THE CONCEPT OF EDUCATION

Dennis Hayes MA (Kent)

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ABSTRACT

A misapprehension of the concept of education is documented. This reflects a weakness in our grasp of the concept of the concept of education and a faulty understanding of the nature of thought and argument. This misapprehension involves the essentially Kantian view of examples as intuitive aids to understanding. Against this it is argued that examples are absolutely fundamental to thought. Even deduction, our paradigm of good reasoning, reduces to case by case argument. This misapprehension is embodied in 'criteriological' approaches to the concept which assume that to be justified in calling something an example of 'education' necessitates giving 'criteria'. But justification may take the form of case by case 'argument'. This alone can give increased grasp of a concept.

The 'criteriological' approach derives from Wittgenstein. The notion of 'rules' of language functioning as intermediaries between 'criteria' and 'conditions' for the use of terms provides no support for the approach. There are no 'rules' in the special sense required. A reading of Wittgenstein suggests no 'theory of criteria' but a methodological injunction to consider the details of what it makes sense to say in particular cases. Three interrelated metaphors 'family resemblance', 'games' and 'grammar' have been misinterpreted by being interpreted systematically. They are intimately connected with case by case procedure and offer an essentialism without universals.

A 'family resemblance' approach to the concept is developed and discussed. The notion of 'aspect change' is employed to illuminate some examples of education. A case by case procedure is sketched utilising examples from Tolstoy, Dickens, Golding, Austin and others. 'Criteria' extracted from these examples would be clumsy and unilluminating. Seeking 'criteria' is a habit of thought. If these examples are taken as intended we may detect increased grasp.
# CONTENTS

## Chapter One  INTRODUCTION .................................................. p. 5
  1.1. The Kantian View of Examples ........................................ p. 5
  1.2. Documentation (A) ....................................................... p. 7
  1.3. Documentation (B) ........................................................ p. 15
  1.4. Examples and Counter-Examples ....................................... p. 17
  1.5. Case by Case Argument ................................................ p. 25
  1.6. 'Concepts' and 'Analysis' .............................................. p. 43
  1.7. Summary: 'What it makes sense to say' ............................ p. 52

## Chapter Two  RULES AND CRITERIA ........................................... p. 54
  2.1. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions ................................ p. 55
  2.2. Rules .............................................................................. p. 59
  2.3. 'Criteria' as Necessary and Sufficient Conditions ................ p. 69
  2.4. 'Criteria in Philosophy of Education' ................................ p. 76
  2.5. The Basic Criteriological View ........................................ p. 81
  2.6. Meaning and Criteria ................................................... p. 92
  2.7. 'Criteria' in Wittgenstein's Philosophy ............................. p. 99
  2.8. General Criteria and Education ....................................... p. 110

## Chapter Three  THREE METAPHORS ............................................. p. 116
  3.1. 'Family Resemblance' .................................................... p. 118
  3.2. 'Games' ....................................................................... p. 129
  3.3. 'Grammar' ................................................................... p. 139

## Chapter Four  ESSENCE AND EDUCATION .................................... p. 148
  4.1. A Family Resemblance Approach? ..................................... p. 150
  4.2. Learning and Aspect Change .......................................... p. 159
  4.3. 'Grammatical' Remarks ................................................ p. 173
Chapter Five  EDUCATION BY EXAMPLES

5.1. The Particularity of Criticism
5.2. A Case by Case Procedure
5.3. Some Objections

Chapter Six  CONCLUSION

6.1. Breaking a Habit of Thought
6.2. Wittgenstein's Full Stop

BIBLIOGRAPHY
'You mustn't tell us about the ring, here. Very well, then. Describe your father as a horsebreaker. He doctors sick horses, I dare say?''

'Oh yes, Sir.'

'Very well, then. He is a veterinary surgeon, a farrier, and horse breaker. Give me your definition of a horse.'

(Sissy Jupe thrown into the greatest alarm by this demand.)

'Girl number twenty unable to define a horse!' said Mr Gradgrind, for the general behoof of all the little pitchers.

'Girl number twenty possessed of no facts, in reference to one of the commonest of animals! Some boy's definition of a horse. Bitzer, yours.'

'Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely, twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth.' Thus (and much more) Bitzer.

'Now girl number twenty,' said Mr Gradgrind. 'You know what a horse is.'

Dickens  
Hard Times

1.1. The Kantian View of Examples.

'Certainty and clearness', according to Kant, are the two essential requirements of critical philosophy. To meet the demand of certainty he considered it necessary to reject all modes of opining. To meet the demand of clearness it was necessary to achieve a discursive (or logical) clearness through concepts and an intuitive (aesthetic) clearness through intuition, that is, through examples and other concrete illustrations.'

Intuitive clearness, for Kant, is a subsidiary business which is only necessary 'from a popular point of view.' Examples are merely illustrative and in giving too many we may cover over and conceal the articulation and organisation of the system, which, if we are to be able to judge of its unity and solidity are what chiefly concern us.' In these passages Kant is not merely making excuses for the paucity of examples in the Critique. What he says in the First Introduction is quite compatible with his view of examples in enabling us to make judgements. He saw the understanding as the 'faculty of rules' and judgment as 'the faculty of subsuming under rules'. It is the ability
to see whether something is a case of something else. It is a 'natural power' a 'mother wit' which cannot be assisted by logic. Logic, by definition, only gives us general rules, and if we cannot apply them 'logic' cannot help us. If we are wanting in judgement Kant believes that there are two possible reasons for this. Firstly we may have an abstract power of comprehension which finds application to particular instances difficult. Secondly, we may not have received 'through examples and actual practice adequate training for this particular act of judgement.' (6) Such a 'sharpening of the judgement is indeed one great benefit of examples.' (7) There are, however, great drawbacks to examples. They impair the correctness and precision of intellectual insight because they do not enable us to comprehend the universality of rules. 'Examples are thus the go cart of judgement; and those who are lacking in natural talent can never dispense with them.' (8)

I begin an essay on the concept of education with a brief exegesis of a very minor theme of the Critique not because I think Kant's arguments are important or sound, for they are neither. (9) Nor because I believe that contemporary philosophy of education is explicitly neo-Kantian, but because in the passages I have referred to he makes explicit the narrow conception he has about the role of examples in thought. This attitude, as I will show, is implicit in much of the recent work done on the philosophy of education and vitiates all of the recent work done on the concept of education. Crudely put, the central argument of this thesis is that what Kant says is an inversion. Examples are absolutely fundamental to thought. (10)

What I shall venture to call the 'Kantian view of examples' is not absolutely wrong but it is inadequate. It is a philosophical malaise brought about by the search for a systematic philosophy and a philosophic system. Educational philosophers like other philosophers have generally given up the search for philosophical systems. However, they still feel the pull of the analogy between what they are doing and the system building activities of scientists. Perhaps many educational philosophers would repudiate this analogy in favour of one with literature and the arts. (11) The documentation I will present in this thesis will show any such repudiation to be merely rhetorical.
The inadequacy of the Kantian view of examples leads to an inadequate notion of what it is to think, to reflect, to argue. It leads to an inadequate notion of what is involved in 'having' a concept and hence to an inadequate treatment of any particular concept. In discussing the concept of education in the light of this malaise it is important to recognize that the inadequate apprehension of the concept of a concept which is symptomatic of an inadequate apprehension of the nature of thought and argument. Of course, to say that something is inadequately apprehended is not to say that it is not apprehended.

1.2. **Documentation**

To document my claim that the concept of education has been inadequately apprehended I adduce the persistence of the following two related sets of 'questions' and the corresponding affirmative, negative, or contrary 'answers' to them:

(a) Is there one concept of education? (12) Is there one ambiguous concept of education? (13) Are there two concepts of education? (14) Are there three, four, or five concepts of education? (15) Are there many concepts of education? (16) Do different people have different concepts of education? (17) Do particular social groups have different concepts of education? (18) Must every human being necessarily have a certain concept of education? (19) Are there historically independent concepts of education? (20) Is there a super concept of education embracing possibly incompatible concepts of education? (21) Is education a vague concept? (22) Is there an essence to the concept of education? (23) Is education a family resemblance concept? (24) Is education a core concept? (25) Is education an essentially contested concept? (26)

(b) Is it possible to define the term 'education'? (27) Are there several 'definitions' of the term 'education'? (28) Are there necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the term 'education'? (29) Are there necessary conditions for the use of the term 'education'? (30) Are there sufficient but not necessary conditions for the use of the term 'education'? (31) Are there any sort of conditions for the correct application of the term 'education'? (32) Are there criteria for the application of the term 'education'? (33) Has the term 'education' evaluative meaning? (34) Has the term 'education' descriptive meaning? (35) Are there central and peripheral uses of the term 'education'? (36)
Has the term 'education' changed in meaning? (37) Is the meaning of the term vague? (38)

This seemingly straightforward concatenation of interrogatives is meant to be indicative of the sorts of 'questions' asked by philosophers of education during the last decade or so. It is not exhaustive as it ignores such 'refinements' as talk of 'strong' or 'weak' definition. That it reveals a certain amount of confusion might be more apparent if the inscriptions are rewritten in declarative form i.e. 'There is one concept of education.'; 'There are two concepts of education', and so on. Many pairings of questions from both sections will seem to be incompatible if not inconsistent. Occasionally an incompatible pairing is found in a single treatment of the concept of education. (39) Incidental, or even thorough going inconsistency is of marginal importance. What I wish to stress at the outset is simply the persistence of these 'questions' and of 'questions' about these 'questions'.

Though my lists are restricted to 'questions' about the 'form' of the concept or term a similar list could be drawn up which covered the 'content' of the concept or term. (40) Reference would be made, for example, to philosophers who connected the concept essentially with learning and those who argue that this relation is contingent, and to philosophers who consider 'education' to have an evaluative component and to those who deny this. For this purpose of preparatory documentation the list will suffice. What they show is that something is wrong in the way that philosophers talk about the concept of the concept of education. To say that something is wrong and to give evidence that a certain amount of confusion exists is not, of course, to establish that this confusion is a result of the Kantian assumptions discussed above. It may be that these 'questions' are held to be meaningful but that the correct answers to them have not been satisfactorily given. It will be my aim in the balance of this thesis to establish that such continual and repeated questionings are sterile and fruitless, because they embody the Kantian view of examples. In correcting this Kantian misapprehension I hope that the need to ask such 'questions' will disappear and be replaced by an approach to the concept which is more instructive and enlightening.
Set \( (a) \) contains examples of 'questions' about the concept of education and the concept of the concept of education. Set \( (b) \) contains 'questions' about the meaning of the term 'education'. The misapprehension I am referring to is not a trivial one which would occur if sets \( (a) \) and \( (b) \) were somehow confused. John Wilson is intolerant of philosophers of education who talk in an 'incoherent' way of both 'the use of concepts' and 'the use of terms'.(41)

In philosophy and in ordinary conversation we move from one expression to the other without qualm. The distinction doesn't matter unless you are concerned with distinguishing between the nature of concepts and the use of terms. Wilson considers such loose speaking as important because he sees it as resulting from a tension between a personal possessive (or 'psychological') use of the term 'concept' and the meaning of any given term. He argues that there is no intelligible first person possessive use of the term 'concept' so that all we are left with is the meaning of a term. The misapprehension highlighted here is wide ranging enough to cover the confusion involved in seeing concepts as a half way house between some sort of mental entity and the meaning of terms, and the confusion involved in the simplistic reductionism of the Wilsonian kind which involves in a search for the meaning of terms. (42)

One might also add that the misapprehension is also evinced by those who argue that Wilson has a non-dynamic view of language, a fido-fido theory of meaning, and that his approach amounts to an attempt to kill discussion by definition. (43)

Wilson's suggestion that we encapsulate bits of the world as we distinguish it in sets of rules and that these constitute our 'concept' is reminiscent of Kant's position. For both philosophers categorising is forming 'rules'. Philosophical argument consists of attempts to make meanings or sets of 'rules' explicit, or it consists of resolving categorisation problems such as asking if \( A \) is a case of \( X \) or a case of \( Y \), or it evaluates concepts i.e. it asks whether the concept \( Y \) is needed. The 'grasp' of such 'rules' is not an issue. Both philosophers would argue that that is a 'psychological' matter.

'Laying out cases' is merely a preliminary procedure to conceptual clarification, a guide to those lacking in 'mother wit'. (44) Wilson, therefore, exemplifies the Kantian view of examples. To show that his views are not eccentric or atypical it is necessary to adumbrate the way in which the Kantian view finds expression in the arguments of philosophers of education. (45)
Consideration of Wilson's argument clearly reveals that philosophers of education are active on the three levels indicated above. Indeed this could not be otherwise. They are concerned with the concept of education, with the concept of that concept and with the nature of thought and argument. To begin to understand the nature of the Kantian misapprehension the least concrete level must be considered first.

The following characterisation is not given a priori. Nor does the presence of any or all of the following features do more than indicate the adoption of the Kantian view. They proceed from the most general (often merely implied) features to the slightly less general:

1) The assumption that the only truly valid form of reasoning is that which approximates to deduction.
2) The belief that there is one single feature or set of features that characterise a concept or give the meaning of a term.
3) An excessive preoccupation with definition.
4) The production of 'universal' or 'conceptual truths'.
5) An obsession with giving 'rules', 'criteria', or (logically) necessary conditions.
6) An on-going argument about method.
7) A constant need to reformulate analyses.
8) A dearth of examples.

This latter feature is ex hypothesi the most obvious. 1) and 2) give expression to the pull of the analogies with mathematics and science. All these features result from a concern with the general rather than the particular. They are the manifestations of certain confusions or tendencies with a common root. Familiarity with them make an insistence on documenting their appearance in the arguments of philosophers of education seem otiose. But these simply stated points are not merely the well known truisms of a plethora of introductory textbooks. They are evidence of a flawed apprehension of what it is to have a concept. Familiarity with their denials may make a persistence in documenting them appear perverse. Assertion, denial, reformulation and endless qualification is precisely what is being sighted as evidence of a flawed apprehension. Or rather, they are evidence of a flawed apprehension of a flawed apprehension of the concept of education, which results from a flawed
apprehension of a flawed apprehension of the concept of the concept of education, which is the result of a flawed apprehension of a flawed apprehension of the nature of thought and argument. These iterations indicate the complexity of the matter. These tendencies, like the 'truism' that man is mortal and must therefore die are both known and not known.

My first point is the easiest and the hardest to document. It is the easiest because the presence of all the other features establish it. It is the hardest because the contradictory thing is often asserted. Occasionally philosophers will reveal themselves in off-hand comments. Mary Warnock, for example, in her article 'Towards a Definition of Quality in Education' begins with a remark to the effect that 'It must be agreed from the start that in this particular field there is no such thing as proof.' Warnock gives us a picture of proof which we could encapsulate in the expression to an attitude which penetrates our whole way of thinking. For deductive proof gives us absolute cogency an unconditional certainty derived from the laws of logic. This may seem unfair as Warnock is only attempting to be just, but in giving philosophy of education its due, in setting its place, she denies that we can have proof and this distorts our whole view of reasoning. Reasoning need not be deductive and yet can still be a priori. It need not be inductive either. There can be logical connections which are a priori but non-necessary. This needs to be shown. Perhaps Aristotle had this in mind but expressed it in a misleading way? The misleading expression is what we must focus upon. The assumption contained in this misleading way of putting things in a (correct) picture of the unassailable nature of deductive reasoning. This general picture when taken as a model of comparison or paradigm of reasoning forms the basis for the other misapprehensions and confusions. The acceptance of this picture is a habit of thought with philosophers. They do not, as it were, say it to themselves.

The second feature is meant to characterise essentialism without giving expression to any particular form of essentialism. Thus it does not distinguish between what we can call 'vulgar' essentialism the idea that there are certain characteristics that are necessarily true of certain objects, and more sophisticated forms of essentialism which allow any of a varying but given subset of a range of different features to be necessarily true of certain objects. Peters once declared that he did not mind if he put his 'foot on the primrose path that leads to essentialism'. and the essentialist method has
been rife ever since. (48)

The third, fourth and fifth features are a consequence or are concomitants of the second. Definition; dictionary definition; general definition; scientific definition; strong definition; weak definition; descriptive definition; stipulative definition; prescriptive definition; programmatic definition; inventive and non-inventive stipulative definition; descriptive-programmatic definition, all these are familiar terms to philosophers of education. Often they deny that there is any 'dictionary' definition of the term 'education'. (49) Yet they constantly turn to the Oxford English Dictionaries to extract 'exhaustive categories' of education, (50) or to distinguish between a 'general' and a 'specific' meaning of the term. (51) More typically they summarise the 'familiar' objections to beginning their enquiry with definitions of central terms and then to argue that, nevertheless, this approach is not unprofitable and some 'clarificatory attention' to key terms is justified. (52)

A specific objection to using the dictionary which is not covered by the usual philosophical objections is that the dictionary has been shown in some infamous cases to be wrong. (53) And this is something which cannot be shown by reference to the dictionary. Concern with definition results partly from the axiomatic model provided by 1) and the method of 2). This latter feature results in a theory of meaning. For the method is held to produce 'conceptual truths' which look very much like definitions of the sort found in dictionaries. Thus 'to be educated' is said to mean 'to learn to be a person'; (54) 'Teaching' is said to mean 'the intention to bring about learning in another'; (56) and so on. These are said to be 'conceptual truths' which mark conceptual connections. In a less material mode we are said to have 'logically necessary conditions' for the use of the term 'education'. These provide us with 'criteria' for the use of terms. Peters' statement of the (three) 'criteria' of education in Ethics and Education or Hirst and Peters' statement of the (two) criteria of education in The Logic of Education (57) will serve as examples. The presentation of 'criteria' of this general sort follows from features 1) - 3). Often the notion of a 'rule' or 'rules' for the use of the term is introduced to expedite the statement of '(logically necessary conditions' and 'criteria'.

Terms such as 'criteria' and 'rule' are often explicitly said to derive from Wittgenstein. Even terms which do not are incorporated into an interpretation of his writings. But the use of these terms in the writings of Wittgenstein are highly problematic. They are used as explanatory devices when they are in need of careful explanation themselves.

The sixth feature, the constant need to reformulate analyses is something that Peters comments upon. (58) The seventh feature, the ongoing argument about method, follows from the sixth point. Philosophers of education stick to the idea that they have to set out 'conceptual truths' despite the seeming impossibility of producing any true 'truths', and despite substantial criticism. The critics fall into two sorts. There are 'internal' critics such as Reddiford and Dunlop who wish to explore the possibilities of non-analytic, non-contingent truths connected with the concept of a 'human being'. We can also include in this group all those critics who want to push all such truths into the contingent camp. (61) Then there are 'external' critics such as Haack and Nidditch who are much more uncompromising. Nidditch, for example, rejects the method of 'conceptual analysis' which he calls 'Neo-Ramism' on three grounds: Firstly, he objects to an Aristotelian assumption about the uniformity of human beings that the methodology requires. (64) Secondly, he objects to the unargued nature of many of the assertions made by the practitioners of Neo-Ramism. (65) And finally, he objects to the values and preferences of the authors masquerading as 'truths'. (66) Whatever the validity of these points, which have been made by many besides Nidditch, there is clearly a debate about method.

The final point is a surprising one, as it is often baldly asserted that one of the cardinal points in philosophical method is to show points by means of examples. (67) This leaves the giving of examples in philosophy of education as no more than a curiosity. It is an entirely accidental or contingent feature of the subject. As it stands the remark is ambiguous. No attempt is made to clarify or expand it. It could refer to the Kantian view which sees examples as having an important illustrative function. Or it could refer to something more fundamental. That it does not is apparent when you start to count examples. Not that there is something in the sheer quantity of examples that makes them important, but merely that their absence
is more likely to be indicative of the Kantian view than otherwise. If an instructive comparison is sought it might be useful to compare Paul Ziff's discussion of 'The Word "Good"' in *Semantic Analysis* (68) with Peters' discussion of education in *Ethics And Education*. Both are about forty pages long. Ziff considers in detail over 160 examples of the use of the term 'good'. There is nothing like a quarter of this number in Peters' section, and to say this is to be very generous in what we take as an example.

The paradoxical nature of these tendencies is now apparent. The pull of the mathematical analogy is resisted even in the piece of documentation produced to support it. Essentialism is decried while essentialist methods of attempting to see 'behind' our use of terms are retained. Definitional approaches are substantially criticised and vigorously attacked while definitions, of a sort, are given. Universally applicable 'criteria' are sought while their multiplicity is recognised. Analyses are constantly altered and reformulated and the method of 'conceptual analysis' attacked and defended. Examples are held to be important but are not extensively used. And this situation is held to be a 'healthy' state of affairs.

All this is not new and will not be news to philosophers. It is only to be expected given a certain view of the task of a philosopher. This view is that what is characteristic of philosophy is its 'quest for generality' its seeking after a 'general perspective'. These remarks come from Scheffler's seminal work *The Language of Education*. (70) I know of no evidence that suggests that the conception of philosophy of education he gave expression to there has been overthrown. Indeed, philosophers never tire of reminding us that 'by its nature, in looking to universal principles, the philosophy of teaching is abstract as philosophy is always abstract'. (71) The consequences of this perspective are disastrous: when we move from the 'healthy' self-reflective moments of the philosopher of education on his subject to his attempts to solve particular problems. In a primary school where explanations, in the early years at least, may often seem to take the form of ostention or example-giving and in this way be 'radically different from explanations in other institutions', (72) they are seen by one philosopher of education as involving only universal or general elements 'principles',
'definitions', 'standards', 'norms', 'criteria' and so on. The use of examples is not mentioned and there is certainly no indication that consideration of them is necessary. The use of examples is implied for instance in the giving of some procedural explanation of a piece of know-how. But the use of examples is not held to be worthy of treatment parri passu. The efficacy of a satisfactory verbal explanation is such that examples seem only an indirect way of reaching the duller vessels who cannot dispense with them. The consequences of this view could be the misconduct of education. For the moment we are concerned with the Kantian malaise at the most general and academic level. And at this level there is no evidence that this conception of philosophy has been overthrown. The appearance of these tendencies and confusions listed above are obvious manifestations of what has been called a 'craving for generality'. An alternative formulation of this remark would be to say that these philosophers have a 'contemptuous attitude towards the particular case'. Expressions such as 'craving' and 'contempt' are not intended to be insolent or unsavory which they could seem to be if taken out of context. They are not superlatives. They indicate precisely that what is at issue is not a mistaken analysis, a false assumption, or a mistake in argument, but a way of thinking that is habitual and unreflective. It may involve false assumptions and mistakes at another level but these are merely symptoms of a flawed apprehension. What follows may be considered as a plea for particularity.

1.3. Documentation (B)

We have been concerned to document what seems to be a flawed apprehension of the concept of education amongst philosophers of education. This flawed apprehension will be the theme of this essay. Such an activity as discussing a flawed apprehension of a concept may seem academic, frivolous and remote. This is a serious accusation and there are two replies to it, one which is frivolous, and derives from John Wisdom and runs like this '... it's a free country. Everyman to his taste. Some go to the dogs and some consider the concept of having the concept of Doghood, ...' The second, which derives from the same source, concerns the importance of 'documentation'. By 'documentation'
Wisdom means that we should 'produce evidence that the confusions that concern us are active in non-philosophical discourse.' (76) Upon the production of such evidence depends the meaningfulness and relevance of my claim that there is something wrong with our concept of the concept of education. We can do no more here than hint at how we could go about such documentation. It seems to me that the flawed apprehension of the concept of education is apparent in the following sorts of instances: (77)

1. In the existence of demands for the definition of 'education'. Perhaps a classic illustration of this is provided by a letter to The Guardian which announced that as the editor of the 'education' section had not defined what he meant by 'education' people had a 'blank in their minds' as to the meaning of the term. (78)

2. In the existence of the paradoxical situation that it is often claimed that we are all experts on education and yet at the same time we are ignorant of its nature. This sort of argument is regularly produced and commented upon. See for example an article 'Educating the Educators' published in the New Statesman. (79)

3. In the existence of a popular debate about how to talk about education. 'Popular' in the sense that it is not restricted to academics. Here we could refer to discussions about what goes on in primary schools. (80) More specifically a group calling for 'Education for Capability' has recently set out to alter our education system at least partly by altering the way we talk about education. They explicitly state that they wish to alter our concept of education not merely to include but to stress 'training'. The trend of philosophy of education has been to stress that since the nineteenth century the concept of education had been progressively separated from that of training. This they would argue is a debasement of the concept of education. As evidence of this they point out that we have no word for the culture the Germans describe as 'Technik' or for the mode of working the French describe as 'Metier'. In Emile, of course, the concepts of education and training are almost synonymous. Of a heterogeneous collection of some one hundred and forty signatories to a letter in The Guardian setting out the aims of the group none are philosophers of education. (81)

4. In the continuance of a public debate about the nature of education. 'The then Prime Minister, Mr. James Callaghan, introduced just such a debate on 18th October 1976. (82)

5. In the misconduct of the process of education. Perhaps, the 'Tyndale' affair provides a good example here. At least one commentator saw it as a result of confusion about what education was. (83)
No attempt is made to deal with all the possible permutations of these instances. Many other examples could be produced from newspapers, magazines, television and radio, as well as from everyday life. This limited gesture towards such documentation demonstrates the extent of what seemed \textit{prima facie} a purely academic or philosophical misapprehension.

1.4. Examples and Counter-Examples

I have been indicating what seems to be evidence of an inadequacy in the treatment of the concept of education by philosophers of education. I have called this inadequacy a result of the 'Kantian view of examples'. Under this view of examples they have a clear function. They illustrate a general hypothesis. This belongs to a whole style of philosophising which is well illustrated by Scheffler's method. Typically Scheffler makes a few general remarks and then proceeds to consider selected examples. (84) All our attention is focused on the general. Now this is clearly a role for examples and a useful one. As I have said, the Kantian view is not all wrong.

This typical way of thinking has a corollary in the giving of counter-examples. It is usually held \textit{pace} the treatment of scientific hypotheses that one counter-example is sufficient to refute a thesis. (85) Let me illustrate this method with an imaginative counter-example to the epistemological hypothesis that 'Knowledge is justified true belief'. The counter-example to this well entrenched thesis was thought up by Colin Radford and goes as follows: 'Imagine the case of a French-Canadian who believed he knew nothing of English history. In the course of a game he makes several correct guesses about dates in English history, including the date of the death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603. At the time they seem to be merely guesses, but he subsequently remembers what he had forgotten, namely, that he once had to learn these dates in school. So he did in fact know the dates, although he did not believe he did. Giving this sort of counter-example is clearly a useful role for examples.' (85)

This brief sketch does not start with an over-simplistic view of scientific method. What we are presenting is part of a picture of scientific methodology and one of mythological proportions. "It could be argued that whatever fails to fit our systems or breaks universal rules is not rejected but is an exciting challenge for
scientists to develop new theories. By examining cases of how scientists actually proceed Feyerabend has convincingly shown that the gauntlet is not taken up and 'whatever fails to fit into the established category system or is said to be incompatible with this system is viewed as something quite horrifying or, more frequently, it is simply declared not to exist.' (87)

General theses and counter-examples also feature largely in literature on the concept of education. The trouble is we are reluctant to give theses up. Just as there have been desperate attempts to rescue that famous definition of what we mean by knowledge. (88) There have been equally desperate attempts to rescue the infamous definition of 'education' as 'initiation into a worthwhile way of life'. Obvious counter-examples to this are someone undergoing an education in a 'Robinson Crusoe' sort of situation, or someone's saying 'Travelling with him was a real education.' (89) Desperate attempts are made to save the general thesis. The concept is battered, re-shaped, cut up, squeezed and forced into the required form. The methodology of this metamorphosis has been illustrated. But this way of dealing with counter-examples, by shuffling them off the stage, is so common place that it is rarely questioned. It has indeed been called the 'Classic Move' of the conceptual analyst. (90) Again, there is clearly some validity in such a move at some times in an argument. It can be a way of focusing someone's attention on the cases you want them to consider. But to persist in making this move is to risk conceptual distortion.

'Examples', 'Instances', and 'Cases' are used as if they were interchangeable. But there are important differences which we can indicate in a rough and ready fashion. An example suggests something imaginative and creative. We give examples when we are struggling to understand or to challenge a received understanding as in the Radford example. An instance is evidence for a general argument or hypothesis. An instance must be an instance of something, as in philosophy we talk of an instance of some universal or other. 'Case' is a more neutral and general term referring to events, happenings, instances and examples. Equivocation between 'instances' and 'examples' is facilitated by the use of the more neutral term 'case'. 
Thus to defend the conceptual analyst's belief in the existence of something 'behind' our use of terms against those who stress the importance of a consideration of a manifold of cases it is claimed that 'An example must be an example of something'. And this is true, but not in the sense intended. We shall return to this last point.

Examples as they feature in the abundant literature on the concept of education are cursory, hackneyed and restricted. Cursory examples are a result of seeking a 'general form' for 'education' which makes no reference to content. Connections between 'education' and 'knowledge' and 'understanding' can be made explicit without committing oneself to any particular content. Thus we get offhand references to 'experiences being transformed' and to people still listening and learning even in middle age and when it does them no financial or other extrinsic good. Or to a man who only knew mathematics or who was trained in military skills and habits. Hackneyed examples abound Spartan Education, Robinson Crusoe, anamnesis as demonstrated in the Keno, and so on. The lack of specificity in examples results from the concept itself which demands the development of knowledge and understanding in breadth. This restricts examples even more than the restriction on 'content' and presents an illusion of understanding.

A defence of 'trivial' or 'simple' examples seems possible in philosophy of education as in philosophy of morals or religion. An argument that education is necessarily a non-trivial thing would have equal force in the case of these other branches of philosophy where the suggestion is often made. By 'trivial' philosophers mean to indicate that the examples must be such as not to enbroil you immediately in a heated and emotional dispute. To be 'simple' they must be transparent in a sense which will be made clear. Philosophers who consider such examples do not separate the 'trivial' from the 'simple' but it is useful to distinguish them to meet the obvious objection that a trivial example is going to be simple, but a simple example need not be trivial.

The giving of trivial examples in moral philosophy is held to be not only necessary but desirable. Thus examples such as whether we ought to return our overdue library books, or pay for our groceries are held to illuminate the nature of moral judgements because what we ought to do in these cases is obvious. The suggestion is that we can illuminate the nature of moral judgements without reference to
the content of those judgements. This is consonant with the thesis that moral judgements are universalisable i.e. that I hold that X is the right thing for me to do in situation S commits me to holding that it is the right thing for Y to do in a not dissimilar situation. A consideration of a full and complex example will show that this thesis is false at least for a class of moral judgements and in doing so will show the necessity of considering fully fledged examples. The counter-example comes from Melville's novel *Billy Budd.* (91) Captain Vere after hearing the case decides that Budd is guilty of murder and should be put to death. This is not a simple rule-book decision it involves considerable reflection on Budd's actions, the situation he found himself in on the H M S *Indomitable.* A different Captain or even Vere himself at a different time may reach a different decision about what is morally right. There may appear to be no difficulty here. The difficulty becomes apparent when it is claimed that both judgements can be morally right. This may seem to establish that moral judgements are ineluctably particular only at the cost of contradiction and inconsistency. But this is not the result and we can see this if we represent the matter schematically. V's decision that X is the right thing to do in situation S does not commit him to holding that W in a not dissimilar situation S should also decide that X is right. For things may weigh quite differently with W. He is a person with different inclinations and a different disposition. This only comes out when a complex example is considered. It must be pointed out that the decision is not a problematic one. The facts of the case are not in question. It is only in such complex or full-blown examples that we can see this feature of moral judgements. In the trivial cases we have extracted 'universalisability' as a characteristic of moral judgements precisely because the cases we are considering are trivial in that they lack exactly that which makes our concerns moral. In the case of 'Starry' Vere this could be said to be a conflict between a strict naval code and humanitarian feelings. If we remove this content we are not dealing with a recognizable moral problem.

Bambrough makes out a strong case for considering 'simple' examples. He argues that they have two advantages. Firstly they provide us with unquestionable cases of knowledge, and secondly,
they are transparent in the sense that they allow us to see the patterns which connect these cases with more complicated ones. This is possible because they lie in an absolute unbroken continuum. He warns that we must not think that simple cases allow us to see more clearly a single element common to all cases, rather that we look for 'patterns of analogy or family resemblance'. (92) Bambrough comments that his remarks are quite general in their application. Drawing on arguments familiar to those who have read his influential paper on 'Universals and Family Resemblances' Bambrough argues that in the case of religion there must be such patterns of resemblance because we do after all call the Gods of Olympus and the God of Moses 'Gods'. As we shall see in Chapter Three Bambrough is repeating a mistake of his earlier paper. The position he is maintaining is simply a sophisticated version of the essentialism he disparages. This explains why so many disclaimers appear in his argument to the effect that differences are as important or more important than similarities. But Bambrough also equivocates between 'trivial' and 'simple' cases. The examples he gives are far from trivial. Thus he dwells at length on Homer's account of Athena appearing before Telemachus in the guise of Mentor. This is not trivial in the way that not returning your library books is. And indeed Bambrough admits that his simple examples are not so simple after all. 'Simple' seems to mean a perspicuous or even good example. However we interpret the appearance of Mentor this interpretation will be coloured by the fact that we don't believe in these gods. Whatever account we give will show that we have demythologised whatever was intended by the writer. Bambrough then proceeds to show how certain 'theologians' such as the Bishop of Woolwich have demythologised Christianity in a similar fashion. Juxtaposing such 'simple' cases may indeed illuminate but this illumination is not a function of their simplicity.

Examples in philosophy of education have a contrived air. Consider Johanna Burgess' attempt to construct an 'academic paradox' out of Peters' analysis of 'education'. She gives the example of a professor who is doing beneficial work but receiving payment from a dubious source something which as a moral man he should reject. Have we here a case of a man who is doing something worthwhile and yet not worthwhile, and therefore a man who is educated and not
educated? And is it an answer to say that this exploits two senses of 'worthwhile' and that a man can be educated and not live up to his ideals?\(^{(93)}\) Doesn't this just fail to see the force of the paradox in the way that St Paul failed to see the force of the paradox of the Liar when he considered the fact that they always lie just another indication of what a bad lot Cretians were? What are we to say about this example? It illustrates a further feature of the kind of examples that we find in philosophy of education. They are hopelessly indeterminate and this indeterminacy precludes the possibility of any sound judgement. More than this, an indeterminate example lends a spurious credibility to whatever argument is being advanced.\(^{(94)}\)

That examples are often cursory, hackneyed, trivial, and indeterminate is a result of the Kantian view. If we primarily seek 'conceptual truths' of one sort or another, or 'criteria', or 'rules', or 'logically necessary conditions' for the use of terms then the use of examples will remain simply a matter of presenting 'instances' to indicate whatever 'universal' we have in mind. To drive this point home, consider an analogous case from literature. Turning our discussion of trivial and poor examples on its head we may point out that any set of general considerations that establish that King Lear is sad will do the same for the death of Little Nell, and, as Oscar Wilde remarked, it would take a heart of stone to read the latter without laughing.

Examples can be disparaged for non-philosophical reasons. In politics they can mislead when produced as evidence or counter-evidence for hypotheses requiring quantitative consideration. An instance would be the suggestion that unemployment benefit is claimed by people who nearly all have clandestine jobs. Instances of dramatic abuse may even have effect at the level of social policy making. The use of examples, analogies and allusions in such cases leads to vagueness and imprecision. This may or may not be consciously contrived. It remains a common misuse of examples which could be fairly listed in some loose philosophical categorisation such as Bentham's political fallacies among other 'arguments' used by demagogues to mislead and prejudice the ignorant.\(^{(95)}\)
Another danger in giving examples in the eyes of educationalist Herbert Kohl is that people use them as models to imitate. An example becomes an exemplar. A familiar danger mentioned by Wittgenstein is that one feeds one's mind with a one-sided diet of examples of a single kind (P.I. s 593). (97) This remark is worth repeating as one philosopher has suggested that it is a dietary recommendation. (98)

Again examples can be seen as something akin to the phenomenologist's 'pure situation' which you have to consider carefully if you wish to see the real meaning of something. (99) These dangers of examples result from the Kantian view. In the first case we simply generalise from a single instance in a classically fallacious way. In the second case we give credence to one particular view by selecting only examples which exemplify that perspective. In the last case we have simply another variant of essentialism.

The Kantian view leaves us with a distorted practice. We give examples in ways which exhibit our prior concern with more general features of our concepts. Criticising this view does not mean that we should simply consider more counter-examples or borderline cases. To do this would be to invoke in philosophy of education something analogous to Feyerabend's 'counter inductive' procedure. This involves the construction of hypotheses inconsistent with both accepted theories and established facts. This is necessary in science because a counter example to an orthodox theory is only seen as a counter-example i.e. a refutation if it is enmeshed within a theoretical system. This means that we remain at the level of theory construction no matter how we increase and maximise discrepancies. Therefore the 'anti-methodology' of 'anything goes' will not serve to weaken the misapprehension brought about by the Kantian view.

It has been claimed that this view involves a contempt for the particular case. At its most extreme it errs in not even considering the giving of examples a preliminary way of answering questions about a concept. (101) Or, if this is granted, it is granted grudgingly. For example, Elizabeth Hindess in her article 'Teaching the Meaning of Words' discussed the question of what it is to know the meaning of a word. She allows that there are different senses in which we can give an account of the meaning of a word. She argues that there are 'less
'demanding' senses in which we can give an account of a word's meaning: 'It could be no more than giving examples of how the word is used on any occasion.' (102) This is a clear instance of the Kantian prejudice. Presumably the more demanding way of giving an account of a word's meaning would be to produce 'criteria' or 'definitions'. In this essay I want to correct this sort of misapprehension about the role of examples. I want to stress their fundamental importance in giving an account of a concept. The view expressed by Hindess is that the giving of examples is an indirect or barely adequate way of explaining the meaning of a term. Our knowledge of what it means is something unformulated, perhaps a definition. The hard work comes in formulating this 'definition'. Against this I want to argue that the term 'concept' is vague and that to make clearer what we mean when we talk of any particular concept including the concept 'concept', we must proceed by examples. This is how we make things more determinate. To seek clarification of any other sort will only get us into trouble. (103)

In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein presents a critique of the Kantian view. So much has been written and said about this that Wisdom and others have had to warn us that a distaste for simplification, for definitions and the like can be too *simpliste*. We shall see why later. For the moment, let us take up once again the 'question' that Wittgenstein asks his interlocutor in just the sort of situation I have been discussing:

'Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of game; shewing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these; saying that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and so on.' (P.I. s.75)

It should be noted that it is not asserted that the giving of examples is sufficient. Nor is this denied. A consideration of Wittgenstein's style would reveal that the suggestion is entertained or exhibited rather than asserted. Thus it is not open to a facile form of 'refutation' that has become commonplace. But for the moment we will take it at face value. There are dangers of misinterpretation that result from doing this. To see the passage as more assertive than its form suggests may avoid the Kantian malaise at the risk of appearing to begin to justify some sort of mad particularism. But the Kantian view is so rife that
the dangers are minimal and the prophylactic possibilities considerable. This qualification aside we can put positively the argument that examples are absolutely fundamental to thought. This thesis is not an original one but it is entirely misunderstood at least by philosophers of education. It derives from the work of John Wisdom who in the closing paragraphs of his article 'A Feature of Wittgenstein's Technique' puts the corrective to Kant's view succinctly:

"Kant said that examples are the go-cart of the human understanding. But this is not enough. Examples are the final food of thought. Principles and laws may serve us well. They can help us to bring to bear on what is now in question what is not now in question. They help us to connect one thing with another and another. But at the bar of reason, always the final appeal is to cases."

Wisdom's remark, though colloquial and simple in its presentation, is laconic and difficult. He had developed his ideas about the role of 'examples' or 'Instances' or 'cases' in his 1957 lectures on 'Proof and Explanation' delivered at the University of Virginia. In these lectures, commonly known as The Virginia Lectures, he defends in detail the idea that examples are fundamental to thought. In doing so he utilises the notion of what he calls 'Case by Case Procedure' or 'Case by Case Argument'. What I have to say about the importance of examples derives entirely from a careful reading of these lectures supplemented by consideration of Wisdom's other writings and of the relevant work of Wittgenstein. As the lectures are not widely available, I will summarise the most relevant passages and arguments before going on to apply them in an effort to rectify the inadequate apprehension of the concept of education which exists in the recent literature. (105)

1.5. Case By Case Argument

The aspect of the Virginia Lectures that I want to concentrate upon is Wisdom's claim that 'All reflection comes in the end to a case by case procedure.' (VL. IX. 1.) Time after time he suggests that failure to recognise just this point is the root cause of many philosophical misunderstandings. Yet Yalden-Thomson, in the only
freely available summary of the Lectures, remarks that this 'does not need to be laboured.' (106) This dismissive attitude is thoroughly wrong-headed. In this account of what I believe to be Wisdom's central theme I want to stress how radical and original this thesis is.

Passmore describes Wisdom's philosophical method as consisting in his 'first making a distinction ... as if it were a sharp one and then blurring its edges.' (107) This puts him at odds with Kant and contemporary philosophers like Quine. For example, Kant sought for a 'criterion by which to distinguish with certainty between pure and empirical knowledge.' (108) In a similar manner Quine criticises empiricists for their metaphysical belief in the analytic/synthetic distinction because 'a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn.' (109) Quite clearly Quine is working with Kantian assumptions. The existence of borderline cases seems to show, as far as he is concerned, that we cannot distinguish with certainty between the two sorts of statement and therefore the distinction is a 'dogma'. Wisdom is not troubled by such demands for 'certainty'. Is a satyr a man or a goat? We may hesitate over the answer 'but that doesn't mean that there is no difference between a goat and a man. So if it is the fact that we hesitate over borderline cases that is being referred to, I shouldn't put it in the form that a boundary has not been drawn.'

Wisdom's method may seem like Quine's but Quine takes the existence of borderline cases to show that the distinction is a metaphysical dogma. Wisdom, on the other hand, questions the underlying Kantian assumptions at work when this sort of move is made. He shows that such demands for 'certainty' must be rejected because they embody a false picture. Nor is Wisdom introducing the concept of 'broad borderlines' as a modification of the Kantian view. This interpretation, though tenable, and seemingly supported by passages in the Virginia Lectures, (110) is one that must ultimately be rejected. Wisdom's point goes much deeper and challenges a whole way of thinking about such question.
Let me give another example which will be useful to have at the back of our minds when discussing the Lectures. This example is derived from Wisdom's earlier writings, where he asks the question 'What sorts of questions are there?' Four clear cut and distinct sorts of question emerge:

(a) Empirical questions; (b) Questions of strict logic; (c) Conflict questions; and (d) Paradoxical questions.

What sorts of question are these? (a) are questions like 'Will the gas explode?' or 'Is this poisonous?' where if we are in disagreement we know that would settle the matter for or against.

(b) are questions like 'Is this a thoroughbred horse?' or 'Does 12 x 12 = 144?' where there is a convention in the matter or a generally accepted and fixed usage.

(c) are questions which call for a legislative decision such as 'Can one love unknowingly?' or 'Can one keep a promise unintentionally?' or 'Was there negligence in the case of so-and-so?' In these cases there is no settled convention.

(d) are the sort of cases where we know the convention but still ask the question. The questions therefore have an air of paradox about them. 'Aren't we all mad really?', 'Can one never know the real world?' In these examples borderlines are being crossed and broken down. If we take an example of this group 'Is love a process in which one person devours another?' Yet consider it as an example of group (b) or (c) then the affirmative answer is false. In such questions the logic of our concepts is being rewritten.

Typically Wisdom shows how such easy distinctions break down again and again. Three examples will have to suffice. Firstly, questions of strict logic (b) may turn out to have no settled conventions, and appearances to the contrary, a decision may be called for. The whole problem of borderline cases is raised here. These questions may therefore resemble questions of type (c).

Secondly questions of types (a), (c) and (d) may become mixed, for example in the question 'Is this whooping cough without the whoop?' Here there may be some argument about the symptoms, or some test not having been carried out, or the possibility of a new test. The issue is partly a priori, being the request for a decision (c) and partly empirical (a), and yet paradoxical (d). The question may begin as an a priori one and end up as an empirical one or vice-versa. And finally, cases of (a) and (d) can be mixed. Someone might say to us 'We're all mad really.' and when we look at people we find them to resemble mad people more than we thought. This, and much more is Wisdom's method. Such distinctions are employed in the Lectures and broken down over and over to reveal an account of thinking much more radical than anything that appeared in the earlier writings. I now
turn to this account.

I have suggested that Yalden-Thomson does not do justice to Wisdom's central thesis. Part of the reason for this is that he quotes it out of context. Consider how it occurs in the summary of Wisdom's 'arguments so far in Lecture V:

'10. Every statement calls for reflection.
11. All reflection comes in the end to no more than procedure by parallels.
12. Then if any reflection which came in the end to no more than proof by parallels isn't really reasoning, isn't rational, it follows that nothing can be rationally established, nothing known.' (VL.V.6.)

It would be wrong to think of Wisdom as asserting something like Blake's 'To particularise is everything to generalise is to be an idiot.' Wisdom always gives generalisation its due but no more. What is at issue is a very radical form of scepticism. Ordinary inductive scepticism arises from noting that statements like 'This is a table' involve an infinite amount of investigation. Radical scepticism, which is what Wisdom is concerned with, arises from noting the infinite amount of investigation that any and every statement involves. This scepticism is scepticism about the very nature of reasoning itself and it is tied up with the Kantian view of examples. Wisdom develops his notion of 'Case by case procedure' in order to deal with this scepticism and with ordinary scepticism. Radical scepticism is scepticism about both induction and deduction. I shall briefly try to summarise Wisdom's treatment of induction and deduction in order to indicate how he deals with both sorts of sceptic. It will also be clear that Wisdom is attacking this dichotomy.

Wisdom does, of course, apply his central thesis in other realms, the law, literature, religious belief and psycho-analysis. I will not touch on his application of case by case procedure to these areas. The reason for this is that one result of the failure to understand and appreciate the role of examples in thinking is the belief that if a problem is not amenable to empirical investigation, and deduction was no use, then the question was just a matter of words. Induction, deduction or words. To attack this trichotomy it is necessary to show that all reasoning comes in the end to case by case argument.
**Induction**

J.H. Keynes saw the close connection between analogy and induction. Induction could be brought under analogy in the sense that its force rested on its approximation to perfect analogy. Whatever the truth of this I shall accept Keynes' assimilation for the time being as it allows me to make an important distinction between Wisdom's treatment of induction and his treatment of deduction.

At one point in the Lectures Wisdom suggests 'a priori analogy' as an alternative name for case by case argument. (VL. VIII. 6.) However, argument by analogy is 'extremely different, because in ordinary cases of argument by analogy, the instances, if they are to be of any use, must be actual instances.' (VL. VIII. 6.) Furthermore, with the imaginative or fictitious examples used in case by case argument, there is no further way of finding out whether the parallelism suggested is or is not the case as there might be with actual instances. Essential to Wisdom's treatment of induction is the notion that when we are justifying a claim about a supposed causal connection an appeal to instances is necessary. He argues that saying there is a causal connection here is a matter of appealing to instances. In inductive cases we are concerned with a connection really being there, whereas in apriori or deductive cases we are concerned only with what it makes sense to say.

The first stage in the inductive process is supposed to be the direct apprehension of the relevance of some generalisation or other to a particular instance. As Wisdom puts it we 'see in an instance a universal'. (VL. IX. 7.) The accounts most philosophers give of this are misleading. They represent it as a psychological act. The same is true of their treatment of causal connections. They leave the cognition of the universal, or causal connection, as something mysterious. One of the reasons for this obfuscation is that claims about these sort of thing involve 'a certain feature that we are reluctant to recognise, namely, that the verification of the statement about a given time may involve logically what happens outside that period of time.' (VL. IV. 6-7.) Seeing a connection logically involves looking at other instances. There may be nothing surprising in this as induction is about generalisations covering several instances. Wisdom goes further than this in two ways. Firstly he establishes by looking at a number of examples of recognising things such as 'the stars stripes', 'pink, green, large, small, quite considerably archaic
crosses', and 'triangles, dogs and mice'; (VL. IX. 7-9.) that there is no psychological penumbra passing from the instance to your mind. What happens is a simple act of comparing the instance now present with familiar instances. That they may be so familiar that we hardly reflect upon them is of no consequence. Secondly, when the question of the justification of inductive procedures is raised, Wisdom establishes that this too is a matter of comparing instances with instances. A striking example of this is his treatment of one-termed propositions such as 'This is a spade'. Wisdom argues that even this statement 'involves reflection, as well as verification of enormous complexity running over the whole of time and space.' (VL. VI. 4.) Reflection is, for Wisdom, the comparison of a case with case after case. This case by case procedure is the process of proof'. (VL. VI. 4.) The process of proof is 'the process of learning carried out in reverse'. (VL. IV. 5.) No doubt the feeling that this sort of procedure 'isn't reasoning' (VL. IV. 3.) because it is not induction or deduction (VL. IX. 8.) will come back at this point. But if it does it is worthwhile to recall that one of Wisdom's aims was 'to get away from calling unprovable those cases that can only be proved by a case by case procedure.' (VL. VI. 5.) Wisdom therefore, establishes that induction is a case by case procedure and justifies induction through a case by case procedure and shows that justification is a case by case procedure. This way of proceeding is brought into question through an implicit comparison with deductive methods of reasoning. Deduction, with its strict rules and definitions, serves as a paradigm of valid reasoning. It is, therefore, of fundamental importance to see how Wisdom shows that deduction reduces to a case by case procedure. Everything else rests upon this.

**Deduction**

Wisdom's claims about deduction are twofold. Firstly, as we have seen, he claims that deductive reasoning comes to, or reduces to case by case argument. Secondly, there is the related claim that case by case argument is parallel to deduction in that it is just as valid and sound. I will illustrate how Wisdom establishes these two claims by reference to two of the many impressive examples he discusses.
Example 1

A child is struggling with the following question: 'There are six airlines from England to France, and for each of these six ways of going to France by one airplane of a given airline and coming back on an airplane of that same line. How many ways are there of going to France on one airplane of a given line and coming back on a different airplane of that line?' (VL. IV. 3.) His mother helps him by a lengthy case by case procedure. She starts with questions like 'You have two boxes and in each box two beads. How many beads have you?' The child answers 'Two times two'. More cases are presented. There are two ferries to the otherside of a river and for each ferry there are two ways of crossing the river by one boat and coming back by another. How many ways are there of crossing the river by one boat and coming back by another?' 'Two times two' says the child. And so on with progressively more complicated cases until we get 'Six times six' as an answer to the first problem.

In this example there is no appeal to anything general. But does this mean that no proof has been given? Suppose now that the father takes a hand and says: 'Look here, if there are \( N \) things of sort \( X \) and for each of these things there are \( N \) things of sort \( Y \), then there are \( N \) times \( N \) things of sort \( Y \). Therefore if there are six airlines to France, and if for each of these there are six ways of going to France by one airplane and coming back by another, then there are six times six ways of going to France on one airplane and coming back by another one.' (VL. IV. 3-4.) However, the child is a bit of a philosopher and asks the father if the instance in question is included in the general principle? If it is, then the argument is circular, and if it isn't, then its inconclusive. The father can then resort to more general principles to establish what he says. But the philosopher-child can still go on to question his father in the same way. His father will at some stage be able to go no further and will resort to examples. Wisdom comments that the father's procedure, of 'bringing to bear all the cases covered by the principle except the case in question..... does as much as the mother's procedure, but no more. And that is what I mean by saying that the father's procedure comes in the end to proof by parallels.' (VL. IV. 4.) This result, according to Wisdom, is perfectly general with the consequence that cases which seem the last word in good reasoning turn out to be no more than a repetition of case by case argument: 'The point is that if \( C \) follows from \( P \), then any distance from
another particular case which is required for the truth of C, will also be required for the truth of P. It may nevertheless be much easier to carry out the comparison when our conclusion is stated in the form C.' (VL. IV. 5.) To grasp this point it is necessary to understand that we are dealing with an internal relation. We do not need to appeal to anything external like a general principle. We are concerned with what something means. A general principle may help us if the reasoning is complex but it is not essential. (112)

Example 2

Suppose someone asks a Logician the question 'When are arguments in the fourth figure of the syllogism and when not?' (VL. XI. 1.) He might be satisfied with an answer like: 'If the conclusion is universal the minor must be negative; if the conclusion is affirmative the minor must be universal; or if the conclusion is negative the minor must be universal. If these conditions are fulfilled the argument is good, if not, not.' This answer may suffice but it may not. Someone might still ask 'But when is a syllogism in the fourth figure and when not?' An answer along the lines of the first answer may be given to this question. And again this answer may suffice and it may not. Someone may still ask a question like 'But what is a minor premise?' And so on. (VL. XI. 1.) What happens in this example, which is given step by step by Wisdom, is that in each answer the logician sets out the necessary and sufficient conditions for each expression he uses. Perhaps he goes as far as 'premise'. At some point he may give up this procedure and resort to examples. Indeed he may use them from the start. These examples will be drawn from an infinite range of conceivable instances. However, there is no necessity for him to give examples. (VL. XI. 2.) His general answers are perfectly satisfactory. Wisdom makes the point that there is an equally satisfactory alternative way of proceeding. A logician may reply continually with examples. Examples of good and bad fourth figure syllogism, minor premises etc. Though such a procedure is not adopted in many textbooks of logic, it is perfectly acceptable. (VL. IV. 3.) Two qualifying comments are needed or this will be misunderstood. Firstly the distinction between deductive reasoning and case by case reasoning seems to have become, or seems to be, a matter of form. Wisdom gives a reply to this suggestion which is worth quoting at length:
'One might well say that the difference is merely a matter of form; and that is the reason why I've said "reduces to". On the other hand, suppose that one has a deductive proof. "This is K", therefore this is "K" where K' is narrower than K (that is, K' implies K, but K doesn't imply K'). Then this can hardly be said to bring to bear all the cases that would be brought to bear by a complete direct procedure. It's only when K' is equivalent to K that one might say that the whole case by case procedure here differs from the deductive procedure only in form.' (VL. VIII. 2)

And he continues:

'The expression "comes to", or "reduces to", can very well be put "differs only in form from", provided one remembers that the deductive argument may present only part of the whole scope of the justification that could be provided by a complete case by case procedure, when the premise entails the conclusion but the conclusion doesn't entail the premise. But if you put in the proviso that the conclusion is equivalent to the premise then you may indeed speak of the performances as differing only in form.' (VL. VIII. 3.)

The second is one which will expand the discussion slightly. It may be that I, like Wisdom in the Lectures, have given the impression that all case by case argument is good case by case argument. That case by case argument is somehow valid per se. This would be quite wrong. There is good and bad case by case argument. 'Well! it might be asked, 'When is it good and when is it bad?' Wisdom demolishes this question. It 'conceals an opposition to the case by case procedure'. (VL. X. 5.) Asking the question is the first mistake answering it would be worse. What sort of answer could be given? What sort of answer is expected? Quite clearly one of the form 'When conditions A.B.C...X are fulfilled.' This sort of answer is what we are used to. The question is a request for some general criterion by which to distinguish with certainty between argument which succeeds and argument which doesn't. But there is another alternative and one which must be adopted here, that is, to give examples. A question about the distinction between good and bad case by case procedure can be answered by a case by case procedure. Let me give just two examples of bad case by case argument. During wartime a man may say of a soldier who has killed his enemy that 'He had committed murder.' Suppose that he reasons like this. He starts from a paradigm of murder such as the killing of Cain by Abel. Then he moves on till he reaches cases of shooting. He considers what a sniper does, and then arrives at the regular soldier. This is bad case by case argument because
the proponent of it has ignored important differences between the cases in favour of some similarity which for some reason has impressed itself upon him. (VL. X. 6.) Another famous example may be Russell's chicken. In this classic case Russell assimilates the chicken's feeding pattern to Rutherford's scientific procedure. Again this misleads in the same way.

What is an example of good case by case procedure? Wisdom gives a fine illustration from the Bible. I shall discuss it in terms of the distinctions between types of question that I mentioned earlier.

The 'Adultery' Example

The question of adultery was once a fairly simple question of fact. 'Did the act A occur or not?' It was therefore a question of type (a) we knew what would count as adultery and what not. The matter was legalistic and empirical. The terms also had a clearly defined use so the question was also one involving section (b) of Wisdom's classification. The term had a strict logic. But when Christ said: 'But I say unto you, any man that looks lustfully on a woman has already committed adultery with her in his heart.' The question became a question of type (c). A decision is now called for. As Wisdom put it, Christ 'Gave us a new geometry of adultery, and of sin'. (VL. V. 7.) Christ's statement leaves our heart's desires as the ultimate verification of our adulterous natures, of what state of immorality we are in. But our truthful statements of our heart's desires are incorrigible. Freud's notion of unconscious desires makes the question of adultery more difficult still. For now we can ask 'Did I conceal the desire from myself?' Freud pushed psychological statements 'in the direction of the corrigible.' (VL. XIII. 16) He removed the asymmetry involved in Christ's position. Someone may argue that although Freud's remarks seem to put the question of adultery into the class of paradoxical questions (d), they do in fact also put them once again quite close to (a). For I may not always know my heart's desires best. Someone else may know them better for he may know me better than I know myself. But this state of affairs is quite clearly paradoxical. It remains so even though the paradoxical air can quite easily be removed. The sort of shifts outlined here in this example alter our whole concept of adultery, and indeed of human nature. We get out of them a deeper
appreciation of man's nature. However, some people may feel that the insight offered by Christ and Freud, that is by questions of types (c) and (d) respectively, bring with them a sort of conceptual fog, an obscuring of vision 'so that we will have to go back to the old expression.' (VI. VI. 6.)

All this has important ramifications as far as the meanings of terms are concerned. Before Christ said what he did it was quite possible to take a 'dictionary-like' view of the meaning of the term 'adultery'. It could be held to mean something like 'Voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with one of the opposite sex other than his or her spouse.' This would be the 'strict logic' of the term. Christ pushed and stretched the use of the word breaking down its strict logic. It can't be argued that he didn't know or had misunderstood the meaning of adultery. Yet, if conventional use is taken to be the yardstick of meaning then what Christ said, taken as a comment on the meaning of the term 'adultery' was strictly speaking false. Such an argument would be absurd. This is how Winch takes the example. He argues that it only makes sense in the light of Christ's other remarks, in particular, Luke 6. 37 where Christ says 'Judge not and you will not be judged'. Seen in this way Mark 4. 27 becomes 'a warning against Pharisaism and a reminder of what we all have it in us to do, but for the grace of god: Christ does not say, absurdly that "committing adultery in one's heart" is just the same as "committing adultery."' (113) Winch's claim that the sameness here would be absurd simply reveals his own lack of response to the example. Unpacked in the way Winch suggests the remark loses all its force. It is easy to see why Winch takes this line as he is trying to establish an important moral distinction between what a person was before a crime and what he becomes by virtue of committing that crime. Whatever distinction there is here, and Winch admits that it is problematic, Christ seems to be blurring it. But that is the essence of paradox. Christ could accept that there are relevant moral distinctions between the two cases and yet press home his remark as postulating an identity.

Christ noted and brought to our attention in a striking way those cases in which we do have physical signs of adultery and those cases in which we do not. As Wisdom puts it he 'brought them together
with a shock.' (VL. VI. 6.) He extended our concept of adultery. What went on before, say in a court of law, was almost deductive. If act S with U, then A. Act S. with U. Therefore A. When Christ made the question a conflict question he made it necessary for us to look at each individual before we could decide, even at individuals who had no intention to do anything. When Freud's notion of the unconscious is applied to this case of adultery no one is safe from the charge. 'The scope for adultery becomes infinite.' (VL. VI. 6.) Every case has to be examined, even the cases where there was neither thought nor intention. However, everything has become so complex and anxious that people may feel the need to assert forcefully and at length that adultery really means the physical act. There is endless scope for argument here and argument goes on and on giving us increased grasp of the concept.

This account of Wisdom's defence of his claim that 'All reflection comes in the end to a case by case procedure' undoubtedly misrepresents his position in many ways. Wisdom himself is known to be very unhappy about the Lectures and has so far refused to let them be published. Let us summarise the central argument before entering a caveat against it. We often feel that we must answer questions in certain ways. The train of our thoughts runs on regular and straight lines. Wisdom attacks this habit of thought at its strongest point. Deduction is held to be the paradigm of reasoning. Holding this paradigm results in ordinary scepticism. Wisdom goes further and shows that if we hold to this paradigm the result is radical scepticism. If deduction reduces to case by case argument and if case by case argument is held not to be argument then our paradigm of good reasoning is not reasoning. That is radical scepticism. Wisdom shows in example after example that case by case argument is argument. I have sketched a few of his examples to show how he does this. All these points are general. The adultery example shows how good case by case argument can modify our concepts. It shows that to understand fully a concept it is not sufficient to be interested in its 'strict logic'. It shows that the appeal to cases is fundamental.

I would suggest that what is unsatisfactory with my, and perhaps Wisdom's account, is that it succeeds too well in presenting case by case argument as argument. It makes the consideration of cases seem too much like the arguments which form the basis of the study of logic.
As we have seen, Wisdom faces at one point the question of how you discriminate good from bad case by case argument. He says this conceals an antipathy towards case by case procedure. (VI. X. 5.) The systematic discrimination of good from bad argument is a common view of the nature of logic. (114) The question therefore assimilates the procedure to a deductive model. The issue is partly a matter of words, and Wisdom does give alternatives such as 'procedure by parallels'. But words are important: "An unsuitable type of expression is a sure means of remaining in a state of confusion. It as it were bars the way out" (P.I. s 339) Although Wisdom achieves his end of showing that appeals to instances constitutes reasoning of a non-deductive and non-inductive sort calling them 'reasoning' and 'argument' may seem metaphorical. What Wisdom is doing, of course, is stretching or modifying our concept of argument.

Two examples will illustrate how opposition to the Kantian view can be misapprehended by representing the form of this opposition as argument. The first example is the briefest and serves merely as an example of a general tendency. The second example will be developed at length as it will serve to distinguish central argument being advanced here from the notion that we proceed in philosophy by giving examples of ordinary or everyday speech.

The first example concerns what Passmore calls 'the excluded opposites argument'. (115) This is argument of the 'ice could not be thick if ice could not be cold' sort. It is held to be a feature of Neo-Wittgensteinian philosophy. And there are passages like this in Wittgenstein's writings. Let us take one example. Discussing the possession of a unique visual field he writes 'And this too is clear: if as a matter of logic you exclude other people having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it (P.I. s 398). As an 'argument' this is almost an uninformative truism. Standing alone it might appear simply to beg the question. But it does not stand alone. In context it says much more. It occurs at the end of a lengthy discussion of the notion of a private language and the way in which mental concepts in general are affected by idea of a private or internal ostensive definition. This notion is irremediably confused. It is not simply a complex 'argument' with numerous flaws and false assumptions. It is a picture of the working of language that we find compelling. To lead us away from this picture analogies, metaphors, similes, and imaginative examples are invoked. 'Arguments' of this
sort are exhibited in an attempt to direct us away from this picture. It is only one of numerous perspectives that are being offered. It can be argued that what is involved here is a different conception of philosophy which manifests itself in a different style of philosophising. To grasp the difference between the two styles we might say that Wittgenstein's use of this 'argument' is like that of a poet who might use a familiar syllogism about the mortality of man to say something new about death.

The importance of style is apparent in the second example. I refer to the representation of a technique of 'linguistic' philosophers as a form of argument. Wittgenstein is often said to have held that philosophy consists in assembling reminders of how we ordinarily speak. It can be quickly shown that this does not amount to the same thing as the consideration of examples. Examples are more imaginative than instances of how we speak. As usual an example is appropriate, and a striking one is Wittgenstein's 'assertion' that 'meaning something is like going up to someone.' (P.I. s 457) This proposition is clearly not an instance of ordinary usage, nor is it asserted. Simple and perspicuous examples like this encapsulate pictures of the working of language that influence our thought. But Wittgenstein is also reported to have told his students that propositions such as 'I see a chair' uttered when a chair is clearly visible in front of us have a use similar to that of the necessary propositions of mathematics. The use of such reminders of how we speak to rebut the sceptic who claims that we cannot have knowledge of such things as the existence of material objects has been called Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). The name if not the idea is held by Catherine Beattie to derive from an earlier paper on G.E. Moore written by Norman Malcolm. Beattie makes several criticisms of Malcolm's PCA: 1) It is untenable; 2) It is unsatisfactory; 3) It incorrectly represents all statements about the world as disguised statements about language use; 4) It incorrectly suggests that ordinary language is a model to which we should conform; 5) It fails in giving bite to its anti-sceptical thesis if its utterances are empirical; And 6) It fails again if they are a priori as they are not vindicated by the practice of language users. Finally 7) It makes unsubstantiated claims to give insights into ontology. As an 'argument' the PCA is irrelevant, inconclusive, trivial, inapplicable, and useless. The only role for examples from ordinary language is the restricted one of providing a starting point for discussion. (116)
This gives the kernel of Beattie's argument against the PCA. But its illusion of effectiveness is entirely a function of its brevity. Let us analyse the PCA in the quite literal sense of taking it apart. Thus we have to see it as and consisting of the presentation of 'cases' which are held to be 'paradigms' and which are said to constitute 'argument'. It is hard to quarrel with the suggestion that 'cases' or instances of ordinary language are exhibited. Therefore Beattie's conclusion that these cases have only a restricted use is a function of her arguments against these cases being 'paradigms' and constituting 'argument'.

If paradigm case 'argument' is argument then it is untenable argument. If an appeal to 'paradigm' case is intended to rebut certain sceptical claims without further argument, then this is unsatisfactory. If all claims about what is the case in the world are reduced willy nilly to claims about how language is used when descriptive statements about language use can be distinguished from descriptive statements about the language we use to describe what is the case in the world, then we have here a paradoxical and probably inconsistent philosophical position. If so-called paradigm linguistic statements are empirical then they do not provide bite for a general thesis rebutting scepticism. If they are seen a providing bite for a general thesis rebutting scepticism, then whether empirical or not, they fail to do so. If these linguistic statements are a priori then they are not validated by the practice of language users. If the argument provides us with a model in ordinary language to which we should conform then this is (if it is meaningful) an improper injunction. If the 'argument' is supposed to give us insights into ontology which are not substantiated then this is to be deplored. Furthermore if this 'argument' is essential to the method and outlook of 'linguistic' philosophy then linguistic philosophy is threatened. All the points that Beattie makes would be true if the antecedent of all these hypotheticals were true. But if they are not then her critique is a failure. Let us look at the 'paradigm' nature of these cases.

It is unfortunate that Malcolm is taken as the progenitor of this putative 'argument'. For Malcolm had admitted that what he argued in 1942 was wrong. Writing on Moore again some twenty years later he says this of the 'paradigm' nature of his cases:
'I misunderstood this point when I first wrote on Moore. In "Moore and Ordinary Language", I said that Moore's replies to various sceptical assertions consist in presenting paradigms of knowing something for certain, seeing bodies and so on.' (117)

and again:

"Moore did not have to present a paradigm of seeing a body as I once thought. He had merely to remind his listeners that the sentence "I can see a door over there" has a correct use and, can express a true statement. On one famous occasion Moore was actually in error in his example. This delighted the sceptics in the audience. On my view he was right even when he was wrong." (118)

The majority of points that Beattie raises as objections against Malcolm are in fact dealt with in his early paper. Thus he suggests that Moore's method may fail to convince because he fails to bring out sufficiently the non-empirical nature of the paradoxical utterances of the sceptic. It seems as if he were 'opposing one empirical proposition with another, contradictory empirical proposition'. (119) Malcolm thus explicitly denies that countertheses are being put forward. He denies that his 'paradigms' are empirical. Are they therefore a priori? If we are being forced into a simple dichotomy then a Kantian move seems appropriate. The nearest we can get to a characterisation in terms of this very dangerous dichotomy would be that such propositions were synthetic a priori. Or to adopt a more fashionable terminology we might say that they are like 'grammatical' propositions in that they are reminders of what it makes sense to say. They are quite different from the usual sorts of things that are offered as examples of 'grammatical' propositions such as 'No surface is both red and green all over'. But this proposition is only a short hand for the fact that it makes sense to talk of 'Seeing a red chair' and 'Seeing a green chair' but not to talk of 'Seeing a chair that is red and green all over'. We are talking of two different levels. 'Grammatical propositions' are frozen records of what it makes sense to say. Instances of ordinary language remind us of what it makes sense to say. They are not, of course, reminders of anything empirical e.g. 'Grass is green'. This deals with Beattie's points 2), 5) and 6).

Points 3) and 4), the supposed 'inconsistency' and the suggestion that ordinary language is a model to which we should conform are both dealt with in Malcolm's later paper, although what he says there is
merely an elaboration of his earlier arguments. Malcolm shows by extensive reference to the arguments of Pritchard that there is no other way in which what he was attempting to say could be understood. Pritchard was not blind to the fact that we see bodies. His denial is the claim that it is impossible to see bodies. Moore's assertion is only a reply if it is understood as the assertion that there is no logical absurdity in the notion of seeing a body.\(^{(120)}\)

In cases like this there is no alternative to viewing the sceptics claim as a claim about language. Nor is it a matter of begging the question by an appeal to ordinary language. The point is not that the utterances of ordinary language are correct without question but that it is not even a question whether the utterances of ordinary language are correct.

Malcolm has suggested that the confusion in his early paper reflected a confusion of Moore's about what he was doing. Moore thought that he was presenting true perceptual statements. But Malcolm was confused about more than this. He attempts to set up the assembling of reminders of how we ordinarily speak as 'refutations'. As we have seen he sees Moore as arguing that there is 'no logical absurdity in the notion of seeing a body. This almost makes the argument seem as if it could be formulated in a general and formal fashion. And like Beattie he sees the giving of such instances as a preliminary step. They allow us to see that the view in question is false before we begin to examine it. Malcolm does not refer to the giving of such instances as constituting 'argument' but the implication is clearly there. Malcolm is the first in a long line of philosophers who vulgarise the assembling of reminders of how we speak. Beattie mentions many others in ad baculum fashion to support her contention. She correctly shows that an even more vulgarised notion of the PCA allows ideologically motivated philosophers of education to illegitimately extract 'necessary conditions' for the use of terms. That they do extract such conditions in an illegitimate way will be an argument in Chapter Two. To show why the PCA is a vulgarisation of a method of 'linguistic' philosophy and show how the assembling of reminders of how we ordinarily speak is fundamental it is necessary to have some inkling of the major step forward they represent in philosophy. Beattie's amazement at the continuance and influence of the PCA in philosophy shows that she is unaware of this. In giving an account of this 'step forward' we will also provide some substantiation for the claim that the assembling of reminders provides insight into ontology.
The question at issue is that of our entitlement to speak and think in the way we do about phenomena. Various Pre-Kantian philosophers attempted to say that our entitlement was due to the nature of things. Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' in philosophy was to show that our entitlement to speak and think in the way we do about phenomena rested in the nature of our thinking about things. It is an inescapable feature of our thinking that we conceive of the world as consisting of substances and attributes. No account is given of these conceptual necessities except as 'Principles of the Understanding'. Here as the gears of a super-empirical mental mechanism they become vulnerable to Kant's own arguments against the introduction of a supra-sensible mode of awareness of the real nature of things. Wittgenstein takes a major step forward in the investigation of the entitlement question. Whereas Kant hypostatized the understanding to account for our a priori knowledge of matter. Wittgenstein identifies the nature of our thinking with how we can intelligibly speak. The consequence of this that concerns us is that Wittgenstein is claiming that the ways in which we speak are basic. This does not mean that 'grammatical propositions' are basic for these merely encapsulate what it makes sense to say. To give an account of the nature of things to say such things as 'Tables are substances' is to remind someone (who may have said something incoherent) of what it makes sense to say. And this is to do no more than remind him that it makes sense to say 'Two of us picked up the table', 'The table was so heavy we dropped it'. The assembling of reminders of how we speak is a result of Wittgenstein's consolidation of Kant's revolution in philosophy. (121) That it is revolutionary in the way indicated explains why it persists and why it cannot be identified with the PCA.

The PCA is a vulgarisation of a philosophical method that has its roots in a metaphysical question. This method of assembling reminders of how we ordinarily speak does not give us 'paradigms' nor does it constitute 'argument' in a strict sense. The nascent PCA was presented as an attempt to refute the sceptic's denial of our entitlement to speak and think in the way we do about things in a straightforward counter-argumentative way. Hence the feeling that as an 'argument' reminders do not appear tenable. Case by Case Argument was introduced not to deal with the ordinary form of scepticism but with a radical form of scepticism. Is it therefore open to similar objections? Although it has a wider scope it certainly is not concerned with 'paradigms'. A philosopher who restricted his interest to the use of terms would in Wisdom's eyes be lacking in 'the very
(VI. II. 7) To keep us wedded to ordinary language when not considering a question like the entitlement question is to risk distortion. It is language that keeps us from seeing in the familiar term what we have missed. By proceeding through invented and imagined cases Wisdom's procedure is concerned with concepts and not the use of words. Is it likely to mislead by being described as 'argument'? There is an obvious way in which it invites a defence of the Kantian View. For example, my calling Case by Case Argument 'argument' is always to risk the reply or retort that 'It isn't argument really, it isn't conclusive, deductive, demonstrative argument.' And, of course, it's not argument by inductive analogy either. This raises the whole question again. It revives the case for saying that in the sort of instances Wisdom was considering no reasoning is possible. The danger of misinterpretation is a measure of the strength of the Kantian view. We can go someway to rectifying the Kantian misapprehension of the nature of reasoning without mentioning the term 'argument'. A summary of Wisdom's thesis would be possible without the use of the term. In the *Virginia Lectures* Wisdom refers to it most often as a 'procedure'. In a brief summary it is necessary to attempt to give the main elements of the argument and to attempt to express its force. Calling it case by case argument runs the risks of vulgarisation, and debasement that produced the FCA. But the differences between the two make this less likely. This is because case by case argument tackles a more radical form of scepticism. For if case by case argument isn't argument, then, as all argument amounts to a consideration of cases, argument isn't argument. Unless we are to succumb to irrationalism and allow nothing to count as argument or reasoning then we must allow that case by case argument is argument.

1.6 Concepts and Analysis

An intending student could read among other things that 'a prodigious capacity for puzzlement by the very familiar is a characteristic quality in a great philosopher.' (122) He is unlikely to meet and even less likely to understand the related remark that 'when we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilised men, put a false interpretation on them, and draw the queerest conclusion from it.' (P.I. s 194) Students might begin to understand if their limited 'capacities for puzzlement' were directed towards the 'questions' and 'question-like' inscriptions that they will be asked to 'answer'. 'What is education?' 'What does the
term 'education' mean?' Inscriptions like these appear in essays on the concept of education. Dunlop, (123) Peters, (124) and Hirst and Peters (125) provide instances for their use. Conceptual analysis seems traditionally, if not of necessity, to involve the use of inscriptions in this particular interrogative form. Often supposedly more general inscriptions appear such as 'What is a concept?' (126) and 'What is the meaning of a word?' (127) It is the oddness of these inscriptions that should cause puzzlement. For the first four 'questions' are not questions and the last is a specimen of nonsense.

These inscriptions are not questions. They are marks on paper which have some vague and indeterminate sense. They are not senseless. Uttered in appropriate contexts by appropriate persons they could be questions. An appropriate person might be a foreigner who was puzzled over the meaning of the word 'education' having, for instance, never heard it before. Or he might be troubled about the nature of the concept. Having translated the term into his own language he is still puzzled about the nature of the thing. When a philosopher utters these 'questions' or uses these 'inscriptions' he is engaging in a form of metonymy. (128) We ask these 'questions' with a very sombre air, or with a wry smile on our face; or we ask it with eyebrows raised. It is unsatisfactory to give the answer that Harnett and Naish do. They say that the question is usually a request for a programmatic definition. (129) This may be true when the question is asked appropriately but not when it is asked philosophically. When a philosopher utters such a 'question' he is entertaining it, not asking it. He is trying to induce us to feel puzzled about things that do not puzzle us. He wants to make us feel 'lost' so that we may be enabled to find our way about. He is hoping for greater illumination, for an increased grasp of the concept.

If the 'questions' are in the formal mode we might say that the philosopher is trying to get us to consider the meaning of words the meaning of which we already know. And this may be disputed by someone who will argue that we don't know the meaning of the terms we use. The existence of this paradoxical situation which is never quite as stark and obvious as presented here is evidence for a misapprehension and we can connect this misapprehension with the Kantian view of examples. For such 'questions' predispose us to seek definitions as the outcome of our enquiry. Analogously, if they are in the material mode they predispose us to attempt to remedy the confused nature of our
concepts by producing or exhibiting conceptual connections which
tend to assume the form of definitions. Because philosophical interests
are of a general kind seeking a general characterisation or 'criterion'
seems to follow as a matter of course. If we wish to justify our use
of any particular term it seems that we must appeal to some general
principle. And implicit in all this is the denigration of case by
case argument. Particular cases or examples cannot justify our use
of terms. Suppose a philosopher were to ask a student the 'question'
'Why do you call this an example of education?' The student replies
by giving more examples. This doesn't seem adequate. He hasn't
given us a justification of his claim. He hasn't produced reasons.
Wisdom would argue that he has produced reasons, that we can always
give reasons which justify our examples. But these reasons are appeals
to other examples. Of course the reasons (cases) we give may be
inadequate, just as the reasons (criteria) we give may be inadequate.
But in both cases we would show this by considering examples. The
paradoxical situation involving the two opposed epistemological claims
about the meaning of terms might be invoked here. The dogmatic
position might incline us to reflect more on the language we use,
while the sceptical position might suggest that we need to consider
the concepts of things in order to get clearer about the meaning of our
terms. If it does not mean something like this it collapses into either
the claim that some of us don't know what we are talking about, or the
claim that none of us knows what we are talking about. The first claim
is true but unhelpful while the second makes clarification impossible.
Introducing the term 'concept' is harmless enough if it means no more
and no less than the injunction to consider imagined as well as actual
cases. Some distinction like this is implied by Austin's distinction
between the 'syntactics' and 'semantics' of the explanation of meaning.
The former involves the exhibiting of sentences in which a term is
used while the latter involves the imagining of experiencing of
situations in which the term might be employed, and those in which it
might not. Where the distinction drawn by Austin and that drawn in
the discussion of case by case argument diverge is that 'imagined' is
to be thought of a covering cases where we might be said to be offered
a 'new concept. The 'adultery example' is an instance which could not
be catered for by Austin's account.
That the fourth 'question' is one of a species of nonsense 'questions' typically asked by the philosopher can be seen if it is compared with the question 'What is the meaning of the word "word"?' asked in an appropriate setting. It is nonsense because by being construed on analogy with questions asked in appropriate circumstances it forces anyone who seeks to 'answer' it to hypostatize entities to explain what it is they think the 'question' is about. Thus we conjure up 'meanings', 'ideas', 'concepts' and ultimately 'universals'. These stand as the designates of the 'questions'. 'What is a gerbil?' 'What does 'gerbil' mean?' We can do lots of elementary things in the way of answering these questions if raised by some person in an appropriate context, for example, in a primary school science lesson. But with 'What is the "meaning" of a word?' 'What is the "meaning" of meaning?' and the more dizzying 'What is the meaning of a concept?' (130) We cannot proceed by ostensive definition or by demonstrating the 'syntactics' and the 'semantics' of the terms. This does not mean that we cannot ask questions about meaning. There is nothing nonsensical in 'What-is-the-meaning-of (the phrase "what is-the-meaning-of (the word) 'x'"?') (131) To answer such a question we proceed in the way indicated. These comments which derive from Austin do not go far enough. When a 'question' such as 'What is education?' or 'What does the term "education" mean?' is asked by a philosopher it is still a specimen of sense in his twofold categorisation of interrogatives. One reason for beginning with a collection of interrogatives was to suggest that these 'questions' mask a misapprehension. They constitute one form of philosophical nonsense which is related to Austin's characterisation of seemingly more general questions as nonsense. They are asked with these seemingly more general questions in mind. As we shall see there are several related ways in which 'questions' can be given spurious senses by seeing them as more general forms of appropriately uttered questions. Austin's categorisation of these questions is one stage in the aetiology of philosophy. If we wish to know why such 'questions' are formulated we have to look to such things as the idea that all general words function in a similar way to proper names. What concerns us for the moment, is that the philosopher's 'questions' are not appropriately uttered or inscribed.

It has been suggested that this sub-species of nonsense aims at increased grasp of a concept. But a paradoxical situation arises. Precisely by seeking to 'answer' such 'questions' increased grasp is thwarted. Equivocation between appropriate utterance and philosophical
utterance serves to define 'conceptual analysis' and to explain its utility. A common characterisation of this philosophical activity is that it is the unproblematic but very difficult business of 'attempting to make explicit the rules behind our usage of words, and thus get clearer about our concepts.' (132) This platitudinous and seemingly safe explanation is a hornet's nest of confusions and wild assumptions. The claim that we need to get clearer about our concepts is undocumented. Who needs to 'get clearer'? This cannot refer to the ignorant, the ungrammatical, the illiterate, and the illogical. What they need is education not reflection on the concept of education. But the 'underlabourer' conception of philosophy only seems credible if we assume a progressive continuum of cases. We shift from cases of the above sort, to cases of confusion perhaps induced by conflating what one was told about education in the different disciplines, (133) to a much more nebulous and philosophical confusion. This conception of philosophy is often felt to be unsatisfactory because although it disentangles pseudo-debates it leaves the most interesting questions untouched. (134) Part of this dissatisfaction stems from the way in which the working model of conceptual analysis we are given embodies the Kantian view. This is a habit of thought and we interpret the model of how to do philosophy of education in a certain direction without reflecting upon the all too familiar methodological injunctions.

Take as an example Wilson's assertion that we should not jettison the weapons of 'clarity' and 'analysis'. Our immediate need is to 'look harder and get clearer'. (135) What we have here, and in the example from Hirst and Peters, is a series of well worn metaphors. In this particular case we have a chemical metaphor and two visual metaphors. It is these metaphors that mask the Kantian view. The metaphor of 'analysis' fits easily into a mesh of similar metaphors familiar to any student of philosophy. 'Analysis' in philosophy is sometimes like that in chemistry where we take things apart. But this analogy can be pushed towards another metaphorical paradigm. The comparison could be with literacy or artistic analysis which is the art of juxtaposition, of contiguity, of injunctions and so on. This analogy meets with resistance because the background is missing which facilitates the take up of the metaphor. The analogy with scientific method is so familiar we do not give it a thought. The visual metaphors cause similar problems but can also be signposts to a different terrain. 'Clarity' can be the clarity of analysis in the first sense. We see
the structure more clearly by separating out its constituent elements. The analogy need not refer to something analogous to microscopical technique which literally gives us better vision. We can still talk of getting clearer when everything is before us and we view it in conditions of optimum solar illumination. Nothing is hidden 'behind' anything else but the way we look at it is changed. We see something new. And the way this new vision is facilitated is by an analysis similar to literary analysis. We shall return to consider this sort of analysis in Chapter Four.

What gives the habitual interpretations of 'conceptual analysis' their strength is that we seem to have in Wilson's and Hirst and Peters' presentations of the working model a prima facie candidate for microscopical technique in 'rules'. For most people are held not be be able to state the 'rules' that govern their use of words. Searle has suggested that in attempting to state the semantic conventions of language in a rule-like format we are in the position of someone who has learnt to play chess purely by watching games and who now attempts to state the rules of the game. Here we meet the game metaphor which by being interpreted systematically has been systematically misinterpreted by philosophers. References to it abound in discussions of the concept of education. (136) The analogy does not help when interpreted in Searle's manner. For it avoids the central questions as to whether there are 'rules' of language in the sense in which there are rules for games like chess. In Chapter Two it will be argued at some length that there are no such 'rules'.

This may seem an extreme claim, Searle seems to see this sort of claim as an expression of despair. Some philosophers have sought rules of use whereas 'Certain other philosophers, dismayed perhaps by the failure of their colleagues to produce any rules, have denied the fashionable view that meaning is a matter of rules and have asserted that there are no semantical rules of the proposed kind at all'. He argues that 'this scepticism is premature' and it stems from a failure to distinguish between two sorts of rule. But, as we shall see in the next chapter, Searle fails to make the distinction he is hinting at. Furthermore, his more general attempt to state the necessary conditions of 'promising' from which he intends to extract semantical rules is a self-declared FAILURE. It is not just humility which drives him to say that; 'I find the statement of the conditions very difficult to do, and I am not entirely satisfied with the list I am about to present'. (137) He then lists the reasons why:
(1) Ordinary Language has no strict rules; (2) There are odd, deviant, and borderline cases; (3) There are counter examples; (4) There are half promises, metaphors etc. (5) The conditions are circular. How can such seemingly intractable problems be dealt with? Simply by ignoring them. The method is not Ockham's Razor but Procrustes' bed.

'Rules' serve philosophers of education well. In analysing the concept of education they provide us with the analytical residue. They also enable us to connect language with the world because we encapsulate bits of the world as we distinguish it in rules. They also provide us with justification for 'rules' and 'principles' are said to underlie our use of words. 'Rules', 'principles', '(logically) necessary conditions', and '(public) criteria' are all sides of the same coin. The essential motivation for introducing them is Kantian. How else are we to explain our grasp of a concept?

All this may seem to avoid the central issues. 'Some account of what a concept is, or what it is to have a concept should be offered. It is not equated with the use of terms but is not adequately distinguished from them. Accounts of a concept could be offered in terms of behaviourism, Platonism, constructivism, conceptual realism, or in several other ways. We could argue that the term 'concept' is an imprecise technical term of philosophy or metaphysics whose utility depends upon its imprecision. (139) 'Metaphysics' refers to talk about the talk of others. It is when we reflect upon the talk of others; educationalists, mathematicians, children, or philosophers that we are likely to use the term 'concept'. Talking of mathematics Wittgenstein argues that "Concept" is a vague concept'. (140) When this remark is quoted it is often taken along with his remark that 'The word 'concept' is by far too vague' (141) to indicate that what he says about concept formation in mathematics is imprecise obscure and confused. (142) But Wittgenstein's point is that even in mathematics which is our paradigm of deductive reasoning we clarify our concepts and this includes the concept 'concept' by means of examples. When he makes the remark about the 'word' being far too vague he is discussing one of the ways in which we might take the concept to be part of the proof. Then we might say that the concepts developed were dependent on the structure of the system and then go on to give rules determining what concepts could be formulated. The concept shows in how we go on after the proof. It shows in what we say and do and don't say and don't do. It is not a possession in
any sense other than that in which we can be said to possess a language. When Wittgenstein says that the word 'concept' is far too vague it is said in the specific context of the seeing the concept as part of the proof. Words may mislead. But the concept is still held to be vague. Wittgenstein certainly rejects any account of 'concept' which refers to 'general principles'. He offers no account of a concept other than to repeat and repeat the near simile that 'Concept' is something like a picture with which one compares objects'. (143) To do more than this would be to offer up some account of a concept in terms of universals i.e. something with instances or in terms of Frege's notion of a concept as a 'possible predicate'. Wittgenstein rejects the Platonism implied by such accounts, but avoids conventionalism as well.

Two examples will illustrate this last point and tell us something about the concept 'concept'. Part of Wittgenstein's rejection of Platonism is a result of the difficulties in seeing what its predicates were predicates of. But it also came from the recognition that there were many 'concept terms' such as 'slab' and 'block' and 'tile' of the famous language game involving builders (P.I. s. 2) which do not appear in subject predicate propositions. Wittgenstein raises the question as to whether this language game contains concepts. It could become a language game with concepts if there were a technique of representing, describing, or portraying those objects. (141)

A series of 'thin' examples are given by Wittgenstein aimed at showing Platonism to be wrong by illustrating how calculating, counting, measuring and so forth could be done differently. One example involves a society which had the following way of calculating the price of wood. They sold it a price proportionate to the area covered by piles with no reference to height. (145) At first it seems that we can understand such a society. But the consequences are absurd. If I hold a plank of wood which measures six foot by one foot on its end its value increases when I put it down. If I am carrying a pile and drop it scattering the timber far and wide I increase its value. A radical conventionalism requires that such alternative concepts be intelligible. Wittgenstein's example shows that these
alternatives when fleshed out are not intelligible to us. What the example shows is that the formation of concepts different from ours is intelligible, not that those concepts are intelligible to us. This also explains why the example is unusually thin for Wittgenstein.

The notion of a concept as a picture is illustrated with 'visual demonstrations'. Two simple ones can be used to illustrate the point about concepts. A rectangle can be made of two parallelograms and two triangles, and the proof of this can be the simple diagrammatic representation of the figure. (146) We can also divide a rectangle with a wiggly line. (147) The first shows us something the second does not. Thus we might say it gives us a new concept of a rectangle. This is because we can do things with it. It shows certain transformations I can perform with triangles and parallelograms. The second has no such use. The two main points that can be drawn from such 'visual demonstrations' is that no appeal is made to any rule of deduction or any form of reasoning or general schema behind the picture. It is the proof that proves. The transfiguration of shapes is shown in the picture. This explains the appeal of the 'geometrical view' of proof for Wittgenstein. It is a counter to Russell's view that what a proof rested upon was a logical proof in *Principia Mathematica*. The second point is that such demonstrations may be said to give us a 'new' concept only because we have a system of concepts (calculations, proofs) in which we place it. There are obvious analogies between the giving of such demonstrations and examples considered in the discussion of how deduction reduces to a case by case procedure.

The notion that a proof 'rests on' a logical proof in $\mathcal{L}$ is a specific form of the general idea that there might be rules that determine why we think in the way we do. Mathematics is a motley of techniques of proof. Mathematical proof has been regarded as our paradigm of reasoning because it introduces new concepts by giving definitions. But definitions must be given in terms of undefined elements so the process of refining a concept can be endless. Even a relatively determinate one like 'triangle' can be clarified. Every new definition, every new fact, clarifies a little of the picture that was blurred. But all pictures are only determinate to a certain degree after that, they are vague. Such 'definitions' can mislead because they are determinate in a way that the meaning of words in everyday language is not. If we consider 'education' to be
definable in the way that 'square root' is definable we will be misled. If we define 'square root' of a number we can say that for any given number x 'the square root of x' is a definite description of another number Y. But the meaning of any given proposition about education is not a definite description of any sort of entity. (148)

The formation of concepts in mathematics is different from the formation of concepts in chemistry. In philosophy of education the concepts that are discussed are concepts which function mostly in civil life, that is, in everyday speech. Part of the vagueness of the concept 'concept' lies in the fact that what it is to talk of a 'concept' is not given independently of its employment. If we wish to make the concept 'concept' clearer we must proceed by considering examples. We cannot proceed by deciding that to have a concept is so and so and then consider some particular concept. That is, unless we set out to mislead.

1.7. Summary : What it Makes Sense to Say

Misleading talk about 'a delicate balance between principles and cases' (149) has been upset by the introduction of case by case argument. The appeal to cases has been shown to be fundamental. To put it another way; an argument has been made out to show the logical priority of the particular case. Vulgar empiricists misleadingly argue that to acquire a concept you must examine particular things and see what is common to them all. Against this it is misleadingly argued that the empiricist must be wrong because to be seen as instances they must be instances of something. So there must be some prior or underlying principle of organisation. There must be a criterion. (150) The parallel in philosophy of education to this picture of concept acquisition is even more misleading. To explicate a concept is to produce criteria. To consider instances is misleading because to see them as instances presupposes underlying criteria by which we recognise them to be instances of the concept. The introduction of case by case argument has upset the delicate balance between the more empirically minded philosopher of education and his opponent. The whole aim of discussing case by case argument is to cast doubt upon if not erase the idea that to know that a thing is of a certain kind it is necessary to produce a criterion. Thus the empiricist is wrong for the same reason as those who argue that he puts the cart before the horse.
A whole range of sophisticated interpretations of 'criteria' are available to supplement if not supplant the simple model outlined in this introduction. For example the notion that certain considerations criteriologically imply that X is a case of Y but do not deductively entail it. Some such consideration is clearly active in the views we have considered and will consider. Such accounts will be shown to be as misleading as the simple initial model. Again a series of sophisticated moves are available and utilised by philosophers of education to deal with the related notion of a 'family resemblance' which is seen to have application to their attempts to explicate concepts by seeking criteria. These moves usually repeat in some form the misapprehension the metaphor was intended to correct.

There is a tendency to suggest that the philosopher's 'questions' we have discussed are nonsense. There are no real issues here. The anxious doubt they create in us about our understanding of familiar concept fades as we come to see the inappropriateness of the interrogative form. But this will not quite do. We have documented a misapprehension about the concept of education that is at work in everyday life where we seem to get on well with the concept. We have noted a paradoxical state of affairs in relation to this misapprehension. The misapprehension is due to what we have called the Kantian view of examples. This has a corollary in philosophy in the broadly 'criteriological' approach adopted by philosophers of education in an attempt to make our concepts clear. Such approaches attempt to set out the mathematics of the concept. But in doing so they perpetrate the Kantian misunderstanding.

In Wisdom's phrase they are concerned with the 'strict logic' of the concept. Such an approach may be justified when we are in an 'obfuscation-state' because of paradoxical utterances about education. But a concern with the strict logic of the term will not give us increased grasp. Increased grasp comes from a clear understanding of what it makes sense to say about the concept. To understand what it makes sense to say is to consider fully fledged and determinate examples. Increased grasp comes from reflection on a multitude and variety of cases. In what follows it will be argued that 'criteriological' approach cannot give us increased grasp. Increased grasp comes when, and only when, we consider education by examples.
We now enter a labyrinth in which there are many turnings and many dead ends. The thread to lead us in and out has been partly unwound in Chapter 1. If we do not keep the multiplicity and variety of examples of education in mind we will get into trouble. Wittgenstein once said that the first mistake in many philosophical controversies was the asking of certain questions. From which it follows that the second is attempting to answer them. The questions we will consider do not bear their danger on their face unlike 'What is a question?' but they are expressions of deep confusion. In this chapter and the next the following questions will be considered: 'Are there necessary and/or sufficient conditions for (the use of the term) education?' 'Are there criteria for (the use of the term) education?' and 'Is education a family resemblance concept or term?' How calm these questions seem. But this is merely a function of their familiarity and the fact that they are written in a certain highly developed 'scientific' style. They are, in any case, merely schemata representing the many variations which are actually found in the literature. These questions are often mixed up. Questions about necessary and sufficient conditions being married with questions about criteria. Similarly, questions about criteria are often linked with the notion of family resemblances. Thus confusion is heaped upon confusion.

The 'criteriological' view has been characterised as the idea that something is a case of X we must be able to produce a criterion or criteria. The term 'criteria' is used in various ways by philosophers. This chapter looks at different aspects of this usage. Section 2.1. introduces the notions of necessary and/or sufficient conditions. These are shown not to be simple analytical tools but to imply that language is largely a matter of rules. Section 2.2. shows why it is misleading to suggest that language is a system of rules. It is also shown that there are no 'meaning-rules' that justify the use of certain words. Section 2.3. connects the previous sections with the discussion of 'criteria' by considering and rejecting an interpretation of which associates them with the notion of necessary and sufficient conditions. Section 2.4. consists of a critique of various attempts to weld sets of criteria on to the concept of education, primarily through the idea of 'human nature'. Section 2.5. sets out a 'theory of criteria' that is
commonplace in philosophy. This is a systematic interpretation of the notion as used by Wittgenstein, and as such, is yet another misinterpretation. Section 2.6. considers an attempt to separate the notions of 'criteria' and 'meaning'. Section 2.7. examines the use of the notion in Wittgenstein and suggests that the only plausible interpretation is one which ties the notion closely to the details of particular cases. Finally, section 2.8. returns to the cruder use of the term in philosophy of education.

The discussion of the 'family resemblance' notion is left until the next chapter. Although it is often taken to be a warning against looking for necessary and sufficient conditions in an over simple way it presents exegetical difficulties which merit independent treatment. These concern the use of this analogy in Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

2.1. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Almost every introductory book on philosophy\(^1\) has a section devoted to 'necessary and sufficient conditions'. For the most part these notions are taken as unproblematic ones. Something is a necessary condition (C) of something else (E) if in the absence of (C), (E) never occurs. On the other hand (C) is a sufficient condition of (E) if whenever (C) occurs, (E) occurs. The distinction is an elementary one and elementary examples are given to illustrate it. Typical examples would be the following: Oxygen is a necessary condition of human life. Being a plain figure bounded by three sides is (in Euclidian geometry) a sufficient condition of being a triangle. This latter condition may be said to be both necessary and sufficient. All this is rather trite, though it is not clear whether we are referring to things, events, concepts, or words. I want to concentrate on cases in which these pieces of jargon have a linguistic turn. For in these cases it becomes clear that this ancient and obvious distinction trails clouds of meaning theory. Flew, to take a typical example, makes this comment when introducing the terms: '... the meaning of a proposition is just the sum of the logically necessary conditions of its truth.'\(^2\) Hirst and Peters have made the notion of a 'necessary condition' in Flew's sense central by conceiving of 'conceptual analysis' as the process by which we set out 'logically necessary conditions'. This methodology separates their enquiry from that of the scientist. The connection between the methodology and search for such conditions can be seen if I continue a quotation that will be familiar from Chapter 1.
'In attempting to make explicit the rules behind our usage of words, and thus get clearer about our concepts, it is important to distinguish logically necessary conditions from other sorts of condition that may be present.' (3)

These other sorts of condition are merely de facto ones. 'Being an oxygen-breathing organism' might be a pre-condition of anythings being educated. Even a silk worm would meet this condition. But such conditions would not have anything to do with what we meant by 'education'. 'Conceptual analysis' is therefore an apriori enquiry not an empirical one.

This is how the terms are usually introduced. There are many complicated issues involved in their introduction that I have avoided going into at this stage, because I wish to comment first on the way this distinction is imported into what is supposed to be an account of meaning. Flew talks about the meaning of propositions, while Hirst and Peters talk about the meaning of a word. To this we can add the general question of what is involved in saying anything meaningfully. How do all these cases relate to the giving of 'necessary conditions'? To answer this question it is important to get several things clear about 'meaning'. (4)

It is primarily words and not sentences or utterances that we know the meaning of. We understand sentences or utterances and we know the meaning of words but not vice versa. The question 'What does the sentence "Rodney is going to the theatre" mean?' seems odd. We would only ask it in very rare circumstances perhaps when learning a language or an unusual code. We can find out what words mean by comparing their applicability in certain linguistic environments. 'Killed' and 'murdered' can be seen to differ because the former but not the latter is applicable in the environment. 'The falling rock ...... the climber'. Sentences are often said to be meaningless but not words. We may say the remark by a Labour politician that his party was going to 'put an end to all competitive business activity' was meaningless because what it suggests is logically impossible. But the individual words still have meaning. We may say that a word like 'love' is meaningless. But this is not a comment on semantics but an expression of disillusionment or heartbreak. The fact that words rather than sentences are said to have meaning is not surprising. Ziff argues that to determine whether a word has meaning it is necessary to consider the 'distributive' and 'contractive' sets of utterances in which it appears, and does not appear respectively.
This is because it is reasonable to suppose that a meaningful word will not change its meaning every time it occurs, and because what is said depends on what is not said. So it is necessary to consider what could contrast with the word in the same linguistic environment. But if such elements are necessary in determining whether a word has meaning it is far from clear that sentences have meaning. For it is far from clear that they have 'distributive sets'.

Words are the primary things that are said to have meaning. Philosophers of education are concerned with the meaning of the word 'education' despite the fact that the term is so familiar to us. To get clearer about its meaning it may be necessary to consider utterances in which it occurs and does not occur. Nevertheless they are not primarily concerned with the meaning of sentences. For this reason I do not wish to consider further the notion that the meaning of a sentence is the function of its necessary conditions. Though discussion of whether language has rules is in part a critique of this.

Before considering the idea that there are necessary conditions for the use of the word 'education' it is important to distinguish this from a similar sounding but completely different notion. This is the idea that 'there are logically necessary conditions for the use of any word'. The latter are the necessary conditions under which anyone can meaningfully say anything. They are logical in a proper sense. Thus if we take a word to be X then it can't be not X. If we use a word to refer to a person or thing then we are committed to using the same word to refer to another person or thing with similar features or characteristics. And so on. These are logically necessary conditions that must be met if we are to speak meaningfully. But such conditions do not serve to give the word or words we are considering a place in a particular conceptual framework. Very little follows from such necessary conditions. As Reddiford puts it 'these formal conditions' place no substantive limits on the contexts in which the word can be used nor upon what is to count as correct usage.' But arguments about the necessary conditions for the use of a word are confused with arguments about the necessary conditions for speaking meaningfully. Can't we simply allow that there are necessary conditions in Reddiford's sense? Doesn't his account seem innocuous? If we say education is X then certain 'formal conditions' follow from this 'definition'. One supposes that these are the rules or laws of logic. Thus if A says E is X then it is not not X. At the end of the brief section in which he makes the distinction between the two sorts
of necessary condition, he comments 'Not only moral judgements are universalisable'. If we use a word in a certain way then we are committed to applying that word in similar circumstances to similar things. Two qualifications must be made to this textbook account of logical consistency. Firstly, the argument presented in Chapter 1 about Vere's judgement in the novel *Billy Budd* suggests that educational like other judgements which are regarded as having a moral force are not so easily universalisable. For in some cases at least the fact that A can judge that C, is a case of E because it is X, does not commit him to holding that B must judge that a not dissimilar case C2 is a case of E. A can allow that B can judge not E and be right. B could also judge that C1 was not E and A could allow that he was right. And this will be the case when both A and B produce the same 'definition'. For the question is not whether being E implies X but whether this case before us is and instance of E. Reddiford argues that certain logically necessary conditions obtain despite the difficulties of definition. Such 'definitions' will not help us in the problem of determining what is an instance of what. Secondly, why can we not utter 'Contradictions'? Education is worthwhile and not worthwhile. Play is serious and not serious. Are these instances of the law of contradiction; P, not P? They do not seem to be meaningless contradictions but rather deep paradoxes. We can take the law of identity x = x as the paradigm of consistency. Surely a thing must be identical with itself! But is this a logical truth? The algebra of logic does not tell us anything about things. If the variables are interpreted as propositions then there are substantial counter-examples to this so-called logical law. 'War is war'; 'Business is business'; 'Love is love'; 'Richard is Richard'; and so on. These are not empty tautologies. Nor would 'Education is education' be such a tautology. We can imagine a context which gives it a sense. It can be uttered to get us back on the rails when faced by those who would water down the content of education by defending some impoverished concept of education. Likewise 'War is war' reminds us of the reality of the thing'; 'Business is business' places it above morality; 'Love is love' suggests that such behaviour is to be expected; 'Richard is Richard' remarks that Richard III is now himself again. What both these qualifications point out is that we cannot determine whether it makes sense to talk of there being logical conditions of saying anything is not given prior to a consideration of what we say in particular cases. To talk of 'necessary conditions' without these qualifications is to facilitate the prestidigitation that Reddiford is condemning. A slide is made from talk of logically
necessary conditions in this sense to some other sense. It becomes easier to suggest that there are also logically necessary conditions for the meaning of a term. Following up Reddiford's ideas, Earwaker has suggested that Peters' error in going beyond formal matters and starting to analyse the content of education. Thus we may say that formal conditions about saying anything meaningfully provide us with no way of dealing with the content of a word like 'education'. With words like this 'meaning remains a permanent problem.' If the argument about particularity presented above and in Chapter 1 is valid, then we cannot attempt to increase our grasp of the concept of education without reference to content. In other words, it is necessary to consider detailed and determinate examples.

Perhaps it will be argued that there are 'necessary conditions' for the use of the term 'education' (or any other) in the minimal sense that they specify the rules behind our usage. This it could be argued is a different interpretation of 'necessary condition' than the one connected with saying something meaningfully and the 'other sense' that I have not specified yet. There are a lot of confusions in this suggestion, though it is essential to the methodology of 'conceptual analysis'. The idea is something like this. Knowing the meaning of a word is applying it in accordance with certain rules. These rules are laid down in the teaching of language. If we break these rules we misuse the word. If we wish to 'get clearer' about a word then we must specify these rules. This move, ubiquitous though it may be, is of no use. 'Rules' have nothing to do with understanding the meaning of a word. We can misuse language as we can misuse a saw, a pen, or a hammer, but in doing so we break no rules. There are two major confusions here. One is a mistake of fact; the other involves a misinterpretation of an illuminating analogy.

1.2. Rules

The factual error is the belief that we are taught language or even most of it. By and large we learn language but are not taught it. We pick up the majority of our words, phrases, and remarks, without any teacher. More importantly we cannot learn what it makes sense to say, by any pedagogic method. Learning to speak is not just learning the vocabulary and rules of grammar of a language. The picture at work here is the teaching of such things as formal grammatical rules at a later date. This is the paradigm we have in our minds when we consider what 'rules' lay behind the use of any expression. We are
taught these 'grammatical rules' and it is thoughtlessly assumed that we must be taught the rules of language and the rules for the use of expressions when we are learning language. Let us consider this misleading picture in some detail.

'Rules' are thought to explain a child's ability after a finite period of time to utter innumerable well formed sentences that he has never heard. This is sometimes referred to as the ability to extrapolate or the phenomenon of linguistic creativity. To be able to speak a language we must be guided by 'rules'. Even though the child does not know these 'rules' his ability to extrapolate is guided or governed by these unknown 'rules'. Before Chomsky's sophisticated 'internalist theory' the ability was explained by reference to 'universals' or 'principles' or even 'concepts'. These mysterious presences along with an equally mysterious act of 'guiding' or 'being guided by' serve to direct the flow of words. That such views have become commonplace is a result of stretching the analogy with games. Chess clearly has rules which are stated and available. It is usually learnt by reference to these rules. But there are still three possible ways in which the game can be learnt:

1) A learns to play chess very skilfully but entirely by watching. He has never seen or heard or attempted to formulate the rules.

2) B learns the rules by rote but has played so long that they have become habitual with him. He never refers to them.

3) C has learned some rules but constantly checks up in his book when he makes a move.

Language learning ab initio is only characterisable by a rule description of the sort given in 1). To make this clearer let us see why rule descriptions of types 2) and 3) cannot be said to explain a child's ability to extrapolate. At an advanced stage a child might improve his ability to produce well formed sentences by learning rules about the split infinitive or about when to use 'infer' rather than 'imply'. But this is not what has to be explained. Such a person already has the ability to use language. Does the introduction of 'rules' explain anything about the child's untutored abilities? The answer that it is not explanatory at all assumes that there is something worthy of explanation here. But it is unhelpful to postulate 'rules', and there are many difficulties created by their introduction. There are problems with the notion of 'unknown' rules, of what it is to 'learn'
such 'unknown' rules, and of what exactly it is to be guided by such rules? Do we need another system of rules to show how we are guided by this set and so on. If we are to avoid this regress are we merely to say that having an 'internal' system of rules is not something requiring further explanation? Why get going on this regress at all? We can be 'governed' by rules we don't know but can we be 'guided' by 'unknown' rules? Why should the structure of the rules of grammar be the same as the internal grammar? If there are different grammars do we say that people have different structures in their heads? Any regularities may point to structural similarities but this is different from a similar grammar. Thus the introduction of the notion seems to raise more problems than it solves. But there is one insuperable problem.

The postulation of explicit or implicit rules cannot explain language acquisition without circularity. The ability to use any such rules presupposes a mastery of language which is what is supposed to be being explained. We simply have no idea what it means for there to be structures guiding us when we speak. We may as well say that we have internal structures guiding us when we walk or make love. (11)

In Chomsky's internalist theory the system we are presented with is a deductive or mathematical model. The 'deep structure' is like the axioms from which are deduced the sentences a person wishes to utter.

Language is, of course, rule-like and rule-describeable, we could not have grammar books if it were not. But it is another question as to whether it is rule-governed or rule-directed. It may seem that we are leaving the matter of a child's ability to extrapolate entirely without explanation. That is, we have not presented any theory to explain the child's ability to extrapolate. There are obvious alternatives here. An empiricist theory could be advanced leaving the matter open to further investigation of what it is to recognise, compare, remember, and to generalise. Particular attention would have to be paid to habits and pattern recognition. (12) What ever variant is adopted and whether explanation is given in terms of analogical inference, association or abstraction the common factor in all empiricist accounts is that language learning is seen as a subcase of the ability to be inductive. A more rule centred or rationalistic theory could be presented. Chomsky's generative grammar would be a restricted form of such a theory. A more complete theory which links both the syntactic and semantic elements of language into a
unified whole. Such a unified system would consist of a list containing the entire rules of language. Each sentence would have the form of a prescription or injunction. It would be a hierarchy of sub-systems of rules. (13) Quite clearly this would be a deductive model. Empiricist theories offer a satisfying solution to the problem of meaning by associating certain elements, whether words or sentences, with the world. Traditionally all such theories resort to some absurd form of ratiocination such as inductive abstraction to explain this connection. The deductive model avoids this problem by reference to some prescriptive rule e.g. 'This $X$ is to be associated with $Y$'. But this comes up against all the objections we have mentioned in connection with the introduction of 'rules' to explain extrapolation. The model of language as a rule following activity like a game is a corrective to empiricist theories. But the deductive model comes up against equally strong objections. The choice is between a mythology of abstraction or a mythology or some super-deductive inner guidance system. This is no choice at all. However, we do not have to go into detail for the point is not to resolve but to quickly review the debate so that the peculiar nature of the philosopher's 'appeal to rules' can be made clear. Aware of the non-choice between the Scylla of induction and the Charybdis of deduction some philosophers incline to view that the rules are non-inductive, non-deductive, inference rules'. (14) Whatever their status the use of 'rules' does not explain or justify an ability to use language. What I shall argue is that there is nothing to explain or justify here.

It may be thought that 'rules' as used above is metaphorical. It is obscure. It does not reflect our ordinary usage of the term. What is needed is a non-metaphorical account. Or one which minimises the reliance on metaphor. We could proceed by distinguishing 'rules' from closely related notions such as descriptions, laws, commands, principles, maxims, canons, orders, customs, regulations and so forth. This would follow the classic pattern of conceptual analysis. A characterisation of 'rules' could then be provided which could tell us whether language could be said to be a rule following activity. Such an analysis has been provided and 'rules' have been characterised as appropriately adopted prescriptive linguistic entities having no truth value. More fully linguistic entities called 'rules' i) have no truth value; ii) are followable; iii) are prescriptive; iv) have been adopted;
v) remain in force till unadopted; and vi) are conditional, that is, they act as critiques of behaviour if and only if certain antecedent conditions are fulfilled. (15)

Even such an analysis does not help the proponents of the rule-governed theory. Quite the opposite, as the characterisation given above only allows examples of the sort given in case 3) above to be rule following activities. We cannot go into all the details of the argument here. (16) But briefly we could say that in case 1) we have merely an example that is in accordance with rules. In case 2) we have an example which is both in accordance with and fulfils rules. But only 3) is in accordance with, fulfils and follows rules. So the second criterion is not fulfilled. Given this our initial objections of a less rigid sort are confirmed and language is not strictly speaking a rule governed activity but is an activity that can accord with rules. Which is to say no more than that it is rule-describable.

Thus language cannot be said to be rule-governed and the learning of language is not explained by reference to either explicit or implicit rules. It may be though a consequence of this that all we do in learning language is to learn what generally happens. This is what Ziff argues when he reduces 'rules' to 'regularities'. He argues that it is regularities not rules that we are concerned with when we are concerned with language. Rules constrain but regularities do not. This can be illustrated by considering the following three propositions:

(a) Ann regularly cycles to work.
(b) As a rule, Ann cycles to work.
(c) The rule is that Ann cycles to work.

(a) is easily assimilated to (c) via (b). The more general mistake is the assimilation of language to a metatheoretical system which is supposed to describe it in the sense that it is an adequate projection of it. 'Rules' are important in formal systems and it is assumed that because these, or some of them, correspond in relevant systems to semantic regularities, that these regularities are the 'rules' of language. That is, that there are 'rules of language'. We are here concerned with non-syntactic semantic regularities but the point holds good for syntactic regularities as well. This argument is not always made very clear. When it is, it is obvious that to say that 'there must be rules in natural language is like arguing that roads must be red if they correspond to the red lines on a map.' (17)
What Ziff ignores is that language is more like a rule-governed system than a series of observed regularities because it makes sense to talk of 'right' and 'wrong' in connection with language. But this, in turn, does not mean that language is a rule-governed activity. We can be right or wrong without breaking any rules. 'I was right about that picture, it does go well in this room' or 'I was wrong about the curtains the pattern is too large'. Both these comments can be made without reference to any rules.

To say that in learning language we learn rules is to speak metaphorically. Rhetor qualifies his talk of 'rules' in connection with language by allowing that learning language 'is in some ways like learning the rules of a game, although in some ways it is very different. It is different from learning the rules of a calculus, too. In fact in some ways it is misleading to talk of rules at all here. But it does make somethings clearer - that it is possible to use an expression wrongly, for instance.' (13) When you learn to speak you learn not merely what other people do but to say something. We agree that this sample is red. If we did not agree in our reactions it would be impossible to say anything, as nothing could be taught. Talk of 'rules' brings out the force of this agreement. But it is not that there is a criterion and therefore a justification for our calling a sample 'red' in 'human agreement'. We have no criterion and we need no criterion. We have no justification and need no justification.

The point about metaphor can be made clearer by reference to Wittgenstein's style. For the notions of 'rule'like the notion of 'criteria' are both most at home in his work. He uses the notion of a 'rule' of language to combat a misleading picture of language that was common to empiricist theories. But this stress on rules has to be seen in the context of his repeated denials that he is presenting an alternative theory, and the way he does this is to show that we need not talk of 'rules' but merely knowing how to continue a series of examples. Examples are an antidote to theories.

To illustrate how the analogy with 'rules' can be both illuminating and misleading let us look at the analogy with 'games' for it is the rules of games like chess that form the basis of the former analogy.

Games are autonomous. What is right or wrong in any game is determined by the rules. If I castle after moving my king then I am no longer playing chess. If I wish to play I must follow the rules.
There is no external purpose in playing chess. Language is autonomous in a similar way. What is right or wrong is not determined by something external to language. Right and wrong is decided by reference to the internal 'rules' of language. Bernard Harrison has suggested that 'autonomy' is what distinguishes language from a series of marks, or sounds. We read off the meaning from the faces of the signs if we are dealing with a language. (13)

Games and the rules of games are also arbitrary. We can ask whether a game is good. We can choose whether we play it or not. We can alter and invent rules at will as a result of human choice. But language is not arbitrary in this sense. If it were we could say that a 'private language' is impossible because there is a decree by human beings that it be impossible. We have set up a 'rule' to the effect that there shall be no private language. Thus by fiat the notion would be meaningless or nonsense. Wittgenstein warns of the dangers of seeing language as arbitrary in the way that games are when he says that 'When a sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless' (P.I. s 500) To take another example from Chapter 1 'No surface can be red and green all over'. The contradictory of this is impossible. But not because of a rule. We cannot explain why we accept this 'grammatical proposition'. We could go further and remind ourselves of what it makes sense to talk about 'red chairs' and 'green chairs' but not 'red/green chairs'. But we still give no reasons for this.

When we use metaphors, give analogies, or use similes we are inviting someone to compare and contrast something with something else we are not inviting them to equate and identify two things. If we interpret metaphors systematically we systematically misinterpret them. We have seen that it is misleading to consider that language is a rule-governed activity and that its 'rules' do not provide us with a justification for what we say in the way that the rules of chess justify the moves made in that game. The idea behind this is that the whole of language is a 'language-game' and can be said to have rules like any other game. The expression usually refers to some primitive or incomplete fragment of language. Thus we can talk of the language-game of 'promising'. Can such activities be defined by giving a complete list of the rules for engaging in that activity? Searle gives five rules of promising which he derives from nine conditions which do not differ from these 'rules' except that four
are of more general application. The two most important rules are
the 'sincerity rule' 'P is to be uttered only if S intends to do A' and
the 'essential rule' 'The utterance of P counts as the
undertaking of an obligation to do A'. (20) Having produced these
rules Searle adds that the 'rather tiresome analogy with games is
holding up remarkably well! But this is bound to be the case
because promising is being rewritten as a game with rules. But
nothing is gained by talking of 'rules' for the 'speech act' of
promising. If someone is insincere when he goes through the
motions of promising we may be outraged. He's broken his promise.
But this is a breach of commitment not the breaking of a rule. Austin
almost always talked of instances where the promising was 'null and
void' or 'insincere' or involved a breach of 'commitment' as
'unhappy'. (21) We could talk of 'happy' and 'unhappy' rather than
'rule-fulfilling' and 'rule-breaking' instances. Nothing would
be lost but an illusion of strictness. The illusion that in some
way rules determine when it makes sense to promise and when not.

Rules do not and cannot define the nature of an activity. This
holds even for a game like chess. Statements like Searle's rules for
promising are attempts to explicate the activity of promising. They
attempt to remind us what it makes sense to say about promising. In
Chapter 1 we referred to such reminders as 'grammatical remarks'.
Once again the term 'grammar' derives from Wittgenstein. It differs
from school textbook grammar in reminding us of so much more.
Grammar reminds us that it makes sense to say 'He goes out' but not 'He
out goes'. 'Grammar' reminds us that it makes sense to say of chess,
for example, things like 'Let's play', 'Good move', 'Careless', 'I beat
him' and so forth. But these remarks are not 'rules' in any sense. The
rules of chess define chess. This is unobjectionable. An example will
illustrate these points. (22)

Imagine a tribe who have a sacred rite of chess. Two priests
play one game once a year to determine the will of the gods. If white
wins the community will flourish. If black wins there will be trouble.
A traveller asks 'Who is winning?' and receives the reply that 'Chess
is not a battle'. Later on he asks his host if he would like to play
competitive games. They have no concept of winning. To them the idea
of winning at chess would be as absurd as the idea of winning at mass
in our culture.
There are several ways in which this example needs to be made more determinate. The origin of the game needs to be explained. Perhaps it is a result of a visit by a westerner long ago. It would bear some resemblance to the infamous 'cargo-cults'. But for our purposes we can fill out the necessary details by meeting some objections to the example.

It could be argued that although this activity is not a game for the observers it could be one for the priests, they could enter into competition. But this changes the example. The example was not one of a culture where the priests played regularly in secret but in public only once a year. Nor is the indeterminancy of the outcome a function of competition. The priests could stop after every move and wait for divine guidance. They need not use strategy. It could also be argued that the example is not adequate as the priests must obey the rules of chess and not merely make moves in accordance with the rules. But they do. If asked why the bishop moves diagonally they will refer to the rules. Finally it could be made a condition of their really playing chess that they see themselves as playing chess. But they do not see chess as a sacred rite. If this means that this cannot be seen as a game of chess then the point is made. This is precisely what is being argued. The rite of chess has a different 'grammar' from the game of chess.

This example shows clearly that rules cannot explicate what it is to play chess. Playing chess does not consist in acting in accordance with the rules. The game is not characterisable as a system of rules. It is only when you know the 'grammar' that you know what sort of activity something is.

We are now in a position to deal with Searle's suggestion that there are two sorts of rule and that scepticism about formulating semantic 'rules' stems from a failure to distinguish them. We have already suggested that what he calls 'rules' are 'grammatical propositions'. This will be the basis of the criticism of the distinction he makes between 'regulative' and 'constitutive rules'. Regulative rules merely regulate antecedently existing behaviour whereas constitutive rules create or define new forms of behaviour. But such constitutive rules cannot define what is the nature of an activity. A new activity, a new practice can only be brought into being when its grammar is clear. Suppose the 'rules' of X-ing are listed from these rules alone we could not tell what sort of activity X-ing was. It could be a rite, or a
game or something else. The 'rules' would be something more pointless than a pointless list until their 'grammar' is given. In so far as Searle's constitutive rules give us the 'grammar' they may be said to explicate the concept of promising. But what of the 'important' distinction between the two sorts of rule? Constitutive rules seem to have an alchemical power of creating new forms of behaviour while regulative rules merely regulate existing behaviour. This is seriously ambiguous between creating new behaviour and new descriptions of behaviour. The distinction may thus be seen to be being blurred. Perhaps there is a distinction to be made here but why should it be made in terms of a distinction between two sorts of rules? Why not say that there are two sorts of behaviour rule-regulated behaviour and rule-constituted behaviour? If we do not say this

',... we certainly imply, and shall probably think that there exist two classes of rule that are formally and inherently different. But rules are rules of, and in relation to, behaviour. They are not things which can be examined in abstraction and, upon examination, be classified by their very nature constitutive or regulative. To speak of two kinds of rule is to speak of two kinds of relationship. We cannot know in particular cases what kind of relationship (and hence what kind of rule) until we know what piece of behaviour is in question.'(23)

Etiquette is behaviour which Searle suggests is characterised by regulative rules. But this can pass the constitutive test, and in a far from trivial way. We have certain pieces of behaviour, shaking hands, kissing a lady's hand, and such like which were possible before the rules of etiquette were introduced. But etiquette creates new possibilities of behaviour in the form of 'polite' and 'impolite' behaviour. We could shake hands before the introduction of the rules of etiquette but now it has a point that it didn't have before. Before it was no insult to refuse to shake hands. A new form of behaviour is introduced and not merely the regulation of antecedent forms. What Searle characterises as 'regulative' rules are therefore a form of 'constitutive' rules of his definition. If we consider other examples we will see that the point about etiquette applies to other activities constituted by 'regulative' rules. Constitutive rules in some fully fledged sense which introduced a new form of behaviour tout court would be distinguishable from the backward looking sort of rules of the sort that characterise etiquette. However the introduction of such 'rules' would not enable us to participate
in any activity because we would not know the nature of the activity in question. Only by being given the 'grammar' of the activity could we engage in it. To the extent that Searle's so-called rules give us the 'grammar' of some activity they do enable us to understand and participate in that activity. But they do not enable us to do this by being 'rules' of any sort.

The idea that language is a matter of rules misleadingly suggests that there is a systematic connection between the conditions of utterance and that utterance. Our use of a term can then be justified by reference to these conditions via the rules which give us 'criteria'. In the next section we will see how this misleading idea gains expression in philosophy of education.

2.3. 'Criteria' As Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

So far I have said little about 'necessary and sufficient conditions' or 'sufficient conditions'. In doing so I merely followed a common practice. These sorts of conditions are usually only considered in connection with symbolic systems where tight logically necessary and sufficient conditions can be laid down. The attempt to produce 'necessary and sufficient conditions' for the use of terms in ordinary language is now almost universally admitted to be futile. The reason usually given is that ordinary language is too vague. Whatever is meant by this it does not preclude the surreptitious re-introduction of necessary and sufficient conditions to help refine the vague concepts embodied in ordinary language.

The idea that there are 'necessary and sufficient conditions' for the use of terms is often called the 'strong thesis' of 'conceptual analysis'. The 'weak thesis' is the claim that there are 'necessary conditions' for the use of terms. It is in the exposition of this 'weak thesis' that we meet with the 'other sense' of 'necessary condition' that I hinted at earlier. To introduce this highly dubious and questionable 'other sense' I want to follow another common practice of philosophers of education. I will introduce the term 'criterion' into the discussion as if it were totally unproblematic. My excuse for this is the fact that I will consider it later in great detail and offer an account of it.
The term usually slips in unnoticed in the general muddle associated with 'use', 'application', 'rule', 'condition' and several other terms which are also used without too much explanation of what they mean. Firth and Peters provide us with a typical example of such a muddle. In *The Logic of Education* they begin with a discussion of 'sufficient' conditions, and 'necessary' conditions for the possession of a concept. They then make a few remarks about having a concept and the possession of an ability and try to differentiate this from a more fundamental 'grasping of a principle'. (24) They then mention 'publicly observable criteria' without explication. They then talk about definition and distinguish between the setting out of *logically necessary conditions* and other sorts of conditions. They then show how Wittgenstein brought the possibility of finding necessary conditions into question. They then say that they do not adopt a 'crude view' of the explanation of a word's meaning that would involve them in trying to produce a hard and fast set of logically necessary conditions for all uses of a word. 'Education' suggests to them two 'conditions', the 'desirability' and 'knowledge' conditions. These give us 'criteria' for distinguishing between cases of education and other things. They consider counter-examples which suggest that these are not 'logically necessary conditions' of the term in general use. To cater for this they distinguish between a 'specific' and 'general' concept within the 'continuum' of cases of education. On the basis of an argument from etymology they suggest that our modern concept of education is or incorporates in a 'central' position this more specific concept that they have picked out. This more specific concept presumably has tight 'logically necessary conditions'. Indeed Peters has referred to his analysis as bringing about a tightening up of the concept of education. (25)

In other works by Peters and others these implied 'conditions' are called 'criteria'. In *The Logic of Education* these conditions are merely said to 'give' us criteria by which we can make certain educational decisions.

This introductory account is 'subtle' in that it incorporates the 'classic move' of conceptual analysis. It is not intended to be an authoritative account. But if all the available papers are studied there is little substantial improvement upon it. Considering the concept of education for contemporary philosophers of education means dealing with the work of Peters. Almost all papers begin with his account, or contrast their accounts with his, or suggest some amendment to his account, or merely set out to clarify aspects of his account. I shall discuss the many variants on his basic approach as my argument proceeds.
The 'muddle' is the lack of a clear differentiation between the sorts of thing mentioned. 'Principles', 'publicly observable criteria', 'conditions', 'necessary conditions', 'rules' and 'criteria' are all mentioned but only the first two are differentiated. Hirst and Peters attempt to impose a Kantian wedge between a concept as an activity and some more fundamental grasping of a 'principle'. It is questionable whether it is possible to insert such a wedge in any absolute sort of way. More interestingly this general 'principle' seems to be a 'condition', possibly a 'necessary condition', and also a 'rule' and a 'criterion'. To untangle this Gordian Knot it is necessary to consider just what is involved in the suggestion that there are 'criteria' for a word's use, or for the application of a concept. Thus the questions 'Are there necessary and/or sufficient conditions for (the use of the term) education?' and the question 'Are there criteria (for the use of the term) education?' cross here.

Though I have linked the 'criteriological' approach to concepts firmly with Kant, Plato's Socrates could be a contender for the role of antagonist in my arguments. The 'criteriological' approach is what many people call the 'Socratic Method' it merely differs from it in not necessarily seeking for 'criteria' to fit all cases. It allows broad borderlines. The notion in current use derives almost exclusively from Wittgenstein. Some evidence for this claim can be given: Firstly, there have been over 200 articles written recently in which Wittgenstein's use of 'criteria' has in some way been discussed. Secondly, encyclopaedia entries dealing with this concept are almost entirely restricted to discussions of Wittgenstein's use of it. Thirdly, the use of the term in philosophy of education has connections with Wittgenstein. This will be clearer when we discuss amendments to Peters account, but it is evident from Peters' own work. Peters is quite clearly familiar and concerned with Wittgensteinian notions such as 'family resemblance' and Langford has suggested that his use of 'criteria' is an abuse of Wittgenstein's notion. Discussing Wittgenstein's notion gives us a way into this perplexing maze. Before offering an account of Wittgenstein's notion I shall discuss another common interpretation of it which has strong affinities with the 'Socratic' view of 'criteria'.

This early and mistaken interpretation issues from a seminal paper by Albritton. 'The criterion', he says, 'is a logically necessary as well as sufficient condition.' Thus his interpretation illustrates how 'necessary and sufficient conditions' can get in through the
back door. How far this interpretation can be attributed to Peters is hard to say. He does not specify the notion he is working with. But if it is, then there is quite clearly a serious contradiction in his writings as he, tacitly at least, agrees with those who reject the 'crude' search for such conditions. I suspect that Peters' unanalysed notion exhibits a stronger connection with one of two more 'interpretations' of 'criteria' that I shall give. But all this is mere opining until such time as Peters specifies exactly what he means by 'criteria'.

How does Albritton defend his contention? A main line of his defence rests on his reading of two remarks from the Brown Book where Wittgenstein is discussing 'reading'. The two remarks are a reference to the 'real criterion for a person's reading or not reading' and one to 'the real criterion distinguishing reading from not reading'. (30) He considers only one objection to his equating 'criteria' with 'necessary and sufficient conditions'. This is that he is doing violence to Wittgenstein's thought by trying to force it into a straight jacket of jargon. One of the major tenets of Wittgenstein's thought is supposed to be that many explanations of what we mean by an expression are inherently vague and none the worse for that. In reply to this he says that he has not offered to tabulate 'strict rules' for Wittgenstein's use of criteria. He also adds a rider to the effect that the 'logically necessary and sufficient conditions' of X being a case of Y rest on human conventions.

A serious objection to this account is that it is based on a very cursory textual reading. The two examples of ways for looking at reading that are given in the Brown Book (31) are being criticised by Wittgenstein. The first is actually prefaced by the phrase 'There is a great temptation to regard the conscious mental act as ....' In the second example Wittgenstein is questioning the notion that a person's feelings are the criterion of reading or not reading. Clearly Wittgenstein is not suggesting that we take up the notion of there being something which is the criterion of reading. Exactly the opposite, he is attacking this notion. He is attacking the idea that there is a 'law in the way a word is used' not putting this forward as a possibility. This is what is wrong with Albritton's introduction of 'necessary and sufficient conditions'. These terms bring with them the idea of laws, of strict rules. Albritton may not set out strict rules for the application Wittgenstein makes of the term 'criterion' but he is committed to the idea that it allows us to show how terms are
strictly applied on the basis of human convention. As we shall see later Albritton is mixing up two different accounts of meaning.

This way of interpreting 'criteria' has had many criticisms levelled against it. Newton Garver, F.A. Seigler, Carl Ginet and Paul Ziff have discussed it at length in symposium. Garver begins by criticising Albritton in just the way that he had expected and unsatisfactorily tried to preempt in his paper:

'...to begin in this manner (ie. with necessary and sufficient conditions) is to set off in the wrong direction. The terminology is alien and inimical to Wittgenstein's thought, for the concept of a criterion was introduced by Wittgenstein precisely to avoid speaking of necessary and sufficient conditions in respect of those relations where such a formal notion does not apply. Criteria are human instruments, whereas conditions are natural phenomena; criteria are used or applied, whereas conditions obtain; criteria are arbitrary or conventional, and when we reach then "the chain of reasons has an end", whereas statements about necessary and sufficient conditions are justified by something else, generally by scientific laws; conditions are conceptually independent of what they are conditions for, whereas criteria (in Wittgenstein's sense) are not, and so on. Only confusion and perplexity can result from amalgamating two such diverse concepts...' (32)

If this is compared with my sketch of how such 'conditions' are usually introduced in philosophy of education it is quite obvious that something different is being considered. For Peters' account begins by separating 'logically necessary conditions' from other sorts of 'conditions' such as contingently necessary pre-conditions. Peters' 'criteria': are more like Garver's 'criteria' in that they are said to be conceptually connected with what they are of. Thus it looks as if Garver's account of a 'condition' is wrong or Peters is mixing up 'conditions' and 'criteria'. I shall leave the resolution of this problem for the moment, and taking Garver's account at face value, show other ways in which it can be faulted.

Garver takes Wittgenstein to be using the notion of 'criteria' to apply to relations where the notion of 'necessary and sufficient conditions' does not apply. This makes 'criteria' both like, as well as unlike 'conditions'. They are like 'conditions' in that they do the job (as instruments) that 'conditions' do, only where 'conditions' for some reason, are not applicable. On this view 'criteria' are merely intended to fill in a gap left over by 'conditions' and thus cannot be 'conditions'. But suppose that many 'conditions' change. Will the 'criterion' of X still ensure that something is X no matter
what other factors have changed? Albritton, if he is to hold to his view that 'criteria' are 'necessary and sufficient conditions' must agree with this view, though it is highly questionable. Sadly, the same thing seems to be true of Garver's view. For, as he strongly differentiates then he does not allow for this sort of case. Garver's whole approach seems to me to set off in the direction that Albritton sets off in. He is clearly looking for some sort of 'theory' of 'criteria'. (35) As I have said Wittgenstein is attacking the idea that there is a 'law in the way a word is used'. To pick out 13 'distinctive features' of 'criteria' in the way that Garver does is a totally un-Wittgensteinian procedure. Such listing is the essence of essentialism. How it is supposed to illuminate his use of 'criteria' is beyond conjecture. It is as if someone were to try to understand what a 'form of life' is by looking at all the occasions on which Wittgenstein uses the term and listing the common features we found. What we would come up with would seem very like 'conditions' for the application of the term. Or perhaps Garver would say we would have 'criteria' for the use of 'criteria'? Whatever he would say it is not surprising that his fellows in the symposium found his comments unclear and often inconsistent.

Garver makes the point that 'conditions' can be used in the way that Garver says 'criteria' should be used, and he concludes with the insightful remark that '.... the feeling that criteria are somehow suspect often arises, I believe, from wondering how precisely they are like yet not the same as necessary and sufficient defining conditions.' (34) But Ginet also seems to make this very mistake when he suggests that:

"Wittgenstein's notion of a criterion is a generalisation of the notion of a defining necessary and sufficient condition ..... which does not require that they be blessed with necessity or sufficiency ..... things are determined by the more fluid, or worldly things of human custom and agreement in human responses.' (35)

It would be better to adopt Wittgenstein's own method of never comparing the two. Indeed I have found no reference to 'necessary and sufficient conditions' in Wittgenstein's work. Contrasting them with 'criteria' even in the way Ginet does leads to the problems he describes. When he says that 'criteria' are a generalisation of the notion of 'necessary and sufficient conditions' this is true. What Ginet does not understand is what Wittgenstein is producing this generalisation for. Siegler sees one of his intentions very clearly:
'Often Wittgenstein uses the notion of criteria to avoid the suggestion of necessary and sufficient conditions. And the term is most often used in the criticism of sceptical or metaphysical theses .... He asks the sceptic to explain in whatever way he likes what he means, or how he can mean what he must in order to say what he wishes to say, or how he can do what he implies he can do, or the like ....' (36)

He introduces the notion to avoid the suggestion of 'necessary and sufficient conditions'. In fact, as we shall see, the term is introduced to attack a whole way of looking at questions about meaning of which looking for such conditions is merely one aspect. Superficially the Ginet and Siegler accounts seem incompatible, but they are not. The generalisation is used as part of an attack on a theory of meaning and is applied during the criticism of certain sceptical or metaphysical theses in a rather unusual way. The unusual nature of the way in which Wittgenstein applies the term is one which precludes any talk of his having a 'logical theory of criteria'.

All of the participants in the Symposium were agreed on the general conclusion that 'criteria' were in no way to be seen as 'necessary and sufficient conditions'. Yet all the accounts of 'criteria' given, make the error of making the notion seem a little too like the notion of such conditions. The reason for this is that they are not able to give an adequate account of why the term is introduced. But even before such an account is offered they hint at a distinction between 'criteria' and such conditions. Ginet's comments will serve as an example. He considers that to distance the two it is necessary to establish (a) that there can be different criteria for the application of a term that are not a set of necessary conditions; and (b) that there can be a logically insufficient criterion. He attempts to answer these points in the following way. He mentions the 'family resemblance' notion and the importance of particular circumstances, as included in criteria, as possible answers to (a). The idea of a 'logically insufficient criterion' troubles him. He thinks that the 'shooting a duck' example given by Garver might be an example of a case where a criterion cannot be specified. It is a case where there is room for doubt. A man may raise a gun and shoot a duck, that is, one may fall from the sky. Now we may say he aimed at it, and what we saw may be our criterion of so saying. But doubt is not ruled out, so our criterion may be an example of an insufficient one. (37) A differentiation is possible along such lines, and I shall take up several of Ginet's suggestions as we proceed but
I will put them to a slightly different use.

Leaving the 'strong thesis' aside, let us consider the 'other sense' of 'necessary condition'. This is also an assimilation of the notion to that of a 'criterion'. But a different and more complex account is given of 'criteria'. This account is one that I think is implicit in Peters' notion of a criterion as it has been interpreted in the literature.

2.4. 'Criteria' In Philosophy of Education

This notion of 'criteria' has been developed to attack or to defend or to make more explicit the nature of the 'conceptual truths' about education propounded by Peters. I will consider one account and show how it derives from a use of the term that has become increasingly common in 'pure' philosophy. The account is that of F.N. Dunlop.

Dunlop's account is exegetical and his positive contributions are tentative. He does not deal at length with the notion of 'criteria', but from his account of what Peters is doing certain things stand out. Firstly, there is a necessity behind language which forces us to adopt a certain concept. We have to accept it because the world is what it is. (38) This suggestion is supported by using the notion of a 'human being' as an intermediary. The world being what it is and we being what we are certain things must be held as conceptually true. Of course Dunlop cannot deny that people disagree about what education is. To deal with this pertinent objection he put forward the rather implausible notion that 'being human is an achievement'. (39) Then the state of being fully human is never reached, according to Dunlop. We still lapse from it, we are irrational, and often passive victims of convention. Secondly, he exploits a distinction between the 'uses of a word' and the 'concept' in an idiosyncratic and misleading fashion. If we were only interested in the way words are used then 'the concept could be connected with all sorts of criteria in particular social groups'. (40) The word may have unusual and odd uses but we can say that the concept is being misused if we go so far as to deny certain things, for instance, that one ought to develop the mind. (41) Thus, for Dunlop certain 'criteria' are guaranteed by the way we are, by what we do. We must acknowledge these criteria if we are to be human.
The force of the first point comes from Dunlop making the notion of 'human being' central to an account of 'education'. But he is assuming a totally unbelievable view of the uniformity of human beings. Education can be considered to be 'truth', 'the development of the soul', 'a process of exploitation' and many many other things. Someone who was committed to the view that education was about the development of the soul might radically disagree with Dunlop's suggestion that education implies that we should develop the mind. It is not impossible that these two views could be held to be incompatible. As I understand it, Dunlop's only line of defence would be to say that his opponent's view was evidence that he was less completely human than himself. But this defence will not stand up. Being 'human' is not an achievement concept in the way that Dunlop thinks. A prima facie piece of counter-evidence is that there are no common utterances in our language of the form 'now he is a human being' or 'He is now half way to being a human'. If what Dunlop says is true you would expect such expressions to be as common as they would be important. But though they may have a use, say in a lecture on evolution when some stage in the movement from the primordial slime to Shakespeare is being discussed, they have no other clear use. Dunlop is running together the fact that we may embody certain elements of the human condition to a greater or lesser degree, and thus may be said to be at any given time a more rational human being, or a fully spiritual human being, with our being human. That is he is treating the concept of a 'human being' as if it is like one of its elements such as a 'spiritual or moral human being'. These elements or factors of the human condition clearly have an achievement aspect. We often do say of someone that they became, or have become, a more moral human being. Dunlop's position here is very similar to Oakshott's notion of education. He also argues that 'nobody is born a human being' and therefore the educational engagement is necessary if the postulant to the human condition is to be initiated into the 'inheritance of human achievements of understanding and belief'. Dunlop obviously thinks that we are less human if we fall from the heights of rationality into error and silliness. Yet it is quite possible to mutiny against this suggestion and suggest that what characterises human beings is exactly that they, unlike beasts and infants are 'liable to sillinesses, stupidities, and wrong-headednesses other than scholastic ones, and in being capable of being judicious in other ways than judicial ways'. There may be a problem with babes and infants though I suspect that the denial thatOakshott and, by implication, Dunlop make about their not being human beings is a rather unfortunate way of expressing the
'tautology' that infants are not adults. Such remarks are incautious. It would be better to say that infants cannot be said to be 'human beings' or not 'human beings' they are infants.

As far as relatively adult human beings are concerned there could be a case made out for saying that some feature such as 'thought' marked them off from animals. Ryle has attempted to make out such a case without embracing some crude form of essentialism. (46) But even if it is true that such an idea as 'using or misusing our wits' which is constitutive of specifically human actions, it is going much further than this to claim that we must take a particular view of one particular concept. This claim is open to many counter-examples in a way in which Ryle's may not appear to be. It would be more or less equivalent to the move that Ryle explicitly rejects of suggesting that all thinking is concerned purely with the intellectual fault of breaching the rules of logic. (47) This suggestion, like Dunlop's notion of education, can be countered by discussing alternatives. As there are alternative notions of education there are alternative intellectual virtues. But there are counter-examples to Ryle. What would we say of someone who could use their wits and fail to use them yet who never showed any affection? Mary Midgley has suggested that this is one of the commonest reasons for calling someone 'inhuman'. We might evince any of the so-called marks of being human such as thought, reason, language, self consciousness, tool using, production, a sense of the future, and still be considered inhuman if we lacked affection. Her point is not that this is the simple differentia that marks man off from animals, for animals show affection in abundance, but that there are no simple marks. There is a cluster of more or less essential marks whose arrangement can be altered from time to time for many reasons. She concludes:

'What is special about each creature is not a single, unique quality but a rich and complex arrangement of powers and qualities, some of which it will certainly share with its neighbours. And the more complex the species the more true this is. To expect a single differentia is absurd. And it is not even effectively flattering to the species, since it obscures our truly characteristic richness and versatility.' (48)

There is no simple distinguishing mark of man. Dunlop's mistake is to conflate the idea of such a distinguishing mark with a particular view
of what is involved in a particular concept. This conflation puts him in the awkward position of having to suggest that to espouse what he calls a derivative or idiosyncratic use of 'education' 'is simply to fail to be human or, (if this is intelligible) to give up trying to be.' (49)

This unhappy attempt to get us to accept that there are certain criteria that all humans will accept as being part of the concept of education is bolstered by the distinction between 'words' and 'concepts' mentioned above. The idea is that only certain uses of the word 'education' 'touch reality' and so can be said to be part of the concept. How it is decided that certain uses are paradigmatic ones is unclear. Presumably they are those uses which exhibit the criteria that Dunlop suggests we must accept, as humans, as applying to 'education'. This would be a decidedly circular argument. However, it is difficult to see how he avoids the circularity. His only option is to argue that fundamental disagreement is impossible. He must impose a unity on the heterogeneity of what we call education. Presumably because if disagreement is allowed it may seem as if we can never say what education is and whether it is good or bad. Dunlop rejects universals yet uses the concept of human nature as a surrogate. What we call a 'concept' comes into existence only by incorporation into language. (50) Dunlop cannot make the concept of education a touchstone for distinguishing between different uses of the term. He can only show that his use of the term must be accepted by showing that there cannot be rival views. This he has not done.

Dunlop's account is rather extreme, but it does contain several elements which reveal a crude application of what has come to be taken as a cardinal part of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. I refer to Wittgenstein's notion that philosophy was in part the art of supplying remarks on the 'natural history' of man. ( PL. S.415) This is an important element in his account of logical necessity. It is interesting to compare how the concept of 'human nature' is used by him when discussing logical necessity with Dunlop's use of the same notion. According to Barry Stroud, Wittgenstein calls such remarks 'facts of our natural history' because he wants to emphasize both their 'contingency' - that is, that they might not have obtained - and the fact that they are somehow "constitutive" of mankind that is, that their obtaining is what is responsible for human nature's being what it is'. (51) It is a 'contingent' fact that we take '1002, 1004 . . .' to be going on in the same way as we do when we put down '996, 998, 1000'. If certain general facts of nature had been different -- if we
were not the creatures we are -- we could have followed another rule. The idea of following another rule is intelligible to us although that other rule may not be. This applies to concepts. If certain facts of human nature were different we might have formed different concepts. This idea is intelligible to us although those different concepts may not be. The notion of 'human nature' is put to use here to counter both Platonism and Conventionalism as theories of mathematics as we saw in Chapter 1.

Wittgenstein also applies the concept of 'natural human responses' to particular concepts, 'pain' being a well known example. But pain gets a foothold with the wriggling fly so we are not considering differentia here. How far is this sort of reflection on things such as 'following a rule' as constitutive of human nature relevant to the concept of education? Wittgenstein's point is that the possibility of our imagining a society such as that described above is excluded. We would have to be other than we are to imagine it. We merely imagine that it is possible. But with the concept of education Dunlop has to admit that there are not only imaginable cases of societies in which people did not have the particular concept of education which Peters has refined but lots of actual instances. Indeed most of mankind has not got this concept. Faced with this objection Dunlop assumes a minimum of moral properties present in any given group of the biological species Homo Sapiens. But that one must have some minimum of 'morality' nothing follows, certainly not agreement about education. Even if we have the full concept can't we reject it in favour of training? Dunlop cannot reject such views as unintelligible in the way that the suggestion that men could count in the strange way illustrated above is unintelligible.

The account of logical necessity provided by Wittgenstein, and the account of 'education' that Dunlop draws out of Peters' analysis are both attempts to solve problems of justification. Wittgenstein was concerned with how we can justify certain logically necessary propositions in mathematics, whereas Dunlop was concerned with how we can justify certain 'conceptual truths' or propositions that are held to be necessary, about the concept of education. In both instances the 'problems' are rejected in favour of certain things being necessary in our logic, because of the way we are. The idea that 'criteria' are essential elements in (Wittgensteinian) theories of justification is a commonplace of contemporary philosophy. This is how the notion is usually interpreted:
'To say that X is a criterion of Y (where 'X' and 'Y' range over types of event or states of affairs) is to say at least that, whenever I know X is instantiated (that something of type X occurs or obtains), I am to that extent warranted in supposing that Y is instantiated as well.' (52)

There are many grounds on which this synopsis can be criticised. For example, certain constructivists reject the idea that 'criteria' connect states of affairs or events in the interests of simplicity. Furthermore, the notion is a weaker one that that which can be drawn out of Dunlop's account. There are similarities which will be more apparent when I develop what W.G. Lycan calls the 'basic criteriological view'. (BCV)

2.4. The Basic Criteriological View

It is best to approach the BCV through a statement of the problematic nature of 'criteria'. The classic remark comes from Wittgenstein:

'The fluctuation in grammar between criteria and symptoms makes it look as if there were nothing at all but symptoms'. (P.I. 8 354)

'Grammar' here is a metaphor but it is unnecessary to go into all the complexities of Wittgenstein's use of it here. In current jargon it is taken to be equivalent to 'the logic of language'. We have seen that it, like 'logic here', and 'rule' is a metaphor. The characterisation we gave earlier is that 'grammar' is a matter of what it makes sense to say. (53) Wittgenstein's point is that if our criteria for Y fluctuate then we may think that there are not 'real' criteria only symptoms contingently connected with Y.

To help in distinguishing between 'criteria' and 'symptoms' it is useful to borrow some terminology from Lycan:

'a "C proposition" states that a criterion obtains - a C relation will be said to hold between X and Y - and a "C connection" will be said to hold between the proposition that X obtains and the proposition that Y obtains, if and only if X is a criterion of Y'. (54)

We have already had occasion to reject the view that links 'criteria' with necessary and sufficient conditions. Utilising this terminology it is easy to refute any attempt to conceive of 'criteria' as logically
necessary characteristics. Quite clearly, and 'C connection' can break down because it is always conceivable that one 'C proposition' should be true while the other is false. The obvious example here would be a proposition about 'pain behaviour' and some conclusion about being in pain. However there is supposed to be some sort of 'necessity' about 'criteria' in the sense that they are not merely de facto features of concepts. To establish this 'criteria' must be clearly differentiated from 'symptoms'. To show how this is usually accomplished we must consider the four points which make up the BCV and some objections to them.

B.1. 'X is a criterion of Y' means 'It is necessarily true that X is evidence for Y'. This is only true in most cases otherwise we would have a defining criterion.

B.2. 'C relations' get their unique status by playing an essential role in the way concepts are formed, and in the way words are learned.

B.3. If a certain 'C relation' did not obtain, then our language would not be the way it in fact is. Our 'grammar' would have shifted towards another paradigm.

B.4. The important difference to bear in mind when attempting to distinguish criteria and symptoms, is that between what we have discovered to be evidence for something and what we have learned to call evidence for something. (55)

These are the central themes of the BCV. The first point is, however, open to some obvious objections. For example someone could deny Y and allow X. But the onus would be upon the objector to show why the case in point was odd. More seriously, someone could point out that it was not logically incoherent to suppose not Y. This objection could be dealt with by pointing out that it is, nevertheless, logically incoherent to demand further justification for saying that Y does obtain. To avoid this sort of objection B.1. is usually amended to read something like B.1. (a) If one understands language he will see the impropriety of asking for further justification. According to the BCV, then, 'criteria' are the same as 'essential justifying conditions'.

There are several similarities between the BCV and Dunlop's discussion of the sort of connection that Peters' 'criteria' have with the concept of education. Firstly, there is the notion that our
'criteria' for a concept are given an essential role in the way that concepts are learned. Dunlop would allow that the 'C relation' is formed when we in the process of becoming 'human' acquire the concept of education. That is, that it is a part of the learning process. Secondly, Dunlop would agree with the modified version of B.1. to the extent that if we questioned the concept, or wished to say that it was other than the standard R.S. Peters' type of analysis, we would be failing to be human, or merely using the word 'education' and not touching the concept. Thirdly, Dunlop deals with the restriction on the use of the criterion in the unmodified B.1. by suggesting that only central paradigmatic cases 'touch reality'. Fourthly, B.3. is clearly an essential part of Dunlop's analysis, though once again it is given a more extreme interpretation. For if we change our concept of education, then we are no longer human. Finally, there is general agreement that we are dealing with some sort of necessity which is tied to human nature, and is neither de facto nor something known a priori. These similarities are rough ones but they indicate that Dunlop is working with a crude version of the BCV.

As the notion of 'criteria' will be central to several of the arguments I will present in this and later chapters it will be useful at this stage to discuss a recent and very full treatment of the concept. This will involve the statement of an interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language which I do not agree with. It is, however, the most thoroughgoing of all the attempts to construct a 'theory of criteria' out of Wittgenstein's work. This interpretation will have much in common with the BCV I refer to John T.E. Richardson's 'constructivist' account of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language in his book The Grammar of Justification. (56) In philosophy of mathematics 'constructivism' is concerned primarily with the 'proof conditions' of mathematical propositions. In philosophy of language the term refers to a family of semantic theories which attempt to explain the meaning of any sentence in terms of the conditions appropriate to its employment. Thus declarative sentences are to be explained in terms of truth conditions. I shall elaborate this theory, as Richardson propounds it, only insofar as it is necessary for an understanding of the concept of 'criteria'.

Constructivist theories are usually opposed to realist theories. This opposition will reveal the way in which the notion of necessary and sufficient conditions is an essential element in realist notions of meaning. This is something I deferred earlier but must now take up.
There are three features common to most realist theories of meaning. Firstly, they assimilate all cases of assertion to the stating of facts about objects. Secondly, they hold that the meaning of an individual word is to be explained in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Thirdly, non-declarative sentences have to be explained in terms of declarative sentences which correspond to them. This is because realists explain meaning in terms of truth conditions and only declarative sentences can be true and false. The opposing position set out by Richardson has been labelled by Dummett 'Anti-Realism' but this is far too negative. There are three features found in Richardson's characterisation which will serve as an introduction. Firstly, a constructivist theory describes but does not explain the conventions which determine the appropriateness of particular utterances. Secondly, constructivists describe grounds conventionally taken to justify assertions. These conventions must also be recognised by the speakers of any particular language as obtaining when they do obtain. And thirdly, assertive and non-assertive uses are not assimilated.

Richardson develops what he takes to be Wittgenstein's version of constructivism in a lengthy discussion of the notions of 'family resemblance' and 'broad borderlines'. He says in the concluding pages of his book that 'Wittgenstein's discussion of criteria makes precisely the same points as the theses of family resemblance and broad borderlines'. Taking him at his word I will make the points solely by reference to the notion of 'criteria' as I do not wish to pre-empt my discussion of 'family resemblance.'

Central to Wittgenstein's supposed 'constructivism' is the notion of meaning-as-use. Richardson deals with Wittgenstein's 'woolly' use of 'use' in the following way. He argues that, in general, the word 'use' merely draws attention to the aim or function of a word, its role in the life of a community, and the idea that language and concepts are instruments. This general approach is expressed in Wittgenstein's use of 'Gebrauch'. This word immediately sets his approach against the realist one. For realists see meaning and use as separable, the former governing the latter. However, Richardson points out that the term 'Gebrauch' also involves two other notions, 'Anwendung' and 'Verwendung'. The 'Verwendung' refers to the employment of a word in a game i.e. its role in language. This is the 'set of rules governing its use'. The 'Verwendung' is constituted by the 'Anwendung'. This term refers to the connection between signs and the world. Richardson takes it to mean 'the linguistic practices of a community.' By 'game' in the above I mean of course 'language
game'. This refers to either a simplified form of language, a primitive form of language, or an activity by which a child learns language. Richardson defines a 'language game' as 'an activity determined by a system of linguistic rules which specify the circumstances which are conventionally recognised as legitimate for the employment of a concept or set of concepts.' 

This notion of rules constituted by the linguistic practices of a community, with the idea of conventionally recognised grounds are the two main bases on which Richardson erects his 'theory of criteria'. He follows Hacker in simplifying the 'criterial relationship' so that it is said to hold only between linguistic entities rather than the variegated sorts of things that Wittgenstein applies it to. Thus he thinks a 'criterion' can be defined in the following way:

'A symptom is merely inductive evidence which regularly coincides with some criterion. Richardson further characterises 'criteria' by listing several descriptions of them which are to be found in Wittgenstein: He therefore states that i) Criteria determine the meanings of words; ii) If you change the criterion you change the meaning; iii) To explain criteria is to give a grammatical explanation; iv) Criteria are fixed by convention; v) They determine the language game with a word; vi) They are kinds of justification; and vii) They are laid down in the rules which determine what counts as adequate justification for the ascription of a concept.' 

Richardson utilises his reading of Wittgenstein, and his understanding of the BCV, to attack several of those writers, already mentioned, that see the criterial relationship as a 'somewhat strict logical relationship, to be assimilated, perhaps to entailment.' In other words he attacks those writers that assimilate 'criteria' to 'necessary and sufficient conditions' and thus give Wittgenstein's semantic theory a form more appropriate to realist semantic theories. Much of Richardson's discussion of these other interpretations centres, as do their accounts, on the well known passages in the Blue Book. I have already suggested that these may be misinterpreted. Richardson attempts to argue against a suggestion by Hacker that there are two different uses of the term in Wittgenstein, one in the Blue Book which
seems to be a sort of 'necessary and sufficient condition', and one
found in the P.I. which does not seem so. To do this he tries to
show that the Blue Book account is misleading in that it gives a false
account of medical diagnosis and disguises rather than exhibits what
Wittgenstein actually thinks about the special status of 'criteria'.

The medical point need not detain us long. This revolves around
a discussion of J.S. Clegg's paper on 'Symptoms'. (65) Clegg bases his
discussion upon the fact there are many tests available to enable us
to identify diseases which are not constitutive of them. 'Criteria'
cannot, he suggests, be said to be 'necessary' nor 'sufficient'
conditions. They are 'not sufficient, because the patient may be a
carrier of the disease they are not necessary because the empirical
correlation between symptoms and criteria may fail.' (66) Whether
Wittgenstein is right or wrong when he gives his medical example there
are two things to note. Firstly, Wittgenstein is merely exhibiting
and not stating the case for 'criteria'. (67) And secondly, his method
for much of the later philosophy was the giving of examples. This
method is, of course, a varied one sometimes consisting of lists, some-
times quotations, sometimes the description of primitive or fantastic
situations but most often it consists of reminders of the commonplace.
What it is important to remember about this method is that it is
detached. The example per se does not matter. It is said that
Wittgenstein was always willing to withdraw examples if people found
fault with them. (68)

The account is further inaccurate according to Richardson in that
it seems to encourage the assimilation of criteria to 'necessary' and
'sufficient' conditions, and to see the 'criterial relationship' as
something similar to entailment. We have discussed the first version
of this so we will concentrate here on the second. The 'criterial relationship' is taken by the propounders of the BCV (or some of them)
to involve the giving of 'decisive evidence'. Thus Kenny follows
Malcolm in considering that 'a criterion differs from a symptom in
being a piece of decisive evidence.' (69) The arguments against this
view are legion. There may be no single criterion for something. It
amounts to equating 'criterion' with 'sufficient condition' which
would lead to a behaviourist interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy
of mind. Wittgenstein himself objected to the dependence on entailment
and attacks strict rules for the application of terms. And finally,
the idea implicit in this view that phenomena sited in the explanation
of a term are sufficient conditions of a term's use is a very un-
Wittgensteinian one. He would obviously reject it, and any variation on it.

This strand of the BCV is one of the few attempts to answer the question 'Are there sufficient conditions for the application of a term?' in the affirmative. Though it is inadequate, a version of it is given a cursory mention in Fielding's 'Against Competition'.(70) Fielding refers to what we can all the Kleinig/Scriven argument after the philosophers from which he derives it. The argument is an anti-essentialist one, but it allows that words may be partially defined in terms of sets of conditions which are jointly sufficient for the terms use in the sense that they are characteristically, or typically, implicit in their use. Though this account of meaning is interesting and deserves a mention it is too laconic to be dealt with here in any satisfactory way. It does, however, utilise conventionalist notions 'typically' and 'characteristically' which may align it with some form of constructivism. I will, therefore, consider it to be dealt with in a similar fashion to Richardson's account.

What is wrong with Richardson's 'constructivist' interpretation of Wittgenstein? If there is nothing wrong with it, then as the fullest and most developed of recent accounts of 'criteria' it would provide a basis for a 'criteriological' analysis of the concept of education in the manner of Peters. It develops out of the BCV but avoids most of its blind alleys. By stressing the importance of linguistic convention it also avoids the pitfalls of the quasi-realism implicit in Dunlop's paper.

Anyone who has followed the arguments of Section 2.2 of this chapter will already understand the gist of my objection to his account. For he also builds his theory of meaning on the idea that there are rules constituted by the linguistic practices of the community. These rules give us criteria and determine what is adequate justification. We shall not go over these arguments again but approach its inadequacies by considering Richardson's account of Wittgenstein's philosophical method.

According to Richardson, when Wittgenstein notes that in philosophy 'we' continually compare our use of words with one which follows exact rules, he is not criticising such procedures. Richardson believes that Wittgenstein's method is to remove philosophical problems by clarification of the rules according to which we are inclined to use language.
Though this is a one-sided way of looking at language, Richardson argues that Wittgenstein at no point suggests 'that having such a "one-sided point of view" is at all unsatisfactory' (71) Thus Wittgenstein is said to study language as if it were a game with fixed rules. In support of this he quotes the remark from *Zettel* where Wittgenstein says that though we do not seek the real meaning of words, 'we do often give words exact meanings in the course of our investigation.' (72) This method is justified to the extent that it removes disagreement. 'Alternative' conceptions of meaning such as the name-bearer or causal theories might also be useful for specific purposes. The culmination of all this is that Wittgenstein is said to have a 'theory of criteria'.

By quarrel with this strange account is not that it is wrong but that it ignores entirely the 'form' or 'style' of the *P.I.* (and Wittgenstein's later works) and extracts from them a content which is exhibited not asserted. Let us take the first remark about what 'we' do when philosophising to make this point clear. The remark is the result of Wittgenstein's reflection on a conversation with Ramsey (P.I. s. 81) He is concerned with what can lead us to think that to mean something we must be 'operating a calculus according to definite rules.' Richardson is quite right in saying that Wittgenstein is not criticising such a view. But neither is he asserting such a view. He is not offering any 'alternative' to the views that he has supposedly been 'criticising' he is showing how we can be misled. He then opposes this picture by getting us to consider the familiar rough ground of language by considering games in which there are no definite rules (P.I. s 83) Richardson believes that Wittgenstein is attacking the notion of 'strictness' and not that of 'rules'. But again I do not see Wittgenstein as presenting any 'alternative' to strict rules in terms of lax or flexible rules. Richardson is insensitive to the whole tenor of the *P.I.* if he really thinks that this 'one sided' way of looking at language would not be objected to by Wittgenstein. It is prima facie implausible, is it not, that the philosopher who warned 'A main cause of philosophical disease - a one sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example'. (P.I. s. 593) was not against a 'one sided' treatment of language? Wittgenstein described his remarks as 'a number of sketches of landscapes' which were made in the course of 'long and involved journeyings' (P.I. Preface p. ix.) He is like an artist making sketches rather than the scientist putting forward theories and hypotheses. Thus it is hard to see Wittgenstein as presenting any theories. Just a brief catalogue of
some of his remarks should be enough to establish this:

'If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to question them because everyone would agree with them'. (P.I. s. 1228)

'We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place.' (P.I. s. 109)

'Compare a concept with a style of painting'. (P.I. p.230)

'"The sense of a proposition" is very similar to the business of "an appreciation of art"'. (73)

'Do you think I have a theory? Do you think I'm saying what deterioration is?' (74)

Richardson makes little or no attempt to deal with these remarks. Thus when he argues that the method advocated by Wittgenstein is that of clarifying the rules of language, and perhaps accidentally giving words exact meanings, he is like the 'someone' mentioned by Wittgenstein who is looking at a landscape painting with a house in it who asks 'Whose house is that?'. The imagining finishes with the remark: 'The answer, by the way, might be "It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it." But then he cannot for example enter his house.' (P.I. s. 398) Richardson has confused the 'theory' sketched by Wittgenstein as his theory, which it is in the trivial sense that he is the artist.

A possible line of escape would be to say that the thesis attacking theses (P.I. s. 128) is at best paradoxical, and taken at face value quite obviously false. This sort of line is taken by Bambrough who is much given to remarks like the following:

'Now the denial of a thesis is a thesis. And though one may deny a theory without affirming an alternative theory, the rejection of a theory, like the rejection of a thesis, is the adoption of a thesis. Wittgenstein rejects all theories and many theses, so Wittgenstein cannot be said to hold the philosophical opinion that he holds no opinions in philosophy.' (75)

'Not even his own philosophical words can be taken at their face value, not even when they express his theory about the nature and effects of philosophical theories.' (76)

These remarks come from a paper entitled 'How to Read Wittgenstein'. They ignore the fact that reading Wittgenstein is like reading poetry or looking at pictures (or sketches) which capture aspects of a thing. Not for nothing is picturing a profound and ubiquitous metaphor in the later writings. The so-called 'theses' about theories are
merely pictured by Wittgenstein not seriously offered as 'alternatives'. If they were then the sort of points made by Bambrough would connect with what he says, but they do not. The essential thing about poetry (or any art) is that it defies translation. A literal paraphrase, or clarification of, say Keats 'Ode to a Nightingale' would simply be a parody. Philosophy, like art, is particular. It consists in the presentation of examples which are reminders for some particular purpose.

The point about the analogy with the arts, which will be developed later, is that the points made by Wittgenstein cannot be summed up in any general formula or theory. It is the place of the remark, point, or example within the context in which it is made which would give each of them its unique character. The point of any remark is that it is set next to this and this, but not that. Thus Richardson's one sided view of language is set against other misleading pictures of how language works. It may have a strength which tempts us to set it up as an alternative to these other pictures but this would be misled by another picture. What Richardson gives us is another picture of the workings of language. I am suggesting that it would be a very un-Wittgensteinian move, to suggest, as he does, that this picture is being given us by Wittgenstein as the correct one.

These are very general points which may tell against Richardson's overall approach to Wittgenstein. It remains now, to show how they relate to his characterisation of 'criteria'. Certainly, the whole notion that Wittgenstein had some sort of implicit 'theory' must be dropped. It is a misreading of his work. But the characterisation must also be rejected. Remember that Richardson is attacking the notion that the criteriological relation is an entailment relation. One would therefore expect him to be moving away from this 'logicist' paradigm. But this is not so. He merely wants to show that 'the criterial relation is an evidential relation, but it is something weaker than entailment'. (77) He does not move far enough away. He restricts the application of 'criteria' to propositions. The term only applies to phenomena, words, or concepts in a 'derivative' sense. All this is despite 'Wittgenstein's variegated usage'. Such simplifications of Wittgenstein are necessary, only if you wish to produce a 'theory'. As we have seen such exclusions are one of the typical features of essentialist arguments. Richardson does seem to be trying to avoid essentialist positions even when he is arguing like an essentialist. Thus when he gives the list of characteristics of
criteria - which would be the first step in the essentialist procedure of isolating what is common to them all - he comments that it is difficult to decide if any of the descriptions 'is to be definitive, and we may always revise our description'. (78) He presents his list of characteristics as analogous to those descriptions used to 'define' the term 'Moses' in P.I. s. 79. The point being that any 'definition' can be withdrawn without making the term useless. They are 'props' we have in readiness when we are challenged. But Richardson is still seeing the use of such characteristics as definitions. Admittedly he is a long way from the position of the cruder proponents of the ECV, like Albritton, who would seem to want one single criterion given by linguistic convention. Richardson accepts that there may be several. What he is ignoring in using the 'Moses' passage as an example is that part of Wittgenstein's intention there is to show that a term can be rightly used 'without a fixed meaning'. This does not only mean that our definitions of the term are all corrigible and therefore not sufficient. It may also mean that we have no such definition in mind at all, however difficult it may be to imagine this being true in the case of this particular proper name. As Wittgenstein puts it elsewhere 'To use a word without justification does not mean to use it without right.' (P.I. s. 289)

Richardson is correct when he suggests that the popular view of 'criteria' is derived from 'an over-dogmatic view of the central discussion in the Blue Book'. (79) Richardson himself makes no apologies, however, for also concentrating on this central discussion. This concentration on one small area of Wittgenstein's work is a result of the fact that Wittgenstein uses the words 'criteria' and 'criterion' more often in these pages. I have indicated that Richardson's account of 'criteria' is misleading in that it is still a 'logicist' account. It puts considerable stress on 'rules' and 'teaching' in a manner which I have already shown is mistaken. (80) The most general criticism that can be made of his account is, however, that it is a misreading of Wittgenstein. Of course, to thoroughly establish that it is a misreading would involve my giving an account of 'criteria' which is consistent with a reading of Wittgenstein which is sensitive to his 'style'. This I shall attempt later on in this chapter.

Richardson's account, then, is to be found in the Blue Book. He offers a subtle analysis of the notion of 'criteria' by comparison with that offered by several other writers. Yet for all its subtleness his
account fails to make sufficient allowances for the importance of the 'style' of the later writings. This means that the 'form' or 'method' of Wittgenstein's work cannot easily be separated from the 'content' to give us a 'theory' of some sort. To facilitate the separation he desires it is notable that Richardson takes the usual path of denigrating the importance of examples, both in Wittgenstein, and in philosophy generally. (81)

2.6. Meaning and Criteria

All the interpretations of 'criteria' that we have considered up to this point have been examples of what can broadly be called 'criteriological theories of meaning'. Such theories may seem to be guilty of quite an elementary confusion. They conflate questions about the nature of meaning, that is, about what it is one is supposed to know when one knows the meaning of a word, with questions about what requirements must any word meet if it is to be said to have meaning. Thus, to take one of Locke's favourite examples, they answer the question 'What does "gold" mean?' by giving a criterion such as 'Having a certain specific gravity'. According to G.H.R. Parkinson (82) such an answer is unacceptable because there is more to gold than this. But if the insufficiency of the criterion is Parkinson's only objection to it, then he has not precluded a Lockeian sort of answer to this question which would be sufficient and therefore be also an answer to the former question. We would merely have to complete the 'complex idea' of gold by listing all those 'simple abstract ideas' other than specific gravity which together give the essence of gold viz: yellowness, weight, malleability, etc. (83) Though there are well known difficulties with Locke's semantic theory (84) the possibility of it bridging the gap between the two sorts of question shows that they are not so obviously separable as Parkinson seems to think. The 'criteriological' theories so far considered quite clearly link the two sorts of questions by considering that 'criteria' capture at least necessary conditions of meaning. They too would not usually consider their 'criteria' to be sufficient but would argue that they captured essential elements of the terms meaning.

The classic attempt to separate 'criteria' from 'meaning' is found in R.M. Hare's famous chapter in The Language of Morals. (85) Woods and Barrow have recently attempted to import his distinction into their treatment of the concept of education. The two distinctions they
make are not exactly the same. Hare distinguishes between 'meaning' as use' and 'criteria' whereas they distinguish between 'criteria for use' and 'meaning'. Perhaps some presently unfathomable depths are indicated by such terminological ripples, but they need not concern us. If we take Woods and Barrows 'criteria for use' to mean something like 'criteria for application to a particular instance' then their position is similar enough to Hare's to enable us to gloss over this small point. I will summarise their argument before attempting to deal with Hare's distinction.

They argue that there 'is an important philosophical distinction between meaning and criteria for use.' (87) However, they do not apply this distinction to the 'unrewarding' concept of education but follow the more recent work of Peters in analysing what is involved in being an 'educated man'. They drive their wedge between 'meaning' and 'criteria' by contrasting the labelling of someone as 'educated' with calling, say, a symphonic performance 'first class'. 'First class' is an evaluative term and their discussion explicitly utilises the hoary old distinction between evaluative and descriptive meaning. It is also a term used in commending and by introducing it alongside 'educated' they show that they have performed their analysis of the term 'educated' on the lines of Hare's treatment of 'good'. Hare says three things about good that are taken up by Woods and Barrow. Firstly, that the function of the word 'good' is to commend. Secondly, that it has evaluative meaning, and thirdly, that it has descriptive meaning. (88) 'Good' has these latter two features in a peculiar combination and, as we shall see, Woods and Barrow experience not a little difficulty over the question as to whether or not 'educated' has descriptive meaning.

Their argument begins where Hare concludes, with one common sense of 'mean' which is a request for a criterion. Suppose I call a symphonic performance 'first class' and you ask me 'what do you mean?' I may reply that the performance was 'technically equal to the demands of the symphony'. I give here the criteria for my application of the term in a particular case. (89) This is a valid use of 'mean'. But there is another sense of the term 'mean' to which this reply would not be acceptable. If it were acceptable then the meaning of 'first class' would be 'co-extensive with my reasons for using the term and your question would be redundant.' (90) We can independently characterise 'first class' as being not unlike 'applauding loudly' and make no reference to the criteria for applying the term. The 'criteria' for
something are the reasons I have for applying it. But we can see that 'first class' has an evaluative meaning which can be understood without reference to specific criteria. Different people may apply different criteria for a things being 'first class' but it nevertheless has an evaluative meaning common to all uses. 'educated' differs from 'first class' in two ways. Firstly, it is a less general term of commendation, and secondly, it may be that 'educated' possesses an element of descriptive meaning such that seemingly different criteria for use on the part of different people do, in fact, have common elements. These common elements would then serve to identify the elusive descriptive meaning. A search could be made for some such common element, or to put it differently for the 'necessary and sufficient conditions of being educated'.

Thus, to call someone educated is to pin an award or medal on them. This is what calling someone educated means in one sense of mean. This simple claim is complicated by the possibility that there may be some common element to the various criteria for applying the term. As we have to look for such an element it seems to be something purely contingent and presumably gratuitous. It is far from clear whether Woods and Barrow would allow that this 'descriptive meaning' is part of the 'meaning' they separated from 'criteria for use'. If they allowed this it would make nonsense of their earlier distinction, and they must allow this to some extent for they call this descriptive factor 'descriptive meaning'. If they wish to allow this descriptive meaning and retain their earlier distinction between 'meaning' and 'criteria' I simply do not see how this can be done as the descriptive meaning just is a common criterion for the application of educated in particular cases. The distinction is, to say the least, obscured. To consider further this radical dichotomy it is necessary to look closely at Hare's more extreme position.

Hare believes that to teach what makes something good is different for different cases but 'the word "good" has a constant meaning which, once learnt, can be understood no matter what class of objects is being talked about.' Though he accepts that attempts to characterise this common meaning for all classes of objects are doomed to failure, he thinks we may well be able to give it for certain groups of object i.e. 'being efficient' applies to many good objects such as cars and tools. Hare wishes to show that 'good' unlike 'red' has a meaning independent of its criteria for application. To do so he produces two main arguments. The first is an attempt to show that we can teach someone the criteria for something being a good such and such while he
remains ignorant of the meaning of 'good'. The second is an attempt
to show the reverse, that is, that we can teach someone what 'good'
means without teaching any criteria for application. This latter
argument is similar to Woods and Barrow's argument about the 'redundant'
question as to what 'first class' means if 'means' is understood as
'criteria for application'.

Hare adopts Wittgenstein's suggestion that 'the logical character
of words can be investigated by asking how we would explain their
meaning'. (93) He sees this method as involving questions about how
we would teach the meaning of a word to a foreigner. And this points
to a first and very general mistake in Hare's overall approach, as far
as it is typified in this particular chapter. I have already mentioned
that the over emphasis on 'teaching' that is rife in contemporary
philosophy is a weakness. But it is made even more of a handicap in
finding your way about the conceptual environment when it is compounded
with an investigative model which is one of the most important of the
misleading pictures of the workings of language that Wittgenstein set
out to free us from. I refer to the Augustinian view of language which
Wittgenstein discusses in the opening paragraphs of the P.I. Here is
Wittgenstein's clearest characterisation of it:

'Augustine describes the learning of language as if the
child came into a strange country and did not understand
the language of the country; that is, as if it already had
a language, only not this one'. (P.I. s. 32)

What Wittgenstein is suggesting is that we consider how we would teach
someone who has no language what a word meant, or how we would teach
the meaning of a word to someone who has acquired some but not all of
his native language. The point is not a trivial one. The assumption
that a person already has a language provides a medium which seems to
explain someone's understanding of a term when it really begs the whole
question. Suppose we wanted to teach some foreign philosopher the
rules of chess. He may know how to play the game, but not the English
word 'chess' nor 'rook' or 'mate' etc. Once we show him the board,
pronounce the words 'chess', 'mate' etc. he may soon be playing, and
using the English terms. We may have to go over some of the rules in
case he thinks this is some other game, but this does not matter. The
point is he picks up the game quickly because he already know the rules,
even though he cannot tell us the rules. With a child the situation is
different.He has no previous knowledge to utilise. We must teach him
the rules by giving him examples, showing him move after move. After
sometime he will, unless he is very stupid, pick up the game. To
assimilate these two cases would be absurd. However, the situation is masked somewhat if we consider the following situation. The foreigner comes from an island where the people rarely play games. They have no contact with the west and as part of his induction into western culture we try to teach him, or explain to him, the rules of cricket. This case will then be analogous to that of the young child who is learning about cricket for the first time. Or is it? Perhaps we have here an example of bad case by case argument, the decisive move in the philosophical conjuring trick being made simply by placing these two cases side by side and stressing obvious similarities when dissimilarities are more important. The test in Hare's case as to whether or not his general methodological mistake has serious consequences is to be seen in the two examples he gives to establish his two main arguments.

Hare's examples exemplify many of the defects of examples mentioned in Chapter 1. They are incomplete and hopelessly indeterminate. To establish that we can teach the criteria for a class of objects without teaching the word 'good' he asks us to imagine a man trained to put augers into two piles. The man has no idea that this involves selecting certain augers in preference to others. (94) Presumably his 'manager' does know this. What can we say of this man? Has he no language? Is he a complete imbecile? How does he come to be in this situation? Doesn't he ask questions? Couldn't we replace the man by a machine or a monkey? Would we then be tempted to say that we had taught the monkey criteria for application? The acts of this man or this monkey are completely meaningless for them. Not only do they not know the meaning of the word 'good' they do not, in a quite ordinary sense of the word, know what they are doing. Hare's example demands too much if it is to be successful. But if we fill it in then this will introduce the notion of preferential selection which it is intended to exclude. The example seems to work because we know that he is really distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' augers. And we are assisted in this because we know the meaning of the word good is not primarily a commending one.

The second example exploits the Augustinian view of language and it would not have any force without the assumption that the person giving a paradoxical explanation of the meaning of 'good' already has a language. The paradoxical situation arises if we imagine a tribesman who is explaining a game which is played with an instrument called a shmakum. Before the explanation goes any further the Englishman asks what sort of shmakum would the tribesman choose if he were buying one from a shmakum-maker? Receiving the answer 'the one that he could
make the most smashes with' the Englishman is able to conclude that this would be the 'best' *shmakum* and 'best' is the superlative of 'good'. Thus he has managed to explain the meaning of 'good' to someone with reference to objects for which there are no criteria known to the person giving the explanation. The ability to make smashes would not be a criterion as it does not describe a physical property. Thus explaining the meaning of the word 'good' is 'quite different from explaining any of the various criteria for its application.' (95) But the indeterminate nature of the example means that it is purely chance as to whether the Englishman is right. Hare's argument relies on the Englishman's being able to convict the tribesman of having the thought that 'the best shmakum is the one that you can make the most smashes with'. As the first example exploited the detached observer's understanding of the fact that the selection was preferential, so this example exploits the fact that someone knows the criteria. But suppose the tribesman says 'No'? Hare's example does not exclude this possibility. We cannot make it a requirement that the game is cricket as we play it. The tribesman may belong to a tribe that only values and commends the underdog. Defeat alone is commendable and victory is a sign of the action of evil powers. We select our *shmakums* on an equal basis but the 'best' *shmakum* is the loser's *shmakum*. This is the one we hang on the clubhouse wall. Such a topsy-turvy world of values is not without foundation in a typically 'British' attitude to sportsmen.

A more general criticism can be made of Hare's contention that the primary use of 'good' is to commend. Hare's claim is one example of the claim that it is possible to explain the meaning, or part of the meaning of words by reference to the speech acts performed when they are uttered. (96) The idea is that meaning can be explained by reference to the illocutionary act performed without reference to further semantic information. But such acts are performed by sentences not words. Furthermore, it is only non-determinate utterances that come close to being independently identifiable. Determinate utterances such as 'George K crossed the Hudson on October 20th 1943' do require supplementary semantic information. (97) With non-determinate utterances such as 'It's over there' we can not only identify the act in its context where it can be replaced quite easily by a gesture. Holdcroft has argued that only such acts as can be performed without the sentence can be independently identified. This has the consequence that if the illocutionary act could not be performed without the sentence then it will be:
impossible to show that it is not necessary to understand the sentence first to identify the act, and of course if it is necessary to understand the sentence first to identify the act under a full description, then any attempt to explain the meaning of the sentence by reference to the act would be circular. (98)

For most determinate sentences we cannot explain the meaning by reference to what we do with the sentence. This is a general conclusion applying to any determinate sentence containing the word 'good'.

Hare supports his contention that the word 'good' has commenatory meaning by reference to the Oxford English Dictionary. (99) Paul Ziff has pointed out that reference to the dictionary is not a trouble free procedure in philosophy. The dictionary is often wrong, and it is wrong in the case of 'good'. Ziff discusses over one hundred and sixty examples to produce his analysis of 'good'. He has no difficulty utilising this painstaking case by case procedure in coming up with many non-commending uses. Utterances such as 'Be sure to do a good job' are urging not commending uses, and what would we say of 'It is good that she is dead?' Is it an utterance commending death? There are many more examples in his book. Consider these few and ask what they are commending:

'(104) No news is good news ...
(105) We shall have good weather tomorrow
(106) I want a good cup of coffee
(107) I had a good time
(108) George has a good opinion of himself
(109) The good seats are all reserved
(110) A good tennis racket unfortunately costs twenty dollars.' (100)

Ziff also stresses the point that we have no reason even in commending uses to suggest that 'good' the word does the commending. This point is, of course, implicit in Hordercroft's paper. Consider a simple sentence that seems to commend such as 'That is good'. The use of good is not necessary because we could replace it with 'fine' or 'spendid'. It is not sufficient for we can ask 'Is that good?' If we replace 'that' with 'what' we can get 'What is good?' So we can as well say that 'that' does the commending rather than 'good'. There does not, therefore, appear to be much in the idea that 'good' has commenatory meaning. Ziff rejects this notion and is firm in his conclusion that 'apart from certain minor, derivative, or deviant cases, "good" in English means answering to certain interests'. (101) Only one thing will upset this
analysis, he says, 'a better one'.

Hare's distinction runs into great difficulties which are compounded in the case of 'education'. Not only is it a 'less general term of commendation' but it follows from the above argument that it does not necessarily have commendatory meaning, but is used in sentences which may commend. Rather than saying that many people do not accept the desirability criterion of 'educated' we can simply say that they do not use it in sentences which commend, and thus avoid the seeming paradox that they do not desire the desirable. Woods and Barrow accept that 'educated' may carry an element of descriptive meaning. One reason why Hare wished to avoid this move with the word 'good' was to resist the idea that the features of objects determined the meaning of the word. By importing the descriptive or evaluative dichotomy into the discussion to avoid this conclusion he misses a more important and related distinction between the 'phenomenological' and the 'grammatical' which we shall discuss in Chapter Three.

A concluding remark about the distinction between 'evaluative' and 'descriptive' meaning can be made. Woods and Barrow clearly think that it is important to distinguish them when analysing the word 'educated'. But it is important to make a simple qualification when such familiar philosophical distinctions are brought into play. It is not the word but the utterance in appropriate circumstances of an utterance that may be said to have evaluative meaning and not any particular word in the utterance. Even something that seems to be a purely factual and descriptive utterance such as:

'Henry VIII had six wives.'

could be highly evaluative if we imagine it being spoken by a staunch Roman Catholic in the course of a debate about sin and monogamy. To stress such a point is to do no more than remind ourselves about the importance of context, and to bring the particular to bear once more upon the general.

2.7 Criteria' In Wittgenstein's Philosophy

Mention of the particular brings us back to the main theme of this essay. What I must offer now is some account of 'criteria' which differs substantially from that given by those writers who see Wittgenstein as offering some sort of 'theory'. In giving this account I will also extend and elaborate my previous remarks about the importance of a sensitivity to Wittgenstein's style.
To help to characterise Wittgenstein's use of the concept of 'criteria' I want to begin by looking at how he could be seen as offering a 'criteriological theory of meaning' as a solution to the so-called 'problem of other minds'. The 'criteriological' theory I will discuss is quite clearly and deliberately similar to Richardson's extension of the BCV. Scepticism about other minds results from any attempt to drive a wedge between 'body' and 'mind'. Such attempts usually introduce some extraordinary use of the term 'body' such that we see 'bodies' and not people, and are therefore held to have to provide special grounds for believing that these other bodies feel, think etc. as we do. To answer the sceptic we are prohibited from making appeals to what would ordinarily count as evidence for, say, a problem about how a particular person felt (He told me!). Instead we must justify our inferences from basic statements - descriptions of the movements of these mindless bodies - by an appeal to something extraordinary (God) or by some purely formal means. One way of seeing 'criteria' as an answer to this demand. To see Wittgenstein as introducing 'criteria' to solve this problem is to see him as a subtle sort of behaviourist. His disclaimers about being a behaviourist are to be ignored, or are to be taken as instance of self deception. The connection between pain and pain behaviour would therefore be established by reference to movements whose connection with pain was established when the word or concept of pain was taught to a young child. These movements, grimaces or whatever would therefore be contingent yet necessary in the way we mentioned earlier. It is by reference to these 'criteria' that we could say that someone would be in pain. Thus to take just this typical example we could deal with the problem of other minds by reminding people of the 'criteria' for someone's being in pain, and therefore establish that they felt the 'same' as we do when we are in pain. Or if they did not feel the same it would not alter the fact that the word 'pain' still had a meaning. Other mental concepts could be established as having application to these mindless moving objects by analogous procedures. The criterial relation will not be a strict logical relation like necessary and sufficient condition it will be something looser. There may indeed be several criteria which connect up the application of mental predicates with characteristic patterns of movement. This account is quite a common one but its ubiquitousness does not vindicate it. I want to show that this is not how Wittgenstein meant the term to be applied and that he was using it to deal with quite a different problem.
As we have seen many interpretations of 'criteria' rely on the few pages in the Blue Book where the term is introduced. Again it is wise to look closely at the text. Wittgenstein is dealing with the notion that it is not important to consider the details of particular cases because all we need is to find a common element between various cases and the bewilderment which leads us to ask 'What is ...?' questions will disappear. Immediately before introducing the terms 'criteria' and 'symptom' Wittgenstein is discussing how philosophical paradoxes can be cleared up by the consideration of cases:

'We said that it was a way of examining the grammar (the use) of the word "to know", to ask ourselves what, in the particular case we are examining, we should call "getting to know". There is a temptation to think that this question is only vaguely relevant, if relevant at all, to the question: "What is the meaning of the word 'to know'?". We seem to be on a side track when we ask the question "What is it like in this case 'to get to know'?" But this question really is a question concerning the grammar of the word "to know"...' (102)

Wittgenstein introduces the two terms in a few paragraphs later in order to 'avoid certain elementary confusions'. He gives the medical analogy criticised earlier, and distinguishes between the two terms in the way that Richardson does. But he then goes on to remind us that in practice we won't be able to say that is the defining criterion and what the symptom but will have to make an 'arbitrary decision ad hoc'. This, he says, is not a 'deplorable lack of clarity':

'For remember that in general we don't use language according to strict rules - it hasn't been taught us by means of strict rules, either. We, in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to strict rules. This is a very one sided way of looking at language.' (103)

What Wittgenstein is doing here is characterising essentialism, the notion that there must be a common feature in all cases of knowing, thinking, expecting, reading etc. It is part and parcel of this view that the difference between different cases 'symptoms' are of no interest to those who want to answer 'What is ...' questions. What is rarely seen about the notion of 'criteria' is that this denigration of the particular is self-contradictory. This point has been made, as far as I know by one solitary philosopher, John Cook. According to Cook:

'... the claim that in the various particular cases of expecting we can discover only symptoms is self-contradictory, for how could we set out to search through these cases for
that common element which we complain of not finding if we did not know that they were cases of expecting. If there must be a defining criterion, and we admit to not having discovered it (but only "symptoms"), then we should also allow that we do not even know whether we have been considering cases of expecting. But this is absurd. ... But if the idea of a "defining criterion" is a bogus notion, then in considering the details of particular cases we are not considering merely "symptoms". These details which vary from one case of expecting or knowing to another, can show us something about the grammar of the words." (104)

As we shall see this argument is often reversed. (105) The argument is not complete in the Blue Book. It needs to be read against certain passages in the P.I. such as section 153 which concludes 'And if I say it is hidden - then how do I know what I have to look for? I am in a muddle'. The rejection of essentialism necessarily involves a rejection of the search for a defining criterion. Of course, several writers attempt to retain 'criteria' but drop the notion of a 'defining criterion' suggesting that the target of Wittgenstein's attack was the notion of definition and not that of a 'criterion' as such. It is my contention that the two notions cannot be separated in this way. What the attempted separation relies on is a use of 'criterion' which is acceptable and is to be found in Wittgenstein. This use of 'criterion' refers precisely to those details of particular cases that we would mention in justifying our use of a certain term in a particular circumstance in everyday life. Such details can be as small and seemingly insignificant as the twitching of someone's nostrils which may be in some particular case our criterion for someone's expecting someone else. We can imagine this being of great importance in a novel, a great turning point in the psychological account of a character. But such details cannot be accommodated in a version of the BCV like Richardson's. Such views attempt to retain the notion but defend it against the standard criticisms of 'definition'. Despite Wittgenstein's assertion that 'we may not advance any kind of theory' (P.I. s. 109) such attempts to defend the 'criteriological view' do not move substantially away from the essentialist idea he is attacking. They merely provide a more refined theory. Nowhere does Wittgenstein suggest that by isolating 'criteria' that a philosopher can bring out all or even most of what is of interest to us in a concept. Apologists for the BCV will take two main lines of defence against the arguments I am trying to put forward. Firstly they will remind us of the passages in the investigations where Wittgenstein refers to our 'criterion' or 'criteria' for this and that. Secondly they will seek some account of Wittgenstein's
work which explains how Wittgenstein could use 'criteria' to characterise a view he wished to attack, while also making further references to 'criteria', which avoids the implausible hypothesis that Wittgenstein used the same piece of jargon to refer to two seemingly contradictory notions. To answer the first criticism let us return to our discussion of the putative 'problem of other minds', and what is supposed to be Wittgenstein's 'criteriological' solution to it.

If Wittgenstein was advocating a 'criteriological' solution to the 'problem of other minds' you would expect him to refer to characteristic criteria or sets of criteria which justify our ascription of mental predicates. But he does not do this. The 'problem' arises because of a Cartesian notion of 'body' which is metaphysical. This notion is attacked from several directions. In sections 203 to 209 of P.I., for example, he recreates the puzzlement that leads to scepticism: 'What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel? ... Couldn't I imagine having frightful pains and turning to stone while they lasted? Well, how do I know, if I shut my eyes, whether I have not turned into a stone?' (P.I. s. 203) He continues through the maze of related problems such as the idea that a body can have pains (P.I. s. 206); the idea of a private inward identification of pains (P.I. s. 205); the misleading assimilation of pictures, expressions, and grammatical statements (P.I. s. 207, s. 208, and s. 209 respectively); the idea that thinking is an 'incorporeal process' (P.I. s. 209); and the difficulties involved in seeing children and other human beings as automata (P.I. s. 210). There are a whole family of issues that make up the 'problem' and Wittgenstein considers many more examples of the family than those I have mentioned. This is characteristic of his method. He approaches the 'problem' from many different directions like an artist sketching a landscape. What he does not do is to simply point out salient features which are 'criteria' but uses analogies, examples and counter-examples. We get example after example of the sort of thinking that leads to scepticism, along with examples designed to counter these misleading trains of thought. Some of these examples illuminate by connecting like and unlike, for example, the analogy between seeing a human being as an automaton and seeing a cross piece of a window as a swastika (P.I. s. 210). Others reveal misleading assimilations by making disguised nonsense explicit. For example Wittgenstein compares trying to get at the meaning of the word 'think' by watching yourself while you think with trying to find out what 'mate' means 'by close observation of the last move of some game of chess' (P.I. s. 216). One of his commonest uses of examples is to
show that what we think is a perfectly clear and intelligible statement, suggestion, or possibility is based upon a misleading analogy. This analogy need not, of course, be clearly formulated or even capable of clarification. For example, when Wittgenstein is discussing 'understanding' he asks 'How should we counter someone who told us that with him understanding was an inner process?' (P.I. Part 2 P. 181). And immediately asks the 'parallel' question 'How should we counter him if he said that with him knowing how to play chess was an inner process?' This particular analogy with the game of chess comes up time after time. What he does with it in each case is to make the absurdity of the statement, suggestion, or possibility clear by making an analogous statement etc., that hints at the sort of mistake that is being made. That is, it shows that in these cases we are assimilating concepts of different sorts. This is brought out in the example we are considering by simply presuming that the person we are talking to persists in his assimilation even in this second case. He argues that for him playing chess is an inner process. How do we deal with this? Wittgenstein makes the suggestion that we should 'draw his attention to the criteria that would demonstrate his capacity, and on the other hand to the criteria for "inner states"' (P.I. Part 2 P. 181). Similarly, when discussing what is involved in expecting and whether this is an 'inner' feeling Wittgenstein warns against assimilating different sorts of concepts by remarking that: 'An "inner process" stands in need of outward criteria'. (P.I. s. 580). Here we seem to have Wittgenstein adopting a 'criteriological' approach. Admittedly he does not actually present the relevant criteria but he indicates that there are such. We seem, therefore, to be in a paradoxical position. Wittgenstein introduced the term to characterise 'essentialism' and yet uses the term in a way that appears to allow the idea of a 'common element' to creep back. But this is a misreading. As we have seen if the notion of 'criteria' has any use it refers to the details of particular cases that we might refer to in ordinary life. Thus in the example we discussed above this would involve giving detailed examples of what it is in case after case to have the capacity to play chess, and detailed examples of 'inner states' such as feelings, sensations, and pains. The details of these particular cases would be our 'criteria' for the ascription of one sort of concept rather than the other. No doubt some of these cases may have similarities but this point is not relevant here, for, as we have seen, we cannot ignore any details. However tempted we may be to produce some common element there will be many cases in which it
does not fit. Though such a move may be satisfying it is mainly so because it abrogates the need for further thought. The problem seems to be solved by producing a formula. But this is not Wittgenstein's way of working. He does not give us 'solutions' but considers cases of the one sort and then of the other. A good example of this method is section vi of the second part of the P.I. the very section to which we have been referring. To counter the idea that understanding the use or the meaning of a term was a psychological feeling Wittgenstein does not produce 'criteria'. He gives examples of what this could 'mean', produces counter-examples, presents analogies, and constantly asks questions. He gets us to appreciate the numerous ways in which the analogy works upon us. For the assimilation of concepts of different sorts works analogically. We assimilate this case to that often only dimly aware of what we are doing. By making the analogy explicit through concrete examples Wittgenstein weakens its pull. The assimilation of concepts of quite different sorts is a form of bad case by case argument.

We can now give answers to the two objections. Firstly we have seen that Wittgenstein does talk of our 'criteria' for this and that. But we have also seen that he does not give criteria but mentions that there are criteria in the sense of details of particular cases. Where he does seem to give a criterion as in s. 146 'The application is still a criterion of understanding'. It is quite clear from the context that this is a way of getting us to consider the particular circumstances which justify the understanding (P.I. s. 154 and 155). Note also that the very general reference to application is only said to be a criterion. Wittgenstein is dealing here with the assimilation of concepts of different sorts. It is mostly in such cases that he will refer to 'criteria'. But there is nothing in his use of the term that implies that he is reintroducing the idea of a common element. Indeed, he is still combatting one of the residual ideas of essentialism. For if we concentrate on a common element such as knowing the formula for producing a series we can come to think that all the accompaniments to understanding this—being able to write out the series using pen and paper, having been taught some elementary maths in the past etc. - are inessential. Thus it is possible to come to believe that having, say, the mental image of the formula is all that is necessary to have the capacity to produce a series. To counter this view Wittgenstein gets us to consider what in particular circumstances would be our criteria for saying that someone had this capacity. What he refers to is not the common element but to the details of these cases. Thus, he
cannot be held to be either re-introducing the idea of a common element or of using two contradictory notions of criteria.

However, as is so often the case, an insensitive reading of Wittgenstein by which I mean a prosaic and superficial understanding of the techniques he employs can lead to the following interpretation of what I have just argued. It could be thought that there is an obvious contradiction in all this. Either criteria are common elements or they are details of particular cases but not both. Wittgenstein seems to refer to criteria in both ways. Thus he refers to our 'criteria' for something i.e. inner states, in a general way and seems to refer to a common element, whereas it is argued that he means 'the details of particular cases'. This seems a rather thin argument.

Wittgenstein's style has been compared with an artist, a painter sketching landscapes. It has been compared with poetry because of its non-assertoric style. It can also be compared with music. Wittgenstein often compares music and language: 'Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music that you may think.' (P.I. s.527). 'Speech with and without thought is to be compared with the playing of a piece of music with and without thought.' (P.I. s. 341) It is useful to try to see P.I. in musical terms. If we take Wittgenstein's use of 'criteria' as a theme and the Investigations as a symphony it is possible to appreciate what he does with the concept. A theme introduced at a certain point in a symphony can be light hearted. The context makes it so. Reintroduced in a later movement it can appear sombre and heavy. In another context it can almost be hidden. Thus it can be used to evoke now one effect, now another. Similarly Wittgenstein introduces the notion to characterise essentialism - which is a powerful picture of how terms have meanings - and tries to win us away from this picture. But he is not attacking one theory to propound another. Thus we find him saying later that 'Essence is expressed by grammar' (P.I. s 371) This can be viewed as a metaphorical use of the term 'essence'. But this would only be the case if the assumption were to be made that all uses of 'essence' had to be referring to a common element. Wittgenstein had dealt with the misleading implications of this view earlier. Here he is using the term in a different context, one in which there is no suggestion of a common element. In a sense he is giving us, in this aphorism, a notion of essence without universals. (107) Wittgenstein is suggesting that if we want to understand something we must look to
the form of life, the actual way the thing is manifested. If we have not followed his reflections we will read a common element back into this passage and be puzzled by it. The idea of an essence is innocuous if we do not think of it as a common element. His use of the term 'criteria' functions analogously. Wittgenstein is not suggesting that there are no criteria. This would be absurd. But he is rejecting the notion of a criterion as a 'common element' which alone justifies the application of a term. Once the charm of this picture is weakened the term can be used and should not trouble us. If we are still bewitched then Wittgenstein will seem to be using one expression in contradictory ways. The important thing is that Wittgenstein is not denying essentialism and proposing an alternative theory. He is trying to free us from a picture.

We could describe Wittgenstein's use of concepts like 'criteria' and 'essence' in musical terms as contrapuntal. In music counterpoint is the blending or adding together of melodies. Wittgenstein in the example given blends the notion of essence with that of 'grammar'. We have said that he means by 'grammar' much more than the stuff of school textbooks. It is meant to bring us back to the rough ground of ordinary language, to actual human practice, to the customs and conventions of human culture. This is a far cry from the rigid view of language implied by the search for a 'common element' or a 'defining criterion'. Again when Wittgenstein uses the notion of 'criteria' when we are tempted to assimilate concepts of different sorts he uses it to get us back to the rough ground of what we would say in actual cases. This is a contrapuntal use of term again. We are not asked to draw out a common element but to look at cases. Both these uses of the concepts are contrapuntal in another sense. In music two melodies that are at odds with one another can be said to be contrapuntal. Similarly Wittgenstein sketches a skewed and distorted picture of 'criteria' or 'essence' which nevertheless has a great charm for us and then goes on to show how misleading this picture is. He renders it innocuous, and then uses these terms along side different pictures. Although these different sketches can be said to be at odds this must not be taken to mean that Wittgenstein is presenting rival actions or theories. The distorted pictures of the workings of language, the nature of reality or whatever, that he wishes to erase are very powerful. The metaphors, analogies, stores, and dialogues that he presents may have an equal force and magic. They must have if we are to escape the seductive and familiar grasp of our habitual modes of thinking. He does not present us with two notions of 'criteria'. He removes one bewitching picture but does
not put another in its place. He merely leads us back to the rough ground of particular cases.

This account does follow the so-called 'therapeutic' interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy. It stresses the analogy between philosophy and therapy set out by Wittgenstein in §255 'The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.' Under this interpretation Wittgenstein's comments are not propositions or arguments but therapeutic comments which aim to cure a philosophical malady. What this is depends on the context. Its treatment must be slow: 'In philosophising we may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and slow cure is all important.' (108) No counter-arguments or statements are produced no theories advanced. Talking of a misleading picture in mathematics Wittgenstein said: "Your concept is wrong. - However, I cannot illuminate the matter by fighting against your words, but only by trying to turn your attention away from certain expressions, illustrations, images, and towards the employment of the words." (109) According to this view Wittgenstein does not 'proffer his remarks for simple agreement but to help the reader question and think. Two points about this way of reading Wittgenstein are very important for the arguments I am presenting here. I shall briefly discuss them before illustrating the approach by discussing the 'family resemblance' metaphor. The first point is that philosophy is not viewed as architectonic. We do not build philosophic systems, or advance theses. Such systems are merely castles in the air. In seeming to destroy them we are merely destroying 'houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand.' (P.I. s. 118) The second point is that this interpretation suggests that one of the main causes of philosophical disease is 'a one sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example'. (P.I. s. 593).

What this interpretation embodies in these last two points is not a recipe for philosophical anarchy but an important step towards viewing philosophy as an art rather than a science. Wittgenstein, we are told, 'repudiated the analogy with mental illness and the assimilation of his method to psychoanalysis'. (110) Allowing that he probably meant only that others had made too much of the similarities this disavowal still points to a further and more widespread way of misreading Wittgenstein. The whole notion of philosophy as therapy is self-reflexive. Part of the therapy would be to wean us from the notion that philosophy is a form of therapy. The idea that Wittgenstein is writing like an artist and sketching rather than asserting philosophical theses must be applied to the allusions to mental illness and therapy. To attempt to draw out the precise points of this analogy is to make a fundamental error. We
are presented with only an aspect of Wittgenstein's view of philosophy. To try to specify in detail what he means by such remarks is to try to convert them into assertions. This would involve ignoring his style and merely referring to the supposed content of the remarks. It is not a piece of mystification to but an important insight to realise that these comparisons and analogies cannot be stated otherwise than they are. They may seem to be vague, indefinite, and opaque. They are intended to free us from the very idea that we must be presented with something definitive in all its respects if we are to really understand what is being said. Consider how David Pears, for example, deals with the two elements of the 'therapeutic' approach mentioned above i.e. the non-architectonic approach, and the importance of giving detailed and varied examples. The two points are not unrelated. If you resist the thrust of science and system building you of necessity move towards the idea that a philosopher should present examples in the way that an artist does. This is certainly the way that Wittgenstein moves. Pears calls such a shift 'very elusive'. It is 'difficult', he says, 'to be sure of the precise points of the analogy.' (111) Of the suggestion that examples must involve implicit generalisations Pears suggests that Wittgenstein might have thought the idea both false and useless 'but it is not entirely clear whether that was his view'. (112) He considers the suggestion that Wittgenstein thought that the meanings of the things people said were somehow 'irreducibly particular'. But he continues: 'This is a vague suggestion. How much more precise can it be made?' (113) Pears holds that Wittgenstein's 'wholism' could have led him to the view that the impression made by any example cannot be caught in a formula because its position in the whole system, its context, gives it a unique character. However despite all his attempts to get all precisely what Wittgenstein meant by rejecting the architectonic in favour of the detailed presentation of examples he concludes that it is 'not clear exactly how far he went' in this direction or 'precisely what view he took of the application of the particular case'. (114) By seeking precision Pears deals with several misunderstandings and misinterpretations. But as an attempt at 'getting at what Wittgenstein meant' it is necessarily wrong-headed. Wittgenstein meant what he said. If he had wanted to present a formal and precise view of the role of examples he would have done so. In approaching Wittgenstein we must take note of his style understood in its widest sense as not opposed to content. We cannot detach the meaning from what he says in order to restate it more clearly. This is the essential mistake of 'constructivist' interpretations of Wittgenstein like Waismann's and Richardson's. I would be loath to say that Pears falls into this mould unequivocally, but to the extent
that he is actually seeking precision rather than adopting an exegetical device he cannot provide a satisfactory account of the later writings. Such an approach goes against the grain of those works.

2.8. General Criteria and Education

With this background it is possible to make some progress with the second of the questions with which this chapter opened 'Are there criteria for (the use of the term) education?' As I have indicated I do not intend to do anything like attempt to answer this question but to understand it. Something of what I would suggest as to what sense can be given to the notion of 'criteria' can be gleaned from the previous sections of this chapter. I want now to consider the notion as it is used in contemporary philosophy of education. Its use is not simple or monolithic, its development is not unilinear, and it is often taken as a term that is totally unproblematic. However, to simplify the task of this section I will concentrate on the use that Peters and Hirst make of the term and of the developments of it made by only a few other writers. As a starting point I will begin with a supposed paradox pointed out by R.J. Haack in a recent paper.

Haack's paper is a piece of mud-slinging - an inefficacious diatribe against philosophy of education as it is currently practised. Peters has called it a 'slovenly' piece of work. (115) Haack wants to suggest that philosophy of education is somehow 'internally defective'. (116) Despite the glaring oversimplification of Haack's paper it is possible to derive from its turgid pages four different views of education supposedly held by Peters at various times and harvested from papers published over a ten year span. This does not mean that Haack clearly distinguishes between the views but they are mentioned in his paper.

(1) The Essentialist view - that there are a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the term 'education'. Or the view that there is a sole criterion for the use of the term. (117)

(2) The Family Resemblance view - though Hirst and Peters discuss this view at length Haack's only support for Peters' acceptance of it is a remark of his that it is absurd to think that there could ever be one agreed aim for education. (118)

(3) The 'Historically Independent Concepts' view of education - the Spartans had a completely different view from us etc. (119)
Haack argues that it is difficult to know which of these views Peters accepts, and that Peters is far from clear about what he wishes to assert. Delineating such views, however, tells us little. Are they incompatible or contradictory, justifiable or arbitrary? Haack feels that (1) and (2) are incompatible, and this is the suggestion that I wish to consider. Two of the three main criticisms that Haack ventures against Peters' notion of conceptual analysis concern the fact that Peters seems to want to accept some sort of essentialist view and a family resemblance view or that he seems to accept a 'family resemblance' view and a multiple concept view. Haack does not develop any of these points in detail or in any sort of depth. He merely mentions them to intimate that Peters' account of the concept is thoroughly confused. Thus he leaves him with an easy line of retreat. In his reply Peters remarks that Haack's criticisms gain a spurious credibility from contrasting or assimilating elements that he had recently distinguished.

'He (Haack) must know, surely, that I do not now think that by "education" we mean "initiation into worthwhile activities" for that conflated the fact that people become educated by taking part in various activities of learning with the characterisation of them when educated — i.e. by reference to their state of mind, not necessarily by reference to the activities in which they then might take part. I later distinguished a general concept of education, which is more or less equivalent to bringing up or rearing, from a specific concept which picks out processes of learning by which educated people develop. Being "educated" is characterised by the possession of knowledge and understanding which is not inert and not just specialised.' (121)

In a sense this new distinction, is simply a clarification of a distinction implicit in many of Peters' earlier remarks. In Ethics and Education he distinguishes uses which are 'central' from others. (122) Of course, there are dissimilarities. In the earlier writings the peripheral cases are likely to be metaphorical or extreme uses of the term 'education'. Latterly certain specific uses are distinguished from a loose sort of use of the term according to which almost any process could be called 'education', or 'educational'. Whether this means that there are three concepts to be distinguished is something that we will discuss later on. (123) For the present I will assume that whatever the difference is between these two views they can both be considered to be examples
of 'core' concepts. As I shall use this term it refers to any attempt to understand a concept by making the 'classic move' of conceptual analysis - that of distinguishing between 'central' and 'peripheral', 'specific' and 'general', or 'essential' and 'inessential' uses of a term or parts of a concept. Let us now return to what Peters actually says about the concept in order to appreciate that there is some substance to Haack's hasty criticisms.

Peters' treatment of the concept of education is protean. He readily admits to changes of position, emphasis, and even to inadequacies in his analysis. (124) Certain changes do not directly concern us here. By considering how his views have altered it is possible to see that he oscillates between contradictory analysis. It is also possible to understand the important assumptions which flaw his work. Initially at least, Peters was an avowed essentialist:

'...have I already put my foot on the primrose path that leads to essentialism? ... Frankly I do not much mind if I have ...' (125)

Thus he cavalierly dismisses any qualms about essentialism. His first analysis consisted of making three points about education which were 'necessary for the explication of its essence'. (126) These 'points' soon become 'criteria'. 'Criteria' are in one common way of using the term 'standards' or 'tests'. Peters weaves around and into this usage a number of philosophical notions of meaning. Some of these will be familiar from the earlier sections of this chapter. However, his use of the term is, by and large, unexplained. We have discussed some sophisticated attempts to explicate what he means but not his own suggestions. These are found in four seminal works. (127) Consider first his remarks about 'criteria' in Ethics and Education and The Logic of Education (with P. Hirst). Both these accounts attempt to say what a philosopher of education is doing when he engages in 'conceptual analysis' and, although there is a four year gap between them, they both begin by 'squaring up' to Wittgenstein. In both cases serious problems for 'conceptual analysis' are seen as arising out of Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' notion. These problems are dealt with as if nothing fundamental is affected by them. For instance, Wittgenstein's discussion of the 'naming' model of meaning is discussed in a paragraph and Peters concludes: 'few would deny that his general thesis was a salutary if unoriginal one'. (128) What is at issue here
is not Peters attitude but the fact that his whole account of the concept of education and of his notion of 'criteria' are developed from the start by comparison with Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' notion. This itself is but a minor part of a general conflict about the way in which these philosophers view philosophy.

Peters seems to accept whatever he understands the 'family resemblance' notion to be about insofar as it involves an attack on the notion of 'precise definition'. He accepts that the notion involves the idea that the uses of a word are connected not by a formula but 'by a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.' This remark taken out of any meaningful context, is all we get of Wittgenstein. Peters is fairly consistent in his view of definitions. In contrast to a suggestion made by John Woods that 'conceptual connections' should be as tight as those between 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' Peters argues that such a premise would: 'stop most works in ethics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, political philosophy aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion - as well as in the philosophy of education.' (129) Despite this concession to Wittgenstein, and his acceptance of the fact that 'education' is 'a concept of this sort' he qualifies his comments with the statement that nevertheless 'it is not as difficult to get a grip on it as it is on more abstract concepts such as "cause" or "truth".' (130) He accepts that it is important to recognise differences between uses of the term 'education' but it seems that this does not override the recognition of similarities: 'The formulation of criteria which started with Socrates, is an attempt to make explicit what binds the uses together. It is like a guide to the customs of a people rather than a definitive statement of their law.' (131) Superficially this could be a version of the BUS like that found in Richardson. But the situation is further complicated by Peters' assertion in the same paragraph that exception to the 'obvious' criteria do not mean that 'there are no criteria which are co-extensive with most of its central uses.' (132) Is this a 'core-concept' view or just the 'classic move' or both? If we look elsewhere we find Peters saying that to call certain activities education 'is to say that they conform to certain very general criteria'. (133) For it seems as if he is merely restoring the essentialist views that he sees the 'family resemblance' notion as attacking. The very general criteria reduce ultimately to two, the knowledge and desirability criteria. (134) Roughly, these criteria are that for someone to be said to be educated he must have knowledge
and understanding which is not merely technical know how, and that 'education' implies that desirable qualities are passed on. (135) But there are counter-examples to these conditions which 'make it very difficult to maintain that an adequate analysis has been given.' (136) Earwaker has suggested that utilising these criteria and the notion of a 'specific' and a 'general' concept of education it is possible to argue that there are at least four concepts of education. (137) The point that comes out of all this is that even if there is a very general criterion covering all central cases - whatever this means - it has not been specified. All that has come out of this attempt to produce criteria is a cancerous multiplication of 'concepts'. What Peters never questions - as we shall see - is his approach to the concept.

If what analysis throws up is never satisfactory it is not enough to continually patch things up with ever more sophisticated thread. We must consider that analysis. As Peters notes the search for criteria has a long heritage and the habits of two thousand years cannot be easily thrown. The method of analysis is tied up with the notion of 'criteria'.

Peters usually adopts the 'formal' rather than the 'material' mode of speech when discussing education. That is, he discusses the use of the term 'education' rather than the 'concept'. He seems to accept that if we wish to elucidate the concepts of education we must look at how we use the word education. He has said that 'Philosophy, as I understand it, is concerned mainly with the questions, "What do you mean?" and "How do you know?" ' (138) The notion of 'criteria', as he uses it is so elastic that it is capable of answering both these questions. In Ethics and Education he says that 'education' ...picks out no particular activity or process. Rather it lays down criteria to which activities or processes must conform.' (139) Later he says that criteria are 'implied by' or 'built into' (140) the term or concept. The question he is concerned with is 'What is 'education'? put in the 'formal' mode of 'What does the term "education" mean?' This is so from the beginning but it is obscured by the fact that he assumes straight away that there is no general problem here. He believes that to answer questions about meaning you take note of the use of terms. Any problems about meaning are already solved or of no importance. The nearest we get to any solution is a vague remark that criteria are 'co-extensive' with central uses, and that they make explicit what binds the uses together. Thus criteria are connected in someway with unspecified elements of meaning. The question 'How do you know what education is?', therefore, seems to provide an answer to
the question "What do you mean by the term "education"?" It answers it by offering some unexplicated version of the criteriological theory of meaning.

That it is a crude version of that theory can be seen from the presentation of his ideas in The Logic of Education. In this work talk about 'criteria' is divided between 'criteria' which help us decide whether or not something is educational and 'conditions', presumably identical to these criteria, which are principles which determine the correct application of terms. This fits in well with the method of conceptual analysis. This method is characterised in the following ways:

'The point is to see through the words, to get a better grasp of the similarities and differences that it is possible to pick out'. (141)

'... in the process of trying to make explicit the principles that underlie our use of words, we shall have become clearer both about how things are and about the sort of decisions that have to be faced in dealing with them'. (142)

By reflecting on the use of terms we come to see those principles that lie behind them. These principles are also our criteria for determining whether some cases are instances of the particular concept we are interested in. We have seen that the notion of 'rules' governing our use of language will not support the extraction of 'criteria'. We have also seen that although Peters has moved from the notion of a defining set of criteria to a weaker notion of definition, exactly what theory or view of 'criteria' Peters invokes is entirely obscure and confused. It appears to be an unhappy marriage of the BCV and a cruder interpretation of criteria like Albritton's. The uncertainty is complicated by his accommodation to the 'family resemblance' metaphor. This metaphor is meant to direct our attention away from the search for a common element to all examples of what we call 'language'. Applying this metaphor to a particular use of language i.e. to the term 'education', Peters accommodates to it by employing conceptual analysis to refine a specific concept of education out of the variegated usage of the term. What is misleading about this seemingly innocuous shift can only be brought out by considering the 'family resemblance' metaphor and why that metaphor is used.
Chapter Three

THREE METAPHORS

'Play ... is a non-serious and self contained activity which we engage in just for the satisfaction involved in it ... ' (1)

'Both play in general, and games in particular can be very serious ... Games ... do not seem to be so arbitrary, marginal, unserious and non-mattering as a tidy person might have hoped ... play insists on being taken seriously.' (2)

Play is non-serious and discontinuous with the 'business of life'.

Play is serious and continuous with the 'business of life'. There is no simple equivocation in these remarks between 'internal' and 'external' forms of seriousness. Both of the authors of these conflicting remarks accept that a player can play seriously and that the rules of a game might demand that we take it seriously. Bridge is more serious than tidily winks, and football more serious than British Bulldog. The 'seriousness' of games in this internal sense is not at issue. What these conflicting remarks show is that there is a defect in our grasp, not of what play is, but of what it is to explicate the concept of play. Our interest in the concept of play is directly connected with the understanding of the family resemblance metaphor. That metaphor interests us because it is intimately connected with the consideration of cases and not just cases but cases and cases and cases. (3) This is also true of the analogy with games and the metaphor of 'grammar'. These are the 'three metaphors' that will be considered in this chapter.

The 'family resemblance' metaphor presents a forceful and attractive model of the explanation of meaning to counter the 'property in common' model of meaning. As we saw in Chapter Two the prima facie opposition between these two models of meaning demands that philosophers still charmed by the first model of meaning must dispose of this metaphorical alternative. Hirst and Peters make a fairly typical series of accommodations to, and criticisms of this alternative. They argue that the search for defining conditions which are both necessary and sufficient is only appropriate to artificial symbolic systems. In philosophy we settle for a weaker notion of making explicit 'defining characteristics' for something or logically
necessary conditions' for the application of a term. This notion of 'loose' definition is what they are concerned with. But unfortunately, 'it has become fashionable in recent times to deny that it is ever possible to produce such definitions.' (4) The 'games' example from the P.I. is mentioned and the quotation given earlier is repeated. Wittgenstein is held to be reminding us of the existence of counter-examples, cases in which the condition we thought we had 'pinned down' does not apply. 'This, at least, should warn us that we may not always be successful in our search for logically necessary conditions for the use of a word.' (5) Yet he goes on to argue that 'sometimes we may be'. The 'games' example is also attacked:

'... it can be doubted whether Wittgenstein was even right about this particular concept. For how would we know which samples to lay out in order to look for the similarities? Why did not Wittgenstein take gardening or getting married as examples of games? Does this show that there is a more general principle which underlies calling things "games" which he might have overlooked? ... it depends on how a human being conceives an activity. A necessary condition of calling something a game is, surely, that it must be an activity which is indulged in non-seriously.' (6)

Wittgenstein is held to be bringing out the fact that calling something a game is not to refer to any simple observable property. Thus his use of the 'family resemblance' notion is held to be part of his general attacks on the naming theory of meaning. The outcome of all this is that we come to see that we 'must not look for defining characteristics in any simple stereotyped way, with the paradigm of just one type of word before us.' (7) Langford has said of this section of Peters' book that it is 'odd ... to interpret Wittgenstein as saying, in effect, that since conceptual analysis is difficult you may have to be satisfied with, at best, logically necessary rather than sufficient conditions.' (8) He suggests that a better interpretation is through Bradley's idea that 'analysis is mutilation'. Certainly, this is an odd account of Wittgenstein. Although he did allow that some misunderstandings might be removed by substituting one form of expression for another and that this might be called an 'analysis' because the 'process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart'. (P.I. s. 90) He saw nothing but dangers in this approach. For it 'may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our forms of language, and so a single resolved form of every expression'. (P.I. s. 91) 'Analysis' seeks to remove misunderstandings by making our use of words more exact. It does this by bringing something hidden to light. Thus Peters seeks an underlying general principle which Wittgenstein might
have overlooked. But such principles are a requirement not a result of 'analysis'. Peters uses the terminology of 'analysis' but does not produce any underlying 'general principle' but makes a grammatical remark. The distinction here is of absolutely fundamental importance. To grasp it we need to see what led Wittgenstein to the 'family resemblance' metaphor. This metaphorical use of language is a use of language like any other and to understand it we must see it in its context.

3.1. Family Resemblances

Wittgenstein introduces the 'family resemblance' metaphor in answer to a specific challenge that he has 'nowhere said what the essence of a language game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language.' (P.I., s.65) He introduces the idea of a 'language game' early in the P.I. through examples. He specifies in more general terms what he means by the phrase in s.7. Here they are related to 'those games by which children learn their native language'. It is not just the speaking of words but 'the' whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven. The term is connected with his notion of a 'primitive language', a language more primitive than ours, which he refers to as a 'language game'. Thus the notion of a 'language game' introduces the 'game' analogy long before it comes in s. 66 to illustrate the 'family resemblance' metaphor. There is an important connection between the two and they cannot be understood separately. For the first 64 paragraphs of the P.I. Wittgenstein is discussing the 'philosophical concept of meaning' (P.I., s. 2) through examples of various language games. But 'behind all these considerations' lies a 'great question' (P.I., s. 65). This was the question that gave him the most headache the attempt to specify the 'general form of propositions' and of language. This is a reference to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In the 'Preface' to the P.I. Wittgenstein says that his old thought and his new ones should be published together because 'the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.' In P.I. Wittgenstein is discussing the 'temptations' that we feel when reflecting on language and logic. That book no less than the former is a work on the philosophy of logic. In the Tractatus, he succumbed to the 'temptation' to produce something common to all that we call
language. The passages we need to consider, to understand the 'family resemblance' metaphor are part of Wittgenstein's fight against this particular form of 'essentialism'. They are part of his attempt to explain his new thoughts about 'language'. He answers his interlocutor's suggestion that he is dodging the 'great question' quite categorically: 'I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are related to one another in different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all 'language'. '

(P.I. s. 65) To understand the specific use that Wittgenstein is putting the metaphor to we must, despite the risk of gross oversimplification sketch his earlier concept of 'language'.

In his 'Preface' Wittgenstein says that philosophy results from misunderstanding 'the logic of our language'. His book aims, he tells us, to 'draw a limit' to the 'expression of thoughts' and it is only 'in language that the limit can be drawn'. (9) He is concerned with what it is for a language to have sense, with what it is for there to be any language at all. Logical form, and symbolism, the nature of a translation of one formula into another by means of logical operations, are central to his account of what it is for language to have sense. Wittgenstein says 'thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically' (T. 3.03) and 'It is impossible to represent in language anything that "contradicts logic"'. (T. 3.032) Thinking is a sort of calculating. The general form of logical operation is the general form of thinking. A formal operation in a symbolic system is a sort of 'translation'. Wittgenstein sees thinking as operating with a calculus. The 'picture theory' is no exception to this. 'A picture presents a situation in logical space...' (T. 2.11) To picture a fact we must see it in a system. There is no other way. Wittgenstein is concerned with internal relations. If we give the essence of all propositions, i.e. what is common to them all (T. 5.47) and hence of language we give the 'general propositional form'. With this we also give the 'general form of operation', that is, the general form according to which one proposition can be generated out of another by means of an operation' (T. 6.002) This brief reminder of how important the notion of a logical operation is in the Tractatus, helps to make sense of Wittgenstein's comments in P.I. s.81 that in philosophy we often 'compare the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules' and that if we reflect upon language in this way we may come 'to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.'
To avoid making this error — Wittgenstein made it in the *Tractatus* — we need to attain greater clarity about the concepts of 'meaning', 'understanding' and 'thinking'. This 'clarity' is not the sort that Wittgenstein sought in the *Tractatus*. What Wittgenstein did in both these works could be referred to as 'conceptual analysis'. But this would be misleading. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein states that 'A proposition has one and only one complete analysis' (T. 3.25). There is only one final analysis according to the correct scheme exemplified by the general form of operation. Wittgenstein's goal was to give the essence of language. To do this he had to require (cf. P.I. s. 107) that every proposition had a precise sense. By 'analysis' understood as 'substitution' or 'translation' the fundamental nature of a proposition could be revealed. A complete analysis of all (factual) propositions would consist entirely of elementary propositions i.e. a class of logically independent factual propositions. (See T. 4.211 and 5.134). These elementary propositions would then serve as a point of origin, from which the philosopher, using a logical formula can calculate the limits of any possible language.'

This notion of analysis is that of uncovering what is hidden by language (T. 4.002). He presents one single scheme centred on the picture theory for solving the 'great question'. In the *P.I.* there is no one scheme but many reminders to help remove particular confusions.

One final point may help to show exactly why the concern with formal systems is so important to the *Tractatus* and how this produced an essentialist treatment of language. According to Rhees the thing that troubled Wittgenstein about the plurality of logical constants in *P.I.* was that 'this made the development of the logical system seem arbitrary'. (11) This would mean that there could be forms of inference only vaguely related to one another, and this could lead someone to doubt the reality of logic. The general form of propositions, if given, would meet these doubts: 'One could say that the sole logical constant was what all propositions, by their very nature, had in common with one another. But this is the general propositional form'. (T. 5.47) The problem of setting a limit to language is at least in part the problem of showing that logic is not arbitrary in this sense.

These short paragraphs are not meant to do anything but give an idea of the sort of problem that Wittgenstein was using the notions of 'language games' and 'family resemblances' to dissolve. I have
missed out many essential points such as the relationship of the
ordinary use of propositions to their 'picturing' role. But we are
not engaged in an exegesis of the Tractatus. I am merely trying to
put certain passages of the P.I. into their proper context to facilitate
a critique of Peters.

Wittgenstein came to see that he had been misled. He ceased to
talk about language in the way he had in the Tractatus. He turned
his way of thinking completely about. Thus we find him saying that:
'No philosophical problem can be solved by a calculus'. (12)

In the P.I. Wittgenstein uses the 'family resemblance' notion to
bring out the difficulties we face in attempting to explain 'language'
and its related concepts and to dispel them. To appreciate the
problems more than a cursory look at the text is needed. Wittgenstein
introduces the metaphor with a methodological injunction:

'Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games".
I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games,
and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say: "There
must be something common, or they would not be called "games"!
but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For
if you look at them you will not see something that is common
to them all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole
series of them at that. To repeat: don't think but look!' (P.I.s.66)

This injunction is often taken to be nothing more than the adoption
of a more 'empirical' as against the 'high a priori' approach of the
Tractatus. This is not incorrect as long as it does not lend us to
think that Wittgenstein is embracing empiricism. In the Tractatus we
find a general rule for the analysis of propositions, a general rule
of thinking, a general rule of what is sense and nonsense. In other
words, a general account of language. All Wittgenstein's examples in
P.I. are concerned with fighting against this picture of language as
strictly defined. This is a fight against the contemptuous attitude
towards particular cases. This fight takes the form of presenting
examples and analogies. The 'game' metaphor is important because if
we consider games we will find common features such as 'winning',
'losing', various skills, an element of amusement. But these will
not be common to every game. As we move from game to game some
features drop out and others appear:

'And the result of our examination is; we see a complicated
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing:
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of
detail.' (P.I.s.66)
Wittgenstein says that he can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than 'family resemblances' because the resemblances between members of a family criss-cross in a similar way. Therefore he says that 'games' form a family (P.I. s. 67) This metaphor is dependent on the 'game' analogy, and it is difficult to discuss them separately. Here we are concerned with how the metaphor arose we shall have cause to consider its usefulness when we consider the suggestion that games do not form a family. The metaphor is immediately applied to the concept of 'number' and provides an account of conceptual extensions:

'We extend our concept ... as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.' (P.I. s.67)

The power of this metaphorical style of philosophising can be seen if it is compared with what Peters offers us when he says that 'terms in a natural language develop a life of their own and send out shoots which take them far away from the central trunk of the concept.' (13) This 'organic' or 'tree' metaphor is a piece of mystification. What, for example, does 'develop a life of their own' mean?

Having given this account Wittgenstein proceeds to refute any attempts to systematise what he is saying, to make it more than an analogy. For when a metaphor or analogy is used there is always because of our 'craving for generality' an attempt to make it run on all four legs. To do this is not to try to make Wittgenstein's ideas more clear (does this mean more exact?) it is to misunderstand the form in which he gives them. Which means to misunderstand them. Thus it could be argued that there is something common to all these constructions' - namely the disjunction of all their common properties' (P.I. s. 67). This would be 'playing with words' as if one were to argue that the 'continuous overlapping' was what was common to all cases.

He then takes up in various ways that it is possible to misunderstand the metaphor. All these reactions have their root in the idea of the 'crystalline purity of logic' (P.I. s. 107). Accepting Wittgenstein's metaphor seems to do away with logic: 'But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here' (P.I. s. 108). I will briefly mention what these criticisms are and how Wittgenstein answers them.
The first is a suggestion that for Wittgenstein a concept can be defined as 'the logical sum of a corresponding set of sub concepts' (P.I. s. 68). Wittgenstein replies that we can give a concept rigid limits in this way. We can use it as a rigidly limited concept but we need not do so. We normally do not, and this does not trouble us: '... we can draw a boundary - for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all.' (Except for that special purpose.)' (P.I. s. 69). This and other passages dealing with drawing boundaries and giving definitions (i.e. P.I. s. 75 s. 76 s. 77) make nonsense of the interpretation of the metaphor by Peters. We can give definitions which allow of no exceptions for special purposes. The D.E.S. might do so in a report and equate education entirely with what goes on in certain listed institutions. But this sort of approach cannot be adopted if we are engaged in 'conceptual clarification'. It is not that what we would like to do is shown 'empirically' to be impossible. It is quite possible, but it is hard to see what the point of it would be.

If a concept like 'game' is uncircumscribed, not being everywhere bounded by rules, it may seem to be vague, inexact, blurred. It may seem that we don't know what it means, that it is not a concept at all. Wittgenstein replies that it is often the rough (P.I. s. 70), or indistinct (P.I. s. 71) picture that is exactly what we need.

Many of these passages immediately following the introduction of the metaphor are concerned with the notion of a 'rule'. We have already spent some time in discussing the idea that in order to explicate a concept we must give 'rules' in a special philosophical sense of the term. Wittgenstein's use of the term 'rule' is held to be 'notoriously eccentric'. Part of the difficulty with Wittgenstein's use of the term stems from his attempt to combat the idea that when someone utters a sentence they must be operating a calculus according to fixed rules. A fixed meaning is not necessary for a term to be useful. Discussing someone's use of 'N' he asks 'what do I call the rule by which he proceeds?'?

'The hypothesis that satisfactorily describes his use of words, which I observe; or the rule he looks up when he uses the signs; or the one which he gives us in reply if we ask him what his rule is? - But what if observation does not enable us to see any clear rule, and the question brings none to light? - For he did indeed give me a definition when I asked him what he understood by "N" but he was prepared to withdraw it and alter it. - So how am I to determine the rule according to which he is playing?' (P.I. s 82)
Again it is useful to look at the analogy between language and games. Wittgenstein imagines people playing ball games on a field, some traditional games, but others involving chasing and bombarding. Sometimes they make up rules as they go along and change them at will. What would we say if someone said they were following definite rules? Peters wants to get clearer about the rules underlying 'education'. But isn't education analogous to the use of 'N' above? Would talk of a 'weak' definition help? It does not mean it can be withdrawn. Wittgenstein says that we often compare the use of words with games and calculi with fixed rules. This reminds us of Richardson's one-sided view of philosophical method discussed in Chapter Two, and we could apply that method here. If we allow that when someone uses language he needn't be playing such a game because:

'... the actual usage of a word resembles, not one game played according to strict rules, but rather an activity approaching sometimes this game, sometimes that, moving irregularly (floating about) between them, then nothing we would call one system of rules will describe this usage. We have then to describe various games, giving various sets of rules, serving as centres of variation.' (14)

Such rule descriptions of language are perfectly possible. But this is a far cry from uncovering hidden principles governing our use of terms. But these rule descriptions lie always on the brink of a misunderstanding. This procedure is not mistaken but it is dangerous and wrong-headed. We have characterised Wittgenstein's style as 'contrapuntal'. The 'rules' he refers to are the rules of grammar' in the lives of beings with a language. 'A rule stands there like a sign post' (F.I. s.85). As we saw in our discussion of the 'rite of chess' the 'rules' have no meaning unless the 'grammar' of the activity is given. Wittgenstein qualifies his talk of rules by stressing that they are 'practices', that they belong to a form of life, that to obey a rule is a 'custom' or 'institution' (F.I. s. 198). Peters wishes to use analysis to clarify concepts by getting clearer about the rules behind our use of words. But analysis will not help. What we need is to understand the 'grammar' of a concept.

The 'games'passage is to be read as an injunction to consider examples. The source of metaphysics is a craving for generality, a contemptuous attitude to the particular case. We disavow the particular case because any example, or set of examples, seems incomplete even if we add the phrase 'and so on'. Wittgenstein understands the dangers that lie in giving examples because of our cravings for generality:
'... this is ... how one might explain to someone what a game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. - I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I - for some reason - was unable to express; but that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is not an indirect means of explaining - in default of a better.' (P.I. s. 71)

Certainly, sometimes we only give examples because we cannot produce a definition but this is exactly the sort of one sided example that can mislead us. We are up against the idea of the 'hidden'. Our craving for generality makes us ignore examples we want to get at the essence but we do not seem to know where to find it. We may argue that any particular example is a special case - rather like Peters' treatment of cases of education that don't match his criteria - consider it peripheral. 'In order to find the real artichoke we divest it of its leaves' (P.I. s. 164) Wittgenstein means that what we consider to be 'peripheral' or a mere 'symptom' is just one of the family of cases. This consideration can be carried further. It can be used to dispel the idea that there is anything like a central group of 'uses' of a term or a 'core' to a concept. Imagine a picture of colour patches with clear boundaries and another set with vague contours. It is possible to see the first as a model of the second. In the second you have a vague blue circle and in the first you have a clearly defined disc. So far so good. 'But if the colours ... merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a hopeless task to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one?' (P.I. s.77) You can draw anything you like a square or a circle or a triangle. It is like this with the core concept notion. It is drawn on the concept rather meaninglessly. As if you took one leaf of the artichoke and said that it was the essence and the rest peripheral. Wittgenstein says quite clearly that '... this is the position you are in if you look for definitions corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics' (P.I. s.77). This sounds like the sort of thing that Peters was saying in his reply to Wood. But Wittgenstein means that if you try to produce an essence in the form of a definition then 'Anything - and nothing - is right'. And this goes for both 'weak' and 'strong' definitions.

Analogies will not remove the feeling that if we can't say what we know then we don't know it. We have no real concept of a thing. It is hard to dissuade anyone from the quest for the hidden essence by giving examples, they want a general formulation of their knowledge:
What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean to know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to an unformulated definition? So that if it were formulated I should be able to recognise it as the expression of my knowledge? Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of game; showing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these; saying that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and so on' (P.I. s. 75).

Perhaps this paragraph more than any other presents us with the problem of the method of the P.I. Wittgenstein once told his students: 'What I want to teach you isn't opinions but a method. In fact the method to treat as irrelevant every question of opinions ... If I'm wrong then you are right which is just as good'. (15) He said that he was trying to get people to do something they won't do. That is why he talks about 'cravings' and we have talked about 'habits'. Examples are not taken to have any import. Hirst and Peters illustrate the sort of intellectual reluctance that is met with. They consider that there are many counter examples to their analysis so 'it is very difficult to maintain that an adequate analysis has been given' but they continue:

'It is possible, however, that there is some explanation of these counter-examples. It could be the case, in other words, that the cases that fail to fit the analysis could themselves be linked in some way. If we could get clearer about the principle underlying the counter-examples further light would be shed on the concept of "education" generally' (16).

Conceptual illumination is seen only in terms of finding a hidden underlying principle that connects up counter-examples. This means that given a set of counter-examples - the instances of technical education, Spartan education, Lawrencian or Tolstoyan 'anti-educational' views - described in some detail, that no illumination of the concept of education is available until we have said 'What is common to all these cases is ....' This view is adhered to despite the fact that what usually fills the blank is something trivial or platitudinous.

These desires for exactness, completeness, and definitiveness, all find expression in the view that the essence of things is hidden from us. This is something that analysis must dig out. Thus Peters wishes to look through language to see the principles that underlie the use of terms. Thus the Wittgenstein of the _Tractatus_ sought the structure of language. Thus philosophers have always sought to ask 'What is ...?' questions:
"The essence is hidden from us!": this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask: "What is language?", "What is a proposition?" and the answer to these questions is to be given once and for all; and independently of any future experience". (P.I. s. 92)

Until now we have only looked at what Wittgenstein actually said to indicate that some of the points about definitions, central uses, underlying principles, the idea of 'weak' definition, or of giving logically necessary conditions, and so forth made by Peters in a consistent way through several works, are not compatible with the 'family resemblance' or 'game' metaphors. Nor are they successful accommodations to it. That picture is directed at a method of philosophising and thus the issues may seem to be a terminological one or 'a matter of words'. These metaphors are introduced to combat a powerful picture of the working of language. But it is not possible to simply contradict that picture. What would this involve? 'There are no necessary conditions for the use of the term "education"?'

This is as misleading as the assertion of its contradictory. What we need to do is to run away from looking at concepts in the way that Peters and others have made the norm in philosophy of education. But this cannot be done by saying the contradictory of what he says or by ignoring what he says. Wittgenstein says in reply to the suggestion that to use a term without a fixed meaning may be said to be speaking meaninglessly, or speaking nonsense: 'Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts. (And when you see them there is a good deal you will not say.) (P.I. s. 79)

It might be objected at this point that this is pretty old hat. If we disregard Hirst and Peters qualifications about not looking for a 'simple observable property' and that they doubt if Wittgenstein was 'right about this particular concept' then they can be seen to be taking this point. The necessary conditions they look for are not found among the physical properties of games but in 'how a human being conceives an activity'. Although this may sound subjective and relativistic, in a way that talk of 'how human beings conceive an activity' would not, they are approaching the concept as part of a 'form of life'. This comes out more convincingly in Dearden's early article on play. After reviewing how the 'family resemblance metaphor may strongly tempt us to accept that play 'is not to be demarcated by
looking for some feature present always in play activities ... but by making a move quite different from those usual ones'. (17) This involves a considering play 'in relation to social life generally'. (18) Again it is dependent on how adults conceive certain activities. There are similarities between this unusual move and the discussion of 'grammar' in Chapter Two. But the differences are greater. Dearden does not mention 'rules' but he is seeking 'criteria'. Several psychological criteria of play are rejected as being insufficient or not necessary or both. But we still have 'criteria' which locate play on the social map. This may seem to be half way there even if it retains the 'criteriological' mode of speech. But what this unusual approach amounts to is a repetition of one of the mistakes the family resemblance approach sets out to rectify. Only it does this at a 'grammatical' rather than a 'phenomenological level'. That is, in the sphere of social life rather than in the features common to play activities. My juxtaposition of Dearden's remarks with the conflicting remarks of Mary Midgley at the beginning of this chapter was intended to bring this fact to light. It is now appropriate to go into some more detail.

It has been claimed that the 'family resemblance' metaphor is connected with the need to look at case after case. We have seen that explicating a concept is not just looking at what we might think are central cases. We have seen that the metaphor is an attempt to remind us that we need not draw a boundary to make a concept usable. That we can give a concept rigid limits but we need not do so. We can define or refine a concept for special purposes. Some comments of William James seem to be consonant with Wittgenstein's position:

'To understand a thing rightly we need to see it both out of its environment and in it ... (and) ... it always leads to a better understanding of a thing's significance to consider its exaggerations and perversions, its near equivalents and substitutes and nearest relatives elsewhere'.(19)

Dearden does not consider that deviant cases are worth enumeration:

'... this account of play could be complicated in all sorts of ways, for example by considering what to say of those people who have a professional interest in games, or those who play for the purpose of maintaining health or getting business contracts, but to chase such cases would be merely tedious. When one is trying to get somewhere, one does not pause to consider every lane and side track.' (20)

Yet if what you are trying to get to is the position where you command
a clear view of a particular concept consideration of such cases is essential. It is not the obvious cases that go to the heart of the concept. And this explains the difference between Dearden's and Midgley's accounts of play. For she delights in just such cases, even, heading her article with this remark from Bill Shankly: 'Some people talk about football as if it were life or death itself, but it is much more serious than that'. They look at different examples of play and produce conflicting analyses. But let us shift the 'games' analogy back into the centre of the metaphor.

3.2. 'Games'

Mary Midgley bases her discussion of 'games' on the repetition of the assumption that, unless we have clear knowledge of an underlying unity, metaphor, or any extended use of a term is impossible. She expresses this conviction at least twelve times. The idea she has is simple. Metaphor is an epidiascope, and an epidiascope needs something to project. It projects an enlarged image of a words meaning. Thus she uses a metaphor to explain metaphor. This metaphor forms the backbone of her paper. In the paper she considers numerous examples of the use of the term 'game' including metaphorical uses. The point of this is to 'draw out the meanings that emerge from it when you use it metaphorically.'

Before discussing her critique of the 'family resemblance' metaphor it is essential to note that something is asked already. For she appears to have no understanding of metaphor. Metaphors can be seen as mere decoration. If they are not seen in this way they are important and what can be important can be dangerous. Her metaphor is dangerous because it expresses a rigid view of concepts. Drawing a line is crucial for her because it will help solve what we called 'Conflict Questions'. Is this a case of X or Y? But it is quite clear that drawing lines does not help with moral conflicts and dilemmas. If I know that X is right and Y wrong, or I know how near what I am deliberating about is to cases of what is wrong and cases of what is right this won't help me. It is because we know this that we have moral dilemmas. Whatever we do it goes against our moral sense and practice. Midgley does not attempt to see why the 'family resemblance' metaphor was important to Wittgenstein. She does not attempt to see why he uses it. We have seen that it is used to dispel a certain approach to the concept of language, exemplified in the Tractatus. There is also a double use of metaphors here. 'Games' are used to
illustrate the 'family resemblance' metaphor and in their own right as a metaphor for our use of language. These uses of metaphor are related in that they are both aids to dispelling the notion that there is an essence to language. It is this use of metaphor Midgley does not mention. She considers the metaphor as merely making a 'point about definition'. She suggests that, on the basis of her own metaphor about metaphor, Wittgenstein is denying that there is a common element and also asserting that there is an underlying unity. Midgley talks as if Wittgenstein is impaled upon a contradiction in someway. But to talk of something common and to talk of a unity are not the same thing at all. She constantly assimilates the two terms and equivocation vitiates her approach. There is nothing common and there is no underlying unity. She supports her epistemic metaphor with a reference to the metaphor of Christ as 'the light of the world'. This only works because people know what lights have in common. We have a 'clear positive idea' of the root notion here. Indeed Wittgenstein talks of lamps and light as examples of objects which allow a sharp distinction between essential and inessential. (P.I. s. 62) The metaphor was not meant to apply to all concepts. If it was it would imply a theory of meaning. This theory would be a variant of realist theories of resemblance. Perhaps it could be applied to concepts such as 'lamp', 'chair', 'orange', and 'parrot' but nothing of philosophical importance would result from this application of the metaphor. The metaphor was an attempt to stop us looking for the essence of language. Applied to particular concepts as if it were a general account of concepts it would be contradicting these accounts. But it is merely exhibited not asserted as the correct account of concepts in general. Midgley's initial attempts to weaken the metaphor is nothing but a desperate attempt to get the 'family resemblance' metaphor to run on all four legs. Thus she points out that Wittgenstein says in s. 67 that 'games form a family' which is very different from having a 'family resemblance'. The metaphor is then made to run on two legs when she says 'A family is a functional group with a concentric structure...' (26) and upon all four when after giving the 'thread' metaphor she says: 'But the threads must end somewhere; how do we know where to cut them off?' (27) The metaphor is connected with an injunction to consider cases. This in turn is connected with 'grammar' with what it makes sense to say. The sort of unity Midgley is commenting upon here is no underlying unity or common feature but a unity provided by 'grammar'. To make this clear let us consider the following examples of metaphorical uses of language:

She is a Borgia
She is a Smith
Christ is the light of the world
This is as white as snow
Now is the Winter of our discontent
This is my body (said of bread by Christ)
'Tis the Taj Mahal (said of a hat)
Beauty is truth
Simone is a dajati

Metaphor works in inverse proportion to the degree of similarity or familiarity of the items juxtaposed. "metaphor is one of the language games we play. Language is shot through with metaphor. Thus a metaphor such as 'As white as snow' does not strike us at all. Midgley argues that unless we have a 'clear grasp of the underlying unity' metaphor won't work. We must have a 'pretty clear, positive idea of the root notion'. (28) What does this mean? We could be up against two of the ideas criticised by Wittgenstein. Firstly, that there must be a strict definition of a term or clear boundary to a concept before it is usable. Secondly, there is the notion of the 'hidden' something underlying or below which gives unity to a concept. Thus we have Midgley talking of 'family resemblances' as consisting of 'surface similarities'. (29) Consider how this view may come about. If I say of a flower that its colour is 'As white as snow' there appears to be a reference here to a surface 'phenomenon' i.e. there is a similarity of colour conceived as a sort of epidermis. The same 'phenomenal' relation could be said to exist in the faces of a certain family i.e. the cold blue eyes. Snow is usually white if we except that found on one of Jupiter's moons. All the eyes of a certain family may be blue. This is the supposed common element. We can then talk of flowers being like snow and someone being like an 'X' where this variable stands for the cold blue-eyed family's name. Could we say that Midgley has a 'phenomenal' view of metaphor? She seems to view it as needing something like the 'Galtonian Composite Photograph' before we can place it on the epidiascope. Thus she sees shifting surface resemblances irrelevant. Suppose that someone says 'She's a Borgia'. Here we have a different sort of metaphor. Midgley explicitly rejects the suggestion that this could refer to any 'phenomenal' characteristic. They must, she says 'have something in common apart from being linked by their family resemblances'. (30) The point has already been made that such remarks take the metaphor too literally. But given this qualification, what is misleading in her suggestion that there is something common to all Borgias? One of the mistakes we make when thinking about similarities and differences is to think that
differences of the 'phenomenal' sort differ from other sorts of difference in degree only. For instance, the difference between 'rock' and 'plant' is different from the question 'What is a plant in essence?' only in the fact that the latter is a more general question. Thus when searching for what is common to all Borgias we look for an element which is not 'phenomenal' but is nevertheless essentially similar to a phenomenal difference. Whereas what we should look for are 'grammatical' remarks about the concept 'plant' and these alone will satisfy our curiosity. We shall go into the complexities of what 'grammatical' remarks are later, but we can bring in the related notion of the use of this term in language to shed light here. We call someone a 'Borgia' rather than a 'Smith. What difference is there? We know how to use both the terms. But there is a difference, we may know lots of Smiths and nothing may strike us about any of them. But if we know some history we may know some facts about the more famous Borgias as we may know things about other famous families such as the Mills or the Churchills. If I call someone by anyone of these names what sort of clear positive idea of the root notion must I have? I may defend my application of the term with any one or any set of facts I know about the Borgias or Mills or Churchills. Metaphors are usually challenged on the question of their applicability. You call her a Borgia but she is good, kind ... etc. Where the actual metaphor is challenged we usually express our ignorance. 'Simone is a 'dajati' - will bring the immediate response: 'What is a "dajati"?'. We can answer this question in a variety of ways. We can give examples, show pictures, present definitions or whatever. We do not pick out a common element. We try to teach someone the use of the term by showing him the sort of language games we can play with it. We give examples of its everyday employment. Now Midgley will argue that it is only possible to use a term or concept 'because it does have some principle of unity, because it is not infinitely elastic'. The Christ metaphor may work because the essence is sharply defined because 'people knew very well what lights had in common (namely a certain relation to the things and people lit)'. Midgley admits that if we looked at the differences between lights we might see that they differed as much as games. But these differences would be uninteresting. Her critique of the 'family resemblance' metaphor seems to amount to a distinction between a clear positive 'unity' and a set of surface similarities which are related in a 'family resemblance' fashion. This seems to approach something like the distinction between the 'phenomenal' and 'grammatical' as answers to 'What is ...?' Yet she goes on to say that she wants to talk about the sense in which we do know what is in common...
between games, the sense in which there is an underlying unity.'(32)
If this 'common' factor that gives underlying unity is simply
knowledge of how to use the term, if it is related to the fact that
we live in a society that plays games etc. then it is something that
must be acknowledged. If we say 'Now is the winter of our discontent'
'This is my body' (Christ said of the bread eaten in the upper room)
we must have experience of winter, we must live in a society where
religion has a foot hold. Midgley seems to think that the notion of
'following a rule' is crucial. It is, but she gives no space to the
discussion of the variety of things that could be meant by that phrase,
so it is difficult to understand what she means. Perhaps it is something
like a definition to her? But this would be of no interest to us. All
questions about metaphor would be related to questions of 'strict logic'.
But will this do? It is quite clear that there is some relation but
that relation is not clear. Suppose I say of a hat that my wife has
chosen 'It's the Taj Mahal' or when Keats says that 'Beauty is truth',
how do questions of 'strict logic' help us? We could say that we apply
the term 'Taj mahal' only to 'Taj Mahal' - like objects, or objects
which are elaborate, domed, and splendid. But this won't help the hat
isn't shaped like that. 'Beauty' isn't like truth. Certainly, every-
thing is like everything else in some ways. Chalk is like cheese. To
understand these metaphors, however, we need more than a general
connection of this sort. What is credible in the case of a things being
as white as snow does not move us at all in these latter cases. Any
connection we found between 'beauty' and 'truth' would be fatuous.
Something else is needed and the thing needful is an understanding of
the culture in which the metaphor is possible. In the example from
Keats we need to be sensitive to romantic poetry and to be aware of his
view of the nature of art and its relation to life. In the Lectures
and Conversations Wittgenstein says that 'what belongs to a language-
game' is a whole culture.'(33) This, rather than the production and
application of trivial definitions, is what lies at the heart of
understanding a metaphor.

Midgley is suggesting that certain of our moral concepts are in
some sort of trouble. She argues that 'Since they do a lot of work we
must try to define them and look for underlying unities (here they are
unlike 'family resemblance', an idle concept if there ever was one)... 
(34) She does acknowledge that we shall not be able to give a simple 'litmus
paper' test which will facilitate the use of moral concepts. Yet if
we make too much of this and cease to look for underlying unity we will
find that our concepts will fall to pieces just as, she thinks, the
concept of art has done. We are concentrating on her wider points about definition because they are in direct conflict with the remarks of Wittgenstein's we considered earlier about it being a hopeless task to draw sharp boundaries around a blurred picture. If we do so then anything and nothing is right, and his conclusion was that '... this is the position you are in if you look for definitions corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics'. (P.L. s. 77) This points to a paradox in her argument. For although she looks for a definition she does not produce one! This fact escapes notice because she examines and explicates the concept of a game by considering examples. She examines case after case of metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses of 'game'. She is convincing when she argues that football (Rangers v. Celtic) is not cut off from the lives of players or supporters. She is convincing when she shows that metaphorical uses of 'game' in literature stress not the arbitrariness of life but point beyond it to 'God' who controls our play. She is convincing in her talk of the Stoic morality of 'playing the game'. She deals with Plato's view that play is the only serious business in life. She dwells on Ernö's examples of 'games' people play. She discusses Huizinga's view that play is a ritualisation of the most important things in life. She accepts that Plato and Huizinga may appear 'somewhat paradoxical'. But she concludes play demands to be taken seriously and is not as arbitrary and non-mattering as had been thought. (35) This is a corrective to the account offered by Dearden and taken up by Peters. But where is the definition? The nearest we get to it is talk about the profound and complex need for play. But because this need is complex 'the things that will satisfy it will not share any simple obvious characteristic, like being painted green, but because it is strong and universal, they will share structural characteristics which are easily and widely recognised'. (36) She provides an immediate parallel with 'chairs' which provided you understand that they are used to sit on can take an infinite variety of forms. This need is simple whereas 'the need for play is subtle and complex. We do not well understand it. Which is what makes Wittgenstein's point attractive'. (37)

The 'family resemblance' metaphor is connected with an injunction to consider a variety of cases. This Midgley does in the hope of finding an underlying unity. But it is her examples that illuminate the concept by reminding us of what it makes sense to say about games. Thus she gives us an insight into the 'grammar' of the term 'game'. But she does not give us anything like an underlying unity. What we get is a misleading analogy with the 'grammar' of the term 'chair'. Games have a unity which is shown in their 'grammar' which marks them off from
other sorts of things. But it is not a matter of a difference between 'simple' and 'complex' and 'simple characteristics' and 'structural characteristics'. The analogy, and Midgley's comments, make the differences here too slight.

Midgley's 'chair' analogy comes from an article by Haig Khatchadourian. If we follow up her reference to it we find that it will hardly support her nascent 'definition'. Khatchadourian has isolated 'pleasure' as an 'effect' common to all games. He writes:

'But now a doubt arises: is the pleasure produced by different games, or different kinds of game, of the same kind in every case? Are not the pleasures produced related merely by certain "family resemblances," at least in the case of the pleasure produced by games of different "kinds"? If the answer is in the affirmative - and Wittgenstein would say that it is in the affirmative - then obviously Wittgenstein's analysis of games would be completely true, though here it would be the effects of games that are related by "family resemblances", rather than, or as well as, their characteristics themselves'. (38)

Khatchadourian considers the possibility and although he allows that there are distinctions between 'physical' and 'psychological' pleasure but that in the end all games produce a relatively determinate kind of psychological pleasure. The distinction between 'intellectual' and 'emotional' pleasures, for example, 'more concerns the way in which the pleasure is produced and its general intensity'. (39) This 'capacity' common to all games is only obvious when they are seen from 'a very general standpoint'. (40) And this is why we may be misled into thinking they only have 'family resemblance' characteristics. Khatchadourian does not argue his case. We are left with the assertion that there seems to be merely a distinction of quality here. Two considerations can be offered to cast doubt on this assumption. Firstly it is prima facie implausible that chess and snap provide commensurable psychological effects. Secondly, even if they do, and no evidence has been produced for this, then we may wish to use an argument to the effect that some differences in quality of commensurable effects are differences in kind. If this is so then it follows, on Khatchadourian's own admission, that Wittgenstein's 'analysis' is true. And he adds a footnote which makes this point, and a very important qualification to his argument about 'common names':

'It is noteworthy that many of the phenomena Wittgenstein analyses are complex "psychological' processes, such as thinking, doubting, learning; and it may well be that
there only "family resemblances" can be discovered. But supposing this to be true, and even if in the case of games themselves, only "family resemblances" are discoverable in their effects, our position seems to remain secure as far as the names of manufactured objects are concerned — and also of activities which do not appreciably include psychological elements in their effects." (41)

But what is the point of all this? What is at stake if it is established that manufactured articles have an essence in the sense of a 'capacity'? As we saw, Wittgenstein explicitly mentions lamps as an example of something which has an easily distinguishable essence. Khatchadourian like Mdigley is exploring the possibilities of the 'family resemblance' notion as if it offered an account of concepts. Philosophical problems are caused by misleading analogies between forms of expression in different regions of language. Much of the early part of the investigations is concerned with the explanation of the meaning of language on the model of the way in which we name objects. Khatchadourian can easily establish his restricted case as it was never in question. What he and Mdigley do is simply to reverse the analogy. Mdigley's 'structural characteristics' which we recognise so easily may, once we have some account of them, be related by a 'family' of characteristics. Certainly 'needs' in general would appear to be linked by 'family resemblances'. What we have to note, then, is that we do not get any 'definition'. Therefore we do not get an account of an underlying unity.

We were led to consider Mdigley's account of 'games' because of Peters' vague suggestion that there may be underlying unities or common elements. Mdigley suggests that we do know of some underlying unity or common element. In both cases the implication is that if there is no such element then it will follow that all our concepts are in trouble. Both make the point that if we didn't know of such elements that we would not know where to find examples of what we are talking about, as Mdigley puts it: "Don't think, but look!" says Wittgenstein. But we need to think first or we shall not know what to look for." (42) This slick retort — which is a truism if it refers to the search for a lost sock — raises the crucial point. How do we know what is an example of something and what is not? I would want to say that we know through examples. I think Wittgenstein would say that this is the case as well. We have seen that he allows that we can explain our concept of something through examples and that this is not an indirect or faulty way of proceeding. Mdigley seems to think it is. If so, then her avowed failure to produce a definition
after considering numerous enlarged examples of 'games' is disastrous'. She argues that metaphorical uses of a concept like 'game' are possible because the concept stands on a 'small island of meaning - a firm island with a definite shape'. (43) This turns out to be Atlantis.

However, Midgley does give some idea of the unity of the concept by describing its 'grammar'. But this unity is not underlying, it is on the surface for all to see. Khatchadourian suggests that we will not see any 'capacity' unless we consider it from a general standpoint. The word 'general' is dangerous but what he means is: 'Considering a thing in the light of how we talk about it in actual contexts'. We do this by considering examples of usage and imaginative examples. This is what the metaphor is meant to get us to consider. But we must read it right. If we look for a common element in actual examples then we will see a complicated network of similarities ... and so on. The conclusion is that there is no common feature which constitutes essence and not that the essence is constituted by a 'family resemblance'. If we seek a common feature to explicate a concept whose 'grammar' we are familiar with, and so not just assume that we are asking a 'What is ...?' question in an appropriate context, the result is paradoxical:

'I confess to you, Lord, that I still do not know what time is. Yet I confess too that I do know that I am saying this in time, that I have been talking about time for a long time, and that this long time would not be a long time if it were not for the fact that time has been passing all the while. How can I know this, when I do not know what time is? Is it that I do know what time is but that I do not know how to put what I know into words? I am in a sorry state, for I do not even know what I do not know!' (44)

There are a family of language games which make up the grammar of 'time'. To present the problem of 'time' (and there are many different problems depending on context) as one that can be solved by definition is not to oversimplify the 'problem' it is to make a fundamental but very deep error. The 'family resemblance' metaphor is one of many suggestions made by Wittgenstein to wean us away from certain notions of meaning. He is primarily concerned with language, with speaking, with communicating. But 'time' presents analogous problems. His injunction to look, to consider use and language games is part of an attempt to teach us differences to get us to look at the motley of things. In doing this we may come to notice important facts. Here touches upon this when he says 'It may never have struck me before that some form of language - say geometry - does or could belong to the "meaning" of "time".' (45) This is why it is important to stress the point that when we are discuss-
ing language games we are discussing whole cultures. The notion that meaning can be found by drawing out of an instance or instances some definition is a nonsense. This is not to say that it might not be useful to do some such thing at some time, perhaps, when teaching. The essential point is one that is often stated as the importance of context. Words such as 'time', 'rule', 'game' and 'thinking' get their meanings from the particular circumstances in which they are used. Without regulated ordered societies, without clocks and deadlines, without geometry there would be no meaning to 'It must be almost time to go'. To understand the 'grammar' of 'time' it is necessary to stop looking for common essences and to consider what Wittgenstein calls the 'natural history' of human beings.

Hidgeley began her paper with some reflection on the contemporary philosopher's concern with 'game'. She sets out to illuminate a corner of Wittgenstein's thought by concentrating on the single concept of a game. She hopes that this might be 'a helpful example when we wonder about other examples of seeing something in common, and that the concept itself may be a more important one than it seems ...\(^{(46)}\) But how important is the concept per se? It may be important in the philosophy of primary education to take note of the way that play demands to be taken seriously. But the philosophical importance of the 'game' analogy resides in application by Wittgenstein as one of the many examples he uses to deal with a habit of thought. As an example it was unimportant although its unimportance may be important. If it did not succeed there are other examples that may and it can be replaced. Wittgenstein is suggesting that there is an analogy between the way a philosopher might explain what 'game' means and the way in which he might explain what 'language' means. There is unity in the two that is the unity that a family might have. But Wittgenstein is not suggesting that the two are the same. There are disanalogies here. I can explain what a game is if you don't know by describing examples and by saying 'this and the like' are games. But if you can't speak, and hence can't use language, I cannot proceed in this way. My descriptions of 'speaking' simply would not do. His general point is that we can see through this analogy that it is possible to explain what a language is without reference to any general form. There are many problems with the analogy. But these problems relate to what Wittgenstein intended by the analogy.
'It is not the property of an object that is ever 'essential', but rather the mark of a concept.'
Wittgenstein (47).

When Hirst and Peters point out that 'whether something is a game or not does not depend on any simple observable property'. They draw no further conclusions, other than that we must not look for defining characteristics in any simplistic way. As this stands we can look for more subtle or complex characteristics. But something more important is meant, and it is worth labouring the point. Let us consider Bambrough's interpretation of the 'family resemblance' metaphor, as this is becoming the standard account of what Wittgenstein meant.

Bambrough argues that Wittgenstein has solved the problem of universals. Using what he calls a 'legalistic' technique he interprets the 'family resemblance' passages as being a denial of the common assumption of both the realist and the nominalist:

'The nominalist says that games have nothing in common except that they are called games.
The realist says that games must have something in common, and he means by this that they must have something in common other than that they are games.
Wittgenstein says that games have nothing in common except that they are games.' (49)

He presents a simple diagram to illustrate the analogy with reference to five objects with a closed set of features:

'We may classify a set of objects by reference to the presence or absence of features ABCDE. It may well happen that five objects edcba are such that each of them has four of these properties and lacks the fifth, and that the missing feature is different in each of the five cases...

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Here we can see how natural and how proper it might be to apply the same word to a number of objects between which there is no common feature ... Even if the actual instances were indefinitely numerous, and they all happened to have one or more of the features in common, it would not be in virtue of the presence of the common feature or features that they would all be rightly called by the same name, since the name also applies to possible instances that lack the feature or features.' (80)
The dispute between the nominalists and realist is resolved, according to Bambrough, because Wittgenstein allows that the nominalist is right in saying that 'games' have nothing in common other than their being games and by also allowing pace the realists that we are, nevertheless, objectively justified in calling them games because games are related in the way suggested by the schema. It is enough for any individual game to have a subset of such features. This deals both with 'what is ...?' questions and 'what justifies us in calling this a ...?' questions.

To understand why Bambrough's interpretation is essentially no different from realism is important. For then he is open to Wittgenstein's criticisms of realism. Furthermore, such a revelation would protect us from the plausibility of Bambrough's position. To begin let us revive the distinction between the 'phenomenal' and the 'grammatical' mentioned when discussing Midgley's treatment of metaphor.

The difference between an apple and an orange, a tree and a plant, and brick and a flint, is a difference of perceived features. The difference between 'five' and 'red' and between 'cold' and 'pain' is not a perceived or phenomenal difference. It is a difference of 'grammar', of the use these words have in language. The distinction between 'grammar' and 'use' is merely a shift to a formal mode of expression. Hubert Schuyzer has argued that a pervasive and fundamental theme in the P.I. is that the difference between the question 'what is the difference between an orange and a grapefruit?' and the question 'what is the difference between a number and a colour?' is made to seem too slight. Thus when a philosopher asks 'what is a number?' he is held to be asking an analogous question to 'what is a grapefruit (as opposed to an orange)?' In this latter case a list of features is appropriate, but not in the former. Suppose we ask 'what is a grapefruit?' in the philosophical way, then we may say that it is really extended, solid, coloured etc. It is easy to think of these characteristics being simply more general than the 'phenomenal' features we could list i.e. being yellow, bitter, large etc. This would be misleading. These latter features determine what a grapefruit is. Thus it is because they are coloured that we can speak of seeing them, because they are solid that we can speak of picking them up. If apples were different in these features then we could not talk of picking them up etc. Of course, they could be of no interest to us so that we did not notice them which shows that these 'phenomenal' features are not absolute. But to list characteristics like 'solid' is almost not to describe apples, that is, it is not
to attribute features to them. These characteristics do not determine how we speak about grapefruit. They are merely 'backhand' ways of saying that it makes sense to talk about picking up grapefruit etc. It is because it makes sense to say certain things about grapefruit that determines what grapefruit are. Saying 'grapefruit are extended' is a grammatical remark about the use of language, about what it makes sense to say in a language game. The confusion of the 'phenomenal' with the 'grammatical' is at the heart of Bambrough's interpretation of Wittgenstein.

When we ask 'What is ... ?' in philosophy we are concerned with the explication of a concept with what a word means. Bambrough, and this is clear from the passage quoted above, believes that ultimately the meaning of a term is what it applies to, that is, a subset of family features. Thus it is just another variant of what Wittgenstein is attacking – the notion that the meaning of a term is an object. He has hypostatised the family resemblance notion. Schwyzer shows this clearly by setting up schemata similar to Bambrough's to show that the use of a word cannot be determined in such a way:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>A:</th>
<th>a: plastic lawn</th>
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<tr>
<td>B: not commonly eaten</td>
<td>b: ripe avocado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: soft, yields to the touch</td>
<td>c: copy of P.I. (3rd U.S. Edition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: green</td>
<td>d: kitten</td>
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<tr>
<td>E: an individual thing (not stuff)</td>
<td>e: moss</td>
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Each of the objects edcba has four of the properties ABCDE and lacks the fifth, and the missing fifth is different in the five cases. Thus

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Let us call the term that is explicated by the schema under this interpretation "omega". (51)

Here we have a formula by which we can determine whether an object is an 'omega' or not. It is not an arbitrary or closed term as would be a name for the things in my pocket. Suppose that we are totally proficient in applying the formula. Then we discover an actual language in which the word has a use and is subject to the above formula. Will we be able to say that we understand the people who use the term? Will we know what language game they are playing? Perhaps we would say 'They are playing the language game "describing omegas"?' But how do we know? It might be that to say 'I have found an omega', 'He collects omegas', 'Omnas exist' etc. is the purest nonsense. 'Omega' might have a particular function, to warn off young tribesmen who step too
near an object falling under the formula, it might be a curse, or something which we cannot translate easily and can only give the formula as a poor gesture. What would make an 'omega' one of these things or something else would not and cannot be a matter of the family features as these are ex hypothesi the same whatever 'omega' means. Only a description of the language game can tell us what a word means. Bambrugh fails in his account because he ignores everything Wittgenstein says about use.

Schwyzer also shows that Bambrugh's account will not work even for the restricted case of general descriptive terms. He gives another example:

'The word "beta" applies to things just in so far as they have the property of being red. - So we have the schema:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{a} & \text{b} & \text{c} & \text{d} & \ldots & \text{n} \\
\text{R} & \text{R} & \text{R} & \text{R} & \ldots & \text{R}
\end{array}
\]  \\
\text{(58)}
\]

Suppose we meet another tribe which uses the term 'beta'. We guess that it means red on the basis of the formula. But we find tribesmen who say things like 'I had three betas for breakfast' but someone who says 'What a beta sunset!' is held to talk nonsense. The formula cannot choose between the two possibilities of 'beta' meaning 'red' or 'red one'. This is a difference in grammar, in the use of words.

It must be said that Bambrugh is not unique in adopting such an approach. There are several philosophers who have recently produced papers making a similar misinterpretation of the metaphor. Fogelin is a case in point.\(^{(53)}\) He argues that Wittgenstein is distinguishing between sorts of concept, those which are family resemblance ones, and those which aren't. Wittgenstein, of course, uses number as his example of a family concept. Fogelin argues that the term does not have general application and that it has 'its most natural application to descriptive terms'.\(^{(54)}\) He rejects Wittgenstein's application of it to ethics and aesthetics because terms like 'good' have clear definitions! In utilising the notion in this way, Fogelin, like Bambrugh, is treating the notion as if it presents some alternative theory of meaning. The arguments of Schwyzer will hold against both. Wittgenstein is trying to dispel a badly understood picture or, if you like, to correct a misleading way of thinking. This can be seen as the assimilation of 'phenomenal' and 'grammatical' statements. He is correcting a misleading idea of what constitutes the essence of concepts.

Yet another philosopher to treat the concept in this way is Harold
Osborne. He argues that philosophers have become capricious in their treatment of aesthetics because of the fashionable influence of Wittgenstein's notion of a 'family resemblance group'. He argues:

'... it would be virtually impossible to think of anything at all which had not some relation of resemblance to any other thing in the universe, and it would be possible to construct an infinity of the most outre and extravagant assemblages of things each connected by the fact that each item had some relation to some other item in the assemblage. Nothing would be excluded. Such groupings are quite arbitrary.' (55)

This is a warning not to expect a significant feature common to everything in the group or for necessary and sufficient conditions for everything in the group. But the very notion of a 'family' group should lead us to expect that the things within it are 'linked by significant and coherent, not just arbitrary and haphazard, relations of resemblance'. (56)

The philosopher's job is to investigate the common features ... determining the necessary and sufficient conditions' of something being included in a group. These features are often implicit and the philosopher must render them 'articulate and precise'. Osborne is discussing a 'work of art' and shows through historical examples that there may be something for the philosopher to say about the development of a 'popular consciousness' of what constitutes a work of art. But his general approach to the metaphor is the same as that of Peters, Midgley, and Fogelin. He takes the metaphor to be introducing a general account of a concept. He misreads the passage. The point must be made again. If you look for common elements you will not find them. What tells us what belongs in a group is 'grammar'. Or, as we have put it, our knowledge is constituted by examples. Instead of being read as a corrective to the misleading 'material object' or naming view of language the metaphor is seen as providing an inadequate account of the relation of members of a given class and the misleading picture is reinstated. This, and like examples, can be multiplied indefinitely as evidence of our craving for generality and the strength of that misleading picture of how language functions.

Perhaps part of the difficulty is to grasp just what is meant by a bad or misleading picture. The tendency is to see it as a sort of mental image. This would be wrong. The clearest example of a misleading picture is the one the Malcolm tells us Wittgenstein himself used:
'Suppose that a cord was stretched tightly around the earth at the equator. Now suppose that a piece one yard long was added to the cord. If the cord was kept taught and circular in form, how much above the surface of the earth would it be? Without stopping to work it out, everyone present (at one of Wittgenstein's at homes) was inclined to say that the distance of the cord from the surface of the earth would be so minute that it would be imperceptible. But this is wrong. The actual distance would be nearly six inches.' (57)

We are misled because we compare the additional length to the total length which, quite correctly, seems insignificant. It is the same when we are misled by mental pictures in philosophy. Our whole way of looking at the problem misleads us. Wittgenstein in using the 'family resemblance' analogy and asking us to 'look and see' is attempting to direct our attention to particular language games so that we are not misled by a particular picture of what constitutes the essence of concepts. Here it is necessary to distinguish between 'essentialism', the way of thinking that embodies the mistaken assimilation we are considering and, for example, the idea of essence being expressed by grammar. Wittgenstein is not suggesting that if we look and see we will find that beside those concepts with a common thread we will find 'family resemblance concepts' which can be understood through some sophisticated neo-realist theory. The purpose of the metaphor was to charm us away from the idea that there was a common structure to all that we call language which directly correlated with reality.

What sense, then, can be given to the suggestion that the concept of education is a 'family resemblance' concept. As we have seen this is almost taken to be a truism. It should be clear from the discussion above that to make this suggestion, or to attempt to apply the metaphor would be misguided. Wisdom suggested in Other Lines that the therapeutic dialogue of the philosopher was an 'aseptic' technique. It did not involve statements of proofs, but questions and questions. The idea was that every philosophical question would answer itself if asked aseptically and fully. However, it was not always necessary to adopt this technique in its entirety instead 'One may gently, surreptitiously introduce a septic but beneficent notation ...' (58) The 'family resemblance' metaphor is such a notation but it has a charm which may mesh those not held captive by the picture it aims to correct. It may help us towards grasping what is at issue or towards seeing this in a different arrangement. The danger of using a septic technique
is that the notation offered may be utilised outside the context in
which it had a job to do. Can the metaphor be utilised to throw
light on other concepts than the peculiar philosophical ones associated
with language? Would such an application necessarily be crude and
uninteresting?

If the 'phenomenal' 'grammatical' confusion was evident in the
ways in which philosophers of education dealt with the concept, and if
the 'family resemblance' metaphor helps to dissipate the confusion then
perhaps it has a use. This is far from saying that 'education' is a
'family resemblance' concept. With certain concepts such as 'lemon'
or 'car' or 'monkey' the metaphor would do no obvious work, although
it is possible to apply something like a 'family resemblance' notion
to the relationship of various individuals in so-called 'ring species'.
In these cases no philosophical effect would be achieved. And it might
be objected that no one would make the 'phenomenal/grammatical' confusion
in the case of 'education', even though this concept is important to us.
Certainly a concept like 'furniture' might involve us in such an error
because here there are physical objects which might misdirect our
enquiry. But in the case of 'education' there are no such objects.
Yet the word 'object' has several different uses other than to designate
the 'grammatical' category of material object. We can talk of the
colour 'red' as an object and we can even go as far as Husserl's
'intentional object'. Therefore it is not necessary to think of a
thing as 'phenomenal' to interpret it on analogy with a material object.
Language masks this. The similarity in grammar between the questions
'What is education?' and 'What is an apple?' where the latter means
'What is an apple as against a pear?' encourages us in the thought that
these questions are to be answered in similar ways. In reality it is
far from clear what sort of question if any is being asked in the first
case. What is obvious is that the latter calls for a list of features
while the former calls for a grammatical answer if it is a question
about explication of a concept. 'Grammatical' remarks are not lists
of features but statements about what it makes sense to say about a
thing. When people produce general criteria of 'education' as they do
of 'game' it is often, as we have seen, far from clear what is going on.
Nevertheless, time after time, suggestions of the hidden, of the need
to look behind words, search for a common factor, suggest that what is
being sought is a phenomenal feature. Mention of 'rules' sometimes
confuses the issue but there are other indications that the assimilation
is being made. The confusion is, in part, another example of putting
the cart before the horse. Certain 'grammatical' remarks are held to
be features which determine how we talk about 'education'. Thus the statement that 'Education is desirable' does not give us a characteristic of 'education' that makes something a case of 'education'. Rather it is because it makes sense to talk about wanting education, because people seek to have an education, etc. that allow us to speak of education being desirable. The tendency to hypostatize 'grammar' leads us to see desirability as a characteristic of education that cause us to seek it out. This tendency becomes more transparent if we consider how the 'grammatical' statement is then elevated into a check by which we can test any particular instance. Rather as if we were sorting out apples from pears. This exercise is as vacuous as the application of the 'omega' formula. What indicates more than all else that this sort of assimilation is being made is the neglect of the particular case. If we read Wittgenstein's use of the 'family resemblance' metaphor as essentially connected with the injunction to consider the particular case then it is necessary to consider the language games we play with words. This is implicit in the notion of 'grammar' for Wittgenstein does not use that metaphor simply to mean 'rules' as Waismann suggests, but to refer to what we say to human activity, to a form of life, to a culture. Thus, to seek some sort of application of the 'family resemblance' metaphor to education would amount to no more than to consider case after case of education.

Richardson has suggested that the notions of 'criteria' and 'family resemblances' are often used to make precisely the same points. And from our discussion of these notions there are some similarities. It has been suggested that talk of 'criteria', if it means anything at all, refers to the sorts of things it makes sense to say in ordinary life. Likewise the notion of 'family resemblances' is connected with an injunction to consider the language games we play in ordinary life. Both are elements in Wittgenstein's attempt to deal with our craving for generality. But if this means, and I suspect it does, that there is some sort of equation of 'family resemblance' features and 'criteria', then so much the worse for Richardson's 'theory of criteria'.

We began by asking 'Are there necessary and/or sufficient conditions for (the use of the term) education?' 'Are there criteria for (the use of the term) education?' and 'Is education a family resemblance (term)concept?' All these questions embody in their different ways elements of the malaise that places all value in the general. We have discussed several misleading assimilations that run through these questions. No answer has been offered to any of them. However, this was not the object of
considering them. The object was to try to understand what led to
the asking of these questions. It is hoped that having come to some
understanding of this then the urge to ask these questions would be
reduced. Whether this reduction has been achieved will only be
apparent to the extent that one begins to consider examples.
What we have been calling case by case procedure, or the consider-
ation of instance after instance, has at least one peculiar feature. This concerns the status of examples. The examples themselves are not important per se. They do not concern us as, for instance, the descrip-
tion of a particular battle might concern a military historian, or the description of a particular school in a certain historical period might concern an educational historian. In one sense we illustrate a method of proceeding by considering a large and heterogeneous number of cases. Yet in another sense we hope to gain insight into whatever conceptual area we are discussing through the examples we give. They may become important and familiar landmarks. This is true of the 'games' example that Wittgenstein used to introduce the 'family resemblance' notion. He could have written:

'Consider the phenomena we call 'truths' and 'true proposition'. I mean scientific truths, mathematical truths, historical truths, aesthetic truths, and so on. What is common to them all? - Don't say there must be something common or they would not be called 'truths' - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: Don't think but look!' 

If we apply the metaphor to the concept of truth the injunction to consider examples may be illuminating. Given the particular intention in this section to explain why no definition of language has been produced it is doubtful whether a central concept like truth would have the same magic as the 'games' example. However it could function in the same way. Just consider the following examples of true propositions:

(1) London is the capital of England
(2) CKp Cpqq
(3) Hitler was an evil man
(4) Red is the colour with the greatest wavelength
(5) Shakespeare is a greater playwright than Rattigan
(6) Henry VIII had six wives
(7) Beethoven's Sonata No. 14 in C sharp minor Opus 27 No. 2 sounds like moonlight.

Imagine the battering and squeezing that would have to go on to fix these in the requisite philosophical boxes of truth as correspondence, or coherence, or in some sense pragmatic. If we consider these and other examples we will see some correspondence here, coherence there, and many variants. In (1) we might see nothing but correspondence, in (2) coherence. But what of the other examples? Perhaps (3) would not be allowed to be an example of a truth but of an evaluative judgement. Sufficient criticism exists of the 'fact/value' dichotomy to suggest that there is no such easy way out and that (3) does state a fact. The general import of such criticisms can be indicated by considering (6), which we mentioned in Chapter Two. This clearly seems to be a case of correspondence with the facts. But imagine it being uttered by a devout Roman Catholic 'Henry VIII had six wives.' Is it now a statement of value? Whether (6) is a statement of fact or value is determined by the context of utterance. Perhaps (4) could illustrate a pragmatic truth. But what of (5) and (7)? Are these examples of truth by consensus? Or can we stretch 'correspondence' so that (5) is covered by that notion? It is hard to see what 'corresponds' to the claim that Shakespeare is 'greater than' Rattigan. To use the term here would be to divest it of meaning. In the case of (7) there is no possibility of any sort of 'correspondence'. How can music be said to correspond with 'moonlight'. Yet many people say that it does. Beethoven did not give his Sonata that name, it is the name that has been given to it by audiences. When we call something a 'truth' or a 'true proposition' what makes it true is the context of utterance, or to put it better the language game in which it occurs. This is better because it does not suggest the immediate context but suggests human society and culture is involved. If we consider a wide range of examples we will see a whole series of similarities and relationships between the sorts of things we call 'truths'.

Perhaps for Wittgenstein's purposes 'truth' would not have been quite such a happy example. And this should remind us how much philosophy is like art. In the context of the P.I. a certain example works. But here we are considering a wider application of a method exemplified by Wittgenstein. We have begun to adumbrate a possible application of the injunction to consider cases that proceeds the introduction of the 'family resemblance' metaphor. With 'Truth' the
application of the metaphor may have some point. Philosophers
notoriously concentrate on a restricted and hackneyed set of examples
such as 'The cat is on the mat', 'My watch is on my wrist' etc. Is
this true of their treatment of the concept of education?

4.1. A Family Resemblance' Approach?

Peters' distinction between the new and 'specific' concept of
education can be put metaphorically. The concept of education can be
compared to a city that has undergone slum clearance. In the centre
there are formal well planned streets. As you move outward there is
more variety when you reach the garden suburbs, and eventually you
come to the rambling country lanes and pathways. These pathways
represent the peripheral instances of the concept. The outlying areas
are for our diffused and general concept. The inner city area (where
stands the university) is the core concept we have developed. This is
a potent suggestion. But it changes entirely if we shift the formal
streets to the edge of our concept city and think of it as a 'new town'
complex. Wittgenstein describes language in a similar way as 'an
ancient city': 'a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new
houses, of houses with additions from various periods; and this surroun-
ded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and
uniform houses' (P.I. s. 18). The concept of education is more akin
to something like 'the architecture of a city'. We can appreciate
them in similar ways. We can study specific styles, and periods,
methods of construction or decoration, or concentrate on recent devel-
opments. Or perhaps we can wander through the city looking at the
buildings in various ways. The question is not which is the correct
method. All that interests us is increased grasp. But let us not
labour this metaphor.

If we approach the notion of 'education' in the same way as we did
that of 'truth' we can re-write P.I. section 66 in the following way:

'Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'education'
I mean moral education, social education, religious education,
technical education, physical education, aesthetic education,
scientific education, special education, liberal education,
outdoor education, and so on. What is common to them all? -
Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not
be called 'education'" - but look and see whether there is
anything that is common to all, but similarities, relationships,
and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but
look!'

There are several different ways of looking that could be adopted. To
begin with consider the following examples of what might be called 'educational situations':

(8) Teaching a child the names of toys and simple objects by giving him the object and saying the name of the object.
(9) Learning 'Ode to Autumn' for homework.
(10) Memorising a mathematical formula and applying it.
(11) Visiting an ancient Cathedral.
(12) Camping in the Welsh mountains.
(13) Playing football.
(14) Discussing the arguments for and against abortion.
(15) Writing a poem.
(16) Doing a scientific experiment.
(17) Visiting a modern art museum.
(18) Directing and acting in a play.
(19) Doing a jig saw.
(20) Sitting 'O' levels.
(21) Seeing a film on Jewish family life.
(22) Learning tables and spellings.
(23) Drawing and painting.
(24) Working in a factory.
(25) Doing language work based on social situations.
(26) Doing research into shop prices.
(27) Criticising Platonism in a seminar.
(28) Reading Proust.
(29) Listening to a story.
(30) Listening to a Beethoven symphony.
(31) Memorising important dates in British history.
(32) Visiting and assisting old people.
(33) Visiting a large industrial complex.
(34) Doing comprehension exercises.
(35) Learning to speak French.
(36) Discussing your character in a group situation.
(37) Dissecting dead animals.
(38) Writing a novel.
(39) Producing a short critical paper for 'Analysis'.

This list is not meant to be complete. It is sufficient to illustrate the sorts of thing that might be called 'educational situations'. By coining this piece of jargon I am not attempting to straddle the so-called 'task' and 'achievement' senses of the word education. It is usually held that 'achievement' wears the pants. Here the examples are viewed from the 'task' aspect. It might be argued that none of
the cases here is sufficient to allow us to talk of a person's being educated simply because he has achieved whatever task is mentioned in the particular situation. Perhaps a specific set of these examples would be allowed to constitute 'education' in some achievement sense. Or an indefinite set? Such a move would clearly be a mistake. Let us see why.

Several of the examples in the list fall into broad groups. (11), (12), (17), (32), and (33) form a group, as do (15), (18), (23) and (38), again, (16), (26) and (37). The first group might be considered with the required use of 'and so on' to constitute Social Education, the second Aesthetic Education, and the last group 'Scientific Education'. A common factor could perhaps be produced for each group, and in instance belonging to another group that factor may be present but the focus would be on some other common element. Thus we would have a network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing. This would involve similarities of detail i.e. going to a particular Cathedral, and overall similarities such as 'increasing one's knowledge'. This latter overall similarity would drop out in particular cases such as the broadly creative instances (23), (37), etc.

Would this constitute a 'family resemblance' approach to the concept of education? It seems to fit in with Hambrough's interpretation. He argues that it is not just a poor joke but an important philosophical insight when it is realised, to apply his argument to our case, that cases of education have nothing in common other than the fact that they are cases of education. Likewise our 'educational situations' have nothing in common other than being cases of 'education situations'. Is there no more to this than, as Peters never tires of pointing out, the term 'education' is not associated with any particular sort of activity or process? As we have seen, to propose that 'education' picks out some subset of activities or processes would be to make exactly the sort of mistake that Wittgenstein was criticising when he introduced his metaphor. We would be treating 'education' as if it had meaning because it referred in some sense to an 'object'. But from our discussion in Chapter Three it will be obvious that this is an inappropriate and misleading move, but we are pressing the metaphor into service precisely to see how far the search for a common element can go. These 'educational situations' merely provide us with material to test the various types of 'criteria' that have been put forward. For example we could test the suggestion that we can produce general criteria in the way advocated in Peters' earlier writings. In the
sense that there are 'intuitive' criteria such as 'education is something that we consciously contrive'. This would allow some of the instances given above to be called 'educational', for example (8) and (26) and (27) which involve such contrivance but not others. And there are also the criteria produced by analysis such as 'knowledge' and 'value'. As we have seen some of these criteria are met by some examples (10) and (14) respectively, but not by others i.e. (24). How could 'Working in a factory' be educational according to these criteria? Applying them means that such examples more properly come under the rubric of 'training'.

What is important, then, is that despite the application of criteria there appears to be no criterion that meets all or even most of these 'educational situations'. Perhaps it may be argued that this is because Peters' distinction between the specific and general concept is being ignored. The general concept is a catch all that includes anything that doesn't meet the requisite criteria. But this distinction is purely arbitrary. John Earwaker has attempted to derive four 'concepts' of education from it. He distinguishes whether a term is 'value-loaded', suggesting approval or disapproval, from Peters' notion of 'desirability' which suggests straightforward positive approval or prescription. He sums up the possibilities in a diagram (See Diagram 1).

Diagram 1

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Peters, according to Earwaker, does not distinguish clearly between the form and the content of education. Unlike Peters he wishes only to show the kinds of meaning the concept can have. He is not concerned with the interesting business of giving it any particular content like
Peters' 'knowledge in depth and breadth'. The diagram reads thus.

'A' refers to any process of rearing in a neutral fashion as when we talk vaguely and loosely about 'Education in China'. 'B' refers to a use of education which equates it crudely with learning. It ignores the need to define what it considers valuable in any satisfactory way.

'C' covers a precise but neutral use of the term as when we talk of 'Primary Education'. 'D' is 'much more difficult to illustrate by example'. It is a use which suggests that the term 'education' is expressive and emotive one which is defined idiosyncratically. In other words, we all have different ideas about what education is. Peters' concept belongs to this fourth category as would the views of those who want to reject education altogether. Illich occasionally takes up a position like the latter.

The character of this analysis is interesting. It is held to be purely formal. Throughout the article Earwaker does not reflect on the 'content' of education in any systematic or detailed way. This is not the business of 'conceptual analysis'. Peters' twofold distinction (represented by the broken diagonal line) is arbitrary in the sense that it is only one of many ways in which the concept of education can become more clearly specified. By not distinguishing sufficiently between form and content and involving himself in lengthy discussions of content Peters' 'narrows down' rather than 'tightens up' the concept. The concept can be made more specific while still being broad in scope. Earwaker's four-fold distinction does seem to clear up in sympathetic way some problems with Peters' analysis, such as the suggestion that he is prescribing a concept. But is it any less arbitrary? Although it would be natural to see it as a classification of four types of 'usage' Earwaker states quite clearly that 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D' are not views of education but different concepts.

Admittedly 'Concept' is a vague concept. But there are serious problems in Earwaker's use of it. He often talks of 'the concept of education', he distinguishes on a purely formal basis between four concepts, and yet he suggests that there can be many alternative concepts in sense 'D'. This seemingly paradoxical picture can be cleared up if we consider the first reference to be a meta-level reference to actual uses of the concept, and the third reference to bring in the more interesting question of 'content'. This would leave us with two tests of the four-fold classification. The first would involve showing that these are the concepts we work with. The second test would be to show that it did assist in the job of conceptual analysis, that is, that it could clear up what appeared to be substantial confusions by showing
that they were merely errors due to the assimilation of the different forms of concept.

The problem we are considering is how far the 'family resemblance' treatment of the concept could be said merely to ignore the distinctions presented in the diagram and gets its force by oscillating between the various sorts of concept. Let us take literally the suggestion that a concept, and hence the concept of a concept, is a picture with which we compare things. We can visualise the 'family resemblance' notion as a fine web and the diagram overleaf imposed upon it with no difficulty.

The question we must ask is whether Earwaker's suggested set of distinctions isn't just a case of the sort of move that led to Wittgenstein's remark that when we try to draw such clear boundaries on such concepts then anything and nothing is right. This problem is set by the first test. The analysis is produced on the basis of intuition about what a consensus (Earwaker's replacement for necessary conditions) view of our concept(s) of education are. Let us replace this procedure with a consideration of examples. If we start with those given as illustrations of these four concepts we shall see that things are not as simple as Earwaker suggests.

Earwaker's examples 'Education in the U.S.A.'; 'Education ... is roughly equated with learning'; 'Primary Education'; and 'Education implies knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth' are somewhat strange. For these to approach anything like the status of concepts they would have to have clear usage. But what sort of utterance are his examples of 'A' and 'C'. The two examples given are only semi-complete. The cases where we might want to talk in a neutral way of 'Education in the U.S.A.' are highly sophisticated and complicated. On Earwaker's own analogy with 'culture' the cases he is thinking of would occur in textbooks of a scientistic social anthropology. In such cases objective reference would be made to all the rearing processes of a culture. Other uses could possibly be found in Tourist Guides to various countries or in Reports by U.N.E.S.C.O. and similar bodies. Similarly cases of type 'C' are found most commonly in academic and governmental reports. So this sense of being neutral as to value but content-specific is not really a sense at all. For here we are talking about labels put upon institutions. What does it mean to say that such a phrase has no built-in evaluation? Evaluation is not built into a term but into the surroundings in which it is used. Consider these actual examples of 'A' in full statements:
There must be some education in the U.S.A.!

Chapter Three discusses 'Education in China'; Chapter Four discusses 'Education in the U.S.A.' and so on.

There is nothing that can be called education in the U.S.A.

Schooling is not the most important form of education in the U.S.A.

No one values education in the U.S.A.

Except for (40) and (41) all these utterances in which the phrase 'education in the U.S.A.' occurs are examples of uses of type 'D'. Reference is being made to a specific concept. (40) appears to be the nearest we can get to an 'unsophisticated' use of the term. A 'sophisticated' use is given in (41). It is possible to imagine someone uttering (40) in a debate with the sort of person who would utter (42) and (44). Therefore it too appears to be a very sophisticated response. Earwaker suspects that we rarely talk as vaguely as this. I would suggest that we hardly ever do and that here we have a very esoteric use of the term 'education'.

Cases of type 'C' are even more puzzling. In a footnote (3) Aspin expresses concern that Earwaker is not just using 'education' as a synonym for schooling. There is a lot in this suggestion in that it draws our attention to the fact that reference is made in all these examples to some institution or institutionalised form of bringing up young people. Hence such uses seems to have a specific social reference. Earwaker argues that it simply doesn't matter that the people who talk of 'Comprehensive Education' criticise or praise it. For the term has no built-in evaluative content. Thus he says in an earlier paragraph that 'Nazi Education' has no built-in evaluative content. But this is not because we are dealing with a different concept. Consider the following instances of 'C':

As leader of the Nazi party I say that what Britain needs to be great again is a system of real Nazi Education.

Education in Germany under Hitler failed because it was Nazi Education.

On educational grounds there can be no such thing as Comprehensive Education.

For convenience we can divide institutionalised forms of education into 'Primary Education', 'Secondary Education', 'Special Education', and 'Tertiary Education'.

The good life can only be built on the basis of a spiritually and morally cleansed form of primary education.
All these uses of the phrases mentioned by Earwaker except (48) imply that what is being mentioned is of value or otherwise. On the basis of a person's belief we give a phrase positive or negative value. If a Nazi talks of Nazi Education we take him not to be speaking descriptively but discussing something he values deeply. I may disagree with him and say things like 'Nazi Education is no education at all'. But even here the phrase is not neutral and descriptive but negatively valued. Consensus about Nazis does not change the fact that what we have here is a clash of values. The same is true of the other instances.

What Earwaker is referring to is simply the use of capital letters and parentheses. If a name is changed, say, Elementary Schooling, becomes Primary Education, or Teacher Training becomes Teacher Education, a re-evaluation not a re-description has taken place. Thereafter, because of the existence of those institutions we use labels which reflect this change but they function rather like book titles. Once we call a novel 'The Brothers Karamazov' we do not create a new concept of say 'Brothers'. Arguments could be produced to show that we had done so. If we take the equivalence 'brothers' = 'male siblings' we find this is no longer true:

(50) The Brothers Karamazov is Dostoyevsky's greatest work
(51) The Male Siblings Karamazov is Dostoyevsky's greatest work

One of these assertions is true and the other false. The point is that the use of the term 'education' in parenthesis is not the creation of a new concept but a frozen concept. The use of parentheses indicates this fact.

To conclude. Both these 'neutral' examples are very sophisticated uses of the term 'education'. In the case of 'A' we have esoteric and sublimated use of the term. In the case of 'C' we have nothing that is different in any real way from 'B' or 'D'. So we are left with 'B' and 'D'. These differ only in that concepts of type 'D' are supposedly more specific. This, of course, raises the fundamental question that is being posed in various ways throughout this thesis. Earwaker distinguishes the two by suggesting that concepts of type 'B' are not sufficiently defined. What is being suggested in this thesis is that although definition may clarify a concept, it is not the only way of proceeding with conceptual clarification. If our concept of education were vague what would be achieved by a process of definition? Something rather like parody? Perhaps it would be possible to proceed by examples. But concepts of type 'D' are definitions which embody our theories about education. The relation of such 'definitions' to
examples will be discussed later in this Chapter. What is important now is to notice that the only distinction we are left with is that between a concept which is vague and one which has been given a definition. The distinction simply being that in cases of concepts of type 'a' a definition has been given, whereas, none are given in cases of type 'b'. Accepting this as true, it will be my contention in the balance of this thesis that we can have a much clearer idea of what 'education' is, or what someone's concept of education is, where they proceed by examples and not by definition, important as definition sometimes is.

Despite all these objections it might be argued that Earwaker's four-fold distinction may have uses in clearing up simple misunderstandings. Thus if we except the fact that there are difficulties in Earwaker's it can still be applied usefully. It is a useful way of viewing the family resemblance web. No doubt this could be true but unfortunately it is not. Earwaker proves this himself. At the end of his paper he gives an example of how analysing 'education' in this way can dissolve confusion. He suggests that student who argues that 'Education is socialisation' is guilty of conceptual confusion if he thinks that this answers the question about the needs of the individual vis a vis society. This is only a partial description (Sense A?) and not a prescription (Sense B?). Once he sees this he will no longer feel there is a conflict between his psychology, sociology and philosophy tutors. There is no real disagreement. Conceptual analysis dispels the illusion. But does it? Suppose the student had been reading Oakeshott and far from agreeing with him that the gradual replacing of 'education' by 'socialisation' is a bad thing wishes to precipitate the process of change. He would therefore be prescribing. Perhaps Earwaker would wish to use conceptual analysis to show that Oakeshott is guilty of conceptual confusion? But Oakeshott or the student need not merely be mixing disciplines. Something very important could be being argued by the student Earwaker disparages. The example is so thin and ambiguous that a variety of parallel situations can be described. The problem of the 'ambiguity' of the term 'education' is not a function of the terms vagueness, for that does not stop it being usable. Rather it is a function of the indeterminacy of the examples given. Too often we get 'examples' which are ambiguous in the sense that they support various interpretations until we know more of the context in which they are uttered. Their disambiguation will be achieved not by the imposition of arbitrary distinctions but by finding determinate examples.
Earwaker's distinction seemed less arbitrary than Peters' merely because it seemed to cover more possibilities. When looked into it reduced the arbitrary dichotomy he started from. The distinctions had little obvious application. But before leaving the topic let us derive an objection to our 'family resemblance' procedure exemplified in (8) - (39) out of concept 'E'. This is that vague but positively valued sense in which any process of learning can be referred to as 'education'. It might be suggested that although the list of 'educational situations' is presented in such a way as to suggest that there is no common element that these situations must at least involve 'learning'. Here is a prima facie common element. Thus it could be suggested that like some educationalists what is being argued for in this thesis is just a more subtle version of this loose common usage.

4.2. Learning and Aspect Change

We can agree to some extent with Peters that 'education' does indeed 'imply some kind of learning'. (5) What is not so clear is that in this instance he is distinguishing 'education' from 'schooling' or merely equivocating between his two concepts. To discuss the suggestion that my examples all involve learning we need a better characterisation of the connection between the two concepts. The only philosopher to provide a reasonable characterisation of this view is Langford. It is worth considering his notion of education in depth as an example of how all such putative 'common' features can be dealt with.

Langford says that a major point of difference from the analysis of education given by Hirst and Peters and his own is that he 'draws attention to the connection between education and learning'. (6) They seem to rely on the notions of "initiation" (into worthwhile activities) and (personal) "development". "Learning" enters into their account only when they begin to talk about teaching. (7) Langford wishes to defend a definition of 'to be educated' as 'to learn to be a person'. (8) He does allow, however, that this definition is merely the occasion for discussing the concepts of a 'person' and 'learning' which are surely of central importance for the philosophy of education. (9) He does admit to doubts about the process of definition, which he suggests may be radically defective. (10) What we will be concerned with is the veracity of Langford's 'definition' as far as it develops the suggestion that there is an essential connection between 'education' and 'learning'.
Langford makes five points about the concept of learning as it relates to that of education. Firstly, he says 'Learning is a psychological concept.' (11) Secondly, that 'Learning is a temporal process involving a change in the learner'. (12) Thirdly, that this change must 'be a change connected with the person as a functioning living organism, or person.' (13) Fourthly, 'Learning involves restrictions on the way the change is brought about.' (14) It 'must be a consequence of the learner's past experience', (15) and not, for instance, of drugs. Finally, Langford tells us that 'the concept of learning is an epistemological one.' (16) These points will be developed later, but a general remark about Langford's procedure needs to be made at the outset.

He is engaging, like Peters and Barwaker, in 'conceptual analysis'. As we have seen this process involves giving what are known as 'weak' definitions. The point is well made by Langford's characterisation of education, or by his treatment of the concept of learning. Such definitions are usually so very weak that it is easy to agree with Fred Inglis when he says that 'In practising this style of thought, the philosophers do their considerable bit to make more trivial the study of education'. (17) We shall call this the charge of 'trivialisation'. The substance of the charge is that philosophers who engage in conceptual analysis '... do not describe the world sufficiently. They deprive the world of its history, ideology, and social origins.' (18) To put this in Wittgensteinian jargon they ignore the language game, the whole culture in which a concept has a use. This trivialisation does not merely result in then presenting definitions which tell us what we know in even more commonplace and platitudinous form after each refinement. It also results in the giving of uninteresting and unilluminating, even if clever, examples. Langford's is a case in point. The section of his paper which is devoted to the discussion of 'learning' revolves round the single example of learning about the toads that live in Lake Titicaca. It is hard to see, unless Langford is adopting the crudest form of vulgar essentialist, how such a case can be brought to bear on learning to be a person. The motley of what we call 'learning' is probably unsurpassed. Learning facts about frogs and toads is one sort of learning. But there are other sorts; learning to cook, learning to play games, learning to appreciate art, music, painting, learning to love one's fellow man, learning to love God, an endless series of possibilities. It is very hard to see what, if anything, such cases of 'learning' could be said to have in common. This is a central issue. If a common element is extracted as a way of rejecting a 'family
resemblance' interpretation. It can then be asked what do all these cases have in common. Look and see. Quite generally the question can be asked of any supposedly common element. What is common to have in common. This enables us to re-iterate a quite general point about the 'family resemblance' metaphor. If any common element 'x' is extracted as a way of rejecting a 'family resemblance' approach to a concept we can raise the doubt again: What do all cases of 'x' have in common? And if we look and see and find a common element 'y' we can ask again: 'What do all cases of 'y' have in common?'. This regress could be called Khatchadourian's regress as it follows from his remarks about the application of the metaphor to exactly such complicated 'psychological effects'. What the regress shows is that such common factors cannot provide the unity that is sought.

The charge of trivialisation is not to be seen as trivial but harmless. The charge is that by ignoring the whole culture in which a concept is applied and attempting to give a neutral and logical analysis of the concepts that interest them these philosophers chronically mis-describe these concepts. Specifically it is the argument of this thesis that the concept of education has been chronically mis-described.

The list of 'educational situations' is inadequate in that they are in no sense fully described. Nothing appears there that might not appear on the syllabus of an 11-16 comprehensive school. Yet some of them, (12) (23), (30), (36) and (38) for instance, need not necessarily have an element which can be called 'learning'. This point is going to be misunderstood unless we look at examples which have, as it were, a history, an ideology and a social basis. Two examples from literature will suffice for the present.

The following examples are meant to be counter-examples to the dogma that 'learning' is a necessary condition of 'education'.

In Tolstoy's War and Peace there is a scene in which Prince Andrey visits the Postovs at Otradnoe. Whilst there he hears the young girls, Sonya and Natasha, playing and singing. At night he over-hears their chatter about the moonlit sky. He stays only for that night but because of the girls falls asleep 'feeling incapable of seeing clearly into his own state of mind'. (19) On the surface there appears to be nothing educational about this everyday domestic experience. Now consider the context in which it occurs. Since the death of his wife
Andrey has lived in the country. He feels that his meaningful life is over. This is brought out in a vivid incident in a birch forest in the Ryazan district which he visits prior to Otradnoe. Driving through the spring forest Andrey sees an old oak which has in his eyes refused to send out any shoots in protest against the meaningless cheat of 'Spring and love and happiness'. Andrey found himself spiritually akin to this oak:

'Yes, he's right, a thousand times right, the old oak ... others, young creatures, may be caught anew by that (20) deception, but we know life: - our life is over'.

The passage is heavily ironic and reveals the almost melodramatic and bathetic state of self deception that Andrey has placed himself in. Previously Andrey had been light hearted and thoughtless but the oak produces quite a change in him. It is clear to the reader that he has not been leading an empty life at least in public. He has ordered his estates and freed his serfs. He is engaged in writing several books. It is this clear headed Andrey who is transformed into someone who doesn't know his own thoughts after one evening at the Rostovs. However, the effects of that evening first become apparent when he passes the oak that was his spiritual double. The oak has undergone a metamorphosis:

'The old oak utterly transformed draped in a tent of sappy dark green basked faintly, undulating in the rays of the evening sun.' (21)

This again stirs his thoughts:

'No life is not over at thirty-one ... It's not enough for me to know all there is in me, everyone must know it too; Pierre and the girl who wanted to fly away into the sky; everyone must know me so that my life may not be spent only on myself; they must not live so apart from my life, it must be reflected in all of them and they must all share my life with me.' (22)

This incident is not merely the first stirring of Andrey's love for Natasha. At this point he can hardly remember her name. It is the expression of a fundamental change in outlook. Andrey's view of the world his Weltanschauung has changed. Or rather, to him the world has changed. The isolated introverted Andrey becomes decisive and moves again into public life.

My second example also comes from Tolstoy. This time it concerns Levin in Anna Karenin. Towards the very end of the book Levin is going through a crisis. He reads the works of many philosophers including
Plato, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Spinoza and Schopenhauer. But when he turned from their 'fixed definitions' to life all their systems 'fell to pieces at once like a house of cards.' The works of theologians fall apart likewise when he discovers that the writings of different faiths are inconsistent. Levin's educational experience arises out of this intellectual turmoil. When working with the peasant Fyodor, Levin discusses the other peasants with him. Fyodor comments:

'Oh, well, of course, folks are different. One man lives for his own wants and nothing else, like Mituh; he only thinks of filling his belly, but Fokanitch is a righteous man. He lives for his soul. He does not forget God.' (23)

Levin debates the rationality of this seemingly incompatible pair of propositions about how to live. The first he finds rational a conclusion dictated by reason. The second he finds irrational but true. This hits him with the force of a discovery:

'What is it that makes me glad? What have I discovered? ... I have discovered nothing. I have only found out what I knew. I understand the force that in the past gave me life, and now too gives me life.' (24)

Levin's struggle is a religious one. His doubts are resolved by the platitudinous murmurings of a peasant. By the statement of things he already knows.

These examples give us sufficient material with which to discuss Langford's notion of learning. However, not all the elements which he lists as characterising learning are important or distinct from one another. The first point that 'learning' is a 'psychological concept' need not trouble us. There are many things that are instances of learning which are not in any sense psychological such as learning to ride a bike. This condition seems to be simply inappropriate. It is also dangerous in that it sounds like 'Learning is a concept of psychology' which could evoke misunderstandings. The other conditions are mere apposite. The second condition suggests that learning happens over a time and involves a change in the learner as 'a functioning living organism or person'. This condition is meant to reject certain changes such as growing another ear. I have run three and two together for without the qualification of the third point, growing an extra ear could be considered a change over a period of time. Similarly, the fourth point can be seen merely as a further restriction on the second. Yet it is possible to imagine someone's gaining knowledge through drugs, or an ability of sorts which we might allow
as a case of learning. We could imagine a continuum of cases starting with lectures and practice with an admixture of drugs, to cases involving greater and greater amounts of drugs until the lectures are unnecessary. It might be hard put to know what was learning and what not. However, we can accept this point for the purposes of this essay. Langford's final condition must be left to stand. Therefore, there are really only two meaningful conditions of learning. First that a change takes place in a person over a period of time and that change is subject to some restrictions. Secondly, that change involves an increase in knowledge. What I want to show is that my cases are clear counter-examples to this notion of learning and yet are clear instances of 'education'. For the moment I am not going to argue this latter point but merely to assume the truth of it. I will discuss it below.

Langford suggests that the epistemological condition is very important. Normally one counter example is enough to show that a condition is not met and is therefore invalid. Here we have two examples in which the epistemological condition is denied. For in both cases nothing new is learnt. No new facts are presented to the protagonists. No new experience is undergone. Although this is explicitly brought out in the Levin example where he actually denies that he has gained any new knowledge, it is also true of Prince Andrey. He has heard the chatter of girls before, seen oak trees come into leaf suddenly, been restless, seen beautiful moonlit nights etc. What happens is not new and he gains no new knowledge but everything is different. It seems therefore that these two examples of education have no connection with the Langfordian concept of 'learning'. There is, however, another possibility here. We could have two examples of non-Langfordian learning. In an article on 'Human Learning' (25) Hamlyn mentions an objection to his associating 'learning' and 'knowledge' which is similar to that presented in these examples. Thus certain sorts of learning may not in fact end in knowledge such as learning to accept, learning to appreciate things, learning to see things in new ways. Hamlyn suggests that these counter-instances may not involve knowledge simpliciter but in some indirect way they must. Besides 'knowledge can take a great many forms'. (26) This is rather a desperate attempt to stretch the meaning of 'knowledge' so it covers any case. This would be like stretching 'correspondence' until it covered all the 'truths' mentioned earlier. This is clearly unsatisfactory for our purposes. Non-Langfordian knowledge presents a challenge. We can deal
with it in two ways. We can show that we have here an instance of another family resemblance concept, or we can dispute the claim that these are cases of learning in this new and unspecified sense. The former move has no further implication, the latter has several. The cases mentioned above have to be shown firstly to be quite different from my examples, and secondly an account has to be given of my examples. There is a clear difference. In the cases mentioned above the very use of the term 'learning' suggests Langford's other criterion that of change over a period of time. With the examples from Tolstoy what happens happens very quickly. Learning to see things differently suggests a lengthy faltering process. This is not implied in my examples. Before elaborating this point in giving an account of what happens in my examples let us look at the other criterion.

In the case of Prince Andrey there is change, certainly, but it is change which is divorced from the knowledge condition. Change like 'learning' is a family of different things. Not all changes involve learning something. Though according to Langford, the reverse is necessary. A clear example of a case of learning which involves a change is that of Austin's Emma. Emma through various hard knocks and the guidance of the 'all-wise' Mr Knightly came to be a better person. This change is very difficult to mark. People are led to believe that Emma will go on making the same sort of mistaken judgements even after the end of the novel. What constitutes change is different in every case. In Andrey's case the change occurs later. First there is a change in mood, followed by changes in behaviour. So there are many different cases. But the Levin example is completely different. Here there is no change in Levin and he feels this paradox deeply. He resolves because of his reflections on Fyodor's remarks that he will not be the same again. In particular he resolves not to argue with his brother. But he is no sooner with his brother than he behaves as usual. Thus Levin is unchanged, and must be, for that is part of what he sees.

We have seen that there are grounds for challenging the two conditions laid down by Langford. To avoid the suggestion that we can, nevertheless, describe these cases of learning I wish to offer a more illuminating description of what occurs in each case. To do so I wish to pursue the question of whether they are instances of education. (28)

The notion of an 'aspect change' is developed with the help of an analogy with certain illustrations found in textbooks of Gestalt psychology. The most familiar of them is the 'duck-rabbit'. (Fig. 1)
'Aspect-Change' Illustrations
Someone may see this only as a duck (or a rabbit). The important thing is that this 'continuous seeing' can end and the duck is suddenly seen as a rabbit as well. Wittgenstein calls this the 'dawning of an aspect', and tells us that the 'flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought.' (P.I. II. § xi p.117) Wittgenstein is careful to distinguish two uses of 'see' that are relevant to aspect change. The first use is illustrated with a brief dialogue: "What do you see there?" - "I see this" (and then a description a drawing a copy)." (P.I. II. § xi p.193). The second sort of seeing is that involved in 'seeing a likeness between two faces'. In the latter case the two faces are clearly visible to all. It will not create too much confusion to call the first sort 'perceptual' seeing and the second 'conceptual' seeing. We are interested in the latter, and the way in which we can illuminate concepts by considering the Gestalt diagrams. We are not interested in what causes us to see one picture one way rather than another, which might be pressure on the eyeball. The general problem posed by such pictures is this. In the case of the man who sees Fig. 1 as a duck and the man who sees it as a rabbit, the pictorial element is the same. Asked to draw what they see, both men, being competent draftsmen, would produce the same diagram. Similarly if a man drew the diagram before and after the dawning of the second aspect he would draw the same series of lines. Though the change might be described as perceptual the visual element has not changed. How can this simple analogy illuminate human conceptualisation?

Hanson presents the following example. Tycho Brahe and Kepler are, let us imagine, watching the sun rise. Kepler has a heliocentric, Tycho a geocentric concept of planetary motion, or rather, celestial motion. The question is 'Do they see the same thing?' If asked to draw what they saw they would produce a picture of 'a brilliant yellow disc centred between green and blue colour patches.' (29) A common suggestion is that the difference must lie in their respective interpretations of this observational data. This is simply untrue. Consider the second Gestalt figure (Fig. 3). We do not just see these lines and then interpret them as a young or an old woman. We just see it one way or the other. We are aware of no act of interpretation. Interpretation has a clear meaning and it is precisely in contrast to this sort of 'Eureka' situation that interpretation gets its meaning. Yet, it is true that someone who sees this as an old woman sees something different from someone who sees it as a young girl. If we can account for this then we will go some way to solving the problem of how Tycho and Kepler can see something which is the same and different. We will also begin
to understand what it is that is different in the cases of Levin and Andrey although nothing is changed. They both see the same, yet see it differently. This leads to subsequent changes in Andrey's behaviour but not in Levin's.

Now consider Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. Fig 3 is a 'duck-antelope' a variant of Fig. 1. No one who had not seen an antelope could see Fig. 3 as an antelope. And it may be that someone may not see an antelope in Fig. 4 even if he has seen one. A lot of talk and gesturing may be necessary to get someone to see the figures as antelopes. This suggests far away from anything like a 'sense datum' notion of seeing. For the context is becoming part of the illustration. What happens in such cases is that a pattern is imposed upon the lines and that this makes us appreciate the elements of the picture differently. What changes is the organisation of what is seen. Like the monkey in the tree once we have seen it we can never stop seeing it. If we see Fig. 5 as a bear climbing a tree, nothing in the picture changes. Organisation is not another element in the picture. But the description 'see this as a bear climbing a tree' would be part of the illustration.

The central point that is being made is that the context is part of the illustration. Often the context is so familiar that it is built into the illustration. Fig. 6 brings this out. To a child it will appear to be no more than an electric light bulb. To a physicist it is a picture of an X-ray tube viewed from the cathode. The child would have to learn a lot to come to see this picture as an X-ray tube. This knowledge would change his whole way of seeing. Hanson puts this connection between the way we see things and our knowledge in a forceful manner. If we ask anyone to give an example of seeing they will probably suggest something like 'seeing the blue sky'. Hanson profoundly disagrees:

'If one must find a paradigm case of seeing it would be better to regard as such not the visual apprehension of colour patches but things like seeing what time it is, seeing what key a piece of music is in, and seeing whether a wound is septic.' (30)

We can add examples such as 'Seeing that Shakespeare is a greater playwright than Fattigan', 'seeing that Hamlet is not really insane', and 'seeing education as a form of commodity production'. The point is that observation is shaped by prior knowledge. In this sense it could be said that seeing is 'theory-laden'. The fact that most people will see the six figures given above in the same way merely
indicates the degree to which we share similar knowledge and the way in which this knowledge organizes the way in which we see things. Everyone in western industrial societies will expect the same things of the object in Fig. 6, for instance, that it will break when dropped. The way we see the figure is the way we think about it. It is not the way we think that allows us to interpret what we see. This is the point of using perspective-reversals as part of a philosophical argument. They show that we see the thing differently while there is no new element that we see. Let us conclude this introduction with Hanson's final remark: 'The paradigm observer is not the man who sees and reports what all normal observers see and report, but the man who sees in familiar objects what no one else has seen before.' (31)

A warning about the use of such pictures has been given by Tony Skillen. The cases we are discussing are connected with 'world views'. Skillen argues that they can easily be used to defend these like 'objectivist-pluralism'. This is the notion that there can be alternative but equally valid 'objective' moralities in the same way as there is a duck and a rabbit in Fig. 1, assuming that the picture is an analogy of our moral framework. Skillen's objection is 'that whereas a Christian world-view is incompatible, say, with a Marxist world-view (neo-ecumenicism aside), that "D.R." is a picture of a duck is not incompatible with its being a picture of a rabbit. Hence picture-pluralism does not support world-view pluralism.' (32) There is a sophisticated level on which we can see Fig. 1 as a 'duck-rabbit' rather than as either a duck or a rabbit. Communism and Christianity cannot be married in this way. We are dealing with the world views of fictitious individuals. Excepting the rack of irony on which many interpretations run aground we can say that as far as these individuals are concerned they cannot but think that their new way of seeing things is right. So we are not propounding in any way a form of 'objectivist-pluralism'.

Hanson's use of the 'aspect change' notion and my own must be made distinct. Hanson is concerned with discovery. He is concerned with changes in perception that might be brought about by learning. Lots of new information must be gathered before we can see Fig. 6 as an X-ray tube. However his scientist merely pulls the duck-rabbit out of the hat in the sense that he shows us what we have not seen before although it was visible all the time. He connects one element with another and we are enabled to see things differently. There are shades of difference in the application I wish to make of the notion that can be seen best by using an analogy with literature rather than science. This time I
do not mean what happened to the characters in novels but to ourselves when reading them. It is a notorious fact that novels give us no new knowledge, no new information. This is given paradoxical expression by Bambrugh when he says 'In literature, as in other media in which philosophy of life may be conducted, we often learn without learning anything new.' (33) Bambrugh subsequently goes on to weaken this point by talking about literature as a sort of second hand experience. We may not know what it was really like at the front but we can read Goodbye to all that. Graves' book is the very example he gives when discussing the paradox. We began this discussion with an attempt to resolve the suggestion that there were non-Langfordian senses of 'learning'. If this is so then Bambrugh's remark is merely a pun. What happens when we read a book is analogous to the perceptual change that occurs when we see one of the Gestalt drawing differently. This, we need hardly pause to say, is not true of all books but merely great ones. What do we learn when we read King Lear? Do we learn that it is wrong to put out the eyes of old men, or that this act is horrific? Do we learn that old men can be foolish and virgins wise? We come to see these things afresh because we have seen this foolish old man and watched his tragic downfall. We learn nothing that we did not know but here in this arrangement, this particular organisation, we see things we saw and yet did not see. This is the case with Andrey and Levin. Through their experiences things that they have already learned have come into focus. The internal relations of what they know have shifted. But still there is no new knowledge, no learning. It is to try to give expression to what is happening when our 'world-view' changes that leads us to speak paradoxically about such experiences.

Of course learning must occur as a precondition of being educated. But this is not the sort of case we are discussing. The cases we have looked at are the sort where one wishes to talk of an increase in wisdom, where things are illuminated in a way in which they never were before. This illumination is not the sort of thing you can get from finding our something you did not know. These cases are not unique. There is a clear use of the term 'education' which is different from that nebulous concept that Peters derides or any of the more specific concepts of Earwaker's type 'D'. There is a certain vocabulary that goes with it. Let me introduce it through a muddle that Rush Rhees tells us he got into over the question 'are men better off with education than they would have been without it?' He admits that he was confusing questions about the value of education with the question of whether education is possible. In one sense this latter question is silly.
because it has been going on for years. Rhees was trying to formulate the sort of questions a sceptic about education might ask. One further formulation of a sceptical question is this:

'One might put the question in terms of wisdom, or one might put it in terms of enlightenment, I suppose. Both of these are difficult conceptions, and a philosophy of education might have to discuss them.' (34)

With the cases we have been discussing to call them instances of education is to bring in concepts like 'wisdom' and 'illumination' and 'enlightenment' and 'insight' and 'vision'. No doubt these are difficult concepts. Perhaps that is why they are ignored by philosophers of education. It may be that when we hear something paradoxical said like, 'Your education is no education at all' what is being expressed is not some philistine anti-intellectualism but a real doubt as to the efficacy of the man's past education to give him wisdom. During February 1980 many schools in the south east of England were informed to a series of lectures on 'Enlightenment - The Highest Ideal of Education'. (35) Enlightenment is described in the course leaflet as a 'new angle' on education. As an aim of education in Peters' sense it might be important to consider it. Perhaps a beginning could be made with the debate between F.R. Leavis and T.S. Eliot as to just what constituted an 'educated man'. Eliot had said that Lawrence, unlike Babbitt, was and would always remain 'uneducated' having no 'instinct' for, or 'apprehension' of where everything belonged on the map of what had been written in the past. Of having no understanding of his own ignorance. Leavis replies that Babbitt was 'complacently deaf and blind to literature and art' and had no understanding of his 'incapacity'. He argues that Eliots' idea of the 'educated man' is the born academic 'obstuse in his dogged argumentative erudition'. (36) Again, some insight might be gained by discussing Lawrence's letters about his acquaintance with Russell in the 1930's. Many biographers see Lawrence as feeling inferior and 'ill-educated' whereas he is in fact, very critical of Russell's inexperience 'It isn't that life has been too much for him, but too little.' (37) 'Enlightenment' may come into such discussions which are concerned with a consciousness which may not be covered by the knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth' formula, which would hardly exclude Russell. It is exactly of a highly educated man in Peters' sense that we might make paradoxical remarks. We could not say such things of an ill-educated or half-educated man. Conversely we can say of a man that lacks formal education that he has a greater education. And we need not though some people are, arguing for
ungarnished and pure 'experience' in favour of the things of the intellect. We think of the simple person one meets often in Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky. It is as hard to formulate some sort of general characterisation of the sort of 'education' that I am thinking of as it was for Rhees to formulate the sceptic's question. That does not mean that there is nothing to articulate just that articulation in general terms is inappropriate. Look at Levin, look at Prince Andrey, consider what they say and do then. Reflection upon these cases will begin to initiate some understanding of the nature of their 'education'. Such examples bring out the fact that a common element may be outweighed by something that appears a mere 'symptom'. Appeals to 'experience' may generally be philistine and anti-intellectual but not in certain cases. And these are the illuminating ones.

We have moved from considering 'educational situations' to fully-fledged instances of 'education' or of what it is to be an 'educated man'. The intention being to exploit the extrapolation of common features or general criteria from such situations. Thus 'learning' which it is easy, but inaccurate, to suggest characterises all 'educational situations' clearly does not characterise all cases of 'education'.

4.3. 'Grammatical' Remarks

Is it enough to stress the particular instances in this way? Is it not the case that we can produce illuminating general propositions about the nature of education, whether we call them 'definitions' or not? There is no doubt that they have some efficacy in certain situations. To discuss them and their function in detail it is necessary to consider some examples. There are so many different ways of answering the question 'What is (do you mean by) education?' and so many different things that might be meant by this that it is easy to rattle off a multitude of examples:

(52) Education is initiation into worthwhile activities
(53) Education is the acquisition of knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth
(54) Education is socialisation
(55) Education is the passing on of a cultural heritage
(56) Education is a preparation for life
(57) Education is a process of growth
(58) Education is the bringing up of the young
(59) Education is the acquisition of the forms of knowledge
(60) Education is the process of systematic instruction
(61) Education is the development of the mental powers
(62) Education is learning to see the world as it really is
(63) Education is learning to be a person
(64) Education is the development of the soul
(65) Education is a preparation for redemption in the infinite
(66) Education is a mystery beyond human conception
(67) Education is the process by which bourgeois society transforms children into articles of commerce and instruments of labour
(68) Education is learning to rule and be ruled
(69) Education is training
(70) Education is enlightenment

These examples of general propositions, restricted as they are to positive characterisations of education, could be extended. There are many and more sophisticated versions of all of them. What can be said about them? They are not obviously false or inadequate. They do tell us something unlike trivially true assertions such as (71)'Education is education' or (72)'Education is the process by which a person becomes educated'. But as we saw in Chapter Two even seemingly 'empty tautologies' such as the former do have a sense. We can imagine a context where the 'tautology' is used to remind us of the fact that there is more to education than schooling. But these eighteen examples seem to offer more than the last two. But although they tell us something, this is, I submit, very little.

It is possible to imagine, and we have discussed some, sustained defences of these and similar views. Why do people say such things? Scheffler would argue that their aim is to clarify our concept or to capture part of the prior use of a term. (38) We could approach these remarks in his manner presenting general categories and strategies that might facilitate their appraisal. We might point out that (57) is a metaphor, (56) a descriptive definition, (59) a programmatic definition and so on. In many cases it may be very difficult to decide in which category to put a particular general statement. But although it may be difficult to decide in a particular case whether any of the general propositions listed above were programmatic only two (67) and (68) might be claimed not to be descriptive in Scheffler's sense.
Scheffler's discussion of descriptive definitions begins with two misleading analogies. Firstly he refers to the introduction of the term 'virus' to a high school class, and then talks of the fact that ordinary terms are often ambiguous with reference to 'trunk' which can refer to both boxes and to the anatomy of elephants. (39) The first case is an instance of what we have called an 'appropriate' situation for asking a 'What is ...?' question. The second example leads us to expect that, say, 'education' though a single phonological word with a consistent orthography might be the realisation of several grammatical words in the manner of 'down', 'bank', and similar words. But there is no evidence for this. Clarification of our concepts is not therefore likely to be analogous to either of these cases. Scheffler also points out that descriptive definition cannot be the basis on which an educational programme is justified. We cannot decide what to do 'by inspecting the concept of education.' (40) He illustrates this by discussing a programme which was based on the belief that 'the fundamental meaning of concept of education is to help boys and girls to active participation in the world around them'. (41) He argues, without giving any examples, that this programme of play and pupil evaluated activities constitutes a borderline case. It is both sufficiently like and sufficiently unlike clear past instances. The basis for such programmes is to be found in our moral framework. We can agree with Scheffler that descriptive definitions do not in any simple way assist in justifying an educational programme. We have seen that his account of their ability to clarify our concepts is misleading. Can such 'definitions' be said to give us increased grasp at all? To answer this we need a less superficial account of the sort of connections brought out by the general propositions listed above.

These remarks or at least some of them, would be characterised as 'conceptual truths'. We have discussed Dunlop's attempt to characterise these as 'necessary' or 'a priori' truths. The account was found to be unsatisfactory in several ways. A more sophisticated account of 'conceptual truths' has been put forward by Reddiford. We have already discussed certain aspects of his account in Chapter Two. To discuss his characterisation of such 'truths' we have to distinguish between conceptual 'systems', 'connections', and 'frameworks'. A 'conceptual system' is something that is not designed. It is the system of concepts through which a person gives form and content to his understanding of the wide range of human activities. (42) Different people have, or may have, different systems and these may overlap to a greater or lesser amount with the systems of other individuals. Conceptual systems are
distinguished on the basis of 'internal relations' between concepts within a system rather than by reference to the 'external relationship' of a system to the world. The meaning of a concept is given by its relationships in one person's system to that of someone else the concept will be said to have different meanings in each case. To give the meaning of 'education' would be to set out the 'conceptual connections' between the various concepts in our system. Thus Langford, in a recent paper, discusses the 'conceptual truth' that 'education is the whole man' and declares that this simply 'draws attention to the close connections between the concept of education and that of a man'. On Reddiford's account all conceptual connections within a conceptual system are examples of conceptual connections and that these are the 'conceptual truths' that interest the philosopher. The set of existing conceptual relationships in any system of any individual can be termed a 'conceptual framework'. We are free to choose and adopt conceptual frameworks (or areas of discourse - or language game?) to describe and justify educational processes. If our view of the world changes, and this process need not be such a purely utilitarian or functional one as 'choose' suggests, then our 'conceptual frameworks' can be said to have changed. This does not make the whole matter arbitrary. In employing conceptual frameworks we are still subject to the laws of logic and the demands of consistency i.e. if we accept A and B as conceptual truths about concept X and A and B imply C then we cannot deny C. How far we can go in pursuing some peculiar view of a concept - an eccentric set of conceptual connections - depends upon its consistency and compatibility with other elements of our world view. All this is relativistic and Reddiford does seem to be advancing a 'family resemblance' view of the concept of education. His view would, seemingly, cope with the variety of general statement about education exemplified in the examples above.

Redefford differs from the philosophers discussed in Chapter Two. The most obvious difference is that he rejects essentialism. Reddiford rejects the idea that we are searching for logically necessary propositions which will give us the basis for talk about the 'correct' use of a concept or term. He allows that there are many such correct uses provided they are consistent with other applications of constituent terms and with our beliefs. Thus if we have an eccentric view of education that connected it with what is now called 'human movement' this view could only be put forward on the basis of agreement about the use of 'human' and 'movement'. To employ every word like Humpty Dumpty would be to render communication
well nigh impossible. His analysis is formal in Earwaker's sense because he is not putting forward his (or a) particular view of what education is. He is merely discussing what is involved in putting forward such views. There are striking similarities with the arguments of Richardson about the nature of 'criteria'. Richardson, it will be remembered, argued for a plurality of criteria for the application of a term. Although his relativistic approach and his general emphasis on choice are reminiscent of 'constructivist' writings. Certainly, Reddiford's account seems more able to encompass eccentric views of education than would a multiple-criterion rule-based analysis such as Richardson's. We questioned Richardson's account of 'criteria' which was criticised for being too 'logicist' and for presenting a one-sided interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion. Similarly Reddiford rejects the notion that there are substantive determining criteria implicit in the use of words that could support a monolithic account of education in the manner of Peters'. Nevertheless his account could be developed and given more of a Wittgensteinian gloss by bringing into it further discussion of 'language games', 'culture' and 'criteria'. Reddiford is both here and elsewhere $^{(47)}$ much concerned with 'cultures'. This is where he differs most strikingly from the other philosophers we have considered. By this I do not merely mean that he takes account of other cultures in the sense of other nations and races and their attitudes, beliefs, ways of life etc. I refer rather to the sense of 'culture' that is implied by Wittgenstein's use of the term in connection with a 'language game'. The sense, which we have discussed, in which whole systems of thought may be part of the 'meaning' of a word like 'time'.

To bring out all the similarities and dissimilarities which can be drawn between Reddiford, Richardson and the antikantian account being presented here, let us look at the notions of 'grammatical' and 'criteria' as they were developed in Chapter Three. This will allow us to go into more detail and to show how important a familiarity with the aspects of meaning theory discussed in Chapter Two is to any successful fresh approach to the concept of education.

What we called 'grammatical remarks' are general propositions in Scheffler's sense. Not all propositions of a general nature are 'grammatical', for example:

(73) There are 500,000 people receiving education in Britain or

(74) 'Education' belongs to the class of nine letter words
Both of these are general propositions containing the word 'education'. But they mark 'external' rather than 'internal' conceptual connections. They refer to educational institutions and to orthography rather than the concept of education. A 'grammatical remark' would be, in Reddiford's terminology, a general proposition expressing a conceptual connection. It is not necessary to deal with the distinction between slogans, metaphors and stipulative and programmatic elements made by Scheffler, for it is reasonable to claim that if these have any force at all they express conceptual connections. The matter is not merely a terminological one. The adoption of one way of expressing something is not, despite what even this seems to imply, simply a different way of saying the same thing. The adoption of another way of speaking is the linguistic expression of the rejection of a misleading picture of how language works and of a method of doing philosophy congruent with that picture.

We saw in our discussion of the various interpretations of 'criteria' in Chapter Two that attempts are often made to marry a misleading picture with a prophylactic one. We sympathised with the so-called 'therapeutic' interpretation of Wittgenstein to the extent that we saw his introduction of certain pieces of terminology, new concepts, and striking metaphors as essential to his avowed task of the painstaking dis-solution of philosophical problems. We characterised 'grammatical' propositions as reminders of what it makes sense to say in a language game. This shift from Reddiford's terminology is a move away from the language of philosophy as practised by the 'logicist' philosophers. I use this expression to mean those who press the analogy with deductive models of thought like Wiadom's 'father' who we met in Chapter One. Reddiford is clearly aware of the short comings of such an approach as we also saw from his discussion of the idea that there are necessary conditions for the application of a term. He does present a limited analysis which could be developed in a Wittgensteinian way rather than in the language of conceptual analysis that he uses. The reasons for talking of 'grammatical remarks' rather than 'conceptual connections' can best be brought out by concentrating on the question of 'rules'.

We can perhaps, talk of two sorts of 'logicist'. Firstly there is the philosopher who would seek strict rules for the application of a term. Perhaps this is a straw philosopher given the qualifications we discussed in Chapter Two. But we have the early Wittgenstein as an example if we remember Richardson's remark that the later Wittgenstein
attacked the notion of 'strictness' rather than 'rules'. This view of 'rules', if rarely expressed is influential. A recent introductory book (49) on the philosophy of education makes the point that if Peters' definition of education is right then that is the end of our inquiry! Such impressions are a result of the methodological procedure of philosophy as 'conceptual analysis'. Those philosophers such as Peters who attempt to make some accommodation to Wittgenstein's work are 'logicists' in a weaker sense. They seek clarification of 'rules' in a restricted sense. Even Reddiford suggests that an alternative formulation of his remarks about conceptual connections is possible in terms of 'meaning rules'. (50) Thus the aim is still to make explicit the 'meaning of rules' of language. This is the termination of the 'conceptual' part of philosophy of education, after which, more 'important' matters are discussed. We saw from our discussion of the 'rite of chess' that such general propositions as are produced are not rules of any sort. They are reminders of what it makes sense to say in everyday language. That some of them impress themselves upon us as impossible to dispense with may lead us to talk of 'rules'. But it is preferable to see them as 'grammatical remarks' as attempts to explicate a concept. They indicate something of the 'grammar' of a concept. It is this 'grammar' that expresses the essence of a concept. But it does so, as we have seen, without reference to universals. 'Grammar' indicates the rough ground of ordinary usage. It reminds us of the language games we play with a word. Part of the objection to talk of 'conceptual connections' is that it can direct us away from the employment of words.

But this does not mean that we should simply consider examples of ordinary usage. And here we must correct an impression, perhaps given by our references to Schwizer's work, that we are appealing to everyday usage. Schwizer uses phrases like 'what it makes sense to say', 'the kind of use a word has in language', 'the language game played with the word' as indications of what Wittgenstein meant by 'grammar'. But there is an important difference of emphasis here. We are not concerned with 'what we say' but 'what it makes sense to say'. We can grasp something of the difference by discussing Ziff's characterisation of ordinary usage in his 'jewel' analogy:

'An element mi can have associated with it a set of sets of conditions Cmi. Think of mi as a jewel, of each member of Cmi as one facet. Then which facet catches the light depends on contextual and linguistic environmental features, thus on its setting.' (51)
The 'element' Ziff refers to is a morphological element, for our purpose we can take him as meaning 'word'. The 'contextual and linguistic environmental features' are quite clearly meant to be 'sentence frames'. Ziff illustrates his analogy with the word 'brother' i.e. 'He is my brother', 'He's a brother to me', 'He's a brother of the order' etc. He argues that 'in each case, if it is a standard case, a different facet of the word is turned to catch the light'. (52) Any grammatical remark about 'brother' could be said to capture one of these facets. This seems to be a fairly adequate view of the matter. But it is not. Ziff recognises that he is dealing with only certain cases. So far as we restrict our enquiries to these cases then the matter seems quite straightforward. We are only considering the word's 'strict logic'. Once we consider what Ziff calls 'deviant utterances' then, 'matters become vastly more complex'. (53)

Ziff is still doing 'analysis'. The multiplicity of cases he sets out are presented with a view to definition which will include all but deviant and minor cases. This view is, in fact, more compatible with the Tractatus where the propositions of ordinary language were in 'perfect logical order' (T. 5.563). For the later Wittgenstein this was where the problems started. 'Grammar' is not constituted by lists of ordinary usage, it is not an elaborate version of the PFA. Ziff's approach, for all its stress on 'regularities' rather than 'rules', is 'criteriological'. This can be seen both from his general methodology and from the 'jewel' analogy. His approach would be a sophisticated one rather like Richardson's for, as we saw in Chapter Two, he rejects the BGV. But the hidden 'conditions' that come to light in a certain setting can be taken to be 'criteria'.

Three things come out of this brief consideration of the 'jewel' analogy. Firstly there is a tendency to reduce or equate 'grammar' with consideration of ordinary usage. 'Grammar' is not meant to direct us towards linguistic phenomena, or towards non-linguistic phenomena, but towards 'forms of life'. We have introduced the idea of considering a 'whole culture' in connection with 'grammar'. 'Grammar' is connected with the idea of a 'concept' in Wittgenstein's sense of a 'picture' with which we compare things. If 'grammar' discusses the application of anything it is these 'pictures' rather than the application of words. But the central stress is upon 'cultures'. The 'depth' of 'grammar' is the depth of the background, the style of life within which these 'pictures' operate. Thus we cannot sum up the 'grammar'
in terms of a general formula. This is why 'use' is also connected with 'cultures' and 'institutions'. We cannot represent such things in terms of general propositions for easy understanding. We have to make a background, what Wittgenstein calls our 'natural history' clearer before we can assimilate a 'culture'. The point is not just to understand language but to have a feeling for the context and attendant circumstances. This is why the emphasis on 'sense' is important. Secondly, the connections between 'criteria' and 'grammatical' remarks and propositions becomes clearer. The tendency of 'analysis' or of 'logicism' is to hypostatize 'grammar' to see it as a vapid logic or skeletal structure, rather than as involving descriptions of our 'natural history'. Wittgenstein described his own work as consisting of 'remarks' and this is connected with his rejection of theories and explanations. Perhaps this helps to show why, say, Ziff's procedure is not wrong but 'wrong-headed'. If we see his sets of conditions as 'criteria' we have begun to hypostatize 'grammar'. In discussing the various interpretations of 'criteria' we followed Cook in suggesting that if the term meant anything it referred to the details of particular cases that one might refer to in ordinary life. We cannot ignore 'background' details or ignore what we have called the 'culture' which is associated with 'grammar'. We saw also that Wittgenstein's style was 'contrapuntal' and that we could refer to 'criteria' in a way which seems superficially similar to 'criteriological' approaches but whose whole import is the opposite. 'Grammatical remarks' are reminders of what it makes sense to say in a 'culture' or a 'language game'. The emphasis, as with 'criteria' is on the particular. A 'grammatical remark' is an injunction to look at the 'language game' we play with the word. It can be made when we have been misled by analogies in language e.g. 'believing is not thinking' (P.I. s.574). A 'grammatical proposition' has a different status as a frozen record of what it makes sense to say e.g. 'Every rod has a length'. Such propositions have a quality which we might describe as their being 'unassailable'. In certain contexts our list of 'definitions' might serve as 'grammatical remarks', just as the juxtaposition of them might be called making a 'grammatical remark'. Some have been defended as if they were 'grammatical propositions'. These general propositions are, therefore, like signposts. In this form and context they direct us to the 'common feature' in another they may direct us to the particular.

Thirdly, Ziff's account is restricted to a words 'strict logic'. He openly makes the 'classic' move of conceptual analysis even to the extent of listing counter-examples against his own definition of 'good'.
If we accept that his approach is 'criteriological' the 'jewel' analogy and the consideration of 'deviant' instances would give us something like a 'family resemblance' account of a term's meaning. Thus in different cases different sets of 'criteria' would be associated with the term. This would leave us with an account very much like Richardsons.

Richardson believes that the 'theory of criteria' that Wittgenstein presents and the 'family resemblance' notion make exactly the same points. A 'family resemblance' term is seen as one governed by a loose set of criteria. These would parallel Ziff's sets of sets of conditions. We have argued in Chapter Three that it is a mistake to see the metaphor as it is a mistake to see any of Wittgenstein's metaphors, as more than a metaphor. It does not give us a general or restricted account of meaning. It is meant to direct us away from looking for any single account. It does not present us with an anti-realist account of meaning but collapses into realism. Our attempt to apply the metaphor in a literal way at the beginning of this chapter was an attempt to show both the limitations as well as the prophylactic possibilities. Our account was restricted to a supposedly 'second order' sense of the term 'education' which connects the term with what goes on in schools. (54) But instances to which our list of 'definitions' apply could be said to be related to one another in a 'family resemblance' way and hence related by a loose set of criteria. This would tie up with Reddiford's analysis as he urges us to consider more than one or two 'language games' played with the word 'education'. Though his position on the idea of a 'loose set of criteria' is uncertain, his rejection of 'substantial criteria' and 'logically necessary conditions' in Peters' sense are clearly rejections of the BCV.

We therefore have an account of meaning which rejects the excesses of both sorts of 'logicist' procedures and avoids the pitfalls of the BCV. To resist such a view we would have to repeat the argument of previous chapters. For the introduction of a 'family resemblance' account of meaning would be 'wrong-headed'. Nor would it be at all efficacious in breaking the habit of thought that we are combatting. For such an account would still embody what I have called the 'criteriological' tendency. The tendency aptly put by Wisdom as the idea that 'Unless one has a criterion that things are of a certain kind, then one can never have rational ground for the claim that a thing is of that kind or for a claim that it is not of that kind.' (VI, XII p.1.) Despite their going someway to recognise variety and criteriological variance these views still encourage the view that the
relationship between these loose sets of 'criteria' and any application of a term will remain one of 'quasi-entailment'. This will become clearer in our discussion of Casey's 'criteriological' approach to literary criticism in Chapter Five. But one obvious objection to such an account can be mentioned here. 'Loose sets of criteria' are still 'criteria'. Our craving for generality is such that philosophers will see such a view as defeatist. There will always be a tendency to look for the dominant criterion.

The 'family resemblance' metaphor, it has been argued, is essentially connected with the case by case procedure. In applying the notion to the concept of education in a restricted way we do see something of what an injunction to consider cases meant. However, this was inadequate for reasons already mentioned. The concept of education neither is nor is not a 'family resemblance' concept.

The aim of our inquiry is to give increased grasp of the concept of education. We are concerned with understanding a concept despite the fact that we seem to understand and 'employ' that concept very well. When we said earlier that any of our list of general remarks in 'definitional' form do not tell us much we might have said that they do not illuminate the concept of education. They do not give us increased grasp. Part of the problem stems from the inappropriateness of the philosopher's questions which are answered in what we might call 'appropriate' form. Such remarks serve us well. They connect up cases. But in making such connections they do not go beyond what would be achieved by a presentation of case after case. Nor can they get us off the ground. Only a case by case procedure can do that. Only a case by case procedure can give us increased grasp.
'Examples' suggests imaginative descriptions. Unlike 'instances' they do not so readily suggest the instantiation of universals. 'Cases', our preferred term up to now, is more neutral. In Chapter One we documented the perfunctory treatment of examples in philosophy of education. We found that examples, when presented, were hackneyed, restricted and hopelessly indeterminate. Examples from literature have the advantage of being determinate. Although their presentation may be indeterminate. A novel gives us a detailed and concrete presentation of a 'form of life' or 'culture' in Wittgenstein's sense. Indeed an almost Wittgensteinian example is provided by William Golding's The Inheritors which describes the 'form of life' and 'culture' of Neanderthal man. Neanderthalers have 'many pictures' but 'few words' and exhibit a remarkable capacity for 'imaging'.(1) We should, therefore, consider whole novels. But we must be content with a rough and indeterminate sketch of them. That such examples are determinate does not mean that disagreement is impossible. It means that disagreement cannot take the form of new facts. There are no rabbits to be pulled out of hats. (2) Nevertheless critical judgements and evaluations vary, and we may think that if they are not to remain entirely subjective their justification must take a 'criteriological' form.

5.1. The Particularity of Criticism

Judgements about whether any example from literature is an example of 'education' will be a class of critical judgements. A difficulty for a case by case approach, here as elsewhere is created by the existence of a 'criteriological' theory. In literary criticism such an account would take the following form. Critical judgement is objective because critical argument is rational. Critical argument is rational because there exist non-inductive, and non-deductive 'criteriological' considerations which connect certain considerations with certain (value) judgements. Considerations which show a novel like Howard's End to be sentimental, albeit in an innocent way, 'criteriologically' imply that it is immature. Making a critical error would, therefore amount to failing or refusing to see the non-deductive, non-inductive, quasi-entailment relationship exists between certain characteristics and a response. This, by now
familiar scenario, represents the view of literary criticism put forward by John Casey. Casey considers that there are 'close analogies between the way one justifies the interpretation of a rule' and 'the way one argues for a particular interpretation of' a novel and 'the way one can rationally persuade someone to take up a particular attitude'. (3) He makes much of a quotation from Wittgenstein's discussion of understanding to the effect that 'it is the circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify him in saying that in such a case he understands' (P.I. s. 155). There is an internal relationship between the work of art and the response. But we cannot deduce the response, and it is not something invariably but contingently connected with the work. The 'criteria' we have are neither necessary and sufficient or sufficient conditions but they do entail certain judgements. This, we are told, is an application of Wittgenstein's 'general account of reasoning'. (4)

But the analogy with following a rule will simply not support Casey's account. As we saw in Chapter Two there is no justification for our colour judgements. We say 'This is red' but we cannot justify this by reference to our following a 'meaning rule' associated with 'red'. But our colour judgements are objective. Our colour preferences may not be, and we often give reasons for them. 'I like this blue it goes well with the Morris wallpaper'. Thus we can have objective judgements, and hence objective critical judgements, without their necessarily taking the form Casey suggests. And reference to rules will not supply a general account of reasoning. Reasons are not in order here 'we follow a rule blindly' (P.I. s. 219). The notions of 'objectivity' and of 'giving reasons' are quite distinct and we do not need 'criteriological' implications to make critical judgement objective.

Casey wishes to make the objectivity of critical judgements a result of the acknowledgement of, or of coming to see, certain 'criteriological connections'. His paradigm is 'sentimentality is unintelligent'. This is his idea of cogent reasoning in literary criticism. Thus coming to see that examples are examples of education would be coming to see that because criteria 'X', 'Y', 'Z' are present here this is a case of 'education'. This procedure can be challenged by a sceptic, and there are two problems to be faced. Firstly there is the '(philosophical) problem of getting someone to see how a given set of criteria count towards a conclusion' and secondly there is the
'(critical or aesthetic) problem of getting him to see that these criteria are the relevant ones for the conclusion in question'. (5)

'Someone may know a, b, c, ..., and yet not see how a, b, c, ..., bear on C; and someone may know that if a, b, c, then C, and yet not know whether a, b, c, ..., or even see that such and such was an example of a, b, or c, etc. The latter ignorance creates a difficult problem, for it may require not only the enforcing of particular judgements (on the basis of further criteria), but also an introduction to aspects of the whole context in which evaluation takes place. When the two forms of ignorance are combined they must be remedied together; and that is what I call the problem of getting someone to see the criteria as criteria.' (6)

To influence the sceptic we can proceed 'extensively' and contrast these criteria with other examples of criteria or by contrasting them with features that aren't criteria. Or we can proceed 'intensively' and pick out a central criterion the bearing of which cannot be denied in some other case, and hence cannot be denied in this. Much of what Casey has to say is supported by references to Wisdom's appeal to cases. He talks of bringing cases to bear on cases, and of the procedure of 'reflective thought' as advocated by Wisdom. (7) And yet what we have here is a parody of Wisdom's case by case procedure. When faced with someone who is sceptical about the objectivity of critical judgements we present them with 'criteria'. And we are being told, by implication, that this is Wisdom's view!

Casey's account of the objectivity of critical judgements simply will not do. If we talk about such judgements as being 'subjective' this is an expression of exasperation. It is difficult to discover considerations which will stop our vacillations. For example, is Marlowe in The Heart of Darkness as hollow as all the rest, or is he a reliable narrator? Hard and arduous critical labour must be engaged in before we can decide. If critical judgement is objective this is not a matter of logic, or quasi-entailments of the 'criteriological' kind. Rather it is a matter of fact or of convergence towards consensus. And this can be expedited by talk. Talk may provide us with a rationale, but not in the form of 'criteria'. Talk may also help us with the sceptic. Talk may also lead us to change our minds. Indeed it often does so, and it is this fact that leads us to believe that criticism is objective. One of Casey's central examples will illustrate this point. Leavis characterises the opening lines of Shelley's poem The Cenci as being 'voluminously emotional'. We come to
accept this as an apt characteristion of Shelley's work. We do not come to this conclusion by being forced to agree that being 'voluminously emotional' 'criteriologically' entails being immature.

Producing considerations which 'criteriologically' entail certain responses has a general failing which we commented upon in Chapter One. Any considerations that showed us that one work was 'funny', 'sad', 'tragic' might equally well apply to another work where such a judgement was not appropriate. Isn't this a reason for avoiding a 'criteriological' approach? Surely there is more to literary criticism than pointing out 'criteriological' considerations. Leavis thinks so. In reply to criticisms of Revaluation he says:

'Has any reader of my book been less aware of the essential criteria that emerge than he would if I had laid down such general propositions as:
"poetry must be serious in relation to actuality, it must have a firm grasp of the actual, of the object, it must be in relation to life, it must not be cut off from direct vulgar living, it should be normally human ..."? If, as I did, I avoided such generalities, it was not out of timidity; it was because they seemed too clumsy to be of any use. I thought I had provided something better. My whole effort was to work in terms of concrete judgements and particular analyses: "This - doesn't it? - bears such a relation to that; this kind of thing - don't you find it so? - wears better than that", etc.' (9)

Clearly, Leavis would find a 'criteriological' approach intolerably clumsy and inadequate. His remarks about being aware of Wellek's 'essential criteria' are not to be taken as suggesting that we will gain anything by extracting such abstract principles. By abstracting such principles and criteria his work would be made less precise, and much would be lost.

Casey is concerned with establishing that there is a 'logic of the emotions'. But his account of critical judgements about 'emotions' is one that applies to all critical judgements, indeed to all forms of judgement. It is a general account of reasoning. We shall see in section 5.3. what consequences this has for Leavis' critical procedure. For that procedure as represented schematically above has obvious parallels with a case by case procedure. The main reason for considering Casey's account here is to forestall and pre-empt obvious criticisms of a case by case procedure that makes extensive reference to examples from literature. For that, too, attempts to offer something better than 'abstract principles' or 'essential criteria'.
5.2. A Case by Case Procedure

When would a case by case procedure or an account of 'education' by examples, be appropriate? Perhaps in reply to the philosopher's inappropriate questionings? Or perhaps in reply to an appropriate question? But here we would have to take great care and perhaps simplify things. Perhaps it can be imagined as a course in philosophy of education? Or perhaps as a lengthy debate? A debate that need not, as our documentation established, be conducted by academics or philosophers. Whatever setting we chose the procedure would go something like this:

In Free Fall by William Golding the early life and schooling of Sammy Mountjoy is described. Much of it concerns his interaction with two teachers, Miss Pringle, and Nick Shales. Rhees argues that a good teacher is like a person of character in that he can illuminate his subject. (9) The man and the subject cannot be separated. Our education can come from knowing someone. Sammy experiences the separation of man and subject:

'Yet I did not choose a materialistic belief, I chose Nick. For this reason truth seems unattainable. I know myself to be irrational because a rationalist belief dawned in me and I had no base for it in logic or calm thought. People are the walls of our room, not philosophies'. (10)

Nick taught science whereas Miss Pringle taught religious studies. Sammy knows that Moses is more important to him than 'the composition of water' but:

'The beauty of Miss Pringle's cosmos was vitiated because she was a bitch. Nick's stunted universe was irradiated by his love of people'. (11)

Miss Pringle is 'frustrated, eaten up with secret desires and passions', with only a 'flimsy virtue' accredited to her by her virginity. Nick the rationalist, on the other hand is 'followed by children as if he were a saint'. (12) Sammy's education is constituted by these deep contradictions. Perhaps this is too complicated and paradoxical an example to begin with. Let us take another example:

In Fyodor Dostoyevsky's The Idiot (13) the simpleton, Prince Myshkin, recounts the 'story' of his relationship with the consumptive peasant girl, Marie, and of his friendship with the village children.
This friendship makes an enemy for him in the person of Thibault, the village schoolmaster and gains him only criticism from Schneider, his doctor, who castigates his 'harmful system with children'. Myshkin has no system. He merely befriends the children, never concealing anything from them, even to his own detriment. After several rebuttals he eventually has a great success in getting the children to treat the dying and rejected Marie with reverence and respect. For this he is persecuted by the villagers. But this only strengthens his relationship with the children. As Schneider says, he is 'a complete child himself.' And though this is not quite true he is as innocent as a child and this reaches the children. The story is not an irrelevant aside in the novel. It is an important mirror to how the Prince will affect people throughout the novel. It makes sense to call this 'incident' one of education for the children. But such examples need not be closely tied to schooling:

In Ken Kesey's *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* (14) Randle McMurphy brings into the Institute of Psychology 'the man smell of dust and dirt from the open fields, and sweat, and work.' The effect of this man on the inmates Billy Babbit, Harding, George, Scanlon, and Chief Bromden in particular is traumatic. He clears away the fog in which they live. Their experience of McMurphy the man, is an education. Let us look at some different examples.

In Boris Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* (15) Yury Zhivago does well at Moscow University medical school coming second in the whole city. He is also artistically inclined and has a book of poems published. A paradigm of what most people would call education.

Consider also Thomas Hardy's *Jude The Obscure* (16) Jude Fawley's story is one of 'constant failure both in ambition and love.' His ambitions are academic ones, but because of his class and background he is thwarted in them. He is by no means an unlearned or ignorant person. In Chapters 1-6 we read of his intensive, if incomplete, private study. He masters alone and single-handed the elements of Latin, Greek, Mathematics, History, and Religion. It could hardly be denied that this provides a clear instance of education.

In Charles Dickens' *Hard Times* (17) we have a notorious example of something that is not a case of education in action - the Gradgrind School with its emphasis on facts 'and nothing but the facts'. But here also we have the history of Sissy Jupe and of her adoption by
Mr. Gradgrind. Gradgrind clearly expresses his aims to Sissy as being 'to take charge of you, to educate you, and provide for you'. The irony in this is that Sissy accomplishes an education of the Gradgrind family one that is the opposite of the utilitarian ideal. At the end of the book we have Gradgrind asking his star pupil, aptly named Bitzer, 'Have you a heart?' and receiving a purely factual anatomical answer. To anyone who has read the book this would be clear case of Mr. Gradgrind's education simply through living in close proximity to Sissy. Let us look at yet another set of examples:

In Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn (18) we are presented with the experience of two boys sailing on a raft down the Mississippi River. The two boys, Huck and the negro Jim, learn a lot from their trip. They advance and grow not only worldly wise but morally as well. This is clearly shown when Tom appears towards the end. He is still the child they knew in Tom Sawyer. Jim has been imprisoned as a runaway, though he is free and Tom knows this. Tom does not act directly but turns the whole saga into a romantic daydream, one which ends happily for him because he gets a quixotic bullet in his leg. There is an air of cruelty about Tom's seemingly childish actions. He is introduced into the novel as a foil to reveal Huck's moral development. His development is instanced several times towards the end of the novel. One notable example concerns the scene in which Huck plays a trick on Jim when they are lost in thick fog on the river. Jim is so hurt by the incident that Huck is moved by this simple 'nigger':

'It was fifteen minutes before I could work myself up to go and humble myself to a nigger - but I done it and I warn't ever sorry for it afterwards neither. I didn't do him no more tricks, and I wouldn't done that if I'd a knowed it would make him feel that way.' (19)

It is not for its readability, not for its being a rattling good yarn, that this book has impinged itself upon the American consciousness. It is not a series of chance incidents but a fine example of a boy's education.

In Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe (20) Crusoe does not seek to suffer shipwreck. At the moment of shipwreck he resolves 'to sit all night, and consider the next day what death I shall die, for as yet I see no prospect of life.' (21) From these thoughts of suicide he begins to reflect upon his lot somewhat deeper. He contrasts the polar elements of his situation the 'evils' and the 'good'. He adapts to his situation. He learns how to build a house, to cook, hunt, to kill, to cultivate the ground and grow crops, to do wicker work, to
harvest, to make clothes. All this takes six years. After twenty five years on the island he rescues a savage and learns to live with him. He learns humility through this friendship. It is clear that we can agree with Rousseau in considering this as an example of an education.

In H.D. Thoreau's Walden (22) Thoreau's persona suggests that building your own university would be the best form of education for students. (23) His own attempt to simplify his life and to live by Walden pond is often taken to be an instance of education through an experience of solitude and self sufficiency. But it is not a model for education. What is educational about that experience must end in its rejection. His life at the pond leads Thoreau to exclaim 'Thank heaven, here is not all the world.' (24) This experience also has an essential element the rejection of the isolated hermit like existence that Thoreau lived. A subtler instance of education.

In Henry Fielding's Tom Jones (25) Master Blifil and Jones' education is entrusted to two gentlemen, a Mr Thwackum, who is a devout man, a believer in the divine power of grace, and a Mr Squire, a philosopher who puts his trust in the natural beauty of virtue. Both boys are brought up between these two paradigms of learning. Jones becomes master of none, and pays regard to neither of these learned men. Master Blifil, on the other hand, soon masters both systems, and uses them to advantage. Jones' education is gained at the hand of Black George the game keeper, and his daughter Molly. This is the pattern of the book. Jones' education is gleaned from bed to bed and not book to book. Fielding clearly contrasts the worthlessness of the 'education' of Blifil with the education that Jones receives.

In James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (26) we have a picture of the developing sensibility of a rather pompous young artist. What are we meant to make of Stephen Dedalus? If we consider his poetry, in particular the villanelle 'Are you not weary of ardent ways?' We find that it is competent. But is it good? We are not sure how we are supposed to take the poem. This ambiguity is built into all Stephen's educational experiences at Conglowes, at Trinity, and in the streets of Dublin. Are we meant to laugh at Stephen's antics, at his 'aesthetic theory' or not? This very difficulty gives us a problematic or borderline case of 'education'. But the following are not 'borderline':
In D.H. Lawrence's *The Rainbow* (27) the last part is taken up with the story of Ursula Brangwen's excursion into the outside world as a teacher. While teaching at Ilkeston she moves from idealism to the reality of classroom discipline. When she is forced to cane a boy she feels 'as if violated to death.' (28) She goes to college. She has an unhappy affair. Lawrence tells us that her experiences have given her 'unalterable knowledge' of her real self, the kernel within her which 'was free and strong to take new root, to create new knowledge.' (29) With this new knowledge the arch of the rainbow is completed. Ursula's achievement is clearly intended by Lawrence to be thought of as an education.

In Jane Austin's *Emma* (30) Emma Woodhouse is described as 'handsome, clever and rich, with a comfortable home and happy disposition.' (31) Throughout the novel we witness Emma's responses to a series of hard blows from fate. These culminate in her cruelty to Miss Bates, a harmless chatterbox. Because she has had too much of her own way and thinks too well of herself she has escaped both criticism from others - except Knightly - and has protected herself from herself through romantic fantasies. After the Box Hill episode in which she hurt Miss Bates, and earns Knightly's reproach, and because this comes on top of much else, she cannot escape the shame. Nor does it diminish for 'she felt it in her heart'. (32) She humbles herself and matures from being a merely clever into a compassionate woman. Though this brief outline does not do any justice to the subtle nature of Emma's redemption - something that is evinced by the commentators who argue that she will never change but will soon find another Harriet - there is enough of the story to make sense of the claim that it is another instance of education.

In Edward Albee's *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* (33) the 'Fun and games' between George and Martha, and between George and Martha and Honey and Nick develop less and less funny overtones as their social evening progresses. At the end of the play Martha breaks an implicit promise and reveal the 'existence' of their fictitious 'son'. Because of this revelation George finds it necessary to 'kill' him. We leave the play with the protagonists, George and Martha, desperately lonely and clinging together on stage. That series of games could be described as their 'education'.

In Robertson Davies' *The Manticore* (34) we are given a lengthy account of David Staunton's treatment by a Jungian psychoanalyst Dr.
J. von Haller. Staunton is an advocate and has a first class degree from Oxford. He is an educated man. But his education is shown to be no education. His education results from his treatment and his experience in the cave of bears during his stay at Sorgenfrei. It follows from his recognition of man and hence himself as not a 'good' but a 'noble' animal. As a descendent of a bear worshipper who shudders and stinks: 'Was it only yesterday I had been called the boy who could not shudder?' A trick of the wind in the cave causes fear 'I knew in that instant the sharpness of death' and 'my bowels turned to water and gushed out into my pants, and the terrible stench that filled the tunnel was my own!' (35) But Staunton's experiences only take him 'Out of the darkness into the gloom'. (36) The process of education is never completed. Now let us look at some examples similar to those given in Chapter 4 section 4.2:

In Tolstoy's The Cossacks (37) Olenin tries to live in the village of Movomlinsk like a cossack peasant. Though he apes Gaffer Yeroshka, the old hunter, and makes love to the beautiful peasant girl Marianka, his attempt is doomed to failure from the outset. Tolstoy makes it abundantly clear that he is trying to live out a romantic fantasy. He can never be like the peasants. As he spends the night drinking and discussing his plans to join the army, Tolstoy remarks: 'The workers are beginning to get up after the long winter night, and set off for work. But, for the gentry, it is still the evening before.' (38) Though Olenin lives, and hunts, with the peasants they regard him with disdain. This is not the way they treat other army officers. In the end he leaves disillusioned. The novel closes on this note:

"Goodbye, lad! Goodbye! I won't forget you!" shouted Yeroshka. When Olenin looked round the old man was chatting to Marianka, evidently about his own affairs, and neither he nor the girl had a glance for him'. (39)

Olenin's stay in the village constituted an education for him.

In The Death of Ivan Illych (40) Tolstoy says: 'The story of Ivan Illych's life was one of the simplest, most ordinary, and therefore most terrible.' (41) Illych has lived a purely formal and public life. Only when he is dying does he come to know compassion through his dependence on his servant Gerassim. His first attempt to come to terms with impending death is to reflect upon the syllogism 'Caius is a man,
men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal.\(^{(42)}\) This reveals his previous character and Tolstoy's views about the importance of a man as a rational animal. Illych's son and daughter are cast in his mould. They see his dying days as a wretched inconvenience, and they are upset because he can't bring himself to comment on their dress.

Illych comes to realise that his life has been 'loathsome and senseless' and a sense of 'horror' fills him. After the sacrament is given to him he begins to scream for days with a moan that was 'so awful that one could not hear it through closed doors two rooms away without horror.'\(^{(43)}\) At the end of his life Ilych is moved to feel real pity for the sufferings of his family and his fear of death vanishes. 'In the place of death there was light.'\(^{(44)}\) Another example of an education.

In Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*\(^{(45)}\) Marlow, a man as hollow as all men, tells us of his experience of the heart of darkness through his 'chosen nightmare' Kurtz. Mr. Kurtz who, ironically, is a representative of the 'International Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs' becomes a member of a savage tribe in a 'region of subtle horrors, where pure uncomplicated savagery was a positive relief.'\(^{(46)}\) Kurtz, and through him Marlowe, faces the horror at the heart of man's life. Unlike Kurtz, Marlowe finds the prospect of facing this reality too frightening: 'It would have been too dark.'\(^{(47)}\) He has not the courage to go into the heart of the immense darkness. Marlowe's struggle with Kurtz, man and legend, is an instance of education.

In George Eliot's *Silas Marner*\(^{(48)}\) Silas loses his gold and gains a golden child 'a round, fair thing, with soft golden rings all over its head.'\(^{(49)}\) Previously 'money had stood to him as the symbol of the earthly good.'\(^{(50)}\) Though Eppie is not his natural child, he brings her up. When her real parents come to claim the child several years later, her mother says 'I've a claim on you Eppie - the strongest of all claims'.\(^{(51)}\) Eppie rejects this biological fetter and at the end of the novel affirms Silas her true father. This is evidence of how he has changed. He has learnt to value the things of the heart and is rewarded by Eppie's loyalty. It is this sort of case that we commonly talk of someone's undergoing an education.

To take another example from Tolstoy we can return, once again to *War and Peace*.\(^{(52)}\) After the battle of Moscow, Pierre, though a non-combattant, is arrested as a spy. He is questioned by Davout, almost
shot, and put into prison. It is this experience in prison that is the period of his life that has the most effect on him. Imprisoned, he finds he is an equal with the peasants and with Platon Karataev in particular. Tolstoy expresses the change in Pierre in terms of the change in his physical appearance. But there is also a spiritual change. When Platon falls behind on a march, and is shot by the French, Pierre undergoes one of those momentous shifts (aspect change?) that are frequent and central in Tolstoy:

"How simple it is and how clear" thought Pierre. "How was it that I did not know before? God is in the midst and each drop strives to expand to reflect Him on the largest scale possible. And it grows, and is absorbed and crowded out, and on the surface it disappears, goes back into the depths, and falls not to the surface again. That is how it is with him, with Karataev; he is absorbed and has disappeared." (53)

Pierre's imprisonment has illuminated and made meaningful this piece of theological dogma. His world has changed though he knows no more than he knew before. A case of education.

We could go on. We need not terminate the procedure here. Examples come to mind from A Passage to India, The Brothers Karamazov, Pickwick Papers, The Outsider and many other novels. Many of these works have critical commentaries written upon them which expressly refer to a central character's 'education'. (54) It would be useful to develop and extend these examples. But there are numerous objections to this approach and we must meet them.

5.3. Some Objections

We might have ended this concatenation of cases with the remark that 'These and the like' are examples of education. This is quite different from the suggestion that we might end with the remark that this, and this, and that 'And so on' are cases of education. For the use of the phrase 'And so on' implies that there is some sort of rule to follow here. We could say of examples like the one illustrated by Yuri Zhivago, and by any case of a successful university career that they all have certain features in common. Perhaps we could end a list of such cases with the phrase 'And so on'. There seems to be some 'rule' that we could isolate that would apply in all these cases. Perhaps Peters' 'knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth' would be applicable here? Similarly, we could isolate common features in
several of the other cases and analogous instances. Of cases like *Emma* we can say it illustrates a general notion of education as a process of moral growth and development. Of cases like that of Pierre in *War and Peace*, and of Nekhlyuov in *Resurrection* we can talk of them as instances of the idea that education is the development of the soul. We could, in fact match these examples with many of the general propositions listed in Chapter Four. We can go further and talk of education of the emotions. We would thus have a set of principles that would, perhaps, enable us to make use of the phrase 'And so on'. This, as must be obvious, would be to reinstate the Kantian view of examples and merely to see them as illustrative of general propositions. This is certainly a role for examples. But it is not one to which our energies have been devoted. We tried to offer something better.

An account offered in terms of 'common features' or 'criteria' would soon run into difficulties. We may find actual or imaginable cases which meet any criterion but which we would deny were examples of education. This may be because one criterion of education conflicts with another. We might take Ivan Illych to be a man of great knowledge and understanding, and therefore an 'educated man'. But there would always be a Tolstoy who would dispute this and not allow that someone was educated until he underwent a spiritual development which meant giving up, literally in Illych's case, the ordinary knowledge of the material world. If two 'dominant' criteria clash in this way then the classic move of conceptual analysis is often employed. This allows the complex and difficult examples to be ignored if they prove too intractable. Either the examples are bruised and battered until they fit some general criterion or they are dismissed as peripheral or eccentric. A 'family resemblance' approach which allows the existence of a 'loose set of criteria' might seem kinder to such examples. Difficult examples can be said to be typical of a concept with 'broad borderlines' where, though we have determinate criteria, we are not certain which criteria apply in such cases. Alternatively, if we allowed that the set of criteria was indeterminate there would seem to be a redundancy here. Why talk of 'criteria' at all? Four courses seem open to us: Firstly, we make the example fit the criterion; secondly, we ignore the example; thirdly, we look for a determinate criterion; and fourthly, we simply allow the criterion to be indeterminate. Such an unhappy state of affairs suggests a fifth alternative, simply don't talk of 'criteria' at all, or at least not in this way. Not when our intention is to bring about increased grasp of the concept of education.
But if we don't talk of 'criteria' in connection with these examples then it may seem that anything goes. It may seem impossible to bring counter-examples. Any example from literature could be said to be an example of education. And if everything is an example of something then nothing is. To put this another way, selecting certain examples as examples of education implies that other examples are not examples of education. Consider the Huckleberry Finn example. Wouldn't any account of childhood in literature constitute an example of education? Quite obviously not. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye provides us with an instance which has often been compared to Huckleberry Finn. Holden Caulfield's experience bears only a superficial resemblance to those of Huck. Holden runs away from school to busy New York. 'All life' seems to be there, just as on the Mississippi. The obvious difference is seen in the conclusion. Holden sits in the rain getting soaked, while his little sister has a ride on a carousel:

'I felt so damn happy all of a sudden, the way old Phoebe kept going round and round. I was damn near bawling. I felt so damn happy, if you want to know the truth. I don't know why. It was just that she looked so damn nice, the way she kept going round, in her blue coat and all. God, I wish you could've been there.' (55)

'Voluminous emotionalism' is put to good effect here to describe a breakdown. Holden's is a desperate attempt to remain a child. To fix himself, like Phoebe, eternally on a carousel. An example of an attempt not to grow up but to grow down. The acceptance or rejection of such examples is expedited, by talk, by discussion of the details of the works in question. This can proceed in a case by case fashion. Compare this here with how this works here. The details of such a procedure and the possibility of extracting 'criteria' from it will be discussed below. We have seen that we are not in a position in which 'anything goes'. Some remarks about why we may feel that we are in such a position are apposite here.

In philosophy, we are not primarily concerned with the correct or incorrect use of a word. We are not concerned at all with the question of how many people use the word to mean such-and-such. Thus it might be that a very frequent use of a word was of little interest to us. Purely quantitative concerns are not ours. It may be a fact that the majority of people when they use the word 'education', use it in the closest connection with educational institutions such as schools, colleges, and universities. If this was some philosopher's basis for undertaking conceptual analysis then we should have to say that whatever
his enterprise was, and however valuable it turned out to be, it was lacking in the very spirit of philosophy. In the examples given above a certain bias can be detected. Crudely, we can express this by saying that most of the examples of education given are questionable. They can, and will, be challenged. An elaborate series of examples could have been given of the more 'traditional' kind which would correspond with common usage in the sense discussed above. These would include examples of successful university education (Yuri Zhivago, Ivan Karamazov, etc.) and of self education (Jude Fawley, etc.). In these cases something is achieved that is connected with formal instruction, even if given by oneself. These examples are so rife that it could be contended that the practice of conceptual analysis restricts itself to them, and more importantly, gains whatever credibility it has from the prevalence of such cases. No doubt some criterion can be extracted from such cases. But these examples may not be central in any other than a non-philosophical sense. They may reflect a common but unilluminating usage.

Peters has argued that many people who use 'education' in this way clearly do not value it. The implication being that they do not see the value of it, and not that they are sceptical about what they are being offered. Even if the majority of people did value education as characterised by the knowledge criterion, little would follow from this. Reddiford has suggested that the attempt to weld the concept of education firmly to knowledge and value is most appropriate in a primitive society where the adult 'discernment of the possibilities of human relationships offer few paradigms to the next generation'. (56) The poverty of such a concept of education renders it a commonplace if applied to sophisticated modern societies. Philosophers of education achieve such analyses by restricting themselves to the 'strict logic' of a term. That is, they are interested only in cases which are clear instances of an established usage of a term. In Chapter One we discussed Wisdom's classification of philosophical questions. The suggestion being entertained here is that conceptual analysis is restricted because it restricts itself to questions about a term's 'strict logic'.

Wisdom's classification was fourfold. Questions were divided into (a) Empirical questions; (b) questions of Strict Logic; (c) Conflict questions and, (d) Paradoxical questions. It has been suggested that, although we are not engaged in empirical enquiry, conceptual analysis trades on certain empirical facts about common usages of the term 'education'. 'Borderline' questions within this framework are easily
resolved. When we proceed by conceptual analysis rather than through examples we are restricted to strict logic. Here also there is a simple 'litmus paper' test for cases of education. It is towards the other two sorts of question 'conflict' and 'paradoxical' that we have slanted our examples. This is not to exaggerate and misapply Wisdom's classification. It can easily be rewritten as a classification of the sort of examples we consider in philosophy. And it must not be forgotten that the classification is simply an analytical framework used by Wisdom to illustrate, in case after case, how such a framework breaks down. Many of my examples are 'conflict' cases in that they call for some sort of decision. By including them the decision has been made and ipso facto the conflict is disguised. Paradoxical cases have as their paradigm the 'Adultery' example. It is unlikely that any of our examples approach this powerful and illuminating instance. Several of them do have a paradoxical air. The examples from Tolstoy illustrate the paradoxical nature of cases of education best of all. For, if we consider the Levin example, we have a case of 'education' which seems to meet no criteria at all. This is expressed in paradoxical ways. For instance, by saying that for Levin everything was changed and yet nothing was changed.

Interpreting our examples in this way presents certain difficulties. In the case of conflict cases we can be asked 'Who decides?'. This question has similarities with the question "Can you define 'education'?" It is an expression of the habit of thought we have called the 'criteriological' tendency. The assumption is that there is always some clear criterion by which a decision can be facilitated. This assumption also carries with it the implication that people who do not propound some criterion or other simply have no basis on which to take a decision. This takes us back to the search that Kant mentions in the Critique for a criterion to distinguish with certainty between cases which are instances of a certain kind and cases which are not. This is not to suggest that we do not have to make decisions. What is being suggested is that they do not always have to be made on the basis of 'criteria'. The notion of 'aspect change' is helpful once again. If we recall the 'old' and 'young' woman (Fig. 2) we see that we cannot just decide to see it one way and now the other. One view just forces itself upon us. It is not a matter of choice. Similarly with the various examples. We do not just decide to see them as examples of education. If someone just couldn't see one of these examples as an example of education we might begin to convince him exactly as we would in the case of someone who couldn't see the young woman in Fig. 2. That is, we would adopt
a case by case procedure. In the latter case we would begin by
displaying paintings of old and young women by Toulouse-Lautrec.
Pictures of young women in profile, young women wearing chokers,
and so forth. In the former case we might take a case we can
mutually agree upon as an instance of education and proceed, by
considering cases, to the case in question. In either case we
may fail. The person we are talking to simply may not be able to
see the figure in the way we do. We might talk of 'aspect blindness'
in both cases. But we may succeed. In neither case is a decision
appropriate. We can make decisions and back them up with a case by
case procedure. The procedure involves seeing how far our decision
case was like, and unlike, cases which are, and are not, cases of
education. This may involve a fairly lengthy comparison of cases.
And this procedure may be a bad case by case procedure if it
inclines us to accept something as a case of education which (it could
be shown by a good case by case procedure) is not a case of education.

The prejudice against examples is deep rooted. What is being
advanced here as 'case by case procedure' has its origins in the
writings of Wittgenstein. What we have called the 'criteriological'
tendency is manifest in Wittgenstein's earlier writings. Discussing
various definitions of 'good' he argues that their enumeration is
intended to:

'... produce the same effect which Galton produced when
he took a number of photos of different faces on the same
photographic plate in order to get the picture of the
typical features they all had in common. And as by show­
ing to you such a collective photo I could make you see
what is the typical - say - Chinese face; so if you look
through the row of synonyms which I will put before you,
you will, I hope, be able to see the characteristic
features of ethics'. (57)

We have discussed at length the search for such 'common features'. But
here the emphasis is different. What we are considering here is a
methodological point about the presentation of examples. In his
earlier work Wittgenstein saw them as essential if we were to isolate
a common feature. In the later writings a variety of examples is
important, but not to enable us to 'look through' them to a common
element, but to keep you from looking for it. Our response to
examples need not be so explicit, and yet it may still exhibit the
'criteriological' tendency. Let us return to our discussion of Casey's
'criteriological' account of literary criticism to see how such a
tendency may express itself in a less explicit way.
As we have seen Leavis explicitly holds that he offers something that is better than an analysis which sets our 'criteria' for good literature. Leavis' work does not characteristically proceed from the particular to the general. But it is possible to 'point to some extremely general terms in Leavis' vocabulary - 'life', 'maturity' and so on - which seem to be like paradigms or central criteria, the ultimate premises of a critical system'. (58) It would be a mistake, argues Casey, to see Leavis' thickly interrelated terminology as the 'premises' of such a system 'as if they existed in isolation and a priori, to be accepted or rejected entirely on their own right.' Yet on the other hand, 'there is a sense in which they can be described as premises'. (59) Casey isolates Leavis' 'paradigmatic' terms and lists them in an appendix. They include 'intelligence, consciousness, complexity, sensitive, whole, spontaneous, actuality, variety, richness, strength, poise, and precision'. (60) All these words are associated with 'life'. Although Casey, like Richardson, would deny that there was any sort of strict 'entailment' between these 'criteria' and particular judgements, the relationship is still held to be a matter of 'logic', of what we have called 'quasi entailment' between terms in Leavis' critical 'system'.

An elaborate defence of Leavis will not be attempted here. The question that Casey's extraction of 'criteria' from Leavis' critical discussions poses for us, is whether such 'criteria' could be extracted from our discussions of various examples. We have argued that reflection upon a variety of cases might be illuminating. It might increase our grasp of the concept of education. But what exactly does this 'reflection' consist of? In our discussion of examples from literature regular terms occur: 'knowledge, experience, freedom, strength, success, development, learning, revelation, seeing the light, change enlightenment, wisdom, world view, and moral awareness'. It could be said that these terms are 'criteria' in Casey's sense. They are considerations which 'quasi entail' certain judgements in this case the judgement that we have here instances of education. It may also be possible to select or extract 'general criteria' from these discussions. To isolate such 'criteria' would be at best an idle and unilluminating act.

But there is an alternative way of viewing our discussion of examples. Some credibility is given to the 'criteriological' interpretations mentioned above because our examples are indeterminate they are attempts to give brief accounts of whole novels or aspects of
novels. It is possible to talk of 'criteria' in connection with such examples but in a quite different sense. We have argued that Wittgenstein meant 'criteria' to be, if anything, the details of particular cases that we might take notice of in ordinary life. We made the point that there is no easy distinction between details which are 'criteria' and those which are not. It has also been stressed that details which are dissimilar may be more important than similarities. Once we start to pick our 'paradigmatic' terms which are meant to characterise certain important details of our examples, a habit of thought will express itself in our taking these terms to be more or less general 'criteria'. The qualification that they are not given in any a priori way is superfluous. They will be taken as if they were.

In defending or justifying our examples as example of education, we might proceed by pointing out certain details that might halt his vacillations and assuage his doubts. We could talk of these details as 'criteria', but even to talk of such details in this way is to put us back on the criteriological road. There is no need to respond to the sceptic in this way. We could justify an example as an example of education simply by proceeding from an agreed case 'x' and moving through a consideration of cases until we get near to the case in question. Two examples from those presented above will serve to illustrate this procedure. It must be recognised that whole chapters could be devoted to discussing any of the examples given above. The outline here will of necessity be schematic. Let us take as our examples Robinson Crusoe and Emma. These are both illustrative of how a case by case procedure can throw up examples which are quite out of the ordinary. The former has been much maligned and a brief look at it will perhaps explain why.

The continuum of cases in which Robinson Crusoe is placed stretches from a professor in a university engaging in a thorough study and critique of the whole basis of society and successfully completing his study, to the case of the shipwrecked mariner who survived on berries until he is picked up, or who simply died. At one end we have a prima facie case of education, while at the other we have a similar case that is not a case of education at all, but a case of shipwreck pure and simple. Somewhere on this continuum we might place Olenin and Thoreau. Faced with a sceptic our job is to justify Robinson Crusoe as a case more like the former than the latter. And we must also face the problem that the particularity of such cases poses for education as involving any prog-
rammatic elements. To attempt to repeat Robinson Crusoe's experience would be simply to experience shipwreck. Going through cases involves certain elements. It will involve detailed reference to the novel and the construction of intermediate cases. From either end then, supposing we have initial agreement, we can discuss cases such as that of a Professor who in order to study his society, goes to live and work in a different society where he can view his own society from a different perspective. On the other hand we can think of someone who goes to some lonely place to find wisdom. Somewhere in the middle we will meet and perhaps accept the Crusoe example. If the accidental nature of Crusoe's shipwreck causes concern it is always possible to begin with examples where someone, perhaps a traveller, achieves education although (like Kurtz) his intentions were the opposite.

Emma is perhaps a more problematic case, though this results from cursory textual reading rather than from a flawed text. The continuum would be from cases of, say, a young girl with a PhD, who spent her early years working as a psychologist and achieved an iconoclastic perspective on human relations; to the case of the spoilt brat who by interfering in human lives in her suburban environment causes untold human misery. Both these cases can be conceived to have superficially similar features such as social class, income, numbers in family etc. The move again would be through less academic cases on the one hand, and through less overtly malicious cases on the other, to Emma.

The procedure outlined might seem to give comfort to the enemy in that both cases reference is made to a continuum which has at its 'positive' ends two paradigms of education which might easily fit the textbook criteria of knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth. But the point of this procedure is to answer the sceptic who deny that examples like Emma provided instances of education. We could reverse the procedure if we were dealing with a woman like Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Ramsey. To someone who valued the emotions above all else we might find a ready acceptance of Emma and a rejection of Jude and Zhivago and indeed of the sort of 'education' we get in schools. Such a person would have to be argued against by putting cases like Emma next to other cases which moved ever closer to our textbook example. The question of getting agreement about a case from which to begin is a fundamental one. A perverse anti-educational sceptic could reject all the examples we presented. Someone who believed that the only form of education possible was that that occurred after death in a spiritual world would be less extreme than the sceptic we are imagining. But his position would be a
difficult one to defend in any detail. We would have to question him in depth as to whether he meant that no one had ever achieved education, yet, in which case we should be able to get some sort of clue from him as to what he means. Or he may be denying that the term 'education' means anything now, in which case we can hope that he is a traditionalist, and so on. We will probably be able to pin him down, though that would be a task we need not attempt here. Most people would have some example or other that they would give as an instance of education and this single example would be sufficient to start our procedure, which could be a very slow one. Of course it may be that we cannot get agreement about an example. This is a very difficult problem which we will only touch upon in the conclusion of this thesis.

We have been trying to illustrate what a complete case by case procedure would look like. The hope is that such a procedure would illuminate the concept of education more than a criteriological approach. We have already seen that it can lead to the discovery of important connections with Wisdom and to the beginnings of a discussion of aspect change where this involves a change in world-view. Such insights need to be developed but this is not the place to do so. This thesis is concerned with correcting a misapprehension about the role of examples in argument, which has led to a misapprehension of the concept of education. In a sense the dichotomy that is being set up between a case by case procedure and a 'criteriological' procedure is a false one. But it is false only in a practical sense. In actual argument and in discussions of education a varied mixture of both forms of argument will quite naturally occur. But the point that is being made here is that there is no necessity for us to proceed through the giving of 'criteria' or through a mixture of examples and 'criteria'. We can proceed by case by case procedure alone. The further claim is made that this is perfectly adequate. To doubt this is to embrace the 'criteriological' tendency.

This brings us back, yet again, to Wittgenstein. Near the end of his life he discussed in Zettel the very question that is now being raised. Can we proceed by examples alone? He is discussing 'rules' and comments:

'You must remember that there may be such a language-game as 'continuing a series' of digits' in which no rule, no expression of rule is ever given, but learning happens only through examples. So that the idea that every step should be justified by something - a sort of pattern - our mind, would be quite alien to these people.' (62)
Such examples in Wittgenstein's work have a dual role. Like the tribe that measures wood by the amount of ground it covers etc., we are meant to question the possibility as well as to learn from it. There are differences in giving examples in this sort of case and giving examples of a complex concept like education. The grammar of 'education' is very complex and loose compared with the grammar of 'table'. By giving examples of the latter we might get near to a tight definition. It is our success in cases like this that leads to the criteriological tendency. The psychologistic notion of understanding what it is to continue a series mentioned by Wittgenstein above, is just another form of this tendency.

Giving examples can by itself mislead. For it could be suggested that what is at work here in our advocacy of case by case procedure is a variant of something we have attacked. This is the notion that a word means an object. The denotation theory of meaning. For in this account of meaning it follows that giving examples is sufficient to explain a word's meaning because we are giving the meaning by giving examples. Clearly the word 'example' here does not mean something verbal, as it does in many of the cases we are talking about. It does not refer to a description but to a phenomenal object, something that can be presented to the senses. This is clearly not the point, however, when we are talking about 'habits of thought' might it not be that the idea that we can proceed by examples alone derives its credence from the dim awareness of this theory? This suggestion can be refuted by simply clarifying the difference between the denotative theory and case by case procedure. The denotation theory purports to be a theory of meaning. The case by case procedure is a procedure to be followed in attempting to explicate a concept. As was shown in Chapter One, the difference between induction and case by case argument isthat the latter can utilise fictitious examples. The denotation theory cannot do this without great difficulty. The case by case procedure is not empirical or sensory. It would be simply to play with the word 'example' to suggest any connection between the theory and the procedure illustrated here.

As a final objection let us take up the suggestion that to adopt a case by case procedure is to participate in some form of mad particularism. This could be called an 'argument' but it is best described as a 'feeling of insecurity'. It is as if the whole rigid framework supporting our concept has shaken loose. This is a familiar suggestion which advocates of 'family resemblance' accounts of a concept have to face. This must
not be taken to mean that such an account is being advocated. We have certainly looked at what 'family resemblance' accounts involve, but have argued that this amounts to no more or less than an injunction to consider examples. Another way of expressing this objection might be to say that we have upset the 'delicate balance between principles and cases.' (63) But whatever the 'balance' needed to teach someone set theory, this is of no interest to us. Indeed the very suggestion involves the resurrection of the Kantian view of examples. This is the view that to have a concept is 'to know the principle in accordance with which things are said to be of the relevant kind'. (64) The argument of this thesis has been that such an idea as embodied in the 'criteriological' tendency has led to the misapprehension of the concept of education. The 'family resemblance' metaphor is an attempt to lead us away from looking at concepts in this way. It is not just a critique of empiricist views of concept formation. It is a critique of the search for general principles or principles of organisation which constitute having a concept. To put this another way, we might say that the metaphor is part of an attempt to show us that to produce a 'definition' embodying such a principle would be idle. Wittgenstein is concerned with the idleness of defining 'language'. But what he says is as true of defining 'truth', 'knowledge' or 'education'. There is no single answer to what it is for a thing to be of one kind rather than another. We can only show what such things are by giving examples and by presenting various 'language games' in which these terms appear. And this is connected with what we have called the peculiarity of the philosophical enterprise. We are not trying to introduce unfamiliar concepts but are attempting to explicate a concept which we are very familiar with. Philosophical puzzlement is not like the puzzlement which we have when we come across new, unusual or technical terms. It is more like the puzzlement expressed by Augustine when he says that when we use the words 'time' and 'times' we understand them: 'No words could be plainer or more commonly used. Yet their true meaning is concealed from us we still have to find it out'. (65) This 'sorry state' can be ameliorated only by reflection upon examples. Other sorts of puzzlement might be ameliorated by setting out the 'mathematics' of a term but not this peculiarly philosophical puzzlement. We have argued at length that only a case by case procedure can give us increased grasp of a concept. In part this could be said to redress the imbalance between principles and cases produced by the 'criteriological' tendency, but is more thorough going than this in that it constitutes a criticism of the assumptions that the tendency embodies.
Perhaps this thesis will seem a little less wild and extreme if it can be shown that there is a precedent for it. Hamlyn suggests that his comments only apply to disciplines where there can be said to be something approximating to a theory. Though we often talk about the 'theory' of education, it is notoriously difficult to specify anything like a theory, if by 'theory' we mean something which meets standard criteria for a scientific theory. This is the starting point of a paper by D.I. Lloyd (66) which advances an argument analogous to the argument of this thesis although with a slightly different intent. Lloyd sets out and successfully argues against Paul Hirst the following case:

'... underlying his (Hirst's) thinking here is a desire for unity, for a system, for a set of principles. I want to question whether such a desire to tidy up our thinking and to provide us with a theoretical backing is either necessary or desirable; then to see if practice, as an alternative, is sufficient on its own; and finally to introduce the idea of reflection as against theorising which for me retains the link with practice without being chained to it.' (67)

Lloyd's paper essentially introduces a form of case by case argument. He says 'My case is that understanding is more likely to be acquired by examining particular cases.' (68) Taking the definitions of a theory offered by Hirst and O'Connor and developed on analogy with empirical science we have something like the following:

(i) A set of hypotheses confirmed by observation
(ii) That are refutable
(iii) That are explanatory

Lloyd argues that people can learn language, and act morally without any knowledge of theory. In the former case the very suggestion is an absurdity. He mentions that the most effective teachers can be those with no theory. He points out that 'Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, Forster's Passage to India and Baldwin's Another Country are more helpful to understanding people's attitudes to immigrants in a London suburb than an ethnological study.' (69) This line of argument will now be very familiar. He fires away at various arguments produced in defence of theories of education in order to make us sceptical of them. On to this sceptical seed bed he scatters the notion of reflection on particular cases. This differs from practice in that it demands that 'one stands back in order to think about what one is doing, without standing back so far that the detail of the picture becomes blurred or even lost to one's vision (which is the hazard of theory)'. (70)

Lloyd does not allow any of the habitual notions to reassert themselves.
He acknowledges that reflection may help us to see similarities but 'it will be as likely to reveal dissimilarities which may be more important.'(71) Although his paper is brief and necessarily sketchy he is clearly putting forward something which is analogous to the thesis we are arguing for. Lloyd restricts his examples to psychology but he admits that there are implications for the whole of educational thought. One of the weaknesses of his paper is that it does not tackle the central philosophical issues. If a plea is to be made for particularity then age-old philosophical habits must be tackled first.

Showing that there is a precedent - or rather that someone is thinking on similar lines - does not verify an argument. Two routes can lead up the same blind alley. If this is a blind alley then documentation will have to be produced to show that it is as sterile a methodology as that which goes under the name of conceptual analysis. In Chapter One considerable documentation was produced to show that there was something wrong with our grasp of the concept of education. In Chapter Two we saw how the asking of the sorts of questions that the search for criteria necessitated us asking, lead to several dead ends. In Chapter Four and Five we explored several ways in which we could consider examples. What is sketched is a methodology which must prove itself in consideration of other concepts and problems. It was essential at the outset to challenge the analyses of the concept of education put about by contemporary philosophers of education. People are very dissatisfied with the answers they are pressed to accept when they are made to reflect upon the question 'What is education?' They feel, intuitively perhaps, that there is something not quite right in the way they are asked to proceed in their enquiries. 'Why are the answers we are given so platitudinous?' 'Why must we accept such and such a definition - even to the extent that if we do not we are held to be only partially human?' These objections which are, I believe, at the bottom of many teachers cynical attitudes towards philosophy are not shallow objections. They are not made just because teachers are excessively concerned with practical issues. They are not a result of sheer woolly-mindedness. They may be a result of a lack of philosophical training. But I submit that this merely explains why objections to philosophy of education are couched in pragmatic and functional language. An understanding of philosophy - as distinct from philosophy of education - would lead many teachers and others to an understanding that what they are being fed in philosophy of education is simply a one-sided diet. That there are other forms of philosophising is some-
thing that is not acknowledged.

If we are right then the arguments presented here for a case by
case procedure may open up a new approach to some old questions. Concern
about the criteriological method of philosophising is not an irrationalism
it reflects not a rejection of reason but a deep disquietude about what
is presented as rationality. We began by suggesting that what was at
issue in this thesis was a radical form of scepticism. A scepticism
about all thought. In presenting an argument for reflection upon case
after case after case we have been battling this scepticism. But we
have also been concerned with reflection upon the concept of education.
We have been pursing a methodological question, and illustrating it
with one particular example. There are important reasons why this has
been our procedure. In most of the work done on the philosophy of
education philosophical positions are assumed rather than made explicit.
(Here one thinks of O'Connor's strangely anachronistic little book
putting forward a positivist philosophy for teachers.) This is often
done for the best of reasons. The audience of such books is not made
up of philosophers. There is an urge to get down to the nitty gritty
of the concepts we actually are interested in. But this short cut is
essentially unphilosophical. Too many things slide past and an inevit­
able logic seems to take us to conclusions we do not want to endorse.
Assumptions about 'criteria', 'rules', 'definitions' and examples have
proved very confusing. The number of shifts of position and half
shifts we have documented point to the need for a radical re-think of
the approach to the discipline rather than to a consideration of
different problems in the old way. Some people researching into
philosophy of education are now considering topics such as 'death
education'. It can only be suggested, yet again, that understanding
is more likely to come from reflection upon particular cases than from
any other approach. What would be more illuminating than a study of
The Death of Ivan Ilych, The Outsider, Darkness at Noon, Tess of the
D'Urbervilles, The Trial, Death of a Salesman, King Lear, Mother Courage,
and Murder in the Cathedral?
Chapter Six

CONCLUSION

Logic is the study of the form of arguments. It must be distinguished from the study of arguments which lack form. Case by case procedures may seem to be 'argument' which makes a virtue of formlessness. It is 'argument' without form but it is nevertheless reasoning. In all subjects we meet both concrete and abstract reasoning. It is a philosophical prejudice to prefer one over the other.

In a recent book Langford has looked again at the question 'What is education?' He suggests that just to ask the question is to leave it 'ambiguous between a particular question or questions ...' Thus if asked in the context of the activity of teaching it can be empirical or it can be prescriptive. It becomes philosophical when it embodies 'a request for the principle of identity according to which we recognise different educational traditions as instances of the same kind of thing.' Those who employ this 'principle' possess a 'higher order' concept of education, which like the laws of economics, apply to any tradition or alien culture. How would such an 'eternal' or 'abstract' principle help us at all? How would it increase our grasp of the concept of education? Is the uncovering of such a principle of philosophical interest? Is 'education' a 'higher order' concept which embodies a principle which is as generally applicable as the laws of economics? Langford's analogy fails him disastrously. Talking of the common characteristics of all 'epochs' of production Marx writes:

'Some determinations belong to all epochs others only to a few. Some determinations will be shared by the most modern epoch and the most ancient. No production will be thinkable without them; however, even though the most developed languages have laws and characteristics in common with the least developed, nevertheless, just those things which determine their development, i.e. the elements which are not general and common, must be separated out from the determinations valid for production as such, so that in their unity - which arises already from the identity of the subject, humanity, and of the object, nature - their essential difference is not forgotten. The whole profundity of those modern economists who demonstrate the eternity and harmoniousness of existing social relations lies in this forgetting.'

The economists real concern is not the general part. A case by case procedure forces us to concentrate on the essential differences rather than similarities. In doing so it may increase our grasp of the
concept of education. The dissimilarities are more important than the similarities: 'The whole profundity of modern philosophers of education who demonstrate the eternity and harmoniousness of the concept of education lies in this forgetting'.

6.1. Breaking a Habit of Thought

We have been concerned in this thesis with two things. Firstly, we have been trying to establish that our grasp of the concept of education is weakened by a failure to appreciate the role of examples. More generally we have been concerned with the neglect of case by case argument in contemporary educational thought. Secondly, we have been concerned to increase our grasp of the concept of education through examples, that is by trying to give something like a schematic case by case treatment of the concept. We have considered case after case of education. It may be that someone would deny that many of the instances which I have referred to are valid examples of education. This does not matter. For it cannot be denied that in giving examples and in discussing them that what was going on was reasoning. That there may be dispute and disagreement about certain examples does not mean that there has been no increase in grasp of the concept of education. As Wisdom put it when discussing legal cases where a judge or jury is called upon to make a decision about a case:

'... if it should happen that neither the answer "Yes" nor the answer "No" comes out unhesitatingly, this isn't the slightest indication that we haven't gained an extra grasp of the situation - the degree to which the classifying word is applicable is not correlated with the gain in grasp.' (VL III 5)

The case of the concept of education is similar. Looking at cases and reflecting upon them may give increased grasp. However doubts may still linger. To return to the more general point. Looking at case by case argument may incline us towards a greater grasp of what it is to reason and argue even though doubts may linger. There is a reason for this persistent doubt. We have been concerned to combat what Wisdom called a 'habit of thought' what we have more specifically labelled the 'criteriological tendency.' Words like 'habit' and 'tendency', as we have said, are meant to indicate how insidious certain ways of thinking are. They are not just sloppy or emotive terms. They are meant to suggest something that is essentially unreflective. What we are dealing
with is a sort of philosophical hydra, an inadequate notion of what it is to reason, to argue, to prove something. Cut off one of the heads and the tendency appears in a different guise. Again and again in his Virginia Lectures Wisdom, in discussion, came up against the almost spontaneous regeneration of the cramped notions of reasoning that he was trying to alleviate. As we saw, he expresses this in a suitably Kantian way:

'Unless one has a criterion that things are of a certain kind, then one cannot have a rational claim that a thing is of that kind or for a claim that it is not of that kind.' (VL. XII p.1)

The doubt we are discussing is just a further manifestation of this tendency. The doubt also takes another form. The very suggestion that we have any sort of grasp can be questioned. Thus the tendency finds expression in questions like 'How do we know when we have this grasp?' Wisdom replies to a similar question so well that it is worth quoting his answer at length:

'You perhaps think that an answer should take the form "when conditions C1...Cn are fulfilled". If so, the matter could be represented deductively. See how it creeps into the mind, this habit of thought. "Could you define the word?" -- implying that he doesn't know what he means (people seem to be taught that this can be asked in any intellectual company). As though W1 should be defined in terms of W2 and that in terms of W3 and so on and on. The habit of thinking that one doesn't understand a word unless one can define it ties our hands. People can have a grasp of usage without any criterion at all.

It is in fact instances which show what a persons grasp is. compare the court case (Was it negligence?) with the situation at the end; at the end if the counsel have done their job well, you don't want to go on with it - you may feel inclined to flip a coin for the answer, but that it reaches this in the end doesn't mean that it was to be settled that way in the beginning. One may detect increased grasp.' (VL III 6)

The hold of this habit of thought is very hard to break. It may be that we have not succeeded in breaking the hold of it even on one small and over-worked corner of the philosophy of education. It may be that after reading this someone will still search for criteria for education. As we have said several times this may not be an unilluminating thing to do. It may also lead to insights. But no one reading this thesis and following the arguments presented could go away without increased grasp of case by case argument and of the way in which the role of examples is underplayed in philosophy of education.
There is a further complication which we mentioned earlier which comes in with the question of what we do when someone does not take the examples given in the way we intend. It may be that such a negative response to the examples presented here would reduce the effectiveness of my defense of case by case argument. The problem is a general one not solely associated with the giving of examples, but one which is seen most clearly when examples are involved. The problem is best set out by applying one of Wittgenstein's great arguments to his own technique of giving examples.

6.2. Wittgenstein's Full Stop

Of the notion that we must always postulate some intermediary to explain something else - for example 'understanding' - whether it be an image or an idea, or whatever, Norman Malcolm makes the point that there is always the great criticism of Wittgenstein to be met: 'namely, his point that no matter what kind of state, paradigm, sample, structure, or rule is conceived of as giving us the necessary guidance, it could be taken, or understood, as indicating a different direction than the one in which we actually did go.' (5) Whether we give general criteria or definitions or examples these can always be misunderstood. D.Z. Phillips has recently discussed this criticism as far as it applies to examples. No matter how we present them, he argues, 'Examples may not be taken in the way we liked.' (6) Some philosopher or other may just not see their implications. At this point 'discussion may come to a full stop.' (7) The reason for this is that we all bring different knowledge and experience to each example and it is quite possible that given the same example 'one philosopher may say his spade is turned and another may go on.' (8) These remarks of Phillips' mean that there is nothing about an example per se which makes us take it as an example of one thing rather than another. The examples which have been given as examples of education can easily be taken to be examples of something else. No amount of discussion may influence our hypothetical philosopher. In going over such examples all that can be done is to try to bring to bear (using case by case procedure) aspects of experience which might incline our philosopher to take them in the way desired. Whether they will be or not depends largely on the individual who is examining the examples. Perhaps the consideration of examples in this thesis will have brought most people to a full stop, but they may also promote a certain movement onwards. (9)
Chapter One

Introduction

Chapter 2. pp. 3-4.


(3) ibid p. 13

(4) ibid p. 13


(6) ibid p. 178

(7) ibid p. 178

(8) ibid p. 178

(9) Two major objections may be noted here. Firstly, Kant illegitimately separates the application of concepts from having them. And secondly, in the 'schematism' he provides a general technique of concept application. All such techniques involve knowing that if some sort of description fits then we can apply the concept. But knowing this would be to apply the concept. For these and other objections in more detail see Bennett, J. Kant's Analytic, Cambridge, 1966. Ch. 10

(10) The argument is quite general. 'Education' is entertained here merely as an example and is of no peculiar power or value in itself. The misapprehension of this concept is not a misapprehension peculiar to itself. R.H.S. Tur in 'What is Jurisprudence?' (pp. 149-61 in The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 28 No. 111. April 1978) reflects upon the often unhappy and embarrassing attempts to answer this putative 'question'. He discusses many of the paradoxes that will occupy us. Three examples will establish that there are similarities. Firstly, he considers the possibility that 'the lack of an answer is attributable to the nature of the question' which 'presupposes an essentialist doctrine' whereas what is needed is a description of a 'form of life' (P. 150). Secondly he takes note of the fact that some authors seek definitions of central concepts while others 'do not see or feel the need for a definition' (p. 151). Thirdly, he remarks that some philosophers have an analytical approach which represents, for them, 'the essence of the subject'. This consists in the 'analyses of general legal concepts' not specific to any legal system, whereas he is more concerned with the nature of the subject itself.

(11) As to this point you pay your money and take your choice. Israel Scheffler (The Language of Education, Charles C. Thomas (U.S.A.) 1960, 'Introduction' pp. 4-7) seems to stress the connections between philosophy and science. Whereas R.S. Peters in some of his remarks about getting 'clearer' about the contours of the concept seems to be moving away from this paradigm. See Peters, R.S. et al. 'Aims of Education - A Conceptual Inquiry' in Peters, R.S. (Ed.) The Philosophy of Education O.U.P. 1973 pp. 11-57. p. 44. fn. 15(Hereafter Aims)
An example of treating the concept as if it were one uniform concept is provided in Peters' early discussion of the concept. See Peters, R.S. Authority Responsibility and Education, (1959) Revised Edition, George Allen and Unwin, 1973. Ch. 8. pp. 85-6. (Hereafter Authority.)


Dunlop ibid p. 41

see Dunlop ibid pp. 36-9


See Haack ibid p. 170


See Haack ibid p. 169-70


See Dunlop ibid p. 24

See Harnett and Naish ibid p. 84.

See Harnett and Naish ibid p. 78.

See Harnett and Naish ibid p. 78


Hirst and Peters ibid p. 6.

(32) See Reddiford ibid p. 206

(33) See Peters, R.S. Ethics and Education, George Allen and Unwin 1966. Ch. 1. p. 45. (Hereafter Ethics)

(34) See Peters, R.S. Authority. Ch. 8. p.91 Here 'conditions' and 'criteria' appear as aspects of the same coin.

(35) Woods and Barrow ibid p. 16

(36) Woods and Barrow ibid p. 16

(37) Peters, R.S. Ethics. Ch. 1. p. 24

(38) See Harnett and Naish ibid p. 74

(39) See Peters, Ethics. Ch. 1. pp. 23-4 and Haack, ibid pp. 170-7

The paradoxical nature of these sorts of questions when taken as requests for definition is recognised by John Passmore when talking of the concept of teaching: "These sound like real problems; a seminar, I am sure, could have a most animated time discussing them. But however lively, the discussion would be fruitless". The Philosophy of Teaching, Duckworth, 1980. p. 19 Passmore is also aware of the contrary nature of the 'answers' given to such 'questions'.

(40) See Earwaker, ibid p. 247. 'Form' refers to how the concept functions while 'content' tells us what it signifies.


(43) Snelders, P. 'An Essentially Contesting Philosopher: A Reply To John Wilson' pp. 17-22 in the Journal of Philosophy of Education Vol. 15. No. 1. 1981. The conflict between Wilson and Snelders could be contained in lists (a) and (b) if they were extended to include inscriptions like 'Is there a concept of education?'; 'Is there any concept of education?'; 'Is the concept of education reducible to a set of rule(s) of usage for the term 'education'?'. But the extension would be redundant as Snelders defends Hartnett and Naish (see fn. 22) while Wilson defends a position similar to that of F.N. Dunlop (see fn.17).

(44) Wilson, ibid p. 12

(45) To some extent the ubiquitous nature of the Kantian view is given expression in lists (a) and (b) and fns. 12-44. Textual incorporation would be possible but clumsy. The interrogative form allows a different aspect of the misapprehension to be presented.


(47) Peters, R.S. Authority p. 83

(48) Fielding, ibid pp. 132-33

(49) Peters, Ethics. Ch. 1. p. 23. Peters begins his seminal work with a denial—albeit qualified—of the possibility of a definitional formulation of the term 'education'. J. McLellan in philosophy of Education (Prentice Hall, 1976) argues that if such a definition is given this terminates our enquiry. (P.20).
The enumeration of different sorts of definition can be a seemingly endless business. 'Definition' is certainly not any sort of straightforward activity. N.R. Hanson in *Perception and Discovery*, (Freeman, Cooper and Co. (USA) 1969, Ch. 2: pp. 26-41) considers the following types of definition: Definition by synonyms; Prescriptive definition; hybrid definition; historical-authoritative reportal definition; stipulative definition; stipulative-descriptive definition; definition by analysis; definition by genus and differentia; definition by synthesis; causal definition; systemic definition; implicit definition; denotative definition; ostensive definition; regular definition; axiomatic definition; indirect definition; operational definition to name but a few. Hanson concludes that at least one general recipe for confusion in this area derives from taking scientific laws as models for 'definition'.


There may be only one criterion as many people do not have the more 'specific' concept which is marked by the 'desirability' criterion.


(68) Ziff, ibid. Ch. VI

(69) Snelders ibid p.21


(71) Passmore, J. The Philosophy of Teaching, Duckworth, 1980. Ch.1. p.16


(73) Fairhurst, ibid, pp. 207-8.


(75) Wisdom, J. 'Price's "Thinking and Experience", pp. 104-113 in Paradox and Discovery, Basil Blackwell, 1965. p. 113

(76) Wisdom, J. Virginia Lectures, (Unpublished Manuscript) Lecture 1

(77) These instances derive from Wisdom's discussion of the possibilities of documentation in the first Chapter of the Virginia Lectures.

(78) See 'Forum' in the 'Educational Guardian' in The Guardian 27.8.74.


(80) This sort of discussion often occurs when 'progressive' primary schools are being discussed. See Sturgess, D. 'Happenings in a Primary School' in Rubinstein, D. and Stoneman, C. Education for Democracy, Penguin, 1972. pp. 91-7.

(81) The Guardian 22.2.80.

(82) The so-called 'Great Debate' had, however, been going on for sometime.

(83) See the review of two books on the subject by Wilby, P. entitled 'Trubulent Priests' in the New Statesman 22.10.76. pp. 564-5

(84) Scheffler, ibid, Ch. 111. p. 48.

(85) See Armstrong, D.M. Belief Truth and Knowledge, C.U.P. 1973 Part III. Ch. 10. Section VI. p. 146

(86) Radford, C. 'Knowledge - by examples' Analysis. 27. 1966-7


(88) See Armstrong, ibid, Ch. 10. We should note that Radford accepts his counter example is an artificial one merely reducing the range of applicability of the belief condition to most cases. See his 'Knowing and Telling' The Philosophical Review Vol. LXXVIII, 1969. pp. 326-336

(89) See Peters, Ethics. pp. 23-24

(90) Dunlop, ibid, p.24


(93) See the account in Daniels, *ibid*, pp. 239-41.

(94) For a similar point see Skillen, T. *Ruling Illusions*, The Harvester Press, 1977. Ch. 4. pp. 124-25. Skillen argues that indeterminate examples are used by moral philosophers to encourage a 'lazy subjectivism'.

(95) For an example of this method at work in a supposedly ironical context see Scruton, R. *The Meaning of Conservatism*, Penguin Books, 1980. Conservatism is essentially inarticulate (p.11) and it 'is of the nature of conservatism to avoid abstraction' (p.17). It may be added that the examples and abstractions (of which there are many in the arguments) remain unrelated.

(96) Kohl, H. *The Open Classroom*, Methuen, 1973. 'Introduction' p.15

(97) Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations* (1952) Trans. by Anscombe, G.E.M., Basil Blackwell, Third Edition, 1968. References to this work will be incorporated into the body of the text in a conventional way. References to Part 1 will be given by section number:-(P.I. s. 34). References to Part 2 will include both sections and page no:- (P.II. xi. p.203).


(101) Wittgenstein, L. *The Blue and Brown Books*, Basil Blackwell, 1972. p. 20. Wittgenstein refers to Socrates as having this attitude to examples. (See the *Thaetetus* 146 D - 7 C)


(105) References to the *Virginia Lectures* (Unpublished Manuscript) will be incorporated into the text using the following conventions. The initials VL will be followed by the Lecture number in Roman numerals, and the page number in Arabic numerals eg; (VL.III.3.) The typescript is not paginated consecutively.


(108) Kant, *ibid* p. 43. (B.3)

(110) See, for example, his remarks on James' treatment of religion in (VI.XI.3). Essential to James' method was the consideration of outlying and very outlying cases.

(111) This exposition is largely drawn from Gasking, D.A.T. 'The Philosophy of John Wisdom' pp. 1-41 in Bambrough. pp. 2-7.

(112) For a more detailed treatment of this example see Dilman, I Induction and Deduction, Blackwell, 1973. Ch. 9.


(118) Malcolm, ibid. p. 179


(120) Malcolm, N. 'G.E. Moore' ibid pp. 181-82


(123) Dunlop, ibid, p. 21.


(126) Hirst and Peters, Logic. Ch. 1. pp. 3-12


(129) Harnett and Naish, ibid, p. 77.

(131) Austin, ibid p. 60

(132) Hirst and Peters, Logic. Ch. 1. pp. 3-12

(133) See Earwaker, ibid p. 256

(134) Earwaker, ibid p. 256

(135) Wilson, ibid p. 15

(136) With what effect we shall see in Ch. 3.


(138) See Bennet, ibid, Ch. 6. a. 21. p. 75.


(141) RFM V. 38

(142) Chihara, C.S. 'Mathematical Discovery and Concept Formation' pp. 448-68. in Pitcher. pp. 464-65

(143) RFM V. 50

(144) RFM V. 50

(145) RFM I. 147-49

(146) RFM I. 50

(147) RFM I. 70

(148) Austin, ibid For an account of Wittgenstein's treatment of mathematical concepts see Slater, B.H. 'Wittgenstein's Later Logic'. pp. 199-209 in Philosophy, 54. 1979


(150) Hamlyn, ibid, pp. 37-38

Chapter Two Rules and Criteria


(2) Flew, ibid. pp. 324-5

(3) Hirst and Peters, Logic. Ch. 1. p.5.

(5) See Ziff, ibid Ch. 5. p. 151

(6) Reddificord, ibid p. 196

(7) Reddifikord, ibid p. 197

(8) For a discussion of such 'logical truths' see Slater, B.H. 'Wittgenstein's Later Logic' in *Philosophy* 54 1979. pp. 199-209

(9) Earwaker, ibid p. 257


(12) Ganz, ibid Ch. IV. s.4. pp. 117-124


(15) Ganz, ibid Ch. 3. p. 104 and 'Preface' p. 5

(16) See Ganz, ibid Ch. 1. and Ch. IV

(17) Ziff, ibid 'Appendix to 1' pp. 34-38. p. 38


(21) See Austin, J.L. *Performative-Constative* pp. 13-22 in Searle, J.R. (Ed.) *The Philosophy of Language*, O.U.P. pp. 14-15. One reason we may incline towards the language of 'rules' here is to express the depth of our feelings, the more so the more serious the promise.


(24) This seems to be a repetition of an error of Kant's. See Ch. 1. Fn. 9.

(25) See Earwaker, ibid pp. 247-8

(26) See the bibliography and footnotes in Lycan, W.G. "Noninductive Evidence" Recent Work on Wittgenstein's "Criteria". pp. 109-25 in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 8, 1971. Lycan lists about 120 in his article and there have been many since then several of which have been and will be discussed in this thesis.


Albritton, R. 'On Wittgenstein's Use of the Term "Criterion", pp. 231-50 in Pitcher. p. 235

Albritton, ibid p. 235


See Ziff's criticisms of Garver, Symposium p. 81

Ginet, Symposium pp.72-3

Ginet, Symposium p. 73

Seigler, Symposium p.79

For 'insufficient conditions' see the discussion of Richardson's 'theory of criteria' below.

Dunlop, ibid p.38. Dunlop is clarifying what he takes to be implicit in Peters' work.

Dunlop, ibid p.41

Dunlop, ibid p. 41

Dunlop, ibid p. 41

Many of these alternatives will be considered in more depth in Chapter 4.


Oakshott, ibid p.22


Ryle, ibid p. 176. Ryle criticises the Aristotelian notion of distinguishing a species by reference to 'some single and simple differentiating property.' His use of 'thought' is not essentialist, unless someone is going to argue that by calling games 'games' we are being essentialists.

Hyle, ibid pp. 190-1


Dunlop, ibid p. 38. He even talks of the necessity as à priori.

Waismann, F. The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy. Edited

(51) Stroud, B. 'Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity' pp. 477-496 in Pitcher. p.493


(54) Lycan, ibid p.110

(55) These points derive from Lycan op cit.


(57) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. II. p. 34. I have run several of Richardson's points together.

(58) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. IV

(59) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. V. p. 126

(60) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. III. p. 51

(61) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. III. p. 75

(62) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. V. p. 126

(63) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. V. p. 125 slightly paraphrased.

(64) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. V. p. 112

(65) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. V. p. 109

(66) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. V. p. 109

(67) See my account of Wittgenstein's 'style' in section 2-7 and Chapter 3.

(68) This story derives from a memoir by Gasking and Jackson, and is well known. See Binkley, T. Wittgenstein's Language, Martinus Nijhoff/The Hague, 1973. p.39


(70) See Fielding, ibid pp. 132-3

(71) Richardson, Grammar. Ch. III. p. 57


(74) Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations, p. 10 See also Zettel s. 444

(76) Bambrough, ibid p. 125

(77) Richardson, Grammar, Ch. V. p. 122

(78) Richardson, Grammar, Ch. V. p. 124

(79) Richardson, Grammar, Ch. V. p. 129

(80) See the discussion of 'rules' in section 2.2

(81) See Richardson, Grammar, Ch. 3. pp. 56-57. I shall return to this point later.


(83) See Locke's Essay, in particular Bk. 3. Ch. 3. Para. 3.

(84) These difficulties are discussed in my M.A. thesis The Theory of Signs in John Locke, University of Kent, 1975

(85) Hare, R.M. The Language of Morals, (1952) O.U.P. 1972 I refer to Chapter 6, 'Meaning and Criteria' pp. 94-111

(86) See Woods, R.G. and Barrow, R. St. C., An Introduction to Philosophy of Education, Methuen, 1975 Ch. 1.

(87) Woods and Barrow, ibid Ch. 1. p. 14


(89) See Woods and Barrow, ibid Ch. 1. p. 15. and Hare, ibid Ch. 6 p. 111

(90) Woods and Barrow, ibid, pp 15

(91) Woods and Barrow, ibid, p. 17 Footnote

(92) Hare, ibid, p. 102

(93) Hare, ibid, p. 95

(94) Hare, ibid, p. 103

(95) Hare, ibid, p. 105


(97) Holdcroft, ibid, p. 175

(98) Holdcroft, ibid, p. 177

(99) See Hare, ibid, Ch. 5. p. 79 and Ch. 7. p. 112

(100) Ziff, P. Semantic Analysis, Cornell University Press (USA) 1960

(101) Ziff, ibid, p. 247

ibid p. 25


This idea is important as we shall see when discussing 'family resemblance' and in particular Schwyzers article 'Essence Without Universals'. See below.


ibid s. 463


Pears, ibid, Part 2. Ch. 9. p. 176

Pears, ibid, Part 2. Ch. 9. p. 177

Pears, ibid, Part 2. Ch. 9. p. 178

Pears, ibid, Part 2. Ch. 9. p. 183


See Haack, ibid, p. 170. I have added the criteriological interpretation of essentialism as Haack does not mention it.

Haack, ibid, p. 170

Haack, ibid p. 170

Haack, ibid p. 170

Haack, ibid pp. 170-1

Peters, Philosophies. pp. 478-9

Peters, Ethics, Ch. 1. p. 24

Problems about whether there are one, two, several, or innumerable concepts of education will be discussed in Ch. 3. and Ch. 4.

See Peters, R.S. Ethics. Ch. 1. Logic. (with P.H. Hirst) Ch. 1 and Ch. 2. and Aims.

Peters, Authority, Ch. 58 p. 83

Peters, Authority. Ch. 8. p. 85
Originally Peters defended the idea that there were three criteria of education. See Ethics. Ch. 1. and Authority. Ch. 8. Writing more recently in particular with Paul Hirst in Logic, he defends two, the third being superfluous. But the desirability criterion is questionable, so perhaps there is only one criterion?

Chapter Three

Three Metaphors


(4) Hirst and Peters, Logic. Ch. 1. p. 6

(5) Hirst and Peters, Logic. Ch. 1. p. 6

(6) Hirst and Peters, Logic. Ch. 1. p. 6

(7) Hirst and Peters, Logic. Ch. 1. pp. 6-7


(12) Rhees, ibid p.3. Rhees gives no reference for his quotation.

(13) Peters, Ethics. Ch. 1. p. 23


(16) Hirst and Peters, Logic. Ch. 2. p. 24

(17) Dearden, ibid p. 79

(18) Dearden, ibid p. 80


(20) Dearden, ibid p. 85 (My italics)

(21) Midgley, ibid p. 231

(22) Midgley, M. ibid See p. 232 lines 4-5, lines 11-13, 16-18; p. 233 lines 9-10, 10-12, 25-28, p. 244 lines 12-17, 18-20, p. 249 lines 17-19; p. 252 lines 30-31, 34-35; p. 253 lines 3-4, 6-8.

(23) Midgley, ibid p. 249

(24) Midgley, ibid p. 249

(25) Midgley, ibid pp. 231-32

(26) Midgley, ibid p. 232

(27) Midgley, ibid p. 232

(28) Midgley, ibid p. 232

(29) Midgley, ibid p. 232

(30) Midgley, ibid p. 232

(31) Midgley, ibid p. 233

(32) Midgley, ibid p. 233

(34) Midgley, ibid p. 252

(35) Midgley, ibid p. 248

(36) Midgley, ibid p. 244

(37) Midgley, ibid p. 245

(38) Khatchadourian, H. 'Common Names and Family Resemblances' pp. 205-30 in Pitcher p. 212

(39) ibid p. 213

(40) ibid p. 217

(41) ibid pp. 213-4 fn. 6

(42) Midgley, ibid p. 233

(43) Midgley, ibid p. 233


(46) Midgley, ibid p. 233


(48) Hirst and Peters, Logic. Ch. 1. p.6


(50) Bambrough, ibid pp. 189-90


(52) Schwyzer, ibid, p. 76


See also Ruby, P.M. 'Family Resemblance', pp. 66-7. Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 18

(54) Fogelin, ibid, p. 118


(56) ibid p. 17


(59) A point made in a Wittgenstein seminar by Dr. Colin Radford.


(62) Richardson, Grammar Ch. 5. p. 128

Chapter Four Essence And Education


(2) Earwaker, ibid pp. 252-52

(3) Earwaker, ibid footnotes 17, pp. 258

(4) More evidence has to be produced to show that the term 'education' is troublesome. Philosophers are prone to thinking that this is obviously the case and to suggest ultimately idle ways of making ordinary language more rigorous. An example is Passmore who suggests that 'A systematic book on the philosophy of education would need, in fact, to distinguish between education 1 (upbringing), education 2 (schooling), education 3 (producing educated men), - to say nothing of education 4, the study of these processes'. (The Philosophy of Teaching, Duckworth, 1980 Ch. 2. p.22). Applying this system of subscripts to Earwaker's analysis and attempting to distinguish between specific concepts 'B' and 'D' would produce an endless series.


(7) ibid p. 32

(8) ibid p. 10

(9) ibid p. 32

(10) ibid p. 7

(11) ibid p. 18

(12) ibid p. 18

(13) ibid p. 19

(14) ibid p. 19

(15) ibid p. 24

(16) ibid p. 24

(17) Inglis, F. Ideology and the Imagination, C.U.P., 1975 Ch.2. p.58

(18) ibid p. 58


(20) ibid p. 449

(21) ibid p. 452
(22) ibid pp. 452-3


(24) ibid p. 764


(26) ibid pp. 180-1

(27) Tolstoy, L. Anna Karenin, pp. 768-78

(28) The classical discussion of 'aspect change' occurs in P.I. II s.xi. This account follows Hanson, N.R. Patterns of Discovery, C.U.P. 1972. Ch. I and Ch. IV.

(29) ibid p. 8

(30) ibid p. 16

(31) ibid p. 30


(33) Bambrough, R. Reason Truth and God, Methuen, 1969. Ch. 7 p. 121


(35) A leaflet distributed by the 'British Association for the Application of Transcendental Meditation in Education'.


(38) Scheffler, I. The Language of Education, Charles G. Thomas U.S.A. 1960 Ch. 2. p. 36

(39) ibid Ch. 1. p. 17

(40) ibid Ch. 1. p. 32

(41) ibid Ch. 1. p. 32


(44) Reddiford, ibid p. 199

(45) Reddiford, ibid p. 207

Chapter Five  Education by Examples

(1) Golding, W. The Inheritors, Faber and Faber, 1955. See Ch. 2
The Neanderthalers think in images: 'Quite without warning, all the
people shared a picture inside their heads'. Ch. 2. p. 38

(2) Thus we must gloss over problems of authorial intention. If
unknown material came to light to inform us that the authors beliefs
or intentions were different we would have to take the work in the way
he intended. (See Chioffi, F. 'Intention and Interpretation in Criticism'
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LVIV, 1963-4). If material
came to light to show that one of the authors I cite expressly denied
that the example can be taken of one of 'education' then it might have
to be rejected.


(4) *ibid* Ch. 1. p. 13

(5) *ibid* 'Notes to Chapter One' p. 33

(6) *ibid* 'Notes to Chapter One' p. 33

(7) *ibid* Ch. 1. p. 17

(8) Leavis, F.R. 'Literary Criticism and Philosophy' pp. 211-222

(9) Rhees, R. 'Learning and Understanding' pp. 155-64 in Without


(11) *ibid* p. 226

(12) *ibid* p. 214


(14) Picador Books, 1976
(15) Fontana, 1969
(16) Macmillan, 1972. Ch. 1. – Ch. 6
(17) Everyman, 1970
(18) Everyman, 1972
(19) ibid p. 258
(20) Daily Sketch Publications, undated. See also Rousseau, J.J. Emile
(21) ibid p. 59
(22) Signet, 1960
(23) ibid pp. 38–41
(24) ibid p. 212
(25) Penguin, 1966
(26) Penguin 1976. The Villanelle appears on p. 223. The discovery
of the preliminary draft Stephen Hero complicates matters in the way
suggested in fn. 2. But, if anything, this is in favour of our case.
(27) Penguin 1970
(28) ibid p. 399
(29) ibid p. 493
(30) Everyman 1973
(31) ibid p. 1
(32) ibid p. 331
(33) Penguin 1973
(34) W.H. Allen, 1979
(35) ibid Part III. p. 304
(36) ibid Part III. p. 305
(37) Penguin 1972
(38) ibid p. 165
(39) ibid p. 334
(40) Penguin, 1972
(41) ibid p. 109
(42) ibid p. 137
(43) ibid p. 159
(44) ibid p. 160
(45) Penguin 1973
(46) ibid p. 84
See, for example, the 'Introduction' to Dickens, C. *Pickwick Papers*, (1836-7) Penguin Books, 1974. p. 25


Reddiford, ibid, p. 207. Another parallel that suggests itself is 'education' as undertaken by the Houyhnhnm's. Gulliver tells us that 'They have no fondness for their colts or foals, but the care they take in educating them proceeds entirely from the dictates of reason'. (See Swift, J. *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), Penguin Books, 1974, Part IV. p.316 What Reddiford says of Peters can be repeated in the case of Langford's 'learning to be a person' which also seems a primitive notion. D.H. Lawrence's remarks in *Studies in Classic American Literature*, (Penguin Books, 1974 Ch. 2. p. 15.) seem appropriate: 'Education'. Which of the various me's do you propose to educate, and which do you propose to supress? ... Is Yale College going to educate the self that is in the dark of you, or Harvard College?'


ibid p. 156-7

ibid Appendix to Ch. VIII pp. 177-8

Examples in this schematic account will be indeterminate in a sense familiar from Ch. 1. However, this does not matter as we are merely indicating how to answer the sceptic and not attempting to illuminate a concept.

Wittgenstein, L. *Zettel*, University of California Press (USA) 1970. s. 295


ibid p. 37. Hamlyn rejects empiricist accounts of concept acquisition. We cannot acquire a concept simply by reviewing instances and seeing what is common to them all. We cannot do this because some principle of organisation is required which allows us to see these particular things as instances. Where his view differs from that presented here is that he sees the organising factor as a 'general proposition' whereas we take it to be a 'form of life' or 'culture'. Hamlyn seems to imply that to have a concept we must be able to state the general underlying principle even in the case of terms like 'red'. But he equivocates. On p. 26 he runs 'without some appreciation of
general principles' and 'some idea of what it is all about' together. But these are quite different. What he says of the blind man's understanding of 'red' is more in line with the latter than the former. Nor does Hamlyn attempt to deal with cases where there is no obvious principle of organisation, e.g. the concept of a 'game'. With his general point about wanting to maintain a balance between the general and particular in teaching subjects such as physics we can only agree.


(67) ibid p. 101

(68) ibid p. 107

(69) ibid p. 102

(70) ibid p. 106

(71) ibid p. 109

Chapter Six

Conclusion


(2) ibid p. 77

(3) ibid p. 80

(4) Marx, K. Grundrisse, Trans. by Martin Nicolaus, Penguin 1977 'Introduction' p. 85. My italics. Different 'cultures' and 'traditions' in the economic analogy will be simultaneously existing 'epochs'.


(6) Phillips, D.Z. 'Wittgenstein's Full Stop' a paper read to the Philosophy Society of the University of Kent at Canterbury, 16th November 1977. (Quotations from notes).

(7) ibid

(8) ibid

(9) I would like to thank Reynold Jones for advice and criticism, but above all else for encouragement.