Education as Initiation into Social Practices:
An Alternative to Liberal Education

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims at examining the possibility of education as initiation into social practices as an alternative to liberal education. To this end, the main arguments run as follows.

Firstly, I argue that liberal education, as both the pursuit of rationality and the promotion of personal autonomy, does not give a satisfactory explanation of educational phenomena because of several internal and external criticisms. Both versions of liberal education have limitations for different reasons: in dealing with human practices and practical matters which are raised by vocationalists and in meeting a variety of social or communal demands that are addressed by communitarians, respectively.

Secondly, I analyse the notion of 'social practices' as a basis for understanding 'education as initiation into social practices' by examining a conventional conception and some recent influential conceptions. A conventional usage of 'practice' as opposed to 'theory' is inappropriate in terms both of the Greek notion of 'praxis' and of Ryle's 'knowing how' and Wittgenstein's 'language-games', and is also inappropriate from an educational perspective. On the other hand, positively, I establish my conception of social practices as a modified Maclntyrean conception by analysing Maclntyre's conception of 'a practice' in its various dimensions and discussing Miller's and Schatzki's crucial distinctions within social practices.

Lastly, I draw the overall picture of 'education as initiation into social practices' by comparing Maclntyre's, Hirst's and Langford's views and by applying them to teaching as education writ small, and I examine its possibility as an alternative to liberal education. I suggest that 'education as initiation into social practices' should be understood in a 'substantial'(prescriptive) sense and, on the basis of this, I tackle curriculum issues and teaching process.

I conclude that social practices-based education could be an alternative to liberal education by taking a middle way between liberal education as the pursuit of rationality and as the promotion of personal autonomy.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

A. The Main Purpose and Tasks of the Thesis

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the possibility of social practices-based education as an alternative to liberal education. Social practices-based education in school education can be best expressed in the phrase ‘education as initiating pupils into social practices’. This view presupposes dissatisfaction with liberal education. Hence, my main query lies in exploring how ‘education as initiation into social practices’ can overcome deficiencies of liberal education. To this end, I attempt:

1) to explore the claims of liberal education both as the pursuit of rationality and the promotion of personal autonomy.
2) to examine the claims of liberal education both as the pursuit of rationality and the promotion of personal autonomy in terms of internal and external criticisms of it.
3) to critically look at a conventional conception of ‘practice’ that is in opposition to ‘theory’.
4) to analyse and elaborate the conception of ‘social practices’.
5) to draw an overall picture of ‘education as initiation into social practices’.
6) to show what ‘education as initiation into social practices’ in school education would be like with regard to the selection of the curriculum content and teaching process.
7) to justify why ‘education as initiation into social practices’ can be an alternative, or at least a complement, to liberal education.

B. An Overview of Arguments

The overall argument of the thesis can be outlined as follows.

In Part I (Chapter 2 and 3), I argue with reference to internal and external criticisms, that liberal education, as both the pursuit of rationality or knowledge and the promotion of personal autonomy, does not give a satisfactory explanation of educational phenomena.
In Chapter 2, I mainly examine the claims and internal criticisms of two versions of liberal education. Liberal education as the pursuit of rationality addresses the development of rational mind or rationality as its intrinsic aim through initiating pupils into several forms of knowledge. This is justified by the transcendental argument. However, neither the forms of knowledge that are specifications or contents of education for rationality, nor the transcendental argument that is the way of justification for the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, stand on firm ground. On the other hand, liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy, whether the rationalistic model or the desire-satisfaction model, emphasises one’s autonomous choice or life. The former model which underlines ‘rational autonomy’ is often associated with liberal education as the pursuit of rationality and thus it may face similar limitations to those which liberal education as the pursuit of rationality faced. The desire-satisfaction model stresses the satisfaction of one’s needs and desires in exercising one’s autonomy, whether post-reflective desire-satisfaction or informed desire. However, the relations between reason and desires, and between one’s desires and others’ desires, are not clear.

In Chapter 3, I discuss the fundamental weaknesses of liberal education in the light of external challenges. Liberal education as the pursuit of rationality may not satisfy many practical demands which are not intrinsic but very important for human life or society. Liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy may have some limitations in meeting a variety of social or communal demands, although some liberals assume social and political frameworks and they also recognise that the self is, to some extent, embedded in one’s society. But, liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy may be not enough in coping with stronger communitarian challenges which claim that education should be derived from social demands which are based on the public nature of education.

In Part II(Chapter 4 and 5), I analyse the notion of ‘social practices’, which is a central concept in understanding ‘education as initiation into social practices’, in two ways: by examining a conventional but inadequate way, and by looking at influential conceptions.

In Chapter 4, I try to show that a conventional usage of ‘practice’ which is often understood as ‘everything that is not theory’ is mistaken in terms both of the Greek
notion of 'praxis' and of Ryle's 'knowing how' and Wittgenstein's 'language-games', and from an educational perspective. The Greek notion of praxis (doing) makes sense in relation to 'poiesis' (making or producing), these being two modes of practical activity, rather than 'theoria'. For Ryle, 'knowing how' is logically prior to 'knowing that' and thus practice is not 'a step-child of theory', but rather theory cannot be fully understood without participating in practices to which someone belongs. In an educational context, the strict dichotomy between theory and practice may not be plausible in that it tends to overlook the nature of educational practices and the role of practitioners who engage in them.

In Chapter 5, I explore five criteria (coherent and complex forms of socially established co-operative human activities; achievement of internal goods; standards of excellence; rule-governed or rule-following activities; and their improvement by ongoing traditions) and three dimensions (human activity, society and tradition) of a (social) practice through analysing MacIntyre's account of it. I also try to establish my conception of social practices by discussing Miller's 'self-contained' and 'purposive' practices, and Schatzki's 'dispersed' and 'integrative' practices. Through this process, in the end, I take a modified MacIntyrean conception of social practices. That is, I basically take MacIntyre's criteria of a social practice, but I am inclined to understand social practices in a purposive and integrative sense.

In Part III (Chapter 6, 7 and 8), I explore what 'education as initiation into social practices' means by comparing MacIntyre's, Hirst's and Langford's views and by understanding it in the light of teaching as a specific educational context.

In Chapter 6, I try to draw the overall picture of 'education as initiation into social practices' by analysis of the conception of 'initiation' and by comparing three writers' views. The phrase 'education as initiation into social practices' should be understood in a 'substantial' (prescriptive) sense - in that education not only should be derived from current social practices, but also should bring about concrete prescriptions, such as changes of an educational perspective, selecting the curriculum content and teaching process - which goes beyond a formal or descriptive sense that education is a (kind of) social practice. In this regard, MacIntyre, Hirst and Langford provide us with the central features of 'education as initiation into social practices'. MacIntyre's account
of social practices underlines the achievement of internal goods and their relation with
the virtues. Hirst's view of education tends to understand it in a rationalistic way in that
it can be achieved from engaging in socially constructed rational practices and, thus, the
role of education lies mainly in developing practical judgements, so as to choose the most
defensible practices and critically reflect on various social practices in the light of one's
desires and the good life. Langford addresses the social nature of education and the
degree to which education is often equated with socialisation in that to become persons
is to be members of society who are to assimilate social values as their own values. My
overall picture of social practices-based education is, in short, that through initiating
students into current pervasive social practices it is developing educated publics who will
bring about the flourishing of society as a whole.

In Chapter 7, I try to show a clearer picture of 'education as initiation into social
practices' by applying it to teaching as education writ small, that is, by considering
conceptions of teaching, curriculum issues and teaching process in terms of social
practices. With respect to the content of curriculum, whatever the content of curriculum,
it should grow out of social practices to which one or a society belongs and a mere list
of the spheres of human life is not enough for selecting the content of curriculum. Rather,
it should be integrated into forms of life and aspects of experience. It is natural, therefore,
that the content in a social practice-based curriculum will be selected by its significance
for one's everyday life and a flourishing society in the light of ongoing traditions of social
practices, and thus the contents are never taken for granted or have canonical status. The
teaching process of social practices-based education, as I show by exemplifying
citizenship education and environment education, can be portrayed in terms of the variety
and flexibility of teaching methods. The most striking feature of a social practices-based
teaching process may lie in not only starting with pervasive social practices, but also in
resulting in flourishing social practices and society.

In Chapter 8, as a concluding chapter, I discuss why social practices-based
education is better than liberal education in terms of integration of the
academic/vocational, the individual/society, and the theory/practice divides. Furthermore,
I examine the possibility of social practices-based education as an alternative to liberal
education. My argument for this, in the end, takes a middle way between liberal education
as the pursuit of rationality and as the promotion of personal autonomy in terms of the nature of each form of education, its justification and its underlying ground. The middle way involves i) a social picture of education rather than universal or individual pictures of education, ii) internal justification rather than intrinsic justification or autonomy for personal well-being iii) a grounding in real human practices rather than personal desires or transcendental logic. Lastly, I examine some possible objections to social practices-based education and some reflections on my thesis as a text in relation to real social practices; these reflections include limitations on my thesis, contributions it can make and further tasks for research.
Part I. Liberal Education and Its Limitations

When we examine a possibility of ‘education as initiation into social practices’ as an alternative to liberal education, the first task that we should tackle may be the question: what is wrong with liberal education? To do this, what exactly liberal education means should be answered, but it is not so easy to answer straightforwardly, because the liberal education tradition itself is ‘complex and pluralistic in character’ (Gray, 1995, p. 21).

There seem to be two (or three) different versions of liberal education: as the pursuit of rationality; as the promotion of autonomy; (and maybe also as the education appropriate to political liberalism). Liberal education as the pursuit of rationality in general and of knowledge in particular was, as represented by Peters and Hirst, a typical liberal education tradition for the 1960s and 1970s. For Peters and Hirst, roughly speaking, the heart of education in general and liberal education in particular is the development of rational mind or reasoning and thus addresses the pursuit of knowledge and understanding as the real core of developing rational mind. Liberal education as the development of rational autonomy is related to, and influenced by, the former tradition. This tradition can be found in various liberals on education, notably J. White, although recently his view of autonomy has slightly changed: from limited concern to wide concern. His recent view of autonomy, which emphasises desire satisfaction in deciding one’s (autonomous) choice, tends to emphasise political contexts for autonomy, whilst his earlier view of autonomy, which addresses reason, is more or less detached from social and political contexts. For White, personal autonomy is a crucial value within a liberal democratic framework rather than for its own sake and this seems to be influenced by political liberalism.

In this Part I, what I want to argue is why liberal education, as both the pursuit of rationality and the promotion of personal autonomy, does not, in view of internal and external criticisms of it, give a satisfactory explanation of educational phenomena. In

\[^{1}\text{However, I am not directly concerned with political liberalism, although it is partly involved in White's liberal education and the liberal-communitarian debate.}\]
Chapter 2, I shall mainly deal with the claims and internal criticisms of the two versions of liberal education, i.e. liberal education as the pursuit of rationality and as the promotion of personal autonomy. In Chapter 3, I shall examine the two versions of liberal education in the light of the two challenges, i.e. vocational education and communitarian views on education, respectively. These internal and external criticisms against liberal education, in turn, lead us to search for an alternative to liberal education.
Chapter 2. Liberal Education: Internal Criticisms

Attempts to clarify and justify conceptions of liberal education have been much debated throughout the history of western thought, particularly since the 1960s. The debates on liberal education can be divided into three: intrinsic versus extrinsic - whether liberal education is initiation into knowledge and understanding for its own sake or acquisition of useful knowledge for instrumental reasons; broad versus narrow - whether liberal education is general or specific; and individual versus social - whether liberal education is development of autonomous and critical thinking or initiation into a particular tradition of thought. To put it crudely, the first two debates are related to the Peters-Hirstian liberal education, while the third debate, which is more complicated, is connected to the debates on liberalism-communitarianism. These debates also seem to be based on different conceptions of liberal education. The first two debates rely on the Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education, whereas the third debate involves the Whitean liberal education and political liberal education. It is noteworthy that the Whitean liberal conception of education which emphasises autonomy seems to lie in a middle way between the Peters-Hirstian liberal education and political liberal education in that White addresses personal autonomy including intellectual and rational autonomy on the one hand and, on the other, he says that autonomy should be understood in the light of social and political frameworks. It is thus necessary to explore the two versions of liberal education in order to understand, and further to criticise, the claims of liberal education fully.

To do this, I shall examine the Peters-Hirstian liberal education as the pursuit of

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2 The issue of whether Peters' and Hirst's conception of liberal education can be equated is arguable. Nevertheless, Peters' theory of liberal education is often equated with Hirst's. This kind of thinking is reinforced by their joint work, The Logic of Education (1970) and thus many people tend to think that Hirst's theory is an epistemological elaboration of Peters' theory. In this respect, henceforth, I call their theory the 'Peters-Hirstian liberal education'. We must admit, however, that there are some differences between them in terms of their starting points, the relationship between education and liberal education, and so on. For the details of this, see Appendix I. Dearden (1986) also points out their minor differences in terms of the relationship between education and the development of rational mind, between knowing forms of knowledge and the development of mind, and the nature of the forms of knowledge itself. In each case, Peters' position, in general, is more flexible than Hirst's (pp. 73-4).
rationality (in section A) and the Whitean liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy (in section B).

A. Liberal Education as the Pursuit of Rationality

The Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education is generally admitted, as O’Hear pointed out (1981, p. 4), to be ‘a standard view of education’ in Western countries, as well as countries influenced by the West, at least, in the past two decades. Indeed, whether or not one agrees with their view of liberal education, it is obvious that they have refined the idea of liberal education. Accordingly, it has been taken for granted that their theory is a typical view of liberal education. In this respect, their theory offers a good starting point for seeking an understanding of liberal education. Hence, in this section, I shall look at the Peters-Hirstian liberal education and internal criticisms of it.

1. The Peters-Hirstian Liberal Education

Peters’ and Hirst’s liberal education is often identified, since they share some fundamental issues: education is linked with the good life; the good life is a rational life; for a rational life, the pursuit of rationality is necessary; therefore, the pursuit of knowledge and understanding is central in education; and the ground for the pursuit of rationality relies ultimately on Kantian transcendental deduction. We may also admit, as I explain in Appendix I, they have different views on the relation of education to liberal education, and different concerns: the focus of Hirst’s liberal education is on epistemology and its application to curriculum, whereas Peters’ concern lies in philosophy of mind and social/moral education. In this respect, Hirst’s liberal education can be seen as an epistemological elaboration of Peters’. My concern here is not analysing the Peters-Hirstian liberal education as a whole, partly because it is well known and partly because I put it forward in Appendix I, but rather briefly sketching their liberal education in order to show its limitations.

Peters’ account runs as follows: education is linked with the pursuit of worthwhile activities. That worthwhile activities should be intrinsic to education is built
into the concept of education. The intrinsic aim (or value) of education is connected with knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective. (Liberal education is the claim that any restrictions for realising the intrinsic aim of education should be removed). Hence, education should be the pursuit of knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective. On the other hand, Hirst’s logic for liberal education runs as follows: education is fundamentally associated with the good life. For the good life, the development of rational mind is central. Liberal education is fundamentally concerned with the development of rational mind and the achievement of knowledge, which are logically connected. It can be achieved only through initiating pupils into a number of distinctive forms of knowledge. Therefore, one of the most essential tasks of (liberal) education is initiating pupils into the various forms of knowledge.

From this, the Peters-Hirstian liberal conception of education can roughly be summarised thus: liberal education is linked to the pursuit of worthwhile activities. For them, the worthwhile activities can be defined as the development of rational mind. The development of rational mind is possible through being initiated into various forms of knowledge. The strong emphasis on the forms of knowledge results, in the end, in a tendency to regard education as the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Accordingly, when we consider the Peters-Hirstian liberal education, regardless of their intention, we tend to equate liberal education with pursuit of theoretical activities, i.e. the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake. What is more, we are inclined to regard ‘the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake’ as the ‘intrinsic aim of education’. In this sense, the Peters-Hirstian liberal education might be called the ‘rationalistic’ approach to (liberal) education.

2. Internal Criticisms

However, the Peters-Hirstian rationalistic approach to (liberal) education has been criticised in various aspects and by various scholars. Perhaps they are a typical case among greater thinkers who have been criticised from both sides of the same points. For they have been portrayed as too conservative (Enslin, 1985), elitist (Ormell, 1988), narrow (Thiessen, 1987; Crittenden, 1993) and too theoretical. This criticism coexists
with a more common one, from the opposite extreme, that they are not completely theoretical in that forms of knowledge are at best forms of experience, not knowledge (Gribble, 1970; Watt, 1974; A. O’Hear, 1981, pp. 92ff; Cooper, 1993) and their way of justification, i.e. the transcendental argument, is not sufficient (J. White, 1973, chapter 2; 1982, chapter 2; Downie et. al., 1974, chapter 3; Shin, 1989). Roughly speaking, the former are external criticisms in that they are trying to find their solution outside of the logic of liberal education, whereas the latter are internal criticisms for the reverse reason.

External criticisms are intimately linked with the ‘rationalistic character’ of the Peters-Hirstian approach. The excessive emphasis on the pursuit of knowledge and of rationality is seen, sometimes, as necessarily ‘conservative’ in that it supports traditional education through emphasising traditional subjects, and it is, sometimes, regarded as ‘narrow’ in that it overlooks emotional, moral and vocational aspects, etc. It is also shown to be theoretical rather than practical in that it emphasises the pursuit of theoretical knowledge. And for the same reason, it is often criticised as education for an elite and thus as promoting inequality in education.

Regarding internal criticisms, it must be said that there are some criticisms in the rationalistic understanding of liberal education even within Peters-Hirstian circles. These

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3 Being faced with this criticism, Bantock (1981) tried to overcome its shortcomings by reinterpreting the conception of liberal education in a broader sense. According to him, the modern conception of liberal education tends to be narrowly defined, with its wider meaning being lost. He writes: ‘Yet in all these attempts to redefine liberal education in the changed circumstances of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries one crucial feature of traditional liberal education has been forgotten- the element of sprezzatura, of play... It protests against both the excessive faith in knowledge and understanding as the modern world seeks these... The solution is not an abandonment of what knowledge has brought with it but a balancing with other modes, so that both the strengths and the limitations of ‘understanding’ become apparent... surely this sense of balance was one of the first virtues that a liberal education, in the dawn of its history, set out to promote’ (pp. 78-9). Bantock’s prescription is, in turn, to suggest broadening the conception of liberal education by recovering an element of ‘play’ that once we had. Pieper’s (1952) attempt to understand the conception of liberal education in terms of its origin, i.e. scola or leisure, can be understood in a similar context. According to him, education should be connected with ‘homo capax universi’, who is ‘capable of grasping the totality of exist things’ or reality (p. 36). Leisure is ‘the prerequisite of the apprehension of reality’, that is, a contemplative attitude for the grasping of the whole world (p. 41). Pieper’s conception of liberal education, eventually, is similar to Bantock’s in the sense that their solutions rest on the origin of it. Unlike Bantock, Pieper’s conception of liberal education is much wider in that it encompasses not only aspects of the whole person- intellect, emotions, will, etc.- but also understandings of the whole world including the metaphysical world. We can surely admit that both views certainly see liberal education as wide. It must be said, however, that their views may not be enough for defending external challenges, such as vocational preparation, although Bantock’s and Pieper’s modified views of liberal education can avoid a too narrow intellectualism. For the external criticisms, I shall deal with them more fully in Chapter 3. My concern here is to discuss internal criticisms of the rationalistic liberal education.
criticisms are largely twofold: the pursuit of knowledge, particularly forms of knowledge; and its way of justification, i.e. the transcendental argument. Let us examine these more fully in turn.

First of all, the criticisms regarding the pursuit of knowledge fall into two categories: the relation of mind to knowledge; and forms of knowledge themselves. With regard to the relationship between mind and knowledge, Hirst’s claim that there is a logical connection between the concept of mind and that of knowledge is less tenable than he maintained it to be, since we can hardly say that ‘the development of mind can solely be defined in terms of the growth of knowledge’ and, further, the methodological argument that the pursuit of knowledge is a means to the development of mind is also dubious. Rather, it is more exact to say that rationality or knowledge itself cannot comprise the human mind, although it is a part of the human mind. Hence, it is an exaggeration to say that the development of mind is identified with the acquisition of rationality (Shin, 1989, p.136).

With regard to the forms of knowledge, the debates seem to be focusing on whether the criteria and seven or eight forms of knowledge suggested by Hirst are plausible. Indeed, there is a double paradox here. If his criteria are correct, and if we apply them to his forms of knowledge in a strict sense, the forms of knowledge he suggested would be questionable. On the contrary, if we accept his forms of knowledge as sound, his criteria for them would be less convincing. Gribble (1970), Watt (1974), O’Hear (1981) and Cooper (1993) belong to the former group, whereas Phillips (1971) and Simons (1975) belong to the latter group.

Gribble as regards ‘morals’ and ‘literary criticism’ and Watt as regards ‘religion’, ‘morality’ and ‘aesthetics’ within Hirst’s forms of knowledge are sceptical whether these are forms of knowledge4. What is more, O’Hear and Cooper seem to strongly suggest that Hirst’s criteria should be applied more strictly in order to avoid the criticism that his forms of knowledge are no more than ‘forms of experience’. For them, forms of knowledge, regardless of whether these include religious and moral domains or not, necessarily lead into a narrow intellectualistic education. For me, it should be noted that education, of course, essentially includes the

4 In contrast, some would argue that religious and moral languages can fit the criteria of the forms of knowledge. See B. Crittenden (1993). These arguments are, it seems to me, more or less arbitrary. A more fundamental solution to this, I suggest, is that ‘forms of knowledge’ in the narrow sense should be replaced by ‘forms of life’ in a broader sense or ‘social practices’ for the present purpose, since forms of knowledge, regardless of whether these include religious and moral domains or not, necessarily lead into a narrow intellectualistic education. For me, it should be noted that education, of course, essentially includes the
knowledge should be confined to the logically distinctive knowledge, not a broad sense of beliefs.\(^5\)

On the other hand, Phillips' and Simons' criticisms are more radical in that they attack the foundations for the forms of knowledge.\(^6\) It is surprising, however, that Phillips and Simons raise questions about the unclarity of the criteria, instead of directly attacking the foundation for the criteria. Phillips raises the question that there is a possibility of different forms of knowledge within a form of knowledge. It is hardly appropriate to say that science, for instance, has only one structure. What is more, for Simons, besides seven or eight forms of knowledge, there might be some other forms of knowledge such as astrology, etc.\(^7\) Simons' assertion, in the end, requests other additional criteria for opening up the possibility of the other forms of knowledge. Phillips' and Simons' assertion, as contrasted with the former group, is, in short, that the criteria should be more flexible since there is no strict logical distinction between forms of knowledge. These criticisms in the end lead to the negation of forms of knowledge.

What I have examined so far is the plausibility of the Peters-Hirstian assertion that there is a logical relationship between mind and knowledge and, therefore, liberal education should be initiating pupils into seven or eight forms of knowledge. The upshot is that their assertion is less obvious than they seem to think.

Let me move on now to the second point, i.e. the transcendental argument that is the ground for justifying the pursuit of rationality in general and of knowledge for its own sake in particular. Given the criticism of the relationship between mind and knowledge and, further, of the forms of knowledge, is the transcendental argument that is the way of justification for them still sound? If the transcendental argument is not

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\(^5\) Following O'Hear and Cooper, for instance, religious beliefs such as 'God created the heavens and the earth', unlike scientific knowledge such as 'light travels in a straight line', might be not included in Hirst's forms of knowledge, because they may regard religious beliefs as 'forms of experience' rather than 'forms of knowledge'. They both do not dissent from Hirst's assertion in that the contents for the promotion of rational mind are in the end constituted by forms of knowledge and forms of knowledge can be distinguished by some logical criteria.

\(^6\) The reason is: if Hirst's criteria that constitute the underpinning of the forms of knowledge are dubious, his forms of knowledge thesis and, further, his theory of liberal education as a whole would be seriously threatened, since his forms of knowledge are a central thesis within his liberal theory of education.

\(^7\) With relation to this, Hirst seems to recognise this point in saying that 'music' might be a discipline within literature and the fine arts. Hirst(1974), p. 97.
independent of the Peters-Hirstian view of liberal education, it is unlikely to be so\(^8\). To evaluate it more fully, first of all, let us see the Peters-Hirstian account of the ‘transcendental argument’:

To ask the question ‘why do this rather than that?’ seriously is therefore, however embryonically, to be committed to those inquiries which are defined by their serious concern with those aspects of the reality which give context to the question which he is asking. In brief the justification of such activities is not purely instrumental because they are involved in asking the question ‘why do this rather than that?’, as well as in answering it(Peters, 1966, p.164).

To ask for the justification of any form of activity is significant only if one is in fact committed already to seeking rational knowledge. To ask for a justification of the pursuit of rational knowledge itself therefore presupposes some form of commitment to what one is seeking to justify(Hirst, 1965, p.126).

The transcendental argument, as what Peters may call the ‘argument by presupposition’(1966, p.114), is a way of justification by revealing the logical presupposition of the question itself. For them, the questioning itself depends on accepting the very ground that is finally being called into question. In justifying the development of rationality in general and the pursuit of knowledge and understanding in particular, they follow this argument. That is, the importance of the pursuit of knowledge and understanding is presupposed in the question ‘why do we pursue (forms of) knowledge rather than something else?’ But is this true?

In what ways is the transcendental argument unsatisfactory? Let me put it at some length. First of all, the form of argument is rather a negative one. Asking such a question seriously is nothing more than an expression that someone wants to ‘come to know something’(White, 1982, p.10)\(^9\). Indeed, this cannot positively justify why we should pursue knowledge for its own sake, although it may provide us with an answer to the question of whether the pursuit of knowledge in which I engage is worthwhile and of why

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\(^8\)We, however, cannot straightforwardly say so, since it is geared to justifying worthwhile activities as a whole. That is, it is not used merely to justify the pursuit of knowledge but to justify the fundamental moral or ethical principles such as freedom, equality, etc.

\(^9\)In this sense, the criticism that to some extent their justification is merely based on ‘intuition’ or
we should pursue knowledge for its own sake. If the pursuit of knowledge can be justified as being constitutive of questions about the good life or rational life, its justification rests on the place of such questions within the good life or rational life. This may raise a question: what makes up the good life or rational life?\(^\text{10}\) This question should be answered; however, presumably the result will end up negatively, since its answer is inevitably diverse (Hirst, 1986, p.24).

Secondly, the justification for the pursuit of knowledge supported by the concept of rationality is a circular one. Hirst himself also acknowledged this point. He says that 'the apparent circularity is the result of the inter-relation between the concept of rational justification and the pursuit of knowledge' (Hirst, 1965, p.127). Indeed, this argument, at best, can be used 'to justify theoretical pursuits in so far as they are concerned with the pursuit of reason for doing things' (Hirst, 1986, p.23), because it does not offer an answer to the question of 'why knowledge is to be sought for its own sake' (White 1982, p.10). In this sense, the transcendental argument is no more than a way of glorifying the 'rational game' (Hirst, 1986, p.23). Hence, another justification, that is, whether rationality itself is good, is needed.

Lastly, the justification for the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge, in general, cannot meet the particular demand for the justification of liberal education, nor justification of education as a whole. Even if we accept that the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge can be justified by the transcendental argument, or whatever, it does not follow that a justification for liberal education is assured. Even if the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge can meet the demand for the justification of liberal education, we can hardly conclude that it guarantees the justification of education as a whole. Hence, the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge in education stands in need of justification. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish the value of knowledge in an educational sense from the value of knowledge itself. Indeed, it is one thing to say that knowledge is of value in itself and it is quite another to say that some kinds of knowledge are educationally worthwhile. Therefore, the

\(^{10}\)For the purpose of this thesis, indeed, the question of what the good life consists in is important, because 'what counts as education?' relies on that question. For Peters and Hirst, the good life might be expressed as 'the life of the pursuit of rationality, or knowledge', for White, it would be an 'autonomous life'. I must point out here, however, that these views seem to be commonly mistaken in seeing the good life as apart from social practices. For the details, see Chapter 3.
problem of justification remains unresolved (Shin, 1989).

B. Liberal Education as the Promotion of Autonomy

In the previous section, I examined a typical concept of liberal education, i.e. the pursuit of 'rationality' in general or 'the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge' in particular, by discussing the Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education. According to the above argument, neither the relationship between mind and knowledge, nor the forms of knowledge themselves, nor the transcendental argument for the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge or rationality in education is convincing. From this point of view, we may conclude that liberal education in the Peters-Hirstian sense cannot be properly justified. In this section, I shall examine another typical notion of liberal education, i.e. 'autonomy'. Indeed, over the past 20 years or so, a great deal of work regarding the concept of autonomy has been written by liberal philosophers or philosophers of education. Particularly, autonomy as an educational aim or ideal in modern liberal democratic societies has been popular with liberal philosophers of education (Stone, 1990, p.271; Norman, 1994, p. 25). Their conceptions of autonomy can largely be divided into two: the rationalistic model and the desire-satisfaction model. The distinction between them rests on the answer to the question of what a key element for deciding one's autonomous choice is. In the rationalistic model, rational autonomy is underlined in that being equipped with reason, knowledge, judgement and rationality is a prerequisite of the exercise of personal autonomy. In the desire-satisfaction model, one's needs and desires play a pivotal role in deciding one's choice and thus exercising one's autonomy. Hence, in this section, I shall look critically at two models of autonomy.

1. The Rationalistic Model of Autonomy

General trends in the study of autonomy within philosophy of education circles


12 For the analysis of the conception of autonomy in general, see Appendix II.
seem to go as follows: from the emphasis on rationality (or reason) to the emphasis on desire; from a detachment from the social/political context, to an attachment to it. White seems to show us this transition clearly. Henceforth, I shall follow his transition in understanding autonomy.

First of all, in White’s early writings such as *Towards a Compulsory Curriculum* (1973), his notion of autonomy seems to be intimately connected to reason or rationality. His argument for autonomy goes something like this: for one’s (rational) life planning, in logic, an autonomous life is required. And for the autonomous life, it is presupposed that one could choose something autonomously. Therefore, for autonomous choice and thus for the autonomous life, knowledge and understanding is necessarily required. He said that ‘he [or she] must know of all possible things he [or she] may want to choose for their own sake’ (1973, p. 22). In other words, for life-planning in general and for the exercise of autonomy in particular, its prerequisite condition, that is, the knowledge for choosing what he or she does or wants to do, is needed. He presents an ideal case for being autonomous:

In the ideal case what is wanted for its own sake on reflection is what a man would want for its own sake, given at least (a) that he knows of all the other things which he might have preferred at that time and (b) that he has carefully considered priorities among different choices, bearing in mind not only his present situation but also whether he is likely to alter his priorities in the future (1973, p. 20. My italics).

White’s autonomy, as shown by the above passages, emphasises the role of knowledge and reflection in one’s autonomous choices. For him, without careful reflection and knowledge about objects of choice, autonomy in a real sense is not possible. His conception of autonomy, in short, tends to underline ‘rational’ choice rather than ‘spontaneous’ action itself.

This tendency leads us into an intellectual interpretation of autonomy. Probably, the best example of this tradition is shown by Dearden’s classical definition of it:

A person is ‘autonomous’ to the degree that what he thinks and does cannot be explained without reference to *his own activity of mind*. This will, of course, be very much a matter of degree. And perhaps one should add that it is what a person thinks and does in the
more important areas of his life that we should expect to be explained by reference to *his own activity of mind* (Dearden, 1972, p. 453, emphasis added).

In making clear Dearden's conception of autonomy, the term 'his [or her] own activity of mind' plays a key role, since his conception of autonomy cannot be explained without referring to 'his [or her] own activity of mind' and, furthermore, the interpretation of autonomy is quite different depending on whether we stress 'his [or her] own activity' or 'mind'. The former interpretation seems to be followed by existentialists who stress 'choice by self'. Rationalists such as Dearden follow the latter position. Indeed, Dearden seems to assume the conceptual link between 'autonomy' and 'rationality' in that the activities which are constitutive of the exercise of autonomy, such as choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, judgements, etc., are to offer the reason why the person thinks and acts. Hence, his conception of autonomy might properly be called the 'rationalistic model' of autonomy. However, we need not understand his conception of autonomy as confined to theoretical subjects or activities. Indeed, as he maintains, it is used 'in a whole range of daily and practical activities: in buying things, in choice of job or in the way that a job is interpreted, in arriving at a particular sort of domestic arrangement, in the uses that are found for leisure and so on' (ibid., p. 454). We should not ignore, nevertheless, that his conception of autonomy is fundamentally related to the exercise of reason.

If we follow this line of argument, the following questions would be raised: what would autonomy in education be like? How should we do education for autonomy? Is there any difference between 'education for autonomy' and 'education for rationality'? It is more or less obvious that if we pursue autonomy as an educational aim, it would require 'a knowledge of the methods, curricula and patterns of organization which will best promote it' (ibid., p. 462). It is less obvious, however, to what extent 'education for autonomy' is different from 'education for rationality' when we see autonomy in relation to rationality. Indeed, for earlier White and Dearden, 'education for autonomy' is not

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13 He says elsewhere that the exercise of rational choice presupposes 'a well grounded understanding of one's situation in the world' (1968, p. 60)
14 White and Dearden may not agree with this. They may argue that the fact that autonomy presupposes having various sorts of knowledge and understanding does not make it rationalistic. If their claims refer to this, this would be true. However, their claims go beyond that. For their conception of autonomy, 'rational'

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entirely different from ‘education for rationality’ in that they maintain that ‘education for autonomy’ is best understood insofar as ‘autonomy should be kept in proper balance with rationality’ (Lee, 1985, p. 111). In this respect, it is not surprising at all that Dearden discussed autonomy in relation to Hirst’s forms of knowledge. According to him, understanding of the forms of knowledge is important for that of autonomy in two ways: in terms of content, forms of knowledge ‘contribute much to the background perspective from which choices, decisions, opinions and so on are made or formed in our society’; and ‘these basic forms supply the general criteria in terms of which validity of various claims is to be assessed’ (Dearden, 1972, p. 462). That is, why forms of knowledge are important might be shown by answering that the exercise, or the development of autonomy is only possible by possessing self-knowledge (ibid., p. 463). By the same token, for White, education for autonomy aims at providing the abilities for a person’s autonomous choices which enables the person to do what he or she wants to do. Indeed, for him, developing the dispositions to make reflective and thus autonomous choices should be one of the fundamental educational aims.

What I have discussed so far is what the claims of the ‘rationalistic model’ of autonomy are and what its educational claim is. This tendency was best found in early White’s and Dearden’s writings. White summarised this: ‘a central educational aim should be to produce children who think for themselves, who rely on reason rather than authority to substantiate their beliefs, and who, precisely because they think for themselves, work out their own plan of life according to their own lights, not swayed by the opinions of those around them’ (1982, p. 26).

Their logic seems to run as follows: the exercise of autonomy presupposes that someone has abilities by which he or she thinks and acts in accordance with his or her own activity of mind. These abilities can be developed by initiating into various forms of knowledge, and promoted by a fuller, and deeper, understanding of those forms. For ‘education for autonomy’, therefore, ‘education for rationality’ is important, too. However, what I want to question, for the present purpose, are two things: does ‘a rational person’ assure ‘an autonomous person’; and is it possible to have ‘his or her choice and action seem to be stressed.

Some would want to include O’Hear in this category. Indeed, we must admit that O’Hear’s account of autonomy was certainly taken to be a rationalistic approach. See, his (1981).
own activity' without having ‘others’ or ‘society’? Indeed, this ‘rationalistic model’ of autonomy, it seems to me, is mistaken in two ways: it tends to define autonomy too narrowly by confining it within a rationalist framework on the one hand, and on the other it divorces ‘self’ and ‘autonomous action’ from ‘society’ and ‘social activity’. These questions force us, and White, into modifying the notion of autonomy.

2. The Desire-satisfaction Model of Autonomy

Let me turn now to what we might label the ‘desire-satisfaction model’ of autonomy. In *The Aims of Education Restated* (1982), *Education and the Good Life: Beyond the National Curriculum* (1990) and *Education and Personal Well-being in a Secular Universe* (1995), White seems to suggest that autonomy is based on personal(and/or social) desires, although the term appears slightly differently in his writings, that is, ‘post-reflective desire-satisfaction’ in *The Aims of Education Restated* and ‘informed-desires’ in *Education and the Good Life*.

Before considering White’s autonomy as desire-satisfaction, it is worth noting that his main concern seems to be not autonomy itself, but rather personal well-being or, at best, the significance of personal autonomy in relation to personal well-being. Although in *The Aims of Education Restated* both autonomy and personal well-being are conflated in the phrase ‘post-reflective desire-satisfaction’, his current position seems to be addressing personal well-being in a broad sense, and ‘informed desires’ as its essential element, rather than personal autonomy. The reason may be this: a broad sense of personal well-being may be applied to any human society including a tribal society or tradition-directed society, but autonomy may be limited to, at best, a liberal democratic society. For instance, think about two persons in tribal society, of whom one has a good background such as good parents, wealth, health, etc., and the other has a poor background. Of course, both of them will be concerned about how to flourish in their life; however, probably the former person will be likely to maintain a more flourishing life than the latter person. Nevertheless, this result is nothing to do with their autonomous actions. It must be said, however, that White seems to hold, at least implicitly, the importance of personal autonomy, whether as an independent virtue in a liberal
democratic society or as a relative value in relation to personal well-being. Whether or not personal autonomy is linked with the 'satisfaction of informed desire' or 'post-reflective desire-satisfaction', for White, personal well-being must involve it in modern societies. So, it seems to be almost impossible to imagine someone's well-being without the premise of his or her autonomy, although these are 'logically different kinds' (White, 1982, p.42).

Let me now concentrate on White's later view of personal autonomy or autonomous personal well-being. To put it bluntly, he seems to change from autonomy which is based on 'reason' or 'reflection' as a human quality to autonomy which is based on 'desire' as an element of human nature. In his later view, knowledge is no longer 'a self-justifying state on its own' (1982, p.122) and, accordingly, it is given a subsidiary status, not a central one (ibid., p.124). This tendency seems to be more evident in Education and the Good Life and Education and Personal Well-being in a Secular Universe. In Education and the Good Life, he suggests the satisfaction of 'informed desires', as defining personal well-being, rather than 'post-reflective desire-satisfaction' (p.29). An 'informed desire', roughly speaking, is something like this: individuals can make rational, informed choices of their own lives in terms of the satisfaction of their most important desires. This desire, thus, seems to be based on sound empirical and logical information about its object (ibid., p. 28). The satisfaction of 'informed desire', too, is different from 'post-reflective desire-satisfaction' in that 'post-reflective desire-satisfaction', unlike 'informed desires', is applied 'only to autonomous people' and it also does not necessarily presuppose being informed about desires, although it involves some reflection on various possible options (p. 29).

There are, nevertheless, some common points between the two grounds for autonomy. Firstly, White's conception of personal autonomy, whether it involves the satisfaction of 'informed desires' or 'post-reflective desire-satisfaction', seems to assume a particular framework, viz., a 'liberal democratic society'. In fact, in his later books, unlike an earlier book (1973), he often explicitly mentions that framework: a liberal...
democratic society should promote ‘the personal autonomy of its all citizens’ (1990, p. 27, p. 24); ‘personal autonomy... is a central value in a liberal democratic society’ (ibid., p. 95). It must be said, therefore, that personal autonomy has not always a necessary value in any society. What is more, ‘the autonomous way of life is not the best way of life in every set of circumstances’ (White, 1990, p. 26). Indeed, one of the major, and serious, mistakes of his earlier view was in claiming that personal autonomy has a universal value in any society. It is safer to say, therefore, that its importance can only partly be assured within a liberal democratic society.

Secondly, regardless of the role of the satisfaction of ‘informed desire’ or ‘post-reflective desire-satisfaction’ in autonomy or personal well-being, the role of reason or ‘critical’ reason is still important in deciding one’s desires. In the case of the satisfaction of ‘informed desires’, we must admit the fact that critical reason is working when we make appraisals of given information about desires. For ‘post-reflective desire-satisfaction’, we cannot help recognising the role of critical reason when we choose certain desires among various possible desires. We must inevitably allow that some degree of reason is needed for the satisfaction of desires, although reason is not the primary concern in that model.

Thirdly, related, White’s account of autonomy, at least implicitly, seems to presuppose a certain kind of hierarchical structure of desires in which more higher-order desires are more valuable. His terms such as ‘informed’ and ‘post-reflective’ imply that ‘desires are not all on the same level’ (1990, p. 30) and which desires are more important may differ depending on individuals and the communities in which they are located. For some, academic life is more important than making money, and for others, *vice versa*. It must be said, however, that, for White, personal well-being is closely associated with the satisfaction of one’s important desires and, further, education has something to do with promoting personal well-being, unless educational aims are nothing at all to do with it.

Lastly, we should admit that, for White, personal autonomy is fundamentally linked to satisfying one’s desires, although it involves reflection. Indeed, one of the striking features of his later view lies in addressing ‘desires’ rather than emphasising ‘rationality’. His addressing desires is best expressed in his inaugural lecture *Education and Personal Well-being in a Secular Universe* (1995). In his lecture, he seems to
maintain that personal well-being should be understood in the light of a ‘cosmic framework’ in general or a ‘natural framework’ in particular, which is broader than a social framework, rather than a religious framework. From this point of view, in deciding on values, human needs, pleasures, or desires are prior to other things such as the will of God and, thus, these human needs and desires play a pivotal role in the exercise of personal autonomy. For him, therefore, the nature-directed values, for instance, enjoying nature-oriented feelings, a love of natural beauty, etc., are essential.

So far, I have explained White’s account of personal autonomy that is based on his later writings. It can be summarised thus: his later account of personal autonomy is, in short, grounded in ‘desire’, that is, either the satisfaction of ‘informed desire’ or ‘post-reflective desire-satisfaction’. This should not be interpreted in an intellectual way or in a universal way. Furthermore, the value of personal autonomy can be assured if and only if it is related to personal well-being and/or it lies within a liberal democratic society.

What, then, would education for ‘desire-satisfaction’ be like? What is important in education for ‘desire-satisfaction’? What are the educational tasks for it? According to the desire-satisfaction model, crudely speaking, education might be seen as primarily concerned with the promotion of one’s desire satisfaction. Indeed, from the perspective of personal well-being, White says that good education must include ‘the satisfaction of one’s most important desires, taking one’s life as a whole’ (White, 1990, p.30). One’s most important desires, however, are immensely various among individuals and, further, these desires might also change over time through one’s life as a whole. What is more, considering or reflecting on all one’s desires in educational practice is, in reality, almost impossible. What, then, is the role of education? White suggests two tasks. One is ‘to equip us with desires we previously did not have’. The other is ‘to help us to organize our burgeoning desires, to impose a hierarchical structure on them and resolve conflict between them. This, too, is a matter of creating, or shaping, desires within us, only the desires are now of a higher order’. For White, therefore, education is necessarily required for children ‘to be brought up to have some understanding of what the objects of their desires involve’ (ibid., p. 31).

This ‘desire-satisfaction’ model is, as hinted above, a more satisfactory one than
‘the rationalistic model’ of autonomy in some ways. Firstly, the former model is wider than the latter one. The ‘rationalistic model’ of autonomy tends to undermine other factors such as (non-)rationalistic dispositions, actions, feelings, attitudes, desires, beliefs, etc. in the spheres of human activities in general and educational activities in particular.

Why, for human beings, are rational practices more important than other human practices? In fact, there is no good reason why non-rationalistic practices should be overlooked in human activities and educational activities. Nevertheless, in the ‘rationalistic model’ of autonomy, many human practices, which should be regarded as essential parts of human life, are inevitably ignored without any good reason because the model is confined to rationalistic human activities. In contrast, in principle, in the ‘desire-satisfaction’ model, unlike the ‘rationalistic' model, any activity is not ruled out, if it is wanted and desired by someone.

Secondly, related, the ‘desire-satisfaction’ model of autonomy seems to be more plausible than that of the ‘rationalistic’ model at least within a liberal democratic society, since the ‘desire-satisfaction’ model rests on a particular context, i.e. a liberal democratic society, whereas the ‘rationalistic’ model relies on the universal truth that rationality, irrespective of whether in every society or at every period, has a permanent value. The universal application of the ‘rationalistic’ model, however, is not so persuasive, particularly in a plural society. Rather, we might more plausibly say that the value of something might be different from society to society, from time to time, and even among individuals. Following White, as I indicated above, his ‘desire-satisfaction’ model seems to be suggested as a necessary element of liberal democratic citizenship. The idea that personal autonomy has an important value within a political framework seems to be influenced by political liberalism. However, I do not intend here to explore political liberalism, partly because, unlike White, political liberals—such as Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin, Raz, etc.—have said very little about education, and partly because I shall deal with this issue in section B of Chapter 3 at some length. Thus, let me now point out some possible criticisms of the idea of personal autonomy.
3. Internal Criticisms

Many criticisms against the idea of personal autonomy for a justification of liberal education in general and a liberal aim of education in particular have been raised in a philosophical and educational context. These criticisms are of two kinds: internal and external criticisms. In external criticisms, the following claims may be included: autonomy, as feminists claim, is merely a masculine concept of self (Stone, 1990) and, thus, autonomy might not be relevant to the lives of many women (Griffiths and Smith, 1989). Some would think that caring about oneself is more important than personal autonomy (Cuyper, 1992). Furthermore, for communitarians, community or the virtue of community is more desirable in a society (Sandel, 1982).

Examples of the internal criticisms may include the following: whether to know something can be guaranteed to be autonomous action; whether we do not need to take account of emotions in giving a full account of autonomy; whether autonomy is compatible with commitments which are either given rather than chosen or held in such a way that they will not be revised; whether desire satisfaction as the criterion of autonomy is plausible; whether all desires are desirable, etc., etc. My concern here is confined to internal criticisms. Some criticisms would be more relevant to the ‘rationalistic’ model of autonomy and others may be applicable to the ‘desire-satisfaction’ model of it. Some criticisms could make sense against both models. Henceforth, it might be helpful to look at criticisms against autonomy in two ways: criticisms against the rationalistic model; and criticisms against the desire-satisfaction model.

Let us begin with possible criticisms against the rationalistic model of autonomy. One possible attack might be related to the question of what is the relation between cognitive aspects of autonomy and action. The rationalist autonomy seems to be assuming that an individual can raise questions, rationally assessing any of his or her prior beliefs and values and, furthermore, he or she acts in accordance with his or her beliefs and values. Indeed, it is more or less obvious that rationality is an indispensable element in being autonomous, since without at least a certain degree of cognitive

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For the detail of external criticisms of autonomy, in particular, communitarian views on that, see...
judgement, in practice, one can hardly manage to live an autonomous life. We should not, however, confuse the following two propositions: that rationality is a temporal precondition of autonomous life, and that autonomous activity presupposes a minimum rationality. The two assertions have in common that autonomy and rationality, to some extent, are related to each other; however, in the former case, unlike the latter, one’s autonomous activity cannot emerge without rationality already in place. Moreover, for the former case, the place of rationality in autonomy may be exaggerated. This leads us to an over-intellectualistic interpretation of autonomy, and even to equating a ‘rational person’ with an ‘autonomous person’. However, the relationship between rationality and autonomy seems to be less direct than rationalists often thought. Many complicated elements, of course, are involved between them. What I want to point out, however, is that it is one thing to say that I know what is good or important for me, and it is quite another to say that I choose or do it autonomously. That is to say, to know what one should do does not necessarily lead to one’s autonomous activity.

The second criticism seems to link with a sceptical view on whether autonomy is compatible with commitments. This criticism seems to be grounded in an assumption that autonomy is separate from one’s commitment about someone or something. Indeed, within the rationalistic model, rational reflection ‘has priority over non-reflective commitments, and is conceived of as the sole source of the self’s actions and traits’ (Aviram, 1995, p. 63). The rationalistic autonomy that is based on rational reflection, therefore, does require one’s flexibility in the face of new evidence or changed circumstances as well as one’s rational decision-making (ibid., p. 66). This, in the end, leads us to conceive of autonomy and commitment as incompatible. If autonomy and commitment are incompatible, certainly the value of autonomy for education would be very limited, and even considered as a dangerous thing. Callan (1994) argues, however, that a person who acts according to prior commitments, that is, the kind of commitment which has made him what he is and cannot be given up without a radical change in identity, can still be autonomous. It raises the question, however, how far a person, to count as autonomous, must have consciously become aware of and endorsed his or her own commitment?
The third limitation might be that rationalist autonomy does not include feelings, emotions and desires. Indeed, it does not give a positive relation between autonomy and feelings, emotions and so on. Telfer (1975) tried to bridge the gap between them through suggesting a three-stage autonomy: the definition of one's feelings, emotions and so on; the (possible) appraisal of them given by convention, or by whatever; decisions or actions on the basis of those things. She seems to offer, to some degree, a way of understanding how emotions, etc. are connected to autonomous activity. However, Telfer seems to fall short of a full and sufficient explanation of the relationship between them. That is, what is not clear for her is what feelings, emotions, desires, etc. are appropriate for autonomous actions. 

Let me move on now to the criticisms against the 'desire-satisfaction model' of autonomy. The first attack goes like this: if we accept that rational choice is crucial, there is still the problem of whether the satisfaction of desire can be possible as a basis for rational choice. This criticism assumes that the satisfaction of desire as a criterion for rational choice is a rather subjective or even arbitrary one. The ground for this seems to run like this: the motive of one's autonomous action rests on his or her strongest desires or wants. However, one's strongest desires or wants may be different among individuals, and, moreover, these may be changeable from moment to moment within one's life as a whole. Therefore, the reason for choice may be at best subjective, or even arbitrary. Some would argue, however, that when we speak of one's strongest desires being satisfied, this does not mean one's particular desires which can emerge from time to time throughout our life, but one's pervasive desires over one's life as a whole, and these desires can also be seen as common ones which are, to a large extent, embedded in our human nature, rather than purely one's own desires (White, 1982, pp. 55ff). Nonetheless, we may admit that desire satisfaction as a condition of autonomy is more or less subjective in nature. What is more, it must be pointed out that human nature is rooted in a society and a particular tradition, not a vacuum or transcendental state.

The second objection, as related to the first, raises the question: whether all desires necessarily involve desirability or moral character. If this criticism is plausible, autonomy as an educational aim would face a serious limitation. The notion of autonomy

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\(^{18}\) For the details of the discussion of that argument, see Stone, 1990, ff. 275.
seems not necessarily to have built in desirability, since, as Dearden has pointed out (1984), ‘it is perfectly possible, conceptually, for a person to be highly autonomous yet amoral’ (p. 110). It is also true, in fact, that an autonomous person does not necessarily have to be ‘altruistic’, since autonomous people occasionally can act egoistically. Indeed, White seems to be acknowledging this kind of criticism, so that he tries to escape from it by distinguishing ‘autonomy’ from ‘egoist autonomy’. According to him, while ‘the autonomous egoist’ chooses major ends which are ‘in his or her interests alone’, the autonomous person that White has in mind chooses ends in which ‘personal and altruistic interests are inextricably involved’ (1990, pp. 74-75). In the advocacy of autonomy which involves desirability, White goes on to say that autonomous people ‘come to make choices of wider and wider scope’. They gradually recognise that there are some hierarchies among desires and which desires are more important in that context. In this way, eventually, autonomous persons can choose higher-order desires and more global desires rather than lower-order desires and more local desires (ibid., p. 84). Some questions for White’s argument, however, should be raised. Firstly, White’s stipulative definition of autonomy, which involves personal and, at the same time, altruistic interests, can not be accepted as a universal one, since autonomy and morality are derived from quite different roots. It must be pointed out, then, that the argument for autonomy in terms of morality would be very limited and, thus, weakened. Secondly, even though we accept White’s definition, the claim that autonomous people ‘always’ choose higher-order and, thus, more desirable desires may be doubtful, since autonomous people, as he may admit, often choose desires which are not higher-order or desirable, and even they may be backsliding on occasion.

To turn now to consider some further issues for autonomy, whether the rationalist or the desire-satisfaction model. The issue of the nature of autonomy and its justification may be mentioned. On any plausible account, autonomy may be a matter of degree rather than an all or nothing matter. Let us suppose two cases: a pupil at one moment is not autonomous at all and at the next moment is; an academic may be quite autonomous in some respects such as his or her research field but less autonomous in others such as social matters in which he or she might follow convention uncritically. We may say that autonomy is a matter of degree on the grounds that the former example is not plausible,
while the latter is possible.

The issue of whether the value of autonomy can be universally justified also seems to be controversial. What is more or less obvious, as in White and Raz (1986), is that autonomy seems to be valuable in a liberal democratic society or pluralist society, since that kind of society demands that people make their own choices. What is not obvious, however, is whether there is some universal kind of justification for the value of autonomy. Certainly, in some societies, such as a tribal society, or any society which does not consider autonomy as valuable, autonomy cannot be justified. This kind of argument is also applied to autonomy as an educational aim. Indeed, it is controversial whether autonomy as an educational aim is justified locally or universally, i.e. whether the argument for autonomy is valid in a particular society, or independently of the circumstances of particular societies. We might say, thus, that if someone claims that autonomy can be justified in any society, it would be dubious.

One more point I want to argue is to reflect on autonomy as an educational aim. In fact, personal autonomy as an educational aim is often commended or even taken for granted at least in a liberal democratic society. I am sure that autonomy is certainly a crucial element in an educational process. But I am not sure whether autonomy should be an educational aim. My point is that autonomy should be assured in educational practice as an educational principle. But it cannot be equated with autonomy as an educational aim. It seems to be a fallacy that autonomy as an educational process or principle substitutes for autonomy as an educational aim. What I want to insist is that autonomy seems to be more suitable as a starting point or principle for educational practices rather than as an educational aim, since, as Morgan says, ‘all truly educated people are autonomous, but not all autonomous people are educated’ (1996, p. 251). In this respect, we may say that an educated person is far more than an autonomous person. Even if we accept autonomy as an educational aim, the criteria for that still remain unresolved.
Chapter 3. Some Challenges to Liberal Education

In the previous Chapter, I have pointed out the shortcomings of liberal education in the educational context. The arguments are summarised as follows: a typical liberal education tends to stress either ‘rationality’ or ‘autonomy’, although there are some different versions within liberal education. The Peters-Hirstian view represents liberal education as the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge and/or rationality, whereas the Whitean view represents liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy.

The Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education addresses the development of rational mind or the pursuit of rationality, which is often regarded as initiation into worthwhile activities. Their central philosophical grounds for the pursuit of rationality in education, that is, the logical relationship between mind and knowledge and the thesis of forms of knowledge, are less obvious than they might expect. What is more, the transcendental argument for justifying the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is also not so powerful in that it rests on tautology rather than presenting positive reasons.

The Whitean liberal education is inclined to emphasise personal autonomy in education for the promotion of well-being. There are two different versions of autonomy: the rationalist model and the desire-satisfaction one. Whether we take the rationalistic interpretation of autonomy or autonomy as desire satisfaction, there must be some limits to it as an educational aim. When we adopt the rationalistic model, we may be faced with similar problems to those faced by liberal education as the pursuit of rationality. When we take the desire-satisfaction model, liberal education has more or less a private or subjective nature and, thus, it might be difficult to find a common basis for teaching in a society.

Besides these internal criticisms of liberal education as the pursuit of rationality and autonomy, there have been proposed more forceful challenges to liberal education such as vocational education and a communitarian view on education. These external criticisms seem to be more powerful and even radical in that they do not only attack the weakness of liberal education but advocate alternatives. But external criticisms can also urge liberal educators to reconsider and modify liberal education, and may even show that
it should be replaced by (other current) substantial social practices. For instance, vocational education may be suggested as a rival idea against the Peters-Hirstian liberal education. Communitarian views on education seem to challenge liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy.

In this Chapter, what I want to do is to explore external criticisms, which may be seen as fundamental attacks on liberal education. To this end, in the first section, I shall consider some different kinds of vocational challenges in relation to the Peters-Hirstian liberal education. In the second section, I shall deal with communitarian views of education compared with the Whitean liberal education. In the final section, I shall deal with some efforts towards the modification of liberal education in facing these challenges.

A. Vocational Education

The Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education, as I explained in section A of Chapter 2, tends to be defined as ‘initiation into the pursuit (of forms) of knowledge’, which is regarded as worthwhile activity for its own sake. Following this account of liberal education, whilst the cognitive and theoretical aspect of education is highly important, the other instrumental values such as vocational value might be neglected or undermined. Why is the pursuit of rationality more valuable than vocational preparation? Is vocational preparation really not so valuable? May we ignore it in schools?

1. Is Vocationalism a Bad Enemy against Education?

A good starting point as to whether vocational education does not constitute worthwhile activities might be Cooper’s ‘bad enemy’ thesis. He insists that for the development of philosophy of education, good enemies are needed. According to him, for instance, ‘Progressivism’ in the 1960s and ‘sociology of knowledge’ in the 1970s were examples, in that these arguments stimulated philosophers to elaborate their educational doctrines such as the justification of rationality on the one hand, and to combat opposite claims on the other. It is more or less clear that these ‘good enemies’,
as Cooper has acknowledged, seem to contribute to articulating the claims of liberal education.

What is really controversial is, however, whether we can definitely say that vocationalism is a ‘bad enemy’. Cooper once claimed that vocationalism is a bad enemy. He said: ‘Today there is no good enemy. There is, to be sure, an enemy: that mindless technological vocationalism that dominates government educational policy. But philosophically, and otherwise, the policy is a bad enemy; for it is as devoid of stimulating ideas, even confused ones, as the kind of education it seeks to promote’ (1986, p. 5). Is vocational education really a ‘bad enemy’, which acts as an ‘obstacle’ to stimulating and scrutinising philosophical arguments rather than as a ‘medium’ for generating and promoting philosophical argument in education? Why did he see vocational preparation as a bad enemy? What are the criteria of the distinction between a good enemy and a bad one?

The answer to these questions seems to be depending on how we understand his phrase ‘mindless technological vocationalism’. This phrase seems to need clarification. It can mean ‘mindless and mere technological vocational training’. It can also refer to ‘vocational education as a whole’. If it refers to the former, as some liberals understood it, Cooper’s ‘bad enemy’ thesis, to some degree, seems to stand on a sound ground, since the ‘mindless and mere technology’ that is equated with a narrow sense of vocational training has nothing to do with stimulating philosophical thinking. However, if it refers to the latter (and to some extent he seems to assume this position), his claims offer no strong reason for regarding all vocationalism as a bad enemy.

It seems to be quite clear that vocational preparation in most contexts, in fact, will be involved as part of school education, although we can admit that it is doubtful whether vocational preparation should be central in school education. It seems that Cooper has no good reason for advocating liberal education and rejecting vocational preparation. In this sense, Cooper’s claim that vocational preparation may be a bad enemy rather than a good enemy.

19 Besides Cooper, we might say that Oakeshott, Hirst and Bailey also stand in a similar line. For Oakeshott (1972), liberal education has to do with emancipation ‘from the immediate contingencies of place and time of birth, from tyranny of the moment’ (p. 74), not connected with providing skills for satisfying current demands such as vocationalism which is often regarded as the state of the corruption of education. Hirst (1972) and Bailey (1984) also similarly claimed that liberal education is different from vocational education in any sense and, further, it stands in contrast to all kinds of vocational education.
enemy, merely seems to show that his position stands in a rationalist tradition. That is, it is, as I mentioned, a kind of the glorification of the ‘rational games’. Peters (1977) also admits that point. He no longer holds the sharp distinction between knowledge for its own sake and vocational ends, which he held in earlier writings. Rather, he now sees the distinction between them as a mistaken dichotomy.

It is natural, therefore, that some philosophers have been trying to close the gap between liberal education and vocational preparation, or even to suggest vocational education as an alternative to liberal education. They must include Dewey (1916), Pring (1993; 1994; 1995) and Scheffler (1995b) who agree that vocational preparation must be considered in school education, regardless of whether their proposals are for an alternative, or at least a supplement, to liberal education, and of whether their suggestions are plausible or not. I shall examine these three different voices which raise vocational challenges and, then, I shall add some comments on their views. Before doing this, I shall look at some assumptions of vocational education and its background.

2. Background and Assumptions of Vocational Education

In Britain, as a rule, there has been growing pressure for vocational training or preparation over the past two decades. This demand in the British context seems partly to be a reflection of social, economic and political change, and partly to be a reaction to the dissatisfaction with liberal education. Let me put it in more detail.

First of all, the vocational challenge to education is associated with social changes in a broad sense. They, of course, involve changes of political, economic context. Economic concerns among them seem to be a powerful element in the changing social context as a whole. Britain’s poor economic performance is often thought to be due largely to poor education such as poor training and inadequate preparation in the skills which are needed in the workplace. For economic utility, education should be reflecting these social needs. This claim presupposes that there is an intimate relationship between education and economic performance. Indeed, Prime Minister James Callaghan’s

speech\textsuperscript{21} and several subsequent government documents on education\textsuperscript{22} seem to show that this speech and the documents can be regarded as a reflection of this assumption. It is more or less obvious that economic performance, in fact, is related to education in terms of 'consumption and of investment' (Aldrich, 1996, pp. 96-97). It must be said, however, that economic performance is not logically related to education, but contingently related. This means that, at times, the relationship between them is apparent and, at times, not apparent, even not present at all. From this perspective, there might be a danger of reducing education to economic, social demands. Nevertheless, it is evident that education should consider social and practical demands.

Secondly, with respect to the dissatisfaction with liberal education, Pring(1993) presents four reasons for this (pp. 57-60). The first reason is that under liberal education too many pupils (about 30%) either drop out or fail in one subject and, thus, are excluded from the benefits of liberal education 'either because they are incapable of appreciating it or because they choose not to adopt the values it represents'. In this sense, the critique of the slogan, 'the liberal ideal for the few' and 'vocational alternatives for the many' seems to make sense (Pring, 1995, p. 186). The second reason is that liberal education tends to undermine economic needs and utilities. This leads young pupils not to prepare adequately for the world of work. The third reason is that liberal education is irrelevant to social needs. This is often regarded as a cause of the 'disconnection between the academic interests pursued at school and the social and moral values which education should promote'. The last reason is that liberal education is inclined to concern 'the individual and intrinsic value', which leads to 'the lack of public direction over a publicly endowed activity' (1993, p. 60).

These criticisms, according to Jonathan(1994), presuppose three assumptions which are interrelated, i.e. 'macroeconomic view', 'social welfare' and 'individual

\textsuperscript{21}In 1976, Prime Minister's speech delivered at Ruskin College, Oxford. The outlines of this speech can be summarised in four points: the acquisition of basic skills which industry needed for school leavers; the promotion of more positive attitudes to industry and to the economic needs of society; equipping people with technological know-how for the technological society; and the development of personal qualities for the future.

benefit'. Let us examine these assumptions in turn. To begin with the macroeconomic view, as I mentioned above, ‘jobs shortage’ was inclined to be politically interpreted as ‘skills shortage’. If we accept this view, as vocationalists often have, education in general and liberal education in particular in schools would be a main cause of the unemployment problem in that they do not offer practical skills for practical life, but rather they emphasise the theoretical and intellectual subjects at the expense of ‘the practical and technical, raising expectations unrealistically, and ignoring the skills needed by the labour market’. The evidence suggests that ‘the jobless are frequently without skills, with the implication that if those young people had skills on leaving school, they would also have jobs’ (p.6700). Is this true?

A number of researches show, however, that the secondary school curriculum is not so decisive for producing employment prospects on leaving school (Grasso and Shea, 1979; Collins, 1979). Furthermore, increasing job scarcity is more linked with social backgrounds than with educational achievements. From this perspective, we can hardly say that the structure of the labour market is altered by changing educational practice (Oxenhham, 1984). This empirical evidence shows us that any strong macroeconomic view for vocational education and training would be false, or at least would not be satisfactorily justified.

Secondly, the social welfare assumption, as related to the first, demands that education has to contribute to social good lives as well as to personal good lives. An extreme position on vocational education, according to Jonathan, often claims that ‘society is basically an economic collective in which the welfare of each can be unproblematically aggregated to yield the welfare of all, such that it is in each individual’s interest to maximize the wealth-producing capacity of society. It disregards the effect of social structure on individual effort and opportunity, concentrates on the exchange value, and sees the education system as a labour force service rather than as a producer and modifier of values, cultural and social as well as economic’ (pp. 6700-1). Moreover, those who hold the social welfare view tend to claim that ‘education is every one’s business, since collectively everyone pays dearly for it’ (p.6702).

This claim, however, has an ambiguity. It is not clear whether the term ‘everyone’s business’ used by advocates of social welfare means ‘public
enterprise' (concern) or 'instruments of success in life for everyone'. If it refers to the former, their point may be correct, since education is never any particular individuals' possession. If it, however, refers to the latter, their assertion can never be justified. Another possible interpretation of 'everyone's business', in contrast to the second interpretation, is that individual freedoms should be sacrificed to the collective economic welfare. Again, there is a risk of replacing the autonomy of individuals and education with collective demands.

Finally, individual benefit can be interpreted in two ways, i.e. as the state of an educated person, or in economic terms. In vocational training or education, 'individual benefit' means, in general, the latter. Thus, this assumption can be interpreted as meaning that education provides individuals with 'the relevance and use of education for their future development and with personal goals, including their economic goals' (p. 6703). When we consider individual benefit in school education as empowerment of individuality in terms of economy, it is often tempting 'to seek to secure the commitment of young people to learning by offering programmes whose immediate and instrumental application to the world of work appears evident' (ibid.).

If we follow this logic, education would be entirely different from liberal education. In this education, the following issues might be included at least in part: learning 'how the economic relates to the political and the social, how "economic imperatives" acquire their cultural necessity, and how the social agenda develops in a free-market democracy. With this kind of understanding, the pupils would be better equipped to be subjects rather than objects of the vocational impetus' (ibid.)\textsuperscript{23}. In other words, this education would be extrinsically justified, i.e. an instrument of an individual's economic wealth. In this sense, liberal educators who ascribe the intrinsic value to education might criticise this view in that it is likely to distort the very nature of education.

What I have done so far is to consider some assumptions of and possible objections to vocational training or education. At a logical level, it must be admitted that the logic of vocational preparation is neither adequately articulated nor strong enough

\textsuperscript{23}Political liberals might think that this would be likely to enhance students' autonomy and, thus, this might be seen as supporting their argument.
compared with that of liberal education. Does the vocational challenge, then, become meaningless? I would think not. At a substantial level, vocational demands are fairly influential in that they would be strong social demands when we acknowledge that education is a social practice. Of course, however, I do not maintain, as an extreme vocationalist, that education should be replaced by vocationalism or that vocational training should be compulsory at school. On the contrary, I also do not think that education can always fit or at times change social needs or the structure of the labour market. My assertion is rather that education should inevitably include initiating students into crucial current social practices, whether vocational preparation or whatever, although the issue of which practices are crucial is controversial. If my assertion stands on a sound ground, attempts to reconcile liberal education and vocational challenges would be natural. Indeed, some philosophers of education set out to perform this task.

3. Bridging the Gap: Some Proposals

Attempts to fill the gap between liberal education and vocational preparation have been made by a number of scholars, notably Dewey, Pring and Scheffler. Their views have in common that they try to reconcile these two, although their intention and ways of reconciling are more or less distinct. I shall explore their attempts in turn.

Let us begin with Dewey’s position. He may be not only the first philosopher who gives detailed attention to and attempts to reconcile the liberal/vocational divide in education, but also he offers a good starting point on that issue. Dewey says: ‘the conflict of philosophic theories focuses in discussion of the proper place and function of vocational factors in education’ (1916, p. 358). What he says in this passage implies, to put it another way within this context, it is inevitable that (liberal) education should consider vocational elements at some level. But the disputable issues are: how far can we consider it in education? What is the proper place of vocational factors in education? Let us consider what his views on these issues are.

Dewey’s position, in a word, might be labelled ‘liberal-vocational education’ or

25 For a fuller explanation on that, see Dewey (1916), chapter XV, chapter XXIII and Scheffler (1995a),
‘vocational-liberal education’ in that he rejects the vocational/liberal education divide and, further, he does not allow any dualism, such as mind-body, knowing-doing, theory-practice, leisure-labour, and so on\textsuperscript{26}. How is it possible to mitigate such kinds of dualism? He seems to solve the problems by rethinking the scope of vocational education, that is, by redefining a list of vocation related terms such as vocation, occupation, career, etc. in a broader sense. He defined vocational education broadly in order to avoid misunderstanding of it, which is often regarded as too narrow, specific and practical\textsuperscript{27}. For instance, a ‘vocation’, he defines, is ‘nothing but such a direction of life activities as renders them perceptibly significant to a person, because of the consequences they accomplish, and also useful to his associates’ (ibid., pp. 358-359). Regarding occupation, he says, ‘it includes the development of artistic capacity of any kind, of special scientific ability, of effective citizenship, as well as professional and business occupations, to say nothing of mechanical labor or engagement in gainful pursuits’ (ibid., 359). Eventually, for Dewey, vocational education seems to be a factor in the transformation of industrial society itself rather than an adjustment of ‘the untransformed, unrationalized, and unsocialized phases of our defective industrial regime’ or ‘a means of securing technical efficiency in specialized future pursuits’ (ibid., p.369). And school would be regarded as an agency for transferring the older dichotomies into ‘a society minimally democratic’ (ibid., p.372). In summary, for Dewey, as Scheffler has pointed out, ‘an education in the fullest meaning of vocations is at the same time an education in the fullest capacity of control and hence of democratic freedoms’ (Scheffler, 1995a, p.37).

Dewey’s attempt to integrate the dualism between liberal and vocational education, however, does not seem to succeed, since he did not offer concrete proposals as to how to reconcile them, except redefining the notion of vocation and vocational education. Dewey’s main concern does not seem to lie in suggesting specific principles pp.27-45.

\textsuperscript{26}In a similar vein, A.N. Whitehead (1950) insists that the liberal/vocational divide which is seen as ‘an evil side of Platonic culture’ would be mistaken (p.77). He says: ‘the antithesis between a technical and a liberal education is fallacious. There can be no adequate technical education which is not liberal, and no liberal education which is not technical: that is, no education which does not impart both technique and intellectual vision’ (p. 74). However, it must be admitted that his overall liberal education is ultimately based on knowledge rather than technique.

\textsuperscript{27}From this perspective, some might claim that Dewey’s position represents a ‘liberal vocational education’ (T. Lewes, 1994, p.213). However, this claim, it seems to me, draws too hasty a conclusion, because Dewey’s main intention was to break down the false dichotomies between liberal(or, in using his
or programmes for the integration of liberal and vocational education, but rather in showing that education can, and should, meet social and practical demands such as vocational education.

Another difficulty for Dewey, however, lies in his terminology. He does seem to deny any distinction between liberal and vocational. The difficulty that arises from serious semantic variation is that, for Dewey, the term ‘vocational education’ is too inclusive to make any differentiation between vocational and liberal education (ibid.). This might lead to the vagueness of education, whether in conceptual distinction or in practical situations. From this point of view, S. Hook’s assertion that ‘his vision is utopian’ (1971) seems to be plausible, although Dewey himself would deny it. Nevertheless, the significance of Dewey’s emphasis on vocational education, if any, lies in raising two fundamental questions: ‘whether intelligence is best exercised apart from or within activity which puts nature to human use; and whether individual culture is best secured under egoistic or social conditions’ (Dewey, op. cit., p. 374). What is his answer to these questions? He did not explicitly give the answer. Presumably, however, his position would be like this: liberal education should be grounded in human activities and current social practices.

Secondly, Pring’s view is similar to Dewey’s in that he tries to reconcile the vocational/liberal education gap by redefining the terms. However, the object of redefinition and the forms of definition are quite different. Whilst Dewey tried to integrate liberal education with vocational education by reconceiving the notion of ‘vocational education’, Pring tried to close the gap by reconceptualising the conception of ‘liberal education’. There is also a difference in that Dewey does not tend to admit the division between the two concepts, whilst Pring recognises variations of the distinction. He says: ‘Vocational education is a fairly elastic term and it covers many different ways in which the relationship between education and preparation for the world of work might be understood’ (Pring, 1993, p. 60). Nevertheless, there would be some important differences between vocational education and liberal education. How, then, does Pring try to bridge the liberal/vocational divide?

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28Pring’s view on this has been gradually articulated in his series of writings: Pring (1993), ‘Liberal Education and Vocational Preparation’; Pring (1994), ‘Liberal and Vocational Education: A Conflict of
Pring's view can be labelled 'vocationalising liberal education' in that his main concern lies in how to meet vocational needs in education, although his basic position seems to be grounded in liberal education. His attempt to reconcile liberal education and vocational preparation goes like this: there is basically a difference between liberal education and vocational education; the main pillar of education is liberal education; at the same time, (liberal) education should be considering social demands such as the vocational challenge; and in doing this, there is an inevitable vocationalising of liberal education. The following citation illustrates this point:

The vocationalising of liberal education has arisen from the criticisms emerging from quite different quarters- the inclusion of so many from the liberal idea, the disconnection of education from the practical world of business, the failure to incorporate the moral and social formation of the next generation, the lack of public accountability in a publicly funded service. But the 'vocationalising' of education in response to those criticisms may be most significant not in the curriculum proposals so much as in the language through which that transaction between teachers and pupils is described and evaluated (Pring, 1993, p. 64).

Pring here seems to have a double dilemma. That is, he must reflect the vocational demand within (liberal) education on the one hand and, on the other, he should present a compromise between liberal and vocational education, which are sharply distinguished in terms of the aims and values to be pursued, the structure and content of the knowledge to be acquired, the representative virtues and dispositions to be fostered, and the authorities to be obeyed. For instance, the aim of vocational preparation, unlike liberal education, may lie in the development of competence for the future life rather than the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. The content of a vocational programme, in contrast to that of liberal education, may be the acquisition of skills, qualities, attitudes and knowledge for the world of work rather than theoretical knowledge, which is represented by forms of knowledge. The justification for vocational preparation, unlike liberal education, may rely on external or practical justification rather than internal or intrinsic justification (Pring, 1993, pp.66-76;1994, pp.16-18; 1995, pp.186-188). How
does he try to achieve vocationalising the liberal education agenda?

He seems to search for the possibility of reconciliation through re-examining the conception of liberal education. Liberal education is mistakenly inclined to be defined by contrast with vocational education. According to Pring, however, liberal education is neither incompatible with, nor the opposite of, vocational preparation. For him, the dichotomy between liberal education and vocational education, like a well known list of dichotomies, such as that between theory and practice and that between thinking and doing, is simply false. In what way is this so? Pring tries to bridge the liberal/vocational divide by reinterpreting the term 'liberal'. For him, the term 'liberal' should be interpreted in a broader sense, which includes not only the pursuit of rationality but also human capacities in general which we engage in such as thoughts, feelings, doings, skills, and so forth. But where we should not be confused is that when he suggests 'vocationalising liberal education', the term 'vocationalising' does not necessarily mean that education should be very limited training or skill for the job. Pring's view of 'vocationalising liberal education', in the end, could be summarised thus: liberal education should be reinterpreted in the light of new situations and new challenges, such as vocational demands, since education cannot be established without considering the following questions: 'what it is to live fully human lives; and what the connection is between personal development and the wider social framework in which that development might take place'(Pring, 1995, pp. 194-5). Being faced with vocational demands, education should be reinterpreted so as to satisfy these demands, since education is a necessary part of human social practices. From the perspective of liberal education, however, Pring's reconciling agenda might be criticised as making the concept of education vague.

Finally, Scheffler's reconciling attempt is of quite an opposite kind to Pring's view. Having faced demands of vocational preparation, Pring's attempt lies in 'vocationalising' liberal education. By contrast, Scheffler's tries to reconcile them by 'liberalising' vocational education. From this perspective, his view might be labelled 'liberalising vocationalism'. Scheffler's position does not differ from Pring's view in seeing that education has to consider social needs; however, there is a fundamental difference between them in that Scheffler claims that vocation also has to become a field
of (liberal) education, whereas Pring's attempt lies in expanding the conception of liberal education by accepting demands of vocational preparation. Scheffler's position, therefore, seems to be liberal at a more fundamental level than Pring's in claiming that all education including vocational preparation should pursue a liberal ideal. In what way does he think that? What is his agenda for the integration? How is it possible?

Scheffler's overall reconciling agenda seems to go as follows. For him, all education, if we are to call it 'education', should satisfy some criteria such as developing one's capacities and dispositions for intelligent activities. These capacities and dispositions are not only required for vocation but, further, education can eventually be seen as a reflection of the necessity of vocation. Hence, vocational education can hardly be seen as a 'kind' of education which is distinguished from education as such or as a 'particular' education which aims at preparation for certain occupations. From this point of view, the phrase 'vocational education' is nothing more than a 'sheer redundancy' (Scheffler, 1995b, p.45). How, then, can we avoid that redundancy of vocational education? There could be two possibilities: one possibility is to separate 'vocation' from 'education' by paying attention to pure vocations in a narrow sense, i.e. focusing on particular trades or crafts; and, the other strategy is to reinterpret the concept of (liberal) education in relation to vocational preparation, that is, (liberal) education is seen as involving liberalising vocation. Scheffler seems to stand in the latter track. For him, the concept of education involves character traits, such as reliability, punctuality, honesty, etc., intellectual dispositions and skills which are needed in coping with variable situations for any vocation. For him, therefore, education in this sense can encompass vocational demands.

Scheffler's proposal, in turn, can be summarised thus: education, to some degree, should meet current social and practical needs including vocational demands. His way, however, does not seem to lie in preparing students 'for unpredictable job markets by providing either general skills or the peculiar techniques of given jobs'. But, rather, he holds that it would be possible 'to educate students to organize their knowledge and exercise their critical powers of judgement in dealing with the problems presented by one or another realm of practice'. Such education, for Scheffler, would be 'a central avenue' of liberal education (Sheffler, 1995b, p.54). What is more, beyond claiming that
education should bring up educated workers who have abilities to solve diverse practical problems, Scheffler seems to suggest that society in general and vocation in particular also provides students with educational opportunities or fields.

Scheffler’s agenda for reconciling through expanding the conception of liberal education, however, would be too ideal in at least two ways: the educationalising or liberalising of vocation, in practice, may be impossible, even if we accept his extension of the concept of education; and even if it is possible to liberalise vocational education, we must admit that, from the vocational point of view, there is still the gap between Scheffler’s attempt and vocational demands, since his view is too speculative to meet strong vocational demands. In this respect, Hook’s critique, i.e. ‘his vision is utopian’ which was made of Dewey seems to fit Scheffler’s agenda rather than Dewey’s.

So far, I have examined three attempts to bridge the gap between liberal education and vocational preparation. Three authors, i.e. Dewey, Pring and Scheffler, have in common that education is able to reflect vocational demands and that vocational demands should be considered in the concept of education. Their views are also similar in that their reconciling attempts involve the expansion or redefinition of main concepts such as vocational education, liberal education, and so on. However, there are differences among them as to the interpretation of what the phrase ‘reflecting vocational demands’ means and in how they reinterpret the crucial concepts. It can be shown as the following Figure.1.
To put this crudely, Scheffler's agenda is directed towards liberalising vocational education through expanding liberal education. But his main concern in liberal education is to predict and provide intellectual competencies that are needed in vocational practice. Through this, it is possible to bridge the gulf between liberal and vocational education or practice. Pring's proposal is not different from Scheffler in that he tries to reconcile them through the reformulation of the conception of liberal education. However, his way of reconciliation, in contrast to Scheffler's, relies on a broad conception of liberal education which includes vocational elements, not on a rigid and narrow sense of liberal education. Through the vocationalisation of rigid liberal education, he attempts to close the gap. Dewey's position stands in a middle way between Scheffler and Pring in that on the one hand he advocates a broad account of vocationalism which has, to some extent, liberal meaning, and on the other he emphasises practical and pragmatic matters.

Whichever position we take among these, however, the reconciling agenda might be criticised in certain ways. From a vocational perspective, their attempts are too
negative or weak in satisfying vocational demands. Vocationalists may call for education to have a more positive commitment to labour markets. From a liberal educator's perspective, to a large extent, their conceptions of education are not clear. Further, some, like extreme liberals such as Oakeshott\textsuperscript{29}, would regard the reconciling position as an attempt at the obliteration of education or schools. From a school educator's point of view, their attempt may not provide practical guidelines in school education, i.e. how to teach vocational education in schools. Indeed, the attempt to reflect vocational demands in education, whether at a theoretical level or at a practical level, seems to have many difficulties.

On what points, then, does the reconciling agenda challenge educational theory and practice? We may include at least two points. One challenge is that, being faced with demands of vocational preparation, there should be changes in the conception of education and thus educational perspectives at a conceptual level. Another challenge is that education should not undermine practical demands and the various tasks that are demanded in social and educational practice at a practical level.

What I have so far done is to explore the limitations of the Peters-Hirstian liberal education from the perspective of vocational education. What then does vocational education contribute or challenge to education? Vocational preparation challenges, in short, that education should be understood in relation to practical demands both at a conceptual and substantial level. This may be a much more satisfactory understanding of education. Nevertheless, there is still a temptation for people to think of education, whether liberal or vocational, as a means to personal achievements or benefits. However, we should not think of education as a purely individual or practical matter, rather than a social matter. We must recognise thus that, whether liberal education or vocational education, education can be fully understood in the light of its social context in a broad sense. This leads us, further, to consider communitarian views of education.

\textsuperscript{29}His cynical metaphor 'the character of a school of dancing' reveals this point. According to him (1972), education can never be a business and/or schools must not become market places. Rather, education must initiate young people into conversations about mankind and cultural heritage. In this sense, schools should be more like 'monasteries' than 'market places'. That education is related to the cultural heritage is more or less obvious. Both extreme positions seem to be hardly justified. In monasteries, education might be apart from social practices and, thus, education is likely to become 'inert' or remain at a linguistic level. In market places, by contrast, education might easily lose its autonomous character. For the debate on the market metaphor in education, see Bridges and McLauglin (eds.) (1994), part II.
B. Communitarian View of Education

In the previous section, I have considered whether vocational education challenges the view of liberal education as the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and in what way vocational education could challenge it. My argument may be summarised thus: the Peters-Hirstian account of liberal education that is based on ‘the logical analysis of the nature of knowledge and of the concept of education’ seems to be contrasted with vocational education that relies on ‘educational practice’ or ‘practical demands’. No matter what vocational education’s challenge to liberal education is, it seems to me, educational practice and practical demands in education need to be seriously, and sufficiently, considered not merely in the sphere of the theory of education, but of education as a whole, since education seems to be basically a practical matter rather than a theoretical concern. What is more, this leads us to reconsider the conception of education as a whole, that is, education should be anchored in practices.

In this section, what I want to do mainly is to contest another liberal view of education, viz., that personal autonomy, whether in a political context or not, should be an important educational aim, in the light of the communitarian view. In a liberal democratic society, autonomy is often regarded as having a taken-for-granted value. Even if we accept that our society is a liberal democratic society, the following question should be answered: why should autonomy be regarded as the supreme value rather than communal affairs, religious doctrine, and so on? A fuller understanding of the meaning of this question seems to be possible when we consider the communitarian’s perspectives, since this question is often raised by communitarians. The following issues might be considered: what exactly from the perspective of communitarianism are the shortcomings of liberal education with regard to promoting personal autonomy? In what way does communitarian thinking contribute to education in general? Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of these questions, it is necessary to outline overall communitarian assertions.

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1. What is Communitarianism?

What counts as communitarianism is often in dispute, since different communitarians have different views of what communitarianism is. It is more or less obvious that communitarianism, in contrast to liberalism, addresses ‘sociality’ or ‘community’ rather than ‘autonomy’ or ‘individuality’. However, many communitarians have different conceptions of what constitutes society or community, in what way society or community is important, and so on. They would also differ in their categorisation of communitarianism.

Having clarified the conception of communitarianism, first of all, it might be helpful to draw a distinction between ‘low’ communitarianism and ‘high’ communitarianism. The former refers to communitarianism as a ‘movement’ at the practical level. Its main concern lies in making certain sociological claims, such as about political arrangements. The best examples of it may be found in currently well-known exponents, A. Etzioni in the USA and H. Tam in the UK. Their common concern seems to lie in constructing a good society which is governed or realised by communitarian principles at a practical level. On the other hand, ‘high’ communitarians, like MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor and Walzer, are mainly concerned with making certain claims about how we can offer sound philosophical grounds for the nature of human beings, or conditions, which are contrasted to liberalism, rather than with practising communitarianism as a practitioner.

For the ‘low’ communitarians, as Tam puts it, communitarianism would be like this: ‘in order to build inclusive communities in every sphere, and at every level of social existence, communitarian politics requires the development of citizens who can take part

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30Their view is well illustrated in the following their works, respectively: Etzioni(1995), The Spirit of Community; Etzioni(1997), The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society; Tam(1998), Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship.
31Regarding the movement character of communitarianism, Etzioni’s following phrases are well expressed: the goal is ‘to provide the social bonds that sustain the moral voice, but at the same time avoid tight networks that suppress pluralism and dissent’(1995, p.122).
32The issue of whether these figures are communitarian would be controversial, since they are hesitant themselves to be called ‘communitarian’. Some, like Walzer, would think that their position is close to liberal or does not necessarily reject a liberal position. Even, like MacIntyre, some would manifest his position that ‘I am not a communitarian’, because ‘I do not believe in ideals or forms of community as a nostrum for contemporary social ills’(G. Borradori, 1991, p. 151). Whether or not they themselves agree that they are communitarian, it is more or less clear that their assertions belong to communitarianism or,
in co-operative enquiries determining a wide range of issues; who recognize that they share a respect for common values and accept the responsibilities these values imply; and who actively support the transformation of power relations for the common good (Tam, 1998, p. 8). Such developments, presumably, involve the following: changes to the form of citizenship education, the motivation of citizens for engaging in productive work for their communities, and capacities for protecting themselves from the threats to their common values (ibid.). According to Tam, communitarianism has something to do with providing 'an alternative to both individualism and authoritarianism' and, thus, social practices can be changed 'in relation to their contributions to the development of sustainable forms of community life' (p. 7). Furthermore, 'low' communitarians' real concern is to apply the communitarian principles, i.e. cooperative enquiry, mutual responsibility and citizens' participation, to the practical problems of 'how claims about what should be believed are to be judged, what common values should shape the responsibilities to be undertaken by all citizens, and how existing power relations are to be transformed' (pp. 12-13).

For the 'high' communitarian, the conception of communitarianism is more difficult to grasp, since their assertions are quite different from each other. One obvious thing is that their assertions are associated with the rejection of liberalism, the central issue of which is the constitution of self. According to communitarians, in contrast to the liberals, self is inevitably located in its social, cultural and historical contexts; that is, human beings are essentially social and, thus, their identities are shaped and revealed by the communities to which they belong. The issues concerning the relation between personal autonomy and society are ongoing current debates between communitarians and liberals. What I am concerned with here is to point out the limits of liberalism in general and the weaknesses of the promotion of personal autonomy as an educational aim in particular in terms of communitarian view. In order to do that, I shall examine the liberal-communitarian debate in more detail.

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at least, these involve communitarian factors.
2. The Liberal-Communitarian Debate

The idea of communitarianism can be clearly understood vis-a-vis liberalism which is its conceptual counterpart, although we must admit that there are a number of cross-purposes and misconceptions in each. The heart of the debate between them seems to depend on how we can understand individuality or autonomy and society or community, and the relationship between them. To put it crudely, liberals tend to emphasise personal autonomy, individual liberty and rights, whereas they often marginalise the social nature of the person, the value of community and historical surroundings. Liberals even tend to think the value of autonomy, explicitly or implicitly, is so obvious that it does not require any justification. Is it really so? Can liberalism that relies on a highly individualistic conception of the self be justified? If we adopt this position, the primary task of education would lie in the maximisation of the promotion of personal autonomy resulting in ‘the eventual social benefit of all’ (Jonathan, 1995, pp.93-4). That is, liberals presuppose that the individual virtues, such as the promotion of personal autonomy, eventually offer social well-being to all of us. Is this assumption correct?

The answer to these questions depends on the relationship between ‘society’ and ‘individual’. But we might properly say that the logic that the development of social well-being follows that of personal well-being is a rather ‘naive illusion of romanticism’, in the light of the analysis of liberal education history. This point is more clearly revealed by the communitarians’ counter-argument. Let me briefly look in turn at four communitarian arguments against liberalism’s ‘self thesis’: the embeddedness thesis, the narrative thesis, the social thesis and the cultural options thesis.

First of all, let us start with Sandel’s ‘embeddedness thesis’ that the self is fundamentally embedded in one’s society. His attack focuses on Rawl’s ‘metaphysical’ conception of the person and asocial individualism which might be called ‘the

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33 See Taylor (1991). He tries to make this clear in terms of ‘ontological issues’ and ‘advocacy issues’.
34 Kymlicka critically examines the five arguments as to why the liberal view of the self is inadequate, although his position stands in the advocacy of liberalism. These are ‘the liberal view of the self i) is empty; ii) violates our self-perceptions; iii) ignores our embeddedness in communal practices; iv) ignores the necessity for social confirmation of our individual judgements; and v) pretends to have an impossible universality or objectivity’. For a detailed argument, see his (1989), chapter 4. And also see his (1990), chapter 6.
unencumbered self”. Liberals, notably Rawls, have a strong tendency to address the conception of the person as an ‘autonomous chooser of ends’ and ‘an antecedently individuated subject’ (Mulhall and Swift, 1996, p. 47). For liberals, thus, ‘the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 560). According to Sandel, this Rawlsian position is basically anchored in ‘the individualist and asocial metaphysical foundations of liberal principles’ (Mulhall and Swift, op. cit., p. 55). For Sandel, however, the self is by no means prior to its ends, but rather the self is constituted by its ends and ‘embedded in some shared social context’ (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 51). Sandel’s argument goes like this: persons are fundamentally understood within substantial communities rather than in relation to a metaphysical conception of the person, since persons are embedded in (political) communities. Their identity is also constituted by their membership of community. Therefore, persons cannot be understood at a distance from their society and culture.

This argument, as Kymlicka showed, can be called into question in the following way: how can we prove to both positions that ‘we can’t perceive a totally unencumbered self’ and that ‘we can’t perceive our self without some specific end or motivation’ (ibid., p. 53). Indeed, this question shows a clear-cut philosophical difference between the liberal’s and the communitarian’s position. However, I must point out that Kymlicka’s question is an extreme one, since any communitarian, however thick, to my view, would not hold that position. Rather, communitarians would insist that it is, in fact, impossible to think of the self or autonomous person without supposing a particular context at the practical level and, further, even if it is possible, we can hardly find our just identity which makes sense of our lives at a philosophical level.

Secondly, in a similar vein, MacIntyre criticises liberalism on the one hand, and advocates an ‘embedded self’ thesis on the other. Why does he criticise liberalism and how does he conceive of liberalism? On what points does liberalism deserve to be criticised and what is his alternative? The conception of liberalism that MacIntyre

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35 Rawls’ this position is appropriated from his well-known book, *A Theory of Justice* (1971). However, his position was modified in his later paper, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’ (1985). For the differences between ‘metaphysical’ and ‘political’ in justice as fairness, see P. Neal (1990).

36 His criticisms against liberalism, according to J. Horton and S. Mendus (1994), can be summarised in three points: ‘the liberal conception of the self’, ‘liberalism’s denial of a *telos* for man’ and ‘liberalism’s disregard of social context’ (p. 8). For the details of it, see section A of chapter 5.
criticises seems to be identified with ‘liberal individualism’ which is associated with an emotivist view of the self that derives from the Enlightenment tradition. For him, this liberalism is the main cause of the incommensurable fragments of moral languages which are seen as just another name for confusion and chaos, and so represent a great catastrophe in that they reflect echoes of ‘the Tower of Babel’ (J. Stout, 1988, p.191).

This liberal individualism, it seems to me, can mainly be criticised on two related grounds: one is its Janus-faced character, i.e. a mistaken universal assumption, but, in reality, a subjective character. The other is that liberal individualism tends to overlook its social contexts. Hence, MacIntyre’s criticisms, that hint at solutions, are connected with these points.

His ‘narrative thesis’ that individuals can be fully understood within their narratives shows us the precise shortcomings of liberalism and, at the same time, what his solution is. He criticises and revises liberalism’s errors and weaknesses on the one hand. On the other, he addresses ‘the importance of communal life to the identity and integrity of the individual’ (Mulhall and Swift, op. cit., p.71). MacIntyre argues that one’s narrative can be appreciated by looking at his or her own narratives of life and one’s narrative in the end becomes a part of others’ narratives, since my narrative is not independent of others’ narratives, but rather intertwined with others’ narratives, that is, the narrative of my life is ‘embedded in a history which locates me among others, and implicates my good in the good of the communities whose stories I share’ (Sandel, 1984, p.9). Therefore, a fuller understanding of the self can only be possible within one’s history of narratives and, further, the contexts of his or her community (Avineri and de-Shalit, 1992, p.3). MacIntyre himself illustrates this: ‘we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles... the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity’ (1984, pp. 204-205). For MacIntyre, the self is always embedded or situated in his or her society, whether he or she is conscious of that or not, and, further, the self comes to have meaning within his or her histories and communities. He tries to show this by deploying a triad of
conceptions, i.e. the conception of a practice, that of the narrative unity of human life and that of a tradition. For him, individuals are located in an overarching and nested set of inherently social matrices including overlapping communal practices and historical traditions which lie deep within our culture and are embedded in our everyday life and institutions. The real understanding of the self, therefore, allows us to make reference to the engagement of individuals in social practices and traditions. In this sense, we might say that MacIntyre’s ‘narrative thesis’ is a tighter and extended form of Sandel’s ‘embeddedness thesis’ and, thus, it is more plausible than Sandel’s.

The third communitarian response to liberalism’s ‘self thesis’ would be Taylor’s ‘social thesis’. His social thesis that those human capacities could not develop outside society or outside a certain kind of society, is contrasted with the ‘atomism’ that ‘represents a view about human nature and the condition which makes a doctrine of the primacy of rights plausible’(1985, p. 189). Against atomism, Taylor argues that ‘since the free individual can only maintain his identity within society/culture of a certain kind, he has to be concerned about the shape of this society/culture as a whole’. For him, the identity of the autonomous and self-determining individual requires a social matrix which enables us to recognise the individual’s identity through series of the practices of our society (p. 207). If his social thesis is correct, the primacy of right, which atomists claimed, would be wrong.

Taylor’s thesis seems to go further than ‘the embeddedness thesis’ and ‘the narrative thesis’ in that he, like Sandel and MacIntyre, not only rejects ‘the unencumbered self’, but he also insists that the development of liberal virtue, such as personal autonomy, can be only possible within a particular society. For Taylor, ‘even if liberals are right about our capacity for choice’, they overlook the fact that the capacity for individual choice can only be developed and exercised in a certain sort of society, ‘in and through relations and interactions with others’ (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 74). What is more, for communitarians, the common good that is understood by liberals ‘as the result of a process of combining the preferences’ is conceived of ‘as a substantive conception of the good which defines the community’s ‘way of life’’. For the communitarian, this common good provides ‘a

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37 Liberal thinkers may not hold an extreme view that human capacities could develop outside human society. Nevertheless, it may be true that liberals’ primacy of right thesis at least implicitly, might involve that idea. See R. Nozick (1974).
standard by which those preferences are evaluated’ rather than ‘adjusting itself to the pattern of people’s preferences’ (ibid., p.77). According to Taylor (1985), people can ‘only develop their characteristically human capacities in society. That claim is that living in society is a necessary condition of the development of rationality, in some sense of this property, or of becoming a moral agent in the full sense of the term, or of becoming a fully responsible, autonomous being’ (pp. 190-191).

The fourth attack against liberalism’s self thesis can be found in Walzer’s ‘cultural options thesis’. His thesis assumes that ‘human society is a distributive community’ (1983, p.3). For him, human society is fundamentally defined as follows: ‘people distribute goods to (other) people’ or, more precisely, ‘people conceive and create goods, which they then distribute among themselves’ (p.6). How does he develop this thesis?

Walzer’s overall argument goes something like this: ‘that the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that the different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods themselves-the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism’ (ibid.). This involves two distinctive arguments: one is the ‘differentiated substance’ thesis that ‘different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons’. The other is the ‘particularistic methodology’ thesis that these differences derive from different ‘understandings of the social goods themselves’ and that such understandings are ‘the inevitable product of historical cultural particularism’.

With respect to the ‘differentiated substances’, as Mulhall and Swift put it (1996), Walzer insists that ‘different goods constitute different distributional spheres within which specific distributive arrangements are appropriate’ (1996, p. 128). With respect to the ‘particularistic methodology’, Walzer rejects Rawl’s methodological abstraction by using two kinds of argument, the conceptual and democratic argument. According to Mulhall and Swift, Walzer defends the position that ‘the way to see how particular goods should be distributed is to look at how those goods are understood in the particular culture in question’ (ibid.). Walzer’s conceptual argument seems to be connected with the view that ‘all the goods with which distributive justice is concerned are social
goods' (1983, p. 7). For him, the meaning or value of a particular good is not natural or individual, but it is necessarily derived from the societies to which individuals belong and, thus, it is a social one. His democratic argument seems to show us that distributive principles are good-specific and good-specific principles are also culture-specific. This means that both goods and their meanings and principles must be inherently social, namely, these are constructed and maintained 'by the community and its practices and institutions rather than by the thoughts and deeds of any individual' (Mulhall and Swift, op. cit., p. 155).

If these arguments are sound, goods may have different meanings in different societies and principles of justice are also different from society to society. What does this conclusion imply regarding the conception of the person and the relationship between autonomy and society? Walzer might say that cultural conditions are prerequisites of the exercise of autonomy and, thus, the exercise of autonomy is facilitated by a pluralistic culture. Hence, autonomy may require a social infrastructure involving wider range of opportunities, 'the purpose of the infrastructure is to enable 'the mass of citizens to participate in ... valued social activities' (1986, p. 137).

So far I have argued against liberalism's unencumbered self thesis from communitarian perspectives, that is, the embeddedness thesis, the narrative thesis, the social thesis and the cultural options thesis. To put it crudely, the communitarians share the view that the self is fundamentally social, which includes historical/cultural contexts, and that one's self is, at least, inevitably influenced by social practices to which one belongs. Being faced with these communitarian criticisms, what are liberals' responses? Communitarian attacks on liberalism, whether wittingly or unwittingly, have made liberals reconsider and modify their theory in order to withstand communitarian criticisms. Under this situation, it is natural that many liberals try to reconcile their more or less extreme views. Indeed, many liberals, explicitly or implicitly, seem to accept or even endorse the social embeddeness thesis. Let us briefly sketch their positions.

First of all, let me consider Rawls' response. Rawls' response to communitarian attack is a key in understanding the overall liberal position, since his position is not only

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38 My exposition of Rawls' revised version is, by and large, indebted to D. A. Bell's argument (1993). He argued Rawls' position under the following headings: the liberal self, liberal universalism and liberal atomism. For more details of this, see pp. 9-13.
influential among liberals but also communitarian attacks on liberalism are concentrated on his position. Rawls' philosophical position, as we can see from 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical'(1985) and Political Liberalism(1993), has, to some extent, changed. In response to the objection that liberalism is premised on an overly individualistic theory of the person, Rawls himself denied that liberal justice appeals to that or any other metaphysical conception of human nature. For him, the conception of the person is seen as political, not 'metaphysical'. Justice as fairness, Rawls insists, is intended 'as a political conception of justice' which works out in a 'society's main political, social, and economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of cooperation'(1985, pp. 224-5). This justice does not depend on philosophical 'claims to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature and identity of persons'(p.223). Rawls, like other liberals such as Kymlicka and Dworkin, no longer holds the view that liberalism has something to do with choosing our own life plans as if unencumbered by social ties and commitments. Rather, he thinks now that liberalism founded on the value of self-determination requires only that we are able critically to evaluate our ends; and so 'no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination'(Kymlicka, 1989, p. 52).

With respect to liberal universalism, Rawls has significantly modified his original position that principles of justice are universally valid. He argues that the task of political philosophy is 'to articulate and to make explicit those shared notions and principles thought to be latent in common sense'. The liberal conception of justice may not be 'suitable for all societies regardless of their particular social or historical circumstance'(1980, p. 518). This view is, in fact, not far from the communitarian view, as MacIntyre understood it, that conceptions of justice are results of social practices and traditions and, thus, they may be different from society to society, from tradition to tradition39. Both are concerned with interpreting the community's shared understandings, and their dispute would seem to turn on who provides a better account of them. Rawls' position seems to be a significantly 'communitarianised' liberal position. We can find this tendency in other liberals, for example, Raz, Dworkin, Kymlicka, and so on.

Raz maintains that autonomy can be compatible with the social embeddedness

thesis in that autonomy does not require a ‘perfect existentialist with no fixed biological or social nature who creates himself as he goes along’(1986, p.155). For him, autonomous personality can only develop and flourish against a background of social constraints. Similarly, Dworkin also recognises that personal autonomy cannot exist apart from a social context which provides meaningful choices and develops the capacity to choose options(1985, pp.230-233).

By the same token, Kymlicka makes it clear that the importance of the social thesis, which communitarians address, needs to be emphasised ‘for civic participation and political legitimacy’ as well as ‘for the exercise of our capacities for choice(1990, p.229). Furthermore, liberalism is not necessarily incompatible with stressing community, but rather provides an interpretation of it. What does make a real difference between liberals and communitarians is, according to Kymlicka, the issue of what ‘the proper role of the state’ is, that is, of whether society depends on the state, not of whether the individual depends on society(p, 230). Whatever their differences are, they all seem to agree on the communitarian claim that autonomy requires some instantiating forms of life.

Having sketched out political liberals’ responses, we can identify political liberalism, unlike other liberalisms, as not so far from the communitarian position that the self is inevitably socially constituted. However, the question of whether the political liberal’s conception of self can be equated with the communitarian’s and if so, in what way and how far they are similar, would still be controversial. What recent debates between liberalism and communitarianism show us, for present purposes, may be something like: being faced by the communitarian attack, liberals tend to accept the communitarian social thesis and this tendency seems to be more satisfactory than the original liberalism. From the communitarian perspective, nevertheless, the liberal’s way of conceiving of the community would not be satisfactory in terms of the conception and role of society and community. Liberals would want to keep their basic premise that personal autonomy is important not only in choosing and evaluating one’s own actions, but also in making judgements of social and communal interests. This conception of

Henceforth, WJWR and TRV, respectively.

40For instance, D. Vokey(1993) discusses how far there are differences and similarities between communitarianism and liberalism in the light of a comparison of MacIntyre with Rawls.
society and its status would be too thin, since communitarians assume that society or community ‘must be constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants and embodied in their institutional arrangements’, and not be simply an attribute of certain of the participants’ life plans (Sandel, 1984, p. 167). Furthermore, they criticise liberalism as being at least partly responsible for the ‘failure of a liberal society to foster a sense of community’ (Hirsch, 1986, p. 423).

This leads us to reconstruct the concept of autonomy as a social one. If we were to reconstruct the concept of autonomy as socially located, i.e. having a social value, ‘we would not only begin the reconstruction of a theory of liberal education for all, but would also address what is beginning to be acknowledged as a theoretical impasse for political philosophy’ (Jonathan, 1995, p. 106). The liberal education that stresses the promotion of personal autonomy needs to be reconnected with social theory and social practices. If we accept that Jonathan’s suggestion is on the right lines, the essential tasks that we should tackle may lie in establishing what a communitarian view of education should be and how to integrate the liberal view of education and that of the communitarian. What kind of education would best realise this aim? This line of questions is by no means easy to answer. One of the possible answers, for the present purpose, would be something like: education should be aiming at either ‘equipping students to become good citizens, capable of contributing meaningfully to public deliberations and pursuits’ (Sandel, 1984, p. 6) or, to use MacIntyrean phrases for the purpose of my thesis, education should comprise ‘initiation into various social practices and traditions’ beyond ‘equipping students to become autonomous individuals’ (41).

C. Reflections and Preludes to Searching for the New Direction

What I have discussed so far is in Part I, a single question: is liberal education really ideal or the best we have? To do this, I have drawn a distinction between two typical versions of liberal education, i.e. liberal education as the development of rationality and as the promotion of personal autonomy. My argument can briefly be

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(41) This does not mean that ‘equipping students to become autonomous’ cannot be an educational aim. Some liberal-democratic societies, perhaps, stress autonomy as an educational aim. My assertion is that this aim
First of all, the idea of liberal education as the development of rationality in general and the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake in particular, which is linked with theoretical pursuits, was best addressed by Peters and Hirst. For them, the pursuit of theoretical activities is a natural result of the analysis of the concept of education and, thus, it is intrinsic to education. When we define education in this way, it follows logically that education must be confined to the theoretical activities which are intrinsic to education, whereas values extrinsic to education such as vocational education are inevitably undermined or even entirely excluded.

Is this claim correct? I have pointed out that the Peters-Hirstian basic premises that there is a logical relationship between mind and knowledge and that there are distinctive forms of knowledge are controversial. Furthermore, their transcendental argument, that is the justification of their claim which rests entirely on circular logic, may also be dubious. It is, then, natural to reconsider what Peters calls the ‘extrinsic value of education’. Is it really so unimportant that it should be neglected in education? I have argued that vocational education should not be neglected in educational practice. I would insist that ‘logical logic’ is not more valuable than ‘practical logic’. Education is fundamentally a practical matter rather than a theoretical matter, and thus it is inevitable that it will reflect practical demands such as vocational education, although it would be absurd to conclude from the fact that education is a practical matter that it should reflect any and every practical demand.

Secondly, the view of liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy, explicitly or implicitly, can be found in White’s writings. For him, autonomy is important, so far as personal autonomy leads to human flourishing, although he seems to deny a logical connection at a surface level. In White’s claims for personal autonomy, we need to distinguish the ‘rationalistic’ model which his earlier view rests on from the ‘desire-satisfaction’ models which his later view relies on. The rationalistic model of autonomy addresses the individual’s ability to make autonomous choices that he or she needs and to exercise one’s autonomy in education. In contrast, the desire-satisfaction model for autonomy, whether ‘post-reflective desire-satisfaction’ or ‘the satisfaction of
informed desire', tends to emphasise 'desire' as a common aspect of human nature. Education, therefore, should help children to realise their most important desire in their life as a whole by critical reflection.

However, liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy must be confronted with some questions: is autonomy valuable? If so, in what ways?; even if we accept that autonomy is valuable, is this value universal?; even if we recognise that the value of autonomy should be considered within a particular society such as a liberal democratic society, does this show an adequate relationship between the individual and the society? My brief arguments in response to these questions are something like this: education for autonomy can be a central value within a liberal democratic society. However, this statement needs to be cautiously interpreted. It must not be understood as implying that in any society, or even in any liberal society, autonomy has a universal value. Of course, different societies can have different values. Even within similar societies such as liberal democratic societies, there is no good reason why we should have the same opinion of a particular value such as autonomy. Some liberal democratic societies, like the USA, would stress the value of justice rather than autonomy. Even within the same liberal democratic society some minor societies, like Amish society, would regard religious virtues as more valuable than personal autonomy. What this shows us is, as communitarians indicate, that autonomy also should be understood in the social context to which one belongs, and the promotion of personal autonomy in education entails a very limited conception of society and community.

In conclusion, liberal education, whether it refers to the development of rationality or the promotion of personal autonomy, ought to be challenged at least in two ways. One is that its success is limited in dealing with practical matters which are based on practical logic. It is, therefore, necessary to include practical demands such as vocational needs. The other is that liberal education does not sufficiently and adequately accommodate the value of society or community and the relationship between individual and community, although political liberalism is partly concerned with social and political

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42I would not maintain that autonomy must be a central educational value, nor that it must be a central educational value in any democratic society. Some would argue that one cannot make sense of democratic institutions without understanding personal autonomy that is embedded in them. But that something is valuable in understanding democracy does not necessarily imply that something is educationally valuable.
backgrounds. Hence, liberal education must face the communitarian’s challenge that tends to stress the value of society and community.

If we adopt the whole line of argument I have discussed in Part I, what follows about education? What kind of education could meet these challenges? Being faced with these challenges, I would suggest ‘the social practices’ thesis. This thesis has an assumption that education should be fundamentally based on practices that are social in nature. It can be expressed, in a word, as ‘education as initiation into social practices’. I would say that ‘education as initiation into social practices’ can meet the demands I have outlined.

I am, of course, not the first to assert the ‘social practices’ thesis in education. This tendency has been raised in various forms by various scholars- such as Wittgenstein, Bourdieu, MacIntyre, etc.-, even if they have said little about education. The discussion of the ‘social practices’ thesis in an educational context seems to appear in Langford(1985; 1989) and Hirst(1992;1993;1998). In the 1990s, it seems to me, the educational pendulum swings in western countries away from ‘liberal education’ that addresses either the development of a rational mind or the promotion of personal development as having universal value divorced from a particular society, to ‘education as initiation into social practices’ which holds that, whatever education is, it must reflect ongoing traditions of social practices. Before proceeding to further arguments about the social practices thesis, let us briefly sketch the preludes to the social practice thesis. Paradoxically, we can find these preludes in the liberal educators I have mentioned.

Peters, White and Hirst in their recent writings seem to recognise the limitations of liberal education in the face of internal and external criticisms. Peters(1983), in reviewing the trends of philosophy of education in Britain, has pointed out two major mistakes for liberal education in Britain: the concept of education was defined too specifically and narrowly; and a convincing transcendental justification was not provided(p.37). What is more, he has also pointed out that crucial concepts in liberal education, such as ‘rationality’ and ‘autonomy’, etc. tend to be treated in ‘too much of a vacuum’ and he has even suggested that an ‘alternative to or revision of ‘forms of knowledge’ as a basis for the curriculum as a whole’ is required(ibid., 53). He goes on:

Somebody must come up with a convincing alternative to Hirst’s ‘forms of knowledge’
thesis as a philosophical foundation to the curriculum - or he must develop his theory in
greater detail to meet more adequately important objections to it as it stands. Without
such a theory modern discussions of the core curriculum, etc., seem very *ad hoc* - a

Peters seems to recognise the limits of liberal education both as the development
of rationality and as the promotion of personal autonomy. The former sense of liberal
education is too specific and too narrow, since it is mainly confined to the pursuit of
knowledge for its own sake. The latter sense of liberal education may be undermining its
social connection. This diagnosis seems to stand on sound grounds. Being faced with
these suggestions, what are Hirst’s and White’s responses?

Surprisingly, they, to a large degree, seem to accept Peters’ recommendations. J.
White tries to modify his position in ‘Education, Liberalism and Human Good’ (with P.
White, 1986) and Education and the Good Life(1990). In ‘Education, Liberalism and
Human Good’, White criticises the tendency of liberal education simply to stress personal
autonomy without morality. For him, the main educational task is to bridge the gap
between personal autonomy which aims at the realisation of satisfaction in keeping with
human nature, and morality which is necessarily required for collective living. Indeed,
according to White, MacIntyre conceives the maximisation of one’s preferred desires in
a way compatible with morality. In this sense, in White’s evaluation, MacIntyre provides
a reasonable ground for liberal education by seeing that one’s well-being involves moral
elements in a broad sense(pp.155-156). However, MacIntyre’s great contribution, it
seems to me, lies in introducing social practices and traditions in understanding (moral)
education rather than in maintaining that moral elements are built into the realisation of
one’s satisfaction, as far as education is concerned.

Whether or not we are satisfied with White’s evaluation on MacIntyre’s
perspective, we may admit that White’s position represents one step forward in terms of
social practices. His next step, as we can see in Education and the Good Life, may be to
consider social/political frameworks when we consider educational aims. However, this
position is not strong enough for satisfying social concerns, since his concern is limited
to the flourishing of personal well-being and its political context and, thus, his ground for
this relies on circular logic. Therefore, a more positive interpretation is needed. Like other
kinds of education, liberal education, whether the development of rationality or of personal autonomy, also should be regarded as constituted by social practices in that without social practices, there is no liberal education. This line of thinking is best found in Hirst’s later writings.

Hirst has gone beyond mere modification of his theory; he has jettisoned his earlier view on education; moving from liberal education in general and ‘initiation into forms of knowledge’ in particular to education as social practices in general and ‘initiation into social practices’ in particular. His departure point appears in his ‘Educational Theory’ (1983). He recognised his mistake which is a distorting emphasis on theoretical rationality. Furthermore, he seems to emphasise practical rationality. As he puts it:

... if we are to develop rational educational practice, it now seems to me we must start from a consideration of current practice, the rules and principles it actually embodies and the knowledge, beliefs and principles that the practitioners employ in both characterising that practice and deciding what ought to be done. The practical discourse in which what is going on can be expressed will have much in common with the discourse of everyday practical activities... The activities and practices of everyday life are developed and modified in a wide context of knowledge, beliefs and values about men and their physical and social context... Educational theory I still see as concerned with determining rationally defensible principles for educational practice. The adequate formulation and defence of these principles I now see as resting not simply on appeal to the disciplines, but on a complex pragmatic process that uses its own appropriate practical discourse (ibid., pp. 16-26, my italics).

Although we cannot see, in the passages quoted above, his total conversion from liberal education\(^{43}\), it is more or less clear that he no longer holds the following philosophical grounds which his earlier view relied on: education is concerned with living a good or rational life; liberal education is the core part of education for the good

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\(^{43}\) Some would claim that Hirst never asserts that education should be defined as liberal education or that he never undermines other values of education, such as specialist education, physical education and character training. It, however, must be admitted that Hirst (over-)emphasises a liberal education as initiation into forms of knowledge. Hence, his switch from ‘education into forms of knowledge’ to ‘education into social practices’, at first glance, is radical. However, I would say that the issue of whether his switch is radical is less obvious than someone might think. For more details of it, see Section B of Chapter 7.
or rational life; therefore, the pursuit of rationality in (liberal) education is central; and the pursuit of rationality can be well justified by the ‘transcendental’ argument.

His thorough conversion is explicit in his ‘Educational Aims: Their Nature and Content’ (1992) and ‘Education, Knowledge and Practices’ (1993). Indeed, he radically changed his view of liberal education. He proclaims this:

... there has been a shift in much philosophy of education from seeing education as primarily concerned with knowledge to seeing it as primarily concerned with persons and that it is now time to move on further to seeing it as primarily concerned with social practices (1992, p. 40).
... we must shift from seeing education as primarily concerned with knowledge to seeing it as primarily concerned with social practices (1993, p. 184).

Education, following him, should be defined as a ‘wide’ range of practices and, furthermore, as having ‘social’ activities or practices which involve all the knowledge, attitudes, feelings, virtues, skills, dispositions and relationships. If his jettisoning of his earlier view is on the right lines, the questions that must be answered are: what exactly does ‘education as initiation into social practices’ mean? When we see education as ‘initiating children into social practices’, what would it be like in school education? Why should education be defined as ‘initiation into social practices’ rather than ‘the pursuit of rationality’ or ‘the promotion of personal autonomy’? I shall tackle these issues in Part III. Before doing this, it is necessary to examine what ‘social practices’ are. I shall deal with this in Part II.

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44 This paper is a revised and extended version of ‘Educational Aims: Their Nature and Content’ (1992).
Part II. An Understanding of Social Practices

In Part I, I have discussed the claims of liberal education and its limitations. Internal and external criticisms of liberal education, in turn, lead us to look for an alternative, or at least a complement, to liberal education. Presumably, one of the plausible alternatives is ‘education as initiation into social practices’ or ‘social practices-based education’. The following questions, then, need to be addressed: is education as initiation into social practices a plausible alternative? If so, in what aspects can we say that? If we accept ‘education as initiation into social practices’ as an alternative, what would it be like? Before answering these questions, in this Part, let us explore the notion of social practices.

This Part aims at establishing the notion of a social practice(s) as a preliminary task for developing the idea of ‘education as initiation into social practices’. To do this, I shall analyse the notion of ‘a social practice(s)’ in two ways: by examining a conventional but inadequate notion of practice, and by discussing some influential conceptions and distinctions. In Chapter 4, as a preliminary analysis of the concept of a social practice, I shall argue that a conventional usage of ‘practice’, which is often used in distinction from ‘theory’, is inappropriate in terms both of the Greek notion of ‘praxis’ in relation to poiesis (section B) and of Ryle’s distinction between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’ and Wittgenstein’s language-game theory (section C), and is also inappropriate from an educational perspective (section D).

In Chapter 5, I shall discuss some influential conceptions of and distinctions within social practices. In section A, I shall explore what MacIntyre means by a ‘social practice’. In section B, I shall address three dimensions of a social practice (human activity, society and tradition) by analysing MacIntyre’s account of ‘a practice’, along with other writers who back them up. In section C, I shall elaborate MacIntyre’s conception of a ‘social practice’ through discussing Miller’s distinction between ‘self-contained’ practices and ‘purposive’ practices, and Schatzki’s distinction between ‘dispersed’ practices and ‘integrative’ practices. Through this process, I shall establish my own, modified MacIntyrean, conception of social practices.
Chapter 4. Inappropriateness of the Conventional Usage of ‘Practice’

In order to fully understand what ‘education as initiation into social practices’ is, the question of what counts as a (social) practice plays a key role. The notion of ‘practice’ has often been used as sharply demarcated from that of ‘theory’. But this demarcation can not be seen as correct, because it overlooks too many factors which can be involved in the issue of theory and practice. Therefore, what I want to point out in this Chapter is that the extreme position that separates theory from practice may be mistaken in the light both of etymological sense and modern philosophical discourses, and from an educational point of view. Firstly, what I want to show through analysis of the two Greek concepts of praxis and poiesis is that the distinction between theory and practice does not make sense, whereas the distinction between different kinds of action, i.e. praxis and poiesis, makes sense. Secondly, two influential modern philosophers, i.e. Ryle and Wittgenstein, show that theory should be regarded as (a social) practice or at least understood in relation to practice, rather than as having supreme status. Lastly, in an educational context, theory and practice also should not be separated in that educational theory cannot be pursued apart from educational practice in which someone engages.

A. Preliminary Remarks on the Dualism between Theory and Practice

The precise meaning of ‘practice’ might not be easy to grasp, since the term is diversely and even incompatibly used depending on authors and contexts. One of the easiest ways of understanding the notion of practice is probably to analyse the concept of ‘practice’ by comparing it with ‘theory’. Indeed, the notion of practice is often used with ‘theory’ which is regarded as the counterpart term. When we use the notion of practice in this way, ‘practice’ is often defined as ‘something that is not theory (at all)’. In other words, theory is concerned with the pursuit of universal, objective and theoretical knowledge, whereas practice is concerned with particular, context-bound and human
actions that occur in a concrete everyday life. From this point of view, the notion of practice is often regarded as ‘lived life as opposed to abstracting ideas, or else man’s acting as opposed to his ‘mere’ thinking and reflecting’ (Lobkowicz, 1967, p.3), because we have a tendency to think that ‘practice’ is connected with ‘doing’ or ‘making’, whereas ‘theory’ is linked with ‘seeing’ or ‘knowing’.

When we consider this notion of practice as part of a dichotomy between theory and practice, we can often imagine two extreme positions. One is a rational-liberal position, the other is a pragmatic-utilitarian position. They do not differ in assuming that theory and practice are different and thus separated. But they are quite opposite in terms of the priority of theory and practice. Rational liberals often too much emphasise the priority of theory over practice, so that the importance of practice is overlooked. This claim presupposes that theory and practice are strictly (at least logically) distinguished or even divided. However, for them, the reasons why theory is more important than practice and why theory and practice are separated, are often regarded as not in dispute.

On the other hand, pragmatic-utilitarians tend to (excessively) stress the importance or necessity of practice as a reaction against the rationalistic liberal education tradition. The logic of this claim is, roughly speaking, as follows: liberal education is inclined to stress theoretical knowledge and subjects. There is, however, another aspect such as practice or practical activity that is part of our lives. We should consider, therefore, practice or practical activity in education. This claim might also be a fallacy if taken to the opposite extreme. That is to say, the emphasis on practice or practical activity might be ignoring theoretical aspects of education in particular and of life in general. Whether we stress theoretical activity or practical activity in this way, it seems necessary to allow that theoretical and practical activities are separated and, further, one of them should be given priority.

Both positions, however, never give us a satisfactory explanation of the relationship between theory and practice in that they assume the dichotomy between theory and practice. When we think of the conception of practice, then, what is wrong with understanding it in terms of the theory/practice dichotomy? The limits of this may be grounded on at least the following three reasons. Firstly, this dichotomy stands on a

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1 In a strict sense, however, this common sense, as will be explained later, is not correct, since ‘doing’ and
misunderstanding of the Greek term praxis and its related conceptions. There are series of misconceptions about the relation of theory to practice and of making to doing. This misunderstanding seems to have originated from misinterpretations of the crucial Greek terms such as praxis, poiesis, phronesis and techne. What these Greek terms show us is that the distinction is adequately applied to two different kinds of human action, i.e. 'doing'(praxis) and 'making'(poiesis) and, further, to the forms of disposition or knowledge, i.e. practical knowledge and judgement(phronesis) and technical knowledge and skill(techne)

Secondly, this dichotomised understanding of practice overlooks underlying contexts. The theory/practice divide is grounded in a false assumption that the concept of practice and its relationship to theory are universal and static. This false assumption seems to be caused by overlooking its temporal and spatial contexts. Without temporal (or historical) contexts and spatial (or social) contexts, we cannot properly and fully understand the meaning of practice, because it is by no means to be seen as universal or static, but rather its meaning is heavily dependent on historical and social contexts. The conception of practice, like most other terms, has little meaning apart from temporal and spatial contexts which give a fuller and vivid meaning to it. Hence, the conception of practice should be understood in the light of the ongoing traditions of philosophical arguments.

Thirdly, this dualistic account of practice cannot appropriately consider the

'making' are different concepts.

Some could argue that there are three kinds of reasoning based on different aims: theoretical, practical and technical reasoning. 'Theoretical' reasoning is directed towards good understanding of how things are. For instance, disciplines, such as science, history etc., belong to the theoretical thinking. 'Practical' reasoning is designed to making good decisions. For instance, political decision-making is a case. 'Technical' reasoning is related to making good products. For example, drawing a portrait, making a desk might be cases. These distinctions correspond to three kinds of social practices, i.e. theoretical practices, practical practices and technical practices, respectively. See P.Walsh(1993), chapter 8; see also Schwab's series of papers on 'The Practical', i.e. 'The Practical: A Language for Curriculum' (National Education Association, 1970); 'The Practical: Arts of Eclectic' (School Review, 79: 493-542); 'The Practical: Translation into Curriculum' (School Review, 81: 501-22) and 'The Practical: Something for Curriculum Professors to Do' (Curriculum Inquiry, 13:3, 239-365). The former three papers were reprinted in his(1978), I. Westbury & N.J. Wikof(eds.), Science, Curriculum and Liberal Education: Selected Essays. Also see 'Structures and Dynamics of Knowledge', in M. Levit(ed.)(1971), Curriculum, pp. 181-214. This argument seems to be plausible when we consider the curriculum. My concern here is not in discussing the curriculum but in pointing out the inappropriateness of the distinction between theory and practice. The arguments for the curriculum will be dealt with in Chapter 7.
dynamics that can occur between practitioners and practice, and theory. In particular, insofar as education is concerned, the strict dichotomy between theory and practice is never satisfactory, since educational problems are so complicated that they cannot always be labelled as either ‘theoretical’ (‘theory’) or ‘practical’ (‘practice’) and, further, they cannot be solved in such a way. What is more, this dichotomy tends to underestimate, to a large extent, practitioners who engage in educational practices and to undermine what they are trying to do. In this sense, practice should not be seen as opposed to theory, but rather theory and practice should be seen as being integrated into educational activities in which teachers are engaging. When we define education as initiation into social practices, the term ‘social practices’ never denotes that kind of practice which is isolated from theory. Rather, it is much safer to say that social practices should be seen as integrating theory and practice.

So far, what I have tried to show is that it is impossible to understand adequately the conception of practice through simply comparing it with that of theory, since this is too simple, and also perhaps distorted, to give a full and appropriate account of the concept of practice. In order to get a fuller understanding of practice, it is necessary to understand it along with crucial conceptions that are closely related to the account of practice, its historical and social contexts, and philosophical traditions on this issue. Hence, I shall explain the details of the foregoing arguments in turn. These arguments will show why the theory/practice divide is not appropriate, particularly in the educational context. All of them constitute a preliminary exegesis of conceptions of social practices which I shall deal with in the following Chapter.

B. The Greek Notion of *Praxis*

The task of this section is to show that the dichotomy between theory and practice is not plausible in the light of the Greek understanding of *praxis*. This should include exegeses of *praxis* with its related concepts and its context, and of ways of life, because conceptions themselves are socially constructed and, thus, are reflections of human lives in their time.

Firstly, let me start by elucidating the cluster of terms. A good starting point for
this might be a distinction between *praxis* and *poiesis*, because many problems involved here are closely related to this distinction. The classic articulation of the distinction between technical and practical reasoning is to be found in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (henceforth, EN). In Book Six of EN, he analyses the concepts of *techne* and *phronesis*. According to him, *phronesis* and *techne* are two modes of what we would call 'practical knowledge or reasoning'. They are, roughly speaking, distinguished by the overall purpose and by which modes of human activities are connected. For Aristotle, *techne* as productive (poietike) knowledge or reasoning is connected with a kind of activity that he calls 'making' or 'producing' (*poiesis*). This activity 'issues in a durable outcome, a product or state of affairs' which can be precisely specified by the maker before he engages in his activity and which provides it with its ends or purpose (telos). *Techne* 'is a kind of knowledge possessed by an expert maker' (Dunne, 1993, p.9).

On the other hand, *phronesis* as practical (praktikos) knowledge is linked with another type of activity, i.e. *praxis*, 'which is conduct in a public space with others in which a person acts in such a way as to realize excellence that he has come to appreciate in his community as constitutive of a worthwhile way of life'. *Praxis* is different from *poiesis*. Although both of them involved a self-realisation and concern with other people, *praxis* 'engaged one more intimately than...the *poiesis* over which one exercised an uncompromised sovereignty'. It needs practical knowledge (*phronesis*), which knowledge is fitted to *praxis* (ibid, p.10). Aristotle strictly restricts *praxis* to *phronesis* which has to do with the conduct of one's life, particularly as a citizen of the *polis*, whereas *techne* is restricted to *poiesis* which has to do with making or bringing about a product or outcome. Aristotle illustrates this:

> Making and acting are different... so that the reasoned state of capacity to act[i.e., *phronesis*] is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make[i.e., *techne*](1140a2-5); *phronesis* cannot be ... *techne*... because action and making are different kinds of things(EN1140b1-4, quoted in Dunne, p.262).

As we can see from the quotation above, *phronesis* and *techne* have in common that they both are a 'reasoned state of capacity', that is, practical activities that require rationality or reasoning for exercising them. But they are different in that *techne* results in 'making
action' through providing (effective) product-related knowledge in which artisans engage, whereas *phronesis* is directed towards the process of taking action, which is related to human good, that is, how to live well.

Given that *praxis* is connected to taking morally good actions guided by *phronesis*, let me say more to put the Greek notion of *praxis* into its social and temporal contexts. Although the Greek notion of *praxis* can be roughly translated as 'practice', the usage of the term is quite different from our own. What is really meant by *praxis* is, indeed, a matter of dispute. The notion of practice might be different in every period. Similar examples can be easily found in philosophical terms, such as virtue, well-being, and so on. For example, the notion of 'arete' in Greek and 'virtue' in modern English may be quite different. The term *arete* in Greek at least encompasses intellectual excellence and moral goodness. It would be more accurate to say it has one meaning, which is 'excellence', whether intellectual or moral, or whatever. Virtue in English does not seem to involve both meanings. So some philosophers would like to distinguish 'intellectual virtues' from 'moral virtues'. However, in a strict sense, this is not correct in that the conception of 'virtue' in English seems to have merely the latter meaning. Presumably, we can say that the term 'arete' reflects the social contexts of the ancient Greeks. Hence, without referring to any context, to fully understand the notion of *praxis* (and/or of any concept) is almost impossible.

For Aristotle, a more apparent understanding of the notion of *praxis* may be possible through seeing it with the *polis* as its setting, in that it contains shared answers of its citizens to the question 'what is the best mode of life for human beings?' (WJWR, p.133). In this respect, we might say that the *polis* is a presupposition of ongoing inquiry into the nature of the supreme good (ibid., p.135). Therefore, one cannot know the current account of the supreme good or other goods and cannot have rational judgement and rational action which is connected with a capacity for identifying and ordering the goods of the good life, without participating in the *polis*. From this point of view, for Aristotle, membership in a *polis* is essential for both the good life and capacity to reason.

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1 *Eudaimonia* is another example. The term 'eudaimonia' in Greek, etymologically, *(eu: well, good + daimon: god who is called 'daimon') has various meanings. It is difficult to translate into English. It is, therefore, translated variously in its context such as 'well-being', 'happiness', 'flourishing', 'the good life', and so on. We can hardly say that the modern sense of well-being is a precise meaning of the Greek notion of *eudaimonia*, although we use these translations.

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practically. The *polis* exists primarily for the sake of the goods of excellence. Aristotle’s emphasis on the *polis* presupposes a positive world-view; the life of human beings is naturally a life of virtue, not survival, and the city, as the perfect or complete human community, must naturally be for virtue as well. In this sense, the *polis* can be seen as the perfect community in that the life of virtue and logos was fully realised (Simpson, 1990, p. 156). When we see the notion of *praxis* within the *polis*, it is closely connected to living the good life through participating in the *polis* which can fully realise the good life.

What this analysis shows us is that the conception of *praxis* (and/or other conceptions) is embedded in a society and social practices that are outcomes of forms of social life. From this point of view, we could say that the differences between the ancient Greek concepts and the contemporary English usages of them reflect ‘not simply a linguistic difference, but a difference between two forms of social life’ (Carr, 1995, p.65). It leads us to an attempt to understand the notion of *praxis* in the light of forms of life in ancient Greece.

The purpose of Greek people’s life in the *polis*, as I mentioned above, lies in realising the good life through participating in the *polis*. However, for Aristotle, the question of what form of life is fully realised in *eudaimonia* is not clear, although his conception of *eudaimonia* plays a pivotal role within his theory. What seems to be clear is that *eudaimonia* is the ultimate human good on the following grounds: the highest good (*teleion agathon*) should be most final and self-sufficient; *eudaimonia* is most final (EN, 1097a35-b5) and self-sufficient (EN, 1097b 14-16); therefore, *eudaimonia* is the highest good (1097b 20-1). It is more or less clear that *eudaimonia* can be realised through participating in the *polis* which comprises ‘citizens, self-sufficiency, the good life and a certain constitution’ (Richardson, 1992, p.351).

What seems to be unclear is, however, what the relationship of *eudaimonia* to two ways of life, i.e. the *bios theoretikos* (contemplative or theoretical life) or the *bios politikos kai praktikos* (practical life), is. Indeed, the debate between interpretations of *eudaimonia* is very complicated. These interpretations, roughly speaking, fall into two

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4In a strict sense, contents of *eudaimonia* fall into three: the life devoted to pleasure (*bios apolaustikos*), practical and political life (*bios politikos kai praktikos*) and contemplative or theoretical life (*bios theoretikos*). This tripartition, in fact, can be reduced to ‘practical’ and ‘theoretical’ life. This is, in turn, becoming the first explicit contrast between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, even though it is not correct.
categories: exclusivist or intellectualist interpretations\(^5\) and inclusivist interpretations\(^6\). The former takes *eudaimonia* in Aristotle’s EN to be contemplation(*theoria*), while the latter takes *eudaimonia* to include both contemplation and morally virtuous activity. Exclusivist interpretations\(^7\) adopt one of two contents of *eudaimonia*, i.e. *bios* either *theoretikos* or *praktikos*, even though most exclusivists tend to adopt the former position. On the other hand, inclusivist interpretations\(^8\) include in some manner both of the *bioi*, theoretical and practical. These views seem to be closer to the spirit of Aristotle than the exclusivist view in that they see in *eudaimonia* two aspects of life and its realisation, not two separated lives. This explanation may be enough to further my argument, because my intention lies not in exploring the debate concerning *eudaimonia*, but in revealing a mistaken dichotomy between theory and practice in the light of the Greek context.

It seems to me that the dichotomy between theory and practice was derived from the misunderstanding of *eudaimonia* which involves two ways of life, i.e. theoretical life(*bios theoretikos*) and practical life(*bios praktikos*). The rationalistic view of the relation of theory to practice tends not only to take an intellectualistic interpretation of

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\(^5\)Strictly speaking, the exclusivist interpretation and intellectualist interpretation are not the same. Nevertheless, we often equate the exclusivist position with the intellectualist one, since someone who adopts the former position tends to interpret *eudaimonia* in an intellectual way. Roughly speaking, Kenny(1992) seems to show the standard intellectualist line. This line of thought seems to make a distinction between theory and practice and, further, see theoretical life as superior to practical life. Liberal educators seem to accept this line of thought.

\(^6\)C.D.C.Reeve (1992), unlike Kenny, seems to take an inclusive interpretation. His logic is roughly as follows: i) *eudaimonia* is exercising the human function well. ii) virtue is what exercises a function well. iii) therefore, *eudaimonia* is virtuous rational activity. There are two sorts of reason or rationality, i.e. practical(*phronesis*) and theoretical(*nous*). Therefore, for him, *eudaimonia* requires both morally virtuous activity and contemplation. Some would argue that Kenny does not deny it. This might be right. But it is also true that he addresses the theoretical aspect of *eudaimonia*. It is obvious, nevertheless, that Kenny’s position is different from Reeve’s one.

\(^7\)According to L.Nannery(1981), the two interpretations each have three different positions, respectively. One exclusivist view is that Aristotle’s *eudaimonia* is identified with the *bios theoretikos tout court*. ‘This generally goes by the name of the strict intellectual view. The activity of *theoria* is the human good, either a) to the exclusion of ethical life altogether or b) with the understanding that the ethical virtues derive any value they may have from an instrumental relationship to theoretic virtue’. A second possible exclusivist view is that Aristotle’s *eudaimonia* is equated to the active life *tut court*, e.g. *eudaimonia* is civic life; and the last possible interpretation takes the developmental view, that is, ‘Aristotle was evolving from the view that the *bios theoretikos* by itself constituted *eudaimonia* to the view that *eudaimonia* is constituted solely by the ethical virtues, and that the EN was composed short of the final development’(Nannery, 1981, pp. 278-280).

\(^8\)According to Nannery, there are three interpretations: ‘The Trade-Off View’ which is that ‘a maximization of both practical and theoretic virtuous actions can be calculated, with each type having a equal value’; ‘The Absolute Priority View’ which is that ‘one never can trade off theoretic for practical virtues’; and ‘The Superstructure View’ which is that the moral life imposes certain minimum requirements which should be satisfied before engaging in theoretical activity(pp. 280-1).
eudaimonia, but also to understand theoretical life and practical life as being separated. In other words, rationalists often assimilate eudaimonia to the life dependent on leisure (or contemplation or theory). There may be nothing wrong in this; however, their real problems lie in seeing the life devoted to leisure as separate from practical activities and in seeing theoretical life and activities as having independent value without considering any contexts. Let me put these two points in more detail.

The first point that I want to make is that we should not confuse the relation between practical life and theoretical life with so-called ‘dualism’, which refers to the lines of distinction between theory and practice, knowledge and action, thinking and doing, and so on. The Greek distinction between theory and practice has little to do with such a dualistic distinction. Rather, it is ‘a way of articulating two different forms of socially embedded human activities, each within its own intellectual commitments and its own moral demands’. Hence, it hardly follows that theory and practice can be separated, from the fact that there are two ways of life, i.e. practical and theoretical. It is thus unsurprising that we rarely find discussions about the relationship between theoria and praxis in Aristotle’s discussion concerning the ways of life (Carr, 1995, p.67).

The second point is that the two ways of life are anchored in the concrete context and in a public domain, not transcending the context or in a private (or secret) domain. In other words, as I indicated, any form of life, whether theoretical life or practical life, or a life of pleasure, cannot be fully realised without participating in the polis, insofar as the good life is concerned, because all citizens and their lives constitute the polis. From this perspective, the rationalist assumption that theoretical life is, unlike practical life, more or less apart from the concrete context and everyday life may be fallible, as far as the ancient Greek context is concerned. Rather, theoretical life is fully fulfilled only through participating in the activities of the polis.

The rationalists’ understanding of the forms of life, in the end, results in a false understanding of the notion of practice. Surely, praxis in Greek also linked with two distinctive ways of life, that is, practical life that refers to the life which is devoted to right living through the pursuit of the human good and theoretical life that refers to the life which is devoted to theory and contemplation. However, we should not think that ‘practice’ is only linked with ‘practical life’, whereas ‘theory’ is only connected with
‘theoretical life’, as rational liberals often assume. Their views of practice may be too narrow in that their uses of practice are only restricted to the practical life and its related activities. What is more, their views are mistaken in that they assume the theory/practice dichotomy and thus lack any dynamic character. It seems to me that theoretical life and practical life, and theory and practice, are neither separable nor distinct. Rather, for the purpose of this thesis, I might say that the two ways of life may be outcomes of two different practices, and theory and practice also may be seen as two different practices, which come to be fully understood through engaging in the relevant activities and communities.

What I have outlined so far can be summarised as follows. The view that the meaning of practice can only be determined by clarifying how it relates to theory would have made little sense, as far as the Greek notion of praxis is concerned. The reasons are: firstly, praxis should be understood in relation to poiesis, rather than theoria. Secondly, praxis should be fully understood in terms of the polis that provides the context of ancient Greece, rather than without considering any context. Lastly, praxis can be more fully understood in the light of ways of life at that time. Accordingly, the rationalistic view of the relation between theory and practice that takes for granted the theory/practice dichotomy and the priority of theory over practice is also not a proper understanding of the conception of practice. This, eventually, will lead us to the assertion that the relation of theory to practice should be identified and developed by traditions of participation in the practice itself to which one belongs. In the next section, therefore, I shall turn to modern philosophers’ arguments on the relation between theory and practice.

C. Theory and Practice in Ryle and Wittgenstein

In the previous section, I tried to show that the conception of practice as separated from theory is not appropriate in the light of the meaning of the Greek term praxis. In this section, I shall show the absurdity of the theory/practice dichotomy through analysing ways of treating the conception in modern philosophers, notably Ryle and Wittgenstein.
1. Ryle’s Distinction between ‘Knowing That’ and ‘Knowing How’

A plausible reaction against the dualistic approach of rationalists regarding the conception of practice can be found in Ryle’s *The Concept of Mind* (1949). Particularly, in chapter 2 of this book, he tries to draw a distinction between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ and, furthermore, to assert the independence of practice. Before explaining that, it is worth noting that his distinction was intended to point out a special kind of ‘category mistake’ in our concept of mind, a mistake inherent in the ‘mind-body dualism’, or what Ryle calls ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’ (Ryle, 1949, pp. 16ff). The most typical ‘modern’ type of dualism can be found in Descartes. His dualism is associated with the idea that there are two worlds, i.e. the physical world and the mental world and, thus, the two realms are separated, i.e. mutually exclusive and exhaustive. For Descartes, the essential feature of human beings is mind and the essence of mind is consciousness. This line of thought has become one of the most widespread views of mind among educated people in the West and even among most contemporary philosophers who criticise ‘Cartesian dualism’, inasmuch as they tend to regard all mental concepts in terms of cognition (Kenny, 1989, pp. 1-2). For instance, Schon (1983) tried to avoid Cartesian dualism, but his ‘reflective practitioner’ thesis shows the continuing influence of Descartes’ legacy in that he addresses cognitive aspects of practice, such as ‘knowing-in-action’ and ‘reflecting-in-action’. For Schon, action or practice should be followed by ‘thinking’ or ‘reflection’, although he may deny that practice is an application of (prior) thinking.

Ryle, however, strongly rejects two mistaken assumptions used in support of dualism, viz., that ‘theorising is the primary activity of minds and that theorising is intrinsically private, silent or intentional operations’ (Ryle, 1949, p. 27). These assumptions lead inescapably to the wrong conclusion that the mental epithets indicate a separate occult place of operation apart from the practice itself, and, moreover, that intelligent practice is nothing but ‘a step-child of theory’ (ibid., p. 26).

Ryle also criticises the common tendency that is often found in the liberal tradition, in which ‘knowing’ is interpreted exclusively as a matter of ‘knowing that’, and ‘propositional knowledge’ is given a privileged status in the domain of knowledge.
According to Ryle, it is one thing to 'know that' something, and it is quite another to 'know how' to do something. To take his own example, the intelligence in medical practice involved in translating the prescriptions into practice('knowing how') is not identical with that involved in intellectually grasping the prescriptions('knowing that') such as knowledge of medical science(p. 49). Rather, his position seems to be that 'knowing that' is to be better defined in terms of 'knowing how' and in terms of manner or ways of dealing with what one knows. Not all forms of intelligent 'know how' presuppose that the person possesses the 'know that' of the relevant principles. For instance, good cooking came before relevant recipes and next we can formulate the principles of good cooking.

Hirst also seems to share Ryle's view. Hirst insists that 'rational action can, and in certain respects must, precede rational principles, the latter being the result of reflection on rational actions'. This, however, does not mean that 'principles, once formulated, are not useful in promoting rational action, or that the range of rational action cannot be extended by modifying the principles of such action in specific ways' (Hirst, 1983, p.10). What he really tries to reject is that 'an adequate account of rational action in general can be given simply in terms of principles determined prior to action and justified independently of such action' (p.11).

If we examine the 'logical behaviour' of mental concepts, Ryle argues, we inevitably reach the conclusion that 'theorising is one practice amongst others and is itself intelligently or stupidly conducted'(1949, p. 26). For him, the rationalists' major concepts, such as knowing that, understanding, theorising, etc., should be regarded as a part of 'knowing how'. This view of Ryle's seems to be grounded in two reasons: one is that 'knowing how' is logically prior to 'knowing that'. It means that rational action is not predetermined by rational principles or theory. From this point of view, practice is not 'the step-child of theory', but rather theory can be fully understood only in terms of practices in which practitioners engage. To put it another way, theory or theorising is itself 'a form of practice, which requires skill, competence and know-how of various kinds', but, on the contrary, a practice can never be reduced to theory9(Carr, 1995, p. 63). Indeed, this was an apparent fallacy of the rationalists and liberals in education. The other

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9In this sense, what counts as a practice is very important. A more extended conception of that can be
reason is associated with overcoming the weakness of the 'dualism' which is often entitled 'the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'. Indeed, for Ryle, 'Cartesian dualism' leads us into other mistaken dualisms such as 'knowing that and knowing how', 'theory and practice', 'knowing and doing', and so on. What is more, this dualism misleads us into 'the source of double-life theory'(Ryle, op. cit., p.18).

Let me turn now to think of what Ryle's distinction shows us. It is quite clear that he criticises the Cartesian dualism and the priority of theory over practice. Instead, he maintains that 'knowing how' cannot be reduced to 'knowing that'. Indeed, the greatest contribution of Ryle's theory may lie not only in revealing the importance of practical knowledge that is undermined by rationalists, but also in taking one step forward in terms of social practices through insisting on the priority and independence of 'knowing how' in relation to 'knowing that'. Certainly, 'knowing how' is at least as important as 'knowing that' in a flourishing life and social life. Perhaps, it would be more accurate to say that 'knowing how' is by and large more important than 'knowing that' in that 'knowing how' is rooted in the practical real world rather than in the abstract world and thus 'knowing how' is more relevant to everyday life, unless a flourishing life is not related to our everyday life. The emphasis on 'knowing how' leads us to draw attention to the 'social practices' thesis, because the significance of practical knowledge can be best revealed when one engages in social practices to which one or society belongs.

It is less clear, however, whether the priority of 'knowing how' can clearly overcome the theory/practice dichotomy and whether it is sufficient for the understanding of educational phenomena. It seems to me that there is possibility of a danger that leads to another type of dichotomy, or rather, the same dichotomy under a different name. Indeed, the subsequent debates between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' show this point in that these conceptions are often used in a very limited way in an educational context. We can find this tendency even in Ryle himself. In 'Teaching and Training' (1967), Ryle suggests that the focus of educational discourse should be shifted from 'teaching that' and 'learning that' towards 'teaching to' and 'learning to'; to put this another way, education should be more concerned with teaching and learning abilities,

found in Chapter 5.

\(^{10}\)See, J. R. Martin (1961;1970, chapter 8 and 10).
skills, competencies and practices rather than ‘teaching that’ and ‘learning that’. The plausibility of his argument relies upon the assumption that ‘teaching that’ takes the form of ‘telling’ or ‘informing’, and ‘learning that’ is identified with the ‘old notion of propositional cramming’ (Ryle, 1967, p.110). When we use ‘knowing how’ in this restricted way, we can hardly say that Ryle’s advocacy of ‘knowing how’ satisfactorily overcomes the theory/practice dichotomy, since this might lead to a ‘transformed’ dualism, that is, ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ are replaced by ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’.

What is more, seen in this way, Ryle’s ‘knowing how’ cannot be equated with the notion of a ‘social practice’ in the strict sense that I shall explore, at least as far as education is concerned. Many examples of ‘knowing how’ in a Rylean sense, for instance, how to lay bricks, how to throw balls, how to plant turnips, etc. are by no means social practices themselves at least in MacIntyre’s sense, although they constitute (part of) architecture, football and farming, respectively. In other words, a social practice is far more than a knowing how. On similar grounds, we should certainly say that ‘education as initiation into social practices’ involves much more than merely ‘knowing how’ or ‘learning (and/or teaching) to’ do something. To put this another way, the assertion that education should be understood in terms of social practices goes far beyond the claim that education should be addressing learning abilities, skills and competencies. I would conclude, therefore, that education can be fully understood in terms of social practices and, in this regard, knowing, whether ‘knowing how’ or ‘knowing that’, should be regarded as (part of) a ‘practice’.

2. Wittgenstein’s Language-games

Wittgenstein is similar to Ryle in that he rejects the rationalists’ series of mistaken assumptions: that mind and activity are separated from each other; that mind is a prerequisite for activities and, thus, that mind is superior to activities. For Wittgenstein, unlike the rationalists, ‘mind’ can not be seen as either an abstract or cognitive apparatus, or an inner or subjective consciousness, which is contrasted to ‘activity’, treated as behaviour which is related to individual intention. Rather, mind is
not separated from activity in that mind is ‘a collection of ways things stand and are
going that are expressed by bodily doings and sayings’ and words for mental phenomena,
such as ‘pain’, ‘doubt’, ‘thinking’, etc. are used ‘to articulate how things stand and are
going for someone’ (Schatzki, 1996, p. 23). From this perspective, mind should be
understood as part of a (social) activity which expresses activities and how things are, not
as an abstraction or inner consciousness. We conclude, thus, that activity is the
appearance of mind and mind is the expression of bodily activity, or more fully, mind is
not a feature of subjective consciousness, but rather activity which is socially formed by
‘participation in extant social practices’ (ibid., p. 87).

The correctness of the rationalists’ view that mind is prior, and thus superior, to
activity also relies entirely on the validity of their view of mind and activity. Thus this
may be meaningful if and only if the traditional view on mind is correct. According to the
above explanations, however, it is obviously wrong in terms of the relation between mind
and activity. For Wittgenstein, mind is a symptom (not a criterion) of social activities,
rather than an independent entity, and thus it can be fully understood by engaging in
social practices which Wittgenstein might call ‘language-games’. Hence, all activities,
theoretical or practical, result from ongoing social practices rather than being isolated
from social practices. In Cartesian doubt, for instance, we never know what his claim of
doubt means, without understanding its setting in customary practices. In this sense,
doubting that is regarded as a mental phenomenon may perhaps be not only part of
language-games but also be ‘constituted within and carried by social practices’ (ibid., p.
25).

In summary, Wittgenstein’s view of mind and action is something like this: that
mind as human activities which express how things are, should be seen as part of social
practices as well as of language-games. What we should bear in mind is that this view of
Wittgenstein’s certainly goes beyond Ryle’s theory in that he does not merely attack the
theory/practice dichotomy and the priority of theory over practice, but he argues this in
terms of a broader social context. In order to fully understand this, therefore, we need to
explore Wittgenstein’s language-game theory in relation to social practices at some
length.  

11 Wittgenstein’s language-game theory is well expressed in his later works such as Philosophical
For Wittgenstein, language-games go far beyond ‘naïve’ or ‘pure’ abstractive language-games which rely on the ‘grammatical’ aspects of the use of words (PI, s. 496; s. 558; s. 664). In a Wittgensteinian sense, there is an intimate link between language and social life. Language-games are fundamentally part of social activities which are ultimately anchored in forms of life. It is natural thus that a language-game cannot be called a pure abstractive language play, but rather a (part of) social activity or a social practice.

This may be explained as follows. For Wittgenstein, language-games are basically regarded as human activities, which are characterised as multiple rule-governed activities with family resemblances. These activities are fundamentally anchored in forms of life in general and surrounding circumstances in particular, to which one belongs, and thus the meaning of these activities is dependent on them. Forms of life include various human practices, such as playing games, theoretical and practical activities, and so on. To put it more exactly, various human activities are reflections of various human forms of life. The meaning of all kinds of human practices is ultimately interpreted in the light of forms of life which are a kind of presupposition that everybody who engages in human practices must accept. For, forms of life are something which are given and, thus, have to be accepted, not something which can be chosen or discarded at will. In this sense, ‘forms of life’ seem to be the one and only ground for any language-game if it exists, insofar as what people accept as a ‘ground’ or ‘justification’ lies in showing ‘how they think and live’ (PI, s. 325), since forms of life embodied in language-games provide the underlying reasons for our lives. Indeed, for Wittgenstein, without imagining a ‘form of life’, it is impossible ‘to imagine a language’ (PI, s. 19).

If a language-game is meaningful, therefore, it must be based on what he calls the ‘forms of life’, and the activities which are expressed in the language-games are fully

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\textit{Investigations, Blue and Brown Books, Zettel} and \textit{On Certainty} (Henceforth, PI, BB, Z and OC, respectively). However, it is necessary to note that I do not intend to spell out his language-game theory as a whole. His language-game theory is partly revealed in section B of Chapter 5, along with this subsection.

\textsuperscript{12}Wittgenstein says: ‘what has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - \textit{forms of life}’ (PI, s. 226).

\textsuperscript{13}In a similar vein, we can speak of what Kuhn calls a ‘paradigm’. Forms of life and paradigms have in common that they are frameworks for interpretations which we must participate in if we are to have adequate understanding. Forms of life are much broader than ‘paradigms’ in that ‘forms of life’ are not confined to particular fields, whereas a ‘paradigm’ is in general confined to the academic and theoretical world. (See Kuhn, 1974).
understood when we see them in terms of ‘forms of life’, since forms of life offer the minimum rule or ground for the game, the ground on which the game is possible and which provides the ‘agreement in judgment’, which is essential for engagement in the same language-game. He says: ‘So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?’ - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. This is not agreement in opinions but in forms of life’(PI, s. 241. italics in original). If certain language-games are meaningful, above all, they require people to be initiated into the forms of life which constitute the background of the language-games. Hence, to say that someone is engaging in the language-games presupposes that someone is initiated into the forms of life which are embedded in the language-games. And forms of life are articulated and developed within their own societies and traditions.

From this point of view, a language-game is a social practice, not just talking or theoretical activity. He says: ‘Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training... the children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in this way to the words of others’ (PI, s. 5-6. italics in original). For Wittgenstein, a language-game is primarily not a linguistic utterance or statement, but a social practice that relates to bringing about some actions and doings through engaging in the activity. Hence, language-games are never conceivable apart from traditions of social activities in which people engage. For Wittgenstein, therefore, human activities on the one hand and understanding of language on the other are ‘bound together within social practices’(Schatzki, 1996, p.25). That is to say, the performance of certain human activities presupposes practices which constitute the background of understanding (of language). Hence, they are bound together ‘by virtue of participating in these presupposed practices’(ibid.). Wittgenstein’s understanding of language-game theory is much closer to MacIntyre’s account of a social practice which I shall deal with in the next Chapter, beyond Ryle’s solution of the dichotomy between theory and practice.

I have so far argued that, in a Wittgensteinian sense, all language-games are social practices, beyond simply a literal sense of language. The overall picture of this is more or less clear. It is not clear, however, whether Wittgenstein’s intention is to show that language-games are necessary social practices or to explain social practices as a whole
through the idea of a language-game, and whether all social practices are language-
games, or if not all, which social practices are constituted by uses of language. The
former issue may be a key for the understanding of Wittgenstein's overall picture of
language-game theory and the latter issue might be a stepping stone for discussing
educational phenomena. Nevertheless, these issues may be related to each other.
Wittgenstein's overall position is something like this: all language-games are inevitably
reflections of social practices in a broad sense; however, we should not conclude, from
this, that all social practices can be reduced to a language-game or that all social practices
can be expressed in language(ibid., p.13). Perhaps, theoretical practices and/or second-
order practices are mainly constituted by uses of language, whereas at least some basic
practices including affective and conative domains of human practices might not be
constituted by uses of language. For instance, Bourdieu's habitus that emphasises
preconscious disposition may not completely be expressed by language. Hence, we may
conclude that, although language is one of the most powerful instruments for transmitting
social practices, it cannot express all social practices and, thus, it cannot be equated with
social practices nor comprise all aspects of human practices.

D. Theory and Practice in an Educational Context

In the previous section, I mentioned that the dichotomy between theory and
practice in an educational context cannot be plausible. However, the dichotomy between
theory and practice in an educational context has been widespread, although it has been
shown to be more complicated. We can easily identify it in the O'Connor-Hirst debate
on the nature of educational theory, or in educational practice. Hence, in this section, I
shall argue the inappropriateness of the dualism in the educational context in terms of the
nature of education or educational theory, and in terms of the teacher's role.

With respect to the nature of education, many philosophers of education tend to
emphasise one or other side of either the practical nature or theoretical nature of
education. A typical case is to be found in the O'Connor-Hirst debate.14 For O'Connor,

14See the following writings regarding their debates: D. J. O'Connor(1957), An Introduction to the
and Scope of Educational Theory (1)'; P.H. Hirst (1973), 'The Nature and Scope of Educational Theory
in short, theory in the educational context is at best no more than 'a courtesy title'. He concludes:

We can summarize this discussion by saying that the word ‘theory’ as it is used in educational contexts is generally a courtesy title. It is justified only where we are applying well-established experimental findings in psychology or sociology to the practice of education. And even here we should be aware that the conjectural gap between our theories and the facts on which they rest is sufficiently wide to make our logical consciences uneasy. We can hope that the future development of the social sciences will narrow this gap and this hope gives an incentive for developing these sciences(1957, p. 110).

This conclusion is a natural result following his account of ‘theory’. According to him, theory can be used in two ways. Firstly, ‘theory’, as contrasted with ‘practice’, refers to ‘a set or system of rules or a collection of precepts which guide or control action of various kinds... Educational theory would then consist of the those parts of psychology... which directly guide or concern the work of the teacher'(p. 75). Secondly, ‘theory’ is used as it occurs in the natural sciences where it refers to a single hypothesis or a logically interconnected set of hypotheses that have been confirmed by observation. It provides us with ‘standards by which can assess the value and use of any claimant to the title of ‘theory'”(p.76). For O'Connor, educational theory cannot justly be called educational theory according to the standard meaning of theory. O'Connor’s intention here was not to close the gap between theory and practice. Rather, his intention was to show the absurdity of the claim that educational theory should have any significant practical implications on the one hand and, on the other, to confine the nature of educational theory to the production of ‘empirically’ or ‘factually’ established findings, since in a strict sense, educational theory cannot be rightly called ‘theory’(Carr, p. 31).

Hirst’s view, by contrast, seems to run in the following way: educational theory fundamentally belongs to practical theory, which is ‘concerned with formulating and justifying principles of action for a range of practical activities’(1983, p.3). Education,
of course, includes scientific predictions and explanations, but it is not limited to them but goes far beyond them. That is, besides many kinds of knowledge, education includes beliefs including metaphysical, moral and religious and value judgements. What is more, education is, in more fundamental aspects, mainly concerned with making practical judgements in answer to practical questions. In this sense, it is much safer to say that educational theory is practical in its nature. Moore seems to go along with Hirst in claiming that educational theory is primarily a 'practical theory', although in some cases educational theory could not be used to explain what is happening in a lesson (1974, p.7).

In summary, Hirst and O’Connor agree that scientific theory and practical theory are quite different in nature and, thus, it is important to decide what the nature of educational theory is. Their answers, however, are quite different. That is, Hirst insists that educational theory in its fundamental aspect is practical, whereas O’Connor claims that educational theory should be scientific. Hirst’s conception of educational theory seems to be more adequate than O’Connor’s in claiming that educational theory should be understood in terms of educational practice. As far as his earlier writings are concerned, however, he did not see educational theory as a social practice and, consequently, failed to close the gap between theory and practice in education.

On the other hand, unlike O’Connor and Hirst in his earlier writings, Langford understands education as a practical activity. He writes: ‘education is activity, like politics, manufacturing or farming, which aims at practical results. A practical activity may be contrasted with a theoretical activity which is concerned to discover how things are; physics, etc.’ (1968, p.16). For Langford, education is fundamentally a practical activity, the purpose of which is to bring about practical results in some desirable ways rather than theoretical activity which aims at describing how things are. Certainly, Langford’s educational theory opens the possibility of the interpretation of education theory in terms of social practices in that he sees education as fundamentally linked with bringing about practical results or practices. However, as far as his earlier writings are concerned, he still did not explicitly see educational theory as a social practice in a strict sense, because he often thought that education is no more than a practical activity and thus often overlooked the fact that education involves a theoretical activity. Langford’s
view leads us to consider ‘educational theory’ in terms of social practices. When we see ‘education as initiation into social practices’, all activities, whether theory (theoretical) or practice (practical), should be seen as outcomes of social practices in which people engage. From this point of view, as Kemmis rightly points out, ‘theory is not merely words, and practice is not simply action in the educational context. They are mutually constitutive aspects of one another’ (Kemmis, 1995, p.15). They are linked through social practices in which someone engages. Hence, when we see the conception of ‘practice’ as being in opposition to theory in an educational context, we overlook many ‘aspects of educational practice which are not constrained by criteria of immediacy, particularity, context-dependency and the like’ (Carr, 1995, p.62).

Let me turn now to the dichotomy between theory and practice in relation to the teacher’s role. Many teachers often claim that educational theory is not relevant to their practice, that is, educational theory does not give useful guidance in teaching practice. Indeed, from the practitioners’ point of view, educational theory might not be satisfactory. It is natural in a sense, therefore, that they demand practical theory that is directly related to practice. This view, however, seems to see the relation of theory to practice in too simple a way. They tend to define practice too narrowly. Neither theorising education without engaging in any practical activities nor practising education without engaging in any kind of theorising is possible and desirable (Carr, 1995, pp. 52-3). In general, practitioners tend to overlook the fact that theoretical activities as well as practical activities are social practices, but different kinds of social practices which are developed within social contexts and within existing and ongoing traditions in which each social practice is undertaken.

For me, as I roughly pointed out above, practitioners’ views of educational theory are also not grounded in strong foundations nor give a fuller explanation of the relationship of theory to practice, although they address the importance of practice. The reasons are: firstly, they fail in integrating relationship between theory and practice, since their explanation is located in one side or the other side. Secondly, they seem to be neglecting the dynamics of the relationship between theory and practice. Namely, they

\[15\] However, I do not intend to explore the relation of educational theory to educational practice in terms of social practices, because my aim here is to show the implausibility of the dichotomy between theory and practice in an educational context. Regarding debates on educational theory in terms of social practices,
seem to overlook the mutual influence between educational theory, practitioners and social contexts. These dynamics can never be shown without recognising that theory is a part of social practices. Lastly, all practices may have their conceptual frameworks. To put it another way, practices are 'theory-laden', not 'opposed to theory'; since 'educational practice is always guided by some theory about the ethical goods internal to that practice, it cannot be made intelligible in terms of an opposition to theory. But at the same time, it becomes equally clear why this does not mean that educational practice can be sufficiently characterized as a theory-guided pursuit' (Carr, 1995, p. 72). In short, educational practice 'can only be made intelligible as a form of praxis guided by ethical criteria immanent in educational practice itself', criteria which serve the distinctions between educational practices and non-educational practices, and between good practices and bad practices (ibid. p. 73).

We should not think, therefore, that closing the gap between theory and practice is simply a matter of finding ways of improving the practical effectiveness of particular theory, that is, that theory has to be completed before it can be effectively applied. Rather, closing the gap is a matter of improving the theories employed by practitioners to make sense of their practices. We can conclude, therefore, that matters of the gap between theory and practice in education can be solved when we see education or educational theory in terms of social practices in which practitioners are engaged. Carr points it out clearly:

There are no 'educational phenomena' apart from the practice of those engaged in educational activities, no 'educational problems' apart from those arising from these practices and no 'educational theories' apart from those that structure and guide these practices. The only task which 'educational theory' can legitimately pursue, then, is to develop theories of educational practice that are intrinsically related to practitioners' own accounts of what they are doing, that will improve the quality of their involvement in these practices and thereby allow them to practise better (p. 37).

As shown in the above passage, although Carr's position is, to some extent, a narrow and extreme one in claiming that educational phenomena and theories can only come out

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see Chapter 8.
from practitioners' practices\textsuperscript{16}, he clearly shows us that the relation between theory and practice can be properly understood in terms of a social practice, and, furthermore, it is possible to close the gap between them, by seeing the relation in this way.

What I have tried to show so far is that theory and practice cannot, and should not, be separated at least in an educational context. Nevertheless, we can often see the conventional gap between theory and practice in every domain, particularly in educational contexts. Why does this happen? The main reason I have pointed out lies in the fact that educators do not see education as social practices, although they engage in educational activities. That is, they do not recognise that 'seeing education as social practices' and 'engaging in educational activities' are not different. Hence, 'theorising, too, is a public process and a social practice. Who participates in this public process, this social practice, is crucial not only in terms of whose interests are served by educational theorizing, but also in terms of what the substance of educational theorizing will be- what educational theorizing will be about' (Kemmis, 1995, p.17). If the problem of the gap between theory and practice in educational contexts can be solved in terms of social practices, the matter of how we define 'social practices' would be a crucial key in education. It is, therefore, natural to ask what 'social practices' mean.

\textsuperscript{16}In fact, educational phenomena and theories can occur or be produced without practitioners' practices. My assertion is rather that they are \textit{best understood} in terms of social practices.
Chapter 5. Conceptions of Social Practices

In the previous Chapter, I pointed out the implausibility of a common view of 'practice', which assumes a sharp distinction between theory and practice, in terms of the Greek notion of praxis, modern philosophers' writings and an educational context. The upshot of this may be thus: theory and practice should be integrated in terms of social practices. From the perspective of social practices, theory and practice cannot be separated, since they both belong to the sphere of a practice, but they are different in that they are 'different kinds' of practice. We can say, therefore, that the common view of practice errs in that instead of treating theory and practice as different kinds of practice it places them in different domains.

This leads us to explore a positive account of a (social) practice, as shown partly in the previous Chapter. However, the question of what exactly counts as 'a (social) practice' is very difficult to answer, because the conception of a (social) practice is differently used by various writers in the field of philosophy and sociology. For instance, a (social) practice is often equated with Wittgenstein's 'the inherited background' or 'language-game', Ryle's 'knowing how'(and 'knowing that'), Schon's 'tacit knowledge', Bourdieu's 'habitus', and so on\footnote{I already mentioned these in the previous Chapter. For other examples, see S. Turner(1994). pp. 1-3.}. These various forms of idea in the field of philosophy and sociology certainly show us, at least to some degree, the characteristics of a social practice, although it is in dispute that they can precisely be equated. What is more, recently some philosophers of education have tried to understand educational phenomena in terms of social practices. For instance, Hirst's 'education as initiation into social practices' and Langford's 'teaching as a social practice', Walsh's(1993) 'education as a philosophical practice' and so on, are cases. Hence, in order to fully and properly understand what 'education as initiation into social practices' means, it is necessary to properly understand the conception of 'social practices'.

In this Chapter, therefore, I shall establish my conception of social practices through discussing some influential conceptions of 'social practices'. In section A, I shall introduce MacIntyre's conception of 'a practice', since his conception of 'a practice'
provides the overall structure of social practices which I shall make explicit. In section B, I shall emphasise three dimensions of a social practice through analysing MacIntyre’s conception of a practice and using other writers’ arguments. In section C, I shall articulate MacIntyre’s conception of a social practice and establish my conception of social practices through discussing Miller’s distinction between ‘self-contained’ and ‘purposive’ practices, and Schatzki’s distinction between ‘dispersed’ and ‘integrative’ practices.

A. MacIntyre’s Conception of a Social Practice

1. Preliminary Remarks

MacIntyre, unlike other authors, introduces the idea of a (social) practice for explaining his virtue or moral theory, not vice versa. His argument for moral theory in general and virtue theory in particular which is based on practices, is linked to his reaction against sceptical modern ‘individual liberalism’ that is mainly derived from the Enlightenment project. Indeed, in After Virtue (1984, Henceforth, AV), he begins with a ‘disquieting suggestion’:

The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is that so much of it is used to express disagreements; and the most striking feature of the debates in which these disagreements are expressed is their interminable character (AV, p. 6).

He, as we can see from the passage quoted above, expresses deep discontent with modernity and, accordingly, with the liberalism which gave rise to it, in terms of a state of disorder, fragments and chaos of contemporary moral language. Why is he sceptical of liberalism?

His criticisms, according to Horton and Mendus (1994, p. 8), are threefold: ‘the liberal conception of the self, which implies that moral value is determined by individual choice or decision’; ‘liberalism’s denial of a telos for man, which results in its inability to differentiate satisfactorily between what we are and what we ought to be’; and

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‘liberalism’s disregard of social context, which results in its inability to acknowledge fully the role of what is ‘given’ in moral life’. For MacIntyre, the problems of liberalism in turn are summarised in two categories: one is that liberalism does not recognise the social context including history and tradition as the referential framework of the self, the other is that it does not acknowledge the telos which human beings ought to have.

Being faced with these problems, MacIntyre tries to offer a more satisfactory moral theory which might be called ‘a reconstructed version of Aristotle’ in a broad sense. His moral theory relies heavily on Aristotle’s ethics on the one hand and he tries to overcome Aristotle’s limits on the other. To put it more fully, MacIntyre accepts the idea of Aristotle’s human telos; however, his understanding is grounded in the ‘narrative unity of a human life’ instead of ‘metaphysical biology’ which Aristotle relies on but which is now dubious. MacIntyre also adopts what Dunne might call ‘the rough ground’(Dunne, 1993, p. 377), which refers to the social, cultural contexts which play the constitutive role for morality; however, he tries to find the idea of a community in morality without presupposing utopian social settings. That is, MacIntyre deploys the notion of a ‘practice’ and that of a ‘tradition’ instead of the polis which Aristotle’s tradition rests on. It is thus natural to explore ‘tradition’ together with ‘narrative’ and ‘practice’ which lie at the heart of his moral theory(Mulhall and Swift, 1992, p. 82).

With respect to the narrative unity of human life, MacIntyre rejects the view that a person should, as liberals claim, be simply seen as a chooser and decider, since human actions cannot be fully intelligible without the ‘history of the agent’s life and of settings

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18 The issue of whether social practices-based education overcomes the weakness of liberal education will be dealt with more fully in Chapter 8.

19 His telos and social/historical contexts are also found in Aquinas in a similar way. For Aquinas, like Aristotle, the good life for humans is always connected to his notion of eudaimonia which synthesises Aristotle’s teleology of natural goods with Augustine’s metaphysics of the transcendent Good. Hence, for him, there is still a teleological element, although his human goal is slightly different from Aristotle’s one. On the other hand, the human goal also should be understood in the light of social contexts which we might call the ‘civitas Dei’. Aquinas lived in a society which might be described as containing pluralism of thought on the one hand and attempting to reconcile rival versions of thought on the other. Therefore, his thought also should be understood as a product of the social context in which he lived. Indeed, according to MacIntyre, the superiority of Thomism consists in ‘its ability to construct a rational narrative within which the advances and crises of other traditions can be described and transcended’(J. Haldane, 1994, p. 102). In this sense, it might more accurately be called ‘Aristotelianism-cum-Thomism’. However, we must admit that there are big gaps between them. For more details of these, see WJWR, particularly pp.103ff.

20 Regarding this, MacIntyre says: ‘although this account of virtues is teleological, it does not require the identification of any teleology in nature, and hence it does not require any allegiance to Aristotle’s
in which it occurs. It rather is understood that ‘action has a basically historical character, our lives are enacted narratives in which we are both characters and authors; a person is a character abstracted from a history’ (Mulhall and Swift, 1992, p.87). His narrative understanding of the self ‘implies that answers to questions of what we ought to do involve not merely choosing what to do as individuals, but also, and essentially, discovering who we are in relation to others’ (Horton and Mendus, 1994, p. 9). In this respect, we are not entirely autonomous. We are, sometimes, influenced by others and by our surroundings. Nevertheless, what seems to be obvious is that the narrative of our lives provides us with a certain teleological character. The narrative unity of human life provides the framework within which we make rational choices concerning the conflicting demands of different practices and, further, it directs us towards the good life for human beings. In short, MacIntyre attempts to restore ‘teleological concepts to our culture via the narrative features of human life’ (MCMYLO, 1994, p.69). His narrative conception of human life and community ‘focuses on the quest of defining the good life itself’ (ibid, p.73) and it is determined by a particular social context (p.86).

Secondly, virtues should be understood in terms of various forms of human activities that MacIntyre calls ‘practices’. That is, it is difficult to see virtue as having a unitary meaning or to see its meaning as being always fixed and determined (AV, p.194). For MacIntyre, practices play a central role in his virtue and moral theory, because morality is fundamentally seen as ‘practice-based’ activity. Acting morally, like playing chess well, is ‘not a matter of individual preference or decision’. Rather, it is related to the actualisation of virtues and the criteria for it are basically determined by the practice itself in which we are engaged. For him, morality is ‘construed primarily in terms of a life embodying the virtues; and our understanding of what the virtues are, and why they are virtues, is crucially dependent on coming to recognise their place in the practices’ which are situated in a wider context (Horton and Mendus, op.cit., pp.10-11).

Lastly, MacIntyre’s moral theory tends to stress the role of tradition. To understand the concept of a tradition more fully, it is necessary to grasp its relation to practices and the narrative order of a human life. A practice provides the contexts of


21Regarding this, Dunne explains it using two metaphors: ‘navigating the sea’ and ‘the rough ground’. We, like sailors, must navigate our passage in the sea on the one hand and we also must start from, and return
human action 'by locating the action with reference to the person’s own history' and 'by reference to the actor’s role in the history of settings'(McMylor, p.154). The history of narratives shows us how best to live, that is, it provides stories of the pursuit of the good. Hence, a practice of morality cannot be imagined in isolation from its history and tradition. In this respect, we might say that his conception of tradition is an extended form of the narrative of an individual’s life in respect of both social and historical context. In short, the traditions of our lives are embedded in the larger narrative of a historically and socially extended argument about the goods which constitute those traditions(AV, p. 222).

What I have explained so far is that MacIntyre’s moral or virtue theory can be understood in terms of tripartite elements: of narrative unity of human life, practices and traditions. Given this, let us explore his conception of a practice. Before doing this, it might be helpful to note some remarks. Firstly, regarding MacIntyre’s overall framework, as I pointed out above, it should be borne in mind that his conception of practices tends to be connected with virtues and, at the same time, virtues can be effectively possessed and exercised in the course of social practices, although he denies that they are always so(AV, p. 187). This connection becomes a matter of definition, as virtue is associated with the realisation of goods internal to practices: ‘A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods’(AV, p.191). Hence, in order to understand the virtues we must examine the ways in which these qualities are essential to achieve the goods that are internal to a range of such practices. More specifically speaking, they are related in the following ways: on the one hand, virtues not only keep practices from the corrupting power of institutions, but also ‘sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices’, by furnishing us with knowledge of the good and sustaining us in the relevant quest for the good(AV, p.219) and, on the other, practices give the meaning of virtues in two respects: ‘we cannot know what it means in concrete terms to possess a virtue unless we are familiar with the range of practices within which that virtue is displayed’; and ‘we cannot understand why justice, say, is a virtue unless we grasp its role in sustaining such

to, the rough ground on the other(Dunne, 1993, p. 377).
Secondly, with regard to MacIntyre's definition, it is worth noting two points. The first point I want to point out is, as MacIntyre himself says, that he uses the term 'practice' in 'a specifically defined way' which is not always consistent with ordinary usages (p. 187). We can find this in Ryle's case, as I mentioned. Ryle might say that a 'knowing how' is a practice, but it is not necessarily so in MacIntyre's sense. 'How to lay a brick', for example, may be a practice in Ryle's sense, but not a practice in MacIntyre's sense. From this point of view, we may say that MacIntyre's conception of a practice is more strictly defined than an ordinary conception of it. The second point that I want to note is that MacIntyre's conception of 'a practice' can be interchangeably used with 'a social practice' in that he always recognises that a practice is social by nature and thus it cannot be properly and fully understood without relying on a social context, although he did not directly mention or define the conception of 'a social practice'. Given the place of a social practice within MacIntyre's framework, let us look in the next sub-section at his conception of a social practice.

2. MacIntyre's Criteria of a Social Practice

The conception of a 'social practice' may be less clear than we often think. Although many authors mention the term, they do not give a fuller explanation of it. However, MacIntyre provides us with a powerful inspiration as to what is meant by a 'practice'. In order to understand what social practices are, therefore, the best way might be to start with his definition. Indeed, MacIntyre offers more or less a good framework for the concept of a 'practice'. He illustrates:

[By a 'practice' I... mean] any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended (AV, p. 187).
He extends his definition. He goes on to say:

A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the practice. Practices of course... have a history: games, sciences and arts all have histories. Thus the standards are not themselves immune from criticism, but nonetheless we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the best standards realized so far(ibid., p. 190).

According to MacIntyre, tic-tac-toe is not a practice, nor is throwing a football with skill, whereas the game of football and playing chess are practices. Bricklaying is not a practice but architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice, but farming is. Arts, sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the making and sustaining of family are included in practices. What, then, are the criteria that make a distinction between a practice and non-practice?

As indicated in above passages, following MacIntyre, there are, roughly speaking, five criteria of a (social) ‘practice’: ‘a coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity’, ‘the achievement of internal goods’, ‘standards of excellence’, ‘obedience to rules’ and ‘the development or progression of form of activity’. These five conditions must be met if we can legitimately call something a (social) practice in a MacIntyrean sense. To put this another way, it should satisfy the following questions: 1) Is it a coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity? 2) Does it promote the achievement of internal goods? 3) Are there standards of excellence inherent in the activity of it? 4) Are there rules to which one is obedient? 5) Does it improve or progress through its traditions?

To begin with, a (social) practice is, he says, ‘a coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity’. This condition may involve at least three elements: a complex human activity, a coherent human activity and a socially established cooperative human activity. This implies that not all human activities are practices, although a practice is defined as a human activity. Let me pursue this in more detail.
If some human activities are to be practices, the activities should satisfy at least the following three conditions. Firstly, the activities should not be too simple, such as tic-tac-toe, bricklaying, kicking a ball, and so on. These examples are not practices, since these are not complicated skills. Rather, practices are more or less ‘complicated’ ones, such as playing chess, architecture, playing football as a game and so on, although there are still differences of degree. Secondly, complexity of an activity alone does not always guarantee that this activity deserves to be called a practice. In order to satisfy the concept of a practice, a human activity should have not merely a complex form but also ‘coherence’ within it. For instance, think of the situation in which there are two people and one ball. If whichever person is closest to the ball kicks it randomly in any direction, not backwards and forwards from one to another, this could be incoherent and thus cannot be properly called a practice. Furthermore, an activity shared in by more than one person cannot be cooperative without to some degree being coherent. Lastly, if some activity is to be a practice, the activity must be a ‘socially established cooperative human activity’. That is to say, the concept of a practice is ‘social’ in character, meaning that it has a public nature. In this respect, as I noted earlier, a practice should be equated with a social practice, because there are no practices without ‘social’ character. On this ground, henceforth, I prefer to use a ‘social practice’ rather than a ‘practice’. Indeed, all MacIntyre’s examples, such as football, farming, architecture, etc., are socially established activities and are also sustained and developed within a society and its traditions. These examples, therefore, cannot be fully understood in isolation from the social contexts in which they occur.

Secondly, with respect to the achievement of internal goods, a social practice is necessary to explain MacIntyre’s sense of ‘internal goods’. It presupposes that there is a distinction between goods internal to social practices and goods external to social practices. Goods internal to a practice are distinguished from those external to it by two facts: one is that we ‘can only specify them’ in terms of the specific kind of activity; the other is that they ‘can only be identified and recognized by the experience of participating in

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22 Although it is far from clear what MacIntyre means by ‘coherence’, we may say that the category of coherence/incoherence would not apply to a single person kicking a ball and, further, coherence does not really have any status as an independent criterion.

23 More exactly speaking, my most favorite term is the plural expression ‘social practices’. For the rationale for this, see section C of this Chapter.
the practice in question’ (AV, pp.188-9). In contrast, ‘external goods’ are only ‘contingently’ related to practices, and also, ‘in principle’, could be obtained independently of practices (Mason, 1996, p.192). For instance, the good that consists in playing chess well is an internal good, since it cannot be obtained in any other way but only by playing chess. By contrast, obtaining the money, status and prestige through becoming a champion chess player is an external good, because money can be got without engaging in the practice of chess. It is, however, not simple in practice, because we can think of the case in which the aim is to achieve the prestige, status, and money by ‘participating well in’ a genuine social practice like chess, not by ‘cheating’ at chess or by participating in some ‘other’ forms of activity. One obvious thing is, nevertheless, that money, status, prestige etc. are not intrinsically related to playing chess, although it is possible to achieve such things by participating appropriately in that social practice.

Thirdly, related to the internal goods, if something is a social practice, it would fit ‘standards of excellence’. In fact, the concept of good itself presupposes that it should be achieved by attempting to excel, i.e. reaching or exceeding existing standards of excellence, as far as human activities are concerned. Such internal goods can only be experienced if the learner is willing to accept the authority of the standards of the subject and their own inadequate performance as judged against them. The standards, as those of practices, are not immune from criticism and may undergo change over time. It might be different in accordance with societies and traditions.

Furthermore, there are differences in the standards of excellence which a practice should achieve within different social practices. In some practices, the standards of excellence will be relatively straightforward, whereas the standards in other practices are less obvious. For instance, in the practice of chess, it would seem that there would be relatively less controversy about the standards of excellence to be applied. Teaching is a social practice that relates to many other concerns of life in various ways; however, the practice of teaching may be open to dispute regarding its standards of excellence, since the issue of what kind of teaching can be regarded as good teaching is controversial according to societies and their traditions. Nevertheless, it is clear that teaching does involve such standards, even though there are difficulties and controversies in identifying the standards (Pearson, 1989, p. 91).
Fourthly, with respect to obedience to rules, all practices are necessarily rule-governed activities. To say that an activity is rule-governed or that an activity has rules which one should obey can be understood in two possible ways according to two types of rule. One is what Pearson calls 'basic' rules such that without keeping the rules, it is impossible to do the activity. This rule is the rule which everybody who is engaging in the activity must observe. The other is what Pearson labels 'strategic' rules, relating to good and bad ways to perform an activity. According to him, in playing chess, there are two sorts of mistakes: basic mistakes and strategic mistakes. A basic mistake, such as moving the knight straight ahead, may be the case that 'someone violates one of the explicit rules of chess'. If someone refuses to make corrections to basic mistakes, we would conclude that 'the person is not playing chess'. When someone makes strategic mistakes in chess, it would not be said that he or she is playing some other game in that he or she does not violate the explicit rules. But he or she may be rightly accused of failing to take the game seriously, since strategic mistakes 'are likely to lessen the chances of success in the game'(p. 92). So, some rules are constitutive of the activity itself, others are constitutive of success in the activity. To engage in the activity seriously, one must be willing to see the rules as correctives to one's moves when performing the activity. To see rules as correctives to what one does is to put oneself in the position of being obedient to the rules of the activity.

This distinction implies that different social practices have different kinds of obedience to rules. For instance, the standards and rules of playing chess might be different from those of painting and of teaching, etc. Roughly speaking, rules of painting and teaching might be more flexible and thus more difficult to specify than those of playing chess. Nevertheless, it is more or less obvious that teaching and painting are rule-following activities.

Lastly, a major character of social practices might lie in the progression of practices themselves. Social practices are necessarily required to be 'systematically extended', although Maclntyre uses this phrase of human powers and concepts. This includes the following elements: the improvement of a 'practice itself'; the improvement of the 'understanding' of the practice by its practitioners; and thirdly, the improvement

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24 For discussion of teaching as a rule following activity, see Chapter 7.
of the ‘situation’ in which practices take place (Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p. 165). We would argue that there might be deteriorating practices as well as improving ones. This may be right, because practices are not always developing or improving, as can be identified in human history. However, at least in a MacIntyre’s sense, practices are intended to progress so that, unless they improve, they have little meaning.

Social practices are developed through ongoing traditions in which someone engages. To say that social practices are improving or progressing implies the development of the criteria of a ‘practice’ such as ‘coherent and complex form of activities’, ‘internal goods’, ‘standards of excellence’ and ‘obedience to rules’25. Let us take MacIntyre’s own example, portrait painting. According to him, there are at least two different kinds of good internal to the painting of human faces and bodies. One is ‘the excellence of the products, both the excellence in performance by the painters and that of each portrait itself. This excellence… has to be understood historically. The sequences of the development find their point and purpose in a progress towards and beyond a variety of types and modes of excellence… It is in participation in the attempts to sustain progress and to respond creatively to problems that the second kind of good internal to the practices of portrait painting is to be found. For what the artist discovers within the pursuit of excellence in portrait painting - and what is true of portrait painting is true of the practice of the fine arts in general- is the good of a certain kind of life… but it is the painter’s living out of a greater or less part of his or her life as a painter that is the second kind of good internal to painting. And judgement on these goods requires at the very least the kind of competence that is only to be acquired either as a painter or as someone willing to learn systematically what the portrait painter has to teach’ (A V, pp.189-190). As we can see in this example, a social practice is more or less elaborated and improved through ongoing traditions of the social practice in which they engage.

The upshot of what I have tried to explain so far seems to be affirming MacIntyre’s conception of a social practice. Some disputes, however, still remain. First of all, there is still unclarity in the distinction between practice and non-practice. The unclarity of this distinction comes mainly from the fact that MacIntyre does not consider matters of degree within social practices. There are some differences in terms of degree

25 For discussion of these criteria in an educational context, see section A of Chapter 7.
both within social practices and within non-practices. It is the case that bricklaying would be harder to exclude from the class of social practices than tic-tac-toe, if there is a possibility at all of including them in the class of social practices. The relation between goods internal to a social practice and goods external to it also seems to be problematic. ‘Goods can be external to a social practice in more than one way’. Some goods, like the satisfaction of hunger, thirst or sexual desire, may not belong to a particular social practice, because one can achieve them without engaging in any of the coherent, complex, socially extended cooperative forms of activity26. ‘Other goods are external to one social practice while internal to another’ (Stout, 1988, p. 272). Genetically modified foods, for example, may be goods internal to a food industry, but may be external to, or conflict with, the practice of environmental conservation.

What is more, MacIntyre does not seem to recognise that modes of social practice could vary within the same social practice. In other words, even within the same social practice, for instance, what we call ‘farming’, there might be different activities according to cultures and societies. Amish farming, for instance, is quite different from modern American farming in various aspects such as concept of farming, manner, technique etc., although we can call ‘farming’ a social practice. Take another example of a voting practice. In communist countries the people participate in voting activity. Their voting is, however, quite different from that of western countries. In order to understand the meaning of an activity, therefore, it is necessary to understand the backgrounds against which that activity is performed.

Secondly, even if we accept his definition, it is not clear how we can distinguish one practice from other practices. This distinction is very important at least in an educational context. For instance, in what aspect is teaching different from medicine, politics, and so on, on the one hand and different from indoctrination, conditioning, training, preaching and so on, on the other? Certainly, MacIntyre did not give the answer to that. There are many possible ways: internal goods that a particular social practice pursues, rules that people who engage in it should obey, its standards of excellence, the overall purpose of a social practice, and so on. If we define education as ‘initiation into

26 Although hunger, thirst, or sexual desire can be satisfied without engagement in social practices, this is not normal in what we call civilised societies. We do not just drink and eat when we have meals. Ways of preparing food, serving it, and so on, may be seen as social practices with cultural variations. Satisfaction
Thirdly, are all practices always good? MacIntyre certainly recognised this critique: that some practices, for instance, torture and sado-masochistic sexual activities, are evil. He responds to that question: ‘there may be practices’ which simply ‘are evil’. But, he does not in fact believe that ‘either torture or sado-masochistic sexuality answer to the description of a practice which his account of the virtues employs’ (p. 200). (In this sense, MacIntyre would be reluctant to say that torture and sado-masochistic sexual activities are evil social practices, although we may often say that they are evil practices.)

Even if we do not think that some social practices are definitely evil, however, we can still appropriately ask the question ‘are all practices always good?’ For MacIntyre, the notion of ‘internal good’ is a crucial concept in his explanation of a social practice. However, it is not clear whether all internal goods are necessarily desirable. For instance, playing chess in certain society could be regarded as at best a way of spending time or even as a disgraceful or illegal act. The standards of value judgement in a social practice may be different according to social traditions. We can hardly say, thus, that all social practices are valuable or desirable, even though we recognise his modified and supplemented view that a social practice should be ‘enriched and supplemented by being connected with the notions of the good of a whole human life and of an ongoing tradition’ (AV, p. 275). On the other hand, we may say that chess would retain its internal goods, even if it is regarded as a waste of time. This means that not all internal goods necessarily entail that they are good or desirable. Borrowing Miller’s term, not all ‘self-contained’ practices guarantee shared or social goods. This may show a limit of internal goods in sustaining flourishing society. From this perspective, we may open up other arguments that the distinction between ‘intrinsic’ (internal) and ‘extrinsic’ (external) can be seen as not a matter of good or bad but a matter of practical choice, and not clear-cut but a matter of degree.

Lastly, in an educational context, we can ask what the place of a social practice is. On the one hand, education can be defined ‘initiation into social practices’. On the other hand, education is far more than a social practice, although this depends on how we of sexual desire may be surrounded by all sorts of social practices, such as dating, courtship, marriage, etc. Miller draws a distinction between ‘self-contained’ and ‘purposive’ practices. For the details of it, see section C of this Chapter.
understand the notion of a social practice. What is the difference between two claims, i.e. ‘a particular form of education is a social practice’ and ‘education as a whole can be reduced to a social practice’?

What is more, in order to reveal the educational meaning of a social practice fully, the following questions should be asked: what does ‘following a social practice’ mean and how should we do this in an educational context? What are the differences between so-called liberal education and social practices-based education in terms of the educational aims, curriculum construction, teachers’ attitude and teaching method, and so on? What kinds of a social practice should be transmitted in schools and universities? Is there any difference between schools and universities? (different social practices? or another part of the same practices?, or different level of the same practices?) Are there any priorities among social practices? If so, what are the criteria on which social practices are chosen? What is the status of theoretical knowledge compared with other social practices? Although I do not entirely agree with MacIntyre’s detailed account of a social practice, I do want to argue that education can best be understood in terms of social practices.

So far, I have examined a widely accepted concept of a practice that is defined by MacIntyre. As I pointed out above, although MacIntyre’s account of a social practice shows many characteristics of a social practice, the concept of a social practice still needs to be further elaborated. In the next section, I try to articulate it by considering three dimensions of a social practice.

B. Three Dimensions of Social Practices

In the previous section, I explored MacIntyre’s account of a social practice. His account of a social practice can be summarised as follows: ‘a coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity’, ‘the achievement of internal goods’, ‘standards of excellence’, ‘obedience to rules’ and ‘the development or progression of form of activity’. This definition seems to provide us with at least three dimensions of a social practice: action, society and tradition. Hence, in this section, I shall emphasise each dimension of a social practice.
1. Activity Dimension

In order to understand an activity dimension, it might be helpful to remind ourselves of MacIntyre’s definition: ‘any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity...’ This definition involves at least three qualities of human activity: a complex human activity, a coherent human activity and a socially established human activity. This clearly shows us the first dimension of a social practice, i.e. a ‘human activity’. What I want to address here is whether a practice is fundamentally defined as a ‘human activity’, rather than a ‘language’ or a ‘subject’. Why should a practice be defined in terms of ‘activity-words’?

In a similar vein, Wittgenstein sees uses of language as human activities. He states:

"Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but the end... it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game(OC, s. 204, italics in original); ...but the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is ungrounded way of acting(OC, s. 110, my emphasis )."

Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life(PI, s. 23, italics in original).

What this citation shows us is largely two things: we should see uses of language as activities or actions; and thus language-games should be understood in terms of forms of life in general and activities in particular beyond language itself. He clearly has ‘speech acts’ in mind here. Of course, ‘language-games’ are broader than ‘speech acts’ in that language-games include ‘giving orders’, ‘describing the appearance of an object’, ‘reporting an event’, ‘making up a story’, ‘making a joke’ and so on(PI, s. 23). What is obvious is that, whether speech acts or language-games, they should be understood as actions or activities. Hence we can say, as Habermas(1971) has said, that language and action or activity are closely connected and, thus, are interpreted reciprocally in Wittgenstein’s language-game(p.168).
‘Language-games’ are also part of multiple or complex human activities with family resemblances. For Wittgenstein, language-games are plural. This presupposes the multiplicity of uses of language. He compares words and their uses to tools and their uses\(^{28}\). Just as tools are used to do things; hammers to drive nails, screw-drivers to drive in screws, and so on, so, words are used to perform certain acts. There might be various kinds of game whose nature is quite different. We might say, therefore, that the meaning being expressed in the language is largely ‘dependent on its use in the language-game wherein it occurs’ rather than language having a single meaning beyond its usage and contexts(Thomson, 1981, p.18). This raises a question: is there any common element to all different language-games? Wittgenstein illustrates this:

Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games’. I mean board-games, card-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?... For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that... And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail(PI, s. 66). I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members of family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. -And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family (PI, s. 67).

The passages quoted above show us that games can be related to each other in all sorts of different ways which he calls ‘family resemblances’. Within games, there are ‘a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing’, as there are ‘various resemblances between members of family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament etc.’. Some of a family have a similar nose, others have similar eyes and others again a similar way of walking. And these likenesses overlap. We cannot be a member of family by virtue of possessing certain characteristics, such as eyes, nose etc. in common, but rather family members have nothing common except that they are a family member. Indeed, it may be true that ‘brothers have in common that they are male

\(^{28}\)He explains: ‘Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws- the functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects’(PI,
siblings, but their having in common that they are male siblings is their having in common that they are brothers, and not their having in common something in addition to their being brothers' (Bambrough, 1966, p. 194). Similarly, games have nothing in common except that they are games. Hence, we might say that language-games have not any common essence except they all use language.

In conclusion, a social practice in Wittgenstein's sense should be grounded in a complex 'human activity' which is expressed by language-games with family resemblances. For Wittgenstein, engaging in language-games does mean participating in what we call language-games as social practices, which are continually accumulated and elaborated by their traditions. 'Understanding a language' and 'being able to speak' refer, then, to skills that one has acquired, to activities that one has learned to carry out in common with others. This internal connection of language with practice, with knowing how to do certain things, is evident in the learning situation itself (McCarthy, 1979, p.163). In this sense, as Habermas has said, we could say that language-games are 'not only language, but also practices' (quoted in McCarthy, p.166. emphasis in original).

2. Society Dimension

The second dimension of a practice that I want to address is a society dimension. To this end, it might be useful to raise the following question: are all practices necessarily social? If this is so, we would prefer to speak of a 'social practice' rather than a 'practice'. In my view, as I implicitly or explicitly indicated, all practices are fundamentally social, although there is a matter of degree. For instance, studying physics and playing football are quite different in the nature of the activity, as well as in its relation to society. The former is a typical theoretical activity that is related to seeing or observing, whereas the latter is a practical activity that is related to acting or doing. Studying physics, unlike playing football, may be a less social co-operative activity than playing football. Nonetheless, we can hardly deny that studying physics is a social practice. In what senses, then, can we say that a practice must be, to use a MacIntyrean phrase, a 'socially established cooperative activity'? I shall back up this in terms of

s. 11).
Firstly, what makes a practice, e.g. studying physics, social lies in the uses of languages, since languages are inconceivable apart from social human beings. Languages themselves are embedded in social structures which go far beyond mere structures of language. Uses of language rest fundamentally on conventions, customs and institutions and so on, since these are social constructs and results of human practices. Take an example of studying or doing physics. When we are studying physics, we use physical languages, such as speed, acceleration, gravitational force, electron beams, Archimedes’ principle, etc. in order to understand physical phenomena. These languages do not belong to a private domain, but rather a public and social one in that they are products of people who engage in ongoing traditions of physics.

The idea that uses of language are social and public in nature is more clearly, and directly, revealed in Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’. He seems to argue that a private language is impossible by attacking its two different underpinnings: that I can learn privately the language of personal sensations, e.g. the conception of pain, and various mental states by attending to my personal feelings and associating them with words and processes of introspection; and that an isolated person, e.g. Crusoe, could conceivably invent or develop his own language (Rubinstein, 1981, pp.155-7).

Against the former argument, Wittgenstein argues that the idea of a private language should be understood as having the social and practical nature of a language. According to him, even the meaning of sensation words is established in a system of social and practical usages rather than in private mental events, because the concept of pain can be properly understood in terms of ‘its particular function in our life’ (Z, s. 532) and, thus, it is not known by associating an internal sensation with a word, but by participating in the various social practices with which it is connected. To have the concept of pain, therefore, we must be able to understand and participate in these various practices. That requires socialisation into the systems of practices and conventions that, in a given society, are built around the concept pain, since different cultures and education might lead to different conceptions of pain (Z, s. 387). The essential connection between language and social practices shows, in turn, that we cannot learn the language of inner experience ‘by private ostensive definition’ (Rubinstein, op.cit., p.163).
Against the latter argument, Wittgenstein emphasises the ‘rule-bound nature’ of language and ‘social character’ of rules. Crusoe, like Adam in the garden of Eden did, might name plants, animals, and so on. But, unlike the first person Adam, if his usage of language is meaningful, Crusoe must observe conventional language rules which are already given rather than his own but artificial rules. Hence, in order to name something we must use a word consistently according to rules (PI, s. 199). As Wittgenstein puts it:

Is what we call ‘obeying a rule’ something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life?... To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions) (PI, s. 199, italics in original).

He clearly points out this point: ‘Obeying a rule’ is itself a practice. And to think one was obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’; otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it’ (PI, s. 202). We can say, therefore, that to use a language implies that it is a public activity in that a language has certain rules, and anyone who participates in the games should understand the rules and obey the rules which direct the activity within the language-games. From this point of view, we would not call Crusoe’s utterances ‘language’ at all, if he did not obey conventional language rules, whether strict or not. This leads us to look at the social character of a rule-governed activity.

Secondly, a practice is social in that it is a rule-governed or rule-following activity, as noted in the previous section. All practices, such as playing chess, drawing, painting, language-games, teaching, etc. are necessarily rule-governed activities, whether the rules are ‘basic’ ones that everybody who is engaging in the activity must observe or ‘strategic’ rules that decide good or bad ways to perform an activity. Language-games, for example, may not follow any strict rules, nor have any strict meaning. Wittgenstein states:

... Remember that in general we don’t use language according to strict rules- it hasn’t been taught us by means of strict rules, either. We, in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to exact rules (BB, s. 25).

Many words in this sense... don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To think
it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary (BB, s. 27).

For Wittgenstein, a rule seems to be interpreted as the factor which constitutes a minimum ground for the game to be possible. In this respect, his language-games are neither strict nor static, but dynamic and flexible. It is clear, nevertheless, that they are rule-governed activities which are required for meaningful activities.

However, perhaps most social practices have both basic rules and strategic rules, the rules which are derived from social customs and traditions. Hence, to say that some activities have rules that people who engage in these activities should obey presupposes that these activities are social, because rules are in principle made for collective life or human coexistence. We might generalise, therefore, that rule-following activity can be seen as the paradigm of human activity and it is necessarily the reflection of social phenomena in a broad sense. In this sense, Peters’ proposition that ‘man in society is a chess-player writ large’ is quite right in showing that human activities have inevitably a social character (Peters, 1958, p. 7). In short, all human activities, whether explicitly or not, can be characterised as rule-governed activities and thus necessarily connected to their social life.

So far I have argued that all practices are necessarily social on the grounds that they are rooted in uses of language and rule-governed activity. These grounds are indirectly related to society. Lastly, let me now consider the social nature of a practice in terms of its direct connection with the real world. To this end, it may be helpful to consider a sociological argument, because, unlike philosophers, most sociologists tend to underline the social nature of a practice in relation to the real social world. For example, Bourdieu sees social practices in terms of the dynamic relationship between habituses and current capitals as realised in a given field. To put it more concretely,

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29 What is more, Wittgenstein says that the language-game is more or less ‘unpredictable’ like our life (OC, p. 559). And also we need to recognise that rules are different from game to game. The rules of a ball game, for instance, differ from those of chess. Further, it might be, at least slightly, different within the same game according to temporal and spatial backgrounds.

30 This ongoing project is apparent in his two major books, Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) and The Logic of Practice (1990). Henceforth, OP, LP respectively. Habitus among them plays a key role. But his account of habitus is not clear. The reason why lies mainly in Bourdieu’s intention which is ‘not in fact to define but rather to characterise the concept of habitus in a variety of ways in order to communicate a certain theoretical stance or posture, to designate a certain sociological disposition, a certain way of looking.
one's capital is 'the product of the habitus, just as the specificity of a field is an objectified history that embodies the habitus of agents who have operated in that field. The habitus is self-reflexive in that it encounters itself both as embodied and objectified history' (Postone, et. Al., 1993, p.6). Habit, therefore, is 'acquired through participation in the social practices that it perpetuates through the actions it generates; and in perpetuating these practices it thereby also perpetuates the objective conditions established through the existence of those practices', not acquired 'within' objective conditions (Schatzki, op. cit., p. 143).

From this point of view, the social nature of a practice is better captured in sociological terms such as habitus, since the source of practices 'resides neither in consciousness nor in things but in the relationship between two stages of the social, that is, between the history objectified in things, in the form of institutions, and the history incarnated in bodies, in the form of that system of enduring dispositions' (LP, p. 190). Viewing habitus from a sociological perspective means that just as the world is prior to my world, so society is prior to the individual, since the history of the individual is never anything other than a certain specification of the collective history of his group or class. Therefore, 'each individual system of dispositions may be seen as a structural variant of all the other group or class habituses' (OP, p.86, italics in original). A fuller understanding of the concept of habitus is thus possible through a sociological approach, since habitus could vary from field to field and from society to society.

In a similar vein, Giddens' theory of structuration also stresses the social aspect of practices on the one hand and tries to overcome dualism in terms of a 'duality of structure' on the other. For him, practices are part of the duality of structure in that they

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31 Besides Bourdieu and Giddens, Foucault and Habermas also try to overcome the dualism between individual action and social structure. Foucault attempts to transcend the dualism 'by analysing a middle ground of social practices and how they express relations of power' (Layder, 1994, p.9). For him, the self is the product of a number of discourses, and practices and discourses are 'expressions of power relations and reflect the practices and positions that are tied to them' (p.97). In both discourses and practices, we need to specify a wider context and settings. On the other hand, Habermas attempts to understand the relationship between the life-world and system in terms of different kinds of social integration. For him, society should be understood not only from the perspective of individuals as actors in the everyday life-world, but from an external observer's perspective on the operation of the system (p.195). According to him, life-world and
consist of both action and structure rather than of two separated and opposed phenomena. Practices form 'interlocking nexuses called 'systems''. This duality of structure is united through social practices by seeing structure as not external to action but as internal to the flow of action which constitutes the practices in question. For Giddens, human beings create meaning and social reality within social settings, and therefore social forms such as institutions and systems\textsuperscript{32} have no existence apart from the activities they embody. Practices can never simply be 'the 'empty' expression of the social community, they are inseparable from the direct and active involvement of people'. Social practices thus reflect 'the ability of humans to modify the circumstances in which they find themselves, while simultaneously recreating the social conditions(practices, knowledge, resources) which they inherit from the past'(Layder, pp.133-4). From this point of view, we may say that Bourdieu's 'habitus' and Giddens' 'structure' do not differ in that they are the means through which people produce and reproduce the social circumstances in which they live, although Bourdieu sees social circumstances as having more conventional and objective meaning compared with Giddens' structuration theory\textsuperscript{33}(Layder, pp.144).

To sum up, for Bourdieu, all habituses and practices are necessarily social in that they are fundamentally social products to which one or a society belongs. Hence, there are no other practices apart from social practices and thus practices are inevitably social practices\textsuperscript{34}. We must hastily add, however, that all habituses have historical natures\textsuperscript{35}. Indeed, for Bourdieu, social changes are linked with historical changes. Habituses come

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\textsuperscript{32}Although 'social systems' and 'institutions', referring to the visible patterns of social relation, are mainly used in relation to reproduction of social activity, the function is slightly different. That is, the former refers to 'reproduced practices', whereas the latter refers to 'reproduced rules and resources'(Layder, p.140). However, I shall use the terms interchangeably.

\textsuperscript{33}Giddens' claim that structure can never be separated from human reasons and motivation enables us to insist on the above assertion, although Giddens seems to provide a balance between activity and structure(Layder, 1994, p. 212). This point, i.e. the view that social structure is anchored in human activity, is radically different from Foucault's position that structure is seen as 'floating in space'(ibid., p. 148). For more on Giddens' theory of structuration, see his(1984).

\textsuperscript{34} Some could argue that scientific habitus is not like this. Indeed, according to Brubaker, the scientific habitus is quite different from other habituses 'in its reflexivity, in including a disposition to monitor its own productions and to grasp and to make explicit its own principles of production'(p.225). Although we admit that a scientific habitus is not like other habituses, it is obvious that it, too, is a social product which is mainly made through the dialogues within the scientific circle. Some would also argue that there is a matter of degree; that is, some habituses are more social, other habituses are less social. However, this has little meaning in Bourdieu's sense, since all habituses are essentially social phenomena.

\textsuperscript{35} For more details of this, see S. Turner(1994), pp.78-100.
and go in history. To put it another way, habitus has social elements and at the same time, historical elements. Social structures are products of historical practices and are constantly reproduced and transformed by historical practices (LP, pp. 53-54; OP, pp. 82-83). This leads us to explore the third element, i.e. 'tradition' which offers temporal contexts, whereas 'society' provides spatial contexts.

3. Tradition Dimension

A good starting point for a tradition dimension of a social practice might be dealing with a mistaken assumption: that tradition is conservative or static by nature. Indeed, when we think of a 'tradition', we tend to think that tradition is associated with a certain kind of preservation and thus it is often regarded as 'static'. Particularly, this perspective has been adopted and reinforced by conservative thinkers such as Oakeshott.

He rejects revisionism in the name of practical rationality (Taylor, 1994, p. 34).

For MacIntyre, however, traditions are not static, but rather dynamic. A living tradition is, according to him, 'an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition' (AV, p. 222). Traditions change and develop over time; some decay and some emerge in response to changed circumstances. There is nothing inherently conservative about his conception of tradition. We can find this in his major writings, in particular, WJWR and TRV. In

MacIntyre's triple works themselves show us the possibility of the transition of tradition through the transition of his own thought. In AV, MacIntyre's interpretative framework is the concept of 'narrative' which is underpinned by a human 'telos' and 'tradition' within practices. In WJWR, he develops the concept of 'narrative' in terms of that of 'tradition' in order to elaborate a theory of rationality and justice in terms of ethical argument and practical action. For him, justice and rationality are ineluctably tied to particular traditions of thought and social practice (T.S. Hibbs, p. 217; M. Kelly, 1989-90, p. 72). Obviously, in his historical discussion the links between ideals of justice and conceptions of practical reason are learned and often quite insightful. Although WJWR aimed at articulating the theses of AV, there is still a striking difference between the two works. In WJWR, MacIntyre has shifted his ultimate philosophical allegiance from Aristotle to Aquinas, i.e. in AV Aquinas was a 'marginal figure', whereas in WJWR Aquinas becomes the 'central figure'. In WJWR, the main focus is much more on 'tradition' of rationality. In TRV, MacIntyre continues his defence of Aquinas. He does not substantially alter the claims of WJWR. Rather, he does clarify and amplify his position in WJWR. Although he introduces three rival versions, i.e. 'Rationalist approach of Encyclopaedists', 'Nietzschean genealogical approach' and 'Thomist approach by Aeterni Patris', his real concern is to introduce Aquinas. Put more exactly, it is 'a renewal of the Thomist tradition, a tradition he believes is lost to modern liberal society, but a tradition which he partially and indirectly outlined in AV' (Coleman, p. 66). Indeed, in several places in TRV (and WJWR), he sets out elements of the Thomist view. Eventually, his ultimate task has been done in ways which contribute to the establishment of that view as a via media between the radical relativism of the genealogist and the universal rationalism of the encyclopaedist (Haldane, p. 104).

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WJWR, MacIntyre tries to show that virtues such as practical rationality and justice can be modified, advanced and even abandoned from time to time within some particular traditions. He shows us this through examples from Aristotle's, Augustine's and Aquinas’s conceptions of practical rationality and justice. Further, in TRV, he amplifies his argument. In TRV, MacIntyre presents three or four traditions. First, the Encyclopaedist tradition which claims ‘timeless, universal, and objective truths’ which are ‘independent of time, place, and historical circumstances’(p.65); according to this tradition, ‘no tradition is rational qua tradition’(p.117). The Genealogists’ tradition which, in contrast to the Encyclopaedist tradition, claims provisional and relative truths; according to it, ‘no tradition can be rational’(ibid.). And the Thomist tradition which emphasises its own history and tradition; tradition has its own rationality qua tradition. In addition, MacIntyre engages with what he calls ‘liberalism’ which, ‘beginning as a repudiation of tradition in the name of abstract, universal principles of reason, turned itself into a politically embodied power, whose inability to bring its debates on the nature and context of those universal principles to a conclusion has had the unintended effect of transforming liberalism into a tradition’(WJWR, p.349).

How is it possible for tradition to change and, at the same time, how can we keep the rationality of tradition? According to MacIntyre, the rationality of tradition is determined by its ability to resolve its moral crises. In order to reach a rational solution of any of its moral crises, it should satisfy certain kinds of procedural criteria. The criteria are introduced in terms of the notion of ‘epistemological crisis’, which is the philosophical concept underlying MacIntyre’s account of the productive role of conflict in the stages of the development of a tradition’s rationality37(WJWR, p.361). Thus MacIntyre, like J. Habermas38, thinks that practical rationality is basically grounded in

37According to MacIntyre, three requirements of the development of tradition are as follows: firstly, this in some ways radically new and conceptually enriched scheme...must furnish a solution to the problems which had previously proved intractable...secondly, it must also provide an explanation of just what it was which rendered the tradition...sterile or incoherent...and thirdly, these first two tasks must be carried out in a way which exhibits some fundamental continuity of the new conceptual and theoretical structures with the shared beliefs in terms of which tradition of enquiry had been defined up to this point(WJWR, p. 362).

38MacIntyre and Habermas have in common that they both not only reject Kantian universal practical rationality but also they admit that practical rationality is grounded in tradition. However, there is a difference between them in arguing that, for MacIntyre, practical rationality is ‘tradition-bound’on the whole and is, therefore, defended by tradition whereas, for Habermas, practical rationality is ‘tradition-dependent’; however, it can be justified independently of tradition. In other words, practical rationality is tradition-dependent but its validity can, at the same time, transcend any local context(Habermas,1987, pp.
a tradition. He argues that the rationality of a tradition develops in three stages: the first stage is that ‘in which the relevant beliefs, texts, and authorities[of a tradition] have not yet been put in question’, and they are thus able to provide a ‘structure of normality’ to which individual agents within the tradition can turn for guidance when they act; the second stage is that ‘in which inadequacies of various types have been identified, but not yet remedies’; and the third stage is that ‘in which response to those inadequacies has resulted in a set of reformulations, reevaluations, and new formulations and evaluations, designed to remedy inadequacies and overcome limitations’ (WJWR, p. 355). For him, in short, the history of moral life and of moral enquiry ‘are aspects of a single, albeit complex, history. And to be initiated into moral life is to be initiated into the tradition whose history is that complex history’ (TRV, p.129).

Regarding MacIntyre’s dynamic change of a tradition, however, there may be at least two criticisms from the different perspectives. One is that it gives rise to the objection that his view is committed to a form of moral relativism. The other is that his historicism cannot be compatible with the Thomism which he rests on (Coleman, 1994, pp.65-90). With respect to the charge of relativism, MacIntyre attempts to show how the dynamic interaction of rival traditions may provide room for critical reflection on a tradition and the avoidance of relativism. He argues that within major cultural and social traditions we find some distinctive views of human nature, of the human good. And although these claims to truth are ‘supported within different traditions by appeal to rival and often de facto incommensurable standards of rational justification, no such tradition is or can be relativistic either about the truth of its own assertions or about the truth’ (1994, p.295). Horton and Mendus (1994) also share this point of view: ‘although morality is itself tradition-dependent, and although traditions constitute the ‘given’ of life, it is nevertheless the case that rational argument is possible not only within traditions but also between them’ (p.12).

Coleman is doubtful concerning the consistency between MacIntyre and Aquinas on the flexibility of tradition. According to her, the claim that practices have a history must be distinguished from the claim that the practices can be defined by the history of practices. That is, although Aristotle and Aquinas may recognise ‘a history of practices’,
defining standards and goals is universal and absolute, not dependent on traditions or practices. From this point of view, Coleman argues that, when MacIntyre says that the standards are defined by practices, he is mistaken, since a definition is ‘not culture bound nor is it temporal’. Furthermore, she claims that ‘MacIntyre is not a Thomist when he says ‘we cannot be initiated into practice’, that is, into what men who are considered virtuous in a particular historical culture consider good practice, ‘without accepting the authority of the best standards realized so far’” (AV, p. 190; Coleman, p. 81). The issue of whether Coleman’s critique is correct or not still remains. I am not intending to solve it here, since it is a matter of debate and it is also not directly related to my purpose.

So far I have argued that a tradition is never static. For a tradition to be meaningful, as McMylor has said, it ‘must involve debate about what constitutes itself as a tradition’ (p. 160). Let us move on to tradition as a dimension of a social practice. Whether or not we accept the details of MacIntyre’s argument on tradition, it is more or less obvious that there is a historical dimension in a social practice. It can be easily ascertained in either the history of social practices themselves or the history of practitioners who engage in social practices.

Let us begin with the fact that a social practice has a history. What MacIntyre calls social practices such as games, sciences, arts, politics etc. all have their own histories. Each social practice is sometimes changed and sometimes elaborated and developed by an ongoing tradition within the social practices. Good practices and bad practices are also determined by the accumulated traditions of the social practices. The recent strategies and skills of football, for instance, are quite different from the times when the first World Cup was held. Some good strategies at that time might not be relevant any longer these days. If we still stick to old strategies without considering an ongoing tradition of the football practices, presumably, it is impossible for any team to win the World Cup, even if the team has the best members.

39 MacIntyre raises some sets of questions that Coleman seems to fail to perceive: ‘The first set concerns apprenticeship to any tradition-constituted practice, including practices of enquiry: by what standards are apprentices to be guided and from whom are they to learn what those standards are and why? The second set of questions concerns the nature of rational justification and of that attainment of truth which constitutes the telos of rational enquiry: what is it to have achieved finality of understanding concerning this or that subject-matter and in what terms must this understanding be given expression? The third set of questions is about how answers given to the second set of questions are to be rationally defended against rival answers proposed from within the standpoint of some fundamentally different tradition’ (1994, p. 300).
Every social practice also requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in it. Hence, we may best identify a social practice through participating in the social practice or seeing a history of it which has been created by practitioners. For instance, think of the practice of portrait painting as mentioned earlier. Portrait painters, of course, may fully understand the practice by engaging in it. MacIntyre also can identify the practice of portrait painting, and find it meaningful, if he sees it in the light of the history of that practice. A good practitioner has been formed by a history of participation in the practice itself. ‘To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with its contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us in the practice, particularly those whose achievements extended the reach of the practice to its present point’ (AV, p. 194). In a similar way, we can say that teaching can be seen as a social practice carried on by teachers in accordance with a social tradition, not simply as a transaction between otherwise isolated individuals, and thus we may best understand it in this light, because a tradition provides those who engage in a social practice not only with a way of seeing and doing which lays down how that practice is to be carried out but also with an overall purpose which tells participants what to do, and by providing the knowledge and skills it makes it possible for them to do it (Langford, 1978, p. 3; Langford, 1989, p. 159).

Why should a social practice be understood in terms of its tradition? MacIntyre himself suggests, in relation to practical rationality, the following four reasons: firstly, ‘doctrines, theses and arguments all have to be understood in terms of historical context’. In other words, rationality is a concept with a history. In this sense, it is thus more exact to say that we refer to rationalities rather than rationality and also to justices instead of justice, since there is a diversity of traditions of enquiry, with histories. Secondly, the concept of rational justification is essentially historical. To justify is to narrate how the argument has gone so far. Those who construct theories within such a tradition of enquiry and justification often provide those theories with a structure in terms of which certain theses have the status of first principles. Thirdly, the mode of rational justification is also different from tradition to tradition. Lastly, it is crucial, therefore, that ‘the concept of tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive rational enquiry cannot be elucidated apart
from its exemplifications’ (WJWR, pp. 8-10).

In summary, MacIntyre’s conception of social practices is not static. Rather, those practices are transformed and enriched continually by the ongoing debate of the practitioners who engage in those social practices. In this sense, we can say thus that the concept of social practices involves a historical dimension, i.e. tradition.

C. Reflections on the Conceptions of Social Practices

What I have so far discussed in this Chapter is mainly what constitutes a social practice. According to MacIntyre, a social practice should meet five criteria: 1) A social practice refers to a coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activities. 2) A social practice concerns the promotion or achievement of internal goods. 3) A social practice has standards of excellence that activities should achieve. 4) A social practice consists of rule-governed or rule-following activities, although the rule is not strict. 5) A social practice itself is improved through the ongoing debates of the practitioners who are engaged in the social practice, not static. This account can be best understood in terms of a tripartite dimension: 1) A social practice begins with a human activity and continues to engage in it. 2) A social practice is inherently social in that it is a product of society. And 3) a social practice is not static, but continually transformed and developed by its ongoing traditions.

Given MacIntyre’s account of a social practice and the triadic dimension of it, let me elaborate the conception of social practices by discussing some crucial issues and distinctions. The main issues that I deal with are: how can we understand the nature of social practices?; and is achieving internal goods satisfactory for understanding the conception of social practices? My response to the first question may clarify MacIntyre’s understanding of social practices by contrasting Schatzki (1996) with Turner (1994). My response to the second question may offer a supplementation to the notion of a practice by discussing Miller’s (1994) distinction. Let me now discuss these related questions.

With regard to the nature of a social practice, I have already, by exploring Ryle’s and Wittgenstein’s arguments, endorsed the point, which is implicit in MacIntyre’s account, that practices exist not in the minds of actors but in sets of actions or activities.
This does not mean that all people agree with this view. Turner (1994), for example, claims that practices are seen primarily as shared mental objects, such as tacit knowledge, presuppositions, dispositions, and so forth, with causal powers (pp. 58-9). For him, a practice is seen as a set of mental objects no matter whether it is conceived cognitively, as a kind of presupposition, or causally, as a kind of mental trace which disposes thought or action in a certain way. People's different activities or performances within a shared society also can be explained in terms of different understandings, since understanding is a causally efficacious mental object underlying certain activity. The reason why he holds this position is that practices must be transmitted and their effective instruments are conceptions, information, sentences etc. which are largely associated with mental states. However, reducing practice to cognition or equating practice to knowing is not plausible in that mental objects cannot comprise all practices, but rather, they should be understood as part of practices. Moreover, this reduction tends to imply a category mistake in that practice and cognition or knowing belong to different dimensions.

In contrast, Schatzki (1996) argues that (social) practices are basically defined as ‘sets of doings and sayings’: ‘the understandings expressed by doings and sayings are not internal states that cause these behaviours’ (p. 109). Schatzki shares with Ryle and Wittgenstein the view that practices constitute mental objects, activities and worlds, not vice versa. Hence, understanding or intelligibility, whether world intelligibility, i.e. how the world makes sense, or action intelligibility, i.e. which actions make sense, is fundamentally articulated through the organisation of practices within social practices rather than by mind or intelligence. Intelligence is not separate from social practices, but links with it and, thus, should be conceived in terms of social practices (ibid., pp. 111-125). This gives rise to further questions: what constitutes practices as a set of doings and sayings? What is the place of mental objects within practices? These questions may be important for both clarifying the conception of social practices and understanding education in terms of social practices.

To tackle these questions, let us consider Schatzki’s distinction between the ‘dispersed’ practices and the ‘integrative’ practices. Before doing this, it might be helpful

46Practices as mental objects are largely divided into two categories: ‘practices as causes’ and ‘practices as presuppositions’. For the details of this, see Turner (1994), pp. 19-43.
to briefly sketch Schatzki’s overall conception of a social practice. He seems to have in mind practice as ‘a temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of doings and sayings’. ‘That the doings and sayings forming a practice constitute a nexus’ presupposes that ‘they are linked in certain ways’. The main linkages are: 1) ‘understandings’; 2) ‘explicit rules’ embracing principles, precepts, and instructions; and 3) ‘teleoaffective structures’ which consist of two components: the purpose-related elements, such as ends, purposes, projects, tasks; and the affective-related elements: beliefs, actions, emotions, moods. The distinction between dispersed practices and integrative practices depends by and large on which linkage is taken. Dispersed practices can be expressed like this: sets of doings and sayings of X-ing which are primarily linked by the understandings of X-ing; whilst integrative practices, as more inclusive than dispersed practices, are understood in terms not merely of understandings but of rules and teleoaffective structures.

Let us start with dispersed practices. Dispersed practices are ‘widely dispersed among different sectors of social life’, such as describing, ordering, explaining, questioning, imagining, and the like. Dispersed practices primarily emphasise understandings as a linkage rather than the second and third forms of linkage. Understandings involve three components: ‘the ability to carry out acts of X-ing’; ‘the ability to identify and attribute X-ings, in both one’s own and other’s case’; and ‘the ability to prompt or respond to X-ings’. Someone who holds this view tends to assume that understanding of X-ing presupposes the practice of X-ing and individual acts of X-ing, since understanding X-ing means to understand what is being expressed by the behaviours forming the practice of X-ing. We can find a paradigmatic example in Oakeshott. He states: ‘a practice may be identified as a set of considerations,
manners, uses, observances, customs, standards, canons, maxims, principles, rules, and offices specifying useful procedures or denoting obligations or duties which relate to human actions and utterances' (Oakeshott, 1975, p.55). For Oakeshott, a practice is a set of considerations that governs how people act. That is to say, it rules action not directly by specifying particular actions to perform, but by offering understandings of action. He here tries to split practice from action. However, there is a problem in that the considerations that constitute practices cannot specify substantial actions, since we may raise 'the question of at what level of description is what someone does a 'substantial' action'. Oakeshott's attempt to separate practice from action is 'thus rendered otiose by the fact that the nonpropositional elements of his practices... generally determine the what of the action'. It is noteworthy, however, that 'Oakeshott's talk of 'using considerations' fails to do justice to the nonpropositional dimension of practice' (Schatzki, op. cit., p. 98).

On the other hand, 'integrative practices', like dispersed practices, can be seen as 'collections of linked doings and sayings'. But, unlike dispersed practices, they are more complicated and complex ones which can be 'found in and constitutive of particular domains of social life', such as farming, teaching, business, religious practices and the like (ibid., p.98). Integrative practices are joined by: 'understandings' of X-ing and Y-ing, as emphasised in the dispersed practices of X-ing and Y-ing; 'explicit rules'; and 'teleoaffective structures' (ibid., p. 99). (In this respect, the distinction between dispersed practices and integrative practices may rather refer to two different conceptions of the nature of practices rather than two different kinds of practices). However, this does not necessarily mean that an integrative practice must involve some particular understanding of dispersed practices, because without any particular explanation of farming, for instance, a farming practice is possible. Nonetheless, a farming practice includes some understanding of farming. We also should not think that this means that integrative practices are simply the lists or assemblages of dispersed practices, although integrative practices involve dispersed practices. For instance, the activities of describing, questioning and explaining (dispersed practices) may be part of religious practices and farming practices (integrative practices). But the sum of dispersed practices of a religion cannot be an integrative religious practice. It is also true that the same dispersed activities

way. But Schatzki seems to have entirely interpreted habitus as a disposition instead of a social and practical
of religious practices, e.g. describing, questioning may be different from those of farming practices (ibid., pp. 103-4).

In addition, what we should have in mind is that integrative practices presuppose 'social entities', that is, phenomena of human coexistence (ibid., 104). It follows that the organisation of an integrative practice is, in Charles Taylor’s phrase, 'out there in the practices themselves', as opposed to in here 'in the minds of the actors'\(^4^3\). That is, the array of understandings, rules, and teleoaffecive structures that organise an integrative practice should be understood as 'out there', not as 'in the minds' of individual participants (ibid., 105). It is safer to say thus that 'a set of doings and sayings constitutes a practice only if its members express an array of understandings, rules, and structures'. From this perspective, I would prefer to speak of 'social practices' rather than 'practices', or even 'a social practice' in an educational context on the following grounds: firstly, all practices are necessarily social; secondly, plural expressions such as 'teaching practices' connote not only the varied activities that make up teaching, but also the different forms teaching takes across social space and time.

So far by exploring Schatzki’s integrative practices I have addressed the point that social practices cannot be understood just cognitively; they involve rules and teleoaffecive structures. (Schatzki’s emphasis on integrative practices may go beyond Ryle’s and Wittgenstein’s argument). This may be important in an educational context, because education must be concerned with developing the whole person including his or her aims, understandings, rules and emotions, etc. So perhaps the social practices view of education has more to do with integrative practices. Is this sufficient for explaining social practices and further educational phenomena? This leads us to the second question.

Is achieving internal goods satisfactory for understanding the conception of social practices? Miller seems to throw light on this issue by drawing a distinction between self-contained practices and purposive practices. Before exploring his distinction, three points

\(^4^3\) Taylor (1985) uses this phrase in expressing the relation of language to social reality. He claims that 'the distinction between social reality and the language of description of that reality is an artificial one' (p.34). The meanings and possibilities marked by the terms of a public language are 'not just in the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices themselves' (p.36). For linguistic terms have meaning only in use, and use is a feature of ongoing practices.
may be worth noting. Firstly, his distinction is employed for the purpose of explaining the relation among virtues, practices and justice. Secondly, Schatzki’s and Miller’s distinctions may have different starting point and aims. Schatzki’s idea of integrative practices focuses on the integration of components of social practices including teleoaffective structures as a reaction against understanding-centred dispersed practices, whereas Miller’s idea of purposive practices focuses on social ends in relation to virtues because of dissatisfaction with the understanding of virtues as internal (or intrinsic) to practices. Lastly, perhaps Miller’s distinction only applies within integrative practices, since it would be odd to talk of the goods, either internal or external, of such dispersed practices as describing and explaining. But this does not mean that an integrative practice must be purposive. Religion, for instance, may be self-contained rather than purposive. Hence, there seems no particular reason for expecting the two distinctions to coincide.

According to Miller (1994), the evaluation of a self-contained practice ‘consists entirely in the internal goods’ and ‘critical assessment can only be carried out from within the practice itself’. In contrast, purposive practices ‘exist to serve social ends beyond themselves’ and ‘are opened to critical assessment in the lights of the ends they are meant to serve’ (Miller, pp. 250-4, p. 262). This distinction may be clearer with some examples. The practice of chess appears to be self-contained in that excellence in chess is only evaluated within the context of the achievement of standards, rules, etc. of the game itself. This may be more or less apart from (external) social ends chess may serve. In contrast, the practices involved in the criminal justice system, e.g., the making of laws, the investigations by police, bringing people to trial, putting convicted criminals in prison, and so on, presumably serve ends of protecting peace and security; and, as Miller says, such practices can be assessed in terms of how well they serve those ends.

Miller seems to maintain that a plausible practice-based account of justice is purposive rather than a matter of self-contained practices (p. 254). For him, purposive practices cannot properly be understood in isolation from social or external goods and thus the value of a practice should be evaluated at least in part in the light of social or external ends which the practice is meant to serve. How would this distinction challenge MacIntyre’s account of a social practice? To see this, it is important to realise that a practice being social and a practice having social ends are not the same things. Chess, for
example, is certainly a social practice, but it may well be one that is not defined by reference to any social ends, that is, how well it serves some end outside itself. Miller's emphasis on social ends would go beyond MacIntyre's conception of a social practice which relies largely on its internal ends. Certainly, Miller's distinction challenges the significance of the social understanding of virtues, such as justice. For instance, in the UK the legal practice of allowing a defendant to chose to be tried by a jury has recently been questioned. The value of this practice might be evaluated by reference to (broader) social ends which the practices of the criminal justice system are meant to serve. From this respect, purposive practices should be addressed, as far as virtues are concerned. We should also admit that many practices have both internal goods and social ends. MacIntyre also would not deny this\textsuperscript{44}.

However, too much emphasis on social ends in an education context may result in the flourishing of external goods or instrumental values and thus not be free from corruption. Universities, for instance, should serve social ends at least partly by advising and researching on crucial social matters using their sophisticated knowledge and resources. Through these activities, some universities may have sufficient finances and top reputations. But universities may face a serious crisis and thus hardly escape from criticisms, if due to external ends they ignore academic research or teaching which may serve internal goods. In this respect, basically, I would still hold the goods of social practices as 'internal' to activities in which practitioners engage. But the term 'internal' should not be identified with the term 'intrinsic' in a Petersian sense. The term 'intrinsic' in a Petersian sense has a conceptual or logical force. Hence, for Peters, the phrase 'intrinsic to education' refers to goods which are conceptually or logically related to education and thus the intrinsic value of education is regarded as universal and objective, irrespective of individual preferences or social demands. On the other hand, by 'education is internally related to social practices' I mean that education should be understood in terms of engagement in social practices to which one or a society belongs. Hence, the good of education as internally related to practices, unlike the good intrinsic to education,

\textsuperscript{44}He suggests three distinctive kinds of good: 'those internal to practices, those which are the goods of individual life and those which are the goods of community'. He says that to see virtues, such as justice, 'in terms only of practices is incomplete' (1994, p. 284).
is necessarily connected to social goods or ends. From this point of view, the 'social ends beyond themselves', to which Miller refers, are precisely contrasted with 'intrinsic goods', rather than 'internal goods'. Seen in this way, Miller's suggestion of 'purposive' practices might be seen as stressing social ends of social practices, and so being in a way redundant. Hence, my sense of social practices may comprehend Miller's purposive practices, and thus goods internal to practices should be addressed.

In Part II, so far I have discussed the conception of social practices. My conception of social practices, which may be an extended version of MacInytre's, can be summarised as follows.

Firstly, social practices are basically defined as human activities, which can be expressed as a set of seeings, sayings and doings rather than mental objects.

Secondly, components of human activities, i.e. 'a set of seeings, sayings and doings' should be understood in a broad sense as, to use Schatzki's term, integrative practices, not narrow dispersed practices. That is, social practices involve not merely understandings but also rules and teleoaffective structures.

Thirdly, social practices are related to the achievement of internal goods. By internal goods, I mean goods which can only be identified and should properly be achieved by 'engaging in the social practices in question' rather than 'intrinsic goods' in a Petersian sense. This presupposes that there are standards of excellence which one tries to achieve. We should not think, however, that standards of excellence are universal or transcendental. Rather, these may be determined by a society's ongoing practices.

Fourthly, social practices, needless to say, are social in nature. Social practices, as MacIntyre shows, are human activities which are more or less coherent and complex, co-operative, and socially established. Social practices are, thus, associated with rule-governed activities, whether basic rules or strategic rules.

Lastly, social practices have their own traditions which are characterised by internal debates. Social practices are continually changed, extended, developed and articulated through ongoing traditions of the social practices in which people are engaged.

In short, social practices can be defined as 'socially constructed integrative human activities which are concerned with the achievement of internal goods and their standards,'
and these activities are developed by ongoing traditions which are constituted by internal debates'. Is this conception of social practices sufficient? How sound is this concept of social practices in dealing with educational issues? How can, or should, we understand social practices in educational contexts? In what respects are social practices important in educational contexts? Can ‘education as initiation into social practices’ overcome the limitations of liberal education? These questions lead us to explore social practices in relation to educational issues. In the next Part, I shall tackle these issues.
Part III. Social Practices and Education

In the last two Parts, what I have tried to do is largely two things: pointing out the limitations of liberal education both as the development of rationality and as the promotion of personal autonomy; and exploring the conception of social practices.

In Part I, I have argued the weaknesses of liberal education. Liberal education as the development of rationality or the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake tends to stress theoretical knowledge and the intrinsic value of education. It is natural that practical knowledge and the extrinsic value of education are overlooked in liberal education. We, however, may rightly question why these are not regarded as valuable in education. I criticise, thus, the claims of liberal education in two ways: internal criticisms and external criticisms. In internal criticisms, I pointed out weaknesses of the underpinning assumptions of liberal education, i.e. the logical relationship between mind and knowledge, the forms of knowledge thesis and transcendental argument. In external criticisms, liberal education is inevitably challenged by external values, such as vocational education, which are socially demanded.

On the other hand, liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy is inclined to emphasise self-directed actions in education. The ultimate sources of self-directed actions may be either one’s rationality or one’s desires. Whether autonomy derives from one’s rationality or one’s desires, it is more or less obvious that the value of autonomy is taken for granted within a liberal-democratic society. However, it must be noted that the value of autonomy is not guaranteed without justification, even if we live in a liberal-democratic society. Rather, we may rightly say that someone’s values are dependent on the social values to which one belongs. In this sense, communitarian challenges are plausible.

In the face of these limitations of liberal education, it is natural to seek an alternative conception of education, that is, education as ‘initiation into social practices’. To this end, in Part II, I have spelt out the conception of social practices in two ways: by examining a conventional notion of practice, and by exploring MacIntyre’s conception of a social practice. I have argued that the conventional usage of ‘practice’, which is used
as demarcated from theory, has little sense on the basis of the Greek notion of ‘praxis’, Ryle’s ‘knowing how’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘language-game’ theory, and of an educational perspective. This leads us into looking at the conception of social practices.

The conception of social practices, according to MacIntyre, can be based on the following five criteria: i) coherent and complex forms of socially established cooperative human activities, ii) the achievement of internal goods, iii) standards of excellence, iv) obedience to rules, and v) the development or progression of the social activities. This definition of a social practice may have three dimensions, that is, activity, society and tradition. This definition may be elaborated by discussing other philosophers’ arguments such as Miller’s and Schatzki’s. Through these processes, I have drawn the conception of social practices as follows. 1) Social practices are basically defined as human activities, which can be expressed as a set of seeings, sayings and doings rather than mental objects. 2) Social practices should be understood as integrative, that is, they involve not merely understandings but also rules and teleoaffective structures. 3) Social practices are related to the achievement of internal goods in MacIntyre’s sense, not in the Petersian sense. This presupposes that there are standards of excellence which one tries to achieve. 4) Social practices have a social nature, which, as MacIntyre shows, is more or less coherent and complex, cooperative, and socially established. Social practices are, thus, associated with rule-governed activities. 5) Social practices are continually changed, extended, developed and articulated through the ongoing traditions of the social practices in which people engage.

In this Part, what I want to try to do is to answer the three related questions: what exactly does ‘education as initiation into social practices’ mean and how can we draw the overall picture of it? (Chapter 6); how can we understand the thesis that education is initiation into social practices in teaching as education writ small? (Chapter 7); and why is ‘education as initiation into social practices’ important in comparison with liberal education? (Chapter 8). This series of questions, in turn, shows us the overall picture of ‘education as initiation into social practices’ as an alternative to or at least a complement to liberal education.
Chapter 6. Education as Initiation into Social Practices

The question at stake is what 'education as initiation into social practices' would be like. When we maintain that education should be initiating pupils into social practices, what is the overall picture of education we have in mind? On what points is this education different from liberal education?

To this end, in section A, as a preliminary analysis for the understanding of education as initiation into social practices, I shall analyse the term ‘initiation’ and some possible positions which someone might adopt. In section B, I shall explore MacIntyre’s, Hirst’s and Langford’s views on ‘education as initiation into social practices’. Lastly, in section C, I shall compare the three writers’ views and comment on those views.

A. Preliminary Analysis of Education as Initiation into Social Practices

How can we understand the phrase ‘education as initiation into social practices’? Does this assume that there is a possibility of educating pupils in some other directions, for instance, initiation into forms of knowledge, without initiating them into social practices? Is ‘initiation into forms of knowledge’ really incompatible with ‘initiation into social practices’? What is the difference between education as ‘initiation into social practices’ and ‘initiation into forms of knowledge’, and/or ‘promotion of personal autonomy’? Is the conception of ‘initiation’ different from other conceptions, for instance, teaching, indoctrination, induction, inculcating, introducing, etc.? In order to answer this line of questions, above all, some terms that are included in the phrase ‘education as initiation into social practices’, for example, ‘initiation’ and ‘social practices’, need clarification.

It might be helpful to consider the following questions: is there any difference between ‘education as initiation into social practices’ and ‘education as inculcating social practices’; and is ‘education as initiation into social practices’ different from ‘education as social practices’? In the strict sense, however, the two questions are different in kind. The first question is linked with asking what the very meaning of the concept of
‘initiation’ is in this context, whereas the second question may be about the range of social practices. Let us consider these questions in more detail.

1. A Conception of ‘Initiation’

To get a clearer meaning of ‘education as initiation into social practices’, let us start with the term ‘initiation’. The term ‘initiation’ can be diversely used in various contexts. It may be used as ‘rites of passage’ for becoming adult or obtaining social membership in a primitive society. It can also mean ‘religious induction’, such as a believer’s baptism or confirmation, in a religious context.

The term ‘initiation’ in an educational context may be used in a number of ways. Firstly, the term ‘initiation’ can be used in a narrow and neutral sense. This sense of ‘initiation’ is often equated with ‘social conformity’ or ‘socialisation’ in a narrow sense but not a bad sense. Stenhouse (1975), for instance, would draw a sharp distinction between ‘initiation’ and other similar concepts such as ‘training’, ‘instruction’ and ‘induction’. In favour of the process model of education in general and the notion of ‘induction’ in particular, he explained as follows: ‘training’ is mainly ‘concerned with the acquisition of skills’ involved in the performance of a specific task which Aristotle may call *techne*, such as making a canoe, whilst ‘instruction’ is ‘concerned with the learning of information’, such as retention of dates in history. ‘Initiation’ is concerned with promoting commitment and conformity to particular social norms and values, whereas ‘induction’ is concerned with introducing into the thought or knowledge systems of the culture which, unlike information, constitute structure or systems of thinking about ourselves and the world (p. 80). For Stenhouse, the first two processes, i.e. training and instruction, are not sufficient for explaining the educational process, although they constitute parts of educational activity. For him, the notion of ‘initiation’ is too narrow. By contrast, the notion of ‘induction’ includes all three conceptions. Moreover, according to Stenhouse, inducting students into the structures of knowledge is an educationally worthwhile activity in that this creates student’s own thinking. It is natural, therefore, that he defined education as ‘induction into knowledge’ (p. 82).

It must be said, however, that Stenhouse’s conceptions stated above seem to be
more or less artificial. His account of initiation, as we can see later, was too restricted. ‘Induction’ and ‘initiation’ are often interchangeably used in an ordinary sense. It seems to me, there is nothing wrong in this usage. The notion of induction in other contexts, for example, in religious usage, is rather similar to his conception of initiation. One more point I want to make is that Stenhouse’s notion of induction tends to stress knowledge and thinking capacity and, thus, it is still limited to the cognitive domain. However, in everyday usage induction may include affective and conative domains. My contention here, in turn, may be summarised as follows: the term ‘initiation’ tends to be used broadly in two senses; it can be both used interchangeably with induction and it can include the affective and conative domain as well as the cognitive domain.

Secondly, in a negative and strong sense, the term ‘initiation’ may be identical with ‘inculcation’ or ‘indoctrination’. In this sense, initiation has something to do with transmission of beliefs, knowledge, thinking and action in an ‘inappropriate way’ on the part of the learner. By an ‘inappropriate way’ I mean that something is intentionally transmitted to the pupils in a narrow and dogmatic way, regardless of the pupil’s minimum critical reflection or voluntariness. If we use the term ‘initiation’ in this way, the phrase ‘education as initiation into social practices’ is nothing more than at best ‘socialisation’ in a bad sense and at worst the schooling typical of ‘totalitarianism’ or, in another word, ‘indoctrination’. This sense of ‘initiation’ may be an extreme version of Stenhouse’s account of ‘initiation’.

Presumably, however, this view will face a strong objection from the liberals who emphasise personal autonomy. From their perspective, a strong sense or negative sense of ‘initiation’ implies that pupils do not choose, think, and act autonomously. I would agree that this strong sense of initiation can hardly be accepted in an educational context, at least within a liberal democratic society, since it may not allow a student’s own understanding or criticality. When we see ‘initiation’ like this, education has a strong tendency to define the educational aim extrinsically and to neglect the learner’s autonomy. This use of the notion of ‘initiation’ would be hard to put on a sound footing. Of course, I do not use the term ‘initiation’ in this way. This may be called ‘indoctrination’ rather than ‘education’ or ‘teaching’.

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1The distinction between education and indoctrination may be drawn in several ways: intention(purpose
Some would hold the view that education should be understood as socialisation or, at least, as a part of socialisation. Education, as Peters has pointed out, may be regarded as a form of 'socialisation', in so far as it implies 'initiation into public traditions which are articulated in language and forms of thought' (Peters, 1964, p.13). This sense of 'socialisation' may be inevitably allowed in education. In other words, to say that someone is 'socialised' presupposes that someone is already 'initiated'. In this sense, as Langford has said, the distinction between 'education' and 'socialisation' may be not so sharp as sometimes suggested. We should admit, however, that education in this sense is too broad and general to allow the distinction between 'education' and 'other forms of socialisation' (Peters, op.cit., p. 13). Moreover, as we can see in a totalitarian society, socialisation in an extreme and negative sense, which can be described as 'procuring absolute and blind obedience to a government's policy', cannot be justified, because education, at least in a formal sense, is not compatible with students simply remaining in the state of accommodation to a particular society or even to dominant social practices. Education, beyond that, involves improvements in social practices. In this sense, to say that education is no more than 'socialisation' or, worse, the kind of practice associated with 'totalitarianism' or 'authoritarianism', can never be regarded as a satisfactory definition of it.

Thirdly, the term ‘initiation’, as we can see in Peters, tends to be used in a positive way, but still in a restricted way. Peters defines education as initiation into worthwhile activities. He has written the term ‘initiation’, because it compounds a variety of transactions. But it should be understood as confined to worthwhile activities and to certain methods. He explains:

Terms like ‘training’ and ‘instruction’- perhaps even ‘teaching’- are too specific. Education can occur without these specific transactions and they can take place in ways which fail to satisfy all the criteria implied by ‘education’. The term ‘initiation’ on the other hand, is general enough to cover these different types of transaction if it is also

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1. Wilson addresses the content criterion among them, although he considers two possibilities, that is, what we teach(content) and how we teach(method), whereas R.M. Hare emphasises the teacher’s intention. For the details about that, see Hare(1964, pp.47-70), Wilson(1964, pp.24-46) and also L. Snook(1972).

2. According to Langford(1985), his argument for this is grounded in the fact that the common view that education, unlike socialisation, is a value-laden term is mistaken. For the details of it, see pp. 162-165.
stipulated that initiation must be into worthwhile activities and modes of conduct (1964, p. 34).

For Peters, the term 'initiation' here is used in a much broader sense than 'training' or 'instruction', or even teaching in general. But he wants to confine this term to worthwhile activities that are mainly characterised by the pursuit of theoretical understandings, such as distinctive forms of knowledge. These worthwhile activities, according to him, can be called 'the holy ground' in that both the pupil and the teacher should be participating in and pursuing them. Teachers and learners are not differing in that they are both engaging in 'the shared experience of a common world'. They may be, to some degree, differing in that the 'teacher is more familiar with its contours and more skilled in handling the tools for laying bare its mysteries and appraising its nuances' (ibid., p. 38).

For Peters, thus, the notion of 'initiation' is not merely applied to an initial stage, as implied in its etymological meaning, but it can also be applied to further levels of engagement. In other words, 'initiation', unlike socialisation, does not remain at the state of the given social practices that one is inducted in. Beyond that, creating or developing social practices, as teachers mainly do, are involved.

Peters' conception of 'initiation' for addressing 'the impersonal content and procedures which are enshrined in public traditions', however, seems to have a Janus-faced character. On the one hand, 'initiation' is, unlike training and/or instruction, linked with, in a general sense, the 'body of knowledge and mode of conduct' in which we are engaging. We, thus, need to understand it not too narrowly. On the other hand, in so far as education is concerned, Peters, like rationalists, is inclined to use 'initiation' in a cognitive way by emphasising its relation to worthwhile activities, notably theoretical activities. However, it seems to me that, insofar as education is concerned, the objects of initiation should not be limited to the cognitive domain. They should also contain a variety of social practices involving the affective domain and skills, and so on.

How, then, can we understand the notion of 'initiation'? I use the term 'initiation'

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3 Peters did not seem to be defining education in so restricted a way, as far as his inaugural lecture 'Education as Initiation' (1964) was concerned, since he saw education as initiating learners not only 'more deeply into distinctive forms of knowledge such as science, history, mathematics, religious and aesthetic appreciation' but also 'into the practical types of knowledge involved in moral, prudential, and technical forms of thought and action' (p. 35).
in a 'positive and broad sense'. This can be best understood in comparison with Peters. Firstly, like Peters, I assume that there are social practices in which both teacher and learner are, or should be, engaged, although I may not think that these are entirely a matter of 'impersonal content'. Social practices that we are engaging in are, it seems to me, 'common grounds' in that we participate in certain common practices; however, social practices as a common ground can be, and should be, 'developed' by people who engage in them and by ongoing traditions within social practices rather than being conserved as 'a holy ground'. In this sense, dominant and/or desirable social practices would be different from society to society rather than universal and absolute. Social practices that should be pursued in education, thus, may be different according to societies, cultures and their traditions.

Secondly, like Peters, I believe that the notion of 'initiation' should be understood in a broad way. I also share with Peters in insisting that initiation is linked with worthwhile activities and modes of conduct. However, I do not agree with Peters' claims that worthwhile activities are mainly theoretical and intellectual ones. My conception of initiation is much broader than Peters' in that I do not confine it to theoretical activities. It may include practical activities, virtues, dispositions, emotions, and so on. My view of it is rather that worthwhile activities may differ in accordance with social traditions. In some societies, for instance, theoretical activities may be crucial in education, whilst in other societies theoretical activities are less important. Some societies address virtues, whereas other societies emphasise skills, and so on. My conception of initiation is, in the end, that it should not be understood in a too restricted way, whether cognitive or affective, or whatever.

Lastly, like Peters, my notion of 'initiation' is linked with transmitting in a minimally understandable and morally acceptable way, not in a dogmatic and an undesirable way. I have written 'minimally', because, in fact, the term 'initiation' could also be used of a process which is not intelligible to the learner and which may be immoral. Think, for example, of initiation into the Mafia society. This kind of initiation may involve an immoral process. There may be nothing wrong in this usage of the word. In an educational context, however, it can hardly be accepted and, thus, I would be inclined to use it in a slightly restricted way. In this respect, brainwashing, conditioning,
etc. will be ruled out from education in that these do not allow the learner’s minimum understanding, willingness and voluntariness. Of course, the distinctions between moral way and immoral way, between ways which involve the learner’s understanding and ways which do not, may be less obvious in practical situations than in our thinking about them. We might say, nevertheless, that it is more or less obvious that ‘initiation’ is different from ‘inculcation’ or at least ‘indoctrination’.

2. Initiation into Social Practices

Let me move on now to a more central point. How can we understand education as initiation into social practices? Before directly tackling this, a reminder of the concept of social practices that I have sketched out in Part II may be helpful. This can be characterised in the following five points. Social practices i) are defined as human activities; ii) involve understandings, rules and teleaffective structures; iii) are concerned with the achievement of internal goods; iv) have a social character; v) have their own traditions and may be changed or developed by their ongoing traditions. This conception of social practices, in short, is the engagement in human activities, including diverse aspects of life, which are social in nature and flexible according to ongoing traditions.

When we define social practices as I described above, what does ‘education as initiation into social practices’ mean? Is this different from ‘education as a social practice’? If so, to what extent? Let us consider, firstly, ‘education as a social practice’. This phrase can be differently interpreted depending on how someone sees the relation between education and social practices. In fact, it may be used in weaker or stronger senses: a) The phrase may be seen as presupposing that education is made up of social practices. b) More strongly, beyond the assertion that education is made up of social practices, the phrase may be seen as implying that education should be the outcome of social practices, or even that education is nothing more than a by-product of social practices. Whether we take interpretation a) or b) of education as social practices, the main point of the phrase ‘education as a social practice’ lies in describing educational phenomena as social practices, rather than prescribing them. From the perspective of
education as social practices', therefore, education is a social practice among a whole range of social practices, not a separate social practice at all.

On the other hand, the idea of 'education as initiation into social practices' may be taken as affirming the stronger sense of 'education as social practices' that I mentioned above. What is more, this view may include practical prescriptions for education on the basis of social practices. In other words, it would be taken for granted that education is growing out of social practices. Furthermore, there is a concern with educational prescriptions, that is, with how we should select important social practices and how we can effectively initiate pupils into adequate and pervasive social practices. Whether we speak of 'education as initiation into social practices' or 'education as social practices', it must be acknowledged that a plausible education can be defined as initiating people into wide ranges of current social practices, although there is a difference in the strength of definitions between them.

The phrase 'education as initiation into social practices' can be understood in two senses: a 'formal' (descriptive) and 'substantial' (prescriptive) sense. In a formal sense, this phrase means that all education, liberal education or whatever, is regarded as a social practice in a descriptive sense and in this sense it may be a crucial social practice, because many other social practices depend on it. People who subscribe to 'education as social practices', such as most sociologists and many political philosophers, tend to take this position. This sense of education can provide a better description of educational phenomena through seeing them in terms of social practices, but it may not bring about fundamental changes in current educational theory and practice- such as, the concept of education, the content of education, teaching method, and so forth.

In contrast, in a substantial sense, the phrase 'education as initiation into social practices' involves two levels: one is that education should be not only derived from one's or a society's current pervasive social practices, but should also result in developing social practices. The other level is that this understanding of education should lead to more specific concrete prescriptions, such as changes in educational perspectives, in organising the curriculum and in teaching process, in terms of social practices. Hence, in education as initiation into social practices in a substantial sense, which goes beyond education as social practices at the surface or slogan level, educational practices, such as
the selection of the content of the curriculum and the teaching process, should be based on social practices at the substantial level. Hence, when I use the phrase ‘education as initiation into social practices’, I use it a prescriptive or substantial sense. In this regard, MacIntyre, Hirst and Langford provide us with the central features of ‘education as initiation into social practices’. It is natural, therefore, to explore their views of ‘education as initiation into social practices’ in order to get a fuller understanding of it.

B. Three Views on Education as Initiation into Social Practices

MacIntyre, Langford and Hirst share the idea that education, however we define it, is fundamentally seen as ‘initiation into social practices’. However, the details of this may be of slightly different form and, at the same time, their theories are complementary. To put this bluntly, MacIntyre makes explicit what constitutes social practices, whereas Hirst and Langford stress why education as initiation into social practices is important. In this section, therefore, what I want to do is to discuss their conception of social practices in relation to education in more detail. This may shed light on what ‘education as initiation into social practices’ means.

1. MacIntyre’s View

Let us begin with MacIntyre’s social practices thesis in relation to education. To grasp his view on education as social practices is not so easy for two reasons: because he does not say much about this; and because, even if he mentions social practices, he does not concern himself directly with ‘education for the good life’, but rather with ‘the good life itself’ (White and White, 1986, p.159). This, however, does not make it impossible to construe MacIntyre’s education in terms of social practices. We rather say that MacIntyre clearly thinks of education as an engagement in social practices. Indeed, his main works may be interpreted in this way.

For MacIntyre, I would say that the theme of an ‘educated public’, which is well expressed in his ‘The Idea of an Educated Public’ (henceforth, EP), plays a crucial role in understanding his overall educational scheme, in that his main educational idea is
embedded in the idea of an ‘educated public’. Indeed, EP links with AV, WJWR and TRV in constituting a project about education. In other words, his educational concern was immanent within AV and, through EP, gradually enlarged and elaborated in his later writings, particularly TRV. It could be roughly outlined thus: in AV, he seems to be concerned with what the nature of educational theory, if it is to enable us to overcome incommensurability, should be. His prescription seems to be that education should fundamentally be realising social practices. In EP, he argues that the individual or autonomous thinking which is emphasised by the liberals is possible only in the context of a certain kind of community and, accordingly, the aim of education is related to bringing up an educated public through initiating pupils into social practices. In WJWR, he exemplifies the educated public in terms of social practices of justice and rationality, which he explores within historical traditions. In TRV, he applies the notion of an ‘educated public’ to the university. He provides an extremely interesting and detailed account both of the nature of education as initiation into the educated public and of how that educated public of which one then becomes a member helps the individual to discover and promote social unity. We can say, therefore, that ‘education should be regarded as a preparation for, and an ongoing participation in’, the educated public in MacIntyre’s sense (Wain, 1994, p.150).

In order to understand MacIntyre’s ‘education as initiation into social practices’ properly, we must explore social practices in relation to his ‘educated public’ thesis. Before doing this, we need a brief sketch of his conception of social practices in relation to a good life. For MacIntyre, without engaging in social practices, we cannot imagine a good life, although engagement in social practices does not guarantee an achievement of a good life. For good lives, social practices need to include certain elements, such as virtues. Let us consider this in more detail.

For MacIntyre, social practices may be regarded as the most basic element, or at least a constitutive part, of human well-being. For him, the notion of social practices, as we have seen in Part II, is related to activities which are pursued for their internal goods rather than external goods. What should be addressed here is that goods internal to a practice, by definition, are connected with engaging in that particular practice and, thus, internal goods should be produced by engaging in the social practice in question. If
someone *tries* to earn money by playing chess, this may be an external good. This may not be constitutive of a good life, even though he or she may be regarded as living a good life. Of course, we can think of other cases. One may achieve prestige, power and wealth through engaging in some particular kind of practice, without external intention. In this case, prestige, power and wealth may be a part of the good life. However, even in this case, these goods should not be allowed to dominate internal goods. Rather, these goods should be ‘subordinate in importance to internal goods’ (White and White, p. 154).

In order for someone to be leading a good life in a proper sense, it is necessary that goods internal to social practices should be realised in harmony with one’s life as a whole, in the way that MacIntyre calls ‘the narrative unity of a human life’, and also with traditions that are historically and socially extended forms of the narrative unity of human lives. Without an overriding telos of a whole human life that is conceived as a unity, individually or socially, our social practices remain partial and incomplete. These should be ‘enriched and supplemented by being connected with the notions of the good of a whole human life and of an ongoing tradition’ (AV, P.275). In the educational context, therefore, this shows us that for living a good life it is necessary not only to maintain coherence of various practices within one’s life, but also to be acquainted with other practices outside one’s own life.

Lastly, and more importantly, to maintain the good life, social practices should be controlled, or modified, by virtues such as justice, courage, temperance, etc., since all social practices are not always desirable for everyone or every society. In order to sustain social practices in an educational context, certain virtues may be needed and these virtues, if not always, might be exercised and acquired in the course of social practices (AV, p. 187). To initiate students into social practices, in the end, involves at least partly the possession of the virtues, and these virtues are reciprocally acquired and sustained by ongoing traditions of social practices. Indeed, one of the striking features in the MacIntyrean conception of social practices seems to lie in the way it addresses virtues. In this sense, for MacIntyre, the conception of social practices tends to be linked to the moral good and, thus, in his conception of social practices, evil practices may be absurd.

What I have argued so far is that social practices are linked with human
flourishing through the achievement of internal goods, the unified whole human life, and ongoing traditions of social practices. These practices, of course, involve virtues. Let us make some possible comments on MacIntyre’s theory of social practices from the educational point of view. First of all, when we define education as initiation into social practices, as we have shown, this implies at least that the educational aim cannot entirely be decided by individuals’ desire-satisfaction or autonomy. Rather, it seems that individuals are recognised as objects who should be initiated into ongoing social practices rather than subjects. In this sense, current dominant social practices, or practitioners as agents for initiating students into those social practices, are more important than the students who are initiated into those social practices in education.

Secondly, social practices should not be confused with institutions. Institutions have a Janus-faced character. On the one hand, institutions function as media for sustaining social practices. Indeed, just as for maintaining and developing medical practices hospitals are needed as their institutions, so educational practices are also sustained through educational institutions, which are initiating students into social practices. On the other hand, institutions may function as constraints on social practices. Institutions, in fact, are concerned with external goods as well as internal goods. For instance, hospitals are not only concerned with the attainment of internal goods such as the development of medical practices, but also with the acquisition of external goods such as money and status. Schools as a main agent of social practices are also concerned with initiating pupils into substantive social practices and, at the same time, are concerned with pursuing external success and prestige. Indeed, social practices can be vulnerable to institutions. In order to resist the corrupting power of institutions, therefore, the virtues such as justice, courage etc. are required. Without these virtues, as MacIntyre has pointed out, there is no way to escape corrupting institutions (AV, p. 194).

Thirdly, for MacIntyre, the virtues play an important role in education. However, this explanation is not sufficient for deciding the specific content of education. It is one thing to say that social practices are related to obtaining internal goods including virtues. It is quite another to say that these social practices are educationally important. Take MacIntyre’s own example of chess. According to him, chess is a typical social practice,
which meets the criteria of a social practice. But this may not be regarded as an educationally valuable one, although it may be important for the particular people who are engaged in it, since it may be nothing more than a game or a pastime rather than being related to human flourishing (J. Elliott, 1991, p. 147). What is more, when we consider the fact that students are engaged in several practices, such as academic subjects, social activities, communication skills, etc., and other practices outside the school, which social practices should be taught in educational institutions cannot be clearly answered only by MacIntyre’s account of virtues. As far as curriculum is concerned, therefore, we may say that MacIntyre’s position is still not obvious. That is, the question of whether teachers have to initiate pupils into all kinds of social practices or initiate them into some important social practices still remains unsettled. If MacIntyre’s position takes the former line, then certainly it would be impossible for teachers to teach all kinds of social practices in school. If he takes the latter, we would ask him how could we judge between more important social practices and less. Regarding this question, he seems to keep silent. Instead, he suggests that the ‘overall system of thought and practice’ which he favours ‘requires both a different kind of a curricular ordering of the disciplines from that divisive and fragmenting partitioning which contemporary academia imposes and the development of morally committed modes of dialectical enquiry’ (TRV, p. 220).

Let me move on to a more central point, namely, what counts as ‘education as initiation into social practices’ in MacIntyre’s sense? His conception of ‘education as initiation into social practices’ seems to be linked with the ‘educated public’ thesis. His ‘educated public’ thesis can be seen in relation to ‘the lost public’, which has been caused by the liberal tradition in general and the Enlightenment in particular. The argument for this runs as follows: the crisis of modern education can be found in the disappearance of the educated public. The loss of the educated public is due, at least partly, to the failure of the Enlightenment project that stresses individual values. The way out of crisis lies in restoring such a public. Presumably, it does this through initiating pupils into substantive social practices within a particular society and tradition (Wain, 1994, p. 151).

Following this logic, the idea of education as initiation into social practices in MacIntyre’s sense seems to be linked with bringing about the educated public. This can
be seen in the case of the educated public of the Scottish Enlightenment that he presents us as a typical case. According to MacIntyre, the educated public, as shown in the Scottish Enlightenment, has the following three characteristics. Firstly, there must be 'a tolerably large body of individuals' who are educated into 'both the habit and the opportunity of active rational debate'. To put it another way, an educated public needs not only to understand the significance of different issues for their shared social experience but also to recognise each other as constituting a public. According to this criterion, for instance, neither 'a group of specialists' whose controversies are, as a rule, restricted to their peers, nor 'a passive mass public' who provide an audience for the debate, can be counted as an educated public. Secondly, there must be 'shared assent, both to the standards by appeal to which the success or failure of any particular thesis or argument is to be judged, and to the form of rational justification from which those standards derive their authority'. Hence, the debates of an educated public are to be contrasted both with sceptics and dogmatists who destroy the possibility of an educated public. Thirdly, there must be 'some large degree of shared background beliefs and attitudes', provided by some shared common body of texts, 'texts which are accorded a canonical status within that particular community'. The possession of such a shared body of texts is 'only possible when there is also an established tradition of interpretative understanding of how such texts are to be read and construed'. Therefore, mass mindless people who lack 'both canonical texts and a tradition of interpretative understanding' are not an educated public(EP, pp.18-9, my italics).

How, then, can we bring up such an educated public? Is this possible in modern society? For MacIntyre, it is only where there is an educated public that two other central aims of all modern educational systems can be compatibly pursued: 'to fit the young person for some particular role and occupation in the social system' and to teach 'young persons how to think for themselves, how to acquire independence of mind, how to be enlightened'(EP, p.16). Unfortunately, according to MacIntyre, to fit children for their social role and occupation and, simultaneously, to teach them to think for themselves are not possible under a modern (liberal) education system, even though every teacher faces the tasks in the classroom and tries to integrate them. He states:

...we should have instead to conclude first that a certain kind of failure is inherent in
modern educational systems, a kind of failure that no type of educational reform can be expected to remedy, and secondly that in respect of these two aims teachers confront not a both/and, but an either/or. Either they can continue to pursue the aim of fitting their pupils for the type and level of social role and occupation prescribed in their society for the products of that part of educational system in which they are at work, or they can continue to pursue the aim of enabling their pupils to think for themselves, but they cannot coherently pursue both aims (EP, p.34).

He goes on to say that ‘the possibility of thinking for oneself only opens up in the context of a certain kind of community’; however, that kind of community is no longer available in modern liberal society (EP, p. 34). Even if it were possible, under this circumstance, the educated public would be lost, or at best be replaced by a set of specialised persons or publics. Therefore, to use Feinberg’s phrases, under current circumstances, we should inevitably choose one of two ways: either ‘grab hold of a particular community and make it comparable to the public’, or ‘grasp a particular conception of the good and insist that such a conception is foundational for the development of a public’ (Feinberg, 1991, p.21).

However, is it really impossible to pursue both communitarian virtues and liberal virtues in a liberal-plural society? Did the educated public really disappear? I would think not. As Feinberg has rightly pointed out, MacIntyre seems to have misunderstood the relation of ‘public’ to ‘plurality’ through defining the conceptions of ‘public’ and ‘plurality’ in a restricted, and improper, way. The concept of ‘plurality’ does not necessarily deny ‘the possibility of a public’. A public also does not necessarily require that ‘all share the same belief system’. Rather, it inevitably involves ‘a certain amount of plurality and a willingness to grapple with questions of right and wrong within the context of others with different beliefs’. MacIntyre seems to have the mistaken idea that ‘publics can exist only where general beliefs and legitimation structures are widely shared’ (ibid., p.22). I share with Feinberg in insisting that ‘the educated public’ needs to be interpreted more broadly so that it should include ‘the possibility of any intelligent, wider public that is capable of rationally considering the merit of different collective alternatives’ (ibid., p.19). Moreover, in an educated public, according to Feinberg, there are some possibilities such as ‘the willingness to continue the discussion even in the context of fundamental differences about what should be done, or the ability to explore an issue from the point of view of a wider community’ (ibid, 24).
If Feinberg is right (and also I am) in the view of an educated public that I have outlined above, MacIntyre's concluding comment, i.e. we must choose either aiming at fitting children for the social demands of a particular community or aiming at enabling children to think for themselves, not both/and, would be wrong, since the two aims in education are not necessarily incompatible. In WJWR and TRV, in fact, MacIntyre seems to modify his position more satisfactorily. In WJWR, he insists that the rational person is always grounded in a tradition while engaging 'both in the ongoing arguments within that tradition and in the argumentative debates and conflicts of that tradition of enquiry with one or more of its rivals'(WJWR, p.394). And in TRV, an educated public is 'a group which not only shares fundamental assumptions on the basis of which it is able to articulate disagreements and organize debates, which reads to a significant degree the same texts, draws upon the same figures of speech, and shares standards of victory and defeat in intellectual debate, but which does so in and through institutionalised means, clubs and societies, periodicals and more formal educational institutions'(TRV, pp.216-7). MacIntyre suggests that an educated public 'could lie in reconceptualising the universities as cultural and intellectual foci for contemporary educated publics but within the pragmatic reality of an irremediably pluralistic world'. This may require 'different educated publics growing around different universities that represent the different contesting moralities and cultures within that world'(Wain, 1995, p.115).

Under liberal-plural societies, therefore, to have a single educated public such as MacIntyre is proposing may not be possible, but it may be possible to have different overlapping educated publics. In this modified MacIntyrean sense, we can still insist that an educated public in a broad sense can be produced in any society, whether a liberal-plural society or tradition-directed society. In this case, the educated public may have a more or less different form according to social traditions. In this respect, there is no reason why an educated public cannot exist in a liberal society. Rather, what I would insist is that, whether the educated public can be defined in terms of communal values or intellectual ones, or whatever, it should be produced by engaging in current social practices. In this sense, Habermas'(1989) assertion that the educated public should be generated from contemporary condition and life-world rather than from the past seems
to be plausible. 

2. Hirst’s View

Let me now move on to Hirst’s view of ‘education as initiation into social practices’. His central tenets run as follows: liberal education is related to the development of ‘a rationally autonomous individual’ as the foundation for the good life and, thus, this education tends to address the initiation of individuals into theoretical disciplines which are often represented by forms of knowledge such as science, social sciences, humanities, arts and religion, and so on. However, for Hirst, this understanding of human nature, the relationship of individuals in society and the place of reason in human life does not offer a satisfactory explanation of educational phenomena in that it undermines human beings as social beings, the practical experience of the world and practical knowledge and rationality, which are basically demanded for the fulfillment of our lives. Therefore, we need to establish education in terms of social practices, which addresses social practices and practical knowledge and rationality rather than theoretical reason and rationality in education. Seen in this way, education for a good life can be realised by initiating into ‘social practices in which we can individually find a fulfilling life’ rather than abstracted and detached theoretical knowledge (1998, p. 19). In short, Hirst’s assertion is that we should shift ‘from seeing education as primarily concerned with knowledge to seeing it as primarily concerned with social practices’ (1993a, p.184).

What, then, does ‘seeing education as primarily concerned with social practices’ mean? How can we understand his conception of ‘education as initiation into social practices’? Does this mean simply underlying social practices of everyday life, instead of the pursuit of rationality? It may be helpful to consider the following series of questions: why did he abandon his earlier liberal conception of education? What are the differences between his liberal education and ‘education as initiation into social practices’? Is his change radical? Let us consider these in turn.

The reasons why he changes his educational idea from initiation into ‘forms of

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5 By the same token, Mendus’ criticism against MacIntyre, i.e. ‘nostalgia for the past’ or ‘the myth of the Fall’ also seems to be sound on the same ground. For the details of this, see her (1992), pp. 179-181.

6 My expositions of Hirst’s later argument here rely mainly on his (1993a) and (1998).
knowledge’ to initiation into ‘social practices’ are, it seems to me, threefold: the importance of social practices in education and of the good life which is based on them; the priority of practice over theory; and the necessity of a stronger type of justification. Let me briefly tease out them in turn.

The first reason is related to the dissatisfaction with two versions of liberal education and their conceptions of the good life in terms of social practices. Liberal educators who hold education as the pursuit of rationality tend to think that the good life is linked with exercising rationality or reason which is regarded as intrinsically worthwhile. They too emphasise the cognitive aspect of human nature so that they ignore other aspects of it, such as feelings, emotions, skills, and the like. What is more, their education is often detached from the practices of the real world. On the other hand, liberal educators who see education as the promotion of personal autonomy are inclined to hold that the good life is to live an autonomous life in accordance with one’s reason or desires. This view often undermines the social nature of the individual by excessively stressing personal autonomous choice. However, for Hirst, a good life is linked to maximising the satisfaction of human desires, individually or socially, through engaging in social practices. Hence, education is fundamentally a matter of engaging in social practices rather than either the development of rational mind which is isolated both from society and other aspects of human nature, or the promotion of self-directness.

The second reason is the significance of practical reason as a medium for pursuing a good life. For Hirst, theoretical knowledge and reason in an educational context is no longer seen as the logical foundation of all kinds of knowledge and reason. He illustrates this:

The main error in my position was seeing theoretical knowledge as the logical foundation for the development of sound practical knowledge and rational personal development. Education in theoretical forms of knowledge was seen as ultimately fundamental to everything else in education(1993a, p.197).

Hirst now sees practical knowledge and reason as necessary for pursuing the good life which incorporates social practices for two reasons: a negative reason and a positive reason. The negative reason is that theoretical knowledge and reason are not appropriate,
because they are 'doubly abstracted from practice': first 'in seeking only cognitive satisfactions, and then 'in seeking within those the specific satisfaction of achieving propositional truths'(1999a, p.111). The positive reason is that practical knowledge and reason are not only logically prior to theoretical knowledge and reason, but also are fundamental, and thus the logical foundation for theoretical knowledge and reason, because theoretical knowledge is theoretically loaded with practical knowledge and reasoning, which are directly connected with social practices.

Traditional rationalists, however, would argue that practical knowledge is not logically, but perhaps empirically prior to theoretical knowledge. This presupposes a distinction between 'logical priority' and 'temporal priority'. Following their logic, in a logical sense, theoretical knowledge is prior to practical knowledge in that the latter is impossible to imagine without the former, although practical knowledge is prior to theoretical knowledge in terms of time. However, this claim may be dubious, as I have pointed out in Chapter 4, because surely we can imagine practical knowledge without theoretical knowledge, and often have it. For instance, knowing how to ride a bicycle without understanding theoretically how it is done. Aquinas seems back up Hirst's logic on an epistemological or ontological ground. According to him, the notion of 'actual existence' is more basic than that of 'logical existence'. 'Whenever we say that something exists in the sense of 'is true' or 'is the case', or that there is something that belongs to the kind we are talking about, there is a prior sense of being which is implied which is akin to 'is there or alive' (Coleman, 1994, p.69). Hence, for Aquinas, the natural law is not only one of 'the primary objects of practical enquiry' but 'the presupposition of any effective practical enquiry' (WJWR, p.180). From this perspective, 'actuality is prior to capability[possibility]' (Coleman, op. cit., p. 69). To put this another way within our context, practice or practical knowledge is prior to theory or theoretical/logical knowledge. If we follow Aquinas' interpretation, in the end, practices are prior to the theoretical discourses both epistemologically (and ontologically) and perhaps logically.

The last reason is related to the first two reasons. If the first two grounds are accepted

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7 According to Aquinas, the true is a match between thing and intellect(De Veritate, Q.1 a.1 response). However, we need to note that there is a difference between the way things exist and the way we as humans come to know them.
as sound, it is natural to rest Hirst's justification of education in terms of social practices on these. Actually, he seems to adopt the practical way of justification which grounds the engagement in theoretical activities in human givens, instead of the transcendental argument which relies on circular logic, because he no longer sees the developed forms of rational enquiry as having justification independently of their role in reflection on other practices. Indeed, the practical type of justification offers a stronger justification in that not only are social practices fundamental but also it can tell us which theoretical pursuits are worth engaging in.

What were the limitations of liberal education for Hirst in terms of 'education as initiation into social practices'? He was mistaken in seeing theoretical knowledge as the one and only type of knowledge that is properly significant in determining both the ends and means of rational practice and thus of the good life (1993a, p. 193). He recognises, of course, that theoretical knowledge, as we can see in philosophical practices, is important in the social development of the practices of critical reflection that the good life requires. He, however, disagrees with the claim that theoretical knowledge itself is a necessary condition for the individual's conduct of the good life (ibid., p. 196). Theoretical knowledge in education cannot be, as he mistakenly thought, the logical foundation of all kinds of knowledge and, thus, fundamental to everything else in education. Rather, education should be directly concerned with a variety of 'practices needed by all for a good life in our contemporary context' (1998, p. 19).

Then, did he not think of the pursuit of rationality as relating to practices, and social ones at that? We would think that Hirst's liberal education could be seen as an initiation into social practices in that his liberal education involved practices of rational discourse and forms of knowledge can be regarded as socially constructed. In this respect, Hirst's main change may be that he no longer holds the view that only the practices of rational pursuit can be justified as having foundational importance. Rational discourses are only one kind of social practices, which we may call 'second order practices'. Although the importance of this kind of social practice relies on ongoing traditions to which some people belong, this is not Hirst's first concern. Nor does his primary concern lie in

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8 This may be one possible (mild) interpretation, although Hirst himself would deny it. This interpretation addresses the continuity of his liberal education and social practices-based education. By contrast, a strong interpretation may emphasise the differences between them.
investigating the nature of an educated person. Rather, education should be the result of being initiated into social practices. What is more, education should bring about the development of social practices through initiating students into certain substantive social practices. In this respect, I would say that Hirst’s focus is on the content of education, that is, on social practices into which students should be initiated rather than on an educated person or public.

On the other hand, if we take another type of liberal education, that is, the promotion of personal autonomy, this type of liberal education also would not be satisfactory in terms of social practices, since society cannot be simply seen as a collection of individuals who pursue the satisfaction of their personal desires, preferences, wants and so on. Rather, in a fundamental sense, persons should be necessarily seen as ‘social constructions’ and further one’s good life cannot be free from existing social practices and traditions. We can say, therefore, that one’s good life is necessarily connected to the engagement ‘in the socially constructed rational practice of engaging in specific rational practices for the satisfaction of wants. And such a pursuit necessarily includes the promotion of rational practices as social institutions’ (1993a, p.194). Whether rationality or autonomy, we might conclude that liberal education cannot satisfy the demands of social practices.

So far I have tried to explore Hirst’s conception of ‘education as initiation into social practices’. The striking features of this may be drawn out as follows: firstly, his conception of education is linked with one’s good life and one’s good life is derived from engaging in socially constructed rational practices. Secondly, related, his account of ‘education as initiation into social practices’ tends to emphasise practical rationality or reasoning as a fundamental element, although he abandoned the centrality of theoretical reasoning. It is tempting to see this as leading to another form of intellectual education, although this may be controversial. In this sense, Hirst’s view may open up the following

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9 This may depend on how to interpret the crucial terms ‘rational practices’ and ‘practical rationality or reason’. If we follow ordinary usages of these terms, this interpretation may be plausible, because he surely emphasises these terms. However, when we focus on ‘the satisfaction of desires’, and ‘practical reason’ is seen as just operation or actualisation of satisfactions in the course of engaging in social practices, then it might not be quite correct to see this education as intellectual. In fact, Hirst’s most current position seems to take the latter view. His most recent overall picture of education, which is based on correspondence with him, runs something like this: education is to live a good life through initiating people into rationally developed social practices. A good life is bringing about the maximisation of the overall desire satisfaction

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question: what is the difference between education that stresses practical rationality and that which stresses theoretical rationality? Hirst’s account of ‘education as initiation into social practices’ is less clear than he thought.

Let us turn now to the issue of composing educational content in terms of social practices. To begin with, what does Hirst mean by ‘initiation into a complex of specific, substantive social practices with all the knowledge, attitudes, feelings, virtues, skills, dispositions and relationships that involves’(1993a, p.197)? This presupposes that there are a variety of social practices which are composed of complex webs including knowledge, feelings, virtues etc.; however, substantive social practices may differ according to social and cultural contexts, since social practices are characterised by human activities which people engage in and which have been socially constructed and developed.

Hirst, like MacIntyre, did not give concrete guidelines as to how we can construct a school curriculum in terms of social practices, although he provides us with some possible social practices in education. The social practices in education, according to Hirst, may include at least the following three kinds: ‘varied basic practices’ which are ‘necessary for any individual to be rationally viable in their given everyday physical, personal and social contexts’; ‘wider range of optional practices’ which are ‘available for the construction of each individual rational life’; developed or second order practices which are constituted of critical reflection on the first two categories. This ‘can be modified by personal rational judgement and new practices can be pursued as judged best in the self-direction of life in detail and overall’(ibid., p.196).

Although he suggests some possible social practices that may be required in education, however, he does not give the details of that. For Hirst, thus, some specific issues about education- for instance, whether all education is necessarily required to be
an initiation into all kinds of social practices; whether some social practices such as basic practices are compulsory and other practices, such as optional practices and second order practices, are optional within education; whether all societies have the same content within a particular social practice- are still unresolved. What is more, in order to get a fuller understanding of education as initiation into social practices, a list of further questions need to be answered: what are the criteria for constructing the curriculum at the school level? Which social practices are valuable in an educational context and, thus, should be taught in school? Should basic practices be included in the school curriculum?

In the case of optional practices, which optional practices can we choose?

Hirst, however, does not deal with the details of these questions. He suggests that a curriculum can be organised in terms of significant practices (1993a, p. 197). But how can we decide this? He may think that the question of which social practices are important and which social practices should be involved in education in general and school curriculum in particular may be determined by social traditions to which a society belongs. For instance, in a Korean educational context, sex education among the varied basic social practices is, in reality, less important than in Britain, because Korea, like many other Asian countries, has a ‘shy’ culture so that many people are inclined to leave sexual matters in mystery rather than to speak out on them. Vocational preparation among optional practices in Korea may also be underplayed, whereas second order social practices may be addressed more than other social practices such as basic social practices and optional practices, due to the pedantic orientation of Oriental elitism, which is called ‘Yang-Ban culture’. Perhaps, Korean education may be a typical case in which the focus has been on second order practices such as theoretical knowledge, and, thus, education in Korea has tended to be understood by, more or less, being isolated from pervasive social practices. This phenomenon was, like a rationalist education, the weakness of Korean education.

Hirst might think that the list of questions that I have raised are sociological questions, so that the issue of which social practices are important, in its nature, should be determined by social consensus or social traditions rather than by a philosophical

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10 I use a ‘shy’ culture for describing the general character of a certain culture. From the moral point of view, it would be replaced by the ‘shame’ culture that is often contrasted to the ‘guilt’ culture. See D. Tombs (1995).
argument. This may be right. Nevertheless, the issue of which social practices are important may be difficult to reach agreement on within a society, since the importance of some social practices is more or less clear, but some social practices are not obvious at all. What is more, even if we reach agreement as to which social practices are important, the issue of whether we should teach those social practices in the classroom is still open, since it is one thing to say that sexual practices, for instance, may be important basic practices; however, it is quite another to say that these sexual practices should be a component of the school curriculum and should be taught in the classroom.

In summary, for Hirst, what is obvious is his overall principle about the way education should be grounded, that is, all educational practices, from organising educational systems to teaching, 'can be rationally developed only in critically reflective experiment in practice itself'(1998, p. 19). In other words, educational practices should be grounded in social practices and such education requires practical reason, which is a capacity of critical reflection on the substantive practices in which one participates(1993a, p. 197). What is still not clear, however, is what it means specifically when we say that education should be an initiation into fundamental social practices.

3. Langford’s View

Lastly, let me turn now to what Langford counts as education as initiation into social practices. His conception of education as initiation into social practices is best understood writ small in terms of teaching. In other words, the meaning of education as initiation into social practices can be concretely revealed in the light of teaching practices, since teaching is aiming at bringing about education. Before exploring this, let me think about his overall picture of education as initiation into social practices. To this end, above all, it is necessary to discuss the relationship among education, persons and society in terms of social practices.

For Langford, put crudely, the relation among them may be characterised as internal. His argument goes as follows11. Persons as members of society are necessarily social and, thus, their actions are understood in terms of social reflection, not simply in abstraction

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11 This argument here relies on his 1985, pp.159-92; 1989, pp. 21-34.
from social reality. Social practices are carried on by their practitioners 'only within the broader context provided by a society' (1989, p. 22). We can say, therefore, that just as the relation of a society to its members is internal, so the relation of a social practice to its practitioners is, too. Engaging in social practices is possible only through practitioners. Practitioners, however, are themselves not social practices, but a part of social practices. Metaphorically speaking, the relationship between practitioners and social practices is similar to the relationship between an engine and a car. The importance of an engine is revealed and specified within a car as a whole, not vice versa. Similarly, the role and importance of practitioners cannot be fully understood unless through social practices as a whole to which practitioners belong. However, unlike an engine, practitioners have the capacity to see and enact social practices, they are not simply passive beings.

On the other hand, education is connected to learning to become a person in the society to which one belongs, i.e. a member of society. To become educated is, in short, 'to become a member of society and also to have learnt what it is to be and live as a member of that society' (1985, p.181). This implies that there are persons who are required in a particular society and thus education should be bringing about members of that society. Like Langford, when we see education in this way, there is an intimate relationship between education and society. According to him, education can be defined in terms of an instrument for performing social functions, whether 'perpetuating the society of which it is a part' or 'preparing individuals for a place in the society'. Seen in this way, major aims of education can be found in two social functions: it aims at looking backward to the past of the society to which it belongs, that is, it is 'a social practice carried on in accordance with a tradition and therefore looks to the past for its content and values'; and it aims at looking 'forward both to the lives which the persons becoming educated will live and to the future of the society in which they will live them' (1985, pp.184-85). Furthermore, when we see education in this way, the following question, i.e. 'what kind of education is important for the developing social practices?' may be more fundamental than 'which social practices are important for individuals?'

Seen in this way, one's good life seems to be entirely reliant on whether, through education, one learns and accepts social contents and values concerning how to live one's life as a member of society. If someone accepts social values that are reflected by current
social practices in a particular society and, thus, he or she lives as a good member of society, he or she would be called ‘an educated person’. To become an educated person is to live a good life. A good life involves accepting social values among one’s values, and it is only possible through initiating pupils into current social practices. This seems to presuppose that social values are valuable, and these values are given or taken for granted. Hence, one’s good life can be achieved through being initiated into current social practices and by accepting social values that are embedded in social practices.

The relationship among education, persons and society, in turn, lies in the following logic: to become educated is to become persons. To become persons means to become members of society. Education, in the end, can be properly defined in terms of social functions. When we see education in this way, however, we face some immediate questions. Is it right that education is entirely defined in terms of perpetuating a particular society? What then are the differences between education and socialisation? Indeed, as I mentioned, Langford is inclined to undermine the distinction between education and socialisation, although he does not deny it entirely. In this respect, we might say that his conception of education is tending excessively to address its social function.

Let me think now of Langford’s conception of education as initiation into social practices. Education, according to him, is defined as becoming persons who are expected to play a role as members of society. Whether or not this is correct, it is at least obvious that ‘education is essentially concerned with people as people’ (1985, p.72). What are the characteristics of educated people which he has in mind, when he says that education is concerned with people as people? How is this possible?

It is convenient to compare Langford’s educated people with Peters’ educated person and MacIntyre’s educated public. To begin with, let us consider Peters’ educated person and Langford’s educated people. These conceptions have in common that they stress the role of human beings in education rather than contents of education, and that the kind of persons concerned become possible through initiating pupils into cultural heritage or social practices. However, there are some differences. Firstly, Peters’ conception of the educated person is concerned with individuals who have cognitive perspectives, whereas for Langford, becoming educated persons is associated with becoming members of society. Secondly, Peters’ educated person is someone who is committed to the pursuit
of intrinsic value rather than extrinsic, whereas Langford’s educated persons do not necessarily exclude external values including social values. Rather, for Langford, external values which are necessary for society are often regarded as important ones. Langford and MacIntyre also have similarities in the following ways: they both address the educated group, the educated public or becoming educated persons, instead of the educated individual; the educated public and educated people are intimately connected to values of a particular society; and these persons are only possible through initiation into current social practices which are carried on in accordance with ongoing traditions. However, unlike MacIntyre, Langford’s educated persons do not necessarily possess certain virtues, although social practices themselves may assume certain underlying values.

What Langford means by ‘education as initiation into social practices’ can be more explicitly revealed by examining this in the light of the practices of school teaching in which we may see education writ small, since the overall purpose of school teaching is the bringing about of education or educating people. School teaching as a social practice, presumably, shows us a paradigmatic example of educational practices. But there is also a danger of restricting the boundary of social practices. When we take school teaching practices rather than educational practices, teaching can be defined as ‘a social practice carried on by teachers in accordance with a social tradition’ (1985, p.159).

If we take school teaching as a social practice, teachers’ role as agents or practitioners is important, since to understand social practices is to see them as their practitioners see them (1989, p. 30). Indeed, how social practices are carried on at the particular time in a particular society depends on teachers’ understanding of the overall purpose of those practices at that time in a particular society. The issue of how teachers understand current social practices is, therefore, a key to education that is understood as initiating children into these social practices. To say that teachers know the overall purpose of teaching presupposes that not only are they aware of current social practices which enter into education, but also they are ready to be committed to that purpose. To say that teachers understand current social practices that are pervasive and substantive in education means that they know ways of seeing and doing provided by ongoing social

12Downie et. al.(1975) also seem to discuss school teaching as a social practice, although they did not use the terminology of practice. Like Langford, they also seem to be saying that school teaching as a social practice is bringing about educated people.
In order to understand teachers' role in terms of social practices, therefore, it is necessary to understand teachers' role in relation to social traditions. Social traditions, on the one hand, provide teachers with a source of substantive social practices that students should be initiated into and, thus, with an overall purpose of teaching. On the other hand, social traditions may be changed by teachers' accumulating reflections on their teaching practices in which they have engaged and, thus, their overall purpose of teaching and even the conception of their overall purpose itself also could be modified. Hence, teachers are required to play a double role, that is, both to be sensitive to and reflective on the ongoing traditions of social practices. If teachers are not sensitive to the ongoing tradition of social practices, education in general and teaching in particular may be divorced from the real world's demands. If teachers ignore reflections on social practices as a whole, education may turn into the instrument for perpetuating a particular society or, at best, it would be 'socialisation'. In this sense, we might say that a good teacher should strike a balance between sensitiveness and reflectivity regarding the ongoing traditions of social practices to which he or she belongs.

For Langford, like MacIntyre and Hirst, it is obvious that education can be, or indeed should be, defined as initiating students into social practices. Unlike MacIntyre and Hirst, Langford understands the conception of education in the light of the conception of teaching that is defined as 'a social practice carried on by teachers in accordance with a social tradition'. This may be throwing light on the issues of which social practices are important and of who determines these. According to Langford (1989), social practices can be divided by the overall purpose for which they are undertaken into two kinds: 'theoretical' practices that are concerned with 'the acquisition of knowledge' such as biology; and 'practical' practices that are concerned with 'bringing about change' such as engineering. Perhaps, as Langford has recognised, many social practices may be 'both theoretical and practical' in that knowledge may be sought not merely 'for its own sake', but 'for the sake of the use' (p. 32). For Langford, the issues of which social practices students should be initiated into and of how to select these practices rely entirely on teachers who, as practitioners of social practices, know both the ongoing traditions of social practices to which they belong and how to achieve their
purposes. In other words, whether we are thinking of practical practices or theoretical practices, or whatever, the question of what kind of social practices are valuable is to be decided by teachers who have a shared overall purpose in accordance with the ongoing traditions of social practices in which they have engaged.

However, we should not understand Langford's conception of practices to be a more or less individualistic one because it addresses the teachers' role. For him, as I have indicated, what we should have in mind is that the teachers' role here is their role as practitioners of social practices and their role as practitioners lies mainly in initiating students into substantive social practices rather than creating or interpreting their own social practices, although this is, partly or implicitly, built into their role. From this point of view, although we admit that there is more or less progress, the following issues may be still problematic at the school education level: who is to decide, and how, when there is disagreement about the overall purpose of teaching as helping others to become educated or disagreement about what counts as becoming educated between teachers, between educational traditions, between geographical domains, between small societies or ethnic groups, etc. within a larger society? How are substantive social practices to be selected that entail educational values and, at the same time, are useful for becoming educated, when we encounter many different social practices carried on in a society and even encounter differences of scope within the same practices?

C. Discussion of Education as Initiation into Social Practices

In the previous section, I have tried to show what MacIntyre, Hirst and Langford mean by 'education as initiation into social practice'. To put this crudely, they have in common that education can be best understood in terms of social practices and, further, education should be defined as initiating pupils into social practices. However, their emphasis on that is slightly different from each other. The overall picture and comparison of their views may be drawn as <Figure 2>.
Let me explain the detail of each item briefly. Firstly, as we can see in <Figure 2>, MacIntyre, Hirst and Langford have slightly different conceptions of social practices. Whilst MacIntyre’s account of social practices is explicitly related to the internal goods and the virtues, Hirst’s and Langford’s accounts of social practices are not necessarily

![Figure 2: Comparisons of three views of 'education as initiation into social practices']

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>MacIntyre</th>
<th>Hirst</th>
<th>Langford</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concepts of Social practices</td>
<td>Virtue-oriented Internal goods Traditions</td>
<td>Patterns of activity people engage in for the good life</td>
<td>Social activities guided by perspectives provided by traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good lives</td>
<td>Harmony with the narrative unity of a human life, tradition and virtues</td>
<td>Engaging in the socially constructed rational practices for the satisfaction of wants</td>
<td>To live as good members of society who have social values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational aims</td>
<td>Person-oriented Educated public</td>
<td>Content-oriented Practical reasoning for the engagement in substantive practices</td>
<td>Person-oriented Educated persons (people)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents of Education</td>
<td>Wide (not confined)</td>
<td>Basic Optional Second order</td>
<td>Theoretical Practical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles of Selection</td>
<td>Ongoing social traditions</td>
<td>Practical reasoning</td>
<td>Practitioners who have overall purposes provided by tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Striking features</td>
<td>Internal goods and virtues</td>
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<td>Practitioners and social traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall forms of Education</td>
<td>Social + individual</td>
<td>Intellectual (rational), Individual</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<Figure 2> Comparisons of three views of 'education as initiation into social practices’
connected with the virtues or goods and, thus, are not confined to these. We may say, however, that Hirst and Langford also deal with virtues as elements of the complex package that practices are, or their account of social practices is, at least implicitly or contingently, related to social practices. We might say, in principle, that Hirst's and Langford's conceptions of social practices are broader than MacIntyre's in that their conceptions are not necessarily confined to the virtues or goods; however, in reality, the degree of conceptual difference is not so obvious, since we are unlikely to find that there are cases of social practice in Hirst's or Langford's sense which do not involve goods in MacIntyre's sense. Moreover, when we think of education in terms of social practices, we should admit that their views are very similar, because social practices into which people are initiated in education, presumably, should be valuable from the educational point of view. In this sense, we can say that social practices are assuming certain values, insofar as education is concerned. Hence, it is not surprising at all that their conceptions of social practices in an educational context do not appear so different.

Secondly, MacIntyre, Hirst and Langford have in common that all of them assume a certain kind of 'being educated' or 'educatedness' in relation to the good life; however, they have different views of the good life and being educated. MacIntyre's good life is directly connected with his account of social practices. That is, if someone is not only concerned with the achievement of internal goods, but also to live in harmony with his or her life as a whole and with traditions, which are socially and historically extended forms of the narrative unity of human lives, this is the good life. For MacIntyre, hence, it is natural that his educational aim is to create the educated public who have commitment to achieving internal goods throughout their whole lives and, further, who are to live in harmony with the social values provided by ongoing traditions of social practices. Langford's educational aim, like MacIntyre's, lies in bringing about educated persons or people rather than an educated individual. Like MacIntyre, that people become good members of society is an aim which can be only achieved by initiating students into social practices provided by social traditions. However, unlike MacIntyre, Langford's good life is inclined to underline communal elements. For Langford, the good life is often equated with living as a member of society and, therefore, education is, to some degree, regarded as socialisation. On the other hand, unlike MacIntyre and Langford,
Hirst emphasises the fact that education should involve initiation into substantive social practices that may constitute the good life, rather than a certain type of person. The good life depends on how to develop the practical rationality or reasoning, which is necessary for engagement in socially constructed rational practices. This may be different at every stage of history and society (1993a, p. 195).

Thirdly, from the perspective of educational content, paradoxically, MacIntyre does not have any suggestion as to which social practices can be included. He may think that any social practices can be educational contents, if they are associated with internal goods and the virtues and if they are in harmony with one’s whole life and social traditions. In this respect, he may see no need for categorising or restricting contents of education in terms of social practices. In this sense, insofar as educational content is concerned, we could say that his position is not clear. In contrast, Hirst and Langford provide us with a minimum clue as to which social practices can possibly be contents of education. For Langford, educational contents may involve ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ practices. The issue of which social practices can be included may be decided by overall purposes within a society. However, it must be said that this categorisation of Langford’s is for classifying social practices rather than for organising educational contents. From this point of view, his contribution on educational content is still not clear. Hirst, unlike Langford, is concerned with the composition of educational content. Having this intention, he divides social practices into three kinds, i.e. basic, optional and second order practices. Following Hirst’s suggestion, education is likely to involve varied basic practices, a wide range of optional practices and second order practices, although the issue of which practices should be included may be different depending on social traditions.

Regarding principles for which social practices people should be initiated into in education, MacIntyre seems to rely entirely on ongoing traditions mediated by internal debate within a society. This could be controlled by virtues. But as far as education is concerned, virtues, in fact, do not seem to be a powerful principle for the selection of educational contents, although they play a crucial role in the conception of social

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13 His examples of social practices, of course, can be categorised in the following ways: games (chess, football), productive activities (farming, architecture), intellectual activities (science, history), artistic pursuits (painting, music) and politics (creating political community). It is worth noting, however, that
practices. For Hirst, practical rationality or reason, which is a capacity to judge whether practices are valuable for the good life, may be regarded as a fundamental principle. The decision of which practices are important depends on practical reason, individually or collectively. For Langford, the selection of social practices depends, eventually, on practitioners who have an overall purpose provided by traditions through participating in social practices to which they belong. To sum up, they all agree with the overall principle that which social practices should be considered must rest on ongoing social traditions in which someone is engaged. But, specific principles, to some degree, may be different from each other, such as practical reason, practitioners’ overall purpose, etc.

Lastly, let me outline some striking features of the three writers’ theories and their overall picture of the social practices thesis in terms of education. In MacIntyre’s account of social practices, his most striking feature lies in his addressing the achievement of internal goods and its relation to the virtues. This gives social practices protection against corruption on the one hand, and on the other makes possible their continual development. From this point of view, education, explicitly or implicitly, underlies moral goods. Indeed, when we see education in terms of social practices, we would say that education must start from initiating students into significant social practices and, further, must move on to developing social practices. MacIntyre’s account of social practices provides us with the underpinning structure of this through pursuing the internal goods and referring to the virtues, and, further, through heeding ongoing traditions of social practices in which someone is engaged. What must not be confused are internal goods which are related to the engagement in the social practices in question and intrinsic goods that are more or less isolated from current social practices. Hence, what he might address in education is initiation into current social practices and ongoing traditions of social practices, not a transcendental good.

Like MacIntyre, Hirst assumes that education is linked to the good life and that it should grow out of social practices. To put this another way, the good life, individual or social, can be achieved by engaging in socially constructed rational practices and, thus, the role of education lies in developing the capacities, through which one is able to choose the most defensible practices and to reflect critically on various social practices.

MacIntyre does not seem to see these in relation to educational contents.
in the light of one’s desires and idea of the good life. To do this, the most important factor is to develop practical knowledge and practical rationality or reason. For Hirst, practical rationality that is based on practical knowledge is the most important element in selecting what is the ‘most defensible for present immediate wants and for the future development of the good life’ (1993, p.195). This seems to result in another form of rationalistic education, although Hirst would deny it, which is different from the type of liberal education that emphasises theoretical knowledge and theoretical rationality which I have criticised in Part I. Hirst is still inclined to address the individual’s knowledge, reason, criticality, rationality, etc. in education. What has really changed for him is that he stresses practical knowledge, practical reason, practical criticality, practical rationality instead of theoretical knowledge, theoretical reason, theoretical criticality, theoretical rationality, and so on. Namely, all he has changed is the object or purpose for which knowledge, reason, etc. are used. From this point of view, we may rightly raise the question: at what point is education that is based on theoretical knowledge and reason distinguished from that which is based on practical knowledge and reason? There may be a logically drawn distinction between these two views of education, but, in reality, the two forms of education may not be so different. Presumably, both views of education, at least to some extent, result in a rationalistic or an intellectual form of education.

Langford, unlike Hirst, has emphasised socialisation as an educational function. Indeed, for him, education is often equated with socialisation. His logic goes as follows: to be educated is to become a person. To become persons is to become members of society. To be members of society is to live as practitioners who are to assimilate social values as their own values and, thus, to acquire social ways of seeing and doing. To have social ways of seeing and doing is to know perspectives provided by ongoing social traditions. In order to know social perspectives, persons have to be initiated into ongoing social practices. Langford may be right in saying that education cannot be, properly or fully, understood detached from social phenomena and function. However, his claim goes farther than this. That is, it seems to me that he tends excessively to address social roles of education. Education cannot be fully understood apart from society, but education surely goes far beyond a simple socialisation. Ironically, one surprising thing in Langford’s position is, it seems to me, that he puts forward education as socialisation in
the light of school teaching as education writ small, although if we are thinking only of school education there is a risk that the boundaries of socialisation will be unduly restricted. However, this is hardly surprising, if we have in mind that school teaching is one of the effective, and influential, institutions of socialisation. This may be explained as follows. The issue of whether socialisation is successful or unsuccessful depends largely on how teachers as practitioners and agents of social practices play their role, if we see education as initiating pupils into social practices. Teachers are people who have overall purposes provided by traditions of social practices, and their main role is to lead their pupils to see and live social perspectives by initiating them into social practices. In this way, socialisation may proceed effectively and given social values can be reproduced. This interpretation of Langford's view of education in terms of social practices may be an extreme one. However, it is more or less obvious that his education overemphasises social functions. In this respect, we need to explore school education in general and teaching in particular in a balanced way in terms of social practices. This may show us the overall picture of 'education as initiation into social practices' in a fuller sense. In the next Chapter, I shall deal with this in more detail.

Before doing this, let me briefly put forward my view of education as initiation into social practices. This may be summarised as follows. Firstly, education as initiation into social practices is basically to be understood, beyond pointing out the fact that education is a social practice, as saying that education as a whole should be reflecting ongoing traditions of social practices at some substantial level. I have written 'at some substantial level', because education as initiation into social practices should be understood as a substantial principle and practice; however, to what degree we should reflect substantive social practices may be different from society to society. This implies that education is constituted by overlapping sets of social practices and that pervasive social practices and educational contents could be different according to society and tradition. Secondly, given a basic standpoint that education as initiation into social practices should be understood in a substantial sense, my overall picture of social practices-based education is as follows. I am inclined to assume, like other writers, that education is related to the good life in some sense. The good life here is not merely confined to the pursuit of individual goods, but it should be harmonious with social
goods. In this respect, I would rather say that education is a matter of bringing about a
good life which is characterised as the flourishing of society as a whole including the
development of social practices and the promotion of personal well-being. Hence, an
educational aim may be to bring up educated publics who are devoted to the flourishing
of society as a whole by engaging in ongoing traditions of social practices. We might
conclude, thus, that education is a complex social activity which through initiating
students into current pervasive social practices aims at bringing up educated publics who
will bring about the flourishing of society as a whole.
Chapter 7. Teaching as a Social Practice

In the previous Chapter, I have drawn the overall picture of ‘education as initiation into social practices’. This may be summarised as follows: education should reflect substantive social practices at a substantial level in accordance with ongoing traditions of social practices to which a person or a society belongs, although there are differences of degree according to societies and traditions. From this point of view, education, in turn, aims at bringing up educated publics who are committed to the flourishing society as a whole including social practices and individual goods through initiating learners into substantive social practices.

In this Chapter what I want to do is to explore the following question: when we see education as initiation into social practices, what would school education be like? This question implies a sequence of questions as follows: what is teaching as a social practice? How can we organise curriculum? How to select social practices as contents of education? How to teach social practices? (What are the roles of the teacher?) In short, the main task of this Chapter is applying ‘education as initiation into social practices’ to the practice of school education at a specific level.

Before tackling these questions, it is worth noting why we start with teaching as a social practice rather than other social practices in order to make explicit education as initiation into social practices. There are three reasons for this. The first reason lies in the importance of formal education. Education, of course, is not limited to formal education, it may include informal education. In particular, when we see education as initiation into social practices, informal education may be important, since social practices are regularly encountered outside school. For this reason, some would prefer to define education as bringing up or upbringing in a broad sense. This broader definition, however, may tell us nothing about the distinction between education and non-education. Whether or not we accept this, it is more or less obvious that formal education is everyone’s concern. Without consideration of school education, education as initiation into social practices may remain at a slogan level. Therefore, the issue of what school education would look like when we maintain that education should be an initiation into social practices is
central. Secondly, ‘education as initiation into social practices’ can be made clearer in the light of ‘teaching as a social practice’. As we saw in Chapter 6, although I tried to make clear what ‘education as initiation into social practices’ is, this is still not apparent partly due to the vagueness of the conception of ‘education’ and ‘social practices’, and partly due to the broadness and complexity of education. In contrast, teaching as a social practice is more or less clear compared with education, because the concept of teaching is relatively uncomplicated and teaching as a social practice is taken for granted. Thus, it may be helpful to consider what ‘teaching as a social practice’ means so as to get a fuller understanding of the thesis of education as initiation as social practices. Thirdly, as related to the second reason, ‘teaching as a social practice’ can specify what ‘education as initiation into social practices’ is through providing a concrete context. Indeed, an abstract meaning of ‘education as initiation into social practices’ may be made more specific and revealed with a clearer meaning, when it is applied to teaching as its concrete field.

A. The Nature of Teaching as a Social Practice

When we consider ‘teaching as a social practice’ in relation to ‘education as initiation into social practices’, the following issues may come up: how can we understand teaching as a social practice? How can we distinguish teaching as a social practice from other practices? What is the uniqueness of teaching as a social practice? In what ways does this throw light on the understanding of education as initiation into social practices?

To begin by asking the question ‘is teaching a social practice?’ may be a good starting point, since the other questions I raised above are dependent on this question. Is teaching a social practice? If so, what kind of social practice is it? To tackle this, let us briefly sketch the concept of teaching.

1. What is Teaching?

When we consider the concept of teaching, we often associate it with the concept of
learning as its counterpart concept. We find this in Hirst’s account of teaching. His account of teaching is always assuming specific teaching activities. He asked: ‘how are specific teaching activities to be distinguished from all other specific activities?’ ‘Why exactly is opening a window or sharpening a pencil not teaching?’(Hirst, 1974, p.102). According to him, this depends on how a person sees the activity, i.e. one’s purpose. He puts it:

The intention of all teaching activities is that of bringing about learning... It involves the claim that the concept of teaching is in fact totally unintelligible without a grasp of the concept of learning. It asserts that there is no such thing as teaching without the intention to bring about learning and that therefore one cannot characterise teaching independently of characterising learning. Until therefore we know what learning is, it is impossible for us to know what teaching is. The one concept is totally dependent on the other. Because of the tightest conceptual connection then, the characterisation and raison d’être of teaching rests on that of learning... Of course pupils may learn many things when a teacher is not in fact teaching. That is another matter... I wish to maintain therefore that the notion of teaching is totally dependent for its characterisation on the concept of learning and that this has important practical consequences for how teachers see their job and therefore for what they do in the classroom(Hirst, 1974, pp. 105-6).

Hirst’s arguments on teaching, as we can see from the passages quoted above, can be summarised in two claims: one is that the most crucial factor in teaching is the intention of teaching, which is to bring about learning. The other is the claim, closely linked to the first, that there is a logical relationship between teaching and learning. Let me briefly examine these in turn.

His first claim that the purpose of teaching is to bring about learning seems to be obvious, regardless of whether teaching activity is successful in bringing about learning or not. He seems to recognise that, from the premise that teaching must be directed towards the goal of learning, it does not follow that it always results in the intended learning. The causes of the failure or underachievement of the intended learning may

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14Hirst defines teaching as ‘the activity of a person, A(teacher), the intention of which is to bring about an activity(learning), by a person, B(the pupil), the intention of which is to achieve some end-state(e.g. knowing, appreciating) whose object is X(e.g. a belief, attitude, skill)’ (ibid., p.108).
involve other factors, such as the teacher’s teaching method, students’ intention, students’ ability and so on. The fact that teaching is a goal-oriented activity is identified in Langford and Pearson. For Langford, as we have seen so far, teaching is an activity for bringing about learning. Pearson (1989) also insists that a teacher’s intention to bring about learning is a necessary condition for a teaching activity. Teachers as a profession do intend the students to learn something, although teachers in a classroom are not always intending to bring about some learning, that is, teachers in a classroom are not always doing teaching activities. We should also admit that it is not true that only teachers can teach. A day-care centre worker may engage in teaching activities (p. 66). Notwithstanding, if we are to call something teaching, all teaching activity should involve, explicitly or at least implicitly, the intention of bringing about learning.

On the other hand, Hirst’s second claim that teaching is logically connected with learning might be arguable. Hirst seems to assume that the counterpart concept of teaching is learning and that there is a conceptual relationship between them. Pearson, by contrast, argues that ‘teaching is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for learning’, because ‘teaching is not a necessary condition for learning’ in that ‘learning can take place without teaching’ or professional teachers and teaching is also ‘not a sufficient condition for learning’ in that ‘teaching does not imply learning’. Teaching can occur without learning, just as learning can also occur without intentional teaching (Pearson, 1989, p.79). However, Pearson may confuse two different claims about a logical connection between teaching and learning: a) ‘if teaching takes place, this logically implies that learning takes place, and b) ‘we cannot understand the meaning of teaching without understanding the meaning of learning’. If Hirst’s claim is a), this may be false. But Hirst’s claim is b) rather than a) and, thus, Hirst’s assertion may be true even though a) is false.

Is, then, Hirst’s understanding of the relation between teaching and learning satisfactory in terms of social practices? Of course, Hirst’s assertion shows a logical truth about teaching and learning; however, he does not furnish us with an understanding of teaching as a social practice in which teachers engage. By contrast, being dissatisfied with Hirst’s conceptual analysis of teaching and learning, some would suggest a causal or
factual relationship between them. Seen in this way, teaching can be a causal, perhaps an effective, factor in learning. In particular, when we imagine school teaching or professional teaching, the relationship between teaching and learning may firmly be revealed, because a teacher's role as a professional is characterised as intending to bring about learning. However, we should not think that teaching is always bringing about successful learning, because teaching is a polymorphous activity and thus for effective or successful teaching other factors are needed.

What we should not ignore is that, whether we take a logical or causal relationship, there is a possibility of unsatisfactory results in terms of social practices. The (over)emphasis on a logical relationship in school education might be inadequate in seeing the vivid dynamic relationship that can emerge between teaching and learning activity. On the contrary, the emphasis on a causal or factual relation may be apt to overlook the intimacy of the relationship between teaching and learning. How to overcome this dilemma?

One of the best ways may be to see teaching as a social practice in which teachers are engaging. Teachers' activities here, of course, involve teachers' intention in that teachers have their overall purposes in accordance with ongoing traditions to which they belong. This intention, on the one hand, fits with pupils' own desires or interests in that the teachers' intention is not divorced from the real world in which they live. On the other hand, the teachers' intention can meet social demands in that teachers' overall purposes are reflections of current social practices and social traditions. This leads us to see teaching as a social practice.

2. Is Teaching a Social Practice?

Let me move on now to the issue of whether teaching is a social practice and if so, what kind of social practice it is. In fact, implicitly or explicitly, I have regarded teaching

15 It is necessary to make clear that a causal relation is different in kind from logical relation. We can say that 'X is a causal condition of Y if it is necessary or sufficient for occurrence of Y', i.e. X is empirically necessary to bring about Y; in contrast, 'X is a logical condition of Y if a thing's being X is logically necessary or sufficient for its being describable as Y', i.e. X is conceptually related to Y (Downie et al., 1974, p. 74).
as a social practice. But is all teaching a social practice? This may not be so. An isolated instance of teaching can be called a teaching activity, but this does not yet make it a social practice, just as not all (social) activities constitute social practices. Isolated instances of teaching themselves are, to use MacIntyre’s terms, more like bricklaying than like architecture. When we see teaching as a social practice, teaching means professional teaching, school teaching or university teaching. In this sense, our question can be modified into ‘is teaching as a profession a social practice?’ The brief sketch of this question seems to be helpful in understanding the nature of teaching as a social practice more clearly. If teaching is a social practice, as I suggested in Chapter 5, it must meet the following four conditions\textsuperscript{16}: i) a coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activities, ii) a wider understanding of rules and teleoaffective structures, iii) achievement of internal goods and standards of excellence iv) development of a particular practice in accordance with ongoing traditions. Is teaching a coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity? Is teaching a social activity which is based on a broad understanding of rules and teleoaffective structures? Does teaching promote the achievement of internal goods? Does teaching have its own developed traditions?\textsuperscript{17}

To begin with, let us think of whether teaching is ‘a coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activities’. This condition involves at least three elements: complex human activities, coherent human activities and socially established human activities. Accordingly, if some human activities are to be considered social practices, the activities should be not very simple ones, like kicking, but more or less complicated ones, like playing football, although there are still differences of degree. The activities should have not merely a complex form but also coherence within them. Furthermore, the activities as practices should be socially established by cooperation.

Does teaching, then, satisfy these conditions? Teaching, at least school teaching, obviously meets these conditions, because school teaching is not only a complicated social activity which is grounded in the relationship between teachers and pupils, but it

\textsuperscript{16}I am here following the five criteria which I listed on pages 129 and 132. But for the convenience of the argument, I have here compressed ‘human activities’(i) and ‘social nature’(iv) to a single criterion, i.e. ‘social human activities’(i).

\textsuperscript{17}Pearson(1989) also examines teaching as a social practice in terms of internal goods, standards and rules of teaching. For the details, see pp. 88-93.
is also a socially well-developed activity systematised through long periods. It, therefore, cannot be fully understood in isolation from the background of educational institutions in which it occurs. Indeed, teaching is mainly established and developed by cooperation and ongoing internal debates within practitioners in a social practice of teaching. Hence, to engage in teaching activity is to become a participant as a practitioner in a public activity that is shared by other practitioners. These are necessary, not contingent, features of teaching as a profession. Teaching is, therefore, essentially a social practice. Teachers as agents of social practices (like chess players though the demands on them are more complicated than those on chess players) engage in a wide range of social activities in the course of pursuing their practice and their ways of seeing and doing are derived from traditions deeply embedded in the institutional settings in which teachers work. This entails that teachers change and improve their practice reflecting critically on the traditions of thought shaping their own practical experience (Langford, 1985, p.12).

Secondly, related to the first point, teaching activities certainly involve some kind of understandings, rules and teleaffective structures which Schatzki calls ‘integrative’ practices. Teaching activities as a profession presuppose that teachers as practitioners or agents have some understanding of students, institutions, educational aims, subjects, teaching methods, etc., and that teachers do teach in accordance with these understandings. Indeed, in an educational context, wider ranges of understandings regarding teaching and its related knowledge are necessarily required. According to Pearson (1989, pp. 93ff), they involve causal knowledge, normative knowledge, experiential knowledge, subject matter knowledge and general knowledge. Presumably, practical reasoning based on this knowledge is very important, since teaching is a complex social practice. It is important for the teacher to recognise, above all, that teaching should stand firmly on the integrative understanding of the social practice of teaching.

All transmission activities are not necessarily composed of teaching activities. Teaching as a social practice may be a kind of rule-following activity; however, it is quite different from that of playing chess in that what is constitutive of teaching is mainly the intention of teaching rather than the rules of teaching. In this respect, we would say that the rules of teaching are by and large, if not totally, using Pearson’s term, ‘strategic’
rather than 'basic'(p.93). We might say, therefore, that, in the practice of teaching, the successful achievement of learning on the part of students must be important. Furthermore, strategies for this may also be crucial, since education in general and teaching in particular are connected with moral good; however, there may be controversial issues involved in what is to be accepted as the standards and what counts as appropriate strategic rules for teaching. Some strategies for that may be accepted, others are rejected(ibid.). To conclude, the fact that teaching is a rule-following activity is more or less clear; however, to specify the specific rules is not easy, because of their strategic nature.

Thirdly, the fact that teaching is necessarily concerned with the achievement of internal goods is clear. It is also not difficult to identify external goods of teaching, such as money, status, prestige, and the like, because they can be achieved without engaging in the practice of teaching. What is really difficult is to identify what exactly the internal goods of teaching are. Are there any internal goods of teaching which can only be achieved by engaging in that practice? We can think of some possibilities. One could think of the intention and result of bringing about learning. However, what teachers intend in bringing about learning might be various, such as knowledge or skill, critical thinking, autonomy, serving God, and so on. But the intention to bring about learning may not be the internal good, since having this intention seems too easy to be an internal good which teachers can be striving to achieve. Furthermore, learning itself cannot be the internal good, since the learning is external to the teaching. One could think of excellence of teaching as the internal good of teaching. Presumably, to teach well – for instance, a teacher’s clear, precise and logical teaching- may be to achieve internal goods of teaching. This teaching, generally speaking, would be better than illogical teaching. But it does not follow that logical teaching always brings good outcomes and thus is appropriate to all learners, since outcomes and appropriateness might be different according to learners’ dispositions and ages. This shows us why what constitutes an excellence of teaching is so complex and controversial. To sum up, what is clear is that the internal goods of teaching should be identified, specified and achieved by participating in the practice of teaching. However, their specifications are less clear. They may be by and large dependent on ongoing social traditions to which one belongs and
thus they will vary according to social traditions in a broad sense.

Lastly, one of the striking features of a social practice might be progression in the social practice itself. This is the requirement of the development and articulation, through ongoing traditions, of the ‘practice itself’, of ‘understanding’ of the practice and of the ‘situation’ in which the practice takes place (Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p. 165). This condition might not be a necessary or conceptual requirement of teaching as a social practice in a strict sense, because some teachers may not try to improve their practice, although teachers ought to be always concerned with the improvement of their own practice. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the possibility of improvement is inherent in the practice, even if individual practitioners are not trying to improve. Indeed, many of the things which teachers do consist of a part of practices, and the practices are more or less elaborated and improved through ongoing traditions of practices in which they engage.

In this case, of course, we can ask: how do standards of improvement relate to standards of excellence? As far as teaching is concerned, we may say that the standards of improvement are not so strict and straightforward, but rather flexible and open-ended in that the standards might be different depending on judgements made about teachers’ achievement and who makes the judgements. The standards might appear differently from the teacher’s and learner’s perspective. Let us think of a case: a student obtained historical perspectives, but failed to gain good scores at the university-entrance examination. In this case, from the teachers’ perspective, the teaching of history is successful, because the reason for teaching is for students to acquire the historical viewpoint. In contrast, from the student’s point of view, he or she may not satisfied with the results. Take another example. When certain teaching activities bring a good result in some students, but not in other students, how can we judge whether these teaching activities are successful or not? It may be controversial. On the other hand, the criteria of judgements might also vary from one society to another society, from certain periods to other periods within a society. For instance, for fundamentalist Muslims, their standards, presumably, are strictly limited religious matters whereas for the British standards will be very flexible. Within Britain, the standards will be quite different between the Victorian Ages and the current pluralist society. Hence, in short, the
standards of excellence and progress in the practice of teaching are not static, but rather they may undergo change over time and should be established through ongoing debates between practitioners who engage in the practice of teaching.

So far I have argued why teaching is a social practice. Our conclusion is that teaching can be considered as a social practice involving dynamic interactions between pupils and teachers, although details of it involve many complex and controversial arguments. What is more, as Langford insists, we could say that ‘teaching is best understood as a social practice carried on by teachers in accordance with a tradition and, therefore, that specific teaching activities owe much of their character to their place in such a practice’ (Langford, 1985, p. 136). Although I have tried to show that teaching as a profession is basically a social practice, it still needs to be considered what teaching as a social practice means, how it can be distinguished from other practices and why it is important in an educational context.

3. Understanding Teaching as a Social Practice.

In order to get a fuller understanding of teaching as a social practice, it is helpful to begin with Langford’s account of a social practice, that is, teaching as a social practice can be understood as an activity engaged in by teachers in accordance with a tradition. As I pointed out in Chapter 6, his account of teaching as a social practice shows the overall picture of teaching as a social practice, although he overemphasised social factors. In order to understand his account of teaching as a social practice, it is necessary to explain the crucial terms ‘engaged in’, ‘teachers’ and ‘tradition’ and their relationships. Indeed, these terms show us what is meant by teaching as a social practice and their relationship within it.

It is necessary to address, above all, that teaching as a social practice is also, like other practices, a specific social activity ‘engaged in’ by practitioners, mainly teachers. In other words, insofar as teaching is a social practice, teaching must be focused on specific social practices themselves in which teachers engage rather than other social practices from which teachers are disengaged. This may have implications for the content of education. Indeed, the question of which social practices students should be initiated
into should come from social practices in which teachers have engaged\textsuperscript{18}. Therefore, the criteria of whether a practice is successful or not are generated in the practice itself and, further, the development and the elaboration of social practices also rely largely on ongoing traditions of social practices in which teachers engage.

The second element I shall consider, as it is closely related to the first, is tradition. Teaching has its own history and tradition that is constituted by the accumulating social practices in which teachers engage. This tradition provides not only directions for what to do and how to do it at a particular time as well as in the future by providing the way of seeing and doing, but also criteria for what social practices are successful through showing accumulated and articulated traditions of social practices. In this respect, teaching is inevitably confined within the broader context provided by the society and its tradition to which teachers belong. However, as pointed out in Chapter 5, we should not make the mistake of thinking that traditions are static, since the practice of teaching, as we can see in the case of teaching science with its paradigm shifts, has changed or developed.

The third important point in the understanding of teaching as a social practice might be the teacher who is a practitioner and agent of teaching as a social practice. It is difficult for children to understand social practices properly in school without practitioners’ perspectives, which practitioners see by interpreting ongoing traditions of social practices, since social practices themselves do not have ‘bodies’ or ‘organisms’ (Langford, 1989, p.22, p.30). This, however, needs to be cautiously interpreted. Langford holds the view that social practices reflect and decide the character of teachers as their practitioners, not vice versa (ibid., p. 26). From this point of view, the role of teachers lies in seeking the overall purpose of teaching from ongoing traditions of social practices and in initiating pupils into social practices in accordance with the overall purpose.

In the light of the above arguments, the relation of teaching as a social practice to practitioners(teachers), and to traditions of social practices here is internal. This can

\textsuperscript{18}This could also have implications for what kind of people are teachers. In an academic curriculum, it is necessary that, for instance, teachers of history should be people who have engaged in doing history. But this does not deny the fact that there are many social practices, which may be important in education, which many teachers may not have engaged in. As a matter of fact, not all teachers of environmental education are engaged in environmental action.
be explained as follows: teaching as a social practice is carried on by teachers as practitioners. What teachers as practitioners do is to initiate students into current pervasive social practices in accordance with the overall purpose of teaching. And the overall purpose of teaching and the content of teaching are provided by ongoing traditions of social practices.

In a similar way, Hirst (1990, pp. 80ff) characterises the nature of teaching as a social practice as follows: firstly, teachers engage in the social practices; secondly, what teachers teach is dominant and successful practices; thirdly, successful practices are generated and developed in practice itself no matter what subject and area we are concerned with; and lastly, criteria of successful practices ‘must necessarily be developed in this process and knowledge and control of human and social affairs are of the essence of successful social practices’ (p. 81). Like Langford, Hirst assumes that teaching is a result of the ongoing social practices in which teachers engage. Beyond Langford, he indicates which social practices students should be initiated into. According to him, they are ‘successful’ social practices. They are always generated and developed within social practices themselves and justified by traditions of social practices. The choice of successful social practices depends heavily on teachers’ judgement or, on some occasions, this may be clearly revealed by social traditions.

When we see teaching as a social practice rather than in other ways, some strong points may be found: it can be faithful to the concept of teaching itself; it may be a possible way of bridging the theory/practice divide. First of all, as I have mentioned above, the social practice of teaching that may best be identified by participating in the activity is internally related to the concept of teaching. Teachers’ activities, social practices and the contents of teaching are interrelated, so that it can be possible to provide a well-balanced education that contains a logical coherence among teaching, social traditions, educational contents and teachers and, at the same time, shows the dynamic relation which can occur among them. What is more, it is possible to escape the fallacies both of the rationalist approach and of the emotivist or relativist approach by grounding education on engagement in social practices themselves, not on universal reason nor individual feelings.

Secondly, teaching as a social practice might provide an important clue as to how
we are to envisage the relationship between theory and practice. The debate between theory and practice in education 'comes down to the nature of teaching as a social practice' (Pearson, 1989, p.127). That is, the issue of how theory and practice are related in education can be seen as how the teacher initiates pupils into current pervasive social practices. Teaching as a social practice contributes to our understanding of the relation of theory to practice by showing us that education should start from a consideration of current social practices in which teachers engage, and by suggesting which social practices pupils should be initiated into. I shall be saying more about how the social practices view bears on the theory/practice divide in Chapter 8.

So far, I have tried to show that teaching as a social practice should be understood in terms of the internal relation among social practices as contents of education, teachers as practitioners, and ongoing traditions of social practices as sources of criteria for internal goods and standards of excellence of teaching and of conceptions of the overall purpose of teaching. It should be acknowledged, however, that the nature of teaching as a social practice is not always clear. Of course, teaching as a social practice is clearly distinguished from other social practices, such as medicine, architecture, science, logic, etc., in terms of the overall purpose of practitioners who engage in the specific social practice. For instance, the overall purpose of teaching is to bring about learning, whereas that of medicine is to bring about healing or curing ill creatures and architecture aims at designing buildings, science at understanding scientific phenomena, and so on.

The following two cases need to be approached carefully. Some would regard indoctrination, conditioning, preaching etc. as teaching or part of teaching in a broad sense. At first glance, these activities in a broad sense could be called teaching in that they are interpreted as bringing about learning something. But in a strict sense, these activities are distinguished from teaching in terms of their overall purposes. For instance, teaching is geared to 'turn children into adults', whereas indoctrination is geared to make them 'into perpetual children' (Hare, 1964, p.69). Conditioning aims at shaping one's particular behaviour or belief. Preaching is interested in belief in certain religious doctrines. Think about other examples outside school teaching, such as teaching someone to drive, teaching swimming, and so on. These examples can be regarded as social practices in that these are more or less complex social activities, with their own internal
goods, standards of excellence, rules, etc. However, we can hardly say that these practices are other instances of the same practice of teaching. They may be quite different social practices, since the practitioners, their internal goods and overall purposes, their traditions of social practices, etc. are fairly different, although we sometimes use ‘teaching’ of them.

The following examples apparently show us how far teaching as a social practice is not clear. Let us take three cases: a hospital nurse and a nursery nurse; a nursery nurse and a nursery teacher; and a nursery teacher and a university teacher. For the first case, they have common that they both must be engaged in nursing as a social practice for the purpose of caring for clients. Their tasks, nevertheless, might be quite different. Indeed, a hospital nurse’s task, presumably, may be to do typical work as a nurse, like injection, measuring pressure of blood and so on, whereas a nursery nurse’s routine is to help children to play, like a teacher. For the second case, unlike the first case, the role of a nursery teacher and that of a nursery nurse are similar, although they have a different job and intend to engage in different social practices. Perhaps, the nurse’s internal goal is to care for children who are ill, mentally or physically, whereas the teacher’s main task is to teach the whole person. In a nursery school, the nurse’s role is not entirely different from that of an assistant teacher. In the last case, a university teacher and a nursery teacher might engage in quite different practices, although they have teaching in common. The teacher in the university will provide students with critical thinking through lectures and discussions, whereas a nursery teacher’s role is mainly playing with pupils. In this case, we may raise the following questions: is it possible to engage in different practices within the same practice, if the field of practice is different? In a nursery nurse and a hospital nurse and a nursery teacher and a university teacher, are their practices different practices or different parts of the same practice? Is it possible to engage in the same practice within different practices, if the field of practice is similar? How can we distinguish a nurse’s role from a teacher’s role in the nursery? This line of questions shows us that teaching as a social practice in the concrete context, like other practices, is less obvious than we might think.

Secondly, some difficulties of teaching as a social practice can also arise, when we teachers initiate children into successful or crucial social practices, since teachers
have different views as to what social practices are successful or crucial. Some teachers would think that what should be taught to students is rationality whereas other teachers would think that what teachers teach to students is social co-operation, though they are both engaged in the practice of teaching. This disagreement might often emerge under present conditions in which educational traditions have radically changed, since social practices are not static but ongoing and debatable within traditions, and, further, many different practices are carried on at the various times and places. Under this situation, to grasp the most defensible social practices into which students should be initiated may be controversial. There is inevitably the possibility that different teachers might be judging different practices to be successful out of those which are currently available in this area. This is one factor for making it difficult for us to understand teaching as a social practice. This difficulty may also arise when we tackle curriculum issues that I shall deal with in the next section. Before doing this, let me briefly make clear the relation of teaching to education.

4. Teaching and Education

The relationship between teaching and education is not simple, since their relation might be differently interpreted depending on how we define the notions of ‘teaching’ and ‘education’. All kinds of teaching, as I have mentioned, are not necessarily constitutive of teaching as a social practice, and are not necessarily bringing about educated people. Education can also be defined in various ways. This, sometimes, refers to formal education or school education, sometimes it refers to informal education and, sometimes, it refers to formal and informal education all together. Their relationship also may be different according to different writers. Peters and Hirst(1970) seems to assume that teaching is not logically related to education, although learning is so(p.77). For Langford, the connection between teaching and education seems to be not a logical but contingent relation in that the questions ‘what is teaching’ and ‘what is education’ can be treated as separated questions. Is there any strong relationship between teaching and education? Formal education and teaching as a profession may be the case where there is.
Formal education and teaching as a profession are internally related. The logic for this runs as follows: schools are central institutions devised for the students' education. Teachers are professionals who are sent to the school for educating students. What professional teachers do within the institutions is to teach students in order to bring about educated people. This logic, however, might face some objections. Some aims of teachers might not be directly related to education\(^\text{19}\). Moreover, teachers do sometimes fail in bringing about educational achievement; however, at least in terms of the overall purpose, that is chiefly bringing about learning which is connected with education, where the contents of learning are composed of social practices, we can say that teaching is logically related to education, regardless of the results of the teaching activity. Indeed, teaching is only a genuine profession to the extent that teachers are, according to Langford, able to make the educational quality of teaching their central professional concern\((1985, \text{p. 18})\).

We may say that teaching as a profession can be regarded as part of school education and, further, a typical case of school education. Put another way, teaching as a social practice is part of educational practices and, further, a typical educational practice. In this respect, we may get a clearer picture of education as social practices by exploring the practice of teaching as a profession, although there is always the possibility of a danger that education as social practices might unjustly be limited to school education. If we do not make this fallacy, to explore teaching as a social practice is helpful for grasping the specified picture of 'education as initiation into social practice'. In the next section, I shall tackle some curriculum issues and the teaching process which are central parts of teaching.

B. Selecting Curriculum Content and Teaching Process

In the previous section, I have sketched the overall nature of teaching as a social

\(^{19}\)According to Downie, et. al., teacher's aims are divided into five kinds: 'personal aims', e.g. opportunity for playing badminton; 'ancillary aims', e.g. encouraging his pupils to take an interest in their personal appearance; 'intrinsic aims', e.g. cultivating the mind; 'extrinsic aims', e.g. fitting pupils for employment; and 'complementary aims', e.g. learning chess. What this analysis of the aims of teaching as an occupation shows is, for present purposes, that all activities of teachers as professionals are not always directly related to education\((1974, \text{pp. 4-7})\).
practice. When we consider teaching as a social practice at a concrete level, it may include the following aspects: aims of education, selection of the content of curriculum\(^{20}\), and the process of teaching. I have discussed in Chapter 6, to some extent, the aims of education in terms of social practices. All that I am concerned with here is the issues of selecting curriculum content and teaching process. Indeed, selecting curriculum content and curriculum development and teaching are not two distinct processes. Rather, the former is an essential part, and natural process, of teaching activity. In this section, therefore, I shall focus on how to select curriculum content and what the teaching process might be like, when we organise the curriculum in terms of social practices. What kind of contents will be included? What is the best way of organising the content of education? Which social practices are important, so that pupils need to be initiated into them? What are the differences between a subjects-based curriculum and a social practices-based curriculum in terms of (the selection of) the content of curriculum and teaching process?

1. Insufficiency of the Cognitive Domain as the Content of Curriculum

Let us start by discussing the scope of the content of education in schools. When we consider the content of education in schools, we are inclined to confine it to the cognitive domain, that is, knowledge as the basis of classroom practices. This tendency has been profoundly influenced by the Peters-Hirstian conception of liberal education, regardless of whether their intention was so. Indeed, Peters' emphasis on cognitive criteria of the conception of education, i.e. knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective, and Hirst's emphasis on forms of knowledge tempted us to think of the cognitive domain as the educational content. Their theory seemed to end up as an unjustly narrowed interpretation of Wittgenstein's 'language-games'.

Wittgenstein's idea of language-games seems to be interpreted in two ways: in a literal-narrow way and in a broad way. The narrow sense of language-games in education, used by some liberal educators, tends to stress certain theoretical or rational

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\(^{20}\) I mainly use the term 'selecting or organising (the) curriculum (content)' at school or classroom level, rather than at an educational policy level. I am not directly concerned with the political issues of who organises the curriculum and who decides the curriculum content.
practices. To put this another way, liberal educators who take the narrow sense of language-games are often concerned with how to teach a language-game in a purely linguistic sense or, at best, how to understand disciplines, which are reflected in several forms of language-games. The Peters-Hirstian earlier view that stressed, at least implicitly, the understanding of the forms of knowledge or disciplines as language-games may be an example. Their logic seems to run as follows: education is connected to the understanding of forms of life. Understanding forms of life is possible through forms of knowledge or disciplines as several distinctive forms of language-game. Therefore, education is inevitably linked with the understanding of forms of knowledge or disciplines.

This may be called into question: can forms of life be reduced to the forms of knowledge or disciplines? Forms of life certainly involve several forms of knowledge or disciplines which, so far as language is concerned, are embodied in particular language-games. However, forms of life go far beyond even such a liberal sense of language-games. We may say thus that language-games in a literal or narrow sense lead us to the narrow sense of education as initiating students into several given forms of knowledge or disciplines. The aims of this education may lie in a better understanding of several given subjects and thus the content of education is inevitably restricted to the cognitive domain that can mainly be expressed in (propositional) knowledge. In this respect, we may rightly raise the question: is there any good reason for limiting the content of education to the cognitive domains? Why not skills, actions, emotions, and so on? This question leads us to take a broad sense of language-games.

Language-games in a broad sense are seen as a reflection of forms of life. For present purposes, this could be expressed as a constituent part of social practices. In this sense, as I have taken it in section B of Chapter 5, the claim that education is a kind of language-game means that education should primarily be understood in terms of forms of life or social practices, rather than forms of knowledge or disciplines. This may at least in terms of the scope of content be a quite different picture from that in which education is seen as an understanding of forms of knowledge. Seen in this way, education is not limited to the theoretical knowledge or practices that are mainly expressed in the several

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21Wittgenstein says: 'to imagine language is to imagine a form of life' (PI, s., 19).
forms of subjects. Of course, to some degree, school subjects might be useful in revealing glimpses of our life, but they may inevitably have some limitations in the fuller understanding of forms of life as a whole, since real life is not always packaged by (the language of) subjects and, thus, we cannot fully grasp real life as a whole through understanding given subjects. For instance, think of the ten subjects of the National Curriculum (three core subjects: English, mathematics, science; seven foundation subjects: history, geography, art, music, physical education, technology and, at secondary level, a modern foreign language). We never think that these subjects involve whole forms of the human world, or even that they reflect current social practices of our society. In this respect, initiating students into forms of knowledge or subjects may not enable them to understand the real world as a whole, or even to cope with real-world problems. How can we escape this difficulty?

One might think that Gardner’s multiple intelligence theory may enable us to construct a broader content of education through including many other kinds of intelligent human activities, which are neglected in conventional intelligence tests. According to him, human intelligences are composed of seven (or eight) kinds of multiple intelligences, i.e. linguistic intelligence, musical intelligence, logical-mathematical intelligence, spatial intelligence, bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, interpersonal intelligence, intrapersonal intelligence and possibly naturalist and spiritual intelligence (Gardner, 1993, part two). Gardner here extends the scope of the cognitive domain so that it includes these other intelligencies such as bodily-kinesthetic, personal and spiritual intelligence. This may suggest that the scope and content of curriculum should be extended in terms of (a broad sense of) human abilities. However, Gardner still does not consider other domains22, that is, he does not give a clear answer as to why human beings should be understood and evaluated in terms of intelligence rather than values, emotions, skills, etc. From this perspective, we may say that Gardner’s theory, like the Peters-Hirstian, is rooted in a similar intellectual ground.

In contrast to the intellectual tendency in education, someone might think of the content of education as action. Action research may be an example. Action research,

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22D. Goleman (1995) suggests that ‘emotional maturity’ may be more important than ‘intelligence’ in predicting one’s performance. For a fuller discussion of Gardner’s multiple intelligences from a critical stance, see White (1998a). One interesting point is the fact that he criticises multiple intelligence theory and
unlike liberal education, sees education as 'a process which centrally engages practitioners in improving aspects of educational practice'. This process 'becomes a prescription for action'. It thus is natural that action research is concerned with utilising a school based curriculum (Grundy, 1987, p. 50). This action research may contribute to educational theory as a whole in that it offers an internal relationship among conceptions of education, practitioner and educational practice. However, action research in educational practice too often emphasises 'practice' itself rather than 'education' or 'educational practice', so that there might be a danger of losing balance (Walsh, 1993, p. 45). There is also a risk of confining too narrowly the sense of social practices in relation to educational content and teaching process, by focussing on specific teaching activity and the teacher's role rather than education as a whole.

It must be said that both these two extreme positions, whether education as initiating students into forms of knowledge or as action research, may be flawed at least in seeing education as confined to school education, regardless of whether they stress knowledge or action. When we see education as 'initiation into social practices', school education is certainly important. It is also, however, necessary to consider life-long education in general and education outside school in particular, since the initiation of people into social practices can occur throughout the whole of working life and beyond that.

What contents, then, can be possibly involved in social practices-based education? Of course, theoretical practices, like a variety of knowledge, can be included. Other kinds of human social practices, involving for instance affective domain and conative domain may also be included. Contents of education in terms of social practices include a variety of aspects of human life, such as thinking, creativity, feelings, emotions, passions, actions, dispositions, habits and so on, not restricted to the cognitive or (purely) linguistic domain. To put this in Bourdieu's way, 'all habituses' which are products of social practices may be contents of education, although he is interested in understanding social phenomena from the perspective of social practices rather than passing on good social practices or a particular kind of social practice.\footnote{This may also be Bourdieu's (and perhaps most sociologists') limitation. He may give a plausible description that all education (including academic or liberal education) is inevitably some kinds of social Hirst's forms of knowledge theory on the same lines.}
So far I have argued that the content of education should not be limited to the cognitive domain. Rather, it includes teleoaffective structures such as virtues, emotions, dispositions, habituses and actions. What then does this mean? If we include these elements in education, is this sufficient for the content of education? It is more or less clear that the content of education should include not only the cognitive domain, but also affective and conative domains, and that 'a mere list' of the aspects of human life, like a cafeteria menu, may be not enough for the content of education. Rather, the content of education in terms of social practices must be integrated into forms of life in general and aspects of experience in particular. Think of how we select academic or vocational subjects, for instance. We can hardly think that the content of education should consist of either academic or vocational subjects. This may be not enough. Rather, curricula should be designed to eliminate the gap between academic and vocational, since the two concepts are deeply melted into our social life. That is to say, various human aspects in education should be an integral part of the whole educational process.

2. Some Limits of White's Compulsory Thesis

Just as the assertion that the content of education is not confined to the cognitive domain but should be integrated into social practices as a whole seems more or less obvious, so does the assertion that the content of education, in whatever ways, should inevitably be selective, if it is impossible to initiate pupils into all social practices. Chess, for example, may not be included as a major content of the school curriculum. At best, it may be included as an extra-curricular activity in school education, although it must be a social practice. (In this regard, MacIntyre's chess example would be a disaster in terms of the content of curriculum.) Why cannot chess be a major subject, whereas mathematics is so? Is there any possibility of excluding mathematics from the school curriculum? Which social practices are important, so that people should be initiated into them in school? How to (and who) decides them?

To tackle these problems, to examine White's distinction between Category I and
II activities may be helpful, because this distinction seems to provide a useful philosophical argument for determining the content of the school curriculum at least in two ways. Firstly, it suggests one possible way of deciding which items are more (or less) important within education and thus which items should be selected in curriculum contents. Secondly, the idea of engagement in activities, which is his criterion for drawing the distinction, is especially relevant when we are considering social practices, although these two approaches are quite different.

Before examining White's distinction, it is worth noting two points. The first point is that one of his contributions in relation to the content of education seems to lie in using 'activity-words', although he does not seem to recognise seriously the importance of this term. This implies that the content of education can be determined in terms of engaging in activities and, thus, that educational activities can (or should) be defined in terms of social practices, regardless of whether he recognises this or not. This may bring about a substantive change in teaching practice. For instance, so-called academic subjects or theoretical subjects, such as mathematics and science, can be seen as something teachers and pupils do, not as a lump of information that teachers inculcate into pupils' memory. This, in the end, helps to bridge the gap between studying mathematics and doing mathematics, between studying science and doing science, and so on.

The second point is that White's distinction and a social practice-based curriculum may be different in terms of their starting point. White seems to have an assumption that education is concerned with a personal flourishing life. For White, personal or individual flourishing life is fundamental, although he does not deny that society is a necessary condition for it and also the activities which individuals choose will be by and large cooperative ones(1990). In contrast, in a social practices-based curriculum, the educational concern may lie in a flourishing society or often in flourishing social practices themselves. But it should not be interpreted that an individual or personal flourishing life is regarded as a vehicle for improving society or social practices. All I want to say is that a flourishing society goes far beyond personal well-being. In other words, although personal well-being partly constitutes a flourishing should be initiated into? etc.- go beyond Bourdieu's thinking.
society, a flourishing society is more than the sum of personal well-being. The difference in assumptions inevitably leads to a difference in the content of the curriculum (and perhaps in the process of teaching). For White, in a flourishing life, certain activities are more essential than other activities. Hence, the questions of what constitutes the good life and, thus, which activities are most important educationally are fundamental in determining the content of curriculum. In contrast, the primary concern of a social practices-based curriculum lies in exploring what counts as substantive social practices, which are given by ongoing traditions of social practices and how we teach them.

Let me turn now to White’s distinction. According to him (1973), the activities that one can engage in as part of educational activities can be divided into two categories: that in which ‘no understanding of what it is to want X is logically possible without engaging in X’ (Category I); and that in which ‘some understanding of what it is to want X is logically possible without engaging in X’ (Category II). Some examples for Category I are: communication in general, engaging in pure mathematics, engaging in the (exact) physical sciences, appreciating works of art, and philosophising. In Category II, the following examples are included: speaking a foreign language, cricket (or other organised games), cookery, and painting pictures (or writing poetry, or composing or performing music) (pp. 25 ff, my italics).

White’s claim can be summarised thus: Category I activities of which ‘no understanding of what it is to want them is logically possible without actual engagement’ seem to be given definite priority in the school curriculum over the Category II activities of which ‘some understanding of what it is to want them is logically possible without engaging in them’. On what grounds are Category I activities more important than Category II activities? His claim seems to be grounded in the following logic: children should engage in all possible kinds of activities during school life. But, in fact, this is impossible. Thus, it is necessary to select some crucial activities. Probably, the best way of selecting activities is for children to engage in certain activities that are unintelligible without such engagement. Category I activities are the cases. Consequently, students must be compelled to engage in Category I activities (1973, pp. 37-8, pp. 69ff).

Is this logic sound? A line of immediate questions may arise: 1) can we make a

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24 It seems to be quite unclear what exactly ‘what it is to want x’ means, that is, whether ‘what it is to want
sharp distinction between Category I and Category II activities in terms of engagement?; 2) if we accept this distinction, is there any good reason why the activities of which 'no understanding of what it is to want them is logically possible without actual engagement' should be given a definite priority in the school curriculum over those of which some understanding is possible without such engagement?; and 3) even if we admit the priority of Category I activities, can this be a sound reason for claiming that the curriculum should be compulsory? Let me consider these issues in turn.

White’s distinction itself contains some controversial issues. I am not sure that Category I and Category II can be clearly distinguished in terms of engagement. Can Category II activities really be understood without engaging in those activities? Think of my own experience of a cricket game. Before I came to the UK, I had never come across a cricket game. I watched several cricket matches on TV here. I tried to understand the terms, rules, etc. of a cricket game. I still do not know how one team can win, how one can get scores, why in some cases a hitter runs and in other cases not, in which case a hitter is out, etc, etc. In this case, I may rightly raise the question: how is it possible to understand this game without engaging in this activity? White might respond in two ways: a negative and positive response. The negative response might be stressing the phrases 'some understanding' or 'to some extent', that is, Category II activities can be understood, to some extent, without engaging in them. However, I still would respond to that: can we properly say that, in my case, I have some understanding of the game of cricket? I would think not. The positive response might be the claim that one could fully understand without playing cricket, such as by reading a book about cricket. If this is his response, his conception of engagement would be too narrow in that playing cricket is identified with engaging in cricket. It seems to me that engaging in cricket is more than simply playing cricket. However, I do not contend that cricket belongs to Category I rather than Category II activities on the ground that it might be impossible to understand without actual engagement in it. It may be a matter of complexity of games rather than of different categories. What I want to point out is that the distinction between Category I activities and Category II activities in terms of engagement is much less clear than it appears.

x' can be identified with 'what it is to understand x'.
We can raise a more fundamental question as to why White’s distinction and thus his education put so much weight on understanding itself rather than other elements. For White, the distinction between Category I and Category II activities in turn can be reduced to a matter of understanding. That is, it is a matter of whether understanding is possible without engagement, not vice versa. In contrast, on the social practices view, understanding is by no means the main focus for the distinction nor for education, but rather engagement itself. From the perspective of social practices, understanding becomes a sort of by-product of the engagement, instead of the engagement being a means to understanding. Hence, what is important is the particular activities in which people engage, although to this should be added other elements for selecting the content of curriculum. Certainly, we cannot imagine that there is curriculum content in which nobody is engaged. This element is a necessary condition, although it is not a sufficient condition.

Let me consider now the second question: whether the activities of which ‘understanding of them is logically impossible without actual engagement’ are to be given definite priority in the school curriculum over ‘those of which some understanding is possible without such engagement’. Why are Category I activities more important than Category II activities in the school curriculum? White’s answer to this question seems to run like this: there is no way to understand Category I activities without engaging in them. If we do not intend for students to engage in Category I activities at school, in fact, students may not have the opportunity to engage in them and thus may not be able to understand them, whereas Category II activities, at least to some extent, can be understood without engagement with them and, further, even if they are not to be taught at school, (most of) these activities can also be experienced outside school. Therefore, Category I activities should be given priority over Category II. We, however, still can ask why the priority in the school curriculum should be given to Category I activities. Is this condition that the activities cannot be understood without engagement sufficient for giving them priority in organising the school curriculum? Is there any good reason for excluding some activities that do not belong to Category I, such as history, human science, etc.?

White would say that his intention is that Category I activities should be included
in the school curriculum, but not that Category II activities are excluded. Furthermore, he would admit that some Category II activities are very important in the school curriculum, but for other reasons. For instance, history may be very important, although it does not belong to Category I activity, because it provides us with a civic requirement for being a good citizen. If these are his claims, the question of the priority of Category I activities is still unresolved and his justification for Category I activities is partial or weakened. Indeed, his overall justification of certain activities has to do with autonomous choice of intrinsically valuable activities, and his justification for Category I activities can be fully understood within this context, as far as The Compulsory Curriculum is concerned. This logic is something like this: if we choose certain activities from the extensive range of options in the school curriculum, in order to choose or reject these activities you should have sufficient understanding of them. Category I activities cannot be understood at all without engagement in the activities. Therefore, people ought to have the experience of engaging in Category I activities, because it is the only way of understanding them. It seems to me that the plausibility of this argument relies on the first argument; that is, White's claim that Category I activities should be given definite priority over Category II activities in the school curriculum would be plausible, if at all, if his claim that Category I activities can only be understood through engaging in them is correct. But the claim of whether Category I activities really cannot be understood at all without engaging in them is not clear.

What is the real problem with White's argument for the priority of the curriculum content is rather that in White's argument the question of what is educationally most important is separated from the question of which activities are most important in themselves. If x is an activity which cannot be understood without engaging in it, then on White's argument x should be in the curriculum, regardless of whether x is an important activity in itself. However, even if we hold up the distinction, and even granted that this distinction applies to activities and thus practices, we still cannot directly apply it to the issues of which social practices should be given priority within the curriculum. This may be explained in the following way. Of course, as I said earlier, engagement in activities is important for pupils to come to have understanding of a wide range of social practices. But this is not yet an argument for initiating pupils into all those practices. If
there are some practices which people cannot understand at all, unless they are initiated into the practices, that may be a reason for initiating pupils into them, but not a sufficient reason. Although people cannot understand certain social practices without engaging them, there is no reason for selecting these practices, if they are not salient in a society or if they are trivial, or morally objectionable. Hence, for the social practices view, if a practice is important for a flourishing society, it is important that there are people engaging in it.

The third question is closely linked with the second question. Even if we admit that Category I activities are more significant than other activities, we can hardly accept that Category I activities should constitute compulsory subjects. For, I pointed out earlier, the value of Category I activities is not obvious and, moreover, the issue of whether a compulsory curriculum is needed is also controversial. Hence, if White suggested that Category I activities can (or should) constitute a compulsory curriculum, then his view would be flawed. In a strict sense, it is one thing that Category I activities are important and it is quite another that Category I activities should be compulsory subjects.

So far I have argued that White’s argument for the distinction might provide a possible way for selecting the content of curriculum, but his argument does not exactly fit the social practices view, even if we apply his principles of selection to social practices. The main reason, as I noted earlier, may be derived from fundamental differences in terms of starting points between White’s liberal view and the social practices view. For White, for autonomous choice of activities, priority should be given to understanding as an aim in itself. That is, no judgement of importance comes into the

25 Although he uses ‘activity-words’, his overall argument is not so different from the Peters-Hirstian earlier argument in that their claims ended in supporting liberal education and its subjects. Indeed, as White himself may admit, his Category I activities are similar to Hirst’s forms of knowledge in terms of contents and ways of justification. Category I activities considerably overlap with forms of knowledge, although communication is not a form of knowledge, and history, human science, moral and religious knowledge, among the forms of knowledge are also not Category I activities. White’s way of justification that is based on engagement is also partly similar to Hirst’s justification that rests on intrinsic value. That is, White’s answer for why Category I activities are important in the school curriculum is that Category I activities, negatively, cannot be understood without engaging in them and, positively, they are connected with autonomous choice of intrinsically valuable activities. Similarly, Hirst’s answer for why forms of knowledge are important is that they are intrinsically worthwhile. They both do not present any further (forceful) reasons for their ways of justification.

26 This might be thus: a practice is a strong candidate for inclusion in the curriculum if i) it is important in the society, ii) there is no objection of, say, a moral or political kind to it and iii) it is impossible for people to understand it without being initiated into it.
argument, other than the subjective judgement made by each individual when one
understands the activity. In contrast, the importance of a social practice is not something
that can be left to individuals to decide for themselves. Nor is understanding an end in
itself, but it is rather linked with bringing about a flourishing society through engaging
in current crucial practices and in this sense understanding is nothing more than a by-
product of such engagement. Our upshot may be that White’s argument as it stands is not
satisfactory in determining the content of curriculum. How, then, to determine
significant social practices into which students should be initiated?

3. Towards a Social Practices-Based Curriculum

An alternative approach to the selection of curriculum may lie in selecting the
content of curriculum on the basis of social practices, rather than of forms of knowledge
and understandings, or even modes of activities. The organisation of curriculum that is
based on social practices is entirely different from that of curriculum that is based on
forms of knowledge and understanding, as far as the ground and process of the selection
of curriculum are concerned.

In terms of the criterion of the selection, a social practices-based curriculum, to
a large degree, rests on the social practices of everyday life, whereas a knowledge and
understanding-based curriculum, more or less, relies on traditionally established
disciplines under the name of intrinsic value(s).

On the other hand, in terms of the process of organising the curriculum, a
knowledge-based curriculum tends to address subjects as the core of forms of knowledge.
An organiser of a knowledge-based curriculum may be mainly concerned with how we

27White and O’Hear(1991) have more satisfactorily modified the content of curriculum from the
perspective of personal well-being as citizens of a liberal democratic society. This may be outlined as
follows: 1) personal qualities: personal concerns, social involvement and concern for others, and critical
and reflective awareness. 2) three areas of knowledge and understanding: personal, social, scientific and
technological. 3) experiences of the arts(all the arts, the appreciation of the built environment and natural
beauty). 4) four areas of practical competencies: communication and numeracy; physical movement, health
and safety; social interaction; planning and organisation(pp. 11-16). This content is more like the later
Hirst’s categorisation. From this perspective, we may ask what are the differences between the good life-
based curriculum and social practices-based curriculum. This may depend on how to understand the relation
of the good life to social practices, that is, depend on whether the good life encompasses social practices
and social practices imply the good (life). See next sub-section.
can categorise forms of knowledge into several foundation subjects. This seems to presuppose a line of underlying assumptions: if we have a fuller understanding of forms of knowledge, then skills, emotions, attitudes, etc., which are related to particular forms of knowledge, may be brought out; if we can get those characteristics, then we would live a flourishing life; and, therefore, if pupils are initiated into forms of knowledge, they would live good lives. These assumptions, however, may be defective in that understanding knowledge does not guarantee living the good life. Indeed, many knowledgeable people are not always living a happy life. In contrast, a social practices-based curriculum may have to do with practical activities of everyday social life, such as shopping, eating, health care, travelling, etc. Hence, someone who supports a social practices-based curriculum, presumably, may start by looking at a variety of current pervasive social practices in which many people (including him or herself) engage. Through engaging in these social practices, one can achieve knowledge, skills, attitudes, etc., which are related to these social practices. Then, one may be mapping or theorising these social practices systematically through reflection on social practices. In this respect, basic social practices themselves are more fundamental than subjects in organising the curriculum in that subjects or theoretical activities are secondary elements of human lives, rather than primary ones.

When we organise the curriculum in this way, which social practices can children be initiated into? This may be different according to the traditions of social practices to which someone belongs, since different societies may have different forms of life and thus involve different social practices. According to Hirst (1993b), basic social practices, into which pupils should be initiated, are roughly divided into the following six main areas:

1) Social practices concerned with coping with the physical world (e.g., motor skills, food, health, safety, domestic and environmental circumstances).
2) Communication social practices (e.g., reading, writing, conversing, numeracy and information technology).
3) Social practices involved in the relationships of personal and family life.
4) Wider social practices (e.g., local, national and world relationships and institutions, work, leisure, economic matters and law).
5) Social practices of *art and design* (e.g., literature, music, dance, painting, sculpture and architecture).

6) Social practices concerned with *religious beliefs and fundamental values* (pp. 35-36, italics in original).

Let me put forward some observations on Hirst's category of basic social practices. At first glance, his classification of the basic social practices seems to encompass the everyday practices which contemporary ordinary English people may experience. However, many instances of this classification of social practices may often overlap. To take some examples: food, safety, domestic circumstances, etc. are important in keeping good relationships in personal and family life as well as in coping with the physical world. Communication may play a crucial role in any social practices, particularly, family life, wider relationships and religious life. Art and design may be related to leisure, and so on.

Secondly, in fact, the overall content of the six main areas is, to some degree, overlapping with White's Category I and II activities and even the ten foundation subjects of the National Curriculum, although the principle of the selection of the curriculum is entirely different. Most of White's Category I and II activities including communication and appreciating art may also belong to basic social practices. Many basic social practices may involve the foundation subjects including technology, art, music, and so on. Of course, a social practices-based curriculum and knowledge-based curriculum can coincidentally overlap. The real difference between them seems to lie in their answer as to why these practices or subjects should be selected. In fact, one of the problems of the 1988 Education Reform Act is that it does not give a (sufficient) reason why these subjects are important, if the acquisition of knowledge and understanding is addressed. Indeed, in a knowledge-based curriculum, as shown in the Peters-Hirstian theory, the value of subjects is often taken for granted under the name of intrinsic value(s). In this curriculum, thus, the traditional subjects are accepted without any doubt. By contrast, in

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28 Surprisingly, the basic common curriculum of Korea (year three to year ten, i.e. the first year of high school) is, to large degree, consistent with the ten foundation subjects in the UK. The ten compulsory subjects of Korea National Curriculum: moral education, Korean language, mathematics, social studies, science, physical education, music, fine arts, practical arts (technology and home economics) and English, see 1996 Education Reform in PCER report (1997).
a social practices-based curriculum, the issue of why certain social practices are
important in school seems to be determined in the light of their significance for current
human living in a society. In other words, certain social practices can be selected for the
school curriculum, if and only if these practices penetrate our everyday life and are also
influential for contributing to the good society and life, although there is room for
different understandings of what counts as the good society and life. Why, as I have
shown in note 27, White’s and O’Hear’s structure of content is fairly similar to Hirst’s
later classification can be explained in terms of their sharing current social practices in
philosophy of education. In this sense, we may say that White’s and O’Hear’s structure
of the content can be understood as a kind of plea that British education should be based
on the promotion of the human flourishing of citizens of liberal democracy, which is one
of the current substantive social practices in the UK29.

Lastly, these basic social practices can take at least slightly different forms
according to the spatial and temporal conditions to which someone belongs. Presumably,
pervasive basic social practices of Britain in the 1990s are quite different from those of
Britain in the 1940s and from those of contemporary Korea, since forms of life may differ
in their temporal and spatial conditions. These differences may be found in Education
Acts (1944 Education Act, 1988 Education Reform Act) and thus in the construction of
curriculum. Then, some would raise a question: how can we understand the similarity
except for moral education between the ten foundation subjects in England and the ten
compulsory subjects in Korea? This may be explained in two ways: partly because of
westernisation (and/or globalisation) of Korean education and thus the sharing of
educational contexts. And partly because Korean (and/or English) curriculum content
does not rely on its own educational practices30. Whether or not we accept either reason,
nevertheless, we may admit that Korean education is different from other countries’

29This claim of White’s can be explicitly found in his ‘New Aims for a New National Curriculum’(1998b).
In this paper, he argues that the aims and content of education are rooted in democratic values and thus they
should be determined by democratic procedures. In addition, English peoples’ attitudes are also surprisingly
consistent with Hirst’s and White’s in that they regard literacy, numeracy, communication, social or
information technology skills, etc. as important social practices. For details of this, see QCA/MORI(1998)
30G. Haydon(1997) seems to share the latter reason. According to him, the aim(and thus the content) of
curriculum is dependent on ‘a context of tradition and existing institutions’; however, the National
Curriculum offered nothing new, because it is grounded in ‘what , in practice, has become a canon of
subjects which is recognised across most of the world(pp.16-7).
education. Think of the place of moral education, for instance. Unlike western countries, in Korean educational history over thousands of years, moral education as a (independent) subject plays always a key role among other subjects, while it has also been thought that all subjects should incorporate moral education. Furthermore, schools have been taking the central role in moral education (PCER Report, 1997, p. 78). This shows us that social practices can be different according to temporal and societal conditions, although the differences are often undermined.

How can we determine the content of the curriculum? Is there any principle for that? In a strict sense, in the social practices view, there may be no principle of the kind which rationalists hold for selecting curriculum content. If there is a principle, curriculum content should be selected on the basis of current pervasive social practices. Indeed, social practices themselves and their traditions can offer a plausible basis for determining the content of curriculum. In what way, then, can (traditions of) social practices themselves be a persuasive basis for determining the content of curriculum?

Firstly, social practices suggest that, whatever the contents of the curriculum are, the words we use to label the items in the curriculum should be words naming activities rather than disciplines or bodies or knowledge. This means that the content of the curriculum must be determined by reflection on (traditions of) social practices in which one(society) engages rather than by certain kinds of predetermined knowledge or subjects which are more or less divorced from social reality. By doing this, we can close the gap between propositional knowledge and performative knowledge, between studying subjects and doing subjects.

Secondly, (traditions of) social practices as a basis for determining the content of the curriculum are directed towards the good life and good society, since social practices are intimately linked with the achievement of internal goods and are also connected with virtues. Hence, successful social practices that are selected for the curriculum may be judged by their moral and social values. In this sense, as Hirst has pointed out, moral and social values may be ‘at the very centre of what constitutes a successful practice’ (1990, p. 81). Eventually, education can be seen as initiating students into a complex of successful and substantial social practices; these social practices constitute a flourishing life that is fundamental to education (Hirst, 1993a, p. 197).
Thirdly, (traditions of) social practices can meet the demands of the real world, because social practices are fundamentally grounded in everyday life, not the logical or hypothetical world. The activities of everyday life, such as shopping, mass-media, vocation, reading novels, etc. reflect vivid real (forms of) human lives. These activities which are socially constructed may be important in everyday life and, thus, could be constitutive of the content of education. Of course, I do not claim that all concerns of everyday life should be included in the content of the curriculum. My assertion is rather that, if something is involved in the content of the curriculum, it must be grounded in our real life and thus selected due to the importance of our practical life.

Fourthly, (traditions of) social practices are, as I have shown in section B of Chapter 5, not static, but dynamic. This may be so in two senses: one is that the tradition of a social practice itself can be changed or developed by internal ongoing debates, the other is that changes and developments of social practices in one area may affect social practices in other areas. In many cases, to identify social practices is not so easy, due to ongoing debates within them. Think of the nature of education, for example. The main stream of the (theoretical) practices of education in western countries, roughly speaking, has shifted from (in 1960-70s), liberal education as the pursuit of rationality to (in 1970-80s) liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy and personal well-being, and to (in 1990s) education as initiation into social practices. (These trends may be influenced by sociology or social philosophy, this may also bring changes in other areas). This shows that social practices may be subjected to constant criticism and thus can be changeable. Some would think that current British philosophy of education practice is linked with human flourishing, rather than social practices. These debates themselves also constitute important social practices.

Lastly, (traditions of) social practices as a basis for determining the content of the curriculum can provide a stronger justification than the transcendental argument that relies on forms of knowledge, or justification relying on engagement, or even justification resting on personal well-being within a liberal democratic society. For, these justifications are not grounded in the real world or limited to certain societies, whereas the justification of social practices is grounded in the real world that consists in practical, social, political and moral practices. From this perspective, Hirst’s assertion that ‘the idea
that curriculum might be organised in terms of significant social practices is thus not merely a contingent matter. Such organisation, rather than attention to forms of knowledge, becomes a necessary demand' is quite right (ibid., p.197).

The question of how a social practices-based curriculum content is determined which I suggested above may be clearer with an example. Think of environmental education. Which practices should pupils be initiated into or discouraged from engaging in? (Indeed, curriculum content may involve not only initiating pupils into desirable practices, but also discouraging pupils from practices which have undesirable consequences.) Take 'the school run' as an example. Many parents drive their children to and from school in every weekday morning and afternoon. It is estimated that in certain areas at certain times of day about one-third of all traffic consists of cars doing the school run. This leads to traffic-jams and results in wasting of fuels, oil pollution, and so on. The British government has recently called for measures to reduce this, and some schools are trying to encourage children to walk to school. Indeed, new practices are growing up around this idea, e.g. children walking to school in a group, the clearing of footpaths for children to walk along, etc. This example shows why certain social practices are important and thus pupils should be initiated into them (or discouraged from undesirable practices).

So far I have discussed a broad category of social practices in relation to the content of education, and traditions of social practices as the basis for selecting curriculum content. However, I do not intend here either to judge whether Hirst's categorisation is sound, or to discuss whether certain social practices should be included (or excluded) at a concrete level, since the issue of which social practices are basic or substantial can be contestable. Instead, in the following sub-section, I shall pick out some basic social practices which seem to be seen as substantial in this society and consider their teaching process in school education. This may provide us with some implications for social practices-based teaching.

4. The Content of Curriculum and Teaching Process

Before considering the teaching process of a social practices-based curriculum,
in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding, let me note two points. Firstly, as hinted above, I do not propose a social practices-based curriculum as a ground for a compulsory curriculum. Of course, as I have argued so far, I am more or less sceptical of the view that forms of knowledge, Category I activities, personal autonomy, participation in democracy and even personal well-being can provide us with incontrovertible grounds for the compulsory curriculum. From this, some would be tempted to think that I am suggesting that a social practices-based curriculum is the only ground for a compulsory curriculum. This might be true, if and only if a compulsory curriculum is necessary. However, I am not sure whether a compulsory or common curriculum for a whole society is necessary from the perspective of social practices, since to initiate pupils into social practices is possible in school education, as well as outside school and, furthermore, different teachers in different schools would try out different things. Hence, my concern does not lie in arguing that a compulsory or common curriculum is necessary and, furthermore, claiming that a social practices-based curriculum should be compulsory. Rather, my real assertion is that, if the selection of content is inevitable, (selection of) the content of curriculum should be based on current pervasive social practices, regardless of whether a compulsory or common curriculum is necessary and of whether a social practices-based curriculum can be compulsory.

The second point that I want to note is that a social practices-based curriculum is not contentless, although I have not spelled out a detailed mapping of its curriculum content. Someone who is accustomed to a knowledge or subjects-based curriculum would have dissatisfaction with a social practices-based curriculum in terms of the content and its arrangement, because this curriculum, unlike a subjects-based curriculum, may appear as neither logical nor coherent. In some sense, a social practices-based curriculum may have this character. Nevertheless, we may say that a social practices-based curriculum does have certain contents. What is a striking feature of a social practices-based curriculum, unlike a subjects-based curriculum, is that educational contents and their contexts are never taken for granted.

Of course, a social practices-based curriculum might involve certain subjects that are emphasised in traditional curricula, such as mathematics, science, history, art, etc. But the reason why these subjects should be included in the curriculum may be quite different
between a subjects-based and social practices-based curriculum. In a subjects-based curriculum, there seems to be no good reason as to why mathematics, science, history, art, etc. are important and thus should be included in the curriculum. People who hold a subjects-based curriculum would claim that mathematics is important for developing mathematical thinking, science for understanding of scientific phenomena, history for historical outlook, art for aesthetic perspective, and so on. In fact, as I have pointed out, their criteria for the selection of curriculum seem to be not clear, although subjects-based curriculum organisers would say that these subjects are intrinsically worthwhile. But again why are these subjects intrinsically valuable? Why should these subjects have canonical authority?

In contrast, a social practices-based curriculum is quite different from a subjects-based curriculum in several ways. Firstly, in a social practices-based curriculum, unlike a subjects-based curriculum, certain subjects, such as mathematics, science, history, art, etc., are not taken for granted. There is no reason why these subjects should be included in the content of the curriculum in every society at every time. Some particular subjects may not be included in the curriculum in some societies at certain periods. For instance, in the Middle Age of Korea, art, music, business subjects and even some scientific subjects, such as astronomy, were excluded or at least not encouraged in the curriculum for the elite.

Secondly, and more importantly, even if the above subjects, such as mathematics, science, history, art, etc., are selected for the curriculum, the reason for the selection, as I have indicated, lies not in the significance of knowledge for its own sake or of its canonical status, but in the necessity or importance of these subjects for everyday life and for a flourishing society. For instance, mathematics is very useful in handling data, planning the budget of home economy, such as shopping, income, etc., and so on, science may be important for understanding and improving the physical world, history for reflecting on the history of human (flourishing) lives, art for appreciating paintings at an art gallery and producing paintings, and so on. Some would claim that these reasons for a social practices-based curriculum are purely extrinsic. But, it seems to me, to engage in these activities is not purely instrumental, but rather is an essential part of maintaining a flourishing society.
So far, I have argued that traditional subjects, from the perspective of a social practices-based curriculum, are not necessarily taken for granted, and that they can be selected if and only if they are substantive social practices in everyday life and significant for a flourishing society. In this sense, we might say that essential and substantive cross-curricular themes, their related subjects and skills are more important than the ten subjects in terms of a social practices-based curriculum. The reason is that these are 'useful, relevant and worthwhile' for pupils' everyday life in the real world: 'useful' because pupils can easily use knowledge and skills to make decisions or to solve problems occurring in everyday life; 'relevant' because these themes are closely related to their (flourishing) life, whether individually or socially; and 'worthwhile' because these encourage them 'to look around them, to understand the responsibilities that human beings have in looking after the planet and to recognize that human actions have consequences' (Radnor, 1994, pp. 26-7). Indeed, pupils can easily find these themes and skills as part of everyday life in the classroom, family and community, and these comprise crucial aspects of our real world. From this perspective, as Hirst has pointed out, we may say that consideration of cross-curricular themes and skills in the National Curriculum is at least some recognition of 'the value of education in social practices of great variety' (1993b, p.37). Hence, we may say that cross-curricular themes make possible a deeper understanding of current social practices and the real world than the ten subjects, although these themes are, in fact, not a legal requirement of school education at all.

To turn now to the more central point. How can we describe the teaching process from the perspective of a social practices-based curriculum? This issue is important, because teaching process shows us general features of a social practices-based curriculum. I do not contend here that there is necessarily a major and clear-cut difference between the processes appropriate to a subjects-based and appropriate to a social practices-based curriculum. (Teaching process is a 'symptom' rather than a 'criterion' for

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31 According to the NCC document (1990), five cross-curricular themes are: health care, environment, citizenship, economic and industrial understanding, and careers education and guidance. Related subjects are: rural studies, environmental studies, social studies, humanities, drama, business studies, active tutorial work, careers, health education, political studies, peace studies, industrial studies, industrial experience, European studies, economics and computer science. And cross-curricular skills: communication, numeracy, study, problem-solving, personal and social, and information technology.
curriculum). Given this premise, it might be useful to show general features of the teaching process of a social practices-based curriculum by comparing it with that of a subjects-based curriculum. Firstly, an aim of social practices-based teaching lies in contributing to a flourishing society and social practices by actual engagement in them, whereas an aim of subjects-based teaching lies in understanding itself. Hence, although both might involve, say, teaching on environmental education, subjects-based education and practices-based education could be different in terms of aim. Secondly, a subjects-based curriculum and a social practices-based curriculum may involve different teaching methods. A social practices-based curriculum may prefer a practice-centred teaching method, whereas a subjects-based curriculum may prefer a teacher-centred teaching method. Put more concretely, teacher’s and pupil’s role between the two teaching methods may be different. In practice-based teaching, the teacher’s and pupil’s roles are not completely different in what they are doing in that they both together engage in the social practices at issue, whereas the teacher’s and pupil’s roles in teacher-centred teaching are clearly distinguished: the teacher’s role is transmitting, or even inculcating, knowledge that is related to each subject in a more or less well organised way; on the contrary, the pupil’s role is acquiring knowledge that is transmitted by teachers - in fact, in many cases, pupils remain at the rote learning-forgetting repetition level. Furthermore, practice-centred teaching may be more flexible and varied than teacher-centred teaching in terms of teaching method.

To consider cross-curricular themes may be helpful for this purpose, because most of these themes are crucial topics, which are based on substantive social practices, and, eventually, teaching process can show some striking features of a social practices-based curriculum. To this end, let me pick out two cross-curricular themes: citizenship and environment education.

First of all, think of citizenship education. How can we bring children up as having citizenship so that they contribute to maintaining a flourishing society? In a social practices-based curriculum, the teaching process is not limited to transmitting knowledge and discussion. Rather, it is more flexible in that teachers (and students) use a wider

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32 My intention here is not to provide philosophical argument for citizenship education, but to show a possible teaching process of citizenship education from the perspective of a social practices-based curriculum. For philosophical arguments for citizenship education, see P. White(1996) and Callan(1997).
range of teaching methods and resources, and that, further, the scope of teaching methods is extended to work outside school as well as within school. Perhaps, first-hand experience, exploratory activities, audio-visual media, interviews, case collection, enquiry projects, participatory approach, group discussions, collaborative teamwork, exemplification, role-play, simulations, special events (e.g. citizenship campaign day, environment week, etc.), visiting related organisations, etc. may be included. In order to appropriately understand the process of citizenship education in terms of social practices, therefore, we need to remember that teaching processes for citizenship education may take a variety of forms. And, more importantly, what we should bear in mind with regard to the teaching process of citizenship education is that this theme is selected because of the substantive social practices which are significant for a flourishing society as a whole. This implies that teaching process should be linked with real life. (These two points may be similarly applied to environment education and other social practices.) In summary, one of the distinctive characters of a social practice-based curriculum can be found in a variety of teaching methods. But the most striking feature of it may lie in its intimate connection, and thus relevance, to the current pervasive social practices.

Then, how can we initiate pupils into citizenship as basic social practices, which involves acquiring knowledge, skills, attitudes and values linked together? The process might follow these steps: in the first phase, the teachers' task is to initiate pupils into the basic social practices. This would include equipping them with basic knowledge, skills, attitudes and values in an integrated way. To do this, understanding citizenship as interweaving knowledge with activity through practical and productive ways is important. It may be possible through ascertaining pupils’ needs in relation to citizenship at a primitive level, identifying citizenship in real-life situations such as the family, the school and the community life, mapping social practices in the area of citizenship and linking the pupils’ concerns with society’s concerns. In this stage, the following teaching activities might be included: for making communication, explaining basic terms, e.g. freedom, justice, democracy, citizenship, racism, pluralism, etc.; mapping the category, such as multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, muti-faith, multi-lingual issues on citizenship; investigation of population of the UK by ethnic group, language, faith, etc.; collecting cases of sexual or racial harrassment experience in school and society, and so on at their
In the second phase, the teacher’s task may be to stimulate pupils to realise the significance of citizenship at a personal and social level through participating in practical citizenship experiences. Pupils find out what they need to know in order to complete the activity and then reflect on and discuss the experience that has taken place. In this stage, a day visiting the centre for multicultural education or participating in its activities, a half-day attending a debate in Parliament, a half-day auditing the process of judgement of a Law Court, individual or small group experience of various organisations, etc. might be included.

This leads to a third phase, in which the teacher’s task is to encourage critical reflection on citizenship issues. Interactive and proactive activities may give pupils opportunities to engage in observing, organising, identifying, discussing and debating. Indeed, through participation or experience of various citizenship-related practices, and through discussing and sharing others’ different experience, pupils may develop their own judgement as citizens. Sometimes, role-play, for example, ‘bullying in school’, ‘the pain of racism’ may be helpful in understanding the importance of citizenship. Through these processes, pupils may become equipped with practical reasoning, that is, they may acquire wisdom as to how to live as good citizens in a plural society. So pupils may recognise that citizenship is significant for living a flourishing life, as well as keeping a sane society, and that citizenship as social practices is intimately connected to other social practices, such as, environment education, health education, and so on.

In the last phase, the teacher’s task is to encourage pupils not only to use their practical reasoning, but also, ultimately, to contribute to promoting citizenship in their own way and their places and, further, to promoting a flourishing society as a whole. The following activities might be included: participation in decision-making and elections, exercising rights, duties and responsibilities, working collaboratively, commending or protesting actions of schools, mass-media, local store, borough, and so on.

Let me now consider the second example, the teaching process of environment education. The ways of initiating pupils into environment-related basic practices, presumably, are various. One possible way at primary or secondary level may be for pupils to recognise the necessity or importance of the preservation of environment
through finding and collecting cases of the destruction of the environment and its results. The possibilities are various: for instance, air pollution, water, landscape, waste, technology, destruction of the ecological balance, deficiency of natural resources. These cases can be got through mass-media, such as television, newspapers, magazines, etc.; observations, like directly going to a road and seeing the pollution by cars; reading books, and so on. Through being in contact with these problems, some pupils may feel that the environment is not distant from our life and, furthermore, recognise its importance, at least at a surface level. Some pupils might have difficulty in describing these phenomena and, furthermore, understanding why these problems are happening. Some people may have difficulty in identifying whether a particular case is the case or not. Considering a variety of situations, teachers should equip their pupils with a minimum understanding of basic terms and skills in order to enable them to communicate and solve their problems, such as basic terminology- ‘pollution’, ‘acid rain’, ‘ozone’, ‘greenhouse effect’ according to pupils’ level. Sometimes, the teacher needs to categorise the variety of environmental matters, such as home, school, workplace, urban, natural, social environment.

In the second stage, the teacher may let pupils participate in environment education-related activities, such as participating in the Green Peace movement for a week, in a conservation group, and so on. Through practical experience of them rather than just through their imagination, they may more clearly recognise the seriousness of matters. Then, sharing their experience and discussing. Through these processes, pupils may recognise that this issue is not single issue, but is related to other issues, such as citizenship, health care, and so on. This may lead to more systematic understanding of these issues.

In the third stage, the teacher tries to give more balanced knowledge, and to provide an opportunity for critical examination and deeper understanding of environment issues. This may be possible through the following processes: for instance, through watching videos on ‘destruction of natural habitats’, discussing the ‘impact of technology on environment’ and providing a variety of knowledge and perspectives that relate physical, geographical, biological, sociological, technological, ethical, etc., points of view.
In the last stage, the teacher encourages pupils to make decisions for generating a better social environment by considering or prescribing how to participate in environmental projects in their situation at a practical level, such as, participation in reducing litter and waste; participating in recycling projects by sorting into different types of materials, such as metal, plastic, glass, paper, etc.; using recycled paper; protecting wildlife; involvement in conservation groups.

So far I have tried to show the overall teaching process of a social practices-based curriculum by taking as examples citizenship and environment education. According to the above argument, the teaching process of a social practices-based curriculum is portrayed as a practice-centred approach which starts with pervasive social practices, but also aims at flourishing social practices and a flourishing society, for example, participating in resolving or ameliorating environmental problems. However, for resolving some questions regarding the teaching process of a social practices-based curriculum, the following points need to be added.

First of all, let me point out two related, but at first glance paradoxical, points. A social practices-based teaching process may be not confined to a classroom. It may also be extended to family, school and wider communities.

Secondly, the four phases I suggested are not necessary sequential stages. These phases are just the overall order of the teaching process, it does not necessarily follow that the first phase is for Key Stage 1, the second phase for Key Stage 2, the third phase for Key Stage 3 and the fourth phase for Key Stage 4. In addition, it should also be admitted that the distinctions between each phase, that is, between phase 1 and 2, between 2 and 3, and between 3 and 4, are not clear-cut, but there may be overlap between one phase and another.

Thirdly, the teaching approach of a social practices-based curriculum might be different according to educational institutions, such as school, college, university, but this may be a matter of different levels of the same practices. For instance, the university curriculum might be composed of wider optional practices and second order practices, and the teaching process might proceed in a logical and critical way. In contrast, the school level curriculum may mainly be basic social practices and some wider optional

\[\text{Footnote: For more (concrete) examples on these issues at the primary and secondary level, see Radnor (1994),}\]
social practices and the teaching process may be more practical. Nevertheless, we may say that the overall teaching process is not much different in that all levels of education are strongly connected to the current pervasive social practices and to developing these practices for a flourishing society.

Lastly, social practices themselves can effectively be created and developed by a social practices-based teaching process. Some would think that social practices in the social practices-based curriculum could not be radically changed, since social practices themselves are relying entirely on longstanding traditions. However, in principle, this is not necessarily so. We may respond in two ways. One response is that social practices are not merely relying on longstanding traditions, but can be changed and developed by the process of responding to the wider societies' ceaseless demands. The other response is that teachers may not blindly follow current practices, but also take critical traditions among ongoing debatable traditions. Indeed, citizenship and environment education show this point in that they are relatively new practices, whose importance has been recently recognised in school through ongoing debates. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we can hardly deny that schools as institutions can suffer from inertia and thus can get out of date compared with what is going on outside. In order to avoid conservatism, schools need to be responsive to what is going on outside.

chapter 3 and 4.
Chapter 8. Towards Education as Social Practices

What I have argued throughout this thesis can be summarised thus: education can be best understood in terms of social practices and, therefore, education should be seen as initiating students into social practices in a prescriptive and substantial sense. This view is not only fairly different from that of liberal education both as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge and as the promotion of personal autonomy, but also different from ‘education as initiation into social practices’ in a descriptive and formal sense. My remaining task for this concluding Chapter is to ascertain whether social practices-based education provides an alternative to liberal education. Does the social practices view of education really overcome some criticisms and challenges about liberal education?

To this end, in section A, I shall show that social practices-based education can have some advantages compared with liberal education in terms of integrating the academic/vocational, theory/practice and individual/society divides. In section B, more positively, I shall examine whether social practices-based education can provide an alternative to liberal education. In section C, I shall discuss some possible objections to ‘education as initiation into social practices’. In section D, as a conclusion, I shall deal with my reflections on this thesis as a text, considering its limitations, contributions it can make and further tasks for research.

A. Why Education as Initiation into Social Practices?

I have addressed the importance of education as initiation into social practices compared with liberal education both as the pursuit of rationality and as the promotion of personal autonomy throughout this thesis. In this section, I do not intend to introduce any new substantial argument. Rather, I shall summarise, and hopefully elaborate, the primacy of education as initiation into social practices over liberal education that has been partly argued in the foregoing Chapters in terms of bridging the academic/vocational, theory/practice, and individual/social divides.
I. Integration of the Academic/Vocational Divide

First of all, one of the strong points of social practices-based education, as compared with (the rationalistic) liberal education, lies in overcoming a line of similar gaps between academic and vocational subjects, between theoretical knowledge and practical demands, between intrinsic value and extrinsic value, and between logical logic and practical logic.

Liberal education as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge, as implied in its name, tends to address 'initiating pupils into forms of knowledge' under the name of the 'intrinsic aim of education'. Namely, according to Peters and Hirst, education is conceptually or logically related to knowledge and understanding. This means that education is necessarily concerned with the pursuit of knowledge in its intrinsic sense. Therefore, however we define education, it must be logically connected to the pursuit of knowledge, insofar as we are concerned with, and faithful to, IE. What is more, if this logic is correct, the pursuit of knowledge and understanding are inevitably regarded as a universal and objective value (and aim) in education, irrespective of individual desires, social and temporal contexts.

However, is this logic valid? Why should (only) the pursuit of knowledge and understanding be IE? Why are not other important values, such as vocational preparation, justice, citizenship, environment, health, and so on, involved in that? Is there any possibility of defining education without excluding important educational values and, at the same time, without damaging its own value? Indeed, within Peters’ framework, it seems impossible to meet this condition. The reason runs something like this: within Peters’ framework, only IE such as the pursuit of knowledge has essential importance and thus other values, such as vocational preparation, justice, citizenship, etc., which are EE, are regarded as trivial compared with IE. Seen in this way, IE and EE are always sharply distinguished and, thus, educationally significant values are always confined to IE, that is, so-called ‘theoretical activities’. In contrast, the value of practical activities which are essential parts of a good life and society is undermined in education on the ground that they are simply not part of IE from the Peters-Hirstian point of view. Hence, from the

34Henceforth, I use abbreviations IE and EE instead of 'the intrinsic aim(value) of education' and 'extrinsic
Peters-Hirstian perspective, education, in principle, should be defined in terms of the conceptual analysis of education itself, which is isolated from the real human life or society. Accordingly, social and practical demands for human or social good, vocational preparation and justice, etc. are, by definition, excluded or at least overlooked. It is hardly surprising thus that, in the Peters-Hirstian liberal education, vocational preparation that is seen as an extrinsic aim was undermined. In this respect, in their liberal education, it may not be possible to adequately cope with voices demanding vocational preparation.

On the other hand, to some extent, liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy, unlike the Peters-Hirstian, could meet practical demands that are required in the real world. But this version of liberal education may also have limitations in satisfying social virtues—for example, social justice- and social demands.

Social practices-based education, unlike the Peters-Hirstian liberal education (and maybe liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy), emphasises participation or engagement in social practices. In other words, from the social practices perspective, education is internally related to social practices35, that is, education should be understood as an actual engagement in social practices to which one or a society belongs rather than intrinsically related to the conception of education, such as the pursuit of knowledge and understanding. Both conceptions of education are not different in that they both can, to some extent, maintain consistency or coherence of education, whether logical or empirical. We, however, should not ignore here some differences between ICE in a Peters-Hirstian sense and ISP. Firstly, ICE results from the logical analysis of the concept of education and, thus, the relation between education and the pursuit of knowledge is conceptual, whereas ISP stresses engaging in (social, educational, practical, or whatever) activities and the relation of education to the activities is experiential or empirical. Secondly, related to the first point, ICE is linked to understanding of the forms of knowledge that is given by logical analysis of education, whereas ISP is anchored in the real human lives and practices which are continually constructed by participants who engage in them. In this sense, we may say that ICE is related to the real life or world only

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35Henceforth, I shall use ISP for ‘education internally related to social practices’ and ICE for ‘education intrinsically related to the conception of education’. Indeed, I prefer to use the term ‘internal’ instead of ‘intrinsic’ in expressing the relation between education and social practices in social practices-based education.
in indirect or abstract ways, whereas ISP is directly connected to it. Hence, regarding human life or society, the former is more or less passive and static, whereas the latter is active and dynamic. Thirdly, the value of certain activities in ICE is grounded in transcendental argument and thus their value is objective and/or universal, whilst the significance of certain activities in ISP relies entirely on pervasive or successful social practices and thus their value might be different according to temporal and spatial contexts, i.e. contexts-bounded.

When we see education as promoting goods internal to social practices to which one or a society belongs (ISP), as seen in the above comparison, there are some advantages. Firstly, social practices-based education may reflect vivid forms of human lives, which are embedded in society, by engaging in the social practices, not by abstract forms of knowledge which rely on conceptual analysis. Following this education, many important virtues and activities, which are outcomes of engaging in social practices to which one or a society belongs, can be treated as more important than knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective. Furthermore, theoretical knowledge (or subjects) and activities may be important, if and only if they are significant in relation to practical human life and flourishing human practices. Hence, there is no longer the demarcation between theoretical subjects and practical subjects. Rather, a variety of knowledge, skills, attitudes, values and virtues are integrated into social practices. Secondly, social practices-based education may offer stronger justification than the transcendental argument by its justification grounded in social practices and, thus, without claiming universal truth, certain social practices can be justified in the light of the significance of human life, which is given in ongoing traditions of social practices.

In what ways is social practices-based education better than liberal education in terms of bridging the academic/vocational divide? In the Peters-Hirstian liberal education, as I have pointed out, academic subjects and vocational subjects are sharply separated and, further, (only) academic subjects which are represented by forms of knowledge, are regarded as valuable in education since they are part of IE. Under this circumstance, there is no possibility of integrating them. In contrast, a social practices-based curriculum content rests entirely on ongoing traditions of social practices in which people engage. Hence, in principle, vocational preparation in social practices-based
education may not be ruled out, if it is internal to social practices or it results from engaging in the social practices, even though it is not intrinsic; and, more positively, in this education, even theoretical subjects which are typical parts of IE in Peters’ sense cannot have any significance for themselves without connecting with current pervasive social practices. What is more, social practices-based education substitutes ‘practice’ for ‘academic subjects’ or ‘academic disciplines’. This has the advantages of forcing us to think more broadly about possible curriculum components, and of teaching us the intimate connection between studying an activity and engaging in the activity, such as studying science subjects and doing science, studying painting and doing painting, studying music and doing music, and so on. This leads us to consider the issue of integration of theory and practice.

2. The Integration of Theory into Practice

Let me now think of the advantage of social practices-based education in terms of the integration of the relationship between theory and practice. This is related to the integration of the academic/vocational divide. My focus here is the integration between theory and practice in relation to educational theory rather than the integration of theory and practice as a whole. The debates on the relationship between theory and practice in the educational context have so far been distorted in one aspect or another. Perhaps, the debate between O’Connor and Hirst is a typical case. As I sketched in Chapter 4, O’Connor claims that a typical example of educational theory, if there is any, should be like a scientific theory. (However, in fact, educational theory neither consists of a logically interconnected set of hypotheses nor conforms to the paradigm provided by a scientific theory. In this sense, it is no more than a ‘courtesy title’). Hirst, on the other hand, recognises the practical nature of educational theory; however, at the same time, he still claims that it is theory which involves matters of beliefs and values, not educational practice. In this respect, we may say that both O’Connor and Hirst see educational theory as something separate from educational practice so that they both fail to consider practice sufficiently (Langford, 1978, p.90).

Langford, in contrast to O’Connor and Hirst, sees education as a practical activity
which is concerned with bringing about practical results rather than observing how things are (1968, p.16). This view is quite opposite from both Hirst’s and O’Connor’s views of educational theory in that educational theory is practice rather than theory. But Langford’s view is not different from both views in that, by seeing practice as being separated from theory, he fails to integrate theory and practice.

In order to close the gap between theory and practice, it is necessary to introduce social practices-based educational theory which emphasises the intimate connection between theory and practice realised by practitioners who engage in the educational activities. This view appears in Hirst’s (1983; 1990; 1993), Carr’s (1995), and Langford’s (1985; 1989) more recent views of education. Hirst, Carr and Lanford in their recent views agree that educational theory should start from current social practices in which practitioners engage and that it is an integral part of educational practices.

Four models of educational theory that I have briefly outlined can be drawn as <Figure 3>.
<Figure 3> Models of educational theory
As we can see in <Figure3>, models of educational theory can largely be divided into two categories: theory-oriented and practice-oriented models. O’Connor’s and Hirst’s old models belong to the former in claiming that education should fundamentally rely on theory, whether scientific theory or practical theory. By contrast, Langford’s and my models\textsuperscript{36} belong to the latter in seeing that educational theories grow out of practices in which practitioners engage, regardless of whether each model can integrate theory into practice.

Let us explain these in more detail. Firstly, O’Connor’s model can be labelled the ‘scientific theory model’ in claiming that educational theory should be based on empirically or factually established findings and confirm them. Following his logic, if something is theory, it must fit some conditions for a scientific theory. For him, therefore, insofar as education is a theory, it should perform scientific functions, such as prediction and explanation of educational phenomena, and educational knowledge also should be scientific.

Secondly, according to Hirst’s old model, educational theory should not be limited to scientific functions but rather should be concerned to determine and guide educational practices. Hence, educational theory also should not merely be limited to scientific knowledge, but also include various ‘forms of knowledge’ including non-scientific knowledge such as moral and religious. In this sense, we might call it the ‘practical theory model’. Hirst’s contributions to the models of educational theory might be twofold: an extension of the range of educational theory, that is, from science alone to morality and religion which are composed mainly of values and beliefs as well as science including social science; and defining educational theory as a practical theory, which enables us to take the first, albeit small, step towards seeing education as social practices.

However, what is a common limitation for both ‘scientific theory’ and ‘practical theory’ models may lie in seeing practice as fundamentally derived from theory. In other words, practices are seen as an outcome of a theory successfully implemented. Both these models, therefore, take for granted the primacy of theory over practice in that theory is

\textsuperscript{36} Although I label it ‘my model’, this model may apply to social practices-based models of educational theory as a whole, such as Langford’s (new), Hirst’s (new), and Carr’s models.
a guide for practice (Kemmis, 1995, p.9). Then, their most striking mistake is embedded in their common assumption that educational practice is separated from educational theory and also educational practitioners from educational theorists. This fatal limitation leads us to consider practical models of educational theory.

Thirdly, Langford’s old model has opened up the view of educational theory as practice. For him, in short, education is ‘a practical activity, the purpose of which is to change those being educated in some desirable ways’ (Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p.108). In this sense, his model can be called the ‘practical activity model’. Indeed, for him, all activities are something that people do whether performing actions or making observations. Particularly, educational activities are practical activities.

Certainly, the ‘practical activity’ model has shown that education is best understood as a practical activity and thus it is likely to be a practice, although not all practical activities are practices. In this model, in a sense, there is no gap between theory and practice, since everything is to be seen as an activity which is doing something and, accordingly, everything is practice rather than theory. We can ask, then, ‘is education or educational theory no more than (practical) activity?’ Although Langford recognises that education is a practice with a social nature, he does not seem to have a strong view of social practice, so far as his earlier writings are concerned. What is more, he seems to overlook theoretical aspects of educational activity and, thus, he does not succeed in reconciling theory and practice in education.

Lastly, my model of educational theory is not different from Langford’s old one in that educational theory is basically a practice which arises from engagement in the activity itself. But, beyond this, in this model, education involves not only practical activities, but also theoretical and technical activities. And these activities are fundamentally products of existing and ongoing social traditions of educational activities in which teachers and students engage. In this sense, this model may be called the ‘social practices model’.

What is stressed on this model are: firstly, education should be regarded as comprising various social practices, e.g. theoretical, practical and technical practices, rather than belonging to one social practice among them. Secondly, education is fundamentally socially constructed and thus in continuous interaction with societies.
Lastly, education should address a practitioner's roles both as an agent and as a translator. As agents, practitioners initiate pupils into crucial current social practices to which they belong. As translators, practitioners integrate educational theory and practice by translating theory and practice adequately onto the learner's level.

The last characteristic of this model is particularly important in terms of the integration of theory and practice in an educational context. As a matter of fact, educational theory and practice can be integrated by practitioners who engage in ongoing traditions of educational practices and thus know 'how to do it'. Hence, the gap between theory and practice might be bridged by seeing the relation between theory and practice within educational activities in which teachers are engaged, since 'educational phenomena', 'educational problems' and 'educational theories' should be outcomes of ongoing traditions of social practices in which practitioners engage rather than separate from them (Carr, 1995, p.37). In this respect, this model is better than liberal education and other models in integrating theory and practice. On the other hand, liberal educators tend to regard the dichotomy between theory and practice as natural and the primacy of theory over practice is taken for granted as we can see in O'Connor's and Hirst's models. Accordingly, for them, the integration between them is impossible and not necessary.

3. The Integration of the Relation between the Individual and Society

The issue of how can we see the relation of the individual to society is very complicated. It can be said that the individual and society may be intertwined with each other, to borrow P. White's metaphor, like 'two stout strands in a rope' (1989, p. 4). What this metaphor shows us in this context is that, whatever way it is, education inevitably involves these two aspects of human lives and, thus, education should reflect both aspects in some way. The problem is how to see the relation between the individual and society. The integration between the individual and society can be understood in two ways: a negative and positive way. In a negative sense, society is important only insofar as it provides a framework for education. In a positive sense, education should have something to do with the flourishing of society.

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37 This can be equated with a descriptive and prescriptive sense of education as initiation into social
In this regard, liberal educators tend to undermine the integration between the individual and society or, at best, take a negative stance on it. In the case of liberal education as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge, the integration between them is not a primary concern and thus is often overlooked, because education is seen as more or less being detached from society. On the other hand, in the case of liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy, society is important but only in a negative sense. To put it another way, liberal educators who emphasise the promotion of personal autonomy tend to think society may be valuable, if it 'can provide a framework within which people can choose from among other objective values' or that it gives an important context for meaningful choice, which is 'an essential element in the realisation of personal autonomy' (M. Moore, 1991, p. 677; p. 683). For them, the value of autonomy is justified in terms of personal well-being, because they think that it is an essential element for the good life.

Is this enough for defining the relation of the individual to society? It may be not enough. Perhaps, the role of society may go beyond that. Rather, it may be safer to say that autonomy has a social nature or, more positively, is fundamentally social on two grounds: on the one hand, one’s desires or preferences are not purely personal, and on the other autonomy itself is not innate, but is exercised and developed through society. Hence, we cannot see it in isolation from society or society's values. Art, for instance, can hardly be seen as merely expressions of personal vision in that the artist’s inspiration must be learnt from society and from traditions of social practices in art which provide ways of seeing and doing (Langford, 1985, pp. 41-2). What is more, according to MacIntyre (1990b), liberals may encourage to a ‘privatization of the good’ by substituting autonomy for the public realm. In other words, they see society as a means of exercising autonomy or personal well-being. This may not look at the good of society in a proper sense, because we hardly see personal well-being and autonomy as being absolute or independent goods.

From this perspective, social practices-based education may be needed in that this view not only provides a positive perspective regarding the role of society, but also it can
adequately explain education as social phenomena. Indeed, from the social practices point of view, education is fundamentally seen as an active engagement in social practices to which one or a society belongs for the purpose of the flourishing of society and social practices themselves. The importance of autonomy can adequately be worked out in this context. From the social practices perspective, personal autonomy can contribute to society in two respects: every practitioner who engages in the social practices 'is granted equal respect and concern' and it may be possible for practitioners to 'take a critical stance' about ongoing social practices to which they belong (Pendlebury, 1990, pp. 274-6). To engage in human practices means, in turn, to autonomously participate in ongoing traditions of social practices.

Seen in this way, it might give an adequate perspective on at least extreme liberal and communitarian views of education. Liberals tend to assume that autonomy is a common feature of human nature and thus valuable in every society, particularly in a liberal democratic society. This assumption in the end leads to the conclusion that autonomy is of value independently of circumstances of particular societies, and further it tends to undermine the value of social practices. By contrast, communitarians tend to assume that it is natural that people as social creatures need to be well adjusted or accommodated in a given society and, thus, one of the major tasks of education lies in enabling people to live as members of the society to which they belong. This assumption presupposes that a society or community is regarded as good in itself. (A community or society should be directed towards the good, but this does not mean that it is the good itself.) In this situation, presumably, individual values may be replaced by the community's values on many occasions. Both claims, however, are dubious. Liberals may not explicitly realise that social practices are the content of education, by confining it to a set of theoretical and/or propositional knowledge or personal desires, which are, by and large, detached either from social contexts or from communal interests. Communitarians' claims might not only confuse education with socialising but also undermine agents' active role as practitioners.

Let me now consider whether social practices-based education can have meaning in a plural society. Today's society is often labelled 'pluralism' or 'multiculturalism'.

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38 It is worth drawing a series of distinctions between 'plurality' and 'pluralism', between 'plural' and
Pluralism can easily be identified in academic fields as well as in ordinary lives. However, the issue of how we should understand the phenomena of plurality in an educational context is very complicated, since there are many clusters of issues involved, such as how we understand different interpretations of plurality, how we can teach different values within a society, how we can maintain a proper balance between commonality and diversity, and so on (Tamir, 1995; McLaughlin, 1995). However, my concern here is not spelling out these issues as a whole, but examining whether social practices-based education has any benefit in a pluralist society compared with liberal education.

How should we understand social practices-based education in a pluralist society? In what ways is social practices-based education better than liberal education in response to pluralistic challenges? Liberal education and educators are often criticised for overlooking and ignoring either society as a whole or the special character and needs of minority cultures by focusing on rational autonomy or the overall (thus often majority) social contexts (Feinberg, 1995, p. 203). Of course, as Feinberg points out, liberal doctrines per se do not necessarily prohibit education from teaching different or other cultures and thus liberalism itself is ‘no enemy to multicultural education’ (ibid., p. 203). Indeed, liberal educators not only can teach a diversity of cultures and other cultures, but also in fact they do teach them. However, their teaching aims at understanding the phenomena of cultural plurality in general rather than understanding other cultures as one does one’s own. Indeed, ‘understanding a plurality of cultures’ and ‘making a pluralist society’ are different. It is one thing to say that I understand that our society is plural or multicultural containing a plurality of values, cultures, ethnic groups and religions. It is quite another to say that I (can) contribute to making a pluralist or multicultural society.

‘pluralist’, and between ‘pluralism’ and ‘multiculturalism’. Firstly, ‘pluralism’ refers to the phenomena itself, i.e. the fact of diversity in values, beliefs, ways of life and so on, while ‘pluralism’ refers to an official view, which is related to modes of asserting and maintaining these phenomena. Secondly, the term ‘plural’ is used to refer to the fact of diversity, whilst the term ‘pluralist’ includes attitudes about it. For instance, to say that ‘a society is plural’ is pointing out ‘a matter of fact’ such as a diversity of values, cultures, etc. but to say that ‘a society is pluralist’ means that it has adopted ‘the position that different values, cultures, etc. have a right to exist alongside one another without discrimination’ (Haydon, 1997, p.116, n.1). Lastly, ‘pluralism’ and ‘multiculturalism’ have in common that they are connected to the differences and diversities which are exhibited in life styles, ways of thinking, religious beliefs, moral views, philosophical positions and cultural identities. But pluralism is applicable to all these phenomena, whereas multiculturalism is restricted to the cultural ones. In this respect, multiculturalism is rather one aspect of pluralism, i.e. a plurality of culture. Nevertheless, due to the broadness of the conception of ‘culture’ which embraces all that humans create,
In this respect, liberal claims are weak.\footnote{More strongly, Kekes(1992) maintains that liberalism is not only incompatible with pluralism, but also with relativism.}

On the other hand, social practices-based education might have some advantages in touching on diverse values in a plural society in that not only are the social practices which are central to education basically grounded in a particular society and thus come from it, but also it provides more positive suggestions on maintaining a pluralist society. It should be noted, however, that I do not claim that plurality itself is desirable nor that education should be plural-directed. Indeed, this claim can hardly be justified, since plurality does not denote desirability and further the fact that our society is plural does not imply that it is, or should be, a pluralistic society (Haydon, 1987, pp.9-10). My assertion rather assumes that if we are given a plural society then, since living in that society is inescapable, it is necessary to educate for a pluralist society, although a plural society is not necessarily desirable. Indeed, it is more or less apparent that we live now in pluralities of values and cultures, etc. within and between societies. No matter what they are, it is important for people to understand and respect other people’s and society’s values and cultures as well as one’s and a society’s own values and cultures. In this respect, education is inevitably directed towards a pluralist society such as encouraging people to respect other values and cultures, insofar as we are living in a plural society.\footnote{Similar arguments regarding liberal virtues and religious education are found in Haydon(1997), p.111-116; pp. 126-129.}

If I am right about this, social practices-based education might be more appropriate for a pluralist society than liberal education. The reason may be explained thus: liberal education relies ultimately on individuals making up their own minds on choices of values and ways of life and thus the individuals need understanding of other values and cultures only if they are ‘real options for the individual concerned’ (Haydon, 1997, p. 140). In contrast, social practices-based education depends entirely on social practices to which one or a society belongs and this presupposes understandings and considerations of other values and cultures within one’s society. Some would argue, however, that the emphasis within the social practices view that understandings and values are different according to the traditions of the culture to which one or a society belongs, cannot escape from relativism. My immediate response would be: what is wrong with the point that they can be used interchangeably, especially in the field of education.
different societies have different values and cultures, and thus their understandings are inevitably grounded in them?41

B. Social Practices-based Education: An Alternative?

So far, I have tried to show why social practices-based education is better than liberal education, both as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge and as the promotion of personal autonomy, in explaining educational phenomena. Should then education as initiation into social practices be an alternative to liberal education? This question is very difficult to answer straightforwardly, because the answer may be different depending on how we understand the term 'alternative', but also on how we conceive of 'liberal education' and 'education as initiation into social practices'. If we do not use the term 'alternative' in a strict sense, if we see 'education as initiation into social practices' in a prescriptive and substantial sense, and if I am right about my understanding of 'liberal education', I would say that social practices-based education may be an alternative to liberal education. Let me try to show this.

Liberal education as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge emphasises 'initiating pupils into forms of knowledge' because of IE. Seen in this way, however we define education, it must be logically connected to the pursuit of knowledge and thus the value of knowledge and understanding is regarded as universal and objective, regardless of individual desires, and social and temporal contexts. However, this view may have some weaknesses. Firstly, presumably, it may negate or undermine important values in a society, such as vocational preparation, justice, citizenship, environment, health, and so on, by stressing IE. Secondly, related, it is isolated from the real human world so that, accordingly, it is almost impossible for education to reflect practices and values of a particular society. Lastly, also related, there is no way to integrate internal and external values and theory and practice because their conceptual differences are sharpened.

Liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy tends to emphasise the satisfaction of one’s desires in the name of the significance of autonomous choice or even personal well-being in a liberal democratic society. The promotion of personal autonomy

41Walzer(1983) also makes a similar point. For further arguments, see Walzer(1983) and section B of this
as an educational aim has some limitations. Firstly, on this approach, it may be difficult to maintain consistency or coherence within education, because one's desires may be changeable from time to time through one's life. Secondly, the satisfaction of personal desires may have limitations in realising social or moral desires and values if there is conflict between one's personal desires and social desires. Lastly, personal autonomy as an educational aim may be limited in that it is valuable within a liberal-democratic society, not in all circumstances.

Social practices-based education, unlike liberal education as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge and as the promotion of personal autonomy, addresses participation or engagement in social activities or practices. To put it another way, from the social practices perspective, education is internally related to social practices, that is, education should be understood as part of the outcome of engaging in social practices to which one or a society belongs, rather than intrinsically related to the conception of education or democratic principle or personal well-being. This may have some benefits. Firstly, as I mentioned above, without any metaphysical or logical ground, the social practices account can be given a justification by being grounded in substantive human practices in which someone or a society participates. In addition, it can ensure a consistency among education, participants and social practices. Secondly, it might be better in handling diverse values in a plural society in that social practices are basically grounded in a particular society. Lastly, it may make it possible not only to bridge the gap between theory and practice or theoretical activities and practical activities, but also to provide vivid practical education by dealing with the real human practices of human lives and societies.
To sum up, as shown above in <Figure 4>, social practices-based education can give an alternative to liberal education on the following grounds. 1) It might avoid the two extreme positions of liberal education, that is, universal and individual pictures of education, by suggesting a social picture of education. 2) It might overcome the weaknesses of the justification of liberal education that relies either on intrinsic justification or personal well-being by resting on the social practices to which one or a society belongs. 3) It might have a sounder grounding than liberal education in that it stands on real human practices rather than personal desires or transcendental logic. My argument for social practices-based education is, in the end, overcoming the weaknesses of liberal education by taking a middle way between quite different (and in a sense extreme) developments of a tradition of liberal education, i.e. liberal education as the pursuit of rationality or knowledge and as the promotion of personal autonomy.

C. Some Possible Objections

So far I have tried to show in what ways ‘education as initiation into social practices’ can have strong points and thus overcome the limitations of liberal education. In this section, I shall consider some possible criticisms about social practices-based education.

The first possible objection might be a fundamental question: is social practices-
based education really an alternative to liberal education? This question which liberals would raise, is certainly a difficult and perplexing one. This objection seems to be grounded in my sharp comparisons and arguments. Liberals might criticise my understanding of the liberal position as (too) stark and restricted. For example, some would think that liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy has never undermined or ignored the importance of society. Some would think that the view of liberal education as the pursuit of rationality is not (necessarily) to be equated with the view of education as a whole. These points may be right, as I have admitted. Nevertheless, we can hardly deny that liberal education as the pursuit of rationality is often regarded as a claim about education as a whole, and that personal autonomy-based education particularly stressing ‘rational autonomy’ is more or less detached from society. When we see liberal education in this way, I hold that social practices-based education may be an alternative to liberal education. However, as far as political liberalism is concerned, I do not hold a strong position, since some political liberals tend to maintain that education is a social practice. For example, Jonathan (1995; 1997) tries on the one hand to overcome ‘perennial tensions between individual freedom and social justice in a liberal society’ (1997, p. 12; cf. 1995, p. 106) and on the other to broaden the horizons of liberal education, by reinterpreting liberal education in the light of social theory and social practices. For her, education is ‘a society’s most central social practice’ (1997, p. 1). Jonathan’s position could be understood, to use my classification, as ‘education as initiation into social practices’ in a descriptive or formal sense rather than in a prescriptive or substantial sense. Seen in this way, I would say that this version of liberal education might be a complement to (or of) liberal education. But I am not sure whether this position can still be called ‘liberal education’.

The second possible objection might be conservatism. This attack can be raised in two ways: the nature of social practices, and social practices in school education. Firstly, when we see education as an initiation of people into substantive social practices to which one or a society belongs, some would think that, to some extent, it may inevitably allow conservatism. This may be partly true, because substantive social practices are not very frequently changed; however, it is also true that social practices are
by no means something fixed and given from outside, as I have stressed several times\(^ {42}\). Secondly, some would worry about conservatism in the school in that social practices within school are relatively less changeable, for example, it took schools a long time to catch up with the use of computers in business. We can admit this point, but this is derived from the conservatism of institutions, not of social practices themselves. Hence, in principle, there is no reason why social practices within schools should not change.

The third possible objection, as more or less opposite to the second objection, might be locality or relativity of social practices. Social practices are basically ‘located in time and space’ because they always exist ‘in specific communities and arise[s] out of mutual engagement, which is largely dependent on specific places and times’ (Wenger, 1998, pp.130-131). From this point of view, some would raise the criticism that social practices-based education is more or less relativistic and its justification is at best local justification\(^ {43}\). This claim would be correct in that social practices cannot transcend spatial and temporal contexts and their justification also is ‘always found within a particular set of shared values’ (Thigpen and Downing, 1989, pp.542-543). This criticism presupposes the claim that education should pursue universal values and its justification should be universal. But my response may take two forms: a negative and positive form. In a negative response, is universal justification either possible or necessary for the justification of values? In a positive response, what is wrong with local justification? In a social practices-based education, to some extent, ‘weak relativism’ may be accepted in a pluralist society, although an ‘extreme’ or ‘sceptical relativism’ may be rejected\(^ {44}\), because social practices could be different according to the traditions of society to which one or society belongs. Hence, local justification which relies on a particular set of shared values is inevitable in a pluralist society.

The last objection is related to the practical difficulties in educational practices. When we practise ‘education as initiation into social practices’ in school, many practical

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\(^ {42}\) See section B of Chapter 5 (regarding flexibility of traditions), section B of Chapter 7 (regarding social practices of school education) and section D of Chapter 8(cf. a change of my academic life and a ‘voyage’ metaphor).

\(^ {43}\) For details of the locality of social practices, see Wenger (1998), chapter 5.

\(^ {44}\) S. Lukes (1995) divides the two kinds of relativism: ‘cultural relativism’ which holds that ‘each culture is valid in its own terms, that its norms and principles are only applicable within[it], that to understand means not to criticise’; ‘the sceptical view’ that, ‘for epistemological or other reasons, judgements cannot be made across cultural boundaries: ‘they’ cannot be judged by ‘our’ standards’ (p.178). The former can
problems are raised: which social practices are most substantive and thus important? Who is to decide them and how? How can we select educationally valuable social practices? How can students be initiated into them in a classroom? etc. Although I have tried to be clear about lists of questions at a school level and have also suggested that ongoing traditions of social practices to which one or a society belongs must be the basis for answering them, there are still questions unsettled. Some cases are more or less clear, but many cases may not be clear at all, when we perform social practices-based education at a specific level. Some would say that this is a matter of sociological, political concerns or of pragmatic principle. Even if we follow these principles, we may be faced with difficulties in maintaining coherence within social traditions and democratic bodies, because we have 'different traditions and practices according to different ethnic and cultural backgrounds' and, moreover, 'within a society that shares moral traditions and social practices, there may be disagreement about what these traditions and practices require' (Tunick, 1998, pp.3-4). Accordingly, teachers as practitioners may have different opinions about which social practices students should be initiated into, how to initiate them, and so on. In this respect, we should stop thinking that social practices-based education can be carried out in accordance with a universal principle, but rather we should improve and elaborate it by accumulated trial and error.

D. Reflections and Conclusion

This thesis, in fact, has been completed by dealing with the justification of social practices-based education and some possible objections. In this section, I shall put forward some reflections on my thesis as a text, which include some limitations of it, contributions it can make and suggestions for further study.

Let me begin with reflection on the character of this thesis as a text. My thesis has been written against the background of contemporary writings in the philosophy of education on the one hand and, on the other, it can be seen as, at least to some extent, a reaction against these. In favour of social practices-based education rather than liberal education, I have made much of the point that education should be based on current

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be labeled 'weak relativism' and the latter can be called 'strong relativism'.
social practices of the real world in which we engage. However, my thesis itself as a text might not be directly linked with this point due to the abstractness of the nature of academic discourses in general and a philosophical discourse in particular. Indeed, academic discourses are in general theoretically-oriented and thus academic writings are more or less theory-biased. In this respect, academic discourses and writings, implicitly or explicitly, tend to encourage the gap between theory and practice rather than close it. In particular, a philosophical discourse is highly theoretical and logically-oriented, and thus encourages students to write with these virtues rather than to solve practical problems which occur in our society. Without any logical or theoretical tightness, philosophical writings are often regarded as lacking in value.

My thesis is not an exception. The thesis follows the traditions of academic writings in philosophy. Put more exactly, my academic writing is still grounded in the analytic traditions of philosophy, as far as philosophical methodology is concerned. Philosophy as an academic field may belong to a ‘second-order’ practice rather than ‘basic’ practice. Hence, philosophical discourse itself is not directly connected with the real world and thus does not directly tackle practical problems which occur in our society, although it can show the real world of philosophy as a discipline. This irony or limit inescapably appears in my thesis, in so far as I am engaging in philosophical discourse or practice. Indeed, my thesis does not directly treat social practices themselves in which I live, although I stress both that education should grow out of social practices of the real human world and that ‘practical logic’ is more fundamental than ‘logical logic’.

Given the fundamental limit, nevertheless, my thesis contributes to something about social practices. First of all, this text itself shows a social practice both in the field of philosophy of education and in my (real) academic life. This text is an outcome of engaging in ongoing traditions of philosophy of education. It shows exactly how philosophical practices have so far been changed in the field of education. The overall argument of this text follows a chronological order, for example, from liberal education as the pursuit of rationality and knowledge to liberal education as the promotion of personal autonomy, and then to social practices-based education. Furthermore, in general, the details of it also show changes in ongoing traditions of philosophy of education- such as, regarding educational theory, from the scientific theory of education to the practical
theory of education, to the practical activity of education, and then to the social practices view of education. On the other hand, my thesis also shows a social practice which reflects my twenty years-academic life as a student and as a university teacher of philosophy of education. I have been educated by the liberal education tradition in terms of substance and by the analytic traditions of philosophy in terms of methodology and this is extended in my academic career. When I came to the Institute of Education, which has the best-established traditions of liberal education, my intention was to more strongly justify liberal education by digging into Aquinas’s conception of liberal education, which is a missing tradition of liberal education able to bridge the gap between the ancient and modern liberal education. To do this, I systematically read and analysed MacIntyre’s writings for the purpose of glimpsing Aquinas’ thought. This work made me interested in MacIntyre’s idea itself and I found his ‘social practice’ thesis attractive. My current thesis is a kind of expansion and elaboration of his social practice idea in an educational context, although it certainly goes beyond MacIntyre’s thesis. This break in my academic tradition is the result of the ongoing traditions of philosophical practices in which I engage.

Secondly, my thesis as a text can contribute to the understanding and improvement of social practices in education by providing theoretical foundations and the overall picture of ‘education as initiation into social practices’. The relations between educational practices and a philosophical argument or practice in education are complementary. On the one hand, philosophical argument should not only be based on educational practices, but also should unceasingly be modified in the practice of everyday life, classroom, education and society. On the other hand, educational practices need to be articulated and improved by the practical theory which philosophical practice may provide. Social practices are not only improved through trial and error but also articulated by academic or philosophical practice. In this respect, teachers engaged in educational practices and scholars engaged in academic practice perform different parts of the same practices, and thus cooperative and collaborative work between them is desirable in order to promote the development of virtuous practices. Furthermore, we should consider nonacademic but crucial social practices in which we live along with them.

My thesis as a philosophical practice in the end should be translated, expanded,
articulated and rewritten according to traditions of social practices in which one engages or to which one or a society belongs. Korean educational traditions might be different from the UK’s. So my further research might require my arguments to be reinterpreted against a Korean educational background. What can I say about Korean education in terms of social practices at a specific level—such as curriculum organisation, teaching process, teacher education, and so on? Another task which I have in mind is to (re)consider other fields of education, such as moral education and religious education from the social practices perspectives. What would social practices-based moral and religious education be like in comparison with a traditional approach? It is natural that these two tasks are given for me, partly because my life is greatly indebted to two backgrounds, i.e. Korean education and Christian education, and partly because I am engaged in these practices.

Let me conclude with a metaphor: ‘voyage’ and ‘sea’. Social practices, like a sailor’s voyage, are continuously changed and advanced. Although sometimes navigators put down the anchor in the harbour and sometimes temporarily cannot navigate because of storms or because the engine is out of order, their general duty is characterised as the voyage itself. However, social practices are always worked out within certain backgrounds, just as a ship’s voyage is possible only on the sea. Sometimes, certain adventurous navigators want to go on uncharted waters, but they must be navigating on the sea.

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45 For a partial argument for social practices-based moral education, see Hirst (1999a).
APPENDIX I: The Peters-Hirstian Liberal Education

In this Appendix, I shall deal with how far there is a difference between Peters' and Hirst' views of liberal education¹.

1. Peters' Liberal Education

Let us begin by considering Peters' 'liberal education' in relation to 'education'. Is there any difference between the concept of education and the concept of liberal education? To put it another way, is liberal education a form of education or the same concept? The answer to this question might be different, depending on what we mean by 'education' and 'liberal education'. If we define the concept of education broadly, for instance, 'all kinds of teaching and learning activities', liberal education might be a form of education. In contrast, if we, like Peters, define the concept of education strictly, liberal education would be synonymous with the concept of education². His logic seems to run as follows: the most fundamental question in education concerns the very concept of education itself, i.e. 'what is education?' This question implies both 'what is an ideal form of education?' and 'what is an original form of education?' From this point of view, for Peters, 'what is education?' and 'what is an ideal form of education?' or 'what is an original form of education?' are not quite different questions, and the question 'what is education?' presupposes that there is 'the concept of education', or 'the ideal form of education'. The answer to this question, according to Peters, is liberal education.

¹It is necessary to analyse their books and papers as a whole in order to understand their ideas of liberal education and its limitations. However, my understanding of their liberal education relies mainly on the following writings: Peters' Ethics and Education(1966), 'Ambiguities in Liberal Education and the Problem of Its Content'(1977), Hirst's 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge'(1965) and Knowledge and Curriculum(1974), even though they have presented their ideas of liberal education in a wide variety of papers. The reason why these books and papers were selected is that these are good illustrations of their ideas of liberal education, as well as providing an overview of how these ideas have developed and changed over time. For more details of the process of Peters' modification of his theory, see Hirst(1986), R.K.Elliott(1986) and R. F. Dearden(1986).

²It needs to be noted, however, that the claim of the equation of education with liberal education is considerably weakened by Peters' modification of his view on the concept of 'intrinsic value' in later writings. In 'Ambiguities in Liberal Education and the Problem of Its Content'(1977), he has pointed out that both practical activities such as cookery and theoretical activities such as science can be pursued 'for its own sake'.

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Let us consider this more fully. Peters’ starting point for liberal education is to enquire about what the concept of education is. It is clearly shown in his *Ethics and Education* (1966). According to Peters (1966, pp. 25-43), the concept of education has to satisfy three criteria: a normative criterion, a cognitive criterion and a procedural criterion. These are briefly thus: ‘education’ implies the transmission of what is worthwhile to those who become committed to it; ‘education’ must involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective, which are not inert; and ‘education’ at least rules out some procedures of transmission, on the grounds that they lack wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner (p. 45). From this point of view, education should be intrinsically rather than extrinsically defined, tend towards a broad rather than narrow belief system and understanding, and be intelligible to the learner rather than unintelligible in terms of procedures.

This concept of ‘education’ is not different from that of liberal education in that these criteria of education are exactly the same as the criteria of liberal education. He puts it:

The demand for liberal education might not be for a special kind of education, but for the removal of certain restrictions or impediments that might hinder education as ordinarily understood. The function of ‘liberal’ would then be the negative one of emphasizing one or other of the three types of criteria of ‘education’ in a context where these were being made difficult to realize (1966, p. 43).

As we can see, from the passage quoted above, for Peters, liberal education is not a particular form of education, but rather the very concept of education or an ideal form of education in that liberal education is a kind of plea that restrictions or impediments in realisation of the concept of education should be removed and thus that what is intrinsic to education should be recovered.

What then are the restrictions or constraints on practising liberal education? These constraints, according to Peters, are threefold: firstly, they relate to extrinsic ends such as the production of material goods, obtaining a job or manning a profession. In other words, the demands for ‘liberal education’ are protest against instrumentalisation of education and an opposition to the restriction of the curriculum to what is deemed to be relevant to extrinsic ends. Secondly, they relate to ‘training’ that, as a contrasting concept to ‘education’, is related to the development of
competence in a limited skill or mode of thought. The demand for liberal education is in effect a plea that education should not be confined to specialist training. Lastly, they relate to methods by which (liberal) education cannot be transmitted in a morally acceptable manner. In this sense, we could say that the demand for liberal education is a kind of protest against constraining people’s beliefs by narrowly conceived or dogmatic methods such as indoctrination, conditioning and brainwashing (ibid., pp. 43-45).

These different ways of conceiving of liberal education appear in some ambiguities of the concept of ‘liberal’. There are, therefore, bound to be ambiguities inherent in the demand for liberal education (Peters, 1977, p. 3). These ambiguities appear in the following three forms: as knowledge for its own sake—liberal education must be pursued ‘for its own sake’, not viewed as instrumental to some other end such as vocational or utilitarian ends; as general education—liberal education is a plea against the mind being confined to one discipline or form of understanding; and as the development of the free person—liberal education relates to constrictions on the mind imposed by dogmatic methods of teaching (ibid., pp. 3-20).

Given the concept of liberal education has ambiguities and vagueness, Peters’ view of what is central to liberal education can roughly be expressed thus: education is fundamentally a matter of worthwhile activities. All worthwhile activities are linked with intrinsic goods which are built into the concept of education such as developing rational mind-related activities. The core of these goods is the pursuit of knowledge and understanding. Therefore, intrinsically worthwhile activities in education can be reduced to the pursuit of knowledge and understanding. For Peters, in short, the phrase ‘liberal education’ appears something of a slogan which takes on different meanings according to its immediate context. It usually labels a form of education of which the author approves, but beyond that its meaning is often entirely negatively derived. For instance, liberal education is not a vocational education, not a specialist education in any sense, and so on (Hirst, 1965, p. 113).

2. Hirst’s Liberal Education

Hirst’s liberal education is not different from Peters’ in addressing knowledge and understanding. But the differences between their views are apparent at least in
terms of a starting point and the relation of education to liberal education. Unlike
Peters, Hirst's starting point of liberal education lies in suggesting a stipulative
definition of it, not education as a whole. Hence, he tried to define the concept of
liberal education in a positive and logical sense. Indeed, Hirst's 'Liberal Education
and the Nature of Knowledge' (1965) is an attempt to clarify the concept of liberal
education in a positive sense.

Hirst tried to establish the idea of liberal education by examining the Greek
idea of liberal education which was rooted in a number of related philosophical
doctrines regarding the nature of knowledge, mind, reality and the relationship among
them. According to Hirst, this logic runs like this: it is the peculiar activity of the
mind to pursue knowledge; in that the mind, which is related to pursuit of knowledge,
comes to know the essential nature of things and can apprehend what is ultimately
real and immutable; and the pursuit of knowledge is the fulfilment of the mind and,
therefore, an essential element in the good life. From these doctrines there emerged
the idea of liberal education as a process concerned simply and directly with the
pursuit of knowledge (ibid., pp. 113-4).

A classical argument that the doctrines lend to this conception of education is
threefold. First, such an education is, or should be, based on what is true (episteme)
rather than on uncertain opinions and beliefs (doxa). Secondly, since knowledge itself
is a distinctive human virtue, liberal education has a value for the person as the
fulfilment of the mind. Thirdly, because of the significance of knowledge in the
determination of the good life as a whole, liberal education is essential to a person's
'understanding' of how he or she ought to live, both individually and socially (ibid.,
pp. 114-5). However, these doctrines, in particular the doctrine of 'epistemological
realism', have become less convincing, since knowledge is no longer seen as the
apprehension of reality but merely as the understanding of experience. Being deprived
of its original philosophical grounds, is there still significance in liberal education? If
so, are there any other grounds for liberal education without resting on metaphysical
assumptions? If so, on what grounds?

Having satisfied this demand, Hirst provides us with a revised and plausible
liberal education which is grounded in 'knowledge itself'. His argument runs as

3He also examined the Harvard Committee Report (1946) and A. D. C. Peterson's idea (1960) of liberal
education. For the details of this, see Hirst (1965), pp. 116 ff.

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follows: there is a logical relationship between the concept of ‘mind’ and that of
‘knowledge’, from which it follows that ‘the achievement of knowledge is necessarily
the development of mind in its most fundamental aspect’ (ibid., p. 123). To put it more
fully, a liberal education is ‘determined in scope and content by knowledge itself’, i.e.
forms of knowledge and it ‘is thereby concerned with development of mind’ (ibid.,
p. 125). In other words, liberal education is, fundamentally, aiming at the development
of mind and what content, to some extent, can be taught relies on knowledge itself. If
Hirst’s assertions that liberal education is aiming at the development of mind and that
the acquisition of knowledge is logically connected to the development of mind are
correct, this conclusion presumably follows: the content of liberal education is
necessarily constituted by forms of knowledge and thus teaching forms of knowledge,
as it is related to the development of rational mind, is the essential part of education.
From this point of view, Hirst addressed the following two things: evidence of the
development of mind that cannot be defined but by acquisition of knowledge; and the
classification and justification of several forms of knowledge. We can say, therefore,
that, for Hirst, forms of knowledge lie at the heart of his liberal education.

What then are forms of knowledge? According to Hirst, the forms of
knowledge are, in short, ‘the basic articulations whereby the whole of experience has
become intelligible to humans’ and thus ‘they are fundamental achievements of
mind’. He puts it more explicitly: ‘To acquire knowledge is to become aware of
experience as structured, organised and made meaningful in some quite specific way,
and the varieties of human knowledge constitute the highly developed forms in which
humans have found this possible. To acquire knowledge is to learn to see, to
experience the world in a way otherwise unknown, and thereby come to have a mind
in a fuller sense’ (ibid., pp. 124-5). Forms of knowledge are, in short, distinct ways in
which our experience becomes structured, articulated and extended. It is natural to
say, hence, that different forms of knowledge reflect different understandings of our
experiences (ibid., p. 128).

What then are the criteria for the distinction between forms of knowledge?
How can forms of knowledge be classified? He puts forward the distinguishing
features of forms of knowledge as follows: 1) They each involve certain central
concepts that are peculiar in character to the form. 2) As a result, the form has a
distinctive logical structure. 3) The form has expressions or statements that in some
way or other are testable against experience. 4) The forms have developed particular techniques and skills for exploring experience and testing their distinctive expressions'(ibid., 129. My emphasis.). The developed particular techniques and skills among other criteria are, as Hirst himself admits in his later papers, merely some secondary features that do not directly follow from the logical distinctions of forms of knowledge. We can say therefore that 'the distinctions between the various forms of knowledge which will principally govern the scheme of education will be based entirely on analyses of their particular conceptual, logical and methodological features'(ibid., p. 125). From these criteria, the forms of knowledge can be classified as follows: 1) distinct disciplines or forms of knowledge: mathematics, physical science, human science, history, religion, literature and fine arts, philosophy. 2) fields of knowledge: theoretical, practical'(ibid., p. 131).

So far I have explained Hirst's stipulative conception of liberal education. His conception of liberal education, unlike Peters', is positively defined by 'knowledge itself'. Given his conception of liberal education, let me now briefly sketch the relationship between education and liberal education. For Hirst, unlike Peters, liberal education is not necessarily education as a whole nor should education as a whole be equated with liberal education, but rather liberal education is a part of the whole of education. As Hirst admitted, liberal education 'cannot be regarded as providing a total education' in that there is a danger of ignoring many crucial other concerns such as specialist education, physical education and character training(Hirst, 1974, p. 96; 1965, p. 136). Nonetheless, for him, liberal education is the very heart of the whole of education. Hence, we may rightly say that in his earlier education the pursuit of knowledge and understanding was addressed in the following logic: education is concerned with the whole person who lives the rational good life. The good life is obtained and justified by the exercise and pursuit of reason. Having reason or justification presupposes having knowledge and understanding. Hence, the pursuit of

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4 For this reason, he modifies the criteria and the terms as follows: 'concepts', 'logical structures' and 'truth criteria'. For the details of it, see Hirst, (1974), pp. 85ff.

5 The question of how many forms of knowledge can be identified is controversial. Indeed, Hirst's classification of forms of knowledge has also been slightly modified as follows: in 'The Nature and Structure of Curriculum Objectives' (1974), mathematics, the physical sciences, knowledge of persons, literature and fine arts, morals, religion and philosophy(p.25); in The Logic of Education(1970), the truths of formal logic and mathematics, the truths of physical sciences, our awareness and understanding of our own and other people's minds, moral judgements, objective aesthetic experience,
rationality in general or knowledge and understanding in particular is the central part of education as a whole. This leads us to identify Hirst’s liberal education with Peters’.

宗教主张,和哲学理解。对于他整体立场的更广泛讨论,参见“The Forms of Knowledge Re-visited”(1974), pp. 84-100.
APPENDIX II: An Analysis of the Conception of Autonomy

The concept of autonomy is ambiguous in that the denotation of it is not clear. Indeed, the notion of autonomy has been used in an exceedingly broad fashion. According to Dworkin (1988), it is often used as an equivalent to the following terms: liberty, self-rule or sovereignty, freedom of the will, dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility, and self-knowledge, qualities of self-assertion, critical reflection, freedom from obligation, the absence external causation, knowledge of one’s own interests. ‘It is even equated by some economists with the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons. It is related to actions, to beliefs, to reasons for acting, to rules, to the will of other persons, to thoughts, and to principles’ (p.6). Indeed, the meaning of autonomy varies according to the speakers’ intention and social context.

On the other hand, the concept of autonomy is also vague in that the connotation of it cannot be confined. In other words, even if the connotation of autonomy is defined, there still might be dispute regarding the meaning of autonomy in terms of degree or level of autonomy. What is more, the focus of autonomy, as we can see from White, has been changed from time to time: from focusing on the intellectual and rational tendency to focusing on the satisfaction of desires, and again from focusing on universal human qualities such as rationality and human desires to focusing on autonomy within a social and political context. This also makes it difficult to understand. In order to understand the status of autonomy in liberal education, therefore, it is necessary to follow these transitions. Before I do this, let me put forward some preliminary analysis of the notion of autonomy.

What is autonomy? Who can be called an autonomous person? One of the easiest ways of clarifying the concept of autonomy might be to compare the notion of autonomy with similar concepts such as ‘freedom’ and ‘independence’, and with contrary concepts such as ‘heteronomy’. Is autonomy the same thing as freedom, or independence? What is a typical state of heteronomy? And what are the differences between autonomy and autarchy, and between autonomy and authenticity? How far are these distinctions sound?

Let us start by contrasting ‘autonomy’ to ‘heteronomy’. The paradigmatic case of heteronomy may be easily found in someone who lies under excessive external
constraints. According to White, 'autonomous people choose their major ends
themselves rather than leaving them to tradition, religion or others' domination' (1990,
p. 74). In other words, autonomous persons tend to choose their ends without relying
on external authorities, whilst heteronomous persons tend to rest on external factors
when they choose some particular ends. For heteronomous persons, external
authorities always constitute some kind of constraints. In this sense, we can say, as the
simplest way, that autonomy is not a heteronomous state which is determined by
external constraints. This sense is linked to negative freedom or liberty. It should be
noted, however, that there is no reason why someone should not act heteronomously
under internal constraints. One's heteronomous actions may also be influenced by the
internal constraints, although we admit that they mainly occur under the influence of
external constraints. This may be linked with a positive freedom or liberty.

The concept of freedom, in general, is used in two senses: a negative and a
positive sense. In a negative sense, according to Berlin (1969), freedom is connected
to the question: 'what is the area within which the subject- a person or group of
persons- is or should be left to do or be what he[or she] is able to do or be, without
interference by others?'. In contrast, a positive sense of freedom is linked with the
question: 'what, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine
someone to do, or to be, this rather than that?' (pp.121-122). That is, negative freedom
is concerned with the area, in which the subject should be left without interference or
coercion, whereas positive freedom is concerned with who or what controls. Let us
begin with considering negative freedom.

The idea of negative freedom is well encapsulated in Berlin’s claims: ‘I am
normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interfere with
my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can
act unobstructed by others’ (1969, p.122). These claims show us two things: Berlin’s
advocacy of negative freedom; and that the meaning of it can be expressed as an
absence of or lack( of obstacles to choice) in which nothing obstructs one. For Berlin,
therefore, his main concern seems to lie in how to remove obstructions to individual
choice. His claims, of course, must be subjected to some questions; however, I do not

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6 One obvious question is what counts as interference or constraint when we define negative freedom as
the state of the absence of interference or constraint (D. Miller, 1991, p.13). The answer to the question
may be various, for instance, other people, material resources, laws, etc. For a full discussion of this,
want to criticise them here, since my present purpose is to establish the concept of autonomy in relation to that of freedom.

Negative freedom, in short, can be defined as ‘the absence of constraints or restraints relevant to what we do want or might want to do’ (Dearden, 1972, p. 450). It may be the case, for instance, that someone voted for or against some issues without anybody’s, or any institution’s, or any party’s directions. In this case, we can say that he or she was being autonomous in voting. Hence, negative freedom can be a necessary condition for exercising autonomy in that without a minimum freedom, to exercise autonomy is impossible. However, we should not confuse the exercise of autonomy with the development of autonomy, since exercising autonomy does not always guarantee developing autonomy. Furthermore, we can never say that freedom is a sufficient condition for both exercising and developing autonomy, since freedom itself cannot guarantee the exercise of autonomy, although it is a minimum condition. Indeed, for exercising autonomy, other elements are needed such as reason, desire, volition for action, and so on. We might conclude, therefore, that the notion of negative freedom cannot be equated with that of autonomy, but it is a basic, and important, condition we should inevitably assume for exercising autonomy. This leads us to consider positive freedom.

What, then, is the relationship between positive freedom and autonomy? The answer to this question seems to be more complicated. According to Berlin, positive freedom can be presented thus: ‘I wish to be the instrument of my own, not other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object...deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men ... that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them’ (1969, p. 131, emphasis added). In positive freedom, as we can see in the passages quoted above, the notions of ‘my own’, ‘self-directed’, ‘subject’, etc. are addressed. It seems to me that positive freedom emphasises a subject who controls an action, i.e. ‘self’ in an autonomous action, whilst negative freedom emphasises the issue of whether one’s state is free or not. Negative freedom, in practice, is merely a necessary condition for autonomy, not a sufficient condition. That is, being free from the constraints does not guarantee

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see F.A. Hayek(1960), H. Steiner(1974-5) and G. A. Cohen(1979). These seem to show us, in turn, that the meaning of freedom cannot be determined satisfactorily by negative freedom (Taylor, 1979).

*Dearden(1972) draws the distinction between an exercise of autonomy and the development of it. See pp. 451-2.*
being autonomous. If my analysis is correct, we might say that positive freedom seems to be much closer to autonomy than negative freedom to it. It is noteworthy, however, that positive freedom, like negative freedom, cannot always assure an autonomous action. For, it is one thing to say that ‘I am not prevented from doing something’ or ‘I can choose to do something for my self’. It is quite another to say that ‘I am doing something autonomously’.

Comparing autonomy with authenticity and autarchy can make the conception of autonomy more explicit. Authenticity is often equated with autonomy in that they both address individual choice. However, the two conceptions can be distinguished: the conception of authenticity stresses the fact that ‘everything is ultimately self-chosen’ or ‘only self can be the chooser of everything’, whilst that of autonomy emphasises self as rational chooser. In this sense, authenticity, as it is best illustrated in Nietzsche, may be an extreme form of autonomy. It should be noted, however, that authenticity, at least in fact, is neither possible nor desirable, since genuine self-choosing as a social being, as a matter of fact, is impossible and there is no guarantee that everything I choose is always good.

On the other hand, the conception of autonomy can be distinguished from that of autarchy. An agent’s being autarchic refers to ‘the freedom of action of an agent who, while enjoying (over a wide range of actions) that negative freedom which covers the absence both of force and of coercion, also exercises unimpaired all the normal capacities and powers of a rational chooser by reference to which freedom as rational self-direction is defined’ (Gray, 1983, p. 74). In this sense, in a tradition-directed society, to some extent, there is no reason why one cannot be autarchic (White, 1990, p. 97). What then is the difference between autonomy and autarchy? According to Gray, an autonomous person has the features of the autarchic person; however, in addition to ‘exercising capacities for rational reflection and strength of will in the objective choice-conditions which are not distorted by the presence of force or coercion, an autonomous agent must also have distanced himself in some measure from the conventions of social environment and from the influence of the persons surrounding him’ (Gray, ibid.). In short, whilst the autarchic person stresses the self as a rational chooser, the autonomous person should be not merely a rational

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8The best exposition of Nietzsche in terms of philosophy of education may be found in Cooper’s Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche’s educational philosophy (1983).
chooser, but a critical reflector\textsuperscript{9}. For the autonomous person, therefore, at least two conditions are needed: critical capacities which are required for rational reflection; and one’s volition which is both to act as he or she wants to act and to follow his or her own critical reflection. The former factor seems to be embedded in ‘the rationalistic model’ and the latter element seems to be stressed in ‘the desire-satisfaction model’.

\textsuperscript{9}In this respect, some would call them a ‘weak’ sense of autonomy and ‘strong’ sense of autonomy, respectively. It, however, should be noted that this distinction is more or less a product of the legacy of Kantian rationality. This tradition can be found in Peters(1977), Dearden(1972) and White(1973). In contrast, Cooper would object to the rationalistic notion of autonomy and authenticity, because he sees authenticity as embracing cognitive and affective domain in human lives. For details of this, see his(1983), pp. 20ff. My concern here does not lie in judging whether this distinction is sound, but in exploring and criticising the strong sense of autonomy, which is distinguished from autarchy.
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