If A Lion Could Talk:

A philosophical investigation into frameworks and the transmission of values in schools.

by

Paul Michael Severn

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Institute of Education University of London
June 2003

The copyright of this thesis remains with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author.
Abstract
If a Lion Could Talk: A philosophical investigation into frameworks and the transmission of values in schools.
By Paul Michael Severn.
Submitted for the degree of PhD at the University of London, Institute of Education.
June 2003

There is a widespread concern about values and values education at the present time, which I explore in an introductory chapter. Whilst it is conceded that talk of ‘crisis’ is perhaps excessive, there does seem to be genuine cause for concern. At the end of this introduction, I make the claim which is at the heart of this work: that the teaching of values requires a framework.

The term framework is widely used and I begin by exploring and clarifying my use of this term further. I discuss frameworks and language drawing principally on the work of Wittgenstein. I consider frameworks and tradition drawing on the work of MacIntyre, and I consider frameworks and community, drawing on the work of Charles Taylor. Finally, I synthesise these, to derive an understanding of frameworks for values education.

Then I respond to the twin criticisms that either my claim is so general as to be trivially true, or that insisting on a framework is tantamount to indoctrination. I argue that this is a false dichotomy and that my framework constitutes a via media.

Recognising that a number of references have been made to the nature of the self I draw these together, particularly in the light of the liberal / communitarian debate. I argue that the self is both encumbered and autonomous and I go on to expand this position, to justify my claim that values education requires a framework.

Then, I address the possibility that the classical liberal approach to education constitutes a framework and argue that it does not. Finally I examine the debate about faith schools and make comparisons between it and my own discussion, in an attempt to show that my largely philosophical discussion and the conclusions I draw, are indeed pertinent to current educational debate.

The author confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.
# Table of Contents

**Preface**

| I   | Introduction                                      | 6 |
| II  | Language and Frameworks                          | 25 |
| III | Tradition and Frameworks                         | 41 |
| IV  | Community and Frameworks                         | 57 |
| V   | Frameworks for Values Education                  | 74 |
| VI  | Bridging a False Divide                          | 91 |
| VII | Autonomy and the Self                             | 103 |
| VIII| Frameworks Justified                              | 121 |
| IX  | The Impossibility of a Liberal Framework          | 135 |
| X   | New Labour and Faith Schools                      | 148 |

**Bibliography**
Preface

There is a widespread concern about values and values education at the present time which I explore in an introductory chapter. Whilst it is conceded that talk of 'crisis' is perhaps excessive, there does seem to be genuine cause for concern. I go on to explore the question 'what are values?' and I briefly consider a dichotomy posed by the teaching of values in schools. At the end of this introduction, I make the claim central to this work, that the teaching of values requires a framework, and I briefly outline what kind of claim I take this to be.

The term framework is widely used and in chapters two to five I explore these uses in order to clarify my use of this term further. In chapter two I discuss frameworks and language drawing principally on the work of Wittgenstein. In chapter three I consider frameworks and tradition drawing on the work of MacIntyre, and in chapter four I consider frameworks and community, drawing on the work of Charles Taylor. (Whilst Taylor does not claim to be a communitarian himself others see him so, and either way, his development of the notion of the self as situated within community is highly relevant to my discussion.) In a fifth chapter I synthesise these, to derive an understanding of frameworks for values education based on components of language, tradition and community.

In chapter six I respond to the twin criticisms that either my claim is so general as to be trivially true, or that insisting on a framework is tantamount to indoctrination. I argue that this is a false dichotomy and that my framework constitutes a via media between two extremes. In chapter seven I recognise that a number of references have been made to the nature of the self and try to draw these together, particularly in the light of the liberal / communitarian debate. I argue that the self is both encumbered and autonomous and drawing on Raz I argue that the self is autonomous not contra the community but within it.

In chapter eight I offer an argument to show that values education requires a framework, based on the situated nature of the self. This key argument at the heart of thesis is dependent upon a prior understanding of both frameworks and the nature of the self, and so although there is some argument for placing it nearer the beginning I felt it could only be properly articulated when the other pieces of the jigsaw were in place.

In chapter nine I address the possibility that the classical liberal approach to education itself constitutes a framework and I examine this from the perspectives of language, tradition and community which I have developed. I conclude that there can be no liberal education
framework because considerations of community developed in chapters four and five are not met.

In chapter ten I examine the recent political and academic debate in this area, centred around Grace’s *Catholic Schools: Mission, Markets and Morality* and the “Faith Schools Consensus or Conflict” conference held at the Institute of Education, University of London in June 2002. I make comparisons between it and my own discussion, and show that my largely philosophical discussion, and the conclusions I draw from it, are indeed pertinent to current educational debate.

A balance of analytic and speculative philosophy applied to theoretical and related practical problems as exemplified by the work of Peters and Hirst is the stance adopted in this enquiry. The method is to draw on “established branches of philosophy and bring together those segments that are relevant to the solution of educational problems” (Hirst and Peters 1970 p13). This entails both the analysis of concepts and the application of them to educational situations, in our case the analysis of the concept of a framework for teaching values, and reasons to justify its application in a real school setting. Shortcomings in providing an absolutely water-tight definition of a framework for values education may also be viewed in the light of Peters’ own remarks that the inability to produce a “neat set of logically necessary conditions for the use of a word like knowledge or education is not necessarily a hallmark of failure” (ibid.). The process of analysis clarifies our concepts and reveals their links with other concepts, thus increasing our understanding and prompting a more informed and balanced reaction to the social situation in which we find ourselves. I do not see my own inability to define framework categorically as a failure, for the aim here is to draw out conceptual links, advance understanding and make connections where they did not previously exist.
Is there a crisis about values and values education?

Speaking to serving teachers, considering the national press and reading specialist educational publications, gives the impression that there is a problem with values and values education at the present time. There is a sense that values and values education are at worst in crisis, and at the very least in decline. In this section, this suggestion will be examined, and we shall seek to establish that there is indeed a legitimate cause for concern about values and values education. The historical and social events that have or may have caused any decline are inevitably highly complex, and the aim at this stage is to describe rather than explain the situation.

Before we begin one possible objection about the concept of decline needs to be met. In 1993 Graham Haydon published, *Education and the Crisis in Values*. In this short monograph he makes several important points, but in particular he says that any talk of decline assumes some standard against which a decline can be measured. Whilst he concedes that for example crime rates may have increased and there may be higher levels of truancy, he also points out that there is an increased awareness of green issues, and a concern for justice, particularly for animal rights. This is seen as a counter trend, in a sense a moral advance and Haydon says in the face of this plurality, there is an absence of a unified scale to which appeal can be made. In the light of this he suggests that talk of decline does not make sense. This is certainly plausible, but not water tight for it is not clear that a single measure is essential. If there were a recognisable decline by some standards and an advance by others it is possible that some overall trend or balance could be recognised. There may be dispute about the overall balance, but the idea of a balance or an overall measure of decline is not itself incoherent.

In 1994 Lord Hailsham published *Values: Collapse and Cure*. Before the content of this work is considered it must be said that it is quite remarkable that a man of Lord Hailsham’s stature should publish a book with such a title. It must be conceded that it would be a fallacy *ad hominem* to say that if Lord Hailsham says there is a collapse in values then there is. Equally well when the former Lord Privy Seal, and a fellow of All Souls College, bothers to write a book with such a title at eighty-seven years of age, this is not insignificant.
Lord Hailsham begins by admitting that he felt within himself a mood of deep depression around the end of 1992. Initially he connected this with the state of the royal family, the external political and economic situation at home or perhaps the problems in Bosnia or the Middle East. Upon further reflection he comes to realise these are not the causes of his mood but a “despondency about the failure of belief in the things which had buoyed me up throughout my life” (Hailsham 1994 p5). Hailsham says he does not mean religious beliefs as such but values and value judgements: “the good, the right, the beautiful, the honourable and even the true” (ibid. p8). He says the vision of our life has become confused and uncertain and is in danger of signifying nothing.

Hailsham suggests that this confusion stems from a widespread acceptance of Logical Positivism, either consciously, or at least “because that belief is an accurate description of the actual code of behaviour by which an increasing number of people live” (ibid. p165–6). When he talks of positivism he is thinking of the version proposed by A. J. Ayer in *Language, Truth and Logic* and he forcibly puts forward the familiar criticism that positivism fails because it is self-contradictory. He does little more to argue that there has actually been a collapse in values, and indeed he does not assert this beyond describing his own mood and feelings, but the suggestion is implicit.

The book continues by asserting that there are definite, objective values and value judgements which are not verifiable in Ayer’s sense. He examines various kinds in turn: aesthetic values, values in law etc. and although one may not want to endorse all that he says (indeed he persistently muddles an emotive theory about values with a subjective theory which is distinct) nevertheless the vigour and passion with which he argues cannot leave one cold. The very fact that the question of a collapse in values has been raised in this way is a significant first piece in a complex jigsaw.

Hailsham distinguishes values per se from religious values but many authors do not. Shortly after being appointed Secretary of State for Education in 1992, John Patten published an article in *The Spectator* entitled: “There is a Choice: Good or Evil.” In this article Patten maintains that there is a crisis in values and a moral decline and he explicitly linked this to a decline in church attendance, the loss of faith and an absence of the fear of damnation. The article aroused much debate and the explicit connection drawn between morals and faith caused many to dismiss Patten’s paper as political posturing, but ignoring the party political issues, we are interested in whether indeed there is a crisis – what led Patten to this conclusion?
Patten noted the growth of ‘Victorian values’ in the nineteenth century and suggested that these developed as the century progressed, reaching “their apogee in Edwardian times” (Patten 1992). Following the Second World War, Patten maintains that there has been a steady decline in the importance of values in society and he points to three indicators of this. Firstly there are now higher levels of crime. Secondly there is a higher incidence of marital breakdown, divorce and abortion. And thirdly there is a growth of secularisation, and a search for happiness centred on “cars, colour televisions and consumables” (ibid.).

It is proper that these assertions should be questioned. Is there really more crime, are there really more abortions etc. or is it that we are now much better at recording and counting these things? Can we ignore the increased interest in green issues, ecology and animal rights, and even if we can rely on Patten’s assertions, do they point to a crisis in values or to a radical shift in values? Is it the nature of the change itself, or the rate of the change that is causing alarm? I think Patten’s short paper was designed to spark debate and that it certainly did, but to draw too many definite conclusions from it without considering the wider picture would, I think, be a mistake.

Professor John White links values to religion but in a slightly different way. In his inaugural lecture as professor of the philosophy of education at the London Institute of Education (1995), he begins by speaking of Britain’s “overwhelming unreligiousness” (White 1995 p3) and finds it surprising that “in 1990 the proportion of active church members in the UK population was 15%, the smallest for all West European countries” (ibid.). He goes on to outline how children from a religious background are provided with frameworks of meaning, but suggests that “with secular children it is more hit-and-miss” (ibid.). He suggests such children lack clear bearings and in terms of their personal flourishing are disadvantaged.

The precise details of White’s subsequent discussion may be ignored at this stage, for the crucial point is that there is no established tradition in which non-religious children may be initiated. There is no agreed framework of values distinct from the religious framework in this country and although there have been attempts to locate secular value systems (White mentions Iris Murdoch’s *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*) there is no general agreement. Confusion and uncertainty concerning values and values education, are the prevailing trends that Professor White identifies.

This idea of confusion about values is one which many authors develop. In 1992 R. M. Hare published a collection of essays on religion and education. Some of these were re-workings or copies of earlier essays but significantly in essay number nine Hare acknowledges the
“bewildering choices of values, principles, ideologies, ways of life etc. with which they [people] are confronted” (Hare 1992 p137). The choice itself does not entail a crisis, but the breadth of choice and its bewildering nature does suggest a cause for concern.

In 1996 Les Burwood published a paper: “How Should Schools Respond to the Plurality of Values in a Multicultural Society.” The content of this paper is a discussion about whether values are objective or subjective, and in turn what this entails about the teaching of values. More importantly for us, the very fact that the question of what to do about values in a multicultural society needs to be raised in 1996, shows that there is confusion and uncertainty. The paper does not set out to praise or criticise an established approach, but asks more generally how should we respond, suggesting to me at least, that there is a profound uncertainty about value systems, and how they might be transmitted.

In Education and the Crisis in Values Graham Haydon also suggests that confusion results from the plurality of value systems. He goes on to suggest this plurality of standards or values in British Society, stems not so much from ethnic diversity but from religious diversity, and a “diversity of moral traditions” (Haydon 1993 p2). Haydon says this is not new, but the public recognition of it is, and with increased communications and the high profile role of the media we have become particularly aware of the non-homogeneity of our moral outlook. The recognition of this change does not necessarily indicate a decline but there are those for whom change is equivalent to decline!

Furthermore, it has to be said that whilst a recognition of a plurality does not entail a decline it is quite possible that the way that the plurality is perceived may lead to a decline. That is to say that it is only a few short steps from a recognition of a plurality to embracing relativity and subjectivism about values, and from there to the suggestion that if value systems can not be objectively distinguished then really they do not matter. If this is a widespread pattern of thought then it is possible that “plurality of standards does contribute something to moral decline” (ibid. p4) but note that this is a possibility not a certainty.

In 1997 Haydon developed some of these thoughts in a book: Teaching about Values. Enlarging on a point made earlier that diversity of values stems from religious diversity, he insists again that values are closely tied to religion and religious culture for the majority, even those who do not consider themselves religious. If the separate religions are in separate social groups this is unproblematic, but when the separate religions are in the same social group this can lead to problems. The reason for this is that religion is not simply about (metaphysical) beliefs, but entails behaviour, belonging, tradition etc.. Therefore if we do not
learn how to accommodate religious plurality, then religious conflict and with it conflict about values is likely. The suggestion here is stronger than the suggestion above. Whereas above; the plurality of values and the way that this is perceived may lead to a decline, here the suggestion is that plurality, if not appropriately accommodated will inevitably lead to conflict of one kind or another (see Haydon 1997 Chap. 4). Talk of conflict in society generally and in schools particularly, is a cause for concern by any standards.

Another point is also particularly relevant. Haydon says that his book was written as a response to the public’s demand that schools teach about values and also the fact that “teachers in particular, who are in the front line in responding to these expectations, have very little guidance on how to go about it” (Haydon 1997 pxi). From an author who works in a major centre of teacher training (The Institute of Education, London), it is a significant observation that teachers are not taught adequately how to deal with values issues. If this is the case then it is no surprise that there is a cause for concern about values education!

In 1994 there was an education symposium at St Mary’s College, Durham which resulted in another collection of essays, entitled Society in Conflict: The Value of Education. In this text R. P. Minney identifies “a confusion of values because we live in a multicultural, multi-religious and socially polyphonic society. As if that were not enough mass communications present to us and our children, systems of value, or rather fragments of value systems, from all over the world” (see Ashton 1994 p53). The interesting and relevant point here is that we receive fragments of value systems: both fragments which may be part of an incomplete whole, and fragments from separate systems which may appear to contradict one another.

If fragmentation or disintegration of value systems is the major trend which dominates or is overlaid upon the problems associated with increased plurality in value systems, then this could be considered a crisis. As society becomes more diverse and as communications technology becomes better and faster, this fragmentation is likely to increase. It seems clear that this is a real problem which will not just go away, and one which those who have a interest in, or a responsibility for values education need to consider very carefully indeed.

Finally, in the last twenty years scientists have made huge technical advances in the fields of human health care and genetics. Prematurely born babies have an ever increasing chance of survival, raising questions of viability and abortion. In 1978 Louise Brown, the first ever test tube baby was born and since then there have been huge advances in genetic engineering and screening. In 1997 the first cloned sheep (Dolly) was born in Scotland and in August 2000 the Chief Medical Officer, Prof. Liam Donaldson recommended to the government that the
cloning of certain human tissues should be permitted (see *The Independent* 17 August 2000). The health benefits, especially to those with degenerative diseases seem obvious, but with the cloning of humans ever more likely there are serious concerns too.

If we add to this the great advances in the Human Genome Project, the mapping of the human DNA code, then the possibilities of genetic modification and genetic screening loom larger and larger. The value responses to these possibilities are hugely varied. Roger Gosden in his book *Designer Babies* cites (at one end of the scale) Pope John Paul II: “Genetic screening is gravely opposed to the moral law when it is done with the thought of possibly inducing an abortion depending on results. A diagnosis which shows the existence of a malformation or a hereditary disease must not be the equivalent of a death sentence” (Gosden 1999 p86-7). At the other end of the scale some American health insurance companies have tried to escape responsibility for care when they feel parents to have done insufficient to prevent the birth of a ‘defective child’. In an American court cases have even been brought by children, against their parents on the grounds of ‘wrongful birth’ (ibid. p87)

In the light of these new technologies a number of bodies have been established. A committee was convened in 1982 to enquire into human fertility and embryology and this committee published its report under Dame (now Baroness) Mary Warnock in 1984. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) was established in 1991. The Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAC) existed from December 1996 to December 1999 and produced reports on Insurance and Genetic Testing (Dec. ’97), Cloning (Dec. ’98) and Employment and Genetic Testing (July ’99). In December 1999 the HGAC was replaced by the Human Genetic Commission (HGC).

The HGC is a government body whose purpose is to analyse developments in human genetics and then to advise ministers on the likely impact upon health and healthcare, and their social, ethical, legal and economic implications. So it cannot be said that scientific research progresses unchecked but there are, I think, two principal problems.

The first is that these bodies do not speak with a single voice (indeed the 1984 Warnock report has an appendix of “expressions of dissent” from the main findings), and that they are only advisory. Whilst this is of course proper and to be expected, it creates something of a difficulty for the teacher approaching the subject with a view to explaining some of this material. The wealth of opinion is just as likely to confuse the issues as clarify them for the pupil. Secondly, there is a difficulty in so far as the advisory bodies tend to produce their
reports after the relevant scientific advance. There is a definite sense that the world of values is trying to keep up with the world of science, and this causes uneasiness at the very least. It is significant I think that John Harriss opens his book, *Clones, Genes and Immortality* with the words: “The rapidity of scientific advance and in particular advance in the field of genetics and reproduction has left our moral categories in disarray” (Harriss 1992 p1).

In the light of both the educational literature and the difficulties surrounding the moral evaluation of recent medical achievements I think there is genuine cause for concern about values education. Again I emphasise that at this stage I have tried to describe the situation rather than explain it, and before any explanation is sought it is fitting to consider the more general and logically prior question: what do we mean by values?

What are values?

Unfortunately there is no simple answer to the question what are values and indeed there is a great diversity of opinion in the field of values: philosophers, sociologists, educationalists etc. all seem to want to have their say! This however should not act as a deterrent, for if progress is to be made we must begin somewhere, and an attempt to explain what values are is surely as good a place as any.

Modern philosophers have tended to consider values as distinct from facts, and this distinction is usually accredited to David Hume (1711-1776). In a *Treatise of Human Nature* Hume protests that some writers of moral philosophy begin with statements joined by ‘is’ and then change almost imperceptibly to statements joined by ‘ought’. Although the difference seems minor, Hume claims that this is a new relation and “a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it” (Hume III i 1). This protest has become the loosely expressed dictum that ‘you cannot derive an ought from an is.’ It may be noted that to overplay this distinction is to detach value from the world entirely. To underplay it is to suggest (implausibly) that an ought can be derived from an is without a problem. A satisfactory account is likely to suggest that ought and is are somehow interrelated.

Naturally this has provided a rich source of discussion for moral philosophers, and there is a considerable literature on the question of whether Hume’s law is valid and if not what are the reasons that Hume demands. In his book *Ethics*, J. L. Mackie discusses John Searle’s example of Smith who promises to pay Jones $5 and therefore ought to pay him. Mackie argues that certain linguistic and social conventions do indeed warrant the transition from
ought to is. Mackie considers the game of chess, whose rules and conventions certainly legitimate an inference of the type: a bishop is attacking your queen therefore you ought to protect your queen (cf. Mackie pp 64 – 72).

More importantly for us, Hume’s dictum draws a sharp distinction between values and facts, or to put it another way between evaluative and descriptive judgements. Just as this has provoked debate in the moral arena, so it would be foolish to expect this semantic distinction to be entirely clear cut.

Traditionally, a fact is the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs that obtains making the proposition true. Facts are complexes of objects and properties which are abstract, even though their constituents may not be. For example the fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar contains the objects Brutus and Caesar standing in the relationship of stabbing (in that order). The actual obtaining of the state of affairs makes it true (properly makes the descriptive judgement true) that Brutus stabbed Caesar. The problem with this approach is that difficulties arise over negative, disjunctive and modal facts (cf. Honderich p267).

Values on the other hand express feelings and attitudes, which traditionally cannot be discerned by the senses or scientific instruments. It may be that values are sui generis properties, or relationships of a particular kind. Additionally, problems arise over the questions of whether a single judgement could be both descriptive and evaluative and whether this partition is exhaustive, and so it is to the twentieth century treatment of these questions that we now turn.

In the 1920s and 1930s logical empiricism or logical positivism began to develop, centred on the Vienna Circle founded in 1926 by Moritz Schlick. The members of the Circle were philosophers, mathematicians and scientists who were united by a common interest in scientific methodology and an opposition to traditional, metaphysical philosophy. The manifesto of the Circle published in 1929 lists fourteen members and ten sympathisers (see Ayer 1982 p129) and there were several distinguished visitors (e.g. Ayer and Quine). The rise of Nazism, the German invasion of Austria in 1938 and the onset of the Second World War eventually caused the decline and dispersal of the Circle and it met in a barely recognisable shape for the last time in Cambridge in the summer of 1938.

Although not one of the founding members of the Circle, Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) was to become one of its leading exponents and his: *The Logical Construction of the World (Die Logische Aufbau der Welt)* was published in 1928. In a similar way to Frege, Carnap was
interested in semantics and formalised languages to describe the world. He aimed to solve philosophical problems through logical analysis and he seemed to believe that philosophical disagreement could be solved by linguistic clarification. The precise details of Carnap’s position changed and developed over his long and prolific career, but his essential philosophical outlook remained unchanged. Significantly for us, the earlier Carnap thought that value statements could be defined within science, but he later came to sympathise with Ayer and others that value statements have approximately the same status as statements of metaphysics; and can therefore be dismissed a meaningless on the same sorts of grounds.

Sir Alfred Ayer (1910-1989) published his hugely influential Language, Truth and Logic in 1936, in which he outlines his verification principle which (loosely) asserts that a factual statement is only meaningful if it can be empirically verified, otherwise it is meaningless – nonsense. (Ayer admitted that some a priori statements were meaningful, but said that these were tautologies, not statements of fact.) Metaphysics is the first and intended victim of Ayer’s analysis and considering the debates between monists and pluralists, and between idealists and realists he asserts that since none of their positions is actually or even possibly verifiable, each is nonsense. Metaphysical debate is not solved by linguistic analysis but is shown to be meaningless – literally non-sense.

It may be asked: what of ethics? At the beginning of chapter six of Language, Truth and Logic, Ayer recognises what he calls a common distinction between facts and values. He considers the thesis that statements of value are genuine synthetic propositions that cannot be verified. If true, this would undermine Ayer’s whole enterprise, so he has to give an account of value statements, and ethics and aesthetics are principally what he has in mind.

Firstly he concedes that there could be genuine philosophical debate about the meaning of ethical terms such as good or wrong, what would now be thought of as meta-ethics, but argues that in fact normative ethical terms are unanalysable as they are pseudo concepts. He says that the presence of an ethical symbol adds nothing to the factual content of a proposition. As for a statement such as “stealing money is wrong” (Ayer 1936 p142). Ayer analyses this as “stealing money!!” where the exclamation marks, by convention denote disapproval. Generalising this, ethical utterances are really utterances of personal emotion, of moral sentiment, which may arouse or stimulate action but are not actually factual propositions.

It is important to distinguish the emotive theory from any subjective analysis. In a subjective analysis qualities of various kinds, moral in particular are not inherent in objects but depend
on the judgement of subjects. There may be reasons and theories underlying these judgements and a subject may be rationally persuaded to change his mind. For the emotivist, moral utterances report feelings, likes and dislikes, not assertions, and they are not rationally based, so there are no contradicting views about which one can meaningfully argue. This argument about ethics applies mutatis mutandis to aesthetics and to all questions of value. In reply to the criticism of Ayer by Moore that we do in fact argue about questions of value, Ayer says that our arguments are actually clarifications of fact or logic. Alternatively the argument may not actually entail formal contradiction, and it is when this is not recognised “that we finally resort to abuse” (ibid p147). In short then Ayer recognises a distinction between facts that can be empirically verified, and value judgements which appear to be genuine synthetic propositions, but upon closer inspection are emotive utterances about which questions of truth and falsehood cannot arise.

This view was shared by the American Charles L. Stevenson (1908-1979) who developed the emotive theory of ethics, in two papers published in the late thirties and in his influential book Ethics and Language published in 1944. Like Ayer before him, Stevenson argued that ethical judgements and value judgements generally, are distinct from factual judgements and only report the subject’s emotions or attitudes and are really no more than utterances of approval or disapproval.

R. M. Hare, was a member of the Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy dominated by J. L. Austin which thought the key to philosophical understanding was an analysis of ‘ordinary language’. Formal languages such as those sought by Frege and Carnap were at best unhelpful and at worst irrelevant. Hare maintained that moral utterances were not facts, but were in a special logical category because of their prescriptive nature. Ethical judgements are logically independent of facts, and commend or prohibit certain actions. Because of the universal nature of such judgements, that is to say they should apply to every relevantly similar case, they are not simply emotive, but have a rational basis. A full exposition of Hare’s position is not appropriate here, but it is important to note that the separation of facts from values does not necessarily entail emotivism.

A mention should be made of C. I. Lewis (1883-1964) whose early work focussed on logic, but whose later work included epistemology, value theory and ethics. A full discussion of the 550 or so pages of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation is not really possible, but Lewis believed that values are an intrinsic part of experience, like sensory qualia. Our experience of perceiving values is akin to our experience of colour or pitch, and as the experience of perceiving colour is distinct from perceiving red, so values are not identified with a
particular quality but a mode of perception. In Lewis’ theory of sense perception, sensory qualia are an intrinsic part of a sensory experience and for Lewis, are infallible. Similarly then, our experience of values is infallible. Of course, it is this that leads to problems, for an infallible experience cannot lead to knowledge or a rational judgement, since these must contain the possibility of error. Secondly, whereas our experience of red, or heavy is justified (on Lewis’ view) by it looking red or feeling heavy, there are public criteria of light wavelength, and weight to which we agree. For our experience of value this is not the case and values are pushed into a mystical realm. Furthermore, value judgements are then completely subjective, for if my infallible perception is at odds with your infallible perception, there is nothing we can do.

Lewis is also vague about the kind of objects that give rise to experience of value, and takes most of his examples from the field of aesthetics. In the field of ethics his position is not entirely clear. The precise clarity and coherence of Lewis’ position is, however, not our principal concern. What is important for us is the philosophical suggestion that valuation is always a matter of empirical knowledge and that perception of values is in some way akin to our perception of other sensory qualia.

More recently James Griffin has explored the question of value judgement. He rejects the Humean notion that we value what we desire, and refutes any kind of reductionist position. That is he argues that values may not be reduced to natural facts. He suggests that values are somehow embedded in facts and gives a lot of attention to the idea that values are supervenient upon natural properties. He rejects a straightforward supervenience relation because of contextual problems of relevance (cf. p44) and offers his theory of ascent, “one ascends through the hierarchy because one cannot explain directly or economically, at the lower level what one can at the higher” (Griffin 1996 p48). Having said this much, Griffin also asserts the “fuzziness” of the boundaries of the empirical or the natural and concedes his idea is “extremely rough” (p49), but he seems to see his task in this area as exploration or preliminary investigation rather than asserting watertight theory.

Simon Blackburn is suspicious of the supervenience relationship and asks why does it obtain? Further if we know everything about the natural state of an object, can we also know without exception all its supervenient states? And if so, how? Blackburn suggests that these are particularly difficult questions for the realist for whom, in particular, “supervenience then becomes a mysterious fact and one which he will have no explanation of (or no right to rely upon)” (Blackburn 1984 p185).
Blackburn argues for a projective theory of values. Based on our perceptions of the physical world, we construct theories involving higher order concepts that we then project upon the world. Things have values that we project upon them. As physicists construct theories of the properties of light, or thermodynamics and so can then project properties of colour and temperature on to a body, so similarly we can project values on to objects on account of the theories we develop and the higher order concepts we construct. Blackburn argues for this position mainly in grounds of economy and from metaphysical considerations, and in so doing he embraces a quasi-realism that he describes as “the only progressive research programme in moral philosophy” (ibid. p189).

As hinted above, it is not only philosophers who have wrestled with questions of fact and value. Early social philosophy sought to explain social phenomena by sole reference to the individuals who constituted the society. By contrast Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) who is considered to be one of the founding fathers of modern sociology, insisted that there are social facts which are greater than the aggregate of individual facts and indeed cannot be reduced to them. Social facts, he insisted, are “things” and may only be explained in terms of other social facts.

Similarly, he understood values as a sort of collective conscience, shared by members of a society and the bonds that maintain order in that society. He maintained that social instability is caused by a breakdown in the system of shared values and that if an individual is adrift from the society’s value structure he becomes anxious and disaffected. These themes were discussed in Durkheim’s *Suicide: a Study in Sociology* (1897) which was highly original but which has also attracted criticism because of the use (or abuse!) of anthropological data. Just as Lewis attaches values to empirical knowledge, so Durkheim attaches values to social groups, and insists that social phenomena cannot be reduced to a catalogue of phenomena about individuals.

Max Weber (1864-1920) insisted most strongly upon the distinction between facts and values suggesting that facts indicate what exists and values indicate what should be. Facts are the result of scientific enquiry, whereas values guide actions and give them meaning. He argued that science generally and social science in particular must be conducted in a value free environment. By this, he meant, that the scientist must take great care not to inadvertently allow his own values to influence the conduct or the results of scientific investigation. His particular example is that Calvinists must accurately report the sexual practices of tribal peoples under investigation, despite their own repugnance to them.
This however is a problematic thesis, for the question becomes is it actually possible to study social science in a value free way? Many would argue not, for a social scientist’s values determine the way he frames his hypotheses and the methods he uses to investigate them. As a compromise, Weber insisted that value neutrality should be sought. A scientist is to clarify the values that he has and the way they may influence his work, rather than pretend he has no values. Again the details of this position do not concern us, but the suggestion that the values we hold are in some way a part of us, are integral to our social make-up and cannot simply be laid aside, is an important point to which we shall return.

John Dewey (1859-1952) was involved in both philosophy and social issues such as education and politics. He was much influenced by Darwin and has been described as a naturalist; but was also influenced by Hegel and has been described as a pragmatist – a term which he disliked – and he wrote prolifically. The question which most occupied Dewey was “How should life be lived?” and in trying to answer it he rejected classical philosophical dichotomies such as mind/body, means/ends, thoughts/actions and of course facts/values. Dewey argued that all facts are value laden, that is to say they have a social context from which they cannot be divorced. Values he said, are rooted in the psychic dispositions of ordinary people. The way to approach philosophical and social questions is by intelligent enquiry, testing hypotheses and correcting and refining them. Dewey did not believe in absolute knowledge for the possibility of further revision was always there.

All the details of this do not concern us here, but it is worth noting that although Dewey claims to reject the fact/value distinction, in fact he does not. He says facts are value laden, which is surely to say that facts are distinct from values but cannot be separated from them? This is a position that we have already seen. Furthermore, Dewey locates values in the psyche of society, they are something shared and are a part of our human disposition.

R. S. Peters (1919- ) whose early work was very much in the style of the Oxford analytic school, was driven by the search for a definition of education. Peters came to revise his earliest definition as time passed, but in his inaugural lecture as professor he said, “Education involves, essentially, processes which intentionally transmit what is valuable in an intelligible and voluntary manner” (Peters 1963 p102). The interesting point here is that education involves the transmission of something of value. What did Peters mean by this? He said education had not taken place if the result was undesirable, or not worthwhile. Peters employs a difficult Kantian argument to define the worthwhile which essentially says that to genuinely seek the worthwhile entails that one has some concept of what this means in advance. Peters suggests that the worthwhile (that of value) is a framework made up of
synthetic *a priori* propositions, which we can somehow know independently of experience. This is a very difficult position to defend, and the Kantian philosophy behind it is open to debate, but the suggestion again is that values are somehow distinct from ordinary experience, and are possibly even independent of it. Peters does not address the fact/value distinction directly as far as I know.

In contemporary writing about values education one of two things seems to happen. Either the authors omit any definition of values, supposing, perhaps not unreasonably, that we all know what values are. Alternatively one or more definitions are offered but there appears to be no general consensus. Halstead and Taylor cite various possible definitions at the beginning of their *Values in Education and Education in Values*. From Raths, Harmin and Simon, values are “beliefs attitudes or feelings that an individual is proud of, is willing to publicly affirm, has [sic] been chosen thoughtfully from alternatives without persuasion and is [sic] acted upon repeatedly.” From J. R. Fraenkel in *How to Teach about Values*: “both emotional commitments and ideas about worth.” Similarly but longer, from Shaver and Strong, in *Facing Value Decisions*: “Values are standards and principles for judging worth. They are criteria by which we judge ‘things’ (people, objects, ideas, notions and situations) to be good worthwhile and desirable or on the other hand bad worthless and despicable.” Finally, Halstead and Taylor themselves offer “Principles, fundamental convictions, ideals, standards or life stances which act as general guides to behaviour or as points of reference in decision making or the evaluation of beliefs or action and which are closely connected to personal integrity and personal identity” (Halstead and Taylor pp5-6).

The time has come to try and draw some conclusions although I recognise that these remarks may be criticised as raising more questions than they solve. In an absolute sense this is undoubtedly a valid criticism. Nevertheless in so far as the aim of an opening chapter is to begin to establish a working context, and as this is not a thesis about the ontology or semantics of values I think it suffices to recognise the difficulties involved and to work from a position of broad consensus whilst acknowledging alternate positions.

The broad consensus is that values are distinct from facts as they cannot be measured by scientists, and value judgements cannot be proved to be true in the same way that factual assertions can be. Additionally there seems to be general agreement that whilst values are distinct from facts they may not be entirely divorced from them, and either through linguistic conventions, modes of perception, a projective theory like Blackburn’s or Griffin’s supervenient relationships values and facts are connected. However the precise nature of this connection need not concern us.
What is relevant however, is that it seems to be widely held that values, whatever they are, are given to objects by humans and do not exist independently of humans. Talk of values *per se* or the value an object has is really a shorthand for the values we give to objects, or the value a particular object has been invested with by an individual or individuals. Values in this thesis are to be understood in this way, as human constructions. Values are intimately connected with beliefs, attitudes or dispositions that a person holds or recognises, and it seems these cannot be held in private. Values must be shared to some extent, within an appropriate community and indeed I will suggest that the communities of which we are a part to some extent determine the values we hold.

Finally, just as our values have an essential social dimension, there is a broad consensus that they cannot be private in the sense nobody else knows about them. Values are the sorts of things that we will stand up to defend, and which provoke and to some extent determine our actions; they have some causal influence. Blackburn points out that we may not always be aware of what we value or how much we value it, but when things go wrong we may come to realise, retrospectively as it were, that we have valued something. (cf. Blackburn 1998 p67). If this is the case, then the way that values are formed and transmitted in schools is of course of great importance.

Teaching Values in Schools

People generally and children in particular are affected by a multitude of influences: family, friends, the media, television, school and so on. My interest is in the school element and the teaching of values in schools. Much has been written about this and there are obvious questions about the aims and objectives of values education, questions about the curriculum and assessment and so forth but I want to proceed directly to a fundamental theoretical question: a basic dichotomy in values education.

B. V. Hill’s 1991 book: *Values Education in Australian Schools* was acknowledged and expanded in a more recent study by Stephenson, Burman, Ling and Cooper. The details of these two works need not concern us, and their methodology and conclusions are indeed open to question, but importantly here, two very broad approaches to values education may be distinguished. Firstly, those that are based upon some framework, for example some religious belief or the conviction that there are universal moral principles which should be taught and adhered to.
Secondly there is a broad approach to values education that denies the need for or the existence of any such framework. Hill describes a consensus pluralism model which is derivative from a secular democratic ideal based on both reasoning and conduct. Rather than inculcating students they must be encouraged to make their own enquiries, recognise their own autonomy and take responsibility for their own actions. This model is committed to upholding democracy and seeking a consensus, but is neutral about what that consensus should be (cf. Hill p 28-30). (For a discussion of whether such a neutral consensus itself constitutes a framework see chapter nine.) Stephenson and co. also identify a moral vacuum paradigm which they describe with words from Owens’ *Organisational Behaviour in Education*. The moral vacuum paradigm is “a loose collection of ideas [rather than] a coherent structure, preferences are discovered through action rather than on the basis of values” (Owens 1981 p24 and Stephenson & co. 1998 p15).

The contention at the core of this work is that values education requires a framework and that values education without a framework does not or more strongly cannot succeed. Such a statement immediately raises two questions. Firstly what precisely is meant by framework here? This term is widely used and has a number of senses in contemporary discussion and in chapters two to five I explore these and try to define the meaning of ‘framework’ for values education. Secondly, how can the assertion be justified? This is a more complex matter and after a number of preliminary chapters I attempt to do this in chapter eight.

It must be clarified straight away what kind of questions these are supposed to be. The investigation might be psychological, something along the lines that the brains of children are such that they are not likely to successfully assimilate lessons about values if there is no underlying framework. This may well be true, but it is not the concern of this thesis. The questions above are not to be understood as questions about psychology.

The argument could assert that children have certain background influences and schools are certain kinds of socially constructed places, providing a certain social context such that, children are not likely to successfully assimilate lessons about values if there is no underlying framework. I am not sure whether this is true or not, but either way that is not the concern of this thesis. The questions above are not to be understood as questions about sociology and sociological arguments will not be employed in this work.

The questions, although posed loosely are supposed to be philosophical and point to a conceptual link between the success of values education and the underlying philosophical approach. The suggestion is that there is something illogical about expecting a successful
outcome to values education if it is not underpinned by some kind of framework. Our argument may be stated; it is a philosophical requirement that successful values education needs a framework, and indeed not just any framework, but one with relevant suitability conditions attached.

The Nature of Philosophy

Implicit in this approach is the notion that philosophy concerns itself with analysis. The so-called analytic approach finds its roots in Aristotle and the British empiricist school of philosophy (notably Hume) and blossomed in the early part of the twentieth century. As a style, rather than a doctrine analytic philosophy investigates the function, style and connections of the object under scrutiny. G. E. Moore was a leading proponent of this school for whom to analyse a concept or proposition was to discern a number of parts and see how they are connected. The philosopher inspects the concept as an artist might inspect a painting. Definition is not just a wordy or dictionary definition, but is the expression of a concept in equivalent or simpler concepts. For example Moore analysed the single term brother as ‘male sibling’ thus distinguishing constituent parts of the concept. Moore famously applied his technique to establish the metaphysics of common sense, and also asserted that there are some fundamental concepts that cannot be analysed, in particular the ethical term ‘good’.

Bertrand Russell’s interest was principally in logic and mathematics and he used analysis to clarify the meaning of certain expressions, and maintained that we are often mislead by the surface form, or surface grammar of an expression. Contra to those who suggest the proposition ‘the present king of France is bald’ is meaningless because there is no present king of France, Russell analysed the proposition as a three part conjunction. ‘There is a king of France, that there is only one such thing (‘the’ implies uniqueness) and that thing is bald.’ Now as the first conjunct is false, so is the whole proposition. Russell’s analysis bears a direction, that of reducing a proposition to its bare logical form; a feature which is not found in Moore.

Wittgenstein worked with Russell in Cambridge between 1912 and 1913 and kept in touch with him thereafter, and the Tractatus concerns itself with the picture theory of meaning. That is (loosely) the theory that complex propositions can be expressed in terms of simpler atomic propositions. The early Wittgenstein thought that the analysis of the atomic propositions and their (sometimes hidden) structural form in complex propositions was the key to solving or more frequently dissolving philosophical puzzles.
The later Wittgenstein was also concerned with the analysis of language and the explication of meaning but he came to reject all notions concerning the hidden or fundamental structure of language. In the *Philosophical Investigations* a word or expression is to be analysed in terms of the way it is used or applied in ordinary speech. There can be no analysis of expressions in terms of a basic logical structure because expressions have a different form depending on how they are used: of which language game they are a part. The essence of a proposition is not “beneath the surface” but “already lies open to view” (Wittgenstein 1953 PI 92) and more generally “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (ibid. PI 109).

This preoccupation with the analysis of language developed into an influential school of linguistic analysis. Dummett believed the nature of thought could be elucidated by the analysis of language. Similar work was done by H. H. Price and Gilbert Ryle in Oxford and Ryle though that the sole task of philosophy is the detection of linguistic idiom which gives rise to repeated misconstructions and absurd theories. For P. F. Strawson “analysis is the descriptive task of tracing connections between the concepts in our scheme of thought, with a view among other things of seeing what order obtains among them, thereby helping us to see why, for example, various forms of scepticism need not trouble us” (Honderich p28).

Much of this approach is resonant with Wittgenstein’s insistence that philosophy “leaves everything as it is” (Wittgenstein 1953 PI 124) and “may in no way interfere with the actual use of language” (ibid.). The task of the philosopher is to describe and never to prescribe. Wittgenstein would say that there are no facts of philosophy; “If one tried to advance theses in philosophy it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them” (ibid. PI 128). All that philosophy can do is to clear the ground of linguistic rubbish and misunderstanding.

This view may be contrasted with a more speculative approach, which does seek to advance theses about the nature of reality, which constructs theories and in the field of ethics not only analyses ethical terms but lays down binding norms. We can imagine analytic and speculative philosophy as opposite extremes of a continuous scale; extremes between which most philosophers will be located. Paul Hirst and R. S. Peters were such philosophers.

They thought that conceptual analysis was at the heart of philosophy; and they sought definitions of terms like education and knowledge and conditions for the application of concepts such as punishment and justice. Importantly, however, they did not see conceptual
analysis as an end in itself but as a preparation to answering other philosophical questions. “In our view there is little point in doing conceptual analysis unless some further philosophical issue is thereby made more manageable” (Hirst and Peters 1970 p9).

Philosophy itself was characterised as a concern for “second order questions about science, morality, religion and other such human concerns” (ibid. p10) which are often prompted by worries at a first order level. In answering a first order question the subject is not doing philosophy, but in so far as the second and first order questions are inter-related, philosophical enquiry may help to illuminate and elucidate practical problems, like how to teach values in schools! Peters also points out that the inability to produce a "neat set of logically necessary conditions for the use of a word like knowledge or education is not necessarily a hallmark of failure" (ibid.). The process of analysis clarifies our concepts and reveals their links with other concepts, thus increasing our understanding and prompting a more informed and balanced reaction to the social situation in which we find ourselves.

A balance of analytic and speculative philosophy applied to theoretical and related practical problems as exemplified by Peters and Hirst is the stance adopted in this enquiry. The method is to draw on “established branches of philosophy and bring together those segments that are relevant to the solution of educational problems” (ibid. p13). This entails both the analysis of concepts and the application of them to educational situations, in our case the analysis of the concept of a framework for teaching values, and reasons to justify its application in a real school setting.
In this chapter Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language as found in the *Philosophical Investigations* will be examined and particular attention will be paid to the notion of a language game embedded in a form of life as this is most pertinent to our exploration of the concept of framework. This however cannot be neatly divorced from Wittgenstein’s concept of meaning so this will be considered too. Finally, in so far as the Investigations must be seen, in part at least, as criticism of empiricist theories of language and his own earlier position in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* these must be briefly outlined. Scholarly debate about whether Wittgenstein’s later position was opposed to or rather enhanced and complemented his earlier position is acknowledged, but is not directly relevant here.

Broadly speaking, Wittgenstein’s concerns stem from an unhappiness about the notion that words derive their meaning by standing for something else. On the one hand in Locke’s theory of language, words stand for or signify (Locke did not have a concept of meaning in the modern sense) ideas in the speaker’s mind; common nouns and adjectives signifying general ideas. Locke understands a one-to-one correspondence between a word and the idea that it signifies and language does no more than report “the ideas in the mind of him that uses them” (Locke II ii 2). Intersubjective language is made possible by Locke’s theory of abstraction which relates to problems concerning universals and would take us a long way from our theme.

On the other hand Wittgenstein’s early theory of language as found in the Tractatus expresses the so called picture theory of language, at the heart of which is the idea that words stand for material objects. Wittgenstein says, “in a proposition a name is the representation of an object” (TLP 3.22). The logical structure of a proposition made up of words reflects the material structure of the objects which the words name. A proposition is true if it correlates with a picture that really obtains and false if the picture does not obtain. Wittgenstein is said to have conceived this scheme when he saw the representation of a car crash by toys and dolls in a law court in Paris (see Wittgenstein’s notebook entry for 29 September 1914 NB7). Wittgenstein came to see that there are considerable philosophical difficulties with both of these theories.

Briefly, the first is that many useful and meaningful words cannot be said to name anything. In *Philosophical Investigations* he makes a list of words such as; away, ow, help, no etc. which are not the “names of objects” (PI 27). He also spends some time discussing cardinal numbers, and is concerned that “five” (say) does not mean five particular things but is an
abstraction. He also suggests that if I try to define two by pointing to a group of two nuts, the person given the definition may think that “two is the name of this group of nuts” (PI 28), or I suppose even the name of the kind of nuts. Wittgenstein says a little later that any ostensive definition only makes sense if one knows the appropriate context for the definition – he will say within an appropriate language game.

Similarly, the principal problem with the picture theory is that any picture has several possible interpretations. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a boxer in a particular stance, and then he says “Now, this picture can be used to tell someone how he should stand, should hold himself, or how he should not hold himself, or how a particular man did stand in such and such a place and so on” (PI bottom of p11). Similarly in the *Philosophical Grammar* Wittgenstein considers the possible ways of considering two people sitting at an inn drinking wine and he observes: “If I say when I look at the picture, ‘here two people are sitting etc.’ If the picture tells me something in this sense, then it tells me words” (PG p164). In other words a picture cannot be understood unless we know its sense, and the several possible propositions that I may associate with a picture show that the meaning of the words cannot simply reside in the picture. Wittgenstein concludes, words do not derive their meaning by standing for objects.

Wittgenstein’s attack against the Lockean theory of language is found in his private language argument, and is a two pronged attack leading to a *reductio ad absurdum* argument. The first prong of the attack is that words cannot acquire meaning by bare ostensive definition as discussed above. The second prong of the attack concerns the possibility of defining some suitable private sensation such as a mood or a pain. (Wittgenstein discusses the latter possibility at some length.) It is important to understand what is meant by private here. A person who keeps a secret diary that nobody else sees, and perhaps even employs secret abbreviations is not using a private language in Wittgenstein’s sense for the contents of the diary could be explained if the author wished.

Private in the appropriate sense here means ostensively defined by me for me and incommunicable to another. Having a particular pain that cannot be communicated to another is Wittgenstein’s favourite example, and he spends much time discussing it, for Locke’s theory of language does allow for such private definitions. Wittgenstein’s attack on such private languages is a *reductio ad absurdum* argument. He imagines I record a certain sensation - associated with the symbol S - in a diary each time it occurs. This sensation is ostensively defined for me alone and S cannot be expressed in public language. We are to imagine that “I speak or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention
on the sensation … in this way I impress upon myself the connection between the sign and the sensation” (PI 258). But Wittgenstein goes on, “‘I impress it upon myself’ can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness” (ibid.).

When the diarist comes to re-use the symbol S he must be sure that it stands for the same sensation as it did before, and he must call up a memory sample of S. “Now is it possible that the wrong memory might come at this call? If not, then S means whatever memory occurs to him in connection with S, and again whatever seems right is right. If so, then he does not know what he means” (Kenny p194). It must be emphasised that Wittgenstein is not advancing some form of scepticism about the validity of memory here. He is arguing that if a sensation is entirely private there can be no check upon it, even by the subject in question, and so talk of correctness is out of place. Hence the notion of a private definition, and of a private language generally, is incoherent. Wittgenstein concludes, words do not derive their meaning by standing for ideas.

Overall Wittgenstein says, words do not get their meaning by standing for something else. How then does language work, how do words get their meaning? As every student of Wittgenstein knows the meaning of a word is its use. And crucially, its use within an appropriate language game. So we must consider what does Wittgenstein mean by language game, and what counts as use within the context?

Characteristically Wittgenstein nowhere gives a definition of language game, and one has to build an understanding of what he means from a variety of examples. It is thought that he first drew the analogy between language and a game in a discussion of formalism in mathematics, in Schlick’s house in 1930. Frege had suggested that arithmetic is either just about signs (ink marks on paper) or it is about something that the signs represent. Wittgenstein wishes to reject both of these positions and argues it is a false dichotomy, by suggesting that the game of chess is either just about the pieces or something that the pieces represent. “If I say ‘Now I will make myself a queen with very frightening eyes, she will drive everyone off the board’ you will laugh” (WWK p104). The queen does not stand for anything, but derives her significance from the context of the game.

In the Blue and Brown Books and in the early part of the Investigations Wittgenstein talks of simple or primitive language games, often in the context of learning language. (See also PG p62) “We can also think of the whole process of learning words in (2) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games language
games" (PI 7). Later he comes to use the term in a much broader sense and identifies a wide variety of different language games, even offering a list:

- Giving orders, and obeying them
- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements
- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing).....
- Guessing riddles" etc. (PI 23).

The chess model with its rigid calculus has given way to a much more flexible, less rule bound model; chess is increasingly seen as atypical and the multiplicity of different games is a metaphor for the multiplicity of different types of language game.

Wittgenstein anticipates and discusses at some length the challenge that language games in particular, and games generally, must all have something in common or we would not call them games. He says, “Don’t say ‘there must be something in common or they would not be called games’ but look and see whether there is something common to them all” (PI 66).

Wittgenstein offers various possible defining characteristics of games (e.g. winning and losing) but rejects each one offering a counter example (e.g. throwing a ball against a wall (ibid.)). He concludes there is nothing more than a “complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities and sometimes similarities of detail” (ibid.). He describes this as family resemblance and says games (and hence language games!) form a family (cf PI 67). He illustrates this further by comparison to the fibres that make up a thread. “As in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres” (PI 67).

Having moved away from the understanding of language as a calculus to the understanding of language as a game, Wittgenstein suggests that nonsense arises when a word or phrase is used outside an appropriate language game. The problem that occurs here is that Wittgenstein does not give any indication of how language games are to be individuated; where does one end and the next begin? His reply to this is the warning that we must not be mislead by the surface grammar of an expression, but must attend to the depth grammar (cf. Chomsky). For instance we cannot lump all assertions together in a single language game because they are assertions, but we must look deeper and consider how we might use such assertions, what doubts we might have about them, what would make them true etc..

Wittgenstein goes on to assert that meaning of a word or phrase is given by use. He writes “The meaning of a phrase is characterised for us by the use we make of it. The meaning is not a mental accompaniment to the expression. Therefore the phrase ‘I think I mean
something by it’ or ‘I’m sure I mean something by it’ which we so often hear in philosophical discussions to justify the use of an expression is for us no justification at all. We ask, ‘what do you mean?’ i.e. ‘How do you use this expression?’” (BB p65).

Wittgenstein is indeed fairly loose about whether his meaning is use dictum is to apply to words or whole sentences, and in different parts of his writing he seems to suggest either. He would probably say, that the unit of meaning is dependent on the complexity of the language game.

An objection to the idea that meaning is use seems to be that I could use words or phrases however I like and that would somehow confer meaning upon them. If words do not stand for objects or ideas then is their application arbitrary? “Why don’t I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary?” (Z 320)

Wittgenstein suggests that the difference is in part that there are ways of judging the outcome of cookery – it is done for a purpose – whereas language is in a sense autonomous. However, Wittgenstein is only tempted to call language arbitrary, for he says you may use language differently but then you are playing a different game. “If you follow other rules than those of chess you are playing another game; and if you follow grammatical rules other than such-and-such ones, that does not mean that you say something wrong, no, you are speaking of something else” (ibid.). Elsewhere Wittgenstein says it would be perfectly satisfactory to open a game of chess with a black move, but then the game would be a different game, not chess.

The key thing is perhaps that a person is said to understand the meaning of a word or an expression if others can recognise and respond to the person’s use of it. We cannot compel a person to use language in a particular way but if we cannot take certain things for granted, then we have parted company before we have begun! Wittgenstein discusses this at some length and says “Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People do not come to blows over it for example. That is part of the framework on which our language is based” (PI 240).

This underlying framework, the set of things we must take for granted, is referred to by Wittgenstein as our form of life. He is adamant that linguistic and non-linguistic activities cannot be separated; language is embedded in our communal activity: “The speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (PI 23). Language cannot function unless there is some shared linguistic and non-linguistic machinery behind it to which we all agree. This machinery is not in need of any justification but is simply given. “What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life” (PI part II p226) and again “If I
have exhausted justification, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'this is simply what I do’” (PI 217).

Godfrey Vesey gives the example (p39) of the distinction between Europeans one the one hand and African nomadic herdsmen on the other. The herdsmen own their cattle but have no concept of owning land; they use the land to graze their cattle and then move on. Europeans on the other hand have a well-developed sense of owning land, so the erection of fences by the herdsmen would be seen as a challenge about land ownership to the Europeans, when in fact it was no such thing. Wittgenstein would say there is not a disagreement about meaning here, but a disagreement in form of life. In this context we can understand Wittgenstein’s rather peculiar remark that “If a lion could talk we could not understand him” (PI part II p223). This is not a remark about difficulties translating roars into English or anything of that kind, but expresses the idea that we would have no common ground from which we could begin. Similarly Wittgenstein suggests that the remark, “the sky is always the hardest part” (ibid.) is perfectly coherent to those who do jigsaws, but to those who are not familiar with jigsaws, it is nonsense!

Nevertheless, the concept of a form of life is not without its problems, and as with language games no criteria for identification and individuation are given. Roger Trigg observes “We only have to ask whether religion, Christianity or a particular Christian denomination such as Catholicism should be regarded as a form of life. There is no clear way of answering such a question...” (Trigg p72). Norman Malcolm seems to think Wittgenstein did understand religion as a form of life, and even if Wittgenstein did not, Malcolm does himself. “Religion is a form of life, it is a language embedded in action – what Wittgenstein calls a language game. Science is another” (Malcolm p212).

Fergus Kerr in his *Theology after Wittgenstein* rejects this grandiose conception of a form of life and returns to Wittgenstein’s text. He suggests forms of life are much simpler; and refers to “facts of living” (Kerr p64), and he seems to suggest that we simultaneously participate in a multiplicity of forms of life which make up a background weave. Philosophers have suggested that this weave or form of life is on the one hand natural and fixed, and on the other acculturated and in a state of flux.

Firstly, our form of life is a natural (and historical) framework of agreements and shared human practices, which is simply given. It is an unjustifiable pattern of human behaviour, which “rests upon but is not identical with, very general pervasive facts of nature” (Baker and Hacker p137). “That we do more or less share such forms rests upon nothing deeper;
nothing ensures that we will, and there is no foundation, logical or philosophical, which explains the fact that we do” (Cavell p223-4). There is clear agreement here that our form of life cannot be justified and must be simply accepted.

On the other hand our form of life is not totally static. “...the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters of the river bed and the shift of the bed itself: though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other” (OC p97). Kenny puts it that a form of life is not a structure of unchanging atoms, but is a shifting pattern grafted on to basic human nature (cf. Kenny p224). Baker and Hacker take up the point, saying that as we grow and develop our form of life changes, or perhaps as Kerr and others might say we participate in a richer weave. “Training in what counts as justification, acceptance of undoubted truths of the world-picture, is acculturation in the forms of life of a community” (Baker and Hacker p137).

Before turning to educational issues, and in the light of the above it is fitting to ask what Wittgenstein said of ethics and in particular how his ethical theory fitted with this understanding of form of life. In some ways however, we are to be disappointed for Wittgenstein said little of ethics and what he did say is not really related to forms of life at all. A paper delivered to ‘The Heretics’ at Cambridge and published as “A Lecture on Ethics” in the Philosophical Review (Vol. 74 no. 1 1968) was unusual in that it was “not about ethics at all, as the term is usually understood” (Monk p278). Wittgenstein discussed various examples of the misuse of language, including the idea that it is extraordinary that the world should exist. (Not things in the world but the world itself.) Wittgenstein says this is a nonsensical idea since we cannot imagine the world not existing. More generally he argues that all too often we deceive ourselves when we speak of entities beyond the factual as if they were factual: we are confronted by the boundaries of language itself.

Considering Wittgenstein’s views on ethics as expressed in his diaries and notebooks we see a continuation of this theme and discover that in ethics at least he did not really ever move away from the position of the Tractatus. In the Tractatus the ethical and the religious are in the realm of the mystical and may not be spoken of. “It is clear that ethics cannot be put in to words. Ethics is transcendental” (TLP 6.421). What can be communicated about ethics must be shown. Ethics must be expressed in action, is a principle Wittgenstein held, and indeed much of his life may be seen as trying to live this out. That is to say not talking about ethics but living ethically is what really mattered to Wittgenstein.
Even if Wittgenstein himself did not explicitly link concepts in ethics and religion with an understanding of form of life his disciples certainly did. D. Z. Philips and H. O. Mounce have argued that the capacity to make moral judgements entails belonging to, or being related to certain moral practices. They expand this by saying that moral judgements are only possible because of a shared form of life. “The agreement in the way of life forms the background against which the particular judgement has its sense” (Phillips and Mounce p70). Furthermore without a shared form of life, not only agreement but also disagreement would be impossible for there must be certain things which are not open to dispute. Agreement and disagreement “can only occur when people share what Wittgenstein describes as a form of life of which we have described as moral practices form a part” (ibid.).

It is worth noting the positions from which Phillips and Mounce distance themselves. On the one hand they object to R. M. Hare’s view that facts and value judgements are logically distinct and argue that certain practices do entail moral judgements. On the other hand they object to the view which they attribute to Philippa Foot that “a moral conclusion can be derived from a factual statement” (Phillips and Mounce p14) for they say that this must be relative to the agent involved. “For everyone who is a moral agent certain facts will entail that some things are right and wrong, but from this it by no means follows that the same facts will entail that the same things are right or wrong for everyone who is a moral agent” (p15). Additionally Phillips and Mounce distance themselves from any form of relativism, for they say that the notion of a form of life explains the origin of meaning and the possibility of value judgement. This does not mean, they say, that values can be reduced to observations about institutions or ways of life (cf. p71).

In a similar vein, R.W. Beardsmore tries to steer a middle way between the positions of Hare and Foot. He quotes Wittgenstein to the effect that “If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement, not only in definition, but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements” (PI 242 / Beardsmore p121). Beardsmore elaborates this by denying that this means that there is to be “a technique by which universal moral agreement can be obtained” but that “it is within a particular moral code that we find the framework of agreement” (ibid.). Beardsmore also emphasises he is not a conventionalist (morals are freely chosen and agreed to by a group of people and not forced by nature) and quotes Wittgenstein again to the effect that the agreement of which we speak is not agreement of opinion, but of form of life. The crucial function of a framework is to give language its sense.
Finally, the Wittgensteinian Peter Winch, in his essay “The Universalizability of Moral Judgements” (in his *Ethics and Action*) discusses the moral predicament of Captain Vere of the H. M. S. Indomitable when faced with judging the case of Billy Budd. Budd, an upright junior sailor is bullied and falsely accused by a more senior and 'satanic' sailor Claggart. “In the stress of the situation, Budd is afflicted with a speech impediment which prevents him from answering the charge. Frustrated, he strikes Claggart, who falls, strikes his head and dies” (Winch p155). Winch discusses what action Captain Vere should take and to what extent the circumstances surrounding the event should influence his judgement.

Crucially, Winch suggests that one could agree with the captain exactly, about all the events that took place, and agree entirely about all the surrounding considerations and still, without contradiction, come to a different conclusion about the case. What I “ought to do is not a matter of finding out what anyone ought to do in such circumstances” (Winch p168). Winch says the dispositions of the agent cannot be discounted: “We cannot know everything about another person’s concrete situation (including how it strikes him, which may make all the difference). But if we want to express, in a given situation, how it strikes the agent, we cannot dispense with his inclination to come to a particular moral decision” (Winch p169). This talk of disposition and inclination is not reducible to will or whimsy, but expresses a deeper facet of an agent’s being which although Winch does not call it so, is clearly understandable as a shared form of life in which the agent partakes. It is an irreducible given which cannot be explained and must be simply accepted.

Whatever difficulties Phillips, Mounce, Beardsmore and Winch’s positions may have, there is a clear case here for saying that if Wittgenstein’s later theory of language is adopted, moral and value judgements cannot be semantically separated from a form of life. And this must have implications for the way we attempt to teach values in schools.

The argument may be expressed as follows. Teaching children about values entails teaching them to recognise value judgements, teaching them to make value judgements in an appropriately informed way, arguing about value judgements and so on. In short teaching about values is teaching how to play a particular language game (or set of very closely related language games). The ability to play this game presupposes Wittgenstein tells us, a common perspective, a shared outlook, in short a form of life. Therefore it is important to realise that the teaching of values requires that either a shared form of life be already in place, or if it is not in place it must be established. An attempt to teach values without this suitable background or form of life, is a doomed venture.
The key question then becomes, how does this understanding of a form of life relate to the notion of a framework for teaching values; is a framework identical to a form of life or are they different, and if so how? And it is perhaps worth emphasising I mean framework in the sense of this thesis – a framework for teaching values, rather than framework in the sense that we have seen Wittgenstein use it (PI 240) where he does seem to equate a framework (for language) with form of life. To answer this question it would be helpful to have a definition of form of life, but there is some disagreement here, and Wittgenstein himself did not offer a definition, so any definition that I might offer is likely to be problematic and open to dissent. However even in the absence of a precise definition it will be useful to have the most important and non-controversial features laid bare. Hence I will say, a form of life is the non-linguistic background to language. It is rooted in our actions, in the way we live; it is not fixed and rigid but gradually evolves and changes and crucially it rests in nothing deeper, it has no underlying foundations. It is simply given and we learn to participate in it, as we learn language.

The difficulty with this definition is that it does not define the scope of a form of life, or allow forms to be individuated. Do we participate in just one or two, or as Kerr suggests in a multiplicity that perhaps are nested and / or overlap and form a weave? What degree of sharing of form of life is actually required for values teaching? I think the clue to answering this kind of question is to consider what Wittgenstein himself might have said. Firstly, I do not think he would have been very sympathetic to this kind of question for speaking of games he says: “But I want to say; we misunderstand the role of the ideal in our language. That is to say: we too should call it a game only we are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to see the actual use of the word ‘game’ clearly. We want to say that there can’t be any vagueness in logic. The idea now absorbs us, that the ideal must be found in reality” (PI 100 and 101).

In other words the concept of form of life is an ideal one, and we cannot expect to see it precisely instantiated in real life. There is a fuzziness to it. I do not want to put words in to Wittgenstein’s mouth, but perhaps he would also have said that on the one hand we would know when there was insufficient sharing of a form of life since teaching would be hugely problematic, and on the other hand part of the teacher’s task is to nurture and foster the necessary form(s) of life. By this I mean the teacher may need to highlight or emphasise the non-linguistic givens that we do share, not to justify or explain them, but to show the agreement that already exists. For Wittgenstein, showing is often far more appropriate than trying to explain and indeed showing can often occur when telling fails.
With this in mind it can now be said that a form of life is distinct from a framework for teaching values in so far as there are historical and metaphysical elements in a framework too. A framework has an additional depth and is not simply given. It seems that whilst language and form of life are an important ingredient of any framework there is more to a framework than this. It may be said that a shared form of life is a necessary constituent of a framework, but is not sufficient to define it completely.

For example, if we were to identify a form of life with a framework, then it would follow that if all words derive their meaning from use within a language game, and all language games presuppose a form of life then all meaning, all communication requires a framework. There is no special status to be afforded to values education, and indeed the fact that communication is possible at all shows that there is a framework in place already. This however is not the truth, because much communication whilst requiring a shared form of life requires nothing further. If I give a pupil a basic instruction about the time of an event or the whereabouts of an object I expect to be understood. Time/space forms of life are in place and nothing further is needed here. However if I explain a complex mathematical idea, or suggest a complex moral dilemma (e.g. Siamese twins) I might expect to meet with some incomprehension, not because of any unfamiliar vocabulary I may use, but because of a whole understanding of which the pupil is not a part. So whilst it is true that discourse of any kind requires a shared form of life, specialised discourse requires additional agreement, a shared framework.

Having said this though, while we may now want to say that values education requires a framework, so too does any school subject. Values education has no special status, and again the argument that values education requires a framework seems no more than vacuously true. For example, if I teach physics must I not teach about accuracy of physical measurements, about units and dimensions, about observer independence and objectivity? If my pupil tells me that under standard conditions water boils at 70°C or light travels around corners I must correct him. He is challenging the agreed framework of physics. In short, am I not teaching a particular language game and does not this suppose a form of life and a certain framework? Of course it does! Therefore it would seem that whilst the teaching of values in schools requires a framework so does any school subject. (Whilst arguments concerning the objectivity of physics are recognised, they do in general not play a part in school-level discussions.) Therefore the question becomes, is there a relevant distinction between values education and physics education (say) here?
Oakeshott, MacMurray and Collingwood recognised various distinct forms of knowledge, but it was Paul Hirst who did most to formalise this position. Forms of knowledge were not conceived as an independent hierarchy, as in the Greek sense, but as a number of separate disciplines which were empirically observable. These disciplines which became known as Hirstian Forms were identified slightly differently in various texts, but they are given in *The Logic of Education* as logic and mathematics, physical sciences, understanding of our own and other peoples minds, moral judgements, aesthetics, religion and philosophy (Hirst and Peters p63 – 64).

"By a form of knowledge is meant a distinct way in which our experience becomes structured around the use of accepted public symbols" (Hirst 1974 p44). The key features which distinguish the forms are: each form involves certain central concepts which are central to the form. Each has a distinct logical structure. Each has expressions or statements that are in some way or other testable against experience. And each form has developed particular techniques and skills for exploring experience and testing their distinctive expressions (cf Hirst p44). The forms are to be distinguished by the different ways we approach them, the ways we verify different kinds of assertions, the ways in which different kinds of knowledge are structured and so on. Hirst's phrase “structured around the use of accepted public symbols” (ibid.) is immediately resonant with Wittgenstein.

Hirst sees the forms as logically distinct and says elements in one form cannot be reduced to elements in another, but he does say that the forms are not totally separate and share certain concepts and patterns of reasoning (Cf. Hirst p44). This is what Wittgenstein would probably have understood as a form of life: underlying shared concepts and patterns of reasoning.

Having said this, it could be argued that in some sense each Hirstian form presupposes a particular form of life. Again there is a difficulty concerning the scope and the individuation of forms of life here. Form of life could be understood in a very broad sense, or we may simultaneously share in a multiplicity (weave) of forms of life that overlap and criss-cross, like the language games themselves. Wittgenstein does not give a clear indication of his intentions and his commentators seem divided on this point. However the necessity of one or more forms of life seems undisputed.

The principle difficulty with Hirst's analysis has been seen to be the insistence that each form should have statements that are in some way or other testable against experience. In the form of morals (and religion) it is in no way clear what this might mean, what tests would be possible? Hirst recognised this difficulty: “moral knowledge and the arts involve distinct forms of critical test, although in these cases both what the tests are and the ways in which
they are applied are only partially statable” (Hirst p45). For some this is too vague, and questions have been raised whether morals and the arts are forms of knowledge at all. The implicit suggestion here is that if they are not forms of knowledge then they are somehow non-valid or illegitimate. However, much work has been done, especially in theology to suggest that theological utterances constitute a separate language game, with its own internal structure, and based on a distinct form of life. The game is not in need of any foundation or justification of the kind that is being suggested here. Much of what applies to theology applies *mutatis mutandis* to morals and values generally so it is fitting to consider this position, even if only briefly.

The suggestion that religious language is a discourse of a special kind seems to be in keeping with the views of Wittgenstein himself. In his “Lectures and Conversations on Psychology and Religious Belief” he points out that to have a religious belief is not to have an opinion about something, which may turn out to be false, but to have a belief that orders and regulates one’s life. The use of the word ‘believe’ in the religious sense is not akin to the ordinary sense of believe, it is more akin to ‘know’. Religious understanding entails religious action or practice; as D. Z. Phillips puts it “there is no theoretical knowledge of God” (Phillips 1970 p32). Wittgenstein stresses that Christianity is not a doctrine, but is something that changes peoples’ lives.

As a result of this Wittgenstein is adamant that the search for ground or justification for religious belief is futile. “A confession has to be part of one’s new life” (CV p16). Religious belief is so ingrained into the life of the believer, and is so connected with the habits, customs and practices of the believer that a demand for evidence is inappropriate. Wittgenstein says the same sort of thing about mathematics. It is a motley of practices which is so entrenched, that to ask for its foundation is senseless. Indeed much of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is devoted to showing that the work of the foundationalist schools at the beginning of the twentieth century was not so much wrong, as misguided. He says of religion “faith is faith in what is needed by my heart, my soul, not my speculative intelligence” (CV p33).

D. Z. Phillips developed Wittgenstein’s position by rejecting the apparent dichotomy that religion is either referential or metaphysical. (Compare the chessmen response to Frege’s dichotomy above.) On the one hand, to treat religious utterances as referential is a misunderstanding. Despite the apparent similarity between requests for evidence of the existence of a material object and requests for the evidence of the existence of God, the kinds of answers that might be given to these two apparently similar questions are entirely
different. Hence questions about the existence of God are in an entirely separate category to most existential enquiries. On the other hand, to see religious questions as metaphysical is also misleading, for religious beliefs are evident in the way people live their lives. Phillips says, a man who has found God has not found an object, but "he has found God in a praise, a thanksgiving, a confessing and an asking which were not his before" (Phillips 1976 p181).

In the light of this Terence McLaughlin makes several points. He recognises a genuine pedagogic difficulty that teaching about religious practices and participating in them cannot be neatly separated. Explaining a religious ceremony from the outside as it were is to lose an essential characteristic of it. Religion is more about practice than doctrine, and so to teach doctrine as if it were equivalent to the practice is to lose an essential component. McLaughlin asserts that in the religious domain, "Truth and reality are seen as requiring a much more subtle and nuanced elucidation" (McLaughlin 1995 p304).

Further McLaughlin says the abstract or context free treatment of religion in schools is to be avoided. It might be wrong to give a profoundly one-sided account, but equally well it is a pretence to suppose there is a neutral ground from which religion can be viewed. There is no "essence or single normative form of religion" (ibid.p305) so teaching about religion must include a given perspective – what I am calling a framework.

Ieuan Lloyd (1986) develops a confessional approach to education in religion from a Wittgensteinian perspective. He underlines that religion is not simply a rational matter, and argues that presenting it as such ignores the roots and attachments that a child has. By extension, he says that a child should be initiated into a domain, so as to have some unshakeable beliefs of a basic sort and (in an earlier paper) he attacks John White's notion of maximising a child's choice, picturing school "as being like a sweet shop in which a child has been given money to spend" (Lloyd 1980 p334).

Finally McLaughlin accepts the difficulties inherent in the confessional approach, and recognises the issues that rise from the uncertain epistemic status of religious assertions. However he says that the advantages of the confessional approach needs to be acknowledged as significant in certain situations. Undoubtedly the most appropriate situation is in a homogeneous school setting, and problems undoubtedly arise in situations of religious plurality, but nevertheless there seem to be persuasive arguments that religious education cannot be satisfactorily achieved in a context free way. A framework of some kind is required.
Much if not all of what has been said here about religion applies equally well to other value judgements, especially moral ones that are taught in schools. They all have an uncertain epistemological status, but equally they are grounded in customs and practices which are a form of life and the idea that they may be taught in a neutral or context free way seems to me very dubious.

To conclude, let us return to the earlier comparison between physics education and values education that arose from the suggestion that values education does indeed need a framework, but that this is only trivially true in so far as all school subjects require an appropriate framework. I want to say that whilst this truth is perhaps a trivial one it is one that has been overlooked. In school physics there is generally agreement about the nature of the subject, the results of experiments, the nature of the dialogue and so the required underlying framework is taken for granted. It is so much a part of the way we think we probably are not really aware that it is there. It might be almost described as a ‘hidden framework’, but although it may be hidden it is certainly there.

Further we may suggest that there is a continuity of a sort between school science and common sense. Although refined in science lessons, notions of weight and length, for example, are part of a child’s way of thinking from a very early stage: the framework is in place. Similarly a child learns words such as good, naughty and perhaps has concepts of ought at an early stage, but it is not clear this is analogous. The young child’s moral concepts may not be formed in to any kind of system, and school values lessons may not have the same kind of continuity as in the science case. The plurality of backgrounds in the field of values, and the plurality of positions that may be adopted by pupils upon reflection, is not analogous to the science example, where although dissension is possible it is very uncommon.

In values education there is little if any universal agreement about the nature of the subject, there are no ‘standard results’ and the dialogue is a shifting and evolving entity. From recognition of these characteristics and of the plurality in modern schools, the conclusion seems to have been drawn that a values framework is neither desirable nor possible. The values framework baby has been thrown out with the proverbial plurality bath water! As I have shown though, to make such a move neglects some of the most fundamental features of language itself, most importantly that language (and language about values) is a shared enterprise that derives its very meaning from an underlying form of life, and this must be a key constituent of any values education framework.
To conclude, the thrust of the argument has been to suggest that a consideration of Wittgenstein’s later theory of language leads to an appreciation of the need for a shared form of life as a backdrop to language. This is true in a most general sense, it is true for school subjects across the curriculum, and it is true for values education. I would suggest that this latter point has been neglected, and values education has suffered as a result. It may well be said that the conception of framework as presented here is so general as to render the argument almost trivially true, and perhaps to be of little practical use to the teacher in the classroom. Nevertheless it is important that linguistic considerations are not ignored, and their relevance is acknowledged; they may be only one of a set of considerations to be made, but they are a necessary part of the complete picture. A fuller understanding of frameworks as they apply to values education, must also acknowledge considerations of tradition and of community and it is to these that we now turn.
In this chapter Alasdair MacIntyre’s moral philosophy, principally as found in *After Virtue* and *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* will be examined and particular attention will be paid to the notion of tradition, as this is most pertinent to our conception of framework. In order to see how and why MacIntyre considers tradition as such an important part of any ethical theory, it is necessary to return to his point of departure at the beginning of *After Virtue*, and to follow the development of his argument. Nevertheless, at the same time, it must be recognised there is a depth and richness in his analysis that cannot be reproduced in a single chapter!

MacIntyre likens our moral situation to an imagined situation where almost all of our scientific theory had been lost and only fragments remained. These fragments are to be imagined as from a variety of historical periods and to approach their subject from a variety of directions, leading to a variety of incompatible and irreconcilable scientific theories. MacIntyre says our actual moral domain is such: something has been lost and all we have is a plurality of positions which are both contradictory and irreconcilable.

MacIntyre continues by offering brief but incisive criticisms of various ethical positions. Moore’s claim that good is a non-natural property that can be intuited is dismissed as “plainly false” (MacIntyre 1981 p15). Kant’s ethics based on the categorical imperative is treated more respectfully but as MacIntyre points out many maxims that pass Kant’s test (e.g. always eat mussels on Monday (p44)) are silly. We cannot distinguish which universal claims should be adopted and which not and Kant’s attempt to base ethics on the categorical imperative cannot be defended. MacIntyre similarly rejects the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, for he says that pleasures cannot be neatly compared on a single scale. “Different pleasures and different happinesses are to a large degree incommensurable: there are no scales of quality or quantity on which to weigh them (ibid. p62). Despite its claims, utilitarianism does not offer any solution or method of solution to our moral dilemmas.

MacIntyre’s most sustained attack is against emotivism to which he considers we now all conform. “We take our value judgements to express preferences not to record any facts that we might expect others to acknowledge” (Pettit p178). More precisely the claim that an expression such as ‘this is good’ means roughly the same as ‘I approve of this: do so as well’ is challenged on three grounds.
Firstly, MacIntyre suggests that to elucidate a certain class of utterances by reference to feelings or attitudes prompts the question: what kinds of feelings or attitudes? Emotivists are wisely silent here for if moral utterances are expressions of moral approval then a vacuous circularity lurks. Secondly, MacIntyre insists that utterances of personal preference and evaluative expressions are distinct since “the first kind depend on who utters them to whom for any reason-giving force that they may have, while utterances of the second kind are not similarly dependent” (MacIntyre 1981 p13). Thirdly MacIntyre cites Ryle’s example of the angry schoolmaster who shouts at the small boy who has just made an arithmetical error that “seven times seven equals forty-nine”. The use of this expression to vent a feeling (anger) has nothing to do with what the expression actually means.

Various other criticisms of emotivism are offered which need not concern us here, for the main conclusion of the early part of *After Virtue* is that all Enlightenment moral theories fail and were bound to fail. MacIntyre argues that during the Enlightenment morality was separated from society as a whole. The integration of morality, religion and law was lost and thus morality needed a justification of its own, but an appeal to reason or to the passions failed and had to fail. Why?

Turning to Aristotle MacIntyre asks what is ethics, what is its function? He answers this in terms of a threefold schema, which begins with man-as-he-happens-to-be and ends with man-as-he-would-be-if-he-realised-his-essential-nature. Ethics is the means or the pathway by which the former is transformed into the latter. Any two elements of the schema without the third are unintelligible, and in particular man-as-he-happens-to-be and an ethical code divorced from a conception of man-as-he-is-to-become is incoherent. This idea of a goal, purpose or telos for man is crucial, and MacIntyre argues powerfully that it is the loss of a conception of human telos that is at the heart of the failure of Enlightenment ethical theories.

MacIntyre considers Hume’s distinction between an ‘ought’ and an ‘is’ and gives a couple of examples where he says a value judgement can be derived from facts. “From such factual premises as ‘He gets a better yield for this crop per acre than any farmer in the district.’ ‘He has the most effective programme of soil renewal yet known’ and ‘His dairy herd wins all the first prizes at the agricultural show’, the evaluative conclusion validly follows that ‘He is a good farmer’” (ibid. p55). This argument is valid according to MacIntyre because of the special character of what it is to be a farmer – namely that a farmer has a function that can be done well or badly. Functional concepts have a telos or purpose of which we may speak. Another example is a watch, (it keeps time therefore it is a good watch) and Aristotle maintained that man is a similarly functional concept. The function of man is to lead the
good life. Expanding this is to say that man’s function is realised, his telos is achieved when he leads the good life, which in Aristotle’s analysis is a life governed by the distinctive human capacity of reason (both theoretical and practical). The details are not relevant here but the main point is that man is a being with a purpose, of whom it can be said what he ought to do, given his nature.

Further for Aristotle and those who preceded him, central to this notion of living the good life is fulfilling a set of roles within society: as a citizen, as a member of a family, as a soldier, as a servant of God or whatever. Only when man is thought of primarily as an individual independent of any society does he lose his functionality and thus his telos. Furthermore the notion of right is that which a good man does, and a good man fulfils his purpose in life, hence judgements about what is good and right are very much factual as opposed to evaluative (cf. p56).

For Aristotle, the telos of man is eudaimonia, which literally means ‘having a good guardian spirit’ but denotes the supreme human good: leading the good life. Man achieves this end by exercising the virtues; which according to the Nicomachean Ethics, lie at the mean point of opposing vices. For example courage lies between rashness and cowardice. The details do not concern us here but it is important to realise mean does not connote mid-point here, but rather that balance which any given situation requires and which is determined by the intellectual virtue of phronesis. Additionally it should be noted that there is no mention of following rules here.

Most importantly of all is the realisation that, for Aristotle, all social, political and cultural life was centred on the city-state – the polis. Hence, Aristotle’s system is not considered to be universal but for the polis of Athens and binding on its citizens only. Indeed MacIntyre argues that there was in fact a considerable diversity in identifying and interpreting the values in Greek thought of the time, but that the unit of agreement, so to speak, was the polis. “A virtue...is a quality which will ensure success. But success for the sophists as for other Greeks, must be success in some particular city. Hence the ethics of success comes to be combined with a certain kind of relativism” (ibid. p130). MacIntyre goes on “What is taken to be just in democratic Athens may be different from what is taken to be just in aristocratic Thebes or military Sparta. The sophistic conclusion is that in each particular city the virtues are what they are taken to be in that city” (ibid.).

From this exegesis, MacIntyre continues in the final section of After Virtue to look at the historical development of Aristotle’s position and from it develops a neo-Aristotelianism.
which has at its centre the key notions of practice, narrative and tradition to which we now turn. Firstly, distinguish goods internal and external to a practice. External goods are goods that come from a particular practice, but could be achieved by the pursuit of some other practice. Internal goods are those that can only be achieved by the pursuit of that particular practice.

MacIntyre then says; “By ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established, cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill, but the game of football is and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a practice, architecture is” (ibid. p175).

Since practices are goal-directed and intentional they must be rooted in a historical context; they must have a setting or a situation that MacIntyre calls a narrative, and it is the narrative that gives the practice sense. A practice outside the context of a narrative is senseless. For example, Lutheran Pietists brought up their children (e.g. Kant) to tell the truth to everybody always. Traditional Bantu parents taught their children not to tell the truth to strangers as they believed that could expose the family to the harmful effects of witchcraft (cf p180). The point is not that one is wrong or right, but that each receives its context and indeed its sense from the historical setting; the narrative of which it is a part.

A more entertaining example is that of the young man who utters “The name of the common wild duck is Histrionicus histrionicus histrionicus” at a bus stop (see p195). Whilst it is clear what this utterance means, the intentions of the young man can only be made sense of if we know some context (e.g. former enquirer at a library, patient in therapy, Soviet spy etc.). Without any context at all, without a suitable narrative, the practice is rendered senseless, and we would judge the man mad.

In the final stage of MacIntyre’s analysis in *After Virtue*, a narrative must be located within a tradition. If the individual is considered as an agent, engaged in practices which are part of a narrative there is nevertheless a wider context. I am born with a past, within a particular community (neighbourhood, city, tribe) and whilst I may come to rebel against it, I inherit a social context which is handed on to me from my forbears. This is a tradition.

44
It may be noted straight away that MacIntyre says that the Burkean contrasts of tradition with reason, and the stability of tradition with conflict are misleading. A tradition examines itself; it transcends criticism and evolves. When healthy, it is “constituted by a continuous argument” (MacIntyre 1981 p206) and embodies conflict. It is not unhelpful to think of tradition as something alive and dynamic, in which narratives are embedded. The analogy may be continued for MacIntyre says “the history of each of our own lives is generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer histories of a number of traditions. I say ‘generally and characteristically’ rather than ‘always’ for traditions decay, disintegrate and disappear” (ibid. p207), and this is a point to which we shall have cause to return.

To summarise the argument so far: MacIntyre rejects what he calls Enlightenment theories of ethics which appeal to reason or the passions for justification. He appeals to Aristotle to show that ethics and the practice of virtue is the means whereby man achieves his telos. He goes on to develop Aristotle's position to suggest that such practices derive their sense from being part of a narrative, which in turn must be part of a larger tradition. This tradition is not an inert or static thing, but can be self-critical, can adapt, can change and decay or even die.

It is no surprise that *After Virtue* prompted much discussion and argument, and many cannot find themselves in agreement with MacIntyre's position. In the second edition of *After Virtue* a postscript was included where MacIntyre responded to some of his critics. He concedes various factual errors in the book, and discusses various fine points of interpretation of classical texts. He discusses the role of history or historical analysis as a philosophical tool, and disagrees with those who suggest philosophy to be a purely analytical activity. He also concedes a neglect of the theological dimension of his position, but suggests *After Virtue* must be seen as a work in progress. Hence it is fitting for us to consider its sequel *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* and to examine the notion of tradition as it is developed there.

MacIntyre's first point is that reason is embedded in tradition. He rejects the Enlightenment view that there is some historically and socially independent standard of justification. He makes four points in support of his position. Firstly, he suggests justification always has a historical element in so far as part of justification is the narration of a story. There is a need to explain what the premises are and “how the argument has gone so far” (MacIntyre 1988 p8). There can be no rational process distinct from this structure.

Secondly, MacIntyre rejects the Enlightenment position which characterises dispute as between different doctrines whose truth, falsity and justifiability may be argued for. He says
“Doctrines, theses and arguments all have to be understood in terms of historical context” (ibid. p9). He concedes that from this it follows that, just as there is a plurality of histories and traditions, so there is a plurality of rationalities. There is no timeless place where concepts and their justification and elaboration, can be considered in a context-free way. Thirdly, the proponents of the Enlightenment assert that this plurality makes “radical disagreement” harder, not easier to resolve. But no, says MacIntyre, for the disagreement is not always to be solved, but is to be understood in its context and is to be transformed in such a way as to be resolved.

Finally, MacIntyre suggest that concepts can only be elucidated by exemplification. Here he means that uses of concepts (e.g. true) are different in different traditions and at different times, so there can be no abstract discussion of concepts outside of a particular tradition. He gives two examples of the sorts of thing he has in mind. Firstly he considers the post-Homeric structure of the polis, and contrasts excellence and efficiency as the determinants of the just. Whilst there may be broad agreement between these two positions there will be disagreement in certain areas, and these will be irreconcilable. Each position is justifiable and understandable in the context of its tradition but au fond the two are separate and lead to different political standpoints.

MacIntyre points to discussion between Plato and the Sophists as another example. “Callicles’ grudging, uncandid and sullen withdrawal from the argument with Socrates in the Georgias and to the almost, but not quite, complete silence of Thrasymachus through nine books of the Republic” (ibid. p75) show the impossibility of discussion between the two because of their very different base premises. “The premises and presuppositions of the Platonic account certainly entail the falsity of any sophistic view and vice versa” (ibid.).

Andrew Mason takes up the point and suggests that in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre seems to individuate traditions by characterising them as giving rise to rival and incompatible theories; and not only incompatible but incommensurable too. Mason formalises MacIntyre to say that theories within different traditions are incommensurable if they have one or more of the following:

Different base premises.
Different conceptions of rational resolvability
Partial untranslatability.

This may prompt the question: is this the end of the story? Are conflicting theories and traditions with their antagonistic base premises, their rival conceptions of rationality and
their mutual untranslatability condemned to be eternally at odds? The answer is no, and for MacIntyre, the supreme example and indeed exemplar of how separate traditions may combine is found in the work of S. Thomas Aquinas.

MacIntyre sees Aquinas as an inheritor of the philosophy of Aristotle and the theology of Augustine which is essentially Platonic in its nature. It was the genius of Aquinas, so MacIntyre contends, to fuse these two positions together, or more precisely to create a synthesis out of two dialectically opposed positions. All the details of this need not concern us here, but it is worth briefly noting the following points. The structure of Aquinas' argument is an advancing discussion which is ultimately open-ended, for it is "always open to addition by some as yet unforeseen argument" (ibid. p172). In a similar way Aquinas' notion of the telos for man is a transformation of Aristotle's in that it is open-ended. It has a transcendental or divine dimension, which can only be fully realised by the Grace of God after death.

Secondly just as Aristotle's notion of the telos for man only made sense within the context of the polis, so Aquinas enlarges the notion of the polis by appropriating ideas from Augustine and Gregory VII of the civitas Dei. Importantly, everyone is a citizen of this community except those who exclude themselves, and a certain universalism albeit within a Thomist tradition is beginning to emerge. Thirdly, Aquinas appropriates Aristotle's virtue of phronesis, (wise judgement in exercising the virtues) and replaces it with prudentia which has a theological dimension in so far as it directs the exercise of human law to be in line with the Divine Law (cf. p197).

Finally in De Ente et Essentia Aquinas distinguishes essence and existence. This was in response to the challenge that confronted him that: "a particular thesis can be true in philosophy, while some logically incompatible thesis is true in theology" (ibid. p170). Distinguishing a thing's nature from its being, allowed Aquinas to synthesise disparate elements of theory together in a "unified metaphysical theology" (ibid. p171). The details of all of this are not directly relevant, but they give some idea of what MacIntyre has in mind when he speaks of merging traditions. From the example of Aquinas, MacIntyre develops a more general theory of the evolution of traditions, and as this is pertinent to our concept of framework. It is to this that we now turn.

Firstly, MacIntyre makes the point that the merging or synthesis of traditions is a difficult business because there is no arbitrary standpoint from where the two rival positions can be evaluated. A person who achieves such a synthesis must have the "rare gift of empathy"
MacIntyre sees Aquinas as unique on account of his education in that he understood two rival traditions \textit{from within}. It is this that prompts the remark that "Perhaps no one else in the history of philosophy has been put in to quite this situation" (ibid. p168).

MacIntyre contends that the merging of traditions happens in two stages. Initially each position must characterise the contentions of the other in its own terms. Each must have some understanding of the other, whilst leaving questions of truth and falsity on one side. Thereafter, one position must use resources from the other to explain more adequately its own defects or inadequacies. This may lead to a number of different possible outcomes. One tradition may jettison some of its contentions in favour of contentions from the rival tradition, thus removing the division. There may be an impasse, where certain issues have to remain undecided, or in certain rare cases "to understand may lead to a judgement that by the standards of one's own tradition the other tradition offers superior resources for understanding the problems and issues which confront one's own tradition" (ibid. p370).

Underlying this characterisation of concepts is, of course, the assumption that one tradition must accommodate the language of the other. MacIntyre reminds us that there is no neutral language, for language is historically and socially conditioned, so for traditions to merge, one tradition must learn the language of the other as a first language. MacIntyre talks of a second-first-language. There is some rather technical debate here about the nature of translatability which I shall side step to come to several final but important points at the end of \textit{Whose Justice? Which Rationality}?

Firstly, MacIntyre reiterates that liberalism characterised by the lack of any overriding good, and based on desires of the individual is not the neutral standpoint it claims to be. The Enlightenment project of providing a neutral ground from which moral judgements could be made, and a rationality, to which all would agree, failed. He continues by saying, that there is no sound a priori argument why there could not be such a neutral ground (cf. p346) but equally clearly, liberalism is the best contender that there has been or is likely to be. Since liberalism has failed we can assert with confidence that there is no neutral ground; "there is instead only the practical-rationality-of-this-or-that-tradition and the justice-of-this-or-that-tradition" (ibid. p346).

Additionally MacIntyre asserts that liberalism is itself a tradition, but one in which "less and less importance has been attached to arriving at a substantive conclusion and more and more to continuing the debate for its own sake" (ibid. p344). If we were left in any doubt he goes on to say "Like other traditions liberalism has its set of authoritative texts and its disputes
over their interpretation. Like other traditions, liberalism expresses itself socially through a particular kind of hierarchy" (ibid. p345). This seems rather odd for two reasons: firstly, it is a departure from the position MacIntyre held in *After Virtue* and secondly it opens up a considerable number of difficult, albeit interesting, questions about conflict and disagreement within traditions.

Stephen Mulhall observes that "MacIntyre’s conception of liberalism and its weaknesses has shifted significantly over the last decade" (Mulhall p223). In *After Virtue* MacIntyre seems to dismiss liberalism because of "internal methodological and conceptual incoherencies at its heart" (ibid.) but in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* as we have seen, MacIntyre suggests liberalism is a tradition. If this is so, Mulhall makes the obvious remark that it is "no more open to purely methodological or conceptual assault than his own neo-Thomistic tradition" (ibid. p224). However it may be asked, is liberalism a tradition in the normal sense?

Andrew Mason poses the question: if liberalism is a tradition how can disputes among liberals be explained? He suggests the question prompts the following dilemma: if liberalism is a tradition then it contains several conflicting and incommensurable theories, Rawls’ and Nozick’s theories of justice being the much-discussed example. However, MacIntyre seems to take incommensurability as a central and distinguishing feature of different traditions. On the other hand, if theories such as Rawls’ and Nozick’s were regarded as commensurable how can the intractable disagreement to which they seem to lead be explained? MacIntyre’s own view of tradition would be compromised.

Mason suggests that MacIntyre might avoid the dilemma by denying that “liberalism, as it is ordinarily understood, is a single tradition” (Mason p228) and suggests “perhaps we should think of Rawls and Nozick, perfectionist and neutralist liberals, and utilitarian and deontological liberals, as each part of different but overlapping traditions” (ibid.). But this seems at odds with MacIntyre’s implicit belief that there are relatively few traditions and his suggestion that Rawls and Nozick are part of a single tradition (see Mason p229).

Mason admits uncertainty here but suggests a position in which a single tradition may contain theories which are commensurable in some respects and incommensurable in others. It acknowledges that there may be partial commensurability across traditions which MacIntyre himself concedes (cf. MacIntyre 1988 p351). However, on Mason’s view a tradition may contain rival theories whose differences are more than superficial and which might be significantly incommensurable. Mason goes on to suggest that the problems
surrounding commensurability are more fundamental for MacIntyre than “the intractability of contemporary political disagreement” (Mason p229) and the charge that MacIntyre has not sufficiently explained how traditions are to be individuated seems to linger.

Finally it is worth considering the final chapter of *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*, and MacIntyre’s reconception of the university. Not only does this give some inkling of how his scheme might apply in reality, but also, despite the differences between schools and universities, what MacIntyre says about universities is very pertinent to our notion of frameworks in schools.

MacIntyre suggests that the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica offered a unified vision of the world; it was almost a canonical text. The tenth edition was little more than a revision of this but the eleventh and subsequent editions were no more than a set of well-ordered facts, reflecting an increasingly fragmented and specialised enquiry. The largely homogenous views of the educated public had given way to an educated public who no longer shared fundamental values. This shift in the perception of what an encyclopaedia constituted was accompanied by a change in the nature of a university.

MacIntyre argues that the pre-liberal universities were conformist; each one having an agreed morality and agreed standards of rational justification. There was a “high degree of homogeneity in fundamental belief” (MacIntyre 1990 p223) almost so that one could speak of a university’s particular *telos*. This homogeneity was not static but evolved, it was a changing consensus, but as MacIntyre points out it was consensus none the less. Historical completeness demands that we note that such universities excluded those who held views which were seriously at odds with the agreed consensus, most notably Jews and Catholics. A preferment system operated so that those who would be expected to maintain the status quo were promoted above those who had brilliance, and MacIntyre notes the preferment of Cleghorn to the chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh over Hume (ibid. p224).

The establishment of the liberal universities appealed to two premises. Firstly, to the correction of the injustices of exclusion, and this is lauded by MacIntyre. Secondly to a neutral and non-partisan rationality; “freed from external constraints and most notably from the constraints imposed by religious and moral tests” (ibid. p225). It is no surprise that MacIntyre regards this ideal as spurious, even non-sensical, and speaks of the subsequent history of the liberal university as one of “increasing disarray” (ibid.). Most telling is the current sidelining of theological and moral debate, these enquiries have been ‘dethroned’ and
the liberal university has no agreed values, no agreed standards of rationality, in short no *telos*.

MacIntyre attacks the Great Books Curriculum, a system of initiation in to our inherited culture and tradition through great books such as Plato, Euclid, Locke’s Essay, Shakespeare, Mill’s On Liberty etc.. These books cannot convey a tradition since they are varied and present different view points and most crucially says MacIntyre they cannot be read ‘straight’ but need interpretation. But in the Great Books Curriculum no method of interpretation is given, there is no initial consensus and of course, in the ideals of a liberal university no standard of interpretation no consensus, could be given. The Great Books Curriculum does not achieve what it is supposed to. What then?

MacIntyre goes on to propose that the post-liberal university has two roles. Firstly to advance enquiry within a particular point of view, “preserving and transforming the initial agreements with those who share that point of view” (ibid. p231) and secondly to engage in systematic controversy with those with whom one disagreed. It is suggested that this systemised controversy would have ethical and theological issues at its heart, there would be no arbitrary neutral standpoint and positions would change and evolve in the way that traditions change and evolve, as discussed earlier. MacIntyre imagines sets of rival universities with their own exclusions and prohibitions, along the lines of a “twentieth century version of the thirteenth century university, especially the University of Paris, the university at which the Augustinians and the Aristotelians each conducted their own systematic enquiries, whilst at the same time engaging in systematic controversy” (ibid. p232). Before turning to the implications of such a view for schools it is fitting to consider other contributions to the discussion of the place of tradition in education that have a more overtly ‘educational’ perspective.

The idealist philosopher, Michael Oakeshott maintained that reality is mediated to us via human practices which are not things that we simply know about but are to be lived. Similar to Wittgenstein’s language games where the only way we can show we understand them is to play them, so we engage with reality by entering practices. What exactly does Oakeshott mean by practice? He says, “As civilised human beings we are the inheritors, neither of an enquiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation...... education properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation” (Oakeshott 1962 p198-199). To master a subject we must be initiated into its literature and Peters reminds us that this is a mastery of moves made by one’s predecessors “which are enshrined in a living tradition” (Peters 1963 p109).
Although Peters' own philosophical position changed and developed, his early work as found in "Education as Initiation" (1963) and *Ethics and Education* (1966) was driven by the attempt to define education. In brief, Peters argued there are three elements to education: the transmission of something worthwhile, which has a cognitive content and which is transmitted in a non-coercive manner. He says "Education involves essentially processes which intentionally transmit what is valuable in an intelligible and voluntary manner and which create in the learner the desire to achieve it, this being seen to have its place along with other things in life" (Peters 1963 p102).

This definition is underpinned for Peters by two philosophical theses: one about the nature of the worthwhile which we can ignore, and the other about the nature of the mind. Peters rejected the empiricist theory of the mind as a *tabula rasa* (or "empty cabinet" (Peters 1966 p51) as he put it) upon which sense *qualia* are impressed and from which knowledge was derived as a sort of precipitate. He also rejected the Kantian notion developed by Piaget; of innate knowledge by which experience was structured and from which concepts were derived. "Both share a common defect, that of regarding the educator as a detached operator who is working for some kind of result in another person who is external to him" (ibid.).

In contrast to these two positions Peters stressed the essentially interactive nature of education and saw education as a process of initiation, initiation in to a common language, shared concepts and an inherited tradition. For Peters this tradition served several purposes which can be briefly explored. He says creativity and inventiveness are important aspects of education "but talk of inventiveness is empty unless the individual is brought up in a tradition which enables him to see and find a way round a problem when it arises" (ibid. p57). He says our concepts are culture bound and socially determined so that there is a tradition or a fraternity (cf. p217) into which pupils are to be initiated. The practical consequences of this for Peters are both mundane and far-reaching. Tradition underpins school rules and classroom discipline (p272-3); it underpins reasonableness and tolerance (p303) and is ultimately required for the functioning of democracy.

Richard Pring explores the connection between tradition and the curriculum. Echoing Oakeshott, he makes the point that Oakeshottian conversations should take place directed only by the conversations themselves. That is to say the contents of the curriculum should arise "not from the fiat of a Secretary of State worried about the usefulness of what is learnt, but from within a tradition of scholarship and critical enquiry" (Pring 1996 p107). He enlarges upon this point when he considers two extremes of educational practice. In the first
he imagines a teacher who on account of his greater knowledge simply tells the pupils what they should learn (conveys the tradition) without any consideration of their interests. In the second he imagines teaching driven solely by pupils’ interests, where everything is to be negotiated and education is seen as mutual enlightenment.

Pring says education must lie between these two extremes, and observes that the art of the teacher is to bring the interests of the pupils and the established tradition in to contact. The teacher must inhabit a worked-out tradition which he will convey, whilst at the same time respecting and responding to his pupils interests. These traditions are public and arise from “systematic, disciplined reflection and criticism, and should be seen as resources from which the student-centred curriculum is drawn” (Pring 1976 p98). Pring is mildly critical of a headmaster who integrated a curriculum around the idea of bees; queen bees leading to associations with royalty etc., worker bees leading to ideas of careers and jobs, drones introducing “social security, layabouts and hippies” (ibid. p107)! He suggests such a scheme is no more than idiosyncratic, for it is just an association of ideas without any conceptual unity. He prefers a structuring of curriculum, around a reality that has “already been found adequate and has withstood scrutiny by others” (ibid.).

Finally we should note that Pring persistently talks of traditions in the plural, almost to the point of suggesting each teacher may inhabit his own tradition, which without qualification, risks being non-sensical. Pring does not tell us how broadly or narrowly he imagines traditions or how they are to be individuated, and this is an issue which will be considered again in chapter five.

In his inaugural lecture as professor, John White explored the relationship between values and personal well-being. He recognises the role that Christianity has historically played in British values education, but suggests that this is now outmoded and irrelevant. “Christianity is crumbling everywhere” (White 1995 p16) he says and he struggles to see “how the government’s attempt to involve a by-and-large godless school population in the rites of a dwindling religious cult will do anything for the students’ own or other people’s flourishing” (ibid. p3). In the light of this White asks is there an alternative framework?

He develops the idea that ethical ideas associated with well-being are rooted in our human nature, but that our nature is not simply given but is a social and more importantly a historical construct. [Values] “have been developed across human time in response to our needs and desires....[and] if you ask me why friendship is a good thing, or sexual pleasure, or concern for the needy or personal autonomy, my answer will have to be in those
terms” (ibid. p8). That is to say although White has a very different agenda to MacIntyre (say) he does recognise that our values are principally explicable in terms of how we have developed, and so our history, our tradition is a something that is to be explicated and indeed to be handed on.

To summarise all this I want to say that a tradition is that which we receive from our forbears as opposed to that which we invent or discover for ourselves. It underpins a shared rationality, a common approach to the rational solving of problems and certain other agreed base premises. In addition to this epistemological machinery a tradition also functions as a backdrop to moral discourse and to human narrative; a context within which human lives are situated and from which they derive their significance and sense. Our engagement with reality is mediated through a particular tradition that is a product of historical discussion, debate and refinement.

It is tradition in this sense that I understand as a constituent of a framework for values education. If teacher and pupil do not share a basic rationality and agree on base premises it is hard to see how education could occur – even communication would be hugely problematic. More specifically and for our purposes then, there must be a shared moral dimension here, recognition of an inherited tradition as a backdrop to making moral sense of human lives as a part of values education. Moral understanding is a part of what values education is about. When considering questions of value the pupil must not only understand the meaning of what the teacher teaches but must also grasp its significance too. School values education is inextricably linked with morals and MacIntyre’s whole argument is that these are only coherent within a given tradition. The pupil must understand that to make a moral judgement in particular, and a value judgement more broadly, is not an isolated event but has a cultural and historical context, and that this context is not just a context for the judgements but is the context of the life of the pupil (and the teacher!) too!

In other words the tradition not only provides a common rationality and a backdrop to moral judgements, but provides a broader context that gives human life meaning and sense. A tradition embeds human narratives and provides continuity between our moral lives and our lives more generally. Our moral life is not a disjoint part of us, but is continuous and contiguous with the rest of our lives, and the recognition of an inherited tradition behind all this gives meaning and sense to the way we live, and is a crucial part of values education.

I want to express all of this by saying that a framework for values education must have a component of tradition. I do not think that tradition is the only component; the only part of
the framework that needs to be considered but it seems to me that in the absence of tradition and the recognition of the place of tradition, values education would be incoherent.

The practical implication of this may be considered in two separate cases. Firstly, in the case of culturally homogeneous schools such as Lutheran schools in Norway, or some Catholic schools in Britain, there seems little doubt that tradition would and I would suggest should be a significant factor in the life of the school. The history and ethos of the school, the particular religious perspective, the kind of language that is used in school documents, even hymn singing and public assemblies/worship would all be part of a shared tradition. Even in some cases the décor or plan of the school might be influenced by tradition and in particular if we think of long-established independent schools, the place and importance of tradition in unquestionable. This is not to say that this tradition is fixed for indeed it evolves; nor is it to say that other traditions are ignored, for they are acknowledged and discussed, but crucially from the perspective of an established position. Finally we may note that such schools are readily replicated and one may think of Benedictine schools (or former Benedictine schools) at Ampleforth, Downside, Douai, Belmont and so on that despite their superficial differences, are profoundly similar, because they are a part of a tradition originating in S. Benedict (c.480-547).

In culturally heterogeneous schools the situation is very different. If MacIntyre’s views about universities were to be replicated in schools, the suggestion is presumably that culturally heterogeneous schools should be replaced by culturally homogeneous schools, in which cultural groupings of pupils could be separately educated. In Britain church schools of various denominations already exist and the emergence of Islamic schools is a current phenomenon. We can imagine an extension of this provision to reflect other ideological traditions, although such a move may well be opposed on the charges of separatism, and the institution of rival ghettos. This is a potentially powerful objection, but more work needs to be done to make it stick, for all that is being suggested here is that schooling be divided on traditional lines, not that society generally, or the leisure activities that people enjoy be so divided.

However it is not clear that schooling and ‘society generally’ can be so neatly partitioned. The situation in Northern Ireland, where Protestants and Roman Catholics are separately educated, might seem to suggest that separatist schools divide communities and are part of the problem rather than part of the solution. However, that situation there is highly complex and judgements about schools cannot be meaningfully made in isolation from a considerable number of other issues.
The reality is, I think, that culturally heterogeneous schools are with us to stay. If one were to continue a strict MacIntyrean line, one might consider schools as places where rival traditions are assimilated and where new traditions emerge, but in the light of remarks about the unique intellect and position of Thomas Aquinas, this seems an unlikely occurrence! A more balanced approach seems to me to be an acknowledgement of the central importance of tradition, tempered by the realisation that tradition is not the only factor to be considered.

A balanced response must recognise the cultural diversity within schools and attempt to embrace various traditions to the full, rather than watering them down to the lowest common factor. Additionally however, schools cannot be thought of as ideal institutions, they are real institutions inhabited by real people, and whilst the traditions of these people must be respected and fostered, it also must be realised that these people form or should form a community. Not only is this community to be understood as within the perimeter fence of the school, but the school itself is (or should be) an integral part of the wider community. It would seem that school situation is not analogous to MacIntyre’s post-liberal university, and in order to develop a framework for values and values education in schools, the demands of tradition must be considered alongside the demands of a pluralist community life.
IV Community and Frameworks

Thus far I have explored the notion of framework through the lenses of language and tradition. I have also suggested that the notion of community is important in the pluralist world in which we live, and in this final chapter of exploration, I turn to the notion of community and the work of Charles Taylor. Taylor’s work is relevant here, because he locates the self within a community, and this location; this structural setting is not just a possibility or an optional extra but is a necessity. I think this unavoidable location of the self within community is highly relevant for the broader location of values education within frameworks.

Recall, MacIntyre’s analysis is principally historical in nature and follows a long line of development from Aristotle, through Augustin, Aquinas, and the Enlightenment to the present day. Taylor adopts a very similar type of historical analysis in his magisterial Sources of the Self, which traces the development of the understanding of the self, particularly the self as a moral agent. As Taylor puts it: “What we are constantly losing from sight here is that being a self is inescapable from existing in a space of moral issues, to do with identity and how one ought to be” (Taylor 1989b, p112).

In her review of this text Martha Nussbaum observes that: it is difficult to give a sense of the richness of Taylor’s argument, and impossible to do justice to the all of his historical articulation, and this is a sentiment that we can echo here, but some attempt must be made. Like MacIntyre, Taylor begins with the ancients and observes that Plato locates the self or the soul as a unit within society. One has a place and a role to play within the ordering of society. More importantly individual morality, man’s orientation towards the good and indeed one’s reason cannot be independent of society but must be integrated with it. “The cosmos...is related to the right order of the soul as the whole is to the part, as englobing to englobed” (ibid. p122). Furthermore this very large picture is instantiated in the polis, where our moral and rational well-being depends not only on our individual selves but also on our place within and our relationship to, the society of which we are a part.

Saint Augustine combined Platonic philosophy with Christian doctrine and in particular viewed the created order in all its parts as participating in the Divine order, which is a manifestation of the good. “God saw all he had made and indeed it was very good” (Genesis 1:31). That is, for Augustine, God rather than the idea of the Good is the source of all good, and man’s ultimate well-being depends on orientating oneself towards God. This is consonant with Plato’s orientation towards the Good except that Plato’s man must look
outside himself but Augustine’s man finds God on an inward road. God is the very source, the root of human being.

As we noted earlier, Augustine’s man is situated within the *civitas Dei*, he is located within a community of the faithful, but according to Taylor, a crucial change has occurred. By suggesting God is to be found interiorly, Augustine has introduced a self-centred, introspective or reflexive stance that was to dominate future thinking. Taylor goes as far as to suggest that Augustine foreshadowed a “radical reflexivity” (Taylor 1989b, p143) that Descartes adopts and indeed enshrines in his *cogito*. Taylor also notes that Descartes’ theistic proofs start from within the self’s own ideas, unlike Aquinas’ proofs which start from external being.

More generally Descartes abandoned any teleological approach to reasoning, and thought that the universe was a mechanism to be understood by independent reason, grounded ultimately in the method of doubt. The proper intellectual stance was detached engagement. Crucial for Taylor’s analysis is the moral shift that went with this: Descartes situated the source of morality within the self. Descartes’ self could rationalise independently about moral matters, and although theism remained, on a human level, the self had an autonomy and a dignity based on its own reason. For Descartes, strength of will is the supreme virtue and reason is no longer determined by societal factors but is a procedure, internal to the self, for establishing the truth.

Locke advanced this position further by developing the notion of the human agent who is able to shape his own destiny. The self has an instrumental stance towards his own feelings, desires and habits and can regulate them to an extent. The self is neutral, objective and disengaged and can turn reflexively upon itself, as well as considering the external world. Moreover Locke also rejected any teleological concept of the self and any claims to innate knowledge. He adopted a strict empiricism reconstructing epistemology on the grounds of experience alone. “Rationality is above all a property of the process of thinking, not of the substantive content of thought” (ibid. p168).

Locke’s stance leaves little scope for authority in any shape or form, but morality is not jettisoned. We form habits whereby doing good causes happiness and evil causes uneasiness. This habituation is a mechanical thing, which is instrumentally determined, but lacks the background of nature which characterises Aristotle’s *hexeis* (cf. Taylor 1989b, p171). This habituation however is not escapable; Taylor points out “Locke is acknowledging in his own way here what I argued in part I; the close connection between our notion of the self and of
moral self-understanding. Locke’s person is the moral agent who takes responsibility for his acts in the light of future retribution. The abstracted picture of the self faithfully reflects his ideal of responsible agency” (ibid. p173).

Kant following Rousseau defined freedom and morality in terms of each other. Since for Kant, to act morally is to act according to a motive or sense of duty, one must be free to do this! Further this motive or duty is not determined by nature but is a law of morality determined by reason, the reasoning of the self. This reasoning which is based on the rational has a normativity for Kant, in that all rational agents would draw the same conclusion about the same circumstances. There is an internal activity, generated within the self, independently of nature, that motivates the rational agent.

It is interesting to note that it is this rational capacity that confers dignity upon man, and although Kant retained a Christian belief, it was God who designed things the way they are, and man who was able to confer dignity on himself. At the beginning of his well-known essay on the Enlightenment, Kant writes that “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity” and he continues, “Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!” (cf. Taylor 1989b, p366) The self is an established entity, morally independent of God, and its natural surroundings.

Considering modern philosophy Taylor highlights Kierkegaard who suggests that we attain the ethical by “choosing ourselves in the light of infinity” (ibid. p449). That is to say on the one hand the aesthetic man of Either/Or never moves beyond worldly, finite choices dictated by his senses; and is ultimately unfulfilled. His life is not a proper life. On the other hand the ethical man of Either/Or gives value to the self by the very act of choosing it. By choosing the ethical above the aesthetic my life, my very self is transfigured, it is freed from the ultimate drudgery of the senses, it accesses a new dimension, and I become a full person. Although this was not to be the final word and Kierkegaard ultimately came to value the religious above the ethical, nevertheless it was the place of the Divine, or perhaps better it was the acceptance of the Divine, that allowed the individual to fully realise his own self. The individuated self is paramount!

Taylor also highlights Nietzsche, who characterises man as trapped in a suffering, finite cosmos and searching for an escape: a resolution, a way out. In particular Nietzsche sees Christianity as one such illusory attempt to find a way out, an option or doctrine for escape, a promise of future reconciliation and justice. But Nietzsche’s Übermensch (supermen) are those who realise there is no way out, there is no escape. The Übermensch recognise and
accept the situation as it is, and in so doing overcome themselves and take on a transfigured self. New meaning is found by a new orientation of the self.

All of this and the moral stance which it entails is an act of will, an exercise of power that the Ubermensch summon from within themselves. It is the influence of the community and surroundings that heightens our sense of unworthiness and condemns us to an all-too-human life (cf. ibid. p453). Finally it is worth noting that Nietzsche’s rejection of theism further underlines or emphasises that the force that transfigures is not external, but comes from within; within the unencumbered self.

Alongside and interwoven with these more overtly philosophical positions, Taylor also considers a number of other social and cultural developments that have severed the self from its community in modern thought, and he finds the origin of these developments in the affirmation of ‘ordinary life’. For Aristotle the highest aims in life were contemplation and political association, although he realised that these had to be underpinned by more modest (ordinary) aims such as production and labour, marriage and sexual fulfilment and so on. These latter aims however were not seen as ends in themselves but were means to higher ends. In the modern era Taylor suggests Aristotle’s highest aims ceased to be universally acknowledged and so-called ordinary life was given a dignity and worth in itself.

Taylor argues that there were two especially significant aspects to this. The first was the emergence of a work ethic and the development of commerce. The high ideal of military conquest was replaced by the idea of business success, which provided corporate stability but which also elevated successful individuals and engendered a sense of competition amongst them. The second was a shift in the understanding of marriage. There was an increased emphasis on the affection of the partners for each other and for their children, and so there was an increased emphasis on the voluntary nature of marriage and choosing a partner. More families were able to have their own homes and in the homes of the rich, family and servants were partitioned. This promoted a general sense of privacy and exclusiveness within the family relationship and “the open, goldfish bowl world of traditional society” (ibid. p291) declined.

Taylor also charts the development, in the eighteenth century, of the novel as a literary form, and points out that the new novel tended to focus on the individual (the hero or heroine) and concerned itself with the particular rather than the general. Taylor cites Ian Watt (p287) who points out that the characters now have ordinary proper names, unlike those we find in Bunyan (say) which are “personified qualities” (ibid.). Similarly Taylor mentions the
emergence of the biography and autobiography and these too add to the notion of a world of individuals, and play down notions of community and the place and role of archetypes and universal forms.

Finally reformation theology moved away from the notion of universal salvation brought about by Divine grace to a notion of salvation for the individual who lived a life by faith and good works. Protestant religion brought the focus of eternity in to the life of the individual who ultimately had to account for himself and who would be judged as an individual. Using a perhaps rather well worn but effective metaphor, Taylor has it; “I am a passenger in the ecclesial ship on its journey to God. But for Protestantism there can be no passengers. This is because there is no ship in the Catholic sense, no common movement carrying humans to salvation. Each believer rows his or her own boat” (ibid. p217).

At this point we must not lose sight of Taylor’s aim. He charts the history of the self, the development of the individual’s reflexive stance not to endorse it but to understand it. Through his detailed analysis he aims to show where modern society has gone wrong. Only towards the very end of Sources of the Self do we see Taylor’s rejection of the doctrine summed up so well in Herder’s phrase “Jeder Mensch hat ein eigenes Mass” (Each human has his own measure. ibid. p375), and the suggestion that in poetry man still has some sense, some longing, for the transcendent which goes beyond the craze for social atomism and self-fulfilment.

Taylor speaks of an attempt to recapture “public poetry” (p483); a conversation between the poet and a broad audience. The aim is to articulate “common realities and hopes, pains and fulfilments” (p484) rather than plumb the inner depths of meaning. Now these common realities, hopes etc. may be aesthetic, but it is Taylor’s contention that they have an ethical element too, and this ethical dimension based upon common shared themes locates the individual within community. This idea is taken up in Taylor’s Ethics of Authenticity to which we now turn.

Taylor characterises the modern ethical position as individualism “whose principle is something like this: everyone has a right to develop their own form of life, grounded on their own sense of what is really important or of value. People are called upon to be true to themselves and to seek their own self-fulfilment” (Taylor 1991 p14). Taylor says this position is not so much to be criticised but suggests a fundamental ideal has been lost, and sees the philosopher’s job as one of recovery.
Taylor characterises human life as essentially dialogical. Firstly in its genesis: we learn language and other skills through interaction with others, we cannot accomplish this alone. Additionally throughout life we develop and grow not in a monological fashion but through dialogue. This dialogue provides a “background of intelligibility” (ibid. p37) to our lives which Taylor goes on to call a horizon. We define ourselves against this horizon, and indeed our very identity requires recognition by others. Further intimate and loving relationships are seen to be “the prime loci of self-exploration and self-fulfilment” (ibid. p45). Behind this must be some shared standards or values, against which difference can be recognised, and we must recognise that we are essentially embedded in a human mesh, we are not disengaged, and we cannot function in the disengaged way that individualism would suggest.

Taylor argues against choice as a source of worth. He counters the suggestion that “all options are equally worthy, because they are freely chosen, and it is choice that confers worth” (ibid. p37), because this ignores all pre-existent horizons. If these are denied then all our choices are on a level plain and no one is more or less significant than any other.

Taylor suggests that if homosexual orientation were to be justified on grounds of choice, then sexual orientation becomes no more significant than a preference for “taller or shorter sexual partners, blondes or brunettes” (ibid. p38) which is absurd. That is to say no one would discriminate against another for preferring blondes or brunettes for these choices are not important. But, by contrast, to choose a sexuality is to choose a whole way of living, and this cannot be considered unimportant! Although it is questionable whether sexual orientation is something that one chooses, appeal to the right to choose is often made, and the point remains that conferring worth by choice collapses horizons, and the very thing to be valued is rendered insignificant – valueless. Resonating with Wittgenstein’s forms of life Taylor declares, “horizons are given” (ibid. p39).

Moreover, my very identity depends on gives in history, nature and society where there are given demands and orders of significance, and to ignore these and appeal to choice as the ultimate is to undermine and trivialise the very nature of the self. This is a point to which we shall return.

Taylor’s philosophical arguments have extended and developed into the political sphere. The fragmentation that Taylor describes can lead to a sense of political powerlessness, but it also has prompted the emergence of the recognition of common purposes. This has happened most significantly in the USA and has centred on the notion of rights, but it has also led to the increase of so-called “single issue” politics and has had implications for devolution and
the decentralisation of power. Much contemporary discussion has surrounded the theory of communitarianism.

Broadly speaking communitarianism is “the thesis that the community rather than the individual, the state, the nation or any other entity is and should be at the centre of our analysis and our value system” (Honderich p143). Kymlicka underlines that whereas utilitarianism, liberal equality, libertarianism and Marxism promote people’s interest by letting them choose the kind of lives they want to lead, and indeed almost take self-determinism as axiomatic, communitarians question our ability and even right to be totally self-determining. We can certainly imagine members of society who through immaturity or disability need decisions making for them, but liberals allow for this (cf. Kymlicka 1990 p200). What we need to ask is are there individuals who are perhaps unsuccessful at making life-decisions, and who would be better off if these were made for them? Are all choices best left to the individual?

Kymlicka imagines a policy of taxing wrestling and subsidising the theatre. Defenders of such a policy might say they were justified if studies revealed “theatre is stimulating whereas wrestling produces frustration and docility; or that wrestling fans often come to regret their past activities, whereas theatre goers rarely regret theirs; or that the majority of people who have tried both forms of entertainment prefer theatre” (ibid. p201). If any of these could be shown, should the government not encourage theatre and save the people from wasting their time on wrestling? Naturally questions arise as to whether any of the claims above could be justified, but more broadly what a government should do in theory and what it does in practice needs to be distinguished, and we have to question whether it would be right to give a government such power. Nevertheless “nothing in principle excludes the possibility that governments can identify mistakes in people’s conception of the good” (ibid. p203).

The retort to this is that choosing and being mistaken is a higher good than being led, we might say coerced! If, say we were to take somebody to church and make them say and do the right liturgical things at the right time this would in itself have no value, because such convictions must come ‘from within’. Paternalism concerning inner convictions or life choices (as opposed to pragmatic issues such as the wearing of seatbelts in cars) defeats the very thing it sets out to achieve!

But communitarians argue that paternalism is not what they are about. The centre of the debate is about an interpretation of the common good. On the one hand liberals argue that people are entitled to neutral concern from governments and all choices, so long as they do
not violate the rights of others, are equal. Communitarians suggest not that some choices are compulsory but that there is a weighting and that some choices are valued more highly than others in the public conception of the common good. This public, shared conception of ends defines the community’s way of life and thereby ranks some values above others. Kymlicka points out that there may be occasions when an individual has the right to veto a common decision, but observes that it is not clear or agreed what occasions these might be (cf. Kymlicka 1989 p77).

Now if the shared ranking constitutes a given for the communitarian, in contrast to the non-weighted equal choices offered the liberal, the question is why must the communitarian take these shared values as given? Michael Sandel offers a self-perception argument against the notion of the unencumbered self (Sandel 1982). Sandel says that if the self is unencumbered, then when we introspect we should perceive a pure self distinct or prior to a self with ends, aims, ambitions, desires and so on. He says that since we do not in fact perceive this pure self then the self is in part constituted by the givens of my community. These givens are inescapable. Kymlicka suggests that this argument is misleading since the liberal does not deny that the self cannot be separated from its ends, but that the ends which I currently have could be different. In other words although the self must have ends, it could have any set as opposed to a particular given set (cf Kymlicka 1990 p212). Sandel must argue, not that the self cannot be separated from its ends, but the self cannot be separated from given ends. This is an argument about the very nature of the self, which will be postponed.

Although in depth consideration of the self has been postponed, there are other social and political aspects of communitarianism to be attended to. Taylor presents a social thesis, which asserts that even if the liberals were right about choice, they emphasise it so much that they ignore the very conditions for making that choice possible. Taylor’s social thesis has two elements: conceptual arguments and empirical arguments. Taylor’s conceptual argument is that if the ability to exercise choice requires a certain kind of society, then the society has already been put above the individuals and communitarianism is endorsed. Kymlicka expresses it: “It would be incoherent to put the rights of individuals above the good of creating a society where those rights can be exercised” (Kymlicka 1989 p78).

Kymlicka seems to advance the counter-argument by suggesting that proposing constraints so that people are able to choose is distinct from requiring a community to pursue a shared ideal. He says, “there’s nothing incoherent in saying that the common good for liberals is to bring about a society governed by a politics of neutral concern” (ibid.). But this is precisely Taylor’s point: it is incoherent in that it is self-contradicting!
Taylor also puts forward an empirical argument in favour of the social thesis. If the ability to exercise free choices depends on having a particular kind of liberal society, which it does, then the proponents of liberalism have an obligation to protect that kind of society and to oppose those things that threaten it. Liberals must maintain a culture which enables free choice. Now of course liberals such as Dworkin and Rawls agree with Taylor but there is an empirical difference in that the liberals appear to think such a culture is self-sustaining whilst Taylor seems to suggest that such a culture is in danger of collapse.

For the liberal the requirements of justice ensure that a culture of choice is maintained and in cases of conflict the justice considerations take precedence over or trump the implementation of the common good. In Taylor’s view, the increased centralisation of government and the increase in political bureaucracy, threaten the culture that liberals require and the notion that it is self-sustaining is socially naïve. Now Kymlicka characterises Taylor as having saddled the liberal position with “a lot of extraneous baggage” (Kymlicka 1989 p84) and having proposed a counter-position which need not be communitarian. Historical and political judgements are required here but these raise complex empirical issues which take us a long way from classroom education, and so having noted the problems we move on.

A central issue that does concern us is the communitarian attitude towards minority groups. The communitarians are strangely silent on the shared ends and practices that we can all endorse. What is the communal ranking of values? And how can the continued marginalization, if not discrimination against “blacks, gays, single mothers, non-Christians” (ibid. p87) in certain parts of America be explained and defended? This is a real issue for communitarians, although liberals have to face it too. It is arguable that the pursuit of a liberal economy and cut-backs in the welfare state have themselves contributed to the lack of appropriate care for minority groups.

Kymlicka cites McDonald (1987) who advances a defence of communitarianism against this charge. He (McDonald) reiterates that our personal identity is inseparable from the community to which we belong; our very selves are historical, social and cultural products. He also quotes Kant to the effect that we all have a duty to respect others, and a part of that respect for others is a respect for the community from which they derive all or part of their identity. Minority rights are an extension of what it is to treat individuals as persons. But for communitarians not all minorities are necessarily to be tolerated; under what circumstances are minority rights to be respected? McDonald answers that minorities which partake of a form of life are to be acceptable. But what constitutes a form of life here? McDonald
supplies two criteria: firstly a form of life is found, discovered or given as opposed to chosen or created. Additionally forms of life are characterised by shared projects, ends and general conceptions of the good life (cf. Kymlicka 1989 p238).

Kymlicka goes on to suggest that this is really no help and cites the example of two French-Canadians who share a certain inherited cultural identity, but whose life plans are totally different. Exercising personal choice in matters of religious conviction, sexuality, professional conduct and so on need not entail abandoning a particular French-Canadian cultural identity (ibid. 1989 p239). However equally it may, and one may want to dissociate from one’s inherited form of life. Kymlicka’s riposte seems to me to miss the point. It says nothing specifically about the rights (or otherwise) of minority groups and fails to show the precise fault with McDonald’s position. To put this another way: if Kymlicka’s riposte is to be successful then he must show that McDonald’s distinction between forms of life that we are given (or that we discover), and those that we choose is not coherent or does not do the ‘work’ it is supposed to do. This difficulty is not unrelated to the difficulty we have already considered: that of individuating forms of life.

This difficulty is compounded in that we do not simply belong (or not belong) to one community only, but we belong to many overlapping communities: family, village, workplace community, professional association or trade union, sports’ club not to mention nation, state or country. In the light of this I might consider myself as a marginalized minority on one level, but the centre of community life at another. For example I might be the centre of attention and fully part of the professional body to which I belong, but I may be a marginalised, misunderstood and perhaps even discriminated-against member of the village where I live.

Henry Tam talks of inclusive communities which are characterised by all citizens being included in decision making processes. There is to be no hijacking of such processes by authority. “Inclusive communities are to be distinguished from other forms of community by their operative power relations, which enable all their members to participate in collective processes affecting their lives” (Tam p8). He goes on to say that from a communitarian perspective, changes need to be made so that citizens can develop in order to participate in these processes at every level of society. “Such developments must involve changes to the way citizens are educated, engaged in productive work for their communities, and enabled to protect themselves from the threats to their common values” (ibid.).
Tam envisages a hierarchy of threats: to life, physical damages, psychological damages, economic deprivations and cultural deprivations. He suggests that there is a broad consensus here but acknowledges that there are also areas of disagreement, which are “far from being settled” (ibid. p118). He discusses abortion, euthanasia, and drug use and suggests that “In the absence of any general agreement on the basic principles involved the only thing we can agree on in practice would be to guard against any single faction dictating to the others about what is to be done. However, a call for compromise is not to be interpreted as a signal for quasi-market negotiations that inevitably favour those in a stronger bargaining position” (ibid.).

This concession is a difficult one, and raises more questions about the place of minorities or more precisely the toleration of minorities than it solves. For the possibility of compromise seems to offer the possibility of a minority group pursuing its ends against the wishes of the majority, on the grounds of there being no universal agreement. Issues surrounding abortion seem particularly apt here, but also pertinent questions could be asked about the degree of toleration of euthanasia, animal experimentation or recreational drug use. Tam admits the communitarian approach is not always clear cut in such cases (p120), but then a slide towards liberalism, which seems to undermine the communitarian position, seems a real possibility.

Taylor is perhaps more radical and wants to include the communal sharing of qualities that are not necessarily found or discovered, but are part of the groups conception of the common good. Taylor makes no appeal to the right of individuals, but appeals to the fundamental right of the community. Extending his position concerning the essentially dialogic nature of human interaction, and illustrating how an interaction can be more than the sum of individual parts he says: “One could never describe what it is to be on an intimate footing with someone in terms of monological states. On a transpersonal, institutional level, the same difference can play an important role” (Taylor 1989a p168). Kymlicka characterises the position: “Special protection of the historical community, including the shared choices of its members, may not be justified on the grounds of treating individuals as equals. But there is some independent claim by the community itself to equal treatment” (Kymlicka 1989 p241).

Now Kymlicka regards this position as incoherent for he says: “Groups have no moral claim to well being independently of their members, groups just aren’t the right sort of beings to have moral status. They don’t feel pain or pleasure. It is individual sentient beings whose lives go better or worse, who suffer or flourish” (ibid. p242). But again this seems to beg the
question, for surely the heart of the communitarian claim is that communities can suffer or flourish, and can rejoice or mourn* qua community?*

There is a final and important point which Taylor makes in his essay “Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate” to which we must now turn. Taylor says much of the communitarian-liberal debate is at cross-purposes because there are two fundamental communitarian theses which are not properly distinguished. Taylor identifies an ontological issue and an advocacy issue. The ontological issue concerns “what you recognise as the factors you will invoke to account for social life” (Taylor 1989a p159). Taylor characterises this as a debate between atomists and holists: those who believe communal identity is accounted for in terms of individual identities, and those who believe individuals are formed by their communities. And of course there are shades in between.

The advocacy issue is the moral issue and again is a continuum between those who give primacy to individual rights and those who give primacy to the community. Taylor characterises these positions as individualist and collectivist, and again recognises shades in between.

Taylor’s point is that whilst these issues are not unrelated the adoption of a particular ontological stance does not logically commit one to a particular advocacy stance. Taylor identifies atomist individualists (Nozick), holist collectivists (Marx), holist individualists (Humboldt) and atomist collectivists although he says these are only “for the student of the bizarre or the monstrous” (ibid. p163). Taylor suggests conflation of these two categories is the source of much muddled thinking. In particular he characterises Sandel’s position in *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* as an ontological one, but suggests that the liberal response to it has “generally been as a work of advocacy” (ibid. p160). Sandel’s thesis of the situated self does not logically commit him to advocacy of anything! Taylor emphasises that we must be aware of the multi-faceted nature of the communitarian-liberal debate and with this in mind we turn to consider some of the implications of communitarianism for education and our concept of frameworks.

Tam devotes a whole chapter of his book to education, and begins by saying the aim of education is to enable citizens to participate fully in inclusive communities. He underlines that education is not to be seen as the function of schools and colleges only, but is the responsibility of research institutions, the media and parents too. Tam notes the increased crime rates in the USA and stresses the importance of values in education but is quick to point out that these cannot be imposed by authority.
The communitarian seeks co-operative solutions to problems based on values of love, wisdom, justice and fulfilment which he considers in turn. Tam says that instead of adopting a neutral policy that excludes intolerance teachers must genuinely care for their pupils, they must communicate the importance of love and compassion and must have special regard for those pupils deprived of love. They must fight against those “false values” (Tam p60) that undermine loving relationships: that is discrimination based on sex, religion, race etc.

A commitment to wisdom rules out irrationality and indoctrination but also underlines that knowledge is not just the assimilation of raw facts. Pupils’ knowledge must be coherently organised, or as Tam puts it: pupils must be introduced to the “epistemological reality that knowledge is embedded in discursive communities” (ibid. p64). All claims to knowledge are to be validated and when appropriate modified, in a spirit of co-operative enquiry, he says. On the face of it this is not dissimilar to a Hirstian-type claim about forms of knowledge but whereas Hirst would see the ‘discursive embedding’ as a logical function of the subject matter itself (its internal grammar etc.), Tam sees this embedding more in terms of real communities. Putting words in to Tam’s mouth perhaps, but I would imagine that a distinction between discursive communities and real communities would be one Tam would hesitate to draw.

Justice is to be based on a spirit of “imagined reciprocity” (p61) where a pupil is to be taught to consider how he would feel as a recipient of a proposed action or omission. The notion of discipline is first and foremost a notion of self-discipline or self-mastery, based on a principle of fairness not fear. Tam acknowledges the possibility of dissension within the community here, but contrasts the Rawlsian notion of abstracted agents behind a veil of ignorance, with communitarians whose “inclusive community would rely on citizens with a deep appreciation of their common values, [and] to consider together and choose the principles with which they could live” (ibid.).

Finally, the increased prevalence of boredom is to be countered by the teaching of how fulfilment is to be sought. Pupils are to be inspired by exemplary teachers both in their academic studies and in other ‘non-academic’ activities. In all things the teacher is to guide, not to impose authority, and there is to be a shared search for the truth which is not allowed to collapse in to the assumption that everything can be challenged.

Tam is realistic about some of the practical problems involved in his suggestions and acknowledges the need for smaller class sizes, he suggests teachers need more thorough
teacher training, and suggest teachers' status and salaries should be brought in line with those of doctors and lawyers. However there is no adequate explanation of how co-operative enquiry is to overcome the deep and profound disagreements that are found in modern society, both inside and outside the classroom. At the beginning of MacIntyre's *After Virtue* the seeming intractability of some contemporary moral dilemmas is discussed, and it almost seems as if Tam was not aware of this or perhaps finds it more convenient to ignore it? Similarly it is in the very nature of teenagers to disagree with one another and it is often the case that when co-operative enquiry fails, a decision must be made by someone with appropriate authority. Now it may be countered that this is a reflection of the kind of society we currently live in, and when communitarianism is more widely understood and practised this would not occur, but it seems the burden of proof here lies with the communitarians and has not been adequately met.

Tam goes on to stress the importance of the role of parents in education. Parenting is a responsibility which citizens must undertake, and must be helped to undertake, and issues surrounding traditional and single-parent families are discussed, but the well being of children is to be the paramount concern. There is to be recognition that the community may curtail the private rights of parents and in particular parents are not to teach their children values which are opposed to the values of the community.

Finally, we should note that Tam distinguishes between guiding values and comprehensive values. Guiding values are central to inclusive communities but do not prescribe behaviour in every situation, they offer more general norms. Comprehensive values by contrast purport to cover every situation. Tam says that a school "dominated by a set of comprehensive guidelines would suffocate intellectual and cultural diversity" (ibid. p77), but he also recognises that there is a continuous scale here. Indeed he suggests that the guiding values might be thickened in the interests of Islamic, Hindu, Catholic, (etc.) traditions and communities. Schools should be able to encourage their respective pupils in a faith or tradition so long as this does not undermine social cohesion through depriving them of a common core of guiding values (cf. Tam p78).

Little has been said so far of frameworks, but undoubtedly Tam is proposing a framework here and indeed he uses the word himself. Citizens are to "use their own initiative in a framework that best guarantees the realisation of the good for all" (ibid. p59). The core guiding values possibly supplemented by additional traditional or religious values pursued in a spirit of non-authoritarian co-operative enquiry is the framework that Tam proposes.
Some similar points are made in the recent collection: *Education for Values* edited by Roy Gardner and co. Robert Fisher (chapter 4) says communities should give a voice to all individuals and permit them to vote in accord with democratic principles. Critical reasoning not convention should be the arbiter of moral judgement and the community should be organic in the sense that its procedures and values should be open to adaptation (cf. Gardner p54). He goes on to characterise a community of enquiry which additionally has shared experiences, meanings and voluntary communications (Gardner p55) and this is seen this as a paradigm for the classroom.

Fisher too, challenges the idea that learners are “solo learners who do most of the intellectual work of learning inside their own heads” (ibid. p56) and emphasises the social, physical and symbolic aspects of cognition. Teachers are to manage and exercise executive control over group learning, which sounds a fine ideal until we read that “children and their teacher sit in a circle” (ibid. p57)! This immediately suggests to me a gap in understanding, a gap which fails to recognise a distinction between a discussion of an ideal community of enquiry and a real classroom situation. Serious models of community learning need not entail sitting in a circle!

There are issues surrounding both what pupils can actually discover for themselves and what they need to be taught (told!) by a better informed person. This of course raises questions about the very nature of education itself. Additionally there are questions of group discipline, which the ideal model fails to address. Real children get bored easily, have their own selfish agendas and are at times deliberately and purposefully disruptive and malicious. An appeal to co-operative enquiry, or group discussion on such occasion would in my view be inappropriate and very likely impossible. If a group spent prolonged periods of time (which it well might) discussing internal discipline issues, would it ever get to the substantive core of the enquiry?

John Annette (chapter 8) discusses citizenship studies and community in the light of recent political change and with reference to a large body of reports, recommendations and other written materials. In particular he points on the one hand to research that shows there is a significant proportion of secondary teachers who feel uncomfortable with citizenship education as it is value-laden and inappropriate for the multicultural classroom. On the other hand he points out that Nick Tate as chief executive of QCA has urged that British values be a central part of citizenship education (see ibid. p112).
Apart from the obvious difficulties of ‘British values’ Annette suggests that it is crucial to clarify how “education for citizenship can recognise difference while providing a framework for a shared political identity based on historical tradition and contemporary social and political reality” (ibid.). He does not offer a clarification but emphasises that this is the central challenge.

Michael Totterdell (chapter 9) discusses ethical frameworks in the context of the professional preparation and formation of teachers. Whilst this is not our direct concern his remarks about frameworks in education generally are illuminating, and provide insights as to what a framework is. He suggests that the moral role of teachers is increasing, and in the light of this he suggests teachers need to be adequately trained and prepared. He says: “if teaching is to sustain its claim to professional status, it not only needs a professional structure, supported by a framework of national standards but also a professional ethic, based on a sense of collective responsibility” (Gardner p129).

Acknowledging MacIntyre, Totterdell says a key role of ethics is to help individuals pursue their telos “that is, the ‘good life’ of human flourishing in community” (ibid. p133). The community is an essential part of Totterdell’s understanding here and relates to his understanding of persons whose identity is constituted through relations with others. In virtue of being a teacher the teacher teaches something to somebody. There is an inescapable dialogic aspect to the very identity of one who teaches and right behaviour for the teacher is therefore right behaviour qua teacher. Being good is to be understood as being good in one’s role, that is teachers’ professional practices and their actions as moral agents are inseparable. Having said this Totterdell rules out any “attempt to assert ethical proprietary rights over teachers-in-the-making” (p137) and describes approaches “that provide little moral sustenance” as “unsatisfactory” (ibid.) and he reasserts that “Notions of competence….need to be re-appropriated within a framework which gives more space for the exploration of educational values underlying ‘good’ practice and encourages a morally serious conversation about the insights and aspirations of education” (ibid. p138).

To summarise all of this I want to make three points. Firstly I want to acknowledge the difficulty in individuating communities and I recognise that we simultaneously belong to several which are not necessarily disjoint. However each community to which we do belong is one in which (as Tam says) we all have a say, but within the context of the values of the community. There is both a dynamic and dialogic exchange and an acceptance of common values.
Secondly I embrace Taylor’s argument and accept that morals and values are not just an individual concern. This is true both in the genesis of values; the set of values that a person comes to hold is in part determined by the community to which they belong. And also, and perhaps more significantly the values an individual holds cannot be divorced from the community to which they belong. To repeat Taylor’s remark, “being a self is inescapable from living in a space of moral issues” (Taylor 1989b p112). The self can only choose in the context of the community to which it belongs.

Thirdly then, I think it follows from this that any attempt to teach values must recognise and indeed explicate this connection between the values that an individual holds and his or her community. I think an inescapable part of values education must be an understanding of the extent to which community shapes and contains our moral life and the life of values more generally. To put this in my terminology, the shared values of a community will and must permeate any values education framework. A framework must have a component based on community and this communal component must be recognised and integrated with the other two. It is to the details of this overall picture that we now turn.
V Frameworks for Values Education

The concept of framework can and has been used in a variety of different ways. It is therefore worth reiterating that the kind of framework that is to be established here is a framework for teaching values in schools. It is to be expected that there would be certain moral and perhaps theological norms at the heart of such a framework, but the preceding discussion indicates that a framework for teaching values would and must be much richer than this. Firstly the framework would include a common language and a shared form of life to underpin it. Secondly the framework would embody certain “epistemic machinery”: a commitment to a certain understanding of truth and rationality, ways of arguing and procedures for establishing validity and veracity. This machinery could not be simply invented or devised, but is historically rooted in tradition and embodies certain recognised practices and narrative patterns. Thirdly, a framework is not only rooted in a historical tradition but is also shared or communal. It is both established by and definitive of the community and as such shapes and forms individuals within it. A framework for teaching values is therefore not just about the values themselves although these are not unimportant, but is a more comprehensive commitment to ways of living.

A number of positions have been considered which distance themselves from various forms of individualism expressed succinctly in Herder’s phrase that every man is his own measure and reified in the classroom by an approach to teaching that aims to present pupils with the relevant ‘facts’ concerning moral and value questions and encourages them to choose their stance. This approach to teaching seems to bend over backwards to avoid the charge of indoctrination, emphasises personal autonomy as the *summum bonum*, and aims to encourage each pupil to create his or her own framework, or what we might characterise as a framework-for-one. It should already be clear that I do not consider such a framework to be a genuine framework for it does not pay sufficient heed to the place of tradition in society; education as the teaching of shared practices. Nor does a framework-for-one accommodate our essential dialogic nature and the role of the individual in a community. However the framework-for-one does play a useful and instructive role if considered as one extreme or endpoint of a sliding scale.

At the other end of this sliding scale would be some kind of universal framework, a framework that everybody would agree to and in this context John White’s discussion of cosmic frameworks and the SCAA recommendations on values is relevant. In his inaugural lecture as professor, White examines the notions of personal well-being, human flourishing and the idea of a framework. He asks whether “personal well-being needs to be understood
against some kind of cosmic framework” (White 1995 p7) and suggests that some kind of framework is required for values to have any existence or meaning at all. He also suggests that the work of writers such as MacIntyre, Taylor, Raz and Nussbaum point towards the concept of a framework as a backdrop to personal well-being.

He suggests three possible kinds of cosmic framework. Firstly, Christianity in which the will of God is seen as the source of a framework from which the notions of good and right are ultimately derived. Secondly, he suggests, some non-theistic Platonic form of the Good which somehow “irradiates our value-world” (ibid. p7), but suggests these theistic, supernatural or even natural frameworks carry an epistemological price tag which is too great; for neither can we know the will of God, nor, as he puts it, can we “interrogate nature” (ibid. p8) and make any relevant discovery. Thirdly he wonders if a cosmic framework is not to be found in human nature itself and suggests a framework which is innate, rooted in our very nature; “a product of our human world” (ibid.).

White is aware of the difficulties surrounding such cosmic frameworks, but he does also speak of social frameworks (note the plural). Social frameworks relate to one’s family, friends, political community and other social groups. However White hints that there must be something behind these if we are not to confront a world with “no apparent meaning or purpose” (p14). He suggests some thin cosmic framework must underpin a thicker social framework for everyday life.

In a similar way many who have the task of teaching values are aware of a profound uncertainty or even a void at the centre of what they are trying to do. It has been thought that schools might do a better job if there was a reliable source of values supported and agreed by society, and it was to this end that delegates at the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority’s meeting “Education for Adult Life” on 15 January 1996 recommended the creation of the National Forum for Values in Education and the Community. The initial consultation document states SCAA set up the Forum to make recommendations on: “ways in which schools might be supported in making their contribution to pupils’ spiritual, moral, social and cultural development” and “to what extent there is any agreement on the values attitudes and behaviour that schools should promote on society’s behalf” (SCAA 1996a).

The Forum consisted of 150 members nominated by a variety of groups with an interest in education, and from a broad cross-section of society. The members were divided in to ten groups which each met on three occasions. One of the outcomes of these meetings was the SCAA document Education for Adult Life: the spiritual and moral development of young
people published in July 1996. Whilst the Forum emphasised that there was no agreement about the source of values that we share, nor on how to apply the values that we share there was overwhelming support for a list of values that we do share and which form a framework for discussion. These values are listed under four headings: Society, Relationships, the Self and the Environment and include such things as respect for the dignity of all people, developing a sense of self-worth, preserving areas of beauty wherever possible etc. (Cf. SCAA 1996b pp3-4)

These finding were further endorsed by a MORI omnibus poll of 1500 adults, approximately 95% of whom agreed with the values outlined in the Forum’s statement. This consensus confirmed the view that there is a set of values to which we all agree, but we have to ask does this constitute a framework for teaching values in schools, for the Forum’s report was not without its critics.

Briefly these criticism were firstly that the values were obvious and couched in terms to avoid disagreement, to which Talbot and Tate reply, of course! (Talbot and Tate p3) Given the aim was to find a list of values to which all could agree this is hardly a surprise or a substantive criticism.

Secondly it has been said that so few people live up to these values that they are not our values, whatever the supposed consensus might be. This criticism misses the point that values are ideals, goals to strive for, and even when we fall short this does not itself invalidate our ideals or values. Thirdly, it is said that The Forum’s agreed list of values avoids areas of controversy and disagreement. It says nothing on how pupils should deal with moral conflict. Again supporters of the Forum’s report point out that the Forum’s remit was to decide if there are any values that we all share, not to solve the problems with which theologians and philosophers continue to wrestle! The agreed values are supposed to be a starting point, a set of agreed initial premises from which debate can develop.

Finally and continuing from the point above, the Forum recommended that SCAA produce guidance for schools on spiritual, moral, social and cultural education, but guidance that could be adapted by schools. The Forum’s list of agreed values is a starting point, to be adapted by schools as their own circumstances dictate and in consultation with the local community (cf. SCAA 1996b p16).

To summarise, in contrast to the notion of a framework-for-one there has been some discussion of universal frameworks for values education, but those who propose these are
insistent that these very general proposals must be instantiated locally. White underlines that
his cosmic frameworks underpin social frameworks, and SCAA’s list of agreed values is to
be a starting point for concrete school and community partnerships. Even given that a
framework for values education must occupy a point between the extremes of ‘social
extension’ we may still ask how exactly will this work? More detail is required to answer the
question of how a compromise position is to be found.

Something of a compromise position is recognised by the Norwegian Signe Sandsmark who
speaks of world view rather than framework. She says, “A world view would normally
include beliefs about the nature of reality, the existence of a god, the nature of man, life after
death and ethics” (Sandsmark 2000 p6). She adds religions are world views but have an
added dimension of worship.

She goes on to say that every person has a world view however fragmented or unconsciously
held; and that this has an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’. The outside is made of collective socio­
cultural and public elements, the inside personal and subjective, a product of experience and
emotion. She concludes, “A person’s world view is influenced by and depends on both
traditional world views and the society he or she is a part of; but there is also room for
personal variation and decision” (ibid.).

Before continuing it is necessary to distinguish Sandsmark’s world view from the kind of
framework I have in mind. Although I think there are many similarities it is important to note
in particular that Sandsmark seems to suggest that liberalism is, or could function as a world
view, although this is one she rejects. In contrast I do not think that liberalism can function
as an educational framework. The reason for this is tied up with Sandsmark’s view that we
all have a world view, individually as it were even if fragmented and unconsciously held;
whereas I think there is an essential “sharedness” about a framework. It must be held in
common as it is a product of common language and tradition. As an aside it is perhaps worth
noting that this point relates to a difference between a protestant Christianity which
emphasises the nature of each individual’s relationship with God and a more Catholic
approach which emphasises God’s universal salvific purpose and is latent within the
positions that both MacIntyre and Taylor adopt.

For the purposes of education I propose that each school should have its own framework
which should be loosely rooted within a wider world view. As the school is the principal
locus of most pupils’ formal educational experience it is a natural unit for such a framework.
I think an individual year group or class is too narrow a unit and would fail to recognise the
communal nature of the school as a whole. This nature is inherent in that pupils move from one part of the school to another over time, and that special or solemn occasions are usually celebrated by whole school gatherings: e.g. end of term services or assemblies, prize giving, sports day etc.. I also think that a geographical region or LEA would be too large a unit, as there need to be different kinds of school in a given locality to reflect and enhance the plurality of society itself. When I say that each school should have its own framework this need not entail that each school have its own unique framework. This could be the case, but much more likely is that similar schools would adopt similar frameworks as best suit their educational aims and ethos. It may well be that the number of distinct frameworks is quite small or that there may be a number of variations clustered around a handful of ‘core’ frameworks.

Michael Smith seems to endorse a similar point when he writes of schools as communities and says: “Each [school] has its own moral practice, and although there may be ‘familial’ overlaps between schools as regards their moral practice or their ‘prevailing winds’, it is nevertheless a defining feature of individual schools that they have their own customs and professional practices derived from their moral practice, which distinguish them from other schools” (Smith 1999 p324). He goes on to say, “each school community provides a non-prescriptive framework in which professional reflection, choice and action can take place” (ibid.).

The question is what will be included and what will be excluded from each framework? In Sandsmark’s terms what will constitute the outside, the given of the framework and what will constitute the inside, the open-ended element where a degree of personal choice is to be encouraged? I think that this is a question which can largely be answered by reference to language, tradition and community. That is to say considerations of language, tradition and community are ways of understanding or explaining what a framework for values education must be like. They are the lenses through which the framework comes into focus. It is true that there are problems individuating languages, traditions and communities but I would suggest that these are perhaps more akin to family resemblance terms rather than precise categories, and are not irredeemably obscure. Remember Peters’ aim of illuminating concepts and links between them, even when precise definitions are elusive.

I think education generally and values education in particular should take place in a language that all the pupils understand; a language that they all share and with the exception of multilingual or very able pupils this would normally be their mother tongue. It is worth noting that many foreign countries have English schools. These are sometimes international.
schools where English is the *lingua franca* or most commonly spoken language, but there are also English schools for English pupils abroad in many places. Why are there so few if any foreign language schools in Britain for students whose principal language is not English? I would be happy to see Arabic (language) schools for Arabs and Muslims, Indian (language) schools for Indians and so on. I would insist that the study of English was a principal component of the curriculum and I would encourage social integration outside school but I do not see why this could not be done in the medium of the mother tongue.

Although mundane - the reason behind this suggestion is practical in part – surely pupils will be hindered in their learning if they do not adequately understand the language in which they are being taught. However the question of language goes deeper and Cardinal Martini has observed that “it is nonetheless evident that the names of things do have importance because a name is not an arbitrary thing but rather the product of an act of intelligence and comprehension that, when shared with someone else, brings the recognition, however theoretical of shared values” (Eco ands Martini p29). A pupil has to be sufficiently competent in a language (relative to his or her age) for this intelligence and comprehension to be possible.

John Rae also underlines that I am only able to be tolerant towards another’s position when I am secure in my own, and to be secure in my position I must understand it and be able to articulate it. Tolerance is not passive acquiescence but is active and based on understanding. And recall from Wittgenstein, understanding is not some private, inner state but is manifest in the ability to enter into and continue dialogue; to be a fluent user of a language (cf. Rae p 8).

Therefore I think we may say that a framework presupposes a common language, or more technically a shared language is a necessary component of a values education framework. In the light of chapter two above, it hardly needs repeating that when we talk of sharing a language there is more to it than sharing a vocabulary although this is important! There is an implicit background to language that we share, and as we saw above playing a language game presupposes a form of life. This form of life is in part epistemological, like Sandsmark’s world view, it consists of things that we believe and possibly the way in which we organise those beliefs but there is more to it than that. It also consists of the things that we do and the way that we do them. Wittgenstein tells us that language is embedded in communal activity and George Vesey’s example (considered above) which points to a link between the concept of land ownership and patterns of grazing, emphasises this
embeddedness. I am suggesting that a shared language and a shared form of life go hand in hand and that our attempts to teach values must accommodate this.

It may be countered that my assertion is simply not true. There are many millions who speak English for example, as a second language and do not share a form of life. Similarly it may be said that many Europeans do share a form of life but do not share a language. We can imagine groups of people in France and groups in England who are alike in almost every way (who share a form of life) but speak different languages. What then is the significance of language? The answer lies, I think, in the fact that we are speaking of education. We are not talking here of reflective multilingual adults, but of children, and children in an educational setting where language, forms of life and abstract concepts are introduced, nurtured and developed. In this educational context language has a heightened role, and although it is perhaps more of a psychological than a philosophical point I think the use of a shared language is inextricably connected to a shared form of life and a conceptual development that goes with it.

Further, I want to say that a form of life is to a large extent constituted by shared practices and the resonance of this term is wholly intentional but needs to be further examined. Recall that in MacIntyre’s analysis a practice is a goal directed human activity, which is given its sense by being part of a narrative. Furthermore the practice has internal goods which are realised in the pursuit of the practice.

For example, imagine I am teaching young children the importance of telling the truth, and perhaps I tell a suitable fable in which a person who lies come to a sticky end. This lesson is in one sense an end in itself, it has an internal good, namely the teaching of truth telling. But this is not coherent unless there is some wider teaching agenda and some attempt to show how truth telling is connected with the prohibition on stealing, with notions of fidelity in relationships and with concepts of justice generally. In MacIntyrean terms the practice of truth telling must be located within a wider narrative. The individual lesson on truth telling must be part of a wider framework. Hence a further clue to what a framework must be, is afforded by a re-examination of MacIntyre’s notion of narrative.

From his consideration of Homeric and Icelandic epics, MacIntyre suggests that the epic narrative has a threefold structure. Firstly the individual has or inhabits a social role. Secondly, there is a conception of the qualities or virtues that the individual requires to fulfil this role and thirdly there is a notion of the fragility and vulnerability of the human condition and its ultimate end in death. These three elements cannot be properly understood without
the other two and MacIntyre writes, “all three elements can find their interrelated place only within a larger unitary framework…. The framework is the narrative form of epic or saga” (MacIntyre 1981 p129).

In other words individual actions only make sense within a wider setting. This setting has temporal and teleological elements; the order and the reasons for which I do things is important, and MacIntyre calls this a narrative. Indeed without a narrative my actions are rendered senseless. Not only does the narrative give my actions sense, but also it provides a coherence for my very identity. MacIntyre is critical of both empiricist and analytic philosophers’ attempts to define personal identity in terms of psychological states or events, as they both “fail to see that a background has been omitted” (ibid. p217). To put it another way I am not principally a chooser, shaping my own destiny as emphasised by liberalism, but I am a discoverer and in searching for what I might or ought to do I enter a narrative quest. I am both the subject of my own life-to-death narrative and a player in a wider narrative (just as others are players in my narrative) and I am both accountable for, and able to ask for account of, actions.

What this means for education is that teaching values is not just about teaching individual lessons but is also about teaching pupils about the intelligibility of life, which derives from locating themselves within a personal and social narrative. My pupil, if he is to behave coherently, cannot do just as he likes but is (morally) constrained by the narratives of which he is a part. Hence my values education framework must recognise and reflect the narrative nature of the self. It must be a structure enabling a pupil to be taught that he has a position and a role within society, from which his identity and the intelligibility of his actions are derived. But this personal narrative itself is not free-floating: it derives its status from historical precedent and other members of society; from tradition and community.

Much has already been said about tradition but recall that a tradition underpins a personal narrative, it is the historical and social context into which the individual is born and which is handed on to him. MacIntyre does not see this as a fixed canon, an immutable constitution, but as an evolving entity. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, MacIntyre insists that the meaning of concepts and the notion of rationality itself is only coherent within a particular tradition and he gives examples of those who are debarred from debate because they do not share in the relevant tradition. (Thrasymachus is silent throughout nine books of the Republic! (MacIntyre 1988 p75)) Mulhall and Swift express it “A tradition is constituted by a set of practices and is a mode of understanding their importance and worth; it is the medium by which practices are shaped and transmitted across generations. Traditions can be
primarily religious or moral (for example Catholicism or humanism), economic (for example a particular craft or profession, trade union or manufacturer), aesthetic (for example modes of literature or painting), or geographical (for example crystallising around the particular culture of a house, village or region)” (Mulhall and Swift p90).

A part of values education then, must be a recognition that our values are located within a tradition which has formed them. Even if the tradition is not fully defined and articulated, the role of historical development needs to be recognised and studied, in order that we better understand our beliefs and our practices. It is worth emphasising the historical dimension here and underlining that if a pupil is to understand his values, his beliefs and practices then he needs some historical context. Not a full-blooded study of the history of values necessarily, but some notion of where his values came from. It is worth noting that firstly this is not to suggest that historical study or context is all that matters, because then any set of values with a history would do! The influence of the community and its response to this history is relevant too. Secondly it is important to note that the emphasis on historical awareness is at odds with SCAA suggestions and some forms of liberalism, which emphasise a foundation based upon a presently existing consensus rather than historical development. The notion of a tradition as an underpinning of any values system suggests to me that history cannot be simply ignored.

However, this does not suggest and need not entail a slavish devotion to continuity for discontinuity, evolution and even revolution within traditions are to be recognised too. This is a point that MacIntyre makes, and in a diverse and multi-cultural setting it is obvious that a pupil’s values education is not the only thing that will influence him. The persuasiveness of other influences may encourage him to develop or even abandon his ‘home’ tradition. It may be conceded that the more culturally isolated a tradition is the less likely this will be, but there are few if any completely isolated traditions these days and so powerful or not, the impetus for development and change will be present.

To summarise the argument so far: we have said that a shared language is a necessary component of a values education framework. We have gone on to suggest that for children in an educational context a shared language goes hand in hand with a shared form of life and that this is constituted by shared practices which are only intelligible in that they are a part of a human narrative. This narrative itself is part of a broader historically constituted tradition and therefore tradition is a second necessary component of a values education framework. In other words when we teach values we must recognise and indeed explicate to pupils that we cannot choose any old values, or the ones we would like, but are necessarily constrained by
historical and cultural forces. In some ways the point is clearer when expressed negatively: a failure to recognise the place of tradition and the effect that it has, will lead to disconnected human narratives, meaningless practices and hence, confusion about values.

As mentioned above MacIntyre in *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* does give a model of how this might work in the university setting. Each university would have its own agreed standards of morality and standards of rational agreement to which its students would be expected to adhere. There would be a fundamental homogeneity based upon a consensus and a shared tradition. The role of the university would then be to pursue studies and develop ideas within its own tradition and to challenge and respond to those of other traditions.

Can we imagine a school system like this? We might have a number of Christian schools representing different Christian denominations, Islamic, Jewish and Hindu schools; perhaps politically orientated schools, Conservative, Marxist, green; and a more wide spread distribution of schools specialising in music, sport, ballet and the like. It is easy to imagine possible networks of such schools serving different geographical areas, and parents and pupils choosing the particular school they like the most, or they feel is most appropriate. We can, I suggest, imagine this all too easily and at the same time we recoil from the idea perhaps even with horror. We must ask why is this, but also, we must consider can this imagined school system be legitimately inferred from MacIntyre's remarks about universities which are by no means fully developed?

Firstly, we feel uncomfortable with the idea of a child choosing so narrowly at an early age. We do not want dogmatic theologians, fanatical politicians, or sports superstars who have no other interests. We want broadly and roundly educated pupils. But not only do we want roundly educated pupils, the very exclusivity implied by such choice raises a number of practical if not political difficulties. Surely it would be better to pursue a broad curriculum which allowed natural talent to emerge. There may be a place for specially focussed academies but these will surely be the exception rather than the norm.

Secondly if our system is motivated by considerations of tradition it becomes crucial to know what exactly constitutes a tradition and how they are to be individuated. For example it is not clear that Catholicism, green politics and cricket playing (say) represent different traditions for we can readily imagine a Catholic, green cricket player. It may be here, that the choice of categories is fortuitous for it is much harder to imagine a Catholic Marxist or a Quaker at a military academy! This makes me think that traditions are to be understood as more broadly demarcated than the multiplicity of school-types above might suggest. A
tradition is a broad thing and can accommodate much variety. Having said this, at the same time it must be recognised that there are certain differences that cannot be accommodated within a single tradition and fundamental disagreements do exist.

Further light is shed on this by consideration of a point made by Horton and Mendus who question the coherence of Maclntyre’s position and describe him as “interestingly Janus-faced” (Horton and Mendus p13). They argue that on the one hand MacIntyre recognises a number of rival traditions with a rightful claim to pursue serious study, which are to politely and seriously interact with one another. And on the other hand he strongly rejects a basic liberalism and points to the exercise of authority within traditions, the need to safeguard traditions and the exclusion of those who do not agree with the tenets of the tradition.

I think it has to be said here that the multiplicity of traditions which Horton and Mendus imagine is much wider than that which MacIntyre has in mind. Liberalism suggests a wide diversity of positions and Horton and Mendus interpret this as a wide diversity of traditions or stemming from a wide diversity of traditions. When MacIntyre talks of different traditions he only seems to have a handful in mind, although the difficulty of how many traditions there are and how we distinguish between them remains. MacIntyre speaks of Homeric, Aristotelian, Augustinian and later Thomist traditions, which observe, are not temporally coexistent, and two or possibly three are all we could imagine in a particular locality. He also talks of the “Scottish tradition” (MacIntyre 1988 p326) but again it does not make sense to talk of a multiplicity of national traditions all present in one place.

Further MacIntyre suggests that the relationships between individuals and traditions are various; ranging from unproblematic allegiance, to opposition which may extend as far as attempting to amend the tradition. Additionally there is a strong sense that we do not choose a tradition (at least not initially) as the liberals would seem to have it, but find ourselves in one, inhabiting one and although we may subsequently undergo conversion that is a separate matter. In so far as education implies an initial formation, it is within a given tradition although we might subsequently move from one tradition for another.

What is important here for education is the idea of commensurability. We can ignore the debate about whether commensurability is coextensive with tradition, as Maclntyre seems to maintain or whether commensurability is more fundamental as Mason suggests and simply say that the requirement of tradition in a framework for values education is that the values we teach must be internally commensurable. This means that they are all derived from a basic set of premises to which all agree. There may be conclusions drawn from these
premises which are not universally accepted but this is legitimate diversity within the
tradition. Rationality and fundamental premises are not disputed. There is space here for
pupils to question received values, to learn through the exploration and even creation of
values but crucially the search for truth does not entail that everything may be questioned
and challenged.

The tradition component of a framework for values education is the requirement that there
are certain basic premises, and certain modes of reasoning which are historically and
culturally produced and which are not open to question. In order that values education be a
coherent and worthwhile endeavour pupils should be educated alongside those who share the
same base premises and an agreed mode of reasoning. I suggest those who do not share base
premises and modes of reasoning would be better served by a separate programme of values
education.

At this stage it would perhaps be appropriate to consider some real examples of sets of base
premises or consider different modes of reasoning, but if these practical queries can be left
aside at present there is another theoretical issue to be examined. This arises since the
requirement of tradition has an inherent vagueness that needs further examination. Suppose
two people or two groups of people, call them A and B, have a shared rationality and each
has a set of base premises. Suppose further that 80% of B’s base premises are identical to
80% A’s base premises but 20% differ. Are these the same tradition and are they to have a
common values education or is separate provision required? And what if the 80:20 ratio
changes? And what if we have a groups A, B, C, D etc. who each have sets of overlapping
but non-identical base premises, what happens then? Must there be a great multiplicity of
values education programmes, or can there be a common programme or a small number of
programmes?

There seem to be two possible ways of approaching this set of difficulties. The first is to
deny that these all these varying groups could actually exist. We might say that tradition is so
pervasive and the number of sets of base premises is so small that there are very few
different groups. These groups should have separate values education provision, but as they
are only a handful this is not a problem. This is something of a MacIntyrean answer, as he
frequently seems to infer that there are fewer separate traditions than many of his critics
would seem to want to foist upon him.

This is a difficult corner to argue convincingly, and it is not the approach that I wish to
adopt. I want to say that those who have wildly different base premises should have separate
values education but that in the main individuals or groups who have broadly similar sets of base premises will benefit from a common values education programme. The difficulty of fully articulating sets of base premises remains but again I think sufficient difference may be recognised so that traditions may be distinguished in schools.

However there is a further consideration to be made because in addition to the constraints of tradition there are constraints of community. From what has been said so far it may seem that MacIntyre’s analysis of tradition is wholly backward-looking, but this is not really the case as there is a strong forward-looking, teleological or purposive element to his analysis too. Recall that the individual has a telos; a purpose, a social function, a role within society. Admittedly this was perhaps more overt in ancient societies than it is now and Maclntyre’s discussion centres on the social structure of the polis, but he also urges that this truth has not been superseded. There may have been an element of a crude determinism in the ancient world but it remains true that human identity can only be understood in relation to a particular society.

Taylor too is most insistent about this point, and argues as we have seen, that one’s orientation to the good and one’s reason are only intelligible within a community. This is because human life is essentially dialogic. It is inextricably embedded or enmeshed with those around us and it is dialogue that gives a background of intelligibility. It is true that we each belong to a number of communities, but nevertheless these are not all of equal importance and some measure of priority is certainly plausible. Further, just as MacIntyre recognises that there are differing relationships between individuals and their traditions, Taylor recognises that there are degrees in the bond between an individual and his community, but he suggests that ultimately that bond is ineradicable. He offers the following example which though long is worth quoting in full.

“The householder, who sees the meaning of life in the rich joys of family love, in the concerns of providing and caring for wife and children, may feel that he is far from appreciating these joys at their full or from giving himself to these concerns unstintingly. But he senses that his ultimate allegiance is there, that against those who decry or condemn family life or who look on it as a pusillanimous second best, he is deeply committed to building over time a web of relationships which gives fullness and meaning to human life. His direction is set” (Taylor 1989b p46).

In chapter four we saw how this philosophical position locating the self in community may be developed to a more political position where the community is the principal unit of
analysis, where the community is to be valued above the individual. Communitarians value the community above the individual. Liberals value the individual above the community. There would appear to be a choice, either or, but the real situation is not so simple and suggests something of a both / and solution. We need to value individuals in that they are part of a society, and we need to value the society as an entity in that it is made up of individuals.

Recall Kymlicka is keen to defend communitarianism against the charge of paternalism and suggests that the communitarian orders values hierarchically for the common good. He also suggests that there may be occasions when an individual may be able to exercise a veto and we can imagine an individual permitted to reject some part of the hierarchy so long as it does not undermine the community as a whole. Conversely an individual choice which threatened the very community itself would not be permitted.

Similarly Tam suggests that in the absence of agreement, in the cases of abortion and euthanasia etc. the policy must be to guard against the domination of the majority by a single faction, who dictate policy. Tam says this is not a signal for “quasi-market negotiations” (Tam p118) but could be recognised as an instance where both / and choices have to be made. That is to say in the case of abortion for example there might be those who would say that the individual has a right to a termination over the collective will of the community, and there would be those who would say that to permit such termination undermines the very fabric of the community itself. The question then becomes what type of decisions properly belong with the community and what decisions properly belong with the individual?

At this stage it is worth remembering that our concern is not a restructuring of society as a whole, but concerns itself with schooling and education! Bruce Ackerman’s Social Justice in the Liberal State recognises a distinction between adults and children. Ackerman says children are not full citizens because they cannot linguistically frame their objections and therefore cannot enter into full dialogue with the community. This dialogic requirement is at the heart of Ackerman’s liberal state and is enshrined in his rationality principle. “Whenever anybody questions the legitimacy of another’s power, the power holder must respond not by suppressing the questioner but by giving a reason that explains why he is more entitled to the resource than the questioner is” (my italics) (Ackerman 1980 p4).

Ackerman continues that as a result of children not being full citizens parents and educators may exercise legitimate authority over children. This is not because of their moral superiority; indeed Ackerman rejects all horticultural models of education, but in order that
children become full citizens. This is the only justification for their exercising of power. He
gives the example that it is legitimate to prevent a child from stealing (say) and teach it not
to steal because if it is not so taught it will, in all likelihood, be restrained in prison later! It is
legitimate to limit a child’s behaviour in order to minimise the limits on the behaviour of a
citizen over his whole life. Ackerman’s parent says of his daughter “she will still be
subjected to special restrictions” to which Noble replies “I don’t deny it” (ibid. p152).

Having said this, Ackerman concedes that “it is however, one thing to state a principle, quite
another to work out the particular shape of parental control that is justified within a particular
institutional setting” (ibid. p148). Two points can perhaps be made. Firstly, Ackerman does
recognise that children need a familial and cultural situatedness for their upbringing. He
concedes that exposure to the full “cacophony” (p155) of liberal views may not only be
harmful to a child, but may make upbringing incoherent. If all views were pressed upon the
young child then its development would be undermined for it would not be able to form any
views at all, and so some restrictions and something of a ‘framework’ is appropriate at an
early stage.

Secondly, it is important to note that Ackerman, arguing as a liberal, agrees with Taylor’s
insistence on the central place of dialogue within community. Taylor and Ackerman may
denote something slightly different by the term community, but despite their differing
positions, they both recognise the importance of it. And it must be a part of our framework
for values education too. Community must be a third necessary component of a values
education framework, because it is within community that humans in general and pupils in
particular come to full maturity. Pupils should be taught about the nature and history of their
own community and they should be urged to consider their place within it. It certainly
follows that different communities may be better served by different frameworks for their
values education. Perhaps not wildly different, but subtly different certainly. These need not
entail wholly inward looking and “suffocating” communities, for the community may well
be outward looking, and well-informed about others beliefs and practices, whilst, at the same
time, being secure and confident in its own.

It is perhaps strange to write this in the light of some recent disturbances centred on schools,
and I cannot help but think of the dispute centred upon Holy Cross Catholic School in
Belfast, Northern Ireland during September 2001. If I understand correctly, the Catholics
wished to assert their right to travel to their Catholic primary school via a predominantly
Protestant residential area, and the Protestants saw the Catholic action as inflammatory and
wanted the Catholics to find an alternate route. Powerful pictures on the television showed
terrified Catholic schoolgirls being shepherded by their intransigent parents and terrorised by Protestants on their journeys to school. The situation seems all the worse for the enormous presence of the military and armed police personnel. The news reporters contrast this segregated schooling, with mixed Catholic-Protestant schooling in other parts of Ireland, which are presented as models of harmony and excellence. How then can the separate education of different communities be justified?

I suppose it may be argued that Catholic Christians and Protestant Christians do not actually constitute separate communities, but I think in this case this is mistaken. What I do think however is that agitators on both sides, in a political dispute over territory and government which is over 100 years old are only too ready to use religious practice as a scapegoat. As I have said earlier separate schooling does not and need not entail a segregation of society generally, and a part of either a Catholic or Protestant schooling would be a tolerance or even a love of ecumenical partners. As this has been successfully achieved elsewhere (e.g. David Shepherd and David Hope in Liverpool spring to mind) this suggests to me that the schooling arrangements in Northern Ireland are not the root cause of the problems there.

Returning to our theme, it should be mentioned that Ackerman draws a sharp distinction between primary and secondary education, and suggests that much less coercion or restraint may be legitimised as a child gets older. Indeed he suggests it is a paradox that the more successful parents and educators are in their educative endeavours the less justification they have for continuing! This of course hints at the central rationale for liberal education which is to prepare children for full citizenship in a liberal state; “to provide the child with the materials he will find useful for his own self-definition” (ibid. p154).

This of course, is where we must part company with Ackerman, for in our analysis such self-definition within a liberal state is not the purpose of education, and is ultimately not even possible. Definition of the self is not solely within a community or state, as Ackerman would have it, but must also be in the context of a tradition. In our analysis tradition, in part, defines not only what is possible but also what is desirable and this is a move that the liberal would not be willing to make.

In this context it is interesting to note that Ackerman repeatedly contrasts liberal with authoritarian whereas Taylor contrasts liberal with communitarian. Ackerman’s liberal seems to be trying to escape from the overwhelming and possibly malevolent intentions of some authority, whereas Taylor’s liberal seems more of a solipsist, unwilling to recognise and conform with the community of which he is necessarily a part. In schools it seems better
that we teach pupils about their roles and positions within community, rather than educate them to define themselves against authority, real or imagined.

At this stage it seems that by way of a conclusion to this section a definition of a framework for values education should be offered, and this will be done in a moment but two final observations need to be made. Firstly the framework we have been discussing is not really a document or text that might be part of a mission statement or a teachers’ handbook. It is a conceptual apparatus; a linguistic and socio-cultural backdrop which provides coherence, and structure. Implicit within it perhaps, is a description of the kind of pupils who can be taught values together and this is best phrased negatively. That is to say values education will be difficult if not impossible if the pupils in the school do not share a common language, if they do not share a common tradition and if they cannot be said to form something of a community. The framework might almost function as a part of a school’s admission policy, in that it suggests that values education requires a certain homogeneity in the pupil body.

A second point is the recognition that the framework is an ideal, it has been arrived at by philosophical means and takes little or no account of practical concerns. In the real world factors such as the shortage of native Urdu teachers, or a crippling budget deficit will make the situation considerably more complicated. Further the framework will need to be “unpacked”. Theory must inform practice. Again however whilst this is an important issue it is a separate one and problems of instantiating the framework do not undermine the framework itself. It has been suggested to me that my framework might be a framework for successful values education and in its absence unsuccessful values education might take place. I find the notion of unsuccessful education somewhat contradictory, and indeed Peters tells us that education brings about something essentially valuable or worthwhile. However this does not mean we cannot admit of degrees of worth or success, and talk of more and less successful values education.

Hence to conclude: an ideal framework for the most successful kind of values education requires a full consideration and indeed integration of components of language, tradition and community. Values education is of necessity, most successful in a largely homogeneous setting and as heterogeneity increases then values education, of necessity, becomes harder if not impossible to achieve with a comparable level of success. This is a descriptive conclusion; it employs philosophical arguments to explain what does or will work best. It is not a prescription, but leads very quickly to a prescription, for if we think the best possible education should be provided for children, then this conclusion should be adopted.
The kind of framework that I have proposed may be attacked from two principal directions. On the one hand it may be said that such a framework is too doctrinaire, too rigid and leaves no room for personal choice, individuality and autonomy. In short it is tantamount to indoctrination. On the other hand it may be said that, of course children’s values education needs to take some account of their linguistic background, of tradition and the role of community – that is obvious! The assertion that such a framework is required is a trivial truth and hardly worthy of discussion. I think this is an extreme polarisation, which is a product of certain developments in the philosophy of education, which need to be explored and explicated if they are to be escaped. The aim of this chapter is to explore the development of this dichotomy, and to show how the framework that I propose is a genuine *via media*.

In philosophy generally there are many discussions centred upon pairs of opposites; for example mind and body, sense and meaning, realists and idealists, deontologists and consequentialists and so on. When there is such polar opposition there are three ways for the discussion to proceed. Each side can develop and entrench its own position in the hope of finally defeating the opposing position. The two sides can begin a process of convergence by realising that there is some truth in both positions and what is needed is a compromise; some measure of reconciliation. Or, finally of course the whole debate may be thrown out as resting on a misunderstanding, or upon a philosophically nonsensical distinction.

This last option is a favourite of feminist and postmodern thinkers who have characterised much modern debate as based on a number of dichotomies or binarisms which silently influence our thinking and our social structure. Their aim is to deconstruct these binarisms, to destroy what they consider to be outmoded philosophical dichotomies, to jam the theoretical machinery of modern debate. This is not an approach that I wish to adopt here.

The compromise option has been become increasingly widespread; for example in the field of moral philosophy Kantians have had to incorporate elements of virtue ethics in to their analysis and in political philosophy liberals have had to take elements of communitarian theory in to their analysis. In some areas of philosophy such syntheses are being developed, but it seems that philosophy of education is a little slow off the mark in this respect. For example in international education, Richard Pearce has observed a divergence between what he calls “New Worlders” and “Old Worlders” who espouse mutually exclusive positions in their attitudes (Pearce 2001).
The particular dichotomy that faces us is an extreme partition of liberal education and indoctrination. We may ask how did this come about? In *Ethics and Education* R. S. Peters begins by defining the concept of education. Although he came to reject this approach (that is, the separation of the concept of education from those who are educated) he suggested then that education is (briefly) the transmission of something intrinsically worthwhile, which has a cognitive content and which is transmitted in a voluntary manner. In particular education is to be contrasted with conditioning or brainwashing which has no epistemological content and is on a level with blinking or salivation in the sense that the subject is unaware of what is going on. Similarly education is to be contrasted with indoctrination, which although it may be understood or assented to in some embryonic way (cf. Peters 1966 p42) involves a lack of respect for the learner who must be free to choose or reject the teaching. Indoctrination is not cognitively grounded as the foundations, development and critique of the doctrine are not a part of the indoctrination. Furthermore, those who oppose the doctrine are not acknowledged.

Peters goes on to say that his definition of education is to all intents and purposes a definition of liberal education in the sense that ‘liberal’ emphasises a lack of constraint in respect of Peters’ three conditions. In particular Peters notes the connotation of ‘liberal’ as a protest against the “tendency to constrain people’s beliefs along narrowly conceived or doctrinaire lines” (Peters 1966 p44), and underlines that education is a voluntary process. In a brief discussion of the liberalising of vocational education he also remarks that “the knowledge required for vocational education should be transmitted in a less dogmatic way, that trainees should be encouraged to be more critical about what they are taught” (ibid. p45). This is the first sign that education has become liberal education by default.

Hirst working alongside Peters at that time, observed that the notion of liberal education derived from the ancient Greeks was liberal in the sense it was for free men rather than slaves but also liberal in the sense that it freed the mind. Education was the pursuit of knowledge which was defined in terms of scope and content in order that the mind be satisfied and fulfil its end thereby contributing to the good life of the individual as a whole. Considering the scope and content of knowledge, Hirst, drawing on earlier work of Oakeshott, MacMurray and Collingwood, came to believe that the structure of knowledge is characterised or mapped in terms of types or forms which are logically distinct. The details of this need not concern us here, but following such an analysis, Hirst was to write “A liberal education is, then, one that, determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned with the development of the mind” (Hirst 1973 p99).
Given such a position it became important that all the forms should be studied in a balanced way and that one or more should not been given ‘priority’ over the others as this would lead to imbalance. Further the notion that a form of knowledge should contain some distinct truths of one kind or another, probably led to a worry about falsehoods being taught and so there developed a notion that everything could or maybe even should be challenged. It is worth noting that in the seventies the main debate in education moved away from these epistemological concerns, and became centred on questions concerning child centred education. The effect of this, I suggest, was to leave the indoctrination / liberal education dichotomy under-developed and this is a legacy we have received today. In other words, very little work considering a synthesis between the two positions has been done.

Indeed it may be said that much of the work that has been done in developing the liberal position has only served to further entrench the divide. As the philosophical successor to Peters and Hirst, John White’s account of liberal education (in *Education and the Good Life* (1990)) distinguishes between what is taught and the way it is taught. The central issue for White is that because in a liberal democracy there are a number of conceptions of the good life, the pupil must be allowed to choose between them, and indeed a principal educational aim is to develop the pupil’s faculty for making this choice. There must be a guard against the possibility of indoctrination, which White defines as “intentional prevention of reflection” (White 1990 p104). In other words autonomy is all important so that people will be free to “practise their religion, express their ideas, control their own lives and determine where they will live and what kind of work they will do” (ibid. p22).

Furthermore White appears to think that there is a sufficiently thick agreement of what constitutes the good life, for this to form a basis for values education in schools. I do not want to criticise White’s position at this stage, but it is important to notice that this development of an earlier position is an entrenchment, a sharpening of the divide, and offers no real compromise.

It is significant, I think, that in a 1996 book, J. Mark Halstead can approvingly refer to Bailey who “describes a liberal education as one which liberates individuals from the restraints of the present and the particular, so that they can become free choosers of what is to be believed and what is to be done” (Halstead 1996 p24). Note that in this analysis, the alternative to a liberal education is one that restrains the individual and prevents his free choice!
So to summarise we have, it seems, at one extreme, indoctrination that presents material to
be learnt in a closed manner, fails to provide alternatives and curtails the pupils' response.
We may put it that a particular values system is taught as if it were the only value system. At
the other extreme we have a liberal position that offers a broad and balanced picture of
reality and leaves pupils to choose concerning matters of value. This polarity excludes the
possibility which I imagine, that a particular values system be taught, further that it be
suggested that this system is the best, or most complete picture. However, at the same time it
is made very clear that there is licit dissent from this position and other viable alternatives
exist.

Some philosophers of education have developed compromise positions, but not many and
this does suggest that there is an under-explored territory between the two extremes.
Kenneth Strike, for example, deals with these some of these issues in his *Liberty and
Learning*, and although much of what he says is about universities, it is applicable to schools
too. Strike characterises the debate as an attempt to answer the question, of “how the notion
of the authority of received ideas applies to questions of liberty in both educational and civil
contexts” (Strike 1982 pviii). As an example of the conflict Strike cites the legal case of
Yonder v. Wisconsin in the US Supreme Court which hinged on whether children from the
Amish minority, who have a religion which is connected with a simple farming life, could be
compelled to attend school after 12 years of age. The court recognised the state’s interest in
producing educated citizens but also recognised that the Amish themselves were making
good citizens of their children, well suited for their way of life and the court forbade the state
from enforcing its compulsory education programme over the Amish children.

Strike develops a philosophical view which rejects empirical epistemology and is largely
based upon a Kuhnian scientific method. Concepts or theories are not simply read off the
surface of phenomena but observations must be integrated with pre-existent theory if they
are to make any sense. The pre-existent theory Strike (following Kuhn) calls a paradigm,
which “serves to set the problems that science must solve, it suggests the direction to be
pursued in solving the problem and it indicates what counts as a solution to them” (ibid.
p29). The paradigm is both a set of initial beliefs or assumptions and a set of tools to pursue
further investigation. Those who would wish to separate teaching a child certain values and
teaching it to be able to make autonomous choices are making a distinction that cannot be
drawn. Strike approvingly quotes Toulmin and goes on to assert that “the things that I have
been loosely referring to as received ideas or that Toulmin calls a conceptual inheritance are
not simply the objects of thought, they are the means or instruments of thought” (ibid. p19).
This is not to imply doctrinaire rigidity: the paradigm is not set in concrete. Strike insists that the paradigm has a provisional status, that is to say (following Kuhn) in the light of further experience it may come to be modified, enhanced or rejected but from the outset a paradigm of some kind is required.

Furthermore, Strike notes that for knowledge to develop and research to proceed, scholars who will not agree to everything must share a common paradigm. Strike talks of communities of intellectuals, who are inheritors of a particular tradition and “who have been initiated into and have mastered the communities’ standards” (ibid. p36). Strike insists that research is not a matter of individuals collecting evidence, but is a social enterprise where findings are reproduced, checked, discussed etc. within the appropriate peer group. Strike defends such a conception against the attack that it can lead to failures in objectivity and is essentially closed, for he says “the notion of objectivity is substantially defined at any given moment by the concepts that have become authoritative in the field” (ibid. p37). Note again the temporal qualification, and the implicit view that paradigms can shift, can be rejected or replaced, but that we cannot do without them!

Considering a particular and very relevant issue, Strike says universities should be neutral. He develops a number of slightly different senses of neutral which need not concern us here, but to ensure academic freedom a university cannot have an official point of view on a matter, because then those faculty members who disagree with it would be on a collision course with their own employer! Given the role of the university to pursue knowledge and truth, its members must be free to do so. Strike rejects the notion of a university having any mission statement, “A university that is Catholic or Protestant, conservative or communist, in any way that binds the views of its members, cannot fully be a place where truth is sought” (ibid. p76).

Such a view if modified and applied to schools would be a terminal blow to any framework of the sort that I am suggesting. However Strike himself subsequently concedes that mission-orientated universities are legitimate provided that three conditions are met. Such missions must be constrained so that they: “be extensions of the university’s primary role of research and teaching, that they be selected in a legitimate way, and that they generate minimal conflict with academic freedom” (ibid. p97ff). Of course it may be said that this simply raises the question of what counts as legitimate, and what constitutes minimal conflict. However Strike suggests that a mission is acceptable if it does not interfere with the university’s primary function, and this in turn will be some function of the broader values of society. So for example it would be legitimate to have a Catholic framework in a school, so
long as this did not extend to compelling staff and pupils to engage in practices they did not accept, or dismissing staff or expelling pupils if they changed their minds. However it seems to me that during the selection of pupils or staff it would be legitimate, even prudent, *ceteris paribus*, to choose one who could more fully participate in the Catholic life of the school over one who was less able to do so.

Furthermore, it is not entirely obvious that the aims of schools are quite the same as the aims of a university. The school’s teachers are employed to teach, not to research and so are, to some degree, in a different situation to university researchers and professors. Criticism and debate are essential to the university’s life and function, whereas in a school open and healthy debate may be seen as a good and positive thing, but they are not essential in the same way. In terms of the student body too, Strike defends a form of paternalism on account of the immaturity of the pupil and says this is more justified the younger the child. He also says the parent (or teacher) who controls some part of a child’s life also has a duty to act “for the sake of the interests and well-being of the child” (ibid. p131), and emphasises all such relationships must be balanced. In particular he observes that “it is an abdication of the responsibilities of parents and teachers to fail to provide guidance with respect to the preferences that children acquire” (ibid. p139).

To summarise, Strike recognises and argues for the need for balance between recognising and encouraging students’ and pupils’ rights on the one hand. And recognising that they must be taught certain things without the possibility of dissent in order that they are able to express those rights. In an amusing analogy he has it that it would be lunacy not to teach a child language on the grounds that it had not expressed which language it wished to learn. In this case teaching English, French or Chinese cannot be described as an imposition, a restriction of the child’s liberties and Strike asks, “How do moral concepts differ? The answer is that they do not” (ibid. p54).

Elsewhere Strike takes up this metaphor of language again. Writing more specifically about schools, he sees morality as the basis of values education and suggests that each community may have its own private or local language, but in addition liberal societies must have a public or civic language that everybody understands. The public, civic language is thin and neutral between communities and should be the main language of schools and should be taught in schools. This language is based on an overlapping consensus which Strike calls pragmatic liberalism.
The private local language is thick and is the way that each community expresses its values. Such languages may be religious, ethnic or philosophical and augment the public language. Strike observes that the liberal public discourse is insufficient to sustain society, but is a necessary tool in a pluralistic context, so the local languages should be left “significantly in place” (Strike 1992 p277). The school should help pupils with their local language, perhaps in small groups. There is a striking affinity here between my earlier remarks and Strike’s suggestion of separate language provision, although I think a neat distinction between public and private (civic and local) language cannot be made. We play a number of separate language games, with their own rules and conventions, their own norms and expectations, which overlap and intertwine and I am not sure that the neat partition that Strike suggests can be made. Nonetheless, and more importantly, we do have a significant move away from the stark dichotomy described at the beginning of this chapter and a realisation and acceptance that balanced values education inevitably leads to the murky waters of compromise and playoff.

As Strike distinguishes between public and private, or better local, language Terrence McLaughlin distinguishes between public and private or non-public values. Public values are seen as inescapable and binding upon all persons and should be taught and upheld in schools. Non-public values are those that go beyond what can be required for all members of society and are often a source of strong disagreement. The school should adopt an attitude of “principled forbearance” (McLaughlin 1996 p146) of influence, and remain silent about such issues or assist pupils to come to their own reflective decisions about them. Additionally McLaughlin endorses the development of autonomy as an aim of all education but suggests that particular world-views or religions cannot be taught as true, as they are fundamentally uncertain.

Drawing the distinction between public and non-public values immediately suggests that there might be some middle ground to explore and a number of questions may be raised. Two in particular seem to dominate McLaughlin’s writings. The first of these is can one teach public values without explicitly or implicitly teaching some non-public values? McLaughlin seems to answer this question negatively, even if a little hesitantly. The second question is, can a Catholic education (either in a common school or under separate provision) be compatible with liberal educational principles? Here McLaughlin answers positively and offers extensive argument.

McLaughlin suggests that “every form of education teaches implicitly or explicitly a philosophy of man” (ibid. p141) and McLaughlin approvingly quotes Archbishop Beck who
writes, "only when we know what man is can we say how he should be educated" (Beck 1964 p109). Several authors use a cake metaphor and say of Christianity, and presumably this could apply to other values systems as well, that it is not the icing on the cake of education, but is the yeast that invigorates the whole mixture (cf. Walsh 1983 p4). That is to say any values education, by the very way that it is conducted, and by what is included and what is excluded, has a non-public values commitment.

Kevin Williams goes further, and writes “It is hard to see how we can actually teach religion without actually initiating children into a particular religion, just as we cannot teach sport without actually teaching children to play a specific game, or teach music without teaching a particular musical instrument” (Williams p53). It must be noted that this is a remark about teaching religion specifically rather than values generally, but it is a definite exaggeration and overstates the case. For surely we can teach about the principles and rules of a game without being able to play it, and indeed many sport spectators attest to this fact. Similarly we could teach about space travel, its principles, history, we could study things written by astronauts and have a very competent knowledge of space travel without ever having left the earth! Williams' analogy does not work.

To a certain extent the debate turns on what a religion is considered to be. McLaughlin and other Catholics would emphasise belief, the knowledge of doctrine and the familiarity with practices; and although true faith would be said to be more than this, much of it may be taught. Catholic emphasis on catechesis is evidence enough for that. Protestant Christians, such as Signe Sandsmark for example emphasis that Christianity is all about a living relationship with God and this cannot be taught: “indoctrinated dogmas are of no use” (Sandsmark p122) she says! Notice again how Catholic doctrine is not teaching but indoctrination and belief is dogma! The dichotomy discussed above still has a very powerful grip, and there is a reluctance to move in to the middle ground.

McLaughlin also asks can a Catholic Education be liberal? And spends some time arguing that it can. He says a proper Catholic education is characterised by its openness, and Catholicism invites pupils to reflect in a systematic way on the world and their place in it. Faith is proclaimed or offered but never imposed and McLaughlin reminds us of the teaching of the Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education that in the Catholic school “great respect is called for those people in the school who are not Catholics” (McLaughlin 1996 p144). McLaughlin also highlights the teaching of the Church that adherence to faith on the part of those who are taught is seen as the fruit of grace and freedom (ibid.). And characteristically
without qualification, Williams declares: “there is no incompatibility between being autonomous and participating in the Christian tradition” (Williams p51).

To those who might find such remarks laughable, McLaughlin does identify a shift in the way Catholicism is perceived. The emphasis on truth and received doctrine has given way to an emphasis on human relationships and issues of justice and peace. The role of the individual conscience is affirmed in a way it once was not, and there is an increased recognition of the need for balance (cf. McLaughlin 1996 p149). In the light of this McLaughlin is able to reaffirm that Catholicism is not incompatible with liberalism, and indeed suggests that distinctive Catholic education contributes to democracy, by offering a counter position to many contemporary trends.

Myself, I am not convinced by McLaughlin’s argument and I do not see how a proper Catholic education can also claim to be truly liberal. For example the Catholic must teach that abortion is wrong and the right of the unborn baby take precedence over the will of the mother. To support a pro-choice position could not be Catholic and similarly to allow pupils to believe that there are a number of viable alternatives which they might choose is simply not Catholic teaching! This does not worry me as I am not trying to endorse liberal education and think liberalism has lots of difficulties of its own, but the debate here seems somewhat muddled by different parties attaching slightly different meanings to the same term.

McLaughlin says, freedom in the Catholic tradition is a freedom to respond to the moral law through grace, the greatest obstacle to which is sin. The law is still binding on the conscience and the notion that one might accept or reject one law or set of laws as the liberal must allow is nonsense! Perhaps Catholic education may be said to be liberal in the sense that the teaching may not be liberal but ultimately the pupil cannot be compelled to accept it, but then any teaching is like this. I think Catholic education is ultimately incompatible with liberal education, for the salvation of souls is not on the liberal agenda. The Church is in an important way contra mundum and this is a point that McLaughlin concedes. However, and this is the really important point, it does not follow from this, that Catholic education is indoctrination, which seems to be an inference all too commonly drawn. Of course this would follow if liberal education and indoctrination were the only alternatives but as I have tried to show there is a middle ground, a compromise position, even if it is poorly illuminated and only vaguely defined.

Finally in this section I which to re-examine the kind of framework that I have proposed and to show that it is neither liberal nor doctrinaire, but is a genuine via media. As I have
analysed it, a framework for values education rests upon language, tradition and community. These categories are not arbitrary since each contributes something about our life that is given. That we speak a particular language, play certain language games and partake in a particular form of life is given. It could have been otherwise but for a particular group of speakers it is just so. Similarly the traditions which we have received and which shape our rationality and our morality are fundamentally inescapable. They might have been otherwise, but as it happens they are as they are. And similarly with the community or communities of which we are a part – to a large extent these are functions of where we were born, where we live and whom we have, as it happens, bumped into on the way. This is not to deny choice in any way but is to recognise the human situation.

Any coherent values education must recognise and build upon this framework, it must recognise that certain factors are given and are not functions of choice, and it must seriously accept that in an educational context these must be preserved, explained and handed on. Two important things however follow from this. Firstly, I have tried to show that even if some things are given it does not in any way follow that everything is given or that there is no room for individual choice or expression. Secondly it must be remembered, that there is a difference between saying ‘we as a group believe X, we encourage you to question it, argue against it and even reject it’ and saying ‘people believe X, Y, and Z and you must choose any or none as you think fit.’ Values education within the context of a framework recognises the rights of pupils, but also recognises a legitimate paternalism; an insistence on certain standards. Hence those who are educated will come to have the knowledge, capacity to articulate and the maturity to accept or reject the framework. It may even be, of course, that those who are best initiated in to the framework are those who are most able to contribute to its future evolution and modification.

The burning issue, as we have said before, would seem to be then what precisely are these givens, what is part of the framework and non-negotiable and what may be negotiated, what is a matter for individual choice. The problem with such a question is that it has no general answer, since it depends on the framework itself. Framework F1 built upon language L1, tradition T1 and community C1 will have givens inherent in L1, T1 and C1; whereas framework F2 based upon L2, T2 and C2 will have a different set of givens and a different scope for the exercise of freedom and autonomy.

Perhaps a few examples will help. Imagine an urban, cathedral school with a long history. Such a school would have a religious element in its framework; it would attach a high value to music, and may place a lot of emphasis on sport and academic success. This framework
would have very little to say about political persuasion, rural issues e.g. fox-hunting, and the place and role of the armed forces (say) and these would be areas within the framework where the pupil would need to exercise his or her own autonomy and freedom. On the other hand imagine a rural school founded by a Tory peer for the education of the sons and daughters of armed forces personnel. A framework in this school would have a discernible political element, it would emphasis values of loyalty and duty, and it would probably encourage pupils to consider the military as a career. It might show nominal Church of England religious persuasion, but religion generally, academic success or the participation in particular sports may be matters largely left to the individual. Different frameworks will have different givens and will have different areas of scope for the exercise of individual choice.

It may be said that this comparison avoids the crucial issue. This is all very well for two frameworks, but it still remains to be explained for a single particular framework, how we may say what is given and what is more open-ended? What is non-negotiable and what is negotiable? There are two kinds of answer here I think. The first is to emphasise that the framework that I propose does not involve coercion, compulsion or indoctrination, and so ultimately everything, even the framework itself may be rejected. If this were to happen though it may well be that the relationship between the pupil and his teacher or the pupil and his school would collapse also. A pupil who could not accept a school’s framework may well be better off elsewhere! Putting these extreme cases to one side, what I want to say is that in circumstances of normal schooling it has to be recognised that for education to succeed some things must be taken as non-negotiable, there will be a set of agreements that will not be questioned. There is a temporal qualification here (we may add for the time being) and we should recall Strike’s remarks about the provisional nature of the academics’ paradigm.

The second is to observe that we successfully use terms such as language game, tradition and community without having strict criteria to distinguish one from another. We are not able to say precisely where one tradition or community ends and another begins but that does not preclude the successful use of these terms. And so it is with our framework. Wittgenstein gets exasperated with those who press him for a precise definition of game, and imagines the question: “But if the concept ‘game’ is uncircumscribed like that, you don’t really know what you mean by ‘game’” (PI 70). Wittgenstein says that in the end “one gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way” (ibid.). He says general definitions may be misunderstood too, he observes that ‘exactly’ and ‘roughly’ are used differently in different contexts (cf. PI 88) and concludes that we define a particular game by showing how it is played. Similarly a framework will be defined or described as it is used.
If the response to the assertion that values education requires a framework is a request for a delineation of the boundary of the framework, then the essential point has been missed. What is crucial is that a framework which recognises and accepts certain things as given is a necessary prerequisite. Furthermore, what is given is simply given as part of the language we use, the traditions we have received and the community of which we are a part. Do not ask how it must be but look and see how it is! ("Don’t say there must be......but look and see" (PI 66).) This Wittgensteinian slogan does not mean that the framework is set in stone and so cannot be modified in any way, but neither does it mean that it is a matter of unrestricted choice. It has elements of both, it is a via media and until this is properly recognised, discussion of this topic will continue to be dominated, dare I say strangled, by those who unwaveringly defend liberal education as the only alternative to indoctrination.
Although my principal concern has been values education, much of the discussion so far may be located within a wider debate between liberals and communitarians. Beliefs about the nature and purpose of society and the individual’s place within it necessarily influence views about the nature and purpose of education. Having said this to enter into the full complexity of the debate between these two parties is a task beyond the scope of this thesis. However a particular strand of the debate and an issue I have already touched on in several places is a question about the nature of the self, and in this chapter I intend to expand some of my earlier remarks and to tie up some loose ends. I am not in a position to defend a fully articulated view of the self, but I do intend to present an outline of my own view and to reject certain prevalent alternatives.

Furthermore and perhaps most importantly, I believe that clarity about the nature of the self and of autonomy has implications for what education is about generally and what values education is about in particular. Once this is understood, I contend that my claim that values education requires a framework will follow. In other words a theory of the self will contribute to a justification of my earlier claims about values education.

An initial difficulty that I shall note but then largely ignore is that the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘communitarian’ are not neatly defined, but represent families of views, which although related can be quite varied. The debate is not infrequently coloured by claims of misunderstanding rather than disagreement. Again to enter into all the minutiae of this debate would be a digression, but I shall begin by considering the liberal view of the self and the nature and place of autonomy within that view. Then I shall go on to consider the critique of this view as found in communitarian theory. I have however already hesitated to embrace a full-blooded communitarianism, and I have suggested that what is required is something of a via media and I shall conclude this chapter by considering how such a compromise view of the self might be characterised.

In *A Theory of Justice* and *Justice as Fairness – a Restatement*, Rawls makes it clear that what he is proposing is an ideal model, and that persons understood in the pre-social state are part of this model. He emphasises that as a political conception of justice is sought, then we have a political conception of the person. He writes, “the conception of the person is not taken from metaphysics or the philosophy of mind, or from psychology; it may have little relation to conceptions of the self discussed in these disciplines” (Rawls 2001 p19). Further putting the self in the original position behind the veil of ignorance is a heuristic device; a
part of the model designed to bring out the nature of the self in this special case. Nevertheless Rawls’ model of the self has stuck, sometimes without his caveats, and is the point of departure for subsequent development.

Rawls’ person is free and equal, properly informed and rational. Rawls characterises free and equal persons as being endowed of two moral powers: the first is “the capacity for a sense of justice” and the second is “a capacity for the conception of the good” (ibid.). The agent can understand and act from principles of political justice and can rationally pursue a conception of the good. This conception of the good is not specified, it could be religious, political or moral, and in order that citizens be free, it cannot be laid down. “Rather, as citizens, they are seen as capable of revising or changing this conception on reasonable and rational grounds, and they may do this if they so desire. As free persons, citizens claim the right to view their persons as independent from and not identified with any particular conception of the good, or scheme of final ends” (ibid. p21).

The other side of this coin is that to accommodate the “reasonable pluralism” (ibid. p15) of citizens the state must remain neutral, and further it must uphold neutrality. As Rawls notes this is not procedural neutrality which is dictated by the understanding of justice as fairness, but neutrality of aim. This means “institutions and policies are neutral in the sense that they can be endorsed by citizens generally as within the scope of a public political conception” (ibid. p153 n.27). It is from this understanding of the neutrality of the state, to uphold the citizen’s right to remain an unattached chooser that modern concepts of liberal education seem to ultimately derive.

At the heart of these concepts is the notion of autonomy which originated in Kantian ethics. For Kant, autonomy is a property of the will, and the self wills autonomously when it follows laws it has made for itself. Most important is not that the self wills autonomously, but that it has the capacity to do so. The human is not constituted by the aims, interests and conceptions of the good that it has decided to follow, but is constituted and given its worth and dignity by the capacity to select such aims, interests and conceptions. What matters, is not our final ends, not what we choose, but our ability and capacity to make that choice.

The result of this is to put the autonomous self prior to its ends; it detaches the self from those ends and puts the self first. To put this another way, just as the subject is prior to its ends, so the right is prior to the good, and Rawls takes this up; “we should reverse the relation between the right and the good, proposed by teleological doctrine and view the right
as prior” (Rawls 1971 p560). Hence the liberal conception that autonomy is the highest value, and is an essential prerequisite for personal flourishing; that is living the good life.

Further, linked to this is the notion that the autonomous self is responsible for his actions. He is responsible for them since he has freely chosen them, and similarly he cannot be held responsible for those obligations that are not voluntary. Indeed these additional obligations undermine the subject’s autonomy as they undermine his essential nature, as one who chooses.

Liberal theories of education have taken this to their hearts and hence see the principal aim of education as promoting autonomy and the exercise of responsible choice. Any attempt to promote a particular set of values, or to prescribe a particular conception of the good life undermines the prior and most fundamental characteristic of the human: that he be able to exercise autonomy. John White suggests that the overarching aim of education is personal well-being which is based on autonomy. He concedes that autonomy is not a logical condition for well-being and that there could be other paths to well-being, but goes on to add that in a pluralistic liberal democracy, individual autonomy based on personal choice is the only legitimate path (c.f. White 1990 p99).

In her Colston Lecture of 1992 Susan Mendus characterises the autonomous self as detached from its final ends, and says that as an antecedent chooser my attachments or the values I do in fact hold are simply those that I have happened to choose at that time. Further, detached from my own ends I am in a sense also detached from other selves – Mendus says ‘estranged’. But this is not a picture we recognise for in fact we do recognise special responsibilities to parents, siblings, even pupils which are not chosen but often thrust upon us.

The kind of emphasis on autonomy as personal choice is again a hardening of the dichotomy between choosing everything and accepting everything as given. Mendus seems to suggest that obligations restrict my autonomy, and so it is only partial and admits of degrees. In part this is due to the non-ideal nature of the world, but more importantly, Mendus also suggests that our notion of autonomy as it stands needs some revision. (c.f. Mendus p9). But before we proceed here, we do well to heed Onora O’Neill’s warning.

Onora O’Neill (referring to Dworkin) observes that autonomy has been variously understood as liberty, self-rule, sovereignty, freedom of the will, dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility, self-knowledge, self-assertion, critical reflection, freedom from
obligation and absence of external causation, and is a term over which “there is a spectacular amount of disagreement” (O’Neill p203). O’Neill distinguishes ‘independence of acts’ and ‘coherence of acts’ and suggests we need some combination of the two. This is because if sheer choice alone was the basis of autonomy we would not admire it, and coherent acts not freely pursued are not autonomous.

Although this combination is desirable O’Neill argues that it is not possible within empiricist theory, because preferences underpinning acts and beliefs underpinning coherence cannot be separated out – preferences and beliefs are themselves dependent (c.f. ibid. p218). O’Neill hesitates to reject empiricism outright and endorses a Kantian position, which she is careful to distinguish from “the stereotype of Kant’s position” (ibid. p219).

She suggests Kant understood autonomy as self-imposed law rather than self-imposed law and so is not committed to any transcendent, metaphysical view of the self. Kant accepts both independence and coherence at the expense of a unified theory of autonomy that the empiricists seek, and on O’Neill’s interpretation of Kant, “human action must be approached from two indispensable yet mutually irreducible perspectives” (ibid. p218). Is this compromise by another name?

Given a number of positions which may be described as liberal and given the confusion and complexity highlighted by O’Neill we do well to approach the critique of the liberal view of autonomy and the self carefully. Further, liberals are challenged by conservatives, Marxists and feminists and these are positions I shall ignore, focussing instead on the communitarian challenge. I want to look at a number of communitarian challenges to the liberal view of the self and their implications for autonomy, especially when it is considered as an educational aim. Firstly I shall consider Michael Sandel’s work which criticises Rawls specifically, then I shall consider MacIntyre who attacks a much broader conception of liberalism and then I shall consider Taylor’s views which lend themselves to a more political interpretation and lead naturally to a consideration of compromise.

Although Rawls does not use the word autonomy himself (he speaks only of free and equal persons) we have already seen that he does contend that ends are related to the self by an action of the will (they may change their conception of the good if they so desire etc.). The subject chooses his own ends, but as Sandel points out, this not the only possibility. The self may select his own ends by an act of cognition, as a result of understanding, knowledge and reflection. Indeed Sandel thinks the self does engage in acts of self-scrutiny, and considers its own position reflexively, but this is a possibility which is excluded a priori by Rawls’
conception of the self. Further not only does Sandel think Rawls is wrong, but in emphasising a voluntary relation to ends Sandel considers Rawls to have distanced himself from much traditional moral and political thinking (cf Mulhall and Swift p50).

Secondly, Sandel maintains that the antecedently individuated self may identify with his chosen ends, even very closely, but that as chosen, these ends can never be an integral part of that self. There remains a gap between the self and its values, or as Sandel calls them constitutive attachments. If I choose my values then I can stand apart from them, and this undermines the possibility of being torn between conflicting ends, it seems to rule out the possibility of an inner struggle. Further if I only posses an end having chosen it, it cannot be essential to who I am. I could drop it or change my mind without my identity being disrupted. But experience suggests the contrary: “We need only think of people who build their lives around a cause and whose life is accordingly devastated by the failure of that cause, of people whose sense of themselves is torn apart by conflicting desires or aims” (ibid. p52).

As a more specific version of this second point Sandel argues the antecedent self commits Rawls to a very vapid view of political community. For Rawls the primary aim of the well ordered society is the advancement of the self, even the mutual advancement of selves, but this is distinct from the advancement of a community. For the communitarian an individual may derive his sense of identity by his commitment to a public ideal, he may be willing to follow a shared aim specified by the community, but on Rawlsian considerations of the principle of justice this would seem to be ruled out. Of course liberals can pursue public or common aims, but the idea that such aims could contribute to a person’s identity is rejected.

Overall Sandel claims that Rawls’ absolute and unqualified commitment to justice can only be justified by appealing to a particular conception of the self which has some serious metaphysical underpinnings. Sandel claims that these metaphysical views are not acknowledged by Rawls, and that far from simply belonging to a well ordered society for mutual advantage, the self is constituted by communal ties and bonds, the alteration or severance of which changes the very identity of the self. Mulhall and Swift have it that “In short......Rawls’ theory of justice seems to offer little scope for those who understand their relationships with others as constitutive of their identity as persons” (ibid. p54). Sandel characterises Rawls’ liberalism as ‘metaphysically myopic’, failing to see how attachments to family, community, and common causes fundamentally and essentially defines us as selves.
When we come to consider a liberal response to these points we have to bear in mind that Rawls' position has evolved. I use this word cautiously for some say that Rawls' later work has clarified his earlier position and removed misunderstanding, whilst some suggest that there have been some substantive changes. So an attribution to Rawls is not wholly unproblematic! At the heart of Rawls' reply to the Sandelian critique is that Rawls' theory is a political one, not a moral one. Hence the self in Rawls' theory is the self *qua* citizen, the self as he acts in the political sphere only. Rawls is not committed to the metaphysical theory that Sandel attributes to him. The Rawlsian conception of the self is not a reflection of the whole truth about persons but is a political device which is latent in our public political culture! As a result of this a person can hold and even be constituted by other non-political values or ends, and one can hold that autonomy is not the *summum bonum* in these spheres so long as this does not compromise one’s identity *qua* political self. Brighouse emphasises that in liberal political theory the person is only partially defined, and observes that the principle of justice requires us to pick out commonalities not differences. Impartiality must underpin justice and other differences are simply not relevant (cf. Brighouse 2002). However whether this distinction can coherently be made, and whether there can be any guarantee that one’s political self and one’s other selves will never come in to conflict is something I doubt.

Additionally, Brighouse argues against what he sees as a false dichotomy; namely that constitutive attachments are chosen or given. He says of course the liberal self has given constitutive attachments (e.g. love of one’s family) but the autonomous liberal self can exercise judgement about these givens. Brighouse writes “It is not plausible to suggest of anyone that they could ‘be whatever they want to be’, but it is equally implausible to suggest that we have no control over our character traits at all” (Brighouse 2002 p89). Brighouse emphasises autonomous reflection and asserts; “judgement, then, is more fundamental for liberals than is choice (though choice is not unimportant)” (ibid. p90).

We may not doubt that Brighouse is a liberal for indeed he is, but we may wonder whether he is a strict Rawlsian liberal. He seems to be developing or annotating Rawls, to take some account of Sandel’s criticisms, which he clearly does not think fatal to Rawls’ endeavours, but seems to think that certain amendments or annotations might be necessary. I would suggest that perhaps some hint of compromise between the two sides (that we shall consider again later) is emerging here.

Turning to MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism, recall that MacIntyre’s fundamental contention is that Enlightenment theories of ethics failed because they failed to recognise the notion of human *telos*. An ethical theory is to guide us from where we are to where we ought to be and
this ‘where we ought to be’ can only be understood in teleological terms. If we recall Rawls’ remark that “We should reverse the relation between the right and the good, proposed by teleological doctrine, and view the right as prior” (Rawls 1971 p560) we can see that these two thinkers are on a direct collision course!

Recall again that MacIntyre analyses moral activities as practices, which derive their sense from being part of a greater narrative which in turn is part of a received tradition. MacIntyre’s self is located within this social matrix, and his moral actions and even his very rationality cannot be understood apart from it. The matrix provides the very possibility of constitutive attachment and without this social matrix any notion of constitutive attachment (whether communal or personal) is incoherent.

Mulhall and Swift distinguish two senses in which this can be meant. Firstly there is the "sociological-cum-philosophical point" (Mulhall and Swift p15) that people obtain their self-understanding and concept of the good from the matrix. The matrix provides the origins of their identity. Language, thought and moral life are impossible without a social setting and these are themes which we have considered already. Secondly, not only the possibility of moral ends but also the content of moral ends cannot be shaped independently of the community. The communitarian objects to the liberal’s conception of selves as participating in society solely for mutual advantage, and emphasises that social bonds and communal values are thereby illegitimately excluded from consideration. But for the communitarian these social bonds and communal values are the very stuff of a meaningful life.

MacIntyre is critical of Rawls’ self in the original position behind the veil of ignorance who deliberates on what kind of ends he should choose for himself, on the assumption that others make a similar free, equal, rational and properly informed choice. The question ‘what ends would I choose, what would I value?’ (emphasising the I) rules out the possibility of ends that of their very nature are held in common; ends for a community over and above the ends of any individual in it. Not only is this at odds with MacIntyre’s conception of the way things are, but it is a shortcoming of the original position, because the subject is not free in his choice as Rawls supposes.

Finally, MacIntyre thinks that choices especially moral choices made by the unencumbered self are subjective and worthless as they are ultimately arbitrary expressions of preference. In Rawls’ scheme there is no possibility of rational or objective justification, that is to say ratification by the community. This is not directly a point about the self, but if the self has ultimately arbitrary constitutive attachments as opposed to independent or given constitutive
attachments then this will affect the way we consider selves. Common sense suggests that it is not the case that one view is as good as another. If a life devoted to beauty is no better than a life playing video games that we are in a sorry state, but given that people do disagree about what constitutes the good life, how do we choose? MacIntyre sees liberalism as a variant of emotivism; we have no grounds for choice except preference, and ultimately this choice cannot be justified.

Again the liberal response to this is that not all choices are those of the unencumbered self, not all are arbitrary and unjustifiable, made alone behind the veil. Only those that relate to the self *qua* citizen. Only those features of the self that are irrelevant to the concept of justice are put to one side. But the question remains, can justice be legitimately partitioned from other ends, other constitutive attachments in this way? For example can a Christian conceive of a notion of justice wholly independently of his religious belief?

In order to get a handle on this question I shall recast it in slightly different terminology. Rawls calls those fundamental ideals by which people actually live their lives, the conception of the good which they actually follow, as perfectionist ideals. To pursue justice the state must remain neutral between these fundamental ideals, it must allow people to make their own choices and so is said to be anti-perfectionist. Rawls defends what he calls anti-perfectionist political liberalism, but communitarians who do not accept that the state can be anti-perfectionist say Rawls is committed to a comprehensive liberalism, which he fails to recognise and which undermines his claims of state neutrality. Communitarians claim our political, moral and other final aims cannot be partitioned in the way Rawls suggests.

Mulhall and Swift have it that “the fundamental question that Rawls must face is how he can and should respond to someone who acknowledges that the goods of an anti-perfectionist liberal polity are goods, but believes that in some important cases they can be trumped by the goods that form part of the comprehensive perfectionist doctrines to which she is committed” (Mulhall and Swift p221). They examine a number of separate responses that Rawls has made and make a further distinction between a partially and a fully comprehensive doctrine. A fully comprehensive doctrine covers all values but a partially comprehensive doctrine allows some political values to be separated out from other values. They suggest that in some places Rawls does seem to embrace a partially comprehensive doctrine and in so doing has undermined the neutrality of the state. “The fundamental concession has nonetheless been made, for regardless of whether the comprehensive liberalism that Rawls invokes is precisely articulated or not, it is undeniably comprehensive: it involves going beyond the resources of purely political liberalism” (ibid. p222).
In other words the self can be understood as having some fundamental aims, some constitutive attachments which may under certain circumstance ‘trump’ the values of political liberalism. One might try to categorise these certain circumstances, to lay down which constitutive comprehensive attachments trump which strands of the theory of justice and under what circumstances. However this would be extremely difficult if not impossible and it seems to me that the concession mentioned above suggests that a compromise position is required; that the road that tenaciously adheres to liberal v. communitarian or perfectionist v. anti perfectionist dichotomies is a dead end.

In order to explore this compromise position more closely I shall briefly reconsider Charles Taylor’s position and then turn to the work of Joseph Raz. Taylor’s analysis begins with the question “who am I?” (Taylor 1989b p27) and it is immediately clear that for Taylor the answer “I’m Bob Smith” or whatever does not amount to much – if anything. On Taylor’s view the self only begins to get some sense of its identity when it ‘knows’ where it belongs; “…say as a Catholic or an anarchist. Or, they may define it in part by the nation or tradition they belong to; as an Armenian, say, or a Quebecois” (ibid.). Furthermore Taylor insists “this is not meant just as a contingently true psychological fact about human beings; which could perhaps turn out one day not to hold for some exceptional individual or new type, some superhuman of disengaged objectification. Rather the claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognise as integral, that is undamaged, human personhood” (ibid.).

For Taylor the individual’s relationship to his community is constitutive of his identity and if that relationship is severed then the person experiences an identity crisis, disorientated and without bearings. The task of finding out who I am is the task of finding where I fit into the community or communities to which I belong. This commitment to community has a moral dimension too, and knowing who I am cannot be separated from my conception of what is valuable or good. As a narrative self I must be oriented in a moral space, I must have a sense of where I have come from and where I am going, in other words strong values are constitutive of the self.

Nicholas Smith draws out the parallel between Taylor’s arguments for our situated identity and our ethical orientation towards the good. The development of Taylor’s position would take us a long way from our theme, but Smith argues that: “Taylor’s study of Hegelian dialectics enabled him to formulate more clearly the claim to validity of Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological description of embodied subjectivity” (Smith 2002 p62). From perceiving objects as up or down, closer or farther away we have an inescapable structure to our perception and if these disappear we lose all sense of normality. Similarly we have inescapable horizons that define our identity and these horizons bound and give sense to our very being. Smith goes on, “Taylor responds with a transcendental argument that tries to show that an orientation to the good is an indispensable feature of human agency. The argument has the same form as the ‘proof’ Taylor gave of the thesis that human beings are essentially embodied agents” (ibid. p93). Both these ‘proofs’ argue via a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* that without boundaries or horizons our very identity and also our moral functioning would fall apart. In order for coherent life our selves must be embodied in community and our moral lives constrained by a strong orientation to the good.

This philosophical position has, as we have seen, some far-reaching political implications. Smith tells us “Taylor agrees with Hegel that neither the liberal democratic state whose exclusive purpose and legitimacy resides in protecting the rights of individuals, nor the ‘Jacobin’ state whose purpose is to generate a unanimous will through the full participation of a homogeneous citizenry, are capable of delivering freedom to the individual” (ibid. p142). A strongly communitarian position is inadequate as it lacks the resources to deal with the multiplicity of identities that persons have and as we have seen earlier cannot accommodate minority groups. Taylor proposes what he calls ‘situated freedom’ as a compromise.

For Taylor freedom or the capacity to choose is not a capacity fully formed at birth. It is a capacity that must mature and develop and the real right is the exercise of mature freedom. Now this mature freedom can only be exercised against a certain background, and indeed can only mature within society. Taylor concludes: “the right to freedom of the individual cannot be divorced from the ‘obligation to belong’” (ibid. p145). Exercising freedom whilst belonging is situated freedom.

For liberal critics such as Kymlicka this situated freedom is more situated than free. The individual is subsumed in to a community which is unduly conservative and which restricts the autonomy of the individual. “No individual is (or ought to be) compelled to align herself with any particular goal or purpose, however ‘authoritative’ it may be within the community” (ibid. p146). As we have already noted Taylor thinks much debate in this area is based upon confusion between issues of ontology and issues of advocacy.
Taylor claims that the communitarian position is generally an ontological one which posits how selves in fact are. This thesis is not logically committed to advocacy of anything. The liberal responses have often been works of advocacy challenging the nature of community and their conception of final ends. Hence Taylor claims the liberal attack is no attack at all, as it rests on what we might call a category error. Despite this distinction, Taylor acknowledges that the relation between ontological questions and advocacy issues is “complex” (Taylor 1989a p.160). He says the issues are not “completely independent, in that the stand one takes on the ontological level can be part of the essential background of the view one advocates” (ibid.). As I understand it this means that whilst there is a logical distinction to be made, in all likelihood and as a matter of fact one’s ontological position will prompt (is part of the essential background of) what one advocates. Given this, it seems to me that there is a genuine case for compromise between liberals and communitarians.

Joseph Raz is widely thought to be one of the most successful explorers of the ‘middle ground’. It must be said straight away that here I cannot do justice to the richness of Raz’s analysis, but I hope I can bring out the essential features without over-simplifying his position. I shall concentrate on what Raz has to say about autonomy and largely ignore what Raz has to say about authority. Raz agrees with Rawls that a (if not the) core value in human life is autonomy. For Rawls the possibility that an individual can revise his own commitments and pursue his own conception of the good means the state must be neutral; anti-perfectionist. Raz holds the reverse, the view that for an individual to be able to revise his own commitments and pursue his own conception of the good the state not only can but also must be perfectionist.

To explore this further I shall first note three positions that Raz wants to distance himself from, three arguments against anti-perfectionism, then I shall consider Raz’s understanding of autonomy and the argument for perfectionism. Firstly Raz says controversy in politics does not mean one position will be allowed to dominate or overrule another. (Disagreement and reasoned debate in politics often leads to development of ideas and acceptable compromise.) Secondly a perfectionist approach to politics does not mean that one group need necessarily coerce another to conform to a particular lifestyle. And thirdly, permitting a state to act on perfectionist ideals does not mean that one lifestyle will be promoted and all others will be eliminated, for there may be a multiplicity of acceptable lifestyles. Perfectionism is not inconsistent with pluralism; Raz is not a political monist!

Turning to Raz’s arguments for perfectionism as a guarantee of autonomy, it is first necessary to elucidate what Raz understands by autonomy. Crucially he says that well being
depends on living a life of value, which he distinguishes from a life believed to be of value. A particular life has value because it can be justified by good and valid reasons independent of belief. Or to put it another way and to bring out the sharp contrast with the liberal position, a life is not of value simply because the person living it believes it to be and has freely chosen it. Observe that a person can be mistaken about a particular conception of the good, and that there is no inherent contradiction in saying a person’s life was freely chosen but worthless. The assumptions here are that some goals and ideals in life are better than others and that reason and argument can justify this. Neither of these claims seem particularly counter intuitive or alarming.

Hence for Raz, an autonomous choice is a choice in pursuit if the good, and for it to be a meaningful choice at all there must be a variety of possible options to choose between. And it should be emphasised, this is not a choice between several options only one of which is good, but that there be a variety of good options. “To understand why Raz thinks that autonomy requires a choice between good options we need only see that he regards the choice between good and evil as no choice at all” (Mulhall and Swift p266).

Raz’s central argument then goes like this. Autonomy of the individual is of highest importance, but autonomy is only of value if the individual is presented with a genuine choice. This possibility of choice presupposes a certain kind of society, a society where there is a stable social matrix, because “A person’s well-being depends to a large extent on success in socially defined and determined pursuits and activities” (Raz 1986 p309). If autonomy requires a stable social matrix then it is the state’s function to ensure that this matrix exists and is sustainable. This is the sense in which the state is perfectionist, for it must intervene to maintain the social matrix, it cannot fail to act, it cannot remain neutral, when the necessary social forms are threatened.

Hence for Raz the state may endorse goals or ideals because there are valid reasons that justify them, independently of how many or how few people think so. “The fact that the state considers anything to be valuable or valueless is no reason for anything. Only its being valuable or valueless is a reason” (ibid. p412). Raz recognises that states may be corrupt or that states may make errors in their evaluations, but nonetheless he firmly rejects the liberal notions that such decisions are impossible and the state should remain neutral.

But contrary to the knee jerk reaction of the liberal to which we may have become accustomed, this does not compromise autonomy because the individual can “through the development of his own variations and combinations, transcend the social form” (ibid.)
The individual’s rights are in no way compromised, but we must be careful here for Raz understands rights too in a particular way. Adam Swift characterises Raz’s position as “X has a right if and only if X can have rights and, other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interests) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty” (Swift 2001 p143). In other words by linking the rights of one to the duties of others, Raz shows how individuals only have rights within a community. Far from driving a wedge between individuals and community, Raz underlines that the former have no rights without the latter. For example “if I have a right to a trial by jury – so others have a duty to provide me with such a trial – then, presumably too I have a duty to do my jury service when my number comes up” (ibid. p144). The well-being and rights of the individual are incoherent without community.

In particular autonomy is not an individual right, for the interests of the individual are not sufficient reason to burden a potentially large number of people with such duties. However autonomy is a political or social device; it does not articulate “fundamental moral or political principles” but exists “to maintain and protect the fundamental moral and political culture of a community through specific institutional arrangements or political conventions” (Raz 1986 p245).

In the light of this discussion I wish to propose an understanding of the self which is central to this thesis and which underpins the basic claim about the need for a framework for values education. This understanding has both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ components. On the negative side the widely accepted liberal view of the self which is antecedently individuated and chooses its own constitutive attachments is firmly rejected. It is rejected for the reasons that this is not what actually happens, the rationality and morals of the self are inextricably interwoven with a community. Additionally it is rejected because of a sympathy with the view that there is something basically incoherent about the liberal claim. That is to say that the separation of the self into separate parts which seems to be a necessary feature of liberal analysis is not possible and does not make sense. We cannot separate the self-qua-citizen from the self as a whole. We cannot separate out essential constitutive attachments from other attachments; there is a continuum of attachments for each person, between the loosely held and the most deeply held, not a stark partition between those that are constitutive and those that are not. And finally, as Raz points out, we cannot make sense of one who chooses in the absence of a community. These divisions prompt thinking which is based on a nonsense premise and lead us in to all sorts of confusion and misunderstanding.
On the positive side, I contend that, firstly, the self is 'encumbered' and has significant constitutive attachments which are derived from the community of which he is a part. This is of course true for adults but it is also especially true for children. It is as children, with our families and in the places that we grow up that our values have their genesis. Of course they mutate and develop as we mature, but there can be little doubt that the earliest birth of our values and the way that they develop is to a large part a function of what happens to us at school in the widest sense.

Crucial to this analysis is the notion of attachments. We all have a set of attachments which are ways of living and / or thinking which we acquire to some extent by accident and to a greater extent by the way we are brought up and educated. These attachments are a function of the traditions that we inherit and the communities to which we belong. As reflective and autonomous individuals we may reflect upon our attachments and some we accept readily, some we accept uneasily and some we reject. Additionally some may be easy to reject and some may be extremely difficult – there is a continuum here, and at the extreme there may be those attachments that if I reject them I almost become a new person, and I leave a certain part of my old self behind.

These most deeply held attachments whose rejection entails a change in a person’s nature I understand as essential constitutive attachments. But it is important to note that just as change in a person’s nature is an imprecise term and admits of degrees so there is no sharp distinction between constitutive attachments and others. Additionally and more importantly I do not see the rejection of constitutive attachments and the changing of a person’s nature as possible for a child. It is only possible for a mature individual who already has a set of significantly held attachments to reject. As I see it a child must be initiated in to way of life before the possibility of rejecting it and choosing another becomes coherent.

The second positive claim is the belief that the self is ‘encumbered’ does not entail that the self is deprived of autonomy. The self is free to make choices, to reflect on values and to make important and significant judgements. The mistake of liberal education, I think, is to suppose that the autonomous self must be able to choose absolutely anything or it is not properly autonomous. Again I think there is a lurking incoherence here which has derailed the liberal’s good intentions, for the autonomous self cannot choose just anything. The community of which he is a part necessarily bounds his choices; there are borders of rationality and morals, of language and tradition which he cannot transgress and still remain within the community. And as Raz points out there can be no autonomy without community.
Brighouse notes that there are limits to plasticity of human persons. What he means here is that some individuals are able to live good lives from the inside under certain conditions while other people are unable to live good lives from the inside under the same or similar conditions. This second group needs more freedom or autonomy. What is essential for one person to live the good life may not be essential for the next. Some children seem ill constituted to develop the particular virtues their parents espouse and endorse. By contrast some children will be well constituted to the ways of life into which they are inducted by their parents (cf. Brighouse 2001).

Brighouse sees this as an argument for liberal education where the state does not comment on the substantive ends of children, but leaves such questions open. It seems to me that however, that by the same consideration of plasticity some children may gain little from a liberal approach and fail to find a way of life they can live well from the inside. They may drift and feel lost or confused in a moral maze. Appealing to the differences in plasticity of children seems to do little to help us here.

At this point it is perhaps also worth noting the distinction that John White makes between a weak sense of autonomy and a strong sense. Weak autonomy is autonomy within a system or framework. Strong autonomy is a radical autonomy that questions the entire system or framework. For example I might be weakly autonomous about deciding whether to marry or in choosing a spouse, but I am strongly autonomous if I question the whole institution of western monogamous marriage. Voting within a liberal democracy may be seen similarly; choosing how to vote within society is a different matter to critically reflecting on the democratic structure of society as a whole.

White thinks that weak autonomy is essential for the personal flourishing of both children and adults and I agree with him. There is nothing in my argument against autonomy within a framework. White goes on to suggest that adults cannot avoid (at least) occasional reflection about wider issues and therefore they will be better placed if they can also exercise autonomy in the stronger sense and I have no disagreement here.

White considers the appropriateness or desirability of strong autonomy for children and admits "things tend to get complicated at this point" (White 1991 p92). He suggests a child may flourish in a community which is not strongly autonomous, but says for this to happen "educators and other community leaders have to take steps to keep children within the fold, to prevent their being influenced by the values of the wider society. This means that forms of
indoctrination may be used, aimed at a deliberate sequestration from the wider society and a deliberate restriction of attention to the values and traditions of the community” (ibid.).

No! White is wrong, he assumes children will reject what they are taught and will need to be kept in the fold. Why? They may accept the teaching and values of their community and be happy to be in the fold! And even if they do question the values and norms of their community these may be explained and reasons for them may be given – this is not indoctrination! Nor does it follow that if I pay attention to the values of society as a whole or even if I am influenced by them, I will reject the values of my community – I may come to hold them more firmly. The deliberate restriction of attention to the community’s own values that White suggests is necessary, has no justification.

It seems to me that distinguishing weak and strong autonomy is an instructive device, but there are not really two types, but a continuum. MacIntyre and Taylor speak of a multiplicity of relationships of belonging to tradition and community. Hence the young child may be encouraged to be weakly autonomous but not allowed to question the framework. As the child matures a stronger sense of autonomy will be progressively more appropriate and the young adult may come to reject the framework in which he has been educated. I have no problem with this, but that a framework is required initially seems to me undeniable.

Again, White presents his arguments as a choice between very stark alternatives. The pupil who is not fully autonomous is one who has been indoctrinated, and this seems to me to be a fruitless dichotomy. White saves his final burst of scorn for Christianity and says, “in an autonomy-supporting society all children must be protected against true believers who wish to impose their non-autonomous conception of the good life” (ibid. p92). There is a regrettable ambiguity here: on the one hand if White means that children must be protected from those particular believers who wish to impose their non-autonomous conception of the good life then the claim is relatively uncontroversial and I agree with him. On the other hand if, as I suspect, White means children must be protected from all believers who of their very nature wish to impose their non-autonomous conception of the good life then I disagree.

It is by no means clear that the believing Christian is non-autonomous and whilst it may be true that some believers ‘impose’ their belief there is no general requirement to do so. Additionally the claim that all children need protecting from Christianity seems to me either deliberately inflammatory or neurotic. White seems keen to sharpen and delineate the battle lines despite recognising difficulties here, and to reject any possibility of compromise between autonomy and communal attachment in advance.
Finally, although not directly a point about the self, we may note that a political compromise between liberals and communitarians; a belief in partially comprehensive liberalism or 'partial perfectionism' of the state would seem to suggest that schools other than common schools should be allowed and even encouraged. If certain value systems are to be understood as providing essential and fundamental constitutive attachments for individuals and do not undermine the stability of the state as a whole, then it seems such individuals and groups of individuals have every right to see these systems instantiated in schools. This is not necessarily to say that there could or should be no common schools, but it is to say that if one of the roles of the state is to provide education, then it should provide for a pluralist society; schools for Christians, Muslims, Hindus, whatever. This is a complex issue which immediately raises questions of how and to what extent the state may regulate 'faith schools'. This issue is particularly pertinent in the USA and is an issue to which I shall return in chapter ten. However it is important to note again how philosophical arguments about the self may have far reaching consequences.

As a footnote it is important to realise that interest and debate in the nature of the self and in particular its relationship to community, is not a debate that is confined to liberal-communitarian circles. In the analysis of the American George Weigel, Pope John Paul II has been one of the most influential if not the most influential character of the twentieth century. Before his election to the See of Peter in 1978 Karol Wojtyla was professor of ethics at Lublin University (appointed 1 December 1956), where long before the publication of the texts upon which I have focussed, Wojtyla was concerned with the relationship of the self to the community. Wojtyla’s work was very much a product of his department which was concerned to study the nature of the self, to answer the question ‘quid est homo?’ in the light of the horrifying Polish experience of the Second World War. Wojtyla’s and his colleagues considered themselves to be studying philosophical anthropology and their approach, possibly best developed by Wojtyla, was based on realist metaphysics combined with a phenomenological method.

On the one hand, Wojtyla emphasises the primacy of the self as a free agent. When persons interact with others they endow their own existence with a personal dimension. Wojtyla sees participation in community as a distinctive property of humans as persons and a method by which the self is fulfilled. Participation is a property “of the person by virtue of which human beings, while existing and acting together with others, are nevertheless capable of fulfilling themselves in this activity and existence” (Wojtyla 1993 p237 my italics).
On the other hand Wojtyla emphasises community, not as a multiplicity of subjects, but as “the specific unity of this multiplicity” (ibid. p238). That is to say in community the set of relations that holds the group together and defines it come to the fore. “The concept of community….has both a real and an ideal meaning: it signifies both a certain reality and an ideal or principle. This meaning is ontological as well as axiological, and hence also normative” (ibid. p239). The mention of normativity here is Wojtyla’s recognition of the ethical constraints that the community exerts on the self.

More interesting perhaps than this difficult presentation is the recognition of the essential conflict: “the problem of the relation between the community (the value of the community) and the autoteleology of the human being” (ibid. p240). Wojtyla’s resolution of the problem resides in a distinction between ‘I-Thou’ relationships and ‘we’ relationships. ‘I-Thou’ relationships are person to person relationships, one-to-one, where both parties are simultaneously subject and object in the relationship. There is a reflexive recognition that the Thou is also another I, and each recognises the other as “fully constituted, separate, personal, subjects with all that comprises the subjectivity of each of them” (ibid. p242).

By contrast the ‘we’ relationship is the relationship of the person to a group, and this is more than a relationship to many selves, it is a bond to a common good. The self is not diminished in this relationship, but in fact finds a new social dimension. Wojtyla’s compromise (if we wish to call it that) is his insistence that both types of relationships are necessary for a fulfilled life: for the complete development of the person. His favourite example is marriage, in which there is clearly an interpersonal ‘I-Thou’ relationship between the man and the woman, but there is also a ‘we’ relationship, they are a single entity, they have new responsibilities and duties, and through the ‘we’ relationship each partner grows and is enriched.

The lesson to be learnt in the context of education and education for values is a rejection of the antipathy between freedom or autonomy of the self, and alignment with or membership of a given group or community. Of course there are manipulative and coercive communities just as there are wicked and destructive individuals, but in speaking of education to a certain extent we concern ourselves with an ideal. I contend that because of the very nature of the self, the ideal here is that the individual reaches maturity and fulfilment not as a liberal autonomous self contra the community, but as a situated autonomous self within it!
My early discussion about what constituted a framework was underpinned by and dependent upon certain assumptions about the nature of the self. I hope that in chapter seven these assumptions have been laid bare and have been located within the context of the liberal-communitarian debate. Following Raz I contend that the autonomy of the individual is not an autonomy contra the community of which the individual is a part, but that membership of some community is an essential prerequisite for the exercise of autonomy. The notion of the unencumbered self is rejected, and the self is understood as partly encumbered and yet autonomous. As I suggested earlier these clarifications do not only serve to explicate what a framework is but they also provide the reasons why a framework is necessary for values education. In short, I contend that the concept of the self that I have proposed also serves to justify my claim that values education requires a framework.

The purpose of this chapter is to present that justification: that is to draw out the links between the notion of framework that I have developed and the notion of the individual as a free but encumbered self. In its simplest or most basic form the argument runs like this:

A1 The well-being of the self requires it to be situated.
A2 The enhancement of the well-being of the self is (or ought to be) the purpose of education.
A3 Hence the (or at least a) purpose of education is to situate the self.
A4 Hence education must provide a situation – that is a framework.

As it stands this is too stark and requires a number of additional qualifications and expansions. It will be necessary to consider the notions of individuals and selves, of well being, the obvious communitarian reply to A3 that education is about the formation of communities not individuals, and the connections between situatedness and frameworks need to be shown. So with these qualifications in mind, let us start again. Finally as this thesis is about education rather than about selves it seems education is a more fitting place to start than selves.

B1 Education in a liberal society should aim at the flourishing of individuals.

Three points may be made here. Firstly, the term well-being (in A1), derived from Aristotle and bound up with notions of the good life, is widely used and may be taken to mean "both a condition of the good life and what the good life achieves" (Honderich p908). Possible
ambiguities lurk here however not only because of this dual designation but also on account of the good life being understood in moral terms or as a life of enjoyment. Whilst Aristotle saw these two as integrated, i.e. the moral good life is the enjoyable life, other philosophers have found this dichotomy problematic. Further well-being seems to suggest something of an inert state, a condition in which one is or to which one aspires. In the literature ‘human well-being’ is used almost interchangeably with ‘human flourishing’ and little distinction is drawn between them, but for our purposes flourishing seems a better term as it less burdened with ambiguity and suggests a characteristic of the person as a whole. Further and perhaps more importantly, flourishing suggests something of a mode of existence rather than a state of being and seems more appropriate to the endeavour of education. We do not aim at a final end product (well-being) but at a way of living. Hence it seems appropriate to replace well-being in A1 by flourishing.

Secondly, we do not tend to refer to people as selves, but rather as individuals. It is almost as though the individual has a self, but is more than it. The self is that theoretical, perhaps inner part of a person about which philosophers speculate; the meaning and nature of the self are under scrutiny, but in schools the concern is broader than this. Schools and education are concerned with the development of whole persons, individuals not just selves. Hence this section of the argument seems better expressed in terms of individuals than selves.

Of course, this does not mean that the previous discussion (chapter VII) is redundant for we may make a distinction between the more theoretical and the more practical aspects of the discussion. The theoretical side of the discussion is located within the context of the liberal communitarian debate and is couched in the language of the self. When we engage with this debate it is appropriate to speak of the self and selves. When we come to apply some of this theory to the educational situation, talk of selves seems less appropriate and talk of the individual seems better. At the beginning of Sources of the Self, Taylor declares his is a search for the modern identity, “what it is to be a human agent, a person or a self” (Taylor 1989b p3). Taylor does not unravel the distinctions between these terms but settles for self, as “morality and selfhood turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes” (ibid.). It is then I think, legitimate to move from one expression to the other when the parameters of our discussion are widened.

Thirdly, the notion of the aims of education is not unproblematic. We should observe the obvious communitarian concern and likely counter to A2, that education does not concern the flourishing of the self but the flourishing of the community as a whole. However, we may notice that the flourishing of the community entails to some extent the flourishing of the
individuals within it. We can imagine individuals flourishing without their community flourishing but we cannot imagine a community flourishing without the individuals who constitute it doing so. It is, of course, something of a question of numbers for a flourishing community may have a minority of malcontents or deprived individuals, but they cannot all be so. The communitarian would maintain that the community must take precedence over the individual whereas the liberal would put the individual first. I would want to suggest the two cannot really be separated out and hence a compromise must be sought, but we can in fact side step the problem for, philosophy aside, we do in fact live in a liberal society.

In other words whilst this analysis is largely theoretical, it is supposed to be applicable to the real world. It is supposed to have the situation that we are presently in as its starting point, and so we can with some justification, base the purpose of education on the liberal society in which we find ourselves. In other words we may go along with the liberal agenda for education here, for as a matter of fact, that is where we find ourselves.

In addition to B1 and in the light of chapter seven we need a second premise:

B2 The flourishing of individuals necessitates that their selves be situated.

It is worth briefly reiterating what this means and why it must be so. In MacIntyre’s analysis the individual is situated in a social matrix apart from which the rationality and the moral action of the individual cannot be understood. Without social attachments the actions and the utterances of the individual are incoherent. The actions of the individual are only given meaning in so far as they conform to certain practices which are in turn part of a wider narrative and ultimately a tradition. In so far as the individual’s actions are rendered senseless without a situation, his flourishing depends on one!

Taylor’s analysis emphasises the individual as situated within a community. My self identity and my concept of the good are derived from the community or communities of which I am a part. I am essentially an encumbered self or agent. Taylor suggests that the unencumbered agent is somehow damaged or even unrecognisable as a human agent. Again the flourishing of the individual – his full and rewarding participation within social discourse – depends on his situation.

Additionally it has been noted that even if autonomy is taken as the *sumnum bonum* of human flourishing, then on Raz’s account with which I am inclined to agree, choosing and the exercise of autonomy must have a context. They must have a stable social context or
form, which we may call a situation. Raz points out that "generally speaking, to entertain thoughts and to have beliefs we need concepts, and as concepts are historical products, so is the ability to have the beliefs and thoughts which they are needed for" (Raz 2001 p65). In response to the suggestion that we may invent or develop our own thoughts and beliefs, Raz concedes that we may, but says "no one can invent all the concepts needed for further invention, and therefore everyone depends on the socially available concepts to think about and to understand values" (ibid. p66).

Finally we should observe that in this analysis situatedness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for flourishing. That is to say that we must have situatedness for flourishing, but situatedness is itself not enough. A person, and a child in particular, must also have his or her physical needs met. He must be clothed and fed, As a child he needs to be safe from danger and ideally within a stable family. These latter requirements are crucial but are not the domain of education. It is the particular educational aspects of situatedness that concern us here. What are these? To answer this we may qualify B1 with:

B3 The most important aspects of education, as far as situatedness is concerned, are those relating to values.

The kind of education that is relevant to situatedness as discussed above is education that covers social, historical, cultural and moral norms. Education that derives from our common heritage and in short our values. There are certain aspects of education that are effectively valueless and these do not relate to situatedness. The sorts of things I have in mind are teaching a child to swim, or to do mathematics where the learning outcome is more of a process rather than a corpus of knowledge. What about teaching a child to paint? This is a process, but has inherent values relating to aesthetics and perhaps too the inescapable influence of religious art etc.

In saying this we must also distinguish the content of what is taught and the way that it is taught, for the manner of teaching may well convey certain values very strongly. In teaching mathematics I may well convey all sorts of values by the language I use, the manner I adopt and the examples I choose. In saying this there is perhaps no value free teaching, but this is not a real problem as B3 asserts what is most important; where values and situatedness are most likely to be to the fore. B3 does not assert that values education is the only relevant aspect where situatedness is concerned.
Finally, the consideration of a subject like physics reveals a further complexity. On the face of it we may think of physics as a typical 'hard' science, factual in the extreme and as value-free as any subject is likely to be. But behind our doing physics is a multitude of assumptions about the scientific method, about epistemology and procedural protocol, which quickly become apparent if we compare the twenty-first century physicist with his twelfth century counterpart. In other words we should not ignore a distinction between what we might call explicit values and implicit or tacit values. Nevertheless, having recognised these subtle influences, I think, it is appropriate to continue to concentrate on the more overt contributions to values education because these are the ones that are likely to have the greatest effect and are the ones we can most readily control.

Hence, given B1 to B3 we ought to be able to say that if flourishing requires a situation and situatedness is the domain of values education then values education should lead to flourishing and situatedness. But this still needs to be tightened for why cannot the individual be situated entirely independently of education? Might a sufficient basis of language, tradition and culture be acquired in the home and in recreational and other non-educational activities? The answer to this question must be that it might be possible, and cannot be logically ruled out, but in all likelihood education, (and by that I mean school education) will play a large part in the acquisition of situatedness. Why should this be so?

In earlier times society was indisputably more homogeneous, people who lived in villages or suburban settlements formed tight knit communities, schools were generally much smaller, and the school life of a child and his home life were closely linked. We might almost say that the school life of the child was an extension of his home life. In such cases a child may have received much if not all his situatedness through his family life. Language, tradition and community would have been as much a part of life outside the school as within it. In present (late-modern or post-modern) times this is not the case. People generally live in larger, heterogeneous and often urban locations. They go to schools which are often very large and which may be at some distance from their homes. There is much less continuity between home and school life, and so the importance of both the school and the family to the acquisition of situatedness is increased.

Additionally, if family life is increasingly unstable, if there is a higher divorce rate, if there are more single parents and broken homes, then the school has a greater responsibility to its pupils. There is more and more reason why schools must consciously and deliberately contribute to the situatedness of their pupils.
Furthermore, it has been the experience of teachers that those things that one could or might assume a child would know by a certain age, because he had learnt them at home, he often does not know. My own experience as a child was being taught my multiplication tables at home by my parents and being rewarded by two pence for each one (up to twelve!) that I had mastered! My experience as a mathematics teacher would very strongly suggest that this kind of parental involvement is very rare nowadays. Much the same can be said of literacy skills, and the demise of reading at home (bedtime stories) can be clearly understood in terms of the increase of television watching and the playing of computer and other games. I think similar things can be said in terms of education generally and of values education in particular and in the field of sex education and HIV prevention the teaching is to be based on the assumption that the pupil will not have learnt the lesson at home.

Hence given that there are areas of doubt and uncertainty about what a child learns at home, and indeed uncertainty about the kinds of counter-culture that the child may be exposed to outside the school, it seems appropriate to strengthen the argument above with:

B4 It cannot be assumed that individuals will achieve and maintain situatedness without deliberate educational intervention.

Combining these four premises we can now conclude;

B5 Therefore it should be a part of the business of education to try to ensure that, as regards values, individuals are situated.

Having achieved this much, the transition must be made from arguing about situatedness to arguing about frameworks. The deliberate educational intervention to achieve and maintain situatedness must be within a framework. Why does situatedness require a framework? In the light of what has already been said the answer to this should be obvious but it is worth repeating the essential points again.

In the light of what has been said above the self cannot be conceived as an atomistic entity but must be situated within a social matrix. This matrix is inseparable from a tradition and a community, and is instantiated locally by shared rationality, shared practices and shared language. Furthermore these elements whilst distinguishable are such that one cannot be reduced to the others, nor can any be jettisoned.
Ultimately these matrices cannot be escaped but as we have already noted the relationship between the individual and the matrix may be harmonious or troubled, it may be close or distant, easy or uneasy. It is the purpose of values education, surely, to try to give an individual an easy and comfortable relationship to the matrix in which they find themselves. A framework along the lines that I have proposed does this, in so far as it is based on these crucial elements of language, tradition and community.

It is worth noting that Haydon writes of his wish to have a “conception of morality which teachers can be comfortable with and articulate” (Haydon 1999 px). He seems to mean, as I would mean, a conception in which they were well grounded, one which was widely shared, in the sense of not largely contentious, and one which they could readily expound and explain. In his review Dunlop takes Haydon to task for trying to find a conception of morality with which we can be comfortable, rather than one which is true or truly conceived.

Dunlop’s remarks seem misplaced for I do not think Haydon is advocating comfort at the expense of or instead of truth. Admittedly much turns on one’s view of the origin and purpose of morality, but on any account I would want to agree with Haydon that morality is largely tradition and community specific (or at least the interpretation of morality is). In this social context it is hard to see what ‘true’ in some universal sense might mean for truth is a socially constructed concept too. I would want to go along with Haydon that a comfortable relationship with a framework, or conception of morality is a valuable thing.

A key element here is coherence. The individual (especially the young pupil) who is provided with a mountain of information and invited to choose about key issues will find it difficult if not impossible to integrate them. A framework will provide the link, the continuity underlying certain value judgements, by relating the whole educational endeavour (as far as values are concerned) to language, tradition and community.

Recall MacIntyre speaks of the narrative unity of life. Narrative renders individual practices intelligible and when we ask of the source of the unity of life: “the answer is that its unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life” (MacIntyre 1981 p218). As we have already discussed, the narrative underpins the intentions of what I do and relates them to my goal or end, providing continuity to my identity over time. I am the main subject of my own life to death narrative, but others are also significant players in my narrative, just as I am in theirs. And indeed without this narrative unity, if it is not nurtured or if it is fatally damaged,
then my identity is put at risk and as the young man at MacIntyre’s bus stop (c.f. MacIntyre 1981 p210) I would be considered mad.

Similarly, in his book on liberal theory, when considering children, Bruce Ackerman makes the point that cultural coherence is essential for primary education. “Exposing the child to an endless and changing Babel of talk and behaviour will only prevent the development of the abilities he requires if he is ever to take his place among the citizenry” (Ackerman 1980 p141). He says the infant needs coherence but concedes that the degree of coherence is a matter of dispute.

In the realm of secondary education, the ‘restrictions’ on coherence are loosened but “on the one hand, school curriculum must be respectful of the parents legitimate – if declining – authority over their children. On the other hand parents have an obligation to refrain from using their residual authority in ways that sabotage the child’s right to a liberal education” (ibid. p156). Ackerman also considers what kind of restrictions there should be in schools, on the voices (or those who express them) of outsiders. In short he says that legitimate outside voices must be trustworthy (c.f. p155) but goes on to say that what counts as trustworthy depends on “subtle facts about particular societies” (ibid.). Even as a liberal then, Ackerman concedes there should be restrictions based on societies. But what are societies based on? Surely among other things they are significantly based upon shared language, tradition and community! Of course Ackerman does not propose a framework as such, but where restrictions end and frameworks begin is a questionable point.

In the light of all this it seems that we cannot speak of a person being just ‘situated’ but he has to be situated within something. This something is variously called a social matrix, a narrative unity, a society restricted for children so that it coheres or what I have called a framework. The elements of language, tradition and community behind the structures above are all present in my concept of framework, and so it is not inappropriate, as a corollary to B5 to make the transition to:

B6 Therefore it should be a part of the business of education, to try to ensure that as far as values are concerned, individuals are educated within a framework.

and

B7 The more detailed nature of such frameworks can be explicited by considerations of language, tradition and community.
Finally it is fitting to return to elements of previous discussions regarding the scope of a framework. If each class or year group in a school had its own framework then as a pupil moved from class to class (in the course of a day) or from year group to year group over a longer period of time, then it would encounter a changing framework. It is abundantly obvious that this would lead to confusion and bewilderment, but additionally since language tradition and culture do not change between classes or year groups within a school the framework cannot either.

On a much wider scale we can imagine a geographical area or LEA having a particular framework for pupils and schools in that area. This however does not accommodate the mixture of traditions and communities within society. It fails to recognise that in almost any given area in the UK, people who follow different religions, come from different cultures and have different backgrounds, and indeed speak different languages live side by side. A geographical area or educational zone is not the appropriate field for a values education framework.

This leaves a middle way that each school should have its own values education framework. This is indeed what The National Forum for Values in Education and the Community seem to suggest when they say that their list of values is a starting point which is to be adapted by schools as their circumstances dictate. (cf. SCAA 1996b p16). Hence we may conclude our argument in this section by:

B8 The way for schools to ensure that they maintain situatedness is by whole schools subscribing to a particular framework.

This takes us to the heart of the debate about New Labour’s faith schools which we shall consider shortly. Before we turn to these, however, it is worth considering some observations made by Geoffrey Alderman in The Guardian (6 November 2001, Education section p16).

Alderman begins by referring to a suggestion made by Lee Jasper, race advisor to Ken Livingstone, the Mayor of London, that Afro-Caribbean children might be better educated in separate schools. He (Jasper) encouraged the black community to avail itself of the opportunity for funding independent state schools where that could be based on the black community serving the needs of black children. These schools would have black governors, black teachers as role models and would deliver a “culturally relevant curriculum” (Guardian Education p16). In addition to these positive elements, Jasper claims, such a school would
shield Afro-Caribbean children from the "institutional racism" of the current educational system.

Alderman points out that the knee-jerk reaction to such a suggestion is that such separate education is inherently unequal, and cites a 1954 ruling of the US Supreme Court (Brown v. Topeka Board of Education) to support this. But it does not follow that distinct educational provision is necessarily unequal. No two educational institutions are identical, and so those factors relevant to equality need to be separated out. Further, it may be argued that the notion of educational equality cannot treat, or should not treat, all pupils as identical and some consideration of their educational needs or requirements is relevant to the question.

Leaving these issues to one side Alderman discusses a number of segregated universities in the US. He notes there are Jewish, Catholic, Methodist and Baptist universities and whilst these universities “will accept (indeed, must accept) students of other faiths or no faith in no way” (sic) detracts from their denominational status and ethos” (ibid.). Additionally he notes that there are black universities and again although they cannot exclude white students they are “overwhelmingly (over 90%) black” (ibid.). Howard University, America’s most prestigious black university whilst pledging itself to a policy of non-discrimination also declares itself (in its mission statement) as a “predominantly Afro-Caribbean university…..providing educational opportunities for African-American men and women and for other historically disenfranchised groups” (ibid.).

And it is not only America, Alderman points out that Oxford and Cambridge are Anglican foundations, and an advertisement in June 2000 for a pro-Rector for the university of Surrey stipulated that the successful candidate would be a Methodist. Although not directly relevant to our discussion I think both of these examples are poor. Oxford and Cambridge are not really “Anglican foundations” as both pre-date the Reformation and whilst they may have an Anglican flavour now (many colleges have Anglican chapels and chaplains) this does not influence their appointments, admissions or curricula to any significant degree. The Surrey case is presumably a consequence of some founding charter or benefaction, but I am almost certain that the broader operation, admission and teaching of Surrey University is in no way influenced by its having a Methodist pro-Rector. The comparison with the American universities is not analogous, for there, I think the whole point is that admissions, appointments and indeed curricula are influenced to a point by the ethos and orientation of the university. (cf. Our earlier discussion of MacIntyre’s remarks in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry).
But the key question remains. Given that this segregation is voluntary, (and very few people defend enforced racial segregation), and given that Afro-Caribbean pupils fare better in segregated schools should they be established? Alderman’s own view is that “to permit genuinely voluntary segregation seems to me nothing less than common sense” (Guardian education p16) and I am inclined to agree with him. Indeed such schools based on common language, tradition and community seems just the kind of thing I have been arguing for.

One reservation remains. Alderman and Jasper seem to suggest that such segregated schools are better or provide a better education. Now what does better mean in this context? If it simply means enhanced examination results then we must be very careful, for despite the modern obsession there is more to education than exam results. If better means something like increased exam performance or a reduction in teenage crime and improved racial harmony then this is a very strong case. But these consequentialist concerns, however compelling, are distinct from the sort of I claim I have been making based on the essential nature of individuals with situated selves. My claim is that human nature is such that individuals flourish when their selves are situated, and hence situatedness in the context of an educational framework is an inherently worthwhile thing.

It is worth emphasising: I have said that ‘in so far as the individual’s actions are rendered senseless without a situation, his flourishing depends on one!’ and ‘the flourishing of the individual – depends on his situation’ but these are quite distinct from comparative statements. That is: I am not saying the individual is better off with a situation (or some similar locution) I am saying it is essential. Even if we return to the use of well-being there is no comparative here for we do not speak of ‘ better being’ or ‘more well-being’. Therefore whilst I am largely inclined to agree with the sort of conclusions Alderman reaches, I would say that my reasons for so doing are distinct from his.

Additionally Alderman stresses that there is to be no compulsory segregation of pupils, and presumably those Afro-Caribbean pupils who did not wish to attend the Afro-Caribbean school could attend any other schools of their choice including the local common or comprehensive school. I am in full agreement with this but again need to point out that this is slightly different to my claim. There is no precise analogy in that those who did not want to attend School S with framework F would be free to go elsewhere, but there would be no neutral or common school. Every school would have a framework of some kind. As I have tried to say these may be tighter or looser, confessional or non-confessional, but I do not imagine a neutral or framework-less alternative as selves could not then be situated. Further,
I believe there is no such thing as a neutral or liberal (I use the terms loosely) framework, but this is a more controversial claim, and one to which I shall address in chapter nine.

And finally whereas the Alderman discussion explicitly talks of segregation of pupils, my school frameworks entail no such segregation. A school with a given framework would be open to all, but those who did attend that school would expect a particular ethos and would be expected to participate in it and to contribute to it. Admittedly this becomes a little more complicated in the case of confessional frameworks and we may ask for example, would non-Catholics at a Catholic school be expected to attend Mass? The answer in my mind is yes but two points may be made. Firstly this is a particular kind of example given that the Mass is a central part of what Catholicism is all about; it is at the heart of what Catholics do, and a Catholic who never attends mass is an oddity indeed. This example is chosen as it raises the dilemma starkly. Secondly, however, it is to be acknowledged that one can participate in the Mass at different levels and whilst it may not be appropriate to ask a non-Catholic to read a lesson or lead prayers, they could reasonably be expected to attend and engage with the liturgy at their own level. I do not consider this in any way problematic as it rests on the prior choice of the pupil (or his parents choice for him) to attend a Catholic school.

Having said this a distinction needs to be drawn for unlike the present English situation where Catholic schools are generally oversubscribed (often for reasons other than religious affiliation) and are often the only schools in an area with a clear framework, under my system there would be a plethora of choice. In other words my framework is really a recipe for what happens at the schools, not one for who is allowed to attend. I appreciate that this in practice is likely to lead to a certain "segregation", but this is now a pejorative term, conjuring up images of apartheid, and it seems to me, talk of something like community schools, or communities of pupils, is more positive. I would rather concentrate upon and emphasise those who are included rather than those who are excluded. Additionally, emphasis on the diversity of choice that might be available is again a positive thing, quite distinct from the notion of segregation which tends to conjure images of ‘them’ and ‘us’ which seem to colour the debate adversely.

It is worth noting briefly that whilst the kinds of reasons I have given for segregated schooling are distinct from the kinds of reasons that Alderman gives, these do not exhaust the possibilities. Kevin Mott-Thornton argues from the primacy of autonomy as an educational aim, and says that autonomy must be based on rational choosing rather than arbitrary choosing, and that “rational choices can only be made from within some given
framework of value” (Mott-Thornton p166). Mott-Thornton goes on to argue that the common school cannot adequately provide such a framework for a heterogeneous body of pupils and argues for an “alternative model... involving the rejection of common state schooling... and based on the conservative or civic pluralist perspective” (ibid. p165). The details of this need not concern us but the possibility of a number of separate arguments here should be noted, and the premises from which they proceed should be distinguished.

Of course, there are many who disagree with these arguments and vigorously defend some liberal conception of education. We will address these challenges in chapter nine, but at this point we may observe a less theoretical but perhaps more widely held worry. Shirley Rowan writes: “My hesitation, however, runs as follows: for a school to embrace whole-heartedly a particular tradition seems to involve a rejection of rival traditions as wrong, misguided or flawed in some way” (Rowan p83). My answer to this would be, I think, yes and no.

That is to say yes, I think there are cases where it would be legitimate to say we reject the tradition you hold as wrong, muddle headed, or misguided. I do not think we should be afraid of this possibility, and thinking of some particularly extreme or fundamentalist religious sects, this is a view I would certainly want to adopt. Equally well on some occasions I think it would be appropriate to say no, we do not reject another tradition as wrong or misguided, nor do we see it as a rival, but it is not our tradition. I can envisage separate traditions existing side by side, with one accepting and respecting the other, but nevertheless disagreeing perhaps about certain fundamental issues. I think this is the kind of situation MacIntyre imagines and Rowan accedes to this, but thinks there are more of us “betwixt and between” (ibid.) than MacIntyre’s analysis accounts for.

That is to say, I think, that Rowan recognises that many of us are products of a number of traditions, which perhaps overlap, and to which we are related in a variety of ways. This may be true, but I think there is, in the majority of cases, an identifiable ‘home tradition’ and that fewer of us are really betwixt and between than we might imagine. This theoretical consideration is easily muddled with a more practical concern that traditions often do not sit comfortably side by side, but threaten and fight one another. This is perhaps what motivates Rowan’s remarks, and indeed many examples of such tension may be cited, but I would want to contend that it need not be so. If those educated within a particular framework act with hostility towards those educated within an alternate framework, that is not a reason to throw out the whole notion of frameworks, but to adjust or modify them. As part of any framework, pupils must be taught that there are alternatives which can co-exist side by side.
By making these kinds of distinctions and recognising the real possibility of error, I think we need not share Rowan’s hesitation. I think we can both reject certain traditions without any qualms, and at the same time recognise and respect others without seeing them as flawed or inferior to our own, just different! Saying that such options are possible does not mean that decisions will be easy or unproblematic, but we should not shy away from making difficult decisions as a part of a genuine search for values education which is effective and appropriate.

The notion of different frameworks for schools co-existing side by side brings us back to the heart of our theme. In this chapter I have argued that schools must recognise and accept their role in the acquisition of situatedness for their pupils, and that this must be done by teaching values within the context of a framework. I have refrained from specifying particular frameworks beyond a general characterisation in terms of language, tradition and community.

I have noted that a number of writers come to conclusions similar to mine, albeit for different reasons. I have also acknowledged the challenge of those who consider what we might call a ‘liberal framework’ in the context of a common school to be a better and viable option. It is to a consideration of this final challenge that we must now turn.
IX The Impossibility of a Liberal Framework

Whilst the central argument in this thesis has been a positive one: namely that values education requires a framework, there has also been a strong critical element underlying this. I have repeatedly suggested that certain aspects of liberal political theory in particular the liberal conception of the self are wrong and have suggested that the liberal approach to education is misguided. The time has come to focus on the liberal approach to education and to explain precisely why this is so, or in my language to argue that there can be no liberal framework for values education.

There is a difficulty here though that liberal theory is not a single well-defined theory, but is rather a family of theories and ideas, and the liberal approach to education exists in several forms. Furthermore, the relationship between a liberal political theory and the liberal approach to education has not been made specific. However this is not a thesis about liberalism in any form, so having noted this problem I think it will suffice if the salient and principal features of liberal education are outlined, and finer details are added if and when they are needed.

At the beginning of chapter six, I argued that the early definition of education proposed by Peters became to all intents and purposes a definition of liberal education, as it emphasised a lack of constraint in respect of Peters’ three conditions. Working with and alongside Peters, Hirst mapped education into distinct forms of knowledge and suggested “liberal education is then, one that determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned with the development of the mind” (Hirst 1973 p99).

Although determined in scope and content by the forms, the key element here is that liberal education concerns itself with the development of the mind, with understanding and rationality as qualities superior to knowing particular things, and perhaps (although this need not detain us) somehow independent of them. Furthermore this pursuit of rationality and understanding was to be sharply distinguished from anything that might be or appear to be, brainwashing, indoctrination or in any way non-voluntary.

Dearden developed the idea of rational autonomy and emphasised liberal education’s aim as the recognition of “the idea of the individual as an autonomous chooser with a recognised right to rule his own life within wide moral limits” (Dearden 1984 p43). He distinguishes the teaching and learning of topics that may be characterised as the choices of a “well-informed chooser” (those things with which we all broadly agree) and those topics that must be
“subject to the pupils’ choice” (ibid). Contrasting this with any proposed science of education he suggests that liberal education seeks “agreement on agreement to disagree” (ibid).

I also suggested in chapter six that John White is in many ways the successor to the Peters, Hirst, Dearden line, and White’s work has developed and underlined the approach to liberal education that they took. White has emphasised that it is not so much what is taught but the way that it is taught, allowing pupils to choose and indeed enhancing their capacity for choice. White’s work has been closely related to notions of well-being and the good life, and how these can be best achieved in the context of a democratic society which is, and is increasingly, pluralistic.

White defines well-being in terms of satisfaction of our most important, informed desires (cf. White 1990 pp28-30) and whilst he does concede there is a broad agreement among most of us about what desires are worth fostering, he does not emphasise this agreement so much as the opportunity for licit dissent. The task of education is to help pupils form their desires, establish a priority of desires and as they grow help them to become choosers of their own desires, in other words to promote autonomy.

As I have discussed earlier (chapter VII) autonomy has become increasingly central to the liberal education agenda and is understood by White as the only legitimate path to well-being in a pluralistic liberal democracy. (cf. White 1990 p99). Indeed White sees autonomy as the fundamental prerequisite for well-being. The autonomous pupil is neither deprived of choice nor coerced into certain choices concerning matters of value, and the development of the capacity to choose is the best insurance against the prevailing influences of religion, tradition and the like, all of which are social constructs. Precisely how White advocates that this be done, and the need for some initial criteria to enable an informed choice need not concern us here and indeed has already been considered. What we must note is the central concern with autonomy and choice.

More recently certain post-modern thinkers have gone further than White. They insist that we construct the world we live in, so all measures and norms that we use are constructed too. In particular we construct our notions of values, of truth and even of rationality and so all-encompassing schemes must be ruled out, and as Sandsmark points out, for the post-modernist, the claim that one ideological or religious claim is superior to another is necessarily wrong (cf. Sandsmark p47). The only absolute is that there are no absolutes and pluralism is the order of the day!
In such systems the bearers of value are those things which have been freely chosen or constructed. Truth or moral rectitude in any absolute sense plays no part and the act of choosing whilst at the same time keeping one’s options open becomes central. Meaning itself is conferred by the choice of the individual and so it is the job of the educator to enable the individual to make such choices and to foster and confirm the rights and the development of the individual as paramount.

Of course the post-modern position is distinct from the liberal position since many liberals do admit of objective values, for example freedom and autonomy. However it is instructive to view the post-modern position as an extension or extreme version of the liberal position since this emphasises its key elements. What I mean here is the notion of construction that Dearden mentions, and the centrality and emphasis on choice in White’s work. Of course it may be said that the post-modernist has unfettered choice and the liberal advocates choice within something like Dearden’s ‘wide moral limits’ and I do not wish to deny this, but neither should the absolute centrality of choice be overlooked.

Although there are differences between the different conceptions of liberal education sketched here and the post-modern position that I have suggested may be seen as an heuristic extension of it, I do think there is a sufficient consensus to legitimate the question of whether mainstream liberal education, or perhaps better the liberal approach to education, constitutes a framework. It need hardly be said that I do not consider that it does, but more relevantly and more importantly we must turn to the question of why the liberal approach to education does not constitute a framework.

Firstly it is appropriate to consider language. Does the putative liberal framework have a sufficient linguistic foundation? I said earlier that a framework presupposes a common language or that a shared language is a necessary component of values education; is there then a shared or common language behind liberal education? I think the answer is both straightforward and positive. It is clear from the development of liberalism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the extensive discussion of both liberalism and liberal education in our own day that there is a widely understood and shared arena of discourse or language. Not only is the vocabulary understood, but also there is broad agreement about the nature, scope, or content of the discourse and there is no doubt in my mind that there is a sophisticated language game that underlies liberal theory and liberal education. The publication of copious books and journals is ample evidence if any were needed!
Further I think there is an identifiable liberal form of life, which, recall, Wittgenstein recognizes as the linguistic and non-linguistic machinery behind our language. In other words I think it is fair to say that liberals and those involved with liberal education too have a broad epistemological agreement. There is a broad consensus about the nature and function of politics and at a micro level those liberals involved in teaching do behave and teach in broadly similar ways in their classrooms. That is to say the way they teach difficult and controversial topics is based on a common liberal approach, an approach to the topic and to the pupils, which may not be present in an evangelical Christian (say), or non-liberal classroom environment.

I think then, that liberal education does not fail as a framework because of any concerns about common language or the background to it. It seems only too clear that liberals and liberal educators have an advanced language with well-developed practices or a form of life underlying them. However, because of these practices can we go further and say that liberalism and the liberal approach to education constitute a tradition?

This is a less straightforward question that has already been discussed at some length in chapter three. Recall Alasdair MacIntyre’s central concern is to reaffirm the telos of man. As a part of this project he identifies practices as goal directed activities rooted in narratives, which are historical settings or contexts that give the practices their sense. Narratives themselves are situated within wider inherited social contexts which MacIntyre calls traditions. In this sense then, is liberalism a tradition, and hence could there be a liberal education framework?

In his earlier writing it seems that MacIntyre does not consider liberalism as a tradition. Liberalism encompasses such a range and a breadth of conceptions of the good life that it seems not to be compatible with a single tradition. Liberalism does not constitute an inherited context in an appropriate way. Further we have already noted Mulhall’s remarks that internal methodological and conceptual incoherencies, perceived to be at the heart of liberalism disbar it from being a tradition in After Virtue. Further, Mason’s remarks about the profound disagreements between liberals themselves (e.g. Rawls and Nozick) would indicate that liberalism does not constitute a single tradition at all.

In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? it seems there is something of a change of heart or at least a shift of emphasis. When MacIntyre is discussing whether liberalism is a neutral, independent ground and arguing that it is not he says “that liberalism fails in this respect, therefore provides the strongest reason that we can actually have for asserting that there is no
such neutral ground........There is instead only practical-rationality-of-this-or-that-tradition and the justice-of-this-or-that-tradition” (MacIntyre 1988 p346). Note that rationality or justice of a particular tradition are contrasted with, indeed exist instead of, liberalism as characterised as a neutral ground! So MacIntyre seems clear that liberalism understood as a neutral ground is not a tradition.

But then he seems to muddy the waters by asserting almost straight away that “Liberalism like all other moral, intellectual and social traditions of any complexity, has its own problematic internal to it” (ibid). So liberalism is now a tradition, but presumably not the neutral, independent one considered in MacIntyre’s earlier discussions! Macintyre now suggests that liberalism is characterised by a particular view of the self and of the common good, and in so far as these have developed historically and conceptually, they have a very plausible claim to be a tradition (cf. MacIntyre 1988 pp 346-8).

So the question of whether liberalism is or is not a tradition seems to turn on whether or not it may be considered as a neutral standpoint. This is of course a controversial question and one that we have already briefly considered in our discussions of the neutrality of the state in chapters four and seven. Recall Kymlicka’s remark that “there’s nothing incoherent in saying that the common good for liberals is to bring about a society governed by a politics of neutral concern” (Kymlicka 1989 p78). However for Taylor this is a contradiction in terms; for in protecting freedom and in particular the freedom of choice for its citizens, the state is most definitely not neutral!

The main concern here is however educational rather than political and whilst we may discuss to what extent political liberalism is neutral, and hence whether it constitutes a tradition, this does not necessarily have any direct bearing on the educational question. That is to say the neutrality of the state when dealing with its citizens does not necessarily entail neutrality in an educational setting. Indeed we may recall the earlier discussion of Ackerman's position in chapter five. The nature of the relationship between the state and educational provision is a vast and complex one that we cannot consider here, so we must focus our attention on the question of whether liberal education is a tradition.

I think we may say that if liberal education is considered as some neutral ground, almost in the post-modern sense mentioned above, or on the sense of MacIntyre's After Virtue then liberal education does not form a tradition. There are no widely accepted social contexts in which narrative generally and practice in particular can be grounded. If this is the case then I think the idea of a liberal framework for education could be readily dismissed, as it would
have no component of tradition. There may be those who might want to adopt such an approach to liberal education but I think they would be very rare.

To repeat, MacIntyre, in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* came to regard liberalism not as a neutral ground, but as a theory based on a particular conception of the self, and similarly whilst those who defend liberal education emphasise choice, they do so within broad bounds. These bounds include a commitment to dialogue and respect for the voice of the other. They include the freedom of the individual and the autonomy of the self and as such may not be considered as neutral.

John White discussed this in *Education and the Good Life.* He suggests that neutrality as understood as the state not imposing a particular conception of the good life is a good thing, but goes on to say that for an individual to be able to choose his or her own conception of the good life the state should provide “the necessary conditions for people to lead a life of well-being” (White 1990 p21). White talks of building a substructure, centred upon autonomy and including welfare considerations and a moral framework, upon which the superstructure of a liberal economy may be built. In this sense the state is not neutralist and indeed White says that “neutralism is an untenable position; it overlooks the fact that it is tacitly presupposing the value of personal autonomy” (ibid. p22). With this kind of understanding of liberal education in mind then it does seem as though liberal education may be regarded as an authentic tradition.

Recall, I have argued that a framework must be constituted by, or based upon language, tradition and community. The relevant linguistic background is in place, and I have suggested the liberal approach to education almost certainly does constitute a tradition, although some doubts may be raised about more extreme versions of liberalism. However this issue is not yet decisive, for community must be considered too.

Note that if liberal education locates individuals within communities and creates community then the question of tradition is crucial and will decide the matter. On the other hand if liberal education is neither the product of a particular community, nor forms community in any sense then the possible doubts about whether the liberal approach to education is a tradition will become academic; one that I may (in this context) ignore.

Recall Taylor’s insistence that our orientation towards the good and our very reason are only intelligible within a community, because of the essentially dialogical nature of human life. Our constitution as persons and our ability to grow and develop depends on dialogue and
hence we are enmeshed in a human background – a community. The question then becomes does liberalism or liberal education provide that background, that mesh in which humans and children particularly can develop and grow?

Firstly, can there be dialogue within the putative liberal framework? We have already considered a linguistic background to liberalism and it would seem dialogue is eminently possible. It is worth noting the importance that both liberals and communitarians attach to dialogue and indeed it is a mark of the mature and properly functioning citizen. But recall (the liberal) Ackerman draws a distinction between citizens generally and children. He concedes that children are unable to frame complex arguments or enter into certain discussions so a certain degree of paternalism is not only justified but necessary. In order to situate a growing child both culturally and psychologically, it is necessary that not everything be open to questioning. There must be certain givens, which are to be accepted unconditionally for now, even if open to revision later. The recognition that a child is not a fully formed citizen necessitates that there be limits to dialogue, that there be certain givens and so the free dialogue that liberals insist upon is undermined.

Secondly, for dialogue to be rich and fruitful, to be educationally nourishing and ultimately even to be possible, it must be underpinned by shared values. In particular in the context of a school, there must be agreement between pupils and between teacher and pupil about certain things. Liberal educators would agree to this too, but would say there is a sufficient albeit thin agreement already in place whereas I would want to say that the agreement afforded by the liberal approach to education is not thick enough. However, it is very difficult to measure thickness or thinness of agreement and even if we could, how any judgement could then be made is unclear.

In Values, Virtues and Violence, Graham Haydon writes of the public understanding of morality and says that if it is to be public, this understanding cannot be so rarefied (abstract in terms of norms) that only a handful of trained philosophers have it. But neither can it be so specifically formulated in terms of rules that it cannot accommodate unusual cases and has little or nothing that could be described as understanding. Haydon suggests a compromise; “A trade-off between breadth and depth” (Haydon 1999 p102) as he puts it, and suggests while the language of virtues is important, the language of norms must be given priority.

Haydon goes on to acknowledge that agreement about broad principles or norms does not necessarily entail agreement about more precise details or rules. I would agree with this and acknowledge the need for interpretation and relation to context, but I cannot help feeling that
in a school environment more specificity is required. That is to say whilst the understanding of broad principles, and the interpretation and recognition of context, are skills that I would want to see promoted, I think it is legitimate at the same time to seek a thicker, rule orientated understanding. Schools may be distinguished from society generally in so much as they are inhabited by young people. What no sensible person would advocate for society, may well be appropriate in a school setting.

In the end however, the debate about whether the agreement is thick enough, is I think, not relevant. I think there is a deeper, more fundamental and indeed logical concern. This concern is that for the liberal, in the great majority of cases, it is individual choice that confers worth. It seems to me that it is precisely here, that liberalism goes wrong for liberals cannot have it that dialogue requires shared values and at the same time assert that it is individual's choice that confers worth. Let us consider this a little more closely.

Firstly it is instructive to distinguish institutions and communities. Institutions are things like trade-unions, hospitals and specifically schools that have a number of rules (with values implicit in them) to govern their functioning. Rules about punctuality and time-keeping, election of representatives, non-violence and listening to another's point of view for example. These are rules for the very functioning of the institution and if they are not adhered to the institution would not be able to function. Those who break these kinds of rules, without extremely good reason, disbar themselves from the institution automatically.

On the other hand, communities in addition to rules about their functioning have additional rules or values that distinguish them as a community, give them a communal identity and contribute (to a greater or lesser degree) to the identity if the members of that community. For example a Catholic should not eat meat on a Friday. If this rule is broken then the functioning of the Catholic Church is not threatened, its structures are not undermined; but the rule is a significant one, although it may not seem so, for it is a reminder of what the church is about and what sort of people its members should be. In a school perhaps pupils should rise when a member of staff enters a classroom. If this does not happen the functioning of the school is in no way undermined, but if it does happen this is an acknowledgement of the value that the school places upon its teachers, and is constitutive of the identity of both teachers and pupils.

Now consider a set of shared values held by a community as a basis for their language, morals etc.. These values define the community, exemplify what it is about and contribute to the identity of its members. Those who accept the values belong to the community, but what
of those who do not accept the values of the community? This raises a question of judgement for members of many communities do not rigidly adhere to all the values of the community. Other members may question the values of the community and may be heralds of change or reform; and again the community may have novices or newcomers who are exploring the values of the community, whilst considering fuller membership. The community must embrace all of these, but at the same time will on occasion have to make the judgement of an individual that their degree of sharing is so weak, or perhaps so strained that membership of the community is untenable. Conversely there are individuals who change and who, upon reflection, no longer wish to be a member of a particular community themselves, and we have seen MPs swap party allegiance and churchmen change their ecclesial allegiance, so we are not obliged to think solely in terms of heavy handed communities expelling their wavering members!

However, it cannot be that we both share our values with a particular group as a community and admit that these values are a matter of choice, and their worth is established by our choosing them. The liberal, insisting that a pupil be able to choose his values undermines the givens and shared values that are a prerequisite for community. It may not be consistently asserted that there is a philosophical requirement for shared values within a community, both as a part of its functioning and as part of its self-definition, and that members of that community may choose their own values in these areas.

Even if a value or set of values was chosen freely by all the members of the community, after a great discussion, say, then once the decision has been taken it becomes normative. It is not the choosing it that makes it so, but that alternative choices then become irrelevant. Wittgenstein discusses this at great length in the context of rule following and his philosophy of mathematics. It would be a great diversion to follow this point in full, but one example may illuminate the point.

In his *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics* Wittgenstein discusses John Wisdom (a pupil of Wittgenstein’s) who when first told that $3 \times 0 = 0$ disagreed, and wanted to say that $3 \times 0 = 3$. For three cows multiplied by zero are not multiplied at all and are hence still three! Wittgenstein’s point is that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this, and it could be adopted, however as it conflates with a previously adopted rule or grammatical convention (for multiplying by one) it is of no use and the community gains nothing by adopting it. (cf. LFM p136). I am not suggesting that the adoption of values and the adoption of mathematical rules are exactly analogous, but suggesting that once a value (like a rule) is adopted, a new or different value that could be chosen, would undermine the whole system.
Elsewhere Wittgenstein gives another example saying that a chess game could be started by a black move instead of a white move, and this would be practical, but the game would no longer be chess.

But a question remains: is a school merely an institution, or is it, must it be a community? If education includes values education, and I take it that it does, then I have argued that this requires a framework that is constituted by components of language tradition and community. Therefore schools should not only be functioning institutions, but should be communities and have shared values that constitute their identity and contribute to the identity of their members. It is this requirement to teach values and an understanding of teaching, as in part at least, transmission that is incompatible with the liberal approach to education.

We might put the same point another way, and at perhaps a deeper level. Is it part of the task of education to form pupils' identities? We might want to be careful what is meant by ‘form’ here, but apart from that, it seems fairly uncontroversial that education is about the forming of individuals – the development of selves. The requirement that education form the self, combined with a notion of the situated self developed in this thesis in chapter VII would lead to the idea of schools as communities. The school that is not a community; that does not have a framework of shared values will fail to situate the self, and will not fulfil its educational purpose as a school.

The understanding of school as community does not mean that all the pupils will be exactly alike. We have already recognised that the relationship between an individual and its community will vary, and further we should observe that communities have guests, and newcomers. People come and go but the requirement of community is that there be a set of shared values which constitute the community’s identity and contribute to the identity of its members.

This point has obvious practical ramifications in terms of the admissions and exclusions policies of schools. Firstly, considering admissions and drawing on the distinction we have already drawn between institutions and communities we may easily say that those who do not accept the rules and values of the school as an institution should not be admitted. Admittance of such pupils would undermine the very functioning of the school. Of course this raises the question of what is to be done with pupils whom no school is prepared to admit but this is a separate question.
When admission of pupils based on the acceptance of the values of the school as a community is considered, the question is rather more complicated and is ultimately a matter of judgement. For example, some Catholic schools admit Muslims whilst others will not admit the Non-Catholic Christian who lives next door to the school. Such examples are widely reported in the press. Sticking for a moment with the Catholic example the Church is clear that Catholic schools have a remit to both preserve and maintain the faith, and to spread the faith and teach it to non-Catholics. Any admission policy then must take the nature of the local population in to account. The Catholic School at a third world mission station will be different to a high school in a Catholic part of England such as Liverpool.

The head teacher, admissions team or whoever must attempt to effect a balance between preserving and maintaining the framework of the school, and extending hospitality to those who have other frameworks. The purpose of the school is relevant too and some may exist to preserve and sustain a tradition and foster a strong community, whilst some may be to serve marginalized and deprived children of any framework or none. Again the Catholic Church is a good example since it has both types of schools in the UK. This is not to say the school’s framework itself must be diluted or diminished, but to say flexibility about admissions is essential, and it is also to recognise that from time to time there will be difficult and controversial decisions to make, and that head teachers (or whoever) will from time to time make mistakes.

In recent times we have seen “educational contracts” between schools pupils and their parents as part of admissions procedures at some schools. In the main the parties agree to keep the rules of the school *qua* institution, but it needs to be recognised that these are both value laden and are part of a continuum with the values of the school *qua* community. Some values may clearly fall in to one area rather than the other, but equally well it may be hard if not impossible to say exactly where the line is to be drawn. Of course there needs to be flexibility here, and again the purpose and location of the school will have a determining effect on what might be included in any contract.

The consideration of exclusions is much simpler. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, those who break the institutional rules of the school, or cannot accept the values of the school as an institution must be excluded (temporarily or permanently) for the preservation of the functioning of the school. Those who do not accept the values of the school as a community must be considered from the perspective of the nature and purpose of the school as discussed above, and the extent to which the individual’s rejection of the communal values of the school harms the communal identity of the school as a whole.
It is no criticism of my insistence on a framework for values education to say that problems concerning admission and exclusion of pupils from schools will remain. I think there are and probably always will be some difficult questions here and indeed some difficult decisions that some people will ultimately have to make. In some cases the existence of a framework may make this easier and in some cases this may make things more difficult, but the insistence on a framework for values education is ultimately about situating persons and about the development of pupils and these other questions are as I suggested ramifications. The criticism that difficulties about admissions and exclusions remain is really no criticism at all.

To conclude then I want to recognise that there are difficult considerations and judgements that have to made in real life practical situations, and indeed the insistence on a framework will not solve all of these, but au fond the liberals insistence on the centrality of choice, both as a right and as a worth-conferring action is mistaken, and must be rejected. Hence, with the caveats discussed above, I maintain the choice of an alternate value, or alternate values undermines and splinters communities. I conclude that the liberal approach to education is not derived from a particular community, and does not form or enhance community either. Hence liberalism does not meet the condition of community and hence cannot constitute a framework in the sense that I have developed.

The following objections might be made. Firstly it may be said that I have misrepresented liberalism as a position that leaves absolutely everything to the choice of the individual; that I have made liberalism into a straw man, just to knock him down. The liberal might or probably would say there are of course certain agreed norms, certain values which are accepted by all and that my suggestion that value is conferred solely by choice is misleading.

I think a number of points may be made in reply to this kind of objection. Firstly that as I have suggested there may be a difference between liberalism as a political position and liberalism as an approach to education. Whatever agreement there may be in the political sphere, it does seem that in the educational realm choice is paramount. Certainly in the literature the possibility of licit dissent is emphasised much more than any notion of agreement and I would say that liberal education is essentially about choice. This question is important in the context of my discussion, for it has a bearing on whether liberal education constitutes a tradition, and I have suggested that it does not whereas, others may want to say that it does. However, I am not adamant on the point for it is not crucial. My real objective is
to argue that liberal education does not constitute a framework, and tradition or not, I think the argument from consideration of community is a more telling one.

Secondly it may be said that I have characterised the belonging to, or exclusion from a community in terms that are far too black and white. It has already been noted and accepted that the nature of the relationship between the individual and the community varies and may take several different forms. To talk of inclusion and exclusion on the basis of sharing a particular set of values is too stark. Further, of course, it has been noted and accepted that we all belong to a number of overlapping communities and again to draw rigid boundaries is problematic.

It seems to me that in the abstract (and the political) there may be a difficulty here, but I think in the concrete situation of education which is my primary concern, the difficulty largely disappears. Recall each school is to have it own framework, and so whatever other beliefs one may hold, whatever other communities one may belong to or traditions one may have inherited the real question will be, to what extent do you agree with the framework for values at this school. If the agreement is broad, then fine, if it is not you might be better off somewhere else. The crucial point is that a conception of a particular school having its own framework is not compatible with the idea of a pupil making free choices about all their beliefs, practices and norms. We cannot have a framework and unfettered choice as this undermines community itself.
In this final chapter I intend to alter the focus from the theoretical to the more practical. There has been much discussion recently of New Labour’s initiative to improve education and in particular to increase the number of faith based schools. The proposals have been welcomed in some quarters and rejected in others and there has been a variety of opinions expressed in the press and elsewhere. The publication of *Catholic Schools: Mission, Markets and Morality* by Professor Gerald Grace (2002) and the ‘Faith Schools: Consensus or Conflict’ conference at the Institute of Education in June 2002 have underlined the pertinence of theory and policy to practice at this time.

In this chapter I intend to explore the government’s proposals and the reasoning behind them as outlined in *Schools achieving Success*. To consider alternate justifications for faith based schools that have been publicly aired, and to consider the counter-arguments and the responses that have been made to them. As I have intimated above it seems that most of the arguments in the political domain tend to be consequentialist, and of an empirical nature and thus from a philosophical standpoint, hard to evaluate. Additionally there are a number of complex issues here which overlap and interconnect, but to simply separate tidy philosophy from the messy situation of everyday life is, I think, something of an evasion and some effort needs to be made to link theoretical and practical concerns.

The Department for Education and Skills under Secretary of State Estelle Morris published the white paper: *Schools achieving Success* on 5 September 2001. The two basic premises behind the document are firstly, that education has a “dual purpose, offering personal fulfilment together with the skills and attitudes we need to make a success of our lives” (DfES 2001 p3). Secondly the document asserts that change is timely because of changes in the labour market and that “we’ve come to realise that for most of us the ‘job for life’ is a thing of the past and the opportunities afforded by unskilled jobs are dwindling rapidly” (ibid.). As a prime consequence of this we cannot tolerate an education system with a “long tail of poor achievement” (ibid. p5) because there is no longer a supply of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. The overall educational standard has to be raised.

To meet this economic demand, the white paper claims that the government’s first task in office was to improve standards of literacy and numeracy in primary schools. The paper highlights a number of reforms which are underway and are proving successful, and claims much has been achieved. Given this situation, the challenge for New Labour’s second term in government is to carry these reforms through to the secondary sector. “We are determined to
finish the job” (p9) they say! Thus it is secondary reform that is the subject of the white paper.

There are a number of key proposals in the paper. The first is to ensure high standards for all by supporting teaching and learning. The second is the implementation of a broader and more flexible curriculum for 14-19 year olds which has an enhanced component of vocational education. The third is to promote excellence innovation and diversity and is dealt with in chapter five of the paper. The fourth concerns government intervention in failing schools and the fifth relates to increasing the number of teachers and support staff.

“Expanding the number of Beacon schools, faith schools and City Academies” (ibid. p37) which is part of the third general proposal is the most significant as far as we are concerned. Beacon Schools are those recognised as among the best in the system, and are given additional resources for their work. The City Academy scheme “means that sponsors from private, voluntary and faith groups can establish new schools, whose running costs are fully met by the state”, bringing “a distinctive approach to school management and governance” (ibid. p44). Faith Schools are recognised as having “a significant history as part of the state education system and play an important role in its diversity” (ibid. p45).

The white paper welcomes “faith schools, with their distinctive character” (p45), into the maintained sector where there is local agreement. It says “decisions to establish faith schools should take account of all sections of the community” (ibid.) but it speaks positively of those faith schools that were established in the first term of Labour’s office. In addition to a large number of Christian schools, there were in June 2002 eleven minority faiths and two minority Christian denominational schools that had been admitted into the state sector since 1997: five Jewish, two Sikh, four Muslim, one Greek Orthodox and one Seventh Day Adventist. Of course there is also a number of independent faith schools and the white paper recognises their interest in “extending their contribution to the state sector” (ibid.).

It would be a mistake to suppose that faith schools are the only schools that can say they have a values framework, but in the context of this discussion they are most obvious case. Nevertheless it is important to note that these remarks come within the wider context of chapter five which declares that the aim is “for every school to create or develop its distinct mission and ethos” (p38). Schools are strengthened, it declares, by a positive ethos and a strong sense of purpose, which in turn act as a focus for school improvement.
There are a number of reasons behind this policy. Firstly, “evidence shows that schools with a distinct identity perform best, with the ethos acting to motivate staff and pupils across a wide range of subjects and activities, improving teaching and learning” (p38). In other words, the policy is based on empirical studies, of which there are many, that show or claim to show, that in faith schools examination results are higher and social harmony or school discipline is greater. Work concerning Catholic schools in the United States by Coleman & Hoffer (1982) and by Bryk et al. (1993) claims that results in Catholic schools are significantly better. They explain this in terms of social capital, a strong sense of community, a structured environment and the vocational commitment of teachers. We may assume much of this would also be applicable to other faith schools.

However their research has its critics and Lauder & Hughes (1999) and Goldstein (1993) suggest that the prior achievement and background (parents) of the pupils profoundly skews the results. In other words when comparisons are made, like is not compared with like. There are studies that have tried to ‘factor out’ external influences to find an effect that is solely understandable in terms of a faith ethos but these have been unsuccessful, and when relevant comparisons are made, critics claim, there is found to be no significant difference between faith and non-faith schools. In the USA Convey concludes, “self-selection prevents a conclusive answer to whether or not Catholic schools are more effective than public schools” (Convey 1992 p6). I shall omit any closer analysis of these studies and direct numerical comparisons as I think that ultimately, there are non-empirical arguments that are more interesting and more telling.

Secondly the white paper notes that too few pupils stay in education after 16. “We are well down in the OECD international league tables for pupils staying on in education beyond the age of 16. 73% of UK 17-year olds are enrolled in education compared to an OECD average of 82%, and participation rates of 90% or higher in countries such as France, Germany and Japan” (DfES 2001 p14). The white paper sees that this must now change, and aims at expansion in post-16 education. This aim is to be met in part by curriculum change but also in changing the kind of places that post-16 schools are. The paper is committed to diversity as a way to achieve this and also the partnership of schools with other bodies as we have already mentioned. Additionally it seems, although it is not clearly stated, that there is an expectation that pupils are more likely to remain beyond 16 at schools with a strong ethos, or religious character.

Thirdly we may note that the paper makes reference to Lord Dearing’s report to the Archbishops’ Council and recommends “that the Church of England increase significantly
the number of secondary places it supports” (ibid. p45). This recommendation is welcomed by the white paper but qualified by the wish that these schools be inclusive and serve the whole community. “We want faith schools that come in to the maintained sector to add to the inclusiveness and diversity of the school system and to be ready to work with non-denominational schools and those of other faiths” (ibid.). This call to inclusivity, often unpacked in schools’ admission policies can cause not only practical problems for schools themselves, but raises conceptual and ideological difficulties too, as we shall see below.

Having considered the white paper itself let us now consider some of the voices of those who support it. In the House of Commons debate on faith schools (6 February 2002) Damian Green (Con.) said his support was based on the “simple pragmatic observation that the church school is very often the good school” (Tablet, 23 February 2002 p38). He suggested that the problems at Holy Cross School in Belfast were not essentially school problems but reflected “wider tensions in Ireland” (ibid.) and he said that the recent Ofsted (Office for Standards in Education) report showed that church schools scored disproportionately well. It is worth remarking that this finding is endorsed by A. B. Morris’ research published in the journal Educational Research. In his paper ‘Catholic and Other Secondary Schools: an Analysis of Ofsted Inspection Reports’ he concluded, “The superiority of Catholic schools in respect of measures adopted by Ofsted is very noticeable” (Morris 1998 p189). But again the caveats considered above apply.

John Selwyn Gummer (Con.) robustly defended the religious content of education as what he called the “most important part of education” (Tablet, 23 February 2002 p39). He rejected a belief in a particular kind of multiculturalism and multiracialism held by many MPs and urged a security within faith. His reason was that those who are secure within their own background find it easier to reach out and accommodate peoples from other backgrounds and added, “some of the greatest proponents of tolerance in intolerant societies have had the strongest adherence to their faith” (ibid.). He suggested faith schools could often do more than any other in a community to promote the very tolerance and understanding that we seek! The Muslim Ibrahim Hewitt echoes these sentiments saying “educating young people in environments where they feel religiously secure and thus more open to study, gives them the confidence to interact with the wider community” (TES 30 November 2001 p20).

It should be noted that the Muslim community has been a very strong supporter of faith schools, that the number of Muslim schools has steadily increased since the founding of the Islamia Schools Trust in 1983, and that Muslim schools are often heavily oversubscribed. Not only do these schools tend to do very well academically, but they have a reputation for
high moral standards too. Mr Livingstone, when he presented prizes at Islamia’s Brondsbury College for Boys said that “Here in this school you produce children with a moral code and a clear sense of right and wrong” (ibid. p6.). Finally Muslims point to the tolerance of other religions enshrined in the Koran. Mr Yusef Islam of the Islamia trust has said that, clear ethos “made us more conscious of our relationship with other schools in the area, and with the council and in a broad sense it helped our school integrate” (ibid. p6).

Two other (connected) reasons are often cited in favour of faith-based schools. The first is that faith based schools better tend to pupils’ spiritual needs. They acknowledge the realm of the spiritual, and they better provide opportunities for engaging in and learning about prayer, reflection and silence. For the religious person this is undoubtedly a good thing, but he must recognise that the whole notion of spirituality is a controversial and contested one, and the problems associated with it, even in the context of a faith school, can be considerable.

Secondly, perhaps as an outer sign of an inner spirituality, it is claimed that faith based schools can better provide pupils with opportunities for celebration and help them to deal with grief. The great popularity of carnivals, particularly the Notting Hill carnival, and the national outpouring of grief at the deaths of Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, and Diana Princess of Wales in particular point to an urge for common sharing of celebration and grief. (And it is not just royalty, there was great mourning at the death of the late Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Basil Hume for example and much grief following the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001.)

The rituals surrounding such celebrations and sadnesses often seem to point to the transcendent, to a reality beyond the material, and are deeply rooted within communities and traditions. They cannot just be manufactured or made up as the occasion demands and they often have a religious or liturgical core. Additionally and curiously, it is regularly observed that on such occasions many people who would not normally count themselves as religious have a need to be involved in such rituals. Naturally it may be said that such occasional rituals are sufficient and do not justify faith-based schooling at all, but this is to drive a wedge between everyday life and particular celebrations. To me at least this is artificial, since celebration only really makes sense within a continuity of existence; within a community and as part of a tradition.

The emphasis of ritual within life is currently unfashionable, and raises some deep and difficult sociological points with which I am not qualified to deal. However it seems to me
that this is a particularly strong argument, or at least a strong contribution to a set of arguments in favour of faith based schools.

The TES/MORI poll also found that of those questioned who were in favour of faith schools, 35% desired children to be educated in the same values and beliefs as their family. 28% cited good discipline, 27% said religious ethos, 16% good teaching and only 10% said good exam results. However whereas 25% of those polled supported the expansion of faith schools, almost double (43%) did not, with the remainder neither supporting nor opposing the expansion (see TES 30 November 2001 p6-7). I quote these numbers as I think they are interesting, but I do not wish to suggest that the majority must be right because they are the majority, or even that the majority will tend to hold a correct or most persuasive view. The arguments themselves and the conclusions to which they point, need to be evaluated, regardless of how popular or unpopular they may be. But what of those who oppose the expansion of faith schools - why do they oppose them?

In the TES/MORI poll some 35% of those who oppose faith or church schools do so because religion should not be a part of education. In addition to the philosophical worries about indoctrination and the undermining of autonomy (which we considered in chapter six), opponents of faith schools argue that in the modern scientific world with its emphasis on rationality, evidence and knowledge; faith and ideological commitment should be given a new status. Education, they say, should concentrate on verifiable claims and should be separated from unverifiable claims, or else we may ask why is astrology not on the syllabus?

Hirst is not unique in holding the view that “just as intelligent Christians have come to recognise that justifiable scientific claims are autonomous and do not, and logically cannot, rest on religious beliefs, so also it seems to me, justifiable educational principles are autonomous. That is to say, that any attempt to justify educational principles by an appeal to religious claims is invalid” (Hirst 1976 p156). Although this is a powerful claim I think two points may be made, firstly we have to recognise that no education can be totally objective, autonomous and value free. The nurturing of persons by other persons in a social context inevitably brings some kind of ideological commitment with it whatever it may be. This commitment, be it atheist or humanist, is like religion ultimately unverifiable, and inescapable. Hirst seems to pine for a Utopia which is unobtainable.

Further it is not entirely clear that the religious school justifies its ‘educational principles by an appeal to religious claims’. It may transmit religious claims or support religious claims, but its educational principles and their justification may come from elsewhere. In particular
it may be a principle of education to have a number of schools each with its own framework, including religious schools, and this principle may be justified entirely independently of any religious claim.

Perhaps those who oppose religion on the grounds that religion should be no part of education, imagine that religious upbringing and initiation should be done by families and church groups. This may be so, but there are powerful historical precedents for church schooling and there are many who say there is no better guide to the present and the future than the past. The past success of church schools validates their continuing existence and future expansion. Against this it may be said that our society has changed significantly since the introduction of church schools in the nineteenth century and continues to change at an ever faster rate. The heterogeneity of our society at the present time demands a rethink.

The poll found that the second most popular response to the question of why people oppose faith schools is that they increase divisions within society. Ashok Kumar MP said “this is a road to segregation, ghettos will emerge” (TES, 30 November 2001 p6). Tony Wright MP (Lab.) said, “before September 11 it looked like a bad idea, now it looks like a mad idea” (ibid.). And Frank Dobson MP (Lab.) argued that the new church schools would not be new foundations, but would replace current community colleges and so the choice for pupils would be reduced and divisions will increase (cf. The Tablet, 23 February 2002 p38).

Concerning the situation in Northern Ireland to which commentators repeatedly return, the Humanist Philosophers Group in their publication Religious Schools: the case against write: “We have clear evidence ... from Northern Ireland, where the separation of Catholic schools and Protestant schools has played a significant part in the perpetuation of the sectarian divide” (p35). Similarly Richard Dawkins, professor of the public understanding of science at Oxford University said “Sectarian Religious schools only serve to promote prejudice, confusion and division” and “religious violence in Northern Ireland is stoked by segregated schools” (TES 23 January 2001 p17).

Apart from all this rhetoric I think two lines of argument may be distinguished, which we may label as positive (emphasising the good things about common schooling) and negative (emphasising the bad things about faith schools). The positive argument suggests that pupils receive a better and more rounded education in a multicultural and multiracial environment. The argument goes that this is the background from which pupils come and where they live, and is the world in to which they will go so that is the sort of education they should have. In
a common education pupils will better learn tolerance and mutual understanding and through a broadening of pupils’ horizons conflict will be diminished and harmony enhanced.

From all that has gone before it will be no surprise that this is an argument with which I do not agree. I think this argument totally fails to accommodate the kinds of things that human beings are and the way that their selves are constituted and develop. It fails to recognise that an integral part of being human is being constituted by certain traditions and belonging to certain communities. It also ignores the fact that being firmly established in a particular belief system often enhances an understanding and tolerance of those who do not belong to that system. Finally it seems to me that the empirical claim that mixed education in common schools leads to more understanding, tolerance and diminished conflict is one for which we do not have sufficient evidence and indeed some readings of the available evidence would suggest the reverse!

The negative argument for faith schools suggests that separate faith schools contribute to social division and conflict; that they are a causal factor in racial and religious conflicts that we have recently witnessed, and that an increase in faith schools will only exacerbate the current problems. In response to these kinds of remarks three responses need to be made. Firstly those who support faith based schools have enquired after the evidence which supports the claims made by Dawkins and the Humanist Philosophers Group, and have suggested that the sort of evidence that is required is either inadequate or missing. (The HPG offer no evidence in support of the assertion on page 35 of their pamphlet!) Grace has remarked that if Dawkins applied the same standards of academic rigour to his remarks about education as he does to evolutionary biology then his assertions could never have been made!

Secondly, it must be recognised that the situations in Northern Ireland (to which people so often refer) and more recently in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley are deeply complex and multi-faceted and comments about schools and schooling must be understood in their appropriate context. That is to say, it is naive if not downright misleading to consider schooling apart from issues of immigration, poverty and political oppression in these areas. Those who point to separate schooling in Northern Ireland and suggest it does not work fail to appreciate the wider context of the conflict and the historical development of the situation. Estelle Morris has remarked that “it is wrong to land on the head offaith schools all of society’s concerns about segregated communities” (TES, 30 January 2001 p1) and Grace quotes from the Government’s 1973 white paper: Northern Ireland Constitutional proposals.
"To make the education system itself the scapegoat for all the ills of Northern Ireland would obscure problems whose origins are of a much more complex character" (p7).

Additionally it is worth briefly noting that The Guardian (25 June 2002 p2) refers to some recent research which suggests that pre-school children have sectarian prejudices acquired from their relatives and where they live. If this is the case it is hard to see how separate faith schools can be held responsible for their attitudes. Of course it may be said that separate schooling only serves to reinforce these prejudices, but this is speculation for which there is currently insufficient evidence.

Thirdly, it is appropriate to distinguish policies and practices in faith-based schools. It may well be that certain faith-based schools do not live up to the high standards we might expect. However considering policies of love, peace, harmony and reconciliation that feature prominently in the mission statements of all types of faith schools it is hard to see how, as a matter of policy, such schools could contribute towards division and hatred. It must be remembered that the arguments here for frameworks and faith-based schools are policy arguments and are no guarantee in themselves, that in practice things will not go wrong.

It is worth noting the point made by Prof. Tony Gallagher at the Institute of Education’s faith schools conference that all of those who oppose separate schooling in Northern Ireland argue for more integrated and connected provision. They do not argue for secular provision and in the Province all schools including integrated schools see themselves as faith schools!

Two final points that are commonly made against faith schools need to be considered. The first is that faith schools engage in ‘selection by the back door’ and the second concerns issues of funding and the claim that faith-based schools should not be funded from the common purse.

On the question of selection it is pointed out that there are more applicants to faith based schools than there are places. Therefore faith-based schools are able to select their pupils and no wonder exam results are improved and behaviour enhanced! Critics say pupils are getting a privileged education at public expense and further the population of common schools is thereby depressed in various ways as a disproportionate number of able pupils have been pre-selected for faith schools. Additionally there have been documented cases of parents and pupils adopting religious belief and attending religious worship in order to be eligible for a particular faith-based school. Many see this as morally reprehensible.
We shall consider this in more detail when we look at questions of inclusivity. However it may be briefly observed that an increase in the number of faith based schools should alleviate the problem, as the number of applicants will less exceed the number of places (assuming the number of applicants to be fixed). Fewer pupils who want a faith-based education will be turned down and so there will be less selection. Additionally there is a significant number of Catholic schools in inner city areas that cater specifically for the poorest and most marginalised in society. Again I do not want to examine all the figures here but in so far as faith schools exercise 'an option for the poor' alongside more affluent middle class schools, the charges of selection are surely diminished? Indeed some American researchers have recognised the "important contribution to the common good of American society" made by Catholic schools in deprived areas that are no longer predominantly Catholic (cf. Grace 2002 p85).

I think the question of funding is distinct from many of the questions above. The above questions consider whether faith-based schooling is a good thing (educationally) for individuals and for society. The question of who pays for it is a largely separate issue, and not a part of my discussion. Furthermore it is necessary to distinguish the question of whether the state should pay for any faith-based schooling? And whether if the state funds some faith-based schools it should fund all that apply and meet the appropriate educational criteria?

The classical liberal answer to the first question is that the state should not fund faith-based schooling and this is the situation in present day France and the USA. The simple argument is that it would be wrong for the state to fund something from which certain people were excluded on account of their religious belief. Briefly there are two kinds of reply to this. The state could fund religious schools of all desired types so that each and every pupils who wished to go to a faith-based schools could, but this is generally considered to be practically impossible. Alternatively it is argued that parents have a fundamental right to be able to send their children to a faith-based school of their choosing. This is a highly controversial claim that we do not have the opportunity to evaluate here, and personally whilst I feel parents probably do have a right within bounds to choose the type of their children's education, I do not think this entails that the state should fund it.

On the second question, it is argued that if the state is willing to fund some state based schools, then it should fund all faith-based schools that apply, so long as they meet certain educational standards. This is the debate that is being argued at the present time, with Muslims and other groups arguing that if the state funds Christian and Jewish schools, it
should fund Muslim and other religious schools too. Two points are relevant I think. The first is that there is a general feeling that a line needs to be drawn somewhere to exclude certain religions or sects which are generally considered extreme, but there is no clarity about where the line should be drawn. Secondly it seems relevant to me that like it or not, Britain has a constitution that links the Church (of England) to the State. Now many think the Church of England should be disestablished, and many others point to the heterogeneous nature of contemporary society, but the fact remains that at the present time Christianity has a constitutionally privileged place. I think this is relevant to the discussion. Whilst I have sympathy with arguments about constitutional change, here is not the place to rehearse them.

Finally in the light of all the above arguments for and against faith-based schools, it is appropriate to consider proposals that try to affect a compromise, or pursue a middle way. What of the demand that faith based schools must be inclusive? This can mean that a faith-based school must accept a pupil of any faith or none if it has surplus places, or more strongly that any faith-based school must accept a certain proportion of pupils who are not of the faith of the school.

In particular Lord Dearing’s report to the Archbishops on Church of England schools stressed that Church of England schools should be distinctively Christian and yet inclusive and this is a point that the Archbishop of Canterbury himself has echoed. This is formalised in Schools Achieving Success: “we want these [Church of England secondary] schools to be inclusive and welcome the recommendations that Church of England schools should serve the whole community not confining admission to Anglicans” (DfES 2001 p45). In practice at the present time, about 20% of pupils in Catholic schools are non-Catholic and many Church of England primary schools are open to all comers. There is a distinction however to be drawn between primary schools which on account of their small size and small catchment areas are generally ‘open’ and faith-based secondary schools which tend to have a much tighter admissions policy. The reasons behind this are connected to the facts that faith-based secondary schools are numerically fewer, they have much larger catchment areas, and pupils can be expected to travel further to them.

Considering the legal position: the law currently defends the right of faith schools to select entirely from that faith, such that local families of other faiths or none may be excluded from that school. Estelle Morris has agreed “that the right of a church school to admit by faith necessarily excluded others of a different faith. But in the balance of rights and freedoms between “giving the person living next to the Catholic school the right to go there no matter.
what” and “the right of the Church to select by faith”, she had come down on the side of the second” (Tablet, 23 February 2002 p39).

In the debate in the Commons on 6 February 2002 Frank Dobson (Lab.) tabled an amendment to the Education Bill that would give the local education authorities the power to compel a school to accept 25% of their pupils from other faiths or none. He argued for this on the grounds that non-inclusive faith based schools brought inclusive faith-based schools into disrepute. There is no empirical evidence for this, and charges of disrepute hardly seem like grounds for changing the law! He also suggested that (exclusive) faith based schools contributed to a divided society and cited Northern Ireland. These are issues we have already considered.

A number of counter-arguments were advanced, which went beyond the scope of inclusivity and again most of which we have considered. Crucially it was argued that faith based schools have the right to exclude those who do not share the faith of the school, to protect their ethos and integrity. Having said that, many MPs wished to encourage faith based schools to be inclusive, but did not want to make this a point of law and this is a position with which I am wholly sympathetic. Dobson’s amendment was defeated by 405 votes to 87 (cf. Tablet 23 February 2002 pp37-40).

At the Institute of Education’s Faith Schools’ conference Ian Terry, an Anglican clergyman suggested that inclusivity was central to Anglicanism and related this to the adoption of programmes that promote justice in the widest sense. Terry went on to make the point that Anglicans have a vision of God as inclusive, and whilst he did not suggest this claim is particular to Anglican Christians, he did suggest that it was because of the very nature of the Godhead, that Church of England schools should adopt inclusive policies. He suggested that inclusivity was based on a balance of preserving a faith and welcoming others, and he said the putting of this policy into practice would be crucial to the future of Church of England schools.

In the context of the call for balance, there has been some discussion of what percentage of pupils not of the faith, a faith-based school might admit before it loses its distinctive nature. Some have suggested 10% others 25% and so on, whilst others have suggested it is not the composition of the pupil body that is important but more the teachers and the values of the school that essentially define it. Particular problems have faced those dealing with admissions in oversubscribed faith-based schools, where the tasks of serving those of the faith, remaining inclusive and exercising an option for the poor have come in to conflict.
I think it would be an error to try to give general solutions to these types of problems or to make provision in law. I think schools need to be seen as part of a wider social context and faith-based schools should have additional connections to the local church, mosque or temple. Depending on the context, governors of schools and those responsible for admissions need to formulate and implement local inclusivity policies for faith-based schools.

Finally, many who oppose faith-based schools entirely have suggested the debate about inclusivity is a smokescreen and a façade of political correctness, designed to obfuscate the central issue. They say that inclusive or not, faith-based schools are not an appropriate vehicle for state funded education in a modern pluralist society and historical precedent is no longer a valid guide. It need hardly be said that this is not a view that I am in agreement with and I think the details of the 'smokescreen argument' have already been dealt with. I think influences of faith still go very deep, and I think a crucial part of education is initiating pupils in to a particular framework (language, tradition and community) of which faiths are particularly good exemplars.

To conclude, I want to make three points. Firstly the recent debate both in academic circles and in political circles suggests that the question of frameworks and faith-based schools is a highly relevant one today, and is not simply a philosophical curio that nobody in their right mind would consider. I think that as technology increases and people travel and communicate more and more, questions of who we are and how we belong are increasingly being asked, and these cannot be disassociated from questions about the nature and function of schools.

Secondly, I should probably nail my colours to the mast and say I am largely in favour of the educational policies of the current New Labour government in so far as they relate to the expansion of faith-based schools. However, I think particular care needs to be taken to ensure there is adequate and fair provision for non-Christians who wish to be educated in faith based schools and I think issues of inclusivity need to be carefully considered in particular local situations. I am also in favour of the proposals to encourage non-faith-based schools to develop a strong ethos and community spirit. There is nothing in my argument to suggest the frameworks for which I have been arguing must be religious, it is just that religious frameworks are easy to conceive and have a high profile in current debate.

Thirdly and finally, having expressed a broad agreement with New Labour’s policies I wish to distance myself, quite profoundly, from the arguments they put forward to justify them. Of
course I am in favour of increasing educational standards in schools and I want citizens to have fulfilling and rewarding work lives, but I do not think this is what is essentially constitutive of human life. I am also profoundly sceptical about the way and the extent to which statistical evidence is used to ‘justify’ the New Labour position. For me, it is much more important to consider what is essentially constitutive of being a human person. In my analysis human persons belong to one or more linguistic families. They are constituted by tradition, particularly in respect of their rational and moral lives. And they belong to communities, which give them stability and belonging, which in turn give them certain rights and oblige them to certain responsibilities. It is this understanding of what it is to be a human person that lies beneath the surface of the whole of this argument that values education needs a framework, based on language, tradition and community.
DfES (2001) Schools Achieving Success (HMSO)
HARRISS, John (1992) *Clones, Genes and Immortality* (OUP Oxford)
HAYDON, Graham (1993) *Education and the Crisis in Values: Should we be Philosophical about it?* (Tufnell Press, London)
HAYDON, Graham (1997) *Teaching about Values* (Cassell, London)
HILL, B. V. (1991) *Values Education in Australian Schools* (ACER, Melbourne)
HIRST, P. H. & PETERS, R. S. (1970) *The Logic of Education* (RKP London)
HUMANIST PHILOSOPHERS’ GROUP (2001) *Religious Schools; the case against* (British Humanist Association, London)
HUME, D. (1739) *A Treatise of Human Nature*
IRIGARAY, Luce (1985) *Speculum of the Other Woman* (Cornell UP, Ithica)
KYMLICKA, Will (1990) *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (OUP New York)


MAURITAIN, J. (1946) *St Thomas Aquinas: Angel of Schools* (Sheed and Ward, London)


PATTEN, John (1992) “There is a choice: good or evil.” The Spectator 18th April


PETERS, R. S. (1963) “Education as Initiation” Delivered as professorial inaugural lecture December Reprinted in Archambault pp87-111

PETERS, R. S. (1966) *Ethics and Education* (George Allen and Unwin, London)

PETERS, R. S. (ed.) (1973) *The Philosophy of Education* (OUP, Oxford)


PRING, Richard (1996) “Values and Educational Policy” In Halstead and Taylor chap. 9 pp104-117
RAE, John (1980) *What should be the Aims of Religious Education?* (Hockerill Education Foundation, Essex)


SCAA (1996a) *Consultation on Values in Education and the Community*

SCAA (1996b) *Education for Adult Life: The spiritual and moral development of young people* (Discussion paper no 6)


TAYLOR, Charles (1989b) *Sources of the Self.* (CUP, Cambridge)


TRIGG, R. (1973) *Reason and Commitment* (CUP Cambridge)


WHITE, J. (1991) "The Justification of Autonomy as an Educational Aim" in Spiecker and Straughan chap 8 pp84 - 93


WILLIAMS, K. (1998) ‘Religion, Culture and Schooling’ in Feheny M. *From Ideal to Action* pp 45-56 (Veritas, Dublin)


