempts made by reactionary elements to exploit religion - against its nature and spirit - with a view to impeding progress. These elements fabricate false interpretations of religion in flagrant contradiction with its noble and divine wisdom. 46

2. On the quest for scientific culture, the Charter is even more sanguine. It declares:

"Revolutionary action should be scientific ..... Science is the true weapon for revolutionary will. Here emerges the great role to be undertaken by the Universities and educational centres on various levels...

The responsibilities of the universities and scientific research centres in shaping the future is not less important than responsibility of the various popular authorities.... Therefore, the universities are not ivory towers but rather forerunners discovering a mode of life for the people......

The major economic and social problems confronting our people, at present, must be resolved on a scientific basis.

The scientific research centres are required at this stage of the struggle to develop themselves so that science would be in the service of society....Therefore, science for society should be the motto of the cultural revolution at the present stage......" 47

46. ibid. p.85

47. ibid. pp.101-102.
8.4. Within Educational System Processes
8.4.1. Administrative Modernization

Policy Formulation and Adoption

The national educational policy is formulated by the Executive through the Ministry of Education. Before national independence, there was a central Ministry of Public Instruction which, in keeping with the rigid administrative framework of the time, was considered as a top-heavy system of control.\(^{48}\) It lacked a proper articulation of community, professional and managerial interests in its operation. In 1953, the Revolutionary Regime re-shaped the Ministry to become the Ministry of Education and Instruction. Then in 1961, when accelerated growth was planned, it was considered necessary to institute two separate ministries of education: The Ministry of Higher Education was given separate status in view of the urgent demand for the creation of modernising leadership; while the Ministry of Education was to administer all education below the tertiary level. Both Ministries are the chief national policy-formulation agencies in their respective jurisdictions. For policy adoption each Ministry is now responsible to the National Assembly through the Under-Secretary of Parliament who answers all questions concerning education in the Parliament.\(^{49}\)

To advise the Ministers in the formulation of policies there are certain advisory councils viz: the Central Advisory Council of Education, the Supreme Council of the Universities, the Higher Council for the Encouragement of Art, Literature and Science; the Higher Council of Science; the Higher Council of Youth Welfare and the Higher Committees of Cultural Affairs and Missions.

\(^{48}\) See Taha HUSSAIN, The Future of Culture in Egypt, tran. S. Glazer, Washington, D.C. 1954, p.48. Dr. Taha Hussain the renowned literary figure of Egypt was the Minister of Public Instruction between 1941-45 and 1950-52. After national independence, he was appointed the Director General of Cultural Affairs. As a Minister of Public Instruction, he was highly critical of the administrative rigidity of the Ministry and advocated its total overhaul.

To represent community interest in the formulation of educational policy there is a special department of Public Relations. Among other things, this department is concerned with the aggregation of community interest through various media the A.S.U., and the Pressure Groups and with informing the Ministers concerned. It also feeds back information to the public through the same media and the information bureaux.

Technical interest is represented in the policy making by the General Assembly of the Teachers' Syndicate whose aims have been described by Law 219 of 1951 as below:

- to promote the professional standard of teaching
- to safeguard the interests of its members, and
- to advise the Minister of Education on teachers' interests.

Regional Level

At the regional level, the country is divided into 25 Education Zones (known as Al.Manatiq al Ta'llimyyah), parallel to the Governates. In the metropolitan Governate of Cairo, however, there are four such Zones. Each Education Zone is headed by a Director of Education (Mudir al Ta'llim) who is responsible to the Central Ministry of Education.

To represent community interest in the educational policies at this level, the Mudir is assisted by an Advisory Council which is presided over by the Mudir. The majority of its membership is, however, formed of the community leaders and members of the Regional Congress of the A.S.U. These councils advise the Mudir in policy matters at the Regional level. Their role in the adoption of policy is however, limited as this is mainly done at the top.

Town and Village

At the local level these functions are very much restricted to the village Advisory Councils appointed by the Ministry of Local
Administration. Each school is to have a P.T.A. and local members of the A.S.U. take part in the school committees. But their actual participation is still minimal, as traditional attitudes of dependence on the governmental agencies are still persistent.

**Policy Implementation - National Level**

The Central Ministry of Education is divided into various secretariats, each concerned with a distinct aspect of educational policy. Important secretariats are: Administrative Affairs; Financial Affairs, Central Services, Follow-up and Evaluation and Planning.

**Regional Level**

The Directors of Education are primarily concerned with the implementation of policy within their Education Zones. In this they are assisted by various experts and advisers and Inspectors who visit schools and assess their standards. They also act as 'eyes and ears' of the government and it is their duty to see that the amount of equilibrium allowed by the Centre between the community interest, managerial and technical aspects of policy implementation is properly maintained.

**Ministry of Higher Education**

Policy formulation and implementation with regard to the Institutions of Higher Education and Universities devolve upon the Minister of Higher Education, who is advised by the Supreme Council of Universities. The Council is constituted of the Rectors, the Vice-Rectors and one representative from the academic staff and three notable figures experienced in University education who are appointed by the Presidential decree. The Council is also entitled to employ foreign experts for consultation and advice. The main functions of the Council have been listed as below:
1. "planning the general policy of University education;
2. keeping the Universities in contact with national needs in order that they may contribute to national progress;
3. harmonizing the policies of the various Universities in matters related to academic courses, degrees and the appointment of members of staff for each University;
4. considering all affairs and making appropriate decisions as requested by the Minister of Higher Education of any single University."

For managerial functions, the Ministry is divided into the Planning Board for Higher Education, the Organization Board and the various departmental secretariats.

Within University Administration

The modernized structure of each University consists of a Senate and a Faculty Council. The Senate is concerned with the managerial aspect of policy administration, while the Faculty Council is concerned with the technical aspect.

Structural Differentiation of the Educational System

Structural Organization

The contemporary educational ladder became stabilised between 1953-60 by virtue of various National Laws aimed at integrating and consolidating the various autonomous school systems into a unified national system. Accordingly, the new school system begins with a pre-school stage of nurseries and Kindergartens, a six-year primary stage, a three-year preparatory, a three-year secondary and a four-year University stage covering altogether 16 years of education beginning at the age of six and terminating at twentytwo. A two-year intervening stage was provided for special teacher-training schools and other vocational schools such as commerce, communications and public health after the completion of the secondary stage.

50. BOKTOR, op. cit. pp.100-105
51. See Chart opposite.
52. ibid. p.22.
ORGANISATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND TEACHER TRAINING INSTITUTIONS FOR MEN AND WOMEN U.A.R.

GENERAL SECONDARY STAGE

GENERAL PREPARATORY STAGE

PRIMARY STAGE
Primary Stage

Having considered the fact that before the national independence, 12.5 per cent of the total number of pupils who entered schools managed to stay on to the end but that an over-whelming 87.5 per cent dropped out, the Revolutionary government by Act 210 of 1953 declared primary education between the ages of 6 and 12 to be compulsory and free. All fee-charing private schools were incorporated into the National system, fees were abolished and all examinations at the termination of the primary schooling, except an enrollment test for entry into the preparatory school, were cancelled, and foreign languages were removed from the primary school curriculum.53

The new law also declared that primary schools as a rule should be co-educational (art. 21).54

Preparatory Stage

Secondary education was reorganized by the 1953 Act No. 211 to form a three-year differentiated system which replaced the existing two-tier schooling of five years called Al-Kafaa and Bacealaureat. The modernized system now consists of one-year general schooling and then a two year branching off into scientific and literary studies, paralleled by similar technical, vocational agricultural courses for boys, and Home economics, health and fine arts for girls in the technical and vocational secondary schools.55

Higher Education

The institutions for the Higher Education in Egypt are now differentiated into four secular Universities, various colleges and Institutes administered directly by the Ministry of Higher Education and Al-Azhar, the oldest Alma Mater of Islamic learning.

The first secular university was established in Cairo in 1908, mainly through private efforts of modernist intellectuals who held high

53. HARIY and AZZAWI, op. cit. pp.59-67
54. ibid. p.62
55. ibid. pp.71-72.
offices; many of them had ventured from education in Europe and wished
to have a modern Egyptian University for their sons' education. By 1925,
the Cairo University comprised four Faculties in Egypt and there was
an affiliated branch of three Faculties in Khartoum in the Sudan. Later,
two more universities were established: one at Alexandria in 1942, and
the Ein Shams University in 1950. Each of these two now has nine
faculties. In 1957-58, a new university was established in Assuit,
mainly to cater for the needs of Upper Egypt, and it only has two faculties,
of Science and Engineering.

The Higher Institutes

These were designed basically to divert the flood tide of students
from the universities, and to provide education in teacher-training,
agriculture, commerce, fine arts, music and drama. Though in theory
these institutes are supposed to give training in practical skills,
leaving theoretical courses to the universities, in practice, however,
this distinction is not maintained.56

8.4.2. Expansion of the Capacity of Educational Facilities

In order to raise the capacity of the educational system, as
demanded by the various inputs into it, the Revolutionary government
in the beginning drew up ambitious plans for expansion. Unlimited
education was promised to all. But by the year 1960, when planning was
undertaken, it was discovered that a replacement of emphasis was needed
in order to achieve a balanced progress of the various sectors of the
economy and society. The Institute of National Planning, for example,
surmised that "a rapid expansion of primary education at the expense of
secondary and higher levels may lead to unskilled unemployment on one
side and shortages in high technical personnel on the other....Therefore,

56. H. QUBAIN, Higher Education in the Arab Countries, op. cit.
    pp.61-84, also BOKTOR op. cit. pp.100-101.
the adoption of a policy of universal literacy cannot be given the
highest priority especially in the earliest stages of economic
development at the expense of skills at the secondary and higher
levels". 57

The original target of 100 per cent literacy by the years
1964-65 and the related impractical pledge of opening 400 schools
every year had to be abandoned. The date of universal literacy was
therefore postponed to the year 1970.

To gauge the expansion in primary school enrollments between the
years 1954-68, see the figures in Table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>7,152</td>
<td>984,415</td>
<td>595,676</td>
<td>1,580,089</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>7,213</td>
<td>1,524,514</td>
<td>927,863</td>
<td>2,452,377</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>7,698</td>
<td>2,009,824</td>
<td>1,285,008</td>
<td>3,294,832</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>7,771</td>
<td>2,129,884</td>
<td>1,341,450</td>
<td>3,471,334</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7,816</td>
<td>2,189,002</td>
<td>1,361,460</td>
<td>3,550,462</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Statistical Abstract of the UAR, 1951/52 - 1967/68. For the
year 1968 only UNESCO Year Book 1971.

These figures show a steady increase in the number of primary
schools in Egypt since 1955, but the demand for primary education far
exceeded the supply of facilities. Even the revised target of the
1960-65 National Plan to open 130 schools a year instead of the 400
envisaged earlier, had not been met by the year 1965 when only 546 out
of the proposed 650 schools had been built. Bottlenecks were, therefore,
imminent. To relieve these the Ministry of Education proposed to
employ some crash measures e.g. the operation of a two-shift system at
primary schools, the use of post-primary schools for primary education
in some areas, and permitting an increase of pupil-teacher ratio in
others. 58

57. BOKTOR, ibid. p.12.
58. International Year Book of Education, UNESCO, 1968, p.500, also
BOKTOR, op. cit. p.28.
fixed by the Law 213 of 1956, but this had been allowed to extend as far as 60 or even 70 pupils.59

Preparatory School Enrollment

The importance of preparatory schools has grown considerably with their reorganization into a three-year system and the upgrading of the technical and vocational preparatory schools to the secondary level. Obviously the number of technical preparatory schools and their enrollment have shown a steep decline but the general preparatory school and its enrollment have increased considerably as is evident from the Table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Number of Pupils</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Technical</th>
<th>G.Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total General</td>
<td>Tech</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>255.1</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>181.7</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>400.6</td>
<td>173.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>1,195</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>463.1</td>
<td>202.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>508.1</td>
<td>228.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Abstract of the UAR.

Secondary School Enrollment

Expansion and diversification of secondary education was considered especially important for manpower supply. The upgrading of technical schools from preparatory to secondary level also gave the new secondary school increasing functional importance. It was estimated that only 40 per cent of preparatory school leavers would seek admission into secondary schools. Of these the following proportion of distribution into different types of secondary schools would be kept as a guideline:
40 per cent into general secondary schools
30 per cent into technical schools
11 per cent into teacher-training schools
4 per cent into female culture schools
15 per cent into the various training centres in industry and commerce.

Table VIII records the rate of expansion at the secondary school level:

Table VIII.8.
Expansion in Secondary Education between 1955-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Tech Total</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Technical</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>149.7</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>149.7</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>149.7</td>
<td>149.7</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>166.1</td>
<td>166.1</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>112.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>179.3</td>
<td>179.3</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Statistical Abstract and Boktor op. cit.

These statistics show that in the thirteen-year period there has been an allround increase in the number of secondary schools, but technical schools have multiplied 2.25 times. Similarly enrollment in the technical secondary schools has increased seven times in the same period. This fits well with the projected manpower demand and the stress on the supply of technical manpower. According to the National Plan, full manpower will only be met by the years 1984-85.

Of particular significance were the five Higher Commercial Institutes opened between 1957-58 at Tanta, Zagazig, Assuit, Mansurah and Port Said; five Agricultural Higher Institutes at Minia, Kafr el Sahikh, Luxor, Shebin el Kom and Zagazig; four Industrial Higher Institutes opened at Jelwa, Mansurah, Minia and Shaben and three more.

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projected to be opened before 1970.61

Teachers' Education

The achievement of the educational targets set by various national Plans all had, in the last analysis, to depend upon the huge number of teachers required to operate the various schools. To meet this enormous demand, the Revolutionary regime started in the initial years with emergency courses condensed into one-year day and evening classes and with appointing surplus graduates to teach in primary schools.62 But by the time the National Plan was announced, these emergency courses had been discontinued and an integrated system of teachers' education was set up. This is shown in the diagram opposite.

Under the modernised Teachers' education system, there are basically two major categories of teachers' training institutions: Teachers Training Schools and Higher Teacher Training Institutions; the former preparing teachers mainly for primary and preparatory schools, and the latter for secondary schools, in general subjects as well as special subjects.

The Five-year Nation's Plan envisaged a demand of a total number of some 40,000 teachers by the year 1964-65. The number of students in all the various institutions had already exceeded this target by the same years by about 18.65 per cent. Shortage of teachers, however, remained acute, particularly in subjects like science, mathematics, English and music. In spite of the shortage at home, Egypt offered to provide less developed sister Arab and African countries with trained teachers. During the year 1963-64, some 5,000 trained teachers, both men and women, were seconded for such service. The general expansion

61. Amin BOKTOR, op. cit. p.64.
of enrollment in teacher-training institutes is shown in the table below:

Table VIII.9.
Expansion in Teacher-training Institutions
1955-56 to 1967-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>16,606</td>
<td>11,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>7,267</td>
<td>8,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>23,527</td>
<td>17,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>28,896</td>
<td>20,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>19,290</td>
<td>15,604</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Boktor, op. cit. and Statistical Abstracts.
* Decline in the number of institutions and enrollment in 1967-68 is due to the fact that in 1966-67 certain emergency type institutes e.g. the special departments in General Teachers Training Institutions were abolished.

Higher Education

Following from the expansion at lower levels, dramatic expansion has been registered in the institutions of higher education, both in the number of students enrolled and in the structural differentiation within the institutions and, especially in the universities. The causes of this rapid increase have been the various input demands for the political, economic, social and cultural mobilizations, spurred by the modernization programme.

To take the structural differentiation first, this has been manifested not only in the establishment of more institutions and faculties in the universities but also in the introduction of newer branches and types of specializations within the various faculties. Each university has been expanded in the number of faculties and types of research units as well as specialising institutes. There has been a parallel increase in the number and diversity of Higher Institutes sponsored by the Ministry of Higher Education.

Expansion in enrollment, however, has been astounding. Since national independence, the number of students at all universities, other than Al-Azhar, as is shown in Table VIII.10, increased from 15,781 in 1953-54 to 124,308 in 1967-68 i.e. a 2.5 times increase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Higher Institutes</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>51,781</td>
<td>4,829</td>
<td>5,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>59,550</td>
<td>7,201</td>
<td>7,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>73,124</td>
<td>9,333</td>
<td>9,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>83,141</td>
<td>11,666</td>
<td>13,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>88,709</td>
<td>13,781</td>
<td>19,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>94,857</td>
<td>15,014</td>
<td>22,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>98,537</td>
<td>17,617</td>
<td>22,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>109,682</td>
<td>21,932</td>
<td>25,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>126,838</td>
<td>27,951</td>
<td>32,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>124,308</td>
<td>31,158</td>
<td>29,973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: F. Qubain, op. cit. p. 71 adjusted with figures from The Statistical Abstract.

Expansion in enrollment at the Higher Institutes was even more impressive i.e. from 5,285 in 1953-54 to 29,973 in 1967-68, or a six-fold increase. Another noteworthy feature of expansion in the higher education was the accelerating increase every year in the numbers of girls in all types of institutions. Between 1953-54 and 1961-62, their numbers increased on the average by four times, which at Alexandria University now including the Higher Institute of Nursing as well, was an increase from 744 girl students in 1953-54 to 6,994 in 1967-68 - about ten-fold.

This increasing participation of girls in higher education of all types is even more significant for the emancipation of women and the modernization of the Egyptian society, considering the fact that until independence very few, even among the most liberal parents, would have willingly allowed education for their daughters beyond the secondary stage.
Before 1950, Universities only contained the faculties of Arts, Law and Commerce and Dar-al-Ulam (Teacher-Training Institute) in the Humanities. In 1950, two more faculties i.e. education and the Girls' College were introduced. The Faculty of Sciences included general science, medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy, Engineering, Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine. Under modernization now, the main faculties in the Humanities are divided into Arts, Commerce, Law, Education, Girls' Education, Dar-al-Ulam, Economics and Political Science, Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Theology, Arabic Studies, Business and Administration and Islamic Studies for Girls. In the Sciences, they now form the faculties of Medicine, Pharmacology, Engineering, Agriculture, General Science, Dentistry and Veterinary Medicine. The following Graph shows the Expansion in Enrollment in the Humanities and Sciences during 1950-68.
Students Enrollment in Universities, Faculties and High Institutes (1959-1967-68)

As the graph indicates, until the year 1960, there was an acceleration of enrollment in the Humanities while the Sciences lagged almost half-way behind. Then in 1960-61, enrollment in the scientific and technological subjects started to 'take off' and by 1967-68, it overtook Humanities. The figures for 1967-68 are: Humanities 68,573; Sciences 70,045. This is a tremendous turning of the tide from Arts to Sciences and should have far-reaching consequences for Egyptian economy, industry and indeed for the modernization of Egyptian society.

But, at the same time, this rapid and bulging expansion of higher education is not without problems. The rising unemployment among B.As., the shortage of teaching staff, particularly scientific and technical, and the decline of academic standards are only the obvious problems faced by the Egyptian educational system. According to Professor Ginsburg, however, even in this, "Egypt has been no more and no less successful than most other governments of developing nations with similar problems." Another grave problem of higher education in Egypt manifests itself in the over-concentration of higher education institutions in the metropolis - there are four universities in Cairo. This corresponds to the trends in the urbanization of Egypt in general, and indicates an imbalance of educational development among the regions.

8.5. Educational Outputs
8.5.1. Political Outputs
   Modernising Leadership

Revolution in Egypt was ushered in by the 'Free Officers' whose rationale for the modernization of their country included such radical measures as the absolute overthrow of foreign domination, and the complete over-hauling of their unjust socio-economic and political order. These measures and their inherent difficulties demanded the

64. Statistical Abstract, p.152.
65. Eli GINSBURG, op. cit. p.188.
creation of a class of modernising leadership which, considering the conditions of the Egyptian society of the time, only the army could provide. As Halpern has remarked:

"as a ruling power, an army has several extra-ordinary advantages. Middle Eastern armies tend to produce more able, honest and decisive leadership than any other institutions." 66

And the longer the struggle, the longer the concentration of ruling power in the hands of the army. Therefore, inevitably, for a generation at least, the mainstay of the innovating leadership had to come: from the cadre of army officers and their catalysing comrades, the younger generation of bureaucrats and technocrats. Intellectuals, who used to dominate the elite class in the past, were, as Professor Kerr has pointed out, obviously left out of the top leadership. 67

But it would be wrong to see education only as a tool that the army used to fortify themselves and perpetuate their hierarchy. The output function of the Egyptian educational system since national independence in its role of elite formation, must be viewed in the light of a colossal transformation of the whole occupational structure that has emerged as a result of changes introduced by the regime; and its overthrow of the traditional elite system.

Educational development in Egypt since national independence, as has been seen above, took place more under the impulse of national socialism, democratisation and equalization of education. Education was seen as a basic right and not just as a privilege of the upper class, as in the past. The regime for its own part, deemed it fit to encourage for its political and economic policies, the spread of demand for education at all levels, in order to draw legitimation and support. But this was also the

67. Malcolm KERR, in Education and Political Development, (ed) J. S. Coleman, op. cit. p.193. "Since the orthodox intelligentsia often will not and cannot fill this (modernization) role, revolutionary leadership usually turns to the secular intellectuals located at more mobile positions in the universities or mass media". D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, op. cit. p.246.
first time since Muhammad Ali Pasha that talent for leadership was
sought from all strata of society rather than from the established
hierarchy. By the time, however, that planning was undertaken, and
economic control had been established, limits had to be set on the
basis of demands in the various occupational categories and in the
types and stages of educational provisions.

The entire corps of modernising leadership in Egypt is now
recruited from the University graduates. Lerner's study shows that
77 per cent of the top leadership class in his sample, had university
and college education, 22 per cent secondary school education, and
1 per cent only elementary. 68

Similarly Berger's study of the Bureaucracy in 1957 revealed
that, out of the 249 high level bureaucrat respondents in his sample,
192 or 77.1 per cent had a B.A. Degree; 10.9 per cent had higher than
a B.A.; and, 29 per cent had secondary education. In other words,
88 per cent of the modernizing elite come from the Universities and
institutions of higher education. But, whereas before the Revolution
recruitment into the top Bureaucracy was only a privilege of the
aristocracy, now it is well diffused among all the classes. Already
in 1957, showed the Berger study, that 76.4 per cent of bureaucrats
listed the occupation of their fathers as other than 'landlord', and,
16.1 per cent as peasants. The position since 1957 has even further
changed more in favour of the peasants and white collar workers. So
it can be safely concluded that modernised education in Egypt is now
acting as a multiplier of horizontal class mobility, whereas traditional
education was restricted to the landed aristocracy. But imbalances
and maladjustments are still rampant. Commenting on the role of Higher
Education generally in training of modernising leadership, Dr. Fahmy

68. D. LERNER, The Passing of Traditional Society, op. cit. p.222
69. BERGER, op. cit. p.45.
of the Institute of Planning observed in his 'Tentative Plan' that:

1. "The universities have failed to train the required number of engineers, doctors, research workers and many other specialists. Although, recent organization of university education has aimed to double the output of high scientific and technical personnel in the shortest time by making the study on two shifts. It is important, however, to ensure that such measures must not lower the quality of University education by increasing the burden on the teaching staff."

He continues:

2. "The distinction drawn between the function of the Higher Technical Institutes sponsored by the Ministry of Higher Education and the Universities whereby the Universities emphasize the academic and theoretical branches of studies, Higher Institutes the practical, is unsound and unuseful. It is obvious that the purpose of the higher technical institutes is essential to the national economy exactly as the University. The two types of institutes are supplementing each other. It would be most unwise to assign the training of high technical personnel to one type of institution. The country needs hands and brains trained in different ways to fill the varied technological posts in the spheres of production, invention, design research and management. There is no single way leading to the highest technological posts in industry, and if industry were to select for these posts only those individuals trained in one type of institution, there is no guarantee that such selection would secure the best high technical personnel for the whole field available".

The projected demand and supply of modernizing elites, measured by the graduate output of the Universities and Higher Institutes, was estimated by the National Plan as below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Years Ending</th>
<th>Projected Demand</th>
<th>Projected Supply</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>205,536</td>
<td>215,238</td>
<td>+ 9,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>315,416</td>
<td>278,368</td>
<td>- 37,048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The enrollment figures in 1967-68 show that the projected supply is much lower than the Plan had expected i.e. 154,281 as against the stipulated 278,368 (1969-70). To conclude, therefore, although recruitment into the elite status is now diffused among all sections of the society and on achievement rather than on ascriptive criteria; although the capacity of the educational system has been enhanced, equality and democratisation of education is more noticeable, more women are now participating in the education services at all levels and more development and progress in the scientific and technological fields has to be achieved than before, nevertheless attrition, imbalances and maladjustments still remain rampant.

8.5.2. Outputs to the Economy

Catalysing Manpower

In the early years of the Egyptian Revolution, educational modernization was not designed in the light of manpower requirements formulated from explicit national educational planning. Motivated by their desire to democratise education, those responsible for the educational policies of the regime in the early stages, worked towards the universalization of elementary education. To quote Harby and Azzawi, the main stress was on the human-right idea of education.

"A human consideration related to the right of the individual, namely that every citizen should be afforded full opportunity to achieve the largest possible measure of spiritual and intellectual development, and to realize the greatest success possible within the limits of his capacities. This is the root of true democratic life." 71

An underlying assumption in this approach seems to have been that maximization of educational facilities to the limits of individual capabilities is in itself instrumental to the acceleration of modernization. Egyptian educationalists of the time considered

71. HARBY and AZZAWI, op. cit. p.56.
schooling mainly in very broad terms, that is to say, 'preparing students for life..., to use leisure more usefully..., to develop students' talents, help discover their skills and provide opportunity for a beneficial employment of their leisure time", hence the importance of including hobbies in the curricula.72

It was not until near the end of the 1960-65 National Plan, in fact in 1964, that studies of manpower demands were undertaken in order to bring about co-ordination between schooling and manpower requirements. Preparatory and secondary schools had expanded haphazardly and been so organized as to accommodate all the primary school graduates into post-primary schools. In 1964, the National Institute of National Planning, divided the total national manpower into various occupational categories and planned the related educational requirements to produce them. Leaving the higher professional categories for the universities and the higher institutes, middle technical personnel, white-collar co-ordinating staff, and skilled labour were envisaged as a manpower demand on the preparatory and secondary schools, general as well as technical.73 The Plan aimed at achieving a complete co-ordination between the manpower demand and the educational supply only by the twentyfive-year period in 1985. The gaps still existing in the intervening period were envisaged as shown in Table below:

73. FAHMY, op. cit. loco. 398, chapter III, pp.17-49.
### Table VIII.12
Projected Manpower Demand and Supply during Two Five-year Plan Periods 1961-65 and 1966-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>1st Plan Year ending 1965</th>
<th>2nd Plan Year ending 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>Secondary Technical and Training Centres</td>
<td>380.8</td>
<td>192.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>Secondary General Commercial schools</td>
<td>235.8</td>
<td>190.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Labour</td>
<td>Training Centres Post Prep Schools and Apprenticeships</td>
<td>1,061.6</td>
<td>658.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Labour</td>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>6,116.1</td>
<td>6,850.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graduate outputs at primary, preparatory and secondary levels all show a considerable gap between demand and supply and reveal a persistent failure of the educational system to produce the forecasted manpower.

In 1967, the total number of students who passed the preparatory general school examination was only 190,470; secondary general 23,772; secondary scientific 51,325. All of these figures were considerably lower than the estimates. This indicates a serious failure on the part of the educational system to produce the required manpower.
The manpower study of the Institute of National Planning was highly critical of some of the educational policies and practices that led to this failure. In particular it criticised the introduction at the preparatory level of technical schools which turned out skilled pupils at the age of 15, which they stressed, was too early for the young to bear the responsibilities imposed upon them by their position in industry or business as skilled workers.\textsuperscript{74} The study also argued that modern industry requires from the skilled worker a high degree of general education; and primary education alone did not provide them with sufficient background on which to base technical and vocational education.

In the same manner, the study was highly critical of the general secondary school system for its continued academic imprint. It argued that the secondary school, on the whole, continued to exhibit the main features and spirit of the old traditional secondary education, and prepared students, as did the traditional system, mostly for white-collar, clerical (muazif) jobs.\textsuperscript{75} Secondary education, the study emphasized must be diversified into general and technical according to the future careers of the students. After a general course of one-year, specialisation should start for the second year then the curriculum should be divided into an equal number of general and scientific subjects.\textsuperscript{76} The study recommended that technicians should be trained at technical schools and that vocational training for skilled labour should be provided at post-preparatory vocational training centres. General secondary schools should prepare students only for entry into Higher Institutes and Universities.

\textsuperscript{74} ibid. p.23
\textsuperscript{75} ibid. pp.24-25
\textsuperscript{76} ibid. p.35.
8.5.4. Cultural Outputs

Integrative Culture: (a) The Language

The Arabic language has, since the rise of Islam, always remained as the pre-eminent component of the Arab culture. Arab nationalism and Arab unity without the classical Arabic language are inconceivable. As the language of the Quran, it is a sacred heritage and an a priori standard of perfection held even by non-Arab Muslims. So strong is the emphasis on its preservation and primacy as an integrative symbol, that any move by the modern linguists to have the colloquial language introduced into the educational system for reasons of scholastic expediency, has been vehemently rejected. Wilber in his study of the Egyptian People, Society and Culture has observed:

"Colloquial Arabic is popularly disparaged. English speaking Egyptians refer to it as 'slang' and the term 'Arabic' unless explicitly qualified otherwise, means classical Arabic." 77

Arabic has always occupied, and still occupies, the highest place in the curriculum of Muslim education. With the modernization of Muslim education its place within the compulsory education curriculum is still predominant as an instrument of socialisation into the cultural heritage and national unity. The Cairo Conference on Compulsory Education of 1954 stressed that compulsory education in all Arab countries should instil in the child the principles of Islam, and develop a pride in the Arab homeland and Arab cultural heritage. 78

At the primary school stage 66 lessons out of a total weekly timetable of 208 lessons are devoted to the teaching of Arabic, and if some of the 18 more periods allotted for the reading of the Quran

77. WILBER, op. cit. p.57.
78. UNESCO, Compulsory Education in the Arab States, op. cit. p.48. In Jordan the foremost objective of education has been written down as "to prepare the student to be fond and proud of his/her Arabic language". See Amin F. MALHAS, "National Aims in Using the Mother Tongue", in Kurt Opitz (Ed), Mother Tongue Practice in Schools, UNESCO, Institute of Education, 1972, pp.181-198.
and religion are also included, the time allocation becomes much higher. At the preparatory and secondary levels though, the time allocated to the teaching of Arabic is reduced to accommodate foreign languages such as English and French, yet, except at the secondary literary stage where 21 lessons are devoted to foreign languages against 18 to Arabic, out of a 90 lessons weekly time-table, the latter still dominates. At the higher education level, the universities of Cairo, Alexandria and Ein-Shams all have departments of Arabic language and literature, while As-Azhar university has a separate college for Arabic language. In these institutions an average of 14 out of 17 weekly lessons is devoted to the study of Arabic language and literature.

This primacy of classical Arabic does, however, account for the deficiency of standards in achievement in all examinations, and particularly in foreign languages and mathematics as well as scientific subjects. So low is the standard of achievement in foreign languages that students are promoted to institutions of higher studies with low passing marks, even with failures.\(^79\) According to Professor Boktor, low standard in achievement in English and French has affected the Faculties of medicine and science where English is the medium of instruction and of law in which French is largely used.\(^80\)

Although Egypt doesn't face the problem of conflict between the national language and regional languages or the mother tongue, yet the language difficulty is aggravated by a growing demand among some nationalist groups, under the impress of national integration, to teach the scientific subjects in Arabic instead of English. Apart from the material difficulties of the lack of text books, and the absence of lexicons of technical and scientific terms, this demand is seen by

\(^79\) Amir Boktor, op. cit. p.163.

\(^80\) ibid.
educational experts as a further lowering of standards in these very subjects. 81

But, viewed from another angle, the Egyptian educational system, in keeping with the greater 'Arab-nation' concept of Egyptian-nationalism, has taken a leading role in 'national' integration by training brother Arab students in its educational institutions, and also by seconding Egyptian teachers for service in sister Arab states. In 1966-67, for example, the number of students from the Arab World on roll in the Egyptian institutions of Higher and Technical education was 23,434 out of a total of 34,516 foreign students, that is to say 67.9 per cent. 82 Similarly, out of 4,515 teachers seconded for foreign service 4,908, or 94.2 per cent, were sent to Arab countries, mainly Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan. 83

Innovative Culture

(b) Religion

The compelling commitments made in the National Charter, aiming at the expurgation of obstructionist forces and attitudes that had taken hold of Islam, impinged upon the educational system in a number of ways. In the first place, the historically derived duality of the system in which the Kuttabs, Madrassahs and Al-Azhar existed side by side with the state system, had to be abolished. The regime saw no justification for the separate existence of the specifically religious institutions like Al Azhar to continue in the country. The reasons given by the Regime for ending this hegemony of Muslim educational institutions were founded on the historical role of these institutions themselves. They argued that Muslim educational institutions in their classical era produced scholars as well as scientists, physicians and other specialists as well as judges, jurists, teachers and administrators. So, as the largest and the oldest university of the

81. F. QUBAIN, op. cit. pp.87-89
83. QUBAIN, op. cit. p.200.
Muslim world, Al-Azhar must play its true role of "an disseminator of all sciences, not just the religious ones." 84

The modernization of Al-Azhar has been regarded as the most outstanding achievement of the Revolutionary Regime in its overall bid to eradicate all types of traditionalism from Muslim education — a change which had become overdue, and the one which, it can safely be argued, could not have been attempted, or carried out, effectively, by non-revolutionary methods. Although attempts at reform in the old university had been made earlier at the beginning of this century, they barely went beyond the acceptance in principle of foreign languages, such as French and English, Hebrew, Persian, Chinese and Turkish as subjects of study. So strong was the resistance of the Ulama and the Shaikhs of the university to the introduction of any innovation and particularly to any sponsored by the government, that even though the teaching of these foreign languages had been approved in 1901, only the teaching of English actually did start, and even that not until 1958.

Law 103 of 1961, which modernised Al-Azhar, basically aimed at the following objectives:

1. "to maintain Al-Azhar's position as the largest and the oldest Muslim university in the East and West;
2. to maintain its position as the stronghold of religion and Arabic from which Islam will be renewed in its true substance to all levels and every locality in society;
3. to graduate scholars who have a knowledge and experience so that religion will no longer be their only craft or profession;
4. to destroy all barriers between Al-Azhar and other universities so that Azhar graduates may enjoy equal opportunity in the spheres of knowledge and work;

5. to give a common account of knowledge and experience to all Azharies so that they may be intellectually and psychologically equal with all other sons of the Fatherland;

6. to standardise school and university certificates in all U.A.R. universities and schools." 85

To bring it on a level with other state universities, the administrative structure of Al-Azhar is now divided into the following departments:

Supreme Council,
Muslim Research Academy
Muslim Cultural and Missions Department
Al-Azhar University,
Al-Azhar Institutes.

Al-Azhar education is organised now on a four-stage basis:

1. The pre-school Quranic memorization class;
2. The four-year primary stage;
3. The five-year secondary stage, and
4. The four-year Higher stage. 86

Transfer of students into the secular system is made easy at all the various stages. Graduates of the secondary stage, for example, can enter the Dar al Ulum College of Cairo University for teachers’ training.

In place of the three traditional faculties of Islamic Jurisprudence, Theology and Arabic, the new Al-Azhar University consists of the following different colleges:

1. College of Islamic Studies;
2. College of Arabic Studies;
3. College of Business and Administration;
4. College of Engineering and Industries;
5. College of Agriculture;
6. College of Medicine, and
7. College for Girls’ Education.

Two fundamental conditions have, however, been kept intact in the modernization Act: (1) "Arabic is the language to be used in Al-Azhar University exclusively, unless the Council of the University decides that a foreign language be adopted on specific occasions; (art.37), and (2) it is implied by articles 38 and 39, that only Muslims would be

85. ibid. p.343
86. BOKTOR, op. cit. p.153.
on the teaching staff, and only Muslim students admitted. 87

A particularly significant innovation in Al-Azhar University has been introduced with the establishment, by Art. 15, of the Islamic Research Council as the highest body to conduct research in the area of reinterpretation of Islamic doctrines in the light of present day circumstances. As the Article concerned stimulates, its objectives are:

"to undertake the study of all matters related to such research, and works towards the renewal of Muslim culture, its liberation from intrusive vestiges and traces of political and ideological fanaticism, its demonstration in its pure and original substance, promoting knowledge of it at every level and in every locality, the expression of opinion and new ideological or social problems affecting the creed, and assuming the responsibilities of the call for the sake of religion with wisdom and good counsel". 88

The opening of the gates of Al-Azhar to girl students since 1962-63 can equally be regarded unquestionably as another successful achievement of modernization, and has further demonstrated the value attached to the universalistic, rather than the traditional ascriptive criteria on which the modernized Al-Azhar should operate. The expansion of enrollment at the Azhar can be gleaned from the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>4,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>5,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>6,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>7,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>6,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>9,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>12,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>15,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>15,644</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Abstract. I. D. Crecelius, op. cit.p.347

88. ibid.
To sum up, the modernization of Al-Azhar has made a tremendous impact on Muslim education, both within Egypt and abroad. More Muslim students of the Middle Eastern and other Asian countries and Africa, even from other continents come to join the university than ever before. Traditional attitudes among the Azhari Shaikhs are disappearing fast, and slowly but surely, a consciousness is emerging among the ulama in general of the need for them to participate in and extend the boundaries of knowledge that had been rigidly fixed during the Middle Ages, including the modern socio-cultural systems of the Muslim instead of narrowly constrained spiritual and religious interests alone. This, one hopes, will lead to the greater rationalization of Islamic beliefs and practices. This is highly important because effective modernization in all the layers of a Muslim society will be easier to implement if the Ulama begin to, or are so trained as to, appreciate the norms of modernity. 89

(c) Scientific Culture

As has been seen above, enrollment at secondary and higher institutions and universities in the scientific studies has increased considerably in Egypt since the 1961 'take-off'. At the higher level, by 1967, the enrollment in sciences even exceeded that in the humanities. Another way of gauging the progress of the quest for the scientific culture would be to note the increase in the output of science graduates. The Table below shows this output with the subjects in which qualifications were achieved.

89. ibid.
Table VIII. 14

University Graduates in Science and Applied Sciences

between 1953-54 and 1967-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>1953-54</th>
<th>1954-55</th>
<th>1964-65</th>
<th>1967-68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>1,227</td>
<td>1,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>2,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>1,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentistry</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Medicine</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>2,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,820</td>
<td>3,303</td>
<td>6,745</td>
<td>8,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall total University Graduates</td>
<td>4,949</td>
<td>10,079</td>
<td>16,273</td>
<td>21,111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Abstract and Nader and Zahlan.

Again, Table VIII.5 indicates the number and types of degrees obtained in the scientific subjects during the years 1953-54 and 1963-64.

Table VIII. 15

Number and Types of Degrees in the Sciences 1953-54 to 1963-64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>B.Sc.</th>
<th>Diploma</th>
<th>M.Sc.</th>
<th>Ph.D.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Scientific Research

In order to promote scientific research in the country, the National Research Centre was created in 1956 as an autonomous agency attached to the Presidential Secretariat. Its aims were registered as:

"the promotion of scientific research, both basic and applied, especially in the fields of industry, agriculture, medicine and all other matters related to the national economy". 90

The N.C.R. is authorised to grant scholarships for research, in the U.A.R. or abroad, to establish centres for documentation and to disseminate scientific information. It has four main departments: Chemistry and Chemical Technology; Physics and Engineering Physics; Agriculture Research and Medical Research. Each department is further sectionised into various sub-divisions and research units.

The UNESCO International Conference on the Organization of Research and Training held in Lagos in 1964, established that in a developing country, a minimum of 200 research workers to a million heads of population should be reached by 1980 to attain a minimum level of achievement in science and technology. The U.A.R. Ministry of Scientific Research in its 1965 Report estimated that in the U.A.R. (Egypt) 300 research workers to a million of population would be produced by the year 1970. In view of this Report, asserts Sabet, the UNESCO Conference's target needs further investigation, both in its definition of a research worker and the scope of his work.

Apart from the various research institutions, research units and laboratories now functioning under the N.C.R. there are about 35 learned societies and 45 scientific periodicals that encourage publication of the results of various research organizations, as well as promoting research undertakings. A list of these organizations and periodicals is given in Chart 'L' below.

8.6. Conclusions

Egypt's progress in socio-economic and political modernization since its national independence and its time scale have, considering the stupendous poverty and backwardness prevalent in the country, been relatively impressive though various problems still remain obtrusively

91. JUBAIN, ibid. p.171.
92. Adel A. SABET, op. cit.
persistent. An apt and balanced assessment of the degree and impact of modernization in Egypt has been given in a critical and penetrative study of the country's development by Patrick O'Brian in 1966, who asserts:

"Egypt's ruling elite is attempting to build a 'Socialist, Democratic and Co-operative society'. Its achievements since the coup d'etat of 1952 and more obviously since the proclamation of these goals in 1957, are not unimpressive. Few would deny that progress has been made, particularly in the sphere of social justice; but its extent should not be exaggerated.... Through the Arab Socialist Union the Free Officers hope to encourage more participation in politics and are seeking to establish a viable set of political institutions. Gross inequalities in income and wealth have been eradicated but redistribution has so far done little to alleviate the material conditions for the mass of poverty-stricken Egyptians.

If new privileged groups have emerged in Egypt, it is not really among the ruling elite and their entourage, as some writers suggest, but among factory workers, median peasants, beneficiaries of land reform, and the urban middle class. Until the effects of social and economic policy are more diffused, the regime's dedication to socialism --- will remain mainly ideological". 93

Educational modernization in Egypt has also relatively kept pace with that of ideological, economic, political and social aspects of modernization, and even contributed to the sustenance of the overall modernization effort. To quote O'Brian again:

"With a limited natural endowment Egypt is devoting resources towards the improvement of her most abundant resource, manpower ... Education is not simply an agent for economic development but also the most important vehicle for social mobility now operating in Egypt. The status and material standards of poor and illiterate families will rise with their childrens' advancement up the educational ladder". 94

94. ibid. p.298.
The most remarkable achievement has surely been in the modernization of the historical Islamic University of Al-Azhar where changes have been introduced without resort to extremity, as in Turkey, or mistrust, as in Pakistan, but by striking a willing concord between the religious classes and the modernists. Consequently, the great institution of Al-Azhar has gained new dimensions of scholarship as the greatest Muslim university of the world.
List of Learned Societies and Research Institutes
Engaged in Innovation and Research
in Egypt

ACADEMIES

ACADEMY OF THE ARABIC LANGUAGE: CAIRO.

INSTITUT D' EGYpte: Cairo. f.1959. Considers literary, artistic and scientific questions relating to Egypt and neighbouring countries.

LEARNED SOCIETIES AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CENTRE: CAIRO: f.1947; fosters and carries out research into pure and applied sciences.

EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION: CAIRO: f.1898. Acts as an information centre for farmers; and its activities include seed selection, importation of fertilizers, periodic agricultural and industrial exhibitions etc.

EGYPTIAN DESERT INSTITUTE: CAIRO.f.1950. A Scientific institute for the study and development of desert areas; carries out research into various aspects of the desert economy and life; maintains field stations and laboratories.

EGYPTIAN HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY. Cairo. founded 1915.

BUILDING RESEARCH INSTITUTE: GIZA, Carries out basic and applied research work on building materials and means of construction, provides technical information and acts as consultant.

ARMENIAN ARTISTIC UNION: CAIRO. f.1920. Aims to promote Armenian and Arabic culture.

ATELIER. Alexandria. Society of artists and writers.

Egyptian Concert Society, Alexandria.

HELLENIC ARTISTIC UNION. ALEXANDRIA.

HIGH COUNCIL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE. CAIRO. f. 1956.

INSTITUTE OF ARAB MUSIC: ALEXANDRIA.

INSTITUTE OF ARAB MUSIC: CAIRO.

THE MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE: Alexandria. ; carries out basic and applied research in the field of medicine.

NUTRITION RESEARCH INSTITUTE

OPHTHALMOLOGICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MEMORIAL INSTITUTE FOR OPHTHALMIC RESEARCH: CAIRO. f. 1925.

OPHTHALMOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF EGYPT. CAIRO. f.1902.

PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES: MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH. CAIRO.f. 1885.

RESEARCH INSTITUTE AND HOSPITAL FOR TROPICAL DISEASES: CAIRO. f.1932.

ALEXANDRIA INSTITUTE OF OCEANOGRAPHY AND FISHERIES: ALEXANDRIA. f.1931.

ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT. CAIRO.

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY AND MINERAL RESEARCH DEPARTMENT. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY.f.1898.

INSTITUTE OF ASTRONOMY AND GEOPHYSICS: EGYPTIAN OBSERVATORIES. CAIRO.f. 1903.
INSTITUTE OF FRESHWATER BIOLOGY: CAIRO.
NATIONAL CHEMICAL RESEARCH CENTRE: CAIRO.
NATIONAL INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION CENTRE: CAIRO. f. 1955.
Accumulates and disseminates information in all languages and in all branches of science and technology.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STANDARDS: CAIRO.
NATIONAL LABORATORY FOR METROLOGY AND MATERIAL TESTING.
RED SEA INSTITUTE OF OCEANOGRAPHY AND FISHERIES: ALGHAZARDAQA. f. 1929.
SOCIETE ENTOMOLOGIQUE D'EGYPTE: CAIRO. f. 1907.
EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH: CAIRO. f. 1948.
EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES: FACULTY EDUCATION, AIN SHAMS UNIVERSITY, CAIRO. f. 1948.
SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION OF EGYPT: CAIRO. f. 1957.
EGYPTIAN SOCIETY OF ENGINEERS, CAIRO. f. 1920.
HIGHER INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTE: ASWAN. f. 1962.
HYDROLOGICAL RESEARCH STATION, Cairo. f. 1902.
METALLURGICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, HELWAN.
EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR ARCHIVES AND LIBRARIANSHIP: CAIRO. f. 1956.
EGYPTIAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: CAIRO. f. 1945.
EGYPTIAN SOCIETY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, STATISTICS AND LEGISLATION: CAIRO. f. 1909.
INSTITUTE OF ARAB RESEARCH AND STUDIES: CAIRO. f. 1953.
EDUCATION DOCUMENTATION CENTRE FOR EGYPT: CENTRAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION: CAIRO.
DEUTSCHE ARCHAEOLOGISCHES INSTITUT (GERMAN ARCHAEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE): CAIRO. f. 1936.
EGYPTIAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY, CAIRO. f. 1876; REORGANISED. 1917.
HELLENIC SOCIETY OF PTOLEMAIC EGYPT: ALEXANDRIA. f. 1908.
INSTITUTE DOMINICAN D'ETUDES ORIENTALES: PRIORY OF THE DOMINICAN FATHERS: CAIRO.
INSTITUT FRANCAIS D'ARCHEOLOGIE ORIENTALE (FRENCH INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL ARCHAEOLOGY): CAIRO. f. 1880.
SOCIETE ARCHEOLOGIQUE D'ALEXANDRIE: ALEXANDRIA. f. 1893.
SOCIETY FOR COPTIC ARCHAEOLOGY: CAIRO. f. 1934.
ALEXANDRIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ALEXANDRIA. f. 1921.
CAIRO ODONTOLOGICAL SOCIETY: CAIRO.
EGYPTIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION: CAIRO. f. 1919.
EGYPTIAN SOCIETY OF MEDICINE AND TROPICAL HYGIENE: ALEXANDRIA. f. 1927.
HIGHER INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC HEALTH: UNIVERSITY OF ALEXANDRIA.
MEDICAL RESEARCH EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION: CAIRO.
BILHARZIASIS RESEARCH INSTITUTE: GIZA.
DRUG RESEARCH INSTITUTE: CAIRO.
INDUSTRIAL HEALTH RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

EUROPA PUBLICATIONS. LONDON. 1972.
PART IV

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

From the viewpoint of social planning and cultural borrowing a most important type of study is that which endeavours to anticipate and compare events in a number of given situations. It is perfectly possible to make international comparisons of education achievements using certain criteria of success.

Brian Holmes.
Problems in Education
A Comparative Approach
CHAPTER 9.

QUANTIFICATION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MODERNIZATION

9.1 A QUANTITATIVE TAXONOMY OF MODERNIZATION

Sophisticated attempts have been made in recent years, following planning and prediction techniques used at UNESCO, to chart out multivariate data in order to gauge the level of modernization of various countries. The latest of these, and the most comprehensive so far, is the Harbison et al study entitled, "Quantitative Analyses of Modernization and Development" (1970) which corroborates the Harbison and Myers' earlier "Composite Index on Human Resources Development" study (1964). The later study devises a multivariate taxonomy based upon the 1968 UNESCO 'Taxonomic Method' developed by Professor Zygmunt Hellwig, for the purpose of ranking, classification of countries and areas with respect to their levels of modernization. Originally, this taxonomy, remark Professor Harbison et al, "was designed - in 1952 - in order to obtain

"a statistical method of determining homogeneous units or 'types of things' in an n-dimensional vectoral space, without the use of regression, variance or correlation analysis'

and was envisaged to serve as a useful methodology for a comparative analysis at international level.¹

Using the numerical values assigned to some eight commonly accepted, multiple indicators of modernization namely: economic manpower development, demographic mobilization, cultural development,

¹. Frederick H. HARBISON et al, Quantitative Analysis of Modernization and Development, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 1970, pp.15-29
health services provisions and educational effort, the Harbison study arrives at a standardized value ranked as '0' which is assigned to an 'ideal-type' model country, and then ranks 112 countries of the world on that standardized value index. Two types of rank orders have been drawn to mark the level of modernization as measured from the 'ideal-type', viz: (1) the 'Pattern of Development' which marks the distance of each country to the 'ideal-type', and (2) the Measure of Development which has been defined as 'a method of simulating the percentage of development and the critical distance from the so-called 'ideal' country. Both the ranks are so constructed that the closer they are to '0', the more modernized is the country.

To take one example, on the Economic Development Index, in the matrix of 'developed countries', the U.S.A. has been shown as the 'ideal' country having '0' as its Pattern of Development and '0' as its Measure of Development; and, within the same matrix, Portugal with 6.3968 as its Pattern of Development and 0.9134 as its Measure of Development would be considered the least economically modernized country within the 'developed countries' matrix.

The Harbison taxonomy seems quite useful for constructing a matrix of modernization comprising selected Muslim countries, and particularly to gauge the comparative level of modernization vis-a-vis educational modernization of the countries under study: Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey.

2. ibid. p.
3. ibid. p.
It must be stated here that this study does not itself attempt to process the raw data which alone would be a stupendous task. But, with the permission to reproduce the processed data granted kindly by the Princeton University, Industrial Relations section and the authors of the study, it only utilizes the processed values of the Harbison et al study, both for the Pattern of Development and the Measure of Development indexes in respect of some 15 selected Muslim countries from within the grand matrix of some 112 countries of the World. Certain rather atypical countries within the Muslim matrix e.g. Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and some Gulf Sultanates, are not included because of their asymmetrical modernization resulting from their extra-ordinary oil finances. One such oil-rich country, Libya has, however, been included because until 1965, its development was not too inconsistent with the rest of the countries in the matrix. The three countries under this study have been specifically brought under focus on the Comprehensive Data Matrix and the various other indexes. The comparative picture that emerges is found to be significantly supportive of the findings of the case studies.

Table IX.I shows the Comprehensive Data Matrix for 15 Muslim countries on some 40 variables/indicators of modernization that are listed in Chart IX.2. Table IX.3 shows the Composite Index of Modernization of these 15 Muslim countries, while Table IX.4 shows the Index of their Educational Modernization. In Table IX.5, Comparative trends and rate of Change in Modernization of these countries between the years 1960-1965 have been shown. Graph 'N' shows the comparative trends in the educational modernization of the three countries under study between years 1960-69.

4. See Appendix 'A'.

<p>| SELECTED COUNTRIES | POPULATION | FERTILITY | LIFE EXP | DEATH RATE | GROWTH | GDP/GDP | ENSR | CH GR | MGR | SF GR | CR GR | SF 2 | SF 3 | SF 4 | SF 5 | SF 6 | SF 7 | SF 8 | SF 9 | SF 10 | SF 11 | SF 12 | SF 13 | SF 14 | SF 15 | SF 16 | SF 17 | SF 18 | SF 19 | SF 20 | SF 21 | SF 22 | SF 23 |
|------------------|------------|-----------|----------|------------|--------|---------|------|-------|-----|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|
| 1. Afghanistan   | 350        | 17        | 5        | 24         | 2.7    | 0.5     | 0.1  | 0.37  | 1.74 | 55    | 11    | 1953  | 93   | 10    | 13.3 | 0.6  | 10.4 | 2.9  | 66    | 27    |
| 2. Algeria       | 597        | 14        | 13       | 51         | 13.9   | 1.2     | 1.2  | 2.50  | 33.9 | 70    | 21    | 2347   | 57   | 15    | 55.6 | 11.9 | 7.2  | 21.2 | 217   | 42    |
| 3. Indonesia     | 730        | 123       | 11       | 47         | 80.5   | 2.44    | 14.9 | 0.4   | 2.24 | 6.9   | 58    | 13    | 1900  | 31   | 7     | 13.6 | 1.5  | 5.0  | 2.7  | 91    | 99    |
| 4. Iran          | 636        | 30        | 13       | 51         | 100.6  | 3.1     | 16   | 24.1  | 11.1 | 50    | 24    | 1890   | 60   | 15    | 69.1 | 3.4  | 3.0  | 8.4  | 232   | 45    |
| 5. Iraq          | 170        | 9         | 15       | 54         | 99.7   | 2.5     | 19   | 18.9  | 2.4   | 0.8   | 2.35  | 18.9  | 61    | 28    | 2100  | 37   | 12    | 343   | 9.2   | 1.0  | 11.8 | 2.0   | 610   |
| 6. Jordan        | 38         | 2         | 15       | 52         | 100.5  | 4.1     | 22.8 | 2.8   | 0.9  | 2.41  | 17.1  | 55    | 25    | 2190  | 49   | 9.1   | 135   | 15.4  | 5.0  | 10.3 | 212   | 265   |
| 7. Libya         | 680        | 2         | 37       | 57         | 95.2   | 3.7     | 1    | 23.9  | 3.4  | 6.12  | 32.1  | 62    | 24    | 2340  | 55   | 5.0   | 14.2  | 0.3   | 53.4 | 614   | 590   |
| 8. Malaysia      | 120        | 11        | 37       | 81         | 101.3  | 3.05    | 20.8 | 2.1   | 0.1  | 6.55  | 39.3  | 51    | 30    | 2400  | 52   | 54    | 427   | 14.6  | 11.0 | 27.8 | 303   | 424   |
| 9. Morocco       | 175        | 16        | 40       | 53         | 95.7   | 2.8     | 32.2 | 18.8  | 0.9  | 0.2   | 2.33  | 15.6  | 50    | 21    | 1940  | 57   | 14    | 56.0  | 10.2  | 13.3 | 17.6 | 162   | 173   |
| 10. Sudan        | 967        | 16        | 52       | 40         | 27.6   | 2.8     | 6    | 4.9   | 0.4  | 0.0   | 3.49  | 9.93  | 64    | 41    | 1940  | 59   | 17    | 3.0   | 0.3   | 2.9  | 97    | 87    |
| 11. Syria        | 72         | 6         | 40       | 52         | 104    | 2.9     | 30.2 | 34.2  | 2.5  | 0.7   | 1.40  | 11.6  | 78    | 13    | 2600  | 52   | 11    | 335   | 16.4  | 4.0  | 7.2  | 173   | 393   |
| 12. Tunisia      | 63         | 5         | 45       | 53         | 92.7   | 2.3     | 28   | 24.4  | 1.1  | 0.3   | 2.48  | 29.7  | 79    | 21    | 2390  | 57   | 27    | 82.2  | 12.8  | 0.3  | 19.5 | 194   | 234   |
| 13. Pakistan     | 366        | 117       | 50       | 45         | 83.4   | 2.1     | 313   | 10.3  | 1.7  | 0.0   | 0.76  | 3.55  | 52    | 21    | 2290  | 72   | 18    | 9.7   | 1.5   | 2.0  | 1.6  | 85    | 92    |
| 14. Turkey       | 301        | 36        | 43       | 55         | 84.3   | 2.5     | 42    | 21.3  | 4.1  | 0.5   | 3.06  | 17.3  | 98    | 16    | 3110  | 71   | 45    | 85.5   | 11.2  | 1.1  | 6.9  | 267   | 422   |
| 15. Egypt (U.A.R)| 387        | 34        | 43       | 54         | 87.9   | 2.5     | 31.2  | 22.7  | 4.8  | 1.3   | 4.54  | 22.3  | 85    | 15    | 2940  | 73   | 150   | 54.5   | 3.3   | 2.0  | 4.4  | 148   | 267   |</p>
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### CHART IX.2

**INDICATORS OF MODERNIZATION**

**KEY TO THE ABBREVIATIONS**

| DEMOGRAPHIC | 1. BIRTH RATE | Number of births per 1,000 population. |
|             | 2. DEATH RATE | Number of deaths per 1,000 population. |
|             | 3. LIFESPAN  | Life expectancy at birth (in years). |
|             | 4. DEPRATATION | Dependency Ratio (0-14 and 65 plus population as percent of 15-65 population). |
|             | 5. GROWTH RATE | POPULATION Growth Rate (average percent 1963-67). |
|             | 6. POP/SQKM  | Population density per square kilometer. |
|             | 7. URBPOP    | Percent of population living in cities of 20,000 and over. |
| HEALTH      | 8. DOC/DENT  | Doctors and Dentists per 10,000 population. |
|             | 9. PHARM     | Pharmacists per 10,000 population. |
|             | 10. NURSES   | Nurses per 10,000 population. |
|             | 11. HOSPITALS| Hospital Beds per 10,000 population. |
|             | 12. GM PROTEIN| Daily grams protein consumed per capita. |
|             | 13. ANIMAL PROTEIN | Daily animal protein as proportion of total grams protein. |
|             | 14. CALORIES | Daily calories consumed per capita. |
|             | 15. STARCH | Daily cereals and starches as proportion of total calories. |

**COMMUNICATIONS AND CULTURE**

| 16. NEWSPAPER | Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population. |
| 17. RADIOS   | Radio receivers per 1,000 population. |
| 18. TELEPHONES | Telephones in use per 1,000 population. |
| 19. CINEMA   | Yearly cinema attendance per capita. |
| 20. MOTORVEHICLES | Passenger cars and commercial vehicles excluding Military and Police, per 1,000 population. |

**ECONOMIC**

| 21. PCGNP | Per capita Gross National Product at factor Cost (in 1964US $) |
| 22. ENERGY | Per Capita Energy Consumption (in Kg of Coal Ton Equivalents) |

**EDUCATIONAL MODERNIZATION**

<p>| 23. LITERACY | Literacy Rate of Adult population (15 Plus). |
| 24. ENROL I | First-level enrolment Ratio (adjusted for 5.14 population) |
| 25. ENROL II | Second-level enrolment ratio (adjusted for 15-19 population) |
| 26. ENROL III | Third-level enrolment ratio (adjusted for 20-24 population) |
| 27. TEACH I | First level Teachers per 10,000 population. |
| 28. TEACH II/III | Second and Third Level Teachers per 10,000 population. |
| 29. STEM I | Percent female enrolment in First level education. |
| 30. STEM II | Percent female enrolment in Second level education. |
| 31. STEM III | Percent female enrolment in Third level education. |
| 32. AGRENROL | Proportion of Third-level enrolment in Agriculture courses. |
| 33. MEDENROL | Proportion of Third-level enrolment in Medical Courses. |
| 34. SESENGENROL | Proportion of Third-level enrolment in Science and Engineering. |
| 35. PCREX$ | Per Capita public recurrent expenditures on Education in US $. |
| 36. RECUNIT I | Recurrent Cost of education per unit at First Level. |
| 37. RECUNIT II | Recurrent cost of education per unit at Second Level. |
| 38. RECUNIT III | Recurrent cost of education per unit at Third level. |
| 39. CAPED | Public Capital expenditure on education as percent of total public expenditure on education. |
| 40. RECGNP | Per Capita public recurrent expenditures on education as percent of per capita Gross National Product. |</p>
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<th>Measure of Modernization</th>
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Some Highly Modernized Countries

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**Some Highly Modernized Countries**

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Some Comparative Figures from the Developed Countries

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9.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A scrutiny of the foregoing tables clearly shows that within a matrix of fifteen selected Muslim countries, the three countries under study are so placed that Egypt ranks higher than Turkey as well as Pakistan, both on the Composite Index of overall modernization and the index of educational modernization. Again, the gap between the ranking of Egypt and Turkey on the index of Educational Modernization is wider than that on the Composite Index of Modernization. Pakistan obviously remains more backward than both Egypt and Turkey on both the indexes, though its rate of change during the period from 1960-65, as shown in Table 'D', has been 61.4 per cent as compared with 19.5 per cent of Egypt and 18.7 per cent of Turkey.

The higher ranking of Egypt on both the indexes is unquestionably significant, considering the fact that chronologically it was the last of the three countries to achieve its national independence; and that it has suffered serious setbacks consequent to its continuing involvement in the Arab-Israel conflict. Turkey's progress in modernization, on the other hand, remained, until 1965, rather slow, intermittent and inconsistent with its declared ideals.

Taking the rank-order of some 112 countries of the world, whereas Pakistan ranks 25, Turkey 44 and Egypt 47 on the Composite Index of Modernization; on the Index of Educational Modernization, the lead taken by Egypt has been greater, though the order of ranking has remained unchanged. Here Egypt stood at 64, Turkey at 53 and Pakistan at 36.

A further breakdown of the Educational Index indicates that Turkey has achieved the highest rate of literacy, 38.1, while Egypt remains at 19.5 and Pakistan at 15.8. But Turkey's lead on this score is offset by the difference of the time-scale of modernization, i.e. about 50 years for Turkey, 12 years for Egypt and 15 years for Pakistan.
The comparative figures for enrolment show that although in Turkey 90.8 per cent of school age children were enrolled in primary schools as compared with 52.4 in Pakistan and 74.3 in Egypt, at the secondary and higher level enrolment Egypt has taken the lead. The second level enrolment in Egypt was 28.7 per cent, in Turkey 18.1 per cent and in Pakistan 17.9 per cent. But the third level enrolment figures stood 9.5 per cent for Egypt, 4.93 per cent for Turkey and 3.38 for Pakistan.

On the supply and training of teachers, Egypt again has kept the lead over both Turkey and Pakistan. The differential for second and third level teachers is considerable viz. 9.0 per cent for Pakistan, 11.0 per cent for Turkey and 20.2 per cent for Egypt.

Taking yet another significant variable of educational modernization, i.e. the percentage of females enrolled at the various levels, the comparison is even more striking. Whereas in Pakistan the percentage of females enrolled in the first level education was 29 per cent, in Turkey it was 40 per cent and in Egypt it was 39 per cent. In second level education, however, the trend was reversed. In Pakistan the percentage stood at 32 per cent, while in Turkey it was 26 per cent and in Egypt, 28 per cent. For the third level, the picture did not change much, Egypt's percentage was equal to Turkey's; and both much higher than Pakistan's. This clearly shows that the Egyptian woman is more emancipated and educationally ahead of her counterpart in Turkey and Pakistan.

The promotion of science and technology in the three countries under study also shows Egypt in the lead while Turkey and Pakistan lag behind. An additional significant point in favour of Egypt's technological progress appears in the fact that in Egypt the lead in enrolment in scientific and technological subjects has been coupled
with a relative increase in enrolment in Agricultural Subjects. Whereas both in Pakistan and Turkey enrolment in the higher level Agricultural Courses was 3.2 per cent, in Egypt it was 10.7 per cent.

Moreover in 1965, Egypt spent 5.4 per cent of its G.N.P. on education as compared with 1.1 per cent in Pakistan and 3.1 per cent in Turkey.

These comparisons quite manifestly testify that Egypt, by following a middle path and a socialist nationalism, has marched ahead in a much shorter period of time than Pakistan and Turkey, where higher ideological commitments and practices inconsistent with ideology still persist; and the resultant divisions, disparities and imbalances have turned modernization into an uneven, city-centered, bureaucratic and elitist force running counter to modern norms of equality and integration. Whereas, in Egypt, the tensions between the traditional and the modern, the secular and the religious, the peasant and the factory worker and other division within the society have been relatively balanced out, both in Pakistan and Turkey these polarities have increased. Hence, education too has failed relatively to provide the source of national and societal integration so necessary for an effective modernization which demand norms of equality, capacity and the criteria of achievement, universalism and affectivity-neutrality. The contrary has been truer in Pakistan and in Turkey.

Future trends of modernization obviously flow from past performances as well as from recent political and economic crises or developments of the three countries. Whereas Turkey's participation in the European Common Market, and in the O.E.C.D. is bound to rectify its previous lags in all aspects of modernization, the political situation in both Pakistan and Egypt is more likely to remain, unchanged and
detrimental to all aspects of modernization, until stability there is assured; material as well as ideological, quantitative as well as qualitative.

As can be seen from the Graph Chart on page 398, already the trends of change between the years 1965-69 have considerably moved away from the pre 1965 performance of the three countries. Turkey is rapidly taking lead in the development of scientific and technological education and in the provision of literacy, while female education there has remained as slow as before. In Egypt, scientific and technological education has made steady progress but enrolment in the Arts and the Humanities has showed a decline since 1965. Female education in Pakistan and Egypt has been progressing rather more dramatically than in Turkey. The supply of teachers in all the three countries, however, has remained relatively low, although the rate of progress in this respect remains higher in Pakistan than in Egypt and Turkey.
CHAPTER 10.

CONCLUSIONS

10.1. ISLAM, MODERNIZATION AND EDUCATION

Hardly less than a quarter of a century has elapsed since the Muslim World, taken as a whole, has emerged independent of the colonial rule. Judging by every indicator of modernization, it is already moving decisively on the highway to modernization. Any sojourner through the Muslim capitals or researcher in the literature of the Muslim countries could hardly deny the tremendous changes that immediately strike him both in the ecological and demographic features, and the domain of ideas, of the Muslim societies. Even the most isolated lands of Islam that had, for centuries, remained aloof and unaffected by the changes outside their immediate environment, e.g. the very heartland of Islam, the Arabian peninsula, have emerged, uninhibited by any let or hindrance, to devise and to carry out programmes of modernization. Many a Muslim land, which only some two decades ago did not comprise more than a few traditional townships with a vast hinterland of pastoral villages, can now boast of some of the most up-to-date network of urban centres, communication systems and modern institutions, such as the parliament, universities and colleges, a fairly differentiated system of first, second and third level educational institutions, hospitals, airports, highways, telephone exchanges, radio and television stations, foreign exchanges, banks and super-markets; flats and skyscrapers.

Modernization appears not only to be accepted, desired for, and clamorously indulged in pursuit; but one wonders, if it does create any apparent problem for an average Muslim man or woman of today to
be modern. A contemporary sight of the rows of mosque-goers—men and unveiling women shoppers in the streets, many of whom look too modern by their appearance and dress, strikes the observer, who would recall that hardly half a century ago, a Muslim man could not enter a mosque with a Western styled garment to join in the prayer, and a Muslim lady was not to be seen without purdah outside home, as a great attitudinal change. A large section of the hundreds of thousands of pilgrims who flock to the Holy cities of Makka and Medina, fly in the most modern jetliners of their national airlines. Most of these pilgrims are educated not in the traditional Muslim Maktabs and Madrassahs but in the modern national schools, colleges and universities, and speak English, French or Dutch after their national or mother tongues. Furthermore modern normative outlooks are also considerably discernible from their thoughts and behaviour.

On the outside, therefore, one sees no tension or protest against modernization from an average Muslim of today. Like all peoples used to living for centuries with their traditions with little change, a Muslim too has caveats and fears against change per se, but he seems to have no qualms of conscience against modernization itself. On the contrary, modernization has equipped him to play multiple effective roles in all aspects of his society over and above his primary positions. He is now a voter, a councillor, a technician, a salaried wage-earner or a professional man, a consumer, and an industrialist— even a politician. As a result of the communication revolution and spread of modern education, his cognitive horizon has widened. He is more informed of the local, national and international events than his forefathers. His empathetic capacity has, therefore, been enhanced.

1. For example J. B. PRIESTLEY writing about the "English" asserts, "Furthermore, while Englishness is not hostile to change, it is suspicious of change for change's sake rejecting the idea that we are now committed to some inevitable mechanical progress" The English, op. cit. p. 242
His children receive an education which is more systematic, articulated, wider in scope and dimensions, and more rewarding, at least, in this-worldly life. The chances of his children's socio-economic mobility are far greater than his own. And so, he is receptive, even appreciative of all what modernization has yielded to him. His sensibility is, however, struck suddenly when the traditional community leader, the Imam (preacher) of the mosque warns him that his faith, his culture and his 'aqbat' (life in the hereafter) are in danger as he is moving away from the Islamic path - the path trodden by theaslaf (ancestors) for centuries. He is obviously bewildered and looks askance. Little does he know as to how and where to stop the change; and what to accept; what not. Himself not too well educated and sophisticated enough to know for sure the advantages and disadvantages, or the choices available to him in the face of modernization, if any, he is unable to rationalise the dilemma. He is modernizing but without convictions. The strongest hold upon his beliefs and psyche remains in the hands of the traditionalist Islamic intellectuals - the ulama, the 'guardians of the Faith' who, as a class, stand opposed to modernization. It is pertinent, therefore, to analyse how the ulama view modernization of the Muslim societies and the Muslim education. In this respect, it should be observed, the cases of Pakistan and Egypt are more relevant while the situation in Turkey varies because of the liquidation of the influence of the ulama by Mustafa Ataturk.

10.2. THE ULAMA AND MODERNIZATION

Pakistan

During the long years of the controversies over the creation of Pakistan as an independent Islamic state, the ulama of the subcontinent, on the whole, had remained opposed to the concept of Pakistan mainly because they regarded nationalism as a western concept, anti-Islamic and designed to weaken the World Muslim Community vis-a-vis the Muslims.
in the subcontinent. As a corollary of the same, the ulama were sceptical of the designs of the modernist-westernised leadership of the Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and Liaquat Ali Khan, and others, who, they argued, knew little what Islam really stands for. After Pakistan, however, became a reality, ulama became the most formidable advocates of making it an Islamic state. The most organised and progressive among the Pakistani ulama is the Jamait-i-Islami (Islamic Community) Party convened by Maulan Abu'al Aala Maududi, who remains, though he has explained Islam in a more rationalist manner than the rest of the ulama class, and has made a greater approach to the more educated Muslims, strictly adherent and arch-supportive of the traditionalist interpretations of Islam.

The Maulana is highly critical of the apologetic approach of the Modernists, which he believes started as a result of the Western domination over the Muslim Societies during the colonial rule, with men like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Sayyid Amir Ali, Sayyid Jamal al Din Afghani, Shaikh Muhammad Abduh and others. "Islam", he asserts, "needs no apology." Maududi sees modernization together with the different character traits and norms associated with it, e.g. rationalism,

2. See Leonard BINDER, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1960, p.22. also cf. Kalim Siddique, Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan, Macmillan, London, 1972, op.cit. pp 109-110. Siddiqui remarks, "A regular feature of Pakistani politics ever since independent has been the running confrontation between the Mullah party [ulama] and the ruling elite. The first round was won by the latter under Jinnah's leadership. The Mullah (this is a nickname given to the ulama by the modernists) had followed Jinnah to Pakistan to challenge the Pakka Sahib's authority. He had kept up constant pressure for Pakistan to be made into an Islamic State ..."

3. For Maulana Maududi's views on modernization and modernization of the Muslim Education, see Appendix B, pp 422-28 being the excerpts from this reader's lengthy interview with the Maulana during his visit to Makka to attend the annual meeting of the World Islamic League, in November 1968, where this reader was working under the Ministry of Education.

4. See Appendix 'B'

positivism, nationalism, and scientism, essentially as a deeply-rooted desire of man to dominate man by the ever-shifting ideological concepts.

Summing up his views, writes Jameelah,

"All modernist ideologies are characterised by man worship. Man worship most often appears under the guise of science. Modernists are convinced that progress in scientific knowledge will eventually confer upon them all the powers of Divinity" (5)

Maududi declares that Islam stands in absolute opposition to all these ideologies since in Islam man is taught, as his priormost article of confession, to submit only to God and to discard all other masters.

"To dominate is to play God, and to accept domination is to worship a Golden Calf", insists Maududi. "Whenever, man finds himself in a position from which he can dominate, tyranny, excess, intemperance, unlawful exploitation and inequality reign supreme." 6

Modernism, therefore, appears to Maududi as an ideology of domination by the scientifically and technologically advanced nations of the world of the rest of mankind; and so he stands vehemently opposed to it. In his view, God's revelation is essential as the highest normative, universalistic link between mankind. On the question of the need to transform the traditional Islamic interpretations, the Maulana insists that Islam is a perfect religion and a way of life which must be re-lived rather than re-stated.7 Fanciful reinterpretation of the Revelation, he warns, is misleading. According to Maududi Muslims are weak and backward because they have strayed from Islam. He, therefore, staunchly and sincerely preaches for the true understanding and application of Islamic concepts in individual and social life today not only for the Muslims but also for the Westerners.

5. Maryam JAMEELAH, Islam and Modernism, op. cit. pp.116-17
7. Appendix B.
"If the West had ever to face true Islam, the Westerners rather than the Muslims would have been conquered to it." (8)

The Maulana is equally strongly critical of the traditionalist Muslim theologicians for their aloofness, inward looking and blind attachment to the past in every detail. He chastises them for their failure to study the Western society first hand to propagate Islam using the modern publicity techniques. He only wishes, and sees no harm for the Muslims, to borrow western technology and machines but not the western cultural influences, and he is sanguine that such a selective borrowing is possible.9

But he severely reprimands those Modernist Muslim scholars who he believes wish to see Islam reformed, as misguided and bewitched by the 'materialist' civilization of the West, whose system of life he remarks, is "entirely devoid of piety, truthfulness, virtue, chastity and modesty."10 The only reform that Maududi deems necessary in the body politic of the Islamic world is the replacement of the westernised elites by the truly Islamicised ones through a political change. Muslim education, in his view can only be successfully organised, re-oriented and made effective when all the societal features, in particular the Muslim polity, are also Islamicised. All the efforts to modernize Muslim education until that time are futile and self-defeating and misleading.

EGYPT

Many of Maulana Maududi's ideas and reasonings resemble that of, if not actually inspired by, the founder of the famous Ikhwan al Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), Shaikh Hasan al Banna of Egypt. Shaikh al Banna was tooth and nail opposed to modernization, secularism and material progress. His 'Muslim Brotherhood' party emerged

8. ABBOTT. op.cit. p.180
9. Appendix 'B'
10. ABBOTT. p.180
highly activist in their effort to reverse all the non-Islamic social, economic, political and ethical practices that had crept into the body social of Islam, particularly in Egypt, consequent to the superimposition of modernization.

Shaikh al Banna was convinced that modernism was inimical to what Islam stands for. He preached for world Muslim unity to "strengthen the Islamic world and to re-establish the principles and practices of Islam in their purest form; that is, to strengthen Islam against encroachments of materialism." 11

Shaikh al Banna too saw Islam as a complete guidance, in no need of any borrowing from outside. 12 He rejected all foreign inspired ethno-centric concepts of modernism as devious attempts to confuse the Muslim intellectuals. In his view, the only reform needed in the body social of Islam was the eradication of 'extravagant and traditional social ceremonies such as the spend-all marriages, as well as social evils like bribery, nepotism and favouritism etc.' Other than that, he insisted, Muslims needed only to put Islam into practice. 13

As a political party, the Ikhwan too put top priority on the restoration of an Islamic polity, that is, the establishment of the Khilifah. 14 But they also believed that before the Khilifah was established, there must be thorough preparation in the Islamicization of the educational, social, economic and other aspects of the Muslim life. Complete Islamicization of the individuals and organizations such as the Civil Service, the army, the universities, schools and colleges, etc. was a pre-requisite to the rehabilitation of the Islamic society and the Islamic way of life. 15

12. ibid. p.162
13. ibid. pp.172-32
14. ibid. p.166
15. ibid. p.167
The Ikhwan were opposed in principle to the secular education as obtaining in the contemporary institutions of the country; they aimed in the event at Islamicising all Muslim education, religious as well as secular. But during this preparatory period they also advocated a fuller participation into the present system of education, and the learning of at least one foreign European language as highly vital by all 'Brothers' and 'Sisters.' 16

These uncompromisingly particularistic ideological strands of the ulama both in Pakistan and Egypt, obviously allow for no contemporary normative influences to affect the Islamic psyche. Whereas, the colonial rule has withdrawn from all Muslim lands leaving behind traces of influences and forces that were, to be sure, uncongenial to the Islamic culture and, as pointed out by Professor Adam Curie, impeded the development of the colonised people in general. But, now that that phase has passed, it would certainly be more harmful to the development of the Muslim countries, if the ulama should fail to grasp the positive and elevating forces of modernization. The ulama apparently, have not forgiven the bygone event of the colonization of the Muslim societies, and remain, in their attitudes, close to the eighteenth century defensive response. What they fail to acknowledge is the fact that the greatest share of the blame for the Muslims' backwardness that led to their domination by foreigners fell upon their own shoulders. As intellectuals of Islam, they have been stressing in the past, and to a great extent do even now, the other-worldly interests of the Muslims as against their this-worldly affairs, though they still insist that Islam cares for all aspects of life. A rather caustic criticism of the attitudes of the Ulama as a class towards the socio-economic and political uplift of their


of their co-religionists in the present times has been presented by Kalim Siddique, as below:

"The self-appointed custodians of Islam in India had become so alienated from the Islam of the Prophet that they began to equate freedom to worship with freedom of political action...Islam, they argued, was a universal religion which could not be contained or defined in terms of a territorial nationalism... The Mullah conveniently forgot that even in its early days Islam made little headway until the Prophet had acquired a territorial foothold in Medina."

Siddique goes on,

"In the Islam of the Mullah, political power and Muslim domination in a territorial state were not relevant to the Muslims' overriding concern in life - to achieve personal piety and salvation in the Hereafter. He held up the corrupt rich as example of what would happen if 'the world' was pursued. 'The poorer are closer to God' became a standard Mullah doctrine. Because he was in no position to help his flock out of the abyss of poverty, he converted poverty into a permanent and abiding virtue."

Ulama's rigidly unbending approach to the idea of change per se, and trepidation of any outside influence into the body social of Islam has led to the inculcation, whether deliberately or otherwise, of a rather xenophobic mentality among the Muslims. Xenophobia obviously cannot make a community that has become backward and desolate into a viable, upright and forward-looking people. Again, xenophobia has no place in Islam of the Qur'an and the Prophet who exhorted the Muslim even to travel to China in search of knowledge, as indeed a great Muslim scholar like Ibn Batuta in fact did in the thirteenth century. What, one might question the Ulama, did the Prophet want the Muslim to learn from China: definitely not Islam, if anything, some foreign socio-economic and political concept or practice. But the Prophet exhorted the Muslims for it, still the same.

It was these traditionalist tendencies and trapping of the traditionalist school of the Ulama in Turkey which perhaps led Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to strike a severe blow at all the vestiges of

18. K.Siddique, op. cit. p.69
traditionalism, sweeping in the process even the great integrative past traditions. In Egypt, in spite of the increasing adherence of the mass and the educated Muslims to the ideals of the Okhwan, their various contradictory standpoints, their vague conceptualizations of the present day conditions failed to make them suitable for 'delivering the goods'. In the event, their resort to violence and terrorist methods brought them in direct conflict with the Revolutionary Command Council in 1954, when about five hundred of their members and all the leadership were arrested, the leading 'Brothers' and the 'Guide' were executed, and Ikhwan as a party, was outlawed.

In Pakistan too, in spite of the sophisticated methods of canvassing and publication of its programmes, the Jamaiti-Islami has failed in all elections held so far to gain any worthwhile strength in the national policy-making organisation - the parliament. Even allowing for the malpractices that the more powerful political parties of the developing countries, particularly the one already in power can manage with impunity to resort to, a clear verdict of the Pakistani people as a whole, as gleaned from the election results, has been against the traditionalist versions of life and ideologies presented by the Ulama.

10.3. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions drawn from these events and facts are clear. Muslim societies all over the world are all out for modernization - modernization of their socio, economic and political conditions. Realistic Muslim scholars regard re-interpretation of the Shariah as fundamental. The clearest proof of this can be found in the following dissertation of Ahmad Zaki Yamani, a Cabinet Minister in Saudi Arabia which is unquestionably the most orthodox Muslim society. Yamani asserts:

19. HARRIS, op.cit. pp.212-237
"I think one ought to look at the Shariah metaphorically as an organic creature, growing, developing and evolving; attached with a strong link of interdependence to its society, adapting to its needs, and changing with different circumstances. The Shariah must be viewed as an adequate system meeting the needs of society at any particular interval in history. However, its intrinsic value is not in this momentary adequacy, but in its capability to satisfy the requirements of an ever-changing society" (20)

Question arises: is Islam, as a normative and institutional system, amenable to absorbing in itself the essential norms of modernity and to emerge successfully as a living guidance for its adherents; or is it, like religion in general, endangered as modernization progresses in Muslim societies?

Answer to this rather unponderable question as provided by the functionalists like Parsons, Halpern and others who base their judgement mainly on the decline of Christianity in the West as a result of modernization, indicates a clear verdict on the inability of any religious vision - Islam included - to withstand the encroachments unleashed by modern science and technology as well as the persuasive norms of modernity. Yet, Muslims themselves and those non-Muslim scholars who search deeper into the dynamic of the religious vision vis a vis the Islamic vision and reject modernization and its norms as the ultimate ends, do not envisage an eclipse of the Islamic appeal of universalism, simplicity and egalitarianism in the teeth of modernization. Professor Montgomery Watt, for example, sees Islam as a religious vision which provides a dynamic model of a living 'charismatic community' which men today are looking for. 21 "Islam" he asserts "is certainly a strong contender for the supplying of the basic


21. W. Montgomery WATT, What is Islam, op.cit. p.234
framework of the one religion of the future". In his view, Islam is to play a vital role as a 'mighty force' in the world affairs in the years to come. But he insists that to be so, its rational reappraisal would devolve on those Muslims "who believe that their faith can be stated in modern terms to work for the realization of such a programme."

A similar optimistic view is held by Professor Isma'il al-Faruqi, who has critically examined the position of Islam with regard to modern scientific and rational norms. Al-Faruqi concludes:

"While the secularist may rest assured that science will triumph in Islamic society, it is equally certain that he will never see the fulfilment of his wish for the dissipation of Islam. The capacity to adapt to new challenges, and to absorb and digest them, is innate to Islam. Furthermore, Islamic modernism has identified itself, not without reason, with the progressive forces that count on science and research to secure a brighter future. In fact, in modern Islamic terminology, progress, science, well-being, power, liberty and dignity have become equivalent to and interchangeable with piety, the Will of God, and the will to a space-time in which "God's word is the higher" (Quran 9:41). It is unlikely, therefore, that the future in Muslim society will be anything but Islamic."

The case of Turkey itself where Islamic systems and traditions were severely undermined in the wake of a supposed assault on traditionalism of the Ottoman society has clearly demonstrated the fact that after fifty years of forced westernization, the Turks have, save a very negligible minority, adroitly and overwhelmingly remained faithful to Islam. Observers and scholars like Reed, Kazanias, Eren and others bear witness to this fact. In fact, as one observer has remarked, even the atheist-secularist Turks are more religious in their outlooks than a believing religious man in the west.  

23. ibid. What is Islam, pp.225-26
25. For a detailed first-hand study on the Turkish Muslims' zeal for Islam, both in belief and observance, see Howard A Reed, "The Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims" in Richard N. Frye, Islam and the West, op.cit. pp.108149. Drawing conclusion for the (contd.)
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+ including 6,595 pilgrims from Bangladesh
evidence supportive of this claim can also be gleaned from the increasing number of pilgrims who travel to Makka from Turkey every year. It is significant to note that since the 1940's when pilgrimage was re-allowed to the Turkish Muslims by their government, the number of Turkish pilgrims has been constantly rising until in the later half of the 1960's/Turks continuously formed the highest national group at the pilgrimage. Table X.1 shows the number of pilgrims from different Muslim countries between the years 1967-72.

This study shares Professor Watt's and Al-Faruqi's optimism for a future role of Islam as a religious vision in the evolution of an international religious belief crystallization. But it also stressed that to play such a vital role the more rationalist, collectivity-orientated and universalistic concepts in Islam will have to be made explicit and put into practice.

This huge task, particularly the change in norms and value-systems, insists Dr. Tibawi, cannot be achieved except by the co-operation of the Ulama, who, argues Tibawi,

"in all ages possess that collective instinct which indicates to them how far to go, what compromises to accept and where to stand firm in upholding the system..." (26)

This study supplements Tibawi's argument with the assertion that the Ulama themselves cannot successfully perform this task unless they come out of the cocoon of traditionalism. Hitherto they have been taking refuge in the lofty effort made by the aslaf in the interpretation of

25. Contd. future, Reed remarks, "It is my opinion that there is now a definite resurgence of Islamic sentiments and insight in Turkey. Earlier carelessness and past ignorance of religious precepts and Allah's guidance as provided in the Quran are being generally recognised... Searching educated men and women who cherish Islam, are certainly apprehending it in many newer, more personal ways. They are recovering and re-appraising their Islamic heritage...Out of the current efforts to re-appraise this issue the Turks may evolve a clearer and more viable understanding of the relation between human rights, secularism and Islam." pp.144-148

Islam, and have themselves failed to put up a parallel effort. It is vital that they must 'go round the world' and have a clearer view of modern conditions of life so that they could then look back into the Quran and Sunnah to search for the dynamics that must be re-introduced among Muslims of today. At the same time it may be asserted that it is vital for the modernist ruling classes of the Muslim countries to secure the involvement of the ulama into the process of modernization of their societies. Hitherto they have only striven to keep them at bay with the resultant lopsided modernization. Having traditionally assumed the role of the 'guardians of the Faith' and watchdogs of the interests of the Ummah, the ulama have a genuine and vital stake in the modernization process. Although they fail to put it in clear terms because of their political involvement, their primary concern seems to be that the equilibrium so essential for stability and a harmonious growth of the Ummah should not be sacrificed for any set of new values. However, they must realise that the traditional equilibrium (which the aslaf ancestors had achieved in the past) to which the ulama still remain faithfully attached, could be regarded only as an ad hoc compromise solution; it was not binding for eternity and it did not result in a rational growth of the community. As time went on it only helped to establish traditionalism firmly in the body politic of Islam. Any new equilibrium between the changeless and the changing, or between the ideal and actual verities of the Islamic vision that should crystallise in the modern times must essentially be based on rational grounds.

Again as an all-permeating group that successfully achieved integration of the total Muslim community, the ulama also have a greater advantage over the modernist classes in their perennial readiness and ability to identify themselves and make direct personal affiliation with the mass of their poor co-religionists - an advantage which is by no
accidental but forms a part of the social norms and the egalitarian spirit of Islam.

The modernists on the contrary still remain seated in the ivory tower of power and prestige. They approach the masses and their traditional leaders, the ulama, in an authoritarian manner so reminiscent of the 'pakka sahib' attitude of the colonial rule. Hence the impact of their modernization on the perceptions and loyalties of the Muslim populace, who by habitue still look up to the elite and the ruling classes as their guides, remains largely superficial. It is true that a Muslim when required to do so, largely supports and votes for modernization and the leadership that promises more of it, but he still suspects the modernist class as a self-seeking and self-imposed group whose loyalties are neither to the norms of Islam nor to the interests of the masses. The modernists have yet to learn to associate themselves, however they manage to do so, with the larger Muslim masses in order to diffuse their message of modernization among them in such a way that they assimilate it and make it a part of their thinking. They have also to understand the dynamic of fostering change while still keeping the essential equilibrium intact. Unless they do these, their strategy of modernization will remain suspect. Hitherto they seem mainly engaged in depicting the orthodox ulama as an obstructionist class whose only interest is supposed to be to seek authority in the Muslim societies through religious backdoor.27 They fail to appreciate the basic concern of the ulama, i.e. the evolution of an equilibrium within the Muslim societies on the basis of the normative essentials of Islam.

Both groups, the modernists and the traditionalists, remain in their contending positions and fail to evolve a common, integrative via media basically because of the widespread ignorance among their people as a whole. Once education is extended to the larger section of the

27. See Aziz AHMAD, "The Activism of Ulama in Pakistan", in Nikki R. Keddie, Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Substitutions in the Middle East, op.cit. pp.257-72.
Muslims, the polaric postures adopted by the modernist and the traditional elites of their societies will lose appeal. Until then the traditional ulama will keep their hold on the loyalties of the masses as 'guardians of the Faith' and remain posing modernization or change as anti-Islamic.

To sum up, the response of Islam to modernity so far has been in two phases, viz. the phase of apprehensive-defensive modernization, and the phase of experimental-disintegrative modernization; the first manifesting before and the second after the achievement of national independence of the Muslim countries. The result of these two phases has been that the Muslims on the whole have achieved only a superficial, imitative capacity in ideas, appearances and artifacts. Out of these phases must come an assimilative-integrative phase when modernization becomes a living and dynamic force; assimilated; not imitated.

Viewing this as the final phase of modernization, Black reiterates its characteristics as below:

"A Society that teaches this stage of integration can make much more efficient use of its human resources - if one may refer to human being in such an impersonal manner. It has consumer production for a mass market, high per capita national income, a high level of general and specialised education, widely available social-security and adequate organization for leisure." (28)

It is here in the bringing about of an integrated, viable, empathetic and participant Muslim society that modern Muslim education has a decisive role to play. At present, the overwhelming majority of the Muslims, all over the world vis a vis in the three countries in this study is ignorant. Their true perception of the essential values and qualities of life today is extremely limited. Their cognitive map is almost blurred. Their effective participation in the economic, political and social aspects of society is not proper without a proper cognition of its verities.

28. C.E. BLACK, op.cit. p.81
Even if they do make some economic progress, whether in agriculture or industry, their value-system is still entrenched in traditionalism. It is a truism that whatever degree of empathetic capacity, normative change there is among the Muslims in every Muslim society, is to be found among the educated Muslims. The more therefore, the spread of education and the more the expansion of the educational capacity of the Muslim peoples, whether it be in the socialisation, in schooling and in the higher cultural function of education the more chances of their subscribing to the 'rationalist-positivist' norms; the more their chances to evolve 'self-regulating' economies, and the more their chances of participation in and demand for the benefits yielded by modernization. Education, therefore, is certainly the key to the modernization of Muslim societies. This study would conclude by quoting two exhortive traditions of the Prophet of Islam who draws no barriers in the search for knowledge for the Muslims: and has undoubtedly assigned key position to education for the growth and strength of the Muslims:—

The Prophet has said:

1. Valueless is the Muslim who is not a teacher or student.

2. Seeking knowledge is as blessed as worship and any trouble in acquiring it is considered a jihad. (28)

September 21, 1973

C. Nabi
Student Comparative Education
Institute of Education
University of London
London, W.C. 1

Dear Mr. Nabi:

This is in answer to your letter of 13 September requesting permission to reproduce some of the data and indices compiled in our publication "Quantitative Analyses of Modernization and Development" by F. Harbison, J. Maruhnic and J. Resnick.

We are pleased to give you permission to reproduce this information for use in your study.

Sincerely,

Dorothy Silvester
Administrative Assistant
MODERNIZATION

Reader. Maulana, as you know many Muslim scholars of our time seem to feel convinced that traditional social systems and institutions of Islam which were crystallised in the medieval conditions, can and should be transformed. To such scholars Islam is a dynamic system in which sufficient scope and elasticity has been embedded to assimilate and sustain changes in time and space, and yet still able to keep its axiological bases intact. What is your view on this question?

Maulana. My dear, Islam has furnished key answers to all the problems of human and social life in such a way that they are perfectly practicable today and ever in future. They do not need any fundamental change. The problem today is that either one should accept Islam and then act upon its tenets and requirements, or one should expressly denounce it. The trouble is that most of these Muslims who want to see Islam reformed or modernized follow a hypocritical path. On the one hand they claim to be true Muslims, and on the other, they want to follow their own whims about Islam. This ambivalence is highly dangerous. What is needed is the implementation of Islam in our societies, not the modernization of it.

* The Maulana is the founder of the Jamait-i-Islami (The Community of Islam), an Opposition Party in Pakistan whose programme calls for the establishment of an Islamic State based on the Shariah and the Islamic Law. Born in 1903 in the town of Aurangabad, Central India, the Maulana was educated in the traditional Muslim values at home by his father. From the very early age of sixteen, he entered into journalism and showed command in his persuasive writing on Islamic topics. He later moved to Pathankot (Punjab) and published his writings. When Pathankot went to India in the partition, he moved to Pakistan and organised his party. Arrested by various central and provincial governments of Pakistan, he was sentenced to death by the Martial Law regime of Ayyub Khan - a sentence not carried out because of strong pressure from within Pakistan and from other Muslim countries. As distinct from the other Ulama of Pakistan, Maulana Maudoodi appeals to the educated Muslims.
Reader. But, Maulana, changes do take place and have been taking place within Islam all the time. If you allow me I can quote one aspect, viz. the political policies and programme of your own Party, where even you have justified some innovations. For example, the very parliamentary party system, under which your Party functions and has contested elections, is an alien concept. Then your support of Miss Fatimah Jinnah during the recent elections itself is a deviation from the orthodox position on the political role of women in Islam. How can these innovations be legitimised?

Maulana. Here you must distinguish between the means and the ends. At the present juncture, when the political system imposed upon us in Pakistan and other Muslim countries is a foreign imposition, the only method by which we can change it and rehabilitate Islamic systems is by participating in it as a means. We do not accept it as an end. But we have no alternative except to work within the legal framework of the prevalent system for its eventual transformation. When a truly Islamic polity comes into effect, a party system would have no place in it. Other forms of democratic participation as vouchsafed in Islam would be put into practice.

Similarly our support of Miss Jinnah was an expedient move, that is, the lesser of the two evils. The immediate aim was to join those who wanted to oust the despotic, debauched and corrupt regime of Ayyub Khan. Miss Jinnah herself had agreed to step in simply to help Pakistan get rid of an illicit regime. Once Ayyub Khan had been defeated, and democracy restored, she had no ambition to keep power in her own hands. It was agreed that she would make way for those who really wanted to introduce Islamic systems in Pakistan.

Reader. Speaking historically, which period of Islamic history leaving the Khilifah-i-Rashidun out, would you regard has been based on a truly Islamic system of state and society, the Abbasid Caliphate, or the Mughal Empire, for example?

Maulana. Even the Mughal Empire was more acceptable as an Islamic polity, because it did not disregard Shariah and it protected the Ummah under a Muslim Sultan.

Reader. Is not the demand for an Islamic polity in Pakistan then a latent attempt by the Ulama at gaining the strategic control of high advisory or legislative offices in their own hands at the exclusion of those educated in modern institutions?
Maulana. No, Ulama do not want to gain control of any office. At the present moment, there are many Muslim leaders who have been educated in the modern institutions and yet can be the legislators in an Islamic polity.

Reader. Could you name any of the contemporary or past Pakistani leaders who would be fit to hold the highest office in an Islamic Pakistan?

Maulana. Yes, Khawja Nazim-ud-din, the Second Governor General and Prime Minister of Pakistan, was one; Chaudry Muhammad Ali is another.

Reader. To revert to the question of the need for and form of changes in the traditional interpretations of Islam, some scholars seem to suggest that certain traditional practices can be reformed so that their symbolical and not literal meaning is given prominence. For example, Chaudhry Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, in a recent address at the University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, while replying to a question on the principle of reform in the (hudud) punishments of Islam for certain offences, such as the amputation of the hands in the case of theft, argued that 'cutting off the hands' could symbolically be interpreted to mean gaoling the offender instead of an actual operation on his hands. Can such an interpretation of the established Islamic practices be allowed in your view?

Maulana. One should ask Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan why he does not suggest any novel formula for the cutting of an apple. But the crucial point is that, if the Prophet himself interpreted the Quranic injunction in the actual physical and not the so-called symbolical sense, then no room whatsoever, is left for any other reinterpretation. We have to put the law into practice first and see its deterrent effect and benefits. I am sure that if Islamic punishments are restored, the crime of theft would be reduced to the bare minimum and the cases of amputations would also remain very few indeed. Even today Saudi Arabia is the most secure country in the world as far as thefts are concerned, and yet how many hands are cut every year? Contrast this with the manifold loss of life in armed robberies in some of the most modern countries of the world.
The thesis that the spirit and not the actual words of the Qur'an should form the basis of conformity with the Qur'an, is also highly misleading. What I want to know is what sort of Islam would these people envisage where the revealed words of the Qur'an, which has been regarded as the only miracle given to the Prophet, would not be followed. And, then who on earth would decide what did and what did not constitute the true spirit of the Qur'an other than the words of the Qur'an themselves?

**MUSLIM EDUCATION**

Reader. Maulana, how can we educate the young in Pakistan so that they are deeply socialised in Islam as well as equipped with the modern scientific education so necessary for life today?

Maulana. We can only do this by changing the present un-Islamic system of education, and by removing from office all those administrators who themselves lack insight into the ideals of Muslim education.

Reader. This would mean that the system must first be changed and administrators removed. But that is a political action which would take long time to carry out and is likely to give rise to strife and instability. Isn't it possible that the 'ulama or the religious organizations should endeavour to establish model Islamic institutions in which they impart true Islamic and useful education for life today and then to bring about a change from the bottom?

Maulana. This would be a very difficult process in the conditions of today. It would involve huge fiscal and other material requirements which only governments could effectively meet. Then, the output of such proposed institutions would fail to find a proper placement in the society since its orientations are at variance with an Islamic society, as for example happens in the case of the Azharite graduates. Only an Islamic society would place the proper input-output demands on the truly Islamic educational institutions.

We did inaugurate in Lahore an institution on the lines suggested in your question. But we would only find some 15 students whose parents were ready to have them admitted. Then, not only did they want scholarships but also financial assistance for their parents. Obviously we have no taxes or grants from
where such demands could be met. But the Jamait has nevertheless opened a few schools and colleges in which sound Muslim education is being given.

Reader. Don't you think that the institutions like the Central Institute of Islamic Research which was set up by President Ayyub and vouchsafed in the Constitution, in order to conduct research on the reform of Islamic thought and institutions as well as to raise good modern scholars, could fulfil this objective?

Maulana. This Institute is the most 'Satanic organization' created in Pakistan at the instigation of foreign scholars to disfigure the understanding of Islam. Its Director, Fazlur Rehman wants to see Islam completely changed. He has even legitimised the forbidden alcoholic drinks like beer. What does he know of Islam, and how can one trust such people?

Reader. I have gone through your books dealing with Muslim education in which you advocate that Western cultural importations have had a corrupting influence on the Muslims, and that such foreign cultural systems, including sports like cricket, must be banned from our educational system. I wonder how far is this possible or even desirable when modern gadgets and scientific technology, mostly invented in the West, such as radios, television, cars, aeroplanes, machines etc. have become so widespread and taken for granted in our society and culture?

Maulana. Yes, I do insist that all such sports and practices which form an integral part of a superimposed foreign culture upon us must be banned. Cars, radios and technology we can use as we desire and choose to use without undermining our culture, but playing cricket definitely orientates us to a foreign culture.

Reader. Then, what sort of games, sports or pastimes would you regard as suitable for Muslims today; or, do you propose that Muslim education today should still remain academic and theoretical on the traditional pattern?

Maulana. Not at all. Our youth can play games like Kabbadi, polo, wrestling and many others that used to be played in the Muslim countries in the past.
Reader. An important question that follows from the above: is it really possible for us to be selective in borrowing and if so, how?

Maulana. Yes, as in the past, we can take only those concepts, ideas and systems that are culturally either neutral or contributory to Islamic concepts. Ideas and concepts that run counter to Islamic concepts are not acceptable to us.

Reader. Finally, Maulana, I believe every ideology, movement, even religion emerges to bring about change and make life easier and progressive. In its initial impact, it is dynamic and problem-solving and not surrounded by a sacred halo. In the event, however, it becomes rigid, particularistic and affectivity oriented. Isn't this true of the traditional view of Islam as well? Isn't there a need to rehabilitate the Islamic way of life in such a way that it becomes dynamic once again?

Maulana. The only way to rehabilitate Islam is to practise it entirely, to study it thoroughly and to defend it staunchly. The only people who can infuse a new spirit in any vision are those who investigate it deeply, and who live it. Regeneration cannot come from exercises in apologetics or by the introduction of alien notions and concepts.

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**GLOSSARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahl-al-Kitab</td>
<td>Lit: 'People of the Book'; designation given in Islam to the Christian and Jewish peoples because of their faith, in common with the Muslims, in the Divine Revelation, the Kitab.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asabiyya</td>
<td>Lit: 'tribal consanguinity'. The term was used by Ibn Khaldun in the interpretation of history to denote the fundamental urge in human society which impels groups of human beings to assemble themselves, define and struggle for common social and political goals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ayans</td>
<td>The landed aristocrats of the Ottoman Empire.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bida'a /Bida</td>
<td>Opposite of sunnah or the known traditions. The term is applied to any dogmatic innovation that contradicts the orthodox doctrines of Islam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caliph/Caliphate</td>
<td>See Khalifa/Khilafah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar-al-Harb</td>
<td>The World of War or the country against which the Muslims are at war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar-al-Islam</td>
<td>The World of Islam; Islamdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar-al-Ulum</td>
<td>The House of Learning; Academy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatima / Fatimah</td>
<td>Daughter of Prophet Muhammad; wife of Ali, the fourth Caliph, and mother of Hasan and Hussain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatwa /Turkish.Petva</td>
<td>A formal legal opinion given by a Mufti on a point of the Islamic Law.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fikh / Fiqh</td>
<td>Lit: 'intelligence, knowledge'. The term denotes the science of jurisprudence in Islam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghazi</td>
<td>The honorary Muslim title for one who distinguishes himself in war against Islam e.g. Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ghazi Salah-ud-din Ayyubi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadith</td>
<td>Tradition. The term is used to cover all the sayings, actions and teachings of Prophet Muhammad on matters of religious doctrine or conduct and forms the second source of Islamic law after the Quran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadd (pl. Haddud)</td>
<td>Boundary or limit. The term implies the limits imposed by the Divine Law or the sanctions based upon it either as commands or prohibitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haj, /Hajj or /Hadj</td>
<td>The annual pilgrimage to Makka, a duty for every Muslim with proper fiscal means and in good health once in life. Hence Haji/Alhaj the pilgrim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijra/Regira</td>
<td>Migration. The migration of Prophet Muhammad from Makka to Yathrib or Medina. The Islamic era starts from the Hijra of the Prophet.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Ijma /Idjma.
Lit: Consensus. Ijma forms the third source of the Islamic law. The consensus of the Muslim Ummah directly or through the consensus of the learned in Islam on a point of law also determines law after the two primary sources of the Quran and the Hadith.

### Ijtihad./Idjihad.
Lit: the exerting of one's self to the utmost degree. In Islamic Theology and Law, the term is used to denote the utmost endeavour of human reason and understanding to ascertain the best interpretation and application of the Islamic doctrine to a particular situation arising at the time. Ijtihad is now being accepted as the positivistic strand of law-making in Islam though the orthodox scholars have always restricted it to the ijtihad of the 10th century jurists. They still hold it binding today.

### Ilm. (pl.Ulum).
knowledge.

### Ikhwan-al-Musalemun,
The Muslim Brotherhood Party of Egypt led by Imam Hasan al Banna.

### Imam.
Lit: one who leads the caravan, hence a guide. Commonly used to designate the leader of the congregation in prayer, or the leader of the Muslim community. In the Shia sect, Imam is taken to mean the sole, faultless and charismatic leader and descendent of Caliph Ali. Hence the Shia conception of 'Imamate' to denote the hereditary charismatic leadership or polity.

### Jamait-i-Islami.
The religio-political party of Maulana Abu al Ala Maududi of Pakistan.

### Jami/Djami.
The Islamic university e.g. Jamia Al-Azhar,

### Janissaries (Tur.YeYiceri).
Lit: 'New Troops'. The name given to the regular infantry created by the Ottoman Sultans in the fourteenth century which became their principal force.

### Ka'aba / Kaba.
The Cubicle stone-walled building in the centre of the Holy Mosque in Makkah considered by Muslims as the House of Allah to which Muslims anywhere in the world face when praying.

### Kadi/Kazi/Qazi.
Judge in Islamic Law.

### Khalifah/Khilafah.
Caliph/successor or vicergent of the Prophet of Islam. Title of the supreme head of the Muslim community in religious and political affairs. Caliphate/Khilafah denotes the elected/selected institution of succession to the Prophet or leadership of the Ummah according to the Sunni sect.

### Koran/ al-Koran/Quran.
The Holy Quran.

### Madina/Medina
Originally the town of Yathrib in Hijaz, north of Makkah which later became the residence and abode of the Prophet and capital of the Islamic Khilafah. The Second holy city of Islam.
A Muslim School or College for higher studies. First founded in Baghdad in 1067 A.D.

The first holy city of Islam, repository of the Kaaba, sanctuary of the Muslims and the birthplace of Prophet Muhammad and the nucleus of Hajj. This study eschews the spelling 'Mecca' for its unholy usage in the Western world for Dancing Halls, Gambling Clubs etc., and prefers Makka.

Lit: Benefactor. The title given to a learned, wise man in Islam or the one dedicated to the truly Islamic way of life.

The celebration of the birth of anyone especially the Prophet or the meeting of rememberance held after prayers.

Community. The institution of religious communities as allowed under the Ottoman Sultans.

The juris-consult in Islamic Law; the highest office for the interpretation of law in Islam.

Censor or the officer appointed by the Khalifah or Sultan to see that the religious and moral order of the Muslims is preserved.

Lit: The New Order. The name given to the modernization policies of Sultans Selim and Mahmud in the Ottoman Turkey.

The highest official title of honour in the Ottoman Society.

Analogy; the fourth source of Islamic Law. The highest official title of religious and moral authority in Islam, the pontiff of Islam.

The Rule of Law in Islam. The collection of all religious and socio-political laws of Islam as derived from the four sources of the Quran, Hadith, Ijma and Qiyas. The axiological core of Islamic norms.

Custom, use, tradition. The way of the Prophet of Islam.

People of the Sunnah. The greater majority of the Muslims in the world who consider themselves to be the true followers of the Sunnah and who vouchsafe the consensus of the Ummah as the next best guide.

Lit: scission, split. The second large sect in Islam who consider following of the Imamate as the best guide.

The series of institutional modernization laws introduced by the Ottoman Sultans.

The concept of Unity of God as in Islam.

Plural of Alim: one who is learned. The class of the orthodox learned doctors in Shariat.

The Muslim Community at large.

The Islamic poverty tax being 2½% of all wealth owned continuously for a year.
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