Visible Strategies in Pedagogy and Management:
Schools' responses to the quasi-market system

Fujio Ohmori

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Institute of Education,
University of London

May 2008
I hereby declare that, except where explicit attribution is made, the work presented in this thesis is entirely my own.

Word count (exclusive of appendices and bibliography): 74,196 words

Signed:  
Fujio Okmori

Date:  3 May 2008
ABSTRACT

In England, schools with self-management responsibility compete to be chosen by parents, for whom information on exam/test results is available, and student numbers as a result of parental choice decide the allocation of school budgets. This quasi-market system, introduced by the Education Reform Act 1988, has survived the changes of government and premiership. There has also been a continuing controversy between the advocates and critics of the quasi-market.

Strangely, both the advocates and critics agree on a paradoxical view that the traditional academic model with rigorous teaching prevails in the quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and diverse. The schooling model is influenced by parental choice only indirectly through the schools’ strategies. Based on Basil Bernstein’s theory, this thesis proposes a hypothesis that school managers in the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies oriented towards explicit rules in pedagogy and management, or towards ‘conservative’ pedagogy and ‘managerial’ management, than invisible strategies oriented towards implicit rules, or towards ‘progressive’ pedagogy and ‘collegial’ management.

To examine the hypothesis, as a multiple-case study targeting six secondary schools in a London borough, semi-structured interviews with headteachers were carried out between 1994 and 1995, when the quasi-market system was ‘purer’ than the current one that contains more interventionist mechanisms added by the Labour government. The results of the study show that in five of the six schools, the headteachers were adopting more visible strategies than invisible ones and therefore, lend support to the hypothesis and its theoretical framework.

Thus the framework can be a solid basis for the systematic analyses of the effects of the quasi-market forces on school strategies. In discussing the implications of the findings for Labour’s policies, research on quasi-markets, and Bernstein’s theory, reviews of recent literature demonstrate the sustained relevance of this research to the education system at the time of writing the thesis.
# Table of Contents

## Part I Introduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 The Aim and Focus of This Research</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on school strategies in the quasi-market</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research question and empirical work</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance and originality of this research</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outline of the organisation of this thesis</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Part II Quasi-Market and School Strategies: Place for the Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 The Education Quasi-Market: An Academic Controversy</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conservatives’ education reform: The creation of the quasi-market</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The economic analysis of the quasi-market</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The advocacy of the quasi-market</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The educational/sociological criticism of the quasi-market</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 School Strategies as a Key Concept</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistency in both sides’ arguments</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice and diversity versus inequality and hierarchy</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The predominance of the academic model, despite the complexity in</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parental choice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providers’ strategies and consumers’ choices</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School strategies</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies oriented towards the academic model</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications of school strategies for inequality, efficiency and standards</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale for the use of Bernstein’s theory in research on school</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strategies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Part III School Strategies in the Quasi-Market: Theory Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 Visible/Invisible Strategies in Pedagogy and Management:</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of Bernstein’s theory of visible/invisible pedagogies</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The quasi-market reform in favour of visible pedagogies  
The extension of the theory of visible/invisible pedagogy to management  
Directive visible, responsive visible and invisible modalities of management  
Modalities of management corresponding to those of pedagogy  
Visible, invisible and neutral strategies  
Visible strategies predominant in the education quasi-market: Hypothesis  
The place of Bernstein’s theory in this research

Part IV School Strategies in Headteachers’ Discourses: Multiple-Case Study  
Chapter 5 Methodological Description of the Empirical Study  
Case study as the research strategy  
Multiple-case study: Targeting six secondary schools in a London borough  
Semi-structured interviews to be adopted  
Headteachers to be interviewed  
Conducting the interviews and the transcripts as empirical data  
Classification of strategies into visible and invisible modalities  
Qualitative data analysis to interpret each strategy in a particular context  

Chapter 6 Strategic Changes Described by the Headteachers  
Easthill Girls’ School: County; girls; 11–16  
Roundham Catholic College: Voluntary-aided; co-educational; 11–18  
George Square School: County; co-educational; 11–16  
Fertile Land School: County; co-educational; 11–16  
Seymour Field School: Grant-maintained; co-educational; 11–18  
Riverside Street School: Grant-maintained; co-educational; 11–16  
Findings: Strategic changes towards more visibility

Part V Implications, Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 7 Implications of the Findings for Research on Quasi-Markets

The controversy continues as empirical studies accumulate

In contrast with recent research on school strategies in the quasi-market

Continuing relevance, originality and uniqueness of this thesis

Implications of this research for the debate on the education quasi-market

Chapter 8 Implications of the Findings for Labour’s Policies

Back to the future: The quasi-market at the heart of education reform again

The then New Labour’s policies: The quasi-market continued with more state interventions added

The relevance and implications of this research for Labour’s policies

Chapter 9 Implications of the Findings for the Theoretical Framework

Relevance of visible/invisible modalities as school strategies

Implications in the light of recent work by and on Bernstein

Issues for furthering theoretical development

Chapter 10 Summary and Conclusions

Summary

Conclusions

Bibliography

Appendix I: Dates of the Interviews with the Headteachers of the Case Schools

Appendix II: Full Description of All the New Strategies Mentioned by the Case School Headteachers
List of Tables

Table 4.1 Definitions of the modalities of pedagogy 65
Table 4.2 Visible Management and Invisible Management 86
Table 4.3 Definitions of the modalities of management 90
Table 4.4 Subdivisions of Visible Strategy 96
Table 4.5 Subdivisions of Invisible Strategy 96

Table 6.1 Easthill Girls’ School’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility 116
Table 6.2 Roundham Catholic College’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility 121
Table 6.3 George Square School’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility 124
Table 6.4 Fertile Land School’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility 130
Table 6.5 Seymour Field School’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility 135
Table 6.6 Riverside Street School’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility 144
Part I Introduction

Chapter 1 The Aim and Focus of This Research

Research on school strategies in the quasi-market
This piece of research work is intended to contribute to the continuing debates on the market-oriented system of education in Britain through theoretical and empirical analyses of schools' strategic responses to the system.

The market-oriented system was originally created by the Education Reform Act 1988 under the then Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher in her premiership, who was succeeded by John Major. The reformed system has been called the *education quasi-market* by some researchers (Bartlett, W. & Le Grand, J., 1993, etc.) because it involves putting market pressure on schools through the competition between them but it differs from conventional markets in some points including public ownership and non-profit organisations. Despite the change of government, Labour's policies have basically let the quasi-market mechanisms remain largely intact, and basic structures of controversy over the education quasi-market have been rather stable although the Labour government led by Tony Blair and now Gordon Brown has introduced a number of new initiatives in the education policy.

There has been great controversy over the education quasi-market. The controversy has been educational, academic and political. The advocates (Pirie, 1988 & 1992, etc.) of the quasi-market have argued that the reform had replaced the monopolistic system with inefficiency, bureaucratic control and uniformity by the competitive system with efficiency, choice and diversity, and that the reformed system was raising educational standards. The critics (Bowe and Ball with Gold, 1992a, etc.) of the quasi-market have judged that what the new system has brought about is not choice and diversity but inequality and hierarchy, and denied that the quasi-market system has improved educational standards.

One of the focal points of the controversy is that there seems to be an interesting inconsistency in both the advocates' and the critics' arguments. The advocates, on the one hand, have emphasised the diversity of schools for parents
to choose from; however, on the other hand, some of them have expected that the traditional academic model with rigorous teaching and discipline will be dominant in the quasi-market. The critics, on the one hand, have emphasised the complexity of parental choice and denied the dominance of academic performance as a factor of choice; however, on the other hand, they have predicted the formation of a hierarchy of schools and the increase in inequality among pupils. The predicted hierarchy and inequality are based on the assumption that the competition between schools for parental choice will be significantly driven by the academic performance as measured by examination and test results.

Why does the traditional academic model seem so predominant while parental choice seems so complicated? In this question, there seems to be a key to the academically productive discussion on the above-mentioned inconsistency. Whether or not schools pursue the traditional model is influenced by parental choice not directly but indirectly through the schools' strategies. We need to distinguish the strategies of schools as 'providers' from parental choices as voices of 'consumers'. Parental choices influence schools’ practices only through their influence on the schools' strategies. Therefore, it is very important to investigate what kind of strategies schools adopt and implement in response to not only parental choices but also other conditions, including strategies of neighbouring schools, in the local quasi-market. The focus of this research is on school strategies in the education quasi-market.

**Research question and empirical work**

In this thesis, a hypothesis of school strategies is expected to explain why the academic model of schooling seems to be predominant in the quasi-market system of education, despite the apparent complexity of parental choice. The hypothesis is that, in the quasi-market, school managers have increasingly adopted school strategies oriented towards more explicit rules in pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers and/or in organisational relations between school managers and teachers. In order to make their school survive and prosper in the competitive environment, the managers seem to seek more explicit and formal control over the various aspects of school including teaching, assessment and reporting, discipline, and organisation and staff.
In the thesis, the above-mentioned strategies are named visible strategies, oriented towards explicit rules as stated above, as opposed to invisible strategies, oriented towards implicit rules, on the basis of Basil Bernstein's (1990) theory of pedagogies and the organisational theories of ambiguity and loose coupling. Visible strategies are basically school strategies for more conservative pedagogy and/or more managerial management. The conservative modality of pedagogy, which visible strategies are oriented towards, can be rephrased as the traditional academic model with rigorous teaching and discipline. Invisible strategies are those for more progressive pedagogy and/or collegial management. The more precisely rephrased hypothesis is that school managers in the quasi-market system have introduced more visible than invisible strategies.

To examine the hypothesis, an empirical work was conducted to investigate how secondary schools in a London borough were strategically responding to the development of a market-oriented education system as created by the education reform since the Education Reform Act 1988. The hypothesis is to be empirically examined through the analysis of school strategies as presented in the interviews with the headteachers of the secondary schools. The interviews were carried out in 1994 and 1995. Therefore, the subject for the empirical work is the education system reformed by the Conservative government and not yet modified by the succeeding Labour government.

Relevance and originality of this research
The uniqueness of this research lies in examining the hypothesis through the analysis of school strategies in the quasi-market education system in its original form before being modified by Labour's more interventionist policy initiatives, which are centrally forced rather than being realised through market mechanisms. For example, the Labour government has directly promoted more visible modalities of pedagogy in literacy and numeracy. As schools are affected by the central policy initiatives as well as the quasi-market mechanisms, it is more difficult to judge the effects of the latter mechanisms through school strategies.

Nevertheless, because the continuity of the quasi-market system between the Conservative and Labour governments is generally agreed upon, the research findings and theoretical framework of this thesis are still relevant, and have
significant implications for the current arena of education policy under the Labour government.

Furthermore, because policy proposals in the controversial White Paper (DfES, 2005), advocating power and choice for parents and freedom for schools, launched by the former Prime Minister Tony Blair and the then Education Secretary Ruth Kelly in October 2005 have been implemented¹, the importance of the education quasi-market and school strategies in it has been re-enhanced.

The current Prime Minister Gordon Brown has been following his predecessor’s policy on education and doing nothing to change the quasi-market system. In July 2007, both the Prime Minister’s statement² to the House of Commons and the statement³ to the House from Ed Balls, Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, outlined their education policies that include raising the education leaving age from 16 to 18 and focus upon raising standards and promoting discipline and leadership as continual themes. In their statements, there was no hint that they might undermine the education quasi-market.

Therefore, the relevance and significance of this research have been kept, as the quasi-market with parental choice and school autonomy has survived the changes of government and premiership.

The above-mentioned hypothesised predominance of visible strategies and the related movement towards uniformity, rather than diversity, will have significant implications for the current policy issues. In this regard, the rhetoric of ‘choice and diversity’, inherited by the Labour government from the Conservative government, deserves doubt if the hypothesis is confirmed. This means that choice may not result in diversity.

Moreover, although there has been accumulating research on the education quasi-market, including some valuable works of a descriptive nature and a grounded approach, this thesis is unique in demonstrating systematic and consistent analyses of orientations of school strategies in the quasi-market within

¹ Many of the proposed policies became law in the Education and Inspection Act 2006 that received Royal Assent in November 2006.
² From the Parliament’s website, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070711/debtext/70711-0004.htm (Last accessed on 10 August 2007).
a theoretical framework. Thus, the thesis, with its continuing relevance and originality, is intended to make a meaningful contribution to the current debates on market-oriented policies of education.

Outline of the organisation of this thesis
This thesis consists of five parts. In the next part, Part II, the research question of the thesis will emerge in the course of the review of literature in relation to the education quasi-market. Part III will provide a theoretical framework and hypothesis with regard to school strategies. Both Parts II and III set the stage for the empirical study and therefore, use the literature that was available by the time the empirical study was conducted between 1994 and 1995. Part IV will be a full description of the empirical study as a multiple-case study of six schools, including methodology, data analysis and findings. In Part V, the implications of the findings will be discussed, and the summary and conclusions will be made with a view to further developing the theory and empirical research. This part uses recent literature available in the 2000s to re-examine the focal issues in the thesis, and demonstrate the sustained relevance and significance of this research to the education system at the time of writing this thesis.
Chapter 2 The Education Quasi-Market: An Academic Controversy

This chapter is regarding the review of the literature that was available by the time the empirical work was carried out in 1994/5. The review was conducted to establish the design of this research on the education quasi-market and explicate the context for the empirical work.

In this chapter, after a brief introduction of the quasi-market reform implemented by the then Conservative government, the economic analysis of the education quasi-market will be presented because the concept and definition of quasi-market is economic. The advocacy and criticism of the quasi-market will follow it. Naturally, there were different points of view on the quasi-market as a controversial device for reforming the education system.

The Conservatives' education reform: The creation of the quasi-market

Since the Education Reform Act 1988 (ERA)

the Conservative government, led by Margaret Thatcher and then John Major in their premiership, implemented the education reform, which was regarded as the most important change in the education system based on the Education Act 1944. The reform contained, as its main elements, the policies of the National Curriculum and Assessment, Local Management of Schools (LMS), Open Enrolment, and Grant-Maintained (GM) Schools. The principles of the reform could be summarised as parental choice, autonomous schools, reduction of the Local Education Authorities' (LEAs) powers, strengthened control by the central government, and the market principle.

While the idea of a National Curriculum was not restricted to the Conservatives, the National Curriculum and Assessment stipulated by the ERA was the result of

4 On the theme of the ERA, there exist a number of books, including a detailed description of the ERA by Stuart Maclure (1992), a focused discussion on the most important aspects of the ERA in the historical and ideological background by Denis Lawton (1992), and a collection of papers on the ERA and its origins and implications within a broader socio-political context, edited by Michael Flude and Merril Hammer (1990).

two different motives of the Conservative government and its supporters. One motive was that of the neo-conservatives who criticised the so-called progressive or child-centred education and wanted to restore traditional standards and values in schools through a centrally prescribed curriculum. The other was that of some neo-liberals who thought that the nationally standardised curriculum would be a good basis for providing information to be used for parental choice in the form of test and examination results. There were, however, other neo-liberals who disliked the idea, and believed that market forces would effectively improve the curriculum without bureaucratic prescription. The mixture of these motives for the National Curriculum and Assessment resulted in standardised curriculum and a testing and examination system to make schools accountable to both the central government and the parents.

The ERA stipulated that the core subjects in English secondary schools were mathematics, English and science, and that the other foundation subjects were history, geography, technology, music, art, physical education, and a modern foreign language. All schools, except independent or private ones, were required by the ERA to provide all pupils with the National Curriculum. The National Curriculum documents contained ‘programmes of study’ to set out what pupils should be taught and ‘attainment targets’ to set out the expected standards of pupils’ performance in each subject and for each key stage. The pupils’ progress through the National Curriculum was to be assessed at the end of each key stage. Based on an expert group’s report, the assessment was originally designed to be formative and diagnostic drawing heavily on teachers’ observations as well as on ‘standard assessment tasks’, which could also take the form of a defined activity within the teaching programme as well as that of testing. The complex nature and the central role of teachers’ judgement in the original assessment system aroused suspicions among Conservative politicians who preferred paper and pencil tests. The then Secretary of State for Education, Kenneth Clarke, himself was said to have condemned the standard assessment tasks in 1991 as ‘elaborate nonsense’.

---

6 The current lists of the core and foundation subjects, as revised by the Labour government, are slightly different from these original ones. Now, information technology is a core subject, and design and technology is a foundation subject.

7 The years of compulsory schooling were divided into Key Stage 1, up to age 7 (Years 1 and 2); Key Stage 2, up to age 11 (Years 3–6); Key Stage 3, up to age 14 (Years 7–9); and Key Stage 4, up to age 16 (Years 10 and 11).
(Lawton, 1994, p.79). After the first assessment of 7-year-olds (Key Stage 1) in 1991 caused widespread complaints from teachers about the amount of work and time spent on the assessment, the Conservative government changed the complex and elaborate ‘tasks’ into simpler short-written ‘tests’. The simplified system of assessment consisted of a combination of standardised national tests and teachers’ assessment at the end of Key Stages 1, 2 and 3 and the GCSE at the end of Key Stage 4.

LMS consists of three elements—‘formula funding’, ‘financial delegation’ and ‘staffing delegation’. Although a number of LEAs had voluntarily been experimenting with their schemes of local financial management (LMF) to delegate budgets to schools, the ERA required all the LEAs to draft their scheme of financial delegation and submit it for the Secretary of State’s approval. The LEAs were required to distribute most of their education budget to individual schools, holding back only specific items such as loan charges, central administration and some support services. The governing bodies of schools became responsible for the use of the delegated budget, which was not specified item by item. Moreover, the ERA further extended the powers of the governing bodies over staff appointments, suspensions and dismissals, which had already been increased under the 1986 Education Act. This meant a further reduction in the LEAs’ powers to intervene in staffing issues. The ERA enabled the governing body of each school to decide the number of teaching and other staff to be employed and who should be employed while the LEA remained the employer. In short, all secondary schools became entitled to the power of decision making regarding their own budget and staffing. The amount of budget available for each school depended largely on the number of pupils enrolled at the school through a formula for the distribution of the LEA’s budget to all schools within the LEA’s jurisdiction. This mechanism of formula funding, in which a single formula had to be applied to all schools under the LEA, was designed to diminish the scope for political distribution by the LEA in favour of some schools over others. It was also expected to encourage schools to compete for pupils or their parents.

On LMS, see the writings of Maclure (1992, pp.41–60), Lawton (1992, pp.52–3) and Hywel Thomas (1990).
In this regard, the reformed system of education needed to empower parents to choose a school for their child. Open Enrolment\(^9\) was the device for this purpose. The ERA stipulated that all schools were required to accept pupils up to the limit of their physical capacity rather than up to that set by the LEA’s discretionary planning and catchment-area policies. It was no more possible for the LEA to allocate pupils to schools against parents’ preferences on the grounds of the provision of efficient education or the efficient use of resources.

Although schools under LMS became nearly self-managing, the LEA still had jurisdiction over them. The ERA created a new category of self-managing schools, called GM schools\(^{10}\), by allowing schools to ‘opt out’ of the LEA control and be funded directly by the central government. All secondary schools became eligible to apply for GM status although only a minority did so\(^{11}\). The decision to apply rested with a secret postal ballot of parents. Once a school opted out, the property and staff were transferred to the governing board of the GM school as the new owner and employer. ‘No provision in the Act aroused stronger feelings than those on grant-maintained schools’ (Stuart Maclure, 1992, p.61). The LEAs and the Labour Party among others were hostile to the introduction of GM status\(^{12}\).

The market principle seemed to make it possible to compose the reform as an integrated package of the above-mentioned policies. The thinking behind the policy package was as follows. Open Enrolment encourages parental choice as consumer power, and schools are forced to endeavour to attract parents and their children, who bring implicit vouchers through formula funding. Financial and staff delegation enables schools as autonomous providers to try and do their best to improve and differentiate their education based on their own decisions with little administrative interference from their LEA. GM status is expected to make the LEA’s interference zero and further the diversity between schools from which parents choose. The National Curriculum and Assessment also has its place in the

---

\(^9\) On Open Enrolment, see the writings of Maclure (1992, pp.30–40), Lawton (1992, pp.51–2) and Andrew Stillman (1990).

\(^{10}\) On GM schools, see the writings of Maclure (1992, pp.61–84), Lawton (1992, pp.54–5) and Flude and Hammer (1990).

\(^{11}\) As of 1995, GM schools accounted for just above 15 percent of all (about 4,500) maintained secondary schools.

\(^{12}\) By the 1998 School Standards and Framework Act, the Labour government changed the status of GM schools into that of ‘foundation’ schools, which came back under the LEAs’ jurisdiction, in 2000.
The results of examinations and tests based on the common curriculum are expected to provide important information on the performances of schools from which parents choose and a common forum where schools have to compete. The publication of ‘performance tables’ or ‘league tables’ clearly show such policy-makers’ expectations. The education quasi-market is the education system as created by the package of the reform policies.

**The economic analysis of the quasi-market**

The education system, reformed by the then Conservative government, became a subject of economic analysis. In such an analysis, the system was regarded as a quasi-market system in the public sector.

*Definition of the Quasi-Market*

Le Grand and Bartlett (1993a) defined quasi-markets as follows. “They are ‘markets’ because they replace monopolistic state providers with competitive independent ones’. They are ‘quasi’ because they differ from conventional markets in characteristics such as non-profit organisations, public ownership and consumer purchasing power through state funding mechanisms. The authors said, ‘what the non-profit enterprises do have as their objectives is often unclear’. In conventional markets, private enterprises have clearer profit-making objectives.

Glennerster (1993) argued that the education system created by the reforms fell short of a full market solution for at least four reasons as follows. First, no money could escape to the private sector. Secondly, there was no free entry for new providers. Thirdly, choice was limited because all state schools were required to follow a common curriculum, that is, the National Curriculum. Fourthly, teachers’ salaries were still set on a national salary scale limiting the freedom of each school to arrange its budget.

*Economic research on market mechanisms in education*

While the education quasi-market established by the ERA was not a conventional market as such in economic terms, it was the case that both the advocates and critics of the quasi-market system often developed their arguments on the basis of
the perceived merits and demerits of the market and its mechanisms. Here, some economic discussions on market mechanisms in education are introduced. Although the advocacy of the market in education was constructed from some concepts of economics, economists' analyses of market mechanisms did not necessarily support the advocacy.

Some economists analysed market mechanisms in education generally, and others focused on a voucher scheme specifically. Vouchers 'became an important symbol of market ideas in education' (Lawton, 1992, p.38) although the Conservative Party never adopted them as its official policy. With regard to the ERA, it was pointed out that 'the combination of open enrolment and per capita funding in effect produced the same result as the voucher systems' (Lawton, 1992, p.53). However, voucher schemes in theory need not be confined to the state school system, and may cover private schools as well as state schools. The results from the economic research on market mechanisms, including vouchers, were not necessarily in favour of these market alternatives. Questions were raised concerning efficiency, responsiveness, choice and especially, equity. Some of the results were applicable to the quasi-market system while others were not.

Le Grand, Propper and Robinson (1992, Chap.3) admitted certain advantages of a market system, rather than a quasi-market one, in education including the freedom of choice. However, they concluded that the system would not achieve either of the two main objectives of efficiency and equity and that some form of state intervention was necessary. They argued that the attainment of efficiency was likely to be impeded because of capital market imperfection, imperfect information, externalities and spatial monopoly and that equity was unlikely to be achieved when access to education was determined by the ability to pay. Such factors as imperfect information and spatial monopoly seem applicable to the quasi-market. Maurice Peston (1984) also concluded that the optimum decision would be some mixture of privatisation and the maintained system. Barr and Whynes (1993) seemed a little more pro-market when they argued that even the best-designed package of intervention had limitations where market failures were serious because market could be very efficient.

Le Grand, Propper and Robinson (1992, Chap.3) noticed that the voucher scheme and the quasi-market shared many features and attracted similar criticisms
that they would fail to achieve equity and efficiency because of imperfect information and spatial monopoly. They considered the voucher supporters’ claim that it would offer a wider choice through a diverse education system, and regarded the claim as not yet proven. They also mentioned that schools with substantial investments would find it costly to expand or contract in response to short-run changes in parents’ tastes. Peston (1984) raised the question of whether a privatised system would be biased in favour of the immediate and clearly discernible consequences such as the inculcation of 3Rs type and the obtaining of diplomas rather than the long-term and qualitative kind of consequences such as personal development and an ability to cope with society. These questions regarding responsiveness, choice and diversity were more or less relevant to the quasi-market system as well.

Le Grand, Propper and Robinson (1992, Chap. 3) referred to the fear that a voucher scheme to cover both private and state schools would lead to a hierarchy of schools based on fees. On the other hand, however, they also noticed the argument that the system of state provision was hierarchical as well. Then, the authors said, ‘the relevant question becomes: would the introduction of a voucher scheme reduce or increase inequality?’ They implied that the question depended on how far better schools had creamed off the more able pupils. They referred to the criticism that the publication of examination results could be misleading because it rarely took account of the starting ability levels or social backgrounds of different school populations and that it might act as a mechanism for attracting more able, middle class children to apparently successful schools while consigning lower achievers to ‘sink’ schools. Peston (1984) also noticed that the quality of the output from education partly depended on demanders, that is, pupils and in that sense, a school was similar to a club. He argued that a high spending, lower-achieving school might be more effective if it had more difficult pupils and an adverse environment. In these discussions, the pupils’ baseline achievements and socio-cultural environments constituted an interrelated issue.

Efficiency, responsiveness, choice and inequity in the education quasi-market
While the reviewed economic research on the education quasi-market mentioned above did not seem to submit decisive conclusions, some researchers were
positive regarding the possibility of improving efficiency, responsiveness and choice while they pointed out the danger of increasing inequity.

Bartlett and Le Grand (1993) proposed that efficiency, responsiveness, choice and equity should be the criteria against which the quasi-market reforms could be judged. In contrast with the other three criteria, equity \cite{Lee1996} 'rarely appears explicitly as one of the policy objectives of the quasi-market reforms'. They pointed out that a number of conditions concerning the 'market structure', 'information', 'transactions costs and uncertainty', 'motivation', and 'cream-skimming' had to be satisfied if the reforms were to achieve the ends of increased efficiency, responsiveness and choice without adverse consequences in terms of increased inequity.

The above conditions were assessed as follows by Bartlett (1993) in his case study of a county LEA.

He said that the 'market structure' was broadly competitive. He exemplified that in the past, open enrolment already had pronounced effects on the pattern of admissions. Although there was no provision for a school to go bankrupt and the opening-up of new schools remained an administrative decision to be taken by the LEA, there was a developing competitive spirit between the headteachers in open enrolment. The author referred to a case wherein a 'gentlemen's agreement' between headteachers had been broken. However, he indicated that the enrolment system was far from being completely open with limits on admission numbers imposed centrally.

Concerning 'information', Bartlett pointed out that a 'bandwagon effect' on parental choice might develop as a consequence of lack of adequate information. Glennerster (1993) also argued that parents would get misleading information about the efficiency of the schools because they were not in a position to know the value added by different schools.

\cite{Lee1996} The empirical and theoretical research work on 'equity' in formula funding by Tim Lee (1996), which is beyond the literature review coverage, revealed the complex and problematic nature of equity in practice. His findings indicated that although the LEAs' formulae were required to ensure the equitable allocation of resources, the LEAs adopted myriad versions of equity in terms of additional educational needs including special educational needs, social deprivation and other types of needs, with some changes in many LEAs' formulae over time, but without any great convergence between the LEAs. In his view, the diversity and churning in the LEAs' policies were at least partly because of confusions and uncertainties generated by the concept of equity itself with no more meaning than consistency and proportionality of treatment.

20
With regard to ‘transactions costs and uncertainty’, Bartlett, based on the case study, indicated that the numbers of oversubscribed schools and parent appeals had increased and that allocating pupils and dealing with the appeals had become more costly.

Concerning school managers’ ‘motivation’, Bartlett argued that the individual school in the case study was concerned with both the generation of the best overall results for the children and the maximisation of its budget, which implied maximising the level of admissions. He also pointed out that LMS had brought about underspending by the schools in the case study because of a cautious approach adopted by headteachers and governing bodies in contrast with the consistent pattern of overspending, which had characterised the previous system. He said, ‘Headteachers have responded to the new system of delegated budgets with enthusiasm, and there appear to be no headteachers who have indicated that they would wish to return to the previous financial regime’. With regard to parents’ ‘motivation’, Bartlett insisted that parents had responded to the new system by taking increasing advantage of the possibilities to exercise a greater degree of choice of school.

Bartlett and Le Grand (1993) explicated cream-skimming as follows. While conventional markets are not equitable in a sense because the ability to pay is not correlated with need, quasi-markets do not suffer from this problem since consumers receive services free of charge. However, if inequity is to be completely avoided, there must be no incentive to cream-skimming, which is discrimination by providers against the more expensive users. If schools received larger funding weights per pupil for potentially expensive children through formula funding, they would have no incentive to cream-skim. In reality, however, Bartlett (1993) insisted that the more popular schools were becoming increasingly selective through such measures as interviews and examples of a child’s work. He indicated that, while the cost of educating children differed according to their educational needs, the funding formula did not count enough the difference in the needs including special educational needs. Glennerster (1993) also pointed out that in a quasi-market, there would not only be efficiency competition but also selection competition where schools would seek to exclude
pupils who would drag down the overall performance score, and insisted that the quasi-market would produce a selective system.

Bartlett (1993) referred to the fact that it was difficult and costly for pupils to switch schools if the quality did not meet up to the expectations. Propper (1993) pointed out ‘a danger that those pupils who remain in low-resourced schools will receive a poorer education than those in high-resourced schools’. Glennerster (1993) also mentioned that the decline and bankruptcy of a school would cause considerable educational and social costs to the pupils caught up in its demise.

Indecisive conclusions: Improvements in efficiency and responsiveness and increased inequity

The above-mentioned analysis by Bartlett (1993), as a whole, seemed to regard the ‘market structure’ with open enrolment as increasing ‘responsiveness’ and the ‘motivation’ by school managers with LMS as enhancing ‘efficiency’ while expressing concern about increased inequality through ‘cream-skimming’ with admission limits and formula funding. Bartlett (1993, p.152) concluded that the reformed system had brought about a number of improvements in the areas of efficiency and responsiveness through the mechanisms of delegated management and open enrolment, and that the main problem areas were associated with the way in which formula funding generated inequality and the way in which centrally established admission limits restricted a free choice of school. On another page (p.126), however, he criticised open enrolment, which, he said, with formula funding tends to increase inequality. He proposed changes in the funding formula to reflect children’s different initial educational abilities and empowerment of the LEA rather than that of the central government to determine admissions limits.

Le Grand and Bartlett (1993b) were more cautious when they appraised quasi-market reforms in various welfare services and said, ‘we have not been able to assess directly whether the quasi-market changes have actually improved efficiency, choice and responsiveness and equity’.

Overall, the above-mentioned economic analyses did not seem to provide decisive conclusions to the issues of efficiency, inequality and other important
aspects of the education quasi-market, although the issue of efficiency tended to be assessed positively and that of inequality, negatively.

Then, let us review the quasi-market advocates' argument on its supposed benefits and the critics' focus on its expected dangers.

The advocacy of the quasi-market

Criticism of public monopoly and advocacy of the market
Advocates of the market principle, based on the public choice approach, criticised monopolistic supply by bureaucracies in the public sector including education as lacking efficiency and accountability.

For example, Madsen Pirie (1988, Chap.2) listed the problem areas for the public sector such as high costs, inefficiency, producer interests, less innovation and flexibility. He (Pirie, 1988 & 1992) contrasted the supposed weakness of the public sector with the supposed strength of the private sector as follows. First, competition and profit-making keep private businesses leaner and more efficient than their public counterparts. Secondly, while private firms need their customer choices and are controlled by the public, state industries financed from taxation are not controlled by the public but by their administrators and workforce. Thirdly, private markets provide variations for consumers to choose from, whereas the public sector tends to offer standardised services.

He (Pirie, 1992, p.14–15) argued that the Conservative government had introduced three policies to overcome the problems in the public sector—privatisation, internal markets and the Citizen's Charter. He said, 'The common thread linking the three policies is Public Choice Theory'. According to his account, the public choice theory applies the methods of economics to social affairs, and is based on the premise that politicians, civil servants, interest groups and ordinary electors tend to behave as if they were economic participants who try to maximise their advantages and act rationally to secure their objectives. James Buchanan (1991), summarising a result of research in public choice, says, 'the government alternative is inherently inferior to the market'. Let us see how advocates of the market described the inferiority of the government in the provision of education.
Pirie (1992, p.56–57), blaming comprehensive schooling as not being of a high standard, insisted that education had been captured by its producers and that the quality of education had been measured not by output but by input. According to Glennerster (1993), the public choice approach contended that education spending had been pushed up by public sector workers and bureaucrats who had manipulated the democratic process to increase rewards for themselves without producing gains in output. Michaelsen (1989) also took a public choice approach to education and says, ‘Large, centralized public school districts are very much like centrally planned economies’. He insisted that these large systems afforded little incentive for the discovery of the knowledge regarding particular facts that are necessary for effective and responsive education. His view showed that he was an advocate of both the market and the traditional education with an emphasis on teaching knowledge.

James Tooley (1994) presented a philosophical ‘thought experiment’ to examine whether there could be any principled objections to markets as such, rather than quasi-markets in the real world, with regard to educational provision. He invented an abstract market model where the state did not provide schooling, which should be provided by private businesses, charities and other agencies in a civil society. In the model, as a funding safety-net, the state only provided bursaries to those families who could not afford schooling for their children. His argument was to deny two main areas of objection to the market model. He claimed that it was not sustainable to object to the market model on the grounds that education is a ‘public good’ and therefore, schooling should be provided publicly. He also argued that the market model satisfied equality of educational opportunity. According to his account, the thought experiment with this extreme and abstract model of the market would allow us to distinguish between the objections to the markets and those to something else in the actual reforms’ contingencies. In his view, ‘very often writers from the political “left” … move

---

14 From a completely different viewpoint, Lawton (1992, pp.83–105) discussed six theoretically possible options in terms of relations between the state and the market in education: (i) a completely free market—no state intervention; (ii) a market constrained and regulated by the state; (iii) a school system, which is wholly private but subsidized or paid for by the state; (iv) a system where schools—state and private—are all in competition with each other (mixed economy, quasi-market); (v) state and private schools complementing, and co-operating with, each other (mixed economy, planned); and (vi) only state schools permitted. His judgment was to exclude options (i), (ii), (iii) and (vi), and his preference was option (v) rather than (iv).
very quickly from discussion about the “internal markets” (with recall, state funding, state regulation and state provision of schooling) to making sweeping judgments about “free markets” (Tooley, 1994, p.149). He concluded, ‘The question I want to prompt is the wisdom of allowing states into areas of our lives where they have no business, where the agencies of civil society can manage very well without them. My defence of markets against some criticisms is one step forward that nobler aim’ (ibid, p.150).

Quasi-market rather than privatisation

Some advocates of the market principle regarded the outright privatisation of education as politically infeasible and showed the internal market, that is, the quasi-market realised by the education reform as a realistic option to introduce market forces into education. Their view, as follows, was that the internal market would make education more efficient, responsive, diversified and even equitable than the traditional public provision criticised by them as above.

According to Pirie (1988, Chap.21 & 1992, Chap.1&5), the Conservative government privatised the public industries and utilities but did not attempt the outright privatisation of human services covering education, health and welfare because it was politically infeasible in the UK where these services were very firmly established as state responsibilities. Instead, the government introduced internal markets in which the consumers continued to enjoy free services but the producers were under the pressure to compete for consumer choices. He, like the others, argued that the internal market in education had been realised by three measures of parental choice, independence of schools from the LEAs and funding based on enrolment, which comprised the invisible or virtual voucher. He claimed that each of the components was supported by specific interest groups such as parents and headteachers and together, constituted a novel system.

Pirie insisted that internal markets had succeeded in making the human services responsive. He (Pirie, 1988, p.232–233 & 1992, p.58) stated that the internal market in education provided a greater variety for parents to choose from. On the other hand, however, he (Pirie, 1992, p.60) said, ‘Schools, which impart knowledge and skills in a structured way within an orderly environment are the ones which parents have overwhelmingly preferred. The others have to copy this
formula or risk going under’. As Michaelsen did above, Pirie showed his preference for the traditional education with an emphasis on rigorous teaching and discipline. Although equity was not a topic that advocates of the market often mentioned, Pirie (1988, p.232 & 1992, p.56) criticised the former education system before the reform as the one in which the comparatively wealthy had the choice of changing residence or choosing a private school. EG West (1970, p.xl-xl) also criticised the state school system’s inequality based on catchment areas that largely reflected the different socio-economic backgrounds of the populations.

When the debate on the market-oriented education reform was proceeding in the aftermath of the ERA, one of the most influential works for the promotion of choice and school autonomy was John E Chubb and Terry M Moe’s (1990) empirical research with recommendations based on the research findings although their research and recommendations were on the US’ system of high schools. As very few comprehensive empirical works for the advocacy of market-oriented education reform were available in the debate, their work deserves a slightly lengthy summary here. Based on the analysis of a large-scale data set of more than five hundred schools including both public and private ones, their findings were presented in a rather simple flow of logic as follows. First, they claimed to have found that school organisation and academic performance were related. ‘High performance schools differ in goals, leadership, personnel, and educational practices from low performance schools. Their goals are clearer and more academically ambitious, their principals are stronger educational leaders, their teachers are more professional and harmonious, their course work is more academically rigorous, and their classrooms are more orderly and less bureaucratic’. (Chubb and Moe, 1990, p.99) The authors’ view was that these organisational characteristics were highly interdependent and worked together as ‘organizational syndromes’ (ibid, p.139). Secondly, according to their findings, school organisation was not only associated with performance, but also was its cause. In their analysis, school organisation is the second most significant cause of student achievement while student ability is the first and family background, third. Thirdly, the authors argued that school autonomy from external influence, including administrative and personnel constraints, was the most important prerequisite for the effectiveness of school organisation. Fourthly and finally,
although bureaucracy is bad for effective school organisation, they concluded that 'the root of the problem' was not bureaucracy that accompanied democratic control by the state and district governments but direct democratic control itself. Their conclusion, here, meant that private schools tended to have more effective organisation than public schools; In their words, 'When all else is average—average student achievement and behavior problems, average parent SES and school contacts, average school size—schools subject to market control tend to have highly effective organizations while schools subject to direct democratic control have organizations that are merely average' (ibid, p.181).

On the basis of their empirical findings mentioned above, the authors proposed a new system of public education to be built on school autonomy and parent-student choice. In such a system, public schools would be legally autonomous, and parents and students would be legally empowered to choose their school, though the funding of schools would continue to be the responsibility of the government (federal, state and district governments) without allowing parents and students to supplement public money with personal funds. Therefore, it can be said that their proposal was to create quasi-markets in American public education. While they denied that their proposed reform would privatise public schools, the reform would replace democratic control by market control. This proposal was natural for the authors, who claimed, 'Clear academic goals, strong educational leadership, professionalized teaching, ambitious academic programs, teamlike organizations—these effective school characteristics are promoted much more successfully by market control than by direct democratic control. The kind of qualities that contemporary school reformers would like public schools to develop, private schools have developed without external reform at all. ...They are products of school competition and parental choice'(Chubb and Moe, 1990, p.182). The authors predicted that the American educational reform movement led by state and federal governments since the 1980s was 'destined to fail' (ibid, p.2). In their view, despite the fact that the most fundamental cause of the problem was the institutions of direct democratic control, including school boards, superintendents and bureaucracies at both state and district governments, the

---

15 Socioeconomic status
reformers continued to rely on the very institutions in planning and implementing their reform initiatives including tougher academic requirements, newly introduced tests, raised certification requirements for teachers, merit pay, school-based management and magnet schools. The authors argued that even when choice and autonomy were part of the reform package, the result was 'a more decentralized version of the traditional system of democratic control' (ibid, p.216).

Although the above-mentioned authors’ arguments were on the US’ education system, essential points in their arguments seem to be relevant to the British context of the debate on the market-oriented reform.

Let us now turn to the criticism of the market or the quasi-market in education.

The educational/sociological criticism of the quasi-market

Financial efficiency and educational standards

On the one hand, equality was a topic on which the advocates of the quasi-market did not often comfortably talk and critics of the quasi-market often pointed out problems. On the other hand, efficiency was a topic on which the advocates preferred to talk and the critics defended their position. This review will discuss the arguments by the critics of quasi-markets first on efficiency and later on equality. Many researchers worked on LMS, taking the issue of efficiency into consideration.

Leonard (1988, p.213) referred to the concern that LMS would make headteachers senior administrators who had increased financial responsibilities. Cave (1990) argued that it was a common complaint among headteachers that they spent an increasing amount of time in management and a decreasing amount of time in teaching and contacting their colleagues. Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992b) said that the early perception among many senior staff members and the head, particularly, in the case study school they had investigated was that LMS had offered an opportunity for schools to become self-determined, free from the inefficient constraints of the LEA. However, the authors concluded, ‘far from releasing people from the burdens of bureaucracy, LMS may well increase the internal administrative load’. Their argument was that LMS often distracts schools from the world of educating students. They pointed out that senior staff
had difficulties in finding time to pursue both entrepreneurial management and educational issues.

Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992b) indicated a contradictory effect of LMS on micro-situations within each school. In contrast with decentralisation regarding the relations between schools and the LEA, each school’s decision making increasingly rested with a small group of senior staff in a hierarchical management style, making many non-senior teachers feel excluded from their working situation.

The authors emphasised constraints on self-management from the budget sum decided by the level of the LEA expenditure and the allocation via the formula over which schools had no or little control. It was suggested by them that under LMS, the schools’ flexibility was restrained by lack of financial stability, predictability or continuity. They also indicated a difficulty for schools in carrying out the cost-benefit analysis of activities. Bash (1991) described the negative effects of LMS with resources, staffing and training being underfunded though he acknowledged the value of the increased autonomy of individual schools.

Halpin, Fitz and Power (1993) accepted that GM status and LMS helped some school managers to make more effective and efficient use of resources, but they questioned whether such financial effectiveness and efficiency contributed to educational effectiveness or raising educational standards.

Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992a), based on their case study, provided an intensive analysis of the actual work of quasi-market mechanisms. In their view, the quasi-market reform had created much tension between professional and enterprise cultures and had not contributed to raising the educational standards. The authors insisted that their case study schools worked with many doubts, concerns and uncertainties with regard to competition and market. Their argument was that, although some schools and some teachers clearly embraced the new ‘enterprise culture’ wholeheartedly and governors from industry, consultants and bursars were bringing in the new values, the educational reform confronted historical cultures and went through the complex process of adaptation. According to the authors, certain aspects of marketing and competition were reacted against but others were incorporated into normal practice. However, they
stressed a value conflict between business methods and education or the idea of comprehensive education. In their view, the relationships between educational objectives and marketing could be contradictory. The authors also insisted that the wishes of parents would have to be balanced against the professional judgements of the teachers. It was implied by them that educational needs were not well reconciled with the demands of efficiency. They submitted an example of the tension between teachers’ professionalism and the market forces in the case of mixed ability teaching. Based on the interviews with senior teachers, the authors argued that ‘the more time and resources devoted to market activities mean less time and resources available for direct educational activities’. After quoting a head, they said, ‘if managing educational expenditure “efficiently” and being less “slovenly” are seen as one positive result of LMS, linking it to the market has only added new, unwelcome pressures and given rise to new dilemmas’. Adding another comment to mention the time-consuming market activities, they continued, ‘Here, the market does not raise standards, it threatens them. . . . It does not lead to productive self-evaluation but to an unhealthy concern with what the competition is offering, with mimicry, with faddish attention-seeking’. According to the authors, earlier agreements between schools were being reneged up on in response to competitive pressures. They said, ‘The market is seen to be destroying a beneficial educational collaboration’. Their conclusion was that the market was not value-free, the education quasi-market presented difficult ethical issues, and unproblematic relationships between market forces and educational standards were far from clear-cut. To summarise, the authors focused their critical analysis on competition and marketing rather than LMS, and raised a question about market mechanisms’ effects on efficiency in terms of educational standards.

The researchers on educational management suggested more optimistic views as follows. Marren and Levacic (1992), based on their case study of a county, indicated that all the schools including financial losers under the formula, welcomed the freedom given by LMS. They also argued that concern regarding efficiency had been found in all the schools with the exception of one. Bush, Coleman and Glover (1993), based on their research on the first 100 GM schools, argued that GM status had been effective in raising the morale of the staff and
governors and said, 'heads, staff and governing bodies are well able to decide
their own priorities and target resources effectively'.

To summarise, autonomous school management realised by LMS got
ambivalent responses from many educationalists and sociologists of education
who were critical of the quasi-market reform. They alleged the negative features
of the autonomous management such as administrative burden and the dominance
of economic calculation over educational consideration. Even when they
admitted the improvement of financial efficiency, they did not confirm that the
improved financial efficiency contributed to educational effectiveness or
educational standards. Some of them referred to the tension between professional
and enterprise cultures, the waste of resources and time on marketing, and the
destruction of educational collaboration with other schools. Researchers on
educational management tended to be more optimistic about the possibilities of
autonomous management.

*Inequality among pupils and hierarchy of schools*

Many educational and sociological researchers expressed their concern about the
education quasi-market on the grounds of a danger of increased inequality among
schools and among pupils. In the related context, the researchers often denied that
the quasi-market reform would raise educational standards. Most of these
researchers argued that the competition between schools for parental choice would
be significantly driven by the academic performance as measured by examination
and test results, and that schools wanted to admit academically more able children.
They insisted that the mechanism of such a combination of the competition and
admission would facilitate the formation of a hierarchy of schools and the
inequality among the pupils in these schools of different hierarchical positions. In
their view, the above-mentioned hierarchy and inequality were not only
educational but also social because the examination and test results of pupils were
correlated to their socio-economic backgrounds.

Walford (1990) predicted, 'Parental choice within a market of diverse schools
will ensure that inequality and selection will soon become the major
characteristics of British education'. His argument was that examination success
would dominate parental choice without information about 'added value' and that
it would lead to a development of pupil selection by schools because examination success was related to the ability of the school intake. Edwards and Whitty (1992) stated that the value-added analysis was not only very difficult but also not necessarily likely to influence parental choice more than the absolute level of performance, and doubted 'whether greater choice works inexorably to raise educational standards'.

Coulby (1991) said that the labelling process for children who failed in the national test results would lower those children's educational standards and life chances. He argued that these children would be from black and white working class groups as until now and that the national testing was likely to reinforce failure among them. His prediction was that streaming and class groups based on attainment levels would be used as strategies to institutionalise the labelling process, and that competition between schools would increasingly be conducted based on national test results. The author then argued that inner-city and predominantly working-class schools with those parents who could not send their children anywhere else would suffer from underfunding under the assessment arrangements, open enrolment and formula funding while the middle-class parents could manage to transfer the children to neighbouring schools. He concluded that the reform to bring competition and control had done nothing to raise the educational achievement of the majority of pupils. Chitty (1992) was also straightforward in expressing his anti-market view when he insisted that privatisation and the infusion of market values would do nothing to raise the educational standards, nor was that their true purpose, and said, 'The free market philosophy underpinning the 1988 Act has everything to do with competition and unequal treatment'.

Walford (1990) said, 'The market principle means that those children already from disadvantaged homes will probably find themselves at an even greater disadvantage, while those already having considerable advantages will probably be rewarded with further privileges'. He insisted that schools would become more class differentiated and segregated on ethnic lines. Cave (1990) also referred to the danger that parental choice would reinforce social division and create racial segregation.
Whitty (1990) argued that little stress on the socio-economic factors in formula funding with parental choice to guarantee privileged parents to escape from poor schools would result in increasing disadvantages for children in inner-city schools. Whitty and Menter (1991) pointed out that the simple funding formulae, particularly by using the take-up of free school meals as a measure for special educational needs, could have striking effects. Leonard (1988, p.217–8) argued that schools with their own budget would focus attention on ‘the relative costs of providing for different kinds of pupils’. According to the author, the most attractive to schools would be the large band in the middle because of their cost-benefit, and the most able would be equally valuable owing to their examination successes. ‘But pupils with learning difficulties have no such advantages to bring with them’.

Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992a) argued that both the advocates and critics of the social markets had probably overestimated the individual schools’ intention to grow and maximise income, and indicated that all their case study schools had a sense of their optimum or preferred size. They referred to a tension between quality (or effectiveness) and size mentioned by senior deputies. Edwards and Whitty (1992) argued that successful schools might choose not to grow but to select whom they teach, mentioning the very high correlations between current and prior attainment and between attainment and social background. Whitty and Menter (1991) argued that the popular schools, denied the opportunity to expand beyond their standard number, were faced with the temptation of becoming covertly selective.

Edwards and Whitty (1993) argued that successful schools were likely to become more selective rather than to expand, referring to economic reasoning ‘that any surplus of demand over supply enables the producer to choose and may thereby disadvantage some consumers, and that educational choice is not marginal because the exercise of choice by some may adversely affect the choices available to others’. They predicted that such selection would result in a high correlation between the socio-economic status and the schools’ ‘success’ or ‘failure’.

Although they admitted that that the situation was not new, they said, ‘What is new is the policy of deliberately increasing the differences between schools and types of schools, in status and in resources’. They expressed their concern ‘that
far too much is being left to the market' and that ‘the outcome is likely to be more stratified and unequal educational provision’. They concluded that democratic accountability based on public debate and collective responsibility remained a necessary complement to choice.

Walford (1990) predicted a hierarchy of schools based on academic selection and fees. In the hierarchy, the Headmasters' and Headmistresses' Conference (HMC) and Grammar School Association (GSA) schools would be at the top, GM schools and lower-ranking private schools would come next, and other schools would be last. Whitty (1990) also predicted a more hierarchical system in which independent schools would be at the top, CTCs\(^\text{16}\), GM schools and voluntary aided schools below them, and county maintained schools at the bottom.

Ball (1993) argued that the ideology of the market had failed ‘to carry over the assumptions about rational self-interest from their critique of “monopoly public professionals” into their idealisations of “educational entrepreneurs”’. Based on his review on the studies in the UK and the US, he concluded that the market reforms in the two countries were bringing about more social stratification and differentiation in the education systems through differences in the cultural capital. He argued that choice and the market enabled the middle classes to reassert their reproduction advantages in education, which had been threatened by the increasing social democratic policies. Brown and Lauder (1992) also blamed free market education in which, they said, ‘education will be increasingly a means to translating material capital into cultural capital’.

However, Fitz, Halpin and Power (1993) indicated that in their case study there was no clear class dimension to the frequency with which the parents were able to secure a place at the school of their choice, and that there was no evidence of the effect of opting-out on this matter. They said, ‘there appears to be no inevitable correlation between the status of the school, whether LEA, GM, comprehensive or

\(^{16}\) Fourteen city technology colleges (CTCs) and one city college for the technology of arts (CCTA) were opened as publicly funded independent schools with a technological emphasis for inner city children aged 11–18 in the period from 1988 to 1993. The ERA established a specific legal basis for the scheme of CTCs and CCTA to encourage the industrial and commercial sponsors although the scheme was possible without the ERA’s provision. Later, the Labour government allowed these colleges to keep their status while providing choices to change their status into that of the maintained school or Academy, which was a similar type of independent school, with a focus on one or more subject areas, initiated by the Labour government. There are twelve CTCs and one CCTA as of March 2006.
selective, and its social class composition. Nor are there any statistically significant shifts in the social class composition since opting-out’.

Some critics of the market-oriented reform referred to the existent inequality in the previous system before the reform, though they blamed the reform for increasing the inequality. Walford (1990) indicated that ‘the educational system, which existed prior to the 1988 Education Reform Act, was far from offering equality of opportunity’. According to the author, catchment areas ensured each school to have a relatively homogeneous social class intake and that the Solihull LEA’s proposal to reintroduce selection was effectively rejected by middle-class parents in the south of the borough who feared a risk of not being chosen for the selective schools. Edwards, Fitz and Whitty (1989) pointed out the under-representation of working-class children in grammar schools, in the Assisted Places Scheme and, ‘even more disconcertingly, in the upper ability bands of comprehensive schools’. Although Whitty and Menter (1991) said that the predominantly working-class and black populations had never gained an equitable share of educational resources under the past policies, they insisted that the Education Reform Act was likely to increase inequalities rather than challenge them. They expressed their preference for planning approaches as compared to market approaches in saying, ‘Any government genuinely committed to social justice would then have to find new ways of planning the education system so that it served the needs of the least advantaged members of society rather than merely those well-placed to play the market’.

Edwards and Whitty (1992) considered the view that the market would diffuse the choice reserved for the wealthy and articulate and realise distributive justice, referring to the contradictory empirical researches in the US and the UK both to confirm and to deny that the competence of choosing schools ‘wisely’ was distributed along social class lines, and concluded that equality of choice had to be doubted where demand so exceeded supply that schools could choose their intakes. Although they stated that traditional social democratic approaches, which favour the idea of a common school would have to find ways of responding to the

---

17 The Assisted Places Scheme was created by the 1980 Education Act, whereby the central government paid part or all of the tuition fees, on a means-tested basis, for children who had been in maintained schools to attend selected independent day schools. Later, the 1997 Education (Schools) Act, the first education act introduced by the Labour government, abolished the scheme.
changes in contemporary societies, they believed that giving priorities to individual rights might provide additional escape routes for some of the relatively advantaged while undermining the reform of those schools, which the least advantaged attended.

*The traditional academic model being predominant in the quasi-market*

Most of the critics of the quasi-market, as mentioned above, argued that the competition between schools for parental choice in the reformed system would be significantly driven by examination and test results. Some of the critics referred to *the traditional academic model of education*, and they insisted that the model would be predominant in the quasi-market system as much as or more than in the previous system. In their view, the quasi-market would not result in a positive diversity of schools, which were different but equal, but result in a hierarchy of schools whose degree of success was measured by examination and test results. They supposed that the hierarchy of schools was, as stated above, accompanied by the social inequality among pupils.

The focus here in the literature review is not on the inequality among pupils but upon schools’ responses to the market pressure expressed as parental choice. One response could be, as stated above, the movement of their admission towards covert selection. Another response could be regarding the nature of their educational practices. Some researchers expressed their concern that the quasi-market would enhance more examination/test-oriented education and thereby tempt schools to concentrate on measurable knowledge and skills and impoverish unmeasurable aspects of education.

Edwards and Whitty (1992) mentioned that the Right, including the neo-liberal and neo-conservative, associated greater choices not only with more differentiated provision but also with the defence of traditional academic standards, and judged that the market-oriented reform would continue the long history of hierarchy in English education rather than promoting the positive diversity with the alternatives as being different but equal. They referred to the conventional sociological view that the parity of esteem was unlikely between schools, which were related to the access to different levels in higher education and different
segments of the labour market, and also referred to the empirical researches on American and British education.

Edwards and Whitty (1993) furthered their research on ‘diversity or hierarchy’, and argued that a ‘less tangible but hardly less powerful constraint on diversity’ than the National Curriculum was ‘the continuing predominance of a traditional academic model of “good” secondary education’. In contrast with the market advocates’ argument that a public monopoly imposed uniformity or ‘majoritarian’ constraint, the authors indicated that the leading private schools in England were less socially diverse and more academically homogeneous than state schools. They pointed out that their campaigning in defence of the traditional academic standards was also campaigning to keep their position in the market. Referring to the Assisted Places Scheme as an example of the dominance of the English traditional academic model, they insisted that the scheme had resulted in boosting those private schools’ examination results that were vital to their market appeal. The authors considered the TVEI\textsuperscript{18} and CTCs as the Government’s efforts to sponsor alternative versions for diversity. Their argument was that the TVEI ‘ran up against the long English tradition’ and ‘so failed to establish its suitability for the “top fifteen percent” of the ability range’. They indicated that the motives for choosing CTCs were conspicuous and said, ‘More influential seemed to be a sense of CTCs as being selective schools, generally better resourced, and likely to uphold traditional values and discipline’. In their view, the connotations of vocationalism were of ‘second best’ provision. They pointed out that the ‘able’ students were ‘worth’ more than the others in the emerging market conditions and that schools claiming good academic results in league tables and good future chances to higher education and to privileged occupations were likely to be over-chosen and in short supply in the market.

Whitty and Menter (1991) implied that GM schools would be pursuing a traditional secondary schooling image with such characteristics as being selective, voluntary and single-sex. They concluded that the reform would not produce the

\textsuperscript{18} The Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) was a scheme in which LEAs, some GM schools and colleges of further education participated to receive grants for technical and vocational education programmes for 14–18-year-olds. The TVEI was introduced in 1983 as pilot projects, and was extended in 1987 to cover the whole country. However, it was phased out, and its funding finally ceased in 1997.
positive diversity but would generate greater differentiation between schools on a linear scale of quality and esteem.

Walford (1990) gave great importance to the role of examinations and tests in the new system of market principle. He argued that choices between schools had to be made on a restricted range of evidence such as numerical data, and said, ‘This can lead to a greater concentration on examination results at the expense of less quantifiable social and personal development issue’. Murphy (1990) also presented concern that simple information through national testing on a restricted set of basic skills to represent a market indicator could create both confusion among users and a distortion of good practice in schools. Cave (1990) seemed to have concerns about the means to measure educational standards by a narrow range of academic achievement and by examination success while education was a process the outcomes of which were difficult to measure. Coulby (1991) predicted that under the competitive pressures headteachers and teachers were likely to prioritise those subjects which were tested and focus their lessons on the answers which would be required in the tests, and that the curriculum could be impoverished in terms of its breadth.

Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992a) showed an ambivalent criticism of the quasi-market system. On the one hand, they criticised the rhetoric of the market principle as oversimplifying in spite of the complexity of local quasi-markets with specific conditions and histories. The authors pointed out the continuity from the past as well as the impact of open enrolment and formula funding. Their emphasis was on the importance of proximity in parental choice and the diversity and complexity of the choice. On the other hand, they indicated that competitive relationships in terms of academic performance had been enforced, and regarded it as a negative impact. Describing the marketing endeavours made by their case study schools, the authors noticed that reputation could be both made and lost. It could be seen that the senior staff in their study were enough aware of the impact of parental choice reinforced by open enrolment and formula funding. They quoted a senior deputy’s saying that neighbouring schools were introducing streaming and top ability sets, and that the school of the deputy itself established an Academic Attainment Monitoring Group to monitor the 28 most able students to stop losing ‘the aspiring middle class stereotypes’. According to the authors,
one effect of competition was that schools would become far more sensitive to parental concerns and especially to academic performance. Referring to Bourdieu’s metaphor, they said, ‘schools are competing to attract greater cultural capital hoping for higher yielding returns’. They raised the questions regarding who benefited and what was measured (‘value added’ was not measured) in examination league tables. The authors referred to a teacher’s concern about the possibility that examination results might control the whole exercise of schools.

To sum up the above arguments, these critics of the market-oriented reform predicted that competition in the quasi-market would encourage schools to concentrate on exam-oriented teaching, and enhance the traditional academic model of education, reinforcing the hierarchical differentiation between schools based on their examination results and their ability to attract academically able children often from the relatively privileged backgrounds.

The complexity of parental choice

While the above-mentioned arguments seemed to assume that parental choice rested primarily on schools’ academic performances measured in terms of exam and test results, the empirical studies of parental choice revealed both the complexity of choice and the methodological difficulty in finding real motives of choice.

Johnson (1990) presented a comprehensive summary of the major studies of parental choice not only in state schooling but also in private schooling. Her review of the studies in state schooling before the market-oriented reform confirmed the complexity of parents’ reasons for choosing their children’s schools. It also revealed considerable differences in the findings between the studies with different approaches and methodological difficulties in researches on such complex actions. She said, ‘Research into the exercise of choice in the maintained sector has so far done no more than scratch the surface’. The Edinburgh study claimed to have found that the majority of parents chose their child’s school at both primary and secondary stages from a humanistic or pastoral perspective than a technological or academic perspective. It echoed Elliott’s study which claimed that ‘process’ rather than ‘product’ criteria were more important to the parental choice of secondary schools. The NFER study, however,
indicated that a bare majority of parents listed an academic or product reason to be as important to their choice of secondary school though about ninety percent of the parents included process reasons. Johnson pointed out that parents tended to rate highly the personal happiness of their child, but she naturally raised a question regarding what exactly parents meant by ‘happiness’. In short, her review of those studies in state schooling showed that the features of parental choice were not so simple as a single-minded determination to concentrate on academic criteria.

The author’s review of the studies in private schooling seemed to offer a less complicated situation in which parental choice seemed more purposeful and gave more importance to such aspects as academic performance and discipline. Although she indicated that the studies concerning private schooling made contact with ‘educational families’, she argued that the social origins and the lifestyles of these families were varied and that it might therefore provide some evidence that the desire to make choices was not confined to a particular social class. The author insisted that ‘the motivation or lack of motivation to make choices might be linked to local educational circumstances rather than social class’, quoting a finding by Whitty, Fitz and Edwards (1989) that the willingness to express a choice seemed to increase with the scope of the choice available. Her argument was that, if parents felt that they had a genuine choice, they would put time and effort into making that choice. She also argued that, if the choice was successful, family commitment to the school of choice seemed high. According to the author, a heightened atmosphere of choice might lead parents to evaluate schools on the basis of examination results in the future, along with many of the other criteria, quoting a finding by Edwards, Fitz and Whitty (1989) that, where variety was available, not only was parents’ sense of choice generally increased but they also began to set more store by particular criteria such as high-quality academic teaching.

In the book that detailed the results of the comprehensive research work, known as the Edinburgh study, on parental choice in Scotland that was enabled much earlier than in England and Wales by the Education (Scotland) Act 1981, the authors (Michael Adler, Alison Petch and Jack Tweedie, 1989) presented not only their often quoted finding of an apparent non-significance of educational
outcomes or teaching quality for parental choice in parents’ own accounts, but also another finding, seemingly inconsistent with the former finding, of a migration of pupils from secondary schools with poorer examination results and lower staying-on rates to those with better examination results and higher staying-on rates. In the 1980s, actual admissions into secondary schools in both the Scottish cities of Burns and Maxton showed ‘the emergence of a number of highly sought-after and a number of very unpopular secondary schools’ (ibid, p.208). Most of the former schools were in mixed inner-city areas, and most of the latter schools were located in areas of the least prosperous housing. According to their data, parents across the entire social class spectrum and not merely middle class minority made placement requests. The inner-city, previously selective schools were better situated to attract pupils from adjacent schools than were the suburban schools with more affluent catchment areas. The result was ‘the migration of pupils from “less effective” to “more effective” secondary schools, i.e. from schools in which attainment measures are lower to schools with similar social class intakes in which attainment measures are higher’ (ibid, p.200). The authors continued, ‘It does not, of course, follow from this that parents chose to send their children to these schools because they were more effective. ...The reasons parents gave for rejecting their local catchment-area school (where they did so) and for choosing the school which their child attended, referred most frequently to concerns with where the child would be happiest, to the child’s own preferences, and to the state of discipline at the school. In fact, parents made very few references to examination results, other educational outcomes, or the quality or content of what was provided at the schools in question. If parents were aware of an instrumental connection between happiness, their child’s preferences and discipline on the one hand and school effectiveness on the other, they were most reluctant to express it’ (ibid, p.201). A fuller interpretation of the apparent contradiction between the individual parents’ accounts of their choice of school and the aggregate data of the actual moves between schools was not available in the authors’ writing.

Regarding the parental choice in England, an empirical study by Anne West, Miriam David, Jean Hailes, Jane Ribbens and Audrey Hind (1993) indicated possible examples of greater importance being placed on academic performance
by parents in a heightened atmosphere of choice. During the academic year 1991–92, they carried out interviews with 70 parents of Year 6 children in London Boroughs of Camden and Wandsworth. The results showed that the three ‘P’s, consisting of performance or academic results, pleasant atmosphere/ethos, and proximity to home, were the most frequently mentioned factors in choice of secondary school (West, David, Hailes, Ribbens and Hind, 1993, p.44). Among the factors spontaneously mentioned as important in the choice of school, good academic results (mentioned by 34% of the parents), atmosphere/ethos (31%), and near-to-home location (26%) were the top three factors (ibid, pp.33–4). Asked an open-ended question regarding what they liked about their preferred school, 41% of the parents mentioned subjects/facilities, 27% atmosphere/ethos, and 27% academic results, which were the three most common categories of their responses (ibid, p.18). As the most important reason for their choice of secondary school, 27% of the parents gave academic record/good education, 20% the child’s wishes/happiness, and 14% location, that is to say, the three reasons given most frequently (ibid, p.36). Asked what sort of information they were looking for about secondary schools, 50% of the parents spontaneously mentioned academic side/subjects offered, 33% A level results, 30% GCSE results, 30% general atmosphere/feel, 24% specific subjects, and 21% discipline/behaviour/bullying, which were the types of information mentioned by more than 20% of the parents (ibid, pp.24–5).

Edwards and Whitty (1992 & 1993) referred to various empirical studies. The results of those surveys were far from confirming that the academic performance of a school was a single dominant factor of parental choice, but showed complexity and indecisiveness. Some surveys confirmed that most parents declared themselves as satisfied with the local school while a small minority of parents actively considered several alternative schools. The authors claimed that proximity remained a very significant factor not only because of the convenience but also because of the feeling of continuity and the child’s wish to move with his/her friends. They (1992) said, ‘Parents own criteria also range far beyond strategic calculations about their future life chances’. Their argument (1993) was that more general, less utilitarian judgements about school ethos and about the child’s happiness appeared prominently. However, the same authors (Edwards
and Whitty, 1993) also said decisively, ‘We see the traditional academic model of secondary education as retaining its market dominance’. These seemingly contradictory statements were not unique to these authors.

For example, Ball (1993) said, ‘All the evidence in the UK from parental choice research indicates a distinct mismatch between the Government’s imposed indicators and the assumption of market theorists, and parents’ actual preferences’, while he insisted that parental choice was increasing the inequality between classes as described above.

All the above-mentioned literature review in this chapter was carried out in order to set the stage for the design of the empirical study, which was conducted in 1994/5. The reviewed literature was available by that time. The literature appearing in the next chapter is of the same nature. The key issues raised here will be re-examined with the recent literature available in 2000s towards the end of this thesis in Part V in order to demonstrate that the relevance of this research has not diminished, and that the research findings have significant implications for the education system at the time of writing this thesis.
Chapter 3 School Strategies as a Key Concept

Inconsistency in both sides’ arguments
As explicated in the last chapter, now there seems to be an interesting inconsistency between the findings of the researches on parental choice and the critical arguments about the quasi-market. On the one hand, it is said that parental choice is complex, and that a humanistic perspective seems more predominant than academic performance or, at least, the latter is far from a single dominant factor. On the other hand, most of the critics of the quasi-market argue that the competition between schools for parental choice will be significantly driven by the academic performance as measured by examination and test results, and that the competition will result in the formation of a hierarchy of schools and an increase in the inequality among the pupils. They assume that the traditional academic model of education will be predominant in the quasi-market.

More interestingly, a similar inconsistency can also be seen in the arguments by the advocates of the quasi-market. On the one hand, they emphasise the freedom of parental choice, and insist that the quasi-market provides a diversity of schools for parents to choose between. On the other hand, some of them expect that parents prefer the traditional academic type of schools with rigorous teaching and discipline.

Moreover, the same people on both sides often make such inconsistent statements.

Choice and diversity versus inequality and hierarchy
As indicated above, there seems to be a paradoxical inconsistency in both the arguments by the advocates of the quasi-market and those by its critics.

The former arguments, on the one hand, emphasise the complexity of parental choice. On the other hand, these arguments predict that school competition for parental choice will be driven by exam results and bring about a hierarchy of schools and an increase in the inequality among pupils. The latter arguments, on the one hand, emphasise the freedom of parental choice and the diversity of schools. However, on the other hand, some of them expect that the traditional academic model will be predominant.
Both the advocates and the critics seem illogical in making such inconsistent arguments as mentioned above. Let us devote a little space below to examining why there is such an inconsistency in both sides.

Going back to the traditional academic schooling is a theme of neo-conservative thought, and choice and diversity in the market is that of neo-liberal one. Thus, the advocates of the quasi-market reform containing both the neo-conservative and neo-liberal elements are obliged to assert the two themes contradicting each other. On the one hand, the advocates expect parental choice to be increasingly driven by academic performance as measured by performance or league tables and the competition between schools for the academic-oriented parental choice to raise the educational standards. On the other hand, they assert that the quasi-market system will enhance the freedom of parental choice and the positive diversity of schools.

Then, the critics of the quasi-market feel obliged to deny both the above-mentioned arguments. On the one hand, they emphasise the complexity of parental choice to deny the mechanism of raising educational standards though they may regard the standards in the advocates’ usage as having a narrow sense. On the other hand, they predict the hierarchy of schools with the inequality among pupils to deny the positive diversity.

The predominance of the academic model, despite the complexity in parental choice

Although the arguments by the advocates of the education quasi-market are seemingly contrary to those by the critics, there is a paradoxical similarity in both sides’ inconsistency as mentioned above. Both of them seem to assume that the traditional academic model will be predominant in the quasi-market while parental choice is complex and/or diverse. The apparently illogical arguments by both sides can be logically explained by introducing the concept of ‘school strategy’ as mentioned below, which mediates the schooling system’s response to parental choice.

Providers’ strategies and consumers’ choices
Why does the traditional academic model seem so predominant while parental choice seems so complicated? This question might be a key to the constructive discussion on the apparent inconsistency found in both the advocates and the critics of the quasi-market.

Whether or not schools pursue the traditional academic model is influenced by parental choice not directly but through the schools' strategies. In more general terms, schools formulate their strategies in response to the quasi-market, and parental choice influences schools' practices through its influence on their strategies. Therefore, we need to consider the strategies of schools as 'providers' in response to the market pressures expressed by parental choices as the voices of 'consumers' and their readings of their competitors' strategies. School strategies in the quasi-market are the focus of this research, and whether or not these strategies seek to pursue the traditional academic model will be examined later in this chapter.

School strategies

I define strategies of a school as plans that the school management team headed by the headteacher adopts and implements in the quasi-market education system. The management team usually includes the deputies and other senior teachers. School strategies are institutional strategies at management level, as opposed to pedagogic practices at classroom level, but include strategies in pedagogic fields such as teaching, assessment, reporting and discipline as well as those in managerial fields such as organisation, staffing and marketing. These strategies are not necessarily written down or publicised as such. Therefore, this research aims to identify school strategies in the internal structures of managerial discourse.

Here, the term 'strategy' is used in accordance with the customary usage in the management literature. The following is a review of the management literature that was available by the time the empirical work was carried out in 1994/5. According to James Brian Quinn (1980, p.7), 'A strategy is the pattern or plan that integrates an organization's major goals, policies, and action sequences into a cohesive whole' (Original emphases). The concept of strategy developed in theories of corporate management, without any major transformation, was applied to school management. For example, Brian Fidler (1989, pp.20–1), based on
Quinn’s definition of strategy, described ‘strategic plan for the school’ as ‘the plan, which integrates all the actions of the school’. ‘Strategic Planning’ was defined, by John West-Burnham (1994, p.84), as ‘A process operating in an extended time-frame (three to five years), which translates vision and values into significant, measurable and practical outcomes’. Adapting John Bryson’s approach to strategic planning for public and non-profit organisations (Bryson, 1988), Brian Caldwell and Jim Spinks (1992, pp.92–104) presented a detailed account of a process for strategic planning for schools. The process included the stage of ‘generating a list of strategic issues, in order of priority, on the basis of strengths, limitations, opportunities and threats’ and that of ‘formulating strategies for action for each of the strategic issues’ (Caldwell and Spinks, 1992, p.93). Strategic issues might arise from changes in ‘context’ (political, economic, demographic, etc.), ‘curriculum’ (including approaches to teaching and learning, etc.) and ‘community’ (including matters related to competitors and collaborators) (Caldwell and Spinks, 1992, p.102).

In England and Wales, before the Education Reform Act 1988, the planning role in primary and secondary education was largely assumed by LEAs, and schools have little power or responsibility in planning for their own future. Strategic management became an important issue just as the local management of schools was introduced together with other elements of the quasi-market reform including parental choice and league tables. As early as 1989, Fidler declared, ‘Schools now more than ever will be in a position where they will be largely responsible for their own destiny. ....Thus, strategic management at school level will be crucial and require new ways of thinking and acting’ (Fidler, 1989, p.20). The school-based planning in England Wales was disseminated through the ‘school development plan’ (SDP) approach. Being initially promoted by the then Department of Education and Science (DES)/Department for Education (DFE) and later required in the inspection process by the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), most schools made their SDP.

However, whether the SDPs were strategic was in question. Corrie Giles (1995), on the basis of his empirical research on some hundred experienced teachers enrolled on a university postgraduate course, argued that within the sample schools, planning seemed ‘ad hoc, with little strategic planning taking
place' (p.6). The survey results revealed little link between resource allocation and priorities in the SDP (70% answered that resources were not allocated to clear costed priorities identified in the SDP) and weakness in the systematic evaluation of progress (67% answered that schools lacked a systematic approach to monitoring and evaluating progress) (p.6).

In the mainstream of management theory, Henry Mintzberg (1994) already declared the fall of strategic planning. In his judgement, the term ‘strategic planning’ was an oxymoron because strategy formation was synthesis while planning was analysis. Furthermore, as early as 1980, Quinn (1980) reached a paradoxical finding that ‘formal planning systems rarely formulated a corporation’s central strategy’ (p.38) although the corporate planning systems contributed to the implementation of strategic changes and decisions including budgeting, evaluation and information sharing. Formal planning frequently results ‘primarily in either formless wordy statements of principle or detailed budgetary plans, neither of which meets the most basic criteria—like concentration of forces, concessions of positions, and planned flexibility—that effective strategies demand’ (p.154). In his view, one of the disturbing tendencies developed in formal planning within major enterprises is that ‘planning activities in such enterprises often become bureaucratized, rigid, and costly paper-shuffling exercises divorced from actual decision processes’ (p.ix).

While a rather optimistic, and sometimes simplistic, endorsement of strategic planning and other business-sector approaches seemed to be a dominant discourse in the school management literature, the above-mentioned and other developments in the corporate management literature were not fully introduced.

In short, the above-mentioned review demonstrating the elusive nature of strategy, of which management theorists had different understandings, suggested that the literature of school management imported the basic theories and concepts of strategy, without major modifications and with some immaturity in both theory and practice, from that of corporate management, and pointed out that it was too naïve to regard some written documents—like school development plans—as strategies. The methodological strategy adopted in this research, that is, the analysis of the discourses in the interviews with the headteachers of the case schools as being discussed in detail in the chapter for methodology, is justifiable
in the context of the management literature. In the search for strategies, entities elusive enough as discussed above, this methodological strategy is at least as good as, in my judgement, as discussed later in Chapter 5 better than, the analysis of written information in school development plans and other documents.

Now, we should go back to the issue of the orientation of school strategies in the quasi-market education system.

Strategies oriented towards the academic model
Why should we assume that the quasi-market system encourages schools to adopt and implement strategies oriented towards the traditional academic model? We now need a tentative answer to this question in order to establish the theoretical framework for this research. The tentative answer or reasoning is as follows.

Even if parental choice in general is a complex issue, what is important for a school is to secure enough choices by floating consumers or parents of the shopping-around type in addition to core families who choose the school for such reasons as proximity, siblings and friends. Parents who are committed to sending their children to their local school will do so anyway. In other words, schools need to target parents who are motivated to choose their child's school for educational reasons.

However, choosing a school for educational reasons does not necessarily mean favouring the traditional academic model of education. As stated in Chapter 2, the studies of parental choice present humanistic or pastoral reasons such as the happiness of the child as well as utilitarian or academic reasons such as examination results. Therefore, the progressive or child-centred model of education can be attractive to some choosy parents who are highly motivated towards education. Nevertheless, at least a part of the choosy parents or floating consumers are those who are determined to choose their child's school for such reasons as academic performance and discipline. The traditional academic model is their choice.

Then, why should we assume that school strategies are oriented more towards the traditional academic model than towards the progressive or child-centred model? This is because the quasi-market reform was designed to promote the academic model. As stated in Chapter 1, the results of examinations and tests
based on the common curriculum are expected to provide parents with important information on the performances of schools from which they choose. The publication of performance tables or league tables has such a policy objective. This means that the examination and test results constitute a linear scale on which the schools are positioned and compete with one another for higher positions. With this mechanism for performance measurement, the reformed education system provides more explicit information on the schools' academic performances than the previous system. The academic model focuses on such measurable performances or results while the progressive model places the emphasis on learning processes, which cannot be easily measured and compared. Therefore, the education reform has enhanced the availability and explicitness of information that is useful for some parents who are attracted to the academic model that is supposed to be successful in raising the examination and test results. On the other hand, with regard to other parents who are attracted to the progressive model, the reform has not helped them to find useful information on schools. All this means that the schools are encouraged to pay attention to those parents who are attracted to the academic model, which is supposed to raise the examination and test results. It is reasonable that such parents become a prime target group for school strategies to secure a sufficient number of pupils.

Furthermore, what matters for a school is not just the number of its intake. Performing well in league tables not only contributes to increasing or maintaining the numbers of applications and admissions, but also is in itself important for the perception of the school's social status in the local community and the pride of the staff and governors. The pride of the staff seems to be a mixture of professional pride in their performance and pride in the status of their school. Performance tables provide a linear scale on which schools are positioned, and their position on the scale is regarded as an indicator of their status. It is too naive to regard only the economic reasons as motives of the providers in the quasi-market. Their economic incentives are limited by some conditions of the quasi-market. The number of enrolment is inevitably limited by the school’s physical capacity when enough capital grants are not available. More importantly, if the managerial staff and governors of an oversubscribed school feel that its viability is secured, they may not be motivated to expand the school. The expansion will not produce
significant economic benefits because schools are non-profit-making organisations and teachers’ salaries are basically prescribed by law. With or without being concerned about the number of its intake, it is understandable for a school to have strategies to raise its status indicated in league tables. It is reasonable that such strategies are oriented towards the traditional academic model that is supposed to focus on and be successful in raising the examination and test results.

The academic ability and discipline of the intake is important for the school’s apparent performance in these tables. The quality of input heavily influences the quality of output. As some researchers fear, some schools may become rather interested in overt or covert selection to raise the apparent academic performance. Furthermore, many people worry that the competitive system is encouraging schools to exclude more children with behaviour problems and discouraging some schools from admitting children with special educational needs. As stated in Chapter 2, Johnson (1990) presents a review of the studies of parental choice in private schooling, and the review seems to offer a less complicated feature in which parental choice is more purposeful, giving more importance to such aspects as academic performance and discipline. According to her, private schools’ customers are often from educational families that consist of parents and children who are highly motivated towards education and perhaps, with much ‘cultural capital’. She recognises that a majority of these families are from middle-class backgrounds. Such families have crucial significance for the strategies of state schools to survive and succeed in the quasi-market although state schools generally provide their education to a wider variety of parents and children than private schools. The quasi-market prompts schools to seek to attract those families who seem to have higher motivation and potential for academic success. The traditional academic model of education seems attractive to a substantial part of these families. In short, it seems reasonable to assume that the quasi-market presses schools to pursue strategies oriented towards the academic model in order to secure their intake of good quality in terms of the potential for higher performances in league tables.

The above reasoning assumes that the motives of school strategies in the quasi-market are not only economic but also social. Schools aim for a good or better
position in league tables not only to secure a large enough number of intake for their economic viability or prosperity but also to keep or improve their perceived status for their social pride. To raise the examination and test results, schools may adopt strategies oriented towards the traditional academic model, which is supposed to focus on academic performance, and which is attractive to at least some of those families who have the potential for contributing to good or better academic results. Although not all schools pursue the model and not all parents favour the model, the quasi-market system with performance measurement tends to encourage schools to adopt and implement strategies oriented towards the academic model. For parents who are attracted to the model, choosing a school for their child is not making a choice between ‘different but equal’ ones but trying to get a place at a school as good as possible. For the schools that pursue the model, they compete for higher positions on a linear scale rather than for unique positions on diverse scales. These schools’ perceptions of the criterion for the parents judging the quality of a school is basically the same as that for the schools measuring their position, that is, the academic performance. What is important here is that the academic performance is the performance of consumers (pupils) rather than that of providers (schools) in a strict sense. The academic performances of pupils affect their future life chances. In other words, education has the function of social selection as well as that of socialisation, and the academic performance is the criterion for the selection. The linear hierarchical nature of school positions as mentioned above reflects that of social stratification. The hierarchical nature itself is not economic but social, and existed in the previous system before the quasi-market reform. However, it seems to be the case that the quasi-market tends to encourage schools to compete for better positions on the hierarchy, which has become more explicit with such information as performance tables. The important question here is whether school strategies are really responding to the competition with each other for more explicitly indicated positions on the hierarchical scale.

Not only the economic but also the sociological analyses reviewed in Chapter 2 do not seem to emphasise enough the above-mentioned social motives of schools and the social nature of the schools’ hierarchy in the education quasi-market. Both the advocates and critics of the quasi-market tend to focus their arguments
on the operation of economic market mechanisms—the former praising its benefits and the latter denouncing its harmful effects. We need to be aware that everything in the quasi-market is not necessarily the product of market mechanisms, and that the motives of school strategies are social as well as economic.

**Implications of school strategies for inequality, efficiency and standards**

If school strategies tend to be oriented towards the traditional academic model of education, these strategies will have significant implications for social inequality, financial efficiency and educational standards, which are the focal points of the controversy over the quasi-market system of schooling. Based on the literature review, the following are the preliminary discussions on these implications.

*Social inequality*

With regard to the issue of social inequality, the question is whether or not the inequality among pupils from different socio-economic backgrounds will be more in the quasi-market than in the previous system before the quasi-market reform. The danger of increased social inequality is an issue which the critics of the quasi-market refer to most often. Even some economic researches regard it as the most important defect.

It is quite natural that Ball (1993) blames ‘market theorists’ for applying double standards. As argued by him, the advocates of the market often avoid applying critical consideration to markets, which they apply to public monopolies. However, the critics of the market are often more or less to blame for the same tendency. The critics have presented examples of inequality and mechanisms of generating inequality in the quasi-market system of education, but they have not succeeded in fully comparing the inequality in the quasi-market system with that in the previous system. It would be unfair not to compare the reformed system with the previous system or any other real system but with a fictitious ideal system (See Le Grand and Bartlett (1993b)).

There are a few questions to be answered when concern about the increased inequality in the quasi-market is addressed. The first question is whether or not, as discussed above, the quasi-market is strengthening the hierarchy of schools
with different positions ‘on a linear scale of quality and esteem’ (Whitty and Menter (1991)). We should not forget that the education system before the quasi-market reform was not free from the hierarchies of schools. As mentioned by Edwards and Whitty (1992), the education system in England has a long history of the hierarchy of schools. Therefore, the hierarchy should not be regarded as unique to the quasi-market system. The point is whether or not the quasi-market system is more hierarchical than the previous system. In this regard, it might be the case that the quasi-market enhances ‘a linear scale of quality and esteem’ (Whitty and Menter (1991)) if school strategies tend to be oriented towards the traditional academic model of education. Even in that case, however, whether the hierarchy of schools with different positions on such a scale is stable or unstable is a different question as the schools compete to improve their own position. Nonetheless, if the quasi-market system enhances such a hierarchical scale, it will have a significant implication for the debate on the issue of school hierarchies in the quasi-markets.

The second question is whether the correlations between the socio-economic backgrounds of pupils and the hierarchical positions of schools are stronger in the quasi-market system than in the previous system. The previous system had long preserved social inequality. The non-market administrative system of admission including the catchment areas had its own mechanism of generating social inequality on the basis of different populations in different areas. It is not irrational to consider the possibility that the mobility enhanced by parental choice may contribute to decreasing the projected inequality. At the same time, we should also pay attention to the argument that more and more schools have been tempted to covert selection and that more selection can lead to more inequality between the socio-economic groups. If school strategies tend to be oriented towards the traditional academic model of education, these strategies will have a potential implication for this second question as well. The implication depends on whether or not such strategies have a particular appeal to certain socio-economic groups as some researchers have argued as mentioned above. These issues should be addressed empirically.

Financial efficiency
Economic researchers tend to be cautious about drawing conclusions from their studies on the educational quasi-market. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there has not been enough direct proof of the improved efficiency in schools for the researchers to provide a decisive conclusion on the issue of efficiency in the education quasi-market. Nevertheless, they often seem positive or at least not negative to the possibility that the quasi-market will improve the efficiency in schools.

Many educational and sociological researchers seem reluctant to admit that the quasi-market will improve efficiency though they have not succeeded in disproving it persuasively. They attack the negative by-products of the quasi-market such as marketing costs and internal administrative burden, especially in the transitional period.

Concerning the internal administrative burden, Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992b) vividly describe the real life of schools with frustrating difficulties. They present many negative constraints on school management such as ‘not enough money’, ‘not enough time’ and ‘contradicting demands’. However, these features seem to be relevant not only to schools but also to any kind of organisation. It should be remembered that real life is not so easy and that managers have to endeavour to devise creative responses to difficult circumstances. Although constrained budgets, rapid transition and changing government policies seem to make the circumstances of schools more difficult, the lives of the school’s senior staff described by the authors can be interpreted partly as such creative endeavours in response to difficult situations. Despite these difficulties and hardships, these senior staff members do not want to go back to the old system according to Bartlett (1993) and Bullock and Thomas (1994, p.89).

A more fundamental issue might be the tension between professional and enterprise cultures, which is pointed out by Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992a). This tension can be interpreted as resistance by many teachers to market pressures which push them to adopt practices against their educational ideals such as equality, equity and child-centredness.

In that regard, the critics of the quasi-market reform fear the dominance of economic calculation over educational consideration. Moreover, some of them
even imply that the educational needs are not well reconciled with the demands of financial efficiency.

However, we should be careful not to confuse the two concepts of efficiency as explained by Bartlett and Le Grand (1993). One of the concepts refers to the total costs of service. The other concept, 'productive efficiency', refers to the costs of providing any given quality or quantity of a service. Cheap service of very low quality can be efficient in the first concept but inefficient in the second concept. This means that 'productive efficiency' can, in principle at least, be compatible with educational purposes.

Nevertheless, the critics of the quasi-market also tend to question how much financial efficiency contributes to educational standards.

**Educational standards**

The ultimate question on the quasi-market is whether or not the quasi-market system will raise educational standards. Needless to say, it is very difficult to give a definitive and conclusive answer to the question. First, what is the definition of educational standards? Secondly, how can we measure the standards? Thirdly, how can we distinguish the effects of the quasi-market from the effects of other causes? The question is inevitably accompanied by not only educational but also philosophical and political implications.

Both the advocates and critics of the quasi-market sometimes make decisive assertions on this ultimate question.

The advocates optimistically assume that the quasi-market system will raise the educational standards by making schools more efficient in providing education that is more responsive to parents. While they insist that parents enjoy the freedom of choice from a diversity of schools in the quasi-market, some of them expect that the market forces expressed by parental choice will press schools to orient their education towards the traditional academic model of schooling with rigorous teaching and discipline, implying that this orientation will contribute to educational standards.

The critics of the quasi-market deny that the quasi-market will raise the educational standards because they believe that market forces are not reconciled with educational values and will be harmful to the interests of those people who
are already educationally and socially disadvantaged. They either question whether the quasi-market will improve efficiency, or argue that the financial efficiency in the quasi-market will not contribute to the educational standards. In their view, the predominance of the traditional academic model in the quasi-market will result in the hierarchy of schools and impoverish the education for the pupils from lower socio-economic groups who tend to be admitted to the schools of lower hierarchical positions.

From the above-mentioned arguments, it is evident that the advocates of the quasi-market expect the traditional academic model to raise the educational standards while the critics regard the same model as having negative effects or, at best, no positive effects on the educational standards. The advocates and critics find a common ground in assuming that the academic model is to be predominant in the quasi-market system of education although the two sides take opposite views on the effects of the predominance. The difference seems to lie in what should be the criteria for educational success. However, the predominance of the academic model is not self-evident, as the advocates claim the diversity of schools for parents to choose between in the quasi-market while the critics emphasise the complexity of parental choice and deny the dominance of academic performance as a decisive factor of choice. Therefore, whether or not school strategies tend to be oriented towards the academic model will have a significant implication for this debate.

**Rationale for the use of Bernstein’s theory in research on school strategies**

To enter the discussion on whether or not school strategies tend to be oriented towards the traditional academic model, we need to consider what the traditional academic model means. What characteristics do the schools pursuing the model have? The model connotes traditional education set in contrast to progressive education and academic education set in contrast to practical or vocational education. Theoretical elaboration is required for further discussions on this issue.

Can the school management literature be the basis for such theoretical elaboration? Does the literature provide a theoretical framework for researching school strategies in this thesis? The answer is ‘no’. Why? The reason lies in the literature’s apparent indifference, as to be discussed soon, to the broader policy
context or the societal, political and economic environments including the quasi-
market forces and government interventions, and to the conflicting values and
ideals in education. This thesis is about schools’ strategic changes as responses to
such macro-level environments, and these changes inevitably have significant
implications for educational values and ideals. The main question in the thesis is
whether or not under quasi-market pressures, the schools were moving towards
the traditional academic model of schooling, and away from, or at least not
towards, the progressive or child-centred model.

Jenny Ozga (1992) concisely and Lawrence Angus (1994) extensively
addressed the above and other deficiencies and absences in the education
management literature. According to Ozga (1992, p.279), ‘The missing
dimensions in these texts relate to the external policy context—almost never
discussed, and if briefly reviewed then taken for granted; the absence of
connection between management practice and broader theoretical or theorised
frameworks; the lack of intellectually demanding argument, or of considerations
of principles, values and ethics’. Angus (1994, pp.81–2) echoed, ‘most
publications that are targeted to inform and assist participants in school-level
management and decision making tend to reduce the complexity of contested
educational debates and policies to simplistic how-to-do-it manuals for school
administrators’. The nature of the management literature described above might
be summarised as ‘decontextualised and de-politicised’ (Angus, 1994, p.80).
Basically, the context of education itself was not very significant in the school
management literature. As the brief review of the literature’s treatment of
‘strategy’ illustrated as above, fundamental concepts and theories were originated
in the corporate management literature, and then applied to school management.
‘Good school management, then, is just like good management in business’
(Angus, 1994, p.84).

Due to the above-mentioned reason, the school management literature is not
used as a theoretical framework for this research on school strategies.

This thesis formulates its theoretical framework in the use of Basil Bernstein’s
theory of ‘visible/invisible pedagogies’. In contrast with the school management
literature, Bernstein’s sociological theory focuses on specific aspects of education,
and links the micro-level of classrooms and schools and the macro-level of the
educational system and social structure in the historical context. It also has a potential for linking pedagogy and management. Moreover, importantly, the theory confronts contesting values in education, and interprets them in the light of the broader social structure.

In the school management literature, this kind of ideological conflict tends to find no or little place. The literature also tends to pay little attention to the macro-micro linkage. It focuses on the micro-level of individual schools without paying due attention to, or critically reviewing, the context of the macro-level education policies and system, which has been reformed into the quasi-market. These two tendencies, namely being 'decontextualised and depoliticised' (Angus, 1994, p.80), seem to be interrelated to each other. With regard to school strategies and other issues, the management literature often provides normative principles and guidelines and, in extreme cases, 'how-to-do-it manuals' (Angus, 1994, p.82). In the literature, educational values and ideals tend to be hidden behind practicalities and technicalities. This feature is related to the fact that basic concepts and theories are imported from the corporate management literature into the school management literature.

In the meantime, sociological and other criticism of the education quasi-market pays attention to the peculiarities of education and its historical, systemic and ideological context. However, an integrated theory does not seem to be emerging from the criticism. Such criticism is generally descriptive in analysing its defects and harmful effects against the market theory rather than being theoretically constructed, that is, presenting its own theory.

As introduced in the next chapter, his terms 'visible pedagogy' and 'invisible pedagogy' are defined concepts to replace 'traditional academic education' and 'progressive or child-centred education' respectively. With the defined concepts, the meanings are clarified, and the criteria for judging the orientations of pedagogy are established. It also has a potential for linking pedagogy and management; the potential is to be developed to the substantial linkage in this thesis. Hence, his theory provides a very productive basis for the theoretical framework with conceptually defined dichotomies to clarify the orientations of school strategies.

The rationale for the use of Bernstein's theory lies in these points.
Chapter 4 Visible/Invisible Strategies in Pedagogy and Management: Theoretical Framework

The use of Bernstein’s theory of visible/invisible pedagogies

Visible/invisible pedagogies with explicit/implicit rules

Here, I want to introduce Basil Bernstein’s theory of pedagogies into my research context. According to Bernstein (1990), visible and invisible pedagogies are ‘usually referred to as conservative or traditional and progressive or child-centred’ (ibid, p.63). We may be able to use the visible pedagogy instead of the traditional academic model of education and the invisible pedagogy instead of progressive education.

We shall now look into his theory of pedagogies. The following five paragraphs are a summary of the theory.

Bernstein (1990) analyses the three kinds of rules of the ‘pedagogic relations’ between ‘transmitters’ (teachers) and ‘acquirers’ (pupils), that is, ‘hierarchical rules’, ‘sequencing rules’ and ‘criteria rules’. Hierarchical rules are the rules of social order, character and manner which are a prerequisite of the pedagogic relations. Sequencing rules mean ‘Something must come before and something must come after’ in learning and teaching process. Sequencing rules imply pacing rules. Pacing can be expressed by how much a pupil has to learn in a given amount of time. Criteria rules represent what kind of criteria the pupils are expected to take over and apply to their practices. The criteria can be used to assess pupils’ practices. Visible pedagogies are one of the two generic types of pedagogic practice which have explicit hierarchical rules, explicit sequencing/pacing rules and explicit criteria rules. Invisible pedagogies are the other generic type with implicit hierarchical, sequencing/pacing and criteria rules.

The hierarchical rules of visible pedagogies are explicit and the power relations between teachers and pupils are very clear. The relationship is that of ‘explicit
subordination and superordination’ (ibid, p.67). ‘If the child disobeys, then privileges are withdrawn and explicit rules are articulated. In the extreme, strategies of exclusion and physical punishment may be used’ (ibid, p.83). In the implicit hierarchy of an invisible pedagogy, ‘power is masked or hidden by devices of communication’ (ibid, p.67), and ‘control lies almost entirely in interpersonal communication’ (ibid, p.83). In this case, the children are expected to learn actively and play creatively, and the role of the teacher is to facilitate and accommodate the process of acquisition.

Visible pedagogies have the strong pacing rules of academic curriculum, which ‘tend to reduce pupils’ speech and privilege teachers’ talk’ (ibid, pp.77–8). ‘Curriculum cannot be acquired wholly by time spent at school’ (ibid, p.77), and pupils are expected to do homework. The sequencing rules of the visible pedagogies are explicit and a pupil can be ‘aware of what her/his expected state of consciousness is supposed to be’ (ibid, p.67). In the case of invisible pedagogies, the pupil’s own time and development are given priority, but the pupil initially cannot be aware of the signs of his/her development process of which only the teacher is aware.

In visible pedagogies, the criteria are explicit and specific, and pupils are often aware of the criteria, although the awareness differs between pupils and between the criteria. In the case of invisible pedagogies, the criteria are implicit and only teachers are aware of them. According to Bernstein (1990, p.70), ‘It is as if this pedagogic practice creates a space in which the acquirer can create his/her text under conditions of apparently minimum external constraint and in a context and social relationship which appears highly supportive of the “spontaneous” text the acquirer offers’. Visible pedagogies place emphasis on the ‘performance’ or external product of a pupil against explicit, external common criteria, and produce stratifying differences between pupils. On the other hand, invisible pedagogies focus on procedures internal to a pupil, that is, cognitive, linguistic, affective and motivational procedures of acquisition or learning, regard the procedures as shared by all pupils, and interpret the differences between pupils as ‘uniqueness’ produced by shared ‘competences’, not as a basis for comparison between the pupils. Bernstein (1990, p.71) summarises, ‘invisible pedagogies emphasize acquisition—competence and visible pedagogies transmission—performance’.
Bernstein (1990) introduces a dichotomy in the rules of the pedagogic relations. The hierarchical rules are called ‘regulative rules’, and the other rules of sequencing/pacing and criteria are called ‘instructional or discursive rules’ (ibid, p.66). This dichotomy is based on his concepts of pedagogic discourse, that is, ‘instructional discourse’ ‘concerned with the transmission/acquisition of specific competences’ and ‘regulative discourse’ ‘concerned with the transmission of principles of order, relation, and identity’ (ibid, p.211).

What is the essence of the typology of visible/invisible pedagogies? It is explicitness/implicitness. Bernstein defines that visible/invisible pedagogies have explicit/implicit ‘regulative’ and ‘instructional’ rules. The former rules can be regarded as hierarchically regulative rules of social relations between teachers and pupils. These rules are concerned with how explicitly the hierarchical regulations are seen in the social relations. The latter, that is, instructional rules, which consist of selection, sequencing, pacing, and criteria rules, seem to mean, in less esoteric terminology, ‘prescriptive’ rules of the contents of knowledge and skills to be transmitted, methods of transmission and acquisition, and assessment criteria. The issue is how explicitly these contents, methods and criteria are prescribed, and therefore the term, ‘prescriptive’ rules, instead of ‘instructional’ rules, will be used in this thesis.

Now, we can use visible and invisible pedagogies instead of the traditional academic model of education and the progressive or child-centred education respectively. The concept of visible/invisible pedagogy is operationally defined by explicitness/implicitness in the regulative and prescriptive rules, and therefore is suitable for the empirical study that will be pursued later in this thesis.

**Autonomous and market-oriented visible pedagogies?**

Bernstein (1990) argues that there are two forms of visible pedagogies. One is the ‘autonomous visible pedagogy’, and the other is the ‘market-oriented visible pedagogy’. ‘The autonomous visible pedagogy justifies itself by the intrinsic worthwhileness and value of the knowledge it relays and by the discipline its acquisition requires’ (ibid, p.87). The market-oriented visible pedagogy is justified by its market relevance, and ‘a truly secular form born out of the “context
of cost-efficient education", allegedly promoting relevant skills, attitudes, and technology in an era of large-scale chronic youth unemployment' (ibid, p.86).

The term, autonomous visible pedagogy, may sound as if pupils could enjoy autonomous learning. The terminology is especially misleading when schools and other educational institutions are expected to manage themselves autonomously in the quasi-market system of education. However, it is relatively easy to understand the concept of the autonomous visible pedagogy. Although it is not definitely stated by Bernstein, it seems that the autonomous visible pedagogy is the prototype of visible pedagogy as defined above.

I would not be satisfied with the concept of the market-oriented visible pedagogy, without substantial modification, which could seem to me a jumble of different elements of the education reform. He exemplifies the various elements of the market-oriented visible pedagogy as follows. ‘New forms of assessment, profiling, criteria-referenced rather than norm-referenced assessment, allegedly to recognise and liberate individual qualities, allow of, and mark, greater control of assessment. At the same time periodic mass testing of pupils concentrates new distribution procedures for homogenizing acquisition and, at the same time, creates performance indicators of its effectiveness. Vocationalism appears to offer the lower working class a legitimation of their own pedagogic interests in a manual-based curriculum, and in so doing appears to include them as significant pedagogic subjects, ...' (ibid, p.87)

These elements of the market-oriented visible pedagogy are not necessarily consistent with each other in terms of their ideological bases as follows. The education policies under the Conservative government were products of the mixture of three ideologies of the neo-conservative, the neo-liberal and vocationalism. Although most of the policies seem to be in favour of visible pedagogies, not all the policies simply endorse these pedagogies, and some of the policies, especially the ones based on vocationalism, seem to encourage a compromised mixture of visible and invisible pedagogies. Vocationalism emphasises the importance of pupils’ practical work on their initiative, which seems to be compatible with invisible pedagogies. Furthermore, the assessment criteria for such work cannot be as explicit as that for academic knowledge that can basically rely on pencil-and-paper type tests. He seems to be aware of the
point but still believes in the consistency of the market-oriented visible pedagogy. He says, 'Even the pedagogic regimes are mixed, drawing on features of invisible pedagogy, e.g. in the “negotiation” of pupils’ profiles, life skill programmes. The new pedagogic discourse recontextualizes and thus repositions within its own ideology features of apparently oppositional discourses' (Bernstein, 1990, p.88).

It seems to me that treating a mixture as a mixture is more appropriate than treating a mixture as a single substance. Vocationalism, which does not necessarily fit into visible pedagogies, is far from amalgamated with the neo-conservative and the neo-liberal.

There seems to be a confusion regarding the education quasi-market and the economic market in Bernstein’s argument. He almost presumes twin relations between the market-oriented education system and the perceived needs of the economy. It is too simplistic to presume ‘market-relevance’, that is, alleged relevance to the economy, of a pedagogy which the education quasi-market endorses. The quasi-market may just endorse a ‘back-to-basics’ type of the traditional visible pedagogy, that is, the autonomous visible pedagogy in Bernstein’s terminology, which is advocated not by vocationalism but by the neo-conservative and part of the neo-liberal. As stated in the previous chapters, a lot of literature argues that the quasi-market system will enhance the traditional visible pedagogy which aims at high academic performance in well-disciplined environments. Vocationalism may just provide the second best for people who are not given access to the traditional academic education.

In short, the education quasi-market does not necessarily endorse the so-called market-relevance, and it is more appropriate to regard the education reform as a mixture of various policies with different ideological bases rather than as a series of consistent policies to enhance the market-oriented visible pedagogy.

However, it should be noted that Bernstein appreciates the existence of more than one modality of visible pedagogy in the market-oriented education system. His dichotomy between autonomous and market-oriented visible pedagogies provides an important inspiration, which enables me to develop a different dichotomy more relevant to the realities of the education quasi-market as follows.

*Directive and responsive visible pedagogies*
I provisionally suggest the dichotomy between directive and responsive visible pedagogies. I provisionally define the directive visible pedagogy as a modality of visible pedagogy, which has explicit regulative and prescriptive rules, and the responsive visible pedagogy as a modality of visible pedagogy, which has implicit regulative rules and explicit prescriptive rules. I repeated the word, provisionally, for emphasis, because my research is primarily not regarding pedagogies at classroom level but regarding strategies at management level, and therefore the concepts of the pedagogies are treated as tools for developing the concepts of the strategies in the course of my research.

Table 4.1 shows the above-mentioned definitions of the directive visible and responsive visible pedagogies as well as the invisible pedagogy in a diagram.

Table 4.1 Definitions of the modalities of pedagogy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pedagogy</th>
<th>Regulative Rules</th>
<th>Prescriptive Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directive Visible Pedagogy</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsive Visible Pedagogy</td>
<td>Implicit</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Oppressive Visible Pedagogy?)</td>
<td>(Explicit)</td>
<td>(Implicit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invisible Pedagogy</td>
<td>Implicit</td>
<td>Implicit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that there is another possible modality of pedagogy, that is, oppressive visible pedagogy, in the above diagram. I have inserted a question mark in brackets next to it because I doubt that this modality will have any relevance to my research. Although it is logical to fill in the blank row that has explicit regulative rules and implicit prescriptive rules, it is not easy to imagine it as a sustainable modality of pedagogy because of its oppressive and unnatural nature. It is not only oppressive but also unnatural to sustain a pedagogic regime in which teachers expose pupils to explicit power relations but do not explicitly show them what they should learn. Therefore, I provisionally exclude this modality of pedagogy from the set of the concepts as tools for my research.

The directive visible pedagogy is directive because it means that the teacher directs the pupils' learning under the explicit regulative and prescriptive rules. The responsive visible pedagogy is responsive because the teacher and the pupils are expected to be responsive to each other under the explicit prescriptive rules.
and the implicit regulative rules. In the responsive visible pedagogy, as in the case of invisible pedagogy, the teacher tries to avoid exposing the pupils to the power relations between them. In the case of the responsive visible pedagogy, however, the teacher expects the pupils to learn in accordance with the explicit selection, sequencing and pacing rules. The pupils can be aware of the expectation and the rules, and are expected to respond properly. Then the teacher is expected to respond to each pupil's conduct and performance in accordance with the explicit criteria rules of which the pupils can also be aware. The responsive visible pedagogy is visible because the explicitness, rather than the implicitness, is dominant in the rules of the pedagogic relations as a whole.

There is a similarity between the responsiveness in the responsive visible pedagogy and that in the market economy. The market economy depends on the responsiveness of the actors including the consumers and producers, and the direction or coercion is not a primary measure to operate the system. The directive visible pedagogy seems more traditional than the responsive visible pedagogy. It is possible to perceive some similarity between autonomous and directive visible pedagogies as well as between market-oriented and responsive visible pedagogies. Bernstein (1990, p.87) mentions that the market-oriented visible pedagogy is a complex construction, or 'a new pedagogic Janus', which incorporates some of the criticism of the autonomous visible pedagogy. Similarly, the responsive visible pedagogy has two faces, one of which originates from the directive visible pedagogy—the traditional modality—and the other from the invisible pedagogy. The former face is the explicitness of the prescriptive rules and the latter is the implicitness of the regulative rules.

My assumption is that most parents and many teachers in the education quasi-market do not dare to rely on invisible pedagogy, which apparently does not seem to ensure the children's success in tests and examinations. While some of them may be in favour of the strictness of the directive visible pedagogy, others may not be happy with its rather old-fashioned image. The responsive visible pedagogy may be attractive to the latter group of parents and teachers who have been socialised in a society where autonomy, independence, individuality and other liberal and democratic values are publicly endorsed. After undergoing a certain degree of the dissemination of invisible pedagogy, the education system
may be unable to encourage just the directive visible pedagogy. A kind of amalgamation of pedagogies, which forms the responsive visible pedagogy, may be happening in the quasi-market system.

Although the similarity between Bernstein’s dichotomy and mine is not accidental and the latter dichotomy owes much to the former, the differences between the two dichotomies, which I hope will be clear from the above explanations, should be emphasised as well. Probably I should state definitely that the responsive visible pedagogy does not imply being more relevant to the quasi-market education system than the other modality of visible pedagogy as Bernstein’s market-oriented visible pedagogy by definition does. It should be judged by empirical research rather than by definition which modality of visible pedagogy is encouraged more than the other in the quasi-market system. My dichotomy, with the definitions in reference to Bernstein’s theory, is more operationally defined than his own dichotomy for the purpose of the empirical research on the education quasi-market.

Here I would like to make it clear that the purpose of this research is not to work on Bernstein’s theory but to theoretically and empirically analyse school strategies in the quasi-market system of education although my theoretical framework for the research is inspired by his theory of visible/invisible pedagogy. Therefore, while this part of Bernstein’s theory is used as an essential basis for my thesis, I do not claim that the thesis discusses his theory in its integrity.

The quasi-market reform in favour of visible pedagogies

Visible pedagogies promoted by the quasi-market reform
The quasi-market reform by the Conservative government seems to have aimed at attacking progressive or child-centred education—the invisible pedagogy—, and reinforcing conservative or traditional education—the directive visible pedagogy. In Chapter 3, it has been briefly explained that the quasi-market reform is expected to promote the academic model of education, which can now be replaced by visible pedagogy. We can expand on this topic as follows, using the concepts of regulative (or hierarchical) rules and prescriptive (or selection, sequencing, pacing and criteria) rules and those of explicitness and implicitness.
M Pirie (1988 & 1992), like others, describes that the market forces in education have been realised by the three measures of parental choice, the independence of schools from the LEAs, and funding based on enrolment. However, there is another important element of the quasi-market. This element is performance indicators including the results of national tests based on the National Curriculum and the results of public examinations including GCSEs. The government publishes the performance tables or league tables of the public examinations, and truancy. It is correct for H Thomas (1990) to count the ‘assessment of performance’ as one of the elements in LMS package or the implicit voucher system in addition to financial delegation, formula funding, open enrolment, and appointment and dismissal of staff. The introduction of national tests and the publication of performance tables represent the government’s policy orientation towards more explicit criteria rules, which the quasi-market needs and enhances. It is expected by the government that many parents as consumers attach importance to the above-mentioned performance indicators when they choose a school for their child and that the schools competing for parental choice then endeavour to raise their standards in the indicators.

We can easily understand that the National Curriculum clearly shows the policy orientation towards more explicit selection, sequencing and pacing rules. The government’s approaches to truancy and other disciplinary issues seem to have shown their favour for traditional social order advocated in the ‘Back to Basics’ campaign. In other words, the orientation of the disciplinary policies seems to be towards more explicit hierarchical or regulative rules.

In short, it seems that the above-mentioned policies have been in favour of the directive visible pedagogy, which has explicit regulative and prescriptive rules. What I want to emphasise here is that the planners of the education reform seem to have expected that market forces press schools to follow these policy orientations towards the explicit rules. These various policies are part of the policy package of creating the quasi-market system in which at least some of the policy-makers expect the conservative or traditional education to flourish. In their view, parents would prefer the rigorous teaching of specific knowledge and skills in a disciplined atmosphere, that is, the directive visible pedagogy, and market pressures would push schools to meet the parents’ preference.
However, it seems that the Conservative government's orientation towards stricter discipline was more an advocacy than a policy. By contrast, its policy of the National Curriculum and Assessment was very real. The responsive visible pedagogy can be attractive to some parents who attach importance to autonomy, independence, individuality and other progressive values as well as to examination and test results. Therefore, we should provisionally expect that the quasi-market system of education would promote visible pedagogy, which might be directive or responsive.

Some tensions between the reform elements
However, it is not appropriate to conclude the discussion on the government policies without some reservations. Not all advocates of the market have necessarily been satisfied with the compromise between the market-oriented policies and the policies for more central control including the National Curriculum and Assessment. Some would accept any results which parental choice produces even if those results do not enhance the traditional type of education with emphasis on structured teaching and social order, that is, the directive visible pedagogy.

More obviously, there has been some tension, as G Whitty (1990) points out, between the neo-liberal as the advocacy of the market-oriented system and vocationalism as the advocacy of the needs of industry and commerce. It is somewhat ironical to note that business people in the real markets are often more interested in the practical usefulness of education for business than in the market principle in education or the quasi-market system, and they do not hesitate to want government interventions to realise desirable results.

Moreover, they are often endorsing more vocational-oriented education relevant to the technological economy than the traditional academic education. Vocationalism, which the business lobby recommends, is not necessarily compatible with the directive visible pedagogy with the emphasis on the traditional teaching, which the neo-conservative and part of the neo-liberal endorse. The responsive visible pedagogy may be more easily in harmony with vocationalism than the directive one. It is possible that the implicit regulative rules in the responsive visible pedagogy allow pupils to do practical work on their
initiative, which is supposed to be important in vocational education. However, the difficulty of standardising vocational curricula and, in particular, assessments may imply that vocationalism is more compatible with invisible pedagogies, which have implicit instructional rules, than with visible pedagogies, which have explicit ones.

It should be carefully examined whether the implications of the new vocational and technological initiatives including CTCs and GNVQs are in favour of visible or invisible pedagogies.

In the case of TVEI, it seems to have been half compromised with progressive education. According to M Hickox and R Moore (1990), 'it is probably true to say that today many of those same liberal teachers are expressing considerable support for TVEI and fear the possible consequences which the National Curriculum and the GCSE might pose for it'. They say, 'as far as TVEI is concerned, the “technicist” approach can be seen as having more sympathy for aspects of progressivism than for traditional liberal-humanism. This is particularly so in terms of the progressive interest in experimental and process learning'.

The advocacy of CTCs seems to present some elements of invisible pedagogy, although the reality of the pedagogic practices in CTCs is a different topic. G Whitty, T Edwards and S Gewirtz (1993) describe the ‘new vocationalism’ of CTCs as follows, 'It is under that heading the apparent “progressivism” of CTCs’ emphasis on (for example) more practical, investigative and collaborative forms of learning can be reconciled with the expectation that they should provide a form of secondary education directly relevant to the personnel requirements and the culture of modern industry’. However, according to them, ‘Much of the CTC rhetoric about pedagogic innovation is more about prospect than practice’. Edwards and Whitty (1993) point out that the motives to choose CTCs are conspicuous and say, ‘More influential seemed to be a sense of CTCs as being selective schools, generally better resourced, and likely to uphold traditional values and discipline’, which are the elements of visible pedagogies.

Although the education reform as a whole seems to endorse visible pedagogies, it does not mean that the individual policies are unproblematically coherent with
each other. This is an important point because it may increase the complexity of the education quasi-market.

**School strategies oriented towards visible pedagogies**

It has already been explicated in Chapter 3 that the quasi-market system with the performance measurement is assumed to encourage schools to adopt and implement strategies oriented towards the academic model although not all schools pursue the model and not all parents favour the model. Now we can replace the academic model by visible pedagogy. To raise examination and test results, schools may adopt strategies oriented towards visible pedagogy, which focuses on academic performance, and which is attractive to at least some of those families who have the potential for contributing to good or better academic results. Schools aim for a good or better position in league tables not only to secure a sufficient number of their intake for their economic viability or prosperity but also to keep or improve their perceived status for their social pride. These mechanisms for school strategies oriented towards the academic model, that is, visible pedagogy, have been examined more thoroughly in Chapter 3. Here I just want to add a supplementary discussion on what Bernstein has said in this regard.

Bernstein (1990) relates the different fractions of the middle class to visible and invisible pedagogies as follows. ‘The assumptions of a visible pedagogy are more likely to be met by that fraction of the middle class whose employment has a direct relation to the economic field (production, distribution, and the circulation of capital). Whereas the assumptions of an invisible pedagogy are more likely to be met by that fraction of the middle class who have a direct relation not to the economic field but to the field of symbolic control and who work in specialized agencies of symbolic control usually located in the public sector’ (p.74). These social-class implications help to account for the conflicts between professional and enterprise cultures as pointed out by Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992a). The point which I wish to emphasise here is that there are certainly some middle-class families who are in favour of invisible pedagogies.

Nevertheless, it is realistic to think that most parents from middle-class families including the supporters of invisible pedagogies are not prepared to sacrifice their child’s success in examinations and advancement into higher education for their
ideal of education. Then they need some visible pedagogies for their own child. For a 'visible pedagogy (...)' will always place the emphasis on the performance of the child' (Bernstein, 1990, p.70) and invisible pedagogies' 'focus is not upon a "gradable" performance of the acquirer but upon procedures internal to the acquirer' (ibid, p.71). In plain speech, visible pedagogies are more exam- or test-oriented than invisible pedagogies. The supporters of invisible pedagogies may want both visible and invisible pedagogies. Bernstein (1990) clearly describes this dilemma for the supporters of invisible pedagogies as follows. ‘Indeed, this fact is explicitly taken into account by many middle class families who favour this regime in the early years of their child’s life before switching to a visible pedagogy at the secondary stage. Such favouring families often run a compensatory pedagogic programme dedicated to reading, writing, and counting whilst the child’s creative potential may be facilitated by the invisible pedagogy of the infant school or pre-school’ (ibid, p.81). ‘It is clear that, even for ardent sponsors of invisible pedagogies, this practice is generally confined to the child’s early years; certainly by the secondary level the demand is for a visible pedagogy, as it is this practice which leads to professional occupational placement’ (ibid, p.84).

Now we have learnt about Bernstein’s assumption that visible pedagogies meet the demands of middle-class families more often than invisible pedagogies do, especially in secondary schooling. This assumption leads to the prediction that school strategies targeted towards middle-class families will tend to be oriented towards the discourses of visible pedagogies. However, sometimes school strategies may be oriented towards the discourses of the mixture of both kinds of pedagogies, that is, the responsive visible pedagogy. The professional culture of the school is more likely to support the responsive visible pedagogy than the directive one. In any case, school strategies will be rarely oriented towards the discourses of solely invisible pedagogies.

The extension of the theory of visible/invisible pedagogy to management

Bernstein’s theory and school organisation

72
This research is on school strategies in response to the quasi-market education system. In other words, the focus of the research is institutional strategies by headteachers and their senior management teams rather than classroom practices by individual teachers. School strategies are institutional strategies at management level, as opposed to pedagogic practices at classroom level, but include strategies in pedagogic fields such as teaching, assessment, reporting and discipline as well as those in managerial fields such as organisation, staffing and marketing. Bernstein’s theory of visible/invisible pedagogy is concerned primarily with pedagogic relations between teachers and pupils rather than organisational relations between the management team and teachers. In order to make a whole theoretical framework for this research, we need to extend the theoretical basis to organisational relations between the management team and teachers. School strategies are to be implemented through organisational relations in the case of managerial fields and through both organisational and pedagogic relations in the case of pedagogic fields.

We should note that Bernstein’s theory can be extended over the border of pedagogic relations and be brought into organisational relations in school as well. The extension is seen only in germ in Bernstein’s own writings. His work on visible and invisible pedagogies (Bernstein, 1990), which is heavily used in this thesis, does not particularly deal with school organisation, while it extends his theory of pedagogic discourse to the analysis of society as a whole in terms of symbolic control and cultural reproduction. His earlier work (Bernstein, 1977, pp.85–115) examines the ‘organizational consequences’ of ‘collection and integrated codes’, that is, visible and invisible pedagogies. He says, ‘the collection code within the framework of oligarchic control creates for senior staff strong horizontal and vertical based relationships, whereas the work relationship of junior staff are likely to be vertical and the horizontal relationships limited to non-work-based contacts’ and ‘the integrated code will require teachers of different subjects to enter into social relationships with each other which will arise not simply out of non-task areas, but out of shared, co-operative educational task’ (ibid, pp.103–4). The definitions of some key concepts used here are introduced as follows. The collection code is the type of educational code with explicit and strong boundary maintenance in ‘classification’ and ‘frame’ while the integrated code...
code is the type with implicit and weak one. ‘Classification refers to the nature of the differences between contents. Where classification is strong, contents are well insulated from each other by strong boundaries. Where classification is weak, there is reduced insulation between contents, for the boundaries between contents are weak or blurred’ (ibid, p.88). ‘Frame refers us to the range of options available to teacher and taught in the control of what is transmitted and received in the context of the pedagogical relationship. Strong framing entails reduced options; weak framing entails a range of options. Thus frame refers to the degree of control teacher and pupil possess over the selection, organization, pacing and timing of the knowledge transmitted and received in the pedagogical relationship’ (ibid, pp.88–9). By the way, against the historical background at the time of his this work (Bernstein, 1977), it was suggested that there was some movement away from collection to integrated codes. It means the movement towards progressive or child-centred education.

Bernstein (1977, pp.174–200) presents another germ for the extension. Here his theory of educational code is applied to production or work. Contrasts are made between the codes of education and the codes of production. In the same way as the codes of education, the codes of production are indicated with ‘classification’ and ‘framing’. ‘We can ask what are relationships between the various agents, unskilled, skilled, technologists, managers, administrators, etc. The relationships between these categories can be strongly or weakly classified. If the former, then the relationships are stable and sharply distinguished, the functions well insulated from each other, and the agents are not interchangeable. If the latter, then the relationships between agents are less sharply distinguished, there is reduced insulation between functions and agents are more interchangeable between categories’ (ibid, pp.181–2). ‘If the primary unit of production is a repetitive, individually performed, strongly paced, explicitly sequenced divisive act, we can say that this is strong framing. If the primary unit of production is relatively co-operative, group based, where there is opportunity to vary the conditions and perhaps sequencing and pacing, where the outcome is less a fraction of the total object of production but bears a more direct relation to it, we can say that this represents weak framing’ (ibid, p.182). Bernstein’s intention in this work is to show that there is not necessarily a correspondence or continuity
between the codes of education and those of production, and that there is relative autonomy of education. He presents examples of discontinuity between school and work such as elite secondary schools' collection codes of strong classification and framing, irrespective of codes of production of their pupils' destination, and less able pupils, leaving secondary schools with integrated codes of weak classification and framing, and being destined to workplaces with collection codes of very strong classification and framing.

There seems to be no reason why we should not apply the above extended code theory to school organisation, which is surely a type of workplace. However, Bernstein himself has not explicitly done so. His above-mentioned analysis seems to focus on production in the economic field. Furthermore, his work on visible/invisible pedagogy (Bernstein, 1990) does not develop the theoretical extension to workplace in the above-mentioned way. In order to extend the theory of visibility/invisibility from pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers to organisational relations between school staff including teachers and managers, the school organisation literature may be of some use.

William Tyler (1988) presents an overview of the sociological approaches to school organisation and gives special importance to Bernstein's theory as a structuralist perspective. He provides us with an abstract but important comment that 'the theory of codes suggests that at the deepest level of social organisation the relations between the organisation of the curriculum, the methods of teaching and the patterns of governance and supervision are tightly related'(ibid, p.154). My extension of the concept of visibility/invisibility or explicitness/implicitness is in accordance with this comment.

Enquiry into the theories of school organisation and management

It should be emphasised that the purpose of this research is not to work on Bernstein's theory although the theoretical framework for the research is inspired by his theory of visible/invisible pedagogy. While I never claim that this thesis discusses Bernstein's theory in its integrity, the thesis will not be constrained by the scope of his theory. For the purpose of building a theoretical framework for this empirical research on school strategies, we need to extend the theory of visibility/invisibility or explicitness/implicitness to organisational relations.
between the school management team and teachers. This need will lead us to a consideration of theories of school organisation and management that may have some relevance to the extension.

Ambiguity model

According to Tony Bush (1995), there are six major models of educational management. They are ‘formal’, ‘collegial’, ‘political’, ‘subjective’, ‘ambiguity’ and ‘cultural’ models. He regards all these six models as partial and complementary, and thinks that it is rarely appropriate to label any school as typifying a single model and that elements of many or all of the models may be found in almost all organisations.

He states that the formal model ‘dominated the early stages of theory development in educational management’ and that the ‘other five models...all developed in response to the perceived weakness of’ the formal model. According to Bush, the formal model is an umbrella used to embrace a number of similar but not identical approaches, that is, ‘structural’, ‘systems’, ‘bureaucratic’, ‘rational’ and ‘hierarchical’ models. The formal models have several common features which emphasise the importance of systems, official structure, hierarchy, goal-seeking, rational process, authority of leaders and accountability.

Among the contrasts between the formal model and the other models, the one between the formal model and the ambiguity model seems to be the most useful one for this research. The reason is that the contrast apparently seems to correspond to that between visible pedagogy and invisible pedagogy in a sense that both contrasts seem to be based on the degree of explicitness in social relations. Moreover, as Bush states, the data supporting the ambiguity model have been drawn largely from educational settings.

According to Bush, the ambiguity model has the following features.

1. There is a lack of clarity about the goal of the organisation. Goals are so vague that they can be used to justify almost any behaviour.

2. Organisations have a problematic technology in which their processes are not properly understood. It is not clear how pupils acquire knowledge and skills so that the processes of teaching are clouded with doubt and uncertainty.
3. Organisations are characterised by fragmentation and ‘loose coupling’ which W K Weick (1976) uses as a term to describe relationships between subunits of organisation. The concept of loose coupling was developed for, and first applied to, educational institutions.

4. Organisational structure is regarded as problematic. There is uncertainty over the relative power of the different parts of the institution.

5. Ambiguity models tend to be particularly appropriate for professional client-serving organisations including educational institutions because of the requirement that professionals make individual judgements, rather than acting in accordance with managerial prescriptions.

6. There is fluid participation in the management of organisations. Members move in and out of decision-making situations.

7. A further source of ambiguity is provided by the signals emanating from the organisation’s environment.

8. Ambiguity theorists emphasise the prevalence of unplanned decisions. The lack of agreed goals means that decisions have no clear focus. Problems, solutions and participants interact and choices somehow emerge from the confusion.

9. Ambiguity models stress the advantages of decentralisation. Given the complexity and unpredictability of organisations, it is thought that many decisions should be devolved to subunits (for example, departments) and individuals.

The above-mentioned features show that the ambiguity model is an antithesis to the formal model in a way apparently similar to the way in which invisible pedagogy is an antithesis to visible pedagogy. While visible and invisible pedagogies are concerned primarily with pedagogic relations—social relations between pupils and teachers—, formal and ambiguity models are concerned primarily with organisational relations—social relations between staff members. Both contrasts seem to be based on the degree of explicitness in social relations.

Behind this apparent similarity, however, there is a significant difference between the two contrasts. Invisible pedagogy is not such a chaotic arrangement as the ambiguity model is. For example, the ambiguity model mentions the lack of agreed goals, without which invisible pedagogy or progressive education would not be possible. Before turning to a closer examination of the difference, we must
draw attention to other researchers on school organisation and management, whose literature seems to have some relevance to the extension of the concept of visibility/invisibility or explicitness/implicitness.

**Loose coupling model**

Tyler (1988) presents a typology of models of school organisation, which is considerably similar to, but considerably different from, the typology of models of educational management presented by Bush (1995). They are ‘functionalist’, ‘bureaucracy’, ‘contingency’, ‘loose coupling’, ‘interactionist’, and ‘structuralist’ models. He regards ‘functionalist’, ‘bureaucracy’ and ‘contingency’ models as parts of the ‘formal organisation’ theory as an umbrella. He also uses ‘interpretive’ approaches instead of ‘interactionist’ models. Tyler’s and Bush’s typologies are similar in that both regard the ‘formal’ model as one of the basic types. They have another similarity in regarding the ambiguity or loose coupling model as one of the basic types, though Bush regards the loose coupling model as one of ambiguity models while Tyler regards loose coupling as one of the basic types. It is not surprising that different researchers in social sciences use different typologies. However, there are two important reasons for the differences between Bush’s and Tyler’s typologies. First, Tyler’s interest is in school organisation which consists of all social relations including those between pupils and those between pupils and staff members, as we can see in his discussion on the interactionist model, as well as those between staff members, while Bush’s interest is in school/college management which deals specifically with social relations between staff members. Secondly, Tyler is also interested in the relations between education and society or the sociological implications of school organisation in society as we can see in his discussion on the structuralist model, while Bush concentrates on the internal management of school though external environments are not neglected.

The concept of ‘loosely coupled’ systems is provided by K Weick (1976). According to W Tyler’s (1988) summary, loose coupling exists if the common variables are weak as compared to other variables that influence the system and such systems are characterised by the loose connections between the ‘stable subassemblies’ which are their elementary components. ‘Many writers (...) have
since supported this view that schools consist of constituent parts which are only weakly coordinated and controlled’, according to Dimmock (1993).

In his discussion on the loose coupling model, which is relevant to my research, Tyler provides a very important view by saying, ‘While there is good evidence that the administration of school systems is loosely coupled with instruction, there is emerging a view which actually advocates tight coupling as a management strategy within school units. This literature seems to be a reaction to the insights of Weick and others and takes an explicitly normative and prescriptive approach. Much of this commentary and research links the organisational and the “school effectiveness” literature in unexpected ways’. According to Tyler, the literature says that ‘effective’ schools have clear goals usually with an academic orientation, a regular outcome orientation, tight linkages among variables including individuals, units, processes and actions, and consistency in rules, procedures and values.

Tyler (1988) also introduces the empirical criticisms of the above-mentioned literature. He quotes Astuto and Clark (1985) ‘who question the classical, tightly coupled image of the instructionally effective school’ (Tyler, 1988, p.95), and state that their analysis of case studies ‘revealed a range of differences in quality and quantity of interaction between teachers and principles’ (ibid, p.95). He refers to the ideological implications of the school effectiveness literature when he says, ‘One might also see in the definitive pronouncements about tight coupling something of an ideological bias that is attuned to the managerialist attempt to reassert control over the technical core’. He suggests the necessity of more theoretical criticisms in saying, ‘The claim that there is a set of universally acceptable outcomes rests on a much more questionable assumption that schools are consensually based institutions in which diversity of viewpoint and goal is not important’ (ibid, p.96).

What is important to my research here is that the school effectiveness literature, which Tyler criticises, seems to advocate explicitly normative and prescriptive strategies of schools. The difference between that literature and the criticism of the literature seems similar to that between visible pedagogy and invisible pedagogy.
Dimmock (1993) develops the concept of ‘linkage’ which ‘incorporates not only Weick’s notion of loose-tight coupling, but other dimensions too’, and, based on the ‘eight dimensions of coupling identified by Orton and Weick (1990)’, applies ‘each of the eight dimensions to appropriate school situations’. The eight dimensions are ‘individuals’, ‘sub-units’, ‘organizations’, ‘hierarchical levels’, ‘organizations and environments’, ‘ideas’, ‘activities’, and ‘intentions and actions’.

Concerning the first dimension, ‘individuals’, ‘Teachers have traditionally enjoyed a large amount of independence in their classroom behaviour and have justified their considerable classroom autonomy by appeal to their professional status’. Concerning the fourth dimension, ‘hierarchical levels’, Dimmock (1993) argues that research evidence suggests a lack of connectedness in schools between senior managers and teachers responsible for the delivery of the curriculum. The sixth dimension of linkage is ‘between ideas expressed in the form of values, missions and goals’. ‘Few schools engaged in goal-setting prior to the late 1980s, and even fewer did so collaboratively. Nowadays, schools in many countries are expected to engage in school development planning’. He says, ‘goals are often discounted, ignored or misunderstood by teachers’. The final dimension concerns the linkage between policy and practice. The exclusion of staff from decision making, poor communication and lack of planning may lead to loose coupling between intentions (goals, policies and priorities) and actions. ‘There may be loose linkage between planning and implementation. Educational programmes, instructional activities and classroom management may not align with educational goals and priorities’.

However, Dimmock argues, ‘with the advent of restructuring and school-based management, the effectiveness of loosely coupled schools is seriously challenged’. ‘Faced with new activities to be undertaken, such as school development planning, the formation and operation of school decision-making groups, the introduction of participative decision-making processes, the appraisal of staff, and greater emphasis on school-level curriculum planning within system frameworks, it is logical to assume tighter linkages in each of the eight dimensions’. ‘This is supported by studies on effective schools (…) which emphasise the importance of tight linkage and interaction between principals and teachers, especially in the
area of instructional leadership'. He concludes that 'If the functional connections can be achieved so that autonomy, flexibility, responsiveness, planning, participation, collaboration and self-efficacy have maximal impact on learning, teaching, climate and curriculum structure and content, then improved student learning may be achieved'.

Value conflicts
G Campbell-Evans (1993), in her examination of the importance of values in school management, indicates some points of value conflict although she takes a basically positive view of school-based management as Dimmock does. Campbell-Evans says, 'System initiatives may be interpreted in very different ways depending upon the thinking of the individual or staff in terms of rational and non-rational perspectives. School planning, for example, if seen as a prescriptive exercise could be interpreted as a system-level attempt to impose rational processes and procedures on to schools'. Based on Greenfield’s (1986) argument that ‘administrators are essentially value carriers in organizations’, Campbell-Evans considers value conflict of ‘the principal who believes in educating the whole child by attending to emotional, physical, affective and academic development’ whereas ‘System-level or community pressure is put on the school to improve upon student academic achievement in relation to neighbouring schools’. ‘Any number of value conflicts may emerge between individuals or groups of staff, within the overall school community and/or between the school and system levels’. Some of these ‘value conflicts’ seem to be between professional values, which are often progressive or liberal, and managerial values, which put emphasis on more explicit performance. In other words, these conflicts have a significant similarity to those between invisible and visible pedagogies. The latter modality of pedagogy is to be promoted by the quasi-market reform of education. ‘The restructuring movement brings with it system-level implications and pressures for open enrolments, competition for students, entrepreneurship, marketing, emphasis on exam and test results’.

Towards tight coupling and less ambiguity
Now, from the above-mentioned literature by several researchers on school organisation and management, we can identify a few important points relevant to this research.

First, many researchers point out an important aspect of school organisation. This aspect is called 'ambiguity', 'loose coupling' or 'loose linkage'. The aspect can be found in other kinds of organisation as well. However, school organisation usually has more ambiguity and looser coupling or linkage than other organisations. I can summarise the aspect as follows. School organisation has ambiguous or loose relations between staff members and between subunits, and organisational values and processes of control in school organisation are ambiguous or loose.

Secondly, the education reform has brought about some changes into the above-mentioned nature of school organisation and management. It seems that the combination of school-based management and competition, that is, the quasi-market, is urging school managers to tighten up the coupling or linkages within their school organisation. Many headteachers and their management teams seem to seek to make relations among staff members and subunits, organisational values, and processes of control less ambiguous or more explicit through such managerial strategies as school development planning, curriculum planning, the formalisation of decision-making process, and staff appraisal. The literature on school effectiveness tends to support these strategies of an 'explicitly normative and prescriptive approach' (Tyler, 1988, p.93). The market pressures seem to push school managers to adopt the managerial strategies that make the rules of social relations in their school organisation more explicit so that their school can be directed as a unity and can survive and prosper in the competitive environments.

Thirdly, as pointed out by Campbell-Evans, value conflicts in school organisation seem to be a fundamental issue. The ambiguity or looseness in school organisation is based at least partly on the professional values and interests of teachers. Therefore, we can hardly expect that headteachers and their management teams succeed without difficulty in making and implementing explicit strategies.
Now, we may draw an analogy between the modalities of pedagogy and those of school organisation and management. The contrast between tight and loose coupling or linkage, or that between less and more ambiguity, apparently seems to correspond to that between visible and invisible pedagogies in a sense that both contrasts seem to be based on the degree of explicitness in social relations. While Bernstein's theory of visible/invisible pedagogy is concerned primarily with 'pedagogic relations' between teachers and pupils, the theories of ambiguity, coupling and linkage are concerned with 'organisational relations' between the management team and teachers. Here we can remember the comment by William Tyler (1988, p.154) that 'the theory of codes suggests that at the deepest level of social organisation the relations between the organisation of the curriculum, the methods of teaching and the patterns of governance and supervision are tightly related'. However, we should further examine the above-mentioned analogy between the modalities of pedagogy and those of school organisation and management in order to extend the theory of visibility/invisibility or explicitness/implicitness to organisational relations between the school management team and teachers.

**Invisible pedagogies different from loose coupling and ambiguity models**
The invisible pedagogy is not chaos merely with ambiguity and looseness but a generic modality of pedagogy which requires a set of professional values. The values are often regarded as progressive. Bernstein seems to see a tighter ideological linkage or coupling in 'integrated codes', that is, invisible pedagogies, than in 'collection codes', that is, visible pedagogies. He says, 'It may be that integrated codes will only work when there is a high level of ideological consensus among the staff' (Bernstein, 1977, p.107). 'Collection codes have explicit and strong boundary maintaining features and they rest upon a tacit ideological basis. Integrated codes have implicit and weak boundary maintaining features and they rest upon an explicit and closed ideological basis' (ibid, p.109). In other words, Bernstein believes that values in a school with invisible pedagogy are more tightly coupled or less ambiguous than those in a school with visible pedagogy.
Organisational structure and culture

John O’Neill (1994) provides us with a relevant perspective from which we are able to examine the above-mentioned difference between visible/invisible pedagogy and tight/loose coupling (or less/more ambiguity). He presents two complementary concepts of ‘structure’ and ‘culture’. ‘Analysis of organizational structures focuses on visible and tangible features of educational organizations. Cultural analysis examines those seemingly intangible and invisible characteristics of organizations’ (ibid, p.101).

He argues that the ‘radical’ organisational structures with the shared values and beliefs are more appropriate than the ‘traditional’ organisational structures with hierarchical lines of authority and established procedural norms in order to survive in the changing environments of a market. ‘In a radical organizational structure, new activities trigger a flexible organizational response according to the demands of the task itself. Thus structures become ad-hoc rather than permanent. In such an environment hierarchical lines of authority and established procedural norms are inappropriate responses when “adaptive, short-run decisions are made at the front-line”’ (ibid, p.115). ‘The, comparatively recent, increased focus on organizational culture . . . has, in part, directly paralleled the move, discussed above, in educational organizations away from rigid, hierarchical management structures’ (ibid, p.115).

His concept of the ‘radical’ organisational structure has two important characteristics, that is, the importance of devolved management and that of culture. ‘Normative models of task-driven organizational management have been characterised by a call for more distributed forms of leadership . . . with managerial authority devolved to autonomous teams . . . . These trends have been accompanied by attempts to identify appropriate values, norms and organizational behaviours which enable members of the organization to work in a flexible, creative way’ (ibid, p.116).

He confirms the trend towards devolved management, saying, ‘in both the secondary and further education sectors there is a growing body of evidence which indicates a perceptible trend towards less bureaucratic, hierarchical structures’ (ibid, p.113). He refers to empirical studies of secondary schools, saying, ‘In these studies effective management is characterised by clearly defined
O’Neill states that ‘tight administrative control is replaced by tight cultural control’ (ibid, p.117). According to Bernstein (1977, p.109), while visible pedagogy has explicit boundary maintaining features and a tacit ideological basis, invisible pedagogy has implicit boundary maintaining features and an explicit ideological basis. Then, does it mean that visible pedagogy is being replaced by invisible pedagogy? No, I do not think so. As discussed earlier, it is assumed that the quasi-market system encourages schools to adopt strategies oriented towards visible pedagogies. It seems that the confusion arises from O’Neill’s concept of the ‘radical’ organisational structure which includes devolved management and culture. Devolved management and culture should be treated separately.

Regarding cultural control, there is much evidence of value conflicts in schools under the quasi-market system. It seems that devolved management has been accompanied by formal structural control rather than informal cultural control. Explicit structural control in management can be regarded as equivalent to explicit regulative and prescriptive rules in visible pedagogies.

What is important here is that O’Neill provides us with the complementary concepts of organisational structure and culture. Here we should remember that Bernstein (1977, p.107) says, ‘It may be that integrated codes will only work when there is a high level of ideological consensus among the staff’. This means that invisible pedagogy can exist as a generic modality of pedagogy because of its explicit cultural control in organisational relations between staff members. Then, we may assume that visible pedagogy can exist without explicit cultural control because of its explicit structural control in organisational relations between the school management team and teachers. However, this does not mean that cultural control cannot be explicit in the case of visible pedagogy.

Now I extend the theory of visibility/invisibility or explicitness/implicitness to organisational relations between the school management team and teachers, and propose two modalities of management that correspond to two modalities of pedagogy. Invisible management is oriented towards implicit control (loose coupling or ambiguity) of structural aspects and explicit control (tight coupling or lack of ambiguity) of cultural aspects while visible management is oriented
towards explicit structural control and explicit or implicit cultural control. Table 4.2 shows these definitions of the visible management and the invisible management in a diagram.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2 Visible Management and Invisible Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visible Management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explicit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Invisible Management</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above extension of Bernstein’s theory of visibility/invisibility to organisational relations is in accordance with the comment by William Tyler (1988, p.154) that ‘the theory of codes suggests that at the deepest level of social organisation the relations between the organisation of the curriculum, the methods of teaching and the patterns of governance and supervision are tightly related’.

As Bernstein (1990) says, visible pedagogy is a conservative modality of pedagogy, and invisible pedagogy is a progressive modality of pedagogy. Correspondingly, visible management is a managerial modality of management, and invisible management is a collegial modality of management.

**Devolved management and performance monitoring**

As we can see below, it seems that devolved management in the quasi-market system tends to be accompanied by formal structural control rather than informal cultural control. The structural control in devolved management seems to be realised through senior management’s monitoring of staff’s and sub-units’ performances measured by explicit indicators.

The combined use of devolved management and performance monitoring is an essential characteristic of the market-oriented reforms of public services. Performance indicators have been developed as tools for organisational control in the public services. In the case of education, performance indicators including examination results and truancy rates have been built into the quasi-market system.

According to Common, Flynn and Mellon (1992), ‘Whatever the motivation for decentralization, senior management cannot afford to allow people lower down
the organization to have so much autonomy that they fail to follow the strategy of the organization or meet agreed performance targets. Decentralization requires an adequate system to measure the performance of units and their contribution to the performance of the organization as a whole' (ibid, p.52). In their analysis of the UK’s reformed public service systems with competition and decentralisation, the authors point out the prior movement towards decentralisation in the private sector. ‘Decentralization in the public sector has reflected a trend in the private sector over the past two decades. Many companies have tried to reduce the size of their head offices and make plant and branch managers more autonomous’ (ibid, p.50).

Levacic (1995) also focuses on the combination of decentralised or devolved management and performance monitoring in both private and public sectors. She says, 'There appears to be an apparent paradox . . . that increased central control of the curriculum has been accompanied by decreased control of resource management. However, the equivalent organizational change in the private sector—that of the multidivisional or M-form firm replacing a centrally controlled, functionally specialized corporate structure (U-form firm)—has been explained as a means of enhancing top management control and hence efficiency’ (ibid, p.173).

She explains the supposed merits of the M-form firm as follows. ‘In contrast, a multi-divisional or M-form organization is structured into operational divisions, based on products, which are given a high degree of autonomy to manage themselves. They are controlled by the headquarters management by being set targets, monitored against these targets, and allocated resources in line with their success in contributing to overall company goals. The greater efficiency claimed for the M-form firm . . . stems from the ability of top management to engage in strategic management rather than being immersed in detailed operational issues, as in the U-form structure’ (ibid, p.174). ‘Appropriate incentives are given to divisional managers through setting personal and divisional performance targets which promote company-wide objectives. Thus the self-interest of managers and divisions is harnessed for the benefit of the organization as a whole. The information required by top management is therefore restricted to that needed for monitoring the overall performance of managers and their divisions and for
making strategic decisions about the development and direction of the business’ (ibid, p.175).

She examines the analogy between the M-form firm and the reformed education service. She tries to regard schools as operational divisions of an M-form organisation and the LEA or the central government as the headquarters management. ‘The 1988 Education Reform Act specified key elements of the M-form model, in particular establishing schools as operational divisions managed as independent cost centres, and creating in the national curriculum and its national testing a means for assessing the performance of schools and holding them accountable’ (ibid, p.175). However, she admits imperfections in the analogy, saying, ‘While the constituent features of the M-form model correspond well to equivalent features of the restructured education service, the model as developed in the English school system at the time of writing lacks the clear lines of accountability between top management and the divisions which characterize the generic M-form model’ (ibid, 175).

I would say that schools in the quasi-market system are more analogous to companies in a market than to operational divisions of a company. As she herself points out, school governing bodies ‘are no longer part of the line of hierarchical control between school and LEA’ (ibid, pp.176–7). The drastically strengthened powers of governing bodies are accompanied by the drastically weakened powers of LEAs. The strengthened powers of the central government are to establish and regulate the market framework, within which schools compete for parental choice, rather than to function as the headquarters management. It is difficult to regard the whole education service as one organisation. However, the subsequent Labour government’s policies on education may have changed this situation. Schools may be a little more similar to operational divisions of a company than they were before the implementation of the Labour’s policies.

Although Levacic’s analogy between the M-form organisation and the reformed education service may have the above-mentioned imperfections, it provides us with a significant insight into the combination of devolved management and performance monitoring as an important means of control in the reformed education service. She regards LMS as ‘an organizational form for securing greater efficiency and stronger organizational control’ (ibid, p.186).
The word ‘control’ in this context has a rather broad sense. She says, “‘Control mechanisms’ in the sense used here cover a range of distinctly different devices, most of which do not imply coercion except as a last resort’ (ibid, p.169). She presents four distinct control devices—‘market relationship’, ‘hierarchical control’, ‘political control’ and ‘ethical codes of accepted behaviour’—, and these devices can also be regarded as ‘modes of accountability’ (ibid, pp.169-170). Based on the classification of the modes of accountability by Kogan (1986), Levacic argues that ‘consumerist accountability’ corresponds to ‘market relationship’, ‘public accountability’ to the mixture of ‘hierarchical control’ and ‘political control’, and ‘professional accountability’ to ‘ethical codes of accepted behaviour’ (ibid, p.170).

The education reform has replaced ‘LEAs’ hierarchical administrative control of schools by a quasi-market in which schools receive payments which are contingent on their success in attracting pupils’ (ibid, p.171). Parents are expected to regard performance indicators including examination results as important when they choose a school for their child. Public examinations and national tests are surely essential control devices through performance monitoring in the reformed education system. Ofsted’s inspection scheme is another one. These control devices are structural and visible, while professional ethics or ethical codes are cultural and invisible devices of control. These modes of control through devolved management, performance monitoring and competition are responsive, while the modes of control through bureaucratic administration are directive.

The structural and cultural control devices are relevant to both the system level and the institutional level. This research will examine control devices adopted by school management teams at their schools.

**Directive visible, responsive visible and invisible modalities of management**

Based on the extension of Bernstein’s theory of pedagogy to school organisation, I have stated that invisible management is oriented towards the implicit control of structural aspects and explicit control of cultural aspects of school organisation while visible management is oriented towards explicit structural control and explicit or implicit cultural control. Now the theoretical
extension can be applied to two modalities of visible management as well as invisible management. Like the case of visible pedagogy, visible management can be directive or responsive. As the responsive visible pedagogy’s equivalent in organisational relations, the responsive visible management allows the apparent autonomy of school staff in their work through devolved management, but tries to establish tight control over the results of the work through performance monitoring. The above-mentioned literature of devolved management and performance monitoring seems to suggest the relevance of this modality to the quasi-market system of education. The directive visible management is a more traditional modality of management with hierarchical and direct control of staff’s work.

I define the three modalities of management as follows. The directive visible management is a modality of organisational relations, between school managers and teaching staff, which has explicit regulative rules and explicit prescriptive rules. The responsive visible management is a modality which has implicit regulative rules and explicit prescriptive rules. Invisible management is a modality which has implicit regulative rules and implicit prescriptive rules. Table 4.3 shows these definitions of the modalities of management in a diagram.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modalities of Management</th>
<th>Regulative Rules</th>
<th>Prescriptive Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directive Visible Management</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsive Visible Management</td>
<td>Implicit</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Oppressive Visible Management?)</td>
<td>(Explicit)</td>
<td>(Implicit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invisible Management</td>
<td>Implicit</td>
<td>Implicit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Structural control is divided into control in regulative rules and that in prescriptive rules. Both the regulative and prescriptive rules here are in organisational relations between school managers and teachers. The regulative rules have to do with how explicit the hierarchical power relations are between the managers and teachers. The prescriptive rules are concerned with how explicitly the teachers’ tasks, methods of performing tasks, and performance measurement criteria are prescribed. In other words, the prescriptive rules are the rules that tell
teachers what to do, how to do, and what is to be evaluated. In contrast, the regulative rules are the rules that tell teachers to obey the managers’ instructions about what to do and how to do.

I do not include the aspect of cultural control in the above definition, but only the aspect of structural control consisting of regulative and instructional rules. Although Bernstein’s theory implies that invisible pedagogy is oriented towards more explicit cultural control and more implicit structural control than visible pedagogy, I think that the difference between visible and invisible pedagogies does not depend on the explicitness of cultural control, but on the explicitness of structural control, that is, regulative and/or instructional rules.

As implied by Bernstein, in order to function properly as a modality of pedagogic and organisational relations, invisible pedagogy may possibly need more explicit cultural control than visible pedagogy. Otherwise there is a danger of invisible pedagogy becoming chaotic. Without explicit cultural control, visible pedagogy can more easily avoid a chaotic situation than invisible pedagogy because the former has more explicit structural control than the latter. However, it does not mean that visible pedagogy cannot have explicit cultural control. Furthermore, whether or not invisible pedagogy manages to avoid a chaotic situation is a matter of empirical research rather than that of a theoretical definition.

Finally, I should mention the oppressive visible management in Table 4.3, which corresponds to the oppressive visible pedagogy of Table 4.1 in this chapter. I have inserted a question mark in brackets next to this modality of management in the same way as I have done for the corresponding modality of pedagogy. There is no reason to believe that the modality of management will have more relevance to my research than the modality of pedagogy. It is not only oppressive but also unnatural to sustain a management regime in which school managers expose teachers to explicit power relations, but do not explicitly show them what tasks they should perform. Therefore, I provisionally exclude this modality of management, as well as the corresponding modality of pedagogy, from the set of the concepts as tools for my research.

Modalities of management corresponding to those of pedagogy
Now it seems possible to integrate the whole theoretical framework of pedagogy and management based on Bernstein’s theory of pedagogy and the organisational theories discussed above. I shall summarise the above-mentioned discussion as follows.

Bernstein’s theory of pedagogies and the organisational theory of ambiguity or coupling have a common feature. This feature is the contrast in the degree of explicitness of the rules in social relations. While the theory of pedagogies are concerned primarily with pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers, the ambiguity or coupling theory is concerned primarily with organisational relations between staff members. The tight/loose-coupled organisation has more/less explicit rules in organisational relations. Visible/invisible pedagogy has more/less explicit rules in pedagogic relations.

However, invisible pedagogy is not mere chaos with ambiguity and looseness, but a generic modality of pedagogy with a set of professional values regarded as progressive. Bernstein implies that there is a tighter ideological linkage or coupling in invisible pedagogies than in visible pedagogies. Using the theory of organisational structure and culture, I have stated that invisible management is oriented towards explicit cultural control and implicit structural control while visible management is oriented towards explicit structural control and explicit or implicit cultural control. Thus Bernstein’s theory of pedagogy has been extended over the border of pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers and brought into organisational relations between staff members as well.

Then, the theory of devolved management and performance monitoring enables us to extend the concepts of the directive and responsive visible modalities to organisational relations. While the directive visible management is oriented towards the explicit control of both regulative and prescriptive aspects in organisational relations, the responsive visible management is oriented towards the implicit control of regulative aspects through devolved management and the explicit control of prescriptive aspects through performance monitoring. Here in the context of organisational relations between school managers and teachers, the regulative rules have to do with how explicit the hierarchical power relations are between the managers and teachers. The prescriptive rules are concerned with
how explicitly teachers’ tasks, methods of performing tasks, and performance measurement criteria are prescribed.

Thus, extending Bernstein’s theory of pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers to organisational relations between school managers and teaching staff, I define directive visible, responsive visible and invisible management as three modalities of organisational relations between school managers and teaching staff in school as follows. The *directive visible management* is a modality of organisational relations, between school managers and teaching staff, which has explicit regulative rules and explicit prescriptive rules. The *responsive visible management* is a modality which has implicit regulative rules and explicit prescriptive rules. *Invisible management* is a modality which has implicit regulative rules and implicit prescriptive rules.

In the above-mentioned definitions, which correspond to the definitions of the three modalities of pedagogy, there is a presumption that pedagogic relations and organisational relations may have the same or similar orientation in terms of regulative and prescriptive rules. As Bernstein (1990) said, visible/invisible pedagogy is conservative/progressive modality of pedagogic relations between teachers and pupils. In parallel with the dichotomy of pedagogy, visible/invisible management is managerial/collegial modality of organisational relations between school managers and teachers. The above-mentioned presumption is based on the perception that the combination of conservative education and managerial organisation is as natural as that of progressive education and collegial organisation. The latter combination is generally regarded as based on the professional values of the so-called liberal educational establishment.

The above presumption seems meaningful, and is in tune with Tyler’s comment that ‘the theory of codes suggests that at the deepest level of social organisation the relations between the organisation of the curriculum, the methods of teaching and the patterns of governance and supervision are tightly related’ (Tyler, 1988, p.154). The presumption is useful for formulating the above three modalities of management as corresponding to the modalities of pedagogy. The importance of Bernstein’s theory lies in each modality’s definition in the use of the explicitness of regulative and instructional or prescriptive rules.
The control in the responsive visible pedagogy and management is not necessarily looser than that in the directive visible pedagogy and management. Explicit prescriptive rules can realise tight control in organisational relations as well as in pedagogic relations. Levacic (1995) says, 'The M-form organization thus depicted as tight mission accompanied by loose means. Top management operates tight control through strategic management and performance monitoring, while leaving how the objectives are attained to middle managers and their divisions'. Performance measurements based on prescribed norms of instructional discourse and quantitative indicators including examination and test results seem to penetrate the three levels of relations—pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers, organisational relations between teaching staff and school managers, and market relations between schools and parents. At institutional level, classroom teachers can be held accountable to their head of department and/or the headteacher and senior management team, and the heads of department can be held accountable for their performances to the headteacher and senior management team. At system level, schools can be held accountable for their performances to parents, local and central government, and other stakeholders. Performance indicators and measurements, which make prescriptive rules more explicit, seem to be effective means of control in organisational relations as well as in pedagogic relations. There may be some linkage between a modality of pedagogy and that of management, and explicit prescriptive rules may have an increasing importance for both pedagogy and management in the education quasi-market. These issues will be examined later in the analysis of the empirical data.

**Visible, invisible and neutral strategies**

Now, with the above-mentioned theoretical framework of visible/invisible pedagogy/management based on Bernstein’s theory of pedagogy and the organisational theories, let us return to the focal issue of school strategies. Here I will repeat the definition of school strategies to ensure that the theoretical framework of school strategies is well integrated with that of visible/invisible pedagogy/management. In Chapter 3, I have defined strategies of a school as plans that the school management team headed by the headteacher adopts and implements in the quasi-market education system. The management team usually
includes the deputies and other senior teachers. School strategies are institutional strategies at management level, as opposed to pedagogic practices at classroom level, but include strategies in pedagogic fields such as teaching, assessment, reporting and discipline as well as those in managerial fields such as organisation, staffing and marketing. These strategies are not necessarily written down or publicised as such. Therefore, this research aims to identify school strategies in the internal structures of managerial discourse.

In Chapter 3, I have presented a basic assumption that the quasi-market system encourages schools to adopt and implement strategies oriented towards the traditional academic model. Now, with the theoretical framework of visible/invisible pedagogy/management, this assumption can be rephrased. The rephrased assumption is that schools in the quasi-market tend to introduce strategies oriented towards visible pedagogy and management. I call these strategies visible strategies. Conversely, invisible strategies are those strategies that are oriented towards invisible pedagogy and management. In other words, visible strategies are basically strategies oriented towards more conservative pedagogy and more managerial management. Invisible strategies are those oriented towards more progressive pedagogy and more collegial management.

I will give more operational definitions to the above-mentioned modalities of school strategy as follows. A visible strategy is a school strategy that enhances the explicitness of regulative and/or prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers or in organisational relations between teachers and school managers. An invisible strategy is a school strategy that enhances the implicitness of those rules. If a school strategy enhances neither explicitness nor implicitness of the rules, the strategy is a neutral strategy.

The modalities of visible and invisible strategies are subdivided as follows. A regulative visible strategy is a school strategy that enhances the explicitness of regulative rules in pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers or in organisational relations between teachers and school managers. A prescriptive visible strategy is a school strategy that enhances the explicitness of prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations or in organisational relations. A regulative invisible strategy and a prescriptive invisible strategy are defined in the same way.
There is another dimension of the subdivision of the modalities. School strategies can be placed in either of the two broad areas of pedagogy and management, which correspond to the above-mentioned theoretical framework of pedagogy and management. Strategies in pedagogic fields, such as teaching, assessment, reporting, extracurricular activities, pastoral care and discipline, are concerned with pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers. Strategies in managerial fields, such as organisation, staffing and marketing, have to do with organisational relations between teachers and school managers. Therefore, I will indicate the place of each strategy as follows: **Regulative visible strategy in pedagogy, prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy, regulative invisible strategy in management, prescriptive visible strategy in management, etc.**

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 summarise the above-mentioned subdivisions of the modalities of visible and invisible strategies respectively.

**Table 4.4 Subdivisions of Visible Strategy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To Enhance the Explicitness of Regulative Rules</th>
<th>To Enhance the Explicitness of Prescriptive Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Pedagogy</strong></td>
<td>Regulative Visible Strategy in Pedagogy</td>
<td>Prescriptive Visible Strategy in Pedagogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Management</strong></td>
<td>Regulative Visible Strategy in Management</td>
<td>Prescriptive Visible Strategy in Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.5 Subdivisions of Invisible Strategy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To Enhance the Implicitness of Regulative Rules</th>
<th>To Enhance the Implicitness of Prescriptive Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Pedagogy</strong></td>
<td>Regulative Invisible Strategy in Pedagogy</td>
<td>Prescriptive Invisible Strategy in Pedagogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Management</strong></td>
<td>Regulative Invisible Strategy in Management</td>
<td>Prescriptive Invisible Strategy in Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Visible strategies predominant in the education quasi-market: Hypothesis

Let us return to the above-mentioned assumption that schools in the quasi-market tend to introduce strategies oriented towards visible pedagogy and management. Now, with the theoretical framework of visible and invisible strategies in pedagogy and management, this assumption can be developed into the basic hypothesis of this research. The hypothesis is that school managers in the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies than invisible strategies in pedagogy and management. This research is intended to examine the hypothesis.

The above-mentioned hypothesis implies that more and more schools become oriented towards visible pedagogy and management in the quasi-market system of education. However, I must make it clear that the empirical study in this research does not deal with the whole picture of pedagogy and management of any school. Nor does the study describe all the strategies that were being used in the school at the time. The empirical data focus on ‘new strategies’, which the school managers introduced or changed since the quasi-market reform by the Education Reform Act 1988. Those strategies were ‘new’ at the time of the data collection. The empirical study in this research aims at investigating new strategies or strategic changes pursued by the school managers after the quasi-market reform in order to examine the basic hypothesis that school managers in the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies than invisible strategies in pedagogy and management.

In other words, the empirical study is not concerned with the predominance of any modality of pedagogy and management, but is concerned with the directions of the strategic changes pursued by the school managers. The hypothesis—the introduction of more visible strategies than invisible strategies—implies a general direction of movement towards visible pedagogy and management. The hypothesis is based on an assumption that the quasi-market system tends to encourage school managers to try to move their school in the direction of visible pedagogy and management.

Whether the general direction is towards the directive or responsive modality of visible pedagogy and management is another question. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the direction for pedagogy is the same as that for management. I can only expect clues to these additional questions from the empirical study.
These issues will be discussed on the basis of the empirical findings. However, the subdivisions of visible and invisible modalities of pedagogy and management are essential for the whole theoretical framework of my research, which gives meaning to the hypothesis and the additional questions.

The place of Bernstein’s theory in this research

Based on the above theory development, let us now clarify the place of Bernstein’s theory in this thesis as follows.

The dichotomy of visible and invisible modalities can be extended from pedagogy to management, and school strategies in both pedagogy and management can be interpreted in historical and systemic contexts. Bernstein’s theory of visible and invisible modalities enables us to relate strategic changes at the micro-level of school to quasi-market mechanisms and other forces at the macro-level of the education system. The integration or linkage of macro and micro levels is a major theme in Bernstein’s sociological theory. Bernstein’s theory also makes it clear that education is not a value-free field, and the choice between visible and invisible modalities, that is, academic and progressive education, has been a major disputed issue within the battleground of educational discourse in Britain and elsewhere. At least some advocates of the academic schooling model, that is, visible modality, constituted a part of the coalition that promoted the then Conservative government’s policy of introducing the quasi-market into education. The macro/micro linkage and the ideological context of education are interrelated as Brian Davies (1994, p.16) says, ‘The different modalities were viewed as representation of different ideological positions within the state regulation of education and representations of different ideologies of control sponsored by different class fractions. The development of the concept of code allowed movement from macro structures to micro contexts, pointed to ideological arenas of appropriation, sponsorship and creation and showed the social basis of different acquisition’.

In short, Bernstein’s theory provides a solid and fertile basis for formulating the theoretical framework to analyse school strategies at micro-level in relation to historical and systemic contexts at macro-level, at both levels of which conflicting values and ideals are of enormous significance due to the social functions of
education including socialisation and selection. Such value conflicts can be understood in a simple but fundamental question of what kind of education is desirable for individuals and for society. Concerning pedagogy, the question will be regarding the role that should be played by academic (visible) or progressive (invisible) education. Regarding management, the question will be whether managerial or collegial operation of school is desirable.

Having presented the above-mentioned importance of Bernstein’s theory to this thesis, I would like to re-emphasise that the purpose of this research is not to work on or test his theory. The key focus of this thesis is not his theory of pedagogy for its own sake but school strategies introduced or changed in the quasi-market system of education although the theory provides a valuable inspiration for formulating the conceptual framework to investigate those changes. Therefore, while this part of Bernstein’s theory is used as a tool for this thesis, I never claim that the thesis discusses his theory in its integrity. Nor is the thesis constrained by the scope of his theory. The dichotomy of visible and invisible modalities is explicitly extended from pedagogy to management by the author of this thesis. Such an extension is seen only in germ in Bernstein’s own writings. The theoretical framework to analyse school strategies in the use of the dichotomy is originated by the author, and school strategies in the analysis include not only strategies in pedagogy but also those in management.
Chapter 5 Methodological Description of the Empirical Study

Case study as the research strategy
The first question for designing the empirical study is what methodological strategy should be adopted. According to Robson (1993, p.40), a widely used approach classifies research strategies into three main categories of ‘experiment’, ‘survey’ and ‘case study’. Case study is adopted as the strategy for the empirical element of this research. It is almost meaningless to consider a possibility of choosing experiment as the research strategy because the research interest here is in the real world of the education quasi-market which is too complex to control and manipulate variables and conditions for undertaking any experiment. Then, why is case study chosen instead of survey?

The methodological strategy should fit the purpose of the empirical study. The purpose of the empirical study in this research is to investigate new strategies or strategic changes pursued by school managers after the quasi-market reform. The study must be designed to examine the basic hypothesis that school managers in the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies than invisible strategies in pedagogy and management. It is very difficult to receive more than superficial responses to a standardised set of questions in a survey concerning such a complex issue as school strategies in the quasi-market. First, respondents may simply not understand what is really sought when they are asked about ‘strategies’ in the questionnaire. Even if they understand it, it is unlikely that they will spend much time to give thoughtful answers to such a complex issue when busy respondents do not feel obliged to do so. Furthermore, the issue may be too sensitive for them to give direct answers with regard to strategies in the real world of competition. The most serious problem is that it is very difficult to get enough information in the questionnaire to judge whether each strategy is visible or invisible. The judgement will be possible only if strategies are described in detail and analysed within its context.
All the above-mentioned difficulties and problems indicate the relevance of the 'case study' strategy that enables intensive and in-depth analysis of the detailed descriptions of each strategy and its context. The methodology of 'case study' may open the doors to more than superficial accounts, thoughtful answers with the understanding of the issue, subtle responses, rather than no response, to sensitive questions with some rapport and appropriate techniques, and detailed descriptions of each strategy and its context.

Multiple-case study: Targeting six secondary schools in a London borough

If ‘case study’ is chosen as the methodological strategy, the next important question is regarding the ‘case’ for this research. The subject of the research is new strategies or strategic changes in schools pursued by school managers after the quasi-market reform, and therefore a school or a certain number of schools may be the case(s). According to Yin (1989, p.46), ‘A primary distinction in designing case studies is between single- and multiple-case designs’. Considering that the purpose of this research is to examine the basic hypothesis that school managers in the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies than invisible strategies for their schools, there seems to be no rationale for a single-case design. The examination of such a tendency probably needs more than one case. Such rationales for a single-case as ‘critical case’, ‘extreme or unique case’ and ‘revelatory case’ (ibid, pp.46–49) seem to be irrelevant to the purpose of this research. ‘The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust’ (ibid, p.52).

However, the same author cautions us, ‘the conduct of a multiple-case study can require extensive resources and time beyond the means of a single student or independent research investigator’ (ibid, p.53). On the grounds of limited time, manpower and resources available for this research, the number of cases cannot be large.

It is necessary to decide whether the case schools should be primary or secondary. The decision was to target secondary schools on the assumption that they were under more market pressure than primary schools, with which proximity was more important for parental choice, and on which performance tables were not yet published at the time of the empirical study.
It is also necessary to decide where the cases should be chosen from. As a matter of practicability, the cases cannot be too far from the researcher’s residence. It is also appropriate to choose a geographical cluster of schools, which may compete with each other. This does not mean that these schools are to be in a single local quasi-market. It is not easy to judge which schools are in the local market and which are not, until a detailed analysis is completed. We should note that the purpose of this study is not to describe a local quasi-market but to analyse strategies of schools. Not the local market but the schools are the cases for this study. Although some schools may compete with other schools that are not in close proximity, there is a higher possibility of competition between schools if they are near one another. Any findings of competition between the schools may be useful as background information for analysing strategies in the contexts. Whether or not all the schools studied are in the single local market, it is easier to analyse their strategies in some local contexts if they are in a limited geographical area.

Because the purpose of this research is to examine a hypothesised tendency of the strategic movement of schools in the quasi-market, ‘extreme’ cases should be avoided in the use of a similar logic to Patton’s ‘typical case sampling’ (Patton, 1990, pp.173–174). For example, analysing the strategies of schools in very affluent areas with extraordinarily choosy parents may not make the findings particularly persuasive. On the other hand, there is no point in studying schools in areas where transportation or any other factor almost prohibits school choice. Politically famous LEAs such as the then Conservative government’s flagships or their targets of political attack would not be very relevant either.

With reference to the logic of Patton’s ‘maximum variation sampling’ (ibid, p.172), if the cases include various types of school, such as co-educational/single-sex, LEA-maintained/grant-maintained, secular/denominational, and academically high/low performing schools, it may result in ‘important shared patterns that cut across cases and derive their significance from having emerged out of heterogeneity’ (ibid, p.172).

The above-mentioned factors taken into consideration, a non-affluent London borough without any extremeness has been chosen. The population in the borough has diverse socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. Roughly speaking,
it becomes relatively more affluent as you move away from the inner-city areas and more deprived as you go towards the inner-city areas. The borough as a whole is less affluent than the national average. The 1994 performance tables or the so-called league tables published by the then DFE show that the average for schools in the borough (excluding independent schools) of the GCSE exam results in terms of ‘5 or more Grades A-C’ is more than 10% lower than the England average (including all the schools) (43.3%).

Before the case schools were chosen, an interview with the Assistant Education Officer of the borough in charge of admissions was conducted to bring about preliminary information on the secondary schools in the borough. The information taken into account, from the borough’s secondary schools, six schools in relatively close proximity to one another were chosen as the cases. The case schools were chosen to include a variety of types of school, that is, co-educational/single-sex, LEA-maintained/grant-maintained, secular/denominational, and academically high/low performing schools.

The empirical study has been conducted on condition that the borough, the schools and the people concerned will remain anonymous. I give the borough a pseudonym of Roundham and the six case schools the pseudonyms of Easthill Girls’ School, Roundham Catholic College, George Square School, Fertile Land School, Seymour Field School and Riverside Street School.

The basic features of the six case schools are as follows. All the schools are comprehensive.

**Easthill Girls’ School**
Type: County; girls; comprehensive; 11–16
Standard number: Not much below 200
GCSE results (1994; 5 or more A-Cs): Almost the same as the England average

**Roundham Catholic College**
Type: Voluntary-aided; co-educational; comprehensive; 11–18 (with sixth form)
Standard number: Not much below 200
GCSE results: Just above the borough average
George Square School
Type: County; co-educational; comprehensive; 11–16
Standard number: Not much above 100
GCSE results: Below the borough average

Fertile Land School
Type: County; co-educational; comprehensive; 11–16
Standard number: Not much above 100
GCSE results: Below the borough average

Seymour Field School
Type: Grant-maintained; co-educational; comprehensive; 11–18 (with sixth form)
Standard number: Not much above 200
GCSE results: More than 10% higher than the England average

Riverside Street School
Type: Grant-maintained; co-educational; comprehensive; 11–16
Standard number: Not much below 200
GCSE results: Higher than the borough average but lower than the England average

Semi-structured interviews to be adopted
The ‘semi-structured interview’ has been chosen as the main method of data collection for this research. Documents have been collected from schools as supplementary data.

Because of the nature of the research objects, ‘school strategies’, it is highly unlikely to be able to get relevant data mainly from the written information. We can easily imagine that such sensitive and complicated objects as the strategies to compete with other schools are rarely explicitly stated in written information and need to be asked about. School development plans and school policies may provide valuable information, but it will be still necessary to ask specific questions in order to find what strategy has actually been adopted in specific
contexts, why it has been done with specific meanings, and what its implications are for the school’s competition with other schools for parental choices. Therefore, interviews are essential for this research. Documents including prospectuses, development plans, policies, and Ofsted inspection reports (if the inspection has been done) have been collected as supplementary data sources to assist the transcription and interpretation of interview records.

The semi-structured interview method has been chosen from different interview methods because of the following reasons. The purpose of this empirical study is to examine the basic hypothesis of school strategies, and therefore it is necessary for the interviewer to have great control over what topics should be covered, and the topics should be listed in advance and referred to by the interviewer during the interview. Without such structure and control, the interviewee’s talk might end up with, for example, just criticisms against government policies, complaints about his/her workload or details about his/her subject. On the other hand, however, the interviewer needs a great deal of flexibility in asking to expand on some important comments, pursuing new topics emerging during the interview, changing the order of topics according to the flow of the interview, and so on. Moreover, the nature of the research interest in the competition between schools, which is rather sensitive and complex, requires much more tact than allowed by the fully structured interview method.

The self-completion questionnaire method has the problems of the high non-response rate and the very little possibility of checking the respondent’s seriousness and understanding in addition to the same disadvantages as the fully structured interview method. Although observation methods might have been of some use to this research, it is unrealistic to replace the interviews in the research by observations because asking questions is much more efficient in getting information on school strategies than observing. Observations could have been used as a supplementary method, for example, in such occasions as staff meetings and parents evenings. However, eventually I have avoided including the method because of the lack of time for it and its sensitivity, which might have discouraged the schools to accept even interviews.

Headteachers to be interviewed
The obvious next question was who should be interviewed. The purpose of the empirical study in this research was to investigate new strategies or strategic changes pursued by 'school managers' after the quasi-market reform in order to examine the basic hypothesis that 'school managers' in the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies than invisible ones in pedagogy and management. While intensive and detailed analysis of interview data was necessary, time, manpower and resources available for the study were limited. Remembering Yin's caution (Yin, 1989, p.53), it was rational to concentrate on the most important ones among 'school managers'. Therefore, it was decided that the headteachers should be interviewed.

The research interest is primarily in strategies or strategic changes planned and implemented by the management team which the headteacher leads. While deputies and other managers may also have important roles in planning and implementing strategies, there is no reason to believe that they are more responsible for and knowledgeable of all the strategic changes in their school than the headteacher is. Then, how about school governors? It is unlikely that governors are more knowledgeable of all the school strategies than the headteacher is. The governors' role is usually not to plan and implement concrete strategies but to supervise the planning and implementation and give broad policy directions. In short, 'managers' rather than 'governors' are the main priority for this research. Therefore, interviews with headteachers are essential.

The research is focused on managerial strategies, and pedagogic practices are not directly investigated. It would be interesting if the research could also pursue relations between the strategies and the practices. However, it would require another piece of research. The implications of the findings of this thesis for such research will be discussed towards the end of the thesis.

Conducting the interviews and the transcripts as empirical data

After considering the questions to be asked in each interview and the practicability in terms of getting the appointment, it was decided to ask the headteachers to spare one and half hours for the interview at their school. Because of the importance of each case from a not-large number of target schools, it was essential to avoid them declining the appointment. It was thought that one
and half hour interviews would provide substantial amount of information to make
a significant analysis. The judgement was that to ask for two hours or more might
make the possibility of declining high as headteachers were believed to be very
busy, and that it was more convenient for them to spare time for the interview at
their school without having to move. A letter to request an appointment was sent
to each of the six case schools, and all of them accepted it. From November 1994
to April 1995, the six headteachers (including one acting headteacher) were
interviewed. The actual dates of all the interviews are stated in Appendix I.

As stated above, the interviews were carried out as ‘semi-structured interviews’. The interviewer made sure that the interviewee understood that the interviewer was searching for new strategies or strategic changes since the quasi-market-reform in any aspects of the school both in pedagogy and management. For that purpose, the interviewer mentioned exemplifying categories such as teaching, discipline, assessment and reporting, marketing, admission, and management as potential areas where any strategies might still be left out. Nonetheless, especially during the early stage of the interview, the interviewee was encouraged to discuss what he/she thought to be important as new strategies. In the course of the interview, when the interviewer felt that something potentially important was mentioned but not fully explicated by the interviewee, the interviewer asked the interviewee to expand on it. Although one and half hours were not plenty of time, towards the end of each interview, the interviewer managed to check with the interviewee to see if everything to be discussed was covered.

All the interviews were tape-recorded with the interviewee’s permission and
fully transcribed later. The transcripts are original data from which school
strategies have been sought out. The transcripts were thoroughly and repeatedly
read to prevent any new strategy or strategic change from being missed in a large
amount of transcribed interview data. These new strategies, which were
specifically said to be introduced or changed after the quasi-market reform, have
been identified in the data and analysed in detail. The new strategies have been
classified as visible, invisible, or neutral unless it has been impossible because of
the lack of information (in that case, classified as unknown). The strategies have
also been classified into two categories of pedagogy and management.
Classification of strategies into visible and invisible modalities

First it should be reemphasised that the strategies to be identified in this empirical study are ‘new’ strategies, which were introduced or changed since the quasi-market reform by the Education Reform Act 1988. These strategies were new at the time of the data collection. The empirical study aims at investigating the new strategies or strategic changes pursued by the school managers after the reform in order to explore the basic hypothesis of this thesis that school managers in the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies than invisible ones in pedagogy and management.

The new strategies are identified within the transcribed interviews with the six school headteachers and classified as regulative and/or prescriptive visible or invisible strategy in pedagogy and/or management. The judgement for each strategy is based on qualitative analysis, and the following examples show how it is done. All the identified strategies are fully described and classified in Appendix II.

The first example is one of the Easthill Girls’ School’s strategies in pedagogy, which is judged as a prescriptive visible strategy, as follows.

(Easthill Girls’ School’s Strategy) To introduce setting earlier in mathematics, science and languages: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

At the time of the interview, the school was introducing setting earlier in the subjects of mathematics, science and modern languages:

I would say where it’s changed, for example, in maths, we now try to set in Year 8 rather than leave it to Year 9 or 10. So the setting has come down earlier.

In languages, French, Spanish, are also trying to set earlier, and science again we’re setting earlier.

The headteacher explains that the earlier setting is a strategy targeting more able pupils:

Right, we now try to do that because we feel that the more able girls have a better chance of getting the very top results if they’re set earlier. Obviously you have to balance with the average girls and the less-than-average girls, because we don’t want to label children, but we definitely feel that in most subjects, the higher ability girls have a chance of getting, say, the starred A grade or the A grade if they are set earlier and targeted more, the work is targeted more.
This strategy stratifies the pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore makes prescriptive rules, criteria rules in this case, more explicit in pedagogic relations. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy.

The second one, Roundham Catholic College’s strategy in pedagogy, is an example of the strategy judged as invisible as follows.

(Roundham Catholic College’s Strategy) SMILE scheme of mathematics:
Regulative and prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy
The school introduced a mathematics scheme called ‘SMILE’ five years before the interview. Under this scheme, pupils work at their own level through sheets and cards without textbooks, and a teacher’s role is that of a facilitator moving around and encouraging pupils. The headteacher describes the scheme as being very child-centred:

But, er, I would say that, er, when the school was set up, er, again, it’s, it’s something that, that happened in the past, I think there was, there was a, a very great stress laid on a child-centred education, and on the idea of children taking responsibility for their own learning. And for example, one of the, the other things that we have done here is a mathematics scheme, which is called ‘SMILE’, which is, er, very child-based. The children, er, sort of, control their own sort of learning to some extent and they can all work at their own level.

... the idea is that it’s, er, the children work, er, they, they work to their own ability. And a teacher is more a person who comes around and, and so then encourages them and shows them, and . . . . But they take, they take a lot of responsibility for their own learning. The, there are no textbooks, the, er, the scheme is, is taught through work sheets and cards, and there is a, a very complex system of progression and assessment. And, er, actually, to be honest, the logistics of introducing the scheme is very difficult, you know.

The SMILE scheme was controversial. There were quite a few parents, according to the headteacher, who were quite negative about the scheme at the beginning. He perceived that very many parents liked a very traditional approach:

That has been very controversial. And ironically, although it was introduced, er, I suppose to, er, to encourage, er, parents to see a more positive aspect of the school and so on, er, quite a few parents, I think, probably at the beginning, were, were quite negative about it.

Parents were, parents were not, not supportive of our, er, I think parents, parents at that time were, would have preferred a more traditional approach. And, er, it was, we’ve had a difficult, er, time introducing this,
this new scheme, because it is very new and it is very innovative. . . But I think, again, parents in Catholic schools, I have to say, and in county schools presumably as well, er, curriculum innovation is not always, er, applauded by parents. Parents, very many parents like a very traditional approach. In some ways, Catholic schools always had a, a reputation as being very traditional, and that was one of the, the, things that, er, the parents found attractive about them, er, especially in the areas of discipline and behaviour and those sorts of area.

Some mathematics teachers also had difficulty in adapting themselves to the scheme, and in-service training was provided for the transition to the scheme:

And again we had here, er, people who were trained in a very traditional teaching style. So it, it took a while for them to adopt, er, to the new system and for it to be effective.

But, but let me say it was very, very difficult for logistics of moving from traditional mathematics to a new system, which involves cards and filing cabinets and children moving about the classroom and things like that. And the training and, er, in-service training for staff, that was involved.

The introduction of the SMILE scheme implies a strategic change from visible to invisible pedagogy to improve the school’s performance in mathematics as follows. The reasons for the introduction of the SMILE scheme was that the senior management including the headteacher identified a clear problem in terms of performance in mathematics and that it was suggested that a child-centred and dynamic scheme might be more suitable for the pupils in the school than the traditional type of mathematics teaching:

Er, but the headteacher and senior management, I mean, obviously, er, right from the start, we were looking at performance, and we were looking at performance indicators. And we could recognise very early on that mathematics was the area which needed very significant improvement.

Well, first of all we identified that there was clearly a problem and, er, it had to be resolved, something had to be done. And, er, it was suggested that, er, perhaps one of the reasons why children were failing was because that they were not suited to, er, to the traditional types of courses that had been taught, and that, er, mathematics as a subject within the school had been taught in a very, er, uninteresting, stiff, boring sort of way, and that perhaps, er, if we encouraged children to take some responsibility for their own learning and if we introduced the very dynamic new scheme, er, which was child-centred, that perhaps we could turn things around. And that has proved to some extent to have been the case.

According to the above description by the headteacher, the introduction of the SMILE scheme loosened the mathematics teachers’ directive control over the pupils and the prescription of what and when the pupils should learn, and
therefore made regulative and prescriptive rules more implicit in pedagogic relations. It is a regulative and prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy. It is interesting to note that a form of invisible pedagogy can be adopted to improve examination results despite the conception that visible pedagogy is more exam-oriented than invisible pedagogy.

The third example, from Riverside Street School, is a strategy in management, which is judged as visible as follows.

(Riverside Street School’s Strategy) Departmental review: Regulative and prescriptive visible in management

The headteacher has introduced a departmental review, a review of performance of each curriculum area. Once a year, in October, every head of department has to report to and discuss with the headteacher and the deputy head in charge of curriculum. It is focused on examination results. After examination results come out in August, each head of department writes a report in September. According to the headteacher, he and the deputy ask the heads of department very difficult questions in the review meetings:

Every year, once a year, we have what’s called a departmental review. Every head of department has to come in this room with the deputy head, curriculum. They have to write a report on their examination results, who took the exam classes, and we ask some very, very hard questions about the quality of teaching. ‘Are your teachers setting homework regularly? Are they marking it regularly? Who are the best teachers teaching examination groups? Why did your results go down last year? How have you spent your money and resources?’

With regard to the introduction of the departmental review, the headteacher’s intention is to make his teaching staff accountable to him and the deputy in terms of examination results and make their control over the staff’s performance more explicit and tighter:

We set them targets. We set, we make them accountable to us. It’s not good enough to teach all year and say, ‘Our exam results weren’t very good last year’.

Er, we now insist on proper departmental reviews. Teachers are made accountable. If you went to a maths teacher now and said, er, ‘What happens if you don’t get good examination results?’, their answer would be, ‘Well, I have to explain to somebody what I have been doing’. We make the teachers accountable, put some pressure on the teachers.
Review meetings are recorded and minuted, and the headteacher reports on the reviews to the governing body. The procedures seem quite formal. The consequences of the reviews can be very serious. In the interview, the headteacher mentioned a particular teacher whose performance did not satisfy him and the head of department, and he said that, unless the teacher improve, he would not let the teacher teach any exam classes in the following year. He regards the threat to the job as a necessary part of the quality control, which the management imposes on the teaching staff:

Now, I think that comes a time when it's up to the headteacher and the deputies to impose on teachers a form of quality control. If you thought you were going to loose your job because you were doing it, you're not doing it properly, that, that is a motivator. In this country, there isn't enough of that in my opinion.

The departmental review can be regarded as a formal kind of monitoring scheme to tighten not only prescriptive but also directive control by the school management over the staff based on examination results as a particularly important criterion. Therefore, it is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management, which enhances the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive (criteria) rules in organisational relations.

**Qualitative data analysis to interpret each strategy in a particular context**

The above examples of interpreting each strategy show how this method of qualitative analysis works. Ultimately it relies on the persuasiveness of the logical analysis of a strategy in its particular context. While handling qualitative data 'in a rigorous and disciplined way' (Robson, 1993, p. 373) is not an easy task, the analysis of qualitative data in this research is such an endeavour. Moreover, there does not seem to be other better strategy for the analysis of the data collected in this multiple-case study. The following chapters are expected to demonstrate the success of these procedures.
Chapter 6 Strategic Changes Described by the Headteachers

Now this chapter presents the six schools’ ‘new’ strategies that were introduced or changed since the quasi-market reform according to their headteacher. In order not to lose sight of the research theme, only some examples of the strategies are presented here, and each school’s strategies are summarised and discussed in a compact manner and purposefully in the context of the hypothesis. The full description of all the new strategies mentioned by the six school headteachers are presented in Appendix II, and you can see that the summarised discussion is still relevant after you read the appendix.

Easthill Girls’ School: County; girls; 11–16
Standard number: Not much below 200
GCSE results (1994; 5 or more A-Cs): Almost the same as the England average
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 1 December 1994

To introduce setting earlier in mathematics, science and languages: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy
This school, as stated above, introduced setting earlier in mathematics, science and languages, which is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy. The strategy aimed at enabling academically able pupils to get very good grades in GCSE examinations. It is evident in the headteacher’s account quoted in the previous chapter.

Examinations Officer: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy and management
The school also initiated the post of Examination Officer as one of the three senior teachers to raise examination results through comparing and analysing performances of pupils and those of the curriculum areas. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in both pedagogy and management to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic and organisational relations.

About four years before the interview, the headteacher appointed the first Examination Officer, who helped the headteacher to monitor each curriculum area’s performance in terms of examination results:
Right, I have an Examination Officer, and one of his main roles is to monitor with the heads of the curriculum areas on their students’ achievements, and he will prepare the analysis for me that I would then look at, and I meet regularly with the head of each curriculum area. We would look at their results in detail at the meeting, trying to identify where praises due and where there are areas for improvement.

For this headteacher, examinations work was a priority to put money from the limited budget into:

But that post is quite an expensive salary. So it means you have to make a decision to put money into a person doing that work. So it’s a question of priorities.

Absence policy being planned: Regulative visible strategy in pedagogy

In addition to examination results, truancy or unauthorised absence was another sort of published information for parents as consumers. The headteacher was working on absence policy at the time of the interview, and was very conscious of the published figures of unauthorised absence:

... I’m working on improving the figures for the school and form groups. ... I wrote to all the parents in my news sheet last week, saying, ‘It’s quite good but it isn’t good enough, and there are too many occasions of girls having a day off and parents not writing a note, and therefore it’s seen as a unauthorised absence ....’ ... as you know, the, the absence figures are published now as well.

Not as important as exam results, but it’s still important. ... it’s making the schools like myself look at it to tighten up. It’s the publication that is draw my attention to it to see how it can improve.

The headteacher’s initiative aimed at tightening the control of absence to improve the published figures, and therefore is a regulative visible strategy in pedagogy to make regulative or hierarchical rules more explicit in pedagogic relations.

Monitoring of teaching performances: Regulative visible strategy in management

Coming back to the focus on examinations, we can see that visible strategies were adopted not only in pedagogy but also in management. The headteacher of Easthill Girls’ School had introduced a monitoring scheme two years before the interview. The teacher’s performance related to the children’s performance was monitored at the two levels of headteacher and heads of faculty:

... it’s over the last two years that I’ve introduced the monitoring policy. Before then, there was just ad-hoc monitoring by me, walking around the school, popping into classrooms through four to five minutes, totally
unsystematic . . . and by myself, whereby, er, teachers’ classes are visited without prior notice. And I will go at the beginning of the lesson, and I will monitor the whole lesson, the teacher’s performance to children’s performance, to resources, the methods of curriculum delivery. All those aspects, the behaviour, all those aspects are, will be monitored. And the teacher will then come to me for feedback and a discussion and can bring items to my attention. And I see every member of staff throughout the year, without prior notice. . . . And also the head of their subject has the responsibility to go to each of their teachers, monitor, monitor the books, monitor the marking, . . . .

The relationship between the monitoring process and the appraisal process, in which threatening elements are avoided, seems to be confusing:

. . . the teacher’s performance related to the children’s performance comes under monitoring, not appraisal . . . . And it’s the monitoring they would pick up any underperformance by the teacher . . . It could come upon appraisals as well, but we are trying to make appraisal non-threatening.

The headteacher stated that the staff’s objections to the monitoring scheme were overcome as follows:

Originally there were objections and this was discussed in the union meetings. And I spoke at several staff meetings, trying to explain the reason for it, that it was to aim to improvement, you know, make sure we’re looking at . . . . It’s like quality checks, and it’s not just looking at the teacher. It’s looking at the students’ attitude, ‘Are they carrying up the students’ responsibility?’ It’s looking at the resources, ‘Has this teacher been given sufficient resources to teach this topic?’ It’s in order for me to find out more about the National Curriculum, more about the modes of delivery. And although people were suspicious at first, I supposed it’s got to happen, so it’s started to happen. But because the feedback interviews are made optional, not compulsory, but almost every member of the staff has come, and they have then gone back and they’ve found it useful and important. They had my entire attention. I could give helpful points to them, and they had an opportunity of bringing to my attention, any issue they wish, such as they felt they’re given insufficient resources, they felt their line manager wasn’t treating them appropriately. So now this is accepted by the school and actually even enjoyed. People are now speaking in favour of how helpful they have found this at the union meetings. So by the dialogue and the presentation of the policy and reasoning, er, people have accepted this and seen it as part of the normal life of the school to, to, you know, help us to achieve this quality education. So I haven’t now had any resistance.

The above statement shows that the headteacher emphasised to the teachers the benefits, such as attention to pupils’ behaviour and resources and the optional feedback with helpful advice. She also minimised the threatening nature of
monitoring teachers’ performances. The headteacher endeavoured to make the essentially hierarchical or regulative nature of the monitoring scheme less explicit.

The scheme is a means of making the school management’s hierarchical control over the teachers’ performances more explicit. Therefore, it is a regulative visible strategy in management to make regulative rules more explicit in organisational relations between the teachers and school management.

**Supplementary and summary comments**

Easthill Girls’ School was a very popular school for girls in ‘Roundham’ (the pseudonym of the London borough). Its exam results were very good, much better than the average for all the ‘Roundham’ state schools, although they were almost the same as the England average. Even in this less affluent inner-city area, the importance of the GCSE examination results was obvious for the headteacher of this advantageously positioned school. She named Seymour Field School, a GM school with the best examination results in the borough, and the other girls’ school in the borough, as the main rivals of her school, primarily based on the examination results. Against this background of the school’s perceived position in the local market, many of her strategies aimed at improving the examination results, and tended to be visible strategies to make pedagogic and managerial rules and control more explicit and tighter.

**Table 6.1 Easthill Girls’ School’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Visible</th>
<th>Invisible</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10(^{(1)})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16(^{(1)})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) Two of them are in both pedagogy and management.

In short, the above discourses of the headteacher seem to lend support to the basic hypothesis that school managers were adopting more visible strategies than invisible ones in response to the perceived market pressures for improving the examination results among others. Table 6.1 shows that the primitive quantitative
analysis of the Easthill Girls’ School’s strategies does not seem to contradict this comment. The full list of the school’s strategies and the thorough description of each strategy are presented in Appendix II.

**Roundham Catholic College: Voluntary-aided; co-educational; 11–18**

Standard number: Not much below 200

GCSE results: Just above the borough average

Date of interviewing the headteacher: 7 December 1994

**SMILE scheme of mathematics: Regulative and prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy**

As stated already, Roundham Catholic College introduced, five years before the interview, a child-centred scheme of mathematics teaching called ‘SMILE’, which is an invisible strategy in pedagogy. The SMILE scheme was controversial because many parents liked a very traditional approach. Some mathematics teachers were also familiar with a traditional teaching style and had difficulty in adapting themselves to the scheme.

The driving force for the introduction of the SMILE scheme was the senior management team’s judgement that the school’s mathematics needed very significant improvement in terms of examination results and that a child-centred and dynamic scheme might be suitable for the pupils in the school, and might improve the examination results. According to the headteacher, the expected results were acquired, persuading the previously sceptical parents. The headteacher stated that parents and governors were beginning to be convinced that the SMILE scheme was good because the GCSE results had shown a significant improvement:

> And it’s only this year when we can see a very significant change in our mathematics results and performance at the GCSE level that, I think, parents are, have become, er, beginning to be convinced that, er, you know, this, this scheme is, is a good idea and has worked. Er, for example, last year we had got about nineteen percent of the children who passed mathematics at the A to C level, and this year that one got to thirty-four percent. And this year was the first year who had come through the new SMILE system.

> But, er, I think we have managed to convince both governors and parents that, you know, there, there has been some progress. And certainly did the
results themselves at performance indicators, you know, scream out that, you know, for the, we can, we can clearly show that, that the children who've come through this SMILE system have performed much better, er, than those who have not.

This is an interesting example of the adoption of an invisible strategy for the purpose of improving the examination results, which is usually the reason for introducing a visible strategy.

The school also introduced visible strategies to improve the results as follows.

The introduction of a fast-track group in science: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy
The school had had a fast-track group in science for two years by the time of the interview. This initiative was taken by the science department:

Sciences recently approved to, er, to have one group which is, er, a kind of fast-track group, and mixed ability elsewhere.

And that has come from the science department itself.

And science [department] thought that, er, that in particular they would like to focus one group out of three, which would be, er, the more able students. And the other two groups would be sort of mixed. Now as I said, too early, er, for us to see if there is any significant, er, change. But, er, it's an area that obviously we're looking at with great interest.

The headteacher described the school as a whole and himself as being very committed to mixed-ability teaching. However, he stated that he was pragmatic and prepared to accommodate this type of new developments by the departments in certain autonomy:

I mean, we, we have allied most of our departments in certain autonomy, er, with an reason. I mean, the school itself is very much committed to mixed ability. But at the same time, we are happy to, er, accommodate opportunities for, you know, for departments to try, er, a new sort of developments.

And, er, I, I have to say personally I'm very committed to mixed ability, and, er, I will take some convincing about, er, about introducing, er, you know, er, a very structured level of setting throughout the school. But at the same time, I haven't got a closed mind on it, and I don't think staff generally have. I think we're quite pragmatic and we would, er, we would look at things and, er, make decisions, er, based on information.

The introduction of a fast-track group in science stratifies pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.
The initiative for the introduction was taken by the departmental management rather than the top management, which accepted that it became a school strategy.

**Beginning setting in Year 8 in modern languages: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy**

The school was beginning to have setting in Year 8 in modern languages at the time of the interview:

... we begin to, er, to set students, er, in Year 8. If we cannot, it varies. Er, generally speaking, they will be mixed ability in Year 7, in the first year, but after that we will try and, and put them into sets.

The headteacher's attitude to the organisation of teaching, expressed in the above-mentioned topic about science, is evident here about languages as well:

Whether those sets are, I mean, I don’t think we're into rigid setting. I think they're, in languages in particular, they're quite flexible. But at the same time, er, they would argue that languages in particular is the subject area where one has to, er, has to have some sort of setting. And I can, I can live with that.

Beginning setting in Year 8 in modern languages means more stratification of pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic relations.

**Study clubs organised by the SEN coordinator: Prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy**

Here is again an invisible strategy. Four or five years before the interview, the special educational needs coordinator started organising study clubs on two evenings in every week, where pupils could study any subjects and staff voluntarily help them. The headteacher stated that the students in the clubs were very often less able:

Er, he has organised, he has two homework clubs after school, er, for students. And very, very often they are, er, students who, er, who are less able.

... Mr Smith [the pseudonym of the SEN coordinator] might say, ‘Oh, I’ve got, er, such and such a person who is coming to me on, er, Wednesday afternoons’, and, you know, they're, they're working humanities really very far behind, and one of the humanity teachers, he would speak to them, and maybe they’ll be coming along and give some
extra help to, to that child. It’s very informal, but I have to say it works very effectively, and quite well attended by various students.

... they’re in both study clubs in the library areas and you would have staff working there themselves and, you know, obviously, you know, if, if they see children, er, who need support or help, they would come and help them. ... it’s a good, good situation, and it’s very informal.

This scheme was expected to provide the less able pupils with remedial assistance and therefore decrease the stratifying differences between the pupils’ performances. It is a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy, which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more implicit in pedagogic relations.

Supplementary and summary comments
The headteacher of Roundham Catholic College very often mentioned his school’s peculiarity as a Catholic school. According to his description, because of this peculiarity, his school was less influenced by market pressures than the neighbouring schools. The headteacher indicated that his school’s competition was more with other Catholic schools than with the neighbouring schools. Nevertheless, he was aware of the increasing pressures from some of neighbouring schools, especially girls’ schools.

......there are some Catholic parents who in particular with daughters, with girls, who would look to single-sex schools, because single-sex schools can provide, er, very good results for girls. ......We would also lose a few pupils to Easthill Girls’ School and to [the name of the other girls’ school in the borough]. But not a tremendous number. ......I don’t think it is at the moment, but it is, it is nearly that that could be significant, er, over the next few years.

The headteacher emphasised the necessity for avoiding complacency in competition. The importance of school performance tables or league tables was obvious for him although he was personally not enthusiastic about them.

......no school can be complacent about the performance indicators that kind. And I mean, it would be very foolish for anybody in education not to recognise that parents in particular rightly or wrongly or for whatever reason are interested in, er, in the performance league tables. ......I’m not against them particularly, er, although I’m against sort of crude data being used. ......But, er, we take the performance tables very seriously, and I don’t care, I mean, lots of, lots of schools will, will say that they are not interested in them in the manner displayed and so on, but at the end of the day people are interested, and unfortunately that’s the reality.
However, it does not necessarily mean that he was compelled to adopt visible strategies against his educational ideals, which are clearly expressed in his view of his school, ‘there was a, a very great stress laid on a child-centred education’. A good example of this argument is the introduction of the SMILE scheme for the purpose of improving the examination results. The improved performance in terms of examination results persuaded the parents that the new scheme had worked. This case indicates that invisible strategies can survive the market pressure if they manage to be seen as producing better results.

Nevertheless, visible strategies are also adopted as the school’s strategies although the initiative was not necessarily taken by the headteacher. Table 6.2 shows some balance between visible and invisible strategies although too much emphasis should not be put on this primitive quantitative analysis. The full list of Roundham Catholic College’s strategies and the thorough description of each of the strategies are presented in Appendix II.

Table 6.2 Roundham Catholic College’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Visible</th>
<th>Invisible</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

George Square School: County; co-educational; 11–16

Standard number: Not much above 100
GCSE results: Below the borough average
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 7 December 1994

Introducing setting in science: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

At the time of the interview, the school was introducing setting in science for the first time. In that academic year, Year 10 pupils were grouped into sets including top sets, and pupils from Year 11 above were still in mixed-ability groups:

Er, maths still sets, French sets, science is now setting for the first time in Year 10.
... we are implementing at the moment. So Year 10 has got accelerated, got top sets. They are setted [sic] to, you know, we are looking in fact to see, you know, how that actually works. Year 11 above are still in mixed-ability groups. And so, yeah, we are actually changing from that sort of point of view, I suppose really.

When asked about the reason for the change, the headteacher described it as an innovative trial to improve science teaching, and mentioned the competitive pressure from league tables:

One, that was trials as the innovation to seek for the improvement and what we are actually offering. And it becomes the reason really. And the science [department] had been talking about it sometime, ‘Should they keep mixed-ability groups through the five years?’ And this was the school decision that for this year we in Year 10 start the two-year course that we will actually try a setting and to see what effects it’ll have really. . . . Is that a response to league tables? Possibly so. Possibly so actually.

The headteacher expected top sets to stretch more able pupils:

. . . through creating a sort of top sets, I mean, therefore, the more able children can work at a, hopefully, at a faster pace.

The introduction of setting means stratifying pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

The profile of a pupil to the parents: Prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy

According to the headteacher, the school’s reporting to the parents had been changed from simple reports to detailed profiles:

Well, I think we’ve actually developed actual profiling side. I mean, we’ve worked on that side quite a bit.

I mean, the old reports were basically put down 50% and then the teachers wrote a comment, which basically is the same format, but now there is much more structure, I think, in what is actually put in.

When asked how structured it was, the headteacher answered as follows:

Well, I mean, it depends how the department has actually the details the department put in there. And the science [department] may put in, for instance, percentages of different sorts of units, units they’ve actually tested, and they need to take an average from that, you know, they’ve come from the final result, something like that. . . . But obviously the parents who used to more traditional, er, ‘50 over 100’, ‘satisfactory effort’, I mean, that’s quite different, because obviously for many years that’s basically what it was. We’ve come a long way from that.
Although the new profiling scheme seems to have certain criteria, because of the technical complexity of the structure, it should be regarded as having less explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations than the previous reporting with simpler and more clear-cut information. Therefore, the change should be identified as a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy.

The hierarchical merit system of awarding gold, silver and bronze certificates: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

Two years before the interview, the school introduced a merit system to award gold, silver and bronze certificates for achievements in all aspects of the school life:

And so we have a merit system. Gold, gold certificates, er, silver and bronze. So they get so many commendations in a journal, it goes the head of year, the head of year presents the, no, the form tutor presents the bronze, the head of year sends or presents the silver and, lucky enough to get gold, the headteacher will present the gold.

When asked what kind of activities are rewarded, the headteacher answered as follows:

That is down, that is down to the individual teachers’ judgement. So if a child brings in what they’ve considered a very good piece of work, they may well get a merit for that and that will be recorded as such. If a child suddenly, say, their behaviour hasn’t been too good, their behaviour in fact suddenly gets a lot better, that is then recorded, you know, the child gets a sort of, you know, benefit right as well. It seems to work with children.

The above-mentioned hierarchical merit system highlights the stratifying differences between pupils with gold, silver and bronze certificates and pupils with nothing, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

Monitoring each pupil’s performance: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

When asked what strategies the school had in order to improve the examination results, the headteacher mentioned that the school had recently started the close monitoring of each pupil’s performance in terms of examinations:

Er, hard work really. Er, hard work identifying those areas that need improvement, and monitoring those subject areas to during their final year, 11, that’s the final year, to actually see really how the children are actually performing. I mean, you know, we’ve done something on that recently. Because tomorrow on a study leave, there are mock GCSE, just before the
holidays. So we'll look at the mock GCSE results obviously after the holidays, in January, follow that the parents evening, and so on, you know, then we have a, hopefully we have a very clear picture of level of performance, you know.

The above-mentioned monitoring of examination performances, enabling the comparison between pupils and between subjects, enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. Therefore, it is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy.

Supplementary and summary comments

Although the headteacher of George Square School expressed his disbelief in league tables, he acknowledged that they were influential.

I haven’t met any head certainly who are basically in favour of any league tables. Er, having said that, it’s human nature you do not want your school to be at the bottom of the league table. I think league tables are unfortunate, because some other things have gone to actually make sure you get the good percentage, I don’t necessarily agree with. ……We all look to see what percentage everybody else has actually got.

Table 6.3 George Square School’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Visible</th>
<th>Invisible</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

He only mentioned a small number of strategies, but nonetheless the analysis of the strategies in Table 6.3 implies a tendency towards more visibility. The full list of the school’s strategies and the thorough description of each of the strategies are presented in Appendix II.

Fertile Land School: County; co-educational; 11–16

Standard number: Not much above 100
GCSE results: Below the borough average
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 22 November 1994
Fertile Land School shows that significant invisible elements can coexist with the visible ones in the same school. However, even in the case of this school, visibility is still dominant in the school’s strategies. First, invisible strategies are introduced as follows.

**Open and honest sex education programme: Regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy**

The headteacher mentioned an open and honest sex education programme as a part of the school’s personal and social education programme, which had been developed two years before the interview and then implemented, as a strategy in curriculum:

Well, we’ve done, we won an award this week, we went to collect last Saturday for our sex education programme, and that was regarded as something that was quite courageous because there is, there is a difficult climate nationally at the moment for open and honest sex education programmes to take place. . . . Er, we were on a TV last week . . . .

Well, we spent all of last year developing the sex education programme, er, within a broader personal and social education programme. So we did quite a lot of training slots throughout the whole year, er, and that was two years ago, and the actual programme has been running for a year now, we are on second year of it now.

The sex education programme has adopted discussion and open-ended questioning techniques as its major methods:

So the whole thing about, you know, questioning techniques and open-ended tasks and that sort of things has had a lot of promotion in the last couple of years. Er, and also that goes hand in hand with our sex education programme, because a lot of that is discussion-based.

A positive initiative on sex education, generally regarded as progressive, implies respecting and encouraging independent thinking and behaviour by pupils, and this programme of sex education is particularly so with its emphasis on discussion and open-ended questioning techniques. Therefore, it is a regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the implicitness of hierarchical (regulative) rules in pedagogic relations.

The techniques will be explained in the following paragraphs.

**Discussion and open-ended questioning techniques: Regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy**

125
According to the headteacher, two years before the interview, the techniques of
discussion and open-ended questioning had been developed in the personal and
social education (PSE) programme including the sex education programme:

Well, the whole PSE programme, the personal and social education
programme. And that’s where we put a lot of emphasis two years ago in
our planning, preparation and training. So it’s, you know, it’s actually
been functioning properly for a year and a term. But we did a year’s
planning.

The headteacher argues that the use of the techniques is not limited within the
PSE programme but is spread over other curriculum areas:

No. it isn’t only that, but that’s where we focused at that time, because this
was, the PSE programme was a new development for the school. . . . So it
was focused particularly on the PSE programme, but it has knock-on
effects on the rest of the curriculum, too.

The techniques target more able pupils:

We’ve done a fair bit of work on teaching and learning styles and
techniques and methodologies, er, because we want to make sure that
we’re pitching our material at a range of levels because we’ve got a lot of
different ability levels here. So stretching the more able is very important.
So the whole thing about, you know, questioning techniques and open­
derned tasks and that sort of things has had a lot of promotion in the last
couple of years.

Well, it’s to do with this business about differentiation and having
appropriate materials, appropriate delivery, and that’s where the open­
derned questioning and the open-ended tasks are so important. Er, so,
that’s been developed for everybody, but particularly targeted on the more
able.

Some teachers, especially those teaching heavily content-led subjects, were not
very comfortable with the techniques when they were introduced:

And a lot of them, no, not a lot, some teachers weren’t feeling very
comfortable with that. So we did some training associated with that as
well.

That is, basically it’s discussion. And if you are a teacher of a heavily
content-led subject like science or history or something, then you may not
be so accustomed to teaching in a discussion or sort of way like that.

The promotion of the techniques seems to have a complex effect on prescriptive
rules in pedagogic relations. It may enhance the explicitness of criteria rules by
focusing on the stratifying differences between pupils’ performances on one hand,
but may make selection and sequencing rules more implicit on the other hand. It
enhances the implicitness of regulative (hierarchical) rules because it respects and
encourages independent thinking and behaviour by pupils. Therefore, it is a regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy, which makes regulative rules more implicit in pedagogic relations.

The headteacher states that the school has had a mixture of various teaching methods including individual, group and didactic work and that the new method of questioning and discussion will not undermine other methods but enrich the mixture:

Well, it’s all of these things have to be part of a package. Er, there isn’t one teaching style that happens in Fertile Land School. There’s a whole range of ones. But we identify that the whole area of questioning and answering was the one that needed more development in Fertile Land School. So that’s why we concentrated on that. But it’s not at the expense of the others. There are still a lot of group work, a lot of pair work, a lot of individual work, and there’re still a lot of didactic work as well. So it’s just a part of bigger . . . .

While invisible strategies are adopted in teaching styles and methods as mentioned above, visible strategies are predominant in assessment and reporting as follows.

Assessment and reporting towards clearer description of achievements:
Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy
According to the headteacher, at the time of the interview, the school was developing a hard-edged way of assessment and reporting with clearer descriptions of achievements. The existent way of assessment and reporting was an encouraging one with much identification of efforts and less clear descriptions of achievements:

Assessment is one of our key points of focus this year. And what we are doing is changing our reports to parents so that we are reporting achievements in a much more hard-edged way than we have done before. In the past, we’ve, we’ve done a lot of, er, we’ve, we’ve had very encouraging reports, and we’ve identified all the efforts that they put in, but the achievement hasn’t been there so clearly. So this year we’ve started doing that, putting in the achievement, estimated grades and so on.

Well, the staff at the moment are developing, er, a grading system that we can use both in our marking and for reporting to parents. And at the moment we are just, er, trying to work out how, exactly how it will, er, link with the National Curriculum levels.

The headteacher pointed out three reasons for the school changing the assessment and reporting. These are the necessity for the staff to know of the pupils’
achievements, some parents’ concern, and the inspectors’ comment in the Ofsted inspection of the school:

Well, because, er, for a number of different reasons. We often felt that we didn’t know what the child is achieving. Because, unless we taught them ourselves, reading the reports, we couldn’t determine what they’d actually achieved. And then some parents were concerned that they didn’t know what their child achieved as well. Er, and the combination of those two made us realise that, you know, that we’d got to focus on it. We had the inspection in September, and the inspectors said the same sort of thing. We just hadn’t been clear enough about the attainment part of it.

The change is based on the view that assessment and reporting should provide clearer information on comparative performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic relations.

Prize-giving for high achievers only: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

At the time of the interview, the school was changing their award system from the celebration of everyone’s achievements to the prize-giving just for high achievers in subjects:

... this term, we have a prize-giving, for the first time, which is targeted just to the high achievers, nothing else. In the past we celebrated the achievement of everybody regarding, you know, for their effort, attendance, something else. This year we don’t . . .

The headteacher regards the change as one of those strategies which target the more able children:

... it’s just part of our wider focus, at the moment, which is on promoting the more able and promoting the school as the place where high-ability children are going to be taught well. That’s a current sort of strategy.

The award system highlights the stratifying differences between pupils, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

Visible strategies are not just for pedagogy but also for management as follows. Like in the case of Easthill Girls’ School, ‘monitoring’ is the key word.

Monitoring of the curriculum and the staff performance through written reports from curriculum areas: Prescriptive visible strategy in management
At the time of the interview, the school’s management had just completed the planning of a new monitoring scheme, which was to be implemented from the following year. Under the new scheme, all curriculum areas are required to submit a written annual report with certain evidence to the headteacher, and the school management monitors the curriculum and the staff performance. The headteacher emphasises the importance of the monitoring scheme in terms of clear accountability:

Er, in terms of accountability, we’ve set up very clear lines now, with a bit confusion for a while, but we’ve got very clear lines of accountability now. And all curriculum areas have to, starting for next year, we’ve just done all the draft work for it, starting from next year, they will have to report to me in a written form on annual basis, er, and it will, the report has to cover certain evidence. So the evidence will be collected from now. That’s, that’s where we’ve developed it now. So the evidence collection will be very much to do with monitoring the curriculum and the staff performance.

The monitoring is intended to formalise the assessment of staff performance, and therefore enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in organisational relations. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in management.

Supplementary and summary comments

Although the headteacher was proud of her school’s reputation as a caring school, she was anxious to attract more able children, especially girls, to her school to balance its intake.

I think parents regard us as a school with a very caring ethos that has a lot of concerns for children’s welfare, child-centred school with good relations between staff and students. ……last year was a crunch point because that’s when we had eleven children with the statement of special needs coming into the school, and that was of our thirty-four in the whole school, the whole borough population of that year group. So we had a third of them just in our school. Er, and coupled with the high gender imbalance, so many boys, it meant we had a real problem about adjusting the needs of those children. So this year we’ve concentrated on trying to target the more able. So I won’t know until this time next year whether it’s paid off.

When asked why she needed to attract able pupils as well, she answered as follows:

Well, because if we don’t, we will lose our position in the league table that’s published every year, and that will mean it’s more and more difficult to attract children of quality. And if more schools become grant-maintained and if Riverside Street School gets to enlarge its, its space and
so on, it will mean that there may come a time when we can’t attract the numbers. And then we will be in a, you know, downward spiral then. …..But that’s not the whole story. The other story is the professional pride. And the staff know they can do well with special needs children. They want to prove to themselves that they can do well with very able children as well, and everything that goes in between.

Her answers vividly show the complexity of the education quasi-market, where not only numbers but also quality of pupils matter for both the economic survival and social prestige of a school.

Fertile Land School seems to have been oriented towards more visibility in its strategies, while a few invisible strategies in the field of teaching exemplify the room for manoeuvre by school managers in line with its reputation as a ‘child-centred’ school with a caring ethos as long as the strategies do not prevent the school management from endeavouring to improve its market position as clearly perceived by the headteacher.

Table 6.4 Fertile Land School’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Visible</th>
<th>Invisible</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4 shows that the primitive quantitative analysis of the school’s strategies is compatible with the above comment. The full list of the school’s strategies and the thorough description of each of the strategies are presented in Appendix II.

Seymour Field School: Grant-maintained; co-educational; 11–18
Standard number: Not much above 200
GCSE results: More than 10% higher than the England average
Date of interviewing the acting head teacher: 28 April 1995

Seymour Field School also shows a combination of dominant visible strategies and significant invisible ones. Again teaching is the field for invisible strategies.
From a teacher-led style to a variety of teaching styles with the emphasis on independent learning: Regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy

The acting headteacher states that the school has done a lot of analysis work on teaching styles, with help from the Technical Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) and that, as a result, the school now has more variety of teaching styles with the emphasis on independent learning than previously when there used to be one teaching style of chalk and talk:

Er, I, I would put that down to, er, the staff really, and the way that they’ve been prepared to take on continuity, er, the way they’ve prepared to, to take on, er, issues of learning styles and motivation of children, er, carefully analysing how children learn in relation to how they teach. And we’ve done quite a lot of work on, on that side. We’ve had a TVEI programme when, er, . . . .

So you had this, er, about 360,000 over five years. That’s enabled us to put money into, er, you know, the vocational side of education and also to look at, er, helping staff develop more flexible teaching styles and more variety of teaching styles. And so I think that there has been a lot of adaptation in terms of the way the classrooms are managed . . . .

Well, there used to be one teaching style, he stands in front of the classroom with a piece of chalk, and you tell the children to do this. And now that’s just one, one of many styles that you’ll see enacted. Children take a far more active role in what they are doing. In most areas of the school, er, they take much more responsibility. Er, this kind of independence is something that TVEI, I think, has featured and promoted.

According to the acting headteacher, the teachers are encouraged to make their classrooms interesting in order to keep the pupils’ motivation high and encourage them to become independent learners. The change has been gradual, however, because the staff includes a high proportion of experienced teachers who are accustomed to traditional styles with strict discipline and have difficulty in adapting themselves to a more open and maybe more noisy classroom environment:

. . . the teachers are encouraged to vary things, make things as interesting as possible for the children to keep their motivation high, encouraging them to become independent learners. Er, but it’s been hard going, because, er, our staff profile indicates quite a high proportion of people in their 40s. The staff have been here some time. And, er, moving people who are very experienced and very good at, say, disciplining children, er, moving attitudes toward more open, maybe more noisy kind of classroom environment, because it’s better for their learning activities, er, is qu-, has been quite difficult one to confront. Er, but, you know, over a period of
years, er, those things are, er, I think the way to move things in schools slowly, inchmeal, then things do gather pace, you know.

The above description of the change implies that the change is a regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy, which reduces the explicitness of hierarchical (regulative) rules in pedagogic relations.

Seymour Field School also adopts an exam-oriented visible strategy as follows.

Using external services to analyse examinations: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy and management

The school is using more and more external services to conduct detailed analyses of examination results and value-added measuring:

... we, er, monitor the GCSE results by, er, we, we usually do graphs subject by subject. Er, in such a way, if you average the child's GCSE results, then, er, then compare that individually. If you do that subject by subject, then you can see, er, you know, if they're underneath the line for themselves there, then they're underperforming in that subject or doing better in that subject. That gives quite good information, and you can do gender breakdown as well. Because quite good information for departments, you know, break that down teacher by teacher.

We've got an exam officer and, er, she usually does the, the main exams. But we also use the service, which has a computer system, which produces these graphs, which we find very helpful. ... When we get them in Year 7, we're going to give them NFER non-verbal reasoning tests, so that we can do value-added measuring in time.

Other local authorities, er, do administer those tests. ... the neighbouring borough, that we've got good relations with, we've got good relations with every local authority except Roundham, er, has, has a year-on-year value-added data. So we could actually tap into that to, to give some kind of, er, information in that aspect. We also subscribe to 'ALICE', the A level information system, which, which matches correlation, GCSE results to A level results.

The above-mentioned detailed analyses assisted by the external services enhance the relative evaluation of pupils' and teachers' performances, and therefore should be regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in both pedagogy and management, which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in both pedagogic and organisational relations.
As in the cases of Easthill Girls’ School and Fertile Land School, Seymour Field School also adopts a ‘monitoring’ scheme as a visible strategy in management as follows.

**Quality assurance initiative to monitor teaching in classroom: Prescriptive visible strategy in management**

According to the headteacher, at the time of the interview, the school was in a process of developing a quality assurance initiative to monitor the effectiveness of the curriculum and the quality of learning in the classroom:

> Well, that [monitoring], that wasn’t happening, but it is happening more. Er, we’ve got a quality assurance initiative going, er, to set up systems of monitoring the curriculum. It’s always basically what you’re doing. It’s monitoring effectiveness of the curriculum and quality of learning in a classroom.

> We’ve got a, we’ve got an evaluation phase coming up at the end of the summer term and out of that will come, you know, the next developments towards it.

An informal collegial approach to monitoring did not work very well, and then a relatively formal approach has been tried:

> So, you’ve got an initiative, which would again, we try and start off in a, in a non-threatening friendly way. Teachers find it very threatening to have something walking into their classroom. That doesn’t always happen here. . . . So by building it up, er, in such a way that, er, it becomes a common place for staff to walk in and out of other people’s classrooms and to have common feedback. I think that was a good idea that though didn’t work very well. What about trying this kind of idea, er, but also putting it on a, a, a relatively formal basis? Then, er, that’s one way. We are trying to prove, er, the quality of what goes on and the monitoring of what goes on.

The approach needs certain criteria but the criteria will be qualitative rather than quantitative:

> A problem with monitoring, anything, I think, is that you’ve got to have yardsticks to monitoring. You see, you know, you can walk into anywhere and you get perceptions of what places, what’s going on, er, but how you can make any other judgement on a purely subjective, like-or-dislike judgement, without having clear understanding of what criteria are important for what level is, er, I don’t know. So, so, it’s setting up, er, really, er, quality characteristics and monitoring. The main thing we sought was to think about what quality characteristics and some measures we could be working towards. By building the means to a planning of activities in the classrooms and, you know, sharing what these things are, that we are trying to achieve this today or that today, then, er, we feel that
is a more effective way of monitoring than sending somebody in with a tick sheet and keep a check on how many children are paying attention or how many good at their sheet.

The above-mentioned initiative of quality assurance or monitoring is intended to assess teaching in classroom with more explicit criteria, and therefore enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in organisational relations. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in management.

Supplementary and summary comments

The acting headteacher, who was subsequently appointed as headteacher, of Seymour Field School made it clear that his school had a better reputation than the neighbouring state schools, and mentioned its competition with grammar schools and independent schools. When asked which schools he regarded as rivals of his school, he answered as follows:

......in terms of rivals, where you’re talking about local schools, we don’t look at them, we don’t look upon them as rivals. ......we do get a lot of people applying to this school, er, who might have less distance to travel to one of the other schools like [the name of a county school] or Fertile Land School or Riverside Street School, because they perceive this school to be a better school. That is the kind of message you get from parents. In some ways our rival schools are not Roundham’s schools, but we’re, we’re tending to merge with the, er, markets in [the name of a neighbouring borough] where they run 11–18 schools, grammar schools and there are a couple of popular, er, public schools, which also offer scholarships.

When the school became GM, it was already very popular, and GM status seemed to have further increased the popularity.

Er, the school’s popu-, the, er, popularity of the school was already high. ......And, since becoming grant-maintained, er, it’s becoming more popular.

The basic strategy of the school was to maintain the popularity and reputation.

......we’ve reached a kind of, er, reputation. So what we’re going to do is to maintain that reputation. The way to maintain your reputation is by, er, what we do.

The school had been keeping a traditional policy of strict discipline as follows:

So, we run the school where the pupils are all strictly in uniform. Er, we don’t let them out at lunchtime. So, that improves things in the neighbourhood. Er, we don’t put up with any nonsense. ......And you’ll find that the children enact the aims and values of the school, which are clear and easy to understand. They know the boundary line beyond which they can’t go, I mean, they know the consequences, they don’t beyond
them. ....... You, you’ve got to be quite strict about it. You’ve got to be quite disciplined about it. I think you, you’ll find it if you, if you have a disciplined professional approach, it doesn’t appear to be a, er, highly, er, er, militaristic kind of feeling. ....... Er, but it’s a strict regime, and I think, I think you’ve got to do that.

When asked if classroom teaching was becoming increasingly exam-oriented, the acting headteacher non-apologetically answered:

So, you’re talking really about coaching for exams, which, yes, we do, absolutely have to, that’s why. Er, but there are, there is a variety of ways of successful coaching and we employ a number of, of them, you know, different ways, it’s not just in the classroom, extracurricular classes or in, er, small groups as well as in class activities. And we take exams very seriously because they are a fact of life. Whether you think they are a good form of assessment or not is irrelevant. You have to do one of the exams, you know, period.

The strict discipline and exam-oriented teaching as mentioned above were not new strategies for the school but part of its traditional basis, and imply the directive modality of visible pedagogy.

As Table 6.5 shows, the school’s seven new strategies, of which four are visible and two are invisible, combined with the above-mentioned basis, seem to be consistent with the hypothesised movement towards more visibility in school strategies. At the same time, however, we should note that invisible strategies could be favoured again in the field of teaching. The full list of the school’s strategies and the thorough description of each of the strategies are presented in Appendix II.

Table 6.5  Seymour Field School’s strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Visible</th>
<th>Invisible</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) One of them is in both pedagogy and management.

**Riverside Street School: Grant-maintained; co-educational; 11-16**

Standard number: Not much below 200
GCSE results: Higher than the borough average but lower than the England average

Date of interviewing the headteacher: 13 March 1995

The headteacher of Riverside Street School described his school's strategies far more in accordance with the hypothesised movement towards more visibility in pedagogy and management than the other five schools in this research. Let us start with the strategies in pedagogy.

To employ staff with the teacher-led teaching style: Regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher makes it clear that he has a policy to employ staff with the traditional teacher-led teaching style, which he believes to be the best:

I like to employ teachers who have a more traditional approach to work. I want to see all the children in rows facing the teacher with the blackboard behind them. I want to see teachers directing the learning. I don't have much faith in people who say to me children learn from each other. Yes, children learn bad things from each other as well. Children should be learning most of what they learn from teachers who are skilled at what they are doing, who know and understand their subject.

If, if teachers come into my school for interview and they don't agree with this, there is no point in appointing, I won't appoint them. So, I explain all this that goes out in information.

What I insist on is I ask, I ask in all interviews, 'What is your classroom management style like? What, what is it that you want to teach and pass on to children, and how do you do it?' And teachers turn round to me and say, 'Well, we, we get together in groups and give them a theme and they, they . . . .' I'm not interested.

A good example is the appointment of the head of English whose approach is very much in tune with the headteacher's belief:

I have employed an En-, a head of English who is far more in tune with what I believe in which teaching should be. I don't want children in English forever writing poetry. Yes, that's important, creative work is important. I want children using proper English grammar, full stops, capital letter sentences, and I want children reading a lot of English literature. Er, and, so, when I employed my new head of English, I was very keen to employ somebody who agreed with this.
Although he admits that there are people who do not agree with his belief, he argues that he as the headteacher of the school can make the decision based on his belief:

I think teachers direct, the best, the most effective way is for teachers to direct learning. I think a lot of time can be wasted otherwise. Not everybody agrees with me. I, I perfectly accept that. But then again, everybody’s head of this school, therefore its’ up to me to, to determine what I want.

He acknowledges that the teaching methods in the school did not radically change since he became headteacher or the school became grant-maintained. What he and his management team do for existing teachers is to focus their attention on the quality of pupils’ work.

I, er, it will be wrong for me to suggest that since I became head or, or we’ve got a new senior management team or since we became grant-maintained, then we radically altered the methods of teaching. I think what we’ve done is to focus attention on the quality of the children’s work. I don’t want teachers accepting poor quality work from the children.

The headteacher also emphasises the importance of discipline in classroom management regarding employing new teachers:

Er, but every time I have an opportunity to appoint new teachers, I make sure that they, they understand and accept this system and are willing to work in that system and have a view of classroom management where there is discipline in control. If there is not discipline in the classroom, there is not much that’s to go on.

This strategy is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which is intended to enhance the explicitness of both regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations.

Banding system introduced: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher has been introducing a banding system since September 1994. Previously pupils were taught in mixed-ability tutor groups all subjects except mathematics, which had setting for Year 7 and above, and French, which had setting for Year 8 and above. Under the present system with banding, the pupils are put into three broad bands of ability. The top band children form three classes, the middle band three, and the bottom band two.

These children are very able, they work very fast. . . . These groups, the middle band, a few less children, and they work perhaps a little slower.
And these children are children who've got special needs, these children who've got reading difficulties, language difficulties and so on. English, Science, history, geography, and religious education are taught in these band groups. Mathematics is taught in set groups within each band for Year 7 and above, and French also for Year 8 and above. Physical education, music, art, and technology are taught in mixed-ability tutor groups. Therefore, the pupils belong to three or four different classes, depending on the subjects—mixed-ability tutor group, banded group, mathematics set group, and for Year 8 and above the French set group as well.

So, let's say a child, if a child comes in, called 'John', John comes in, and he goes into Tutor Group C and he register, you know, they take his name, and John is in a class 7C for music, for art, PE, design, but he is in also Band E, and so he goes into E1 for English, but he could also be a very good mathematician and so he is in Set 1 for maths. So, John could be in 1, 2, 3 different classes, depending on the subject.

The new system is replacing the old system year by year:

So, I've only had this in place since September 1994 in Year 7 and 8. September 1995, in a few months time, it will be in 7, 8 and 9. And over the next few years, it will be in 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

The children coming to the school, who are offered a place in the school, sit NFER mathematics and English tests sometime in June, and they are put into bands based on the results of the tests.

The headteacher regards the introduction of the banding system as one of the most important strategies which he has initiated. He states that the strategy was the second thing he did; the first thing was raising the status of teaching and learning. This strategy is based on his firm belief in the necessity of differentiation:

One of the most important strategies that I've put in place in this school for the parents of this area is to not completely sweep away mixed-ability teaching but to reassure them that their children will be working with children who are of the same ability in those classes in those subjects. Now, I think, this is a way of differentiating, er, the curriculum to suit levels of ability. I ask you a question. Do children all learn maths at the same pace? No. Do they, are they all of the same ability in English? No. Well, why put them in the same class? ... Now, that is a strategic plan that I put in place, a strategic procedure I put in place to, er, improve the quality of teaching and learning that goes on in the school. So, that's, that was the second thing that I did.
The headteacher seems to think that parents tend to prefer differentiated-ability groups to mixed-ability groups:

... I say to parents we will give them a test, and the parents, well, they are quite happy. They know that their children are not now going to be in a mixed ability situation.

He mentions that the teachers were not necessarily in favour of the banding system when it was going to be introduced, and that there are still some teachers who do not like it because they regard it as elitist:

The first year [from September 1993], I had to plan it all, talk to my staff, er, not everybody was keen on it. There are even now people who, not particularly, don’t like it, because they think it’s, it’s a bit elitist . . . . You must have heard of it in England a lot of people are concerned about equal opportunities. Well, equal opportunities to me means treating children according to their differences.

When asked what percentage of teachers agree with the banding system, the headteacher answered that it was 50% when he suggested the system but now 90% of the teachers like the system although some of them might have reservations about the philosophy:

When I first put it, I would say 50%, but I made sure that my heads, my deputy headteachers, senior teachers, and heads of faculty understood the system. Now it’s, now it’s operating, I would say 90%, easily 90% of the teachers like this system. They might have reservation about the philosophy, but this is the practicality of this, are [sic] much easier to teach. You can set work more easily.

He states that the practicality has persuaded some teachers into accepting the banding system, and implies that the examination results have also contributed to the persuasion:

... some of them are very, very keen on this, some of them have accepted this as being a more realistic, practical way of teaching children, and all of them were very concerned that in 1993 the examination results in the school were the worst in this borough. Er, they are not now.

He even emphasises the merit of the banding system for the less able children. In the system, the class size of the bottom band classes is smaller than that of the middle band classes, which is smaller than that of the top band classes:

This is not to say that these children will be getting a poorer quality education. Far from it, I think, these children will be getting a better education because they’re in smaller classes. In these classes, specialist teachers of English and maths teach them.
The introduction of the banding system stratifies pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy, which enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

Simplified reports to parents: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

According to the headteacher, the forms for reporting on examinations to parents have been simplified:

... we have simplified our procedure, and they are all like this. School badge, name of the subject, name of the pupil, tutor group, punctuality: good, number of attendances and its lesson, attainment: excellent, good, average, below average, and in between them, so, this child is, his attainment is average to good, effort: average, then there is a course description telling the parents what they are learning, and then it's my comment. And all the reports are exactly like that, maths, English, science, history, geography, Year 7, Year 8, Year 9, Year 10. Year 11 is slightly different.

He states that the simple reports are in accordance with what parents want to see:

But all the reports, I think, if you are a parent, you want to know very quickly, 'Is your child attending?', and what level, and what effort they are putting in, what is the course they are doing, and then you want to see what the teacher says. That is very simple. Attendance, effort, achievement, course description, teacher comment.

The reporting form for reviews is even simpler:

Er, the review is name of pupil, and it has a list of all subjects that they are taking, and it has a space for the teacher to comment. And the teacher simply in English has to say 'good', 'not so good', English, maths, history, geography, er, and one sheet you get a quick review of all subjects.

After the examination, one sheet for a subject. For the review, all subjects on one sheet.

The simplification of the reporting forms is based on the view that reporting should provide clearer information on comparative performances, and therefore a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which is to enhance the explicitness of prescriptive (criteria) rules in pedagogic relations.

System to award pupils prizes for their attainment and effort: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher introduced an awards system in 1994. Under the new system, he awards a trophy to pupils who have shown the best academic achievement. The
first prize was awarded to two pupils who had achieved the best results in their GCSE.

Well, I just, that’s my prize for the most outstanding achievement. They got nine grade As each. So I shared the prize between them.

As a part of the system, he has also introduced a lower school presentation evening when books are awarded to pupils who have shown very good attainment or effort in each subject:

And the maximum number of prizes that a child can receive is two, and last July we gave prizes to around about eighty children and, er, I gave them book prizes to the value of eight pounds each.

So, we had Year 7 history prize, boy and girl, Year 8 history prize, boy and girl, Year 9 history prize, boy and girl, and that’s the same for all subjects, and then we get, er, effort prizes in history, maths, science, er, so, we, what we do is to reward attainment and effort.

The awards system highlights stratifying differences between pupils, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of prescriptive (criteria) rules in pedagogic relations.

**Clearer and stricter policy of permanent exclusions: Regulative visible strategy in pedagogy**

The headteacher has made it clear that consistently misbehaving pupils will be permanently excluded although the official procedures have not been changed.

He had permanently excluded four pupils, and was going to exclude another pupil at the time of the interview:

The procedures are the same, but the children now know that if they misbehave consistently in this school, I will remove them from the school.

But where children consistently, persistently misbehave, I think, it’s my responsibility to say, ‘Unless you behave properly, you will not jeopardise the chances of the other children in your class’.

He argues that his policy of exclusions is supported by parents and governors who regard it as a deterrent:

Now, because a lot of my governors and parents, they want to see discipline as a deterrent, in other words, if I stand in front of all my Year 10 children for example and say, ‘You will behave properly or I will put you out of this school’, that frightens them. And if they know that the threat is real, then, generally speaking, they behave better.

He mentions, as a merit of GM status, that the LEA cannot make the school admit disruptive children who have been excluded from other schools:
And what has changed on the GM is that the LEA cannot send other children from other schools who are disruptive to this school. They cannot do that. Er, I won't take into this school children who've been disruptive in other schools unless they have a particular special need.

The clearer and stricter policy of permanent exclusions is a regulative visible strategy in pedagogy, which increases the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) rules in pedagogic relations.

Now let us turn to the strategies in management.

**Departmental review: Regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management**

As the headteacher's discourse quoted in the previous chapter shows, a review of the performance of each curriculum area is focused on examination results and is intended to make his teaching staff accountable to him and his deputy. It makes their control over the staff's performance more explicit and tighter. The departmental review is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management.

**Larger management team with clear role of each member: Regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management**

Before the school became grant-maintained, the senior management team consisted of headteacher and two deputies. Now the team includes four senior teachers and a senior administrative officer as well. Therefore, the number of team members has been increased from three to eight. This has been coinciding with the increase in the school size:

... it's not a massive school, it's big, and it's getting bigger. And the management structure in the school was, before grant-maintained status, head, two deputies, that's it. Now head, two deputies, four senior teachers, senior administrative officer who doesn't teach, she is an administrator. Now my senior management team is eight.

Each member of the team has a clear role and, according to the headteacher, the management structure is much stronger than it was previously. He intends to make the management businesslike in a sense:

One of them is head of upper school, Year 10 and 11. One of them is head of lower school, Year 7, 8 and 9. One of them does all the day-to-day administration, if teachers are absent, cover, diary and timetable. One of them is the head of careers and, er, that's basically all he does. I have to say he might be leaving soon and, if he leaves, I won't replace him on the
senior management team. He is a senior member of staff historically, he is a senior member of staff. So, head of upper school, head of lower school, head of administration, careers teacher. My two deputies, one is in charge of staffing, staff appraisal, INSET and duties, and one is in charge of finance and curriculum. My responsibilities are governors, outside liaison with agencies, all issues to do with staffing and policy-making. I make all the policies. My senior administrative officer does all day-to-day finance. Er, she used to be the school secretary, but now she is much more than that. She is also clerk to the governing body. So, I have a management structure of eight, and it's a lot stronger than it was.

Er, I'm very keen that people have a clear view of their own role. Mr Ohmori, you see, I, I, I would say to you that this school is like a business . . . our job is to provide a quality service. If we don't provide the service, parents will choose to go to other schools.

Larger management team itself does not have particular implications in terms of visibility, but the above-mentioned expansion of the management team is intended to provide the management with more hierarchical structure and clearer responsibility. Therefore, the above-mentioned change is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management, which increases the explicitness of both regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive rules in organisational relations.

Clear agenda for a meeting of the management team: Regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management

The management team holds a meeting for three hours every week, and the headteacher provides a clear agenda at every meeting:

We meet here around this table every Wednesday afternoon at 2.30, 2.30 to 5.30, three hours. Er, we go through the diary for four weeks. We go through all staffing issues. . . . I produce an agenda for every meeting. Last week, diary, four weeks, next two weeks, two weeks, diary request, bulletin, caretaking, staffing, in-service training, and then various issues that are important to us. That takes place once a week. And there are eight people around a table. They've all got various responsibilities.

According to the headteacher, previously there was no agenda and no real structure:

A regular meeting every week, but no agendas, no real structure. I didn't like it.

His intention is to make the school organisation tighter and more explicit:

Er, and that happens once a week. So, the organisation and administration is hopefully all very tight, very clear.
This is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management, which increases the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive (sequencing) rules in organisational relations.

**Supplementary and summary comments**

According to the headteacher of Riverside Street School, his school is a 'classic case' of improved performance with GM status:

> .......this school is a classic case of a school that was within the LEA system and the school was not performing well. .......In fact in 1993 it was the, it was the lowest school, it was the bottom of the list in terms of examination results in this borough. .......(Its examination results in 1994 were) the best that this school has ever got GCSE.

The results were improved by about 170%. In his perception, GM status was a part of the driving force for the strategic changes of his school.

> I think that one of the reasons why we have got considerably better, why we are getting very much better is because of grant-maintained status. .......there have been real significant changes in terms of leadership, organisation, administration, and strategies since 1993.

The above descriptions of the strategies by the headteacher in the interview imply that the strategies as a whole seem to be oriented towards a 'classic case' of the directive visible pedagogy and management.

Table 6.6 Riverside Street School's strategies in pedagogy and management classified in terms of visibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Visible</th>
<th>Invisible</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogy</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6 shows that there are fifteen visible strategies, six neutral strategies, and no invisible strategy, which are described by the headteacher. Riverside Street School is the only school for which no invisible strategy is identified. Of the fifteen visible strategies (the largest number among the six schools), one strategy makes only regulative rules more explicit, five strategies make both regulative and
instructional rules more explicit, and therefore six strategies make regulative rules more explicit. Easthill Girls’ School has two strategies that make regulative rules more explicit. All the other four schools have either zero or one such strategy. This comparison is compatible with the outstandingly directive nature of Riverside Street School’s strategies expressed in the headteacher’s discourse.

Among the six headteachers interviewed, he is the only one who has expressed the preference for traditional teaching style. His directive approach is also applied to his staff. The teachers are accountable for the results of their pupils’ achievements. The directive approach in his management is not just traditional but businesslike as well. The headteacher expressed his belief that schools should be more like business and industry.

If you have a job, you should be performing to the best of your ability and then it’s up to managers to make, just in, in exactly the same way as industry and business. ...Now, as far as I’m concerned, being the head of a grant-maintained school makes me more accountable to the people who are my clients and customers. ...I want my school to be run more on business lines, I want quality education, quality control, targets set, children performing well.

At the same time, however, teaching itself is the most essential part of his strategy for the school.

There was, what I’ve done is to shift the focus of attention to the quality of the teaching in the classroom. It’s important that the teacher prepares their lessons, marks the work, returns it quickly, and insists on high standards from the children. You might say, ‘Sure, all schools must do that’. This school wasn’t doing it. ......the most important thing must be the quality of the teacher. If the teacher in front of the children is good, has a rapport with them, likes their subject, works hard, then the teacher will be, will be, er, enthusing the children to learn. My job, it’s to make the teacher’s job easier. I have to put in place with them structures and procedures that allow them to do their teaching properly. ......I think when parents see and pupils see and teachers see that the most important thing is the quality of what goes on in those our lessons, then the children will work a lot better.

Examination results are the focus of his strategy.

And we’ve made a very conscious effort to improve our public image. Now the most important performance indicator for parents is the examination results. If they think their children are going to come to our school that is well disciplined and where children are going to be made to work hard and perform well on the open market, they will look to our school to send their children. ......Every, everything was put aside and all attention was focused on ‘Please this year we will work hard on the exam.
results'. When in the past what had happened was we came in, we taught, and we hoped for good exam results.

The school had been struggling to improve its public image and examination results in an area with better-performing schools including Seymour Field School. According to the headteacher, as a result of the strategic changes, the public image of Riverside Street School was very much improved.

The image that people had of this school was a school that was not very disciplined, that, er, children came here and were happy but didn’t achieve very much in terms of high academic achievement. I like to think that the perception of the school from the general public and parents is considerably better. Examination results are improved. The children look better. And if you ask, if you would go on to the street of [the area name], they would tell you now that their perception of Riverside Street School is a school that is getting very much better, not perfect yet but considerably better than it was. I think I’m right in saying that, er, the school’s, the respect that people have for this school has significantly increased over the last eighteen months. That’s true.

The number of applications showed a rapid increase since the school became GM. In 1993, Riverside Street School did not have enough applications to fill its places. In 1994, the number of applications was more than one and half times as large as the school’s standard number. For 1995, the school received an even larger number of applications.

Now the headteacher hoped that his school was competing more with Seymour Field School and selective schools than with the LEA schools.

Before 1993, the main rivals were within ‘Roundham’, Fertile Land School, [another county school], er, Seymour Field School. Since 1993, I think really, they are, Fertile Land School and [the above county school] are... they are less of a rival than we are, than the other schools are now. I do get now a number of requests to transfer children from Fertile Land School or [the above county school] to here. I think the LEA schools, they are still rivals, but more, more importantly now, I think, schools like the grammar schools, independent schools and Seymour Field School who are like ourselves, have a degree of independence, we have, we have moved into that league, if you like, and they are, they now represent more in terms of competition than the LEA schools.

Realistically, however, he described a different picture as follows:

Good independent schools don’t regard us as rivals. They have a very strong traditional base. And there are still lots of, lots of parents in this country who, if given the opportunity, would prefer to send their children, if they are bright and able, to schools where only bright and able children go to. What that causes of course is divisiveness. It’s, it, it causes a division. No, I don’t think they see us a rival. Er, now the
small, and there is only one really, very small independent school, that see us as a rival. [The above county school], Fertile Land School, they see us as a rival. Er, Seymour Field School, to a certain extent, but, but they've, they've been a good school for a long time. My job is to make this school better, better, better and put it in the same league as Seymour Field School.

It seems that Riverside Street School was moving towards a stereotype of directive visible pedagogy and management as far as the strategies described by the headteacher are concerned.

Here we are at the end of the presentation of the six case schools’ new strategies or strategic changes, since the quasi-market reform, in their headteachers’ discourses. Now we will see what can be found from the above empirical data as a whole.

Findings: Strategic Changes towards More Visibility

Now we should sum up all the findings from the above analysis of the six schools’ strategies described by the headteachers as ‘new’ strategies that were introduced or changed since the quasi-market reform by the Education Reform Act 1988.

Visible strategies dominant across the case schools

Among the above six schools, only Roundham Catholic College indicates some balance between visible and invisible strategies, and all the other five seem to lend support to the basic hypothesis that school managers were adopting more visible strategies than invisible ones as ‘new’ strategies although in different degrees. While Fertile Land School and Seymour Field School have substantial minority elements of invisibility in their strategies, Easthill Girls’ School and particularly Riverside Street School show very little or virtually no elements of invisibility. The essential point here is that on the whole the new strategies expressed by the headteachers seem to be consistent with the hypothesised movement towards more visibility in school strategies.

In the case of Roundham Catholic College, according to the headteacher’s discourse, the fact that it is a Catholic school decreases the competitive pressures for his school in the local school market. In addition, he seems to be most in favour of the so-called child-centred education among the six headteachers as far
as their discourses in the interviews are concerned. These factors may have affected Roundham Catholic College’s strategies.

More prescriptive visible strategies than regulative ones
While Riverside Street School has six regulative visible strategies that make regulative rules more explicit, and Easthill Girls’ School has two, all the other four schools have either zero or one such strategy. The vast majority (even for Riverside Street School) of the visible strategies expressed by the headteachers are prescriptive ones. Among the six headteachers interviewed, the headteacher of Riverside Street School is the only one who shows the preference for traditional teaching style, and his directive approach is also explicit in the organisational relations with his staff as well as in the pedagogic relations with pupils. We may cautiously interpret the results as indicating that quasi-market pressures are directed more towards academic achievements or, more crudely, examination results than towards discipline and moral aspects in schooling.

Examination results as the agent of change
In all the six headteachers’ discourses, the most prominent topic among others is how they take examination results seriously—whether or not they are personally in favour of them being used as performance indicators of schools. This seems to be the main driving force towards prescriptive visible strategies adopted by the schools. It is clear in the headteachers’ discourses that they are conscious of possible or even probable consequences of the effect of the increasing role of examination results for parental choice in the local market.

The analysis of examination results is a focal point of strategy as the cases of Easthill Girls’ School, George Square School and Seymour Field School exemplify. The monitoring of pupils’ academic achievements can be closely linked to that of teachers’ performances as explicitly indicated in Fertile Land School and Riverside Street School.

Coupling of strategies in pedagogy and management
Visible strategies in management often seem to be in tune with those in pedagogy. In particular, a mechanism for monitoring or reviewing the performances of staff
and/or subject departments in relation to pupils' performances, introduced as a new strategy in Easthill Girls' School, Fertile Land School, Seymour Field School and Riverside Street School, is a typical case of the strong linkage between pedagogic and managerial domains.

The combined use of devolved management and performance monitoring is an essential characteristic of the market-oriented reforms of public services. Performance indicators have been developed as tools for explicit organisational control in the public services. In the case of education, performance indicators including examination results have been built into the quasi-market system. The accountability line between the state and schools and that within each school are linked with each other, and both are based on pupils’ academic achievements.

Room for manoeuvre for invisible strategies

While on the whole the emphasis on examination results tends to promote visible strategies, it does not necessarily prevent the adoption of an invisible pedagogy that 'works'. Roundham Catholic College introduced a child-centred scheme of mathematics, SMILE, in order to improve examination results and, according to the headteacher, it has 'worked'. Interestingly, the improved results persuaded the sceptical parents who liked traditional teaching approaches. On the one hand, this case exemplifies the perceived parents' favour in traditional teaching or visible pedagogy. On the other hand, it indicates that invisible strategies can overcome the parents' attitude if they 'work' towards improving the results.

In the cases of Roundham Catholic College, Fertile Land School and Seymour Field School, the adoption of invisible strategies in teaching styles and methods is prominent. It may tell us that the market pressure in terms of parental preference is more about ‘results’ than about ‘processes’. While sacrificing the examination ‘results’ for whatever reason may not be a very realistic choice for schools, prejudice held by parents rightly or wrongly against particular teaching approaches or ‘processes’ is not necessarily unchangeable. Therefore, there seems to be room for manoeuvre by school managers who introduce invisible strategies in processes as long as the strategies improve the results or, at least, do not endanger them.
As the findings of the empirical study have been analysed as above, the next task in the following Part is to discuss the implications of the findings for broader contexts including research on education quasi-markets, Labour's policies, and the theoretical framework. These implications will demonstrate the significance, relevance and originality of the findings and their theoretical basis.
Part V  Implications, Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 7  Implications of the Findings for Research on Quasi-Markets

The controversy continues as empirical studies accumulate

The empirical work for this thesis was carried out from 1994 to 1995. Since then, there have been more empirical studies on the effects of education quasi-markets. Lauder et al. (1999, p.1-2) classified the processes of the debate on education markets in Britain, New Zealand and other countries into three phases. In the first phase, the advocates and critics of education markets exchanged abstract arguments based on principles and inferences. The second phase included research on the aspects of policies to introduce market mechanisms. They declared that their book initiated the third phase, in which the effects of education markets were reported and claims of the advocates and critics of markets were to be tested. Based on their empirical study of New Zealand's education markets, their conclusion was largely in favour of the claims of the critics, saying, ‘In general terms our studies have found that the trends predicted by critics of marketization are confirmed’ (ibid, p.131) and ‘our findings suggest that neither efficiency or equity is well served by education markets’ (ibid, p.134).

Nonetheless, the debate is still going on.

When the empirical work of this research was conducted, the debate was in the second phase. Now the debate is in the third phase as termed by Lauder et al. (1999, p.1-2). However, the basic features of the debate have been astonishingly stable and virtually unchanged. According to Lauder et al. (ibid, p.131), ‘Three major issues lay at the heart of the debate: choice, polarization and school effectiveness’. In the terminology of this thesis (see Chapter 3), the focal points of the controversy are still the interrelated issues of ‘choice and diversity versus inequality and hierarchy’ and ‘educational standards and efficiency’, on both of

19 There seems to be a prevailing view that quasi-market reforms make schooling less equal and more hierarchical. Stephen Gorard and John Fitz (2000) challenged the view. According to them, ‘the notion of markets having a significant stratifying effect on school intakes is now so commonly held that it will take substantial evidence to shake it’ (Gorard & Fitz, 2000, p.116). They analysed data from all secondary schools in England and Wales relating to poverty and special educational needs, and concluded that overall
which empirical research has been accumulating but has not yet reached decisive conclusions. Therefore, as shown as follows, the empirical findings and their theoretical basis in this thesis have important implications for the research and debate, at this current stage, on education quasi-markets.

In contrast with recent research on school strategies in the quasi-market
Regarding school strategies in, or school responses to, quasi-markets, the research has been accumulating. This section reviews other research works in contrast with the findings and implications of this research. As the review demonstrates below, the thesis’s findings in the context of its theoretical framework have relevant implications for the current quasi-market system, and the originality and uniqueness of the findings and theoretical framework are not diminished by other recent research.

Nick Foskett (2003, pp.131-4), after discussing ‘strategic management’ comprising three components of ‘strategic analysis’, ‘strategic choice’, and ‘strategic implementation’, says, ‘Few detailed research-based case studies exist either in the school sector or in FE’. Then, he introduces four such research works in addition to one of his own. Although Foskett himself works on school management and marketing, three of the four named works are not within the management literature tradition but in the policy sociology tradition that deals with the consequences of the education quasi-market. These three works contain empirical work on school responses to, or strategies in, the education quasi-market. Therefore, here these works will be reviewed in the context of the theme of this thesis.

Segregation between schools had been declining from 1989 to 1998. They suggested that the desegregation was not primarily due to market forces, but more likely due to other social and demographic changes including the reorganisation of schools. Their argument attracted much criticism from other researchers including Alex Gibson and Sheena Asthana (2000) and Philip Noden (2000). Gibson and Asthana (2000) not only criticised the methodology adopted by Gorard and Fitz, but also referred to ‘the wealth of evidence cataloguing the detrimental consequences of the marketization of education’ (Gibson and Asthana, 2000, p.150) produced by largely qualitative studies. Noden (2000) analysed the data for all English secondary schools from 1994 to 1999, and concluded that there was a net increase in segregation during the period although he cautiously mentioned a possibility that this increase was from a lower baseline than the level of segregation prior to the quasi-market reform. Nonetheless, Gorard (2000) insisted not only that schools were becoming more socially mixed in the 1990s, but also that achievement gaps between different groups of students in terms of class, ethnicity and gender were all decreasing over time.
Philip A. Woods, Carl Bagley and Ron Glatter's (1998) work is valuable as one of the limited number of empirical studies on school responses, that is, strategic changes in response, to the quasi-market system of education in Britain. Moreover, a particular strength of this research work lies in the combination of quantitative surveys on parental choice and qualitative interviews with school staff about school responses to choice and competition. Their work is based on a multiple case study of parental choice and school responses to choice and competition, in the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods\textsuperscript{20}, for which data collection was carried out between 1993 and 1996. The case study, known as the Parental and School Choice Interaction (PASCI) study, covered three areas of a town, a deprived urban area and a semi-rural area, each of which included three to six state secondary schools, to the total of eleven. ‘The main objectives of the interviews’ were to find ‘the ways in which secondary schools perceive the issue of parental choice and competition’, ‘the extent to which secondary schools can and do respond to parental choice and competition, and the factors that influence those responses’, and ‘what, if any, changes the research schools were making were intended to encourage parents to choose their particular school’ (pp.6-10).

Although Woods, Bagley and Glatter’s (1998) work may have enormously contributed to the detailed description of the quasi-market, ‘public-market’ in their terminology, their approach is different from the one adopted in this thesis, resulting in different values. While their work provides descriptive accounts of ‘school responses’, this thesis analyses school strategies with a highly conceptualised framework for judging the directions of those strategies, providing an explicitly defined trend in the schools’ strategic changes. While their work explicates the dominance of the academic aspect against the personal and social aspect in school responses to choice and competition, this thesis clarifies the directions of change in the academic aspect and the personal and social aspect with a refined conceptual or theoretical framework. Furthermore, the thesis pays

\textsuperscript{20} The data collection on parental choice consisted of annual surveys in the use of postal questionnaires, which resulted in a total of nearly 6,000 (2000 per year) completed questionnaires, and supplementary personal interviews with samples of parents (124 interviews in total). In the questionnaire survey, parents were asked about sources of information and factors influencing choice of school. On the other hand, the principal method of the data collection on schools was personal interviews with headteachers, deputy heads and other teachers as well as a small number of bursars/business managers and governors. Each interview lasted around 45 minutes to an hour, and the total number of interviews was 109, including ‘repeat interviews with key individuals’.

153
particular attention to a possible linkage between responses (strategies) in pedagogy and those in management. The thesis has presented and examined the hypothesised trend in school strategies towards more visible modalities of pedagogy and management and their interconnection.

In contrast to the complexity of parental choice and the importance of the intrinsic-personal/social, with regard to the school responses to choice and competition, the authors argue that they have found an increasing focus on the 'academic', which they define as 'educational progress which is primarily oriented towards success in examinations' (p.162). They insist on the dominance of the academic aspect against the personal and social aspect in school responses to choice and competition. This is in line with this thesis’s earlier discussion on an interesting inconsistency between the findings of the researches on parental choice and the critical arguments about the quasi-market. While it is often said that parental choice is complex and that a humanistic perspective seems more predominant than academic performance or at least the latter is far from a single dominant factor, most of the critics of the quasi-market argue that the competition between schools for parental choice will be significantly driven by the academic performance as measured by examination and test results.

Foskett (2003, p.134) also names the book edited by Glatter, Woods and Bagley (1997), which contains fourteen chapters written by different authors. As one of those chapters, the work by David Halpin, Sally Power and John Fitz (1997), based on their empirical studies21 carried out between 1992 and 1994, presents a picture of the institutional changes in a sample of GM schools in comparison with the neighbouring LEA-maintained schools. While the changes found for the GM schools in their work are similar to the strategic changes towards more visible modalities of pedagogy and management found in this thesis, their work is not about the overall trend in the strategic changes of schools including both the LEA-maintained and the GM schools. Furthermore, their work does not take the approach of constructing a theoretical framework such as the

21 Their empirical studies consist of semi-structured (audio-recorded) interviews with the headteachers of nine GM schools, seven LEA schools, and one private school; a questionnaire survey of the teachers in six of the nine GM schools, all the LEA schools and the private school; supplementary interviews with a range of governors; a questionnaire survey of Year 7 pupils; and semi-structured (notebook-recorded) interviews with Year 9, 10 and 11 pupils.
one in the thesis that enables us to analyse both pedagogy and management in the use of an integrated set of concepts, that is, visible and invisible modalities.

The main conclusion of their research is that the then GM schools in the sample were, rather than becoming innovative, moving towards the traditional modes of education with the emphasis on academic achievement and rigorous discipline, that is, ‘opting into the past’. Among their key findings, the combination of the ‘organisational orthodoxies and curriculum and pedagogical conservatisms’ (p.66) is important in the context of this thesis. With regard to management, the authors argue that ‘the concentration of power within the hands of the headteacher is more pronounced in schools which have opted out’ and that ‘staff in GM schools are less likely to be involved in decision-making’ (p.62). Furthermore, the organisational structure found in the GM schools ‘is more hierarchical and traditional than that found in many LEA-maintained schools’ (p.63). Concerning the curricular change, according to their account, ‘Most of the changes mentioned by GM headteachers in interview represent either glosses on the National Curriculum (notably in technology) or revivals of academic selectivity and traditional modes of education generally’ (p.64).

While their findings seem to suggest that GM schools tend to have more visible pedagogy and management than LEA-maintained schools, it does not imply a general trend towards more visible modalities of school strategies. Furthermore, although their research work has shown a significant possibility of linkage between school strategies in pedagogy and those in management, the linkage is not theoretically explicated. By contrast, this thesis enables us to interpret possible linkages in the context of the integrated theoretical framework for pedagogy and management in the use of the concepts of visible and invisible modalities.

Another chapter of the same book, written by Jason Hardman and Rosalind Levacic (1997), provides interesting and important information not directly on school strategies but on factors for the ‘market success’, in terms of recruitment of pupils, which has implications for school strategies. Importantly their quantitative analysis demonstrates a positive linkage between successful recruitment and the GCSE examination performance. Therefore, this finding implies that school strategies to raise examination results are really responsive to parental choice.
while their paper itself does not say anything about school strategies. In this sense, their work is complementary to this thesis.

Their paper is based on the longitudinal quantitative analyses of five LEAs’ administrative data on some 300 secondary schools, though the number of schools available for each particular analysis differs. The first of their research questions is whether parental choice causes recruitment changes and hence brings about competitive pressures for the sample schools. The authors’ answer is ‘yes’. They say, ‘The existence of surplus capacity along with evidence of the annual redistribution of the incoming pupil cohort amongst groups of closely located schools together indicate that competition between schools as a result of parental choice can and does arise’ (p.132). They also explore the hypothesised association between ‘market success’ in terms of intakes and ‘two key school characteristics’ (p.119), that is, the GCSE examination results and the socio-economic status of pupils. Concerning the latter characteristic, because of data limitations, they have only reached a tentative finding that ‘the most successful schools (i.e. ‘improving/full’) tend to have lower proportions of pupils qualifying for free school meals than their competitors’ (pp.128–31). With regard to the former characteristic, they have found that ‘“improving/full” schools tend to have a higher percentage of their pupils achieving five or more A-C grades in GCSE than the “middling” schools’ and ‘declining/plateau’ schools for each academic year from 1989–90 through to 1993–4. However, ‘There is no significant difference in the GCSE results of “middling” and “declining/plateau” schools’ (p.127). Based on these findings, the authors argue that ‘quasi-market success is coupled with a relatively high level of GCSE performance’, and that ‘parental choice and the school resourcing mechanism are tending to favour schools in line with Government expectation’, while ‘the lack of a significant difference in the mean GCSE performance of “middling” and “declining plateau” schools suggest that examination results may not be a key reason for parents avoiding particular schools’ (p.133).

While the empirical study in this thesis did not collect data on parental choice, its qualitatively analysis of the headteachers’ discourses suggests that the school managers were adopting more and more visible strategies often to raise examination results.
This thesis, without collecting data on parental choice, cannot give a direct answer to the question of whether these school strategies were really responsive to parental choice. Therefore, on one hand, Hardman and Levacic’s (1997) work, demonstrating a positive association between the successful recruitment and the GCSE examination performance, complements the thesis in this regard. On the other hand, their work does not tell us anything about what strategies the schools are adopting in response to parental choice, and the thesis’s value lies in researching these strategies.

However, as their work suggests that complete failure in the quasi-market may not simply be decided by examination results, parental choice is complexly influenced by a number of factors. This thesis is unique in pointing out a paradox that both the advocates and critics of the education quasi-market seem to agree with each other that the academic schooling model with focus on examination results prevails in the quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and diverse. The very nature of the quasi-market with league tables as an essential element incorporated encourages schools to attract parents who want to choose a better school in terms of examination results. Incentives for school managers’ strategies in the education quasi-market are both ‘economic’ in terms of enrolment numbers and ‘social’ in terms of their school’s perceived status. Such complexity is typically expressed in the following answer by Fertile Land School’s headteacher to the question why her school needs to attract more able pupils:

Well, because if we don’t, we will lose our position in the league table that’s published every year, and that will mean it’s more and more difficult to attract children of quality. And if more schools become grant-maintained and if Riverside Street School gets to enlarge its, its space and so on, it will mean that there may come a time when we can’t attract the numbers. And then we will be in a, you know, downward spiral then. …..But that’s not the whole story. The other story is the professional pride. And the staff know they can do well with special needs children. They want to prove to themselves that they can do well with very able children as well, and everything that goes in between.

By both the economic and social incentives, school managers are motivated to raise their position in league tables and attract academically able children and academically oriented parents. Therefore, the managers tend to increase visible strategies oriented towards the academic schooling model with focus on
examination results. This is the reason why the model seems to prevail in the education quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and diverse.

Importantly 'the positive association between schools’ market success and their raw GCSE performance', as a key finding by Hardman and Levacic (1997), suggests that school strategies are really responding to parental choice. This view is in line with the theoretical framework and empirical findings of this thesis. The thesis, based on its empirical findings from the qualitative data collected in the context of its theoretical framework, argues that the school managers were responding to subjectively real pressures. Hardman and Levacic’s (1997) findings suggest that these market pressures are objectively real as well. Complemented by their findings, the thesis can argue that school strategies are responsive to market pressures from parental choice.

The other book named by Foskett (2003, p.134) is Sharon Gewirtz, Stephen J. Ball and Richard Bowe’s (1995) work. Their work, which was arguably said to be the first comprehensive study of market dynamics in British education, seems to have enormously contributed to setting the scene of controversy at the first stage of empirical research on the education quasi-market. While their extensive and detailed descriptions of local education markets22 are valuable in themselves at that stage, their grounded approach, contrastive to this thesis’s approach with an explicit theoretical framework, has produced results of different values. Here the review of their work focuses on their analysis of the secondary schools’ ‘institutional responses to competition’ or ‘policies being enacted within schools’ (p.156) in the context of this thesis’s interest.

The authors argue that they have identified five key trends. The first one is the ‘short-termism’ or ‘quick fix’ approach including a strictly enforced dress code, telephoning and writing to parents of truants, and permanent exclusions (pp.157–60). The second one is to ‘pass the buck’, seen in permanent exclusions and formal and informal selection (p.160–6). The third one is ‘internal provisional differentiation’ including reduced provision for children with learning difficulty, newly developed provision for able children, and a shift away from mixed-ability

---

22 Their research was carried out between 1991 and 1994, and the empirical data was collected from ‘three competitive “clusters” of schools in three geographically contiguous LEAs in London’ (p.13). The number of the secondary schools researched was fourteen. They also interviewed eighteen headteachers of feeder primary schools and, moreover, conducted 137 interviews with parents.
grouping towards setting. The fourth one is a ‘narrowing of scope’ of schooling with almost exclusive emphasis on academic and instrumental aspects at the expense of social and expressive aspects (pp.174–5). The fifth and the last one is ‘commodification of schooling and the child’ (pp.175–8), which means ‘not only schools or school services but also children themselves are coming to be viewed as commodities, some of whom are more valuable than others’ (pp.175–6).

We see that individual findings and arguments in their work are informative and sometimes relevant to this thesis. For example, the thesis’s findings are in tune with the authors’ argument that ‘within our case-study schools, particularly undersubscribed ones, it was firmly believed that survival in the marketplace makes it necessary not only to fill the school to capacity but also to retain or create “balanced” intakes and to raise the raw-score performance potential of student bodies’ (p.186).

Their descriptive analysis of the local education markets had a particular value in starting the empirical research on the British education quasi-market. Most of the later research on the issue of school responses to, or strategies in, the education quasi-market has continued to tend to be descriptive rather than theoretically explicative. This thesis is intended to contribute to theoretical development well based on empirical findings. The central device in the thesis is the theoretical framework in the use of visible/invisible modalities of school strategy in pedagogy and management. This device is expected to identify the orientations of schools’ strategic changes in the quasi-market in a systematic and consistent manner and make general trends emerge from those orientations. The empirical findings of the case study in this thesis are generally supporting the relevance of the theoretical device.

Continuing relevance, originality and uniqueness of this thesis
As we have seen in the above literature review, concerning school responses to, or strategies in, the education quasi-market, empirical, mainly qualitative, research has been accumulating and providing detailed descriptions of ‘local markets’ with some emphasis on complex particularities in local (political, socio-economic, cultural, demographic, etc.) environments. Although some generalisations have also been tried in such research, the generalisations have tended to be rather ad
hoc without a conceptually defined theoretical framework. In the absence of such a framework, it is difficult to judge the directions of individual responses or strategic changes in a systematic and consistent manner and to make general trends emerge from those directions.

This thesis is relevantly tackling the above-mentioned weakness in the research development. Its theoretical framework built in the use of visible/invisible modalities of strategy in pedagogy and management is expected to provide the judgement criteria for orientations of individual strategies and a device for finding general trends within apparently chaotic details and particularities. The empirical findings of the thesis, the most important one of which is a general trend towards more visibility, seem to support the relevance and effectiveness of this theoretical framework. The particular originality and uniqueness of this thesis lie in its systematic analysis of school strategies, its integration of modalities of both pedagogy and management in a single conceptual framework, and its empirical examination of the hypothesised movement towards more visibility both in pedagogic relations between teachers and pupils and in organisational relations between school management and staff. The above literature review demonstrates that the relevance, originality and uniqueness of this thesis have not been diminished by other recent research.

Implications of this research for the debate on the education quasi-market

Then, as original research work on the directions of school strategies in the education quasi-market, this thesis may have some implications for the debate on the education quasi-market. The nature of the debate has been rather stable, and the controversy is still focused on the interrelated issues of ‘choice and diversity versus inequality and hierarchy’ and ‘educational standards and efficiency’. As shown as follows, this research has important implications for the debate.

Implications for the paradox of choice and diversity

In Chapter 3, it is indicated that there seems to be a paradoxical inconsistency in both the arguments by the advocates of the quasi-market and those by the critics of it. The former arguments, on the one hand, emphasise the freedom of parental choice and the diversity of schools for parents to choose between, but on the other
hand, some of them expect that the traditional academic model with rigorous teaching and discipline will be predominant. The latter arguments, on the one hand, emphasise the complexity of parental choice and deny the dominance of academic performance as a factor of choice. However, on the other hand, they predict the formation of a hierarchy of schools and the increase in the inequality among pupils on the assumption that the competition between schools for parental choice will be significantly driven by the academic performance as measured by examination and test results. Both the advocates and the critics seem illogical in making such inconsistent arguments as above. However, paradoxically enough, both sides seem to agree with each other that the academic schooling model with focus on examination results prevails in the education quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and diverse.

The predominance of visible strategies among ‘new’ strategies, described by the headteachers as being introduced or changed since the quasi-market reform, in the above empirical study endorses this paradoxical view agreed between the advocates and critics of the quasi-market. When the headteachers explicate visible strategies, they often mention that they take examination results seriously. The very nature of the quasi-market system with league tables as an essential element incorporated in the system encourages schools to attract parents who want to choose a better school in terms of examination results. As the interview data in this thesis show, the headteachers sometimes argue that their school should attract academically able children and that the ‘quality’ of intake is important. This indicates what kind of pupils and parents tend to be targeted in the education quasi-market.

What matters for a school is not just the intake. Performing well in league tables is in itself valuable for the school’s perceived social status and the pride of the headteacher and staff. Performance tables provide a linear scale on which schools are positioned, and their position on the scale can be regarded as an indicator of their status. The perceived status of the school can be linked to the professional pride of the headteacher and other staff. With or without concern about the number of its intake, it is understandable for a school to have strategies to raise its status indicated in league tables. It is reasonable that such strategies are visible ones oriented towards the traditional academic model that is supposed
to focus on and be successful in raising examination results. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, incentives for school managers in the education quasi-market are social as well as economic.

The complex mixture of the economic and social motives of school managers in the quasi-market is typically expressed in Fertile Land School headteacher’s answer, as quoted in Chapter 6, to the question why her school needs to attract more able pupils. According to the answer, losing able children will mean losing her school’s position in the league table, and it may lead to a downward spiral where the school cannot attract enough pupil numbers. Her answer also mentions the staff’s pride.

School managers are motivated to raise their position in league tables, and attract academically able children and academically oriented parents. While these two aims are often in a chicken and egg situation, the logical conclusion is that the managers tend to increase visible strategies oriented towards the academic schooling model with focus on examination results. This is the reason why the model is said to prevail in the education quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and diverse.

Quasi-markets in favour of uniformity rather than diversity in pedagogy
The above discussion suggests that education quasi-markets may promote uniformity rather than diversity in pedagogic strategies at the level of school management. As already discussed in this thesis, it is apparently paradoxical that both the advocates and the critics seem to agree with each other that the academic schooling model with focus on examination results prevails in the education quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and diverse. However, this paradoxical view agreed between both sides should become a solid basis for further developments of the debate on the education quasi-market. In the author’s view, both the advocates and critics of quasi-markets should explicitly agree on this bottom line for academically constructive discussions on education quasi-markets.

The above argument is compatible with some findings of other research. For example, an economic analysis by Adnett and Davies (2000) concludes that market-based reforms of state schooling in England seem to have initially
increased the curriculum conformity to a traditionalist academic orientation rather than curriculum innovation and diversity. Over time, they say, ‘curriculum innovation is more likely, especially amongst schools losing market share’ (Adnett and Davies, 2000, p.164). However, these ‘unsuccessful’ schools are least able to have adequate resources to enable successful innovation. On the other hand, ‘successful’ schools with more resources generally have little incentive to undertake the risks of innovation.

Although there are a number of pieces of research that indicate the same direction towards uniformity or conformity, the uniqueness of this research lies in its presentation of mechanisms to conformity as school strategies. In the education quasi-market, school managers tend to adopt more and more visible strategies oriented towards explicit rules in pedagogy and management to raise examination results and to attract academically able children and academically oriented parents as discussed above. This trend results in a move towards conformity to more visible modalities of pedagogy.

Ron Glatter (2004) points out that ‘the reforms initiated by the 1988 Act were particularly strong drivers of uniformity and homogenisation’ (p.65). As he describes, diversity in secondary schooling has been promoted through the ‘specialist schools’ scheme, which originated in the then Conservative government’s experimental policy and was subsequently extended by the Labour government to an enormous size. More than half of all the secondary schools in England have gained specialist status. The specialisms now include not only technology, languages, sport and the arts but also engineering, science, ‘business and enterprise’, ‘mathematics and computing’, music and humanities. However, the substance in specialisation should be questioned when the reality of specialisation appears as follows. According to the findings by West et al. (2000) as quoted by Glatter (2004, p.65), ‘By far the most common reason cited for seeking specialist school status (by 51% of the headteachers responding) was the additional money it would bring from sponsors and the government. More than half the heads (53%) said that the specialism chosen for the bid was not the school’s strongest teaching area’. Whatever the evaluation of the scheme is, this form of diversity is not from market mechanisms but from a government policy. In other words, it is still valid to say that education quasi-markets tend to promote
uniformity rather than diversity in pedagogic strategies towards more visible modalities.

Efficiency and Educational standards improved by market mechanisms?
If the quasi-market reform promoted visible strategies that placed the emphasis upon academic achievement measured by examinations and tests, a natural question is whether or not these strategies were successful in raising academic achievements or educational standards.

Gorard and Taylor (2002) analyse the possible impact of market forces on educational standards. The authors’ conclusion is that although state schools’ raw scores in GCSE and A-level examinations and their relative position to fee-paying schools have been improving since 1988, it is not clear whether these improvements mean a rise in educational standards and whether the improvements are related to market forces. They point out a fundamental difficulty in measuring the changes in standards over time, saying, ‘if the test is not norm-referenced how can we tell that apparent changes over time are not simply evidence of differentially demanding tests?’ (Gorard and Taylor, 2002, p.15) On the other hand, norm-referencing, by definition, does not allow any rise or fall in grades over time because grades are allocated proportionately within each annual cohort. Even if the improvements are interpreted as a rise in standards, it is not easy to judge whether the rising standards are attributable to market forces. The authors argue, ‘If choice reforms are accompanied by other changes in an educational system, it becomes difficult to isolate the actual cause of academic improvement’ (Gorard and Taylor, 2002, p.8), and this is exactly the case for the English education system.

What can this thesis say about the issue of efficiency and standards in terms of pupil achievement? It is not about the empirical data on the quasi-market reform’s impact on pupil achievement but about the implications of the reform for strategic changes undertaken by school managers with regard to pupil achievement. As the data analysis of the interviews with the six school headteachers presented in Chapter 6 indicates, the strategic changes in the quasi-market seem to be oriented towards visible strategies that are supposed to place the emphasis on measurable academic achievements or, more crudely,
examination results. Therefore, the results of the empirical study in this research suggest that the quasi-market pressures encourage school managers to focus their strategies on academic achievement measured as examination results. In other words, in the education quasi-market, school strategies tend to aim at raising the examination results. Then, the question that remains is not regarding the orientation of school strategies but regarding the effectiveness of the strategies.
Chapter 8 Implications of the Findings for Labour’s Policies

Back to the future: The quasi-market at the heart of education reform again

The interviews for the case study of the six secondary schools were carried out between 1994 and 1995, and therefore this research is primarily on the quasi-market system of education introduced by the Conservative government before being modified by the Labour government. There have been certain changes as well as continuities between the former Conservative government and the current Labour government as discussed later in this chapter. However, because Labour’s policies have basically let the education quasi-market remain largely intact, the implications of the above analysis and findings for the current system are still significant. There has been virtually no argument that the education quasi-market has been replaced by something else under the Labour government, and therefore the change of government has not diminished the relevance of this research work on the quasi-market.

Moreover, the relevance was re-enhanced as the quasi-market with parental choice and school autonomy was placed back in the position of the main driving force for education reform towards the end of Tony Blair’s government. In October 2005, the Labour government published a White Paper, *Higher Standards, Better Schools For All: More choice for parents and pupils* (DfES, 2005), which demonstrated an astonishingly Conservative-like rhetoric and proposals for promoting schools’ freedom and parents’ power in the English education system. The proposed policies included the introduction of ‘Trust school’ status, as self-governing independent state school, easier entry for independent schools into the state sector, easier expansion for popular schools, free transport for children in low income families to any of the three nearest secondary schools, choice advisers to help the least well-off parents, the change of the role of the local authority from provider to commissioner, among others. Although the White Paper cautiously avoided the usage of the words ‘market’ and ‘competition’, the combined effects of the proposed policies could not be anything but a strengthened quasi-market system. The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, himself used the word ‘market’ in his speech on the eve of the publication of the White Paper as follows, ‘In both the NHS and in education, there will in one sense be a market. The patient and
the parent will have much greater choice. But it will only be a market in the sense of consumer choice, not a market based on private purchasing power'.

This description is the exact essence of what the Conservative-originated quasi-market is while both the then Prime Minister and the then Secretary of State for Education and Skills, Ruth Kelly, were keen to emphasise the differences between their policies and the Conservative policies upon the launch of their White Paper.

Their proposals were welcomed, jeeringly though, by Conservative MPs while many Labour MPs and a few Cabinet ministers, including Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, were reported to be unhappy with, or opposed to, the proposals. The Conservative Shadow Education Secretary, David Cameron, offered his support to his counterpart in the Labour Cabinet, saying, 'Wherever the Government promoted rigour, encourages discipline, and gives schools more autonomy and parents more choice, we will support them. And as we read that the Chancellor is against her, the Deputy Premier’s against her, and many Labour MPs are against her, she’s going to need all the support she can get'.

By contrast, the White Paper was very controversial among Labour MPs, and a particular concern was expressed on the further erosion of local authority’s power over schools, upon possible disadvantaging effects of enhanced parental choice and school freedom for poor parents and children, and on the replacement of the comprehensive schooling by more diverse schooling with more school types and more curriculum specialisms.

Despite the uneasiness about the proposed policies within the Labour Party, the then Prime Minister was determined to implement the policies in his legacy territory nearly at the end of his premiership. At the start of his speech on the eve of the publication of the White Paper, Tony Blair argued, 'Tomorrow’s white paper on education marks a pivotal moment in the life of this parliament and this government'. He expected the proposed policies to create ‘a system of independent non-fee paying state schools’, and in the new system, he predicted,

---


‘improvements become self-sustaining within individual schools, with changes owned and driven by schools and parents’ (DfES, 2005, p.4). Furthermore, he also declared that the proposals would ‘ensure irreversible change for the better in schools’ (DfES, 2005, p.4). Therefore, he believed that the strengthened quasi-market system would be basically sustained in the future. Ruth Kelly also bluntly said in a press notice from her Department, ‘The underlying principle is simple—freedom for schools and power for parents equal better standards for all’.

All the above inevitably gives us the impression of going back to the future when market forces, created through a combination of parental choice and school autonomy, are at the heart of education reform. Even though the then Prime Minister and Education Secretary claimed differences between new ‘Trust schools’ and former GM schools, which had been introduced by the Conservative government and then abolished by the Labour government, in terms of fair funding and fair admissions, the great deal of similarity between the former Conservative reform initiatives and the current Labour reform proposals was undeniable with regard to the basic principles of parental choice and school autonomy. The Shadow Education Secretary criticised ‘8 wasted years’ after the Prime Minister abolished GM schools, which ‘had the very freedoms he is now talking about’, while the Education Secretary proudly argued, ‘Without the substantial improvements we have made to the education system, the reforms I am announcing today would not be possible’.

Tony Blair and his education secretary were trying to present the reform proposals in the White Paper as a natural step forward on the basis of what his government had been doing in the area of education since 1997. According to the then Prime Minister, ‘Since 1997, there have been two stages of reform. In the first, we corrected the underinvestment and drove change from the centre. This was necessary. …In the second stage, essentially begun in 2001, we added another dimension. We started to open the system up to new influences and

introduced the beginnings of choice and contestability. ...In schooling, specialist schools all have external sponsors, on a small scale, but nonetheless important in focussing the specialism, whether business, science, languages, art or sport. City Academies are further along the spectrum, with the external partner fully engaged in the formation of the school. ...We are now at the crucial point where the reforms can be taken to their final stage. ...In our schools, as I shall go on to describe, the system will finally be opening up to real parent power. All schools will be able to have Academy style freedoms'.

The then Prime Minister and Education Secretary’s endeavour, however, did not seem to be successful in convincing others including many critical or sceptical Labour MPs, as well as jeeringly cheering Tory MPs and the media. An article in The Guardian read, ‘Tony Blair’s vision of greater autonomy for schools is a clear revisitation of Tory principles’ and another article in the newspaper quoted the general secretary of the Association of Teachers and Lecturers as saying, ‘Too much of the white paper is a return to the failed rhetoric, which was abandoned in Labour’s first term’. The Times’ leading article argued, ‘In aiming to return schools to a state of autonomy not unlike the grant-maintained status that Labour abolished eight years ago, the White Paper does represent a pivotal break with Labour’s centralising past’. In short, the claimed continuity from Labour’s previous policies was not accepted, and the apparent similarity to Tory’s ones was pointed out. Déjà vu clearly existed.

In his speech on the eve of the launch of the White Paper, the Prime Minister himself partly appreciated the former Conservative government’s reforms, saying, ‘To be fair, there were genuine attempts at reform. But they only ever touched a small minority and through the incentives given, often accentuated inequalities in provision rather than ameliorated them. ...GM schools only covered 18 per cent of secondary schools and 3 per cent of primary schools and on both funding and

---

30 From the Guardian’s website, http://education.guardian.co.uk/schools/comment/story/0,9828,1600406,00.html (Last accessed on 6 November 2005).
31 From the Guardian’s website, http://education.guardian.co.uk/policy/story/0,15572,1600431,00.html (Last accessed on 6 November 2005).
32 From The Times’ website, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,1-41-1841171-41,00.html (Last accessed on 6 November 2005).

169
admissions, where special privileges were given, created a real sense of anger amongst other less fortunate schools, needlessly creating a two-tier system. So whereas there were elements of the reforms—greater powers for the frontline—that were welcome—they were seriously flawed because they helped the few at the expense of the many and developed within a culture of neglect and underinvestment where failure for some was seen as inevitable’. The above statement sounds as if he would have preferred to provide all, not part of, schools with GM status, the abolition of which, in reality, was one of the policies his government first implemented. The White Paper also included partial appreciation of the Conservatives’ reform as demonstrated in the following sentence: ‘School improvement has been helped not only by the reforms introduced since 1997, but also by published data and inspection reports, and the ability of many parents to vote with their feet by finding a better state school’ (DfES, 2005, p.8).

In short, Mr Blair’s government explicitly endorsed the quasi-market elements, which were parental choice, school autonomy, and performance tables (now renamed as ‘achievement and attainment tables’) and other information provision for choice, and justified the fact that the Labour government had let the education quasi-market remain largely intact. To be fair, the difference of the policy discourse of Mr Blair’s government from that of Mrs Thatcher and Mr Major’s government was the emphasis placed upon policies for ‘the many rather than the few’ and for ‘all’ pupils, ‘all’ parents and ‘all’ schools. Sharon Gewirtz (2001) argued that the education policies of Mr Blair’s government had been attempting to ‘re-socialize’ working-class parents and make them like ideal-typical middle-class parents who were active consumers in the education market and closely monitored schools, universalising those middle-class parents’ attributes. It seems that Mr Blair’s government might be trying to re-socialize not only parents but also schools, making all parents and all schools fit for further universalised quasi-market of education.

It is fair to say that school autonomy as well as parental choice came back to the heart of governmental initiatives for education reform as the White Paper proposed policies for power and choice for all parents and freedom for all schools. It implied a strengthened quasi-market system of education. The findings and
theoretical basis of this research on the education quasi-market will have particular implications for the 'system of independent non-fee paying state schools'. Tony Blair's preference for visible pedagogy to the invisible one seemed apparent in his speech that argued, 'Local authority efforts to create equity often produced deadening uniformity, with child-centred learning and a rigid adherence to mixed ability teaching too often failing to raise expectations and meet basic standards'. The findings and theoretical framework of this thesis suggest that he was probably right in expecting that his reform would encourage visible pedagogy and discourage the invisible one. The thesis also suggests that school strategies will have a particularly important role in promoting visible, rather than invisible, pedagogy in the quasi-market. This suggestion seems relevant as the White Paper reads as follows: 'We have pushed higher standards from the centre: for those standards to be maintained and built-upon, they must now become self-sustaining within schools, driven by teachers and parents' (DfES, 2005, p.12).

However, the above is not the whole story. A rhetoric that the Labour government inherited from the Conservative one is 'diversity', as demonstrated in its first education White Paper (DfEE, 1997, p. 40) as follows: 'We are deeply committed to equal opportunities for all pupils. This does not mean a single model of schooling. We want to encourage diversity, with schools developing their own distinctive identity and expertise'. Later, another White Paper (DfES, 2001, p.6) argued that the Labour government aimed at 'Encouraging all schools to build a distinct ethos and centre of excellence, whether as a specialist school or by some other means'. In this policy direction, the number of, and the categories of, 'specialist schools' have been enormously expanded to promote more diversity in secondary schooling. The Specialist Schools Programme originated in the former Conservative government's modest scheme, which only covered technology, languages, sports and arts as eligible areas for specialist status. Now, under the Labour government, specialisms also include engineering, science, 'business and enterprise', 'mathematics and computing', music and humanities, and the vast majority, more than 2000, of all secondary schools in England have gained specialist status.
One of the implications of this thesis is that quasi-market forces tend to promote uniformity, rather than diversity, towards more visible modalities of pedagogy and management through school strategies. Therefore, it implies that there is a problem in the logic of ‘choice and diversity’, which originated from the Conservative government’s reform and is now to be revitalised under the Labour government. The thesis suggests that more parental ‘choice’ does not result in more ‘diversity’ in schooling. The thesis uniquely points out a paradox that both the advocates and critics of the education quasi-market seem to agree with each other that the academic schooling model prevails in the quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and diverse. The very nature of the quasi-market with league tables as an essential element incorporated encourages schools to adopt strategies to attract parents who want to choose a better school in terms of examination results.

It seems that Labour government’s aim of the Specialist Schools Programme and other initiatives lies in pursuing excellence in hierarchical standards rather than diversity in different but equal values as demonstrated in the then Prime Minister Tony Blair’s following view: ‘We have seen how specialist schools—with external sponsors, strong leadership and a clear sense of mission, driven by their acquisition and retention of specialist status—have improved faster than other comprehensives. We have seen that Academies—still relatively new independent state schools—improving this year at more than three times the national average in areas of the greatest challenge and disadvantage’ (DfES, 2005, p.3). This means that both specialist schools and Academies are praised for their hierarchically higher achievements in examinations in comparison with other state schools rather than their unique values and that being specialist is regarded as a measure to motivate these schools to improve their achievements rather than a purpose in itself. Then, for the government, it is not a problem that the education quasi-market encourages schools to improve their achievements in uniform standards rather than to enhance their diverse values, and therefore it is a natural choice for the government to strengthen the quasi-market. This is another implication of this thesis for the Labour government’s policy.

However, even under the pressure for improvement in hierarchical standards, schools may adopt invisible strategies in pedagogy as long as the strategies
contribute to improving examination results. As the case of Roundham Catholic College's child-centred scheme of mathematics, SMILE, shows in Chapter 6, invisible strategies, which 'work', can be choices for school management that aims at raising examination performances. Therefore, the search for improvement in hierarchical standards does not necessarily prohibit diversity in approaches to such improvement. Nonetheless, the results of the empirical work in this thesis generally support a hypothesised trend that competition with an emphasis on examination results encourages schools to adopt more visible strategies. It is unlikely that the combination of more freedom for schools and more choice for parents, that is, a strengthened quasi-market, will encourage diverse innovations in curriculum and pedagogy.

Towards the end of Tony Blair's premiership, the education quasi-market came back to the heart of education reform by government while it had continued to exist whether or not government emphasised its importance. In the next section, we will review policy initiatives taken by the then New Labour since its takeover of government in 1997 until the government's interest in the quasi-market reform revived in 2005.

The then New Labour's policies: The quasi-market continued with more state interventions added

Now the policy changes and continuities between the Conservative and Labour governments are to be examined in the light of the theoretical framework and empirical findings of this research.

There is a broad consensus that the then New Labour's education policy is a mixture of ideologically inconsistent measures. Arguably, most importantly, the Labour government has retained the very core of the Conservative's education reform, that is, the quasi-market policy package of open enrolment or parental choice, LMS or school autonomy, and performance tables of examinations and tests based on the National Curriculum. Labour has not only accepted the neo-liberal regime as a fact of life but has also extended some of its elements. A higher percentage of the local education budget is delegated to schools under 'Fair Funding' than under the former LMS. Labour is more daring than the Conservatives were in privatising part of services provided by 'failing' LEAs.
and/or schools. In short, Labour’s policies have basically let the education quasi-market remain largely intact, and therefore the implications of this research for the current system are still significant.

The Labour government has been even more enthusiastic in strengthening the neo-conservative policies to centralise the pedagogic aspects of schooling. Prime Minister Tony Blair justifies his government’s interventionist and centralising approach as follows: ‘Since 1997, there have been two stages of reform. In the first, we corrected the underinvestment and drove change from the centre. This was necessary’. The White Paper in 2005 argues, ‘We have pushed higher standards from the centre’ (DfES, 2005, p.12). Now prescriptive control is put not only on the curriculum or what to teach but also on how to teach and how to organise classrooms although the requirements are technically not statutory.

Pupils, particularly in secondary schools, are to be set by ability for such subjects as science, maths and languages. The Conservatives’ attacks on mixed ability grouping have now been converted to the introduction of setting as a formal policy of the Labour government. Each school is expected to provide highly structured literacy and numeracy hours with emphasis on whole-class teaching plus phonics, mental arithmetic and other basics. Although the Conservative government did advocate whole-class teaching and other traditional ‘back to basics’ approaches, it kept its fundamental position that market forces rather than government interventions should influence pedagogic preferences. Gewirtz (2002, p.160) rightly says, ‘Whilst……Conservative policies of national testing, league tables, the regular inspection of schools by Ofsted and the reduction of the continuous assessment component of GCSEs combined to encourage conservative pedagogies in schools, Conservative governments did not intervene directly to shape schools’ pedagogical strategies’. The above-mentioned interventionist aspect of the Labour policy on pedagogy seems to be oriented towards the promotion of visible pedagogy. In the case of the English language curriculum, Gemma Moss (2002) argues that the switch from invisible to visible pedagogies can be most clearly traced in the Labour government’s revisions on the National

Curriculum and the regulatory document for the initial teacher training programmes.

Sharon Gewirtz (2002, pp.179–80) diagnoses the Labour’s traditionalist policy on pedagogy as more thorough than that of the Conservatives and unfit for the knowledge-based economy, saying, ‘Moreover, the forms of cognition fostered by the traditional pedagogic practices that are being promoted by New Labour, with even more vigour than their Conservative predecessors, do not correspond to the cognitive skills now being demanded by the new multinational ‘knowledge-based industries’. Labour’s intervention policies have been oriented towards the promotion of visible pedagogy, possibly directive visible pedagogy.

Power and Whitty (1999, p.537) rightly say, ‘Although state regulation was an important element of quasi-markets, the New Labour government has, in some respects, sought to control education more directly. Unlike the previous governments, which were often considered to “steer at a distance”, this one has intervened directly on a number of fronts’. It is obvious in both their rhetoric and initiatives that Labour has been more in favour of state interventions than market forces until the launch of the White Paper in 2005. The Labour government showed its intention of not waiting for market forces to bring about improvements on schooling but directing pedagogic practices to raise education standards when the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE, 1997, p.5) said, ‘The focus will be on standards, not structures’. With blunt target-setting, of pupil performance, at national, local and school levels, Ofsted inspects LEAs as well as schools, and identifies the ‘failing’ ones.

These interventions might contribute to enhancing the explicitness of both regulative and instructional rules in pedagogic and possibly organisational relations. The target-setting, of pupil performance, at national, local and school levels, with the monitoring of performance seems to be intended to make more explicit instructional and possibly regulative rules in both pedagogic and organisational relations. This is something like a nationalised system of performance monitoring comparable to a departmental review, a review of performance of each curriculum area, introduced by the headteacher of Riverside Street School, as quoted in Chapter 6.
LEAs have been given a new role in raising education standards and new responsibilities with regard to the national initiatives including Education Development Plans with the above target-setting. According to the DfEE (1997, p.27), the LEA’s role is as follows: ‘The LEA’s task is to challenge schools to raise standards continuously and to apply pressure where they do not. That role is not one of control. Those days are gone. An effective LEA will challenge schools to improve themselves, being ready to intervene where there are problems, but not interfere with those schools that are doing well’. This rehabilitation of the LEA’s role was a clear departure from the Conservative policy. On the other hand, those LEAs reported by Ofsted as unsatisfactory or worse are under enormous pressure from the Labour government, which bluntly states, ‘In some cases, there has been full or partial outsourcing of LEA services or strategic management to a private sector provider, or joint venture delivery in an equal partnership with the private sector’ (DfES, 2001, p.49). Now, with the White Paper’s proposals waiting for implementation, local authorities’ power is likely to be undermined further in the near future, but that is another story.

The above-mentioned interventionist policy instruments adopted by the Labour government place emphasis on academic performance primarily measured by tests and examinations, and therefore may have promoted visible strategies in schools. Now not only quasi-market pressures but also state interventions are the driving forces for the promotion of visible strategy in pedagogic practice and in performance monitoring. The Labour government has not been hesitant about taking direct measures to impose traditional pedagogic practices including whole-class teaching, setting, phonics, and mental arithmetic, which the Conservatives did not impose but promoted through quasi-markets with tests and examinations. Rather than waiting for market forces to bring about desirable results, the Labour government has supplemented the inherited quasi-market system with the quality control system strengthened by the blunt target-setting, of pupil performance, at national, local and school levels, monitoring of the performance through Ofsted inspections, and LEAs’ interventions in ‘failing schools’.

In short, the quasi-market system is still in place, but more central intervention has been added to the system. The combination of market forces and state interventions is not new. The Conservatives-created system itself was made of
such a combination. However, Labour's policies have added new emphasis on the significance of state interventions. Not only the quasi-market but also the state interventions may have been promoting more visible modalities of pedagogy and management. Therefore, it is worth trying to examine whether school managers are adopting more and more visible strategies in the current system under the Labour government. Furthermore, as we have seen, once the policies proposed in the White Paper in 2005 are implemented, the education quasi-market will be strengthened, and the importance of school strategies in the market-oriented system of education will be further enhanced.

To be fair, it should be pointed out that part of Labour's rhetoric has surely included social democratic ideals, and some policy changes have been implemented to demonstrate its commitment to those ideals. However, the changes have not been made to discontinue the education quasi-market with choice and autonomy or the standard-oriented reform with prescribed curriculum and tests and examinations introduced by the Conservative government. Rather, the changes have been aimed at disseminating benefits of the standard-oriented reform to all pupils as stated in its manifesto in 2001 (Labour Party, 2001, p.18): 'Excellence for the many, not just the few is our driving passion. Our goal is to develop education to harness the individual talents of every pupil'.

The Labour government's quick actions to abolish the nursery voucher system and the assisted places scheme were consistent with the social democratic agenda of previous Labour administrations. The change of status from GM to Foundation schools was subtler. On one hand, bringing those schools back under the auspices of the LEAs could be regarded as a backward movement in terms of autonomous management. On the other hand, however, as Power and Whitty (1999) argue, greater parity between different types of school in terms of the amount of funding and the degree of independence is not inconsistent with a quasi-market approach.

A significant difference between Labour and the Conservatives lies in the issue of selection in schooling. Labour's policy on the differences in ability is not the stratification between schools but that within each school. The party's manifesto in 1997 (Labour Party, 1997, p.7) stated, 'There should be no return to the 11-plus. It divides children into successes and failures at far too early an age. We must modernise comprehensive schools. Children are not all of the same ability, nor do
they learn at the same speed. That means “setting” children in classes to maximise progress, for the benefit of high-fliers and slow learners alike. The focus must be on levelling up, not levelling down’. While letting the local parents decide whether the remaining grammar schools should be retained or abolished, the Labour government has ruled out any more introduction of partial selection by academic ability and empowered the adjudicator to end such selection where it already exists. On the other hand, specialisation by aptitude, introduced by the Conservative government, has been endorsed by Labour. The Labour government has been endeavouring to expand the establishment of ‘specialist schools’ as discussed already. Docking (2000, 33) describes this change of policy as ‘a shift from a policy of choice based on school status (grammar and GM schools v. comprehensives) to one based more on curricular diversity (specialist v. general comprehensives)’. This shift may be more consistent with a quasi-market approach if the shift means more equal conditions for competition in quasi-markets. Labour’s modifications of the education system, including greater parity between former GM and LEA schools and stopping further introduction of partial selection, might have contributed to restoring the ‘level playing field’ (Power & Whitty, 1999, p.539) in quasi-markets.

Labour distanced themselves from the Conservatives in introducing Education Action Zones (EAZs) and the Excellence in Cities (EiC), both of which were intended to target additional funding on schools in socially disadvantaged areas and encourage partnerships between public, private and voluntary sectors in communities. Although these initiatives had a privatising element or commercial involvement as well as community involvement, even Hill (1999), a Left critic of New Labour policy, regarded these initiatives as social democratic and exemplifying the principle of ‘social inclusion’, that is, one of the eight guiding principles of New Labour in his judgement. According to West and Pennell (2000, p.533), who analyse the distribution of funds to LEAs and schools, while ‘A focus on school standards remains, indicating continuity with the previous Conservative Government’, ‘the targeting of resources on disadvantage through

34 Now there does not exist the EAZs scheme that was absorbed into the EiC scheme.
35 The other seven are ‘standards and control’, ‘managerialism’, ‘competitiveness and selection’, ‘privatisation’, ‘traditionalism’, ‘techno-ideology’ and ‘low public expenditure’, all of which he regards as continuation of Conservative government policy.
some of the DfEE initiatives is a clear break with the Conservative legacy’. The funding initiatives that allocate more money for certain schools on the basis of political decisions rather than market forces may have decreased, to a probably modest degree, the importance of quasi-market mechanisms in those limited areas. This may have some effects on the school strategies in the areas.

However, it is not appropriate to exaggerate the impacts of the changes on the basic framework of the education quasi-market. With the above-mentioned and other initiatives, Labour has been advocating ‘partnership’ instead of ‘competition’. However, as mentioned above, quasi-market mechanisms have been retained. As Gewirtz (2002, p.158) points out, ‘Crucially—despite the rhetorical emphasis on collaboration, partnership and community—market forces have been preserved, with resources still distributed to schools primarily on a per capita basis’. According to Jackson (2000, p.178), ‘Co-operation was sought within a system designed for competitiveness’. Quasi-markets are still in place, and therefore this research has relevant implications in this regard.

The relevance and implications of this research for Labour’s policies
Despite all the complexity of the Labour government’s policies, the most important point is that the policies have basically let the education quasi-market remain largely intact. The Labour government has retained the quasi-market policy package of open enrolment, LMS, and performance tables of examinations and tests based on the National Curriculum. Therefore, the relevance of this research’s findings for the current system has not diminished. The bottom line is that both the quasi-markets retained and state interventions strengthened by the Labour government can be expected to promote visible pedagogy. Therefore, it is worth trying to examine whether school managers are adopting more and more visible strategies in the current system under the Labour government.

Furthermore, not only the former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s policies for more parental choice and more school freedom proposed in the White Paper in 2005 have been implemented to strengthen the education quasi-market, but also the

36 However, even these initiatives meet with criticism from Gewirtz (2002, p.168), who indicates the demerits of the bidding system as follows: ‘One distinct possibility is that resources will accumulate in those areas and institutions with the most skilled bidders’. ‘Moreover, significant amounts of LEA money, which

179
current Prime Minister Gordon Brown has been basically maintaining his predecessor’s positions on education policy. Therefore, the importance of school strategies in pedagogy and management has been kept. In Chapter 6, the qualitative analysis of the interviews with the headteachers indicates that the quasi-market pressure from parental choice in combination with the published examination results was very real in their perception when they undertook strategic changes towards more visibility in pedagogy and management. The findings and theoretical framework of this thesis imply that the continued quasi-market system may have been driving school strategies towards more visible modalities of pedagogy and management even under the Labour government. The thesis has another related implication that such movement towards more visibility means more uniformity rather than more diversity in schooling, which is within what the Labour government intends to realise despite the rhetoric of diversity. The intention seems to be to realise excellent achievements in hierarchical standards measured as examination and test results for more schools and more pupils rather than to allow diverse schooling models with different but equal values. In other words, ‘choice’ will not promote ‘diversity’, but it is okay for the Labour government. With these implications of this thesis, future research on school strategies in the education quasi-market will be of significant importance.

could be spent directly on teachers and classroom resources, are being diverted to paying for the consultants who are employed to write the numerous bids, not all of which are successful'.
Chapter 9 Implications of the Findings for the Theoretical Framework

Relevance of visible/invisible modalities as school strategies

The findings of the empirical study in this research seem to have shown a fertile possibility of the theoretical framework with visible and invisible modalities in analysing school strategies. The hypothesised dominance of visible strategies as newly introduced strategies is found in the headteachers’ discourses across the case schools. In tune with the market pressures linked to examination results as a performance indicator, the vast majority of these visible strategies are prescriptive visible strategies rather than regulative ones. Some possible interrelation or coupling between strategies in pedagogy and those in management is also suggested.

The theoretical framework with visible and invisible modalities in analysing school strategies has a particular value because it enables the analysis to be related to the continuing controversy on a simple but fundamental question of what kind of education is desirable for individuals and for society. The dichotomy of visible and invisible modalities is linked to ‘the enduring debates around the nature of what constitutes an “appropriate” form of education’ (Sally Power & Geoff Whitty, 2002, p.600). With regard to pedagogy, the question will be whether academic (visible) or progressive (invisible) education is desirable. Concerning management, the question will be whether managerial or collegial operation of school is desirable. Such debates are only meaningfully understood in the context of macro (system) and micro (school) level linkage. Therefore, there is a strong interrelation between the macro/micro linkage and the ideological context of education. As shown in the case study data, the headteachers’ discourses often seem to be conscious of the system (policy) level context and the ideological (political) implications, especially when they connect their strategies with market, competition, league tables, etc. The theoretical framework contains such ideological context in macro (system) and micro (school) level linkage.

While Bernstein’s theory of pedagogy provides a valuable basis for constructing the theoretical framework, this thesis explicitly extends the dichotomy of visible and invisible modalities from pedagogy to school management, and elaborates these modalities to apply them to the analysis of
school strategies. The theoretical originality of the thesis in relation to his theory lies here. The case study adds the value of empirical examination. Nonetheless, it is hoped that this thesis contributes to the Bernstein-originated theoretical developments in a broad sense, including those in the use of part of his theory such as this one.

At the same time, however, it should be restated that the purpose of this research is not to work on Bernstein’s theory for its own sake but to theoretically and empirically analyse school strategies in the education quasi-market. While the theoretical framework for the research is constructed in the use of a part of his theory, that is, the theory of visible/invisible pedagogy, as an essential basis for the framework, it can never be claimed that this thesis discusses his theory in its integrity.

Implications in the light of recent work by and on Bernstein

Since empirical work was conducted for this thesis, there has been increasing literature by Bernstein and on his research. Although sadly he is no longer able to produce his own literature, other authors’ literature on his theory and research will probably accumulate further more. While this thesis is not intended to discuss Bernstein’s theory in its integrity, it should refer to relevant works that are directly or indirectly related to its research topic. Bernstein himself was not necessarily happy with other researchers’ partial use of his work. ‘They are regarded as especially deplorable when they break up “the unity of the original corpus” for their own academic convenience, treating a part as all that matters’ (A.D. Edwards, 1995, p.103). However, I agree with Edwards (1995, p.103) in saying, ‘it seems unreasonable to expect complex theoretical formulations to be used only in their entirety and strictly within their terms of reference’. This thesis may also be a case of such use for its own academic convenience. While Bernstein’s work is known by ‘his highly abstract descriptive language’, ‘his ideas have nevertheless proved remarkably good to think with about a wide range of “practical” topics’ (Tony Edwards, 2002, p.527). The thesis is also on such a ‘practical topic’—the orientation of school strategies in the quasi-market system in Britain. As explicated above, the theoretical framework of visible/invisible modalities, developed on the basis of his theory of visible/invisible pedagogy
(Bernstein, 1990), seems to be relevant in analysing those strategies in pedagogy and management. However, it is necessary to see whether the framework is still relevant in the light of more recent work by and on Bernstein as follows.

Bernstein (1996) mentions that the theory of pedagogic codes is applicable not only to families and schools but also to other social relations including industrial relations, saying, ‘We have discussed the codes of pedagogic practice in terms of family and school, but the conceptual language is not limited to these agencies. It can be applied to any pedagogic relation, or more generally to any transmission relation of control, e.g. between doctor and patient, social worker and client, psychiatrist and patient, prison staff and prisoners, and, of course, to industrial relations’ (pp.103–4). The above-mentioned extension of theoretical application is again only in germ in his own writing. Nonetheless, the extension seems to be in line with this thesis’s extension of his pedagogic theory to organisational relations in school.

The finding of the dominance of visible strategies is in tune with Bernstein (1996) saying, ‘The management structure’s major focus is upon the school’s performance, with regard to attracting and retaining students, their conduct and their attainments’ (p.75). Furthermore, the revised edition (Bernstein, 2000) seems to echo what is found in some visible strategies within this research when it discusses the ‘De-centred Market’ (D.C.M.) identity or position as a sort of ideological position, saying, ‘The management system here is explicitly hierarchical, small, non-elected committees, few in number, which will distribute resources to local units, according to their efficiency and their procedures of accountability. Management ideally reveals itself to distribute rewards and punishments. Management monitors the effectiveness of the local units, groups or departments in satisfying and creating local markets’ (p.69). On the other hand, another ideological position, ‘De-centred Therapeutic’ (D.C.T.) identity or position, ‘is not a strong player in any arena’ (p.70). ‘The transmission prefers weak boundaries, integration prefers to talk of regions of knowledge, areas of experience. The management style is soft, hierarchies are veiled, power is disguised by communication networks and interpersonal relations’ (p.70).

The D.C.M. seems very similar to visible management defined in this thesis while the D.C.T. does so to invisible pedagogy and invisible management.
However, Bernstein himself does not explicitly explicate the relations between the new typology of concepts including the D.C.M./D.C.T. and the previous typology of pedagogic code concepts including visible/invisible pedagogy and collection/integrated code. Moreover, the D.C.M./D.C.T. is not conceptually defined, as the previous code concepts, but is described in a rather ad hoc manner.

In this regard, the concepts of this thesis are more conceptually tidy and operationally defined, and are used for an empirical examination, while the recent development of Bernstein’s theory is still in tune with the theoretical framework and empirical findings of the thesis. The thesis presents and examines the hypothesis that under the quasi-market system school managers tended to engage in strategic changes towards visible modality of pedagogy and management, and the findings support the hypothesis. Thus, the thesis contributes to both the theoretical and empirical development of research based on Bernstein’s work. Here is an aspect of originality of this research in relation to his theory.

A substantial quantity of empirical research on the basis of, or in the use of, Bernstein’s theory of pedagogies or educational codes has been carried out by other researchers. While such research naturally often focuses on curricular and/or pedagogic aspects at classroom level, there is also research work on policy-level initiatives. Recent examples of the policy level research include the work by Isabel Neves and Ana Morais (2001) on science curriculum reforms in Portugal and that by Joseph Solomon and Anna Tsatsaroni (2001) on a Hellenic governmental project of school self-evaluation. Neves and Morais (2001, p.223) argues, ‘We consider that Bernstein’s model of pedagogic discourse (Bernstein, 1990, 1996) permits a comprehensive sociological analysis of the processes and relationships which characterise curriculum development at the macro and micro levels’. Indeed, ‘macro-micro’ linkage or integration is a major theme in the literature by and on Bernstein, and it is evident in such expressions as: ‘the attempt of the theory to integrate macro/micro levels and disciplines’ (Bernstein, 1996, p.92); ‘modelling the macro and micro structuring of knowledge’ (Parlo Singh, 2002, p.572); ‘Working at both micro and macro levels, Bernstein provided a model for the understanding of how social class and power distribution become internally shaped means of recognition and cognition’ (Mario Diaz, 2001, p.84). Therefore, macro (society and/or policy) and micro (classroom) levels are
linked up. However, astonishingly and curiously, managerial or organisational aspects at school level seem to be almost missing from the literature by and on Bernstein. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to filling this gap. The thesis focuses upon school strategies, expressed in headteachers' discourses, in both pedagogy and management.

**Issues for furthering theoretical development**

Although Bernstein's recent work is generally compatible with the theoretical framework and empirical findings of this thesis, there are issues that can be raised through the review of the recent work by Bernstein and that in the use of his theory.

*Practical skills and knowledge relevant to work and life*

First, we can discuss the issue of the 'technologizing of knowledge' (Bernstein, 1996, p.23). Bernstein (1996) points out a trend in pedagogic discourse towards practical skills and knowledge relevant to work and life. In higher education, 'there are pronounced moves to regionalization' (p.74). 'Regions are the interface between disciplines (singulars) and the technologies they make possible. Thus engineering, medicine, architecture are regions. Contemporary regions would be cognitive science, management, business studies, communications and media. Regionalization in higher education has proceeded at a rapid pace in the new universities' (pp.65–6). 'Regions' are applied areas of scientific knowledge that are supposed to have some practical relevance to human life and society. 'Singulars' are academic disciplines including physics, chemistry, history, economics, etc, and 'are, on the whole, narcissistic, orientated to their own development, protected by strong boundaries and hierarchies' (p.65). Bernstein (1996) takes note of a tendency towards 'regionalization' in higher education, especially in non-elite institutions.

'In contrast, as a consequence of the National Curriculum (and its many revisions), there is a stronger classification, for this curriculum is a collection of singulars (subjects)' (pp.74–5). 'State monitoring of this curriculum through national testing and the structures of public examinations support this collection code' (p.75). 'It is a matter of interest that the organization of discourse at the
level of the school is firmly based in singulars, despite movements to regionalization in higher education’ (p.66). However, he continues, ‘Perhaps the equivalent of regionalization in higher education at the level of the school is the move to generic skills’ (p.66). ‘Generic modes are predominantly, but not exclusively, found in Further Education (FE)’ (p.67). Nevertheless, generic modes seem to have been influencing secondary schools as well. ‘Generic modes are essentially directed to extra-school experiences: work and “life”’. ‘Generic modes are produced by a functional analysis of what is taken to be the underlying features necessary to the performance of a skill, task, practice or even area of work. These underlying apparently necessary features are referred to as “competences”’ (p.67).

Bernstein (1996) classifies the ‘generic mode’ as one of the three modes of the ‘performance model’, which is almost identical to visible pedagogy or collection code. However, he acknowledges that the generic mode has similarities to the ‘competence model’, which is almost identical to the invisible pedagogy or integrated code, as the term ‘competences’ is used in the discourse of the generic mode as suggested above. Generic skills are not confined to academic subjects (singulars), and the emphasis is not on compartmentalised knowledge but on practical capacity to deal with real world situations. Generic modes ‘have their deep structure in the concept “trainability”’(p.73), that is, ‘the ability to profit from continuous pedagogic re-formations and so cope with the new requirements of “work” and “life”’(p.72). Generic modes are expected to ‘realize a flexible transferable potential rather than specific performances’ (p.73). The generic mode seems to emphasise active and creative learning rather than passive transfer of knowledge from teacher. In the generic mode, it may be difficult to find the explicitness of selection, sequencing, pacing and criteria of knowledge transfer/acquisition and that of hierarchical control as in visible pedagogy. The generic mode seems rather similar to invisible pedagogy in this respect. Nonetheless, Bernstein (1996) argues that ‘generic modes and the performances to which they give rise are directly linked to instrumentalities of the market, to the construction of what are considered to be flexible performances’ (p.69).

Therefore, he judges the generic mode to be within the ‘performance model’ ‘despite superficial resemblance to competence modes’ (p.69). The question here
is whether his judgement is persuasive enough against the resemblance and whether the resemblance is merely superficial.

Johan Muller (2000, p.105) restates Bernstein's view in saying, 'Performance models are geared to be accountable to something outside the learner. We must distinguish between two rather different forms of performance model: the autonomous and the market oriented. The former is the traditional (elite) secondary and tertiary model—Young's (1999) “curriculum of the past”, where learners are subjected to the regime of disciplinary subjects; the latter is skilling tailored to specific needs, tasks and slots in the increasingly labile occupational hierarchy'. Magnus Haavelsrud (2001, p.329) also seems to follow Bernstein's line in this respect, saying, 'The shift in official ideologies over the last 30 years from an ideology of competence to an ideology of performance can be understood as a change in the dominant ideology of the pedagogic device. The previous emphasis on the pupil's inner commitments and possibilities (dedications) has been replaced by short-term instrumentalities or short-termism, in which the formal school is seen as a contributor to modernisation and economic growth. In this quest for performance, a greater emphasis is placed on a new identity construction in which identities can be achieved through an explicitly entrepreneurial/vocational culture of the new rationality of the school'. Here, there seems to be no question of tension between vocationalism and visible pedagogy while the recent policy direction to promote visible pedagogy instead of invisible pedagogy is well summarised. However, Tony Edwards (2002, p.533) discusses 'a new form of vocational education' described by Bernstein, and says, 'It was a version that shared with "old progressivism" its rejection of subjects and their "visible" transmission, but not its anti-technology and anti-industrial bias. In its emphasis for future managerial professional "leaders on widely applicable (generic) skills" and on problem-solving that exploits relevant knowledge without regard for conventional academic boundaries, it was not obviously aligned with the persistently "academic" character of elite schooling'. Edwards' argument here seems to be a balanced description of the nature of the generic mode in relation to visible and invisible pedagogies.

In a book published after his death in memory of himself, Bernstein (2001a) raises the question, 'Is a segment of the economy setting up a generalised demand
for new knowledge of “creativity”, “adaptibility” [sic], on the basis of the imagined needs of a particular sector of the economy? Understanding I.T. is quite different from being programmed by it as the source of a new intellectual potential releasing the acquirer from the restricting boundaries, social and intellectual, of the old knowledges’ (p.368). Here he critically reviews the emergence of discourse for new forms of knowledge and the transmission of them. Are they not more similar to invisible pedagogy or integrated code than to visible pedagogy or collection code?

William Tyler (2001), in his analysis of hypertext-based or online learning in the use of Bernstein’s theory of pedagogic discourse, says, ‘In fact, one might argue that many instances of post-modern culture, or rather what might be termed “post-culture”..., are infused by a de-institutionalised form of the invisible pedagogy, especially in its ludic manifestations such as the “leisure principle”, “edutainment”, and so on’ (p.350). ‘It is argued that Bernstein’s theory of pedagogic discourse provides a particularly valuable basis for generating a descriptive model not only of the applications of the virtualising technologies to educational contexts but also, reflexively, of the less explicit pedagogic processes of a digitalised culture’ (p.340). Tyler’s classification of pedagogic discourse in online learning as a form of invisible pedagogy seems rather natural.

A recent trend in pedagogic discourse towards practical skills and knowledge relevant to work and life is evident in the regionalization in higher education and the generic mode in further education and vocational elements within secondary education. The recent development of online learning or e-learning also tends to support the emerging discourse in favour of a new form of knowledge and its transmission. Although some tensions between vocationalism and the academic education model with visible pedagogy are already pointed out early in this thesis, the main theme of the thesis is developed on the dichotomy between visible pedagogy or academic education and invisible pedagogy or progressive education. At present, the generic mode may not be so substantially embedded in school. However, how about the future? What will be the relation between the generic mode and the dichotomy? This issue may require further theoretical development and empirical research. Bernstein (1996, p.75) argues, ‘Thus there is a dislocation between the culture of the pedagogic discourse and the management culture. The
culture of the pedagogic discourse of schools is retrospective, based on a past narrative of the dominance and significance of disciplines, whereas the management structure is prospective pointing to the new entrepreneurialism and its instrumentalities. The State has therefore embedded a retrospective pedagogic culture into a prospective management culture’. The question here is whether the above dislocation between the culture of the pedagogic discourse and the management culture is stable or unstable. The findings of this thesis may suggest that it was stable at least at the time of the empirical study, which shows that the performance indicators of academic examination results were important as both pedagogic evaluation criteria and organisational accountability criteria as far as the headteachers’ discourses are concerned. The effect of the generic mode on such stability may be an issue.

State and market

The second issue to be raised here is the role of the ‘state’ in relation to the ‘market’. As mentioned above, Bernstein (1996, p.75) says, ‘The State has therefore embedded a retrospective pedagogic culture into a prospective management culture’, and continues, ‘However, the emphasis on the performance of students and the steps taken to increase and maintain performance, for the survival of the institution, is likely to facilitate a state-promoted instrumentality’.

For Bernstein, the state and the market are not an opposing dichotomy. Certainly the quasi-market education system in Britain has been introduced by the state, that is, the then Conservative government. Furthermore, the publication of the state-imposed performance indicators of examination and test results is an essential element of the quasi-market. There are also non-market interventionist devices including Ofsted inspections. With all these, it still seems productive to research on the quasi-market system of education from the market mechanism viewpoint. However, increased direct interventions on pedagogic discourse and practice under the Labour government has probably strengthened the role of the state, and the market mechanisms may have been made more complicated by influences of the state interventions. School strategies may now be more directly influenced by state interventions.
Under such circumstances, is there a necessity to redefine the relation between
the state and the market in the context of the education system? Bernstein’s
analysis of this issue is shown in his concept of ‘Re-centred State’, which ‘refers
to new forms of centralised regulation whereby the state de-centralises and
through (a) central setting of criteria and (b) the central assessment of outputs of
agencies, financially (and otherwise), rewards success and punishes failures:
Beck (2002, p. 623), mentioning Bernstein’s discussions of the role of the State,
argues that ‘his analyses are certainly incomplete; they could be criticized for a
certain “ad hoc” character’, and continues, ‘Moreover, there is no general theory
connecting his theorizations of class, pedagogic discourse, and the key concepts
of powere and control, to a comprehensive analysis of the State’. In a paper
published after his death, Bernstein (2001b) points out ‘the pervasiveness and
management of symbolic control by the State through central targeting linked to
allocation of resources’ (p. 31). Is it the case that both market mechanisms and
direct interventions constitute an integrated system of such symbolic control? Or
do market mechanisms and direct interventions problematically coexist in a
significant tension? What are consequences for school strategies? This issue may
deserve further theoretical and empirical research.

World-wide historical trend?
The third issue is the position of the current British movement towards visible
pedagogy and management in a world-wide historical context. Patricia M.
Broadfoot (1996) argues, ‘Employing Durkheim’s categories of social order,
Bernstein identifies a tendency in contemporary society for there to be a transition
from a social and economic order based on overt mechanical solidarity and covert
organic solidarity to one of overt organic solidarity and covert mechanical
solidarity. One outward sign of this change in education systems is a trend
towards invisible pedagogies and integrated codes represented by more student-
centred teaching and cross-curricular approaches. The latter are presented by
Bernstein as a movement towards weak classification and weak framing, in which
subject boundaries are broken down and teachers enjoy considerable freedom over
what and how to teach. The reason for this trend, Bernstein argues, is
developments in technology which have given rise to the need for a more flexible, inner-directed labour force... Although there is by no means a consistent development in this respect in any society, since any such change comes up against a whole range of powerful sources of resistance which are rooted in traditionalist ideologies and vested interest (as in the current backlash against "progressive" educational ideas in the United States and the United Kingdom), international evidence concerning the changing shape of educational qualifications and thus courses would nevertheless appear to demonstrate a continuing trend’ (pp.84–5).

Is the current situation in the UK a mere backlash? Bernstein himself seems to have argued that the current movement from invisible to visible pedagogy is more deeply rooted in social, economic and political structuring at least in Britain and probably elsewhere. Gemma Moss (2002, p.552), reviewing Bernstein’s (1996, pp.54–81), paper, says, ‘Thus the paper re-traces the emergence of invisible pedagogies in the 1960s, considers their apparent dominance on the education scene during the subsequent decade, and then goes on to review the current trend towards their replacement by much more visible forms of pedagogy in many parts of the world’. Nevertheless, the universality of such a movement is in question. Courtney B. Cazden (1995, p.159) seems to support Broadfoot’s argument in saying, ‘Prominent educational discourse in the United States argues that changes in the economy demand deeper understanding of knowledge, greater flexibility of skills, and more interpersonal competencies for all students than even many of the elite achieved in the past. When we remember Bernstein’s (1975) statement that “the weak classification and frames of the invisible pedagogy emphasize the importance of ways of knowing, of constructing problems” (p.134; emphasis in the original), it is not surprising that contemporary statements of educational reform goals often echo tenets of progressive education of an earlier era’. What seems to be certain is that struggles are still going on between visible and invisible pedagogic discourses in the UK and other parts of the world. Visible and invisible pedagogies are ‘manifest in some of the enduring debates around the nature of what constitutes an “appropriate” form of education’ (Sally Power & Geoff Whitty, 2002, p.600). In the meantime, the trend towards visible
management seems to be more universal, though modalities of pedagogy and management seem to be interrelated as suggested by some findings of this thesis.

Therefore, continuing development of theoretical frameworks for modalities of pedagogy and management is necessary. Bernstein’s theory provides a good basis for such development. This thesis explicitly extends his dichotomy of visible and invisible modalities to cover organisational relations in school as well as pedagogic relations in classroom, bridging these two levels of relations, and thus is intended to contribute to encouraging further theoretical development and empirical research in this direction.

Managerialism and performativity

As Stephen Ball (1998) summarises, there are general and common elements in contemporary education reforms across national borders. These elements or sets of influences, which constitute ‘the new orthodoxy’ endorsed by the World Bank and OECD among others, include neo-liberalism, new institutional economics, performativity, public choice theory, and new managerialism. Elsewhere Ball (2003) focuses upon three interrelated ‘policy technologies’ of the market, managerialism and performativity, which are the key elements of the education reform package. How do the concepts of (new) managerialism and performativity relate to this thesis’s theoretical framework with visible and invisible modalities of pedagogy and management? To answer the question, we need to briefly discuss these concepts as follows.

New managerialism is ‘the insertion of the theories and techniques of business management ... into public sector institutions’ (Ball, 1998, p.123). As discussed by Martin Thrupp and Robert Willmott (2003, pp.22–5), New Public Management (NPM) is another term that is almost identical to new managerialism. Typical features of NPM includes ‘attention to outputs and performance rather than inputs’, ‘the separation of purchaser and provider’, ‘using competition to enable exit or choice by service users’, and ‘decentralization of budgetary and personnel authority to line managers’ (John Clarke, Sharon Gewirtz & Eugene McLaughlin, 2000, p.6). We can easily find these characteristics in the quasi-market reform of the British education system. The education quasi-market is a package of competition between schools, with delegated powers of budgetary and personnel
control, for parental choice and for better performance indicators including league tables. In this system, schools, as service providers, are regarded quasi-autonomous bodies to be managed separately from local and central government (purchaser) that funds education. NPM or new managerialism is more about policy trends at system or government level than about strategic changes at provider or school level. The conceptual framework of new managerialism cannot replace that of visible and invisible modalities. Rather, most characteristics of new managerialism in British education are expected to encourage schools to strategically change towards more visible modalities of pedagogy and management.

According to Ball (1998, p.122–3), *performativity*, named by Lyotard (1984), is a mechanism of ‘indirect steering or steering at a distance’ which replaces intervention with ‘target setting, accountability and comparison’. It seems that performativity is an essential element of new managerialism. Elsewhere he defines performativity as ‘a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change—based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic)’ (Ball, 2003, p.216). As discussed in Chapter 4, the combination of devolved management and performance monitoring is an essential means of control in the quasi-market education system, and this combination is applicable not only to the system level relationship between government and schools but also to institutional level relationship between school management and teaching staff. Performativity concerns these relationships at both levels. The combination at the institutional level is identical to the responsive visible management with implicit regulative rules, which allow apparent autonomy in work through devolution, and explicit prescriptive rules, which establish tight control over the results of work through performance monitoring. Even at the level of pedagogic relationship between teachers and pupils, performativity seems to exist in the form of responsive visible pedagogy. The empirical study of this thesis has supported the hypothesised trend towards more visible pedagogy and management, especially through responsive visible strategies rather than directive visible strategies.

Ball (2003, p.219) says, ‘In Bernsteinian terms, these new invisible pedagogies of management, realised through appraisals, performance reviews and forms of
performance-related pay, “open up” more of the managed to control. The weaker frames of new managerialism enable a greater range of the workers’ behaviour and emotional life to be made public’. His reference to Bernstein’s conceptual framework is meaningful and relevant to the theme of this thesis although the view of the thesis’s author is that the performativity in the education quasi-market concerns responsive visible, rather than invisible, modality of management. As Ball (2003, p.218) himself points out, ‘The ethics of competition and performance are very different from the older ethics of professional judgement and co-operation’. The former is a characteristic of the responsive visible management and the latter is that of invisible management.

However, Ball (2003) rightly indicates some trends towards opacity or invisibility, rather than transparency or visibility, in the flood of various indicators and evaluations. ‘The teacher, researcher, academic are subject to a myriad of judgements, measures, comparisons and targets. Information is collected continuously, recorded and published—often in the form of League Tables, and performance is also monitored eventfully by peer reviews, site visits and inspections. …A sense of being constantly judged in different ways, by different means, according to different criteria, through different agents and agencies. …And yet it is not always very clear what is expected of us’ (p.220). His description is applicable to both school and higher education levels.

The above reality of performativity is not necessarily identical to the responsive visible management. Administrative accountability mechanisms, including school inspection among others, should not be confused with the quasi-market accountability mechanisms of competition for parental choice partly in the use of crude data in examination league tables. The former type of accountability seems to sometimes increase complexity, opacity or invisibility while the latter enhances visibility. Performativity in the real world includes both types of accountability. Part of performativity with complex and opaque requirements may not necessarily have been promoting visibility in prescriptive rules. At the same time, the situation with increasing direct interventions may have been making regulative rules more visible.

Since its establishment by the 1992 Education (Schools) Act, the inspection system for all schools has been regulated and managed by Ofsted, and actual
inspections of schools have been conducted by teams of independent inspectors contracted by Ofsted. The Ofsted inspection has been one of the major sources of external influence on both pedagogic and management aspects in school. This non-market type of accountability system should be regarded as an important device for performativity.

The Ofsted inspection is 'both an accountability measure and a spur for improvement', as pointed out by Nicola Brimblecombe, Michael Ormston and Marian Shaw (1996, p.126). According to the official description of the purpose of school inspections in the latest framework for school inspections (Ofsted, 2005, p.4), ‘The inspection team’s findings provide a measure of accountability and must help the school to manage improvement’. The former Ofsted Handbook (Ofsted, 1995, p.8) mentioned the expected impact of an inspection on the school’s strategy as follows, ‘The inspection process, feedback and reports give direction to the school’s strategy for planning, review and improvement by providing rigorous external evaluation and identifying key issues for action’. Therefore, the inspection has been intended to directly affect school strategies.

According to Janet Ouston, Brian Fidler and Peter Earley’s (1996) research on 170 headteachers of secondary schools inspected in 1993, most headteachers were positive about the inspection’s contribution to their school’s development. Furthermore, the Ofsted inspection’s influence has been not only on school management but also on classroom teachers. Over one third of the 850 teachers in 40 secondary and middle schools, researched by Brimblecombe, Ormston and Shaw (1996), answered that they intended to change their practice in some way or another as a result of inspection. The authors were reasonably cautious not to confuse intention to change with actual change, and even if there was actual change, they said, ‘It is impossible, too, to pinpoint the source of change’ (ibid, p.131).

This problem in identifying the cause of change is explicit in the following discourse by the headteacher of Fertile Land School in this thesis, pointing out three reasons why the school started changing the way of assessment and reporting to a more hard-edged one with clearer descriptions of achievements:

---

37 Under the latest framework, now the observation of classroom lessons no longer have such great weight as under the previous regime.
Well, because, er, for a number of different reasons. We often felt that we didn’t know what the child is achieving. Because, unless we taught them ourselves, reading the reports, we couldn’t determine what they’d actually achieved. And then some parents were concerned that they didn’t know what their child achieved as well. Er, and the combination of those two made us realise that, you know, that we’d got to focus on it. We had the inspection in September, and the inspectors said the same sort of thing. We just hadn’t been clear enough about the attainment part of it.

The driving force behind the above-mentioned prescriptive visible strategy could be the Ofsted inspection, quasi-market mechanism, professional pride, or all.

The influence of the Ofsted inspection, as a device for performativity, on visibility in pedagogy and management seems to have been complex. In an analysis of 400 inspection reports produced in 1993 and 1994, Jean Northam (1996) pointed out that the issues raised in the great majority of reports were those of whole-school planning and staff roles and responsibilities as well as inconsistencies in standards. ‘A more systematic approach to whole-school planning, monitoring and review was required in most schools’ (Northam, 1996, p.87). ‘The issue of staff roles and responsibilities was frequently raised, especially where these were undefined or unclear or, as in the case of some secondary schools, variable from one department to another’ (ibid, p.87). These features of the inspection reports might imply a leaning towards more visible management. However, elsewhere, the same analysis showed apparently different inclinations as well as similar ones. For example, one of the features shared among the ‘good schools’ was ‘a management style encouraging staff participation in decision-making’. Furthermore, the compiled profile of the ‘good school’ included ‘teachers can use a variety of teaching approaches’ and ‘encourage active participation in lessons’ (ibid, pp.94–5). These features do not seem to have recommended more visible modalities of management and pedagogy, and may have suggested some invisible modalities. Nevertheless, the research by Brimblecombe, Ormston and Shaw (1996, p.130) found that in preparing lessons for the inspection ‘a quarter of the teachers planned to deliver a more formal lesson than they would have done’. ‘Some did this in the belief that the inspector would consider more didactic lessons to be the “right” sort—and this was before the much publicised DFE/OFSTED drive for more whole-class teaching’. It is
probably appropriate for us to accept the above complexity in the Ofsted inspection’s implications as it is.

The Education Act 2005 and the latest framework (Ofsted, 2005) for the Ofsted inspection under the Act have streamlined school inspections and decreased the burden on schools and their staff in terms of time, work and pressure involved in preparation for and in the course of on-site inspection. Now schools usually have no more than two days’ notice, and therefore are unable to spend weeks of anxious pre-inspection preparation. An on-site inspection takes only two days rather than a whole week. Under the previous regime, a dozen inspectors came to a school, and observed a sample of lessons to judge the quality of teaching in the school. The new inspection arrangements give much more emphasis to dialogue between the inspection team, comprising no more than five inspectors, and the school’s senior management, and the school’s own self-evaluation plays its role as the starting point in the dialogue. The observation of lessons is no longer conducted in the same way as under the previous regime, and inspectors do not always observe complete lessons or sessions.

The above-mentioned changes may have well responded to a number of problems, pointed out by teachers, school managers and educational researchers, including the one that was described by Carol T Fitz-Gibbon and Nicola J Stephenson-Forster (1999, p.114) as follows: ‘The aspect of inspection which is the most expensive in inspectors’ time, the most costly to schools in staff stress, and the least validated, is the practice of having inspectors sit in classrooms using classroom observation methods which have not been demonstrated to meet any level of quality standards and drawing unchallengeable conclusions which have yet to be subjected to proper scrutiny for their reliability, validity or sufficiency for the purpose of publicly rating an entire school’. One of the results of their survey (Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster, 1999, p.107) was that a vast majority (72%) of the headteachers would believe the value-added data rather than the Ofsted judgement if these two were different from each other. Only a tiny minority (8%) answered that they would believe the Ofsted judgement. The authors (Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster, 1999, p.107) argued that ‘the inspection system of the future could be vastly reduced in cost, be far more economical and have higher perceived validity if value-added indicators replaced
the guesses of inspectors'. Furthermore, according to Cedric Cullingford and Sandra Daniels (1999), every school year from 1993–94 to 1996–97, the schools inspected in the year had a significantly less proportion of pupils obtaining five or more A* to C grades at GCSE than the other schools not inspected. The authors (Cullingford and Daniels, 1999, p.66) concluded, ‘Ofsted inspections have the opposite effect to that intended. Year on year they lower standards’.

Despite the above-mentioned uneasy relations between the essentially personal judgements in inspections and the quantitative performance measurements in the form of league tables, not only advocates but also critics of the Ofsted inspection too often regard it as a market-oriented policy measure in the same direction as the publication of examination and test results. For example, this confusion is implicit in Cullingford’s (1999, p.5) argument as follows, ‘The purpose of inspection is to be able to measure, against set criteria, the exact levels of performance. The more simple the formulae, indeed the more simply quantifiable, the better’. It is not so easy to regard ‘the bureaucracies of inspection, growing even faster than Parkinson’s Law’ (Cullingford, 1999, p.1) as a policy instrument to apply the market principle. Maurice Kogan and Margaret Maden (1999, p.18) found that following the Ofsted inspection, 25% of the schools had changed their management structure and 58% had changed their teaching styles and curricular organisation even though there was little presented in the inspection reports that the schools were not aware of and working towards remedying. Therefore, the Ofsted inspection has influenced school strategies. The important question is in which direction the inspection has changed these strategies. As discussed above, the Ofsted inspection’s implications for visibility in pedagogy and management can be complex.

Performativity in education includes both the mechanism of the measurement of output (examinations and tests) and that of the evaluation of process (Ofsted inspections)\(^\text{38}\). Both the mechanisms are different from the market itself. Nonetheless, the former mechanism is deeply integrated into the quasi-market system of education as parental choice is expected to be partly driven by

\(^{38}\) As pointed out by Gewirtz (2001, p.368), the government’s website, on the theme of choosing a school, encourages or advises parents to look at league tables and Ofsted inspection reports, with links to these pieces of information. The current address is http://www.parentscentre.gov.uk/educationandleaming/choosingaschool/ (Last accessed on 7 May 2006).
examination and test results, and the latter is also at least related to the system. Performativity in the real world of British education is a complex structure, the components of which do not necessarily promote the same modalities of pedagogy and management.

This complexity in performativity inevitably means the complexity in new managerialism that contains performativity as an essential element. Another source of complexity can also be found in the concept of new managerialism. ‘New’ managerialism, with discourses of innovation, creativity and empowerment and freedom, is contrasted with the traditional public sector management, with bureaucratic and inflexible control, which is called Taylorist management (Thrupp & Willmott, 2003, p.22). It may sound as if new managerialism is oriented towards an invisible modality of management. Nevertheless, ‘the new managerialism does not dispense with Taylorism’ (ibid, p.25), since the system of payment by examination results for elementary schools was introduced by the revised Code of 1862 as Thrupp and Willmott (ibid, p.25) refers to. Ball (2006, p.13) also argues, ‘the shift from neo-Taylorist management to new managerialism is by no means clear-cut. The use of performance indicators, specified contracting between purchasers and providers and the continued interventions of the state into organisational practices all tend to encourage the retention of organisational characteristics of “machine bureaucracies”’. The question raised here is how ‘new’ new managerialism is. At the same time, these arguments mean that both Taylorist management and new managerialism have visible modalities of control in common. Based on Bernstein’s concepts, the theoretical framework of this thesis distinguishes the directive visible management and the responsive visible management. The former modality of visible management may be similar to Taylorist management and the latter to new managerialism. Nonetheless, new managerialism, as well as performativity, in the real world seems to contain elements of not only the responsive visible management but also the directive visible management and even the invisible management.

As discussed above, both managerialism and performativity are descriptive concepts of a package of complex policy trends and discourses that are not necessarily in harmony with each other. By contrast, visible/invisible pedagogy
and management are more purified concepts of analytical nature. While the theoretical framework of visible/invisible modalities of pedagogy and management has its unique strengths in the analysis of the school-level effect of the quasi-market, the above brief discussion is not sufficient to explicate the relationship between the framework and the concepts of managerialism and performativity. It needs more work, which is beyond the primary purpose of this thesis.

In the meantime, the work of Thrupp and Willmott (2003) provides a thorough critique of the education management literature, which indirectly supports this thesis’s attempt to use a sociological theory of Bernstein, rather than the management literature, as its theoretical basis. Their work comprehensively reviews education management texts, and enables us to find out examples of management discourses that are ‘decontextualised and depoliticised’ (Angus, 1994, p.80). In the education management texts reviewed by them, the importance of social context is underplayed, and political conflicts are not emphasised.
Chapter 10 Summary and Conclusions

Summary
This thesis is intended to make a contribution to research on the quasi-market education system, which was introduced by the Education Reform Act 1988 under the Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher, and has survived the changes of government and premiership. The essential elements of this system are autonomous management of schools, parental choice, examination/test results as performance indicators, competition among schools, and funding based on student numbers as follows. Schools with self-management responsibility compete for choice by parents. Information on exam/test results is available for parents. Student numbers as the result of parental choice largely decide the allocations of public funding to individual schools.

As well as the continuation of the quasi-market system, there has also been a continuing controversy between the advocates and critics of the quasi-market. Despite the great controversy, there seems to be a strange agreement between the advocates and critics. Both sides have a paradoxical view that the traditional academic model with rigorous teaching prevails in the quasi-market system even though parental choice is complex and diverse. To try to explain the paradox, this thesis focuses on schools’ strategies as schooling model is influenced by parental choice only indirectly through the schools’ strategies. Based on Basil Bernstein’s theory, the thesis proposes a hypothesis that school managers in the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies oriented towards explicit rules in pedagogy and management, or towards conservative pedagogy and managerial management, than invisible strategies oriented towards implicit rules, or to progressive pedagogy and collegial management.

The hypothesis has been empirically examined through a multiple-case study targeting six secondary schools in a London borough. Semi-structured interviews with the headteachers were carried out between 1994 and 1995, when the quasi-market system was ‘purer’ than the current one that contains more interventionist mechanisms added by the Labour government.

The results of the empirical study show that in five of the six schools the headteachers were adopting more visible strategies than invisible ones, and
therefore lend support to the hypothesis of school strategies in the education quasi-market and the relevance of the theoretical framework. The supported hypothesis may be an endorsement of the paradoxical agreement between the advocates and critics of the quasi-market that the academic schooling model prevails in the education quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and diverse.

Thus, the hypothesis and theoretical framework can be a solid basis for systematic analyses of effects of quasi-market forces for school strategies. In discussing the implications of the findings for Labour’s policies, research on quasi-markets, and Bernstein’s theory, reviews of recent literature demonstrate the sustained relevance and significance of this research to the education system at the time of writing the thesis.

In summarising this thesis, the main findings of this research are reemphasised as follows:

*Strategic changes towards more visibility in the quasi-market*

The strategic changes expressed in the headteachers’ interviews on the whole show the hypothesised movement towards more visibility in school strategies. In other words, the results of the empirical study seem to be consistent with the basic hypothesis that school managers were adopting more visible strategies than invisible ones as new strategies in the quasi-market system.

*Prescriptive, rather than regulative, visible strategies*

The vast majority of visible strategies expressed in the interviews are prescriptive ones, and the regulative visible strategies found are not so many. A cautious interpretation of the results is that the effects of quasi-market forces are more on academic achievements or examination results than on discipline and moral aspects in schooling.

*Strategies in pedagogy and management in tune*

The coupling of strategies in pedagogy and management is found in the results of the empirical study. Typically a mechanism of monitoring or reviewing the performances of the teaching staff and/or subject departments in relation to
pupils' academic performances is found as a new strategy for four of the six schools in the study. These visible strategies in management are linked to performance measurement at pedagogic level. The results suggest that the accountability line, based on pupils' academic achievements, between state and schools is extended to within each school, between the school management and teaching staff.

League tables as major driving forces for strategic changes
All the six interviewed headteachers expressed that they took examination results seriously whether they were personally for or against them as performance indicators of schools. They were conscious of possible or even probable consequences of the results for their school's success or failure in the education quasi-market. This may explain why prescriptive visible strategies were so often adopted as new strategies after the quasi-market reform.

Some invisible strategies for better examination results?
The empirical study shows that the perceived importance of examination results seems to have promoted visible strategies, especially prescriptive ones. However, there is room for manoeuvre for invisible strategies that work for improving the results. In one of the six schools, there was such a case where a child-centred scheme of mathematics was introduced to improve the results, and the actually improved results persuaded the sceptical parents who originally liked the traditional teaching approaches. Furthermore, three of the six schools adopted invisible strategies in teaching styles and methods. It seems to be the case that the effects of quasi-market forces are more about 'results' than about 'processes', and that invisible strategies in 'processes' may be acceptable in the quasi-market as long as the strategies improve or, at least, do not endanger the 'results'.

Implications of the findings for the current education system under the Labour government
While Labour's policies have basically let the education quasi-market remain largely intact, their policy changes include more direct interventions by government in pedagogic practice and in performance monitoring. The findings
of this research can contribute to an accumulation of research concerning the
education quasi-market in two ways. First, the above-mentioned policy
continuation assures a reasonable degree of relevance of the findings to the
current system. Secondly, the findings on the recent past system of a purer quasi-
market are informative when the distinction between the effects of quasi-market
and those of governmental intervention is needed.

Implications of the suggested strategic changes for the debate on the education
quasi-market
The focal points of the controversy over the education quasi-market have been the
two issues of ‘choice and diversity versus inequality and hierarchy’ and
‘educational standards and efficiency’, on both of which empirical research has
been accumulating but has not yet reached decisive conclusions.

It is apparently paradoxical that both the advocates and critics of the quasi-
market reform seem to agree with each other that the academic schooling model
with focus on examination results prevails in the education quasi-market even
though parental choice is complex and diverse. This paradox is explained by the
finding that school managers seem to increase visible strategies oriented towards
the academic schooling model with focus on examination results to raise their
school’s position in league tables and attract academically able and academically
oriented parents. This finding suggests that the education quasi-market may
promote uniformity rather than diversity in pedagogic strategies at the level of
school management.

However, whether or not the promoted uniformity leads to inequality and
hierarchy, or segregation and polarisation, in schooling is a different issue.
Furthermore, whether or not strategies at management level, distinguished from
classroom level, positively impact on academic achievements in terms of
examination results is beyond the purpose of this research, which is not intended
to work on empirical data concerning academic achievement. What the findings
of this research suggest is that the quasi-market pressures encourage school
managers to focus their strategies on academic achievement in terms of
examination results.
Trends in school strategies emerging through systematic analysis in a defined theoretical framework

Research on the education quasi-market has been developing without any doubt. As Ron Glatter's (2004) concise summary shows, the development covers a number of issues: parental choice, diversity and hierarchy of schools, school responses to quasi-markets, quasi-markets' effects on educational outcomes including examination results, and socio-economic segregation and polarisation.

With regard to school responses to, or strategies in, the education quasi-market, empirical, mainly qualitative, research has been accumulating, and providing detailed descriptions of local markets with emphasis on complex particularities. Although some generalisations have also been tried in such research, the generalisations have tended to be done in a rather ad hoc manner without a conceptually defined theoretical framework. In the absence of such a framework, it is difficult to judge the directions of individual responses or strategic changes in a systematic and consistent manner, and to make general trends emerge from those directions. The literature on school responses so far is generally descriptive, and has not yet sufficiently developed in terms of theorisation.

The aim of this thesis is to tackle the above-mentioned weakness in the research development. Its theoretical framework with visible/invisible modalities in pedagogy and management is expected to provide judgement criteria for the orientations of individual strategies and a device for finding general trends within apparently chaotic particularities. Thus it is hoped that the thesis will contribute to theoretical development well based on empirical findings.

Implications of the research results for theoretical development

The relevance and effectiveness of this theoretical framework seem to be supported by the above-mentioned empirical findings of the thesis. The hypothesised trend to more visibility, much more prescriptive visible strategies than regulative ones, and a possible interrelation between pedagogy and management are among the most important findings.

The theoretical framework has a particular value because it is related to the continuing dispute on a fundamental question of what kind of education is desirable. The dispute lies in an ideological context with macro (system) and
micro (school) level linkage. The theoretical framework seems to be relevant and effective in enabling us to analyse school strategies at micro-level in relation to the historical and systemic context at macro-level, at both levels of which conflicting values and ideals are of enormous significance due to the social functions of education including socialisation and selection.

The theoretical framework contains such context. While Bernstein's theory provides a fertile basis for building the theoretical framework, this thesis explicitly extends his dichotomy of visible and invisible modalities from pedagogy to school management, and elaborates the modalities to apply them to school strategies in pedagogy and management.

Although there has been increasing literature by Bernstein and on his research, the theoretical framework is still relevant to the purpose of this thesis for the following reasons. First, while recent work by Bernstein often tackles issues related to the quasi-market, his writing is generally in tune with the arguments and findings of this thesis. Secondly, although he has developed new concepts, the development does not necessarily provide this research with more useful device that is conceptually neat and operationally defined for empirical studies. Thirdly, while research works in the use of Bernstein's theory by other authors as well as those by Bernstein himself focus not only on curricular and/or pedagogic aspects at classroom level but also upon policy level initiatives and trends, astonishingly and curiously, managerial or organisational aspects at school level seem to be almost missing from such literature. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to filling this gap. The thesis focuses on school strategies, expressed in the headteachers' discourses, in both pedagogy and management.

Conclusions

The above-mentioned findings were with regard to the quasi-market education system created by the Conservative government and not yet modified by the succeeding Labour government. Nevertheless, as Labour's policies have basically let the quasi-market system remain largely intact, the findings have significant implications for the current system. Furthermore, as the Labour government has introduced a number of new policy instruments to strengthen direct state control,
the findings of this research can be of a particular value in providing the analysis of the comparatively purer form of quasi-market system in the recent past, which was rather rapidly lost after ten-year or so existence. This study now provides a baseline for subsequent research, possibly returning to the same schools to examine their experiences during the interim time period. Such continuity for longitudinal analysis is an obvious possible next step, which this thesis itself cannot afford due to time constraint. The author’s hope is that this thesis will contribute to further theory development and empirical studies on the effects of quasi-market forces for school strategies in pedagogy and management. The theoretical framework of the visible and invisible modalities of school strategies and the above empirical findings can be a solid basis for such development and studies.

Nevertheless, this thesis has its limitations on both the methodological and theoretical fronts as follows. Methodologically, the empirical study of this research is limited to a relatively small-scale multiple-case study. Moreover, while the data from the interviews with the headteachers is relevant to the research purpose and is of good quality as shown in the thesis, it would be better if the data could be supplemented with that from the interviews with other staff and/or governors. Observations could also be a supplementary method though the inclusion of this method with some sensitivity might have discouraged the headteachers to accept even interviews. On the grounds of limited time, manpower and resources available for this research, the number of cases could not be large, and the variety of data collection methods had to be restricted. Rather, much of the precious research time has been concentrated on conducting an elaborated analysis of the quality data in a systematic and consistent manner. In other words, depth is chosen at the expense of breadth. Hence the empirical findings of this research need a cautious approach to any claim to generalisation.

Theoretically, although the dichotomy of visible and invisible modalities has shown its productivity, relevance and effectiveness in researching on school strategies in the education quasi-market, the generic mode in Bernstein’s terminology, as an emerging trend in pedagogic discourse towards practical forms of knowledge and its transmission relevant to work and life, may shake the stability of the dichotomy in future. Furthermore, the role of the state in relation
to the market may have to be re-examined against the background of increasing complexity in the education quasi-market with Labour government’s direct interventions in addition to built-in elements, introduced by the then Conservative government, including examination and test results, as performance indicators, based on the nationally prescribed curriculum, and Ofsted inspections. For Bernstein, the state and the market are not an opposing dichotomy, and may even be regarded as constituting an integrated system as discussed in the last chapter. However, it may turn out that market mechanisms and government interventions problematically coexist in significant tension. This issue may deserve further elaboration. Regrettably, we are no longer able to get comments from Bernstein, to whom this thesis owes so much.

With reference to the above-mentioned values and limitations of this research, in concluding the thesis, possible future research developments are suggested as follows. These developments need not necessarily be independent ones. Some of them can be connected within the same research, depending on the research design.

**Larger scale research on the quasi-market for the purpose of generalisation**
Larger scale case studies, collecting data not only from headteachers but also from other staff, governors, and possibly pupils and parents, will be a possible option to test the theoretical framework and hypothesis of this research. Such studies may even include some quantitative method, designed on the basis of this thesis’s findings. Nonetheless, any new studies must be careful of distinguishing the effects of quasi-market forces and those of government interventions, strengthened under the Labour government, which links to the following research development.

**Longitudinal research on the case schools**
An obvious possibility for follow-up research is a longitudinal study on the case schools’ subsequent experiences, which is out of consideration in this thesis itself because of the limited time available for it. While there can be such longitudinal research as an independent piece of research, the longitudinal element can be included in the above-mentioned larger scale research.
Effects of the mixture of state interventions and market forces on school strategies
A crucial development may be about the issue of the state and the market in relation to Labour’s combination of state powers and market forces in their education policy. In the current education system under the Labour government, there are more governmental interventions to directly influence pedagogic practices rather than waiting for quasi-market forces to bring about desirable results. When effects of the complex mixture of state interventions and market forces need to be distinguished and comprehensively analysed, the findings of this research on the recent past with the purer form of quasi-market may contribute to such efforts. Such empirical work may need further theoretical elaboration on the basis of the theoretical framework of this research.

Strategies at management level and practices at classroom level
Another possible development based on the findings of this research may be to examine how effective school strategies at management level are in changing the pedagogic practices at classroom level, and what factors influence their effectiveness. This category of research is of a particular significance for complementing the findings of this thesis. A fundamental question here is whether or not visible strategies at management level are successful in promoting visible pedagogy at classroom level. The data from teachers and pupils is of particular importance for such research.

School strategies and educational outcomes
In relation to the above-mentioned type of research, relationships between school strategies and educational outcomes may also be explored. Educational outcomes can be narrowed to examination results or broadened to the inclusion of the personal and social aspect of schooling, depending on the research purposes, designs and feasibility. Not only the effects of strategies on outcomes but also the possible influences of outcomes on strategies may be researched. The modalities of strategies are expected to have hypothesised implications in both the directions.

School strategies and socio-economic segregation
Equality in educational opportunities and hierarchy of schools have arguably been the central issue in the controversy over the education quasi-market. Future research work may examine the interrelations between school strategies and socio-economic segregation. Such research may focus on how visible/invisible strategies adopted by competing schools affect, and are affected by, socio-economic segregation, and have implications for the dispute over the existence or non-existence of polarising effects of the quasi-market. Complexity will be added by the effects of government interventions including specialist schools and other diversity policies.

Integration of the generic mode into the theoretical framework
Future theoretical development, with some empirical work, may integrate the generic mode into the theoretical framework. Although the generic mode does not seem to be substantially embedded in secondary schools at present, such research work may be an important step forward for the future direction. When that sort of research is conducted, particular attention needs to be paid to the mode’s ambivalent relations with both visible and invisible pedagogies, which have been discussed in the last chapter.

International comparison of trends in modalities of pedagogy and management
As suggested in the last chapter, the universality of the current British trend towards visible pedagogy and management is in question, and then the issue needs to be explored ideally in a world-wide historical context or at least in some international comparison. Possible interrelations between pedagogy and management must be taken into consideration in such research.
Bibliography


King, R. (1976) ‘Bernstein’s sociology of the school – some positions tested’,


King, R. (1981a) ‘Bernstein’s sociology of the school – a further testing’,


  of school inspection’, in Cullingford, C. (ed.) *An Inspector Calls: Ofsted and

  Election Manifesto).

  for Britain*.

  Work*, Buckingham: Open University Press.


  Press.

Lee, T. (1996) *The Search for Equity: The funding of additional educational
  needs under LMS*, Hants: Avebury.


217
Buckingham: Open University Press.


department for Education and Employment.


Appendix I: Dates of the Interviews with the Headteachers
of the Case Schools

\textit{Easthill Girls' School}
Type: county; girls; comprehensive; 11-16
Standard number: not much below 200
GCSE results (1994; 5 or more A-Cs): almost the same as the England average.
Interview with the Headteacher: 1 December 1994

\textit{Roundham Catholic College}
Type: voluntary-aided; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-18 (with sixth form)
Standard number: not much below 200
GCSE results: just above the borough average.
Interview with the Headteacher: 7 December 1994

\textit{George Square School}
Type: county; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-16
Standard number: not much above 100
GCSE results: below the borough average.
Interview with the Headteacher: 7 December 1994

\textit{Fertile Land School}
Type: county; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-16
Standard number: not much above 100
GCSE results: below the borough average.
Interview with the Headteacher: 22 November 1994

\textit{Seymour Field School}
Type: grant-maintained; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-18 (with sixth form)
Standard number: not much above 200
GCSE results: more than 10\% higher than the England average.
Interview with the Acting Headteacher: 28 April 1995
Riverside Street School
Type: grant-maintained; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-16
Standard number: not much below 200
GCSE results: higher than the borough average but lower than the England average.

Interview with the Headteacher: 13 March 1995
Appendix II: Full Description of All the New Strategies Mentioned by the Case School Headteachers

(A) Easthill Girls’ School: county; girls; comprehensive; 11-16
Standard number: not much below 200
GCSE results (1994; 5 or more A-Cs): almost the same as the England average.
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 1 December 1994

(A1) Development of technology facilities: Neutral strategy in pedagogy
Two years before the interview with the headteacher, the school obtained a quarter of million pounds under the government’s Technology Schools Initiative and spent the money on developing the technology facilities.

The headteacher is clearly conscious of effects of this strategy on parents:

So we spent that money on developing our technology facilities, and that, er, is focused upon particularly for parents, when they come to visit our school, because other schools around here haven’t got that, so even Seymour Field School, School I [county; girls; comprehensive; 11-16] haven’t got.

Technology is one of the focal points in the promotion evening of the school:

... I speak from the platform toward the visitors, er, I say something about each area of the curriculum, but, you know, music and technology obviously I’m able to state quite clearly where we have advantages over others.

The headteacher seems to expect much from the eye-catching equipment:

... I think that’s very attractive to parents, because they see it is very important for future careers, and when the parents go to that area, they see all our excellent machinery, they are very impressed.

The headteacher’s description does not imply that this strategy has been adopted with particular effects on either regulative or prescriptive rules, and therefore the strategy is identified as neutral.

(A2) To introduce setting earlier in mathematics, science and languages:
Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy
At the time of the interview, the school was introducing setting earlier in the subjects of mathematics, science and modern languages:
I would say where it’s changed, for example, in maths, we now try to set in Year 8 rather than leave it to Year 9 or 10. So the setting has come down earlier.

In languages, French, Spanish, are also trying to set earlier, and science again we’re setting earlier.

Although the policy was to set earlier in mathematics, the introduction of the earlier setting was interrupted by the tight budget:

There has been a problem this year on the staff, and we won’t be able to do it. But we’re trying to make that the norm so that normally in Year 8, the second year into the school, the girls will be set . . . .

The problem was that, I’m, I’m, our budget is very tight and I just didn’t have enough teaching in Year 8 maths to enable us to split the girls into a set group which needed seven teachers, we only had six available at that time. But we see that more as a hiccough. The year before we set them, and we are planning to do so next year. So the general policy would be to set earlier in maths now.

The headteacher explains that the earlier setting is a strategy targeting more able pupils:

Right, we now try to do that because we feel that the more able girls have better chance of getting the very top results if they’re set earlier. Obviously you have to balance with the average girls and the less-than-average girls, because we don’t want label children, but we definitely feel that in most subjects the higher ability girls have a chance of getting, say, the starred A grade or the A grade if they are set earlier and targeted more, the work is targeted more.

The strategy stratifies pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore makes prescriptive rules, criteria rules in this case, more explicit in pedagogic relations. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy.

(A3) More differentiation of work for pupils: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

According to the headteacher, more differentiated work is provided than previously and that is a policy of the school:

What’s been done already is mainly in the provision of differentiated work, more challenging work.

That is the policy that each area must meet the needs for differentiation. . . . There used to be, there’s been a shift, for example, it used to be the staff just looking for differentiation by outcome, setting the same work, looking for different outcome, but we’ve moved away from that, it’s got to be differentiated input to the students that will then assist differentiated outcome.
As a part of the differentiation, more able pupils are provided with extension work:

Well, what we, our policy tends to be that we would in each of the areas have extension work for the more able. So they would be given additional work, harder work, as an extension to the normal so that everyone would do the normal but then some students would be given the extension work.

This strategy focuses on and encourages stratifying differences between pupils’ performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to make criteria rules more explicit in pedagogic relations.

(A4) Teaching hours increased from 23.20 to 25: Neutral strategy in pedagogy
Eighteen months before the interview, the school increased the teaching hours from 23 hours 20 minutes to 25 hours. The reason, according to the headteacher, was that they felt that more time was necessary to teach the national curriculum and other areas:

The purpose of that was we felt that the 23 hours 20 minutes didn’t give us enough time to teach all that had to be taught, with the national curriculum plus the other areas outside the national curriculum that we felt important. So we felt we needed that increase to be able to teach everything.

This strategy only refers to amount of time for teaching, and does not imply particular effects on either regulative or prescriptive rules. Therefore it is identifies as a neutral strategy.

(A5) Firming-up of homework: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy
The headteacher states that there has been more firming-up of homework policy and more close monitoring of the implementation of the policy over the last four years in response to examination performance tables or league tables:

We’ve had always had a homework policy, so that’s always happened. However, I think that what’s happened is, with the increased focus on the examination achievement, there has been more firming-up of the policy and more monitoring . . . .

I think it’s happened as there has been more focus on the publication of the results. I think that’s definitely, I think that’s had an effect, so it takes gradually, probably over the last four years, yes, it is that sort of period, has things become more public.

The headteacher is conscious of the parent viewpoint on homework:

Parents on the whole are very keen on homework, er, of a good quality. Er, so it is important to parents.
This strategy of firming up homework policy implies more explicit prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy.

(A6) Detailed analysis of examination results: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy and management
The headteacher explains that the school has been doing more detailed analysis of examination results in the last two years than before, comparing them between subjects and with expected results, in order to improve the results:

Er, we can analyse their average score in all their other exams. So this teacher can tell whether her students have achieved their expected or they’ve done better in her subject than the norm or whether they haven’t done as well. And if they haven’t done as well, then we have to look why not in order to improve it in the following year. So very detailed in-depth analysis of each student and each teacher’s result in order to try to keep improving our standard.

. . . examining the results of the public examination in detail against their expected . . .

Based on the past achievement at the mock, the practice examination, the homework, the coursework, based on all that . . .

Last two years. Before then it was more basic and straightforward. Much more detailed now.

The above analysis targets not only each pupil but also each teacher, and aims at getting a clearer picture of their performance in terms of examination results. This strategy is to make criteria rules more explicit in both pedagogic and organisational relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in both pedagogy and management.

(A7) Examinations Officer: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy and management
About four years before the interview, the headteacher initiated the post of the Examination Officer as one of the three senior teachers, who helps the headteacher to monitor each curriculum area’s performance in terms of examination results:

Right, I have an Examination Officer, and one of his main roles is to monitor with the heads of the curriculum areas on their students’ achievements, and he will prepare the analysis for me that I would then
look at, and I meet regularly with the head of each curriculum area. We would look at their results in detail at the meeting, trying to identify where praises due and where there are areas for improvement.

For this headteacher, examinations work is a priority to put money from the limited budget into:

But that post is quite an expensive salary. So it means you have to make a decision to put money into a person doing that work. So it’s a question of priorities.

The appointment of the Examination Officer means the headteacher’s commitment to raising examination results through comparing and analysing performances of pupils and those of curriculum areas, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in both pedagogy and management to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic and organisational relations.

(A8) More frequent assessment: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher states that there has been more frequent assessment over the last two or three years:

The change over the last, er, two stroke three years is that there has been more assessment and more frequent assessment. So, er, that could be, that would be depend on the individual subject area, but it would include short test, half-term test, and set questions in set time, time to question, so the assessment throughout the school has increased without any doubt.

The increased assessment is mainly through written tests:

But obviously some spoken as well where it’s appropriate, languages, the spoken English, the presentation skills, but the majority will be written.

The frequent assessment mainly through written tests makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy.

(A9) Detailed and technical reporting to parents: Prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy

Eighteen months before my interview with the headteacher, the school introduced very detailed reports to parents, which was subsequently criticised as too technical by parents:

... we have tried very detailed reports to the parents which we tried in the last year, eighteen months, to try to give them more information, then we found some parents for saying to us, “This is too technical and we want
some more straightforward, such as ‘good’, ‘average’, ‘below average’.”
So we are looking again at that.

... we had these very detailed reports, and they are getting feedback from our parents through the governors’ curriculum group, the parents association.

... for example, in the technology department, they would write all about their course and some of that was very technical and really not what parents wanted to hear. And then there would be, for most subjects too, a general paragraph, saying the child works hard, and has done quite well in this but not enough in this and needs to aim for this, but in the end the parents are saying, “That’s all very nice, but it’s not saying to us, so they are, our girl is excellent at science and poor at English.” They wanted something more direct with results, with the result of, say, any test, you know, seventy percent on this paper. So they are more into the very clear information, er, which they can take in at a glance.

The parents’ criticism means that the detailed and technical reporting included many descriptions of absolute nature and only ambiguous information on comparative performances. It is a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more implicit in pedagogic relations.

(A10) The review of the reporting in response to the parents’ criticism:

Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

In response to the parents’ critical viewpoint, the school was going to review and modify the reporting to parents:

... what we’re going to do is then, modify again, and then, “Is this better?”, “Is this what you want?”

The headteacher emphasises the importance of parents’ viewpoint to the school policy:

So this year we’re still more experimental and we hope to firm up on, on sort of the whole school policy for next year, but this is the first time that we’ve really considered the parents’ viewpoint as much. Before, it was the school decision, but it’s only been in this, last year that we’ve had been this policy of getting feedback from parents... So the reporting to parents is for the parents’ benefit and the girls’ rather than just the school benefit.

The review is based on the parents’ view that reporting to parents should provide clearer information on comparative performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic relations.
Written policy on bullying: Neutral strategy in pedagogy

The school introduced a written policy on bullying two or three years before the interview and has updated it. The necessity of clarification and the parents’ concern were the reasons why the written policy was introduced:

...I think there were two main reasons. One was that, although we had an unwritten way of dealing with it, because it’s unwritten and there would be a team of teachers, a number dealing with incidents, if the policy wasn’t written, there was a danger of differential approach and the policy not being applied constantly. ... And it was necessary too because of parents’ concern to show quite clearly what would happen if there was an incident.

The headteacher implied that the way of dealing with bullying had not been changed by introducing the written policy. Therefore the policy does not seem to have particular effects on either regulative or prescriptive rules. It is a neutral strategy.

Absence policy being planned: Regulative visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher was working on absent policy and was very conscious of published figures of unauthorised absence:

...I’m working on improving the figures for the school and form groups. ... I wrote to all the parents in my news sheet last week, saying, “It’s quite good but it isn’t good enough, and there are too many occasions of girls having a day off and parents not writing a note, and therefore it’s seen as an unauthorised absence ...” ... as you know, the, the absence figures are published now as well.

Not as important as exam results, but it’s still important. ... it’s making the schools like myself look at it to tighten up. It’s the publication that is draw my attention to it to see how it can improve.

The headteacher’s initiative aims at tightening up the control of absence to improve the published figures, and therefore is a regulative visible strategy in pedagogy to make regulative or hierarchical rules more explicit in pedagogic relations.

Monitoring of teaching performances: Regulative visible strategy in management

The headteacher introduced a monitoring scheme two years before the interview. The teacher’s performance related to the children’s performance is monitored at two levels of the headteacher and the heads of faculty:
... it's over the last two years that I've introduced the monitoring policy. Before then, there was just ad-hoc monitoring by me, walking around the school, popping into classrooms through four to five minutes, totally unsystematic. ... and by myself, whereby, er, teachers’ classes are visited without prior notice. And I will go at the beginning of the lesson, and I will monitor the whole lesson, the teacher’s performance to children’s performance, to resources, the methods of curriculum delivery. All those aspects, the behaviour, all those aspects are, will be monitored. And the teacher will then come to me for feedback and a discussion and can bring items to my attention. And I see every member of staff throughout the year, without prior notice. ... And also the head of their subject has the responsibility to go to each of their teachers, monitor, monitor the books, monitor the marking, ....

The monitoring process seems to have confusing relations with the appraisal process in which threatening elements are avoided:

... the teacher’s performance related to the children’s performance comes under monitoring, not appraisal ... And it’s the monitoring they would pick up any underperformance by the teacher ... It could come upon appraisals as well, but we are trying to make appraisal non-threatening.

The headteacher states that staff’s objections to the monitoring scheme have been overcome as follows:

Originally there were objections and this was discussed in the union meetings. And I spoke at several staff meetings, trying to explain the reason for it, that it was to aim to improvement, you know, make sure we’re looking at .... It’s like quality checks, and it’s not just looking at the teacher. It’s looking at the students’ attitude, “Are they carrying up the students’ responsibility?” It’s looking at the resources, “Has this teacher been given sufficient resources to teach this topic?” It’s in order for me to find out more about the national curriculum, more about the modes of delivery. And although people were suspicious at first, I supposed it’s got to happen, so it’s started to happen. But because the feedback interviews are made optional, not compulsory, but almost every member of the staff has come, and they have then gone back and they’ve found it useful and important. They had my entire attention. I could give helpful points to them, and they had an opportunity of bringing to my attention, any issue they wish, such as they felt they’re given insufficient resources, they felt their line manager wasn’t treating them appropriately. So now this is accepted by the school and actually even enjoyed. People are now speaking in favour of how helpful they have found this at the union meetings. So by the dialogue and the presentation of the policy and reasoning, er, people have accepted this and seen it as part of the normal life of the school to, to, you know, help us to achieve this quality education. So I haven’t now had any resistance.

The above statement shows that the headteacher has emphasised the benefits to the teachers, such as the attention to pupils behaviour and resources and the
optional feedback with helpful advice, and minimised the threatening nature of monitoring teachers’ performances. The headteacher’s endeavour has been made to prevent the essentially hierarchical or regulative nature of the monitoring scheme from standing out. The scheme is a means of making school management’s hierarchical control over teachers’ performances more explicit. Therefore it is a regulative visible strategy in management to make regulative rules more explicit in organisational relations between teachers and school management.

(A14) Deputies decreased from 3 to 2: Neutral strategy in management

According to the headteacher, because of the financial difficulty, the number of deputies were decreased from three to two and half years before the interview:

... we find finance very difficult. So there was a restructuring two and half years ago where I removed one deputy head person from the structure. There used to be three, but now there are two deputy heads, and then there are other three senior teachers, and then there are, er, curriculum heads, eight.

There is no indication that this strategy has a particular implication for regulative or prescriptive rules, and therefore it is a neutral strategy.

(A15) Delegation to deputies, senior teachers and heads of faculty: Prescriptive visible strategy in management

The headteacher says that she has delegated more responsibility to two deputies, three senior teachers and eight heads of faculty:

So, I, I think that possibly the change is that I have delegated, er, specific items to the two deputies and made them totally responsible rather than me to try to do it all. And, er, that has made, then given them more job satisfaction. And it’s enabled those particular areas to have better in-depth management. ... And again the senior teachers’ job descriptions have been reviewed and altered. And the heads of faculty have been given more responsibility. So, as I talk through, the major change is an emphasis, each of these management posts in quality work, er, and looking, you know, even more detail, you know, the whole thing’s got to be about quality.

The headteacher, according to herself, has chosen the centre of interactions as her role:
And my role, er, what I’ve chosen for my role is I very much, er, do a lot of the interacting, the parents, the governors, the officers, the finance, and the children. So I am a knocker, high-profile people person. Er, but it’s so that every area of management is done in detail.

The headteacher’s purpose in delegating managerial responsibility is to realise quality management in detail with clear accountability lines, and therefore the delegation should be regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in management to enhance the explicitness of prescriptive rules in organisational relations.

(A16) To try to get more public attention in the media: Neutral strategy in management

The headteacher points out that the school has been trying, as a marketing endeavour, to get more public attention in the media for about three years:

I would say that one endeavour has definitely been, over the last three years or so, to try to get more, er, public attention for the school in the media. So we have consciously tried to do that. We send our press releases, we keep in touch with the television, and we’ve been quite successful. . . . So we try to be, er, involved in the initiatives and then we try to publish our initiatives to keep our name in the forefront.

When they approach the media, the school tries to promote unusual things including Internet, arts, music and links with industry:

So I try to promote the unusual so that the parents will see that we do unusual things. . . . So people say, “Ah, this is the forward-looking school, new initiatives.”

There is no indication that the marketing is focused upon either explicitness or implicitness of regulative and prescriptive rules. Therefore it is a neutral strategy.
(B) Roundham Catholic College: voluntary-aided; co-educational; 11-18

Standard number: not much below 200
GCSE results: just above the borough average.
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 7 December 1994

(B1) Developing vocational courses: Neutral strategy in pedagogy

The school introduced vocational courses about three years before the interview with the headteacher:

... in recent years we have, er, put some emphasis on vocational education at fourteen to sixteen and at sixteen plus, and we’re in a process of trying to develop new vocational courses, GNVQ courses at sixteen plus.

The headteacher thinks the vocational courses are particularly beneficial because the school has a sixth form:

... many of the other schools are doing similar things, maybe not, not exactly the same, and also they are limited in a sense that they, they obviously are restricted to eleven to sixteen. ... the big thing about, I think, vocational courses is linking them throughout the school, er, so that you provide, er, a sort of two tier system to further education. That’s what I hope is ...

The school first introduced the vocational courses into the sixth form and then into fourteen to sixteen year olds. The headteacher explains that the school introduced the vocational courses because they wanted to stop missing the students who did not fit into academic courses:

... if I start for the sixth form first, er, originally when we, when we began in 1988, we simply provided academic courses. And the, the problem was that you’re asking the people to come back, er, for two years to do A levels, basically that was all. ... but we felt that we were, we were missing out, there were a lot of our students who didn’t fit into that academic, er, pattern. So we had to, we had to make sure that we put, er, fine courses that would suit them. And really that’s what, what we do. And again the other thing is that, er, we, we also felt that it would be useful to have some vocational input, er, in the fourteen to sixteen age group as well. And, er, we set up a City and Guilds course there, er, which has been quite successful.

The school introduced two GNVQ courses in the sixth form in the year of the interview and intended to extend GNVQs further:

Er, we have, this year, we’ve started two new GNVQ courses in the sixth form, one in health and, er, one of business studies. And they have been quite successful. They look very positive. Er, we offer them at present at
Level 2. We would eventually like to extend to Level 3, and I would talk on that. That would, would happen in next couple of years.

Although the headteacher feels that the vocational courses are beneficial to the students, he is not sure whether the courses have contributed to the school’s popularity among parents:

I don’t know. I’m not sure about that. I don’t know whether I could make that clear. But I think, er, I think, er, from the, the point of view of the students, I feel that, er, that the introduction of vocational courses for the first time, we’re actually looking more the individual and trying to fit the individual with the course that they require rather than just offering a very narrow, a limited, er, curriculum in a, in a sixteen to eighteen. I think it is, it’s much more effective, and I feel that if, that if, you know, obviously if you’re developing things, er, if there is clear developing taking place, I think, one would hope that parents and so on would, would see those things and, er, er, you know, and value them and, and the, er, the sort of public image of the school would, would be enhanced by that.

As discussed in Chapter 7, vocational education itself is not a modality of pedagogy, and its implications for visible/invisible pedagogies are complex. On one hand, vocational education often have progressive elements, such as experimental and process learning, which are in favour of invisible pedagogies. On the other hand, the differentiation between academic and vocational courses implies the stratification of pupils on the basis of their performances which makes criteria rules more explicit. Therefore, if a strategy of vocational education has no apparent implication for the explicitness/implicitness of regulative and prescriptive rules, it should be regarded as a neutral strategy.

There is no particular indication that the above strategy of developing vocational courses leans towards either more explicitness or more implicitness of regulative and prescriptive rules. Therefore it is a neutral strategy.

(B2) SMILE scheme of mathematics: Regulative and prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy

The school introduced a mathematics scheme called ‘SMILE’ five years before the interview. Under the scheme, pupils work at their own level through sheets and cards without textbooks, and a teacher’s role is a facilitator moving around and encouraging pupils. The headteacher describes the scheme as very child-centred:
But, er, I would say that, er, when the school was set up, er, again, it's, it's something that, that happened in the past, I think there was, there was a, a very great stress laid on a child-centred education, and on the idea of children taking responsibility for their own learning. And for example, one of the, the other things that we have done here is a mathematics scheme which is called ‘SMILE’, which is, er, a very child-based. The children, er, sort of, control their own sort of learning to some extent and they can all work at their own level.

... the idea is that it’s, er, the children work, er, they, they work to their own ability. And a teacher is more a person who comes around and, and so then encourages them and shows them, and . . . . But they take, they take a lot of responsibility for their own learning. The, there are no textbooks, the, er, the scheme is, is taught through work sheets and cards, and there is a, a very complex system of progression and assessment. And, er, actually, to be honest, the logistics of introducing the scheme is very difficult, you know.

The SMILE scheme was controversial. There were quite a few parents, according to the headteacher, who were quite negative about the scheme at the beginning.

He perceived that very many parents liked a very traditional approach:

That has been very controversial. And ironically, although it was introduced, er, I suppose to, er, to encourage, er, parents to see a more positive aspect of the school and so on, er, quite a few parents, I think, probably at the beginning, were, were quite negative about it.

Parents were, parents were not, not supportive of our, er, I think parents, parents at that time were, would have preferred a more traditional approach. And, er, it was, we’ve had a difficult, er, time introducing this, this new scheme, because it is very new and it is very innovative. . . . But I think, again, parents in Catholic schools, I have to say, and in county schools presumably as well, er, curriculum innovation is not always, er, applauded by parents. Parents, very many parents like a very traditional approach. In some ways, Catholic schools always had a, a reputation as being very traditional, and that was one of the, the, things that, er, the parents found attractive about them, er, especially in the areas of discipline and behaviour and those sorts of area.

Some mathematics teachers also had difficulty in adopting themselves to the scheme, and the in-service training was provided for the transition to the scheme:

And again we had here, er, people who were trained in a very traditional teaching style. So it, it took a while for them to adopt, er, to the new system and for it to be effective.

But, but let me say it was very, very difficult for logistics of moving from traditional mathematics to a new system which involves cards and filing cabinets and children moving about the classroom and things like that. And the training and, er, in-service training for staff, that was involved.
The introduction of the SMILE scheme implies a strategic change from visible to invisible pedagogy to improve the school's performance in mathematics as follows. The reasons for the introduction of the SMILE scheme was that the senior management including the headteacher identified a clear problem in terms of performance in mathematics and that it was suggested that a child-centred and dynamic scheme might be more suitable for the pupils in the school than traditional types of mathematics teaching:

Er, but the headteacher and senior management, I mean, obviously, er, right from the start, we were looking at performance, and we were looking at performance indicators. And we could recognise very early on that mathematics was the area which needed very significant improvement.

Well, first of all we identified that there was clearly a problem and, er, it had to be resolved, something had to be done. And, er, it was suggested that, er, perhaps one of the reasons why children were failing was because that they were not suited to, er, to the traditional types of courses that had been taught, and that, er, mathematics as a subject within the school had been taught in a very, er, uninteresting, steeled, boring sort of way, and that perhaps, er, if we encouraged children to take some responsibility for their own learning and if we introduced the very dynamic new scheme, er, which was child-centred, that perhaps we could turn things around. And that has proved to some extent to have been the case.

The senior management took the initiative in introducing the scheme, guided by the head of mathematics, the LEA inspector and other consultancy services:

Well, the initiative was taken, er, taken by the senior management. . . . And, er, we looked at a various, er, sort of ways of improving performance. We sought, er, advice of expertise from the local authority advisory service, er, from, you know, other consultancy services. And it appeared to us that to time after, you know, examining, the situation of SMILE would be, er, a good opportunity for, for us.

Er, the London University, er, King's College, we are very closely linked with them, with their PGCE course. They are, because, er, the mathematics, er, group in, in King's, actually, er, they, they do a lot of SMILE work. So they have good links with our school, because we are a SMILE maths school.

Well, I have to say the, the input of the scheme from the senior management, but it was very much guided by the head of mathematics, and very much guided by the, er, inspector, er, the person in charge of mathematics within the local, er, the London Borough of Roundham.

The headteacher stated that parents and governors were beginning to convinced that the SMILE scheme was good because the GCSE results had shown a significant improvement:
And it’s only this year when we can see a very significant change in our mathematics results and performance at the GCSE level that, I think, parents are, have become, er, beginning to be convinced that, er, you know, this, this scheme is, is a good idea and has worked. Er, for example, last year we had got about nineteen percent of the children who passed mathematics at the A to C level, and this year that one got to thirty-four percent. And this year was the first year who had come through the new SMILE system.

But, er, I think we have managed to convince both governors and parents that, you know, there, there has been some progress. And certainly did the results themselves at performance indicators, you know, scream out that, you know, for the, we can, we can clearly show that, that the children who’ve come through this SMILE system have performed much better, er, than those who have not.

According to the above description by the headteacher, the introduction of the SMILE scheme loosened the mathematics teachers’ directive control over the pupils and the prescription of what and when the pupils should learn, and therefore made regulative and prescriptive rules more implicit in pedagogic relations. It is a regulative and prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy. It is interesting to notice that a form of invisible pedagogy can be adopted to improve examination results despite the conception that visible pedagogy is more exam-oriented than invisible pedagogy.

(B3) The introduction of a fast-track group in science: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

The school had had a fast-track group in science for two years by the time of the interview. The initiative was taken by the science department:

- Sciences recently approved to, er, to have one group which is, er, a kind of fast-track group, and mixed ability elsewhere.
- And that has come from the science department itself.
- And science [department] thought that, er, that in particular they would like to focus one group out of three, which would be, er, the more able students. And the other two groups would be sort of mixed. Now as I said, too early, er, for us to see if there is any significant, er, change. But, er, it’s an area that obviously we’re looking at with great interest.

The headteacher described the school as a whole and himself as very committed to mixed-ability teaching. However, he stated that he was pragmatic and prepared to accommodate this kind of new developments by departments in certain autonomy:
I mean, we, we have allied most of our departments in certain autonomy, er, with an reason. I mean, the school itself is very much committed to mixed ability. But at the same time, we are happy to, er, accommodate opportunities for, you know, for departments to try, er, a new sort of developments.

And, er, I, I have to say personally I'm very committed to mixed ability, and, er, I will take some convincing about, er, about introducing, er, you know, er, a very structured level of setting throughout the school. But at the same time, I haven't got a closed mind on it, and I don’t think staff generally have. I think we're quite pragmatic and we would, er, we would look at things and, er, make decisions, er, based on information.

The introduction of a fast-track group in science stratifies pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

(B4) Beginning setting in Year 8 in modern languages: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

The school was beginning to have setting in Year 8 in modern languages at the time of the interview:

... we begin to, er, to set students, er, in Year 8. If we cannot, it varies. Er, generally speaking, they will be mixed ability in Year 7, in the first year, but after that we will try and, and put them into sets.

The headteacher's attitude to organisation of teaching, expressed in the above topic about science, is evident here about languages as well:

Whether those sets are, I mean, I don't think we're into rigid setting. I think they're, in languages in particular, they're quite flexible. But at the same time, er, they would argue that languages in particular is the subject area where one has to, er, has to have some sort of setting. And I can, I can live with that.

Beginning setting in Year 8 in modern languages means more stratification of pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic relations.

(B5) Listing very able pupils: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

One or two years before the interview, the school began to make a list of very able pupils across the curriculum who should be targeted for more demanding task.

The heads of year took the initiative to introduce the listing:
Er, but what the heads of year have done over the last year or two is they have tried to identify, they have tried to make sure that there is a list, a clear list of pupils who they believe, er, you know, er, very able and, er, who are pupils who require high level of work and, and so on, and that information has been fair to departments and to subject areas. And their hope is that those pupils who have been identified will be targeted in, er, different subject areas and, er, teachers will, for example, when they’re giving homework and so on, will, will ensure that the more able student has got, er, a much longer task to do than perhaps somebody who is, er, is a bit on the, er, on the weaker side.

The headteacher’s ambivalent feeling towards this kind of differentiation is evident in the following statement:

... it’s a very positive thing and I’m very pleased about it, and, er, you know, something that, that we need to develop in the future. I mean, I think the difficulty, the difficulty is, I mean, again, I think, the more able students are catered for in other ways. Because for example, er, we provide music lessons and so on for students here, and many of our, our able students would be the students who take up those lessons. ... So, er, I think, I think that does happen but there’s no specific bias apart from, er, trying to ensure that the people are targeted and identified. And I think that is certainly important.

The strategy of listing very able pupils focuses on and encourages stratifying differences between pupils’ performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic relations.

(B6) Study clubs organised by the SEN coordinator: Prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy

Four or five years before the interview, the special educational needs coordinator started organising study clubs on two evenings in every week, where pupils can study any subjects and staff voluntarily help them. The headteacher stated that the students in the clubs were very often less able:

Er, he has organised, he has two homework clubs after school, er, for students. And very, very often they are, er, students who, er, who are less able.

... Mr Smith [the pseudonym of the SEN coordinator] might say, “Oh, I’ve got, er, such and such a person who is coming to me on, er, Wednesday afternoons”, and, you know, they’re, they’re working humanities really very far behind, and one of the humanity teachers, he would speak to them, and maybe they’ll be coming along and give some extra help to, to that child. It’s very informal, but I have to say it works very effectively, and quite well attended by various students.
... they're in both study clubs in the library areas and you would have staff working there themselves and, you know, obviously, you know, if, if they see children, er, who need support or help, they would come and help them. ... it's a good, good situation, and it's very informal.

The headteacher describes this informal scheme as a restoration of the goodwill which existed before the major teacher strikes in 1980's:

The problem with, with these sort of things in British education is they, they happened a lot until the government actually decided to impose a contract on teachers. And as soon as they set any actual number of hours, the teachers had, we began to have great difficulty getting teachers to do those, you know, "My hours are such and such."

You know, there was a tremendous amount of goodwill before. And to some extent the, the so-called governmental reforms undermined the good practice that had taken place, and it's taken the school a long time to re-establish that. And I think, you know, that's basically what's happening here.

This scheme is expected to provide less able pupils with remedial assistance and therefore decrease stratifying differences between pupils' performances. It is a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy, which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more implicit in pedagogic relations.

(B7) Study clubs run by departments of English, mathematics, science and modern languages: Prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy

More recently than the start of study clubs organised by the SEN coordinator, departments of English, mathematics, science and modern languages began to have their own study club after school on one evening a week:

... very many subject areas, science, for example, maths, er, languages, have a day after school where they have a homework or study club in the library as well.

... you know that if you go on a Thursday, there's going to be a science teacher there because it's the science study club. You know that if you go on a Tuesday, there's going to be a maths teacher ....

The headteacher highly appreciates staff's commitment to the voluntary work:

... it's very positive because, you know, er, I mean, we are always very pleased where we can get staff to, er, you know, to get extra to time and, and energy and so on on the students.

Again the headteacher emphasises the benefit to less able pupils:

And you've got to remember very many of our students would not necessarily have, er, the facilities at home where they have quiet and peace and so on where they can get a bit of work done. And so it is very useful. I have to say that, er, the people who benefit most from this would still be
the less able, which are, it’s not, not a bad thing but, er, I would say it is
more geared to less able students at present than it would be to the average
or to the, the, er, sort of, er, the top level.

This scheme of departmental study clubs is also a prescriptive invisible strategy to
enhance the implicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

(B8) Structuring homework with a diary, a timetable and monitoring: Prescriptive
visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher stated that the school had been structuring homework for the two
years before the interview and that it was an on-going thing. The school has a
homework diary and timetable, and homework is supposed to be monitored
closely:

We, we have clear policies on homework. We, we expect all our students
to do homework. Er, they are supposed to have a homework diary, and
they are supposed to, to write on what homework they have. Er, the
homework is supposed to be followed up and monitored very closely.

... I think there’s always been an attempt to structure the thing. There is a
homework timetable. And, er, there’s been, I suppose, much more effort
put into monitoring over the last two years, perhaps that wasn’t in the past.

The headteacher is conscious of the pressure from some parents who want more
homework, and feel that more work should be done on homework:

Er, some parents who suggest that it isn’t, er, it isn’t as much as, er, they
would like. But, er, I would say we’re fairly, fairly strong on homework.
Er, there are one or two areas that we can obviously improve on, but . . .

... personally it’s an area that I feel I would like to have more work done
on.

The more structured or tighter control of homework implies stronger pacing for
pupils and teachers, and therefore is a visible strategy to enhance the explicitness
of prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations.

(B9) Special schemes of homework for less able pupils: prescriptive invisible
strategy in pedagogy

The SEN coordinator recently developed special schemes of homework for less
able pupils:

And he has, er, developed, er, you know, er, special schemes of work
which parents can use with children at home for the less able.
The development of the schemes can be expected to provide less able pupils with remedial assistance and therefore decrease stratifying differences between pupils’ performances. It is a prescriptive invisible strategy, which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more implicit in pedagogic relations.

(B10) Meeting time on Wednesday mornings: Neutral strategy in management
Three years before the interview, the school started to have a meeting time of an hour and a half from 8.45am to 10.15am on every Wednesday morning, decreasing teaching hours accordingly:

Basically we, we work from a quarter to nine until half three but an hour for lunch. But on Wednesdays the children do not come into school until a quarter past ten. So we have a late start on Wednesday. Staff come in at a quarter to nine, and we have, we use that an hour and a half for staff meetings and for organisation and so on and so forth. . . . it suits staff very well.

The headteacher mentions parents’ negative attitude to this change:

Parents were not tremendously happy about it, but again, I think they realise that it was innovative and slightly different.

The headteacher justifies the meeting time, which he thinks allows his staff to feel fresh and be efficient in dealing with organisational businesses:

. . . the headteacher of the time believe that, er, very many meetings were after school. And people had been working all day and when I came to meetings, they were tired and they weren’t very effective or efficient. And that would be a much more interesting idea perhaps to try and toughen the people’s energy enough when they were fresh and they were, you know, ready to go in the mornings. So, er, that was a good opportunity to, er, to set up a meeting time from a quarter to nine to a quarter past ten on a Wednesday morning and, you know, concentrate, er, a lot of, er, the sort of whole school business and departmental business and pastoral business into that period of time. And I have to say it has been quite effective.

The above change is solely about time management, and does not imply particular effects on either regulative or prescriptive rules. Therefore it is a neutral strategy.

(B11) Replacing the faculty system by the department system: Neutral strategy in management
At the time of the interview, the school was going to replace the faculty system by the department system from the next term. According to the headteacher, there were two reasons for the change. One reason is that the faculty system did not
work well because different subject teachers in a faculty do not have much to discuss in common. The other reason is that the department system would create more middle-manager posts and give staff more opportunities of promotion and more motivation:

Well, the faculty idea didn’t work for us. I mean, for example, the communications faculty that we had here prior to this change, it had modern languages, English, drama, physical education and, and art. They were all in that one group. And when they came together to meet, they didn’t necessarily have a tremendous amount to say to each other. It was an unnatural, er, sort of grouping of subjects. So we felt, rather than doing that, we would try to have a head of department group, which represented all the heads of department.

And we hope to create more posts at the bottom end to, er, retain staff and to promote people from within.

There, there was very little middle management because you had five senior teachers who were heads of faculty controlling everything. So there was very little happening below that. And there was very little encouragement.

There is no indication that this organisational change enhances either explicitness or implicitness of regulative and prescriptive rules. Therefore it is a neutral strategy.

(B12) Beginning to market the school: Neutral strategy in management

According to the headteacher, they were beginning to market the school. They had not publicised even important events for the school:

... we’re really only beginning, er, to market the school in any real sense. For example, I think, er, whereas in the past events took place and, you know, very often quite important events, and they wouldn’t even got mentioned in the local press. They would barely got mentioned in the, in the sort of parents newsletters. Er, for example, this, we have a very good tradition here in drama. Er, the school play here is, is always very good, and twice in the last three years the school play has been, er, the students and staff have taken the school play to the Edinburgh Festival and performed it at the Edinburgh French Festival, er, in August, er, you know, in a, in a proper professional venue. ... And, er, certainly we have not got publicity for those sorts of things that we really should have.

The headteacher states that there has not been so strong competitive pressure on the school as a Catholic school as on county schools and that it is part of the reason why the school has been slow at marketing. However, the situation is
changing, and the senior management and the governing body are going to
develop marketing:

... we’re not a school that, that is into, er, into publicity or into, er, sort of
projecting as image, something that we do very badly. And I think partly
the reason why that, er, has happened is because there hasn’t been the
extreme pressure on us as a Catholic school to compete in the way that
there has been for other county schools. But even for us, in recent years,
we are beginning to take it a lot more seriously.

I think, I think we need a much, er, a much higher profile. I think we need
to celebrate and publicise very much the good things that we do, and I
think we, er, we need to get away from sort of complacency that there is.
Because we are now slightly privileged position in a sense of not chasing
people so much as some of the other schools. Er, I think we’ve got to, er,
we’ve got to market the school in a much more professional way. And, er,
it’s an area that the senior management are taking on board. And certainly
it’s an area that the governing body want developed.

On recent example was the bishop’s visit to the school which they tried to
publicise in a way that previously they wouldn’t do:

... for example, on Friday we had, er, the bishop, er, visited the school
and we had quite a high profile for that and, you know, parents were told
about that and parishes were told about that, and we hoped that the local
press would cover it and so on and so forth. You know, er, whereas in, er,
in the past we wouldn’t need such a big deal of that. Now we will, we will
try and look at it for, for all these works.

... as I’ve said, we had a bishop visiting the school on, on Friday, and, er,
it was a very high-profile thing. We had, er, we’d all our governors here,
we’d all priests from all the local parishes. Er, we had a very large number
of, er, people from our, from a kind of Catholic community involved. And,
er, it will be very heavily, er, reported and very sort of significantly
reported in the Catholic press at least and also presumably in the local
press.

The Catholic community is one of the focal points for the school’s marketing
endeavours:

Our main link, one of the areas that we need to develop is a link with our
local parishes, our local churches. And what we try to do is we try to
prepare newsletters that go to the parish every couple of months, once a
term, say, that tells people who are not necessarily parents of children at,
at Catholic, at, at a Catholic school, but who may have children who could
be going to or who may have children who did go in the past, er, that’s tell
them a little bit about the school and make the school more a focus for the
Catholic community in the area.

While the above statements show an orientation towards distinction within the
Catholic community, there is no indication that the strategy of beginning
marketing is oriented to the enhancement of either explicitness or implicitness of regulative and prescriptive rules, and therefore it should be regarded as a neutral strategy.
From integrated humanity to separate history, geography and religious education: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

At the time of interview, the school was moving from the integrated humanity to separate history, geography and religious education:

... in the humanities area, because now again we, having moved to integrate the humanity situation, we are now actually sorting out the other way again now and moving into, to gain separate history, geography and RE.

Asked what was the purpose of that change, the headteacher answered as follows:

One is the response to what we are required to do. And two is also obviously the point we are trying to get the, what can I say, the best system that, you know, that we can actually envisage, you know, we can actually develop.

Obviously, as implied by the headteacher, the change is the school’s response to the national curriculum and the RE syllabus, but legally the school is still able to teach history, geography and RE in the integrated humanity subject if they wish to do so. Therefore, as pointed out by the headteacher, the change is a strategic one to develop the best way to teach the humanities. The separation should be regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy because it enhances the explicitness of selection and sequencing (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

Introducing setting in science: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

At the time of the interview, the school was introducing setting in science for the first time. In that academic year, Year 10 pupils were grouped into sets including top sets, and Year 11 above were still in mixed-ability groups:

Er, maths still sets, French sets, science is now setting for the first time in Year 10.

... we are implementing at the moment. So Year 10 has got accelerated, got top sets. They are setted [sic] to, you know, we are looking in fact to see, you know, how that actually works. Year 11 above are still in mixed-ability groups. And so, yeah, we are actually changing from that sort of point of view, I suppose really.
Asked for the reason for the change, the headteacher described it as an innovative trial to improve science teaching and mentioned the competitive pressure from league tables:

One, that was trials as the innovation to seek for the improvement and what we are actually offering. And it becomes the reason really. And the science [department] had been talking about it sometime, "Should they keep mixed-ability groups through the five years?" And this was the school decision that for this year we in Year 10 start the two-year course that we will actually try a setting and to see what effects it'll have really. . . . Is that a response to league tables? Possibly so. Possibly so actually.

The headteacher expected that top sets would stretch more able pupils:

. . . through creating a sort of top sets, I mean, therefore, the more able children can work at a, hopefully, at a faster pace.

The introduction of setting means stratifying pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

(C3) Monitoring each pupil’s performance: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

As asked what strategies the school had in order to improve the examination results, the headteacher mentioned that the school had recently started the close monitoring of each pupil’s performance in terms of examinations:

Er, hard work really. Er, hard work identifying those areas that need improvement, and monitoring those subject areas to during their final year, 11, that’s the final year, to actually see really how the children are actually performing. I mean, you know, we’ve done something on that recently. Because tomorrow on a study leave, there are mock GCSE, just before the holidays. So we’ll look at the mock GCSE results obviously after the holidays, in January, follow that the parents evening, and so on, you know, then we have a, hopefully we have a very clear picture of level of performance, you know.

The above monitoring of examination performances, enabling the comparison between pupils and between subjects, enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. Therefore it is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy.

(C4) The profile of a pupil to the parents: Prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy
According to the headteacher, the school’s reporting to parents had been changed from simple reports to detailed profiles:

Well, I think we’ve actually developed actual profiling side. I mean, we’ve worked on that side quite a bit.

I mean, the old reports were basically put down 50% and then the teachers wrote a comment, which basically is the same format, but now there is much more structure, I think, in what is actually put in.

Asked how structured it was, the headteacher answered as follows:

Well, I mean, it depends how the department has actually the details the department put in there. And the science [department] may put in, for instance, percentages of different sorts of units, units they’ve actually tested, and they need to take an average from that, you know, they’ve come from the final result, something like that. . . . But obviously the parents who used to more traditional, er, ‘50 over 100’, ‘satisfactory effort’, I mean, that’s quite different, because obviously for many years that’s basically what it was. We’ve come a long way from that.

It seemed that the assessment group took the initiative in developing the profiling, and that the headteacher a little distanced himself from the profiling when he pointed out the difficulty parents had in understanding their child’s profile:

And the assessment group within the staff, you know, have been responsible really for amendments and installations to that. Hopefully we are more efficient, you know, et cetera, et cetera. Whether the parents actually understand them as well is another matter.

So I mean that parents basically do get much more information about each subject area, much more information. If they’re wanting it or not, it doesn’t matter.

Although the new profiling scheme seems to have certain criteria, because of the technical complexity of the structure, it should be regarded as having less explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations than the previous reporting with simpler and more clear-cut information. Therefore the change should be identified as a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy.

(C5) Hierarchical merit system of awarding gold, silver and bronze certificates: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

Two years before the interview, the school introduced a merit system to award gold, silver and bronze certificates for achievements in all aspects of the school life:

And so we have a merit system. Gold, gold certificates, er, silver and bronze. So they get so many commendations in a journal, it goes the head
of year, the head of year presents the, no, the form tutor presents the bronze, the head of year sends or presents the silver and, lucky enough to get gold, the headteacher will present the gold.

Asked what kind of activities are rewarded, the headteacher answered as follows:

That is down, that is down to the individual teachers’ judgement. So if a child brings in what they’ve considered a very good piece of work, they may well get a merit for that and that will be recorded as such. If a child suddenly, say, their behaviour hasn’t been too good, their behaviour in fact suddenly gets a lot better, that is then recorded, you know, the child gets a sort of, you know, benefit right as well. It seems to work with children.

The above hierarchical merit system highlights stratifying differences between pupils with gold, silver and bronze certificates, and nothing, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

(C6) Awards evening: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

In the year of the interview, for the first time, the school gave the certificates to the pupils in the awards evening. Previously the evening had been the ceremony where the ex-pupils got the GCSE certificates:

It’s a very nice evening, so very pleasant. . . . Basically what is the awards evening? It’s the celebration of achievement.

This celebration of achievement also should be regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy for the same reason as the above merit system.
(D) Fertile Land School: county; co-educational; 11-16

Standard number: not much above 100

GCSE results: below the borough average.

Date of interviewing the headteacher: 22 November 1994

(D1) Open and honest sex education programme: Regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher mentioned an open and honest sex education programme as a part of the school’s personal and social education programme, which had been developed two years before the interview and then implemented, as a strategy in curriculum:

Well, we’ve done, we won an award this week, we went to collect last Saturday for our sex education programme, and that was regarded as something that was quite courageous because there is, there is a difficult climate nationally at the moment for open and honest sex education programmes to take place. . . . Er, we were on a TV last week . . . .

Well, we spent all of last year developing the sex education programme, er, within a broader personal and social education programme. So we did quite a lot of training slots throughout the whole year, er, and that was two years ago, and the actual programme has been running for a year now, we are on second year of it now.

The sex education programme has adopted discussion and open-ended questioning techniques as its major methods:

So the whole thing about, you know, questioning techniques and open-ended tasks and that sort of things has had a lot of promotion in the last couple of years. Er, and also that goes hand in hand with our sex education programme, because a lot of that is discussion-based.

A positive initiative on sex education, generally regarded as progressive, implies respecting and encouraging independent thinking and behaviour by pupils, and this programme of sex education is particularly so with its emphasise on discussion and open-ended questioning techniques. Therefore it is a regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the implicitness of hierarchical (regulative) rules in pedagogic relations.

The techniques will be explained in the following paragraphs.

(D2) Discussion and open-ended questioning techniques: Regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy

251
According to the headteacher, two years before the interview, the techniques of discussion and open-ended questioning had been developed in the personal and social education (PSE) programme including the sex education programme:

Well, the whole PSE programme, the personal and social education programme. And that’s where we put a lot of emphasis two years ago in our planning, preparation and training. So it’s, you know, it’s actually been functioning properly for a year and a term. But we did a year’s planning.

The headteacher argues that the use of the techniques is not limited within the PSE programme but is spread over other curriculum areas:

No. it isn’t only that, but that’s where we focused at that time, because this was, the PSE programme was a new development for the school. ... So it was focused particularly on the PSE programme, but it has knock-on effects on the rest of the curriculum, too.

The techniques are targeted on more able pupils:

We’ve done a fair bit of work on teaching and learning styles and techniques and methodologies, er, because we want to make sure that we’re pitching our material at a range of levels because we’ve got a lot of different ability levels here. So stretching the more able is very important. So the whole thing about, you know, questioning techniques and open-ended tasks and that sort of things has had a lot of promotion in the last couple of years.

Well, it’s to do with this business about differentiation and having appropriate materials, appropriate delivery, and that’s where the open-ended questioning and the open-ended tasks are so important. Er, so, that’s been developed for everybody, but particularly targeted on the more able.

Some teachers especially in heavily content-led subjects were not very comfortable with the techniques when they were introduced:

And a lot of them, no, not a lot, some teachers weren’t feeling very comfortable with that. So we did some training associated with that as well.

That is, basically it’s discussion. And if you are a teacher of a heavily content-led subject like science or history or something, then you may not be so accustomed to teaching in a discussion or sort of way like that.

The promotion of the techniques seems to have a complex effect on prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations. It may enhance the explicitness of criteria rules by focusing on stratifying differences between pupils’ performances on one hand, but may make selection and sequencing rules more implicit on the other hand. It enhances the implicitness of regulative (hierarchical) rules because it respects and
encourages independent thinking and behaviour by pupils. Therefore it is a regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy, which makes regulative rules more implicit in pedagogic relations.

The headteacher regards it as a new teaching method added to existent methods including teacher-led and child-centred ones rather than an antithesis to teacher-led methods:

They would be more, more accustomed to group work and pair work combined with teacher-led activities, er, which is quite different from being able to chair a discussion with a group of students. So, and this whole thing about questioning styles and providing, you know, making sure you’ve got open-ended questioning techniques, that kind of things, are very important.

The headteacher states that the school has had a mixture of various teaching methods including individual, group and didactic work and that the new method of questioning and discussion will not undermine other methods but enrich the mixture:

Well, it’s all of these things have to be part of a package. Er, there isn’t one teaching style that happens in Fertile Land School. There’s a whole range of ones. But we identify that the whole area of questioning and answering was the one that needed more development in Fertile Land School. So that’s why we concentrated on that. But it’s not at the expense of the others. There are still a lot of group work, a lot of pair work, a lot of individual work, and there’re still a lot of didactic work as well. So it’s just a part of bigger . . . .

(D3) Maths master classes on Saturdays: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

About two years before the interview, the school started the maths master classes on Saturdays, which were targeted on more able pupils:

And we’ve also got some, you know, we started the chess club targeted the more able, and the maths master classes on Saturdays that was targeted the more able . . . .

This strategy focuses on and encourages stratifying differences between pupils’ performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic relations.

(D4) Assessment and reporting towards clearer description of achievements:

Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy
According to the headteacher, at the time of the interview, the school was developing a hard-edged way of assessment and reporting with clearer descriptions of achievements. The existent way of assessment and reporting was encouraging one with many identifications of efforts and less clear descriptions of achievements:

Assessment is one of our key points of focus this year. And what we are doing is changing our reports to parents so that we are reporting achievements in a much more hard-edged way than we have done before. In the past, we’ve, we’ve done a lot of, er, we’ve, we’ve had very encouraging reports, and we’ve identified all the efforts that they put in, but the achievement hasn’t been there so clearly. So this year we’ve started doing that, putting in the achievement, estimated grades and so on.

Well, the staff at the moment are developing, er, a grading system that we can use both in our marking and for reporting to parents. And at the moment we are just, er, trying to work out how, exactly how it will, er, link with the national curriculum levels.

The headteacher pointed out three reasons why the school started changing the assessment and reporting. They are the necessity for the staff to know pupils’ achievements, some parents’ concern, and the inspectors’ comment in the Ofsted inspection of the school:

Well, because, er, for a number of different reasons. We often felt that we didn’t know what the child is achieving. Because, unless we taught them ourselves, reading the reports, we couldn’t determine what they’d actually achieved. And then some parents were concerned that they didn’t know what their child achieved as well. Er, and the combination of those two made us realise that, you know, that we’d got to focus on it. We had the inspection in September, and the inspectors said the same sort of thing. We just hadn’t been clear enough about the attainment part of it.

The change is based on the view that assessment and reporting should provide clearer information on comparative performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic relations.

(D5) Prize-giving for high achievers only: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

At the time of the interview, the school was changing their award system from the celebration of the achievement of everybody to the prize-giving just for high achievers in subjects:
... this term, we have a prize-giving for the first time which is targeted just to the high achievers, nothing else. In the past we celebrated the achievement of everybody regarding, you know, for their effort, attendance, something else. This year we don’t . . . .

The headteacher regards the change as one of those strategies which are targeted on more able children:

... it’s just part of our wider focus at the moment which is on promoting the more able and promoting the school as the place where high-ability children are going to be taught well. That’s a current sort of strategy.

The award system highlights stratifying differences between pupils, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

(D6) Chess club: Neutral strategy in pedagogy

About two years before the interview, the school started the chess club, which were targeted on more able pupils:

And we’ve also got some, you know, we started the chess club targeted the more able . . . .

Although a strategy targeted on more able pupils may seem to focus on stratifying differences in performances, the chess club for amusement should not be regarded as a strategy to enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules on what learning should be assessed against. Therefore it is a neutral strategy.

(D7) Bullying policy of forefront: Neutral strategy in pedagogy

The bullying policy of the school has been, according to the headteacher, of forefront of national thinking:

Our bullying policies have been very much of forefront of national thinking, and we were on a TV for that as well a few weeks ago.

The headteacher points out some characteristics of the policy including creating the climate where the pupils feel comfortable about telling the staff of bullying, responding very quickly, counselling as well as punishing the bully, excluding the bullies in serious cases:

When we have, last week, we had the promotion evening when we recruit for next year, have five hundred people here, and in my speech, I specifically said that we have bullying like every other school in the country because it happens everywhere. So I think the first thing is to be open and honest about it. And then, er, then it’s to do with creating the
right kind of climate in the school so that disclosure by children is accepted, they feel comfortable about telling. . . . And then responding very quickly when it is reported. Er, er, what we do is we do take a punitive action against the bully if that’s appropriate, but we also counsel because we believe that the bully has got something going wrong in their life as well and they need support and counselling to get through it. . . . So we try and support them as well. But if none of that works, then I will exclude them from the school. Er, especially if it involves physical violence or racial or sexual harassment of any sort, if those are the things, we think really serious.

The policy seems to be balanced in terms of hierarchical rules and not to lean towards either the visible or invisible end. Therefore it is a neutral strategy.

(D8) Uniform developed: Regulative visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher, who arrived in this school four years before the interview, changed the school uniform. The former uniform was a navy-blue V-neck jumper with a very light blue name of the school. The present one is a navy-blue sweat shirt with a round neck and the school logo in green, a bright green polo shirt underneath with the navy-blue school logo, navy-blue trousers or skirt, and black shoes. The headteacher explains the reason for the change as follows:

It, it just looked old-fashioned and sloppy. It didn’t look up-to-date and crispy and modern. So it’s got, I mean, it’s got to look businesslike, it’s got to look as if something, you know, they are associated with the school.

She emphasises the significance of the present school uniform as a visible symbol of the school identity:

. . . when they are all in the assembly and they are all in the uniform, it looks very smart, and you can see that it’s, they are associated with Fertile Land School straightaway. So that’s important, we think, because they, we stress they are ambassadors for Fertile Land School, you know, they are representing us when they go outside.

This strategy of uniform seems to be a visible one because it explicitly symbolises the school’s control over pupils and enhances the explicitness of hierarchical (regulative) rules in pedagogic relations. Therefore it is a regulative visible strategy in pedagogy.

(D9) Monitoring of the curriculum and the staff performance through written reports from curriculum areas: Prescriptive visible strategy in management
At the time of the interview, the school’s management had just completed the planning of a new monitoring scheme which was to start to be implemented from the following year. Under the new scheme, all curriculum areas are required to submit a written annual report with certain evidence to the headteacher, and the school management monitors the curriculum and the staff performance. The headteacher emphasises the importance of the monitoring scheme in terms of clear accountability:

Er, in terms of accountability, we’ve set up very clear lines now, with a bit confusion for a while, but we’ve got very clear lines of accountability now. And all curriculum areas have to, starting for next year, we’ve just done all the draft work for it, starting from next year, they will have to report to me in a written form on annual basis, er, and it will, the report has to cover certain evidence. So the evidence will be collected from now. That’s, that’s where we’ve developed it now. So the evidence collection will be very much to do with monitoring the curriculum and the staff performance.

The headteacher declares her style of monitoring and management to be formal and open. Asked if the monitoring is becoming more formal, she answered as follows:

Yes, very, yes, very much more formal. At the same time, my personal style is to be as open as possible. I’ve, I’m very, er, conscientious about providing as much information as possible to everybody. Er, and they can determine how much they need to use. But I think it’s important to be open and honest to people. And I consult as widely as possible, but I also make it clear that I’m the one that takes the final decision wherever it’s necessary.

The monitoring is intended to formalise the assessment of staff performance, and therefore enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in organisational relations. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in management.

(D10) Structuring the management with development teams: Prescriptive visible strategy in management

The first thing that the headteacher did after her arrival in the school was to develop a structure of the school management with development teams responsible for particular issues:

Er, when I first came here four years ago, the first thing I did was developing the new staffing structure. Er, and that has in it, er, management levels for the curriculum, management for the pastoral side of the school, and also, er, development teams which are responsible for developing key issues within the school on annual basis. Er, and the
development team leaders form the senior management team with myself and my deputy. So that was a very important development, because that’s what facilitated everything else in the school.

The headteacher’s purpose in developing the management structure with development teams was to make accountability lines clearer, and therefore it should be regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in management to enhance the explicitness of prescriptive rules in organisational relations.

(D11) More aggressive PR: Neutral strategy in management

The headteacher describes her school as having become more aggressive in terms of the public image:

Er, in terms of, er, being much more aware of our image, since I’ve been here four years, in that time, we’ve concentrated a lot on things like uniform and behaviour outside the school gates, and, er, promoting ourselves through the local press wherever possible, that sort of things. . . . So we’ve been more, much more aggressive in terms of the public image that we represent.

Uniform and behaviour should be dealt with in pastoral care rather than in marketing. The more aggressive PR through the local media, etc. should be regarded as a strategy neutral in terms of visibility.
Seymour Field School: grant-maintained; co-educational; 11-18
Standard number: not much above 200
GCSE results: more than 10% higher than the England average.
Date of interviewing the acting headteacher: 28 April 1995

(E1) From a teacher-led style to a variety of teaching styles with the emphasis on independent learning: Regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy
The acting headteacher states that the school has done a lot of analysis work on teaching styles which has been helped by the Technical Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) and that, as a result, the school now has more variety of teaching styles with the emphasis on independent learning than previously when there used to be one teaching style of chalk and talk:

Er, I, I would put that down to, er, the staff really, and the way that they’ve been prepared to take on continuity, er, the way they’ve prepared to, to take on, er, issues of learning styles and motivation of children, er, carefully analysing how children learn in relation to how they teach. And we’ve done quite a lot of work on, on that side. We’ve had a TVEI programme when, er,....

So you had this, er, about 360,000 over five years. That’s enabled us to put money into, er, you know, the vocational side of education and also to look at, er, helping staff develop more flexible teaching styles and more variety of teaching styles. And so I think that there has been a lot of adaptation in terms of the way the classrooms are managed ....

Well, there used to be one teaching style, he stands in front of the classroom with a piece of chalk, and you tell the children to do this. And now that’s just one, one of many styles that you’ll see enacted. Children take a far more active role in what they are doing. In most areas of the school, er, they take much more responsibility. Er, this kind of independence is something that TVEI, I think, has featured and promoted.

He also thinks that the national curriculum has been encouraging pupils to be responsible for their own learning:

But also I think the, the style, in order to cope with the national curriculum, children had to become, say, more aware of self-assessment. And if they’re doing self-assessment, they are automatically taking more responsibility for their, er, their own learning and have been encouraged to do so.

According to the acting headteacher, the teachers are encouraged to make their classrooms interesting in order to keep the pupils’ motivation high and encourage them to become independent learners. The change has been gradual, however,
because the staff includes a high proportion of experienced teachers who are accustomed to traditional styles with strict discipline and have difficulty in adapting themselves to more open and maybe more noisy classroom environment:

... the teachers are encouraged to vary things, make things as interesting as possible for the children to keep their motivation high, encouraging them to become independent learners. Er, but it's been hard going, because, er, our staff profile indicates quite a high proportion of people in their 40s. The staff have been here some time. And, er, moving people who are very experienced and very good at, say, disciplining children, er, moving attitudes toward more open, maybe more noisy kind of classroom environment, because it's better for their learning activities, er, is qu-, has been quite difficult one to confront. Er, but, you know, over a period of years, er, those things are, er, I think the way to move things in schools slowly, inchmeal, then things do gather pace, you know.

The above description of the change implies that the change is a regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy, which reduces the explicitness of hierarchical (regulative) rules in pedagogic relations.

(E2) From banding to setting: Prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy

The acting headteacher has changed the organisation of teaching in the school. Under his predecessor, the lower years (Years 7, 8 and 9) of the school had a banding system where some subjects were taught in ten banded groups, two tops, six middles and two bottoms, which were based on the general ability, whereas other subjects were taught in eight mixed-ability tutor groups. The acting headteacher has changed the system for Years 8 and 9 to a setting system where each of mathematics, science, humanities and French has its own grouping of ten sets, two tops, six middles and two bottoms, based on the ability in each subject. The new system started in the academic year when the acting headteacher was interviewed. The reason for the change was that the old system did not benefit pupils good at a particular subject but not good at other subjects:

... that has occasionally caused problems, because a child might be good at maths but not good at science or humanities or French but they couldn’t be moved.

Well, we free that up now . . . .

The Year 7 still has the banding system because there is not enough information on their academic ability to introduce setting:
So, we keep the banding system for Year 7, er, unless there is a particular case, special case they're moving for a subject, but for Years 8 and 9 each subject then will create its own grouping.

A problem, a problem with Year 7 is getting high quality assessment information on their academic ability.

The change from the banding system to the setting system makes the stratification of pupils on the basis of their performances more complicated and ambiguous. Therefore, it should be regarded as a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy, which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more implicit in pedagogic relations.

(E3) Teaching hours increased from 23 to 25: Neutral strategy in pedagogy
One year before the interview, the predecessor of the acting headteacher increased the number of teaching hours from 23 to 25. This strategy only refers to amount of time for teaching, and does not imply particular effects on either regulative or prescriptive rules. Therefore it is regarded as a neutral strategy.

(E4) Homework increased and tightened up: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy
The headteacher said that the school had increased homework and tightened up the homework policy:

Once or twice, we, we actually pushed it up to twice a week, yes. There, there has actually been, er, we review the policy and tighten it up and, er, yeah, trying to maintain and monitor homework policy.

The increase in and tighter control of homework implies stronger pacing for pupils and teachers, and therefore a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations.

(E5) Using external services to analyse examinations: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy and management
The school is using more and more external services to do detailed analyses of examination results and value-added measuring:

... we, er, monitor the GCSE results by, er, we, we usually do graphs subject by subject. Er, in such a way, if you average the child's GCSE results, then, er, then compare that individually. If you do that subject by subject, then you can see, er, you know, if they're underperforming in that subject or doing better in that subject. That gives quite good information, and you can do
gender breakdown as well. Because quite good information for departments, you know, break that down teacher by teacher.

We’ve got an exam officer and, er, she usually does the, the main exams. But we also use the service which has a computer system which produces these graphs, which we find very helpful. . . . When we get them in Year 7, we’re going to give them NFER non-verbal reasoning tests, so that we can do value-added measuring in time.

Other local authorities, er, do administer those tests. . . . the neighbouring borough, that we’ve got good relations with, we’ve got good relations with every local authority except Roundham, er, has, has a year-on-year value-added data. So we could actually tap into that to, to give some kind of, er, information in that aspect. We also subscribe to ‘ALICE’, the A level information system, which, which matches correlation, GCSE results to A level results.

The above detailed analyses assisted by the external services enhance the relative evaluation of pupils’ and teachers’ performances, and therefore should be regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in both pedagogy and management, which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in both pedagogic and organisational relations.

(E6) Quality assurance initiative to monitor teaching in classroom: Prescriptive visible strategy in management

According to the headteacher, at the time of the interview, the school was in a process of developing a quality assurance initiative to monitor effectiveness of the curriculum and quality of learning in classroom:

Well, that [monitoring], that wasn’t happening, but it is happening more. Er, we’ve got a quality assurance initiative going, er, to set up systems of monitoring the curriculum. It’s always basically what you’re doing. It’s monitoring effectiveness of the curriculum and quality of learning in a classroom.

We’ve got a, we’ve got an evaluation phase coming up at the end of the summer term and out of that will come, you know, the next developments towards it.

An informal collegial approach to monitoring did not work very well, and then a relatively formal approach has been tried:

So, you’ve got an initiative which would again, we try and start off in a, in a non-threatening friendly way. Teachers find it very threatening to have something walking into their classroom. That doesn’t always happen here. . . . So by building it up, er, in such a way that, er, it becomes a common place for staff to walk in and out of other people’s classrooms and to have common feedback. I think that was a good idea that though
didn’t work very well. What about trying this kind of idea, er, but also putting it on a, a, a relatively formal basis? Then, er, that’s one way. We are trying to prove, er, the quality of what goes on and the monitoring of what goes on.

The approach needs certain criteria but the criteria will be qualitative rather than quantitative:

A problem with monitoring, anything, I think, is that you’ve got to have yardsticks to monitoring. You see, you know, you can walk into anywhere and you get perceptions of what places, what’s going on, er, but how you can make any other judgement on a purely subjective, like-or-dislike judgement, without having clear understanding of what criteria are important for what level is, er, I don’t know. So, so, it’s setting up, er, really, er, quality characteristics and monitoring. The main thing we sought was to think about what quality characteristics and some measures we could be working towards. By building the means to a planning of activities in the classrooms and, you know, sharing what these things are, that we are trying to achieve this today or that today, then, er, we feel that is a more effective way of monitoring than sending somebody in with a tick sheet and keep a check on how many children are paying attention or how many good at their sheet.

The above initiative of quality assurance or monitoring is intended to assess teaching in classroom with more explicit criteria, and therefore enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in organisational relations. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in management.

(E7) Devolution of decision-making to pastoral managers: Regulative visible strategy in management

The acting headteacher, who subsequently became headteacher, expressed his plan of devolving decision-making and responsibility especially to pastoral managers. He believes that decision-making closer to classrooms is better and that there are many horizontal working groups on various issues but there is not enough vertical organisation for pastoral staff:

... I would make the pastoral staff, head of lower, head of middle, head of sixth form, more responsible for curriculum areas so that the monitoring of curriculum can be more systematic and more effective and that the communication of problems or issues can be dealt with. I take the view that, er, you have to make decisions based upon the needs in the classroom. And more levels of management you’ve got back to where the decisions are made, the more difficult it is to respond to the decisions because things dilute when they get through there. So I think we need closer, er, links to the classroom level so that you can understand their response, problems,
clear overview. That’s what I’ll be saying in my interview [for the headship].

... there have been some moves to devolving, er, say, budget, increasingly giving people budget to manage. Er, er, er, therefore giving people more empowered decision-making facilities, then responsibilities. ... there are different levels of these decisions. So we’ve got some, er, cross-fertilisation groups like, er, the staff development group committee or the learning resources committee, er, there is the quality assurance group, you know, groups linking everything really, and too many groups. Er, but what I think we are lacking is, er, we, we’ve got a very horizontal system, we, more vertical, we need the two really to get, to get them, er, everybody properly consulted, fully aware of what’s going on.

His plan seems to be intended to enhance the explicitness of vertical lines of accountability through pastoral managers including heads of lower, middle and sixth form. Therefore his plan of devolution should be regarded as a regulative visible strategy in management, which enhances the explicitness of regulative or hierarchical rules in organisational relations.
Riverside Street School: grant-maintained; co-educational; 11-16

Standard number: not much below 200

GCSE results: higher than the borough average but lower than the England average.

Date of interviewing the headteacher: 13 March 1995

Student planner to organise learning: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

In 1994, the headteacher introduced the ‘student planner’, a booklet for each student in which school rules are written and the student can fill their own attendance record, calendar, homework record and comments, and so on. His intention was to give teaching and learning a higher status and make them more organised:

... what I’ve done is to shift the focus of attention to the quality of the teaching in the classroom. It’s important that the teacher prepares their lessons, marks the work, returns it quickly and insists on high standards from the children. You might say, “Sure, all schools must do that.” This school wasn’t doing it. Let me show you something. ... I felt, er, that, er, the children needed to realise, we needed to give some status to the learning in the school. So, er, I’ve invested money in these for the children. All the children get a Riverside Street School Planner, student planner. ... This gives learning a higher status. ... this is for the children, say, “Look. Learning is important. This organises your day. Take that.”

The introduction of the student planner is expected to make pupils more aware of the organisation of their learning, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations.

Providing parents with more information on the curriculum: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher, who was appointed in 1993 when the school became grant-maintained, has started to give more information on the curriculum to parents.

This strategy also is aimed at raising the status of teaching and learning:

I wanted to give much more information about what their children are learning. So, this is the parents information booklet, the Key Stage 3, Year 7 to 9, and these details, each subject, who the teachers are, what they are
going to be learning. So, in that your question again, another strategy for me was to raise the status of teaching.

The strategy seems to enhance the explicitness of prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy.

(F3) To employ staff with the teacher-led teaching style: Regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher makes it clear that he has a policy to employ staff with the traditional teacher-led teaching style which he believes to be the best:

I like to employ teachers who have a more traditional approach to work. I want to see all the children in rows facing the teacher with the blackboard behind them. I want to see teachers directing the learning. I don’t have much faith in people who say to me children learn from each other. Yes, children learn bad things from each other as well. Children should be learning most of what they learn from teachers who are skilled at what they are doing, who know and understand their subject.

If, if teachers come into my school for interview and they don’t agree with this, there is no point in appointing, I won’t appoint them. So, I explain all this that goes out in information.

What I insist on is I ask, I ask in all interviews, “What is your classroom management style like? What is it that you want to teach and pass on to children, and how do you do it?” And teachers turn round to me and say, “Well, we get together in groups and give them a theme and they...” I’m not interested.

A good example is the appointment of the head of English whose approach is very much in tune with the headteacher’s belief:

I have employed an En-, a head of English who is far more in tune with what I believe in which teaching should be. I don’t want children in English forever writing poetry. Yes, that’s important, creative work is important. I want children using proper English grammar, full stops, capital letter sentences, and I want children reading a lot of English literature. Er, and, so, when I employed my new head of English, I was very keen to employ somebody who agreed with this.

Although he admits that there are people who do not agree with his belief, he argues that he as the headteacher of the school can make decision based on his belief:

I think teachers direct, the best, the most effective way is for teachers to direct learning. I think a lot of time can be wasted otherwise. Not everybody agrees with me. I, I perfectly accept that. But then again, everybody’s head of this school, therefore it’s up to me to, to determine what I want.
He acknowledges that the teaching methods in the school did not radically change since he became headteacher or the school became grant-maintained. What they do for existing teachers is to focus their attention on the quality of pupils' work.

I, er, it will be wrong for me to suggest that since I became head or, or we've got a new senior management team or since we became grant-maintained, then we radically altered the methods of teaching. I think what we've done is to focus attention on the quality of the children's work. I don't want teachers accepting poor quality work from the children.

The headteacher also emphasises the importance of discipline in classroom management regarding employing new teachers:

Er, but every time I have an opportunity to appoint new teachers, I make sure that they, they understand and accept this system and are willing to work in that system and have a view of classroom management where there is discipline in control. If there is not discipline in the classroom, there is not much that's to go on.

This strategy is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which is intended to enhance the explicitness of both regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations.

(F4) Banding system introduced: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher has been introducing a banding system since September 1994. Previously pupils were taught in mixed-ability tutor groups all subjects except mathematics which had setting for Year 7 and above and French which had setting for Year 8 and above. Under the present system with banding, pupils are put into three broad bands of ability. The top band children form three classes, the middle band three, and the bottom band two.

These children are very able, they work very fast. ... These groups, the middle band, a few less children, and they work perhaps a little slower. And these children are children who've got special needs, these children who've got reading difficulties, language difficulties and so on.

English, Science, history, geography, and religious education are taught in those band groups. Mathematics is taught in set groups within each band for Year 7 and above, and French also for Year 8 and above. Physical education, music, art, and technology are taught in mixed-ability tutor groups. Therefore pupils belongs to three or four different classes, depending on the subjects, mixed-ability tutor group, banded group, mathematics set group, and for Year 8 and above French set group.
So, let’s say a child, if a child comes in, called ‘John’, John comes in, and he goes into Tutor Group C and he register, you know, they take his name, and John is in a class 7C for music, for art, PE, design, but he is in also Band E, and so he goes into E1 for English, but he could also be a very good mathematician and so he is in Set 1 for maths. So, John could be in 1, 2, 3 different classes, depending on the subject.

The new system is replacing the old system year by year:

So, I’ve only had this in place since September 1994 in Year 7 and 8. September 1995, in a few months time, it will be in 7, 8 and 9. And over the next few years, it will be in 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

The children coming to the school, who are offered a place in the school, sit NFER mathematics and English tests about in June, and they are put into bands based on the results of the tests.

The headteacher regards the introduction of the banding system as one of the most important strategies which he has initiated. He states that the strategy was the second thing he did, and the first thing was raising the status of teaching and learning. This strategy is based on his firm belief in the necessity of differentiation:

One of the most important strategies that I’ve put in place in this school for the parents of this area is to not completely sweep away mixed-ability teaching but to reassure them that their children will be working with children who are of the same ability in those classes in those subjects. Now, I think, this is a way of differentiating, er, the curriculum to suit levels of ability. I ask you a question. Do children all learn maths at the same pace? No. Do they, are they all of the same ability in English? No. Well, why put them in the same class? . . . Now, that is a strategic plan that I put in place, a strategic procedure I put in place to, er, improve the quality of teaching and learning that goes on in the school. So, that’s, that was the second thing that I did.

The headteacher seems to think that parents tends to prefer differentiated-ability groups to mixed-ability groups:

. . . I say to parents we will give them a test, and the parents, well, they are quite happy. They know that their children are not now going to be in a mixed ability situation.

He mentions that teachers were not necessarily in favour of the banding system when it was going to be introduced, and that there are still some teachers who do not like it because they regard it as elitist:

The first year [from September 1993], I had to plan it all, talk to my staff, er, not everybody was keen on it. There are even now people who, not particularly, don’t like it, because they think it’s, it’s a bit elitist . . . . You must have heard of it in England a lot of people are concerned about equal.
opportunities. Well, equal opportunities to me means treating children according to their differences.

Asked what percentage of teachers agree with the banding system, the headteacher answers that it was 50% when he suggested the system but now 90% of teachers like the system although some of them might have reservations about the philosophy:

- When I first put it, I would say 50%, but I made sure that my heads, my deputy headteachers, senior teachers, and heads of faculty understood the system. Now it’s, now it’s operating, I would say 90%, easily 90% of the teachers like this system. They might have reservation about the philosophy, but this is the practicality of this, are [sic] much easier to teach. You can set work more easily.

He states that the practicality has persuaded some teachers into accepting the banding system, and implies that the examination results have also contributed to the persuasion:

- ... some of them are very, very keen on this, some of them have accepted this as being a more realistic, practical way of teaching children, and all of them were very concerned that in 1993 the examination results in the school were the worst in this borough. Er, they are not now.

He even emphasize the merit of the banding system for less able children. In the system, the class size of the bottom band classes is smaller than that of the middle band classes, which is smaller than that of the top band classes:

- This is not to say that these children will be getting a poorer quality education. Far from it, I think, these children will be getting a better education because they’re in smaller classes. In these classes, specialist teachers of English and maths teach them.

The introduction of the banding system stratifies pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy, which enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations.

(F5) Teaching hours increased from 23 to 25: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

Before the school became grant-maintained, pupils were taught 23 hours a week.

It has been increased to 25 hours:

- The timetable has changed. We teach more. Before we are a grant-maintained school, we taught 23 hours a week. Now we teach 25. There are five lessons a day, each of one hour. Er, there used to be four lessons a day of an hour and 10 minutes.
In this school's case, the increase in teaching hours implies strengthened pacing in pedagogic relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy.

**F6) Extra classes at lunchtime and after school: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy**

As one of the endeavours which have raised the examination results, the headteacher mentions extra classes at lunchtime and after school:

> And the teachers themselves worked very, very hard, extra classes at lunchtime, after school. Every, everything was put aside and all attention was focused on, “Please this year we will work hard on the exam results.” When in the past what had happened was we came in, we taught and we hoped for good exam results. The examination results that we got in 94 were the best that this school has ever got GCSE.

The extra classes scheme implies strong pacing in pedagogic relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy.

**F7) Homework lists: Regulative visible strategy in management and prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy**

According to the headteacher, he has made his staff more accountable for homework to him through homework lists which he can ask the staff to submit:

> . . . I’ve increased the accountability in a sense that if a parent rings me up and says, “I don’t think my child is getting enough homework”, I did it on Friday, I will write to that teacher or the head of faculty and I will say, “Please supply me with a list of homeworks [sic] that have been set since September. They have to write now what they set. I do, I do it in my, I’ve got, I’ve got one of these, and I write my homework in. So, I think it’s up to managers in a school to make teachers accountable.

This strategy is to enhance the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) rules in organisational relations as well as that of prescriptive (pacing) rules in pedagogic relations, and therefore is a regulative visible strategy in management and prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy.

**F8) Introduction of academic reviews in addition to examinations: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy**

Every year pupils get a set of examinations and an academic review both of which are reported to parents. Although different year groups have different schedules of examinations and a review, approximately every six months pupils’ academic
performances are assessed and reported to their parents. Before the school became grant-maintained, there were only examinations and no review, and therefore parents got a report only once a year:

What we are keen on is that every six months, approximately every six months, children’s academic performances are assessed and monitored. On one of those occasions it is formal testing, and on another it is the teacher’s reporting to parents on effort, attainment, behaviour in the class. So, no more than six months goes by without the children having had some kind of monitoring or assessment reported to parents.

... there was a exam that was reported to parents. There were no reviews, there was no analysis of reviews, there was no posting of results to parents.

Based on the review results, pupils might move from one band to another:

If they are not working very well, they might come out of Band E and go to Band L. Children in Band L might go into Band E.

The introduction of reviews in addition to examinations is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of prescriptive (criteria) rules in pedagogic relations.

(F9) Simplified reports to parents: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy

According to the headteacher, the forms for reporting on examinations to parents have been simplified:

... we have simplified our procedure, and they are all like this. School badge, name of the subject, name of the pupil, tutor group, punctuality: good, number of attendances and its lesson, attainment: excellent, good, average, below average, and in between them, so, this child is, his attainment is average to good, effort: average, then there is a course description telling the parents what they are learning, and then it’s my comment. And all the reports are exactly like that, maths, English, science, history, geography, Year 7, Year 8, Year 9, Year 10. Year 11 is slightly different.

He states that the simple reports are in accordance with what parents want to see:

But all the reports, I think, if you are a parent, you want to know very quickly, “Is your child attending?”, and what level, and what effort they are putting in, what is the course they are doing, and then you want to see what the teacher says. That is very simple. Attendance, effort, achievement, course description, teacher comment.

The reporting form for reviews is even simpler:

Er, the review is name of pupil, and it has a list of all subjects that they are taking, and it has a space for the teacher to comment. And the teacher simply in English has to say ‘good’, ‘not so good’, English, maths, history, geography, er, and one sheet you get a quick review of all subjects.
After the examination, one sheet for a subject. For the review, all subjects on one sheet.
The simplification of the reporting forms is based on the view that reporting should provide clearer information on comparative performances, and therefore a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which is to enhance the explicitness of prescriptive (criteria) rules in pedagogic relations.

(F10) System to award pupils prizes for their attainment and effort: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy
The headteacher introduced an awards system in 1994. Under the new system, he awards a trophy to pupils who have showed the best academic achievement. The first prize was awarded to two pupils who had achieved the best results in their GCSE.

Well, I just, that's my prize for the most outstanding achievement. They got nine grade As each. So I shared the prize between them.

As a part of the system, he has also introduced a lower school presentation evening when books are awarded to pupils who have shown very good attainment or effort in each subject:

And the maximum number of prizes that a child can receive is two, and last July we gave prizes to around about eighty children and, er, I gave them book prizes to the value of eight pounds each.

So, we had Year 7 history prize, boy and girl, Year 8 history prize, boy and girl, Year 9 history prize, boy and girl, and that's the same for all subjects, and then we get, er, effort prizes in history, maths, science, er, so, we, what we do is to reward attainment and effort.

The awards system highlights stratifying differences between pupils, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of prescriptive (criteria) rules in pedagogic relations.

(F11) Colours for very good sport players: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy
The school also introduced colours for very good sport players:

And we introduced, er, what we call colours. Er, if you are a very good footballer or netball player and you play for the school team, you get a little badge to sew on to your blazer.
As a part of the awards system, this is also a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of prescriptive (criteria) rules in pedagogic relations.

(F12) Introducing a house system: Neutral strategy in pedagogy

At the time of the interview, the head teacher was trying to introduce a house system where pupils would involve themselves in extracurricular and pastoral activities through their house:

I want to introduce into the school a house system and, er, I’m explaining that, I’ve already explained it to governors already, and now, now just about to explain to the staff what I want. I want children involved in competition, I want them involved in doing things in their school as much as possible.

The house system does not particularly seem to have an orientation towards increasing or decreasing the explicitness of regulative or prescriptive rules, and therefore is a neutral strategy.

(F13) Clearer and stricter policy of permanent exclusions: Regulative visible strategy in pedagogy

The headteacher has made it clear that consistently misbehaving pupils will be excluded permanently although the official procedures have not been changed. He had excluded permanently four pupils, and was going to exclude another pupil at the time of the interview:

The procedures are the same, but the children now know that if they misbehave consistently in this school, I will remove them from the school.

But where children consistently, persistently misbehave, I think, it’s my responsibility to say, “Unless you behave properly, you will not jeopardise the chances of the other children in your class.”

He argues that his policy of exclusions is supported by parents and governors who regards it as a deterrent:

Now, because a lot of my governors and parents, they want to see discipline as a deterrent, in other words, if I stand in front of all my Year 10 children for example and say, “You will behave properly or I will put you out of this school”, that frightens them. And if they know that the threat is real, then, generally speaking, they behave better.

He mentions, as a merit of the GM status, that the LEA cannot make the school admit disruptive children who have been excluded from other schools:
And what has changed on the GM is that the LEA cannot send other children from other schools who are disruptive to this school. They cannot do that. Er, I won’t take into this school children who’ve been disruptive in other schools unless they have a particular special need.

The clearer and stricter policy of permanent exclusions is a regulative visible strategy in pedagogy, which increases the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) rules in pedagogic relations.

(F14) Departmental review: Regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management

The headteacher has introduced a departmental review, a review of performance of each curriculum area. Once a year, in October, every head of department has to report to and discuss with the headteacher and the deputy head in charge of curriculum. It is focused on examination results. After examination results come out in August, each head of department writes a report in September. According to the headteacher, he and the deputy ask heads of department very hard questions in review meetings:

Every year, once a year, we have what’s called a departmental review. Every head of department has to come in this room with the deputy head, curriculum. They have to write a report on their examination results, who took the exam classes, and we ask some very, very hard questions about the quality of teaching. “Are your teachers setting homework regularly? Are they marking it regularly? Who are the best teachers teaching examination groups? Why did your results go down last year? How have you spent your money and resources?”

With regard to the introduction of the departmental review, the headteacher’s intention is to make his teaching staff accountable to him and the deputy in terms of examination results and make their control over the staff’s performance more explicit and tighter:

We set them targets. We set, we make them accountable to us. It’s not good enough to teach all year and say, “Our exam results weren’t very good last year.”

Er, we now insist on proper departmental reviews. Teachers are made accountable. If you went to a maths teacher now and said, er, “What happens if you don’t get good examination results?” their answer would be, “Well, I have to explain to somebody what I have been doing.” We make the teachers accountable, put some pressure on the teachers.

Review meetings are recorded and minuted, and the headteacher reports on the reviews to the governing body. The procedures seem quite formal. The
consequences of the reviews can be very serious. In the interview, the headteacher mentioned a particular teacher whose performance does not satisfy him and the head of department and he said that, unless the teacher improve, he would not let the teacher teach any exam classes in the following year. He regards the threat to the job as a necessary part of the quality control which the management impose on the teaching staff:

Now, I think that comes a time when it’s up to the headteacher and the deputies to impose on teachers a form of quality control. If you thought you were going to loose your job because you were doing it, you’re not doing it properly, that, that is a motivater. In this country, there isn’t enough of that in my opinion.

The departmental review can be regarded as a formal kind of monitoring scheme to tighten not only prescriptive but also directive control by the school management over the staff based on examination results as a particularly important criterion. Therefore it is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management, which enhances the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive (criteria) rules in organisational relations.

(F15) More in-service training: Neutral strategy in management
The headteacher states that he and one of his deputies have increased in-service training of the staff, and that it has been possible because the school is grant-maintained and therefore has enough budget:

Er, I worked very hard with one of my deputies to do what we call a lot more in-service training. I have to be honest with you in saying that a lot of this is not possible unless you have financial resources. And being a grant-maintained school, I had access to more money to do this than perhaps other schools had.

This strategy of staff training does not imply any leaning towards the explicit or implicit end in regulative or prescriptive rules, and therefore is neutral in terms of visibility.

(F16) Larger management team with clear role of each member: Regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management
Before the school became grant-maintained, the senior management team consisted of headteacher and two deputies. Now the team includes four senior teachers and a senior administrative officer as well. Therefore the number of the
team members has been increased from three to eight. It has been coinciding with the increase of the school size:

... it's not a massive school, it's big, and it's getting bigger. And the management structure in the school was, before grant-maintained status, head, two deputies, that's it. Now head, two deputies, four senior teachers, senior administrative officer who doesn't teach, she is an administrator. Now my senior management team is eight.

Each member of the team has a clear role and, according to the headteacher, the management structure is much stronger than it was previously. He intends to make the management businesslike in a sense:

One of them is head of upper school, Year 10 and 11. One of them is head of lower school, Year 7, 8 and 9. One of them does all the day-to-day administration, if teachers are absent, cover, diary and timetable. One of them is the head of careers and, er, that's basically all he does. I have to say he might be leaving soon and, if he leaves, I won’t replace him on the senior management team. He is a senior member of staff historically, he is a senior member of staff. So, head of upper school, head of lower school, head of administration, careers teacher. My two deputies, one is in charge of staffing, staff appraisal, INSET and duties, and one is in charge of finance and curriculum. My responsibilities are governors, outside liaison with agencies, all issues to do with staffing and policy-making. I make all the policies. My senior administrative officer does all day-to-day finance. Er, she used to be the school secretary, but now she is much more than that. She is also clerk to the governing body. So, I have a management structure of eight, and it’s a lot stronger than it was.

Er, I’m very keen that people have a clear view of their own role. Mr Ohmori, you see, I, I, I would say to you that this school is like a business. ... our job is to provide a quality service. If we don’t provide the service, parents will choose to go to other schools.

Larger management team itself does not have particular implications in terms of visibility, but the above expansion of the management team is intended to provide the management with more hierarchical structure and clearer responsibility. Therefore the above change is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management, which increases the explicitness of both regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive rules in organisational relations.

(F17) Clear agenda for a meeting of the management team: Regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management

The management team has a meeting for three hours every week, and the headteacher provides a clear agenda with every meeting:
We meet here around this table every Wednesday afternoon at 2.30, 2.30 to 5.30, three hours. Er, we go through the diary for four weeks. We go through all staffing issues. . . . I produce an agenda for every meeting. Last week, diary, four weeks, next two weeks, two weeks, diary request, bulletin, caretaking, staffing, in-service training, and then various issues that are important to us. That takes place once a week. And there are eight people around a table. They’ve all got various responsibilities.

According to the headteacher, previously there was no agenda and no real structure:

A regular meeting every week, but no agendas, no real structure. I didn’t like it.

His intention is to make the school organisation tighter and more explicit:

Er, and that happens once a week. So, the organisation and administration is hopefully all very tight, very clear.

This is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management, which increases the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive (sequencing) rules in organisational relations.

(F18) To publicise positive aspects of the school through the local newspaper: Neutral strategy in management

He approached the local newspaper to seek positive reporting on the school’s activities:

I, I indicated to the local newspaper in September that I was keen for us to be seen in the community as doing things. The whole of my wall there, most of those pictures, photographs come from what’s happened, newspaper reports of good things going on in the school. We’ve set up a bank. we have a famous footballer who is an ex-pupil. Er, we have entered a maths competition. We’ve got a school magaz–, school magazine.

There is no indication that the above strategy has an orientation towards the explicitness or implicitness of regulative or prescriptive rules, and therefore it is neutral in terms of visibility.

(F19) Newsletters to parents full of information: Neutral strategy in management

The school sends a newsletter to parents every six weeks, and it includes much information on positive aspects of the school:

... every six weeks, I send a newsletter home to parents, full of information. ... lots of, lots of information, it goes home toward parents, about what’s happening in the school, mathematics competition, we went
to the House of Commons, visits, school magazine, anything that goes on, that markets my school amongst my parents.

Again this strategy does not have any particular implications in terms of visibility, and therefore is a neutral strategy.

**(F20) Brochure of better quality: Neutral strategy in management**

The quality of the school’s brochure has been improved:

That’s, that’s the brochure that parents get. It’s a better quality, it’s not perfect yet, but it’s better than it was. And, er, so, marketing my school, the quality of the brochure is important.

This does not seem to lean to the visible or invisible end, too. Therefore it is a neutral strategy.

**(F21) Fostering the links with the industry: Neutral strategy in management**

The school is trying to foster more links with the industry:

So, marketing, I’m doing more of it. We have a governing body’s subcommittee called Community and Public Relations. We are very keen at the moment to begin fostering relations . . . in the industry. And, er, in July I’m going to speak to the local chamber of commerce, which is local groups of businessmen, and I shall be basically putting our school on the map, and say this is what we’re doing in the school, these are the links we’d like to have with the industry. We’ve just started, er, a link with Midland Bank, we’ve got links going with, er, a local car manufacturer. Er, there is a lot to do on that, yes.

This is also a neutral strategy which does not show any leaning towards the visible or invisible end.