DRAWING AND THE DRAWING ACTIVITY:
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION

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THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

1982
This thesis is a philosophical examination of the phenomenon of drawing. Drawing is considered as the means whereby the draughtsman makes actual, through making graphic, his perceptual interchange with and implicit reflection of the world. The concern is set not so much in what is affected, as what is being affected. Drawing is viewed primarily as process, as the movement toward meaning. This movement is evidence of the draughtsman's imaginative engagement and brings space and time together. Through his drawing, caught within all its material structuring, he temporalises space and spatialises time. These together found and promote its image. The drawing, as image in form, demonstrates the draughtsman's move from the 'lived' of his experience to the 'thought about'. His transcription moreover discloses an intrinsic subject/object dialectic and founds the whole possibility of the drawing's 'world', ordered and sustained through all its representative and expressive potential. In this context the views of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Dufrenne, Wollheim and Witkin among others are examined.

In the light of these theoretical considerations and as visual
support for the arguments, the drawings of five draughtsmen are discussed. These are further amplified through transcripts of conversations about their own drawing activity. The work of three of these is presented through time-lapse sequence photographs, to give opportunity to discuss in detail the process of the activity itself.

The thesis maintains that the draughtsman is a phenomenologist. Within the scope of all the ways he makes his marks, through all their transmutations, he seeks routes for the interrogation of how things are. Through his drawings he seeks to inscribe a fecund spatiality that gives visibility back to vision. This is the ontological status of drawing and this is the phenomenological concern.
To Sylvia, David and Michael.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks are due to both my supervisors, Mr. Stanisław Frenkiel and Dr. Tony Dyson of the Art Department, Institute of Education, University of London. Mr. Frenkiel's passionate involvement in art, his profound grasp of philosophical issues and his wide cultural experience coupled with his perceptive and sustained intellectual support in the process and progress of this thesis have been of immeasurable value. To Dr. Dyson I owe my thanks for his always ready encouragement and advice and for his careful and painstaking pursuit of the detail of each argument and the unceasing help to find precisely the most effective means for its presentation.

My thanks also to the draughtsmen who participated in the project; to David Cowley, Arthur Di Stephano, Wynn Jones, Wendy Thompson and Feliks Topolski, for their patience, their interest and understanding and their willingness to allow their work to be photographed and included in the documentation and for their generosity in allowing transcripts of their conversations with me to be included. My thanks also to Ann Winn, a painter and colleague in the Art Department at the Roehampton Institute; to Mike Jedderburg, a student at the Royal College
of Art; to Bina Roberts, Susanne Sprenger and June Wyles, students at St. Martin's School of Art, who also took part, but whose work, for reasons outlined elsewhere in the thesis, is not included.

My thanks are also due to the Rector, Professor Kevin Keohane and the Art Staff of the Roehampton Institute for their generous agreement that I be allowed study leave during 1978/1979. My thanks also to Judy Ollington, a colleague in the Religious Studies Department at the Roehampton Institute for many rich and provocative discussions on the central issues and for her tireless encouragement.

I wish to thank Professor Peter de Francia, of the Painting School at the Royal College of Art for his interest and valuable advice and for permission to work in the School. Also my thanks to the staff and students of the school whose discussions stimulated areas for my own subsequent investigations.

My thanks too, to Ian Simpson, Principal of St. Martin's School of Art, for his generous support and for permission to work in the Painting School and in the Graphic Design Department.

I am grateful to Dermot Goulding, Head of the Photography Unit at St. Martin's School of Art and to his technicians for their invaluable support and technical help in the preparation and presentation of the photographic material.

I would like to thank Mr. Bosley of the Film Unit of the University
of London for his advice and for the impeccable presentation of the film strips.

My thanks also to Philip Rawson, Dean of Goldsmith's College, London, whose generous interest and support has given me much encouragement. I have greatly valued his advice and suggestions and have been fortunate in benefitting from his wide and authoritative experience in the field of drawing.

Finally I wish to record my gratitude and indebtedness to Sylvia, my wife, for her meticulous typing and presentation of the manuscript and for all the typing and presentation of previous preparatory material. I could not have completed this project without her and her wholehearted practical support.
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INTRODUCTION


Drawing is essentially the particular means an individual finds for ordering and uncovering his perception of the world. In the sense in which I wish to use the term, I will consider 'drawing' as an endeavour to bring together, through such elements as lines, strokes and other marks, made by an implement on a surface, some kind of visible formulation - a graphic structuring. Drawing is concerned with using these elements to bring into being something that is not presented as such in the natural world. To make a drawing is supremely to make an invention. As Rawson(l) points out, all these elements 'have a symbolic relationship with experience, not a direct, overall similarity with anything real'(op cit pl). The examination of this 'reality' will, of course, form part of our philosophical task. However, drawing, in this sense, is the graphic means through which a particular experience, a particular visual experience can be brought into such a form as to make that experience accessible, not only to us as spectators, but also to the draughtsman.
For the phenomenologist, the examination and description of these structures is of supreme interest. If as we suggest, they reflect the individual's interchange with the world, their traces will evidence his movement through this experience. This movement, as we shall see, discloses the dynamic of his graphic imagination. Any consideration of this interchange between the draughtsman and his 'world', where he, as subject, confronts and seeks to penetrate through his drawings, the world as 'object', immediately raises a dialectic which has profound phenomenological reverberations and which will continue to occupy us throughout our ensuing discussions.

In an important sense then, drawing, like the art activity itself, of which it is an aspect, is a direct means of actualising visual experience. Furthermore, because of its particularity of means, there is a necessary uniqueness to the ordering of this experience, which we shall be considering in some detail later. Essentially drawing is a means which enables us to clarify an area of our experience that we cannot reach through words or language, and this is important. In our ordinary intercourse with the world we use verbal denotation to fix and define our experience. This is one way of forming our experience. Yet there are, as Rawson suggests,

"... a huge number of other genuine, valid 'forms' of experience ... for which we have no conventionally associated words. They probably constitute a submerged 98 per cent of our actual, perceived experience. But they lie atrophied and inert in our minds, unless we can find ways of bringing them forward into consciousness." (ibid p26).

This begins to open something of the 'reality' drawing encompasses. To make a drawing is to cast thinking in a particular direction; it is to
give experience a particular momentum. In experiencing a drawing we are moving in an area of thinking and understanding that cannot be reached through any other means. It is important to emphasise that drawing is not language, neither is it speaking; it casts 'reality', however this might be constituted, into a form that we come to recognise as drawing. Drawing is therefore not only a means to the articulation of experience; in an important sense, it becomes experience. Here, drawing is not simply the vehicle for the expression of thinking, as though thinking were elsewhere. Drawing is the very embodiment of thinking, indeed, as Merleau-Ponty(2) has said, when I see the drawing, "It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or with it, than that I see it." (op cit p 60).

We think through and with the drawing. In one sense, we are through the drawing. As Beittel(3) has also observed:

"The self is not a thing nor inviolable. The drawing makes the self quite as much as the self makes the drawing." (op cit p49).

To think graphically is not to think in words, it alters the dimension of consideration of what constitutes thinking and understanding. What is no longer becomes only what can be said there is. Indeed, Madenfort(4) has pointed out:

"Art is not the expression of the embodiment of experience which is mediated by means of concepts. Such expression is reserved for language. Art is the only form of expression devised by man to embody the immediate sensuousness of his living experiences." (op cit pl33).

One of the paradoxes of all art criticism is that it is concerned with writing about what is essentially expressive in other terms. Indeed, in writing about the activity of drawing, for example, it becomes
something else and even the support of the necessarily static photographic images cannot uncover the primary stratum of that dynamic and direct interchange of "the very private affair" as Beittel says (op cit p25), between the individual and his drawing. We can only look at the shadows that are made on the surface of the paper and make inferences toward that which inspired the drawing. Any such enquiry is necessarily lodged within the locus of this speculative limitation.

1. 2. **Direction of present enquiry.**

I am not seeking to uphold a particular methodology of drawing. My enquiry is not toward setting up principles for drawing activity. I am not concerned to suggest there is only one way that drawing should be taught or one way in which drawing can be defined. To do this would be to fall prey to a determinism antagonistic to my philosophical position. My concern is to demonstrate that the drawing activity, by whatever means and toward whatever intention, survives the determinism of a particular methodology and is concerned with a primary activity of thinking. It is true that the historical and sociological context of drawing cannot be ignored, but I am not working to demonstrate that one method or technique is paramount, neither am I suggesting that only 'objective' drawing is important. Had I been writing in Ruskin's day my whole thesis would have been clear, I would have been concerned with describing drawing as a technique for a particular purpose - a means for the expression of a certain lyrical, romantic and somewhat nostalgic view of nature. Paul Klee, on the other hand,
has presented a whole new philosophy of drawing and a fresh attitude emphasising a more formalist view - a more direct contact with immediate sensory experience.

There is a sense, and Meeson(5) has touched on this, in which both the writings of Ruskin and Klee show a shift in the central concern for the consideration of drawing today. Ruskin was concerned with the experience of 'physical-optical' seeing and the recording of this through the particular techniques and skills of employing tone, chiaroscuro, perspective etc. - a 'naturalistic' approach. Reference to an idea or feeling was made via the drawing to an object or form in nature. In Klee's work, on the other hand, reference is centred about the drawing itself, where it takes on a more positively symbolic role. Thus, through the formal elements of the drawing - point, line and plane - he makes a structural ordering, not unlike mathematics, that questions not the idea of a 'window on the world' but a 'world in the window' - the metaphorical importance of pictorial space.

I am considering within this thesis the drawings of individuals that make reference to the everyday world - and by doing so they necessarily use the conventions of drawing - lines, strokes and other marks, to convey the sense of their experience of this world. My concern, however, is not that these drawings are set within the 'naturalist' framework of someone like Ruskin but rather that the means whereby the individual records his experience is primarily an indication of the symbolic relationship of the terms of the contract of his experience. Thus, the people I am working with are employing
particular techniques to achieve their purpose, but these are not strictly defined in academic terms — their concern is not so much to present a record of their 'physical-optical' engagement with the world but rather to demonstrate a characteristic attitude of thinking. Arthur di Stephano, a first-year painter at the Royal College of Art, shows this in his drawings. He uses a flexible and probing line to demonstrate the way he sees the articulation of the space surrounding the model. There is more connection with Klee than Ruskin; indeed, his drawing is evidence that he draws as he does because of the history of ideas in drawing that have manifested themselves during the last fifty years.

1.3. **Purpose and intention of drawing.**

The idea that drawings are made from other drawings is an important one. Any drawing looks more like any other drawing than it looks like whatever it is a drawing of. What is crucial here is that in the first place a drawing becomes an object through representing a single unified space and in turn the drawing through becoming an 'object' in this sense, can symbolise as well as represent things outside itself. To these issues we shall return.

Thus the purpose and intentions behind drawings are important. Further, by seeing, as Merleau-Ponty says, "according to" (op cit p 60) the drawing, we are no longer engaged in how it may represent or otherwise physical-optical engagement. We are concerned to see
how far, as he(6) points out, the drawing becomes "coherent deformation" (op cit p91), and how the elements of our own perceptual experience are reshaped and reformed within an area of logical possibility — whose forms have a coherence that give fresh insights to seeing.

Nelson Goodman(7) has remarked:

"In representation, the artist must make use of old habits when he wants to elicit novel objects and connections. If his picture is recognised as almost but not quite referring to the commonplace furniture of the everyday world, or if it calls for and yet resists assignment to a usual kind of picture, it may bring out neglected likenesses and differences, force unaccustomed associations, and in some measure remake our world. And if the point of the picture is not only successfully made but is also well-taken, if the realignments it directly and indirectly effects are interesting and important, the picture — like a crucial experiment — makes a genuine contribution to knowledge." (op cit p3).

In an important way, therefore, drawings do not so much define as disclose. What is reached in a drawing is still being reached toward. The search is to disclose what is, yet is always becoming. This is where drawing becomes process, where its purposiveness is caught in seeking the means for disclosing what cannot be reached in any other way.

2.1. Philosophical framework of present enquiry.

I have spoken of drawing as being the actualising of our experience of the world in a particular way. Cassirer(8) has noted that:

"Pure experience, which is the source and kernel of all our knowledge of reality can never be sought elsewhere than in our simple original perceptions, untouched by theoretical interpretations. The
"reality of perception is the only certain and unproblematical, the only primary datum of all knowledge." (op cit p23).

My direct experience of the world through my perceptions is the point from which the phenomenologists begin. Phenomenology is the philosophical model from which I will pursue my descriptions of drawing and from which I will seek to clarify the particular relational significance of the on-going dialectic of the activity itself.

Merleau-Ponty(9) has suggested in his book *Phenomenology of Perception* that phenomenology is a philosophy for which the world is 'already there', before reflection begins, as an unalienable presence. Phenomenology seeks to uncover the most primary and fundamental aspects of experience. It is a philosophy of radical empiricism, for what it seeks to do is to reveal the factors of our experience without presupposing anything other than the primary experience of our being in the world. It studies what all the particular sciences take for granted and what we also in our 'natural' every-day interchange with the world take for granted. Phenomenology reaches back to things themselves in their essentiality and their manner of appearing to us. It questions the source and origins of our perceptions and seeks to describe them without recourse to existing philosophic or psychological positions.

Pierre Thévenaz(10), in his essay on *Phenomenology*, has said:

"Phenomenology is neither a science of objects, nor a science of the subject; it is a science of experience. It does not concentrate exclusively on either the object of experience or on the subject of experience, but on the point of contact where being and consciousness meet. It is, therefore, a study of consciousness as intentional, as directed toward objects, as living in an intentionally constituted world." (op cit pl9).
Thus, in that particular area of concern, at that particular point of contact, in that particular and peculiar and unique interaction between the draughtsman and his world which we call drawing, can be seen to appear structures of meaning and significance that give indications of a particular view of mind.

Natural science, for example, can tell me something about the physical nature of the world of things, but it can do nothing to explain my experience of things that asks questions about the way I see beyond the natural presentation of things. My experience of pleasure is an example. My aesthetic experience cannot be contained by laws, it cannot be formulated as a science – it is a different ordering. This antepredictive experience is given before science can begin.

Merleau-Ponty in a telling passage says:

"All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge is gained from my own particular point of view, or from some experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless. The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by re-awakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression." (ibid pVIII).

And again Merleau-Ponty(2) in his essay Eye and Mind says: "Science manipulates things and gives up living in them." (op cit p55). Objectivity, deductive reasoning and a claim to truth through a causal determinism have become the structures through which science has reached its conclusions. This has had its effect on philosophy, through a suggestion that truth can be reached through a hierarchical stratum of logical structuring that can be objectified, set apart and determined as
propositions. There is a tradition of 'intellection' which sucks the very life blood from areas of experience that cannot be so causally and coldly considered as facts. The world loses its 'opaqueness'. It loses its ambiguity and becomes an 'object-in-itself' for consideration and elaboration. Mind becomes separated from body, and as Rudolf Arnheim (11) suggests, thought "moves among abstractions" (op cit pV) and cognition is determined only by reflective judgement separated from any context, situation or relational concern. Pre-reflective experience is negated and antepredictive experience only given credit by the way it can be described. The tacit dimension of experience, of being and knowing, is not regarded as a knowing of which we cannot tell. All thought, all experience is only such as can be crystallised in language. In an important way I wish to demonstrate that the drawing activity is free from the constraint of language.

Thus, the concern is to re-establish the importance of the particular experience of seeing, that occurs through drawing. Within the dynamic of the drawing activity the individual is caught within the directness of his experience of the world. Each individual casts his form, his formulation within a framework that reflects his particular sense and the particular significance of the event. An individual's drawing, as much as his perception, is in Merleau-Ponty's (9) terms "a way of patterning the world" (op cit pXVIII). Whether or not we are concerned with the thing perceived, we grasp it, not only for what it is in representation - its properties, but what is unique in its mode of existence, what it is for it to be. I wish to examine the drawing activity for what it is, the manner through which it brings drawings
into existence. The phenomenologists, particularly someone like Merleau-Ponty, are concerned to discover a principle of operation. As he says:

"It is a matter ... of finding the Idea, in the Hegelian sense, that is, not a law of the physico-mathematical type, discoverable by objective thought, but that formula ... a certain way of patterning the world ... " (ibid pXVIII)

In drawing, we are concerned to see according to the patterning of the world as figured within the images wrested from the world by the draughtsman. As Rawson has clearly pointed out, to talk of an artist's vision of the world is misleading unless the terms are further defined:

"This word 'vision' does not mean that he sees the world - so! but that he always makes an image of his world - so! ... Even if a drawing be purely topographical in intent, it does not merely point to an external object." (op cit p23)

It is the visual ontology of this image that rests it within a phenomenological concern. Transcendence, as we shall see, is a mark of any drawing's meaning; it is also a primary phenomenological principle.
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I. 1. 1. The drawing - as criterion of the visual experience -
Wollheim's thesis.

Wollheim(1), in his book On Art and the Mind, has a chapter en-
titled 'On Drawing an Object'. In this chapter he discusses ways in
which a drawing can be considered a representation of 'what is seen'.
The following quotation taken from Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investi-
gations, Oxford 1959 II XI) is the basis on which he begins his own
enquiry:

"What is the criterion of the visual experience? ...
Well, what would you expect the criterion to be? 
The representation of 'what is seen'.".

I use Wollheim as a starting point for this present discussion because
he opens up issues related to perception, action and knowledge, which
are central to his (and my own) enquiry into the nature of representa-
tion itself.

First, in what ways can we adequately talk of a drawing being a
'criterion' of the visual experience, what indeed is the nature of
this visual experience? Is the visual experience something that can
be equated with 'what is seen' and how is the drawing properly a
representation of 'what is seen'?

It is important that we set the context straight for the whole of the ensuing discussion in which Wollheim engages. He clarifies that, for the purpose of his argument, the medium of representation is to be drawing (op cit p7). He sees drawing as something essentially linear that seeks to present through its linear convention some kind of representation of the appearance of the visible world of objects. That is to say, he sees drawing as a kind of mimeographic activity that presents the objects of the visible world or the objects within our visual field, in such a way that we might say that we recognise a similarity between the objects in the visible world and the objects in the drawing. A kind of physical-optical engagement in which drawing reflects this encounter.

I. 1. 2. Line, contour and 'imitation'.

In differentiating drawings from visual experience, he examines the nature of the line. The world of visible objects is defined by the 'edges' of these objects and the linear counterpart in a drawing becomes not so much an edge as a 'contour'. He adds:

"... I wanted something that differentiates them essentially. And that is what contours do. For contours in the sense that they belong to drawings can belong only to two-dimensional surfaces: which is why they belong to drawings, and possibly to other forms of representation, and why they do not belong to visual experiences." (op cit pp21/22).

This raises crucial and fundamental issues, but it is important that
we establish in which sense Wollheim is talking about drawing. It inevitably colours the whole of what he subsequently discusses.

Now, in its most basic form, drawing by means of linear representation certainly serves a function in providing some kind of analogy for the visible world of objects. Indeed, if one looks at the history of drawing, particularly in the Western world, much of it is to do with developing techniques that adequately present an 'imitation' of the visual reality. To some extent 'naturalistic' art falls into this category and it is specifically within this compass that Wollheim presents his arguments about the nature of drawing. He sees a direct relationship between drawing and the natural world. Moreover, he sees drawing as 'representing' the natural world of appearances and he assumes this natural world is what we see when we have 'the visual experience'.

It is certainly true that artists in the Western world, even before Leonardo and up to the 19th century and beyond saw their task as developing techniques in drawing that adequately mirrored what they saw as the visual reality - the world of nature peopled by objects. Indeed, it was commonly assumed that if people wanted to communicate to others what they had seen, they would use the accepted techniques and conventions of drawing, with all its attendant, built-in references to visual constancies, proportion and perspective. So powerful a means of communication was it that drawings and the visual arts generally conveyed information about the visual experience of the artists that mere words could not match. The artist had the distinct advantage
over the reporter - or at least, his advantages were of a different and perhaps more easily recognised kind.

An exemplification of this can be seen in the topographical artists and draughtsmen of natural history and ethnographical types who accompanied the first explorers to the New World and paved the way for the flowering during the 18th and 19th centuries of their specialised branch of graphic recording. In this sense, the topographical drawing was executed to the elimination of any information that might be considered misleading. The aim was to present as accurate a record as possible. Indeed, most drawings done for scientific purposes are of this order. We shall discover, however, that even drawings that are purely topographical in intent do not merely point to an external object. What is important for the present is to see the context in which Wollheim is presenting his arguments that drawings might be considered the criterion of what is seen.

Wollheim does accept that in seeing something we see 'what we expect to see'. And, as Blakemore(2) has pointed out, that in seeing what we see

"We do not perceive our retinal image; we experience an externalised world of solid things." (op cit p67).

Thus all perception is 'shaped' perception and expectation and mental set play a crucial part in the way we perceive the world, as world. Yet we must be careful here, for 'seeing what we expect to see' might be something that the psychologists of perception have accepted, but it is a very different matter when looked at from the point of view of the images that man creates from his perception of the world. The
history of art is full of these images that rise from a very different intention than that of mere psychological observation. Poussin painted landscapes in the classical manner and landscapes in their turn came to be seen 'as a Poussin'. The Egyptian draughtsmen drew a generalised concept for 'man', but not a man as he would see him in a given situation under specific lighting conditions. Indeed, if we were to take this further and say to someone 'draw what you see' (that is to reconstruct a representation of his retinal image) we would be asking him to discount what he knows, to hold back his habitual mental sets and his interest in things and to distort his customary constancies of vision. The attempt to draw what one sees inevitably changes one's seeing, as artists of the Impressionist and Post Impressionist periods discovered.

Wollheim's position is clear. Drawing for him is

"... a research into the world of appearances: by which is meant, of course, how things look to us. Implicit in such a conception is the view that draughtsmanship, or the techniques of representation taken more generally, afford us in certain cases a direct revelation of what we see, a revelation not mediated by any perceptual judgement." (op cit p4).

How far this is possible needs clarifying for it raises issues about the nature of the visual experience itself which we will return to.

I. 1. 3. The drawing - visual experience and knowledge.

Wollheim's main argument is developed like this:

"... it might be objected against this criterion that
"it allows of the absurd eventuality that we could come to know what our visual experience was by observing our representation of it: that when we had finished our drawing, we could look at the sheet and, by scrutinising the configuration lying upon it, learn what we have seen ..." (op cit p5).

He is saying that it is impossible that the artist, by looking at his drawing, can come to know his own visual experience. He says the drawing cannot be a revelation to me of how I have seen because my representation of what I have seen is based on the knowledge of what I have seen and it is absurd to think that by looking at my drawing I can come to know of something I had known about all along.

He substantiates this view by saying:

"... something must have happened at the time of the visual experience, which allows us, or influences us, to draw as we do." (op cit pp9/10).

He feels that this influence is our knowledge of the visual experience itself and he adds:

"When we have the visual experience we eo ipso know what we have seen, and this is why we are able, at a later point in time, to represent it. And this in turn is why it is absurd to think that by looking at what we have drawn, we could come to know what we have seen. For it is this knowledge that guides the drawing." (op cit p10)

and further

"... even if we accept the contention that the representation (or let us say, more specifically the drawing) of what is seen is the criterion of the visual experience ... we still do not have to embrace the conclusion ... that we could ever come to know what we have seen by looking at our drawing of it ... in my own case, when it is I who draw, it is not open to me to come to know by observation what I have done." (op cit pp10/11).

The first point that needs clarifying here is a crucially important one. My knowledge of what I see must be independent of (not
prior to) my knowledge of what I draw, for if my knowledge of what I see was dependent on my knowledge of what I draw, I could not make any judgements to the efficacy of my drawing by reference to what I see. The knowledge I have in order to make the drawing is one thing, indeed I must know what I see before I draw it, but having made the drawing, I can and must have knowledge that is independent of my making the drawing in order to make any kind of judgement about it. The problem it seems, is in the use of the word 'criterion'. Any judgement as to the efficacy of the drawing is made by reference to the visual experience, or more clearly our total perceptual experiences; we do not judge the efficacy of our visual experience by reference to the drawing. Under normal circumstances we would call the visual experience our criterion of judgement of the drawing - not the drawing a criterion of the visual experience. Wollheim seems to be stretching the linguistic sense of the word 'criterion' beyond its normal meaning.

I. 1. 4. The drawing - a temporal as well as spatial construct.

There is a second issue which rises from the foregoing which also needs clarifying. Wollheim discounts the notion that we could ever come to know what we have seen by reference to our drawing of what we have seen. Rawson(3) points out:

"... drawing is not seeing ... on the contrary works of art are in fact, made; they are artistic constructs, based on ingrained scanning procedures." (op cit pp21/22).

It is a common fallacy, entertained by many philosophers, that a work of art, or in the case we are discussing, a drawing, is the record of
something seen. Of course, there is a kind of correspondence between a drawing — a representational or figurative drawing and the visual world, but this correspondence is not a one-to-one identity. It is a paralleling through a particular means and the means lies in the symbolism of a drawing's visual forms — not by means of imitation. Goethe called it a kind of 'second nature' related and parallel in many ways to the first nature. But it is not the first. Rawson has suggested that in the history of drawing there have been times when the artist's notion of truth (in Wollheim's phrase, his 'visual experience') has involved an accurate paralleling of the visual field of tone by drawn tone, "But this in itself reflects a specific, not an ultimate, philosophy of visual realisation." (op cit p23). In a very real sense no drawing, not even the most 'representational' can ever convey a pure 'likeness'. As Rawson has pointed out, first and foremost a drawing conveys meaning "... not by a general similarity of surface but by a structure of symbolic elements which are formulated as method." (op cit p24).

The important point is that drawings are made. Moreover, they are made in time. The sequence photographs that are appended support this central concern of my thesis. Drawings present to us a history of glances, the response to a whole activity of looking. Cézanne, in a memorable passage recorded by Gasquet(4), said:

"All that we see gets dispersed, goes away. Nature is always the same, but nothing remains of it, of what appears to us. Our art has to give the feel of its duration together with the facts, the appearance of all its changes. It has to make us sense it as eternal. ... It might be supposed that realism consists in copying a glass as it is on the table."
"In fact, one never copies anything but the vision that remains of it at each moment, the image that becomes conscious. You never copy the glass on the table; you copy the residue of a vision. ... Each time I look at the glass, it has an air of re-making itself, that's to say, its reality becomes uncertain because its projection in my head is uncertain ... or partial. One sees it as if it were disappearing, coming into view again, disappearing, coming into view again - that's to say, it really always is between being and not being. And it's this that one wants to copy."

These extraordinary insights will occupy us more fully later. Any drawing 'of what is seen' is the representation not of the visual experience as such, but a whole tissue of glances - the image of the residue of many visions always from memory, the drawing will be an accumulation of memories none of which is quite the same as the other because each of them is affected by what has gone before, by the continually changing relation between all that has already been put down and the next glance. Put in these terms, the idea that the drawing is the criterion of what is seen, becomes a very meagre kind of description.

I. 1. 5. Drawing - as process.

Drawings are not so much made as achieved. Furthermore, to the one who is engaged in the drawing, as Cezanne has described, the drawing does become the arena in which there is a revelation of how things appear to be. Wendy Thompson, a student at the Royal College of Art with whom I have been working, remarked to me that while she was drawing the nude on the chair with feet on an adjacent stool, the nude seemed to her to be floating away from the stool although anchored
Although this eventually became the topic of the drawing, it was discoverable to her only through the process of making the drawing. Michael Ayrton in describing the act of drawing has said this:

"The process of drawing is before all else the process of putting the visual intelligence into action, the very mechanics of taking visual thought ... it is the process by which the artist makes clear to himself, and not to the spectator, what he is doing. It is a soliloquy before it becomes a communication."

Drawing is thus better described as a heuristic technique by which we are enabled to change our visual experience in certain determinate fashions given the same or similar stimulus patterns, rather than a means by which we achieve knowledge of a constant and unchanging visual experience. This is important. As we have seen, visual experience and particularly the visual experience as part of the drawing process does not stand still. It is not a hermetically sealed phenomenon that can be investigated as an entity, it is a whole funding and to talk of the possibility that the drawing might be considered as the criterion of this experience is to misconceive the nature of drawing. Drawings rise from the visual experience, they are the reflection of that interchange between ourselves and the world. Furthermore, we do not have a prior knowledge of how all this relationship will be, and then deliver it through the conventional techniques of representation. Knowledge that arises from the drawing process is a coming to know, not a knowledge achieved prior to the on-going dialectic of the process itself. Paul Klee cryptically suggested: "A painter knows a great deal, but he only knows it subsequently." (op cit p126). Furthermore, this coming to know may not be entirely a conscious affair; there are many
agencies at work in the making of a drawing, only some of which are 'known' in a conscious way.

Even the topological artist, to return to the thesis suggested by Wollheim, draws what he sees and judges his drawing to be a more or less correct representation of what he sees within accepted representational conventions. The drawing is not a confirmation to him of his unchanged and constant visual experience. Even when naturalistic art is a 'research into the world of appearances' drawing is an arduous activity calling for prolonged and concentrated guided vision, controlled by a predominating interest in particular aspects of the natural world - to which other things are held in subordination. Drawings are always made from a point of view and no matter how limiting it might be, drawing in the sense of its relationship to visual experiences, is charged with its particular flavour and concern. In a word, the notion of a visual experience to which a drawing relates, is an ephemera. All drawings happen after an event in time, but in time - drawings are made within the context of a constantly changing and revisable experience of looking. To this important issue we shall return in Chapter IV.

Constable remarked once that 'I almost put my eyes out' through the intensity of persistent perception. In such cases the draughtsman does not simply try to represent what he has seen within familiar conventions, but exerts himself to perceive more clearly an aspect of his visual world, by which he is particularly moved. Interdependent on all we have said is that drawings are made for a purpose, or more
accurately through a particular intention. What is clear is that through the process of achieving a drawing, the draughtsman does not come to a better knowledge of what he has been seeing all along, but by the concentrated effort of controlled looking guided by a predominant concern that emerges as the drawing is achieved and helped by the processes and techniques that are occurring under his hand, he comes to see differently. Indeed, for the draughtsman the techniques of drawing may be a useful ancillary in the process of achieving a changed visual experience which he finds more appropriate. The draughtsman does not use his drawing to attain knowledge of what he has all along been seeing, rather, his drawing reinvests his seeing when he looks again at those things. It is indeed, and has become for him, a new way of seeing.

I. 1. 6. The importance of the medium.

Before I leave this aspect of the 'visual experience', I would like to consider something further. It is this: Drawings are made in a medium. Wollheim in his discussions does not specifically mention this factor about drawings, except to say that the making of a drawing is the making of a representation of what is seen, using the conventions and techniques of drawing. As we have seen, he talks about drawing as having 'contours' and this he likens to the 'edges' of objects in the visible world. Thus he is predominantly talking of drawing as being conceived in linear terms. Drawings, of course, may be considered as such if one is thinking purely theoretically, but in
practice drawings are made with materials of different kinds, on grounds of different kinds. This is important, as we shall subsequently discover in Chapter V, because in talking of a drawing as a representation we cannot legitimately talk in this way without thinking of the medium in which the drawing is cast. A drawing's sense, is not just what it represents - its notional reality or what it might portray. Important as these elements are, its sense is borne by the way all these various elements are achieved together. The medium of the drawing is a crucially important part of its total sense as a drawing.

Thus the draughtsman realises that the means he uses to execute his drawing are often totally inadequate to represent his visual experience completely. There is an element of transposition going on all the time. Moreover, to talk, as Wollheim does, of drawings and visual experience solely on the basis of the linear aspects of any drawing is to seriously undermine the sense in which a drawing can come to be a representation at all. What is crucial for us is to see that ones change in seeing, in the sense in which we have been talking, is affected by the way in which the visual idea is caught and held for contemplation within and through all the means and media of the drawing itself. It is impossible to separate the sense in which what is represented and how it is represented is made such through all the possibilities of the medium. Indeed, the affirmation of the visual 'reality' of the drawing is brought about through the marriage of the visual idea within the construct of the medium. The two are totally interdependent. A Rembrandt brush drawing may have
surface 'likenesses' to the appearance of groups of people, but the way in which it has been cast, the form and structure in which the drawing is founded, delivers a sense about the groups of people in the drawing that has to be far more than a mere 'representation' of Rembrandt's visual experience. To talk in such terms is to miss the whole direction of the drawing's ontology.

Sickert once said that artists fall into two psychological groups. Those in the first exert themselves to see more clearly the aspects of the visible world which interest them, and then find the means to represent this within available media and techniques. The others see in the media and this fundamentally influences the way their vision is directed.

I. 2.1. The drawing - as representation of 'what is seen'.

I would like now to consider a further linked question. We have been considering through Wollheim's arguments the relationship between drawings and 'visual experiences', but there is a further issue: How can a drawing be a representation of 'what is seen'?

In an important sense the first question to ask in respect of any drawing is this: To what features of experience do its basic visual elements ultimately correspond and how do they do so? What are the visual realities to which forms both in a drawing and of the
drawing refer? We have discovered that no drawing, even the most
'representational' or 'figurative' or 'topological' ever simply points
to external objects in the visible world, nor do drawings ever convey
pure 'likenesses', nor a selection from naturally given, objectively
formulated visual data. As we have seen and as Rawson has pointed out,
the drawing's sense (indeed, how it comes to be a representation at
all) is conveyed to us not "by a general similarity of surface but
by a structure of symbolic elements which are formulated as method"
(op cit p24). This symbolic interrelationship of forms in drawing
and forms in the world is something I wish to discuss in a moment.
What is important at this stage is to say that forms in drawing are
and needs must be analogous to the realities which give them their
meaning. Unlike verbal forms which have only a conventional rela-
tionship to the realities they signify, forms in a drawing - indeed
all visual forms an artist might use - must bear in some way an ana-
logous relationship to the realities they signify. What is crucial
is that the realities that a drawing points to are not themselves
things. Language and linguistic forms of expression have an inbuilt
determinacy. As Cassirer(7) has so aptly pointed out:

"By the same spiritual act through which man spins
language out of himself he spins himself into it,
so that in the end he communicates and lives with
intuitive objects in no other manner than that
shown him by the medium of language." (op cit p15).

It is this linguistic constraint that often forms so much of the
problem to logical positivist philosophers when they come to talk
about the way that a drawing can be a representation of what is seen.
The trap is a very subtle one indeed, for it immediately equates
'things' in the drawing with 'things' in the world to which they
might refer. This objective definitism paralyses the whole interpretive funding that the drawing offers to vision and not to language. So much has this subtle insinuation found its way into the whole discussion of representation and expression that before long one is caught within the web of 'translating' one form in terms of another where the terms of their referencing are taken as being synonymous. The 'realia' of the drawing is not the 'realia' as constituted by language and to talk of 'objects' as being the determining factor of the 'realia' of a drawing is to become involved as Wollheim does in considering 'edges' and 'contours' to be the determining factors in the differentiation between visual experiences and drawings. Rawson points out that:

"... a drawing may be highly representational, as for example a Rembrandt, and yet at the same time its whole assemblage will not look 'like' a factual piece of the world. It may gain part of its meaning from the relations of its internal structure to other similar structures, not from their relations to everyday percepts." (op cit p32).

The 'things' which seem to some to be the 'givens' of perception are only such in so far as they serve as a function of that perception; and moreover - and perhaps more importantly - in so far as they are part of the linguistic communication structure of the perceiver. The logical and causal determinacy of language will propose, in the Wittgensteinian sense, that what there is is only what it can be said there is. The 'realia' of drawings are not 'things', they are categories of thought and conception which are not reached by language. Indeed, the utilitarian concerns of language cannot carry the sense of these visual realities at all and they are lost to those whose
perceptual ontology is based on categories of thought, structured and cast solely in verbal or linguistic terms.

In what ways, therefore, can we say that the realities a drawing refers to are carried to us. What is immediately important is to point out that the identity of the 'subject matter' of the drawing and the way this notional aspect might depict or portray or represent an aspect of the visible world, although important, is not a sufficient condition for understanding the drawing as being a representation of what is seen. The subject matter, or as Rawson has pointed out, the 'tenor' (ibid p5) of the drawing is an important element in coming to understand its meaning, and indeed, to continue Rawson's analogy the 'tenor' of the drawing may be the means by which the 'topic' of the drawing is achieved. That is, the sense of the drawing's visual reality may be reached through its subject matter, this is, however, often only the necessary and not sufficient condition for its total meaning. Furthermore, the context in which the drawing was conceived is equally important if one is to come to an understanding of its sense. The historical and cultural antecedents of the drawing make an important and vital contribution to understanding the drawing's significance. All this is contributory in coming to understand how a drawing can be a representation of what is seen.

I spoke earlier of the symbolic significance of forms in a drawing. This has to do with the 'subject matter' of the drawing, but perhaps it is within the drawing's fundamental visual methodology that this symbolic sense can be demonstrated: the way in which the
notional realities of the drawing are achieved. This includes, as we have seen, consideration of the media in which the drawing is made - its physical attributes, for it is the interdependence between means and method that is important in the understanding of the drawing's total sense.

I. 2. 2. Representation - the significance of relationships.

The ability to analogise and the ability to see one thing in something else lies at the root of our perception of the world. We are only ever able to make sense of our world because we carry within us the ability, not only of seeing the relationship between things, but also because fundamentally we have learnt to see this relational significance in terms of analogies. Indeed, to see forms at all means that we see them within groupings or clusters that bear a relational significance. This ability gives shape to our whole perception so that our world indeed becomes a world. Further, memory enables us to store these analogised forms in such a way that makes them immediately available to us for recall and recognition. In an important sense, memory is a repertoire of image forms that have been constituted as such through our conscious and unconscious activities of perception. Many of these forms will be visual, many kinaesthetic, many tactile or sensuous in other ways. Our verbal language reflects our everyday life fairly comprehensively yet in many respects, as we have seen, there are a huge number of other genuine valid 'forms' of experience, produced by the analogising faculty and, therefore, perfectly 'true' in any possible sense of that word for which we have
no conventionally associated words. These forms energise the visual arts and this is why the need for a schema is, as Gombrich (8) has pointed out, the need for a code; and drawing is a code — it is a whole symbolic structuring.

Through maintaining contact with his own forms of association and feeling the draughtsman is able to shape his marks so as to evoke the appropriate analogy responses in others. But this is a very complex affair; the analogy response to visual statements goes on all the time. Furthermore, as is evident, if we are to understand drawings we must become a party to their symbolism. They offer us routes of possibility to sense their 'numen' but unless we are able to match, or find the response within ourselves that these visual analogues are offering, the meaning sense of the drawing will be lost to us. Thus, the particular interest and attention of the draughtsman has shaped these marks in a specific way that can carry their feeling sense to us. This is the visual reality of the drawing. This is why drawings affirm what is. Thus the skill of the draughtsman is to shape his marks in a determinate and specific fashion if he wants to elicit a particular response of meaning. Van Gogh's drawings are examples of this: they are rich in visual analogies that recall, in a particular way, sensations often of a kinetic kind that are rooted in our own past perceptual history.

In order that he might achieve this, the draughtsman is directing his own vision in a particular way, but he is not directing his vision toward 'things' — we have discovered the fallacy that this suggests.
His vision is directed toward aspects of the visible world that constitute a relationship, and this relational sense he brings to his drawing. A good drawing is not made up from a collection of separated items; it presents a unified whole, not the units but the system of connection. This is why when we come to see the drawing as a representation, we come to sense the significance of its relationships. It becomes a representation of what is seen only as the relational structure in which it inheres, demonstrates the artist's vision of a world—a tissue of events brought together in time and welded into a relational framework. This is what we mean when we talk of the symbolic structure of the drawing and it is made up from a whole inter-relationship of marks and vectors, of rhythms and enclosures, of implied structures that support the tenor of the drawing and give it its particular 'numen'. Drawings are far more than pointers, they are a means of access into a world of possibility. This, as Gombrich has so ably described, is the basis for any consideration of what might be called 'visual discovery' in art (op cit p232). There is more to drawing than denotation.

I. 2. 3. Representation and the image.

We have been discussing the ways that the draughtsman, through the whole assembly of his drawing, can capture and hold for our specific and focussed contemplation, visual analogues, or as Merleau-Ponty (9) would say, visual 'anchoring points' (op cit p249) that in turn reach out and meet our own response rising from the recalled memories of
our own perceptual history. In sensing the drawing's meaning, we are inevitably part of this symbolic contract. We have seen that this is the central concern in consideration of the features of our experience to which a drawing's basic elements ultimately correspond. Further, we have seen that this is achieved from the inbuilt analogising factor present in every aspect of our perception of the world. We have seen that for analogies to work at all there must be a field in which their relational structure can operate. An analogue is an image of relations. A drawing is also an image of relations.

Karl Pribram(10) has this to say of the image:

"The elements composing the image are relations between events, rather than events per se .... the image is thus a sign of relationships. In this way imaging provides internal meaning to signs." (op cit p7)

(This will form the basis of a continued discussion in Chapter III.)

The richness that attaches itself to the concept that the drawing is an image arises not because the drawing is an image of any 'thing' but because it is a sign of the relational significance between aspects of the visual world of the drawing and aspects of the spectator's own visible world. The symbolic contract completes itself within the image of the drawing - its total synthesis in form. As Langer(11) has said:

"An image does not exemplify the same principles of construction as the object it symbolises but abstracts its phenomenal character, its immediate effect on our sensibility...It organises and enhances the impression directly received. (op cit p59).

Furthermore, the only way one can reach one's perceptual history and thus come to a sense of oneself is through the image. Memory
images and traces, of all kinds, from one's past are reawakened, re-
called and given, moreover, fresh direction and intensity as they
find their counterparts within the visual sense of the drawing it-
self. This has to be beyond mere imitation, or resemblance, corre-
spondence or similarity. A drawing can be said to 'represent' what
is seen when it transforms seeing.

This aspect of transformation is fundamentally tied to the
notion that not far from the concept of representation lies the con-
cept of expression. We have argued throughout this analysis that
what drawings 'represent' are not 'things', but relationships. Not,
however, just 'relationships' per se but rather the contract and
field in which this relational significance emerges. This forms
the discussion of our next chapter.
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Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling
CHAPTER II. EXPRESSION

II. 1. 1. Introduction

Scruton(1) suggests that:

"Expressiveness may be loosely defined as the power to remind us, call up for us, evoke or 'symbolize' ... objects, such as emotions and states of mind. It lies, therefore, at the intersection of a complex network of feelings and thoughts and it will be impossible to describe the recognition of expression in any simple or unitary way." (op cit p216/217)

and again:

"In recognising expression I am brought to an awareness of what is expressed. But what I learn can itself be described only in terms of an experience of 'seeing', 'hearing' or 'grasping the meaning of' a work of art. ... It is the experience of the work itself that summarises what I know." (op cit p239).

Both these descriptions are important because they clarify two things. First that the concept of expression is a notoriously elusive one and in seeking to clarify aspects of it one is really only setting up a framework within which the concept might possibly be held long enough for certain conditions and implications to be explored. The second is that any recognition of expression and thus any sense of expressiveness can only come from the orbit of the individual's experience of
the world and those of its objects that hold for him a particular significance and value. Scruton is particularly concerned, in his analysis, with aesthetic expression and indeed this is my concern also. For Croce, aesthetic expression was the only true kind of expression, any other expression - like natural expression - being ruled illegitimate.

What is clear is that there are broadly two kinds of expression - natural and aesthetic. The first order of expression includes things like cries of pain, shouts of joy, exclamations etc. and to some extent a work of art might be said to be expressive in this way if we were to sense that what proceeds as an outward manifestation bears upon it the unmistakable marks of an inner state or condition. In this sense, the word 'expression' comes very close to its etymological root 'ex-primere' which literally means to squeeze or press out. An expression in this sense becomes a kind of 'secretion'. The second order of expression is really closer to a kind of 'correspondence'. This is really the area of aesthetic expression. Wollheim(2) puts it like this:

"...we think of an object as expressive of a certain condition because, when we are in that condition, it seems to us to match, or correspond with, what we experience inwardly: and perhaps when the condition passes, the object is also good for reminding us of it in some special poignant way, or for reviving it for us. For an object to be expressive in this sense, there is no requirement that it should originate in the condition it expresses, nor indeed is there any stipulation about its genesis ... " (op cit p47)
between the two. If we conceive of a notion of fittingness or appropriateness between expression and expressed it might be thought that this only makes sense in the case of aesthetic expression but even in natural expression we would sense, for example, the fittingness or appropriateness of raging to an exclamation of rage. We might agree also, for example, that a particular gesture is appropriate to a particular expression. Reid(3) has put it in this way:

"... expression ... changes something, brings something new into being ... which is known for the first time ... the drawing of the jagged line may express some feeling which is already there. ... But the feeling-of-the-jagged-line is a new event, and we have no right to assume that it 'expresses' exactly what the artist felt before he began to draw. (He in fact probably now feels very different.)"
(op cit p45)

What is important—and what Wollheim has pointed out—is that any affective view of perception is only reached through that relationship between inner states and outer conditions. We see it most clearly demonstrated in the human body itself: the human body as the expression of the psyche. Wollheim feels that:

"When we endow a natural object or an artifact with expressive meaning, we tend to see it corporeally: that is, we tend to credit it with a particular look which bears a marked analogy to some look that the human body wears and that is constantly conjoined with an inner state." (op cit pp48/49)

There is thus a relationship between natural and aesthetic expression. What is important, as we shall discover, is that for aesthetic expression to be experienced and achieved, any natural expression must be given shape in form and this form must be seen not only to bear a fittingness to the expression, but perhaps more importantly to shape a fresh significance that holds the form of
expression in such a way that makes it available to contemplative, imaginative perception.

II. 2. 1. The perception of expression.

In Cassirer's (4) phenomenology the perception of expression begins with perception itself. He argues that perception is essentially 'two-faced'. There is within perception an 'object' pole and a 'subject' pole. All perception, in his view, occurs along a continuum between these two polarities. He suggests:

"The world which the self encounters is in the one case a thing-world and in the other a person-world. In the one case, we observe it as a completely spatial object and as the sum total of temporal transformations which complete themselves in this object; whereas, in the other case, we observe it as if it were something 'like ourselves'."

(op cit p93)

All perception of any kind of 'reality' as such is experienced in this double aspect. Perception of either subjective or objective 'pole' has a different colouring or tone about it. To see things in an affective way inevitably means that we must immerse ourselves within their objectivity but in doing so move past this 'objectness' to sense an aspect of ourselves within them. Cassirer is arguing that expression as a phenomenon is rooted within this double aspect of perception itself. The perception of expression lies at the conjunction of the seeing of one thing in something else, at the imaginative intersection of subject with object, at the point where subjectivity meets objectivity. These two terms are useful only in their support of an argument. It would be a mistake to conceive of either subjectivity or objectivity
as separate entities; they serve to clarify ways of looking at the world.

Thus, in the perception of expression we do not so much perceive 'things', as things-immersed-in-an-aspect, as bearing significance, sense and value. Perception of expression is not a mental interpretation after an event, like the processing of so called 'sense-data', but perception that in itself is shaped and meaningful. Merleau-Ponty(5) has suggested, as we have begun to discover, that science manipulates the world and 'gives up living'in it (op cit p55). Science as a pursuit of 'objectivity' is a conceptual structure dealing fundamentally with objectively formed and independent 'facts'. To view the objectivity of science one must suspend any perception of expression itself. Science is essentially dealing with cause and effect, with 'properties' and perhaps more importantly with a whole system in which the laws of repeatability and constancy play a crucial part. Science, in Cassirer's terms deals with 'thing' perception. Art manifests the nature of the perception of expression. There is a different mode of significance operating within the two areas. In science we see things as presenting aspects of a temporal, spatial world; in art we grasp aspects of a world 'like-ourselves'. They lie within different modes of symbolisation and representation. The metamorphosis and morphology of the forms in art, rising as they do from an imaginative funding of continually emerging associations and interpenetrations, indicates that the whole ambience of art lies in a different 'direction'. Forms in art have not been built up and constituted from 'fixed properties'. Properties and an atomistic-like
regard of structures are factors which empiricist observation makes known to us to the extent that the same determinations and relationships return ever and again over long stretches of time. This aspect of repeatability, of constancy within an acknowledged and pre-determined structural ordering, and which is demonstrable in something like mathematics, for example, is an inherent attribute of that structure. Moreover, it is built up by a whole symbol structure, where referential meanings are of the essence. This is the medium, as we shall see, of object perception - of thing perception - and in Witkin's(6) terms has more bearing on impression than expression. The root of the perception of expression lies in the reflective way an individual perceives the world. In all this we are talking about an aspect of the perception of expression that deals with qualitative interpretation. Moreover, this qualitative experience is achieved through modes of symbolising that bear no relationship to fixed and determined structures built up on laws that have been conceptually framed from primary qualities and in which the aspect of universality and constancy is crucial. Much of 'sense-data' philosophy arises from this kind of determinism and indeed one might say that the whole of logical-positivist philosophy rises from the premise that any analysis of expression as a concept must first begin with an analysis of the 'elements' and 'properties' in sensation that might logically constitute such a formulation.
II. 2. 2. Expression and the world of 'subjectivity'.

In all this we sense that what is of prime concern in any analysis of expression as such, must uncover that aspect of subjectivity which is revealed as Being-in-the-world. The perception of expression is only such as it rises from an individual's relationship with his world, in reflexive action that is not simply re-action, but action charged with a fresh significance arising from the interchange. This, as we shall see, is Dewey's(7) view: it reveals an aspect of perception that demonstrates this reflexivity and reciprocal interchange.

Thus the perception of expression is rooted in seeing the world 'like ourselves'; as sensing the impact of the world; as bearing a reflexive value. Expression is not a 'thing'; expression is value; expression is dealing essentially with meaning that bears a qualitative stamp, a mark of distinguishing significance relevant to individual and idiosyncratic appraisal. Expression perception is what the world means for us as we are indissolubly linked within its matrix. As we suspend this personal reflexive view, we necessarily suspend any interest in the expressive potential within our own worldview and take on an interest that is toward a different orientation, a different order. In this suspension we become involved in quantitative assessments that are relevant only within a pre-determined structural organisation, in which cause and effect, properties and constants supply the base line and where the concepts of recurrence and repeatability are a necessary condition.
The world of subjectivity therefore is not directly open to the world of science; even psychology does not concern itself solely with subjectivity, for it seeks to define subjectivity within objectively formed conditions. There has in recent years been a shifting of view: built into laws of science are laws of uncertainty, and the concept of tolerance has been given far greater respect. Nonetheless, there is always the search for definition. Subjectivity cannot so much be defined as explored, not so much explained as described. Thus any interest in the way things appear to us is very different from an interest in the way things are, built up from a pre-determined given. Expression perception is thus a perception of the world as becoming and not the perception of the world as a pre-given, spatially determined object.

What is paramount, as Cassirer and many others have pointed out, is that perception itself, in its normal day-to-day functioning is primarily concerned with the perception of expressive rather than 'thing' qualities. Perception is always shaped and given its significance through the orientation of the individual self toward its objective, whether this be outward or inward. The two aspects are never separated - even though they may through our reflective experience be seen as distinct. Perception of things has become the perception of the expression of things.

II. 2. 3. **Expression and the influence of language.**

Cassirer points out that the development of consciousness within
the individual, genetically shows that 'sense-data' which were thought to be the starting points for all knowledge of reality - are relatively late products - a gruelling and lengthy process of abstraction is necessary in order to draw them out from the whole tide of human experience. He feels that:

"All unbiased psychological observation testifies to the fact that the first experiences of the child are experiences of expression. The perception of 'things' and 'thing qualities' comes into its own much later." (op cit p102).

Language is what turns the tide. The capacity for objective representation grows in direct ratio as we begin to give linguistic expression to our experience of the world. The determinacy which language brings, as we have begun to sense, is really the root of the perception of 'things'. Perception of the qualitative aspect of things; their relational and characteristic ambience and sense, lies beyong the capacity of language - as verbal denotation to signify. It is only as one reaches past the determinacy of language to its metaphorical ordering that one senses what language has some capacity to suggest, but which other forms of expression, particularly forms in art, are able sensuously to embody. Language as a structure of denotation points to objects; art embodies within its 'objectness' a qualitative value. A drawing, for example, ceases to become a 'thing'; it becomes expressive of potential and possibility. It bears within itself, caught in its objectness, the funding for that imaginative appraisal of the world and the self that is the mark of expression perception.

Perception of things in the sense we have been describing,
belongs primarily to a **theoretical** world view. It is fundamentally Cartesian. The cosmology of Plato and Aristotle was founded on an **animate** aspect of the interpretation of the cosmos. Plato felt that the soul was the beginning of all motion, indicating primarily that the concepts of relationship and connection were the basis for the soul's existence. The Cartesian view of the universe was essentially mathematically and mechanically based, a view that was a **terminal** rather than an initial one. Basically this view is a product of **abstraction** and any scientific account of the phenomenon of the natural world is basically rooted in a system of theoretical abstraction. Cassirer adds:

"Thus the physical 'nature' of things is that aspect of appearances which always recurs in the same manner and which as such admits of being **reduced** to strict unbroken laws." (op cit p103).

The perception of things, as things, thus belongs really to theoretical abstraction. The naive world of perception is a world of expression perception. The recurring aspect of things is only such as we are able to extract as a **constant** from the sum total of phenomena known to us. But what is thus loosened and abstracted can only be the product of theoretical reflection; it is a philosophy of ends not a philosophy of beginnings.

**II. 2. 4. Expression and the 'I', 'you' relationship.**

Thus in a very important way subjectivity is not something isolatable, loosened from its world context and abstracted. The 'I' is crucially grounded in its relationship with the 'you', where the 'you'
is not theoretically determined but becomes what it is as it is built up and constituted by the 'I'. Subjectivity is revealed in and through the contract of relationships that occurs with its 'objects', and expression and its perception is the recognition of this relational concern. Thus in the perception of a drawing for example, we do not in sensing its expressive quality perceive it as an 'object' theoretically discerned. We enter into its meaning as a kind of contract of significance that is constantly revealing not a world of theoretical dimensions but a world that shapes our own world, that shapes our own perception, that bears in reflexively with ourselves, that is charged with personal significance. Any expression that is revealed through the forms in art bears this mark. Their value is such that this contractual significance is understood. This is not an end, not a terminus a quo, but a beginning, a terminus ad quem. This is the context in which any cultural form is perceived at all.

The 'I' and the 'you', the subjective and objective poles in perception, are never, as Cassirer has pointed out, to be considered as separate 'entities'. As we have seen, they are always located in the meeting point of that reciprocal transaction which occurs in the sensuous forms of speech and art. What is important is that these forms, in their particular way, focus the significance of expressive value, to the extent that we recognise it. We bring to all our perception of the world this potential - forms in art lift this value out from the contingency of our day-to-day perception and enable us to sense a fresh direction of possibility and meaning.
The reaching back to the significance of this relational concern is, as we have seen, rooted in perception itself. Within all perception there is this reflexive reciprocation and for Arnheim(8), expression is considered as the primary content of vision (op cit p430). The imaginative engagement with the expressive object - the drawing, the poem, the music - brings this primary content of vision into a new focus of significance. Yet the perception of expression, as Arnheim points out, is such only as we experience in it more than the resonance of our own feelings. There is, as we have seen, a further cognitive dimension, a reflexive dimension. What resonance we find in ourselves through expression perception is indicative of a wider world view - we are thus enabled to sense our place in the world and moreover, to discern the inner unity of the whole. We are able to sense symbolic value and go beyond what mere sense experience can tell us; we can sense the general in the particular, the world in a grain of sand.

This interpretation of the 'I' with the 'you' is reflected in Merleau-Ponty's evocative statement:

"... my body is a thing among other things; it is caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself. Things are an annex or prolongation of itself; they are encrusted into its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the world is made of the same stuff as the body. This way of turning things around, ... these antinomies, are different ways of saying that vision happens among, or is caught in things - in that place where something visible undertakes to see, becomes visible for itself by virtue of the sight of things; in that place where there persists ... the undividedness ... of the sensing and the sensed." (op cit p59)
and again:

"Things have an internal equivalent in me."

(op cit p60).

This physiognomic aspect in perception saturates all we see. As Merleau-Ponty says, things are no longer 'things'. Neither are they perceived as things. They are an annex or prolongation of the self. They are 'part of its full definition'. Moreover, when the self is able to move past the contingencies of the world of 'objectivity' toward fresh possibilities of realisation, there comes the knowledge of that 'undividedness between the sensing and the sensed'. This characterises all we have been saying about expression perception.

Cassirer(9) in characteristic terms puts it like this:

"... for the reality we apprehend, is in its original form not a reality of a determinate world of things, originating apart from us, rather it is a certainty of a living efficacy that we experience. Yet this access to reality is given us not by the datum of sensation but only in the original phenomenon of expression and expressive understanding. If expressive meaning were not revealed to us in certain perceptive experiences, existence would remain silent for us. Reality could never be deduced from the mere experience of things, if it were not in some way already contained and manifested in a very particular way in expressive perception." (op cit p73).

II. 3. 1. The act of expression - Dewey's view.

As we have seen, we cannot move very far in any analysis of expression without coming to that significant interaction of Being with world. We have already spoken of this reciprocal transaction,
and now this needs to be looked at, not just as being crucial to the recognition of expression, but perhaps at a more fundamental level, at the level of the individual's action. We have seen that the 'I' and the 'you' are not separately determined entities, but coalesce within the individual's transaction with the world. And any full analysis of expression must include an analysis of the act of expression. The act is always that impulsion from the Being of the individual outward to the world. Within the various forms of expression this activity is disclosed. Cassirer(4) feels that:

"Only in this activity do the 'I' and the 'you' exist with the possibility of simultaneously distinguishing themselves from each other. They exist both within and next to each other as they preserve their unity within speech, thought and all manner of artistic creation." (op cit p109).

Let us look more closely at this act. For both Dewey and Witkin every experience of the individual begins with an impulsion. Witkin feels that this impulsion consists of 'movements' that the individual makes prior to those movements being shaped by the adaptation process. He feels that this impulsion can only properly be called action as it is adapted to its medium. The medium can be part of the physical world of objects in everyday perception or the symbolic world of the individual's thought processes.

Dewey's description of action is along similar lines. He feels that this impulsion outward rises from an inner organic need. He too feels that it can only be satisfied as this need is met through 'instituting definite relations (active relations, interactions) with the environment' (op cit p58). This movement toward a kind of equilibration is precisely what Witkin talks about when he sees action as
adaptive behaviour. Action is seen to be such movements as are made by the individual to adjust his impulsion in the light of interaction with the 'objects' of the environment. As Witkin is quick to point out, these 'objects' can be physical - as in the experience of someone finding his way around a room, or swimming in the water or jumping for joy - or they can be mental, in the sense of someone organising his thinking in symbolic terms. Thus action can take place both in the physical world - the outside; and the symbolic world of thought representation - the inside. This is how we can talk of experience as action being the 'consciousness' of the individual towards these 'objects' be they physical or mental. What constitutes them as being 'physical' or 'mental' is nothing but a different intention of consciousness itself, a different ordering of the experience.

The mere relationship of this impulsion with its 'objects' is not sufficient however. Experience, as active experience, is not merely reactive to the environment. Dewey feels, for example, that when this impulsion meets 'resistance and deflection' from obstacles in the world 'it does not return and restore itself to its former state' (op cit p58). This is important; experience is not simply the equilibration of mere stimulus. Experience, in Dewey's terms, is something gone through - that is, the resistance and deflection met by the impulsion now returns to the individual bearing a sense of the significance of the interchange. These 'objects' (physical or mental) have now become 'significant objects' - that is they bear meaning and value, they are not mere 'things', not just sense 'data'. They have become part of the individual's shaped experienced
perception of the world. What of course is crucial here is the aspect of reflection. Reflection is an imaginative activity, for impulsion from need is something basic to all living organisms. What makes this impulsion and subsequent delivery particularly human is that ability we have to give shape and meaning to our world, which is constantly shifting and changing, not only in the light of present experiencing but as this present is funded and given fresh significance through experiences of our past perceptual history. This is what gives the sense in perception. This is why there is an undividedness between the sensing and the sensed. The significance and qualitative aspect in perception takes its colouring from the whole analogising and reflective activity of consciousness itself. This is why 'subject' and 'object' are not separate entities. This is why objectivity is rooted in the ground of subjectivity. Reflection is the hallmark of this imaginative consciousness, whose life is funded from the images of its active experience in perception and whose dynamic is such through the whole network of its interacting and relating. No action is therefore separable from the stream of acts in which it is embedded. No experience per se is only an experience. Experience, like our conscious life, feeds on the network of relationships that make up the fabric of our world.

Within the interaction of impulsion and subsequent resolution there is a characteristic tension. This one might call the potential for experience. There is never complete resolution; there is always a potential that drives the impulsion continually forward and gives us moreover our sense that experience is 'lived through'. This
potential and characteristic tension is what funds the art experience
itself, and through the sequence photographs of the drawings of those
who have participated in our project, we can sense this 'lived through-
ness' of their own experience of bringing into being something pre-
viously not existing. Dewey puts it like this:

"The junction of the new and the old is not a mere
composition of forces, but it is a re-creation in
which the present impulsion gets form and solidity
while the old, the 'stored' material is literally
revived, given new life and soul through having to
meet a new situation." (op cit p60).

He comes to see this activity not just as activity but as an act of
expression:

"It is this double change which converts an activ-
ity into an act of expression. Things in the
environment that would otherwise be mere smooth
channels or else blind obstructions become means,
media. At the same time, things retained from
past experience that would grow stale from routine
or inert from lack of use, become coefficients in
new adventures and put on a raiment of fresh
meaning." (op cit p60).

II. 3. 2. The act of expression - expressive/impressive,
Witkin's position.

Witkin talks in less eloquent terms but discloses the same sense.
He talks of action as being expressive or impressive. He feels that
what we do to the environment, how we manage the objects of our ex-
perience, how the environment and context is changed through our
action upon it, this is expressive action. Subject managing object.
Similarly, how these 'objects' in our environment change us, affect
us, this he calls impressive action. Object impressing itself on
subject. We must remember that these 'objects' can be either physical or mental. They can be part of the outer world of our perceptions or the inner world of thought representation. It must also be remembered that these distinctions are only made for the purpose of clarifying the issues. Only in an ideal sense can we talk of action that is purely expressive or action that is purely impressive. What the distinction does is to give a fresh dimension to the act of expression under consideration at the moment. Dewey feels that not all action is necessarily expressive in the sense in which he wishes to use the term. He puts it thus:

"While there is no expression unless there is an urge from within outwards, the welling up must be clarified and ordered by taking into itself the values of prior experiences before it can be an act of expression ... where there is no administration of objective conditions, no shaping of materials in the interests of embodying the excitement, there is no expression." (op cit pp61/62).

One cannot separate expression in the sense we are discussing it - as a direct consequence of action and experience - without its embodiment in some kind of physical or symbolic form. Any perception of expression becomes of necessity the perception of its form, as Susanne Langer's thesis testifies - its embodied form. The ordering of the experience and the action through the mediation of the values of prior experiences is what characterises an act of expression. Moreover, as Dewey points out, there is a management of the action. There is a staying with, a working out to completion. Further to this there is an added sense of the consequence of one's management. This is reflected in the imaginative ability of the individual to reflect on the possible, to entertain possibility. It is this imaginative enterprise that brings to the act of expression its distinctive 'expressiveness',
its particular quality. Dewey says:

"The consequences undergone because of doing are incorporated as the means of subsequent doings because the relationship between doing and undergoing is perceived." (op cit p62).

In Witkin's terms an expressive action is something like this: I throw my hat in the air for pure joy and dance on it when it lands. My action is the expression of a joyous impulse, and is what in our introduction to this chapter we called a 'natural' expression. My dance on the hat, on the other hand, is a 'feeling form'. The whole of my action has a characteristically 'joyous' feeling about it and this expression has 'got into' the dance - I have managed my acts subsequently into a hat dance. Impressive action on the other hand is described like this: Instead of taking my hat off and throwing it in the air for pure joy, I take it off and aim it carefully at a hatstand. In this instance I am doing something quite different, particularly if the hat finds its target and lands on its intended peg. My behaviour in respect of the hat and the hatstand are very much under the control of their specific properties as objects. For example, the lightness of the hat, the stiffness of the brim, all these qualities are 'impressing' themselves on me and are shaping up my action in respect of them into an act of propulsion of the right force and direction. He says:

"To the extent that the impulse determines the actual form of the action, to the extent that it shapes behaviour, action is expressive and it gives rise to 'feeling-form'. To the extent that the object in respect of which the individual is acting shapes his behaviour and not the impulse, action is impressive and it gives rise to 'object-form'." (op cit p6).

Here we meet again what we discovered in the double aspect of...
perception as described by Cassirer - its subjective and objective pole. Cassirer felt that the genesis of any perception of expression lay at the interchange and interrelationship of these two aspects. Witkin has uncovered the same kind of distinction within the arena of action and we can now perhaps see more clearly how, for example, in the making of a drawing both kinds of action are involved. The impulse to move forward in the shaping of materials gives rise to an action that is intrinsically expressive, but the 'resistance' (to use Dewey's term, op cit p65) of the materials in respect of my action, my impulse, in their turn shape my behaviour in respect of them, they 'impress' themselves on me to such an extent that the tension arising from their management is coming both from myself as subject and the material I am working with as 'object' to produce a 'feeling-form' whose resolution is always an amalgam of both expressive and impressive action.

II. 3. 3. The act of expression - the subject/object dialectic.

All action, as Witkin suggests, is projection through a medium. When my action is expressive, it is my impulse that is projected through the medium of objects. These as we have seen can be real or symbolic - shaping and in a reflective sense giving significance to these objects. When action is impressive the reverse happens, the objects, real or symbolic, shape my action. All action, Witkin feels, ranges along this continuum and as we have seen in perception itself, which is also action of a kind, this double aspect is present.
Within summarises it thus:

"To the extent that my actions in respect of objects receive the impression of those objects they constitute a 'medium of impression' through which these objects are projected. To the extent that my actions in respect of objects express my sensate impulse, the disturbing of my being, to that extent the objects constitute a 'medium of expression' through which my sensate impulse is projected." (op cit p6).

We can now see why, as Cassirer has pointed out, within the act of expression, the 'I' and the 'you' exist with the possibility of distinguishing themselves. He pointed out that they exist both within and next to each other as they preserve their unity within speech thought and all manner of artistic expression (op cit p109). Ben Shahn(10) has also echoed the same sense when he suggests:

"To me both subjective and objective are of paramount importance, another aspect of the problem of image and idea. The challenge is not to abolish both from art, but rather to unite them into a single impression, an image of which meaning is an inalienable part." (op cit p45).

The act of expression is a fusion of this duality of subjectivity and objectivity. Yet the fusion is never always complete, just as a resolution is never always complete. Within any activity of expression, for example in the making of a drawing, there is a characteristic tension and dialectic. Beittel(11) has pointed out that:

"In short, the art process is one of dialectic energized by the contradiction of opposites. Whence come these opposites? Are they a kind of mental pattern-matching of the remembered with the on-going, allowing us to attend to qualitative aspects of experience, an essential ingredient in conscious imagination?" (op cit p26).

We now begin to see that this dialectic, this characteristic tension, is energised through the relational significance arising from action
that is expressive and action that is impressive. Action that moves out from impulse and action that is shaped by the impinging qualities of 'objects' through which my total experience of meaning, my experience of the perception of expression is achieved. Max Black\textsuperscript{(12)} put it thus:

"There is ... in all artistic creation a characteristic tension between the man and the material in which he works ... the artist literally wrestles with his material, while it both resists and nourishes his intention. ... He finds himself constantly excited by the qualities objectively present in the material which it is his aim progressively to discover." (op cit p290/291).

In the area of making a drawing the draughtsman is both maker and observer; he is involved in a continuous move from subjective to objective pole. Moreover, as we have seen, he is acting in respect of the drawing as his action is being shaped by the drawing. He is acting in the world of the drawing as his Being is being disturbed through the arena of his drawing. The question arises, how can he act in the world, and be thus disturbed, if he does not in some way know his disturbance, perhaps more importantly recognise his sensing? For in the previous chapter on Representation we discovered that the apprehension of the drawing is a continuous movement toward coming to know — and this coming to know through the agency of the drawing, is a recognition of the sensing in respect of the drawing. This gives to expression its qualitative concern. Knowing and expressing are very close together. Similarly, knowing and expressing are found together in action. How do we know our sensing? How do forms evoke in us a sense of their significance to the point where we can recognise this qualitative aspect? Witkin feels that the simple answer
to how we know our sensing is that:

"... we only know it in so far as we express our sensing in displacements in the object world. ... Sensing known is sensing expressed. It is sensing projected through the medium of that which evokes sensing, through the medium of the object."

(op cit p20).

Thus we can only come to know our sensing as the impulse from Being, in its action outward to the world, shapes the objects it encounters in such a way that makes them accessible for recall. This is how forms in art, for example, can become 'feeling-forms' where there is a specific managing of the activity to embody the sense — the sensate impulse. Through these 'feeling-forms' this sense is evoked in me. Moreover, my sensing is only made known to me as it is built up and constituted within and through the objects I am acting upon — be they real or symbolic. The knowing that we are talking about, arising from action, is a knowing in Being. Through an individual's expressive actions he comes to know his sensing in respect of the world and through his impressive actions he comes to know the world in which he has his Being. Reid has pointed out:

"There is a real sense in which mind comes into being through its encounters with the world." (op cit p289).

We have seen these two kinds of action are only such that in an ideal way they can be spoken of in these terms. We shall see that through the different media both of impression and expression, the individual can operate on a symbolic level of knowing that enables him in a more mobile and flexible way to organise his experience. Knowing is action resolved within both these aspects of experience; what each aspect does is to bring a different orientation to knowing.
We can know our sensing as a 'feeling idea', which is the reflexive component of the affective life and which brings to the objects of our experience their distinct 'tone' or 'colouring'. Or we can also know about ourselves, we can know facts about the world and we can operate at the level of concepts. This is a form of 'object' knowing and has its place in the totality of our experience of enabling us to make sense of the world.

II. 3. 4. The act of expression - the importance of recall.

We mentioned the importance of recall. This we touched on in the last chapter when we spoke of the way the sense we give to forms in art is achieved through our analogising faculty of recalling from past perceptual experiences their felt response. We have now the ground for a proper appreciation of what this is. This sense of recall is fundamental to all knowing and we shall see the importance it has in the act of expression itself. A child who repeats an operation through the sheer joy of repetition is in essence not only coming to know the object of his attention but perhaps more importantly coming to know his sensing in respect of the object. He is really recalling his sensation; that is, expressing his sensing in order to know it. Even here in infancy we can see the embryonic forms of expressive action itself. All expressive action is concerned primarily with realising our sensing in respect of the action, more than to realise the object of the action itself. Further, when we grasp the expressive content of something like a drawing, it is because within the
medium and through the form of the drawing we are able to recall, not just the 'object' of our sensing, but our sensing. In this way we can talk of the expressiveness of the drawing, for the drawing has, in its particular and unique way shaped our action (our perception), and therefore the significance of this sensing is directly known to us in respect of the drawing itself.

What is important is that this recall is going on all the time, and the individual is continually being transformed by new reflective and reflexive acts, new knowing. This imaginative, reflective transformation, adds up to an entirely new dimension in the managing of his acts. It is always a process of transcendence, of moving beyond the given, of piercing the skin of things to sense their numen. This lies at the heart of every act of expression.

Within the activity of making a drawing, as the process photographs clearly demonstrate, we see the shaping of forms to recall sensing. This is the whole purposiveness of the activity itself. It is to resolve or attempt to resolve that intrinsic dialectic which we have seen is the motivation for all action, to make sense known. The act of expression is an act that deals fundamentally with giving shape and form to this sense, so that the sense is truly embodied in the forms themselves to the extent that they are so clarified and ordered that they give shape to sensation and bring what might be simply an activity to the point of it becoming an act of expression. The value that thus resides in them is given them through the history of their being achieved, through the sensing of the path that has
brought them this clarification, this new dimension and reflects the resolution of that tension, that was the genesis of their very being. Within the act of expression, the individual is always probing. As Witkin has pointed out:

"In order to control the development of form in the expressive act, ... the consciousness of the individual must 'oscillate' intensively between the impulse and the medium. Only in this way can the impulse (which in itself is blind) be guided by its effect in the medium." (op cit p22).

This 'oscillation' goes on all the time within the creative act and it sets up a kind of guidance system for the impulse, so that the impulse can continually adjust to its requirement of recalling sensing - for the next impulsion. It is the to and fro movement of the impulse that funds the on-going process. The process is of finer and finer adjustments within the individual's sensing. It is in this way he comes to know his sensing. He is always testing his sensing in respect of the medium and reflexively managing his actions. The individual is quite literally feeling his way through from start to finish. Witkin has suggested: "Sensing is always in control, shaping form for recall." (op cit p23). If he is lucky and if the outgoing impulse and returning response coalesce and the form takes on its own dynamic, not only does it become truly expressive but it reveals what Merleau-Ponty has so evocatively called that 'undividedness of the sensing and the sensed' (op cit p59).
II. 4. 1. The medium of impression.

We have already mentioned the media in which the two kinds of action, expressive and impressive, have to take place. It will now be our concern to discuss these media in more detail. In realising the possibility of there being two kinds of medium we are brought back to that first disclosure of Cassirer's that perception itself could be regarded as having an objective and subjective pole. The relationship between subject and object has given us the model on which our analysis has been built and provides us now with a way of looking at two modes of signification.

First the medium of impression. This is the medium in which, as we have seen, my actions are shaped by objects. To take an example: If I feel a stone and passively allow the sensation of roundness or convexity to reach me in sensation, my sensing is being shaped, is being 'impressed' by the specific properties of the stone. If now I carve the stone, shape it, then my action becomes expressive, because it comes under the control of my sensing. In an ideal sense the medium of impression allows no facility for the expression of the individual's sensate impulse. Of course at this concrete level (like the illustration of passively feeling the stone) the medium of impression is very rudimentary indeed. In areas of concrete operation, in operating with materials or objects in the world the media of both impression and expression are very close indeed - 'for example, it is very difficult to feel a stone 'passively'. It is really only in the more abstract levels of operation, in activities like thinking where,
to use Piaget's terms, concrete operations have become symbolically represented that we can begin to make the distinction between the two media. It is only in the area of symbolic functioning that the distinctive aspects of the two media become apparent. Witkin puts it like this:

"The power of representation permits the individual operating on a symbolic level to differentiate much more clearly between media of impression and media of expression simply because he can construct ... symbols that have a purely impressive function in addition to being able to make use of symbols that can be used in either context as expressive or impressive." (op cit p25).

This is enormously important, because it demonstrates the crucial link between representation and expression. It also indicates that within representation there are different orders of denotation and reference. Not all representation is expression - it underlies the fact, as we have seen in the section dealing with expression perception, that much philosophy that is to do with 'object' perception and sense 'data', deals with symbolic representation that more properly belongs to the domain of impression rather than expression. Little wonder that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the search was for sense 'data' and 'associations' - for ultimate 'units' or 'impressions'. The empirical psychology of the day was inadequate to deal with art, imagination and aspects of emotional life. Some indeed sensed that in thinking there was something more than the recognised contents of the mind - something more than realistic cognition. The writers who felt that there was this something more were the first to realise that there was a sort of significance that differed from the definable meaning of words and a logic that was not
like the logic of language, yet was a form of truth, of 'reasonableness'. It is clear now that the recognition of these two aspects of thinking, one within the symbolic medium of impression and the other in the symbolic medium of expression, underline both these different directions of orientation.

An example of the medium of impression, which ideally is free from the control of the individual's direct sensing would be mathematics. There is in most mathematics an arbitrary relation between symbol and object. Mathematics deals with the representation of the world of objects without embodying any of the sensate possibilities of the objects themselves, and therefore — and this is important — without providing any possibilities for the expression of the individual's sensate impulses. Thus x can equal this, or y can equal that. In a similar way words as words bear only an arbitrary relationship to what they signify. Thus the languages of logic, science and mathematics constitute a relatively 'pure' medium of expression. Words operating in their definitive sense can often veil an expressive aspect because of the way they convey their meanings conventionally and not intrinsically. Moreover, a word is readily taken up in thinking and follows its course in deviation from the expressive content originating in vision itself. We have seen how language can veil the expressive aspects of perception, inhibiting the individual to operate on the level of his sensing to achieve the sense of significance that lies behind words. As we have seen, language really provides a secondary rather than a primary entry into the world of the visible, into that world which permits expressiveness as a
significant value to arise.

However, it may be true that natural language, particularly when it becomes speech, might serve a dual function of operating both as a medium of impression and expression. Poetry and certainly metaphor in language are examples of the move from the medium of pure impression, viewed as discursive concatenation, to expression. One might therefore call the medium of impression - like mathematics - a logical symbolism. Logical symbolism as a system allows no leeway at all for alternative or additional meanings.

II. 4. 2. The medium of expression.

The medium of expression on the other hand is entirely different. The medium of expression consists either in objects that have the power of evoking direct sensate experience or on a symbolic level of representation, through, for example - and to use Witkin's term (op cit p27) - images that incorporate intrinsically the 'sensate possibilities of objects'. Thus media of expression always have the power of stimulating directly. This is why Susanne Langer(13) describes the first medium, the medium of impression, as the medium of discursive symbolism and the latter medium, the medium of expression, as presentational, that is directly available to sense and able also thus to evoke sense.

The important distinguishing mark is that the medium of expression
is essentially iconic. This iconicity would include not only the visual modes of representation but the audile and tactile as well. The dominant mode of the iconic is visual, but for the purposes of expression it can be extended. Visual icons can reach us in a direct way because visual icons have the power of emulating the stimulus properties of objects in the world. This is why visual representations are such a powerful means for allowing and enabling us to see as. Witkin points out however that:

"The dominance of the word and the visual icon as modes of representation may well derive from their capacity to do what neither the purely expressive, nor the purely impressive media can do, namely to provide a subtle harmony and blending of subject and object in a single form." (op cit p28).

This brings us full circle to where we began this investigation into the phenomenon of expression. Subject meets object in a single form. Through the perception of expression and the act of expression we have come to the unitary focus of expression - within a single form. Value, as we have seen, can only be embodied in form and becomes value as subject meets object as the individual is given that path through objects that in his action upon them lends them a significance which far from dominating, controlling and defining him, releases him into fresh areas of possibility and action. In this way the individual can truly be said to be operating through the medium of objects to the extent that they lend to him their impressiveness which he in turn transforms into expressive sense. He has met himself in objects without their objectivity drowning him. The tension between the medium of impression - the form in which the object is cast - is caught within the medium of expression, as sense is seen to be embodied in form, as form and content fuse to make not a single
determinate and referentially bound meaning, but an arena of meaningful possibility.

The visual ontology of this visual icon is now released: the sense of it is an expressive sense; it has ceased to be a mere datum and has taken on the cloak of possibility and potential. In a drawing, with its direct structural sense, its immediate symbolic significance, the significance of its expressive sense lies in the subtle interaction between 'subject' and 'object', form and content, material and medium. The ultimate 'truth', the ultimate affirmation of a Van Gogh drawing for example, is such because of the subtle way the expressive medium of our reciprocating response is shaped by the impressive medium of the object form in which it has been cast. These two meet together in the iconicity of the drawing, in its particularity no less. We know our sensing in respect of the drawing, for its forms not only shape our perception in an impressive sense but shape them for recall, so that images of the forms of our past perceptual history that have already been incorporated within the matrix of our Being are evoked and recalled to give us in a new way, through the particularity of this new found form, the sense of its significance.

Forms in drawing - indeed in all expressive media - have the power, intrinsically their own, of evoking and refashioning the forms of our past perceptual experience of the world. In a reflective sense they recall for us that interpenetration of ourselves with the world. We sense them as immediately expressive. Susanne Langer has put it thus:
"The effect of symbolic expression is primarily the formulation of perceptual experience, and the constant reformulations of the conceptual frames which the cumulative symbolizing techniques - conscious or unconscious, but rarely altogether absent - establish, one upon another, one in another, one by negation of another." (op cit p80).

She goes on to talk of Campbell-Fisher who writes of the expression of sadness in Mozart's music, that gives evidence to the way perceptual experience is thus formed:

"If I could be as sad as certain passages in Mozart, my glory would be greater than it is... The fact that I know as much as I do of the essence of pathos comes from meeting with such music. If those passages made me sad, which in fact they most often do not, that would be an extraneous and irrelevant detail. My grasp of the essence of sadness... comes not from moments in which I have been sad, but from moments when I have seen sadness before me released from entanglements with contingency." (op cit p88).

Now we see how such a medium can be truly said to be a medium of expression - how such forms can be expressive, how such iconicity emulates directly an experience of felt form - of significant expression. What Campbell-Fisher has so eloquently said is that this feeling idea has become particularised, lifted from the habitual paths of contingency. What so often happens when we recognise this through the forms in art is that their intrinsic expressiveness delivers the particularity of this felt idea to the point where we feel it too. It comes to us bearing significance because it has been given significance through the particular clothing of the work itself. This felt form, this felt idea, is born within the context of the work and rises as it does because this particular context has given it its life - its significance and sense. The work has given it the orbit in which it can now live, in which it can deliver its sense in which it can be expressed. Contingency and habit, like reference and
bound meanings, hold it back from sight. The visibility in vision is born when visibility is freed from the contingency and entanglement of ordinary habitual perception. It is freed when the perception of things becomes the perception of the expression of things.

II. 5. 1. **Drawing as a medium of linear expression.**

We have outlined the general conditions implicit in the phenomenon of expression and I now want to consider briefly the way drawings, particularly as linear presentations, support these general conditions. We shall come to discuss these issues more fully in our last chapter, but at this stage it would be useful to see the implications of what we have been discussing with specific reference to linear expression in drawing. Here it is necessary to point out that in any discussion of the expressive potential in drawings we must of course be mindful that the significance of drawings is only disclosed in their total unity as images of thought and feeling. Having said this, however, we can still proceed with an analysis of drawings from a particular point of view, if we constantly keep in mind that there are many further aspects which might be looked at. I choose the linear aspect of drawing as a point of departure, for it seems to me that whatever else is said about drawings, they are essentially delivered through the mediation and interrelationships of their linear elements. Line, not as 'object', but as phenomenal appearing is the raw material for drawings. An examination of drawings from this point of view will
reveal a further phenomenological appeal. Line in drawing is always a bringing into being of that which previously did not exist and any analysis of it, as a contextual element, gives direct access to the draughtsman's felt thought and visual intelligence. His use of line in drawing will be the genesis of a whole ontology that reaches past his lines as these lines, to a reality that lies embedded within the very formas these linear elements support. The line in drawing is the means whereby we can reach past the contingency of things in the world to a fresh disclosure of sense. Moreover, in its whole contextual interpenetration it is, as Merleau-Ponty has pointed out, a 'blueprint of a genesis of things' (op cit 79). It is symbolic of a way of ordering and, as we have seen from our discussion of Wollheim's thesis in our previous chapter, it is not simply the delivery of the 'edges' of things in the world, of the contours of things in space. Drawing, in its linear manifestation and representation, is not concerned with that 'factual' and 'spatial' pre-given 'reality' of things in the world. Drawing is misconceived if it is seen as the result of the 'tracing' of edges of things that arises from a mechanistic physical-optical engagement with the world. Line in drawing, fundamentally discloses its symbolic relationship with experience, not any direct overall similarity with anything 'real'. Thus we are brought back to our discussion in the first section of this analysis of what Cassirer developed. The line can be said to be expressive in drawing, because of the way it reveals the draughtsman's dialectic and dialogue with his own ways of seeing within the totality of his own perceptual experience of the world. As Ayrton(14) has said, the process of drawing:
"... is before all else the process of putting the visual intelligence into action, the very mechanics of taking visual thought." (op cit p64).

In all this it becomes clear that in our consideration of the linear aspect of drawing we are not considering these elements as 'objects', as 'things', as so much furniture: we are concerned to disclose the phenomenal nature of these elements within the totality of the whole, that lends them a significance and sense that can be truly said to be expressive. We have come to see that expression is that fusion of the 'I' with the 'you' within a single form and that the path outward toward the significance of these forms is only as they find their counterpart in that path inward to ourselves that reveals the world to us and, perhaps more importantly, in the reflexive reciprocation of this activity of seeing reveals ourselves in relation to world. The experience of seeing in drawing and with drawings, is always a qualitative one. To see them as drawings at all is to reach toward their value and expressive potential.

Thus we are taking one aspect of drawing and examining its contribution to our thesis. The undividedness of the sense of the whole image in which this aspect resides will always be borne in mind. Rawson(15) refers to Arnold Schönberg who put it thus:

"In a real work of art it is like this: everything looks as if it had come first, because everything is born at the same time. The feeling already is the form, the thought already is the word." (op cit p77).

We are looking at the means by which this process of putting the visual intelligence into action is achieved. What, of course, makes
a great draughtsman is the way in which within his particular and idiosyncratic graphic forms he makes his endless varieties and improvisations. The richness and texture of the drawing's expressive sense reaches us through the apprehension of this significance as borne in by their means. This includes the variation and tension that arises from the inventiveness of the graphic forms themselves. The clarity and precision of the draughtsman's felt thought comes through from the seeming endless thematic variation he achieves through his graphic forms. Ayrton feels that Ingres "draws ... with the tip of his tongue" (op cit p67) and Rembrandt "has ... the effect of a man planting with gentle, stubby fingers, the green fingers of the spirit, an endless diversity of plants and seedlings" (op cit p68).

II. 5. 2. The line - as figuration.

We are talking, therefore, of seeing drawing primarily as figuration - not configuration. The degrees by which we advance into the richness of its expressive sense is reflected within the variation and interpenetration of its various graphic formulations that each in their relational significance contribute to the wholeness of the drawing's numinous quality. The line as made and now appearing does not have its genesis as an attribute of the objects in the natural world, from which it might spring. The line is not in the natural world at all, it is read into the world. Gore(16) has put it thus:

"... the drawn line is seen as line because the mark is seen as conveying a gesture. If it did not convey anything we would not see it as line. We call it a
line because it is a mark that records a movement." (op cit p29).

This implicit gestural sense of the line makes it directly graphic and indicates the immediate way drawing can disclose visual thought in action. Line bears in itself this physiognomic quality and visual force. The line has a tactile and kinetic basis and comes to vision charged with feeling affect that rises from our own bodily sense. Movement and dynamic are an implicit aspect of all expression and as Arnheim has pointed out, gives to perception itself its primary quality. This affective aspect in perception we have already discovered in Cassirer and we have seen how it lies at the root of expression perception itself. Arnheim(17) clarifies this dynamic in perception when he says:

"In looking at an object, we reach out for it. With an invisible finger we move through the space around us, go over to the distant places where things are found, touch them, catch them, scan their surfaces, trace their borders, explore their texture." (op cit p19).

In drawing, this perceptual activity is given historicity as it is caught and formulated through its various elements and made graphic. The line can restore this sense in us as we follow through the movements of the artist's own vision. Rawson has further suggested that in order to gain insight into the significance of any drawing, we must follow or scan the original movements of the point, all of them, in due scale of emphasis. This is where it has become invaluable to reach into the historicity of the drawing through the sequence photographs of our subjects, but it is often possible, even without this information, to trace the development of the drawing,
to sense the probing and the shaping for recall within the way the marks are put together. By 'reading' a drawing in this way one adopts the mental scanning patterns that the artist originally set down, as we shall discover when we come to the analysis of the drawings before us. What gives to drawing its expressive sense is that this perceptual activity, in action as it were, engages our imaginative concern and we 'live through' the drawing; we stay with it and thus entertain the whole possibility of its expressive and qualitative potential. The greater the richness of the structuring of this experience by the draughtsman the greater will be our share in its expressive sense. For this experience is the experience of felt forms, not forms merely recorded. Their dynamic and qualitative utterance resides in the tension of what they are as marks and the significance they lend to the shaping of our experience of them as forms that leads us past mere configuration to their phenomenal appearing, the path towards the drawing's ontology.

II. 5. 3. The line - physiognomic significance.

We have spoken of the visual tension that the linear elements - as indeed all the formal elements in drawing - can disclose, and we have seen how the line specifically can register that activity of perceptual dynamic which Arnheim feels is embedded in perception itself. Before we are thus able to appreciate this dynamic within drawings, or any other iconic representation, we must already possess the ability in our perception of the world itself to sense the
significance and relationships between things. We must be able to bring that aspect of ourselves into all our perception of the world. Arnheim(8) feels that:

"The impact of forces transmitted by a visual pattern is an intrinsic part of the percept, just as shape or colour. In fact expression can be described as the primary content of vision." (op cit p365).

He suggests, for example, that a blanket thrown over a chair can seem to be twisted, sad or tired (ibid p365). This physiognomic aspect in perception, he suggests, should not surprise us - our senses are not self-contained recording devices operating for their own sake. He goes on:

"The organism is primarily interested in the forces that are active around it - their place, strength, direction ... the perceived impact of forces makes for what we call expression." (ibid p365).

Moreover, he maintains that the significance of the configuration of forces - as the basis of expression - is such, not only for the object in whose image these forces appear but for the whole physical and mental context of the world in general.

"Motifs like rising and falling, dominance and submission, weakness and strength, harmony and discord, struggle and conformance underlie all existence." (ibid p368).

We do not read into these motifs our feelings, as the theory of empathy might suggest; they are not "dressed up ... by an illusory 'pathetic fallacy'" (Arnheim, ibid p368) as though these motifs were a clue to a kind of associationist view. These felt forms are immediately perceived and apprehended as observable qualities in the presentation itself. Therefore, our apprehension of these felt qualities in a drawing not only seem phenomenologically to be
immediate and direct; they are so. We do not make an inference from
the physical sign to the mental state, we apprehend expressive sense
directly. Cassirer has also sensed what we have been saying when in
talking about the line he says:

"As we immerse ourselves in the design and construct
it for ourselves we become aware of a distinct phy-
siognomic character in it. A peculiar mood is
expressed in the purely spatial determination, the
up and the down of the lines in space embraces an
inner mobility, a dynamic rise and fall, a psychic
life and being. And here we do not merely read our
own inner states subjectively and arbitrarily into
the spatial form, rather the form gives itself to us
as an animated totality, an independent manifestation
of life ... all this lies in the line itself as a
determination of its own reality, its objective
nature." (op cit p200).

This immediately raises issues of profound philosophical interest.
It brings us full circle to all we have been saying about the phenome-
on of expression, for we can see again how within the fusion of a
single form that tension that rises from the line's move outward to-
ward subjectivity is grounded in its own objectivity as line. Its
symbolic and metaphoric significance is caught within the tension of
its own double aspect. The richness of the experience it can bring
to us is revealed through the endless variety of its own form, its
own objective nature - its own means. Thus, not only in its rise
and fall, not only in its visual tension, but in the way in which it
is constituted and built up, in the variety of its pressures, of its
expansion and contraction, of its speed and weight, of the space it
points to, as well as the space it encloses - all these aspects are
impressing us. And as they echo forms already embedded in the matrix
of our Being, shape and sense, give it direction and, through the
the marriage of felt forms in our past perceptual experience, disclose a new significance. The line is never visually self-sufficient.

Sonia Rouve (18) says:

"If forms are to be meaningful, such meanings must be found within the forms themselves and not grafted from without on to these forms ... forms are never visually self-sufficient. They always refer to meanings which remain beyond all optical images and yet are embodied in them. ... This Janus-like essence of forms is to be clearly understood. (op cit p204).

André Breton (19) writing about Kandinsky's line said:

"He has restored the line to its proper necessity. It is the thread of Ariadne that leads us through the maze of appearances, through the mist of objects stripped of their external and specific identity ... ." (op cit p11).

The line as the 'thread of Ariadne' has its own internal necessity. Its very linearity is disclosed in the form of its being linear and yet it comes to us clothed in content, it faces both ways. Thus, its linearity might point to its visual forms, but it comes to us bearing significance, the meanings the line refers to are not 'grafted on', they arise out of the very existence of its own linearity. The two areas of the contract of significance join in the manifestation of the meaning which indeed is beyond all optical images. To see the line as the thread that leads us through the maze of appearances is to enter into an imaginative contract with it that feeds us with meaning as the meaning lies embodied in the linearity of its form. The two tokens are fused within the image of the line's form. Thus the face of Janus faces inwardly and outwardly at the same time. The line takes on its own dynamic, becomes expressive.
The tension arising from the duality of the line's nature, its metaphorical significance is always present in drawing. Indeed this tension between the line as a two-dimensional figure on its ground and its three-dimensional metaphoric sense as figuration, is what gives to drawing its 'life' and 'presence'. For drawings to carry this expressive significance we must sense the tension that is caught and held between their two-dimensional surface unity and their three-dimensional plastic sense. Cézanne is often quoted as being pre-eminently occupied with flat picture surface, the truth is that the significance of his image forms is achieved through a vivid realisation of that tension that exists within the two-dimensional sense of that three-dimensional plasticity. Merleau-Ponty characteristically grasps this significance when he says:

"Figurative or not, the line is no longer a thing or an imitation of a thing. It is a certain disequilibrium kept up within the indifference of the white paper; it is a certain process of gouging within the in-itself, a certain constitutive emptiness - an emptiness which as Moore's statues show decisively, upholds the pretended positivity of the things. The line is no longer the apparition of an entity upon a vacant background, as it was in classical geometry. It is ... the restriction, segregation, or modulation of a pre-given spatiality." (op cit pp79/80)

and again he says:

"The beginning of the line's path establishes or installs a certain level or mode of the linear, a certain manner for the line to be and to make itself line, 'to go line'. Relative to it, every subsequent inflection will have a diacritical value, will be another aspect of the line's relationship to itself, will form an adventure, a history, a meaning of the line ..." (op cit p79).

Bergson(20) talks of line as being "... not in one place any more than in another, but it gives the key to the whole" (op cit p229)
and Leonardo(21) in his *Treatise on Painting* is reputed to have said:

"The secret of the art of drawing is to discover in each object the particular way in which a certain flexuous line which is, so to speak, its generating axis, is directed through its whole extent . . ." (op cit p229).

It is because drawing can give such direct access to the structural sense of the draughtsman's vision that makes it so rich an area for the exploration of his visual thought. There are no lines visible in themselves, the draughtsman in making his linear manifestation is unequivocally making an affirmation of the *is* of his reality. As Ayrton has pointed out, drawings are first a soliloquy before they become communication. Their sense is first private for they structure in visible sense the draughtsman's structuring of his vision. The line reveals, like no other mark, the course and clarity of the draughtsman's visual sense. This is why drawing is more self disclosure than self expression. The line records the draughtsman's search through the world of appearances. His intention, if his search is true, is to 'render visible' as Klee once said. Lines, suggested Merleau-Ponty are "... indicated, implicated and even very imperiously demanded by the things, but they themselves are not things" (op cit p78). The qualitative sense of their deliverance lies, as we have seen, in the relational tension they bear, not only to those structures within the drawing but to that inherent structural ordering that the draughtsman has found within 'things' that in this new delivery breaks the 'skin of things', as Michaux(22) says, and gives them a fresh qualitative sense. Moreover, he gives to them a fresh dimension of vision and formulates them within an image that enables us
to move past the contingency of them as mere 'things' to sense that new dimension they now hold for us, through the particularity that is given to them in the whole graphic sense of the drawing itself.

The structural ordering that line can bring to experience through drawing is of course crucial to an understanding of the drawing's sense. A drawing that is made up of flowing calligraphic linear elements has a very different sense to one that is constituted from elements that have an angularity and straightness about them. Feliks Topolski's drawings for example, are full of an organic rhythmic sense that arises from the way the lines are used. David Cowley's drawings, on the other hand, have a very different visual sense because the line is used primarily as an axis of direction and movement. These descriptions have more than a mere topological distinction - they present very different ontologies as we shall discover more fully later in Chapter V. Of course, in a formal sense, there is a very different expressive 'feel' to lines that are straight and angular and lines that are curved. Much of this has to do, as Arnheim suggested, with the kinetics of their implied movement, and their visual sense is brought to us as having qualitative value because of the visual forces they generate, not only in themselves but in relation to the co-ordinates of the page. Rawson(15) points out that straightness implies a fixed sense of direction. It also establishes a claim to rightness and validity, and if drawn mechanically as for example, in architectural drawings or mathematical diagrams, present an ontology that is specifically relating to a system. Drawings done in this way, as part of systemic art for example, point away from any
movement of the individual to a world of fixed and unchanging values -
a world of impression - a world of objectness and objectivity. Cas-
sirer has described such linear manifestations like this:

"We now perceive a graphic representation of a trigonometric function. ... The spatial form is nothing but a paradigm for the formula ... it belongs to a system." (op cit p200).

Curved strokes on the other hand, the varieties of which are immense, are based on the concept of change. A curve is drawn by an instrument that is continually changing its direction across the ground. This sense of time and change which is evidenced in drawing is a very important part of its expressive sense and shall occupy our thinking in Chapter IV. Curves have a symbolic significance as Rawson(15) points out:

"The qualities of curves, and their content of experience of change, are one of the most important sources of artistic vitality for they extend the meaning of drawn forms via the suggestion of change into the dimension of time. They are symbolic of life, suggesting the contours of fruit, flesh, organic substances which are full of sap, juice, blood, and they are capable of movement, in contrast to the inorganic, lifeless and crystalline immobility of the straight, the flat, and the equally faceted." (op cit p90).

This view of time and change caught as it were within the drawing, makes sense of how drawings can hold our attention and how so often we can return to them without ever tiring of them. What this also demonstrates is that drawings have been constructed in time; they are made up from a whole history of looking, a whole tissue of glances, a visual experience that on the part of the
draughtsman has been 'gone through'. He has structured his vision so and it is this that we ourselves experience as we scan the drawing. The other further symbolic significance is that within these curvi-linear transitions there is the expression of a visual ontology which views reality as fluid and constantly changing, without true static forms. The calligraphic art of the Far East embodies this sense in its image forms.

Furthermore, the element of change that the implied movement of these lines might suggest is beyond all words to describe. We might say that lines may 'plunge' or 'float' or 'swoop' but these verbal descriptions are crude approximations to what lines do in their visual sense in drawings. There are lines for movement concepts for which there are no words, and this is why forms in drawing can cut across any categories of thought defined by language. Yet the ultimate meaning and sense of the line can be felt and known in a way that is fully cognitive. As we have seen, Cassirer has pointed out that all our perception of the world proceeds from an apprehension and differentiation of certain physiognomic characters with which in a sense it is saturated (op cit p200). Indeed, the linguistic designation of movement almost always discloses this factor. It is interesting to notice that instead of describing the movement as such, as the form of an objective spatial and temporal process, language names and fixates the condition of which the movement is an expression. Ludwig Klages(23) suggests that 'quick', 'slow' and 'abrupt' as descriptive of lines,

"... may be understood in terms of pure mathematics,
but 'violent', 'hurried', 'restrained', 'exaggerated' are just as much names for conditions of life as for kinds of movement and actually describe the latter by indicating their characters. Anyone who wishes to characterise forms of motion and spatial forms, finds himself unexpectedly entangled in a characterisation of psychic attributes, because forms and movements have been experienced as psychic phenomena before they are judged by the understanding from the standpoint of objectivity and because language can express objective concepts only through the mediation of the experience of impression." (op cit p80).

For this reason the dance of the pen-tip across the surface of a Rembrandt drawing is essential to the image and crucial in helping us come to understand the full significance of the drawing's expressive concern. The element of time and change as met and recognised and moreover experienced through the elements of a drawing have a fundamental part to play in the expressive content of the drawing itself.

II. 6. 1. Summary

We have come for the moment to the conclusion of this present discussion. We have attempted to demonstrate that through one of the basic ingredients of the drawing we can begin to sense the implications of all that we have said in connection with the concept of expression. We have analysed one aspect of drawing which gives an entry into how the graphic forms in drawing can begin to hold significance for us. We have realised, in the course of this appraisal, that this constitutes only part of how a drawing can deliver its
expressive sense. Drawings deliver meaning that is rising from their wholeness. All we have done is to take one aspect which is a constituent of that structural ordering in drawing and analyse the way in which it makes its own contribution to this sense of significance that gives drawing its qualitative aspect. The metaphorical concern to which the linear elements in a drawing point is indicative of that wider qualitative aspect that we bring to our every-day experience of the world. Drawings, through their graphic means, hold this sense for contemplation.
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III. 1. 1. Introduction - Perception and Imagination.

Drawings are images. Their first and most important function is that they are representations. The representative principle, as we have begun to see from our earlier discussions, lies at the root and source of their meaning. This chapter investigates the image, not only as it becomes formed in structures like drawings, but also as idea. We shall consider the underlying relationship between image and idea. We shall look at the image as external perception and the image as thought, as it functions in ordinary perception and in aesthetic perception. However, we shall be careful not to make too great a separation between perception and imagination, for we shall discover that in experience no such clear-cut distinctions can be made.

In Chapter I we considered Susanne Langer's definition of the image:

"An image does not exemplify the same principles of construction as the object it symbolizes but abstracts its phenomenal character, its immediate effect on our
sensibility ... It organises and enhances the impression directly received. And as most of our awareness of the world is a continual play of impressions, our primitive intellectual equipment is largely a fund of images, not necessarily visual, but often gestic, kinesthetic, verbal or what I can only call 'situational'. ... we apprehend everything which comes to us as impact from the world by imposing some image on it that stresses its salient features and shapes it for recognition and memory." (op cit p59).

Thus images are born spontaneously as our consciousness reaches out into and is invaded by the world. Images are the product of the mind's unceasing search for meaning. Karl Pribram(2) also, as we discovered, suggested that:

"... the elements composing the image are relations between events, rather than events per se ... The image is thus a sign of relationships. In this way, imaging provides internal meaning to signs. Imaging is therefore the first of several ways by which meaning can be achieved." (op cit p7).

This is of enormous importance for it underlines the relational significance and dynamic of the whole of our image formation and it also clearly suggests that the image is not a 'thing', it is always a relationship. Furthermore, for the individual, his images, his formulations between events, must be the very touchstone of his knowledge of the world. All knowledge springs from a grasp of the significance and relationship between things. This is the basis of all ideation. We cannot possibly know one thing without knowing it within the context of something else. Through our images we can set ourselves at a distance from ourselves - we can reflect. Images become that middle term, as Dufrenne(3) says (op cit p345), between our being-in-the-world and our sense of being-in-the-world. Images lie at the root of the 'objectness' of things in the world and they are the enabling
for us to sense through our own objectivity our subjectivity as well. The image is the coalescence of both poles of our experience in and of the world.

III. 2. 1. The rise of the image - from 'presence' to representation.

How is this image formed and whence does it spring? In Mikel Dufrenne's phenomenology the advent of the image takes place within perception itself. He suggests that:

"Every complete perception involves the grasping of a meaning. It is thus that perception engages us in action or reflection and is integrated into the course of our life. To perceive is not to register appearances passively - appearances which are meaningless in themselves. To perceive is to know - that is, to discover - a meaning within or beyond appearances ... " (op cit p335).

How, asks Dufrenne, is this meaning deciphered? How do we move, in Saussure's(4) terms, from the sign to the signified? To say that it is simply by judgment is to invoke a deus ex machina, without showing its origin. Further, to say it is a result of learning is too simple. As Dufrenne argues, certain meanings appear to be understood at once in experience - in immediate experience. A child, for example, is able to comprehend the gestures or language of others as soon as he is capable of certain modes of behaviour and long before repetition has been able to establish stable associations and fix them in him.

Meaning is something I respond to, not something I think with detachment. Dufrenne points out that meaning is something that concerns
and determines me,

"... resonating in me and moving me. ... Meaning is a demand to which I respond with my body." (op cit p336).

Thus any theory of meaning and thence of knowledge must begin from realising my existential presence in the world. The duality that has arisen from a consideration of mind and body is a duality that forgets the lived experience of myself with the world. We have seen, from our earlier discussions, that it is because I am in the world that objects take on a significance for me and that I am able to catch in them a physiognomic sense which is the bedrock of their expressive quality. We must take care, however, that we do not move too swiftly to seeing this activity as being part of representation. What we are talking about here is that indissoluble fusion I have with the world that precedes representation. It is as though I come to the world, bearing in my body its likeness. In fact, as Dufrenne says, things are present to me,

"... there is no screen between them and us. We are both of the same race." (op cit p337).

This consideration has enormous implications of course, especially when we come to Sartre's analysis, where he talks of the implicit knowledge that rises with the formation of the image and we have seen that Merleau-Ponty is also fully aware of this area of the pre-reflective when he speaks of the undividedness between the sensing and the sensed. As Dufrenne points out, the discovery of the object in perception is not like the solution to a riddle, in which we are called upon to decipher sense 'data' - strictly speaking a task for
"If the thing does not possess ... a secret for me, this is because the thing is on a level with me, or, rather, because through my body I am on a level with it ... My body is, as it were, a branching out from things and is capable of recording their presence or absence. The transcendental activity which intellectualism assigns to the mind can also be attributed to the body. ... As living and mine, the body is itself capable of knowledge, and this fact represents a scandal only for those who consider the objective rather than the animated body." (op cit p337).

No statement could be clearer as regards the essential unity of body and mind. Intellectualism has been the curse that has separated mind from body, where concept has been split from percept. There is a knowledge that rises from acquaintance, the very acquaintance I have as my lived-in body. Can this knowledge, lived at the level of presence, be conscious? Not in the same sense as conscious awareness. As Dufrenne points out:

"On the plane of presence, everything is given, nothing is known." (op cit p338)

and again:

"... here I know things in the same way that they know me, that is, without explicitly recognising them." (op cit p338).

It is in this way, from this level of implicit knowledge that conscious perception gains its sense and meaning. This implicit knowledge gives to perception, as Dufrenne says, its impression of 'plenitude' (op cit p338). Conscious perception must add to this the power of seeing - of detaching itself. This becomes the advent of representation. The power in perception, in conscious perception, to see, to detach itself from the level of lived presence is provided by the imagination. But any theory of perception cannot remain at the level of presence. As
Dufrenne points out:

"It must break open a pathway from a comprehension lived by the body to the conscious intellection affected at the level of representation." (op cit p339).

What of course is crucial for our present enquiry is that it is precisely aesthetic perception that confirms this. We meet the sensuous aspect of the aesthetic object first through our lived experience in our body. The aesthetic object, the drawing, the painting, the dance, the music or drama, first manifests itself to the body and as it were invites the body to join forces with it. How else can we talk of the movement of the linear elements in a drawing, for example, if this was not first felt in our body, without our conscious awareness, but only becoming such through the representation of these lines? The unity and sense of wholeness that something like a drawing achieves, the totality of its sense is made known to us because, as Dufrenne points out:

"The body is the always already established system of equivalences and intersensory transpositions. It is for the body that unity is given before diversity." (op cit p339).

Yet perception cannot be wholly confined to the level of the pre-reflective. There must be a move from the lived to the thought, from presence to representation. It is this move that gives rise to the image. There is, as we have seen, a capacity at the level of presence that is assumed by the body. This we might see as a 'being-with'. This is still an aspect of the imagination, but now its work assumes the role of 'seeing-as'. 'Seeing-as' is the hallmark of the representative principle and lies at the root of all
image function. The important issue here is that the move from presence to representation and beyond is fundamentally the work of the imagination. Sartre(5) tends to make a distinct and sharp division between imagination and perception, but we shall discover that there is no such clear-cut separation. Perception would not assume its role of 'being-with' and 'seeing-as' if it were not for the work of the imagination. He sees the imagination largely in its empirical concerns, whereas Dufrenne, as we shall discover, considers imagination as having wider powers, that is, as both empirical and transcendental. The fundamental work of the imagination however, is to make sense of the world and of the body, to consciousness. Imagination makes up the totality of mental life. Whereas Sartre for example, talks of a perceptual consciousness and an imaginative consciousness, Dufrenne prefers to use different terms and, indeed, when it comes to an analysis of aesthetic perception, he radically parts company with Sartre on the basis of principle.

III. 2. 2. The image - as middle term between presence and representation.

We have been considering the move from presence to representation. This move is affected by the imagination and in coming to representation we inevitably come to the image. Dufrenne argues that:

"The image, which is itself a metaxy or middle term between the brute presence where the object is experienced and the thought where it becomes idea, allows the object to appear, to be present as represented." (op cit p345).
This is one of the clearest insights into the definition of the image. As we shall see from Sartre the focus of intention is not on the image but on its objective term. The image allows the object to appear. Now this 'object' can take the form of things in the world - structured by sensuous materials - objects of our perceptual life, or this 'object' can take on the form of the content of a thought or idea arising from all the intersensory projections of our psychic and mental life. As Sartre has said, there is not a world of objects and a world of images (op cit p20), there is a different level of existence, a different orientation of consciousness, a different conscious intention. We have seen that it is through the imagination that the move from presence to representation is affected and even if the imagination gives us the capacity to see 'as', or to suggest, it is still rooted in the body and further this implicit knowledge that, as it were, prepares us to see, located as it is within the level of presence also nourishes representation. As Dufrenne points out:

"Representation is the heir to what the body has experienced. Moreover, the body itself prepares for representation. ... The body reconciles us with the object instead of separating us from it ... " (op cit p346).

In an important sense, also discussed by Sartre, impressions cannot begin to qualify as objects, as having objective content, if we are not first able to form the image. It is through the image that objects come to us as bearing objectivity, as objects and not merely as impressions. It is through the image that we are able to distance ourselves from impressions so that these impressions come not undivided to us but as wholes, as making sense. It is through
the image that the in-itself of objects begins to appear. We must notice, and Sartre also makes this abundantly clear that it is never on the image that our intention and attention is focussed. It is always by means of the image, through the image that we are able to reach the identity of existence of objects in perception and it is through the image that we are able to reach the identity of essence that is the mark of all thought and ideation. Dufrenne adds:

"The schematism by which the object can become object for an intelligence is attributable to the body. In this view the body does not merely respond to the object. It imitates the conditions under which the object can be thought and located in a world."

(op cit p346).

And it does this through the image. This schematism is the structure by which the image appears. This schematism is the basis for the content and structure of the image. Images of our ordinary perception have a material frame, are shaped in various ways through their material existence. Similarly, in considering images in art, they too are shaped; they become objects of sense for us, built up and constituted by all the interrelationships and make-up of their schemata. These schemata, as Sartre points out, are analogues, on which and through which the image appears. This schematism, this sense, as Dufrenne has pointed out, is first attributable to the body. The image is born out from the body and is the middle term that indicates the move from the primary lived experience of presence to representation, to a re-presentation to me in consciousness of what has already been prepared in presence. The image allows me to move from presence, where I am indissolubly linked with the world and, moreover, to view this move, to sense it, to perceive this relational dynamic. The image is the middle term between presence and
representation. Its roots are in the pre-reflective. The image allows its object to appear. How is this 'opening' achieved? How is this 'distancing' effected? This 'opening' is crucially important for it represents the disintegration of the unity of subject and object at the level of the pre-reflective, in order that the intentional character of the for-itself can be achieved, so that consciousness can become consciousness, that is conscious of itself. We have seen how the image discloses the in-itself of the existence of objects, clothes them with objecthood. In doing so and for this to happen there must be a consciousness that views this sense. Herein lies the rise of the sense of subjectivity. The for-itself of the subject can only be such in so far as the in-itself of the object is distanced from it. The dialectic of subject and object that makes representation what it is now takes on its relational significance. The image carries this relational significance within itself. The advent of the image is the advent of the dialectic between subject and object and is the mark of consciousness itself. Dufrenne puts it thus:

"An opening is involved, in so far as the detachment of consciousness from object hollows out an empty space ... in which the object can take on form."
(op cit p346).

The image thus provides the background and context for the in-itself and the for-itself to appear, the ground for the whole reflexive interchange between subject and object and the field in which images as we find them in art appear. Herein lies the power of the icon, for images in art bring about that fusion with subject and object which, as we saw from our earlier discussions, is the mark of their expressive concern.
III. 2. 3. The image - as the means for reflection.

The image provides us with this arena, this opening. Moreover, as Dufrenne points out, this opening is achieved and made possible through time. Through my image I can contemplate, I can survey, I can cast forward my intentions, I can grasp the possibility of the possible, I can attend, think, reflect, I can stay with my image in thought just as my look, in perception, becomes a duration. Space and time are correlative. Dufrenne adds:

"To be attentive, to give representation its full due, is to transport oneself into the past in order to grasp the object in its future ... I perceive ... from the past and into the future; in the present, I can only act." (op cit p347).

The image thus enables me to detach myself from the present; in the present I can only act, because the image "hollows out an empty space" (op cit p346) and I can view my relationship with the world instead of being overwhelmed by it. Furthermore, I can reflect, I can, as Dufrenne says, "return to the past in order to surprise the future" (op cit p347). My image enables me to anticipate the opening as created by the image and that which defines this space is the milieu wherein the object can appear; the image gives to the object its in-itself and gives to my consciousness its for-itself. Further, it is by means of the image giving shape to this space that objects can appear, where seeing becomes a possibility and where I can both perceive and conceive.

Dufrenne, in a remarkable passage, puts it thus:
"Every image possesses a spatial background. I contemplate what is in space from the depth of the past. If on this basis, I can follow the movement of time - lie in wait for the future and anticipate it - this is because space somehow contains the future ... And if space is the condition or, rather, the nature of everything represented in so far as it is given, we have evidence that the given is always appearance, that it is always presented imperfectly and that there always remains an elsewhere and a beyond. ... The advent of representation occurs with the upsurge of space and time." (op cit p347).

To these extraordinary insights we shall return in Chapter IV, but here we see the dual role of the imagination found in its double aspect. Kant distinguished these two aspects when he spoke of the imagination in its productive and reproductive sense, in its transcendental as well as its empirical concern. The empirical imagination strives to make the object appear through the image. The transcendental imagination gives to us the sense that this is only appearance and that there always remains an elsewhere and a beyond. Sartre's view of the imagination, as we shall see, is an empirical one and this leads him, when talking of the image in aesthetic perception, to suggest that it is 'unreal', that it is 'imaginary' and that in viewing it one is really suspending one's belief. This is the inevitable outcome of viewing the work of the imagination in its empirical aspect only. The transcendental imagination takes us beyond the appearance of representation as such to the possibility that there is a world beyond mere appearances, that appearances are only the tokens of the real.

Of course, in discussing the work of imagination we can make these distinctions, but in experience these two aspects function together and, as Dufrenne suggests (op cit p348), they "nourish"
perception and prepare perception for the 'fullness' it seems to possess in experience. Meaning inheres in perception and is prepared for us from the level of our presence in perception. This level, as we have seen, is our 'lived' experience of body-world - there, but not consciously known. It arises to knowledge as awareness through the representational aspect of the image. It is imagination in both its aspects that prepares the ground for perception and carves out a space in which the image can take on form - can achieve its 'object' through intentionality. For intentionality is itself shot through with meaning and carries within itself implicit knowledge. Imagination, in its work of animating and extending appearances is not created out of nothing. Imagination is rooted in perception, at the level of presence, at the level of representation and at the level of reflection. Further, as we have seen, imagination is at work in mobilising this knowledge that is implicit in our lived experience with the world and converts what is acquired in this experience into something visible. The imagination strives to make the object appear, to make sense of this level of our experience with the world. This striving to make explicit what is implicit is what constitutes the image. Of course, this conversion into something visible, as visible, belongs to the realm of the image in perception. The striving toward the visible is also true of the images of our imagination, our mental images. This 'visible', however, is not, as we shall see from Sartre, of a 'physical' ordering: it is that element that rises from all the psychic and intersensory functioning of our body - this visible belongs to the imaginative and not the perceptual consciousness, to use Sartrian terminology. This striving
to make visible is what gives to our mental images that sense of quasi-
observation which is part of their inherent characteristic. What is
important is that the imagination is the motivating force that strives
to make what is not known, but implicit, known and present through the
agency of the image. This is the mark of the image's function, it is
always a striving to present sense to us - to make sense. This is
why Susanne Langer is able to say that the image is the stamp we give
to everything that comes to us as impact from the world. It is the
image that gives form to impressions, stressing their salient features
and shaping them for recognition and memory (op cit p59).

III. 3. 1. Sartre's analysis - the image as consciousness.

In all the foregoing we have begun to relate imagination to per-
ception and have discussed the context of the rise of the image. We
have seen that the image is that middle term that comes to be as the
move is made from presence to representation. It will be our concern
in this section to look at Sartre's analysis of the image in order to
prepare the ground for an investigation of the place and function of
the image in aesthetic perception, with particular reference to the
image in drawing.

In his book The Psychology of Imagination, Sartre(5) discusses
four characteristics of the image. These he describes as: the image
as consciousness; the phenomenon of quasi-observation; the image as
positing its object as nothing; and the spontaneity of the image.

First, let us consider his analysis of the image as consciousness. This is the central concern of Sartre's whole thesis on the imagination and is the theme that runs through the whole of his argument. We have begun to see from Dufrenne that the image is the mark of the move from our lived presence in the world toward our sense of being in the world. This, as we have seen, give rise to the advent of representation, for things only represent for us and therefore become known to us, as the imagination strives to make visible and thus explicit what is implicitly felt at the level of presence. Moreover, as Dufrenne has pointed out, in the present I can only act, but through my image I can reach not only into the past but into the future; through the image I can attend to the present and anticipate the future. Further, we have seen that the image lends to objects their objectivity. We can grasp the object not only in its existence but also in its essence.

In his book Imagination. A Psychological Critique, Sartre gives the example of looking at a sheet of white paper (op cit p1). The qualities of its shape, colour and texture give it a kind of existence, a kind of place, outside myself as it were, distant from myself. We might say that the paper possesses these qualities in-itself. This existence, as Sartre points out, is a kind of inertness. The piece of paper (with acknowledgement to Berkeley) is always there. We call the piece of white paper a 'thing', it has an objectness about it. Now my consciousness, my awareness of this object could never be
a 'thing' in the same way, because consciousness is never 'in-itself' in the same way; it is never 'inert' as the object of my perception might be; my consciousness is always my consciousness, always for itself, never in-itself. My consciousness appears as purely spontaneous, confronting the world of things, which have in themselves a kind of passivity about them. In uncovering this in-itself and for-itself we have begun to describe two kinds of existence. Objects in the world exist in themselves, apart from me. I, on the other hand, can never exist apart from myself. I must always exist for myself. I can, by turning my head, annihilate, as Sartre puts it, this sheet of white paper - it ceases to exist for me. But at another time and in another place, through an act of imagination I might 'see' the sheet of white paper and recognise it as the sheet of white paper I was looking at previously in perception. Sartre feels:

"... this essential sameness is not coupled with existential identity ... it exists differently. I do not see it. ... Nor is it an inert datum existing in itself. In a word it does not exist in fact it exists as image." (op cit pp2/3).

The original French, from which the translation has been made has en image (op cit p3). The sense is: 'by way of the image'. What is important is that I can distinguish what exists as a thing and what exists as an image. Sartre is, of course, talking here of what we would commonly call the 'mental' image. However, much confusion has arisen from considering this image as a thing. This 'mental' does not mean 'in' the mind at all, rather it always indicates the means by which consciousness clarifies to itself the objects of its intention. Psychological introspective techniques have built up a picture of mind peopled with 'images' that can be 'inspected'. 
Sartre's whole thesis is that mind is synonymous with the activity of consciousness. It is the imagination, as we have seen, that strives to make visible the 'object' of the mind's intention; this it does through the agency of the image. The image is not in consciousness at all. The image is always a consciousness - the mark of imaginative engagement. Thinking that images are things in themselves lies at the root of the whole problem concerning the relationship between imagination and perception. The image, as that middle term that represents the move from presence to representation is not an image built upon perception - as visible existence. The image puts us en route for the visible and always is a representation of appearance. To think that the image is but a 'fainter' copy of the impressions given by perception is to fall prey, as Sartre(5) puts it, to the "illusion of immanence" (op cit p2). Consciousness and the image as consciousness exist not in themselves as things in the world, but for themselves. We are never deceived into thinking, for example, that our images are perceptions (except perhaps in extreme cases like hallucinations). We know when we have the image in perception and we know when we have the image in imagination. We know spontaneously the difference between perceiving and imagining. The recognition of the image, as imaginative act, is an immediate datum of inner experience. The difficulty is to rid oneself of the habit of thinking that all modes of existence must be physical in type. Sartre(7) clarifies it thus:

"After all, the paper as image and the paper in reality are but one and the same sheet of paper on two different planes of being. Consequently, as soon as one shifts from pure contemplation of the image as such to thinking about images with-
out forming them, one slides from essential identity of image and object to an alleged existential identity. Since the image in this case is the object, one draws the conclusion that the image exists in the same fashion as the object."

(op cit pp3/4).

The problem is clear. As soon as we abandon the consciousness of the 'object' of the image, that is, as soon as we abandon what the image is aiming at - its content, its meaning - as soon as we abandon the piece of white paper as something in-itself and consider the image of it, we turn the image into the object of contemplation and begin to give it the status of a thing. The illusion of immensity has returned.

It is easy to see how this confusion has arisen. The root of the word 'image' has its origin in the Latin 'imago'. 'Imago' in turn is derived from 'imitari', 'to imitate'. It more properly denotes something that is 'graven' or 'made in the likeness of'. Imagination as a covert process, first came into use through metaphor. The metaphor has now become literalised. The root metaphor equated imaginings with imitating. Imagination meant copying through the construction of an object that resembled the model, i.e. the graven image. When applied in a metaphorical way to what we now mean by imaginings, the idea became a constructive process whereby likenesses were created. It is easy to see, as Sartre has pointed out, how the submerged metaphor has led to calling mental images 'pictures in the mind'. Hume went as far as to say:

"Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence we may frame impressions ... By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and
Thus the 'ghost was born in the machine' and the whole theory that Sartre(7) has called the "naive metaphysics of the image" (op cit p4) came into being. Much of the dilemma and futility of the notion has been caused because 'seeing' in terms of eyes, imagination and understanding came from the use of 'seeing' as a referent word. The problem is always, as Sartre points out, due to considering the image as a thing, as in-itself. It becomes clear that if we actually saw our images (no matter how faintly), we would have difficulty distinguishing them from actual perceptions. Thus, through this naive metaphysical theorising, images became not only things but lesser things, possessed of their own existence and given to consciousness like all other things and in the process maintaining external relations with the things of which they were images – only the relationship was of a lesser degree and of a lesser clarity. The problem is that these theories and certain psychological speculation have begun with an a priori speculation. The error once committed was difficult to eradicate. Images are not things in themselves; their existence is solely for themselves, arising directly and spontaneously as an activity of the imagination. The identity of the image in perception is one of a kind of existence, the identity of my mental image is one of essence. Both arise from the activity of the imagination but the 'intention' of each image is of a different order. The image is the means by which I can reach either the 'object' in my perception or the 'object' in my imagination. In both instances the object is framed in different ways. In terms of the object in perception the frame is the physical material existence of the object that is serving..."
as an analogue to its representational sense. In terms of the 'object' of my mental image the frame of reference, which is its content, is arising from all the intersensory relationships of my psychic life and being, rising from all the interpenetration of myself as being-in-the-world, from the level of my presence in the world. Thus the image rises as the search is made toward meaning. The image is always the means by which my conscious intention can be clarified. My intention is always directed to its 'object' through the image. The image is always the means by which its object might appear. Further, in order to have a consciousness of an image, I must reflect. In other words I must take up a different position with myself than when I am simply perceiving or simply imagining. Thus to talk of the image at all, as some kind of abstract concept, is to disclose a kind of second-degree activity where my attention is turned away from the 'object' of my consciousness to the way or manner in which this object is made known to me. It is only through an act of reflection that I can say I have an image. This, of course, is the basis for any certainty I might hold about myself and the world and is at the root of my belief. For, through the awareness of having an image I cannot possibly deceive myself - for it has arisen from my own reflective judgments. This immediate sense of certainty is a peculiar characteristic of the image. It lies at the heart of all my images - both in perception and imagination.

What this has enabled us to see, and where earlier thinking on the image went astray, is that these conclusions are vitiated by a failure to see that imagination is not some kind of secondary activity
of perception. Under this guise images become pale copies of perceptual objects. Sartre(5) admits that if it were not for the difficulty of ignoring centuries of traditional usage he would dispense with the term 'image' and use 'imaginative consciousness' (op cit p5) instead, as this would seem a more appropriate term and would not imply that the image is an object or thing. The truth is, of course, that by putting the image into consciousness, consciousness itself is destroyed. Putting images into consciousness turns consciousness itself into an object. This would necessarily involve a further consciousness to judge the first and so on to infinite regress. Sartre maintains that consciousness is the image - it is not then conscious of the image, or if it is, it is operating in a reflective way, having a different 'object' of intention. By saying that the image is in consciousness, consciousness ceases to be transparent to itself - its essential unity is broken. This wholeness is characteristic of our awareness of the world and of ourselves. All images are for consciousness, they are always for-themselves, not in-themselves.

As Sartre(5) maintains:

"The word image can therefore indicate only the relationship of consciousness to the object; in other words, it means a certain manner in which the object makes its appearance to consciousness, or, if one prefers, a certain way in which consciousness presents an object to itself." (op cit p5).

And again:

"... an image is nothing else than a relationship ... my attention is not directed on an image, but on an object." (op cit p5).

Thus not only is consciousness distinct, it is capable of distinguishing itself from the object. This is of enormous importance
in realising the place of images in thinking. Cognition is not something separated from this intrinsic act of consciousness. The ability to distinguish through reflexive judgment, my consciousness and my consciousness in its relation to its objects, is the basis of all my ideation and knowledge. To speak of my ability to form images and of my ability to give shape to my impressions and, from the flood of impressions known and consciously received, as well as all those impressions I am receiving below the level of my conscious awareness, to structure these impressions into sense, is to speak of the work of my imagination and indeed is to speak of the structure of my very Being itself. Furthermore, as Mary Warnock(9) has suggested:

"There emerges a space between the thinking subject and that which is the object of its thought, between the perceiving subject and that which it perceives." (op cit pIX).

The emergence of a space is the indication of a conscious Being, for to be conscious is to be at a distance from the world, is to maintain a relationship with the world. As we have seen from Dufrenne, it is the imagination that carves out this space – through the image. The image is the token that this space exists. Furthermore, through this reflective act of judgment I can grasp the significance of the in-itself of existence and the for-itself of essence. I can begin that reciprocal interchange with the world that enlarges my being. Sensing that a space exists between myself and the world means that objects can be questioned. Imagination, through the image, gives me the power to interrogate the world. I can form the image of the possible, I can see that the appearance of objects is only a token of a beyond, I grasp the sense that appearance is only appearance. My
ability to propose that something is not so, is evidence that I am free from the bondage of a causal determinism that is the mark of an animal's existence. I do not simply respond to perception as mere impression. I can reach out into perception and grasp it as expression. I am free to move through the world and still remain distinct from it. My image is the path to an ontology that is free from the here and now of mere action. My action is given the dimension of purpose and intention, for as Dufrenne says, through my image, formed as it is from all my presence in the world, I can reach into the past in order to surprise the future (op cit p347).

III. 3. 2. Sartre's analysis - the image and the phenomenon of quasi-observation.

The second characteristic of the image that we discover from Sartre's analysis is that of quasi-observation. We have begun to see this aspect revealed by Dufrenne, when he speaks of the image having a kind of spatial background. In uncovering this present characteristic Sartre examines the relationship between perception and conception. Sartre argues that to perceive, conceive and imagine are three 'types' of consciousness by which the same object can be given to us. In perception, for example, I 'observe' objects. He gives the example of looking at a cube (op cit p7). In looking at it, I know it is a cube if at some time I have seen its six sides. The cube is certainly present to me, I can touch it, explore it, etc., but I always see it only in a certain fashion, which includes and excludes at one and the same time an infinity of other points of
view. In fact, we learn to see objects, that is to multiply on them other points of view. The perception of an object is thus, according to Sartre, an infinity of aspects. However, when I think of a cube, as Sartre says, I am at the centre of my idea. I seize the idea of a cube at one glance. This does not mean that my idea does not have to complete itself – by a kind of progression. What is important is that I can think 'cube' in a single act of consciousness. I do not have to re-establish the appearance, as I do in perception; "I have no apprenticeship to serve" says Sartre (op cit p6). This is the clearest distinction between a perception and a thought. It is also one of the reasons why we cannot think a perception nor perceive a thought. They are radically different phenomena.

"... the one is knowledge which is conscious of itself and which places itself at once at the centre of the object; the other is a synthetic unity of a multiplicity of appearances, which slowly serves its apprenticeship." (op cit p7).

What is the relationship of the image to these two modes of consciousness? Does the image have to serve its apprenticeship like perception or is it immediately known? At first the image seems to belong to perception – people do talk of 'seeing' their images. But in the image we do not have to make, as Sartre says, a 'tour' of the object as we do in perception (op cit p7). The object as image is immediately presented for what it is. In a sense, as Sartre points out, when I say that I perceive a cube I am making a hypothesis; at the close of my perceptions I might have to revise my judgments. When I say, however, that the object of which I have an image at this moment is a cube, my judgment is final, there is an absolute certainty about my knowledge. I cannot be deceived by my image although I may well be
deceived by my perception. In perception, Sartre feels, knowledge forms itself slowly and is built up gradually through successive acts. In the image knowledge is immediately given with the image.

The image then gives us no more than is already known. This, Sartre calls the "essential poverty" of the image (op cit p8). All that I have, I have in the image. This knowledge, arising as it does from this particular act of imaginative consciousness is not - and never can be - separable from the intention that brought forward into conscious the object of the image. The very intentionality of consciousness is charged with knowledge. Moreover, this knowledge is of a particular kind, it is an imaginative knowledge. It is a knowledge I cannot reach by description; it is not a conceptual knowledge; it is a knowledge I have in acquaintance. This knowledge that is now known to me, made explicit through the very appearing of the image, has its roots in that level of perception that Dufrenne has called presence. It is akin to the knowledge that Polanyi(10) describes, which is a knowledge that is "more than we can tell" (op cit p4). Further, Quentin Smith(11) in his paper on Sartre, argues that the characteristic of 'pure' knowledge or conceptual knowledge is that it always envisages 'rules' rather than objects - and in such a way that objects are viewed in a relational framework that is rule-bound (like mathematics or language) where the objects or the symbols of their structuring have an arbitrary relationship to the objects they signify. Rules sustain the relationship between their various objects. We came across this significant difference when we discussed the various media of Impression and Expression in
the chapter on Expression. 'Pure' or conceptual knowledge belongs to the media of impression; imaginative knowledge is given directly to consciousness through the image and carries with it an expressive and affective tonality. Imaginative knowledge always envisages objects before rules. It is a knowledge that is prior to conceptual knowledge.

Furthermore, there is a difference between imaginative knowledge and perceptual knowledge. Sartre feels that perceptual knowledge has the characteristic of never being complete - it has, as we have seen, its 'apprenticeship' to serve. For the perceptual object, as Smith suggests:

"... has an infinite number of relationships with other things and in any given perception we are only aware of a limited number of these relationships." (op cit p70).

Herein lies the 'essential poverty' of my mental image. Essentially so because the intention on which the image is founded is directed toward its aim. Sartre feels that objects in perception, objects in the world, 'overflow' with perceptual intentions (op cit p7). There is a 'massiveness' about them because they are open to an infinity of aspects. Indeed this characterises the very in-itself of their existence, for as we have seen from the example of the sheet of white paper, its existence is not dependent on me. Their 'meanings' moreover cannot be contained. The only way I can reach any degree of relationship to the objects in the world is through my image. For my image presents itself as a synthesis, it abstracts the phenomenal aspect of the 'massiveness' of objects in the world and allows me to arrive at their significance, sense and meaning to me. The
image always presents the for-itself of essence from the in-itself of existence.

Thus imaginative knowledge is not a structure added onto an already built-up image that simply serves to clarify it and make it intelligible, for as Smith points out:

"Once we realise that the image is not a revived sensation that needs to be interpreted and deciphered by imaginative knowledge, then it becomes apparent that the imaginative knowledge is an active structure of the image itself. It is not an addendum to an already constituted image, but is itself constitutive of the image." (op cit p71).

All that I know I have in the image. The image is the only certain datum for my experience of the world and of myself. It is the touchstone from which I move out into the world to interrogate it instead of passively accepting it. My image is the only certain thing I have because it is the only certain thing I know. As Sartre has pointed out (op cit p8), objects in the world have a kind of 'brimming over' quality about them and compared to the richness and density of the perceived object, the image bears within itself this 'essential poverty'. It tells us nothing for it only contains what we have put into it. We certainly seem, at certain times to 'observe' our images but in an attitude that is in no way informative. The image is produced by one act of consciousness and completely annihilated by another. Therefore (and this supports Sartre's first claim to the image) in an important sense the image is tied to consciousness. It cannot free itself from consciousness in the way that the object 'out there' can remain independent of my perception of it. The image exists only as long as it is contemplated.
Although the image teaches me nothing, as Sartre would say, for it is my imaginative knowledge that has constituted it, my knowledge of the image is always correlative to my knowledge of it as representation. As Sartre points out:

"In the act of consciousness the representative element and the element of knowledge are united in a synthetic act. The correlative object of that act becomes at one and the same time a concrete, sensible object, and an object of knowledge." (op cit p10).

Thus it is that the move from presence to representation achieved by the image is an imaginative act of knowledge. To move to representation is already to know, for representation is only sustained through imaginative knowledge, built from my sense of Being-in-the-world and now made known to me through the representative function of the image itself.

III. 3. 3. Sartre's analysis - the image as positing its object as nothing.

The third characteristic of the image is that it can 'posit' (to use Sartre's terminology (op cit p10)) its 'object' as nothing or not present. This, as we have begun to see, opens for the imaginative consciousness the possibility of not being. This sense that things may be other than they appear to be is the work of the transcendental imagination. Moreover, to sense the possible is to underline that we are at a distance from the object we are interrogating. The object, as it were, fills the space provided for it by the empirical imagination, and the transcendental imagination brings to us
the sense that this 'object' is not only appearance, but we can position it as not being, or as not being present. We have seen that the advent of representation occurs with the upsurge of space and time and the dialectic of subject and object is predelineated in the dialectic of space and time. Because the imagination strives to make the image appear, that is, seeks to give its object a relational framework, this relational sense (that is only an aspect of an implicit spatial concern) carries with it its correlative of time. The sense that something might be other than it is, or might even cease to 'exist', is the work of possibility. Warnock(12) also has suggested that there is, as it were, an area of "free play" (op cit p7) around the object of consciousness that enables the conscious being to approach it, contemplate it, question and describe it. What is of course important, is that as soon as a question is asked about the object of consciousness, there immediately is raised the possibility of two kinds of answer - an affirmative or negative response. This existence of negation or of being not could not arise except for conscious beings who raised questions about the world and had certain expectations about how things were in the world. This is a fundamental and ineradicable fact about the whole of our awareness of the world. The notion of ambiguity and of uncertainty, which can be so rich an area for an individual's searching and reasoning arises from the fact that we can, through the image, hypothesize, we can preview events and can cast forward an intention. We can, as Dufrenne has suggested, lie in wait in the present in order to surprise the future. The holding back of response, which is the mark of anticipation, is through our imaginative ability to form an image of the possible.
This whole situational concern is, of course, the mark of creative activity and is an indispensable factor both in the making and apprehending of images in art. It lies at the root of all creative thinking for it lends the necessary tension between the actual and the possible that funds the whole experience of creating itself.

Furthermore, as we have begun to see, if through the image we are able to sense the possible and if we are able to sense the relationship between the actual and the possible, material reality, as Grimsley(13) has pointed out, can be kept at a distance. Through our faculty of being able to imagine the possibility of another kind of existence we are prevented from being enslaved by what Dufrenne has called the 'tyranny' of brute existence and from being 'bogged' in the domain of mere matter. In short, we are able to exercise our freedom. This of course gives to the intentional activity of consciousness its meaning. Freedom to move and freedom to exercise choice is the mark of individuality and the kinds of shaping given to the 'objects' of this intentionality is the mark of personality. Imagination inscribes the space in which the individual can take on his 'persona'. Caught up within the brute presence of the world and unable to separate ourselves from its bondage, we would be held in a tyrannical grip with perception. We would have eyes but we would not see. The image is the middle term that marks the move from the tyranny of the undivided subject/object, to representation, where all that we see and all that we sense takes on an objectivity which means we can come to be and to give shape and structure to our world - which is the token of our experience of it.
III. 3. 4. Sartre's analysis - the spontaneity of the image.

We have already touched on the fourth characteristic of the image, as described by Sartre: it is that of spontaneity. Our imagination in our perception of the world spontaneously produces images. As Susanne Langer has said, it is part of the very activity of consciousness itself. Sartre says that in ordinary perception, when we confront objects in the world, our consciousness - in a sense, in a passive state. We open our eyes and the world is there before us. Yet even though this world is there before us we give it a kind of continuity - a kind of duration through the image - spontaneously born; we are able to 'hold onto' the objects of perception and give to them a sense of structure and objecthood, a kind of directional sense. In a similar way, in imagination we are able to hold onto our ideas, follow them through and reach conclusions. This is the result of the complete spontaneity of the imagination, both in the area of our ordinary perceptions and in the whole of our mental life.

III. 3. 5. Summary

What Sartre has done is demonstrate that the image is not a condition, a solid opaque residue - but a consciousness. Psychologists have suggested that thought is supported by images. All this does, as we have seen, is to feed the illusion of immanence. An image is thought through and through. There is not thought then an 'image'
of it. The thought is the image. As he says:

"The image is a consciousness which is sui generis, which can in no way form a part of a larger consciousness. There is no image in a consciousness which contains it, in addition to the thought, signs, feelings and sensations." (op cit ppl4/15).

Thus far we have been concerned with the image as a kind of static, isolated phenomenon. We shall now turn to a consideration of all that we have said about the image in its functional aspect. We shall investigate the relationship between the image and its object, in other words, were we find them. We should expect to find that within the situational concern of making and giving shape to images in art we should begin to grasp the significance of what we have begun to disclose. The shape the artist gives to his idea, that forms itself into an image, is not just the means that he has of clarifying his idea to himself, it is also the route whereby we can gain an insight into his thinking and, furthermore, provides a paradigm for mind in its broadest reaches.

III. 4. 1. The image in aesthetic perception.

The aim and intention of aesthetic perception as an aspect of the imaginative consciousness is always the appearing of the aesthetic 'object', be this in the form of the drawing, the painting, the poem, the drama. The image as it finds its transformation into shaped material that delivers a particularity of sense and meaning, is what
constitutes the aesthetic object, and it is within these terms that we shall look at drawings. Thus, our aim in this section shall be to consider how the image as idea becomes the image as formed; that is, as given form through a material structuring. Thus far we have been considering the term 'image' as the means whereby consciousness makes clear to itself its intentions. But this 'mental' image is only part of what Sartre describes as a wider 'Image Family' (op cit p16). At no time should we consider images as 'things' — that is as phenomena set apart from where we find them. There is a further point we will wish to consider. The movement from image as idea to image as formed and clarified is not one of simple projection — as though all I did in a drawing for example, was to draw a line round my intention. The move is far more complex and much more interesting than that. The activity is not simply reproductive — it is thoroughly productive, as our discussions of Wollheim's arguments have disclosed. Something new and vital emerges from the transaction between my idea, and my idea as now given form. In a sense, even with thoughts and ideas, they are not fully known unless and until they are given form. Form is the registering and the coming together of space and time — this is why images as ideas can have a kind of spatial background. But there is a world of difference between the image as it is idea and the image as it takes on plastic form within, for example, the area of art activity. Sartre has taught us that the mental image has a kind of essential poverty. Images as they are formed in art have no such poverty, for they are constructed not only from the maelstrom and flux of our mental life, where images are often fragmentary and fleeting, but they are constructed within material and
physical structures. They take on an objecthood, a kind of in-itself existence that sets them apart from the inner world of the artist. They are open to contemplation, they become part of the world not only of the artist but also of ourselves. The maker becomes spectator and like ourselves becomes participator of their sense. Herein lies their richness and herein also lies their power. As Herbert Read(14) has said": "what has not first been created by the artist, is unthinkable by the philosopher." (op cit p70).

These images as now formed thus become the focus for the ordering and enlarging of our experience. We have begun to sense this in the whole transactional situation of making and apprehending such things as drawings. It is often true for example, that we only know what it is we want to say as we say it. Our experience, our knowing, our understanding and all our learning springs from the form that we give to our activity of experiencing through our images. Not only as they are part of our inner world of sense, that silent world of our experience, but as we give these images and intentions realisation through all the diverse, rich and varied forms of language, science and art. Herbert Read has put it clearly when he says:

"... man's first instinctive response to any challenge from across the threshold of knowledge, from the numinous void, is to strive to make it evident to the senses ... . To realise: that is the literal sense, the primitive sense, of the artistic process."

(op cit p71).

Coleridge grasped the significance of this when he talked of the concept of 'organic' imagination (not unlike the notion of transcendental synthesis given by Kant to the work of the imagination). Herbert Read
describes Coleridge's idea by saying:

"... there was an essential difference between a constructive activity that merely assembles and rearranges discrete elements and an organic activity that has assimilated these elements into its own system and proceeds to give birth to a new living reality - not an assembly of parts, but a new organic whole, an integrated organism." (op cit p127).

This is precisely what a successful drawing is. A drawing by Rembrandt is never merely a sum of its parts - it is a totality of sense, not a collection of single images but a total image, that at once unites and delivers the uniqueness of the drawing's particular sense - its numen.

III. 4. 2. 'Image' and aesthetic 'object'.

We have spoken of the total 'image' of the drawing and we have also used the term 'aesthetic object'. We should now clarify these terms for the purpose of setting the context for the ensuing discussion. We have suggested that the 'aesthetic' object is the object of a particular kind of perception. A perception that is not so much interested in the drawing, for example, as so much material but in the drawing as a drawing - that is as already bearing a representational and expressive significance. But further than this, the 'object' of aesthetic perception is that which appears through all the substructure and substratum of images in a drawing and is the unique sense that this particular drawing delivers. In other words, there is a difference between the work of art and the aesthetic object. Wollheim(15)
Works of art, be they drawings, paintings, sculptures, photographs, all have an existence in the world (like the piece of white paper in Sartre's example). They have an existence as things, as material constructs apart from myself, as things in-themselves, as perceptible objects. In physical terms they occupy space, as so much material, paper, pigment, stone, chemicals on paper. For these materials to come together and begin to function as images, that existence depends on me. For me to grasp, for example, the phenomenal aspect of a drawing, I must have already seen it as a drawing and have seen beyond its material construction. Yet, in an important sense, this image that has now appeared could never be what it is, if it were not for the structure and support given to it through its material, physical substances. Herein lies the essential difference between a work of art and an aesthetic object. The work of art has a constant being which is not dependent on being experienced. The aesthetic object only exists as experienced, as experienced by a consciousness directed in a particular way, as we intimated in the introduction to this thesis. There is a sense in which in its essential 'thingness', a work of art can be used in various ways. We can, for example, attend to it by noticing its composition and material structure. We can also use the work of art for identifying purposes, as the social historian might use the portrait of someone to determine a particular aspect of the historical past. The image is here being used as document. All these ways of attending are legitimate. However, what makes the transition from work of art (and from attending
to it in all these various ways) to aesthetic object, is a fundamental shift in attitude. It is only as aesthetically perceived that the work of art becomes aesthetic object. It now gains a particular felt dimension which it lacked merely as a work of art. Thus we see that the aesthetic 'object' of a drawing, for example, is that particular quality which this particular drawing delivers through every part of its constructed means. Haftmann(16) in his book on Paul Klee has described it thus:

"...that form which lies concealed within it. It cannot be seen unless one looks beyond the surface, for an eye that stops at surface appearances (optical-physical seeing' Klee called this) will only see a schematic projection." (op cit p154).

He further adds:

"The essential form can only be seen if the eye has that penetrating spiritual power which Goethe (like Kant) calls 'the power of intuitive judgment'." (op cit p154).

Now we can see why Klee(17) was able to say "Art does not reflect what is visible, but makes things visible". It is this essential form, this image, this essence, that makes appearance possible. A drawing, for example, can never be a 'model', a schematic projection of an already existing reality 'out there'. As Susanne Langer says:

"An image is different from a model and serves a different purpose ... an image shows how something appears; a model shows how something works. The art symbol, therefore, sets forth in symbolic projection how vital and emotional and intellectual tensions appear, i.e. how they feel." (op cit pXIX).

Dufrenne, as we have seen, points out that the three 'moments' of perception - those of presence, representation and reflection, find
their parallel in the aesthetic object (op cit p333). It is important to realise that in the grasping of the sense of what Haftmann is concerned with in the quotation above, we are engaged in aesthetic perception in all three 'moments'. The aesthetic object, the image as formed, is only constituted as such whilst we are actively and simultaneously engaged with it: firstly in the aspect of sensing it at the level of presence; secondly knowing it at the level of representation; and, thirdly, experiencing it in its expressive and felt dimension through reflection.

III. 4. 3. The aesthetic object and the 'sensuous'.

This image, that is, the object of our aesthetic attention, has to be given form. It has to be structured through material. Now, when grasping the phenomenal aspect of the work we are not of course directing our attention to the work's material base as such. Yet without this material structuring there would be no image. The material serves as the medium through which the image appears. Dufrenne calls this aspect of the work 'sensuous' (op cit pl1). It is that perceptible element of the work which is the frame for the appearing of the image. Furthermore, the image arises through a coalescence of all the sensuous elements. We are talking here of a metaphorical transition and we can begin to see that all meaning in art must be, as Dufrenne puts it "immanent in the sensuous, being its very organisation" (op cit pl2). Thus, it is that we begin to realise the enormous importance of the material substratum of drawings.
The ground or support on which the draughtsman works and the particular materials he chooses to work with crucially determine the eventual quality and significance of his image. What the draughtsman works on and what he works with constitute his 'given'. Rawson (18) points out:

"The essential point is that the ground, whatever it be, is the underlying symbol in the drawing for the objective-as-such, for the Gegenstand which is set up facing us as the ontological basis of the communication. So it can never be ignored. Its symbolism is part of the symbolism of the drawing." (op cit p38).

Of course, this paper on which the draughtsman works, this rock on which the Paleolithic cave drawings were made, is part of the actual; it is part of the world of things as existing. What the draughtsman does is draw into his image this part of the objective actual that begins to serve as an aspect of the propositional truth of the drawing. This material basis is part of the in-itself of the drawing's existence. The image, as representation, could never take on the for-itself of its essence without the support of the in-itself that ties it to the world. What is extraordinary, of course, is that this material takes on a metaphorical significance in the promotion of the drawing's essence. The material has become the medium through which the image now appears.

III. 4. 4. **Spatiality and temporality of the aesthetic object.**

Thus the sensuous is that which promotes the meaningfulness of the image. But this sensuous is ordered in a particular way. It
is structured through particular spatial and temporal 'schemata' (a term used by Kant) which differ in complexity and configuration from art form to art form. Drawings have particular schemata that set them apart as drawings and thus make them different from paintings or sculptures, works of architecture or music. Drawings demonstrate a particular way of organising space and time, for all drawings are spatial and thus inherently temporal. Space and time within the schemata of drawings are correlative. We begin to sense the significance of our earlier discussions concerning the contribution space and time have to the advent of the image as representation. The image as it appears does so, as we have seen, through the sensuous. This sensuous is ordered—that is, given form—by means of the way space and time is shaped through the schemata of the drawing. We shall return more specifically to these important issues in Chapters IV and V. What of course really occurs through this ordering is that space is temporalised and time spatialised. The two correlative that gave birth to the representative aspect of the image now coalesce within the image as formed. Indeed, to talk of form at all is to give to it its content that has arisen from the union of space and time within the schemata we take as the drawing. The direct consequence of this spatialising of time and temporalising of space is to give to the image a realisation. It is to give a support to the image that can hold it before us for contemplation. The fugitive image as idea, as fleeting thought, has become transfixed within this ideogram. Yet we must be careful. This fugitive thought has not become transfixed completely. The conception has not found total realisation. The gap that exists between conception
and realisation keeps the whole of the art activity going. The tension between conception and realisation is the whole funding for the activity of making, and not only of making, but of apprehending as well. If the image was the complete realisation of the idea, no further acts would be necessary. It is the constant to and fro from subject to object in reciprocal interchange that marks the work of the imagination itself. This is why the dry schemata of the drawing can take on 'life', can become expressive. Moreover, as we have said, the imagination in both its empirical and transcendental aspects strives to make the image appear, strives toward giving vision its visibility. There is always a potential within this activity which is the spur for future and continuing acts of imagination. It is this potential that prepares the future for me within the present, from the past, and gives me that unique sense of the anticipation of objects, not only as they exist in perception but as they become formed in art. This, in turn, is why the aesthetic object becomes a kind of 'quasi-subject', why we are able to be taken up and drawn into the sense of the drawing. For the image of the drawing has become in its beingness capable of harbouring spatio-temporal relationships within itself. This is why we can talk of the 'world' of the drawing, a world which is more like an atmosphere than an objective cosmos.

We begin to grasp here the correspondence to Sartre's characteristic of the image. Furthermore, this is why we can refer to the aesthetic 'object' of the drawing as an image. This characteristic of quasi-subject that the image of the drawing possesses is akin to
the phenomenon of quasi-observation that we have met in Sartre's description of the mental image. There is one vital difference. Sartre has shown us that the mental image offers us nothing through its observation - for its content has already been constituted by what we have put into it. But the 'object' of our aesthetic attention is altogether different and altogether richer. Further, as we have begun to see, it is not constituted in the same way as the objects of our ordinary perception. Even though it draws its in-itself existence from being made up through material that ties it to the world, its material has become transformed into the sensuous base that takes on a metaphorical significance. It is already a representation. It is no longer an 'object' like objects in the world. It is a re-presentation, formed out from all the intentions of its maker and now offering to me in a unique way a fresh ordering, a distillation, an essence. Moreover, this essence is thoroughly expressive and this is why there is a unique and particular quality to its sense. It is this metaphorical significance given to what otherwise might be the lifeless schemata of the drawing that draws us into its significance. We talk of a kind of 'presence' that a drawing may possess and we are caught up within what Dufrenne has called its "irresistible and magnificent presence" (op cit p86). There is a kind of beingness that this image begins to assert. Thus we enter, in aesthetic perception, what Ingarden(19) has called "the world of the work". Dufrenne goes further and suggests that this world is an 'expressed world' and Casey(20) comments:

"This expressed world ... is characterised less by its specific contents than by the singular affective quality which permeates it. This affective quality makes the world of the aesthetic object
expressive and endows the aesthetic object with the inner complexity and coherence of a quasi-subject." (op cit pXXVII).

III. 4. 5. Aesthetic experience and the aesthetic object.

As a kind of 'world' the aesthetic object shares the fundamental characteristic of the image; we have seen this from Sartre's description. Furthermore, this 'world' is always a 'for-itself'; it is not, just as the image is not, an 'in-itself'. This 'world' only exists as I apprehend it in imaginative engagement: one shift of attention can annihilate it. This world could never be and thus never be expressive without the fundamental union of my imaginative consciousness with it. So it is with my image as idea. I am always at the centre of it and as such it always holds within it its intentional character. This intentional character is not simply my knowledge of it, is is my felt knowledge. So it is with the image as it takes on form within something like a drawing. The image that constitutes the world of the drawing is always a for-itself. Yet, as we have begun to see, this expressed quality is always held in some kind of formal means - the drawing's schemata. What lends drawings their varying and distinctive expressive sense is the way these schemata are organised. But we have further discovered that these schemata have their roots in the physical world; they have a material existence and form the basis of the drawing's sensuous quality. Whatever else I know, I know that this drawing is still a drawing, that is, it occupies physical space 'out there' and is not an illusion or mental image.
Thus, there is also an in-itself of existence that joins with the for-itself of the essence of the drawing to make it what is is. This is why forms in art are truly metaphorical. It is within the image as formed that the tension is held between the identity of its existence as object and the identity of its essence as subject. The coming together of subject and object poles is achieved through this image as now formed. Yet this in-itself-for-itself that constitutes images in art is always an in-itself-for-itself for us. Casey has put it with admirable clarity when he says:

"Within its expressed world, the aesthetic object opens up a spatio-temporal field which is ceaselessly filled then emptied in the unfolding of aesthetic experience. Hence temporal and spatial schemata, creating an expressed (and expressive) world secure for the aesthetic object the status of a self-transcending for-itself." (op cit pXXVII).

Casey here speaks of the 'unfolding' of aesthetic experience. We have also spoken of the engagement that we have with the aesthetic object that is an imaginative activity involving us at all three 'moments' in our perception of it. We have spoken of maintaining this imaginative stance in order that through the sensuous the image might appear and be made known to us in all its expressive sense. We have also spoken of the strange and imperious 'presence' this image seems to have that is as it were drawing us into the orbit in which it has its being. Dufrenne has outlined the work of the imagination in our ordinary perception and from this we have discovered how the image comes to be at all. He suggested that in ordinary perception, imagination is feeding and as it were 'nourishing' perception and giving to it its 'plenitude'. In aesthetic perception, however,
the 'object' is already represented. In ordinary perception images are formed from the concrete, physical existence of things. However, in apprehending the image as formed in something like a drawing, we are coming to an already constituted essence — as that which is already brought together and thoroughly representational. This essence, as we have seen, is of a different order from the existence of objects in the world and is something set apart. Now, as Sartre says, this new formed image, this object of our aesthetic attention, is unreal; we have, in Sartre's opinion, to suspend our belief in respect of this object and realise it as non-existent. We have discovered that it is because Sartre limits his view of imagination to its purely empirical activity, that he comes to this conclusion.

Dufrenne also accepts that the imagination is at work in our apprehension of the aesthetic object, but rather than its work being such that it separates the aesthetic object from the real, its work lies in transcending the real to a constituted world that we begin to grasp as a possibility. We have seen the implications of this in Sartre's description, but Sartre never sees the aesthetic object in this way. His notion of positing 'being not', which we discovered was at the centre of the notion of possibility, is never taken to its fulfilment in his description of the aesthetic object. For Sartre, the aesthetic object always constitutes an unreality. Now of course the terms 'real' and 'unreal' are misleading, for they only refer to one aspect of the work of the imagination whose function lies in the striving to make the object appear. However, in aesthetic perception, which Sartre hardly deals with, it is the transcendental
aspect of the imagination that assumes importance. Dufrenne answers the limitation of Sartre's position. He feels that the aesthetic object, the represented image, as perceived, is certainly perceived 'out there'; it is not 'imagined' as a mental image might be. He suggests that the empirical aspect of the imagination, in aesthetic perception, plays a less central role than it does in ordinary perception. He puts it thus:

"The object as known by ordinary perception is a present and real object which calls for action on our part. Imagination projects the possible lines of this action ... which confirms and develops the object's signification. But the object represented by the aesthetic object (whose function lies precisely in this representation) has a purely represented ... being. The represented object exists only by virtue of appearance, which itself exists only in order to signify this object. Moreover, to comprehend an object in ordinary perception is to locate it in a world of external objects ... However, the object represented by art, does not refer to anything external. It is not in a world, but constitutes a world which is internal to itself."

(op cit pp359/360).

This is what we have been discussing as the world of the work. In aesthetic perception the object tends to separate itself from the world, to constitute a world apart - the world of the drawing. What is thus designated is another world, a shift in the modality of meaning. Herein lies the capacity for images in art to be representational and this is why a drawing is more like any other drawing than what it might be a drawing of. Imagination in aesthetic perception is directed to grasping this other world; it is fully transcendental, for it is not directed to the control of the 'real' world at all. Dufrenne feels that the aesthetic object "appears through the deepening, not the surpassing of the given" (op cit p360).
Appearance is always self appearance; forms in art exist for themselves and thus they do not so much surpass a 'given' as provide the possibility of a given. They do not point to an external given, they are their own given. Thus these forms can in no sense be described as unreal, rather they inscribe another reality, which deepens rather than surpasses any given reality. These forms do not have to 'borrow' any of their meaning from outside their world. They refer to nothing external that is not already what is in their very appearing. All that is 'given' is given within the appearance. This does not mean that there might not be objective corollaries from these forms to a world outside this world, but there is never a reference to these forms that might be in any way an issue of resemblance. Forms in art always point to themselves as part of their internal structure; they never simply denote or point to forms outside the appearance they have within their world.

Thus the role of imagination in aesthetic perception is a relatively limited one (in Dufrenne's view). This derives from the primary fact that the aesthetic object is already a represented object. Far from meaning that the imagination is absent, rather it plays a lesser role than it does in ordinary perception. This does not mean to say that imagination does not animate the appearance; of course it does, indeed it must, to give stability and consistency to the represented object — for after all, the lines in a drawing take on form, they are not merely figuration. What Dufrenne is saying is that in this represented object, there is an all given, a world. Certainly this world can be explored and the depth and
variety of this world gives the depth and richness to aesthetic experience, still an active on-going imaginative engagement. But the aesthetic object, this image, is not an occasion for the imagination to run wild, it is not an opportunity to indulge in fantasy. The greatest offering that the image in art has is that it directs and controls the imagination, to the extent that we can talk of these images as clarifying ideas; as bringing ideas within an orbit of contemplation. The world of the work exists in comprehension and intention, not in extension. Thus as Dufrenne suggests:

"The real task of the imagination in aesthetic experience is therefore to grasp the represented object in appearance without substituting for it ... an imaginary object held to be more or uniquely true." (op cit p367).

When Cézanne makes his 'distortions' in the objects of his still life, we are not called upon to 'correct' him. There is a significance and meaningfulness to these forms, for they do not so much surpass the 'given' order of reality, as point to an internal order that is only such as it is formed within this work. Thus it was that Giacometti(21) moved to making smaller sculptures and said: "only when small were they like". They were 'like' because in their appearance they began to approach his own idea of how they should be. Thus 'likeness' only exists as it exists within the structure and organisation of the image that we have discovered makes its appearance only within and through the orbit and world of the work. We do not have to join Sartre in suspending our belief as we enter the world of the work. This world is not unreal, rather it is a pre-real; it does not so much surpass the given as deepen it. It always provides the
possibility of seeing and of seeing that things might be other than they are.

III. 5. 1. The image in drawing – its structural ordering.

We have spoken of the image of the drawing rising from the whole interrelationship and substratum of the sensuous, built up from the physicality of the drawing itself. This has led us to a consideration of the world of the drawing, a kind of spatio-temporal field in which the image appears. We have looked also at the way imagination animates this field and holds the image for contemplation. Further, we have discovered that this image, which is none other than the aesthetic 'object' of our attention, controls and directs the imagination to the point where we can say that this image as formed begins to clarify and distil the draughtsman's visual idea.

The schemata of the drawing only serve as ways in which space and time can be organised; ways in which space can be temporalised and time spatialised. This organisation is promoted by the nuclear idea in the draughtsman's mind which is given projection in form through the sensuous and becomes the drawing. The idea will have come to the draughtsman from his direct experience with the world – the world of his perceptions. He may work directly from nature or he may work from a synthesis of ideas from memory, from his imagination. Whatever his starting point, his concern is to realise these
ideas in some stable form through his drawing. A drawing, as we have seen, is not a meaningless object, it is fully meaningful. This sense of meaning, Rawson has described as the drawing's 'topic'. The terms 'topic', 'tenor' and 'numen' are terms which Rawson uses in his analysis of the structural ordering of the drawing itself (op cit p5). In considering that every drawing has a topic, one might suppose that this necessarily meant drawings had to be 'figurative', that is, have some kind of direct objective correlative to the 'literalness' of things in the world. But this is not so, for so-called 'non-figurative' drawings can still have a topic, even though, as Rawson suggests, this might be "a most refined intuition" (op cit p5).

The topic of the drawing, the nuclear idea behind the drawing, has, as Rawson suggests, two aspects. The first is the 'tenor' and the second is the special meaning that is enclosed in the topic that rises from the structural organisation of the tenor. We can take an example from the drawing by Wynn Jones called 'Caring Gestures' (Fig.44) The tenor of the drawing is concerned with the disposition of the two figures across the space of the paper. In a sense, the tenor is the 'subject matter' of the drawing - what the drawing is depicting. But these figures are not the whole topic. The topic of the drawing is something infinitely more complex and begins to approach what we have been discussing in terms of the drawing's 'image'. The topic of the drawing is supported and given its extension by the particular iconography of the forms. But it is more than simply two figures. The two figures form a relationship. We begin to sense
the strange, almost hypnotic tension that exists between them and we begin to move out from the drawing (or, as Dufrenne might argue, further into the world of the drawing) to a consideration of the drama and theatre of human interaction. For Wynn Jones, this is a particular field of interest and concern and this is the basis for the promotion of his topic.

The tenor, as Rawson suggests, can be likened to the tent poles of a tent. They give the tent its extension in space, but are not themselves the tent. 'Tenere' in Latin means to 'hold' or 'sustain'. The topic is held and sustained by the forms that in most drawings are the recognisable elements like figures, landscapes, objects in a still-life. The image of the drawing cannot become what it is without the support and interaction of the images in the drawing. Yet the totality of the drawing's sense, which resides in its topic, is always more than the sum of its parts. In a sense, the topic is the key to the drawing and the tenor is the means by which we, as spectators, gain entry into the world of the drawing. Thus the topic, promoted by the tenor, provides the field through which we can grasp the particular and individual numinous quality the drawing distils. This finally is the drawing's 'image' and is ultimately the focus of our aesthetic attention.

III. 5. 2. The image in drawing - the draughtsman's individual graphic method.

There is a further very important point. The meaningfulness of
the drawing by Wynn Jones does not reside simply in the forms of these two figures and their attitude of mutual solicitude. The meaning lies, not so much in the tenor of the drawing, but in how it is treated. It is not so much what is said but how it is said. In drawing this amounts to the graphic way the draughtsman promotes his topic. In the drawing by Wynn Jones, the ultimate meaning of the drawing is bound up with the particular graphic methods he employs; the way he uses the charcoal and pencil, in consideration of the white of the paper. This treatment which of course is unique to the drawing, is what collaborates with the tenor and topic of the drawing to deliver its particular numinous quality. Furthermore, the graphic treatment of the drawing is the primary entry we have into the draughtsman's visual intelligence. Here we shall discover his strength or his weakness, the truth or falsity of his intentions. Here nothing can be hidden, there is an unequivocalness about the visual statement he makes. His treatment will reveal the path of his progress in bring forward his idea into image. Nothing could be a clearer revelation of this thinking. Ayrton(22) describes this process:

"The thought projected into drawing may or may not run smoothly; with Leonardo da Vinci it presumably did, but on the other hand with Cézanne it manifestly did not. He was often unsuccessful and sometimes totally confounded by his own intentions. But paradoxically his drawing gains from this, from his inexpert manipulation, because he never for one moment relaxed his grip upon the self-set problem and his anxious intelligence builds form into conclusive fact with every pencil stroke. The image which is sometimes very shaky is yet laboriously built touch on touch by the mind engaged fully in every movement of the hand." (op cit p66).
This underlines that before all else drawing is an essentially private affair. It is a way of clarifying to oneself (an incidentally to others) the rising images of one's thoughts. It is within this situational contract that these ideas find their ultimate expression and projection. But they do not come pre-formed. Cézanne developed his thinking as he developed the image in formation under his hand. Further, as the conversion with Feliks Topolski testifies, the maker is often taken by surprise in their appearing; something new is born (appendix p359).

Thus the tenor is important. The subject matter of the drawing, the images in the drawing, act as a focus around which the draughtsman can assemble his graphic forms and create a point of entry for us, as spectators, into the world of the drawing. But it is always the way that the 'object' of the draughtsman's perception becomes transfigured within the context of the drawing that lends a fresh relevance to seeing. There will always be links between what we see in a drawing and our experience of the world and this is because imagination in all its aspects is as much at work in perception as in aesthetic perception. But, as we have seen, forms in a drawing never merely point to objects in the world. There will always be in the tenor of drawings an objective correlative, but this is never one of mere resemblance, nor is it an identity of mere reference.

Perception, we have discovered, is constantly enriched, prepared and given its 'plenitude' through the whole interplay and activity of the imagination. The imagination is the enabling power we have of
seeing one thing in something else. In our apprehension of forms in art, we cannot help but make analogies toward the forms of our experience. Indeed, this is what makes the world of the drawing a kind of 'observed' world that draws us into its orbit. What is crucial, and what gives uniqueness to our perception of this world, is the means by which the draughtsman brings his fleeting idea into stable form. The way the draughtsman assembles his basic graphic forms and puts together the units that are his graphic repertory bring into existence this distilled image that can be found nowhere else but within this unique visual construct, within this drawing. Now the draughtsman develops a repertory of forms that he uses over and over again. This is his personal handwriting and becomes the mark and stamp of his image. In the history of drawing, the draughtsman developed his graphic forms from prepared pattern books and the rise of drawing methodology is, of course, closely linked to systems of working from particular forms in particular ways. The coming of the Plein Air School in the mid 19th century represented the dismantling of this tradition. It is nevertheless true that draughtsman still develop their basic graphic repertory from looking at other works that they admire. This repertory of forms need not be in any way sterile because of this, and a good draughtsman builds from these forms, so much so that they become an inherent part of his thinking. As he works he begins to develop his thinking in terms of these forms and his emerging ideas begin to coalesce as they are inextricably bound to them in the context of their subsequent realisation. Sometimes the graphic constructs the draughtsman employs can be so powerful that we, as spectators, can find ourselves projecting them
onto the objects of our ordinary perception. The Provençal countryside will never be the same now that Cézanne has given to it his particular stamp and identity. Thus it is that we come to drawings prepared by the graphic constructs of other drawings. We come to sense significance of their image forms, because we have come to understand the conventions of their means. Rawson, in talking of the repertory of graphic forms the draughtsman employs, puts it thus:

"They identify his topic for him and provide a vehicle for his structure and invention. They are the means whereby the artist refers to meanings already implicit or formulated in previous works of art. The draughtsman may have inherited his stock of types from tradition, and may use it timidly, repeating other men's thoughts. But if he is a major master, he will develop substantial modification of his types and perhaps add substantial type-ideas of his own from his observation and synthesis of forms and meanings." (op cit p254).

The graphic forms that Feliks Topolski uses, for example, have a clear and identifiable character and quality about them. Moreover, they have become an integral part of his vision and one senses a complete ontology beyond these forms. They disclose a significance that could only ever be through the manifestation of his drawings. This is why, through these forms, we gain a fresh insight into seeing. The individual character of his graphic forms opens for us his world. Further, they demand our attention because they catch that aspect of our experience which is now made known to us and which before lay beyond the reach of our awareness. His line has a restless urgency about it. One senses his hand is never far from the paper and that he does not so much confront objects; they invade him. His line is like a seismographic probe; it is like the flickering trace on an
oscilloscope, registering points of contact that are no sooner made than gone. His line is a reminder of appearance; it echoes distant responses in our body, like the movement and trace of our eyes. His line not so much defines as explores, and the forms that coalesce out from this moving trajectory are forms that have been caught and held as if in webs. Here time is spatialised and space temporalised – we catch the visibility in vision, as something which forms itself gradually and comes into focus to be held for contemplation. Here and there the concentration of lines reaches a climax that becomes the focus for the appearance of the image and allows it to coalesce as form.

The drawings of Wynn Jones are very different. Their strange introspective dream-like sense is not made known to us only through the fact that we recognise in these forms echoes of the gestures of our own experience, but also because through his graphic formulations, (for these are his means) he prompts in us that strange sense of elusiveness and tentative search that constitutes the space confronting individuals. Here his line gently probes the space of the white paper and one sense that infinite care has been taken over the texture and surface of these forms that in turn respond to the sensitivity and texture of our mutual feelings as human beings.
III. 6.1. Summary

All our descriptions have registered the rise of the image.

As Haftmann has commented:

"Something emerges out of darkness and takes form without conscious intention, without direction. It is like a cryptic writing which strives to become visible, to transmit a communication. But here again it must submit to a strict discipline: the process of selection, refinement, fabrication and completion. That is called 'finding one's way on the formal plane'. There the image grows according to the subtle laws of living things. There too is decided whether a picture will be born and also what sort of picture." (op cit pl43).

We come to meet this emerging image for, as we have seen, we are prepared for it at the level of presence, at the level of representation and at the level of reflection. The engagement we have with it is an imaginative one, and reflects imagination's dual role. This image not only strives to appear but it provides the possibility of sensing the essence in existence, the intangible along with the tangible and as Klee(23) says "the prehistory of the visible".

David Sylvester(24) has put with admirable clarity what we have been reaching toward throughout this chapter. It is for this reason that I quote in some length:

"Working from nature is working from memory: the artist can only put down what remains in his head after looking. And the time between the instant when he looks at the model and the instant later when he looks at the paper or canvas or clay to copy what he has just seen might as well be an eternity. The model can go on standing still forever, but the work will none the less be the product of an accumulation of memories none of which is quite the same as any other, because each of them is affected by what has gone before, by the continually changing relation between all that has
already been put down and the next glance at the
model. And it is not merely because of the nece-
sity to look away from the model to look at the
paper, canvas, clay that, as soon as we try to
copy what is seen, it was seen: it is also because
our mind has to get outside the sensation before we
can copy it, our very awareness of having a sensa-
tion pushes it into the past, for we cannot think
about our present thought, it slips away as we try
to grasp it, because we try to grasp it. The artist
can never get there, whether he works from nature
and builds up an accumulation of memories modifying
and contradicting one another, or whether he works
from memory and constructs a synthesis of what he
remembers from having seen."

Of course, as we have seen, the gap can never be closed. But
in spite of this, as Sylvester suggests further on in his article,
there is a 'hard core' which remains from all that has been seen and
this can be rendered as if indestructible and this is the image.

The draughtsman, in making his images, is always working "from
the residue of vision", as Cézanne(25) put it. This residue is like
a flux, it is always between being and not being. It takes his image,
given form through his drawing to stabilise this vision and moreover
gives to it a duration.

The draughtsman draws to give order to his thought, it is a
process whereby he makes clear to himself what he is doing. It is
a process that simultaneously orders and enlarges his experience.
Drawings are the mark of the draughtsman's visual intelligence in
action. They are the clearest indications of that continuing dia-
lectic between image and idea which prompted Baudelaire to suggest
that the draughtsman was the true philosopher of art. Cassirer(26)
in characteristic terms has suggested:

"Artistic activity ... shows how impossible it is to draw a line between inner vision and outward formation, it shows that here vision is already formation, just as formation remains pure vision."

(op cit p39).
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CHAPTER IV. THE SPATIALITY AND TEMPORALITY OF DRAWING

IV. 1. 1. Introduction

Our purpose in this chapter is to uncover the essential spatiality and inherent temporality in drawing. Our task will be to discover how these unite to promote the movement of meaning through the particular graphic means which drawing employs. To this end we shall ultimately be looking at the work of the five draughtsmen who have collaborated in our venture and we shall seek to demonstrate how each in his or her own way has ordered space and time.

This present chapter is divided into three sections. The first deals with space, the second with time and the concluding section considers the spatiality and temporality of the aesthetic object, with particular reference to drawing.

The meaningfulness of any drawing is embedded in its spatiality, but this spatiality, as we shall see, is not simply the space of extension, of mere projection, of quantifiable measurement. The spatiality of which we speak lies in the drawing's image. Although drawing
is primarily an art of space, time is also implicit. Any consideration we shall make of movement, rhythm and tension in drawing, will point to that aspect of time which is turned toward space. We shall sense, moreover, what Dufrenne(1) calls the 'solidarity' of space and time as they coalesce within the drawing's image (op cit p241).

Thus, the spatiality we are speaking of is such that is opened out for us through our entry into the world of the drawing. We shall seek to describe this phenomenal spatiality - for it is this spatiality that the image carves out for itself in order that it might appear. This spatiality is always for us; it is beyond the space of the geometrician, a mere network of relationships. It is a spatiality that is always on the move, filled by the reverberation of countless images whose very mobility ignites our interest, our attention and our participation. This is the 'felicitous' space described by Bachelard(2) - the space we love to inhabit. This qualitative spatiality always bears a value, sustains the world of the drawing and gives it the status of an expressive world - a world which offers directions and orientations and dimensions for us - for our Being.

This is the space the draughtsman strives to inscribe with his line. There is a 'logos' of lines which is the privileged domain of the draughtsman. Through his linear descriptions he can lead our gaze. He can carry us through the space he has already traversed, the space of his own imaginative intentions. As words are to the poetic imagination, so line is to the graphic imagination. In each we catch aspects of Being, for in each we catch space and time at
their source.

In Chapter III, we noted André Breton(3), writing about Kandinsky in a catalogue to an exhibition of his work in London in 1938, said:

"He has restored the line to its proper necessity. It is the thread of Ariadne leading us through the maze of appearances, through the mist of objects stripped of their external and specific identity. It is the quickening thread uniting the pagoda's long robe to the long robe of the whirlwind, the sear of lightning to a furrow of a voice in wax, the nervous complex to a tangle of rigging. He found a punctuation that fuses into one the firmament of stars, a page of music and all the eggs of all the nests under heaven." (op cit p11).

This utterance is testimony to the way Kandinsky's line could ignite the poetic space of Breton's imagination. Kandinsky's line opens pathways of poetic thought for him and begins to inscribe an interiority, which marks depth of feeling and expressive power. These images resonate in us also, for we too are caught up in the passage which this linear thread traces.

From whence does this sense of space arise? What is this duration which carries us through the reverberation of these images? Wherein lies their attractiveness? Why are we drawn into their 'felicitous' orbit? To begin to answer these questions is to begin to sense why the draughtsman can catch at the roots of visibility in vision, why the essential spatiality in drawing is a spatiality which is always more than we can tell.

This space is always at the edge of the drawing as it were - as
if waiting to be uncovered through the imaginative engagement of the spectator. For the imagination, the space of the drawing is always seemingly alive, it engages our attention, it draws us toward itself in its constant movement toward meaning. These lines seem to have an imperious presence, they direct and animate our looking. Up and down, right and left, swooping, plunging, curling, soaring, floating, impassive, cold, warm, welcoming, savage, dancing, quiescent, shimmering, vibrating, resonating, singing—these words which actively suggest being, are capable of being evoked through language, but they are immediately present in their linear deliverance. They are first of that spatiality which is pre-linguistic. Their evocation lies beyond all concatenated language, evocative because they lie within that space which the poet knows and achieves through a topology of words and a space which the draughtsman knows through a topology of line. The space which the poet and the draughtsman seeks to carve out is a felicitous space—he is always traversing it and never meets its horizon; his very endeavour is the impetus for his whole creative activity. It is a space made such through the advent of representation; it is the space which takes on form and is heralded through a deeper sense of that pre-objective spatiality that lies in wait to be surprised, that lies in wait to be opened and evoked by these new-formed images which the draughtsman forms under his hand. Through these forms these spaces are ignited and magnetised.

The draughtsman has a peculiar and unique privilege, not shared in the same way by any other practitioner in the visual arts. His privilege is to make his space visible; to make his space reverberate
and resonate through his line. The handling of line is full of adventure. It is immediately for the spectator an invitation to the voyage. The line is the figure which breaks from the silence of its ground. As soon as the line traverses the field of the surface of the paper, it magnetises the space it subtends. This space becomes evocative, it calls from the silence it was to the activity it now is. The line is the mark of the draughtsman thinking towards poetry. Through his line he muses. Never, in this context, is it the mark of the geometrician, whose concern is only measurement. For the draughtsman is not marking off, he is marking within. He is always engaged in that search which is the process of his drawing — that space which is never an 'all-done' but a constant coming-to-be, with its horizons always beyond the given.

We have sought to set the direction of our enquiry. To many of these issues we shall inevitably return, but the central issue is clear. Our task now is to describe and establish this spatiality.

IV. 2. 1. Space — 'a condition of the possibility of phenomena'.

Merleau-Ponty(4), writing in Phenomenology of Perception, follows and develops the Kantian view of space. Kant(5) spoke of space not as a concept, but as a fundamental intuition. This is Kant's description:

"Space is a necessary representation a priori, forming the very foundation of all external intuitions. ... Space is therefore regarded as a condition of the possibility of phenomena, not as a determination
produced by them; it is a representation *a priori* which necessarily precedes all external phenomena." (op cit p62).

Space is not a thing-in-itself. There is no question of regarding space as the relationship of container to contained. As Merleau-Ponty suggests "space is anterior to its alleged parts, which are always carved out of it" (op cit p243) and in a telling passage he says:

"Space is not the setting (real or logical) in which things are arranged, but the means whereby the positioning of things becomes possible. This means that instead of imagining it as a sort of ether in which all things float, or conceiving it abstractly as a characteristic they have in common, we must think of it as the universal power enabling them to be connected." (op cit pp243/244).

The area of the pre-reflective is one we have already come across. We have outlined the pre-reflective 'moment' of presence in perception in discussing Dufrenne's position in the preceding chapter. We have discovered that the image rises from this condition and the pre-reflective 'prepares' the image so that for us we can say that representation can achieve its full plenitude. Now Merleau-Ponty also speaks of two conditions of being - the lived and the thought about - the advent of representation is the mark of the move from the lived to the thought about. We cannot always remain at the level of the lived only, but we needs must move to the thought about - and indeed this is precisely what occurs when we reflect. Both time and space are involved. Temporality is the condition of our movement toward. Space provides the condition for the appearance of the image; for representation to take on 'object-hood'; for us to sense the 'gap' between pure subjectivity and the sense of *ourselves* (as we sense the distance affected between ourselves and objects in that reciprocal interchange between
subject and object which is borne in on us through the image). The advent of representation is the 'upsurge' of space and time, as Dufrenne puts it (op cit p347). It is only as we reflect, as we sense the 'gap', that we can talk of space or time at all. Merleau-Ponty describes it well when he says:

"Therefore, either I do not reflect, but live among things and vaguely regard space at one moment as the setting for things, at another as their common attribute - or else I do reflect: I catch space at its source, and now think the relationships which underlie this word, realizing then that they live only through the medium of a subject who describes and sustains them; and pass from spatialized to spatializing space." (ibid p243)

Here we sense the very movement of consciousness itself. For consciousness to be, there must be the constant movement and reciprocation between the lived and the thought about. Thus as soon as we have made a thought about space we have moved from spatialising space, which is the ground and condition and possibility of all our reflection, to spatialised space. What is essentially implicit has now been made explicit. This is the very condition of all thought, the very condition for the appearance of the image and the root of representation itself.

Spatialising space is the condition for the whole mobility of images; it is the arena for their very reverberation and the ground from which the objectness of objects can appear. Spatialising space is the condition *a priori* for the possibility that things may be other than they are. Oneiric space, poetic space and cosmic space all feed from this ground. Art is born out from this space and through its
forms we can reach back into this space, catch the roots of this space and come to sense its duration. This space is the possibility of visibility of vision.

IV. 2. 2. Space - the importance of the body.

The question remains to be answered: How do I sense this pre-given spatiality? If this is the condition for the whole appearing of phenomena, whence does it spring? Merleau-Ponty seeks to answer these questions by saying we should not make the mistake of separating mind from body. If this pre-objective spatiality is the condition for all our being, it must be because we are the totality of mind and body. We are already situated in the world. We are already present in the world, we are already at work in the world. Sensations are not received passively and then 'interpreted', there is, as we have discovered in his essay Eye and Mind(6), "the undividedness of the sensing and the sensed" (op cit p59). Now the importance of the body is crucial to the whole of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. In his Phenomenology(4), he suggests:

"What counts ... is not my body as it in fact is, as a thing in objective space, but as a system of possible actions, a virtual body with its phenomenal 'place' defined by its task and situation."

(op cit pp249/250)

and again:

"My body is wherever there is something to be done."

(op cit p250).

We must return, he says(6),
"... to the sight, the soil of the sensible and opened world such as it is in our life and for our body - not that possible body which we may legitimately think of as an information machine but that actual body I call mine, this sentinel standing quietly at the command of my words and acts." (op cit p56).

So much of the importance of sensing this spatiality lies in the fact that we are already situated, already at work. Perception is not a passive affair, we are actively engaged through our bodily presence in the world. Merleau-Ponty(4) gives an example of someone looking into a tilted mirror at an image of a room that seems to be at an angle (ibid p248). There are two spatial 'levels' - the one of the room 'outside' the mirror and the one in the mirror. A piece of card falling in the mirror seems to fall sideways. However, as we continue to look into the mirror we make the necessary perceptual adjustments and what we see does not appear odd - for we are able to orientate our perception toward it.

Before looking into the mirror we are adjusted to the spatial level outside it and we recognise this - but as we look into the world of the mirror our perceptions induce another spatial level which is compatible with what we are looking at, and makes sense of the phenomena. We find in the mirror fresh anchorages, so that the orientation of verticality and horizontality might proceed. What, asks Merleau-Ponty, is this spatial level which is always seemingly ahead of itself (ibid p249)? If we say that a new kind of stability is achieved as we find we can make sense of the image in the mirror, does not the establishment of one spatial level not indicate possible pre-established
levels? Thus we find no difficulty in orientating ourselves to the new direction. This must mean that the world of the mirror has become a possible 'habitat' (ibid p250). As Merleau-Ponty says, it is through my body that I make this fresh adjustment, because my body is already situated in a world and is always a system of possible actions, a fresh situation demands fresh anchorages, for the whole activity of the body is to make sense. As we look into the mirror for a few moments, provided we do not strengthen our initial anchorage by looking away, "the reflected room miraculously calls up a subject capable of living in it" (op cit p250). This new anchorage demands a new way of looking - a fresh aspect, a new orientation. As Merleau-Ponty puts it:

"This virtual body ousts the real one to such an extent that the subject no longer has the feeling of being in the world where he actually is, and that instead of his real legs and arms, he feels he has the legs and arms he would need to walk and act in the reflected room: he inhabits the spectacle." (op cit p250).

We can give a further example that amplifies the ability we have of engaging different spatial levels. If we are viewing a distant landscape from a high vantage point, we sweep the horizon of our vision, revelling in the distant space of the immensity of a seeming infinity. By degrees we can come to spaces much closer to us and eventually we can arrive at the intimacy of the interstices of the grass close by. One spatial level can dissolve into the other and as it does so each calls for our anchorage and habitation. The intimate is never very far from the immense. The one is capable always of dissolving into the other.
These examples of adjusting to new spatial levels are paralleled when we can without difficulty adjust to the visual images we find in art. We can move from what Langer(7) has called actual space, to the virtual space of the pictorial object without any problem. In Merleau-Ponty's philosophy the very possession of a body implies the ability to change levels and to 'understand' space. Thus it is that I can identify this new spectacle, not through any concept I need to have of space but because I already am situated, I already live in it, because as he says:

"... I am borne wholly into the new spectacle and, so to speak, transfer my centre of gravity into it."

(op cit p251).

Everything that Merleau-Ponty argues for throws us back to that organic relatedness of the subject and space - "to that gearing of the subject onto his world which is the origin of space" (ibid p251). This picture of gearing onto the world is an evocative one. It suggests that the body, as a system, has the possibility of an infinite number of adaptations through the way it can lock onto new situations and continually make fresh adjustments of levels. The potential for this possibility is the origin of space. Being situated does not simply mean being in place, but rather being within the context of extending possibilities. Not simply a relationship with the world, where the world and I are things, but a relatedness, a gearing of myself with the world. The origin of space rises where there is something to be done, and all action presupposes the ground from which it springs - my situation in the world.
Now the painter, says Lerleau-Ponty(6), echoing Valéry, "takes his body with him" and he adds:

"Indeed we cannot imagine how a mind could paint. It is by lending his body to the world that the artist changes the world into paintings." (op cit p57).

Thus through being situated we are already immersed in the world. I do not so much appropriate what I see, I open myself up to what I see. Moreover, I see because I am already at work in the world. The movement of my gaze, the orientation of my looking is not, as Lerleau-Ponty says:

"... a decision made by the mind ... It is the natural consequence and the maturation of my vision." (op cit p58).

As we have seen, in a truly remarkable passage, he summarises all he has said concerning the importance of the body in the understanding of space:

"Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among other things; it is caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself. Things are an annex or prolongation of itself; they are encrusted into its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the world is made of the same stuff as the body. This way of turning things around (ces renversements), these antipathies, are different ways of saying that vision happens among, or is caught in, things - in that place where something visible undertakes to see, becomes visible for itself by virtue of the sight of things; in that place where there persists, like the mother water in crystal, the undividedness ... of the sensing and the sensed." (op cit pp58/59)

This is none other than a description of the primary spatiality of being. This is the ground out from which things are born, where
the world becomes world - for me. This is where in all objectivity one senses the horizon of the pre-objective. This is the root of all the expressiveness of things - for they seem to grow out from me - as an encrustation, as a prolongation of my body. This being-immersed is why vision can happen among things, is caught in things, where things can take on the spatiality of existence. Vision is totally and always spatial. It is never that separated activity of my being. Vision, as my being, is already at work in the world. Indeed this being situated, this being open to the world, is part of being's full definition. Furthermore, this manifest interiority, this undividedness between the sensing and the sensed is the mark of my presence in the world. The undividedness is the basis of my individuality, for it foreshadows all my subsequent reflection of the world and of myself. This cohesiveness, this wholeness is the primary, pre-reflective, pre-objective ground of my Being. It is, as we have seen, the implicit which surrounds and gives direction, form and shape to the explicit.

IV. 2. 3. Space - its indissoluble link with time.

Being already situated implies being already orientated. There is always in being a directional thrust, a movement toward meaning. Here temporality is indissolubly linked with spatiality. Space needs time, as much as time needs space, for the full definition of being. Being is not wholly spatial; it is temporal as well, as we shall discover when we come to discuss movement. However, without the one in
the other, as figure is to ground, there would be no being. The essence of being is being orientated. This orientation needs clarifying. This is not the orientation of a subject faced with a world where there are already absolute directions. This orientation is not of a subject outside perception, this is an orientation within perception. Thus to understand space is not to reduce it to one spatial level. It is to understand that space precedes itself; it is already constituted and for any given level of spatiality, for any one particular orientation, there are previously established levels, for which a change of meaning can deliver a fresh anchorage, a fresh spectacle, a new way of looking. As Merleau-Ponty(4) argues:

"We must not wonder why being is orientated, why existence is spatial ... why its (our body's) co-existence with the world magnetizes experience and induces a direction in it. The question could be asked only if the facts were fortuitous happenings to a subject and an object indifferent to space, whereas perceptual experience shows that they are presupposed in our primordial encounter with being, and that being is synonymous with being situated."

(op cit p252).

Let us pursue Merleau-Ponty, for the moment, as he examines the significance of the various spatial 'levels' to which the subject is orientated. The primary spatiality, this spatialising space, is of enormous importance in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, for without the acknowledgement of it we cannot hope to understand how space can be the condition for the possibility of objects. To understand why objects may take on an existence which is more than they at first appear is to grasp the possibility of successive levels of spatiality beyond them, and if this is so, of levels of spatiality which precede them, and indeed 'prepare' them and give them their plenitude, their fullness
and their expressive significance in perception. The grasping of
the aesthetic object, the indwelling of this 'world', is the orienta-
tion to a spatial level, already prepared for us through our own
bodily presence and co-existence in the world. The orientation of
our being in the world animates all our perception of it and this
includes all our aesthetic perception too.

Now we do not live our lives only at this primary spatial level.
Orientation is the movement affected from this primary lived level of
spatiality, this spatialising space, to the spatialised space of the
thought-about — of representation — of the image. The circle of
reciprocity is complete when, through the image, and in our case
through the graphic image, we can catch the roots and sense the hori-
zon of this primary spatiality. Of course, we do not know it, in the
sense of systematising it, for to systematise it is to destroy it com-
pletely. We can however catch its presence, as through for example,
the graphic images of Klee, the poetic images of Breton; in these we
sense the visibility, the mobility, the reverberation in vision.

Merleau-Ponty(4) describes how:

"Each of the levels in which we successively live
makes its appearance when we cast anchor in some
'setting' which is offered to us. This setting
itself is spatially particularized only for a
previously given level. Thus each of the whole
succession of our experiences, including the first,
passes on an already acquired spatiality. The con-
dition of our first perception's being spatial is
that it should have referred to some orientation
which preceded it. It must, then, have found us
already at work in a world." (op cit p253)

"There is, therefore, another subject beneath me,
for whom a world exists before I am here, and who
marks out my place in it. This captive or natural
spirit is my body, not that momentary body which
is the instrument of my personal choices and which fastens on this or that world, but the system of anonymous 'functions' which draw every particular focus into a general project." (op cit p254).

Witkin(8), as we have seen, also suggests this two-fold aspect of Being. All that we have been seeking to describe is the space of subjectivity. This spatiality which is the ground and condition of all our experience of the world. It is this spatiality which is magnetised through the images and forms in art. This is the spatiality beneath all objective space. The spatialising space from which spatialised space rises. The one is incompatible without the other and in focusing on the figure of all objective space one catches the ground of this pre-objective space. This is the spatiality of the I can of my bodily presence in the world. To see something is to have already reached it, to be already orientated toward it, to have caught its directional movement of meaning. The space of the subject is, as Merleau-Ponty describes, "a communication with the world more ancient than thought" (op cit p254). This is why space always precedes itself. It cannot be caught in any kind of immanence, for to spatialise space, to make a thought of it, to objectify it, is to already acknowledge its pre-history.

Now this understanding of space will make a profound difference to the consideration of depth. The interiority which this spatiality hollows out is an interiority without dimensions. It is never measurable, quantifiable - as extension. This spatiality is known only in intention. As it is united with time, it forms the condition of all the movement of meaning, all the flux and constant mobility of
the productive imagination.

IV. 2. 4. Space – and the 'third' dimension.

We can begin with a consideration of two aspects of space: breadth and depth. For Berkeley(9) depth was invisible, because when we stand in front of something that 'hides' something else, all we receive is a 'flat' projection on our retinas. For Berkeley depth could not be 'seen' because it is not spread out before our eyes, but appears only in a kind of foreshortened form. Thus for example, two dots can be seen when they are side by side, can be seen in breadth, but if one moves 'behind' the other, all we see is one dot, so depth has disappeared – is not discernible. Lerleau-Ponty(4) picks up this argument of Berkeley's and says that this is nothing more than saying that depth is breadth seen from the side (op cit p255). The reason it seems that I cannot 'see' the hidden dot is that I am badly placed in respect of them – although someone else looking from the side at the two dots would have them clearly in view all the time.

Now this illustration is important and, moreover, Lerleau-Ponty's comment is full of insight – for it brings to light an important issue. To view space as Berkeley does, is to put oneself in one place, one position, and the world is then viewed from this singular perspective. Thus breadth is seen, but not depth, for the error has been committed in equating depth with breadth. Thus, depth becomes a 'third' dimension ranged alongside the dimensions of height and breadth. To equate
depth with breadth is to commit the error of thinking of space in one way. This is the error of all empiricist and intellectual determinism. To get beneath the error we must trace back the problem. For Berkeley, depth belongs to a perspective of the world — a view on things. Now to see depth as breadth in profile as it were, the viewer must somehow abandon his position, or think otherwise than he is. Thus, intellectualism gives us no account of the human experience of the world. Berkeley's argument is concerned with a view of space of someone who is, as it were, on the outside looking in — as though this space were like a cube — space rationalised. Moreover, this 'visible' needs examination for if, as Berkeley suggests, depth is 'invisible', he has become a spectator. This is the trap of all empiricist and intellectualist dogmatism; its plausibility, moreover, discounts any originary experience of the world. It takes no account of the spatiality of the subject, immersed and already at work in the world. This intellectualist view of space irons out the individual's affective experience of space and reduces this experience to a kind of uniform perspective. Moreover, this philosophy makes too great a separation between subject and object — the subject has become an object alongside all other objects, reduced to playing a role. Further, space has become a kind of medium in which these objects, including the spectator, is placed. The originality of depth must be looked for beyond the mere intellectualist conception of it.

Depth is only depth because of our indissoluble link with things. Depth is only such for us. Depth reveals that relatedness of ourselves with the world — not simply the distance as measured between ourselves
as an object and other objects. Depth becomes the qualitative interaction of our being in the world. Depth announces our situation in the world, not our separateness from it. Thus objects take on an expressive potential. They are not merely things. Our affective experience of the world is an acknowledgement of the originality of depth. Merleau-Ponty puts it thus:

"By rediscovering the vision of depth, that is to say, of a depth which is not yet objectified and made up of mutually external points, we shall once more out-run the traditional alternatives and elucidate the relation between subject and object." (op cit p256).

Descartes(10), too, tried to construct vision as a model in thought. The Cartesian view of vision and space is based on causality. Descartes view is modelled on the sense of touch. Reflections in mirrors are no more than reflected light rays. All things are in their place because one action causes another. Thus mirror images are nothing but reflections, caused by light rays coming from the objects. Similarly, light rays enter our eyes as though streaming from objects in the world and we 'decipher' the image we receive on the retina. Thus relationships of objects in space, and phenomena such as reflections, are nothing but the effect of the mechanics of things. The Cartesian concept of vision, suggests Merleau-Ponty(6), removes the 'enigma' of vision (op cit p72). Thus images and illusions are nothing but a 'class of things' (op cit p65), distinct, separate, operating through causal laws and totally determined. Rationalism destroys the oneiric world of the icon. For Descartes, there was no ubiquity in icons - Merleau-Ponty comments:

"As vividly as an etching 'represents' forests, towns, men, battles, storms, it does not resemble them. It
is only a bit of ink put down here and there on the paper." (op cit p66).

This is crucial: the Cartesian view of the image is that it only represents, it never resembles. Further, this image is only such for Descartes as it presents the outside form of objects, their 'envelope'. The bits of ink laid down here and there are only signs which represent the exteriority of things; they could never resemble them. Now, says Merleau-Ponty:

"At one swoop ... he removes action at a distance and relieves us of that ubiquity which is the whole problem of vision (as well as its peculiar virtue)." (op cit p65).

The fact is that icons are visual metaphors; images in art always bring us face to face with the ubiquity of vision. There is far more to representation than mere reference. Merleau-Ponty reinforces the metaphorical idea when he says that the Cartesian argument is finally lost if the entire potency of images, as they are found in art, is that of a text to be read, a text totally free of promiscuity (op cit p66). A metaphor's power of expression lies in that ambiguity between the literal and the figurative, that area of the possible which maintains the tension of subject and object within the image.

Resemblance in the Cartesian view is the result of perception not its mainspring. Actually to see one thing in something else is to sense the possibility of the existence of one thing alongside something else. The oneiric world of the image, is only such as we see past the mere reference, the mere signs which are the marks on paper. Within the Cartesian position, there is no room for analogy, for coherent
deformation. Cartesian thinking does not begin with the body, but with deciphering the signs given in the body. Rationalism cannot equate eyesight with insight. Cartesian thinking could never accept the spatiality in vision which promotes its visibility.

Furthermore, the Cartesian notion of space is the presentation, through the forms of the outside of objects, of their spatial relationships. This is the thinking which characterises space as an object-in-itself. This in-itself of space rises directly as the natural consequence of the argument which places objects together in a world and then uses a determinist system, like perspective, to represent this space. What is lacking is that there is no room in Cartesian philosophy for the secondary quality of things, particularly for qualities like colour. If Descartes had looked for these qualities, qualities which underlie all representations, he would have been obliged to integrate perspective, which is only one means of gearing ourselves to the world, into a wider more ample ontology. As we have discovered, there is far more to drawing than mere extension through projection. Drawings never merely point to objects in the world. Within the Cartesian framework of vision and space, icons 'lose their powers', as Merleau-Ponty says (op cit p66). Causality extinguishes the 'imaginaire' (op cit p73) in vision and closes down the route toward the possible; that oneiric spatiality which lies in wait to surprise us as we come to indwell the world of the icon. Thus Descartes, like Berkeley, saw depth as a third dimension derived from height and breadth.
In *Eye and Mind* Merleau-Ponty engages a further discussion of this 'third' dimension of depth (op cit p68). Now we think we 'see' space when objects 'hide' each other. But actually we do not, for all this demonstrates is that we are saying we see space by relating it to the size of objects, that is, through the way we measure objects by their height and width. In other words, we say we 'see' space when we derive it from height and width, this plane in front of my face. It is never the case that things really are behind each other, or partially hidden by each other. This 'behind' and this 'hidden' reveal the trap of erecting space into a positive in-itself and betray only a point of view, a perspective. Now perspective, as the artists of the Renaissance demonstrated, developed hand in hand with the rationalism that sought to reduce space to a system. Of course, Descartes too supported this view. But it was a dangerous moment in the history of Western thought. Indeed, even in its invention lay the seeds of doubt. In constructing their theories, the men of the Renaissance sought to forget the spherical visual field *perspectiva naturalis*, in favour of *perspectiva artificialis*, capable in principle of producing an exact construction. In doing so they were careful to avoid the Euclidean theorem that no parallel lines ever meet. Euclidean space is boundless, without horizons. No system can ever contain space, for a system only produces, as its offspring, objectively defined phenomena. Of course, the painters knew this. The 'camera obscura' presented only a monocular view of the world and offered only a limited ontology. To trace what is on the screen in front of my eyes is to map out according to a principle, rather than to be involved in all the ubiquity of vision. A formalised recipe
replaces visual judgment. A given view of the object from a given point of view in a given moment of time – the triumph of rationalism. This represented the capitulation of the human mind to a standard of mechanical exactitude. However, the seeds of its own destruction were in the flower of the discovery of the 'solution'. Central perspective demonstrates more than anything else the symbolism of the focussed world. However, no means of expression once mastered resolves the problems of painting or drawing. Merleau-Ponty points out:

"... no symbolic form ever functions as a stimulus. Wherever it has been put to work and has acted, it has gone to work ..." (op cit p70).

And as Bradley(11) has said of art:

"... it is not symbolic, it is rather a presentiment which leads us to the symbolic ... one of the most important functions of art works is ... metaphysical. They lead us toward rather than simply show. Their literalness dissolves as they lead us to what they are not."

Thus the perspective invention of the Renaissance is, as Merleau-Ponty suggests:

"... no infallible 'gimmick'. It is only a particular case, a date, a moment in a poetic information of the world which continues after it." (op cit p70).

But what a powerful moment! The thinking which produced the system still permeates our thinking of space, as a dye difficult to remove.

IV. 2. 5. Space – and the spatiality of 'depth'.

Thus, neither the men of the Renaissance nor Descartes 'solved' the enigma of depth. Once the system so laboriously built up by the
inventions of Brunelleschi and Alberti had ceased to have any further function, had ceased to work, new directions had to be sought and found. The acquiring of fresh dimensions in art has always a metaphysical significance. If the work opens up another field, through which it now appears in a new light, it inevitably changes and becomes what subsequently follows. This is the 'texture' of the work, this is the work working. This is the evidence of that surplus of meaning, of that fecund and rich 'promiscuity' of the text – never as an 'all done' but a constant movement toward. This is the work's ever-opening spatiality, the promise of its depth.

And this search is what draws the painter and the draughtsman on. Giacometti(12) is reported to have said that Cézanne was seeking depth all his life and for Delaunay(13), depth was 'the new inspiration'. No longer is depth that 'mysterious interval', as Merleau-Ponty suggests (ibid p75), between things as though this certain relationship between things could be measured. Depth is crucial to the draughtsman's search. This we shall come to deal with more fully in the final section of this chapter. We conclude this present consideration with this telling passage from Merleau-Ponty, where in talking about depth he says:

"The enigma consists in the fact that I see things, each one in its place, precisely because they eclipse one another, and that they are rivals before my sight precisely because each one is in its own place. Their exteriority is known in their envelopment and their mutual dependence in their autonomy. Once depth is understood in this way, we can no longer call it a third dimension. In the first place, if it were a dimension, it would be the first one; there are forms and definite planes only if it is stipulated how far from me their different parts are. But a first dimension that contains all the others is no longer a
dimension, at least in the ordinary sense of a certain relationship according to which we make measurements. Depth thus understood is, rather, the experience of the reversibility of dimensions, of a global 'locality' - everything in the same place at the same time, a locality from which height, width, and depth are abstracted, of a voluminosity we express in a word when we say a thing is there." (op cit p75).

This brilliant analysis forces us to recast our thinking concerning space - as he says so eloquently, space becomes the reversibility of dimensions. No longer can depth be seen as a dimension extrapolated from height and breadth. Furthermore, this very reversibility means that we can no longer call depth a dimension at all, that is as measured or read off from other dimensions. Depth becomes not an aspect of spatialised space but spatialising space. A dimension cannot be such if it holds and envelops all others; it must be considered as primary, and the basis and ground from which any other orientation might take place. Depth in this primary sense precedes all other faces of it, faces we might come to recognise as we thematise it through the directions of height and breadth. This very reversibility halts pre-determinist and rationalist thinking in its tracks. It asks other questions: it gives us the means for interrogating the world in other ways. It reverses depth as a one-way direction, as breadth seen from the side. This depth is characterised by the being there, the Da of Dasein. This there has a voluminosity, has a past as well as a future and is the reason why we sense the whole affectivity of our experience with the world. The Cartesian view of space is always a space without the 'thickness' of this expressive significance, Cartesian space is devoid of all feeling,
it still makes acknowledgement to the separation of mind and body. But this there which this primary depth discloses, is outside all quantitative assessment. This there is always an opening out, an opening out from within the interiority hollowed out and prepared through the pre-reflective. It is that which leads us to the qualitative sense that we are. This depth is always first lived before it is thought about. Depth in the sense of its precedence resists my thought of it and yet the registering of my reflective attitude is testimony to its presence.

Now to begin to consider depth in this way, as an interiority which opens out, which has a voluminosity, is inevitably to imply the presence of temporality, and it is to this issue we now turn.

IV. 3. 1. Time - a condition for the possibility of movement.

In our previous chapter on the Image, we spoke of the area of 'free-play' (to use Warnock's term) that surrounds the image. We said that the image was the mark of the 'distancing' of the self from itself. We spoke of this in terms of the essential spatiality of the image. Now it was Heidegger who recognised the importance of this 'gap', which allowed the self to establish itself as a self, as having a sense of its own being. We suggested that this 'distancing', which proclaimed the advent of the image, allowed the individual to reflect, allowed the individual to cast forward possibility and sense
being not. Moreover, it was the enabling for the individual self to gain its sense of orientation and direction. Now as soon as there is any suggestion of movement, time is involved. For Heidegger this perpetual return of the self to itself, establishing itself in becoming other as it were, is the very basis of all the sense we have of duration. Duration is the inner sense we have that we remain the same while constantly changing. Kant(16) in his Critique, grasped this when he said:

"... it is the form of the internal sense, that is of the intuition of ourselves and our internal state." (op cit p77).

He felt that time was the a priori of all our awareness. It is this primary temporality which hollows out the interiority for us to sense ourselves, to be aware, to be conscious. Just as there is a nascent spatiality so there is also a nascent temporality. This pre-objective time is time seen as the implicit relationship of the self with itself, or as Kant again puts it, of the self 'affected by itself' (op cit p87). This is of course the basis for the reciprocity of which Witkin(8) speaks, when he talks of the relationship and reciprocal dialectic between Being and the self. Now we begin to grasp the extent of this interiority, this distancing of which we spoke earlier.

Primary time is a pure movement of being, of departing from the self in order to return to it. It is through this pure movement, this impulsion, that the sense of our own existence is made known to us. Indeed, we sense that without this interiority which is carved out through our nascent temporality, there would be no space, no time, no objectivity at all.
IV. 3. 2. Time - its symmetrical relatedness with space.

And here we come to an important consideration. This reciprocal interchange is the pre-figuring of that primordial dialectic between subject and object, whose whole inner necessity is to separate in order to become whole. The reciprocal movement of the self with itself, of Being to other is in order to be. There is a symmetrical relatedness between time and space. If time lies at the source of subjectivity, space must lie at the root of objectivity. To talk, as Kant does, of the form our inner sense takes, is tacitly to imply space. If the self can only know itself, can only become aware of itself through a reciprocal movement that is always toward a unity, the poles of this reciprocation, of the constant oscillation between being and the self, being and other, can be effected only as time is joined with space. Thus, the subject only becomes subject as it opposes itself with its objects - and in the first place with itself as object. We cannot, as we have seen, always remain at the level of pure presence. There must be a move from the lived to the thought about. If a distance is to be effected between ourselves and the world, this must first be pre-figured within ourselves, within the sense we have of our own existence. Moreover, to sense this is to sense the possibility of our existence. To sense possibility is to sense being not, is to sense other, to sense that things may be other than they are. This is the basis of all our transcendence, the sensing we have that there could ever be a beyond to objects. Transcendence is testimony that being is in movement toward other in order to return to itself to remain the same. Without this sense we have
of *duration*, there could be no transcendence. Our whole imaginative endeavour testifies to the reciprocal dialectic between subject and object. There could be no *movement toward*, no directional enquiry, no imaginative *enterprise*, if this essential dialectic were not implicit. Interiority and the voyage we make into depth betrays the implicit 'solidarity', as Dufrenne says, of space with time (op cit p241). Thus, movement toward takes on its sense of opening out.

The temporality of the subject needs the spatiality of the object to make up the full definition of what it is *to be*, of its *being*. Dufrenne clarifies it when he says:

"Space is what is designated in this movement of opening up - space as the aspect of otherness, as what is always outside (whether it is far or near), and as an elsewhere opposed to the here which we are." (op cit p244).

So presence in perception should be considered both as spatial and temporal. This is, of course, implied in all that Merleau-Ponty has said. The 'distance' which is effected by temporality in the relationship of the self with itself implies a nascent spatiality. Thus, this withdrawal, this movement of the self within itself, this interiority which is hollowed out, is a function not only of originary time, but also of originary space. Indeed, to render the situation of being *in front of*, of being *before*, which is the condition of all the possibility of objects - of things being *other* - this primary signification is not the sole preserve of time, but of space as well. Throughout the whole of our analysis we are seeking to underline the complete symmetry of time and space. It takes space to know time. This is, as we shall see, what caused so many problems for Bergson. Kant, of
course, had his finger on the issue when he suggested that both space and time collaborate and are necessary to that "pure synthesis of imagination" whose unity "is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge" (ibid p143).

Thus for any aspect of phenomena to appear, for representation ever to take on its status of re-presentation, time must collaborate with space. For reflection to open up the possibility of there being other, space and time must come together. If time needs space, this is because we can only sense the primacy of temporality in and through our experience and situation within the world. This lived time, the sense we have of enduring, is only known to us through the intermediary of space. This duration then becomes a time which we can control and, moreover, gives us the sense of having an implicit direction and orientation, a sense of purpose. Of course, this is because we are part of this lived time, it is a time, as Dufrenne says, which 'has us' (op cit p246). It is however, through the intermediary of space that we can take our place within this time, and sense the course of events, not as entities, but as bearing a coherence. The implicit symmetry between space and time is like the illustration comprising figure and ground. Even when we focus on one aspect, the presence of the other is still implied. The figure of spatiality only speaks from the silence of the ground of our implicit temporality. Furthermore, in sensing the movement toward, which is the directional thrust of all meaningfulness and significance, we uncover the way the subject is in constant reciprocation with other, as object. Being needs the annexation of the self, to achieve the impulsion of intentionality.
Now we begin to sense the significance of this movement, as being always movement toward, movement that seeks always to return to Being in a constant search for unity, for equilibrium. All action, all search, all the reaching toward a wholeness which animates and directs our operations and our projects in the world, which indeed sustains the image, is here pre-figured in the heart of Being. A constant returning, which yet remains the same in becoming other. The very ground for the individual to be an undivided self.

Movement is characterised by the intimate relationship between space and time. As Dufrenne has so succinctly put it: "Movement is the side of space which is turned toward time ..." (op cit p277). It was Kant who suggested that movement in the object is first movement in the subject. Thus, what we sense as movement 'out there' in the world of objects, is first pre-figured in us. What we apprehend as movement in the world is only such because of its inscription within ourselves, characterised by the relationship of the self affected by the self. We have suggested, furthermore, that this movement is also such because it opens up the possibility of being other; of being not, so clearly characterised by Sartre in his descriptions of the spatiality and quasi-subjectivity of the image. An interiority is hollowed out, the positing of the possibility of the other, gives us the basis not only of self-knowledge, but subsequently of all our knowledge of phenomena. Now the seeing of possibility, that things may be other than they are, is to acknowledge that this movement has already moved us. The possibility that movement might be effected, is to mark that it has already been anticipated. For us, to know is to
be implicitly caught up within this movement. For us, knowing is always movement toward, being orientated. The French have a word for this: it is sens, which has a double usage, not only does it mean 'sense', it also means 'direction'.

IV. 3. 3. Time - and 'duration' - the limitation of Bergson's view.

It is this sense of passage which Bergson(17) grasped so convincingly in his philosophic analysis of duration. Bergson sought to describe duration as being wholly qualitative; for him duration was the quality of lived time. Artists, and particularly musicians, have always found a powerful attraction in his philosophy, and his ideas have had a profound influence on aesthetic thinking. His philosophy almost became a philosophy of art, for his metaphysical insights go to the very heart of all the arts. It has been left to the practitioners to sense the fecundity of his thinking and its outworking. One thinks in this respect of Boccioni(18) and the enormous influence Bergson's thought had on the writing of the Futurist manifesto.

The reason that Bergson's philosophy never really developed into a fully worked out philosophy of art, in spite of all its promise, was that he refused to allow that his conception of duration could have anything to do with space. His all-important insight was that every conceptual form which is supposed to portray time oversimplifies it to the point of leaving out the most important and interesting aspect of it - namely the characteristic appearance of passage, so
that, in Bergson's view, what we are left with is a scientific—
that is, 'measurable'—equivalent rather than a conceptual symbol
of duration. His challenge was clear: to find a means through which
we can conceive and express our experience of this primary aspect of
time. His own answer to this problem was to say that it was impossible
to reach through any kind of symbolism—such symbolism is only a
metaphysical pitfall. For Bergson, all symbolisation was a kind of
falsification, for all symbolisation was essentially spatialisation,
and it was the total eradication of space from time which was his
main preoccupation. Every traffic with space became, for Bergson,
a betrayal of our real knowledge of time. His view of space was that
it only 'measured' time, in extension. His recourse was that we must
give up logical conception and try to grasp the inward sense of this
duration by a kind of 'intuition', but in these terms he admitted
that this was a hopeless task. The artist, however, still finds his
philosophy powerfully attractive, for the artist senses that through
his own symbolism, through the images he can form in and through his
various modalities, he can eclipse the barrenness of the literal.
Bergson sought to develop his metaphysical position through the logi-
cal ordering of linguistic forms—this very discursiveness led to
the failure of his philosophy as a philosophy of art. What he could
not grasp, and what the artist implicitly strives for, is the meta-
phorical significance, that passage of the figurative. Thus, in the
final analysis, it was the realism of Bergson which was his undoing.
The demand Bergson makes of philosophy—to clarify the dynamic forms
of subjective experience, art fulfills. This is the artist's busi-
ness. His aim always is to get back to pure duration. He seeks to
achieve this through his image forms, "to join the aimless hands of nature" as Cézanne(19) once said. Like Klee(20), he works to 'break out'; this breaking out is the continual attempt he makes, to 'break through'. Bergson set up a task which was impossible in the realm of discursive expression, the realm that is the logic of language. Caught within his own rationalism, he did not have the means to break out, and his quest ends in questioning. Furthermore, as he himself had to admit, blind instinct is no solution. But this is exactly the artist's concern. Nothing is more reasonable to a poet, a painter or a musician, and especially a musician, than Bergson's metaphysical aims. The artist does not ask whether this philosophy is feasible, he makes his images; as Langer(7) says, he "subscribes to a philosophy that lays claim to it" (op cit pl15).

Bergson saw the shadow of the determinism of language which constantly haunted him. In describing the two aspects of Being, two forms of 'multiplicity' as he called it, the one of duration and the other of conscious life, he says in Time and Free Will:

"In other words, our perceptions, sensations, emotions and ideas occur under two aspects: the one clear and precise, but impersonal; the other confused, ever changing and inexpressible, because language cannot get hold of it without arresting its mobility or fit it into its common place forms without making it into public property." (op cit pl29)

and again:

"In short, the word with well-defined outlines, the rought and ready word which stores up the stable, common and consequently impersonal element in the impressions of mankind, overwhelms or at least covers over the delicate and fugitive impressions of our individual consciousness. To maintain the struggle on equal terms, the latter ought to express themselves in precise words; but these words, as soon as they
were formed, would turn against the sensation which gave birth to them, and, invented to show that the sensation is unstable, they would impose on it their own stability." (op cit p132).

Herein he senses the inadequacy of language, language as denotation. Herein we also discern Bergson's cry for help, his challenge to philosophy. His challenge is that he asks for a symbolism which embodies rather than merely describes this duration. The images in art do this par excellence, for they always carry a metaphoric significance. Their efficacy lies not in their reduplication, but in their transcription. Thus the spatiality of their symbolism is never the spatiality of extension of quantitative determination, but always of intention, of qualitative experience, of expression.

One of the most important contributions Bergson made, inspite of all the limitations of his realism was to uncover that essential temporality beneath all our conscious awareness of time. His problem lay, as we have seen, in seeking to describe this duration from the standpoint of the logical determinism of language, and although he sensed that his metaphysical ideas were in the direction of the work of the poet, painter and musician, he could never bring himself to wholly identify with their position. Nevertheless, through his analysis of duration he provided a conceptual framework, which the artist could sense immediately lay in the potency of his image. When Bergson (21) for example, speaking of movement says: "All movement being indeed a passage from one point of rest to another, is absolutely 'indivisible'" (op cit p209), he is talking of the way our sense of duration makes this possible. (It is interesting that Rodin(22) also
made the same observation.) Thus, this recognition of the path of time, of its passage, of its transience, is crucial for an understanding of the form of duration. Passage is something one cannot measure; it does not enter into any order of measurable time, of time objectified; it is only known as we live it, as we are on the inside of it, not viewing it as so much change of position. Indeed if one takes movement apart, by setting it out in its spatial positions, one destroys movement altogether. Duration is not a period, not an actual phenomenon, not a thing in-itself. It is radically different from the time in which our practical and public life proceeds.

Thus when we talk, as we do, of the passage of musical time, or indeed of the passage of movement which we might sense in a drawing, as Langer(7) says:

"Such passage is measurable only in terms of sensibilities, tensions and emotions; and it has not merely a different measure, but an altogether different structure from a practical or scientific time." (op cit p109).

'Clock time' is the ordering of events through a kind of logic. It is above all the systematising or thematising of time, through setting it out in relation to positions in space. It enables us through its one-dimensional linearity to mark out the future from the present and the past. It is time conceptualised. The way of the clock is the way of all rationalist systems, it makes us think discursively. The underlying principle of clock time is change. As Langer has so lucidly pointed out (op cit p112), it is that which is measured by contrasting two states of an instrument - the hand of the pointer
and the point on the dial at successive locations, counted by being correlated within a series of distinct numbers. Now these states or positions, we identify by giving them a mark in space. What we call change is constructed, is extrapolated, in terms of these different positions in space. Change itself is not represented. As Langer says: "it is implicitly given through the contrast of different 'states', themselves unchanging" (op cit p112).

Change, as movement, is given implicitly, not explicitly; we sense the passage of movement when we say of something that it moves. To reduce movement simply to a change of position is to simply make an observation about positions in space, it is to say nothing of our experience of it. Thus the experience of time is infinitely more complex than the simple property of its length. Time can have a voluminosity, it can have a thickness. Time can have a density. In all our reference to these aspects of time we are acknowledging the presence of duration. And in all the affective descriptions of time, we sense the presence of space, space not as object, but as lending its condition of always giving to time a fullness, a plenitude. This time as duration is part of the condition of our situation in the world, the world of our acts. As Bergson says in Time and Free Will it is quite possible to divide an object, but not an act (op cit p112). Langer adds:

"But life is always a dense fabric of concurrent tensions, and as each of them is a measure of time, the measurements themselves do not coincide. This causes our temporal experience to fall apart into incommensurable elements which cannot be all perceived together as clear forms ... but for perception they give quality rather than form to the passage of time, which unfolds in the pattern of
the dominant and distinct strains whereby we are measuring it." (op cit pl13).

This is the time of the subject, it was this time which Bergson sought to capture as 'la durée réelle'.

The problem for Bergson was in seeking to reconcile the two distinct worlds (for him) of the lived and the thought about. He sought to describe these two aspects of being as two forms of 'multiplicity'. His problem lay in seeking to describe the subjectivity of duration through the objectivity of conscious life. He was caught within the web which the determinist form of his linguistic expression had spun. This is a warning against the realism which all behaviourist thinking would promote. In polarising, one must take care never to make a separation. To divide consciousness, as we have learned from Sartre, is to destroy it. For in doing this we make consciousness an in-itself and it loses the for-itself of its existence. Duration is the very condition of consciousness, the pre-objective temporality, which Bergson sought so valiantly to describe within the limitation of his terms - is the ground of all our experience of the world. But Bergson's descriptions are enlightening, for they are a warning to all who would set up the model of consciousness in this way, without the realisation that all experience is an inseparable and incommensurable web of the relatedness and interpenetration of these 'two worlds'.

Our task throughout is to suggest that it is through the Image, that this essential dialectic and reciprocal coalescence takes place.
Musicians have always found Bergson's ideas compelling. Indeed Bergson himself recognised the close connection between his ideas and the musical matrix. He sought to clarify the reality of duration through the discursive symbolism of language, but the musical image presents directly the sense of passage, which he was at such pains to describe. The desire to exclude any form of space in his conception of duration led him to deny this duration any structure at all, it became an impossible dream. When, for example, as Langer says, he uses the simile of musical time, he treats it as a completely formless flow "the successive tones of a melody whereby we let ourselves be cradled" (op cit p116). Langer continues:

"Consequently he misses the most important and novel revelation of music - the fact that time is not a pure succession, but has more than one dimension. His very horror of the scientific abstractions he finds typified in geometry makes him cling to the one-dimensional pure succession of states ..."

(op cit p116).

But form in music, as is true of form in all the arts, is multi-dimensional, polyphonic. It took Paul Klee's(23) incisive insight to realise that:

"What the so-called spatial arts have long succeeded in expressing, what even the time-bound art of music has gloriously achieved in the harmonies of polyphony, this phenomenon of many simultaneous dimensions which helps drama to its climax, does not, unfortunately occur in the world of verbal didactic expression."

(op cit p17).

Thus it is that the image can give us a sense of this duration, this inner time, this primary temporality. The image is first lived before it is subsequently thought about. The literal must give way to the figurative if we are to catch the sense, and that means the
directional movement of 'la durée réelle'.

We mentioned earlier the influence Bergsonian doctrine had on Boccioni, and John Golding in an essay on Boccioni's *Unique Forms of Continuity in Space*, helps us see this clearly. Boccioni was writing his Futurist sculpture manifesto and had access to Bergson's writings through an Italian translation of his *Introduction to Metaphysics*. His interest was in movement and he says:

"... the gesture which we would reproduce on canvas shall no longer be a fixed moment in universal dynamism. It shall simply be the dynamic sensation itself." (op cit p6).

And this is the passage (quoted by Golding) in Bergson, to which Boccioni was referring:

"Consider the movement of an object in space. My perception of the motion will vary with the point of view, moving or stationary from which I observe it. My expression of it will vary with the symbols by which I translate it. For this double reason I call such motion relative: in the one case as in the other I am placed outside the object itself. But when I speak of an absolute movement, I am attributing to the moving object an inner life and, so to speak, states of mind. I also imply that I am in sympathy with those states, and that I insert myself into them by an effort of imagination." (op cit p7).

He goes on to say:

"Every feeling, however simple it may be, contains virtually within it the whole past and present of the being experiencing it, and, consequently can only be separated into a 'state' by an effort of abstraction or analysis." (op cit p7).

As Golding points out, Bergson implies that the result of this sort of analysis can only bring about partial understanding and although, as he says, an artist in his rendition of a subject can intuitively feel
"the throbbing of its soul" his depiction of it will inevitably be "an external and schematic representation" (ibid p7). It will be the viewer's intuitive apprehension of the work which will allow him to reassemble the schematic symbols meaningfully: "from intuition one can pass to analysis", Bergson says, "but not from analysis to intuition" (op cit p7).

Here we clearly see why Bergson found it so difficult to embrace a philosophy of art. Any symbol of whatever kind is only an external schematic representation. He is caught in the same rationalist trap as Descartes. All significance for Bergson is based on a causality which sees space as a one-dimensional extensity. He had no other view of space than that which viewed it from one point of view. The polyphonies of space, the way space can lend itself to time, to create that sense of the texture and voluminosity of duration was abhorrent to him. He could never reconcile space with time in his descriptions of duration at all.

The distinction Bergson makes between relative and absolute movement Boccioni challenged in his work Unique Forms of Continuity in Space. These two aspects of movement he sought to combine within a single image. Boccioni believed that through his image he could combine an analytic depiction of the movement of a subject and simultaneously embody 'the throbbing of its soul'. He felt he had found an image which could render the sensation of continuity in space. He did this through his drawings and his sculpture and he felt that:

"No one can any longer believe that an objects ends where another begins and that our body is surrounded
by anything - bottle, automobile, house, tree, road - that does not cut through it and section it in an arabesque of directional curves." (op cit p15).

Here in one swoop he exposes all the limitations of Bergsonian realism. The determinism of the literal symbol which bound Bergson to a spatiality which was only the distance and relationship between objects, Boccioni took and exploded through his images. No longer are objects points in space surrounded by an envelope, they have an interiority which invades their surroundings. Thus not only can we sense through the image the analysis of continuity in space, we can feel the 'throbbing of its soul', the reverberations which echo along its path. Boccioni provided through his image-forms what Bergson had been seeking for in his metaphysics. The image reaches into that spatiality which is barred to any philosophy which seeks it through the logical discursiveness of the literal symbol. To catch the figurative beyond the literal is to follow the path of movement of the image. The image fills the gap left by discursive symbolism. The image is never a reduplication. It is always a transcription, it writes a new order of reality as it goes.

IV. 3. 4. Time - as presence.

Before turning our attention more fully to a consideration of the spatiality and temporality of the aesthetic object, it will be our task now to look more closely at what we have begun to describe as presence, the inner sense we have of duration.
The language of time, as we have seen from Bergson, is fraught with difficulty. Words like 'before' or 'after' cut time into spatial segments – they delimit. What we have found from the image as it occurs in art is that it can present the sense of time's duration, but only of course as we come to indwell it.

Thus language presents one difficulty. The second is that there is a certain duality in our experience of time; for to be aware of time we have to be both in it and beyond it. To be aware of time is to be able to stand outside it, we have to stand apart from something we are already in. Our awareness of time comes about because we are both imprisoned within it and yet also detached from it. Thus existence is the sense we have of standing out: ex stance. To stand out we must already be standing in. This is the crucial aspect which we have already discovered from Merleau-Ponty; that to move to the thought about we must already be within the lived. Space collaborates with time here, but the already being is the condition of our temporality. This is presence. This presence which is the lived, 'gives to all our perceptions their fullness, their density, their quality. It is the ground and condition, as we have seen, for the rise of the image and lies at the root of why objects can ever have an expressive significance.

We cannot grasp together the lived and the thought about, the standing in as the condition for the standing out, but one is the ground that allows the other to appear. The silence of the milieu, the ground of our existence must be the presence, for the voices of
any subsequent appearing. Time, then, in this pre-objective sense, is the milieu which gives to all objects a sense of their objectivity, of their endurance and moreover gives to all our looking a duration. Time in the sense of this presence gives us the hold we have on objects and is the reason why they can hold us, as we follow them and trace their movements in our perception. They have truly become motifs. Now this presence, this silence that lies beneath all our conscious awareness is not absence, is not non-being; rather it is the ground for all our being. In that unitary experience, in that undividedness between the sensing and the sensed, which is our life, our human life; this ground is the a priori, the given, the condition for all our coming to know; the basis for all the movement we make toward meaning, sense and significance. Thus the inner sense we have of rhythm, the sense we have of the melodic phrasing of the line in drawing, the apprehension we have of all gestural significance, rises from the ground of our temporality, our presence in the world, our already being situated. Time, thought of in this way, is not a line unfolding as one unravels a ball of string; rather, as Merleau-Ponty (4) says, it is "a network of intentionalities" (op cit p417). Time considered as succession is already time 'thought about'. Viewed in this way time has been spatialised. In order to view time as a line, there would only be one real point, the present, with two imaginary vectors - past and future - radiating from it. This destroys time altogether; it is to thematise or rationalise time; to take up a point of view with regard to it. It becomes an in-itself and we make a separation between ourselves and things. As Merleau-Ponty puts it:

"Time is, therefore, not a real process, not an actual succession I am content to record. It
arises from my relation to things. Within things themselves, the future and the past are in a kind of eternal state of pre-existence ... What is past or future for me is present in the world."

(op cit p412).

And with extraordinary insight he adds:

"If we separate the objective world from the finite perspectives which open upon it and posit it in itself, we find everywhere in it only so many instances of 'now'. These instances of 'now', moreover, not being present to anybody have no temporal character, and could not occur in sequence." (op cit p412).

Thus any description of time must underline the fundamental relationship I have with the world. Without a subject the past would not be the past, nor the future the future. It is the subject, my being, which introduces into the world the perspective of a past and a future and thus also of the possibility of not being, of being other. Thus the passage from one moment to another is never purely conceptual. To experience passage, movement, rhythm, is to be already engaged in a relatedness with the world. Time is not a set of objective positions through which one passes. Time as the metaphor of flowing presents more difficulties than it solves. This image fallaciously leads us to believe that time comes from the past pushing the present then the future. This necessarily entails the view that the future is prepared behind the observer. It is impossible to conceive of the present, without taking account of the becoming which comes from the future. Merleau-Ponty senses this when he says that time seems to move from the future to the present as "a brooding presence moving to meet" man (op cit p411).

Mel Larshak(25) has also so clearly grasped this when she says
that attainment is "a pull, a burden from above" (op cit p56). In attaining it is we who become captive. Perception is an attainment, a constant pull from the now of mere action. In all our perception it is not the past only which holds us, it is the future as the possibility of objects which directs our looking and captures our gaze. How significant this becomes as one is literally caught up in the creative act, as in drawing one is drawn on. All making is an attainment and all the making within the process of drawing is the testing of the possibilities of the future against the present of action prepared from the past of my memory. The consideration of drawing as process - and this includes not only the activity but also the image as formed - is grounded on this view of time as a 'network' of intentionalities. The image now takes on the aspect of always becoming, of a spatiality and a temporality, of a depth, which it is constantly disclosing.

Thus there is a 'future' for me in the world, this is the I can of all my projects. 'Lived experience' becomes a kind of destiny, a journey outward, for I can, with the help of the image, project possibility. I can surprise the future within the present; the sensing of possibility is the indication to me of the future on all my horizons. Thus time is not a line, nor does it flow; all these metaphors do is establish my position in respect of time and effectively detach me from it. I am already situated, I am already at work in the world. Thus it is that this inner time is where I learn the nature of passing, and transience. Moreover, I can sense the directional movement of meaning, I can transcend the now and reach toward other. As
Llerleau-Ponty says:

"... my presence in the world is the condition of the world's possibility ..." (op cit p432).

How rich this insight becomes as we consider the world of the aesthetic object. Herein lies the path to all our consideration of its depth, its plenitude, its being.

The already-being-situated, the situation for all my actions in the world, is my field of presence. This is never a single instant, like a point along a line, rather it is a situation built from the actions of my immediate past and the possibilities that lie within any future projects. Furthermore, this field of presence can have a kind of 'density' about it. If the future broods too heavily I can be caught in anxiety. Thus there is a certain qualitative 'weight' to my field of presence which can characterise the style of my activities. In this way I learn to make contact with time as I sense the horizons of the past and the pull of the horizons of the future. Time in this most fundamental sense is what is "traversed by my life" (op cit p416).

IV. 3. 5. Time - the need for a synthesis - Husserl's view.

Yet time needs a synthesis, it needs some kind of form, some kind of structure through which we can sense it. As we found in our discussions concerning Bergson earlier, to catch the movement of the duration he was describing, we needed Boccioni's image. The image is the synthesis through which we can sense time. Merleau-Ponty
senses the difficulties when he says:

"The problem is how to make time explicit as it comes into being and makes itself evident, having the notion of time at all times underlying it, and being, not an object of our knowledge, but a dimension of our being." (op cit p415).

This is precisely what images in art do. They are such because they are the synthesis through which we can make contact with time, as it is made explicit. The musical image a fortiori presents us directly with the image of duration. Furthermore, as we have discovered, these images are never objects-in-themselves — objects for our conceptual knowledge only. They are always the synthesis of that for-itself which is always a for-itself-for-us. The world of this image is not simply a represented world; it is an expressed world. Thus truly can these images transcribe a fresh reality, for they become not simply objects of our knowledge, but dimensions of our being. Their very metaphoric utterance is because as images they have first touched the depths before they have stirred the surface.

It was Husserl(26) who used the musical image to explore the richness of time consciousness. In his Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (hereinafter referred to as Time-Consciousness) he uses the example of listening to a sounding note in seeking to describe the enduring quality of duration. Our task is to explore how the spatiality of the pictorial world of the drawing can take on the quality of duration and it is with this in mind that we follow Husserl's analysis. His example is taken from the temporal image of music but one can immediately sense the link
to the visual counterpart in drawings. We talk quite naturally, for example, of the phrasing of the line, of its rhythmic quality, of the movement of the line in its passage. To talk of the line in this way is to sense its qualitative duration and the parallel to the temporal world of the musical image is not without significance.

Time to Husserl was an inner time, indissolubly linked to the notion of subjectivity. We have sensed that for Merleau-Ponty this is a 'lived' time, the inhabiting condition of our body with world. Merleau-Ponty's indebtedness to Husserl is very apparent, but for both philosophers, this temporality pervades all our actions, all our perceptions and is the silent milieu for all our being.

In Husserl's view, while the note is sounding we are attentive to it as an *impressional consciousness* (op cit pp46/47). When the sound ceases it still lingers, it still 'continues' and Spicker(27), in his analysis of Husserl's position calls this our 'retentive consciousness' (op cit p236). While the note is sounding it is called an 'impressional' object; when it ceases to sound but its sounding still lingers, it is called a 'retained' object. (We can also see Witkin's(8) indebtedness to this description.) All perception is like this if, as we have seen, perception is our gearing to the world, our being already situated. There is a constant reciprocity between impression and retention. In our scanning of a drawing, for example, our gaze is held within the movement of its lines, the phrasing of its tonalities, for we move with it. We do not see its elements as isolated impressions, but always as a constant resonating, a constant
oscillation between impression and retention. We hold onto the movement within the drawing, because it first holds us. Perception is thus **eventful**, not simply extended looking.

Spicker, in commenting on Husserl's analysis, points out that as we listen to this sounding note and subsequently hear another note, we don't hear another 'thing', as though the 'previous' note was shut off and sealed in its own invisibility; we hear the new note, not as something entirely different but as bearing a continuing essence which relates it to the first, a continuing identity. This retentiveness is an internal characteristic of consciousness. As he says, in his comment (op cit p237), the temporal positions are not separated from one another through divided acts. The unity of perception is a breachless unity which dispenses with all interrupting internal differences. Thus there are distinct temporal points but these are never separated. In hearing the note, says Husserl, these are two different modes of appearing. The first is as it breaks in on our perception — the **impression** of the sound and then the further retention of this sound which is a **modification** of this initial impression. Thus, as Husserl says, the consciousness of the sound is a **complex**. It includes an impression of the sound, a modification of the sound as we continue to hear it and also a third characteristic which is a synthesis that is arrived at as the appearing both of the sound and its modification which enables us to sense it as the same sound through these various appearances. Thus the sound **endures**. What Husserl does is to introduce into the notion of duration a kind of temporal perspective, where we sense that what we hear is the same sound, where it is held
in perception under varying orientations and out from differing contexts. This is what J.J. Gibson(28) refers to when in calling our senses 'perceptual systems', he says, we are able to grasp the invariable within the variable (op cit p262). Our perception is fully active, fully eventful and demonstrates our implicit relatedness within the world. Husserl, in his analysis, is attempting to demonstrate how we can hold the presence of the past in the present. The tone of the note he says:

"... appears in the form of a concrete present with the now-point, the horizon of the continual past, on one side and that of the future, on the other. This present phenomenon is in a continual, original flux from Now into an ever new Now, under corresponding alterations of the past and future horizons." (Spicker op cit p237).

Now we sense Kerleau-Ponty's indebtedness to Husserl, for he too has said that time needs this synthesis, which is never complete, never 'fixed', but is undertaken afresh in every act of perception, a continual becoming. Husserl asks, what then is the relationship of succession to this duration? How is it we hear the same tone, how is it that it seems to endure even though its modes of appearing have undergone modification and alteration? Husserl feels that the 'now-point' of the impression of hearing the note is not lost as it recedes, but undergoes a modification, it is still, as it were, 'held-in-ones-grasp' (Spicker, op cit p237). Thus because we can hold this present in hand as it recedes, we can turn our attention to it in a new way - in a way which can properly be called an act of reflection. Thus each 'moment' in perception contains beside its present content a retrospective perception of one or more prior moments. This continuation
of the past in the present, he says, gives to consciousness its retro-
spective and reflective character. Reflection is made possible by a
retention which is a continuing modification of the 'now-point' of
impression as it is still held in one's grasp, even though it sinks
back from its original entry into our perception to what we call the
past. This is why every act of perception can be made an act of re-
flexion. Husserl maintains that the sense we have of sequence is
because of the fundamental and breachless unity of consciousness.
It is this unity which is our enabling to 'hold onto' objects, to
'stay with' objects and which lends to objects their enduring quality
of objectivity. The grasping of this invariability within the complex
variability of our conscious life is what gives us in the end our
sense of stability, our sense of wholeness and is the characteristic
of consciousness in its constant reaching toward meaning. Thus in
listening to a sounding note, every phase has in essence the quali-
tative content, the invariable which allows us to perceive this note
as the same note, even when its tone may recede and become fainter.
Indeed when its tone has ceased, it has not become lost, for it still
takes its place in the passage of the melody of which it at some point
has been a part.

The whole of this analysis seeks to preserve in the present the
presence of the past and of course the anticipation of the future.
The horizon of this 'now-point' extends not only backward and down-
ward, but forward and upward, for this present now is only what it
is as it also contains the anticipatory 'pull' of the future. More-
over, there is a certain ambiguity about this 'now'. Its knife-edge
notion fits philosophic language as an invention, more than it does actual experience.

Husserl, even though he described time as a 'flux', still thought of it basically as a line. It was Merleau-Ponty who developed Husserl’s thinking by suggesting that far from being a line, time was a "network of intentionalities". Thus the 'now' of my experience reaches back into the past and forward into the future as a whole network. This, of course, is why I can talk of the texture of my experience, the tissue of the passage of my life. In the present I can only act. Moreover if my act did not take its place within a context, it would be a now that would be a miniature eternity and all my awareness of time would be a series of jumps from one 'now' to another. Furthermore, we should never be able to explain how we come to be aware of past or future, we would be locked into an eternal present, we would have no experience and no sense of existence. Time would cease because there would be no duration. Thus the presence of experience is not simply the present 'moment', it is not simply an awareness of what is now, but carries with it, in all its complex network of intentions the past, as memory and the future as anticipation. Husserl described our awareness of the past in any experience, its retention, and the awareness of the future, its protention. He says in Time-Consciousness (referred to by Jacques(29):

"Every perception has its retention and protentional halo." (Jacques, op cit p40).

These are the temporal overtones and undertones which characterise the 'thickness' of time, its density and voluminosity. Time can drag, time can fly, we can be 'lost' in time. Time takes on an interiority,
a depth, duration is not simply a formless flow: in all the spati-ality of its intentionality it seeks a synthesis. Here the image is born.

The draughtsman too works from within this presence he has in his relatedness to the world. As he makes his drawing, he builds up out from the constellation of his looking visual analogues that will give him a graphic fixation, which never become 'points' mere 'positions' in space - they in their turn, like Husserl's sounding note, take their place within the fabric of his emerging image. These visual analogues are like the threads in the texture of his emerging drawing. They reflect a whole history of looking, but a history that is not a simple 'succession' of causes, a history that has a depth woven from all the multiplicity of his memories and his anticipations. These visual 'elements' are always yielding more, always yielding a qualitative reciprocity. His looking is surrounded by the halo of what he has already seen and the anticipation of how it will appear once he has found his visual transcription, for his visual transcription will modify his looking. Temporality is the rootedness of drawing, for drawing is always a process, a process that seeks to hold in this image the depth from which it has risen, the tissue of its making and the texture of its continuing possibili-ties, the directional thrust of its meaningfulness, the opening up of that oneiric space which not only shapes it but is its shaping.

The process photographs which accompany this enquiry, within the stark limitation of their presentation, seek to demonstrate this
movement of the passage of the draughtsman immersed in the presence of his drawing activity. Of course they are shadows, like footprints in the sand, for nothing can adequately show what this essential experience is. And yet they show the trace of it. The pleasure one gets from viewing a process is that one relives, even though less intensely, what first occurred from within the activity - the anticipatory pull of the future. It is akin to the pleasure one gets from listening to a familiar melody, or returning to resavour a favourite drawing.

The future is always there, beckoning, like a brooding presence that is about to burst upon our present. Thus it is that all our actions contain some apprehension of how the action will go. As the draughtsman moves out across the primal whiteness of his paper and makes his initial mark, he is pulled forward by the future coming to meet him. He projects his line across this ground, he throws it outward into this space he is now shaping; he has been caught up within the adventure of this journey. Yet what he makes registers its impression upon him and he makes fresh marks as they arise from the history of what he has already seen, apprehended within the anticipation of how it will appear. Much of the pleasure which arises from the activity of making comes from the sense of risk. Risk is the registering of the anticipation of the future in the present. It is the acceptance of the pull of the future from beyond the now. Risk is a hypothesis we make, it is calling the bluff of the future and is one way we have of making our way in the world. The making of the line, the handling of all its interpenetrations, of all its
opening possibilities, is full of adventure because it is full of risk. Drawings that are full of visual clichés are tired and dead because they have taken no risks. It is as this sense of risk is kept alive that innovation is born. Innovation rises as the means is found of embodying this sense, this sense that the hypothesis has been made. A Rembrandt drawing is full of adventure because it is full of the daring, of the venturing to go. Within the literalness of his graphic means he has embodied his venture, so we can enter into its transcription, we can sense its innovation as we sense its metamorphosis. Metaphor is the perfect example of the anticipatory pull of the future on the present from the past.

IV. 4. 1. The spatiality and temporality of the aesthetic object.

We have spoken of the symmetrical relationship of space with time. We have also begun to sense that for us in any way to grasp time as duration, time needs a synthesis. We have seen that this synthesis, this coalescence, is achieved through the image. In our previous chapter, we spoke of the image as having a kind of spatial background, of its quasi-subjectivity and this characteristic led us to talk of the aesthetic object as constituting a world. Thus the space and time of which we speak is always in relation to this world, as an expressed world. This world of the aesthetic object is always a world for us, a qualitative experience and not simply a quantifiable datum. This, we have discovered, lies at the basis
of the difference between the aesthetic object and the work of art.

Moreover, this world is not self-sufficient, it is only ever a 'world' as it becomes such for a subject who participates in it. There is always an indeterminacy about this world, not only because it is 'represented' and not 'real', but because its incompleteness is acknowledged as we realise there is always a 'beyond' to it, it is never an all-done. As we have begun to sense, this constant search toward, which characterises the movement of meaning in this world, is such because it is first inscribed in us. Therefore, any descriptions of its spatiality and temporality are wholly qualitative and are not reached through any extensity which is quantifiable through objective measurement. The source of its very openness, its evocation is to be found within the spatiality and temporality that are the basis of its phenomenal appearing.

And yet there is a striving for wholeness and unity which is the basis for us calling the world of the aesthetic object a world in the first place. Moreover, this unity is given with it, we do not have to labour to build it up through its parts. It registers a unity because its wholeness is always more than mere addition. Space and time lie at the basis of this ordering, which is always a seeking toward an opening and not a closure. It is only closed, it only ceases to work as a world, when through its signs, we sense no risk, no venturing, no possibilities of a beyond. We become bored with it and it no longer holds us, it collapses upon itself as we cease to participate with it. It has become no more than a
Now this openness is always an openness of intention rather than extension. This network of intentionalities is the degree of the possibilities of its depth. Thus this 'indefinite' is a potentiality which no actualisation can exhaust. This is always for us the possibility of a world, the possibility of objects, the glimpse we catch of their interiority, the horizon of their futures for ever distilling from this present. Cassirer has talked of the 'pregnancy' of symbolic form - this is the 'halo' which surrounds all our perceptions and is specifically that which 'holds' this world in its unity, but always a unity that is the ground for the potentiality of its continuing openness. Like Husserl's sounding note, it carries within it the polyphony of immeasurable harmonic overtones.

Thus the aesthetic object has the dimensions of a world - but these dimensions are dimensions which defy measurement. As we have seen from Merleau-Ponty, it is because it exists first in its depth. This is not a world, as Dufrenne says "... crowded with objects; it precedes them" (op cit p182). Thus we do not so much see its space, as its essential spatiality prepares this world to be seen. Always this world presents the potentiality of space and time and never space and time objectively determined. The duration we grasp within the passage of the symphony is never its length of time as determined by the clicks of the metronome. The movement of a linear passage within a drawing is never a mere geometrical projection of subtended points.
However, this is not to say that the aesthetic object cannot be the source of its own space and time. Indeed, it can and indeed it must in order to be expressive. The work works, the work is animated because the work is first expressive before being merely representative. The directional thrust of its meaningfulness is to be expressive for this is the very ground of its appearing in the first place. To merely 'represent' time is to invoke chronology and to merely 'represent' space is to invoke geometry. The expressed, as Dufrenne points out:

"... is, as it were, the possibility of the represented and the represented is the reality of the expressed. Together with the style which gives them body, they compose the world of the aesthetic object." (op cit p185).

IV. 4. 2. Movement and motif.

Now our task is to consider how drawing can manifest its own particular style of space and time through its modalities. Drawing is essentially a 'spatial' art. Time and space serve only as broad generalisations for the character of works of music or works of drawing. Music unfolds in time while drawing manifests itself in space, but as we have begun to sense, a more thoroughgoing examination diminishes the differences. So always, the aesthetic object implies both space and time, even though in a given case it appears to be only to do with space or only to do with time. Drawing is not without its relationship to time. Whenever we talk about movement within drawing and drawing as movement, we acknowledge that its spatiality
has been ignited and magnetised through time. Here is Paul Klee's unforgettable description:

"Movement is the basis of all becoming. When a dot becomes movement and line, time is involved – a work of art is built up, piece by piece, just like a house. Scene of the action: time. Character: movement. The genesis of writing provides a very good parallel for movement. A work of art is also first and foremost a genesis; it is never experienced ready made. Paths are cut through a work of art for the venturesome eye of the spectator as it might be an animal grazing. The eye follows the paths prepared for it through the work of art. The pictorial work originated in movement, is itself recorded movement and is received as movement."

(op cit pp93/94).

Thus Kandinsky's line can become for us the thread of Ariadne leading us through the world of appearances. The felicitous space this line inscribes is hollowed out for us, bears an interiority and a depth which we catch through its movement. The coalescence of space and time, their dialectical reciprocity, is here prefigured. The space which unites 'the pagoda's long robe to the long robe of the whirlwind' is not 'empty', it is fully evocative. We sense the reverberation of this space within the resonance of the continual movement of the metaphoric tension within this poetic utterance.

The network of our felt experiences that make up the fabric and texture of our lives, our being, is here magnetised through these images. What we sense 'on the surface', as it were, has first been inscribed in us, through that primordial dialectic between subject and object. In this way we have no difficulty in ascribing a 'living' quality to the world of the aesthetic object. We can say of the line that it moves, it is a movement caught in immobility. Like our being, it
is a constant returning, a *genesis* which yet remains the same in becoming other.

It is in search of this depth, it is to make this depth speak which animates the draughtsman, the painter, the poet and the musician. Thus the draughtsman, through his unique modality and through the harnessing of his means, makes speak his space. He may speak with different voices, he may employ different tongues, yet what he strives for is not the mere imitation of some spatio-temporal world 'out there', not simply the envelope of things but the beingness of objects. In his seeing they are always rivals before his sight; they strive to take their place within the spatio-temporal world of his drawing. Thus he uses sensuous means, the ink, the graphite, the ground of his surface. Indeed, the magic is that through these means he can reach into that interiority which is the mark of his transcendence of objects as mere 'things'. If he is successful, all the elements in his work will herald a sense of appearing to have been born together. Depth here is everything in the same place at the same time. Simultaneity is what is meant by the 'moment' in drawing. Indeed, if we sense this coming together this is where the image of the drawing can become evocative for us and we can begin to revel in the promiscuity, the fecundity and the richness of its ever opening sense, of its *mobility*.

Now the draughtsman works from his 'motif'. These may be the images of his imagination, or the images he finds in the actual world. In working from it however, he always seeks to penetrate it, or rather
be penetrated by it, for he constantly strives to uncover the direction, the depth, this motif has magnetised. It is interesting to realise that the root of the word 'motif' is motive, that is, the tendency to imitate movement. This is why Cézanne(32) could say that the painter, in the face of his motif, is about "to join the aimless hands of nature".

The motif for the draughtsman is such that it has just moved him. They are motifs because they have already moved him, have already magnetised his gaze. Some motifs for the draughtsman are so rich, so full, they almost ask to be drawn. This is what prompted Klee(33) to say that he painted "to break out", as though the interiority of the world of his vision was pressing itself upon him, impressing him, emblazoning the tracks of its movement within him, so that he had to find the means of exorcising this movement; join the aimless hands of nature; make his drawings.

This is what we mean when we say that vision is caught or happens among things; this is the inherent spatiality in vision, and it is toward this visibility that the draughtsman moves as he seeks to bring his image to form. He searches for a fixation. His line is one of the means he uses to bring to a kind of concentration what he has seen. This is what Ricoeur(34) talks about when he uses the term 'iconic augmentation' (op cit p40). Far from his drawing being a mere 'copy' of reality it actually pre-figures it. Thus this inscription of his line is never reduplication; it is always a transcription, a metamorphosis. This is the peculiar effectiveness of drawing, for
drawing in a particular way, through its limitation of means, as Ricoeur says, "yields more by handling less" (op cit p40). This it does through a kind of contraction, a kind of miniaturization (not a reduction) which is like a concentration, an opening out.

In order to pierce the skin of things, to show how things become things, how the world becomes world, there must be some kind of fixation, some way in which reality can be pre-figured. The draughtsman in his unique way makes this fixation by writing his reality. Ricoeur points out that the main effect of painting (and we will include drawing) is to resist the entropic tendency of ordinary vision (ibid p40). Ordinary vision constantly tends to dissipate, it flows away. The grasping of the motif is the beginning of the path toward the fixation which the draughtsman makes in his drawing. The image he forms under his hand can hold the potentiality in vision, can saturate it, can concentrate it, until it gives birth to the visible, the yielding of the more. Ricoeur puts it thus:

"This effect of saturation and culmination, within the tiny space of the frame and on the surface of the two dimensional canvas, in opposition to the optical erosion proper to ordinary vision, is what is meant by iconic augmentation." (op cit p40).

Thus the inscription the draughtsman makes, his transcription, is always a metamorphosis. Through this fixation he can clothe objects in a new objectivity, he can promote a fresh ordering, a new dimension of being. Thus objects, his motifs, are never merely 'out there', they are here in the heart of vision. Through his ability to yield more by handling less the draughtsman can uncover their
essential spatiality, their essential voluminosity and thickness, their expressive physiognomy, their depth. Depth is born out from this pre-figuring. No longer are objects merely items, they are motifs, they are drawn into that relatedness with the subject which lifts them to a new plane of existence.

Beckmann (35) has grasped this essential movement when in his essay On My Painting, which is more like a prose poem than an essay, he says:

"I am seeking for the bridge which leads from the invisible to the visible, like the famous cabalist who once said: 'If you wish to get hold of the invisible you must penetrate as deeply as possible into the visible' ... It is not the subject which matters but the translation of the subject into the abstraction of the surface by means of painting. Therefore I hardly need to abstract things, for each object is unreal enough already, so unreal that I can only make it real by means of painting. ... My dream is the imagination of space - to change the optical impression of the world of objects by a transcendent arithmetic progression of the inner being." (op cit pp132/134).

And in a truly evocative passage at the end of his essay he says:

"Thus the figure from my 'Temptation' sang to me for a long time, trying to escape from the square on the hypotenuse in order to achieve a particular constellation of the Hebrides, to the Red Giant and the Central Sun." (op cit pl37).

For Beckmann it was this translation, this transcription, this transcendence that he sought. What was at first not his, unreal, he had to make real by making it his own through an act of appropriation, through his means. The images he made was his move to fill the gap, to make productive the distance between himself and other. This is why it is only in making this distance productive, making it
work, that the draughtsman can be said to come to know through his drawings. Thus before his motif he seeks to 'rescue' (to use Ricoeur's term, op cit p43) images which would have a tendency to dissipate, in 'rescuing' them he gives them form. He joins the aimless hands of nature. He makes his fixation.

For the draughtsman, the surface of the white paper he works on can be like alien ground, it can fill him with apprehension. This feeling can sometimes be so strong that Redon(36) is reported to have said:

"I have a horror of a white sheet of paper. ... A sheet of paper so shocks me that as soon as it is on the easel I am forced to scrawl on it with charcoal or pencil, or anything else, and this process gives it life." (op cit p80).

Now this 'life' rises because he has rescued this space from mere oblivion and given it order and direction. It has become expressive because he has brought it into a new relationship of proximity. He has made it his own.

This actual space of the format of the surface has now become pictorial space. The two-dimensionality of its format, the in-itself of its objectivity begins to take on the possibility of the opening out of the dimension of the for itself of its depth. This inherent dialectic founds the whole possibility of the visual arts. The work of the draughtsman is a constant effort to move us away from the mere 'illusion' of depth, of mere trompe l'oeil and establish that intrinsic tension which arises from the space he is seeking to inscribe and the integrity of the flatness of the format he is working on. It is
from within the dialectic of this tension that the image, the world of the aesthetic object coalesces as world. The synthesis of which we have been speaking cannot be achieved except it is caught and made visible through the sensuous. Furthermore, the quality of this space he is shaping is directly related to the ways and means the draughtsman employs. Thus the line that is made with the soft fullness of the brush dipped in ink will have a very different quality to the taut sharpness of a line made with the pencil or the pen. These qualitative aspects we will explore further as we look at the work of our five draughtsmen. However, these various ways of shaping his space, these various modalities, give to the space he is inscribing a richness, a density. They give to it more than a singular direction. These modalities add a whole network of meanings to this space, which makes it reverberate as a polyphony, where we seem always to be on the threshold of fresh dimensions of meaning.

We have said also, that the draughtsman builds his image as he is immersed within the activity of making, of shaping. His drawing is a putting together, a gathering from, a harvesting from his visual activity. His drawing emerges from the history of his looking. The movements he makes, the graphic analogues he finds are put together and begin to interpenetrate each other, and this in turn yields the richness and density to his visual search. Now one of the chief attractions of drawing is that drawings, because of the way they write the 'space' the draughtsman is moving toward, leave a record of the passage of his looking. His linear descriptions are the indications to us of where his vision has been caught in what has already
moved him in his motif. Drawings are one of the clearest means within the visual arts of taking hold of time through space. Furthermore we have no difficulty in sensing this implicit movement, the imprint of the draughtsman's searching gaze. In seeing the drawing, we see 'according to it', as Merleau-Ponty (6) says, when we grasp this movement by immersing ourselves within it (op cit p60). This is also why drawings can present us so forcibly with this sense of process. This is never the concatenation of mere sequence, for this would destroy the implicit movement altogether. The unity of the drawing is the acknowledgement of this movement.

There is a difference of course between the movement we have been speaking about and the representation of movement within the 'subject matter' of the drawing. Thus the sower in Van Gogh's drawing seems to be caught up within the action of sowing. Géricault's horses seem to epitomise the whole movement of galloping. Where a photograph can so easily 'freeze' a movement, a drawing can distil it. Thus the leap of a dancer across a stage when photographed can become an incongruous distortion, where he seems only to be suspended. Merleau-Ponty sensed this when he says characteristically:

"The photograph keeps open the instants which the onrush of time closes up forthwith; it destroys the overtaking, the overlapping, the 'metamorphosis' ... of time." (op cit p81).

One might add that the incongruous photograph has no presence. The 'instant' made visible within the photograph is frozen because it gives no sense of 'leaving here', 'going there' (ibid p81). It has become the portrait of a miniature eternity, there is no sense of passage. Time has ceased to collaborate with space in animating the
image. Now the limitation of the photograph is the opportunity of the drawing. The draughtsman can catch the aspects of the movement of a figure and bring these together within a single image. These aspects he can reach as he first senses the whole of the movement and then finds the graphic means which together incorporates these faces of movement into a sense of the movement's passage. So Van Gogh's drawings of his peasants are full of action. His sower sow, his field 'fields'. Not only is movement represented, it is fully implied. Dufrenne clarifies it thus:

"In other words, pictorial space becomes temporalized when it is given to us as a structured and oriented space in which certain privileged lines constitute trajectories that, instead of appearing to us as the inert residue of some movement, appear as filled with movement realized in immobility." (op cit pp277/278).

This livingness, this animate is crucial. This is central moreover to the whole rise and sustaining evocation of the image. As we have seen from Bergson, it is impossible to arrive at mobility by taking it apart. The whole activity of perception, including aesthetic perception is grounded in the presence of mobility. We cannot talk of the world of the drawing unless we acknowledge the movement of pre-objective time which gives the enabling for this image to appear. Images are never static things. They have a primacy and a mobility which precedes all conceptualisation. The very sensing of movement, the catching of time within pictorial space is at the heart of why this image is now image. This image, as now appearing; as a continuous mobility toward meaning; as the continuous outpouring of many echoes of sense, many directional networks. In memory it rises from the past and carries with it all the possibilities of a beyond. This is
where the image reverberates, not only because it has a history in us, but also because we have a future in the world. The 'l'élan vital' of Bergson. This is not just a feeling of being, of existence, not just the acknowledgement of the 'gap', but an active participation in the productivity this gap afford. Bachelard \(^{(37)}\) has already grasped the richness of the image's mobility. He quotes Gabriele D'Annunzio who says:

"... when we begin to open our eyes to the visible, we have long since committed ourselves to the invisible." (op cit p16).

This is the whole basis for our imaginative grasp of the world of the drawing. We may not be conscious of time, but for this image to work, for it to be sustained as a whole movement, for this image to sing, we must already be living it within the depths of our imagination, for this is where it has first stirred and burgeoned into life. Genuine movement is never simply displacement, genuine movement is always an aspiration, an affirmation of the self, a striving toward other, a search, an appropriation, an unfolding network of meaning. This is why the world of the drawing is always pointing outward from itself, toward an ontology. It is never self-sufficient. The work works because it has a certain impatience to be heard, an impatience to disclose its meaning, to be 'rescued'. This is why it holds us, this is why it seems to embody a kind of imperious demand, a longing for other. This demand is what makes us reach forward to appropriate it, to make it ours. Its whole beingness as world is only such as there is a kind of concentration of all its elements toward meaning and wholeness. Drawings are
metaphoric deliverances, and the very tension which keeps alive their metaphoric sense is sustained by this impatience toward a resolution. Tension, which is the very dynamic of metaphor, is sustained movement.

IV. 4. 3. Movement and rhythm.

There is another aspect of movement which I now wish to discuss and this has enormous importance in any description of the space and time which is disclosed within the world of the drawing. This is rhythm. We have spoken of the movement we can sense within the drawing, we have spoken of movement as a continuous dialectic reciprocity. We have acknowledged that in its metaphoric sense this is how the image comes to be evocative, to reverberate. We shall now discover that rhythm is a particular form which movement takes and is an aspect of the character of movement. The first important thing to establish is that to sense rhythm within a drawing is to sense it within the whole of the drawing. As in life, so in the spatio-temporal world of the drawing, rhythm is related to organic wholeness.

Rhythm is unequivocally present in all drawings which can be said to work, to have gone to work. To talk of the form which the spatiality of the drawing suggests, is to acknowledge the way this spatiality is ordered. Rhythm, as an aspect of movement and given with it, as we shall see, is never simply a measurable phenomenon. The draughtsman creates rhythms with as much freedom as he creates other forms. Rhythm is the indissoluble mark of the draughtsman's
personal handwriting. It is bound in to the whole qualitative and expressive thrust of the drawing. If a drawing has no rhythm it has no heartbeat.

Repetition is not the essence of rhythm. The ticking of a clock can be repetitious but it is the listening ear which organises this repetitious beat into a rhythmic sequence. We form phrases of the beats which group around accents that provide the focus for the rise and fall of what now becomes rhythm, a temporal form, not simply equal ticks. To sense rhythm as an aspect of time is to recognise a qualitative engagement. Furthermore, as Langer suggests, 'rhythmic continuity' (ibid p127) gives us the feeling of endurance, a kind of permanence to things and events which is really a pattern of changes. Thus it is we can sense throughout all the variability of perception an invariability. It is through this sense we have of rhythmic continuity that we can bring a sense of wholeness to events, we can grasp their essential relatedness. Langer(38) points out:

"Rhythmic concatenation is what really holds an organism together from moment to moment; it is a dynamic pattern, i.e., a pattern of events, into which acts and act-like phenomena very readily fall: a sequence wherein the subsiding phase, or cadence, of one act (or similar element) is the up-take for its successor.” (op cit p323).

This of course we have begun to discover through all our discussions concerning the primary temporality of presence. Inscribed within our being is this rhythmic reciprocity. This is the ground of our lives, it is that which makes us human. This inscribed rhythm prepares us in presence, for all that we subsequently meet in representation and which
we further sense as being the basis for expression. Thus our whole activity, our whole orientation in the world is born out from a situation, of already being engaged in the world. All acts occur from within a situation of a stream of preceding acts. To make a complex structure like a drawing is to be thoroughly immersed within what Langer calls 'a situation', "... a constellation of other acts in progress ..." (ibid p281), and what Merleau-Ponty(4) talks about as a specific spatial 'level' (op cit p249). Rhythmic continuity is what holds all our acts together, it gives to our actions a sense that they are not discrete entities but form part of an on-going whole. The inception of any specific act is the impulse toward; the search for meaning. But this impulsion has arisen from a previous action that has now died away. As Langer(7) points out:

"... the situation that begets the new crisis must be inherent in the denouement of its forerunner."

(op cit pl27).

So rhythm is a continual alternation of tensions which build to a crisis and ebb away in a gradual course of relaxation which prepares the build-up to a new tension that has in its turn a fresh crisis and its cadence of falling away. If these series of actions point toward a series of contraries, such as rise and fall, push and pull, we call the rhythmic sequence dialectic. The tick-tock of the clock is a dialectic rhythm. Indeed these dialectical rhythms are so powerful we find them everywhere in our perception. It is this very dialectic that prepares us for grasping the expressive nature of perception itself. It should not surprise us that this is so, for as we have seen, this dialectic reciprocity is inscribed in the heart of our being— as the continual movement of the self toward other in its implicit
reverberation. Thus what we see as the rise and fall of the line, what gives inanimate objects their animation is because their expressive significance is prefigured within the profound rhythm of our being. Thus the rhythm which animates and indeed holds together the world of the drawing, which is indeed its heartbeat, is because it is first inscribed within our own subjectivity. The merely represented has now become the expressed. Moreover, because this rhythmic continuity holds this world together, is always a continuity, this prepares the way for all the subsequent opening out of this world and founds its very interiority.

However, we need a synthesis - for just as we saw that to grasp the pre-objectivity of time, the inner time of the subject, we need the space of the object, so also, for us to reflect on this inner rhythmic reciprocity we need a structure through the schematism of the drawing. It is by means of this schematism that rhythm can be spatialised, or given a spatial determination. Without this 'external' structuring, without this extension across the format of the drawing, we would have no way of sensing the drawing's inner movement, where rhythm is the secret law of its internal development, its internal logic.

In this sense there are two kinds of rhythm. The one extrinsic, a kind of marking without; the other intrinsic, a kind of marking within. We might distinguish these two aspects by saying that one is external and the other organic. One is a kind of measure for the other. External rhythm is a means whereby we can gain access to the
rhythmic movement of the whole work, its duration. In music, for example, there can be a rhythmic schema which is beaten out by the metronome and indicated by the time signature at the beginning of the piece. But such measurement only acts as a structuring, a framework for the true movement in the music to appear; the movement of its duration. But this duration needs its synthesis, it needs a form to be made perceptible. This formal framework is achieved in music through the schema of rhythmic 'markers'; one mimics these markers by beating time, tapping one's foot. However the real expression of rhythm is not so much the mechanical succession of intervals as the almost imperceptible 'push' and 'pull' of those intervals, their tension together which forms the rhythmic rise and fall of the piece - this is how we reach into its sense of duration. There is inevitably a spatial element, and even in the fundamentally 'temporal' form of music, space is always implied. But this is never merely the spatiality of extension, which caused Bergson so much problem. It is that essential spatiality without which we could never know movement or rhythm. This spatiality is not that which simply allows for the adding of instants together, it is that spatiality which is the enabling of rhythm to organise movement, for rhythm to be made perceptible and take on form.

Now what is apparent within the musical matrix is also discoverable within the spatial manifold of the drawing. To scan a drawing and begin to participate in its rhythmic determination is far from simply the adding up of instants. Rather to sense rhythm in drawing is to be penetrated by all the 'push' and 'pull', the
rise and fall, the here and there, of its elements, which coalesce into a rhythmic continuity. In some instances this rhythmic sense can be so completely realised that within a single line, as one drawn by Latisse, we grasp a tremendous sense of the drawing's presence - that moment when all the drawing comes together simultaneously, as though it were a single act-form.

Rhythm then is not simply the counting of instances. Rhythm never implies a stretch of time, a measure, which is subsequently divided into units. Rather, rhythm is always the possibility of identifying equal intervals or periods between units and referring to their repetition. A series of equally spaced points is not rhythm, but these only provide the 'markers', which can indicate for us the passage of transition. A curve is an act-form, it has implicit to its being curvilinear, a gathering from, a climax and then a cadential dying away. In all rhythm there is an ictus or stress and an answering relaxation. It is this fundamental dialectic which gives rise to all that we describe as the tensions within a drawing. We indeed talk of the tautness of the line, the gentleness of a curve. These descriptions acknowledge that these elements are act-forms and carry their discrete rhythmic resonance. It is in this way that the spaced intervals within a drawing are gathered into groups, begin to form themselves into aspects which help us determine the movement of the drawing. Perception is always an active search, rhythm is the means it can use to give a particular orientation to its activity. Thus it is through the 'external' rhythm of the schematism of the drawing, this rhythmic pattern, that allows us to
move through into that interiority the drawing provides. An interiority that is never empty, for it resonates as it reciprocates with the external schematism that has provided the very means for its appearing and lends a qualitative dimension to its opening and unfolding. These two aspects of rhythm which we have discussed are in constant resonance. The one provides the ground for the other to appear. It is only as we coincide with the drawing that we ever sense its inner rhythm. Thus in Dufrenne's terms:

"Rhythm is a means of taming time without betraying it to the repetition of the constantly identical."

(op cit p309).

It is within the visual arts, and particularly within the art of drawing that this becomes evident. Drawing is essentially a rhythmic ordering of all its space, because of its use of less to yield more, it can resonate directly through all the act-forms embedded within it. The line is immediately given in movement; the substructure of drawings, revealed through all the whispers of tiny marks and additions, can open out upon a whole rich rhythmic texturing.

There is always in drawing the richness of this diversity within its unity. David Cowley's drawing (Fig. 1) can demonstrate this. Its whole rhythmic direction is announced in the same way as a time signature is placed at the beginning of a piece of music. Its tempo is con brio: written 'with energy'. There is a rhythmic thrust to the whole matrix set up by the directional axis of its linear vectors. However, within the main rhythmic movement, there are minute adjustments that are made, which are like side currents; they are like the harmonies of the sounding note, which lend an amplitude to the main
metric form. These counter rhythms are enormously important in
drawing. Sometimes, as in Feliks Topolski's drawings, they are
minute flecks on the surface which together build into a kind of
constellation that is indicating the passage of his hand across the
drawing as he makes his main axis marks. There is an implicit rela-
tedness between the main rhythmic directions and these counter
rhythms. It is almost as though the one throws up the other in the
course of its development, and this second harmony is orchestrated
into the main 'beat'. Sometimes the main metric measure is a single
line. Arthur Di Stephano's drawings are full of these, (Fig.33)
is a good example. The main rhythmic measure is the sweep of the
line as it unites the bent head of the model and her hair as this
runs into the contour of her leg. Or it could also be the running
line over the model's back, which breaks in a tiny folded curl and
then is picked up on her thigh. However, within these basic metric
forms there are other very subtle rhythms - like 'pulses' along the
line. We begin to catch the significance of saying the line 'breathes'.
Its rhythmic dialectic is caught within its movement. In all of this,
what is important is that these rhythms, these act-forms take their
place within the whole and lend their animation to this world.

We have spoken of the formal schemata of the drawing as giving
us the means to reach toward the drawing's inner rhythms and we shall
return to this consideration more fully in the next chapter. However
for the moment, we should not dismiss the importance of the 'subject
matter' of the drawing. We have spoken in our earlier chapters of
the importance of the 'tenor' of the drawing. The recognition that
Arthur Di Stephano is drawing a nude can become the means of our entry into the world he is seeking to inscribe. This notional subject can provide us with a key around which the rhythmic structures can condense. This is one of the reasons why the nude has provided such a rich motif for draughtsmen. Our participation within all its suggested rhythms is immediate. Rhythm is always an aspect of movement which in turn betrays time. Dufrenne clarifies what we have been seeking to disclose when he says:

"Temporality, which is evident in the arts of time and secret in the arts of space, resides in the internal movement by which the work unifies itself in order to appear and deliver its song. Rhythm manifests and marks off this movement."

(op cit p299).

IV. 4. 4. Movement and the interiority of depth.

All that we have been discussing promotes the depth of this always-becoming-world of the drawing. Spatiality and temporality unite to give to us what we only know as the drawing's presence, its feeling. Depth is a certain quality of lived experience and it is only as we feel it that we can talk of the profound when we talk of the meaningfulness of this world. In conclusion, let us examine a little further this notion of depth. There is about it the idea of the hidden. Something yet to be, something not as yet revealed. Thus the progress toward this unveiling, the process which is the drawing, is what challenges our project and lends to it its directional concern and pulls us forward toward its own disclosure. This
adventurous move, magnetised in drawing by all the act-forms which animate the format, all the schematism of its marks and traces, is a 'letting go'. As we move into the world of the drawing we are in a state of readiness to be surprised. Bachelard(37), in the book On Poetic Imagination and Reverie, speaks of this 'letting go', this opening out as 'L'invitation au voyage (op cit p19). Imagination, he says, is so often talked about as the faculty we have of forming images, rather than, as he thinks it should be, as the faculty of deforming them. Now we can see why the images which the artist forms, the images which the poet evokes through his language, do not point simply to existing images, rather they change existing images; their task is to bring about unexpected unions that give rise to a swarm of aberrant images. Thus mere reproductive imagination is the prose of productive imagination. This is why Lerleau-Ponty(39) can call the image the artist makes 'coherent deformation' (op cit p91). Thus if a present image does not work in recalling an absent one, if an occasional image does not give rise to an explosion of images, there is no opening out, no imagination. Images in art pick up the ordinary habitual images of perception and throw them toward a fresh direction, a fresh dimension of being. We begin to sense their depth, because they begin to open fresh paths in us, they begin to reverberate; we do not so much imagine them as imagine with them. Undoubtedly, as Bachelard(37) says, the imaginary lays down images during its prodigious life, but always it appears to exist beyond its images (op cit p20). Indeed it does, for the image we now have in representation has been prepared in presence. Depth rises as a directional enquiry as we participate within the image's essential mobility. Drawings
which work, have gone to work, are images which refuse to stand still.

Their impatience to be heard is their invitation. To feel their fecundity, we must be ready to loosen our grip on levels of habitual spatiality; we must be ready to see according to these images; we must engage them and be engaged with them in their expressive potential.

Each artist, says Bachelard,

"... owes us his invitation to the voyage. With this invitation we register, in our inner being, a gentle impulsion which shakes us, which sets in motion beneficent reverie, truly dynamic reverie. If the initial image is well chosen, it is an impulsion to a well-defined dream, to an imaginary life that will have real laws of successive images, really vital meaning. The sequence of images arranged by the invitation to the voyage takes on, through the aptness of its order, a special vivacity that makes it possible to designate ... a movement of the imagination. This movement is not just a metaphor, we shall actually feel it within ourselves ... an effortless imagination of connected images, an eagerness to pursue the enchanting dream." (op cit pp21/22).

With truly remarkable insight he adds:

"The true voyage of the imagination is the voyage to the land, to the very domain of the imaginary ... the immanence of the imaginary in the real, the continuous passage from the real to the imaginary." (op cit p22).

The depth of the world of the aesthetic object is only for us as we are caught within this movement. We can talk of the intimacy of this world because it now has come to possess us. As we sense the explosion of its aberrant images, we are drawn on through an interiority which constantly affirms. This is why drawings can point toward an ontology, this is why there can be a visual philosophy of forms. In its affirmation, within its productive ambiguity, the draughtsman makes a this is. Moreover, if his utterance is clear, if his utterance
shines forth, if the revealing reveals itself, then we begin to sense the profundity, the fecundity of this new found depth. Its very ontology is an invitation to us to project ourselves into what it affirms and participate wholly in its celebratory powers. This becoming, this revealing, reveals an ever disclosing hiddenness which is not 'not seeing'; it is rather an increasing for us of this now appearing visibility. To grasp the affirmation of the visionary in vision is to commit ourselves, is to move forward in the-always-coming-to-be, the constant self-disclosure of the aesthetic object. This kind of depth belongs to the world of feeling, particularly to aesthetic feeling. The world of the aesthetic object does not belong to us in its intimacy unless we belong to it. For it to work for us we must live it. The depth of its feeling is because it reaches into every part of the texture of our being. We cannot detach feeling from that which it is a part. We sense duration, we sense the plenitude of this world, because this duration is first in us. We are the duration of which this world makes us aware.

Depth is a directional enquiry, a yearning, a reaching toward a resolution. Depth is always our project in the world, filled from our immanence in the past and magnetised through the possibility of our future. There remains in us a potential for being surprised, this readiness is the movement of our imagination. The mobility of images is testimony to this movement. Their depth, their interiority, their power to evoke is such because they have the power of revealing ourselves to ourselves, of laying open the self, the depth in ourselves.
This 'hiddenness' of which we have spoken has nothing to do with opacity. We must be wary of the rigidity of the images of physical depth. The 'hiddenness' is an aspect of depth which has about it always the feeling of the more to be revealed, as though this world possesses a secret which it seems to have an impatience to disclose. Further, this opacity is not strangeness, neither is it to do with the task or difficulty of 'unravelling' the secret. Wynn Jones's drawings possess a 'strangeness' but this has to do with our possible unfamiliarity with them. This strangeness they have is nothing to do with any kind of confusion. If we do not understand them the strangeness is in us. Thus the hiddenness in these drawings is such because it possesses a potentiality for making plain. Their hiddenness is like that part of the voyage ahead which is yet uncharted but beckons us. Their hiddenness is the pull we sense from their future possibility, the uncovering of their secret interiority is what holds us within the orbit of their expressive potential. This yet-to-be-discovered is a productive hiddenness, a hiddenness with promise, one that discloses itself as it constantly affirms. Its very hiddenness calls us from the known to the unknown. Its hiddenness is its power to uproot us from the habitual, to bring us into new worlds of meaning, new worlds of being.

This hiddenness rises from this interiority only if the aesthetic object is capable of igniting us, capable of surprising us, capable of being evocative. If it does not we turn away from it. If what is represented does not also express, it remains only on the level of the represented. If there is no sense of mobility in this image, it
becomes simply an object of habit, it fails to move us. The work, if it is working, is always calling for us to experience its depth, not merely to understand it by rationalising it. Thus its hiddenness is not a secret to be 'solved' like some kind of riddle. Its demand is to be known in feeling rather than merely known in understanding. We come to understand it through feeling. The mobility of its images are only such as we let go, as we allow the work to work. Its very working suggests that we are already committed to its power of deforming the images of habit. To rationalise the work by seeking to find 'solutions' through causality is to misunderstand the productivity of this hiddenness. It was through Cartesian determinism that icons came to lose their powers.

Thus this strangeness is not to be confused with an equation, as though we were seeking its 'solution' according to whether it matches an existing 'norm'. This hiddenness has an aspect that not so much deters, that negates, but that affirms, that welcomes our engagement. The comprehension of this depth is, as we attain it through the agency of feeling, a world that is inexhaustible because it cannot be defined. The work invites us to a world that is not a world of obscurity, there is no obscurity for feeling, only for the understanding which has not caught the mobility of the expressive and still remains in the world of the merely represented. Its power to express is because this world is an analogue of a subjectivity. There is no confusion for a subject, only for a subject that does not understand its object, because it has included itself as object. Confusion is the mark of separation, of disintegration, not of
wholeness. The world of the aesthetic object is always a movement toward a unity. It is an analogue of consciousness. It is always a for-itself for us. Thus its spatio-temporal world discloses a world because this world is first in us. Any sense of its structure, any sense of its order, any sense of its depth come first because the individual that moves out to meet this world, that moves out to participate in this world is already an undivided whole. But this individual needs the world just as the world of the aesthetic object needs its sensuous ordering. Each is in need of the other for beingness to arise. We only come to know this world of the drawing as we sense it through all its physicality, through all its graphic deliverance. So also do we know ourselves, become aware of our being, come to know, as we mark out that interiority in ourselves which arises through our reciprocal relatedness within the world. Space and time collaborate in what it is for us to be. They collaborate too in making the world of the drawing a world for us; this image-world which is our route toward all the possibilities of becoming. It is to this world that we now turn, as we examine its formal structuring through the work of those who have taken part in our venture.
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CHAPTER V. ANALYSIS OF THE DRAWINGS

V. 1. 1. Introduction

This chapter is concerned primarily with a formal analysis of the drawings of the five draughtsmen who have participated in our project. The analysis of the particular drawings will inevitably make wider reference to the formal ordering and structuring of drawing in general and this is important.

It was necessary to limit the number of people included, so as to bring the documentation within reasonable proportions for this thesis. More than five draughtsmen were involved in the project, but these that are included were chosen because between them they demonstrate some of the most important formal concerns in drawing, as I shall attempt to show.

Of course, within the necessary limitation of the work of only five draughtsmen, this analysis cannot be exhaustive, but we shall discover that the dialogue which engages each of them touches the roots of all drawing and illuminates, moreover, the concerns which
have occupied us thus far.

We have begun to discover that drawing is a particular way of ordering space and time; that it provides a particular means of spatialising time and temporalising space and the sequence photographs, within the limitation of their presentation, seek to demonstrate this directional enquiry. Their limitation is that they mark only instances in time which for the draughtsmen did not exist as such. However, they suggest something of the constellation of his looking and will be useful in the analysis that follows.

It will be our task now to demonstrate the unique way in which these five draughtsmen have reached into their own highly individual graphic interiority, and further, how they have brought this into form. Thus we hope to sense, through the structures they have made and in conjunction with what they have said, something of the mobility of their own imaginative engagement and something also that points toward an ontology which is in support of our epistemological enquiry.

Our investigations will be toward uncovering formal elements within these drawings that contribute to the ordering of their inherent spatiality. Any consideration of aspects will always be grounded in the acknowledgment of the organic wholeness of the drawing, which, as we have suggested, promotes the essential movement of its meaning. The purpose of this formal investigation therefore is not so much to 'fragment' these images through an analysis which might only 'take them apart', but to demonstrate how these draughtsmen, through their
particular means, have achieved the directional significance of their own graphic enquiry. This movement is always more than the sum of its parts.

V. 1. 2. Material structuring of the drawing.

We have considered already in Chapter III on the 'Image', the importance of the physical materials the draughtsman works with and the kind of surface he works on and we shall be giving further consideration to this during the course of our investigation. As we have begun to see, these material elements provide the 'givens' which the draughtsman uses to interrogate the world of his vision. Here is where the for-itself of the drawing's graphic essence is joined with the in-itself of the drawing's material existence to promote the metaphoric utterance of the drawing's image.

V. 1. 3. Phenomenological importance of the line.

We shall consider the importance, within the whole of this context, of the line. Drawing is an inscription of space, and the line, through all its passage, is the animation of this spatiality. The line is, par excellence, the spatial image of all process. Whenever we think of any kind of movement toward, the first and most readily available graphic image which transcribes this spatial metaphor is the line. Movement, rhythm and tension which the line gives to drawing
is the tracery of its suspension in time and space. To pursue the line in all its accents, along all its pathways, is to uncover the 'felicitous' spaces of which Bachelard speaks. He has described these spaces through the metaphors of poetic language; my task is to demonstrate that the draughtsman, in the handling of his line, in all its aspects, can open through this his own graphic metaphor, similar and new evocative spaces. And why should this not be? It is first in the image that we grasp the mobility of this spatiality. Through being made graphic, we reach immediately, without any inhibitory mediation of language, dwelling spaces that remain unique and are always testimony to this particular mode of transcription and metamorphosis.

We shall thus pursue the line. We shall pursue it as it marks out its spaces, its enclosures and its openings. We shall sense it as it evokes its texturing of dark and light and as it sings its continuous song of touch.

V. 2. 1. 'Format' of the drawing. Two kinds of implied spatial directions.

The figure of the line is only such as it also animates the ground which it traverses. The surface across which it moves and the directional significance given to it through the verticality and horizontality of the format edges of the sheet are implicit in our reading of all its spaces. We shall look first, therefore, at these implicit
supports.

The actual space of the drawing surface and the boundness of the format edges of the sheet form an integral part of the drawing's image. The way in which the draughtsman relates his drawing to the surface format and its boundaries gives us clear access to the direction of his own spatial enquiry. Any directional significance that we give to the elements of the drawing will be in relation to the verticality and horizontality of the sheet. We have become accustomed to accepting these orientations whenever we look at drawings and they form a powerful datum in our scanning of them and our entry into them. All the drawings of our five draughtsmen have been made on manufactured sheets and the format boundaries are used in different ways.

There are perhaps two polar ways of considering the representation of space in respect of the format. We have come across these to some extent already. In instances where the format edges are treated as a frame and where there are clear subdivisions within this frame, the concentration is on the representation of space as a thing-in-itself. In this case the frame becomes a boundary, like the open side of a box which contains all its space. All perspective systems belong to this mode of space representation and indeed depend on it for their very functioning. Here the surface of the format is treated very much like a transparent plane through which we see objects and their relations. This, as we have seen, is a reading of the space inward from the boundaries and presents to us a symbolism of the focussed world, the view of a spectator outside looking in.
In contrast to this view, the surface, instead of being treated as the primary plane behind which are ranged all the others, is treated as an open unspecified area, where the concentration is on particular graphic forms that evolve their own space and where areas of the surface are energised and not defined. This is echoed in Claes Oldenburg's(2) comment when he says:

"It is characteristic of all my drawings that the paper 'opens up' and that its whiteness ... is regarded as an area or space of light and atmosphere, in which energies, represented by the dot, crystallise in forms partially suggested by outline," (op cit p249).

John White(3), in his book *The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space* also discusses these two modalities of space representation. In many ways, as he points out, each represents different ways of considering the drawn object. In the first, the consideration is focussed on the space between objects, positively determined and represented, from which developed the whole geometric projection of the perspective system.

He suggests, however, that the second method of space representation, where the focus is on the drawn object itself and its intrinsic spatiality, is, in fact, a far older convention, and is seen most clearly in primitive art. As he points out (op cit p29) it was developed fully, prior to the Renaissance, by artists like Cimabue.

This view of the space of the surface as open and unspecified is characterised by the art of the Far East. Here the surface emphasis is negative rather than positive. The unmarked silk or paper becomes
at once the 'atmosphere' where the space is evoked rather than defined.

Henri Foçillon(4) described these two modes of space representation as l'espace limite, space as limit, and l'espace milieu, space as environment. They are, of course, only moments in the history of presenting space graphically and are not mutually exclusive. Aspects of their methodology are often found together. Cézanne always sought to reconcile both modalities within a single image. For him, the format with all the tautness of its two dimensionality, all its planar significance, became an invitation to examine the whole possibility of painting. He broke across the endless illusion of l'espace limite and brought it together with l'espace milieu to create a fresh ordering of metaphoric space. Here for us is a further indication that depth cannot be contained and as soon as one methodology emerges this becomes the spur for fresh enterprise, because the pursuit of depth is a continual directional enquiry. The fecund possibility of this search animates all creative endeavour.

The designation of the format is an important consideration with all five of our draughtsmen. It is particularly important to David Cowley and is clearly acknowledged when he says:

"... for a drawing to work, ... it's got to live within a kind of environment and I know that sounds a bit strange, but you've got to get it somehow to be able to operate, or work ... live within that kind of environment which is both two-dimensional, you can never get away from the flatness of the paper ... the marks have got to be both on the surface of the paper but they have also got to work beyond it and in front of it, so you are really working within that old convention of a 'cube' ..." (appendix p343).

Here, as he speaks, one senses that for him the format within which he
works is also something on which he works. It is for him an arena for possible action. He describes his active and dynamic relationship with it as he seeks to move beyond it and in front of it through the marks he makes. He is continually sensing the space he is shaping as it rises from the actual surface he is working on. All the space he shapes is a celebration of all the space that is, that is offered him through his format and beyond. When asked whether he was affected by the format edges, he agreed that to be bound by them was a limitation. However, he marked a kind of frame for himself "four or five inches in from the edge and four or five inches outward". He wished it were possible "to have such a large piece of paper that you never really were limiting the edges of this" (appendix p343). One is reminded how Giacometti would inscribe a linear 'boundary' within the format edges which in its relationship with them would amplify the 'box' of space in which his figures sat. For David Cowley, the format edges are only a reference; they do not rigidly define the cube of space he works within, rather they help to determine and establish the initial scale of the drawing. This is also constantly in flux as he establishes directions within the format that also seem to move outside it. However, once the drawing begins to become established, there is a concentration inward toward the spatiality the figure itself seems to contain.

Arthur Di Stephano treats the format very much more freely, although he recognises its importance. In making his drawing (Figs. 28, 29), he actually moves out of the format into the space beyond it and then returns to it. In his conversation he says:
"... because all the figure isn't there, doesn't mean that it's not complete. I think there's more of a foot that's not shown than one that is, because one has to imagine things as well, we're not mindless, we do organise ... And we organise that which is not even there, you know, not even on the paper." (appendix p366).

This movement out from the frame of the format, an encompassing of the space outside the format, is an invasion of our space and consequently has the effect of pulling us more fully into the space of the figure. The proximity we thus feel with this figure lends it a greater degree of intimacy. There is a feeling in his drawings that this space can be filled and can overflow. As it overflows it reaches out and draws us into its world. Because the figure he draws fills the frame, and in some instances overflows it, we feel it as overpoweringly close, as though we could reach out and touch it. His drawings become like part of ourselves seen in a mirror held close to our bodies. This intimacy of spatial concern is a very important aspect of these drawings.

Wynn Jones also is concerned with exploring this intimacy of relations. His is the intimacy that rises from the sense we grasp of the space his figures envelop. He says:

"... once the particular form of the figures are established on the paper, they, in a sense, create their own environment, by that I mean that the sort of tension that exists in the surrounding space, in the areas between and around them become as important as the figures themselves. This has got nothing to do with 'composition' in the sense of one aspect of what's going on 'balancing' out another, or anything like that, but rather with an imaginative grasp of space growing out of the intuitively felt relationship within the figurative situation."(appendix p370).
Here is a clear indication of how one modality of space representation is working within the other. As they come together within this graphic situation, we begin to sense the pulse of the intimacy of their relations. Here the space of the ground held within the format becomes the arena for these human dramas to appear. Here verticality and horizontality, as directions of being, play their part in the establishing of the felt tensions between these figures. We shall return to these important considerations more fully later.

Wendy Thompson's drawings are full of the evidence of her working very much within the frame. Because of this one senses a kind of conceptual distancing of herself from the motif she is drawing from. There is a sense of intellectual appraisal, very much as though she is an observer 'looking in' and maintaining an 'objective' position. Thus she is concerned to register, particularly in (Figs. 65-68) the fall of the light on the nude giving it a solidity and actuality in its 'box' of space.

V. 2. 2. Dialectics of 'inside' and 'outside'.

As we speak of the format and the implied notions of the frame, and the boundary made by its edges, we are inevitably dealing with the dialectics of inside and outside. Indeed within the whole tenor of our discussions this dialectic will be present, for it is impossible to speak of one aspect of something without bringing it into relief against another. It is important, however, at the outset of our
present enquiry that we are mindful of what Bachelard describes as this 'implicit geometry' (op cit p212). We have begun already to use terms like open and closed reflected in Poillon's descriptions of l'espace limite and l'espace milieu. We have spoken of the 'negative' and the 'positive' attributes of the surface, and of the dialectic of figure and ground. The important issue at stake is that we do not fall into the trap of too positive a divisionism. In all the space with which we are concerned it is the movement of metaphoric space which concerns us. Formal analysis is important in so far as it offers fresh images, fresh anchorages for thought, where the graphic image is in a sense given fresh wings as it is seen within the context of the images rising from our analysis. We are only caught in the trap of this divisionism when we are blinded by it. When we allow it to systematise space. Unless we are careful we use it to govern all thoughts of positive and negative. But, of course, as we have discovered, we must move from the lived to the thought about. It is impossible to be without this implied geometry. As Bachelard acknowledges:

"Thus profound metaphysics is rooted in an implicit geometry which - whether we will or no - confers spatiality upon thought; if a metaphysician could not draw, what would he think?" (op cit p212).

Thus the space which these drawings are evoking is not the space of place only. In following the spaces these drawings evoke we, as it were, are on the point of contact of inside/outside. The spaces of these drawings reverberate where inside becomes outside, where outside becomes inside. Every image needs these orientations to become a synthesis. Thus the format edge is not a barrier, not only a frame,
it is acknowledged as an aspect of the unique space, a moment within the space which the drawing itself inscribes. Too great a concentration on one aspect can lose for us the direction of the other.

When we speak of the surface of the format of these drawings it is not only the physicality of the actual surface; this surface becomes a field of possibility through which all the action of the drawing is transposed. But of course, this tensive dialectic of the surface is indispensable for the image to appear. Indeed the word 'surface' is thoroughly evocative, for it becomes the space where being and non-being coalesce. As Wynn Jones puts it:

"Once I had discovered the kind of surface that I could work with, the next step was to explore the power of images and the prophetic reality of space that were unique to working on that surface."

(appendix p 377).

We live these spatial images because they disturb the very equilibrium of the space of inside and outside. Their presence is testimony that we are already in movement with them. They are evocative because they reverberate on the edge of all that is inside and all that is also outside.

V. 2. 3. *Surface* and the value of 'white' as ground.

For Arthur Di Stephano the surface of the paper beckons his activity as a draughtsman. Its very whiteness has a primal essence which he seeks to preserve throughout the process of his drawing. He allows its whiteness to speak; it becomes for him a singular value.
which he acknowledges and works with. For David Cowley, however, the white of the surface is only such as it offers him an occasion to show the process of his drawing. Thus it becomes scored with countless marks. It becomes submerged under the onslaught of myriad strokes of dark. Once established, this matrix becomes in turn the ground for the white to reappear, through all the erasures he makes. The white is assaulted, attacked and destroyed, it is witness to the aggression of the draughtsman’s encounter. David Cowley works with the surface, very much as a sculptor with clay. One is reminded of a draughtsman like Jim Dine who ravishes the surface by rubbing it, tearing it and sculpting it. So much so, that he has to have papers specially made for the purpose.

The unmarked whiteness of the sheet is full of evocation. In whatever way the draughtsman uses it, it is full of the possibility of daring to go, of the unfettered imagination. Here the divisionism of inside and outside dissolves, for the white of the ground seems to be alive with all the pull which for the draughtsman is his invitation to the voyage. Images of touch abound, the dark of the line traversing in its passage the softness of the white ignites his graphic imagination and is the very spur for him to make his drawing. He wants above all else to see how it will appear.

Our concern is to search the intimacy of these drawings, the intimate spaces that their figurative elements combine to promote. In Chapter II we spoke of the expressive potential of the line in drawing and we shall turn now to a fuller examination of this in
respect of the drawings before us.

V. 3. 1. **Straight and curved orientations of the line.**

We have begun to sense already the phenomenological appeal of the line as a metaphoric utterance for the draughtsman. We have sensed that through its essential linearity it can carve out and modulate spaces that, as Merleau-Ponty(5) has so eloquently put it, rise from a pre-given spatiality (op cit p80). The very reverberation of all its image forms is testimony to this. For the draughtsmen there is a world for line, a logos of line. In and through the linear spaces he shapes, he manifests the whole possibility for this pre-given, this always opening pre-given, this depth to appear. The line for the draughtsman is graphic testimony of the is of his visual philosophy.

In Chapter II we spoke of the broad difference between linear directions - of those that were essentially straight and those that were curved. Of course, straight and curved are only concepts that describe aspects of the orientation of Being. Once again we must be careful of the dangers of divisionism, but as directions they do at least give us a way of ordering the kinds of spatial images which they promote. It must again be stressed that in talking of these directions we are talking of their values. As we have seen, a draughtsman is not measuring without, as though his drawing was so much topology,
he is reaching within, to that interiority and depth that these linear manifestations disclose.

We have seen that straightness implies a fixed sense of direction, a claim to validity, the presentation of an ontology that suggests a system of rules and operations—perhaps also images of aggression, of hostility and of cold determination. Curved forms suggest change and change suggests the proximity of time in space. The curve is an organic form, fully evocative and suggestive of life and movement. Worringer (6), in his book *Form in Gothic*, suggested that these different linear orientations could form the basis for a distinction between the Gothic, with its emphasis on the ecstasy of linear inventiveness through its geometric forms, and the classical, with its emphasis on the 'natural' expression of mainly curvilinear forms. For Worringer these distinctions represented two very different modes of Being. In turn, they become for us, anchorages from which to view the graphic manifestation of the line. Each orientation is present within the other. A 'straight' line, drawn by the hand, is full of the minute inflections of change which reflect the adjustments of the hand to a movement which is not essentially natural to it.

Of course, for us to enter the graphic world the draughtsman makes with his line, we must leave the world of the fixed dialectics of words. To adventure with the draughtsman, we cannot remain within the divisionism of straight or curved. To sense their passage we must move with the images these linear directions carve out for us.
However, let us pursue these orientations of linear being from the drawings we have before us. For the phenomenologist, every fleeting image, even the image that a word like 'straight' or 'curved' ignites can be thoroughly productive.

V. 3. 2. The spatiality of the straight line.

In David Cowley's drawing (Figs. 5-17) we see clear demonstration of how the lines are used to generate a strong directional sense. Their very straightness reflects the kind of space he is interested in disclosing. His space is like the space caught by a grid - full of interstices which invite our penetration. His drawing is an emphatic statement of: 'This goes like this'. It is full of touch marks that seem to have come from a rehearsal of their directions in the air, prior to their being registered on the paper - sometimes by the tiniest whisper. Gradually, toward the central axis and generating core of the figure, these touch marks coalesce and form a bonded whole (Fig. 16), that run together in a crescendo of accumulated lines which spiral from bottom left to top right. The strong directional sense is achieved as the straightness of the line, acting as a generating axis is given full rein. Only the parts of the surrounding space - like the divisions in the screen or the plant (Fig. 9) are used to reinforce this surging, uncompromising and very positive movement. So much so, that the head of the figure becomes engulfed in this surge of direction and is grasped only as its skeletal core lends its own dimension to this uprush of linear direction (Fig. 10). The space is held by webs of
line, made through constant additions and subtractions (for he uses the eraser freely) and through tiny adjustments that hold this web co-ordinated to the format of the drawing itself.

This space is always a constructed space, felt toward from the first marks of the drawing. Indeed if one looks at the early stages of the drawing (Figs. 5&6), within the first few minutes the area of the white is criss-crossed by a constellation of marks - all mostly straight and made with straight movements of the arm - touches that mark a fraction of the wider sweep of the hand - and this constellation of marks becomes the matrix in which and through which the surrounding space grows. These initial marks establish the 'going' of the drawing, the texture of the ground out from which the emerging figure is shaped and from which the whole drawing speaks.

The drawing is like the crystalline structure of rock - hard and unyielding, but nonetheless delicately nuanced; very different from the initial marks of Wendy Thompson’s drawing (Fig. 61). David Cowley’s drawing is born out from a kind of ruthlessness, a determination to aggressively assert that this is how it is. There is almost an anxious urgency to dominate the space of the white. Wendy Thompson’s initial marks (Figs. 53, 55&61) are like the gentle pro- bings of an insect’s antennae, a hesitant feeling outward - a recep- tive acknowledgement of the white. David Cowley’s drawing is marked by an uncompromising push, an almost Appollonian rape of the white. He treats the white very much as an arena in which the go and the no- go are acted out - physically. This kinetic directness is very strong
in his drawing, he revels in the drama of the making. He loves this challenge, he welcomes the savaging of the white, where the half-erased marks become the whispers of a history of change and counter-change, the dialectic tissue of the emerging image. Even the marks made by his erasures are straight (Fig. 7). Indeed the erasure lines form an important aspect of the drawing. Through them, there is a kind of hollowing out of the space as well as an inscription of it. The whole movement of the drawing, suggested by all its linear vectors, is an attempt to pierce the shell of the envelope of the mere physical appearance of things, to reveal their essential inner mobility.

Through this drawing particularly we are dealing with a phenomenology of emergence. In describing the drawing, we have begun to promote what Bachelard calls 'shell' images (op cit p107) - the picture of something alive within a crystalline structure; a crystalline structure that is not built from the outside inwards but spiralled from the inside outwards. But there is here a dialectic tension. In describing the living creature within this shell, Bachelard says:

"And since it does not come out entirely, the part that comes out contradicts the part that remains inside. The creatures rear parts remain imprisoned in the solid geometrical forms." (op cit p108).

How clear a picture this is of the metaphoric tension that keeps alive all graphic images! David Cowley's drawing echoes with all these mobile images of the shell. Its crystalline aggressiveness yields to the sensitivity within, yet not entirely, for this emerging inner core is caught and held by the supporting matrix of its 'geometric' forms.
It is not until quite late on in the process of the drawing (Fig. 9) that this evolving inner core takes on the significance of a 'figure'—we sense the disposition of the nude, emerging from its surrounding space. In a very real sense, the 'habitation' for this notional figure is built first from all the tissue of lines already laid down. The emergence is affected by erasures (Fig. 6, frames 11A, 12A, 13A) particularly (16A). But no sooner are the erasures made then, as in (frame 19A) they are crossed. Thus the space of the 'figure' is won against the ground, then subsequently lost. In (Fig. 8, frame 29A) the erasures take on the significance of white lines on black—a kind of reversal of the initial marks of the drawing. There is, as it were, another drawing going on within the first. A counter movement of straight linear marks made by the sweep of the eraser appears over the first. This has the effect of achieving another level or value of white and begins to open up the space of the first marks. This counter change creates its own constellation through which we sense the marks underneath.

In (Fig. 8, frame 37A) the long sweep of the line from top right to centre bottom is interrupted by a cross-hatching of erased marks that throws us back into the matrix of the central forms. This central area becomes filled with a terrific concentration of energy as the latter frames testify (Figs. 15 & 16). Furthermore, the whole directional axis of this central area is oblique. As Arnheim(7) has pointed out, perceptually this is one of the most powerful (because unstable) of visual forces when placed within a rectilinear format. There is a strong sense that the movement generated by the drawing in some way
comes from outside the format, enters at lower left and spirals and twists its way outward toward the top right (see appendix p351).

One feels that so powerful is this movement that even the marks and traces outside it are drawn toward it through its energy. The verticality and horizontality of the sheet are also powerful moments within this movement which we acknowledge.

Characteristically, Bachelard also does not miss these primal orientations and directions of being, when, in his description of the 'house' image, he draws attention to the space of forms that rise, that rise from cellar to attic (op cit p17). To Bachelard, forms that rise evoke a space that is toward dreams. For, as he points out, the attic is the space where we dream, we rise to be part of that space, we feel the lift of our feet on the stairs (op cit p26).

The motif of rising, with its attendant cadence of falling, as we have seen from Langer(8), powerfully reflects all our rhythmic interchange with the world. There is a sense in David Cowley's drawing that it, too, builds as it goes. His drawing energises our consciousness of dynamic verticality and also, through its concatenated concentration, our consciousness of centrality. Both underpin and interpenetrate the whole movement of its graphic significance.

As we come to inhabit the intimate spaces of David Cowley's drawing, through all its linear directness, we begin to enter and resonate with these spatial orientations. There is a rising in his drawing which is also a gathering of concentrated energy. There is a reach that is both upward and inward. He reaches inward through
the multiplying of all the marks that track his passage to the core.
Indeed every form is treated as though it were the inside which
mattered. Thus the darks in his drawing take on an energy which
magnetises all the concentration of the search. Their density might
be at the expense of clarity. However, the process photographs cannot
show, and herein lies their limitation, the subtle nuancing present in
the original drawing. The darks seem to brood. This singular spatial
value of the darks in drawing we shall return to.

V. 3. 3. The spatiality of the curve.

If the spatiality of David Cowley's drawing promotes images of
domination and of aggression, Feliks Topolski's drawings evoke very
different spaces. The spatiality of David Cowley's drawing rises
from the way he uses the line as an axis, probing the essential direc-
tions of the forms. With Feliks Topolski it is very different. He
uses a flowing curvilinear calligraphy to unite and promote their
interpenetrations. David Cowley's line suggests a kind of conceptual
'distance' from the space he is working within. Feliks Topolski's
lines are full of images of passivity and acceptance, of intimacy and
proximity. He says in conversation:

"I am after really being responsive to the atmosphere
and, putting it roughly, to action, to movement and
to character of things. And so to speak, in the
round - scanning the whole circle of vision, not just
the cut-out slice in front of me, but immersing my-
self." (appendix p 388).

Here the contrast to David Cowley's idea of the 'cube of space'
is immediately apparent and their drawings demonstrate these different spatial concerns. Feliks Topoloski's drawings are full of the restless sweep of his vision. The scrambled scribble of his lines suggests a total immersion within the activity of seeing. His drawing point, one senses, is always very close to the drawing surface; one feels his eye is right at the point where the trace is made (Fig. 94). Here there are no previous rehearsals. The traversing of his eye as it interrogates the nooks and crannies of the face (Figs. 70, 71) and (Figs. 72, 73) leaves its track on the paper. Indeed, unlike David Cowley's drawing, his drawings reflect the absence of conscious deliberation. They are indeed very like 'automatic' drawings. As he suggests:

"I'm receptive and I work, let's use a simple and innocent word 'seismographically', in other words, I react to the rhythm and motions and clashes of living. So the result is unpredictable and I watch it forming on the page with some surprise and it is sometimes as puzzling to me as it may be to anybody or as the reality itself may be." (appendix pp. 388/389).

Now this state of being receptive, of 'letting be', so characteristic of the Taoist philosophy of the draughtsmen of the Far East, is something Arthur Di Stephano also shares. For him too, what is important in drawing is to be "the heart that beats with the world" where there is no 'distancing' no 'interruption' between the draughtsman, the world of his drawing and the world of his Being (appendix p. 364). Both draughtsmen use the line in a calligraphic sense; their line writes the whole interplay and interpenetration of the forms as it goes. The essence of this kind of line is its curvilinear transition. Rawson(9) puts it clearly when he says:

"Curves make temporal transitions visible as process;"
so that art which uses virtually nothing but curvilinear transitions is really expressing an ontology which views reality as fluid and constantly changing, without true static forms." (op cit p91).

The curve is the most natural and direct mark made by the moving hand. Within its graphic presentation, the spatiality of our body can find an immediate visual anchorage. This is why the curve seems to invite our participation. For Bachelard, the curve "incites us to possession, it is ... inhabited geometry" (op cit p146). But of course, Feliks Topolski's drawings, although basically cast in this direction, are made up from many complex and interrelated curvilinear forms. The expressive quality of the movement of such linear directions depends greatly on our being able to sense where one transition begins and the other ends. (Fig. 77) is full of these transitions. Indeed the 'pick up' from one rhythmic transition to the next, which almost as it were 'prepares' it, is vital to sensing the overall tension and whole internal logic of the drawing. Thus the sequences, repetitions and opposed curves which initially were made as united groupings, for example in (Fig. 77) - over the shoulder of the kneeling priest and then up into the robes of the Pope - must not be missed if we are to appreciate fully the meaning of the drawing. And, of course, in following these transitions we come to sense the draughtman's scanning patterns, which gives us so directly an entry into his way of seeing.

The vitality and tension which these transitions set up is fundamental to the whole vigour of the drawing. In an interesting analysis, Rawson makes the point that the curve derives its implicit tension because of its underlying tendency to resolve itself, to achieve
stability (op cit p91). The most stable and static forms is the straight line, for its very straightness is an indication that it shows no tendency for deviation. Hence the powerful datum, as we have seen, of the verticality and horizontality of the format. It is against these stable orientations that the curving line with all its inflections achieves its expressive potential. Thus curves derive their tension and their springing because they traverse a path which is essentially a deviation and we register all deviation as change. All deviation is a mark of the presence of time in space. Deviation is space temporalised. Furthermore, there is a quantum of direction implicit in all curves. The geometric projection of a semi-circle, for example, is always uncomfortable in a drawing, for it only belongs to that geometric and diagrammatic representation that has no cross-reference in its inflection. It is always only a description of its own circularity. Thus much of the tension and vitality of the curved stroke when drawn, that is, when not projected mechanically, is that it is made up of an infinite variety of straight inflections which are making relations, not only along the length of the curve, but to other co-ordinates across its line of direction.

It is these subtle deviations within the curve which give to it its expressive value. The pure geometry of the circle, with the loci of all the points of its circumference based on its own centre, is always complete in itself and returns to itself. The loci of points along a curve that is drawn is based on a quantum of points that are directed not only to the curve but to the value of the space it subtends - thus the curve drawn by Feliks Topolski or Arthur Di Stephano is full of the harmonies, which a note played on a musical instrument has, as
opposed to the 'pure' note of a computer synthesiser. These subtle and minute inflections make up relations across, as well as with, the directions of the curve's passage and, as it were, constitute the polyphony of related directions which gives the passage of the curve a plenitude, a richness of expressive possibility.

Now to achieve this expressive sense in one line is immensely difficult. This full spatiality which a single line might promote, is what the Japanese draughtsmen seek to achieve in the linear style known as Ukiyo-e. The great linear draughtsmen of the West, like Matisse and Picasso, also valued the visual economy of the line when used in this way. One of the profoundest values this kind of drawing promotes is the immediate tension it sets up between itself, as linear vector incorporating all the diacritical values we have been discussing, and the surface two-dimensionality of the format.

This intrinsic value of the line is what Arthur Di Stephano is seeking to achieve constantly, as it were, in one movement of the drawing which, for him, will bring together the 'moment' of the drawing. This presence of the drawing is an extraordinary quality of wholeness, when every inflection of the line with all its attendant harmonies comes together. In Beckman's(10) terms the image, through the means of the drawing, seems to bear a "transcendental arithmetic progression of the inner being" (op cit p134). In this instance, the line is not so much describing reality as singing it.

Perhaps one of the clearest examples of what I mean can be seen
in Arthur Di Stephano's drawing (Fig. 33). The line, gathered in short knots at the top of the head, runs down into the model's leg on the left hand side. As he moves into the leg he picks up the drawing of her hand. The drawing point returns to the watershed of lines which make up the model's hair and then traverses the fullness of her back, is arrested by the folds in her coat, explores the upper part of her arm and then moves down into the hand which supports the weight of her body as it rests flat on the plane of the floor. Even the drawing of her thigh as it moves out of the format is seen first through the clarification of the form of her foot as it is tucked underneath her. One senses here that his line gently caresses the contours of all the forms he sees and through its singular value of continuity, shapes all the fluidity of the emerging forms.

This way of drawing means that, for Arthur Di Stephano, there is no going back. He places the full significance of bringing these forms together within the inscription of the single flowing line. Indeed, when he did try to make a drawing where there were multiple readjustments on the page, the drawing was a disaster - as he recognised (Figs. 20-24). He points out:

"... there's no room for reassessment because the first assessment has to be the right one and sometimes it works and sometimes, more often than not, it does not." (appendix p358).

Arthur Di Stephano values this aspect of the primacy of the line. The line, for him, is in this sense fully evocative. He says:

"... there's no fudging - you can't conceal anything, the line is self-explanatory in that sense, it tells you about how your hand was at that time." (appendix p360)
and again the line:

"... can never be as the world is. But one can assimilate how the world is, in the way you make it." (appendix p360).

And he uses the line, not in the sense of a co-ordinate in space, as a device for mapping out space, but as a means to evoke the 'fluidity' of space, "... well, we move through it!" (appendix p362). For him the line "... must correspond to how we live in the world ourselves" (appendix p362).

Thus his visual philosophy is one of using the whole linear deliverance of his drawing to suggest a continuous present. David Cowley, on the other hand, is interested in this present seen through the history of the process of change. Arthur Di Stephano feels he does not want to 'interrupt' the condition of the 'beingness' of his drawing. In his conversation he reads a quote from Simone Weil and suggests that this is how he wishes to be as he draws:

"May I disappear in order that those things that I see may become perfect in their beauty from the very fact that they are no longer things that I see."

(appendix p364).

He uses the efficacy of the line's continuous passage across the white of the ground. Its going magnetises all its spaces and for him this primal orientation of the line is crucially important.

V. 3. 4. The phenomenology of 'contour'.

Any description we may make of the line, throughout our analysis, whether straight or curved, outline or contour, heavy or slight, light
or dark, is always a description not so much of what the line is, as a description of what the line does.

In whatever way we might use the conceptual labels of language to pin the line down, as it were, it always resists such analysis, it is always on the move, always seeking to move away from itself to the spatiality it is transcribing. The reason is clear: for the line to be line, it must already be at work; it must, as we have seen from Merleau-Ponty, already suggest a spatiality that allows it to appear as line at all.

It may pay us for a moment, particularly with reference to Arthur Di Stephano's drawings, to look at the phenomenological distinction between 'outline' and 'contour'. We have considered to some extent these distinctions in our discussion of Wollheim's arguments in our chapter on Representation. At bottom, all lines are 'separators'. Depending on their context, we read them as either enclosing a 'positive' body, or magnetising an open 'negative' space. We have already acknowledged the problems that this divisionism brings. In a sense of course, this implied geometry is bound to follow all the steps of our consideration. It is useful only if it does not blind us into constructing a contrived spatiality from these dimensions. Each is, as we have seen, an indication to us of the orientation of Being rather than a description of Being. Too much concentration, for example, on the figure the line encloses, destroys the significance of the spatiality it rises from. It is always uncomfortable, when talking of the linear deliverance of a drawing, to describe it
as so much outline. To speak of it as 'contour' seems to offer us a wider imaginative engagement. The reasons are not hard to find. In a sense, each describes what the other is not. 'Outline' serves a phenomenological function in modalities of geometric space, of the space of conceptual systems, space rationalised. It suggests a marking out; contour suggests a marking within. We can never escape, even here, the inherent geometrism of the word. Words betray the direction of their limited intentions. However, when I use the word outline, I mean a description of the line's function in a particular sense, a sense which really allows for it within a system of limited possibilities - like geometry. In using the word contour, I am seeking to describe the line's function that goes beyond the limitation of a system, to embrace the possibility of a spatiality that is not bound by the implied dimensions of height and width and breadth. Contour is a word, which, for my purpose, promotes a spatiality which is not divided and resists demarcation. It is evocative of thought and rethought, evocative of the very movement of Being.

Of course, these inherent dialectics, this Janus face of dualism, not only founds the whole of philosophic discourse, it founds the whole possibility of drawing. When we draw, we draw out, we come out, we betray this essential reciprocity of Being. Drawing is a philosophic enterprise, for in itself, it asks questions, it is a coming out in order to be, to raise the very possibility of being not. No sooner has the drawing spoken than it continues to speak through the reverberation of all its possibilities. This is why each of these designations of the line's spatiality is a description also of what each is not.
How cryptically Bachelard puts it, when in quoting Pierre-Jean Jouve he says:

"For we are where we are not" (op cit p211).

Drawing is full of the texturing of touch, and one resists, in the light of this description, the finality of the spatiality of outline. The draughtsman is finding his way, probing with his line the directional possibilities of the forms he is making. His awareness, as he draws, extends to the spatiality he is shaping 'outside' the form he is making, as much as the spatiality 'within' it. Visual form in drawing, and this includes all the rhythmic phrasing of the line, will always resist the reduction of verbal philosophising.

Bachelard often imagines that words are like 'little houses':

"... each with its cellar and garret. Common-sense lives on the ground floor, always ready to engage in 'foreign commerce', on the same level as the others, as the passers-by, who are never dreamers."

(ibid p147)

and later he says:

"To mount and descend in words themselves - this is a poet's life. To mount too high or descend too low, is allowed in the case of poets, who bring earth and sky together. Must the philosopher alone be condemned by his peers always to live on the ground floor?" (ibid p147).

Well, if words are like houses, so are lines. They have a beyond, they have an 'attic' as well as a 'cellar' and this is the spatiality the draughtsman explores.

There is a further important consideration. The meaning of such linear figuration is not accessible only as it delivers a kinetic
sense, only as it is seen as the incarnation of gesture. We understand the significance of the line's passage as this is also clarified through the notional realities it might describe. These may be parts of the body, like hands or feet. They may be descriptions of hair, or the folds of a coat. For example, for us to sense the full significance of Wynn Jones's drawings (Figs. 36-47), it is important that we recognise these forms as human; that we recognise the twisted anxiety of their hands and the strange perfunctoriness of their faces pulled from all the ways he uses the contour as a shaped edge.

V. 4. 1. Rhythmic phrasing of the line.

Thus for the purpose of our analysis we may point to these topological aspects of the line. However, in search of these directions we are bound to be caught within the whole spatial network that each of these aspects promotes. This is also the draughtsman's concern. He seeks to make more by handling less, as Ricoeur(11) says. He recognises the implied limitation of his graphic conventions, but through it all there is a progressive visual logic that engages him. He achieves this progression as he orders his space through all the rhythmic phrasing of his forms. There is a logic within this progression which is something far more than a simple repetition of identical units. It suggests all the cadential push and pull, all the adventuring to go which makes up the whole enterprise of his activity, all the directional enquiry of his search.
We shall see how this works through the drawings before us. It can be sensed, of course, within a finished drawing, and indeed this organic wholeness which a drawing achieves is testimony to all the movement of its inherent rhythms. It is, however, through the process photographs that one catches aspects of this progression laid out in time. This is the value of such sequential images.

The rhythm within a drawing can be sensed through all the variety of ways that the draughtsman phrases and groups his forms across the format of the drawing surface. This phrasing is crucially important, for through it we follow the development and unfolding of the drawing's inherent spatiality. This is achieved, not so much through a conscious deliberation on the draughtsman's part, but rather it develops from the fluency of his own graphic habits. Each draughtsman develops graphic notations which we recognise as being aspects of his or her personal 'handwriting'. For example, David Cowley's graphic identifying mark is the cluster of small pulled straight strokes that run in parallel sequences. In Arthur Di Stephano's drawings it is made from a longer flexing line that seems to be put together with a studied deliberation. In Feliks Topolski's drawings, it is made from the twisted scribble line, often found in parallel groupings - an informal flurry. Wynn Jones's would perhaps be the taut binding line that draws into its path textured darks, soft and sometimes brittle. Wendy Thompson's graphic motif is perhaps characterised by the small pulled broad mark elaborated by a cluster of cross-hatched lines.

Even within these personal motifs which one can in a sense
identify, there are a multiplicity of tinier forms, of vector traces, of whispered marks, that make up the tissue and texture of the draughtsman's graphic repertoire. In all of this, one has to point to the generalities of forms that one can recognise, and from this one accepts the whole quanta of their interrelationships which in the end make up their graphic expressiveness. However, Beckman has used the term 'arithmetic progression' (op cit pl34) which does indicate that there is a kind of 'logic' which these interrelated graphic elements betray. He also, of course, has used the word 'transcendental', and this is always the indication that, although we may examine the 'instants' of this progression, it still is the passage of the progression which promotes the whole ontological status of these visual forms.

Thus when we talk of rhythmic phrasing, it is because we sense the way the draughtsman has used his personal repertoire of graphic motifs, the way he has grouped them, and also through them, the way he has achieved graphic invention through the variety of their interrelationships. The important thing about the phrasing of these individual graphic motifs is that there is a visual logic within their connectiveness - that is a sequence where each part is seen to bear a rhythmic relation to the whole and although seen to be part of the whole, is indivisible from it. In music for example, a composer might have a particular grouping of notes which we recognise as being his musical hallmark. On their own they are relatively meaningless, but when set within the context of the progression of his musical idea, we recognise them and assimilate their musical meaning into the whole of its matrix.
In graphic terms it has to do with how the draughtsman finds his own means, developed over the history of making many drawings, to establish and clarify his visual idea. And of course this will involve, in an inventive draughtsman, modifications he makes to his basic graphic motifs as he goes. This promotes the whole progression of his continuing search, and this is how he develops pathways to fresh images. If we catch this graphic inventiveness through his forms, we begin to sense the spatiality of his drawings can take on an expressive depth. The later drawings of Rembrandt, for example, are full of this maturation; his marks seem to contain a directness, a simplicity, an economy, a confidence and a synthesis that has arisen from all the years of experience of making graphic his vision.

Let us examine how this phrasing works by looking at some of Wendy Thompson's drawings. In her drawing (Fig. 50) we see her begin by establishing a rapid placing through a feint linear contour of the relationship of the model and the stool. She then begins to make tiny groups of marks along this feint structural filament of line. These she makes from the top downward. The progress of the drawing continues downward through further groupings of darks that begin to set up their own rhythmic relationship. She then moves back to the top of the drawing making further developments to the form along directions she has previously established. The effect of these groupings gives us a sense of the plasticity of the model on the stool, but also develops across the surface of the drawing a rhythmic sequence of darks on light. The darks are made with short 'pulls' of the pencil from right to left and slightly downward. This has the effect, as it
finds its repetition through the other darks, of pulling together the surface unity of the drawing. Sometimes, as in (Figs. 49 & 51) she changes the way she holds the pencil; this makes a broader mark which is opposed to the tauter mark made by the finer line. In (Fig. 53) she traverses the white very quickly by drawing lines that are full of the pressures of the hand holding the pencil on its edge. She registers this graphic motif in this way because she finds that in looking at the model and stool in front of her, she saw opportunities to employ this device. She notices the upright edge of the stool very early on in the drawing and this edge becomes the springboard for the gentler lines of the model to 'float' from it.

These rapid drawings (Figs. 49, 50, 51, 52, 53), each taking only about ten minutes, are full of the varying pressures of touch. The lines are phrased in passages of light and dark that register the pressure of the pencil held not only on its point but also on its edge. They are also made with a continuous movement that gives one the sense that the pencil is never far from the surface. These movements are mostly convex, that is, they record the fullness of the form of the model she is drawing from. This convexity of the line is a further indication of how she shapes the notional figure from its ground.

Where the line breaks is also important, for this represents a fresh act of conceptualisation on the draughtsman's part. In Felik's Topolski's drawings, the breaks occur in a trajectory which almost indicates a continuous movement (Fig. 76). However, these interruptions
in the passage of the line mark where the draughtsman has sensed new directions. Read together, these punctuations reflect the rhythmic movement of his imagination and testify to the opening spatiality of his graphic interest and intent.

We have sensed this already in David Cowley's drawing. Here the phrasing is achieved right across the format, from the very first marks. Indeed these small clusters of marks present fresh acts of seeing and they build not only from what he is working from, in terms of the motif of the model, but also what is being evoked from within the drawing itself.

This rhythmic phrasing of the line is crucially important in Wynn Jones's drawings too. Here particularly the line is phrased not only along the whole of its length, but also as it comes together to form a catena of enclosures. In this case it functions to provide an existential value to the spaces it surrounds. In his drawing 'An Anxious Time' (Fig. 42) for example, there is a dark cavernous open-mouthed void toward which the figure on the left is being irresistibly drawn. This is achieved through the reciprocity of the two convex linear movements between the figure and the cave, which makes the space between a kind of magnet that joins them but also keeps them apart. Any closer and the figure would be too near. Further away and the tension would cease to exist. His drawings are full of this concave/convex tension between the forms where, when the feeling suggests, as in 'Sacrifice' (Fig. 36), the convex form of the one offering is received into the concave form of the one receiving. These
tensive distances promote a haunting spatiality in his drawings. The line wraps and envelopes the forms, we discern the shapes of hands or feet, or strangely compressed bodies and paper bag heads. This binding line gives the forms an insubstantiality— as though in dreams— for its continuousness has the effect of fastening them to the flatness of the paper. Almost any drawing suffices as an example but particularly (Fig. 47).

It is through the way these draughtsmen phrase their graphic motifs that we begin to sense the kind of spatiality which interests them. The rhythmic phrasing of drawn forms is full of the images of touch, a distillation of seeing. Thus the contour may be made up of short broken lines, where its direction is achieved through myriad touch marks. Wendy Thompson's drawing (Figs. 55-58) is such an example. This phrasing has much to do with the whole reciprocal dialectic of drawing. It is a constant search, a constant research into where this line should be, for where this line is made and remade is where the space of the drawing is born. This statement of the where is not made for the satisfaction of the casual spectator, it is made for the draughtsman who is seeking to satisfy himself that he knows. Drawing from a model for example, is drawing from a model who is always moving, or if not, the draughtsman's gaze is always moving. Thus the draughtsman seeks as he makes his distillation, to pin down, to make a fixation through his line, of where precisely the form of the model's head or her arm or her leg turns in space. He seeks to catch this deviation which he has seen, and to catch it within all the movement of his searching gaze across these forms. And this
movement of his gaze is caught as he phrases his line. Each mark he makes is a punctuation of the spatiality he is reaching toward. A fresh glance registers a fresh act of seeing, and this has also its cadence in the mark he makes on the paper. So the phrasing of these grouped marks, these interrelated traces becomes an indication of his active search to find precisely where this form is in its space. It is moreover a search for the whole of the space which is now beginning to reverberate as fresh distillations are made. So the phrasing and grouping of these tiny marks along the directions of the line, these inflections, as in Arthur Di Stephano's drawings, or across the line's vector, as in David Cowley's drawing are all attempts to make visible this process of interrogation. The restated contour is a comment on this active engagement in vision.

Feliks Topolski's drawings offer good examples, particularly (Fig. 82) where the whole head of the Pope is made from a continuous swirl of lines, full of all the rhythmic sense we have been talking about. Another good example is (Fig. 70) which resonates with re-statements. Each lift of the charcoal registering a fresh act of sensing and of probing. Other examples are (Fig. 71), (Fig. 72), (Fig. 73) and (Fig. 74).

Wendy Thompson's line, particularly in her two sustained drawings (Figs. 55-58 and Figs. 61-68), is short-breathed, hesitant - a probing touch. These phrase marks are those of the sculptor who is passionately concerned about the way surfaces turn and change. So the line is like the trace of her fingers registering the subtle nuance of the fall of
light on the model. Thus the rhythms are not only along the direction of the line, but across it and away from it toward the surface spatiality and interiority this tissue of lines seeks to evoke. This kind of drawing, through all the intimacy of its touch marks, is a graphic way of indicating the need to feel the surface of the object suffused by its surrounding space. Thus the lines that are drawn might not correspond directly to the turn of the edge of the object under the draughtsman's gaze, but might be a way of indicating the fall of light on its surface and, in David Cowley's case, its underlying structural habit. The very hesitancy of these linear staccato phrases indicates a deliberation, a consciousness of concentrated change and counter-change. Not for Wendy Thompson the fluent calligraphic gestural line which writes with such bravura the graphic forms of Feliks Topolski—she speaks with a quieter voice, a sensitive, acutely conscious search, which accumulates by touch, demonstrating how these forms dwell in their space. In her drawing (Figs. 61-68) we can see this in process. The early stages of the drawing (Fig. 61), (Fig. 62) shows clearly this accretion of forms through minute additions. Indeed it is very difficult to sense much 'outline' in these early marks, she moves very quickly (Fig. 61) to register the centre of the forms, building the whole movement of the model and stool together. Her marks are like impressions in clay, they are a graphic celebration of the sensuousness of touch. The dark accents that run up through the centre of the drawing, even at these early stages, are like the core of an apple, whose flesh is built outward into all its spaces.

One is reminded, throughout all these intimate graphic images of
touch, of Bachelard's descriptions of the nest, built from the constant, minute and gentle pressures of the bird's breast forming a circle round itself from inside (op cit p101). This is the spatiality of Wendy Thompson's drawings. If Feliks Topolski's line registers the passage of the bird's flight, Wendy Thompson's whispered marks register its habitation.

Our reading of the way one line springs from another, our reading of the breaks in the line's movement, of the surges and hesitations of the line's path, promotes our sense of the internal logic of the drawing's spatiality. The reading of this complexity is our entry into the depth of the drawing's 'world' and our pathway to its exploration. Furthermore, and this is where the process photographs are useful, we sense in the scanning of all these rhythms the history of the draughtsman's engaged activity of looking; we sense the whole process of his search.

A drawing which can give us a sense of this history is one where its 'leading lines' are not obliterated by subsequent ones which compromise these first fresh graphic manifestations of the draughtsman's initial engagement with his motif. In looking at the sequence drawings of Arthur Di Stephano, there is a clear sense that his lines are phrased from groupings which begin from around the head of the model. He recognises this in the conversation (appendix p363). This cluster of grouped lines form a watershed from which the rest of the linear structure is developed. (Fig. 26) and (Fig. 27) are good examples. Indeed, one senses the 'pull' of these lines downward and the fall of
this linear directions gives a sense of the weight of the model's limbs.

In (Fig. 28) the line of the inside of the coat is drawn downward from the chin and across the looped fullness of the breasts. Here he pauses and goes back up toward the left shoulder of the model picking up the contour of her arm and finding as he draws it, the springing point for the emergence of her thigh. He then moves across to the right hand side of the drawing, finding the thigh again and makes two lines (he discovers the lower one is better placed). In following the movement of the legs tucked underneath the model, he resolves the shaped weight of one hand over the other which rests on the leg. Here, we do not refer simply to the 'stages' in the process of the drawing, we grasp the logic of this linear sequence as it is caught within all the graphic fluency of the drawing itself. Moreover, this sequence builds up an evocative chain of images which together fill out and give a plenitude to the drawing. Herein lies the presence of the drawing and herein lies its world. Where one line breaks and another begins, where one line curves in the fullness of its convexity promoting the echo of its concavity, this is not arbitrary. As Ruskin(12) says, when we sense this rhythmic continuity, it is evidence of the draughtsman "knowing the way things are going". These continuities evoke a spatiality that is never static, but always on the move.

In Feliks Topolski's drawings, one senses this directly. In (Fig. 71) we can follow his eye as it has searched the form of the
head. He began on the left hand side of the head, first making the mark from temple to cheek, pausing because there was a definite change in contour, which he picks up with a tiny inflected mark, making two subsequent marks for the chin. He moves to the right of the chin and up the right hand side of the face, pushing the charcoal against the natural pull of his hand. In doing so, his eye is searching the form ahead and he makes the connections by pulling short strokes downward. Now we sense, through these tiny inflections, the convex and concave twists of the charcoal, the wresting of figure from ground as he searches the living space of this emerging form. This arises because the marks are so truncated, they are made so rapidly, that they echo in their tiny fragments what we subsequently grasp as the nose or the furrowed brow, or the creased chin. The whole space of this head is built in a revolving spiralling activity from the left hand side downward, then from the right hand side upward to the crown. Having come back to his starting point he continues the circular activity of his look, as it spirals downward to the left eyebrow, then twists to the bridge of the nose, down its contour and across to the cheekbones. All the time the line is dancing, in short bursts that hardly touch the form, but where they touch they register the form. It is as though we were picking up the form through all the amplitude of what is not said, for what is said is sufficient to indicate all the going of these forms. His short linear bursts are where his eye has touched the play of light and dark on the form, where he has sensed the turn of the form on its edge. Moreover, the sense of the space across, within and through the head, rises through all the continuity of his looking. This is why the lines have a logic
of sequence, their breathless urgency is marked through their brevity. We are reading the animation of this head's spatiality. It is neither 'here' nor 'there'. It is caught in that tension between all its 'heres' and 'theres'. The vector of each tiny line and all its 'going' is projected and anticipated through the way the receiving line picks up this implied direction. This lends the drawing its fluid sense of space. The head is disclosed through all the spatial evocation these tiny vectors give us.

V. 4. 2. Individual graphic habits of the draughtsman.

Through the way the draughtsman develops the rhythms of these sequences, lies all the visual logic and ordering of his drawing. Each draughtsman develops his particular and characteristic range of marks, his nuclear graphic forms and these, of course, give the drawing its individual graphic style. As the draughtsman begins to discover these forms, they become for him his graphic habit. He comes to use these forms to direct his seeing, because in an important sense, his seeing dwells in them. The habit of his looking will rise from the habit of his drawing. Moreover, they energise his search, for they are implicit in the motifs he draws from. For example, the flowing folds of a robe will give Feliks Topolski a visual anchorage for employing his characteristic calligraphic style. Examples abound in his drawings but (Fig. 75), (Fig. 76) and (Fig. 79) are particularly useful. This interdependence he acknowledges when he says:
"So my starting point is predominantly amassed humanity in movements and conflicts, but as gathered human beings with characteristics of shape, of costume or whatever; but I am not documenting it, I am leaping off that, bouncing off that into the realm of linear creation." (appendix p389).

And Arthur Di Stephano also acknowledges the importance for him of working from the model:

"... I want to know how she sits in one particular day - how her arms interlock with her head ..."

and

"I have to find, as Matisse stated, the 'individual rhythm' which is in every face, and this is distinguished by the contrast existing between the face of the model and all other faces ... What I was saying about Matisse is that he worked from her ... she was there and she was not there at the same time. It's that thin line again that I'm talking about."

and finally,

"One needs the physicality of the presence of her there, one doesn't mean you're a slave to that at all." (appendix p361).

Thus these motifs feed the drawing quite as much as the drawing feeds these motifs. In drawing from the draughtsman is also drawing toward. The motif the draughtsman works from becomes charged with fresh possibilities as these are in turn funded by the graphic formulations, the graphic sequences the draughtsman builds within his drawing. This is, of course, how the spatiality of objects in the world takes on, for the draughtsman, an interiority - an interiority that springs from the inventiveness of his own emerging graphic forms. His seeing is directed very specifically through them.
There is in all this a sense of development, a sense in which the draughtsman moves through his fixations toward a resolution. But of course, he never resolves completely and this funds the whole of his activity. Graphic innovation is only such as the draughtsman discovers the graphic possibilities in the marks he makes, within the context and boundness of his drawing. In a sense, we can only talk of graphic innovation and visual suggestiveness as this boundness is realised. The logic of any sequence of development implicitly acknowledges this bounded context. Forms do not evolve arbitrarily, they are held together as one recognises the context in which they function as forms. Thus within any range of graphic marks there is a kind of quantum, recognised but never defineable, an area around which the richness and inventiveness of these marks can be employed. Thus the expressiveness of the range is characterised by how far the draughtsman explores this area of possibility, rather how far he is able to suggest it. Herein lies the importance of the visual ambiguity of the drawing. This is where the drawing, through all the quanta of its linked nuclear forms can become, as Merleau-Ponty (13) says, 'coherent deformation'; can promote, in Ricoeur's terms 'a surplus of meaning' (op cit p45). The richness of this visual ambiguity rises as the draughtsman acknowledges that through the very limitations of his means, through his 'handling less', as Ricoeur says, he can reach toward the disclosure of the 'more' (ibid p40). Herein lies the whole efficacy of drawing. Its very 'iconic augmentation' (ibid p40) is testimony that the draughtsman is finding his way toward the possibility of condensing his vision around the graphic forms he makes. Moreover, through this condensation, lies his pathway
to fresh vision. These graphic motifs the draughtsman finds for himself, these clustered touches, are full of directional significance. They have arisen primarily in answer, not only to what the draughtsman sees, but also to how he sees. This reciprocation is crucial to their ability to transcend, to their ability to suggest. Furthermore, their reciprocity funds the internal graphic logic of the drawing. They spring from the draughtsman's urgency to see how they will appear and how far they appropriate to all he is reaching toward. The richness and density of their variation will be testimony to how far he himself has penetrated their evocative spatiality. This spatiality is held together and promoted through all the rhythmic sequence of images that his drawing suggests.

V. 4. 3. Thematic development and innovation.

Thus, these graphic nuclear forms which the draughtsman develops, initiate what one might call the thematic advance of the drawing. Their appearing serves to promote fresh movements of the draughtsman's graphic imagination. This development is crucial, for within it lies all the possibility, all the richness of the drawing's unfolding spatiality. As he takes these forms, as he augments, heightens, interrelates and orchestrates them, he delivers the very texture and 'going' of his drawing. They structure his 'topic', as Rawson has it, and become the focus, the spatial anchorages around which the drawing's graphic meaning can coalesce. By providing a kind of invariant, they magnetise the possibility for his further graphic 'inventiveness'.
They provide a potential for fresh acts of seeing and fresh directions for his enquiry. He must sense the coming rise of possible graphic forms and marry these to what he has already developed.

An example of the thematic development of graphic forms can be seen in Wynn Jones's collection of drawings. (Fig. 47) was done, as he says in his conversation, very early on in the sequence. The line in this early drawing is rigid and sparse. It has not yet opened out into the kind of space which it subsequently achieves in his later drawings. It seems to be restrained and hesitant. It does not yet have the expansiveness which it takes on in 'Void' (Fig. 38) for example. In (Fig. 47) it is as though he is just beginning to sense the possible richness of the play along the edge of these lines. We sense that the line has not yet developed its full amplitude, nor its haunting spatiality. However, the promise of this development lies in the earlier drawing.

This kind of graphic development in drawing is never a predetermined movement. It evolves and is revealed to the draughtsman in and through the activity of making the drawing. The internal logic and connectiveness between the graphic forms the draughtsman makes and the possibility for their development are constantly coming under review and revision as he works. His task is always to make a coherence within these forms, which he always seeks to keep open, to allow their fecund ambiguity to work, but always within a boundness which he recognises. He advances his theme through what he gives primary significance to. In Wynn Jones's drawings we are gathered into the light
and dark passage of enclosures and we are compelled to follow the softness of the line's edge as it opens cavernous darks and charged voids. For a mainly linear draughtsman like Feliks Topolski, all his forms will spring from the inventiveness of his line as it searches all the spaces he sees. David Cowley develops his thematic sense from the way he penetrates, through all the interstices of his drawing, the space the model inhabits. Wendy Thompson's drawings advance along the line's soft probing as it is married to all the tonal transitions of touch (Fig. 69, Drawings 30A and 37A). In Arthur Di Stephano's drawings, his theme rises from all the linear inflections of the sinuous contour as it wraps the space of the model (Figs. 34 & 35).

In all these accumulated groupings, in all the rhythmic interchange between these forms, fresh directions are always implied. This is the very process of drawing, the drawing from that is also drawing toward. This thematic advance, of which we have been speaking, is testimony to the whole graphic movement of the drawing. As we have begun to see elsewhere, it is not so much 'thought about' as lived. We move with these forms as they catch and resonate fresh evocative spaces. In this they never merely describe reality, they sing it. Furthermore, in seeking to uncover this thematic significance, we can only point toward areas of its possible generation. To acknowledge it, and to follow it within a drawing is already to be moving with it.

We reach this essential movement of the drawing, grounded in all the catenae of its forms, not only through the graphic elements of the drawing itself, but also through what we might term its notional
'subject matter'. Thus the transition of one graphic form to another can be held together for us because we recognise the fall of the model's hair, the twist of her thigh, or the weight of her arm. We recognise the imploring gesture of the raised hand in Wynn Jones's drawings. This aspect of the drawing's spatiality we shall return to later. The graphic forms the draughtsman uses can offer a kind of counter subject to this notional subject matter. Of course sometimes, this counter subject becomes the primary theme of the drawing, as it does with a 'non-figurative' draughtsman like Cy Twombly. His drawings rely solely on the graphic meaning rising from their marks and transitions.

However, the richness of the interplay between this counter subject and the notional subject gives a unique opportunity for the draughtsman to develop his thematic material. In all this, whether it be the motif the draughtsman works from, or the nuclear graphic forms and motifs he employs within his drawing, each provides a focus, a point for the distillation and coalescence of his graphic meaning. Each takes its place and offers an entry for our advance into the spatial interiority of the drawing.

V. 5. 1. The line and the dialectics of 'open' and 'closed' forms.

So far we have mentioned that these linked chains of forms are promoted in drawing primarily through the line. We have examined its
springing and we have also begun to speak of the way, from its figure in passage, it animates all its ground. This leads us now to examine a little more closely how it also inscribes enclosures which, in turn, are sensed and read and complete themselves within the whole rhythmic movement of the drawing. In graphic terms it is impossible when speaking of the line and all it evokes, not to speak also of the spaces the line ignites. Now these 'enclosures' are not static and defined areas – as so much measured geometry. They are read as figures against their ground. Much of this has to do with the sense they bring of recognisable forms like people, robes, hats, hands, feet etc. but, as we have seen, these graphic representations never simply point to objects in the world.

The simplest figure occurs when a line encloses an area, like a circle, where in its closure we sense immediately the figure of the circle. Here the line is acting in its primary graphic function as a separator. There is also a second kind of enclosure where the line does not fully enclose the figure and, in our perception of it, there is sufficient visual indication for us to 'complete' it. One is reminded here of Sartre's (14) views on the way we 'enact' this completion and read the line as though it were there. This enactment in vision goes on all the time – and is how we read the whole movement and continuity of forms. Perception demands this 'wholeness', this active search for meaning. The impulse is always, as Arnheim(7) suggests, to reach the most 'stable' (op cit p406) resolution. The completion occurs through the need to resolve the imbalance and, of course, in graphic terms is the ground from which all the expressive
tension of forms rise. When we see the figure of the circle as described by the line, it seems to 'come forward', to immediately have a spatial significance. The centre of this figure seems denser, seems to have weight and body. Arnheim maintains that this is because perception is always seeking the 'simplest' (op cit p246) of resolutions. Thus this 'standing out' is in order to maintain the essential planar concern of the surface of the format. We have met this 'standing out' before - in all our discussions on the unity of time with space - this existential, this ex-stance. To see and experience the figure is to catch at the roots of this reciprocity of time with space. The figure is the cry from the silence of its ground. The essential temporality of being, of beingness, can only come-to-be, can only appear, as this temporality finds its co-existence with space. Here is pre-figured the move of time into space, the pre-figuring of the primordial dialectic of Being. Thus the reading of enclosure is a fundamental movement in all our perception, a primary orientation of Being. It is irradicable and inviolable; this movement awaits us as we open our eyes, this there. There because we are already at work in the world.

In terms of drawing, Arnheim makes an interesting comparison between the line drawings of Rembrandt and Matisse (op cit p216). Rembrandt achieves a tremendous 'solidity' to his forms in space because he kept his outlined units relatively small and, moreover, he reinforces the enclosed surfaces with linear designs like folds of cloth etc. In Matisse drawings, particularly in his later drawings, the units are often so large that the contour all but loses its effect -
the border line character of Matisse's line is weak - they have much the quality of independent lines. The 'enclosed bodies' have a looseness about them - they tend to reveal that they are nothing but pieces of 'empty' paper surfaces. The drawing lies like a transparent web - the space of the illusion of 'depth' reduced to a minimum. This, of course, is not due to negligence or incapacity, Rembrandt wanted to express the weight of volume and a clearly discernible depth illusion. Matisse was far more interested in the way he could graphically 'dematerialise' the object and this through minimising this illusionist space. Thus Matisse drawings are not intended as illusions of physical reality - their concern is the surface from which they spring. These different approaches represent very different visual philosophies, they promote radically different ontologies.

From this example of Matisse's drawings, we can see that enclosures need carry with them no specific suggestion of figure and ground. Indeed the focus here becomes purely the figure of the line, rather than what it encloses. In drawing the draughtsman must be supremely aware, however, of all the ground he is shaping as he makes his figure. Thus the presence or absence of the notional 'bodies' within the drawing, like faces or hands, sky or trees, are not at this stage important. Indeed enclosures carry implicitly the significance of areas of the format surface and they can be read as figure, but always their ground is tacitly acknowledged, if the full expressive sense of their spatiality is to be achieved. Some 'enclosures' can suggest 'voids'. (How we echo all the discussions of the dialectics of inside and outside that we have shared with Bachelard.) Wynn Jones's drawings are full
of this essential descriptiveness. The expressive tension of these 'figures' resonate as they animate all the voids they also inhabit. We sense in all he says in his conversation, his own incisive consciousness of their presence:

"... once the particular form of the figures are established on the paper, they, in a sense, create their own environment, by that I mean that the sort of tension that exists in the surrounding space, in the areas between and around them becomes as important as the figures themselves. This has ... to do with ... an imaginative grasp of space growing out of the intuitively felt relationships within the figurative situation." (appendix p370).

We can see this, particularly in 'Void' (Fig. 38) and 'Bond' (Fig. 38).

There is a further important point. In their interrelationships within and with the format edges, enclosures are always full of the activity of movement, always bearing within themselves this tension that springs from our seeking to resolve all their 'imbalances'. They are always on the move. They can 'open', 'condense', 'coalesce', 'connect', 'bond together'. However, these are only verbal descriptions, caught within the confines of linguistic determination. They can never fully encompass the opening metaphoric spatiality these graphic enclosure forms promote. They also, like lines which are 'enclosures' of a kind, have their own diacritical values. In their passage, whether seen as either 'positive' or 'negative', the whole expressive significance of the drawing is embedded.

Within the distinctions we might make between 'figure' and 'ground' there is never any separation when we come to live and inhabit their spaces. Graphic images are only evocative as we sense
the tension across the surface of all their interchange and permeability. Where one becomes figure and the other ground, where one becomes ground and the other figure, lies the very condition for all appearing. By means of the drawing, this 'transcendental arithmetic progression', as Beckman says (op cit p134), can come to be.

Thus the contour of any enclosure is always a shared border, not a boundary. Contours, as we have seen, point both ways. Their Janus face is turned toward all the figure they describe, from all the ground they are inscribing. The drawn curve is full of the implications of both concavity and convexity and depending on how the draughtsman is using it and the context of his operations, it will reflect how far he is thinking, as he draws, away from the line.

What is this here from which all the theres arise? In Dasein, in 'being-there', where, asks Bachelard, is the main stress to come, on 'being' or 'there' (op cit p213)? We make a mistake, he says, if we try to enclose Being, if we try to encapsulate existence as a simple dialectic of inside and outside. The insidious determinacy of language would lead us in this direction. Unless we are careful, this there carries a kind of dogmatic assertion, as though it were in some exteriorised place. Existence does not have to come clothed only in physicality. Graphic images are not concepts, frozen in clusters. As soon as we sense a graphic enclosure as an enclosure per se, we have already been imaginatively engaged in the movement of its significance.
Thus a term like 'enclosure', only becomes for us a handle in uncovering aspects of the spatiality of these drawings. To grasp the resonance and reverberation of image forms within a drawing is to reciprocate with all the dialectic of inside and outside, of positive and negative, of figure and ground. They resonate because in our movement with them we do not follow only one dimension of their possibility. Their density and richness is because as forms, as forming, they do not stand still long enough to congeal. They condense, coalesce and go on working. Like the figure of the spiral which is an image, as Bachelard says, that can move either inward or outward, full of 'invertible dynamisms' (op cit p214), coalescence suggests also a move toward what is, as well as toward what is not - the very possibility of being.

V. 5. 2. Rhythmic continuity of such forms.

Let us turn now to a consideration of the various ways some of our draughtsmen have made use of enclosure forms.

It is interesting that in David Cowley's drawing for example, he keeps open the 'enclosure' of the model as figure, for as long as possible. It is as though he were engaged throughout his drawing, and wanted to keep 'alive', the whole interplay of space which presses in upon and permeates and penetrates the figure and from which she finally emerges. Through all the directional vectoring of his line, he inscribes the space the figure animates. The figure is caught, as
it were, in the suspension of her own space. Arthur Di Stephano, on the other hand, has a very different intention. He seeks to maintain and preserve the primacy of the areas of full and void through the inflections of his contour. However, David Cowley holds back from fully defining this positive and this void. His interest is the total interpenetration of this whole 'cube' of space and, as he says in his conversation, the points he makes are like hand holds which chart his progression through it (appendix p344). The ambiguity which rises from this conflict and interchange is an important source of the drawing's significance. It is this continuity of the forms moving through and interpenetrating all their space which provides the counterpoint and thematic development of his drawing. He is at pains to obliterate and indeed to run across the 'positive' areas he makes, to deliberately ignore, as it were, their positive presence in order to activate the voids. It is not until at least (Fig. 11) that we begin to sense something like the figure of the nude emerging. Indeed, it is as though he were laying down his ground through building up a multiplicity of linear forms into which and through which, through erasures and cross hatchings, he builds toward the sense of this solid figure spun within the fibres of its casing. The tensive dialectic between open and closed takes on an important dimension in his drawing, so much so that one feels it is still in process, still fluid and that he could 'go on' with it, for it continually suggests its own direction (appendix p355).

Feliks Topolski's drawings have enclosures that are very much 'open'. His particular calligraphic style ensures that he is only
ever really suggesting enclosures and not defining them. As he points out in his conversation, he does not set out to 'copy' the

"... existing scene in front of me ... enumerating every element ... I am after ... scanning the whole circle of vision, not just the cut-out slice in front of me, but immersing myself." (appendix p388).

Thus his line interpenetrates forms and where there are enclosures he moves through them. His enclosures such as they are, are always moving into and through other suggested enclosures. Much of the expressive vitality of his work, as we have begun to discover, is that his line does not prescribe. His line follows his gaze as it actively searches over and through boundaries, to give the suggestion of volume - rather as we sense something rising from the sea, with rivulets and streams of water running off and across the surface of the emerging form. So much is left for our own enactment in these drawings, our own participation in following all the line's closure paths. Thus there is always in his drawings the logic of the linked connectiveness of forms - for the line weaves together the magic of their interrelatedness. His enclosures spring from his constantly searching line, which is never still. It reaches into all the intimate interstices of these concatenated forms in their passage across the drawing surface.

If we look at (Fig. 83) and (Fig. 84) we can see this clearly. There is much that is left 'open' and in leaving open we are constantly brought back to the presence of these lines as they not only activate depth through their interpenetration and overlapping, but they trace out a surface structure which is a modulation of the whole format of
the drawing.

In (Fig. 83) and also in (Fig. 93) he superimposes forms, heaping them up on the page, juxtaposing heads, improvising all the intricacies of scale. The vigour of these drawings lies in the free use of all their space, where each form seeks its resolution within the space of its neighbour.

In his 'Procession' drawing (Fig. 85), with minimal bravura and with studied restraint, he orchestrates this slowly moving space through the pressing convex forms of the priests. They move beneath the chatter of mitred hats towards the raised upright of the cross. On the page these linear forms beat like a musical score; the voids, like pauses are never empty, but seem charged with a melodic continuity. The shuffling movement of their recession is caught not only through their diminution, but also through their overlapping. These graphic conventions of representing space become expressive as they are held together by all the subtle resonance and reciprocation of concavity and convexity.

This dialectic can be sensed in and through the forms of the drawing itself. However, the whole space of the format can be considered as either concave, where one seems to be looking into this bowl of space through the format frame, or convex, where, as it were, the drawn forms rise toward us out from their own space. Here we meet the distinction of space as limite and space as milieu that we have discovered already. These contraries are evidence that metaphoric space can never be contained, but each becomes the occasion for the
Wynn Jones is a draughtsman who uses most specifically areas of enclosed forms to promote a rhythmic development across the format. It will be useful to investigate his use of enclosure forms, because more than anything else they exemplify the principles we have been discussing. We have already spoken of the kind of line he uses but, in a sense of course, this is really an enclosure form in itself. As it moves across the format surface it carries in its thickness a sharp and suffused aspect. This he makes by drawing areas of tone right up against the line - where it comes in soft and goes out hard. The forward thrusting arm in 'At One' (Fig. 41) is an example and has the effect of suggesting a turn to the form right on the contour. This gives the enclosure, not a great voluminosity - a sculptural plasticity, like David Cowley's, but rather an extension which maintains the flatness of the enclosure area. He reduces the illusion of volume in these figures to an extenuated surface uniformity, which is just sufficient to give them substance, but a substance which one feels is ephemeral - paper thin - not really tangible, yet there none-theless. He works across his enclosures with drawn tone, and there is a wide range of tone, from very light-breathed marks, barely discernible, to areas of dark which one senses, form themselves through a patina of touch, built up from a delicate and patient working across the surface. This lends these velvet darks a very different qualitative sense from the savaged, aggressive accumulations of David Cowley's drawing. Wynn Jones's darks murmur in their softness across the format surface. A good example is 'Manoeuvres' (Fig. 37). Sometimes these
darks represent the figure, as in the figure on the left, and sometimes the ground, like the dark tonal area underneath the white shape toward the bottom left of the drawing. This antithesis gives an extraordinary ambiguity to the forms. It relates them very much to the surface structuring of the format and is a further way of giving them a kind of insubstantiality. He draws not only what is 'found', but also what is 'lost'. This he does constantly along the edge of forms, through a counterplay of light and dark. 'Hurrying By' (Fig. 40) and 'Having Fun' (Fig. 43) are useful examples.

Through this catena of darks and lights, Wynn Jones opens up the interiority of his drawings. He speaks of his penetration of this depth when he says:

"I should say that I often start with one figure, but I feel it will never stay at that - being about one figure. Because what's interesting is what that figure can do when it's confronted with another figure ... I feel that what happens is that in the beginning these images are very much like shadows in their ebb and flow, in the way they resist coming out into the light." (appendix p372/373).

This eloquently suggests his search for the intimacy of these shadows and his stealth as he patiently seeks to clothe them in a substantiability which will be just sufficient to promote their haunting spatiality. We sense these images of intimacy through his treatment of the surface of these drawings. They are drawings that are put together, like Wendy Thompson's, through a contemplative perseverance. He echoes this when he says:

"They're all done on the kind of paper which allows a certain amount of exploratory activity to go on and I develop a very intimate kind of relationship"
with the surface I'm working on." (appendix p 375).

And earlier he says:

"... the ideas that I have in relation to that area, do have a kind of texture, I mean there is a sort of texture to my thinking which demands a response in terms of the materials I'm using." (appendix p 375).

We shall return to these images of touch and of the texture and intimacy of drawing later. But all their evocation is felt within the subtle nuancing of his forms. From the texture of his thinking, from these evocative images of touch, develops the intimate surface of his marks. In his drawing 'Seekers' (Fig. 45) the soft searching touch of the two shapes with their sensitive hands that twist through the ambience of the surrounding space, is not a frenetic anxious seeking, it is a probing, a movement toward each, with the suggested whisper of contact and away again. Even images that are seemingly aggressive are never openly so, this is an aggressiveness that lets be rather than dominates, for example, 'Show of Strength' (Fig. 41). 'Caring Gestures' (Fig. 43) is full of the soft evocation of intimate involvement. The pattern of dark enclosures rise from the bottom edge of the format and twist away like tendrils of smoke into the upper area of the space and die in a cadential curve.

V. 5. 3. Rhythmic transitions of dark and light.

The rhythmic movement of these dark passages is further reinforced as tonal groupings are made within their transition. Thus we pick up
the spatial disposition of very dark areas and these may be counter-
pointed by passages of lighter tone. This subtle changing harmonic
of tone is very important. It is of great interest to both Wynn Jones
and Wendy Thompson, and to some extent, Feliks Topolski. It will pay
us to give this qualitative aspect of their transition some attention.

If we look at Wynn Jones's 'Manoeuvres' (Fig. 37), we can see
that there is a rising pattern of dark areas that group themselves
in an oblique movement from the bottom left hand corner of the drawing.
They are almost opposed to each other in an alternating way, rather
like a tessellated checkerboard. Indeed this counterchange gives a
clear spatial sense of 'manoeuvering'. The lighter grey areas play
a secondary movement beneath and around these principal darks. Not
only is there this patterning, but in the darks themselves there is
a sympathetic echoing of shape, particularly in the dark 'commas' of
the hair. In 'The Lesson' (Fig. 44) there is a modulation between
the shape of the coat on the left-hand figure and the bonnet of the
figure on the right. These principal darks often rise from a ground
of suffused grey. There are many examples, 'Confidences' (Fig. 36),
'In the Dark' (Fig. 39) and 'Dressing' (Fig. 43).

These rhythms of grouped darks, these areas of grey, have for
Wynn Jones a special value. In his conversation he points out:

"... one of the reasons why most of the work does
tend to move between areas, degrees of grey is that
that's how things are, shades of grey, and they
work at their best when the conflict between atmos-
phere and activity is held in a very fine balance."
(appendix p376).

Now for Wynn Jones finding his way through the subtle movement of
these greys, suggested also by the kind of surface he worked with, a surface that was sufficiently grained to catch the charcoal or pencil in its pools and hollows, was a way of inscribing the spatial texture of his feelings. Grey is full of spatial value; it offers in a visual way an opportunity for him to explore, as he says, the power of images and "the prophetic reality of space that were unique to working on that surface" (appendix p377). In all its suggestiveness there are images of tentative probing and the distillation of positive affirmation, full of the metaphoric tension held in fine balance.

Wendy Thompson uses in both her extended drawings a very full range of greys - almost as a painting might. For her, these greys give the opportunity to fully investigate the plasticity of the model and her space, as she says in her conversation; it is this 'physicality' (appendix p381) that interests her. Not a 'copy' in any way of the physical object she might have been working from, but the overpowering physicality of the space arising from the drawing. So grey, for her, becomes a value of change and modulation - of presenting the sense of surface articulation.

Through the sequence photographs, one senses the way she establishes from very early on, patterns of dark with attendant harmonies of lighter tone right across the format. In (Figs. 55 & 56) we can see this chain of looped darks beginning to suggest the spatiality of the figure slung between chair and stool. She sometimes feels, as she says, that she overworks her drawings in her anxiety (appendix p383). There was a
period in the middle of her second extended drawing (Fig. 64, frames 36A, 37A) when the visual 'balance' of the surface structure of the drawing was about right (appendix p383). However, as he says, she is interested in the whole process of drawing, so sometimes she finds herself moving too far but this, for her, is the challenge of drawing (appendix p383).

Feliks Topolski also makes use of these grouped rhythms of darks. In his drawings they are often caught within a surge of linear movement. Sometimes he will make them with broad hatched strokes with the chalk. Sometimes they appear through the sheer concentration and coalescence of the lines themselves, (Fig. 78), (Fig. 80), (Fig. 86), (Fig. 87), (Fig. 88) are good examples. In (Fig. 89) he makes strong accents with a black felt-tip pen, that read as insistent punctuation across the passage of linear verticals. In (Fig. 91) they are grouped in clusters along an arched axis, at the apex of which is the centred dark of the Pope's head. Through a change in pressure and sometimes with a change in medium, he suggests a strong sense of space through the weight of the darks in the lines he draws. (Fig. 83) and (Fig. 90) are clear examples. Heavy interpenetrates with soft, dark with light; through all their fluctuating pressure and tonality one senses the weave of all their space.

V. 5. 4. Rhythmic relatedness of 'figurative' forms.

Our entry into the spatiality of these drawings is not only
through their formal graphic means but also, as we have seen, as these are married to recognisable figurative forms. Thus the rhythmic interplay of enclosed forms can become the rhythms between forms that are recognised as hands, or heads, or figures. Their various aspected related and grouped positions across the format can be powerfully evocative. Thus we sense the space of the pointing finger, we feel the enclosed space of a clenched fist.

Wynn Jones uses these figurative opportunities to explore the intimate space of human interaction. His drawings are full of the gesture of hands and the mask-like face. He says:

"I think that the more obviously expressive areas of the human body are the face and the hands. And it interests me, the way that these two areas of the human body have been depicted, going back to pagan ritual ceremonies where sometimes make-up and masks were used to transform the identity of a person, to induce a kind of belief in something other than who that person actually was." (appendix p371).

The expressive gestures of these forms describe the space of their habitation. We feel the charged space between the glances of the figures in 'Bond' (Fig. 38) and the strange groping foolishness of the hands in 'In the Dark' (Fig. 39).

Of course, their tensive significance rises also from the direction their titles give. For Wynn Jones, the verbal descriptiveness of the titles of his drawings makes a positive contribution to the spatiality of his visual images. He says in conversation that the connection between the verbal and the visual has always intrigued him. He points to Kitaj as being an example of an artist who seeks to find links with other forms of art. He also mentions Beckman who, of course,
found a wealth of expressive potential in the poetic use of language (appendix p373). The titles Wynn Jones gives to his drawings are not simply labels, they offer far more than that. He says:

"... I never feel that a piece of work is complete if it doesn't have a title. Usually the titles are pretty straightforward, there's nothing bizarre about them. They are about simple things, everyday activities and I think that's an important point to make, because at a superficial glance I think that the esoteric appearance of things can be misunderstood and the title is meant to place the idea in its proper context." (appendix p374).

These titles, of course, have their own spatial orientation. When they are caught within the spatial directions of the drawn images a new density, a fresh metaphoric deliverance is achieved. Almost any drawing serves as an example. He talks of his use of titles in respect of 'A Day Out' (Fig. 46) and from its description we find the context for seeing the shape of a boat's hull and the heads of those in it as sails caught by the wind. There is a brief suggestion of a horizon and the shape of clouds.

The significance of the gestures in both 'Caring Gestures' (Fig. 44) and 'The Lesson' (Fig. 44) is reinforced and given a plenitude through the image generated by their titles. It is Wynn Jones's concern that these verbal images set the direction for the visual images to multiply and advance. It is a device that is effectively employed to clarify their direction and to set in motion the orientation of their graphic significance. It is interesting that most of the titles suggest images of expressive activity and taken together with the gestures of hands and faces amplify these specific graphic forms. His
titles move in conjunction with his images; their intrinsic spatio-

tiality interpenetrates, permeates and provides a locus for the ignition
and subsequent distillation of the visual images themselves.

These verbal descriptions, when seen within the vectors of direc-
tion set up through the exchanged glances or the clasped hands of
these figures, deliver a powerful spatial orientation and together
play an important part in and through all the formal means of the
drawing in establishing the tensions and linked connectiveness of
the space across the drawing surface. Indeed, these invisible vec-
tors, as it were, modulate the whole spatiality of the drawing itself.
The 'hands' in Wynn Jones's drawings are given a special kind of atten-
tion and are full of this directional sense, their vestigial fingers
probe out like antennae into their surrounding space. The fingers,
for example, in 'In the Dark' (Fig. 39) grope through the emptiness
which becomes charged with the significance of finding one's way.

The chain or sequence of these figurative forms through the
drawing is enormously important. Of course, these linked sequences
can only be followed and suggested and prompted by the graphic connec-
tedness and 'logic' which we have so far described. Indeed such is
the power of the mind to group like with like and to see the deviation
of like with unlike, that a powerful sequence of movements and counter-
movements can be orchestrated within a drawing. It is this drama of
linked forms which animates Wynn Jones's drawings. The tenderness,
tenuousness, fragility, aggressiveness, stridency and apprehensiveness
which characterises so much of our own human spatiality, is here
figured in graphic terms. In 'Welcome' (Fig. 45) one feels between these two figures that strange uncertainty and apprehension that occurs when one first meets and greets someone else. The figure on the right is ready to embrace, but the figure on the left still has some reservation, his upheld arm with closed hand offers a resistance, very different from the openness of the advancing figure on the right.

Again in 'Formalities' (Fig. 40) one feels the strange backward hesitancy of the figure on the left, his face raised with mouth slightly open, that makes him appear caught in the foolishness of his own embarrassment. His hand is held back, forefinger and thumb together, as if mimicking the tying of the bow which is being done for him.

In 'Surprise' (Fig. 37) the figure on the right has one hand raised to cover his mouth while the other is covered with the fingers of the figure on the left. In 'Manoeuvres' (Fig. 37) this linked sequence of gesturing hands promotes a rhythmic cadence that marks out a kind of counter theme in and through and across the dark axes of the figures.

This drawing is full of charged space. One figure comes from behind the other, another plants a foot as if to stake out a position and the whole has a feeling of jostling for a place, of searching and adjusting for a personal space. The rhythm is established in the bottom left of the format and moves through the linked forms of dark, directed by the gesturing fingers, themselves twisted and contorted.

A minor theme runs up from the base of the drawing to meet this major cross current and is directed into it through the two hands in the centre of the drawing. This rhythmic surge is partly checked by the halting and hesitant position of the head of the figure pressing from the left. Further the movement is from left to right, as though from
uncertainty to certainty. There is a minor drama being played by the hands in this drawing which seek to 'touch' but do not do so completely. Two hands with splayed fingers seem to be marking out the open area of the top right of the drawing, as if to establish an anchorage. He has found within the intimacy of the gestures of these hands and within the aspects of these 'faces' the spatiality of *manoeuvreing*. The sequence of their passage across the drawing, the subtle rhythms of the tiniest form, begins the reverberation of this space. We are caught up with images that rise from we know not where, but they together promote the song of the drawing. And this is not arbitrary, this spatiality rises from these manifestly present graphic images.

Thus it is that the hands of the figure on the left in 'Sacrifice' (Fig. 36) are raised in mild opposition against the forward extension of the hands of the figure from the right who proffers the gift. If we look at the space between these gestural forms, we sense the articulation of all the feelings of hesitancy and of acceptance. And in 'Confidences' (Fig. 36) the space between the figures is closely interwoven, the figure on the left whispering from behind his raised hand. In 'Void' (Fig. 38) the fingers of the figure on the left seems to probe the open space with that touch of the man temporarily blinded. In 'Bond' (Fig. 38) the fingers are tightly laced and there is a particular importance given to them through the care with which every detail of them is delineated, through to the finger nails themselves. In 'Show of Strength' (Fig. 41) the repetition of the folded fingers over the strings gives a sense of unity and confidence. And in 'The
Lesson (Fig. 44) the figure on the left is demonstrating with clarity how to tie a knot, contrasting with the hidden awkwardness of the one receiving instruction on the right.

Thus within the main directional axes of these figures run these counter themes set up by the smaller forms of the hands and the faces, sometimes only recognised as such through the suggestion of an eye, or a half-open mouth. These faces, moreover, are nearly all drawn in profile - their aspected directions are across the format. Only in one drawing 'An Ending' (Fig. 39) are we presented with a frontal aspect. A single baleful eye peers out toward our space, we become locked into this space of personal confrontation. In all the other drawings we are, in a sense, 'outside' them, as though witnesses to a drama. This is also the only drawing in this particular series where there is a single figure. It is almost as if the only dialogue this figure can have is with ourselves. We are the other half of its contract, forced through its stare into its suicidal space.

Examples of this linked sequential cadence of grouped figurative forms is clear also in Feliks Topolski's drawings. In particular from this point of view, we have noted his 'Procession' drawing (Fig. 85). Similarly in (Fig. 83) links are set up between the various heads as they cascade down on each side of the Pope's raised arms. In (Fig. 84) we can follow the rhythms of the mitred forms of the priests' hats and in (Fig. 91) we find him enjoying the smaller rhythms made by the nuns' habits on the right. All these forms are held together by his line, which moves between them, uniting them in their
rhythmic rise and fall.

David Cowley's forms rise from an interest in all their dynamic axes. This directional sense he gives to the forms of the emerging nude characterises the whole thrust of the drawing. He describes the motif and situation he was working from with the same energy that his drawing subsequently reveals:

"... she was squashed between those two quite powerful masses, one being that bed at the back and the other was a wooden block and it was quite interesting how, I know there wasn't much space in that life-room, but you had an area of fairly open floor which was somehow drawn up into her legs, went along her thighs, up across her stomach and up through the head and then there was quite a big gap between some screens and so that kind of movement disappeared right through and went right back, in fact, into the open door just behind her. So that was quite powerful. There was a restatement of the two massive blocks as well, because the chair at some stage had arms, not arms in the sense that they were physical arms, but there was an area between her buttock and the edge of the chair which was defined by her black coat and they gave a very powerful feeling of again squashing this very luminous flesh between areas of black." (appendix p351).

Here we find him describing his whole interchange within the process of his drawing. Images of his intimate involvement with the experience abound. His whole desire is to catch these movements within the fixations of his drawing.

V. 6. 1. The spatiality of touch - concluding remarks.

All the formal considerations of graphic structure that have occupied us thus far are not such that they are wrought with 'self-
consciousness' on the draughtsman's part. The logic of all the inner rhythmic movements of the drawing, all the progression of its inner being, all that constitutes its world, are made with a freedom caught up in the process of all its shaping. Drawings are the intimate manifestations to the draughtsman of his investigations of the world. They are not so declamatory as paintings or sculptures, they speak more as soliloquies, and herein lies their value. For above all else, they evidence the texture of the draughtsman's thought. Wynn Jones comes very close to the significance of this when, in quoting Paul Klee, he says:

"I'm interested that Klee, back in 1909 was saying that he would 'now dare to tread once more the original ground of psychic improvisation. With a link to an impression of nature now only quite indirect, I may once more give shape to what is actually weighing on my soul. To note down experiences which could translate themselves into lines in complete darkness. This is a potentiality for original creation which has long existed - interrupted only temporarily by the timidity caused by isolation. In this way my essential personality will be able to speak, to free itself with the greatest freedom.'." (appendix p 378).

In using the materials he does and through working with a particular surface, he finds he becomes increasingly conscious "of the expressive possibilities of the materials I am using" (appendix p 375). These possibilities prompt him to feel that their texturing, their fecund images of touch give him a sense that "... there is a sort of texture to my thinking which demands a response in terms of the materials I'm using" (appendix p 375). This does not mean, of course, that he is 'drawing textures'. The metaphor he uses is rich in all its suggestion of how these images of touch are reflected within the
process of all his graphic improvisation.

Drawings through all their means evoke these spatial images of touch. Their graphic utterance testifies to the intimate meditations of the draughtsman. Through their intimacies they can open up pathways toward immensity. By immensity we do not mean that spatiality in which we are lost, where we have no anchorage, rather this immensity is a hollowing out, an enlarging from the space where we are. Drawings lead us toward such spaces. As we have seen, they offer through the logos of all their linear pathways the opening of a world. Intimate has a sense of a world which opens up from a world that is miniature – the world within a world. Bachelard gives an example of the cyst in a pane of glass which when we come up close to it, in a kind of intimate union with it, reveals to us a world that invites our habitation (op cit p157).

It is from this intimate that images begin to abound and escape. In Wynn Jones’s drawings it is as though he were inviting us to follow the texture of the passage of these forms, not to hurry by them, but to taste and savour them. In allowing ourselves to move with their textural punctuations and surfaces, we come to the edge of voids which hang in immobility. He, within the intimate security of his drawings, opens up for us the texture of fresh worlds, their possibility no less. Bachelard echoes our thinking when he says:

"Large issues from small, not through the logical law of a dialectics of contraries, but thanks to liberation from all obligations of dimensions, a liberation that is a special characteristic of the activity of the imagination." (op cit pp154/155).
Wendy Thompson is aware of this. In her conversation she says:

"... in my mark-making I always look for things - I don't consciously look, but over the years I have built up a way of drawing so that I can tack on to anything that I need - it could be a dot or a squiggle or a blue line, I don't know, it just could be a million things, but that its extremely opposite to the next thing that I put down - that's so important to me to get some kind of tension and I suppose, in a larger sense, it's exactly how I feel ...

(appendix p383).

So it is also with Wynn Jones. He also moves out into this space, with care, patience and deliberation; watching with an eye which is sensitive to the slightest change and nuance of his line's passage across the white. Tiny fragments, faint impressions, images that coalesce along the line. Images which spill over from the drawn line of charcoal on paper, leaving as it goes the dust of its passage, all of this begins to sharpen the appetite of touch. Drawings which explore the texture of this possibility open up for us images of the cosmic.

It pays to dwell on minutiae - so easily is this sense of a drawing's intimacy lost, so soon its meaning evaporates to an eye that looks only to an immediate representation - a kind of taxonomy that reaches only toward a partitioning for classification. Indwelling takes time, and it takes a commitment. It takes the pinning of one's faith in the direction this movement is making. This is only within the reach of the eye which comes to inhabit these enclosures; to an eye which savours the tracing of these borders; to an eye which traverses these 'open' and 'closed' forms; to an eye which lifts to all the singing of these lines and readily goes with the evocation of their calling and follows them as one which resonates with all their harmonies. As Bachelard
points out:

"All small things must evolve slowly. ... Also one must love space to describe it as minutely as though there were world molecules, to enclose an entire spectacle in a molecule of drawing. ... It is as though the miniaturist challenged the intuitionist philosopher's lazy contemplation, as though he said to him: 'You would not have seen that! Take the time needed to see all these little things that cannot be seen all together.'" (op cit p159).

Drawings are 'world molecules' that invite our participation. Their invitation is to follow the adventuring of the draughtsman's imagination, to share his appetite for discovery.

Bachelard writes illuminatingly on the word 'vast'. He says that for Baudelair the word had a vocal value (op cit p196). It is there to be pronounced, not simply read. This is the space of immensity. As he says:

"It transmits to our ears the echo of the secret recesses of our being." (op cit pp196/197).

This movement toward speech which the voice has as it apprehends the word 'vast', is a movement toward the gesture of making sound. Bachelard likens this to a sixth sense, like a delicate Aeolian harp, set at the entrance to our breathing.

"It quivers at the merest movement of metaphor; it permits human thought to sing ... I begin to think that the vowel 'a' is the vowel of immensity. It is a sound area that starts with a sigh and extends beyond all limits." (op cit p197).

Drawing is the draughtsman's sigh for sounding. It is gesture begun in vocalisation. It is the mark of his coming out. The 'ah' of his having seen at the root of the sounding vowel of 'vast' is testimony that he is already participating in images that begin to
reverberate toward this fresh orientation of possibility, this opening cosmic spatiality. These images of intimate immensity are magnetised in drawing through all the images of touch. Through the drawing's touch we catch the cadence, the 'ah', of the draughtsman's graphic imagination, his daring to go. The song of all his line, the harmonies of all his tonalities, only resonate, only move as his touch delivers them. Touch is the texture of his thought in act and it is always caught, implicitly and inevitably in the way the drawing is put together. Touch registers the draughtsman's appetite (or lack of it) for search, his hunger to bring together, to satisfy himself that he knows. Ayrton(15) senses this when he says:

"Thought is not, I imagine, ultimately divorced from appetite even among philosophers. Cézanne's urgent groping for form could not achieve its powerful grip upon the solid without a certain greed for the solid as a tangible satisfaction. An apple has no final reality even for the painter unless he bites it. So he bites, but the decision to bite into the apple and where to bite it and how exactly it will feel as lips and teeth meet it and the fingers hold it for the biting are, in the process of transferring these intentions and sensation to paper, subject to an intellectual transmutation." (op cit pp67/68).

The drawn line, as we have begun to sense, reveals directly this transmutation, this appetite and hunger to make visible. It can reveal strength of purpose as well as weakness of spirit. This it does unequivocally. Herein lies its magic and therein lies its potency; for in revealing courage, it can also betray cowardice; in revealing integrity, it can also reveal only posturing and in revealing truth, it can also betray falsity. Where the draughtsman bites, where he makes his fixation, where he takes his grip on the world, will be known in his drawing through all his touch. Rawson(16) has so ably
summarised it when he says:

"What every draughtsman does is to enact a positive proposition, amounting to a statement without words. 'This', he says, 'is how it is'. His acts in drawing define the terms in that proposition: 'this', 'how', 'it' and 'is'. He opens up by these creative acts fundamental questions about our perception of form, about the meaning of what we perceive, and about what we mean by the reality we assume we know." (op cit p56).

This is why for the draughtsman his drawings are so important, they offer through their transmutations routes for the interrogation of how things are. Within the scope of all the ways he makes his marks, through all the means he uses to put his questioning together, through all the formal structures he employs, he seeks to inscribe a spatiality that allows for this interrogation, a spatiality that feeds his continuing appetite for the search.
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CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of drawing with all its attendant images made actual in drawings has occupied us during the course of this thesis. We have sought to examine and describe drawing as the means through which the draughtsman actualises his experience of the world. Caught within the activity and process of his drawing, he is a pure phenomenologist, for through these images he seeks to describe, rather inscribe the experience of all his seeing. Rawson's comment at the conclusion of our previous chapter is a fitting focus for our concluding remarks. In making his drawing the draughtsman enacts his proposition, makes his statement. The draughtsman through his drawing is saying 'This is how things are'.

The 'this is' of drawing brings it immediately into the realm of the actual - of the act made form. 'This is' in drawing is a demonstration, a way of showing, a disclosure. In making this affirmation the draughtsman has an anchorage from which he can interrogate the world. As he moves out, he also begins to move within all the opening spatiality his image forms promote. Within this affirmation lies all the opportunity of possibility uncovered through this singular act.
'This is' moreover begins the whole process of drawing, the drawing from to draw toward. This enactment is the invitation to the voyage. In making his move across the primal whiteness of his ground, in his move to draw, he himself is drawn out and is caught within all the movement toward which characterises the core of his endeavour. The 'this is' of drawing brings space and time together in that reciprocal dialectic that lends to his emerging image all its expressive potential. His move to make his representation, his fixation, is testimony that he himself has already been moved by what he has seen, has already been magnetised. The 'this is' in drawing discloses the implicit orientation to make sense.

If the 'this is' of drawing is the draughtsman's visual thought made actual in form, the 'how' gives to it its clothing. Our final chapter examined the 'how' of drawing through all the various means the draughtsman employs as he moves to make. The particularity he gives to his thought only clarifies itself as he clothes it through the graphic structures he himself discovers. Herein, as we have seen, lies the whole efficacy of drawing. More clearly than any other form in the visual arts, drawing immediately betrays how the draughtsman thinks. It betrays because it also reveals. By these forms shall you know him. However within all its boundness and implicit coherence lies his opportunity for uncovering the 'imaginaire' in vision. Un-equivocal as these lines are in their appearing, their truth or falsity, their courage or timidity, will stare him in the face. They will moreover, reveal his touch, for his touch is where he has sought to grasp what he has seen. The 'how' of drawing gives us insights into
the pathways of the draughtsman's thought-in-act, and in doing so ignites all our own images of touch, images of intimacy and images of depth.

'This is how things are'. Drawing, through all the richness, variety and particularity of its graphic forms can give a fresh sense of the 'objectness' of things in the world. Pathways made moribund through habit take on a new significance through his images. Through his 'coherent deformations' he can uncover a spatiality not known or acknowledged by us before, he can remake our world. He can lift the mist that surrounds objects, can pierce their skin, uncover their envelope and generate new directions. Things no longer become 'objects' coldly appraised, they become immersed in an aspect, they take on a voluminosity, a thickness, an expressive significance; they offer routes for new knowing.

Finally, the draughtsman seeks through his drawing a sense of a continuing presence. 'This is how things are'. In the 'are-ness' of his drawing the draughtsman is seeking not so much to define, as explore; to open up within the acknowledged boundness of his drawing the reverberation of images; the sense that they present areas of fecund possibility. A spatiality that testifies to the fact that we are where we are not, caught in that contact between being and non-being. Herein is the texture of the draughtsman's image, the work working, leading us toward rather than simply pointing to. What is reached in drawing is still being reached toward. It is a disclosure of what is, yet is always becoming. Drawings, if they are working, are
not simply texts to be read; they offer a promiscuity caught within
the richness of their visual ambiguity that is never an 'all-done'.
Herein lies their ontological and epistemological status.

The whole of our philosophic endeavour has sought to move within
the orbit of this tolerance. To seek to make definitive what these
drawings so eminently suggest, would be to undermine the whole imagi-
native concern. Speculation is not uncertainty, speculation points
toward possibility, possibility that rests within an arc of probability.
Neither philosophy nor any other science of knowing can do more. All
it can do is seek to narrow down the arc's compass.
APPENDIX I:
TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATIONS

DAVID COWLEY
ARTHUR DI STEPHANO
WYNN JONES
WENDY THOMPSON
FELIKS TOPOLSKI
David Cowley
Geoffrey Bailey

I'd really like to start with the things that you were doing at St. Martins over the two days and really to say something first about the process photographs and then perhaps to move on to some of the other things you have done in the past. One of the things that strikes me immediately and certainly as I was watching you when you were drawing, was the way that you're constantly concerned with exploring the space in which the model is situated even though very early on you're not really concerned whether it's a model or whether it's another kind of object. The marks that you make seem to me to indicate that you're building up a kind of constellation in which this space can begin to happen. Is this perhaps a realistic sort of assessment of the way you are thinking about the drawing initially?

Yes, and I think it is very true that you ... for a drawing to work, or whatever that means, it's also got to live and it's got to live within a kind of environment and I know that sounds a bit strange, but you've got to get it somehow to be able to operate, or work, or function, or live within that kind of environment which is both two dimensional, you can never get away from the flatness of the paper and yet it's more than just being totally an illusion of three dimensional space on that two dimensional space, but the marks have got to be both on the surface of the paper but they have also got to work beyond it and in front of it, so you really are working within that old convention of a 'cube' rather than a flat sheet ... though you can't deny that ... So that's quite important, I mean very early on I think, with the marks I'm making, are eventually marks moving backwards, forwards, rather than ones just marking out boundaries ... well, I suppose they are marking out three dimensional boundaries and directions within those boundaries rather than just going for where one surface turns and joins another.

How much are you affected by the actual boundaries of the paper? Is the cube of space that you are talking about situated somewhere within these boundaries or are you making the kinds of initial sort of tentative probes around this space, with the boundaries of the paper in mind? Because that obviously is part of the two dimensionality of the surface - the actual boundaries of the paper. Is that important in the initial stages of the drawing?

It's difficult to know how important it is because immediately I say, "right, the edges of this so-called cube are the edges of the paper", there's a limitation. So what I probably say is that it fluctuates four or five inches in from the edges and four or five inches outwards. I mean, I wish it was possible to have such a large bit of paper that you never really were limiting the edges of this. I mean, I tried a thing, that quickly became a cliche, very early on, by framing, making some marks within and framing the drawing within the edges, moving in say three or four inches
DC from the edges of the paper and marking those out and saying those are the edges that you work in and around the edges of that. But that very quickly became a kind of cliche and so you're aware of the edges of the paper, but they mustn't be a restriction of any sort, but just a vague delineation in some sort of way. I wish in looking at the photos ... the whole sequence now, that the edges ... perhaps the whole thing had been worked right through. I mean, I try and work right from top to bottom and in every way through, the edges seem a bit, not ill-considered, but not as totally relevant as they should be.

GB So that space, within which this image is beginning to emerge, is tacitly assumed as you begin the drawing, it's something that you are in a sense perhaps intuitively feeling your way in and out of, as you build up the image of the drawing, and so therefore the marks that you make are, in a sense, in response to that tacit knowledge that you have of the space that you're trying to make even though you haven't got to it.

DC No, I think the marks, in fact, mark the space and create the space in a way that's very different from how the space exists in front of you, or how you think how it exists in front of you. And, I mean, we haven't mentioned time at all and it must change in a sequential way as well, so it's not only a spatial thing, it's time as well as space. But the space you're trying to create has some visible links with what's in front of you, but it must operate in its own right. Because, I mean, they're only anchor points, what's in front of you, but they are very important anchor points that give what you're particularly looking at its particularity. So the marks are made with the space in mind, but with the sense of it being able to develop its own space as you go along, so they are tentative feelings out to a kind of reality, rather than a ...

GB Rather than a definition of that reality.

DC Yes, yes.

GB I was going to say, at what point does the sense of that take over ... of the space that you are trying to achieve within the image, begin to happen for you? I mean, is this, in fact, what you really are concerned about all the way through the drawing, so that when you leave the drawing at the end, to some extent it may or may not be successful, but it is, in fact, an exploration along that kind of direction that you're concerned with?

DC You mean the spatial thing?

GB Yes.

DC No, it's only one tiny part of it. I think you stop a drawing when you realise that the image is there and whether you've arrived at it by means of reaching out toward that spatial ... those series of spatial elements or whether you've achieved it by the very two dimensionality of the mark working in a very surface level, are only just ways of achieving the image and the image for me seems to be able to be found within a three dimen-
sional examination of spatial marks as well as two dimensional ones, but it varies. I mean, sometimes the marks you are making you are very conscious of them being marks ... on the surface and tying together in that sort of way across and up and down and suddenly you put one more mark that will take it back and it will make all those marks work in a very three-dimensional way. So I am not out to produce a three-dimensional drawing in any way.

GB An illusion.

DC An illusion, no, I mean I wouldn't know what ... the illusion... No, it's not an illusion of an image because the image must be very tangible, but it's the image and you know, at some stage or other there is no reason why I shouldn't completely destroy the three dimensional qualities that exist within a drawing in order to achieve the image.

GB How important in the achieving of that is the actual subject matter? For example, you talked earlier about anchor points and references to some kind of outside spatial reality. How important in the formulation of this image that you're talking about which has to do with all these elements that you have discussed, how important is the actual subject, is that crucial or not to you?

DC You mean subject matter in terms of whether it's a figure or an object?

GB Is the figure an object?

DC The figure is a figure and the figure is an object and the figure is an image and the figure is whatever you want it to be, but essentially it's a series of reference points. And obviously you respond very differently to a figure than you would to a particular type of object. You are very aware of ... I mean, I was aware of that girl very early on in the terms of how suddenly aggressive she was, in a way, almost wanting to say what the hell am I doing here? And more importantly what are you doing there drawing me when I need to be somewhere else? And I think that came through, it must have come through, I think in a way over a long period of time, and that's why I like to work on drawings as long as I possibly can. I mean if I could get hold of that model again I would go on with that drawing. But that was a kind of immediate thing that I was very aware of and came through at the beginning. I think it changed very slightly on the second session, she wasn't so openly aggressive or sullen; there were odd spurts of it, and I must have responded to that as well. So drawing a figure is very different from drawing an object. I'm quite pleased that she changed her pose a bit, I was never too worried about that. I mean I would find it a great restriction if she was always in the same pose and I certainly wouldn't paint her with little red crosses and say don't wash for a week. (Laughter)

GB No, no, so the way that Euan Uglow, for example ...
DC Yes, I was thinking of him. I mean it's very necessary for his work and that kind of tenacity and singleness of purpose is very interesting. So going back to that initial point, I would respond very differently to a figure than to a series of objects, though essentially they wouldn't be approached in any very different way, the anchor points would still be there, I'd try and create the image from there.

GB Yes, I was thinking more in terms of your subjective involvement with the figure is obviously an important element in you preferring perhaps to work, in that sense of involvement, more than just with an object - I mean that's fairly important isn't it?

DC Well, what do you mean by subjective?

GB Are you interested ... you talked about the kind of sullen aggressiveness ... is this part of a characteristic that you want to try and achieve?

DC No, not that mood feeling. In a way I think it perhaps determines initially how you attack a drawing and it gives you again another anchor point, doesn't it. But that's all and those are things that pass and move in, just like, you know, suddenly you realise that the whole thing is very grey and you long for a bit of colour and it's a very instant thing and you know perhaps, I didn't do it with this drawing, but with other ones you reach for colour and very quickly work the colour in because that is what you need at that time. You can work through the colour back to black and white or shades of grey if you like ... but it's an anchor point and you think it suddenly seems to be something that might be useful and so ... I tend to be impulsive in that way and I jump into it, you know. I think we talked a long time ago, when I did the first series about how fascinating I found Nick's approach to drawing when he went from stage one to stage two. This is something I couldn't do. So if I suddenly felt the need that the whole thing should be red, I'd do it.

GB Which indicates a very real feeling... You are feeling all the time that the thing is in flux and is constantly shifting both backwards and forwards, in and out. That kind of flux situation is indicated, one might almost say, by the kind of technique, by the way in which you actually draw. So you're not so much interested in defining as exploring, would this be true?

DC Yes, yes, I think that's it. You're exploring but with the hope that something will be defined.

GB Yes, it's a different kind of definition isn't it? I mean, in the sense that somebody picking up the line of a contour and actually working through it, like one of the subjects I am working with at the Royal College does that in terms of his own drawing. This is a very different way from the way in which you actually see your approach to making the image and your approach to definition in that sense. You're not involved with putting a line round something, you're actually involved with exploring the shift of spatial concern along an edge within a total context, aren't you?

DC Clarity can come in very many different ways and I think that
DC gradual build up to clarity can be a way of working and I think that's initially how I approached drawing when, you know, when I was at college and painting as well. We were taught by people, in fact, who worked in that way, so you worked by gradually mapping the whole thing in and gradually worked in to knuckles, nipples and kneecaps, but it left out so much and you weren't free; you were working to a kind of formula that produced well-defined drawings, but they were empty and hopeless and they didn't have any kind of excitement about them. I mean that really is what is important, the excitement of achieving the invisible by looking at the visible.

GB Yes. Were there any points in the process of the drawing where you felt this was really coming through. In other words, were there points in the drawing where you achieved this to some extent ... this is the image isn't it; this is really what you are talking about and then it moved away from you.

DC I think it happened all the time quite honestly. I find there is an initial period where you're looking around for anchor points and you don't want to rush these. I mean, the first mark you make might be one you discard at the end of a drawing or in a couple of days or a couple of minutes, it doesn't matter, but you are tentatively searching for a kind of framework on which to hang the image and tie it together if it's possible to tie ... and you always think that mark you have just made is quite relevant to the build-up of that image and you see it there and you lose it and you move inwards and outwards from it.

GB It's a kind of morphology isn't it?

DC Yes it is, but in a way I'd stop a drawing immediately I felt that I had achieved the image because it would, it would force you to stop if you were aware of what was going on ... if you were not aware then you would be working to some kind of formula, which is what I try not to do. I know it's impossible not to work to some sort of limitations. It's this discovery thing or desperation, it's excitement in the drawing and once you've done the drawing, in a sense, it's both interesting and irrelevant.

GB I was going to say, once you have moved past the history of its making, you have a very different attitude to the whole of the drawing itself. I mean, this is another aspect of the temporal nature that you were talking about earlier. In the process of actually bringing this image through, which is what it is you are endeavouring to do, you have a very much more dynamic link obviously with the drawing because it is in process. When the drawing has passed, how important is it to you?

DC It's a way of reliving the looking which is quite interesting and that's quite relevant. It's a way of reliving the sensations you had when you were drawing. The sensation of her stretching back on that chair is as important as the marks that lead you into it, so there is a series of feelings that are tied to it, as well as visual experiences - that's very interesting.

GB But it always makes you go on to make fresh drawings.
DC Takes you want to ... Yes, or continue, with that drawing if that was possible. It doesn't tell you any more about how you should draw or ... it doesn't lead you on to a path ... because that seemed to be a very particular experience and I find it very dangerous to try and relive those experiences hoping that they will help you to draw or live better.

GB Are you always trying to refine your way of drawing, because of what you've just said?

DC I'm trying to be more articulate if that's refinement, no, I don't think it is. No, I don't think it's refinement, in a sense, it's trying to be more articulate in that way and in a very momentary way too. I mean, going back to that thing about how relevant is a drawing after you have done it. I mean, many people say I can't see the drawing because there's so much 'shine' from the pencil or whatever and I can, perhaps, only see the drawing if I walk past it very quickly and in a particular moment I can see the drawing clearly and I say fine - that's all and it's really rather like that moment ... the walking ... or the drawing you have done, for that one drawing, suddenly in that one moment you see the clarity and that's all.

GB And that really is the image isn't it?

DC Yes, I think so ... the one that makes you stop and, perhaps, re-examine it and go back to that position and try and re-evaluate the whole thing.

GB And the holding of that image for contemplation, in a sense, is what makes the presence and the feeling of the drawing?

DC Yes, I think so.

GB And that is what you're moving towards when you are talking about clarity and articulation, that is the kind of thing ...

DC It's clarifying the image in a far more potent and powerful way. There are other ways ... I was quite interested in Wynn Jones' drawings because his image is clarified by the marks he makes in the bottom right hand corner ...

GB The titles.

DC Yes ... The problem is with something like that, is that the clarity is given to you - it's not a clarity that you achieve. I'm quite interested in the clarity that comes out of the drawing.

GB Visually.

DC Visually in any way possible ... I want people that look at the drawing to arrive at that clarity in an equally personal way and that's why I'm quite reluctant to put titles, although, in fact, it would help ... you know, immediately ... somewhere on that drawing, if I put 'reclining figure' people would then start to operate visually in a particular way; they would start to sort out things. I mean, perhaps the image is far more powerful if it ... if they see it in a series of forms, shapes and surfaces...
DC communicate a feeling of something reclining in a chair without it being stated.

GB A lot of what you're saying, David, seems to include the whole area of visual ambiguity in the image forming process, which you're actually very, very interested in aren't you? Because this is part of the image's 'clarity'; this is part of its sense; this is part of its meaning - the visual ambiguities that are coming through at various points in the drawing which are contributing to this momentary sense of what the image is. Would this be true? Is ambiguity, in the sense of what I've just said, important to you?

DC I don't want the drawings to be ambiguous for the sake of being ambiguous - because they give a kind of false excitement, I mean, you know, if you are not certain about what one thing is or another. But if you're going for a kind of clarity, a kind of organization of what you think is important and a kind of articularity, in a way, you have got to be aware of the ambiguous, the things that lead you away from what you want. I think it can be used.

GB Aren't these part of the structure though of the image that you are making ...

DC Well, it's that ambiguous thing we were talking about - the two dimensional surface of the drawing and the marks that could indicate a three dimensional quality. I mean, you're aware of both aren't you? And perhaps you should be aware of all the other possibilities - the ambiguity, in fact.

GB Would another term be tension - a kind of visual tension, or does this go too far toward a sort of structuralism feeling about the drawing. Is visual tension and visual ambiguity something that operates ... it obviously operates in what it is you're doing ...

DC I think it could be an area that could be the basis of attention, yes. On the other hand, marks working against one another can have a tremendous amount of tension as such, but they don't necessarily have to be ambiguous do they? Though you could say in certain areas of the drawing, you're not absolutely certain whether the mark works backwards from point A or forwards - but that's, perhaps, when you just see it in isolation, don't you? The ambiguity is when you don't see the totality, and it's one individual part that can ... it's like watching a film, isn't it? Where you for one reason or another see the wheels of a stage coach go backwards, and if you're looking just at those wheels, they could be a kind of ambiguity, but if you're seeing the totality of the image, there's no doubt in your mind. So ambiguity, perhaps, could come from isolating things and because the image, we could go back to this really, the image is not powerful enough to override those ambiguities.

GB Yes, yes. Have we at any point, do you think, clarified what the image is; that it is that you are trying to achieve?

DC I don't think we could really. I think we tried this last time, didn't we? To try and clarify what the image was. I don't think I could, I mean, perhaps I could come nearest to it by saying that it's the totality of visual and emotional experiences in
that activity of drawing that seem to be the most fruitful and the most powerful, but that's all. I don't... the image isn't more powerful if the figure looks 'fleshy', or the image is not more powerful if the drawing is very 'spatial', the image is not more powerful if... well the if's go on and on and on, don't they? But it's something that I take responsibility for and the viewer takes responsibility for as well - the identification of that image, and you know, people have got to work at looking at drawings too. Philip Rawson is fine when he says, right at the beginning of his book, and it's really a restatement all the way through of the 'language' and how the particular language of a drawing and how to read it and all that. Well, O.K., but I think people should enjoy working that out for themselves, if the drawing holds them for long enough. I want to be able to hold them for long enough for them to be able to work out the 'language', if there is such a thing, of that particular drawing.

So really this is asking for somebody to become involved in your own scanning processes and your own particular directional involvement and interest and absorption with this image that it is you are trying to make and to, in a sense, draw them in through the efficacy of the drawing itself. I mean, this is really what it is you are trying to do, isn't it? This is the kind of truth; this is the kind of value; this is the kind of meaning that a drawing would have for you.

Yes, yes. I mean, it's like looking at one of Cézanne's self-portraits and working your way with total involvement from one section of the head across the whole of that hard skull right to the other side. I mean, you are, you're grabbed, you're involved, you're working your way across that surface in a totally committed concerned way, and you're reading it, you're reading it as perhaps he wanted you to read it; but I mean, how were you grabbed, what made you want to do it - the power of the image.

Yes, yes. How far do you find yourself at certain points in the drawing possibly being seduced by the kinds of marks that you're making? Is this a danger that you have been aware of and actually deal with in the process of making your drawing? Are you ever actually seduced by the sorts of marks that you make?

(Laughter) Yes, I am all the time. I mean once you've made a mark you're seduced by it - either with going on or going back or whatever. I never really look at a mark and say: "Gosh, isn't that a beautiful mark, let's keep it". I think there is a danger and anyone that makes marks on canvas, paper or whatever is aware of it. But if that mark isn't relevant for what it contributes, as well as being relevant in its own right, I think it should go - but I think you are... I mean, there's something really very satisfying in a notebook and I've done this more than once - just sitting, making marks and trying to get the most seductive marks out on the paper, the problem is that once you try and make seductive marks they never look seductive. Seduction is something that takes you unawares sometimes.

Right - and it's also something after the event, isn't it? In other words, if the thing is working and if it's actually in context you can actually, in a sense, stand back from it and then
GB: begin to assess it in its context for what it is which actually means you can continue the drawing rather than become involved just with the sort of drawing that it is. I mean this is the difference, isn't it?

DC: Yes, I think the thing too is that I tend to work over a drawing in a very radical way. I'll put a mark down but I will re-assess it, very very soon after having put the mark down, in relationship to the marks that came before and the marks that came on after it. So, if I suddenly find, and this is probably where these sequences are so interesting, if I suddenly find that a mark has stayed untouched for any length of time, (a) it's got to be very important or (b) it's beginning to have a negative influence on the total drawing. And I assess that and it might mean that I would need to remove that mark totally, see how the drawing operates without it and then perhaps come back to it and restate it.

GB: Do you remember, at points in the drawing, when we stopped for coffee and were just talking about it, the graphic anchor points that seemed important to you in the middle stages and certainly in the early stages of the drawing was the way in which the space, or the areas around the figure, was compressing this figure up through a kind of diagonal, leaning back core. Now this was a very, very visual and graphic thing that you were holding on to. That was important to you, wasn't it, at some stage in the drawing?

DC: Hell, at that time, I mean, she was - she was squashed between those two quite powerful masses, one being that bed at the back and the other was a wooden block and it was quite interesting how, I know there wasn't much space in that life-room, but you had an area of fairly open floor which was somehow drawn up into her legs, went along her thighs, up across her stomach and up through the head and then there was quite a big gap between some screens and so that kind of movement disappeared right through and went right back, in fact, into the open door just behind her. So that was quite powerful. There was a restatement of the two massive blocks as well, because the chair at some stage had arms, not arms in the sense that they were physical arms, but there was an area between her buttock and the edge of the chair which was defined by her black coat and they gave a very powerful feeling of again squashing this very luminous flesh between areas of black. So that was quite important ... I held that for most of the time. It changed character a great deal, the marks weren't as graphic as you said they were at the beginning, but essentially that feeling was there all the way through.

GB: And that's the feeling of the drawing, isn't it? Because that in the end is what comes through in the last frame - that sense of compression and tension, that in a sense is running up right through the core of the figure, twisting over, turning, incorporating the various nuances within the change, within the figure. And, in a sense, one might almost say, the graphic meaning of the drawing lies in that kind of explanation, that kind of exploration really. Would you say that this was possibly true?

DC: Yes. I had to weigh that up equally with another series of marks that were very, very strong vertical marks. I think while there was this graphic, twisting and bending as you said, there was also
a very strong vertical one that was stated quite early on if I remember, just slightly to the left of her head and it went down, straight down across the body into the leg of the chair. Now it stayed there, it altered, it shifted to the left and the right, the angles changed a lot too, sometimes they were quite accurate in the terms of what I could see, the leg particularly of the chair. But I felt it was somehow an anchor point, I removed it at some stage ... the vertical mark also became a kind of angle which reinstated the floor, sometimes the mark went right to the edge of the paper, right off the paper and at other times it stays quite compact underneath the chair. So I played around with these two elements and in quite a formal way they were contributing something quite powerful to the image. I found, after a bit, that the bottom vertical mark had to move over slightly and I think if you look at the drawing, you'll see that it has shifted quite considerably at the top as well as at the bottom - so I wanted to emphasise the verticality of the drawing in conjunction with the twisting and bending backwards.

And how important is the floor, David? This other dimension that is moving, in a sense, underneath this verticality because the verticality is almost a two dimensional thing that links it almost to the surface of the paper, the floor actually is another tension moving against it. And that seemed quite important, because you've made marks that describe the cube of the chair on the floor.

Yes, the floor was important. At some stage I thought I wanted the floor and one foot to be very, very closely linked together and for the foot to take off the floor and carry your eye up the leg and where the knees were bent and across. Very soon after that I decided I did not want that obvious anchor point; I wanted it to be implied two or three inches out of range of the drawing. I wanted to imply that the floor and the foot were ... and I think they do work together in quite a good way. So the floor had to be spatially seen in order for that foot to operate outside the drawing, in fact, that was quite important.

Yes, yes, which is another indication of this cube of space extending past the boundaries of the edges of the paper that you were working on. I mean, here is a very real example of their working. Not only is there a spatial sense within the drawing but it is actually seeking to break the bounds of the edge of the paper.

But you see that spatial ... this series of spatial relationships are important for what they do, not for what they are. I mean, I've done drawings that are illusions of spatial elements, that work really quite well, but they don't do it for any other way or any other reason that they're spatial drawings, which is like saying I'm going to do a pencil drawing - so what, so what if something operates spatially, there's got to be something far more beyond that, that really is the most important thing.

Is this something that you might talk about in terms of the visual idea of the drawing?

Yes. I think it's the visual idea that develops from the drawing. I don't think I started off with that idea; I think it gradually crept up and into the drawing; the idea might change. I might
DC have found half-way through that I really wasn't that concerned about the black coat and the space enclosing the figure and crushing it and squeezing it, I was far more concerned about the way that light flesh was a kind of gap that was torn between the areas of black and, in fact, the flesh was actually seeping into areas of black and permeating the whole thing rather than the other way round. It didn't develop that way I must admit, but it could have very easily gone that way.

GB Yes, and if you were continuing the drawing that it is at the point where these ideas are suggested to you through what you have already achieved in the drawing - which is an important thing about drawing, isn't it? I mean, it is actually developed a particular kind of thing that you have begun to try and sort out but weren't clear about, but which is now giving you a platform from which to move forward into fresh areas of exploration and possibility that are provided within the visual structuring of the drawing itself.

DC Yes, the thing too is that many people have said I can't see your drawing, why don't you do a whole series of them; rather like the way potters make objects, they never work one idea out with great clarity by destroying what they've got, they simply make a whole series, which would be fine ...

GB Blind you by number.

DC Yes. I mean, I think painters do this as well, everybody does - somehow feels the image is so precious that you can't bear to destroy it. I think that intention of being able to destroy it is important. Anyway that's a side track. It's important that all the events and ideas, the misjudgments, whatever, are held within that drawing, because I think that's what gives it its kind of potency, in a way, so, if somehow or another I had felt very strongly that the idea of having a fissure expanding into the areas, and opening the space out was important, I would have done it, quite consciously, over the top of what already existed; it's not another drawing, it's the same aspect of the same drawing. I mean, this perhaps leads to a kind of difficulty in being able to read the image with clarity, but you know, you've got to say what is important, a well seeable drawing or a well readable drawing. The real excitement is that in the next moment it might fall apart - totally, and you have got to be aware of everything at a very crucial level in order to keep it where it is - because you can lose it.

GB This tenuousness is something which you touched on before and is a kind of fragility, that is an aspect of the image that you are trying to reach toward, isn't it? And yet it ... in other words, it can be or not be, and the line between it being or not being is a very, very fine one indeed, isn't it? And the livingness of the drawing depends on almost the tension that exists between that kind of dichotomy, isn't it?

DC Yes, yes, the excitement of knowing or not knowing.

GB Or of falling ...

DC Yes, I mean, you start a new piece of work with a real excitement
DC in the sense, that not only are there so many things you want to put down and say and look at and examine or whatever - we still haven't got used to this idea of wasting time have we? That you might, in fact, spend two or three weeks drawing something every day of the week and find at the end that there's nothing; that you were neither up to seeing what was there or putting down what you felt was important. And I'd much rather have nothing than something that was nothing. I mean, I've been drawing for myself - I clarify the way I see, I clarify the way I look, as well as clarifying the things I'm looking at - clarifying my response to things - that's all. It's nice when people look at the drawings; it's even nicer when they quite like them, but really they have got nothing to contribute apart from what they want to contribute when they look at the drawing.

GB Is that what makes drawing, for you, something which is very essential to the way you think and operate? Is that why drawing is important to you, because of its very, very private kind of ...

DC I was trying to explain to some students in the Fine Art Department about how drawing had, in fact, become an activity that was totally natural to me - that I didn't think about drawing and I can't imagine not making marks on paper for a day or two ... It's just something that is as total as picking up a book or reading or looking at a newspaper. It's an essential part of ..., not because it's anything important or vital, but it's just an activity that happens - because many people have to make a very conscious decision to draw or they draw for a reason, you know, does that drawing relate to what your work's about or what you're thinking about, but the actual activity of drawing is something very important. I mean, I was trying to explain, when I had been brought up on the farm in Rhodesia, that drawing suddenly became the activity of living and finding and being in a way - making marks was as natural as reading books. I was lucky, in a sense, that my parents encouraged me to read a great deal and, I suppose, because there was a kind of sense of isolation very early on, and not wanting to have anything to do with my younger brothers and sisters as they were two or three years younger than I was, made this a kind of way of living and operating and it's totally natural. I mean, I don't draw except for any reason apart from just drawing.

GB Yes, yes. So for you it really is an extension of yourself outward into the world, just as language is, just as the way you use clay and so on. It's as natural to you as that, in the sense, of how it operates for you.

DC Yes it is. It's not only in the way I use clay, but it's in the way, as you said, the way I use language, the way you use anything you use the body or a tool to communicate something. Drawing is another way, it seems totally natural to make a gesture on paper rather than a gesture in the air. Sometimes, it can say far more in terms of pin-pointing something or making it more articulate. It's not drawing really, is it? It's clarifying something in a way that it's possible to clarify.

GB The interesting this is that it formulates the history of these gestures doesn't it? Into a form that can be lived through again, whereas a gesture is lost on the air, words are lost, unless they're
GB recorded, words are lost once they have been spoken, drawing has a very tangible way of bringing back and evoking the sense of the excitement of its making and that's important also obviously in your own drawing, isn't it?

DC Yes, I think so. Though I'm not absolutely certain whether gestures that are made in the air ever are lost. I think there are ways in which they are recorded either via other people, I mean you must be able to know the particular gestures or remember the gestures people make, rather than what they were trying to communicate when they made the gesture. So I think it is a way of trying to form links and trying to re-examine that period of two days when we were doing the drawing and perhaps a mark or a photograph in a way will do just that, pull you back to it.

GB You enjoyed doing this particular drawing, Dave, didn't you?

DC Yes I did. The nice thing about it was that I had the chance to do two days of concentrated drawing that wasn't linked to a self-portrait of one sort or another. I'm always there when I want to draw myself and that's fine but having a model over these two days, yes, it was very good. Then you become greedy, don't you ... (laughter) ... you wish you could go on for four days or five days, a month ...

GB So, as far as what you've done is concerned, there's a sense that has come through from the drawing to you of something vital that happened - of one is to talk of success or not in terms of the drawing, one might say that this drawing really began to work.

DC Yes, I mean, as I said earlier, I think I would certainly go on with it, for there are many things that need very radical changes and I wouldn't know what those are now. I mean, I wouldn't work on the drawing away from the model. I'd have to have that figure back there in order to make those marks formed far more relevant. What I'd do if I ... I mean, I've done this sometimes, worked away from the model; I tend to use the solutions of other drawings in order to solve the problems of this, which becomes a strange sort of mish-mash of nothing in the end. But I might, yes, I would be quite interested, perhaps, in going back and re-looking at that model and re-examining the drawing in front of her. I might find it would lead me on a new track; it might be just a way of clarifying certain parts there. But it certainly has ... it isn't successful in the sense that I couldn't do any more. I mean, that's when a drawing really is successful and it stops. It's very interesting seeing these drawings and I really will spend some time looking at them and I'm glad I didn't look at them before hand, before we talked, because I think it might have sorted things out in a way that I didn't want to. But the danger is that you look back over these and you suddenly think: I wish I'd stopped there. There's a path there that I didn't take that might have been more fruitful. So there is a chance of you almost beginning, if you are not careful, of negating some of the activities because the rest of the activity might have been another path - and that's a problem. You've got to be quite strong with yourself and say: No, that's the path I chose and I've got to stand and be responsible for that.
GB Being too self-conscious of your own activity in that way could be inhibiting of course, couldn't it? While, for example, you're making a drawing and you have remembered what these sequences looked like to you - there is a danger in that, isn't there? Where you could come across, in terms of your next and subsequent drawings, a point where you think ... I remember what this was like when I looked at those sequences, I'd better stop here. That could be a real danger, couldn't it?

DC Yes, yes. It is like when I paint, for example, scraping down at the end of the day is quite important, because sometimes you leave something there. I mean, either you've finished a painting or you haven't and if you leave what's there and come fresh to it the following day, the following morning - you can be seduced by what you've left, rather than seeing it in a totally clear way and, perhaps, it might be an idea the next time I draw to remove everything that's there at the end of the day if it doesn't work and start again. I don't mean with another bit of paper, but on that same paper where there are only slight remembrances of what was there rather than too many, as it were.

GB Yes, yes. Well, David, thank you very, very much indeed. You have found it valuable looking back through the processes?

DC Yes, as I said earlier, drawing is a natural activity. I find doing natural things valuable.
 Were you surprised to see your own process in action, as it were, was there any kind of surprise coming from looking at the process photographs themselves?

The surprise of making?

Yes, and also the surprise of perhaps a recognition of a new kind of order, when you actually started to see the way you worked through the kinds of images that the photographs obviously gave you - was there anything particularly interesting about that to you?

No, because the way I work for the moment ... is that I ... it's a step by step progression and in a way it's a very methodical way of working, all that the photographs do is that they chart, that it's just pleasant to see what the decisions were.

Do they indicate to you something that you already knew - about how you work?

Sure, there's nothing in them that I could say, "Oh, that surprises me", as opposed to anything else.

Yes, the one that you did where you did a great deal of change, do you remember? And you rubbed it out and rubbed it through and so on. That kind of tracks an event of the drawing itself and you weren't really very happy with that drawing were you? (Figs. 20-24)

Well, see, that was an exception. I did that, to tell you the truth, because you were there. I thought it would be a worthwhile endeavour just to push the drawing further than I normally would have done anyway. For, as you know, I would have stopped earlier on and would have got a new clean sheet of paper and begun again, but instead, I decided, 'I'll overcome that and push it through'.

But that's not your normal way of working, is it?

No, no. I don't want to confuse the idea of labour - for me, that was a laborious drawing, where one was working against pentimenti, you know, the lines that were already there and I was working more against those than what was actually there and the response to that ...

You mean in terms of the model?

Yes, it seemed like I was trying to make a 'life drawing' of the errors that I had made rather than what was actually there in front of me.

So, really your drawing is very much concerned with an immediate response to what's there ...
No, no.

On the paper...

No, the reassessment - there's no room for reassessment because the first assessment has to be the right one and sometimes it works and sometimes, more often than not, it does not, due mainly to the fact that, what can one say, one is a student and one has to learn how to draw lines, develop the language of drawing, tone, line, shape and so on - the vocabulary of drawing.

But your approach is very much to do with sensing what it is you want to say almost before you put it down ...

Rather, I know what I do not want to say; to have a pre-formed notion of the image is not the motive for drawing. The only concept I have before making a drawing from the model is that the image should create itself; to find itself via modes which come into being during the act of drawing. These modes are not necessarily arbitrary but based on the 'non point' of view (which, however, is a point of view) of allowing everything there is to be included in the drawing, but inevitably creating only one. Hopefully the one most appropriate at that most specific moment in time.

In other words you want a kind of clarity first of the image.

Yes.

You don't want this clarity to emerge by a reassessment on the paper ...

No, no.

You want it first and then you deliver it by the line ...

Well, what I do is ... I think I said this to you before, is that I always walk a thin line. It's no use having an a priori image inside your head right? Because that destroys the making of the drawing itself. But also there is, as you said, this wanting of clarity, but trying to make, achieve that ... through ... not forcing it, let it happen. It's a 'state of being' when you're drawing, for me - of having knowledge right? Of experience of drawing through continuous drawing and making use of it ... well, not making pictures ... the drawings in themselves are revelations of this experience of drawing so that they are experiential in that sense, but they are not ... going through the motions of drawing - so you have to recreate yourself everytime you get a new sheet of paper and so on.

So the white paper is an immediate kind of challenge in the sense of its being open to you - as being you know ...

Yes.

... within this experience, but it's also got a kind of tension as well hasn't it?

Yes, the whiteness of the paper has a beauty in itself, right? Which I acknowledge and one has to make something of that, it's cognising that
DS that fact right? One begins a drawing with the whiteness of the paper.

B It's using it, isn't it?

DS Yes, if we are going to talk about paper - texture, colour, that too is important as much as what I'm going to put on it.

B Yes, so this last series of drawings, where you were working not on newsprint but actually on fairly good quality white cartridge - was a different kind of experience which you actually felt, wasn't it?

DS Yes, oh yes, I respond to the paper, sure.

B But you respond to it not as a surface on which you can then, in a sense, like Jim Dine, sculpture the thing, by rubbing out and re-assessing, the primacy of the white ...

DS Yes.

B Or the space, if you like, is a very important thing, isn't it?

DS Yes. Could I just mention about Jim Dine. He's a draughtsman, I feel, who is very aware of the fact that he is sculpturing, and he is making use of the paper and it's an awareness of which I ... don't like ... it's something I try and extirpate from myself, you know. It's a consciousness I do not want - that you're consciously using the beauty of the paper to make an artificial beauty which isn't as beautiful as the initial ground, you know.

B So the drawing becomes a kind of resolution between the tension between the whiteness of the paper and ...

DS The model.

B ... the model.

DS And the day.

B ... and the day, yes ... and Merleau-Ponty talks about the line as a gouging out of the in-itself, and this is something really which you're appreciating in the kinds of experiences that you're talking about when you're talking about drawing, isn't it?

DS Yes, yes, well you know that I read him quite a lot, yes.

B That you would share, wouldn't you?

DS Yes, the line itself has a primacy, different kinds of line, how they arrange and how they organise themselves on the space. See ... and I think that might almost contradict what I said - there is the model right? And the time of day and also when you see the drawing taking on its appearance, you know, its in itself - that too makes demands on you, so you've got to keep almost a third eye on the drawing, you see ...

B What is emerging under your hand?

DS Right - so you have to pay tribute to that as well, so you have to say
DS "This line may not correspond to what's out there, but it may help the structure of the drawing as a thing in itself".

B So if anyone was to say - "Your drawings are simply about putting a line round an object"— this couldn't be farther from the truth, could it?

DS Right—right. Well, as you know, there are no lines round objects anyway—nature's not made up of human lines. You know, what a human being does is create equivalents for those, that's all we can do and in that sense they're artificial constructs; they can never be as the world is. But one can assimilate how the world is, in the way you make it.

B Right, so this for you, is really the value of the line, isn't it? This kind of double aspect that it has ...

DS Yes.

B ... not only of being what is is within itself but also what it is that it's making outside itself ...

DS Yes, yes.

B ... which is an important part of the value of the line for you and you try and preserve this kind of ... I suppose it is a primacy really, within the way in which you draw.

DS Well, the line ... there's no fudging—you can't conceal anything, the line is self-explanatory in that sense, it tells you about how your hand was at that time. Whether it was confident of itself, whether your hand was at one with what your brain ... the thought it was transmitting and so on. That's why I use the line, though in some cases, such as Ingres, the line has been used almost cosmetically, you know.

B As an addition?

DS As a refining process, as a symbol of some kind of order which he had right.

B Predesignated.

DS Yes, an a priori order which is something I don't want—I can't achieve anyway, I haven't got ... To me, the act of drawing is to put the chaos of the world into some kind of order, I carry with me every day and I try to exemplify the ordering of this chaos in the way I draw.

B Yes, that's fascinating. The other thing is, you were talking earlier about the model and how important the model is within this kind of tri-partite thing that's going on within the drawing. Why is it important to you to draw from the model?

DS I can only repeat what L'atisse said "that if there were no model one could not deviate from it". It's not as if he could not draw without her, he used the model as a starting point—right? He never relies ... she's not a crutch—an artifice that one needs. I find her useful in that as an exemplar of the world I can create my experience of her (and so the world) and thus in the devition of her recreate it anew.
The sense of the value of the expressiveness of the line that you can achieve, seems somehow perhaps from what you are saying — to marry most when it comes in conjunction with the human figure.

Yes. I want to draw the human figure. I want to have an intimate knowledge of the human figure. Well, we have to talk about the human figure in the terms of a woman, more often than not, the human figure to the artist is synonymous with the woman and for me, that requires that I be with her for a long time, just as when you are with someone else that you wish to know for a long time — they're the only grounds that one has, when you can say — well I know the human figure — you draw her all the time. We're not talking about anatomical — you know I know how many ribs there are, I know how the blood ... the blood system and so forth. I want to know how she sits in one particular day — how her arms interlock with her head — I'm more interested in the external physiognomy, rather than in the internal.

So you're seeing the model 'like yourself'. I mean in the sense of you being in the world, you're sharing this kind of sense as you look with the ... at the model, this kind of evocation that you feel within yourself — because you also are a body — you talked about the physiognomic significance of the forms that you're drawing from, which seems, in a sense, to echo the directions of your own experience with the world.

Yes, it's only through myself that I experience the world, so whilst I acknowledge the other bodies are like you ... I have to find, as Matisse stated, the "individual rhythm" which is in every face, and this is distinguished by the contrast existing between the face of the model and all other faces.

It's because you have a history in the world that you can respond to the kind of history that comes through when you are actually drawing from the model.

Well, I never know the extent of that history. I never know what it is. I always have to discover that, you know, it's not as if it's there all the time as if it's there for us to see. One has to go out and interrogate this history, one has to pick it up and examine it. I have to clarify why I work from the model. What I was saying about Matisse is that he worked from her. If you see the sequential photographs of him at work, he always began with a likeness, slowly he moved away from that. It's that thin line again that I'm talking about.

It's the fugitiveness of that, isn't it?

One needs the physicality of the presence of her there, one doesn't mean you're a slave to that at all.

So like Klee would say — drawing for you is not physical-optical seeing — it's about a kind of sense of getting beneath — piercing the skin of things, isn't it?

Well, yes, if we're talking about piercing the skin, we have to talk about Giacometti. Giacometti's a great example of that, for me he holds a lot of value, in that he made the human body transparent — what is it — you know, there's this great density of lines, but there's always this
light coming through it, if it wasn't there he would, you know, erase some parts - what you had was the front of the body and also you had what was behind.

The essentiality really - of this being in space, but not a kind of space ... where the space became as tangible as the tangibility of the object, you know ...

Well, I think he would say that he was concerned with the space. But how do you experience space? Because there are objects, concrete things of phenomena in the world which we can touch bodily or sense, gauge the nature of their order with our vision, and thus intellect, that we can discern space as the net of our being which we can haul in, find what is there, and throw out again. When one draws, paints, sculpts etc, we draw in this net.

So this really, coming back to your own drawings, would be the kind of value that you're really seeking to achieve, isn't it? It's not spatial concern in the sense of mathematical three-dimensional measurement.

No, no. No, no. That's not space anyway. I'm not interested in co-ordinates. I'm not interested in co-ordination of space. I'm not interested in the mapping out. I may be one day, but I'm certainly not at the time being. No, I'm interested in the fluidity of it - well, we move through it!

Yes, yes - it's a flux isn't it?

Yes, yes.

Would you say this is why the line is such an important element to you within the drawing?

Oh, yes, if you look at the lines, they're always different, there's always equivalents, there's always ... must correspond to how we live in the world ourselves.

And this is their beingness, isn't it?

Yes.

It doesn't mean to say they define in the sense of contour, but they actually are delivering a sense because they are to do with an essential feeling that we have about our sensing of what is out there and the focussing of this sensing, to demonstrate the flux of it.

Yes, yes.

The other thing from the photographs, is the way that you begin always in the same place with the drawing. You begin with the head and the drawing unrolls almost. It moves downward through from the head. I've noticed, and you must have noticed, when you were looking through the process photographs, how over and over again, your initial marks are to do with the area around the head and around the eyes particularly and the nose and so on. Is there a reason for this? It's done so regularly isn't it through your drawings - can you say why this happens?
Well, maybe it's a habit which one day I may have to overcome, but why not? I don't try to defend myself, but obviously it's the most human thing in the world to look at the head, it's the most exposed part of human beings. I don't use it - as we read character from it, it just seems to be the most important part of the body, it's the top.

And in a sense the body reaches out to the space surrounding it from the head. Is it in any way, I don't know, is it in any way symbolic for you that you start from the head?

It's the capo di monte, it's the head of the ... it's the top of the mountain, in Italian 'capo' also means 'head' so it's ... it's like a descent. If I was climbing a mountain one would start from the bottom, but because a drawing is not a mountain, only an analogy, we can begin anywhere, and I begin from that place from which we near the mountain of the world - the head.

But you would never feel, would you? I mean, starting from the feet and arriving at the head?

No, because it's an unnatural progression. If you work with line, the tendency is, you know, to work downwards, lines are more often than not downwards and to draw from the bottom up is almost like a reverse process you know. It may be interesting to do one day, but for the time being it's difficult enough to draw in the usually prescribed manner, you know in the Western way of doing things. (laughter)

So your drawings, when they are complete, are read as a whole, but the interesting thing always is that the lines although they proceed down from the head, are always in a sense bringing back your focus to the head.

Yes, yes. If the initial lines of the head are not right, whatever that means, then more often than not the drawing is usually abandoned. I continue on it with increasing reluctance. So somehow they have to be right, they have to have a sense of being in the right place. The marks do comprise a unity in themselves.

Because it is from where you look out on the world, you know ...

... you were talking about capo di monte, it is, in a strange kind of way, almost the centre of the beingness and so the progression outward from that, not only outward into the space of the paper - which is the designation of the form that you are seeking to make, but it also has a sense of ... you were talking earlier about the rightness of this, establishing this rightness first - which is a kind of genesis for the whole of the drawing isn't it?

Well, I wish I could elaborate on what I mean by rightness. I mean if anyone was to ask ... to say to me, I would demand that they explain themselves. At the moment I can't - it's just a felt experience, you're either happy with it or not.

One of the drawings on the sequence toward the end, where the model had her arm crooked and ... this one (Fig. 33)
Oh, sure, yes.
You were quite happy with that one, weren't you?

Yes.

Where she's got her head resting on her knee and I remember you had two goes at that didn't you?

Yes, well it was such a beautiful pose you know, it was one of those things where you really respond to it. The pose drew itself really, that's why I was so happy about it - one was just a mediator for a change and you weren't imposing any kind of pre-aestheticised notions ... it just drew itself ...

Yes, what you're talking about in a sense Arthur, is not a kind of Appollonian domination, but it's almost a Dionysian thing, isn't it? You're actually allowing rather than dominating aren't you?

Well, yes, one has to **give** oneself all the time, not in a submissive sense, not in a ... Don't be obsequious with the world, but one has to allow the world to be as it is, for me anyway. With regard to the Appollonian sense, it's something I wish to eradicate from myself - that most anatomical drawings are not even beginnings, they're not even aware of how the world is. It's something I don't wish to acknowledge, one goes beyond that. Do you mind if I read?

No, no.

It's a quote from Simone Weil, in her book 'Gravity and Grace' and the quote I am going to read out more or less embodies what it is I do, or what it is, or how it is that I am when I draw, it's this (reads):

"May I disappear in order that those things that I see may become perfect in their beauty from the very fact that they are no longer things that I see."

- that's one right? And another thing she wrote, it's in a chapter called 'Self-effacement'

"To see a landscape as it is when I am not there. When I am in my place I disturb the silence of heaven and earth by my breathing and the beating of my heart."

That's it, what she's saying in fact is that there has to be an acquiescence with regard to the world right? That man ... I almost regard the human being as an interruption of that process. What we must do is to **be** that, to **be** the heart that beats with the world and that's what it is, that's what I try to ... the state of being I aspire to be in the drawings.

A oneness really?

Yes, well, yes, it's all ... sounds ... it's not ... I mean it's almost a cliche, it sounds a cliche, but that's more or less how it is.

Your interruption with the world is not something that actually interrupts, but is in a sense a passage of yourself through the world. It's that kind of thing, isn't it - it's a kind of unitary thing with the world, isn't it?
The drawings are evidence of that, they may not be seen so, you know, if someone was to look at them they might not at all think of what ... they might not understand what it is that I'm doing.

You could really say that that is a kind of philosophy of drawing. That is the philosophy of your drawing, isn't it?

Well, yes. One has to draw. It's not for no reason that people have to draw. They draw for something, it's not for some kind of entertainment. To me it's a revelatory process, it's a ... aspiring to be ... in a state of being. That most human beings in this world have not got the opportunity to do... I don't know what the word is, happier, may be, ... better off, who knows.

They would know themselves.

Yes. O.K. Right.

What you're really saying is that drawing for you brings together the fragmentary elements of experience, that coalesces them into a single kind of focus, in which you can then live through yourself.

Yes, right, that's a good assimilation.

Now the other thing is the speed at which these drawings are done. I've notices for example and I've made some notes about the way in which your drawings very rarely take more than about twenty minutes, half an hour perhaps. But you move very rapidly from one drawing to another through-out the course of a day. This is again evidence of your seeking that moment ...

Yes, seeking that moment but one also loves the activity of it as well - but I like to draw, I don't like to obscure the paper too much, unless one has to. But you are right about the moment, sure. Although you can only achieve it once, if you know you haven't achieved it, there's no use in trying to pull it back, I mean, the evidence is there on the paper.

This is why I think it's fascinating that we've got evidence of a drawing which you did try and pull back and which in the end you were very unhappy with and you almost did it because there was a recording session going on. Did the recording session interrupt you? I mean did you find it difficult to work alongside that situation?

At first, I did, even in the second session I did, you probably noticed I was, but once you get ...

Once you're lost ...

Once you're lost, you don't care who the hell's there. I'm not saying I could draw in a crowded room, but one could draw in a room where the person's are allowed - that doesn't matter. I found it quite useful, it almost acted as an intensifying agent, you know, it made you all that more keen, acute.

You've seen Peter de Francia and you've talked to him about the drawings and so on and he mentioned an aspect of the power of some of these drawings that they are not contained within the paper.
DS Yes.

B That was interesting wasn't it? Because it related to the space in which you were drawing in.

DS Yes, right, right.

B You know - the space at the college, because it is quite narrow there, isn't it? Where you're having to work. And also a kind of optical distance that he was talking about - but that never seems to get in the way of their significance. One never looks at them and feels, 'Oh, I wish he had got the whole of ...'.

DS The figure in, yes ...

B The figure into the boundary of the format of the paper - that's interesting, isn't it? Because it again demonstrates this sense of the way in which the moment of the drawing can actually be found as an embryo within part of the drawing and without it necessarily being a line that is completely round the figure.

DS Well, the embryo in most cases is often the totality of the thing - because all the figure isn't there, doesn't mean that it's not complete. I think there's more of a foot that's not shown than one that is, because one has to imagine things as well, we're not mindless, we do organise right? And we organise that which is not even there, you know, not even on the paper. If you're talking about the viewer - when the viewer comes along and says 'How is that foot?' then he must know how that foot is by the way the hand is, I don't see why that's not ...

B No, true, true. So really the sense of the wholeness of these drawings is coming from an awareness again of what we've said earlier of our own being in the world.

DS Yes.

B We have a self-knowledge of ourselves in the world.

DS Of course.

B Which we lend to the drawings.

DS Yes, yes.

B And again, as I think Merleau-Ponty says, we don't see the drawing so much as see according to the drawing, you know, the drawing is the shaper of our forms and our feelings and this doesn't have to be a shaper which is a format or a stereotype, you know ...

DS Well, there are things that are most interesting ... to artists anyway. Seeing those things which more often than not do not relate to how we usually experience things in the world, they present a different point of view. It is as true to say there are many different points of view and that's the beauty of them, because there are so many there isn't any one.

B So these drawings are as much about what is not there in visible terms, as what is demonstrated by what is there, through the visible terms.
It's a very phenomenological point of view, isn't it? The whole aspect of your own drawing is rooted very much within that kind of feeling and thinking.

I suppose it is phenomenological - but this is the way I've always been. Then if there was such a thing as phenomenology I fall within that category - it's the way I am.

The whole essence of these is the emergence of this image that is to do with the moment, isn't it? And that, going back to what we were saying earlier, has a great deal to do with the speed at which you work and their execution.

Yes, right, but they're not so fastly done are they? If you notice that they are quite considered.

Ah, yes.

You see, when I am talking about moments it almost sounds like saying - It's so fast how does he realise ... how do you recognise this moment? They are considered, it's just that the marks have to correspond, they have to be right within themselves, then one can progress to do something else, to carry on down and across, over and above, beyond and so forth.

Yes, in a sense when you're talking about speed, you're talking about another aspect of time, aren't you? Which actually doesn't come into what you have just said, you're talking about moment, which is timeless.

Right, right, that's just what I was going to say actually, you can prolong it - the power is in how long you can prolong this moment that hits you hard, which you feel very strongly, it will show in the drawing how it was.

And this is when you leave the drawing and say 'It works'.

Or leave it and say 'It doesn't' and do another one.

Yes, but that's the whole exploration of the drawing - is really a move toward that kind of distillation really.

Yes, yes.

These drawings are things in themselves, aren't they. They're not preparations for paintings, are they?

No, no, how could they be? If they were preparations for paintings I would have had definite plans about how the model must sit and so forth. But if I liked the position in which she was moving I told her to stop and I drew her, you know, it was a day to day activity, it wasn't anything planned.

Right and that's important as far as your own drawings are concerned - that they are considered as something in their own right.

Yes, but they are not intended as objects with a social function. If one wanted to make social, beautiful drawings, one could do that anytime with one's eyes closed. They are not intended for show - they're for me really.
GB I acknowledge that and have been glad to be part of that with you because obviously when somebody has been coming in and observing a very private process that's going on there are problems. But this is almost a dialogue with yourself, isn't it?

ADS And ... well, it's a tripartite dialogue, with myself, the paper and the world.

GB And in that sense there are ways in which you are beginning to reinforce and establish this kind of unitary thing that you were talking about earlier and this is where for you the drawings are important.

ADS Yes. All life is figure and ground (laughter).

GB I read somewhere in your studio, where you had written down on a piece of paper, 'I'm not so interested in craft as cunning' (laughter).

ADS Yes, that's right, that still goes (laughter).

GB That still stands, does it? That's fascinating.

ADS The cunning is from Joyce - you know, the craft is also another form of cunning, also craft in the social sense means a pre-acknowledged way of doing things, which I do not acknowledge, which is something I wish to escape from - that's right.

GB That's really in a sense what would summarise what these drawings are about. Is there anything else you want to say?

ADS Only that I am not illustrating some kind of philosophical dogma - that's what I may sound like, but I'm not; but one reads these things and finds that the coin is also rolled for you, that you too can use it, and it's nice that other people are of the same mind.

GB But you could never ever think of yourself not drawing.

ADS Oh no, drawing must ... drawing must be like breathing for me.

GB So for you it is a very natural expression of yourself.

ADS It's not natural enough - it will be, one has to cultivate that, there are some things that have to be cultivated. Drawing must be a natural form of activity - the primitive man drew and that's the first signs of anarchy I think (laughter) - sounds flippant but I don't think it is. I think all those people who draw must be anarchists - they must be because today it has ceased to be a form of expression natural to everyone, the state of our societies in which we live has alienated man from the very sources of his sustenance, from the very activity which would enable him to put an end to his oppression.

GB Yes and in a sense they are trying to reshape the given, aren't they? That kind of anarchy is something that is going on all the time, isn't it? In an interesting sense I suppose the only real resolution of that comes about when you see it demonstrated within the drawing, because until you're able to give it form it has no value. And this is what these drawings are doing, they're giving a significance to that anarchy which, you know, you feel and you want to resolve in some sort of way.
Right. When a society has a set of known precepts and accepted modes of behaviour so therefore you want ... you read things you know; the rich are allowed to be rich and racialism and so forth. I know this sounds incredibly general, it's a gross generalisation, but I agree with Jean-Marie Straub when he made his film 'Anna Magdalena Bach' he said "This is my contribution to the war in Vietnam, you know, and he wasn't being flippant. This is a man doing what he has to do in the world and that's all he can do. He can't be anything else other than what he is, right? And this is all I can ever do, it is as important as demonstrating; it is as important as ..."

Of course.

It's my voice, you know, it will be heard one day. There will have to be a time when ... one can't be like the blind man, one can't be prematurely blind-folded all the time, one has to open one's eyes and make ... well I suppose I am making my stand. This is my stand.
Can you say what it was initially that interested you in drawing with the figure as the primary kind of motif, or 'figurative' as being the primary sort of motif?

I think it's tied in with the interest I have had in painting, which has always been figurative. Progress has been very slow and I've watched with interest the way that people have developed figurative interests in their own work. I've learnt a lot, not just from people working now, but from the past, Beckmann and so on. But I've never really wanted to show work until I felt that I was speaking with my own voice. As to the question of where the actual images come from, I think that's rather difficult, it's rather difficult to give a straight answer, it might be something that will come out in a more indirect way.

But you've always been interested in the figure as human, rather than in the figure as 'object' haven't you?

When you say 'object' what do you mean exactly?

By that I don't mean something that just occupies space, but a figure that has a mood, a figure that actually seems to indicate some sort of drama that's going on, within a space, within even the space of the figure's own dimension, but a kind of drama that is not just to do with a figure in an environment, as might be thought of if it was just an 'object'. Would you say that was true?

I'd prefer to say that once the particular form of the figures are established on the paper, they, in a sense, create their own environment, by that I mean that the sort of tension that exists in the surrounding space, in the areas between and around them becomes as important as the figures themselves. This has got nothing to do with 'composition' in the sense of one aspect of what's going on 'balancing' out another, or anything like that, but rather with an imaginative grasp of space growing out of the intuitively felt relationships within the figurative situation.

Now, these drawings, the scale of them is obviously important, they're about 28cm x 53cm. What interests you specifically in the drawing of these figures that is a distinct concern from the painting of them, for example?

Well, the drawings, the actual ideas that I'm still involved in were first of all explored in drawings. I think the reason for this is that I have always found it difficult to paint small. It's got nothing to do with the fact that drawing is a more 'throw-away' activity than painting. I felt that if I could make some kind of breakthrough on a more intimate scale then I would have a lot that I was looking for and could learn from.
These represent a series, though within a fairly short space of time, don't they, these particular drawings we're looking at now?

Yes. Well, none of them go back to the beginning obviously, but I think that that drawing -

**Fig. 47**

Yes, and there were several drawings of that sort, although that's the only one left. I did try, quite unsuccessfully for some time, to literally translate some of the drawings into paintings, until I realised that I was making a great mistake, that what I should try to do was work within the spirit of the drawings - so that the kind of emotional, felt tension which was emerging in the drawings could surface quite naturally in the paintings.

And drawing does this for you in a particular and unique sort of way - I mean, this is one of the elements of the medium of drawing that you particularly appreciate is it? The fact that you can work these things out within a scale that you can manage and that you can actually begin to explore these tensions through the particular graphic means that drawing offers. Would this be true?

Yes. Obviously I feel now that this is just as successfully done in the paintings. But in the beginning, it was something that was quite unique to the drawings. It took a long time to achieve this in the paintings as well.

These drawings are nonetheless things in their own right aren't they? They're not preparations for paintings in the sense of sketches or work-outs.

Oh, yes, yes. I think that each one of these drawings is as independent as a painting. In fact, there are very few of the drawings which have things in them which have surfaced as a literal transposition in any of the paintings. I mean, I have felt that there are certain sorts of things going on in drawing that I do want to explore further in a painting - such as the recent drawing 'A Day Out'. In fact, I have done a painting which has the same title, but the painting is incredibly different from the drawing.

Yes, I've seen it. Can we talk for a little while about the element of gesture which is obviously very important within the figurative concern of the drawings? Can you say where this comes from, where it arises? Why is it that you are particularly interested in the gesture of the figure?

Well, I think that the more obviously expressive areas of the human body are the face and hands. And it interests me, the way that these two areas of the human body have been depicted, going back to pagan ritual ceremonies where sometimes make-up and masks were used to transform the identity of a person, to induce a kind of belief in something other than who that person actually was.

Another kind of persons?
Yes, and in a much more subtle, in a much more devious kind of way, I think this kind of thing still goes on in our society. I think in our relationships with one another, we still function very much in this way, we're not that sophisticated.

So we're reading signs all the time, from each other, that are often at a kind of subliminal level, but they're none the less recorded in our overall awareness of the person's mood and their feeling and our reaction to it. Would you accept that?

Very much so, that's got a lot to do with what interests me. I falter a little because I feel it's very easy to get into an area where you are, perhaps psychologising and I don't know a great deal about that, I only know what interests me and where I can find it in the art of the past and in the thinking of the present.

Would you agree with me if I said that these drawings could be considered as narrative or would you be happier with them as descriptions?

Perhaps depictions would be a word I'd be happier with, although the way that people want to designate, the designation of what they are, it doesn't interest me a great deal. I am interested in, as I am discussing things with you now, in clearing up any misunderstandings which I feel quite strongly about. But as to how people respond to the drawings and paintings.... I acknowledge the fact that there will be a lot of different kinds of reactions to what I'm doing and I regard that as healthy.

The worst that could be said would be that they would be 'illustrations' - because that would be furthest from their whole orientation and intention wouldn't it?

Yes, I think that would be a gross misunderstanding. I don't think I'm talking in a way that would suggest my ideas are 'illustrations' of anything. I think I'm discussing them as explorations of situations which interest me, figurative situations which interest me.

That's very important, I think. The other thing is the figurative situations that interest you always seem to have some element of confrontation, some element of relational concern. In other words, there are very few of these drawings that actually give an indication of one figure in isolation that obviously has to do with gesture doesn't it? Interaction between figures within this space that you've been describing?

Yes. I should say that I often start with one figure but I feel it will never stay at that - being about one figure. Because what's interesting is what that figure can do when it's confronted with another figure. I feel that the work can be seen in two ways. There are some things which are very strongly theatrical - the drawing 'Manœuvres' for instance, is quite strongly theatrical in its aspect and the other thing obviously is the confrontation.

But a confrontation that doesn't necessarily have a literary kind of sense about it - it's a confrontation that actually emerges within the visual sense of the drawing isn't it?
Oh yes.

That brings us to the point of the titles of the drawings and earlier you were saying that these don't occur first, they emerge subsequently as the drawing develops. Would that have a bearing on your exploration, not only of the confrontation situation between figure and figure but also the way the idea of that begins to crystallise into something that you can give a name to?

If I can go back a little bit, the answer I gave before was in some ways unsatisfactory. I feel that what happens is that in the beginning these images are very much like shadows in their ebb and flow, in the way they resist coming out into the light. At other times there is a more fluid interaction, there is quite a lot of movement and this is a very exciting time. Exploring further the various dimensions which the confrontation between the various images have, can become very prolonged and difficult. Now I hope that what I have said so far doesn't give the impression that I have a kind of philosophy which I turn to in each piece of work I do. I don't really have a very clearly defined philosophy. I feel that everything one does is somehow sign-posting one's own life and, I expect in many cases, the situations that develop are an elaborate cover-up, in a sense, for things which one feels very deeply, but can only be expressed in an oblique way.

And in this sense can only be expressed in a particular and unique way.

Yes, I think so.

Yes, so in a sense, when you talk about a philosophy, you're not trying to 'say' anything through these drawings, you're hoping that, in fact, the drawings will illuminate areas that can't be 'said' in any other sort of way. That's really what it is isn't it?

Right. Yes, yes.

I mean, if you could say what it was that was going on, you'd write about it wouldn't you?

I would.

You'd cast it in another kind of direction altogether.

Yes. Having said that, there are various areas of twentieth century painting where the connection between the visual and the verbal has always intrigued me. I mentioned Beckmann earlier, I think at certain stages of the way that my work has developed other artists would come to mind, ... it's almost impossible to function as a figurative artist today without acknowledging the fact that Kitaj exists, and one of the appeals, I think, of his work has been the fact that there is a strong affinity with other forms of art. In a totally different way Guston would be another example. In theatre I would cite Beckett and in cinema, Bresson.
Other forms of expression really.

Other forms of expression.

Yes, that tension that arises between the linguistic sense of what the thing is about and the visual sense of what the thing is about is something very important to you, isn't it?

Yes, it is.

Because you title the drawings after you've made them, in order to clarify something that has already occurred visually within the drawing, but you're giving it another kind of dimension by giving it a title.

Yes.

Do you think sometimes the title can get in the way?

Well, it obviously doesn't for me, because I never feel that a piece of work, whether it's a drawing or a painting, and I only do drawings and paintings, I never feel that a piece of work is complete if it doesn't have a title. Usually the titles are pretty straightforward, there's nothing bizarre about them. They are about simple things, everyday activities and I think that's an important point to make because at a superficial glance I think that the esoteric appearance of things can be misunderstood and the title is meant to place the idea in its proper context. The drawing 'A Day Out' is basically about three people, and I felt the necessity to draw and paint the images in the way that I did because that was the only way to get at the kind of tensions, the inner tensions of the situation. I mean it wasn't possible to get at that kind of point by showing the figures in detail - noses, eyes and so forth, I felt to bring that essential drama out as strongly as I possibly could it was necessary in fact to conceal them.

Yes, so what is actually mysterious in the sense of these figures is what is actually consciously concealed by the way in which you have made them. Do you do this in a conscious kind of way?

Oh, yes, yes. There's no attempt to mystify, I want to make that very clear. There's absolutely no attempt to mystify. I insist that everything I do is about, basic ordinary situations but I always felt there was more to that ordinary kind of activity than people have been able to express in painting, a psychic dimension that has humour as well as pathos.

And this kind of extraordinariness that is within the ordinary is really what it is that you are exploring in these images isn't it?

Yes.

It's that element that is not stateable but nevertheless is felt.

I feel as a painter, it's only possible to express this kind of thing visually, the strong feelings of tenderness or aggression that develop between the figures is something that has to be faced up to and here
I'm hesitating because I do feel that in figurative painting today there is an awful lot that is being skipped. In many ways I think there's nothing easier than doing painting with figures, but to do paintings that say something about those figures is something else entirely and I don't know many artists today who are really doing this in an interesting way, in a way that is actually related to the time we live in and yet at the same time accessible to people.

GB Yes, it's giving sense and objectivity to something which emerges between people, but giving it an objectivity that's cast in a new kind of form. I mean, somebody like Beckmann for example, would give an objectivity to the interaction of figures in a particular sort of way through almost a kind of super objectivity, through the realism of the figures themselves.

WJ Yes.

GB How you are interested in that kind of objectivity are you?

WJ I'm interested in it but I don't, well, I was going to say I don't use it. I think that's fair enough, yes, I don't use it ... I feel that I am functioning most of the time in an objective way in the sense that I've become increasingly conscious of the expressive possibilities of the materials I am using. It's very easy to use materials, paint and so on in a predictable kind of way that does nothing to deepen one's sensitivity to the essential subject matter.

GB Yes, Surface is very important isn't it - in these drawings?

WJ Yes, it is.

GB Can you say why?

WJ Because, although the actual activity never really occupies the whole of the area I'm working on, nonetheless, I think the drawing or painting is about the whole of that area, and I think the ideas that I have in relation to that area, do have a kind of texture, I mean there is a sort of texture to my thinking which demands a response in terms of the materials I'm using.

GB Yes, so in graphic terms you can find some kind of solution to that continuing situational problem really. You talked about the texture of your feelings, which I thought was very illuminating because these drawings have a direct access to that kind of thing through their own surface don't they?

WJ Yes. They're all done on the kind of paper which allows a certain amount of exploratory activity to go on and I develop a very intimate kind of relationship with the surface I'm working on.

GB The interest that you have in interaction and in this human drama has to do with another kind of thing which is a sort of theatre of human experience, isn't it? Can you say anything about the kind of space that these drawings have which is a kind of indication of this theatre, this arena in which these things occur?
WJ Can you say a little more about that?

GB Yes, the sort of space that is brought about through the interaction of these figures is a kind of arena, isn't it - in which these things are being acted out. And that has a kind of theatre feeling about it, that's important isn't it?

WJ Yes. It's a thing I accept. What came to my mind then was the attachment of the word 'arena' to the abstract expressionist notion, as expressed eloquently by Harold Rosenberg, of the artist working in the context of an arena, the actual canvas itself being the arena in which he functions. I am just trying to express really the difference between that kind of thinking and the way I would see it. Possibly, it does come down to the way I work. I very rarely work 'in the dark' as it were, and perhaps this is where the difference lies. At the end of each day that I work, I'm hopeful of some sign of light, that there is something there to come back to, very often there isn't and there are times of extreme depression in doing this work, but I don't think that it ends up... for me anyway, none of the things that I do end up as depressing.

GB Earlier you spoke of the genesis of these drawings beginning from one figure and then their development and subsequent articulation of the particular feeling that it was you were trying to achieve, arrived not only as you worked out tensions that were within the figure you were making but also as you began to work out into the space surrounding the figure and by making another figure set up a kind of dialectic, a dialogue between them and the space within them.

WJ Yes, and that obviously involves being completely aware of the whole area I am working on. Yes, the drama is as powerful in the way that the figures circulate, move within this space as it is within the figures themselves. Sometimes, this sort of spatial drama, is dictated very strongly by a gash of colour and the way it forces attention onto a contour and the way that contour leads the eye into the total drama. This kind of concern is so much a visual one in front of the object that I find it difficult to express in words. I think one of the reasons why there is less colour, although there are some paintings which use colour very powerfully, very strongly, nonetheless, one of the reasons why most of the work does tend to move between areas, degrees of grey is that that's how things are, shades of grey, and they work at their best when the conflict between atmosphere and activity is held in a very fine balance.

GB That is very specifically a visual concern isn't it - the connotation of greyness through the articulation of the drawing which is fundamentally cast in that way, because of its graphic nature is something that is very particular to the feeling of the drawing isn't it?

WJ Yes.

GB Did you develop this as a particular aspect of the drawing or did you discover it as it were as being part of the nature of drawing itself?

WJ No, I discovered it as something which I, well... let's go back a little bit, I think once I had discovered the surface... the sort of paper -
we are referring now to the drawings. Once I had discovered the kind of surface that I could work with the next step was to explore the power of images and the prophetic reality of space that were unique to working on that surface.

B But this greyness is not lack of clarity is it? That's what I'm saying.

J I hope not.

B This greyness is a positive attribute, that actually contributes to the feeling doesn't it?

J Yes.

B Because you were saying that feelings are like that.

J That's true. In the same sense that in this discussion there are areas where one is being very tentative and other areas where one is being very positive. It echoes, I feel, very much the way that I work.

B And these drawings are really visual explorations of that ambivalence, aren't they?

J That and other things yes. That's certainly a strong feature of them.

B And this kind of tension that we were talking about is partly due to kinds of ambiguities that we are picking up through the drawings. Would you say that was true?

J I feel that without actually using the word I've been talking, discussing the concept of ambiguity all along. The fact that it is impossible for me to get interested in an art which is so declamatory that it says it all for you...I'm interested in the viewer finding a way into these things for himself, some space in them that he can occupy even if it's only for a short space of time. That's a notion that comes back to what you were saying earlier about the theatrical and, I would say meditative nature of the work.

B Is there a kind of despair, a kind of ennui within this space that's created? Are you making a comment about the fragility of human experience?

J I'm sure that comes into it. Although it's not my intention to be as specific as that, I realise that it's inevitable and can't be avoided.

B But that is a very real part of their content isn't it?

J It is for a lot of people, it obviously is for you.

B But would you accept that that is part of what the ambiguity of the drawings is about, because you were saying earlier, the necessity of the role of the spectator in terms of these drawings...because that's also a kind of tension, that's also a kind of drama isn't it?

J Yes, yes, it is. Could you say what you mean by ambiguity?
By ambiguity, I am not really meaning lack of clarity. I am really meaning the kind of space you allow someone to work in and feel their way through which is being prompted by the sense of the drawing that the role of the spectator in respect of the drawing is in fact being allowed for.

Yes, right.

That's what I mean, because you said earlier you didn't want to say it all so that there was nothing left to be said and it's that area of ambiguity which I think is one of the richest elements or characteristics of these drawings.

Yes, that is much clearer in my mind now. My interest really is in the fact that I am actually offering people something - when the drawings and paintings are on view, you can go back the next day, and perhaps something different happens, the feelings you had the day before become enlarged. Conversely it could be that you get a big disappointment, it isn't what you thought it was.

But your interest is very much in the evoking isn't it?

Yes.

In the bringing into focus of these particular kinds of senses, particular kinds of feelings - that's what you're offering.

Yes, if I can come back to the point I made that I felt this particular area was largely ignored in painting today. The fact that I feel that makes me all the more determined to try and do something with it myself. I'm interested that Klee, back in 1909 was saying that he would 'now dare to tread once more the original ground of psychic improvisation. With a link to an impression of nature now only quite indirect, I may once more give shape to what is actually weighing on my soul. To note down experiences which could translate themselves into lines in complete darkness. This is a potentiality for original creation which has long existed - interrupted only temporarily by the timidity caused by isolation. In this way my essential personality will be able to speak, to free itself with the greatest freedom'. Well, Klee said that and it stands up. I feel that the way twentieth century artists have been interpreted, and their achievements analyzed ... is depressingly academic and I also feel that many have been neglected because they represent a challenge which is not acceptable to the academic mind - it's really being left to the painters, other painters to gradually work to a point where the balance is redressed, where the real quality and breadth of what's happened in the twentieth century will eventually be seen in its true richness and depth.

And it's that kind of self-knowledge really that these particular experiences as expressed through these drawings are seeking to uncover isn't it?

In my own modest way, yes, that's what I'm trying to do and obviously I'm speaking about now, this moment in time. I can only see it going on at present because I'm excited and still very involved in all that I have spoken about. I don't really think about the future very much, I think one lives with the possibilities that are open now.
GB So it's really an exploration of this kind of Beingness that these images are about isn't it? Not something that's yet to come, or even an exploration of the past, but something that really is of now.

WJ Yes, but in saying that, I don't want to be misunderstood. We don't have any perspectives on what is happening to us now, the only perspective we have is what we've learnt from the past. I speak of the past in two ways, in the deeply personal sense of myself and also the past as uncovered by other artists.

GB This would be what one would talk about in terms of the kind of 'truth' of these images... their efficacy, would you agree?

WJ I think it's easier for somebody else to say that than for me. You see that again is a statement and I'm not really given to statements a great deal. I know I've quoted Klee, but he was a marvellous diarist and the quotation I felt to be particularly apt. I find it difficult to respond to statements... I think remarks are really more interesting.

GB Asides.

WJ In some cases, yes.

GB When there isn't actually a posturing.

WJ Yes.

GB When there's a revelation occurring beneath that posturing in a sense.

WJ Yes, I think where the person is leaving room for a note taking to take place rather than a kind of dialectic.

GB Yes, yes, and that's, in a sense, what these gestures deal with in the drawings, don't they?

WJ When they are precise. I very often change drawings, not because I don't like what they look like at the time, but because that precision is missing, I haven't been able to pin down the precise nature of a particular feeling or gesture. It could be a very fine thing, or it could lead to a complete transformation, a complete reappraisal.

GB Wynn, thank you very, very much. I think the discussion has been enormously illuminating in terms of the potency that lies within these images themselves.
GB What do you find useful, looking back through the process photographs, that you find valuable? You were saying earlier that what, for you is important about the drawing, is the kind of dynamic that's going on in the making process. The making process for you is very important isn't it?

WT Yes it is, the activity ...

GB The actual business of bringing the image together ...

WT Yes, right from the very first marks. I expect really it's ... it's just got to be a complete building process, building up, taking away, because I think that any image is illusive anyway and the nearest way you can come ... I don't think I ever draw anything as it is because I don't think anything is anything for long enough to be drawn that way. But I think you can come to some kind of consolidation of ... It's like what Philip Rawson calls a 'gestalt', you know there is ... somebody put it in a very good way - like when you meet someone, it was in a film yesterday, you meet them as a personality, you don't start examining their eyebrows, you know - that's it really. There is, I think, a vital image which confronts you about anything, if it's a person or anything which is the only real thing which you can hang on to and it's not ever complete but it's made up of many, many different, little oscillations of vibrations, changing ...

GB That's really interesting. Do you find that when you first come to drawing from the model for example, as these drawings are about, you see that, as it were, right at the beginning or is it something that emerges for you as the drawing goes on?

WT Well, when I first come to draw from the figure, I know ... I know it from the beginning, because I get an enormous excitement and I ... know there is just going to be a way of doing it and it isn't a way that I could preconceive and it would be different tomorrow but I know that the feelings the same. I suppose it's a question of different application, that's all really ... like it's so much to do with atmosphere as well.

GB So that drawing in a sense is a coming to a realisation of this, through the means of the drawing itself. You might see it, but in the end the drawing has to make it, has to coalesce with the same kind of feeling that you have of the image as you see it from the beginning.

WT Yes.

GB ... and the whole process of the drawing is perhaps a bringing of this coalescing together is it?

WT Yes, definitely ... that's a good way of putting it.
GB So you're constantly trying to find graphic equivalents, end marks and means to kind of formulate this image, so it begins to actually happen from the drawing.

WT Yes that's right, to take on its own form of energy and dynamic and I think ... I suppose to ... just use anything, any mark, any .. and not a mark that corresponds with the figure but one that corresponds with a way of saying what the figure is like ... about ... so really it's not of the figure at all.

GB No, and yet it's important for you to draw from something, isn't it?

WT Oh yes. I mean without ... it could just be a black sort of scribble, but if it hasn't got ... if it isn't absolutely one hundred percent content to me then it, I couldn't even do it anyway. I think there has got to be that sensating, like in those Turner things, you don't know if they're to be a tree or a person on the beach or a bit of a log, but you know that Turner knew and they're done in a way with such conviction that they exist completely in their own way and I think that's ... so to say that it doesn't matter whose in front of you, or ... anybody could be, but once that person is in front of you then it's not anybody, that's what I mean.

GB How much of this, Wendy, has come from your own background as a sculptor because you began really in sculpture, didn't you?

WT Yes.

GB You were talking about the forming process, the formulation process in your drawing. Has your drawing a lot to do with the way you worked in sculpture and the kind of plastic sense you developed there?

WT Yes, the thing is though, I did start with drawing and I started drawing very large physical things, so I was already reaching for some kind of plastic sense, but they were very much surface drawings to do with texture and all sorts of ... they weren't from the model, they were from myself, but they were bringing in, I suppose I did them in front of things. Now, I always want to work from life, I don't mean directly but I mean when I did these drawings they were completely from myself and they became very obsessive in that way, but I was always looking for that kind of, sort of plastic sense and when I started making things I found that it wasn't the physicality, the physical object that I wanted to make but the physicality I suppose and that's why ... it did, the sculpture helped me enormously, coming to terms with that and realising then that I was trying to disintegrate forms and that this physicality was far more powerful than the drawing or the sculpture.

GB So this physicality doesn't have anything to do with the illusion of three dimensions or anything like that ... 

WT Oh no, no.

GB It's a kind of core thing, isn't it?

WT Yes, it is.

GB That perhaps goes back to what you were saying about the image and is
GB this thing that you sense, is this part of the excitement that you
sense when you begin a drawing, say from the model or from something...

VT That physical ... oh yes, definitely. I would think it's also my own
physical excitement that I'm projecting probably, I suppose in a way I
don't think I could be objective, you know.

GB How do you mean?

VT Well, I don't think it could exist in drawing; I don't think it does.
I've thought about this a lot and I don't think anyone can be objective.
You know even people who say they are doing very objective drawings, I
think it's always projection to some extent.

GB Yes, so you really can't say, unless you're a machine that you can stand
outside ...

VT like a camera, like a camera would yes.

GB Yes, so really what you find exciting about drawing is the way that you
interpenetrate things ...

VT Interrelate yes. I think that's it really, it's about relationships,
points of contact - electricity (laughter).

GB And things out there, in the world, you don't see them as 'objects' then -
just as objects.

VT Oh no, never, I never see things as objects. I see everything ... I
always think of things in relation to other things. Because ... I mean
like ... if you go out ... I remember going to the Lake District once
and seeing ... there was a beautiful lake and mountains and the sky changed
and I was a long way from the lake so to me it was just visual anyway and
the sky went black so the lake took on the black and it looked like lead,
or sludge or molten metal or something and the mountains became covered
in mist and they were only drawn in, they had no mass and this kind of
perceptive turn around ... I felt that was absolutely wonderful, that
was the key really, I realised it was all about relationships, you know,
because the sky being like that.

GB Yes, and the whole drawing process for you is in a sense about finding
ways in which you can ..., not clarify the 'objectness' of objects in
a kind of physical-optical sense, but really illuminate the relationship
between objects ...

VT Yes, yes.

GB So the kind of ambiguity that objects have, the way they can change their
appearance and give a different sense is part of what you're doing, isn't
it?

VT Yes ... I think, yes in the way that you change towards them, not they
change and the way ... well, I think that's what's so enormously exciting,
nothing's ever the same, nothing ever ends, it's just that relationships
keep altering.

GB Yes. Where do you come in a drawing when you leave it and you say 'that's
it I've got it', you know - do you ever get to that point?
VT Yes. I think it's a very fine balance and I mean I think these drawings are slightly overworked, but then I wanted to overwork them, in the photographs ... that turned out more important and the end product, I suppose never is ... I mean that's not why I do it. I suppose it's coming to terms all the time, I mean, that's what you do - that's what life's all about - it's just basically a coming to terms with what's in front of you ... I know when it's just right because things do have a balance.

GB And looking at the process photographs is there a point in those where, you know, you said perhaps the end product might have been overworked ... is there a point where you feel you could have left it and from the record that the photograph gives that would have been the point which was right?

WT Yes, yes there is definitely I would have said it was bang in the middle (laughter).

GB (laughter) Right in the middle? Of the long one of the model sitting on the stool? (Fig. 64, frame 37A)

WT Yes, I would say probably after a day which is quite strange because the next day it wasn't quite right, maybe I should have carried on with it for another week you know - but I would say it came to the point, back in this drawing - the balance ...

GB That's No. 30 on the first day, isn't it? (Fig. 64)

WT Yes the balance - like the background or the ambience around her was as strong as herself and afterwards when she became stronger it's not quite right although the shadow there (turning the pages as she talks) balances it out.

GB On No. 24 on the final day, the second day. (Fig. 67)

WT You see ... I always have to do that if something gets too strong like a figure, that I need to relate to something straight back, outside the figure, like make immediately a shadow or make a tree or a bird. I think it's all a matter of balance ...

GB Yes that's interesting because it means that the process is as much taking away as it is adding, isn't it?

WT Yes definitely. I think that ... I think to generate any kind of power for me it's got to be a process of opposites always. I mean in my mark-making I always look for things - I don't consciously look, but over the years I have built up a way of drawing so that I can tack on to anything that I need - it could be a dot or a squiggle or a blue line, I don't know, it just could be a million things but that it's extremely opposite to the next thing that I put down - that's so important to me to get some kind of tension and I suppose in a larger sense it's exactly how I feel ... once you get outside the figure, it's how I feel about the environment, it's got to have the same ... it is important ... I mean ... if I could make ... I like to make air solid you know, I like to put a solid mass round figures, you know, I think maybe that's again, talking about a relationship between the figure and ... I know air isn't solid, but what goes on between things is you know.

GB That's interesting Wendy, because it points to something which perhaps
these drawings are about - we've talked about interrelationship and so
on, and balance - space is enormously important, isn't it?

Yes.

But not space in the trite cliche of illusion ...

No, no.

But a space that is tangible ...

Charged, yes.

That's what really you're talking about isn't it?

Oh yes, definitely. But I think that's the only way ... it's like ...
I'm really interested in negatives, you know, I only draw half-positive.
I suppose that's why I like that figure there, because it's only half-
positive.

No. 30 yes. It's the yin and yan, isn't it?

Yes, I can see the opposites, without negative, positive is just valueless
you know.

This goes back to what you were saying earlier about subjectivity and
objectivity doesn't it. There's a balance between the two ...

Yes.

Subjectivity is felt into objectivity and objectivity comes back into
subjectivity - but the tension is what's important, isn't it, between
the two?

Yes.

And that's what makes the dynamic, isn't it?

That's right, yes.

And that's what in a sense you have been talking abo ut as the core of
your drawing sense - the tension that comes out of that relationship.

Yes, I think it is that, I'm sure it is. It's not A and B, but it's the
distance between A and B that I am drawing really and it's a way of getting
there and back.

How important, therefore, is the mark to you?

I think it's absolutely vital - you see it is always a question of complete
opposites because I think the mark has got to be absolutely right. I think
you have no second chance and I think the mark ... if each tiny mark isn't
right then the whole thing won't be right, so that has to be absolutely
critical, so the thing isn't loose really, it isn't arbitrary.

But you're not always conscious of that are you?
WT Oh no, not at all, I think no ... I couldn't work at all if I was conscious of my mark making. I think if you thought of every word you spoke you wouldn't be able to think of what to say, would you?

GB Right, right, so it only comes subsequently?

WT Yes, the recognition does, so it must be unconscious.

GB Yes, so really, in a sense, you're bouncing back of these marks that you're making and tuning your sense finer and finer to this kind of framework, this kind of constellation that you're making and then moving forward within that kind of sense that's coming ... it's very difficult to put into words because the drawing says it much more than words can do.

WT Yes, that's a good way of putting it, in fact, I'm ... I've often thought it's a bit like ... it's awfully akin to say theatre, you know, where you get your piece of paper, like you set the stage and then you start to play the part and the whole thing starts to hang together.

GB And that's what pushes you on always in drawing? That kind of potential that's coming back from that is the spur to move forward again?

WT Yes, it is always in co-ordination with that ... that you know inside, of that image that ... I call it an image - that energy pattern or whatever it is. I think I started off by saying it didn't matter what you did and I still agree with what you say, but I do think ... I'll sort of amend that by saying it isn't arbitrary at all.

GB There is a logic about it.

WT Oh yes, I think so definitely.

GB But it's not a logic you can work out in advance it it?

WT No ... although you can like sharpen all your tools (laughter). You can prepare everything in advance. I think that's why I love the whole thing really so much, because it's so ... it calls on powers of challenge and intuition and sort of survival things - it's part of the whole excitement.

GB Yes. Then is drawing particularly an important means for you to say this?

WT Because it's absolutely immediate. To me, because I'm visually, enormously moved visually, it's the only way I can make symbols to express a feeling. Mark-making I'm sure is absolutely ... has a basic symbolic significance and I think it's mark-making that's the basic, stripping away everything - in a way that you can get down exactly how you feel and it's got to be fast for me because as I say it's about things that are constantly changing.

GB Yes, I think the kind of immediacy thing is probably the closest that one comes to why drawing offers this sort of entry.

WT Yes, I suppose so, I suppose immediacy also means vitality and honesty - you certainly can't make it up.

GB Yes, there's a kind of unequivocalness, isn't there? Once you've made it, it stares you in the face.
WT That's right, you've got to come to terms with it immediately.

GB So really you're talking about a complete kind of dialectic aren't you, that's going on all the time and you're trying to find that within a process of change and counterchange? That for you is the dynamic of drawing?

WT Yes, because I think it's ... life, you know. I don't think I could ever divorce art from life, nobody could, it's ridiculous, but, it's not reporting, but it is in a way. It's not reporting in an illustrative way but I suppose it is in a perceptive way all the time - reaffirmation and reconsideration - like you do all the time, you've just got to.

GB Is the subject matter important to you, by that I mean what the drawing is about?

WT Yes it is ... let's think. No, I don't think it is actually (laughter). I was going to say yes it is, because I always choose my subject matter, but then when I've been told to draw, you know, earlier, it's never mattered. No, I don't think it matters what you draw.

GB So the subject matter is actually coming out of the drawing itself?

WT Yes.

GB That's the real subject matter, isn't it?

WT It is. The drawing - the relationship is what matters. No it doesn't matter what you draw or where you are. In fact, that's remarkable - when I first realised that there was a wonderful feeling of freedom. I think that's got something to do with it. You see, I think it's so many meta-physical things, I mean I've been trying to think, like sort of trying to think of logical reasons, but there's so many reasons bound up that are about things like freedom, ascending material ... you know - physicality ascending the flesh, if you like, spirituality, I think that's why I do it actually.

GB And the image gives you that freedom to move?

WT Yes it does, that's right.

GB Because it's not tied to things in the world - it actually transcends.

WT Yes it does, that's right, that's the word I was looking for.

GB And that image that you are striving for is what you are trying to encapsulate or hold within the drawing itself aren't you?

WT Yes.

GB But not screw it down, but give it freedom to move.

WT No, that's right.

GB So that you can move with it.

WT Yes, that's a very good way of putting it, yes I think that is it ... I suppose it is still about that relationship ... what you make, yes it
WT it transcends, yes it does, it transcends limitations, what's real, what is there.

GB And for you, drawing is sharpening all of that perceptual ability to reach that.

WT Yes, yes. I think ... as somebody once told me and I think it's very good advice, like Rembrandt - it isn't what he put in his drawings but what he didn't put in, that's what the drawing was about. I think that must sum it up really for me, that the marks I make are there to catch what isn't there really - they're just signs; I suppose that gets back to the symbolic thing again.

GB Yes - anything else you want to say Wendy?

WT Yes, (laughter) I can't think of anything else at the moment.

GB Terrific - thanks very much.
GB Feliks, I'd like to start by asking you what kind of description is going on in the drawings that you are making. It's not illustration, but it is a kind of description, what sort of description is it?

FT Well, I feel I have to open the whole subject with an establishment of the frontiers of your interest because my work goes in many directions and spreads itself, as you know, towards the ultimate which is the vast environmental panoramic painting and that really, I think, is beyond your problem. I think you are, and let's establish this and put it down on record, you are interested in my mostly linear drawing which is entirely connected with the function of myself as an eye-witness, as it were. In other words, I wander through my experiences and I note them down. So it's a straight action from the eye to the hand, to the pencil, to the paper or whatever; and this is really the area you want to talk about. But I also think it necessary to state that this drawing 'in action' is not self-contained; the whole of my work feeds on life and this notation is my natural harvesting which later serves the synthesis of my painting. Only some of these notes - drawings - may 'come out' and deserve an existence on their own merit - and many of these found their way into print, they're mostly in my 'Chronicle' and books.

So now, when we have established all this, we can return to your question: the description, the word you use, is naturally embedded in those drawings, that kind of drawing, because there are other drawings that I do which come out of my imagination, or are sketches preparatory for compositions. So this kind of drawing is derived or comes into existence out of facing reality. Therefore, it is in its essence a descriptive drawing but with one correction, all important, that I'm not setting myself, as many artists do, to 'copy' nature, to 'copy' the existing scene in front of me or to take the extreme case, where they sit down on a stool and carefully draw, and we are talking of drawing now, but even in drawing, under an umbrella and whatnots spread, draw for hours, enumerating every element, every window, everything which they see, mostly drawing static scenes, static landscapes, because that's somehow within their capabilities and hence within their interest.

I am after really being responsive to the atmosphere and, putting it roughly, to action, to movement and to character of things. And so to speak, in the round - scanning the whole circle of vision, not just the cut-out slice in front of me, but immersing myself.

GB So really you're not so much an observer, as an interpenetrator; you're somebody who not so much faces reality as allows reality to come in and search you as much as you are searching it.

FT I think you put it very well.

GB That's the kind of inter-reaction that you have.

FT True, I simply yield myself to the situation and then I work almost automatically; all this is instinctive and not deliberate. I am not trying to pass on a message. I'm receptive and I work, let's use a simple and innocent word 'seismographically', in other words, I react to the rhythm
and motions and clashes of living. So the result is unpredictable and I watch it forming on the page with some surprise and it is sometimes puzzling to me as it may be to anybody or as the reality itself may be.

GB So really, Feliks, the kind of space that you're dealing with is not the kind of mathematical space that we were talking about earlier when you were talking about delineation and marking off points and so on; it's a space which is really beyond that, isn't it? It's a space that's emerging as you're exploring your reaction with reality, with what's round you and so on.

FT I would add this, that because my drawing is both instinctive and unpredictable, although it springs from reality, it isn't a copy of reality. In fact, there must be a starting point to creative process, in painting and drawing: a colour-pattern, a still-life, a tale from mythology, a human face, a landscape. So my starting point is predominantly amassed humanity in movement and conflicts, but as gathered human beings with characteristics of shape, of costume or whatever; but I am not documenting it, I am leaping off that, bouncing off that into the realm of linear creation - that is even before I move into painting.

GB Yes, so the reality is, in fact, directed by the line, very, very specifically in your drawing.

FT Well said.

GB The line, I remember reading that Bernard Shaw said of you, "He only uses line" and then he added, "but what a line"; and I wonder if, in fact, all the way through your career, that is why drawing, for you, has been of such importance because of its linear characteristic and so on.

FT I must say, just in brackets, that something similar was said not by Shaw but by Augustus John. But I think what you said stands, it is correct. So to finish that point - possibly going beyond that point, my drawing reaches almost absurd selectivity, when, as often, I would sit in a moving car and going through a moving crowd and scribbling continuously, thus either getting a sketch-book page composed (I repeat: instinctively, at speed) of elements selected over some distance, or several pages forming a sort of action-strip. In fact, if I stopped to draw carefully, placidly, then I would tend to do, by my standards, a bad drawing.

GB There's a very strong element almost of the pre-reflective in what it is you're doing, isn't there? Where you're not reflecting and then deliberating, but you are allowing this image to occur spontaneously and being as surprised by what is happening on the paper and that, in a sense, is structuring what it is you're seeing.

FT Indeed, yes, because in a way that seismographic or instinctive reacting to the scene round me adds up to a certain essence of that reality. So I am told, people react to those scribbles of mine stating that they offer some penetrating truth; they can read into them and out of them a variety of information or even points of view, which I didn't attempt to offer.

GB No, that perhaps shows the kind of universal quality that they might have; that they can actually structure other people's experiences for them in a way which surprises you. They read through your drawings and they enter into the world of your drawings, as it were, and find for themselves the same kind of echoes.
FT Well, I feel I have to produce some sort of counterpoint at this juncture, because it's not true if, from what I said just now, we build a picture of a complete medium, or a complete zombie who simply scribbles in a trance. Of course, I am a human being with some sort of intellectual powers and some preconceptual blinkers and opinions and, of course, those play their part and I suppose, now and again, when I select, I probably select partly because something strikes me as being in character, worthy of dragging out from what I see onto the paper. So there is that element, that definitely. But I am sure that the maximum of the result is given through this yielding to the scribbling situation.

GB This description then - how much of it involves social or political comment?

FT That more or less superficially I touched on just now when I said that I have my normal human set of reactions, intellectual assessments, opinions. However, I am not terribly concerned with them when I am facing my 're-reportage' situation - reportage in inverted commas. So the elements of that sort of comment slip in. Slip in or seep in?

GB Seep.

FT Seep in, you know because ...

GB They colour, they tone ..

FT Yes, of course, unavoidably; but they are not dominating. In other words, I would not do what the cartoonist does, where he offers a political comment and justifies it by his distortions; or a social realist who tries to propagate some point of view. Incidentally, my distortions serve to emphasise character, not to mock.

GB So you're closer to Daumier than you are say to a cartoonist who is making another kind of comment?

FT If I understand you, I would agree, yes. Because Daumier was mainly, I imagine, stimulated to draw by gesture, by characteristics, by human comedy (his light-shadow formal intensity was the means, not the aim), and not by dogmas, principles, political convictions. Of course, these would come out, because he was, as a political cartoonist for engaged in commenting regularly on the very dramatic period for France.

GB For you Feliks, did this really begin when you were a war artist?

FT That's a good question. I didn't think about it, but possibly you are right because it developed then, yet I should think that it was there, but it became more conscious and pure; in other words I matured through the challenges of wartime.

GB That was the platform for all of your work in the 'Chronicles' and so on - the kind of documentation of the human condition worldwide was something that really fired you, as it were - from that whole situation.

FT Yes. I think it's probably correct because I have been rather playful in my earlier years and wasting a lot of my time and my gift on shallow journalism and illustrations; on draughtsmanship that was not sufficiently digested, however it may have been accepted by the public. But war induced the seriousness for me which concentrated me on reality and, in fact, indeed you are right, because during that period I ceased to draw
FT from memory or redraw my sketches. Because I was tending before to develop sketches, to work them up. And then I simply began to realise that as soon as I touched up, as I ceased to rely on my instinctive initial line, I spoiled the draughtsmanship, I spoiled the impetus of the creative draughtsmanship. So I really began during the war to rely on the drawing as it came instantly from under my seismographic scrutiny and never went back to that sort of thing.

GB I've heard you say, and you have been quite annoyed sometimes, when people talk of your drawing as 'gestural', now this is quite untrue isn't it? Because the gesture you are talking about really is nothing to do with something that comes from nothing as it were. It's something much more positive than that, isn't it?

FT I don't remember the annoyance, but you are right in what you say, because I would accept in myself, if one looks for ancestors, a link with the draughtsmen of the East, of China and Japan, who were gestural draughtsmen, but they were tremendously, not so much controlled, as trained, and made gestures that were unerring, because they wanted, in their gestures, to render precisely movement and character.

GB It's a philosophy really of being in union with the world rather than being just an observer outside the world, isn't it?

FT Yes, yes. Even more; the gesture, say, in the modern tradition of abstract art, the gesture of the kind that Pollock would apply, is a corruption, a flight from reality, part of that development in art which started to fear the image; so gesture became at one point, particularly in American abstract expressionism, an ideal - and they would fling the paint and consider that painting was achieved because it had freedom - but freedom from human creativity, thus, being like a gesture of nature, like rain falling; it had, in consequence, certain charm and freshness but very little content. While the Easterners would have a purpose.

GB You said 'fear of the image', which I think is very interesting, could you say a little bit more about that?

FT This is a vast theme and possibly not our theme because it's really what was happening in consequence of the general tendency of modern art, of the logical development away from the pictorial tradition into establishing painting as independent abstract performance - as an object in itself. And so the image became a dangerous taboo to such an extent that even that element which remained for a long time and still existed in modern art as 'La bellepeinture', the brushwork, the textural marks of the artist's touch and bravura was eliminated and the avoidance of any effect of human hand became more and more dominant. Of course, by now the tide is turning, but who cares about tides (laughter): I've never been following the vagues of the day. I have kept on being true to myself, that is to my natural gifts and private (not modish) exploration.

GB The drawings that we are looking at of the inauguration of Pope Paul had a very special significance for you, didn't they? Not only because he is a countryman of yours and in the light of recent happenings in Poland and the joy with which he has been received, there is obviously a deep felt feeling. Can you in any way summarise your feelings to the commission?

FT I do not want to sound a cynic, but I would question all those elements
FT because they, with your forgiveness, everything you said just now tends to sentimentalise the issue and I am not a sentimentalist. And, as you can see from my work, as you can see from contact with me - I am tending to be sharp-eyed, as it were; if one is looking for some sort of adjective, some sort of pointer to what I am as an artist. So I fear sentimentality, and possibly I never touch landscape because landscape turns in me a sort of sloppy quality of worship, of adoration which simply is not my metier.

GB That's very clear. How did you approach then this particular thing that you had to do?

FT In Poland of the twenties and the thirties, that is in my day, in my youth, the young people of all classes were moving away from religion very steadily; and now - I know masses of people of so-called education who being educated are set unavoidably outside religiousity and so the Polish acclaimed Catholicism is really an outlet for patriotic need to protest begun under Hitlerian occupation - of finding the feet of independence as it were, in other words, Catholicism is not a pure thing there. Really, all in all, I really ... Maybe I'm toning down my feelings, but, although I don't deny my ties with Poland, I am sure I went simply because I was very curious, because I was given this opportunity and because my ingrained 'eye-witness' mania pressed, but there was no ... maybe it was suppressed subconsciously, but there was no saccharinish feeling at all. I say 'saccharinish' - I don't deny my ties with Poland, which, however, find expression more often than not in impatience and irritation - the usual family syndrome.

GB So when we look at the drawings - the ones you did of the Pope, particularly the ones where you were able to come fairly close ... 

FT Well, fairly close. I had all possible facilities, through the British Legation to the Holy See, who were very helpful and gave me passes on the diplomatic level. But even with these I wound myself pretty far from the centre of things because the diplomatic seats were embracing the Royals, the Presidents, the Ambassadors and the wives. So this parade of vanities between me and the Ritual served nicely and I simply went on drawing what I saw; but because the ceremonies were prolonged and often very static, I could use now-and-again my Japanese one-eye 'lorgnyon' thing held in one hand while drawing with the other which was very difficult and uncomfortable but still the only way to get a close view of the Pope.

GB Now the drawings of the Pope that you did are mostly in charcoal, do you find that medium ... 

FT Not only no, they are a mixture. I had with me various materials, but when it came to balancing myself on one foot on a chair with crowds pushing at the public audiences which I attended during the next days, well then, then, of course, there was only one single drawing material I could muster and it would be charcoal as the swiftest. But those more complicated drawings, you will see, are in mixed media, used where I could sit and have things on my lap. As it happened (I have no rules and habits) these were biros, markers, pencils, charcoals, coloured pastels and pens.

GB Which is an important part of their whole sense. Not only is the media mixed but the images are superimposed and there's a kind of collage of images across the whole page.
FT Quite, yes.

GB This is important in the way that you're seeing it and also important in what it is you're trying to say about it. Are these preparations for paintings?

FT Oh, no. I didn't draw them with such a definite idea, no. I drew them straight from the shoulder, as I said earlier, as is my usual reaction to reality. I was noting down, but colour was an important part of the whole occasion. So I pushed in colour. What you call collages were often a sort of double-take, as it were. For instance, the one which we are looking at now (Fig. 83) happened to have been the result of a very nasty mix-up (laughter). Namely, at a big audience when I had got a very ambitious - well forward ticket, I began to draw - the Pope didn't appear yet, but the platform was full of ecclesiastical celebrities and I settled to draw them from that comparatively good position; and I had been leaving central space on the page for the Pope about to arrive. And then I was attacked by brutal heavies, the Vatican is full of heavies in civilian clothes (laughter) who claimed I was in the wrong seat and I must move back, but in the meantime the whole place was completely filled up. So I quarrelled, struggled, protested, gave various arguments and though they saw what I was doing, they were just bloody brutish and so while quarrelling, I gained time to finish what I could. And then eventually they almost physically pushed me out of the chair. Luckily, a friend who was with me, a Roman, foresaw the outcome and secured two seats much, much further back, but safe. So then, when the Pope entered, I put him into the drawing, as I could see him from my distant seat, in a vague outline.

GB The gestures that the Pope made in his various activities, did they interest you and were they part of what it was you were trying to say about the Pope in this particular situation?

FT You know, that I don't calculate, I don't preconceive, I don't propose to prove something in my drawing - I draw. But of course, he moves, the action is there and is important and I try to grasp it. Because of the difficulties I had with this eye-glass and things, I really felt more secure with the drawings that were embracing larger scenes. Although some, like this one (Fig 77) I consider rather satisfactory, because it emanates a certain mood and carries it through movement and somehow sums up the theme; what I'm saying though, comes a posteroiri, when perusing, sorting out the results - to say the obvious: many drawings fail utterly, or appear to be inferior to others. When I looked at this drawing, I saw the value of it. In other words, I hadn't looked at, that is taken in, the drawings while drawing them - only later. So amongst those which give the cardinals coming up the steps for a blessing and an embrace by the Pope, there were two or three (Figs. 78/9) which had intensity, possibly more than the rest, because these, for instance, (Figs. 81/2) are very static and, although very accurate, somehow, don't offer enough. But then, this drawing (Fig 85) which was a more distant view, which led to that group which I pointed to earlier, somehow oozed that particularly intense feeling permeating the whole ceremony. While those utterly different, those crowded ones (Figs. 86-94) I also rather like ...

GB Because what we can't get here, is that you also used colour ...

FT Colour, yes, very much so - and I rather like then - but as decorative, well, acrobatic pieces, as it were, offering my ability to give costume
FT shape and crowding, but they are somewhat dry emotionally. The pro-
cessional one, which is somehow well-liked, was a very rapid scribble
rushed through while they were moving away at the end of the ceremony -
which is possibly the closest to purity of gestural drawing, because
having fought against time, this drawing contains the minimum of line
and the maximum of gesture, offering again those two elements which
seem to come to the fore in my linear work: character and movement.

GB Feliks, thank you very much indeed.
APPENDIX II:
PREFACE TO FIGURES

1. Notes on the contributors.

David Cowley. Potter. Trained as a painter. Now teaches in the
Ceramics Department and in the Fine Art Department at Goldsmiths
College School of Art, London. The drawing presented was done over
a period of two days (2 x 5 hrs.) in the studio at St. Martin's School
of Art. The photographs were taken from a distance of about 4 metres
using a telephoto lens (see technical notes below).

Arthur Di Stephano. Painter. First-year student at the Royal College
of Art, London. Completed his graduate study in painting at Goldsmith's
College School of Art, London. The drawings presented were done over
a four-week period in his studio space at the Royal College of Art
and photographed at a distance of about 3 metres using a telephoto lens.

Wynn Jones. Painter. Works in London and teaches at the Byam Shaw
School, London. The series of drawings included here were from an
exhibition of his work at the 'House' Gallery, Regents Park Road, London.
Wendy Thompson. Painter. First-year student at the Royal College of Art, London. Completed her graduate studies in sculpture at Nottingham College of Art. The drawings presented were done over a four-week period in her studio space at the Royal College. Drawing 6 (Figs. 55 - 58) took a day and Drawing 7 (Figs. 65 - 68) was done over two successive days. They were photographed from a distance of 4 metres using a telephoto lens.

Feliks Topolski. Painter. Currently working in London on an 'environmental' painting, based on events during his life-time. He is perhaps best known for his 'Chronicles' which commented on and documented important world events. The drawings presented here are from a series commissioned by the Italian Government on the occasion of the inauguration of Pope Paul II in the Vatican (1978).

2. Technical notes.

The photographs were taken with a Praktica ITTL 3 camera using a Pentacon telephoto lens (2.8/135) on a tripod. The film used was Ilford HP4 and the negatives printed on Grade 3 single weight paper.

The sequence photographs are to be read from the top left-hand corner downwards and from left to right.
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