Critical History and Collective Memory:  
A Problem in Jewish Education

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Critical History and Collective Memory: A Problem in Jewish Education.  
(Abbreviated)

This research has been stimulated by the profound ambivalence which Jewish schools show in deciding whether or how to teach Jewish history.

This ambivalence is first examined in the context of a philosophical analysis of the relationship between critical history and other forms of historical consciousness.  

Finding this approach deficient, a psychological examination of how Jewish students experience the study of Jewish history is proposed.  

A critical review of research into children's historical thinking leads to the suggestion that alternative research traditions may be more fruitfully employed here. As a result, it is proposed to apply a concept mapping methodology to the investigation of what Jewish students acquire from the critical study of Jewish history.

Theoretical problems raised by this proposal are confronted and resolved, and a defensible research strategy is then formulated according to series of explicitly articulated empirical and theoretical assumptions. This culminates in the presentation and description of an instrument for the generation and analysis of conceptual representations of Jewish historical knowledge in cognitive structure.  

Two case studies are offered.  

These are followed by a discussion of (1) how these studies might inform debate about the consequences of teaching critical Jewish history in Jewish schools; (2) the possibilities offered by applying a concept mapping methodology to Jewish education in general.
Acknowledgements

It is probably in the nature of any piece of work which is a long time in incubation or preparation that its final production is strongly marked by the influence and assistance of others. This work is no different. Yet, rather than list the many individuals whose direct and indirect participation have helped to shape what follows, I hope that the work itself serves as testimony to their contribution, and that they will be able to identify where their involvement has come to bear.

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This is not the place to recount the numerous thanks I owe my parents. Nevertheless, in the context of this thesis, it should be said that in a community which often devalues the efforts of professional Jewish educators, their commitment to Jewish education, the Jewish community and above all their own children have provided me with inspiration, encouragement and support for as long as I can remember.

At a time when schools of education are frequently criticized for their lack of seriousness or for their distance from the
real world Jo Cairns has exemplified what a tutor or, more accurately, a mentor can and should be. Over a long period of time and sometimes in difficult circumstances she has unselfishly challenged, coaxed, inspired and supported my efforts as this work has taken shape. She has been a supporter and friend without whose help I would not have survived let alone embarked on the PhD journey.

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CHAPTER ONE

Jewish history teaching: On returning to old problems with fresh approaches.

"Practical problems do not present themselves wearing their labels around their necks. Problem situations, to use Dewey's old term for it, present themselves to consciousness, but the character of the problem, its formulation, does not. The character of the problem depends on the discerning eye of the beholder. And this eye unilluminated by possible fresh solutions to the problems, new modes of attack, new recognitions of degrees of freedom for change among matters formerly taken to be unalterable, is very likely to miss the novel features of new problems or dismiss them as 'impractical'."


This research constitutes an attempt to characterize more adequately an educational problem. It tries to formulate that problem in an original manner so as to generate new ways of solving it.

This problem is of both a general and personal nature. In general terms, the 'problem situation' consists of the ambiguous way in which Jewish history teaching is planned, organized and prepared in Jewish schools in Britain and the United States. In personal terms, it is constituted by the ambivalence and uncertainty which are regularly encountered when attempting to encourage Jewish schools to review or revive their Jewish history curricula.
It is not facetious to compare the state of Jewish history teaching in Britain with the preparation and provision of school dinners. Most Jewish schools provide, but few make consumption compulsory. As their students grow older, teachers seem less and less anxious as to whether their charges partake. Parents generally agree that it is somehow of value, but would probably find it hard to explain why, given what is usually served up. Experts have frequently complained about standards - that provisions are either too stodgy or too spicy. Yet, over the last 20 years, neither the menu nor the tableware have substantially changed.

If this assessment seems imprecise it is substantiated by research in both England and the United States which has extensively if not comprehensively charted the present condition of Jewish history teaching.

In Britain, two unpublished pieces of research have found that:

Only two Jewish primary schools have a timetable slot specifically devoted to Jewish history teaching. Instead, Jewish history is largely integrated with other Jewish and non-Jewish subjects, where something of it is taught by all schools questioned. Only occasionally do schools follow a course which can be identified as Jewish history, and, in these cases, pedagogic materials are created by teachers who are 'enthusiastic' about Jewish history rather than subject specialists (Z.F.E.T. 1992)

In Jewish high schools Jewish history is the one area of Judaic study apart from "Chumash" which appears at some point on the timetable of all schools defined as non-secessionist (Heilman 1982). Indeed, all head teachers interviewed as part of one piece of research stated their wish to have more Jewish history taught in their schools. They complained that it was
lack of timetable space that made this impossible (Michelson 1990).

Only one Jewish high school in Britain follows either a written curriculum or syllabus for Jewish history up to age 16 (and in this instance it is derived from the main themes set out in a Chief Rabbi's essay of 1936). Only three schools teach Jewish history to students over the age of sixteen. In the remainder and even in these three, Jewish history is generally taught for extremely limited periods of time (less than two teaching periods a week). It is normally dropped at the age of fourteen.

There is evidence that schools make little effort to employ Jewish history teachers who are qualified to teach either history or Jewish history. No Jewish history teacher possesses a senior position in a Jewish school qua teacher of Jewish history.

It would seem that a school's decision about whether and how to teach Jewish history is largely dependent on circumstantial factors; for example, in orthodox girls schools where the subject is deemed preferable to a Talmudic alternative which is regarded as unsuitable for girls, or in less orthodox schools where, in a number of cases, the subject's inclusion hinges on whether any of the senior staff happen to be 'keen on' Jewish history.

Given these circumstances it is not exactly astounding that Jewish schools either lack Jewish history textbooks or still use textbooks which have not been revised for more than twenty years. It is also not surprising that theoretical issues in Jewish history teaching have been little reflected on and not at all written about in this country. There is not one reference to research into any aspect of Jewish history teaching in any volume of British Educational Research.
Michelson talks enviously of the situation in the United States where, he says, "Jewish history is a standard component of a Jewish studies curriculum, taught as a secular and as a religious subject" (ibid. p.33). Arguably, however, this assertion owes more to despair than reality.

Bernstein, for example, has found that "despite the fact that Jewish history has become more prominent... in recent years [in the United States], it remains somewhat adrift in terms of the lack of clearly articulated direction among principals and Jewish history teachers" (Bernstein 1986).

He found a number of features to characterize the condition of Jewish history in the Jewish schools he investigated, all of which were modern orthodox.

He looked at schools which all taught Jewish history but found that Jewish history teaching time tended to concentrate in those years when the most able students had moved onto early college admission programmes.

He found that there is a tendency for the subject to be taught by inappropriately qualified teachers or to be swallowed up as a minority option in general history courses.

Above all he pointed to two problems:

"The single problem described by nearly all of the Jewish history teachers interviewed as part of this study can be summarized in a single word: time. The tight constraints of the day school schedule make it impossible to do justice to Jewish history, whose expanse and diversity is much greater than most other history courses" (ibid. p.36).

Secondly, "there is the present lack of thought given to the Jewish history curriculum. In none of the schools studied is the supervisor of Jewish history instruction a department chairperson. Moreover, none of the present supervisors are
themselves trained in Jewish history.... they have little time to focus on Jewish history instruction" (ibid. p.37).

Bernstein's sample is a limited one but it corresponds reasonably well to the typical Jewish secondary school in Britain, where all Jewish high schools are orthodox, and allows the possibility of sketching the most prominent features of Jewish history teaching in (modern) orthodox Jewish high schools in large parts of the English speaking world. It seems that we can say:

1. Jewish history is taught in the vast majority if not all of these schools

2. Headteachers of Jewish schools would like to see more Jewish history taught.

3. Jewish history is rarely taught for substantial lengths of time.

4. Teaching is not usually based on clear thought about what is happening or hoped for from Jewish history lessons.

5. Jewish history is frequently taught by teachers who have limited expertise in the field.

No doubt, it can be said that these features differ little from those which characterize many other subjects on the school timetable in general, or in the field of Jewish studies in particular. Yet, the point we are making about Jewish history teaching is not just that it is impoverished or inadequate, but that it displays what might be usefully be described as a schizophrenia - a profound disparity between rhetoric and reality, or between word and deed.
If, therefore, some of the details in this overview lack appropriate rigour, the broad outlines of the account do allow us to draw up a picture of a subject which is characterized by a profound ambiguity. It is taught almost everywhere but without it usually being clear why or how. It frequently beats off fierce competition for space on the timetable but only occasionally wins sufficient time to be taken very seriously. It is rarely condemned as a waste of time but is rarely considered indispensable.

**Trying to Discern Fault Lines.**

The problem with a survey such as this is that even if it does reveal features that are common to all schools in the sample, it does not indicate whether in all cases these features have been shaped by the same forces or if they will require the same treatment. We would argue that, in this case, the sample is both sufficiently broad and sufficiently well supported by anecdotal evidence for us to tentatively argue that if a typical ambiguity does characterize the state of Jewish history teaching, then it is most likely to be the result of different forces (or different combinations of forces) in different places.

There seems enough evidence to suggest that at least two distinct (though not unrelated) forces are at work in determining the state of Jewish history teaching. The first of these we will call "ambiguity from ambivalence" - a largely ideological matter which seems to derive from uncertainty about whether history is a desirable component of Jewish education. The second we will call "ambiguity from vagueness" - a pedagogical-operational question which appears to stem from uncertainty about what to do with the subject even when it is desired.
As far as the first matter goes, it is almost a cliche that history and religion exist in an antipathetic relationship. Religions are the institutional expressions of faith. They are driven by belief or what some call "truths". History, it is popularly supposed, desires to "record what really happened". Its goal (apparently) is to find objective truth (in the singular). From this perspective, it is not surprising that in a sample of orthodox schools such as this there should be an undercurrent of uncertainty about history teaching which derives from suspicion about how it might undermine the community's collective memories and myths.

Invariably, as was suggested above, this uncertainty does not reveal itself either as outright resistance or hostility. Thus, all modern orthodox Jewish schools do teach Jewish history, it is just that some will either only allow Rabbis to teach it, or will not permit the teaching of certain 'controversial' topics. History and Judaism are not, therefore, in complete opposition but exist in a more ambiguous relationship. As one head of Jewish studies has put it, he "would love to teach more Jewish history, but his difficulty is that Jewish history tends to be too secular for Jewish studies, and too Jewish for history".¹

It is precisely this kind of ambivalence which seems to lurk behind the uncertainty which traditional and orthodox schools display in their attitude towards the legitimacy or usefulness of teaching history. On the one hand, they show interest in what might be called "soft history" - in relating to the past through evocation and commemoration, rather than detached criticism. Thus, in Jewish primary schools, teaching about the second temple period usually has more in common with the faithful teaching of Bible stories than with project work on Roman Britain (Z.F.E.T. op cit). Yet, on the other hand, because this kind of memory-making activity often shades into

¹ A Head of Jewish Studies at a Jewish Secondary school in London, in conversation.
the realm of "hard history" which would undermine uncritical relationships with the past, it invites grave doubts, especially in the secondary sector.

Some Jewish secondary schools even query whether the critical study of Jewish history can ever be appropriate when history has set itself up as an explicator of reality outside of and in contradistinction to tradition. From their perspective, it is less undesirable, for example, that young Jewish people study topics on Islamic Civilization in the context of National Curriculum history than if they take an option on the history of the Jews in Britain. Better, the argument goes, not to learn about the Jewish past at all, than to learn something that might not easily submit either to traditional teaching about the relationship between Jews and non-Jews or to the traditional treatment of Jewish sources. - We would argue that in such schools Jewish history teaching is powerfully shaped by ambiguity from ambivalence. 

Plainly, there are also Jewish schools (and even orthodox ones) which do not feel so threatened by the existential questions history raises, if only because they are not fully aware of them. Indeed, in educational environments where the bulk of students are either Jewishly uncommitted or anti-religious, history promises to play a central role in the incultation of young people into a sense of Jewish fellowship (Arzt 1983). We suggest that when such schools continue to display uncertainty about history's place in the curriculum there must be another force at work. This is what we identify as ambivalence from vagueness.

Typically, such schools know for sure that they want to teach Jewish history but don't know how to do so effectively. They display a commitment to Jewish history teaching (for example, by setting aside significant amounts of teaching time for it and/or by purchasing large numbers of Jewish history textbooks) but they do not seem to have created the
circumstances or to have developed the tools with which to realize their commitment. When pressed they would probably find it difficult to explain why they think Jewish history is so important. Of course it is more difficult to say why they are held back in this way, but it seems fair to attest that their problem cannot only be an ideological one, and that it is at least in part a question of procedure and technique.

To further complicate matters it is evident that vagueness and ambiguity are invariably inseparable. Many schools are dubious about history's promise precisely because they have little idea of what it involves or results in. After all, there seem to be very few examples of best practice which they might try to emulate. At the same time, it is doubtful whether many Jewish schools have completely conquered their fear of critical history's disruptive influence. As one head teacher put it, "Too many historians have ended up as sceptics for us to be totally sure about it".

If, therefore, we intend to identify the forces behind the current state of Jewish history teaching, the most certain we can be is that its ambiguous state is probably the product of either ambivalence about the subjects educational role and its relationship to Jewish tradition and/or vagueness about what teaching it involves.

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2 This emerged during a number of loosely structured interviews with Jewish history teachers, conducted as part of preparation for this chapter.

3 The head of an orthodox Jewish secondary school in London, in conversation.
Establishing Research Goals

From the account we have provided, it will be evident that there are a number of troubling features about the ambivalence which Jewish schools display towards the teaching of Jewish history. In the first place, there are questions about where ambivalence towards Jewish history comes from. Our brief survey conveys a strong sense that ambivalence depends more on hearsay about the consequences of seriously studying Jewish history than on proper consideration or information about the relationship between the study of Jewish history and Jewish memory. It appears to be conditioned by a stereotype of what one might call the historian as heretic.

Secondly, and no less disturbing, there are the often bizarre curricula consequences which ambivalence seems to produce. Because those who run Jewish schools have not made up their minds about Jewish history, they have created curricula that have had to conform to often contradictory and frequently absurd sets of requirements. This leaves students wondering how seriously they should take their study of Jewish history.

Finally, and perhaps least obvious, there is a sense in which uncertainty and ambivalence undermine what might be. Orthodox Jewish schools may be ambivalent about the place of Jewish history teaching in Jewish education, yet, in the world of Jewish adult education there is little doubt that the study of Jewish history has captured the imagination of many adults who had previously been disillusioned with Jewish study. Jewish history courses have been at the heart of a significant return to Jewish education by older people in both the United States and Britain. It makes one wonder whether Jewish schools are not missing opportunities which others who are more in tune

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4 For example, some Jewish schools have offered modern Jewish history courses which contrive to leave out the origins of Reform Judaism and the history of Zionism.

5 Units on Jewish history are found at the heart of many programmes offered by the Florence Melton Mini Schools across the United States and the Spiro Institute in England.
with market forces are cultivating. If school-based Jewish history was treated with similar seriousness might it not also transform the perception of Jewish studies among Jewish adolescents?

As we intimated earlier, there is also a personal dimension here. Having spent many hours and much emotional energy devising Jewish history curricula in schools which cannot then make up their minds about what they want from or want to do with Jewish history, we have experienced at first hand the damage and disappointment caused by the educational indecision that results from ambivalence about the subject.

For these reasons and against this background we have come to ask ourselves what really is the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory. Does the study of history undermine or erode memory, challenging traditions which have survived intact into the modern age, or, are there generic similarities between history and memory which create the possibility that history may heal collective memory loss, even if that healing may be a painful and unpredictable experience?

These are not original questions. In recent years they have become publicly articulated concerns in a number of different societies which have been troubled by fear of, what has been called, "the loss of community" or by the prospect of collective amnesia. Thus, in Britain, there has been public discussion about the contribution which national curriculum history could or should make to young people's sense of a collective past and of a shared future (Aldrich 1987). In the Jewish world there has been debate about the means and ends of holocaust memorialization" and about the role of Jewish education in securing Jewish continuity (The Report of the Commission on Jewish Education in North America 1990; Sacks 1993).

6 "Who owns the Memory?" Jerusalem Report (Cover story) v.3 n.21 (Feb. 1993)
In less populist domains, these questions have been considered from the perspective of analytical philosophy (Le Goff 1988), social psychology (Halbwachs 1980) and history itself (Yerushalmi 1982); but not with regards to what might be called a set of explicitly educational dimensions. There has been little consideration, for example, of how young people and especially young Jewish people experience the encounter between the critical study of history and Jewish tradition. There has been even less consideration of what this might mean in educational terms.

We do not yet know whether young Jewish students relate to tradition and critical history as rival views of human experience or whether they are even aware of such a rivalry. We have little idea if or how Jewish students from different backgrounds think differently about Jewish history, and we have no sense of the kind of impact which the study of critical history may have on the way in which young Jewish people conceive of the Jewish past.

These are the questions which move our research. They are expressed as Jewish problems, for both personal and practical reasons, even if the problem they articulate is not an exclusively Jewish one. All religious communities must decide what role history should play in their children's education. They must decide whether history will turn their children into heretics or sceptics or whether it can enable another generation to recover a rich past which would otherwise be forgotten. All religious communities must determine the relationship between the past described by traditional teachings and the past which is portrayed by academic journals and school history textbooks.

We propose to begin an examination of these questions from a philosophical perspective, since it is only by so doing that we will properly be able to establish what exactly the
terms 'critical history' and 'collective memory' mean. We hope that a philosophical beginning of this sort will then enable us to proceed in an educational direction by establishing, first and foremost, what, in formal terms, the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory might be.
Gershom Scholem (1897-1982) left an extraordinary legacy to Jewish studies. The bibliography of his published works stretches to nearly six hundred entries and includes numerous influential historical studies, detailed philological investigations as well as phenomological surveys. More remarkable, as Martin Buber once remarked, Scholem "literally created a whole academic discipline within the realm of Jewish studies" (Biale 1982). Before Scholem, there had been only occasional or haphazard attempts to study the history of Jewish mysticism. Scholem not only developed a rigorous methodology for the study of Jewish mysticism, he established an immense programme for research and founded a discipline within which properly to conduct it.

It is all the more significant, therefore, that when asked what he saw as being the role of the Jewish historian, Scholem replied that it was "to make sure that our tremendous tradition is brought up and made a problem of" (1974). For this appears to provide powerful affirmation for what we had previously dismissed as a prejudice against the study of Jewish history in orthodox Jewish schools. Indeed, in these terms, Scholem's extraordinary devotion to the realization of such an iconoclastic programme may enable him to serve as an iconic example of the "historian as heretic" - a characterization we had previously regarded as a dubious stereotype.

It is our intention in this chapter to examine, from a philosophical and historical perspective, whether critical historiography does necessarily exist in an antagonistic relationship with the forms of historical consciousness which
have sustained traditional Judaism. This will require us saying, first, what we mean by critical historiography. Then, we will have to explore what alternative forms for apprehending and organizing the past might consist of and how they differ from historiography.

We propose to consider these questions in formal philosophical terms as well as in historical terms, that is, as regards the development of historiography over the last two centuries and its relationship to traditional society. We will also pay attention to the particular context of Jewish culture, since it might be said that Diaspora Judaism provides a special case of the relationship between history, collective identity and self-understanding. After all, as has been widely pointed out, it is somewhat paradoxical that a people of memory, such as the Jewish people, should have found so little use for historians until very recent times (Kochan 1977, Yerushalmi 1982).

"What is History ?"

In the 1960's, philosophizing historians frequently complained about the paucity of philosophical discussion about history. Today, largely thanks to the efforts of these same historians, numerous works of philosophy of history exist in print, a number of which have become standard reading for sixth formers or first year undergraduates. In most of these accounts history is analysed from within the context of the classical Nature - Culture trope (Davis & Starn 1989). In one version, for example, 'History' as an intellectual process and as an activity of the reasoning mind - the endeavour to establish the truth of earlier events - is pitched against the 'past', conceived as a more mythical complex, inherent in the present as "created ideology with a purpose" (Elton 1967, Plumb 1969, Marwick 1970). Alternatively, in a 1980's variation, the
historian's more or less calculated accounts of the past are contrasted with the supposedly organic flow of memory. In David Lowenthal's words: "memory is inescapable and prima-facie indubitable, while history is contingent and empirically testable" (1985).

If these distinctions have been somewhat blurred by post-modernist criticism (for example, in the work of White 1973, Rorty 1989 and Eagleton 1989) they nevertheless provide a means of access to considering what history is, even if we can not say very precisely what it is not. For, what emerges from these discussions is the sense that history is an intellectual act of a certain sort. History (or in Hegel's words, "the narration of the things that happened") is not the past. It is an act of reconstruction or re-presentation. As Wyatt (1964) has usefully put it, "the past as an authentic reality cannot be recovered, it has to be reconstructed. History is a persistent effort to give plausible form to an array of data, a form which continually transcends itself in the light of new data".

This statement is worth examining further, since it exposes some characteristic features of and assumptions behind what can be called critical historiography. For a start, we can point to the way in which a conception of history as reconstruction is intimately associated with a sense of rupture between past and present, that is, with a sense of the past as no longer being immediate or present. Whether historiography is cause or consequence of this rupture we will examine later; for the moment, we are interested in the significant if formal implications of the notion of reconstruction. For, during most of history men scarcely differentiated between past and present; referring even to remote events, if at all, as though they were then occurring. Up to the nineteenth century those who gave any thought to the historical past supposed it to be much like the present
(Lowenthal *op cit*). Historiography conceived as reconstruction, however, infers a discourse of mediation, epistemologically fragile, always problematic and always incomplete. It characterizes history as an intellectual act which seeks to re-present a past which has increasingly become a realm separate from the present. In Michael Oakshott's words, "history is ... an enquiry in which authenticated survivals from the past are dissolved into their component features in order to be used ... to infer a past which has not survived" (1983).

Historical reconstruction, then, is inherently interpretative. Paul Connerton has written that "knowledge of all human activities in the past is possible only through a knowledge of their traces". "Just to apprehend marks (which some phenomenon, in itself inaccessible, has left behind) as evidence, is already to have gone beyond the stage of merely making statements about the marks themselves. To account something as evidence is to make a statement about something else, namely, about that for which it is taken as evidence" (1989). History, Connerton concludes, is an inferential process.

This is a conclusion reached less abruptly and in more colloquial terms by Jack Hexter in the course of developing his notion of the way in which history emerges as the product of encounter between the record of the past and what he calls the second record of the historian (1972). Hexter depicts the record of the past as an array of non-dimensional points, which however closely arrayed, do not make a pattern by themselves. The pattern is always the work of the historian or of someone acting in the capacity of the historian. It always involves an inference. The points themselves do not have the dimension of history and cannot alone legitimize the inference. To legitimize it the historian himself must supply something. Without that something there can be no history, and
that something must come from the historian's second record (that is, everything that historians bring to their encounter with the record of the past), since there is no place else from which it can come.

Hexter's argument is sometimes criticized for being imprecise but it graphically displays an assumption which is central to the notion of history as reconstruction - that of the historian's autonomy vis a vis his evidence - since, in this account, history does not exist as a given but is made by the historian. This position is helpfully articulated here because the notion of the historian's second record, enabling a leap from nondimensionality to dimensionality, is sufficiently ambiguous to allow any number of possible readings of what the historian's autonomy might comprise, ranging from categories founded on Collingwood's idealism through different degrees of linguistic determinism (say from Hayden White to Focault) through to the social or cultural determinism of Agnes Heller's *A Theory of History* (1983). In all these versions, whatever their differences, it is presumed that in history-as-reconstruction, the historian not only supplies the criteria by reference to which evidence is criticized, but that in fact he also causes evidence to exist *qua* evidence.

It will have become apparent from the above that criticism is a preeminent attribute of reconstructive autonomy in history. In functional terms, historians continue to question the statements of their informants (or treat evidence critically) because if they were to accept them at face value that would amount to abandoning their autonomy as practising historians and relinquishing their independence of social memory (Lewis 1975). We would go further to say that, intrinsically, criticism is an attribute of autonomy, since to assert independence of any narrative, memory or tradition - to treat it historically - is critically to transcend it. Indeed, to
deny the givenness of a history independent of oneself is to render all things interpretable (or subject to criticism).

For many, it is this which makes historiography "iconoclastic and irreverent". It is what causes Pierre Nora, for example, to claim that "history's goal and ambition is...to annihilate what in reality has taken place" (1989). This is a judgement we will leave aside for the moment. At this point we are more concerned with the formal attributes of critical history rather than their possible implications. These lead us back to where we started, with Wyatt's conception of history as "a form which continually transcends itself in the light of new data". As critical discourse, history can only be tentative, since it will always be subject to the imminent possibility of a reflexive turning of history upon itself in the production of a history of history (Le Goff 1988). Moreover, as an act of reconstruction carried out in the encounter between the present and the past, history will always be contingent and contested. The context which presently integrates all relevant data can always be replaced by another preferred context or undermined by the sources used by another historian. - These are the realities behind Croce's profound if now familiar formulation that each age writes its own history.

At this point one might ask if the history we have portrayed is substantially different from fiction. We seem to have left history at the brink of a debilitating subjectivism or relativism, which makes the writing of history look like an arbitrary if diverting pastime.

Indeed, some historians do appear to lose their nerve when faced by conclusions such as these. Gordon Wood, for example, argues that "only a faith that the past really exists... brings us closer to knowing the truth about the past 'as it really was'. Old fashioned this epistemology may be, but only such faith makes history writing possible" (1982). Wood
appears to believe that historians need the security (even if artificial) of certainty, so that they do not despair of sensibly going about their practice.

At the other extreme are those like Keith Jenkins who find history's contingency liberating, since "it throws out old certainties, and those who have benefitted from them are capable of being exposed" (1991). Jenkins follows literary theorists like Fish and Eagleton in arguing that the way out of 'hapless relativism' in a situation like this is through the analysis of power in practice. For, "although logically all historical accounts are problematic and relative, some are actually dominant and others marginal" (ibid). It is an ironic awareness of ideology that gives history some stability rather than always undermining it.

We propose to follow Wyatt - a non-historian - who suggests that historians "accustom themselves to dwelling on the sharp edge of paradox, striving for what appears at that moment the most comprehensive context, while knowing at the same time that it will, of necessity, soon be transcended" (op cit). We would add that it is worth remembering that not all reconstructions are equally good. That they are reconstructions does not free them from the obligations of rational or professional responsibility. History may be an intellectual act but it is a public activity in which the historian's claims and procedures are subject to public scrutiny. As Wolfgang Mommsen (1975) has argued, these procedures are not empty formalities which protect professional domains or ideological positions, they are guarantees of reasonableness which give historical discourse its stability. If, as Jenkins has argued, history in the main is what historians make, it is nevertheless subject to the standards required by its consumers.
Alternative Ways of Apprehending the Past.

If it is said that definitions are formalized procedures for making distinctions, then it follows that in the process of defining history we have also hinted (if only inversely) at what may be alternative, non historiographical, ways of apprehending and organizing the past.

We proposed that history was an act of reconstruction or representation, an intellectual act of a certain sort which consists of a persistent effort to give plausible form to an array of data from the past, continually transcending itself in the light of new data. On a counterfactual basis we could therefore expect non-historiographical forms of historical apprehension to possess features which would include immediacy, privacy, idiosyncrasy, authority and perhaps sacredness. However, as we said earlier, poststructuralist criticism has undermined the construction of definitive distinctions such as these in a way that makes most forms of historical apprehension look like heavily constructed narratives, with only institutionally regulated differences between them.

Lowenthal has offered a more measured analysis of non-historiographical representations of the past in *The Past is a Foreign Country*, one of only a few serious studies to include a discussion of different forms of historical representation. Although his book is primarily about attitudes towards the past, it does include a substantial analysis of three distinct though associated ways by which we know about the past - remembering things, reading or hearing stories and chronicles, and living among relics from previous times (1985 p.185 ff).

Lowenthal provides some strong examples of the ways in which each of these "routes to the past" are interconnected and blurred. For instance, how relics mean only what history and memory convey, and how artifacts frequently originate as
memorial or historical witnesses (p.249). In detailed examples, he recounts how interviews with residents of certain areas of London show that their "living memories" invariably include events from long before their birth; and how unassuaged injuries and injustices have led many Irish people to conflate remote with recent times and even with the present (p.250). In fact, at one point he goes so far as to assert that history and memory are distinguishable less as types of knowledge than as attitudes towards knowledge (p.213).

Strikingly, however, at the next juncture in his argument Lowenthal decisively sets history and memory apart. This, he explains, is because historical knowledge is by its very nature collectively produced and shared. Historical awareness implies group activity, while memory does not (p.213). Memory is wholly and intensely personal, it is always felt as a particular event that happened to me (p.194). Our recollections can never be fully shared (p.195). While memory is private and validates personal identity, history is public and perpetuates collective self-awareness.

Lowenthal's difficulties in distinguishing history from memory point to a problem all scholars have had in discussing the ways in which human collectives apprehend the past. As Amos Funkenstein has put it, "we naturally ascribe historical 'consciousness' and 'memory' to human collectives - family and tribe, nation and state". And yet, "this is confusing, since consciousness and memory can only be realized by an individual who acts, is aware, and remembers. Just as a nation cannot eat or dance, neither can it speak or remember" (1989). To put it differently, while on the one hand "memory may even constitute self-consciousness....on the other hand, even the most personal memory cannot be removed from the social context" (ibid).

Faced by such an epistemological paradox it is tempting to conclude that a collective can perceive or organize the past
only through the mediation of historians, public actors who, because they wear the badge of professional autonomy, can claim to speak for no authority other than the truth, and who can presume to provide society with its self knowledge. This, however, is misleading. We will see from an empirical as well as a theoretical perspective that societies have obviously apprehended the past other than through the agency of professional historians working with or on inscribed narratives. Moreover, they have done so as collectives, and in ways which will not require us to make use of explanatory categories taken either from Jungian psychology or varieties of collective genetics.

Society is predicated on shared historical consciousness. It is this which enables its members to share experiences and assumptions, and it is evident that if historiography is a source or expression of such consciousness it is, as Yerushalmi has argued, "only the most recent of a number of alternative ways, each viable and with its own integrity, in which human beings have apprehended their collective pasts" *(op cit)*.

Yerushalmi's assertion is self-consciously indebted to the work of Maurice Halbwachs, the French-Jewish sociologist who pioneered the systematic discussion of collective memory. Halbwachs argued that it was through their membership of a social group - particularly, kinship, religious and class affiliations - that individuals were able to acquire, to localize and to recall their memories (1980). This does not presume that the social group constitutes a genuine psychical unit, rather, as Mary Douglass reports, that it comprises a flexible set of social segments, consisting of live individuals who sustain their common interests by their own selective and highly partial view of history *(ibid)*. Collective memory, therefore, is not a metaphor but a social
reality transmitted and sustained through the conscious efforts and institutions of groups (Yerushalmi op cit).

In recent years sociologists and anthropologists have elaborated on this concept in the course of examining what has variously been called "everyday historical consciousness" (Heller 1983), "historical memory" (Bauman 1982) or "social memory" (Connerton op cit). This elaboration has paid particular attention to the most problematic aspect of Halbwachs' account, that is, his failure to explain how the dynamics of collective memory work; in other words, how, given that different groups have different memories which are peculiar to them, they pass them on from one generation to the next.

In the last ten years a substantial body of work has emerged in this field which is all the more impressive in having dealt with phenomena which are both procedurally informal and culturally diffuse without having declined into hypostatization or having presented as a unity a reality that is complex and structured by a variety of different social categories.

Commemorative Ceremonies

Connerton, for example, has offered an acute analysis of what he calls "the acts of transfer which make remembering in common possible" (op cit. p.39). He points to the role played by more or less informally told narrative histories in grounding communal memory (p.16/17), to the place of gossip in village life and to the transmission of background narratives from one ruling group to another (p.19). Connerton, nevertheless, singles out certain "types of repetition" as constituting acts of transfer of crucial importance (p.40). As he explains, he has "seized upon commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices in particular because it is the study of
these that leads us to see that images of the past and recollected knowledge of the past are conveyed and sustained by (more or less) ritual performance" (ibid).

Connerton proposes that commemorative ceremonies are preeminent instances of how we preserve visions of the past by representing them to ourselves in words and images. They keep the past in mind by a depictive and performative representation of past events. They are reenactments of the past, but do not simply imply continuity with the past. They explicitly claim such continuity through a rhetoric of reenactment which is calendrical, verbal and gestural. They are culturally pervasive performances which involve the return of the past in a representational guise, and which normally include a simulacrum of the scene or situation recaptured.

Connerton offers a few examples of commemorative ceremonies ranging from the narrative cults created by National Socialism, through covenantal ceremonies in Judaism and Christianity to the invented rituals of modern nation states. His discussion is however more helpful for its formal analysis than for its examination of specific exemplars of commemorative ceremonies. These are more readily available and more richly textured in other works, for example in Les Lieux de Memoire, the seven volume collaborative study of the objects and events that "codify, condense and anchor the national memory of France" (eg. Nora 1984). Less grandly there are also the collected studies on the invention of tradition in British and Colonial society (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), or, even more particularly (as we will see shortly), Yerushalmi's influential study of the vehicles of Jewish collective memory (op cit.).
Bodily Practices

The concept of bodily practices re-enacting the past is a less familiar one, but, in Connerton's argument it refers to a phenomenon which is even more fundamental and widespread as a form of historical representation. As he explains, we all "preserve the past deliberately without representing it in words and images. Our bodies...keep the past in an entirely effective form in their continuing ability to perform certain actions", like, for example, swimming well or driving motor vehicles (p.72).

In the same way, posture, gestures, etiquette and habit - what Connerton calls 'incorporating practices' - provide an effective system of mnemonics for the values and categories which groups are most anxious to preserve, whether these are class or sex distinctions or faith commitments. The past is kept in mind by a habitual memory which is sedimented in the body and which is reenacted through its present conduct. Thus, in some cultures, power and rank are commonly expressed through highly structured but apparently 'automatic' postural behaviour, while in other cultures bodily gestures conserve important religious values and categories at the level of habit rather than formal ceremony.

This can sound mysterious since incorporating practices are largely traceless or ephemeral. They are incapable of providing a means by which any evidence or will to be remembered can be left behind, because, unlike other forms of historical reenactment, they do not exist independently of their being performed. As Zygmunt Bauman has explained, "The historical memory of a group....doesn't always surface to the level of communication. It finds its expression in the group's proclivities to some rather than other behavioural responses" and "is not necessarily recognized by the group as a particular concept of the past" (op cit.). For Connerton this is part of the power and persistence of bodily practices. They
simply "are not susceptible to critical scrutiny and evaluation by those habituated to their performance" (op cit).

"Everyday Historical Consciousness"

It is difficult to know where exactly the notion of "bodily practices" separates from another form of historical representation which Heller calls "the sense of the historical" (op cit). Whereas for Connerton bodily practices constitute an immediate or embodied reenactment of the past, identified with what others call habit memory, it seems that for Bauman, bodily practices constitute an external representation of a more fundamental internal process - historical memory - which is embedded in everyday consciousness. In Bauman's argument it is historical memory which is both ploughed into collective actions and which plays an equally prominent part in the everyday activity of making sense.

This is not merely a difference in emphasis, in terms of the extent to which bodily practices are mediated by historical consciousness, Bauman's argument actually points to an additional and alternative form of historical representation which largely has its source elsewhere.

In Bauman's account historical memory denotes "an acquired set of narratives or histories, embedded in everyday consciousness and daily reinforced by micro-social experience, which serve to make sense of the present" (op cit). The concept of historical memory therefore helps to explain how groups which have not been able to record or inscribe a remembered history are nevertheless able (collectively) to make sense of the contemporary world. In these terms, historical memory is not merely a concept which refers to the reenactment of the past in behavioural or unmediated terms, but it signifies a point of reference for making sense of the world.
The concept of historical memory can, however, be even richer than this, in that it can help to explain what makes all human transactions possible. This, for example, is the substance of Alasdair Macintyre's account in certain influential passages in *After Virtue* (1985).

Macintyre's concern is with the development of a moral philosophy, but, as he explains, every moral philosophy has some particular sociology as its counterpart. His philosophy is tied to a conception of a society which can come to understand itself through making use of a shared stock of stories.

Narrative, as Macintyre argues, is embedded in everyday discourse. It is what makes experience and existence intelligible (*ibid*). "In successfully identifying and understanding what someone else is doing we always move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set of narrative histories, histories both of the individuals concerned and of the settings in which they act and suffer". Human transaction - the capacity of members of society to converse and to make sense of each other's actions - therefore depends on members of society owning a shared repertoire of narratives or histories.

The problem with Macintyre's account from our perspective is that it does not explore how members of society actually acquire such a shared repertoire. Although, in his terms, society is founded on humankind's capacity to learn or acquire narratives, he offers little more than general notions of socialization and education in order to explain how these narratives are transmitted or learnt.

For this reason, Heller's *Theory of History* provides a useful analogue to Macintyre's argument. Heller moves in a different direction. She is concerned with writing a sociology, but
cannot abstract herself from certain philosophical and psychological assumptions.

For her, too, stories play a prominent role in the everyday process of making sense, by bringing things into order in our world. In her argument this is because everyday life has its own forms of historical consciousness which are rooted in the consciousness of "practically everyone who reflects on his/her life experience in our world" (op cit). To be precise, the everyday activity of making sense is not so much founded on any special knowledge of history or the past but on consciousness of historicity, that is, on consciousness of "society's capacity to act on itself and determine the order of its representations" (ibid).

Macintyre and Heller occupy different realms and they possess different agendas. He seeks to root and derelativize morality, she prefers to consider the possibility of action against that which is rooted. Both of them, nevertheless, share (with many others) an affirmation of the prominence of narrative (or histories) within the texture of everyday consciousness. Of course, this concept occupies a different place in their accounts but its presence does enable us to signal the existence of processes of historical representation which are distinct from historiography and which are central to human self-understanding and transaction.

The Public Staging of the Past (Between Tradition and the National Heritage)

The foregoing analysis may have reinforced the impression that non-historiographic apprehension of the past is inherently private and personal, that it consists of internal processes equivalent to memory. Yet, this would be insufficient. For, as Patrick Wright argues, "far from being 'behind' the present, the past also exists as an accomplished presence in public
understanding. In this sense it is written into present social reality, not just implicitly as residue, precedent or custom and practice, but explicitly as itself - as history, National Heritage and Tradition" (1985). And it is this which accounts for the inertia of the past - its ability to survive the advent of history.

Wright's argument enables us to identify two general levels at which the past is publicly presented in the present. At one level, it exists as "a paradigmatic kind of historical continuity which might more accurately be called tradition". While at another level, it exists as a "cultivated sense which is reproduced through a variety of public agencies (like schools, television, political debate and historical fiction) and which stages the past explicitly as itself" (ibid).

Tradition, according to Edward Shils is "anything...created through human actions, thought and imagination...which is transmitted or handed down from one generation to the next, from the past to the present" (1981). One suspects that Wright intends it to mean more than this. No doubt, few would disagree that tradition can exist in an objectified form, as knowledge, inscriptions or activities which constitute transmitted elements in any new forms of knowledge, inscription or activity. Nevertheless, as Nattan Rottenstreich has argued, and as Wright intimates, tradition is also a form of historical consciousness with a distinctive epistemological and ontological basis (Rottenstreich 1972).

In some societies (usually characterized as traditional ones) tradition is the mechanism by which the past is made the normative dimension of the present. It is a highly specific form of historical consciousness in which the present does not exist as an autonomous dimension of time, but is rather conceived as commentary and elaboration on the past. In this context, the totality of life is shaped and passed down from one generation to the next.
Of course secular societies are not traditional societies, in the sense that they have succeeded in elevating the present to the level of independent causative factor. They are settings in which the past is no longer binding or completely normative. However, no society exists in a state of complete discontinuity. If tradition no longer constitutes the totality of life it survives as historical consciousness or as historical continuity, and in these forms it re-presents the past to a present which treats it with greater or lesser degrees of criticism and autonomy. Few societies reconstruct anew their institutions and their ideals, even fewer derive them from history books; most, if not all, inherit them as tradition through families, schools, religions, political parties and the media; and it is in these settings that the past is most widely apprehended in the present.

Wright points out that the public agencies among those we have just enumerated also reproduce a past beyond tradition, which is staged explicitly as itself. He refers to this as the 'national past' and describes how it consists of "the public reproduction of a 'national' understanding of the past which includes 'reverence for national heroes' and 'the commemoration of great national events'. He shows how the national past is moreover grounded in the concrete, unarguable existence of a national heritage made up of landscapes, old buildings, monuments, folkways, skills and exhibitable objects, all of which are presented as standing in need of preservation, deference and respect". In the context of Wright's argument this presentation of the past as National Heritage has sinister implications, since, as he explains, the 'national past' as a public presence tends "to institute as fact its thematic generalization of history. It presents this interpretative work in the concrete terms of what at the same time it stresses as the National Heritage" (op cit)
In many accounts it is tradition which is presumed to epitomize a non-historiographic apprehension of the past because it is frequently uncritical and immediately implicit in the present. In Wright's argument, however, it is the past as presence, as National Heritage, which is most sharply contrasted with historiography, since in these terms, it is supposed authentically to preserve a slice of past reality within the context of the present, without the mediation of either interpretation or reconstruction. In presuming to preserve the past within the present it makes redundant history-as-reconstruction. After all, the past need not be reconstructed if it can be tangibly and immediately apprehended.

Collective Memory

Earlier, we quoted Yerushalmi's assertion that "collective memory is not a metaphor but a social reality transmitted and sustained through the conscious efforts and institutions of groups." Hopefully, we have now provided an introductory survey to the diverse efforts and institutions which make up this reality. Their diversity is significant, since by referring to them as aspects of collective memory, it easy to lose sight of the way in which they are composed of institutions as well as internal processes, how they are both formal and informal and how they can be made up of rituals as well as of relics. This, for example, is a point which is powerfully made in Les lieux de Memoire, where a comprehensive examination of the objects which constitute French national memory includes the study of monuments, emblems, commemorations, symbols, rituals, manuals, basic texts and mottoes.

Evidently, if the past is remembered, preserved, reenacted or recalled, and if histories are transmitted from one generation to another, there are and have been a variety of ways in which
this can be and has been done. Modern historiography is the most recent, but only one of a number of viable alternatives. To quote Halbwachs: "History is neither the whole nor even all that remains of the past. In addition to written history, there is a living history that perpetuates and renews itself through time and permits the recovery of many old currents that have seemingly disappeared. If this were not so, what right would we have to speak of 'collective memory'?" (op cit)

History and Collective Memory

The question we have been working towards concerns the nature of the relationship between historiography and these other ways of apprehending the past. Halbwachs describes history and collective memory as existing in a state of "ultimate opposition". He claims that they are not only intrinsically different but that history actually creates a rupture between the past and the present which does violence to the workings of tradition or social memory (ibid). We want to establish whether in empirical terms this has always been the case, and whether in formal terms this is either necessary or likely. Certainly, there is enough ambiguity surrounding the origins and development of what can be called modern historiography to allow for a variety of possible characterizations of its relationship with collective memory, ranging from surrogacy to enmity, with almost any variation in between.

There is, for example, a well known paradox within the transformation of historical writing in the nineteenth century. On the one hand, history is characterized as having emerged as an important supplement to the Enlightenment (V.A.Harvey 1966). It is said that historical research created a new distance from the past, setting people free from the traditions which might otherwise have guided their assumptions and behaviour (Mendez-Flohr & Reiharz 1980). In Dilthey's
words, "the historical awareness of the finitude of all historical phenomena, of every human or social situation, the consciousness of the relativity of every sort of belief is the final step towards the liberation of man" (cited by Rossi 1975).

On the other hand, history may have served to deepen identification with and affection for given facets of culture (Croce 1941). The nineteenth century historiographical enterprise would probably have been unthinkable outside of its setting within the broader struggle for political identity. To many enthusiasts at the time, the study of history and the care of the records from which it was written was required and justified by the belief that the national society would be legitimated and strengthened by the assimilation of knowledge of its own past by future generations (Shils op cit). The transformation of historical writing in Germany was in large part the work of scholars who were intimately involved with the life of the political society to which they belonged. The political commitment of Niebuhr and Ranke, for example, imparts to their work the sense that in constructing a canon of historical research, they were at the same time participating in the formation of a political identity and giving shape to the memory of a particular culture (Connerton op cit).

How one sees the relationship between history and other forms of historical representation depends to a large extent, therefore, on where one locates the origins of historiography. Whether critical history is seen as being the child of the Enlightenment (or possibly the Renaissance) and its quest for autonomously derived truth or whether, alternatively, it is pictured as the child of nineteenth century nationalism (in partnership with Romanticism) and its quest to rediscover forgotten roots, will powerfully determine how one conceives of the place of history in the socialization of children, the
relationship between history and tradition and other forms of collective memory; and the role of the historian in society.

Francois Furet, for example, has powerfully argued that the development of historiography was closely linked to the growth of nationalism (1982). He explains that it was from "out of the quest for genealogical legitimacy that history became the dominant discipline of the period .... and the soothsayer of national progress". According to Furet, it was against this background that history "became indispensable for very young children who had to be trained early in patriotism and critical judgement." He cites Ernest Lavisse, historian and influential history textbook writer in nineteenth century France, who promised that the teaching of history would train "citizens imbued with a sense of duty, and soldiers who love their rifles" (ibid). "To history education", Lavisse wrote, "falls the glorious duty of making our fatherland loved and understood" (cited in Le Gof op cit). Of course, as Furet notes, it does not follow that such a desired outcome followed, automatically or otherwise, from the introduction of history as a discipline into schools. The point is that it was widely assumed that history and historiography would reinforce collective values and commitments. History, was seen both as the child of Nationalism, and as the handmaiden of collective memory.

Shils makes a similar case. In his account of the encounter between historiography and tradition he claims that "in Western countries historians became the chief custodians of the traditions of national history....., since their bona fides as patriots was generally accepted by the laity". "Legislators and civil servants were willing to append public funds to train and employ teachers of national history and to support academic research" because it was assumed that "the teaching of national history would promote a belief in
continuity and identity with the national past, reverence for national heroes" and much more besides (op cit).

Thus, the historian gained a special position in nineteenth century culture. Historical research was devoured by a wide stratum of the educated public in textbooks, lectures, speeches and monographs (Funkenstein op cit). This research, including the most professional, provided a faithful reflection of the problems of identity of the nation state and its societal wishes (for instance, in the writings of Gibbon or de Tocqueville) and also established or made concrete the symbols of the nation (say, the place of the Druids and Celts in the remote Welsh past) (Morgan 1983). It meant, according to Funkenstein, that in the nineteenth century nation state, collective memory was largely produced by historians (op cit). (emphasis added)

This version of events can not be overstated, since a different paradigm usually overshadows it. This identifies history as a product of the Enlightenment, which found realization in the debunking or corroding of once powerful religious myths and traditions (Harvey op cit). It portrays critical historiography as challenging established interpretations of biblical texts and traditions, supplanting traditional accounts with more rigorous or researched narratives. In this account, history and religion could not but have existed in an antipathetic relationship.

For many, it is not only religious tradition that has been and is corroded by history - it is all of the remembered past. This was Lord Acton's point some time ago, when he argued that "if the past has been an obstacle and a burden, knowledge of the past is the safest and surest emancipation" (cited in Lowenthal op cit). It was also the main thrust of Plumb's argument in The Death of the Past. More recently, Bernard Lewis has written from within the same 'enlightened' tradition that "critical history begins with a dissatisfaction with
memory and a desire to remedy its deficiencies". "Professional historians, unlike their predecessors, are not content merely to repeat and pass on the memories of the past. They seek rather to fill its gaps and correct its errors. Frequently, as a result, and perhaps this is a purpose of their efforts, by analyzing the past they kill it" (op cit).

In France, where historiography has taken such a strong formative and didactic role, its impact on tradition and on memory has, according to this argument, been devastating. Nora powerfully argues that this is because historiography "operates by introducing doubt, by running a knife between the tree of memory and the bark of history" (op cit). By interrogating traditions, it is no longer capable of passing them on intact. Thus, movements or moments in the French Revolution (like the storming of the Bastille, for instance) which had a decisive impact on French collective memory have, for many, lost their potency through having been seized on by certain kinds of historians (cf. Schama 1989).

As Hans Meyeroff notes, there is a notable irony in this situation. "Previous generations knew much less about the past than we do, but perhaps felt a much greater sense of identity and continuity with it" (1955). For Nora this is the consequence of a definite chain of cause and effect. As he explains, "the less memory is experienced from the inside the more it exists only through its exterior scaffolding.....hence the obsession with the archive that marks our age". "The indiscriminate production of archives is the acute effect of a new consciousness, the clearest expression of the terrorism of historicized memory" (op cit). The archive is supposed to preserve the past, but it merely serves to further deaden living memory which can exist only in a state of permanent evolution.

The two paradigms we have described directly impinge on how the role of the historian is conceived. On the one hand there
are those who emphasize the historian's critical role. Leonard Kreiger, for example, asserted that it is the historian's task to reform memory, while Carl Becker proposed that it is to test memory and fortify it with sources (1932). For Michael Kammen, "historians have a noble and public obligation that might be described as explaining a culture to itself" (1982). All of these statements take their cue from what has probably been the dominant paradigm in Western universities, but as we argued above they only provide part of the picture. To quote Funkenstein again, it is only "on rare occasions that the historian comes out against distorted and even damaging images of the past; even more rarely, he succeeds in creating a new discourse beyond his professional sphere". If anything, "the critical argument itself can become a pattern for 'collective memory' as has happened with Marxist or psychological terminology" (op cit).

Funkenstein statement comes at the end of a measured and learned discussion in which he, cleverly, goes some way in resolving the ambiguities in the relationship between collective memory and historiography by introducing an additional superordinate concept - historical consciousness - to which they both contribute and by which they are both enriched. As he says, "Western historical consciousness does not contradict collective memory, but rather is a developed and organized form of it. Nor does it contradict historiographical creation, for both lie at its base and are nurtured by it. All three express the same collective mentality, and the expression is always manifest in the individual who recalls and expresses it" (ibid).

This is not mere conceptual slight of hand, since this formulation goes some way in identifying the commonalities and differences within and between collective memory and historiography. Nevertheless, in reconciling collective memory and historiography at a superordinate level this argument
highlights the fact that at another more mundane level they do exist in a shifting state which is both antagonistic and mutually supportive.

In functional terms, if historians were to accept remembered or recalled history without question they would be relinquishing their professional autonomy as practising historians as well as their independence of social memory. History's integrity as an academic and intellectual practice is predicated on its criticism of inherited narratives. Nevertheless, if history did not begin in the present and if it did not start from a context which consisted of and was shaped by collective memory it would neither be meaningful nor intelligible to a professional or lay audience. Moreover, it is evident that even the most critical of historians is bound by assumptions, which may or may not be conscious, and which are themselves inheritances of given accounts of the past.

Funkenstein's conceptual solution cannot therefore settle what is a formal as well as an historical ambiguity. Neither, one suspects, can it be applied wholesale to an analysis of the relationship between Jewish historiography and Jewish collective memory, even though the Jewish context actually provides Funkenstein's initial frame of reference. For, as we said earlier, there are a number of reasons why the Jewish people appear to provide a special case of the relationship between meaning in history, memory of the past and the writing of history. Not the least of these is the paradox that although the Jews have for so long seen themselves as the very axis of world history, they nevertheless ceased to be a historiographic people from the time of Josephus (in the first century of the common era) until the birth of Jewish studies in the nineteenth century. If only for this reason we should give separate consideration to the relationship between Jewish historiography and Jewish collective memory.
Jewish Historiography and Jewish Collective Memory

Over the last ten years most if not all discussion of Jewish history and Jewish memory has defined itself in terms of Yoseph Chaim Yerushalmi's book, *Zachor*. That is not only because this 'little book' is provocative, personal and immaculately crafted, but also because it provides the first and only comprehensive account of Jewish historiography and Jewish collective memory, or in Yerushalmi's own words, 'of the relation of the Jews to their own past and the place of the historian within that relationship' (p.6).

Yerushalmi locates his study in a conceptual and empirical tradition that goes back to Halbwachs' pioneering work in 1925 in *Les Cadres Sociaux de la Memoire*. He warns however that the general categories usually invoked in the study of collective memory cannot be directly applied to the Jewish case partly "because we are dealing here with so literate and bookish a people" and partly because "Jewish society prior to modern times was so much moulded by guiding elites". - Although, having said this, it is notable that many of the categories he employs are in fact included in our earlier survey of the vehicles of collective memory.

Yerushalmi's thesis is richly textured and richly supported. It begins by signalling the centrality attributed in biblical theology to the injunction "Zachor" - 'Remember', or more accurately, 'act with memory' and yet it points to the at best minor role assigned to and played by historiography - the actual recording of historical events - in addressing or arousing the collective memory of the Jewish people (p.5). Yerushalmi argues that in the Biblical period "meaning in history, memory of the past and the writing of history" happened to be linked "by being held together in a web of delicate and reciprocal relationships". However, even in the Bible, historiography was but one expression of the awareness that history was meaningful, and neither meaning nor history
ultimately depended on it. He suggests that the meaning of history was "explored more directly and more deeply in the prophets than in the actual historical narratives; the collective memory [was] transmitted more actively through ritual than through chronicle". (p.14/15)

Yerushalmi says that in Rabbinic (post-biblical) Judaism historiography came to a long halt even while belief in the meaning of history remained (p.26). If the Rabbis were no longer interested in mundane history, this indicates nothing more than that they felt no need to cultivate it. They obviously felt that they had all the history they required" (p.21). Certainly, their ahistorical if not anti-historical posture "did not inhibit the transmission of a vital Jewish past from one generation to the next. Judaism neither lost its link to history nor its fundamentally historical orientation" (p.26).

Yerushalmi says that during the Middle ages Jewish memory moved through ritual and liturgy, and in Rabbinic custom and law. He identifies four characteristic vehicles of medieval Jewish memory (p.45 ff): selichot - penitential prayers inserted into the liturgy; Memorbucher - community memorial books; second Purims which commemorated deliverance from danger; and special fast days which recalled those occasions when there had been no deliverance. He argues that these modes of memory, together with the modes of spiritual creativity open to Medieval Jewry - Halackah (jurisprudence), kabbalah and philosophy - subsumed all possibilities of history. Quoting Maimonides' famous formulation, he concludes that for Mediaeval Jewry, the study of history was at best a diversion and at worst 'a waste of time' (p.52).

In his third chapter, Yerushalmi recounts how the sixteenth century saw a short-lived resurgence of Jewish historical writing in response to the traumatic expulsion of Sephardi Jewry from the Iberian peninsular. Yet, how, once again, as in
the era following the destruction of the Second Temple, the writing of Jewish history came to a halt. Gnostic myth, and not history, provided the extra strength that Jewish memory needed to survive its latest catastrophe. Yerushalmi explains:

"Clearly the bulk of Jewry were unprepared to tolerate history in immanent terms. It is as though, with the culminating tragedy of the expulsion from Spain, Jewish history had become opaque, and could not yield a satisfactory meaning even when, as amongst most of the historians, it was viewed religiously. Patently, however, Jews were spiritually and psychologically prepared for that which Lurianic Kabbalah afforded them - a mythic interpretation of history that lay beyond history" (p.74).

It is in the last part of the book, entitled "Modern Dilemmas: Historiography and its Discontents", that the problematic relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory is articulated most sharply. Partly, this is for objective historical reasons, in that "modern Jewish historiography began precipitously out of that assimilation from without and collapse from within which characterized the emergence of Jews out of the ghetto. It originated, not as scholarly curiosity, but as ideology, one of a gamut of responses to the crisis of Jewish emancipation and the struggle to attain it" (p.85). But, partly this is because, as Yerushalmi's confesses, his subject constitutes a painful and personal problem. For, he recognizes, that as a professional Jewish historian, he lives "within the ironic awareness that the very mode in which he delves into the Jewish past represents a decisive break with that past" (p.81) He acknowledges that he is not the heir either of rabbis or kabbalists but rather of Leopold von Ranke and Barthold Niebuhr. Thus, he works within a discipline which, according to Harold Bloom, of all the modern disciplines practised by Jewish scholars is necessarily the most gentile (1989).
Yerushalmi paints a troubling picture. It is one of rupture, discontinuity and apparent irreconcilability between Jewish collective memory and modern historiography. He describes how modern Jewish historiography, having been secularized, was and is compelled to repudiate the premises that were basic to all Jewish conceptions of history in the past - "the belief that divine providence is not only an ultimate but an active causal factor in Jewish history, and the related belief in the uniqueness of Jewish history itself" (p.89). He explains how Judaism has been historicized by historiography, in that it can no longer be viewed either as something absolutely given or, consequently, as normative. It is inseparable from its evolution through time, from its concrete manifestation at any point in history" (p.92). Finally, he demonstrates how in a time which has witnessed a sharp break in the continuity of Jewish living and with Jewish group memory in ever growing decay, history has become "what it has never been before - the faith of fallen Jews. For the first time, history, not a sacred text, becomes the arbiter of Judaism" (p.86) and this substitution has yielded chaos. He concludes that "for the first time, [there is] a Jewish historiography divorced from collective memory and, in crucial respects, thoroughly at odds with it" (p.93).

In the last few pages of the book Yerushalmi considers the role the Jewish historian might play in a Jewish community which has been traumatized by modernity and where the majority of Jews have 'fallen', in the sense that the contents of Jewish tradition or the commonplaces of Jewish memory are no longer meaningful to them. He argues that those who would demand of the historian that he be the restorer of Jewish memory attribute to him powers that he may not possess. "Intrinsically, modern Jewish historiography cannot replace an eroded group memory which, as we have seen throughout, never depended on historians in the first place. The collective memories of the Jewish people were a function of the shared
faith, cohesiveness, and will of the group itself, transmitting and recreating its past through an entire complex of interlocking social and religious institutions that functioned organically to achieve this" (p.94).

Yerushalmi believes that "for the wounds inflicted upon Jewish life by the disintegrative blows of the last two hundred years the historian seems at best a pathologist, hardly a physician". "The historian does not simply come in to replenish the gaps of memory. He constantly challenges even those memories that have survived intact. Moreover, in common with historians in all fields of enquiry .... no subject is potentially unworthy of his interest, no document, no artifact beneath his attention. We understand the rationales for this. The point is that all these features cut against the grain of collective memory. Certain memories live on; the rest are winnowed out, repressed, or simply discarded by a process of natural selection which the historian, uninvited, disturbs and reverses. The question remains whether, as a result, some genuine catharsis or reintegration is foreseeable" (p.95). Thus, Yerushalmi concludes, while "the burden of building a bridge to his people remains with the historian, I do not know for certain that this will be possible....Those who are alienated from the past cannot be drawn to it by explanation alone; they require evocation as well" (p.100).

Beyond Yerushalmi

It has been necessary to quote so extensively from Yerushalmi's work because it does unquestionably constitute the prevailing orthodoxy with regards to Jewish historiography and Jewish memory (see, for example, Weiseltier 1984 and Mendes-Flohr 1987). Additionally, by quoting so liberally from it we will hopefully have conveyed how intensely and personally felt are the issues at its heart. This is an important point. For, although it might be said that we should
separate discussion of the historical sections of the book from its more confessional parts, we want to argue that its earlier discursive chapters play a rhetorically important role in setting up the more personal conclusions that follow.

Central to Yerushalmi's argument is the claim that "in Rabbinic Judaism, historiography came to a long halt, even while belief in the meaning of history remained" and while a vital Jewish past was being transmitted from one generation to the next (p.26). For by successfully affirming this position he both sharpens the sense in which "the unprecedented explosion of Jewish historiography in modern times" appears to depart from earlier Jewish cultural practice, while also emphasizing the degree to which historiography is unsuited to the transmission or healing of Jewish memories today.

Without doubt, this is a weighty and well supported argument, but recognition of its substance should not blind us to the way in which it is shaped by a number of rhetorical devices. For example, in setting up a contrast between modern historiography and pre-modern apprehension of the past, Yerushalmi has necessarily established a particular definition of historiography against which he can measure other attempts at writing history; and this is suspect for a number of reasons. First, because at no point in these lectures does he go beyond providing a somewhat nebulous formal definition of historiography as "the actual recording of historical events". Second, by taking historical thinking to be identified - in practice - by the writing of histories in a manner which is more or less synonymous with modern historiography he has created a rather meaningless and self-selecting distinction which enables him to characterize the traditional Jewish world as involving patterns of thought which if not anti-historical are then at least ahistorical.

This is disappointing, since historiography is clearly not the only form that historical consciousness can take. As
Funkenstein has argued, "even if historiography hardly existed at all in the sphere of traditional Judaism, and if the midrash constituted an archetypal pattern for completely ahistorical interpretations, a well-developed historical consciousness existed elsewhere - namely, in the halakhic interpretations". "Here we find clear distinctions of time and place throughout: distinctions regarding customs according to period and location, exact knowledge of the place and time of the messengers and teachers of halakha, the estimated value of money mentioned in the sources, the significance of institutions of the past". Thus, "if normative Judaism did not preserve a continuous record of political events in the form of chronicles or historical studies - it did preserve a continuous and chronological record of innovations in the halakha". (op cit). Of course, this is not a historiographic tradition in the limited sense of the term, but it is no less symptomatic of a highly developed historical consciousness.

Ivan Marcus has shown how by making assumptions about what historical writing should look like one can ignore the historiographical creativity expressed by "texts that look like history" (1990). "Heroic stories of founding, conquest, rescue and self sacrifice do not contain historical details, because collective memory is based on a collective forgetting of everything but one considered theme; the spotlight requires a deliberately blacked-out stage" (ibid). It is therefore inappropriate to characterize the societies which produced these texts as ahistorical when for strong functional reasons historiography did not meet the particular requirements these texts served. Myth making, from this perspective is not less historical than historiography, rather, it is a different way of reconstructing the past, for a different set of purposes and according to a different set of rules.

Lionel Kochan (1977) has made a similar point. He argues that because medieval Jewish historical writing tended to look to
the future rather than the past, and in many cases sought to locate the present in typological frameworks, this does not mean that Jewish culture was devoid of historical thinking. Function should not be confused with character. Jewish historiography was predicated on a notion of history as praxis rather than spectacle, and this resulted in a highly ambiguous enterprise. Although this enterprise may have been driven by a set of objectives which at times look more eschatological than historical, it was nevertheless informed by a sensitivity to historical change or to differences between past and present which would be quite at home in 'normal' historiography.

All of this means that Yerushalmi may have set up what is either an exaggerated or a false tension between Jewish memory and Jewish historiography. If Jews did not write historiography it was not because they were antagonistic to it or because they were disinterested in history. It was because they had no immediate need for it. Therefore, if today, there is a tension between the practice of professional historiography and the transmission of collective memory, this cannot be read back on societies for whom historiography was neither a necessary nor a significant option. Yerushalmi, for example, attributes importance to the fact that in the Bible "Israel is told only that it must be a kingdom of priests and a holy people; nowhere is it suggested that it become a nation of historians" (p.10). This is surely misleading. As Yerushalmi himself points out historiography is the most recent of a number of alternative ways in which human beings have apprehended the past. Arguments from biblical silence hardly provide grounds for establishing antipathy towards historians or historiography, it merely highlights the recentness of widespread professional historiographic practice.

A second rhetorical difficulty within Zachor to which attention should be drawn concerns the way in which Yerushalmi
depicts the tension between Jewish historiography and Jewish memory. This comes across so strongly because it is presented as a painful and personal problem. Yerushalmi goes so far as to admit that "there are times when I myself question the value of studying the past, disturbing thoughts that come...occasionally during the day" (p.98). No doubt, as Robert Chazan has commented, many modern Jewish historians have seen themselves in the manner depicted by Yerushalmi, yet, as Chazan continues to argue, that does not mean that there are no other ways of conceiving of the role of the Jewish historian in contemporary Jewish society (1986). Yerushalmi's eloquently expressed anxieties should not smother criticism of his thesis, since, to put it crudely, the tension he depicts may only be as real as his sense of it.

What then do we make of Yerushalmi's claim that the modern turn to historiography has caused the first real rupture between Jewish memory and Jewish history? Is the contradiction between historical criticism and historical continuity irreconcilable?

In the first place, it does seem that Jewish continuity is indeed in grave doubt. As Leon Wieseltier affirms, "The historical attitude, to be sure, has returned many resources to Jewish culture.....No generation of Jews knew more about the past than our own. But no generation of Jews was less a part of it" (op cit). There is also plenty of demographic evidence to suggest that the majority of Jews do seem to have 'fallen', in Yerushalmi's sense that the past is no longer present for them (eg, Kosmin 1991). The problem is in determining what has been and what might be the causal relationship between Jewish historiography and the erosion of Jewish collective memory.

Yerushalmi's conclusions are pessimistic, though, surprisingly, not in the sense that he finds history
particularly injurious to memory, rather in that he portrays
the historian as a somewhat marginal figure. It is significant
that he characterizes the historian as a pathologist rather
than a physician for the wounds inflicted upon Jewish life by
the last two hundred years. The historian, it seems, can not
intervene to help the patient, he can at best diagnose his
condition. Nor, in fact, according to this paradigm, can he
hasten the patient's demise, as was intended by some German-
Jewish historians of the nineteenth century, who in Morris
Steinschneider's fateful words sought, through historiography,
"merely to give Judaism a decent burial". This is, no doubt,
why Yerushalmi takes issue with Rotenstreich's claim that "the
rise of historical consciousness in Jewish thought bought
about a weakening of the bonds of tradition" (op cit).
Yerushalmi says that "this is a causality that seems to be the
reverse of what had initially transpired" (p.144). In other
words, he can not accept that actual historical research and
writing had or could have anything more than a meagre
influence on collective Jewish self-understanding.

Paradoxically, this is not a view shared by many of those who
have written positive if not adulatory reviews of the book.
For example, in an admittedly extreme case, Stiller writes
that "while Yerushalmi suggests that modern Jewish
historiography can never substitute for Jewish memory, his
[Yerushalmi's] work spans both. Zachor is an imaginative
enterprise,...its discoveries akin to that of the Benzine
Ring. Yerushalmi is a poet as well as a historian" (1987). The
point, more prosaically made by others, is that in writing an
historical study which doubted whether criticism could meet
the needs of a living culture, Yerushalmi has himself created
a metaphistorical myth that can in fact be collectively
meaningful to modern Jews (cf. Bloom op cit, Patai 1983,
Schwarz 1984). According to this point of view, Yerushalmi's
work, despite its sanguine conclusions, may contribute
significantly to the creation of a new Jewish tradition that is capable of being collectively shared.

An alternative approach to the issues Yerushalmi raises is to set out to narrow the gap between memory and history. This can be done by working in from one of two directions. On the hand this can be done by pointing to the way in which the 'great' Jewish historians, like Graetz, Dubnow, Scholem and Baron "evolved a modern equivalent...of the biblical injunction to remember the covenant...in order to prompt Jewish consciousness" (Davidowicz 1983). In other words, it can be shown that historiography can serve as a surrogate for collective memory, if a distinction is drawn between those historians for whom "the study of Jewish history has become merely an academic pursuit, no different from the practice of any other branch of history" and the 'great' Jewish historians who enjoyed large popular followings because, although they maintained appropriate professional rigor, they were also driven by a commitment to Jewish survival which animated their work (ibid). In short, this is to adopt the 'nationalist' paradigm of historiography which we discussed above and to apply it to a Jewish context.

On the other hand, coming from another direction, it is possible to limit the gap between history and memory by looking for, what Geoffrey Hartman calls, "middle terms or significant links between them" (1984), that is, memorial genres which might be regarded as history. He finds examples of these in the way we have memorialized the holocaust and particularly in the production of memoirs and yizker-bikher (memorial books for Jewish communities destroyed in the holocaust). He notes Yerushalmi's caution that these works cannot be regarded as historiography, but argues that they constitute a popular and restitutive genre which nevertheless can be characterized as history. In that sense, and contrary to Yerushalmi's thesis, they demonstrate that even if memory
and history are not commensurable, they also do not "stand in radically different relations to the past".

One further way of engaging with Yerushalmi's argument is to accept its basic thesis that the historian is engaged in what is essentially a critical and untraditional enterprise. Yet, rather than regard this as being ultimately corrosive of Jewish memory, one can see it as a means to the consequent regeneration of new shared Jewish traditions. In short, this is to apply a different valuation to the outcomes Yerushalmi describes, as well as to take a longer view of them. This, in Chazan's phrase, is to regard the historian as an agent of 'analytic healing'. "The modern Jewish historian is charged with the task of dredging up discarded realities, to challenge a group memory that, because of its narrow focus, no longer serves effectively in the maelstrom of modernity" (op cit). Through criticism, Chazan is saying, the historian can play a culturally constructive role in the regeneration of Jewish memory.

This is a notion with some pedigree. Arguably, it goes back to Scholem's conception, with which we started, of the historian as someone "who ensures that our tremendous tradition is brought up and made a problem of". We had originally portrayed this as a somewhat iconoclastic notion, but hopefully it will now be apparent that it is more dialectic than destructive. Scholem himself describes how he rediscovered a sense of identification with Judaism and the Jewish people following his 'discovery' of Graetz's History of the Jews (Scholem 1980). Historiography, for him, therefore, does clear away existing or decaying memories, and it does involve confrontation with discordant and disturbing realities, but this is a necessary step in the direction of any future health, in that historiography contributes towards the formation of new and as yet unformed metahistorical myths.
Interestingly, there is another way of conceiving of the relationship between history and memory which is only tangentially considered in *Zachor*. Yerushalmi refers to history as "becoming the faith of fallen Jews", in terms of its content appearing to be more meaningful or truthful than traditional scripture. In fact, which ever way history's content is conceived, it is notable that, in formal terms, history-as-practice has acquired a new position in Jewish culture. By this we mean that in the realm of Jewish cultural practice history has been reified and has assumed a new symbolic status. Nowadays, Jews locate or express their identification with Jewish collective memory by studying history, not by locating it within the content of what they are studying. It seems possible that just as many orthodox Jews fast on days which commemorate ancient events for the sake of fasting not remembering, so, today, they study history for the sake of studying, not in order to find out about the past. The Jewish history study groups and institutes which have proliferated in certain parts of the Jewish diaspora might, therefore, be regarded as constituting secular *Batei Midrash* - houses of study - where study is still 'sacrament', but where the text is not of biblical origin.

**Reaching Conclusions**

It will be difficult reaching conclusions about the relationship between Jewish memory and Jewish history. This is because historiography itself is a culturally ambiguous practice as much as because Jewish historians and Jewish historiography have for so long been treated with ambivalence by Jewish society.

History is too protean to promise a predictable set of outcomes (Tholsen 1977). This, as Jacob Katz has put it, is because "people react to the challenge of the past in
different ways". Katz has argued that the past will inevitably have consequences for the present, but, he maintains, it is another matter altogether, if the historian sets out to produce or predict those outcomes, a priori (1983). To do so is to slide towards a dangerous manipulation of the past, in which the people of the past end up being described in ways which emasculate them of the very features which made them human beings - foremost among which was their capacity to choose freely.

These difficulties are complicated further when we consider that from a post-modernist perspective the assumptions on which our discussion was founded are highly suspect. From this perspective there are few grounds for regarding historiography and collective memory as epistemologically distinct. Historians, it is said, do not uncover truths or criticize myths; they offer narratives or ironic redescriptions - 'useful' rather than 'truthful' accounts, which, functionally, are little different from myths (Rorty 1989, Jenkins 1991).

For all of these reasons it is unlikely that we can reach conclusions about the relationship between history and memory which could be translated effectively into an educational context. Perhaps, though, this is too much to expect from philosophy. It can in fact be said that philosophy is not so much about reaching answers as it is about understanding questions better, and, hopefully, our discussion does make some of the questions here clearer. If, however, we are looking for answers (or at least guidelines for action), then perhaps we should look to another discipline wherein we might better examine the encounter between history and memory. That is why we propose turning to psychology.
Dickinson and Lee have asserted that "only the willfully ignorant could afford to ignore recent research into children's thinking in history" (1984 p.145). As far as they are concerned, this is for obvious reasons. Teaching which is not informed by available evidence about children's ideas will involve building educational structures on shifting foundations. It will result in practice that will be inappropriate to the capacities and interests of students and will fail to address the ideas, assumptions and tacit understandings pupils are operating with (Lee 1991).

We want to suggest that when it comes to reflecting on the consequences of Jewish historical study the price of willfully ignoring research into children's thinking about history will be doubly severe. First, and more obviously, there are good grounds for expecting that the results of research into children's thinking will be of relevance here. After all, it would be difficult to argue that Jewish history is so radically unlike all other history, that research into children's thinking does not shed some light on thinking about Jewish history. Secondly, though obviously far from the minds of Dickinson and Lee, it is possible that the processes of research into children's thinking about history might also serve research into the study of Jewish history. By this we mean that the terms, techniques, expectations and assumptions of research into children's historical thinking may provide an analytical and reflective framework within which to confront some of the causes of ambivalence about Jewish history and Jewish history teaching.

1Radical as it may be, this view is held by significant sections of the Jewish educational community, and it will, therefore, be later examined.
We argued earlier that ambivalence about the critical study of Jewish history is one of the major influences on the ambiguous state of Jewish history teaching. We suggested that this ambivalence revolves around chronic uncertainty about what effect critical history has on tradition; for example, whether history undermines collective Jewish memories and myths or whether it recovers a Jewish past which might otherwise be forgotten; whether history is the implacable foe of tradition or whether it is an unreliable friend.

Yet, as will also have been apparent from our earlier analysis, it is evident that ambivalence about Jewish history teaching is rarely a consequence of serious reflection about a balanced set of educational or curricula considerations relating to the subject. It might conceivably derive from the ambiguous conclusions reached by abstract philosophical speculation in the style of the previous chapter. But more likely, it is inspired by popular conceptions of the ways in which history undermines faith, or by cliches about historians ending up as heretics. Certainly, it is not based on empirical observation of the psychological demands made by or consequent on the study of Jewish history.

This much is clear from the fact that, on the one hand, a comprehensive literature search has failed to produce even one example of research into the ways in which Jewish children think about Jewish history. On the other hand, there appears to be widespread ignorance within the Jewish educational community about the existence let alone conclusions of research into children's historical thinking in general. Thus, a 1990 bibliography of "select materials" intending to serve Jewish history teaching as part of a broad social studies programme contained 54 entries of which only two may be said to reflect any attempt to organize teaching around understanding of the development of children's ideas and thinking in history (Hessel 1989). Recently developed
curricula, like Winnipeg Board of Education's Jewish history programme (1984), invariably show their indebtedness to older virtues like content and chronology rather than to more psychological considerations. In Britain, Jewish history teaching is like a world that time forgot. The two textbooks which are currently in widest use - Klapperman's (1961) *The Story of the Jewish People* and Isaac's (1970) *Our People, History of the Jews* - have not been updated for more than twenty years. Significantly, they are both used indiscriminately in primary and secondary schools, across a chronological age span of more than ten years.

A Hypothesis and a Plan for Research.

It is our hypothesis that the research into children's thinking which Dickinson and Lee talk about, as well as that carried out by those who have adopted what are variously known as intentionalist, constructivist or cognitive approaches to the study of teaching and learning (Armento 1986), may provide a means towards beginning to deal with ambivalence about the character and consequences of Jewish history teaching. By this we do not mean that an advance in knowledge about the findings of research would directly and positively influence attitudes towards and practice of Jewish history teaching. Teaching is not such a rational business. There is no necessary relationship between knowledge, attitudes and action (Morine-Dershimer & Valance 1976, Yinger 1977). Besides, the traditional orientation of Jewish history around subject matter concerns rather than student attributes is evidently rooted in principle rather than apathy or naivety. What we mean to propose is that the whole process of research into children's historical thinking (and not just its findings) might make possible a change in the quality of reflection about the practice of Jewish history teaching by creating a setting for informed contemplation of the way Jewish students
engage with history, and by enabling us to explore, in particular, how students experience the encounter between tradition and history.

Obviously, it would be inappropriate to advance research according to an agenda which expected a consequent amelioration of ambivalence about the teaching of Jewish history. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that such ambivalence cannot even be treated without (more solid) information about what happens to Jewish students when they are asked to think critically about Jewish history. It is our contention that it would be legitimate to set out with the intention of adding to that information. Certainly, we are entitled to expect that whatever the conclusions of our research, by exploring the encounter between tradition and adolescent thinking about it, and between collective memory and history, we will, at least, contribute (substantially or otherwise) to an ever extending field of research into the relationship between the "record of the past" and the "second record" of historians and their audiences (Hexter 1972).

It is our intention in this chapter, therefore, to arrive at some idea of what it is possible to know about children's thinking in history. By critically surveying the current state of research in the field we intend to mark out the frontiers of knowledge about children's historical thinking as well as the means by which such knowledge can be gathered. For, hopefully, this process will enable us to proceed towards developing a research strategy appropriate for investigating Jewish adolescent experience of the encounter between Jewish history and Jewish collective memory.
Jewish History: Absolutely Different or just Different?

First, there are two questions we should try to answer if we are not to leave unexplained some of the basic assumptions on which this quest is based. After all, it might be said that the kind of thinking required by Jewish history bears no (or little) resemblance to the thinking required by history in general and, therefore, that the methods used and findings produced by research into children's thinking are not relevant to reflection about Jewish history teaching. This, for example, is the position of Jewish schools whose "rejectionist" ethos involves adherence to a traditional conception of history which is predicated on a radical distinction and absolute separation between Jewish and secular learning.

For those bound (absolutely) by tradition Jewish history possesses intrinsic features which make the qualities and demands of Jewish historical study different from those of "critical" history. It is also what makes the concerns and conclusions of research into children's thinking about history irrelevant to practitioners of Jewish history teaching.

In what follows, however, we have made two assumptions. First, that if it is either held that Jewish history is not absolutely different from secular history or that all historical study should not be carried out according to the tenets of Jewish tradition, then Jewish history will share some features in common with critical history. For if there is held to be some generic similarity between the processes of Jewish and general history, no matter how limited, then the methods used and findings of research into children's understanding of historical concepts or into any other aspect of the process of history will have relevance to reflection about the ways in which young people think about Jewish history.
Given this attitude our second assumption may be unexpected, but it should explain our decision to invest effort in research into thinking about Jewish history rather than remain content to translate wholesale the findings of already existing research to a Jewish context. For, we suggest that because of the centrality of "history" in the self definition of post-Holocaust diaspora Jewry\(^2\), Jewish, and especially orthodox Jewish students do not think about Jewish history in the same way that any student thinks about any history. In other words, we hold that though Jewish history shows generic similarities to history in general, it is subject to a particular set of influences which make it a species in its own right.

We take our lead here from research which points to the influence of "affective-entry characteristics" (R. Austin et al 1987), substantive beliefs (Shemilt 1987) or convictions on reasoning and judgement in history. We are also influenced by the findings of generally science-based research which point to the significant role played by "implicit theories" (eg. Conners 1978; Munby 1983) or preconceptions (Roth 1985) in shaping learning and thinking. In light of this work we assert in the form of an operating assumption, which may itself be proven empty by our own research, that Jewish thinking about Jewish history is sufficiently distinctive to merit research of its own, but that in its overall shape is sufficiently similar to thinking about history in general to utilize (and, hopefully, enrich) the processes of research into that field.

The Origins of Research into Children's Thinking in History

The work which we have repeatedly referred to as "research into children's historical thinking" may appear somewhat

\(^2\) This assertion is less bold than it appears. A number of analyses have argued that Diaspora Jewry, because of its separation from the influences of land and autonomous culture, is unusually dependent on "artificial" constructs like history (cf. Greenberg 1991).
subject-specific and parochial. It is, however, predicated on a view of students which has significant implications. For, in regarding students as active learners "who can and do think effectively in history" (Dickinson & Lee op cit), it makes students accountable for their role in learning. It is for this reason that it may promise the possibility of examining in an empirical manner the ways in which the beliefs, background knowledge and attitudes of Jewish students mediate thinking about Jewish history; and in turn the ways in which thinking about Jewish history moulds those beliefs and attitudes.

Research into children's historical thinking has only properly taken shape over the last twenty-five years in the wake of the first detailed surveys of the field by E.A.Peel (1967), Michael Honeybone (1971) and Donald Thompson (1972). It has emerged as part of what has been, in the fullest sense of the analogy, a Copernican shift in the way teachers have thought about and researched into improving history teaching. This has involved a dramatic relocation of the centre of the subject's teaching universe, from seeing better teaching as largely depending on the development of better teaching techniques to a sense that it is dependent on knowing better the nature of the subject and its students (Booth 1986a). It has resulted in a "move to a concept of history that emphasizes the methodology of the subject and requires the extensive and developing use by pupils of sources as evidence from which they reconstruct a picture of the past" (Thompson 1984). It has also led to "a concern with analysing the development of central aspects of the pupils' thinking and understanding in history based on how they respond to and comprehend actual historical situations" (ibid).

The shift in thinking about history teaching has been evidenced in a number of ways. Most immediately, one can point to a change in the focus of titles of books published for
history teachers, from a concern with "teaching" the subject—that is, the ways in which the teacher should operate in the classroom—to a concern with the "learning" of it—to matters related to the nature of the subject and its students (Booth 1986a). More notably, there is evidence of a significant relocation of the starting point for thought about what should be taught in school history. In 1952, Ministry of Education Pamphlet, Number 23: Teaching History argued that "the first problem of the history teacher is the making of his syllabus, and that he is confronted at the outset with a major problem of selection—what to leave out, even more than what to put in." Already by 1971 Coltham and Fines in their influential pamphlet on Educational Objectives for the Study of History were interested first of all in "what a learner can do as a result of having learned" (their emphasis) and in measuring the student's attitude towards the study of history. Today, in an educational world dominated by National Curriculum attainment targets, the perception of learning in history as the accumulation of developing but always legitimate cognitive and psychological attributes may well have reached its apotheosis.

When Peel, Honeybone and Thompson marked out the perimeters of what they called "the psychology of history teaching" the situation was different. They surveyed a field which was almost entirely made up of attempts to measure historical thinking according to what were called "global criteria, transcending subject matter", and which, more acerbically, we could describe as the criteria of a Piagetian framework of cognition. This field had mainly yielded pessimistic conclusions about the capacities of young children and adolescents to think historically (eg. Hallam 1966, 1970, de Silva 1969) and had, thereby, reinforced G.R. Elton's widely quoted and highly influential speculations on the doubtful

3Thus Dickinson and Lee's first book was titled History Teaching and Historical Understanding while their sequel was titled Learning History.
appropriateness of teaching "serious" history to "immature" schoolchildren (1967, 1970).

If more recent research has resulted in a quite different estimation of children's capacities and has induced a more tolerant response to them it still conforms to the methodological typology established twenty-five years ago. In 1972 for example, Thompson prescribed the inclusion of three aspects in the psychology of history teaching. First, "an examination of specific factors within the subject which may effect the pupil's attitude towards it". Second, a "consideration of the kind of thinking and understanding that the study of history at school level demands and how this is related to the pupil's intellectual development and capacity". Thirdly, an investigation of "the most suitable means for assessing the extent to which the objectives of history teaching have been achieved" (1972 p.18).

Each of these of these realms has pretty much maintained its shape over the intervening period while at the same time stimulating a diversity of research. The second aspect, regarding how children think with reference to historical material, has, however, attracted a disproportionate degree of interest and it is the area that is of most relevance to us here.

Typically, work in this field has involved taking two steps: First, a decision about what is meant by historical thinking (whether that is derived from philosophical or psychological premises). Secondly, once the particular nature of the discipline has been determined, a decision about the kind of tests that could be devised so as to stimulate a wide range of responses which might indicate different levels or types of historical understanding (Thompson ibid).
Invariably, there have been three directions in which the first step has moved. First, towards locating historical thinking within a Piagetian framework of cognition. Secondly, towards identifying historical thinking with cognitive structures that are specific to the discipline. Thirdly, towards placing historical thinking within non-Piagetian (global) theories.

Because so much of the inspiration behind the beginnings of research into children's historical thinking came from Piaget's work in developmental psychology it is not surprising that the earliest attempts at research in this field characterized historical thinking according to categories taken from Piagetian theory and identified stages in historical thinking which corresponded to Piaget's characterization of the growth of logical operations. Research projects sought to develop models of ratiocination, dealing with the logic wherewith students operate upon history, exploring, for example, the "growth of logical thought in history" or "the relationship between developing reasoning in mathematics and history" (see, Hallam 1975, Lodwick 1972, Peel 1967). They produced findings which portrayed historical understanding as a formal operation developed in late adolescence and as comprehensible according to psychological conceptions taken from thinking in the physical sciences.

Over the last fifteen years, however, scholars have come increasingly to question whether the Piagetian system provides an appropriate cognitive model for describing (all of) historical learning (Downey and Levstik 1988). Either because, like Booth (1983), they start with an altogether different a priori conception of the nature of historical knowledge, or because like Kennedy (1983) their "Piagetian" research has produced discrepant findings which have led them to question the correspondence between the development of historical thinking and Piagetian stage theory, or because, like Shemilt
(1980), despite feeling "optimistic about the application of Piagetian epistemology to children's learning in history", they feel that "as presently constituted, the system (is) divorced from the stuff and substance of children's ideas about history".

As we have said above, there have been and are, logically, two broad alternatives to conceiving of historical thinking within a Piagetian framework. They are, either, to identify historical thinking with cognitive structures that are specific to the discipline, or, to locate it within the framework of non-Piagetian (global) theories. Though it is dangerous to generalize about research, it seems to us that even when the existence of exceptions is admitted, there are grounds for crudely arguing that research based in Britain has tended, under the influence of Paul Hirst's work, to adopt the former subject-specific position, while research in the United States has tended to adopt the latter and more global approach.

The Research Consequences of Epistemological Positions.

Of central importance to our own concerns is what has been the experimental corollary of staking out epistemological positions of this nature regarding the nature of historical thinking. For if we intend to set out the limits of what can be known about children's historical thinking, then the relationship between epistemological positions, experimental decisions and research findings will be one of the central axes around which our work will revolve.

A survey of major exemplars of British "post-Piagetian" research shows that epistemological decisions provide not only the starting point for research, but that they supply the content for experimental categories and criteria, as well as
setting limits on what researchers determine to find out\(^4\). In other words, such a survey demonstrates that the limits of what can be known about children's historical thinking are as much determined by philosophical questions as they are by experimental or methodological ones.

This can be demonstrated through reference to two very different examples of research.

Over the last five years Peter Knight has been involved in a research project based at St. Martin's College, Lancaster. The starting point for research has been an explicit epistemological decision that "History's central feature is the attempt to understand people in the past in (what is called) a differentiated manner" (1989b). Knight explains that "the view of history underlying the research is that it is the study of people in different cultures". "History", he says, "resembles all other attempts to understand people (ancient and modern) who are only known at second hand" (1989a).

These quite definite and it must be said rather unhistorical sounding premises have been translated into a tightly sequenced experimental methodology which has developed "historical equivalents of items used by other researchers into interpersonal understanding" (ibid). It has led to the development of an experimental methodology which tests children's capacities in five clearly identified "subcomponents within the understanding of others" (ibid). These include their capacity to recognize that their perspective is not another's, their capacity to describe another's perspective, to explain a character's action, to predict endings and to handle equivocal information.

\(^4\)The major exemplars we refer to are those research projects that (a) include the fruits of work which go beyond the requirements of producing a single masters or doctoral thesis and which (b) have been reported in more than one monograph or journal article. If these sound like trivial requirements, they do nevertheless identify any work of substance carried out in a field which even very recently was described as "still being in its infancy" (Lee 1991).
Knight reports that his work has produced the following findings: First, that "elements of understanding people in the past...are first observable at different ages, are more or less pronounced according to children's ability and are consolidated at different paces" (1987). Secondly, and more generally, that "a differentiated view of children's understanding of others [is] sustained by empirical studies" (ibid).

Alric Dickinson, Peter Lee and Rosalyn Ashby have conducted research into children's historical thinking for more than twenty years (and in various personnel combinations). Their earliest research confined its attention to a limited part of children's historical thinking which was selected for largely strategic purposes from a multifaceted and essentially holistic conception of the discipline's character. Research sought to explore "that part of historical explanation which involves understanding why some agent acted as he did" (Dickinson & Lee 1978). It was not intended to examine historical thinking in general since, citing Dray, it was acknowledged that explanations in history are a "logically miscellaneous lot" (Lee 1978).

Research was based on pencil and paper tests which produced "evidence of how children worked out their solutions to certain kinds of historical problems". This evidence was analysed according to categories of children's understanding of individual action which in turn produced statistical data regarding, for example, how successfully children could "qualify an historical agents actions or differentiate between his view of the situation and that of a historian" (Dickinson & Lee ibid).

In their later research, however, Dickinson, Ashby and Lee have adopted a quite different "experimental" approach, based on video recording small group discussion about an historical problem. Significantly, it does not seem to be predicated on a
prior decision about the precise nature of historical thinking.

Dickinson and Lee offer a number of reasons why their more recent methodology has been preferred. Few of these are strictly theoretical. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue from their accompanying silence about how they conceive of the nature of historical thinking that there is a fundamental reason for this shift in experimental methodology. In short, it seems that their espousal of a more ethnographic approach reflects their skepticism about and reluctance to establish firm epistemological experimental criteria for measuring historical thinking.5

Most of the reasons they in fact give for the adoption of an alternative methodology are phrased in terms of the deficiency of their previous approach, for example, that while written tests can provide data on children's conclusions, they provide few clues as to how children got there (Ashby & Lee 1987a). More positively, they explain that video-generated data offers a chance to begin to see some of the ways in which children cope with the (apparently) strange behaviour of their ancestors, and to see in detail their initial reactions, the strategies they employ to make sense of a past way of life, the way they use evidence and their own experience, etc (Dickinson & Lee 1984).

In many ways, this is precisely the kind of "data" their research has produced. It may not be susceptible to statistical analysis, but it does nevertheless reveal how children "actually behave when confronted with the 'strangeness' of the past" (ibid). In recent incarnations, following the collection of "hundreds of hours of tape", data

5Their motivation is perhaps made most explicit in Lee's critique of Shemilt's discussion of levels in children's construction of historical narrative. There, he notes that a problem with this kind of approach is the tendency for particular philosophical accounts to begin to play a normative role in the assessment of children's understanding, when those accounts are still contested (Lee 1983). (Our emphasis)
has been interpreted according to specific sets of categories like, for example, "the development of children's conception of evidence" (ibid 1987b). Yet, the most notable feature of even this most recent research has been its "tentative and preliminary" nature (ibid 1987a), its "provisional" character and its presentation as the basis for future discussion rather than for decisive conclusions (Ashby & Lee 1987b).

These expressions of tentativeness or vagueness are significant. For in a sense Dickinson and Lee's research is a photographic negative of Knight's. Where Knight started from a position of epistemological certainty, has developed a highly focussed experimental methodology and has produced hard and reliable data, his research has not told us very much about children's thinking in history. While on the other hand, the less explicit Dickinson and Lee have been about the precise nature of historical thinking and about the relationship between the many components they see as making up historical thinking, the less focussed their methodology has become but, at the same time, the more meaningful6 has been the data it has produced.

Part of this phenomenon will have been predictable. The inverse relationship between the reliability and meaningfulness of experimental data is not an unknown one (see, for example, Shemilt 1983). Similarly familiar is the way in which uncertainty about the precise content of epistemological criteria necessitates a withdrawal from setting out firm categories of experimental measurement and an inclination towards a less evaluative and more ethnographic approach (eg. Gage 1984). However, what is not always so explicit in cognitive research, and what both these examples demonstrate graphically, is the way in which research findings about children's thinking in history are limited as much by a

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6We follow Shemilt (1983) in adjudging the meaningfulness of research according to its capacity to illuminate beyond the findings of an original experiment.
priori decisions about the character of historical thinking as they are by the reliability or validity of research methodologies.

A Map of Research into Children's Thinking about History.

What, then, does this mean in substantive terms? Or, to put the question differently, what has the adoption of a philosophical position which identifies history as a discrete form of knowledge, together with any contingent experimental decisions, allowed us to know about children's historical thinking and what might they allow us to know?

We intend to argue that "post-Piagetian", "subject-specific" research into children's thinking about history can be effectively classified according two sets of criteria. First, according to whether it is interested in ideation or ratiocination, that is, according to whether it is interested in the premises pupils bring to history or whether it is interested in the logic wherewith they operate upon it. Secondly, according to whether it is concerned with what might be called history as craft or with history as comprehension; in other words, whether it is concerned with questions relating to the foundations of historical knowledge and of the historian's method or with questions raised by an incomprehensible past.

1. Ideation about history-as-craft

As we said above, a major stimulus towards research into children's historical thinking was provided by the move towards a conception of history as a distinct form of knowledge and by subsequent interest in introducing students to and even inculcating them in its particular forms. The pages of Teaching History, the journal of the Historical
Association, bear witness to the explosion of interest (especially during the early 1980's) in precisely characterizing the activity of the historian and in deciding how best to introduce students to his craft.

It is not surprising (given that interest in bringing historical evidence into the classroom was central to the new teaching orientation) that the findings of research which are by now most broadly established are those which explore what Shemilt variously calls children's "ideas about how historical knowledge is based and founded" (1980) or "ideas about the nature and uses of historical evidence" (1987). For, even if the achievements of research are relative ones, it cannot be denied that there has been a significant convergence among a number of differently framed projects in creating a picture of the development of children's ideas about evidence and about what historians do.

This convergence is notable because the research methods which underpin it have all utilized different methodologies. They have included (a) Dickinson, Gard and Lee's a priori categorization of "logical phases in the handling (or conceptualization) of historical materials" (1978), (b) Denis Shemilt's use of phenomenological interviews with samples of pupils following Schools Council Project "History 13-16" or traditional examination courses, so as to enquire into "the constructs adolescents use to render the conceptual apparatus of the historian personally accessible and intelligible" (1987), and (c) Ashby and Lee's analysis of video-recordings, generated in an ethnographic manner, of small groups of students set historical problems for discussion (1987b).

Separately these projects could not claim to have generated findings which are other than tentative. For example, Shemilt's work as well as Ashby and Lee's has required interposing a controversial if necessary strata of hermeneutics between interview or video transcripts and the
classification of pupils ideas. Yet it is significant that after having adopted independent approaches to research these projects nevertheless have arrived at conclusions about the kinds of premises which students bring to their conception of historical method and of the basis of historical knowledge all of which bear a striking resemblance to one another.

The exact details of the picture they develop are perhaps not so important. It will suffice to report that they depict the growth of the child's conception of the nature of historical knowledge from something that is given and known by the historian as "memory man" (Shemilt ibid), in which the past is treated as if it is present (Ashby & Lee ibid); through a conception of historical knowledge as something that has to be worked out by rational process, by the historian working in the manner of an "historical detective" (Shemilt ibid); to something which is derived from complex interpretations of evidence within the framework of history as a public form of knowledge (Dickinson, Gard and Lee ibid).

That there is little correspondence between the transects cut through the ideational topography which each of these projects map is probably not of great significance. As Shemilt points out, while transects may refer to genuine developmental stages in the natural history of adolescent ideas they have, nevertheless, been arbitrarily fixed. They are certainly not intended to correspond to invariant stages in the growth of operational intelligence (Shemilt ibid).

2. Ratiocination about history-as-craft

This kind of composite (and, possibly, reliable) picture cannot be built up from the findings of research into the sort of logic with which students operate on historical evidence. This is because research has divided in depicting this logic either as analytical (we might say, deductive) or as
"adductive" (Booth 1983), that is, involving the construction of imaginary webs around related events.

(a) The influence of Piaget on the first position is self-evident, even if the research itself has moved on from depicting thinking about historical evidence in terms taken directly from those which refer to the manipulation of physical objects, or where the evidence required for the solution of a problem is "all in".

The leading exponent of this position is Donald Thompson, although his research has neither been reported in many places nor been very fully described. His starting point is a recognition that "the first and vital stage in research into how children think in history should be a careful examination of what is meant by historical thinking" (Thompson 1972). Yet, he argues that "it is possible to accept that there are major differences between the subject matter and procedures of science and those of history ...without rejecting the value of the respective frameworks that Piaget and Peel suggest" for analysing and categorizing students thinking (ibid 1984).

This dualism has led Thompson to depict the logical processes by which children treat historical evidence in a way that is heavily influenced by Peel's (1971) distinction between "content-dominated" (describer) and "possibility invoking" (explainer) thinking. He has never set out a model of what different levels of thinking would look like according to these categories, but has proposed an analytical framework with which to distinguish between different levels of thinking about evidence.

The bare bones of this framework consist of a distinction between thinking which is restricted by concentrating on immediate information and evidence and thinking which, appreciating the limitations of historical information, goes through and beyond immediate evidence in a disciplined manner.
The problem is that while this analytical framework possesses a certain theoretical appeal, in substantive terms it does not (currently) seem capable of telling us more about children's thinking than is already suggested by the framework's own abstract epistemological categories.

(b) Ironically, many of the findings produced by Martin Booth's research seem to be limited for similar reasons, despite the fact that Booth has consciously set out to develop a research methodology which reflects the unique nature of historical thinking. As he says, "Historical knowledge and the thinking it demands have certain features... To assess these by means of an a priori framework evolved in the first instance from children's language and thinking when dealing with problems in the natural sciences...would seem to be misguided." (Booth 1980 p.247).

The a priori framework he uses is taken first of all from Collingwood's depiction of historical thinking as the construction of an imaginary web around a set of fixed historical points (Booth 1978a). His specific terms of reference are derived from two, more contemporary, sources. First, from D.G. Watts's description of historical thinking as "a form of speculation, directed imagination or vicarious living", something Booth characterizes as inductive thinking (Booth 1978b). Secondly, (and more latterly) from D.H. Fischer's notion of "adductive thinking" which, Booth says, "emphasizes the drawing together of related events to a common centre" (1983).

He has applied this framework to a rich body of research accumulated over many years so as to explore, among other things, "the development...of concepts and skills and the change in attitudes of children (and) the processes by which children conceptualize in history" (Booth 1978b). He has measured changes in pupil's ability to handle primary
documentary evidence, deduce from written cues key concepts covered by (their history) course" as well as changes "in attitude to history as a subject and to national or racial groups and situations with which the syllabus dealt" (1983).

At the heart of Booth's research, and in many ways the most innovative feature of it, has been his empirical investigation of children's capacity to engage in inductive historical thought (Booth 1980), or, to use the classificatory terms with which we have been operating, his investigation of the inductive logic with which children work on historical evidence. He has used the results of this research to exemplify the development of inductive thinking, by distinguishing between thinking which makes use of "abstract inductive concepts", which is not based on immediately observable features of the evidence and thinking which makes use of "concrete inductive concepts", which is less adventurous, creative and imaginative (Booth 1978b).

However, while Booth has reported widely on the sophisticated components in and the results of his long running research, there is a sense in which he has not gone any further than Thompson in charting the characteristic operations of children's thinking. For though he may have provided evidence of the kind of "creative, imaginative and constructionist thinking children are capable of" as well as of the kind of intervention which can improve the quality of this thinking (Booth 1983), he does not provide very solid criteria for evaluating (or measuring) inductive conceptualization. Though he has developed a tantalysingly attractive research methodology he has, like Thompson, posited only the basic outlines of a framework for analysing the development of children's historical thinking, which unless it is reenforced by further philosophical reflection will be incapable of revealing more about children's thinking than is already hinted at by the categorical dyad at its heart.
3. Ideation about history-as-comprehension

To a large extent, "thinking about evidence", or to put it differently, questions relating to the status of historical knowledge, provide no more than a backcloth to the real business of history as a humanity, that is, to its quest to make sense of the achievements, failures, strivings and sufferings of human beings in the past. Yet, while the quest to interpret or explain the past may be history's most compelling feature, the precise form and content of this feature is too much contested, and contemplated from too many perspectives for it to be possible to make many firm statements about its precise nature. Philosophical debate here has spanned questions about the nature of causation as well as about the essence of human nature, questions about hermeneutics and about interpretation. It has involved discussing the meaning of empathy, imagination, objectivity and colligation. It is certainly not surprising that when attempts have been made to map "the specific ways in which human experience has been structured, organized and made meaningful" (Hirst 1965) plenty of room has been left for debate as to where history's basic structure is to be located, or what precisely it consists of (see Bruner 1977, Hirst op cit, Phenix 1964).

Given this epistemological chaos, the progress made by research into children's thinking about history-as-comprehension has been striking, particularly when this research has been premised on the assumption that history does possess unique cognitive structures of its own (as in the examples we are attending to here). It is indisputable, for example, that "subject-specific" research has made headway in (and perhaps because it has concentrated on) exploring the ways in which children explain either people's behaviour in the past and/or what happened to them. To put this more formally, there is substantial evidence that research has
profitably concentrated on investigating thinking about motivation and about causation, when this has been in terms of the premises children bring to such thinking.

(a) Significantly, there has been a good deal of agreement about the development of children's ideas about the behaviour of people in the past. Sometimes this has been obscured behind discussion about whether the object of research is empathetic explanation (Shemilt 1984), empathetic reconstruction or what Knight calls "a differentiated understanding of people in the past" (1989b). Sometimes, and more importantly, it has been obstructed by disagreement over whether empathy is a power (Coltham & Fines 1971), an achievement (Ashby & Lee 1987a), a process or a disposition (Sutherland 1986).

In fact, the work which has generated evidence about children's ideas about (what is involved in understanding) other people's behaviour in the past has been diverse. It has included (a) Dickinson and Lee's pencil and paper "Jutland test"7 which sought to investigate the way children understood why some agent acted as he did, and how students coped with a series of actions which they at first found hard to make sense of (1978), (b) Denis Shemilt's use of phenomenologically oriented interviews, as part of the evaluation of Schools Council Project History 13-16, to advance a model of adolescent construction of people in the past (1984), (c) Dickinson and Lee's (more recent) attempt "to discover more about the ways in which children actually behave when confronted with the strangeness of the past" by making video-recordings of small groups of children attempting to understand Anglo-Saxon oath-helping and Spartan education (1984), (d) Ashby and Lee's use of a similar "ethnographic" technique to "explore children's ideas about what is involved in understanding other people's behaviour in the past, as

7The researchers identified Jellicoe's turn away during the battle of Jutland as being particularly suitable for probing children's understanding of individual action.
manifested in their attempts to make sense of alien institutions and actions" (1987a), and (e) the work of Booth et al with the Southern Regional Examination Board to develop a model of "differentiated historical empathy" (1986b).

Notably, despite the reasonably diverse character of research there has been a significant convergence in the findings generated and the conclusions reached by it. Taken together, these produce a picture of children's thinking about people in the past which begins in a state of confusion and contempt (Dickinson & Lee 1984), in which past actions are unintelligible (Dickinson & Lee 1978, Ashby & Lee 1987a) and in which the people of the past are seen as being mentally defective (Ashby & Lee ibid) and/or morally inferior (Shemilt 1984). Thinking, it seems, turns into an attempt to understand the people of the past by reciprocating positions with them (Shemilt ibid), by understanding action in modern terms, with no distinction made between how we see it and how contemporaries would have seen it (Ashby & Lee ibid). In its most sophisticated incarnation it comprises an attempt both to explain action by reference to the distinction between the agent's view of the situation and the historian's, as well as to set action in a wider context of beliefs and values (Lee 1978, Ashby & Lee 1987a).

As we said earlier, it is doubtful whether, individually, any of these findings could claim to be anything other than tentative. Ashby and Lee, for example, report that they have not yet been able to develop tests that pick out important indicators with any degree of sophistication (1987a). Booth's S.R.E.B. work has also been criticized for making use of inappropriate indicators (Lee 1991). Ultimately, however, because the findings produced by pencil and paper tests, phenomenological questions and ethnographic recordings tend in the same direction their outcome attracts some confidence, but this should not camouflage the fact that many particulars of
experimental methodology are subject to private as well as public criticism.

(b) The attempt to make sense of human behaviour is a part of the historian's wider endeavour to understand why things happened in the past as they did. Motivated action is one (albeit significant) part of the picture the historian will draw of the interrelationship between events in the past. However, because the concept of cause is so much contested in philosophy, research into children's thinking about causation has been limited and its conclusions disputed.

What evidence we have comes almost entirely from the work of the School's Council Project History 13-16 and especially from Denis Shemilt's evaluation of it. This work produces a picture of children's understanding which develops from a position in which historical narrative is seen as lacking inner logic (Sansom 1987) and where change is seen as coming about through a discontinuous eruption of events. It passes through a level at which events are presumed to conform to an austere logic in which everything is thought to be connected (Shemilt 1983, 1984), and develops finally into a set of assumptions which include the idea that different rates of change may occur at the same time in different aspects of human affairs (Lee 1991).

It must be said though, that when an account of the development of an aspect of children's historical thinking is based on a single original experimental source (as in this case) there are good grounds for taking note of Peter Lee's warning about the tendency for particular philosophical accounts to begin to play a normative role in the assessment of children's understanding, when those accounts are still contested (Lee 1991). Lee's caution is stimulated precisely by those problems he finds with Shemilt's analysis of thinking about causation, when the concept of cause is itself so much a contested one philosophically. As he notes, what may be
philosophical nonsense in a Humean account of causation may be perfectly sensible in another philosophical context.

4. Ratiocination about history-as-comprehension

The sort of logic with which students operate on questions regarding either why people in the past acted as they did or why events happened as they did is something of an unknown quantity. The epistemological chaos we described above has largely preempted research into questions of this sort, because, as we have said, it would be hazardous to posit developmental levels for a form of thinking already subject to intense philosophical debate.

At most, it can be argued that Peter Knight investigates the development of the logic with which children operate on some aspect of history-as-comprehension with his attempt to explore the sub-competencies necessary for the understanding of others (Knight 1987, 1989a, 1989b). However, Knight's research does not conform to the normal architectonic of research into ratiocination since it looks at the acquisition of different sub-competencies rather than at the development of one particular competency.

On the one hand, the findings and conclusions of his research are seductive. His depiction of the way in which children develop the capacity, for example, to recognize that their perspective is not another's or to explain another character's action is vitiated by being rooted in general psychological literature on the understanding of others. On the other hand, the meaningfulness of research as an investigation into historical thinking is limited because it is premised on a conception of historical understanding which is indistinguishable from general psychological conceptions of how people understand others. As a result, research is impeded
at a number of points by the attempt to separate the process of history from its content.

Summary and Conclusion.

We have extensively surveyed research into children's thinking in history which starts from a premise of history's distinctiveness as a form of knowledge. We have found that this research offers a mixed legacy. In substantive terms it has produced what are probably reliable accounts of the ways in which children think about historical evidence as well as of the way they think about the behaviour of people in the past. It has, however, only offered tentative suggestions about other aspects of historical thinking.

In methodological terms we have seen that while there may be difficulties with individual research methodologies, for example with the arbitrariness of phenomenological questioning or the indecisiveness of ethnographic recordings, these approaches when taken together with highly focused "psychological" tests may offer access to a rich vein of evidence about children's thinking.

The question now is how far this research and its findings can help in the examination of the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory. This will be our first concern in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR
Towards an alternative psychological research methodology

We begun the last chapter by quoting Dickinson and Lee's (1984) assertion that "only the willfully ignorant could afford to ignore recent research into children's thinking in history". The last part of that chapter surveyed the notable collection of findings generated by this research. Unfortunately, however, while this research seems to promise the possibility of producing rich insights into many of the questions which are of concern to us, its methodology is probably constructed in such a way as to make it irrelevant to our particular research purposes.

On the one hand, by successfully managing to focus on distinct questions regarding, for example, ideation about history-as-craft or history-as-comprehension, this research does appear to hold out the possibility of investigating individual points of encounter between memorial and critical-historical views of the past. These points could include questions regarding the status of historical evidence, the intelligibility of the past and the nature of historical causation - precisely the questions which delimit the boundary between memorial and critical history.

On the other hand though, there do appear to be a number of weighty reasons why neither the tools nor findings produced in answer to these questions will be valid for our purposes. In the first place, this is because research is grounded in epistemological terms which are predicated on a certain view of the nature of history which prevents a valid comparison of traditional and critical interpretations of history.

For example, it is evident that the categories which are both inductively and deductively constituted by research as symptomatic of immature or undeveloped historical thinking are themselves valued features within memorial conceptions of
history. Thus, categorical forms of historical thinking such as "a conception of the unintelligibility of past actions" or "a conception of knowledge of the past as being given", which in the critical epistemology reflect undeveloped or immature thinking are very much desired attributes in a non-historiographical orientation towards the past.

In general terms, one might say that the problem here is that the account of historical knowledge which underpins post-Piagetian, subject specific research into children's historical thinking lays claim to a normative status which it does not merit. In fact, its origins in an uncertain mixture of Piagetian psychology and Hirstian philosophy make it singularly inappropriate for reflection on the form or content of non-historiographic thinking about the past (Herbst 1985).

To complicate matters further, it should not be forgotten that this epistemological difficulty is only one side of an experimental step which can be queried for different reasons. As we have said, there are strong grounds for querying the way in which research makes use of particular philosophical theories in the attempt to translate children's behaviour or verbalizations into stable cognitive terms, as data about how children think. Yet, it is also proper to question the reliability and validity of that process of translation in and of itself because of the way it mediates between what children are seen doing or heard saying and what they apparently think. As we said in the last chapter, there are numerous obstacles that lurk between a child's explanation of why something happened in history and somebody else's analysis of that child's conception of causation in history; and these largely hermeneutical obstacles make it difficult to accept that the conclusions reached by research into children's thinking are either reliable or valid. Therefore, while it might be argued that most children cannot provide a sensible account of the concepts that make up their historical thinking, we would say
that it is still not legitimate to claim to investigate the premises and logic which shape children's historical thinking by subjecting their talk about history to the mediation of dubious interpretative conjecture.

Less damning, but still relevant to the particular concerns of our own work, it can be argued that even if this research had been grounded in valid normative and interpretative terms it would promise us little help, since by focusing on particular or limited aspects of history as craft or comprehension it is too mechanistic or artificial to allow meaningful insights into traditional thinking about the Jewish past (see Egan 1983 who criticizes Schools Council research for similar reasons).

This notion of meaningfulness is of great importance, for it provides a reminder that while research methodologies can produce findings which show something happening, or show the student doing (or even thinking) different things at different times, these findings do not necessarily mean anything in real terms (Neisser 1976). In this case it can be argued that the distinction made, for example, between changes in the child's conception of the nature of historical evidence and changes in their conception of causation in the past, is irrelevant to any characterization of traditional thinking in Jewish history, where (strictly speaking) the historian does not exist separately from the events of the past or his sources. In memorial history, it is meaningless to separate the content of history from its procedures, for the procedures of traditional Jewish history are consequent of its special content.

In Search of an Alternative Research Tradition

Given these criticisms, we have been encouraged to look to a different research tradition from within which to examine Jewish children's conception of the Jewish past. For while we
recognize the significant contribution made by recent research into children's historical thinking, both to our knowledge of how children relate to and think about the past as well as to the subsequent realignment of curricula priorities in history teaching, we have decided to pursue an alternative research methodology in the hope of finding, first, a "neutral" tool which will allow us to compare critical with non-critical thinking about history without having to make judgements regarding the superiority of one over the other. In a sense, this is to be led by the same concerns which encouraged Dickinson and Lee to adopt what we earlier called a more ethnographic strategy for examining children's thinking - that is, a strategy which does not depend on taking prior decisions about the precise nature of historical thinking.

At the same time, we have decided not to adopt Dickinson and Lee's video-centred strategy itself, since it appears to go too far in not establishing firm epistemological categories with which to talk about historical thinking. It seems to have thereby created a different kind of problem by not providing any kind of criteria with which to draw conclusions about children's thinking from the way they behave or verbalize things. While the ethnographic narratives it generates are rich in implication and substance they are both too fluid and too much removed from data which would provide the basis for a focused comparison of different forms of historical thinking.

Our aim, then, is to find a research tool that is, on the one hand, epistemologically neutral but which, on the other hand, is capable of revealing even subtle differences in the ways that children think. It should accommodate cross-cultural comparisons, without being entirely empty of analytical criteria itself. It should take account of the difficulties children have talking about their thinking, but should still
provide evidence about how children think, without depending too heavily on the mediation of hermeneutics.

It is this taxing set of requirements which has drawn us towards a tradition of research into children's thinking which is more closely connected with the field of cognitive psychology than to one which is the joint product of Piagetian psychology and Hirstian philosophy. Of course it could be said that in so doing we have traded one set of debatable assumptions for the equally dubious assumptions of another particular form of psychology. However, even if this is close to the truth, we can say with confidence that cognitive psychology does promise at least one great advantage, in that though it does not treat thinking about history as a cognitive category in its own right, it does, nevertheless, avoid setting up valuative distinctions between critical and non-critical thinking in history.

The Basic Assumptions of Cognitive Psychology

It is axiomatic in a cognitive view of learning that the organism's covert manipulations occupy a central role in determining its responses to incoming stimuli (Holley & Dansereau 1984). Learning, from this point of view, is more productively studied as an internal, cognitively mediated process than as a direct product of the environment, people or factors external to the learner (Wittrock 1978). Indeed, theorists and researchers have posited the existence of a number of such cognitively mediating processes, including motivation (Bar Tal 1978, Wang 1983), attention (Duell 1974, Willows 1974), memory (Newell & Simon 1972, Lindsay & Norman 1977) and cognitive structure (Ausubel, Novak & Hanesian 1978) to cite a few.
As Anderson (1990) argues, while theories of cognitive psychology involve the inference of structures that cannot be directly observed, theories of internal structure make understanding human beings significantly easier, much in the same way as a theory of atomic structure serves as a useful heuristic for research in physics. This assertion is particularly apposite to those theories which have been developed under the influence of information processing theory. These theories, which involve tracing a sequence of mental operations and their products in the performance of a particular cognitive task (ibid), have resulted in the creation of powerful models describing how information is stored in memory, how transformations of this stored information may occur and how stored information is retrieved for use in further learning and problem solving (Stewart 1985).

Common to most of these models are three structures - a sensory register, a short-term memory and a long-term memory - as well as a set of processes involved in the transfer of information from one structure to another. Where models significantly differ is over how exactly information is stored in long term memory, or to put it differently, over what they conceive to be the basic units of memory. Quillian (1966), for example, suggested that human memory may be organized as a semantic network composed of ideas or concepts (nodes) and the named relationships (links) between those concepts. Closely connected with this network model are those models based on propositional structure (eg, Anderson & Bower 1973). In general, these represent the relationship between information units as elemental grammatical propositions, that is two or more linked concept labels, although in Anderson and Bower's model, propositional representation is regarded as being non-linguistic and as being constructed on the basis of visual information as well as verbal inputs. Emerging from a related tradition is the work of schema theorists like Rumelhart and
Ortony (1977) and Schallert (1982) who have posited the existence of schemata - abstract structures that represent what one generally holds to be true about the world (ibid). These structures encode properties which are typical of instances of general categories and omit properties which are not typical of categories (Anderson op cit).

In contrast to network models such as these, which are mainly concerned with representing the storage of information, a number of 'set theoretic' models of semantic representation have also been developed in order to explain how we comprehend quantified statements like 'all S are P' or 'some S are P' (see, for example, Meyer 1970 or Smith et al 1974). In these models each concept is represented as a set of elements, including its descriptive features and properties, and the name of its supersets and subsets. Concepts which share any of these elements form intersecting sets, or may be included one within another. Ultimately, however, it is not possible to comparatively evaluate set theoretic models such as these with network models of semantic memory, because they are not always distinct from each other, and because some are more detailed and specific than others (Cohen 1991 pp.28-42)

The great efforts invested in developing models of how knowledge might be stored in memory reflect the power inherent in the notion that information stored in long-term memory (or cognitive structure) is important in determining how individuals interact with their environment (Stewart 1980). While few have unreservedly espoused Ausubel's (1978) dictum that "the most important single factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows - ascertain this and teach him accordingly" (see, for example, Novak & Gowin 1984), there is little doubt that the cognitive position and the conception of memory that goes with it have vitiated research into children's thinking in general. For, when research is premised
on the assumption that learning is a process of interaction between the learners current knowledge organization and the content to be learned, it becomes theoretically possible to chart subtle changes in children's thinking, to identify the causes and effects of meaningful learning or to explore the relationship between existing knowledge structures and the structure of new subject matter. Quite simply, when research is premised on cognitivist assumptions, it is no longer possible to ignore or even underestimate the student's role in his own learning, for, crucially, it is the student's thinking which mediates learning and achievement.

The Representation of Knowledge

Inevitably, the successful exploration of student learning from a cognitive perspective has been contingent on the ability of researchers to obtain external structural information about internal representations of knowledge, that is, the cognitive structures of students. As Naveh-Benjamin et al (1986) stress, in this respect it is not sufficient just to measure knowledge of concepts (as has always been attempted in classroom tests), it is necessary to show how concepts are related to one another - that is, to measure the structure of students knowledge.

Over the last twenty years several probes of knowledge structure have been developed (see Champagne et al (1984) and Naveh-Benjamin et al (op cit) for a discussion and comparison). Primarily, they can be characterized as being either low-inference or high-inference depending on how much further interpretation they require by the researcher (Elbaz et al 1986). High-inference probes have made use of word association techniques (eg, Shalveson 1974), graph-building (eg, Shalveson & Stanton 1975), modified clinical interviews (eg, Pines et al 1978) and tree construction tasks (eg, Rapoport 1967) and then subsequently applied di-graph
(directed graph) analysis to the data produced (see Rudnitzky 1976). As Elbaz et al (1986) have reported, these techniques typically (1) produce representations in the form of a clustering or spatial arrangement of a given set of concepts; (2) apply mathematical procedures to proximity matrices, which were obtained either directly or indirectly from the subject's responses, to produce these clusterings; and (3) lack subject labels or explanations.

In contrast, low-inference probes require much less interpretation because they are predicated on propositional versions of semantic memory theory. Thus, given the assumption that propositions represent atomic units of meaning in long-term memory, these techniques work towards yielding representations which are in the form of propositional networks from which cognitive structure characteristics are obtained, thereby minimizing or avoiding the need for inference leaps.

Without question, the variety of low-inference probes which are presently in widest use are those which belong to the concept mapping family (see Al-Kunifed & Wandersee 1990). Concept maps are claimed to serve as a metalearning strategy during individual study (eg, Leahy 1989) and as a heuristic device during classroom instruction (eg, Novak & Gowin 1984), as a strategy for formulating instructional design (eg, Cliburn 1986), as a tool for textbook analysis (Ahlberg op cit) and to assess and evaluate learning (eg, Moreira 1979). Most important, as far as we are concerned, they have been used in various guises to probe and reveal cognitive structure and conceptual change in students and teachers, over long periods or following brief interventions (eg, Fensham, Garrard & West 1982, Champagne et al 1981, Wallace & Mintzes 1990).

Stuart (1985) reports that a number of ways of producing maps have been described in the literature. They may be constructed from concepts given to the respondent, either as labels to be
arranged in a suitable order (Stewart 1979, Champagne et al, op cit) or as a list built up as an increasingly specific concept map as more information is added to it (Fensham, Garrard & West op cit). Some workers ask students to construct their maps de novo, being given only a set of rules for drawing concept maps, and a key word or words such as 'nutrition' or 'school' (Edwards & Fraser 1983, Stuart 1983). Additionally, schedules may involve individual interviews, self-regulated activities or group administration (Hoz, Tomer & Tamir 1990).

It seems reasonable to adjudge that all of these techniques originate in one of two research traditions. On the one hand, in Stewart's (1979, 1980) critique of associative mapper techniques, which in turn was stimulated by the work on semantic networks in memory carried out by Lindsay, Norman and Rumelhart; or, on the other hand, they derive from Novak's (1980) work in metacognition which itself was rooted in Ausubel's cognitive learning theory (Ausubel, Novak & Hanesian 1978). Either way, all of these techniques make use of the same basic method so as to obtain representations of cognitive structure. This involves the learner putting concept labels on a page and linking them where appropriate with lines to show a relationship between concepts. Additionally, according to Stuart (op cit), it has now become accepted that more information can be elicited from a concept map if these relationship lines are labelled with a suitable linking word or phrase that reveals the proposition(s) that the learner sees as linking the concepts....[since] once the relationships are described the implication is that the construct (cognitive structure) is one in which the relationships are specific, numerous and context specific.

Stuart fails to mention two important distinctions in her brief survey. First, that it is a matter of some discussion as to whether internal representations of knowledge in memory are
primarily declarative - that is, consisting of knowledge about facts and things (as in Anderson 1982); whether they are procedural - that is, consisting of knowledge about how to perform various cognitive activities (as in Winograd 1973) or whether they are somehow a combination of the two (as in Greeno 1978). Inevitably, the position taken on this question determines which genre of meaning researchers presume concept maps to reveal in presenting external structural information about internal representations.

Secondly, a sharp distinction should also be made between concept mapping approaches which are submitted either to structural or to semantic analysis. This is not merely a second order, empirical rather than theoretical question, for invariably the form of analysis used by any researcher is ultimately determined by a particular theoretical conception of the way in which knowledge is organized in memory.

The structural approach (prominently exemplified by the work of Novak (1981) and modified by others like Cronin et al (1982)) produces scores for structurally different aspects of the concept map like hierarchy, branching, grouping, concept recognition, integration and more (see, for example, Wallace 1989). These categories take their meaning from a group of theoretical principles that originate in Ausubelian learning theory, of which the most important are (1) that cognitive structure is hierarchically organized and (2) that concepts in cognitive structure undergo progressive differentiation or (3) integrative reconciliation. At the same time, these categories also derive their significance from node-link models of memory that emphasize the organization of concepts over the particular meaning of semantic links.

The semantic approach is best exemplified by Champagne and Klopfers' (1981) Concept Structuring Analysis Technique - ConSAT - and subsequent revisions of it (eg, Hoz et al 1984). Though this methodology has been used to generate data about
structure and conceptual organization, it appears to be more closely tied to an analysis of the propositional meaning of cognitive structure, through, for example, semantic analysis of bi-concept links, analysis of the meaning of individual concepts and an investigation of the overall meaning of concept groups measured according to different criteria like homogeneity, structure and title-fit. While Elbaz et al (1984) acknowledge that this methodology is influenced by Novak's technique, it can be characterized as resting on fundamentally different theoretical assumptions, in being so much influenced by J.R. Anderson's work, and in particular his propositional model of memory (Anderson & Bower 1973). From this perspective, it is the meaning of propositional links in cognitive structure that are of greater significance than the geographical organization of concepts.

First Considerations of the Application of Concept Mapping to an Investigation of Children's Knowledge in History

After a survey such as this it still seems necessary to ask just how well concept maps do represent what students know and how they organize their knowledge; in particular, how well would they provide external structural representations of children's thinking in history. On the one hand, does their cognitivist orientation truly avoid having to depend on children's ability to explain sensibly - even philosophically - how they think about concepts? Have they provided release from depending on the shifting mediation of interpretative conjecture? On the other hand, if concept maps do surmount this experimental obstacle, can they really be said to be equivalent to a learner's cognitive structure (representing the way concepts are stored in the mind) when these "ideasycratic" constructions have been made in response to a particular stimulus (Cronin, Deckers & Dunn 1982, Stuart 1985)?
We would argue that questions such as these reveal that there is a danger of overestimating or even of misinterpreting the claims made by concept mapping research. For, those who have carried out the research are themselves most circumspect about it. Hoz, Tomer and Tamir (1990) characterize the cognitive maps produced by interviewees as strongly resembling a propositional network. Concept maps yield representations in the form of propositional networks from which cognitive structure characteristics are obtained (Mahler et al 1990). As Wallace and Mintzes (1990) report, concept maps attend to both what students know and how they organize their knowledge. It is not claimed that they produce a snap shot of the internal representation of knowledge in memory. They produce rich representations of conceptual organization (cognitive structure) (ibid) and it is this data that is especially valuable in documenting the "intellectual journey" taken by students as they restructure their understandings.

Nevertheless, a worrying set of questions still remains. For, it appears that the concept mapping literature contains absolutely no reference to any attempt to investigate children's thinking about history. The vast majority of concept mapping research has been applied to knowledge structures about subject areas from the natural and physical sciences. This leads one to wonder whether the conceptual structures of the social sciences and humanities are too protean to be the subject of a stable cognitive study. Indeed, one could ask whether there are historical concepts as such - that is, concepts which are not really borrowings from other subject areas. This certainly seems to be the case as far as the concepts of Jewish history are concerned.

If we are rigorously to examine the possibilities of using a concept mapping methodology to explore children's knowledge of Jewish history, these are the kinds of questions we will first
have to answer; and it is to these questions that we turn in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

In theory, would it be legitimate to produce conceptual representations of historical knowledge?

In the course of preparing the previous chapter's survey of concept mapping literature we conducted three large-scale computer searches; one of dissertations indexed by Dissertation Abstracts International, one of publications indexed by ERIC (Educational Resources Information Centre) and one of literature referenced by psycLIT (Index to Psychological Literature). Altogether, we found 49 dissertations which, in the period January 1982 to March 1992, reported the use of concept mapping methodologies for didactic, evaluative, curricular or managerial purposes. We discovered, however, that none of these references related to the representation of concepts which can be characterized as historical. Within the ERIC listing, there were 82 references (in the same period) to the use of concept mapping in educational settings. Again, we could not find one reference which reported the application of concept mapping to historical concepts. PsycLIT (1974-1992) contained 39 references to the use of concept mapping methodologies in teaching, research and programme planning. Although two of these were located in social science contexts, it appears that none involved the organization or representation of historical concepts.

The paucity of attempts to represent the conceptual organization of historical knowledge is striking. Certainly, it needs to be explained if our proposal to apply a concept mapping methodology to the examination of historical knowledge is to have any credibility. This is particularly so given that some of the explanations which might be suggested for the dearth of 'historical' research do themselves point to the
implausibility of reliably or validly mapping the conceptual structure of historical knowledge.

For example, it could be said that there are a number of fundamental differences between physical or natural sciences, on the one hand, and history, on the other, which impede the successful application of concept mapping to historical knowledge as opposed to scientific knowledge. Thus, it can be argued that because all history is contemporary insofar as the past is necessarily grasped by persons in the present, historical knowledge cannot therefore attain a true (or scientific) 'objectivity' which would enable it to be reliably represented by a concept mapping methodology.

Secondly, even if it is shown that historical knowledge is analogous if not equivalent to scientific knowledge, it might still be said that because in history, there are not networks of concepts which are peculiar to the discipline, as there are in science (Rogers 1972), it will not be possible to construct concept maps which would be adjudged to represent knowledge which is either characteristically or essentially historical.

Lastly, and most subtly, it might be possible to argue that however we resolve the above problems, historical knowledge will still not be validly represented by a mapping methodology. This is because concepts in any historical narrative are organized in a manner which is linear or chronological rather than spatial or multidimensional. Concept maps, therefore, will neither represent the substance of history as *historica rerum gestarum* - the narration of things that happened - nor will they be sensitive to changes in that substance.

These three claims all raise significant questions about the suitability of a concept mapping methodology to the exploration of questions about historical knowledge (let alone
to the examination of the relationship between critical historical knowledge and collective memorial knowledge).

In their own right, these arguments have generated lengthy philosophical discussion about what have more commonly been referred to as the origins, content and form of historical knowledge. We do not intend to treat them comprehensively as such, but we propose, instead, to consider them from a perspective which emphasizes their empirical implications, that is, in terms of what they imply would be the theoretical reliability and validity of concept maps which claim to represent historical knowledge.

Of course it could be said that there is an altogether less significant reason behind the non-application of concept mapping methodologies to the representation of historical knowledge. This derives from the fact that concept mapping approaches were originally applied to educational questions by scholars working in scientific or mathematical subject areas (for example, by Novak in biology and chemistry (cf. Novak 1984) and Champagne and Klopfer in geology (1981). It is possible, therefore, that because educational research can become ghettoized within a limited community of people or publications that historians or social scientists may simply not have been aware of the existence of this methodology or of its possible applications in their field. This, for example, may account equally well for the paucity of attempts to map concepts in geography or modern languages.

Unfortunately, this is not very credible. Reports of concept mapping have appeared in journals which are by no means the exclusive domain of scientists or science educators (see, for example, Trochim 1989). More suggestively, the proliferation of attempts to apply Piaget’s assumptions and methods to research into cognition in history (by Hallam and Peel, for example) amply demonstrate how aspects of research in cognitive psychology are capable of being translated from
scientific to humanistic contexts, regardless of their final outcome. If there have not been any publicly reported attempts to apply concept mapping to historical knowledge or historical concepts, it is likely to have been for more significant reasons, all of which we must confront.

Is Historical Knowledge too Subjective to be Mapped?

History, as Schwab has put it, is the most protean of disciplines (1964). Sometimes, it seems as if there are as many histories as there are historians. In crude terms, this is probably because history is not the past. No historical account can ever correspond precisely with any actual past made up of a body of fixed and irrevocable facts. Equally important, and in one of Collingwood’s most significant insights, this is also because history is concerned neither with the past in itself nor with what the historian thinks about it. It is concerned, rather, with the relation between the two (1946). This appears to mean that history does not, as an organized body of knowledge, possess a logical conceptual structure independent of the psychological structures of individual historians. It seems, to use Oakshott’s phrase, as if "history is the historian's experience" (1933).

In 'experimental' terms this will have major consequences. First, it is unlikely that conceptual maps of historical knowledge will have either psychometric validity or reliability – where psychometric refers to the examination of between-individual differences (Carver 1974). For, if historical knowledge is incorrigibly subjective, it will not be possible to establish reliable or valid criteria with which to compare the organization of historical knowledge within different people's cognitive structures. We would not be comparing like with like, that is, we would not be comparing different conceptions of history, but, rather, what in real terms are different histories.
Secondly, it means that conceptual maps of historical knowledge are also unlikely to possess either edumetric validity or reliability - where edumetric refers to the examination of within-individual growth (ibid). This is because it will be difficult to judge what any changes in historical knowledge signify or correspond to; whether they correspond to changes in an individual's knowledge of the past or to changes in what Hexter refers to as their 'second record' - that is, everything else they bring to their encounter with the record of the past (Hexter 1972).

Taken together, these arguments appear to suggest why no publicly recorded attempt has been made to create cognitive or conceptual maps of historical knowledge. It seems that historical knowledge is too closely bound to the historian's own personal preferences, as well as to the presuppositions of his or her age.

The problem with this position is that it is founded on two contested if not dubious assumptions. First, that historical knowledge is intrinsically subjective, and, second, that historical knowledge is (therefore) unlike scientific knowledge, which, in contrast, has been successfully and widely subjected to concept mapping methodologies.

Moreover, these assumptions are linked within a series of sprawling and sometimes heated debates about the nature of historical knowledge and its relation to other disciplines. Collingwood's previously quoted position, for example, was sharpened in opposition to nineteenth century champions of 'positivist' history who thought that they could exclude all imagination and even any 'idea' from historical work. Famously, they claimed that the facts of the past would speak for themselves (cf. Acton 1895). In turn, Collingwood's own 'intuitionist' thesis was inspired by Croce's earlier argument that "history is the knowledge of the eternal present" (Gardiner 1959) - that the moment that historical events can
be constantly rethought, they are no longer 'in time', that is, in the past.

In many respects, the debate about the subjectivity of historical knowledge is now somewhat passé (Jenkins op cit). First, because it has come to a standstill by shifting its focus from concern with the substantive content of historical knowledge towards discussion about the historian's procedures and methods. Secondly, because it has been overtaken by developments in the philosophy of science that have made scientific knowledge seem less 'objective'. Thirdly, because debate about history has, as a whole, moved on to a different cultural register, in terms of the rival merits of modernism and post-modernism and history's place within them.

1. Arguably, E.H. Carr staked out, some time ago, what has become the dominant position regarding the subjectivity of historical knowledge. He claimed that the dispute over whether "history was the result of an objective compilation of facts" or "the subjective product of the mind of the historian" was a reflection of the problematic nature of man. "Man, except perhaps in earliest infancy, and in extreme old age, is not... unconditionally subject to his environment. On the other hand, he is never totally independent of it and its unconditional master" (1987 p.29). Carr thereby implied that debate about the factity of history would be interminable and irresolvable. History's centre of gravity was neither wholly in the past nor in the present. He thus concluded that while no historian can claim for his values an objectivity beyond history, an 'objective' history can be written by an historian "with a capacity to rise above the limited vision of his own situation in society and history" (p.72/3). We might say he meant that an objective history is possible if, paradoxically, it is founded on the historian's recognition of history's provisional and subjective nature.
R.W. Davies (1987) notes that although Carr's critics objected to this and defended the traditional view that the objective historian is one who forms judgements on the basis of the evidence, despite his own preconceptions, Carr's argument has largely prevailed. In France, it has been approvingly echoed by the disciples of Marc Bloch who himself pregnantly defined history as "the science of men in time" (1954). Le Goff, for example, has argued that objectivity in history is not a matter of pure submission to facts, but is achieved through the ceaseless revisions of historical work. If history's content cannot attain true objectivity, then at least its procedures guarantee that it is intersubjectively valid and verifiable. In Le Goff's own words, "history is indeed the science of the past, if it is acknowledged that this past becomes an object of history through a reconstitution that is constantly questioned" (Le Goff op cit). To quote Le Goff's mentor, Lucian Febvre: "History [can be described] as a scientifically conducted study, not a science" (cited by Le Goff ibid).

This is an extremely useful formulation, since it points to the way in which non-positivistic notions of history's objectivity have, on the one hand, been predicated on a notion of the intersubjectivity of history's procedures, while on the other, they have depended on continually postponing the prospect of discovering historical truth. According to this line of argument, the substance of history can never be truly objective. In the social sciences, subject and object belong to the same category, and interact reciprocally on each other - history is the historian's reconstruction. Nevertheless, because historical knowledge is always provisional it does not mean that nothing at all is agreed. Methodological rules and procedures cut down interpretive flux, such that if there is no point in asking if something is right - because that kind of truth does not exist in history - there is certainly some point in enquiring whether certain things are wrong. As Rogers
puts it, "sensible disagreement between historians is only possible at all because of agreement as to the criteria and procedures which must be followed and satisfied if a narrative is to be classed as history" (op cit).

This is the way in which debate about history's subjectivity has played itself out. Claims that it is possible to discover 'objective historical truth' have been worn down along with those which propose that history has an infinity of meanings (Golob 1980). The 'subjective dimension' in all historical accounts has been admitted (Marwick 1970), but this admission has been tempered by a notion of intersubjectivity which "is constituted through the judgement of others and primarily that of other historians" (Momsen 1978). To use the language we introduced in chapter two, we might say that notions of history as reenactment or as representation have stalemated in a notion of history as reconstruction, that is, a dialectic encounter between past worlds and present words which is arbitrated according to a paradoxical mix of provisional but professional norms.

2. While debate about the objectivity of historical knowledge was playing itself out, the disputants were transfixed by what many held to constitute the paradigmatic human activity - science, or more precisely, natural science. Today, if the cause of science may have fewer supporters, some philosophers (and most of the general public) have remained faithful to Enlightenment principles and have continued to insist that natural science does discover truth (Rorty 1989). Thus, as Blake has put it, "when questions of objectivity are raised, scientific statements are only too easily pointed out as the very paradigm of impartiality and indifference to time and place" (1959).

In a context such as this, it is inevitable that any conception of history which admits to an interdependence between knowing subject and object known cannot but fail to
meet generally prevailing standards of epistemological respectability. Moreover, if attempts are made to represent the conceptual organization of knowledge, then from this point of view, science will succeed precisely where history fails because scientific knowledge is conceived as being logically grounded, formally framed and universally applicable; while historical knowledge is none of these.

Earlier, we intimated that it was this conception of historical and scientific knowledge which explained the application of concept mapping methodologies to scientific rather than historical knowledge. History's contingency undermined what science's certainty supports. Ironically, however, as Hayden White has pointed out, although this may be the conception of science against which many historians measure their own practice, it is no longer the philosophy of science which currently prevails within the scientific community (1978). For, once again, as Carr noted more than thirty years ago, natural scientists no longer see themselves as establishing universal laws by induction from observed facts, but, rather, as engaging in discoveries through the interaction of hypotheses and facts. Valid scientific hypotheses do not necessarily possess the capacity for precise prediction which is often attributed to them; in some natural sciences they closely resemble the generalizations of historians. Thus, in Carr's own words, "the resemblances between method in history and the natural sciences prove to be greater than the difference between them" (op cit p.61).

The trend towards seeing scientific knowledge in intersubjective terms has steadily increased over the last fifty years, even if it has not entirely filtered through to popular certaintist conceptions of science. For example, Polanyi's notion of personal knowledge while densely formulated has been influential in articulating the notion of the "personal participation of the knower in acts of
understanding" (1958). From this perspective, knowledge in general cannot be separated from commitment. Kuhn's analysis of paradigm shifts in scientific thinking has also undermined notions of scientific objectivity, by historicizing it (1970). More generally, developments in modern physics have relativized notions of scientific truth and have founded scientific knowledge on contingency rather than certainty. If, therefore, scientific method once appeared to lead ineluctably towards the formulation of universal laws while history's dubious subjectivity produced statements of doubtful reliability, today both history and science might be conceived of as analogous routes to different dimensions of an elusive reality.

3. Changes in the relative status of historical and scientific knowledge are not only the consequence of developments in the philosophy of science, they reflect what has been happening in philosophy as a whole. For, arguably, the course of debate about the nature of historical knowledge is merely symptomatic of a much larger discussion about the relative merits of modernism and post-modernism and about the extent to which historiography if not all forms of humanistic discourse can be absorbed into literary and aesthetic domains (Zagorin 1990).

In this context, interesting questions about historiography do not concern how objective historical knowledge is. This has become a purposeless discussion following what White describes as "the discovery of the common constructivist character of both scientific and artistic statements" (op cit). Rather, they are concerned with discussions about the kind of linguistic constructions histories are (Ankersmit 1989). Thus White's analysis of "the deep structure of the historical imagination" in Metahistory (1973) in being predicated on a notion of history as a "purely rhetorical form" - a poetic act - is framed by concerns from the theory of literature,
linguistics and rhetoric rather than epistemology or hermeneutics (Mandelbaum 1980). More pointedly, Paul Ricouer's discussion of what he describes as "the reality of the historical past" (1984) is not concerned with the extent to which the past can be known but rather with the character of historical statements or 'configurations'. Despite the title he gives to his discussion he is interested far more in the linguistic form than the ontological content of historical knowledge.

Obviously, White and Ricoeur have not gone unchallenged nor, admittedly have they been alone in locating history in a context which is framed by literary theory. The point we are making is that debate about the relative solidity of historical and scientific knowledge has been overtaken by more all-encompassing questions concerning what Steiner calls "the relationship between the word and the world" (1989). At a time when there is ongoing discussion about whether all modes of thought - including historical and scientific ones - can be reduced to the common condition of writing (Zagorin op cit), it seems petty to start drawing distinctions between historical and scientific knowledge which suggest that one is more objective than the other. Certainly, we can say that, if, as we found, historical knowledge has not been subjected to conceptual mapping, then it cannot be because history is somehow epistemologically deficient when scientific knowledge is not. From this perspective, history is neither the poor nor unreliable relation of science, it is more usefully described as an equal partner in a generally unstable and extended family.

Are There Historical Concepts?

If concerns about history's contingency do not then prevent the application of concept mapping methodologies to the representation of historical knowledge, there still might be
other reasons why it is not possible to construct concept maps which would be adjudged to represent knowledge which is either characteristically or essentially historical.

For a start, there appear to be few if any concepts which can be identified as historical. Historians employ substantive concepts like revolution, democracy, industrialization and immigration but these are neither categorically nor essentially historical (Lee 1983). As has been widely noted, history, in contrast with the physical sciences, is continuous with, not distinct from general human experiences (see, for example, Becker 1932, Hexter op cit, Rogers op cit). The language it uses is, therefore, the language of everyday experience but within a temporal dimension.

Closely related to this (and in fact to rephrase an argument which goes back to Aristotle's Poetics) there is an additional problem. Because history is preoccupied with the unique or the singular (an event or series of events, or figures who appear only once) the language of history does not appear to be generalizable; it is composed of particulars rather than categorical concepts. At most, as Kitson Clark has put it, history provides instances which give concepts their concrete content (1967). Certainly, history cannot be reduced to a series of concepts, since to do so would be to empty it of that which makes it history - its temporality and its corporeality.

Thus, when it comes to producing conceptual representations of historical knowledge there appears to be a two sided problem. On the one hand, because historical language is not framed in categorical terms, concept maps will probably not constitute valid representations of historical knowledge. On the other hand, because historical language is indistinguishable from other forms of talk, it will be difficult to identify conceptual representations of knowledge as being historical rather than anything else.
Arguably, as in the previous section, what appears to be problematic here may in fact be the consequence of attempting to make history conform to a particular and probably anachronistic conception of natural science. For, from the perspective of a traditional view of natural science, genuine historical knowledge must be founded on an inductive methodology which involves collecting historical facts from which one can derive universal laws or statements of statistical probability. In other words, from this point of view, it is assumed that genuine knowledge is conceptual(ized) knowledge. However, as we have already argued, this is not appropriate. Historical language need not be the language of positivistic science.

Right or wrong then, that still leaves two questions. First, whether it is nevertheless possible to produce conceptual representations of historical knowledge. Secondly, as regards what the content of alternative non-conceptual cognitive maps will be.

In this regard, there appear to be two approaches which we might adopt, even if they are taken from contexts different from our own. One involves conceiving of historical knowledge in terms of its second order structural concepts. The other requires looking for ways in which elements in 'normal' historical language might function as concepts.

The first approach is exemplified by the work of the Schools Council Project 'History 13-16' in its attempt to identify the structure of history as a discipline, or in Hirst's terms, as a 'form of knowledge' (1965). This work was founded on the notion that real historical knowledge is predicated on knowledge of the nature of the historical enquiry itself and that history in education must therefore include an introduction to the historian's methods as well as something of the 'logic of history' (Shemilt 1980).
Cynically, one might say that this was merely a retreat from the difficulties involved in finding the structure of history in its substantive concepts. In other words, it might not be fueled by philosophy but by "fear that there can be no intrinsic historical criteria for the selection of historical content in schools" (Lee 1983).

Either way, the attempt to identify the key concepts with which historians work has been instructive. For, while it has productively changed the emphases of history in education towards concern with concepts like 'evidence', 'cause', 'empathy', 'change' and 'time', it has not made it significantly easier to talk about, let alone examine, historical cognition. First, because concepts like those just listed are not transparent (or categorical) in and of themselves. Cause or empathy, for example, can be understood in a variety of equally legitimate ways depending on the philosophical or psychological theory within which they are framed. Secondly, because structural concepts such as these are no more historical than are substantive concepts like war or famine. Therefore, any ability to give an account of them will not in fact indicate historical knowledge but something else instead, which in this case will be more like philosophical knowledge.

Our problem therefore persists. Semantic memory theories presume that knowledge is made up of propositional or more elemental conceptual networks. Historical knowledge, however, at both substantive and structural levels, is constituted by concepts which are either borrowed from other disciplines or which are the practical concepts of everyday life. Thus, the only special historical concepts which the Schools Council Project 'History 13-16' could identify were those of the primary and secondary source. This appears to mean that in cognitive terms historical knowledge is no more than a pretence. It consists of other forms of knowledge made up in
the shape of the past. Presumably, therefore, attempting to map it would be a wholly invalid and unreliable exercise.

Again, we would argue that this troubling conclusion is significantly effected by conceiving of historical knowledge in terms which are taken from other disciplines. For this reason alone, it is worth exploring the second approach referred to above, that is, by looking for elements in historical language which function as concepts, since this seems to work outwards from the language of history towards categories of cognition rather than moving in the opposite direction from theory to history, as is more commonplace.

Admittedly, the approach we refer to is not really an approach. It is a collection of tantalizing suggestions which point towards a particular way of conceiving of names and labels in history, which regards them as analogous to concepts in other disciplines and other forms of discourse.

In most discourse the following appears to be assumed. That words are conventional or socially shared symbols each of which represents a unitary object, situation, concept, or other symbol in the physical, social and ideational worlds (Cassirer 1957). Proper names (like Peterborough, Patrick and Passover) are regarded as words which are employed as the individual designation of a single and particular place, person or event. Concepts, meanwhile, (like pet, peace and party) have names, like particular objects or events, but consist of the abstracted criterial attributes that are common to a given category of objects, events or phenomena, despite diversity along dimensions other than those characterizing the criterial attributes shared by all members of the category (Ausubel et al 1978). Concepts are therefore conceived of as regularities in events and objects while proper names are supposed to refer to singular events and objects.
If these are the commonplaces of ordinary discourse, there are reasons for suggesting that they do not apply to history, even though, as we argued earlier, historical language does share a strong family resemblance to everyday language. According to A.D. Edwards:

"The historian's concern with the particularity of past events leads him to use a large vocabulary of proper names for that huge cast of characters and panorama of scenes which he must identify and label....[However] the apparently specific names are often condensations of many 'smaller' events, and when used at a certain point in a historical narrative [names like Marston Moor] may 'index' very different details to those who encounter them.... Even the proper names in historical narratives tend to have a wide range of potential denotation; in the more dramatic episodes, they have powerful and diverse connotations too (like the Black Death, the Peterloo Massacre..."

(1978 p.57)

Edwards thus argues that proper names in history possess two distinctive if not unusual features, despite their familiar appearance. In the first place, as a result of the accretion of meaning and interpretation around them, the meaning which they convey is not that with which they are associated in normal discourse. This is partly because in history the meaning of labels and names is never given but predicated on and constituted by the mediation of interpretation, but it is also because proper names in history accumulate a weighty baggage of associations through their repeated narration. As a result, they come to possess a range of connotations which are both richer and perhaps more ambiguous than would be the denotative norm in everyday present-focused discourse.
Additionally, as Edwards continues to argue:

"Despite the historian's alleged preoccupation with the unique, many of his names are overtly categorical. They draw together a number of narrative or biographical instances - the Scramble for Africa, the Little Englanders - and their frequent capital letters indicate their status as temporally limited generalizations" (ibid).

This is a significant formulation. For, with this Edwards goes beyond saying that proper names in history merely 'end up' having a wider range of connotation than those in normal discourse. He is suggesting instead that even when referring to particular events or people historical language is intrinsically categorical even if there are few formal historical concepts as such.

His argument might be expressed in the following way: The historian's interest in the particular creates a multitude of details which can only be meaningfully manipulated through the utilization of generalizations or categorizations. Thus, to use a frequently cited example, the name 'the French Revolution' does not refer to one single event. It is a label referring to a series of associated events which allows the possibility of talking sensibly about them with reference to their shared features (without committing oneself to a precise determination of what constitutes the event referred to by the label). As a proper name, 'the French Revolution' may appear to refer to a single or particular object, but in fact its function is similar to that of a superordinate concept in normal discourse, in that it organizes the criterial attributes of a multitude of instances in accordance with a common and unifying notion. Indeed, these particular instances might have been meaningless in historical terms if some criterial attribute had not been abstracted from them and labelled in this way.
This, we would say, is very much like Carr's argument that history is not really concerned with the unique but with what is general in the unique (Carr *op cit*). For, in Edward's terms, proper names are historically meaningful only in so far as they draw together a range of categorically associated instances. They are meaningful only in so far as they function as concepts.

Edwards does not actually point to any particular influence on his thesis. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to associate it with Walsh's earlier and much discussed notion of colligation in history and the role of what he calls 'concrete universals' within it.

For Walsh, colligation is the central explanatory act in history. Colligation means to explain "an event by tracing its intrinsic relations with other events and locating it in its historical context" (1967). 'Colligatory concepts', like war, revolution and industrialization, are abstractions which are constituted by a pattern of relations or regularities. They consist of the criterial attributes of colligations. What he calls 'concrete universals' are temporally limited colligatory concepts. Thus, the Renaissance, the Punic Wars and the Industrial Revolution, all marked with the definite article, refer to regularities or patterns of association but are confined by particular, concrete (that is, temporal) limits. They look like the names of historical individuals rather than concepts but, as Lee has argued, "when fitted together in a temporal framework, they provide the structure of history at the substantive level in a way that concepts do not" (*op cit*). They act like concepts by anchoring propositional networks in history but they are not concepts themselves because they are linked to particular events, objects or persons.

This is precisely the point we have been trying to develop. In that, although historical knowledge may not be composed of specifically historical concepts, it is nevertheless organized
around linguistic components which do function like concepts and which are intrinsically or essentially historical. We have been trying to suggest that these components largely consist of proper names or, in Walsh's terms, concrete universals. For, proper names in history do not simply refer to discrete entities. They are related instead within propositional networks where they not only convey criterial attributes but where they also temporally locate the substance of the whole propositional network. Indeed, they are what make these propositional networks historical.

Of course historical knowledge does also consist of concepts which may possess either historical or non-historical meaning. The point is that the precise historical meaning which these concepts may or may not posses can be determined, but not by directly transferring analytical constructs from scientific disciplines to another one. Rather, they can be viewed according to stable criteria appropriate to history, for example, according to the nature of their relationship with concrete universals - or proper names in history - as well as by the extent to which they possess colligatory attributes of their own.

Drawing on this line of argument, we want to suggest that although historical knowledge does not consist of specifically historical concepts it might be represented in conceptual terms if there is cognizance of its distinctive features. We suggest that it should be possible to conceptually map historical knowledge if, on the one hand, it is recognized that the categorical components of history can take quite concrete forms, while on the other, it is acknowledged that the conceptual components of historical knowledge do not necessarily express historical content.

Ironically, the sometimes ambiguous and shifting nature of the components in historical knowledge may ultimately result in interesting consequences. For, although our examination of
concepts in history was originally stimulated by doubts about the validity or reliability of mapping the cognitive content of historical knowledge, there are grounds for anticipating that the changeable nature of concepts in history may in fact make a concept mapping approach particularly appropriate for comparing traditional with critical approaches to the study of history. If the meaning of historical concepts is so much determined by their relationship with other concepts and names, in that they rarely possess formal historical content of their own, it is possible that different arrangements of the same concepts will represent significantly different conceptions of history. Paradoxically, then, the protean nature of concepts in history could make them highly sensitive indicators of change in cognition because the same 'historical' concept is capable of meaning so many different things in so many different propositional contexts.

Is History Linear Unlike Maps?

Before we run too far ahead of ourselves with our enthusiasm for the application of concept mapping methodologies to historical knowledge, there is one further difficulty which we have to consider which may itself account for the paucity of research in this field so far.

Essentially, this difficulty revolves around doubts about the feasibility or validity of translating historical knowledge from its linear or temporal form into an apparently analogous spatial or hierarchical representation. In the simplest terms, we might say that while history is chronological and linear, scientific knowledge may be regarded as "fairly nonlinear, hierarchical and weblike" (Wandersee 1990). While history operates within a single, temporal dimension, moving from past to present, or in the opposite direction, science is paradigmatic - abstractly drawing together a number of dimensions. Thus, for precisely those reasons that concept
mapping seems appropriate to scientific knowledge, it seems inappropriate for the representation of historical knowledge. Maps, after all, cannot be translated into strings of text. They are abstractions, analogous to rather than reproducing reality. They are schemas which reduce reality in a way that is quite alien to history.

Arguments such as these have been expressed in a number of ways, but they all seem to point to the apparent inappropriateness of cartographically representing history, as opposed to other disciplines. Thus, Mink, for example, distinguishes between what he calls theoretical, categorial and configurational modes of comprehension. In the theoretical mode different objects may be comprehended as instances of the same generalization, in the categorial mode as examples of the same category, while in the configurational mode as elements in a single and concrete complex of relationships. He suggests that these modes are roughly associated (in turn) with types of understanding characteristic of natural science, philosophy and history (1970).

The relevant point here is that although "there is nothing in principle which cannot be brought within each mode", they are themselves "irreducible to each other or to any more general mode" *(ibid)*. Thus, historical narratives, modes of comprehension which consist of elements in a single and concrete complex of relationships, cannot be translated into a set of categories, that is, a conceptual framework which exists as an alternative and incommensurable system for giving form to experience. In our terms, this appears to mean that history cannot be directly translated into a concept map.

A similar conclusion is reached on the basis of an equivalent distinction which Bruner formulates. Bruner differentiates between, what he calls, the paradigmatic and the narrative (1984). Sacks discusses these categories in relation to one of his patients - Rebecca - who was "defective in the world of
the conceptual and the abstract" but "fully the equal of any 'normal' individual in her powers of concrete and symbolic apprehension" (1986).

The thrust of this argument is familiar. It suggests that there are different ways of making sense of the world. In this case, either through abstract and paradigmatic thought or through symbol and story. Narrative, it is argued, embodies a concrete reality which cannot be adequately translated into a conceptual schema. Again, therefore, it appears that we must conclude that an historical view of reality cannot validly be conceptually represented as is attempted in concept mapping methodologies.

These arguments and other similar ones do appear to support a powerful case against the application of concept mapping methodologies to historical knowledge. Nevertheless, there may still be grounds for suggesting that such a conclusion is flawed in a subtle but significant way. For, while it would be hard to dispute that different disciplines or different approaches to reality are founded on and operate according to different and incommensurable logical modes, it does not follow that their psychological form is similarly incompatible.

What we are trying to say is that it is important to make a distinction between maps which are held to represent the logical structure of any body of knowledge - what Novak and Gowin call 'concept maps' - and those which are supposed to represent the psychological structure of knowledge - what they call 'cognitive maps' (1984). The point is that cognitive maps do not set out the logical relationships between the components of different forms of knowledge or modes of comprehension. They are constructed by individuals and represent idiosyncrasies held by individuals (Mahler et al 1991). Therefore, even when they are held to possess a high degree of disciplinary validity they nevertheless represent
the ways in which knowledge has been transformed by psychological or cognitive processes.

We want to argue that the psychological structures that represent different forms of reality are not necessarily incommensurable. Of course, we do not intend to ignore arguments or evidence which points to "different forms of thought and mind" (Sacks op cit), whether these are labelled as paradigmatic and as narrative or as something else. However, we would contend that although historical knowledge can also be articulated and conceived of through symbol and story, it can also, as we argued above, legitimately be reduced to elemental propositional components. In psychological terms this form is not alien to history since this is how all bodies of knowledge are organized in memory according to semantic memory theory.

Because history is elementally constituted as much by concrete particulars as by concepts and propositions, it should not automatically be assumed that concept maps will therefore be insensitive to history's temporal dimension. An assumption such as this stems from conceiving of the psychological structure of history in terms taken from the logical structure of science. In this case, it appears to be assumed that because the conceptual structure of science is hierarchical (resulting in increasingly comprehensive rules or concepts) the conceptual representation of history could not therefore be sensitive to history's linearity, since that would also be constructed along a vertical dimension. Our point is that there is no reason why the psychological structure of historical knowledge should be necessarily hierarchical or why the insensitivity of conceptual representations to history's temporal dimension should automatically be assumed. In each case these so called problems are more appropriately regarded as fascinating questions on which our proposed research might shed light. They are certainly not foregone conclusions.
Concluding Remarks

Having started with skepticism about the appropriateness of applying concept mapping methodologies to historical knowledge, we have reached a point where we are suggesting that it would not only be legitimate to elicit conceptual representations of historical knowledge but that it would be fruitful to do so.

To sum up: We have proposed that history's apparent subjectivity is not an obstacle to the generation of reliable or valid representations of historical knowledge, since we found that historical knowledge is neither radically subjective itself nor any more contingent than scientific knowledge, which has been productively mapped. Secondly, we suggested that the apparent absence of specifically historical concepts from historical discourse would not be an obstacle to research, since we identified other components in historical language which make up its propositional and conceptual structure. Finally, we argued that suggestions that history's narrativity was irreducible to cartographic representation were powerful but not relevant to our concerns, since in proposing to elicit cognitive representations, we are not concerned with the logical structure of historical knowledge but rather with its psychological structure, to which conceptual representation is not alien.

Having thus failed to establish any significant reasons why we should not attempt to produce cognitive maps of historical knowledge, we can and must turn to a more positive set of questions, in terms of how we apply this methodology to our particular concerns, that is, to the investigation of the relationship between critical Jewish historical knowledge and collective memorial knowledge.
CHAPTER SIX

Towards a practical proposal for the conceptual representation of Jewish historical knowledge.

The last four chapters exemplify the dictum that it easier to criticize than to construct: We set out to determine whether critical historiography is necessarily antagonistic towards the forms of consciousness which have sustained traditional Judaism. We have ended up, however, not only dismissing as inconclusive a sustained philosophical examination of this question, but we have condemned as inappropriate research approaches framed within an influential psychological tradition. Most recently, we have even rejected well established doubts which could have been raised about an alternative research methodology.

The question now is whether we can formulate a convincing approach of our own. For, if, as we found, it is not invalid to attempt to elicit the external representation of internal representations of historical knowledge, then we must say how in practice we would expect this to work. To be precise, we must explain how exactly we would use a concept mapping methodology to investigate the impact of critical historical knowledge on collective Jewish memorial knowledge.

At first, this will involve proceeding fairly tentatively, since, as we have argued, there have not been any previous attempts to apply concept mapping methodologies either to history or to Jewish history. We suspect that the presentation of a defensible research methodology will first require some consideration of what the conceptual content of Jewish history might theoretically consist of, so that we can, at least, establish the substantive parameters of research. Then, less broadly, it will involve contemplating which kinds of concept mapping approaches could be suited to examining historical knowledge in general. Finally, it will entail the detailed
specification and justification of a particular research strategy aimed at investigating identified dimensions in the relationship between Jewish historical knowledge and Jewish memorial knowledge.

**Of what does the Conceptual Content of Jewish History Consist?**

In the previous chapter, we argued that historical knowledge in general was founded on propositional or conceptual networks. We explained how this worked, despite the scarcity of either substantive or structural historical concepts, and pointed to components in historical knowledge which functioned as concepts in combining to provide the structure of history.

It is tempting to argue that these general findings can be directly applied to a consideration of the conceptual content of Jewish historical knowledge. In other words, we might say that because Jewish history provides a localized example of historiographical practice in general, its conceptual content will not be any more tightly prescribed than that of history in general. It will be made up of an unspecified mix of proper names, 'concrete universals' and colligatory concepts which would serve just as appropriately in determining the content of any number of historical narratives with little or no Jewish point of reference. Thus, according to this line of argument, the contents of Jewish historical knowledge will not significantly differ, either in categorical or substantive terms, from the propositional components of either Roman, Risorgimento or Russian history.

The consequences of this position for the external representation of historical knowledge are straightforward. It suggests that we can expect concept maps of Jewish historical knowledge to differ neither in structure nor content from maps which represent any other variety of historical knowledge. For, according to this line of thinking, differences between
historical topics do not reflect significant differences in their conceptual structure.

The problem with this position is that it is founded on an assumption which is not necessarily compatible with the basic presuppositions of Jewish memorial knowledge. For, although the assumption that Jewish history is essentially similar to history in general has served as an explicitly articulated and guiding premise for many professional Jewish historians (see, for example, Baron 1952 and Katz 1983, p.193 ff.), it clashes with some of the most distinctive features of Jewish memorial knowledge, where, for example, assumptions about divine involvement in Jewish history profoundly influence all aspects of conception of the Jewish past. Research into the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory which regarded Jewish history as a localized case of history in general would probably, therefore, be insensitive to the characteristic representations of Jewish memorial knowledge.

Of course, taking the opposite tack will not make it any easier to establish criteria for examining the conceptual content of both historical and memorial knowledge either. It could, for example, be argued that both the substance and structure of Jewish historical knowledge are different from historical knowledge in general and that research should therefore be predicated on this distinction. After all, structural concepts in history like change, time, evidence, empathy and cause are either absent from or transformed by non-historiographic (memorial) conceptions of the Jewish past. From a traditional perspective, Jewish history is not the reconstruction of a serial diachronic past. It is the recollection of an enduring past, where chronology is hardly of significance (Mendes-Flohr 1980). There is little notion of evidence in Jewish collective memory either, since the historian (or recorder of history) does not exist separately from his sources. Causation in theistic conceptions of Jewish
history is also ultimately impenetrable, since the historical reality of the Jewish people either mirrors their relationship with God or is a reflection of the deepest mysteries of being (Scholem 1971).

One can also expect the substantive concepts of Jewish memorial knowledge to differ from those of Jewish historical knowledge in one small but significant way. For, although memory and history do share the same set of referents - that is, the people and events of the past - they are sharply distinguished by the presence of what one might call 'noumenal' concepts in certain forms of traditional Jewish memory. Critical historical knowledge certainly has no room for a God concept or for anything like it, whereas in certain forms of memorial knowledge it is concepts like this which serve as 'concrete universals' or superordinate concepts in 'anchoring' entire propositional networks.

In strictly conceptual terms, then, it appears as if the propositional content of Jewish history does significantly change depending on whether its context is critical or memorial, and that it will probably therefore be difficult to formulate a single and comprehensive notion of Jewish historical knowledge which sensitively mirrors the different ways in which Jewish history can be conceived. In research terms, this means that we are unlikely to formulate a concept mapping methodology which can reliably map both critical and memorial knowledge without having to rely on some form of linguistic gymnastics.

Before we rush towards such a pessimistic conclusion, it is, however, worth reconsidering the line of argument which brought it about. We have concluded that the conceptual content of critical and memorial knowledge of Jewish history are different from one another and have attached great significance to this. Yet, this is no more than a tautology.
For, if critical and memorial knowledge were not different in this way there would have been no difference between memory and history in the first place.

Essentially, we have focussed on the differences between critical and memorial knowledge when the real question here concerns the extent to which there is commonality between them. It is this question which will determine whether we can formulate a single comprehensive notion of the components of Jewish historical knowledge and whether, in turn, we are able to construct a research methodology which validly represents both critical and memorial knowledge without too much distorting the necessary differences between them. - And from this perspective there are grounds for optimism.

It must be said, first of all, that it is somewhat idle to assume that because Jewish history is merely a localized example of historiographical practice in general that it is not possible to prescribe at least to some degree what its conceptual content may consist of. Although it has been influentially argued that one cannot determine a priori whether some historical phenomenon is 'Jewish', just as one cannot dogmatically say what the essence of Judaism is (Scholem 1973), there must surely be certain stable criteria according to which Jewish history is regarded as Jewish rather than something else. For, without these criteria one would not be able to talk sensibly about Jewish history at all. What we mean to say is that although it is unreasonable to prescribe a set of necessary components in Jewish historical knowledge, there must surely be some components whose presence (alone or collectively) is sufficient to make some body of historical knowledge Jewish. In other words, if Jewish history is no more than a localized example of historical practice in general we may nevertheless be able to identify a number of conceptual signposts which consistently signal that locality's Jewishness.
A related conclusion is reached if we work in from the direction of Jewish memorial knowledge. For, although it is evident that the procedures of Jewish memory are indeed different from those of Jewish history, it is also apparent that there are not such extensive differences between the substantive components of Jewish history and Jewish memory. Of course, the substantive content of Jewish memorial knowledge is frequently constituted in terms of its relationship to some God concept - unlike critical historical knowledge - but this should not overshadow the extent to which Jewish memorial knowledge generally shares the same substantive referents as critical historical knowledge.

All of this means that it should be possible and legitimate to conceive of a limited number of substantive concepts, concrete universals and proper names which not only make up most of the necessary conceptual core of Jewish memorial knowledge but which also serve as sufficient constituents of Jewish historiographical knowledge. These, we suggest, could then be used to locate the conceptual parameters of research into different cognitive representations of Jewish history.

The problem is how to do this without sliding into an 'essentialist' trap wherein we claim to prescribe, a priori, the conceptual content of Jewish history. In an attempt to avoid precisely this danger we have been attracted by Rosenak's notion of the commonplaces of Judaism (1987) which is derived, in turn, from Schwab's conception of the 'topics' or 'commonplaces' of a discipline (Schwab 1964 and 1971).

Schwab defines commonplaces as "foci of attention within an area of interest which fulfill two conditions: (a) they demand the attention of serious investigators; (b) their scrutiny generates diverse investigations and consequent diversities of definitions, doctrines and emphases" (Schwab 1964: pp.5-6). In a different formulation, he explains that they are "a set of factors...which...in effect represent the whole subject matter
of the whole plurality of enquiries of which each member-theory reveals only one facade at best, and usually only, one facade seen in one aspect" (Schwab 1971).

Rosenak wants to suggest that Jewish religious tradition is constituted by "five key terms". These are Torah, Messianism, Am Yisrael (the People of Israel), God of Israel and Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel). He argues that these terms are commonplaces because

"(a) the tradition cannot function without these terms and they are therefore the language of the tradition's transmission; and (b) the specific content of each commonplace is ambiguous until it is related to a specific historical, theological-ideological, or normative-halakhic context" (Rosenak op cit p.102).

"Each commonplace, when it must be defined or explained outside a specific legal, historical context (ie, in abstract theological terms), can only be explained or defined relationally" (ibid).

"Theologically, all commonplaces are indispensable for an understanding of Judaism, even though they may be variously graded in different ideological understandings" (p.103).

"The terminology of relationship among the commonplaces is generally (and classically) theological; for example, Israel was 'chosen' by God. However, because of the cultural dimension of Judaism, the terms may be related in historical-existential ways" (ibid).

Fox warns that commonplaces can only be discovered and developed by long and meticulous scholarly work (1985). There is little doubt that Rosenak's argument fulfills these requirements, coming at the heart of a meticulously crafted and carefully articulated philosophy of Jewish education.
These concepts have not only been defined in such a way as to demonstrate their 'formal' quality as well as their particular Jewish content, they have also been presented within the context of their different potential interrelationships.

We want to suggest that this notion of the commonplaces of Judaism can be adopted as a useful heuristic device in the course of investigating the conceptual representation of Jewish historical knowledge. For, as Rosenak explains, although these concepts are commonly conceived of in terms which are largely theological, they can just as validly be regarded as points within a network of secular-historical concepts.

Indeed, we want to suggest that one of the implications of Rosenak's argument that all theologies and ideologies of Judaism are conceived in relation to these terms, is that all philosophies of Jewish history are likewise grounded in the same set of concepts, whether they are critical or memorial. Of course, this does not mean that it is therefore possible to reduce all of Jewish history to a set of stable concepts, say in the manner of Graetz's famous conception of the structure of Jewish history (1975). To attempt as much would be to miss the thrust of Rosenak's and ultimately Schwab's argument. The point about commonplaces is that they serve as a tool with which to identify the differences between a plurality of theories, ideologies or philosophies. They are categorical terms which, in Fox's words "enable us to map a field and to compare different theories in one discipline to see how they treat a specific subject matter" (Fox op cit) [emphasis added].

This is exactly how we hope the commonplaces of Judaism might help us. To rephrase Fox, we hope that they will enable us to map different conceptions of Jewish history in such a way as will allow us to compare different representations of historical knowledge. Admittedly, this might appear surprising
in that it is hard to see how a set of concepts which include *Torah* and *God of Israel* can possibly determine the content of any critical philosophy of Jewish history. However, to reiterate what we have already argued, and to quote Rosenak again, these terms are "idiosyncratic enough to be translated into secular-historical terms" (*op cit*). They are formal terms whose content is neither necessarily theological nor historical.

Consciously, or otherwise, critical Jewish history does always relate to these terms. In all cases this is because critical history must provide an alternative to memorial or traditional conceptions of Jewish history where these terms do possess explanatory authority. Critical history can, thus, be conceived of as a rewriting of Jewish memory, where theological concepts are either translated into secular alternatives or relegated to positions where their meaning is determined by their relationship with secular concepts (Kochan 1977). Additionally, it can be argued that critical history generally relates to these terms because the subjects of Jewish history do themselves frame their lives in relation to ideologies grounded in these concepts, and it is the acts and ideas of such people which the historian (however critical) must explain.

One further doubt about the appropriateness of using commonplaces of Judaism in the analysis of Jewish historical knowledge may still linger. It might, after all, be said that these concepts do not seem or sound very historical, and that they simply look like theological concepts relocated to a historical setting. Here, we suggest that an earlier argument is relevant. For, as we explained in the last chapter, few substantive or structural concepts in history are themselves explicitly or specifically historical. The propositional content of history is made up, instead, of a mixture of proper names, 'concrete universals' and colligatory concepts. The
commonplaces of Judaism do not look very historical but they too are made up of a mixture of proper names and concepts, and as such can provide Jewish historical knowledge with appropriate elemental components in a way which is directly equivalent to the founding of historical knowledge in general.

Of course, the commonplaces of Judaism do not by themselves constitute the conceptual content of Jewish historical knowledge. They will always be located within a network which consists of concepts and names which, like the components of historical knowledge in general, are taken either from everyday discourse or from other disciplines. The point is that it would nevertheless be reasonable to base research into the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory on the heuristic assumption that Jewish historical knowledge (whether critical or memorial) is characteristically constituted by these terms.

What Kind of Concept Mapping Methodology Might Best Suit Research into Historical Knowledge?

If this argument holds and if we have successfully identified a way of conceiving of the content of Jewish historical knowledge which is faithful both to its critical and memorial representation, we can move towards considering the kind of concept mapping methodology which might best allow us to examine historical knowledge. Thereafter, we can proceed to the formulation of a detailed research strategy for investigating the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory.

Obviously, there are a number of kinds of concept mapping methodologies which have been developed. Indeed, as we showed in chapter four, concept mapping is, in generic terms, an alternative to a variety of other methodologies for probing knowledge structure. We earlier explained why concept mapping,
because it minimizes the need for inference leaps, has increasingly been preferred to other methodological traditions like associative-mapping techniques. Nevertheless, the question still remains as to which type of concept mapping methodology is best suited (in both theoretical and empirical terms) to the examination of historical knowledge in general.

During our survey of concept mapping methodologies we found it useful to distinguish between approaches which are submitted either to structural or to semantic analysis. At the time we did not fully spell out the implications of using such categories, but now it is worth pointing out that one important consequence of making such a distinction is that it signals how that the way in which maps are generated is probably secondary to the way in which they are analysed. When we talk, therefore, of identifying concept mapping probes which are most appropriate to the representation of changes or differences in historical knowledge we do not really refer to the ways in which maps are elicited but to the ways in which they are analysed.

In this context, and as we argued in chapter four, it is largely a matter of choosing between the relative merits of maps which follow a structural approach and those which follow a semantic approach. What this involves is comparing analytical approaches which take their meaning from the theoretical principles which originate in Ausubelian learning theory (cf. Ausubel et al, 1978) with approaches which, under the influence of J.R. Anderson's semantic memory theory, are more closely tied to an analysis of the propositional meaning of cognitive structure (Anderson & Bower 1973).

The structural approach, exemplified by the work of Novak (eg. 1981), was not only the first sort of concept mapping probe to be developed, it was and still is the more widely used. However, the problem with this approach is that it has been designed to produce data which is meaningful in terms of
categories which are not only insensitive to the distinct nature of historical knowledge, but which are actually antipathetic to its characteristic configurational structure. Thus, its categories derive their significance from node-link models of memory which emphasize the structural organization of concepts over the particular meaning of their semantic links. Similarly, its view of cognitive structure, is taken from principles in Ausbelean theory which hold that cognitive structure is hierarchically organized, progressively differentiated or integratively reconciled. And, as we suggested in the last chapter, these are constructs which are only likely to make sense in terms of the development of scientific concepts and theories. They do not correspond to the narrative content of history or to its tendency to relate concepts to one another without hierarchically subsuming them under one another.

In contrast, the semantic approach exemplified by Champagne and Klopfer's (1981) Concept Structuring Analysis Technique promises to be more sensitive to the distinctive features of historical knowledge. For, although this methodology and adaptations of it have been used to generate data regarding the structural features of cognitive maps, they are more closely tied to an analysis of the propositional meaning of cognitive structure, through, for example, semantic analysis of bi-concept links, analysis of the meaning of individual concepts and investigation of the overall meaning of concept networks. We suggest, therefore, that this approach is likely to be more sensitive to the character of historical knowledge because it more accurately reflects the way in which the propositional content of historical knowledge changes, not so much because of changes in the structural organization of concepts as because of changes in the meaning ascribed to concepts which, as we have argued, are not formally historical in and of themselves.
In a semantic approach, although issues relating to the structural organization are not ignored, analytical emphasis is on the meaning given to propositional links within cognitive structure as opposed to the geographical organization of concepts. This is why it promises to suit the examination of historical knowledge so well. In a theory of history as reconstruction, the development of historical knowledge does not consist of the acquisition of new concepts, but rather of the reorganization or redescription of already 'known' concepts. A concept mapping methodology which is attuned to changes in propositional meaning is therefore more likely to indicate changes in historical knowledge than a methodology which focuses on the differentiation or integration of changing numbers of concepts.

How to Apply a Semantic Mapping Approach to the Examination of Jewish Historical Knowledge?

If in general, then, a semantic approach to concept mapping promises to be most sensitive to changes in historical knowledge, we can begin a detailed consideration of the particular semantic methodology which will enable us to examine changes in Jewish historical knowledge, and especially the relationship between Jewish memorial and historical knowledge. We can, in other words, begin to set out what we have conceived of as a defensible research methodology for the examination of the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory. This is what we propose to do in the next phase of our work.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CODA: Description of a pre-pilot exercise in the representation of historical knowledge in cognitive structure

The problem with setting out a thesis in the way that we have done so far, is that it minimizes both the disorder and anxiety which are integral parts of any research process. In this case we have begun with the statement of a problem - the ambivalent attitude shown by Jewish schools towards Jewish history teaching - and have worked towards the identification of a research strategy with which to examine and treat some of its dimensions.

With the benefit of hindsight everything fits relatively neatly into place. We began with a 'problem situation', we proposed a diagnosis of this problem in terms of the ambiguous relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory and then determined to subject this relationship to an analysis of some rigor. Having found that a philosophical approach did not allow the possibility of drawing firm conclusions about the relationship between critical history and Jewish tradition, we argued that the problem might benefit from being recast in psychological rather than philosophical terms. Consequently, in subsequent chapters, we have moved towards identifying a psychological research tradition which might make possible the examination of significant dimensions in the relationship between history and memory. Having identified semantic memory theory as such a tradition we have begun to discuss the appropriateness of applying empirical methodologies from within that tradition to the investigation of the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory.

One might call this the Whig approach to research. It is a narrative which begins in confusion or pain and ends with the triumph of reason over chaos. In reality, of course, and as is typical of much research, there have been a number of
different things going on in this project at any one time, all of which have been at different stages of development. And while it is true that the more theoretical discussions in previous chapters have each in their own way enabled us to proceed towards the formulation of a definite research strategy, it would be misleading to presume that they have directly led from one to another in the way we have described or that we, therefore, did not make any attempt to produce cognitive maps of Jewish historical knowledge before reaching the theoretical terra firma of the previous chapter.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not an unusual phenomenon, if only because most efforts at research involve preliminary phases in which researchers familiarize themselves with the use of new or unfamiliar tools in the field (Bell 1987). Certainly, it is rare that researchers wheel out fully articulated and original methodologies which are ready for use without some prior tinkering.

One suspects that researchers rarely report this preliminary phase, partly because it tends to be somewhat primitive and partly because it is usually of private significance only, enabling the researcher to master a particular methodology rather than to generate public data with it. In our case, although this preliminary phase was useful for precisely these 'private' reasons, it does also possess a more public significance and it is for this reason that it merits being reported.

As we have frequently repeated, there are no other existing examples of research into the conceptual representation of historical knowledge. Our discussion of the possibilities for generating cognitive maps of historical knowledge would have therefore been conducted in a debilitating vacuum if we had absolutely no sense of what the external representation of Jewish historical knowledge might look like and only a very
limited idea of the kinds of analytical categories which might be applied to it.

Thus, some time before we had properly developed a notion of what the conceptual components of historical knowledge looked like and before we had identified the possibilities promised by the notion of commonplace Jewish concepts, we endeavored to conduct a pre-pilot exercise which might help in identifying the kinds of questions concept mapping would allow us to ask about Jewish historical knowledge as well as the kinds of strategies that would bring those questions into focus.

In some respects this may not seem very legitimate, since it places the consideration of means before the identification of ends. It portrays an attempt to generate cognitive maps of Jewish historical knowledge as part of an effort to establish what might be reasonable and valid research questions to ask from the external representation of historical knowledge. From some perspectives, this will seem like an inversion of proper research procedures, or, at best, a case of taking two steps back in order to take one step forward.

We have nevertheless chosen to report this episode. First, because it provides an important insight into the evolution of our research proposal, when it might be in danger of suffering from the absence of an empirical counterpoint. Secondly, and more significantly, because it is faithful to an integral part of all research, where means and ends are indistinguishable, and where there is continuing interaction between theory and practice (Dewey 1964). Hopefully, therefore, it will demonstrate the way in which research is conditioned as much by what is hypothetically posited as by what is empirically possible.
Description of the Pre-Pilot Exercise

History: The pre-pilot exercise was initiated once we began to develop a sense that a semantic approach to concept mapping might be appropriate to the representation of historical knowledge. It was regarded as providing an opportunity for examining the consequences of translating a preexisting semantic mapping procedure to a possibly alien 'historical' context, even if, beforehand, we did not have a very clear sense of the kinds of categories we would use in order to analyse the maps produced.

Subjects: The subjects were six 13 to 14 year olds on the three month Givat Washington programme in Israel. They came from one of two Jewish schools in England, where they had received a regular though not intensive Jewish education. Many of them had never studied Jewish history before, while none had studied it in a way which mirrored the seriousness of their general historical studies. Although these students attended schools which were orthodox in their Jewish ethos, none of the interviewees themselves came from orthodox or committed Jewish families.

Item selection: 12 'concepts' were selected for mapping since this was a number which previous researchers found had supported a rich network of propositions without overwhelming the interviewee (Hoz 1991, in conversation). These were: SURVIVAL, INDEPENDENCE, SURRENDER, DEFIANCE, HISTORIANS, JEWS, JUDAISM, G-D (spelled in a traditional Jewish manner, so as not to offend the sensibilities of any of the interviewees), RABBIS, TEMPLE, DESTRUCTION and ROMANS.

With hindsight one can see that the 'concepts' selected contained a mixture of concrete universals like ROMANS and JEWS; colligatory concepts like G-D and JUDAISM, as well as other concepts which are either commonplace in everyday discourse like SURVIVAL and DESTRUCTION and/or which could
come from another discipline, as in the case of INDEPENDENCE and SURRENDER. All could be classified as substantive concepts, apart from HISTORIANS, which reflects an attempt to introduce a reflexive element into the map which, it was hoped, might expose some conception of the procedures or structure of history.

At the time, item selection was not shaped by the more theoretical arguments we have developed in chapters 5 and 6, but rather, and over and above all, by an effort to select concepts for mapping which might represent the different ways in which the Jewish past could be conceived. Thus, an attempt was made to select concepts which related to a topic in Jewish history where conflict between memorial and critical knowledge might be sharpest or at least explicit. To be precise, we selected the concepts TEMPLE, DESTRUCTION and ROMANS because we were hoping that they would trigger a response which pointed to different ways of conceiving of the destruction of the second temple by the Romans, since from both a critical or memorial historical perspective, this was a watershed moment in Jewish history.

Interview and mapping procedure: Given our, at the time unsubstantiated, sense that external representations of historical knowledge would be best elicited through a mapping approach which focused on the propositional aspects of memory, we decided to adopt (with minor alterations) Mahler et al.'s (1991) revised ConSAT schedule for interviewing subjects [See Appendix 1]. In our case, this involved five phases, as follows:

The interview was "administered individually, and require[d] about 45 minutes to complete (for a set of 10-13 concepts from the domain that the cognitive structure representation [was] sought)" (ibid pp.36-7).
It consisted of:

1. "A short training session with [eight] daily concepts for demonstrating to the student the employed procedure and the kind of expected product (ie, a cognitive map with all the possible links made and labeled).

2. The interviewee [was] asked to classify the list concepts that [were] printed on small cards, as either familiar or unfamiliar.

3. The interviewee [was] asked to define (or explain) verbally each familiar concept. The definitions [were] written down by the interviewer.

4. The interviewee [was] asked to construct a map of concepts by spatially arranging the familiar concepts' cards on the table so that the arrangement would reflect the relations among the concepts. When the student [was] satisfied with his or her arrangement it [was] copied by the interviewer on to a large sheet of paper. The interviewee [was] further asked to express verbally the most meaningful relations he or she consider[ed] among the concepts or groups of concepts, which [were] recorded by the interviewer on the line[s] connecting the concepts. The interviewee [was] allowed to modify the map until he or she [was] satisfied. The interviewee [was] also asked to provide a title for the whole map and to explain the nature of the groups (in cases where linked clusters were produced).

5. The interviewee reinspect[ed] the unfamiliar concepts and [was] allowed to add such concepts to the map, along with the appropriate links. Also, he or she [was] allowed to add concepts that he or she [felt were] related to those in the list" (ibid).

6. A neat and final copy of the map was then produced, with help from an audio tape recording which was made of the entire
interview. (All maps shown hereafter are photographic reproductions of these final copies.)

In categorical terms, one might describe this schedule as combining a number of virtues. On the one hand, it presented a closed set of concepts which all interviewees had to respond to, but, on the other hand, it contained an open element which enabled the interviewee to supplement the map with whatever concepts he or she chose. Thus, this approach promised the possibility of some kind of psychometric analysis in which the maps produced by a number of different subjects could be compared, but it also left room for more natural responses in which the subject could strongly influence the conceptual content of his or her own particular map.

The schedule may also be characterized as emphasizing the semantic content of cognitive structure representations. This is not only evident from the way in which the interviewee is specifically asked in phase four to "express verbally the most meaningful relations among concepts" but it also emerges from the fact that interviewees are asked in phase three "to define (or explain) verbally each familiar concept". This is significant since subjects are prompted to conceive of concepts in propositional terms before they regard them relationally, that is, in terms of their relationship with other nodes in the map. We contend that this does not cause the contents of the map to be overshadowed or overwhelmed by prior definitional attempts, since in the context of a propositional network concepts always take on a different and invariably richer meaning. What it does mean, however, is that subjects will already be tending to conceive of concepts in propositional terms when they begin to frame their maps and this should therefore help in clarifying or sharpening their semantic content.
Outcomes: The interviews resulted in the generation of six concept maps all of which took between approximately 10 and 20 minutes to produce and describe, following the introductory three phases. Two examples are presented in figures 1 and 2. (All the maps are included in Appendix 2.)

As we explained earlier, the pre-pilot was not really intended to generate public data. Its main purpose was the provision of evidence with which to fill a vacuum of information concerning the appearance of cognitive structure representations of historical knowledge, not to mention the kind of analytical constructs that might be applied to them. Thus, before we carried out this exercise we did not know whether to expect all representations of historical knowledge to be linear or chronological. Similarly, because all previous concept mapping research had looked at scientific or semi-scientific knowledge we could not be sure whether concept maps would provide representations which could be explicitly characterized as critical, memorial or some other form of historical knowledge.

The examples presented in figures 1 and 2 (on the following pages) will hopefully demonstrate the ways in which this exercise was helpful in diminishing these unknowns, even if, in experimental terms, they are reasonably limited if not flawed themselves. We have presented what are probably two extreme examples of the kinds of maps which were produced in this exercise, in that while Josh#1 is thick with semantic detail, Anna#1 contains very little elaboration concerning the relationships between concepts.

Discussion: In the first place, these maps show the tantalising nature of the data produced by concept mapping probes. Thus, while Anna #1 is primitive in its efforts to link concepts, and limited in its description of propositional links, it does raise a host of intriguing questions about the representation of these concepts. For example, one can ask why it is that GOD is consigned to the past, while JEWS is not.
Why have two groups of concepts been separated and not even connected? Does this correspond to a distinction between concepts which are conceived as relating to the past and those which are not?

Intriguingly, when asked if the concepts were connected in any ways other than those she had described, the subject said that she was sure that they were, but couldn't say how. It certainly makes one wonder whether a representation which looks as spartan as this actually reflects laziness on the part of the interviewee rather than revealing anything significant about their cognitive structure.

osh#1 raises a similar range of pregnant questions. For example, one might ask whether its avoidance of a vertical or linear structure means that it is not really an historical representation or whether it means that the structure's historicity reveals itself in other ways, thereby indicating a certain distinctive form of istorical knowledge? Most significantly, one wonders whether the sense or wordy nature displayed by all the propositional links here undermine the map's status as a cognitive structure representation or whether they in fact enhance it? It is also worth considering whether, given that there are altogether 17 propositional links in the structure, we could say that the 'concept' JEWS occupies some entral status in the map, being a part of 6 propositional links, hereby indicating a certain conception of Jewish history?

nevitably, there are an almost unlimited number of questions which one can ask about maps like these. Indeed, that appears to be one of the outstanding virtues of the graphic representation of knowledge, in that it seems to invite much more analysis than would a prose-like string of propositions concerning the same subject matter.

Perhaps the most important issue here, and a large part of the rationale behind the pre-pilot exercise, is whether these maps offer clues as to how different forms of cognitive structure can be distinguished through representation of knowledge probes and according to which kinds of analytical categories. Here a number of
features seem to emerge. For example, it is evident that although only two 'concepts' (HISTORIANS and ROMANS) were signally or essentially historical, the maps nevertheless consist of structures which represent knowledge which is almost certainly historical. On the one hand, it seems that the grammatical tense used when framing propositions might be of significance. Thus, one can distinguish between propositions which are framed in the present tense (as are parts of Josh#1) like "JEWS only believe in one G-D" or "JEWS' mortal leaders on earth are RABBIS", and those propositions which are framed in some kind of past tense, as is all of Anna#1 (eg, "Some JEWS had to SURRENDER" or "The RABBIS worshipped G-D") and most of Josh#1 where a number of relationships are described as having happened "throughout the years" or as having happened "over time".

On the other hand, it seems - in impressionistic terms, at least - as if conceptual structure is not by itself a reliable indicator of historical knowledge. Thus structures which look quite different can convey quite similar historical meanings, as, for example, in the apparently different treatments of HISTORIANS, ROMANS, DESTRUCTION and TEMPLE in Adam#1 and Nicky#1 (See Appendix 2). At the same time, structures which look quite similar can actually represent significantly different historical conceptions, as in Anna (Liverpool)#1 and Poppy#1, where the similar arrangement of concepts disguises what are two quite different interpretations of Jewish history.

In contrast again, it does seem as if individual concepts can take on significantly different meanings in different maps, serving as useful indicators of cognitive dissimilarity. Thus, G-D can exert quite a strong influence on some maps, initiating distinctive historical chronologies as in Anna(liverpool)#1 which expresses the notion that "G-D made the JEWS who were told to study JUDAISM" or Nicky#1 which articulates how "G-D chose the JEWS to have his Torah. The JEWS have survived through thousands of years", etc.

Yet, in other contexts, the same concept seems to be no more than a
passive referent of other more important concepts which are not necessarily part of historical networks, as in Anna#1, Josh#1 or Adam#1. Thus, while in some representations the concept G-D is used to initiate a theistic conception of the Jewish past, in others it is used to make what might be characterized as a sociological point which does not impinge on historical narrative.

Of course, this exercise has also shown that there are other concepts which consistently seem to have little to do with history and which would be poor items to select for inclusion in a mapping methodology. This is especially the case with INDEPENDENCE which seems to occupy an artificial role in almost all the networks here.

The concepts HISTORIANS and RABBIS have, meanwhile, taken on a range of different and in some cases interacting roles. Thus, in certain instances they seem like rival sources of authority. Compare, for example, Anna(Liverpool)#1 - "Modern day RABBIS teach JUDAISM to kids" and Nicky#1 - "JUDAISM is explained by RABBIS" with Josh#1 - "HISTORIANS have always tried to find out more about the Jewish people/JUDAISM" or Anna#1 - "When the TEMPLE was destroyed the HISTORIANS found it out". In other cases, the use of HISTORIANS seems in and of itself to reveal something about different conceptions of historical practice. Thus, in Poppy#1, "HISTORIANS know a lot about the ROMANS", whereas in Nicky#1 "HISTORIANS can't defy [probably, define] what things are when they find them". Likewise, in some maps HISTORIANS "find out about" ROMANS (Adam#1) while in others they "find out more about JEWS" (Josh#1). In all these cases there are grounds for arguing that these concepts prompt a variety of propositions which can serve as indicators of significantly different conceptions of Jewish history.

**Conclusions:** As we hinted earlier, there is a danger in holding too much store by the patterns which we have described here. At this stage we have not established either the empirical validity or reliability of this methodology. We have not discussed whether it would be capable of comparing different people's cognitive
structures or whether it might be able to chart changes in an individual's knowledge of history. In a sense, we have recorded what is no more than an exercise in empirical improvisation while hoping that a number of themes which emerge will enrich a more composed piece of research.

From this highly tentative perspective, it is possible to be reasonably confident about only very few things. These might include, first, the notion that concept mapping probes do generate a rich diversity of response, which in turn probably promise a range of often subtle insights into the representation of Jewish historical knowledge in memory. Secondly - and perhaps as a consequence of this diversity - it is likely that only analytical approaches which aspire to be comprehensive and even holistic will adequately explore the range of dimensions within the internal representation of historical knowledge. Lastly, and this is most tentative given the limited sample here, this exercise may have revealed something of the different gravitational systems which exert their influence on both the internal and external representation of Jewish history. Thus, we have seen all-encompassing historical chronologies beginning with G-d and ending in the present (as in Anna(Liverpool)#1), present-focussed representations of Jews and Judaism which are strongly informed by historical components (as in Josh#1), and some quite fragmented structures, made up of separate chronologies (as in Anna#1), competing ahistorical and historical components (as in Adam#1) as well as less easily classified propositional mixtures (as in Poppy#1).

Arguably, this looks like an inconsequential set of findings which may not merit the space we have given them. We would suggest, however, that seen as the outcomes of what was no more than a pre-pilot exercise they might exert a moderately significant influence on the development of our research. They have undoubtedly cultivated a sense of what concept mapping might be capable of if more care was taken in the selection of conceptual items and if we
were to have a clearer sense of the ways in which the form and content of cognitive structure representations indicate differences in Jewish historical knowledge. If we worked with an older and more articulate group of subjects, the data produced might be quite enlightening.

It is the preparation of such a research project which we intend to describe in the next chapter, as we step back into the flow of our earlier narrative, informed now not only by the theory which we developed in previous chapters but also by the practice which we have just described.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Determining the scope and establishing procedures for the generation of cognitive structure representations of Jewish historical knowledge.

Until now we have made much of the difficulties caused by the paucity of existing research into the cognitive structure of Jewish historical knowledge. Indeed, it is this very scarcity which provided the rationale behind the previous chapter, where we sought, albeit in somewhat primitive fashion, to fill part of the vacuum created by this deficiency.

Henceforward, some of the advantages which accrue from the absence of direct precedents for our concerns will hopefully become increasingly apparent. For, not only does the scarcity of previous research mean that there is a surfeit of questions waiting to be explored, it also suggests how, from the outset, we can be reasonably confident about identifying a number of preliminary enquiries which will have to be built in to any research strategy we formulate. It is evident that any research design we produce will have to include components which try to establish both the empirical reliability and validity of cognitive structure probes when applied to historical knowledge, since that is largely unknown at this stage.

Until now, our discussion has been conducted in generalities and has arrived at formal rather than substantive conclusions. We have talked about examining changes in Jewish historical knowledge and about investigating the relationship between Jewish memorial and critical knowledge. We have proposed that semantic mapping methodologies may help in exploring these questions and have intimated how in general this might work. However, a defensible empirical study will have to be framed in much more precise terms. It will have to be predicated on a clear statement of experimental intention and empirical scope and will have to detail steps taken to affirm the credibility
of the procedures being described. - This, we suggest, will be our main concern over the next pages.

Establishing Goals

From the outset, we have tried to signal how we are primarily interested in exploring the relationship between the critical study of Jewish history and memorial knowledge of the Jewish past. It was the ambiguities in this relationship which, we suggested, proved to be so unsettling to the processes of effective educational decision making in Jewish schools. This concern is, however, inevitably made up of a number of other smaller and not so small issues, some of which we have hinted at in the course of developing earlier arguments. Thus our original interest in the relationship between history and memory could encompass a host of educational, developmental, sociological and psychological questions, considered together or in their separate parts.

We have already gone some way towards limiting the scope of our concerns by proposing to frame them in psychological rather than, for the moment, any other terms, but that still leaves an exciting if not bewildering array of questions to consider. For example, one could break down our original question into its vertical and horizontal dimensions. These would then include, in the first case, questions that relate to changes over time in an individual's conception of Jewish history and the influences upon them. Alternatively, and looking along a different dimension, they might relate to questions about differences in the way different people conceive of Jewish history.

In fact, we have limited the scope of our interests still further by looking to cognitive structure probes as appropriate research tools for examining the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory rather than turning
to the kind of ethnographic methodology which in chapter three we described Dickinson and Lee as using. This is significant, for, it has meant making an important distinction between thinking and knowledge in history, in that it has involved focussing on the meaning and structure of knowledge, rather than on the processes and procedures of thought which generate or manipulate knowledge. Again, this means looking at the representation and organization of concepts rather than at the ways they are used.

Of course, by focussing our interests in this way we are not signalling that our chosen questions or methodologies are therefore more central to an understanding of the relationship between critical history and collective memory than those we have not adopted. We are, rather, making what is really a calculation about the progress we might expect to make from using any methodology in a doctoral research situation such as this.

For example, it would have been both legitimate and useful to explore the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory by framing what might be called an autobiographical study of Jewish historians. Detailed examination of the academic and autobiographical writings of any number of major Jewish historians would reveal a great deal about the relationship between the study of critical history and collective memory. It would be fascinating to examine the work and life of Jacob Katz, for example, since Katz represents the unusual case of a professional Jewish historian who possesses impeccable scholarly credentials but who has grown up in a traditional Jewish society and continues to be a practising orthodox Jew (Katz 1989).

One also imagines that it would be similarly profitable to formulate an alternative strategy for research which was founded on the premises of literary criticism. Thus, one could mount a systematic analysis of Jewish historical writings
which explicitly serve the strictly orthodox Jewish community and then compare these with critical histories dealing with similar topics or subject matter. Treatment of holocaust history, for example, would provide access to revealing insights into the ways in which collective memory interacts with and reacts to critical historiography in framing a view of the Jewish past.

The point we are making is that these approaches should not be regarded as having been rejected or as competing with the concerns upon which we have increasingly concentrated. They are no less than complementary to it, but as we have tried to explain, there is an undercurrent behind our not having adopted them at this moment which is influenced by calculations concerning what it is possible to achieve in a limited time span and with limited resources.

It is from this perspective that there are a number of arguments which favour the adoption of an approach which looks first and foremost at cognitive structure. For, even if, as we have repeatedly said, there has not been any research carried out into the conceptual representation of historical knowledge, a range of research tools does exist within this field which one could at least try to apply to questions related to Jewish history and Jewish memory. Additionally, the use of cognitive structure probes has had particularly fruitful consequences in other subject areas where they have influenced thinking about planning, pedagogy and assessment (See, for example, Trochim 1989; Cliburn 1986; Edwards & Fraser 1983). For this reason we would expect promising consequences from the submission of Jewish historical knowledge to similar experimental approaches.

Of course, there is also another factor influencing our selection of strategy whose significance should not be underestimated here or in any piece of research. For, inevitably, our choice of concerns and of methodology does, to
some degree, reflect where our own interests and enthusiasms lie. Obviously, these do not blindly take our work where they will, but their influence on a piece of work which requires both extended commitment and intensive involvement cannot be entirely discounted. From this perspective, too, the graphic representation of knowledge possesses an appeal which helps in securing its position as a foremost strategy in our research agenda.

Determining the scope of research.

Although we have said that our interest in cognitive structure probes has limited the scope of our concerns, it would be misleading to presume on that basis that we had therefore left ourselves with little room for empirical manoeuvre. It is important to appreciate that the decision to attend to specific dimensions in the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory is not a consequence of laziness or deficiency but rather that it is a necessary step in sharpening the focus of research. Indeed, although we have established that there may be meaningful consequences for our understanding of the relationship between critical Jewish history and Jewish memory if we use a research methodology which comes from a cognitive mapping tradition, this does not foreclose what that methodology should consist of or try to do.

In point of fact, because there has been no other psychological research into the nature and development of Jewish historical knowledge, whether from a cognitive perspective or any other, there is a strong argument for adopting a research design which is as broadly conceived as possible. For, if we can establish some general sense of the representational nature of Jewish historical knowledge and of how its content might change, we could then deal with more detailed features in subsequent experimental phases.
For this reason, it has made sense to try, in the first instance, to examine two broad questions, each of which will be seen as operating on a substantive and formal register. In the first place, we have decided to explore the possibility of identifying a correlation between the conceptual representation of Jewish historical knowledge and other contextual or background variables. In formal experimental terms, this has therefore meant investigating how effectively we could create valid categories for distinguishing between different representations of Jewish historical knowledge. Secondly, we have intended to investigate if and how Jewish historical knowledge changes following an instructional intervention, which in our case was conceived of as an encounter with critical Jewish historiography. In formal terms, this has meant trying to find out if and how well concept maps can serve as valid mechanisms for documenting and exploring conceptual change in Jewish history.

Arguably, these are not entirely complementary objectives, since experimental designs which are sensitive to between people differences are not necessarily sensitive to within individual changes (Carver 1974). In other words a tool which reliably reflects real differences between people may not necessarily or consistently correspond to real changes within a person. We would argue, however, that given the relatively poor state of our knowledge concerning the sensitivity of any experimental design towards either of these dimensions, it will not have been particularly harmful to attempt to examine both of these dimensions provided it has been well established beforehand that they are not identical and that the experimental design should try as far as possible to take this into account.

These particular concerns as well as the more general ones we have articulated in earlier chapters have culminated in the construction of the following research methodology:
Method:

Subjects: The subjects of this study were two groups of Jewish 18 year olds from England who, after graduation from school, were based in Israel for a year's programme of study and work.

One group of six students were participants in the Bnei Akiva scheme, a religious-zionist programme combining talmudical study with a kibbutz experience. These young people had all chosen a programme option which gave greater weight to study in yeshiva than to secular alternatives. All but one of them had attended a Jewish primary school, half of them had gone to Jewish secondary schools and all but one of them came from families which were highly committed to orthodox Jewish practice. All had been members of a religious-zionist youth group in England. [This information was elicited from questionnaires which subjects completed. See Appendix 3 for a reproduction]

These six subjects were selected from a group of 30 to participate in the research interview, but all appeared to participate willingly.

Another group of six students were participants in the Machon scheme, a religiously non-denominational, zionist programme combining study of Hebrew language, Jewish history and Jewish sociology and politics with a kibbutz and voluntary work experience. Half of them had attended Jewish primary school, none had gone to Jewish secondary schools but all had at some point attended cheder, Jewish supplementary school. All came from families who were slightly less than moderately committed to Jewish religious practice. All had been members of zionist youth groups in England. [This information was elicited from the same questionnaire as referred to above, and included in Appendix 3]

These subjects chose voluntarily to participate in research interviews.
Experimental Design: The experiment was conducted over a period of four months. For the Bnei Akiva group this included a round of 'pre-test' interviews, a period of instruction consisting of five, weekly, one hour long sessions - for the subjects together with the other 22 students on their programme - a round of 'post-test' interviews within a week of the end of instruction, and a final round of 'post-post-test' interviews two and a half months later. For the machon group the experiment consisted of one round of 'pre-test' interviews.

Design of Instrument: As in the pre-pilot exercise, the instrument which yielded dimensions of historical knowledge comprised:

1) a version of Mahler et al's revised ConSAT individual interview in which a cognitive map is constructed during interview (Mahler et al 1991). [See pages 142-3 for a general description and Appendix 1 for the complete interview schedule.]

2) an analysis scheme derived from other studies of cognitive structure, as well as a scheme which we developed ourselves for the purpose of analysing Jewish historical knowledge. [See next chapter for a detailed description.]

Concept Selection: Thirteen 'concepts' were used in the mapping task, with their selection generally reflecting the thrust of the theoretical discussion from chapters five and six, in combination with conclusions drawn from the pre-pilot experience, as described in chapter seven. The 'concepts' included G-D (spelled in a traditional manner so as not to offend any of the interviewees), JUDAISM, LAND OF ISRAEL, JEWISH PEOPLE, TEMPLE, WAR, RABBIS, ROMANS, DESTRUCTION, SURRENDER, ADAPTATION, DEFIANCE and HISTORIANS.
All of these 'concepts' can be classified in terms of the typology for the semantic components of historical knowledge which we developed in chapter five. Thus, there are concrete universals like LAND OF ISRAEL, JEWISH PEOPLE and ROMANS; there are colligatory concepts like G-D and WAR; there are concepts which have been consciously taken from other disciplines, for reasons which we will shortly explain, like SURRENDER, ADAPTATION and DEFIANCE; and there are concepts which come from everyday discourse like TEMPLE, RABBIS and DESTRUCTION and finally there is HISTORIANS which is probably a concept from everyday discourse but which might possibly be a specifically historical one.

The rationale behind choosing these concepts is slightly more complex. In general terms, all were selected with two principles in mind. First, that they should facilitate any analytical distinction between critical, memorial and other forms of historical knowledge. Thus, RABBIS and HISTORIANS were kept on from the pre-pilot exercise because of the way in which they had magnified different conceptions of Jewish history, in contrast to the concept INDEPENDENCE which did not. Secondly, it was hoped that these concepts would be sensitive to conceptual change which resulted from instructional intervention. Thus, the concepts SURRENDER, DEFIANCE and ADAPTATION were selected because they figured prominently as a frame of reference within the programme of instruction.

There was also a range of more particular reasons behind the selection of concepts. For example, a number of concepts were included under the influence of Rosenak's notion of commonplace Jewish concepts (see chapter six). For, if as we previously argued, there are a number of concepts in terms of which all forms of Jewish historical knowledge (whether critical or memorial) can be understood, it seemed appropriate to select these for inclusion in this task, since their
presence may have made possible the articulation of fundamental conceptions regarding all of Jewish history and not just of the immediate point of historical reference for the rest of the map. Indeed, Rosenak's thesis has promised the possibility that these concepts might serve as quintessential indicators of differences or changes in the conception of Jewish history.

Having said as much, we nevertheless did not simply reproduce Rosenak's five concepts in the mapping instrument. Thus, we did not include the concept of messianism at all and we translated the concept Torah into one of Judaism. Arguably, this shows a failure of nerve which prevents us from properly establishing whether these concepts possess a psychological reality which corresponds to their philosophical role. However, we would argue that although in Rosenak's terms these are formal concepts which necessarily possess neither theological nor secular content, they do probably carry connotations in ordinary discourse which might have distorted these sets of cognitive maps in a particular theological direction. Judaism has, therefore, been selected because it is both a more neutral and a less apparently theological term than Torah but, as the pre-pilot showed, may nevertheless serve as a synonym for it. Messianism, meanwhile, has not been selected at all because (if it is not altogether unfamiliar to subjects) it might, if included, give all maps artificial eschatological connotations which do not otherwise reflect their real content.

The concepts TEMPLE, WAR, RABBIS, ROMANS and DESTRUCTION have all been selected with a particular reason in mind. Although, these are not specifically historical concepts, taken together, they signal substantive historical content. As in the pre-pilot exercise, they have been chosen in the hope that they trigger the representation of knowledge concerning one of the most heatedly discussed topics in Jewish history, that is,
the destruction of the second temple by the Romans, its causes and consequences. As we explained in the last chapter, these events are conceived, from both critical and memorial perspectives, as constituting a watershed moment in Jewish history and, accordingly, may be represented in quite different ways within different cognitive structures.

The concepts SURRENDER, ADAPTATION and DEFIANCE have been chosen for quite specific reasons too, in that they reflect our attempt to examine how effectively concept maps allow the documentation and exploration of conceptual change in Jewish history. These terms serve as organizing concepts within the course of instruction to which the Bnei Akiva group was exposed. They have therefore been included in the mapping instrument so that we might examine the degree to which cognitive representation of Jewish historical knowledge changes as a result instructional intervention.

Again, they are not specifically historical concepts. They have been taken from Peter Berger's sociological analysis of the ways in which minority groups respond to antagonistic societies - which in Berger's example consists of religious groups faced by modernity (1970, p.30-37). Thus, for Berger, defiance involves "establishing a counter community...which makes strong claims on the loyalty and solidarity of its members" (p.33). "It entails an attitude of the stiff upper lip, a steadfast refusal to go native, a (literally or otherwise) pontifical insouciance about the opinions of mankind" (p.31). Surrender, according to Berger, is "the polar opposite of defiance". "It represents the self liquidation of [one's ideology] and of the institutions in which the [ideological] tradition is embodied" (p.36). "In this option the cognitive authority and superiority of whatever is taken to be the prevailing weltanschauung is conceded with few reservations" (p.34). Adaptation, Berger argues, refers to a tactic of 
aggiornamento. "Cognitively, this stance involves a
bargaining process with [contemporary] thought, a surrender of some traditional items while others are kept" (p.36). It results in institutional modifications and "entails a process of rethinking, the end results of which are hard to predict" (ibid).

How these concepts shaped and emerged from instructional material will shortly become apparent. At the moment, the point is that these terms have been selected as experimental items because of the instructional role they were expected to play. Their centrality to the content of instruction made them potentially important indicators of conceptual change.

The selection of one more concept needs to be explained: that of HISTORIANS. Here we were particular influenced by our experience of the pre-pilot exercise where this concept had been usefully included as part of an effort to introduce a reflexive element into the mapping exercise. In the pre-pilot this appears to have been relatively successful, in that it encouraged subjects to expose their conception of the procedures or structure of history. Thus, we were hoping to produce similar results by its inclusion here.

Use of mapping instrument: The mapping task was conducted in much the same way as in the pre-pilot exercise. All interviews were administered individually. First interviews took approximately 45 minutes and involved a short training session with eight daily concepts followed by a series of phases involving the thirteen concepts we have listed above, according to the procedure described in the pilot exercise on pages 142-3 and in Appendix 1. Subsequent interviews tended to take between 20 and 30 minutes and did not involve any preliminary or training phases.

The Bnei Akiva group participated in three rounds of mapping interviews. It was intended to compare the first pre-test
round with a subsequent post-test, or a post-instructional round, in an attempt to explore dimensions associated with conceptual change in history.

A post-post-test round was conducted more than two months later with subjects who had not yet returned to England in an effort to establish the empirical reliability of this tool. Subjects did not receive any planned or formal instruction in Jewish history between the second and third rounds of interviews, and it was hoped therefore to examine the consistency or stability of the maps produced by interviews.

Finally, the Machon group participated in a pre-instruction round, since it was hoped that the data generated by this exercise could be compared with data produced by the Bnei Akiva pre-test in an attempt to correlate differences between maps and other background variables as well as to establish categories for identifying differences between forms of Jewish historical knowledge.

Audio recordings were made of all interviews. The results of these were used in helping to produce neat and final copies of the 21 cognitive maps ultimately produced. [These have been collected in Appendix 5.]

Some effort was made to ensure that the experimental methodology not only made 'human sense' to the interviewee (Donaldson 1978) but that it should not threaten the interviewee by seeming to seek to measure their capabilities or attributes. To this end, each test was preceded by an explanation and discussion about what was happening. During this it was explained that the exercise had been developed as part of a project which was not in fact testing how much individual people did or did not know but which was interested, instead, in exploring the different kinds of education Jewish young people had received and how they had been affected.
Design of Instruction: Following the pre-test round of interviews the Bnei Akiva group participated in a Jewish history course which was provided for all those involved in their programme. This, as we have said, consisted of five, one hour long, units, which were collectively entitled "Reactions to the Destruction of the Second Temple".

The instructional materials are included in Appendix 4. In brief, we can say that the five teaching units consisted of the following:

1. An introductory unit looking at the centrality of Jerusalem and the Temple during ancient times.

2. A series of three units looking at three types of Jewish response to the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans, including:
   a) Surrender and despair
   b) Defiance and resistance
   c) Adaptation

3. A final unit examining how realistic this typology is, as well its applicability to other periods of Jewish history.

Instructional materials and methods were shaped by three principles. First, that students should see how traditional Jewish sources can be treated from a critical and historical perspective. Talmudical texts which might, therefore, have been familiar from a yeshiva context, like that which relates to the handing over of Jewish suspects to gentile authorities, were shown to serve as legitimate historical sources, if handled appropriately.

Secondly, the course was moulded by an effort to explain the events of Jewish history without recourse to theological categories. Thus, students would probably have been already
familiar with miraculous explanations concerning the establishment of the Sanhedrin at Yavneh by Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai. Here, they encountered a range of explanations for this event which were offered from a critical historical perspective.

Thirdly, and related to this, it was hoped that students would encounter a critical theory of Jewish history, that is, a comprehensive explanation of developments in Jewish history which was entirely secular and rational. It was assumed that Berger's typology of minority responses to crisis replaced the assumptions of memorial Jewish history with a set of assumptions taken from the social sciences, and as such constituted a rival theory.

Although it is possible to submit instructional materials to critical analysis, so as to determine how well they conform to these principles, there are bound to be uncertainties associated with the analysis of the conceptual content of instructional practice. We conducted the course ourselves, which from one perspective may be regarded as advantageous, in that instruction was carried out with careful attention to our experimental concerns. However, from another perspective, this is obviously problematic, in that in this situation it was difficult to gain an objective assessment of the unintended as well as intended messages conveyed by instruction. In subsequent phases this is something that should be taken into account. However, in the context of what was essentially a pilot piece of research the advantages gained from close familiarity with the goals of instruction will probably have outweighed any attendant disadvantages.

From Generating Maps to Analysing Them

We would argue that the experimental methodology which we have just described makes possible the examination of two
hypotheses which should in turn shed light on the concerns we have been articulating since our first chapter:

1. That there are significant differences between the ways in which students from committed orthodox Jewish backgrounds conceive of Jewish history and those who do not share the same kind of upbringing.

2. That memorial conceptions of Jewish history are placed under strain by encounters with critical or historiographical accounts of the Jewish past.

In the next chapter we will describe the kind of instrument with which we have intended to test these claims, as well as the data which it has produced.
What to make of the twenty-one cognitive maps generated according to the procedures described in the previous chapter?

We have already explained that our research instrument has been designed to investigate (a) if there is a correlation between the conceptual representation of Jewish historical knowledge and other variables; and (b) if and how Jewish historical knowledge changes following an instructional intervention. The problem is that while it has been relatively straightforward identifying an instrument which might be appropriate for the generation of cognitive structure representations in Jewish history, it appears that establishing mechanisms with which to examine or analyse these representations will be more complicated. For, although a number of sophisticated semantic or structural schema have been developed in order to examine changes in cognitive structure as a result of instruction (see, for example, Hoz et al 1984, Kosminsky & Hoz 1992, or Cronin, Deckers & Dunn 1982, and Wallace & Mintzes 1990), it is difficult to see how the categories used in these schema will meaningfully correspond to changes or differences in the ways in which Jewish history is represented in cognitive structure.

In many ways, this is the essence of our challenge over the coming pages; how to establish analytical criteria with which to produce a valid analysis of different representations of Jewish historical knowledge? Certainly this is the heaviest question which will hang over us as we test out the two hypotheses which we formulated at the end of the last chapter.
At the time of the pre-test interviews we were struck by the quite different ways in which subjects from the Bnei Akiva and Machon groups talked about Jewish history and Jewish matters. This was not only in terms of what they said but also in the way they talked. The Machon group were more irreverent in conversation. Their thinking seemed more historical and less theological. As far as it was possible to gauge, they seemed to give a more prominent place to the Jewish people in their maps; a place which one sensed was occupied by God in the maps produced by the Bnei Akiva group. It also appeared that, generally speaking, each group's thinking hinged on a different set of central concepts.

Of course, it should be emphasized that these were very much first and immediate impressions. At the time it was difficult to know whether they accurately reflected experience or were the self-fulfilling product of research expectations. It is also difficult to know whether the more 'orthodox' responses produced by the Bnei Akiva interviewees were influenced by their perception of their relationship to the interviewer as somebody who once occupied a position of authority in their youth movement.

Nevertheless, these immediate impressions led us to try to identify patterns of difference between the two sets of maps produced by these groups, as well as to generate quantitative representations of these differences. Thus, although we had originally expected that we would have to develop sets of categories of our own with which to compare the maps produced by these two groups, we began our analysis by trying to apply already existing schemas to these maps.
We determined to examine 5 semantic and structural characteristics which we posited might be symptomatic of significant patterns of difference between cognitive structures, and proposed to look at these according to analytical specifications which we took with greater and lesser degrees of faithfulness from pre-existing examples. These characteristics included the identity of a central concept in the map; the total number of links in the map; the size of the semantic categories of the links between concepts in the cognitive map; the extent of concept grouping within the map; and the degree of vertical and horizontal extension of concepts.

These characteristics were pinpointed in the following ways:

1. The identity of a central concept: We proposed to measure this in two ways. (a) By following Hoz, Tomer and Tamir (1990) who take this to mean a substantial concept which is part of at least 15% of the possible links; and (b) by identifying the concept which was connected to the largest number of other concepts.

2. The total number of links in the map: This involved counting up the number of propositional links in the map, even if there was more than one link between the same two concepts. Theoretically, in a map containing 13 concepts there were 78 possible one-way propositional links.

3. The mean size of semantic categories: Following Mahler et al (1991), each link in the map was classified according to a semantic category, and the total number of links was divided by the number of semantic categories. [See Appendix 6 for the schedule of semantic categories.] The smaller the figure calculated the richer the variety of semantic categories. Or, from a different perspective, the higher the figure calculated the greater the semantic consistency with which propositions were conceived.
4. The extent of concept grouping in the map: This was found by counting up the number of concepts which had been included in subgroups, dividing this figure by the number of subgroups in the map and then adding to this the number of concepts not included in any subgroups. The more intensively a map was compartmentalized into subgroups the nearer the total would be to 1. If a map contained no subgroups the final total would be 13.

5. The degree of vertical and horizontal extension of concepts: This was an attempt to translate Novak's notion of hierarchy and branching (Novak & Gowin 1984) into terms which were more appropriate to historical knowledge. A score was calculated for temporal (vertical) extension where one point was given for each reasonable level of extension. A score was calculated for ahistorical (horizontal) extension and these two figures were then presented as a quotient in which the first figure was divided by the second. Quotients less than 1 reflect greater horizontal extension and less vertical extension. Quotients greater than 1 and nearer to 13 reflect greater vertical and less horizontal extension.

Results and Preliminary Discussion:

Table 1 depicts the five individual cognitive structure characteristics that were used to evaluate differences between two sets of maps. In substantive terms the main findings are as follows:

1. JEWISH PEOPLE was the central concept in half of the maps, within both the Bnei Akiva and Machon group. However, only two maps in the Bnei Akiva group and three in the Machon group filled Hoz, Tomer and Tamir's criterion for 'central' concepts, that is, involvement in at least 15% of links.
2. The number of propositional links within the Bnei Akiva group ranged between 16 and 25, with a mean of 20.66. In the Machon group, the number of links ranged between 17 and 23, with a mean of 20.16.

3. In the Bnei Akiva group the average number of links per semantic category ranged from 2.7 to 4.8 with a mean of 3.4. (The mean number of semantic categories into which the links were classified was 6.3). In the Machon group the average number of semantic categories ranged from 2.71 to 7.3, with a mean of 3.8. (The mean number of semantic categories into which links were classified was 5.8).

4. In the Bnei Akiva group the sub-grouping measure ranged from 3.25 to 11, with a mean of 7.31. In the Machon group the grouping measure ranged between 2.6 and 13, with a mean of 7.58.

5. In the Bnei Akiva group the quotient derived from the relation between vertical and horizontal extension ranged between 1.2 and 11, with a mean of 3.6. In the Machon group the quotient ranged between 0.57 and 11, with a mean of 3.95.

Table 1: Individual Cognitive Structure Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Central Concept</th>
<th>Number of links</th>
<th>Semantic Categories</th>
<th>Grouping</th>
<th>Horizontal-Vertical extension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avi #1</td>
<td>-- JUDAISM 5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael #1</td>
<td>11 J.PEOPLE 11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abi #1</td>
<td>7 J.PEOPLE 7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>Central Concept</td>
<td>Propositional Links</td>
<td>Semantic Category Size</td>
<td>Reliability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juliette#1</td>
<td>J.PEOPLE 5</td>
<td>LAND OF ISRAEL</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yair #1</td>
<td>G-D 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen #1</td>
<td>SURRENDER 5</td>
<td>TEMPLE</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jo #1</td>
<td>J.PEOPLE 9</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon #1</td>
<td>J.PEOPLE 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandy #1</td>
<td>J.PEOPLE 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy #1</td>
<td>JUDAISM 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel #1</td>
<td>TEMPLE 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayai #1</td>
<td>LAND OF IS. 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inevitably, one is compelled to ask what these statistics are supposed to mean. The features listed here have all be chosen for examination because, of all the dimensions investigated in other analytical schema, they seemed to have promised some relevance to the testing of historical knowledge. Thus, we presumed:

1) that the notion of a 'central concept' would reveal something about the particular focus of each map.

2/3) that the number of propositional links and the mean size of semantic categories might suggest how far maps were constructed according to one dominant schema. We posited that the smaller the number in each case, the greater the extent to
which maps had been shaped by one overarching sense of their content.

4) that the intensity and extent of subgrouping would point to similar features. We imagined that a map which was strongly historical would most likely not be broken up into smaller subgroups.

5) that the relationship between vertical and horizontal extension would strongly indicate the extent to which a map was or was not historical. Maps which produced a quotient which was less than 1 would probably reflect an ahistorical conception.

The problem is that, other than in one dimension, there do not seem to be consistent differences between the maps produced by the two groups. Only with regards to the extent of variation from the mean (the standard deviation) in the relationship between horizontal and vertical extension does any kind of pattern or difference emerge. In this particular case it may imply that maps in the Machon group are either strongly historical or strongly ahistorical but it certainly does not point to a pattern of similarity or difference between the maps produced by the Machon group and those produced by the Bnei Akiva group.

What these results imply is in fact very hard to say. Possibly, they suggest that there is actually little difference between the cognitive structures of orthodox and non-orthodox subjects with regards to Jewish history, contrary, that is, to our original hypothesis and contrary to our immediate pre-test impressions. More likely, they suggest that the sample here is too small to produce stable or clear patterns of similarity or difference between the groups. With only six subjects in each group one or two exceptional maps will dramatically distort data. Equally likely, the results here suggest that the kind of quantitative analysis to which
they owe their origin is not properly sensitive to real differences or similarities which might exist between different conceptions of Jewish history. They seem to suggest that this will continue to be the case at least until we have developed a set of analytical categories which are specifically designed with the conceptual representation of (Jewish) historical knowledge in mind.

Moving Towards an Analytical Approach Which is Sensitive to the Form and Content of Jewish Historical Knowledge

These conclusions (and in particular the last one) have encouraged us to pursue (actually, to devise) a different approach to the analysis of conceptual maps of Jewish historical knowledge. Instead of attempting to generate quantifiable differences between maps or between sets of maps according to criteria which are largely structural, we have set out to explore what it is that gives each map its particular identity and meaning, intending to return, only later, to the issue of difference from there. We have therefore tried to identify maps which seem to be as similar to each other as possible and have only then tried to examine why they nevertheless differ from one other.

The immediate consequences of this approach are striking. First, and in the most general terms, we have found that a significant number of maps can be matched up even though they originate in different experimental groups. (Compare, for example, Karen#1 or Yair#1 from the Bnei Akiva group with Ayal#1 or Simon#1 from the Machon group). It is noticeable that while these maps appear to be very similar in structural and even some semantic terms, they still represent very different ways of conceiving of Jewish history.

This impression is reinforced by two further examples. Thus, we found that the most stable component in the Bnei Akiva pool
of maps was the matrix of 'commonplace concepts', that is, G-D, JUDAISM, LAND OF ISRAEL and JEWISH PEOPLE. These were at the core of all Bnei Akiva pre-test maps and continued to hold together (albeit with some intriguing changes) in post-test maps.

The interesting thing is that these same matrixes also appear in very similar fashion in most of the maps produced by the Machon group, even though one would probably characterize their general representation as reflecting a different view of Jewish history. Thus, while the form and content of the core Jewish matrixes within the two sets of maps appear to have been similar, the meaning of these matrixes was quite different.

Finally, we noticed that while it is possible to identify maps which possess almost the same general conceptual structure (even beyond their core Jewish matrixes) these same maps nevertheless communicate quite different meanings as a result of the labels or titles which interviewees give to the map as a whole (eg. Karen#1 and Mandy#1). In other words, it seems that maps can look quite similar in both semantic and structural terms but because of what appear to be small semantic differences (the titles attached to them) they can mean something quite different.

We would argue that all of this points towards a number of important implications. First, it appears to suggest that maps are most meaningful if treated holistically, without making artificial distinctions between their structural and semantic content. In other words, it is likely that any analysis which focuses on discrete aspects of maps (whether these are structural or semantic) will generate distorted findings which will not reflect subtle features in a person's cognitive structure.
Although, evidently, structure can by itself strongly point to completely different ways of conceiving of historical knowledge (compare, for example, Michael#1 with Jo#1) its significance is probably much more subtle and contingent. This, we will hazard, is because by providing two-dimensional representations of cognitive structure, cognitive maps are bound to conceal as well as reveal information about the rich, thick and tangled business which is human cognition.

Secondly, and perhaps more important, these findings seem to affirm those semantic theories of memory according to which knowledge is stored in long term memory in propositional format rather than as a bare matrix of concepts. This view, as we explained in chapter 4, has been influentially argued by Anderson and Bower (1973) who conceive of long term memory as a propositional structure in which elemental propositions are organized. We would argue that this theory provides powerful support for the kind of analysis which appears to be required here, since it is an easy and defensible step from Anderson's theory to argue that the representation of knowledge should be examined according to the way concepts have been formulated as propositions and not just in the way they have been stored or organized.

In fact Andersonian theory provides theoretical support for a further methodological position that is implicated here. In semantic memory theory the propositional content of knowledge is as significant as its structure. This means that the number of variables available for the examination of the representation of knowledge are therefore infinitely greater, since cognitive structure will be examined not only according to a limited number of structural and a slightly greater number of semantic criteria but in terms of the substantive content of each individual semantic component within a proposition.
In short Andersonian theory precludes the easy reduction of the external representation of memory by quantitative analysis. It also precludes the subjection of concept maps to pseudo-positivistic methodologies which purport to expose changes in individual components of cognitive structure over time or under discrete influences. For, memory, according to this theory, is not only structure and organization it is (no matter how automatic) the semantic transformation of concepts into propositions and that is a process with an infinite number of possible outcomes.

Before we proceed to setting out the kind of analysis which we therefore think is appropriate to the examination of cognitive structure there is one lingering doubt which needs to be tackled. By rejecting the notion that concept maps cannot be used to measure discrete changes in internal human processes or that data generated from them cannot be subjected to quantitative analysis, we may appear to have implied that concept mapping methodologies cannot serve as reliable research tools. Indeed, from this perspective, concept maps may seem to be incorrigibly idiosyncratic, changing in each interview in a potentially limitless number of ways.

This, it cannot be sufficiently stressed, is not our intention. In fact it is appropriate to cite here evidence we have accumulated of the test-retest reliability of the cognitive probe we have been using. As we explained earlier, the main purpose behind our carrying out a post-post-test round of interviews was in order to establish precisely to what extent our mapping instrument produced stable and consistent responses.

A comparison of the last two rounds of maps produced by the Bnei Akiva group (that is, two sets of maps produced with an interval of more than two half months between them) reveal extremely stable outcomes. Some interviewees produced almost identical maps despite such an interval between interviews.
(see, in particular, Michael#2 & #3 and Abi#2 & #3). Indeed, it is useful to note that informal conversation with the interviewees reveals that this stability is not a consequence of them successfully remembering what they did during the last round of interviews but is rather because, on separate occasions, interviewees produced maps which, they explained, really did seem to them to be the most (or only) logical way of representing these concepts.

Our argument is that concept mapping is capable of serving as a reliable methodology, but like all experimental methodologies it needs to be used for appropriate purposes and in suitable ways. Cognitive maps allow us to attend to what students know and how they organize their knowledge, even if they do not reproduce a direct copy of the internal representation of knowledge in memory. Cognitive probes like these possess the capacity to bring to view certain processes and structures, but we should not imagine that these structures exist independently of the stimulus which brings them into view. If used appropriately they might allow us to understand better the learner's behaviour or, to be precise, some of the cognitive processes which may underlie his or her behaviour. This, among other things, is what we now intend to test.

Proposing an Alternative Analytical Instrument for Examining Differences Between Cognitive Structures

We propose that some kind of descriptive analysis is most appropriate to the investigation of the cognitive representation of Jewish historical knowledge. By this, we do not mean a merely anecdotal discussion concerning a number of different maps, but rather a descriptive methodology which is anchored by a series of necessary categorical points of reference which are founded both on a general sense of the distinctive premises of semantic memory theory as well as on
an awareness of the peculiar disciplinary features of Jewish history.

In part, this will involve developing a language or at least a set of concepts which will make it possible to talk about maps with precision and meaning. However, it will probably not involve having to create an analytical language *ex nihilo* since our research methodology is not without an ancestry of its own. We intend, therefore, to work towards developing a descriptive language of our own by first borrowing, when appropriate, from related lexicons in the concept mapping tradition, even if this may lead to an initial awkwardness in our analysis.

We propose that a descriptive treatment of the cognitive structure of Jewish historical knowledge should consider at least the following six features:

1. *Title of Map:* In many ways, this is the most underexamined map feature raised by the ConSAT methodology. In fact, we have been unable to find one reference which until now has made use of this category for analytical purposes, even though the ConSAT mapping instrument invites subjects to commit themselves on this front. One suspects that this is because map titles are not, strictly speaking, part of cognitive structure. Rather, they constitute the interviewee's second order reflection on what he or she thinks their cognitive map represents.

Given our declared intent to treat concept maps holistically, rather than as a collection of separate components, we suspect that titles could serve as useful indicators of what maps as a whole represent. Arguably, they allow interviewees to articulate conceptions whose content is more meaningful than merely taking a sum of the propositional parts of the map.
We propose that analysis should, therefore, first consider what the relationship is between the title and the rest of the map. What, if anything, does the title add to the meaning of the map? Does a map's title offer any clues concerning the general conceptual orientation behind the map? For example, is the map essentially about the Jewish people and/or is it about God? Does it have limited historical concerns or a general theological focus?

2. Identity of cardinal concept(s): Careful attention has been given to the formulation of this category. The term 'cardinal' is not intended to serve as a synonym for 'central', nor is it supposed to be identified in the same way as central concepts have been in other mapping traditions (see page 171 & 174 above).

We have found that although maps can contain concepts which are part of more propositions than any other concept, often these are not the concepts around which the rest of the map is organized or on which a central chain of propositions hang. This is what we intend to convey by using the term cardinal. This category represents the attempt to identify a concept on which the rest of the map hinges or around which it revolves. This may be a concept which is connected to the greatest number of propositions - but not necessarily. Our point is that the identity of this concept cannot be identified in only quantitative or structural terms.

3. Representation of commonplace Jewish concepts: Our earlier argument in chapter 7 leads us to posit that the way these four concepts are represented will provide the clearest indication of the view of Jewish history which shapes different cognitive structures.

In structural terms we will want to know whether they form a self-sufficient block or whether they are dispersed throughout the map like other concepts. Does their arrangement effect the
shape of the map or are they merely features within a larger system?

In semantic terms we will want to know whether these formal terms have been given theological, historical or some other content. Can we construe their representation as symptomatic of a particular theory of Jewish history or is this reading too much into their expression?

4. Grammatical Tense: Cognitive structure probes have not until now paid any attention to the grammatical tense in which propositions are framed. It is possible, however, that this characteristic will serve as an important indicator of the nature of Jewish historical knowledge.

In chapter two we frequently argued that critical history is founded on a conception of history as reconstruction, and of the past as no longer being present. We also suggested that, in contrast, when conceived according to the terms of memorial knowledge, the past is regarded as continuing to live in the present or that it can at least be recaptured. It is tempting to suggest that the grammatical tenses used to articulate propositional structures may point to distinctions such as these and to others. We will therefore want to know if and which propositions have been framed in the present, the discontinuous past or the continuous past tense.

5. Guiding Metaphors: We have been encouraged by the work of Shulman and others on knowledge growth in teachers (cf. Wilson et al 1987) to develop a category for the analysis of cognitive structure which pays attention to the way in which propositional networks may be powerfully shaped by a guiding metaphor. Shulman talks about the way teachers transform subject matter into an ever widening repertoire of conceptual, metaphorical and analogic 'representations'. We suspect that any form of subject matter which has been mastered by anyone will have been submitted to some major idea (Yinger 1979), master
story (Gudmondsdottir 1988) or metaphor and that this may well emerge during the representation of cognitive structure (and not exclusively in the map's title). Indeed, there is reason to suggest that the very act of producing a cognitive map is conducive to the conscious articulation of such metaphors. As Novak and Gowin have argued, "mapping is not merely descriptive it is inherently formative" (op cit). Concept mapping is an exercise in metalearning, that is, it enables the learner to see what they have learnt; and it is frequently at such moments that learning takes on a discernable shape within a particular metaphor.

6. Item representation: This category constitutes the experimental corollary of Anderson's premise that the propositional content of knowledge is as significant as its structure. As we have said, from this perspective, cognitive structure should be examined not only according to a limited number of structural and a slightly greater number of grammatical criteria but according to the content of each individual component within a propositional network.

Concepts were selected for inclusion in the interview instrument on the grounds that they would sensitively indicate differences between, or changes in, the representation of Jewish historical knowledge. Therefore, although one cannot expect every concept in every map to operate in this way, it is reasonable to anticipate that analysis will be sensitive to the way in which each single concept has been framed. This, we would argue, is the experimental implication of Anderson's thesis; that any (and, arguably, every) proposition in each map has the capacity to signal something of significance about the content of cognitive structure. Indeed, one suspects that this is even more likely to be the case when concepts have been chosen with as much care as they have been here.
Using Analytical Categories to Establish Paradigms in the Conceptual Representation of Jewish Historical Knowledge

Having established a number of formal categories with which to anchor a descriptive analysis of cognitive structure, we intend to preface our examination of the two sets of pre-test maps with what we hope will be a useful elaborative exercise.

The six analytical categories which we have described have primarily been expressed in formal terms, which makes it difficult to imagine what they would look like in respect of the particular content of the conceptual representation of Jewish historical knowledge. Although it is hoped that they will enable us to identify characteristics of Jewish historical knowledge - since that is their 
raison d'être - it will be difficult to judge what these characterizations mean in real terms, without first establishing analytical ideal types of the ways in which Jewish historical knowledge appears in cognitive structure. This is what we mean by carrying out an elaborative exercise, for we propose to elaborate on the content of each of these analytical categories in terms of a number of paradigmatic cognitive representations of Jewish historical knowledge.

We therefore propose to compare three maps which we think can serve as suitable contexts within which to identify and elaborate on different characteristics or dimensions of the cognitive representation of Jewish historical knowledge. These maps are Karen#1, Jo#1 and Simon#1 - all three of which have been composed by articulate young people who have not only taken the exercise seriously but who have also produced rich examples of cognition.
(i) A Theological Paradigm

Karen's propositional network begins with GOD - "There is here a gradation from the big master to a focal point - the Temple". However, it does not merely offer a simplified version of a traditionalist reading of history, it is representing something which "is a very philosophical idea". As she explains, "JUDAISM is a theology of GOD". This appears to be a sophisticated but faith-full way of conceiving of a relationship normally seen as narrowly causative, as in the case of Michael#1, for example, where "GOD commanded us JUDAISM as a way of life" or Avi#1 - "JUDAISM came through GOD choosing the JEWISH PEOPLE".

Karen's map is anchored by a concept of GOD as well as by a subsequent chain made up of the commonplace concepts of Judaism. This is paradigmatic of traditional thinking, where concept maps start from God (as in 5 of the 6 maps produced by the subjects in the Bnei Akiva group) and work through the remaining commonplace Jewish concepts in a unidirectional manner. While in some analytical traditions this kind of unidirectional structure may be judged symptomatic of immature or unsophisticated thinking (see, for example, Novak & Gowin op cit) it is likely that this is not the case here given the complex and imaginative organization of the remaining concepts in Karen's map. In this example, the chain effect is almost certainly a faithful representation of traditional conceptual organization, where these commonplace concepts are conceived of as flowing ineluctably one from the other.

From an exclusively structural perspective it would be difficult to judge whether the remaining concepts in the map have been represented in a way which is either traditional or not. After all, it is hard to imagine how the relative location of concepts like WAR or DEFIANCE would change as a result of the maps generally traditional or critical character. However, if the map's general title ("History of
the Jews relationship to God") is recognized as having significance, then all the remaining concepts in the map do assume a distinctive colour which, in this case, is essentially theological and not merely historiographic.

In this context, even the map's structure may be seen as complementing or contributing to its generally traditionalist character, since, one might say, that in the lower portion of the map Karen seeks to separate off the most obviously secular concepts in the set (WAR, ROMANS and DESTRUCTION) without entirely surrendering the possibility that they possess some religious meaning. To this extent, Karen's thinking provides a tantalizing psychological counterpart to modern orthodox Jewish philosophy of history. It compartmentalizes the secular from the religious, although it does not surrender the possibility that these parts may ultimately exist in a historical unity. Indeed, as Karen herself explains, WAR led to "theological consequences" in the "ADAPTATION of Jewish spiritual life to life after the DESTRUCTION of the TEMPLE". Thus, while the map may deal with the events of the historical past, it still views them from a fundamentally theological perspective.

It might be argued that the place occupied by the concept HISTORIANS jars with much of our analysis. After all, the interviewee even suggests that this concept "encompasses everything". However, it can probably be argued that in actual fact this concept possesses a second order role. It represents a "point of view" (the interviewee's words) about the map. It is as if it has been included as an after-thought. (Indeed, on returning to the recording of the interview, it was found that this literally was the case.) It does not provide a rival centre of gravity. Instead, it stands outside the particular conceptual universe of this map and looks in on it.

More subtle still, is the question of which grammatical tense the interviewee has used to describe the arrangement of these
concepts. For, an intriguing bifurcation seems to have occurred. On the one hand, all the commonplace Jewish concepts exist in the present tense. For example, "JUDAISM is a theology of G-D", "Out of JUDAISM comes the JEWISH PEOPLE", and perhaps most significantly, "The TEMPLE is the focal point of the JEWISH PEOPLE". The remaining concepts have been described using the past tense, with the concept TEMPLE serving as the bridge between the past and present. Thus, "the RABBIS were running the show in the TEMPLE", DEFIANCE came from the RABBIS", and "SURRENDER started off as DEFIANCE", etc.

The point is not so much that the map has been constructed using two different tenses, but that the two have been so sharply separated. While the part which contains the core Jewish concepts operates in a timeless present, the other 'secular' part describes events which are entirely from and within the past. In this way the map is an almost pristine representation of an encounter between the different perspectives offered by synchronic and diachronic views of the relationship between the past and the present (de Saussure, cited by Faur 1987) and thus provides extraordinarily cogent exemplification of the philosophical notions we developed in previous chapters.

(ii) A Sociological Paradigm

The map created in Jo#1 may also serve as a paradigm of its type, since it offers a bold and articulate depiction of a certain view of the core concepts of Jewish history.

There is little doubt here as to the concept on which the rest of the map hinges. It is not just that JEWISH PEOPLE is connected to so many more concepts than any other single concept, it is also that so many of the propositions or chains
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

HISTORIANS

RABBIS

JUDAISM

JEWISH PEOPLE

DESPERATION

DESTRUCTION

ROMANS

GOD

TEMPLE

LAND OF ISRAEL

DEFIANCE

ADAPTATION

RETURN TO ISRAEL

THE JEWISH PEOPLE

1. A knowledge of
   history and culture

2. The Jewish faith has
   adapted to different
   circumstances.

3. The Jewish community
   has faced challenges
   throughout history.

4. A sense of
desperation

5. Reconstruction

6. Return to

7. The Jewish people
   have maintained
   their identity.

8. The Jewish people
   have adapted.

9. The Jewish people
   have returned to
   their homeland.

10. The Jewish people
    have established
     new communities.

11. The Jewish people
    have preserved
     their culture.

12. The Jewish people
    have faced
     discrimination.

13. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their faith.

14. The Jewish people
    have adapted to
     new circumstances.

15. The Jewish people
    have returned to
     their homeland.

16. The Jewish people
    have preserved
     their identity.

17. The Jewish people
    have faced
     challenges.

18. The Jewish people
    have adapted.

19. The Jewish people
    have returned to
     their homeland.

20. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their culture.

21. The Jewish people
    have preserved
     their faith.

22. The Jewish people
    have adapted to
     new circumstances.

23. The Jewish people
    have faced
     discrimination.

24. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their identity.

25. The Jewish people
    have adapted.

26. The Jewish people
    have returned to
     their homeland.

27. The Jewish people
    have preserved
     their culture.

28. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their faith.

29. The Jewish people
    have adapted to
     new circumstances.

30. The Jewish people
    have faced
     discrimination.

31. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their identity.

32. The Jewish people
    have adapted.

33. The Jewish people
    have returned to
     their homeland.

34. The Jewish people
    have preserved
     their culture.

35. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their faith.

36. The Jewish people
    have adapted to
     new circumstances.

37. The Jewish people
    have faced
     discrimination.

38. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their identity.

39. The Jewish people
    have adapted.

40. The Jewish people
    have returned to
     their homeland.

41. The Jewish people
    have preserved
     their culture.

42. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their faith.

43. The Jewish people
    have adapted to
     new circumstances.

44. The Jewish people
    have faced
     discrimination.

45. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their identity.

46. The Jewish people
    have adapted.

47. The Jewish people
    have returned to
     their homeland.

48. The Jewish people
    have preserved
     their culture.

49. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their faith.

50. The Jewish people
    have adapted to
     new circumstances.

51. The Jewish people
    have faced
     discrimination.

52. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their identity.

53. The Jewish people
    have adapted.

54. The Jewish people
    have returned to
     their homeland.

55. The Jewish people
    have preserved
     their culture.

56. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their faith.

57. The Jewish people
    have adapted to
     new circumstances.

58. The Jewish people
    have faced
     discrimination.

59. The Jewish people
    have maintained
     their identity.

60. The Jewish people
    have adapted.
of propositions which make up this map start from the JEWISH PEOPLE. Jo's propositional network is as much anchored by the JEWISH PEOPLE as Karen's was by the concept GOD.

Importantly, however, the overall title applied to the map does not indicate that it depicts anything distinctively historical. It is described as "A brief overview of the Jewish people". From this it is also clear that it is not an explicitly theological representation and yet, if anything, the title seems to indicate an ahistorical or sociological orientation, where the overriding concern is with a people rather than with a god.

This impression is powerfully confirmed by the grammatical tense in which almost all of the propositions are couched. Only one proposition in the entire map is constructed in the discontinuous historical past - "the TEMPLE was destroyed by the ROMANS". All other propositions exist either in the present or in the continuous past, for example, "The JEWISH PEOPLE have adapted their religion...", "the JEWISH PEOPLE have been in the DIASPORA" or "HISTORIANS have traced the steps of the JEWISH PEOPLE". In this way, the past is viewed instrumentally, in terms of its role or impact on the present, but not as an organizing frame of reference in itself. The Jewish past is viewed in terms of how it has shaped the Jewish people today, that is, sociologically rather than historically.

This sociological orientation is reinforced by the location of the most explicitly historical concepts in the map (TEMPLE and ROMANS). These have been organized in an almost self-enclosed arrangement on the periphery of the map, where they do not exercise any influence on the final arrangement of concepts. These, as the map's title suggests, are concerned with describing the Jewish people. As is proper, a "brief overview" does make mention of the Jewish people's history, since the past is a datum which contributes to what the Jewish people
are today. In this context though, history merely serves as the handmaiden of sociology.

Intriguingly, then, while this map would seem to be more ahistorical than the most traditionalist of representations, it is nevertheless intrinsically secular. Commonplace Jewish concepts have been linked directly from one to another, as they are in traditionalist maps, and yet in both structural and semantic terms this conceptual structure does not even hint at a theological or traditionalist orientation. Here, GOD is described as something which the JEWISH PEOPLE believe in, the LAND OF ISRAEL is a place towards which the JEWISH PEOPLE pray, JUDAISM is a religion which the JEWISH PEOPLE have adapted. Thus, core concepts are held together, but not in a chain of inevitability or in an organic interrelationship, but rather as the differentiated components which give meaning to one superordinate concept - the JEWISH PEOPLE. It is tantalysing affirmation for the claim that sociology has replaced theology as the governing conceptual framework for contemporary Jews (see, for example Sacks 1989). The commonplaces of Judaism have been stable, by definition, but their meaning has been fundamentally transformed into the terms of sociology. Certainly, this is a powerful demonstration of the way in which a person's cognitive orientation (their master story) shapes their conceptual organization (see, for example, Gudmonsdottir op cit).

If it is proposed that this map serves as an ideal type for a particular orientation to the core concepts of Judaism, it must come with a few reservations. For while it generally offers a phenomological or sociological description of core Jewish concepts, this is not totally so. During the course of supplemental questioning (after the map had been described once) Jo explains that "GOD has a hand in the DEFIANCE of the JEWISH PEOPLE" and that "the JEWISH PEOPLE will never SURRENDER." The tone and content of both these statements are
quite different from the rest of the map, in that they are possibly normative and certainly non-verifiable. Of course, one might argue that as supplemental statements their status is less solid than that of other propositions in the map, but then, it can equally be argued that, coming as an afterthought, they may be less self-conscious or more honest expressions of cognitive structure.

(iii) A Critical/Historical Paradigm

Simon#1 is a different kind of map again. Superficially, it shows some resemblance to Karen#1, for example in its unidirectional structure and in the location of GOD at one pole of the map (in an apparently cardinal position) with HISTORIANS at the other pole. This however, is a useful demonstration of how misleading it can be to analyse maps on the basis of a partial selection of features. For, it can be convincingly shown that this map is some way from offering a traditionalist organization or formulation of Jewish and historical concepts, even if it is not totally consistent in its presentation.

In the first place, as the overall title shows, this map is concerned with the particular. It is "A chronological history(ish) of the birth of the first State of Israel". Thus, although the interviewee has been presented with what are essentially formal concepts he has given them a particular, time-bound field of reference or application, in a manner which, one might say, is characteristic of history as a field of knowledge (Rogers 1972). This is not a description of timeless truths or of God's role in history, it is the description of particular historical events. Thus, Simon has given a particular historical meaning to all of these concepts in the same way as many other interviewees do, less surprisingly, in their post-teaching maps (eg, Karen#2 -
"Destruction of the second Temple", Michael#2 - "Conquest of Israel by the Romans", and Juliette#2 - "Destruction of the Temple and how the Jewish people coped").

Equally significant is the way Simon repeatedly emphasises how he conceives of the map as representing a chronology. Not only does this show in the general title, but also at other points during the interview (eg, "one might add more historical facts in a chronology like this", and "this is a chronological diagram of what happened from very early in Jewish history to the destruction of the temples and the Roman period.") One is tempted to say that chronology serves as the map's guiding metaphor and may perhaps explain its unidirectional structure, whereby one concept leads to another in a continuing chronological chain of events. Certainly, the impression is of a map shaped by an historical rather than a theological orientation.

If, then, the map describes a history of the Jews at a particular period of time, it is a long way from providing a faith-full account of that history. Although GOD may stand at one pole, this concept is connected with some skepticism to the rest of the map, via the JEWISH PEOPLE - "GOD choosing (supposedly) the JEWISH PEOPLE." In bald numerical terms GOD is not actually connected to more concepts than even one other concept in the entire map. Meanwhile, the commonplace Jewish concepts occupy what is at best an ambiguous role. They may all be connected to one another in a roundabout fashion and each in its own separate way may occupy a prominent position in the map, but they do not exhibit a related or decisive preeminence. They cannot be identified as existing as a unit or a distinctive group among the other concepts in the map.

Two of the commonplace concepts do, nevertheless, appear to play especially prominent roles. JUDAISM is described as "encompassing the whole lot" (all the other concepts ?) although it is by no means clear how. If anything, there is a
sense in which JUDAISM is being used as a synonym for Jewish history - "JUDAISM encompasses the whole lot from the time God first makes a covenant with Abraham to the history of the Jewish people developing cultures etc." It is possible that this description as well as its location reveals that despite the prominence given to this concept there is some indecision about what to do with it, particularly given that it is physically connected only to two other concepts in the map.

Less ambiguous is the role played by the JEWISH PEOPLE. This is not only the most widely connected concept, it also probably plays a cardinal role within the map, given its influence on concepts which in structural terms are some distance from it. As Simon makes clear in a number of places, this is a "history of the Jewish people developing", "of the Jewish people in the land of Israel". It is one more reason for arguing that the entire representation is shaped by a critical historical orientation rather than a theological or traditional one.

It could be said that this claim is somewhat undermined by the grammatical tense in which the map is couched, for there is no general tendency to describe even a major part of the concepts in a past focused fashion, as one might have expected from a historical description. But then, there is probably no consistent tendency of any sort here. Arguably, Karen#1 and Jo#1 were exceptional in their consistent use of grammatical tense. This map is more typical of the other samples we have generated, in that its grammatical tense cannot be viewed as symptomatic of any particular cognitive orientation.

This might also be said of the relative position of historical, sociological and theological concepts here. Although a historical story has been outlined and although certain concepts have been linked in a predictable fashion (for example, ROMANS and TEMPLE) others like (ADAPTATION, WAR, RABBIS and JUDAISM) have been placed in positions for which
there are neither equivalents in other maps, nor consistent structural criteria which they might meet in and of themselves.

Although this lack of consistency may raise questions about the map's historicity, it does make it more typical of the other maps we have obtained. For, as we have said, there are few which have been drawn with the rigor or consistency which characterize Karen#1 and Jo#1. However, within the set of maps we possess, Simon#1 does come closest to serving as an ideal type for a critical/historical organization of Jewish history because of its chronological orientation, because of the absence if not the rejection of a theological perspective and because of the centrality of the Jewish people within it. These are features which are characteristic of non-memorial Jewish historical knowledge and which can therefore serve as points of reference against which to compare other maps.

Preliminary Discussion

One of the most striking things about these paradigms is that there are actually three of them. Until now, when we have talked about Jewish historical knowledge it has been in terms of two alternatives - critical historical knowledge and memorial knowledge. Indeed, our attempt to construct these paradigms began in the expectation that we would produce two exemplary polar cases. It was only as we began to work through Jo#1 that we discovered that although this was not a memorial or theological map it was not a historical map either. It was only as a result of identifying the kinds of features which we have described above that we were led towards the notion of a sociological mapping paradigm.

This outcome allows us to make a further claim. For, no doubt, it could be said that the kind of analysis we have just attempted is in danger of reading too much into maps or at
least of finding in them precisely or only those things for
which we have been looking. This is a danger inherent in all
interpretative methodologies, and in a less intimate piece of
research there are certain precautions we would have to take
in order to limit these dangers, as we will explain in the
next chapter. For the moment, however, we would argue that the
unexpected consequences which have resulted from this exercise
may well justify our claim that it has been carried out with
reasonable care and appropriate rigor. After all, our analysis
must have been conducted with some objectivity if it produced
an outcome which was significantly different from our original
expectations.

One more point is worth making at this stage. For, it will
have been apparent that each of these three analyses has been
led by some rather than all of the analytical categories in
our scheme. Thus, we did not pay much attention to the notion
of guiding metaphor in Karen#1 although it was important to
our interpretation of Simon#1. Similarly, we identified
grammatical tense as being a significant indicator in both
Jo#1 and Karen#1 but not in Simon#1.

We would argue that this fluidity of analysis is consistent
with the experimental principles behind our methodology, in
that it is interested more in the overall meaning conveyed by
cognitive structures than in the detailed description of their
particular parts. This also explains why we did not work
through these categories in the same consistent order.
Analysis was led as far as possible by the particular content
of each map.

Using Categories to Conduct a Comparative Analysis of the
Conceptual Representation of Jewish Historical Knowledge.

Having said all of this, it is nevertheless evident that any
attempt to conduct a comparative analysis of two different
sets of maps will require adapting the methodology we have just exemplified. If our identification of paradigm maps made use of a descriptive-analytical methodology in its ideal state, then our proposal to compare two groups of half a dozen maps will demand that we make some experimental concessions so as to make possible the analysis of larger quantities of data.

This is what we attempt to do over the following pages where we use the six analytical categories listed above in a way which is hopefully both systematic and holistic, and where map characteristics are described separately but without losing sense of the overall meaning which individual maps convey. By setting out data in this way we hope to facilitate the comparison of groups of maps without sacrificing the sense of insight into the individual which is one of the most endearing features of this kind of concept mapping research.
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<th>Bnei Akiva Group (pre-test)</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avi# 1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Not clear. Certainly one of the commonplace concepts. G-D anchors the map - &quot;where everything started from&quot;. But L/I also initiates major propositional chains.</td>
<td>Start with G-D, but the rest are predicated on one another. Personalized: &quot;Alot of the time of the Tanach[Bible] we were around the area of the L/I&quot;</td>
<td>Past and present merge. Eg. &quot;When we didn't have people as great as Moshe to lead us, we were given RABBIS&quot;.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Strongly personalized. &quot;We've always learnt to adapt&quot;. &quot;Since we've had the land there's been nothing but wars&quot;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael# 1</td>
<td>&quot;Elements in Judaism and challenges to it&quot;</td>
<td>JUDAISM dominates commonplace concepts. J.P. dominates rest of the map.</td>
<td>Personalized: &quot;G-D commanded us JUDAISM&quot;. Create separate &quot;Jewish Religion&quot; sub-group with RABBIS &amp; TEMPLE. Strong religious - theological flavour</td>
<td>Past seen from the present: &quot;A very important part of JUDAISM is the service in TEMPLE&quot; &quot;People try to adapt JUDAISM&quot;</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Separates secular from Jewish concepts. Would not have included HISTORIANS or ADAPTATION at all. Conceived as challenges to Judaism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abi #1</td>
<td>&quot;Jewish History&quot;</td>
<td>Probably isn't one. Many concepts are connected to four other concepts, in a dense matrix of inter-relationships.</td>
<td>Personalized: &quot;G-D promised the L.I. to us.&quot; Create separate sub-group in which &quot;Jewish Religion&quot; is explicitly separated from &quot;History.&quot; Theological (would like to have added Moshiach), and with one exception, in present tense Present dominating past. Thus, &quot;ROMANS destroyed the TEMPLE which is the closest people came to G-D&quot;</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>HISTORIANS is integral to map. It strongly influences other concepts. Would have preferred not to have included RABBIS &quot;It seems specific while other terms are more general.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juliette #1</td>
<td>&quot;Jewish History&quot;</td>
<td>JEWISH PEOPLE who, in turn, are G-D's chosen people With one exception, in present tense (eg. &quot;the J.P. are G-D's chosen people&quot;) Representationally self-sufficient, in fact, circular. Densely connected one with another.</td>
<td>Almost entirely in present tense but with interesting exceptions. Eg. &quot;TEMPLE was in the L/I&quot; &quot;DESTRUCTION of the TEMPLE led to ADAPTATION&quot;</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>WAR, DEFIANCE, SURRENDER and DESTRUCTION given no immediate historical meaning - they are &quot;aspects of war&quot;. HISTORIANS &quot;could encompass all of this&quot;. Also conceived as &quot;secular&quot;.</td>
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| Yair #1 | "Development of Judaism and the situation of the Jewish People" | G-D: "You could say that G-d is connected to everything" | Form a historical chain (of causation) "G-D created the J.P. to whom he promised the L.t. After that he gave them the Torah which is JUDAISM". | Generally discontinuous past. But "JUDAISM IS what makes the J.P. the J.P."
<p>| A historical chain&quot; | &quot;Would not have included HISTORIANS. They're not part of Judaism as it developed objectively&quot;. (Didn't know the meaning of ADAPTATION OR DEFIANCE) |
| Karren #1 | &quot;History of the Jews Relationship to G-d&quot; | G-D: &quot;There is a gradation from G-d to his religion and to his people, to the people's land and to the centre point of the people's land&quot; | Flow logically one into another. Constitute a &quot;theological&quot; conception (This is not a historical chain) Anchor whole map. | Clear demarcation between commonplace concepts - which are all in present tense - and rest of the map - which is all in discontinuous past tense. | ? | Even secular concepts like DESTRUCTION have &quot;theological consequences&quot;. HISTORIANS probably stands outside the particular conceptual universe of the map |</p>
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<tr>
<th>Machon Group (pre-test)</th>
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<th>Identity of Cardinal Concept</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jo #1</td>
<td>&quot;A Brief Overview of the Jewish People&quot;</td>
<td>JEWISH PEOPLE. It is not only connected to more concepts than any other, it also initiates many propositional chains.</td>
<td>Hold together as differentiated components which give meaning to one central concept. &quot;This is a JP&quot; have adapted their religion. &quot;JUDAISM&quot;. &quot;J P. live in the L/I.&quot; Sociological sense.</td>
<td>Only one proposition is in the discontinuous past tense. Otherwise past is viewed instrumentally, in terms of its role or impact on the present.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Historical concepts, like ROMANS, are self-enclosed on periphery, they provide backcloth for what the Jewish people are today.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simon #1</td>
<td>&quot;A Chronological History (ish) of the Birth of the State of Israel and also a Subjective Philosophical Comment on the Jews at the Time&quot;</td>
<td>Not clear. JUDAISM is said to &quot;encompass the whole lot&quot; but J.P. possesses strong structural and semantic influence. Thus, &quot;This is a history of the J.P. - of the J.P. in the L/I&quot;</td>
<td>Linked to one another only in a roundabout fashion. Cannot be identified as a distinct unit. &quot;G-D stands at one pole, but sceptically linked to rest of map.&quot; &quot;G-D choosing supposedly the J.P.&quot;</td>
<td>No consistent tendency in any direction.</td>
<td>Repeatedly emphasises how the map represents a chronology.</td>
<td>Most concepts linked as part of a historical story - and appear in a temporal chain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mandy #1</td>
<td>&quot;The Lifeline of the Jewish People&quot;</td>
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<td>(This gives uniformity to an otherwise compartmentalized map, broken down into &quot;The central elements of being a Jew&quot;. &quot;A particular period in Jewish history&quot; and &quot;A psychological view of a historical process&quot;)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not clear. Possibly G-d - &quot;central to everything happening and particularly the three things below&quot; (i.e. commonplace concepts)</td>
<td>All four are subgrouped together, mutually predicated on one another. They are characterized as &quot;the central elements of being a Jew&quot;. But this is not a traditional view. It is either a sociological or a phenomenological conception.</td>
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<td>Possibly J P because of the subgroup title, the main title and the concept's position.</td>
<td>Clear demarcation. All commonplace concepts are framed in present tense. Historical concepts - TEMPLE, ROMANS and DESTRUCTION are all in the discontinuous past. Sociological concepts (DEFIANCE, SURRENDER and ADAPTATION) are all in present tense.</td>
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<td>This is really three maps in one. There is unlikely to be one guiding metaphor, even if an attempt was made to articulate one.</td>
<td>Conceptual items given very specific meaning. TEMPLE, ROMANS and DESTRUCTION relate to a particular period in Jewish history. WAR, DEFIANCE, SURRENDER and ADAPTATION are represented in abstract (&quot;psychological&quot;) terms as features of history.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lucy #1</td>
<td>&quot;The Trials and Success of the Jewish People&quot;</td>
<td>JEWISH PEOPLE: Numerous propositions relate to the J.P. even if they are not propositionally linked. It is the referent for the map title. Yet, JUDAISM exerts a strong influence on much of the map.</td>
<td>There is tension between a non-theistic and atheistic view of these concepts. The concepts are dispersed but are strongly held together by J.P and JUDAISM/G-D which act like rival spheres of influence.</td>
<td>The present and the past are in competition. Parts of the map are consistently framed in the discontinuous past, other parts consistently in the present. Very few concepts are conceived in both past and present.</td>
<td>Horizontal axis of map is characterized as &quot;a lot like a timeline&quot;.</td>
<td>Items have been grouped in untypical ways. Eg. WAR is in a subgroup with JUDAISM and RABBIS. It is related to a fight for Jewish identity. DEFIANCE is presented as the opposite of ADAPTATION. DEFIANCE &quot;represents Israel - strength&quot;. ADAPTATION &quot;represents Diaspora - weakness&quot;</td>
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<td>Daniel #1</td>
<td>&quot;A Flow Scheme of Ideas&quot;</td>
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<td><strong>There are really three of them, in three separate subgroups: JUDAISM, WAR and HISTORIANS.</strong></td>
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<td>&quot;All three groups are completely separate&quot;</td>
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<td>Form self-contained group to which RABBIS has been added. Conceived in phenomenomological terms, as the features of a religion to be compared with other religions.</td>
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<td>Internally, all subgroups are framed in the present tense. Almost all links between groups framed in the past tense. The past probably provides data for making sense of the present - the primary concern here.</td>
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<td>There is no consistent conception here, given the fragmented character of the map.</td>
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<td>Sociological concepts are grouped together as &quot;Changes of lifestyle that a civilian population in a time of war might choose&quot;. DESTRUCTION, TEMPLE &amp; ROMANS merge as a topic studied by HISTORIANS</td>
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<th>Ayal #1</th>
<th>&quot;The Change in Judaism&quot;</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Not clear. This is &quot;a chronology that started with G-D&quot; but then subject &quot;wouldn't have known where else to put him/her/it.&quot; Possibly L/I, because, uniquely, it is only framed in the present tense.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Linked together in a chronological chain. It seems traditionally theocentric but this does not match the sceptical tone of much of the map. They are anchored in the present by the L/I.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Almost entirely in past tense. But, L/I has a timeless quality: &quot;The L/I is G-D's gift to the J.P&quot;. The L/I is the promised home in Judaism. &quot;The J P have lived here for however long&quot;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;It looks as if there is a chronology&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>All items have become components in an historical account, even HISTORIANS itself. &quot;HISTORIANS are part of a further adaptation (a more secular one)&quot;... &quot;post-Holocaust&quot;.</td>
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Findings

In the next chapter we will discuss what might be the research implications of examining maps in this way. For the moment, we will present what appear to be the main substantive findings produced by this analysis with regards to our first hypothesis that there are significant differences between the ways in which students from committed orthodox Jewish backgrounds conceive of Jewish history and those who do not share the same up kind of upbringing.

These can be summarized as follows (with points 1 - 6 referring to individual analytical categories):

1. Machon titles tend to be secular, Bnei Akiva tiles are either theistic or simply ambiguous.

2. No pattern seems to emerge when the identity of cardinal concepts in different groups of maps are considered singly.

3. In all Bnei Akiva maps a distinction is made between commonplace Jewish concepts and other items; either by separating Jewish from secular terms, timeless from historical concerns, or by distinguishing stages in a theological or historical chain. In Machon maps there is less consistency. In half of the Machon maps no distinction is made between Jewish and other items. In only one map do commonplace concepts appear to have a superior status.

4. The majority of Bnei Akiva maps involve a blurring of past and present, which gives some a strong timeless quality. Again, within the Machon group, there is less consistency in this respect. However, there are striking examples of compartmentalization of past from present, or of tension between them.

5. Guiding metaphors hardly emerge from any maps. When they do they tend to represent maps as chronologies, which, arguably, is not a metaphor at all.
6. It is difficult to detect patterns with respect to item selection. Although Bnei Akiva maps separate other items from commonplace concepts they do not attribute any specific or consistent meaning to them. They are particularly diverse in their representation of the concept HISTORIANS. Patterns do not emerge from Machon maps either. Some locate items within historical chains, while others strikingly distinguish between historical and sociological concepts, ascribing quite specific and distinct meanings to them.

7. A significant number of Bnei Akiva maps have framed propositions in personal terms (using the first person plural). None of the Machon maps show this tendency.

8. Bnei Akiva maps tend to be conceived in theistic or orthodox Jewish terms, as evidenced by choice of title, identity of cardinal concept and representation of commonplace concepts. Machon maps tend to be more diverse. Half are historical, the remainder are either sociological, phenomenological or psychological. They tend to be shaped by critical and secular assumptions, although in some cases this is not without serious tension.

Again, what the implications of these findings might be we will discuss in the next chapter along with the broader experimental or empirical implications they raise. For the moment, we will suspend judgement on both these matters and will turn instead to an analytical consideration of the second hypothesis which we set out at the end of the last chapter.
Hypothesis 2: Memorial conceptions of Jewish history are placed under strain by encounters with critical or historiographical accounts of the Jewish past.

In many respects this hypothesis looks like an invitation to examine one of the most popular research questions taken up by concept mappers - the question of what impact instructional intervention has on cognitive structure (Carey 1986). For, by proposing to examine the effects of the critical study of Jewish history on memorial conceptions of the Jewish past we seem to be following the path taken by those who have examined the impact of instruction on conceptual change in biological and scientific knowledge (Stuart 1983, Wallace & Mintzes 1990, Beyerbach 1986) as well as those who have investigated changes in disciplinary or pedagogical knowledge among trainee teachers (Hoz et al 1984, Elbaz et al 1986, Hoz, Tomer and Tamir op cit). Indeed, the ConSAT methodology from which our own mapping instrument is derived was itself originally developed in order to examine the impact of instruction on conceptual knowledge of geology (Champagne et al, 1984).

Once again there is, therefore, an enormous temptation to take up preexisting analytical categories of conceptual change and to apply them to our particular concerns. Thus we could examine the extent to which students have integrated certain 'new' concepts and propositions into their cognitive structures (Wallace & Mintzes 1990), or the extent to which they have progressively differentiated pre-existing concepts (Cronin et al, 1982). We could test how far students' cognitive structures conform to a conceptual structure derived from instructional materials (Hoz, Tomer & Tamir op cit), we could chart changes in the semantic richness of maps (Mahler et al, op cit) or investigate changes in the homogeneity of structural sub-groups (Kozminsky & Hoz op cit).

However, as we have spent much of this chapter arguing, the problem with pursuing such an 'adoptive' strategy is that none of the pre-existing categories we have just cited are necessarily sensitive
either to the conception of semantic memory with which we have been working or to the particular disciplinary features of Jewish history. It would therefore be difficult to know what the data they produce actually means in terms of Jewish historical knowledge. For these reasons, above all, we feel that the analytical categories which we have so far developed ourselves will be more sensitive to the impact of instruction on the conception Jewish history, and also more meaningful in terms of what they reveal about Jewish historical cognition.

We propose, therefore:

1. To examine each of the maps generated by the post-instruction phase of Bnei Akiva interviews on the basis of the analytical categories we have already developed for the examination of the representation of Jewish history in cognitive structure.

2. To compare the results of this analysis with data produced from analysis of Bnei Akiva pre-test maps.

3. To attempt to identify general patterns of similarity and difference between pre-test and post-test mapping phases.
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<tr>
<td>Avi#2</td>
<td>&quot;The ladder of Jewish history&quot;</td>
<td>G-D, JUDAISM, L/I and TEMPLE anchor map. &quot;G-D is where it all started from&quot; JUDAISM, L/I and TEMPLE organize the particular propositional content of the map.</td>
<td>In structural terms they are not directly connected to one another, but in semantic terms they collectively conform to orthodox theological conceptions of G-d's relationship to the J.P., the L/I and Torah. Personalized: &quot;G-D chose us from other people&quot;. &quot;The L/I was promised to us a long time ago&quot;</td>
<td>Entirely in the past tense but brought to the present by being strongly articulated in the first person plural.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>ADAPTATION, SURRENDER and DEFIANCE possess no special meaning or position Commonplace concepts and substantive historical ones are mixed together, although HISTORIANS seems to have been given a peripheral position.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael#2</td>
<td>&quot;Conquest of Israel by the Romans&quot;</td>
<td>ROMANS, probably. ROMANS anchors the propositional content of map, and serves as referent for the map's title. Also serves as predicate for commonplace concepts.</td>
<td>J.P., G-D and JUDEA share a collective identity as &quot;Enemies of Rome&quot;, otherwise they would not be associated. L/D is conceived as a special place for J.P. and JUDEA (in present tense), but no theological content attributed to them.</td>
<td>An uncertain mixture of past and present. The map is held together by an historical account (in past tense). Three reactions to destruction are introduced in the present (as a sociological typology) but examples of these types are brought from the past.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>DEFIANCE, ADAPTATION and SURRENDER are grouped as typical &quot;Reactions to destruction&quot;. HISTORIANS doesn't fit into the substantive universe of the map - they &quot;tell us about the event&quot;. Uncertainty about the place of RABBIS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abi #2</td>
<td>&quot;Outcomes of Jewish history / Developments in Jewish history&quot;</td>
<td>Not clear because the map contains a number of distinct propositional networks. Possibly, DESTRUCTION, anchoring sections dealing with &quot;history&quot; and &quot;reactions to destruction&quot;. Possibly, J.P. - &quot;subjects of the whole matter under discussion&quot; Possibly DEFANCE which has produced certain present day Jewish outcomes</td>
<td>Partly personalized: &quot;We've now got the L/I &quot;This is the way we still are&quot;. But, significantly, parts are not, eg. &quot;there's still belief in G-D&quot;. J.P. has been separated off for inclusion in a historical section. JUDAISM, G-D and L/I represent a Jewish present and future that is the outcome of defiance. If they have intrinsic meaning it comes as an afterthought</td>
<td>A complex mixture of tenses. Commonplace Jewish concepts framed in the present, but as the outcome of historical forces. SURRENDER, ADAPTATION and DEFANCE fit into the main historical thread of the map (in the past tense), but they are also conceived as atemporal sociological categories.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>SURRENDER, ADAPTATION and DEFANCE are represented as sociological categories describing &quot;Reactions to destruction&quot; ROMANS, DESTRUCTION and TEMPLE exist in a substantive historical section. HISTORIANS is absorbed into the body of the map, as one of the &quot;subjects of the whole matter under discussion&quot;.</td>
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<td>Juliette #2</td>
<td>&quot;Destruction of the Temple and how the Jewish People coped&quot;</td>
<td>DESTRUCTION and TEMPLE merge as a composite cardinal concept. The whole map revolves around them, structurally and semantically.</td>
<td>Do not form a composite group with any intrinsic meaning. Only JUDAISM and G-D are propositionally linked. J.P. JUDAISM and G-D introduced as problems or questions provoked by destruction. L/I is where the TEMPLE was.</td>
<td>Almost the entire map is framed in the discontinuous past - as a historical representation. But, there is one significant exception. &quot;The whole problem of how to practise JUDAISM is mainly a question of how to serve G-D&quot;.</td>
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<td>&quot;HISTORIANS seems very much separate&quot; - not part of the substantive universe of the map. SURRENDER conceived as &quot;one form of SURRENDER&quot;. DEFiance and ADAPTION were two historical choices faced by RABBIS.</td>
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<td>Yair #2</td>
<td>&quot;The righteous will get their reward&quot;</td>
<td>G-d: G-d anchors two all-embracing propositional chains</td>
<td>Have been separated into two separate pairs which are only vicariously linked. An uncertain mixture of past and present: &quot;JUDAISM has returned to L/T. J.P. served G-d.&quot; &quot;G-d rewards? the good - J.P.&quot; L/T and JUDAISM are tangential to rest of map.</td>
<td>Parts are framed as timeless theology: &quot;G-d punishes the wicked&quot; &quot;G-d rewards? the J.P. because they listen to their RABBIS&quot;. The rest is history - a narrative about the past: &quot;In the end the ROMANS had to SURRENDER&quot;. &quot;The RABBIS served HASHEM&quot;.</td>
<td>A master story of reward and punishment has shaped two propositional chains, and is indicated by the title.</td>
<td>Arguably ROMANS has taken on a symbolic role, representing the wicked who G-d punishes. All items have been incorporated into an all encompassing theological argument.</td>
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<td>Karren #2</td>
<td>&quot;Destruction of the Second Temple&quot;</td>
<td>Probably, WAR. It acts as a hinge between the commonplace concepts and the rest of the map. TEMPLE is also central - &quot;the focal point of the WAR was the TEMPLE&quot; - it is also attended to by the map title.</td>
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<td>Show signs of tension. J.P. has been separated off from the other commonplace concepts in a group entitled &quot;Religious basis of the whole thing&quot;. Other commonplace concepts described as &quot;a gradation getting smaller and smaller&quot;. They &quot;all stem from G-D&quot;, but propositionally they are predicated on the concept TEMPLE.</td>
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<td>Only concepts linked with WAR are framed in the past tense, the rest of the map is entirely in the present tense.</td>
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|           | SURRENDER, ADAPTATION and DEFIANCE are represented as three alternative timeless responses to destruction. 
HISTORIANS occupy one pole of the map where they "have a great effect on the perception of SURRENDER, ADAPTATION and DEFIANCE". |
Comparative Analysis of Pre-Test and Post-Test Bnei Akiva Maps.

1. Of all the maps in the group Avi#2 shows the most limited structural and semantic change. Although the position of the commonplace Jewish concepts has changed, their propositional content remains strongly and theologically orthodox, if not more so than in the pre-test map. Certainly, items do not possess meanings which might be attributed to instruction. This is important, since of all the subjects in the group Avi was the only one who did not take part in the whole course of instruction. He attended only the first two hours of the course and did not, therefore, encounter many of the central components within instruction. Although these two maps could not be classified as constituting a control sample, they do provide a useful counterpoint to maps produced by other subjects after participation in the whole course.

2. Michael#2 shows dramatic changes in conceptual representation. Commonplace Jewish concepts have been emptied of theological content and almost entirely depersonalized. The meaning of the map has been transformed from a present-time and faithful view of the Jewish religion to a focused account of a particular substantive historical episode. Particularly striking is the decrease in the number of propositional links. It is as if the subject has eliminated all knowledge extraneous to this particular history. No doubt this also explains the location of HISTORIANS where effectively it is outside the map - it is not a substantive historical concept. Also notable is the neat integration of Berger's typology into the body of the map.

3. There appear to be as many similarities between Abi#2 and Abi#1 as there are differences. On the one hand, both maps are dense with propositions, with many concepts linked to many others. Both have conceived of HISTORIANS in unusually activist terms. Both have also tended to conceive of commonplace Jewish concepts in personal terms. On the other hand, significant changes have taken place. The
commonplace Jewish concepts have been fractured, with JEWISH PEOPLE, in a sense, becoming more dominant within the context of the map as a whole. Arguably, it has become a historical concept rather than a religious one. Berger's typological concepts have, meanwhile, been drawn together and integrated into the flow of the historical representation, accurately reflecting their position within the instructional materials.

4. One of the most significant changes in Juliette#2 is the grammatical tense in which the map is framed. While Juliette#1 was almost entirely framed in the present tense, Juliette#2 is almost completely in the past tense. It appears that what was a largely theological representation, which separated Jewish from secular concerns, has become a clearly demarcated representation of an historical sequence of events. In the process, the commonplace Jewish concepts have lost their closely knit self sufficiency to the degree that there are only limited suggestions that they might possess intrinsic meaning of their own. Further evidence of the way in which items have been conceptually transformed is provided by the representation of HISTORIANS outside the body of the second nap, presumably because it is not regarded as a substantive historical concept.

5. Yair#2 is a mysterious and ambiguous map. Yair#1 had consisted of a rigorous chain of causation powerfully shaped by a theistic view of history. In Yair#2 the subject reports that "it would be boring to do the same map again". He has therefore produced a map which appears to be conceived as a theological argument concerning reward and punishment, and informed by data from the past. Although the two maps are different, and especially in their representation of the Jewish commonplace concepts, there is one important feature which they do share and which may go some way towards explaining the lack of influence instruction seems to have had on the shape and content of the post-test map. For Yair#1 and #2 are the only maps produced by a subject in this group where one could say that they have been shaped by some sort of master story
or metaphor. It is tempting to argue that this feature points to a degree of conceptual mastery which might make the subject's cognitive structure resistant to the influences of instruction.

6. The title of Karren#2 signals that important changes have taken place in the representation of these concepts. Whereas Karren#1 was concerned with the whole sweep of Jewish history Karren#2 apparently represents the substance of one particular episode in the Jewish past - the destruction of the second temple. Whereas the commonplace Jewish concepts in Karren#1 were conceived as part of a sophisticated theological argument, here they have been fractured, with the JEWISH PEOPLE entering history, and the remaining concepts being predicated, almost as an afterthought on the concept TEMPLE. The concepts from Berger's sociological typology have been integrated into history but are not limited to the discontinuous past. HISTORIANS, meanwhile, is not conceived as a substantive concept at all but as a second order term from which to make sense of the body of the map.

Findings

The main substantive findings produced by this analysis might be summarized as follows (with points 1-6 corresponding to individual analytical categories):

1. In half the maps there has been a notable shrinkage of focus. While pre-test map were conceived as representing timeless issues or universal histories (eg, "Elements of Judaism and challenges to it"), half of the post-test maps have acquired a particular or limited historical meaning (eg, "Conquest of Israel by the Romans").

2. With the exception of Avi#2 and Yair#2 (and probably for reasons which we have intimated above), there has been a change in the identity of cardinal concepts. Whereas in pre-test maps these were made up of commonplace Jewish concepts which had been given
theological content, in post-test maps other items serve as cardinal concepts, without any religious significance.

3. A number of changes have taken place in the representation of commonplace Jewish concepts. Whereas in the pre-test maps they formed an identifiable and even organically linked group, distinct from other secular or ephemeral items, in post-test maps they have become fragmented and are reduced to networks of two or three concepts (in different permutations). In a number of cases they have been emptied of intrinsic meaning or significance, even if they are not entirely indistinguishable from other items.

4. Pre-test maps (apart from Karren#1) tended to blur past and present tenses, perhaps showing a general tendency to conceive of concepts as timeless or as presently meaningful. Although there is again a mixture of tenses in post-test maps, there appears to be greater control or internal consistency about how they are used. Maps now contain parts which are identifiably historical and separate from other parts which very definitely are not historical.

5. Only one map - Yair#2 - exhibits what might be called a guiding metaphor. It may be significant that this map also shows very few symptoms of having been influenced by instructional intervention.

6. There have been striking changes in item representation. Four maps in the post-test group clearly represent the three sociological categories which played a prominent part in instructional materials, whereas in pre-test maps there was little that was uniform about their conception. These four maps have also been consistent in attributing a second order meaning to HISTORIANS, as a concept which does not conform to the substantive character of the rest of the map.

7. While there was a tendency among some pre-test maps to present a personalized conception of these concepts, with a number of propositions being framed in the first person plural; in post-test
In brief, these are the main findings that result from a comparative analysis of pre-test and post-test maps. Strictly speaking they relate only to the impact of instructional intervention on Jewish historical knowledge. The question we must now consider is what they mean in terms of the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory. It is this problem that will be close to the centre of our concerns in the next chapter.
CHAPTER TEN

Drawing conclusions and discussing implications

Over the last few chapters we have tried to signal how we have regarded the empirical part of our research as operating on two registers. On one level, we have characterized it as constituting an attempt to generate data which would shed light on our original concerns about the relationship between Jewish memory and Jewish history. On another level, we have suggested that it might serve as a pilot study in an attempt to apply a particular research tool to unexplored territory.

Inevitably, as we discuss the findings produced by research, it is the second register that must take precedence, since any substantive conclusions about changes or differences in the cognitive representation of Jewish history will be conditioned by conclusions reached concerning the essential reliability and validity of the research tool. There will be little point suggesting that the results produced by the comparative analysis of pre-test maps imply one thing or another, if, to quote Clough and Driver, it is then shown that maps are little more than "artifacts of the methodology, transient solutions devised in an interview when an answer of some kind is a social imperative" (1986). Our discussion of the implications raised by research will therefore begin with issues of experimental syntax (the methodological grammar of research) and will only then proceed to issues of substance, that is, matters related to the specific hypotheses for the examination of which research was constructed.

Syntactical Implications

Champagne and Klopfer, the original creators of the Concept Structure Analysis Technique (ConSAT), suggest that "in the development of any measuring instrument, especially one which purports to provide information about something as elusive as how students structure [science] concepts, there are legitimate concerns about the instrument's reliability and validity" (1984
Indeed, it is precisely these concerns which drove much of our argument through chapters 5 and 6, as we sought to establish, whether, in theory, it was legitimate to produce conceptual representations of historical knowledge.

The problem with our methodology, as was also the case in Champagne and Klopfer's original work, is that it is not possible to determine either its concurrent or predictive validity because no other measures of students' structuring Jewish historical concepts have yet been devised. Nevertheless, the methodology's construct validity can be established in terms of the procedures used to select items for inclusion in the map construction task, and in terms of the procedures used to analyze the representations produced by subjects.

As regards the former, there are strong grounds for asserting that experimental items do conform to a typology of the semantic components of Jewish historical knowledge. Historical knowledge, we have argued, is made up of concrete universals, colligatory concepts and concepts which have been taken either from other disciplines or everyday discourse. It is likely, therefore, that the thirteen 'concepts' which have been selected for inclusion in the mapping exercise do actually represent elemental components in the cognitive representation of Jewish historical knowledge.

As regards the latter, that is, the construct validity of the procedures used to analyze cognitive representations, we are more circumspect. Admittedly, we have tried to develop a descriptive-analytical approach which is discernibly and directly attributable to a particular theory of semantic memory. Similarly, we have also attempted to develop a number of analytical categories within that approach that are sensitive to features in both historical and memorial knowledge, in accordance with our discussions in chapters 2 and 6. However, a suspicion remains that in their separate parts these analytical categories do not identify real differences or changes in Jewish historical knowledge, but rather the tantalizing but not very substantive echoes of artificial experimental
constructs. If, therefore, they do possess construct validity then it is probably as a totality rather than as a collective, that is, where the combined product of their representations is more substantial and meaningful than the sum of their parts.

In considering the likely reliability of our experimental methodology we can be reasonably confident about the outcomes generated by mapping procedures, even if a number of doubts linger over the reliability of analytical procedures. We have already reported in the last chapter how the mapping instrument appeared to show a high degree of test-retest reliability following comparison of maps produced in post-test and post-post-test interviews. Although it is always possible that the strikingly consistent responses created by some subjects in these rounds may actually indicate the instrument's insensitivity to informal or unseen influences on the content of cognitive structure in the intervening period, the importance of finding such experimental stability cannot be sufficiently emphasized. For, one of the most frequent criticisms levelled at methodologies such as this is that they produce 'idiosyncratic' outcomes which change arbitrarily from one interview to the next (Dominowski 1974). Interviewees have been known to claim that if interviewed twenty four hours later about the same items they would produce significantly different maps. However, the generation of a number of almost identical maps in the post-post-test phase, despite an interval of nearly three months between interviews, implies not only that the experimental tool is capable of producing consistent outcomes, but that cognitive structure may itself be extremely stable unless significantly disturbed.

Unfortunately, we still cannot talk about the reliability of analytical procedures with complete confidence. Indeed, it is almost inevitable that a descriptive methodology such as this will be heavily subjective and, therefore, implicitly unreliable. For, to analyse a map is to read one, and no matter how closely analysis is tied to a stable set of categories, it is ultimately dependent
on the kind of intertextual contingencies which are a part of all reading and which make it such a personal business.

For all that, it is evident that certain mechanisms could be built into the methodological design so as to limit interpretative flux and to establish reasonable analytical reliability. Thus, it would be possible to introduce a blind component, in which anonymous maps were subjected to analysis. It would certainly be possible to build in checks and balances whereby analyses were moderated by second or third parties, and it might even be appropriate to introduce a reflexive component in which subjects were invited to comment on the analysis to which their maps had been subjected. One suspects that all of these strategies and others too would go a long way towards limiting the sense that the descriptive analysis of maps is little more than a personal reading.

As far as the work here goes, we can report that many of our readings have been moderated either by individuals who might be described as subject matter experts in Jewish history, or by individuals who possess accumulated experience in reading concept maps. Furthermore, and in some ways more critical, a number of analyses have been presented for discussion before seminar groups made up of students and colleagues. Arguably, these exercises have gone a long way towards establishing the intersubjective reliability and validity of the work presented here.

Substantive Conclusions Regarding Differences in Cognitive Structure

If we have, then, developed a valid and reliable methodology for the representation and analysis of Jewish historical knowledge in cognitive structure, it is legitimate to consider what substantive conclusions might be drawn from the findings produced in the previous chapter. In other words, if the experimental tool is fundamentally sound we are in a position to ask what its findings imply.
Here, unfortunately, we appear to encounter a significant obstacle. For, although our sample may have been of a sufficient size to establish the fundamental reliability and validity of the experimental tool, there may be strong grounds for doubting whether it is substantial enough (in this particular case) to support reliable conclusions about differences or changes in cognitive structure. Our sample was made up of two sets of pre-test maps, with six maps in each group, one set of six post-test maps and one set of three post-post-test maps (Three subjects left the programme before the last round of interviews). The problem is that it is difficult to determine whether such a collection of 21 maps can provide the basis for reaching reasonably firm conclusions about differences or changes in the cognitive representation of Jewish historical knowledge. After all, there are not exactly any pre-existing criteria according to which one could determine such a thing.

We intend to take a subjective and self-consciously minimalist position, and will argue that while the pre-test sample has been more than adequate for establishing and refining sets of categories for the analysis of the conceptual representation of Jewish historical knowledge, it is probably insufficient for building firm conclusions about the character and causes of different conceptions of Jewish history. This is particularly so when considering the influences on or causes behind different cognitive structures. For although subjects have been grouped in two reasonably homogeneous samples within the experimental design (particularly in terms of religious observance), there have probably been too many uncontrolled variables in each group (like length and intensity of Jewish education, or extent of historical education) which may have influenced mapping outcomes.

Indeed, as we have previously argued, it is even debatable whether concept maps can ever serve pseudo-positivist objectives such as these which seek to identify a relationship between components of cognitive structure and discrete influences upon them (cf. Cohen
1991 p.6). From this perspective, it is not only the size and sort of sample that prevents us from confirming or rejecting our first hypothesis, it is, rather, as the messy and sometimes contradictory nature of our findings show, that cognitive structure cannot simply be reduced to a number of identifiable and discretely influenced components (Hunt et al. 1973).

This does not mean that it is not possible to identify characteristic features of different ways of conceiving of Jewish history. As our findings show, we have almost certainly identified a number of quite distinct ways of representing Jewish historical knowledge in cognitive structure. The point here is that cognitive structure on the one hand, and 'Jewish background' on the other are each too rich to correlate with one another in so simple or mechanistic a fashion. Thus, although we found that "Bnei Akiva maps tend to be conceived in theistic or orthodox terms" while Machon maps "tend to be shaped by critical and secular assumptions" (page 208 above), there are nevertheless too many background variables influencing the members of each group and too many exceptional features, or inconsistencies, displayed by many of the maps themselves for it to be legitimate to draw reasonable conclusions about influences operating on different conceptions of Jewish historical knowledge.

Despite these conclusions, and as we have intimated above, we would nevertheless suggest that one of the important outcomes of our research has been that it has generated strong examples of different ways of conceiving of Jewish history. This, after all, is the particular strength of concept mapping methodologies, in that they provide a visual image, an external representation, of the internal representation of knowledge. In this case, we have not only been able to identify powerful paradigm examples of the representation of Jewish historical knowledge, but we have also had the opportunity of comparing the features which they exemplify with a number of quite personal conceptions of Jewish history. Having been able to identify in graphic fashion the characteristics which
constitute different conceptions of Jewish history, we have opened up the possibility of exploring what shapes or influences these conceptions, even if for the moment that kind of analysis remains a long way off.

Substantive Conclusions Regarding Changes in Cognitive Structure

In contrast to the rather blurred conclusions which result from the analysis of pre-test maps, the possibilities suggested by the comparative analysis of pre-test and post-test maps are quite striking. In this instance, it is not that the experimental sample is any larger or more substantive, but it is rather because the variables being examined are much more limited. In seeking to examine the impact of a course of instruction on the conceptual representation of Jewish historical knowledge, we are attempting to chart the impact of what in objective terms is a common set of experiences on an already given and limited set of structures, no matter how diverse the structures may themselves be. For this reason above all, that is, because the experimental situation is so much more closely controlled, we can feel relatively confident about the soundness of some of the conclusions which might be derived from research findings.

Comparative analysis shows four of the six maps having changed in shape, content and overall meaning, in ways which might be directly attributable to instructional intervention, although, of course, this might equally well be due to subjects better understanding the 'context' in which the mapping interview is taking place (cf. Mackay 1973). Thus, these four maps display changes in overall title, cardinal concept, representation of Jewish commonplace concepts and other conceptual items, as well as changes in the grammatical formulation of propositions, which correspond to significant conceptual characteristics within instructional methods and materials.
Research findings also point to two post-test maps which reveal certain changes in conceptual representation, but which are neither consistent with changes in other maps, nor which can be directly attributed to the influence of instruction. One of these maps was produced by a subject who attended only a limited part of the course. The other map was produced by the only subject in this group whose representations appear to be under the influence of a strong guiding metaphor of some sort.

A number of substantive conclusions are suggested by these findings. We will present what are probably the most general conclusions first and proceed towards what are probably the most particular.

i) Concept mapping allows the possibility of describing and comparing representations of Jewish historical knowledge, and of examining the influence of instruction upon specific features of Jewish historical knowledge.

ii) The conception of Jewish history can change in substantial, stable and potentially important ways under the influence of shortish periods of instruction.

iii) The influence of instruction on a given body of Jewish historical knowledge is limited in relation to the extent of an individual's conceptual mastery of that body of knowledge.

iv) Changes in the representation of Jewish historical knowledge following an encounter between memorial and critical conceptions of Jewish history appear to correspond to well established notions of assimilation and adaptation.

v) Critical conceptions of Jewish history can place memorial representations of Jewish historical knowledge under great strain, by tending to empty them of their theistic content, by drawing a clearer distinction between the past and present, and by eroding their personal significance.
Experimental and Educational Implications

Although our research was initiated by a particular problem and a substantive question, in terms of what the relationship might be between Jewish history and Jewish memory, it seems as if the most outstanding implication of our empirical work is not what it has revealed about Jewish history but what it promises in terms of the experimental tool we have used.

Concept mapping is not a new experimental methodology. It has been developed as an evaluative and pedagogical tool over a period of at least twenty years. Yet, as we especially explained in chapter 5, there have been doubts about whether approaches taken from this tradition could serve as appropriate probes of historical knowledge. Not only have there been suspicions about whether history possessed identifiable conceptual components, but there has been skepticism about the possibility of developing analytical procedures which might produce valid accounts of the form and content of historical knowledge.

Our research has shown that not only is it theoretically legitimate to elicit conceptual representations of Jewish historical knowledge, but that in practical terms it is possible to generate data which is meaningful as the external representation of cognitive structure and as regards the place of Jewish historical knowledge within it.

This is a strong and significant claim. For until now research into the character of historical thinking and knowledge as been something of a poor relation to research into the manipulation and representation of scientific knowledge. This is partly because psychological research of this sort has been so much overshadowed by the particular scientific assumptions behind Piaget's work but also because history, of all the humanities, has seemed too contingent or subjective to submit to reliable psychological methodologies.
Ironically, however, our work here, and in particular our attempt to develop an experimental methodology which is faithful to Anderson and Bower's semantic memory theory, has suggested that historical knowledge is unusually suited to examination by psychological probes of the sort we have developed. For, it is not only that historical knowledge is so rich in propositional content and therefore ripe for semantic analysis, but that when changes in historical knowledge are conceived, in philosophical terms, as resulting primarily from the redescription of already known concepts rather than as the acquisition of new ones, there seems to be a tantalizing meeting between psychology and philosophy. For, the development of historical knowledge conceived in philosophical terms such as these is positively analogous to the development of knowledge in semantic memory theory and, as a result, is eminently suited to examination by psychological probes which are predicated on this theory.

Stuart has suggested that "if concept maps are to be of greater utility, for educational research and as an aid to teaching and learning, a more holistic and qualitative scoring technique needs to be developed" (1985). Arguably, that is precisely what has been developed here - an analytical approach which is both systematic and holistic, where maps and their characteristics are treated descriptively but also in a way which facilitates analysis of differences and changes in them. Hopefully, it is a rigorous experimental approach which does not sacrifice the sense of insight into the individual which, as we have previously said, is one of the most endearing features of concept mapping research.

Of course, we do not intend to suggest that concept mapping constitutes some kind of experimental panacea or substitute for a whole series of techniques such as clinical interviews, real life observations and introspective reports. The point we are making is that a methodology such as the one developed here promises the possibility of examining aspects of cognition which were previously considered opaque or somehow inaccessible. They promise, for
example, the possibility of charting the development of student's knowledge over a number of school years and diverse educational experiences.

This effectively brings us back to our original question. For, it will seem slightly dubious to make claims such as these when we have suggested that our work has shed no more than a faint light on the substantive concerns with which we began, that is, in terms of the impact of certain forms of history teaching on Jewish historical knowledge. It should therefore be emphasised that the circumspect character of our remarks was not intended to raise doubts about the potential utility or credibility of the research tool in and of itself, but rather to signal the restricted nature of this particular piece of research. Taking a long term view, our work is best characterized as a pilot study in which promising possibilities are raised but substantial conclusions are not reached. These promising possibilities include a consideration of the potential uses to which the experimental tool might be put, but they also include a number of tentative substantive conclusions which have been derived from the findings here. For while it has been inappropriate to draw conclusions about the relationship between different conceptions of Jewish history and other background variables, there are a number of reasonably sound inferences which it might be possible to make about the impact of the study of critical conceptions of Jewish history on memorial conceptions of the Jewish past.

In this case, concept mapping has provided graphic evidence of the way in which theistic and personalized conceptions of Jewish history are affected by an encounter with a quite different conception of the Jewish past. Thus, it would seem from one point of view that memorial representations of Jewish historical knowledge seem to have been corroded or fractured in this encounter, while from another perspective, that they have reinvented or redescribed themselves as an alternative but no less meaningful set of propositions.
What this means as regards introducing Jewish adolescents to the critical treatment of Jewish history can for the moment only be surmised. Our data certainly does not possess the authority on which such pronouncements can be based. In offering what at this stage is no more than an informed guess, we would suggest that encounters between history and memory may have a number of possible outcomes. In cases where students already have a highly developed sense of what they think Jewish history consists of, critical conceptions of the Jewish past will probably be assimilated with little disruption into pre-existing and powerful propositional networks. On the other hand, where students have only a vague pre-existing sense of what the Jewish past consists of their representation of the Jewish past may dramatically change. No doubt each and every individual encounter between critical history and collective memory will take place somewhere along a spectrum marked out by these poles.

If these are rather bland and somewhat unexceptional inferences, they are accompanied by an extremely strong conclusion which our empirical work does suggest. These might be described as relating to the vitality of cognition. What this suggests is that from the perspective of concept mapping research it is rarely appropriate to talk of memory being undermined by history, or of memorial knowledge being undermined by critical historical knowledge. For, there are no cases here about which one could say that they show one form of conceptualization being subverted or corrupted by another. What they show, instead, is the fertile character of cognitive structure as it develops and as it absorbs new bodies of knowledge. What they show is the student as an active agent in the educational process.

This is not a new idea. It is at least as old as Bartlett's classic 'schemata' experiments of the 1930's but it still has important implications. As we suggested in chapter 3, one of the most significant consequences of the introduction of theories and principles from cognitive psychology into the world of education...
has been that they have placed the student at the centre of reflection about the educational process. This is particularly well exemplified by the experience of examining knowledge through the use of probes into cognitive structure. For having acquired graphic evidence of how the student has adapted or assimilated knowledge in cognitive structure, it is difficult to maintain any notion of the student's conception of the Jewish past as having been passively overwhelmed or undermined by an alternative conception of Jewish history. What we gain instead is a sense of encounter between the student's pre-conceptions and those embedded within instructional materials and methods.

Practitioners of concept mapping have frequently maintained that it is because concept maps provide this kind of evidence that they are so useful. Not only do they promise the possibility of monitoring the 'intellectual journey' taken by students or of assessing the degree to which students have assimilated the conceptual content of specific courses, they also provide data which is of great value to the curriculum developer.

In the world of Jewish education it has long been fashionable to promise curricula which start 'where the student is at'. However, for all the child-centred enthusiasm of curriculum specialists, and often through no fault of their own, curriculum developers frequently do not possess meaningful information about students or of how they conceive of Judaism and Jewish tradition. This, potentially, is the kind of information which concept mapping can supply; rich data concerning the student's conception of commonplace Jewish concepts, of the relationship between the Jewish past and the student's present and of the relationship between Jews and gentiles. If Jewish education is to begin where the student is at, it seems as if concept mapping will at least help in locating the starting line.
From Conclusions to New Beginnings

Unfortunately, our extended reflections, discussions and empirical examinations do not enable us to achieve some kind of closure. In many ways they deepen the sense of unease which moved us in the first place. By having demonstrated how rich and various can be the encounter between history and memory they make one anxious not about the students who experience this encounter but rather about the many more Jewish students who may already suffer from collective Jewish amnesia.

After so many pages, it seems perverse to think in these terms, but having surveyed the fertile consequences of the encounter between history and memory, one suspects that the most urgent Jewish educational questions are not concerned with the possibly corrosive impact of critical history on collective memory but with something else instead. If they relate to the teaching of Jewish history, then it is probably in terms of the impact Jewish history has on students who possess few if any Jewish memories. From this perspective it would be interesting to ask not what impact historical knowledge has on memorial knowledge but rather if history can itself create memory.

If this sounds like a proposal to start all over again, it is not entirely honest. What it really means is making a beginning which has only become possible at a moment of conclusion such as this.
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Appendix 1.
Schedule for Mapping Interview.

In the first interview with a subject the interviewer goes through parts 1-7. In a repeating interview with the same subject the interviewer only goes through parts 4-7.

1. Introduction:

Explanation of task: "First, thank you for agreeing to help in this. Basically, I am going to ask you to do a couple of exercises over the next half an hour or so. Not in order to test what you do or do not know, but, rather, in order to find out something about Jewish education in the country where you have grown up".

2. Demonstration:

a) "The first exercise is intended to give you a sense of what this is all about. I am going to give you a pile of words all of which you will probably recognize. Can you please organize them on the table in such a way as to show what you think about them and what you think is the relationship between them. Please take as long as you want"

b) The interviewer hands the interviewee a set of 8 small cards with one word written on each.

c) When the interviewee is satisfied with the arrangement, the interviewer explains that he is going to draw a copy of the arrangement on a large piece of paper. If concepts were put close to one another or in what looks like a closed relationship, the interviewee asks: "Do you intend that these concepts form a group?" The interviewer circles every group.

d) The interviewer then asks: "Could you explain in detail why you have organized concepts in this way and what you see as the relationship between them". The interviewer connects concepts by line on the piece of paper and records the way in which their relationship is described.

e) When the interviewee is satisfied that all conceptual relationships in the map have been described, the interviewee asks: "Is it possible to give labels to the subgroups you have identified?"

f) The interviewer then asks the interviewee to reconsider the map: "Are there any other connections between words or groups other than those you have described?" The interviewer draws these on the map in a way which distinguishes them from previously stated relationships.

g) The interviewer asks: "Is it possible to give a label or title to the entire arrangement so as to show the general idea behind it?"
This phase should end with a map in which the whole organization is characterized, every group (if such exist) is characterized and all related concepts connected by a labelled line.

3. Preparing for the Arrangement:

The interviewer continues: "Thank you, that completes the first exercise. I'm now going to give you another pile of cards containing words which you may or may not recognize. I'm going to ask you to do a couple of similar exercises with these words".

4. Arranging the Concepts:

a) Identification and Classification - The interviewer hands the interviewee 13 cards and explains: "The first thing I'm going to ask you to do with these words is to organize them into two piles - words you do recognize and words you don't recognize". The interviewer writes down the unrecognized concepts.

b) Definition - After two piles have been made, the interviewer asks: "Please define or explain every concept you have recognized". The interviewer writes down the definitions in the order in which they are given.

c) Arrangement of recognized concepts - The interviewer asks: "In same as way as you did with the last group of words can you organize these on the table in a way which shows how you think about them and how they are related".

d) Recording the arrangement - The interviewer then records the arrangement on a large piece of paper, in the same way as the interviewee, leaving big spaces between concepts. If concepts were put close to one another or in what looks like a closed arrangement, the interviewee asks: "Do you intend that these concepts form a group?" The interviewer circles every group.

e) Explanation of the arrangement and relating concepts. The interviewer then asks: "Could you explain in detail why you have organized concepts in this way and what you see as the relationship between them". The interviewer connects concepts by line on the piece of paper and records the way in which their relationship is described.

f) Identification of sub-groups - When the interviewee is satisfied that all conceptual relationships in the map have been described, the interviewee asks: "Is it possible to give labels to the subgroups you have identified?"
g) Additional links - The interviewer then asks the interviewee to reconsider the map: "Are there any other connections between words or groups other than those you have described?". The interviewer draws these on the map in a way which distinguishes them from previously stated relationships.

h) The interviewer adds: "Are there any relations which you would describe differently from the way in which you have done so already?" These are also recorded on the sheet.

5. Additional Concepts:

a) In cases where certain concepts were not recognized, the interviewer asks: "Can you now add any of the unrecognized concepts to the map?" The interviewee places these where they belong and the interviewer also records these on the map, together with any ways in which they are linked to other concepts.

b) Supplementary concepts - The interviewee is asked "Are there any concepts which you would have liked to have also included in the map which were not on these thirteen cards and if so where would they go?" Again, these together with any propositional links are recorded on the interviewee's map.

6. Interrogation:

The interviewee has an opportunity to remove concepts from the map. The interviewer asks: "Are there any concepts which you included in the map only because you were asked to do so, but which you would otherwise have not related?" The answer is recorded on the map.

7. A Sense of the Whole Map

The interviewer asks: "Is it possible to give a label or title to the entire arrangement so as to show the general idea behind it?" This is recorded at the bottom of the map.

8. The interviewee is thanked for his/her time and help.
APPENDIX 2.

G-D creator of the world
- miraculous
- JUDAIISM
- TEMPLE
- DESTRUCTION
- SURVIVAL
- HISTORIANS
- RABBIS
- INDEPENDENCE
- JEWS
- also were told to study

Modern day rabbis teach Judaism to kids

TERROR key to

Jews not in Jewish history

[ANNA (Liverpool),
21/2/48]
"HISTORY"

EVIL

"We're glad to finding out things we don't know about. I try my stumle hit you out"

DESTRUCTION

DESTRUCTION

ROMANS

HISTORIANS

DESTRUCTION

DEFIANCE

SURVIVAL

"Love myself even though I'm oppressed"

SURRENDER

"Love my self, even though I'm oppressed"

As last choice in life

It's true choice in life

It's true choice in life

LIFE (loss of God's love)

JUDAIISM

RABBIS

Jews

God is independent,

Temple

God is independent,

Temple

Jews

G-D

Tetmal

Jews

G-D

Tetmal

all survive a saved G-d.
1. Name:..........................................

2. Sex:.....................

3. Age:.....................

4. Did you go to a Jewish primary school? Yes / No

5a. Did you go to a Jewish secondary school? Yes / No

b. If yes, was this only in the sixth form? Yes / No

6a. Did you attend Cheder/Hebrew classes/Teenage centre? Yes / No

b. If yes, for how many years? ...............

Since your birth, have your parents (or the relevant parent):

7. Attended synagogue at least once a month...... always usually occasionally never

8. Attended a seder..................................... always usually occasionally never

9. Not traveled on Shabbat............................. always usually occasionally never

10. Not eaten milk after meat......................... always usually occasionally never

11. Put on tefillin daily................................. always usually occasionally never

12. Lit shabbat candles................................. always usually occasionally never

13. Eaten kosher meat at home....................... always usually occasionally never

14. Attended synagogue on Yom Kippur.............. always usually occasionally never

15. Until what school year did you take the study of history? ............

16. If you took any public exams in history what were they?
G.C.S.E./A-Level/Other............
Show your opinion about the following statements by putting a ring around one of the 5 responses.

17. History tends to be one of the more *boring* subjects taught in school.

18. History tends to be one of the *easier* subjects taught in school.

19. History tends to be one of the more *useful* subjects taught in school.

20. Have you ever studied Jewish history other than at Cheder or as part of Jewish studies in school. And if yes, where and when?

Show your opinion about the following statements by putting a ring around one of the 5 responses.

"By studying Jewish history one can better understand:

21. What the role of G-d has been in Jewish history since biblical times*.”

22. Why and how the Jews have survived for so long*.”

23. What the Jewish future will be like*.”
24. What it's like to be a Jew".  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>Not certain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

25. "Studying Jewish history is different from studying history in general, because Jewish history has religious significance while history in general does not".  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>not certain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

26. Jewish historical texts cannot be subjected to the critical methods normally used by historians".  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>not certain</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

25. Please place the following names in the correct chronological order. (i.e. in the order in which these people lived)

Shabbtai Zvi  Baal Shem Tov  Theodore Herzl  Rashi  Bar Kochba

26. Please place the following events in the correct chronological order. (You need only write the word which is underlined.)

The Expulsion from Spain  Destruction of the Second Temple  Warsaw Ghetto Uprising  The Balfour Declaration  The first Reform Synagogue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Expulsion from Spain</th>
<th>Destruction of the Second Temple</th>
<th>Warsaw Ghetto Uprising</th>
<th>The Balfour Declaration</th>
<th>The first Reform Synagogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Where was the centre of Jewish Life in Ancient Times?

National life:

1. "Jerusalem is the Metropolis not only of the land of Judah, but of many other countries"
   - Philo, *On the Embassy to Gaius* 218

2. "There was a city in Babylonia called Nehardia.... The city of Nisbis was situated on the same river as it. For which reason, the Jews, depending on the natural strength of these places, deposited in them that half shekel which everyone, by the custom of our country, offers unto God. Then at the proper time, they were transmitted to Jerusalem; and many ten thousand men undertook the transportation of these donations out of fear of the attacks of the Parthians, to whom the Babylonians were then subject."
   - Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, Book 18, Chap 19

3. A shekel coin made in the city of Tyre. The Rabbis ordered that when people paid their yearly shekel to the Temple they had to use shekel coins made in Tyre (Mishnah Shekalim 1:7).

   Tyre was famous for the quality of its coins and for the way in which they kept their value.
Pilgrimage Routes from The Diaspora to Jerusalem for the Three Foot Festivals (Pesach, Shavuot & Sukkot).

"Three times a year the Jews gather in the city where the Temple has been built. They come from wherever in the world they have settled, in order to thank God for the benefits they have received, to pray for further benefits in the future, as well as to befriend their fellows when they gather and celebrate together. It is wonderful how they are not strangers to one another but are members of one nation who share the same customs. This has come about because of their regular contact and meetings with one another."

Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*
Religious Life:

"The world is based on three things: The Torah, Avodah (the Temple service), and the practice of Gemilut Chasadim (charity)"

Pirke Avot (Ethics of the Fathers) 1:2

"Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said: Prayers correspond to the daily (temple) sacrifices... Why did they say that the morning prayer could be said till midday? Because the regular morning sacrifice could be brought up to midday. And why did they say that the afternoon prayers can be said up to the evening. Because the regular afternoon offering can be brought up to the evening..."

Tosephta Brachot Chap 3.

Rabbi Joshua said: "This (the Temple) is the place where Israel could seek forgiveness for their sins...

Avot of Rabbi Nathan Chap 6.
Civil life and Law & Order:

Halacha (Jewish law) is clear; the Sanhedrin (the most important law-making court) could exercise its authority only when it gathered within the Temple area. "Hamakom Gorem" - Its location gave it its power.

"Originally (in Temple times) there were not many legal disputes in Israel, since these were held only in the high court of seventy-one members which sat in the Lishkat HaGazi, as well as in the two high courts of twenty-three members, one of which sat at the entrance to the Temple mount, the other at the entrance of the Azarah, together with the other courts of twenty-three in all the cities of the Land of Israel".

Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin, Chap 1, Halacha 4.
In Temple times the calendar was not calculated in advance. Instead, a new month was declared whenever a new moon was seen. Witnesses who had seen a new moon would have to come to Jerusalem, because only the Sanhedrin could announce a new month. The Sanhedrin examined the witnesses to check that they had really seen a new moon.

There was a large courtyard in Jerusalem which was called Bat Yaazek and it was there that all the witnesses [who were bringing evidence of a new moon] used to assemble and there the court examined them. Big meals were prepared for them so they that they should get used to coming.

The witnesses were examined about their sightings of a new moon and finally the head of the Beth Din would come out and say: "The moon is holy", and all the people answered..."It is holy - It is holy". Then they would go to a nearby hill and light a beacon to spread the word of the new moon to other places.

Mishnah Rosh Hashanah, Chapter 2.

Political Life:

Professor Y. Gafni has argued that the Temple also played a considerable role in the political life of the nation. Whereas during the First Temple period, the monarchy and the priesthood constituted two independent centres of power; from the beginning of the Second Temple, political and religious elements had been combined. For much of the period, the official head of the nation was the High Priest; even the Kings from the Hasmonean family were careful to keep the High Priesthood in their hands.
Historians argue about the centrality of the Second Temple in Jewish life:

Moshe Hare, an Israeli historian, has written:

"The Temple service and Jerusalem, as the Temple city, were at the heart of all the events and experiences of the Jewish people, whether in Israel or the Diaspora.....

...In fact, the clearest proof of the significance of the Temple and the Temple Service is provided by the way Jews reacted to its destruction. At the time of destruction, the cohanim continued to work as if nothing was happening, until they were killed. At the moment of destruction, many even jumped in to the flames and died.....

Many Jews felt that the destruction of the Temple would be accompanied by the end of the world, since it was difficult to believe that the world would continue to exist without the Temple - one of the foundations on which the world rested."

A number of historians have suggested that the Temple did not occupy such a central place in Jewish life. Their position is based on two arguments.

1) They point to the way various groups in Israel actually rejected the Temple. For example, the Essenes rejected the Temple in Jerusalem and looked forward to a time when "the true Temple would be built by God". The early Christians believed that the Temple was not holy and that Jesus would replace in some way the current occupants of the Temple Mount.

2) They argue that even before the destruction of the Temple the Synagogue was beginning to take its place.
Jewish Reactions to Destruction: Alternative 1

By looking at Roman coins we get a clue as to how Jews reacted to the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Temple.

The following passage comes from a book called the Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch, which historians believe was originally written in Hebrew shortly after the destruction of the Second Temple.

"Happy are those who haven't been born, or who, having been born, have already died. Because they didn't know this sorrow, and they didn't hear what had happened to us.

Woe unto us - those who are alive. For we witness the afflictions of Zion and we see what has happened to Jerusalem.

Farmers, sow no more! Earth, why yield the fruit of your harvest? Hold back your sustaining crops! And you, oh vine, why do you keep giving wine seeing that there will be no more wine offerings in Zion. Nor will first-fruits again be offered? ...

And you, Oh bridegrooms, enter not the bridal chamber. You wives, pray not to give birth... Why give birth in sadness? ...."

Syriac Baruch 9:6-16
"Rabbi Eleazar said: "Since the day that the Temple was destroyed, an iron wall has intervened between Israel and their Father in heaven."

*Babylonian Talmud, Brachot 32b*

"A philosopher who lived in the neighbourhood of Rabban Gamliel said to him: "Since the day that you were exiled from your land, the law of Moses has been superseded, and another Law (*Evangelion*) has taken its place."

*Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 116a-b*

"When the Temple was destroyed, many Jews .... would neither eat meat nor drink wine. Rabbi Joshua got into conversation with them.

Said he: "My sons, why do you not eat meat ?"
They replied: "Shall we eat meat, which used to be brought as a daily offering on the altar, but is now no more ?"
Said he: "Why do you drink no wine ?"
They replied: "Shall we drink wine, which used to be poured on the altar as a wine offering, but is now no more ?"

Then he said to them: "In that case, we should not eat figs or grapes either, since we used to bring them as offerings of first fruits; nor should we eat bread, from which we used to offer the loaves and the shewbread. We should not drink water, from which we used to pour a water offering on the feast of tabernacles."

They were silent.

He said to them: "Not to mourn at all is impossible, for the blow has fallen. But to mourn too much is also impossible. Therefore, this is what the sages advise....."

*Tosephta Sota 15:11-15*
Those who nullified the covenant of Avraham: A form of surrender?

"Rabbi Eleazar haModai said: One who desecrates sacred things, who disgraces the festivals, who humiliates his fellow in public, who nullifies the covenant of Avraham our forefather, and who interprets the Torah in a manner contradictory to the Halachah - though he may have Torah and good deeds - has no share in the world to come."

Mishnah, Avot 3:15

"I have seen many of Thy people who have foresaken thy covenant, And thrown off the yoke of Thy religion."

Syriac Baruch 41:3

"Many who had obliterated their sign of the Covenant were circumcised in the days of Bar Koziba."

Tosephta, Shabbat 15:9

"Rabbi Yehudah said: [Someone who has been de-circumcised] does not have to be circumcised, because it would be dangerous for him."

They said to him: But didn't they circumcise many [who had been de-circumcised] in the days of Bar Koziba, who then gave birth to sons and daughters?"

Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 72b
Historians argue about the state of Jewish morale:

Gedalya Alon, an Israeli historian, has argued:

"During the last three decades of the first century, almost everything that happened seemed designed to destroy the morale of the Jew, to make him turn his back on his people and his God. There were religious clashes and persecutions; bitter subjugation to Rome; the heavy tax burden; the destruction of the Temple and the dashing of the people's hopes which had risen to fever pitch during the resistance against Rome. All this could only bring in its wake a wave of despair."

Shmuel Safrai, another Israeli historian has written:

"The difficult conditions which existed after the Defeat left the people in a state of confusion and pain. A large part of the people were plunged into despair, and that wasn't simply an immediate reaction to the War of Destruction. Many gave up running normal lives; sunk in depression they stopped filling their normal roles...In fact, it seems that this breakdown in the life of the people even continued for a long period. And yet the backbone of the Jewish community was not completely broken....Evidence of this is not only provided by the fact that within a generation the people were again able to wage war on Rome, but also by a dramatic Jewish communal and economic revival by the end of the century...This revival was so swift, that within a generation of the Destruction, Judaism experienced one of the most creative and fruitful periods in its history."
"Imma Shalom, wife of Rabbi Eliezer and sister to Rabban Gamliel, had a certain *philosophos* living in her vicinity whose reputation was that he would judge without taking a bribe. They decided to test him.

She appeared before him with a golden lamp, and declared: "I want a share in my father's estate."

He promptly ordered that the estate be divided (between her and her brother). Rabban Gamliel said to him: "But in our law it is stated that where there is a son, the daughter does not inherit."

The other answered: "From the day you were exiled from your land, the Law of Moses has been removed, and another Law (*Evangelion*) set in its place, wherein it is written: a son and a daughter inherit equally."

The following day Rabban Gamliel brought him a Lybian ass and said: "Look further on in your book, wherein it is written: 'I came not to destroy the Law of Moses nor to add to it'; and the Law of Moses says clearly: 'When there is a son, the daughter does not inherit.'"

His sister hinted broadly to the Roman, saying: "Let thy light shine forth as a lamp."

Rabban Gamliel quickly rejoined: "The ass came and kicked the lamp over."

*Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 116a-b*
Jewish Reactions to Destruction: Alternative 2

In 66 C.E. a large scale Jewish revolt against Rome broke out.

In 70 C.E. Titus, son of the Emperor, occupied Jerusalem. He destroyed the Temple and the city.

The rebels continued to fight on elsewhere in Israel until 73 C.E. They held out longest at Masada, a mountain fortress in the desert near the Dead Sea. Around a thousand people, men, women and children, resisted the Roman army for more than two years.

Josephus tells us what happened in his book The Jewish War.

1. "The new governor in Judaea was Flavius Silva. He saw that only one fortress held out against the Romans. The fortress was Masada. He built a siege wall right round the fortress with camps so that no one could escape. The Romans occupied a spur of rock and built a solid earth platform on top. On this they built a base of stones and on this a tower 27 metres high protected all over with iron plates. This tower was for catapults and stone throwers. A great battering ram was brought up to the platform and swung continuously against the fortress wall until it was smashed".

When the defenders of Masada realized that all hope was lost they decided to kill themselves.

Josephus reported what Eleazar ben Yair, leader of the rebels, might have said:

2. "Long ago, my brave men, we resolved to serve neither the Romans nor any other masters, save G-d alone, for He is man's true and righteous Lord. We should not choose slavery now even at this difficult time. We were the first to revolt against the Romans and we shall be the last to fight against them...

...Come! While our hands are free and can hold a sword, let them do a noble service! Let us die without being made slaves by our enemies. Let us leave this world as free men in the company of our wives and children. This is what the Law ordains, that is what our wives and children demand of us...the opposite of what the Romans wish".
"The Romans are anxious that none of us should die before the fortress is captured. So let us deny the enemy their hoped-for pleasure at our expense, and without more ado leave them to be dumbfounded by our death and awed by our courage."
Ancient historians discuss Jewish defiance:

Writing about 30 years after the destruction of the Temple, the Roman historian, Tacitus, recorded what happened during the Jews' war against Rome.

"Vespasian has almost put an end to the war with the Jews. The siege of Jerusalem, however, remained a task made difficult and arduous by the character of the mountain citadel and the obstinate superstition of the Jews, rather than by any resources which the Jews possessed so as to withstand the inevitable hardships of a siege."

Historiae

Writing about 100 years later, another historian, Dio Cassius, noted how although the Jews were few against the might of the Roman army, they only gave in when part of the Temple was in flames.

"All believed that it was not a disaster but victory, salvation and happiness to perish together with the Temple."

Historia 66:6

When the early Church Father Eusebius (3rd-4th centuries) wrote about the Bar Kochba revolt - a major Jewish rebellion against Rome - which broke out about 65 years after the destruction of the Temple, he reported:

"The rebellion of the Jews intensified in both character and extent. Rufus, the [Roman] Governor of Judaea, after having been sent military reinforcements by the Emperor, went out against them, and suppressed their madness without mercy."

Ecclesiastical History 4:6
Different forms of defiance:

"In order to escape, one may vow to murderers, robbers or tax-collectors that the produce they demand is *terumah*(reserved for religious purposes) even though it is not; or that it belongs to the royal household even though it does not."

*Mishnah Nedarim* 3:4

"Rabbi Akiva said: It is permitted to avoid the payment of customs duties."

*Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma* 113a

Jews who worked for the Romans were despised by their fellows:

"The *minim*(heretics) and the informers....these will go down to Gehinnom (Hell) to be punished there for all generations."

*Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah* 17a

"Also added [to the list of those who weren't allowed to act as witnesses] were tax-collectors and tax-gatherers."

*Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin* 25:b

All of these quotations contrast sharply with the following legal principle which ruled in the Jewish community of Babylon, outside the Roman Empire.

"The law of the land is binding"

*Babylonian Talmud, Gittin* 10b
What kind of reaction does this represent?

"Rabbi Acha said: The Holy one, Blessed be He, makes use of everything to do his service; the snake, the frog, the scorpion and even the gnat.

Titus, the wicked, entered the Holy of Holies with a sword drawn in his hand. He cut down the parochet and dragged in two harlots. He spread out a Sefer Torah under them and raped them there, beside the altar. When he came out, his sword was covered in blood.

He began to blaspheme, insult and spit at G-d on high, saying: "Isn't he who does war with a king in the desert and defeats him, the same as he who does war with a king in his palace and defeats him?"

What did Titus do? He gathered together all the vessels of the Temple and put them in one casket and embarked on a boat with them.

As soon as the boat set off a storm blew up. Titus said: "It seems to me that this God possesses power over the sea only - the generation of the flood was only punished by way of water, similarly Pharoh and his army. It seems that it is the same with me. When I was in his house he didn't have the strength to confront me, yet now he confronts me here."

The Holy one, Blessed be He, said to him: "O wicked one, by your life, I can punish you with a creature lower than anything I created during the six days of creation."

Immediately The Holy one, Blessed be He, intimated to the sea and it stopped raging.

When Titus arrived in Rome all the citizens came out to praise him: "Conqueror of Barbarians", they sang.

Immediately they led him to the bathhouse where he went in and bathed. When they left, they brought him a strong drink.

G-d summoned a gnat which entered his nose and which gnawed its way right up to his brain. Once it started pecking at his brain, he said: "Call the doctors so that they can cut open my brain and find out how the God of that people punished me."

They immediately called the doctors who cut open his brain and found it to be as large as a young dove weighing two litres.

R.Elazar the son of R.Yose said: "I was there and I saw them put the creature on one side of a scale and two litres on the other, and they balanced perfectly.

They took them and put them in a glass container; and however one changed the other also changed. When the gnat died, so too did Titus the wicked."
Jewish Reactions to Destruction: Another Alternative?

"The Roman Emperor sent Vespasian against the Jews. He came and besieged Jerusalem for three years.
Abba Sikra was the leader of the Zealots in Jerusalem.
Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai invited Abba Sikra to a private meeting.

Rabban Yochanan said to Abba Sikra: How long are you going to continue living under siege and kill all the people from starvation?"
Abba Sikra replied: "What can I do? If I say a word, the Zealots will kill me."
Rabban Yochanan said: "Devise a plan for me to escape. Perhaps I will be able to save something."

Abba Sikra advised: "Pretend to be ill, and let everyone come to inquire about you. Bring something evil smelling and put it by you so that people will say that you are dead. Then let your students hide under your bed so that people will not notice that you are still light, since everyone knows that a living being is lighter than a corpse."

Rabbi Yochanan agreed. Rabbi Eliezer went under the coffin carriage from one side and Rabbi Joshua from the other. When they reached the gate of the city some Jewish defenders wanted to put a spear though the coffin. Abba Sikra refused and said: "Shall the Romans say that the Jews have pierced their master?" So they opened a town gate for him and Rabban Yochanan got out.

When Rabbi Yochanan reached the Roman camp, he greeted Vespasian: "Peace be to you O King! Peace be to you O King!"

Vespasian replied: "You have lost your life on two counts. First for calling me King, when I am not. Second, if you are right and I am King, how is that you did not come to me sooner?"

Rabbi Yochanan answered: "I call you King because you really are, since it is written that Jerusalem will only fall to royalty. As for you asking why I didn't come sooner, it is because the Zealots did not permit me."

While they were talking, a messenger arrived from Rome and saluted Vespasian: "Arise! The Emperor is dead and the Senators of Rome have elected you the Head of State."

Vespasian had just finished putting on one boot. When he tried to put the other one on he could not. He tried to take off the first boot, but it would not come off. He asked: "What is the meaning of this?"

Rabbi Yochanan said: "Don't worry. The good news has done this. As it says: "Good news makes the bone fat."

Vespasian said: "I am leaving now, and will send someone to take my place. Now ask me for something and it will be granted."

Rabbi Yochanan said: "Give me Yavneh and its Sages, the family of Rabban Gamliel and doctors to heal Rabbi Zaddok."

Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 56a-b
Historians discuss the origins of Yavneh:

Talmudic literature contains other versions of the same story. These end as follows:

"Vespasian asked. Are you Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai? Tell me, what may I give you?"
Rabban Yochanan replied: "I ask nothing of you, except for Yavneh where I might go and teach my students, establish a place of prayer, and keep all the commandments."

Avot de Rabbi Nathan chap 4

"Vespasian said to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai: "Make a request and I shall grant it."
Rabbi Yochanan said: "I ask you to abandon this city of Jerusalem and leave."
Vespasian said: "Is it for that the Romans have made me King? Make a different request."
Rabbi Yochanan said: "I ask you to withdraw from the Western gate of Jerusalem, so that whoever leaves before the third hour will be saved..."

Midrash, Lamentations Rabbah 1:34
Historians have offered different explanations for Rabban Yochanan's actions:

A

"Rabban Yochanan undoubtedly defected in despair, and he was in all likelihood immediately thrown into the Roman internment camp at Yavneh. His "academy", therefore, at first consisted of scholars discussing their tradition quite unofficially, having neither Jewish nor Roman recognition."

Gerson Cohen in *Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People*

B

"The choice of Yavneh was significant... It was then used as a home for loyal Jews who surrendered. Yochanan's surrender put him in the loyalist camp.

When he asked to join the loyalists in Yavneh, Vespasian was ready to agree to the foundation of a rabbinic school which might form the nucleus of a substitute for the Jewish Sanhedrin as a future organization of Jewish self-government. He was anxious to encourage moderate opinion.

The school at Yavneh was thus set up as a legitimate Jewish authority, with Rome's knowledge and consent, during the war, to prepare to play its part in the post-war reconstruction."

E.M. Smallwood, *The Jews under Roman rule, From Pompey to Diocletian*

C

"[Following Yochanan's escape] Titus received him in a friendly manner, and gave him permission to make a request of him. Yochanan modestly asked that he might be permitted to establish a school at Yavneh where he could give lectures to his pupils.

(This town was in a district which had been bequeathed to the Roman Emperor.)

Titus had nothing to urge against the harmless wish of Yochanan, because he could not tell that by this unimportant concession he was enabling Judaism, feeble as it then appeared, to outlive Rome, which was at the height of its power, by thousands of years."

H. Graetz, *History of the Jews*
Once, Rabban Yochan ben Zakkai was on his way out of Jerusalem, and Rabbi Joshua was following him. When Rabbi Joshua saw the Temple in ruins, he cried out: "Woe to us, that this place, where the sins of the children of Israel were forgiven, is now destroyed." Rabban Yochanan said to him: "My son do not grieve, because we have another way of seeking forgiveness just as effective. It is by performing acts of compassion and forgiveness, by doing good deeds to one another."

Avot of Rabbi Nathan Chap 6

Said Rabbi Joshua ben Korcha: "Rabban Yochanan also ruled that, wherever the Head of the Bet Din might be, witnesses [who had seen the new moon] should not go to him but only to wherever is the place of the Assembly [the High Court]."

Mishnah, Rosh Hashanah 4:4

"When the Yom Tov of Rosh Hashanah fell on Shabbat, they used to sound the Shofar in the Temple, but not in the country at large. After the Temple had been destroyed, Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai ruled that the Shofar was to be sounded wherever there was a Bet Din."

Mishnah, Rosh Hashanah 4:1
The Sages of Yavneh: The Age of Rabban Gamliel (c.85-114 ce)

"For the apostates let there be no (hope) unless they return to Thy teachings. May the Christians and the heretics perish in a moment. (Speedily) may their name be erased from the book of life, nor let them be inscribed with the righteous. Blessed art Thou, Oh Lord, who (humbles) the arrogant."

The Twelfth blessing of the Shemona Esreh as found in the Cairo Genizah.

"Rabban Gamliel says: One should recite the Shemoneh Esreh every day.
Rabbi Joshua says: An abbreviated form of the Shemoneh Esreh (will do).
Rabbi Akiva says: If one can read his prayers fluently he should say the Shemoneh Esreh but if not an abbreviated form (will do).
Rabbi Eliezer says: He who make his prayers fixed [a mechanical task] causes them to lose the quality of supplication."

Mishnah, Brachot 4:3-4

The Rabbis of Yavneh created a new format for the Passover Seder:

"Rabban Gamliel used to say: Whoever fails to mention the following three things at the Passover (seder) has not fulfilled his obligation, namely: 1) the Paschal lamb, 1) the Matzah, 3) the Maror."

Mishnah, Pesachim 10:5

"The Rabbis of Yavneh used to say: I am one of God's children, and my illiterate fellow-man is one of God's children... I get up early to go to my work and he gets up early to go to his work... Would you say that I do much and he does little? But we have been taught that, whether much or little, it is all one, provided that a person directs his heart to Heaven."

Babylonian Talmud, Brachot 17a
One of the local centers for the study of the Torah was Bene Berak, where Rabbi Akiva lived. It is mentioned in the Passover Haggadah: “Once Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon all sat down together for the Seder at Bene Berak”.

From M. Avi-Yonah, Carta’s Atlas II, map 116, p. 77.
What did people really think about the Romans?

1. Rabbi Yehudah (bar Ilai), Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon (bar Yochai) were sitting together, and Yehudah ben Gerim was there as well. Rabbi Yehudah began by saying: "What wonderful things this people [the Romans] have done! They have established market places, built bridges, and constructed bath-houses." Rabbi Yose kept silent. Rabbi Shimon said: "Whatever they have done they have done only for their own sakes. They have built markets - so that they can house prostitutes; baths - in order to preen themselves; bridges - so that they can collect tolls."

   Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 33b

2. Rabbi Yochanan said: It is a mitzvah to go to see the ruler. One need not be concerned about the implied recognition of sovereignty. When the time comes, and the House of David is restored, there will be no problem in telling one sovereignty from the other.

   Jerusalem Talmud, Berachot 3:6a

3. "A group of people are travelling along the highway when they are accosted by gentiles [government troops] who say: Give us one of your number that we may execute him, otherwise we shall kill all of you! What to do? Let them all be killed, rather than surrender a single soul. But if they are asked for a specific person, as Joab asked for Sheba the son of Bichri, then let them surrender him, so that the rest not be killed. Rabbi Shimon ben Laqish said: "That applies only if he was guilty of a capital crime, as Shimon ben Bichri was." Rabbi Yochanan said: "No, even though he was not proven guilty, the order must be respected."

   Jerusalem Talmud, Terumah 7:46b
A case study: The population of the Galilee:

The following inscription was found in a synagogue in Kasyoun in the Upper Galilee, dedicated to the Roman Emperor Septimius Severus. It is in Greek and is dated 197.

"May peace accompany the Emperor Lucius Septimus Severus, as well as Marcus Aurelius Antonius and Lucius Septimus Geta his sons because of these Jewish vows."

This coin dates from the time of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi at the beginning of the third century. It comes from Sepphoris (Tzippori), one of the largest Jewish towns in the Galilee.

The inscription reads:

Dio-Ceasaria [Sepphoris] the holy and autonomous city of refuge, loyal partner in a covenant of brotherhood and mutual assistance between the holy council of the city and the senate of the Roman people."
The relationship between Sepphoris and Rome seems to have fluctuated. Rabbi Yose ben Chalafta, a resident of Sepphoris in the mid-second century, is quoted as saying:

"I saw Tzippori in its tranquility."
Tosephta, Shabbat 7:18

"The law of " Shichachali (forgotten crops left for the poor) does not apply to olives."
Mishna, Peah 7:1

The following letter was found among the Bar Kochba letters. Historians believe that it sheds light on the question of how loyal the Galileans were to Rome.

"From Shimon ben Kosiba to Yeshua ben Galgoula and to the men of the fort, peace. I taken heaven to witness against me that if [unless] you harm [mobilize] the Galileans who are with you every man, I will put fetters on your feet as I did to ben Aphiul. [Shimon ben Kosiba]."
"Elements in Judaism and Challenges to It"
(A historical chain in which God carves first of course, because he is the creator of the world)

- C - D
- Created the I.P.
- Israel - Abrahamic Names
- Next, he promised the
- Israel he promised the
- Land of Israel
- After he gave them the Torah which is
- Judaism, which in the beginning is focused on the
- Temple, the

- Remains
- and back to
- War, which led to the destruction of the Temple
- Destruction
- and
- Surrender.
- Maccabean Judaism was introduced
- Rabbits
  - in the two historians, interpret all of history
  - Historians
    - (we see the development of the Western historians)

"The development of Judaism and the situation of the Jewish People"

"Deplance Adaptation"
(Agreement found in God's religion + his people, to his people's land and to the central point of the people's land which is the Temple)

(G is D (in universe is a very philosophical idea)

JUDAISM out of Judaism comes the T.P. as a direct result

JEWISH PEOPLE a great part of the T.P.'s existence is their...

LAND OF ISRAEL a focal point-the life is the

TEMPLE was a focal point of the 4th

ROMANS were against the Temple, wrote an apologue of a king who took with him the Temple.

RABBIS cause, narrative

DESTRUCTION the destruction of the Temple was a result of the war

WAR in reaction to the DEFIANCE

SURRENDER, evacuation led to surrender

ADAPTATION following surrender, story about man who had to adapt to life after the war (see how they still lived a life of worship)

HISTORIANS you will read Jewish historians, critical of the action of the Romans

"HISTORY OF THE JEWS RELATIONSHIP TO G-D"
"A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE"
A chronological diagram of what happened from very early in Jewish history up to the destruction of the Temples and Roman period.

- **G-D**
- **Choosing (Supposedly)**
- **Jewish People**
  - as leaders in the community
  - classification of people
- **Rabbits**
  - led to wars and may be to take action
- **War**
  - leading to the adaptation of a desert-dwelling people into a people of a conventional and settled lifestyle
- **Adaptation**
  - which becomes the
- **Land of Israel**
- Week in which happenings last
- Temple is built in Jerusalem
- **Temple**
  - came in and wanted to take over the land
- **Romans**
  - states where the Romans came
  - does actually carry away the holy things
  - (also attacks the people against Roman occupation)
  - in Nineveh, Persia
- **Defiance**
  - leading into the destruction of
  - the second temple itself
- **Destruction**
  - attacked, they surrender (ie the actual ending of the Temple era)
- **Surrounded**
  - writing and about the whole lot in expository
- **Historians**
  - not really relevant to this diagram
  - get their historically accurate stories
  - teaching historians at just going at them and how they write books
- "A chronological history (ish) of the first state of Israel"
- Also a subjective comment on the Jews at the time.
- [300]
"The Lifeline of the Jewish People"
(it looks as if there is a
clausology) started with
and then an... just flipped
my

G-D

Israel's part to the SP.

JEWISH PEOPLE

JUDAISM

in Judaism there has always been
a long rift between
is the Promised Land in
LAND OF ISRAEL.

from a chronological (6th) thing,
we've got that settling in the 672
and all the...

TEMPLE

came uninstalled the

ROMANS

have some influence over the...
can be seen (and quite big influences)

DEFANCE

lead climatically to

WAR

lead towards destruction
is a part of

DESTRUCTION

SURRENDER

once all that has been destroyed & the SP.
surrendered here key point is life without
the Temple, would Romans not that order.

ADAPTATION

a major part of his adaptability...

(especially Palestinian)

RABBIS

... a lot more prominent than...

HISTORIANS

THE CHANGING TIDE
"THE PROMISED LAND"

SURRENDER

Through the wars in order to prevent us from surrendering,

WARP

Assured the U.S. we would accept surrender conditions which came through wires.

"ONE OF THE STORIES IN OUR HISTORY"

HISTORIANS

We were only known in history through the historians who tell us stories about us.

PHILORENS

We were the group that destroyed the nation.

DESTRUCTION

Happened to both Temples.

"THE LADDER OF JEWISH HISTORY"

BOTH TEMPLES

At that time the Temple was not a holy place.

Hughes thought and hoped.

That was the way to do it.

JUDAISM

The way we lived to avoid destruction and avoid mean people.

RABBIS

As we needed to survive,

JEWISH PEOPLE

created the YP.

G-D

(started with G-D.

Because we fell into slavery, and we

tried our best to escape from slavery.

God created the world, etc.)
"CONQUEST OF ISRAEL BY THE ROMANS"

ROMANS
1342 years ago the Romans came to the
LAND OF ISRAEL
 broke
war
is a special place for
GOD
HISTORIANS
They don't fit in
very precisely.
If we're talking about
the conquest of Israel
by the Romans, we
have to
consider
...[insert
historian's
view here]...the
RABBIS
were
involved.
JEWISH PEOPLE
DESTRUCTION
JUDAISM
"THE ENEMIES
OF THE ROMANS"
DELEGATES OF THE...
REAGENTS TO DESTRUCTION"

JEWISH PEOPLE

DESTRUCTION
Reactions to destruction
are different types of reactions to destruction.

TEMPLE
Israel's central in the destruction of the Temple (and also the destruction of Jewish identity to a certain extent).

DESTRUCTION
More people were part of the destruction, in some respects of the world.

DEFIANCE
There are some people who tried to fight against their losses like the people of Naziaan, who tried to fight after the destruction of the Temple.

ADAPTATION
There were those who (found communities and) fit in with the new situation like Rambam and his students.

SURRENDER
Some simply gave in and let the Romans take their toll.
"DESTRUCTION OF THE SECOND TEMPLE"
"DESTRUCTION OF THE SECOND TEMPLE AND RESPONSES TO IT"
A Period in Jewish History

(One example of what Jews have had to go through
And yet such an inspiring one, either)
Appendix 6.

The system of semantic categories for bi-concept links (x and y denote concepts).
Derived from Mahler et al (1991)

Analyse link: x is like, similar, analogous or corresponds to y.

Aim link: x aims or approaches y.

Precedence link: x precedes y in time or in a sequence.

Characteristic link: x has y, x is characterized by y, x is a feature, property, aspect, trait or attribute of y.

Contingency link: x is dependent or contingent on y.

Description link: x describes y.

Evidence link: x indicates, supports, documents or confirms, is illustrated or demonstrated by y.

Formation link: x forms or is formed within y.

Influence link: x influences y.

Leads to link: x leads, results, causes, produces or is a tool of y.

Neutral link: x and y are related (with no further specification).

Operation link: x operates on, or is being operated on by y.

Part of link: x is a part, segment or portion of y.

Relation link: x and y are related by either a direct or inverse relation.

Sameness link: x is the same as, or identical to y.

Type/example of link: z is a member, type, kind or example of y or is in the category of y.

Unclassifiable link: cannot be classified by this scheme.

Nonexistent link: no link exists between x and y.